Claassen, N. J. B.Cloete, Neville2016-12-132016-12-132016-01http://hdl.handle.net/11660/5212English: In Roman law things like burial grounds or tombs were classified as res nullius or things that belong to nobody. These things were not susceptible to human ownership and were also known as res divini iuris or things subject to divine law. They were also referred to as res religiosae as opposed to res profanae or profane things since they were endowed with special religious significance. These attributes res religiosae shared with the human body as such which was regarded as an object that was incapable of being owned or subjected to legal and commercial transactions. They were res extra commercium. Res religiosae were also exempt from the ordinary principles and rules of private law and were governed by the ius sacrum or sacred law, which formed part of the ius publicum or public law. Under influence of the Protestant Reformation the Roman-Dutch jurists of the sixteenth century and thereafter introduced a partial secularisation into the law relating to burial places and tombs. Some wrote that the classification of these places as res religiosae had fallen into desuetude and that in Roman-Dutch law all things are susceptible to human ownership, and liable to legal and commercial transactions. Nevertheless they were virtually unanimous in maintaining that despite this relative secularisation respect and reverence had to be shown to the human body and the human tomb or burial place on the ground of the scripturally based believes and doctrines of the resurrection of the glorified human body and eternal life. In the early South African case of Cape Town and District Waterworks v Executor of Elders1 the court held that the Roman classification of things as res religiosae had fallen into disuse, that these things were fully susceptible to ownership and that they could be subjected to legal and commercial transactions. Nothing was said about basic human respect for the human body and its final resting place except that the continued existence of the crime of violatio sepulchri or violation of a tomb was recognised. The court reached this conclusion as a result of a controversial and wrong reading and interpretation of the Roman-Dutch sources. Groenewegen and Van Leeuwen were pitted against Voet, found to have better reflected the contemporary law of their times, and authoritatively applied. Voet on the other hand was held not to have expressed himself on his contemporary law but rather on Roman law and on that basis rejected. Groenewegen and Van Leeuwen were found by the court to have stated without any doubt that the Roman classification of things as res religiosae had fallen into disuse, and that graveyards and other burial places were fully susceptible of ownership and commercial transactions. In this study it is argued that the court strayed and that Groenewegen and Van Leeuwen’s writings never justified such an absolutistic secularisation of the law relating to burial places. When the said two jurists attributed full susceptibility to ownership and commercial transactions to res religiosae they only had the so-called ius sepulchri or the right to bury a body in a particular tomb in mind and not the tomb or place of burial as such. This absolutized secularisation of landownership caused hardship for certain categories of persons such as lessees in terms of a long lease or occupiers of rural and farm land. Land owners were loath to grant burial rights since they believed that the granting of such rights was tantamount to the granting of a servitude over their land with long term consequences and implications. A conservative judiciary endorsed such absolutized ownership of landowners with the result that occupiers could not freely practise their religious and cultural believes in regard to the burial places of their dead. The Extension of Security of Tenure Act2 of 1997 (ESTA) as amended by the Land Affairs General Amendment Act of 20013 brought some relief for occupiers of land since it accords statutory burial rights to them. These rights are original, constitutional and statutory by nature. They exist as rights in their own right independent of any consent from the landowner. They are regarded as original for it is the first time in South African legal history that burial rights are conferred without the consent of the landowner. They are therefore not to be seen as derivative rights derived from the landowner. These rights are also constitutional rights since they find their origin in the Constitution which grants a mandate to the state for the reform of land ownership and for securing security of tenure for all persons. Lastly these rights are statutory by nature since they are embodied in and protected by the ESTA and the Land Affairs General Amendment Act4 which give expression to the state’s constitutional mandate relating to land reform. Despite the obvious benefits brought about by the ESTA it has to be borne in mind that such benefits extend only to a relatively small category of persons, namely occupiers as defined in the ESTA itself. Persons such as long term lessees, bona fide possessors and others are excluded and it is therefore recommended that the legislature should widen the scope of the Act so as to ensure that a broader group of persons qualify for burial rights.Afrikaans: In die Romeinse reg is sake soos begraafplase en graftombes as res nullius of sake wat aan niemand behoort nie geklassifiseer. Hierdie sake was nie vatbaar vir menslike eiendomsreg nie en het ook bekend gestaan as res divini iuris of sake wat aan die goddelike reg onderworpe was. Omdat hierdie sake met ‘n spesiale religieuse betekenis beklee was, is ook daarna as res religiosae verwys om dit van res profanae of profane sake te onderskei. Res religiosae het bogenoemde eienskappe gedeel met die menslike liggaam wat as sulks beskou is as ‘n objek wat nie vatbaar vir menslike eiendomsreg was nie en wat ook nie aan handelstransaksies onderwerp kon word nie. Res religiosae was dus ook res extra commercium en het buite die regs- en handelsverkeer gestaan. Dit was vrygestel van die gewone privaatregtelike beginsels aangesien dit deur die ius sacrum oftewel sakrale reg wat deel van die ius publicum of publiekreg gevorm het, gereguleer is. Onder invloed van die protestantse reformasie het die Romeins-Hollandse juriste van die sestiende en daaropvolgende eeue ‘n gedeeltelike of relatiewe sekularisering van die reg met betrekking tot begrawing en begraafplekke voorgestaan. Sommige het geskryf dat die klassifisering van hierdie sake as res religiosae in onbruik verval het en dat alle sake volgens Romeins-Hollandse reg vir eiendomsreg en handelstransaksies vatbaar was. Desnieteenstaande was hierdie juriste egter bykans eenparig in hul siening dat ten spyte van die relatiewe sekularisering van res religiosae daar nog steeds eerbied en respek daaraan verskuldig was op grond van die Christelike geloof in die wederopstanding van die vlees en die ewige lewe. In die vroeë Suid-Afrikaanse beslissing van Cape Town and District Waterworks v Executors of Elders5 het die hof beslis dat die Romeinsregtelike klassifisering van sake as res religiosae in onbruik verval het, dat hierdie sake ten volle vatbaar was vir eiendomsreg en dat dit vrylik aan regs- en handelstransaksies onderwerp kon word. Byna niks is in dié beslissing aangaande die basiese eerbied vir die menslike liggaam en die finale rusplek daarvan vermeld nie behalwe dat die voortgesette bestaan van die misdaad grafskending of violatio sepulchri erken is. Die hof het hierdie regsposisie as gevolg van die verkeerde lees en uitleg van die Romeins-Hollandse bronne bereik. Groenewegen en Van Leeuwen is teenoor Voet opgestel en daar is bevind dat hulle die kontemporêre reg van hul tyd beter uiteengesit het en is hul menings dus as gesaghebbend toegepas. Aan die ander kant was die hof van mening dat Voet nie sy kontemporêre reg nie maar wel die Romeinse reg weergegee het en is sy standpunt verwerp. Die hof het bevind dat Groenewegen en Van Leeuwen sonder enige twyfel die mening gehuldig het dat die Romeinse klassifisering van sake as res religiosae in onbruik verval het en dat grafte en begraafplase ten volle aan eiendomsreg en kooptransaksies onderwerp kon word. Dit word in hierdie studie betoog dat die hof in hierdie opsig gedwaal het aangesien Groenewegen en Van Leeuwen se tekste glad nie so ‘n absolute sekularisering van die reg met betrekking tot begraafplekke geregverdig het nie. Toe hierdie twee juriste skynbaar absolute vatbaarheid vir eiendomsreg en kooptransaksies aan hierdie sake toegesê het, het hulle slegs die sogenaamde ius sepulchri, oftewel die reg om ‘n liggaam in ‘n spesifieke begraafplek te begrawe in gedagte gehad en nie die begraafplek as sulks nie. Bogenoemde bykans algehele sekularisering van die eiendomsreg van grond deur die howe het tot ontbering onder sekere persone soos langtermynhuurders of okkupeerders van plaas- en ander landelike grond gelei. Grondeienaars was onwillig om begrawingsregte te verleen omdat hulle onder die indruk verkeer het dat dit op die toestaan van ‘n serwituut oor hul grond sou neerkom, met drastiese langtermynimplikasies en - gevolge. ‘n Konserwatiewe regterlike gesag het hierdie absolute eiendomsreg van grondeienaars geëndosseer met die gevolg dat die okkupeerders nie hul kulturele- en godsdiensoortuigings vrylik kon beoefen en uitleef nie. Die Wet op die Uitbreiding van Sekerheid van Verblyfreg van 19976 (Hierna genoem die Wet op Verblyfreg) soos gewysig deur die Algemene Wysigingswet op Grondsake van 20017 het tot ‘n groot mate verligting aan okkupeerders gebring aangesien dit statutêre begrawingsregte aan hierdie persone toegestaan het. Hierdie regte is oorspronklik, grondwetlik en statutêr van aard. Dit bestaan in eie reg onafhanklik van die toestemming van ‘n grondeienaar. Dit is oorspronklik aangesien dit die eerste keer in die Suid-Afrikaanse regsgeskiedenis is dat regte van hierdie aard sonder die toestemming van die grondeienaar aan okkupeerders verleen word. As sulks kan hier geen sprake van afgeleide regte wees nie aangesien die regte nie hul oorsprong in die toestemming van die grondeienaar vind nie. Hierdie regte is ook grondwetlik van aard aangesien hul oorsprong na die Grondwet, wat ‘n mandaat tot grondhervorming en tot die uitbreiding van sekerheid van verblyfreg aan die staat verleen, teruggespoor kan word. Laastens is hierdie regte ook statutêr van aard aangesien dit ingelyf is by en beskerm word deur die Wet op Verblyfreg en die Algemene Wysigingswet op Grondsake8 wat in konkrete terme uitdrukking verleen aan die staat se grondwetlike mandaat tot grondhervorming. Ten spyte van die ooglopende voordeel wat die Wet op Verblyfreg inhou moet dit egter in gedagte gehou word dat die bepalings daarin vervat hierdie voordeel slegs aan ‘n klein kategorie van persone, naamlik okkupeerders soos in die wet gedefinieer, toeken. Persone soos langtermynhuurders, bona fide-besitters en andere word nog steeds uitgesluit en word dit daarom aanbeveel dat die wetgewer weereens sal ingryp en die trefwydte van die wet verbreed sodat ‘n breër groep persone vir begrawingsregte kwalifiseer.afCape Town and District Waterworks v Executor of EldersRes religiosaeViolatio sepulchriRoman-Dutch lawBurial placesSecularisationLand Affairs General Amendment Act of 2001Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997 (ESTA)ConstitutionThesis (Ph.D. (Private Law))--University of the Free State, 2016ThesisUniversity of the Free State