Proof of malice in the law of malicious prosecution: a contextual analysis of Commonwealth decisions
| dc.contributor.author | Okpaluba, C. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-06-03T12:31:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-06-03T12:31:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.description.abstract | English: Generally, malice is a difficult term to define. But, as an element of the law of malicious prosecution, it is likened to spite, ill will or vengeance. In this context, malice represents improper purpose, one alien to the criminal justice system. It emphasises the dominant purpose for the prosecution as to whether it is an improper invocation of the criminal process. Although malice is a separate factor in determining malicious prosecution, it is indeterminate in nature as it tends to overlap with the requirement of reasonable and probable cause. Where the objective sufficiency of the material considered by the prosecutor in deciding to prosecute is satisfied, it is unlikely that malice can be imputed. Whereas from a lack of reasonable and probable cause improper purpose could be inferred. As malice contemplates deliberate intentional act, it is argued that negligence, whatever the degree, will not suffice. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.abstract | Afrikaans: Kwaadwilligheid is moeilik definieerbaar. As ’n element van die misdryf van kwaadwillige vervolging kan dit vergelyk word met nydigheid, haat en wraak. In hierdie konteks verteenwoordig kwaadwilligheid ’n onbehoorlike doel wat vreemd aan die strafreg is. Dit beklemtoon die hoofrede van die vervolging met betrekking tot die vraag of dit ’n onbehoorlike aanwending van die strafreg is. Alhoewel kwaadwilligheid ’n aparte faktor ten opsigte van kwaadwillige vervolging is, is dit moeilik bepaalbaar aangesien dit oorvleuel met die vereiste “reasonable and probable cause”. Waar die inligting waarop die aanklaer sy besluit om te vervolg baseer, voldoende is, is dit onwaarskynlik dat kwaadwilligheid toegeskryf kan word. Terwyl in die geval van die afwesigheid van “reasonable and probable cause” ’n onbehoorlike doel afgelei kan word. Aangesien kwaadwilligheid ’n opsetlike handeling veronderstel, word daar aangevoer dat nalatigheid van enige aard nie voldoende sal wees om die misdryf te bewys nie. | af |
| dc.description.version | Publisher's version | en_ZA |
| dc.identifier.citation | Okpaluba, C. (2013). Proof of malice in the law of malicious prosecution: a contextual analysis of Commonwealth decisions. Journal for Juridical Science, 37(2), 65-95. | en_ZA |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0258-252X (print) | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2415-0517 (online) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11660/2670 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_ZA |
| dc.publisher | Faculty of Law, University of the Free State | en_ZA |
| dc.rights.holder | Faculty of Law, University of the Free State | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Commonwealth | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Malicious prosecution | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Malice | en_ZA |
| dc.title | Proof of malice in the law of malicious prosecution: a contextual analysis of Commonwealth decisions | en_ZA |
| dc.type | Article | en_ZA |