Tracing some consensus regarding pre-scientific frameworks in philosophy of science

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Abstract

English
The wide and sophisticated terminology of contemporary philosophy of science seemingly points toward a multitude of different pre-scientific frameworks (for example, worldviews, philosophy) directing our scientific investigations. This study, however, illustrates forms of consensus between the views of various prominent twentieth-century philosophers of science on the characteristics and functions of pre-scientific frameworks in scientific activity. It specifically highlights various helpful insights offered by reformational philosophy as its point of departure. This study finds that, on the pre-scientific level, fundamental motives and worldviews are usually recognised as pre-theoretical frameworks – with specific characteristics and functions – influencing scientific investigation. Reformational notions such as ‘ground motive’ and certain definitions of ‘worldview’ that did not originate in the context of ‘philosophy of science’ are introduced with a two-fold purpose: to establish a fruitful dialogue between reformational philosophers and more recognised philosophers of science, as well as to better equip us to trace what their views have in common.
Keywords
English
Philosophy of science