Modale universaliteit

English: Universality and individuality are two irreducible traits of entities. In this regard Armstrong is correct in his assumption that individuals and universals exist in states of affairs. Through the relation of instantiation it is possible to see universals as identical elements present in states of affairs. The types (kind) of things are made possible through universals. Universals are modes of being. Propositions are the way things are and relations is the way things stand in relation to other things. Universals cannot be unified with individuals. The phenomenological viewpoint states that the instantiation of universals can be seen as a quality which is not universal. This is unacceptable. The trope-theory is also in this regard wrong, because a trope is viewed as an individual, an instance of its universal. In following Strauss, qualities and relations as instantiated universals cannot be individual. It is only possible to t21 k about the specification of the universal. Hence it is impossible to talk about modal individuality, but only about modal specificity. Nominalism, platonism and conceptualism are associated with finity, denumerable infinity and non-denumerable infinity. It is not possible to count the totality of all sets of positive integers. Hence the platonist conclude that non-denumerable sets exist. Constructivism believes that it is not the existence of non-denumerable sets that makes counting impossible, but rather the mental incapacity to construct a precise idea of the totality of all sets which defines counting. Wang did not recognize the modal dimension of reality, neither did he recognize the antecipatory and retrocipatory direction of the modal aspects of reality. This is the reason why he did not recognize that the non-denumerable infinity is a regulative numerical anticipation in space. We could divide Hale's discussion of the singular term in three themes. The first deals with a syntactical criterium of the singular term. This means that the identification of a singular term occurs on grounds of patterns of conclusions with (first level) existential generalization as basis. The second theme deals with the singular term and the functional term where the functional term could be associated with a proper noun. The understanding of the functional term depends on the recognition of a functional relation which includes the chosen object of the singular term. Modal universality was implicitly recognized in the division of objects in different categories. Explicitly modal universality was never recognized. The third theme deals with the distinction between abstract proper nouns and the predicate. This distinction reflects the distinction between law and law-likeness. The distinction between abstract and concrete involves the tension between olatonism and the nominalistic causal epistemology. The problem is that a omnipresent causal theory of truth is checked by the numerical and spatial aspects of reality. Godell presupposed this when he made a distinction between mathematical knowledge and perceptual knowledge. The causal theory of knowledge doesn't have a total reference to mathematical truth. In the reformational philosophy Stafleu tries to impute individuality structure on spatial figures. This argument ls untenable, because numerical and spatial figures are modal subjects and contains modal universality in its orderliness. Modal subjects cannot be reduced to typical structures. It is prominent how Stafleu did not succeed to denote structure-typicity of the modal subjects. One of the most important points in Hale's view of a sortal concept, is that this concept is grounded in the relation of similarity. Equivalent classes and equivalent relations play an important role in the identification of abstract objects of the same sort. The sorta! concept can be associated with modal universality with similarity as the ground-relation. Van Fraassen's identity and conclusion problem could be solved when the modal dimension of reality could be accepted and the association of law with second-order universals could be denounced. The distinction between law and events and the necessity-relation are presupposed when dealing with the identity and conclusion problem. Modal laws can be obtained through abstraction and not through induction. Perception of a modal aspect does not occur through an empirical-inductive process, because every generalization already implies the meaning of the relevant modal aspect. Fowler and Van der Walt's point of view, namely that God's creation order is unrecognisable, does not reckon modal universality. Together with this, the coherent problem of concept and idea is ignored. Modal terms can be used conceptual or in an idea context. The meaning kernels of the modal aspects exceed conception and is therefore regulative for the use of concepts. In this regard, there is already a rational link between God's creation order and our knowledge thereof. This knowledge is however of a regulative foundational kind (i.e. idea-knowledge). In the history of philosophy modal universality has come to the fore as all-embracing denominators. But sadly the boundaries of the different modal aspects were not recognized. This is called reductionism and it caused the problem that phenomena could not be explained properly. The Pythagoreans for example believed that numericals were the all-embracing denominator of reality. The heaven (ouranos) was viewed as harmony and number. The invention of the irrational number showed the shortcoming of this viewpoint. The hypotenuse of a rectangular triangle cannot be presented with a finite whole number. The mechanistic viewpoint believed that mechanism was the only route to the understanding of nature. Helmholtz was the first to use the energy concept as central mode of explanation of nature as a whole. The important consequence thereof is that the sensual phenomenon of factual conclusions was not good enough for the explanation of principles. The a priorical modal dimension of reality embraces every facet of our experience which means that our experience cannot be reduced to the psychical aspect of reality. The numerical aspect is for example the condition for us to experience numerical relations, etc. In biology we find the one-sidedness of the nominalistic theory of descent and the realistic structural idea (morphology). The first-mentioned induces a chaotical blend which makes the taxonomical classification of living entities impossible or completely arbitrary. The idealistic morphology is platonistic. A person do not have to be an idealistic morphologist to be convinced that the systematics of the natural system must form the foundation of the theory of descent. The significance of Stegmuller's concept of a theory is that the mathematical core of a theory refers implicitly to modal universality. This core-structure cannot be falsified and is denoted by Stegmuller as an abstract 'gegenstande'. That which is abstract, contains similarly the property of universality. There also exists an implicit discontinuity in Stegmuller's concept of a theory. It has to do with the nominalistic association of the empirical with concrete individuality. Stegmuller does not make a distinction between the boundaries of the kinematical and physical aspects of reality. Furthermore, the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms implicitly denotes the boundaries between the spatial aspect and the physical aspect (e.g. in the classical partical-mechanics spatial terms are denoted as non-theoretical).