Towards an ethical approach to statelessness and the right to have rights

Abstract

In ’n toenemend geglobaliseerde wêreld, waar nasiestate deurslaggewende komponente is wat die struktuur van die globale gemeenskap vorm, verteenwoordig staatloosheid ’n beduidende mislukking binne die internasionale samelewing.1 Waar, in ’n wêreld wat uit state bestaan, pas ’n staatlose persoon? Dit lyk asof sulke mense nêrens “behoort” nie en in die oë van die wet bevind hulle hulself dikwels onsigbaar, asof hulle nie bestaan ​​nie.2 Alhoewel daar bewonderenswaardige pogings deur die internasionale gemeenskap was – saam met sekere individuele nasiestate – om op die kwessie van staatloosheid te reageer deur middel van verskeie veldtogte, asook die inwerkingstelling van talle internasionale/nasionale wette, duur staatloosheid en die probleme wat daardeur ontstaan ​​steeds voort. Uit die staanspoor word kennis geneem dat die primêre fokus van die internasionale benadering tot staatloosheid rondom die konsep van wettige nasionaliteit gedraai het, spesifiek deur nasiestate aan te moedig om te verseker dat hul nasionale wette in lyn is met die internasionale wette wat ten doel het om die beginsel te handhaaf dat elkeen die reg op ’n nasionaliteit het. Alhoewel daar geen twyfel is nie dat sommige lande steeds onvoldoende nasionale wette het wat staatloosheid veroorsaak,3 is daar ook lande wie se nasionale wette meer as voldoende lyk (en wat hulself dikwels op konsepte soos menseregte, gelykheid en diversiteit roem) wat ten spyte hiervan, steeds ’n prominente staatlose bevolking binne hul grondgebied het, en steeds nuwe gevalle van staatloosheid het wat voorkom.4 Net so het die humanitêre reaksie, met sy veldtogte en beloftes om staatloosheid te beëindig, ook nie heeltemal in sy doelwitte geslaag nie. Die voortbestaan ​​van staatloosheid bevraagteken dus die doeltreffendheid van beide die internasionale regsbenadering sowel as die humanitêre reaksie op staatloosheid tot op hede en laat die vraag ontstaan: Waarom, ten spyte van omvattende internasionale (en nasionale) wette, bestaan ​​staatloosheid steeds? Die erns van die gevolge van staatloosheid is beide diepgaande en wydverspreid en as sodanig is die versuim om dit uit te roei ’n groot kommer.5 Daar is dus ’n behoefte om moontlikhede te ondersoek buite die dominante benadering wat tot dusver geneem is. Namate staatloosheid en die kwessies wat daarmee gepaardgaan, voortgaan om deur generasies heen te sirkuleer, ontstaan ​​’n behoefte om die doeltreffendheid van die huidige benadering te herevalueer. Daar is ’n gevolglike onsekerheid oor of die kwessie van staatloosheid ooit volledig opgelos kan word deur bloot meer wette, verdrae en aanbevelings te formuleer, en of daar iets anders is wat inherent ontbreek in die huidige benadering. Dit is in hierdie konteks dat Hannah Arendt se idee van ’n “reg om regte te hê”6 ’n waardevolle vertrekpunt kan bied om die ingewikkelde subtiliteite te ontleed wat die huidige benadering nie voldoende aanspreek nie. Met verwysing na die internasionale inisiatiewe ná afloop van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog om ’n universele verklaring oor menseregte op te stel (wat uiteindelik gelei het tot die UDHR wat ons vandag ken), voorsien Arendt dat sulke pogings steeds net binne die grense van staatsgesentreerde internasionale reg bestaan ​​en dus nie daarin slaag om voldoende sekuriteit te bied vir ’n reg om regte te hê nie.7 Met inagneming van die beduidende en wydverspreide maatskaplike koste daaraan verbonde,8 is die wetlike, praktiese en etiese noodsaaklik om staatloosheid uit te skakel nie in dispuut nie. Alhoewel die dominante benadering ’n verskeidenheid regstegnieke gebruik het, is praktiese aspekte rondom kwessies soos behoort, marginalisering en etiese oorwegings egter nie so wyd ondersoek nie.

In an increasingly globalized world, where nation-states are crucial components that form the structure of the global community, statelessness represents a significant failure within international society.¹ Where, within a world made up of states, does a stateless person fit? Such people do not seem to “belong” anywhere and in the eyes of the law, often find themselves invisible, as though they do not exist.² Although there have been admirable attempts by the international community, along with certain individual nation-states, to respond to the issue of statelessness through various campaigns as well as the enactment of numerous international/national laws, statelessness and the problems that arise because of it, still subsists.

From the outset, it is noted that the primary focus of the international approach to statelessness has revolved around the concept of legal nationality, specifically by encouraging nation-states to ensure that their national laws are in line with the international laws that aim to uphold the tenet that everyone has the right to a nationality. While there is no doubt that some countries still have inadequate national laws that cause statelessness,³ there are also countries whose national laws appear more than sufficient (and who often pride themselves on concepts such as human rights, equality and diversity) who despite this, still have a prominent stateless population within their territory and/or still have new cases of statelessness occurring.⁴

Similarly, the humanitarian response, with its campaigns and promises to end statelessness have also not completely succeeded in its goals. The continued existence of statelessness thus calls into question the efficiency of both the international legal approach as well as the humanitarian response to statelessness to date and begs the question: Why, despite comprehensive international (and national) laws, does statelessness still exist?

The severity of the consequences of statelessness is both profound and widespread and as such, the failure to eradicate it is of great concern.⁵ There is thus a need to investigate possibilities beyond the dominant approach taken to date. As statelessness and the issues that accompany it continue to cycle through generations, a need arises to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the current approach. It follows that there is a resultant uncertainty surrounding whether the issue of statelessness can ever be fully resolved by merely formulating more laws, treaties and recommendations, or whether there is something else that is inherently missing from the current approach.

It is in this context that Hannah Arendt’s notion of a “right to have rights”⁶ can provide an invaluable starting point to analyse the intricate subtleties that the current approach does not sufficiently address. Referencing the international initiatives after WW2 to draft a universal declaration regarding human rights (which ultimately led to the UDHR that we know today), Arendt foresaw that such attempts still exist only within the limits of state-centric international law and thus fail to provide adequate security for a right to have rights.⁷

Considering the significant and widespread societal costs associated with it,⁸ the legal, practical and ethical imperative to eliminate statelessness is not in dispute. However, whilst the dominant approach has utilised an array of legal techniques, practicalities surrounding issues such as belonging, marginalisation and ethical considerations have not been as widely explored.

Emhlabeni owandayo, lapho imibuso yezizwe iyizingxenye ezibalulekile ezakha isakhiwo somphakathi womhlaba, ukungabi nabuzwe kumele ukwehluleka okukhulu emphakathini wamazwe ngamazwe. Kukuphi, emhlabeni owakhiwe amazwe, lapho umuntu ongenabuzwe angena khona? Abantu abanjalo “abangeni ndawo” noma ikuphi kanye nasemehlweni omthetho, ngokuvamile bazithola bengabonakali, sengathi abekho. Nakuba kube nemizamo encomekayo yomphakathi wamazwe ngamazwe, kanye nezizwe ezithile, ukuphendula odabeni lokungabi nabuzwe ngokusebenzisa imikhankaso eyahlukene kanye nokushaywa kwemithetho eminingi yamazwe ngamazwe, ukungabi namazwe kanye nezinkinga ezivela ngenxa yalokho, kusasebenza. Kusukela ekuqaleni, kuphawulwe ukuthi ukugxila okuyinhloko kwendlela yamazwe ngamazwe yokungabi nabuzwe kuye kwazungeza umqondo wobuzwe obusemthethweni, ikakhulukazi ngokukhuthaza amazwe-kazwelonke ukuba aqinisekise ukuthi imithetho yawo yezwe ihambisana nemithetho yamazwe ngamazwe ehlose ukusekela umthetho wokuthi wonke umuntu unelungelo lokuba nezwe. Nakuba kungekho ukungabaza ukuthi amanye amazwe asenayo imithetho yezwe enganele ebangela ukungabi nobuzwe, akhona futhi amazwe imithetho yawo kazwelonke ibonakala ingaphezu kweyaneleyo (futhi avame ukuziqhenya ngemiqondo efana namalungelo abantu, ukulingana nokuhlukahluka) okuthi nakuba kunjalo, basenabantu abavelele abangenabuzwe endaweni yabo futhi/noma basenezimo ezintsha zabantu abangenabuzwe ezenzekayo. Ngokufanayo, ukusabela kobuntu, nemikhankaso nezithembiso zokuqeda ukungabi nabuzwe nakho akuzange kuphumelele ngokuphelele ezinhlosweni zakho. Ukuqhubeka nokuba khona kokungabi nabuzwe ngakho kubeka kungabaza ukusebenza kahle kokubili komthetho wamazwe ngamazwe kanye nokusabela kobuntu ekungabini nabuzwe kuze kube manje futhi kubuza umbuzo: Kungani, naphezu kwemithetho ebanzi yamazwe ngamazwe (kanye nekazwelonke), kusekhona ukungabi nabuzwe? Ubunzima bemiphumela yokungabi nabuzwe kokubili bujulile futhi busabalele futhi ngenxa yalokho, ukwehluleka ukukuqeda kuyakhathaza kakhulu. Ngakho-ke kunesidingo sokuphenya okungenzeka ngale ndlela ebusayo ethathiwe kuze kube manje. Njengoba ukungabi nabuzwe kanye nezindaba ezihambisana nakho kuqhubeka ukujikeleza ezizukulwaneni ngezizukulwane, kuphakama isidingo sokuphinda kuhlolwe ukusebenza ngempumelelo kwendlela yamanje. Lokhu kulandela ukuthi kunokungaqiniseki okuwumphumela okuhambisana nokuthi udaba lokungabi nabuzwe lungaxazululwa ngokugcwele ngokumane kumiswe imithetho eyengeziwe, izivumelwano nezincomo, noma ukuthi kukhona yini okunye okushodayo ngokwemvelo endleleni yamanje. Kukule ngqikithi lapho umbono ka-Hannah Arendt “welungelo lokuba namalungelo” unganikeza isiqalo esibalulekile sokuhlaziya ubuqili obuyinkimbinkimbi indlela yamanje engabubheki ngokwanele. Ebhekisela ezinyathelweni zamazwe ngamazwe ngemva kwempi yesibili yomhlaba (WW2) yokubhala isimemezelo somhlaba wonke mayelana namalungelo abantu (esigcine siholele kwi-UDHR esiyaziyo namuhla), u-Arendt wabona kusengaphambili ukuthi imizamo enjalo isekhona kuphela ngaphakathi kwemingcele yomthetho wamazwe ngamazwe ogxile kuhulumeni futhi ngaleyo ndlela yehluleka ukunikeza okwanele ukuvikeleka kwelungelo lokuba namalungelo. Uma kubhekwa izindleko zomphakathi ezibalulekile nezisabalele ezihlotshaniswa nayo, isibopho esingokomthetho, esisebenzayo nesezimiso zokuziphatha ukuze kuqedwe ukungabi nabuzwe akuphikisani. Kodwa-ke, nakuba indlela evelele isebenzise uxhaxha lwezindlela zomthetho, izinto ezingokoqobo eziphathelene nezindaba ezinjengokungabaza, ukucwaswa kanye nokucatshangelwa kwezimiso zokuziphatha akuzange kuhlolwe kabanzi.

Lefatsheng le ntseng le eketsa dikamano tsa botjhaba, moo dinaha tsa botjhaba e leng ditho tsa bohlokwa tse etsang sebopeho sa setjhaba sa lefatshe, ho hloka naha ho bontsha ho hloleha ho hoholo matjhabeng.1 Motho ya se nang naha o kena kae lefatsheng le entsweng ka dinaha? Batho ba jwalo ha ho bonahale ba na le “sebaka” kae kapa kae mme mahlong a molao, hangata ba iphumana ba sa bonahale, jwalokaha eka ha ba yo.2 Le hoja ho bile le boiteko bo babatsehang ba setjhaba matjhabeng, hammoho le dinaha tse ding tse ikemetseng, ba ho arabela bothateng ba ho hloka boahi ka matsholo a sa tshwaneng hammoho le ho fetiswa ha melao e mengata ya matjhaba kapa ya naha, ho hloka boahi le mathata a hlahang ka lebaka la hona, ho ntse ho le teng. Ho tloha qalong, ho hlokomelwa hore sepheo sa motheo sa ho toba ho se be le botjhaba, se dikadika ntlheng ya botjhaba ka ho ya ka molao, haholoholo ka ho kgothaletsa dinaha tsa matjhaba ho nnetefatsa hore melao ya tsona ya naha e dumellana le melao ya matjhaba, e ikemiseditseng ho boloka molao wa motheo wa hore motho e mong le e mong o na le tokelo ya ho ba le botjhaba. Le hoja ho se na pelaelo ya hore dinaha tse ding di ntse di na le melao e sa lekaneng e bakang ho hloka botjhaba,3 ho boetse ho na le dinaha tseo melao ya tsona e bonahalang e lekane (mme hangata di ithorisa ka dikgopolo tse kang ditokelo tsa botho, tekano le phapano) tseo ho sa natse sena, di ntseng di na le baahi ba bangata ba se nang botjhaba ka hare ho tsona le/kapa di ntse di na le dinyewe tse ntjha tsa ho hloka botjhaba.4 Ka tsela e tshwanang, diphallelo tseo batho ba di etsang, ka matsholo a tsona le ditshepiso tsa tsona tsa ho fedisa ho hloka boahi, le tsona ha di a atleha ka ho feletseng ho finyella dipakane tsa tsona. Ka hona, ho tswela pele ha ho ba le batho ba se nang botjhaba, ho baka pelaelo mabapi le katleho ya mekgwa ya molao wa matjhaba hammoho le karabelo ya botho ho ba se nang botjhaba ho fihlela jwale mme ho hlahisa potso e reng: Ke hobaneng, ho sa natse melao e akaretsang ya matjhaba (le ya naha), ho ntse ho na le batho ba se nang botjhaba? Kameho ya ho hloka bodulo e tebile ebile e atile mme ka lebaka leo, ho hloleha ho e fedisa ho tshwenya haholo.5 Ka hona ho na le tlhokeho ya ho batlisisa menyetla e ka thoko ho mokgwa o tlwaelehileng o sebedisitsweng ho fihlela jwale. Kaha ho se be moahi le ditaba tse tsamayang le hona di ntse di tswela pele ho phalla melokong e mengata, katleho ya mokgwa o teng hona jwale e hloka ho lekolwa botjha. Ka lebaka leo, ho na le ho se kgodisehe mabapi le hore na taba ya ho hloka boahi e ka rarollwa ka ho phethahala ka ho qapa melao e eketsehileng, dilekane le dikgothaletso, kapa hore na ho na le ntho e nngwe e haellang ka mokgwa o teng hona jwale. Ke moelelong ona moo mohopolo wa Hannah Arendt wa “tokelo ya ho ba le ditokelo”6 o ka fanang ka ntlha ya bohlokwa ya ho qala ho sekaseka dintlha tse rarahaneng tseo mokgwa wa hona jwale o sa sebetsaneng le tsona ka ho lekana. Ha a bua ka boikitlaetso ba matjhaba kamora Ntwa ya Bobedi ya Lefatshe ba ho ngola phatlalatso e akaretsang mabapi le ditokelo tsa botho (eo qetellong e ileng ya lebisa ho UDHR eo re e tsebang kajeno), Arendt o ile a bona esale pele hore diteko tse jwalo di ntse di le teng feela ka hara meedi ya molao wa matjhaba o shebaneng le mmuso mme ka hona di hloleha ho fana ka tshireletso e lekaneng bakeng sa tokelo ya ho ba le ditokelo.7 Ha ho nahanwa ka ditshenyehelo tse kgolo le tse atileng setjhabeng, tse amanang le yona,8 tlhokeho ya molao, e sebetsang le ya boitshwaro, ya ho fedisa ho hloka boahi, ha e na kgang. Leha ho le jwalo, le hoja mokgwa o ka sehloohong o sebedisitse mekgwa e mengata ya molao, dintlha tse sebetsang tse amanang le ditaba tse kang ho ba setho, ho qhelelwa ka thoko le ditlhahiso tsa boitshwaro ha di so hlahlojwe ka botlalo.