Keeton, Lyndal2016-06-152016-06-152012Keeton, L. (2012). Seeking Leviathan? A test of the revenue maximisation objective in the South African National Lottery. Acta Academica, 44(4), 31-57.0587-2405 (print)2415-0479 (online)http://hdl.handle.net/11660/2962English: A Leviathan is an inefficient government that maximises the public revenue it raises. This article seeks evidence of a Leviathan in the South African government in respect of the National Lottery. This search is motivated by the Lotteries Act of 1997 which legislates that the goal of the National Lottery is to maximise the public revenue raised from the sale of National Lottery tickets. The effective price model is used to estimate the demand curve for National Lottery tickets. Although the National Lottery is not yet maximising revenue, the actions of the National Lottery suggest seemingly Leviathan tendencies.Afrikaans: ’n Leviatan is ’n ondoeltreffende regering wat die openbare fondse wat dit bring maksimaliseer. Hierdie artikel ondersoek bewyse van ’n Leviatan in die Suid-Afrikaanse regering met betrekking tot die Nasionale Lotery. Die soektog word gemotiveer deur die Wet op Loterye van 1997 wat bepaal dat die doel van die Nasionale Lotery is om die openbare inkomste wat uit die verkoop van die Nasionale Lotery-kaartjies ingevorder word te verhoog. Die effektiewe prysmodel word gebruik om sodoende die vraagkurwe vir Nasionale Lotery-kaartjies te bepaal. Alhoewel die Nasionale Lotery nog nie die inkomste optimaal verhoog nie, toon die optrede van die Nasionale Lotery waarskynlik Leviatan-neigings.enSouth African National LotteryLotteries Act 57 of 1997RevenueArticleUniversity of the Free State