Electronic hacking and subversion as tools of foreign policy: a neoclassical realist analysis of cyber power

Abstract

This study develops a new theory of cyber power as a tool of foreign policy, focusing on sovereign states as the unit of analysis and drawing from the theoretical assumptions that are inherent in the realist paradigm of International Relations. This theory describes and classifies the nature of cyber power in international politics, and seeks to explain why different states make differing choices about which cyber strategy to adopt. The study introduces a conceptualisation of cyber power that incorporates both computer hacking and social media disinformation campaigns within a single framework, in which both types of cyber operations are understood as methods for degrading and destroying trust. It then analyses the utility, limitations, and costs associated with technical and persuasive of cyber power, and argues that both forms require the attacking state to accept significant trade-offs. This suggests that states are unlikely to use these tools unless they have pressing reasons to do so. Building upon on this insight, the study then develops a new typology of four cyber strategies: “restrained”, “technical-aggressive”, “persuasive-aggressive”, and “combined-aggressive”.

It hypothesises that cyber strategy selection by states is primarily determined by two independent variables: their external security requirements and their institutional preferences. States with high external security requirements are more likely to make aggressive use of technical cyber power, while states with negative institutional preferences are more likely to make aggressive use of persuasive cyber power. This theory provides a parsimonious and compelling explanation for cyber strategy selection. To test and apply the theory, three empirical case studies are conducted on Brazil, the United States of America, and the Russian Federation. The findings reveal that Brazil has adopted a restrained strategy, while the United States has chosen a technical-aggressive strategy, and Russia has selected a combined-aggressive strategy. These empirical findings are congruent with the expectations of the theory. Lastly, the theory is applied to predict how the cyber strategies of these states might evolve if their associated independent variables were to change. The resulting analysis suggests that the emergence of multipolarity in the international system is likely to be associated with the increased use of both technical and persuasive cyber power by state actors. ___________________________________________________________________

𝑨𝒇𝒓𝒊𝒌𝒂𝒂𝒏𝒔 Hierdie studie ontwikkel ’n nuwe teorie van kubermag as ’n instrument van buitelandse beleid, deur te fokus op soewereine state as die eenheid van ontleding en die teoretiese aannames te benut wat inherent is aan die realistiese paradigma van Internasionale Betrekkinge. Hierdie teorie beskryf en klassifiseer die aard van kubermag in internasionale politiek en poog om te verduidelik waarom verskillende state verskillende keuses maak oor watter kuberstrategie om te aanvaar. Die studie stel ’n konseptualisering van kubermag bekend wat beide rekenaarkrakery en sosiale media-disinformasieveldtogte binne ’n enkele raamwerk insluit, waarin beide tipes kuberbedrywighede verstaan word as metodes om vertroue te verminder en te vernietig. Dit ontleed dan die nut, beperkings en koste van tegnologie en oortuiging van kubermag, en voer aan dat beide vorme vereis dat die aanvallende staat beduidende afwykings aanvaar. Dit dui daarop dat dit onwaarskynlik is dat state hierdie instrumente sal gebruik, tensy hulle dwingende redes het om dit te doen. Voortbouend op hierdie insig, ontwikkel die studie dan ’n nuwe tipologie van vier kuberstrategieë: “beperk”, “tegnies-aggressief”, “oorredend-aggressief” en “gekombineerd-aggressief”.

Dit veronderstel dat state se keuse van ’n kuberstrategie hoofsaaklik deur twee onafhanklike veranderlikes bepaal word: hul eksterne sekuriteitsvereistes en hul institusionele voorkeure. State met hoë eksterne veiligheidsvereistes is meer geneig om van tegnies-aggressiewe kubermag gebruik te maak, terwyl state met negatiewe institusionele voorkeure meer geneig is om van oorredend-aggressiewe kubermag gebruik te maak. Hierdie teorie verskaf ’n skraapsugtige en oortuigende verduideliking vir kuberstrategie-keuses. Om die teorie te toets en toe te pas, word drie empiriese gevallestudies oor Brasilië, die Verenigde State van Amerika en die Russiese Federasie gebruik. Die bevindinge toon dat Brasilië ’n beperkte strategie aangeneem het, terwyl die VSA ’n tegnies-aggressiewe strategie gekies het, en Rusland ’n gekombineerde-aggressiewe strategie gekies het. Hierdie empiriese bevindinge stem ooreen met die verwagtinge van die teorie. Laastens word die teorie toegepas om te voorspel hoe die kuberstrategieë van hierdie state kan ontwikkel indien hul geassosieerde onafhanklike veranderlikes sou verander. Die gevolglike ontleding dui daarop dat die ontstaan van veelvuldige-polariteit in die internasionale stelsel waarskynlik geassosieer sal word met die verhoogde gebruik van beide tegniese en oorredende kubermag deur regeringsmagrolspelers. ___________________________________________________________________