Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorVan Zyl, H.
dc.contributor.authorMostert, Jacobus Willem
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-27T07:22:44Z
dc.date.available2018-07-27T07:22:44Z
dc.date.issued2003-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11660/9002
dc.description.abstractEnglish: The important role of banks in the economy necessitates their regulation. The functions exercised by banks put them at risk of failure. The regulators of banks have to decide to pursue either the stability of the financial system or the efficiency of the financial system. The regulator can pursue more stability by actively regulating the banks in the financial system. The problem is that this has certain cost implications for the economy and the taxpayers. The proponents of free banking promote the regulation of banks by the market forces of supply and demand. The government or central bank should try to attain stability in the financial system, without compromising the stability of the financial system. Despite the fact that the majority of countries have actively regulated banks many countries have experienced systemic bank crises. These bank crises have been caused mainly by macro economic, micro economic and endemic factors. Since 1991 the regulators showed a preference to rateher use prompt corrective action than regulatory forbearance as solution to bank crises. In spite of the fact that banks are obliged according to the Basel Accord of 1988 to keep a minimum level of risk-based capital, the recent developments in the international financial markets have necessitated the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision to make new proposals for the regulation of the capital adequacy levels of banks. The aim of the Basel II proposals is to make the regulation of banks more market orientated. The new proposals mutually support the alignment of the regulation of the capital adequacy of banks with the risk management practices at banks. The proposals consist of three sections are sections which comprises the regulation of capital adequacy, regulatory review and disclosure of information. In terms of the first part of the Basel II proposals the capital adequacy of banks can be determined via the standardized approach or the Internal Rating-based approach. The problems of pro-cyclicality and the geographical spread of ratings will hamper the implementation of the standardized approach. The Internal Rating-based approach has been critized for the possible high cost of implementation. The data requirements, negative incentive effects and the problem of regulatory arbitrage have been identified as possible problem. One way of solving the problems of negative incentive effects for banks is to prescribe a minimum level of subordinated debt to be held by all banks. The holders of subordinated debt have an incentive to monitor the banks, due to the fact that they are last in the line of creditors in the case of insolvency. The implementation of an integrated supervisor in South Africa was then also investigated. The proposal was made to implement the Twin Peaks model. Under this approach bank supervision will still be a function of the South African Reserve Bank. The findings of the study were then tested by means of a questionnaire that was administered at all the major banking groups in South Africa. The respondents supported the findings of the study.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractAfrikaans: Banke moet spesiaal uitgesonder word om gereguleer te word, omdat hulle bepaalde belangrike funksies in die ekonomie uitoefen. Die funksies wat banke uitoefen, maak hulle vatbaar vir ineenstorting. Met die regulering van banke moet daar ’n keuse tussen stabiliteit en effektiwiteit gemaak word. Die voorstanders van stabiliteit verkies dat banke meer direk gereguleer moet word. Soos aangetoon, kan dit egter kostes vir die belastingbetaler en die ekonomie as geheel inhou. Die voorstanders van vrye banke is van mening dat banke meer effektief gereguleer sal word as die regulering van banke aan markkragte oorgelaat word. Die regulering van banke moet dus so markgerig as moontlik uitgevoer word, sonder om die sistemiese stabiliteit van die finansiële stelsels in lande in gevaar te stel. Ten spyte van die feit dat banke gereguleer word, is die meeste lande in die wêreld in die afgelope dekades deur bankkrisisse getref. Die oorsake van bankkrisisse is makroekonomiese, mikroekonomiese en endemiese oorsake. Sedert 1991 verkies die reguleerders om eerder spoedige korrektiewe aksie as regulerende laksheid te gebruik om die bankkrisisse te hanteer. Alhoewel banke verplig word om sedert 1988 verpligte minimum risikogeweegde kapitaalvereistes na te kom volgens die 1988 Basel Ooreenkoms, het die onlangse ontwikkelinge in die internasionale finansiële stelsel die Baselse Komitee vir Banktoesighouding genoodsaak om voorstelle te maak om die regulering van banke aan te pas. Die oogmerk met die Basel II-voorstelle is om die regulering van banke meer markgerig te maak. Die Basel II-voorstelle bestaan uit drie bene, naamlik die regulering van die kapitaalvereistes van banke, banktoesighoudingshersiening en die openbaarmaking van inligting. Die drie bene ondersteun mekaar om die regulering van die kapitaalvereistes van banke by die risikobestuurspraktyke van banke aan te pas. Volgens die eerste been van die Basel II voorstelle kan banke se kapitaalgenoegsaamheid volgens die gestandaardiseerde benadering en die IGB-benadering bepaal word. Die probleme van prosiklisiteit en die geografiese verspreiding van kredietgradering kan die implementering van die gestandaardiseerde benadering bemoeilik. Die IGB-benadering is gekritiseer weens die koste wat die implimentering van die benadering impliseer. Die datavereistes, negatiewe insentiefeffekte en die probleem van regulerende arbitrage is ook geïdentifiseer as moontlike probleme. Om die insentiefprobleme te oorkom, is dit in die literatuur voorgestel dat banke as verfyning van die IGB-benadering ook verplig behoort te word om ‘n bepaalde persentasie van kapitaal in ondergeskikte skuldbriewe te hou. Aangesien die ondergeskikte skuldbriefhouers ’n goeie moontlikheid bied om verliese te lei by die insolvensie van ’n bank, is dit ’n goeie insentief om die bank te monitor. Die instelling van ’n geïntegreerde toesighouer in Suid-Afrika is ook ondersoek. Daar is voorgestel dat Suid-Afrika die “Twin Peaks”-model implementeer. Volgens die benadering sal banktoesighouding steeds onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank se jurikdiksie uitgevoer word. Die gevolgtrekkings wat in die studie gemaak is oor die regulering van banke is aan die hand van ’n vraelys by die grootste Suid-Afrikaanse banke getoets. Die respondente het oor die algemeen die gevolgtrekkings wat in die studie gemaak is ondersteun.en_ZA
dc.language.isoafen_ZA
dc.publisherUniversity of the Free Stateen_ZA
dc.subjectFinancial crisesen_ZA
dc.subjectBank failures -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectFinancial services industry -- South Africa -- State supervisionen_ZA
dc.subjectBanks and banking -- South Africa -- State supervisionen_ZA
dc.subjectThesis (Ph.D. (Economics))--University of the Free State, 2003en_ZA
dc.titleDie problematiek rondom die regulering van bankeen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
dc.rights.holderUniversity of the Free Stateen_ZA


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record