Huber, natural law and the reformational basis of the iurisprudentia universalis
dc.contributor.author | Raath, A. W. G. | |
dc.contributor.author | Henning, J. J. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-08-21T06:49:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-21T06:49:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-12 | |
dc.description.abstract | English: Ulrich Huber's work, De Jure Civitatis, contains the first serious effort to apply the Reformational perspectives on natural law to the field of Public Law. Not only did he integrate the perspectives on natural law with his views on Public Law generally, but he used the idea of natural law as the basis for jurisprudence as a whole (iurisprudentia universalis). In his opposition to the natural law theories of Bodin, Hobbes and Pufendorf, Huber maintained the perspective that law and justice cannot be seen as the products of utility or be determined simply by their usefulness. To Huber the principles of good and bad, lawful and unlawful, just and unjust, are based on immutable principles superceding human manipulation. For these reasons, Huber emphasises the fact that natural law is not the product of man's reason, but is based on the eternal will of God. However, man is able, with his reason, to determine the will of God from its revelation in God's moral law. In effect, then, God's eternal law is the fundamental source of natural law. As such the validity of natural law principles are not subject to an agreement among men, or to the principles of civil law, but they precede the state and the authority of government. Not only do these precepts of natural law apply as normative provisions to all elements of Public Law, but also to the rights of man (among others to life and property) irrespective of the nature and composition of the state. Huber's response to Hobbes's natural law theory in particular, highlights the importance of establishing the principles of law and justice not susceptible to the manipulation of political authorities and government authority. As such Huber's theory of natural law was not only an important contribution in his own time, but he postulated an alternative which may serve as an essential corrective in legal systems where the formal notion of the state subject to law, does not penetrate to the level of informing the material idea of the law state in a fundamental sense. | en_ZA |
dc.description.abstract | Afrikaans: Ulrich Huber se werk, De Jure Civitatis, bevat die eerste ernstige poging om die Reformatoriese perspektiewe op die natuurreg op die terrein van die Publiekreg van toepassing te maak. Nie alleen het hy sy perspektiewe oor die natuurreg met sy siening oor die Publiekreg in die algemeen geïntegreer nie, maar hy het die idee van die natuurreg gebruik as basis vir die regsleer as 'n geheel (iurisprudentia universalis). In sy teenkanting teen die natuurregteorie van Bodinus, Hobbes en Pufendorf, het Huber die perspektief gehandhaaf dat reg en geregtigheid nie gesien kan word as die produkte van nuttigheid of bepaal word slegs deur hul bruikbaarheid. Vir Huber is die beginsels van goed en sleg, regmatig en onregmatig, regverdig en onregverdig, gebaseer op onveranderlike beginsels wat menslike manipulasie te bowe gaan. Om hierdie redes beklemtoon Huber die feit dat die natuurreg nie die produk van die mens se rede is nie, maar gebaseer is op die ewige wil van God. Die mens is egter deur sy rede in staat om die wil van God uit die openbaring van die Morele Wet te bepaal. In effek is God se ewige reg die fundamentele bron van die natuurreg. As sodanig is die gelding van die beginsels van die natuurreg nie onderhewig aan 'n ooreenkoms tussen mense of die bepalings van die burgerlike reg nie, maar dit gaan vooraf aan die staat en die regeergesag van die owerheid. Nie alleen geld hierdie voorskrifte van die natuurreg as normatiewe bepalings vir al die elemente van die Publiekreg nie, maar ook vir die regte van die mens (onder andere op lewe en eiendom) afgesien van die aard en samestelling van die staat. Huber se reaksie op Hobbes se natuurregteorie in besonder, beklemtoon die belang daarvan om beginsels van reg en geregtigheid te vestig wat nie onderworpe is aan manipulasie van politieke owerhede of regerings nie. As sodanig was Huber se natuurreg-teorie nie slegs 'n belangrike bydrae in sy eie tyd nie, maar het hy 'n alternatief gepostuleer wat as 'n noodsaaklike korrektief kan dien in regstelsels waar die formele konsep van die staat onderhewig aan die reg, nie deurdring tot op die vlak waar dit die idee van die staat in 'n materiële sin bepaal nie. | |
dc.description.version | Publisher's version | en_ZA |
dc.identifier.citation | Raath, A. W. G., & Henning, J. J. (2005). Huber, natural law and the reformational basis of the iurisprudentia universalis. Journal for Juridical Science, 30(2), p-30. | en_ZA |
dc.identifier.issn | 0258-252X (print) | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2415-0517 (online) | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11660/997 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_ZA |
dc.publisher | Faculty of Law, University of the Free State | en_ZA |
dc.rights.holder | Faculty of Law, University of the Free State | en_ZA |
dc.title | Huber, natural law and the reformational basis of the iurisprudentia universalis | en_ZA |
dc.type | Article | en_ZA |