Private Law

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Browsing Private Law by Author "Faber, J. T."

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    Die behoefte aan ’n wyer artikel 2(3) van die Wet op Testamente 7 van 1953 (soos gewysig): ’n Kritiese beskouing
    (University of the Free State, 2004) Faber, J. T.; Rabie, P. J.
    Die Hoogste Hof van Appél se uitspraak in 𝘉𝘦𝘬𝘬𝘦𝘳 𝘷 𝘕𝘢𝘶𝘥𝘦 𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘦 2003(5) SA 173 (HHA) het die posisie aangaande die toepassing van artikel 2(3)van die 𝘞𝘦𝘵 𝘰𝘱 𝘛𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘦 7 van 1953 (soos gewysig)¹ duidelik uiteengesit enalle onsekerheid uit die weg geruim. Voor hierdie uitspraak het die interpretasie van artikel 2(3) totregsonsekerheid gelei.Die howe het twee benaderings ‘ontwikkel’, naamlikdie ‘eng’ en ‘liberale’ (‘soepel’) benaderings.² In die 𝘉𝘦𝘬𝘬𝘦𝘳-𝘴𝘢𝘢𝘬 het appélregterOlivier beslis dat slegs die kondonasie van testamente wat persoonlik deurdie oorledene³ opgestel, geskryf, getik, tot stand gebring of verly is, toegelaatsal word. Alhoewel daar saamgestem word met regter Oliver se interpretasievan artikel 2(3) sal daar in hierdie skrywe gepoog word om die deur vir ’n‘wyer’ of ‘liberale’ artikel 2(3) oop te maak.
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    Disposing of property upon death: contemplating the act of gestation performed with animus testandi versus a contractual disposition in terms of a valid 𝘱𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘮 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘶𝘮
    (University of the Free State, 2022) Faber, J. T.
    While the fate of assets upon death is generally decided under the law of succession, it does not have to be. In addition to a valid will (testate succession), succession could also be governed by contract, in terms of a valid 𝘱𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘮 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘶𝘮 (currently either a 𝘥𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘴 𝘤𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘢 or an antenuptial contract containing succession clauses). (Intestate succession, although a third option, is put aside for present purposes.) Both testate and contractual succession require an expression of intention in the form of a legally recognised act. The dispositive act in these two instances shares certain features. In both, the act involves a disposition of property intended to apply upon death and is obligationary. The vesting of rights in both can also only occur upon death, while assets are transferred by the appointed executor who administers the estate. Yet the essence of the dispositive act renders these two forms of succession fundamentally different. Contractual succession, with an agreement as the dispositive act, operates under the law of contract. Since the disposition is contractual, it needs to comply with the requirements for a valid contract, with 𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪 as the defining form of intention. Testate succession is governed by the law of succession, with 𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪 being the required intention. 𝘈𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪 turns the dispositive act into an act of testation, which, in turn, renders the document in which it is embodied a will. Although this distinction seems straightforward enough, South African law is yet to reflect it. This shortcoming results in legal uncertainty, which creates new challenges in light of the court’s power of condonation. This article focuses on the different dispositive acts to shed light on the intention associated with each and, specifically, to clearly distinguish between 𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪 and 𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘴 𝘥𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪 in a contractual disposition, and 𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪. Ultimately, a clear distinction between the intentions will enable a better understanding of the applicable act of disposition. Admittedly, the intention will probably remain central in the event of uncertainty, and the surrounding circumstances will still be decisive in determining it. However, it is suggested that an added focus on the act – assessing it in terms of its essence and associated form of intention – will make for a considerably easier investigation than a sole focus on intention.