PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING:
A CASE STUDY OF THE BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

by

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BLOEMFONTEIN

January, 2018
Declaration

“I, Modeni M. SIBANDA, declare that the thesis that I herewith submit for the Degree, Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.”

Modeni M. Sibanda

Date: 22 January 2018
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Summary

Public participation in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) process does not take place in a vacuum; it is juxtaposed within contextual community realities of power, politics, institutional systemic practices and cultures, as well as inequities in resource capacity amongst other relational social practices. The value system, history, economy, socio-political dynamics, legal and administrative cultures, social conditions and power dynamics shape in critical ways the context of how public participation influences IDP outcomes. An exploration of public participation power dynamics is critical, since it signposts public participation constraints, deepens critical consciousness in public officials, and enables them to ameliorate injustice, thereby promoting community empowerment and distributive justice in integrated development planning and municipal strategic planning. The purpose of this study is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP process and explain how these dynamics influence IDP outcomes in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM). Public participation power dynamics pervasively influence the outcomes of IDP processes, in that forms of power shape the dynamics and outcomes of that process. The dialectical relationship between manifestations of power and community agency shape in complex ways why and how public participation may or might not be a space for giving voice to community priorities and needs.

The study uses an exploratory and explanatory case study research design and a mixed method research approach. A survey questionnaire located within the positivist paradigm and quantitative methodology, as well as focus group discussions situated within the interpretive paradigm and qualitative methodology were used as data collection methods. A final purposeful sample (n=229) consisting of ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders was used for the survey questionnaire. For the second method of data collection, focus group discussions, a final sample (n=34) was used. The results of the study suggest mixed views on respondents’ satisfaction with public participation in the IDP in BCMM. Findings also reveal lack of adequate requisite knowledge and understanding of the strategic nature of the IDP, as well as lack of competences for the public to meaningfully participate. Lack of capabilities and functionings disempowered, marginalised and excluded the public from participating and articulating community priorities and needs. Results further show that some residents get excluded from public participation spaces in the IDP, based on their political beliefs and affiliation. Other critically important voices are thus excluded.

Furthermore, the study findings indicate that residents in BCMM have low to stable levels of trust in the municipal council’s ability to deliver services in response to community priorities.
and needs. Findings thus suggest that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is tokenistic, mostly done to comply with statutory and regulatory precincts. This implies that public participation spaces in BCMM often fail to influence IDP outcomes in response to community priorities and needs. Thus, public participation power dynamics in the IDP in BCMM, marginalises and excludes less powerful interests. This study contributes to practice in that it reveals the underlying dynamics that are undocumented and not well understood in municipal planning. By exposing power dynamics, the study contributes to the empowerment and conscientisation of municipal residents, municipal public officials and other stakeholders with an interest in local governance and especially, public participation in the IDP processes. The study is therefore valuable as it reveals the complexities of how individuals and communities navigate forms of power. The study thus raises critical consciousness in municipal residents, communities and public officials, thus enabling them to address and challenge visible, hidden and invisible forms of power through behavioural changes, collective agency, local institutional, systemic and social reforms, and thereby promoting distributive justice and social equity.

**Key words:** Development, public participation, power dynamics, public value, social innovation, integrated development planning, Integrated Development Plan, Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
Opsomming

Openbare deelname aan die Geïntegreerde Ontwikkelingsplan (GO) is in ’n jukstaposisie teenoor die kontextuele realiteit van die gemeenskap ten opsigte van mag, politiek, institutionele sisteme en kulturele gebruik, sowel as die onbillike voorsiening van hulpbronne van verwante maatskaplike dienste. Die waardesisteem, geskiedenis, ekonomie, sosio-politieke dinamika, wetlike en administratiewe kulture, maatskaplike omstandighede en magsdinamika vorm die kritiese wyse waarop openbare deelname die GO beïnvloed. ’n Onderzoek na die magsdinamika van openbare deelname is belangrik aangesien dit dui op openbare deelname, die kritiese bewussyn van die amptenares verskyn en in staat stel om ongeregtigheid te verhelp. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die kritiese wyse waarop openbare deelname die GO beïnvloed. ’n Onderzoek na die magsdinamika van openbare deelname het ’n indringende invloed op die gevolge van die GO-prosesse deurdat dit die dinamika en gevolge van die proses vervorm. Die dialektiese verhouding tussen die openbaarmaking van mag en gemeenskapsagentskap vorm – op ’n ingewikkelde wyse – die wyse waarop openbare deelname mooi, of moontlik nie, ’n platform vir gemeenskapsbelange en – behoeftes kan wees.

’n Onsoukende en interpreterende gevallestudie met ’n gemengde navorsingsmetodiek is as benadering in hierdie studie aangewend. ’n Opnamevraelys binne die positivistiese paradigma en kwantitatiewe metodologie, tesame met fokusgroepbesprekings wat geskied het binne die interpretatiewe en kwalitatiewe metodologie, is benut as inligtingsversamelingsmetodiek. ’n Finale doelbewuste steekproef (n=229) bestaande uit wyksraadslede, wykskomiteelede, GO-verteenwoordigende forumlede en belanghebbende lede van die gemeenskap van die BCMM is vir die vraelys gebruik. Vir die tweede metode van inligtingsversameling naamlik fokusgroepbesprekings, is ’n finale steekproef (n=34) gebruik. Die resultate van die studie dui op uiteenlopende menings met betrekking tot openbare deelname aan die GO en BCMM by respondente. Bevindings toon verder ’n gebrek aan voldoende kennis en begrip van die strategiese wyse waarop die GO, sowel as ’n ontoereikende vermoë by die publiek vir betekenisvolle deelname. Gebrekkige vermoës en onmag het die publiek gemarginaliseer en van deelname aan die bepaling van gemeenskapsprioriteite en behoeftebepaling uitgesluit. Die resultate dui daarop dat sommige inwoners, as gevolg van politieke affiliasies en sienswyses uitgesluit word van openbare deelname van die GO. Sommige stemme wat van kritiese belang is, word sodoende uitgesluit.
Die studie bevind verder dat inwoners van die BCMM beperkte tot stabiele vlakke van vertroue het in die vermoë van die munisipaliteit vir dienslevering volgens die gemeenskap se prioriteite en behoeftes. Die bevindings dui daarop dat openbare deelname van die GO in BCMM slegs ‘n gehoor is sonder werklike betekenis aangesien dit blykbaar gedoen word teneinde aan die wet en maatreëls te voldoen. Dit sugureer dat funksies bedoel vir openbare deelname in BCMM dikwels nie daarin slaag om GO-beplanning te beïnvloed volgens die gemeenskap se prioriteite en behoeftes nie. Derhalwe word openbare deelname in GO in die BCMM gemarginaliseer en is daar beperkte begrip van deelname vir die bepaling van prioriteite en behoeftes. Belangrike stemme word sodoende uitgesluit.

Hierdie studie se bydrae tot die praktyk is daarin geleë dat die onderliggende dinamika wat nie voorheen beskryf is nie en in munisipale beplanning swak begryp is, blootgestel word. Die blootstelling van die kritiese magsdinamika dra by tot bewusmaking en bemagtiging van munisipale inwoners, die munisipale amptenary en ander belanghebbendes in plaaslike regering, sowel as in die besonder, in die belang van openbare deelname in die GO-proses. Die studie dra by tot ‘n kritiese bewusmaking by gemeenskappe in munisipale gebiede van hoe ingewikkeld dit vir enkelinge en gemeenskappe is om verskillende vorme van mag te bemeester. Dit moet gedragsverandering, samewerking, plaaslike institusionele, sistemiese en maatskaplike hervorming bewerkstellig ter versekering van geregtigheid en sosiale gelykheid.

**Sleutelwoorde:** Ontwikkeling, openbare deelname, magsdinamika, openbare waarde, sosiale vernuwing, geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsbeplanning, Geïntegreerde Ontwikkelingsplan, Buffalo City Metropolitaanse Munisipaliteit
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>BCMM</td>
<td>Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality</td>
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<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<td>DPLG</td>
<td>Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
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<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
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<td>GII</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>General Manager</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<td>HDRO</td>
<td>Human Development Report Office</td>
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<td>HOD</td>
<td>Head of Department</td>
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<td>IHDI</td>
<td>Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<td>LGTA</td>
<td>Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993)</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Member of the Executive Council</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
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<td>MGDS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Growth and Development Strategy</td>
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<td>MPI</td>
<td>Multidimensional Poverty Index</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000)</td>
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<td>MTESF</td>
<td>Mid-Term Expenditure Sectoral Framework</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PMS</td>
<td>Performance Management System</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>Public Value Management</td>
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<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rural Development Framework</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>Urban Development Framework</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION, OVERVIEW AND DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY FIELD

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In South Africa (SA), decades of apartheid stifled most forms of community initiatives, including public participation in development planning in the public affairs of municipalities. This was particularly so for certain racially marginalised sections of society. The post-1948 period signalled deepening separate development with its attendant racial, land use and institutional fragmentation. Legislation such as the Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950), the Group Areas Act (Act 36 of 1966) (as amended) and the Separate Amenities Act (Act 49 of 1953) maintained the racial character of the South African society. Practically, it meant that in terms of section 5(1) of the Population Registration Act (Act 30 of 1950), Whites, Coloureds and Africans had their own version of local government, although with different capacities and powers. The Group Areas Act (Act 36 of 1966) legislated the residential segregation and compulsory removal of Africans to ‘own group areas’ and restricted until 1982, the permanent presence of Africans in urban areas through the ‘pass system’ (Brogden and Shearing, 1993:71).

However, in 1977 the Community Councils Act (Act 125 of 1977), for the first time recognised the permanence of Africans in urban areas. Further attempts to reform separate development by reformists in the 1980s, involved the consolidation of the homeland system, and the passing of the Black Local Authorities Act (Act 110 of 1982). The South African government during that period developed local government along unequal social, spatial and economic lines. It created and perpetuated local separation and inequality, as in separate municipal institutions which had different political, social and financial power bases as well as administrative capacity. Public participation by large sections of the population in the development structures of local government during that time remained distant and remote, both geographically and in terms of the impact on people’s lives. Through racial separation, influx-control and a policy of ‘own management for own areas’ the then system of local government placed little emphasis on democratic participation in local governance by the majority of citizens.

During the 1970s and 1980s, local government therefore became one of the principal battlegrounds in the struggle against apartheid. Township revolts and the campaigns of non-payment, ‘the rent boycotts’ greatly disrupted the then government’s attempts to stabilise local government in the townships (Chaskalson, Jochelson and Seekings, 1987:51-54). The transformative 1990s, an outcome of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA,
I and II) talks, created a framework for a transition of local government in South Africa to full democracy. The first post-apartheid legislation to be introduced at the local level was the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) (Act 209 of 1993).


A paradigm shift advocating public participation in integrated development planning thus appeared on the development scene in the early 1990s with the demise of apartheid in 1994. A new developmental role for local government mandated municipalities to be responsive to people’s needs and to be accountable. Section 152(1)(e) of the Constitution states that, it is the objective of local government to “encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government”. Therefore, the institution of local government, as stated by the Constitution, has to enhance opportunities for public participation, by placing more power and resources at a closer and more easily influenced level of government. However, Section 152(2) is significant in that it stipulates that a municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative capacity to achieve the goals set out in Section 152(1). This therefore means that, where a municipality lacks this financial and administrative capacity, then it does not have to do it. The IDP, the most important 5-year strategic development document of a municipality in South Africa’s legislation, was implemented to be the principal development tool for municipalities (Section 23(1)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000).

As indicated in Sections 28(2) and (3) and 29(1)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), a bottom-up structured decision-making process, which allows broad public participation is a requirement of the integrated development planning process. The idea is that, in deliberative discourses between different stakeholders a strategy for poverty alleviation should be developed. The IDP, thus, serves as the basis for communication and interaction within municipal structures. It is a planning mechanism through which constitutional
obligations are matched with autonomous prioritisation of locally generated development agendas. The process of integrated development planning is one through which a municipality can establish a development plan for the short (one year), medium (two to three years) and long-term (four to five years).

The IDP establishes frameworks and sets goals to meet needs, devises strategies to achieve the goals within time frames and develops and implements projects and programmes to achieve key objectives. This plan recognises the complex interrelationships between various aspects of development, such as political, social, economic, environmental, ethical, infrastructural and spatial relations. At its core the IDP places emphasis on the public participation of all stakeholders in developing local governance strategies that supports local citizens' understandings of how an area ought to develop. Public participation is, however, inevitably pervaded by the presence of power dynamics that impinge upon successful integrated development plan outcomes.

To promote and support public participation in the integrated development planning process, local government structures are expected to promote meaningful public participation by a number of stakeholders, who in the case of BCMM include, the executive mayor, municipal manager, municipal council, ward committee members, the IDP and organisational performance management portfolio committee, the IDP/budget/performance management system technical working group, the IDP strategic working groups and the representative forum and community stakeholders. A stakeholder is defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984:46 as cited in Gossy, 2008:6).

The following stakeholders, for the purposes of this study, the ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders are key structures in public participation during the IDP review process. They participate within a context of power asymmetry imbalances. The ward committee, a structure for participatory governance, channels information between ward committee members and their representative ward councillors in the BCMM. Again, in the BCMM, the IDP representative forum (BCMM, IDP Review, 2013-2013:17) as a structure institutionalises sectoral public participation in the IDP process. The members of the IDP representative forum and community stakeholders include business, NGO sectors as well as political and technical leaders in the IDP clusters. They represent the interests of their constituents in the IDP process.
The BCMM assumed the category ‘A’ (metropolitan status) in May 2011. The transition necessitated the development of an IDP to guide development over the period 2011 to 2016. Thus, pursuant to and in terms of Section 28(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) the BCMM adopted the Integrated Development Plan 2011-2016 on 30 June 2011.

The BCMM espouses values committed to serving its communities and providing services that are consistent with good governance, transparency and accountability. Thus, one goal of the BCMM for promoting good governance is realising a viable and caring institution, embodying the values, principles and best practices for public participation in integrated development planning (BCMM IDP Review, 2012/13). Good governance should in the main be participatory, transparent, democratic and accountable in nature (Masango, 2002:54-56).

In its municipal situation analysis undertaken towards the development of the IDP, the BCMM identified a number of challenges and inefficiencies that limit the manner in which communities participate in the public affairs of the municipality. To address the identified challenges and work towards the realisation of the municipal vision and good governance it has identified six strategic focal areas and set long-term strategic objectives to achieve them. Strategic objective two of the IDP specifically envisions the desire for the municipality to be an institutionally efficient and effective city that inclusively works with communities (BCMM IDP Review, 2012/13).

This study therefore sought to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process and how these dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. The thesis will consist of 8 chapters. Chapter 1, sets the tone and focus for the study. It provides the introduction to the study, the background and rationale for the study, the main research problem, research question, and the aim and objectives that will help to focus the study. Chapter 1 will end by defining key terms that are integral to this thesis.

Chapter 2 establishes a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning. Chapter 3 further conceptualises, theorises and contextualises public participation in integrated development planning through a review of related literature. In Chapter 4, the methodology applied in this study will be presented and motivated. Analysis, interpretation and discussion of results will be handled in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Lastly, Chapter 8 will summarise the study, make some recommendations and conclude the study.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND REASON FOR THE STUDY

Initially the BCMM was established as a local municipality in 2000 after South Africa's reorganisation of municipal areas and is named after the Buffalo River, at whose mouth lies the only river port in South Africa (BCMM 2014/2015:13; Main, 2015:46). On 18 May 2011 it was separated from the Amathole District Municipality and converted into a metropolitan municipality (Main, 2015:46). The BCMM is one of the eight metropolitan municipalities in SA and one of two major urban conurbations within the Eastern Cape Province, the other being Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM, Metro Growth and Development Strategy – Vision, 2030:7). The BCMM chose an executive committee system combined with the ward committee system. The council has 100 councillors, of which 50 of the councillors represent political parties through proportional representation and the other 50 councillors represent the 50 wards in the BCMM (BCMM Annual Report, 2015/2016:44). The 50 ward councillors work with ward committees as a platform for interacting with various interest groups in the ward. It is through the work of these ward committees that community meetings are organised to advance the public participation and accountability of councillors (BCMM Annual Report, 2015/2016:44).

The BCMM is situated on the east coast Eastern Cape province. It is is bordered by the Great Kei, Amahlathi, Nkonkobe and Ngqushwa local municipalities. The city is bound to the south-east by the coastline along the Indian Ocean. The metropolitan area is approximately 2,515km² in surface and includes some 82km of coastline (BCMM, 2011:7). The BCMM consists of towns which include King William's Town, Bhisho and East London, as well as the large townships of Mdantsane and Zwelitsha. East London is the primary node, whilst King William’s Town is the secondary node. This metropolitan is broadly characterised by three main identifiable land use patterns and these are urban areas, rural settlement areas and commercial farmland (BCMM IDP Review, 2012/13:20).

The BCMM has an estimated 247759 households with an average household size of 3.3 persons per household and an estimated population of 810 528 (Statistics South Africa, 2016:3-4). This represents approximately 11.5% of the total population of the Eastern Cape Province, contained within an area of approximately 1.5% of the province. The average population density is 300 people per square kilometre. The annual rate of population growth averaged 0.6% between 1996 and 2001, and 0.7% between 2001 and 2011. This is slightly higher than the provincial average annual population growth rate, reported as being 0.4% for these periods that are 1996-2001 and 2001-2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2011).
The BCMM has developed its 2030 Metropolitan Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) (BCMM Vision, 2030:7). The 2030 MGDS serves as a major plan for the growth and development of the City. It also mobilises the partners towards a determined development programme. It further commits and encourages business and other stakeholders to invest in support of the municipality’s 2030 vision. The strategy is underpinned by various strategic policy frameworks. These include: The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Sustainable Development Goals’ declaration that aims to promote a comprehensive approach for addressing development issues across a broad front. The White Paper on Local Government of 1998, the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP), considered as South Africa’s “long-term socio-economic development roadmap” and the Eastern Cape MTESF priorities comprising of: job creation, better access to health, education, rural development and fighting against crime guides the MGDS (BCMM, 2030:8).

The transition to a metro necessitated the development of a revised IDP to guide development over the period 2011 to 2016 in BCMM. The BCMM espouses values committed to serving its communities and providing services that are consistent with good governance, transparency and accountability. In its municipal situation analysis undertaken towards the development of the IDP, BCMM identified a number of challenges, constraints and inefficiencies that limit the manner in which communities participate in the public affairs of the municipality (BCMM, 2011-2016:99-109). To address the identified challenges and work towards the realisation of the municipal vision, it has identified six strategic focal areas and set-long term strategic objectives to achieve them. Strategic objective two of the IDP, specifically envisions the desire for the municipality to be an institutionally efficient and effective city that inclusively works with communities (BCMM, 2012/13).
1.2.1 The concept public participation

Turner and Hulme (1997:113) noted that bureaucratic cultures and structures often emphasise top-down decision-making, a relative autonomy in deciding who gets what services and an assumption of technical superiority by elected and appointed public officials. They further note that individuals, groups and organisations in the community often have little or no input into deciding what services they receive and again little influence over the quality of services (Turner and Hulme, 1997:113). Masango (2002:52) holds that public participation democratises local governance, by affording communities platforms for information sharing, discussing community needs and priorities and engaging with policy-makers and implementers of integrated development plans.

As Craythorne (1997:99) aptly puts it, “the secret of public participation is to ensure that the relevant publics are approached on any particular issue”. The public can include individual citizens, community groups and interest groups (Thomas, 1995:1). Public participation theorists (Pateman, 1970; Abers, 1998:527) are of the view that public participation eventually creates its own preconditions, that is, it produces an anthropological transformation from self-serving actors to ethical ones and, at a limit, even moral actors.

In this regard, Masango (2002:52) notes that public participation lies at the heart of democracy. Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution supports this view when it states that local government exists, among other things, in order to provide services to communities in a sustainable manner. As argued by Masango (2002:56) for proper service delivery to occur at local government level, members of the community should receive information about such service from the local government, otherwise they may resist and/or reject the delivery of such service. The Constitution prescribes that democracy is both representative and participatory. Section 57(1)(b) of the Constitution, sets out the objectives of local government which are to provide democratic and accountable local government for local communities and to encourage the participation of communities and community organisations in matters of local governance. In terms of section 152(2) of the Constitution, municipalities are required to strive, within their financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objectives as set out in section 152(1). They are to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in municipal affairs.

Section 195(1)(c) of the Constitution further provides that public administration must be development-oriented. Public administration is development-oriented and accountable when it responds to people’s needs (Venter, 1997:230) through public participation in integrated development planning. Brynard (1996a:40) therefore views public participation in integrated
development planning as a mechanism by which information about local conditions, needs, desires, and attitudes can be obtained from communities and other stakeholders affected by planning decisions. Thus, in terms of sections 195(1)(e)(f) of the Constitution, this happens when people are encouraged to participate in municipal decision-making processes and needs are responded to.

Responding to citizens’ needs and doing so in an accountable manner is therefore the overarching justification for public participation in integrated development planning municipalities such as the BCMM in the Eastern Cape Province in SA. Chambers (1997) coined the term responsible well-being. The term “recognises obligations to others, both those alive and future generations, and to their quality of life” (Chambers 2005:193-194). The extent to which individuals have agency, vary with wealth and power, and thus responsibilities and obligations also vary accordingly. Chambers (2005:193) describes well-being as the ‘experience of good quality of life’. Responsible well-being is about using agency, about doing as well as being, in a responsible way to bring about good change.

When well-being is qualified by equity and sustainability it becomes responsible wellbeing (Chambers, 2005:193). A hallmark of the well-being approach in development is its positive focus, and its appreciation of what people can do and be. Accordingly, Marks and Shah (2004:2) see well-being as a way of living, a multi-dimensional process, in which people lead flourishing lives. It is about “developing as a person, being fulfilled, and making a contribution to the community” (Marks and Shah, 2004:2). Chambers (2005:203) writes of a rise in agency and correspondingly of responsibility, as citizens become “more able to exert influence than before” through public participation spaces. Responsible well-being, directs attention directly towards power relations by emphasising the need for the powerful to take responsibility and use their power to empower rather than dominate.

Thus, dealing with power dynamics is critical if public participation in integrated development planning is to unmask abuses of power and more structural and enduring systemic inequity (Cullen, Tucker, Snyder, Lema and Duncan, 2014:262). Gaventa (2006) has sought to understand the ways in which power operates, particularly within spaces which aim to increase public participation in policy processes in the field of development. Gaventa (2006a:25) developed a three dimensional model of power based on the Rubix cube, the power cube. Its three dimensions represent the forms, spaces and levels of power (Cornwall, 2002:52; Brosnan, 2012:46).
Similarly, Rolfe (2016:99) contributes new perspectives to the big society/localism discourse and emerging discussions around community empowerment (Arnstein, 1969:217) in the IDP review process. The literature regarding community strength identifies three key empowerment elements, loosely defined as resources, organisational capacity and ‘community wiring’ (Taylor, 2003:17; Somerville, 2011:10-11). Localism rests on community strength and the belief that, “communities are strongest when everyone has a free and fair say in the decisions that affect them” (Conservative Party, 2009:2). Hence, Arnstein’s (1969:216) rejoinder that “participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process”.

Todaro (1994:566) contends that integrated development planning is often a deliberate attempt to coordinate development planning and decision-making over the long run and to influence, direct and even control the level and growth of social and economic variables. In contrast, the Draft National Policy Framework for Public Participation (SA, 2005:1) commits municipalities to forms of public participation, which are genuinely empowering people, and not only a token of consultation or manipulation. Development theorists further stress the critically important symbiotic relationship between democracy and development. For example, Stiglitz (2002:163-182) advocates the primacy of participatory processes (‘voice’, ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’) as citizen empowering conditions for promoting successful long-term development. Dreze and Sen (2002:3) view the notion of ‘opportunity’ as instrumental to a people-centred approach in which human agency is central. For Dreze and Sen (2002:6-7) social opportunities expand the realm of human agency and freedom, both as an end in itself and as a means of further expansion of freedom. Sen (1999:18) advocates a capability approach to development. Sen (1999) views development as both a measure of and dependent upon individual freedom and the expansion of capabilities of persons to lead the kind of lives they value and have reason to value (Sen, 1999:18).

Thus, in the context of a municipality, the planning, drafting, adoption and review of the IDP (BCMM IDP, 2011/2016:18) through public participation ensures that it remains the principal management tool and strategic instrument and that the IDP “constitutes the centrepiece of developmental local government” that also “gives effect to the constitutionally prescribed role of local governments of promoting economic and social development in South Africa” (Aklilu, Belete and Moyo, 2014:257). At a community level public participation fosters economic, social, spatial and cultural growth. Hence, defining public participation as an empowering process enabling local people to make their own decisions is crucial (Hofisi, 2014:1131). In this regard it becomes imperative that a well-crafted public participation strategy for the planning, drafting, adoption and review of the IDP be put in place by every municipality.
In local government the public participates at four levels: *firstly*, as voters where citizens ensure maximum democratic accountability of the elected political leadership for policies they are empowered to promote. *Secondly*, as citizens they express their views before, during and after the integrated development planning process to ensure that policies reflect community preferences. *Thirdly*, as consumers and end users, they expect value for money, affordable services, and courteous and responsible service. *Finally*, citizens participate as partners in the mobilisation of resources for development and as such have a right to demand transparency, accountability and to be consulted in matters that affect them (Mogale in Mhone and Adigheji, 2003:220; Bauer, 2009:32). The IDP therefore has to get legitimacy from the residents of a municipality, and this can only happen within the context of a community empowering public participation process.

Various authors on public participation literature point to an epistemological shift in planning theory from rational-instrumental rationality to a communicative/collaborative and deliberative democratic theory that now mostly directs planning efforts (Crewe, 2001:435; Yilmaz, 2002:23; Corbun, 2003:420; Fiskaa, 2005:160-1; Forester, 2006:447). Transactive planning advocated by Friedmann (1973) also responds to failures of the synoptic/technical/bureaucratic planning models, which arguably were given a logical structure by Howard and Geddes (Hall, 1992:59).

Planning from the transactive perspective of Lane (2005:293) heralds a new era for public participation in that different stakeholders in integrated development planning become conduits for information dissemination, since the public is encouraged to actively engage in planning processes (Lane, 2005:293). Transactive planning is also normatively linked to advocacy planning, advocated by Davidoff (1965) and a more sophisticated description later provided by Mazziotti (1982) which is predicated on the assumption of social and political pluralism (Faludi, 1973:137). Public participation in integrated development planning and involving communities in their local environments serves as a basis for a participatory democracy where “collective decision-making is highly decentralised throughout all sectors of society, so that all individuals learn participatory skills and can effectively participate in various ways in the making of all decisions that affect them” (Sanoff, 2006:133).

### 1.2.2 The concept of power in public participation

However, due to the growing pluralisation, multiculturalisation and neoliberalisation of the BCMM’s social and economic structures and the wicked nature of integrated development planning problems and solutions, participatory processes are now increasingly challenged by
what has been conceptualised as the politics of public participation and the politics of decision-making. Wright (1997:110) similarly notes that community needs cannot be considered without also raising questions of conflicts, domination and subordination. Wright (1997:110) argues that “the worlds inhabited by some groups work against the needs and interests of others”. Public participation in integrated development planning often has to deal with deep differences, conflicts and power asymmetries that result from divergent interaction between the structuring forces (resources, discourses, regulations and procedures) and the actors (individuals, groups or institutions that regulate, produce and use a public participation spaces in integrated development planning) (Darl, 1957:203; Bourdieu, 1990:112-123; Honneth, 1991:298; Putnam, 1993:6; Lukes, [1974] 2005:12).

Thus, differences, conflicts and power dynamics that characterise public participation represent major challenges for participatory processes within the integrated development planning public spaces. As argued by Massey (2005:152) public participation and development planning spaces should be conceived of as the “product of social relations which are most likely conflicting and unequal … are a product of, and internally dislocated by, heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting social identities/relations, power asymmetries and value-laden power struggles and dynamics”. Similarly, Cornwall (2002:8) posits that public participation spaces in which citizens are invited to participate, as well as those that they create for themselves, are never neutral. Greenberg and Mathoho (2010:14) noted that public participation is often influenced by manifestations of party politics in ward committees. Smith and De Visser (2009:16-22) add that “formally created, government sanctioned ‘invited’ spaces such as ward committees, imbizos and public hearings, crowd out other spaces through which citizens prefer to participate on their own terms”.

Falling within the radical social transformation planning tradition, the Frankfurt School’s critical theory concerns itself with advocating the interests of less articulate policy actors and seeks social change to improve the conditions of the disenfranchised (Lane, 2005:293). Closely linked to the Marxist planning tradition its assumptions are that the capitalist state and mode of production is primarily responsible for inequitable distribution of money, status, and power and this failure of distribution is the source of local government and service delivery malaise (Lane, 2005:294). In terms of public participation in integrated development planning, while Marxists advocate grassroots action, they offer no suggestion for coping with the dominance of the ‘haves’ rather than the ‘have nots’ in integrated development planning (Lane, 2005:294). Sanoff (2000:15) recognises that within “pluralism, consensus may not be accepted with welcoming arms”. He further recognised that in an agreement-oriented process the pressure of arriving at a
consensus constrains the argumentative process and silences those who are marginalised or have dissenting opinions (Sanoff, 2006:139).

Alternatively, the bargaining planning approach is premised on the assumption that transactions exist between two or more parties, which establish “what each shall give or perform and receive” (Dorcey, 1986:83). This suggests that, planning decisions are a product of give and take between active participants in integrated development planning. Forester (1989:19) therefore recognises the uneven distribution of power to bargain, which this study assumes to be a reality during public participation in integrated planning in municipalities such as the BCMM. For its part, integrated development can be taken to mean good change, raising questions of power and relationships concerning who says what is good and who identifies what change matters — whether municipal officials ‘professionals’ do, or whether it is ‘the public’ — those who are poor, marginalised, vulnerable and excluded (Chambers, 2013:2).

Against this background, this study postulates that power asymmetries and the related power dynamics are key variables in determining whose interests are or are not catered for during public participation in integrated development planning. Bargaining, transacting and collaborating with others are thus expressions of power dynamics among participants in integrated development planning in municipalities such as the BCMM. A criticism of policy networks is that they merely describe the various stakeholders involved in public participation and decision-making processes, without explaining the direction or strength of various influences impinging upon participatory spaces (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001:37). Public participation in local governance, which is closely bound up with the notion multi-agency working and policy networks, is vulnerable to similar criticism. The complexity of local governance needs further and better understanding of the politics of public participation, in other words, who wields real power and nature and extent of such power as well as its dynamics in IDP review processes.

This study therefore sought to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process. Furthermore, the research endeavours to explain how these dynamics influence IDP outcomes in the BCMM. A questionnaire survey (quantitative method) was used as the first method of data collection. Focus group discussions (qualitative method) were used as the second method of data collection (see, Addenda G and I).

Analysis, interpretation and discussion of results from Sections B and C of the survey questionnaire administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative
forum members and community stakeholders, using Chapters 2 and 3 as a point of departure was handled in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively (Objectives, 1, 2 and 3). The researcher makes recommendations that bridge public participation power asymmetries, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the IDP review process (Chapter 8).

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM
While the importance of public participation is well captured in various enabling legislative frameworks in SA, and clearly expressed in the broader notion of developmental local government and integrated development planning, an enduring problem is that public participation in integrated development planning in the BCMM is not, as often thought of, an apolitical, value-free, technocratic process serving a common public interest. Power asymmetries are omnipresent, in various forms and levels and as such power dynamics are constantly at play (often invisible) when various stakeholders participate in integrated development planning spaces. Given the exigencies of the municipal council within the public realm and its relationship with political systems and influences, it becomes an arena for intense and often heated power struggles and power games (Coetzee and Orange, 2006:1). Power asymmetries inevitably exude unequal power relationships (Healey, 2003:113) undermining the potential of public participation as a space for influencing integrated development planning, among stakeholders with access to different levels and forms of power (Gaventa, 2006a:25), which include economic or political power, valued knowledge or socio/cultural capital. This inevitably leads to stakeholders wielding power, influence and capacity, which affects which and whose interests or values are included or excluded in the IDP review process (Bourdieu, 1990:112-123; Harbermas, 1996:26; Coetzee and Orange, 2006:1).

Stakeholders’ power, capital, capacity as well as values and preferences have pervasive effects on ‘which’ and ‘whose’ interests or values are included or excluded during public participation. Power asymmetries are pervasive, in various forms and levels and power dynamics are constantly at play (often invisible) when stakeholders participate in the IDP review process (Gaventa, 2006a:25). Thus, in practice; ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders with different conflicting interests, life experiences, political affiliations and value systems, increase the scope for conflict and power struggles over often conflicting public values, with stakeholders staking vested interests in the IDP review process (Buccus et al., 2008:306). Public participation in integrated planning in reality, is consequently often superficial, falling short of tapping into the real power-base, where decisions affecting communities are made (Todes, Sithole and Williamson, 2007:122). Only a privileged few access ‘invited spaces’ (Buccus et al., 2008:306) and usually professional
experts and interests dominate and influence Integrated Development Plan priorities and outcomes.

The problem is therefore that public participation spaces often neglect and fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to deal with the complex power dynamics among stakeholders in IDP review processes. Existing ‘invited spaces’ are thus largely ceremonial and without much bearing on the planning, development and reviews of IDPs responsive to most residents’ needs. Through the inclusion and exclusion of knowledge, or information, power dynamics frame and influence specific ways by which community problems and needs are understood, creates boundaries on possible solutions and determines how results are evaluated during public participation in the IDP review process. The above discussion has provided a basis on which the problem of the study will be explored. The study will therefore be guided by the following two research questions:

(i) What is the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process in the BCMM?; and

(ii) How do those dynamics influence the outcomes of the IDP in the BCMM?

1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process. Furthermore, the research will endeavour to explain how these dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. Consequently, the objectives of this study are:

(i) To establish a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning (Chapter 2) and public participation (Chapter 3) in integrated development planning, through an inclusive study of related literature and official documents;

(ii) To conduct a questionnaire survey (quantitative method) and focus group discussions (qualitative method) to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process. The research design and methodology will be discussed in Chapter 4.

(iii) To analyse findings from the secondary and primary data in order to gain insights into how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence participants during public participation in the IDP review process in BCMM in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively.

(iv) To make recommendations that bridge public participation power asymmetries, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the IDP review process. This will be presented in Chapter 8.
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
An exploratory and explanatory case study research design was used to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process and how they influence the IDP outcomes in BCMM. A mixed methodology approach was used, as both quantitative and qualitative methodologies were deemed most appropriate for this study. A questionnaire survey (quantitative method) was used as the first method of data collection. Focus group discussions (qualitative method) were used as the second method of data collection (see, Addenda G and I). The data collected were supported by a comprehensive literature survey in Chapters 2 and 3, which sought to establish conceptual, theoretical foundations and frameworks for contextualising public participation in integrated development planning (see objective 1).

A pilot study using a draft questionnaire was performed on 16 respondents with similar characteristics. Based on feedback from this pilot study adjustments were made to the final questionnaire. Data were processed both quantitatively using statistics and qualitatively using NVivo 8 computer software. Interviews were transcribed verbatim in the informants’ own words. The research design and methodology will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

1.6 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
Contexts characterised by divergent interactions and by differences, conflicts and power relations that it creates are common to public participation spaces in integrated development planning where the involvement of local communities in decision-making is highly demanded. Municipalities continue to be challenged by the fact that they have to involve a wide variety of stakeholders with contrasting economic, socio-political and symbolic interests, values and claims (or inter-group differences). They increasingly deal with problems and solutions that are highly multifaceted, difficult to define and increasingly conditioned by an economic or market rationality (state-citizen differences and wicked problems). Municipal councils have to cope with different ways in which public participation stakeholders deploy their power to create specific physical, social and political demands (power-relations, power dynamics and power asymmetries). This study has framed the foregoing as public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process.

Despite this commonality, little attention has been given to unravelling the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process and to establishing how those dynamics influence the outcomes of the IDP in South African municipalities in general
and the BCMM in particular. Thus, the differences, conflicts and power asymmetries that result in power dynamics influencing the IDP review process and IDP outcomes, have not been sufficiently addressed through formal research. The challenges that public participation in the IDP review process often encounter thus continue unabated. Consequently, this research highlights the need to address those challenges as an important and necessary step in the theorisation of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process.

The study as such extends and contributes to furthering knowledge on the politics of public spaces and decision-making (the deep differences, conflicts and power dynamics) that pervade public participation in the IDP review process. Both the empirical and theoretical work contained in this study are considered to stand as a significant contribution and a starting point for developing a theoretical approach to better understand influences of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process.

The practical contribution of this study is that it makes visible the underlying dynamics that are undocumented and are often not recognised in public participation spaces in the IDP process. By understanding these power dynamics, municipal residents, public officials in municipalities and other stakeholders with an interest in local governance can better understand the institutional as well as structural forces that they may face in public participation spaces in the IDP processes. The public will thus be more able to navigate power dynamics if they are aware of unjust power inequalities and are more likely to oppose inferiority stereotypes, marginalisation and exclusion.

The study established a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning (Chapter 2) (Section B of questionnaire) and public participation (Chapter 3) (Section C of the questionnaire) in integrated development planning, through an inclusive study of related literature (Addendum G). At an empirical level, it conducted a questionnaire survey and focus group discussions to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process (see Chapter 4). The approach adopted (using Chapter 2, as a point of departure to develop the survey questionnaire questions in Section B (objective 1) and using Chapter 3 as a point of departure to develop the survey questionnaire questions in Section C (objective 1) and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively) has deep implications on how public participation is understood and implemented in practice. It raises critical and hard to answer questions for practitioners in local government about the meaning of public participation and just decision-making in the IDP review processes in contemporary South African local government administration; about the way public
participation is currently practised; about what it is supposed to deliver; and about how to evaluate its success at a local level.

By raising these questions, it is believed here that the theoretical contribution of this study becomes highly relevant to practice. Not only because it provides knowledge that can be unwrapped in a direct, instrumental way, but since the critical and reflective knowledge that it provides and aims at achieving has the potential and goal of making a difference in the practitioner’s frame of understanding, and thus his/her frame of actions. Such a difference allows practitioners to be better prepared when dealing with public participation invited spaces for developing, adopting and reviewing IDPs.

The study will therefore significantly assist practitioners to better understand and more precisely adapt to the limitations and possibilities of each context and each IDP programme/project, and to make better use of the resources that are available, including the competences and capabilities of municipal public officials and stakeholders in public participation. All this, with the goal of reaching better and more just decision-making processes in the IDP review processes in municipalities. Such an approach establishes fairness and competence as two central components of a normative definition of ‘good’ public participation in the IDP review process.

1.7 EXPLANATION OF TERMS
The following sections explain key terms in this study as follows:

1.7.1 Public Participation
Public participation, is often conceptualised as grassroots community engagement (Arnstein 1969:216-224; Weiner 1995:30-44; White 1996:6-17; Lijphart 1997:2-9; Surbun 2003:369-376; Forester 2006:447-456; Gbaffou 2008:1-7). The World Bank (1996:3) is of the view that public participation refers to “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them”. Arnstein (1969:216) dealt with the issue of public participation and its role in power distribution in her famous article “A Ladder of Citizen Participation”. Arnstein (1969:216) views public participation as a form of power, defining it as “the distribution of power that enables the have-not citizens presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future”. Thomas (1995:55-6) defines the public as including; “all organised and unorganised groups of citizens or citizen representatives who could (a) provide information about preferences that might, for example, be useful in resolving public issues, or (b) affect the ability to implement a decision by accepting or facilitating implementation”.

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Masango (2002:53) views it as “a process in which members of the public – as individuals, members of groups, or group representatives deliberately take part in a goal-oriented activity, such as the IDP review process”. The overarching conceptual values of public participation include, but are not limited to, inclusiveness, openness, access, consultation, shared decisions and transparency (Smith 2003:36-39; Du Plessis 2008:1-33; Manjoo and Czapanskiy 2008:1-10). Murambo (2008:124-127) asserts that citizens’ voices and participation are at the centre of democratic government. As such, the official definition of public participation as set out by the SA government and also adopted in this study is “an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision-making. It is further defined as a democratic process of engaging people in deciding, planning, and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives” (DPLG 2005:1).

1.7.2 Integrated Development Planning
Section 152(1)(c) of the Constitution obliges municipalities to promote economic development of communities. To further clarify the role of municipalities, Section B of the White Paper on Local Government, 1998 introduced the concept of developmental local government. Paragraph 1 of Section B of the White Paper defines developmental local government as “local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives,” as one of the characteristic of developmental local government (RSA, 1998:17). The Preamble to the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) mandates municipalities to promote “the notion of developmental local government”, through the formulation and adoption of a single and inclusive IDP that is a principal strategic instrument which guides and informs all planning, budgeting and management decisions (DPLG, 1999:9) in all municipalities. South Africa’s IDPs are a form of strategic planning that aim to achieve integrated development. IDPs are intended to be holistic multi-sectoral plans, which guide the future development of the municipality, giving direction to both the municipality and other spheres of government operating in the area (Todes, 2004:844). The IDP includes a spatial development framework, expenditure priorities and projects for implementation over a five year period. As a planning approach, the IDP shifts towards a more integrated approach to policy coordination. It encapsulates environmental, social and economic factors as cross-cutting concerns in policy.

This creates a planning model based on a single plan that brings together various sectoral action plans into a sustainable integrated development process. The IDPs therefore reflect an interest in
multi-sector, integrated, bottom-up approaches to developmental local development. They give effect to the notions of ‘developmental local government’, namely to align resources around the chosen development directions of the municipality, and to ensure both horizontal integration between sectors within local government, and vertical integration with other spheres of government (Todes, 2004:849). The concept of integrated development planning refers to “participatory approach to integrated economic, sectorial, spatial, social, institutional, environmental and the fiscal in order to support the optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and geographical areas and across the population in a manner that provides sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and the marginalised” (DPLG, 2000:15).

Integrated development planning, hence in the context of this study, refers to a process through which a municipality establishes its vision for the future and designs a development plan. It entails the following: assessing the current situation, prioritising the needs of communities, setting goals to meet those needs, devising strategies to meet those needs, developing and implementing projects and programmes, budgeting effectively within limited resources, setting targets so that performance can be measured, and regularly monitoring the development programmes (DPLG, 1999/2000:4; Reddy, Sing and Moodley, 2003:72-73; BCMM, 2016/2017:3-13; Mashiachidi and Moeti, 2016:400-401).

1.7.3 Power dynamics

Based on Lukes (1974) and Gaventa’s (2006a:25) power cube outlines three forms of power: visible, hidden and invisible forms. Weber, (1957) in Dunkerley (1972:17) defines power as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his/her own will despite resistance, and regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. Public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process, to follow Flyvbjerg’s theorisation, can best be comprehended as “to properly unveil the ‘dark side’ of planning” that is... “the tactics and strategies inherent in power dynamics, so that the abuses of power can be countered” (Watson, 2002:180). Roy (2001:119) rejects the idea of objective rules and the possibility of communication free of domination. However, Innes (2004:13) is of the view that external power disparities are not deterministic, as consensus building processes result in the production of ‘network power’ – power that grows as it is shared and not a zero sum game, – which allows for greater and longer empowerment of all stakeholders.

Irazábel’s (2009:124) conception of power as the capacity to make things happen (‘power to’ or ‘network power’) make others do things (‘power over’), or prevent things from happening
‘preemptive power’), informs the notion of power dynamics in this study. Different modes of power dynamics operate simultaneously. There are occasions where ‘power to’ or ‘network power’ (gaining a capacity to act, or to act cooperatively and to mutual benefits, respectively) and other occasions in which ‘power over’ others’ (controlling others’ actions) can be exercised during public participation in the IDP review process in the BCMM. DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999:22) concede that, this is accomplished ‘either by defeating them’ (dominating power), persuading ‘them’ (bargaining power), or precluding ‘them’ from the decision-making process (preemptive power). For Rinehart [1975] (2001:14) alienation is “objective or structural in the sense that it is built into human relationships and exists independently of how individuals perceive and evaluate this condition”.

Further extending the notion of power dynamics, the community power paradigm advocates that, having power means the ability to have people do something that they otherwise would not have done (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999:19). Pluralist, elite, and non-decisional theorists agree that political power is exercised to gain dominion over others. However differences among community power theorists relate to the form in which power is exercised, not in what is or why it is deployed (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999:19). Following that trend of thought, Davies (2002:6) conceptualised power as social production that derives from the interfaces between systemic and preemptive power. Hence, following Stone’s (1989:227) line of thought, advocating that the power struggle, referred to as power dynamics, embraces not only the control and resistance, but also the attainment and coalescing of capacity to act – power to, not power over. Accordingly, power dynamics in this study are conceptualised as the strategic deployment of ‘practices of cooperation and non-cooperation’ through different forms of power manifested through public participation in IDP review processes. It interfaces between systemic (structure) and pre-emptive (agency) power.

1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE
The thesis consists of eight chapters demarcated as follows:
Chapter 1, is providing the introduction, overview and demarcation of the study. This includes the background and reason for the study, the problem statement, research questions, as well as the aim and objectives that help focus the study. The chapter points out that a mixed-method research approach, utilising quantitative and qualitative methodologies was used in this study. The chapter also points out that a questionnaire survey (quantitative method) (administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders) was used as the first method of data collection and focus group discussions (qualitative method) as the second method (see, Addenda G and I). The chapter further points
out that data collected was supported by a comprehensive review of related literature and official documents in chapters, 2 and 3 (see objective 1). Chapter one ended by defining key terms that are integral to this study.

Chapter 2 establishes a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning (see Section, B: Survey questionnaire) through a review of literature related to the study (Objective 1). Chapter 3 further conceptualises, theorises and contextualises public participation in integrated development planning, through a review of related literature and official documents. The chapter seeks to establish conceptual and theoretical frameworks through which public participation (Section B: Survey Questionnaire) in integrated development planning would be located, discussed and analysed (Objective 1).

In Chapter 4, the methodology applied in this study will be presented and motivated. This chapter presents and motivates the researcher’s paradigm, research design and approach, population and sampling, measures for ensuring instrument validity and reliability, ethical issues applicable to the study and data processing techniques (Objectives 1 and 2).

Using Chapter 2 as a point of departure, the results of Section B of the survey questionnaire, administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders will be analysed, interpreted and discussed in Chapter 5 (Objectives 1, 2 and 3).

Analysis, interpretation and discussion of results from Section C of the survey questionnaire, administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders will be handled in Chapter 6, using Chapter 3 as a point of departure (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). Qualitative data from focus group discussions is presented, analysed and discussed in Chapter 7 (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). Summary and recommendations are presented in Chapter 8 (Objective 4).

1.9 CONCLUSION
Local government functions to bring democracy to local citizens, as well as to educate and socialise them politically. Public participation in local governance is one of the underlying precepts of democracy. This chapter provided the introduction, overview and demarcation of the study, background and reason for the study, problem statement, research questions, as well as the aim and objectives that helped focus the study. The research design and methodology that was employed in an effort to make sense of the research problem was clarified. It provided a
succinct explanation of how the researcher aims to solve the identified problem. The next chapter establishes the conceptual and theoretical foundations for contextualising integrated development planning in SA local government and in BCMM through a review of literature and official documents related to this study. The purpose of the next chapter is to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for contextualising integrated development planning. Chapter 2 will be a point of departure, for developing, analysing, interpreting and discussing the results of Section B of the survey questionnaire administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders (Objective 1).
Chapter 2 : CONCEPTUALISING, THEORISING AND CONTEXTUALISING INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning through a review of literature. Firstly, it conceptualises ‘development’ and ‘planning’ with the purposes of relating and contextualising these concepts to integrated development planning in South Africa. The Human Development Index (HDI), a model that includes several quantifiable human development components will be discussed, with the purpose of locating development within the context of identifiable measures and indicators. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are discussed as they initiated an international push to further human development through social development policies and practices. Through these goals, countries like SA were tasked with creating a more equitable society with increased opportunity to realise individual capabilities. In the context of SA local government, the relevance of MDGs lie in their localisation.

South Africa’s unfinished MDG business, as well as emerging developmental issues, the researcher argues, need to be appropriately integrated within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is argued that SDGs have to be integrated in a manner that places the spotlight on them, while providing adequate direction and impetus for effective planning, development of appropriate policies and budgets, and the construction of appropriate local planning as well as monitoring and reporting systems. The SDG indicators that are agreed on, as well as their domesticated national and localised counterparts, should constitute a framework that focuses on MDG goals that have not yet been attained and that are especially pertinent to unlocking poverty traps and equalising opportunities for historically marginalised groups of people.

An analysis of the concept of planning in this chapter brings forth the fact that, planning encompasses all the management functions of decision-making, policy-making, programming, organising and control. Within the context of this study, planning is thus viewed as a public management function for defining a development policy encompassing development goals and objectives, a development strategy and a development programme for realising the development goals and objectives of a municipality. The IDP as a development planning tool and a product of an integrated development planning process is then discussed and contextualised within the National Development Plan (NDP) and developmental local government planning architecture.
2.2 DEVELOPMENT – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK DISCOURSE

As a concept ‘development’ is seen as a “comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process” (Todaro and Smith, 2006:16-17) which aims at the constant improvement of the “well-being of the entire population and all individuals on the basis of active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom” (Burkey, 1993:35-38). There is no universally accepted precise definition of ‘development’. The word ‘development’ is shifty and has been shifting over time. While the idea of development enjoys a broad range of support, the concept however, differs in meaning from person to person, and accordingly like many other social concepts is elusive (Agara and Ajisebiyawo, 2013:25). Todaro and Smith (2003:15), suggests that it is critically important that a core perspective on its meaning is established. During its early history the concept of development was indistinguishable from that of modernisation, which viewed it as encapsulating, following the footsteps of the West. The original concept of development is thus rooted in Western thought and development as modernisation, was popularised from the 1950s and 1960s (Vengroff, 1977:613; Du Pisani, 1982:45; Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothchild, 1988:14).

Huntington (1971:291) adds that, besides being tied to Western experience, capitalism and liberalism, the concept of development as modernisation is firmly rooted in Western sociology. As Huntington (1971:291) puts it, Victorian styles of thought acquired a new respectability in the late 1950s and development was largely understood in terms of economic growth measured in GDP, instead of social wellbeing. Modernisation as conceptualised by various scholars is the process of change toward those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to South American, Asian and African countries (Eisenstadt, 1966:1; Roxborough, 1979:1).

For many proponents of development as economic well-being, a developed society is a modern industrial society. Such proponents assume that development is inextricably linked with the paradigm of capitalist growth (Rist, 1997:69; Coetzee, Graaf, Heindricks, and Wood, 2007:31; Matunhu, 2011:65-68). Scholars who viewed development as modernisation have for many years sought to understand it within the context of the traditional/modern dichotomy (Rostow, 1965:4; Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill and Rothchild, 1988:14). Udonbana (2000:755), as such writes that in a purely economic sense development is a vision of ‘a better life’, a life materially richer, institutionally more modern and technologically more efficient. This strand of thought is premised on the rupture and the discontinuities between old and modern (Roxborough, 1979:1). While there is no doubt that economic growth is a necessary condition of development,
measuring economic growth as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was traditionally the main objective of development in the 1950s and 1960s. The World Bank has, however, taken a broader perspective of development.

In its World Development Report (1991:4) the World Bank asserts that development involves much more than economic growth. It thus replaced GDP growth with human development indicators. The World Development Report, (1991:4) viewed development as encompassing better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life. Chambers (1995:174) simply states that development means good change. However, following Polanyi’s (1944:43) analysis of capitalism, concerns arose about whom the resulting changes are good for. Thus, for Todaro and Smith (2003:17) development has to represent the whole gamut of change in an entire social system.

As such, the United Nations, Declaration on the Right to Development (1986:1) viewed development as “a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process”. In terms of this declaration, the aim of development is to constantly improve the well-being of an entire population, as well as, that of all individuals by actively, freely and meaningfully affording communities participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom. A public participation strand is discernible in Sengupta (2004:180) who maintains that development must be participatory, with a fair and equitable distribution of benefits resulting in the continuous improvement and well-being of all people. Article 1 of the United Nations, Declaration on the Right to Development (1986:2-3) adopts a rights-based definition of development, viewing it as a comprehensive, economic, social, cultural and political process.

Hamm (2001:1019) therefore links the human rights-based approach to public participation as a right. As such, Clark (1997:26) redefined development to mean a process of improving society and, or a process of change that enables people to achieve their aspirations or take charge of their own destinies and realise their full potential. Clark’s definition consequently, implies that development requires building in people confidence, skills, assets and freedoms. Hence, Clark (1997:27) proposes a development strategy, which he calls ‘Just Development’.

Clark (1997:27) postulates that ‘Just Development’ is about attacking the web of forces that cause poverty. It is a strategy that demands that equity, democracy and social justice be principal objectives alongside the need for economic growth. Further to this, it is an approach that enables the weaker members of the society to improve their situations by providing social
services they need and by enabling them to acquire the assets and to improve the productivity of those assets (Clark 1997:27). Thus, according to this author, the involvement of the marginalised in the economic and political life of the nation is the principal means to achieving an economically healthy and a politically stable society. ‘Just development’ as postulated by Clark (1997:27) as a consequence advocates full human rights and demands the annihilation of all forms of discrimination. It further argues that equal human rights to all would lead to the full utilisation of human assets.

2.2.1 Capability approach for a human development

For Mkandawire (2011:7) “development should be part and parcel of societal self-responses to own historical needs and social needs”. To this end, sustainability is an essential element of human development. Human development is therefore a critical construct of the notion of development in that in fact one cannot conceptualise sustainable development if it is not human and vice versa. Sen’s (1999:36) capability approach views “development as a process of expanding the real freedoms (the capabilities or well-being freedoms, the opportunity aspect of freedom) that people enjoy to be and do what they have reason to value (their plural functionings or well-being achievements)”. Nussbaum (2000:101) provided a philosophical justification for capabilities, when she argued “that capabilities should be based on an intuitively powerful idea of truly human functioning”. Human well-being can thus be best understood in terms functionings. Comim, Qizilbash and Alkire (2008:2) as well as, Nussbaum and Sen (1993:3) have described functionings as “the various things a person may value being or doing”. In turn capability relates to “the various alternative combinations of functionings, any one of which (any combination, that is) a person can choose to have”.

Sen’s capability approach has emerged as one of the leading theoretical frameworks in welfare economics and development. Sen, a leading thinker in development discourse, identified human goals of development. Sen (1999:36) argues that human life can be seen as a set of ‘beings and doings’ (termed functionings) and that a person has a range of functionings from which a person may choose (termed capabilities). Thus, Sen begins from a concern with substantive freedom or capabilities to “choose a life one has reason to value” (Sen, 1999:71). In his book, Development as freedom, Sen argues that development can expand capabilities and thus enlarges the freedoms people have, to lead valuable and flourishing lives (Sen, 1999:293).

Sen (1999:293) argues that development should be conceptualised as “a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication
of poverty”. Sen’s thesis is therefore anchored in the argument that poverty should not be viewed in terms of poor material living standards, but as lack of choice or capability. Poverty in this context means the failure to be able to take a full part in human society. The capability approach therefore offers a coherent philosophical framework for thinking about the full range of development challenges, starting with the question of how development should be defined. The central idea of this approach is the primacy of people, their well-being as the purpose of development and their agency as an essential element of the development process (Sen, 1999:293).

In these terms development means not just combating or ameliorating poverty but also restoring or enhancing basic human capabilities and freedoms. This is critically important if development is taken to mean what Sen (1999) understands it to be, the expansion or enhancement of human freedoms. Thus, Sen (1999:3) views development as a process of expanding real freedoms that people enjoy, and as a process that requires the removal of all sources of ‘unfreedom’ (Sen 1999:3). This perspective suggests that development is a process that requires the removal of all major sources of unfreedom or oppression, such as poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation and intolerance or over-activity of repressive and predatory states. As postulated by Sen, unfreedom is used in this context to mean the denial of freedom or lack of access to the rights that one is supposed to enjoy. Sen (1999:10) broadly defines distinct types of freedom to include: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security.

If capability is freedom of opportunity, agency is freedom of process. Agency refers to “the ability of the individual to pursue and achieve the objectives they value” (Giddens, 1984:14; Sen, 1985:206). An agent is, as Sen (1999) notes, someone who acts and makes change happen. As Deneulin (2014:27) further explains, “wellbeing not only depends on what a person does or is, but also on how they achieved that functioning, whether they were actively involved in the process of achieving that functioning or not”. As noted by Crocker (2008:307), Sen’s answer to his famous question, “Equality of what? is not only limited to equality and democratically decided basic capabilities, but also, and just as importantly, to equality of agency and process freedoms”. Alkire and Deneulin (2009:36-37) enunciated central values of human development. Those values are premised on four interlocking principles relating to equity; efficiency, participation and empowerment, and sustainability.

Equity draws on the concept of justice, impartiality and fairness and incorporates a consideration for distributive justice between groups. Equity is closely related to, the concept of
equality, which implies equality of all people in some space. As pointed out by Alkire and Deneulin (2009:36-37) equity seeks to draw attention to those who are either marginalised or experience unequal opportunities due to various disadvantages as well as unfreedoms and who may require preferential treatment or affirmative action. For Alkire and Deneulin (2009:36-37) efficiency means the optimal use of existing resources. They argue that within the context of efficiency, development must demonstrate that the chosen intervention offers the highest impact in terms of people’s opportunities. Efficiency must however be viewed in a dynamic context since what is efficient at one point in time may not necessarily be efficient in the long run.

Public participation and empowerment would then relate to processes in which people act as agents, individually and as groups. Sustainability is also an important principle of development given that it is often used to introduce the durability of development in the face of environmental limitations, but is however not necessarily confined to this dimension alone. Sustainability is best understood as “advancing human development so that progress in all spheres – social, political and financial – endures over time” (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009:36-37).

Thus, for Sen (1999:14) the ends and means of development require examination and scrutiny for a fuller understanding of the development process. In conceiving development as freedom Sen offers a more radical view of development. His capability theory is thus in tandem with the United Nations, Development Programme (UNDP) (1991:1) which posits that the basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of people’s choices to make development more democratic and participatory. The Report of the South Commission (1990:10) further supports this view by viewing development as a process which enables human beings to realise their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment, a process which frees people from fear of want and exploitation. This also neatly ties in with the Human Development Report, (2000:19) which sees human development as a process of enriching the lives and freedoms of ordinary people.

Similarly, the preamble to the United Nations' General Assembly's Declaration on the Right to Development (United Nations, 1986) underscores wider, all-embracing components of the term ‘development’ by viewing it as:

(i) “... a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and all individuals on the basis of active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom…” (United Nations, 1986:1).

(ii) In a response "to a tendency to confine or reduce the idea of poverty to low income in the case of individuals and low GDP in the case of countries”, Sen (1999:3) came up with a
formulation about development and posits that: “… development requires the removal of major sources of un-freedom that are poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systemic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or the over-activity of repressive states” (Sen, 1999:3).

Sen further explains development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy, and according to him, the focus on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialisation, or with technological advance, or with social modernization” (Sen, 1999:3). Scheepers (2000:8) also defines ‘development’ and argues that it is “a people-centred process of change depending for its ultimate success on the capacity of people to manage the process through a variety of critical steps and phases within the limits of an institutional and value framework that will guarantee meaningful and lasting improvement of quality of life for all in a peaceful, stable and well-governed environment”. Since 1990 the UNDP measures development in terms of measurable indicators (UNDP, 2015:2).

Development is thus a continuous process, it manifests itself in improved quality of life, cultural regeneration, social homogenisation and cohesion, political awareness and the stabilisation and consolidation of participatory political institutions (Egeonu, 2016:97). It therefore comprises the entire evolutionary process of any society. As such, development implies a change in individual and group values and norms and is essentially a dynamic process seeking total societal transformation to effect all round balanced upward change (Egeonu, 2016:97). According to Rodney (1972:21) cited in Egeonu (2016:97) development is a dialectical process in which the individual and society interact with their physical, biological and inter-human environment, transforming them for their own betterment and that of humanity at large. The Human Development Index (HDI) is such a model that includes several quantifiable human development components.

2.3 DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS – THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

The HDI was created in 1990 through the collaborative efforts of Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen (UNDP, 2011). It is a “summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living” (UNDP, 2015:2). While a long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy, knowledge level is measured using the “mean years of education among the adult population, which is the average number of years of education received in a life-time by people
aged 25 years and older” (UNDP, 2015:2). Knowledge level is also measured by “access to learning and knowledge and by expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life” (UNDP, 2015:2). According to the UNDP (2015:2) determining the standard of living is measured by “Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2011 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates”.

This approach to development breaks away from the traditional model based on analyses of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic growth (Huntington, 1971:291; Rist, 1997:69). The HDI thus marked a transition to development measurement centred on advocacy (Klugman, Rodriguez and Hyung-Jin Choi, 2011:256). While, like Sen’s capability approach, it prioritises and privileges certain capabilities over others, this is viewed as being for pragmatic reasons (Klugman et al., 2011:264). For one, the current components can be measured in a way that provides a comparable score that can be understood outside the complexities of each issue. Other proposed components like sustainability, for example, have yet to be clearly defined let alone measured. Additionally, the focus on freedoms and accountability which were included in the 2010 Human Development Report, created political backlash and threatened the future of the Report (Klugman et al., 2011:265). While the Human Development Index still incorporates an economic approach to human development, the addition of measures like the Inequality-Adjusted Human Index, Gender Inequality Index, and Multidimensional Poverty Index – as well as the ability to disaggregate data – enables the HDI to take an important step towards explicating the realities of each country and the people who reside there (Klugman et al., 2011:265).

2.3.1 South Africa – 2015 Human Development Index – An overview
This section presents an overview of key indicators of South Africa’s human development, including the HDI, the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII), and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). South Africa’s HDI value for 2014 was “0.666 – which put the country in the medium human development category – positioning it at 116 out of 188 countries and territories” (UNDP, 2015:2). Between 1990 and 2014, South Africa’s HDI value “increased from 0.621 to 0.666, an increase of 7.2 percent or an average annual increase of about 0.29 percent” (UNDP, 2015:2). South Africa has made some progress in each of the HDI indicators, “between 1980 and 2014, South Africa’s life expectancy at birth increased by 0.5 years, mean years of schooling increased by 5.0 years and expected years of schooling increased by 2.2
years. Its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita increased by about 11.8 percent between 1980 and 2014” (UNDP, 2015:2). Comparatively, South Africa’s 2014 HDI “of 0.666 is above the average of 0.630 for countries in the medium human development group and above the average of 0.518 for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa” (UNDP, 2015:4).

**Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI)** – UNDP (2015:4) defines the HDI as an average measure of basic human development achievements in a country. As pointed out by the UNDP (2015:4) like all averages, “the HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level”. In 2010 HDR introduced the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), which accounted for inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. Basically, the IHDI is the HDI discounted for inequalities. The, ‘loss’ in human development due to inequality is given by “the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, and can be expressed as a percentage”. As the “inequality in a country increases, the loss in human development also increases” (UNDP, 2015:4). The UNDP (2015:4) expounds that while South Africa’s HDI for 2014 was “0.666, however when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.428, a loss of 35.7 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices”. As described by the UNDP (2015:4) the average loss due to inequality for medium HDI countries “is 25.8 percent and for Sub-Saharan Africa it is 33.3 percent”. The human inequality coefficient for South Africa is equal to 33.0 percent.

**Gender Development Index (GDI)** – In the 2014 HDR, the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) introduced a new measure, the GDI, based on the sex-disaggregated Human Development Index, defined as a ratio of the female to the male HDI (UNDP, 2015:5). The GDI “measures gender inequalities in achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: health (measured by female and male life expectancy at birth), education (measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and mean years for adults aged 25 years and older, and command over economic resources (measured by female and male estimated GNI per capita)” (UNDP, 2015:5). The GDI was calculated for 160 countries and in the 2015 HDR. There are four steps to calculating the GDI; firstly, estimating the female and male earned incomes, secondly, normalising the indicators, thirdly, calculating the female and male HDI values and finally calculating the GDI (UNDP, 2016:6). The GDI is simply the ratio of female HDI to male HDI (GDI = female HDI divided by male HDI). In 2015 the female HDI value for South Africa was 0.651 in contrast with 0.677 for males, resulting in a GDI value of 0.962 (values are rounded) (UNDP, 2016:5).
**Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI)** – The 2010 HDR introduced the MPI, which identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health and living standards. The education and health dimensions are each based on two indicators, while the standard of living dimension is based on six indicators. All of the “indicators needed to construct the MPI for a household are taken from the same household survey” (UNDP, 2015:6). The indicators are weighted to create a deprivation score, and the deprivation scores are computed for each household in the survey. A deprivation score of “33.3 percent (one-third of the weighted indicators) is used to distinguish between the poor and non-poor” (UNDP, 2015:6). As pointed out by the UNDP (2015:6) if the household deprivation score is “33.3 percent or greater, the household (and everyone in it) is classified as ‘multi-dimensionally’ poor”. Households with “a deprivation score greater than or equal to 20 percent but less than 33.3 percent are near multi-dimensional poverty”. Finally, households with a deprivation score greater than or equal to 50 percent live in severe multi-dimensional poverty (UNDP, 2015:6).

The most recent survey data that were publicly available for South Africa’s MPI estimation refer to 2012 (UNDP, 2015:6). In South Africa 10.3 percent of the population (5.4 million) are multi-dimensionally poor while an additional 17.1 percent live near multi-dimensional poverty (approximately 9 million people). The breadth of deprivation (intensity) in South Africa, “which is the average of deprivation scores experienced by people in multi-dimensional poverty, is 39.6 percent. The MPI, which is the share of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor, adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations, is 0.041” (UNDP, 2015:6).

South Africa’s multi-dimensional poverty headcount was for example 0.9 percentage points higher than income poverty (UNDP, 2015:7). This implies that individuals living above the income poverty line may have still suffered deprivations in education, health and other living conditions. The UNDP (2015:7) also showed the percentage of South Africa’s population that lived in severe multi-dimensional poverty (1.3% in 2012). Thus, the contributions of deprivations in each dimension to overall poverty complete a comprehensive picture of people living in multi-dimensional poverty in South Africa (UNDP, 2015:6).

In the context of integrated development planning and its inherent local economic development strategies in municipalities, work creation initiatives can thus enhance human development. This happens especially when policies are taken to expand productive, remunerative and satisfying work opportunities, which enrich workers’ skills and potentials, and ensure communities’ rights, safety, and well-being. This implies that measuring aspects of work, both
positive and negative, can potentially shape policy agendas and track progress toward human development enhancing work.

As alluded to earlier, the HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2016:3). As postulated by Morales-Nieto (2008:11) to be holistic, sustainable human development had to be anchored on a comprehensive and holistic human development strategy for the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) founded on human values, political economy choices, economic policy interventions and policy clusters. The MDGs seen by many development scholars and policy-makers as the most vital UN documents pre-2015 called for holistic thinking combined with the identification of specific and tangible targeted development action. The adoption of the MDGs by the General Assembly of the UN in 2000 was a paradigm shift in the international motivation for poverty eradication as well as developmental thought and initiatives by developed states to developing states (UN, 2010:1-4). Therefore, while the HDI exposes the social and economic realities of each country, the MDGs mapped out a plan to achieving human development, with each country tasked with determining the best way to accomplish the components of the plan.

2.4 TRANSITIONING FROM MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS TO SDGs

The deadline for achieving the MDGs agreed by world leaders in New York in September 2000, during the Millennium Assembly of the UN, came and passed at the end of December 2015. The work ahead for every country developing or developed, including the international community, is now to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieve the SDGs agreed and adopted by world leaders meeting in the United Nations Summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda in September 2015 (Kauzya, 2016:24). The pursuit, with relative success, of the MDGs did not however eradicate poverty, nor did it eradicate inequality. As the world and governments embark on the second leg constituted by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs, and with world leaders acknowledging that poverty eradication is the greatest challenge facing the world, all actors need to recast their thinking on how differently they need to work and what different actions they need to take in order to register greater and better achievements, this time leaving no one behind.

2.4.1 Millennium development goals as a framework for sustainable development

Sachs (2006:1) defines the MDGs as "time-bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty in its many dimensions – incomes, poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter,
and exclusion – while promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability”. The MDGs comprised eight time-bound, measurable human development goals, with eighteen globally agreed targets and forty-eight indicators. They represented a global attempt at social development, where ideas and goals that were transnational in formulation were implemented locally with the backing of each country’s national policy. Broadly speaking, social development is the improvement of human outcomes through the utilisation and implementation of policy and reforms (Lusk, 2010:165). The creation of the MDGs initiated an international push to further human development through social development policies and practices. Through these goals countries like SA were tasked with creating a more equitable society with increased opportunity to realise individual capabilities.

The MDGs have their origin in the September 2000 gathering of 189 Heads of State and Government for the United Nations Millennium Summit where the Millennium Declaration was ratified (World Bank 2003:7; Ndifon, et al., 2013:176). The MDGs consisted of eight targets, each with their own sub-set of targets and indicators (Gabay, 2012:1251), (See Figure 2.1). The MDGs were significant in that they were primarily focused on short-term poverty reduction and they were time-bound and had quantifiable targets. For Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, 2004:47-48) the value of the MDGs could be found in their integral link with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A human rights-based approach represented both a ‘vision’ of development as well as a way of ‘doing’ development (Darrow and Tomas, 2005: 482). Other authors note that the MDGs derived their power from the legitimacy and value-base of human rights, particularly through the operationalisation of the right to development’ (Shetty, 2005:74).

From a holistic perspective the MDGs were a set of internationally agreed upon targets to globally improve the well-being of the poor (ensure poverty reduction) in developing states by 2015. Their main objectives were state specific and can be summarised as shown in Figure 2.1. Thus, the South African Government, along with other members of the UN committed to a national and global plan of action to reduce poverty and ensure the development of its people (Statistics South Africa, 2015:1).

South Africa’s focus on developmentally oriented socio-economic rights, equality and human development resulted in a close configuration between its national development and the MDGs, “notably reducing poverty, inequality and improving the quality of life of the marginalised, through social protection services (including social assistance and free basic services), healthcare and education” (Statistics South Africa, 2015:15). However, Statistics South Africa (2015:15) note that emerging challenges in the post-apartheid period brought new pressures to
bear on the country’s support mechanisms and developmental outcomes. The country’s commitment to the “MDGs provided additional impetus, as well as guidance, for directing its resources towards resolving not only historical development deficits but also emerging challenges” (Statistics South Africa, 2015:15).

In SA the MDGs were a natural fit as they aligned seamlessly with the state’s development agenda enunciated in the Freedom Charter and endorsed by successive governments since 1994, this was especially so, given that, the basic rights espoused by the MDGs were already entrenched in the Constitution. Thus, as noted by Statistics South Africa, (2015:iii) “implementation of the goals was a confirmation of the developmental path SA embarked on and gave further impetus to the endeavours of post-apartheid SA”.

Although the MDGs’ processes have since come to an end, there are still challenges in achieving the goals that remain. South Africa continues to be committed to the journey that it embarked on a few decades ago as it moves to the next twelve years of the global development agenda through the SDGs. Statistics SA, (2015:iii) notes that the fact that South Africa’s National Development Agenda, Vision 2030, as espoused in its NDP, reflects South Africa’s commitment to improving the lives of the poor and marginalised in society. This is evidenced by commitment enunciated in the NDP, which explicitly states that: “…By 2030, we seek to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality. We seek a country wherein all citizens have the capabilities to grasp the ever-broadening opportunities available. Our plan is to change the life chances of millions of our people, especially the youth; life chances that remain stunted by our apartheid history…” (National Planning Commission, 2012:5).

In the context of South African local government, the relevance of MDGs lay in their localisation. The localisation process of MDGs provided for a method of implementation and monitoring system at the local level to ensure that the provisions of the MDGs were relevant to the local community. The strength of the United Nations MDG process was therefore in the identification of priority areas in development (i.e. the eight MDGs that formed the Human Development Index) and the quantification of success in these priority areas. As such, converting these goals and provisions into local contexts ensured that the aims outlined, related to the daily lives of the community and could be measured and achieved by local government. This therefore entailed the examination and interpretation of what indicators of success would translate into at the local level at the programme and project as well as service delivery implementation levels. The localising process allowed communities to move beyond (ad hoc) local government led consultations with other stakeholders to create a sustainable and structured
mechanism for on-going policy dialogue and partnerships between local government, civil society’s organisations, the private sector and other stakeholders.
Figure 2.1: Millennium Development Goals and Targets
Adapted from Morales-Nieto (2008:7)
As shown in Figure 2.1, MDGs can be summarised as follows: the eradication of extreme poverty; achieving universal primary education; the empowerment of women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing global partnerships (United Nations, 2010:4-8; Randall, and Burnell, 2008:524). It was expected of the developed and developing states to put mechanisms in place in order to ensure the effective implementation of the MDGs. In terms of the concrete implementation, the MDGs were a state-specific approach and culminated in a two-way agreement between developed and developing states.

Gould in Evans (2006:373) refers to this approach as a so-called post-2000 ‘new conditionality’. The new conditionality can be summarised as follows: Without being prescriptive, developed states committed themselves to the achievement of the MDGs through the channelling of foreign aid, technical expertise, advice and other expertise as needed to developing states (Economist, 2010:5-6). In turn developing states committed themselves to good governance, economic growth and local ownership (Randall, and Burnell, 2008:300). In the process they had to identify and prioritise their domestic needs, including those at the local level. It was also expected of the developing states to identify specific problem areas within the framework of the MDGs. This meant that the developing state had to take the lead in designing state specific human development strategies.

The MDGs were the most broadly supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets the world ever established, so their importance is manifold (Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:4). The MDGs, their related targets and indicators thus dominated human-centred development, being held as the de-facto gold standard for development by various international organisations (Parr (2012) cited in Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:4). However, Sen and Mukherjee, (2013:4) noted that while the goals gave a relatively narrow view of development, the targets and indicators led to largely disconnected funding and policy priorities by different line ministries and departments. Thus in practice, the development agenda shaped by the MDGs created what have been termed ‘development silos’ (Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:5). However, as shown in Figure, 2.2, Morales-Nieto, (2008:11) demonstrates the critical linkages between MDGs and various related human development components, such as human development values, political economy choices, economic policy goals and policy cluster integration.
2.4.2 MDGs and the political economy of citizen empowerment

Scholarly work on empowerment is closely associated with the analysis and advocacy work of civil society. As pointed out by a number of scholars (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002:10-12; Alkire, 2005b:4; Grootaert, 2005:310) empowerment is a critical component of development because of the presence of unequal power relations. Empowerment is about “the extent to which some categories of people are able to control their own destinies, even when their interests are opposed by those of the other people with whom they interact” (Mason and Smith (2003:1). Uphoff, 2005:224-225) distinguishes “power resources”, i.e. the accumulated, invested and exchanged assets from the “power results”, i.e. the activities that are achieved by using these resources. An empowerment process, Uphoff (2005:224-225) argues, needs to provide access to these “resources”, and also to allow people to use them effectively to gain more “power”.

Figure 2.2: Foundations of a Human Development Strategy to achieving MDGs

Adapted from: Morales-Nieto (2008:11)
Empowerment includes the processes by which people who have been denied the ability to exercise agency, autonomy or choices gain such abilities. Sen and Mukherjee, (2013:5) succinctly identified three dimensions of empowerment, which are resources, agency and achievements. Firstly, they identify agency, which refers to the process through which choices are made and exercised. The second dimension is resources, which represent the preconditions or medium via which agency is exercised. Lastly, they view achievements as referring to the outcomes of exercising agency (Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:5).

Resources are further explained not only to refer to material assets but, also political rules and cultural norms that shape social inter-personal interactions between human beings. Resources and agency shape people’s ability to lead the lives they want to live, while achievements are a measure of whether such potential has been realised or not (Freire, 1972:48; Dreze and Sen, 2002:6-7; Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:5). Thus, the empowerment approach advocates the recognition of the strengths of communities. This approach is thus compatible with the Asset-Based Community Development (ABCD) model. The model is based on the premise: A + C = D – (Assets + Community = Development Initiatives).

The foundation for the ABCD model is an exciting journey of discovering a community’s capabilities and assets. The goal is to shift the focus from needs based on ‘problems’ to assets based on community ‘treasures’ (Kretzmann and McKnight, 1997:3). This approach resonates well with the cultural competence approach based on Moll, Amanti, Neff and Gonzalez’s (1992:133) notion of ‘funds of knowledge’, which insightfully posits that historically accumulated and culturally developed bodies of knowledge can benefit communities in terms of their functioning and well-being. Overall, empowerment then refers to those transformative forms of agency that not only address immediate inequalities faced by communities, but also aid changes in consciousness and agency that challenge dominant structures (Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:5).

However, putting the grim reality existing in many developing countries (SA included) into perspective, Amina Mohammed, the UN Special Adviser on Post-2015 Development Planning, states that: “more than one billion people still live in extreme poverty” (Soyeju, 2015:365). Soyeju (2015:365) further noted with concern that, “far too many people continue to face serious deprivations of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, and education, with progress hampered by deep inequalities linked to income, gender, ethnicity, disability, location and age”.
A 20-year review by Statistics South Africa (2015:15) concluded that SA laid a robust developmental foundation for achieving the country’s goals of eliminating poverty and reducing inequality with its first phase and investments. What is however, worrying is that, with that foundation, SA still has not fully realised its developmental potential. Statistics South Africa (2015:15) therefore recommends that attention in the next developmental phase, needs to shift towards the SDGs agenda. In so doing, SA will need to refocus its attention to tackle pervasive challenges and blockages to development. The post-2015 SDGs will thus need to be driven by innovation and accountability. What this means is that SA’s unfinished MDGs agenda, together with emerging developmental issues, have to be aptly integrated within the SDGs framework. Such integration must essentially be done in such a manner that places the spotlight on SDGs while at the same time providing adequate direction and impetus for effective planning, improvement of appropriate policies and budgets, and the building of suitable national monitoring and reporting systems based on targets, outputs and outcomes. Statistics South Africa (2015:15) emphasises the need for SDG targets and indicators that must be predicated on a national focus so as to address the underlying, often historical structural impediments to the effective implementation and impact of the many policies and laws developed to address development challenges.

2.4.3 Post-2015 Development Agenda — Sustainable Development Goals

The United Nations summit adopted the Post-2015 Development Agenda in September 2015. The post-2015 development agenda and the outcome document entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, was agreed by consensus at the informal meeting of the plenary on 2 August 2015 (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b:1). This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity, which seek to eradicate poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, which was rightly acknowledged as the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b:1). The 17 SDGs and 169 targets demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new universal Agenda. The new 17 SDGs and 169 targets seek to build on the MDGs and complete what they did not achieve. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development, namely the economic, social and environmental dimensions (Kauzya, 2016:24).

The SDGs and targets will stimulate action over the next 12 years in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b:2). The United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/69/L85 of September 2015 noted that while almost 15 years ago, the MDGs provided an important framework for development and significant progress was
made in a number of areas, the progress has however been uneven, particularly in Africa with least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and Small Island developing states. Thus, some of the MDGs remain off-track. Resolution A/69/L85 of the United Nations General Assembly therefore recommitted itself to the full realisation of all the MDGs, including the off-track MDGs, in particular (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations General Assembly, 2015c), containing 17 SDGs and 169 targets, is a global one applicable to all countries irrespective of their development status. It has replaced, and is building on, the achievements of the MDGs to guide development efforts by all countries of the world for the next 126 years, beginning in January 2016. Thus the framework goes far beyond the MDGs. Alongside continuing development priorities such as poverty eradication, health, education and food security and nutrition, it sets out a wide range of economic, social and environmental objectives. It also promises more peaceful and inclusive societies. It also, crucially, defines means of implementation.

The integrated approach, recognises that there are deep interconnections and many cross-cutting elements across the new SDGs and its targets (United Nations General Assembly, 2015c:6). The new Goals and targets came into effect on 1 January 2016 and guide development decisions up to 2030. Thus all member states are to work to implement the Agenda within their own countries and at the regional and global levels, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities (United Nations General Assembly, 2015c:15). SDGs and targets signalling the Post-2015 Development Agenda are as shown in Figure 2.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG GOALS 2016 - 2030</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well being at all ages</td>
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<td>4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Reduce inequality within and among countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3: Sustainable Development Goals – Post-2015 Development Agenda

2.4.4 Framing the post-2015 development priorities in RSA context

Given that SA has reached and passed the 2015 MDGs agenda, it is necessary that it implements appropriate interventions for a transition to the SDGs. Worryingly, SA still faces high levels of poverty, inequality, and unemployment especially in the rural areas and urban informal settlements. If progress is to be realised on these fronts the spotlight going forward must now be firmly placed on current development impediments such as unemployment, quality education, unresponsive IDPs, lack of women empowerment, voicelessness, marginalisation and dysfunctional public participation power dynamics. Further to this, there is need to craft SDG
targets and indicators with a national focus for addressing the embedded structural impediments to development. To the extent that it is possible, the SDG indicators that are agreed on, as well as their domesticated counterparts, must going forward constitute a framework that focuses on MDG goals that have not yet been attained and that are especially pertinent to unlocking poverty traps and equalising opportunities for historically marginalised communities (Statistics South Africa, 2015:119).

Kauzya, (2016:26) refers to the ‘six P’s’ of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (people, planet, partnership, prosperity, peace in freedom and poverty eradication); the central one being the ‘P’ for ‘people’, because the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is made by ‘we the people’, for the people, and will have to be implemented with full engagement of the people (Kauzya, 2016:26). However, given the recognition that poverty eradication is the biggest challenge facing the world, Kauzya, (2016:26) has included poverty eradication as a fourth pillar. It is important to recognise the link between sustainable development and other relevant ongoing processes in the economic, social and environmental fields (Kauzya, 2016:27). Sustainable development is understood to refer to three dimensions, that are, economic, social and environment development.

The South African government has developed a NDP, which defines its vision 2030. The South African government proclaimed that The National Development Plan aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. South Africa can realise these goals by drawing on the energies of its people, growing an inclusive economy, building capabilities, enhancing the capacity of the state, and promoting leadership and partnerships throughout society (National Planning Commission, 2012:14).

Like Sen (1999), the NDP draws extensively on the notion of capabilities (Sen, 1999:36), freedoms and functionings (Sen, 1999:71). The National Planning Commission, (2012:17) identifies the following capabilities: political freedoms and human rights; social opportunities arising from education, health care, public transport and other public services; social security and safety nets; an open society, transparency, disclosures and a culture of accountability; and economic facilities, work, consumption, exchange, investment and production.

South Africa’s next stage of its developmental journey has been articulated in the current NDP 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2012) and the 2014-2019 Medium Term Strategic Framework, which are unanimous in their diagnosis, prognosis and prescription for securing national developmental goals (Statistics South Africa, 2015:30). The South Africa envisaged in
Vision 2030 in the National Development Plan is a developmental state that strives to build the capabilities of people to improve their own lives, while intervening to correct historical inequalities (National Planning Commission, 2012:17). Various national and provincial government departments have integrated the vision of the NDP into strategic plans.

To be able to deliver services in an effective and efficient manner, local governments such as BCMM must ensure the sustainable development of their local communities (Van der Waldt, 2014:21). The White Paper, 1998 defines post-1994 local government as “developmental” local government, involving integrated development planning (Pycroft, 1996:151). Visible leadership is however required to match the dream of the Vision 2030 with the daily reality and struggles of communities: poverty, social inequality and high levels of unemployment amongst ordinary South Africans. Apart from leadership and management required to make the dream of NDP come true, bureaucratic capacity, a strong diverse private sector and civil society is critical in making SA a truly capable state.

While, the post-2015 global development agenda is guided by a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it is critical that SA’s unfinished MDG business, as well as emerging developmental issues as envisaged in its NDP Vision 2030, be appropriately integrated within the SDGs. They have to be integrated in a manner that places the spotlight on them, while providing adequate direction and impetus for effective planning, development of appropriate policies and budgets, and the construction of appropriate national monitoring and reporting systems (Statistics South Africa, 2015:118). Informed by the prescriptions of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), an integrated development planning process is formulated and adopted in order to guide the development of the IDP. The public participation process is thus premised on the IDP and budget preparation sessions held in wards. The inputs received from such sessions are subsequently analysed and prioritised in the institutional and departmental strategic planning sessions and forms an integral part of the IDP.

2.5 CONCEPTUALISING PLANNING

According to Gildenhuys (2004:173), planning is broadly conceptualised as a management function for development and a basic principle of administration and about the most critical of its functions, since it permeates all others. The practice of public management entails the carrying out of a number of basic generic management functions. Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1997:180) view planning, organising, leading, control and co-ordination as managerial functions. Cloete (1981:27) describes planning as “a set of processes which must be carried out to find the best course of action to achieve a policy objective”. For an institution to achieve its
purpose, mission and objectives planning is necessary (Smit and Cronjé, 1992:88). Similarly, Ikeanyibe (2009:197) argues that development planning is a necessary tool used by governments to set their visions, missions, goals and means of realising effective direction and control. Gildenhuys (2004:217) however notes that there are divergent views about the meaning and function of planning in the public administration process.

As noted by Gildenhuys (2004:217), ‘confusion’ also still exists. The author, for example, observes that Robbins’ definition of planning is the same as Cloete’s definition of policy-making, namely that, planning is determining in advance what is to be done, how it is to be done, when it is to be done, and who is going to do it (Gildenhuys, 2004:217). Within this perspective, planning encompasses setting objectives as well as making day to day decisions on how these objectives can be achieved, hence planning involves the determination of both ends and means (Robbins, 1980:128). It can also be noted that, what Cloete views as policy-making, Robbins conceives it as planning. In this vein Cloete (1986:58) has viewed planning as synonym for programming, when he states, “one or more plans or programmes can be constructed to provide for actions to achieve objectives”. Nonetheless, Smit and Cronjé (1992:91) advocate that planning forms the basis of all other management functions, as it directs the activities of an institution.

Other scholars clarify the purpose of planning when they conceive it as “deciding in advance what to do, how to do it, when to do it, who is to do it, and how much of resources are to be used” (Robbins, 1980:128; Ujo, 1994:157). Iheanacho (2014:50-51) see planning as embracing all the activities that led to the determination of objectives and the appropriate courses of action that leads to their achievements. Planning is thus an activity which involves decisions about ends as well as means and about conduct as well as result. It emphasises the relationship between planning and results. Similarly, Ikeanyibe (2009:198) has postulated that plans are meant to achieve specific results; hence planning is not just an issue of determining objectives that are not consciously pursued or means that are never followed. It is a blueprint for action. Planning therefore, encompasses determination of control, direction and methods of accomplishing the overall organisation or government objectives. Planning should thus essentially be controlled and directed towards desired set goals.

For Friedman (1987:38) planning is simply decision-making in advance. He views it as primarily a way of thinking about social and economic problems. As such, Friedman (1987:38) postulates that planning is a process of thought, future oriented and aimed at the realisation of goals and objectives. This is in tandem with Brans and Rossbach, (1997) as cited by Connell
(2010:271) who has also viewed planning as a decision on what decisions need to be made in the future. Similarly, Boyne (2001:74) alludes that planning is an attempt to influence the future by forecasting changes in the organisation and its environment, setting objectives, and developing strategies for the achievement of these objectives. Thus a number of prominent scholars in planning theory tend to describe an orientation to the future as a central tenet of planning (Friedman, 1987:38; Bryson, 1988:78; Connell, 2010:271). In SA, Du Toit (1998:175) follows this trend of thought, he sees planning as a process that focuses on the formulation of future objectives for the organisation and on the means and methods of achieving these identified objectives. Planning can thus generically be viewed as a way of managing non-routine affairs in public administration, a formal process of making decisions for the future of individuals and organisations (Healey, 2009:277).

As such, Ojo (2012:450) is of the view that a good development plan has the following characteristics, it must: (i) be specific and clearly stated for easy understanding; (ii) possess measurable or verifiable achievement; (iii) be realistic and consistent; (iv) possess specific period of achievement; (v) include intermediate targets or goals that will facilitate the attainment of the major objectives; (vi) be modern and up-to-date; (vii) can be ranked according to relative importance and form a network; (viii) possess desired results and events, including goals that must be interconnected and mutually supportive; (ix) carry the citizenry along to avert legitimacy crisis, and (x) be spatially fair in a plural society. Planning therefore requires both skill and innovation, since the time period that integrated development plans normally do take care of, is longer (five years for SA municipalities).
Planning is therefore a rational process of preparing a set of decisions for future actions directed at achieving goals and objectives by optimal means (Musaazi, 1982:119). It is futuristic and goal-directed and to achieve sustainable development it has to be a continuous spiral process (Musaazi, 1982:119). Two core aspects of this continuous process are formulation and re-formulation, which involves not only the first design of the decisions for action but also the critical evaluation and continuous adjustment of these decisions to the ever-changing circumstances. The other aspect is implementation and re-implementation, which is the total of interrelated actions that makes possible the achievement of objectives, goals and targets selected in the formulation of the plan (Musaazi, 1982:120).

Planning therefore is incomplete unless it includes both formulation and implementation. Musaazi (1982:121) conceptualises general planning as having four functions: the decision function, technical function, implementation function and control function. The decision function is concerned with goal setting and goal approval. The technical function focuses on the formulation of plans, identification of targets, and evaluation of required resources.
Implementation function refers to the procedures for fulfilling the plan targets. The control function includes the discovery of discrepancies between actual and planned outcomes, problems and the subsequent modification of the plan (Musaazi, 1982:121). These four functions are however overlapping and interlocking. Objectives specified, targets set and plans developed are to be defined and framed in terms of institutional structures, and budget allocations (Musaazi, 1982:125).

To summarise this section on the concept of planning, an analysis of definitions of planning brings forth the fact that planning encompasses all the management functions of decision-making, policy-making, programming, organising and control. The difference being that normally these management functions are aimed at running the day-to-day routine administrative functions for delivering goods and services to the public, but that planning aims at attaining goals and objectives in the future – (i.e. over a period of time). Planning thus relates to future action and the set policy serves as basis, in that the policy lays down the boundaries within which the planning is to take place. In planning attention is therefore normally given to identification of objectives set out in the policy; determining possible alternative ways of action for the attainment of the objectives; and selection of a specific alternative. Planning is a continuous process for improving municipal performance by developing strategies for implementing the IDP. The process includes plan implementation, monitoring and evaluation and control.

Monitoring the implementation of the IDP enables a municipality to have an integrated and holistic view of its performance. Within this integrated approach, monitoring and control processes essentially focus on human resources, finances, service delivery, public participation and governance. Elements of the control environment consist of the effectiveness of the organisational structure; the role of the Audit Committee and Internal Audit Unit; reasonableness of budgets and management plans (service delivery plans); relevance and reliability of management information (reporting systems and record management); the existence of adequate policies and procedures for controlling expenditure and the effectiveness of management controls (Ntonzima, 2011:1011; Sibanda, 2017:318). In the context of this study, planning is thus viewed as a public management function for defining a development policy encompassing development goals and objectives, a development strategy and a development programme for realising the development goals and objectives of a municipality.
2.6 CONTEXT OF INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA

For decades after the advent of municipal planning in SA in the 1930s, planning at the local level was in most cases done on a racially segregated basis and within a top-down apartheid superstructure (DPLG, 2000:12). In most cases it was of a “master plan nature, the domain of the technical expert, with the privileged sectors of society allowed little more than a once-off input and/or a view of the plan at the end”. Provincial governments had “no clear role in regard to provincial and regional planning, but were responsible for controlling local level planning through various Town Planning Ordinances” (DPLG, 2000:12). National government exerted considerable indirect control over local planning through “a dense web of racially based legislation, and through guide-plan processes. In relation to planning for ‘black settlement’ control was often direct, although in the later years of apartheid, some planning powers were delegated to homeland governments” (DPLG, 2000:13).

However, during the transitional phase in the early 1990s the notion of integrated development planning began to crystallise within various negotiating forums that had been set up to forge agreement around development issues. The emergent notion of integrated development planning drew on well-established traditions within planning theory and on the ‘New Public Management’ paradigm, which focused internationally on more effective and efficient ways of delivering public services (DPLG, 2000:13). The outlines of a new approach to planning became evident in a 1992 document entitled the ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic SA. This document proposed that municipal planning needed to: ensure maximum involvement of all communities and stakeholders; be directed at those in greatest need; strive to break down apartheid privilege, geography and institutional structures; be aimed at ensuring integrated and sustainable development; and be focused on service delivery (ANC, 1992). Prior to 1994, no form of metropolitan government existed in SA. Section 174(2) of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of SA, 1993 made provision for separate metropolitan, urban and rural government.

The Constitution created a new framework for local government. It provided for a three sphere government comprising national, provincial and local spheres which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. As with the Interim Constitution, 1993 the Constitution has a chapter dealing with local government. Section 151(3) of the Constitution states that a municipality has a right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community subject to national and provincial legislation. In section 151(4) it is stipulated that national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s right or ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions. This provision marked a fundamental
paradigm shift from the system of local government which characterised South Africa’s intergovernmental system since 1910 (Cameron, 2000:159).

In section 155(1) of the Constitution provision is made for three categories of municipalities (Categories A, B and C). In terms of this section a category A is a municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area of jurisdiction. In terms of section 155(3) of the Constitution, national legislation establishes criteria; for determining when an area should have a single Category ‘A’ municipality or when it should have municipalities of both category ‘B’ and ‘C’; and the procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries by an independent authority, as provided for by the Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998) (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:30-34; Van der Waldt, 2014:59).

The White Paper on Local Government, dated 8 March 1998 (White Paper, 1998), laid down the broad outlines of local government. Paragraph 2.2 of the White Paper, 1998 provides three compelling reasons for the establishment of metropolitan governments. Paragraph 2.2(a) - (c) of Section D of the White Paper on Local Government, 1998 argues that metropolitan government creates a basis for equitable and socially just metropolitan governance. Secondly, that it promotes strategic land use planning and co-ordinated public investment in physical and social infrastructure and thirdly, that it is able to develop a city-wide framework for economic and social development and to enhance the economic competitiveness and well-being of the city (Van der Waldt, 2014:164-165).

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) replaced the two-tier metropolitan structures with unitary-tier authorities. Section 2 of the Structures Act stipulates that areas which must have a single category ‘A’ municipality (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:21-22) are areas that can reasonably be regarded as: (a) a conurbation featuring – (i) areas of high population density, (ii) an intense movement of people, goods and services, (iii) extensive development, (iv) multiple business districts and industrial areas (b) a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy; (c) a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable; (d) having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent units. The above definition is thus considered a de facto description of metropolitan areas (Cameron, 2000:161). In SA, metropolitan cities are characterised by: a population of over one million, established formal core of industrial, commercial and sub-urban development and informal settlements with significant RDP housing on the periphery (Van der Waldt, 2014:165).
2.6.1 Municipal executive systems – Category ‘A’ (Metropolitan Municipalities)

The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) provides for different executive systems for municipalities. These are as follows; collective, mayoral, plenary, sub-council and ward participatory executive systems (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:67). Two types of executive systems are available to metropolitan authorities. Firstly, the collective executive system, allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive committee in which the executive leadership of the municipality is collectively vested (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:67). In this system, provision is made for a mayor, although he/she is only one member of the collective executive. Secondly, the mayoral executive system, allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor in whom the executive leadership of the municipality is vested and who is assisted by a mayoral committee (Cameron, 2005:333; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:67).

Both these forms of executive systems have similar type of powers, which are cabinet-type functions and include the right to determine service delivery strategies and oversee service delivery, and the right to monitor and review (Cameron, 2005:333). The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) provides for executive mayors for metropolitan municipalities. The executive mayor, inter alia, identifies the needs of the municipality, reviews and evaluates those needs in order of priority and recommends to the municipal council strategies, programmes and services to address priority needs through the integrated development plan, and the estimates of revenue and expenditures, taking into account any applicable national and provincial development plans (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:77).

2.6.2 Fundamentals of development planning

As pointed out in section 2.5, planning focuses on the formulation of future objectives for the organisation and on the means and methods of achieving these identified objectives (Du Toit, 1998:175). Planning is critically important in that it aims to determine future circumstances and identifies the measures needed to realise them (Van der Waldt and Du Toit, 2007:183). As such municipal planning bridges the gap between where a municipality currently is and where it wants to be (Du Toit, 1998:173). It enables a municipality to pro-actively identify possible problems and opportunities, and also to identify possible problems outside the municipality and consequently assists it in formulating and implementing remedial action. The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) has key defining characteristics. It is integrated, participatory, strategic and implementation oriented (Van der Waldt, 2014:108-109). Integrated development planning provides a process through which municipalities prepare strategic development plans for a five year period (DPLG, 2000:4). As a planning tool, the IDP guides and informs all planning,
budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality. It is therefore a tool for local government to achieve coordination in all its activities, as well as sectoral integration.

Integrated development plans represent a broadening and shift in the practice of planning. This shift is represented by the move from the ‘master planning’ tradition of control and forecasting to a managerial approach that favours a more strategic response to development issues (Odendaal, 2007:68). As pointed out by Odendaal (2007:68) the broadening aspect refers to the need for planners to understand planning as well as implementation processes, given that the integrated development planning process requires an engagement with strategy and plan making (analysis, formulation of a vision and strategies) as well as understanding of budgeting and business planning processes (operational plans). International influences have impacted on the formulation of the IDP including the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm (Hood, 1991:495; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:19-20; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994:10; Basheka, 2012:55-56) which emphasise private sector management styles and ideas into the public sector, where the language of outcomes, performance and accountability (Harrison, 2001:176-7) are well encapsulated into the IDP discourse.

In November 1996 the preparation of IDPs became a legal requirement for local councils in terms of the Local Government Transition (LGTA) Act (Act 209 of 1993), Second Amendment Act (Act 97 of 1996). Integrated development planning for local government is a form of planning that involves linkage and co-ordination between all sectors of activity that impact on the operation of a municipality (DPLG, 2000:4). This new system of local government made provision for the notion of developmental local government. IDPs are the flagship development tools of municipalities (Cameron, 2005:336). Cameron (2005:336) writes that an IDP reflects a council’s vision for the long-term development of the municipality with special emphasis on its most critical development and internal transformation needs. The process of integrated development planning requires high levels of public participation. Pape (2002:187) is however of the view that lack of political leadership, the vast distances that have to be covered and an inability to involve all the stakeholders are among some of the problems that led to limited public participation in IDPs, with poorly attended public meetings being the major form of consultation. Cameron (2005:336) also observed that there is often a concern that IDPs are merely wish lists and are in fact ‘dead’ documents.

2.6.3 Enabling legislative frameworks for integrated development planning
Integrated development planning is supported by various pieces of legislation in SA. Section 152(1) of the Constitution states that a key objective of a municipality is to promote social and
economic development. Section 195(1)(c) of the Constitution stipulates that one of the
democratic values and principles enshrined is that “public administration must be development-
oriented”. Every municipal council is empowered in terms of section 156(2) of the Constitution,
to make and administer by-laws for the administration of the matters, which it has the right to
administer (i.e. matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 (functions of concurrent national and
provincial legislative competence) and Part B of Schedule 5 (functions of exclusive provincial
legislative competence).

In terms of section 156(4) of the Constitution, the national and provincial governments must
assign to every municipality, by agreement and subject to any conditions, only the
administration of matters listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 of the
Constitution, which necessarily relates to local government, if the matter would most effectively
be administered locally, and the municipality has the capacity to administer it. Thornhill and
Cloete (2014:34) emphasise that the principle of subsidiarity must be applied.

The Development Facilitation Act (Act 67 of 1995) provides primacy to the local government
sphere as a vehicle for reconstruction and development, post-1994. The White Paper on Local
explains that a development-oriented government is one that must strive to develop the state and
its subjects continuously. The duties of a developmental municipality are set out in Section 153
have to encourage active participation of communities in both planning and implementation
stages of municipal strategies. A municipality must inter alia structure and manage its
administration, budgeting and planning process to give priority to the basic needs of the
community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community. Integrated
Development Plans (IDPs) provide powerful tools for municipalities to facilitate integrated and
coordinated service delivery within their locality (RSA, 1998:19).

In terms of section 25(1) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) municipalities are
required to adopt a single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality.
Section 26(a)-(i) describes the core components of IDPs. The process to be followed for
planning, drafting, adopting and review of IDPs is described in sections 27-34 of the Municipal
1996 amendment enables local government, through the implementation of IDPs, to concentrate
on key challenges facing their immediate communities. The IDP is described as a participatory
planning process aimed at integrating central strategies, in order to support the optimal
allocation of scarce resources between sectors, NGOs, geographical areas and across the population, in a manner that promotes sustainable growth, equity and the empowerment of the poor and marginalised (Naude and Van Rensburg, 2007:399).

The IDP supersedes all other plans for local development (Khuzwayo, 1999:56), and is meant to arrive at decisions on issues such as municipal budgets, land management, economic development and institutional transformation in a consultative, systematic and strategic manner. It guides the activities of agencies from other spheres of government, corporate service providers, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the private sector within a municipal area (SALGA, 2003:1). All planning for key social, economic and environmental sectors are incorporated in the IDP (International Republican Institute (IRI), 1998:4). The IDP is the main pillar of the budget and the interface with the community, and a pivotal point around which the whole municipality operates. It is a comprehensive and sophisticated tool for assessing municipal service delivery and infrastructure development (Malefane, 2005:108).

2.6.4 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) -- What is it?
Thornhill and Cloete (2014:90) define an IDP “as consisting of a process through which individual municipalities must obtain a Strategic Development Plan (SDP) for a five year period”. The IDP is “a development planning tool and a product of an integrated development planning process” (Nzimakwe, 2012:142). The IDP as a strategic plan, guides and informs the planning, budgeting, management and decision-making of a municipality. It is also a tool for local government to achieve coordination in all its activities. Integrated Development Plans are aimed at assisting municipalities in achieving their developmental mandates and guides activities of municipalities within their area of jurisdiction (Nzimakwe, 2012:143). For the IDP to be effective and credible “it needs to be informed and be in line with the key fundamentals of development planning” (Mafunisa and Maphunye, 2008:461; Davids, Theron, and Maphunye, 2005:136). Therefore the IDP is the first product of the integrated development planning process (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:90).

Integrated Development Plans are expected to promote intergovernmental co-ordination, as well as ensuring that key municipal activities are encompassed in a single document. Reddy et al., (2003:72-73) note that an IDP is a continuous process whereby municipalities prepare five (5) year strategic development plans. Such plans are reviewed annually with the public participation of communities and stakeholders. Reddy et al., (2003:72-73) reiterate that IDPs seek to promote integration by “balancing social and economic pillars of sustainability, without compromising the institutional capacity required in the implementation, and by co-ordinating actions across
sectors and spheres of government”. Reddy et al., (2003:72-73) advise that, if IDPs are not incorporated and aligned with the budget, it is most unlikely that the objectives, targets and outcomes of such plans will be realised.

As such, in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the IDP is a single inclusive strategic plan for municipalities that integrates and co-ordinates service delivery in a municipality; outlines the general basis on which annual budgets must be based; aligns the resources and capacity of the municipality with the implementation of the plan; and assists democratisation through vigorous public participation (RSA, 2000). South Africa’s IDPs are therefore a new form of planning that aims to achieve integrated development. Similarly, Todes (2004:844) writes that IDPs are holistic multi-sectoral plans, which guide the future development of the locality, giving direction to both the municipality and other spheres of government operating in the area.

The IDP includes a spatial development framework, expenditure priorities and projects for implementation over a five year period. It shifts towards a more integrated approach to policy coordination encapsulating environmental, social and economic factors as cross-cutting concerns in policy (Todes, 2004:849). The intention is to create a planning model based on a single plan that brings together various sectoral action plans into a sustainable integrated development process. IDPs thus reflect an interest in multi-sector, integrated, bottom-up approaches to local development. Furthermore, they are intended to be holistic, integrated and participatory strategic plans guiding the work of the municipality. Integrated development plans give effect to the notions of ‘developmental local government’, by aligning resources around chosen (prioritised) development trajectories in a municipality, thereby ensuring that both horizontal integration between sectors within local government, and vertical integration with other spheres of government is realised (Todes, 2004: 849).

As a legally-required plan for development and governance the IDP starts by defining the municipal vision, then proceeds to identify key developmental objectives. Thereafter, it comes up with strategies which are later translated into programmes and projects, which are budgeted for, and ultimately implemented and monitored. Thus seemingly three core principles underpinning the IDP process can be discerned, they are: consultative, strategic and an implementation-oriented process (Nzimakwe, 2012:143).

Firstly, as a consultative process, an IDP requires that suitable forums are established where local residents, government representatives, non-governmental-organisations (NGOs), civil
society, and other stakeholders can: evaluate challenges affecting service delivery; prioritise concerns in their order of urgency and long-term importance; grow a shared vision and common strategic framework; prepare relevant project proposals; and measure, align, and approve development plans (Van der Waldt, 2007:100). Secondly, as a strategic process, an IDP approach seeks to ensure that: local knowledge is combined with the knowledge of experts; service delivery delays are conquered through agreement within given time periods; both the underlying causes and symptoms of service delivery problems are addressed; scarce resources are used efficiently and effectively; and IDPs are not planned and budgeted for not in isolation, but integrated from the start with other corresponding sectors (Pauw, Woods, Van der Linde, Fourie and Visser, 2009:280-281). Lastly, as an implementation-oriented process, an IDP aims to become the means for better and faster service delivery by ensuring that: concrete, technically-sound project proposals are designed; the link between planning and budgeting is maintained; and sufficient consensus is reached among key stakeholders on the planned programmes and projects (Van der Waldt, 2007:100-101).

2.6.5 Integration in integrated development planning
Escobar (1995:64-76) posits that development interventions with a strong sectoral emphasis are insufficient for dealing with the complexity of the developmental problematique. Alloggio and Thomas (2013:108) note with concern that South Africa’s development conundrum can be captured as an attempt to “obliterate unresolved conflicts and produce a society free from its own history”. Integrated planning is about different actors and sectors working together under a commonly-designed agenda and realigning individual supply chains to produce a commonly defined objective or product (Gueli, Liebenberg and Van Huyssteen, 2000:92-93). Sustainable development requires a paradigm shift towards the simultaneous, rather than sequential – pursuit of diverse objectives, such as poverty eradication, gender empowerment, provision of basic human needs, governmental transparency and accountability and environmental sustainability, as formalised by the Agenda 21 in 1991. Agenda 21 calls for the adoption of strategies for sustainable development that “harmonise the various sectoral economic, social and environmental plans operating in a municipality’s area of jurisdiction” (Gueli et al., 2000:100). Conceptually and as a functional activity integration brings together multiple elements, so that the resulting assemblage has some value that did not exist before (Holden, 2012:305).

integration refers to the management of cross-cutting issues that transcend the boundaries of established policy fields and that do not correspond to the institutional responsibilities of individual government departments”. Stead and Meijers, (2009:317) typically extrapolate two dimensions of integration: horizontal policy integration (across policy domains, within organisations) and vertical policy integration (between policy actors, organisations and scales of governance). This relates to the efficiency-based idea of ‘holistic government’ founded on the notion that multiple, concurrent problems in place cannot be solved in isolation and that coordinated response from a variety of organisations is necessary for incremental development progress (OECD, 1996:29).

In South African local government, integration aims at harnessing, and maximising social development and Local Economic Development (LED) in a coherent and purposeful manner by preventing municipalities from acting in an uninformed and uncoordinated manner which leads to wastage of limited resources (Nzimakwe, 2012:144). Emerging from the above discussion is therefore that integrated planning encapsulates various stakeholders and sectors working together under a commonly-designed agenda geared towards achieving a common objective (Gueli, et al., 2000:92-93). Gueli et al., (2000:93) emphasise that, ‘integrated’ symbolises, or is associated, with good planning. Outputs of the planning process must be clarified more importantly human, systems and financial resources both within and outside the municipality must be aligned (Van der Waldt, 2007:99-101).

Gueli et al., (2000:104) identify three approaches to ensuring integration. These are: structured and systematic interaction; alignment of different planning instruments and targeted interventions. Structured and systematic interaction requires that, external actors engage directly and regularly with local representatives to deliberate on service delivery issues. Structured and systematic interaction further requires that municipal officials as well as stakeholders be responsible for the integrated development planning (Gueli et al., 2000:104). In terms of alignment of different planning instruments, Gueli et al., (2000:104-105) posit that three types of inter-governmental planning instruments should be aligned to ensure unity. These are: planning process; monitoring mechanisms and budgeting cycles. In terms of targeted interventions, integration requires that, high potential areas should serve as basic units that drive multi-sectoral planning and budgeting between various spheres and sectors (Gueli et al., 2000:104-105).
2.6.6 Integrated Development Planning Review Process

Venter (2014:108) identifies different dimensions of the integrated development planning process. The horizontal aspects of sectoral integration includes co-ordination of land use and spatial development with sectors such as housing, education or transport. Environmental integration requires that policies and programmes be co-ordinated with an environmental framework. Vertical integration includes integration of national, provincial, district and local government policies and programmes. At the municipal level, Venter (2014:108) emphasises that it should include integration of attempts by individuals, residents, Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs), the private sector and other stakeholders to formulate objectives and to follow a plan of action to achieve the objectives of the community and of the country as a whole. Time integration has to consider long-term dynamic trends, pressures, objectives and targets, with a strategic horizon of at least twenty-five years. Resource integration would need to include co-ordination with funding sources, programmes and projects in order to fulfil planning objectives. Finally, institutional integration would include the establishment of partnerships and agencies with capacity for implementation (Revetz, 2000:227-228; Venter, 2014:108).

Venter (2014:108) notes that there are important implications in viewing integrated development planning as a strategic management process. Given the fact that integrated development planning is a strategic planning and management instrument, its process follows a cycle and logic consisting of different phases. **Phase one, the analysis**, deals with the existing situation within a municipal area. Situational analysis involves both the external and internal environment. Analysis of the external environment considers political, economic, social, legal and technological factors. That of the internal environment considers factors such as a municipality’s structures, management style, leadership and resources (Van der Waldt and Knipe, 2001:17; Venter, 2014:113).

**Phase two includes the formulation** of the municipal vision which helps create purpose and identity (Thompson and Strickland, 1998:4-5). This phase includes formulation of objectives, which must be quantifiable and achievable (Van der Waldt and Knipe, 2001:182; Venter, 2014:113). This phase, further includes formulation of strategies. Strategies are essentially the ways and means by which a municipality achieves its vision and objectives. It is only when strategies are formulated that they result in the identification of programmes and projects.

**Phase three deals with the design and specification** of projects for implementation (Venter, 2014:113). Municipal projects should essentially directly link with priority issues as well as objectives identified in previous phases. Venter (2014:113) emphasises that projects must be
clear in the following aspects: target group (beneficiaries); the location of the project; the date of commencement and date of completion; the persons responsible for managing the project; the cost of the project; and the funding sources. Further to this the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG, 2001:17) require performance targets and indicators to be formulated to measure both the performance and impact of municipal projects.

*Phase four, integration* requires that once projects have been identified the municipality checks for their compliance with the vision, objectives, strategies, and resources. Integration requires that the foregoing must be harmonised in terms of content, location and timing in order arrive at consolidated and integrated programmes (DPLG, 2001:17). During the *final phase, the approval* phase a municipality provides all relevant stakeholders and interested parties, including other spheres of government with the opportunity to comment on the draft plan, giving the approved plan a sound basis of legitimacy, support and relevancy (Venter, 2014:114). As an essential ingredient for integrated planning in SA, “outside actors should engage directly and regularly with local representatives to deliberate issues on service delivery; develop a shared understanding on which objectives to focus on; and to determine the best strategies to reach those objectives” (Gueli et al., 2000:104). However, on the whole, public participation literature often points to the fact that “participatory processes and systems in SA lack transformative qualities and are marred by a mixture of neglect, lack of service delivery, corruption, infrequent feedback, limited involvement and inexperience on the part of planners and officials” (Booysen, 2009:1-23; Mubangizi and Gray, 2011:4-7; Lues, 2014:802-804; Tsheola, Ramonyai and Segae, 2014:393-403).

**2.7 CONTEXTUALISING INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY**

Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality adopted the 2016-2021 IDP. As required by section 34 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), an annual review of the IDP was conducted for the 2016/17 financial year. The review of an IDP is a lengthy planning process, spanning nine months. It has to be properly organised and carefully followed. It also involves various stakeholders at all levels as required by legislation. As such, a process plan was developed detailing the modus operandi for the entire IDP review process (BCMM, 2016/2017:3). The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) as amended, places the IDP at the apex of municipal planning instruments by suggesting that an IDP, adopted by the Council of a Municipality, is the key strategic planning tool for the municipality.
As alluded to earlier, section 35(1)(a) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) points out that the IDP is the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning and development, and all decisions with regard to planning, management and development in the municipality. Section 35(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) provides that the IDP adopted by the council of a municipality binds the municipality in the exercise of its executive authority, except to the extent of any inconsistency between a municipality’s IDP and national or provincial legislation, in which case such legislation prevails. The legality of the IDP is reinforced by Section 25(1)(a)(b)(c)(d)(e) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), which prescribes that: (1) each municipal council must, within a prescribed period after the start of its elected term, adopt a single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality which: (a) links, integrates and co-ordinates plans and takes into account proposals for the development of the municipality (b) aligns the resources and capacity of the municipality with the implementation of the plan (c) forms the policy framework and general basis on which annual budgets must be based (d) complies with the provisions of this Chapter; and (e) is compatible with national and provincial development plans and planning requirements binding on the municipality in terms of legislation. In accordance with this legislation, BCMM’s IDP, as the principal planning document, sets out the long-term vision of the municipality. It envisions “Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality as a well-governed, connected, green and innovative city” (BCMM, 2016/2017:4).

BCMM detailed the development priorities and objectives, which contribute towards achieving this vision over the Council’s elected term. It also outlined strategies, which are the means by which the objectives would be achieved. IDP programmes and projects which link to the strategies and contribute to the achievement of the objectives are further outlined. BCMM reviews and further develops its IDP and budget in accordance with the requirements set out in the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations 2001 and the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003). Thus, in accordance with Section 34 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) municipalities such as BCMM are required to review their IDP annually. Annual revisions allow the municipality to expand upon or refine plans and strategies, to include additional issues and to ensure that plans and strategies inform institutional and financial planning. In BCMM, the review and amendment of the IDP thus, further develops it and ensures that it remains the principal management tool and strategic instrument for the municipality (BCMM, 2016/2017:4).
2.7.1 The IDP Process Plan in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

In terms of section 28(1) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), “each municipal council… adopts a process set out in writing to guide the planning, drafting, adoption, and review of the integrated development plan”. A process plan outlines the programme to be followed and provides detail on the issues specified in the Act. It is required that a process plan includes a programme specifying time-frames for the different steps; outline of mechanisms, processes and procedures for consultation of the community, organs of state, traditional authorities and role-players. A process plan identifies all plans and planning requirements binding on the municipality, and must be consistent with any other matters prescribed by legislation.

Thus in terms of section 29(1) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), “the process followed by a municipality to draft its integrated development plan, including its consideration and adoption of the draft plan, must (a) be in accordance with pre-determined programme specifying timeframes for the different steps; (b) through appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures established in terms of Chapter 4 allow for: (i) the local community to be consulted on its development needs and priorities; (ii) the local community to participate in the drafting of the IDP; (iii) organs of state, including traditional authorities, and other role players to be identified and consulted on the drafting of the IDP; (c) provide for the identification of all plans and planning requirements binding on the municipality in terms of national and provincial legislation; and (d) be consistent with any other matters that may be prescribed by regulation”.

2.7.2 Key sector plans to be included in the IDP

The IDP as a multi-sectoral/dimensional planning document requires inputs from community stakeholders during its development as well as review process. The MSA (2000) prescribes elements of the IDP which taken together make the IDP credible. As such, the IDP is an outcome of a planning process that is participatory and thus is informed by many issues. In terms of Section 26 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), (as amended), sector plans to be included in the IDP include: Local Economic Development (LED); Spatial Development Framework; Disaster Management Plan and the Financial Plan. A Performance Management System (PMS) is also a requirement in terms of section 41 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), (as amended). A Water Services Development Plan is also required in terms of section 12 of Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997). As a multi-sectoral/dimensional planning document the IDP further includes the Integrated Waste Management Plan, as required by section 11(4)(a)(ii) of the National Environmental Management (NEMA) Act (Act 107 of 1998), National Environmental Management: Waste Act (Act 59 of 2008) and a Disaster

Other policies and plans to consider in integrated development planning are National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP offers a long-term perspective. It defines a desired destination and identifies the role different sectors of society need to play in reaching that goal. The New Growth Path (NGP) framework is also of critical importance. This is a framework for economic policy and a driver of the country’s job strategy. The strategy sets out “critical markers for employment creation and growth, and identifies where viable changes in the structure and character of production can generate a more inclusive and greener economy over the medium to long run” (BCMM, 2016/2017:6). Further to this, in 2014, the Executive Council of the Eastern Cape Provincial Government appointed the Eastern Cape Planning Commission (ECPC) to facilitate a participatory exercise of defining what the NDP should mean for the province. The Eastern Cape Vision 2030 Provincial Development Plan, as an overarching development strategy for the province, provides a development trajectory for the province (ECPC, 2014:i).

Furthermore, the integrated development planning has to align to the Urban Development Framework (UDF) and the Rural Development Framework (RDF). The Urban Development Framework seeks to accommodate the growth and job creation orientation of GEAR with the more re-distributive and ‘people development’ association of the RDP. It does so through the accommodation of the need to stimulate local economic development and enhanced global competitiveness of South African cities. The Rural Development Framework (RDF) asserts a powerful poverty focus. It describes how government working with rural people aims to achieve a rapid and sustained reduction in rural poverty. Other considerations which must be taken into account in integrated development planning include: changing internal and external circumstances; comments from the MEC on the previous IDP Review; BCMM surveys; reports from community engagements; Council’s Strategic Planning Session; as well as Local Government Back to Basics Programme (BCMM, 2016/2017:6).

The BCMM has identified and developed a number of sector plans as part of the IDP development and review process. These sector plans are driven by departmental sector plan champions and coordinated at the level of the IDP Steering Committee (BCMM, 2016/2017:7-
Five strategic objectives were identified through the process of developing the BCMM long-term Metro Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS). The IDP is explicitly aligned and takes its tune from the long-term MGDS. Implementation of the MGDS is to be realised through the IDP (Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM, 2016/2017:8). The BCMM, (2016/2017) IDP review process as shown (Figure 2.5) is a continuous cycle of planning, implementation and evaluation.

![Figure 2.5: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality: IDP review process](image)

Source: BCMM (2016/2017:10)

The BCMM 2016/2017 IDP/Budget/PMS Review Process Plan 2016/17, provides details of the programme with time frames and a description of what is expected to happen throughout the IDP review process. It describes the IDP review phases as a detailed action plan with time frames and dates for the various phases and the identified activities follows in the next section. Whilst the format of the action suggests that the IDP process follow neat sequential steps, the reality is that the process moves between these phases and the phases overlap (BCMM, 2016/2017:10).
2.7.2.1 Phase 1: Preparing for IDP Review
During this phase as outlined by BCMM (2016/2017:10) institutional preparations and arrangements will be made to ensure that the IDP review process runs smoothly. This essentially entails “designing an action programme for the process by indicating main activities, and time frames; assigning roles and responsibilities; and putting in place organisational arrangements and the procedures and mechanisms for public participation. The key ‘output’ of this preparation phase is a Process Plan, to be approved by Council” (BCMM, 2016/2017:10).

2.7.2.2 Phase 2: Monitoring and Evaluation and Updated Analysis
The purpose of the Analysis Phase as pointed out by the BCMM (2016/2017:10) is “to find out what is happening and to ensure that decisions are based on: people’s priority needs and problems; knowledge of available and accessible resources; and proper information and understanding of the dynamics influencing the development in the municipality”. The process involves finding out, collating and soliciting relevant information, including identification of what has previously been achieved as well as any identified gaps with respect to previous IDPs (BCMM, 2016/2017:10). Phase 2 further includes the gathering of information on progress with the implementation of current programmes and projects; new information from internal and external sources, for example: - new policy and legislation, - as well as budget information from other spheres of government and the BCMM. This phase also seeks “to identify potential and available funding from all sources, - more or improved in-depth information about the existing situation and priority issues, information about new development and trends - including information arising out of sector plans and input from stakeholder organisations and constituencies” (BCMM, 2016/2017:11).

All community needs and issues identified during various public consultations and those coming from ward meetings are consolidated and a verification process to determine which needs have been adequately addressed as well which ones still remain top priorities is then undertaken. Within this planning phase, consideration would also be given to how all of the above-noted information impacts on the priority issues, objectives and strategies. The output of this phase is a Situation Analysis Report, wherein prioritised/key issues for BCMM are identified, elaborated and discussed (BCMM, 2016/2017:11).

2.7.2.3 Phase 3: Objectives, Strategies, Projects and Programmes
The knowledge and information generated during the previous phase will inform phase three. During this phase, the objectives, strategies, projects and programmes, within the existing IDP, are evaluated in the light of the ‘analysis’. Thereafter, appropriate changes and adjustments can be made to the IDP. In this phase projects and programmes will further be identified for
implementation, ensuring that set objectives and strategies are realised through a monitoring and evaluation framework.

2.7.2.4 Phase 4: Consolidate IDP Review
During this phase the BCMM, 2016/2017, IDP/Budget/PMS Process Plan 2016/17 anticipates that the IDP programmes and projects would be further refined through the work of Clusters and Directorates. The draft IDP is then presented to the Clusters, External Representative Forum; and thereafter the IDP Report would then be consolidated, ready for submission to Council (BCMM, 2016/2017:12). Once the draft reviewed 2017/18 IDP and Medium-Term-Revenue-Expenditure-Framework (MTREF) Budget has been approved by Council, they will be advertised for public comment and will be presented and discussed in public meetings across the municipality (BCMM, 2016/2017:12).

2.7.4.5 Phase 5: Approval
In this phase consideration is given to the comments arising out of the public participation process and the reviewed IDP 2017/18 is submitted, together with the budget, to Council for adoption. The review of the Integrated Development Plan and Budget involves municipal officials, Councillors, as well as stakeholders external to the Municipality (Van der Waldt, 2014:114).

The Executive Mayor of the BCMM has the ultimate responsibility for the preparation and implementation of the IDP, Budget and Performance Management System (PMS). In his/her executive capacity the Executive Mayor is responsible for the overall oversight, development and monitoring of the process or delegates IDP and PMS responsibilities to the municipal manager (Van der Waldt, 2014:77-79). The executive mayor also ensures that the budget, IDP and budget-related policies are mutually consistent and credible. Further to this, the executive mayor submits the revised IDP and annual budget and the proposed PMS to the municipal council for adoption (BCMM, 2016/2017:13).

The BCMM is the ultimate political decision-making body of the municipality and the Council has the responsibility to consider and adopt the IDP Process Plan and time schedule for the preparation, tabling and approval of the annual budget. Council also considers and adopts the IDP and annual Budget, ensures the municipal budget is coordinated with and based on the IDP, adopts a PMS and monitors progress, i.e. IDP implementation (BCMM, 2016/2017:13).
2.8 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: IDP REVIEW PROCESS STRUCTURES AND STAKEHOLDERS

Urban growth and consolidation results in agglomerations termed ‘metropolitan areas’ (Stren and Cameron, 2005:275). Metropolitan areas are “cities with a very large urbanised core, together with adjacent urban and rural areas which have a high degree of economic and social integration with its core” (Barlow, 1991:33; United Nations, 2002:134). As pointed out earlier, BCMM, is a category “A” municipality and as such has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area of jurisdiction (Van der Waldt, 2014:8; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:21-33). As contemplated in section 8(g) of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), BCMM has a mayoral executive system combined with a ward participatory system (Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:57).

As such, BCMM has 100 seats which include 50 Proportional Representation (PR) Councillors and 50 Ward Councillors. The Executive Mayor with the Deputy Executive Mayor governs using the Executive Mayoral System along with Chairpersons of Portfolio Committees. The Executive Mayor is assisted by the Mayoral Committee/Executive Committee in terms of sections 42-44 of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). In SA metropolitan and local municipalities of the types mentioned in Section 8(c) (d) (g) and (b) and Section 9(b) (d) and (f) may have ward committees (Van der Waldt, 2014:63-64; Thornhill and Cloete, 2014:75).

The ward committee structure is part of local governance and an important way of achieving the aims of local governance and democracy. BCMM has established ward committees in each of its fifty (50) wards. Ward committees are advisory structures of municipal councils that are established in terms of section 73 of the Municipal Structures Act Act (Act 117 of 1998) (Reddy and Sikhakane, 2008:681; Thornhill and Madumo, 2011:131). Ward communities are one of the structures used to foster public participation by local communities (DPLG, 2005:11). They are key institutional mechanisms which contribute towards bringing about people-centred, participatory and democratic local governance (Smith and Visser, 2009:2). The object of a ward committee is thus to enhance participatory democracy (Van der Waldt, 2014:63).

As contemplated in Section 73(2) (a) of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) a councillor representing a ward in the council is also the chairperson of the ward committee, that also consists of not more than 10 other members (Section 73(2) (b). The functions and powers of a ward committee are as provided in Section 74(a) (i) (ii) and sections 74(b) of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). However, while powers and functions can be delegated down to ward committees, they are not meant to be bodies which take major administrative decisions.
In terms of Section 33 of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 2000) a municipality may establish committees, detailing the specific powers of such committees and the need for delegation and commitment of resources to such committees. Ward committees however have no power whatsoever to force council to do anything and can only make recommendations to council.

### 2.8.1 Marginalised voices in the Integrated Development Planning systems

As alluded to earlier, the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), (Section 72(a) (i) (ii)) provides that the formation of ward committees should reflect the diversity of local interests, as well as gender equity. Failure to achieve equity in representing all social formations and interests results in a sizable ‘voice’ not being heard, and the interests of a sizeable population not being prioritised at the local level (Mbuyisa, 2013:125). Integrated development planning requires municipal councils such as BCMM to develop strategies for community involvement, including communication strategies, community outreach programmes and stakeholder involvement strategies (Skenjana and Kimemia, 2011:59). Innovative strategies are meant to improve the levels and quality of public participation.

Without ‘voice’ the IDP processes still remain far from achieving full community involvement in policy-making. Friedman, Hlela and Thulare (2003:56) argues that they remain very much top-down. This mostly remains the case when “communities are merely allowed to comment on proposals developed by municipal officials rather than being invited to contribute to content before its drafting” (Friedman et al., 2003:56). In one study Friedman et al., (2003:56) found out that ward meetings were mostly dominated by questions about unrealised promises, and lists of demands the municipality is expected to address. This is seen most often in the poorer areas of municipalities, where challenges are huge. The major weakness with this arrangement is that it fails to recognise marginalised communities who, because of political vulnerability and socio-economic deprivation, are not able to participate meaningfully in such participatory structures.

Skenjana and Kimemia (2011:58) also found out that “…political affiliation and the desire to maintain control over ward committees often take precedence over concerns of fair representation and the pursuit of set developmental objectives”. Lack of transport and technical and specialised skills to provide legal interpretation of documents and policy, and a lack of language skills and capacity to compile written submissions have also been recognised and raised as inherent weaknesses hampering public participation in ward committees (Friedman et al., 2003:56). Ward committees’ functionality and effectiveness as instruments of democracy and development is however often a matter of serious concern in SA, especially in rural
communities (COGTA, 2009:13). Munzhedzi and Phago (2013:43-45) identified some reasons why some ward committees are dysfunctional. Some of the reasons include political party influences, limited resources, communication, unhealthy stakeholder relations, racial alignment and patronage.

Additionally, Mbuyisa (2013:126) points to the existence of power imbalances and asymmetries, which make it impossible to have meaningful public participation. This imbalance and resultant exclusion and alienation are extended to the broader community and undermine the objectives of public participation that are equity and equality. Other researchers have found state-created public participation spaces insufficient, and “ill-suited to facilitate meaningful community engagement in local planning, decision making, resource allocation, implementation and evaluation” (Friedman, 2011:3). Pithouse (2011:8) laments that there is often a technocratic agenda, which deters genuine public participation. There is thus often an inability to confront elite interests with popular counter power that is inherently undemocratic’ (Pithouse, 2011:8).

2.8.2 Integrated development planning and public participation

The former Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), (2001) IDP Guide Pack advocates that an integrated development planning representative forum has to be established to encourage the participation of communities and other stakeholders. The IDP representative forum may include members of the executive committee of council, councillors, traditional leaders, ward committee representatives, heads of departments and senior officials of municipal and government departments; representatives from organised stakeholder groups, people who fight for the rights of unorganised groups, resource people or advisors and community representatives (Venter, 2014:114). The author notes that the purpose of the IDP representative forum is to: provide an opportunity for stakeholders to represent the interests of their constituencies; provide a structure for discussion, negotiation and joint decision-making; ensure proper communication between all stakeholders and the municipality; and monitor the planning and implementation process.

The council approves a strategy for public participation. Such a strategy among other things articulates: the roles of different stakeholders during the participation process; ways to encourage participation of unorganised groups; methods to ensure participation during the different planning phases; timeframes for public and stakeholder response, inputs and comments; ways to disseminate information and means to collect information on community needs (Venter, 2014:114). Venter (2014:114) therefore notes that the stakeholder and community representatives participate in the integrated development planning representative
forum in order to: inform interest groups, communities and organisations about relevant planning activities and their outcomes; analyse issues, determine priorities, negotiate and reach consensus; participate in the designing of project proposals and/or their evaluation; discuss and comment on the draft IDP; and monitor the implementation performance of the IDP.

In line with Venter (2014:114) BCMM recognises Ward Councillors, Community Development Workers (CDWs) and Traditional Leaders as major links between the municipal government and its residents. The roles of these functionaries are to: (i) link the planning process to their constituencies and/or wards; (ii) ensure that communities understand the purpose and the key mechanisms of the IDP, Budget process, Performance Management and that the community are motivated to actively participate; and (iii) to facilitate public consultation and participation within their wards; and to provide feedback to their communities on the adopted IDP and Budget (BCMM, 2016/2017:13).

The IDP/OPMS Portfolio Committee provides general political guidance over the IDP/Budget and PMS review process. The Portfolio Committee is chaired by the Political Head of the Executive Support Services Directorate and is constituted of Councillors and the Executive Mayor as an ex-officio member (BCMM, 2016/2017:13). Key members of this committee are the portfolio Councillor for finance. Technical support is provided by the Head of Department (HOD) – Executive Support Services, General Manager (GM), IDP/Budget Integration/PMS and GIS, and other relevant officials (BCMM, 2016/2017:13).

The Budget steering committee is responsible for recommending the budget document as well as any other budget-related issues, such as changes in internally funded projects, prior to approval by council (BCMM, 2016/2017:13). This committee is chaired by the Executive Mayor or his/her delegated representative, with chairpersons of the portfolio committees and all section 57 employees serving as members. The Municipal Manager has the responsibility to provide guidance and ensure that the administration actively participates and supports the development and review of the IDP and Budget and works towards its implementation (BCMM, 2016/2017:13).

The IDP Steering Committee is a critically important structure of council (BCMM, 2016/2017:14). The IDP Steering Committee is chaired by the Municipal Manager and has sitting on the Committee the Heads of Directorates who will also be the technical leaders of the different Clusters. The tasks of the Steering Committee are to: (i) provide technical oversight and support to the IDP/ Budget review and its implementation; (ii) consider and advise on IDP/
Budget content and process; (iii) ensure inter-directorate co-operation, co-ordination, communication and strategic thinking to address priority issues; (iv) ensure sector and spatial co-ordination and alignment; (v) ensure IDP and budget linkage; (vi) ensure Performance Management is linked to the IDP; and (vii) ensure the municipality is oriented to implement the IDP and ensure time-frames set for the review are met (BCMM, 2016/2017:14). Directorates and Departments are responsible for sector planning and for the implementation of the IDP. The participation of all Departments is thus critical in that: (i) they provide technical/sector expertise and information, throughout the IDP Budget process; and (ii) ensure that the review process is participatory, integrated, strategic, implementation-oriented, budget-linked and aligned with and satisfies sector planning requirements (BCMM, 2016/2017:14).

The IDP/PM/Budget Representative Forum constitutes the structure that institutionalises sectoral participation in the IDP Process. The members of the IDP Representative Forum include “Business, Government and NGO sectors (as well as political and technical leaders of the IDP Clusters)” (BCMM, 2016/2017:14). The Executive Mayor or his/her nominee chairs the Forum. The Forum has the following functions and duties: (i) it represents the interests of their constituents in the IDP process; (ii) provides an organisational mechanism for discussion and consensus-building between the different stakeholders and the Municipal Government; monitors the performance of the planning, implementation and review process; and (iii) ensures an efficient flow of information to and from stakeholder groups (BCMM, 2016/2017:14).

The Public Consultation/Imbizo Preparation Committee is led by the Mayoral Committee Councillors for IDP, Public Participation and Finance. Members of the Technical Committee include: (i) the General Manager (GM) - IDP/PMS/GIS and IEMP; (ii) General Manager (GM) - Public Participation and Special Programmes; (iii) General Manager (GM) - Development Co-operation and Communication; (iv) General Manager (GM) - Budget and Treasury; (v) General Manager (GM) Organisational Support; (vi) General Manager (GM) - Public Safety; and (vi) General Manager (GM) Community Services. (BCMM, 2016/2017:14). The purpose of the Committee is to provide technical guidance and ensure the administrative co-ordination of key public consultations and imbizos.
The IDP, Budget Integration, Performance Management and GIS Department reports to the Head of Department (HOD) - Executive Support Services and is required to manage and co-ordinate the IDP review process, ensure IDP/budget integration, the roll out of the Performance Management System and monitor the implementation of the IDP, including: (i) preparing the Process Plan for the development of the IDP; (ii) undertaking the overall management and co-ordination of the planning and review process under consideration of time, resources and people; and (iii) ensuring that the review process is participatory, strategic, implementation-oriented, integrated with the budget process, is horizontally and vertically aligned and satisfies sector planning requirements (BCMM, 2016/2017:15). Figure 2.6 shows a typical public/community participation structure in a South African municipality.

2.8.3 Mechanism for Alignment – Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
The HOD: Executive Support Services, supported by the city manager and his/her complement of senior management in BCMM are responsible for ensuring the smooth co-ordination of the IDP review process (BCMM, 2016/2017:18). Of critical importance in this regard is ensuring

Figure 2.6: Typical public/community participation structures in a municipality

that the planning process of the BCMM takes cognisance of the planning activities of other stakeholders operating within its area of jurisdiction.space including: (i) government sector departments operating within the metropolitan municipality’s jurisdiction; and (ii) government agencies and other parastatals within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan and other neighbouring municipalities that have plans impacting on the operations of the BCMM (BCMM, 2016/2017:18).

Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality proposes various engagements to ensure proper co-ordination of the process is undertaken with affected stakeholders from a bilateral level, as well as through formalised inter-governmental relations structures. Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality established Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) structures and processes to ensure that proper coordination as envisaged in the IGR Act (Act 13 of 2005) are realised (BCMM, 2016/2017:18). These include the BCMM IGR Forum. The BCMM IGR forum is chaired by the executive mayor or his/her delegated representative, the BCMM-wide IGR Forum is composed of the mayoral committee, senior managers from sector departments operating within the metro, and senior managers from government agencies and/or parastatals operating within the metro (BCMM, 2016/2017:18). The IDP/IGR Clusters are chaired by political cluster leaders. These clusters are composed of managers and technical workers from the various sectors of government (internal and external) including the private sector (BCMM, 2016/2017:18).

It is critically important that the IDP review process aligns with national legislation, distinguishing between those that deal specifically with municipalities arising from the Local Government White Paper on the one hand and sector planning legislation on the other. The Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998), the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), [as amended], and Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003) are specific to local government. The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), has a specific chapter dedicated to IDPs and it is the overarching piece of legislation with regard to development and review of the IDP. Arising from the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the IDP and PMS Regulations need to be complied with. Further to this, national sector legislation contains various requirements for municipalities to undertake planning. National sector requirements vary in nature. Such requirements include for example: (i) legal requirements for the formulation of discrete sector plans (e.g. a water services development plan); (ii) a requirement that planning be undertaken as a component of, or part of, the IDP (like a housing strategy and targets); (iii) links between the IDP and budget process as outlined in the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003); Legal compliance requirement (such as principles required in the Development Facilitation Act (Act 67 of 1995), and the National Environmental Management
Act (Act 107 of 1998). Furthermore, a recommendation more than a requirement, which is deemed to add value to the municipal planning process and product is Local Agenda 21 (BCMM, 2016/2017:19).

### 2.9 CONCLUSION

The IDP is the principal strategic document that informs all operations of the municipality and therefore, in order to ensure that, a document reflective of the needs of the people and the realistic resource base of the municipality must be developed. As such, on an annual basis, municipalities must make provision in their budgets for the development and/or review of a municipality’s Integrated Development Plan, in accordance with the process plan. Accordingly, the BCMM committed an amount of R863 947.00 from the public participation workshops Vote number 0523230012711DJ1ZZ11 for the implementation of the municipality’s 2016/17 process plan (BCMM, 2016/2017:55).

This chapter has located integrated development planning within a conceptual framework by reviewing literature, examining and discussing the concepts of development and planning. The capability approach as an approach to development established the conditions of human development. Human development this chapter argued requires proxy development indicators which can be actualised as targets at both the national and local contexts.

As such, the Human Development Index (HDI) was discussed as a useful indicator for measuring human development at a national level. The chapter found it necessary to examine the pre-2015 MDG goals as a development framework that has guided sustainable development efforts at the global, national and local levels pre-2015. The post-2015 development agenda – was discussed in terms of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as useful guides for framing the post-2015 development priorities. This then provided the conceptual and theoretical lenses for contextualising integrated development planning in SA and Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

The chapter ended by contextualising public participation within the context of the Integrated Development Plan review process in the BCMM, and also highlighting the critical structures and stakeholders in the IDP review process. The next chapter establishes a conceptual and theoretical foundation for contextualising public participation. The purpose of Chapter 3 will be to establish a point of departure, for developing, analysing, interpreting and discussing the results of Section C of the survey questionnaire (administered to ward councillors, ward
committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders) (Objective 1).
3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter reviewed literature and discussed concepts and theories related to integrated development planning. It conceptualised ‘development’ and ‘planning’ with the purposes of relating and contextualising these concepts to integrated development planning in SA. The Human Development Index (HDI) model that includes several quantifiable human development components was discussed, with the purpose of locating development within the context of identifiable measures and indicators. South Africa’s unfinished MDG agenda, as well as emerging post-2015 developmental agenda were discussed. A review of literature and an analysis of the concept of planning brought forth the fact that, planning is essentially a public management function. The IDP as a development planning tool and a product of an integrated development planning and review process was discussed and contextualised within the context of the South African National Development Plan (NDP) and developmental local government planning architecture.

This chapter conceptualises, theorises and contextualises public participation in integrated development planning through a review of related literature. It discusses the historical context and the approaches to public participation, the management theory, procedural justice and communicative approaches. Public participation is discussed within the theoretical context of network governance heuristics and conceptualised in terms of public participation as citizen power. Public participation power dynamics are then discussed and theorised in terms of the power cube approach, as well as social practice and social exchange theories. Public participation power dynamics are accordingly theorised as an outcome of social exchange relations. Reviewing literature related to public participation power dynamics was critical if public participation in integrated development planning is to unmask abuses of power and more structural and enduring inequity (Cullen et al., 2014:262). This is so, especially given that power dynamics are complex and multifaceted and vary depending on the context, thus presenting public participation in integrated development planning challenges (Cullen et al., 2014:262). It is therefore deemed critically important that conceptual and theoretical analytical frameworks be surveyed and established to identify these dynamics and investigate their influence on public participation in integrated development planning. Public participation as public value transacting is discussed and related to transactive planning theory. Critical theory a tradition of critical reflection on society is surveyed as a lens for analysing social structures and social institutions from the point of view of their dominating influences on individuals and
communities. The chapter ends with an overview of the context of public participation in planning generally and in South African municipalities.

### 3.2 TRACING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public participation plays a key role in a democracy (Lues, 2014:791). Democracy is a Greek word which means ruled \((kratia)\) by the people \((demos)\) (Dahl, 1994:23-30). The foundation of any democratic system lies in the protection of basic human rights for all (Arat, 1999:120-121; Donnelly, 1999:608-10), including minorities, who should have their proportionate share in the exercise of power, along with the right to have their interests carefully considered (Twala and Lues, 2017:114). One of the virtues of democratic local government is its ability to strengthen democracy in society by providing valuable experience of political participation and decision-making (De Tocqueville, 1835/1956:61; Mill, 1861/1910:347-348).

Classic political thoughts, Plato and Aristotle in particular, posit that democratic justice is achieved when numeric equality ensures that a majority of citizens approve of the mechanisms and substance of their rule – justice and what is right, is therefore determined not by a complex examination of principles and values but simply by the endorsement of the majority (Ebenstein, 1969:102). Democratic local government allows “more direct access for the people to the government and the government to the people, and to stimulating the public to participate in development plans” (Reddy and Sabelo, 1997:576). In The New State, Follett (1918/1998:142, 156) states that democracy is “the will of the whole”; “the rule of an interacting, interpermeating whole”.

In Ancient Rome, for example, the rights of citizenship were for the first time granted to all free men in the Roman Empire, by 212 A.D. with the establishment of the edict *Constitutio Antoniana*, under the Roman Emperor Caracalla, and the concept of universal rights of citizenship was thus born (Langton, 1978:19). In the *Public and Its Problems*, John Dewey laid out an ideal form of governance in which democratic institutions and habits of thought enable citizens and experts to act publicly to solve their collective problems. For Dewey, participatory social creative feedback was the essence of democracy (Dewey, 1927:82). For Fung (2004:15-16), a democratic public exists when individuals in society collectively recognise and sensibly respond to the problems that arise from their interactions with one another. Fung (2004:16), however, notes that despite a renaissance in Dewey’s pragmatism and his public philosophy the “problem of the public” as he puts it, remains largely unanswered. For participation to contribute to the democratisation of democracy (Giddens, 2002:93), it needs explicit articulation with the democratic. In other words, a participatory culture needs a democratic culture.

Hill (1994:11) posits that, in medieval times, the term citizenship not only encompassed a duality of loyalty to Church and State, but it also endorsed the fraternity of guild members andburgers in city life. In republican Italy during the renaissance, there was a revival of the ideal of active citizenship and concern with aspects of self-government (Hill, 1994:11). Republicanism had a profound impact on political thought in Britain, America and France in the 17th and 18th century, which culminated in increasing concerns with the problems of how civic life was to be constructed and how public life was to be sustained (Langton, 1978:19-20). In the late 18th century, the theory of representative liberal democracy shifted the terms of reference of democratic thinking, as the rights of citizens became more and more synonymous with participation in the determination of the collective will through representative democracy (Langton, 1978:19-20). The hallmark of both the French and American Revolutions were their unprecedented demands for equality, inalienable rights and the liberty of citizens (Langton, 1978:19-20). Similarly, 19th century Britain advocated a strong moral and democratic ethos of public service and public spiritedness, with local governments increasingly based on elected public involvement (Hill, 1994:11).

Hill (1994:12-18) distinguishes three strands of thought, from which public participation emerged from articulations of the historical development of the concept citizenship. Firstly, the liberal-individualist tradition argues that while citizens are free to choose those who govern, their involvement in public concerns is a matter of choice rather than a necessary feature of citizenship. Secondly, the civic-republican perspective with its roots in Machiavelli’s idea of virtue, advocates the obligation of military service to defend the republic, which in turn was
related to public-spiritedness values (Hill, 1994:12-14). The assumption in this perspective is that, citizens’ engagement in public life is to deliberate on common purposes, and then to take action to secure them. The key factor in this tradition is shared experience of public participation within a political community (Twala and Lues, 2017:117). The civic-republican perspective emphasises communitarianism and citizenship that entail public participation. Within this view not to take part in the same is viewed as abrogating citizen rights.

Thirdly, social rights of citizenship evolved as a third strand of thought in the 20th century. This perspective argues that citizenship is a status possessed by all those in full membership of a community that is based on the principle of equality. This perspective grounds citizenship as political, civil and social rights, thus producing citizenship both as a set of rights and status. The main contribution of this third strand of thought is its acknowledgement that welfare rights are important elements in contemporary articulations in the concept of democratic citizenship (Hill, 1994:12-18). Encapsulating these strands of thought is that the term citizenship also explicitly aligns with the notion of public participation. Classical theorists (De Tocqueville, Mill, and Rousseau) emphasise the educational and experiential role public participation has for individuals. Their philosophical tradition posits that a local level of decision-making with local bodies responsible for addressing problems and implementing solutions stimulates public participation and empowers citizens. This position and school of thought, places emphasis on public empowerment and access to decision-making at the local level (Arnstein, 1969:216; Hill, 1994:23-27; Lues, 2014:798). Senecah’s (2004:23) insightful notion of the ‘trinity of voice’, emphasise that access, standing and influence promote community voice in public participation.

Gramsci (1971:262-263) conceived government and civil society as interdependent, defining the ‘integral state’ as the sum of ‘political society + civil society’. Gramsci (1971:56) defined ‘political society’ as the sphere of government within the ‘public’ domain of the state, and ‘civil society’ the assemblage of ‘so-called private and third sector organisations’. For Sørensen and Torfing’s (2007:18) governance networks serve as functional responses to increasing societal complexity and diversification. Accordingly, governance networks awaken the capacity of the traditional state to govern efficiently through traditional means of hierarchy and the market. As such, for Sørensen and Torfing (2007:18) governance networks are inter-organisational media for interest mediation between interdependent, but conflicting actors each of which has a rule and resource base of their own.

Aggregative theories of democracy take a calculated approach to human social action practice. Key theorists, James Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Charles Montesquieu, Joseph Schumpeter, Robert
A. Dahl and John Rawls regard democracy as a means to regulate interaction between individuals who pursue a calculating logic of consequentiality. Aggregative theories of democracy can be subdivided into two groups: one taking a calculated/conflict approach to democracy, and one adopting a calculated/coordination approach. The former group of theories views democracy as a means of resolving substantial political conflicts between individuals and groups with different interests and preferences (Darl, 2006:8-15). Dahl (1957) and Bobbio (1987) belong to this group of theorists. Dahl regards democracy as a means to reach common decisions in society characterised by a plurality of conflicting interests: “political conflict, not harmony, is the hallmark of the modern democratic state” (Darl, 1957:203; Dahl, 1989:19). Similarly, Bobbio (1987:61-62) shares this pluralist perspective on democracy, maintaining that “a necessary relationship exists between democracy and dissent”.

The one adopting a calculated/coordination approach regards democracy as a means by which to avoid conflicts through procedures facilitating consensus-based coordination. The key proponents of this thought fall within the group of aggregative theories of democracy advocated by John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. Rawls (1972:136) regarded democracy as the best possible means by which “to set up a fair procedure, so that any principles agreed to will be just”. Inspired by classical social contract theory, Rawls argues that a fair procedure is to be found by means of reasoned debate under the ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1972:136-137). Hence, while Dahl perceives of democracy as a means of resolving conflict, Rawls views it as a means of promoting just outcomes through procedures (procedural justice) that enhance coordination, agreement and cooperation between rational individuals, even though they have different interests (Rawls, 1993:28). Jurgen Habermas likewise emphasises democratic procedures, and consequently contributes to the production of ‘reasonable and fair results’ (Habermas, 1996:26). The elimination of power and structural inequality it is assumed assists in the realisation of his ideal typical model of communicative action that permits conflicts of interests to be overcome through reasoned debate between sincere and justice-seeking individuals (Habermas, 1996:26) also supported by Twala and Lues (2017:115).

In American polity, public participation in governance processes is rooted in the Jeffersonian tradition. Jefferson advocated bottom-up government responsive to citizens’ needs (Berner, 2001:23). Cogan and Sharpe (1986:283) cited in Parker (2003:1) postulates that public participation, in the United States of America (USA) was institutionalised in the mid-1960s with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Great Society Programmes’. President Johnson made a passionate call to American citizens to work with their government, so as to make the USA a ‘Great Society’ (Johnson, 1964:232).
Olivier (2003:5-6) has traced the origin of public participation to three root sources. Firstly, public participation as ‘good development project practice’ advocated in the 1950s by social activists and project field workers as a necessary dimension of development. Later, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) hailed public participation as a prerequisite to successful project implementation. Secondly, ‘public participation denotes good governance’ (Olivier, 2003:5). Olivier (2003:5) defines governance, as the nature of the relationship between the state and civil society. This good governance perspective situates public participation within neo-liberal Western democracy origins. Thirdly, Olivier (2003:6) locates the notion of public participation in a local governance context, viewing ‘public participation as empowerment’. The public participation as empowerment discourse positions participation within wider political struggles that link the conditions of under-development with access to political and other forms of power (Arnstein, 1969:216-217; Gaventa, 2006a:25; Twala and Lues, 2017:117).

3.3 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Webler and Tuler (2002:181) identified several ways in which a theory of public participation benefits practitioners. They observe that a theory of public participation insightfully helps practitioners, generalise knowledge beyond each practitioner’s experience. It further highlights preconditions that can influence the public participation process. Furthermore, a theory of public participation assists practitioners focus attention on immediate indicators of desired outcomes. Webler and Tuler (2002:181) are therefore of the view that a theory of public participation enables practitioners to match method with purpose and signposts them to predict outcomes of interventions. Accordingly, Webler and Tuler (2002:181) identified conceptual and theoretical approaches for understanding public participation, namely the management theory, the procedural justice approach and the communicative approach.

3.3.1 The Management Theory Approach

constructivist learning theory and soft systems methodology, and developed a collaborative learning approach. A social-learning perspective of participation is premised on the assumption that the public benefits from participating, since public participation fosters social learning processes, and instils a “citizen identity” (Roberts, 2004:330).

In ‘Citizens as Analysts’ Wildavsky (1987:255) asserts that public policy benefits from public participation. Policies stand a better chance of success … “if citizens have real choices and the right to choose” (Wildavsky, 1987:255). Accordingly, for Wildavsky (1987:255) a better citizenry emerges from the experience of public participation. Wildavsky hence views public participation as democracy in action. Wildavsky (1987:277) argued that by depriving people of autonomy in thought (their consciousness is false, their experience invalid), it is possible to deny them citizenship in action. Defending the virtue of civility in spaces (Gaventa, 2006a:25) both popular and public (Kingwell, 2010:26) similarly like Wildavsky, see a relationship between civility and citizenship.

Lowndes, Pratchet and Stoker (2006:287) postulate that citizens participate when they believe “that they are part of a wider civic identity”. In discussions of civic engagement Hafer and Bing (2016:206-8) places emphasis on “developing a civic identity”. Youniss, McLellan and Yates (1997:620) advocate a developmental perspective to civic identity. They contend that civic identity denotes, “the establishment of individual and collective sense of social agency, responsibility for society, and political-moral awareness”. For Teske (1997:96) activism “enables public participation participants to develop and live according to concerns rooted in a sense of who they are and who they want to be”. Teske’s (1997:690) conceptualises identity (i.e. one’s subjective position) as socially constructed, meaning that it is influenced, shaped and achieved through relationships, experience, participation and discourse. As such he argues that through public participation, individuals become citizens.

Campbell (2005) extends Teske’s (1997) identity construction model of public participation. Campbell (2005:700) uses identity construction through public participation as a foundation to theorise how to reconceptualise authentic participation, consider alternative public spaces for public discourse, and reflect on the role of the public official in “cultivating the publicly engaged self”. Erickson (1968) in Westen and Heim (2003:646) describes individually held identity as “both a highly personal construction, developed through the integration of various identifications and disidentifications with significant others and reference groups, and a social construction developed through internalisation of roles and reflected appraisals of others”.

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Ramarajan (2014:593) an organisational behaviour theorist, deploys a social identity approach, which emanates from social identity theory. Ramarajan (2014:593) describes identity as “subjective knowledge, meanings, and experiences that are self-defining”. The use of social identity approach to conceptualise citizen identity within public participation is insightful for at least two main reasons. Firstly, if public participation is viewed as a process of social exchange involving social groups (i.e. citizens and public officials), it is likely that citizens who participate would classify themselves and their behaviours in relation to their subjective conceptualisation of a social group which participates (create and reinforce social identity) rather than in relation to unique individual characteristics (personal identity).

Secondly, the presence of public official(s) who design participation may constitute a potential salient outgroup (i.e. public officials are agents of the state, whereas citizens are not), which affords citizens the opportunity to differentiate themselves from this outgroup by identifying with the salient in-group (i.e. the subjectively conceptualised social group of citizens who participate) (Hafer and Ran, 2016:213). Thus, conceptualising citizen identity in a public participation context as an acquired social identity, is therefore insightful in that it presents a cogent analytical foundation for understanding how citizen identity is constructed through public participation and how this is related to citizen motivation to participate (Hafer and Ran, 2016:213).

3.3.2 The Procedural Justice Approach
Public officials grapple with issues of fairness, justice and equality, and often confront notions of social equity. Shafritz, and Russell (2005:434) define social equity: fairness in the delivery of public services “as egalitarianism in action – the principle that each citizen, regardless of economic resources or personal traits, deserves and has a right to be given equal treatment by the political system”. Similarly, the procedural justice approach concerns itself with issues of fairness, or procedural justice. Procedural justice refers to the perceptions of fairness of formal procedures used for decision-making (Theodorakopoulos, Ram and Kakabadse, 2015:238). Procedural justice is an important element in people’s satisfaction with decisions, perceptions of fairness, and support for authorities. Principles relevant to procedural justice are: applying criteria consistently, suppressing bias, using accurate information, providing opportunities to correct errors, providing adequate representation in the decision-making process, and ensuring ethical treatment (Theodorakopoulos et al., 2015:238). The procedural justice approach thus more closely examines relationships between procedural justice, distributive justice, support for outcomes, trust and other variables.
3.3.3 The Communicative Approach

The communicative approach stream of theoretical work began with the work of Jürgen Habermas’ (1979, 1984, 1987) theory of universal pragmatics and his theory of communicative action. This theory advocates fair and competent public participation. Webler (1995:81-86) identified different kinds of discourse and specified criteria for each kind of discourse to operate well, which form the foundation of and criteria of a fair and competent public participation process. The two central components of the theory are the ideas of fairness and competence. Webler and Tuler (2002:182) view fairness as referring to “what people are permitted to do in a participatory process”. For Webler and Tuler (2002:182) certain necessary opportunities constitute public participation discourse: agenda and rule making, moderation and rule enforcement, and substantive discussion of the issue. For Webler and Tuler (2002:182) competence which refers to the construction of the best possible understandings and agreements, given what is reasonably knowable to participants at the time the discourse takes place is also a critical component of empowering public participation. Webler and Tuler (2002:182) point out that competence constitutes two basic necessities; access to information and its interpretations, and use of the best available procedures for knowledge selection. Through public participation, “citizens express their preferences to governing officials and convince them to respond to those preferences” (Verba 1999:240-245). Stein (2001:489-500) argues that “transparency supports democracy by facilitating access to information that enables citizens to participate in public life and hold public authorities accountable”.

Modern government is a varying mixture of Weberian bureaucracy, New Public Management, and New Public Governance (Koppenjan, 2012:9-11). Governance networks can be viewed as communities of practice (Wenger, 1998). This is assuming that public participation and exchange of information in the communities might be distorted by power distribution, reputation considerations, and resistance to policy (Roberts, 2006:626-629; Lues, 2014:791; Twala and Lues, 2017:117). Restructuring of government has been dubbed neo-liberal government or advanced liberal government (Dean, 1999:159, 164-165). Neoliberalism points not so much to the rolling back of the state, but to “the proliferation of a series of governmental technologies seeking to make public and private organisations govern themselves according to norms of efficiency, accountability and transparency according to norms of civility, and well-being”. Dean (1999:159, 164-196) distinguishes between neo-liberalism “as a form of governing relying above all on the capacities of the market and advanced liberalism as a form of governing relying on the self-governing capacities of a plurality of more or less autonomous and interacting civil society (the third sector), public and private sectors”. From this point of view, network governance can broadly be characterised as the diverse governmental rationalities,
technologies and norms that seek to govern by promoting the self-steering capacities of individuals and organizations.

3.4 NETWORK GOVERNANCE HEURISTICS

Networks are not only perceived as a defining characteristic of new governance, but also as a preferred alternative to traditional hierarchical structures and market competition in public service delivery (Stoker, 1991:261-268). Rhodes proclaims that governance refers to self-organising, inter-organisational networks. In Rhodes’ (1997b:29-45) view networks are essential to the understanding of governance. The concept of networks is compatible with a system of governance involving extensive institutional fragmentation, in such a system cooperation is essential to get things done (Dean, 1999:159). Not only government is involved, but also quasi-governmental bodies, private and voluntary civic interests, policy systems, policy communities and policy networks (Wilson and Game, 2002:176). For Wilson and Game, (2002:176) the main point of studying governmental institutions is to understand better how policy actors interrelate to make and implement policies.

Policy communities as defined by Rhodes (1999b:142) have a number of distinguishing characteristics including: a limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded; a dominant economic or professional interest; frequent interaction between members of the community on matters related to policy issues; consistency in values, membership and policy outcomes over time; consensus with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; bargaining between members with resources; and hierarchical distribution of resources within the participating organisations, so that the leaders can guarantee the compliance of their members (Rhodes, 1999b:142).

3.4.1 Network Governance – Assumptions and Philosophy

Sørensen and Torfing (2005:202-203, 2007:9) define network governance as: a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; who interact through negotiations; which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; that to a certain extent is self-regulating; and which contributes to the production of public purpose within or across particular policy areas. Governance networks thus interact through negotiation that combine elements of bargaining with elements of deliberation (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:202-203; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007:9). However, as noted by Klijn and Koppenjan (2000:146-148), deliberation seldom leads to unanimous consensus.
It is often imbued with intense power struggles, presence of disagreements, conflicts and social antagonism (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:203). Negotiations also do not take place in an institutional vacuum; rather, they unfold within a relatively institutionalised framework (March and Olsen, 1995:27, 39; Scharpf, 1997:47). Such an institutionalised framework includes a regulative aspect in the sense that it provides rules, roles and procedures; a normative aspect in the sense that it conveys norms, values and standards; a cognitive element in the sense that it generates codes, concepts and specialised knowledge; and an imaginary aspect in the sense that it produces identities, ideologies, common hopes and visions (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:203).

For Rhodes, (1996:660) ‘governance’ refers to “self-organising, inter-organisational networks”. Pierre and Stoker, (2002:30) view governance as “negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between systems of governing at different institutional levels”. Multi-level governance serves as the coordinating mechanism in which command and control have been relaxed or abolished. Peters and Pierre, (2004:77) see this as a shift from a liberal democratic state toward one characterised by complexity and interdependence on many actors. Lowndes (2001:1962) points out that partnerships are promoted in a context that is ‘strategically selective’ in favour of network style forms. Osborne and Gaebler (1992:19-20) advocate entrepreneurial governance. They identify important principles of entrepreneurial governance, including: empowering citizens by taking control away from bureaucracies and giving it to communities; redefining clients as customers; decentralising authority and encouraging participative management; and catalysing partnerships between public, private and voluntary sectors (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992:19-20).

For Pierre and Stoker (2002:32) “the essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government”. In Pierre and Stoker’s (2002:33) view “governance is not about the end of politics but rather the playing out of conflict and cooperation in a broader arena than the formal institutions of government”. It is mostly concerned with how to establish a ‘shared vision’. At the local level, community planning which empowers communities though public participation is an example of this role. Governance focuses on calibration and steering. This means that government influences and steers relationships to achieve ‘desired outcomes’. Governance thus construed, is based on “a consensual premise, that government can persuade people with diverse experiences and capacities to sign up to a common agenda and deploy resources in a positive sum game” (Pierre and Stoker, 2002:33).
According to Alcock (2002:243) the policy idea of partnership, “the institutionalisation of the governance principle by government action, reflects a notion of civil society within which all partners, and all citizens, have mutual interests and obligations in securing local social and economic progress”. As noted by Yang (2007:131) responsiveness cannot be overemphasised. Similarly, Frederickson (1996:265) is of the view that “responsiveness to pressing issues of the day (poverty, racial injustice, social equity) serves the interests of the disadvantaged”. Thus, for Frederickson responsiveness to communities and constituents requires widespread public participation by clients/customers (or citizens).

Different assumptions and philosophies regarding responsiveness differentiate between the New Public Administration and the Reinventing Government movement (or New Public Management [NPM]. Whereas the former advocate an elevated conception of citizenship and active public participation, the latter prefers the customer metaphor and a passive citizenry. Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) built their understanding of New Public Service on responsiveness based on citizenship values. Denhardt and Denhardt assert that government, should not first or exclusively respond to the selfish, short-term interests of ‘customers’ (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003:63); rather, it should “focus on building relationships of trust and collaboration with and among citizens” (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003:45).

In Perry’s (1991:11) view administrative responsiveness involves “the amount and nature of administrative response to individuals and groups within administrative settings”. Rainey (2003:96) writes that the public sector essentially is guided by two values and performance criteria, firstly: competence (i.e., efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, reliability, and reasonableness) and secondly: responsiveness (i.e., responsiveness to rule of law, responsiveness to public authorities, responsiveness to public demands, adherence to ethical standards, fairness, and openness to external scrutiny and criticism). Rainey observed that the responsiveness values often “conflict sharply with competence criteria and also with each other” (Rainey, 2003:96).

Network governance essentially promotes responsiveness across public sectors (Yang, 2007:135). Yang (2007:135) notes that network governance increasingly confronts ‘wicked’ policy problems thus making collaboration and public participation increasingly imperative. In Yang’s (2007:135) view the various challenges confronting public administration necessitates a shift to network governance which focuses on responsiveness to public problems. Network governance requires that the public sector, private sector and civil society become co-governors or co-producers of democratic governance, sharing responsibilities and having equal stances. As
pointed out earlier, in 1979, Wildavsky (1987:252-279) published a lengthy paper called ‘Citizens as Analysts’, in which he developed his thoughts on public participation. As he stated rather bluntly that “whatever else policy analysts may be …, they should be advocates of public participation” (Wildavsky, 1987:255).

As such network governance constitutes a new social morphology in modern democratic societies. Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985:254) asserts that, “democracy is paying attention”. Denhardt and Denhardt (2003:87) identified three government roles in the overall scheme of governance. Firstly, to establish a legal and political framework through which various networks operate, “ratifying, codifying and legitimising decisions that arise from within the various policy networks”. Secondly, helping resolve resource distribution and dependency issues within, between, and among various networks. Thirdly, monitoring the interplay of networks to assure that principles of democracy and social equity are maintained (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003:87). Scholars such as Scharpf (1997:46) and Jessop (2002:224) as such see network governance as providing a distinctive mechanism of governance based on a negotiation rationality.

3.4.2 Governance Network Theory

The idea of governance networks stresses partnership, co-operation and collaboration in policymaking and public service delivery (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001:30). Four stylised theories: interdependence theory, governability theory, integration theory and governmentality theory define governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:208). As pointed out by Sørensen and Torfing (2005:209) interdependence theory advocates that network actors seek to realise different interests through internal power struggles, but they are held together by their mutual interdependence, which facilitates negotiation and compromise. Governability theory defines governance networks as horizontal coordination between autonomous actors interacting through different negotiation games (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:209). Governability theory functionally responds to increasing societal complexity, dynamics and diversification that undermine the ability to govern society efficiently through the traditional means of hierarchy and market (Kooiman, 1993:3).

Integration theory views governance networks as institutionalised fields of interaction between relevant actors that are integrated in a community defined by common norms and perceptions (March and Olsen, 1995 in Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:209). Over time, such governance networks develop their own logic of appropriateness (often influenced by isomorphic pressures), and network actors become integrated through the construction of solidarity and common
identities. Governmentality theory implicitly advocates that governance networks are an attempt of an increasingly reflexive and facilitating state to mobilise and shape the free actions of self-governing actors (Foucault, (1991), in Sørensen and Torfing, 2005:209). Within this view, governance networks are held together and framed by particular technologies and narratives that recruit social and political actors as vehicles of power.

The four theories of network governance, however still, struggle to provide tentative answers to the new and pressing questions about governance failure and meta-governance. They all tend to see closure and the lack of accountability of governance networks as a core problem for democracy, but at the same time they claim that governance networks also have considerable democratic potentials. Interdependence theory argues that if all stakeholders are included, governance networks represent a way of supplementing the territorially organised representative democracy with a functionally organised democracy (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997:174; Rhodes, 1997a:58, 199; 1997b:xiv; Jessop, 2000:14).

Governability theory underscores stakeholder influence as a way of increasing the quality of policy output and thus of the outcome legitimacy of liberal democracies (Scharpf, 2000:118). Integration theory specifies that governance networks will contribute to the development of democratic empowerment, reasoned deliberation and new forms of narrative accountability (March and Olsen, 1995:241-252). Finally, governmentality theory, which is generally critical towards liberal democracy perceives governance networks as a way of increasing the ability of citizens to launch critique, opposition and dissent (Dean, 1999:165).

Critics of ‘network governance’ point to multiple network pathologies, highlighting the limitations of functional explanation and pouring cold water on extravagant claims for the emergence of a ‘network society’ (Davies, Holm-Hansen, Kononenko and Røiseland, 2016:137). Davies et al., (2016:137) note with concern that governance networks are often state-centred ‘invited spaces’ (Gaventa, 2006a:25) where government officials select and invest in civil society organisations. When state investment dries up, networks often fail, suggesting that they are sustained by ‘hierarchy’ (Grote 2012 in Davies et al., 2016:137). The critical literatures also reveal, moreover, that governance networks are prone to closure and elite capture by factions of business and the professions – thereby compounding power asymmetries (Davies et al., 2016:137).

Western vocabularies of networks and collaboration populate elements of the literature on network governance. Ansell and Alison (2008:544) three-part definition of collaborative
governance, use it as a proxy for network governance. Part 1 defines collaborative governance as “[a] governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-governmental actors in a collective decision-making process”. Davies et al., (2016:137) broaden this to ‘collective discussion’. Part 2 defines collaborative governance as “formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative”. Network governance denotes characteristics of transactions being conducted among relevant players on the basis of mutual benefits, trust, and reciprocity (Kim, 2006:22).

Network governance is described as a form of organisational alliance in which relevant policy actors are linked together as co-producers where they are more likely to identify and share common interests (Kim, 2006:22). The concept of governance networks has mostly been criticised for being descriptive rather than explanatory. It is mostly criticised for failing to explain and account, for the distribution of power and influence within networks. Rhodes (1997a:44) is therefore of the view that networks are to be analysed and understood in terms of the distribution of resources between participants. Rhodes has linked his analysis of networks with his own power-dependence model of central-local or intergovernmental relations. Each organisation or policy actor has resources (capital) which they can use in bargaining with others, and each is dependent on the resources of others to realise policy objectives (Rhodes, 1997a:44). In the Bourdieusian tradition, this typically calls for conceptualising and analysing public participation social relations as spaces structured by capital volume and capital composition of especially cultural, economic and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984:99-168, 1998:6). In this context, capital (Bourdieu 1986:241-242) presents a broad and generalised conception of social power as accumulated resources.

3.5 CONCEPTUALISING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS CITIZEN POWER

Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of participation’ metaphor, introduce a normative-critical dimension to the public participation discourse. Her work emphasises that the signifier ‘participation’ hides many different meanings, which range from manipulation to full citizen control. What she brings to the debate is the idea that many different social practices have been labelled participatory and that there is need to carefully distinguish between different participatory intensities. Indeed, some practices are labelled ‘participatory’, while they simply are not, or where the level of public participation is only minimal (Lues, 2014:803).

Arnstein (1969:216) dealt with the issue of public participation and its role in power distribution in her famous article ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’. Arnstein (1969:216) views public participation as a form of power, defining it as “the distribution of power that enables the have-
not citizens presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately
included in the future”. For Arnstein (1969:216) participation of the governed in their
government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy – a revered idea that is vigorously
applauded by virtually everyone. To the critical question, what is public participation? Arnstein
(1969:216) emphasises that, “public participation is a categorical term for citizen power”. She
argues that there is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation
and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process (also supported by Lues,
2014:803).

Arnstein (1969:216) therefore, views public participation as a form of power. She asserts that
“public participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the
powerless”. In her typology, Arnstein (1969:217) proposes types of participation and non-
participation. The typology of eight levels of participation are arranged in a ladder pattern with
each rung corresponding to the extent of citizen power in determining the end product (Figure
3.1).

![Figure 3.1: Eight rungs on a ladder of citizen participation](image)

Arnstein (1969:217) constructs a ladder of participation, from the lowest to the highest. The first two levels from the bottom manipulation and therapy, are described as ‘non-participation’ contrived as a substitute for genuine public participation (Greenberg and Mathoho, 2010:8). The next three levels, informing, consultation and placation, are described as ‘tokenism’, where the public may be heard but lack power to ensure that their voice is heeded (Greenberg and Mathoho, 2010:8). Further levels have increasing degrees of citizen power: partnership, that allows for negotiation and trade-off; and delegated power and citizen control where the public has full managerial power (Greenberg and Mathoho, 2010:8). Hence Arnstein’s (1969:216) rejoinder that “participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process”.

As shown (Figure 3.1), the bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of non-participation, which have been contrived by some to substitute genuine participation (Arnstein, 1969:217). Applied to this study, their main objective is not to enable the public to participate in integrated development planning, but to enable powerholders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants. Rungs, (3) Informing and (4) Consultation, progress to levels of tokenism that allow the participants to hear and to have a voice. When proffered by powerholders as the total extent of participation, the public may indeed hear and be heard. Under, these conditions they however, lack the power to ensure that their views are heeded by the powerful. In such a scenario, there is thus no follow through, no ‘muscle’, hence no assurance of changing the status quo (Arnstein, 1969:217). Rung (5) Placation is viewed by Arnstein as simply a higher level tokenism, since the ground rules allow the participants to advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide. Further up the ladder Arnstein proposes levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Rung (6) Partnership, enables the participants to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional powerholders.

At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, the participants obtain the bulk of decision-making or managerial power (Arnstein, 1969:217). As noted earlier, Robert Dahl (1957:202) conceptualised power as “A has power over B to the extent that he/she can get B do something B would not otherwise do”. Within postmodern social theory, this concept of power is traced to Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince, early 16th century) and Thomas Hobbes (The Leviathan, mid-17th century) (Machiavelli, 1961). Michel Foucault is often considered the most influential scholar of the 20th century of this strand of thought (Wandel, 2001:368-382). Modern social theorists frequently use as a starting point Karl Marx or Max Weber. Stephen
Lukes (1978), Pierre Bourdieu (1990) and Mark Haugaard (1997) are among the modern social theorists.

3.6 POWER DYNAMICS IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Power as the lifeblood of administration is often stressed in public sector organisations. Power is the potential or actual ability of a person to affect the behaviour of others. This ability can be based on a number of factors, such as capital (in various forms) knowledge, personality and even on authority. Power subsumes authority as a formal power relationship (Eze and Kabiru, 2014:176). Long (1949:257-258) places emphasis on the “attainment, maintenance, increase and dissipation” of power. Public administration embraces features of ‘old public administration’ (Denhart and Denhart, 2003:5-12, 28-29) and basic models of contemporary public administration (Frederickson, 1999:701-711). Within the web of Public Administration paradigm shifts, power – its sources, distribution, exercise, efficacy, control and accountability – is of key significance (Thynne, 2013:108). Decision-making processes and power relations are fields in which public participation processes can be located. This then calls for a shift from seeing public participation exclusively as an actual practice, to instead viewing it (also) as ‘a set of expectations about what kinds of social, cultural, economic, or political relationships emerge within a more participatory culture’ (Jenkins and Carpentier, 2013:274). For Dahlgren (2011:8) public engagement is a prerequisite or precondition for participation. As he wrote: “one has to feel invited, committed and/or empowered to enter into a participatory process” (Dahlgren, 2011:8). Jenkins and Carpentier (2013:283) add that whenever structural power imbalance occurs, attempts should be made to redress this imbalance by increasing the level of public participation of disadvantaged actors.

3.6.1 Power and Rationality Discourse

In his seminal work ‘Rationality and Power’, Flyvbjerg (1998:234) argues that the “normative emphasis on rationality leaves the modern project ignorant of how power works”. In situations of political contestation between different actors, rationality yields to power: “actions are dictated by what works most effectively to defeat the adversary” (Flyvbjerg, 1998:232). According to Flyvbjerg, powerful actors are “more concerned with defining a specific reality” than they are “with understanding what reality is”, and for that reason, “power produces knowledge and rationality which is conducive to the reality it wants” and “suppresses that knowledge and rationality for which it has no use” (Flyvbjerg, 1998:36). Flyvbjerg (1998:226) notes that the axiomatic premise that “the more rationality the better” is flawed, because it neglects to confront the ways in which rationality articulates with the exercise of power.
This alludes to the view of power’s symbolic – and thus ‘invisible’ – dimension put forward by Foucault. Foucault in Lukes (2005:86) has argued that “power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms”. Schubert (2008:184) contends that while the symbolic form of power “may in some ways be gentler than physical violence … it is no less real”. He maintains that “hierarchies and social inequality … are produced and maintained, less by physical force than by symbolic domination” (Schubert, 2008:183).

The ways in which participants “actually inhabit and appropriate [the] discursive spaces ‘offered’ to them” (Felt and Fochler, 2010:220) result from the encounter between expectations, structures of public participation, discursive practices in public participation exercises and numerous other factors. Performing participation is thus highly contextual. It implicates capital, political cultures, social imaginaries and socio-cultural resources and political subjectivities (Carvalho, Pinto-Coelho and Seixas, 2016:4). ‘Publics’ selected to be part of participation exercises often distance themselves from the ‘general public’, ‘align’ with experts’ frames, or position themselves mostly as individuals (rather than develop a group ‘ethos’) (Felt and Fochler, 2010:220).

Access not only denotes the opportunity to participate including “sufficient and appropriate opportunities to express [one’s] choices and opinions”, but also “to access sufficient and appropriate support, for instance, education, information, so that [one] can understand the process in an informed, active capacity” (Senecah, 2004:23). Influence signifies the opportunity “to affect the criteria by which decisions [are] made and to have one’s ideas measured against alternatives” (Senecah, 2004:31). Thus, understanding and appraising power dynamics in public participation is important in examining how public authorities use participatory genres to condition citizens’ participation or, how their opportunities and possibilities of having a voice are shaped by particular practices that limit access to information, knowledge and other resources, as well as to means and forums of expression.

This concerns ‘power over discourse’, the capacity to control access as well as to ‘control and change the ground rules of discursive practices’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 2006:273). As such a critical analysis of the immediate situation (aspects surrounding participation) and the broader institutional context, that is, of ‘the environment in which the genre is enacted or interpreted’ is necessary (Dufrasne and Patriarche, 2011:68). Doing so allows expounding: (a) the social conditions that regulate the participatory process and shape its symbolic efficacy; (b) the ways in which access to the different elements of that situation are controlled. It also helps one better
understand the hows and/or whys of language use in texts produced by different types of social agents in the participatory process and the possible power effects of such language use in the institutional context.

3.6.2 The Power Cube Approach

Gaventa (2006a) uses the cube shape to illustrate his analytical framework for analysing three dimensions of power: spaces, levels, and forms (Brosnan, 2012:46). The ‘power cube’ looks like a ‘Rubik cube’, whose blocks or sides within the cube can be rotated (Figure 3.2). Gaventa (2006a:26) argues that any successful change in power relations requires each of the pieces on each dimension of the cube to align with each other simultaneously. Transformative, fundamental change happens when social actors are able to link the demands for opening previously closed spaces with people’s action in their own spaces (i.e. creating horizontal alliances, network governance); to span across local and global action (vertical alliances, network governance), and to challenge visible, hidden and invisible power simultaneously (Gaventa, 2006a:26; Pellissery and Bergh, 2007:288). As such the power cube expounds the complexity and permutations that power can take across space, place and form in any given context.

Freedom is not only the right to participate effectively in a given space, but also the right to define and to shape that space. From this, useful analytical questions can be derived along two dimensions of the power cube: spaces and forms of power. First, one may ask how the spaces for participation were created, and with whose interests and what terms of engagement. Spaces refer to the potential arenas for participation and action (Cullen et al., 2014:262-263) they are decision-making arenas and forums for action (Cullen et al., 2014:265). A continuum of spaces exist; it is possible to distinguish between three main types. Gaventa (2006a) presents Cornwall’s (2002) ideas about the spaces people occupy in relation to public participation (Cornwall, 2002:52). First, ‘closed spaces’ are those where decisions are made by a set of actors behind closed doors, or where elites make decisions in ‘provided spaces’ and provide services ‘to the people’ without the need for broader consultation or involvement. In ‘closed spaces’ decisions are made by a set of actors behind closed doors, without any pretence of broadening the boundaries for inclusion (Gaventa, 2006a:26). In such ‘closed’ spaces decision-making is not accessible to any outside the small circle of privileged elected officials, professional and bureaucrats (Gaventa, 2006a:26).

Second, ‘invited spaces’ are those into which people (as users, citizens or beneficiaries) are invited to participate by various kinds of authorities. Cornwall (2002:52) describe invited spaces
as “those into which people (as users, citizens and beneficiaries) are invited to participate by various kinds of authorities”. Invited spaces can be institutionalised and on-going, or more transient as one-off forms of consultations. Third, there are ‘claimed/created’ spaces, which are claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power-holders, or created more autonomously by them. Claimed/created spaces are those that people create for themselves, including human rights-based approaches. These organic spaces emerge out of common concerns or identities as a result of popular mobilisation. Soja as cited in Gaventa (2006a:26) referred to them as ‘third spaces’ where people can gather to reject hegemonic space. Accordingly, “claimed spaces are those spaces where the less powerful can “develop their agendas and create solidarity without control from power holders” (Luttrell and Quiroz, 2009:11). The transformative potential of ‘participatory’ spaces must, however, always be “assessed in relationship to the other spaces that surround them, as new spaces might simply be captured by the already empowered elite if other participatory spaces that serve to provide and sustain countervailing power are absent” (Gaventa, 2006a:26-27).

The second dimension of the power cube is forms of power; that is, the dynamics of power that shape the inclusiveness of participation within each space (Figure 3.2). Based on Lukes (1974) Gaventa (2006a:25-29) distinguishes between “three forms of power: visible, hidden and invisible forms”. Forms refer to the ways in which power manifests itself including its visible, hidden and invisible forms (Cullen et al., 2014: 262-263). Visible power refers to the “observable aspects of decision-making which usually take place in public” (Cullen et al., 2014:266). ‘Visible power’ denotes “observable decision-making; that is, strategies that are
trying to change the “who, how and what” of policy-making so the process is more democratic and accountable”. Visible power determines the agenda for participation including the way decision-making forums operate, the rules and procedures adopted. Cullen et al., (2014:265) observed that “it is possible to identify visible signs of power by looking at who participates and who gains and loses within decision-making arenas”.

Hidden forms of power refers to ways in which powerful actors and institutions maintain their power and privilege. In this case, the concerns and representation of other less powerful groups are excluded or devalued. However certain empowering advocacy strategies can increase the visibility and legitimacy of their issues, voice and demands (Cullen et al., 2014:266). Consequently, hidden power is that held by those powerful actors who can influence what is or is not allowed onto the agenda, what knowledge is valid for consideration, but more importantly who is not allowed to the decision-making table (Gaventa, 2006a:29). Hidden forms of power also make certain voices or issues more important than others; this can be based on factors such as gender, age, ethnicity or expertise (Cullen et al., 2014:266).

However, using hidden forms of power, the less powerful can also influence the dynamics of public participation in integrated development planning. Scott (1985) as cited in Cullen et al., (2014:269) described a number of tactics less powerful actors can use including dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance and sabotage as ‘weapon of the weak’. Such forms of hidden power illustrate that power dynamics are often more complex that they initially appear and seemingly powerless actors can have more agency than is assumed (Cullen et al., 2014:269).

Invisible power is the most insidious of the three dimensions of power, [it] goes a step further and refers to the social and political culture which shapes the psychological and ideological dimensions of public participation (Gaventa, 2006a:29; Cullen et al., 2014:266). Significant problems and issues are not only kept from the decision-making table, but also from the minds and consciousness of the different players involved. By influencing how individuals think about their place in the world, this form of power shapes people’s beliefs, sense of self, and acceptance of the status quo, even their own superiority or inferiority (Gaventa, 2006a:29). By making people see their subjugation as natural and unquestionable, it constitutes a barrier to public participation in public affairs. It can generate a state of ‘false consciousness’, where its subjects are not aware of their genuine interests. Invisible violence resonates with Galtung’s (1990:291) concept of cultural violence, making the powerless “look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong” These forms of power can be much harder to identify and describe (Cullen et
al., 2014:266). Even voices in ‘invited spaces’ can be but echoes of what the power holders who shaped those places want to hear. Change strategies in this area target individual consciousness to transform the way people perceive themselves and those around them, and how they envisage future possibilities and alternatives. This points to the importance of establishing the preconditions for participation in order for new institutional spaces to lead to change in the status quo. Indeed, without prior awareness building so that citizens possess a sense of their own right to claim rights or express voice, and without adequate ‘political capabilities’, new mechanisms for public participation may be captured by prevailing interests (Gaventa, 2006a:29-30; Lues, 2014:803).

The power cube recognises that power dynamics exist at all levels - local, national and global. Levels refer to the different layers of decision-making and authority, including the local, national and global (Cullen et al., 2014:262-263). Levels also refer to incidences of power from the local to the national and then the global. Since local, national and global spheres are interconnected, power can work throughout the three levels (Gaventa, 2006a:27-28). The power cube thus helps to visualise linkages and interrelations between different dimensions of power. It offers a dynamic perspective of power where each side (spaces, forms and levels) of the cube is linked to each other, permitting analyses from multiple angles.

3.7 SOCIAL PRACTICE THEORY

‘Space is central in any exercise of power’ (Gaventa, 2006a:25). Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice provides a potent theoretical framework for interpreting and explaining the complexity and multi-dimensional manifestations of public participation power dynamics in integrated development planning. Bourdieu’s work is insightful in that it places power at the centre of his theorisation of social relations, and more importantly, his integration of the material and symbolic influences and dimensions of power in public participation spaces.

3.7.1 Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Practice

Dahl’s analysis of power places emphasis on ‘influence’. Dahl insists that ‘power is a relation, and that it is a relation among people’ (Dahl, 1957:203). Similarly, Bourdieu’s theory of social practice views power as “a force that pervades all human relations” (Swartz (1997:96) cited in Hearlson (2014:12). Thus, it recognises social and symbolic dimensions of power. Bourdieu understood social relations as ongoing struggles for power. In his schema, social practice functions as a weapon or stake if and when, it increases the stakeholders’ and actors’ capital. Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field (including the field specific illusio, doxa), capital
and symbolic power and violence constitute key constructs of his theory (Van Aaken, Splitter and Seidl, 2013:355).

### 3.7.2 Social Practice in Bourdieu’s Theory

Bourdieu conceptualises practice as that which ‘unfolds in time’ (Bourdieu, 1990:81), and that in which people engage throughout everyday life. He advocates that practices are constantly (re)produced by the habitus - a system of dispositions (e.g. motivational, cognitive, aesthetic and normative dispositions), produced by the specific social conditions of the individual (Bourdieu, 1984:170-173; Bourdieu, 1990:53). To appreciate the logic of habitus and practice (Bourdieu, Accardo, Balazs, Beaud, Bonvin, Bourdieu, Bourgois, Broccolichi, Champagne, Christin, Faguer, Garcia, Lenoir, Euvrard, Pialoux, Podalydes, Sayad, Soulie, and Wacquant, 1999:607-626) one needs to be conscious of the system of dispositions produced by individuals’ social conditions. This is so since social relations are spaces structured by capital volume and capital composition, especially social, cultural, economic and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1984:99-168; Bourdieu, 1998:6). Capital is accumulated (material, embodied or institutionalised) and thus presents a broad and generalised conception of social power as accumulated resources (Bourdieu 1986:241-242).

### 3.7.3 The Concept of Habitus

Bourdieu (1977a:72) defines habitus as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions”, that actors acquire during the process of socialisation … a “system of lasting, transposable dispositions functioning as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions” (Bourdieu, 1977a:82-83), which shape perceptions and practices. Habitus as “a system of schemes of perceptions and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures is acquired through the lasting experience of a social position” (Bourdieu, 1990:53). As such, it is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices … a sense of one’s place” and a ‘sense of the place of others’ (Bourdieu, 1989:19). Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:127) explain that, habitus is “a socialised subjectivity or the social embodied”. Grenfell and James (1998:14) are of the view that, it is the unconscious internalisation of social structures, as constituted by a “dialectical relationship between individual thought, activity and the objective world”.

An important aspect of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is that action tends to be less consciously reflective than commonly assumed. Agents never know completely what they are doing because their practices are largely reflective of their habitus (Bourdieu, 1990:69). Consequently, social
practices as manifested in public participation largely occur tacitly. As such, Bourdieu’s theory of social practice postulates that, most of the time actors are not aware of how their practices and actions are driven by dispositions that have been ‘formed through past experience’ (Dewey, 1988:33). Given that habitus functions at an unconscious level, the tension between different forms of habitus (or ways of seeing and being in the world) poses a fundamental challenge for public participation in integrated development planning, in that actors with divergent social experiences are expected to forge common understandings that lead to collaborative action.

In Bourdieu’s (1977b:493) theorisation, ‘habitus’ alone is insufficient in ensuring social practice competence. Habitus is to be further understood in relation and reference to ‘field’. Bourdieu (1984:101) defines the ‘field’ as “the structured arenas of social interaction”. He argues that practices, are never the isolated product of an individual habitus, but always the combined result of habitus and a specific field within which practices are situated. The concept of field is broad, but therein lies its utility. Bourdieu describes it as a “tool, the function of which is to enable the scientific construction of social objects” (Bourdieu, 2005:31). Bourdieu, cited in Waquant (1989:44) emphasises that the field is “constructed as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing in one’s practice”. Fields (public participation spaces in the IDP review process in the BCMM) must therefore be understood essentially, as relational spaces, sites for domination of the less powerful by the more powerful (constitutive of a complex web of power dynamics) and sites of power struggles.

A field is a relational configuration of specific forms of capital and practices, i.e. a social universe united towards a specialised social struggle for resources, recognition and power. Fields are integrated by a specific illusio, understood as an interest and investment in field struggles, and by a field doxa, defined by Bourdieu as the tacit rules that are presupposed among actors, and which field actors must know and commit to, if they are to be included in the field (Bourdieu, 1990:66). Consequently, members of a field are characterised by both a certain amount of field-specific resources and by an interest in, knowledge about and engagement in the activities that are going on. Similarly, public participation actors and stakeholders in integrated development planning inevitably possess differential field-specific resources, capital and power which, in turn, either positively or negatively influence them.

3.7.4 The Concept of Capital in Bourdieu’s Theory
Bourdieu uses the concept of ‘capital’ to theorise social, cultural, capacities and capabilities (Sen, 1999:71) or powers of individual agents. On the other hand, Sen (1999:36, 71) argues that human development should be viewed in terms of a set of ‘beings and doings’ (which he termed
functionings) and that a person has a range of functionings from which a person may choose (termed capabilities). Bourdieu dissolves the distinction between different forms of “capital” as sources of power. Capital, in Bourdieu’s theory, is embodied not only in economic, but also in cultural, social, and symbolic forms (Bourdieu, 1986:241). Economic capital refers to monetary income as well as other financial resources and assets (Van Aaken, et al. 2013:355). Elite theorists (Hunter, 1953) have argued that there are a limited number of individuals in the local community (such as powerful business people) whose reputation and control over key resources give them a decisive influence over key local policy (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001:23), thereby dominating public participation in integrated development planning spaces.

Cultural capital in various forms exist in two different forms: incorporated cultural capital, which consists of experiences and habits acquired during the socialisation process and manifested in an actor’s knowledge; and institutionalised cultural capital, which consists of formal educational qualifications. Bourdieu (1986:47) views cultural capital as a set of knowledge and practices accumulated through the “total, early, imperceptible learning, performed within the family from the earliest days of life”.

Two other forms of capital which strongly correlate are social and symbolic capital. Putnam’s (1993:35-6) work on social capital drew attention to features of associational life and social organisation such as trust, norms (customary and behavioural) and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated social actions. Social capital refers to “features of social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993:35-6; Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000:103; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000:226). It is the sum of resources that can be mobilised through membership in or access to important networks (Van Aaken, et al., 2013:355). For Putnam (1993:167) civic engagement and public participation are essential in the functioning of society. Social capital potentially facilitates social networks that help communities to function effectively. Fukuyama (2001:11) has argued that an abundant stock of social capital is presumably what produces a dense civil society, which is widely accepted as a necessary condition for democracy.

A central concept in several of Bourdieu’s (1977c:117) studies is ‘symbolic power’. Symbolic power as “a subordinate form of power is transfigured, that is to say misrecognisable, transformed and legitimised form of other kinds of power” (Bourdieu, 1977c:117). The symbolic is in essence a system of distinction and consolidating the privileges of certain societal categories. It capacitates dominant classes to force through their own definition of reality in
ways which makes invisible the linkage between the symbolic system and the interests of the powerful (Bourdieu, 1979:80). For Jaërvinen (1999:9) it is the result of ‘social alchemy’, where societal hierarchies, (i.e. historically arbitrary social, economic and political orders) are disguised and come to be viewed as natural.

Symbolic power therefore builds on a collective denial of the world of reality, “…the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognised as such, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude and devoutness” (Bourdieu, 1982:192). Alchemic transformation guarantees the continuity of hierarchies, which cause the subordinated and dominated, to bow gently under a yoke they most often do not even feel (Wacquant in Bourdieu, 1996:xviii). Thus for Bourdieu, ‘symbolic capital’ masks its nature and also establishes its own legitimacy. Ideological and cultural forms mask the fact that they themselves are ‘arbitrary’ social constructions. In Bourdieu’s schema it can be deduced that manifestation of language and technical ‘expert’ discourse inherent in public officials are key influences to symbolic dimensions of power. Language enables people to constitute and order the world through symbolic classification, and thus constitute and order people within it. Some categories and classifications serve to legitimise existing regimes of political, social, economic and cultural power through a process of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1977b, 1989).

To appreciate the workings of a field, it is necessary to invoke Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power. Symbolic power is defined in and through the given relationship between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, (i.e. in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced) (Bourdieu, 1989:21-23; 1991:170). This integrates, the notion of social power as resources (i.e. capital) with that of symbolic power. As pointed out by Broady (1991:170) the recognition of capital within a field is always the precondition of capital functioning as capital. Similarly, fields are always both fields of forces and fields of struggles (Bourdieu, 2005:30, 43), and the social relations of a field are always related to the symbolic system of classifications, constituting an ongoing and mutual reproduction, reinforcement and possible social change (Bourdieu, 1984:466-484; Bourdieu, 1990:123-139).

To capture symbolic aspects of power, the concept of ‘symbolic capital’ as power misrecognised and thereby recognised as honour or credit in the broadest sense of the word, is helpful (Bourdieu, 1990:112-123; Bourdieu, 1991:72-76). Symbolic capital is capital and resources transformed into a position of symbolic power, from where belief can be produced, (for example, as systems of classification, the making of symbolic boundaries, or the establishment of a field doxa). A central construct in symbolic capital is misrecognition
‘méconnaissance’. ‘Misrecognition’ legitimates the causes and effects of inequality (Bourdieu, 1984:566). As a concept, misrecognition is central to understanding the notion of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is the experience of feeling out of place, anxious, awkward, shamed, stupid and so on because those who experience symbolic violence are both objectively unable to construct appropriate actions (because the resources necessary to do so are unavailable to them) and subjectively committed to, in the sense of recognising, the very rules of distinction by which they are excluded and dominated. Symbolic violence consists of both the objective hardship and the subjective experience of self-blame, hesitation, self-censorship and so on (Bourdieu, 1990:183; Bourdieu, 2000:170; Samuel, 2013:402).

The production of belief and the transformation of a social class to a position within a symbolic system are central elements of symbolic violence. As observed by Skeggs (2004:4) a complementarity exists between the concepts of symbolic capital and symbolic violence. The significance of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the field for this thesis lies in the principal position he gives to power and capital. As argued by Bourdieu, all practices are directed towards the acquisition and transformation of an individual’s capital (Van Aaken, et al., 2013:355). Indeed, the structure of a particular field is, according to Bourdieu, determined by the balance of forces – or the configuration of power dynamics – inherent in that field. This configuration reflects the relative positions of actors within public participation social spaces. A particular field is always embedded in what Bourdieu calls the ‘field of power’, which is the encompassing realm of human relations that surrounds all other fields. Gaventa (2006a:25) identified forms manifesting as; visible, hidden and invisible forms of power.

As alluded to earlier on, actors caught up in the process of symbolic violence “…remain unconscious of submitting to or wielding to it”, and to this extent, the process of symbolic violence “is hidden” (Bourdieu, 1984:566). Schubert (2008:184) explains that symbolic violence manifests “when society/or the community misrecognise as natural, those systems of classification that are actually culturally arbitrary and historical”. Symbolic violence is thus “an effective and efficient form of domination in that powerful members of the dominant classes need exert little energy to maintain their dominance” (Schubert, 2008:184). As a phenomenon operating at the non-material level, symbolic violence is everywhere and nowhere simultaneously. The violence is symbolic, but the suffering and the reproduction of hierarchies that result are very real (Schubert, 2008:193). Symbolic power then manifests as power to construct reality and the ability to affect classifications and order worldviews. The symbolic construction process tends to verify itself as natural and self-evident, inasmuch as it is backed
up by ‘logical conformism’ thereby often influencing public participation in integrated
development planning outcomes (Schubert, 2008:193).

However, structural inequalities of power and privilege legitimised and reproduced by symbolic
violence do not go unchallenged. Through practice, the structure of a field is open to
contestation, and thus to change. At the heart of this contestation is the struggle to reinforce or
challenge what Bourdieu (1990:66) calls doxa - the dominant framework of ideological and
discursive constructs, that maintain the configuration of power relations (or the structure) of that
field. Bourdieu also describes doxa as “…those things that people accept without knowing”
(Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992:111). Bourdieu introduced the concept of illusio, as a particularly
important aspect of the social field.

In Bourdieu’s social practice theory, the concept of illusio stands for the field members’
unconsciously shared evaluations of the different forms of capital (Van Aaken et al., 2013:355).
That is, by determining what value the actors within a field attribute to different forms of
capital, the illusio shapes the respective power dynamics in the field. The illusio can be said to
function “like the imperial system – a wonderful instrument of ideology, much bigger and more
powerful than propaganda”, (Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992:114) or as ‘legitimate violence’
(Bourdieu, 1993:73), in the sense that it regulates the relationships between agents in a field in
such a way that it favours those who have already the most established positions (Bourdieu and
Eagleton, 1992:114; Bourdieu, 1993:73; Van Aaken et al., 2013:360).

Dominant actors, albeit largely unconsciously, define activities as legitimate and formulate
policies of the organisational field; they shape the rules (Van Aaken et al., 2013:360) which
situate struggles for power. Consequently, in order to enhance their positions according to the
field’s illusio, dominated actors conform to the pro-social perceptions of dominant actors. In
that way, all members of the field unconsciously contribute to the formation and continuation of
ideology and thus limit possibilities of resistance (Van Aaken et al., 2013:360). Given that the
habitus of actors is also shaped by the illusio of a given field, the alignment of habitus with the
field’s illusio lends actors the practical ability to perceive their position as natural and their
practices as the natural way to operate. Social exchange theory provides another theoretical
framework for exploring the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in
integrated development planning and how they influence Integrated Development Plan
outcomes in the BCMM.
3.8 SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY
Social exchange theory (SET) is among the most influential conceptual paradigms for understanding social relationships. Social exchange theory is premised on the underlying principle that reciprocated benefactions create resource power interdependences, social bonds and relational cohesion among public participation actors and stakeholders that foster, cooperation, trust, satisfaction and commitment. To this extent, social exchange theory is found befitting in that it further provides a sound theoretical framework for exploring the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in integrated development planning and how they influence the Integrated Development Plan outcomes in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

3.8.1 The Origins of Social Exchange Theory
Homans (1958:597) traces social exchange theory to “one of the oldest theories of social behaviour” and interaction between individuals in an exchange of resources. The resources exchanged are not only tangible, but also intangible. A basic assumption of social exchange theory is that parties enter into and maintain relationships with the expectation that doing so will be rewarding. Discourse on social exchange has been traced to Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics in which social exchange is distinguished from economic exchange (Lambe, Wittmann, and Spekman, 2001:4).

Homans (1958) “developed the first systematic theory that focused on social behaviour as … [exchange]”. Homans (1958:606) advocated that scholars return to what he described as the oldest of theories of social behaviour … “social behavior as exchange”. Seminal research that contributed to the development of the social exchange theory includes research by sociologists Homans (1958:597), Emerson (1962:31-41), Blau (1964:91-94) and social psychologists such as Thibaut and Kelley (1959:49). Blau (1964:15) is often regarded as the first to use the term ‘theory of social exchange’ to describe his conceptualisation ‘of social interaction as an exchange process’ (Chadwick-Jones, 1976:1-2). Thibaut and Kelley (1959:49) posited a theory of interpersonal relations and group functioning, where dyadic relationships were primarily considered. As pointed out by Kelley and Thibaut (1978:v) this work, along with a few related works of that period (Homans, 1958:597), has come to be known as the social exchange theory.

Chadwick-Jones (1976:1-2) has conceptualised social exchange theory as a collection of explanations, propositions and hypotheses, embodying assumptions about social behaviour. One of the basic tenets of the Social Exchange Theory (SET) is that relationships evolve over time into trusting, loyal, and mutual commitments. To do so, parties must abide by certain ‘rules’ of
exchange. Rules of exchange form a “normative definition of the situation that forms among or is adopted by the participants in an exchange relation” (Emerson, 1976:351). Actors are motivated to seek self-interest, increase rewards and decrease costs. Emerson (1962:31-41) contributes to social exchange theory by propounding the effects of power and dependence on exchange relationships. For exchange theory the inverse association between power and dependence characterises their relations, so (non)reciprocity in the latter generates the problem of (in)equality or (a)symmetry in power (Emerson, 1962:31-41). Emerson theorises that power imbalances cause relationships to be unstable and, thus, interdependence is crucial to the continuance of a social exchange relationship.

### 3.8.2 Defining Social Exchange Theory

Social exchange theory begins by assuming that individuals are rational – when making decisions they choose the option that is perceived to result in the highest net benefit given their preferences and constraints (Blau, 1964:93-94) or at the very least they seek ‘to obtain more of the outcomes that they value’ (Molm, Takahashi and Peterson, 2000:1398). Blau (1964:91) thus defines social exchange as “voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others”. Social exchange assumes that involved parties voluntarily provide benefits, invoking obligation from the other party to reciprocate, providing some benefit in return. Social exchange therefore rests on an ongoing reciprocal process, in which actions are contingent on rewarding reactions from others (Blau, 1964:6), and as such it is premised on trust, which is viewed as an integral component of any social exchange. Accordingly, for Blau, (1968:454) creating trust is a critical component of social exchange. This is so, since social exchange is governed to a large degree by social ‘obligations’ rather than by contracts.

Blau’s contribution to SET was his comparison of economic and social exchanges. He maintained that “the basic and most crucial distinction is that social exchange entails unspecified obligations” (Blau, 1964:93). He argued that only social exchange “involves favors that create diffuse future obligations . . . and the nature of the return cannot be bargained” (Blau, 1964:93) and “only social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligations, gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange as such does not” (Blau, 1964:94). Blau seems to have been treating social and economic exchanges as types of transactions, rather than as types of relationships, for example, he argues that social exchange involves ‘trusting others’ and ‘personal obligations’ (Blau, 1964:94).
Similarly, since public participation in integrated development planning is driven by obligations, community trust in local government affairs is a necessary condition for public participation. Social exchange theory suggests that trust-building starts with relatively small or minor transactions. As the number of interactions increase and also the size of the transactions increases, trust increases as well. As Houston and Gassenheimer (1987:11) puts it, “…if reciprocation occurs, a pattern of behaviour [and trust] begins to be established”. However, trust itself is also assumed to be created by the ongoing social exchange process: “processes of social exchange, which may originate in pure self-interest, generate trust in social relations through their ongoing recurrent and gradually expanding character” (Emerson, 1976:336).

### 3.8.3 Assumptions of Social Exchange Theory

The fundamental assumption of social exchange theory is that actors strive to maintain a relationship with exchange partners only as long as the rewards are greater than the costs (Homans, 1958). Exchange theory is premised on that human behaviour or social interaction is an exchange of activity, tangible and intangible (Homans, 1961:12-13), particularly of rewards and costs (Homans, 1961:317-318). It treats the exchange of benefits, notably giving others something more valuable to them than is costly to the giver, and vice versa (Homans, 1961:61-63), as the underlying basis or open secret of human behaviour (Homans, 1961:317) and as such a phenomenon permeating all social life (Coleman, 1990:37). Social exchange is therefore composed of actions of purposive actors that presuppose constellations of their interests and resources (Blau, 1964:88-91), and is premised on the basic assumption that these processes are governed by reciprocal relations. The concept of exchange ratio or balance-imbalance, leading to the concepts of power-dependence, and cohesion, is implied in the attribute of reciprocal reinforcements (Emerson, 1969:387-389). Similarly, it can be argued that public participation in integrated development planning is premised on this exchange ratio, in that expending time and resources by communities correlates with envisaged benefits to be derived from public participation in integrated development planning.

The assumption is that actors and stakeholders establish and continue social relations and invest time in public participation on the basis of their expectations that such relations will be mutually advantageous. Gould-Williams and Davies (2005:3) argue that social exchange theory is relevant as social interaction impetus provided by the exchange of benefits, intrinsic and extrinsic, independently of normative obligations. Homans (1961:79) conceptualised social interaction as an exchange of rewards and costs. Homans (1961:79-80) proposes the transforming of “*homo economicus*” from a rational egoist or an asocial subject to a new actor
holding not only utilitarian or hedonistic, but also altruistic or social values, and for whom long-term cost-benefit calculation would be an exception rather than rule.

Though the notion of *homo economicus*, related concepts and principles are viewed as applicable to social exchange (Coleman, 1990:37-9), it is often distinguished from its economic form. Economic exchange features precise specifications of transactions and prevalence of extrinsic rewards, especially material gains.

In contrast, social exchange is characterised by unspecified personal obligations and trust, as well as intrinsic, in conjunction with extrinsic rewards (Gould-Williams and Davies (2005:3-4). Although economic rewards are important, social rewards are often valued more. However, as noted by Blau (1968:455) the “most important benefits involved in social exchange do not have any material value on which an exact price can be put at all”. As such the persistence and extension of social exchange is conditioned by bonds based on personal trust, unlike economic transactions that rely on impersonal markets and legal regulations. Moreover, unlike economic exchange, bonds created by reciprocal benefits of an extrinsic character are the principal output rather than side-effect of social exchange (Gould-Williams and Davies (2005:3-4). Hence, Cook (2000:687) has argued that exchange theory is premised on ‘enduring long-term social relations’, as distinguished from ‘one-shot transactions’ in the market realm.

3.8.4 Power Dynamics as the Outcome of Social Exchange Relations

Deducing from rational choice theory and the extant literature, Fararo, (2001:266) notes that admittedly the “power concept is a generalisation of the wealth concept in economic theory”. Social exchange theory typically conceptualises power in terms of (material) resources and their exchanges. Within this view, power is a derivative of unreciprocated exchange transactions in respect of ‘resources’ (Nisbet, 1970:65-66). As noted by Blau, (1994:146-147) power differentiation has social structural effects like asymmetries in relations between members of different groups. This is so given that superiority in group resources is transmitted into the superior prestige of individuals accruing to them by membership independently of personal factors.

In a similar vein, Emerson’s (1962:31-41) viewpoint is that economic-behavioural models of social exchange treat exchange as more fundamental than power, while Cook’s (1990:115-116) theory is that, explicitly or implicitly, the effect on the market-style assumption is that the latter largely emerges and evolves in a complex structure of exchanges of resources. Social exchange
theory purports to provide some additional insights that would ostensibly enhance ones’ public choice, understanding of the manifestations of power in public participation spaces.

For exchange theory the inverse association between power and dependence characterises their relations. (Non)reciprocity in the latter generates the problem of (in)equality or (a)symmetry in power (Emerson, 1962:31-41). Two or more power-dependence relations constitute a power network that tends to closure. A major process in such networks is the legitimation or transformation of power into authority as balanced and directed power exerted only in ways specified by group norms (Emerson, 1969:395-397) and thus a social structural rather than personal phenomenon residing in dyads. The nature of network connections, determine the locus of power in exchange networks. Shifting attention from isolated dyads to exchange networks is therefore a key feature of modern social exchange theory (Molm, 1991:475).

Power-dependence theory suggests that relative dependency of actors on one another for resources of value they obtain through exchange impact the likelihood, the frequency, and the outcome of exchange. Given that, the ability of one member to influence the decision variables of another member is power, dependence therefore refers to the state of relying on or being controlled by another member. In accordance with Emerson’s (1962:32-33) power-dependence theory, Kale (1986) states that “…the power of ‘A’ over ‘B’ is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of ‘B’ upon ‘A’…”. Power-dependency thus views power in relative terms, hinging upon a process of bargaining and social exchange (Wilson and Game, 2002:174). In rational choice versions of exchange theory, the distribution of power among actors is determined by the ‘availability of resources from alternative exchange relations’ in networks consisting only of negative connections like competition and conflict (Yamaguchi, Gillmore and Cook, 1988:851). Rational choice models of exchange typically equate power with the total value of economic resources (Yamaguchi, 1997:840) or wealth.

In turn, the ‘local scarcity of resources’ determines power distribution in exchange networks with solely positive connections such as cooperation. In networks of mixed connections, the distribution of power is conditional on a conjunction of network positions, for example, the distance from the sources and the control of resources. Exchange theorists, argue that actors exercise both reward and punishment or coercive power (Molm, 1989:1417-1418). However, the risk of retaliation and fear of loss, discourage the strategic use of coercive power (Molm, 1997:130) on the part of weak actors, since they are too dependent on their powerful counterparts to use such strategies.
Arguably, power dynamics in social exchange is governed by two variables. One is the structure of power in exchange networks that is, a structural equivalent to the potential power derived from dependence relations and the other is its strategic use. Reportedly, structural power and strategic action are weakly correlated, though both have strong effects on exchange outcomes (Molm, 1990:447). Specifically, strategic action is observed to have a more profound impact on punishment power, and structural power on its reward counterpart. In turn, strategic action, viz. the strategic use of coercive power, is employed to recompense for the lack of structural power rather than intensify or mediate its effects, for powerful actors have less need to utilise such strategies (Molm, 1990:447).

Power is thus a relational and an unobservable phenomenon which is determined by multiple rather than single structural conditions, including resource exchanges. Power use in exchange relations, therefore grounds power in a resource flow in a network. In such networks, power transitivity exists if a resource flow between at least three positions is operative. Overall, power is structurally generated in exchange networks via exclusion and inclusion, or hierarchy and mobility, and is proportional to the ability to avoid being excluded. Exclusion has the effect of effectively preventing some actors from obtaining valuable resources like wealth (and so power and status) by social-structural conditions that affect (and stem from) resource availability, valuation and transfers between individual and collective actors (Molm, 1990:447).

In this rendition of exchange theory, excludability is a major factor determining individual and network realms or power positions. Cook and Yamaguchi (1990:297-300) however object that there is a relationship between power-dependence and exclusion. In sum, both exchanges of resources and configurations of network positions determine power and its use, as manifested in resource distributions. Yet, some exchange theorists (Burke, 1997:149) critique this view, pointing out that power estimation via the accumulation and distribution of resource points perpetuates the rational-choice myth that social actors wish solely to accumulate wealth.

### 3.8.5 Social Exchange Theory – Relevance to Public Participation

Social exchange theory is premised on the interdependence of relationships between persons in the actual process of social behaviour. Trust is an important construct in social exchange theory in that it promotes commitment to the exchange relationship (McDonald, 1981:834). In social exchange theory the causal relationship - between trust and commitment results from the principle of generalised reciprocity, which holds that “mistrust breeds mistrust and as such would also serve to decrease commitment in the [public participation] relationship and shift the
transaction [transactive planning] to one of more direct short-term exchanges” (McDonald, 1981:834).

Institutions channel and influence social capital (Stolle, 2003:21). Three major components of social capital are structural (associations, networks), attitudinal (trust and reciprocity), and cultural (values) (Stolle, 2003:21). Trust and other civic attitudes allow public participation actors and stakeholders to join social and political groups with ease (Noda, 2017:779-784) in Hasan, 2005:2). Trust facilitates life in diverse societies and fosters acts of tolerance and acceptance of ‘otherness’. Further to this, trust-based social capital fosters collective action, outcomes and benefit sharing (McDonald, Jayasuriya, and Harris, 2012:3; Noda, 2017:779-784).

Mutual commitment is an important construct and a critical aspect of functional social exchange in that it ensures that partners will put forth the effort and make the investments [time, resources, etc.] necessary to produce mutually desirable outcomes through public participation in integrated development planning. In their study Lambe, Wittmann and Spekman (2001:21) found trust to be significantly and positively correlated to commitment, cooperation, functional conflict, communication, and shared values. Morgan and Hunt (1994:23) see commitment as “an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it endures indefinitely”. As postulated by Putnam, (1993:170) commitment increases the efficiency of exchange relationships by establishing relational norms that include flexibility and solidarity. Similarly, social capital emphasises trust, reciprocity, solidarity, and empowerment. This is constructed through social networks and network governance, thereby serving to bond groups or communities together; promoting a collective identity (Coopey (2004) in Zeka, 2008:122).

Relationship commitment as a belief, a desire, or an intention (Anderson and Weitz, 1992:12) to continue with a relationship to which a party attaches value is of critical importance in network governance. Commitment is viewed by Anderson and Weitz (1992:19) as a desire to develop a stable relationship, a willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain a relationship, and a confidence in the stability of the relationship. It is enduring and reflects a positive valuation of the relationship. Relationship commitment leads to greater relational social norms and lower opportunistic tendencies. Putnam (2000:22) explains this in terms of bonding and bringing social capital. Bonding social capital undergirds specific reciprocity and mobilising solidity. Bridging networks, by contrast, are linkages to external assets and for information diffusion. For
Putnam bridging social capital generates broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters narrower selves (Putnam, 2000:22). As Putnam (2000: 22-23) puts it “bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue”. Social capital can be either ‘bonding’ or ‘bridging’.

Bonding social capital results in social cohesion and a sense of belonging, which underpins stability in a community. Bonding social capital is associated with social support and reciprocity, and is contrasted with bridging capital, which is empowering and enables the individual to access resources outside of his/her homogeneous group. Other useful concepts in social capital ‘theory’ are the cognitive (personal) dimension of social capital and the structural dimension of capital in society. Cognitive capital refers to “aspects such as values, norms and behaviour that impact on trust, while the structural capital refers to the activities, organisational structure and democratic principles that underpin collective action and decision-making” (Krishna and Shrader, 1999:9). The difference between these two aspects is related to the role of cognitive social capital predisposing people to mutually beneficial collective action and the role of the aspects of structural social capital in facilitating mutually beneficial collective action, by inter alia making "productive outcomes from interaction more predictable and beneficial" (Uphoff, 2000:218).

One of the significant attributes of social capital is that it relies on intra-community and inter-community networks to bridge relationships. On the contrary, hierarchical associations do not create mutuality (common relationship between two or more members of society) and equal participation (Clemens (1999) in Zeka, 2008:122). This lack of mutuality and equal participation is attributed to the asymmetric nature of vertical networks. Unequal power on decision-making favours the leadership; and unlike horizontal networks (involvement of members of society at the same level of decision-making), vertical networks do not promote reciprocity.

Social capital breeds cooperation, defined as “similar or complementary actions taken by actors in interdependent relationships to achieve mutual outcomes or singular outcomes with expected reciprocity over time” (Anderson and Narus, 1990:45). Linked to the notion of cooperation is satisfaction. Frazier’s (1983), cited in Lambe et al., (2001:25) view satisfaction/dissatisfaction as a state reflecting a feeling of being rewarded adequately or inadequately for contributions to a so relationship. Satisfaction plays an integral role in relationships (Wang, 2004:3). Cooperation is also implicit in social exchange theory. According to Homans’ (1961:53) propositions, an exchange that accomplishes a positive outcome is likely to endure. Furthermore he stated, that a
rewarded behaviour will be repeated. Cooperative actions and commitment towards the relationship is likely to increase while a balanced power/dependency relationship is present, as the partners create more value (Wilson, 1995:342).

3.8.6 Theoretical overview – power dynamics and influences on public participation


In the regulated self-governance although government plays a dominant role in final decisions on policy content and regulatory arrangements, its top-down approach is accompanied by more cooperative relationships between public and private actors during the formulation and implementation of public policies (Knill and Tosun, 2012:210-211). Thyne (2013:109) explains that all four types of governance depend on one or more forms of power, with distinctive relationships being forged and maintained. Coercive power in the hands of public administration is essential in the interventionist and regulated self-types comprising command and control relationships. Contractual power and consensual power as bases of management are also important in regulated self-types where exchange and associational relationships are entered into (Thyne, 2014:5).

Fox-Rogers and Murphy (2013:246) note that rooted in the enlightenment tradition of modernity, traditional perceptions of planning view it as an apolitical, value-free, technocratic process serving a common class interest. In contrast, Foucault in Coetzee and Orange (2006:1) are of the view that power is omnipresent in all spheres of society. As such, various forms and levels of power and power dynamics are specifically active (and often highly visible) during public participation in integrated development planning. Fox-Rogers and Murphy (2013:246) have viewed power in terms of the ability of one individual or group to affect another in a manner that disproportionately serves their own interests at the expense of others. Healey (2003:113) acknowledges the inevitability of power in public participation spaces for planning. He argues that planning and thus by implication public participation in integrated development planning is a political activity that carries unequal power relationships.
In a Norway and Denmark study, Pløger (2001:237) found out that, while participative and collaborative planning was institutionalised as the right to be heard and make claims against policy with the aim of improving local democracy, “the ‘consensus’ which emerged tended to be reflective of the interests of the powerful to the disadvantage of the powerless”. Similarly, Fox-Rogers and Murphy (2013:248) observed that by assuming that power bases or ‘communicative distortions’ can be shifted or temporarily set aside through the process of communicative action, huge power disparities that exist among planning stakeholders in terms of their economic power, education, and organisational skills upon entering the public participation arena are often neglected in reality.

However, as noted by Hillier (2002:47), despite there being considerable theorising about power, there seems to be little agreement on the definition on the complex phenomenon of power. As such, Hillier (2003) in Fox-Rogers and Murphy (2013:249) invokes Chantal Mouffe’s concept of ‘agonism’ to understand the issue of non-consensus in planning practice and uses it as a basis for an alternative approach to public participation, which seeks to address the irreducible nature of difference between stakeholders. Pløger (2004:86) similarly noted that “…‘consensus-striving processes’ result in politicians, planners and planning treating conflicts and disagreements as antagonism, thereby failing to see planning practices as ‘strife’ or a form of agonism within planning processes…”

Allmendinger (2001:221) notes that the exercise of power has for many years played a central role in human sciences. In the early 1950s Machiavelli presented a powerful thesis on power in his classic work, ‘The Prince’ (Machiavelli, 1961:99-100; Coetzee and Orange, 2006:4). Machiavelli argued that the aspiration to acquire (more) power is a natural and common phenomenon (also supported by Twala and Lues, 2017:114). He presented tactics and strategies on how power could be obtained (at all costs), how to maintain and hold on to it through prowess and fortune, and how to exercise power by fighting, or by using the law or brute force (Coetzee and Orange, 2006:4).

Foucault (1978:93-93) formulated the concept of power. He studied the mechanics of power on the basis of daily struggles of grassroots levels among those whose fight was located in the meshes of power (Foucault, 1994b:221). Drawing on the work of Nietzsche, Foucault linked power with the flow of knowledge and communication (Allmendinger, 2001:26). His work on hermeneutic sociology and the study of people and institutions resulted in a reconceptualisation of strategic power relations in support of Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Foucault, 1994a:236-237). Public participation in integrated development planning is always carried out
in contexts that are marked by power dynamics that will enable or constrain planning (Buccus, 2007:18-19; Gaventa, 2003a:3-12).

Gordon (1991:5) conceptualises power as “action on the others’ actions”. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983:186) view it as “a general matrix of force relations at a given time, in a given society”. For Foucault (1994b:222) the exercise of power amounts to “a mode of actions upon action” where “certain actions structure the field of other possible actions”. This Focauldian view amplifies important relational aspects of power, it also probes deeper into the workings of power than Weber’s and Darl’s views of power over someone (Darl, 1957:201; Weber, 1978:53), or Giddens’s conception of power as “the capability to make a difference” (Giddens, 1984:14), all of which reduce power to a mere “generalised capacity to act” (Hindness, 1996:1).

Planning theorists (Hillier, 2002:255; Innes and Booher, 2010:37, 116) emphasises the need to synthesise the interests of all, especially the interests of the under-represented, into integrated development planning decisions and outcomes. Power dynamics have a pervasive influence in Healey’s (2003:113) work, she points out that power is a relation and not something that can be visible or tangible. For Foucault, the human condition is to exist within a system of power, and thus it must be “the human potential to incessantly resist its reach, relocate its boundaries, and challenge its authority” (Thiele, 1990:918-921). Similarly, public participation in integrated development planning often takes place in imbalances of power and with conflicting political goals and a communicative infrastructures shaped by power structures (Forester, 1982:69-71). Public participation in integrated development planning stakeholders therefore need to resist a ‘bad’ concentration of power or dominant centres of power and address negative types of communicative action that can become weapons in a continuous power struggle (Allmendinger, 2001:219-22). Underlying Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy is an account of ‘the political’, which she contrasts to ordinary ‘politics’.

For Mouffe, (2005:12) the political refers to ‘the dimension of antagonism’. Mouffe takes ordinary …“ ‘politics’ to mean ‘the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organising human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political” (Mouffe, 2005:13). In Mouffe’s view these “…practices, discourses and institutions are always potentially conflictual, as they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political’…” (Mouffe, 2000:15). Hillier (2002:77) advocates open discussion in which all points of view are heard and argues that resulting policy outcomes are legitimate when they reflect mutual understanding (reciprocity, reflexivity, respect, and co-operation). In the study of Coetzee and Orange (2006:9)
on power dynamics in planning in Tshwane they came up with different types of power which constitutes the power web in local government planning. The research findings of Coetzee and Orange (2006:9) point to the need to better understand different types of power, power relations and power dynamics, as well the effect of these powers and power dynamics in volatile local government political environments.

3.9 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS PUBLIC VALUE TRANSACTING

Public values are being promoted as a core concept in the study of public administration (Rutgers, 2015:29). For example, public value is regarded as solving democratic deficits in modern public administration (Benington, 2009:246; Benington and Moore, 2011b:261). The discourse on public value management (PVM) postulates that the next step after New Public Management, moves away from a state-versus-market perspective (O’Flynn, 2007:358; Benington and Moore, 2011a:9). An important conclusion by Meynhardt (2009:215) suggests a firm foundation for understanding what value is: “the basic idea that public value starts and ends with the individual”.

Public values seem nevertheless to transcend individuality at least in consensus, or what Benington and Moore (2011b:259) refer to as “the social consciousness of interdependence”. Here, the whole issue of what is a public value draws in the vast debate on what is democracy, public interest, publicness or civility. One of the few authors to expound on the concept of public values is Bozeman (2007:13) who provides an elaborate definition, which is often cited: “A society’s ‘public values’ are those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state and one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should be based” (Bozeman, 2007:13).

Bozeman (2007:12) opposes public values explicitly to public interests. For him the public interest refers to the outcomes best serving the long-run survival and wellbeing of a collective as a ‘public’. This suggests that contrary to public values, the public interest is not a matter of consensus. Bozeman (2007:12) postulates that, a most important distinction between public interest and public value is that, ‘public interest’ is an ideal, whereas ‘public values’ have specific, identifiable content.

Benington (2009:233-234) distinguishes between two aspects of public value: First, what the public values, and second, what adds value to the public sphere. However, ‘what the public values’ is not automatically a public value, but it can be a generally shared private value. Public
officials are however, often faced with making difficult choices or judgements among incompatible and incommensurable values (Spicer, 2009:541). Thus in a typical municipality value conflicts may relate (a) good governance (integrity, equality, lawfulness, justice (b) performing governance (effectiveness, efficiency) and (c) responsive governance (participation, transparency, legitimacy, accountability) (De Graaf, Huberts and Smulders 2016:1115).

Transactive planning is based on social learning theory and interpersonal interaction with stakeholders, it allows planning to bring process knowledge to facilitate a shared understanding about integrated development planning (Lew (2007) cited in Wray (2011:608). Transactive planning fosters public participation amongst diverse stakeholder interests, and builds self-learning and intelligent institutions that are able to self-adjust to changing local dynamics (Wray, 2009 in Wray, 2011:608).

3.9.1 Transactive planning theory and public participation

Friedmann (1973) in Hudson (1979:389) writes that transactive planning refers to the evolution of decentralised planning institutions that help people take increasing control over the social processes that govern their welfare. A key objective of transactive planning is mutual learning (Lane, 2005:293). It therefore promotes public participation in integrated development planning by empowering people to direct and control social processes which determine their welfare (Lane, 2005:293). Public participation and empowerment, in terms of transactive planning is thus a goal to be attained rather than a method to be used. Transactive planning is also known as ‘new humanism’ and puts emphasis on the small-scale social organisation, where there are plenty of opportunities for interaction between all actors concerned in the planning process (Khakee, 1998:367). Friedman (1973:223) asserts that transactive planning promotes a learning society. Transactive planning is in many ways associated with the communicative strand of planning theory.

3.9.2 Synopsis of the Transactive Planning Process

Transactive planning advocates bringing public participation stakeholders in integrated development planning together, providing them with public participation spaces. It is based on local working groups designed as microcosms of community stakeholders. Transactive planning has the potential to produce decisions which are acceptable to constituents of community stakeholders (McAvoy, Schatz and Lime, 1991:45). Transactive planning encourages face-to-face communication between principal groups, and provides a setting for sharing ideas or establishing ‘dialogue’ and engagement in ‘mutual learning’ through the acquisition of new knowledge (McAvoy et al., 1991:45).
Figure 3.3 shows that each planning situation is bounded by the environment defined by its task. The guidance system is a planning milieu or set of standards for interaction evolved from the stakeholders (client and planner). It brings to the situation differing assets and perspectives, which can be integrated through mutual learning and augmented by information drawn from centres of research (McAvoy et al., 1991:45). Transactive planning is cyclic and action is a part thereof, rather than removed from the planning process. Since dialogue is ‘person-centred’ or individually centred communication it has to be characterised by a willingness on the part of the stakeholders involved to participate openly and honestly and to be accepting of the views of others involved.

Transactive Planning is based on the need to engage and mediate public interests in integrated development planning (Wray, 2011:608), based on social learning theory and interpersonal interaction with stakeholders. Social learning is described as focusing on overcoming the contradictions between theory and practice, or knowing and acting (Friedman, 1987). The underpinning philosophy of social learning theory is that “knowledge is derived from experience and validated in practice, and is an integral part of action (Friedman, 1987:81). Thus, as postulated by Friedman (1987:81) knowledge emerges from “an on-going dialectical process in which the main emphasis is on new practical undertakings; existing understanding (theory) is
enriched with lessons drawn from experience, and the ‘new’ understanding is then applied in a continual process of change and action”.

Friedman’s concept of social learning centres upon the individual. As pointed out by Friedman (1973:231) “a guided transformation of society is possible only insofar as it begins with a transformation from man”. Friedmann (1973:226) describes four phases of the learning process (i) observation; (2) experimentation; (3) evaluation; and (4) redirection of effort. He postulates that the process of learning “…must reflect the fundamental relationship of reciprocity – man produces reciprocal effects on the environment that runs through intricate chains of consequences back to himself” (Friedmann, 1973:225).

Similar views of epistemology were used and first termed “transactional” by Dewey and Bentley (1949:228). Their transactional view “sees man-in-action not as something radically set over against an envisioning world, nor yet as merely action ‘in’ a world, but as action of and by the world in which man belongs as an integral constituent” (Dewey and Bentley, 1949:228). Friedmann (1973) thus identifies and describes four abilities of man that need strengthening if he/she is to learn, these are: (i) the ability to question existing reality; (ii) the ability to draw general lessons from concrete experiences; (iii) the ability to test theory in practice; and (iv) the ability to sincerely examine results.

As such, in social learning theory, knowledge of reality and practice exerts a mutual influence on each other. Theory in social learning is based not only on an actor’s evolving experience, but on prior learning as well, reflecting the actor’s class position, experience and formal education (Friedmann, 1987:183-187). This is also reflective of the dynamics and complexity of power – how it moves around, how it changes over time and adapts to different situations, what the different types of power are, at which levels they function, and the particular relationship between them (Coetzee and Orange, 2006:8). These are important integrated planning processes that aim to integrate varied stakeholder perspectives and to better engage stakeholders in public participation in IDP review processes. The ability or capacity to develop a ‘transactive relationship’ with stakeholders and to be open to their varied learning processes and underpinning values is therefore a critical component of public participation in integrated development planning (Wray, 2011:610).

Available literature points out that case study research applying concepts from social learning confirmed that “it is only through interactive (participative), concerted action that stakeholders are able to co-construct an issue and its solutions (Koutsouris, 2009:567). Thus if networks for
interaction and learning are not established, interventions may generate uncertainties, alienation and potential social disintegration, and integrated development planning will not realise its intended outcomes. A transactive approach to public participation in integrated development planning relies on a process that is rigorous, informal and grounded in its engagement with diverse stakeholders and communities of interest: fosters an action cycle of knowledge and learning amongst stakeholders; and mediates public interests and integrated development planning goals. This strand of planning theory literature, whilst engaging with the challenges that participation presents, also extols the potential value of public participation.

As a form of communication, dialogue is central to transactive planning. From a modernist reliance on state-directed futures and top-down processes, planning theory has moved to more community-based planning, from the ground up, geared to community empowerment (Sandercock, 1998:30). Thus, since the mid-1990s communicative/collaborative planning has come to be something of a buzz word (Purcell, 2009:146; Sager, 2013:248). Communicative/collaborative planning is a participatory approach in the public planning domain which has become institutionalised as a method of good planning practice and democratic principles. Within this perspective public participation is increasingly accepted as a means for balancing and rationalising multiple interests and preferences (Kaza, 2006:256).

### 3.10 CRITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PRACTICE

Honneth’s work on critical theory has dealt extensively with domination, recognition and power. Honneth rejects Habermas’ power-free sphere of communication and follows Foucault in theorising more fully the role of power in the lifeworld (Honneth, 1991:298). As Honneth puts it, the idea is to exploit the unrealised potential of Habermas’ communicative turn, namely, “the potential for an understanding of the social order as an institutionally mediated communicative relation between culturally integrated groups that, so long as the exercise of power is asymmetrically distributed, takes place through the medium of social struggle” (Honneth, 1991:303). The theoretical work of Habermasian critical theory (agonist theory) draws on the work of Lacan, Mouffe and Zizek, and Foucauldian theory places emphasis on communicative/collaborative planning (Matthews, 2012:141).

Deliberative democracy theory, with close affinity to Habermas’ theory of communicative action also neatly aligns with communicative/collaborative planning (Backlund and Mäntysalo (2010) as cited in (Mäntysalo and Jarenko, 2014:38). Cooke (2000:947) defines deliberative democracy as, “a conception of democratic government that secures a central place for reasoned discussion in political life”. According to Pusey (2005:165) in the deliberative democracy of
Habermas, all matters are carried out inside and through social interaction, that is through actions which are moving toward access to agreement. From this perspective, discursive democracy has deep philosophical roots and is considered as a dimension of his taught horizon principle about gaining knowledge (Pusey, 2005:165). Consensual decisions are reached only by the ‘force of the better argument’, so that, at the end of the deliberative process, all concerned are convinced by the decisions reached and accept them as reasonable (Shahramnia, 2011:25). However, Cobbinah (2011:49) is concerned about how government bureaucrats can transfer power to the grassroots when they remain in control of financial resources. In relation to this, Kapoor (2005:1207) observed that “pretending to step down from power and privilege, even as one exercises them as master of ceremony, is reinforcement, not a diminishment of such power and privilege”.

For Habermas, the public sphere is the broad domain of non-governmental associations in which citizens, debate, and revise variously shared interpretations of the world and its meaning (Baynes, 2009:538). For Cook (2005:56-57) in a free public sphere, the lifeworld, that arena of social life “geared towards the symbolic production and reproduction of its structural components: culture, society, and personality”, can flourish. Habermas’ intellectual work allows one to rethink public participation in integrated development planning. Public participation in integrated development planning within a Habermasian perspective can be re-formed and understood anew as a collaborative, communicative practice in a differentiated world of governance and a networked polity (Matthews, 2012:141). In Habermas’ (1996:119) view homo democratus freely acts communicatively, seeking agreement, which terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Following Habermas, public participation in integrated development planning can be similarly viewed as communicative/collaborative planning.

3.10.1 Public Participation as communicative/collaborative planning
To better understand Habermas’ theory of communicative action, it is necessary to relate it to Kant’s theory of pure reason, according to which subjects can develop a priori knowledge about an object without having to directly experience it, because of the faculties of intersubjective communication and deductive reasoning (Whittemore, 2014:2). Habermas thus brought a positivist notion of communication into critical theory. Critical theorists argue that the capitalist imperative of value maximisation ‘colonised the lifeworld’, especially as Karl Marx argued, through commodity fetishism (Bernstein, 1976:108; Morris, 2001:69). Thus, for Habermas, as was the case with previous critical theorists, there is a very significant question of how the veil of the capitalist imperative could be removed. At the heart of Habermas’ critical theory is
therefore, the argument that the rationality of the enlightenment is a rationality defined by communicative action.

As such, the key for Habermas was communication, since capitalist interests maintain the veil of commodity fetishism through distorted communication (for example, downplaying class interests). Applied to public participation in integrated development planning, Habermas and his followers become instructive in their argument that an ideal language of comprehensible, sincere, legitimate, and truthful communication would reveal the truth of capitalism’s distortions (Habermas, 1979:2; Forester, 1980:278).

In Habermas’ conception, the ‘lifeworld’ offers freedom. Communicative action has therefore been employed in planning theory because of its emancipatory underpinnings. Applied to public participation in integrated development planning, the theory of communicative action leads to the creation of participatory processes and spaces (Gaventa, 2006a:25) to allow a public sphere to flourish. It aims at creating a shared intersubjective understanding between competing stakeholders, and examples of successful public participation processes work to create deep inclusion. The theory of communicative action can further be applicable as a yardstick to measure public participation. Often, it is the failure of participatory practices to reach the ideals of communicative action, which has led to much of its criticism (Mäntysalo and Jarenko, 2014:38).

Criticism of communicative/collaborative planning often revolves around its idealistic utopianism. Mäntysalo and Jarenko (2014:38) point out its naïve character in reference to the consensus goal, communicative rationality and approach to power. As noted by Mäntysalo and Jarenko (2014:38-39) this has led planning theorists to withdraw from democracy-oriented planning theory and following Flyvbjerg (1998), turn to Foucauldian power analytics and Mouffean agonism. Mäntysalo and Jarenko (2014:39) postulate that Foucauldian power analytics is content with identifying the workings of power in planning, while Mouffean agonism is content with grounding the acknowledgement of differences as the essence of politics. This therefore means that power dynamics, political conflicts and legitimacy claims have become critical variables in public participation in integrated development public planning research. Campbell (2006:95) argues that politics and public policy-making, and thus also public participation in integrated development planning are about making critical decisions and acting not merely spectating.
3.10.2 Public participation as deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy theory has evolved since its first generation of Habermas and Rawls, to incorporate more pragmatic and contextual considerations. For second generation deliberative democracy theory, consensus is not considered realistic; the goal is a deliberating agreement in mutual justification, which may also be an ‘agreement to disagree’. The third generation of deliberative democracy theory, takes a step further arguing that, deliberation is considered successful (legitimate) even when parties advocate only their interests, and public reasoning takes the form of intense negotiation (Mäntysalo and Jarenko, 2014:39). Planning theorists have more or less taken this path to develop communicative theory into a more pragmatic direction.

In more recent planning-theoretical contributions Mäntysalo, Balducci and Kangasoja (2011:259) note that Lindblom’s (1959) bargaining and compromising has been re-introduced among the normatively acceptable policy tools in planning, depending on the difficulty of the planning problem. For Hillier (2002:225) bargaining is a legitimate way of resolving integrated development planning conflicts, which would otherwise remain unsolved. Hillier (2002:269) is of the view that it is necessary for planners to accept the possible inaccessibility of consensus and embrace the pluralism of negotiation approaches and tactics.

In a similar vein, Innes and Booher (2010:37,116) view bargaining as one possible form of integrated development planning communication. As such, contemporary theory on communicative planning consistently emphasises deliberative approaches and how they can be enabled in contested and coerced planning processes and how justifiable agreements can be reached and mediated. Forester’s (1993; 2009; 2013) critical pragmatism exemplifies a key strand of contemporary communicative planning thinking.

3.10.3 Communicative/Collaborative planning
Communicative/collaborative planning is normatively grounded in Habermas’ communicative rationality (Connell, 2010:275). It straddles several aspects of positivist and postpositivist planning; modern - (rationalism) and postmodern - (pluralism); celebrating difference and reaching consensus; comprehensive plans and public participation. A key element of communicative/collaborative planning theory’s philosophy is that its planners accept multiple forms of rationality, including both instrumental and communicative rationality (Connell, 2010:275). The communicative perspective converges a set of ideas; Habermas’ (1987) notion of communicative rationality, Dryzek’s (1990) concept of discursive democracy, and notion of dialogic democracy (Giddens, 1994). Healey (1992:150) has expanded the notion of rationality to include all the ways in which people come to understand and know things and use that
knowledge in acting. Healey (1992:150) asserts that inter-subjective communication helps actors understand each other, by recognising that individual concerns are personally, societally, and culturally situated. It therefore recognises the existence of different types of rationalities.

According to Brand and Gaffikin (2007:284) communicative/collaborative planning is not a monolithic block of axioms set in stone. As argued by Brand and Gaffikin (2007:284) some scholars portray it as a planning theory genus that encompasses a heterogeneous and dynamic mix of particular planning theory species, while others treat it as a particular species within the larger genus of communicative planning theories. However, in Harris’ (2002:23) view it is insignificant whichever taxonomy and hierarchy one subscribes to, whether communicative/collaborative planning is considered a theory, a strong programme, a world view or merely a ‘form’ of planning.

As postulated by Forester (1989:19) to plan is to communicate, argue, debate, and engage in discourse for purposes of organising attention to the possibilities for action. As such, Beauregard (1989:393) argues that without the involvement of concerned actors, policy-making cannot proceed. This theoretical pluralism provides a wherewithal for better understanding the political nature of public participation in integrated development planning. That competing interests of stakeholders are to be essentially viewed as atomistic and decisions as negotiated outcomes facilitated and mediated by public officials in local government (planners).

Emerging from literature is therefore that, communicative/collaborative planning is an inclusive dialogic approach to shaping social space (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 2002:216). Brand and Gaffikin (2007:283) has however questioned whether communicative/collaborative planning is a theory in the strict Popperian sense of explanation that permits falsifiable prediction or more like a normative framework designed to describe and guide practice. Innes and Booher (2003:24) are of the view that communicative/collaborative planning is moving forward and spreading as a method, while Brand and Gaffikin (2007:284) see it as an emerging paradigm. Brand and Gaffikin (2007:283) provide insights into the assumptions about reality, knowledge, values and practice of communicative/collaborative planning. In developing a criteria for evaluating its efficacy and for describing the actual and potential role for planners, they examine communicative/collaborative planning under four key dimensions, viz its ontology, epistemology, ideology and methodology.
3.10.4 Communicative/collaborative planning – Ontology

Communicative/collaborative planning shares some fundamental assumptions about the nature of human beings, and accordingly the social world. For Healey (1997:55) the social world is not just constituted of autonomous individuals, each pursuing their own preferences in an isolated, almost autistic manner. Ontologically speaking, communicative/collaborative planning is based on a relational understanding of space. This means that the maxim that everything depends on the context is an overarching part of the ontology upon which communicative/collaborative planning rests. As such, the object of any planning endeavour must not be treated as a blank slate, but as a unique component of an incredibly complex larger system. As noted by Pennington (2002:189) this is a marked departure from the neo-classical model of self-interested utility maximisers. Philosophically, communicative/collaborative planning dispenses with Lockean assumptions of atomistic man in favour of an Aristotelian understanding of humans as political beings.

Similarly, deliberative democratic theory is firmly anchored within an ontology that treats human beings as essentially the product of social interaction. As such public participation in integrated development planning is most effective where there is inclusion and freedom of speech. A strong civil society ethos, civic education, and good channels of communication between all levels of the community facilitate this process. A considerable commitment of time and resources by public officials and stakeholders in integrated development planning, further makes genuine public participation possible (Hart, 2003:1). The significance of Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy lies in that it supplies principles that may be useful for procedural justice in public participation in integrated development planning. Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy thus becomes an attempt to arrive at morally objective principles of justice.

Some authors in the field of communicative/collaborative planning frequently refer to the notion of complex adaptive systems as an element of its ontological assumption. Innes and Booher (2003:10) for example, posit that complex adaptive systems are characterised by fragmentation, uncertainty and complexity, quite often ‘at the edge of chaos’, but with self-organising capabilities (Innes and Booher, 1999:417). Two main well-established philosophical traditions thus share most of the above assumptions and therefore constitute the main genealogy of communicative/collaborative planning. These are Giddens’ structuration theory and Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Communicative/collaborative planning is therefore a hybrid of various theories (Harris, 2002:24).
Giddens’s core assumption in his structuration theory is that agency (human activities) nor structure (the ‘given’ political, technological, habitual structures) provide some kind of *movens immotum*. They both shape each other constantly in a recursive loop, meaning that fundamental change is possible through a spiral bootstrap process. The practical manifestation of such a virtuous cycle is a lengthy, “restless, dialectical process” (Healey, 2004a:96). As noted by Healey, this requires a “major leap in reflexive activity…to re-think problems and challenges…to re-shape the frames of reference in which issues are discussed and decisions taken” (Healey, 1997:244). This self-reflection lies at the heart of Habermas’s theory of communicative action (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:286) and is meant to act as a tool to question and overcome the gravitational pull of existing power dynamics that are already embedded in and acting through all types of structures. The assumption is that reflection and undistorted debate wakes the public up from the power-blind somnambulism and reconstructs a world without hegemonies.

**3.10.5 Communicative/collaborative planning – Epistemology**

Brand and Gaffikin’s (2007:286) assumption that there is ultimate truth ‘out there’ demands a different approach for understanding the world, refocusing on the assumption that everything is socially constructed. The ontology that underlies the concept of communicative/collaborative planning also determines what one looks for in his/her pursuit of knowledge (Graham and Healey, 1999:642). According to Healey (2004b:6) planners should not only know about the immediate patterns driving a planning issue, but also step back and think more about the underlying strategic patterns that derive from the system in which more immediate patterns are defined.

Innes and Booher (1999:418) encourage planners to generate knowledge which transcends the blinders created by community conditions and local governance institutions. Coaffee and Healey (2003:1982) believe that it is only then, that communities can be able to appreciate how power is exercised through taken for granted norms and practices. The questions communicative/collaborative planners therefore pose includes; which are the power dynamics involved in a particular issue; who are potential winners and losers; what kind of arguments are used to forge coalitions and how does the prevailing situation influence the way community stakeholders who participate in the IDP think about integrated development planning issues? (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:287). Communicative/collaborative planning therefore becomes all about disassembling the black box of communities’ situatedness and the constructedness of whatever situation happens to prevail out there (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:286).
Another epistemological issue is the claim that all types of knowledge need to be taken into account (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:286). This implies an acknowledgement of tacit knowledge as a major factor driving human decisions and actions, even if it cannot be articulated, or measured. As Healey (1997:264) puts it, communicative/collaborative planning emphasises the need to facilitate articulation of experiential knowledge. He stresses that there is therefore no privileged, correct “rationality” and that all potential forms of reasoning have to be learned about and given respect.

As such, there has to be no privileged sites of knowledge production. As such, communicative/collaborative planning epistemologically sides with the generation of socially robust knowledge in a ‘post-normal’ or ‘post-academic’ fashion (Brand and Gaffikin (2007:287). These considerations call for the ‘co-construction’ of knowledge among possibly many social actors, which is a clear departure from a bold modernist/positivist epistemology. Within this epistemology, knowledge generation within the collaborative planning perspective therefore resembles more, a collective learning process, resulting in negotiated knowledge that can arbitrate among diverse claims and priorities (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:287) through public participation in integrated development planning.

3.10.6 Communicative/collaborative planning – Ideology
Communicative/collaborative planning is characterised by certain ideological assumptions that reflect its purveyors’ ideas of how the world ought to be. It emphasises values in planning processes, since it views the technical and objective criteria of the ‘public good’ and the ‘common interest’ as sterile and over-aggregated simplifications of real-world complexities (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:287). This is a paradigm shift from the traditional, rationalist notion of the value-free planning process. This brings communicative/collaborative planning close to what Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, (2002:215) call a left-leaning substantive explanatory and prescriptive theory.

Communicative/collaborative planning alongside other concepts like sustainable development and human rights, can be seen as a refuge for leftist ideas, attempting to re-legitimate alternative visions to neoliberalism, and that it overlaps widely with notions of a ‘third way’ that constituted the philosophical underpinnings of Britain’s New Labour government (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 2002:215). Healey (2004a:97) postulates that communicative/collaborative planning permits open negotiation of moralities, beyond utilitarianism, and for a collective avowal to values like aesthetics, enjoyment and other spiritual values that enrich human existence. Communicative/collaborative planning’s inherent impulse
for grassroots democracy that gives ‘voice to the voiceless’ draws attention to gender issues, ethnic diversity and the needs of the disadvantaged. It tries to disperse with power plays altogether by removing distortions that Foucault detects as embodied in almost every aspect of discourse, in formal routines, informal practices and physical structures (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:288).

However, communicative/collaborative planning’s intention is not to dissolve power dynamics in a utopia of transparent communication, but to play games with a minimum of domination (Flyvbjerg, 1996:391). It therefore champions diversity as a social asset, as long as cultural distinctiveness does not promote exclusivist ethnic entrenchments. Like all planning it is interventionist, it intends that local planning processes can combine the environmental, social, and political awareness (Rowley, 2006:1). Also quite interestingly, communicative/collaborative planning is sometimes even understood and marketed “as an accomplice of globalisation because it is seen as fitting with the Zeitgeist of global economic restructuring and local responses” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 2002:207). Sustainable development is highly valued by collaborative planners. Sustainability is “a systemic intelligence, flexibility and robustness that stems from the ability to adapt to new circumstances” (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:289). Other authors see sustainability more substantively. For example, Healey (1998:2) often combines it with ecological concerns to the expression ‘environmental sustainability’. Healey (1997:63) exposes her underlying “ideological position when she reminds us of some absolute priorities, such as a duty of environmental stewardship or of natural justice”.

3.10.7 Communicative/collaborative planning – Exploring the practice

The efficacy of communicative/collaborative planning, which some see as “an important direction for planning theory with significant potential for practice”. Friedmann, cited in Healey (2007:292) calls for “interactive, non-rationalist modes of governance”. In systemic institutional design of governance systems, for inclusionary participatory democratic practice. Healey (2007:294) advocates a set of quality criteria which revolves around issues of “rights and duties . . . resources . . . policy principles [and the] distribution of competencies” (Healey, 2007:292). This agenda coincides with a shift to a more value-driven and proactive model, designed to create sustainable development through integrative strategies and inclusive processes. For this to happen, everyone with a perceived stake needs to be identified and all “stakeholders must be equally informed, listened to, and respected” (Innes and Booher, 1999:418). This further calls for justice to “the relational dynamics of public participation in integrated development planning (Graham and Healey, 1999:642). Thus, “…collaborative planning demands a shift from
representational to discursive and participatory forms of governance where deliberation takes place through a lot of ‘face-to-face interaction in real time’…” (Friedmann, 1993:482).

Policy can thus be designed, not for citizens, but by citizens in their role as policy ‘users’. In other words, the demand-and supply side of policies and planning decisions ought to ‘co-evolve’ (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:290). Therefore, the practice of collaborative planning requires more than just thorough mediation; it requires arenas for non-adversarial discourse where value systems can be articulated, where shared strategic conviction can grow, where conflicts are re-framed in a less antagonistic manner and where the discourse shifts from the competitive bargaining of fixed interests to a mode of negotiative problem definition and consensus building (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:291). However, fundamental critiques challenges the core propositions of collaborative planning that are underpinned by the concept of deliberative democracy.

3.10.8 Communicative/collaborative planning – Critique

Deliberative skills, the need for practical application and the consensus goal are central themes in communicative/collaborative planning theory. With the hegemony of the neo-liberal political ideology, power as an underlying theme has also become more pronounced. Given that deliberative skills are unevenly distributed among participants, thus leading to power imbalances, a broader context of power relationships has to be taken into account to better understand public participation in integrated development planning. Sayer (2013) as cited in Mäntysalo and Jarenko (2014:42) advises that communicative/collaborative planning has to develop a strategy for preventing power imbalances and balancing the power relations between strong public officials (integrated development planners) and weaker citizens. They also question, whether the intention of collaborative/communicative theory to enable bottom-up civil society participation and relax bureaucratic controls, would inadvertently serve neo-liberal interests (Sayer (2013) as cited in Mäntysalo and Jarenko, 2014:42).

This stems from the Marxist critique of seeing structural power imbalances as inherent in the planning system itself. Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998:1982) have argued that in contested planning contexts, the consensus goal of communicative/collaborative theory is highly utopian. Also the Habermasian reliance on communicative rationality as a ‘universal’ logic, justifying the search for consensus in planning, is questioned (Hillier, 2002:110-135). This criticism has been reflected by the communicative planning theorists that have taken the task of ‘reviving’ communicative planning theory. Theorists such as Sager (2013:13) have argued that
it is in conditions of agonism rather than harmony that the search for common ground is urgent, although deep-seated conflict also reveals the limitations of attempts to build agreement.

Obstacles to consensus building in communicative/collaborative planning, include among other things: commitment of agencies, councils (local government), and the ward committees generally, parochial views among ward committee members, effectiveness of ward committee’s operation, ability and skills among ward committee members, effective strategy or strategic direction, leadership within the ward committee and resources funding ward committees and their operation (Margerum, 2002:242). Margerum (2002:242) also identified power and capacity as an important variable which significantly determines the success of communicative/collaborative planning. Margerum (2002:242) postulates that this includes among others, the power of managing the process, the power of knowledge and information, the power of not collaborating, and the power of autonomous decision making.

In Gray’s (1989:119) view stakeholder groups who participate in integrated development planning are successful when they “mutually authorise each other to reach a decision”. Similarly, McCarthy and Shoret (1984:13) are of the view that “power parity is reached when each interest group is unable to impose its proposed solution on the other affected parties”. As postulated by Buchanan, and Tullock (1962:250) in their unanimity rule this may result in the community being held hostage to their most demanding and inflexible members. Available literature offers a range of views about how to respond to power differentials during communicative/collaborative planning. One category of power relates to the capacity to influence process through the control of agendas, information and persuasiveness. A second category is the ability to mobilise, influence and organise action or resistance through stakeholder constituencies. What should be of concern is, however, that major inequities deter communicative/collaborative planning in that parties involved in consensus building yield unequal power (Margerum, 2002:242). As such Innes et al., (1994:20) has suggested that, public participation in integrated development planning requires that stakeholders evaluate power differentials in a kind of cost-benefit-analysis, before they enter into the process. One way of promoting power sharing is through complete consensus on decision making. Based on universal principles such as justice and democracy, many aspects of this proceduralist approach are laudable: its recognition of multiple and diverse stakeholders operating in an increasingly complex, pluralist and unpredictable world; its holistic perspective on development; its implicit value of subsidiarity; and its ambition of an informed and engaged citizenry in respectful interaction for dispute resolution.
However, this deliberative and communicative polity faces a basic ontological problem. As expressed by Mouffe (1999), as cited in Brand and Gaffikin (2007:292) the free and unconstrained public participation (deliberation) of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility. Related to this is the flawed approach to power and inequality implicit in the assumptions about a public sphere for rational discourse leading to democratic consensus. Power differentials, a reality well recognised by many adherents of collaborative planning, cannot be dissolved through logical argumentation (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:292). In Sandercock’s (2000:26) view “beyond the problem of power, there is also a need to acknowledge the role of the emotional and the personal, expressed in the narrative that allows the whole person to be present in negotiations and deliberations”.

Antagonism and conflict are intrinsic to human relations, and this ‘us’ and ‘them’ are particularly manifest in the diversities of contemporary South African society. Thus, for Pløger, (2004:72) it may be less illusionary to pursue a “democratic art of governance, namely civil servants’ and planners’ ability to work productively with and within strife”. Innes (2004:8-9) insists that in an increasingly fragmented world, “the powerful can be induced to participate, given the beneficial security and legitimacy of widespread support, and the added value of new forms of network power and synergy that attend collaborative practice”. Consensus building in communicative/collaborative planning may also require a kind of power-sharing that will produce a stalemate. Gunder (2003) as cited in Brand and Gaffikin (2007:292) advances the concept of ‘passionate planning’. In this perspective, the disharmonies of rival ideas are an immutable feature of an unrepressed pluralist polity. Particular struggles will yield “hegemonic outcomes reflective of the power relations, and will be invariably exclusive of some social interest”. In short, the “agreeability implicit in ‘collaborative’ decision-making demands a level of tractability unrealistic in a discordant world” (Brand and Gaffikin, 2007:293).

Conclusions drawn from communicative/collaborative planning when examined through the lenses of ontology, epistemology, ideology and methodology, in general, indicate that planning/development efforts in South African municipalities shared two important characteristics: they offer the rhetoric of integrated development planning; and all the initiatives are underpinned by public participation, designed to legitimise the process and to secure ‘buy-in’ from key stakeholders, as local government came to increasingly acknowledge that effective service delivery reflective of developmental local government demands multi-agency collaboration. Creating dialogic spaces for public participation in integrated development planning among equal participants for collaborative decisions about priorities and choices is too formidable an undertaking. The voice of the inactive poor remains marginal, while many public
participation audiences largely comprise community ‘gatekeepers’, government agencies, and the usual competing lobbies for development.

Underlying values behind the standard collaborative planning approach: sustainable and equitable development; giving participative depth to conventional representative democracy; the need for social diversity to be reflected in pluralist politics; and the desire that fervently held opposing convictions do not find expression in destructive outcomes such as violent conflict or gridlocked development, however remain worthy values. Nonetheless, such well-intentioned prescription for governance, rooted in civic solidarity, also makes assumptions difficult to sustain empirically, including: the existence of extensive civic capacity to support the inclusivity of an informed public; the decisive role of rationality in dispute arbitration; and, perhaps most tellingly, the willingness of the powerful to participate in these open discourses when more effective and discreet channels are available.

3.11 OVERVIEW – CONTEXT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Public participation is a complex concept, the scope and definition of which is open to debate. Hafer and Ran (2016:208) note that the concept of public participation lacks consistent definitional clarity in academic literature. Bekker (1996:29) has however noted that, “the phenomenon of participation in public affairs of democratic governments is a well-established concept”. Phago (2008:238) states that the participation of community members in governance matters, is not only required, but is an important right for all citizens. Matsiliza (2014) as cited in Mothepu, van Jaarsveldt and Lekonyane (2015:904) writes that the principle of participation by communities in decision-making entails that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process that allows ordinary citizens the opportunity to exercise power over decisions that affect them. Similarly, Brynard (1996b:2) postulates that, to a greater or lesser extent the shaping of public opinion and participation by the public in matters which they believe affects them directly.

3.11.1 The Concept of Public Participation

The concept of public participation, has been defined as grassroots community engagement (Arnstein 1969:216-224; Weiner 1995:30-44; White 1996:6-17; Lijphart 1997:2-9; Surbun 2003:369-376; Forester 2006:447-456; Gbaffou 2008:1-7). The overarching conceptual values of public participation include, but are not limited to, inclusiveness, openness, access, consultation, shared decisions and transparency (Smith 2003:36-39; Du Plessis 2008:1-33; Manjoo and Czapanskiy 2008:1-10). Murambo (2008:124-127) asserts that citizens’ voices and
participation are at the centre of democratic government. Four aspects of public participation are often considered for purposes of concept clarity: who participates, how they participate, how long they participate, and the scope of their participation activities.

Nabatchi and Amsler’s (2014:65) definition of who participates explains that it is “members of the lay public “who are “not holding office or administrative positions in government” (Roberts, 2004:320). In considering how they participate, the focus is on direct participation – “situations where individuals are personally and actively engaged in a process” either in person (Nabatchi and Amsler, 2014:65) – in contrast to indirect participation (e.g., relying on elected representatives, lobbyists, or interest groups to take action on one’s behalf).

In terms of length of participation, concern is with processes that represent ongoing participation that is “embedded in a community’s political institutions and social practices” (Fagotto and Fung, 2009:1) rather than one-time events, classically represented through participation in public hearings. Token participation that entails unidirectional or deflated-bidirectional communication is not the subject of concern (Arntstein, 1969:217). In contrast, the focus is on “authentic” participation, which emphasises participation as a valuable, ongoing process that facilitates truthful and useful exchanges between citizens and administrators, with citizen input being received and acted upon. The term public participation has been widely accepted as a core value of democracy, a basic human right and an indispensable condition for good governance (Vivier and Wentzel, 2013:240).

‘Public participation’ and ‘citizen participation’ are often mistakenly used interchangeably as synonyms. Langton (1978:17) uses the term citizen participation, to refers to “purposeful activities in which citizens take part in relation to government”. Brynard (1996a:40) refer to citizens as those persons without paid office, wealth, special information, or other formal power source beyond their own numbers. Citizen participation is an activity undertaken by one or more individuals previously excluded from the decision making process (Brynard, 1996a:41). Brynard (1996a) thus viewed citizen participation as the active “involvement” of people in the making and implementation of decisions at all levels and forms of political and socio-economic activities. As such, citizen participation is active involvement by people who have a sense of belonging to the policy processes and who have an active role in determining the outputs of governments (Brynard, 1996a:41).

Goutlet (1989:165) defined public participation as the practice of involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of organisations or
institutions responsible for policy development. For Bernhardt (2015:136), it is the direct or indirect involvement of members of the community in policy-making. Munyinda and Habasonda (2013:13) view it as “an instrument of deliberative democratic systems” used by government to capture the concerns, aspirations and opinions of citizens who are affected by government’s decisions. For Roberts (2004:320) public participation includes “sharing power with public officials in making substantive decisions and in taking action related to the community”. Auriacombe (2015:60) has argued that public participation is the process through which the government seeks to get input from communities on what they want their government to do, how, when and where they want it to do it. Auriacombe (2015:60) further explains that public participation requires government to find out what the community thinks of the services they are receiving from government and any changes in needs and expectations.

It can therefore be deduced that public participation refers to the process by which an organisation consults with interested or affected individuals, organisations and government entities before, during and after making and implementing a decision and that the consulted people must remain part and parcel of the whole process. Defining public participation in this way is in tandem with André, Martin and Lanmafankpotin (2012:1) who comprehensively defined it as:

“…a process in which ordinary people take part – whether on a voluntary or obligatory basis and whether acting alone or as part of a group - with the goal of influencing a decision involving significant choices that will affect their community. Such participation may or may not take place within an institutional framework, and it may be organised either by members of civil society or by decision makers…”

The foregoing conceptualisation resonates with Rowe and Frewer (2004:512) who contend that public participation at a general level is the practice of consulting and involving members of the public in agenda-setting, decision-making, and policy-forming activities of organisations or institutions responsible for policy development. Public participation is thus a tool used to involve locals in community planning and development (Hung, Sirakaya-Turk and Ingram, 2011:273). In reality, it is a much more complex phenomenon in which individuals voluntarily take action to “confront opportunities and responsibilities of citizenship (Tosun, 2000:615). Public participation can thus be conceptualised as a direct and authentic participatory process involving the lay individuals of a polity (i.e., citizens) who make substantive contributions to various stages of the policy process (e.g., planning, implementation). Public participation in integrated development planning is central to enabling communities to claim their democratic rights (Van der Waldt, 2014:27). In SA, this right is entrenched in the Constitution of the
Republic of SA, 1996. Section 19 of this Constitution declares that every citizen is free to make political choices and to participate in political processes.

3.11.2 The Context of Public Participation in South African Municipalities
Public participation is particularly important in SA, where (before 1994) African, Coloured and Indian communities were excluded from meaningfully participating in decision-making within state and government institutions or structures. Statutory mechanisms such as the Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950) and the Population Registration Act (Act 30 of 1950) made it illegal for other than White communities to engage with decision-makers openly and gainfully. Since 1996, the Constitution has guaranteed local government its own sphere of governance, so that it is no longer an extension of national or provincial government.

3.11.3 Legal Framework – Public Participation in the Republic of South Africa
To ensure a developmental approach, and people-centred, integrated development planning at the local level, section 152(1) of the Constitution, states that “the objects of local government are ... (e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government”. The South African government has enacted an impressive basket of legislation on local government that demands public participation in municipal decision-making, planning, budgeting and finances. The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) stipulates, that municipalities have to develop a culture of public participation by building the capacity of local communities, councillors and officials to participate in municipal affairs. The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) (section 16(1)), determines that a municipal council must develop a culture of participatory governance, and for this purpose must encourage and create conditions for residents, communities and other stakeholders in the municipality to participate in local affairs. At the core of this Act is to draw on the mechanisms of public participation to entrench the values of accountability, transparency, efficiency and consultation (Pottie, 2004:614).

Section 19(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) further stipulates that a municipal council must develop mechanisms for public participation in performing its functions and exercising its powers. Additionally, the Act stipulates that a municipality’s executive must give an annual report on the extent to which the public has participated in municipal affairs. The Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003) encourages the participation of communities in the finances of municipalities, including the development of municipal budgets. The Municipal Property Rates Act provides that the public must participate in the determination of municipal property rates. Drawing on these principles of an engaged citizenry, the Constitution provides a framework for public participation in all
spheres of government – especially at the local level. Sections 16-22 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) institutionalises community participation as a core function in all the activities of a municipality. In terms of section 16(1)(a) the municipality must encourage, and create conditions for, the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality. As provided in section 16(1)(i)-(v) this has to include: (i) the preparation, implementation and review of a municipality’s integrated development plan in terms of Chapter 5; (ii) the establishment, implementation and review of its performance management system in terms of Chapter 6; (iii) the monitoring and review of its performance, including the outcomes and impact of such performance; (iv) the preparation of its budget; and (v) the making of strategic decisions relating to the provision of municipal services in terms of Chapter 8.

Section 16(1)(b)(ii) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), specifically mandates councillors to foster community participation. Sections 17(1)(4) provides for mechanisms, processes and procedures for community participation. More specifically, Section 73(1)(2)(a)(b) of the Structures Act provides for the establishment of ward committees for each ward in the municipality, consisting of the councillor representing that ward in the council who must also be the chairperson of the committee and not more than 10 other persons. Section 73(3)(2)(b)(i)(ii) further provide for the equitable representation of women in a ward committee, as well as the representation of a diversity of interests.

3.12 CONCLUSION

Literature surveyed in this chapter, indicates that management functions of public administration are tools for steering and controlling the activities of government towards attaining its goals and objectives according to government policy. Such functions include; decision-making, policy-making, programming, organising, co-ordinating, communicating, control, planning and exerting leadership. Planning is a basic management function which helps public sector institutions to keep up with change and which management can use to determine in advance what the institutions should achieve. Planning is primarily a public sector managerial function, which however takes place in a highly political environment.

Literature surveyed emphasises the importance of involving stakeholders in the public participation process and call for a reframing of the participation logic away from ‘top-down’, ‘elitist’ and ‘expert’ decision-making in community governance, towards communicative/collaborative and deliberative democracy paradigms, where the polity, interests and citizenry co-evolve. Thus, emancipatory planning practices emerging within new forms of governance outline the possibilities for participatory governance through public participation in
integrated development planning. Other accounts are, however, more pessimistic and caution that the rhetoric of public participation is undermined by the inevitable rationality of power. Unbalanced relationships between power and rationality may result in domination, conflict and the neglect of good rational arguments. Public participation in integrated development planning, in this way becomes a ‘new tranny’, giving the impression of involvement, while securing the influence of vested interests. Chapter 4 of this thesis describes the research design and methodology used for this study.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the research design and methodology used for this study. It presents the research design and data collection techniques, study population and sampling procedures as well as the statistical analysis of the results. It also clarifies the rationale behind the methodology applied, how the questionnaire was pre-tested, the ethical consideration and what measures were taken to ensure validity and reliability of the study. The research methodology included a literature review (captured in Chapters 2 and 3), which was used to establish a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning (Chapter 2) and public participation (Chapter 3) in integrated development planning.

4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.2.1 Researcher paradigm
Cameron (2011:99) notes that research methodologies exist within philosophical contexts, in which choice of methods is driven by philosophical assumptions. Philosophies of social science research, which underlie this study, are rooted in the empirical-analytical or positivist paradigm and the interpretive paradigm. The philosophical assumptions and worldviews underlying these paradigms differ in terms of their epistemological, ontological and methodological positions (Van Thiel, 2014:31-41). By preferring one paradigm over another, the researcher can be drawn to distinguish between different kinds of knowledge (Alasuutari, Bickman, and Brannen, 2009:44), research strategies (Gravetter and Forzano, 2012:159-167), research designs, objectives (Fouché and De Vos, 2011:94) and purposes of research or research questions (Babbie and Mouton, 2010:79-81; Engel and Schutt, 2013:17). The term paradigm refers to a theoretical tradition or accepted method, a set of beliefs, or a worldview that guides the activities of a researcher and which guides a coherent research agenda and is coupled to a certain scientific approach (Van Thiel, 2014:31).

The significance of paradigms is that they shape how a researcher perceives the world and how it is reinforced by those around them. Within the research process, the beliefs researchers hold reflect the way their research is designed, how data are collected and analysed, and how research results are presented (Maree, Creswell, Ebersöhn, Eloff, Ferreira, Ivankova, Jansen, Nieuwenhuis, Pietersen, and Plano Clark, 2016:52). In this study, a survey questionnaire closely associated with the positivist paradigm and quantitative methodology was used as the first method of data collection. Focus group discussions associated with the interpretive paradigm
and qualitative methodology were used as the second method of data collection (Van Thiel, 2014:32-36).

The foundations of positivism emanate from the work of Comte (Blaikie, 2007:110). Positivism assumes that reality is objectively given and can be described by measurable properties, which are independent of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments. The positivist values reason, ‘truth’ and validity (Van Thiel, 2014:36). The assumption being that reality is tangible and can be measured objectively. As such only objective, observable facts can be the basis for research (O’Neil, and Koekemoer, 2016:3). Theoretical rules or laws are therefore tested by way of deduction in order to find a causal explanation for empirically observed phenomena (Van Thiel, 2014:32). For positivists, explanation or theory of social reality is nomothetic (nomos means law in Greek), based on a system of general laws (Neuman, 2011:96-97).

The quantitative methodology is mostly associated with this paradigm (Maree et al., 2016:59). In this study the researcher self-administered a survey questionnaire (quantitative method) to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process. This study therefore assumed that the respondents would assist in explaining the reality of how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence public participation in the integrated development planning process in BCMM.

Interpretivism has its origins in hermeneutics and phenomenology (Blaikie, 2007:124). Maree et al., (2016:4) point out that the interpretive paradigm believes in a reality that consists of people’s subjective experiences of the external world. This paradigm adopts an intersubjective and empathetic epistemology and use qualitative, often interactional methodologies. Interpretivism assumes that the study of social phenomena requires an understanding of the social world that the respondents have constructed and which they reproduce through their continuing activities and actions (Blaikie, 2007:124).

An interpretivist worldview, enabled the researcher to situate public participation stakeholders at the centre of the integrated development planning process. Respondents in the study, it was assumed, constantly interpret and reinterpret their world – social situations, other people’s actions, their own actions, and humanly created objects and social spaces (Blaikie, 2007:124). As noted by Van Thiel (2014:36) the interpretive paradigm has the following typical characteristics: it identifies with the unique subject of study ‘verstehen’, meaning and relations are holistic; description and understanding is usually inductive; and data is qualitative. It is based on the assumption that meaning and ideas are socially constructed, based on what is
relevant for making sense of social action. Thus, according to Blaikie (2007:124) for an interpretivist, social reality is a product of its inhabitants; it is anchored in the view that social worlds are already interpreted before the social scientist/the researcher arrives.

In this study, the researcher is also of the view that public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process and how those dynamics influence the outcomes of the IDP in the BCMM, are socially constructed. Power asymmetries interrelate within institutional, political, economic, social, cultural and legal contexts. The study therefore assumes that the respondents’ views are to be taken as ‘fact’. Following, Babbie (2016:293-294) this researcher is of the view that immersing himself in the points of view of respondents, would allow him to draw feelings, meanings, perceptions and belief, of respondents (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008:116; Blaikie, 2007:131). Focus-group discussion, therefore allowed participants to build on each other’s ideas and comments. In tandem with Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole (2013:200-201) the researcher found focus-group discussions to be a quick and cheap way of collecting data from many participants.

4.2.2 Research approach and design
A mixed-method research approach was chosen, using quantitative and qualitative research methods in the same study (Bless, et al., 2013:240). Maree et al., (2016:312) support the assertion that using qualitative and quantitative methods in the same research can be beneficial. The essential advantage of the mixed-method research approach in this study was that it enhanced the credibility of the study. Where findings did not correspond, this research approach permitted the researcher to question and improve the research (Bless et al., 2013:241).

To explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process, and to explain how the dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM, the strengths and advantages of both the rigour of quantitative research and the exploratory and explanatory power of qualitative research to the study at hand (Bless et al., 2013:241), was viewed as advantageous. The mixed-method research approach enabled the researcher to simultaneously answer confirmatory, exploratory and explanatory questions, verify and generate theory in the same study (Truscott, Swars, Thornton-Reid, Zhao, Doodley, Williams, Hart and Matthews, 2010:318). For this study the advantages of the mixed-method research approach were therefore that: (i) it allowed the researcher to collect credible results; (ii) it led to richer data; (iii) it led to more depth in the synthesis and integration of theories; and (iv) it uncovered contradictions and served as a test for competing theories (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner, 2007:115). Positivists tend to believe that qualitative research is always exploratory, leaving the more
‘accurate’ description and explanation to quantitative research (Maree et al., 2016:365). However, the interpretive and constructivist researchers argue that qualitative research, formulates rich descriptions and explanations (Maree et al., 2016:365; Neuman, 2011:100; Babbie, 2016:416-485).

A research design is a procedural plan that is adopted by the researcher to answer questions validly, objectively, accurately and economically (Nieuwenhuis, 2016:70). Maree et al., (2016:364) write that, a research design is a plan or blueprint of how a researcher intends conducting the research. Warren, Gerber and Robinson (2013:72) simply refer to it as the process by which data gathering efforts are structured and defined. Research designs are types of inquiry within qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods approaches that provide specific direction for procedures; they have also been referred to as strategies of inquiry (Creswell, 2014:12).

In this research a single case study research design was used to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process and how they do influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. A case study has the advantage of yielding explanatory insights (Babbie, 2016:302). Case studies can be used to explain how and why events occur (Babbie and Mouton, 2010:81), and for Engel and Schutt (2013:19-20) explanation is the ultimate goal of science and remains at the highest level of the knowledge continuum.

Bless et al., (2013:240), assert that methodological triangulation can be built into a research study when a mixed-method approach employs both quantitative and qualitative methods in the same study. A survey questionnaire (quantitative method) using both closed and open-ended questions, was used as the first method of data collection. Focus group discussions (qualitative method) were used as the second method of data collection (see Addenda G and I). The data collected were supported by a comprehensive literature survey in Chapters, 2 and 3, which sought to establish conceptual, theoretical foundations and frameworks for contextualising public participation in integrated development planning (see Objective 1).

4.3 POPULATION AND SAMPLING
The population for the study comprised of ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders in the BCMM. These respondents were selected with the aid of a purposeful sample. The sample size (n) totalled 250 (Table 4.1). All fifty (50) ward councillors were included from the original sample (n=50). One hundred (100) ward committee members, who are the major links between BCMM and the residents
were selected from the target population \((n=500)\). Thirty-five (35) IDP representative forum members were included from the original sample \((n=35)\), whilst sixty-five (65) community stakeholders were also included \((n=65)\) (Table 4.1).

Four focus group discussions were held, one each with the following sample groups: eight ward councillors, nine ward committee members, seven IDP representative forum members and 10 community stakeholders. Thus, out of the original sample \((n=40)\), 34 respondents were able to attend the focus group discussions. The final sample for the second method of data collection, focus group discussions, therefore constituted 85\% of the proposed original sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Questionnaire Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n=250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward councillors</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward committee members</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP representative forum members</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community stakeholders</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final responses</td>
<td>n229 (91.6%)</td>
<td>n34 (85%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants were selected using purposeful sampling \((n=250)\) for the first method of data collection (questionnaire survey). For the second method of data collection (focus group discussions), purposeful sampling \((n=40)\) was also used to select respondents. This selection was based on the need for further investigation in select cases that were information-rich. A pilot study using a draft survey questionnaire was performed on 16 respondents with similar characteristics as the original sample. Care was taken not to include them in the final sample.

Purposeful/judgmental sampling was based on the researcher’s judgment, regarding the characteristics of the sample (Bless et al., 2013:172) as well as his familiarity with the population from which the sample was drawn. For Babbie (2016:187), purposive/judgmental sampling is a type of non-probability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative. Ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders in the BCMM were therefore selected deliberately in order to provide useful information that could not be acquired by any other sampling techniques.
Three goals of purposeful sampling proposed by Maree et al., (2016:198) were considered in selecting this sampling technique. The first goal was the need to achieve typicality of settings (BCMM), individuals (ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders in the BCMM) and activities (public participation in an integrated development planning process). The second goal was to adequately capture the heterogeneity in the population (ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders in the BCMM) (Warren, et. al., 2013:128). The third goal was to select cases that were information-rich. Purposive/judgemental sampling was thus appropriate in selecting unique cases that were especially informative (Neuman, 2011:268). The researcher was however mindful of the fact that purposeful sampling does not allow for generalisation of study findings with certainty (Warren et al., 2013:128).

The final sample, however, out of the original study sample (n=250), 229 survey questionnaires were received back, representing a response rate of 91.6%. This response rate was influenced by the absence and unavailability of some respondents during scheduled meetings. In most cases, where the researcher arranged meetings with ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders, fewer respondents than expected attended (due to issues of leave, other commitments which came at short notice, meetings and other engagements). After scheduling and re-scheduling meetings with the contact persons and after approximately one and a half months of data collection, the researcher was of the view that a representative sample of respondents’ views had been obtained for the study findings to be valid and reliable, and the researcher concluded the data collection phase of the study.

4.4 INSTRUMENTS IN THE COLLECTING OF DATA
A survey questionnaire (quantitative method) was used as the first method of data collection. Focus group discussions (qualitative method) were used as the second method of data collection (see Addenda G and I). The data collected were supported by a comprehensive literature survey.

4.4.1 Literature review
Conceptual and theoretical foundations and frameworks for contextualising integrated development planning (Chapter 2) and public participation (Chapter 3) in the IDP, was established through a study of related literature. A literature review involves a search and study of current writings on the problem under investigation (Bless et al., 2013:49). It accomplishes several purposes, amongst which are that it investigates the information and data that have been published on a topic and considers their contribution and weakness. It therefore relates a study to the larger, ongoing dialogue in the literature, filling in gaps and extending prior studies
(Creswell, 2014:27-28). Concepts form the building blocks of theories, and theories in turn specify the relationship(s) between concepts and why such relationships exist (Blaikie, 2010:112). In this study, a number of sources incorporating national and international books, journals, dissertations, Acts, research reports, internal governmental documents, IDP, and annual reports and other reports from selected agencies in BCMM, were consulted.

This method of data collection was selected, based on the understanding that a researcher develops a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural setting. Another reason for conducting a literature review was based on the need to sharpen and deepen the theoretical framework of the research. That is to study the different theories related to public participation and integrated development planning, within an interdisciplinary perspective (Bless et al., 2013:49). Literature review as a method of gathering data, enabled the researcher to obtain and have a thorough understanding of public participation and integrated development planning, concepts, theories, international and national related literature.

4.4.2 Pilot study
A confidential self-administered survey questionnaire with both closed and open-ended questions was used for the pilot study. The questionnaires were hand delivered to 16 respondents. The questionnaires were completed in the presence of the researcher and collected after at most 25 minutes. The response categories on the items were well represented. Only a few of the items had response categories that were not represented in the pilot study. This would be expected since only 16 respondents were used. There was however, a good possibility that all response categories would be represented in the main study. The fact that the response categories were represented in the pilot data suggests that there is variability in the population of respondents. Statistical methods are designed for datasets with variability and the pilot data suggested that the application of statistical methods would be appropriate in the analysis of the main study data. No tests for statistical significance were carried out on the pilot data because the results would be very unreliable due to sample size concerns. However, the pilot study provided evidence that such tests could be carried out for the main study data.

The logistical backup for the distribution and collection of the questionnaires justified the selected method. In addition, only a very strenuous and time-consuming interview, in the case of each respondent, could have covered the number of variables that were evaluated much more effectively by using the questionnaire (Kumar, 2011:148). Care was taken to include a variety of open-ended questions in the questionnaire (Neuman, 2011:325). Although such questions tend
to pose problems in terms of empirical analysis and quantification, they had the advantage that they invited the respondents to elaborate on certain variables (Kumar, 2011:151). Maree et al., (2016:178) cite some advantages of questionnaires, including that, respondents have time to think about the answers, and that questionnaires can be distributed over a fairly large number of respondents (n=250).

The disadvantage for the open-ended questions is manifested in the complexity with which the collected data are analysed. In mitigating this difficulty, De Vos, Strydom, Fouche, and Delport (2011:403-418) propose that the following should be considered: (i) careful planning and administration of a questionnaire and (ii) clearly constructed items. To avoid or minimise the problems that might have arisen with the use of a questionnaire in the present study, the researcher planned ahead. The questionnaire development was also not hurried, more care and time were expended and every item was thoroughly scrutinised. This was done to avoid ambiguity and to ensure that every question was relevant to the purpose of the research topic. Brief and clear sentences were used and the questionnaire was pre-tested in a pilot study before commencement of the research.

4.4.3 Survey questionnaire
The confidential self-administered questionnaires consisted of twenty-two questions grouped into three sections. Section A of the questionnaire was intended to give a background on demographic information of ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders. It captured the respondents’ gender, age, highest level of education, designation/position and ward number. Section B, on the dynamics of the IDP process, solicited respondents’ views on the nature and extent of public participation dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM. It consisted of 10 questions, comprising 17 items which sought to solicit respondents’ views on the nature and extent of public participation dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM. The questions in Section B tested respondents’ views on the value of public participation in the IDP process; functioning of ward committees and IDP representative forum; inclusiveness of public participation activities and spaces to vulnerable groups; empowering skills and knowledge on the IDP; adequacy of municipal budget for public participation in the IDP; community trust in the municipality’s ability to deliver; access to information on IDP formulation; community empowerment and consultation; perceptions of inclusion and exclusion in public participation; community commitment to the IDP process and community satisfaction with public participation in the IDP (Addendum G).
The confidential self-administered questionnaires were distributed and collected with the assistance of research assistants. A self-administered survey questionnaire was hand delivered to the respondents (Addendum G). Late in June 2017 the researcher briefed the contact persons in BCMM regarding their roles in facilitating the meetings between the researcher and respondents. After the contact persons in BCMM had facilitated the meetings between the researcher and the respondents, and agreed on the dates and venues with the researcher, the researcher and research assistants distributed and collected the questionnaires after each meeting. The completed questionnaires were collected from the respondents by the researcher after at most 30 minutes. The data were collected over a period of one month. The final questionnaires were self-administered in mid July 2017. Once the final questionnaires had been collected in late July 2017, letters were sent to contact persons in BCMM, as well as to the research assistants acknowledging their assistance with the research.

4.4.4 Focus-group discussions
Maree et al., (2016:95-97) assert that the focus-group discussion assumes that group interaction widens the range of responses, activating forgotten details of experience and releasing inhibitions that otherwise discourage participants from disclosing information (Maree et al., 2016:95). Further to this in focus-group discussions, participants build on each other’s ideas and comments. In this study, this therefore provided an in-depth view not attainable from individual interviews. The choice of this method was informed by Bless et al., (2013:200-201) who maintain that focus-group discussions are a quick and cheap way of collecting data from many participants.

The researcher acknowledges some limitations inherent in using focus-group discussions. Some of these are that: samples are typically small and may not be representative; participants must be able to congregate at the same place at the same time which can be difficult; information collected may be biased through group processes such as domination of the discussions by outspoken individuals (Bless et al., 2013:200-201). Focus-group discussions may also result in groupthink (Maree et al., 2016:97). To overcome these limitations, the researcher made sure that rapport was built with the group members so as to encourage participants to express their views, perceptions and feelings fully and honestly (Maree et al., 2016:97).

A focus-group discussion guide (Addendum I), was developed and questions were formulated from the analysis of survey questionnaire responses (first method of data collection). For this second method of data collection (focus group discussion) respondents (n=40) were purposefully sampled. This selection was informed by the need for further investigation in select
cases that were found to be information-rich, based on the results obtained from analysis of the survey questionnaire.

A focus group discussion guide (Addendum I) was used to provide direction to the discussion. Focus group discussions were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim for thematic analysis of the content. Data management was assisted by the use of a computer programme, NVivo 8. The analysis was further guided by two generic analysis strategies involved in qualitative research (Creswell, 2007:148-154), preparing and organising data and reducing the data to themes. Qualitative data were therefore analysed using a thematic analysis approach whereby rigorous, systematic coding and categorisation of major themes were conducted on the focus group discussions’ transcripts and notes. Creswell (2007:244) describes thematic analysis as “aggregating the information into larger clusters of ideas”. This involved, displaying the coding structures in visual maps to explore how the codes could be grouped together under topic areas or themes to identify possible relationships. The codes were a mix of descriptive categories and higher order concepts from literature explored in Chapters 2 and 3 (Bazeley, 2007:82).

Through an iterative process of coding and condensing the data, recurring themes emerged. First, words or phrases were extracted from transcripts and coded by topic. Some topics included, capital (economic, social, symbolic, cultural), capability of actors, access to public participation spaces, perceptions of domination and network influences, commitment and trust to/in the IDP process, empowering knowledge of IDP processes and information availability for decision-making in the IDP, perceptions of marginalisation and domination and satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process. Thematic tables were constructed to assist with interpreting the data, and to compare findings between participants within each data source (Creswell, 2007:244). Once codes were assigned, they were categorised into broader themes according to frequency.

Sub-themes also emerged in each category and further described the findings in each major theme. Negative case analysis was employed to look for alternative explanations and disconfirming evidence (Creswell, 2007:208). Throughout the analysis, the researcher noted which of the sub-themes were mentioned by participants during focus group discussions of each theme. Sub-themes were also ranked chronologically; it was assumed that a participant’s initial response was first ranked (i.e. most important) and anything mentioned afterwards was given second, then third rank. This established which sub-themes were discussed most prominently during focus group discussions, and therefore which responses could be considered most important to public participation power dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM. Rigour and trustworthiness was enhanced through the following validation strategies described in the literature: (a) debriefing
sessions with participants to test and critique emerging themes and (b) maintaining a reflexive journal throughout the research process which documented the researcher’s analytic reflections and research decisions (Creswell, 2007:207).

4.4.5 Validity and reliability
Reliability refers to the consistency of measures, the extent to which, if the study were repeated, it would give the same results. Reliability is a necessary condition for validity (Maree et al., 2016:239). Several indicators of reliability were observed. These included standard conditions for the administration of the survey questionnaire instrument. A uniform informed consent, introducing and explaining the study, was given to all respondents. Responses were coded and entered into spreadsheets for analysis. Closed-ended items provided greater uniformity of responses and could be more easily statistically processed (Babbie, 2016:249), thereby enhancing objectivity. However, the main shortcoming of closed-ended questions was in the researcher’s structuring of responses, which could have overlooked some important responses. However, care was taken to ensure that response categories provided, were exhaustive to avoid loss of accuracy and variability (Babbie, 2016:249), and respondents were allowed to specify other responses they felt were necessary.

Validity refers to the extent to which a study measures what it claims to measure (Maree et al., 2016:122). Internal validity refers to the extent that extraneous variables that might interfere with the results are controlled (Maree, 2007:216-218). Threats to internal validity such as history, pretesting, instrumentation, subject attrition, maturation and diffusion are mostly to be guarded against. To minimise chances of respondents providing socially acceptable responses rather than truthful ones, respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality. Factor analysis was used to determine construct validity and to ensure that the questionnaire findings had high internal validity. External validity refers to the extent to which findings can be generalised (Babbie, 2016:148-152). It would be possible that questionnaire findings could be generalisable to other municipalities. A pilot study was conducted prior to the main research study to determine whether the methodology, sampling, survey questionnaire instrument and analysis were adequate, and also to establish the appropriateness of language, as well as the reading level of respondents and their understanding of question items on the survey questionnaire instrument (Bless et al., 2013:394).

4.4.6 Reliability of the survey questionnaire instrument
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is mostly used as a measure of internal consistency of an instrument (Cronbach, 1951:297-298). In this study, the reliability of the survey questionnaire instrument was thus determined by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Acceptable values
of alpha range from 0.70 to 0.95 (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011:54). Based on this coefficient, an instrument or its section is considered to be having adequate internal consistency or acceptable reliability if Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is at least 0.70, although values as low as 0.65 are sometimes considered acceptable, but questionable (George and Mallery, 2003:231). A low value of alpha could be suggestive of a low number of questions, poor interrelatedness between items or heterogeneous constructs (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011:54). A maximum alpha value of 0.90 has been recommended (Streiner, 2003:99-103). A high value of alpha (> 0.90) may suggest redundancies and show that the survey questionnaire length should be shortened (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011:54). For the pilot study analysis, a threshold value of 0.70 was adopted. However, reliability estimates of 0.80 were regarded as most appropriate, while values of lower than 0.60 were considered questionable and unacceptable (Maree, 2007:216; Tavakol and Dennick, 2011:54).

The reliability coefficient for the whole instrument was 0.62. This value was lower than the threshold value of 0.70. An analysis of the individual items’ contribution to the reliability coefficient indicated that there were items that were negatively correlated with the rest of the items, while others had very low correlations. The results showed that removal of any one of the items would not result in substantial gain in reliability. However, on reversing those items that were negatively correlated with the rest of the items, resulted in substantial increase in the reliability coefficient to 0.89. This suggests that the instrument has high internal consistency. Hence, based on the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, used to measure internal consistency of the instrument (Cronbach, 1951:297-298), feedback and the researcher’s observation during the pilot study, adjustments were made to the final questionnaire. A number of questions were eliminated, for example, after observations were made, for example that the wording in question 8, led to respondents answering using either YES or NO. An adjustment was made to the question to allow respondents to simply specify their experiences. For question 9, the items in that section had a reliability coefficient of 0.69, almost equal to 0.70. Item B91 had the lowest correlation with the rest of the items and removing it would raise the reliability coefficient to 0.89, which is reflective of high internal consistency. Therefore, item B91 was removed from this section.

The reliability coefficient for Question 11 section items was 0.68, which was slightly lower than 0.70 (Addendum G). Item B111 had the lowest correlation with the rest of the items in the section and removing it from this section increased the reliability coefficient to 0.73. These results suggested removing item B111 from this section, as it was responsible for the low internal consistency of question 11 section items.
In question 13, the items in this section had a reliability coefficient of 0.55, which was lower than the normally accepted value of 0.70. Items B137 and B1311 had negative correlations with the rest of the items and removing them from this section increased the reliability coefficient to 0.65 and 0.66, respectively, both lower than 0.70 (Addendum G). However, on reversing these items, the reliability coefficient increased substantially to 0.74. However, this resulted in items B132 and B1310 weakening their correlation with the rest of the items so much that the removal of any one of them would raise the reliability coefficient to 0.81. Due to the resultant weak correlations, both items were removed from the reliability analysis of this section and the results showed a substantial increase in the reliability coefficient to 0.83. These results suggested removing items B132 and B1310 from this section as they did not contribute much to the reliability coefficient.

In section, C of the questionnaire on power dynamics in public participation spaces, the reliability coefficient for question 15 section items was found to be -0.25, which was a clear indication that negatively worded items were seriously influencing the internal consistency of this section (Addendum G). Items C152, C154 and C158 had very weak correlations with the rest of the items in this section while C153, C154, C155, C156 and C158 had negative correlations with the rest of the items. On reversing the items with negative correlations, the reliability coefficient resulted in an increase of the reliability coefficient to 0.12, which was still very low. Removing items with low correlations with the rest of the items, one at a time, did not improve the reliability either. An acceptable reliability was obtained when only items C152, C154 and C154 were kept in the analysis. These gave a reliability coefficient of 0.69, which was close to the 0.70 threshold value. This suggested that items in this section may not have been measuring the same construct and they were subsequently removed from the section.

The reliability coefficient for Question 16 section items was found to be 0.80, which was higher than the normally acceptable value of 0.70. This showed that items on this question were consistent with measuring the same construct or highly correlated constructs. However, item C162 was found to have a weak negative correlation with the rest of the items and C161 had a rather weak correlation with the rest of the items (Addendum G). Removing these items from this section was found to have increased the reliability to 0.86 and 0.81 respectively, while removing both items raised the reliability to 0.91. These results suggested that it was reasonable to remove items C161 and C162 from the section, as they distorted the internal consistency of the items in that section.
Question 17, tested the extent of different stakeholder contribution to shaping of IDP outcomes (Addendum G). The items in this section had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.74, which was reflective of acceptably high internal consistency. While the reliability was high, item C176 was negatively correlated with the rest of the items and removing it raised Cronbach’s alpha coefficient to 0.85. Item C177 had a very weak correlation with the rest of the items and removing it increased the reliability coefficient to 0.89. The results therefore suggested removing item C177 from the section, and keeping C176, as it had a moderate correlation with the items in this section. Pilot study responses also indicated that the wording of question 22, led to respondents answering using either YES or NO. As such, adjustments were made and the question was re-phrased to allow respondents to simply make recommendations.

4.5 ETHICAL ISSUES APPLICABLE TO THIS STUDY

Conducting research with human subjects necessitates that strict ethical standards be maintained at all times. Respondents need to agree voluntarily to participate in a study, without physical or psychological coercion. In this study, the researcher informed respondents of the purpose of the study, how participants were selected and how the results would be handled. The researcher secured informed consent from respondents (Jenkins, 1999:9; Creswell, 2009:89; Fink, 2009:45; Krueger and Casey, 2009:10; Mouton, 2009:42; Henning, Van Rensburg and Smit, 2010:73) by getting respondents to sign an informed consent form (Warren et al., 2013:169-170) (see Addenda E, F and H).

Respondents therefore had a choice to participate, or not (Babbie, 2016:62-63). The participants’ identities were further protected and the researcher assured respondents of strict anonymity and confidentiality (Van Thiel, 2014:155; Babbie, 2016:65). As such respondents’ views were not traced to respondents, since the researcher focused on responses and reported them as themes and statistical data. Data collected for the study was secured, treated in confidence and only made public behind the guise of anonymity (Warren et al., 2013:171-172).

Respondents were furthermore de-briefed, before the survey questionnaire and focus group discussions were conducted (Warren et al., 2013:170). Thus issues of informed consent, privacy, no deception and protection were critically important in this study (Maree et al., 2016:44) (see Addenda, E, F and H). Ethical research principles were strictly adhered to throughout the research process so as to maintain a high standard of work and a high quality of the research study. The information obtained was used only for purposes of this study, and anonymity and confidentiality (see Addenda B, C, E, F and H) of potential research participants or respondents were strictly ensured (Bless et al., 2013:36). Formal approval was also obtained.
from BCMM before the researcher interacted with respondents (Denscombe, 2002:176) (see Addendum D). The researcher, further undertook to make available a copy of the full research report, once approved by the University, to BCMM (see Addenda B and C). The study also maintained academic integrity by acknowledging sources by way of appropriate in text references, using the Harvard referencing method as recommended by the Department of Public Administration and Management at the Free State University. To this end, the researcher fully abided by the ethical protocols of academic research in the social sciences (Neuman, 2011:143-149).

4.6 DATA PROCESSING TECHNIQUES

Data processing comprises a group of operations designed to prepare data for analysis and proper storage. These operations include research design, data organisation, data collection, codebook creation, data entry and checking, data cleaning and editing, and data storage, retention, and destruction. Data processing encompasses the collection, presentation and characterisation of information to assist in both data analysis and the decision making process (Chavda, 2008:293). In this study, data were first edited and coded before they could be analysed so as to detect and correct errors in the responses. Closed ended questions were pre-coded and open-ended questions were grouped together to identify common trends of responses from the respondents.

With the assistance of a statistician from the University of Fort Hare the researcher entered and analysed data using the Statistical Analysis Systems (SAS) Version 9.3. Interviews were transcribed verbatim in the informants’ own words. Qualitative data was processed using NVivo 8 computer software. Qualitative data analysis involved assigning descriptive labels (open codes) to text passages, clustering similar codes and assigning inferential labels or pattern codes (Maree et al., 2016:116). Constant comparison was used by the researcher in determining whether the data segments were in the most appropriate categories and themes. The themes were then interpreted and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and seven.

4.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the research design and methodology used in the study. It further presented the research design, data collection techniques, target population, the study sample, sampling procedures as well as the data analysis techniques used. The mixed-method approach used in the research study was described and motivated. Furthermore, data collection procedures followed in administering the survey questionnaire were described and explained. As with the first data collection method, the second method, the focus group discussions was also discussed in this chapter and motivated. Further to this, the chapter discussed and explained how the reliability of
the survey questionnaire instrument was determined by calculating Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Chapter 4 ended by discussing ethical issues, data collection and the data processing techniques used in the study. In the next chapter, data from sections A and B of the survey questionnaire are presented, analysed and discussed.
Chapter 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (SECTION A AND B)

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents, analyses and discusses data from the survey questionnaire administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). The study results relate to the aim and objectives of the study: to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process, and to explain how the dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. A survey questionnaire (Addendum G) was developed as the first data collection method. For the survey questionnaire 250 respondents (n=250) were purposefully sampled. Section A of the survey questionnaire was informed by the need to capture the demographic data of the respondents. Section B of the survey questionnaire was informed by the need to explore the nature and extent of public participation dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM. Only data from sections A and B of the survey questionnaire are presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter.

5.2 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

A descriptive analysis indicated that 55% of the respondents were female, and 45% were male. Figure 5.1 shows that the highest percentage of participants in this study was in the age group 36 to 45 years, constituting 34.2% of the respondents. This was followed by participants in the 46 to 55 years age group, who constituted 32%. The 26 to 35 years age group constituted 21.8%, while those over 55 years made up 10.2%. Of the participants who took part in this study only 1.8% were below the 26 years age group.

Figure 5.1: Distribution of participants by age group

Figure 5.2: Distribution of participants by education level

Figure 5.2 shows that the highest percentage of respondents in this study, 38.1% only had secondary education as their highest academic qualification. Those with college education
constituted 31.4%. In this study, 22% of the participants had university education. Only 2.7% of the respondents had primary level education as their highest qualification.

Figure 5.3 shows that the majority of participants in this study, constituting 33.5% of the respondents were ward committee members. Community stakeholders constituted 33% of the respondents, ward councillors, 16.3% and IDP representative forum members constituted 15.9% of the respondents. Out of the 229 participants (representing a response rate of 91.6%) who responded to the survey questionnaire, 1.3% indicated that their designation fell under, other. These were mostly PR councillors, who indicated a willingness to participate in the study, since they also worked closely with some wards in BCMM.

5.3 ANALYSIS OF NON-ITEM VARIABLES OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Questions 6, 7 and 14, in section B of the survey questionnaire were about whether public participation supports the IDP process, evaluation of functioning of ward committees and satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process. The frequency distributions are presented in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.

Section B of the survey questionnaire sought to solicit respondents’ views on the nature and extent of public participation dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM (Addendum G). Question 6 solicited respondents’ opinions on whether in their view/perception public participation supports the IDP process. The majority of the participants in the study, 82% responded in the affirmative, suggesting that indeed, public participation in their opinion supported the IDP.
process. However, 18% of the respondents were of the view that public participation does not support the IDP process. Question 7 of the survey questionnaire elicited participants’ views regarding their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the functioning of ward committees in BCMM. The results in Figure 5.4 indicate that the majority of respondents, 44% found the functioning of ward committees satisfactory. Out of the 64% who were satisfied with ward committee functioning, 20% indicated that they were over satisfied (more than satisfied, indicating that ward committees do more than is expected), while 44% were just satisfied (indicating that ward committees do what is expected of them).

Question 14 of the survey questionnaire elicited participants’ views to establish their satisfaction with public participation in the IDP in BCMM. The results in Figure 5.5 show that the majority of respondents, 55% were not satisfied with public participation in the IDP. Only 46% indicated that they were satisfied. It would thus be interesting to further find out the reasons for this disparity in satisfaction with public participation in the IDP.

5.4 ANALYSIS OF ITEM VARIABLES OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
This section analyses item variables of the survey questionnaire. In this section only section B questions (questions 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13) which sought to solicit participants’ views on the nature and extent of public participation dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM are presented and analysed.
Question 9 solicited participants’ views on the extent to which the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of ward committees and IDP representative forum members, in items B91 and B92 respectively (Addendum G). The results indicate that nearly four out of ten respondents agree that the municipal council considers the recommendations of ward committees (37.1% and 6.3%, cumulatively constituting 43.4%) (Figure 5.6 B91). Most of the respondents, 56% (39.9% and 15.9% cumulatively) (Figure 5.6 B92) were similarly in agreement that the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of the IDP representative forum when making decisions on the IDP programmes or projects.

The results in Figure 5.6 however, also indicate that, 56.6% (13.1%, 20.4%) and 23.1% cumulatively) (Figure 5.6 B91) of the respondents were either in disagreement or neutral with the view that the municipal council takes into account recommendations of ward committees. Similarly, a sizeable number amongst the respondents, constituting 44.6%, (6%, 17% and 21.6% cumulatively) (Figure 5.6 B92) were either in disagreement or neutral with the view that the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of the IDP representative forum when making decisions on the IDP programmes or projects. Given that still 55.4% (39.9% and 14.4% cumulatively) (Figure 5.6 B92) of the respondents were in agreement with the foregoing view, this finding can be interpreted as being indicative of the mixed views of respondents on the commitment of BCMM to take heed of the voices of some important stakeholders (IDP
representative forums) during public participation in the IDP. It would thus be interesting to further find out whether there are any associations between public participation supporting the IDP and Section B, items B91 and B92 (Table 5.7) related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No opinion</th>
<th>Very exclusive</th>
<th>Exclusive</th>
<th>Inclusive</th>
<th>Very inclusive</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>17 (7.8)</td>
<td>16 (7.3)</td>
<td>30 (13.7)</td>
<td>109 (49.8)</td>
<td>47 (21.5)</td>
<td>8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>18 (8.6)</td>
<td>23 (11.0)</td>
<td>45 (21.5)</td>
<td>74 (35.4)</td>
<td>49 (23.4)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28 (13.6)</td>
<td>46 (20.8)</td>
<td>46 (22.3)</td>
<td>25 (12.1)</td>
<td>21#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>11 (5.2)</td>
<td>19 (9.0)</td>
<td>26 (12.3)</td>
<td>103 (48.6)</td>
<td>53 (25.0)</td>
<td>15*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*inclusive #exclusive

Figure 5.7: Frequency distribution for inclusivity of public participation spaces for vulnerable groups (Question 10)

Question 10 sought respondents’ opinions on the inclusivity of public participation activities and spaces to vulnerable groups (Addendum G). The results shown in Figure 5.7 indicate that the majority of respondents were of the view that public participation in BCMM, was inclusive and very inclusive of the following vulnerable groups: youths, 73.6% (48.6% and 25% cumulatively); disabled 33.4% (22.3% and 12.1% cumulatively); the poor, 58.8% (35.4% and 23.4% cumulatively) and women, 71.3% (49.8% and 21.5% cumulatively). However, Figure 5.7 worryingly shows that 65.6% (11.2%, 13.6% and 40.8% cumulatively) of the respondents were of the view that public participation activities and spaces were exclusive and very exclusive of the disabled members of the community or simply had no opinion.
Question 11 sought to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP process (Addendum G). The question was made up of four items addressing sufficiency of skills and knowledge for enabling the public to make inputs into the IDP, perceptions of municipal council losing decision making power to residents (municipal council officials’ insecurity), public interest in participating in the IDP and the adequacy of municipal budget for public participation. The results show that the majority of the respondents (62.6% (40.4% and 22.2% cumulatively) felt that the public had insufficient skills and knowledge to empower them to make valuable inputs into the IDP (Figure 5.8 item B111). Out of the 221 respondents who responded to Section B, question 112, only 38.5% (29.9% and 8.6% cumulatively) were of the view that public participation in the IDP results in municipal council officials feeling insecure, due to perceptions of losing decision-making authority to municipal residents. Of the 223 respondents who responded to item (Figure 5.8 item B113) 59.2% (22% and 37.2% cumulatively) were of the view that there was high public interest in participating in the IDP process and 59.4% (40.2% and 19.2% cumulatively) were of the belief that the municipality adequately budgets for the public participation in the IDP process (Figure 5.8 item B114).
Question 12 measured the nature of public participation power dynamics in the IDP. It had four items addressing issues of community trust in the municipal council’s ability to deliver service, education and literacy of community members as a determining factor for understanding IDP documentation, influences of cultural beliefs and practices (customs) on public participation and accessibility of IDP information to residents (Addendum G). The results in Figure 5.9, item B121 shows that the majority of the participants (50.9%) (29.7% and 21.2% cumulatively) feel that there is community trust in the municipal council’s ability to deliver services. Similarly, the majority of the respondents (38.5% and 28.5% cumulatively) indicated that low literacy levels (67%) limit communities’ ability to participate in the IDP process (Figure 5.9 item B122). Out of the 218 respondents, who responded to item B123, 61% (44.5% and 16.5% cumulatively) were of the view that customs (cultural beliefs and practices) influenced one’s public participation in the IDP and 74% (48.4% and 25.6% cumulatively) of those who responded to
item B124, felt that lack of access to IDP formulation information restricts participants’ ability to shape IDP outcomes (projects/programmes) responsive to community needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<th>A</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>Missing</th>
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<td>23 (10.2)</td>
<td>49 (21.8)</td>
<td>32 (14.2)</td>
<td>81 (36.0)*</td>
<td>40 (17.8)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>44 (19.9)</td>
<td>31 (14.0)</td>
<td>91 (41.2)*</td>
<td>44 (19.9)*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B133</td>
<td>12 (5.4)</td>
<td>37 (16.7)</td>
<td>33 (14.9)</td>
<td>91 (41.0)*</td>
<td>49 (22.1)*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B134</td>
<td>9 (4.1)</td>
<td>30 (13.6)</td>
<td>26 (11.8)</td>
<td>91 (41.2)*</td>
<td>65 (29.4)*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B135</td>
<td>18 (8.0)</td>
<td>27 (12.1)</td>
<td>43 (19.2)</td>
<td>85 (38.0)*</td>
<td>51 (22.8)*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B136</td>
<td>21 (9.5)</td>
<td>40 (18.1)</td>
<td>35 (15.8)</td>
<td>80 (36.2)*</td>
<td>45 (20.4)*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B137</td>
<td>13 (5.9)</td>
<td>40 (18.3)</td>
<td>32 (14.6)</td>
<td>84 (38.4)*</td>
<td>50 (22.8)*</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B138</td>
<td>7 (3.2)</td>
<td>41 (18.5)</td>
<td>27 (12.2)</td>
<td>92 (41.4)*</td>
<td>55 (24.8)*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B139</td>
<td>24 (10.8)</td>
<td>41 (18.4)</td>
<td>26 (11.7)</td>
<td>76 (34.1)*</td>
<td>56 (25.1)*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*inclusive

Figure 5.10: Frequency distribution for the nature of public participation power dynamics in the IDP (Question 13 items B131-B139)

Question 13 measured the nature of public participation power dynamics in the IDP. It consisted of nine items addressing issues to do with the municipal council ‘empowering’ the community through empowerment in decision-making, sufficiency of municipal council consultation with stakeholders and interest groups in the IDP, trust in municipal council including issues raised by the community in the IDP, trust in the ward councillor recommending issues raised by the community to the municipal council for inclusion in the IDP, and ward committees’ ability to voice community needs respectively (Addendum G). This question further addressed issues to do with the IDP process domination by the privileged, neutrality of ward committees, community commitment to the IDP process and public participation in the IDP as tokenistic and simply practised as compliance with legislative requirements. The majority of the participants
agree on all the items: (B131–53.8% (36% and 17.8% cumulatively); B132–61.1% (41.2% and 19.9% cumulatively); B133–63.1% (41% and 22.1% cumulatively); B134–70.6% (41.2% and 29.4% cumulatively); B135–60.8% (38% and 22.8% cumulatively); B136–56.6% (36.2% and 20.4% cumulatively); B137–61.2% (38.4% and 22.8% cumulatively); B138–66.2% (41.4% and 24.8% cumulatively); B139–59.2% (34.1% and 25.1% cumulatively) (Figure 5.10). These results suggest that the respondents believe that the municipality affords them decision-making power and that the municipal council consults sufficiently with key stakeholders and interest groups during the IDP process. The results further indicate that generally speaking, the respondents had trust in the municipal council, ward councillor and ward committee members. There was however, a perception that the IDP process is dominated by a few committee members (Figure 5.10 item B136) and that public participation in the IDP is tokenistic and is mostly done for compliance purposes with legislative precincts of local government (Figure 5.10 item B139).

5.5 DATA REDUCTION

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is a commonly used quantitative methodology in the social sciences for data reduction (Osborne, 2015:1). It examines all the pairwise relationships between individual variables (items on a scale) and extracts latent factors from the measured variables (Osborne, 2015:1). Item Response Theory models assume a unidimensional latent structure (Finch, 2006:39). Factor analytic algorithms load matrices, which link items with factors. The interpretation of the loadings occur after they have been rotated in order to amplify the presence of simple structure (Finch, 2006:39). Simple structure for a given item refers to the situation where factor loadings are either very large, suggesting a clear relationship between the item and factor, or very small, suggesting no relationship at all between the item and factor (Finch, 2006:39). Simple structure therefore refers to a condition in which variables load near 1 (in absolute value) or near 0 on an eigenvector (factor). Variables that load near 1 are clearly important in the interpretation of the factor, and variables that load near 0 are clearly unimportant. Simple structure thus simplifies the task of interpreting factors (Bryant and Yarnold, 1995:132-133). Collectively, then a set of items exhibits a simple structure when each factor has a few items with high loadings and the rest with loadings near 0.

Rotation involves a transformation of the initial factor loadings so that a more simple structure is obtained, thus creating a more interpretable solution (Finch, 2006:39). McDonald (1985:40) defines rotation as “performing arithmetic to obtain a new set of factor loadings (v-f regression weight) from a given set”. Bryant and Yarnold (1995:132) define it as “a procedure in which eigenvectors (factors) are rotated in an attempt to achieve simple structure”. Unrotated results
from factor analysis are sometimes not easy to interpret, hence the need to rotate initial factor solutions.

As such in this study, rotation helped the researcher clarify and simplify the results of factor analysis (Osborne, 2015:3). Rotation methods fall into two broad categories: orthogonal and oblique (Osborne, 2015:4). Orthogonal rotations make the assumption that factors are uncorrelated, and produce a rotated loading matrix (Finch, 2006:39; Osborne, 2015:4). Within each type of factor rotation, there are a number of alternative methods. Varimax rotation is by far the most orthogonal rotation (Finch, 2006:39; Tabachnick and Fiddell 2007:646; Osborne, 2015:5).

In relation to this study, in total the survey questionnaire had 38 items and each item represented a variable. Statistical analyses of all these variables could be a tedious exercise. Therefore, the first step of the analysis was to try to reduce the number of variables. For the purposes of onward analysis, a data reduction exercise was carried out with the hope of reducing the items to a manageable number. Factor analysis was carried on the 17 items in Section B of the questionnaire and the 21 items in Section C, separately (Addendum G). The analysis identified one factor from Section B and two factors from Section C. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability was calculated for each of the resultant factors. A factor was considered as reliable if the reliability coefficient was at least 70%. Based on this data reduction exercise three factors, one from Section B and two from Section C presented in Chapter 6, were identified. The results of the factor analysis for Section B of the survey questionnaire are presented in the Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Varimax rotated factor loadings for Section B items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor1</th>
<th>Factor2</th>
<th>Factor3</th>
<th>Factor4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B133</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B134</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B135</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B121</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B131</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B138</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B132</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B137</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B123</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B122</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B124</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cronbach's alpha | 0.84 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.11 |

Table 5.1 shows the factor analysis solution for the items in Section B of the survey questionnaire. Only factor 1 (α=0.84) (Items B121; 131-135; 137; 138) has a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient greater than 70%. As such, this factor was the only one considered to be reliably measuring a single construct. This factor can be called the nature of the public participation spaces factor. This factor is mostly composed of the items from Question 13 which is about the nature of public participation spaces (i.e., 121–community trust, 131–community empowerment, 132–municipal council consulting with stakeholders, 133–trust in the municipal council including issues raised by the community in the IDP, 134–trust in the ward councillor recommending community issues to council for inclusion in the IDP, 135–trust in ward committees’ ability to voice community needs, 137–belief in ward committees as neutral conveyors of public interests, and 138–residents commitment to participating in the IDP process. The rest of the factors in Table 5.1 had low reliability coefficients which suggests that they do not reliably measure single constructs. Consequently, in all onward analysis, the items forming those factors were treated as individual stand-alone variables.

5.6 TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF ASSOCIATIONS

The Pearson’s chi-squared test for independence was used for testing for significance of associations. Where significant associations were detected, the direction and strength of the
associations were assessed using odds ratios and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals. This was meant to answer Objective 2 of the study which sought to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP process. The corresponding frequency distribution tables are given on the EXCEL workbook of output.

5.6.1 Associations with demographic variables
The associations between the demographic variables (Addendum G, Section A, questions 1-4) and each of the variables B14, B6, B7 (Addendum G, Section B), were carried out, in that order. The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 5.2 to 5.6.

Table 5.2: Distribution of satisfaction with public participation in the IDP (Section B, question 14) by biographical variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Satisfied (n; %)</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Females 51 (42.9)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2909</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.76 ; 2.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males 50 (50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Under 36yrs 16 (30.7)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.0746</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.13 ; 0.97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs 38 (51.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 2.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs 34 (48.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.28 ; 1.88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs 13 (56.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary 48 (53.9)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.3702</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>(0.88 ; 3.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET 35 (42.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(0.56 ; 2.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University 18 (39.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ward Councillor 21 (60.0)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2907</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>(1.08 ; 5.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee 37 (49.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>(0.78 ; 2.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep 14 (40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.45 ; 2.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Rep 30 (39.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

5.6.2 Satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process
The chi-squared test statistic value and the corresponding p-values are given in Table 5.2. The results show that the participants' satisfaction with public participation in the IDP has no significant associations with gender \((\chi^2 = 1.1; \ p = 0.2909)\), age \((\chi^2 = 6.9; \ p = 0.0746)\), educational level \((\chi^2 = 4.3; \ p = 0.3702)\) and position \((\chi^2 = 5.0; \ p = 0.2907)\). This suggests that satisfaction with public participation does not depend on demographic characteristics of respondents. It should be noted that all the p-values for the tests are greater than 5%, the significance level used in this analysis. All the 95%
confidence intervals of the odds ratios contain 1, which means at a 95% level of confidence, all the associations are not statistically significant.

Table 5.3: Distribution of opinions on public participation supporting the IDP process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes (n; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Females $^R$</td>
<td>97 (78.9)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5110</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.65 ; 2.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>84 (82.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Under 36yrs</td>
<td>42 (79.3)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.4838</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.42 ; 4.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs</td>
<td>60 (77.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(0.42 ; 3.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs</td>
<td>62 (86.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>(0.70 ; 6.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs$^R$</td>
<td>17 (73.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>73 (80.2)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7256</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.44 ; 2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET</td>
<td>67 (80.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.44 ; 2.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University$^R$</td>
<td>39 (79.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ward Councilor</td>
<td>34 (91.9)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.0245</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(0.52 ; 7.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>57 (75.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep</td>
<td>24 (66.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.16 ; 1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Rep$^R$</td>
<td>66 (84.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reference category

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

5.6.3 Public participation as a support of IDP process

The results in Table 5.4 are similar to Table 5.3, that is just the same as the ones in the previous table. All the p-values are greater than 5% and all 95% confidence intervals of the odds ratios contain 1. This shows that the participants’ opinion on whether public participation supports the IDP process have no relationship with gender ($\chi^2 = 0.4 ; p = 0.5110$), age ($\chi^2 = 2.5 ; p = 0.4838$), educational level ($\chi^2 = 2.1 ; p = 0.1245$) and position ($\chi^2 = 9.3 ; p = 0.0245$).
Table 5.4: Distribution of respondents’ satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM (Section B, question 7) by biographical variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Satisfied (n ; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>80 (65.0)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.8374</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.54 ; 1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>65 (63.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Under 36yrs</td>
<td>28 (52.8)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.0764</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.06 ; 0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs</td>
<td>49 (63.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs</td>
<td>49 (68.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.14 ; 1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs</td>
<td>19 (82.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>69 (75.8)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.0067</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>(1.44 ; 6.29)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET</td>
<td>49 (59.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.68 ; 2.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>25 (51.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ward Councillor</td>
<td>26 (70.3)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>(0.98 ; 5.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>63 (82.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>(2.30 ; 10.20)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep</td>
<td>18 (50.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.42 ; 2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Rep</td>
<td>39 (50.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

5.6.4 Satisfaction with functioning of ward committees

The results in Table 5.4 show that satisfaction with the functioning of the ward committees does not depend on gender ($\chi^2 = 0.04 ; p = 0.8374$), age ($\chi^2 = 6.9 ; p = 0.0764$) but, it significantly depends on the educational level ($\chi^2 = 10.0 ; p = 0.0067$) and position ($\chi^2 = 22.2 ; p = 0.0001$) of the participant. The odds ratio estimates show that those with up to secondary education are more likely to be satisfied with the functioning of the ward committees, compared to those with post-secondary education (FET and university). The odds ratio for secondary education is 3.0, which means those with up to secondary education are three times as likely to be satisfied with ward committees than those with higher educational level. In the case of position, the odds ratios show that ward councillors are as likely to be satisfied with ward committees as are IDP representatives and community stakeholders and these are less likely to be satisfied compared to ward committee members. Ward committee members are 4.8 times as likely to be satisfied as the rest of the other positions (Table 5.4).

5.7 ASSOCIATIONS WITH DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

The Mann-Whitney U test is a commonly used non-parametric statistical test (Nachar, 2008:14). The test was independently worked out by Mann and Whitney (1947) and Wilcoxon (1945). The method is thus often called the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test or the Wilcoxon sum of rank
test (Nachar, 2008:14). The test compares two independent groups that do not require large normally distributed samples (Nachar, 2008:13).

In this study, the Mann-Whitney U test enabled the researcher to answer questions concerning the difference of factor variables across the categories of the binary variables, namely, gender. The advantage was that, this test is useful when the measured variables are of ordinal type and are recorded with an arbitrary and not very precise scale (Nachar, 2008:13). The Mann-Whitney U test implies the calculation of a U statistic for each group. U equations can be understood as the number of times observations in one sample precede or follow observations in the other sample when all the scores from one group are placed in ascending order (Nachar, 2008:16-17). If each group includes more than eight observations, the sample’s distribution gradually approaches a normal distribution.

Thus, the Mann-Whitney U test is used when the conditions of normality are neither met nor realisable by transformations. It is also one of the most powerful non-parametric tests, where the statistical power corresponds to the probability of rejecting a null hypothesis. This test, thus, has good probabilities of providing statistically significant results when the alternative hypothesis applies to measured reality (Nachar, 2008:19). As noted by Nachar (2008:19) the Mann-Whitney U test is less at risk to give a wrongful significant result when there is presence of one or two extreme values in the sample under investigation. The Mann-Whitney U test is strictly a nonparametric test that is a modification of the Wilcoxon W test. Statistical inference theory showed that the test statistic U is approximately normally distributed for large samples (> 30) (Beller, Julien and Hanley, 2010:1). The sample sizes in this study were acceptably large (n=229 final sample size for survey questionnaire) and therefore the normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test was used throughout this study, instead of the Mann-Whitney U. The normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test is based on the Z statistic, hence the use of the Z score in the results.

The Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared test was used for comparing the factor variables across the categories of variables with more than two categories. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric analogue of a one-way ANOVA, which does not make assumptions about normality (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952:583-621; Van Hecke, 2012:242). The Kruskal-Wallis test was used for comparing nature of public participation in the IDP spaces, scores across age groups, educational levels and positions. The Mann-Whitney U and Kruskal-Wallis tests were chosen as the most appropriate methods for comparing the factor variables because these methods do not make any distributional assumptions about the factor variables. This choice was made after the
Shapiro-Wilk’s test for normality had shown that all factor variables in this study were not normally distributed, a central assumption for the appropriateness of the parametric tests.

Table 5.5: Comparisons of the nature of public participation spaces in the IDP (Factor 1) scores across categories of biographical characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (se)</th>
<th>Mean rank</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3.5 (0.074)</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3.6 (0.083)</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Under 36yrs</td>
<td>3.4 (0.080)</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.5098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs</td>
<td>3.6 (0.113)</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs</td>
<td>3.5 (0.097)</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs</td>
<td>3.7 (0.142)</td>
<td>120.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3.8 (0.085)</td>
<td>129.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET</td>
<td>3.4 (0.091)</td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>3.3 (0.112)</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ward Councillor</td>
<td>3.8 (0.122)</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>3.8 (0.097)</td>
<td>134.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep</td>
<td>3.1 (0.120)</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Stak</td>
<td>3.3 (0.087)</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

The normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test was used to test if the nature of the public participation spaces factor (Addendum G: Section B: Question 12 item B121 and Question 13 items 131, 132-135, 137, 138 - Factor, 1) was dependent on gender (Section A: Question 2) and the results show that public participation in the IDP spaces does not depend on gender (Z=0.4 ; p=0.7135) (Table 5.5). The results also suggest that the nature of public participation spaces in the IDP spaces, (Addendum G: Section B: Question 12 item B121 and Question 13 items 131, 132-135, 137, 138- Factor, 1) scores are not significantly different across age groups (KW=2.3 ; p=5098), but are significantly different across educational levels (KW=12.2; p=0.0023) and positions (KW=30.2 ; p<0.0001) (Table 5.5). The differences are such that those with at most secondary school education have higher public participation in the IDP scores, than those with a college certificate who, in turn, have higher scores, than those with university education (Section A: Question 3). This suggests that public participation in the IDP scores appears to decrease with increased level of education. With respect to designation, the differences are such that the Ward councillors have the highest public participation in the IDP scores followed by the ward committee members then the community stakeholders and lastly, the IDP representative forum (Section A: Question 4).
Table 5.6: Comparisons of the nature of public participation spaces in the IDP (Factor 1) scores across categories of public participation variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Section &amp; question</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (se)</th>
<th>Mean rank</th>
<th>Mann-Whitney Z</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3.6 (0.058)</td>
<td>123.4</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.0 (0.125)</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>3.8 (0.058)</td>
<td>135.3</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3.0 (0.089)</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B14</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>3.9 (0.065)</td>
<td>144.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3.2 (0.072)</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Public participation supporting the IDP B6; Satisfaction with ward committee function in BCMM (Section B, question 7); and satisfaction with own participation in the IDP in BCMM (Section B, question 14).

The Mann-Whitney normal approximation was used to test for differences in FB scores across the categories of questions B6, B7, and B14. The results are depicted in Table 5.6 and they show that FB scores are different for all the variables. The YES category of public participation supporting the IDP process (Section B, question 6) scored significantly higher than NO (Z=-4.6 ; p<0.0001). The SATISFIED category of functioning of ward committees in BCMM (Section B, question 7) scored significantly higher than the DISSATISFIED (Z=-6.7 ; p<0.0001) and the same applies to satisfaction with public participation in the IDP (Section B, question 14) (Z=7.3 ; p<0.0001), while the YES category scored higher on the nature of public participation spaces in the IDP (Factor 1) across categories of public participation variables than NO (Section B, question 14).

5.8 ITEMS RELATED TO THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION DYNAMICS

Table 5.7 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between opinion on whether public participation supports the IDP process and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire.
Table 5.7: Associations between public participation supporting the IDP (Question B6) and items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Section &amp; Item</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>YES (n ; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B91</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>55 (68.8)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.07 ; 0.43)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>37 (72.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.08 ; 0.56)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>89 (92.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.62)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B92</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>39 (66.1)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.10 ; 0.48)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>33 (70.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.62)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>109 (90.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.62)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B111</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>31 (68.9)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.1124</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.23 ; 1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>35 (85.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.50 ; 3.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>115 (81.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 1.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B112</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>84 (87.5)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.0289</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>(0.98 ; 4.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>32 (69.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 1.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>115 (81.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 1.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B113</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>118 (86.8)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>(1.56 ; 6.58)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>20 (74.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.51 ; 3.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>43 (67.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.15 ; 0.82)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B114</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>34 (64.2)</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.51)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>32 (72.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.15 ; 0.82)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>115 (88.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.15 ; 0.82)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B122</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>46 (86.8)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.2843</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>(0.75 ; 4.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19 (73.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.29 ; 1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>116 (78.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.29 ; 1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B123</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>48 (73.8)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.2459</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.27 ; 1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>22 (75.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>111 (83.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B124</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>29 (70.7)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.2278</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>16 (76.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.23 ; 2.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>136 (82.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.23 ; 2.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B136</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>51 (76.1)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6567</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.37 ; 1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>29 (82.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.43 ; 3.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>101 (80.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.43 ; 3.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B139</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>62 (89.9)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0422</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>(1.23 ; 7.08)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>20 (76.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.41 ; 3.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>99 (75.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.41 ; 3.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Ward committee recommendation B91; IDP representative forum recommendations B92; skills and knowledge B111; fears of municipal council officials losing decision-making power (B112); local community interest in IDP process (B113); adequate budgets availability for public participation in the IDP (B114); education and literacy levels (B122); cultural beliefs
and practices (B123); access to information on IDP (B124); public participation dominance in the IDP (B136) and Public participation tokenistic, compliance with laws (B139).

Statistically significant associations were detected for items B91–Consideration of ward committee recommendations by the municipal council for input into the IDP ($\chi^2 = 17.6; p = 0.0001$), B92–Consideration of IDP representative forum recommendations when making decisions on IDP programmes or projects ($\chi^2 = 17.4; p = 0.0002$), B112–Perceptions of insecurity by municipal officials, who fear losing decision-making power to municipal residents ($\chi^2 = 7.1; p = 0.0289$), B113–local community interest in participating in the IDP ($\chi^2 = 10.9; p = 0.0042$), B114–Adequacy of budgets for supporting public participation in the IDP process ($\chi^2 = 15.4; p = 0.0004$) and B139–Public participation as tokenism, done to comply with local government laws and regulations level ($\chi^2 = 6.3; p = 0.0422$) (Table 5.7).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, shown in Table 5.7 suggest that the associations between opinion on whether public participation supports the IDP process and Section B, items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics are such that those who disagree or have a neutral opinion concerning consideration of ward committee recommendations by the municipal council for inclusion into the IDP are less likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree with the perceptions that public participation makes municipal officials insecure, fearing losing decision-making power to municipal residents are more likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree or have a neutral opinion concerning local community interest in participating in the IDP are less likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree with the opinion that public participation is tokenistic and is only done to comply with local government laws and regulations are more likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process compared to those who agree or are neutral.
Table 5.8: Associations between satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM (Question B7) and items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Section &amp; item</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SATISFIED (n; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B91</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>38 (47.5)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.18 ; 0.58)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>30 (58.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.27 ; 0.99)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>78 (81.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B92</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27 (45.7)</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.22 ; 0.74)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>28 (59.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.36 ; 1.29)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91 (75.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B111</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28 (62.2)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.0562</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.48 ; 1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>33 (80.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(0.93 ; 3.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>85 (60.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B112</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>67 (69.8)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.3006</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.79 ; 2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>29 (63.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.67 ; 2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>50 (58.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B113</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>92 (67.7)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3948</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(0.71 ; 2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17 (63.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.58 ; 3.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>37 (57.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B114</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>29 (54.7)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.0315</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.41 ; 1.37)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (54.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.31 ; 1.13)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>93 (71.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B122</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>34 (64.2)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.1666</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.71 ; 2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>21 (80.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>(0.86 ; 4.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91 (61.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B123</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>40 (61.5)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3714</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.52 ; 1.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>22 (75.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.60 ; 2.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>84 (63.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B124</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>30 (73.2)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4250</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>(0.88 ; 3.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>13 (61.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.45 ; 2.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>103 (62.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B136</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>44 (65.7)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7673</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(1.60 ; 1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (68.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.49 ; 2.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>78 (62.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B139</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56 (81.2)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(1.16 ; 3.56)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17 (65.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>(0.68 ; 3.31)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>73 (55.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Ward committee recommendation (B91); IDP representative forum recommendation (B92); skills and knowledge (B111); fears of municipal council officials losing decision-making power (B112); local community interest in IDP process (B113); resource availability for public participation in the IDP (B114); education and literacy levels (B122); cultural beliefs and
practices (B123); Access to information on IDP (B124); Public participation dominance in the IDP (B136) and Public participation tokenistic, compliance with laws (B139) (Table 5.8).

Table 5.8 depicts the results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM (Section B, question 7) and Section B stand-alone items of the survey questionnaire (Addendum G). Statistically significant associations were detected for items B91–Consideration of ward committee recommendations by the municipal council for input into the IDP level \((\chi^2 = 22.5; p = 0.0001)\). B92–Consideration of IDP representative forum recommendations when making decisions on IDP programmes or projects level \((\chi^2 = 15.6; p = 0.0004)\), B114–Municipality adequately budgeting or public participation in the IDP process \((\chi^2 = 6.9; p = 0.0315)\) and B139–Public participation as tokenistic, and only done to comply with local government laws and regulations level \((\chi^2 = 13.2; p = 0.0014)\).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, (Table 5.8) suggest that the associations between satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM (Section B, question 7) and Section B stand-alone items are such that those who disagree or have a neutral opinion concerning consideration of ward committee recommendations by the municipal council for input into the IDP are less likely to be satisfied with the functioning of ward committees, compared to those who agree. Those who disagree that IDP representative forum recommendations are considered in the IDP when making decisions on IDP programmes or projects are less likely to be satisfied with ward committee functioning compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree that public participation is tokenistic, and only done to comply with local government laws and regulations, are more likely to be satisfied with ward committee functioning compared to those who agree or are neutral.
Table 5.9: Associations between satisfaction with public participation in the IDP (Question B14) and items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Section &amp; Item</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SATISFIED (n : %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B91</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>26 (33.8)</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.15 ; 0.53)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15 (30.6)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.12 ; 0.52)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>61 (64.2)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B92</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>16 (27.6)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.12 ; 0.48)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13 (29.6)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.13 ; 0.56)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>73 (61.3)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B111</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17 (40.5)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.48 ; 1.98)*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>28 (70.0)</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>(1.58 ; 7.15)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>57 (41.0)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B112</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>46 (50.0)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6251</td>
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<td>(0.72 ; 2.35)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19 (43.2)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.47 ; 2.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>37 (43.5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B113</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>69 (51.9)</td>
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<td>0.0789</td>
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<td>(0.87 ; 2.94)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>25 (40.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B114</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17 (32.7)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.18 ; 0.69)*</td>
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<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11 (26.2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.12 ; 0.55)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>74 (58.3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B122</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27 (51.9)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3644</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>(0.77 ; 2.75)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>14 (53.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>(0.68 ; 3.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>61 (42.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B123</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>26 (40.6)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.4141</td>
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<td>(0.42 ; 1.42)</td>
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<td>16 (55.2)</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.62 ; 3.14)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>60 (46.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B124</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19 (47.5)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9410</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.52 ; 2.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>9 (42.9)</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.35 ; 2.18)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>74 (46.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B136</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36 (56.3)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.1071</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>(1.04 ; 3.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17 (48.6)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.66 ; 2.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>49 (40.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B139</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>40 (60.6)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>(1.28 ; 4.32)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11 (42.3)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.47 ; 2.64)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>51 (39.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Ward committee recommendation (B91); IDP representative forum recommendations (B92); Skills and Knowledge (B111); fears of municipal council officials losing decision-making power (B112); local community interest in IDP process (B113); Resource availability for public participation in the IDP (B114); education and literacy levels (B122); cultural beliefs...
and practices (B123); Access to information on IDP (B124); Public participation dominance in the IDP (B136) and Public participation tokenistic, compliance with laws (B139) (Table 5.9).

Table 5.9 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with public participation and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire (Addendum G). Statistically significant associations were detected for items B91–Municipal council consideration of ward committee recommendations \( (\chi^2 = 72.0; \ p = 0.0001) \), B92–Municipal council taking into consideration of IDP representative forum recommendations \( (\chi^2 = 23.0; \ p = 0.0001) \), B111–Insufficient skills and knowledge for empowering the public to make inputs into the IDP, B114–Adequacy of municipal budget for public participation level \( (\chi^2 = 18.0; \ p = 0.0001) \) and B139–Public participation as tokenistic, and only done to comply with local government laws and regulations level \( (\chi^2 = 7.9; \ p = 0.0185) \) (Table 5.9).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, shown in Table 5.9, suggest that the associations between satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who disagree or have a neutral opinion concerning consideration of ward committee recommendations are less likely to be satisfied with public participation in IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree or are neutral that IDP representative forum recommendations are considered in the IDP are less likely to be satisfied with public participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who are neutral with regard to the opinion that the public lacks the requisite skills for meaningful public participation in the IDP process, are more likely to be satisfied with public participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree or disagree. Those who disagree or are neutral that the public lacks interest in the IDP process are less likely to be satisfied with the public participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree that public participation is done for compliance purposes only are more likely to be satisfied with public participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree or are neutral.
Table 5.10: Associations between satisfaction with extent of public participation in the IDP (Question C18) and items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics

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<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
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<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>72 (80.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B92</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>24 (42.9)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.14 ; 0.55)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Neutral</td>
<td>23 (48.9)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.18 ; 0.73)*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>83 (72.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B111</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>(0.39 ; 1.63)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>85 (63.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B112</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>0.9850</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.53 ; 1.80)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.49 ; 2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>85 (63.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B113</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.2764</td>
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<td>(0.45 ; 1.61)</td>
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<td><strong>B114</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>87 (70.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B122</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.3316</td>
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<td>(0.77 ; 2.95)</td>
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<td>80 (56.3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B123</strong></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35 (55.6)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5373</td>
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<td>(0.45 ; 1.52)</td>
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<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6002</td>
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<td>(0.70 ; 2.40)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13 (54.2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.35 ; 2.01)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>75 (58.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Ward committee recommendation (B91); IDP representative forum recommendations (B92); Skills and Knowledge (B111); fears of municipal council officials losing decision-making power (B112); local community interest in IDP process (B113); Resource availability
for public participation in the IDP (B114); education and literacy levels (B122); cultural beliefs and practices (B123); Access to information on IDP (B124); Public participation dominance in the IDP (B136) and Public participation tokenistic, compliance with laws (B139).

Table 5.10 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with own participation in the IDP process and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire (Addendum G). Statistically significant associations were detected for items B91–Municipal council consideration of ward committee recommendations \( (\chi^2 = 20.9; \ p < 0.0001) \), B92–Municipal council taking into consideration recommendations of the IDP representative forum \( (\chi^2 = 17.0; \ p = 0.0002) \), and B114–Adequacy of municipal budget for public participation \( (\chi^2 = 14.2; \ p = 0.0003) \) (Table 5.10).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, as shown in Table 5.10, suggest that the associations between satisfaction with own participation in the IDP process and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who disagree or have a neutral opinion concerning consideration of ward committee recommendations are less likely to be satisfied with own participation in IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree/neutral that IDP representative forum recommendations are considered in the IDP are less likely to be satisfied with own participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree or are neutral that the public lacks interest in the IDP process are less likely to be satisfied with their own participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree. Those who disagree/neutral with the adequancy of municipal budget for public participation are less likely to be satisfied with their own participation in the IDP process compared to those who agree.
Table 5.11: Associations between IDP representative forum influence on IDP outcomes (Question C20) and items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics

<table>
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<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
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<td>0.0058</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.63)*</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>73 (89.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B92</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>34 (65.4)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.58)*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.21 ; 0.38)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>90 (88.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B111</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35 (87.5)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.3337</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>(0.62 ; 4.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>29 (74.0)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.31 ; 1.69)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>96 (80.0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B112</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>71 (82.6)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5545</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.49 ; 2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>29 (74.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.26 ; 1.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>96 (81.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B113</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>99 (80.5)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4458</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>18 (72.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.15 ; 1.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>43 (84.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B114</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33 (70.2)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.1163</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.19 ; 0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>34 (80.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.31 ; 1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>93 (84.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B122</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>41 (82.0)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4517</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.44 ; 2.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17 (70.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.20 ; 1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>102 (81.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B123</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>42 (70.0)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.0127</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.15 ; 0.72)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19 (73.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.14 ; 1.08)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>99 (87.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B124</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28 (73.7)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.2331</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>12 (70.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.16 ; 1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>120 (83.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B136</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>45 (77.6)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.2374</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.29 ; 0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>23 (71.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.19 ; 1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>92 (84.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B139</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>54 (84.4)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4713</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.61 ; 3.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>16 (72.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>90 (79.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

Table 5.11 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between the beliefs that IDP representative forum influences IDP outcomes and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire (Addendum G).
Statistically significant associations were detected for items testing views on the municipal council taking into account the recommendations of the IDP representative forum (Section B, item B92) ($\chi^2 = 11.4 ; p = 0.0033$), municipal council consideration of ward committee recommendations ($\chi^2 = 10.3 ; p = 0.0052$), municipal consideration of IDP representative forum recommendations (Section B, item B92) ($\chi^2 = 11.4 ; p = 0.0033$), and cultural beliefs and practices influencing public participation in the IDP (Section B, item B123) level ($\chi^2 = 8.7 ; p = 0.0127$).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, shown in Table 5.11, suggest that the associations between belief that IDP representative forum influence IDP outcomes and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who disagree that ward committee recommendations are considered in the IDP process are less likely to believe that IDP representative forum influences IDP outcomes compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree or are neutral that IDP representative forum recommendations are considered in the IDP are less likely to believe that IDP representative forum influence IDP outcomes compared to those who agree. Those who disagree that cultural beliefs affect public participation in the IDP process are less likely to believe that the IDP representative forum influences IDP outcomes compared to those who agree or are neutral.

5.9 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The aim of this study was to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP process. The study also aimed to explain how the power dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. Objective 2 of the study was to conduct a survey questionnaire (quantitative method), so as to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM. Objective 3 of the study sought to analyse findings from secondary and primary data in order to gain insights into how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence participants during public participation in the IDP process in BCMM. This section discusses the results from Section B of the survey questionnaire (Addendum G).

5.9.1 Nature of public participation power dynamics in the IDP

The results of the factor analysis for Section B of the survey questionnaire (Table 5.1), indicated that only factor 1 ($\alpha=0.84$) had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient greater than 70%. This factor relates to the nature of the public participation spaces. The factor included issues of community trust in the municipal council, in ward councillors and in ward committees (Items B13.3, 13.4
and 13.5). It also included issues of community empowerment and decision-making in public participation spaces, community commitment to public participation in the IDP, public participation as a space for the municipal council to consult with stakeholders and ward committees as public participation spaces for articulating public interest.

The results (Figure 5.9 item B121) showed that approximately 51% (29.7% and 21.2% cumulatively) of the respondents trust the municipal council’s ability to deliver services. On whether the municipal council empowers the community by transferring decision-making power to municipal residents, the results portray a mixed view (Figure 5.10 item B131). While 53.8% (36% and 17.8% cumulatively) were of the view that municipal residents are empowered, a sizable percentage constituting 46.2% (10.2%, 21.8% and 14.2% cumulatively) did not view it that way or were just neutral. A majority of the respondents, 61.1% (41.2% and 19.9% cumulatively) were of the view that the municipal council consults sufficiently with key stakeholders and interest groups during public participation in the IDP (Figure 5.10 item B132).

Although these findings were unexpected, they are not surprising, and they may suggest that the local party branches (ANC, DA and EFF in the case of BCMM) animate collective and social life that allows for residents’ expression of local needs, which then gets channelled into participatory structures of the municipality.

The findings are however inconsistent with recent actions of sporadic community protests in BCMM, given that protest actions were mostly related to various grievances over unmet expectations. In her study on community protests in Duncan village in BCMM Ndlovu, (2015:105) concluded that protests were a form of community continued challenge to forms of exclusion and a fight for realising the promises of democracy. Similarly, Mukwedeya and Ndlovu (2017:108) found out that most concerns raised during protests revolved around issues of service delivery, such as access to housing, water and electricity, amongst others, hence their characterisation as service delivery protests regardless of their cause or nature (SALGA, 2017:11). Within BCMM precinct, East London and particularly Duncan village informal settlement is a hotspot for service delivery protest. Duncan village experiences at least one protest every two weeks (BCMM 2013/14 Public Order Policing report cited in Mukwedeya and Ndlovu, 2017:110).

As such, the finding that the majority of the respondents, (61.1%) (41.2% and 19.9% cumulatively) were of the perception that the municipal council consults sufficiently with key stakeholders and interest groups during public participation in the IDP (Figure 5.10 item B132) may in actual fact be resonating with the concept of the ‘political society’ (Bénit-Gbaffou,
Many residents whose lives can at least partly be characterised by informality (informal settlements in BCMM) constitute the ‘political society’ engaging the municipal council, and holding the perception that the municipal council ‘consults’ sufficiently with key stakeholders and interest groups during public participation in the IDP for access to municipal resources. For accessing resources the local politician, ward councillors and municipal officials can constantly be engaged. Within this concept of ‘political society’ the poor’s (the majority of the people) multiple relationships with the government are generally mediated through local arrangements with local leaders, politicians and municipal officials (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012:187).

This mediation, however, also contributes to reproducing existing power structures by limiting the expression of different or opposing views to the dominant ones, on the one hand, and by limiting, to some extent, broader policy changes that could directly benefit the poor (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012:187).

The normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test was used to test if the nature of the public participation spaces factor (Addendum G: Section B) was dependent on gender (Section A; question 1). The results show that the nature of public participation spaces in the IDP does not necessarily depend on gender ($Z=0.4$ ; $p=0.7135$) (Table 5.5). The Kruskal-Wallis test was then used for comparing the nature of public participation in the IDP spaces, (Section B: Factor 1) scores across age groups, educational levels and positions. The results show that the nature of public participation in the IDP spaces (community trust in the municipal council, ward councillor and ward committees; perceptions of community empowerment and decision-making in public participation spaces; community commitment to public participation in the IDP; public participation as a space for the municipal council to consult with stakeholders and ward committees as public participation spaces for articulating public interest) scores are not significantly different across age groups ($KW=2.3$ ; $p=0.5098$), but were significantly different across educational levels ($KW=12.2$; $p=0.0023$) and positions ($KW=30.2$ ; $p<0.0001$) (Table 5.5).

The finding on the significance of educational levels was expected given that inequalities (whether capacity, resource, income, or other marginalised status) are steeped in unequal power relations, defined through forms of capital, of which education is one such form of capital. Capital, in Bourdieu’s theory (1986:241) is embodied not only in economic, but also in cultural, social, and symbolic forms. Cultural capital in various forms exists in two different forms: incorporated cultural capital, which consists of experiences and habits acquired during the socialisation process and manifested in an actor’s knowledge, and institutionalised cultural capital, which consists of formal educational qualifications (Bourdieu, 1986:47).
Thus, consistent with the dimensions of social power power imbalances in educational levels and positions of power, potentially pervade settings of meetings (Culley, and Angelique, 2011:421). The atmosphere (including formal structure) often creates an intimidating environment for public participants in the IDP, so much so that anyone lacking skills in public speaking or fluency in technical language or regulatory process (Culley, and Angelique, 2011:420) could find it difficult to express voice in public participation spaces in the IDP in BCMM. Culley and Angelique (2011:420) similarly noted that resources (e.g monetary, political influence, specialist knowledge) allows for better control of the debate and who participates, which in effect sets the agenda in favour of more powerful interests. The absence of minority, and other marginalised groups means their voices are unheard. Such absence represents unheard voices and this raises questions that have implications for distributive justice and equality in public participation spaces. The vocal often pose a barrier to public participation among those with less power in the community (Culley and Angelique, 2011:420). Fraser (2005:73) therefore advocates reinstating social justice, through her notion of ‘parity of participation’ which requires social arrangements that permit all to relate as peers in social life.

Davies, Gray and Webb’s (2014:121) integrated model of social justice divides the concept of social justice into three constitutive domains: economic, cultural and political, and posits three crucial reparative mechanisms to achieve ‘parity in public participation’: redistribution, recognition and representation.

Results showing that the nature of public participation in the IDP spaces was significantly different across designations (KW=30.2 ; p<0.0001) (Table 5.5) can be interpreted as a manifestation of local clientelism, as a possible form of relationship between communities and local government (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012:187). Bénit-Gbaffou (2012:187) rationalises this by arguing that, in his observation in the South African context, conditions for the development of collective clientelism revolve around local party branch affiliation. Party structures and networks get extensively used to access resources, through the brokerage of ward committees and councillors. The party increasingly gets viewed as more efficient in some instances to address residents’ issues through networked channels of access to powerful politicians, as opposed to red tape and fragmentation of the current local government system. As such, the use of party networks may be providing a useful, possibly efficient, bridge to higher levels of local government. In a way, this may imply the invention of new spaces of public participation shaping to some extent access to resources and voice, but also leads to a form of social control inhibiting criticism towards the party and local government policies of the majority party. This could be so, given that ward committees elections get influenced by political party mobilisation.
5.9.2 Empowering skills, knowledge and expertise
The results (Figure 5.8 item B111) show that the majority of the respondents (62.6%) (40.4% and 22.2% cumulatively) feel that the public have insufficient skills and knowledge to empower them to make valuable inputs into the IDP process. Similarly, the majority of the respondents (38.5% and 28.5% cumulatively) indicated that low literacy levels (67%) limit communities’ ability to participate in the IDP process (Figure 5.9 item B122). This finding is consistent with available literature regarding community strength which identify three key elements, loosely defined as resources, organisational capacity and ‘community wiring’ (Somerville, 2011:10-11, Taylor, 2003:17). This literature argues that, first, strong communities tend to have financial resources, physical assets and human resources in the form of skilled, knowledgeable, confident members (Brodie, Cowling, Nissen, Paine, Jochum, and Warburton, 2009). Second, they need organisational capacity in effective organisations (Kearns, 2003). Third, they need a positive blend of ‘community wiring’ – the connectedness, inclusiveness and cohesion often connected with social capital. Crucially, these characteristics of strong communities are inter-related. In a generic model of public participation, therefore, the different aspects of community strength can be presented as a ‘virtuous circle’ (Putnam, 2000:138-9), or perhaps more usefully, a ‘virtuous helix’, since different elements can be used to generate growth in each other.

5.9.3 Availability of Resources
Availability of resources has implications for community empowerment. Sen and Mukherjee, (2013:5) for example, succinctly identify three dimensions of empowerment which are: resources, agency and achievements. They identify agency, which refers to the process through which choices are made and exercised. The second dimension is resources, which represent the preconditions or medium via which agency is exercised. Lastly, they view achievements as referring to the outcomes of exercising agency (Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:5). Resources are further explained not only to refer to material assets but, also political rules and cultural norms that shape social inter-personal interactions between human beings. Resources and agency shape people’s ability to lead the lives they want to live, while achievements are a measure of whether such potential has been realised or not (Freire, 1972:48; Dreze and Sen, 2002:6-7; Sen and Mukherjee, 2013:5).

Out of the 218 respondents, who responded to the item on the extent to which cultural beliefs and practices influence participation (Section B: item B123), 61% (44.5% and 16.5% cumulatively) were of the view that customs (cultural beliefs and practices) influenced one’s public participation in the IDP and 74% (48.4% and 25.6% cumulatively) of those who
responded to item B124 (Section B) felt that lack of access to IDP formulation information restricts participants’ ability to shape IDP outcomes (projects/programmes) responsive to community needs. Survey data also indicates that there is high public interest in participating in the IDP process and that 59.4% (40.2% and 19.2% cumulatively) of the respondents were of the belief that the municipal council adequately budgets for the public participation in the IDP process (Figure 5.8 item B114). The veracity of this claim could however not be verified, but given the dominance of political affiliation, (ANC in BCMM) it may not be surprising that this perception could be a show of loyalty that makes it difficult to criticise party policies, mostly on the part of ward committee members and ward councillors.

5.9.4 Trust, commitment and community satisfaction

Community-municipal council trust relations are a necessary precursor to public participation in the IDP. Understanding the nature of trust is critical to an effective functioning of local government. For public administration, trust is concerned with relationships between actors and institutions (Walker and Hills, 2014:124). Results from survey questionnaire data in this study suggest that the majority of the participants (50.9%) (29.7% and 21.2% cumulatively) feel that there is community trust in the municipal council’s ability to deliver services (Item B121 Figure 5.9). Trust is the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable based on the belief that the trustee will meet the expectation of the trustor, even in situations where the trustor cannot monitor or control the trustee (Kim, 2005:621). This means that trust is normative and concerned with the “extent that the community is willing to follow government decisions even without sufficient information under the assumption that those decisions will be legitimate and protective of their interests” (Kim, 2005:617). This feeling of community trust in the municipal council’s ability to deliver services may also resonate with the concept of the ‘political society’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012:187), as indicated earlier.

Responses to items B133, B134 and B135 of the survey questionnaire by the respondents suggest that, the majority of the participants (Section B; Item B133–63.1%) (41% and 22.1% cumulatively) trusted that BCMM (the municipal council) includes issues raised by the community in the IDP (Figure 5.10). Similarly, the majority of the respondents (Section B, Item B134–70.6%) (41.2% and 29.4% cumulatively) trusted that the ward councillor recommends the issues raised by the community to the municipal council for inclusion into the IDP. Further to this, there was a general consensus amongst respondents that (Section B, Item B135–60.8%) (38% and 22.8% cumulatively) (Figure 5.10) ward committee members were able to voice community needs. However, consensus should not always be viewed as normatively beneficial to the community. Young (1996) in Koch (2013:2978) has argued that public participation
spaces/settings that strive for consensus, may in actual effect devalue certain styles and contents of expression, while privileging others, most notably those who employ rational and reasonable speech. Consensus seeking might also achieve negative results; it may obscure more profound inequalities of resources and opportunities. In such situations, contestation, resistance, or exit at best become the responses of the silenced and marginalised sections of the community.

Trust therefore does not always work in isolation, but works with other variables and within a range of a trust-distrust continuum. Results indicating moderately high levels of distrust and neutrality: Section B133–37% (5.5%, 16.7% and 14.9% cumulatively), B134–29.5% (4.1%, 13.6% and 11.8% cumulatively) and B135–39.3% (8%, 12.1% and 19.2% cumulatively) could be suggestive of distrust in the municipal council, ward councillors and ward committee members’ ability to influence IDP outcomes (Figure 5.10). This distrust can be potentially unproductive and costly, as it has the potential to create disillusionment and cynicism on the ability of public participation spaces to influence IDP outcomes responsive to community needs. Findings pointing to high levels of trust and moderate levels of distrust in public participation spaces in the IDP in BCMM may also be suggesting that the municipal council is doing a good job, is competent enough, has the skilled people, acts in the public interest or listens to concerns raised by the public. On the other hand, low trust levels may suggest that a critical mass of stakeholders in the municipality do not offer municipal officials (elected and appointed) the discretion necessary to undertake the tasks of service delivery. This could be as a result of a crisis in representative participation (Fung and Wright, 2003:3-6; Crouch, 2004:1-30; Sintomer, Herzberg and Röcke, 2010:15-27; MacLeod, 2011:2645-2650) which may have the potential of triggering civic protests, and a citizenry that feels both disaffected and helpless, when it comes the delivery of public goods and services at the local government level. Future research could thus examine the consequences of trust on municipal performance.

The discourse on public value draws on what is democracy, public interest, and so on. Moore (2013:58) views the public or collective as the starting point, for creating public value, not private or individual value. Moore (2013:58) captures this in phrases such as ‘the collective arbiter of value’. As a consequence, ‘public satisfaction’ becomes a possible public value. James (2009:108) postulates that satisfaction is “an evaluative attitude or behaviour towards some experience or object”. The results (Table 5.6) show that satisfaction with public participation spaces (Factor 1, Section B) scores are different for all the variables. The YES category of B6 (does public participation support the IDP?) scored significantly higher than NO (Z=-4.6 ; p<0.0001). The SATISFIED category of B7 (satisfaction with the functioning of the ward committees in BCMM) scored significantly higher than the DISSATISFIED (Z=-6.7 ;
Similarly, satisfaction with public participation in the IDP in BCMM (Section B, question 14) (Z = 7.3; p < 0.0001) the YES category scored higher on public participation spaces factor (Factor 1, section B) than NO (Table 5.6).

The results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with own participation in the IDP process and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire (Figure 5.6) also detected statistically significant associations for items on the municipal council’s consideration of ward committee recommendations (satisfaction) (Section B, question B91) \((\chi^2 = 20.9; p < 0.0001)\), consideration of the IDP representative forum recommendations (satisfaction) (Section B, item B92) \((\chi^2 = 17.0; p = 0.0002)\), and B114–Adequacy of municipal budget for public participation in the IDP (satisfaction) \((\chi^2 = 14.2; p = 0.0003)\).

However, the results of the chi-squared test statistic value and the corresponding p-values (Table 5.2) showed that satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process in BCMM has no significant associations with gender \((\chi^2 = 1.1; p = 0.3309)\), age \((\chi^2 = 0.9; p = 0.3766)\), educational level \((\chi^2 = 4.3; p = 0.3702)\) and position \((\chi^2 = 5.0; p = 0.2907)\). This finding suggests that satisfaction with public participation does not depend on demographic characteristics of respondents. In a study by Mangai (2016:101) on the dynamics of failing service delivery in Nigeria and Ghana, dissatisfaction was, as expected, particularly noticeable among those that experienced poor services in the area, those that were generally dissatisfied with the performance of politicians, those that were poor and those who lived in rural areas. Hence, socio-economic, demographic and political factors were important determinants of service satisfaction level. However, as with the results of this study, Mangai (2016:100) similarly found that satisfaction and dissatisfaction with service delivery was unrelated to gender.

Results further suggest that satisfaction with the functioning of the ward committees does not depend on gender \((\chi^2 = 0.4; p = 0.8374)\), age \((\chi^2 = 6.9; p = 0.0764)\) but, it significantly depends on the educational level \((\chi^2 = 10.0; p = 0.0067)\) and position level \((\chi^2 = 22.2; p = 0.0001)\) of the participant (Table 5.4). This result is not surprising, given that people may be satisfied of dissatisfied with public services for other reasons: because it is not ‘their party’ or that is in power or they are supportive of the party in power. Similarly, Mishler and Rose (2001:36) found out that assessment of public service delivery could be
affected not only by overall government performance, but also citizens’ own values and circumstances. The finding that satisfaction with the functioning of ward committees in BCMM, significantly depends on the educational level and position is also not surprising, given that personal background and social status can pervasively influence the assessment of government performance or policy outcomes. James (2011:1425) explained this by arguing that, although citizens’ view of public service delivery often begins with a general perception of the public sector covering a broad range of issues, it is their own access to public services, the reality of public service delivery, their expectations of future service delivery and their trust in the government to deliver that will determine their level of satisfaction. Citizens’ expectations and satisfaction can thus vary in relation to individual, cultural and other contextual characteristics (Mangai, 2016:89). Similarly, in public participation individuals are also likely to hold diverse views as a result of their gender, age, values, socio-economic background and experiences (Mangai, 2016:90).

5.9.5 Public participation in the IDP structures of domination inclusion and exclusion

Results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with public participation in the IDP process and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire (Table 5.9). Statistically significant associations were detected for items B91–Consideration of ward committee recommendations ($\chi^2 = 22.0; p = 0.0001$), B92–Consideration of IDP representative forum recommendations ($\chi^2 = 23.9; p < 0.0001$), B111–Skills deficiency, B114–Interest deficiency ($\chi^2 = 18.0; p = 0.0001$) and B139–Compliance requirement ($\chi^2 = 7.9; p = 0.0195$). Done poorly, public participation can result in undemocratic outcomes by reinforcing existing power inequalities, marginalising minority perspectives, creating dysfunction consensus, or fostering cynicism (Sprain, 2016:66).

Results (Figure 5.10) suggest that the IDP process is dominated by a few committee members and that public participation in the IDP is mostly for compliance purposes with legislative precincts of local government. Public participation is often conditioned by education, wealth, gender, and language skills. Hence public participation is often dominated by middle-class residents who are socially and economically better off. This social selectivity of public participation leads to problems concerning representation (Koch, 2013:2978). As noted by Carvalho, et al., (2016:3) public participation becomes a mechanism of technocratic coercion without transformational potential to communities.
Business power groups often have a good chance of working as a counterweight to public actors and have specific economic interests that do not always agree with those of the citizenry (Kock and Steiner, 2017:177). They often do not reach consensus with other social groups in the community, rather seeking to ensure protection of their interests in order to develop their businesses for personal advantage (Kock and Steiner, 2017:177). Kock and Steiner (2017:170) similarly found that economically most powerful families were involved in local politics, playing an important role in local governance, and that frequently local leaders were also entrepreneurs. Such a situation meant that political power also was closely linked to economic power.

5.9.6 Potential of public participation in the IDP to give ‘voice’ and to ‘empower’

The results of the tests for significance of association between opinion on public participation support for the IDP process (question B6) and Section B stand-alone items of the survey questionnaire were presented in Table 5.7. Statistically significant associations were detected for items that tested whether the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of ward committees (Item B9.1) ($\chi^2 = 17.6 ; p < 0.0001$). The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), (section 72(a) (i) (ii) provides that the formation of ward committees should reflect the diversity of local interests, as well as gender equity. Failure to achieve equity in representing all social formations and interests results in a sizeable ‘voice’ not being heard, and the interests of a sizeable population not being prioritised at the local level (Mbuyisa, 2013:125). Without ‘voice’ the IDP processes remain far from achieving full community involvement in policy-making. Friedman et al. (2003:56) argue that they remain very much top-down. This mostly remains the case when communities are merely allowed to comment on proposals developed by municipal officials rather than being invited to contribute to content before its drafting (Friedman et al., 2003:56). It is imperative that when the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of ward committees it becomes mindful of observations by some scholars (Friedman et al., 2003:56) who found out that ward meetings were mostly dominated by questions about unrealised promises, and lists of demands the municipality is expected to address.

Statistically significant associations were also detected for the item that tested whether the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of the IDP representative forum (Item, B92) ($\chi^2 = 17.4 ; p = 0.0002$), the item testing for availability of skills and knowledge for making informed inputs into the IDP (Item B111) ($\chi^2 = 7.1 ; p = 0.0289$), the item testing local community interest in participating in the IDP (Section B, question 11.3).
the item testing adequacy of budgets for supporting public participation in the IDP process (Item B114) ($\chi^2 = 15.4; p = 0.0004$) and the item testing whether public participation is tokenistic, and only done to comply with local government laws and regulations or not (Item B139) ($\chi^2 = 6.5; p = 0.0422$). Skenjana and Kimemia (2011:58) also found out that “…political affiliation and the desire to maintain control over ward committees often take precedence over concerns of fair representation and the pursuit of set developmental objectives”. Lack of transport and technical and specialised skills to provide legal interpretation of documents and policy, and a lack of language skills and capacity to compile written submissions have also been recognised and raised as inherent weaknesses hampering public participation in ward committees (Friedman et al., 2003:56). Munzhedzi and Phago (2013:43-45) identified some reasons why some ward committees are dysfunctional. Some of the reasons include; political party influences, limited resources, communication, unhealthy stakeholder relations, racial alignment and patronage.

Results showing the associations between satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM (question 7) and Section B stand-alone items were shown in Table 5.8. Statistically significant associations were detected for items B91–consideration of ward committee recommendations by the municipal council for input into the IDP ($\chi^2 = 22.5; p < 0.0001$), B92–consideration of IDP representative forum recommendations when making decisions on IDP programmes or projects level ($\chi^2 = 15.6; p = 0.0004$) and B139–public participation as tokenistic, and only done to comply with local government laws and regulations ($\chi^2 = 13.2; p = 0.0014$). Informing, consultation and placation, are described as ‘tokenism’, where the public may be heard but lack power to ensure that their voice is heeded (Arnstein, 1969:217; Greenberg and Mathoho, 2010:8).

Mbuyisa (2013:126) points to the existence of power imbalances and asymmetries, which make it impossible to have meaningful public participation. This imbalance and resultant exclusion and alienation are extended to the broader community and undermine the objectives of public participation: to achieve equity and equality. Pithouse (2009:8) laments that there is often a technocratic agenda which deters genuine public participation. There is thus often an inability to confront elite interests with popular counter power, and is inherently undemocratic (Pithouse, 2009:8). Access to public participation spaces not only denotes the opportunity to participate including “sufficient and appropriate opportunities to express [one’s] choices and opinions”, but also “to access sufficient and appropriate support, for instance, education, information, so that [one] can understand the process in an informed, active capacity” (Senecah, 2004:23). Influence
signifies the opportunity ‘to affect the criteria by which decisions [are] made’ and to have one’s ideas measured against alternatives (Senecah, 2004:31). Thus, understanding and appraising power dynamics in public participation is important in examining how participatory genres condition citizens’ participation or, how their opportunities and possibilities of having a voice are shaped by particular practices that limit access to information, knowledge and other resources, as well as to means and forums of expression.

5.9.7 Capacity/power to influence IDP outcomes

Results (Table 5.11) show the results of the tests for significance of association between the belief that the IDP representative forum influences IDP outcomes and the items related to the nature and extent of public participation dynamics from Section B of the questionnaire. Statistically significant associations were detected for item B91 that tested whether the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of ward committees ($\chi^2 = 10.3; p = 0.0053$) (Item B91). Statistically significant associations were also detected for the item that tested whether the municipal council takes into account the recommendations of the IDP representative forum (Item B92) ($\chi^2 = 11.4; p = 0.0033$).

Similarly results (Table 5.9) showing associations between satisfaction with public participation in the IDP (Question B14) and Section B stand-alone items of the survey questionnaire detected statistically significant associations for items testing, the municipal council taking into consideration ward committee recommendations (Item, B91) ($\chi^2 = 22.0; p = 0.0001$). The test again detected statistically significant associations with the item testing the taking into account of the IDP representative forum recommendations by the municipal council (Item B92) ($\chi^2 = 23.9; p < 0.0001$) (Table 5.9).

These findings suggest that participants in this study had trust in the ward committees and IDP representative forum members’ ability to recommend their public participation inputs to the municipal council for inclusion into the IDP in BCMM. Bryer (2009) cited in Buckwalter (2014:574) highlights the importance of trust in community interactions with council officials. For Bryer (2009) cited in Buckwalter (2014:574) a relationship of trust results from a sense of goal alignment between the community and municipal council officials, and when there is a willingness on the part of representatives of the community to learn from the community about their felt needs.
The finding suggesting that the community trusted ward committees and IDP representative forums, aligns with elite theories of democracy. Conjectures as tentative theories designed to offer provisional solutions to problems (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007:587). They can thus be used to highlight particular themes or tensions that impact on theory or practice (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007:587). Thus the incompatibility conjecture which draws from elite theory starts from the proposition that “local government is an elite institution in complex modern society that must be representative, but not participative”. Thus, within the context of this conjecture, respondents in this study could be viewing representative local government as democratically appropriate, given its complex nature. Following from Schumpeter (2008:269) the explanation could be that communities see the demands of local government as requiring that an elite group dedicate itself to policy and planning processes.

Urban Regime Theory theoretically explains this, as it often suggests, that the public are unable to contribute meaningfully to policy and decision-making. This inability according to Mckenna (2011:1189) has two aspects: apathy and capability. As local elites recognise, citizens are disinterested in formal politics and from a political perspective are perfectly happy with the “division of labour” associated with local representative democracy (Mckenna (2011:1189). However, as predicted by public choice theory, the finding suggesting that the community trusted ward committees and IDP representative forums in BCMM can potentially advance narrow interests which may then dominate within BCMM. The implication is that the such trust in a representative system of ward committees and IDP representative forums may privilege sectional interests, which tend to reproduce patterns of social inequality with the more articulate and wealthy better able to further their own interests. Thus it may be possible that respondents’ views of trust could be driven by the belief, albeit a mistaken one, that representative democracy represents the public interest.

5.10 CONCLUSION

Objective 3 of the study sought to conduct a questionnaire survey (quantitative method) to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process in BCMM. The findings presented in this chapter suggest that ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members, and community stakeholders in BCMM believe that public participation supports the IDP process. Respondents were also mostly satisfied with the functioning of ward committees. There is therefore a general feeling that ward committees function well in BCMM. However, satisfaction with public participation supporting the IDP process had no relationship with the gender, age, educational level and position of the respondents. Respondents’ satisfaction with the functioning of ward committees
was not dependent on gender and age but it was significantly associated with the respondents’ educational level and position. Similarly, the majority of the respondents believed that low literacy levels limited communities’ ability to participate in the IDP process. Capacity to meaningfully participate in the IDP in BCMM was further constrained by communities’ lack of access to IDP formulation information. This constrained and marginalised community voice from shaping IDP outcomes (projects/programmes) responsive to their community needs.

Satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM was positively associated with the views of respondents who believed that ward committee recommendations were taken into consideration by the municipal council when drafting the IDP and with those who believed that the BCMM took into consideration recommendations of the IDP representative forum when making decisions on IDP programmes or projects. The study results suggested that the majority of respondents in BCMM were dissatisfied with their own public participation in the IDP. Dissatisfaction with own public participation in the IDP process however had no significant association with gender, age, educational level and position. This finding suggests that satisfaction with public participation does not depend on demographic characteristics of respondents. The study findings further suggested that there was moderate community trust (50.9%) in the municipal council’s ability to deliver services (Figure 5.9). This means that there is a generally moderate level of residents’ trust in the municipal council’s ability to deliver public services to the expectations and satisfaction of the community.

The study findings further indicated that public participation spaces in BCMM were mostly inclusive of most vulnerable groups such as the youths, the poor, and women, but the spaces excluded the disabled members of the community. Generally, municipal officials often felt insecure and uncomfortable with the empowerment of municipal residents with decision-making power. This suggests that while there is considerable community commitment and interest in participating in the IDP processes from the residents of BCMM, public participation still remains tokenistic, and is mostly done to comply with local government laws and regulations. The study results furthermore confirm that most of the respondents (62.6%) felt that the public had insufficient skills and knowledge and capabilities to empower them to make valuable inputs into the IDP. The study results also indicated that cultural beliefs and practices (61%) influenced public participation in the IDP. There was thus a strong correlation between cultural beliefs and practices and the influencing of public participation in the IDP process.
Chapter 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (SECTION C)

6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter further presents, analyses and discusses data from the survey questionnaire, administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). The study results relate to the aim and objectives of the study: to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process, and to explain how the dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. A survey questionnaire (Addendum G), was developed as the first data collection method. For the survey questionnaire 250 (n=250) were purposefully sampled. Section C of the survey questionnaire was informed by the need to test the influences of the dynamics of public participation in the IDP process in BCMM (Addendum G). The next section presents the descriptive analysis of the survey questionnaire Section C questions and items (Figures 6.1 to 6.3).

6.2 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE SECTION C, ITEMS
Question C15 was made up of 8 items addressing issues of stakeholder power and influence, stakeholder consensus building, domination in the IDP process, resource allocation, IDP document size and comprehensibility, IDP document language, socio-economic exclusion and minority racial group participation (Addendum G).
Figure 6.1: Frequency distribution for respondents’ views on the influences of public participation power dynamics on IDP outcomes

Figure 6.1 shows that, on all the items, the majority of the participants agree. These results indicate that 63.9% (45.1% and 18.8% cumulatively) of the respondents feel that stakeholders use power and influence to include or exclude. Out of the 219 respondents who responded to item C153 the majority 55.2% (32.4% and 22.8% cumulatively) felt that public participation in the IDP was dominated by powerful community networks. Of the 220 who responded to item C155, the majority 73.7% (42.3% and 31.4% cumulatively) were in agreement that municipal residents were often discouraged from participating in the IDP due to the size and incomprehensibility of the IDP document. The results also indicate that 57.3% (44.1% and 13.2% cumulatively) of respondents who responded to item C157 believed that public participation in the IDP was low among residents of ‘privileged’ socio-economic status.
Figure 6.2: Frequency distribution for respondents’ views on the capacity of stakeholders to influence IDP outcomes

Question C16 had five items on stakeholder voice, knowledge and information of the IDP process, stakeholder expertise in prioritising community needs, availability of time and influences of political affiliation to IDP outcomes reflecting community needs. The results show that the majority agree on all five items (Addendum G). This means that respondents perceive stakeholders as having equal voice (56.6%) (38% and 18.6% cumulatively), that stakeholders are equally informed of the IDP process (57.3%) (36.8% and 20.5% cumulatively), that stakeholders have the expertise to prioritise community needs (58.7%) (42.2% and 16.5% cumulatively). The results also show that respondents feel that they have sufficient time to participate in the IDP process (55.6%) (37.2% and 18.4% cumulatively) and that political affiliation is of no influence on what gets recommended to the municipal council as community needs (45.2%) (28.6% and 16.6% cumulatively).
Figure 6.3: Frequency distribution for respondents’ views on the extent to which stakeholder participation shapes IDP outcomes

Question C17 had eight items addressing issues of group and individual interest representation by the IDP representative forum, political domination of ward committees, domination by experts in IDP formulation, domination resulting from material wealth, power of the public to influence the IDP and influence of municipal laws and procedures on the IDP (Addendum G).

The results (Figure 6.3) show that there are just as many respondents who agree that the IDP representative forum represents specific interest groups (40.1%) (30.5% and 9.6% cumulatively), as there are those who disagree (47.8%) (17.3% and 30.5% cumulatively). The majority (55.5%) (20.9% and 34.6% cumulatively) disagree that the IDP representative forum only represents interests of specific individuals.

For the rest of the items, approximately half of the respondents agree. This means that the majority (56.9%) (30.5% and 26.9% cumulatively) are of the view that ward committees are dominated by a single political party and that the public participation process is dominated by the more knowledgeable people (54.8%) (46.1% and 13.7% cumulatively) and that material wealth (46.8%) (30.7% and 16.1% cumulatively) determined whose views gets attention. The results further indicate that there is a belief that less powerful community members are often dominated and alienated by the powerful members of the community (47.9%) (32.4% and
15.5% cumulatively). The results confirm that respondents were consistent in the view that compliance to municipal laws and procedures determines the issues that get prioritised in the IDP, regardless of community input during public participation (Section B item B139–59.2%; (34.1% and 25.1% cumulatively) and Section C item C178–49.3% (36.9% and 12.4% cumulatively).

6.3 DATA REDUCTION

As explained in Chapter 5, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was again used for data reduction (Osborne 2015:1). A factor analysis was carried out separately on each of the 21 items in Section C, (Addendum G). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability was calculated for each of the resultant factors. A factor was considered as reliable if the reliability coefficient was at least 70%. Based on this data reduction exercise two from Section C were identified. The results of the factor analysis for Section C of the survey questionnaire are presented in Table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor1</th>
<th>Factor2</th>
<th>Factor3</th>
<th>Factor4</th>
<th>Factor5</th>
<th>Factor6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C162</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C165</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C161</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C164</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C176</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C163</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C172</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C171</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C177</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C175</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C158</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C152</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C151</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C153</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach's alpha</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1 shows the rotated factor patterns for Section C items and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients corresponding to each factor. The results show that only the first two factors (Factor 1, $\alpha=0.78$ and Factor 2, $\alpha=0.80$) have reliability coefficients greater than the threshold value of 70%. Factor 1 measured a single construct, referred to in this study as the community capability and empowerment factor. Factor 2 measured another construct which was referred to as the inclusivity factor, given that all the items constituting this factor tested the nature of community inclusion/exclusion in public participation in the IDP. In all the onward analysis only the first two factors were considered as two separate constructs, while the items forming the rest of the items were treated as individual stand-alone variables. Table 6.2 shows the distribution of respondents’ views on IDP representative forum influence on IDP (Question C20) by biographical variables.

Table 6.2: Distribution of respondents’ views on IDP representative forum influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Satisfied (n : %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>87 (79.8)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.8912</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.45 ; 1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>71 (80.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age group</strong></td>
<td>Under 36yrs</td>
<td>38 (80.9)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.9973</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.30 ; 4.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs</td>
<td>54 (79.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.26 ; 3.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs</td>
<td>49 (80.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.27 ; 3.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs</td>
<td>17 (81.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>63 (77.8)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.0498</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.60 ; 3.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET</td>
<td>65 (89.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>(1.20 ; 8.78)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>30 (71.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
<td>Ward Councillor</td>
<td>29 (82.8)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.0177</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>(0.28 ; 4.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>52 (71.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.14 ; 0.84)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep</td>
<td>14 (40.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.10 ; 0.83)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Rep</td>
<td>35 (47.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Reference category

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

6.3.1 IDP representatives’ influence on IDP outcomes (C20)

The results in Table 6.2 indicate that educational level has a significant association with the belief or perception that IDP representative forum members influence IDP outcomes ($\chi^2 = 6.0 ; p = 0.0498$). It should be noted that, in this case, the p-value is more borderline ($p=0.0498$) just like in the case of education and satisfaction with own participation. However, the difference with this case is that the significance is also confirmed by the odds ratio confidence interval which excludes 1. Based on that evidence, one is persuaded to conclude that there is a significant association and that it is such that those with an FET education are 3.3
times as likely to believe that IDP representative forum members influence the IDP outcomes as are those with secondary or university education. Position also came out to be significantly associated with the belief that IDP representative forum members influence IDP outcomes ($\chi^2 = 10.1; p = 0.017$). These results suggest that ward committee members and IDP representative forum members are less likely to believe in the influence of IDP representative forum members on IDP outcomes compared to ward councillors and community stakeholders. It can also be noted that the odds ratio is 0.3 in both cases, meaning that ward committee members and IDP representative forum members are 0.3 times as likely to believe in the influence of IDP representative forum members on IDP outcomes as are the ward councillors and the community stakeholders. However, the results indicate that gender ($\chi^2 = 0.02; p = 0.8912$) and age level ($\chi^2 = 0.04; p = 0.9923$) had no significant associations with the belief that IDP representative forum members influence IDP outcomes.

6.4 ANALYSIS OF FACTOR VARIABLES

Table 6.3 presents results of the comparisons of community capability factor (Factor 1 Section C) (FC1) scores across categories of biographical characteristics.

Table 6.3: Comparisons of community capability and empowerment factor (Factor 1 Section C) (FC1) scores across categories of biographical characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (se)</th>
<th>Mean rank</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3.5 (0.078)</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0745+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3.5 (0.081)</td>
<td>118.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Under 36yrs</td>
<td>3.3 (0.098)</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5659#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs</td>
<td>3.4 (0.100)</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs</td>
<td>3.3 (0.106)</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs</td>
<td>3.5 (0.192)</td>
<td>122.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>3.5 (0.088)</td>
<td>118.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.1951#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET</td>
<td>3.3 (0.098)</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>3.3 (0.123)</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ward Councillor</td>
<td>3.7 (0.130)</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>0.0014#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>3.5 (0.098)</td>
<td>121.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep</td>
<td>3.0 (0.143)</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Rep</td>
<td>3.3 (0.092)</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test (Mann-Whitney Z)
#Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$
*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance
Table 6.3 shows results of comparisons of the community capability and empowerment factor (Factor 1 Section C). The same statistical tests as those used in Table 6.2 were used. The results of the tests for differences in the community capability and empowerment factor scores across the biographical variables show that the community capability and empowerment factor scores are the same across the categories of gender (Z=1.8 ; p=0.0745), age group (KW=2.0; p=0.5659) and educational level (KW=3.3 ; p=0.1951). However, the community capability and empowerment factor scores were found to be significantly different across the different categories of position (KW=15.5 ; p=0.0014). The pattern of the differences is such that ward committee members and IDP representative forum members are less likely to believe in the influence of community capability and empowerment factor on IDP outcomes compared to ward councillors and community stakeholders.

Table 6.4: Comparisons of community capability and empowerment factor (Factor 1 Section C), (FC1) scores across categories of public participation variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (se)</th>
<th>Mean rank</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3.5 (0.061)</td>
<td>119.5</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.9 (0.127)</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>3.6 (0.062)</td>
<td>128.3</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3.0 (0.095)</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B14</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>3.7 (0.069)</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3.0 (0.077)</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C18</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3.7 (0.071)</td>
<td>129.4</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.0 (0.081)</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3.4 (0.066)</td>
<td>103.8</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>0.0321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.1 (0.128)</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test (Mann-Whitney Z)

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Public participation supporting the IDP (Section B, question 6); Satisfaction with ward committee function in BCMM (Section B, question 7); and satisfaction with own participation in the IDP in BCMM (Section B, question 14); satisfaction with extent of own participation in the IDP (Section C, question 18); IDP representative forum influence on IDP outcomes (Section C, question 20).

Table 6.4 shows the comparisons of community capability and the empowerment factor (Factor 1 Section C), (FC1) scores across categories of public participation variables. The results indicate that community capability and empowerment factor scores were significantly different.
for all the variables. Table 6.4 shows that all the p-values corresponding to the tests are less than the significant level of 0.05.

Table 6.5: Comparisons of inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) (FC2) scores across categories of biographical characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (se)</th>
<th>Mean rank</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3.0 (0.094)</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>0.1261+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males*</td>
<td>2.8 (0.100)</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td>Under 36yrs</td>
<td>3.1 (0.141)</td>
<td>121.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.4299#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36-45yrs</td>
<td>2.9 (0.120)</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46-55yrs</td>
<td>2.8 (0.124)</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 55yrs</td>
<td>2.8 (0.198)</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>2.8 (0.100)</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.1230#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FET</td>
<td>2.9 (0.125)</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>3.2 (139)</td>
<td>124.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ward Councillor</td>
<td>2.7 (0.188)</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.1141#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>3.0 (0.117)</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDP Rep</td>
<td>3.2 (0.145)</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Rep</td>
<td>2.9 (0.119)</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test (Mann-Whitney Z)
#Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

Table 6.5 shows the results of the comparison of the inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores across levels of the biographical variables. The results show that inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores were not significantly different depending on gender ($Z=-1.5$ ; $p=0.1261$), age group ($KW=2.8$ ; $p=0.4299$), educational level ($KW=4.2$ ; $p=1230$) and position ($KW=5.9$ ; $p=0.1141$).
Table 6.6: Comparisons of inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) (FC2) scores across categories of public participation variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (se)</th>
<th>Mean rank</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.8 (0.076)</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.5 (0.124)</td>
<td>148.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>2.8 (0.082)</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3.2 (0.114)</td>
<td>129.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B14</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>2.6 (0.094)</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3.2 (0.094)</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C18</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.8 (0.091)</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.2 (0.098)</td>
<td>126.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.8 (0.081)</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.3 (0.148)</td>
<td>119.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Normal approximation to the Mann-Whitney U test (Mann-Whitney Z)

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

(*Note) Public participation supporting the IDP (Section B, question 6); satisfaction with ward committee function in BCMM (Section B, question 7); and satisfaction with own participation in the IDP in BCMM (Section B, question 14); satisfaction with extent of own participation in the IDP (Section C, question 18); IDP representative forum influence on IDP outcomes (Section C, Question 20).

The tests for differences in inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores across categories of the public participation variables (Table 6.6) show that inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores differed across categories of all the variables. The p-values are all less than 0.05, therefore, the differences are statistically significant. However, the pattern of the differences in inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores is such that the YES (public participation supports the IDP) for B6, SATISFIED (satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM) for B7, SATISFIED (satisfied with public participation in BCMM) for B14 and YES (satisfaction with extent of own participation in the IDP) for C18 and (IDP representative forum influences the IDP) Question C20 scored significantly lower on this factor.
Table 6.7: Associations between public participation supporting the IDP process (Section B, question 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>YES (n ; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C151</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>34 (81.0)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.3302</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.39 ; 2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>30 (71.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>117 (81.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C152</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>29 (60.4)</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.12 ; 0.55)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>39 (83.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>113 (85.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C153</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56 (80.0)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.0883</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.37 ; 1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (66.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>101 (83.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C154</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>45 (71.4)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.18 ; 0.80)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (68.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>112 (86.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C155</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>38 (90.5)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.1577</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>(0.94 ; 8.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>18 (78.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>97 (77.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C156</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>67 (75.3)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3630</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.34 ; 1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>19 (86.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>95 (81.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C157</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>40 (85.1)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5660</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>(0.66 ; 4.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>43 (79.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>98 (77.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C158</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>49 (76.6)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.21 ; 1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>32 (65.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>100 (87.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C173</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>73 (87.9)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>(0.96 ; 4.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11 (57.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>97 (77.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C174</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>63 (86.3)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.63 ; 3.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>20 (58.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>98 (81.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C176</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>38 (76.0)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.1010</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.28 ; 1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (68.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>119 (83.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C178</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>68 (89.5)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.0350</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>(1.22 ; 6.73)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>33 (75.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>80 (74.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance*
Table 6.7 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between opinion on whether public participation supports the IDP process and the items related to the dynamics of public participation and how they influence the integrated development planning process from Section C of the questionnaire. Statistically significant associations were detected for items C152–Stakehoder consensus building prioritised in the IDP ($\chi^2 = 14.2; p < 0.0008$), C154–Resource adequacy ($\chi^2 = 9.4; p = 0.0091$), C158–Minority participation ($\chi^2 = 11.2; p = 0.0037$), C174–Experts domination ($\chi^2 = 11.4; p = 0.0033$) and C178–Socially powerful dominance ($\chi^2 = 6.7; p = 0.0358$).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, shown in Table 6.7 suggest that the associations between opinion on public participation supporting the IDP process and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who disagree that consensus building is a priority are less likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process, compared to those who agree. Those who disagree or are neutral that the municipality allocates adequate resources for public participation are less likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process, compared to those who agree. Those who are neutral concerning participation of minority population groups in the IDP process are less likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process, compared to those who agree or disagree. The odds ratios further suggest that those who are neutral on the view that the IDP process is dominated by experts are less likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process compared to those who agree or disagree. They also show that those who disagree that powerful community members dominate the IDP process are more likely to believe that public participation supports the IDP process compared to those who agree or are neutral.
Table 6.8: Associations between satisfaction with functioning of ward committees (Section B, question 7) and Section C stand-alone items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SATISFIED (n ; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C151</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27 (64.3)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.1848</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.36 ; 1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>22 (52.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.27 ; 1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>97 (67.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C152</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28 (58.3)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.2294</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(0.36 ; 1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>27 (57.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.27 ; 1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91 (68.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C153</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>54 (77.1)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(1.12 ; 3.46)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>16 (44.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.22 ; 0.95)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>76 (62.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C154</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>34 (54.0)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<td>(0.75 ; 2.28)*</td>
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<td>(1.28 ; 4.70)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>(3.10 ; 11.98)*</td>
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<td>15 (65.2)</td>
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<td>(2.60 ; 11.43)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Disagree</td>
<td>50 (56.2)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>(0.35 ; 1.02)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>83 (71.6)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C157</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35 (74.5)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.2238</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.73 ; 2.61)</td>
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<td>(0.76 ; 2.53)</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>C158</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>39 (60.9)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.35 ; 1.13)*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.12 ; 0.47)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>88 (77.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C173</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>68 (81.9)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>(1.39 ; 4.08)*</td>
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<td>11 (57.9)</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>(0.66 ; 4.06)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>67 (53.6)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C174</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>(0.71 ; 2.13)</td>
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<td>(0.38 ; 1.64)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>74 (61.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C176</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>25 (50.0)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.0173</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.21 ; 0.75)*</td>
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<td>(0.26 ; 1.09)*</td>
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<td>101 (71.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C178</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56 (73.7)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.1080</td>
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<td>(0.79 ; 2.41)</td>
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<td>63 (58.9)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance
Table 6.8 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with ward committee functioning and the items related to the dynamics of public participation and how they influence the integrated development planning process from Section C of the questionnaire. Statistically significant associations were detected for items C153–Social status influence \( (\chi^2 = 11.3, p < 0.0025) \), C154–Resource adequacy \( (\chi^2 = 9.6; p = 0.0083) \), C155–IDP document structure and size \( (\chi^2 = 13.2, p = 0.0014) \), C158–Minority participation \( (\chi^2 = 22.5; p < 0.0001) \), C173–Single party domination \( (\chi^2 = 17.8; p = 0.0001) \) and C176–Community influence \( (\chi^2 = 6.1; p = 0.0173) \).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals shown in Table 6.8 suggest that the associations between satisfaction with ward committee functioning and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who disagree that more powerful community members influence the IDP process are more likely to be satisfied with ward committee functioning compared to those who agree. Those who are neutral are less likely to be satisfied compared to those who agree. The odds ratios further indicate that those who are neutral concerning adequacy of resources allocated for public participation, are more likely to be satisfied with the functioning of ward committees compared to those who agree or disagree. The odds ratios also show that those who disagree or are neutral that the IDP documents are complicated for the public are more likely to be satisfied with the functioning of ward committees. Those who are neutral concerning participation of minority populations in IDP process are less likely to be satisfied with functioning of ward committees compared to those who agree or disagree. They also show that those who disagree that IDP process is dominated by a single party are more likely to be satisfied with the functioning of ward committees, compared to those who agree or are neutral. Participants who disagree that communities have the power to get their priorities included in the IDP outcomes are also less likely to be satisfied with the functioning of ward committees.
Table 6.9: Associations between satisfaction with public participation in the IDP (Section B, question 14) and Section C stand-alone items

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<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0267</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.20 ; 0.82)*</td>
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<td>(0.30 ; 1.16)*</td>
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<td>Agree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28 (41.8)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.1798</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.34 ; 1.23)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14 (22.9)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.10 ; 0.39)*</td>
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<td>(0.15 ; 0.73)*</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Disagree</td>
<td>25 (65.8)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.0272</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>(1.24 ; 5.45)*</td>
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<td>(0.36 ; 2.13)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0019</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25 (56.8)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.2030</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>(0.93 ; 3.73)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19 (31.2)</td>
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<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.17 ; 0.63)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.22 ; 0.87)*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>65 (58.0)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C173</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>45 (55.6)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.0412</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>(1.13 ; 3.53)*</td>
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<td>(0.73 ; 5.42)*</td>
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<td>47 (38.5)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42 (58.3)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.0374</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>(1.19 ; 3.93)*</td>
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<td>(0.54 ; 2.65)*</td>
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<td>46 (39.3)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>46 (43.4)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

-Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance

Table 6.9 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with public participation in IDP process and the items related to the dynamics of public participation.
and how they influence the integrated development planning process from Section C of the questionnaire. Statistically significant associations were detected for items C152–Consensus building ($\chi^2 = 7.2; p < 0.0267$), C154–Resource adequacy ($\chi^2 = 26.1; p < 0.0001$), C155–IDP document structure and size, ($\chi^2 = 7.2; p < 0.0272$), C156–IDP document language, ($\chi^2 = 12.5; p = 0.0019$), C158–Minority participation ($\chi^2 = 13.3; p < 0.0013$), C173–Single party domination ($\chi^2 = 6.4; p = 0.0412$), C174–Experts domination ($\chi^2 = 6.6; p = 0.0374$), and C176–Community influence ($\chi^2 = 7.9; p < 0.0187$).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals shown in Table 6.9 suggest that the associations between satisfaction with public participation and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who disagree that stakeholder consensus building is prioritised are less likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree or are neutral that adequate resources are allocated for public participation are less likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree. Those who disagree that the IDP document is too complicated for the public are more likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree that the language used in the IDP document is easily understood by municipal residents are less likely to be satisfied with public participation, compared to those who agree or are neutral. The odds ratios also show that those who disagree or are neutral that municipal residents from minority population groups participate in the IDP process, are less likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree. Respondents further show that those who disagree that ward committee membership is dominated by a single party are more likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree that their views in the IDP process are dominated by those with expert knowledge on IDP formulation, are more likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree that communities have the power to get their priorities included in the IDP are less likely to be satisfied with public participation compared to those who agree or are neutral.
Table 6.10: Associations between satisfaction with extent of one’s public participation in the IDP (Section C, question 18) and Section C stand-alone items

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<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.0266</td>
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<td>(0.13 ; 0.47)*</td>
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<td>0.0424</td>
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<td>(0.22 ; 1.64)*</td>
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<td>(0.70 ; 2.93)</td>
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<td>0.0538</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.24 ; 0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>27 (56.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.31 ; 1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>73 (67.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C173</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>51 (67.1)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.2535</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>(0.91 ; 2.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>11 (61.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.46 ; 3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>68 (55.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C174</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>46 (69.7)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0789</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>(0.88 ; 3.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15 (46.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.29 ; 1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>69 (58.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C176</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>24 (54.6)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.0352</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 1.25)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>14 (42.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.18 ; 0.83)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>92 (65.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C178</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>49 (74.2)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.0110</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>(1.15 ; 4.42)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>21 (47.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>(0.35 ; 1.45)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>60 (56.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance
Table 6.10 shows the results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with the extent of own participation in IDP process and the items related to the dynamics of public participation and how they influence the integrated development planning process from Section C of the questionnaire (Addendum G). Statistically significant associations were detected for items C151–Stakeholder influence ($\chi^2 = 10.5; p = 0.0052$), C154–Resource adequacy ($\chi^2 = 20.3; p < 0.0001$), C155–IDP document structure and size ($\chi^2 = 6.3; p = 0.0424$), C156–IDP document language ($\chi^2 = 9.1; p = 0.0107$), C176–Community influence ($\chi^2 = 6.7; p = 0.0352$) and C178–Compliance with municipal laws and procedures ($\chi^2 = 9.0; p = 0.0110$).

The corresponding odds ratios and their confidence intervals, shown in Table 6.10 suggest that the associations between satisfaction with own participation and the stand-alone items are such that: Those who are neutral to the opinion that stakeholders use their power to influence IDP process outcomes are less likely to be satisfied with own participation compared to those who agree or disagree. Those who disagree or are neutral that adequate resources are allocated for public participation are less likely to be satisfied with own participation compared to those who agree. Those who disagree that the IDP document is too complicated for the public are more likely to be satisfied with own participation compared to those who agree or are neutral. Those who disagree that the language used in the IDP document is easily understood by municipal residents are less likely to be satisfied with own participation compared to those who agree or are neutral. The odds ratios also show that, those who are neutral about the opinion that communities have the power to get their priorities included in the IDP outcomes, are less likely to be satisfied with own participation compared to those who agree or disagree. They further indicate that, those who disagree that compliance with municipal laws and procedures is the sole determinant of what gets included in the IDP, are more likely to be satisfied with own participation compared to those who agree or are neutral.
Table 6.11: Associations between IDP representative forum influence on IDP outcomes (C20) and Section C stand-alone items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>YES (n ; %)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95%CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C151</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>29 (78.4)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8896</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.33 ; 2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>30 (79.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.35 ; 2.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>101 (81.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C152</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>32 (71.1)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.0570</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.17 ; 0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>29 (74.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.19 ; 1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>99 (86.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C153</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>53 (71.1)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>(0.40 ; 2.09)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17 (74.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.12 ; 0.73)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>90 (84.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C154</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>40 (71.4)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.0880</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>(0.19 ; 0.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>25 (78.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.22 ; 1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>95 (85.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C155</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33 (91.7)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0793</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>(0.82 ; 9.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>15 (68.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>(0.21 ; 1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>112 (79.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C156</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>66 (82.5)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7970</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(0.58 ; 2.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>13 (76.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.25 ; 2.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>81 (79.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C157</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35 (85.4)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.1490</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>(0.45 ; 3.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>34 (70.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.23 ; 1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>91 (82.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C158</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>41 (71.9)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>(0.11 ; 0.64)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>30 (68.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>(0.09 ; 0.55)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>89 (90.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C173</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>64 (87.7)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.1247</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>(1.02 ; 5.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>13 (81.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.37 ; 5.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>83 (75.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C174</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>53 (82.8)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6859</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.61 ; 3.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>25 (83.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.48 ; 4.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>82 (78.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C176</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>32 (74.4)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.1690</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.23 ; 1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>24 (72.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>(0.20 ; 1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>104 (84.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C178</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56 (84.9)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4471</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>(0.62 ; 3.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>30 (75.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>(0.32 ; 1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>74 (79.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-Kruskal-Wallis $\chi^2$

*Statistically significant at 5% level of significance
The aim of this study was to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP process. The study also aimed to explain how the power dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. Objective 2 of the study was to conduct a survey questionnaire (quantitative method), so as to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP process in BCMM. Objective 3 of the study sought to analyse findings from secondary and primary data in order to gain insights into how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence participants during public participation in the IDP process in BCMM. The findings/results from section C of the survey questionnaire (Addendum G) are discussed in sections 6.5.1 to 6.5.5.

### 6.5.1 Stakeholder voice and empowerment

Findings from section C of the survey questionnaire (Addendum G) point to a general perception that public participation spaces in the IDP afford stakeholders in BCMM an equal voice (56.6%) (38% and 18.6% cumulatively) (Figure 6.2) to influence IDP programmes and projects. Similarly, the results indicate that respondents believe that all stakeholders in BCMM are equally informed of the IDP process (57.3%) (36.8% and 20.5% cumulatively) (Figure 6.2) and that the stakeholders have the requisite expertise to prioritise community needs (58.7%) (42.2% and 16.5% cumulatively) (Figure 6.2). Respondents were also of the view that they have sufficient time to participate in the IDP process (55.6%) (37.2% and 18.6% cumulatively)
(Figure 6.2) and that political affiliation has limited influence on the community needs that gets recommended to the municipal council (45.2%) (28.6% and 16.6% cumulatively) (Figure 6.2).

Tests for significance of association on whether public participation supports the IDP process detected statistically significant associations for items testing C152–Stakeholder consensus building prioritisation in the IDP \( (\chi^2 = 14.2 ; p < 0.0008) \), and C154–Resource adequacy \( (\chi^2 = 9.4 ; p = 0.0091) \). These results confirm the finding that in BCMM the general perception is that public participation stakeholders in the IDP use their “power” and “influence” to determine what is included or excluded from the IDP. Similarly the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with public participation in IDP process showed statistically significant associations for items C152–Stakeholder consensus building prioritisation in the IDP \( (\chi^2 = 7.2 ; p < 0.0267) \), C154–Resource adequacy \( (\chi^2 = 26.1 ; p < 0.00002) \), and C176–Community influence \( (\chi^2 = 8.1 ; p = 0.0173) \).

Results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with own participation in IDP process further detected statistically significant associations for items C151–Stakeholder influence \( (\chi^2 = 10.5 ; p = 0.0052) \), C154–Resource adequacy \( (\chi^2 = 20.3 ; p < 0.0001) \), and C176–Community influence \( (\chi^2 = 6.7 ; p = 0.0352) \). The results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with ward committee functioning furthermore confirmed statistically significant associations for items, C154–Resource adequacy \( (\chi^2 = 7.6 ; p = 0.0083) \), and C176–Community influence \( (\chi^2 = 8.1 ; p = 0.0173) \). This implies that BCMM affords residents ‘voice’ and that consensus building is prioritised in the IDP process. There is thus a belief that the community has the power to influence IDP outcomes, that political affiliation has no influence on the community needs that get recommended to the municipal council and that BCMM provides adequate resource support to enable community stakeholders to participate in the IDP process. Affording residents’ voice and spaces for building consensus is consistent with Kim’s (2006:22) view of network governance, denoting characteristics of transactions being conducted among relevant players on the basis of mutual benefits, trust, and reciprocity. However, Healy (2009:1652) is of the view that an epistemological understanding of the dimensions of public participation, needs to also unravel the asymmetries in power, resources and trust among planning stakeholders, along the spectrums of public participation, namely, ‘involvement’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘empowerment’. This implies how public participation is hampered by its practice, the implicit, structural privilege, which relegates the public to marginal status, and/or values which systematically disempower the public.
One aspect of inclusion consistently identified in literature concerns access to the resources, institutions, spaces, social arrangements, and opportunities afforded by community residents (Chaskin, Khare and Joseph, 2012:864). Results show that in BCMM there is a belief that public participation supports the IDP, and this finding was significantly associated with the view that BCMM provided adequate resource support to enable residents to participate in the IDP. Regime theory, for example, elaborates ways in which municipalities are governed through relationships among state actors, private interests, and civic networks (Pierre, 1999:373). It focuses attention on a shift ‘from government to governance’ (Taylor, 2007:299; Stone 2009:267) and, in particular, on networked governance structures that are leveraged to drive agenda setting, decision-making, resource allocation, and policy implementation (Rhodes, 1996:660). Local governance in this sense varies, from a narrow focus on “the coordination and fusion of public and private resources” to more inclusive orientations, focusing on “the capacity to integrate and give form to local interests, organisations and social groups and to represent them” (Le Galès (1998) cited in Melo and Baiocchi, 2006:592). The finding that public participation in BCMM affords residents ‘voice’ and that consensus building is prioritised in the IDP process is thus encouraging. This accords with provisions of section 29(1) of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) which allows for: - (i) the local community to be consulted on its development needs and priorities; (ii) the local community to participate in the drafting of the IDP; and (iii) organs of state, including traditional authorities, and other role players to be identified and consulted on the drafting of the IDP.

6.5.2 Community capability and empowerment

Arnstein (1969:216) viewed public participation as a form of power. The author asserts that “public participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless” (Arnstein, 1969:216). Arnstein (1969:217) proposes types of participation and “nonparticipation”. In this study the community capability and empowerment factor scores were found to be significantly different across the different categories of position (KW=15.5; p=0.0014) (Table 6.3). The findings suggest that ward committee members and IDP representative forum members were less likely to believe in the influence of the community capability and empowerment factor construct (i.e. equal voice, equally informed, expertise to prioritise community needs, sufficient time to participate, political party influences and public power to influence adoption of community needs in IDP) on IDP outcomes compared to ward councillors and community stakeholders. Hence, the study findings also indicated that in BCMM public participation stakeholders (63.9%) (45.1% and 18.8% cumulatively) (Figure 6.1) use power and influence to include or exclude issues to be included in the IDP. There was an
overwhelming perception that public participation in the IDP is dominated by powerful community networks.

6.5.3 Knowledge as practice and knowledge/power

The findings (56.9%) (30.5% and 26.4% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3) showing that ward committees were dominated by a single political party and that the public participation process was also dominated by the more knowledgeable people (54.8%) (41.1% and 13.8% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3) illustrates that power is effective in enabling or constraining action through dynamic alignments that bring action to bear upon another. The results indicating that those with greater material resources are listened to more than other community members (46.8%) (30.7% and 16.1% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3) suggest that the ‘privileged’ members of the community have moderate voice and influence over the less resourced community members (47.9%) (32.4% and 15.5% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3) during public participation in the IDP. Tests of significance of association between opinion on public participation supporting the IDP process, showed statistically significant associations for items testing C174–Experts domination ($\chi^2 = 11.4; p = 0.0033$) and C178–Compliance to municipal laws ($\chi^2 = 6.7; p = 0.0350$). There is therefore a perception that participants in the IDP are dominated by those with expert knowledge on the IDP. The implication is therefore that knowledge is established not only in relation to statements, but also objects, practices, programmes, skills, social networks and institutions (Rouse, 1994:110).

Respondents were also of the view that in BCMM public participation merely fulfils compliance issues. In South African municipalities compliance in this way is seen as an indicator of sound financial and administrative management. The issue of compliance with key legislation has been a repeated challenge for the municipality. This finding implies that public participation in BCMM can be symbolic. Schubert (2008:184) explains that while the symbolic forms of power “may in some ways be gentler than physical violence … it is no less real”. He maintains that “hierarchies and social inequality … are produced and maintained, less by physical force than by symbolic domination” (Schubert, 2008:183). When public participation in the IDP in BCMM is for purposes of compliance, it therefore mostly becomes symbolic.

Tests for significance of association between satisfaction with public participation in IDP process detected statistically significant associations for items, C155–IDP document structure and size, ($\chi^2 = 13.2; p = 0.0014$), C156–IDP document language, $\chi^2 = 12.5; p = 0.0019$, C173–Single party domination ($\chi^2 = 6.4; p = 0.0412$), and C174–Experts domination ($\chi^2 = 6.6; p = 0.0374$). Results of the tests for significance of association between
satisfaction with own participation in the IDP process further confirmed statistically significant associations for items C155–IDP document structure and size ($\chi^2 = 6.3; p = 0.042$), C156–IDP document language ($\chi^2 = 9.1; p = 0.010$), and C178–compliance with municipal laws and procedures ($\chi^2 = 9.0; p = 0.011$). The results of the tests for significance of association between satisfaction with ward committee functioning furthermore confirmed statistically significant associations for items C155–IDP document structure and size ($\chi^2 = 13.2; p = 0.001$), and C173–Single party domination.

The findings showing domination of ward committees ($\chi^2 = 17.8; p = 0.000$) by members of a single party in BCMM, is inimical to the notion of democratic voice, which denotes fair, free and open forms of debate and communication ensuring that no one form of reasoning and/or knowledge dominates others. Thus, while public participation in the IDP in BCMM is generally perceived as representing an “opening of the civic, political and co-governance opportunity structures” (Purdue, 2001:2211) and to provide direct access to and influence in shaping the IDP and municipal responses to resident’s needs, dominance by a single political party in participatory spaces alienates and disempowers other citizens of different political persuasions. Analysing a similar community situation, Simmons (2003:90) observed that the affected communities often felt distrustful, powerless and vulnerable. Public participation in the IDP in BCMM has to incorporate notions of local knowledge, local rights, and local power without marginalising any political grouping. An emphasis on local knowledge is based on the recognition that local residents represent sources of information and insights unavailable to outside professionals, ‘street science’ (Corburn (2005) as cited in Chaskin, Khare and Joseph, 2012:869). Leveraging this knowledge, therefore, is essential for informing more responsive, workable, and sustainable IDPs.

6.5.4 Compliance with municipal laws and procedures

The findings in both sections B and C of the survey questionnaire (Addendum G) therefore consistently converge on the view that compliance to municipal laws and procedures determines the issues that get prioritised in the IDP, regardless of community input during public participation as indicated in items, B139–59.2% (34.1% and 25.1% cumulatively) (Figure 5.10); C178–49.3%) (36.9% and 12.4% cumulatively) (Figure, 6.3). This is not unexpected, given that Auditor-General’s reports over the years, have revealed systematic and political factors, such as poor compliance with constitutional, legislative and regulatory frameworks (Moshikaro and Pencelliah, 2016:27; Nzewi, Ijeoma, Sibanda and Sambumbu, 2016:39). This means that while there seems to a perception that stakeholders have equal voice, are equally informed of the IDP process and have the expertise to prioritise community needs, the role of the public and their
expectations in terms of the municipality’s strategic direction through the IDP, is less valued. This also points to the lack of decisive leadership intervention and consequence management (Auditor-General of South Africa, 2014:80). This is a deficiency in the strategic planning and implementation of municipal mission and vision. In terms of interpretation, this implies that empowerment and capability development still remains a challenge. The finding also implies that there is still considerable misunderstanding of the strategic intent and purpose of the role of ward councillors, ward committee members, the IDP representative forum and the community in linking the planning process to their constituencies or wards. This means that although there is a level of recognition of the importance of public participation in the IDP, the essential ingredient ‘empowerment’ is missing, possibly due to lack of commitment to public participation, as a meaningful link between the municipality and residents. This could imply that key drivers of controls, of which compliance is a significant component still pose a challenge in BCMM.

The results show that there are just as many respondents who agree that the IDP representative forum represents specific interest groups (40.1%) (30.5% and 9.6% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3) as there are those who disagree (47.8%) (17.3% and 30.5% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3). The majority (55.5%) (20.9% and 34.6% cumulatively) (Figure 6.3) disagree that the IDP representative forum only represent interests of specific individuals. The results in Table 6.2 indicate that educational level has a significant association with the belief or perception that IDP representative forum members influences IDP outcomes. Tests for significance of association between the beliefs that the IDP representative forum influence IDP outcomes detected statistically significant associations for items C153–Influence of powerful community members \( (\chi^2 = 8.0; p = 0.0178) \) and C158–Minority population participation \( (\chi^2 = 13.5; p = 0.0012) \). Those with an FET education were 3.3 times as likely to believe that IDP representative forum members influence the IDP outcomes as are those with secondary or university education. Position also came out to be significantly associated with the belief that IDP representative forum members influence IDP outcomes. Ward committee members and IDP representative forum members were less likely to believe in the influence of IDP representative forum members on IDP outcomes compared to ward councillors and community stakeholders. The results indicate that, gender and age had no significant associations with the belief that IDP representative forum members influence IDP outcomes.
6.5.5 Comprehensibility of IDP Document

Findings in this study suggest that residents were often discouraged from participating in the IDP due to the size and incomprehensibility of the IDP document. This finding was confirmed by the test for significance which detected a statistically significant association between satisfaction with ward committee functioning and IDP document structure and size \((\chi^2 = 13.2; \ p = 0.0014)\). It is inferred that the ‘voice’, as well as the ‘expertise to prioritise community needs’, respondents claim to have, does not necessarily translate into substantive community empowerment, in the absence of access to information on the IDP. Senecah (2004:23) supports this inference, arguing that access not only denotes the opportunity to participate including “sufficient and appropriate opportunities to express [one’s] choices and opinions”, but also “to access sufficient and appropriate support, for instance, education, information, so that [one] can understand the process in an informed, active capacity. This implies that, influence signifies the opportunity “to affect the criteria by which decisions [are] made’ and to have one’s ideas measured against alternatives” (Senecah, 2004:31). This study therefore argues that when IDP documents are incomprehensible or inaccessible, they perpetuate powerlessness among municipal residents. This means that, to understand the complexity of power dynamics in public participation in the IDP, it is necessary to have an in-depth appraisal of how public participatory spaces such as ward committees and municipal structures, (ward councillors, IDP representative forums, council) use participatory genres to condition citizens’ participation or, how their opportunities and possibilities of having a voice, are shaped by particular practices that limit access to information, knowledge and other resources. This implies that, as Arnstein (1969:219) proposed in her typology of eight levels of participation “informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options can be the most important step toward legitimate public participation”.

The result confirming a significant relationship between the IDP representative forum influencing IDP outcomes and powerful community members networking and developing connections, thereby advancing their interests and marginalising other stakeholders in public participation spaces in the IDP processes in BCMM, \((\chi^2 = 8.0; \ p = 0.013)\) imply that powerful community members advance interests of their constituencies, due to among other things, personal agendas, and agency problems besetting ward councillors and the municipal officials. Cast (2003:188) is therefore of the view that understanding power dynamics requires explanation about which individuals and under what conditions, powerful actors dominate, so that meanings are consistent with their own definition of situations.
The notion of agency is enlightening on how power dynamics can influence public participation in the IDP. Bourdieu’s theory of social practice (1977b) explains how power is distributed and enacted with a social sphere. Two elements of Bourdieu’s theory, namely ‘field’ and ‘symbolic capital’ are of particular interest (Bourdieu, 1993:72). His notion of ‘symbolic capital’ explains what enables participants in the IDP to exercise their agency in relation to municipal contextualities. Symbolic capital appears in cultural, social, scientific and literacy capital forms, allowing public participation stakeholders in the IDP to wield power, or influence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:98). Fields determine what values are institutionally acceptable, promoted or shared. Each field is governed by its own set of rules, which are taken for granted by all agents, regardless of their position. Actors’ social (interpersonal relationships and the resources embedded within them) and cultural (knowledge and skills) capital shape their sense-making in public participation spaces in the IDP (Safavi and Omidvar, 2016:553). Bourdieu’s ideas are thus suitable in this study, investigating public participation power dynamics in the IDP, as they extend the very understanding of power beyond hierarchical positions and to a broader context within which participatory spaces exist. The concept of symbolic capital is of significant value in this study, as it demonstrates how actors can wield their power in relation to other actors in public participation spaces.

Findings also indicated that public participation in the IDP was low among residents of ‘privileged’ socio-economic status (57.3%) (44.1% and 13.2% cumulatively) (Figure 6.1). The tests for differences in inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores across categories of the public participation variables (Table 6.5) show that inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores differed across categories of all the variables. The p-values were all less than 0.05, therefore, the differences are statistically significant. However, the pattern of the differences in inclusivity factor (Factor 2 Section C) scores was such that in the YES (public participation supports the IDP) for Question B6, SATISFIED (satisfaction with functioning of ward committees in BCMM) for B7, SATISFIED (satisfied with public participation in BCMM) for Question B14, and YES (satisfaction with extent of own participation in the IDP) for Question C18 and (IDP representative forum influences the IDP) Question C20 scored significantly lower on this factor. This implies that differences in resources, do influence public participation in the IDP in BCMM. This finding suggests that access to public participation in the IDP is influenced by a resident’s class, socioeconomic status, thereby excluding the less privileged.

The results indicating that less powerful community members are often dominated and alienated by more powerful members of the community, illustrates that power is best understood as relational. This therefore suggests that in public participation spaces in the IDP are imbued with
the co-construction of meanings, activities, identities, ideologies, emotions and other culturally meaningful realities, including power positions (Declercq and Ayala, 2017:5). From Foucauldian constructionism individuals often take up positions or discourses, be they dominant or marginalised to pursue their own interests (Miller, 2008:258).

Sen’s (1999:36) capability approach inserts the notion of capabilities or well-being freedoms into the opportunity aspect of development as freedom. The NDP similarly, draws extensively on the notion of capabilities (Sen, 1999:36), freedoms and functionings (Sen, 1999:71). The National Planning Commission, (2012:17) has identified; political freedoms and human rights; social opportunities arising from education, health care, public transport and other public services; social security and safety nets; an open society, transparency, disclosures and a culture of accountability; and economic facilities, work, consumption, exchange, investment and production, as capabilities that can create public value. The South Africa envisaged in the National Development Plan, Vision 2030 is a developmental state which must build the capabilities of people to improve their own lives, while intervening to correct historical inequalities (National Planning Commission, 2012:17). This implies that if BCMM is to deliver services in an effective and efficient manner, it must ensure the sustainable development in local communities (Van der Waldt, 2014:21). Building capabilities becomes more important given that the deprivation intensity shows that 39.6% (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.1) of the South African population is multi-dimensionally poor (UNDP, 2015:6).

6.6 CONCLUSION

Chapter 5 presented, analysed and discussed the questionnaire survey data (quantitative method) on the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process in BCMM. This chapter further presented and analysed survey questionnaire data on the dynamics of public participation in the IDP process and how they influence the integrated planning process in BCMM (Section C of the survey questionnaire). This chapter concludes that generally public participation spaces in the IDP affords stakeholders in BCMM a voice to influence IDP programmes and projects. Respondents felt that they were informed of the IDP process and that as stakeholders they had the requisite expertise to prioritise community needs. Respondents were also of the view that they had sufficient time to participate in the IDP process and that political affiliation had no pervasive influence on the community needs that get recommended to the municipal council for inclusion in the IDP. Tests for significance of association showed statistically significant associations with prioritisation of stakeholder consensus building as well as the municipal council adequately budgeting for public participation in the IDP process. Regarding power and influence the study results confirmed that
public participation stakeholders in the IDP use their ‘power’ and ‘influence’ to determine what is included or excluded from the IDP. Tests for significance of association with residents’ satisfaction with public participation in IDP process, adequate provision of resource support to enable participation in the IDP and the ability of stakeholders to influence the municipal council regarding adoption of community needs in the IDP.

Regarding capabilities and substantive empowerment, factor scores were found to be significantly different across the different categories of position. This chapter therefore concludes that ward committee members and IDP representative forum members, were less likely to believe that the community had the capabilities and power to influence IDP outcomes. Respondents were thus less likely to believe that the community had equal voice, that it was equally informed, that it had requisite expertise to prioritise community needs, and that it had sufficient time to participate in the IDP process. Ward committee members and IDP representative forum members were also less likely to believe the political party influences and public power can influence the adoption of community needs in IDP by the municipal council.

With regards to domination of public participation spaces, the chapter concludes that there is a belief that the public participation process gets dominated by the more knowledgeable. Results further indicate that, those with material wealth had more voice and hence the less powerful community members were often dominated and alienated by the powerful. This conclusion was confirmed by the tests of showing significant associations towards public participation supports for the IDP with ‘experts’ domination and compliance to municipal legislative and regulatory frameworks. The chapter therefore concludes that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is often dominated by those with expert knowledge on the IDP. Results further showed that respondents in this study were also of the view that in BCMM public participation merely fulfils compliance issues. This finding implies that public participation in BCMM could be symbolic and tokenistic, thus maintaining and reproducing social inequality, less by physical force than by symbolic domination.
Chapter 7 : PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE DATA

7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses, interprets and discusses qualitative data collected through open-ended questions on the survey questionnaire, as well as focus group discussions with ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). The results presented and analysed in this chapter also relate to the aim and objectives of the study: to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP process, and to explain how the dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. A focus-group discussion guide (Addendum I), was developed, as the second data collection method. For the focus group discussion forty respondents (n=40) were purposeful sampled. This selection was informed by the need for further investigation in select cases that were found to be information-rich, based on the results obtained from analysis of the survey questionnaire.

7.2 PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE DATA FINDINGS
The findings are structured around the themes that emerged, that related to the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP process, and how the dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. Quotes are used selectively to give voice to the participants and to illustrate the meanings. Themes/Findings from open-ended questions on the survey questionnaire, as well as focus group discussion are presented and discussed in sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.9.

7.2.1 Community satisfaction with public participation in the IDP
The ‘Big Society’ initiative encourages ‘the move towards smaller government’ and as a result “places the onus on communities to creatively tackle their own problems” (Chalmers, 2012:17). Public value is intrinsically linked to a collective notion such as ‘the general interest’. In Moore’s (2013:58) view the public or collective is the starting point, not private or individual value. Moore (2013:58) captures this in phrases such as ‘the collective arbiter of value’. The discourse on, public value, further draws on what is democracy, public interest, and so on. As a consequence, ‘public satisfaction’ becomes a possible public value. Satisfaction is defined as “an evaluative attitude or behaviour towards some experience or object” (James, 2009:108). For Mishler and Rose (2001:36) public service delivery is affected not only by overall government performance, but also citizens’ own values and circumstances. Personal background and social status therefore also pervasively influence satisfaction with local government performance,
planning or policy outcomes. Community expectations and satisfaction therefore vary in relation to contextual characteristics (Mangai, 2016:89). Results from the focus group participants show mixed views on satisfaction of respondents with public participation in the IDP in BCMM. Results show that respondents portrayed the following sentiments:

“I participate to the best of my ability and questions are responded to, by municipal officials including the municipal manager. Normally this process starts at ward level, led by the ward councillor and further consultation is done through municipal outreach programmes. In my area everyone participates equally despite political backgrounds. In the IDP meetings the community is free to raise their needs and identify the projects that they want” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

“In many instances identified projects in my ward have been accepted by the municipality... Yes of course I am satisfied...I start the process from the planning stages up to the final stage [adoption stage] ” (sic) (Ward councillor).

“I get invited and attend... I get involved in any process preceding the IDP meetings... I do participate ... but at times priorities as been given by the community are not adhered to... they don’t get included” (sic) (Community stakeholder)

Respondents also indicated mixed feelings with regard to satisfaction with the participation of stakeholders such as the IDP representative forum and influences on the IDP. The focus group participants revealed, for example, that;

“They [IDP representative forum] cover the needs of the community where they come from [sectoral integration]... relevant people are brought in to explain their fields... It is the IDP forum which shapes the direction of the IDP” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“I don’t know if it exists [the IDP representative forum]... I don’t know because I never heard about it before, but as ward committee I want more information to have for the community” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“Our sector plans should be an integral part of our municipality ... in our IDP...because it takes into account different views and that all stakeholders participate freely without fear” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

“The issues that are raised by the communities are taken through the IDP representative forum... I don’t even know their input without community participation... issues raised by the communities are refined on by the IDP representative forum” (sic) (Ward committee member).

The findings are interpreted as portraying a mixture of exposure, vulnerability and threat to public participation in the IDP, which is also viewed as a form of corporatism, given that participation is subordinated to formal local governance structures, as well as presupposed
political consensus in representative democracy (Pløger, 2001:237; Tufo and Gaster, 2002:6). As postulated by Tew (2005:77) in public participation spaces, dominant perspectives may be policed through disallowing the possibility of alternative viewpoints that might undermine the construction of superiority or suggest a continuity of common experiences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Rutgers (2015:39) views public values as specific values that concern ‘the good society’ or ‘the general interest’, that is, the sustainability of society and the well-being of its members, irrespective of immediate personal preferences or interests. The possibility of public participation in the IDP creating public value got resonance from focus group participants who had this to say:

“if the representatives can be active and trustworthy the outcomes would be positive... because they are presenting the community needs, so that they influence the IDP outcomes. I strongly believe that these forums will make the people’s voice to be heard” (sic) (Ward councillor).

“Different stakeholders bring projects that can change people’s lives...IDP representative forum is comprised of all stakeholders... IDP representative forum has all departmental representatives, business community, NGOs and elite groups [interest groups]... my take is surely they are there to benefit themselves... they support each other” (sic) (Ward committee member).

“We [IDP representative forum] have less influence though... they [community needs] can be determined by the priority order. Strong interest groups have more influence as to the final product... it would be helpful if the municipal councils can work according to IDP outcomes as suggested by communities ... it’s all about community needs, isn’t it?” (sic) (IDP representative forum)

“The representative forum can influence the outcome and even change public views...they know the community issues... the IDP representative forum can influence by taking part in each and every IDP outreach meeting... they take the needs from the community, review them and bring back the ones they are prioritising” (sic) (Ward councillor).

Sector departments provide information that assist in the planning of the municipality... there is no representation of the needs of the people... since they discuss the projects prior, they do have an influence. The IDP representative forum shapes the direction of the IDP. It is biased... they are political hence, they are biased” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“All of our IDP outreach programmes always attract large numbers of community members. Yes, I am satisfied with public participation in the IDP, because we fully participate with all our officials of the public participation and communication in our
IDP road shows. My municipality have a goal to put people first to achieve service delivery, public always consult ward committees and ward councillors on issues of development and IDP. Our municipality is dealing with the issues that have been raised during the public participation, meaning communities have been given a chance to participate” (sic) (Ward councillor).

Results from the focus groups also showed feelings of dissatisfaction amongst with public participation in the IDP amongst respondents. The respondents felt that:

“Not enough is being done to educate community about the importance of IDP and participation, therefore most do not attend or a few educated attend... Issues raised by the community remain the same throughout the system. Their ruling party does not do well, they do not listen to public views and they influence the people with their own decisions using their members” (sic) (Ward committee member [opposition]).

“The community needs to be given more knowledge, so they could be able understand what is expected of them. IDP does not satisfy community needs. Because most residents don’t participate as they don’t really understand the importance of taking part in the process. They did not hear most of our views... public participation doesn’t make us aware of the IDP. Our ward area is vast so people are not heard” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“Municipality is not implementing the needs of the people, because some things people want, the municipality does not do it at all ... that is why people get angry and burn the streets all the time. Some things are done quickly to the other communities, to some they don’t do totally”. Some of them they take time such as houses, electricity. Because there is nothing happening it’s only empty promises” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“IDP document is a cut and paste and is the same every year. No implementation and evaluations of projects” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

These findings indicate that the contextual background of a homogenous socio-economic community is related to the expectations and satisfaction of the inhabitants of a neighbourhood or community. Faced with similar mixed feelings on service satisfaction DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons (1990:810) concluded that possibly those residents of a higher socio-economic status could be interested in ‘amenities’, while the working class people may place theirs in ‘housekeeping’ and the lower classes in ‘social services’. This brings in a host of issues related to the way ‘the public interest’ can be established. Expounding on the concept of public value, Bozeman (2007:13) provides an elaborate definition, which is often cited: “a society’s “public values” are those providing normative consensus about: (i) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives
to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (ii) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (iii) the principles on which governments and policies should be based” (Bozeman, 2007:13).

Bozeman (2007:12) opposes public values explicitly to public interest. His workable definition of the latter reads; “in a particular context, the public interest refers to the outcomes best serving the long-run survival and wellbeing of a social collective as a public” (Bozeman, 2007:12). For Bozeman (2007:12) therefore an important distinction between public interest and public value is that…‘public interest’ is an ideal, whereas ‘public values’ have specific, identifiable content”.

A precondition for public values, concerns the very notion of public, the public sphere and the political mechanisms that create and change public values. The implication for this study is therefore that experiences with public participation in the IDP of community residents influences their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the municipal council.

7.2.2 Capability as power in public participation spaces in the IDP

Development thinking has evolved substantially. Unfortunately, and compared to with other important dimensions, the capability approach literature scarcely addresses the relationship between planning and the outcomes of development programmes (Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio and Zepeda, 2014:29). For Sen (2002:585) freedom is valuable for at least two distinct reasons. First, more freedom gives people more opportunity to achieve things they value, and have reason to value. Second, the process through which things may happen is of fundamental importance in assessing freedom. For Sen (2002:585) there is, thus, an important distinction between the ‘opportunity aspect’ and the ‘process aspect’ of freedom. The issue of a lack of understanding amongst community members, of the strategic nature of the IDP was a recurring theme. Respondents were of the opinion that lack of capacity/capability prevents stakeholders from effectively participating in the IDP in BCMM and perpetuates the marginalisation of BCMM residents from meaningfully participating and articulating their needs. A recurring theme was that the IDP was not understood by many community stakeholders, including those who represent them, the ward committees. This view was however not supported by quantitative data analysis in Chapter 5. Quantitative data indicated that public participation supported the IDP process (Chapter 5 Section 5.3), that the functioning of ward committees was satisfactory, indicating that the majority of residents were satisfied, and suggesting that ward committees either mostly did what was expected of them or did more than what was expected (Figure 5.4). Qualitative data from focus group participants, to the contrary showed residents of BCMM lacked capability in the IDP process. One respondent for example, had this to say about IDP outreach programmes in BCMM:
“Most questions from residents during IDP outreach programmes are based on houses and electricity and also jobs for the people... there are lots of disagreements on which activities must be done first. Very few understand the significance of this exercises [public participation in the IDP]...community education is highly needed...people are not well informed about the municipal process concerning service delivery” (sic) (Ward councillor).

Commenting on the capacity of the ward committee, another respondent pointed out that:

“Ward committee is not capacitated to be public representatives. Most of the questions are based to the houses and the people ask about jobs in our municipality” (sic) (Ward councillor).

The practice of discussing issues, unrelated to the IDP, was echoed by yet another respondent who pointed out that:

“The problem is about jobs people want jobs. I have experienced that the community is always shouting, complaining...some are very angry when they want to raise their issues ...some of the issues are never attended to, so it’s a long standing problem” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

These results can be interpreted as implying that, the residents of BCMM, lack the agency and empowerment necessary for meaningfully participating in the IDP process. Agency and empowerment are two core requirements of process freedom (Sen, 2002:585). In his reflections on what he called “human development paradigm” Haq (1995:16-20) listed empowerment as one of four essential components of human development. Empowerment is related to mobilisation, participation, agency, autonomy, self-determination, self-confidence and liberation (Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio and Zepeda, 2014:29). Empowerment may be described as a set of two components (Narayan, 2005:3): the expansion of agency, and the institutional environment that conditions the opportunity structures for exercising agency effectively – what relates to power, accountability, participation, political structures and local community organisational capacities. For Giddens (1984:14) human agency relates to the capacity to make a difference (i.e. to have a transformative capacity, while structure includes social systems and other reproduced social practices – which can have either constraining or enabling effects). As postulated by Giddens (1984:14) the exercise of agency is constrained by social structures. The responses from the focus group participants are suggestive of a worrying lack of that kind of empowerment amongst stakeholders in public participation in the IDP process in BCMM. The issues of RDP houses and jobs raised during public participation meetings suggests that lack of capacity. Lack of capacity was similarly raised by another focus group participant who, for example, indicated that:
There is a lack of understanding, of the meaning of IDP...some think IDP is an ANC branch... Sometimes what the stakeholders suggest does not form the content of an IDP. The community is not educated enough to understand the processes of the IDP...what goes in there and what should be done by other government departments” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

Capacity challenges were further raised by another focus group participant who observed that:

“Capacity challenges [are an issue]... they (community) don’t know the process of IDP... they must learn what it is... so they know what to do when it comes to mayoral roadshows. Some community members don’t take public participation in the IDP process serious, when it is the most important meeting for their future and needs” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

The inclusion of principles is an essential element of Sen’s work on capabilities and freedom, conceived as “considerations that help set priorities or judge society-wide distributions of capabilities, such as poverty reduction, efficiency, equity and resilience” (Alkire, 2010:28). Alkire (2010:37) has proposed to position the ‘process aspect’ at the centre of the capability approach as part of the core objectives of human development. Findings thus also show a worrying trend, that public representatives could also be lacking in the process aspects of capabilities. The lack of competence and capacity in public participation through lack of skills and knowledge on municipal strategic planning, has also been found to be a main challenge for public participation processes elsewhere (Lyhne, Nielsen and Aaen, 2016:320). The capabilities of ward committees were for an example questioned by focus group participants, who noted with concern that:

“The ward committees do not regard themselves as part of the municipality, when the community raises questions, only the ward councillor answers questions...[ward committee members] they also want RDP houses and jobs” (sic) (Ward councillor).

Schmitter (2002:52) has built the notion of ‘stake’ to suggest a range of different ‘holders’ based on the rights, spatial location, knowledge, share, stake, interest, and status. As a normative concept, public participation as a democratic right reduces marginalisation, increases trust, increases empowerment, and capacity building (Stringer, Dougill, Fraser, Hubacek, Prell and Reed, 2006:39). However, done poorly, public participation in the IDP in BCMM can result in undemocratic outcomes by reinforcing or perpetuating existing power inequalities, marginalising minority perspectives, creating dysfunctional consensus, or fostering cynicism (Sprain, 2016:66). This can be the case when public representatives either lack the capabilities
to carry out their mandates or agency to initiate change. For example as noted by a focus group participant:

“Ward councillors forget their responsibilities as they begin to form part of the community and raise complaints and lead the public protests” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Thus the need to capacitate public participation stakeholders in the IDP in BCMM cannot be overemphasised. Foucault’s notion of governmentality relates to the state-civil society relationship and the emergence of governance-beyond-the-state. Governmentality refers to the rationalities and tactics of governing and how they become expressed in particular technologies of governing (Foucault, 1991a:103). However, using Foucault’s analytic lens, the state appears as a ‘tactics of government’, as a dynamic form and historical stabilisation of societal power relations. Thus, by means of the notion of governmentality, the neo-liberal agenda for the ‘withdrawal of the state’ can be deciphered as a technique of government (Swyngedouw, 2005:1997; Lemke, 2002:60). The argument is that, neoliberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a special entrepreneurial form. It responds to stronger ‘demand’ for individual scope for determination and desired autonomy by ‘supplying’ individuals and collectives with the possibility of actively participating in the solution of specific matters and problems which had hitherto been the domain of the state (Swyngedouw, 2005:1997). The ‘tactics of government’ thesis thus can be interpreted as a symbolic power game, where the residents/citizen unconsciously author their own failure. Alkire (2010:37) therefore proposed a core conception of human development which includes process freedoms, in addition to capability expansion. Alkire (2010:37) proposes that in addition to capability expansion, principles such as poverty reduction, durability, sustainability and support for human rights be integral to human development. The issue of sustainability was, for example, raised by a focus group participant who was of the view that:

“... each and every financial year Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan and detailed business plans which explore step by step activities and action to guide employees on what they really need to do to, contribute towards the achievement of broader goals. Residents just want services, they have no regard for municipal plans like the IDP... so I can say priorities and budgets ... is not part of their vocabulary...I don’t think they know how municipalities function” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

Findings from focus group discussion thus highlight perceptions of incapacity and lack of knowledge/expertise for public participation stakeholders to meaningfully contribute to the IDP. Meaningful contribution in the context of public participation in the IDP in BCMM would, in essence, imply that public participation spaces envision issues as: agency, individual and
collective needs and interests, development consequences or purposes, structural conditions and power configurations, local knowledge, capacities, stages of social change, self-reliance, the place of culture in the social context, and evaluating whether ‘real’ participation did take place (Dervin and Huesca, 1999:177; Chasi, 2011:46-147). These capabilities can flourish through agency, consciousness and empowerment, thus giving residents power to meaningfully participate in the IDP process from an informed point of view. Hobbes’s (1985:150) definition of power as a person’s “present means…to obtain some future apparent ‘Good’” is an example of this understanding of power and empowerment. Similarly, Adrendt (1970:44) who views power as “the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert, is insightful”. Thus, power is something – anything – which makes or renders somebody able to do, capable of doing something. It is capacity, potential, ability, or wherewithal.

The implications of these results are that it becomes critically important for all stakeholders in public participation in the IDP to be conscious of how power shapes IDP outcomes in ways that marginalise less powerful interests. While on the surface public participation in the IDP includes a number of stakeholders, powerful interests shape IDP outcomes. Instead, less powerful interests are largely marginalised or unheard altogether (Culley and Angelique, 2011:422). In Declercq and Ayala’s (2017:4) constructivist and interactionist perspective, power is dynamic and interactional. Discourse and decision-making are nested within systems of power that may mask manipulated and manufactured public consent (Culley and Angelique, 2011:411). Thus, the issue of a lack of capacity amongst public participation stakeholders in the IDP in BCMM, speaks to the issues of power, where the municipality by appearing to involve residents who lack understanding of IDP issues, uses public participation as a smokescreen, thereby making residents the authors of their own failure, through tokenistic public participation. Capabilities enable stakeholders to effectively participate in the IDP in BCMM, and where they are lacking, residents get marginalised and excluded from the decision making-process. Thus public participation in the IDP is always permeated not only by power, but also by tactics, strategies, and the microphysics of power. One has therefore to be more careful of attempts to argue that public participation is a way of always empowering communities and promoting public interests. Public participation and learning have recently been viewed as means for exercising rights within rights-based approaches to development (Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio and Zepeda, 2014:31). In that approach, power imbalances are regarded as the basic cause of poverty and inequality. Thus, the rights-based approaches to development focus on political issues such as inequality, rights, exclusion, power, accountability and relationships in general amongst individuals, groups, organisations and spheres of government.
7.2.3 Public participation dynamics influenced by limitations of resources

Public participation approaches and spaces in the IDP process hide conflicts within communities under the apparent consensus of group discussions, as most of the participatory methods in BCMM are outreach meeting based. As noted by Cornwall and Jewkes (1995:1673) it is often assumed that local communities are small entities, homogenous, well defined and integrated, undervaluing differences on wealth, gender, age, religion and ethnicity and therefore power. A popular view of power first described by Darl (1957) views power as control over superior bargaining resources (e.g. money, jobs, political influence), which are used to influence others (Culley and Angelique, 2011:412). Lack of resources also came out prominently in the findings from responses of discussants in the focus groups. The issues of resources related to difficulties of accessing IDP outreach meetings owing to transport problems. For example, a community member was worried that meetings were held far from where some residents lived, thereby making it difficult for them to attend with no resources. The following quotes capture the sentiments of discussants:

“Our areas are far from venue” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Another respondent pointed out that;

“Sometimes ward committees find it difficult to reach certain areas because the stipend is next to nothing for travelling expenses...they are not capacitated to do consultation and to capture community needs and challenges” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Similarly, the issue of lack of resources was raised as a concern by yet another respondent, who emphatically said;

“No resources to attend IDP forums...some don’t have money to attend the meetings ... there is no transport to attend the meeting” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

On being asked if public participation was inclusive, a respondent again pointed to the issue of lack of resources to attend IDP meetings. Findings from focus groups, therefore, tend to suggest public participation spaces in the IDP process in BCMM, systematically discriminates/excludes those community members without means of transport of their own through access to such spaces. This finding is evidenced by a focus group participant who bemoaned that:

“[Because of] lack of transport, some members can’t attend although interested...“The municipality should budget enough in order to visit the people. The community have the right of say. Municipality should hire transport for the community to the IDP outreach meetings” (sic) (Community member).

This finding implies that, resources (e.g. monetary, political influence, specialist knowledge) empower residents to participate. Accessing public participation spaces, especially in marginalised and poor communities, requires resources, without which, many residents of

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BCMM can get excluded from participating. Thus, resources determine who participates, and lack thereof sets the agenda in favour of more powerful interests (Culley and Angelique, 2011:420). Capital is accumulated (material, embodied or institutionalised) and thus presents a broad and generalised conception of social power as accumulated resources (Bourdieu, 1986:241-242). Capital, in Bourdieu’s theory, is however embodied not only in economic, but also in cultural, social, and symbolic forms (Bourdieu, 1986:241). Central to Bourdieu’s sociology, is that society consists of relationships between social agents who dispose of different types of capital such as economic, cultural, social or political. An important aspect of inclusion therefore concerns access to the resources, institutions, spaces, social arrangements, and opportunities afforded to communities (Chaskin, et al., 2012:864). One of the respondents captures the need for resources in BCMM by noting that:

“Many [in the community] are unemployed...resources are the problem...municipal council only chips in when meetings are normally linked with the one on the mayoral outreach programme...so much resource[s] are then availed to ensure success of mayoral programmes...but with other IDP outreach meetings, residents have to use own resources. I believe it is done through mayoral outreach programmes for political reasons” (sic) (Ward councillor).

This finding is in tandem with VaneKlasen and Miller’s (2006:38) postulation that power is the degree of control over material, human, intellectual and financial resources exercised by different sections of community stakeholders in public participation in the IDP. Control of resources therefore becomes a source of individual and social power. The cost of involving citizens in the decision-making process is thus a serious obstacle in the way of the municipality’s efforts to increase participation. Similarly, Irvin and Stansbury (2004:58) concluded that, even if the time and resources of public participants is not taken into account, “the low end of the per-decision cost of public-participation groups is arguably more expensive than the decision-making of a single agency administrator”. This implies that that public participation is best encouraged by social environments that offer reinforcement and encouragement, not ones that raise the social costs of public participation. Accordingly, Fox-Rogers and Murphy (2014:245) also stated that “the ability of stakeholders to participate in and shape the public participation process is largely determined by the availability of resources available to them (i.e. economic power) with such practices often resulting in “the continued dominance of the already powerful”.

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As postulated by Alkire (2010:37) a process freedoms approach to human development would imply catalysing, facilitating and synergising with the public for their empowerment. Active public participation not only enhances local potentialities, based on people’s knowledge, experiences and creativity, but also gives way to facilitate experiential learning processes, beginning with the individual and household dimensions of learning as one of the foundations of expanding capabilities. Thus public participation, viewed as engaging in deliberation processes, brings about a greater likelihood that the outcome would be more robust and effective. Deliberative processes can result in strengthening autonomous individuals’ decisions, households’ livelihood strategies, communities’ plans and municipal council projects, programmes and actions. According to Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio and Zepeda (2014:41-42) this narrative configures an alternative theory of change for development interventions. The traditional results chain model (inputs → activities → outputs → outcomes → impact) may thus, be replaced by one based on the interrelated dimensions of human development defined by Alkire (2010:37) as process freedoms (agency), principles–vision, opportunity freedoms and sustainability (Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio and Zepeda (2014:41). According to Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio and Zepeda (2014:42) activities under which development interventions may be structured would be the following: mobilising, expanding participation capabilities, deliberating principles, values and vision, catalysing autonomy, partnerships, and learning (including evaluative activities), adapting, mutual accountability.

7.2.4 Accessing public participation spaces in the IDP
Access refers to the opportunity to make use of something. Processes, practices, cultural norms and customs shape communities’ understanding of their needs, roles, possibilities and actions in ways that deter effective action and change (VaneKlasen and Miller, 2006:47). Among marginal groups, exclusion can brew feelings of subordination, apathy, self-blame powerlessness, unworthiness, hostility and anger. In SA municipalities this often translates to service delivery protests. Results from focus group participants show that accessing public participation spaces was a problem in some communities in the BCMM. For example, a community member raised the concern that:

“Ward committees don’t involve community in their jurisdiction” (sic) (Community member).

When residents are not fully and meaningfully involved in public participation in the IDP, this contradicts Pierre’s (1999:373) assertion that governance is “the coordination and fusion of public and private resources to more inclusive orientation, focusing on the capacity to integrate and give form to local interests, and social groups” (Le Gales (1998) cited in Melo and Baiocchi, 2006:592). Communities are foundational units offering the possibility of face-to-face
interaction, which lies at the heart of the theory of participatory democracy (Berry, Portney and Thomson, 1993:10). The emphasis on local knowledge recognises that local residents represent sources of information and insight unavailable to outside professionals or municipal elected and appointed public officials. The principle of subsidiarity emphasises the role of intermediary spaces between local government and residents (Ruiz-Villaverde and Garcia-Rubio, 2017:2484) in a municipality’s jurisdiction. Subsidiarity facilitates direct democracy since it increases the opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs. Similarly, pluralist theory of democracy views pluralism as an ideal to strive for (Ruiz-Villaverde and Garcia-Rubio, 2017:2484).

However, with regard to accessing public participation spaces in the IDP in BCMM, focus group participants bemoaned that time was a challenge, meaning that it limited their access to public participation spaces. One participant stated that:

“There is no time to work on ward plans. Time taken in the meeting is too little” (sic) (Community member).

Another participant concurred, reiterating that;

“They don’t give us more time to ask questions or they don’t point us because they are saying we are asking difficult questions” (sic) (Community member).

A ward councillor raised the problem of accessing public participation spaces in the IDP, by pointing out that:

“We can’t raise issues because members of the municipality will be at the meetings” (sic) (Ward councillor).

The inaccessibility of public participation spaces was further highlighted by a community member who also noted that:

“Access is a big issue here ... let me tell you ... municipal officials are not available to the public. IDP is not well publicised. Municipality doesn’t open communication lines with communities, attendance is another issue. IDP meetings is [are] not attended as anticipated, only the ward committees and some few residents worry about the IDP outreach meetings” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

This implies that without accessing public participation spaces, residents get excluded and their voice remains unheard. Van Dijk (1996:84) views power as the control exercised by one group over the action and/or minds of another group, thus limiting the freedom of actions of others. He suggests that one of the key factors in the production and reproduction of power and one of the primary means by which power is exercised, is by controlling and restricting ‘access to discourse and communicative events’ (Van Dijk, 1996:85). Van Dijk (1993:259) identifies four
dimensions of access through which power relations within social practices are enacted: planning, setting, discourse, and audience.

Van Dijk (1993:259) argues that one crucial power resource is privileged or has preferential access to discourse, where some (elite) participants may control the occasion, time, place, setting, and the presence or absence of participants in such events. Thus, although the municipal council is perceived as providing opportunities for public participation in the IDP in BCMM, power and status could still be restricting access to public participation at the local level, thus excluding and limiting opportunities for participation. Therefore, while on the surface, public participation in the IDP in BCMM may appear to be accessible, findings from focus group discussion suggest that that power plays a central role in IDP public hearings constraining the participation that occurs (Farkas, 2013b:402). Where residents access public participation spaces, language, discursive practices and discourse influences the way they put across their community needs. This means that a community’s social and cultural practices and beliefs may also limit access to public participation spaces. Thus language encodes people’s social worlds and allows for systematic and precise analysis of those social worlds (Declercq and Ayala, 2017:4). Language barriers can therefore be exclusionary. The issue of language and literacy and access to public participation spaces in the IDP was a recurring theme in focus group discussions. One participant asserted that;

“Documents must be in the language everyone understands ... publicity is also a problem, venues and time must be clear. IDP must be done at community level [community-based-planning] before they come to ward level. I think that way many will get the opportunity to participate... [But, more importantly] every resident must be listened to irrespective of status and power. I do not think this is happening currently, community members have to be capacitated to fully participate on the IDP roadshows, more budget should be allocated in order to conduct IDP roadshows” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

The issue of language was reemphasised by a ward councillor who similarly pointed out that:

“Language is a barrier to public participation in the IDP in my ward” (sic) (Ward councillor)

Healey (1997:265) advocates holding public discussions and organising public affairs without being dominated by the interests and language of the powerful. Healey (1997:266) suggests a communicative ethic that requires participants to listen for difference, not merely in own interests, but in values and cultural differences. The relative value placed on different types of expertise and language and the professional assumption about decision-making competence can make it difficult for communities to be heard or to have an impact on decisions. Communities
often complain of the unreasonable expectations that they present their views in managerial language: failing to do so may mean those views are never considered seriously (Carr, 2004:15). Conflict and tensions become unavoidable, since they are based on contested notions of the truth, reality and language.

Social innovation is closely linked to changes in values, social norms and local cultures (Ibrahim, 2017:9) and can activate certain norms that encourage pro-social behaviour. It is therefore essential to carefully understand local norms, social values and cultural practices, and to understand how the public cognitively perceive their daily lives. Those who are agents “have diverse valued goals and commitments on behalf of themselves and their communities” (Alkire, 2005a:125). For an individual to become an agent, s/he needs to start thinking critically about his/her life. S/he needs to reflect critically about his/her current status, perceive and aspire for better living conditions and decide and plan an action to bring about this aspired change (Ibrahim, 2017:10). The three stages “reflection – perception – action” constitute the conscientisation process (Ibrahim, 2017:10), which Freire (1972:51) defined as “the process in which men, not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives and their capacity to transform that reality”.

7.2.5 Perceptions of domination and networking in public participation spaces
Criticism that is often made of participatory development schemes is that they sometimes reproduce social inequalities within communities (Drydyk, 2005:261). The dynamics and sustainability of the conscientisation process is affected by the individual’s personal traits such as self-confidence, educational level, profession, and social status as well as the individual’s willingness to improve their lives (Ibrahim, 2017:11). Adaptation can however render the conscientisation process more difficult. As noted by Sen (1999:63) this is mainly because individuals would have to come to terms with their deprivation because of sheer necessity of survival and they may, as a result, lack the courage to demand any radical change, and may even adjust their desires and expectations to what they unambitiously see as feasible. Thus, contextual factors, such as unequal power relations at the household and communal level, can also constrain the conscientisation process (Ibrahim, 2017:11). As such, exclusion and delegitimisation excludes certain groups (and their issues) from the IDP outcomes through hidden power and agenda-setting and influenced by among other things, politics, unwritten rules, practices and institutional cultures. Invisible power shapes meanings and values, defining what is ‘normal’ thus maintaining unequal power relationships that determine whose voices are heard during public participation in the IDP. Results from focus group discussions indicate that
during public participation in the IDP in BCMM some residents get excluded based on their political beliefs and affiliation. For example, a focus group participant asserted that;

“There is discrimination of ward members... about their political affiliation, if you are not ANC member. There are always political disagreements, IDP issues are turned political. So the way I see it political differences among people [community] direct their way of seeing community needs. This should not really be so, IDP meetings need to be politically neutral” (sic) (Ward committee member).

The issue of political domination, networking and exclusion in public participation spaces was further reiterated by another ward committee member, who pointed out that:

“Politics is a problem here...I am not satisfied because my ward community members belong to the other political parties...thus there are conflicts... This also leads the public to be unwilling to attend IDP meetings ...” (sic) (Ward committee member).

This finding is however, not surprising, given that political interest in public participation is likely to be related to political interest in integrating public input into the decision-making and IDP process. As an example of substantive effectiveness, public participation in the IDP may through political pressure lead to changes in activities outlined in the planning to accommodate political interests or characteristics of the local area (Nielsen and Aaen, 2016:313). Central to understanding of context is therefore a vivid conceptualisation of political culture, defined as the “systematic means by which a political community makes binding co-active choices” (Jesanoff (2011) in Nielsen and Aaen, 2016:314). As noted by Nielsen and Aaen (2016:314) political contextual aspects are core concerns and include aspects such as value system, history, socio-political-dynamics and power balance. Conflict of interest during public participation in the IDP was echoed by a ward councillor who bemoaned that:

“The public participants in my ward are always having conflict of interests due to their political affiliations, the process is handled in a manner that alienates the opposition” (sic) (Ward committee member [opposition]).

Depolitisation of public participation in the IDP in BCMM was recommended by a focus group participant, who for example pointed out that:

“The process should not be politicised and the community should be educated about the IDP and its purpose. They [ward councillors and ward committees] should be apolitical... political leaders often interfere... there should be no politics inside the community hall, service delivery must be done... the needs and services of the community and not the needs of the political parties must be prioritised” (sic) (Community stakeholder).
Conscientisation has been viewed as important for the conciliation process in order to enable individuals to reconcile their self-interests with communal goals. For example a focus group participant had this recommendation to make:

“I recommend that the municipality educate the community members to focus on development of the community rather than political interests. They must not be too interested in politics...so I can say community needs must not be accepted or rejected based on someone’s political affiliation...it just raises unnecessary community conflicts and tensions” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

These findings imply that, public participation spaces can be centres of meaning, expressions on intentions and aspirations constructed by human experience. Exclusion from such spaces alienates and undermines feelings of identity, belonging and self-worth, manifesting powerlessness, lack of control, vulnerability and emotional deprivation (Penderis, 2012:10). Hickey and Mohan (2005:238) attribute the inability to bring about transformation, to insufficient consideration of issues of power and politics in public participation spaces. At a political level power manifests itself as ideology (VaneKlasen and Miller, 2006:38). This means that invisible power shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of public participation in the IDP. By influencing how individuals think, invisible power shapes the public’s beliefs and sense of self. The implication is therefore that community conditions, such as political willingness, often sets the local political frame for public participation practices. Public participation in the IDP process in BCMM therefore needs to be voluntary, inclusive and transparent to enhance community ownership of social innovation processes and to ensure that decision-making processes are not captured by already powerful social groups. However, as noted by Ibrahim (2017:13) the conciliation process at the community level is confronted with various constraining factors that can obstruct public participation in the IDP process.

As noted by Ibrahim (2017:13) deprived communities are mostly highly disadvantaged in the formation of collectivities and groups given their limited access to resources, political voice and unequal power relations in these communities. Group membership can even sometimes not only perpetuate poverty traps, but also reinforce existing structural inequalities, rather that helping individuals overcome them. However, Ibrahim (2017:13) suggest that constraining factors could be addressed through enhanced self-awareness, conscientisation and public deliberation that help communities to recognise their inherent collective strengths and the role their representative structures can play in improving their lives. The role of existing social capital and the role of local leaders/innovators (their personality, leadership skills, passion and vision) can all play a role in affecting the conciliation process (Ibrahim, 2017:13). The Human Development Report of 2000 calls for a strategy of “using civil and political rights – of participation,
association, free speech and economic rights – to enlarge the political space and press for social and economic rights” (UNDP, 2000:75).

7.2.6 Community commitment and trust in the IDP process and outcomes
Community-Municipal Council trust relations are a necessary precursor to the functioning of local government. Trust relates to the more down to earth matter, such as reliability of service delivery or expectation that the IDP will respond to community needs (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003:334). For public administration, trust is concerned with relationships between actors and institutions. Trust is thus the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable based on the belief that the trustee will meet the expectations of the trustor, even in situations where the trustor cannot monitor or control the trustee (Kim, 2005:621). For public participation stakeholders in the IDP, to trust the municipal council, it would be expected that the municipal council make positive policy interventions through its IDP. As such, trust in local government is normative and concerned with the extent to which residents are willing to follow municipal council decisions, even without sufficient information, under the assumption that those decisions are legitimate and protect their interests (Kim, 2005:617). High levels of distrust are dysfunctional; they stigmatise individuals, creating disillusionment and cynicism in municipal residents. Findings indicate that focus group participants gave consistently low assessment of trust in public participation in the IDP influencing the municipal council to respond to community needs. Focus group participants often referred to the municipal council ‘hiding information’, giving out ambiguous or inaccurate information, and ‘putting a spin on things, or referring to municipal council announcements as ‘spin doctoring’. One focus group participant for example, had this to say;

“I would think that transparency is an issue. Officials yearly presents projects that hardly happen ... other things that the community need are not shown in the IDP. You have to suspend your ability to believe when you listen to council officials during the IDP outreach meetings” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Concern about the integrity of municipal council officials came heavily into question during focus group discussions. For example, participants in the focus groups felt that:

“Most of the politicians [ward councillors] make IDP as a political platform to fulfil their ideas so as to get more votes... the councillors must call their own ward meetings [ward-based-planning]... we need to prioritise needs of the community... because we have the outcomes [community needs] that were raised by the residents...otherwise public participation in the IDP has no much value to the community” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).
“Yes, I think communities can make a difference [during public participation in the IDP] only if the members [ward councillor; ward committee members] put political differences aside and focus on the development of the community” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“Ward committee must be involved with IDP and its procedures, more advertising to the meetings …training must be given to the ward committee members, as many struggle with understanding the IDP … [yet] they must link community with municipal council….can you imagine?” (sic) (Ward committee member).

These focus group results show concern with the responsiveness of the municipal council to addressing community concerns and needs. It can be interpreted as implying that the municipal council either lacks capacity or commitment to address local community issues in the IDP. Such concerns may account for these findings from some focus group participants who claimed that:

“There is lack of commitment and dedication from the ward committees... ward committees struggle to mobilise people during IDP hearings...there is poor attendance... not all community member participate ... I can say the community is not involved in this thing” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

“The public is not given enough time to raise their concerns...the challenge is time because these meetings are covered after hours...the community need to come very early around 12pm not of 5pm. There is not enough information and time to discuss issues or projects...because of that few hands are taken... [there] is little time for questions” (sic) (Ward committee member).

“We have little time on the day of the IDP outreach meeting. There is just not enough time for the community members to speak at IDP outreach meetings. More time must be given to the stakeholders to voice their concerns. Giving residents positive responses for their concerns will assist in minimising conflict and tensions which lead to community protests” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

The lack of dialogue with the community and the municipal council’s tendency to favour special interest groups were seen as evidence of the municipal council’s lack of accountability to the whole public participation issue. Respondents for example, felt that:

“In the IDP outreach meetings council officials only listen to the privileged representatives. So I think they think that for us we have no much education... that we don’t know what’s happening... that the community don’t understand some things of this IDP... so I suggest the public must be educated enough on the IDP... this has not happened as much as I can remember” (sic) (Community member).

The broad implication for these findings is that there is lack of trust in both the municipal council and public’s commitment to listening to concerns raised by the public. These findings
indicate that the municipal council could be lacking of commitment to act in the public interest, by listening to what ordinary people think and empowering them to participate with equal voice. Theoretical tools that tap into power relations at the level of everyday planning have linked the “real” practice of planning to situations of planning within the complex postmodern society (Tait and Campbell, 2000:505). For example, Lukes’ (2005:17) three-dimensional view of power has guided or informed empirical studies. Lukes (1974, 1978) has frequently been cited by Forester (1982:72; Forester, 1999a:139) in his work on communicative theory and practice.

The three dimensions help to structure studies of power relations in the planning context. Lukes (2005:17) mapped the one-dimensional view of power, as the study of decision-making, where power can be located by examining concrete decisions that is by observing how an actor pushes through decisions that the other actors oppose. This dimension assumes an actual and observable conflict (Lukes, 2005:18). The second dimension of power, first described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), is the ability to control public participation and the nature of the debate in decision-making about key issues. The two dimensional view pays attention to the means to silence significant issues, to keep certain questions out of the decision-making agenda (Lukes, 2005:22). The third dimension of power articulated by Lukes (1974) is the ability to control and disseminate ‘truths’, myths and ideology which are used to shape thoughts, desires, and interests. This is thought to be done by using symbols (including symbolic violence) or language. The third dimension is an attempt to grasp structural influence. It is an approach to planning issues and processes, which routinely favour certain groups at the cost of others, and stem from deeper societal conditions that maintain inequalities through societal and cultural habits and institutional settings (Mäntysalo, 2000:326; Sager, 2009:66, 131). This dimension of power parallels with Bourdieu’s concept of ‘symbolic violence’.

As acknowledged by Lukes (2005:12), power as domination (power over) is only one species of power. Healey (1999:115) treats all relations as manifestations of the exercise of power, and associates power over with the status quo guaranteed by power over relations, and treats capacity to change the existing conditions as power to. Findings from the focus groups suggest that the municipal council lacks democratic accountability to the public and that if it were to engage in genuine deliberative and inclusionary mechanisms of public participation in the IDP, it would significantly improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The findings can therefore be interpreted as meaning that there is generally low to stable levels of trust in the municipal council’s capacity to respond to community needs through public participation in the IDP process. Results from focus groups indicates that resident do not trust promises from the municipal council regarding service delivery commitments. These low to stable levels of trust
suggest that there is either scepticism on the part of municipal residents or lack of accountability and little meaningful dialogue with the community on the part of the municipality. Such concerns may account for these feelings and/or actions from focus group participants:

“I do not attend the meetings because I'm out of the ward working...in any case many people do not have time to express their views” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“I do not normally attend due to busy schedule ... there is limited time for IDP...[municipal officials] saying they have to go to other places ... the notices are done within a very short space of time and we hardly hear of them” (sic) [the IDP meeting schedules] (Community stakeholder).

“I hardly attend IDP meetings ... I don’t always attend. Meetings are called at short notice. I am always busy, I don’t participate, and I don’t have the time. They should announce date when there is still time” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“Transparency is the key to gain the trust of the community members and actually start serving the community with proper services and showing respect to the people's concerns ... I can say for this municipality there is no implementation it’s just paper work... targets should be made to all wards and service delivery must match targets” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

These results from focus group participants indicate that trust is a key dimension of local governance and is closely related to the practicalities of the delivery and performance of public services and residents’ satisfaction with service delivery in the municipality. However, low trust may also suggest that stakeholders do not offer the municipal council the discretion necessary to undertake the tasks of service delivery; restoring trust in the municipality is necessary to rebuild trust and the effective delivery of services to residents. Thus, power dynamics and trust affect the strategic choices made by public participation stakeholders about whether to collaborate, with whom, and to what level. Whereas unequal power relations can undermine and thwart community satisfaction with service delivery, trust will underwrite it. In fact trust is essential for community, social, political and even linguistic relations. This means that community trust is essential to forms of cooperation and commitment (Stein and Harper, 2003:135-136) especially in local governance issues.

7.2.7 Public participation in the IDP as tokenistic

Arnstein (1969:216) dealt with the issues of power and its role in social relations. She viewed public participation as a form of power, that enables the have nots, who are excluded from political and economic processes, to be deliberately included. Public participation, however, often fails to empower a broad range of the community. As previously pointed out by Carvalho,
Pinto-Coelho, and Seixas, (2016:3) public participation could thus become a mechanism or instrument of technocratic coercion or manipulation, where there is no real empowerment or significant skills and knowledge among the parties involved. Often the public are typically given weak roles as recipients of technical information or providers of ‘lay’ views, and those views are not incorporated in a significant way in integrated development plans. Hence, public participation experiences are typically not transformational (Carvalho, et al., 2016:3). The rhetoric of public participation and consensus often contrasts with the practice of reaching agreements behind closed doors, authoritarianism, and increasingly sophisticated excuses to exclude pressure from less powerful planning actors (Nthontho, 2017:164). This means that some stakeholders remain more powerful as they have control over crucial domains of local governance (Nicholls, 2005:785-787; Dodge, 2009:228). Kock and Steiner (2017:170) similarly found that economically most powerful families were involved in local politics, playing an important role in local governance, and that frequently local leaders were also entrepreneurs. This implies that often political power is also closely linked to economic power. Results from focus group participants suggest that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is at best tokenistic, as it is mostly done to fulfil legislative and regulatory requirements for purposes of compliance. Respondents in focus group discussions highlighted this view pointing out, for example, that:

“The municipality should focus on the needs of the community than just compliance with legislation... public participation in the IDP is just a formality. It is just done as a formality. It is more of a compliance exercise than consultative. Most of the IDP documents are old [recycled] and are mostly outsourced. Some municipal officials themselves can’t explain the IDP...so tell me what can you expect from the less informed residents?” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

Another participant echoed the same sentiment that public participation in the IDP was formalistic, by pointing out that:

“It is done just as a formality ... there is lack of information on what communities have to know about the IDP ... there is not much education out there, that we don’t know what’s happening ... communities are often consulted when IDP has passed” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

A community stakeholder focus group participant viewed public participation as just a talk show, implying that it was tokenistic, saying:

“You see for me to participate I need to know what this thing [IDP] is all about...Unavailability of information is a problem...IDP outreach is just a talk show, and one is expected to participate? ” (sic) (Community stakeholder).
Findings indicate feelings of being excluded from the circles of planning decision-making, and the community having little opportunity to influence IDP outcomes, reinforcing the general view that public participation was just a formality for the municipal council. The following sentiments are illustrative of this view:

“Frequent public participation by the office of the speaker should be elevated and budgeted for. This is the time where the municipality informs the community about the activities of the municipality and communicate the council resolutions to the community...council must also follow the decisions [recommendations] of the IDP forums and ensure that everything is done according to resolutions... they must deliver on what the public community wants, they only come with the same thing and they don’t deliver” (sic) (IDP representative forum).

Another participant had this to say;

“IDP outreach meetings should come after we have done the budget ... in most cases stakeholders waste the opportunity [articulating community needs] by dwelling more on what has not been done, instead on focusing on the IDP as a strategic municipal vision for charting the way forward ... community priorities could be considered and done as they were prioritised ... they [municipal council] should satisfy people’s needs ... council must listen to people ... they should not politicise the IDP ... it should not be a compliance driven approach to planning” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

These results indicate that participatory spaces in the IDP in BCMM fail to influence outcomes responsive to community needs as a result of the social power dimensions of public participation spaces and processes. Arnstein (1969:217) underscores the role of power and intensity levels of participation. Results from focus groups participants indicate affinity to Arnstein’s (1969:217) third, fourth and fifth rungs, representing informing, consultation and placation, respectively categorised as tokenism. In Hildyard, Hegde, Wovekamp and Reddy’s (2001:59) view that category reflects top-down planning, as the involvement of local people is merely to lend credibility to decisions that have already been made. This means that such tokenism constitutes mere ‘window dressing’, co-option and ‘pretence’ of inclusion of the marginalised in participatory spaces in the IDP in BCMM. The implication is therefore that this amounts to little more than a cosmetic smokescreen to gain approval of pre-designed plans from passive beneficiaries, with power remaining in the hands of the municipal council. Some stakeholders thus remain more powerful, as they have control over crucial domains of local governance (Nicholls, 2005:785-787; Dodge, 2009:228).
7.2.8 Community knowledge of the IDP

Public participation as ‘popular agency’ recognises “existing capacities of the public as active claims-making agents” (Mohan and Hickey, 2004:3); the community in local governance is often acknowledged as able participants in the development process. In Rowe and Frewer’s (2004:512) view public participation is “consulting and involving members of the public in the agenda-setting, decision-making and policy forming activities” of municipalities for policy development. They, however, argue that engaging, consulting and involving communities rarely results in the anticipated goals of empowerment and transformation. Human development theory stresses empowerment as a means to social change (Boni and Gasper, 2012:458). Empowerment and transformation encapsulates popular agency and true representation of the most marginalised sections, where the residents have equal power and control over participatory processes. Gaventa (2004:25) has emphasised that the institutional arrangements and power dynamics that emerge around public participation spaces determine to a large extent the level of inclusiveness and participatory democracy. This implies that elected and appointed municipal officials as well as residents of a municipality can potentially ‘open up spaces of empowerment’ at the local level in order to build capacity of the communities. This will enable communities to demand accountability and responsiveness thereby influencing key decision-making processes in municipal strategic planning (Williams, 2004:100).

Findings from focus group participants suggest that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is often undermined by low levels of literacy, lack of sense of agency, public apathy, social disincentives to collective action, time costs, disproportionately high respect for authority, negative past experiences with public participation spaces, consultation fatigue and communication gaps. This means that public participation becomes tokenistic, especially in communities with high levels of poverty, weak representative institutions, insufficient resources, and other socio-political constraints to developmental local government. The findings from focus groups participants provide evidence for this view. Some participants, for example, have this to say:

“No, I am not satisfied with public participation in the IDP in BCMM. I feel that people’s opinions are not well informed about the IDP … people need to be more educated … lack of proper education on the issue of IDP is a big problem in my community…they [municipal officials] should show up in the meeting early and distribute information booklets on the IDP to the community” (sic) (Ward councillor).

“The public is uneducated and excluded in IDP participation…tell me, how does someone participate fully without relevant information… there should be more
programmes to educate the community on the IDP process” (sic) (Ward committee member).

These results point to frustrations with public participation spaces in the IDP which have not leveraged residents’ ability to have their community needs responded to by the BCMM. Findings also show that residents often as public participants stray out of the constitutional mandates for SA municipalities in their demands for service delivery. For example, Section 156(5) of the Constitution provides that municipalities have the incidental right to exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for or incidental to the effective performance of their function to the extent set out in sections 155(6)(a)(7). Such matters are listed in Part B of schedules 4 and 5 and Part A of schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. Findings indicating demands for RDP houses and jobs show a disturbing lack of understanding of the powers and functions of local government in SA. Frustrations amongst focus group participants is evidenced in the following responses:

“I am not satisfied with public participation in the IDP, because since I was growing up my elder brothers were waiting for RDP houses, but it has not happened yet, they are still waiting” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Another focus group participant also had this to say:

“I think if the councillor can sit with the members of the community first if there is [are] jobs and projects ... I thought IDP is for the people from the municipality [municipal officials]. I’m not sure what’s going on with this IDP ... I don’t understand it I have never heard about it... my community representative does not give us information of IDP, so I do not know what to say about it, how do I then participate?” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

“IDP document is supposed to circulate so that one could understand it before participating ... the documents take time to understand ... documents issued are too long and difficult to understand ... not everyone has correct information about what the council wants to do with the IDP... so that’s why I think the IDP document should circulate for people to understand ... normally there is not enough information available to communities before IDP meetings” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

“Ward committee members should be more involved with the IDP, we are the people who have to give feedback to the community ... sometimes I felt that I can participate because some of the things I’m clear about ... not everyone knows the IDP... education is needed to support communities” (sic) (Ward committee member).

“Training must be given to those who conduct these programmes so they can talk about things they know and understand. People must be educated so they know how important
IDP is... All stakeholders must be capacitated and sent to different trainings, so that they can be able to have a positive influence on the community, by encouraging and teaching them the importance of the IDP. It would be even better if stakeholders can go to workshops, so that they can be aware of how to participate in a better way on the IDP, so that everyone can be satisfied” (sic) (Ward councillor).

These results indicate the frustrations residents go through in public participation in the IDP. The findings revealed worrying implications for public participation. Without being empowered with knowledge of the IDP, the lack of knowledge on municipal strategic planning can translate into social injustice thereby perpetuating inequality. The results therefore indicate that public participation power dynamics shape IDP outcomes in BCMM in ways that marginalise less powerful interests. This implies that while on the surface public participation in the IDP seems inclusive of a range of stakeholders claiming a stake in municipal planning, powerful or elite interests still shape IDP outcomes. Instead, less powerful interests are largely marginalised or unheard altogether (Culley and Angelique, 2011:422).

The implication is therefore that the contention that knowledge is power, becomes apparent. Power provides knowledge that can support its objectives, while power ignores or suppresses knowledge that will not do so (Pløger, 2001:227). This way power dynamics define not a given understanding of municipal strategic planning reality, but even the physical, economical, ecological and social reality (Flyvbjerg, 1998:227) of the stakeholders in the IDP process. Flyvbjerg (1998:5) explicitly conceptualises power as “a dense and dynamic net of omnipresent relations”, which is not “simply localised in ‘centres’, nor ‘something one can effectively ‘possess’…””. Additionally, his analysis does not place interest in “who has power and why they have it” but in “how power is exercised” (Flyvbjerg, 1998:5). Flyvbjerg (1998:6) therefore emphasises how, in relation to power dynamics, “[t]he Great is found in the Small”. Thus, for Flyvbjerg (1998:231) while power relations “are not immutable in form or content”, they work to generate the “maintenance, cultivation and reproduction” of existing power relations”.

Experiences of symbolic violence manifest in public participation stakeholders in the IDP as feelings of being out of place, anxiousness, awkwardness, shame, feeling ‘stupid’ and so on. This is because those who experience symbolic violence will both objectively be unable to construct appropriate actions (capital/resources necessary to do so are unavailable to them) and subjectively committed to, in the sense of recognising, the very rules of distinction by which they are excluded and dominated. In this regard, symbolic violence therefore consists of both the objective hardship and the subjective experience of self-blame, hesitation, self-censorship in

7.2.9 Portraits of marginalisation and powerlessness

Public participation in the IDP can potentially be for manipulative purposes, through co-option and concealing means of maintaining relations of power (Cornwall and Brock, 2005:1046). Leal (2007:539) ascribes the manipulation and co-option of public participation spaces to the interests of a neo-liberalism policy agenda. Leal (2007:539) argues that public participation’s political decapitation is due to its dislocation from its radical Freirean roots. Bourdieu (1977b:493) adds depth to the analysis of public participation in terms of understanding the complex relationships between human agency and social structures. Examining the dynamics of power relations, the influence of structures on social action and the role of social capital in producing and reproducing inequality provides a potent analytical lens through which to view and understand the complex dynamics of local governance-community relations. However, Bourdieu (1989:16) notes that the ‘visible’ often masks the ‘invisible’ and hides the invisible which determines it and thus the ‘truth’ of the integration that is observed is never fully availed to the observer. With regard to public participation in the IDP in BCMM, findings from focus group participants showed these views:

“... public participation in the IDP does not adequately involve the community as stakeholders... they [municipal council] only report what they have already done ... the public is excluded and uninformed about participation in the IDP, also the public is not educated enough ... so there is no proper review on the IDP... there is no proper consultation ... a lot of people don’t attend these IDP meeting because really at the end of the day their views are not considered ... so why bother? ... so people don’t come and those who do come don’t get [the] opportunity to speak ... not all people are given a chance to speak ... the public is not always informed on what to talk about ... I tell you there is really lack of knowledge out there” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

This finding indicates that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is consequently the result of social practices ordered across spaces which can be “continually repeated, or recursive, reproducing the conditions that make these activities possible” (Giddens 1984:2). Knowledge enables “reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations, which impact on actions and behaviour of individuals and groups” (Giddens 1984:16). This means that power as agency is a reflection of capability, not intentions and it is the exertion of power that creates an effect and impact. For example, one focus group discussant who exhibited hopelessness, and lack of trust in public participation, had this to say:

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“Community needs and requirements are not in the final IDP...our community is no longer interested in these IDP meetings...we have lost hope” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Another focus group participant pointed out that;

“As a stakeholder, I do participate in the IDP. There [is] not enough time because the municipality started the IDP process late ... there should be a provision for community-based planning, where needs are collected ... I think the leader of the council use IDP to manipulate peoples prioritisation and put their needs first ... sometimes I just feel that my presence and absence [in the IDP outreach meetings] is one and the same” (sic) (IDP representative forum member).

These findings imply that the structures in the local government system enable public participation stakeholders in the IDP to reproduce social systems, which also function as a mode of control. Spaces of public participation are therefore centres of meaning, expressions of intentions and aspirations constructed by human experience either at the micro space personal level or macro space municipal level. Conversely, exclusion from public participation spaces alienates and undermines feelings of identity, belonging and self-worth, manifesting powerlessness, lack of control, vulnerability and emotional deprivation (Penderis, 2012:10).

Institutionalised spaces can thus be ‘closed’. This is evidenced by focus group participants who, for example, point out that:

“I wish to participate but public participation [Unit in BCMM] didn’t give us a chance... they should involve the ward committee. I have no confidence, but my priorities should be implemented also I think...You see I am a representative of the people ... So I should matter” (sic) (Ward committee member).

“Yes, some stakeholders who know [expertise] can influence the IDP outcomes - I can say other stakeholders can be influential due to the knowledge they have” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Findings show consistently that too often certain voices and perspectives appear to be excluded from public participation in the IDP. This means that, in most cases, entitlements were conferred upon participants by those who already hold certain power or status (Swynngedouw, 2005:1998-2000; Sprain, 2016:70). Evidence from focus group participants, for example support this, where respondents had this to say:

“The views of all stakeholders must be able to benefit the community, especially the poor in order for a speedy transformation of our communities. Issues that are raised by committees [ward committees] during IDP must at least be implemented ... there should be a list of stakeholders who will come to the programme and everyone should write down their concerns on a booklet provided in the meeting. The municipality should be
closer to the community and also they should prioritise the needs of the communities” (sic)

“The municipality should put the people’s needs and value their views. The stakeholders should treat us the same...financial power gives advantage to those with money and I think culture as well ...cultural because of my age [my] opinion may not count ... I don’t get listened to ... and it is frustrating” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Similarly, in public participation individuals are also likely to hold diverse views as a result of their gender, age, values, socio-economic background and experiences (Mangai, 2016:90).

“Because I don’t have much powers to be heard maybe because of my age ... I think only certain people’s opinions matters ... not easy to participate where you are not recognised... we don’t get chance to talk ... no chance to speak” (sic) (Community stakeholder).

Thus, in Foucault’s theorisation of relational power and its inextricable link to knowledge power dynamics shape participatory spaces (Foucault, 1978:93). Certain powerful people, maintain their influence on the IDP outcomes by controlling who gets to the decision-making table and what gets on the agenda. These dynamics exclude and devalue the concerns and representation of less powerful groups (VaneKlasen and Miller, 2006:39). Thus, by excluding some voices and issues from getting a fair hearing, the IDP can be skewed to benefit a few at the expense of the majority. Public participation spaces as such interact dynamically, constantly opening and closing through struggles for legitimacy and resistance, co-option and confrontation and are thus never static or void of social relations. The implications are therefore that public participation as a spatial space enables elected and appointed municipal public officials as well as residents the exercise of citizenship within the public arena of engagement. Such spaces however reflect particular contexts and traces of histories of governance and cultures of politics which shape relations and rules of engagement and limit opportunities for the enactment of citizenship (Cornwall, 2004:2).

7.3 CONCLUSION
Results presented in this chapter indicated that focus groups had mixed feelings on satisfaction with the influence and public participation of stakeholders in the IDP in BCMM. Results suggest a mixture of exposure, vulnerability and threat to public participation in the IDP in BCMM. Results also indicated feelings of dissatisfaction with public participation in the IDP amongst focus group discussants. Findings further indicated incapacity and lack of knowledge/expertise for public participation by stakeholders to meaningfully contribute to the IDP. Based on this finding, the researcher concludes that, while on the surface public participation in the IDP in BCMM appears to be inclusive of various stakeholders, powerful
interests still shape IDP outcomes, and less powerful interests still get either marginalised or altogether unheard. Lack of substantive capabilities constrain stakeholders from effectively participating in the IDP in BCMM. This implies that when capabilities and functionings are lacking, residents get exposed to the vagaries of marginalisation and exclusion in municipal strategic planning decisions affecting their lives. Public participation in the IDP in BCMM therefore remains permeated not only by power, but also by tactics, strategies, and the microphysics of power (power dynamics) and as is often assumed, public participation does not always give voice to and empower the community in BCMM.

Lack of resources systematically discriminates and excludes those community members lacking in resource capacity. Accessing public participation spaces, especially in marginalised and poor communities requires resources, without which many residents of the municipality get excluded from participating. Resources define who participates, and who gets excluded and lack of resources sets the agenda in favour of more powerful interests. The researcher concludes that an important aspect of inclusion in public participation in the IDP in BCMM concerns access to the resources, institutions, spaces, social arrangements, and opportunities afforded to communities. Control of resources therefore becomes a source of individual and social power. Results in this chapter further indicated that during public participation in the IDP in BCMM, some residents get marginalised, based on their political beliefs and affiliation. There is also low trust in public participation spaces in the IDP. Furthermore, findings revealed that the municipal council often ‘hides information’, giving out ambiguous or inaccurate information, and ‘putting a spin on things’, or that municipal council announcements were often viewed by residents as ‘spin doctoring’. BCMM thus often fails to adequately respond to community needs to the extent it should. This chapter concludes that BCMM either lacks capacity or commitment to address local community issues in the IDP or that there is just no systemic political and leadership will. Low to stable levels of trust could also be suggestive of the fact, that there is either scepticism on the part of municipal residents or lack of accountability and little meaningful dialogue and engagement with communities on the part of BCMM.

Findings further indicate that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is at best tokenistic, as it is mostly done to fulfil legislative and regulatory requirements for purposes of compliance. The issue of language, literacy, understanding IDP documents and the IDP process were also recurring themes in focus group discussions. Based on these findings, the researcher concludes that public participation in the IDP in BCMM is tokenistic, constituting mere ‘window dressing’, co-option and ‘pretence’ of inclusion of the marginalised in participatory spaces. The researcher argues that such tokenism amounts to little more than a cosmetic smokescreen to gain
approval of pre-designed plans from passive beneficiaries with power remaining in the hands of the municipal council. This implies that, while on the surface public participation in the IDP in BCMM seems inclusive of a range of stakeholders claiming a stake in municipal planning, powerful or elite interests still shape IDP outcomes.
Chapter 8 : SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarises the study, makes recommendations and draws conclusions based on the results and findings of the survey questionnaire (n=229) and focus group discussions (n=34) data obtained from ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders and presented, analysed and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). The recommendations in this chapter relate to the last objective of the study: to make recommendations that bridge public participation power asymmetries, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the IDP review process (Objective 4). The purpose of this final chapter was therefore to wrap up the study by summarising the salient features of the study (Figure 8.1), making the principal as well as the concrete recommendations, identifying the limitations of the study, providing suggestions for future research and concluding the study.

8.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
In South African local government, there has been great interest in promoting people-centred development within the context of developmental local government. Such a vision calls for, empowering local communities, making the reality of the communities come ‘first’, listening to the voices of the marginalised and vulnerable members of the community (indigents), and limiting the effects of ‘tyrannical’ public participation spaces in the IDP process. The problem in this study, as stated in Chapter 1, was that public participation spaces neglect or fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to deal with the complex power dynamics among stakeholders in integrated development planning processes. Local deliberative procedures including public participation power dynamics in the IDP process reproduce and naturalise domination relations by means of different mechanisms. This then makes the existing ‘invited spaces’ largely ceremonial and without much bearing on the planning, development and reviews of IDPs responsive to most residents’ priorities and needs. Through the inclusion and exclusion of knowledge or information, as well as other socio-political, institutional, cultural and systemic contextual factors, power dynamics frame and influence specific ways by which community problems and needs are understood, creates boundaries on possible solutions and determines how the participatory process influence IDP outcomes. The invisibility and everydayness of power dynamics may lead to these conditions having more sway than they might otherwise have, given that the nature of power may be hidden by being infused in daily routines, policy and practices. This study was then guided by the following two research questions: (i) What is
the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP review process in the BCMM? and, (ii) How do those dynamics influence the outcomes of the IDP in the BCMM?

The aim of the study was therefore to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the IDP process. Furthermore, the study sought to explain how those dynamics influence IDP outcomes in BCMM. Consequently, the objectives of the study were: (i) to establish a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning (Chapter 2) and public participation in integrated development planning (Chapter 3), through an inclusive study of related literature and official documents; (ii) to conduct a questionnaire survey (quantitative method) and focus group discussions (qualitative method) to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the IDP review process; (iii) to analyse findings from the secondary and primary data in order to gain insights into how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence participants during public participation in the IDP process in BCMM in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively; and (iv) to make recommendations based on the findings and conclusions of the study.

The study consisted of eight chapters. Chapter 1, introduced the study by providing its overview and demarcation. This included the background and reason for the study, the problem statement, research questions, as well as the aim and objectives that helped focus the study. In summary the problem statement was: public participation spaces often neglect and fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to manage complex power dynamics among public participation stakeholders in the IDP review processes. The Chapter indicated that a mixed-method research approach, which utilised both quantitative and qualitative methodologies would be used. Chapter 1 further pointed out that a questionnaire survey (quantitative method) would be administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders, as the first method of data collection and that focus group discussions (qualitative method) would be used as the second method (see, Addenda G and I). Furthermore, Chapter 1 pointed out that the data collected would be supported by a comprehensive survey of literature and official documents in chapters, 2 and 3 (see objective 1). Chapter 1 ended by defining key terms that were integral to this study.

Chapter 2 established a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning (see Section B of the Survey questionnaire) through a review of literature and official documents related to the study (Objective 1). Chapter 3 further conceptualised, theorised and contextualised public participation in integrated development planning, through a review of related literature and official documents (see Section
C of the Survey questionnaire). The Chapter sought to establish conceptual and theoretical frameworks through which public participation in integrated development planning would be located, discussed and analysed (Objective 1). In Chapter 4 the methodology applied in this study was presented and motivated. Chapter four, presented and motivated the: Research paradigm, research design and approach, population and sampling, measures for ensuring instrument validity and reliability, ethical issues applicable to the study and data processing techniques (Objectives 1 and 2).

Using Chapter 2 as a point of departure, the results of Section B of the survey questionnaire, administered to ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders were analysed, interpreted and discussed in Chapter 5 (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). Analysis, interpretation and discussion of results from Section C of the survey questionnaire, was handled in Chapter 6, also using Chapter 3 as a point of departure (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). Qualitative data from focus group discussions were presented, analysed and discussed in chapter 7 (Objectives 1, 2 and 3). Summary and recommendations are then presented in Chapter 8 (Objective 4). Based on a summary of the results of the study and literature survey, an alternative localism theory of change for development interventions and for enhancing community voice in the IDP process is proposed and recommended for public participation in the IDP in municipalities (Figure 8.1)
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal recommendation would be to make a shift from the traditional results chain model (inputs→activities→outputs→outcomes→impact) towards interrelated dimensions of human development (Figure 8.1). Thus, an alternative localism theory of change for development interventions is recommended. BCMM should enhance community voice during public participation in the IDP process with the aim of empowering, capacitating and conscientising the community in the IDP process. The vehicle for such empowerment, capacitation and conscientisation should among other strategies include workshops, educational seminars, mayoral roadshows, public surveys, public hearings, residents associations, advisory boards, focus groups and imbizos. These strategies will need to be guided and buttressed by interrelated
dimensions of human development: process freedoms (agency) + principles–vision + opportunity freedoms and sustainability mobilising. The result of this could directly lead to expanding public participation capabilities + catalysing partnerships, and learning (including evaluative activities) + adapting, mutual accountability. The voice of the community needs to drive public participation in the IDP process. Access to local governance structures and ‘voice’ of citizens in the IDP processes have both intrinsic and instrumental value to the community, particularly the poor and marginalised. More importantly, democratic participation and ‘community voice’ should encapsulate human rights and freedoms and access to delivery of quality public services as well as the enhancement of functionings in the community. Strong communities tend to have financial resources, physical assets and human resources in the form of skilled, knowledgeable, confident members with human agency. They need organisational capacity and a positive blend of ‘community wiring’ – the connectedness, inclusiveness and social cohesion often connected with social capital. The envisaged end product would thus be sustainability, innovation, self-reliance, demand for accountability and responsive politicians and appointed public officials. For communities to exercise voice they may need to engage with the political process (ward committees). This implies that local governance in BCMM has to pay attention to and focus on traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern during public participation in the IDP process. The following eight concrete recommendations are proposed:

**Recommendation One:** Given that public participation in the IDP stands to benefit from empowered and capacitated municipal residents, conscientisation is critically important in order to enable municipal residents to reconcile their self-interests with communal goals. Results showed that the IDP was not understood by many community stakeholders, including those who represent them, the ward committees. These results can be interpreted as implying that the residents of BCMM lack the agency and empowerment necessary to meaningfully participate in the IDP process. Thus, the issue of a lack of capacity amongst public participation stakeholders in the IDP in BCMM, speaks to the issues of power, where the municipality by appearing to involve residents who lack understanding of IDP issues, uses public participation as a smokescreen, thereby making residents the authors of their own failure, through tokenistic public participation. The implication of this finding is that, it is critically important for all stakeholders in public participation in the IDP to be made conscious of how power shapes IDP outcomes in ways that marginalise less powerful interests. Public participation and learning have recently been viewed as means for exercising rights within rights-based approaches to
development. Deliberate initiatives must therefore be activated by municipalities to objectively inform communities about their rights and the consequences of their decisions.

A rights-based approach to development could focus on conscientising communities on political issues such as inequality, constitutional rights, exclusion, power imbalance, accountability and relationships in general amongst individuals, groups, organisations and spheres of government. Therefore, given the results showing lack of capacity amongst public participation stakeholders in the IDP in BCMM, it is recommended that human-rights advocacy groups, including NGOs and local government trains and sensitises the municipal residents, especially in innovative means to address community challenges with the support of COGTA, SALGA and the National School of Government. Municipalities can also use the current generation of Public Administration and Management students, through structured work integrated learnerships to build the capacity of ward councillors, ward committees and communities (Figure 8.1: AIM).

**Recommendation Two:** Lack of resources also came out prominently in the findings from the responses of discussants in the focus groups. The availability of resources has implications for community empowerment and agency. This finding implies that resources (e.g. monetary, political influence, specialist knowledge) empower residents to participate. Accessing public participation spaces, especially in marginalised and poor communities requires resources, without which, many residents of BCMM remain disempowered and perpetually excluded from participatory spaces. Given the state of affairs currently in the municipality, the evolving discourse around community empowerment connects voice mechanisms for influencing services with community self-help and democratic engagement. It is, thus, recommended that sustainable and innovative LED programmes be explored by BCMM so as to support community self-reliance, job creation and poverty reduction so as to empower residents and support community strength (Figure 8.1: END PRODUCT).

**Recommendation Three:** The relative value placed on different types of expertise and language and the professional assumption about decision-making competence can make it difficult for communities to be heard or to have an impact on decisions. Results from the survey questionnaire showed that the residents in BCMM had insufficient skills and knowledge to empower them to make inputs into the IDP. Results also revealed that low literacy levels limit residents’ capacity to participate. It is recommended that workshops and education seminars on the IDP process and, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in municipal planning processes be developed and rolled out to stakeholders who participate in the IDP review. It is further recommended that interest groups, civil society and the Public Participation Unit in BCMM build a critical consciousness in communities, advocating for the inclusion of
vulnerable groups in the community, inclusion of the illiterate, and the disabled so as to empower them to demand accountability and sustainability as envisaged by the National Development Plan. Public participation stakeholders should also be drawn into the IDP process in the agenda-setting stages of the process, and information on the IDP should be disseminated to the public through various social media platforms before scheduling outreach dates, so as to empower communities to be able to make contributions and submissions during the IDP outreach meetings.

Furthermore, jargon and technical language in IDP documents should be simplified to be implemented – similar to the Constitution, to enable the public to access IDP formulation information and documentation with greater ease. Such documentation should also be disseminated in abridged formats in the language communities are comfortable with. Language, discursive practices and discourse shape and result from a community’s social and cultural practices and beliefs; language also encodes the public sphere. BCMM should therefore use clear and easy means of accessing decision-making information and public participation spaces. This study recommends that BCMM together with IDP outreach meetings and mayoral roadshow organisers, should simultaneously use other public participation strategies, which may amongst others, include public surveys, public hearings, residents’ associations and advisory boards, focus groups, imbizos and other innovative mechanisms. Innovation mechanisms involving knowledge generation, diffusion and use, together with processes for turning knowledge into social benefits and outcomes could be used. Innovations maybe technological (social media platforms), organisational, institutional, managerial, related to service delivery and IDP programmes implementation. Social innovation practices may also include rewards in the form of food vouchers and raffle tickets to encourage participation (Figure 8.1: VEHICLES).

**Recommendation Four:** Results showed the issue of political domination, networking and exclusion in public participation spaces. Cultural beliefs and practices were also found to have an influence on public participation in the IDP. This implies that public participation in the IDP process in BCMM could, through social practices, such as political pressure and other beliefs and practices lead to changes in activities outlined in integrated development planning to accommodate political interests, cultural beliefs or practices and the contextual characteristics of some communities. Public participation in the IDP could in another vein also reproduce the status quo in communities. It is thus recommended that public participation in the IDP process in BCMM should be voluntary, inclusive and transparent to enhance community ownership of social innovation processes and to ensure that decision-making processes are not captured by already powerful social groups. BCMM must also institutionalise social cohesion structures and
roll out community programmes on the same. It may use technology, such as cellphones for
group chatting and skype for wider reach. Such innovative platforms could provide fora for
negotiation and dialogue so as to encourage: joint identification of issues; improved linkages
between actors; increased community participation in planning processes; and co-design of
interventions tailored to local livelihoods, environmental conditions and the needs of different
stakeholders (Figure 8.1: END PRODUCT).

**Recommendation Five:** Findings indicate that focus group participants gave consistently low
assessments of their trust in public participation in the IDP influencing the municipal council to
respond to community priorities and needs. However, in contradiction to the perception of the
focus group participants almost half of the respondents in the survey questionnaire (50.9%) felt
that they could trust the municipal council with delivering services responsive to their
community needs (Figure 5.9). These findings indicate that the municipal council could still be
lacking democratic accountability to the public, and that if it were to target and engage the
youth not merely the elderly during public participation in the IDP, it would significantly
improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. These findings also indicate that the municipal
council could be lacking commitment to act in the public interest, by not listening to and
prioritising community needs, thereby disempowering communities in participating with equal
voice. The findings are interpreted as meaning that there are generally low to stable levels of
trust in the municipal council’s capacity to respond to community needs through public
participation in the IDP process. High levels of distrust are dysfunctional, in that they stigmatise
individuals, creating disillusionment and cynicism in municipal residents. These results show
that trust is a key dimension of local governance and is closely related to the practicalities of the
delivery and performance of public services and residents’ satisfaction with service delivery in
the municipality. It is recommended that the municipal council with the support of SALGA
enrols ward councillors and ward committee members in Continuing Education courses with the
relevant SETA accreditation, as well as in other formally accredited Higher and Advanced
Certificate, Diploma and Degree programmes in Public Administration and Management or
Local Government Law and Administration in tertiary institutions to develop their local
governance skills and empower them to become change agents in communities (Figure 8.1:
AIM).

**Recommendation Six:** A statistically significant association was detected, indicating that
public participation was tokenistic and only done to comply with local government legislative
and regulatory frameworks. These results indicate manifestations of exclusion from the circles
of planning, decision-making, and the community having little opportunity to influence IDP
outcomes. It reinforces the general view that public participation in BCMM could be a formality
for the municipal council. The implication is therefore that this amounts to little more than a cosmetic smokescreen to gain approval of pre-designed plans from passive beneficiaries, with power remaining in the hands of the municipal council. Some stakeholders thus remain more powerful, as they have control over crucial domains of local governance and decision-making in municipal planning. While compliance with the requisite legal framework is good practice in municipal planning, BCMM should over and above that, view the IDP not as an end, but a means to an end. The IDP process in BCMM should therefore empower various internal and external municipal actors and stakeholders at all levels as required by legislation. The process followed by BCMM to draft the IDP, including its consideration and adoption of the draft plan, must comply with the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), the Local Government: Municipal and Performance Management Regulations, 2001 and the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003). More importantly, the process should through appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures allow for the local community to be consulted on its development needs and priorities and also allow the local community to effectively participate in the drafting of the IDP, from an empowered and informed vantage point.

**Recommendation Seven:** One aspect of inclusion identified in literature concerns access to resources, institutions, social structures, spaces, social arrangements, and other opportunities afforded to municipal residents. Community empowerment in local government should thus be tied to building community connections and social capital. This includes what Rolfe (2016:112) has termed ‘community-wiring’ to refer to the issues of connections, social cohesion and inclusiveness. This can be realised by instituting a community organiser programme, driven by Residents Associations, Neighbourhood Committees, Community Development Workers and Voluntary Organisations which would aim at supporting disadvantaged communities to build networks. BCMM could also consider putting into place such a programme which must have a deliberate emphasis on inclusion issues within or between communities. This may enhance community empowerment, if and when it is also tied to building community connections with advocacy interest groups and social capital, thus establishing explicit links between community empowerment and wider municipal policies to tackle poverty and inequality. In terms of influence, BCMM’s Public Participation Unit should further establish a community empowerment agenda and programme, largely focused on ‘voice’ mechanisms, emphasising the importance of communities having a role in shaping public services and the equal importance of public services becoming more responsive to service users, and reflecting a perspective that community empowerment is a two-way process (**Figure 8.1: AIM AND VEHICLE**).

**Recommendation Eight:** The society and localism theory of change could also be usefully adopted and adapted to the contextual exigencies of the BCMM and its Public Participation
Unit, as it could help in activating and re-awakening community agency and community-wiring, so as to galvanise community voice during public participation in the IDP, and to achieve wider social outcomes for communities and residents in the BCMM (Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2: The society and localism theory of change

Adapted from: Rolfe (2016:112).

This theory-based approach drawing on theory of change (ToC) evaluation methodology could address complexities in evaluating public participation in the IDP in BCMM. The ToC approach could be used to systematically and cumulatively study and monitor the links between activities, outcomes and BCMM context during public participation in the IDP process. The approach starts with long-term outcomes, identifies actions to generate interim outcomes and lastly articulates and questions the assumptions linking actions, outcomes and context to enable robust reflection and identification of ‘plausible’ success indicators in the IDP. Through individual or collective use of voice, communities can influence IDP outcomes. To exercise voice, communities will need to be empowered, through resources, organisational capacity and ‘community wiring’ (the connectedness, inclusiveness and social cohesion). Community empowerment may help develop skills and confidence (for community self-help). Communities become strong when individuals have free and fair say in decisions that affect them. Community empowerment may be built from Community Organiser initiatives, where communities are trained and supported, to listen to concerns of communities, to build relationships and networks and to help people take community action on local issues that matter to them, reducing bureaucracy and devolving power to communities. With a focus on changing public sector
culture towards a more participative ethos, municipalities, including BCMM could leverage on existing municipal legislation to empower residents, giving communities rights to participate in service improvement through co-ownership of IDP outcomes responsive to community needs.

8.4 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has some limitations that prevent generalisation of the findings. Firstly, content analysis was used to understand the respondents' perceptions on public participation in the IDP, personal bias may therefore exist in coding or categorising the themes. Conclusions derived from data were purely based on inferences deduced from available data. In addition, the qualitative research method used in this study could shed some light on critical findings, but it cannot represent the whole population. The findings can, however, be transferable to similar contexts in RSA and elsewhere. This study was limited to a final sample of 229 respondents, who responded to the survey questionnaire and 34 respondents who participated in four focus group discussions. For this reason, the findings may not fully represent the beliefs, perceptions or views of the BCMM population who participate in the IDP process. In future studies, the scope of sampling should be extended to include the opinions of BCMM authorities (both elected and appointed public officials) in directorates that closely relate to public participation in the IDP review process, especially those from the IDP/Budget/PMS Unit and the IDP/OPMS Portfolio Committee. Given that the IDP is a product of multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional human development planning endeavour requiring inputs from various stakeholders during its development process, future research could also sample key sector departments. Community Development Workers could also be sampled as they play a pivotal role regarding public participation.

8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results in this study indicated mixed views on respondents' satisfaction with public participation in the IDP in BCMM. While public participation in the IDP is generally perceived as opening of the civic, political and co-governance structures, and to provide access to policy agendas and responses, qualitative data suggests that this could be more symbolic than meaningful forms of empowerment. Residents lack knowledge of the strategic nature of the IDP and thus lack the necessary competences. It also emerged that residents in BCMM were often discouraged from participating in the IDP due to the size and incomprehensibility of the IDP documents. This was compounded by inadequate knowledge, capacity/capability, resources and language barriers, which further disempowered, marginalised and excluded residents from meaningfully participating and articulating community priorities and needs in the IDP. Furthermore, results indicated that some residents got excluded based on their political beliefs and affiliation. The study therefore generally concludes that public participation power
dynamics shape IDP outcomes in BCMM, in multiple and complex ways that still marginalise less powerful interests and communities. A systematic failing to include and empower stakeholders who are less interested in local governance, less civically active and more cynical may affect the outcome of public participation in the IDP, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy and democratic value of participation.
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Fox-Rogers, L. and Murphy, E. 2014. Informal strategies of power in local planning system, Planning Theory, 13(3):244-268.


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Addendum A
University of the Free State
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences
Department of Public Administration and Management
205 Nelson Mandela Drive
Park West
Bloemfontein
9301

Date: 1 June, 2017

The Municipal Manager
Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
P.O. Box 134
East London
5200

Dear Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION BY STUDENTS TO CONDUCT RESEARCH STUDY AT BCMM

This serves to confirm that, Modeni M Sibanda (Student Number, 2010131452) is a registered doctoral student at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, completing a Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in Public Administration and Management. I am sure you are aware that any postgraduate study involves completion of a Treatise, Dissertation or Thesis. It is for this reason that I request your personal and professional permission to allow this student to carry out his research in directorates and departments within BCMM.

The title of his Thesis is: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, and is being undertaken under my Promotion (Professor L. Lues) and Dr. C.D. Olivier (Co-Promoter).
The objectives and aims of this research are: (i) To establish a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning and public participation in integrated development planning, through an inclusive study of related literature; (ii) To conduct a questionnaire survey and focus group discussions to investigate the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning process; (iii) To analyse findings from the secondary and primary data in order to gain insights into how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence participants during public participation in the integrated development planning process in BCMM; and (iv) To make recommendations that bridge public participation power asymmetries, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the integrated development planning process.

The research study shall make use of completion of a questionnaire survey (n=250) and focus group discussions (n=40), with key selected potential participants/respondents, chosen through purposeful sampling. The potential participants/respondents would thus include: 50 ward councillors, 100 ward committee members, 35 IDP representative forum members and 65 community stakeholders in the BCMM. The study will be beneficial to BCMM as it will provide both elected and appointed public officials, with a deeper understanding of the complexity, limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces in the IDP process, thereby benefiting the municipality in terms of future integrated development planning.

The ethical research principles will be strictly adhered to throughout the research process so as to maintain a high standard of work and a high quality of the research study. The information obtained will be used only for purposes of this study, and anonymity and confidentiality of potential research participants or respondents will be ensured. A copy of the full research report, once approved by the University will be handed to BCMM.

I thus request granting of permission to this student to collect the necessary data/information from relevant officials and Councillors at BCMM for the purposes of completion of his Thesis.
Your kind assistance in granting him permission will be highly appreciated and thank you for taking the time in allowing your staff to be part of this research study, as I am sure it will not only be of benefit to him, but to them as well.

Yours faithfully,

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Professor Liezel Lues

E-mail address: LuesL@ufs.ac.za

Tel (w): 051 401 2886

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ACTING CITY MANAGER

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REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Dear Dr. T.F. Nolushe, (BCMM - Head: Information, Knowledge Management, Research and Policy)

We are doing research and would like to request permission to conduct our research at Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

DATE

:25 April, 2017

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Public participation in integrated development planning: A case study of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR / RESEARCHER(S) NAME(S) AND CONTACT NUMBER(S):

Modeni M. Sibanda-Researcher 2010131452 040 608 3462
Shepherd Mutangabende-Assistant (UFH)-Student 078 056 1434
Emeka Ndaguba-Assistant (UFH)-Student 073 675 8019

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT:

Name of Faculty: Economic and Management Sciences
Name of Department: Public Administration and Management

STUDYLEADER(S) NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER:

Name of Study Leader (UFS staff member): Professor L. Lues
Contact number: 051 401 2886

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

The aim of this study is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning review process. Furthermore, the research will endeavor to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM.

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

My name is Modeni M. Sibanda. I am employed as a senior lecturer at the University of Fort Hare. I am a doctoral candidate, studying towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in Public Administration and Management, at the University of The Free State, Bloemfontein.

HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?
This study has received approval from the Research Ethics Committee of UFS. A copy of the approval letter can be obtained from the researcher.

**Approval number:** The study was approved by the research committee in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State

**WHY ARE YOUR INSTITUTION/ORGANISATION/COMPANY INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?**

The BCMM espouses values committed to serving its communities and providing services that are consistent with good governance, transparency and accountability. In its municipal situation analysis undertaken towards the development of the IDP, BCMM identified a number of challenges, constraints and inefficiencies that limit the manner in which communities participate in the public affairs of the municipality (BCMM, 2011-2016:99-109). To explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process and explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM a sample consisting of the various stakeholder, who participate in the IDP review process would be necessary. The sample will comprise of the 50 ward councillors, 100 ward committee members, 35 IDP representative forum members and 65 community stakeholders in the BCMM. Participants (n=250) will be selected using purposeful sampling, for the first method of data collection (questionnaire survey) based on the fact that hey are key stakeholders in public participation in the IDP review process. For the second method of data collection focus group discussions.respondents (n=40) will also be purposeful sampled. This selection is informed by the need for further investigation in select cases that will be found to be information-rich, based on the results obtained from the survey questionnaire.

**WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?**

The study involves a survey questionnaire (n=250) and focus group discussions (n=40). The survey questionnaire will have three sections. Firstly, the biographical section (Section A: Demographic data); secondly, the section on power dynamics in the integrated development planning review process (Section, B); and thirdly, the section on the influences of power dynamics in public participation spaces (Section, C) (see, survey questionnaire). The survey questionnaire will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete. Focus group discussions will be the second method of data collection. The focus group questions will be formulated complementary to the questionnaire survey responses. Four focus group discussions (10 participants in each) will be conducted, each with one of the following target groups: ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders. The focus group discussions will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes.

**WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?**

The results of the study will assist public officials, better understand and more precisely adapt to the complexity, limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces in the IDP review process, thereby benefiting your municipality in terms of future integrated development planning. All participant responses will remain confidential. In both the dissertation and any other academic publication emanating from this study, responses will remain anonymous and only grouped data will be presented.
WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL RISKS TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

There are no foreseen potential risks or physical discomfort to the participants. The only inconvenience might be for the participants to avail personal time to participate in the survey questionnaire and focus group discussions.

WILL THE INFORMATION BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Information obtained from respondents will remain confidential. Names of respondents will not be recorded anywhere and no one will be able to connect respondents to the responses they will have given. Responses will be given a fictitious code number or a pseudonym and will be referred to in this way in the data. Responses may be viewed by people responsible for making sure that research is done properly, including the transcriber, external coder, and members of the Research Ethics Committee. Otherwise, records that identify respondents will be available only to people working on the study, unless permission is given for other people to see the records. In both the dissertation and any other academic publication emanating from this study, responses will remain anonymous and only grouped data will be presented. Sections of the study report may be submitted for academic publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such publication or report. Focus-group discussions allow group interaction, widening the range of responses, activating forgotten details of experience and releasing inhibitions that otherwise discourage participants from disclosing information. In focus-group discussions, participants build on each other’s ideas and comments. While every effort will be made by the researcher to ensure that participants in focus group discussions will not be connected to the information that they share during the focus group discussions, I cannot guarantee that other participants in the focus group will treat information confidentially. I shall, however, encourage all participants to do so.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

Hard copies of respondents’ answers will be stored by the researcher for a period of two years in a locked cupboard at the Bhisho campus of the University of Fort Hare, for future research or academic purposes. Electronic information will be stored on a password protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. Hard copies will be shredded and electronic data deleted when no longer required. There are no foreseen potential risks or physical discomfort to the participant.

WILL THERE BE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICPATING IN THIS STUDY?

There is no material or financial benefit for individual participants in this research study.

HOW WILL THE INSTITUTION / ORGANISATION / COMPANY BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Modeni M. Sibanda on 040 608 3462/078 423 6696. The researcher can further be contacted on mmsibanda@ufh.ac.za. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect of this study, please contact Modeni M. Sibanda at mmsibanda@ufh.ac.za, or 040 608 3462/078 423 6696. Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact Professor L. Lues, the study promoter; on LuesL@ufs.ac.za, or 051 401 2886.
Yours sincerely

Modeni M. Sibanda
Addendum C

1 June, 2017

THE ACTING CITY MANAGER
BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
PO BOX 134
EAST LONDON
5200

Dear Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION BY STUDENTS TO CONDUCT RESEARCH STUDY AT BCMM

I am a student at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, completing a Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in Public Administration and Management. I am sure you are aware that any postgraduate study involves completion of a Treatise or Dissertation or Thesis. It is for this reason that I request your personal and professional permission to partake my research in directorates and departments within BCMM.

The title of my Thesis is: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, and is being undertaken under the Promotions of Professor L. Lues (Promoter) and Dr. C.D. Olivier (Co-Promoter).

The objectives and aims of this research are: (i) To establish a conceptual and theoretical foundation and framework for contextualising integrated development planning and public participation in integrated development planning, through an inclusive study of related literature; (ii) To conduct a questionnaire survey and focus group discussions to investigate the nature and extent of public
participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning process; (iii) To analyse findings from the secondary and primary data in order to gain insights into how power asymmetries occur, shape and influence participants during public participation in the integrated development planning process in BCMM; and (iv) To make recommendations that bridge public participation power asymmetries, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the integrated development planning review process.

The research study shall make use of completion of a questionnaire survey (n=250) and focus group discussions (n=40), with key selected potential participants/respondents, chosen through purposeful sampling. The potential participants/respondents would thus include: 50 ward councillors, 100 ward committee members, 35 IDP representative forum members and 65 community stakeholders in the BCMM. The study will be beneficial to BCMM as it will provide both elected and appointed public officials, with a deeper understanding of the complexity, limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces in the IDP process, thereby benefiting the municipality in terms of future integrated development planning.

The ethical research principles will be strictly adhered to throughout the research process, so as to maintain a high standard of work and a high quality of the research study. The information obtained will be used only for purposes of this study, and anonymity and confidentiality of potential research participants or respondents will strictly be ensured. A copy of the full research report, once approved by the University will be handed to BCMM.
I thus request granting of permission to enable me to collect the necessary data/information from relevant officials and Councillors at BCMM for the purposes of completion of my Thesis.

Your kind assistance in granting me permission will be highly appreciated and thank you for taking the time in allowing your staff to be part of this research study as I am sure it will not only be of benefit to me, but to them as well.

Yours faithfully,

________________________________________
Modeni M. Sibanda

E-mail address: mmsibanda@ufh.ac.za
Cellphone: 078 423 6696

_______________________________________
ACTING CITY MANAGER

| Approved | Not Approved |
MEMORANDUM

Date: 19 JUNE 2017

From: HEAD: INFORMATION KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH AND POLICY

To: Dr. M. Sibanda

Our ref: Please ask for
MR J.FINE
(043) 705 9742

Your ref:

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN BCMM:

Dr. M. Sibanda

It is hereby acknowledged that Dr. M. Sibanda a student at University of the Free State, completing the Doctor of Philosophy with specialization in Public Administration and Management, has met the prerequisites for conducting research at Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM) for partial fulfillment of her degree. He has provided us with all the necessary documentation as per the BCMM Policy on External Students conducting research at the institution. With reference to the letter to the City Manager received on 19 June 2017, permission was requested to conduct research at BCMM for her Research Report, entitled PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY. This request was acknowledged by the Office of the Acting City Manager, and forwarded to the Information & Knowledge Management, Research & Policy Unit for further assistance. Dr. M. Sibanda was asked to provide the Unit with the necessary documentation, which he subsequently did.
The relevant Officials to assist in the research were identified and duly informed about the research, and the fact that Dr. M. Sibanda has met all the prerequisites. Their contact details have also been provided to Dr. M. Sibanda and she was informed to contact them directly for assistance.

We wish you good luck in your studies.

DR T F NORUSHE
HEAD: INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH AND POLICY
Addendum E

INFORMED CONSENT FORM - Pilot Study

Name of Respondent: ............................................................

Participate in a pilot study for the PhD study titled: Public participation in integrated development planning: A case study of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

My name is Modeni M. SIBANDA, a PhD student in the Department of Public Administration and Management at the University of the Free State. I am requesting your participation in a pilot study which seeks to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process and explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM. This form serves to (i) provide a synopsis of the information regarding the research and (ii) to request permission for your signature, should you choose to participate in this pilot study.

(i) Synopsis of the information regarding the research

Problem statement and rationale for the study: Public participation spaces often neglects and fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to deal with the complex power dynamics among stakeholders in the integrated development planning review processes. Existing ‘invited spaces’ are often largely ceremonial, in that through inclusion and exclusion, power dynamics frame and influence specific ways by which community problems and needs are understood, creates boundaries on possible solutions and determines how outcomes and decisions are reached in public participation spaces in the IDP review process.

The aim: The aim of this study is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process. Furthermore, the research will endeavor to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM.

The method to be employed: An exploratory and explanatory case study, mixed methodology approach will be used. Data will be collected in two separate phases: a questionnaire survey will be the first method of data collection. After the analysis of the quantitative data, the researcher uses these results to connect through focus group discussions with ward councilors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders.

The contribution that the study will make: This study will contribute to a better understanding of the influences of public participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning review process. By contributing knowledge that recognises the limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces, as well as the influences of public participation power dynamics, the study will further enhance competences and capabilities of local government practitioners in public participation. Municipal public officials and stakeholders, will therefore benefit from the results of this study.
**Ethical approval:** The study was approved by the research committee in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State.

**The nature of participation in the study:** A questionnaire survey will be self-administered to ward councilors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders in BCMM. It is anticipated that data collection could take place from May to Mid-June, 2017.

**The potential benefits of taking part in this study:** The results of the study will assist public officials, better understand and more precisely adapt to the complexity, limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces in the IDP review process, thereby benefiting your municipality in terms of future integrated development planning.

**The potential risks of taking part in this study:** There are no foreseen potential risks or physical discomfort to the participant. The only inconvenience might be for the participants to avail personal time to participate in the pilot study by completing a questionnaire survey.

**Confidentiality:** All your responses will remain confidential. In both the dissertation and any other academic publication emanating from this study, your responses will remain anonymous and only grouped data will be presented.

**Remuneration:** There is no material or financial benefit for individual participants in this pilot study.

**Sharing findings:** A final single copy of the research report will be made available to the municipality on request. The findings of the study may also be published in academic publications. The final study will also be accessible on the University of Free State electronic Thesis and Dissertations.

**Contact detail should you require more information:**

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<td><strong>Department:</strong> Public Administration &amp; Management</td>
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<td><strong>Faculty:</strong> Economic and Management Sciences</td>
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<td><strong>Email:</strong> <a href="mailto:mmsibanda@ufh.ac.za">mmsibanda@ufh.ac.za</a></td>
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<td><strong>Tel:</strong> 040 608 3462</td>
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<td><strong>Cell:</strong> 078 423 6696</td>
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(ii) Request permission for your signature, should you choose to participate in this pilot study

As part of this study I wish to conduct a pilot study on the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process, and to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM. If you agree to take part in this pilot study, I will ask you to complete this questionnaire survey. Please note that there are no correct or wrong
responses. This should take approximately 15 to 20 minutes.

Before I proceed, I need your agreement, that you are aware of the following:

1. I volunteer to participate in this PhD research pilot study which is conducted by Modeni M. Sibanda, a registered PhD student at the University of the Free State.

2. I understand that I am free to stop or withdraw from this pilot study at any time, without any negative consequences.

3. I understand that I may also refuse to answer any questions that I am not comfortable with and still remain part of the pilot study.

4. I understand that I will not directly benefit materially by taking part in the pilot study.

5. I understand that I will not be remunerated for taking part.

6. My participation involves participating in a pilot study by responding to a questionnaire survey facilitated by the researcher. The pilot study questionnaire survey will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes.

7. The findings of the pilot study may be published in an academic publication. As with the dissertation, my identity will remain confidential in any such publication.

8. The information above was explained to me by Modeni M. Sibanda in English. I am in command of this language. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and these questions were answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this pilot study. I have been given a copy of this form.

_________________________  _______________  ____________
Participant: name and
surname  Participant: signature  Date

_________________________  _______________  ____________
Researcher: name and
surname  Participant: signature  Date
Addendum F

INFORMED CONSENT FORM-Survey Questionnaire

Name of Respondent: ..........................................................

Participate in a questionnaire survey for the PhD study titled: Public participation in integrated development planning: A case study of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM)

My name is Modeni M. SIBANDA, a PhD student in the Department of Public Administration and Management at the University of the Free State. I am requesting your participation in a research study which seeks to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process and explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM. This form serves to (i) provide a synopsis of the information regarding the research and (ii) to request permission for your signature, should you choose to participate in this research.

(ii) Synopsis of the information regarding the research

Problem statement and rationale for the study: Public participation spaces often neglect and fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to deal with the complex power dynamics among stakeholders in the integrated development planning review processes. Existing ‘invited spaces’ are largely ceremonial. Through inclusion and exclusion power dynamics frame and influence specific ways by which community problems and needs are understood, creates boundaries on possible solutions and determines how outcomes are reached in public participation spaces in the IDP review process.

The aim: The aim of this study is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process. Furthermore, the research will endeavor to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM.

The method to be employed: An exploratory and explanatory case study, mixed methodology approach will be used. Data will be collected in two separate phases: a questionnaire survey will be the first method of data collection. After the analysis of the quantitative data, the researcher uses these results to connect through focus group discussions with ward councilors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders.

The contribution that the study will make: This study will contribute to a better understanding of the influences of public participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning review process. By contributing knowledge that recognises the limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces, as well as the influences of public participation power dynamics, the study will
further enhance competences and capabilities of local government practitioners in public participation. Municipal public officials and stakeholders, will therefore benefit from the results of this study.

**Ethical approval:** The study was approved by the research committee in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State.

**The nature of participation in the study:** A questionnaire survey will be self-administered to ward councilors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders in BCMM. It is anticipated that data collection could take place from May to Mid-June, 2017.

**The potential benefits of taking part in this study:** The results of the study will assist public officials, better understand and more precisely adapt to the complexity, limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces in the IDP review process, thereby benefiting your municipality in terms of future planning.

**The potential risks of taking part in this study:** There are no foreseen potential risks or physical discomfort to the participant. The only inconvenience might be for the participants to avail personal time to complete the survey questionnaire.

**Confidentiality:** All your responses will remain confidential. In both the dissertation and any other academic publication emanating from this study, your responses will remain anonymous and only grouped data will be presented.

**Remuneration:** There is no material or financial benefit for individual participants in this study.

**Sharing findings:** A final single copy of the research report will made available to the municipality on request. The findings of the study may also be published in academic publications. The final study will also be accessible on the University of Free State electronic Thesis and Dissertations.

**Contact detail should you require more information:**

University of the Free State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department:</th>
<th>Public Administration &amp; Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty:</td>
<td>Economic and Management Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mmsibandana@ufh.ac.za">mmsibandana@ufh.ac.za</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel:</td>
<td>040 608 3462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell:</td>
<td>078 423 6696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) request permission for your signature, should you choose to participate in this research

As part of this study, I wish to collect information on the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process, to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM. If you agree to take part in this study, I will ask to complete this survey questionnaire. Please note that there are no correct or wrong responses. This should take approximately 15 to 20 minutes.
Before I proceed, I need your agreement, that you are aware of the following:

1. I volunteer to participate in this PhD research which is conducted by Modeni M. Sibanda, a registered PhD student at the University of The Free State.

2. I understand that I am free to stop or withdraw from this survey questionnaire at any time, without any negative consequences.

3. I understand that I may also refuse to answer any questions that I am not comfortable with and still remain part of the study.

4. I understand that I will not directly benefit materially by taking part in the study.

5. I understand that I will not be remunerated for taking part.

6. My participation involves completing a questionnaire survey facilitated by the researcher and his research assistants. The questionnaire survey will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes.

7. The findings of the study may be published in an academic publication. As with the dissertation, my identity will remain confidential in any such publication.

8. The information above was explained to me by Modeni M. Sibanda in English. I am in command of this language. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and these questions were answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

__________________________ _____________________ ________
Participant: name and surname Participant: signature Date

__________________________ _____________________ ________
Researcher: name and surname Participant: signature Date
**SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE**

Public participation in integrated development planning:

A case study of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

**Instructions:**

1. Kindly choose the response that will best suit your perception, view or belief regarding public participation in the Integrated Development Planning process.
2. There are no wrong answers.
3. Please complete the following details for the purposes of the research by making a cross X.

### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

This section of the questionnaire is intended to give a background on demographic information of ward councillors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official use</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 or younger</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35 years old</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45 years old</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55 years old</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 55 years old</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Highest level of education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school or less</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College certificate</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please indicate)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Designation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Councillor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Committee Member</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP Representative Forum Member</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Stakeholder</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION B: DYNAMICS OF THE IDP PROCESS

This section seeks to solicit your views on the nature and extent of public participation dynamics in the IDP process in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality.

6. In your opinion, does public participation support the IDP process?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Specify)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. How would you evaluate the functioning of ward committees in your Municipality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More than satisfactory</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. In relation to ward committees, what challenges have you experienced during public participation in the IDP process? (Please specify)

9.

In relation to public participation in the IDP, to what extent do you agree with the following statements in your municipality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.1 The municipal council takes into account the recommendations of ward committees.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 The municipal council takes into account the recommendations of the IDP representative forum when making decisions on the IDP programmes or projects.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. In your municipality, how inclusive are public participation activities and spaces in the IDP process, for each of the following groups of people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Disabled</th>
<th>Youths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements, regarding how the public participates in the IDP process?

11.1 The public has insufficient skills and knowledge to empower them to make inputs into the IDP process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11.2 Public participation in the IDP process generates perceptions of insecurity as municipal council officials feel that they lose decision making authority to municipal residents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

11.3 The local community is not interested in participating in the IDP process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

11.4 The municipality adequately budgets for public participation in the IDP process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements, on the context of public participation in the IDP process.

12.1 The community trusts the municipal council’s ability to deliver services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12.2 Community members with no secondary school education level find it difficult to understand the IDP documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
12.3 Cultural beliefs and practices may influence public participation.  

12.4 Lack of access to information on formulating the IDP makes it difficult for those involved in public participation to shape IDP outcomes responsive to community needs.

13. **Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements, concerning public participation spaces in the IDP process, in your municipality.**

13.1 The municipal council empowers the community by transferring decision-making power from the municipal council to municipal residents.  

13.2 The municipal council consults sufficiently with key stakeholders and interest groups during public participation in the IDP process.  

13.3 I trust that the municipal council includes issues raised by my community in the IDP.  

13.4 I trust that the ward councilor recommends issues raised by the community to the municipal council for inclusion in the IDP.  

13.5 I have trust in ward committee members’ ability to voice community needs.  

13.6 A privileged few committee members dominate public participation in the IDP process.  

13.7 I believe that ward committees are neutral conveyors of public interests.  

13.8 Residents are committed to participating in the IDP process.  

13.9 Public participation in the IDP process is done just to comply with local government laws.

14. **Are you satisfied with public participation in the IDP in your municipality?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This section seeks to establish your views on the dynamics of public participation and how they influence the integrated development planning process.

15. **Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding public participation influences on the IDP outcomes responsive to community needs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.1 Stakeholders use their power and influence to determine what is included/excluded from the IDP.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.2 During public participation, consensus building with other stakeholders is a priority in the IDP process.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3 In my municipality, during public participation powerful community members network by developing connections and associations, advancing their interests in the adoption of IDP programmes and projects.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4 The municipal council provides adequate resource support to enable stakeholders to participate in the IDP process.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5 Documents that are too long and difficult to understand discourage municipal residents from participating in the IDP process.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6 The language used in the IDP documents, is easily understood by municipal residents who participate in the IDP process.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.7 Public participation is low among ‘privileged’ residents who are distrustful of the state, generally, and processes like the IDP, specifically.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.8 Municipal residents from minority racial groups participate in the IDP process.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
16. **Indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements, on the influence of public participation on IDP outcomes responsive to community need in your municipality.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.1 During public participation, all stakeholders, have an equal voice to</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence IDP programmes and/or projects.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.2 All stakeholders are equally informed about the IDP process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3 Stakeholders have the expertise to prioritise community needs.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4 I get sufficient time to participate in the IDP process.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5 A resident’s political affiliation has no influence on what gets</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recommended to the municipal council as community needs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. **Indicate how much you agree with the following statements, regarding the extent to which different stakeholders during public participation, shape the IDP outcomes responsive to community needs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.1 The IDP representative forum only represents the interests of specific</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2 The IDP representative forum only represents the interests of specific</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individuals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3 In my ward, ward committees members are dominated by members of one</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political party.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.4 In public participation, I feel that those with expert knowledge on</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the formulation of the IDP dominate my views.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.5 In this municipality, residents with greater material resources are</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>listened to more than other members of the community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.6 Through public participation, the public has the power to have</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community needs adopted in the IDP by the municipal council.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.7 During public participation, less powerful people in the community</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are often dominated and alienated by those with power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.8 Compliance to municipal laws and procedures determines the issues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that get prioritised in the IDP, regardless of community input during public participation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. Do you feel that you do participate in the IDP process to the extent you would wish to?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please indicate)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Please explain your response to question 18.


20. Do you think that the IDP representative forum can influence the IDP outcomes that seek to address the needs of the community in the municipality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please indicate)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Please explain your response to question 20.


22. What recommendations would you make regarding participation power irregularities, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the integrated development planning process?


Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey questionnaire
INFORMED CONSENT FORM – Focus Group Discussion

Name of Respondent: ............................................................

Participate in a focus group discussion for the PhD study titled: Public participation in integrated development planning: A case study of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

My name is Modeni M. SIBANDA, a PhD student in the Department of Public Administration and Management at the University of the Free State. I am requesting your participation in a focus group discussion which seeks to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process and explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM. This form serves to (i) provide a synopsis of the information regarding the research and (ii) to request permission for your signature, should you choose to participate in this focus group discussion.

(iii) Synopsis of the information regarding the research

Problem statement and rationale for the study: Public participation spaces often neglects and fail to pay attention to the ability of such spaces to deal with the complex power dynamics among stakeholders in the integrated development planning review processes. Existing ‘invited spaces’ are often largely ceremonial, in that through inclusion and exclusion, power dynamics frame and influence specific ways by which community problems and needs are understood, creates boundaries on possible solutions and determines how outcomes and decisions are reached in public participation spaces.

The aim: The aim of this study is to explore the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process. Furthermore, the research seeks to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM.

The method to be employed: An exploratory and explanatory case study, mixed methodology approach will be used. Data will be collected in two separate phases: a questionnaire survey will be the first method of data collection. After the analysis of the quantitative data, the researcher uses these results to connect through focus group discussions with ward councilors, ward committee members, IDP representative forum members and community stakeholders.

The contribution that the study will make: This study will contribute to a better understanding of the influences of public participation power dynamics in the integrated development planning review process. By contributing knowledge that recognises the limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces, as well as the influences of public participation power dynamics, the study will further enhance competences and capabilities of local government practitioners in public participation. Municipal public officials and stakeholders, will therefore benefit from the results of this study.

Ethical approval: The study was approved by the research committee in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State.

The nature of participation in the study: Focus group discussions will be used as the second method of data collection. Focus group discussion questions will be formulated complementary to the questionnaire survey responses. Four focus-group discussions will then be conducted with participants each with one of
the following target groups: ward councillors; ward committee members IDP representative forum members; and community stakeholders. It is anticipated that focus group discussions could take place between mid-May and mid-June 2017.

**The potential benefits of taking part in this study:** The results of the study will assist public officials, better understand and more precisely adapt to the complexity, limitations and possibilities of public participation spaces in the IDP review process, thereby benefiting your municipality in terms of future integrated development planning.

**The potential risks of taking part in this study:** There are no foreseen potential risks or physical discomfort to the participant. The only inconvenience might be for the participants to avail personal time to participate in the focus group discussions.

**Confidentiality:** All your responses will remain confidential. In both the dissertation and any other academic publication emanating from this study, your responses will remain anonymous and only grouped data will be presented.

**Remuneration:** There is no material or financial benefit for individual participants in this pilot study.

**Sharing findings:** A final single copy of the research report will made available to the municipality on request. The findings of the study may also be published in academic publications. The final study will also be accessible on the University of Free State electronic Thesis and Dissertations.

**Contact detail should you require more information:**

**University of the Free State**

**Department:** Public Administration & Management

**Faculty:** Economic and Management Sciences

**Email:** mmsibanda@ufh.ac.za

**Tel:** 040 608 3462

**Cell:** 078 423 6696

(i) request permission for your signature, should you choose to participate in this pilot study

As part of this study I wish to conduct a focus group discussion on the nature and extent of public participation power dynamics during the integrated development planning review process, and to explain how these dynamics influence Integrated Development Plan outcomes in BCMM. If you agree to take part in this focus group discussion, I will ask you to complete this informed consent form and to take part in this focus group discussion. Please note that there are no correct or wrong responses. This should take approximately 20 to 25 minutes.

Before I proceed, I need your agreement, that you are aware of the following:

1. I volunteer to participate in this PhD research focus group discussion which is conducted by Modeni M. Sibanda, a registered PhD student at the University of the Free State.
2. I understand that I am free to stop or withdraw from this focus group discussion at any time, without any negative consequences.
3. I understand that I may also refuse to answer any questions that I am not comfortable with and still remain part of the focus group discussion.
4. I understand that I will not directly benefit materially by taking part in the focus group discussion.
5. I understand that I will not be remunerated for taking part.
6. My participation involves participating in a focus group discussion facilitated by the researcher. The focus group discussion will take approximately 20 to 25 minutes.
7. The findings of the study may be published in an academic publication. As with the dissertation, my identity will remain confidential in any such publication.
8. The information above was explained to me by Modeni M. Sibanda in English; I am in command of this language. I was given the opportunity to ask questions and these questions were answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this pilot study. I have been given a copy of this form.

_________________________  ______________________  ____________
Participant: name and surname  Participant: signature  Date

_________________________  ______________________  ____________
Researcher: name and surname  Participant: signature  Date
Addendum I

Focus Group Discussion Guide

(1) Public participation in the IDP is typically associated with citizen access to power. Do you feel that you have adequate access to and influence in the IDP process?

(2) What opportunities and constraints do you encounter in accessing and influencing public participation in the IDP?

(3) Do you think that the community has voice in public participation in the IDP process? (probe how this is done, so that participants clarify and provide reasons for responses given).

(4) In your view, what factors enable and constrain public participation in the IDP process in BCMM?

(5) How does the community negotiate the terms of public participation constructed by the municipality so as to have a voice in the IDP process?

(6) In your community, what public participation processes enable, constraints or limit community voice in the IDP?

(7) Do you believe that elected and public officials, technical experts, the public and other stakeholders's views get equal attention in public participation spaces for incorporation into the IDP?

(8) Do you believe that public participation in the IDP in BCMM contributes to the empowerment of individuals and groups that are outside the existing circles of power? (probe reasons for any response, beliefs and perceptions)?

(9) Do you consider yourself as having sufficient and appropriate opportunities to express your choices and opinions during public participation in the IDP?

(10) Do you think that you have sufficient and appropriate support, (for instance, education, information, etc), so that you can understand the IDP process in an informed way?

(11) In your opinion do you think that you have the opportunity to affect the criteria by which IDP decisions are made and to have your ideas measured against alternatives during public participation in the IDP?

(12) In your opinion do you feel included or excluded during public participation in the IDP process? (probe so that respondents provide detail and provide justification for any of their views, beliefs or perceptions).

(13) Do you believe that the IDP documents are easily accessible to you to enable you to better influence IDP outcomes during and your ability to participate in public participation spaces in the BCMM? (probe so that respondents the aspects of the IDP document they believe either enables or constraints to participate in an informed way).

(14) What recommendations would you like to make regarding public participation, community voice and power irregularities, among stakeholders, so as to minimise the negative influences of such dynamics in the IDP? (probe depending on responses/discussion)
Addendum J

P O Box 91156, Auckland Park, 2006
Tel. 011 482 2155
Email: glynnecase45@gmail.com
082 663 8498 (Glynne Case)

1 January 2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Re: Proofreading of PhD thesis entitled **Public Participation in Integrated Development Planning: A Case Study of the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality** being submitted by Modeni M Sibanda (Student number 2010131452)

I hereby certify that I have edited and proofread this PhD thesis being submitted by Modeni M Sibanda to the University of the Free State.

Furthermore, I hereby state that before submission of this thesis to the University the onus is on this student to completely perform all the corrections and alterations that I had marked as being necessary.

(Signature)

(Mrs) Glynne Case
### Doc part 2

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