Relativity and relativism: historical and systematic considerations
| dc.contributor.author | Strauss, Danie | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-14T11:08:00Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-06-14T11:08:00Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
| dc.description.abstract | English: A brief overview of the emergence of the relativistic challenge to the so-called “exact” natural sciences, such as mathematics and physics, is followed by an analysis of the crisis that Husserl experienced in questioning rationalism. Against the background of a systematic distinction between modal laws and type laws, the pervasive influence of modern nominalism is identified as the root cause of the problems of relativism as it opened the way to the so-called Copernican turn in epistemology. The crucial and constant conditions required in every assertion of relativity are highlighted, particularly with regard to the foundational role of logical discernment in respect of language use and the impossibility of affirming change and relativity outside or independent of a context of constancy, taking into account the philosophical implications of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. Against this background, the “(onto-)logic of relativism” is assessed and a brief characterisation is given of the fact that modern humanism has merely reified humanity’s accountable freedom to give shape to underlying (ontic) principles in various (historically changing) circumstances. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.abstract | Afrikaans: ’n Kursoriese oorsig van die wyse waarop die relativistiese uitdaging in die sogenaamde “eksakte natuurwetenskappe” na vore gekom het (by name in die wiskunde en die fisika), word opgevolg met ’n analise van die krisis wat Husserl ervaar het by die bevraagtekening van die rasionalisme. Teen die agtergrond van ’n sistematiese onderskeiding tussen modale en tipiese wette word die deursurende invloed van die moderne nominalisme uitgelig as die grondoorsaak van probleme van relativisme aangesien dit die weg geopen het na die sogenaamde Kopernikaanse omwenteling in die kennisleer. Belangrike konstante kon- disies wat benodig word in elke bevestiging van relatiwiteit word uitgelig, in die besonder met verwysing na die funderende rol van logiese onderskeiding met betrekking tot taal- gebruik en die onmoontlikheid om verandering en relatiwiteit te bevestig onafhanklik van ’n konteks van konstansie (deur die filosofiese implikasies van Einstein se spesiale rela- tiwiteitsteorie in ag te neem). Teen hierdie agtergrond word die “(onto-)logika van rela- tivisme” beoordeel en word ’n vlugtige kensketsing gegee van die feit dat die moderne humanisme bloot die menslike toerekenbare vryheid om vorm te gee aan onderliggende (ontiese) beginsels in uiteenlopende (histories-variabele) omstandighede sentraal gestel het. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.version | Publisher's version | en_ZA |
| dc.identifier.citation | Strauss, D. (2005). Relativity and relativism: historical and systematic considerations. Acta Academica, (Supplement 2), 199-231. | en_ZA |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0587 - 2405 (print) | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2415 - 0479 (online) | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11660/9786 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_ZA |
| dc.publisher | University of the Free State | en_ZA |
| dc.rights.holder | University of the Free State | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Relativism | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Relativity | en_ZA |
| dc.title | Relativity and relativism: historical and systematic considerations | en_ZA |
| dc.type | Article | en_ZA |