The demise of the Roman-Dutch 'kommer-recht: interpretation of statutes so as to conform to the spirit, purport and objects of the South African Bill of Rights

Abstract

English: The Supreme Court of Appeal (in a judgment dated 23.11.07) in the case of Bid Industrial Holdings v Strang (2007) SCA 144 (RSA) (now cited as 2008(3) SA 355 (SCA)) held that the common-law requirement of arrest to found or confirm jurisdiction where an incola plaintiff wishes to sue a foreign peregrinus, which procedure is authorised in section 19(1) (c) of the Supreme Court Act 59/1959, is unconstitutional. In essence it was so held because such an arrest restricts a person's liberty and freedom (as entrenched in section 12 (1) of the Constitution) without a just cause. This article evaluates the judgment and highlights the importance of the full historical context and rationale for the existence of a common-law rule as yardstick against which to measure its constitutional justifiability. In this instance the rationale for the existence of the common-law rule of jurisdictional arrest was also, in essence, premised on the unequal treatment of foreigners vis à vis citizens, and predictably, this could not have passed the standard set by section 39(2) of the Constitution. The article investigates the method employed by the SCA in its interpretation of the alleged unconstitutional stipulations of the Supreme Court Act so as to bring it in line with the spirit,purport and objects of the South African Bill of Rights. Special attention is paid to the criticism of the judgment that it failed to comply with the peremptory stipulations of section 172 of the Constitution. The article concludes that such criticism is unwarranted.

Afrikaans: Die Hoogste Hof van Appèl het in 'n uitspraak gedateer 23.11.07 in die saak van Bid Industrial Holdings v Strang (2007) SCA 144 (RSA) nou gerapporteer as 2008(3) SA355 (SCA) beslis dat die gemeenregtelike vereiste van arrestasie om jurisdiksie te vestig of te bevestig waar 'n incola eiser 'n vreemde peregrinus in die hof wil dagvaar, welke prosedure gemagtig word in Artikel 19(1)( c) van die Hoogggeregshofwet 59/1959, ongrondwetlik is. In wese het die hof so beslis omdat arrestasie 'n persoon se vryheid en veiligheid inperk (soos verskans in Artikel 12 van die Grondwet) sonder dat 'n geldige rede daarvoor bestaan. Die artikel evalueer die beslissing en beklemtoon die belang van die volledige historiese onstaans- en bestaansrede van 'n gemeenregtelike reël om behulpsaam te wees wanneer die grondwetlikheid daarvan beoordeel word. In hierdie geval is die historiese regverdiging van die reël deels te vinde in die ongelykmatige behandeling van vreemdelinge vis à vis burgers, en was die verdwyning van die reël in die lig van die Suid Afrikaanse grondwetlike bestel, eintlik voorspelbaar. Die artikel evalueer ook die metode wat gevolg is deur die Hoogste Hof van Appèl in sy uitleg van die beweerde ongrondwetlike bepalings van Artikel 19 ten einde dit in versoening met die Suid Afrikaanse Handves van Mensesregte uit te lê. Bepaalde aandag word gegee aan die kritiek teen die uitspraak, naamlik dat dit nagelaat het om die gebiedende bepalings van Artikel 172 van die Grondwet te volg. Die artikel kom tot die slotsom dat hierdie kritiek ongeregverdig is.