"Imago dei in machina"?: a theological reflection on the ethics of man and machine in communion

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Date
2011
Authors
Staley, Kevin D.
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University of the Free State
Abstract
English: 1. The research project titled Imago Dei in machina?: A theological reflection on the ethics of man and machine in communion addresses the possibility of shared communion between humans and machines. It presents a theologically informed ethical and anthropological response to the problem of admitting solely artificially derived non-human entities into the community of human persons. The rapid progression by technology toward this end and the inadequate theological response to it necessitates a preemptive theological and ethical reflection. 2. In order to understand how the problem arose, the roots of the current trend to merge humans and machines, or to create a machine like a human, are traced through the last four centuries of modern history in the first chapter. Not only is the sophistication and power of technology steadily increasing, but as it has become more prevalent, biological human beings themselves have become the focus of technological advancements; from the attachment of prosthetics to the implantation of artificial organs and joints, machines are merging with people, and machines that resemble people are emerging. 3. The moral challenges presented by technology to-date beg for greater circumspection and responsibility in future design and use. Chapter two affirmed this truth through several contemporary examples and drew attention to the role one’s worldview holds in one’s perspective and subsequent treatment of humanity. Clearly most contemporary experts in the fields of AI and robotics have dismissed God from their considerations and look to technology to remedy human ills and satisfy human desires in both the present and future. The strong tendency to embrace promising technologies, even at the expense of our own humanity calls for a clearer understanding of humanity and a sound ethical response. 4. In chapter three a theologically sound ethical response is shown to be derived from the community of the triune God, and so is a person’s character and ability to respond wisely to ethical issues. A sound ethical response draws guidance from the recorded discourse between God and human persons in Scripture, from the annals of church history i.e. tradition, and from the interpretive community. All of these witnesses find their orientation and interpretation in the person of Christ. Although the written records and Christ do not attend to the specific matters being considered in this research they do provide images and paradigms that do provide sufficient guidance. 5. If humans are truly unique, then they require special moral consideration. In chapter four it was seen that a non-theological discussion, while identifying human faculties and functions that are different from other creatures, nonetheless typically terminate in unresolvable indecision in trying to find something truly unique. The appearance of a human-like machine could close the door on human uniqueness. When this ambivalence on uniqueness turns to equivalence the record shows that humans are typically treated as that to which they are equated. 6. In the last half of chapter four the portrait of humanity theologically derived reveals the real uniqueness of humanity. It is based solely in the relation of and inclusion by the triune God in their communion of persons. On the creaturely side this relation subsists in a persistent human embodiment, initially created by God, subsequently generated by biological procreation and regenerated in the resurrection. Any dislocation of that relation either by false conception or aberrant construction perverts that relationship and renders it even more vulnerable than it already is in its present estrangement from God. 7. There is moral significance to human uniqueness and this is especially clear in the profound moral implications centered on the concept of ‘persons’ in most societies. The efforts to insulate ‘person’ from a purely quantifiable i.e. functional ascription, by relational connectedness i.e. communion, appears to be the best move and one with theological warrant. The triune God (in communion) and His ways of relating are both necessary and sufficient to cast the concept of person, and only God holds the authority to esteem an entity a person by relating to it as such. 8. Remaining in the God-given creaturely relation to Him and others is crucial. The posthuman rejects God’s gift of persons-in-communion, and by an act of self-making severs that which enables them to be in fellowship with Him and creation, therefore missing the receipt of His salvific eschatological gift to creation. The desire to transcend the pain of human limitation is understandable, but it is in our suffering together that the bonds of communion are strengthened and the cords of character perfected. 9. Humanity seen in this unique relational light admits non-human members to its peril. The human community is precisely that, human, and any expansion by the inclusion of animals, robots, or posthumans as persons will jeopardize the integrity of the fabric of the human community. Humanity cannot simply be transformed (as the transhumanists suggest) in isolation from all else, rather all of creation must be set free together, and such liberation lies beyond the reach of any human being or collection of human beings and their technologies.
Afrikaans: 1. Die navorsingsprojek met die titel Imago Dei in machina?: A theological reflection on the ethics of man and machine in communion spreek die moontlikheid aan van gedeelde gemeenskap tussen die mens en tegnologiese produkte. Dit bied ‘n etiese en antropologiese reaksie vanuit ‘n teologiese perspektief op die probleem om kunsmatige nie-menslike entiteite tot gemeenskap met menslike persone toe te laat. Die vinnige ontwikkeling van tegnologie in hierdie rigting en die onvoldoende teologiese reaksie daarop, noodsaak so ‘n voorkomende teologiese en etiese besinning. 2. Om te verstaan hoe die probleem ontstaan het, word die worstels van die tendens om mens en masjien te verbind en om ‘n tegnologiese instrument wat soos die mens is te vervaardig gedurende die afgelope vier eeue, in die eerste hoofstuk nagegaan. Nie net is daar ‘n verbreding van die sofistikasie en mag van tegnologie nie, maar word dit al hoe meer algemeen sodat die biologiese mens self die fokus geword het van tegnologiese vooruitgang. Van die aanhegting van prostese tot die inplant van kunsmatige organe en ledemate word tegnologiese produkte met die mens verbind, en ontstaan masjiene wat met die mens ooreenstem. 3. Die morele uitdagings wat die huidige tegnologie bied, vra om groter omsigtigheid en verantwoordelikheid t.o.v. toekomstige ontwerp en gebruik. Hoofstuk twee lig hierdie feit uit deur die aandag te vestig op die belangrikheid van ‘n wêreldbeskouing op ‘n siening en behandeling van die mens. Die meeste kenners op die gebied van kunsmatige intelligensie en robotte het God ter syde gestel, en kyk na tegnologie om menslike probleme op te los en om menslike begeertes te bevredig in die hede en die toekoms. Die sterk neiging om belowende tegnologie te verwelkom, selfs ten koste van ons menslikheid, vra om ‘n duideliker verstaan van die wesentlike van die mens en van die etiese. 4. In hoofstuk drie word aangetoon dat ‘n gesonde teologies-etiese reaksie afgelei word van die gemeenskap met die Drie-enige God; so ook ‘n persoon se karakter en vermoë om met wysheid te oordeel oor etiese aangeleenthede. ‘n Verantwoordbare etiese respons vind leiding by die opgetekende diskoerse tussen God en mens in die Bybel, asook van die rekords van die kerkgeskiedenis, dit is die tradisie, en ook van die interpreterende gemeenskap. Al hierdie getuienisse vind hul oriëntasie en interpretasie in die Persoon van Christus. Alhoewel die geskrewe rekords en Christus self nie die spesifieke aangeleenthede van die navorsing aanspreek nie, verskaf hulle tog beelde en paradigmas wat genoegsame leiding bied. 5. As mense werklik uniek is, vereis hulle spesiale morele oorweging. In hoofstuk vier blyk dit uit die nie-teologiese bespreking dat alhoewel menslike vaardighede en funksies identifiseer kan word wat van nie-menslike skepsele verskil, so ‘n beandering tog in ‘n doodloopstraat beland. Die verskyning van ‘n masjien wat soos ‘n mens is, kan die einde van menslike uniekheid beteken. Wanneer sodanige ambivalensie neerkom op ‘n gelykstelling, dui gegewens daarop dat mense tipies behandel word soos dit waaraan hulle gelykgestel word. 6. Die laaste gedeelte van hoofstuk vier skets ‘n teologiese beeld van die mens wat die unieke van die mens aantoon. Dit word gebaseer op die verhouding tot en insluiting by die Drie-enige God in hul gemeenskap van persone. Hierdie verhouding bestaan in die menslike beliggaming wat aanvanklik deur God geskep is, en daarna deur prokreasie voortgesit is en vernuwe is deur die opstanding. Enige verplasing van hierdie verhouding of deur valse verstaan of deur afwykende konstruksie versteur die verhouding en laat dit méér broos as wat dit reeds is in die huidige vervreemding van God. 7. Daar is ‘n morele betekenis verbind aan menslike uniekheid, en dit word veral duidelik in die morele konnotasies verbind aan die konsep van “persoon” in die meeste gemeenskappe. Pogings om “persoon” af te grens van ‘n suiwer kwantifiseerbare, d.w.s. funksionele, aanduiding deur relasionele verbinding, dit is gemeenskap, blyk die aangewese weg te wees met die beste teologiese begronding. Die Drie-enige God (in gemeenskap) en die wyse waarop Hy Homself verbind tot verhouding is beide nodig en genoegsaam om die konsep van persoon te definieer, en slegs Hy besit die gesag om ‘n entiteit as ‘n persoon te ag deur daarmee in relasie te tree. 8. Dit is belangrik om met God in ‘n verhouding te leef. Die post-menslike verwerp die gawe van God om persone in gemeenskap te wees, en deur die daad van selfverwesentliking verbreek dit die gemeenskap met Hom en met die skepping, en verbeur so die ontvangs van die eskatologiese gawe aan die skepping. Die begeerte om die pyn van menslike beperking te transendeer is verstaanbaar, maar dit is in lyding dat die bande van gemeenskap versterk en karakter gebou word.9. Wanneer die mens in hierde relasionele lig gesien word, sou dit slegs tot haar eie gevaar dien om die nie-menslike tot gemeenskap toe te laat. Menslike gemeenskap is presies dít, en enige verbreding deur die insluiting van diere, robotte of die postmenslike as persone, stel die integriteit van die menslike gemeenskap in gevaar. Menslikheid kan eenvoudig nie getransformeer word soos transmenslike voorstanders beweer in afsondering van die res van die skepping nie. Die hele skepping moet bevry word, en sodanige verlossing lê buite die vermoë van die mens en van tegnologie.
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Keywords
Transhuman, Technology, Relationality, Persons, Posthuman, Image of God, Humanoid robot, Human uniqueness, Human embodiment, Fellowship of suffering, Cyborg, Communion, Christian ethics, Christ’s incarnation, Artificial Intelligence, Agape, Christian ethics, Technology -- Moral end ethical aspects, Technology -- Religious aspects, Human-machine systems, Human body and technology, Theological anthropology -- Christianity, Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatology))--University of the Free State, 2011
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