Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa, 1923-1953

BY

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THIS THESIS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES FOR THE CENTRE FOR AFRICA STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE

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FEBRUARY 2017
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Abstract

This thesis is a historical examination of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations from 1923 to 1953. Although some historians have paid attention to this “special relationship”, this thesis argues that the relationship is far more intricate and complex than the existing historiography allows for. In particular, it highlights the complexity of the ties between the two countries by studying the political relations, economic links and social and cultural ties between the two. By 1923, Southern Rhodesia had attained responsible government, in the process rejecting union with South Africa. Multiple factors contributed to this development, most notably anti-Afrikaner sentiments. It is this antagonistic, ambiguous relationship that this thesis significantly details and analyses. The thesis is organised chronologically, and discusses the multi-faceted nature of relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. As is argued, economic ties (in particular customs and trade agreements) were the cornerstone of relations. Economic ties were fluid; they were characterised by close ties as well as friction between the two countries. Changes in the nature of economic relations influenced other aspects of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations. In addition, this thesis pays close attention to relations during the Second World War, whilst also examining social and cultural ties such as the role of sport and migration. Archival sources in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Britain were used for this thesis. These sources were supplemented by South African and Zimbabwean newspapers and periodicals. Situated within the broader framework of Southern African history, the thesis provides a lens through which to study the economic, political and social forces that characterised the colonial period in the region. The thesis also contributes to area studies – it shows that, by studying Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations, it becomes evident that countries and settler societies bound by geographical contiguity are not monolithic and do not necessarily maintain harmonious relations. The importance of the thesis from an imperial perspective is that it interweaves economic, political and social developments to provide a multifaceted analysis of British relations with Southern Africa.

Key Words: Responsible Government, Customs Agreements, Federation, Afrikaner Nationalism, Immigration, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Settlers.
Opsomming

Hierdie proefskrif is 'n historiese ondersoek na betrekkinge tussen Suidelike Rhodesië en Suid-Afrika van 1923 tot 1953. Hoewel sommige geskiedkundiges reeds aandag gegee het aan hierdie “spesiale verhouding”, argumenteer hierdie proefskrif dat die verhouding baie meer verwikkeld en kompleks is as wat die bestaande geskiedskrywing aandui. Hierdie proefskrif belig veral die kompleksiteit van die bande tussen die twee lande deur die politieke verhoudinge, ekonomiese betrekkinge en sosiale en kulturele bande tussen hulle te bestudeer. Teen 1923 het Suidelike Rhodesië verantwoordelike regering bereik, en in die proses is samesmelting met Suid-Afrika verwerp. Veelvuldige faktore (in die besonder anti-Afrikanergevoelens) het bygedra tot hierdie verwikkeling. Dit is hierdie antagonistiese, meerduidige relasie wat op beduidende wyse in besonderhede in die proefskrif uiteengesit en ontleed word. Die proefskrif is chronologies gestruktureer en bespreek die veelfasettige aard van verhoudinge tussen Suidelike Rhodesië en Suid-Afrika. Soos wat aangevoer word, was ekonomiese bande (veral doane - en handelsooreenkomste) die hoeksteen van verhoudinge. Ekonomiese bande was vloeibaar; hulle is gekenmerk deur noue betrekkinge asook wrywing tussen die twee lande. Veranderinge in die aard van ekonomiese relasies het ander aspekte van verhoudinge tussen Suidelike Rhodesië en Suid-Afrika beïnvloed. Die proefskrif gee ook nougesette aandag aan verhoudinge gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, terwyl sosiale en kulturele bande soos die rol van sport en migrasie ook ondersoek word. Argiefbronne in Suid-Afrika, Zimbabwe en Brittanje is vir hierdie proefskrif gebruik. Die bronne is aangevul deur Suid-Afrikaanse en Zimbabwiese koerante en tydskrifte. Binne die breër raamwerk van Suider-Afrikaanse geskiedenis voorsien die proefskrif 'n lens waardeur die ekonomiese, politieke en sosiale kragte wat kenmerkend was van die koloniale tydperk in die gebied, bestudeer kan word. Die proefskrif dra ook by tot gebiedstudies deur te toon dat dit uit die bestudering van relasies tussen Suidelike Rhodesië en Suid-Afrika blyk dat lande en setlaargemeenskappe wat deur geografiese aangrensing beperk word, nie monolities is nie en nie noodwendig harmonieuse verhoudinge handhaaf nie. Vanuit 'n imperiale perspektief gesien, is hierdie proefskrif belangrik omdat dit ekonomiese, politieke en sosiale verwikkelinge verweef om 'n veelfasettige analise van Britse verhoudinge met Suid-Afrika te verskaf.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors for their generosity, advice and encouragement. This thesis would not have been possible without their guidance. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Ian Phimister for his supervision and funding that enabled me to pursue my dream. His insights and exceptional understanding of Southern African history is inspirational and it is my good fortune to have learned from him. Thank you. My second supervisor, Dr Kate Law has been instrumental in the completion of this thesis. Her generosity with her time, meticulous examination of my work and suggestions has been invaluable. I am most grateful, many thanks Dr Law. I would also like to thank Mrs Ilse le Roux and Mrs Tarisai Gwena for all their tireless work to ensure that all our academic needs were taken care of, I thank you. A special word of thanks goes to Professor Albert Grundlingh for letting me know about this Doctoral programme; without his suggestion it would not have been possible. I wish to thank the National Research Foundation for providing funds so that I could complete my programme.

I was fortunate to be part of the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State. Thank you to all for the ideas, friendships, time and encouragement, it is has been a joyous time. Elizabeth Ongera, thanks for the company and friendship. It was wonderful travelling on this journey with you. Many archivist and librarians assisted me during my research. I wish to thank all of them for their assistance and willingness to help me. I would like to thank the staff at the National Archives of South Africa, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Bodleian Libraries, National Library of South Africa, and the South African National Defence Force Archives.

Above all I would like to thank my family and friends for all the love and support. Thank you to the Mlombo family, Darlington family, John Quin and Gill Melody, Mary Cullen and Beyers Bezuidenhout for the support. I am most grateful. I would also like to thank my good friends for their encouragement and their generosity in providing accommodation when I was conducting my research. My love and thanks to you.
# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>All-African Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCongress</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANYL</td>
<td>African National Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA Company</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Central African Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade and Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Association Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAZ</td>
<td>National Archives of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTC</td>
<td>Officers’ Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Rhodesian African Rifles</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBVA</td>
<td>Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGA</td>
<td>Responsible Government Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RICU</td>
<td>Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNA</td>
<td>Rhodesian Native Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUA</td>
<td>Rhodesian Union Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>Rhodes University College</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Rhodesia ANC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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USA   United States of America
WITS   University of the Witwatersrand
ZAPU   Zimbabwe African People’s Union
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background
South Africa and Zimbabwe enjoy what some authors and publications term a “special relationship”. A.S. Mlambo for example noted that there is an assumption that such a relation has always existed. D. Geldenhuys argues that the ‘two neighbouring countries have . . . enjoyed a special relationship born of geographical contiguity, historical ties, economic interdependence, racial solidarity and shared political interests’.¹ It is a result of these continuing connections that the assumption of a special relationship exists. But while the notion of “special relationship” remains a contested matter, the existence of a relationship of one kind or another is true. This thesis makes a long, historical appraisal of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations, which stretches back to the late nineteenth century. Although the existing literature covers aspects of this history, a comprehensive study of the relationship has yet to be written. A number of scholars² have discussed important aspects of this relationship and though they do not primarily focus on the relationship, they offer the most significant work which this thesis does build upon.

Chanock notes that there exists a ‘discrete Rhodesian historiography. In it customarily, the “southern factor” appears at the time of Rhodesia’s inception; again as an option rejected by the settlers in 1922; hovers in the wings as a threat countered by federation in the 1950s; and is on stage again after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965’.³ The “southern factor” became an integral component of Southern Rhodesian history. This thesis investigates the complex nature of the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and the “southern factor”, South Africa. In particular, the study offers an account of the relationship from Southern Rhodesian perspectives. It traces the nature and extent of the relationship

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³ Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 1.
and how it developed from 1923 to 1953. Although the thesis begins in 1923, the year which marked the beginning of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia, chapter two examines the years leading up to Responsible Government and the part played by the “southern factor”. This background chapter provides the settling for the state of affairs between the two territories at the dawn of Responsible Government.

Within the time frame outlined above, this study contributes to several overlapping historiographies. These are studies of the Southern Africa region, as well as to studies of settler colonialism and British imperialism in the region. When examining Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa, it is important to explain what is meant by settlers and settler colonialism. A large scholarship exists which has sought to demonstrate that settler colonialism is a distinct form of colonialism. Although Lorenzo Veracini is not the lone voice on this subject, he is at the forefront of current discussions. He notes that “Colony” has two main connotations. A colony is ‘both a political body that is dominated by an exogenous agency, and an exogenous entity that reproduces itself in a given environment’. Though they may refer to different circumstances, “colony” implies the localised ascendancy of an external element – this is what brings the two meanings together. Conceptually, settler colonialism on the other hand incorporates this vital distinction. According to Veracini, since both the

permanent movement and reproduction of communities and the dominance of an exogenous agency over an indigenous one are necessarily involved, settler colonial phenomena are intimately related to both colonialism and migration. And yet, not all migrations are settler migrations and not all colonialisms are settler colonial: Veracini argues that settler colonialism should be seen as structurally distinct from both.

He suggests that settlers are part of a development that sees them undertake a process of movement into a new location and often end up residing there permanently. However, Veracini emphasises the uniqueness of settlers in that they are a product of conquest rather than immigration alone. Settlers are ‘founders of political orders and carry their sovereignty with them (on the contrary, migrants can be seen as appellants facing a political order that

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5 Ibid, 3.
6 Ibid.
is already constituted). While Veracini’s work endeavours to differentiate between colonialism and settler colonialism, it also acknowledges that the two forms do frequently coexist and reciprocally define each other. Citing Georges Balandier, Veracini notes that in the case of settler colonialism, the colonial “situation” in which settlers play a part is characterised by exogenous domination and a demographic balance. The power willed by the foreign minority, racially (or ethnically) and culturally different, ‘acting in the name of a racial (or ethnic) and cultural superiority, imposes itself on an indigenous population constituting a numerical majority but inferior to the dominant group from a material point of view’.

Exploring ‘the evolution of “settler colonialism” as a category of analysis during the second half of the twentieth century’, Veracini positions (settler) colonialism as ‘colonisation in which settlers neither exterminate nor assimilate the indigenes’, he moved. This moves away from what Patrick Wolfe considers settler colonialism as inherently eliminatory. Veracini notes that ‘settlers and indigenes may live either side by side or apart, but in either case there is a lack of wholesale acculturation or eradication (this is not to imply that no culture change occurs). Among the former European colonies that exemplified this type are Algeria, Rhodesia, Kenya, and South Africa’.

In this respect, Veracini provides useful insight into the structure of the colonial project in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The two territories were a product of colonisation and colonialism, both affirming settler dominance over the larger indigenous population. Moreover, the origins and development of the Southern Rhodesian state drew explicitly and implicitly from South African examples, in the process one country mirrored the other in terms of how society was organised, and settler dominance consolidated.

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, 4.
Finally, Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen note that settler colonialism is rightly ‘distinguished from imperial expansion undertaken by military advantage or trade as imperial overlords concern themselves little with possible land seizure or internal government, seeking to work with indigenous partners or chartered companies’. In the situation where an alien population settles in a territory and make its home and enjoys a materially privileged position in relation to the indigenous population provides a different circumstance. Elkins and Pedersen explain that this new dynamic in colonies of European settlement, settlers were driven to create communities constructed on ethnic and racial terms in what they defined as virgin land. Insofar as there was logic to this approach ‘to the indigenous populations, it was a logic of elimination and not exploitation: they wished less to govern indigenous peoples or enlist them in their economic ventures than to seize their land and push them beyond the expanding frontier of settlement’. In this sense, if the colonialism practiced by these ‘settler societies is to be understood as a “relationship of domination” by which a foreign minority governs the indigenous majority according to the dictates of a distant metropolis, it ought to be acknowledged that these settler colonies often sought to weaken metropolitan control’. In such instances, settlers sought to consolidate their power by seeking to weaken metropolitan supervision over the colonial state. Settlers saw themselves as being better placed than the metropole in governing the colony. This was true for South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

By drawing on existing scholarship, this study seeks to use “settler colonialism” as a lens through which to examine Southern Rhodesian relations with South Africa. A common feature of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa from 1923 to 1953 is that both territories were controlled by settlers. It is important to note that the label settler is a contested term

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13 The essence of the empty land theory claims that European colonisation of Africa was justified because when Europeans first arrived in Africa, land belonged to no one and that the continent was unknown territory which had yet to be explored. Given this status, the continent was deemed to be in need of those who could explore and control unclaimed land. Europeans were portrayed as carriers of knowledge, skill and intellect to development the land and African were cast as intellectually inferior to master the conditions and use the land productively.
15 Ibid.
and white South Africans would not see themselves as settlers given that whites have been in South Africa since mid-seventeenth century.

Importantly this thesis will unpack the settler nature of the relationship. Although Elkins and Pedersen and, in particular, Veracini expands our understanding concerning the settler colonial process in Southern Africa, this thesis introduces a new dimension to settler colonialism. This study argues that by studying Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations, settler colonialism in the region was marked by a competitive and antagonistic relationship between settler communities, in particular Afrikaner and English needs attention. Before 1923, uneasiness existed between Afrikaner and English, which was evidently expressed at significant historical junctures such as the South Africa War (1899-1902) and the First World War. Although such friction was a feature in Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations, as this thesis demonstrates it was never consistent.

The thesis examines Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa partly by assessing the significance of this dimension in the development of the Southern Rhodesian state. Conventional knowledge about the Southern Rhodesian state as captured by Kenneth Good is that Southern Rhodesia’s relations with Britain and South Africa were regarded as an important aspect of its power ‘which tends to be hidden behind the strong drive for autonomy and its exceptionalism in internal affairs. Rhodesia’s independence was dependent upon the absence of active African opposition, but British and South African support was intended only to prevent the outbreak of such action’.16

This study hypothesizes that the Southern Rhodesia-South African relationship was far more complex than portrayed by current historiography. It is a relationship in which the persisting features of competition, contradiction and antagonism permeated every aspect: social, political, and economic relations. While this study pursues a broad investigation into the nature of this relationship, it looks closely at political relations, economic links, social and cultural ties as well as African connections. Particular attention is given to political and economic links because at the dawn of Responsible Government in 1923, the new leader of Southern Rhodesia, Charles Coghlan, was primarily concerned with ‘economic problems of a

poor country which was badly under-capitalized’. As Robert Blake, subsequently notes, ‘Coghlan managed to establish good relations with the South African Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog, which eventually facilitated the making of a satisfactory customs agreement with South Africa’.\(^\text{17}\) Customs agreements were therefore an important aspect of Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa. In fact, shifts in the nature of the customs relationship influenced other aspects of this generally complex relationship. This thesis seeks to disentangle the complex nature of the relationship by focusing on the various aspects that shaped it. Chapter three and chapter six in particular explore the multifaceted nature of the relationship. They examine economic, political social and cultural relations as well as African voices. Through examining and analysing these dimensions, the thesis demonstrates the extent to which relations were marked by antagonism, competition and in some instances co-operation.

### 1.2 Literature Review

Knowledge of Southern Rhodesia-South African relations is limited and uneven. Existing writing on affairs between the two territories, especially as it pertains to settler relations has largely been confined to Southern Rhodesian historiography. Even here, while Southern Rhodesia’s early history has received attention, in the process providing insight into early Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations, much more has been written on the post-Second World War period.

Southern Rhodesian scholarship which in part covers Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations focuses on the origins of Southern Rhodesia. The ‘birth’ of Southern Rhodesia marks the starting point of a literature which studies the early ties between the two countries. It is from this particular standpoint that Martin Chanock identifies South Africa as the constant “southern factor” in Southern Rhodesian history. Whites began to settle the territory later known as Southern Rhodesia in 1890, almost all of them coming via the Cape Colony and the Transvaal. For Kenneth Good, the origins of settler colonialism in Southern Rhodesia were linked to the expansion of South Africa’s mineral resources, particularly ‘in the move towards the monopoly control of the industry, wherein Cecil Rhodes played a large and successful part. A “powerful financial link” was established between London,

\(^{17}\) R. Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1977), 205.
South Africa, and eventually Rhodesia which made possible-in the initial form of the Chartered Company-the northward colonial expansion’.

A number of scholars such as Philip Mason, Arthur Keppel-Jones, Stanlake Samkange, and Hugh Marshall Hole have all laid the basis for the study of the origins of Southern Rhodesia by emphasizing the centrality of South Africa in this development. The “southern factor” remains a constant throughout the literature and speaks to the origin of Rhodesia in part as a product of two centres of power in South Africa, the Transvaal and the Cape Colony, contesting fiercely for political, cultural and economic supremacy. It was the Cape Colony which triumphed through the birth of Southern Rhodesia given that many who settled the territory under British South Africa Company administration came from the Cape Colony. The literature which covers this crucial period emphasises that ‘the early years of Southern Rhodesian history was in the main of an outlying portion of the Cape Colony’. Furthermore, the literature highlights the interconnectedness between the two territories and that early Southern Rhodesia had very close links with its southern neighbour. In part, this meant that some of the Europeans who settled the territory carried with them South African attitudes and traditions.

The dominant lens through which such relations have received scholarly attention has been economic. This aspect, according to many accounts, provides the main motive for territorial expansion from the south, initially from the Cape, and eventually for the anticipated union of the two territories. Closer economic ties were pursued aggressively by Cecil John Rhodes, whose British South Africa Company (hereafter BSA Company) had secured a Royal Charter in 1889 to “open up” the land north of the Limpopo. Rhodes hoped to ‘open up new territory for workers from the overcrowded homeland, and new markets for British

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18 Good, ‘Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia’, 16.
manufacturers; to occupy the interior of Africa; to ensure that his “North” should one day fall to the Cape Colony, and to promote the federation of South Africa as a portion of the British Empire’.  

According to Di Perna, the British Government was favourably disposed to proposals from imperial officials in the Cape. The Cape Town based High Commissioner urged London to permit a ‘chartered company to expand British influence to the north. The British Government could avoid a direct confrontation with Kruger, and prevent heavy demands on the Imperial Treasury. Thus, the chartering of a private company became the means by which the Union Jack could be planted north of the Limpopo’. The British Government regarded its reluctance for direct involvement as advantageous and calculated that a company with such wide-ranging purposes and powers ‘would eliminate the need for increased imperial expenditures and hopefully, would avoid diplomatic confrontation with other countries vying for land in Africa. This reluctance for direct involvement by the British Government characterized the early dealing with Rhodesia’.  

A man of substantial riches who had made his fortune in the diamond mines of Kimberley, Cecil Rhodes was also Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in 1890. He used his political position and his wealth to venture north of the Limpopo River. According to Hole, Rhodes always ‘professed a desire that whatever territory could be obtained south of the Zambezi should become the heritage of the Cape’. It was important for Rhodes that the territory north of the Limpopo ought to be claimed and should be an expansion of the Cape. By settling this territory and making it predominately British and promoting its development for the benefit of the Cape Colony, which had experienced British and Dutch cooperation under his premiership, Rhodes sought to counter the increasingly wealthy Transvaal and to secure for the British Empire the region north of the Limpopo. For this to be achieved, what became Southern Rhodesia would need to contain within it a “Second Rand”. According to Samkange, Rhodes declared the land a country for ‘white men and for their families. His

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24 Ibid.

ambition was to fill this land with homesteads and towns with railways and telegraphs for the advancement of Great Britain. Rhodes was aware that not only the Transvaal but Portugal and Germany were interested in Matabeleland’. 26

The economic relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, especially in the early years has been examined by Ian Phimister. In his article *Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand*, Phimister traced the economic interconnectedness between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia locating the origins of relations between the two countries in search for the “Second Rand”. Furthermore, the economic relationship between the two territories operated within an economic regional system incorporating all of southern Africa. The man at the centre of this development was Rhodes, precisely because his ‘three main financial interests lay in Kimberley diamonds, Witwatersrand gold and Southern Rhodesian mines and lands. These interests were closely interlinked and developments within one field of operations normally affected the others’. 27

Phimister also deals with the dominant industries crucial to the economic foundations of Southern Rhodesia. The two main industries in early Southern Rhodesia were mining and agriculture. His study highlights the role of the two industries as they relate to the future of Southern Rhodesia once the Company’s administration term came to an end, a future which included the possibility of union with South Africa. For Phimister, Southern Rhodesia was never in a position to quarrel with South African authorities. Economically and geographically, South Africa was perceived by Rhodesians as very powerful in its relationship to Southern Rhodesia and ‘. . . could . . . put . . . the screw on Rhodesia in more ways than those in which to retaliate even in spite of the fact that Rhodesia bought from South Africa substantially more than South Africa bought from Rhodesia’. 28

Political and diplomatic links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa have also received some attention in the literature. Political ties have featured significantly in the works of Ronald Hyam, Martin Chanock and Philip Warhurst. Warhurst’s work studies the two decades of Rhodesian-South African relations between 1900 and 1923. In particular, Warhurst examines why in 1922 white Rhodesians chose not to join the Union of South

28 Phimister, *Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, 249.
Africa, as had been first anticipated by many politicians in southern Africa and Britain. Warhurst provides a number of reasons for this development, one of which suggests that what distressed most Rhodesians was ‘the rise of Afrikaner nationalism in the Union and economic fears added to the apprehensions of the Rhodesian colonists’. These were significant factors in Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury feared that with the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, union with the south would compromise the supremacy of English in the territory and the link with Britain. For Warhurst, fundamentally, Southern Rhodesia saw itself as a British territory and strived to maintain that characteristic.

Ronald Hyam’s *The Failure of South African Expansion 1908-1948* explores Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations within the context of South African territorial expansionist ambitions. The unification of the South African provinces took ‘place in 1909 with Southern Rhodesia represented by Sir Charles Coghlan. The Act of Union made provision for the inclusion of Rhodesia at any time, and the future leader of the Responsible Government Party returned from the Cape with the hope that his own country would form part of it’. The union of Southern Rhodesia with South Africa was encouraged by Britain at the time as the ‘British government’s bias was “a little in favour” of Rhodesia joining the Union’. Southern Rhodesia, London thought could be an instrument that would act as a makeweight ‘counterbalancing Afrikaner predominance in the Union, and Union was the only way in which all responsibility for buying out the BSA Company could be removed from the British government’. Hyam’s study captures how a particular segment of the South African political class failed to turn its expansionist ambitions into reality. Part of this fate rested on the growing gap between British and South African views. Imperial support had been withdrawn for territorial expansion as Britain’s initial support for Smuts changed over the course of the 1930s and 1940s and formed no part in Smuts’s vision. Smuts wanted an extension of a great White Africa along the Eastern backbone, seeking to connect the north and south. This book manages to emphasise that despite racial hierarchy in the region

whites were by no means a monolithic group but competed amongst themselves for narrow interests.

Operating within the same field as Hyam, Martin Chanock’s *Unconsummated Union* discusses how Southern Rhodesia avoided joining South Africa in 1922. The book identifies Britain as the central player in this process. The greatest threat identified at the time to British interests in the region came from the Dutch-dominated Union of South Africa. Chanock notes that for Britain the Rhodesias were ‘important in the context of maintaining a co-operative government in power in South Africa. The making of the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia was the by-product of a failed exercise in neo-imperialism’.33 Furthermore, the author stresses that as the ‘internal base of the collaborative government waned in South Africa so the addition of Rhodesia was prepared to add to the weight of the imperial factor inside South Africa’.34 The unsuccessful attempt at maintaining the compromise which established the Union of South Africa in 1910 allowed for the emergence of a settler State and was later positioned as providing an external counterpoise to an Afrikaner nationalist South Africa. The relationship between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as captured by Chanock is placed within the context of British and South African relations. The book details divisions within South Africa, South African and British policies with regards to Africans and issues of security and defence are all studied in the context of British imperial power in Southern Africa.

In addition to the above-mentioned historical works, Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw’s *The Lion and the Springbok. Britain and South Africa since the Boer War* discusses certain aspects of this relationship. According to Hyam and Henshaw, relations between Britain and South Africa for much of this period were strained because Afrikaner nationalism was deeply troublesome to British interests in the region.35 Additionally, strained relations between Britain and South Africa were exacerbated by the issue of Southern Rhodesia. When white settlers in Southern Rhodesia rejected joining the Union of South Africa in the 1922 Referendum, this came as a surprise to London given that Southern Rhodesia’s future was earmarked for ‘incorporation with the Union. Rhodes had never regarded Rhodesia as a

33 Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 3.
34 Ibid.
35 See Hyam and Henshaw, *Lion and the Springbok*. 
country outside South Africa or as a black colony like Uganda or Nigeria. Rhodesia was destined to join the south’.³⁶ Over time close links between the two territories maintained the possibility of union. The links between Southern Rhodesia and the Union were certainly close especially as ‘social, business, family, entertainment, and sporting ties were strong’.³⁷ According to Hyam and Henshaw Afrikaner nationalism was a key factor in swaying white Rhodesians away from a union with South Africa. The Rhodesian decision in 1922 ‘altered the whole prospect of British planning in southern and Central Africa. From the imperial point of view, Rhodesia’s function was to act as a counterpoise to Afrikanerdom, preferably inside, but if not, then outside’.³⁸ With Afrikaner nationalism cementing its control from 1948 over South Africa, relations between Britain and South Africa were further strained. Although the book does indeed cast light on some important aspects of Southern Rhodesia-South African relations the relationship is actually secondary to the study’s main concerns.

So far as studies that focus primarily on Southern Rhodesia are concerned, Elaine Lee’s doctoral thesis, ‘Politics and Pressure Groups in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1923’ in part examines how Southern Rhodesia achieved Responsible Government in 1922. Her study primarily focuses on local interests groups in Southern Rhodesia and their contribution to settler political development. The dominant sectors in early Southern Rhodesian history were mining and farming, often in conflict because of their different economic interests. At first, the mining sector had the political influence. According the Gann, mining began as the ‘Chartered Company’s favoured child – farming was its neglected Cinderella. Rhodes’s first object in developing the country was to attract capital to build up the fabled “Second Rand”, which would in turn generate new funds to finance further development, so that the farmer took a back seat in his planning’.³⁹ The settler demands to participate in the country’s affairs grew louder over time and ‘in 1896, after the formation of the Chambers of Commerce and Mines, the political demands were led by the members of the Chambers, which carried considerable weight’.⁴⁰

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³⁶ Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 51.
³⁷ Hyam and Henshaw, Lion and the Springbok, 227.
³⁸ Ibid, 110.
By end of the second decade of the twentieth century, however the agricultural sector had developed greater political significance. In ‘1917 the Responsible Government Association was founded; it was in part based on the Rhodesia Agricultural Union, an organization of farmers who feared union on grounds of competition for black labour on the Rand’. Lee’s work suggests that pressure groups played an important role in political matters before 1923, especially in the context of a non-existing political party system. They were instrumental in ‘seeking to replace Charter rule and were supported by a majority at the 1920 elections and referendum of 1922; and the Company was replaced in October 1923, in spite of opposition by the Company, the Colonial Office and the South African government’.

Studies of Southern Rhodesia have also dealt with Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations. Much of the historiography has focused on producing general narratives of this relationship. Robert Blake’s *A History of Rhodesia* is essentially a political history of the origins and development of Southern Rhodesia. Much of its time is spent discussing prominent individuals (Lobengula, Cecil John Rhodes, Roy Welensky, and Ian Smith) whose actions played an important part in the history of the Colony. Only in passing does Blake claim that Southern Rhodesia was a ‘cultural desert; neither literature, music, nor the visual arts flourished in its arid soil and culturally shared many similarities with English-speaking South Africans’. The relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during the colonial era is presented as close and friendly despite Southern Rhodesia rejecting political association with South Africa in 1922. Rhodesians and South Africans were often in contact with each other with many Southern Rhodesians going ‘south to go to university and for the purposes of sport; Southern Rhodesia was a province of South Africa’. There were many links between the two territories during the colonial era, from business connexions, to marriages and holidays, the peoples of these two territories, Rhodesians and many English-speaking South Africans maintained links and cultural exchanges which dated back to the

41 Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, 179.
43 Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, 278.
44 Ibid, 279.
period when Europeans began to settle in Southern Rhodesia in 1890 with many coming from South Africa.\textsuperscript{45} Almost entirely missing is the economic dimension.

The attention given to Africans in this book is very limited and most exemplified by forty out of four hundred pages dedicated to the pre-colonial era. In spite of this shortcoming the book remains important in understanding the political developments and key personalities in Southern Rhodesia’s history. Given that the book primarily focuses on the colonial era it appears to be sympathetic towards European engagement with Africans. Europeans are given significant attention and are portrayed as a necessity to the territory’s developments. Furthermore, Blake attempts to naturalise the asymmetrical relationship that existed, that characterised race relations. While \textit{A History of Rhodesia} remains an important book in providing some insight in understanding how the Southern Rhodesian state was constructed, it is certainly not a complete history of the country as it remains fairly light on issues relating to the economy, gender and Africans. Fundamentally what the book reveals is that Southern Rhodesian history is far more complex and nuanced then it may appear.

Lewis Gann’s \textit{A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934} provides an account of the early years of Southern Rhodesia. It begins with a brief history of pre-colonial Southern Rhodesia after which it focuses on the early colonial period until the mid-1930s. Clearly Gann’s main interest lies with the colonial era and the presence and contribution of the European settler community. He goes to some length to stress the contribution of firstly the Chartered Company and then the settler administration post-1923 in putting the colony on a successful economic path. In keeping with much of the literature on the issue of self-government, Gann notes the early assumption that Southern Rhodesia’s destiny was to become the fifth province in the Union of South Africa. As Gann expresses it ‘Rhodes originally hoped to build a new British state in the interior which one day would redress the balance of power against the Transvaal as part of a federated South Africa, thereby helping to keep the sub-continent within the Imperial orbit’.\textsuperscript{46} The debates leading to self-government are closely covered in the book. The rest of the book focuses on the post-1923 period. Here Gann highlights how the settler community consolidated its dominant position over Africans. Overall the book primarily looks at the European community of Southern Rhodesia.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid}, 278-279.

\textsuperscript{46} Gann, \textit{History of Southern Rhodesia}, 214.
Rhodesia until 1934, but spends little time examining the Colony’s relations with South Africa.

General histories of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa do shed a little light on Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations. Consistent with much that appears in the specialist literature, general histories devote most attention to the early period of Southern Rhodesian history, which largely focuses on early exploration, the first contacts with the Shona and Ndebele peoples, and imperial competition for the territory that became Southern Rhodesia. Prominent amongst general histories are T.R.H Davenport’s *South Africa. A Modern History*, which studies South African history from the pre-colonial era until the second half of the twentieth century. It gives some attention to early Southern Rhodesia history. According to Davenport, winning the “north” which included Southern Rhodesia was an important part in the ‘encirclement of the Transvaal, which was one aim of British Imperial strategy in the 1890s’. Davenport also lightly touches upon Southern Rhodesia’s representation at the National Convention to establish a constitution for the formation of the South African Union. Southern Rhodesia, ‘still a non-self-governing colony, was represented by observers with speaking but not voting rights, two appointed by the British South African Company and one by the Legislative Council; but Rhodesian settler interest in joining the Union was at best marginal’. This is attributed to the fact that the Cape delegates ‘agreed to accept proportional representation according to the adult white male population, an agreement which tilted the scales against the Cape and even more so against Rhodesia’. The outcome gave Southern Rhodesia little incentive to join the new Union of South Africa.

Similarly, Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson’s, *The Oxford History of South Africa, 1870-1966* highlights the centrality of the Transvaal in the imperial race to settle the north. Much that appears in the book about Southern Rhodesia and its relationship with South Africa covers once again the period leading to and the early years of European settlement in Southern Rhodesia. An important aspect of early relations between the two territories was the customs union. After preliminary negotiations in 1902, ‘conferences on customs tariffs

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48 Ibid, 222.
and railways met in Bloemfontein in 1903 where all four colonies, Rhodesia, and Mozambique were represented. A customs union embracing the Cape, Natal, the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony, Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories, was brought into being’.\textsuperscript{50} Apart from this particular dimension to early South Rhodesia and South African relations, the book highlights many of the same factors which appear throughout the literature on Southern Rhodesian history, only in this case South Africa is the primary focus.

The predecessor to the \textit{Oxford History, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume VIII. South Africa, Rhodesia and The High Commission Territories} had earlier emphasised the significance of Cecil John Rhodes in settling the “North”. In addition to outlining the well-known developments leading to the settlement of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia, the \textit{Cambridge History} also examines the period 1898-1924 with regards to Southern Rhodesia. The most significant factors highlighted over this period were the struggles between the settlers and the BSA Company over the administration of the colony. Furthermore, emphasis at this time was directed at the implication of Union for Southern Rhodesia, which initially was sympathetic to the idea of political association with its southern neighbour. Eventually at the referendum in October 1922 the vote for Responsible Government ‘triumphed and the substantial majority including the solid core of Rhodesians who shared with Coghlan all that was implied in his cry of “Rhodesia for the Rhodesians, Rhodesia for the Empire”’.\textsuperscript{51}

Written from a broadly Afrikaner Nationalist perspective or certainly from an unreflective one \textit{Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa} spends little time on Southern Rhodesia-South African relations. What is there, follows a familiar path. With British acquiescence Rhodes is presented as a key figure and at the heart of settling the “north”. The implication of settling the north was that ‘British moves in the lands north of the Limpopo thwarted Kruger’s plans for northward expansion and isolated the Transvaal’.\textsuperscript{52} According to Van Zyl’s chapter, Britain embarked on a policy of encirclement in the 1880s in South Africa. At the


heart of this policy was to prevent the ‘two Boer Republics (the Transvaal and the Orange Free State) developing into powerful states and threaten British supremacy in South Africa. Britain’s new approach was to surround the republics with British territories to prevent any chance of their gaining independent access to the sea and the outside world’.\(^{53}\) Natal and the Cape in particular, were earmarked to play an important role in the encirclement policy as it provided the base from which Rhodes would win the territory north of the Limpopo. Apart from capturing the early years of South Africa-Southern Rhodesia history, political association with South Africa was a matter, which many Rhodesians found difficult to accept over time. Despite Southern Rhodesia’s repudiation of political association with South Africa, Davey suggests that ‘in both World Wars there was close-co-operation between Rhodesia and South Africa. Rhodesians shared in the campaigns in German South West Africa and East Africa’.\(^{54}\) Overall, it should be stated that the book focuses primarily on South African history and Southern Rhodesia is touched upon very lightly.

The literature on early Southern Rhodesian-South African history is almost entirely focused on whites. Africans and their role in Southern Rhodesian-South African history have received very much less attention. Whether in general studies such as Thomas Pakenham’s Scramble for Africa or recent tightly focused contributions by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s Ndebele Nation little mention is made of African movement from one territory to the other before European settlement as well at the dawn of European settlement in Southern Rhodesia. The subject is clearly understudied. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s The Ndebele Nation. Reflections on Hegemony, Memory and History makes reference to pre-colonial African migration from the south to north of the Limpopo. Focused primarily on unpacking the mythology within Ndebele historiography, Ndlovu-Gatsheni casts light on the history of the Ndebele of Zimbabwe. He notes that ‘Ndebele history is traced from the Ndwande of Zwide and the Zulu of Shaka and how the Ndebele ended up in Zimbabwe is explained in terms of the Mfecane - a nineteenth century revolution marked by the collapse of earlier political formations’.\(^{55}\) Consequently the revolution was characterised in part by migration that saw


\(^{55}\) S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, The Ndebele Nation. Reflections on Hegemony, Memory and Historiography (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2009), iii.
some ‘Nguni and Sotho communities fragmenting into fleeing groups such as the Ndebele under Mzilikazi. New political formations like the Ndebele state emerged from the migrations, which eventually inscribed itself in the southwestern part of the Zimbabwean plateau in 1839-1840’.56

Another significant phase of migration and eventual settlement from the south to the north took place at the end of the 1880s. While the Pioneer Column which set forth from the Bechuanaland to settle the “north” has received a lot of scholarly attention, its African members have been secondary in terms of focus and attention. Thomas Pakenham’s The Scramble for Africa. The White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912 touches upon the role played by black South Africans and Tswana people in this northward expansion. The ‘200 raw recruits were escorted by 500 men of the newly formed Chartered Company police and to help cut the road were 350 Ngwato labourers and hundreds of other Africans to do menial tasks’.57 Arguably the settlement of Southern Rhodesia was as much a product of black as it was of white pioneers.

Only Terence Ranger’s The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930 provides some detail about Africans in the context of Southern Rhodesian-South African relations. According to Ranger, from the start of the ‘colonial period in Southern Rhodesia, a number of Africans were aware of modes of political expression, different from armed rebellion and were fully committed to Christianity and to a Western economy, literate and possessed technical skills. The majority of such Africans were immigrants from South Africa’.58 These Africans initially stood at a distance from the local Africans in Southern Rhodesia but later contributed through their political connections in South Africa to the political development of Africans in the colony. Ranger also notes how some of the immigrant Africans that came with the Pioneer Column contributed on the side of the settler community during the rebellions of 1896-7. He writes that ‘in 1893 the settler column which invaded Matabeleland included “Cape Boys”; in the rebellions of 1896 they were on hand in most of the key episodes. Some 125 of them took part in the defence of Bulawayo in the early weeks of the

56 Ibid.
The association between these Africans and the whites dates back to the pioneer column, recruited in part to provide a buffer between the indigenous population and the whites.

African migrants particularly the Mfengu from the south (Transkei) were identified by Rhodes as an important community for settling the north. The Fingos were Cape Africans, ‘brought up as part of a scheme by Rhodes to form a cordon of loyal natives round Bulawayo to counteract any hostile movements of the Matabele’. Ranger also explains how the black South African settlers were active in forming associations, pioneers in their own right as settlers but also politically developed. The notable contribution of the South African black settlers to Rhodesia was their ‘commitment to Christianity and the Western way of life and its economic manifestation. They also brought with them ideas of black South Africans who were already critical of white pretentions to Christianity and modernization’. It would appear that black South Africans were the umbilical cord that maintained African links across the border. The other important connection Ranger emphasises was the flow of Rhodesian African migrant labour that moved southwards in their tens of thousands compared to the hundreds of South African black settlers who went northward. Ranger suggests that though ‘Rhodesian migrants did not play a prominent part in South African politics, many came into contact with South African ideas of independent Christianity, political organization and trade unionism’. These Rhodesians were the link and provided education on South African political developments to Rhodesian Africans. Continued engagement with South African political developments and how Africans organised themselves also contributed in establishing organisational branches in Southern Rhodesia such as the Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers Union which was inspired by the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in South Africa. Branches were established in Bulawayo and Salisbury. Overall the ICU left a lasting political impression on both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In particular, it changed the methods of African political organisation. ‘It sought mass support, used demonstrations and rallies and considered the use of strikes for political and economic ends. These techniques

59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid, 46.  
61 Ibid, 55.  
62 Ibid, 60.
were inherited by the later nationalist movements of South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1950s and early ‘60s.

Although the existing literature provides some insight into Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations in the first half of the twentieth century, it remains a history that has yet to receive comprehensive coverage. In large measure, the relationship has been discussed in passing, as part of studies concerned with other issues. For South African historians, Southern Rhodesia mattered very little, while for their Southern Rhodesian counterparts, South Africa always loomed large.

1.3 Methodology

Although the existing literature offers some account, though limited and uneven in terms of the relations between the two countries, the historiography focuses on the pre-Responsible Government period as well as focusing on South African or British “perspectives” gives a false impression that the history of this relationship is simply explained from these perspectives. By contrast, this thesis tries to capture the multi-layered relationship from Southern Rhodesian perspectives utilising varied material. Going against the grain, this thesis disentangles the relationship to examine the various aspects that constitutes this complex and multi-dimensional affiliation.

Consequently, this thesis is a qualitative study which makes use of secondary material and archival sources. In order to establish the relevant framework and context for this study, the researcher began by reviewing secondary literature on Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations in general and on political, economic, social and cultural ties as well as African connections in particular. In this process, the study draws upon the work of Martin Chanock, Ronald Hyam, and Ian Phimister, each of which discusses important aspects of the relationship. By studying this relationship, this thesis attempts to draw it closer to the existing literate and bring the relations from the periphery closer to the centre of Southern Rhodesia and South African scholarship.

Primary material was drawn from South Africa. Research was conducted at the National Archives of South Africa, the South African National Defence Forces Archives as well at the

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National Library of South Africa. Evidence from Zimbabwe (National Archives of Zimbabwe) and Great Britain (National Archives of the United Kingdom and Bodleian Library, Oxford) was also used for this study. This research is the first to utilise primary material from the three different countries, over this period, and focuses specifically on Southern Rhodesian relations with South Africa. All these important centres of information provided important material, different in character and substance, for this study.

Much of this primary material used for this thesis is based at the National Archives of South Africa in Pretoria. The archive holds an important collection of archival material relating to information concerning successive South African governments post-1910. The primary material collected in South Africa contained numerous files which largely cover the customs relationship. These files covered proposed amendments to customs, trade and commercial agreements as well as information regarding the value of trade between the two countries. Furthermore, this material contains exchanges between leaders of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia concerning aspects of the agreement. As will be shown in this thesis, the shifting nature of the customs agreement is drawn from archival material. An important aspect of this study looks at political developments in the region. Files containing political material covering the late 1940s were collected. The concept of the Central Africa Federation gaining moment in Southern Rhodesia after the 1948 elections in South Africa featured significantly in the files.

The Smuts Papers contain valuable material, largely economic but also concerning military co-operation between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia during the Second World War. In particular, the terms of union with Southern Rhodesia are exhaustively covered in this collection. Official records of meetings concerning attempts to develop a joint war-effort with Southern Rhodesia are available for the 1940s. They discuss the state of regional defence and searches for joint ways of addressing regional security threats.

The South African National Defence Force Archives in Pretoria were also consulted. South African War Histories administrative files provide information on Southern Rhodesia’s military personnel joining the South African Defence Force during the Second World War. They also contain material regarding meetings between Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa and the leader of Southern Rhodesia, Prime Minister Huggins, notably the agreement
that the two countries will fall under one military command. Research was also conducted at the National Library of South Africa in Cape Town. Parliamentary debates were examined. Customs agreement debates, especially the robust nature of the discussions were scrutinised. Other material collected at the Library was newspaper clippings. These covered the period leading up to Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia. Overwhelmingly from English-newspapers, they closely covered developments relating to the possibility of union between the two territories. The Library has comprehensive runs of South African newspapers such the *Cape Times* and the *Cape Argus*. The former reported extensively on the Southern Rhodesia’s possible inclusion into South Africa. Taken together, they provided crucial perspectives on matters north of the Limpopo. They also provided letters from readers who expressed their position on the issue of union. The Library also stores newspapers designed for African voices. These, however did not reveal anything concerning African opinion about the prospects of union, but focused more on South African issues. The reason for the absence of Afrikaner newspapers is that there were very few available Afrikaans newspapers and coverage of the relationship was not as comprehensive as in the case of English-newspapers.

It ought to be noted that access to primary material from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) in Harare was difficult. Bureaucratic and administrative challenges in Zimbabwe made it difficult to conduct research. It is for this reason that in certain parts of this thesis, as in chapter five, secondary literature is used as primary material. The primary material which was collected in South Africa from NAZ provided a lot of data concerning customs agreements between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa from 1924 to 1948. The study made use of correspondence, periodicals, newspapers, government reports, and parliamentary proceedings. What is largely covered in this material is the trade and commercial relationship between the two countries. All customs agreements are examined as well as discussions in Southern Rhodesia concerning their amendment. Furthermore, the eclectic material offers trade figures between the two territories. The great benefit in this regard was that extensive material was collected for the entire period for this study. As discussed in the relevant chapters detailed examination of this evidence brings to light key shifts in Southern Rhodesia’s economic relationship with South Africa. Other official material included governmental reports as well as parliamentary debates. Although the NAZ material
shows a bias towards the economic aspect of Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa, there are other files drawing attention to political issues. Crucial for this study was that the material from the NAZ revealed Salisbury’s perspective.

Primary material collected in Great Britain added great value to the thesis. Files relating to colonial affairs for southern Africa were of particular importance. Private Papers, correspondence, and tariff negotiations were examined at the National Archives, at Kew Gardens in London. The Private Papers of Sir John Chancellor, the first governor of Southern Rhodesia under Responsible Government were read at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. They provided useful insights on early Southern Rhodesian government exchanges with South Africa during the 1920s. On the issue of self-government, these particular Papers showed that Southern Rhodesia was confident about going it alone. Additionally, National Archive holdings included a comprehensive file on tariff negotiations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in 1948. This was not duplicated in either the NAZ or the South African Archives in Pretoria. Other important correspondence was that between Smuts and the Rhodesia Union Association concerning the issue of amalgamation between the two territories.

1.4 Chapter Outline

This study is divided into seven chapters. The main concerns of this thesis are discussed chronologically from 1923 to 1953, with occasional flashbacks to emphasise the historical nature of a particular point. For instance, chapter three discusses the historical links between the two territories prior to 1923. This section of the thesis, chapter one, presents the study in the context of the settler colonialism, existing literature and the methodology. The thesis is positioned within the existing literature of Southern Rhodesian and South African history and larger southern African scholarship. This chapter also discusses what data was examined and where it was collected. The chapter ends by outlining the structure of the thesis.

Following the introduction chapter two traces early Southern Rhodesian ties with South Africa. It examines Southern Rhodesia’s development towards Responsible Government in 1923, in particular, the role of the “southern factor” in influencing Southern Rhodesia’s decision to “go it alone”. The campaign over union or Responsible Government was highly
contested. The chapter explores the crucial factors that swung the pendulum away from union. In particular chapter two discusses developments underway in South Africa which inflamed political opinion in Southern Rhodesia and subsequently generated momentum towards Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia. Chapter Two not only traces the road to Responsible Government, but provides context and background for the rest of the study.

Chapter three examines Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations during the first decade of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia. During this period, both countries experienced political change, shifting economic fortunes, as well as greater social contact, especially through migration and sports. The chapter looks at this developing relationship primarily from Southern Rhodesian perspectives. One of the key elements discussed is the issue of customs agreements. This chapter examines customs agreements between the two territories over this period emphasizing that the agreements were constantly scrutinised, particularly by Southern Rhodesia stressing that the nature of the arrangements were inequitable. Chapter three marks the shifting nature of the customs agreement, taking into account the regional and global economic context. Discussions on the economic relationship between the two countries benefit from Southern Rhodesian and South African Legislative Debates, newspaper clippings and other archival documents. They provide different perspective from within and between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In terms of greater social contact between the two countries, the chapter examines the links between the two countries by discussing migration in this period. It further examines the South African component of the migratory flow, particularly whites to Southern Rhodesia. It is in this context that this chapter argues that migration provided the foundation upon which social contact between the two territories developed especially in sports and education. Finally the chapter examines African connections between the two territories. It traces the African labour migrations flow from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa as well as the black South Africans going north during the days of the Pioneer Column. What emerged from this trend in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the development of an African voice in Southern Rhodesia by the early 1920s. Movements representing African interests emerged, some of which were influenced by South Africans and modelled on African movements in South Africa.
The fourth chapter focuses on the 1930s, when the customs arrangement between the two territories underwent modification from a customs agreement to a trade agreement, fundamentally changing the manner in which trade ties between the two countries were regulated. In discussing this development in the customs arrangement between the two countries, the chapter also highlights the domestic economic conditions in both countries, marked by an economic recovery from the Great Depression. This chapter argues that both countries sought to develop local industries, which entailed some level of protectionism. Discussion on the economic dimension in the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa draws from the rich primary material that covers the commercial and trade relations between the two countries. Newspapers clippings were helpful in reporting on economic ties and Legislative debates added another dimension in unpacking this relationship. The chapter also discusses the growing aspiration of Southern Rhodesia to join up with Northern Rhodesia. The attraction for Southern Rhodesia was to draw the benefits from Northern Rhodesian copper. This chapter discusses the reasons why Southern Rhodesia in political terms shifted its focus northwards. Chapter four notes that Southern Rhodesia walked a tightrope by maintaining economic ties with an important partner, South Africa as well as exploring other interests which sought not to compromise this relationship.

Chapter five studies Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations during the Second World War. The war effort and the close co-operation between the two countries are detailed highlighting an important dimension to this complex relationship. Material from the South African National Defence Force Archives was important in understating how the two countries came to the decision to co-operate military. Co-operation entailed certain Southern Rhodesian Commands falling under South African supervision, and supplies of military material and as well communication channels were jointly opened. Chapter five also traces economic developments within each country and the extent to which such developments contributed to the joint war-effort and trading relationship. It notes that both countries developed economically during this period, local industries grew significantly and the value in trade between the two countries improved. Finally, the chapter also draws attention to discussions on the future of the customs arrangements. The inequitable nature of the trade agreement with South Africa was raised by Southern Rhodesia, searching for a
new arrangement in part to sustain the economic growth experienced during the course of the Second World War.

The sixth and final substantive chapter examines the post-Second World War relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It covers the period 1946 to 1953, the year in which the Central African Federation (hereafter CAF) came into existence. By studying this relationship, this chapter highlights the extent to which Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations contributed to the establishment of the CAF. It will build on the existing literature on the issue of the CAF, in particular the work of Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, *Lion and the Springbok* and Robert Blake, *History of Rhodesia*. The chapter also focuses on the economic ties between the two countries by tracing the continuation of economic growth experienced during the Second World War in both territories. Social and cultural ties are considered. Immigration, especially from South Africa to the north receives significant attention. Afrikaner immigration in particular gained considerable attention and became a highly politicised matter in Southern Rhodesia especially after 1948, when the ruling Afrikaner National Party promoted ‘Apartheid’ as its policy. The social and cultural ties also extend to sporting ties, where there existed an alignment between both countries concerning the administration of sports. An important issue examined by this chapter is African connections between the two countries. The chapter explores the various avenues which Africans used to sustain contact, particularly African Southern Rhodesians going south and returning back home.

Chapter seven constitutes the conclusion, and provides a summary of the thesis and shows that it has addressed what it set out to achieve. This study has examined a subject that has received little scholarly. The existing literature on Southern Rhodesia-South African relations is uneven and is discussed in haste. This study attempts to tie together the various aspects written about this relationship by undertaking a focused scholarship on this subject over this period. The thesis locates Southern Rhodesia-Southern Africa relations to southern African, settler, South African and Southern Rhodesian history.
Chapter Two

The Road towards Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia: The South African Factor, 1914 – 1923

Introduction
Southern Rhodesia was presented with an unprecedented constitutional challenge at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. It was one of the biggest issues the country had to address since the territory had been occupied and settled by whites in 1890.\(^1\) White settlement had been achieved through violent conquest and domination over the indigenous African population. Successful rule over this territory, as briefly explained in the previous chapter was instigated and financed by Cecil John Rhodes, who had managed to secure the territory through a Royal Charter granted in 1889 to his BSA Company by Great Britain. In addition to its main provisions the Royal Charter allowed the Crown ‘to appeal or vary any section of the document at the end of the first twenty-five years and at the end of every subsequent ten-year period’.\(^2\) The Crown additionally reserved the right to rescind the Charter if in its assessment the BSA Company had not adhered to requirements as stipulated in it.

For Rhodes and successive British Governments, Southern Rhodesia’s ultimate destiny had always been seen along federating lines with union with South Africa. This had in principle been embraced by Britain, South Africa and the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The earliest and most significant document outlining the viability of a South African federation which consisted of Southern Rhodesia and the four southern territories of Natal, the Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Cape Colony was the Selbourne Memorandum of 1907. A report prepared by then Cape Town-based High Commissioner, Lord Selbourne argued that ‘Southern Rhodesia should be looked upon as a constituent part of a future federal South Africa’.\(^3\) In short, the British Government ‘favoured the idea of Rhodesia becoming part of a

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\(^1\) For accounts of the early history of Southern Rhodesia, see J.S. Galbraith, Crown and Charter. The Early Years of the British South Africa Company (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia; Mason, Birth of a Dilemma; Blake, History of Rhodesia; and Hole, The Making of Rhodesia.

\(^2\) Di Perna, Right to be Proud, 11.

\(^3\) Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 48.
South African union which would enhance the Empire in that part of the world. For several years the debate centred on when Rhodesia would join with the other territories rather than whether or not the merger would take place. However, at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the issue of self-government in Southern Rhodesia, as opposed to the once accepted idea of union with South Africa, became a contentious matter in both territories.

2.1 The Constitutional Question in Southern Rhodesia, 1914-1916
In Southern Rhodesia the outbreak of the First World War saw a large number of white settlers volunteering their military services for Britain. Southern Rhodesia’s contribution in terms of man power was substantial, given the size of the settler population at the time. According to Gann, ‘1,720 whites, a high proportion of Rhodesian fighting men, received commissions, the self-reliance and ability to command acquired on lonely farms and isolated mines and workshops standing them in excellent stead; 5,577 Europeans as well as 2,752 natives and 22 Coloured rendered directly military aid’. Southern Rhodesia’s attachment to the British Empire was strong and the high proportion of whites fighting in the war demonstrated the country’s loyalty to the Imperial government.

The war highlighted a marked feature of white Southern Rhodesia, reflecting what its Founder had envisioned it to be; a loyal British territory. Southern Rhodesia’s British character and its loyalty to the Empire, confirmed an observation made by the High Commissioner Lord Buxton when he visited Southern Rhodesia in 1914. He noted in his report to the Cabinet that the most ‘marked feature of Rhodesia, as far as the white inhabitants are concerned, is that they are typically English. They are proud of being British and that they form part of the Empire; and they crave public recognition of this fact’.

The outbreak of the war however yielded quite a different response in South Africa. If the outbreak of the war confirmed Southern Rhodesia’s unquestioned loyalty to the Empire, the same could not be said of South Africa. Although part of the British Empire, and therefore at war by default, this became a divisive issue in the country. Britain’s request that South Africa conquer the German colony of South West Africa generated passions amongst South

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4 Di Perna, *Right to be Proud*, 36.
5 Gann, *History of Southern Rhodesia*, 222.
Africa’s white inhabitants not seen since the South Africa War (1899-1902). The major political entity at the time which voiced its disapproval of a possible military campaign in South West Africa was the National Party (NP). Founded in 1914 by General J.B.M. Hertzog in Bloemfontein the NP considered itself the pro-South Africa party. The party insisted that the interest of South Africa . . . had to be out first and that a sound ‘sense of white nationhood would have to be based on recognition of both Afrikaans and English cultures. The relative economic, cultural and social backwardness of the Afrikaner community could be overcome by developing their own identity as a community and by establishing their own institutions’. 8

South Africa’s formal entrance into the war was approved through a parliamentary majority, and consequently Louis Botha and Jan Smuts launched an invasion of German South West Africa. But from the start, support for Britain was off-set by the ‘anti-British feeling of Afrikaner republican interests, for whom nation and empire were not two agreeable sides of the same historical coin, but profoundly different currencies’. 9 In response to the invasion of German South West Africa, a number of areas in the South African countryside took up arms against the government. Confined to ‘six to seven districts in the northern Free State, a few districts in the northern Transvaal and one or two districts in the Northern Cape’, it was largely a fight amongst Afrikaners of whom 11,472 Afrikaners were estimated to have rebelled. 10 Animosity towards the British amongst some Afrikaners was strong at this time, where memories of the South African War were still fresh in the struggle between Afrikaner and English.

The revolt in South Africa attracted much attention in Britain and Southern Rhodesia. In the context of the revolt, South Africa maintained its war commitment in South West Africa and East Africa. The British ‘commended the loyalty of Botha and Smuts, and gave the South African government a considerable claim to imperial gratitude, though it also underlined the

8 Ibid, 358.
10 Giliomee, Afrikaners, 383.
dependence of imperial power on continued South African support’. South Africa’s strategic importance to the British Empire had been re-established.

The rebellion had also made its impression on Southern Rhodesia. Developments in South Africa had always been closely monitored across the Limpopo River. This particular development had, however, occurred at a critical moment in Southern Rhodesia’s history. South Africa was considered an important component to Southern Rhodesia’s future status. However, it had been noted that the wartime rebellion in the ‘Union had greatly alarmed Rhodesian authorities, and its implications remained one of their concerns. The majority of Afrikaners in Rhodesia, it was felt, could not be relied upon against the Germans, and they were in close touch with Hertzogite republicanism in the Union’. The Rebellion had hardened perceptions and entrenched already existing negative notions which many Southern Rhodesian settlers held towards Afrikaners in both territories. The matter would become a serious political issue in the context of Southern Rhodesia’s constitutional future.

The outbreak of the First World War was not the only matter which Southern Rhodesia had to attend to. Earlier in the year when the BSA Company Charter was set to expire, Company rule was extended by another decade. Before the extension to Company rule, the territory could opt for the ‘continuation of Company rule or pursue other alternatives. The options available apart from Charter rule were entry into the Union of South Africa, Crown Colony government, or Responsible Government. The Union issue had by this time proved to be fairly unpopular with the settlers’. The direction in which South Africa was perceived to be moving made the prospect of union with South Africa unappealing for many Rhodesian settlers. The newly established Union of South Africa was problematic because of its unitary rather than federal constitution; a major issue for many white Rhodesians.

South Africa’s interest in Southern Rhodesia’s constitutional future was grounded in section 150 of the South Africa Act which provided ‘for the future admission of the territory into the South African Union established in 1910’. Southern Rhodesia was also considered by a section of South Africa’s political classes as the most important component in South Africa’s constitutional future.

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11 Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 108.
14 Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 43.
expansionist territorial ambitions. Britain’s position was much the same as it had been over the course of Southern Rhodesia’s existence. London hoped that Southern Rhodesia would eventually join South Africa ‘because it offered the prospect of preserving what was ironically enough called “racial balance” in South Africa, that is, a favourable balance of voters of British descent and imperial sympathies over voters of Dutch descent in order to keep South Africa within the British Empire’.  

The answer to Southern Rhodesia’s immediate constitutional question was to some extent resolved by Legislative Council elections in 1914. Settlers had been given the opportunity to express their opinion through representatives in the Legislative Council, but despite or because of this provision, relations between settler representatives and the Company had been uneasy. This was particularly so once the prospect of riches diminished after it was realised that the territory did not contain a “Second Rand”. The “Second Rand” spoken of refers to the widespread belief at the time that goldfields in Southern Rhodesia would surpass those found at Witwatersrand. The BSA Company now had to find ways of placating settler demands.

The 1914 elections in Southern Rhodesia produced a result overwhelmingly in favour of continued Charter rule with Responsible Government as the ultimate goal. For many settlers, it was the best of a poor choice. Although eleven out of twelve settler representatives favoured continued Company rule, many settlers remained deeply suspicious of Company administration and were dissatisfied with Southern Rhodesia’s constitutional status. The election result also pointed to the settlers’ reluctance to join up with South Africa. Not that this option was completely ruled out; indeed extension of Company rule was seen by some as a proxy for eventual union with South Africa. The chances of such an outcome remained high, so much that after the renewal of Charter rule in 1914, many were encouraged including ‘law-makers in Salisbury to keep the law and its administration as much as possible in harmony with South African precedents. Southern

16 The Legislative Council was established through the 1898 Order in Council and was in effect part of a much improved mechanism of preventing any repetition of irresponsibility that led to the Jameson Raid and the Rebellion.
17 For more on the relationship between mining interests in the Witwatersrand and those in Southern Rhodesia see –Phimister, ‘Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand’. 
Rhodesia began to become a poor imitation of the south'. The BSA Company on the other hand was favourably, ‘disposed to continuing the administration of Rhodesia and to accept the idea of self-government in the future. However, the Company was strenuously opposed to any proposal in which greater control over the fiscal affairs of Government was given to elected members’. The Company welcomed its continued administration of the territory provided that its responsibility over the control of the fiscal affairs of the country had ‘the full support of the Colonial Office’.

Southern Rhodesia’s concerns about closer political association with South Africa were summed up by Lord Gladstone, Governor General and High Commissioner of the Union of South Africa in 1913. He observed that Southern Rhodesia’s constant ‘fear was the “poor Dutch” and of Rhodesia being “made a midden heap of human wreckage of the Union”’. This view did not go unnoticed in South Africa, and led to complaints in the Afrikaner press that ‘the settlement of Afrikaners in Rhodesia is being emphatically worked against’. Many white Rhodesians saw Afrikaners as culturally inferior and a threat to the territories character: a British territory.

A possible influx of poor Afrikaners to Southern Rhodesia was not the only concern for local settlers. South Africa’s poor labour relations were another worry, especially where white miners were concerned in 1913. According to Lee, this was ‘the first of the great strikes in South Africa over a demand for recognition of unions and for an eight-hour day; an event deplored in the Rhodesian press and probably by most settlers’. The strikes were seen as a major destabilising threat to law and order, and by joining South Africa, Southern Rhodesia would invite unwanted industrial instability. For Southern Rhodesia, union with South Africa at this time was an unattractive prospect bringing with it unwanted problems. More importantly, union with South Africa was seen by many English-speaking settlers as a threat to their cultural identity, or rather their perceived British character. An influx of Afrikaners,

18 Denoon and Nyeko, *Southern Africa since 1800*, 137.
19 Di Perna, *Right to be Proud*, 57.
20 Ibid.
21 Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 16.
so called “poor whites”, it was believed, would lower “standards”, bringing about miscegenation and threatening white prestige.

Despite Southern Rhodesia’s hostility towards political integration with South Africa, there were many links between the two territories. These were ‘cultural, sporting, and religious bodies were organised on a southern African basis and many colonists sent their children to school in the Cape or Natal. Furthermore, Roman-Dutch law prevailed throughout southern Africa and exercised an influence which went beyond the purely legal sphere’. The interconnectedness of the two countries could be compared to that of the United States of America (USA) and Canada. Southern Rhodesia like Canada vis-à-vis the United States of America ‘had many people and interests hostile to the drawing of power of an over-mighty neighbour. But the pull of the only major dissentient minority, the Afrikaner, unlike that of the French Canadians, was in the direction of absorption rather than independence’. Although Southern Rhodesia and Canada were part of the British Empire and had relations with the Imperial power, Britain, geography, culture, economics and politics were significant factors in the nature of their respective relationship with their larger neighbour and Britain.

It was said of Canada that throughout her existence, she was subject to the ‘conflicting pulls of history and geography, the one reflected in her membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the other in her intimate friendly association with the United States. Canada was both a dominion and a North American nation’. Unlike Canada, Southern Rhodesia was never accorded dominion status. Apart from this, the dynamics of the Canada-USA expressed above differed very little to the Southern Rhodesia-South African relationship. A further dimension in the Canada-USA example which is relevant to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was geography. In North America, Canadians and Americans did not regard the boundary between them ‘as an insurmountable national barrier, nor did they look upon each other as foreigners. Unremitting and unrelenting was the flow northwards of American ideas and American

24 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 279.
culture, that even had they so desired, Canadians would have no opportunity of forgetting that they were a North American people’. 26

The example holds many similarities between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. South African practices were often used as points of reference in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, the South Africanisation of Southern Rhodesia, implying ultimate absorption by South Africa was a significant factor in the nature of the relationship. Equally, the links with South Africa were relevant in reminding Southern Rhodesians that in reality they were a southern African territory, rather than a county in Great Britain. Given these close links, it might be suggested that Southern Rhodesians were less anti-South Africa or pro-Charter than loyal to the Empire, craving recognition for this by being granted Responsible Government.

Administrative control over the territory increasingly became a matter of political importance, significantly contributing to a growing number of voices advocating for a speedy path towards Responsible Government. The first major agitation against continued Company rule was in 1915. The BSA Company at the time was giving serious consideration to the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias (Northern and Southern Rhodesia). Many settlers and their representatives in the Legislative Council took exception to this initiative, considering the move to be a serious barrier to their ultimate goal of Responsible Government. Coghlan and the majority of the elected members, ‘had stood in 1914 on the platform of eventual Responsible Government, and it was apparent that unification with the “black North” could only adversely affect the time in which Responsible Government could be achieved’. 27 Southern Rhodesian settlers were concerned about the large ‘African population in Northern Rhodesia which had a very small white settler population. Unification of the Rhodesias would greatly increase the number of Africans to white settlers and thereby affect the Colonial Office attitude towards Responsible Government’. 28 White Rhodesians were wary of the BSA Company’s machination and saw its plan as a business venture which ultimately served Company shareholders and not the settlers. They wanted an end to Company rule.

26 Ibid, 105.
Fear of being “swamped” by the “Black north” was widespread amongst settlers. It was seen as a threat to the character of Southern Rhodesia as ‘a white man’s country’. Highly dependent on immigration in order to secure the territory’s future, so-called ‘white’ Southern Rhodesia had to at least maintain the existing ratio between white and black if the idea of Responsible Government was to be an achievable objective. The key individual giving expression to this position was Ethel Tawse Jollie, the founder and organiser of the Responsible Government Association (hereafter R.G.A.). Immigration was a flash point for her once the prospect of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia was raised by the Chartered Company. The Company’s action at this time ‘spurred her into action at a time when settlers lacked effective leadership’. When it came to the issue of immigration and the implications of unification with the North, Tawse Jollie’s position was supported by many settlers. Tawse Jollie, ‘like many other settlers wanted British immigrants. Rhodesia was not interested in any type of settler save the one with capital, she affirmed’. The emphasis on well-heeled British immigrants was part of the perception that Southern Rhodesia was British. More settlers from that background strengthened the territory’s loyalty to the Empire. Attracting British immigrants served in maintaining Southern Rhodesia’s cultural links with Britain as well as acting as an instrument to counteract Afrikaner influence throughout southern Africa.

2.2 A New Political Age in Southern Rhodesia, 1917 – 1919

In 1917, a new political organisation was founded. This was the R.G.A., ‘closely linked to organised agriculture soon secured a large following and campaigned for maintenance of Southern Rhodesia as a British possession’. Born partly out of deep frustration with BSA Company administration, the R.G.A.’s goal of Responsible Government was a key weapon in the struggle to end Company Government. The Chartered Company, though, was unfazed. At a general meeting of shareholders in London, Jameson noted that he and his fellow directors were ‘prepared to consider all offers for buying out the Company in both Rhodesias, but they expected the most likely approach to come from the Union. Now it

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31 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 99.
seemed that the Company was contemplating selling out to the Union government, as the "highest bidder". The prospect of the territory joining South Africa re-awakened anti-South African feeling. With Ethel Tawse Jollie at the forefront, the R.G.A. encouraged ‘settlers to speak as one with the R.G.A., campaigning to champion their cause. Despite the R.G.A.’s best efforts, at this stage, Tawse Jollie realised the need to broaden the support base of the party.

For the R.G.A., Responsible Government was Southern Rhodesia’s ultimate destiny. Amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia or union with South Africa were paths to be avoided. But of the two, the greatest obstacle to the R.G.A.’s cause was the prospect of union with South Africa. The old position where Southern Rhodesia’s destiny was union with South Africa was still very much alive. Towards the end of the First World War and afterwards, Britain was preoccupied with South Africa and its imperial connection. Concern about South Africa had been raised by John X Merriman (former prime minister of the Cape Colony). He expressed the following to his British political friend Lord Bryce in 1917:

> the old Cape policy had slipped back into the way of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Anti-British propaganda remained ‘incredibly violent’, which had inexorably followed Union; and the Senate, designed partly to help African interests, was ‘a very inferior body quite failing to gain the respect of the public or to have any weight’.

But while South Africa, an important member of the Empire or loyalist elements in the country, might be strengthened by Southern Rhodesia’s accession, influential politicians in Britain still considered union with South Africa as Southern Rhodesia’s final political destination. The road ahead would be questioned over the next few years.

As noted above, Southern Rhodesian settlers were determined to secure the territory as a white man’s country and immigration was the key to realising this objective. Immigration had been interrupted by the First World War, but the situation changed thereafter. In November 1918, ‘European immigration increased once more, resulting in a total number of immigrants entering the country rising from 1828 in 1918 to 2542 in 1919 and 4093 in 1923;

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33 Ibid, 229-231.
34 Hyam, Failure of South African Expansion, 40.
the last representing the highest number recorded in any one year to that date’. 35 One key issue regarding Southern Rhodesia’s settler society and its immigration pattern was that it was largely a transient society with migrants moving in and out of the territory. The striking and persistent feature of “settlement” in Southern Rhodesia was that for ‘every hundred migrants arriving, between sixty and eighty were always leaving. As a “settlement”, white Rhodesia has been a sort of frontier outpost of Britain and English-speaking South Africa, to which many “settlers” always intended to return’. 36 Given the transient nature of white society, immigration was therefore always an important political issue. One of the prominent features of early white Southern Rhodesian society was the relatively large number of white South Africans, especially English-speakers. From the very beginning, the two territories shared ties of blood, with white South Africans forming a substantial portion of white Southern Rhodesia.

An important aspect of Southern Rhodesia’s immigration campaign at this time was its desire to ‘attract White women of marriageable age. Southern Rhodesia had always experienced a gender imbalance’. 37 The cause for this imbalance can be traced back to the time when whites, the majority of them men, began to settle in Southern Rhodesia. The position held in the early days in Southern Rhodesia was that conditions were not suitable for white women and children. Consequently, it was only when living conditions gradually improved that white women entered the territory, though the ratio of men to women remained high. Southern Rhodesian settlers would ‘venture across the Limpopo in search for women of marriageable age. The concern in Southern Rhodesia about this practice was the high numbers of marriageable partners in South Africa were of Dutch blood, hence an emphasis for migrants from Britain to ensure and maintain the character of the territory’. 38

The issue of addressing this gender imbalance had a long history. An organisation known as the Rhodesian Committee, the Rhodesian branch of the Overseas Settlement of British Women, had been established as far back as 1901. It provided assistance for the safe passage of white women with confirmed employment. Duties performed by the Rhodesian

36 Ibid, 124.
38 Mlambo, ‘Building a White Man’s Country’, 129.
Committee of the Society were ‘to assist women and girls of “good character, health and capacity” to settle in Rhodesia, to assist women and families obtain work and homes in the country and to help fiancées to be married in Rhodesia and wives to join their husbands’.\textsuperscript{39} Such opportunities were facilitated by the Imperial Government, the BSA Company administration and private organisations.

Despite Southern Rhodesia’s best efforts at attracting large numbers of British immigrants, male and female, the numbers which arrived in the territory were very small. This was despite the generous terms offered to would-be migrants. The most attractive inducement used by the BSA Company administration to attract immigrants was land. The terms were extremely generous. As one settler re-called, her father, who had applied to settle in Southern Rhodesia, ‘had 20 years to pay (for his land) and free medical and hospital fees for ten years, and free arms and a Rhodes Pioneer pension after the age of 60 years’.\textsuperscript{40} But although such terms were undoubtedly attractive, the finer print made it clear that at least some capital was required upon arrival in Southern Rhodesia and to start farming. The emphasis on having capital upon arrival in Southern Rhodesia very probably contributed to the low immigration rate. Compared to other destinations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, Southern Rhodesia was not a popular choice.

Land had become an important issue. White settlers in Southern Rhodesia had begun to question the Company’s control over land. By 1918, the question of who owned unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia had to be addressed. Since 1891, land had been regarded as the property of the Company, acquired through the Lippert Concession and by conquest. This state of affairs remained as such, by acquiescence of the Imperial Government. But in 1902, however, this assumption was challenged by the settlers who, with ‘an eye to the future, argued that the Company could only own land in its administrative capacity and that when it ceased to administer the territory ownership should pass into the hands of the new Government’.\textsuperscript{41} The matter remained unresolved until 1914 when the Colonial Office agreed to submit the question to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The BSA Company’s claim to commercial ownership of unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia was associated in

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 130.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 133.
\textsuperscript{41} R. Palmer, \textit{Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 133.
its assessment with the administrative costs of running the territory. The settlement of the Rhodesias had proved to be an expensive undertaking, and by '1903 the Company had accumulated an administrative deficit of over £7 million. The Company [consequently] claimed commercial ownership of unalienated lands of Southern Rhodesia’.\textsuperscript{42} Settlers in Southern Rhodesia responded negatively to such a claim. For its part the Imperial Government decided to leave the matter unresolved until towards the end of the First World War. The Privy Council’s decision was announced in July 1918. The ‘Commission awarded the Company £4,400,000\textsuperscript{43} for past expenses, but informed that the Crown was in fact the rightful owner of unalienated land. It was clear ‘the Crown had rights to unalienated lands but for as long as the Company continued to govern, however, it was entitled to sell land and pocket the money in part-liquidation of this debt’.\textsuperscript{44}

The effects of this decision made themselves felt in the coming years. Those who supported Responsible Government were greatly encouraged by the report. For the BSA Company, however, this was an extremely disappointing outcome. With the Company determined to recover administrative costs, it soon became clear that one way of addressing the problem would be union with South Africa. But from the start advocates of Responsible Government led by the R.G.A., strongly opposed any such idea. Encouraged by the Judicial Committees report, the R.G.A. became the most vocal proponents of Responsible Government. By 1919, the R.G.A. had greatly improved its position throughout the territory. It had ‘outgrown its “farmers’ party” origins and now appealed to a wider settler community, including its most jingoistic elements. White Rhodesia was fertile ground for patriotic propaganda’.\textsuperscript{45} The R.G.A. worked extremely hard to promote itself in all of Southern Rhodesia’s white communities. One section of the settler society in which the R.G.A. successfully secured votes was white women. Through the hard work of Ethel Tawse Jollie, and the R.G.A.’s support for the right of women to vote, white women were an important source of support to the R.G.A. cause. The women of Southern Rhodesia, effectively white women – achieved the ‘vote in 1919, and their crucial position in pioneer society gave them a powerful degree

\textsuperscript{42} Chanock, \textit{Unconsummated Union}, 46.
\textsuperscript{43} Bodleian Libraries-Weston Library, Oxford, MSS.Brit.Emp.s.284, Box 7/3, File 1-4, Sir John Chancellor Papers, Parliamentary Papers and Reports, 1917-1921, \textit{First Report of a Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider certain question relating to Rhodesia, 12 April 1921.}
\textsuperscript{44} Palmer, \textit{Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia}, 134.
\textsuperscript{45} Lowry, ‘White Woman’s Country’, 267.
of political leverage, in common with their sisters elsewhere in the Empire. The prominence of Tawse Jollie as well as Gertrudge Page, the popular novelist, added to the party’s appeal to female voters’. These developments put the R.G.A. in a strong position among white female Rhodesians and any opposing formation to the R.G.A. had to work hard to convince this significant portion of the white constituency to go into union with South Africa where white women had not achieved the vote.

The R.G.A. soon found itself in a tough fight to convince white Southern Rhodesians that their goal was the most desirable outcome for the country. On January 29, 1919, the Rhodesian Union Association (hereafter R.U.A.) was established, in support of union with South Africa. The R.U.A., however, had a difficult time ahead of it to convince settlers that Southern Rhodesia would be best served by union with its much larger southern neighbour. The R.G.A. had by contrast the advantage of support across many sections of the white community. According to Lee, support for the R.G.A. came from ‘the majority of almost every sector in both the rural and urban constituencies, but it was almost impossible to say which in particular was pro-R.G.A. since no record gives this information which can only be adduced from the election results’. Secondly, South Africa, with its large Afrikaner population, was looked on sceptically by many Southern Rhodesian settlers. The R.U.A. had its work cut out to attract the vote of white women, because their counterparts in South Africa were not enfranchised, and were regarded by Afrikaners in both territories as very hostile towards them. Ultimately the R.U.A. would find it difficult to convince Southern Rhodesia to support their cause for a number of reasons. Afrikaners and South Africa were disliked for the ‘official bilingualism of the Union, and many believed Afrikaners were irreconcilable republicans. Moreover, they feared that union would bring the dumping of large numbers of land-hungry and semi-literate poor whites and that Rhodesia might be sucked into the Union’s immense labour troubles’. Southern Rhodesia wanted to avoid the problems of South Africa. Furthermore, the political and economic structure in Southern Rhodesia mostly benefitted settlers of British heritage. In a country where Afrikaans was spoken by a small community, union with South Africa was perceived as a threat to the job prospects of English-speakers in Southern Rhodesia given South Africa’s push for

46 Ibid, 268.
bilingualism. The demands on the country from a potential influx of Afrikaners were seen as a risk to the status quo which served the interests of the English-speaking community in Southern Rhodesia.

The R.U.A. and R.G.A. would emerge as the two powerful organisations campaigning for the two quite different courses the country might follow once the Company's administrative term came to an end. The R.U.A. was comprised of those whites who had supported union and those who proposed an intermediate period of Representative Government before union. The Responsible Government position was advocated by the R.G.A. Within this camp, there were supporters for permanent Responsible Government and those who saw Responsible Government as a stepping stone towards the long-term objective of union with South Africa. The popularity of each cause would soon be gauged in the general elections of 1920.

2.3 The Road towards Responsible Government, 1920 – 1923

The run-up to the election was dominated by the question of Responsible Government, or union with South Africa. As early as 1919, the R.G.A. was already in campaign mode, attracting extensive support from ‘enfranchised women and the labour movement but strangely enough also from the Afrikaans population’. According to Lee, support from the “Dutch” elements of the electorate for Responsible Government rather than Union, resulted from the belief of the South African Nationalists that inclusion of Rhodesia would strengthen the British nature of the country, and they issued a mandate to their followers in Rhodesia to oppose entry into the Union'. This was significant given that the perception among the Responsible Government camp was that Afrikaners were attached to the south and would be in favour of union. On the other hand, the instruction from the Nationalists in South Africa to their supporters in Rhodesia was part of its plan to weaken the British link in South Africa.

The R.G.A. had the support of most white farmers and white artisans. The R.U.A. drew support from the BSA Company, the press, and notably General J.C. Smuts. Smuts had succeeded Botha as South Africa’s Prime Minister in 1919. Known as a supporter of union, he nonetheless could not engage openly with the matter, because of the precarious political

50 Ibid.
position he was in at home. The Nationalists had made significant gains in the general
election of 1920.\textsuperscript{51} Nationalist Party gains were so considerable that Smuts only returned to
power through a coalition between the South African Party (SAP) and the Unionist Party.

In full swing by the end of 1919 and early in 1920, the Southern Rhodesian election
campaign saw the Responsible Government cause make its mark. Advocates of Responsible
Government highlighted ‘patriotism, the imperial connection and had nationalistic
overtones as part of their argument’.\textsuperscript{52} Rhodesians were aware of their identity, which was
attachment to Britain as well as rejecting any resemblance to South Africa. Economic
arguments reflected the ‘distrust of centralized rule from Pretoria and the Union’s policy on
bilingualism which might interfere with promotion of English-speakers. Farmers and small
workers felt scared lest Union might be instrumental in depriving them of native labour’.\textsuperscript{53}
Concern was also directed at South Africa’s ‘higher taxes and tariffs and the fear that the
Central government in South Africa would take a large share of revenue, leaving very little
for the provinces and that Southern Rhodesia may find few friends in the South African
parliament’.\textsuperscript{54} Southern Rhodesians were wary that joining South Africa, which was a unitary
state, would weaken the country’s bargaining position and be overwhelmed by the
Afrikaner dominated state.

But as the election campaign unfolded advocates for Responsible Government found
themselves confronted by the return of Lord Milner in 1919 as Secretary of State. Milner’s
assumption of office would delay the Responsible Government agenda for the next two
years. The Legislative Council had been ‘rebuffed by Milner in 1919 on the query regarding
the criteria for fitness for self-government’.\textsuperscript{55} His position was that the territory was not fit
for self-government, causing some in the Responsible Government camp to conclude that
he was in favour of union. It would take a change in the political landscape across the
Limpopo in South Africa in the 1920 election to reinvigorate the Responsible Government
cause. South Africa’s election outcome disappointed the proponents of union because

\textsuperscript{51} The 1920 South African election returned Smuts to power, although it was without a working majority; the
Nationalist Party under Hertzog increased their seats from 27 to 44. The SAP won 41 seats, the Unionist Party
won 25, the Labour Party won 21 seats and Independents won 3 seats in the 134 seat House of Assembly.
\textsuperscript{52} Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 238.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 238-239.
‘although Smuts was returned, it was without a working majority; the Nationalist Party under Hertzog increased their seats from 27 to 44’. By contrast, the R.G.A. was confirmed in its belief that its position was the right and only course for Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesians settlers like their English-speaking counterparts in South Africa, were uncomfortable with Hertzog’s politics, seeing him as unfriendly to the British Empire. Smuts was anyway obliged to concentrate on shoring up his own position, thereby stopping him from injecting energy into the R.U.A. cause.

The R.G.A. went into the April 1920 General Election with considerable confidence. Its confidence was well founded, as the Legislative Council election results resulted in ‘twelve out of the thirteen elected members were in favour of a Crown Colony variant. In May the Council sent another resolution to Milner requesting Responsible Government’. This was a clear message from the electorate who ultimately voted for the end of Company. Milner and the Colonial Office did not immediately react, only responding at the end of the year. Milner’s Memorandum of December 1920 ‘stated if the electors re-endorsed the view which they had expressed at the Election of April, 1920, in favour of Responsible Government, it would be granted’. This response added further suspicion from those in the Responsible Government camp who felt Milner was pro-union. As placation, Milner offered an ‘annual £150,000 development loan for the following three years, though they would have to pay off the debt to the Company before they could control the unalienated land’. The leader of the R.G.A., Sir Charles Coghlan argued against further delay and again urged that Responsible Government be granted forthwith.

The election results demonstrated that the R.G.A. campaign and its message had resonated with many settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The R.G.A. had attracted support from most sectors and communities in the country. Out of the striking developments was the election’s ‘first political participation of the country’s African and coloured population, although this was on a small scale which increased when the issue became of greater urgency with the

56 Ibid, 206.
57 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 180.
59 Cape Times, 22 December 1921.
referendum of 1922’. Along with the Matabele Home Land Movement led by Nyamanda, an African elitist group made an appeal for franchise on the grounds of their service in the First World War.

An elite Ndebele personality, Nyamanda Khumalo, ‘the eldest son of King Lobengula, and those chiefs that were reduced to salaried low-ranking colonial officials, sought to revive the [Ndebele] monarchy and to secure a homeland for the Ndebele even within the confines of the colonial state’. Ranger explains that it was ‘through the activities of Nyamanda that the long accumulated Ndebele grievance over land found an expression’. He was in contact with ‘educated Christian Ndebele, on friendly terms with the Ethiopian church leader, Reverend M.D. Makgatho, and acquainted with some of the Fingo settlers. Out of all these connections the National Home movement was born’. This particular early manifestation of African political involvement casts light on opinions held by some Africans about the political affairs of the country. The request for franchise can be interpreted as a rejection of union, as the franchise was largely withheld from black South Africans.

The results of the 1920 election empowered the Legislative Council to pursue Responsible Government. It had commanded the support of many Southern Rhodesian settlers, and energised the campaign for Responsible Government. Milner, though, had ‘opted to defer the matter until the next election and the Company preferred to prolong its administration in the hope it would provide South Africa and Smuts in particular sufficient time to present an attractive financial settlement’. Smuts certainly favoured union between the two territories, but acknowledged that the first step towards achieving this goal was to settle the matter of the Company’s claim for past administrative costs. By deferring the matter for a couple of years, both the Colonial Secretary and the BSA Company hoped to turn the situation to their advantage. But in fact, the R.G.A. began the New Year with enthusiasm at record levels. Apart from its success in the 1920 elections, the Responsible Government cause was greatly improved by the Cave Commission report. This concluded that the total award to the BSA Company ‘amounts to £4,435,225, subject to deduction in respect of lands

62 Ranger, African Voice, 70.
appropriated and lands and rights alienated and in addition to compensation under Article 33 of the Charter. The relevant portion of Article 33 of the Charter states as follows:

And we do expressly reserve to Ourselves (the Crown), Our heirs and successors, the right to take over any buildings or works belonging to the company, and used exclusively or mainly for administrative or public purposes, on payment to the Company of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed or as, failing agreement, may be settled by the Commissioners of Our Treasury.

A few months later, the Legislative Council by a great majority passed a resolution in favour of Responsible Government. The fortunes of the pro-Responsible Government cause were seemingly improved early in 1921 when Milner was succeeded by Winston Churchill as Secretary of State.

Even so, the R.G.A. cause was not without a fierce opponent in the shape of the pro-Union coalition. The pro-Union coalition ‘founded by supporters of Smuts in 1919 and receiving much help from the mining industry’, consisted of the BSA Company and the R.U.A., with the support of the powerful local press and South Africa business interests. Moreover, Smuts was a powerful supporter of the R.U.A. and was widely respected by the British Government. Then too, Smuts’ domestic position much improved after the February 1921 elections which indirectly strengthened the R.U.A.’s cause. The Smuts Government ‘was returned to power with 79 seats in the lower House, the Nationalists maintained their strength with 45 members and the voting power of the Labour Party dropped to 9’. Electoral success freed Smuts to pursue the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia. From Smuts’ point of view, northward territorial expansion was grounded on the notion that the ‘Union was going to be for the African continent what the United States had become for the North American continent’. Southern Rhodesia was but ‘another day’s march on the high

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64 Cape Times, 24 January 1921.
65 Ibid.
66 See Blake, History of Rhodesia, 180: Churchill was not new to the region for he had worked through the House to establish self-government in the Transvaal. Churchill, preoccupied by other matters – the Middle East taking much of his time and through constant pressure from Coghlan led to the establishment of a Committee under the chairmanship, Earl Buxton, the former High Commissioner in South Africa. The commission was set up to provide advice to Churchill on both Rhodesias.
67 Ibid., 235.
69 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 161.
road of destiny. Rhodesia will not stop the march; rather she will proudly form the vanguard’.70 Smuts was set on carrying out what Southern Rhodesia’s founder, Cecil John Rhodes had envisioned for the country: union with South Africa.

The R.U.A. was greatly encouraged by the South African election in February 1921 which returned Smuts to power with a bigger majority. The result brought about a much needed injection of hope for the advocates of union. Unionists claimed support for their cause from farmers in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland. At a Farmers’ Congress meeting in March 1921, ‘attention was placed on the railway rates at which the Chairman of the Union Association, Advocate Longden, expressed that the future development of the railways was contingent on Union government’.71 Fortified by Smuts’ electoral victory, Longden and other Unionists were now confident they could persuade settlers to support them. Unionists believed that the election results had done away with the ‘bogey of republicanism, which alone had kept so many Rhodesians from wanting to join South Africa. Now that the question had been settled, some of the most influential men in the South would be prepared to welcome Rhodesia as a member of the Union’.72 Subsequently, Unionists made their main objective the terms for union. These were particularly important for the R.U.A. because they had never been discussed during the 1920 elections. With republican forces much reduced in South Africa after the 1921 election, the R.U.A. believed its position had greatly improved.

As both groups made their case, the Buxton Report was published in May 1921. Appointed only three months earlier, the speed with which the report appeared was welcomed by Responsible Government supporters. The Report recommended that the question of whether Southern Rhodesia was in a position to assume Responsible Government or not, had to be established at the appropriate moment. Voters should be given the . . . ‘opportunity to express their opinion on the matter. The Committee recommended that this would be best obtained by means of a Referendum rather than Election’.73 If Responsible Government were to be granted to Southern Rhodesia, the limitations and reservations

70 Ibid.
71 Cape Times, 25 March 1921.
72 Ibid.
‘were that the Natives should be secured in their existing position and to be ensured against discriminating disability or restrictions and that special provision must be made for dealing with the unalienated land of Southern Rhodesia’.74

The demand for Responsible Government, acknowledged by the report, disappointed its opponents. The report also came as a disappointment for Smuts, as the proposed referendum accommodated only a yes or no on the issue of Responsible Government. Smuts would have preferred including the ‘option of union. Although Coghlan was against this option Churchill successfully pressed the matter on the visiting Rhodesian deputation’.75

By the time they left London, however, the deputation had secured an agreement along the lines of the Buxton Report. This implied that Southern Rhodesia would be granted Responsible Government in the form ‘granted to Natal in 1893, with full powers of self-government being granted, subject, however, to reservations which will assure the natives of the territory their rights, and will give the Imperial Government a say in the administration of unalienated Crown lands’.76 The R.U.A. attempted to buy more time for the campaign, stressing that it was waiting on Smuts offer to the settlers. Coghlan, however, pre-empted any further delay by introducing the Referendum Ordinance, which set October 27, 1922 as referendum day. As union terms had not yet been presented, the R.U.A. found itself on the defensive.

The Unionist’s cause had a difficult time throughout 1922, with events moving against Smuts during the course of the year. South Africa went through a particularly turbulent period. The most damaging of events for Smuts’ ambition to persuade Southern Rhodesia to join South Africa was the Rand rebellion. Herd explains, that disagreement between the mining houses and the White mineworkers ‘which led up to the strike took a decisive turn at the end of December 1921 when the coal-mining companies told the workers that a proposed wage reduction of 5s. a day was imperative. Union employers conferred and requested arbitration, the employers refused’.77 A key factor that led to mining houses proposing wage reduction was the price of gold. In February 1920, the price of gold was peaking. By the end of year, the price of gold declined. After an initial recovery, by late 1921,

74 Ibid.
76 Cape Times, 22 December 1921.
‘the gold price was falling again, which led to leading mining capitalists deciding to force a confrontation with unions’. 78

With negotiations between the trade union and the employers breaking down during 1921, ‘some of the whites employed in semi-skilled positions guaranteed by the Status Quo Act were replaced by cheaper African migrant workers. Refusal of the mine owners to negotiate led to growing trade union militancy, the result was a general strike of white workers and the insurrection of the 1922 “Rand Revolt”’.79 A semblance of organisation and preparation for the strike among the strikers was visible. In the early stages of the strikes, strikers were setting up commandos – ‘quasi-military bodies designed to ensure discipline and maintain morale. Despite this early manifestation of what were to become combat formations of the strikers, the struggle was generally prosecuted without violence for the first month of its duration’.80 After government intervention against the strikers, a combative atmosphere permeated the strike. In early March 1922, a general strike was called. Government forces organised and ‘mounted an insurrectionary offensive. All wings of the armed forces – including the air force, used for one of the first times in history against organised labour - were then brought in to crush the strike of 1922 and the uprising that grew out of it’.

81 In the end ‘hundreds of people had been killed and wounded; thousands were detained’.82 These developments were significant in the contest of union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It became clear to some Southern Rhodesians that union with South Africa would invite serious labour instability.

Smuts’s repression of the Revolt made a huge impact on Southern Rhodesia’s own white miners. Additionally, violence at Bulhoek near Queenstown in the Eastern Cape some months earlier when 163 “black Israelites” were killed by Government forces, and the bloody suppression of the Bondelswarts rebellion which occurred in South West Africa both combined to show South Africa in a bad light. The timing of these events, particularly the

80 Krikler, Rand Revolt, 48
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid, 291. Blake, History of Rhodesia, 184: On March 10, Smuts declared martial law, took personal command and crushed the rebellion with heavy casualties – 157 dead and 687 wounded.
Rand revolt, was unfortunate for Smuts as a Rhodesian delegation was in Cape Town at precisely that moment. One visit by the Rhodesian delegation during their time in Cape Town was to Parliament, where it witnessed an all-out attack on Smuts by Hertzog. Smuts was accused of being responsible for the bloodshed on the Rand. For the visiting Southern Rhodesians, joining South Africa seemed even less attractive.

Nonetheless, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa continued to co-operate economically. Trade between the two countries was substantial. Official trade figures showed that ‘in 1921 the Union sent goods worth £2,881,000 to Rhodesia, South African produce and manufacturing articles amounting to £1,049,000. Rhodesia sent to Union £477,000 worth of goods’. South Africa sent a variety of products including fresh and dried fruit, tobacco and other manufactured products to Southern Rhodesia.

The South of course was by far the dominant partner. For Southern Rhodesians, especially those who favoured Responsible Government felt that if this imbalance was not checked, industries in the south would grow at the expense of the north. An ongoing debate in the South African parliament regarded cattle imports. Arguments in parliament by some of the members complained that ‘farmers across the border [in Southern Rhodesia] paid no income tax on the increase of his stock and Government had to do something to protect the South African farmer’. Others such as Mr. J. van der Merwe, the SAP member for Wakerstroom, claimed that it cost the ‘Union farmer three times as much as to dispose of his cattle on the Johannesburg market as it did the Rhodesian farmer, because of much lower land values in Rhodesia. He suggested that cattle imports from Rhodesia should be taxed’. Taxing Southern Rhodesian cattle was supported by many speakers in the debate; however, one or two like Captain Cilliers, SAP member for Hopetown, saw no reason for such a move, because by ‘December 1921, South Africa imported livestock from Rhodesia to the value of £88,000 and exported livestock to Rhodesia to the value of £106,000. South Africa remained in a position of economic dominance despite the harsh environmental

83 Cape Times, 27 April 1922.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
challenges’. The real effect of debating a tax on Rhodesian livestock would make itself felt through the referendum results.

In the battle over Southern Rhodesia’s future, Smuts needed to make the terms for union available as soon as possible. He began negotiations with the Company in 1922. In his initial request, Smuts wanted both Rhodesias, although in the end he settled for Southern Rhodesia. Smuts had until July 30, 1922, to publish the terms of union. Discussions with the BSA Company did not go unnoticed in South Africa, attracting debate in the South African parliament. The terms for Southern Rhodesia’s entrance into South Africa, it was argued, should be communicated to the people of South Africa through Parliament. Smuts was asked to take ‘Parliament and the country into his confidence as to actual terms upon which he was proposing to incorporate Rhodesia into Union. When it came to the financial matters with the Company . . . it might commit Union to certain obligations’. Smuts replied, that the Government had discussions with the ‘Company purely as a business proposition, and the reason for a prolonged process was that discussions not only involved the Company but the Imperial Government’. But he did acknowledge that ‘the final judgement of the matter would rest with the people of this country. It would, however rest with both Houses of Parliament as laid down in the South Africa Act’. Smuts response was objected to by the National Party and Labour, both asserting that the behaviour of the Government was autocratic as it bypassed the people of South Africa in formulating an offer to Southern Rhodesia. The young member from Calvinia, Dr. D.F. Malan, was particularly concerned about the language question. He stressed the need for dual-medium education in the territory should it join South Africa. He suggested that ‘if it were the intention of the Government to carry out clause 137 of the Act of Union only in certain parts of the country, then the Government could prepare itself for serious trouble’.

Southern Rhodesia’s political future was also discussed in the House of Commons. The Under-Secretary for the Colonies, Major Edward Wood, assured the House that it would be consulted and parliamentary sanction sought when the question of administrative costs

86 Ibid.
87 Cape Times, 18 July 1922.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
incurred by the BSA Company was raised. Labour Member of Parliament, Colonel Josiah Wedgewood was concerned about ‘Southern Rhodesia being virtually forced to join South Africa for financial reasons. He had complained that progress had not been made to ascertain the value of unalienated land and that Churchill’s efforts were leading Southern Rhodesia inevitably into the arms of South Africa’.\textsuperscript{91} It was seen as important for Southern Rhodesia to have leverage in the event of negotiations with South Africa. Ultimately, Rhodesia was seen as an instrument in counterbalancing Afrikaners in South Africa. Joining South Africa from a position of weakness would undermine Southern Rhodesia’s role from Britain’s perspective. For Colonel Wedgewood, ‘Southern Rhodesia ought to become an independent Dominion. He cast reflection upon the Union Governments traditions as regards its dealings with natives. Major, the Hon. William Ormaby-Gore, however, supported Rhodesia’s entry into the Union, otherwise she would be saddled with a number of debts’.\textsuperscript{92} Such views in the British parliament show the different dynamics at play. On one side, Britain did not want to take on financial responsibilities for Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa provided a solution. On the other hand, Britain sought to maintain its presence in the region, and keeping Southern Rhodesia out of South Africa was a means of maintaining its influence. With South Africa seeking union with Southern Rhodesia and the Afrikaner dominated South Africa seen as a threat to British interests in the region, Britain wanted to look after its interests and Southern Rhodesia was seen as a crucial player in imperial thinking.

Smuts’ terms for Union were eagerly anticipated, eventually appearing at the end of July 1922. Smuts offered ‘£6,836,500 in cash for unalienated land, public works, and railways, with the Company retaining all its other assets, including its mineral, commercial and ranching rights. The British Government agreed to drop its claim, the return of two million pounds advanced for war expenses’.\textsuperscript{93} These generous terms were welcomed by the board of the BSA Company and its shareholders and they accepted the offer. Other aspects of the offer were equally generous. Southern Rhodesia would become a ‘fifth province of the Union, with the name Rhodesia. English and Dutch were to be official languages, enjoying equal rights. Ten members from Rhodesia will sit in the House of Assembly, with ultimate

\textsuperscript{91} Cape Times, 7 July 1922.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{93} Blake, History of Rhodesia, 185.
provision for 17’.\textsuperscript{94} No restrictions were imposed on the movement of whites between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In addition, ‘recruiting in Rhodesia of labour for other parts of the Union was to be prohibited and in the case of non-Europeans the existing restrictions in force in the Union were to apply’.\textsuperscript{95} Salisbury would also receive a generous financial provision, whereby a special subsidy of £50,000 per annum for ten years . . . would go with the usual Provincial subsidy and a development grant of not less than £500,000 per annum for ten years’.\textsuperscript{96} All of this speaks to Smuts serious pursuit of amalgamation, which would strengthen his position in South Africa.

Once the terms were made public, the campaign began in earnest in Southern Rhodesia. The R.G.A., with Coghlan as its leader immediately went on the offensive, stirring the nationalistic sympathies of the settlers. Its approach was two pronged: promoting the Imperial link as well and anti-Afrikaner. The R.G.A. promoted its cause with slogans such as “Rhodesia for the Rhodesians and Rhodesia for the Empire”. The campaign, though, also had a negative side. The patriotic and nationalistic dimension in the R.G.A. cause was very hostile towards Dutch or Afrikaans speaking South Africans. Although vigorously denying that they were ‘anti-Dutch, the R.G.A. leaders did make the Union’s bilingual policy and its “poor white” problem major campaign issues. Coghlan and his followers also underscored the republican attitudes of the Nationalist Party in the Union which was comprised almost exclusively of the Dutch element’.\textsuperscript{97} This aspect of the R.G.A. campaign was later recognised as a ‘dangerous tactic by Ethel Tawse Jollie who advised Coghlan that the “anti-Dutch” campaign was getting out of hand and was losing them many valuable Afrikaner voters’.\textsuperscript{98} At the heart of the anti-Afrikaner element in the campaign was a fear of being governed by the Afrikaner, which was seen in Southern Rhodesia as being anti-British. The R.G.A. campaign simply exploited existing prejudices amongst Rhodesians towards Afrikaners.

The campaign had certain marked features. The R.G.A. possessed better leadership, and was better at communicating its message. By contrast, the R.U.A. had money, and press support, although it lacked an effective message. The latter hoped that the personality of Smuts

\textsuperscript{94} Cape Times, 1 August 1922.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Di Perna, \textit{Right to be Proud}, 155-156.
\textsuperscript{98} Lowry, ‘The Life and Times of Ethel Tawse Jollie’, 353.
would prove decisive. Yet soon enough Smuts discovered for himself the difficulties faced by
the union cause. Undertaking a so-called whistle-stop tour of Southern Rhodesia in August
1922, Smuts gauged the atmosphere of the territory wherever he could. Remarking to a
friend, Smuts confided that,

I hope they will vote into the Union, but I am told that the great current of opinion is still
the other way. They are afraid of our bilingualism, our nationalism, my views of the
British Empire. In fact they are little Jingoes and the sooner they are assimilated by the
Union the better for them and for us. 99

At a speech in Gwelo, Smuts stressed the economic benefits that would materialise once
Southern Rhodesia opted for union. He pointed to the advance ‘made by South-West
Protectorate in the last two years as an indication of the benefits that would follow a flow of
capital into Rhodesia and the spending of money for development. The speech made a
profound impression and was cheered’.100 As the Cape Times realised, the policy which ‘the
Premier of the Union has consecrated his best energies – the building up of a “destiny for
the white races of South Africa greater than Cecil Rhodes or Paul Kruger foresaw” through
the equal co-operation of both races’.101 Essentially, Smuts used the financial muscle of
South Africa and played to racial sentiments to convince Rhodesians that they would be best
served by joining South Africa.

For their part, the Nationalists were deeply disturbed by the entire matter. Their anger was
directed both at the possible incorporation of Southern Rhodesia and at the terms offered
to the BSA Company. At a Federal Council meeting of the Nationalist Party on August 10,
1922, the Council appealed to the white public to protest against the terms offered for
union and the government’s autocratic behaviour. Beneath the surface and the source of
the Nationalists anxiety over union was the ‘nervousness on the part of General Hertzog and
the fact that incorporation of Rhodesia will mean a big increase in the number of General
Smuts supporters, or to put it boldly, the strengthening of Imperial interests in the House of
Assembly’.102

99 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 186.
100 Cape Times, 9 August 1922.
101 Ibid, 7 August 1922.
102 The Territorial News, 17 August 1922.
One unspoken issue concerned was the African peoples in the two territories. No effort had been made to gather their opinions in Southern Rhodesia, partly because they were not considered an important factor in deciding where Southern Rhodesia’s future should be, and because most were in any case denied the vote. The opinion of Africans on the issue of incorporation into South Africa or Responsible Government remains unknown, given little to no coverage by the media and with no interest shown by either the R.G.A. or the R.U.A. At the time of the general election in 1920, few prominent African groupings had leaned towards Responsible Government. One can seek to explain this position by highlighting perceptions around the so-called native policy in both territories. Southern Rhodesia was considered more ‘liberal’ on ‘native’ matters than South Africa. This position was captured by a member of the Union Native Affairs Commission, Dr. Charles Loram on a visit to Southern Rhodesia where he was impressed by its ‘model native policy’. Observing that the ‘Rhodesian policy of setting aside reserves at an early date and in the excellent Keigwin scheme of native development reflected an administration that showed wisdom and statesmanship’, he thought that the ‘country had as fine a body of experts of native administrator as a country could wish for’. 103 Given Dr Loram’s impression and the favourable attitude towards Responsible Government hinted at by a handful of Africans in 1920 elections, it is likely that most Africans favoured remaining outside of South Africa.

As the referendum drew closer, the R.G.A. and R.U.A. aggressively promoted their respective positions. With the intention of making a strong impression on their supporters, pamphlets were widely distributed by the R.G.A. R.G.A. pamphlets contrasted life under union with the benefits of responsible government.

Under union with South Africa:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Access supply to our Native Labour supply. Rhodesian land for poor whites. A few more votes in Parliament. Control of our mineral wealth. A share of Union’s debt. Increased taxation. Control from Cape Town and Pretoria. More fostering of their local industries for which Rhodesians will pay high prices. Access to Congo markets by cheap rates over Rhodesian railways. Overseas Immigration will not be encouraged. Land settlement board to be controlled by the Union. Mining laws to suit the Rand and Rand magnates over small workers. Bilingualism. Women have no vote.}
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103 *Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzanzi Africa*, 22 August 1922.
Under Responsible Government:


The Responsible Government cause persisted with this particular campaign, and it ultimately proved successful. On 27 October 1922, the settlers voted in favour of Responsible Government. The figures of the Rhodesian referendum were 8774 or 59 per cent for Responsible Government and 5989 or 41 per cent for incorporation into the Union of South Africa. The returns from the electoral districts revealed that in ‘only one district (Marandellas) was there a majority in favour of Union’. 105 Though white Southern Rhodesians voted against union with the south, they also voted against the former Company administration and its inability to meet the needs of the electorate. Fear of Afrikaner nationalism and bilingualism also had a major effect on the white settlers. An important component of the electorate ‘was the English-speaking South Africans in Southern Rhodesia who in the referendum were divided; it was reported that “old Colonials, the Cape people are as a body in favour of Union, but those from Natal are all against it”’. 106 The Responsible Government cause managed to attract the ‘support of small miners, small business men, artisans, lower civil servants and some farmers. The Indians, Coloureds and small number of black voters voted Responsible Government, largely because of the Union’s harsher colour bar’. 107 The only settler community which voted in the majority for union was the Afrikaners. Presumably this outcome reflected not only the anti-Dutch tones of the R.G.A. campaign but also the community’s solidarity with its southern kin. In the end it seems that anti-Afrikaner rhetoric worked. Sir Drummond Chaplin, Administrator of Southern Rhodesia highlighted, in a letter to Smuts citing anti-Afrikaner feeling, ‘especially among the women, as a major factor in the Unionist defeat, while the Unionists themselves deplored the R.G.A.’s ‘pandering’ to the women’s vote in the campaign. An estimated 75% of white

104 Referendum Issues (RGA pamphlet), Salisbury, 1922.
105 Cape Times, 8 November 1922.
Rhodesian women voted for Responsible Government’. The voting patterns of women has been attributed to Ethel Tawse Jollie’s imperialist sentiments and anti-Dutch position, with women’s voting patterns in both the 1920 elections and 1922 referendum perhaps the least understudied and underestimated component of the Responsible Government cause. White women accounted for over one third of the electorate. As they voted overwhelmingly in favour of Responsible Government, without their vote the Responsible Government campaign would have found it difficult to win the referendum.

The Unionists attracted the support of ‘mining company representatives, international capitalists and railwaymen’s vote. It had also secured the majority of farmers, the majority of them Afrikaners but also English-speakers’. However, this level of support was not sufficient in giving the Unionists the desired result. It also appears that a number of events in South Africa had an effect on their campaign message and the terms for union arrived too late in the campaign. Overall, the referendum results indicate that, ‘mining magnates and senior civil servants voted Union, as did significant proportion of the farming population. Farmers in more neglected areas of Mashonaland went for Responsible Government, along with small miners, lower civil servants, small businessmen and a large proportion of artisans’. This suggests that the referendum campaign was a battle between big business in the mining and farming industry against the small player seeking to protect his interests. In the end, power and money failed to win the referendum. The referendum result for Smuts and those who championed union came as a great disappointment, putting an end to expansionist territorial ambitions. It also ended the prospect for some in Britain and in South Africa of Southern Rhodesia acting an internal bulwark to Afrikaner nationalism.

Once the referendum had passed, other battles remained to be fought before Responsible Government was granted on 1 October 1923. Hard bargaining took place between London and the BSA Company. The Company wanted to be paid in cash for its administrative deficits before Southern Rhodesia took control of the unalienated lands. In the end, an agreement was reached between the Colonial Office and the Company. The Imperial Government agreed to pay ‘£3,750,000 to the Chartered Company. The Company withdrew its Petition of

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Right and forewent all rights and interests in the lands of Southern Rhodesia except those which the Company is developing and working on commercial lines with the Company recognised as owners of mineral rights throughout Southern Rhodesia’.¹¹¹ For its part, the new South Rhodesian Government had to ‘pay £2,000,000 to the British Government becoming the only community in imperial history which had ever had to pay for the privilege of self-government’.¹¹² Once the financial requirements were met, Southern Rhodesia became a Colony of the Crown represented in the territory by a Governor. The new constitution subordinated keys aspects of the territory to Westminster, at least in theory. Potentially, discriminatory legislation was subjected to British scrutiny but in practice never vetoed. Foreign policy was not left to the Colony but remained the preserve of the British Government. Yet despite this constitutional limiting of the provision, Salisbury welcomed Responsible Government. The new era was greeted with much optimism by most settlers.¹¹³

Conclusion
This chapter has covered Southern Rhodesia’s road towards Responsible Government and has argued that South Africa was a crucial factor in Southern Rhodesia attaining Responsible Government. Southern Rhodesia was administered by the BSA Company before 1923. After the attainment of a Royal Charter in 1889 from Britain, the Company attained the right to administer the territory for an initial period of twenty-five years. In 1914, the BSA Company Charter was set to expire. At this time the territory could opt for the continuation of Company rule, entry into the Union of South Africa, Crown Colony government or Responsible Government. Entry into South Africa was seen as Southern Rhodesia’s ultimate destiny, particularly by Britain and South Africa. The expiration of BSA Company Charter rule in 1914 intensified the cause for Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia, and though the Charter was extended by a decade, Responsible Government was the ultimate goal for a significant portion of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The prospect of union with South Africa, was a notable factor in the referendum campaigns. Setting the basis for the establishment of a political party system in Southern Rhodesia, the campaigns for the 1922 referendum to decide Southern Rhodesia’s future presented the options of what relations

¹¹¹ Cape Times, 13 July 1923.
¹¹² Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 248.
¹¹³ See Ibid, 249-250.
Southern Rhodesia was to have with South Africa. This chapter has shown that white Southern Rhodesians were less encouraged about political union with South Africa. Many white Rhodesians wanted to mitigate the prospects of labour unrest, racial problems (Afrikaner and English divisions), bilingualism and Afrikaner dominance over the territory, which they feared would be a consequence of union with South Africa. In seeking to avoid becoming a South African province, Southern Rhodesia by 1922 opted for Responsible Government. Anti-Afrikaner propaganda from the main advocates of Responsible Government influenced many white voters to opt out of joining with South Africa. Overall, this chapter provides the state of affairs between the two countries at the start of Responsible Government which is discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter Three

A New Era: The first decade of Responsible Government, 1923–1933

Introduction
The referendum of 1922 set Southern Rhodesia on course to become a colony of the British Empire on October 1, 1923, enjoying Responsible Government status. The constitution made provision for African interests by protecting Africans against possible abuses rather than promoting their development. The Constitution safeguarded the interests of indigenous people by the ‘external control of reservation, required in the case of Bills, and by the requirement of prior approval by the Secretary of State of subordinate legislations discriminating against Africans. Special constitutional land provisions were also inserted preserving the right of Africans to own and hold land’. Britain also retained the position to surveillance legislation in Southern Rhodesia. Ultimately, the Southern Rhodesian Constitution of 1923 ensured that Southern Rhodesia was closely tied to London.

Although Company administration had ended, Southern Rhodesia remained economically in the thrall to London. By 1923, the pattern of ownership of Southern Rhodesia’s biggest mines, farms and other large-scale enterprises were uniquely in foreign hands. At the time, the economic field contained practically only ‘one capitalist – the most powerful financial group which comprises the B.S.A. Company and its subsidiary companies. As well as possessing the colony’s mineral rights and railway system, both which enjoyed Imperial protection, the B.S.A. Company had fingers, occasionally a whole hand, in many pies’. The Southern Rhodesian economy was dependent on international capital and settlers of Southern Rhodesia were aware that they inherited a state in which the ownership of the economy was concentrated in the hands of the BSA Company.

Rejection of union by Southern Rhodesia with South Africa prevented for the moment what had been regarded in times past as an inevitable outcome. General Louis Botha, South Africa’s first Prime Minister, had stated repeatedly that ‘the South African Union would not

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be complete until Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories had been included’. 3

Despite the referendum outcome both governments facilitated areas of exchange, particularly in trade, as well as maintaining existing historical links in the post-1922 era. This chapter seeks to place these exchanges in the context of Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa during the first decade of Responsible Government from 1923 to 1933. The chapter first proceeds by contextualising conditions at the beginning of Responsible Government; thereafter it engages extensively with those areas where Southern Rhodesia maintained or developed links with South Africa. Equally important, this chapter will highlight developments in South Africa that impacted on Southern Rhodesia.

3.1 Southern Rhodesia at the beginning of Responsible Government: South African factors

As noted in the previous chapter, the most marked feature of Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers was that they were typically English and sought recognition of this fact. Only one minority white community, Afrikaners eventually attained prominence and political importance. They were important for two reasons. In the first place they preserved group solidarity based on language and a shared religion. Secondly, as Leys notes, they possessed ‘ties with Afrikaner nationalism in the Union which kept alive the idea of a separate racial and cultural heritage. An added factor relates at times of political tension in the Union between Afrikaners and English-speaking whites which has operated on both communities in maintaining a gulf between them’. 4 These factors were closely observed by English-speaking white Southern Rhodesians in the context of union or otherwise between the two territories.

Ethnic and social tensions were but one source of Southern Rhodesia’s difficulties in the 1920s. Problems were also informed by circumstances rooted in the colonising process of Southern Rhodesia as well as the reality of not having complete control over the territory. McCulloch notes that at the start of the 1920s Southern Rhodesia was ‘dogged by economic recession, drought, cattle disease, and the aftermath influenza epidemic of 1918. Those crises did not foster a natural community of interests, and white society was deeply divided. The most flagrant divisions were between miners and farmers, both who competed for the

3 Hyam, Failure of South African Expansion, 1.
company’s favour’. These divisions contributed to a particular social and economic structure in Southern Rhodesia, one that was not entirely unusual given the territory’s development since 1890.

The new Southern Rhodesian government was afforded little time to dwell on the achievement of self-government. After an eventful referendum campaign, the territory faced a set of challenging problems, notably ethnic and social tensions as well as economic difficulties. These became matters of importance in the election, which followed soon after Responsible Government. Prior to the elections, political parties were reorganised. The former “Responsible Government Party” ‘after its success in the referendum reorganised under Coghlan, as leader and interim Premier, to fight the first elections of 1924 as the Rhodesia Party’. Its policy was to provide ‘strong, stable government capable of making a success of the new Constitution and thereafter did not favour change and proposed to “continue” measures designed to promote steady development of the territory, “encourage” gold small-working, prospecting, and settlement’. Coghlan was aware of the financial difficulties the country faced and sought not to disturb the economic structure his government inherited in order to ensure international capital continued to flow in the country.

The party also declared its support for the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and ultimately the establishment of a Central African dominion. Gann and Gelfand have noted that the proposal for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias at this time was encouraged partly by railway polities which ‘entailed co-operation between the two Rhodesias, and “closer union” between the territories north and south of the Zambezi owed its initial inspiration not to the “native question” but to the common task of coping with an overseas-controlled transport monopoly’. This was the first indication in Southern Rhodesia under Responsible Government for closer association with its northern neighbours. Therefore, South Africa was not the only consideration in Southern Rhodesia’s economic considerations in the region.

7 Ibid.
Southern Rhodesia’s premier, Charles Coghlan, set about addressing these issues. Leaving the existing administrative order unchanged, he focused on the Colony’s economic challenges. Its small budget contained an expenditure bill of two million pounds, destined for the Imperial Treasury, as well as £300,000 advanced to the country in 1922. The expenditure bill emanated from the two million pounds payment made by the Southern Rhodesian Government to the British Government in order to purchase Southern Rhodesia from the BSA Company. The £300,000 had come as a loan from the Imperial Government.

Budgetary constraints at this time partly account for Coghlan’s decision to leave the administrative framework largely unchanged. Other factors also help explain his decision. Firstly, the Constitution ensured ultimate imperial control over Southern Rhodesia. The Constitution was largely designed to perform three functions: ‘to protect the rights of capital, prevent discriminatory legislations against Africans without Imperial sanction, and stop Southern Rhodesia from passing laws incompatible with more general interests of the Imperial connexion’.9 The Premier was also concerned with the ‘economic problem of a poor colony which was badly under-capitalized as well as the railway rates, the Company’s mineral rights, the powers reserved to Whitehall, European land settlement, relations with South Africa and Portugal’.10 Therefore, the Constitution essentially kept Southern Rhodesia in a position of dependency on Britain. Phimister concludes that the territory was ‘obliged to accept constitutional provisions which would preserve the orderly accumulation of metropolitan capital. These factors produced a thoroughly conservative successor to the Chartered State’.11 This reinforces Southern Rhodesia’s dependency on foreign financial flows and the need for the settler state to manage the status quo. The state was focused on safeguarding business interests in order to ensure that the country was of good financial standing.

The politics of South Africa at this time provided an added dimension to developments inside Southern Rhodesia. In 1924 Southern Rhodesia held her first election under Responsible Government even as South Africa was consumed by its own general election. The election in South Africa produced an electoral pact between the ‘Nationalists and the

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9 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 118.
10 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 205.
11 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 118.
Labour Party (predominately English and vehemently colour-conscious), which shared a common aversion towards Smuts and ultimately resulted in the removal of Prime Minister Smuts from power at the 1924 general elections.\textsuperscript{12} The Pact Government wanted to distance South Africa from Britain as well as committing to the ‘construction of a national economy, more sympathetic to the promotion of culture associated with the Afrikaans language and harsher on South Africans of colour’.\textsuperscript{13}

Smuts was succeeded by General J.B.M. Hertzog, the leader of the National Party as Prime Minister. At the time, Hertzog promoted a Republican form of government in South Africa, insisting that every nation had in the course of time gained its freedom, and ‘whether it takes a hundred years or a thousand years, South Africa shall get its freedom. The implication was clear; as long as South Africa remained under the Crown, it was unfree and its present condition was transitional’.\textsuperscript{14} South Africa sought complete control over its affairs and Hertzog was intent on achieving this objective.

The start of Hertzog’s premiership coincided with a period of modest economic growth in South Africa, ending with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929.\textsuperscript{15} It was in this context that Hertzog and the NP nudged South Africa in directions which were opposed by English-speaking whites. They disliked Hertzog’s and the NP’s views, especially as they related to the prospects of South Africa’s detachment from Britain and the Empire. The NP was a ‘unilingual Afrikaans party which was anti-British, anti-Royalist, Calvinist and pro-Republican’.\textsuperscript{16} It must be noted, that Hertzog’s rise to power was a critical moment in the rise of Afrikaners within the South African political establishment. When Hertzog assumed political power, many Afrikaners agonised from a sense of inferiority compared to the English. As D.F. Malan put it,

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from year to year, and from one generation to another the Afrikaner is treated and has been treated as an inferior – it is preached in the civil service, by the school, in every public notice alongside a road, and through the entire institutional expression and tone
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Le May, \textit{The Afrikaners}, 150.
\textsuperscript{15} Freund, ‘South Africa: The Union Years, 1910-1948’, 211-253.
of public life. And where others regard and treat him as an inferior he himself begins to regard himself as such.\textsuperscript{17}

Hertzog’s ‘attempts to lift the Afrikaans language and culture from the inferior position they occupied after the Anglo-Boer were viewed with suspicion and he was regarded as a fanatic stirring up racial hatred [between Afrikaner and English-speakers]’.\textsuperscript{18} The concern among English-speaking South Africans was the intent of distancing South Africa from Britain. The Nationalists’ primarily set themselves the goal ‘to free South Africa from Britain as much as possible’.\textsuperscript{19}

The Nationalists’ also began addressing their sense of being wronged by history. Malan, who was the Minister of Health, Education and the Interior in Hertzog’s 1924 Pact Government abolished Dutch and made ‘Afrikaans an official language in the Union. He also replaced the Union Jack as South Africa’s sole official flag and introduced a new Union flag, whose design incorporated the emblems of the two defeated Boer Republics’.\textsuperscript{20} As a consequence of actions taken by the Nationalists’ at this time, distrust became more pronounced in both white communities. The British did not want to learn Afrikaans in ‘fear of an Afrikaner advance. Furthermore, the animosity between the two communities lay in the English-speakers’ fear of a republic and the Afrikaners’ fear of economic and cultural marginalization’.\textsuperscript{21} English culture was ubiquitous in South Africa. The English dominated every aspect of South African life and Afrikaners felt ostracised. With the Afrikaner Nationalists in government, Afrikaner interests were advanced which was received by English-speaking community as an attack on them, thus creating distrust between the two white communities.

Hertzog’s policy of advancing the development of Afrikaners was not only predicated in dealing with English-speakers. It also sought to address the African question. Shortly after the Pact Government came to power, Hertzog announced the outlines of his views on

\textsuperscript{17} Giliomee, \textit{Afrikaners}, 358-359.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}, 401.
\textsuperscript{21} Giliomee, \textit{Afrikaners}, 394-396.
segregation, and ‘led to the proposal of the four so-called Native Bills’. At the core of Hertzog’s African policy was segregation. His ideal was the development of the African ‘along his own lines in his own territory. The importance of General Hertzog’s Native Bills lied not so much in their actual provisions, rather for the first time since Union a common native policy was to be substituted for the widely divergent views in the four Provinces’.

The start of Hertzog’s premiership coincided with the start of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia. According to Gann, the most notable development at this time was that ‘Rhodesia had settled its relations with the Nationalist South African Government. Significantly, Coghlan much preferred General Hertzog’s new South African Government to Smuts’s administration, finding Hertzog’s attitude friendlier than that of Smuts’. But although friendly sentiments were expressed between the two, any talk of union between the two countries was rejected by Southern Rhodesia. In conversation between the new Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir John Chancellor, and Prime Minister Hertzog, the latter’s inquiry about union in the near future was turned aside by Chancellor: I told him while I hoped and believed that incorporation in the Union was its ultimate destiny, there was no immediate prospect of union taking place. I expressed the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by raising the question of union at the present time. For Southern Rhodesia, the issue of union with South Africa had been resolved for the moment. Rhodesia wanted friendlier relations with South Africa rather than enter into a political union.

3.2 Early Southern Rhodesia – South Africa links

Even so, the attainment of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia placed the question of the territory’s relationship with South Africa high on Coghlan’s agenda. That a relationship continued to exist between the two territories was obvious enough. But its precise nature had yet to be delivered. Historically, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were closely connected. As briefly noted in chapter one, the settlement of whites in what became Southern Rhodesia was actively set in motion from the Cape Colony. The Pioneer Column totalling ‘one hundred and eighty-seven included Boers in the expedition, which

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23 O. Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog (Cape Town: Howard Timmns, 1957), 128.
24 Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 253.
committed Dutch South Africa along with young men, all but a few of them still in their twenties, from the whole British world, as well as from South Africa’. 26 Amongst the “pioneers” were the ‘sons of politically notable Cape residents among the recruits, as well as a dozen or more others from prominent backgrounds, but their admittance into the Corps were obligatory in any case’. 27 Furthermore, what followed after the Pioneer Column was the arrival of prospectors from South Africa, and by the ‘end of 1890 some 460 gold claims had been filed’. 28 Mlambo notes that although Cecil Rhodes believed tacitly in the superiority of ‘British culture and civilisation, he never stereotyped other whites on the basis of their origins or nationality and clearly appreciated talent wherever it existed regardless of the individual’s origins’. 29 Rhodes demonstrated his ‘willingness to work with other non-British whites when he deliberately included Afrikaners and Jews in his Pioneer Column which occupied Rhodesia in 1890. This was in accordance with his motto of “equal rights for all civilised men”’. 30 The inclusion of Afrikaners in the Pioneer Column provided for English-Afrikaner collaboration, which had been achieved by Rhodes during his term as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.

From the start, then, links between the two territories were close. For Kennedy, many developments in Southern Rhodesia were based on South African practice. The colony’s legal system, civil service, and native policies ‘all drew on South African models; its economy and society represented extensions of South African patterns; it was, as W.K. Hancock has observed, in essential respects a South African frontier’. 31 The laws that were applied in Southern Rhodesia from the outset were the laws of the Cape Colony which was administered by the Company. But it was ‘only in June 1891 that proper provision for the establishment of a legal system was made’. 32 Furthermore, the ‘Roman-Dutch Law as it evolved in the Cape Colony by 1891 was the common law of Southern Rhodesia’. 33 The other important legal matter of early Southern Rhodesian society was that ‘appeals from

28 Ibid, 15-16.
30 Ibid, 144.
31 Kennedy, Islands of White, 11.
32 Palley, Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 493.
33 Ibid, 495.
the High Court itself, however, lay from 1896 to the Cape Supreme Court, first in terms of the Matabeleland Order in Council and later of the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council’. The South African influence also extended into Southern Rhodesia’s economy, in which banks, businesses, ‘the nascent secondary and service industries drew their people from and their ideas—indeed were usually controlled—from parent companies in South Africa’. Southern Rhodesia at this time was largely an extension of the Cape Colony and relied significantly on the south not only for support to build up Southern Rhodesia but also to maintain links with the outside world.

Geography undeniably shaped the early development of relations between the two countries. Southern Rhodesia had no coastline, and found ‘British influences, sporting teams, books and so on funnelled through South Africa. The white educational system and curriculum was adapted to South African practice and, at the higher levels, to South Africa university requirements’. Thus geography forced Southern Rhodesia to look southwards during its early development. It is a result of these developments that Southern Rhodesia and South Africa developed close relations. Early Southern Rhodesian development mirrored South African examples.

Despite the close links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa Kosmin notes that by 1897, Southern Rhodesia was already a ‘distinct territory with its own character. It had already acquired a unique history and in many ways its white population, in an unusual political, economic and social situation, were beginning to think of themselves as a distinct group within Southern Africa’. Furthermore certain features established during the early years in Southern Rhodesia continued throughout the development of the country. British immigrants who were pulled to Southern Rhodesia were similar to those in the 1890s. In the early days these were people who, whatever their social background, ‘found their self-image, as had the Pioneers. The racial structure of the country, with its small European community, consolidated the settlers both socially and politically, so that Rhodesia was to

34 Ibid. 541.
35 Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision, 68.
36 Ibid.
be an attractive place for those who aspired to a higher social level in the 1920s’.

Despite the strong South African influence in the early years of Southern Rhodesia’s development, the country pursued an alternative path by the 1920s which believed in special privileges for whites of British heritage as well as keeping the country as a British territory.

3.3 Imperial Presence and Regional Impact

Of great importance to Southern Rhodesia’s settlers were the long-term prospects of white rule in British colonial Africa. The question had been raised after the Devonshire Declaration of 1923. The declaration was born of circumstances in Kenya where the Indian community outnumbered its white counterpart. As white settlers insisted that only they should share in government, Indian hostility arose. The Imperial response, delivered by the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Devonshire announced in respect of Kenya that they thought ‘it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail’.

The Declaration which emphasised ‘African advancement and paramountcy of African interests came too late to affect the situation in Southern Rhodesia’. Nonetheless, settlers were wary of Imperial trusteeship and devices used to protect African interests in Southern Rhodesia were still in place.

Subsequent to the Devonshire Declaration, ideas of amalgamating Britain’s African colonies in East and Central Africa emerged. Some settlers thought the idea would improve their safety through increased numbers. Minds were also concentrated by developments in South Africa, where the rise to power of General Hertzog was seen as inimical to British interests. The rise of ‘Hertzogism’ in South Africa caused Southern Rhodesia’s Governor to suggest ‘the expediency of encouraging and strengthening British solidarity northward of the Limpopo. It was necessary to ensure that the policy of the group was so shaped as not to exclude Southern Rhodesia coming in later. Unless this was done, both Rhodesias could inevitably be dragged southwards’.

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38 Ibid, 35-36.
39 Palley, Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, xxiii.
40 Ibid.
41 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 192-193.
The British Government proposed to address the matter by appointing a Commission of Inquiry, later known as the Hilton-Young Commission of 1927. The appointment of the Commission coincided with the period in which ‘extreme Hertzogism appeared to be rampant in the Union, British thinking about the future of her east and central African territories was on an unusually large-scale, linking both east and central Africa in an anti-Union counterpoise’. The Commission produced its report in 1929, with many of its recommendations coming as a disappointment to the settler communities. It reported in ‘favour of federation in East Africa, although it did not include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in it because they had so little in common with the other territories’. Additionally, the Commission examined ‘the question of unifying the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. It found that the northern Africans had reservations about the idea while, generally, the Europeans welcomed it’. Britain sought to find a balance between protecting African interests against discriminatory practices as well as seeking to strengthen British solidarity in the region so as to prevent settler communities being dragged into South Africa.

But Young did consider that ‘the “railway belt” should be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia, that North Eastern Northern Rhodesia should be joined to Nyasaland as a Crown Colony, while in the west, Barotseland would become a native reserve’. The Commission also recommended that a central authority should be established to ensure co-ordination in ‘defence, tariffs and communications under the authority of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia and taking over the supervisory powers of Whitehall in respect of African and imperial policy’. This meant Southern Rhodesia would have access to the rich copper mining areas north of the Zambezi, without having to assume responsibility for the rest of Northern Rhodesia.

Overall, the Colonial Office was satisfied with the report, and support also came from Southern Rhodesia. However, in Northern Rhodesia local white support waned and the idea was rejected by a majority of members in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. In the

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42 Ibid, 193.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
end, Chanock notes that ‘the apparent taming of Hertzog, the conclusions of the Hilton Young Commission and the return of the Labour government to office in 1929 all put an end to counterpoise plans on this scale’. 47

3.4 Trade and Customs ties
Trade and customs ties were one of the most important pillars upon which Southern Rhodesia consolidated relations with South Africa. Historically, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had enjoyed close trading and commercial ties. In 1903, Southern Rhodesia joined the South African Customs Union, ‘when the tariff then agreed upon was subject to special provisions admitting the right of Southern Rhodesia to suspend duties on certain items and to grant greater preference to British goods under the clause of the Order in Council in 1898, generally known as the “Rhodes Clause”’. 48

The Agreement was terminated in 1910, following union of the four South African colonies and it was replaced by ‘Customs Agreements between Southern Rhodesia and (a) the Union of South Africa; (b) Northern Rhodesia; and (c) Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. These Agreements were further revised in 1914 and again in 1924’. 49 The Agreements showed that all the countries highlighted above operated within the same regional economic system and their economies were closely connected.

The Rhodes Clause was an important component in the customs convention between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It stipulated that the duties in Southern Rhodesia ‘shall not exceed those under the Customs Union Tariff in force at that time, in 1898, or the Tariff contained in the Convention between the Cape Colony, the Free State and Natal of May, 1898, whichever were the higher’. 50 The most significant aspect of the customs conventions was that between 1906 and 1924, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had the ‘same Customs Tariff, with a free interchange of products. The Union made commuted payments to Southern Rhodesia in respect of imported goods removed from open stocks in the Union; the payment being made increased at various dates from £58,000 to £125,000 per

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47 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 193-194.
49 Ibid.
50 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 25 November 1924, Column 8.
annum’. Thus Southern Rhodesia and South Africa sought to maintain the free interchange of goods, though South Africa was the dominant partner.

In 1924, however Southern Rhodesia opened negotiations with its southern neighbour for a new customs agreement. The aim was to secure a market for its products, in particular cattle and tobacco. Southern Rhodesia’s attention towards its cattle was motivated by South African determination to protect its own ranchers. Prior to negotiations with South Africa

an embargo on cattle under 800 lbs. weight was accepted by Southern Rhodesia. At the 1924 conference, the dual nature of the Union’s economic development was shown by its request for an embargo on Southern Rhodesian cattle under 1,200 lbs., to protect its farmers, and for the abolition of the Rhodes Clause in Rhodesia, in the interests of its merchants and manufacturers. The latter was declined by Southern Rhodesia; the former was accepted with a limit of 1,000 lbs. in place of 1,200 lbs.

But more than this, negotiations were heavily influenced by regional and global forces. The early 1920s witnessed a period of economic difficulties across the world. In Southern Africa, the effects of fluctuations in the world capitalist economy in the early 1920s ‘led to a tendency toward increasing protection in order to help develop domestic capital formation. The new administration in South Africa, which had won the elections in 1924 largely on the basis of tariff protection and financial assistance to farmers, effected tariff protection’. South Africa sought to develop its industries and protectionist measures were introduced to ensure favourable conditions for the development of its primary and secondary industries.

These considerations affected the nature of the customs negotiations with Southern Rhodesia. In fact, at the start of the 1924 customs negotiations, South Africa had planned to ban up to 75 per cent of ‘Southern Rhodesian tobacco, and impose a weight embargo of 1200 lb for oxen and bulls and 800 lb for cows.’ Southern Rhodesia responded with a threat of a ‘general protective duty against South Africa. In the end only a total ban on scrap

52 Rhodesia Herald, 6 December 1934.
54 Ibid.
tobacco was agreed upon and the weight embargo was set at 1050 lb for oxen and bulls and 750 lb live weight for cows at the point of departure in Southern Rhodesia’.\footnote{Ibid.} It was a compromise that ensured trade of these products between the two countries. They were important markets to each country.

The Southern Rhodesian Treasurer explained before the House that South Africa, under pressure from its voting public, found it necessary to impose some embargo upon ‘our cattle, and proposed that the embargo should be 800 lbs’.\footnote{Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 25 November 1924, col. 7.} The Southern Rhodesians stressed to the South Africans that the free interchange of products was an important part of the Customs Agreement. In the end, the Treasurer explained, ‘we agreed reluctantly to this embargo of 800 lbs. on the understanding that the matter would be fully discussed at the 1924 Conference, and on our agreeing to that the Union Government informed us of their agreement to an extension to the Customs Agreement for a further six months’.\footnote{Ibid.} So far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned, a permanent embargo would be disastrous. He explained that ‘we could not agree to the embargo, the effect of which would be practically to cut out the whole of our cattle from the Union market. We pointed out that the proposal would be quite unacceptable to us’.\footnote{Ibid, col. 8.} Southern Rhodesia sought to keep the important cattle market in South Africa open as it was regarded as an important export market for Southern Rhodesia. Eventually Pretoria relented, if only a little. At the 1924 conference South Africa ‘agreed to 1,050 lb. at this end or 1,000 lb. anywhere in the Union, either at Mafeking or at Messina, or anywhere else in the Union’.\footnote{Ibid, col. 10.} The Treasurer’s explanation concerning the agreement, however, was criticised in the Legislative Assembly. A member of the House, Mr. Robert Gilchrist stated that ‘the speech of the hon. the Treasurer on the previous day was one of apologia, one of making the very best of a very bad bargain’.\footnote{Ibid, col. 37.}

Southern Rhodesia very reluctantly accepted the South African proposals. It had to secure a market for its cattle. This in fact was the main benefit Southern Rhodesia derived from the free interchange of products with the Union, that is an ‘accessible market for slaughter cattle; and if that market were closed by the imposition of an embargo the Customs

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
Agreement would be of little value to Southern Rhodesia’. In this way, Southern Rhodesia preserved its existing trade with South Africa. Essentially, the agreement meant that Southern Rhodesia sold between ‘£300,000 and £400,000 of cattle and tobacco down south, accepting in exchange South African manufactured goods valued at about £1,000,000. The South Africans, succeeded in keeping out Rhodesian tobacco of poorer sort as well as scrub cattle of low weight’. In exchange South Africa made a significant payment to Southern Rhodesia and subsequently trade flows between the two countries continued with little disruption.

When the Southern Rhodesian Governor, Sir John Chancellor met with the South African Prime Minister, in which they discussed the Customs Agreement, he claimed that ‘Southern Rhodesia was quite satisfied with it and expressed hope that the Government of the Union would consent to let remain in existence unaltered’. In particular, Southern Rhodesia wanted to maintain the free interchange of products with South Africa, which provided an important market for Southern Rhodesian producers. More specifically the two sides discussed the position of the cattle industries. Given the lack of outside markets for cattle trade, discussions between Chancellor and the Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture of South Africa, expressed the desire to help Southern Rhodesia on this matter. They expressed the opinion that the ‘cattle industry of South Africa must be dealt with as a whole, and stated that they would be ready to allow Rhodesia to participate on equal terms in any arrangements they might be able to make for developing an export trade for the cattle of the Union’.

Opening the Second Session of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, Chancellor stressed that ‘the Agreement placed before you embodies the most favourable terms that are obtainable, and that it assures a containing market for the disposal of cattle by the producers thereof. You have also been summoned here to-day for the purpose of ratifying

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61 National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), S679/15/2 - Note by Governor, J.C. Chancellor, The Restriction on the Importation of Southern Rhodesian Cattle into the Union, 26 February 1924.
62 Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 254.
64 Bodleian Libraries-Weston Library, Oxford, MSS.Brit.Emp.s.284, Box 7-10, Sir John Chancellor Papers, Notes on Despatches and Official Correspondence, Secret Despatch from Governor of Southern Rhodesia to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 January 1924.
the Customs Agreement’. The wider value of the Agreement, explained the Treasurer, lay in the fact that

friendly relations with the Union Government is of no little importance, as we are associated with the Union in many ways. We get a great deal of assistance from them from their research institutions; we get the products of their laboratories at special rates, and in many other ways we obtain facilities from the Union, and it is of great importance that we should maintain the most friendly relations and that we should continue to enjoy the benefits of these advantages. Now those are the main consideration which influenced the Government in coming to this decision.

While the cattle embargo was not to Salisbury’s liking, the Treasurer expressed that on the whole

the balance of advantage certainly lies in acceptance of the Agreement. The Union Government made a very distinct sacrifice when they reduced that embargo. They told us that the agreement to this reduction of the embargo would cause a great deal of criticism from their own people, but they did so recognising that it was in the interest of South Africa as a whole that this Agreement should be maintained between the two countries.

The compromises made by both countries emphasised the extent to which Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were closely connected and the importance in maintaining friendly relations between two countries which operated in the same economic regional system.

The 1924 Customs Agreement allowed for the continuation of the Rhodes Clause, which ensured that the rates on goods imported from elsewhere in the Empire were not above South African tariff levels. Pretoria agreed to transfer to Northern Rhodesia ‘12 per cent ad valorem on South African re-exports to Northern Rhodesia of imported goods and 6 per cent on South African manufactured goods. The minimum sum paid to Northern Rhodesia was set at £12,500 per annum, and under similar arrangements with Southern Rhodesia it was paid £158,000’. Free interchange of raw material between the two countries continued

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65 NASA, National Archives Repository (SAB), BTS 16/2/3, Vol. 1, Speech delivered by His Excellency The Governor at the Opening of the Second (Extraordinary) Session of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, 24 November 1924.
67 Ibid.
68 Kanduza, Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 57.
and both countries agreed not to use discriminatory railway rates to stifle competition in each other’s markets. Nor was the embargo on low grade cattle without mixed blessings. It obliged Southern Rhodesia to pursue ‘other markets and find new trading partners. The consequence of the embargo on Southern Rhodesian cattle by South Africa was an increase in sale of Southern Rhodesian beef in the Congo as well as Northern Rhodesia’.\(^{69}\) This was to prevent the over-reliance on the South African market which was inclined towards protectionism.

On the South Africa side, the embargo on Southern Rhodesian cattle and tobacco were the consequence of farming interests who strongly advocated protection. The question was raised and fiercely debated in the South African parliament. Opponents such as, Sir Thomas Smartt was clear about the importance of maintaining good commercial relations with Southern Rhodesia. Sir Drummond Chaplin, former BSA Company Administrator stressed further that ‘depriving Southern Rhodesia of a genuine market for its cattle could stir bad feeling and support should be given to them considering that in the face of great difficulties, Southern Rhodesian cattle made tremendous progress’.\(^{70}\) He reminded Parliament that ‘it must also not be forgotten that Rhodesia at the present time buys a good more of its pedigree cattle from the Union, and if the Rhodesian cattle-farmers find their market in the Union barred against them they may go to other countries to buy their pedigree cattle’.\(^{71}\) Chaplin concluded by noting that ‘it would really be a great pity if anything were done to disturb the commercial relations between the Union and Rhodesia, and the experience South Africa shows that the existence of customs barriers between one State and another is fraught with no good’.\(^{72}\) Ultimately, South Africa enjoyed an advantageous trading position in relation to Southern Rhodesia and it was stressed of the need to preserve this position.

But there were plenty of speakers in favour of greater intervention on behalf of South African cattle farmers. One representative of the cattle farmers, M.L. Malan of Heilbron highlighted the difficulties faced by South African farmers. Malan hoped that ‘Government

\(^{69}\) Ibid.
\(^{70}\) Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, 18 August 1924, col. 616.
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
\(^{72}\) Ibid.
will be consistent and act in the interest of our own cattle farmers’. He noted that Southern Rhodesia would in any case have to import what it needed from South Africa. The farmers have had a very hard time of late on account of the competition of Rhodesia. It is impossible for us to sell cattle for £4, as we have to buy land here at £7 per morgen, whereas in Rhodesia they only pay 7s/6d. Are we going to ruin the cattle farmers in the Union for the sake of little trade with Rhodesia? I have every confidence that the Government will not allow that.

Other members who supported greater intervention on behalf of South African farmers pointed to the fact that the output of Southern Rhodesian cattle farmers was increasing year on year, and argued that if ‘no steps were taken, Rhodesia is going to kill the cattle farmers of the Union. Cattle breeding was much cheaper in Rhodesia than here. The Government ought to give serious attention to it because it is urgent’. One Transvaal Member of Parliament insisted that the majority of cattle-farmers in ‘the Transvaal were on the brink of economic collapse. During the last three years they have not sold a single bullock, because they could not sell at £4’. Mr. Heyns went on to stress that Rhodesia was protecting itself ‘by means of railway rates. The rates from here to there are 300 per cent higher than those from Rhodesia to the Union. In this way there is a high levy on goods, while we grant them preferential rates. Charity must begin at home’.

In the end, advocates for protectionist measures prevailed. South Africa secured a measure of protection for its farmer at the expense of their Southern Rhodesia counterpart. A deal was struck whereby Southern Rhodesia was obliged to accept Pretoria’s point of view. Salisbury’s agreed that the ‘weights of cattle should be increased to 1,050 lbs. This is the weight at the station of departure in Rhodesia’. While making the best of a bad job, Southern Rhodesia was never happy with the embargo, and from 1926 onwards, began to agitate for concessions from its giant southern neighbour. In particular, Southern Rhodesia sought to frame its own tariff because of the growing protectionism in South Africa. Southern Rhodesia also objected the ‘South African tariff agreement with Germany in 1927

73 Ibid, col. 618.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, cols. 619-620
76 Ibid, col. 620.
77 Ibid.
78 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates, 23 February 1925, col. 172.
and the anti-Empire attitude which had made the Rhodes Clause highly unfavourable to Southern Rhodesia. She feared being drawn into South African policy of diversifying trading partners while increasingly being protective with regard to Empire trade’. 79 As Southern Rhodesia’s request for tariff reform gained traction, the territory ‘solicited Northern Rhodesian support against South Africa in an effort to “maintain Empire solidarity and to redress” the foreign inclinations which seem to inspire union policy’. 80 Set on reform, Southern Rhodesia pressed forward to amend its customs agreement with South Africa.

3.5 In Pursuit of Fair Treatment, 1928 to 1930
South Africa’s growing protectionist inclinations eventually resulted in Southern Rhodesia acquiring the power in 1928 to ‘frame her own tariff and in 1929 gave notice to terminate the 1924 customs agreement. Southern Rhodesian anxiety increased in 1929 when South Africa announced the intention to reduce tobacco imports from the Rhodesias by instituting a quota system for limited duty-free imports’. 81 It was reported that South Africa’s intention of reducing Southern Rhodesian tobacco imports was the result of ‘pressure being brought to bear with the object of further limiting the markets for Rhodesian products in the south’. 82 But the underlying idea was to protect South Africa’s tobacco growers who produced the ‘same kind of light leaf as Rhodesia, and sold it at about 9d lb, while at the same time allowing to be imported a certain required minimum of the best Rhodesian leaf – not sufficient, however, to interfere with the Rustenburg, Magaliesburg, etc. grower’. 83 The imposition of quotas on Southern Rhodesian tobacco by South Africa was potentially disastrous, because according to Kanduza, ‘the Rhodesian tobacco industry had been built upon the South African market’. 84 It was in this context that Southern Rhodesia requested a customs conference to be held in 1929, where it sought to be free to frame its tariffs independent from South Africa. Amongst the factors pushing Southern Rhodesia to seek amendments in the customs tariff was the fact that from 1925 onwards, the South African Government, in search of a policy to protect its industries, ‘made considerable changes in its tariff, with the result that by the end of 1928 there were many differences between the

79 Kanduza, Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 59.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Countryside, July 1929.
83 NASA, SAB, BTS 41/1/6, Vol. 1, Note on Present Customs Situation between the Union, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, 29 January 1930.
84 Kanduza, Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 59.
tariffs and the two countries. The agreement of 1924 provided that no duty should be levied by Southern Rhodesia on goods imported from the Union. Because of this growing divergence Southern Rhodesia wanted amendments to the existing customs agreement.

3.6 Southern Rhodesia and the shift in focus towards the Imperial market
During the same period, Southern Rhodesia was engaged in an election campaign, which placed its own demands on the Government. At the end of 1927, Sir Charles Coghlan died and was succeeded by H.U. Moffat, who led the ruling Rhodesia Party into the 1928 general elections. Under Moffat’s leadership, the party merely sought to maintain the existing political framework and continue the work started by Coghlan’s administration. The only exception was the concession issue of its campaign manifesto in English and Afrikaans, in recognition ‘to the fact that the Opposition (the Progressive and Country Party) were establishing special ties with the predominantly rural Afrikaner voters. The party’s share at the poll dropped from 58 to 52 per cent, and the Progressives, with nearly 30 per cent, took the share previously given to Independents’. The drop in the poll, Leys concludes was an indication that the ‘popularity of the ruling party was waning’. The government was therefore under pressure to deliver a better customs agreement with South Africa.

The 1924 customs agreement had become increasingly unpopular in Southern Rhodesia and by the end of the decade, the country pressed for a renewal of the agreement. In March 1929 Southern Rhodesia asked for a conference to resolve the outstanding customs issues. Salisbury wanted to

(1) secure tariff autonomy-i.e., the right to arrange its tariff according to the needs of the country; (2) to remove anomalies arising from differences in tariff in respect of the open stock trade between the Union and Southern Rhodesia in regard to those classes of goods on which Union duties are lower than Rhodesian; (3) to secure that the system of British preference as embodied in the Rhodes Clause should be made effective; and (4) to guard against the automatic extension to Rhodesia of commercial treaties entered into between the Union and foreign countries.

85 Rand Daily Mail, 1 October 1929.
86 Leys, European Politics, 135.
87 Ibid.
88 Rand Daily Mail, 1 October 1929.
The last point related in particular to the South African-German Trade Treaty. At a time when South Africa was broadening her markets by concluding a reciprocal tariffs agreement with Germany, Southern Rhodesia was unwilling to be dragged along because ‘Rhodesia adhered to her fiscal policy, namely, the Rhodes Clause, which stressed that British goods shall have preference. In any case, Rhodesia feared that the goods imported into the Union under the German Treaty would be re-exported to Rhodesia’.\textsuperscript{89} In the usual course of events this treaty would be extended to Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury accordingly ‘asked for a new customs conference, explained Gann. The Southern Rhodesians insisted that they should be ‘able to fix their own customs duties; they also demanded free exchange of cattle and other agricultural produce, offering at the same time to admit a broad range of Union manufacturers’.\textsuperscript{90}

The 1930 customs agreement turned out to be unsatisfactory on a number of scores. In the first place, Southern Rhodesia discovered that it did not have an ally in Northern Rhodesia. When Southern Rhodesia invited Northern Rhodesia to make a common stand on a new customs agreement with South Africa, Northern Rhodesia rejected the Southern Rhodesian request. Lusaka’s decision was informed by the fact that the territory was a large importer of manufactured goods from South Africa and with ‘the Colonial Office arguing that Northern Rhodesia would benefit very little if it imposed higher tariffs on South African goods eventually it settled on a position where it would engage and negotiate with South Africa on its own’.\textsuperscript{91} The Southern Rhodesians saw this decision as having undermined its own position. There was the perception in Southern Rhodesia that the decision seriously weakened its ability to ‘act independently. Southern Rhodesia saw the decision as unexpected and embarrassing. “We had all realised the importance of acting in concert with Northern Rhodesia”’.\textsuperscript{92} Southern Rhodesia had the idea that if Northern Rhodesia had joined them, that is ‘if they will join us in going out of the Customs Union and join us in a Free Trade Agreement, we can snap our fingers at the South. But it may pay Northern Rhodesia particularly in regard to its tobacco, to remain in the Custom union with the

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 13 September 1929.
\textsuperscript{90} Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 266.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 267.
\textsuperscript{92} NAZ, NE 1/1/5. Percy Fynn to Francis Newton, 9 December 1929.
South’. This was not to be, and it was particularly galling for Southern Rhodesia because this all took place in the context of talks about the possible amalgamation of the Rhodesias.

Southern Rhodesia’s customs agreement with South Africa in 1930 on balance favoured South Africa, insofar as South Africa ‘continued to ban Rhodesian scrub cattle, and limited the duty-free importation of Southern Rhodesian tobacco to 2,400,000 lb, thereby cutting a large slice out of Rhodesian export markets’. The imposition of a quota, limiting the amount of duty-free Southern Rhodesian tobacco imports to South Africa, prompted the Moffat Government to establish ‘a Tobacco Control Board to distribute the quota amongst the planters’. These arrangements came just as the Great Depression was unfolding after the Wall Street crash of 1929. With the added introduction of South African restrictions, the tobacco industry was under tremendous strain. Yet there was very little that Southern Rhodesia could do in such an unequal relationship. For Southern Rhodesia, commercial ties with South Africa were of the utmost importance because as Sir Francis Newton, High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom put it in a letter to H.U. Moffat, Premier of Southern Rhodesia, ‘no one realises more than you and Fynn, Treasurer, how tied up we are to the Union in many essential points affecting our revenue and welfare’.

3.7 The Search for Change, 1930 to 1933
The 1930 customs agreement was achieved in an environment of great global uncertainty and difficulty. During the initial phase of the Great Depression, Southern Rhodesia’s tobacco production declined from a weight of ‘7 million pounds in 1930 to below 6 million pounds in 1931’. Because of the import quota imposed on Southern Rhodesian tobacco by South Africa, the industry was under great strain. Quite soon, though, ‘tobacco received a fillip as a result of the Ottawa Agreements, and things began to look up again’. According to Drummond, Great Britain used the Ottawa Conference of 1932 to develop preferential arrangements within the dependent colonial Empire. The Treasury and the Board of Trade were trying to manage British capital export and the British ministers went to Ottawa in

93 NAZ, NE 1/1/7. H. Moffat to Francis Newton, 16 October 1929.
94 Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, 267.
95 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 173.
96 NAZ, NE 1/1/7, Francis Newton to H. Moffat, 3 January 1929.
97 Kanduza, Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 59.
search of creating jobs for British workers; to this end they hoped to reduce Dominion and Indian duties, in exchange for the maintenance of duty-free under the Import Duties Act’.  

The conference ended with fifteen bilateral trade agreements, known collectively as the Ottawa Agreements. The overall aim of these treaties was to expand the policy of trade between the dominions.

In addition, the commonwealth nations concluded a number of bargains with Britain, the gist of them being Britain’s promise to continue the preferences already established and to extend them to other commodities – in return for an enlargement of dominion preferences, some by lowering tariffs on British goods, and some by raising levies on foreign products.

Access to markets within the Empire at last provided Southern Rhodesian tobacco producers with an opportunity to broaden its markets, while reducing its over-reliance on South Africa.

The Southern Rhodesian cattle industry was also reeling from the effects of the Depression. Its position was aggravated by an epidemic of ‘foot-and-mouth-disease in March 1931 which halted cattle exports. The industry was at its lowest ebb in 1931-2. Fearing infection, Southern Rhodesia’s neighbours prohibited all Southern Rhodesian animal and vegetable products and South Africa refused to allow chilled or frozen Rhodesian beef passage through its territory’. Overall, the Southern Rhodesian economy struggled during the early years of the Depression. The national economy, ‘never very large, fell from £13.9 million in 1929 to £8.7 million in 1931 as commodity prices plummeted and markets shrivelled’.

The effects of the Depression were felt by primary producers who were the most affected and the ‘value of Rhodesia exports declined catastrophically. Gold was the exception. Southern Rhodesia followed Britain off the Gold Standard in 1931, but South Africa retained the old parity for another year, and Rhodesian exports received a minor temporary

101 Phimister, *Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, 172.
boost’. In Southern Rhodesia, gold at first acted as a ‘stabilizer and thereafter, once its price rose, not only jerked the economy out of depression, but inaugurated a period of expansion and prosperity. For almost a decade, gold alone accounted for more than 50 per cent of Southern Rhodesia’s exports. The rise of the gold price and subsequently for Southern Rhodesia greater earnings was the result of Britain’s decision to go off the gold standard, resulting in the increase in the price of gold. Southern Rhodesia ‘followed suit immediately and managed to make a handsome profit. British buyers purchased great quantities of gold with depreciated pound notes; more mines went into production, and Southern Rhodesia’s principal export flourished while other producers had to tighten their belts’.

An important consequence on Britain’s decision was the development of a nascent sterling area. South Africa however did not immediately drop the gold standard and therefore was not part of the sterling area. As the world’s leading gold producer and as a matter of economic and political principle, South Africa ‘under the Afrikaner nationalist government posed and postured in a manner that would suggest that it was independent from Britain. The immediate effect on South Africa as a result of Britain’s decision on the gold standard was a deepening of the recession and an outflow of capital’.

The matter was further complicated by Prime Minister Hertzog a strong advocate of South African independence from Britain. He declared that those who wanted to follow the British example ‘wanted to undermine South Africa’s national independence and freedom. Their purpose is to bind South Africa economically to Britain; they are trying to deprive us of the freedom we won politically’. Hertzog’s efforts were eventually undone by the pressing need to do something to ease the economic strain South Africa experienced as the Depression intensified. In 1932 after considerable pressure from farmers, mining interests and the manufacturing industry, who stressed the need for a devaluation to regain a share of the most ‘important Southern Rhodesian market in abandoning the gold standard’, South Africa too abandoned the Gold Standard. Moreover, as a result of Britain’s dominance

103 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 211.
104 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 177.
105 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, 80-81.
106 Hyam and Henshaw, Lion and the Springbok, 122-126.
107 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 204.
108 Ibid.
as a customer of ‘South African agricultural goods and a supplier of capital, through the political influence of farmers and mining interests in South Africa, the country had little choice but to enter the nascent sterling area’. Despite South Africa’s initial decision not to abandon the gold standard, commercial relations between Pretoria and Salisbury continued much as before. A customs agreement established in July 1930 between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa ‘embodied the vital alteration that each party was free to frame its own tariff. With mutual freedom to collect each its own duties, the old Customs Union or Convention vanished’.110

But within a few years the Southern Rhodesian government came under mounting pressure to act more decisively in the interests of the territory. Pressure was exerted on the government to terminate the 1930 customs agreement. The Agreement was denounced by Southern Rhodesia in 1933.

Amongst the provisions of the Agreement was the limitation of the quantity of leaf tobacco to be exported to South Africa, and as before the prohibition of the exportation of beef and cattle below a certain weight. With these exceptions there were free interchange of products, but the Union paid to Southern Rhodesia, in lieu of duty on Union manufacturers, 12% on the value of foodstuff and 6% on other articles.111

In particular, the Salisbury Chamber of Industries with support from the Bulawayo Chamber pressed the Government to give notice to terminate the Customs Agreement between Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa ‘before December 31, 1933, with a view to obtaining an arrangement which will afford adequate protection to Rhodesian secondary industries, failing which the Chamber recommends that arrangements be immediately made to control our own Customs’.112 There existed in some sections in Southern Rhodesia a bitterness as to the one-sided operation of the present agreement, especially against the entry of Rhodesian cattle and produce to Union markets. Furthermore, the bitterness was intensified by what was conceived to be the undue prolongation of the foot-and-mouth disease

109 Hyam and Henshaw, Lion and the Springbok, 127.
111 Ibid.
112 Sunday Times, 17 December 1933.
restrictions. This feeling had led to an insistent demand for reprisals and for the severance of all fiscal arrangements between the Colony and the Union.¹¹³

The trade figures, excluding gold and specie for 1930, 1931, 1932, and 1933 contributed in part to Southern Rhodesia’s criticism of the 1930 Agreement.

Table 3.1 Southern Rhodesia and South Africa Trade Figures, 1930-1933 (£)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1930-1931</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
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<td>Imports to</td>
<td>1,657,092</td>
<td>1,215,670</td>
<td>260,849</td>
<td>237,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to</td>
<td>1,052,566</td>
<td>1,355,778</td>
<td>771,072</td>
<td>857,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Table adapted from NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol. 1, Southern Rhodesia – South Africa Commercial agreement and Relations, Provisional Memorandum on The Union-Rhodesian Conference by A Sub-Committee of the External Trade Relations Committee.

Table 3.1 shows that South Africa was the dominant partner. Its position of dominance was a product of the fact that ‘Rhodesia offers a valuable market for a large variety of Union products, whereas Rhodesia is interested chiefly in the export to the Union of a limited number of agricultural products’.¹¹⁴

Southern Rhodesia wanted favourable trading conditions for its cattle and tobacco exports to South Africa. The difficulty for Southern Rhodesia was that ‘for a great variety of Union products there was a comparatively small market in Southern Rhodesia, and the Rhodesians have been agitating that in return for the export of these products the Union should give Rhodesia a greater opportunity of selling cattle and tobacco in the Union’.¹¹⁵ The problem, though, as a South African report noted, that the products imported by Southern Rhodesia are in practically all ‘instances actually required there and these products do not compete with similar Rhodesian products, while Rhodesia desires to have a freer market in the Union,

¹¹³ Rand Daily Mail, 30 December 1933.
¹¹⁴ NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol. 1, Southern Rhodesia – South Africa Commercial agreement and Relations, Provisional Memorandum on The Union-Rhodesian Conference by A Sub-Committee of the External Trade Relations Committee.
¹¹⁵ Ibid.
for products which can be or are being produced in the Union in excess of its requirements’.116

Southern Rhodesia’s efforts at this time were complicated by the Government’s purchase of the mineral rights from the B.S.A. Company for £2 million in 1933. This action ‘positively inflaming a growing opposition which loudly proclaimed its hostility to “external vested interests”’.117 It was this opposition which won the elections in Southern Rhodesia in 1933. But the Reform Party’s unity was precarious. In the past, it had been largely ‘held together by a common dissatisfaction with previous governments’,118 but once in office, its divisions became more pronounced. Despite or because of electoral success, many in the Party demanded ‘more democracy at the top and in the process refused to give a written undertaking demanded by [its leader and new Prime Minister] Huggins that they would vote for all government measures in the House and defend them in the country’.119 At the heart of Huggins thinking was his ‘claim to be free to make a new Railway Agreement and subsequently to negotiate a Customs Agreement with South Africa, without prior consultation with the caucus of all Reform M.P.s’.120 In reality Huggins was the leader of a disparate group who had always occupied the opposition benches prior to the formation of the reconstituted Reform Party and his party management style brought to light strong divisions and personalities who had personal ambitions and for the party.121 However, it would be Huggins who would ‘triumph and become the embodiment of Southern Rhodesia for a political generation’.122

South Africa responded to Southern Rhodesian claims about the one-sided nature of the Agreement by highlighting what it considered to be an imbalanced assessment of the trade relationship. Pretoria emphasised that not ‘enough acknowledgement was given to it for the

116 Ibid.
117 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 173.
118 Leys, European Politics, 136.
119 Ibid, 137. Godfrey Huggins served as the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1933 to 1953 as well as the first Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1956.
120 Leys, European Politics, 137.
121 See Ibid, 136-137.
122 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 217.
credit facilities provided to Southern Rhodesia at no greater cost than to South African nationals’. South Africa protested against the contention that Union benefits to such a great extent through free exports to Rhodesia, which has to be discounted to the extent to which the Union Exchequer pays under Article IX of the 1930 Agreement duties in excess of the amount paid by Southern Rhodesia to the Union. In 1933 these payments saw the Union paying a total of £50,187 to Southern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia paying the Union of South Africa a total of £3,054. The balance was in favour of Southern Rhodesia by £47,133.

The scene was set for a further bout of acrimonious trading negotiations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

3.8 Migration: The building block of Southern Rhodesian-South African relations

Though commercial ties formed a key dimension of the relationship, other bonds also tied the two countries together. These encompassed ‘strong economic, educational, and sporting ties with the Union and until the Second World War, a majority of its immigrants originated in South Africa’. From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, Southern Rhodesia attracted settlers largely from the ‘lower middle or working classes in Britain and South Africa. Most were in trade rather than the professions and they were aggressive in their desire for social and economic betterment. They made a considerable effort to isolate themselves within physical, linguistic, social, economic, and political boundaries’. Most prior to 1923 were of British heritage. Mlambo notes that until 1915, Britain and allied territories supplied the majority of immigrants. Between ‘1915 and 1918, however, the number of immigrants from Britain declined considerably due to the disruptions of the First World War, while that of British South African-born and South African Dutch immigrants increased. Thereafter, the dominance of British immigrants re-emerged’. One notable factor may account for South African migration to Southern Rhodesia before the 1920s. In the pre-First World War era immigration was fuelled in the run-up to the establishment of

123 NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol. 1, Southern Rhodesia – South Africa Commercial agreement and Relations, Provisional Memorandum on The Union-Rhodesian Conference by A Sub-Committee of the External Trade Relations Committee.
124 Ibid.
126 McCulloch, Black Peril White Virtue, 17.
127 Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia, 11.
‘the Union of South Africa in 1910 when a large flow of mostly English-speaking immigrants entered from South Africa. Many of the English-speaking South Africans were escaping what they regarded as an unfairly pro-Afrikaner Union’.128

Although the majority of white immigrants in this early period were British, Mlambo emphasises that the colony was “a fragment of a fragment”. That is, ‘most of the British settlers did not come directly from Britain but via a prolonged sojourn in South Africa. They thus carried the attitudes and expectations of British South Africa rather than those of residential British national into their new settlement’.129 What was telling as a result of this particular migratory flow was that added to the racial and cultural ‘chauvinist baggage originally carried from Britain were added racist attitudes and world views adopted in South Africa and shaped by South African conditions and experiences. It was this “baggage” which predisposed them to be disdainful of and hostile to non-British peoples, White and Black’.130

As previously, immigration to Southern Rhodesia during the 1920s and 1930s was marked by a high turnover of migrants. This phenomenon presented the Colony from establishing a large white population because

from 1921 to 1926, for every ten immigrants, there were seven emigrants; from 1931 to 1936 there were nine immigrants to seven emigrants. These figures can be partially explained by the territory’s vulnerability to international economic fluctuations, as well as the fact that English-speaking South Africans regarded Southern Rhodesia as a forward frontier of British South Africa, where they might try their luck for a while and to which they might return”.131

White Southern Rhodesia was ‘a society of immigrants and transients, most of whom did not stay long enough to establish roots in the country’.132 Although Southern Rhodesia remained dependent on immigrants, the territory was particular in terms of the type of immigrant it considered acceptable for settlement. The economic circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s influenced to some extent what type of settlers were deemed most needed by the territory. The most important aspect was their nationality, British being the

129 Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia, 50.
130 Ibid.
most desired group and the skills and capital they would bring to Southern Rhodesia. The dominant position in the country at the time was to attract ‘settlers of the “right sort”, that is, with capital and skills, few of whom were available in the years of the Depression, when many whites were reduced by unemployment to working on the roads of the colony’. The “right sort” of settlers were considered a good source of much needed capital but also important for preserving the social formation of the territory. Rejecting poor whites was designed to reduce competition for jobs done by Africans.

In the context of the British Overseas Settlement Scheme, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa received far less British immigrants compared to other British settlement territories. According to the statistics of the Overseas Settlement Committee for the years 1922 - 1935, ‘out of 495,242 British emigrants who left for British colonial territories in that period 25% went to Canada, 34% Australia, 9% New Zealand and only 0.2% to South Africa including Southern Rhodesia’. ‘Rhodesia was in many ways handicapped in competition with the United States, the Dominions and even foreign countries such as Argentina’, Clements has noted. ‘In the popular mind, she was in the heart of “Darkest Africa” where savages and wild beasts roamed and where strange and terrible diseases prevailed. With no coastline of her own and with her communications oriented to the south, she was difficult of access’. And far from taking special measures to overcome these disadvantages, Southern Rhodesia added to them ‘by a restrictive immigration policy. The settlers, once they themselves were firmly in power, checked the rate of addition to their numbers’. White Southern Rhodesians were concerned that a large influx of immigrants might threaten white norms and customs. The immigrant was ‘feared as a competitor and a potential disrupter of privilege much more than was the African’.

A sizeable portion of those migrants entering Southern Rhodesia were those who had either settled in South Africa before venturing north or had passed through the country to reach Southern Rhodesia. Generally, Southern Rhodesia tended to attract most immigrants when economic conditions in the country looked promising or when unsettled conditions in

134 Mlambo, ‘Building a White Man’s Country’, 139.
135 Clements, Rhodesia. The Course to Collision, 75-76.
136 Ibid, 76.
137 Ibid.
Europe produced refugees and Southern Rhodesia was seen as a safe haven. Periods of economic prosperity produced the greatest intake of migrants. In the second-half of the 1920s, there was a ‘high immigration flow partly [as] the result of the attraction of Rhodesia’s agricultural prosperity in the 1927-1929 period when the country experienced a tobacco and cotton boom’. The upswing in economic conditions was not only attractive to Europeans but also to South Africans. However, as noted previously, many English-speaking South Africans were attracted to Southern Rhodesia not only for economic fortunes but also as a cultural refuge at a time when Afrikaner Nationalists in South Africa were becoming increasingly hostile towards Britain.

As migration flows persisted, social and cultural contacts between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa intensified. One aspect of the relationship which fostered greater contact between settlers in the two territories was education. Rhodes University in the Eastern Cape was and is a prominent example of educational links. After 1916, the ‘University of the Cape of Good Hope ceased to exist. It was replaced by the University of South Africa, to become known as UNISA, with headquarters in Pretoria. Rhodes, like other tertiary institutions in existence, became a member of the University of South Africa Senate’. Subsequent to its establishment as a member of the University of South Africa Senate, Rhodes’ enrolment numbers began to grow and students were drawn from outside South Africa, particularly from Southern Rhodesia. Currey has noted that, before the ‘war there had been a trickle of Rhodesians arriving each February. The trickle now became a steadily flowing stream; and in 1922, when Rhodesia was on the eve of attaining Responsible Government, an arrangement was entered into with the Rhodesian Department of Education’. The arrangement entailed an undertaking by the university to ‘grant a bursary covering fees for one year for each Rhodesian student, with the department of education making a reciprocal grant. These students became an invaluable part of Rhodes – one of them, Ian Smith, was to become the Prime Minister of Rhodesia’. The educational opportunities provided for Southern Rhodesians facilitated even greater contact between the peoples of the two territories.

141 Buckland and Neville, Story of Rhodes, 11.
3.9 We like to Play: Sporting relations

Migration was an important, though not the only significant link at this time between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Sporting ties between the two countries originated from late nineteenth century. According to Winch, ‘the arrival of the railway line at Bulawayo in 1897 had opened new opportunities for the sporting community. It enabled Rhodesia to begin sporting relations with South Africa in 1898 by entering the highly competitive Currie Cup rugby competition’.142 ‘The decade prior to the Boer War had witnessed the colonisation of Rhodesia and with it the almost seamless introduction of cricket into the new territory’, writes Allen. ‘The administration of the game was needed, and in 1898 the Rhodesian Cricket Union was formed’.143 As cricket developed in the region in the late nineteenth century, the Southern African “imperial club” of cricketing colonies expanded on 1 February 1904 to include Rhodesia in the South African Cricket Association.144 The association itself had been founded some fourteen years earlier ‘after it became clear that a governing body was needed to co-ordinate the different centres’.145 Following its inclusion into the South African Cricket Association in 1904, Southern Rhodesia in the following season (1905-06) ‘celebrated their inclusion in first class competition in South Africa with an appearance in Johannesburg at that year’s Currie Cup tournament. An automatic entry was created at the semi-final stage as the new territory was accepted into the imperial cricketing fold’.146

Sporting ties from this time turned on the flow of migrants coming from the south. This trend was exemplified by Sir William Milton, the South African cricket player and sponsor, who ‘accompanied Rhodes to Rhodesia and became administrator of Southern Rhodesia. The first ‘pioneers’ from South Africa set up sporting facilities very shortly upon their arrival’.147 Sporting facilities in Southern Rhodesia were complemented through the association of sports bodies. Thompson has noted that apart from lawn tennis and in 1935 bowls, Southern Rhodesian sporting bodies including cricket, rugby, athletic, cycling, hockey

144 See Ibid, 67.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid. 186.
swimming, football, and boxing were all affiliated with the ‘corresponding bodies in South Africa with whom close relations were maintained. It is through affiliation of this kind that Rhodesia had been included in the itinerary of so many overseas teams that visited the Union and had occasionally been the venue for inter-provincial tournaments’.  

A notable feature of early sporting connections between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were divisive effects on black and white sporting competition, never mind their manifestation of how settler societies were racially segregated. According to Novak Southern Rhodesian ‘sport was inseparable from white settler identity and contributed to and reflected the social separation of white rulers from black subjects’. Winch further records that as early as 1894

sport was inextricably tied to racist ideologies and policies when Milton linked with Rhodes to block the selection of a Cape Coloured fast bowler, ‘Krom’ Hendricks, for the first South African tour to England. The Western Province Cricket Union backed Milton’s racist stance by introducing legislation to prevent players of colour from participating in white cricket. The influence that Milton wielded was considerable and he, more than anyone, was responsible for preparing the foundations of segregated sport.

An immediate effect of this segregatory trend in early Southern Rhodesian sport resulted by 1900 in ‘mixed-race athletes who had participated on white teams in Cape Town were excluded from competition in Rhodesia and ignored by the white press’.  

Rugby and cricket were central to sporting ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Southern Rhodesian cricket and rugby organisations were absorbed into South African structures after World War One. ‘The South African cricket and rugby associations governed their Rhodesian counterparts, and Rhodesian cricket and rugby teams became dependent on the Currie Cup competition annually in South Africa’. While the Currie Cup was the most prestigious regional competition, the domestic Logan Cup competition in

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149 Novak, ‘Sport and Discrimination in Colonial Zimbabwe’, 853.
150 Winch, ‘There were a fine Manly Lot of Fellows: Cricket, Rugby and Rhodesia Society during William Milton’s Administration, 1896-1914’, *Sport in History*, 28, 4 (2008), 586.
151 Novak, ‘Sport and Discrimination in Colonial Zimbabwe’, 855.
‘cricket was instrumental in conditioning Rhodesian cricketers’.\textsuperscript{153} The popularity of cricket in Southern Rhodesia and the subsequent ties with its southern counterpart date back to the ‘pioneer’ era in Southern Rhodesia. Thompson notes that ‘with such a large percentage of Englishmen among Rhodesia’s first inhabitants, it was only natural that cricket became popular very early’.\textsuperscript{154} Sports in general and cricket in particular had a notable presence in early settler society, even including the administrative sphere. Winch notes that in bringing to the country former sporting associates, Milton associated himself with men similar in outlook.

It was observed that cricket was the principal qualification of his civil service appointees. Six of South Africa’s first ten cricket captains as well as other notable players would at some stage cross the Limpopo to further their careers in the civil service or through business. Milton’s chief secretary was Herbert Castens, ex-Rugby School and a former South African cricket and rugby captain.\textsuperscript{155}

Furthermore, rugby and cricket were perceived as the key sports for the promotion of the ‘British race and of masculinity expressed through sporting prowess. Through the political efforts of Sir William Milton and other early Rhodesian administrators, cricket and rugby governance became highly structured and closely aligned to the settler state’.\textsuperscript{156}

The development of cricket in Southern Rhodesia coincided with more competition between teams from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Until 1923, Southern Rhodesia was able to test ‘their cricket progress when they visited Johannesburg to take part in the Currie Cup tournament in 1904-05’.\textsuperscript{157} After a brief pause from the Currie Cup, Southern Rhodesian cricket ‘was to wait for twenty-five years before entering the South Africa’s premier competition. For the national side, fixtures were therefore limited to infrequent tours from South Africa and English sides during the intervening period’.\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Thompson, Story of Rhodesian Sport, 13.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Winch, ‘There were a fine Manly Lot of Fellows’, 587.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Novak, ‘Sport and Discrimination in Colonial Zimbabwe’, 855.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid. Writing on Southern Rhodesia’s first participation in the Currie Cup, Thompson explains that a major challenge for the Rhodesian cricket team was the uncomfortable and hazardous 26 hour journey they had to make to reach their destination and play a match shortly thereafter. Winch on the other hand notes that, upon
\end{itemize}
During the first decade of Responsible Government, Southern Rhodesia participated in two seasons of Currie Cup cricket, in 1929-30 and 1931-32. Prior to Southern Rhodesia’s return to the Currie Cup in 1929, a number of touring teams from South Africa provided greater competition. According to Thompson, late in 1923 the ‘Rhodes University College (R.U.C.) toured Rhodesia and played fourteen matches. In 1925 they played thirteen matches in the Colony and in 1928 nine games. The R.U.C. team went to every cricketing town in Rhodesia, with tremendously beneficial results’.  

The Transvaal’s cricket tour of Southern Rhodesia in 1928 accelerated the Colony’s return the Currie Cup competition. When the Transvaal made a return visit organised by Southern Rhodesia’s staunch friend in the South African cricket world, ‘Algy Frames, who also managed and captained the side, Rhodesia followed the advice of Mr. Algy Frames and made their second entry into the Currie Cup (1929-30)’. One of the most noticeable features of cricket relations between the two countries was that several Rhodesians had ‘earned recognition in the front ranks of South African cricket and by 1935, Rhodesians had found their way into the Springbok team’.

Rugby competition between the two territories followed a similar pattern. Southern Rhodesia first participated in the ‘South African Currie Cup tournament from 1898 and the Rhodesian Rugby Football Union (established in 1895) was affiliated to the South African Rugby Football Board’. As a result of this early affiliation many individuals stationed in Southern Rhodesia eventually played for South Africa. These individuals came from Afrikaner and English backgrounds. In this area of Southern Rhodesia-South African relations, sporting relations tied the two countries together. English-speaking Rhodesians, such as ‘Ronnie Hill, Andy McDonald, Ian Robertson and David Smith, represented South Africa in international matches, while Afrikaans South Africans, like Salty du Rand and Ryk

the return of the Rhodesian cricket team to the Currie Cup after twenty-five years, players were expected to dip into their pockets and pay for the expensive trip to South Africa. Though these factors may have contributed to Southern Rhodesia’s absence in the cricket Currie Cup, no clear reason is provided in the literature concerning the twenty-five year cricket hiatus.


Ibid, 16-17.

Ibid, 21.

van Schoor, were living in and playing for Rhodesia when they first gained Springbok selection. Rhodesian schoolboys also played in the Craven Week tournaments’.163

According to Spies, a further factor to consider when examining the participation of Southern Rhodesian and other teams from the region in South African rugby competition is ‘the initial widespread perception that the Union of South Africa was an “incomplete dominion”, and that in due course the Rhodesias and the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland would become part of the Union’.164

Southern Rhodesia sent rugby teams to South Africa to compete in the Currie Cup Tournaments of 1898, 1899, 1906, 1908 and 1914, and in 1923 a touring team visited the Union. ‘The 1906 Currie Cup Tournament in Johannesburg took the form of a trial for the Springbok teams’.165 However, rugby engagements between the two countries after 1923 became less frequent. In 1923 a ‘Rhodesian team went south on tour. There was no Rhodesian team in the seasons 1925, 1926 and 1927’.166 Although no particular reason has been offered in the literature as to why Southern Rhodesia did not send any teams after 1923, pre-1923 rugby ties speak to extent to which Southern Rhodesia was connected to South Africa. It was not only a result of geography that the two countries co-operated in matters of sports. Both countries shared similar outlooks and given that many of Southern Rhodesia’s sport men came from or through South Africa, Southern Rhodesia naturally looked south for its sporting development.

3.10 African ties
The movement of peoples from south to north was not only undertaken by whites. Phimister and van Onselen note attempts to procure black labour from South Africa for Southern Rhodesian mines. One particular case was that of the Bonsor mine. Its management looked south to overcome labour shortage. By ‘October 1900, an attempt was made to procure labour from the Butterworth District in the Transkei. With the Rand gold mines closed during the South Africa War, it was hoped to recruit 500 workers for the

163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 J.D. Difford, The History of South African Rugby Football, 1875-1932 (Wynberg: The Speciality Press, 1933), 188.
166 Thompson, Story of Rhodesian Sport, 143-157. No clear reason is provided in the literature concerning Southern Rhodesia rugby teams not touring South Africa after 1923.
Bonsor mine. Only 300 were recruited’. 167 Furthermore, van Onselen has noted that ‘before 1903 the Rhodesian mines drew workers not only from central Africa but also from South Africa – particularly during the years of the South Africa War’. 168 The South African War in particular brought about disruption to mining operations on the Witwatersrand. Consequently, African miners from the ‘southern extremities of the regional economic system (the Transkei, Orange Free State, Bechuanaland and Basutoland) were even forced to seek cash in labour markets in the north and Rhodesia became for African mine workers temporarily the centre of the regional economic system’. 169

Regarding the flow of African labour from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa in the other sections, that is, this was long established. Africans from Southern Rhodesia took care both ‘before and after 1890, to seek out the most remunerative centres of employment. From 1870 and 1886 respectively these were recognized to be the Kimberley and Rand mines’. 170 After 1890, the southward flow greatly increased not least because of the imposition of taxes. In 1894

*The Rhodesia Herald* was of the opinion that ‘many of the [Matabeleland] natives having worked in the Transvaal and Kimberley mines are practised workmen and in Mashonaland district of Victoria most of the tax in 1895 was paid in gold earned on the Rand and at Kimberley. In subsequent years the higher wages of the south continued to attract “large number” of migrant labourers’. 171

An important dimension to African links between the two territories was the development of black political consciousness in Southern Rhodesia. Africans from South Africa played a part in this process. As briefly discussed in chapter one the presence of Africans from South Africa dates back to the arrival of the Pioneer Column. Rhodes had thought that African migrants from the Cape would be invaluable for the Colony and ‘took steps to bring up large numbers. The “Cape-boys” saw themselves as an integral part of the fabric of
colonialization. Many of them fought on the side of the whites during earlier wars, with an estimated 125 taking part in the defence of Bulawayo’.\textsuperscript{172}

Exchanges between the African “pioneers” from the south and their Southern Rhodesian counterparts were initially less than cordial. According to Winch, Southern Rhodesian Africans regarded this group of South African Africans as undesirable because of their ‘support of the white administration and their part in the suppression of the rebellions. Rhodesian Africans had no desire to absorb and be assimilated into white culture’.\textsuperscript{173} Tension and hostility between Africans from opposite sides of the Limpopo gradually dissipated to the point where Southern Rhodesia’s founding had shaped up differently in the 1920s, ‘the African voice in the country, dumb since the rebellions, began . . . to become audible. The earliest and most articulate came from Matabeleland, as one would expect, for the Ndebele aristocracy . . . pressed for a sort of Ndebele home rule within Matabeleland’.\textsuperscript{174} Other movements also began to appear at this time. In 1923 Abraham Twala, ‘an African from South Africa who migrated to Southern Rhodesia, formed in conjunction with a handful of educated Shona and Ndebele allies the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association (R.B.V.A.). It was modelled on the Association operating in the Cape’.\textsuperscript{175} This group as well as the Rhodesian Native Association (R.N.A.) were the two main organised political groups. Fundamentally, the R.N.A. was ‘led by an African petit bourgeoisie and sought to improve the material condition of the elitist class through participation and representation in the settler system’.\textsuperscript{176} Banana notes further that as Africans moved into the wage employment and the subsequent creation of a ‘semi-urban proletariat opened up a new forum for struggle, hence the struggles of the 1920s and Thirties. However, these anti-colonial struggles were non-revolutionary. The struggles of such groups as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association and the Rhodesian Native Association were essentially reformist in character’.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{172} Winch, ‘There Were a Fine Manly Lot of Fellows’, 588.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, 589.
\textsuperscript{174} Blake, History of Rhodesia, 196-197.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, 197.
The 1920s witnessed a new phase of anti-colonial struggle. In the lead up to the end of Company rule in Southern Rhodesia by 1923, Africans responded in a number of ways. Nyamanda petitioned for British control of the African areas and against either ‘Responsible Government or Union. The Mwari priest of Matonjeni cave sent orders to Africans in western Mashonaland to store grain and prepare for British and Boer hostilities, and a Watch Tower preacher told his audience in 1923, to prepare for the end of the world’. 178 Another group of the best educated and most articulate Africans in Southern Rhodesia concluded that 'it no longer made sense to petition the High Commissioner or the King. Power was in the hands of local whites, and in 1922, inaugurated a move away from the politics of protests and towards politics of participation'. 179

The settler state as well as the colonial capitalist system and the incongruities that emerged from this system produced a new “class” of Africans, a ‘semi-urban proletariat. By the outbreak of World War I, a system of labour migration to the South African mines was also producing a sizeable migrant proletariat. Above all, the educational systems and the church were responsible for the production of a tiny class of African petit bourgeoisie’. 180 These groups operated within the political and economic framework of the colonial system and they did not challenge the economic structures and its political suprastructures. The main emphasis of their struggle was the redress of specific grievances, ‘and an expression of the politics of compromise, accommodation and survival within a new political situation’. 181

The second half of the 1920s, however, saw the emergence of the something entirely new. The Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU), was at first closely connected to its South African parent body. Formed ‘through the inspiration of migrant proletarians, who had acquired organisational experience in South Africa’, 182 the ICU was established in Southern Rhodesia in 1927. During the 1920s, Ranger explains that, Southern Rhodesian African workers ‘seeking work increased. The African population became increasingly dependent upon wage labour to meet its cash needs. Wages had accounted for some 80 per

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179 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid, 41.
cent of Rhodesian African cash earnings by the end of the 1920s’. A steady decline in real wages from the 1920s severely affected workers in the urban centres who had to meet the ‘cost of food and rent out of their low wages. It was not surprising that Rhodesian African workers who had been to South Africa and aware of the operation of the ICU there should hope for an extension of its activities northwards’.183

Following an approach by the Southern Rhodesian workers, ‘organizer Robert Sambo was dispatched northwards by the leader of the South African ICU, Clements Kadalie. For five months Sambo operated clandestinely in and around Bulawayo. As early as March 1927 the union claimed 155 members and its ideas were spreading rapidly’.184 Sambo was from the same part of Nyasaland as Kadalie. He as a forceful speaker and was ‘concerned not only with urban wages and conditions but also with the treatment of rural wage labourers on European farms. Of all the African spokesmen in Southern Rhodesia in the 1920s he probably had the broadest conception of African political’.185

Another key figure that contributed to the establishment of the ICU in Southern Rhodesia was Charles Mzingeli. In the 1920s Mzingeli left Southern Rhodesia after completing his primary school education to work in South Africa as a ‘domestic servant and soon came under the influence of the trade unionist Clement Kadalie. Returning to Bulawayo, Mzingeli started a branch of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union and later transformed and led it as the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (RICU)’.186 Despite the bests efforts of Sambo and Mzingeli, the ICU came under threat from colonial authorities. Within a very short time of its establishment, the ICU was seen as posing a serious threat to ‘white labour and the settler colonial machinery as a whole. Measures were therefore taken to weaken the movement whereby the leadership was either imprisoned or detained. In the end the ICU became a weak and ineffectual movement’.187

183 Ranger, African Voice, 149-150.
184 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 158.
185 Ranger, African Voice, 151.
The influence of returning African migrants from South Africa spread to the churches. The church provided another platform for anti-colonial struggle during this period. Following the establishment of the Shiri Chena Church (the church of the white bird), independent churches started to develop during the 1920s, ‘through the initiative of returned labour migrants such as Samuel Mutendri, David Masuka, Andrea Shoko, from South Africa where the independent church spirit was really alive. These reformist started recruiting and mobilising popular support for the Zionist faith’.188 They were joined by Johanne Marange, who ‘started his African Apostolic Church in the 1930s. By the 1930s, Africans within the Church had joined their brethren in the political and economic sectors in the search for self-assertion, human dignity and the African personality’.189 Another religious entity to consider was the Church of the Watch Tower movement. It originated in Nyasaland and brought there by a

remarkable and embittered convert of the Scottish mission, Elliot Kamwana. Kamwana seized upon the predictions of millenarian upheaval, of the overthrow of the imperial powers, of the saving of the faithful remnant. His movement had taken roots and a number of his followers – Kenanites, went south to Southern Rhodesia in search of work . . . in Rhodesian mining compounds.190

Authorities in Southern Rhodesia were suspicious of the movement, fearing a connection between the Watch Tower and industrial action. At ‘Wankie for instance, the Manager was convinced in 1923 that the Watch Tower adherents were “using religion as a cloak to some extent for the purpose of Labour Organization which he had feared would lead to trouble’.191 The suspicions around the Watch Tower members on the mines eventually led to the deportation of the foreign Africans.

Conclusion
This chapter argues that an analysis of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations during the first decade of the Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia shows that the relationship was multi-dimensional and ever changing. Southern Rhodesia was established in 1890, underpinned by migration from South Africa. This set about the fostering of links

188 Ibid, 43.
189 Ibid.
190 Ranger, African Voice, 143.
191 Ibid, 146.
between the two countries, which continued throughout the first decade of Responsible Government. The strongest links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during this decade were economic ties and were administered through customs agreements. Southern Rhodesia entered into a customs agreement with South Africa in 1924 and 1930. Although custom ties continued to exist, Southern Rhodesia became less accommodating to South Africa and by 1933, requested the termination of the existing agreement in search of an equitable trading relationship. Underpinned by South Africa’s protectionist measures on Southern Rhodesian products, the inequitable trading relations became more pronounced under regional and global economic difficulties. As such, over the course of the decade Southern Rhodesia persisted for the renewal of the customs agreements. This particular dimension of the relationship illustrates the complex nature of relations between two countries. Understanding the significance of trade ties, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were careful to ensure that the pursuit of self-interest did not compromise the important economic relationship.

Further analysis of relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa showed that other bonds, in particular migration, education and sports tied together the two countries. Notable in the establishment of Southern Rhodesia in 1890 were the South African migrants. Subsequently, migrants from South Africa as well as Britain began trickle into Southern Rhodesia at the start of the twentieth century. As the flow of migrants continued in the 1920s and 1930s, two key aspects are well worth mentioning. Firstly, immigration to Southern Rhodesia was marked by a high turnover of migrants. This pattern of migration was largely shaped by the economic conditions in the country and the type of immigrant Southern Rhodesia considered suitable for settlement. Secondly, migration from the south was dominated by English-speaking South Africans. They considered Southern Rhodesia not only for economic reasons but also to escape the Afrikaner Nationalists in South Africa who were becoming increasingly hostile to Britain.

As migration flows persisted during the first decade of Responsible Government, social contacts between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were enhanced. Educational links brought about the enrolment of Southern Rhodesian students to South African universities. This received the support from the Southern Rhodesian government as well as host universities like Rhodes University by means of granting bursaries to Rhodesian students.
Sporting ties on the other hand were extremely close. In particular, rugby and cricket fostered close ties, as teams from both countries competed in the prestigious Currie Cup. With Southern Rhodesia’s rugby and cricket sporting bodies affiliated with those in South Africa, the two countries shared similar attitudes to sports. Although the numbers of cross-border fixtures were not many across both sporting codes during the first decade of Responsible Government, such ties enabled a number of Southern Rhodesians to represent South Africa on the international stage.

An important off-shoot of migration between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were African ties. As a result of the regional economic system, African ties between the two countries were underpinned by African labour migration. In particular, Southern Rhodesian Africans went south after 1890. Returning home, many of these migrants partook in anti-colonial struggles of the 1920s and 1930s, following similar practices experienced in South Africa. In fact, many anti-colonial movements in Southern Rhodesia during the period of Responsible Government were influenced, mirrored or started by South Africans.

This chapter illustrates that the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during the first decade of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia became ambiguous by the end of the decade. As will be shown in the next chapter, by analysing economic and political ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the thesis reinforces the abstruse nature of relations between the two countries.
Chapter Four

Customs Arrangements and Regional Implications, 1934-1939

Introduction
This chapter examines changes in Southern Rhodesia’s customs arrangements with South Africa between 1934 and 1939. It discusses domestic developments in both countries which contributed to the modification of the trading convention. The chapter also examines the implications of the customs arrangement for the region; in particular Central and East Africa. Southern Rhodesia’s aspirations in that period for a union of the Central African territories embodied the wish to build ‘an independent Central South African Dominion to check and counterbalance the parochial South African Union’.\(^1\) But despite Southern Rhodesia’s search for closer co-operation with its northern neighbours, it continued to enjoy close economic and political relations with South Africa. Customs agreements were the most important pillars upon which the relationship stood.

With the passage of time, the 1930 customs agreement was seen by Southern Rhodesia as too favourable to Pretoria. When it was signed, initial expectations ‘that the lack of any agreement would benefit the growth of Southern Rhodesian industry gave way to a recognition of the necessity of maintaining even limited access to the South African market in a period of world-wide decline in the demand and prices for the colony's exports’.\(^2\) The new agreement also showed the nature of economic relations between the two countries. The South African government managed to retain access to Southern Rhodesia’s markets, while restrictions were imposed on Southern Rhodesian products entering South Africa. This was the result of South African exerting its strength and there was very little Southern Rhodesia could do.

Under the agreement, Southern Rhodesian exports to South Africa, in particular beef, scrub cattle, and the lower grades of tobacco were ‘prohibited, while the higher grades of tobacco were limited to 2,400,000 lbs. a year. Southern Rhodesia’s increases on a selected group of South African imports (tobacco, spirits, and motor vehicles) were minimal, and duties were

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\(^1\) Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 194.

set at rates lower than those levied on British goods’.³ More than this, the South African government paid ‘duties on South African manufactures exported to Southern Rhodesia; in this manner the market price of South African manufactures was unaffected by tariff rates’.⁴ Martin notes that South Africa’s turn to protection and the ‘accelerated development of local industries seriously challenged these arrangements. There was not only a clear sense of growing divergence between the two states over tariff matters, but also a declining ability of Southern Rhodesia to control the pattern and revenues of commodity trade’.⁵

The desire to change the Customs Agreement gained momentum in Southern Rhodesia in the early 1930s. One supporter of such a proposal was the Salisbury Chamber of Industries. It proposed that the ‘time had arrived when they should be afforded some measure of protection against their more highly industrialised neighbours in the Union of South Africa, by imposing of tariffs on articles imported from the Union of South Africa’.⁶ The proposal by the Salisbury Chamber of Industries envisioned that a new agreement with South Africa would for the first time accommodate independent tariff control.

4.1 In pursuit of a new Customs Arrangement, 1934-1935

In the early 1930s, Southern Rhodesia was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression. Southern Rhodesia’s economy at this time was heavily reliant on primary production as it was a ‘primary producer of gold and other minerals, tobacco, maize, and cattle’.⁷ At a time of falling commodity prices, Southern Rhodesia’s economic difficulties were hugely aggravated by South Africa’s introduction of protectionist measures.

Like Southern Rhodesia, but on a larger scale, South Africa’s economic recovery at this time was underpinned by the rise in the price of gold. The price of gold rose ‘from £4 to £7 an ounce, resulting in economic prosperity returning to South Africa once it abandoned the gold standard. Secondary industry rapidly expanded. Important building projects were undertaken, unemployment fell’.⁸ South Africa’s revenue improved between 1933 and 1939 with ‘the annual value of gold sales between 1932 and 1939 rising from £50m to £99m, and

³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ NAZ, S679/15/4, Letter to the Minister of Finance, J.H. Smit from N. St. Quintin, President of the Salisbury Chamber of Industries, 9 November 1933.
⁷ Blake, History of Rhodesia, 222.
⁸ Kruger, Age of the Generals, 162-163.
since working costs remained roughly stable, large profits were made’.\(^9\) As a consequence, the country was able to invest heavily in developing its secondary industry, which in turn opened up prospects for South Africa to dominate regional markets even more so than in the recent past.

Yet, as noted above, the initiative to renegotiate trading agreements came from Salisbury not Pretoria. South Africa’s subsidised industries were a source of concern for Southern Rhodesian industries. As Huggins wrote to Hertzog, Southern Rhodesia needed ‘to protect certain industries against the competition of subsidised industries in the Union of South Africa’.\(^10\) The backdrop to Prime Minister’s Huggins proposal was that at the time, ‘Southern Rhodesia’s primary and secondary industries had been steadily developing, and owing to the similarity of the commodities produced by both territories, Rhodesian producers had suffered a great deal from competition from longer-established producers in the Union’\(^11\).

By 1934, the existing customs agreement was an important issue in both countries. Historically, Southern Rhodesia had always raised the unfavourable nature of customs agreements with South Africa and at every opportunity had proposed measures to amend every agreement it had with South Africa in order to reach more equitable trading arrangements. The overall state of trading relations goes a long way towards explaining Southern Rhodesia’s position and its desire to amend the convention. A close examination of the trade relationship between the two countries for the period 1923 to 1934 revealed that

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2.99\% \text{ of Union’s total exports of domestic produce had been exported to Southern Rhodesia, and of the Union’s imports only 0.96\% has been domestic produce of Southern Rhodesia. Over the same period, of total exports of domestic produce from Southern Rhodesia, 20.99\% has been exported to the Union, and of Southern Rhodesia’s total imports 18.6\% has been domestic produce of the Union of South Africa. The idea...}
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\(^11\) NASA, SAB, MES 14, CI 86, Union and Southern Rhodesia Trade Agreement Bill, Memorandum on the 1930 Customs Agreement between the Union and Southern Rhodesia, 24 July 1934.
appears to have grown that the present Agreement is far more favourable to the Union
than to Southern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{12}

This was partly a result of the fact that Southern Rhodesian products were and could be
produced in South Africa. One way of developing Southern Rhodesian production of these
goods was for Salisbury itself to adopt protectionist measures in order to reduce imports of
subsidised South Africa products, thereby helping the development of the domestic market
and secondary industries. But in order for this approach to succeed, which was proposed by
the Salisbury Chamber of Industries, a new customs arrangement was required. Another
important aspect of the customs agreement, which contributed to Southern Rhodesia’s
dissatisfaction with the existing convention was the payment made by the South African
government to the Rhodesian government. The Association of Chambers of Commerce of
South Africa at this time, stated that payment by the South African Treasury on 12% and 6%
on South African production and manufacture under the 1930 agreement ‘cannot be
justified, and in so far as these payments are detrimental to the interests of the Rhodesias,
the Committee is of the opinion that the objection raised by the Rhodesia representatives is
well founded’.\textsuperscript{13}

The payments made by South Africa to the Rhodesias under the 1930 Agreement were
rejected at the Rhodesias-Union Customs Conference in Bulawayo in 1934 because the
payments were seen as representing less than ‘would accrue on similar goods imported from
overseas at the Rhodesian Customs Duty levied on the domestic value in the country of
export’.\textsuperscript{14} Southern Rhodesia also objected to the ‘Union manufacturers quoting lower
prices for exports to Rhodesia that was current for consumption in the Union, prejudicial to
any small manufacturers in Rhodesia’.\textsuperscript{15} Southern Rhodesia also objected to the payment
made by the South Africa Treasury, which it claimed ‘should be paid by Union exporters’.\textsuperscript{16}

The dumping of South African goods and subsidised products in Southern Rhodesia
hindered economic progress north of the Limpopo.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} NASA, SAB, MES 14, CI 86, Union and Southern Rhodesia Trade Agreement Bill, Association of Chambers of
Commerce of South Africa. Customs Conference with the Rhodesias, Memorandum for Submission to the
Minister of the Union, 20 December 1934.
\textsuperscript{14} NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol.1, Southern Rhodesia – Union of South Africa Commercial Agreement and
Relations, Union-Rhodesias Conference, Bulawayo, 16 August 1934.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Events in Europe also prompted Southern Rhodesia to look more closely at the development of its industries. The First World War had made it clear to Southern Rhodesians that they were heavily dependent on overseas goods. This state of affairs ‘was to a great extent responsible for what may be termed the foundation of secondary industries in Southern Rhodesia and not because the Union of South Africa remained on gold whilst Rhodesia was on sterling, as often stated in the south’.\(^{17}\) But whatever the reasons for the growth of its own secondary industries, Southern Rhodesia now sought a new customs agreement with South Africa. In preparation for the Customs Conference with South Africa, the matter was discussed and resolutions were taken at the first congress of the ruling United Party. The Congress proposed that ‘no agreement with the Union of South Africa can be satisfactory to this Colony which does not provide for duties leviable on Union goods being collected here by our own Customs. It seemed essential that Rhodesia should collect her own customs and be in charge of her own fiscal affairs’.\(^{18}\) The need for Southern Rhodesia to control her own tariffs was explained by Southern Rhodesia’s Minister of Finance, J.H. Smit, who stated that

> at the present time Southern Rhodesia was exporting the great part of her products not to the Union but to other parts of the Empire, and unless she was able to give these parts of the Empire greater preference, she would eventually find markets for her goods restricted. It would, therefore, be necessary for Rhodesia to be in a position to frame her own tariffs and preferences instead of being bound by an agreement with Union as at present.\(^{19}\)

The imperial direction already taken by Southern Rhodesia had been influenced by the Ottawa Conference of 1932, where Britain had sought to ensure that tariffs in each part of the Empire were attuned so as ‘(a) to give all Empire producers or manufacturers advantage over foreign so far as possible admitting products free when non-competitive with domestic products, (b) to provide in respect of competitive products equality of competition as between domestic producers or manufacturers and those of the rest of the Empire’.\(^{20}\) One of the agreements reached at Ottawa was ‘Britain’s promise to continue the preferences already established and to extend then to other commodities – including minerals, wheat

\(^{17}\) New Rhodesia, 28 September 1934.
\(^{18}\) Rand Daily Mail, 16 December 1934.
\(^{19}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 188.
and meat products – in return for an enlargement of dominion preferences, some by lowering tariffs on British goods, and some by raising levy on foreign goods’. 21 The prospects of diversified trading partners within the Empire consequently improved for Southern Rhodesia. 22 Martin notes that Southern Rhodesia used these circumstances to define the Rhodesian market as a ‘bargaining lever to open overseas markets to Southern Rhodesian exports. While this created some space for Southern Rhodesian manufacturers to expand, it was clear that the protection of primary producers was uppermost in the government’s calculations. Pressed too far by the South Africans, Southern Rhodesia retreated into the Empire’. 23

Although Southern Rhodesia wanted to control her own tariff, which essentially would end the principle of uniform tariffs between the two countries, South Africa remained a key market for Southern Rhodesian industries, particularly for its cattle and tobacco. Any efforts at establishing a new commercial agreement therefore had to recognise the importance of the South African market for these products despite existing barriers. Because Southern Rhodesia saw South Africa as a very important market, the conditions imposed by South Africa on imported Southern Rhodesian cattle were accepted as necessary. The Minister of Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia explained that in order to ‘improve its herds, and also if low grade cattle in large quantities were allowed in the Union from Rhodesia, it would mean a falling in price, and would lead to it being a non-profitable market eventually. At present it is a good market and the only export market for beef’. 24 Additionally, Southern Rhodesia was subjected to a weekly quota. The weight imposed on Rhodesian cattle for export to South Africa was a ‘minimum of 1050lbs. live weight and in the absence of any restrictions owing to the Foot and Mouth Disease, the fixing quota of 500 head per week to the Johannesburg market would satisfy Rhodesian interests’. 25 Dependent on selling cattle to South Africa, Salisbury revealed that any new trade agreement would have to maintain this arrangement or its equivalent.

21 Olson and Shadle, Historical Dictionary of European Imperialism, 298.
22 See Bate, Report from the Rhodesias.
23 Martin, ‘Region Formation under Crisis Condition’, 123.
24 NAZ, S679/15/4, Letter from Minister of Agriculture to Minister of Finance and Commerce, Customs Agreement with South Africa, 4 December 1934.
25 NASA, SAB, BTS, 10/1/37, Vol.1, Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, Customs Conference with the Rhodesias, Memorandum for Submission to the Minister of the Union, 20 December 1934.
Once again, the nature of Southern Rhodesia-South African economic relations showed South Africa’s strength. Southern Rhodesia acknowledged that it had to accept the conditions laid down by South African authorities. The Southern Rhodesian Minister of Agriculture explained that

our agricultural industry depends to a very great extent, anyway at the present time, on the Union markets, and however we look at a new Customs agreement with the Union Government it is of first importance that our agricultural export be continued. If by any new agreement we lose these markets, it would have a very bad effect on the agricultural industry of this country generally.26

So important were these industries to Southern Rhodesia that it was willing to concede that if South Africa opened its markets without reservation to ‘Rhodesian cattle and tobacco, except as regards the minimum weight of the former, they felt sure Rhodesia would agree to the terms of a Convention providing for the free interchange of all products and manufactures – in other words, free trade’.27

Although Rhodesians wanted to foster the development of its secondary industrial sector was understood, South African industries hoped that any new Agreement would still provide opportunities in Southern Rhodesia. The possibility existed for South African manufactures to open up plants in Southern Rhodesia.

This policy had already been adopted by certain Union industries, but whether it will be possible to do this on an extended scale will depend on a variety of circumstances. The determining factors will be the consuming capacity of the Rhodesian market, as well as the inclination of the Rhodesian Government towards large and widespread preferences on British goods, and its decision to protect Rhodesian industries equally against the competition of similar British and Union products.28

The bottom line for South African industries was that in any new Agreement, access to the Southern Rhodesian market should be maintained. Although South African factories wanted access to the Southern Rhodesian market, recognition was given to Southern Rhodesia’s

26 NAZ, S679/15/4, Letter from Minister of Agriculture to Minister of Finance and Commerce, Customs Agreement with South Africa, 4 December 1934.
27 NASA, SAB, MES 14, CI 86, Union and Southern Rhodesia Trade Agreement Bill, Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa. Customs Conference with the Rhodesias, Memorandum for Submission to the Minister of the Union, 20 December 1934.
28 Industrial and Commercial South Africa and Storekeepers’ Review, January 1934.
objective of developing its secondary industries and improving its trade balance with South Africa. The nature of the trade imbalance between the two countries was one of the main factors, prompting Southern Rhodesia to search for a new Customs Convention. At the same time, though, industries in South Africa understood very well that securing the right to control its own tariff ‘as a means of encouraging the export of her primary products outside of Africa was to be the true basis of the economic policy of Southern Rhodesia’.29

In January 1935 the two Governments met in Cape Town. Both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had to contend with the fact that they were exporters of primary produce, always sought to encourage the growth of their own local industries, and both countries considered the market of the other as very important. Southern Rhodesia’s unhappiness with the quotas imposed by South Africa influenced her views of the existing customs agreement. South African officials anticipated that Southern Rhodesia would ‘press its claim to the fullest extent. It was expected that Rhodesia will demand the free entry of cattle to the Rand market, and if that is refused a quota likely to be insisted upon at least twice as large as the Union seems at the moment disposed to concede’.30 Similar efforts were expected concerning Southern Rhodesian tobacco. Pretoria’s position was that South Africa ought to privilege local producers first, and could accept primary products from Southern Rhodesia if they did not ‘compete with Union’s own producers. The Union’s production and consumption should, therefore, be determined and in so far as the Union’s supplies fall short of consumption that share of the market would be placed at the disposal of Southern Rhodesian producers’.31 This level of protection for South African producers was not encouraging for Southern Rhodesian exports to South Africa.

The South African government was urged to open markets to Southern Rhodesian exports when these did not compete with South African products. The two Rhodesias, on the other hand put forward a joint proposal ‘that their tobacco quotas should be increased. Union tobacco growers on the other hand have been pressing for the complete prohibition of

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29 Ibid, January 1935.
30 Rand Daily Mail, 17 January 1935.
31 NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol.1, Report on the Meeting Between Captain Harris and Members of the Rhodesian Delegation and Colonel Reitz and Members of the Agricultural Department, 30 January 1935.
duty-free imports of tobacco from the Rhodesias’. The need to find a compromise on this matter was one of the most important issues at the Customs Conference.

The Customs Agreement was also debated at the South African parliament. South African Minister of Finance had presented to the House how the two countries would trade under a new Agreement. It was stated that the two Governments were free to control their own tariffs for goods that were imported into their respective countries. Customs ports of entry were to be created and the agreement provided for a significant share of the trade between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in the future to be free from payment of customs duty.

‘I want to point out that the position at the moment is that we in the Union have a fairly important trade with the neighbouring states, a trade in a large number of our manufactures and also a trade in imported goods which are sent from here to Rhodesia from open stocks’.

The Minister went on to state that in dealing with the balance of trade, provision was made to receive very important preference in connection with manufactures that ‘we export, and also certain preferences in respect of goods from open stocks. We have preferences on articles which may be imported from Rhodesia. The two chief articles, which Southern Rhodesia is anxious to export to the Union and which compete with our articles are cattle and tobacco’. In an effort to protect the two industries from Southern Rhodesian competition South Africa introduced restrictions. The Minister of Finance justified the introduction of these restrictions by suggesting that the existing market was ‘too small for our own cattle and the home market is therefore not the solution of the question. We think that the two Governments can quite well co-operate to develop an overseas market for our beef and have undertaken to give Rhodesia all possible assistance in exporting its beef overseas’. A combined effort in search of overseas markets for South African and Southern Rhodesian beef was supported by the Minister through a proposal to offer Southern Rhodesia a 50% per cent reduction in railway rates for cattle to be exported abroad. Regarding tobacco, the Minister’s position was that the existing arrangement was to ‘continue for the present year. But from 1936 the legislation which is being passed in

32 NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol.1, Notes of Adjourned Meeting Held in the Council Chamber City Hall, Cape Town, 29 January 1935.
34 Ibid.
connection with a board of control over the tobacco industry will operate and the board of control will have the right to lay down what quantity tobacco can be imported into the Union after 1935'. 36

The Minister was challenged by the members of parliament. Criticism was directed at the Minister for not pressing far enough in seeking significant restrictions on Southern Rhodesian cattle. Dr. N.J. van der Merwe expressed that the cattle position in South Africa enjoyed a surplus. The country was said to be in difficulties with regard to cattle from South-West Africa. ‘It is difficult for us to say that South-West Africa may not export to us. Then there is also the supply from Basutoland and the Government should have made Southern Rhodesia understand that our country is so over-supplied that Southern Rhodesia ought to make different arrangements with regard to cattle’. 37

Another member of the House commented on the two industries under the new Agreement. Mr. Le Roux stated that ‘Rhodesia cannot blame us for saying that we should protect the farmers of Union. This applies principally to tobacco because Rhodesia has a better market for its tobacco abroad than we have. Rhodesia has already developed a market for her tobacco in England’. 38 A further remark was made by the member concerning cattle. Southern Rhodesia was said to have enjoyed as a consequence of special arrangements a low railway rates on cattle,

which is carried over South African railways for export and were in a better position than the Union. Cattle farmers in Rhodesia were in a better position than the farmers of the Union. Land is cheaper there and is more suited to cattle farming. Accordingly, the Rhodesia cattle farmer can sell his cattle better than the farmer of Union. 39

In light of this, the member agreed with Dr. N.J. van der Merwe that the South African Government should have requested further restrictions than what the agreement provides. The new Agreement proved to be a contentious matter in both countries however, the passing of the Agreement in each country speaks to the importance of each market to the other country.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, Col. 3670.
38 Ibid, Col. 3679.
39 Ibid.
4.2 Departing the Customs Union: The 1935 Agreement

A new agreement between Salisbury and Pretoria was reached in February 1935. It marked a significant shift from previous agreements. Chanock states that ‘the customs union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa disappeared and Southern Rhodesia’s future now involved the building of her own industrial sector, and the most obvious market, with the south sealed off behind new tariffs, was the north’. The agreement, which came to full operation on April 1, 1935, was a Trade Agreement rather than a customs union. The 1935 Agreement ‘did not provide for a common tariff and each side undertook to admit products from the rates applicable to similar goods from the United Kingdom subject to preferential rebate of 20% but with exceptions’. The break from the principle of a common tariff had wider implications. It was said that ‘Rhodesians of this generation have made up their minds that it would not be in the interests of the territory to join forces politically with the United South Africa, but at least it could be said that the door was left open while free interchange of products took place’. The new Agreement made the former prospect unlikely and the pendulum had swung against union in both countries. The new barriers to commercial ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa disappointed those who understood that the two neighbouring countries ‘worked in the same world orbit, owe allegiance to the same political ideals, linked by innumerable commercial and social ties, and speaking the same language, when every consideration of common sense urges that the existing barriers should be broken down’. The new tariff arrangement could no longer disguise the fact that ‘henceforth the Union and Rhodesia will move on divergent courses. A tariff, no matter how favourably adjusted at first by a treaty, creates new vested interests, more log-rolling, and fresh sources of irritation’.

The new Trade Agreement, Prime Minister Huggins, was quick to point out, gave Rhodesia the free and unfettered right to alter its ‘own tariff exactly as we like with one reservation, that every time we fix a United Kingdom rate there is a ration rate for the Union, but only so far as it affects the United Kingdom rate purely and simply for the purpose of protecting the

40 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 217.
41 NASA SAB, HEN 3935, 710/8, Trade with Rhodesia, ‘Historical Review of Customs Union and Trade Agreement between the Union of South Africa and the Rhodesias’, 4 February 1955.
42 Cape Argus, 7 February 1935.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
consumer in this Colony’. 45 It also allowed Southern Rhodesia to offer favourable trade terms to the United Kingdom and the Empire, while significantly widening the range of its trading partners. ‘I wished for the best terms with South Africa’, concluded Huggins. Although ‘nobody regrets this break from the Union more than I do on sentimental grounds, on business grounds I am perfectly satisfied that this is the finest thing that ever happened to Southern Rhodesia’. 46

The 1935 trade agreement provided Southern Rhodesia with considerable tariff autonomy. Southern Rhodesia’s agricultural products however, experienced severe restrictions. As previously tobacco and cattle suffered grievously. Southern Rhodesian cattle were subject to an ‘import quota into the Union of 5,200 head per annum. Cattle may be substituted a proportionate quantity of chilled beef on a permit from the Livestock and Meat Industries Control Board who also regulated the distribution of cattle and chilled beef to areas in the Union’. 47 As far as the tobacco industry was concerned, the market for

2,000,000lbs of tobacco was regarded as reasonably assured. Under the new agreement the market was preserved definitely for one more year. Thereafter the quantity which was to be allowed into the Union would be dependent upon the decision of joint board composed of Union growers, manufactures and Government official. 48

It was suggested at the Budget Debate in the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia by Donald Macintyre, M.P. for Bulawayo

that secondary industries are not only necessary for the country generally but necessary for the farming industry. The hon. the Prime Minister shows that he is of the same opinion when he stated: I think we here have to be self-contained and self-sufficient as possible. Any country that is not prepared to get down to it, and see how they can keep as much of their national wealth at home as possible, and spend it in the family and generally take in one another’s washing is going under. 49

In an effort to retain as much wealth as it could, Southern Rhodesia resolved to support its industries, and therefore reduce its dependence on foreign imports.

45 Cape Times, 1 March 1935.  
46 Ibid.  
48 Countryside, February 1935.  
49 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 16 April 1935, cols. 989-990.
During a Legislative Assembly debate on the Trade Agreement, the Minister of Finance and Commerce emphasized that out of this Agreement ‘I foresee that we will gradually develop agreements with other parts of the Empire, and perhaps, in future, also with foreign countries. We believe also that the result of this Trade Agreement will undoubtedly mean the development of secondary industries’.

In addition the Minister thought that South Africa had to be more careful about what treatment is meted out to trade from this country to the Union, because the Agreement is only for a term of two years, if it is found at the end of two years that the Union of South Africa offers no market for our products, there will be no necessity whatsoever to give the Union of South Africa any reduction on British tariffs.

The opposition however felt that the agreement did not go far enough to ensure that Southern Rhodesia had full control over its economic development. Opposition M.P.’s were less positive, arguing that we have not secured unhampered control of our tariffs. We are unable to frame our own tariffs in such a way as to secure the establishment of secondary industries in the country. The concession given to the Union has entailed the surrender of revenue, which has to be found by the taxpayer of the country, and the return we get is not consummate in any way with what we have given.

What these exchanges to speak is Southern Rhodesia’s growing dissatisfaction over its trade relations with South Africa. Despite enjoying a measure of tariff autonomy under the new agreement, Southern Rhodesia still felt that its economic development was circumscribed by South African restrictions imposed on Southern Rhodesian products entering South Africa.

The duration of the Agreement was for an initial period of two years after which it was open to modification. Accordingly, in 1937 the Legislative Assembly was informed by the Minister of Finance and Commerce, ‘to revise the position which followed the alteration, two years ago, for our Customs arrangements with the Union of South Africa. The benefits derived from the Trade Agreement are more material to the population than to direct Government

\[50\] Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 29 April 1935, col. 1352.
\[51\] Ibid.
\[52\] Ibid. col. 1358.
finance’.53 The new Trade Agreement, explained the Minister, meant that, Southern Rhodesia ‘was at liberty to make arrangements with other dominions. Under the new agreement some protection is afforded to the British industrialist, and the progressive replacement of United Kingdom product by Union manufactures has been retarded’.54 The new Trade Agreement was associated with better protection for Southern Rhodesian industries and preferential treatment for United Kingdom goods. This may speak to an increasing effort to shift away from close political and economic relations with South Africa and at the same time look to establish closer trading ties with the United Kingdom and the Empire.

Over time an old problem re-emerged. Trade continued to bedevil Southern Rhodesian-South African relations. The 1935 trade agreement redefined problems without settling anything. South Africa acknowledged that the agreement had fostered Southern Rhodesian secondary industries, which, ‘for their development must necessarily encroach on the field of trading which the Union, by virtue of proximity should regard as its own. Our secondary industries in the Union are, moreover, manufacturing in such a way that prices are much higher than they should be’.55 Despite this recognition, however, South Africa secured at Cape Town in 1939 an agreement that had the result of privileging and safeguarding the interests of the farmers above those of its manufacturers and the growth of their market, refusing to ease ‘restrictions on the entry of Southern Rhodesian tobacco. Stanley, the Southern Rhodesian Governor, reported, “the effect of the Cape Town negotiations on the minds of my ministers has been to render any policy of closer political union with the South even less attractive to them than it was before”’.56

Precisely because barriers continued to be placed on Southern Rhodesian cattle and tobacco, it encouraged Salisbury to turn away from Pretoria whenever possible. Only the booming threat of war obliged Southern Rhodesia to co-operate with South Africa in the interest of the region and the Commonwealth. South Africa remained the most important partner and factor to Southern Rhodesian interests in the region at this time, and any

53 *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 23 March 1937, col. 481.
54 Ibid, col. 482.
55 NASA, Smuts Papers, Vol. 131, No. 1-95, Union of South Africa, June – October 1939, Memorandum on Trade Relations Between Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, 1 June 1939.
56 Chanock, *Unconsummated Union*, 221.
thoughts of political and economic realignment with Central Africa had to accept the reality that South Africa and its relationship was key if not the overriding consideration.

4.3 Southern Rhodesia and the turn to the North
As previously noted, Southern Rhodesia’s desire for a closer relationship with its northern neighbours stemmed partly from the increasingly unfavourable trade relationship it experienced with South Africa. In addition, an ideological rift emerged between South Africa, Britain and British Africa. This position was strengthened in 1934 when the South African parliament passed the Statute of the Union Act, which used the Statute of Westminster to confirm South African independence, and in particular the right to construct its own foreign policy.57

Although the new Trade Agreement with South Africa accorded Southern Rhodesia tariff autonomy, the perception in Salisbury was that its primary exports to South Africa were slowly being frozen out under the new agreement. In fact, Southern Rhodesia believed that ‘the Union was determined to freeze Rhodesian primary products out of their markets as rapidly as possible, and once they had decided upon that policy neither the old convention nor the agreement would materially alter the rate at which this policy would be carried out’.58 The immediate response by Southern Rhodesia was to broaden its trading partners, and minimise its dependence on South African markets for cattle and tobacco.

Northern Rhodesia was the most obvious market for Southern Rhodesian goods after South Africa, as trade between the two Rhodesias had given Southern Rhodesia a favourable trade advantage. This advantage was in part derived from the fact that ‘Northern Rhodesia was highly dependent upon Southern Rhodesia for overseas goods because of a lack of protection and wholesale enterprise’.59 The restrictive terms of the 1935 Trade Agreement hastened Southern Rhodesia’s shift to the north where it already enjoyed a position of strength. In fact, as Kanduza has noted, ‘the restrictions in South African markets forced Southern Rhodesian exports north of the Zambezi. This traffic justified the railways’ case for lower rates in order to retain the traffic. Southern Rhodesia fully supported the railways

58 Countryside, February 1935.
59 Kanduza, Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 147.
strategy’. The political ramification of the trade agreement was certainly one factor behind Southern Rhodesia’s push for amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia. The urgency with which Southern Rhodesia called for amalgamation in 1935 was partly precipitated by South Africa lifting its ban on the recruitment of foreign Africans, thereby beginning to compete with Southern Rhodesia for Nyasaland labour. It also imposed an unfavourable tariff. Accordingly, Huggins suggested a loose federation, which would strengthen the Southern Rhodesian economy and bolster the British position in Central Africa’. ‘The main thing was to find a bigger market for Southern Rhodesian ‘manufactured products, for even the combined outlets of the two Rhodesias only stood on the borderline of forming profitable proportions for industrialists’.62

According to Chanock, settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia resuscitated their demands for amalgamation during the 1930s. A ‘scheme to divide the British central Africa to white and African territories was proposed. In the south and in the railway belt, white interests would be paramount and white development in Southern Rhodesia would be freed from the embarrassing necessity to consider African interests’. Both Southern and Northern Rhodesia had by the early 1930s given the idea of amalgamation serious consideration. By 1933, came ‘renewed demands from northern settlers. The settler government in the south pressed confidently forward during the 1930s with its plans for an extension of its responsibilities to the north’. As a result, Southern Rhodesia’s tilt to the north intensified, consolidating where it could its trading arrangements. As the most developed economy north of the Limpopo, Southern Rhodesia could look forward to enjoying a position of privilege in the region.

In the context of South Africa’s political detachment from Britain, and the 1935 Trade Agreement between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, ‘in May of 1936, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly passed a resolution asking for an early amalgamation of the two Rhodesias under a constitution conferring the right of self-government’. Apart from the South African factor, Northern Rhodesia’s Copperbelt was a significant motive and

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60 Ibid.
61 Wood, Welensky Papers, 55.
62 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, 116-117.
63 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 216.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, 217.
‘became more important over the years. A co-ordinated railways system, customs union, improved administration, a vague sense of the advantages of the larger scale in every field of commercial and governmental activity – all had been for many years part of the argument’. 66

Support for amalgamation came from settlers on both sides of the Zambezi. Developments in South Africa, including the accessing of African labour from Central Africa, trade restrictions on Rhodesian goods and ideological differences with Britain all contributed to Southern Rhodesia’s northwards orientation. Although Southern Rhodesia sought to diversify its trading partners, the unequal nature of its relationship with South Africa was once again revealed by the question of African labour recruitment from Central Africa by South Africa. Southern Rhodesia itself relied heavily on African labour north of the Zambezi for its agriculture and mining. According to Gann ‘80 per cent of the “native” labourers on Southern Rhodesian farms came from Nyasaland, and this in fact alone emphasized the need for a common economic policy’. 67 Thus Southern Rhodesia ‘acquired an additional incentive to safeguard their position in the North’. 68

Amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia also looked increasingly attractive from the perspective of Defence. In the light of both disturbances on the Copperbelt and Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Southern Rhodesia reviewed its own defences, the major concern for the territory was ‘the extent to which the British government would involve the central African territories in a defence system dominated and controlled by the Union’. 69 There was also the situation in Portuguese East Africa. A major concern for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was the vulnerability of the

Portuguese ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques. In addition both countries opposed the training of African troops. The Union government had always objected to the creation of black armies in Africa. In Southern Rhodesia’s case this was the reason for pressing for early amalgamation with the north. As Huggins wrote in 1936, there was

66 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 223. See also, Wood, Welensky Papers.
68 Ibid.
69 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 207.
allowed in the north something which “is foreign to our policy and foreign to the policy of the Union, and that is the training of native troops”.  

Southern Rhodesia thought that amalgamation might change Britain’s thinking about defence arrangements in Central Africa. Indeed, the general position eventually taken by the Overseas Defence Committee was that Britain relied in essence ‘upon Southern Rhodesia for internal security and upon the Union in the case of a general war. The internal defence of British central Africa would be built upon the whites of Southern Rhodesia, while the base upon which external defence would be built was to be in the Union’. In this instance, the imperial hand shaped Southern Rhodesian and South African defence arrangements in the region.

There was further attraction of greater political autonomy for settlers across the Zambezi. In Northern Rhodesia, settler support for amalgamation was motivated primarily but not exclusively on ‘the prospect of speedy emancipation from the Colonial Office control’. Northern Rhodesian settlers, ‘angered by an earlier Imperial statement advocating “paramountcy of native interests” in colonial Africa, solidly stood out for closer association with the south’. The northern settlers sought to reduce Colonial Office control over their affairs, and amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia was seen as a step towards this goal because Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory with better prospects for the white man.

Africans in both territories were unanimous in their opposition to the proposal. They disliked ‘some of the native policy of Southern Rhodesia, and the anxiety of the “natives” in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland lest there should be any change in the system under which they regard themselves as enjoying the direct protection of Your Majesty’s, were factors which could not be ignored’. Given the combined population of Africans in the three territories, their interests could not be ignored by the Colonial Office. The position of the Colonial Office was influenced both by African opposition to amalgamation, as well as by a handful of the few whites. Whites who supported Africans in this regard consisted of ‘the

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70 Ibid. 208.
71 Ibid. 209.
73 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, 118.
74 Windrich, Rhodesian Problem, 22.
clergy, the missionaries and the academic in Africa, and Britain. Their misgivings influenced the imperial Government to some extent, and reinforced the prevailing attitude of the Colonial Office’.75

While the Colonial Office deemed it part of its responsibility to protect African interests, the argument for closer association remained compelling for the Imperial Government and the settler populations in the three territories. The case was made for a strong British influence to ‘counterbalance South Africa already moving towards Apartheid, and more disturbingly towards neutrality in the event of war with Germany. Southern Rhodesia was also regarded with some justice as providing better social services for Africans in the central African region, whatever the defects of its segregatory policies’.76 What these developments suggest is that Southern Rhodesia’s political tilt to the north reflected the diminishing prospects of a ‘Greater South Africa’.

An added dimension to closer co-operation between the Central African territories was London’s entertainment of Huggins scheme of ‘dividing British central Africa into white and African territories’, Chanock explains. Furthermore, the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly passed a resolution requesting the early amalgamation of the ‘two Rhodesias under a constitution conferring the right self-government. In 1937 the Southern Rhodesian Government produced plans for a “native policy”. Councils would be advanced . . . and the admission of more African voters to the voters roll would be stopped – an approximation to the Hertzog policy’.77

Although Britain initially was not wholly negative towards Huggins proposal, the government eventually rejected Southern Rhodesia’s amalgamation plan. According to Chanock, initially Southern Rhodesia was told that

it would be politically impossible from the parliament point of view, but it was agreed that there should be an enquiry into closer co-operation between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, on the strict understanding that Britain would not relinquish control.

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75 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 225.
76 Ibid.
77 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 216-217.
over the “native policies” of the northern territories nor its reserve powers in the south.\textsuperscript{78}

After much discussion, Huggins succeeded in getting the British Government to offer to send out a Commission to investigate the matter.

The whole matter of amalgamation was now investigated by the Bledisloe Commission of Inquiry, appointed in 1937. Its task was ‘to report whether any, and if so what, form of closer co-operation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible’.\textsuperscript{79} The Commission reported its findings in 1939. While acknowledging the need for co-operation between all three territories, the Commission rejected federation out of hand as it was ‘rendered unworkable by the wide disparity in the constitutional and economic development of the territories’.\textsuperscript{80} But even the Commission’s limited support for amalgamation, so strongly advocated by Southern Rhodesia, dealt a blow to Salisbury’s Central African ambitions. The ‘major barrier to amalgamation, concluded the Report, was the segregationists racial policy of the Southern Rhodesian government. On the other hand, the Commission recommended immediate amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland’.\textsuperscript{81}

With the option of northern amalgamation closed off at least for the foreseeable future, Southern Rhodesia’s desire to become less dependent on South Africa was increasingly influenced by factors beyond its control. Tensions in Europe in 1938 brought the looming prospect of war. If Britain went to war, Southern Rhodesia, as a colony would automatically follow. South Africa’s position, however, was different. After the Statute of the Union Act of 1934, she conducted her own foreign policy and in 1938, Pretoria’s was one policy of neutrality. South Africa’s stance at this time was shaped by the centenary celebrations commemorating the Great Trek. For Kruger, the celebrations marked the history of the Afrikaner, by linking the ‘past with the present and that past included not only the desperate struggle against the “natives” but against British imperialism’.\textsuperscript{82} When Britain and France declared war on Germany in September 1939, Hertzog’s position concerning South

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, 218.


\textsuperscript{80} Wood, Welensky Papers, 59.


\textsuperscript{82} Kruger, Age of the Generals, 184.
Africa’s involvement was that “South Africa was not concerned in the matter and Britain was at war because of her position as a European power”. After a heated parliamentary debate whether or not South Africa should remain neutral, Smuts and his supporters carried the vote ‘by a majority of 80 to 67’.

Soon after South Africa’s formal entry into the war, talks were held between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia on the general situation and military preparations by South Africa and all British territories south of the Equator. Present at the talks were Smuts, and, Huggins along with their respective military leadership. The primary task of the conference explained Smuts ‘was designed to show “how our minds were working” in regard to the military problems confronting Southern Africa’. The Southern Rhodesian Minister of Defence, R.C. Tredgold, ‘explained that Southern Rhodesia would be able to undertake its own air training’. It was noted so far as Kenya was concerned, ‘understanding with the R.A.F was necessary. Tredgold claimed that Southern Rhodesia was sending one air and ground survey and could send another. The Chief of the General Staff of the Union’s Defence Forces said that once aircraft were available, a coastal reconnaissance would be established’.

Overall, Southern Rhodesia’s turn to the north clearly shows the failure of the trade agreements in resolving the economic differences between the Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Relations were competitive, especially on the issue of labour. Competition for labour influenced Southern Rhodesia’s search for alignment with the north. In September 1936, South Africa informed the northern territories that it was lifting the ban on the recruitment of labour in Central Africa. The ‘northern territories were conscious that, if they resisted the Union’s labour demands, they were not in a position to stop the voluntary flow of labour southwards, where pay was higher, without the co-operation of the Union government’. There was very little that Southern Rhodesia or Northern Rhodesia could do. They gradually acquiesced to Pretoria’s demands. Underlying this is South Africa’s larger economy and its dominance in the region. Though Southern Rhodesia sought closer

83 Ibid, 189.
84 Ibid, 191.
86 Ibid.
87 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 220.
association with the northern territories, it could not escape the shadow of South Africa. All of this demonstrates that Southern Rhodesia was the junior partner in its relationship with South Africa. South Africa’s larger economy put it in a powerful position and with the outbreak of the war, as discussed in the next chapter; Southern Rhodesia looked south for its security and supplies.

Conclusion
This chapter sought to account for the changes in Southern Rhodesia’s customs agreement with South Africa. It has also examined the implications of the customs agreements for the region. The chapter has shown that by 1935, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa reached a new agreement. It was significant in that for the first time in Salisbury and Pretoria economic relations, the customs union was terminated. Economic ties were now to be administered through a Trade Agreement. Southern Rhodesia’s dissatisfaction with the 1930 customs agreement initiated talks that ultimately produced the trade agreement. Under the new convention, the principle of a common tariff was abandoned. With greater tariff autonomy, Southern Rhodesia sought for greater protection for its industries. Though the 1935 agreement ensured the continued economic ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, over time, an old problem persisted. Southern Rhodesian products experienced severe restrictions under the new agreement raising questions of its fairness. Despite acknowledgement that the agreement did not settle anything, a new agreement was established in 1939 under the looming threat of war.

Although a trade agreement was in place, Southern Rhodesia continued to search for other markets for its products. Finding new markets within the British Empire improved after the Ottawa conference of 1932. More importantly for Southern Rhodesian producers, Northern Rhodesia provided greater opportunities. By identifying Northern Rhodesia as an important market, Southern Rhodesia pressed for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. Underlined by economic objectives, a desire to be less dependent on South Africa, economically and politically and later it concerned the threat to regional security, Southern Rhodesia thought amalgamation would place it in a position of privilege within the region. Although amalgamation of the Central African territories did not come to realisation, Southern Rhodesia sought to be autonomous, though it shared close ties with South Africa.
This chapter shows Southern Rhodesia’s tilt to the north was largely influenced by divergent views on economic matters with South Africa. In practical terms, however, Southern Rhodesia co-operated with South Africa. The looming threat of war prioritised the need for co-operation in the region. The following chapter discusses the circumstances under which co-operation took place. It also discusses in what areas Southern Rhodesia and South Africa worked together. Finally the economic thread is discussed, in particular the trade relations under the trade agreement and its implications on relations between the two countries.
Chapter Five

The War Years, 1940 – 1945

Introduction
This chapter examines the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during the Second World War. The ways in which the two countries co-operated with each other in the context of a global war where colonial ‘peripheries’ were mobilised as part of the allied war effort are examined. As well as looking at war time co-operation, the chapter also analyses economic ties and trade patterns between the two countries. The war also caused disruptions in trade between Southern Rhodesia and overseas territories. The consequence was greater emphasis on developing domestic industries. The following pages will examine the state and development of secondary industries in Southern Rhodesia. For Southern Rhodesia, however, the development of its industries was circumscribed by the development of South African industries.

5.1 Southern Rhodesia and South Africa: The War Campaign
Loyalty and unquestionable support for Britain and her Empire determined Southern Rhodesia’s involvement in the war. The participation of one of Southern Rhodesia’s most recognisable political figures and future Prime Minister, Ian Smith provides a glimpse of his and the Colony’s war-time involvement. Smith’s wartime service as a pilot began in Egypt. I was then posted to an operational training unit course at Baalbek, in Lebanon. I had a good look at Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa en route, and on a number of occasions had the intriguing experience of flying an aircraft 1,500 feet below sea level, over the Dead Sea. From Baalbek my next posting was to 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron to fly Hawker Hurricanes. They had been pulled out of the Western Desert for a break, and posted to Tehran.\(^1\)

Smith joined the Rhodesian Squadron and the ‘first posting on its return to the Western Desert was El Alamein, Montgomery had started his push, and soon they moved again from here to Mersa, Matruh and to Tobruk’.\(^2\) From the Western Desert, Smith flew over Italy and


Germany. Smith’s experiences under the Rhodesian Squadron marks a notable contribution made by the Colony. Compared to other combatants Southern Rhodesia’s absolute contribution of manpower to the war ‘was miniscule – some 8500 white men and 1500 women in the armed services, from a total white population of 65 000; whom 693 were killed in the war’. But relative to the size of the white population Southern Rhodesia’s war contribution was enormous. Gann and Gelfand note that ‘Rhodesians distinguished themselves in British Somaliland and Ethiopia, in the Western Desert and later in Italy’.

By contrast to Southern Rhodesia, white political opinion in South Africa was torn over the issue of South Africa’s participation in the war. Smuts supported South Africa’s involvement. He believed that it was the ‘Union’s obligation to stand by the British colonies from Kenya to the south “like an elder brother on the African continent” and had proclaimed that “our interests, many of our future markets, are situated there”’. Smuts calculated that South Africa ought to play a prominent role in Africa’s development, with the war providing a powerful impetus. South Africa, Smuts envisaged, should lead Pan-African development, ‘based on a mutual relationship between the Africa to the north as a raw material supplier and the Union’s industries as exporters. The war reawakened Smuts far-ranging desires and dreams for the rearrangements of the African continent and did not necessarily involve the incorporation of the Rhodesias’.

Although Smuts saw a leading role for South Africa especially in the war on the African continent, South Africa’s primary responsibility lay closer to home. Immediately after the declaration of war against Germany, Smuts announced that South Africa’s ‘primary duty was to place its defences in the highest state of efficiency. This could be best served by strengthening Union defences, and by so surveying Union resources and to render the Union safe against any inroads from the enemy’. The defence of the Cape sea route was ‘South Africa’s first duty to her allies, and Smuts cast South Africa, in the first instance, for an otherwise passive military role, while raising sizeable forces against contingencies

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3 Ibid, 55-75.
4 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 235.
5 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, 151.
6 Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 235.
7 Ibid.
elsewhere’. The military role envisioned by South Africa was revisited, ‘once France and French sea power had been lost to the Allies, and Italy had entered on the German side, and the continent of Africa became directly involved’.

Southern Rhodesia’s preparation for her own military role in the war took into account its experience from the First World War. The fatalities experienced by the country in that war alerted its political leadership to the fact that ‘casualties on the same scale would mean that, with a white population of about 50,000, she could not be sure of maintaining more than a certain number in the field. In the last war about 50% of the Rhodesian forces obtained commissions, most of them well-educated force’. As a consequence, Southern Rhodesia felt that its resources should be used prudently and roles clearly specified. The military programme of Southern Rhodesia created two groups, one comprising political officers and one that did not. This resulted in the former group given training roughly corresponding to an O.T.C course. When war broke out in 1939, therefore, Rhodesia was able to supply officers, from the former class, to Imperial Units (East African and West African) which were short of white officers. The rest of the Rhodesian forces were split up and served in the ranks of various English or Imperial regiments.

Southern Rhodesia’s operational programme was also speedily established. There had been from the ‘earliest stages of the war practical co-operation in military matters with the Union Government’. This extended to the ‘training of personnel, the transporting of troops to ports of embarkation and the forwarding of military supplies, and the Colony had received the fullest assistance and consideration from the Union authorities’. Southern Rhodesia, initially fell under the East Africa command. Supplies, on the other hand, ‘were obtained from the Union and the Union proved very cooperative’. These developments, however, raised the question of which Command Southern Rhodesia should come under. The Imperial Government presented two options. Recognising Southern Rhodesia’s war effort, ‘the

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10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid, 368.
15 SANDF Archives, Pretoria, Chief of the General Staff GPS CGS GP 2, Box 9, ‘Amalgamation of Southern Rhodesian with Union Forces, 1942’.
Dominion’s Office in the aide-memoire of early 1940, and the Imperial government suggested that the situation could only be cleared up either by Rhodesia’s falling under the provisions of the Delhi conference, or by full cooperation with the Union’. Any decision on the matter was to take into account South Africa’s own military preparedness.

In South Africa, one day after declaring war on Germany, and ‘after consultation with Mr Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, General Smuts cabled the High Commissioner in London to tell him that it appeared advisable that one of South African brigade and several air squadrons should be moved to Kenya as a precautionary measure’. In this instance South Africa responded promptly, however, its general approach was moderate. But that gesture aside, South Africa was actually unready for war. This can be explained in part by geographical and historical considerations dating back to the First World War. Far from the main centres of global conflict, but given that the country was situated at the southern tip of Africa, South Africa relied on the ‘protection of the Royal Navy against the threat of an external attack by sea’. Furthermore, South Africa’s borders in the north ‘were protected by the buffer territories of Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, while reasonably close economic and diplomatic relations existed with the Portuguese administration in Mozambique’. Moreover, at the end of the First World War, the mandated territory of South West Africa was brought under South African control, and subsequently the removal of German power. Consequently, in the period ‘between the two world wars, the maintenance of a large defence force was unnecessary. Indeed, before the Second World War the main role of the Union defence was a limited one of helping settler communities in British Africa in the event of an African revolt’.

Accordingly, the outbreak of the Second World War and South Africa’s lack of military preparedness concentrated Pretoria’s mind. The Government immediately issued ‘emergency regulations, brought Permanent and Active Citizen Force units up to strength and formed new voluntary units. Air-training was intensified and an air-training scheme was

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16 Ibid.
17 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 23.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
launched in conjunction with the Royal Air Force. The coastal defences were also strengthened’.21 By January 1940, the Union Defence Force ‘establishment consisted of 1,750 officers and 36,000 men’.22

Military co-operation between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was facilitated by the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Defence, R.C. Tredgold. According to Blake, Tredgold upon his return from a visit to Nairobi was ‘responsible for opening Smuts’s eyes to the dangerous weakness of the British position vis-à-vis the Italians in north-east Africa. South African artillery and technical units for South Africa Command were quickly dispatched and contributed substantially to Cunningham’s startling successes’.23 Subsequently, the issue of which Command Southern Rhodesia should to join was addressed. The matter remained unresolved, however, until talks between two governments in Pretoria in 1942. Exchanges at the conference between Huggins and Lord Harlech, High Commissioner to South Africa, revealed the following:

Harlech said, ‘you know, Huggins, you cannot be a command on your own. There is West Africa Command, East Africa, Middle East and South Africa: which would you like to join?’ I said: ‘obviously South Africa. All our supplies and communications come from there. We have no communication with the north except a few aeroplanes’.24

Two Commands were to be established, in East and Southern Africa, ‘the Zambezi River constituting and dividing the line between them. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland shall come under the East African command. Southern Rhodesia was to come under the Union command, with the Union government having prior consultation with the Rhodesian government in regard to emergencies’.25 On 27 October 1942, the Minister of Defence announced to the House that the ‘Southern Rhodesian Forces would be linked with South African Command’.26 Southern Rhodesian military co-operation with South Africa was given further impetus once Japan entered the war. According to MacDonald, the South and East African coastlines were vulnerable to Japanese military threats. Hostile success there ‘would

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24 Ibid.
25 SANDF Archives, Pretoria, Chief of the General Staff GPS CGS GP 2, Box 9, Rhodesian Forces, A meeting was held on 19-20 June 1942 between the Prime Ministers of Southern Rhodesia and the Union.
imperil the whole system of Empire communications to India and the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{27} Jackson has argued that Africa dominated important Allied supply routes for the Allied effort, once the Mediterranean was closed to British shipping. From June 1940, the Cape route assumed an ‘importance unsurpassed since before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Six million troops passed through South Africa’s ports in transit during the war, and without control of the Cape Britain could not have maintained contact with the eastern Empire of the Middle East theatre of war’.\textsuperscript{28}

A co-ordinated defence arrangement was established in Pretoria to ensure that no overlapping in the Commands of ‘South and East Africa and that Southern Rhodesia should throw her lot with one of the other. The decision was made in favour of the Union. To a large extent strategy dictated so; for the Colony’s more important lines of communication and supply lead up from the South’.\textsuperscript{29} Southern Rhodesia, immediately after the announcement by its Minister of Defence, dispatched the first Rhodesian unit to be affected by the unification of command, ‘which was the Southern Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment which returned to the Colony on 22 October after nearly two years of service in East Africa’.\textsuperscript{30}

Pleased that Southern Rhodesia ‘had decided to come within the military orbit of the Union and to accept himself as Commander-in-Chief up to the Zambezi’,\textsuperscript{31} Smuts also pressed for the amalgamation of South Africa and Southern Rhodesian forces in the context of post-war African arrangements. Smuts commented that the conditions of war which resulted in Southern Rhodesia joining forces with South Africa would reveal to the Rhodesians their own weaknesses. He observed that Rhodesians were in fact

afflicted by the sort of mentality which inevitably arose from lack of sureness and experience, combined with the consciousness of their own poverty in first-class manpower. This led General Smuts to the observation that the British colonial system had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 368.
\item \textsuperscript{28} A. Jackson, \textit{The British Empire and the Second World War} (London and New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 176.
\item \textsuperscript{29} MacDonald, \textit{War History of Southern Rhodesia}, 368.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 372.
\item \textsuperscript{31} The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Dominion Office (DO) 121/244/2, Sir Eric Machtig Private Papers, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Arrival to South Africa, Resume of points made by Smuts. Minute. On the morning of my arrival (Thursday, 23\textsuperscript{rd} July), 28 July 1942.
\end{itemize}
been at fault in splitting Africa up into small compartments which were self-sufficient neither economically nor politically. Small pockets of white men in large territories had rights which they exercised to the detriment of the whole. 32

To overcome this state of affairs, Smuts concluded,

Southern Rhodesia should look south and should be part of the Union sought to run on its own without the necessary resources in man-power, brains or raw materials. After the war it would be necessary to review all these things and he would hope that wiser counsels would prevail. In the future only large units could survive and the present demarcation was as unworkable as it was illogical. 33

It ought to be remembered that Smuts was closely involved in the 1922 referendum on the side of union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The idea that Southern Rhodesia should join the south remained alive at this time, and Smuts continued to be the chief supporter of this scheme.

Following the June 1942 agreement, further discussions were held by Colonel Day of Southern Rhodesia, Brigadier de Waal and Colonel Campbell-Ross from the Union Defence Force (U.D.F.) for the practical implementation of the resolutions. The respective military authorities confirmed that Southern Rhodesia was to place its ‘military forces at the disposal of South Africa for mutual security and furtherance of any mutual effort. This was to the extent of placing purely Rhodesian formations under the operational control of U.D.F. officers, subject to certain fundamental provisos’. 34 South Africa would pay ‘Southern Rhodesian troops at single men’s rates, provide Southern Rhodesia with military equipment and stores and the financing of units absorbed into the U.D.F. will be a Union responsibility. The Union would send a Staff Officer to Rhodesia to gain information’. 35 Although under the South African Command, Southern Rhodesia also made a major contribution to the war effort by ‘hosting the Royal Air Force Training School in the Colony’. 36 This level of cooperation highlights the extent to which Southern Rhodesia saw South Africa as the

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 SANDF Archives, Pretoria, Chief of the General Staff GPS CGS GP 2, Box 9, Rhodesian Forces, Discussions between Col. Day (S. Rhodesia), Brigadier. de Waal and Col. Campbell-Ross (U.D.F.), early in August 1942.
35 Ibid.
36 Bate, Report from the Rhodesias, 94-95.
indispensable power in the region. At the same time it reinforced the dynamics of the relationship between the two countries with Southern Rhodesia as the junior partner.

Manpower provided by Southern Rhodesia consisted of Africans and white Rhodesians alike. The joint war effort with South Africa saw the ‘Southern Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment serve with the 6th (South African) Armoured Division, subsequent to being successful participants in the East African campaign. In November 1942 the regiment assembled at Gwelo and became a part of South African forces’.37 The Southern Rhodesian Command was considered to be a Motorised Brigade Group. Half of the ‘armoured car regiment of the division which was to be formed in South Africa came from Rhodesia’.38 Under the command of the 6th South African Armoured Division, South African and Southern Rhodesian troops fought alongside each other in Italy. Preparation for this military offensive comprised ‘arduous training for gunners, infantry, armour, signallers and sappers. Out in the great desert camp of Khatatba, north of Cairo, the units of the Division were stationed and in that area carried out much of their training. Serving in the Division were 1400 Rhodesians’.39 The first engagement with the enemy for the Southern African infantry in the Italian campaign took place in 1944. MacDonald notes that the experience was a testing one. The Division ‘had shown initiative and grit. Their losses had been comparatively slight - sixteen killed and fifty wounded of whom one killed and eleven wounded were Rhodesian’.40 All of this speaks to Southern Rhodesia’s role within the South African Command and the close co-operation between the two countries.

According to Mlambo, ‘thousands of Africans participated in the fighting, while those left at home contributed to the war effort through the production of foodstuff and essential minerals such as chrome, and by building military bases for the use by the British Air Force’.41 Furthermore, Killingray has noted the conscription of labour during this period. Native Commissioners called on ‘chiefs and headmen to supply men. This new form of chibaro [forced labour] was strongly resisted. The work was unpopular, especially during the

38 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, 155.
40 Ibid, 486.
41 Mlambo, ‘From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965’, 78.
ploughing season, and wages offered were lower than those received by poorly-paid farm labourers’. Some white farmers, though, ‘anxious to retain their labour force, assisted Africans to avoid conscription. From early 1940 onwards several thousand Africans were employed to build eleven airfields throughout Southern Rhodesia’. At the same time, the Southern Rhodesian Government recruited Africans soldiers. By mid-1940, the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), led by white officers had recruited ‘700 men. Although 8,200 Africans joined the RAR between mid-1940 and mid-1945, more than half were later rejected as medically unfit’.

South Africa produced important military resources both for itself and Southern Rhodesia. The first howitzer was made towards the end of 1940 and output grew thereafter, including an order ‘for six howitzers placed by Southern Rhodesia in November 1940’. For its part Southern Rhodesia helped where it could. The war made it difficult to obtain from overseas countries regular supplies of box-shooks used in the manufacture of boxes for the conveyance of explosives. The local industry accordingly desire to obtain supplies from sawmills in Southern Rhodesia, and to this end the Government of the Union of South Africa are agreeable to the addition of box-shooks for the manufacture of boxes for the conveyance of explosives, to the Free Schedule under Article II of the Union of South Africa-Southern Rhodesia Trade Agreement, 1935.

Both military forces were armed largely from South African resources. Ammunition was produced locally, and the production of small arms was greatly increased. South African ‘heavy industry was called upon to manufacture bombs, shells, trench mortars and other arms including howitzers. Armoured cars were being built in the Union, which ensured the mechanisation of several units in the field’. Furthermore, large industrial state concerns such as ‘the South African Railways and Harbours, the mines, the Mint and Iscor switched

45 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 89.
46 NASA, SAB, BTS 10/1/37, Vol.1, Letter from Minister of External Affairs J.C. Smuts to Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, 3 January 1941.
47 Kruger, Age of the Generals, 197.
over largely to the production of war materials. Various private companies were also encouraged to organise themselves to manufacture military equipment’. The net effect of government intervention was that South Africa ‘was able to provide not only for its own military needs but also for some of its allies. A variety of war materials, including two-pounder anti-tank guns, ammunitions (18 million rounds per month), high explosive shells, mortar bombs, howitzers and rifle spares was produced’. 49

Even as South African secondary industry expanded massively, so too did Southern Rhodesia’s much smaller industries grow rapidly. As manufactured products could not be imported from overseas, customers from ‘Southern Rhodesia as well as from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland looked to Rhodesian factories to supply many of their consumers as well as their military needs. Over time Rhodesia was able to develop a substantial secondary industry, and also began to manufacture a whole range of other products’.50

Secondary industrial development during the war was crucial for Southern Rhodesia’s military effort. They played a part in producing the necessary materials for the Colony’s well-resourced Army. ‘Engineering firms engaged in the manufacture of munitions and worked in collaboration with South African factories, and the Colony’s first factory entirely devoted to munitions and specially built for the purpose was operated by the Rhodesian Railways at Bulawayo and was staffed mainly by women’.51

Conditions created by the outbreak of the war caused the development of secondary industries in Southern Rhodesia to become a matter of urgency. For this development to take place ‘a policy of encouraging private enterprise to exploit those of the Colony’s resources on which secondary industry could be founded evolved’.52 Imports from abroad were curtailed as a result of the war. This concentrated Southern Rhodesian efforts at developing its industries. Commerce added its voice to the ‘industrialists clamour for

49 Ibid.
52 MacDonald, War History of Southern Rhodesia, 381.
sympathetic treatment from the state, and in 1940 an Industrial Development Advisory Committee (IDAC) was formed’. 53

State support for the establishment of the IDAC was not inevitable. In 1939, E.P. Vernall, member of the Salisbury Chamber of Industry was elected into the Legislative Assembly. Receiving support from industry, industrialists were seeking support from the state, in particular providing them protection. Vernall moved, ‘that a permanent advisory committee be set up to assist in the industrial development of the Colony’. 54 In seconding the motion, Donald Macintyre, leader of the opposition Labour Party, stated that as far as he knew, ‘Southern Rhodesia is the only Colony in the British Empire that does not have an Industrial Development Committee of some description’. 55 Advocates of such a committee, ‘referred to South Africa among other countries, as an example of a country that had set up an industrial board to advise and assist in the development of secondary industries’. 56 South Africa had a ‘Board of Trade and Industries, set-up for the purpose of protecting the industries of the country’. 57 Macintyre went on to point out that ‘in Australia, the Scientific and Industrial Development Council advanced the development of secondary industries. From 1931 to 1937, the employment figures in the secondary industries rose from 337 000 to 559 000, and gross output rose from £282 000 000 to £449 000 000’. 58 The matter was put before the Legislative Assembly and it was agreed to.

Government action proved effective as ‘industrial expansion growth in Southern Rhodesia in the 1940s was impressive’. 59 The wartime interruption of competition from overseas was complemented by the ‘expansion of the domestic market through the sitting of the Imperial Air Training Scheme in Southern Rhodesia. British expenditure on the scheme apparently almost equalled the indirect benefit which the [colony] derived from its entire gold-mining industry’. 60

53 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 251.
54 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 1 May 1940, col. 171.
55 Ibid, col. 179.
57 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 1 May 1940, cols. 182.
58 Ibid, cols. 181-182
59 Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 252.
60 Ibid.
An ability to finance the war effort was an important component of Southern Rhodesia’s ability to manufacture resources for its armed forces. Salisbury financed its ‘war effort entirely from her own resources, which, of course, meant greatly increased taxation. The last pre-war budget amounted to £5,300,000, and each year the figure increased until it reached £10,000,000 for 1944-45’. During the war years, Southern Rhodesia was known in this period as the ‘second largest gold producer in the world after South Africa, and also gained substantial earnings from the export of chromite, asbestos, coal, silver and iron’. Along with South Africa, Southern Rhodesia’s gold production was particularly important for Britain’s economic strategy, most of the gold being ‘transported by rail to Cape Town for passage to England whence much was shipped in the form of bars to the United States. As with the other leading African producers, Southern Rhodesia’s gold output reached peak levels in the years 1941-2’.

Economic mobilisation for war effort requires state intervention in the market economy and South Africa was no exception. The South African ‘government introduced wage and price controls, rationing, distribution under licence, and the provision of subsidies for strategic industries. Most South African economists writing in the 1940s accepted this as an undesirable yet inevitable consequence of war’. In 1940, the South African Finance Minister J.H. Hofmeyr presented a budget providing no more than ‘£14 million for Defence. This phase of limited involvement in the war was, however, brought to a sudden end by the Italian declaration of war on the allied forces in June 1940. From then onwards South Africa was committed to a more active role’. The financial contribution made by the Department of Defence in the first year of the Second World War ‘was £6.5 million. The actual Defence Vote for that year was just under £3 million, but this was supplemented by an Additional Defence Account of just over £4 million which was kept secret and was only revealed to the Select Committee on Public Accounts in 1941’. Overall, the South African Treasury relaxed

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61 East Africa and Rhodesia, 17 May 1945.
63 Ibid.
66 Ibid, 154.
its controls over defence expenditure ‘by acceding as a matter of routine to all requests made by a new combined Defence Authorities. Thus funds were released from the economies of peacetime and the Department of Defence’. 67 The South African War Expenses account, closed March 31, 1947, reveals that the total amounts ‘spent on war expense and militarization under the War Expenses Account between 1940 and 1947 were close to £700 000 000’. 68 Overall, South Africa’s economy was ‘transformed by war-related industrialisation and the sharp increase in government expenditures and revenues’. 69 The ability to increase government expenditure at this time was partly a result of the ‘fact that real taxation per head of the white population rose by 75 per cent between 1939 and 1945’. 70

5.2 Economic relations during the Second World War

Southern Rhodesia’s economic ties with South Africa were affected by the war. Prior to 1940, Southern Rhodesia’s ‘import trade was predominantly with the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent with the South Africans’. 71 The outbreak of hostilities, however, brought about ‘considerable dislocation in the import trade from the United Kingdom, while imports from the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom’s principal competitor in the local market, received a marked impetus due to her favourable geographical situation’. 72 Consequently, the effect of the war on trade patterns between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom resulted in ‘imports from the United Kingdom dropping in value from nearly £4,000,000 or 45 per cent of the Colony’s total imports in 1939 to £2,615,000 or only 31 per cent of the total in 1943’. 73 Over the same period, South Africa increasingly became an important source for Southern Rhodesian imports. The purchase of South African products, which accounted for

18 per cent of the Colony’s requirements in 1939 rose to 32 per cent of the total in 1941

and was valued at over £3 million or nearly double the 1939 value. This was the only

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year in the history of the Colony that imports from the Union of South Africa exceeded imports from Great Britain.\textsuperscript{74}

As Southern Rhodesia turned increasingly to South Africa for a larger proportion of its imports, and ‘in 1945 nearly 30 per cent, by value came from the Union, a proportion not far short of that coming from the United Kingdom. These Union exports covered an extensive range of processed and manufactured goods’.\textsuperscript{75} Southern Rhodesia’s exports to South Africa were chiefly ‘raw materials and foodstuffs. Gold, chrome and asbestos do not figure largely in exports to the Union because the Union had an export surplus of those commodities’.\textsuperscript{76} It ought to be noted that industrially, South Africa was more developed than Southern Rhodesia and the latter was starting the process of expanding secondary industries, hence it imported processed and manufactured goods not produced in the country from South Africa.

But the picture of Southern Rhodesia’s trade relations with South Africa was complicated by the fact that what was attributed to ‘exports of Southern Rhodesian goods to the Union of South Africa, prior to and during the war, fluctuated somewhat according to the amount of Rhodesian tobacco purchased’.\textsuperscript{77} Over the course of the Second World War, Southern Rhodesia’s exports to South Africa amounted to

\[ £1,143,000 \text{ or 7.2 per cent of the total in 1945 as against the exceptionally high figure of £2,092,000 or 14.6 per cent in the previous year and the comparatively small figure of £446,000 or 4.4 per cent of the total in 1939. The increase in exports to the Union of South Africa during the years 1942 to 1945 was due mainly to heavier consignments of leaf tobacco at improved prices and to a less extent unmanufactured timber.}\textsuperscript{78}

Tobacco was an important contributor to Southern Rhodesia’s improved export trade figures with South Africa during the war. Fundamentally, the expansion of export trade ‘resulted from the improved prices obtained for leaf tobacco during the war years and the continued demand for base metals and minerals, particularly chrome ore and asbestos and to a lesser extent mica, coal and tungsten ores’.\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, trade expansion was partly

\textsuperscript{74} Southern Rhodesia, \textit{Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia}, No. 4 (Salisbury, 1952), 684.  
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Commercial Opinion}, 24, 289. February 1947.  
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{77} Southern Rhodesia, \textit{Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia}, No. 4 (Salisbury, 1952), 686.  
\textsuperscript{78} Southern Rhodesia, \textit{Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia}, 9.  
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 4.
a product of the fact that the ‘decline in overseas exports was made up for by a noticeable increase in exports to South Africa, and the region’.  

Although the war severely disrupted shipping and trade routes between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom, trade ties were never severed completely. Imports into Southern Rhodesia from the United Kingdom dropped in value in the early years of the war, but by 1944 there were ‘signs of recovery . . . when imports were valued at £4,226,000 or 36.5 per cent of the total, but in 1945 Great Britain’s share in the total import trade dropped to 34.6 per cent of the total despite a slight rise in value of £92,000 compared with 1944’. Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that apart from 1941, when South African exports exceeded the value of the United Kingdom’s exports to Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom remained Southern Rhodesia’s principal trading partner. In fact, South Africa’s share of Southern Rhodesia imports never reached United Kingdom levels throughout the 1940s. Over the period of the war South Africa’s ‘share of the Colony’s share of import trade remained at just under 30 per cent but as a result of overseas post-war competition, mainly from the United Kingdom, her share dropped to 22 per cent of the total by 1949 despite supplying goods to the value of over £12 million’.

Crucial to Southern Rhodesia’s trade patterns with United Kingdom and South Africa was the development of secondary industries. Manufactured products imported from abroad prior to the war were now produced locally. Arrighi has explained, this was in part a product of ‘World War II providing an external stimulant to Southern Rhodesia because goods previously imported became practically unavailable thus creating a demand for local industries; chrome and asbestos assumed strategic importance’. During the same period, as noted above, Southern Rhodesia was identified as an ideal location for an Imperial Air Training Scheme. Arrangements were rapidly put in motion for the establishment of three centres for the Scheme, at Salisbury (now Harare), Bulawayo, and Gwelo (Gweru). Eventually no ‘less than eleven substantial air stations were constructed, and some 15,000 trainees from all over the Empire passed through the Colony. A fair number of these would

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81 Southern Rhodesia, Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia, 7.
82 Southern Rhodesia, Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia, No. 4 (Salisbury, 1952), 684.
stay on or return as part of Rhodesia’s post-war European immigration wave - what some have called the “second occupation”. Overall, the impact of the Imperial Air Training Scheme brought about an influx of military personnel and prisoners of war ‘which caused the white population in the country to jump by approximately 20 per cent. The establishment of training camps coupled with the concomitant increase in the white population helped to create an internal domestic demand for both industrial and agricultural products’. Southern Rhodesia was expected to ‘supply air stations, quarters, land and buildings, with the air training scheme providing a major economic asset. Similarly, farmers and industrial firms suddenly found an almost insatiable market’. The economic stimulant provided by the air training scheme in Southern Rhodesia helps explain the increased share in value of United Kingdom imports to Southern Rhodesia in 1944 valued at £4,266,000.

But even as the Air Training Scheme helped stimulate the growth of secondary industry in Southern Rhodesia, so the infant industrial sector faced the ‘spectre of competition from its large neighbour, South Africa, and unfavourable trade arrangements privileged the bigger economy against its neighbour’. Competition from South Africa was accentuated by the fact that South Africa suffered very little economic ‘adversity or dislocation from the Second World War. Although a belligerent on the Allied side, the Union lay well outside the war zone. And while South African troops fighting overseas suffered high casualties, production on farms and factories as well as in the mines moved forward almost without a break’. South African factories boomed, compensating for numerous ‘categories of local consumer goods previously imported. Thus, for South Africa, in a way that differed from most other African countries, expanded wartime mineral production was part of a general and longer trend of economic growth and transformation; between 1939 and 1945, the real value of manufacturing output nearly doubled’.

85 Samasuwo, ‘Food Production and War Supplies’, 492.
Crucial to wartime industrial development in South Africa was the establishment of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 1940. The objective of the IDC was to facilitate, promote, guide and assist in, the financing of: a) new industries and industrial undertakings; and b) schemes for the expansion, better organisation and modernisation of and the more efficient carrying out of operations in existing industries and industrial undertakings. The fact that there was a general and widespread belief that the gold mining industry was in terminal decline, contributed further to this state-assisted drive for industrialisation which went beyond the immediate needs of the war effort.90

Consequently, a combination of government support for industrialisation, ‘high wartime demand and the lack of import competition had a major impact on the growth of manufacturing. By the end of the war South Africa had developed a domestic machine-tool industry and substantial manufacturing capacity’.91 Overall the value of manufacturing output increased by ‘116 per cent between 1939 and 1945, and by 1945 the South African economy was in a strong position for further expansion’.92

Not surprisingly, Southern Rhodesian producers clamoured for protection for the manufacturing industry, or at least, favourable trade terms with South Africa. In the recent past, however, successive governments had left ‘manufacturing to its own devices believing that it required no special attention’.93 Indeed a committee appointed in July 1939 had ‘advised against an active policy of encouraging secondary industrialisation. Private enterprise, concluded the committee “could safely be left, without direct Government assistance, to develop worthwhile industries as opportunity occurred. It was quite unnecessary for the Government to devote funds to hasten such developments”’.94 But during by the war, the former laissez-faire attitude of the Government towards secondary industrialisation changed given that ‘traditional sources of manufactured products dried up and government realised action was needed to overcome bottlenecks threatening to stifle

91 Ibid.
93 Mlambo, History of Zimbabwe, 95.
94 Ibid.
wider economic expansion’. 95 According to Mlambo, ‘the difficulties of international trade caused by the war had persuaded the authorities that a policy of import-substitution industrialisation was necessary if the country’s economy was to develop’. 96

The war provided a crucial impetus for the government to explore ways of making the Colony self-sufficient. Public funds were made available for ‘approved industrial development and in 1941 the Government established a small ordinance factory in Bulawayo’. 97 But there were always limits to official support. The government’s approach was that where intervention was necessary ‘to enable new industries, particularly those based on the processing of raw materials produced in the country, to become established, the government would either participate directly or it would create conditions conducive to the establishment of industries in the national interests’. 98 The Minister of Finance and Commerce and Supply, Max Danzinger, advised businessmen that the Chamber of Industry and Commerce ‘should get together so that the industrialists could find out what was necessary in the every-day war-time life of the country. Then they could find out which articles they could manufacture. The Government would support their effort to produce these every-day requirements with its influence and finance’. 99 State intervention ‘was designed to complement private enterprise’, 100 not replace it. This mirrored South African examples for Southern Rhodesia looked to South Africa for its development trajectory. 101

An adequate labour supply was also essential for industrial growth; the importance placed on African labour in Southern Rhodesia for its economic well-being was expressly admitted by Huggins: ‘we cannot exist for five minutes without the native today. He is absolutely essential to our wage structure, if nothing else if we went purely on a European basis with the present conditions of living and pay the country would be sub-economic and down and

95 Ibid.
96 Mlambo, ‘From the Second World War to UDI’, 81.
98 Mlambo, History of Zimbabwe, 96.
99 Commercial Opinion, 19, 231, April 1942.
100 Mlambo, History of Zimbabwe, 96.
out in five minutes’. Of great concern, therefore, was the intensifying competition from South Africa for migrant labour. Although Southern Rhodesia was a recipient of migrant labour from the northern territories to the ‘extent that in 1941 some 56 per cent of African workers were non-indigenous’, its own economy experienced a ‘labour drain of indigenous workers, referred to by policy-makers as “clandestine labour”, which found its way to the attractive labour markets of South Africa. Hence Rhodesia was in a subordinate relationship to the Rand and other centres in South Africa’. According to Clarke, the clandestine migration flow in 1944 was such ‘that some 14 000 workers left Rhodesia for South Africa. The cause of migration was economic and strongly influenced by low wages in Southern Rhodesia’.

The labour drain worried officials as well as employers. Addressing the Legislative Assembly, Huggins suggested that there ought to be a conference between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and South Africa.

The conference would discuss what might be called a unilateral fashion, the illegal migration of labourers into the Union. I do not want any hon. member to think we can withhold a passport from a Southern Rhodesian native for going to any other territory in the Empire, we shall give in. What we want to do is to stop the racket occurring on our southern borders at present. Incidentally it will help retain some of our labour we want in the Colony.

For Southern Rhodesia, this formed part of its endeavour by the end of the war at arriving at a favourable trade arrangement with South Africa.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has accounted for war time co-operation and trade ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It has highlighted that after the British government presented Southern Rhodesia the option of co-operating with South Africa militarily, Salisbury chose to merge its forces with its South African counterpart. All of Southern Rhodesia’s supplies and communication lines came from South Africa. Moreover, Salisbury’s military co-operation with South Africa was spurred on by Japan’s entrance into the war. This had prompted

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102 Loney, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response*, 64.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid, 15.
106 Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 May 1940, Col. 445.
serious consideration about the security of the South and East Africa coastline. And since the Mediterranean had been closed to British shipping, the Cape assumed great importance. Therefore, strategy dictated Southern Rhodesia’s decision to join South Africa; ensuring regional security, and supplies and communication lines from the south. War time military co-operation was enabled by the mobilisation of the economy and resources. Both countries ensured war time co-operation took place by means of financing it through a number of ways. The most notable action by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was through taxation. This facilitated the rise in expenditure. As the war disrupted trade between Southern Africa and Britain, war time expenditure contributed in improving the manufacturing capacity in each country in order to produce the requisite resources for war. With South Africa being the most industrially advanced of the two countries, it also manufactured goods to prop up Southern Rhodesia’s militarily supplies. Manufacturing had also started to develop in Southern Rhodesia at this time. The war conditions provided the stimulus. Customers from Southern Rhodesia as well as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland looked to Southern Rhodesian factories for their supplies as imports from abroad were disrupted. This enabled Southern Rhodesia to begin in earnest the development its industries.

Trade relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were also affected by the war. Before the war, Southern Rhodesia’s primary trading partner was the United Kingdom. With disruption to trade between the two countries, the value of trade dropped. As a consequence, Southern Rhodesia turned to South Africa for a greater proportion of its imports. South African imports covered an extensive range of processed and manufactured goods while Southern Rhodesia’s exports to South Africa were chiefly primary material. Southern Rhodesia’s trade relations with South Africa during the war were largely shaped by fluctuations in the amount of Rhodesian tobacco purchased. An increase in the value of exports to South Africa during the war years was largely due to a heavy consignment of tobacco at improved prices. Consequently, Southern Rhodesia’s trade expansion with South Africa allowed the country to contribute in the war effort.

Despite a decline in trade between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom over a large period of the war and an increase in trade between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the United Kingdom continued to be Southern Rhodesia’s primary trading partner. Underlying
Southern Rhodesia’s trade relations with South Africa and the United Kingdom was the development of its secondary industries. A process of import substitution industrialisation was stimulated by interruption to trade as well as the setup of the Imperial Air Training Scheme in the country which resulted in an influx of trainees into the Colony. They provided an economic stimulant which explains the increased share in value of imports especially from the United Kingdom during the latter years of the war.

Overall the war brought about closer co-operation between the militaries of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as well as a rise in the value of trade between the two countries. It also provided an incentive to develop local industries in both countries. Although Southern Rhodesia’s industrial development was growing at a decent pace, it still faced competition from an unfavourable trade arrangement with South Africa. As South Africa underwent its own industrial growth at this time, Southern Rhodesia clamoured for protection for its industries or favourable trade terms with South Africa. In the following chapter, the thesis discusses Southern Rhodesia’s endeavour at finding favourable trading terms with South Africa in the post-war period. The chapter also accounts for other significant aspects of the relationship within a new regional context.
Chapter Six

A period of Change, 1946-1953

Introduction
As the war provided the stimulus for industrial development in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, post-war efforts were directed at sustaining this momentum. The war had made a notable mark, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. The economy expanded as a result of a bigger internal market as well as greater trade with South Africa. However, one constant in the relationship between the two countries, which developed in significance, particularly in Southern Rhodesia was the lop-sided nature of the economic relationship. Southern Rhodesia’s trade arrangement with South Africa was to a large extent at the source of the territory’s dissatisfaction with the state of relations with South Africa. The Trade Agreement of 1935 though considered an improvement on the customs union preceding it remained inadequate for many in Southern Rhodesia. The development of secondary industry in Southern Rhodesia during the Second World and the growth of the economy put the issue of the agreement under scrutiny. At the end of the war, Southern Rhodesia set about challenging the existing agreement. This chapter examines post-war trading arrangements between the two countries. Relations between the two countries were also shaped by new realities. Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa assumed power in 1948, altering the dynamics in the region. This chapter discusses this event as it relates to the establishment of the Central African Federation. As such political, social and cultural ties and African links between the two countries are examined within the new regional context.

6.1 An enduring connection
At the end of 1945, Southern Rhodesia started the process of reviewing its existing commercial agreement with South Africa. A major concern for Southern Rhodesia was the issue of trade in which South Africa’s strong position was supported by the country’s protectionist measures, which Southern Rhodesia sought to, amend in discussions on establishing a new commercial agreement. The trade agreement received attention as industrial development took place during the war in Southern Rhodesia. In fact ‘as industry developed in Southern Rhodesia it became apparent that this agreement was becoming increasingly unsatisfactory from the point of view of Southern Rhodesia and in 1945 it was
decided that the time was ripe for a fresh agreement framed in terms of greater equality.\(^1\) Southern Rhodesia initiated a process by setting up an interdepartmental committee tasked to study the effectiveness of the existing agreement.

The Southern Rhodesian government established an interdepartmental committee in 1945 to study the effects of the agreement and to make recommendations. Upon the completion of the work by the departmental committee, and after hearing the ‘views of representative bodies of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, it recommended that notice of the termination of the Agreement should be given and that an endeavour should be made to negotiate a new agreement with the South African government’.\(^2\) The Committee went further to state that the ‘representative bodies felt that the value to the Union of its export trade to this Colony had now reached such proportions as would justify greater concessions being accorded to us, particularly with regard to tobacco, cattle and manufactured goods’.\(^3\) Preserving the gains made during the course of the war, contributed to the Southern Rhodesian position. The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia went on to emphasise that the great expansion of the territory’s ‘production of leaf tobacco, coincided with the growth of the industrial output through the establishment of new secondary industries. Although these developments commenced years previously, the war gave them an added impetus and we are anxious that the ground should be retained’.\(^4\)

The following year, however, the committee’s work was superseded by the Committee of Enquiry into the Protection of Secondary Industries. The ‘committee came down solidly against the kind of protection which would raise production costs in mining and agriculture. It advised that in order to keep the cost structure down, “assistance granted should as far as possible be confined to end or consumer products”’.\(^5\) The recommendation of the Committee against wholesale protectionism at this time provides a backdrop to Southern Rhodesia’s position on its customs relationship with South Africa. Notice of termination of the existing agreement was delivered to Pretoria in December 1946, ‘but by an exchange of

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1. NAZ, S2225/2, Memorandum of Customs Union (Interim) Agreement between the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
2. NASA, SAB, BTS 16/2/3/1, Vol. 1, Telegram from Prime of Southern Rhodesia to South African Minister of External Affairs, 17 April 1946.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
letters between the two Governments the agreement was to remain in force until a final agreement was reached in the negotiations for the re-establishment of a customs union’.6

Talks had begun earlier when the Union Government approached the Government of Southern Rhodesia expressing the view that consideration should be given by the two Governments ‘to the manner in which their trade relations could best be aligned to harmonise with the principles, regarding preferential duties which might be expected to emerge as a result of the international discussions then proceeding on the forming of a charter to govern world trade’.7 Subsequently, discussions between the two countries working towards the ‘possibility of a Customs Union were held on an official level in Pretoria during October 1946’.8 At this time, Southern Rhodesia had also begun to recognise the challenges that awaited it. Southern Rhodesia from outset perceived that South Africa was ‘desirous of re-establishing a customs union, and Southern Rhodesia, having made it clear that no agreement would be satisfactory which did not give greater quality to this country, agreed to explore the possibilities of a customs union’.9 The Southern Rhodesian government sought protection for certain industries not least because it would help ‘maintain a larger European population, as the country was embarking on a policy of developing industries’.10

Presented before the South African parliament, it was stated that the two Governments sought to achieve the ‘complete removal of all customs and other barriers between the two countries. The Union Government undertook to co-operate with the Government of Southern Rhodesia in a policy of fostering industrial expansion in Southern Rhodesia’.11 There was a strong desire to arrive at a ‘comprehensive agreement embracing trade, customs and tariffs to further trade in Southern Africa to the benefit of both countries’.12 Salisbury and Pretoria pledged to eliminate all trade tariffs and regulations ‘restrictive of commerce in the two countries. The Governments affirmed that their ultimate aim was the re-establishment of a

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7 NAZ, S2225/2, Memorandum of Customs Union (Interim) Agreement between the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
8 Southern Rhodesia Legislatures Assembly Debates, 27 February 1947, col. 2934.
9 NAZ, S2225/2, Memorandum of Customs Union (Interim) Agreement between the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
11 Cape Argus, 5 February 1946.
12 Rand Daily Mail, 20 December 1946.
full and complete customs union and its extension to other African states by subsequent agreement with them’.\textsuperscript{13}

Negotiations for a new Customs arrangement embodying the principle of a return to a free ‘interchange of products between the two territories’ opened in Cape Town early in 1947’.\textsuperscript{14} The Southern Rhodesian delegation at this time was set on discussing the possibility of concluding an ‘interim agreement aiming at establishing a Customs union between the two countries’.\textsuperscript{15} Opinion in South Africa was equally favourable towards achieving a customs union with Southern Rhodesia. It was reported at the time that South Africa had much to gain and little

if anything, to lose by the replacement of the present Customs agreement with Southern Rhodesia by free trade. It was also seen as encouraging, therefore, that the Rhodesian Prime Minister (Sir Godfrey Huggins) was talking of the possibility of a Customs union, the removal of the barriers and a return to some such arrangement as existed before 1929.\textsuperscript{16}

Negotiations continued throughout 1947 and into early 1948, which ultimately led to the signature of the Customs Union (Interim) Agreement between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia

the main purpose of which was set forth as follows in the Preamble to the Agreement: to achieve complete removal of all customs and other trade barriers between the two countries, to re-establish a full and complete Customs Union and to extend such Customs Union to other African States or territories by subsequent agreement with them as a means of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a high level of production, employment and real income throughout the world and in particular in the territories party to this Agreement.\textsuperscript{17}

The interim Agreement provided for the establishment of a body known as the ‘Southern African Customs Council to watch over the working of the agreement and make

\textsuperscript{13} Farmer’s Weekly, Vol. 72, 12 February 1947.
\textsuperscript{14} NASA, SAB, HEN 3896, 710, Trade Relations and Treaties, ‘Trade Relations between the Union and Southern Rhodesia’, July 1950.
\textsuperscript{15} The Star, 8 December 1947.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 27 November 1947.
\textsuperscript{17} NASA, SAB, HEN 3896, 710, Trade Relations and Treaties, ‘Trade Relations between the Union and Southern Rhodesia’, July 1950.
recommendations to the interested Governments for its improvement’. The Council consisted of ‘a Rhodesian member, Union member and an independent Chairman. Its duty was to report on the working of the agreement and to study the development of trade in both countries’. Until such an agreement was established the draft maintained that certain duties were to remain in force in the transition stage. The two Governments ‘agreed to co-operate in so ordering trade between their respective countries as to bring about conditions in which ultimately each country will develop to the fullest extent those industries most suited to it’. Furthermore, the interim Agreement confirmed that the trade agreement entered into in ‘1935 between the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was to be superseded by this Agreement’.

Although the two Governments seemingly wanted to establish a complete Customs Union, reaching settlement on longstanding commercial issues was the main objective. As so often in the past, the trade of cattle and tobacco was a major obstacle, which to a large extent shaped the value of trade between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Under the 1935 Agreement ‘restrictions on tobacco and cattle movement continued, but by annual arrangement. The Union, however, still enjoyed a preference in most things, making the change, in effect, structural, legal and technical. In substance, if not in form, union was always the keynote’. South Africa’s advantageous trade position and the continued barriers imposed on Southern Rhodesian products was constantly acknowledged in Southern Rhodesia and used to motivate the need to amend the agreement. Historically and throughout this period, trade numbers have in part contributed to the Southern Rhodesian position. The table below reveals the following during the 1940s.

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18 Bulawayo Chronicle, 1 October 1948.
20 Cape Argus, 5 February 1946.
The concern in Southern Rhodesia on the issue of the value of trade with South Africa was that South Africa’s strong position was supported by the country’s protectionist measures. It was in light of these developments that Southern Rhodesia sought the removal of barriers to trade, particularly for its tobacco and cattle industry.

Under the proposed customs union, the preamble was drafted and redrafted to provide clarity on how interchange of these products between the two territories was to be administered. The ‘importation of slaughter cattle and beef carcasses from Southern Rhodesia into the Union was to be free from quantitative restrictions, but would be reviewed at the end of a period of five years from commencement of this agreement’. 23 Discussions on the issue of tobacco saw the ‘Union Delegation intimating that it was prepared to agree to the suggestion giving the Rhodesian Minister [of Agriculture] the power to limit the quantity of tobacco leaf to be exported to the Union, provided there is prior consultation with the Union Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. This was agreed to’. 24

After much redrafting, the Agreement finally came into effect on 1st April 1949. In essence, the Agreement embodied ‘unfettered, the Custom Union idea, . . . [with the possibility of extending] it to the Protectorates and Northern Rhodesia, subject to nobody being asked to

Table 6.1 Southern Rhodesia - South Africa Imports and Exports, 1938-1947 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southern Rhodesian exports to South Africa</th>
<th>South African exports to Southern Rhodesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>488,000</td>
<td>1,351,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,157,000</td>
<td>3,721,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,777,984</td>
<td>5,578,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1,900,842</td>
<td>7,951,611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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24 Ibid.
modify preference margins in duties with third parties’. 25 A key feature of the Agreement allowed over ‘an (undefined) transitory period, for Southern Rhodesia to reserve the right to impose duties on many articles to protect her own industrial expansion’. 26 Furthermore, the Agreement provided for the establishment of ‘a Customs Union Council, sitting in Pretoria and Salisbury for alternate periods of six months. This was regarded as an auspicious example of regional cooperation in Africa which would serve as an encouragement in aligning the tariffs of the two countries with foreign nations’. 27 Internationally the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) was to supervise ‘the transition to full customs union. The GATT obliged Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to prove that their customs union was not merely designed to perpetuate preferential arrangements’. 28

The Customs Union was criticised in some quarters. The South African Chamber of Industries adopted a resolution at its annual congress which stated to the effect that sections of the arrangement functioned detrimentally to South Africa’s ‘manufacturing industry and were productive of results inequitable and economically unsound, particularly under the conditions brought about by import control. The resolution urged the Government to take immediate steps to remove the resulting serious disadvantages, which were jeopardising the continuance of established industries in the Union’. 29

The sections of the agreement which the Chamber of Industries in South Africa considered prejudicial towards secondary industry can be explained by the fact that the agreement did not remove all tariff barriers, and those that remained favoured some Southern Rhodesian factories. This was because of the ‘differing stages of economic development of the two countries . . . [suggesting] that ten years should be allowed to complete the Customs Union’. 30 The ten year should bridge the gap between the two countries making possible the free interchange of domestic products. Compared to Southern Rhodesia, South Africa was much more advanced industrially. As a result of the years of ‘industrial experience behind

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Kanduza, Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 215.
29 Rand Daily Mail, 30 September 1949.
her and an array of up-to-date factories, the Union of South Africa made many gestures to help Rhodesian industry in the early stages of its development’. 31

Benefitting from protective duties under the new Customs Union, ‘Southern Rhodesia’s secondary industry, to a considerable extent, a child of wartime conditions proved to be a lusty infant in the post-war years from 1946 to 1949’. 32 Over the same period, secondary industrial output expanded significantly. The annual Census of Industrial Protection revealed an increase in the gross value of output of factory and workshop industries from £4,873,000 in 1939 to £16,903,000 in 1946 and £24,767,000 in 1948 while the equivalent 1949 figure is estimated at £29,450,000. The war years saw, therefore, an increase of 247 per cent in the gross value of output of the factory and workshop traders while there has been a further increase of 74 per cent between 1946 and 1949. 33

According to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, secondary industry had a vital part to play in building up Southern Rhodesia. ‘There is the very valuable contribution which it makes to our balance of trade, not only as an import saver but also as a money earner by exports to neighbouring territories’. 34 Manufactured exports to neighbouring countries and South Africa in particular, increased year on year. Over the decade 1945 - 1954, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa ‘experienced a decade of rapid industrial growth. It was the moment when Southern Rhodesia's economy “took off”, and the core period of South Africa's “industrial revolution”, when “manufacturing output grew especially rapidly”’. 35 This development enabled Southern Rhodesia to develop new export markets in South Africa. Salisbury was no longer selling only its primary products in the south. Because of diversification of export products after the Second World War, ‘South Africa, unimportant as a consumer of Southern Rhodesia manufactures in 1930, took more

31 The Industrial Review, December 1949.
33 Ibid.
34 The Industrial Review, June 1950.
than Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland combined in 1951’. According to Mosley, the importance of the South African market for Southern Rhodesian industry at this time was particularly in the textiles and clothing sector where it was possible for the Gatooma manufacturers to take advantage of the trade agreement with South Africa signed in 1949 to capture a large part of the native clothing trade. This trade on its own, in fact, accounted for 77.6 per cent of Southern Rhodesia’s exports of clothing, cotton piece goods, and cotton yarn in 1951, and indeed for 35.4 per cent of her gross production.

Trade between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa expanded rapidly. The 1948 Customs Agreement ‘was a success. In the Agreement’s first year of operation, Southern Rhodesian exports to South Africa more than doubled, and in 1950 they increased by a further 70 per cent over the figures for 1949’. Southern Rhodesian exports to South Africa by 1948 had risen in value to over £1 million, but her share of the total trade was only 4.7 per cent. In 1949 the value of exports, amounting to £2.6 million of 8.7 per cent of the total, more than doubled in value compared with the previous years and this upward trend continued in 1950 when the Union of South Africa took goods to the value of £4.4 million or 10.9 per cent of the aggregate value of domestic exports.

Thereafter, exports to the south jumped from ‘£1.2 million in 1948 to almost £7 million in 1953, and in the same period, Pretoria’s exports to Salisbury grew from £10.5 million to £23.5 million’. While the reduction of trade barriers under the new Customs Union Agreement was clearly one reason to this growth, Phimister notes that over this period, overall economic activity improved substantially in each country. Nonetheless, the propensity for trade to increase under the agreement seems obvious. Although South African ‘exports to Southern Rhodesia did not increase quite as fast as its total (non-gold) exports, the “proportionate increase in exports of Southern Rhodesian produce to the Union . . . [was] very much greater than that in the total exports of Southern Rhodesia”’.  

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37 Ibid.
39 *Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia*, No. 4 (Salisbury, 1952), 686.
41 Ibid.
In Southern Rhodesia, European immigration grew steadily in these years. With the rise of settler immigration, it was noted that ‘Southern Rhodesia was buying from South Africa more than £100 per head annually. With immigration growing as it was each successive month meant roughly an additional £150,000 worth of business for Union industry’. South Africa saw Southern Rhodesia’s expanding settler population as a valuable market. Southern Rhodesia on the other hand wanted to increase its exports to South Africa by targeting African consumers. It noted that ‘the vast bulk of what South Africa bought from the territory was for the native trade; while Southern Rhodesia purchases from the Union were almost all for our Europeans’. Consequently, Southern Rhodesian officials saw that with the increase of the white population in ‘Rhodesia, the purchasing from the Union would grow; and as the earning power of the native in the Union grew, so would Southern Rhodesia’s industries reap the full benefit of the fact that a large proportion of its production was for the native trade’. Over a two year period the combined trade between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia increased by ‘£8,888,500 between 1948 and 1950 – a rise of 76 per cent. This was shown in the annual report of the Southern Africa Customs Union Council’. The yearly growth in the value of trade reached the point where the countries were exchanging £11,697,000 worth of domestic produce. By 1949 this had increased to £14,822,000, and by 1950 to £20,585,000. During the two years the Customs Union agreement had been in force between the two countries, combined trade had been stepped up by three-quarters of the 1948 figure, the increase in 1950 being nearly double that of 1949.

But despite the fact that trade between the two countries grew substantially in the post-Customs Union period, points of friction began to multiply, noticeably on the Southern Rhodesian side. At the annual congress of the Federated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, delegations from the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, as well as representatives of commerce in Northern Rhodesia, East Africa and Mozambique were invited. One of Southern Rhodesia’s objectives at the annual congress was to instigate a move towards ‘the establishment of closer commercial as well as political liaison with the

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Cape Argus, 21 June 1951.
46 Ibid.
Colony’s neighbours’. A resolution at the annual congress of the Federated Chamber of Commerce in Rhodesia called in 1950 for action in order to bring nearer the establishment of ‘complete customs union between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia by removing entirely the necessity for framing bills of entry for duty-free items from the Union under the present trade agreement. The other call was for the establishment of a customs union with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland’. 

Three years later Southern Rhodesian industrialists were unhappy about the Customs Union. At the annual congress of the Federation of Rhodesian Industries, D.A.G Roberts, President of the Federation declared that

it was with the gravest concern that Industry viewed the South African Government’s complete failure to implement an important article of the Customs Union Agreement. The article concerned, he said, was that dealing with the definition of manufacture, and the result of the South African attitude had been “a complete loss of confidence in the principle or idea of Customs Union”.

The functioning of the Customs Union was also questioned by A.H.V. Muirhead, vice-chairman of the Federation of Rhodesian Industries. Addressing the annual congress, Muirhead insisted that nearly all Rhodesian industrialists held very strong feelings about the operation of the Customs Union, stating that: ‘In fact I will go so far as to say that I am not sure that the agreement is in effect a valid operative agreement today, for part of the agreement has never been ratified and brought into operation by the Union Government’.

The features of the Customs Union put down certain principles intended for the ‘free flow of trade on the basis of fair and unsubsidized competition. It also specifically provided for consultation between the two Governments about the implementation of Rhodesian industry on a sound economic basis but also for the encouragement in each country of those industries most suited to it’. According to Roberts, these ideals and objectives ‘have for the most part been by-passed and that, in fact, various actions have been taken from time to time which, in the view of Industry in this country, are direct contraventions of the

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47 Rand Daily Mail, 7 March 1950.
48 Ibid.
49 Commerce, August 1953.
50 Rhodesia Herald, 10 July 1953.
51 Commerce, August 1953.
stated purposes of the Agreement’. 52 Indeed Muirhead went further and promoted a resolution calling for the Federal Government to introduce equitable conditions which ‘would eliminate the “detrimental influence on Rhodesia’s younger industries”’. 53 With the establishment of Federation, he considered that ‘they should have a very much greater bargaining power in negotiation for a new agreement of this nature with the Union for whom up to now the balance of trade had been decisively in its favour’. 54 At the Federation of Rhodesian Industries congress in 1953, many industrialists called for protective tariffs of local industries once the Central African Federation was established. T.W. Hamilton, vice-president of the Bulawayo Chamber, said that

> although he was opposed to protective customs barriers, they were essential if Central African industries were to have an even break. Both the United States and South Africa were protecting home industries by import control, tariffs or both. South Africa, in fact, had done it so well that Southern Rhodesia was suffering as a direct result. Now, Southern Rhodesia and the new Federal State had no alternative but to follow suit. Unless they adopted similar tactics many local industries would have to close down. 55

Muirhead argued that Southern Rhodesia’s infant industries could not possibly compete without encouragement and support. He said ‘he did not want full protection but only for those products which could be produced in Central Africa. He thought tariffs would keep out cheap goods, and what was really needed was a sound system of import control’. 56 A combination of growing unhappiness with South Africa’s failure to implement certain articles of the Agreement by 1953 as well as the establishment of Federation, both contributed to the desire by Southern Rhodesia Industrialists for revision of the existing Customs Union. The coming of Federation, though was as much political as it was an economic development. Southern Rhodesia-South African post-war relations played a crucial role in this development. The next section examines Southern Rhodesia-South African political relations from the end of the Second World War, in the process providing insight as to how Federation came to existence.

52 Ibid.
53 Rhodesia Herald, 10 July 1953.
54 Ibid.
55 Cape Times, 10 July 1953.
56 Ibid.
6.2 The fault line: political ties, 1946-1953

Following the end of the Second World War, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa boomed. The expanding Southern Rhodesian economy prompted growing interests in some quarters for a larger market and access to more African labour than were ‘available in the country itself. Amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia would provide these advantages while, at the same time, enabling Southern Rhodesia settlers to access the considerable foreign currency earnings from Northern Rhodesia’s copper exports, especially in the light of the copper boom of the immediate post-war years’.57

The allure of amalgamation for the settlers in Southern Rhodesia was captured partly by a tobacco farmer, who said that the goal of merging with Northern Rhodesia was that ‘the copper mines could pay for the development of the whole area, the same way as the coal mines did in Britain and gold in South Africa’.58 But if the economic argument for amalgamation at this time was especially strong it was hardly new. And there was always the matter of political union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa lurking in the background. Concerned voices in Southern Rhodesia were worried that the customs agreement

might lead to political unity. However, the notion was ridiculed by the Burger, which said that in the case of South West Africa and the Protectorates incorporation would only establish de jure something which already exist de facto, namely economic integration. Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, is economically independent and belongs geographically not to the Union but to the British territories in the north. The paper added that South Africa did not desire union between the two countries, but rather co-operation.59

What had changed was the National Party’s victory in the 1948 in the South African general election and the implications of this for Salisbury. Closer Southern Rhodesian ties with South Africa as a means of strengthening ‘white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia would be at the price of Afrikaner dominance, including such possibilities as giving the Afrikaans language equal status with English in the schools and the spectre of an eventual republic. The English-

59 TNA, DO 121/244/2, Sir Eric Machtig Private Papers, Letter from High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Pretoria to Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, London, 2 December 1948.
speaking settlers of Southern Rhodesia acquired a new sense of isolation’. Consequently, many whites at the time did not want incorporation as an immediate prospect. But if the ‘United Party were returned to power in South Africa, if there was an economic recession, and if anxieties about being swamped by African nationalism grew, then pro-Union feeling might intensify’.

The new sense of isolation identified by Leys in Southern Rhodesia had a clearly pressing economic dimension to it. Southern Rhodesia was running short of development funds necessary for nourishing the rapid ‘post-war immigration, and essential to the future of white supremacy. It was feared that the London money market might dry up. There were also strong objections to seeking support from South Africa and Northern Rhodesia’s prodigious copper revenues acquired a fresh significance’. The major supporters in Southern Rhodesia for closer association with the north were the white elite, in particular ‘the industrial and commercial corporations who looked to the larger markets, which would be available and the valuable copper revenue’. Furthermore, a notable section of white Southern Rhodesians also supported ‘amalgamation because they feared that the Colonial Office might impose its African policy [of self-rule on Central Africa]’. Sir Godfrey Huggins, Southern Rhodesia’s long-serving Prime Minister, made the point more explicitly in 1948 for the need of closer association:

We do not want our grandchildren to have as a neighbour a state such as Liberia which has no European guidance. The Southern Rhodesian Minister of Internal Affairs, J.M. Greenfield, made the case for greater autonomy and careful control of African advance:

One of the principal reasons for having this association at all was to get as much power away as possible out of the hands of people far away in London.

Throughout the 1940s, Huggins sought to ensure the issue of amalgamation was not lost especially in the context of the war. The war had caused disruption on certain matters in Southern Rhodesia. For example, the question of amalgamation of the Central Africa

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63 Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, 88.

64 Wood, Welensky Papers, 207.

65 Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, 84.
territories had been interrupted. The approaching war prohibited official discussion on the matter. However, supporters of amalgamation were ‘determined to keep the issue alive. Huggins (now Sir Godfrey) declared in 1941 that he had not agreed to defer amalgamation for the duration of the war, and Roy Welensky in the same vein pressed that the principle at least should be accepted at once’.66

An active supporter of closer relations with the north, Huggins’ commitment was not ‘merely to “closer association” between the two Rhodesias but to their amalgamation as an independent white Dominion’.67 The Prime Minister’s policy turned on the reality that South Africa overshadowed the entire region. In the early 1940s, Sir Evelyn Baring, British High Commissioner in South Africa, observed that: ‘Huggins spends more time flying to Pretoria than he does to Lusaka’.68 Amalgamation now opened up the prospect of escaping from Pretoria’s shadow.

The initial desire for amalgamation between the two Rhodesias changed over time into a Central African Federation including Nyasaland. For Southern Rhodesia, the idea of federation, White notes, was ‘a “marriage of convenience” between a wealthy bride (copper-rich Northern Rhodesia) and a hardworking husband (the not-so-coded reference to white settlers in Southern Rhodesia). Impoverished Nyasaland was accepted “as the unavoidable mother-in-law in the matrimonial home”’.69 All three territories were highly ‘interdependent economically. Federation would promote the prosperity of all through facilitating the flow of goods and services and encouraging increased external investment’,70 but despite the economic case for Federation, Chartrand argues that it was politics which persuaded the relevant parties that federation was urgently needed. The political arguments centred ‘once again on the South Africa factor. It is developments in South Africa far more than the Rhodesian settler campaign, which explains the creation of a Rhodesian settler-dominated federation in Central Africa in 1953’.71

68 Ibid.
69 White, Unpopular Sovereignty, 8.
71 Ibid.
Political events in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia certainly shaped if they did not determine the creation of Federation. In September 1948, a general election took place in Southern Rhodesia. It gave Huggins a victory as conclusive as ‘that of 1934 and even more crushing than that of 1939. Huggins won twenty-four seats and was in an impregnable position for the next five years’. The elections results were a vote of confidence in the administration of Sir Godfrey Huggins, ‘who was Prime of Southern Rhodesia for 15 years, and it was the most decisive result yet recorded in the Colony’s electoral history’. Huggins’ overwhelming victory, however, faded into insignificance compared to events months earlier in South Africa. When South Africa’s election campaign got underway, the ruling United Party (UP) machinery ‘failed to see that it was in trouble, Afrikaners had been seriously alienated from the UP by the split decision in 1939 to enter the war and perceived victimisation of Afrikaners during the war’. Additionally, the UP had to contend with the fact that the cost of living had increased significantly, rising in an index ‘(1938=100) from 133 in 1945 to 146 early in 1948. The real wages of white workers had fallen during the war, while the influx of large numbers of blacks into industry in the 1930s and 1940s, together with mechanisation, frightened white workers, particularly those whose skills were not scarce’.

For its part, the National Party (NP) election campaign made race relations the main issue in the general election. The NP’s racial policy turned on the notion of Apartheid, or so-called ‘separate development’. But while apartheid was the ‘central prop of the NP’s 1948 electoral platform . . . [it] remained a fairly vague set of principles rather than a fully worked-out programme. The NP’s electoral manifesto acknowledged that “apartheid” was very far from a detailed policy’, but it was enough to win the election. In May 1948, the NP, in ‘alliance with the Afrikaner Party won a majority of five seats’. More than this, the NP came into power on an ‘anti-capitalist platform, whose policy promised drastic state intervention in the functioning of labour and other markets, and the strict regulation of all

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72 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 241.
73 East Africa and Rhodesia, 23 September 1948.
74 Giliomee, Afrikaners, 479.
75 Ibid, 480.
77 Giliomee, Afrikaners, 482.
sectors of the economy’. And of huge symbolic significance, the new government formed the first Cabinet in the history of ‘the Union of South Africa from which English-speaking South Africans were excluded entirely. National Party rhetoric also seemed to commit the new government to breaking down the British connection whenever and wherever possible’.

The 1948 South African election outcome was a significant event for southern Africa as a whole and Southern Rhodesia in particular. In Southern Rhodesia, ‘the fear of Afrikaans political and cultural nationalism . . . was still strong and was indeed to remain so for ten years’. Throughout the 1940s, the majority of British Rhodesians had looked upon the Afrikaners of South Africa as the main threat to their own state. ‘Anti-Afrikaner sentiments, provoked by the victory of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, had played a considerable part in the Rhodesian general election of 1948’. Subsequently, antagonism towards Afrikaners intensified, ‘largely because Afrikaners in Southern Rhodesia for the first time formed themselves into an overtly Nationalist group called the Democratic Party with one of its leading members known as a Suikerbossie, the name given to those who had refused to serve in the war’. For one historian, South Africa was important because it brought ‘Malan’s Nationalists into office with the avowed intention of carrying out the policy of apartheid. Southern Rhodesia thus was able to stand out in sharper light as a bulwark of British liberalism in southern Africa’.

The reaction by successive Labour Governments in Britain to events in South Africa was ambiguous. On the one hand, according to Chartrand and Hyam and Henshaw amongst other scholars, there existed a pervasive aversion in Britain towards South Africa’s apartheid policies, which invigorated liberals who may have otherwise not have ‘favoured federation to accept that it was a matter of great urgency to insulate Rhodesia from South Africa’s virulent racism, and that this could only be done by tying Rhodesia’s destiny to that of the

78 O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, 80.
79 Hyam and Henshaw, Lion and the Springbok, 133.
80 Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision, 85.
81 Gann and Duignan, ‘Changing Patterns of a White Elite: Rhodesian and other Settlers’, 126.
82 Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision, 86.
83 Willis, Introduction to the History of Central Africa, 315.
British territories to the north’. These same historians insist that British dislike of South African policies was generally so great that British policy-makers were disinclined to transfer the High Commission Territories of Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland to South Africa, as they distrusted any government which might supplant Smuts’s administration. London’s sense of ‘obligation to the African was now so strong, as Baring put it in 1945, that despite the strategic imperial importance of South Africa, “we should never sacrifice the true interests of Africans to a desire to remain friendly with a Government at Pretoria”’. Any transfer of the High Commission Territories became extremely unlikely after the NP’s electoral triumph in 1948. According the Hyam and Henshaw, ‘Smuts’s loss to Malan at the 1948 election ended the hope of a negotiated transfer of any of the Territories. In winning the election the Nationalists ensured the defeat of formal South African territorial expansion’. Of particular significance for this thesis, is that British refusal to transfer any of its Territories to the Malan Government formed part of a renewed positive policy of containing ‘Afrikanerdom, of which the setting up the Central African Federation was another aspect’. More recently, Cohen has argued that the ‘idea of federating Britain’s Central African territories enjoyed a measure of encouragement from both the Attlee and Churchill governments. This cross-party support for federation has been attributed to halt the spread of apartheid after 1948’. Consequently, Federation was regarded as a way of strengthening the forces of ‘liberalism and racial partnership and counterbalance South African practices’.

But on the other hand, Britain’s strategic concerns in the context of the Cold War tended to make her policy entirely pragmatic. One of London’s major concerns in this period was the ‘looming prospect of conflict with Moscow. The intensification of the Cold War, in this same period obliged Britain’s military planners to take seriously the possibility of outright war with the Soviet Union’. And British military planners thought that the next war would be waged with atomic bombs. By the end of 1946 before the ‘contours of the Cold War became

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84 Chartrand, ‘Political Change in Rhodesia’, 16.
85 Hyam and Henshaw, Lion and the Springbok, 116.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
clear, [Britain] was modelling her defence for the atomic age, and one that mapped a new role for the Empire. South Africa and Australia would provide industrial base areas in order to take responsibility for regional defence using British equipment’.91

In late 1947, Field Marshall Lord Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial Staff, touched down in South Africa to discuss Commonwealth and South African defence. An agreement over the ‘principles defining the position of South Africa in a global war were reached. At the heart of the agreement was the assumption that Pretoria would stand with London and the British Commonwealth in any future war’.92 These developments took place within the context of Britain’s decision to relinquish empire in Asia, and then in West Africa and the Caribbean. But in most British minds these precedents ‘offered no guide for the future of East or Central Africa. London’s attitude was determined by the strategic requirements of the Cold War and by the new economic importance assigned to Africa in assisting the post-war reconstruction of Britain’.93 Given the looming prospects of an atomic war and the need to develop colonial resources for the benefit of Britain, Montgomery’s tour of Africa and South Africa in particular sought to ensure that Britain’s security and economic needs were protected.

Yet British politicians were also wary about the growing power of South Africa. They feared the danger that Southern Rhodesia on her own would gravitate towards South Africa. Britain felt that the Colony would be drawn into domestic white struggles in South Africa. Worse of, it might acquire a ‘poor white and an urban native problem; immigration from overseas would end, and African land tenure might be menaced for the sake of pleasing Union settlers and Great Britain would lose control over a valuable source of raw material’.94

After the NP electoral victory in 1948, British policy in the southern African region was recalibrated. The case for English dominated and therefore ‘liberal’ Central African State as a counterpoise to Afrikaner nationalism appealed to a ‘broad political spectrum in Britain. Economic arguments – dollar-earning capacity of copper and tobacco – and strategic

considerations – the danger of South Africa drawing the territories north of the Limpopo into her orbit – alike pointed towards a new departure from traditional policies’. 95 Southern Rhodesia was a particular source of concern. According to Chartrand, by 1949-1950, that some South African politicians were worried in fact engaged in a covert plan to install a Fifth Column of “right-thinking” Afrikaners within Southern Rhodesia such that one day a majority of Rhodesian settlers would vote for union with South Africa. Griffiths indicated in an interview with this writer that British Intelligence in 1950 had discovered a plot by the South African Broecerbond, a semi-secret fascist society composed of influential Afrikaners, to finance and train Afrikaners to immigrate into the Rhodesias. 96

On the Southern Rhodesian side, there was ‘an emotional but very real fear of South African Afrikaner nationalism spreading northward in 1950’. 97 A group of young Rhodesian settlers, alarmed at what was seen as the Nationalist Afrikaner penetration into Southern Rhodesia, ‘determined to play their part in maintaining the British traditions and connections of the Colony formed themselves into a “vigilance group” to investigate and counteract Nationalist propaganda’. 98 A notable characteristic of this group was that many of its members were former South Africans, and the majority ‘held commissions during the war. Several members of prominent Afrikaner families who immigrated to Southern Rhodesia were members’. 99

Quite how widespread this Rhodesian fear of South African influence actually was, is a matter of debate. Cohen, by contrast argued that ‘pro-Federation settlers exaggerated South Africa’s growing influence in Southern Rhodesia’, 100 in order to put pressure on Britain. For these settlers, Federation was less about curbing South African expansionism than it was about using Federation to obtain dominion status. Federation was not the ‘ultimate goal of the settlers; rather a stepping stone to full independence for a white-dominated country’. 101

Despite the presence of some Afrikaners in the group, noted above, Southern Rhodesia’s official attitude remained wary where it was not actually hostile. There was real difference of opinion between the two countries. Many Southern Rhodesians believed the NP was anti-

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96 Chartrand, ‘Political Change in Rhodesia’, 16.
97 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Cohen, ‘Settler Power, African Nationalism and British Interests’, 5-6.
101 Ibid, 6.
British, and wanted South Africa to become a Republic. Southern Rhodesians feared that South Africa might attempt to control them and the immigration of Afrikaners to the two Rhodesias was regarded as a tangible manifestation of South African expansionism. British authorities were particularly concerned about the number of South Africans moving to Northern Rhodesia mistakenly fearing that the ‘continued infiltration of Afrikaners into the copper belt, arguing that the Dutchmen was more politically minded and apt to breed larger families than Britishers - would one day dominate the country’s electoral roll’. The majority of South Africans migrating north were not Afrikaners but English-speaking South Africans. Although South African immigration to the north received considerable attention at this time, British officials also feared the susceptibility of the Southern Rhodesians to economic pressure from South Africa. According to Hyam, ‘the building up of a strong British state was regarded as essential in order to withstand external pressures. The supreme advantage of such a state appeared to be that it could enforce a common immigration policy for all three territories, and control Afrikaner influx’.

The South African government was better informed about Southern Rhodesian attitudes than was London. British officials persuaded themselves that some Southern Rhodesian ministers, civil servants and businessmen had ‘views indistinguishable from South African apartheid. Furthermore, perhaps a third of the Europeans would vote for incorporation in the Union, some for economic reasons, some to strengthen the pro-British element in South Africa, some out of genuine approval of the Union, and some from dislike of the Colonial Office’. It was also observed that a group of people in Southern Rhodesia was banding together ‘to form a new political party that would advocate very close ties with South Africa, with the ideas of ultimately bringing Southern Rhodesia into the Union, as a sixth province’. Yet Afrikaner support could be less than helpful to Union protagonists. South Africa’s High Commissioner in Salisbury reported that Afrikaners in Southern Rhodesia were indisputably in somewhat of a ‘political quandary for the United Party, chiefly in the person of Sir Godfrey Huggins, had shown that it was in no great need of them. The Liberal Party

102 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, 209.
104 Ibid, 154.
had been fairly circumspect about the Afrikaners and has the one and only Afrikaner in Parliament sitting among its ranks.\textsuperscript{106}

What the British saw however was the apparent danger that Southern Rhodesia would be drawn northwards or southwards. One or the other was inevitable, ‘because she was not large enough to stand on her own as a separate unit without access to the sea. Therefore, it was argued, Britain ought to adopt a deliberate policy of attracting Southern Rhodesia to the north’.\textsuperscript{107} Failure to contain South Africa was seen as an end to British work and influence in the region. It was proposed that ‘it should become one of the cardinal policies to keep Southern Rhodesia out of the Union. This was a keystone of the policy of containing South Africa’.\textsuperscript{108}

By 1951, the prospects of establishing a British Central African State had improved. Returned to power, the Labour Party was open to the idea of some kind of Central African grouping. This might off-set Pretoria’s undoubted regional power. However, Britain would have to move cautiously, given the realities of South African dominance. Gordon Walker, the Commonwealth Secretary, feared that the Royal Navy base at Simonstown might be shut down, and ‘South Africa troops, which Smuts and Malan had “pledged”, might not be available to support Britain in the Middle East in the event of another World War – which, with Korea on the boil, looked a distinct possibility, and South Africa’s gold directly affected Britain’s sterling balances’.\textsuperscript{109}

Despite or because of South African regional power, Walker recommended Federation to the ‘Cabinet because “Southern Rhodesia already had practical independence, and they could defy us with impunity if we sought to interfere improperly”. Also stressed was the latent danger that if Southern Rhodesia was, by the British Government, “improperly” interfered with, Malan stood ready to welcome it’.\textsuperscript{110} With Labour taking the initial step towards Federation, ‘Federation was set up by a Conservative government in 1953’.\textsuperscript{111} As a means of dissuading Southern Rhodesia from South African influence and to ‘curtail the

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Verrier, Road to Zimbabwe 1890-1980, 60.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 66-67.
expansion of Afrikaner influence into the African interior, as well as to strengthen the region’s economy, among other considerations, the British helped sponsor the Central African Federation that brought the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland together in 1953’. 112 Hyam contends that Federation was a higher priority for the Conservatives than it had been for their Labour predecessors. Fundamentally the ‘Conservatives were more inclined as a general policy to want to be friendly towards South Africa. Paradoxically this meant that federation assumed greater importance as the surrogate agent which would carry out the unfriendly work of controlling South African immigration’. 113

Although one of the aims of establishing a British controlled Central African territory was to counter rising Afrikaner political influence, it was seen quite differently by politically aware Africans in the northern territories and their supporters in Whitehall. With few exceptions, ‘they opposed Federation vehemently and consistently because they were convinced that it would entrench white minority rule at the expense of African political advancement’. 114 African opposition to Federation, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was strong from the very beginning. As early as 1950, African organisations opposed Federation. The Nyasaland African Protectorate Council argued that ‘promises made by the British Government would not be fulfilled’. 115 In Northern Rhodesia, similar sentiments were expressed by the Northern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress, which ‘denounced amalgamation as “an act of injustice” and “a breach of the Atlantic Charter” which would lead to increased immigration from South Africa and threaten Native political and economic development’. 116 In Salisbury, a meeting called by the South Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) decided that, ‘whilst the creation of a Central African Federation was economically desirable, it would not be in the Natives’ interest at the present stage of political development’. 117

In South Africa, Afrikaner Nationalists were following developments in the north with keen interests. As discussed in previous chapters, an earlier generation of South African

114 Chartrand, ‘Political Change in Rhodesia’, 16.
115 Mlambo, ‘From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965’, 89.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
politicians had always regarded the absorption of Southern Rhodesia as inevitable. By 1951, ‘the Nationalists were coming to the same conclusion. Strijdom had already said it was Nationalist policy to spread apartheid beyond South Africa's borders’.\textsuperscript{118} Afrikaner Nationalists now stressed the closeness of the ties binding the two countries. Economic ties, it was noted were particularly strong. Southern Rhodesia was ‘yoked to the South African Customs Agreement. All the banks, and most of the press, the large merchant houses and commercial firms, were Union subsidiaries. The co-operation of South African Railways was vital for marketing and transit. The Union had long given favourable economic treatment to Southern Rhodesia’.\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore, ‘the Broederbond had branches there and a shadowy Afrikaner Nationalist Party was set up after 1948; it became the Democratic Party with incorporation as its main plank’.\textsuperscript{120} Added to this was that the Dutch Reformed Church had demanded that ‘Afrikaans be taught in Southern Rhodesia schools by right, threatening that, if the Government did not comply, it would influence congregations in the Rhodesias to strive for union with South Africa’.\textsuperscript{121} In the event, though, this mixture of carrot and stick failed to halt the move towards Federation.

According to Pratt, the fear of South African influence was ‘the most important reason for the support which many liberals gave to the proposals for a Central African Federation. James Griffiths confirmed that as Secretary of State he was influenced by this argument: an argument, he added, that had been pressed upon him by his advisers’.\textsuperscript{122} Similarly, Hyam and Henshaw concluded that Britain’s motivation in setting up Federation was to set-up a counterpoise to South African expansion, in particular to check Afrikaner migration. The Central African Federation was a ‘geopolitical construct designed to place the first line of defence against South African expansion on the Limpopo. The theory was that such a bloc, opposed apartheid and republicanism, might be great value in encouraging a proper development of all British African territories’.\textsuperscript{123} But although Federation was meant to prevent union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the idea was never jettisoned completely in Southern Rhodesia. At the start of 1953, an alternative to Federation was still

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Hyam and Henshaw, \textit{Lion and the Springbok}, 227.
\textsuperscript{121} Wood, \textit{Welensky Papers}, 150.
\textsuperscript{122} Pratt, ‘Why Federation was Supported’, in Leys and Pratt (eds.), \textit{A New Deal in Central Africa} (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 50.
\textsuperscript{123} Hyam and Henshaw, \textit{Lion and the Springbok}, 224-225.
being entertained in Southern Rhodesia. Although it may have been a bluff, ‘Sir Godfrey Huggins and, apparently, the majority of the Southern Rhodesian electorate, which saw that an alternative to federation with the Northern Rhodesians and Nyasaland might be necessary, and that alternative could only be that of becoming a province of the Union, after all’.124 Probably with the intention of putting pressure on Britain to speed up the process, Huggins claimed that,

if Federation failed to go through, Southern Rhodesia might look south and join the ‘White front’ in the Union. If Southern Rhodesia was unable to link politically and economically with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, she would find herself isolated. For economic reasons alone she would have to link up with someone else. ‘If she had to look one way or the other, the odds are that she would join the White front now in South Africa’.125

The idea of union was still alive, more so for Southern Rhodesia as its future was uncertain concerning its ambitions in Central Africa. South Africa continued to loom large in Southern Rhodesian thinking.

6.3 Immigration and Cultural Connections
The historical connections between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa meant that in reality, Southern Rhodesia could not avoid dealing with its southern neighbour. The connection between the two territories dates back to the origins of Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was connected to South Africa ‘by a main line from Cape Town. Occupation of Mashonaland by the Pioneer Column in 1891 was followed by an influx of white people from South Africa and Great Britain. Southern Rhodesians also took six months’ holiday every three or four years, either to Cape Colony or to England’.126 Although Hone describes the connection between the two countries in the early years of the relationship, relations between the two countries by the 1940s continued to be shaped by these developments especially as it relates to migration.

Where South African expansionism was characterised by Afrikaner migration to the north in the 1940s, it was closely monitored by Southern Rhodesia. As noted in earlier chapters, the movement of whites between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was one of the pillars

124 Bate, Report from the Rhodesias, 24.
125 Rand Daily Mail, 30 January 1953.
upon which relations between the two countries were established. This movement accelerated in the post-Second World War era. The white Southern Rhodesian population increased by

39 per cent from 83,450 at 30th June, 1946, to 116,000 at 30th June, 1949. At the end of 1949 it was in excess of 120,000. A comparison of these figures with the European population of 64,000 at 30th June, 1939, shows, that, over the 10 years from 1939 to 1949, the European population rose by over 80 per cent and the major part of this rise took place in the years from 1946 to 1949. 127

Over a period of five years, the ‘Rhodesian European population rose from 82,000 to 135,000 . . . , the highest increase in over thirty years. Of these, some 17,000 entered the country in 1948 alone, the largest one-year inflow ever’. 128 Table 6.2 provides information on the origins of the white population since 1901.

Table 6.2 European Population by Country of Birth (%)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Southern Rhodesia</th>
<th>Union of South Africa</th>
<th>United Kingdom and Eire</th>
<th>Other Countries</th>
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<td>1921</td>
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<td>24.7</td>
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<td>39 174</td>
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<td>1936</td>
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The inflow of immigrants to the country continued well into the 1950s. According to Blake, a second wave of immigrants between 1951 and 1960 led to an increase in the white population ‘from 135,000 to 223,000. By 1950 there were more post-war immigrants among white adults than persons born in the country or settled before the war. They were nearly all English-speaking’.129 Furthermore, Southern Rhodesia had a strict ‘limited quota of foreigners. Very few, even from among the Italians imported to build the Kariba dam, were allowed to take up permanent residence’.130

The society which immigrants entered was intensely, almost overpoweringly, ‘British in sentiment, apart from the Afrikaner, nominally “British” for census purposes, but regarded as outsiders’.131 Furthermore, the white Southern Rhodesian society at the time displayed a way of life in keeping more with America than Britain. It was ‘competitive, conformist,

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130 Ibid.
131 Ibid, 277.
mobile, ostentatious, socially, though not economically egalitarian. In 1952 there was one motor car to every four Europeans – a figure almost equal to that of contemporary America, and the quality of housing and the extent of home ownership was far more American than British. Extremes of wealth and poverty were rare. Settlers had domestic servants, dressed in approximately the same fashion, shared the same drinking and eating habits, nearly all went on the same sort of holidays of similar places and their sport and recreation, schooling of their children did not vary widely; they shared the same doctors, newspapers and largely the same infection of speech. To an outsider all this and much else gave the impression of homogeneity.

The upsurge in immigration to Southern Rhodesia at this time was due to the fact that Britons were emigrating from Britain in large numbers ‘after the war anyway and Rhodesia was . . . able to capture some of that population movement’. Schutz notes that from 1947-53 nearly half of the ‘British immigrants to Southern Rhodesia migrated directly to the territory. The slight decline in proportion during 1950-51 was due to the absolute increase in South African immigration generated it would seem, by the coming to power of the Afrikaner Nationalists in 1948, and the expanding Rhodesian economy’. They were readily absorbed by the expanding economy, as industrial development, combined with ‘discrimination against the employment of Africans in skilled trades, provided ample opportunity for the immigration of skilled workers of European origin’. Another draw to Southern Rhodesia was the fact that the Royal Air Force training centre had been located in Rhodesia during the war. ‘Some of those who immigrated in the post-war period had been stationed in the country at the training centre and had grown attached to it’. ‘People were attracted to Rhodesia because it was a privileged, comfortable life’, explained Schultz. ‘The new immigrants drifted to the towns, particularly Salisbury, while myths of rural Rhodesia and the Pioneers justified their migration’. Overall, immigration to Southern Rhodesia during this period is in part a consequence of the events of the war and ‘the

132 Ibid.
133 Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision, 65.
134 Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia, 7.
136 Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia, 7.
137 Ibid.
condition of Great Britain after the war provided the possibility of extensive British immigration into Southern Rhodesia’.  

Although many new arrivals were from Britain, immigrants from South Africa also constituted a sizeable share of the migrant inflow. From 1946 onwards ‘there had been a great trek from the Union to Southern Rhodesia and altogether more than 34,000 had migrated, which initially no political significance could, however, be attached to this. Many of the immigrants had left while the United Party was in power’. But in 1946-51, during which time the Afrikaner Nationalists ‘came into power and the response was a mild exodus of English-speaking South Africans into Rhodesia. It was suggested that that these were not trekkers to liberalism but were rather people who felt that their political and economic power base was being cut under them’. Of the sizeable number of immigrants from South Africa, Blake notes that many were ‘probably transients from the United Kingdom who had spent a few months in the Union to try their luck before moving on. Others were ‘real’ South Africans, but they were by no means of a uniform category’. There were Afrikaners, seeking better working opportunities up north, as well as English-speakers seeking to escape the rise of Afrikaner dominance in South Africa.

A major concern about the number of South Africans ‘coming into Southern Rhodesia was the rate of Afrikaner immigration to the territory’. The South African High Commissioner thought that there was ‘the nervousness that the privileged position of the English speaking community was being threatened by a big influx of Afrikaners, some of whom were certainly anti-English’. In the context of the unsettled state of Afrikaner-English relations, Afrikaner immigration was debated in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in 1951. Addressing the future of whites in the region, P.A. Wise (Liberal member for Hartley) ‘referred to a reported statement made by Sir Godfrey Huggins, that the Prime Minister was not afraid of Afrikaner infiltration. Wise stressed that that there was reason for anxiety, talks of Broederbond activities, a South African Republic, had made most Rhodesians to

140 *Rhodesia Herald*, 5 April 1951.
142 Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, 274.
143 *Rhodesia Herald*, 5 August 1950.
become very perturbed’.\textsuperscript{145} For his part, Huggins welcomed all immigrants who were ‘willing to be loyal Rhodesians, to accept one official language and to support the British system of Parliamentary government, which meant allegiance to the King, around whom the whole system was founded’.\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, Huggins believed that there existed an Afrikaner element in Southern Rhodesia, which was estimated at between ‘15 and 20 per cent of the total European population of about 128,000 only a small percentage who fell into the category of the “disloyal element” in his condemnation of extremist minorities in the Rhodesia Parliament’.\textsuperscript{147}

Another important factor to consider is that immigration was a subject fully within the control of local government; ‘there was nothing to stop the authorities in either of the Rhodesias from limiting immigration in any way they chose, and Southern Rhodesia did in fact limit Afrikaner immigration in 1952 before federation’.\textsuperscript{148} The issue for Southern Rhodesia was that regardless of the number of Afrikaners migrating to the territory or the potential threat of so-called racial subversion, there existed significant apprehension about Afrikaner dominated South Africa and its potential influence north of the Limpopo. But these fears seem always to have been muted by notions of shared white supremacy. For Clements, Southern Rhodesia, like Canada, was all too aware of the ‘cultural and economic weight of an enormously more powerful and prosperous neighbour’. But the difference was that the ‘powerful force of racial and cultural minority among the whites in Rhodesia unlike the French in Canada, pulled with rather than pushed against the pressures from the south’.\textsuperscript{149}

However, fears of increased Afrikaner immigration into Southern Rhodesia need to be placed in perspective. Quite apart from the different political perspectives which were being ground, there was the fact that other ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa remained undisturbed. Trade interests were largely complementary ‘and there was much in trade that was mutually beneficial. Tourism allowed for many friendly contacts. Furthermore, there were thousands of Rhodesians in South African schools and Universities,

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 2 February 1951.
\textsuperscript{146} Cape Times, 12 April 1950.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, 10 May 1950.
\textsuperscript{148} Chartrand, ‘Political Change in Rhodesia’, 16.
\textsuperscript{149} Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision, 69.
and many more thousands had their origin or education in the Union’.150 One such example was Ian Smith, the last white Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. Smith returned to ‘complete his final year for his degree at Rhodes University in 1946. His first term was in 1938. Smith notes that one of his claims to fame was that in 1946, returning back to Rhodes was his position as stroke in the Rhodes Crew’.151 Smith, however, emphasises that it was rugby and cricket, white Rhodesia’s two national sports that were central to the sporting links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. When it came to sports, in particular ‘cricket and rugby, Rhodesia was a “province” of South Africa, and the highest ambition of any youngster was to play for the Springboks’.152 All secondary schools in Southern Rhodesia had cricket and rugby compulsory games, and indeed, ‘it was the custom every year for one of the top South African schools to send its rugby team on tour, playing against Rhodesian schools. This was clearly why so many Rhodesians excelled in these two sports, a number becoming great rugby and cricket Springboks’.153

Cricket in particular casts valuable light on the extent of social ties between the two countries. Cricket in Southern Rhodesia, ‘returned to normality in the 1945-46 season with the territory’s first post-War friendly against the Transvaal’.154 Cricket fixtures between Southern Rhodesia and South African teams were common, as noted in chapter three, with Southern Rhodesia competing in the South African Currie Cup. In sporting terms the two countries operated as one, with many white Southern Rhodesian players playing and representing South African national teams. For example, ‘two Rhodesians, Kev Curran and Cecil Harris were named in the South Africa XI to play against a touring Australian team at Salisbury in 1949-50. John Wallace and Percy Mansell, both gained selection in the South African XI that played against Australia later that season’.155 Percy Mansell, captain of the Rhodesian cricket team in the 1950-51 season was invited to a Springbok trial and was ‘good enough to earn a place in the Dudley Nourse 1951 Springbok touring side to England. He

152 Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision, 68.
153 Smith, Great Betrayal, 8.
154 Winch, Cricket’s Rich Heritage, 32.
155 Ibid, 44.
made his debut in the Fourth Test at Headingly, Leeds. In the 1951-52 season, Mansell earned yet another place in the 1952-53 Springbok tour to Australia and New Zealand’. 156

These close sporting relations were bound by race. The ‘Southern Rhodesian situation was no different from that of South Africa where a match involving players from the different races was a rare occurrence’. 157 As a result, players of colour in Southern Rhodesia organised themselves in a manner that was similar to the South African system. For example, ‘in an arrangement which followed the South African system of parallel controlling bodies, the Indians formed provincial and national organizations. This encouraged the Southern Rhodesian Indian Cricket Board to send a “national” team to the Indian inter-provincial tournament at Cape Town in January 1953’. 158 Exposure to the game of cricket for many Southern Rhodesian players of colour was closely linked with boarding school in South Africa. As there was no public secondary school for ‘Asians and Coloureds in Southern Rhodesia until 1952, children of those ethnic groups were sent to private boarding schools for African children or to allocated South African schools’. 159

6.4 African Voices
Long-standing African connections between the two territories widened and deepened during this period. South Africa became an important destination for Southern Rhodesian Africans seeking to further their education. Along with the Asian and Coloured communities of Southern Rhodesia, African had no access to government secondary schooling. Amongst those who travelled south were future leaders of Southern Rhodesia’s African nationalist movement. Robert Mugabe, soon to become a prominent figure opposing Federation and much later the de facto President for life of post-colonial Zimbabwe, enrolled at Fort Hare University in the Eastern Cape. At Fort Hare, Mugabe met members of the Southern Rhodesia emerging black elite: Stanlake Samkange, Herbert Chitepo, Josiah Chinamano and Tichafa Parirenyatwa. Samkange was educated at ‘Waddilove and at Adams College in Natal. From there he went to Fort Hare, where he graduated B.A. (Hons) in History. On his return


158 Ibid, 59.

159 Ibid, 60.
to Southern Rhodesia in 1947 he taught at Mzingwane Government School, the first African private school in Southern Rhodesia’.\(^{160}\) By 1951 when he ‘became Secretary-General of the old ANC congress and (together with Joshua Nkomo) attended a conference of African Political leaders, and upon his return persuaded the various political and trade union groups in Rhodesia to merge in the AAC’.\(^{161}\) In 1943, Herbert Chitepo attended ‘secondary school in Natal (Adams College), South Africa, and then went to Fort Hare College in South Africa in 1949. Upon his graduation he read for the bar in London, where he kept company with many people active in anti-colonial movement. He returned to Rhodesia in 1954 as Rhodesia’s first African barrister’.\(^{162}\) Like his fellow countrymen, Josiah Chinamano went to Fort Hare University College in 1949, having succeeded in passing his

first years examinations as an external student. He graduated in 1950 and on his return to Rhodesia he was appointed headmaster at Marshall Hartley Boarding School. With the formation of ZAPU in 1961, Chinamano decide to play an active part in politics and he was soon afterwards appointed an executive member of the new party.\(^{163}\)

Tichafa Parirenyatwa was also a student at Fort Hare University College. His education continued in South Africa after graduating with a B.Sc. where he moved to the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits). He ‘qualified as a doctor at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1957’.\(^{164}\) While at Wits University, ‘he took part in the defiance campaign against the various apartheid laws’.\(^{165}\) He returned to Southern Rhodesia as the country’s first African doctor and he was appointed ‘medical officer in charge of Antelope Mine Hospital in Matabeleland and some of the white farmers were horrified. A group of them wrote to the Chronicle in protest, the interference not quite spelled out but nonetheless clear that it was unacceptable to have a black man attending to their wives’\(^{166}\) In 1961, he resigned to go into politics full time and in ‘January 1962 he was appointed deputy president of ZAPU’.\(^{167}\)

All the individuals mentioned above went on to play prominent roles in anti-colonial struggle in Southern Rhodesia.

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\(^{161}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{166}\) Todd, *Through the Darkness*, 222-223.

\(^{167}\) *Ibid.*, 223.
Mugabe set his sights on ‘amassing as many academic qualifications as possible. Over a period of a decade, he went from a number of teaching posts in Rhodesia to a scholarship at Fort Hare University in South Africa’. According to Meredith, it was at Fort Hare University from 1949 onwards that Mugabe was exposed to a ‘black elite institution where Nelson Mandela had studied ten years before, finding himself for the first time in a political hothouse’. At Fort Hare, Mugabe was introduced to Marxist ideas, ‘joining in discussions with South African communists and reading Marxist literature’. Norman has a slightly different take on this period of Mugabe’s life, claiming that amongst those he met were, ‘Leopold Takawira (who introduced him to Marxism), Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Herbert Chitepo, Robert Sobukwe and James Chikerema. Mugabe later stated that his ‘hatred and revulsion for the system started at Fort Hare’, “I decided I would fight to overthrow it”’. For the authors of the earliest biography of Mugabe, the main political influences on him were ‘the Jewish communists of South Africa who did not study there but were noisy contributors to nationalist meetings. They introduced Mugabe to Marxism. “I felt already that I was a revolutionary”, Mugabe said of his time there’. Hardly revolutionary, however, was the influence exercised on Mugabe during his time in South Africa by the writing of Mahatma Gandhi, a proponent of passive resistance against British rule in the Indian sub-continent. Mugabe expressed that this form of resistance gave him a new kind of ‘vision, a new philosophy, that if Africans were united in the same way as the Indians were, even if they resorted to a non-violent struggle, they would eventually emerge victorious’. When Mugabe completed his studies in South Africa and returned to Southern Rhodesia in 1952, ‘armed with a degree, his view had changed radically. “I was completely hostile to the [colonial] system,” he said. Adding, “but of course I came back to teach within it”’. His time in South Africa made him ‘politically aware . . . [preferring] to continue his studies rather than engage in political activity . . . he enrolled for a degree by correspondence from the University of South Africa. He ordered copies of Das Kapital and other Marxist tracts

170 A. Norman, Mugabe. Teacher, Revolutionary, Tyrant (Stroud: The History Press, 2008), 17.
172 Meredith, Robert Mugabe, 22-23.
173 Ibid, 23.
from London but showed no sign of political commitment’. Mugabe looked back at his
time at Fort Hare as an important period in his life: When I left I had a new orientation and
outlook. The only other twist to these accounts of Mugabe’s South African sojourn comes
from Cary and Mitchell. They claim that ‘Mugabe first became interested in politics when a
student at Fort Hare and had joined the Youth League wing of the S.A. African National
Congress. From then until 1960, however, politics had taken a back seat while he
accumulated experience and academic qualification’.  

Though Fort Hare University was regarded as an attractive destination for Southern
Rhodesian Africans, it was not the only choice available to them. Other Southern Rhodesian
Africans who became nationalist leaders in the 1960s and 1970s include James Chikerema
who completed his secondary education at St Francis College in Natal; Amon Jirira who
attended Fort Cox College of Agriculture in Middledrift, Eastern Cape South Africa, Moton
Malianga, Enoch Dumbutshena and Joshua Nkomo went to Adams College in Natal, with the
latter along with the Ndabaningi Sithole, and Bernard Chidzero completing an external
degree with the University of South Africa. Joshua Nkomo’s time in South Africa was
primarily spent on furthering his education. In Southern Rhodesia, he wanted to qualify as a
‘carpentry instructor but this was in 1942, and the first such secondary school for Africans
was not opened until 1947. He therefore set his heart on going to Adams College in South
African, where he began his studies again after three years’ break’. The first person he
met upon arrival in Durban was a fellow African from Southern Rhodesia, Stanlake
Samkange, who later became a history professor. Nkomo spent three years at Adams
College. His stay at the College was halted when a member of the staff, ‘an Afrikaner called
Mr de Koch who was Dean of all the male students, had reported an improper relationship
between Nkomo and Mrs Julia Hoskins (the school secretary)’. Nkomo explains that

I insisted that I must go at once and tell Mrs Hoskins what had been said. The Senator
completely believed my denial . . ., and instructed Mr de Koch to apologise in person to

174 Ibid.
175 Smith et al, Mugabe, 17.
179 Ibid, 33.
both Mrs Hoskins and me. But after that our friendship could no longer feel free. I felt very unhappy and hated to see Mr de Koch around the College.180

Nkomo left Adams College and went to Johannesburg to complete his studies at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work. During his time at the ‘Jan Hofmeyer School of Social Science in Johannesburg he completed his matriculation and obtained his Diploma. While in Johannesburg he came under the influence of Dr Zuma and Lembede, two of the leaders of the African National Congress in South Africa’.181 He was exposed to the African political scene during his time in South Africa. Nkomo noted that for relaxation he attended the great rallies organised by the ‘African National Congress in one or other of the townships almost every weekend. I was very impressed by the speeches, and by the sheer mass of the people. But I was not yet political: I was still trying to work out the social theories I was learning at the Hofmeyr’.182 However, Nkomo notes that during his time in South Africa, he became interested in the African National Congress, a body, ‘which was moving towards developing a concrete programme for change in society. The Southern Rhodesian ANC was at this time, in 1948, a weak organisation. It had perhaps 5,000 or 7,000 members, and there had recently been a row in the committee’.183

Neither Mugabe’s nor Nkomo’s experiences during their time in South Africa were unique. Rather, they formed part of a male elite group from Southern Rhodesia seeking to further their education in South Africa and in the process being exposed to South African political formations. There was however, another much larger group of Southern Rhodesian Africans who also left the country for South Africa. These migrant labourers, a handful of whom became African Nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia were part of a long-established pattern of northern labourers seeking employment in South Africa. Figures for labour migrants moving from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa and, more rarely, in the other direction, are extremely difficult to find, not least because of the clandestine dimension of the migration flow. Such figures as there are reproduced in the table below.

180 Ibid.
182 Nkomo, Nkomo. The Story of My Life, 35.
Table 6.3 Labour Migration from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Africa (thousands)</th>
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<td>1911</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1923</td>
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Both before and after 1945, some migrants went on eventually to become significant players in anti-colonial struggles in Southern Rhodesia. Prominent amongst them are Charles Mzingeli and Maurice Nyagumbo. Maurice Nyagumbo, ‘unlike so many of his contemporaries who decided to become primary school teachers, made up his mind to travel to Johannesburg in search of employment’.\(^{184}\) Like some of his compatriots, Nyagumbo was exposed to South African political struggle. It was during Nyagumbo’s time in Cape Town and meeting Willie Mashaba, a fellow Southern Rhodesian African, that he was introduced to the Communist Party. He became a member of the party until 1950, when it was declared illegal. During his time in the Communist Party, ‘apart from Willie and himself, he did not come across any other Rhodesian Africans; the other Africans were all indigenous. The Rhodesian Africans saw no point in attending political meetings where they could not enjoy women and drink’.\(^{185}\) Nyagumbo, however, remembered his experience at one particular ‘Communist rally as defining in giving him some political education. In fact, he had been very impressed by the lone African speaker, Mr Moses Kotane, who ruthlessly attacked the race policies of the South African government’.\(^{186}\) After the Communist Party was banned, Nyagumbo joined the South Africa African National Congress. Finding

\(^{184}\) Cary and Mitchell, African Nationalists Leaders in Rhodesia, 71.
\(^{185}\) M. Nyagumbo, With the People. An Autobiography from the Zimbabwe Struggle (London: Allison and Busby, 1980), 74.
\(^{186}\) Ibid, 74.
congenial company in the organisation, he developed a close relationship with a fellow Rhodesian James Chikerema. During his time in the ANC, Nyagumbo organised as ‘many of the “home-boys” as he could manage and to help in educating themselves to political awareness. However, there was the problem that most of the Rhodesian Africans had absolutely nothing to do with politics but had a lot to do with women and drink’. 187 The experiences gained by Nyagumbo and the friendships developed during his time in South Africa continued after his return to Southern Rhodesia. Back home, Nyagumbo ‘teamed up again with James Chikerema and was instrumental in founding the African National Youth League (ANYL). When the ANYL merged with the African National Congress on 12 September 1957, Maurice Nyagumbo became secretary of the Rusape Branch of the reformed African National Congress’. 188

Overall, many Africans from Southern Rhodesia, especially those who became African nationalist leaders travelled to South Africa either for education purposes or employment and returned home after being exposed to South African political movements. These experiences and education contributed significant political awakening for some people and for others the importance of political mobilisation.

Conclusion
This chapter has accounted for the multi-dimensional nature of post-war relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. War time industrial development in Southern Rhodesia had drawn the attention of Southern Rhodesian officials on the country’s trade arrangement with South Africa. Stoneman has noted that, ‘with the end of the war, it might have been predicted that reduction of demand for Rhodesia’s exports coupled with the exposure of cheap products would kill infant industries in the cradle’. 189 Southern Rhodesia’s post-war industrial development continued to grow thus stimulating the economy. Stoneman writes that ‘the period 1945-53 was the period in which the Rhodesian economy “took off” under the stimulus of high export demands and substantial capital inflow’. 190 It ought to be stressed that the development of Southern Rhodesia’s secondary industries was not inevitable. The state’s protective tariffs as well trade agreements, in particular the 1948

187 Ibid, 82.
188 Cary and Mitchell, African Nationalists Leaders in Rhodesia, 72.
190 Ibid, 38.
Customs Union (Interim) Agreement with South Africa provided support towards the
development of secondary industries. The latter case allowed for a return to the principle of
free interchange of goods, which had been abandoned in 1935. This improved the prospect
of co-operative relations between the two countries.

Over the same period, political ties between the two countries were fractured. In particular,
1948 became significant as the NP achieved electoral success in South Africa. Afrikaner
dominated South Africa and the potential spread of its influence north of the Limpopo,
subsequently brought about the establishment of Federation. It was formed in part to
ensure Southern Rhodesia was not pulled towards the South African orbit. Moreover, it was
created in order for Southern Rhodesia, in partnership with Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland to form a British Central African State that would act as a counterpoise to
Afrikaner dominated South African expansionism in the region. The most significant aspect
of South African influence in the north was immigration, particularly Afrikaner immigration.
Afrikaner migration from South Africa to the Rhodesias grew in the post-Second World War
period. Although Afrikaners migrating north constituted a smaller number of migrants going
to the Rhodesias, British as well as Rhodesian views feared that the Afrikaner presence in
the region may invite Afrikaner political influences. Immigration was not only a politicised
matter at this time, but served as an important factor which maintained social contacts
between the two countries. Southern Rhodesians went to South Africa for holidays and
education, sports teams in both countries competed in the same competition and many
Rhodesian sportsmen represented South Africa on the international stage.

Finally, this chapter discussed African connections between the two countries. Southern
Rhodesian Africans in particular travelled to South African for educational and employment
opportunities. The Africans which travelled to South Africa and later returned to Southern
Rhodesia and became African nationalist leaders were exposed to African political
formations in South Africa. This proved for some to be a period of political growth and
awareness and for others it provided exposure and experience in political mobilisation.

In examining post-war relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, this chapter
has highlighted the complex nature of this relationship, where fault lines existed alongside
complementary ties. In the end and in spite of divisions over certain matters Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa relations continued to be significant within the context of the region.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

When the Pioneer Column set foot for Southern Rhodesia in 1890, they could not have foreseen the impact that such a trek would have on the relationship between the territory they emigrated from to the country they were to settle. The decision to trek northwards brought about the establishment of a Southern Rhodesian state sharing close ties with South Africa. Initially, close links encouraged the idea of union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Underpinned by Afrikaner and English antagonism prospects for union waned by the mid-1910s. Ultimately, such division shaped the opinion of many Southern Rhodesian whites in the 1922 referendum, as they rejected union, instead choosing Responsible Government which was attained in 1923.

Relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during the era of Responsible Government expanded through economic and trade ties. However, the nature of economic and trade ties were uneven, especially from Southern Rhodesia’s perspective. Sporting ties were close, with rugby and cricket teams from both countries competing in the Currie Cup competitions. The early migration trend continued over this period, characterised by large English-speaking immigrants as well as smaller but notable Afrikaner immigrants from South Africa, with Afrikaner migration exacerbating existing divisions between Afrikaner and English in Southern Rhodesia. Becoming more pronounced after 1948 when the NP achieved electoral success in South Africa, and as a result of the 1948 election, political views between the two territories diverged further, which in part contributed to Southern Rhodesia joining Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in forming the CAF in 1953. The establishment of the CAF was significant not only to Southern Rhodesia-South African relations but also relevant to Britain, the architect of the CAF. According to Chanock, it had become clear to British governments that the

Union of South Africa was undeniably an Afrikaner and not a British State. The creation of a loyal British State seemed to be the way to hedge bets in southern Africa: but African views could no longer be blithely disregarded. The answer was to move towards
the “multi-policy” Central African Federation, which was to create a counterpoise outside the Union.¹

The creation of a loyal British State in central Africa was largely done to provide a counterpoise to the expansion of South Africa, and in particular Afrikaner immigration into the region. Moreover, it sought to preserve imperial influence in the region and potentially prevent a settler’s revolt against Britain across southern Africa. Ultimately, the creation of CAF and Southern Rhodesia’s incorporation to the bloc was in part related to the “southern factor”.

Until now, this historical relationship has not been comprehensively analysed. Where it has been written about, it has been projected largely through the lens of Southern Rhodesian historiography. Upon review of the existing literature, there are notable historiographical gaps in which a scholarly undertaking such as the one provided in this thesis, would contribute to an extensive and nuanced understanding of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations over the identified period. Although there are numerous studies that make reference to certain aspects of the relationship, there is no existing study that puts together all the information disseminated across the historiography over this particular period. The task of this thesis therefore was to rectify this historical lacuna. By examining the dimensions upon which relations were established over this period the thesis examined the shifts in the relationship between the two countries over this thirty year period. Lastly, it analysed the relationship at the end of the period, in order to assess the nature of the relationship over time.

Southern Rhodesia-South African relations remain a relatively understudied subject. While attention has been given to this field, it has been done not as the primary focus of a particular study.² The existing literature contains a great deal of broad studies in which some of the features are discussed. There is acknowledgement of the relationship, but it is understated, hurriedly made reference to and examined inadequately. Consequently, a comprehensive study of the relationship from Southern Rhodesia’s perspective remains

¹ Chanock, Unconsummated Union, 5.
² See for example, Chanock, Unconsummated Union; Blake, History of Rhodesia; Hyam, Failure of South African Expansion; Phimister, Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe; and Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia.
unattended. The thesis, therefore, builds upon the information disseminated across the literature, suggesting that such a relationship existed, and that it was far more complex than the current literature accounts for. This evaluation is derived from the available primary material. The thesis makes an important contribution to the existing literature and by using primary material from South Africa, Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom; it examines Rhodesia’s links with South Africa and traces the shifts over time. It also unpacks the significant developments in South Africa that contributed in part to Southern Rhodesia’s developing ties with its southern neighbour.

The first comprehensive examination of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations during the period of Responsible Government, this thesis helped to further provide nuanced understanding of the relationship. Engaging with arguments regarding the economic ties between the two countries the thesis has also investigated neglected aspects of the relationship, including migration, sports and African connections. It argued that the relationship was multi-dimensional shaped by a blend of co-operation, competition and antagonism. This study has clearly shown that the two countries shared many links. However, close links could not conceal existing divisions and antagonism shaping in particular Southern Rhodesia’s political outlook.

Of all the studies identified in the ‘Introduction’ literature review, the one with which this thesis engages most closely is Chanock’s *Unconsummated Union*. But while Chanock looked at the relationship between 1900 and 1945 his book focuses almost entirely on the political dimension with Britain cast as the central player. By contrast, this thesis has placed greater emphasises on South Rhodesian perspectives. It has done so by making use of primary material from Zimbabwe, South Africa and Britain as well as a wide range of secondary studies. Although this study confirms that Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa was a significant factor in driving Southern Rhodesia away from union with the south it also looks closely at other local factors that shaped the nature of the relationship. Chanock’s focus on the imperial dimension is found wanting in several key respects.

Building on Chanock’s observation that a ‘discreet Rhodesian historiography exists’⁴, in which the “southern factor”, South Africa appears throughout the colonial period in

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⁴ See Chapter One, 1.
Southern Rhodesia, this dissertation has explored Southern Rhodesia-South African relations. As was repeatedly argued, this relationship over this period existed and was significant: for all that Blake argued to the contrary.\(^4\) This dissertation began exploring Southern Rhodesia-South African relations in chapter two. Chapter two discussed Southern Rhodesia’s journey towards Responsible Government, attained in 1923. One factor which formed part of the campaign for supporters and opponents of Responsible Government was South Africa. The possibility of Southern Rhodesia joining South Africa was a fiercely contested matter in the lead up to Responsible Government. Although the position has always been that union with South Africa was Southern Rhodesia’s ultimate destiny, the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia challenged this notion once Southern Rhodesia’s constitutional challenge began to be confronted from 1914. The white settlers and Southern Rhodesia would over the years drift further away from political union with South Africa. Southern Rhodesians were deeply proud of their identity and wanted to maintain their way of life. They rejected the politics of South Africa and what it stood for. Union with South Africa for Southern Rhodesia was considered by the settlers the antithesis of whom and what they were about: British and loyal to the Empire. Ultimately Southern Rhodesia’s rejection of union was about maintaining its way of life, rejecting being governed by the Afrikaner and be recognised for who they were, Rhodesians. The study has argued that such developments in Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations were underpinned by a competitive and antagonistic element.

Observations made in this thesis also develop Veracini’s assertion on settler colonialism. An important component missing from Veracini’s observation concerns the competitive and antagonistic dynamic between white communities. The thesis has underscored that Afrikaner–English divisions became more pronounced at various intervals, influenced by historical, social, cultural, political and regional circumstances. With the changing nature of the Southern Rhodesian state as well as political developments in South Africa, the settler dynamic did remain static.

The study has shown that as Southern Rhodesia drifted away from political union with South Africa, the resultant dilemma saw that Southern Rhodesia was caught between two perspectives, the search for greater detachment from South Africa, at the same time the

\(^4\) See Blake, *History of Rhodesia*, 189.
need to maintain an economic relationship with one of its closest trading partners. As indicated in chapter five and six, the divergent political views, especially from Southern Rhodesia’s perspectives could not be divorced from the economic ties, particularly during the Second World War, during which time imports from Britain dried up and the value of trade with South Africa improved. These circumstances facilitated closer co-operation between the two countries. This was notable in war effort. Chapter five has argued that as a consequence of the war, the Southern Rhodesian military was subordinated to the South African Command. Imperial considerations and links with South Africa shaped this reality. The threat posed to the coastline of South and East Africa by Japan, and the threat to imperial communication lines to India and the Middle East, as well as Southern Rhodesia’s communication and supply lines coming from South Africa determined Southern Rhodesia’s war time co-operation with South Africa.

The economic theme has been a constant thread throughout the thesis. Examination of this theme has shown that Southern Rhodesia - South Africa relations were complex. Economic relations between two countries showed the extent to which ties were marked by divisions and competition. This thesis has argued that, economic ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa marked the shifts in economic and other aspects of the relationship over time. Agreeing with much of the literature on customs agreements as the dominant dynamic in the relationship, the thesis nonetheless provides the first comprehensive examination of this dimension in Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations during the period of Responsible Government. The detailed exploration in chapter three of the economic ties, notably as managed through successive customs agreements, distinguished this study from Chanock’s *Unconsummated Union*. At the same time, it also follows a different path from the one taken by Phimister’s *Economic History*. While the latter was primarily concerned with charting Southern Rhodesia’s economic, increasingly industrial history in relation to South Africa, this dissertation has sought to establish the significance of trade and customs agreements for Southern Rhodesian-South African relations more broadly.

The relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa over the first decade of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia was examined in chapter three. The chapter highlighted the pillars upon which ties between the two countries rested. The dominant

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5 See Chapter Five, 130-131.
factor throughout this period was the customs agreement. Although customs relations had existed since the early years of the twentieth century, in 1924 and again in 1930 customs agreements were amended to meet the demands of the time. The 1924 agreement, which placed restrictions on the amount primary goods exported to South Africa from Southern Rhodesia, revealed both Rhodesia’s inexperience at negotiations, and her economic weaknesses compared to her giant neighbour. In 1930, Southern Rhodesia pressed for a new agreement. The new agreement again imposed quotas on certain Southern Rhodesian products, notably scrub cattle and tobacco, prompting Southern Rhodesia to call for renewed talks to replace the 1930 agreement. Chapter three argues that over the course of the decade Southern Rhodesia’s attitude became less and less accommodating. Although much the weaker partner, by 1933, Southern Rhodesia was more assertive in advancing its interests. This shift in approach was shaped to a large extent by domestic and South African developments in the context of the Great Depression. Although the customs agreement continued over this period, this chapter suggests that the economic relationship was marked by competition and co-operation as well as by the end of the first decade under Responsible Government a shift in economic orientation on the part of Southern Rhodesia. This was largely provoked by South Africa’s protectionist interests, international economic conditions as well as domestic demands.

Much the same economic theme is pursued by chapter four, by examining the nature of customs relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In particular, chapter four discusses how the customs agreement between the two countries developed by 1935 to a trade agreement, fundamentally altering the long-standing tradition of a common tariff arrangement. The key aspect of the agreement was that it allowed each country control of its own tariffs, therefore, ending the longstanding principle of common tariffs. Restrictive trade measures were nonetheless imposed by South Africa on Southern Rhodesian cattle and tobacco. This maintained the unfavourable nature of trade relations, particularly from Southern Rhodesia’s perspective. The consequences of these developments were significant for both Salisbury and Pretoria. The restrictive trade measures imposed by South Africa

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7 See Chapter Three, 80.
8 See Chapter Four, 110-113.
prompted Southern Rhodesia to explore seriously the idea of amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Accessing African migrant labour from the region as well as benefitting from the riches of the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia all contributed to Southern Rhodesia’s position. Southern Rhodesia was ‘heavily dependent for its labour upon black migrants from beyond the Zambezi, and sought for a common system of control which seemed highly desirable at the time when South Africa seriously competed for northern manpower’. 9 It recognised that access to labour was an important factor to their cause as the larger South African economic orbit posed a challenge to Southern Rhodesia’s access to labour for her own development. Overall, Southern Rhodesia sought to mark itself as an autonomous country, albeit one with strong ties to its giant southern neighbour.

Economic reasons and in particular South African trade restrictions imposed on Southern Rhodesia goods provided one of the motivating factors for Rhodesia’s political and economic tilt towards the north. Consequently, political union with South Africa became increasingly less attractive to Southern Rhodesian politicians. By contrast, according to Gann, there were calls at the time for closer union of the central African territories. Calls for amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia declared that ‘research, customs, communications, mining, non-active education and defence should all be unified and in addition the authorities should set up a common Court of Appeal’. 10 These demands were justified by pointing to the ‘greater economy which would result from the union and by the need to put a stop to Afrikaner influence which was spreading beyond the Limpopo. Southern Rhodesia was culturally influenced by South Africa and many Rhodesian students went to South African universities’. 11 Yet while chapter four identified an increasingly sceptical tone in Southern Rhodesia’s exchanges with South Africa in terms of rhetoric, in reality Southern Rhodesia continued to have close economic ties with South Africa.

The important economic relations between the two territories too loomed large during the Second World War. The disruption of trade between Southern Rhodesia and Britain created

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9 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, 115.
10 Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, 268.
11 Ibid.
new industrial opportunities both in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. One by-product of accelerated industrial development in both countries was greater trade exchanges to meet the demands of the joint war-effort. Closely related to the increase in the value of trade between the two countries was the trade agreement. Industrial expansion in Southern Rhodesia could not conceal the asymmetric trade relations with South Africa as the dominant partner. Trade between the two countries were maintained in part out of necessity to meet domestic demand and to serve the military campaign.

By the end of the war, Southern Rhodesia initiated further consultations on revising the agreement with the objective to return back to the principle of their free interchange of goods. It was partly driven by Southern Rhodesia’s long-standing plea for equitable trading ties with South Africa, as discussed in the thesis. The other factor concerned the value of trade between the two countries. As discussed in the chapter five, Southern Rhodesia’s concern with the trade balance, significantly in South Africa’s favour was buttressed by South Africa’s protectionist measures. Southern Rhodesia sought an amendment to the agreement, in part to ensure that the industrial development taking place in the country during World War Two continued in the post-war era.

Chapter six explored Southern Rhodesia-South African relations during the post-war era. Noting the steady increase in value of trade between the two territories, it discussed trade ties shaped after 1948 by a customs union. This terminated the trade agreement established in 1935. It is clear that improved levels in the value of trade between the two territories during this period unfolded within the context of continued post-war industrial development. If anything, economic relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were even more important than previous, despite the fact their nature had changed from being almost exclusively about primary products.

Although the economic theme has served to show that despite division on certain aspects of this important dimension, the economic relationship was largely co-operative. On the other hand political ties reflected a divisive aspect to Southern Rhodesia-South African relations.

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12 For more on Southern Rhodesian industrial development during World War Two, see Phimister, *Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, 251-258. For South Africa, see Nattrass, ‘Economic Growth and Transformation in the 1940s’, and Nattrass and Seekings, ‘The Economy and Poverty in the Twentieth Century’.
13 See Chapter Six, 147-148.
14 See Chapter Six, 153-154.
Chapter two underscored the political divisions between the two countries. Southern Rhodesia’s pro-British orientation was in stark contrast to South Africa where its relation with Britain was a contested matter. With the growth of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa throughout the period of this study, political ties continued to be divided. In particular, chapter four and six pointed up the increasingly fractured political ties. Southern Rhodesia’s policy towards Northern Rhodesia during the 1930s reflected its northwards tilt. Underpinned by the attraction of Northern Rhodesia’s copper as well as unfavourable trading relations with South Africa, amalgamation of the two territories was pursued south of the Zambezi. Consequently, the prospects for political union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa diminished, which in part was a rejection of union with Afrikaner dominated South Africa.

1948 was a significant year, the Afrikaner National Party achieving electoral success was discussed in chapter six. In Southern Rhodesia, fear of an Afrikaner Nationalist dominated South Africa spreading its influence north of the Limpopo became a political issue for the governing elite. Serious consideration was given by Southern Rhodesia to the establishment of some kind of federation with Northern Rhodesia. The establishment of such a bloc was in part sought to ensure that Southern Rhodesia was not pulled further into South Africa’s orbit as well as a counterpoise to South African expansionism. One local manifestation of anti-South African expansionism was hostility towards Afrikaner immigration into Central Africa in general and Southern Rhodesia in particular. The rise in Afrikaner immigration to the Rhodesias in the post-Second World War era became more politicised.15

The study looks beyond contentious political links and close economic ties between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Social and cultural ties going back to the days of the Pioneer Column puts the issue of migration as a source of analysis. Though migration can act as a means of exposing individuals to different environments, closing the gap of perceived notions of “us” and “them”, this thesis has shown that upon migrating into a new territory, migrants that maintain a cultural identity that is different from the dominant culture are susceptible to suspicion and isolation. Since the 1890s, English-speaking migrants have been the dominant white settler community in Southern Rhodesia. Afrikaners

15 See Chapter Six, 167.
have been alienated, self-imposed as well as enforced by the dominant community. They were also manipulated as shown in chapter two by the Nationalists to help in preventing Southern Rhodesia joining South Africa or put differently, to keep out the pro-British element in South Africa. Migration between the two countries is also discussed in chapter three. Immigration, long formed an important dimension of the relationship between the two countries. A significant number of white migrants settling in Southern Rhodesia over this period had their origins in Great Britain. But crucially however, many of them went first to South Africa before migrating north of the Limpopo. According to Jollie, a new influx began after 1904. Many men who flourished as ‘farmers, business men and miners came to South Africa during the Boer War, and having learnt to love the sunshine and space, came north to found their homes in a country free from racial difficulties’.\(^{16}\) This trend continued soon after the ‘Union of the South African provinces was achieved; and again a small boom took place at the end of the Great War’.\(^{17}\) Continued South African migration to Southern Rhodesia strengthened and consolidated educational, sporting ties, cultural and social contacts.\(^{18}\) By highlighting these important links, this chapter looked beyond the history of contact between officials on both sides and examines the multi-layered nature of this relationship.

The first decade of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia brought about a new phase in Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations. As a starting point, chapter three has noted that at the start of Responsible Government in Southern Rhodesia, there existed many links with South Africa, which date back to the 1890s. The idea and the eventual settlement of whites north of the Limpopo was largely organised and executed from South Africa. Furthermore, a significant number of whites as well as a small number of Africans who arrived and settled in Southern Rhodesia were South Africans. This initial migration was the cornerstone upon which links between the two territories. The early construction of the Southern Rhodesian state drew upon South African experiences; its legal system, civil service and “native” policies drew on South African models. Its economy and society

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\(^{17}\) Ibid.  
\(^{18}\) See Blake, *History of Rhodesia*; and Hyam and Henshaw, *Lion and the Springbok*.  

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followed South African patterns. Early Southern Rhodesia was in many respects an extension of the Cape Colony.

Over the course of the first decade of Responsible Government, these links intensified economically even as they were contested. Although migration continued at this time, in other spheres white migration from South Africa to the north was dominated by English-South Africans who went north often in moments of economic crisis in South Africa as well as in growing response to Afrikaner political dominance. In the context of Southern Rhodesian-South African relations in the first decade of Responsible Government, white Southern Rhodesia resembled South Africa less and less. Southern Rhodesia saw itself as a British Colony while the same certainly could not be said of South Africa in the 1920s. The disposition of both countries shaped the pursuit of their interests and consequently the development of their mutual relationship.

As has been argued throughout this thesis, immigration was an important dimension in the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. For whites, it maintained social ties between the two territories. Southern Rhodesia’s social links with South Africa encompassed holidays and educational opportunities and were readily embraced by white Rhodesians. Sports teams from both countries participated in the same competitions with a number of Rhodesian athletes representing South Africa at international level. Migration also underpinned the African dimension in Southern Rhodesia-South African relations. Chapter three has argued that African links were closely related to African migration, the regional economy as well as anti-colonial formations. During the 1920s and 1930s many Southern Rhodesian Africans returning from South Africa, exposed to anti-colonial experiences in the south supported local African forces seeking reform of the existing systems. At this time some Southern Rhodesian Africans had sought a more cooperative working relationship with the ruling settler class. These Africans organised themselves in order to petition for better conditions. The two incorporationist inclined African formations at the time were the petty-bourgeoisie Rhodesia Native Association (R.N.A.) and the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association (R.B.V.A.). According to Phimister, of all the inter-war black organizations and groupings, the R.N.A. was the most moderate. In 1922 a request to exempt registered black voters, of whom there were only twenty-three, from the pass laws, was turned down. In 1924, the R.N.A was
forbidden to operate in the reserves and in 1928, the Native Department ignored the R.N.A.’s objection to the custom of blacks removing their hats in the presence of whites.\textsuperscript{19}

The South African influence was notable at this time particularly that of the ICU. Drawing inspiration from its South African parent body, it contributed significantly in setting the foundations for anti-colonial struggles in Southern Rhodesia in the 1950s. Chapter six has argued that as the migration trend continued in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly from north to south, amongst them were individuals who went south to take advantage of educational opportunities not available in Southern Rhodesia as well as many men (and some women) who formed part of a long, historical practice of seeking higher paid work to South Africa. The examples discussed in this chapter of Africans migrating from north to south for educational purposes were an elite group of African men whose exposure to South African political developments was crucial for their own subsequent participation in Southern Rhodesian African nationalist politics. This thesis has asserted that much of their experiences in South Africa were not divorced from the broader decolonisation trajectory in Southern Rhodesia during the colonial era. A marked feature of chapter six is the light it casts on the complex nature of this relationship, one of contradictions as well as common interest.

The offshoot of migration was greater social contacts between the two countries, particularly in education and sports. Southern Rhodesian whites went south for educational opportunities. As social contacts increased after 1890, sporting ties also improved. On the issue of sports, teams from both countries contested in the same competitions, in particular rugby and cricket. Despite a hiatus in sporting ties in the 1930s, where no Southern Rhodesian teams were sent to play in the Currie Cup,\textsuperscript{20} chapter three and six has demonstrated the intertwined sporting relations. Chapter three has highlighted in terms of organisation and attitudes, sports in both countries were united in that they resembled societal attitudes on racial matters. The two countries were of similar inclination in their attitude to sports and given that Southern Rhodesia’s sporting bodies were closely associated with those in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia was pulled into the South Africa

\textsuperscript{19} Phimister, \textit{Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe}, 151.
\textsuperscript{20} See Thompson, \textit{Story of Rhodesian Sport}.
sporting orbit. Rugby and cricket competition between the two countries reflected common
atitudes on settler societies. Overall, cricket in Southern Rhodesia was closely linked with
South Africa and South African examples were closely followed in the country. Through
sports, cultural and social ties between the two countries were sustained. Furthermore,
sports in each country reflected the existing social and political dynamics: sport was
racialized and it was shaped by class considerations. In particular, rugby and cricket
demonstrated an aspect of white culture in both countries: sports reinforced the
hierarchical organisation of societies and codifying whites to be in a position of privilege. In
this regard both countries shared a common perspective on sport.

Overall, as this thesis has examined and analysed Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations,
it has done so by highlighting the multi-dimensional nature of the relationship, in particular
studying the close economic, sporting, cultural and social ties enjoyed by the regions white
settlers, English and Afrikaners. They shaped and were shaped by diverse political
perspectives within and between both countries and working economic ties. The thesis has
also demonstrated that careful study of this relationship reveals that settler colonial
relations are multifaceted and do not necessarily constitute harmonious ties. The fact that
both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa arguably were settler colonial societies seems not
to have mitigated friction between the two territories. On the contrary, most crucial aspect
concerning the “southern factor” for Southern Rhodesia was the rise of Afrikaner
nationalism. An Afrikaner dominated South Africa and a British oriented Southern Rhodesia,
were often at odds. For this dissertation, the competitive and antagonistic element in settler
colonialism was in the period under consideration, as important as its similarities, especially
where the former were aggregated by economic and trade competition. Southern
Rhodesia’s imperial links were certainly important, but her contested ties with South Africa
were crucial. So far as its contribution to understanding settler colonialism, as discussed in
chapter one, this dissertation provides an added dimension to this field. Although settler
colonies may share commonalities as discussed by Veracini, settler colonies may also share
points of differences, which contribute to a competitive and adversarial relationship. In
studying Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations, competition and antagonism was an
integral part of a settler dominated relationship.
This thesis has engaged with works that has studied important aspects of the relationship, especially Chanock and Phimister. Chanock’s work is a political history and studies the relationship from the British perspective. Phimister studies the economic dimension of this relationship, though it is secondary in focus as it primarily focuses on Southern Rhodesia’s economic history. This thesis goes beyond Chanock and Phimister in terms methodology, analysis and scope. Where Chanock’s study looks at this relationship through the lens of British policy-makers seeking a counterpoise, initially internally and then externally, to Afrikaner dominated South Africa, this thesis expands his work by examining the domestic factors that shaped the complex political relationship, driven to a large extent by economic factors as well as Afrikaner migration. It also expands on Phimister’s economic history of Zimbabwe by locating its development in relation to that of South Africa, its larger economic neighbour.

So far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned, most studies have placed Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations within the early history of Southern Rhodesia and the post-CAF era. The history of the relationship throughout the literature is limited and uneven. It largely discusses the political and economic dimension and neglects other important aspects of this history. This thesis ties together the limited and uneven literature with other important aspects of this history. Further, it serves to place this relationship closer to the centre of Southern Rhodesia historiography rather than the peripheral position it occupies. So far as South Africa is concerned, the study of this relationship contributes to South African historiography. In particular it addresses the parochialism so often a feature of South African history writing as is the case in the most recent publication of *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, which perpetuates the notion that South Africa cannot be understood outside of the South African context. This thesis provides a different perspective to understanding South African history, by way of studying Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations from Salisbury’s perspective. The thesis therefore stresses that scholarly understanding of Southern Rhodesia and South African historiography is enhanced by examining Southern Rhodesia-South Africa together, not separately and further analysis of this complex and dynamic relationship will enhance these historiographies.

The thesis also opens space for looking beyond the category of area studies. Although it does not dislodge this important aspect in Southern African historiography, the thesis
argues that a historical synopsis of Southern Rhodesia-South Africa relations provides a lens through which the history of colonialism can be incorporated in South African, Southern Rhodesian and Southern African history. Another notable aspect of this thesis is the central importance of settler colonialism. Through the lens of settler colonialism, this thesis provides an avenue through which to understand the colonial legacy of Empire in Southern Africa as well as globally.
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