Financing rebellion: the Rhodesian state, financial policy and exchange control, 1962-1979

English: This thesis examines the history of finance and exchange control under the Rhodesian Front (RF) government between 1962 and 1979. Outlining the background to Southern Rhodesia’s incorporation within Britain’s imperial network from 1890 to 1962, the study’s primary focus is on how the Colony emerged from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 to reconstitute a financial system capable of operating independently from Britain. The Rhodesian case study illustrates the antagonism between British financial interests and colonial financial policies. The political impasse over the Rhodesian question centered on finance as a tool of coercion by London, and conversely, as a rebel bulwark against the metropole. Following UDI in 1965, financial and economic sanctions were imposed by Britain and subsequently the United Nations (UN). The various settlement negotiations that ensued were unsuccessful in stopping the rebellion until the Lancaster House Conference in 1979. The process whereby Rhodesia survived sanctions by the use of financial measures supported by strategic political alliances and trade arrangements with South Africa and Portugal is clearly examined. It was not until the escalation of the guerrilla struggle in the 1970s that the rebel monetary system began to buckle. The study traces the measures taken by Britain and the UN to end the Rhodesian rebellion, including the effects this had on London as well as the geopolitical implications for Southern Africa, notably South Africa and Zambia. It utilizes primary material from Zimbabwean, South African and British archives to determine the different strategies involved and their effects on Britain and Rhodesia. The thesis also discusses the extent to which broader international events influenced developments in Rhodesia, for example, the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system in 1971, the oil shock in 1973 and the global economic recessions which they triggered and their effects on the Colony. Central to this analysis is how Salisbury’s financial administration was coordinated by a Ministerial Economic Coordination Committee to sustain the different elements of the Rhodesian rebellion at different stages until a point was reached when the only option was compromise at Lancaster. Not limited to an examination of the effects of sanctions, the thesis is a study of a neglected area of Zimbabwean and general economic history: colonial financial systems in their transition to a postcolonial state.