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dc.contributor.advisorStrauss, D. F. M.
dc.contributor.authorAlt, Heinrich
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-02T12:43:29Z
dc.date.available2016-02-02T12:43:29Z
dc.date.copyright1995-06
dc.date.issued1995-06
dc.date.submitted2016-02-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11660/2245
dc.description.abstractEnglish: Universality and individuality are two irreducible traits of entities. In this regard Armstrong is correct in his assumption that individuals and universals exist in states of affairs. Through the relation of instantiation it is possible to see universals as identical elements present in states of affairs. The types (kind) of things are made possible through universals. Universals are modes of being. Propositions are the way things are and relations is the way things stand in relation to other things. Universals cannot be unified with individuals. The phenomenological viewpoint states that the instantiation of universals can be seen as a quality which is not universal. This is unacceptable. The trope-theory is also in this regard wrong, because a trope is viewed as an individual, an instance of its universal. In following Strauss, qualities and relations as instantiated universals cannot be individual. It is only possible to t21 k about the specification of the universal. Hence it is impossible to talk about modal individuality, but only about modal specificity. Nominalism, platonism and conceptualism are associated with finity, denumerable infinity and non-denumerable infinity. It is not possible to count the totality of all sets of positive integers. Hence the platonist conclude that non-denumerable sets exist. Constructivism believes that it is not the existence of non-denumerable sets that makes counting impossible, but rather the mental incapacity to construct a precise idea of the totality of all sets which defines counting. Wang did not recognize the modal dimension of reality, neither did he recognize the antecipatory and retrocipatory direction of the modal aspects of reality. This is the reason why he did not recognize that the non-denumerable infinity is a regulative numerical anticipation in space. We could divide Hale's discussion of the singular term in three themes. The first deals with a syntactical criterium of the singular term. This means that the identification of a singular term occurs on grounds of patterns of conclusions with (first level) existential generalization as basis. The second theme deals with the singular term and the functional term where the functional term could be associated with a proper noun. The understanding of the functional term depends on the recognition of a functional relation which includes the chosen object of the singular term. Modal universality was implicitly recognized in the division of objects in different categories. Explicitly modal universality was never recognized. The third theme deals with the distinction between abstract proper nouns and the predicate. This distinction reflects the distinction between law and law-likeness. The distinction between abstract and concrete involves the tension between olatonism and the nominalistic causal epistemology. The problem is that a omnipresent causal theory of truth is checked by the numerical and spatial aspects of reality. Godell presupposed this when he made a distinction between mathematical knowledge and perceptual knowledge. The causal theory of knowledge doesn't have a total reference to mathematical truth. In the reformational philosophy Stafleu tries to impute individuality structure on spatial figures. This argument ls untenable, because numerical and spatial figures are modal subjects and contains modal universality in its orderliness. Modal subjects cannot be reduced to typical structures. It is prominent how Stafleu did not succeed to denote structure-typicity of the modal subjects. One of the most important points in Hale's view of a sortal concept, is that this concept is grounded in the relation of similarity. Equivalent classes and equivalent relations play an important role in the identification of abstract objects of the same sort. The sorta! concept can be associated with modal universality with similarity as the ground-relation. Van Fraassen's identity and conclusion problem could be solved when the modal dimension of reality could be accepted and the association of law with second-order universals could be denounced. The distinction between law and events and the necessity-relation are presupposed when dealing with the identity and conclusion problem. Modal laws can be obtained through abstraction and not through induction. Perception of a modal aspect does not occur through an empirical-inductive process, because every generalization already implies the meaning of the relevant modal aspect. Fowler and Van der Walt's point of view, namely that God's creation order is unrecognisable, does not reckon modal universality. Together with this, the coherent problem of concept and idea is ignored. Modal terms can be used conceptual or in an idea context. The meaning kernels of the modal aspects exceed conception and is therefore regulative for the use of concepts. In this regard, there is already a rational link between God's creation order and our knowledge thereof. This knowledge is however of a regulative foundational kind (i.e. idea-knowledge). In the history of philosophy modal universality has come to the fore as all-embracing denominators. But sadly the boundaries of the different modal aspects were not recognized. This is called reductionism and it caused the problem that phenomena could not be explained properly. The Pythagoreans for example believed that numericals were the all-embracing denominator of reality. The heaven (ouranos) was viewed as harmony and number. The invention of the irrational number showed the shortcoming of this viewpoint. The hypotenuse of a rectangular triangle cannot be presented with a finite whole number. The mechanistic viewpoint believed that mechanism was the only route to the understanding of nature. Helmholtz was the first to use the energy concept as central mode of explanation of nature as a whole. The important consequence thereof is that the sensual phenomenon of factual conclusions was not good enough for the explanation of principles. The a priorical modal dimension of reality embraces every facet of our experience which means that our experience cannot be reduced to the psychical aspect of reality. The numerical aspect is for example the condition for us to experience numerical relations, etc. In biology we find the one-sidedness of the nominalistic theory of descent and the realistic structural idea (morphology). The first-mentioned induces a chaotical blend which makes the taxonomical classification of living entities impossible or completely arbitrary. The idealistic morphology is platonistic. A person do not have to be an idealistic morphologist to be convinced that the systematics of the natural system must form the foundation of the theory of descent. The significance of Stegmuller's concept of a theory is that the mathematical core of a theory refers implicitly to modal universality. This core-structure cannot be falsified and is denoted by Stegmuller as an abstract 'gegenstande'. That which is abstract, contains similarly the property of universality. There also exists an implicit discontinuity in Stegmuller's concept of a theory. It has to do with the nominalistic association of the empirical with concrete individuality. Stegmuller does not make a distinction between the boundaries of the kinematical and physical aspects of reality. Furthermore, the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms implicitly denotes the boundaries between the spatial aspect and the physical aspect (e.g. in the classical partical-mechanics spatial terms are denoted as non-theoretical).en_ZA
dc.description.abstractAfrikaans: Universaliteit en individualiteit is twee onherleibare eienskappe (kenmerke) van entiteite. In hierdie opsig is Armstrong korrek as hy beweer dat individue en universalia slegs bestaan binne toestand van sake. Deur middel van die relasie van instansiasie is dit moontlik om iets universeels te sien as identiese elemente teenwoodig in 'n sekere stand van sake. Universalia is wat van 'n ding sy soort maak. Universalia kan beskou word as bestaanswyses. Eienskappe is die wyse hoe dinge is en relasies is die wyse hoe dinge ten opsigte van mekaar staan. Universalia kan nie gereduseer word tot individue nie. Die fenomenologiese stand punt dat die instansiasie van universalia beskou kan word as 'n kwaliteit wat nie univeseel is nie, is ook onaanvaarbaar. Die trope-teorie is ook in hierdie opsig verkeerd. 'n Troop word ook gesien as individueel, 'n geval van sy 'universal'. In navolging van Strauss kan eienskappe en relasies as geinstansieerde universalia nie individueel genoem word nie. Ons kan slegs praat van die spesifisering van die 'universal'. Daarom kan daar ook nie meer sprake wees van modale individualiteit nie, maar slegs van modale spesifisiteit. Nominalisme, platonisme en konseptualisme kan onderskeidelik geassosieer word met die eindige, die aftelbaar oneindige en die ooraftelbaar oneindige. Geen attelling kan die totaliteit van alle versamelings van positiewe heelgetalle uitput nie. Hier konkludeer die streng platonis dat daar nie-attelbare versamelings bestaan. In 'n konstruktivistiese teorie word die saak anders benader. Dit is nie die bestaan van nie-aftelbare versamelings wat aftelling onmoontlik maak nie, maar eerder die mentale onvermoe om 'n duidelike en presiese idee te vorm van die totaliteit van alle versamelings wat attelling definieer. Omdat Wang nie die modale dimensie van die werklikheid, tesame met die ante- en retrosipasies tussen die modale aspekte van die werklikheid in ag neem nie, kan hy nie tot die insig kom dat die ooraftelbaar-oneindige 'n regulatiewe verdieping van getal in ruimte is nie. Hale hanteer die enkelvoudige term in drie temas. Die eerste handel oor 'n sintaktiese kriterium van 'n enkelvoudige term. Dit beteken dat die identifisering van 'n enkelvoudige term geskied op die basis van patrone van konklusies waar (eerste vlak) eksistensiele veralgemening grondliggend is. Die tweede tema handel oor die enkelvoudige term en die funksionele term waar laasgenoemde geassosieer word met 'n selfstandige naamwoordfrase. Die verstaan van laasgenoemde is afhanklik van die herkenning van 'n funksionele relasie wat die objek wat deur die enkelvoudige term uitgekies word, insluit. Die naaste wat daar aan modale universaliteit gekom is, was die verdeling van objekte in verskillende kategoriee. Nooit is daar eksplisiet rekenskap gegee van mod ale universaliteit nie. Die derde tema het gehandel oor die onderskeid tussen abstrakte selts1andige naamwoorde en die predikaat. Hierdie onderskeid weerspieel die onderskeid tussen wet en wetmatigheid. Die onderskeid tussen abstrak en konkreet het te doen met die spanning tussen platonisrne en die norninalistiese kousale kennisteorie. Die probleem is dat 'n allesomvattende kousaliteitsteorie van waarheid noodwendig moet stuit teen die grense van die getals- en ruimte-aspekte van die werklikheid. Godel wys vir ons dat daar 'n verskil is tussen wiskundige kennis en sinlike perseptuele kennis sodat die kousaliteitsteorie van waarheid nie heeltemal betrekking het op wiskundige waarhede nie. In die reformatoriese wysbegeerte probeer Stafleu individualiteitstruktuur toeskryf aan ruimtelike figure. Hierdie argument is nie houdbaar nie, want getalle en ruirntelike figure is modale subjekte en besit modale universaliteit. Dit le in die ordelikheid daarvan. Modale subjekte kan nie gereduseer word tot tipiese strukture nie. Dit is opvallend hoe Stafleu nie daarin kan slaag om struktuur-tipisiteit van modale subjekte aan te dui nie. Een van die belangrikste punte wat Hale maak is dat vorm 'n soortbegrip is wat onderle word deur die relasie van gelyktydigheid. Verder speel ekwivalensieklasse en ekwivalensierelasies 'n belangrike rol in die identifisering van abstrakte objekte van dieselfde soort. Hierdie soortbegrip kan geassosieer word met mod ale universaliteit waar die grondliggende relasie gelyktydigheid is. Van Fraassen se identiteits- en konklusieprobleem kan opgelos word indien die modale dimensie van die werklikheid aanvaar word en daar at gesien word van die assosiering van wet met tweede orde-universalia. Die onderskeid tussen wet en feitlikheid kan slegs veronderstel word tesame met die relasie van noodsaaklikheid. Modale wette kan nie deur induksie verkry word nie, maar wel deur abstrahering. In 'n modale aspek word tewens nie insig gekry deur middel van 'n empiries-induktiewe proses nie, want elke veralgemening het reeds die sin van die modale aspekte in gebruik geneem. Ook hou Fowler en Van der Walt se standpunt, naamlik dat God se skeppingsorde onkenbaar is, nie rekening met modale universaliteit nie. Ook die samehangende probleem van begrip en idee word geignoreer. Modale terme kan begripsmatig en ideernatig gebruik word. Die sinkerne van die modale aspekte oorstyg begripsvorming en is sodoende regulatief funderend vir die gebruik van begrippe. In hierdie opsig is daar reeds 'n rasionele verbinding tussen God se wetsorde en ons kennis daarvan, al is dit in ·n regulatief -funderende sin. In die geskiedenis van die wysbegeerte het modale universaliteit na vore gekom as allesomvattende grondnoemer waar daar ongelukkig nie rekening gehou is met die grense van die verskillende aspekte van die werklikheid nie. Hier stuit ons teen die probleem van reduksionisme wat daartoe aanleiding gegee het dat verskynsels nie doeltreffend verklaar kon word nie. So het byvoorbeeld die Pythagoreers getalle as die eerste in die hele natuur gesien. Die hemel (ouranos) is harmonie en getal. Die ontdekking van die irrasionale getal het duidelik die tekort van hierdie siening uitgewys. Die skuinssy van 'n reghoekige driehoek kon byvoorbeeld nie voorgestel word deur 'n eindige aantal heelgetalle nie. Die meganisme beskou meganisme as die enigste roete tot die verstaan van die natuur. Helmholtz het vir die eerste keer die kragbegrip gebruik as middelpunt van die verklaring van die hele natuur. 'n Belangrike gevolg hiervan is dat sinlike verskynsels of feitlike konklusies nie meer voldoende was vir die beskrywing van prinsipes nie. Die a prioriese modale dimensie van die werklikheid omvat elke faset van ons ervaring wat betaken dat ons ervaring nie gereduseer kan word na die sensitief-psigiese aspek van die werklikheid toe nie. Die getalsaspek stel ons in staat om ruimtelike relasies te aanvaar, ens. In die biologie tref ons die eensydighede van die nominalistiese afstammingsleer en die realistiese struktuuridee (morfologie) aan. Eersgenoemde gee aanleiding tot 'n chaotiese mengbeeld wat elke taksonomiese indeling van lewende entiteite in beginsel onmoontlik of volstrek willekeurig maak. Die idealistiese morfologie is egter platonisties. 'n Mens hoef nie in 'n idealistiese morfologie te verval om oortuig te wees dat die sistematiek van die natuurlike sisteem die grondslag vorm van die afstammingsleer nie. Ten slotte word Stegmuller se teoretisiteitskonsep bestudeer waar die wiskundige struktuur verwys na modale universaliteit. Hierdie struktuurkern is nie falsifiseerbaar nie en word aangedui as abstrakte gegenstande. Dit wat abstrak is, besit ook tegelyk die eienskap van universaliteit. Daar bestaan ook 'n implisiete diskontinuTteit in die denke van Stegmuller. Dit het te doen met die nominalistiese vereenselwiging van empirie met die konkreet-individuele. Stegmuller onderskei egter nie tussen die grense van die kinematiese aspek en die fisiese aspek nie. Die onderskeid tussen teoretiese en nie-teoretiese terme kan ook implisiet die grens tussen verskillende aspekte aandui. (Byvoorbeeld in die klassieke partikel-meganika waar ruimtelike terme nie-teoreties aangewend word.)af
dc.language.isoafaf
dc.publisherUniversity of the Free Stateen_ZA
dc.subjectThesis (Ph.D. (Philosophy))--University of the Free State, 1995en_ZA
dc.subjectUniversals (Philosophy)en_ZA
dc.subjectOntologyen_ZA
dc.titleModale universaliteitaf
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
dc.rights.holderUniversity of the Free Stateen_ZA


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