'n Kritiese ondersoek na dronkenskap as verweer in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg
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Viljoen, Marina
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University of the Free State
Abstract
Showing abstract in English
English: A person commits an offense if there is behavior on his part that matches all the
elements set out in the definition of the crime, such conduct is unlawful and
accompanied by the necessary culpability. Thus a person's actions have to comply with
the elements of a crime namely legality, conduct, causation, unlawfulness, criminal
capacity and culpability. Alcohol can influence a person in different ways for example
even excluding a person's criminal capacity or culpability.
The problem now arises as to how criminal liability is affected by the intake of alcohol
and how the defence of voluntary intoxication should be dealt with in our law.
Before the case of Chretien it was not possible to raise the defense of voluntary
intoxication. After the decision in Chretien the legal position regarding the defence was
as follows:
1. If a person is so intoxicated that he can not act voluntarily then he can not be
convicted of any crime;
2. It is possible in extreme circumstances that a person's criminal capacity can
be excluded which leads to him also not being criminally liable for any crime;
3. Intoxication can even exclude general intent.
The public was not satisfied with the outcome of the Chretien judgment and demanded
that a less lenient approach be followed. The Legislature intervened and promulgated
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988. The most important changes to the
position regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication after the commencement of this
Act can be summarized as follows:
1. When the accused is so intoxicated that he could not perform a voluntary act,
in terms of the Chretien descission, he can not be found guilty on the main
charge. He will however be guilty of contravening section 1 of Act 1 of 1988;
2. When the accused is so intoxicated that his criminal capacity is excluded he
will also in terms of the Chretien decision not be found guilty on the main
charge, but he will be guilty of contravening section 1 of Act 1 of 1988.
3. When the accused is intoxicated enough to exclude his intention but not his
criminal capacity, he will in terms of the Chretien descision not be found guilty
of the intent-crime. He will also not be guilty of contravening section 1 of Act 1
of 1988 because this situation is not covered in the wording of the Act.
However, if he is accused of a crime that requires intent and his intoxication
excludes such intent, he can still be found guilty on an alternative charge that
only requires negligence.
4. An accused's intoxication will not exclude his culpability where the element
required to prove is negligence. Instead an accused's intoxication can be
used to prove his negligence.
Even after commencement of Act 1 of 1988 there are still many loopholes in our law
concerning the defence of voluntary intoxication. The approach of both Canada and
Australia are studied in this research with the objective of comparing their respective
positions with the approach to the defence followed in South-African law and making
suggestions on how to improve our law.
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Keywords
Act 1 of 1988, S v Chretien, Section 33.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code, S v Johnson, Voluntary intoxication, Culpability, Loopholes, Non-pathological criminal incapacity, Statutory intoxication, Burden of proof, Drunkeness (Crime) -- Law and legislation, Drinking of alcoholic beverages, Alcoholism and crime, Criminal law, Dissertation (LL.M. (Criminal and Medical Law))--University of the Free State, 2013