Modelling the potential impact of a water market in the Berg River Basin

dc.contributor.advisorVan Schalkwyk, H. D.
dc.contributor.advisorBackeberg, G. R.
dc.contributor.authorLouw, Daniƫl Barend
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-08T06:59:38Z
dc.date.available2017-05-08T06:59:38Z
dc.date.issued2001-01
dc.description.abstractEnglish: An increasing number of economists believe that market mechanisms should be incorporated in water allocation policies. It is widely recognised that central planning as an economic system has been inefficient. In fact, it is impossible to plan efficiently from the centre, and the bigger and more open the economy is, the more impossible it becomes. The literature abounds with models for analysing alternative water allocation mechanisms. However, the positive mathematical programming (PMP) technique, which was introduced in this study, to calibrate the regional water market, is a relatively new approach. Modelling of water markets in South Africa has received very little interest in the past. This is probably because formal water markets were not permitted in the old Water Act (1956). The new National Water Act (1998) makes explicit provision for the transfer of water rights. However, the rules and procedures for introducing water markets have not been stipulated. To date no attempt has been made in South Africa to develop methodologies to simulate water markets. According to the new National Water Act one of the most important tasks of Catchment Management Agencies (CMA's) will be to design water allocation strategies for each of the major catchments in South Africa. This study contributes to enhance the capacity of water authorities to make economically sensible water allocation decisions. Without a market price, there is little or no incentive to use water efficiently. True pricing will lead to highest-value uses (e.g. drinking water and the production of high value products). Creating incentives for the most-valuable economic use of water will provide certainty; increase supply for more efficient uses, and create an even playing field for all water users including natural systems. There are legitimate concerns that the market mechanism per se will not guarantee equity. Government therefore has an important role to play in ensuring that the rules and procedures exist to deal with externalities. The secret is to achieve a balance that involves interfering in the market mechanism without jeopardising the proper functioning of water markets. The functional organisation for policy-making, water allocation, water management, and monitoring of users, plays an important role in the implementation of a sustainable water development system.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractAfrikaans: 'n Toenemende aantal ekonome glo dat die markmeganisme 'n deel van 'n waterallokasiebeleid moet vorm. Dit word algemeen erken dat sentrale beplanning as ekonomiese sisteem ondoeltreffend is. Dit is onmoontlik om sentraal doeltreffend te beplan en hoe groter en oper die ekonomie is, hoe meer onmoontlik raak dit. Die literatuur bevat talle voorbeelde van modelle om alternatiewe waterallokasiemeganismes te simuleer. Die positiewe wiskundige programmeringstegniek, wat in hierdie studie gebruik is om die streek se watermarkmodel te kalibreer, is 'n relatiewe nuwe benadering. Modellering van watermarkte in Suid-Afrika het tot dusver nie groot belangstelling gewek nie. Die rede hiervoor is waarskynlik dat daar binne die ou Waterwet (1956) nie voorsiening gemaak was vir die instelling van formele waterrnarkte nie. Binne die nuwe Nasionale Waterwet (1998) word daar wel voorsiening gemaak vir die verhandeling van waterregte, maar die reƫls en die prosedures is nog nie uitgespel nie. Tot op datum is nog geen poging in Suid-Afrika aangewend om metodologieƫ te ontwikkelom watermarkte te simuleer nie. Volgens die nuwe Nasionale Waterwet is een van die belangrikste take van die Wateropvanggebied bestuursowerhede die daarstelling van 'n waterallokasiestrategie vir elkeen van die vernaamste wateropvanggebiede in Suid-Afrika. Hierdie studie lewer 'n bydrae om die kapasiteit van waterowerhede te verhoog om sodoende ekonomies sinvolle waterallokasiebesluite te kan neem. Sonder 'n markprys vir water het gebruikers min of geen insentief om water te bespaar deur dit byvoorbeeld meer doeltreffend aan te wend nie. Indien die prys van water gegrond is op die waarde daarvan vir die gebruikers sal die gebruik van water by die hoogste waarde aangemoedig word (byvoorbeeld vir drinkwater en die produksie van hoƫwaardeprodukte). Deur insentiewe daar te stel vir die mees ekonomiese gebruik van water, sal nie net sekuriteit vir gebruikers geskep word nie, maar sal daar ook meer water beskikbaar wees vir gebruike waar water die doeltreffendste aangewend word. Die markmeganisme verseker verder dat daar 'n gelyke speelveld vir alle gebruikers is, insluitende die ekologie. Daar is rede tot kommer dat die markmeganisme nie altyd gelykheid sal verseker nie. Die staat het 'n belangrike rol om te vervul om te verseker dat daar reƫls en prosedures bestaan vir die hantering van eksternaliteite. Die geheim is om In balans te vind, wat staatsinmenging in die markmeganisme behels sonder om die doeltreffende funksionering van die mark te benadeel. Funksionele organisering vir die opstel van beleid, waterallokasie, waterbestuur en die monitering van gebruikers speel 'n belangrike rol in die implementering van 'n volhoubare waterontwikkelingsisteem.af
dc.description.sponsorshipWater Research Commissionen_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11660/6183
dc.language.isoenen_ZA
dc.publisherUniversity of the Free Stateen_ZA
dc.rights.holderUniversity of the Free Stateen_ZA
dc.subjectWater use -- Economic aspects -- South Africa -- Berg Riveren_ZA
dc.subjectWater-supply -- South Africa -- Berg Riveren_ZA
dc.subjectThesis (Ph.D. (Agricultural Economics))--University of the Free State, 2001en_ZA
dc.titleModelling the potential impact of a water market in the Berg River Basinen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
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