Doctoral Degree (Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law)
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Browsing Doctoral Degree (Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law) by Author "Pretorius, J. L."
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Item Open Access The constitutional framework for broad-based black economic empowerment(University of the Free State, 2010) Janse van Rensburg, Adri; Pretorius, J. L.The negative impact of the apartheid regime’s policies on the social, political and economic conditions of the majority of the population is well established and persists into the present day South Africa. The South African Constitution acknowledges this negative legacy, but also contains a vision of the type of society it envisages for South Africa. The inclusion of values, principles and rights on which this new society is based does not, by virtue of its design, erase all the consequences of the previous discriminatory policies. Simply removing discriminatory legislation and practices cannot alleviate the injustice and poverty that resulted from 40 years of oppressive legislation and government policies. Implicit in this constitutional vision are remedial and restitutionary measures for the achievement of the constitutional goal of a free, prosperous and egalitarian South African society. Illustrative of this fundamental commitment, several constitutional provisions, directly or indirectly, sanction remedial measures to address remaining injustices. Different types of remedial measures are envisaged, namely affirmative action programmes, a government policy of preferential procurement, and Black Economic Empowerment. The constitutional imperative for policy tools to transform the South African economy in particular, by means of black economic empowerment is therefore clear. In this study the legacy of apartheid, with specific reference to the economic aspect thereof, is researched. From this it becomes clear that transformation in the way economic resources are divided is necessary. The enactment of specific legislation dealing with the subject resulted from the recognition of the need for regulatory intervention to give momentum to the process of reform. The B-BBEE Act and its Codes of Good Practice provide the foundation for the drafting and implementing of the BBBEE programme. The B-BBEE programme’s operation is analysed in order to draw conclusions on the constitutionality thereof. Within the framework of the Constitution, several provisions empower the state to adopt remedial measures to correct systemic injustice. The most apparent of these is the right to equality in section 9. It provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law and entrenches the right not to be discriminated against, either directly or indirectly, on a number of specifically enumerated and analogous grounds. Section 9(2) makes specific provision for remedial measures, not as an exception to the equality guarantee, but rather an extension thereof — a restitutionary equality conception. In the Preamble to the B-BBEE Act it is stated that one of the objectives with the Act is to “promote the achievement of the constitutional right to equality”. The right to equality therefore occupies a central place in any constitutional discussion on the B-BBEE programme. The position on the constitutional validity of affirmative action measures, and therefore also the B-BBEE programme, is currently governed by the Constitutional Court’s decision in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden, where the Court formulated three elements for a valid section 9(2) measure. The Court’s approach in the Van Heerden case was therefore analysed in order to make a determination of the constitutionality of black economic empowerment measures. However, in order to place B-BBEE in its constitutional context the totality of constitutional provisions which touch on the programme, that is both mandating and limiting provisions, was considered. The practical operation of the programme was analysed and that information was used to draw conclusions on the constitutionality of the programme when placed in the framework provided by the relevant constitutional provisions. Recommendations were also offered which could address some of the problematic aspects of the programme identified.Item Open Access The constitutionality of categorical and conditional restrictions on harmful expression related to group identity(University of the Free State, 2014-01) Marais, Maria Elizabeth; Pretorius, J. L.English: The theories of truth and the marketplace of ideas, of democracy, and of human dignity underlie the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and simultaneously set boundaries with regard to such protection. The value of expression in terms of these theories firstly determines the scope of protection afforded to particular forms and incidences of expression. There exists an inherent tension in the appeal of each of the values and interests that is involved. Freedom of expression is central to the development of human personality, but may also harm inherent human dignity. The response to discriminatory expression may eventually promote equality. Free expression may be instrumental to the increase in knowledge and to the maintenance of democracy, but may also discourage target groups from participating in the marketing of ideas and in the democratic process. Secondly, the extent to which a discriminatory statement or expressive conduct serves the values and interests of knowledge, democracy and dignity is a relevant consideration in the context of proportionality analyses. It determines the weight to be assigned to the right to freedom of expression relative to other rights or interests that are involved. The Constitution, in terms of section 16(2)(c), categorically excludes, from constitutional protection, “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm”. “Hate speech” on these grounds constitutes a proven threat to constitutional democracy. Expression of this nature should be criminalised. Circumstances may exist where “hate speech” on other grounds poses a similar threat and should likewise be criminalised. Current atrocities in South Africa related to homosexuality and nationality constitute such circumstances. This approach is in accordance with South Africa’s obligations in terms of international agreements. Section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act categorically prohibits a narrowly defined field of expression, including expression under section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. The prohibition does not criminalise expression and does not apply to bona fide engagement in expression stipulated in terms of section 16(1) of the Constitution. Within the limited field that remains, it prohibits expression related to any prohibited ground that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to be hurtful, harmful, or to incite harm or promote or propagate hatred. The prohibition will be constitutional if it can be accepted that the expression will, in all given circumstances, constitute or promote unfair discrimination. Considerations in the South African context of the values that inform the protection as well as the restriction of expression, and of international obligations, lead to a positive conclusion in this respect. Of essential importance is the fact that the prohibition does not stifle debate about issues, even if statements relevant to the debate offend people with reference to their group identity. Section 6 of the Act prohibits unfair discrimination, subject to a fairness analysis. It is often not possible to determine whether the effect of discriminatory expression in the broad societal context is indeed detrimental. In the media context, the unequal balance of power in given circumstances reinforces the risk that inequality will be promoted. In the determination of fairness, care should be taken not to restrict expression without sufficient context-related indications of disadvantage. At the same time, the obligation to prohibit unfair discrimination, and the categorical restriction in terms of section 10, may not be disregarded. In the light of section 192 of the Constitution, these considerations are particularly significant with respect to broadcasting. The present broadcasting codes lack the necessary related guidelines and should be amended accordingly.Item Open Access 'Disabled people' and the search for equality in the workplace :. an appraisal of equality models from a comparative perspective(University of the Free State, 2010-12) Ngwena, Charles Gideon.; Pretorius, J. L.English: Disabled people constitute a historically disadvantaged and marginalized group that experiences discrimination in the workplace among other socio-economic sectors. In this thesis, my focus is on searching for an inclusive type of equality that could inform the interpretation and application the equality clause in the South African Constitution. My aim is neither to arrive at a mathematically constructed abstract type of equality, nor to produce a blueprint of equality that puts finality on the debate on equality. Rather, it is to engage with equality discursively with a view to contributing towards an ongoing development of a juridical as well as philosophical path for constructing the normative architecture of a type of equality that is more responsive to the equality needs of disabled people. The spotlight is on developing a type of equality that is normatively inclusive and transformative as to be capable of sufficiently meeting the quest for political, and more crucially, economic recognition of disabled people. I use a repertoire of analytical techniques to explore and appraise the inclusiveness and responsiveness of contemporary approaches to equality. At a more general level, the discourse employs comparative analysis. However, whilst comparative analysis in this thesis includes comparing and contrasting the equality jurisprudence of different jurisdictions, and in this instance, comparing and contrasting South Africa with Canada and the United States, it is, nonetheless, a relatively small part of my comparative discourse. It is not the primary sense in which the thesis develops a comparative discourse. The greater part of my discourse employs a comparative approach to mean comparing and contrasting the underpinning moral compasses of formal equality and substantive equality with a view to revealing the capacities of each type of equality to be responsive to the equality aspirations of disabled people. Over and above comparative analysis, I use, in the main, the historicity of apartheid, the social model of disability, and feminist theory and practices as analytical techniques for interrogating the responsiveness of notions of formal equality and substantive equality. From insights drawn mainly from the social model of disability and feminism, I construct disability method as a syncretic and legal method for interrogating the normative sufficiency of equality laws and praxis. Disability method is the study’s principal interpretive method for ensuring that the appraisal of pertinent laws, policies or practices is always conscious of the status of disabled people as a disadvantaged and vulnerable historical community, and the imperative of transforming erstwhile culturally, and even more crucially, economically oppressive norms. I contend throughout the study that law does not carry inherently neutral values that, as a matter of course, allow for searching for alternative paradigms of equality. Ultimately, it is the social construction of disability that holds the key to interrogating equality norms in a serious manner and not merely restating what the legislature and the judiciary proclaim about disability and equality. In this sense, by way of clarifying the methodological and philosophical orientation of this study, it bears stressing that the analytical approach that it adopts differs markedly from conventional legal discourses that only use an ‘internal critique’, as it were, to critically evaluate legal norms by using norms derived from law in order to determine whether the law is living up to the standards which it professes to hold and whether the justice promised by those standards is being dispensed evenly across all social groups. Though ‘internal critique’ is part of how some of the arguments in this study are framed, it is only a small part. The greater part of my equality discourse derives from external critique. It derives from appraising the law using ethical or social values that are external to the law but which I argue ought to shape the law. Using disability method, and drawing from the thesis of a heterogeneous civic public sphere, I situate the normative ethical framework for substantive equality within a type of participatory democracy in which equality is constructed dialogically and not unilaterally or hegemonically. I treat equality as a component of democratic ethics that result not from a given centre but from an egalitarian dialogue between disabled people and enabled people. I argue for inclusive heterogeneous equality as the operative equality template for eradicating disablism in an imagined participatory democracy in which respect for pluralism and the eradication of dominance and subordination among social groups are core foundational ethics.