Early modern conceptions of “natural law”

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Date
2001
Authors
Venter, Ponti
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of the Free State
Abstract
English: This article traces the shifts in meaning of the metaphor of “natural law” in modern thought from its pre-modern meaning as a divine standard for human behaviour accessible to reason. Descartes expanded this meaning to include the regularity of mechanical bodies by posing an absolute law system for all possible worlds as a priori, rational, and axiomatic. Newton relativised this from the perspective of the multi-facetted governance of God. The older conception of natural law sustained itself in economics and politicology, serving as a defence of individual freedom and non-intervention (Petty, Locke), but (dialectically) implying a determinism. It remained linked to Cartesian meaning via attempts by Petty, Hobbes and Locke to construct a natural science of social life.
Afrikaans: Die artikel omlyn die verskuiwing in betekenis van die metafoor “natuurwet” in die moderne denke, van sy voormoderne betekenis as ’n goddelike maatstaf vir menslike gedrag toeganklik vir die rede. Descartes het hierdie betekenis uitgebrei om die reëlmaat van meganiese liggame in te sluit, deur ’n absolute wetsisteem vir alle moontlike wêrelde as a priori, rasioneel, aksiomaties te poneer. Newton het laasgenoemde gerelativeer uit ’n perspektief op die veelfasettige regering van God. Die ouer opvatting van “natuurwet” is gehandhaaf in die ekonomie en die politikologie, waar dit gedien het as verdediging van individuele vryheid en non-intervensie (Petty, Locke), maar ook (dialekties) ’n determinisme geïmpliseer het. Dit het egter verband bly hou met die Cartesiese betekenis deur pogings van Petty, Hobbes en Locke om ’n natuurwetenskap van die sosiale lewe te konstrueer.
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Keywords
Natural law, Humankind, Relationship between God, man, law and nature
Citation
Vente, P. (2001). Early modern conceptions of "natural law". Acta Academica, 33(2), 1-39.