

**Land Reform: A comparison of Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy and Land Redistribution
for Agricultural Development – The case of Emalahleni Local Municipality**

By

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Abstract

The study comprises a comparison of the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) and Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) projects in Emalahleni Local Municipality in the Nkangala district, Mpumalanga province of RSA. The study is a qualitative study of a comparative nature where two sub-programmes are compared to find out which one of them best suits the mandate of the redistribution programme. Land reform in South Africa is categorised into three main programmes, namely land restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution; however, for the purpose of this study the main focus is on land redistribution, particularly on the PLAS and LRAD sub-programmes. Numerous studies have been conducted on land reform, particularly land redistribution and its apparent failure to reach the target of transferring 30% of agricultural land to the black majority. However, not much has been done on the new sub-programme of PLAS. There is a need to evaluate this sub-programme of PLAS in comparison with its predecessor in the local context to find out which of the sub-programmes of redistribution performs best in terms of achieving the mandate of the redistribution programme.

Purposeful sampling was conducted on a population of 175 beneficiaries belonging to 42 farms. Eight beneficiaries from LRAD and eight beneficiaries from PLAS were sampled purposefully from four virtually successful farms of PLAS and four virtually unsuccessful farms. On the side of LRAD, four beneficiaries from virtually successful farms and four from virtually unsuccessful farms were similarly sampled.

In terms of the analysis, the study found that in respect of access to land, the beneficiaries had to make some form of application to the authorities to access the land, which is in line with the principles of the redistribution programme as participation is voluntary. The waiting period between sending in an application and the actual occupation of the land ranged between one to five years among the beneficiaries. There are farms where individuals or individual families occupy the land and others where groups ranging between six and 20 members occupy the land in both PLAS and land LRAD farms. The group dynamics are almost the same in these groups, whereas power relations and internal conflicts are sporadic within the groups. Agricultural production is prevalent in some of the farms, but it happens to be more robust in some of the individual PLAS farms and less to almost non-existent in the group LRAD farms. Post-settlement support is prevalent in both the LRAD and PLAS farms, but it appears to be misdirected in the individual PLAS farms. Although production is prevalent in both LRAD and PLAS farms, sustainable livelihoods are only achievable in the individual PLAS farms, although their tenure is not as secured as the LRAD farms due to the lack of title deeds.

The study concluded that neither PLAS nor LRAD can fully address the mandate of the redistribution programme, but elements within each sub-programme may achieve tremendous results if they were to be consolidated into one offering.

Declaration

I, Mailetse Masemola, declare that the master's degree research dissertation or interrelated, publishable manuscripts/published articles, or coursework Master's Degree mini-dissertation that I herewith submit for the Master's Degree qualification in Development Studies at the University of the Free State is my independent work and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.

Signature

Date

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I hereby take this opportunity to acknowledge the support and guidance I received from my supervisor Dr Mark Marais. To appreciate the unwavering support and understanding of my wife Mošopjadi and children. The inspiration I got from my mother, Mahlako 'a Malope le Mologadi, my late father Ngwato 'a Phaahle le Hunadi.

List of Abbreviations

ARC:	Agricultural Research Council
BBBEE:	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
DARDLEA:	Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Land and Environmental Affairs
DALRRD	Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
DLA	Department of Land Affairs
ELM	Emalahleni Local Municipality
ESTA	Extension of Security Act of 1997 (Act 62 of 1997)
EWOC	Expropriation of Land Without Compensation
CASP	Comprehensive Agricultural Support Package
CRDP	Comprehensive Rural Development Programme
LRAD	Land Reform for Agricultural Development
LTA	Labour Tenants Act of 1996
PDI's	Previously Disadvantaged Individuals
PLAS	Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy
PLAAS	Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies
OVG	Office of the Valuer General
SLAG	Settlement Land Acquisition Grant
STATS SA	Statistics South Africa

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Land reform in South Africa, as stated in the Department of Land Affairs' (DLA) *White Paper on Land Reform* of 1997, is made up of three land reform programmes: restitution, redistribution and tenure reform (DLA, 1997: 7; Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies [PLAAS], 2016: 4). The main objectives of land reform are to provide land for previously disadvantaged individuals (PDIs), to improve their livelihoods, quality of life as well as to improve their food security (Mabuza, 2016: 2; DLA, 1997: 61). According to PLAAS (2016: 29), despite efforts to distribute land to fight poverty, many land reform projects resulted in failures that have impacted significantly on the land reform beneficiaries' livelihoods. The *White Paper on Land Reform* of 1997 spells out what should be done in terms of the land reform policy in the country; however, the supporting legislation is still lacking in terms of amending the Constitution (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 969).

Makombe (2018: 1403) states that the purpose of land reform is to alleviate poverty and increase the productivity of the beneficiaries; however, for these to happen, the agricultural productivity of the land must be improved or at the least maintained. It should be accepted that land reform alone cannot address the issue of inequalities and poverty of the majority of the rural poor and perhaps the creation of job opportunities could be the answer. However, the reconfigured land reform could go a long way in addressing the issue, particularly where large irrigation schemes are implemented. This could help in improving household income and creating much-needed job opportunities (Cousins, 2016: 14).

The reconfiguring of land reform will be addressed in the recommendations to follow in Chapter Five.

The expectations for land reform beneficiaries to produce on a commercial scale, perpetuated by the bias to commercial agriculture, have depicted many land users of land reform as being unproductive and yet they produce adequate amounts of crops and livestock products to support their families (Chitonge, 2013: 31). Bailey (2007: 61) highlights the importance of monitoring and evaluation in the implementation of land reform projects – the inclusion of monitoring and evaluation will not only measure the success of land reform, but will also give the required feedback to the policy makers in terms of what works and what is not working. Many scholars have been concerned with the amount of land to be transferred as well as the agricultural production on these farms, but the corresponding socio-economic development of the land reform beneficiaries have been largely overlooked (Mabuza, 2016: 3). According to Sen (1999: 2), development should not only address the issues of accumulation of wealth, but it should go beyond the economic gains by improving the quality of life and the freedom that one enjoys.

Land reform has been slow – only 4.9 million hectares have been transferred through land redistribution with an overall total of 8.4 million hectares transferred to PDIs. This is less than 10% which has been transferred so far from 1994 to 2018 which is shy of the 30% target of the farm land by 2014 (PARLA, 2019: 12). The pace of acquiring and transferring land to the land reform beneficiaries is painfully slow – on average, it takes seven to eight years for restitution or redistribution land acquisition to be completed in Molemole Local Municipality in the Limpopo province (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 14). The prolonged process may discourage the land owners who are willing to sell to the land reform process and end up selling through the open land market.

The Constitution, particularly Section 25 of the property clause, was the main contentious point during the Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations and it is uncertain whether the current regime will amend the Constitution to effect such changes to the property clause (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 969). Cousins (2016: 13) argues that the Constitution – or the property clause of the Constitution – is not the major obstacle at the moment; however, the political will seem to be the case; the author further suggested that should the annual budget of land reform be increased from the current 0.4% to at least 2% of the total allocation, land can be acquired more affordably. By 2016, approximately 7% of the land had been transferred to black people through either restitution or redistribution. This accounts for less than half of the target that the government has set, out although the overwhelming majority of stakeholders agree about the target of transferring 20% of the land by 2030 through land reform administration (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 71).

The current failure in land reform is not due to a lack of enabling legislation, but the inability and ineffectiveness of the implementation thereof where capacitating, funding and training for the institutions that deal with land reform can make a considerable difference (Beinart & Delius, 2019: 9). The diversion of budget to other priorities such as Agriparks, the National Rural Youth Service Corps and recapitalisation funding has led to the decline in land acquisition which has, in turn, resulted in slowing down the pace of land redistribution (PARLA, 2019: 13).

The study comprises a comparison of the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) and Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) projects in Emalahleni Local Municipality in the Nkangala district, Mpumalanga province of RSA. It is a qualitative study where two sub-programmes are compared to find out which one of them best suits the mandate of the redistribution programme. Purposeful sampling was conducted on a population of 175 beneficiaries belonging to 42 farms. Eight beneficiaries from LRAD and eight beneficiaries from PLAS were sampled from four virtually successful farms of PLAS and four virtually unsuccessful farms. On the side of LRAD, four beneficiaries from virtually successful farms and four from virtually unsuccessful farms were similarly sampled.

1.2. Problem statement

In South Africa, the land redistribution programme has been seen as a tool for poverty alleviation and has evolved over the years, from the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) and municipal commonages to the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) and the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) in recent years. One of the main objectives of land reform, particularly land redistribution since its inception in 1994, has been poverty reduction (Aliber, Maluleke, Manenzhe, Paradza & Cousins, 2013: 1).

Numerous studies have been conducted on the beneficiaries of land reform, but empirical data on the new generation redistribution under PLAS is still lacking (PLAAS, 2016: 74). However, these dissertations overlap significantly, thematically (PLAS), geographically (Mpumalanga, including Emalahleni) and generally with the research problems of Masoka's (2014) study on post-settlement land reform challenges and Mahlangu's (2017) study on the sustainable support to beneficiaries of the PLAS sub-programme in the province of Mpumalanga.

The significant difference in policy between the two sub-programmes is land ownership. The study will investigate the success and failure factors between the two programmes. In terms of LRAD, the land is transferred to a registered legal entity either a co-operative or a communal property association (CPA). The co-operative or CPA is usually formed by a group of people and in some cases family members including extended family, while in other cases the members may be complete strangers. In the case of PLAS, the farm is acquired by the State and rented out to beneficiaries for a specific period, usually an initial three or five years which is followed by a long-term lease of either 15 or 30 years. The beneficiaries of PLAS are in most cases an individual who enters into a lease agreement with the State in an individual capacity or as a private company (Pty Ltd) or a close corporation (CC).

Under the redistribution programme, the State and the beneficiaries are both responsible for identifying the land, whereafter the land is purchased by funding made available by the State (Netshipale, Oosting, Raidimi, Mashiloane & De Boer, 2017: 61). Under PLAS, the State identifies and acquires the land and the beneficiaries have to apply for the land; while under LRAD, the beneficiaries identify the land and apply for the funds to purchase the land. Under LRAD, the title deed is handed over to the beneficiaries; while under PLAS, the title deed is kept by the State and the lease agreement or custodianship is issued to the beneficiaries.

Although the programmes both form part of the redistribution programme, the time and period of implementation as well as the method and the target groups differ. In terms of LRAD, the implementation started in 2001 and the programme was phased out in 2008 (Nxumalo & Antwi, 2013: 162). PLAS was introduced in 2006 partially as a replacement for LRAD but also with an added mandate in terms of operation and target groups. The LRAD sub-programme is demand-driven, meaning that participation is voluntary and the responsibility for designing and planning the land reform project lies with the applicant (Adams & Howell, 2001: 6). With PLAS, the idea was to identify land that would then be acquired by the State, where after selected beneficiaries were to be placed on the land and non-performing beneficiaries were to be replaced (Aliber, 2019: 8).

Redistribution farms or projects have some form of documentation or business plans as the basis of their existence or operations. SLAG farms have a form of household income ceiling as a qualifying criterion, while LRAD farms required their own contribution and PLAS farms presently require the signing of a lease contract or caretaker agreement (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 61).

There is a need to investigate whether the PLAS farms are successful as compared to the LRAD farms in terms of the support that the PLAS and LRAD beneficiaries received and whether it has assisted them to be productive or to ultimately establish sustainable livelihoods to reduce poverty on these farms in the Emalahleni Local Municipality.

According to Hall (2009: 83), PLAS is used to acquire land in cases of rights-based programmes such as labour tenants' claims. Where labour tenants have failed to acquire land, the challenge arises in terms of their status as labour tenants and, furthermore, their perception of paying for the land which they have previously used for free. Aliber and Kleinbooi (2010: 15) state that the redistribution programme provides land on a "first come, first served" basis and as a result, the land is often given to people who are unable to use it, while deserving beneficiaries are left out. The technical support that is provided to the land reform beneficiaries is often insufficient or unadapted due to the nature of the service required versus the service provided. Often, the agricultural support or extension support is tailored to the individual or a limited group of farmers; yet in the case of land reform beneficiaries, different skills such as community facilitation and project management are required, which some of the extension officers do not possess (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 11). Historical evidence and lessons learned suggest that positive results in terms of the socio-economic development of land reform beneficiaries can be achieved through complete pre-settlement and post-settlement support (Mabuza, 2016: 28). According to Sihlobo and Nel (2016: 77), post-transfer support is provided through technical and general support services from the departmental extension officers of the provincial and national departments of agriculture and other stakeholders.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 Primary objective

The purpose of the study is to compare Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) and Land Redistribution for Agricultural development (LRAD) farms in Emalahleni local municipality and to evaluate the status of the land reform beneficiaries on these farms to determine whether the economic benefits that they are receiving from land reform projects are able to sustain their livelihoods. Livelihood refers to how people live in a particular space or simply how people earn a living (Scoones, 2009: 172). Kumar (2011: 62) states that the main research objective or the aim carries the weight of the research and, therefore, seeks to answer the research question or solve the research problem.

1.3.2 Secondary objectives

The research project has the following objectives:

- (i) To conduct an international and South African literature review on land reform programmes and the impact of these programmes on farmers.
- (ii) To determine the socio-economic condition of land reform beneficiaries on PLAS and LRAD farms in the district and to investigate the redistribution projects in the municipality.
- (iii) To establish which livelihoods strategies are employed by land reform beneficiaries and whether the support received assisted their agricultural production in the PLAS and LRAD projects.
- (iv) To analyse the factors contributing to the success and sustainability of land reform projects in relation to socio-economic development and sustainable livelihoods.
- (v) To determine the effectiveness of post-transfer support in dealing with issues of livelihoods and provide recommendations for the improvement of land reform programmes.

The distinctive contribution that the dissertation brings to the land reform debate is to determine the shortcomings between the LRAD and the PLAS sub-programmes and establish which one directly contributes to the livelihoods of the land reform beneficiaries. It aims to paint a picture of what works, between owning the land and renting. LRAD beneficiaries have their title deeds, whereas the PLAS beneficiaries have long-term leases on the land and the land is owned by the State. In addition, the contribution of this study to land reform is to determine which one of these sub-programmes works best, to inform future policy of land reform particularly land redistribution in the country.

1.4 Scope of the study

The study aims to compare land reform sub-programmes of PLAS and LRAD in the branch or programme of the land redistribution programme in the Emalahleni Local Municipality. The municipality is in the Nkangala district of the Mpumalanga province of the Republic of South Africa. This study focused on the beneficiaries of both Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) and Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) to assess their socio-economic development as well as livelihoods and ultimately compare them to determine which programme best suits the objective of the land redistribution programme.

The Nkangala district comprises six local municipalities, with Emakhazeni Local Municipality being the biggest in terms of area but with the smallest population at approximately 10 individuals per square kilometre, compared to Dr JS Moroka Local Municipality being the smallest in terms of land area but with the highest in population at 176 people per square kilometre. Emalahleni Local Municipality is the third-largest in the district in terms of area; it has the largest population of 148 persons per square kilometre and – as the economic hub of the district and bordering the Gauteng province – it accommodates 30.2% of the district's population. The biggest economic driver in the municipality is coal mining and energy generation at 35% and 14.4%, respectively; while agriculture is the smallest contributor at 0.5% of the municipal GDP (Emalahleni Local Municipality Spatial Development Framework, 2015: 43).

In terms of LRAD, it is widely documented as a failed programme due to several factors as described by Nxumalo and Antwi (2013: 162), who highlight the large group approach as well as insufficient post-transfer support, among others. The location or proximity of a land reform farm/project is key to the success or sustainability of the project, as the beneficiaries spend a lot of time and resources getting to and from the project; yet the closer the farm is to urban settlement, the higher the risk of theft becomes (Bradstock, 2007: 256).

Regarding PLAS, the lack of a title deed is the main challenge since the farmers cannot access financial support from the government in terms of infrastructure and the private sector in terms of production loans (Masoka, 2014: 203). Poorly maintained access roads, poor infrastructure such as fencing and housing as well as machinery on these farms remain a challenge in some of these PLAS farms. These challenges faced by the farmers negatively affect their progress (Mahlangu, 2017: 92).

1.5 Research methodology

1.5.1 Approach

This research study is a qualitative study that focuses on the beneficiaries of the two land reform sub-programmes, namely PLAS and LRAD, in the Emalahleni Local Municipality. A qualitative approach pays more attention to descriptive information or words than numbers in terms of data collection. The qualitative approach is in line with the research study's objective since the study is concerned with the success or the failure factors of these land reform projects and, therefore, the participants will be required to narrate or explain their experiences.

The qualitative approach is more inductive in nature and its emphasis is on theory generation. It is mostly criticised for the subjective nature and the inability to be replicated, as in most cases the researcher decides which details are included in the study data and how much attention is paid to them. Qualitative research focuses on open-ended questions that follow an interview schedule to guide the participant or respondent by helping them to concentrate on the subject or the topic without bringing in irrelevant information.

The qualitative approach was chosen because it is more relevant to the topic of comparing two land redistribution sub-programmes in a municipality. According to Bryman (2014: 384), the qualitative approach is characterised by six main stages:

- General research questions
- Selection of relevant sites or subjects
- Collection of relevant data
- Interpretation of collected data and further collection of data
- Conceptual and theoretical work and tighter specification of research questions
- Writing up findings, recommendations and conclusion.

Based on the steps above, this research study compared PLAS projects and LRAD projects in the municipality to evaluate which sub-programme performs better in terms of improving the quality of life of the beneficiaries as well as sustaining their livelihoods.

1.5.2 Research design

The comparative research design is aimed at comparing two parallel scenarios to establish the similarities and to test which scenario provides better results (Walison, 2011: 11). The research study compared the two land reform sub-programmes of land redistribution to establish the common factors and, most importantly, to evaluate the success and failure factors of each sub-programme in relation to beneficiary participation and their level of involvement in their projects. The idea was to compare the two sub-programmes of land redistribution to evaluate the success and the failure factors in each sub-

programme. According to Bryman (2014: 74), a comparative study is equivalent to a multiple case study; in this case, a number of farms were selected or sampled and depending on the set criteria and the nature of the programme, some of those beneficiaries were selected and interviewed.

In the case of PLAS, the number of beneficiaries per farm is usually limited to a household or individual farmer, although in some farms there could be more than one household or beneficiary organised into a company, a private company or a close corporation. In this case, four virtually successful farms and four virtually unsuccessful farms were sampled. A total of eight beneficiaries representing eight farms were interviewed under this sub-programme.

In the case of the LRAD farms or projects, where the number of beneficiaries is usually higher per individual farm or farm portion, a maximum of two beneficiaries were selected per farm. The LRAD farms are usually governed by some sort of committee and, therefore, the sampling and selection took the form of one member of the executive committee and one member from the non-committee members. The beneficiaries in these farms are usually organised into a CPA or a primary agricultural co-operative. Four farms were selected and similar criteria were used, where two virtually successful farms and two virtually unsuccessful farms were sampled. A maximum of two beneficiaries in each farm was selected and interviewed. Eight LRAD beneficiaries and eight PLAS were interviewed.

A comparative design is a research design that has more than one case to study and so be able to compare and generate insight into a theory, existing or new, from the contrasting results. The design is aligned with the choice of this research study, because two sets of beneficiaries were investigated, and insight or information was uncovered regarding the success factors and the failure factors of each sub-programme.

1.5.3 Data-collection strategy

The data-collection process is the critical process of every research project. It determines the success or the failure of the research project, because if the data is collected using the wrong instruments, it becomes difficult to analyse or sometimes even impossible to get any results or to arrive at an appropriate conclusion. The main stages of the data-collection process are the interview schedule development and the interview process (Bryman, 2008: 473).

Primary data was collected through audio recordings as guided by the interview schedule. Methods used to obtain answers should be relevant and in this case, the interview schedule and interview process were deemed relevant research tools to obtain data from the relevant source, which is the land beneficiaries in the land reform sub-programmes in the municipality.

- **Interview schedule**

In a qualitative study, an interview schedule is used as a guide to interacting with the respondent, although the answers vary with each individual interviewed. According to Bryman (2008: 473), the researcher already has an idea of what needs to be investigated and uses this to develop a set of questions that will enable the researcher to answer the research questions or to achieve the research objectives. The questions in the interview schedule, unlike the research questions, are directly linked to the outcome of the research; for instance, the question that addresses the issues of post-transfer support.

The reason why an interview schedule was developed or chosen as a tool is that the researcher may be interested in the circumstances concerning the acquisition of the farm, the support received so far and whether the beneficiaries have been able to produce crops or livestock; at the same time, the attitude and the reaction of the respondents are observed by the researcher. This observation may not have been reflected in the research questions, i.e. in the research study, but it was interesting and critical to evaluate as to what the beneficiary received in terms of farm size and capacity per land-use type, how the beneficiaries benefited from the land reform programme and what role that had on their livelihoods. The greater part of the interview schedule in the social science sector has clarity or explanation-seeking questions, with the basic interview schedule having questions of what, how, when and why (Russell-Bernard, 2017: 34).

- **Interviewing process**

There are two main criteria of data collection under a qualitative study. The first one is the data collection using the semi-structured interview schedule and the second one is the observation of the respondents. The two methods assist in enabling the researcher to keep an open mind of what needs to be observed and to apply theories and concepts to be able to arrive at suitable answers (Bryman, 2008: 473). The reason why the two methods are chosen is that in terms of variables such as gender and ethnicity, one can deduce an answer without asking direct questions and it assists in choosing the language or medium of communication.

According to Bryman (2008: 209), the other critical issue that may affect the selection of the people to be interviewed is the attitude of the interviewer and the respondents. People tend to be more comfortable with a friendly approach rather than an abrupt one. In an abrupt setting, interviewees will rush through the interview and omit the important factors such as data, details and shared experiences in the process or sometimes even avoid abrupt characters completely during the process. Therefore, it is important to equip the interviewers to be able to deal with interview situations to get maximum benefits from those types of respondents.

- **Sampling design**

Sampling was used to summarise the findings in a population by using computational methods such as averages. When investigating a phenomenon in a population, a sample can be used to determine the average, particularly where the total population is large enough to produce a representative sample. However, in a qualitative study, sample size may not have much bearing, as the purpose is to study a few cases to establish their diversity (Kumar, 2011: 154). Purposeful sampling was used in this research study. According to Bryman (2008: 418), purposeful sampling is used to sample the participants strategically, particularly where an individual will generate their response in line with the goals of the research.

As alluded to earlier, this research study aimed to compare two land reform sub-programmes of land redistribution, namely the LRAD and the PLAS, in the Emalahleni Local Municipality. The data obtained from the local authorities suggests that there are 175 beneficiaries of PLAS and LRAD who can be found on 40 farms in the municipality. There are 10 LRAD farms with 113 beneficiaries and 32 PLAS farms with 62 beneficiaries. The sampling procedure that was to be followed is the purposeful sampling for both the LRAD and PLAS land reform beneficiaries.

There are two factors that affect the accuracy of the sample, which are as follows:

The size of the sample: Larger samples normally give more accurate results rather than smaller ones; therefore, the sample in this research study was almost one-third of the population. This was more reasonable and was able to produce relatively accurate results. The extent of variation in the sampling population: The greater the variation in the characteristics of the variables of the study, the higher the likelihood of less accurate results; therefore, the variables in this research study was more or had lesser variation. The disadvantage of purposeful sampling is that since it may have characteristics that are not favoured by the interlocutors, suggestions of too much meddling in the selection of the respondents from the target group may be raised (Bryman, 2008: 418). However, it gives a true reflection of each unique situation and, therefore, is ideal for a unique characteristic of the region and high inequalities that are prevalent in the country and the society at large.

To reiterate, purposeful sampling was applied to the beneficiaries of the two sub-programmes of PLAS and LRAD. According to Bryman (2008: 418), the criteria of selection of participants are set before the commencement of the research, bearing in mind the research questions that need to be answered. In the research, the criteria were that the PLAS number of beneficiaries per farm is usually a household or an individual farmer. In this case, four virtually successful farms and four virtually unsuccessful farms were selected. One beneficiary in each farm was interviewed.

In the case of the LRAD farms or projects, four farms were selected from the list. Two virtually unsuccessful farms and two virtually successful farms were selected. Two beneficiaries in each farm were sampled and interviewed. The LRAD farms usually are operated by a community or group of beneficiaries or farmers, who are represented by a committee. In this case, each farm was represented in the study's data-collection process by a committee member and a non-committee. One beneficiary was sampled from the committee and the other sampled from the wider group.

The total number of beneficiaries was 16 people representing 12 farms, eight beneficiaries from four LRAD farms and eight beneficiaries from eight PLAS farms. This represented an equal number of beneficiaries from both LRAD and PLAS and a maximum of 16 participants from a population of 175 was sampled using a purposeful sampling method for this research study.

1.6 Limitations of the study

Limitations in terms of sampling methods, geographical location, time, cost as well as language barrier were encountered in this research study.

- **Sampling method**

The choice of sampling method was a limitation in the sense that only the purposeful sampling method was suitable for the research project. The reason for using purposeful sampling is that there is a deliberate action of comparison where two or more categories of land reform projects were compared. In this case, virtually successful land reform projects of PLAS were compared to virtually successful land reform projects of LRAD. The second phase was to compare virtually unsuccessful projects of PLAS to virtually unsuccessful projects of LRAD.

- **Time and cost**

The research study was limited by the small timeframe in which it had to be conducted and the costs for travelling to conduct the interviews as well as time for an allocated participant for the interviews. The researcher interviewed each participant in his/her farm environment, which meant the researcher travelled from farm to farm; this was time-consuming and transport costs were incurred. Transport costs were also incurred by the respondents in the case where the respondents were not residing on the farm, but had to travel to the farm for other purposes including to show up for an appointment.

- **Geographical location**

The research study was conducted in the Emalahleni Local Municipality, so in terms of geographical location, the research study was limited to the farmers within the municipal jurisdiction. In terms of the farms, again the limitations were that only a number of farms were selected to fit the sampling method described.

- **Language barrier**

The research study was conducted in the local language of the farmers, isiNdebele, and later transcribed into English to compile the research report. The limitations were that some of the meaning of words was lost in translation, such as idioms. Although extra care was taken through the transcription and translation processes, there is always a risk that some of the words may not find proper meaning when translated to English.

1.7 Layout of the study

The research study compares two sub-programmes of land redistribution in the Emalahleni Local Municipality, Nkangala district in the Mpumalanga province of the Republic of South Africa.

Chapter 1 deals with the introduction, problem statement, the primary and secondary objectives of the research, the research methodology, scope of the study, layout and study limitations.

Chapter 2 deals with the current trends as well as the historical origins of land reform. It includes lessons learned around the globe, lessons learned in Africa and lessons learned in Southern African Development Community (SADC) communities. This chapter also tackles the legal framework and policies of land reform in South Africa.

Chapter 3 deals with three main programmes of land reform programmes in South Africa – the restitution of land rights, tenure reform and land redistribution – as well as their challenges, with a major emphasis on the land redistribution programme as the main driver of the study.

Chapter 4 deals with the execution of the study, the research methodology, sampling and interviews. The comparison between the projects or farms of the PLAS land reform sub-programme and the projects or farms of the LRAD sub-programme of the redistribution programme is done in this chapter. In this chapter, we look at the gathering of data as well as the presentation of research results.

Chapter 5 deals with the analysis and presentation of the findings or the research results. The analysis of results begins with the transcribing of audio recordings, the translation of data from isiNdebele to English, coding and thematic analysis. The presentation of results is done according to the themes discussed in the presentation.

Chapter 6 deals with the recommendations and conclusion of the research. In terms of the recommendations, it is done according to the significant theme in terms of the analysis and the conclusion sums up the research project.

1.8 Conclusion

Land reform is a contentious issue in South Africa and although the majority of stakeholders believe or have an idea of what can be done, it is more often than not very far from the truth. The challenge is that most of the land reform programmes, particularly the redistribution programmes, are designed without the consultation of the beneficiaries themselves and the whole exercise is based on a top-down approach.

Regarding PLAS and LRAD, not all land reform projects are the same in terms of geographical location, which greatly influences a number of factors such as distance to the market of suppliers of inputs, climatic factors such as rain distribution or the prevalence of frost, social factors such as the local community dynamics such the prevalence of theft and so on. The question is whether the PLAS or LRAD is designed to serve the programme of land redistribution better, based on the factors mentioned earlier. The success and failure factors may differ from project to project and sub-programme to sub-programme; therefore, it is concluded that this thesis will answer some of the questions and provide clarity as well as unearthing such factors.

The next chapter will look at the lessons learned on land reform implementation, legislation and policies around the world, in Africa and the SADC region in terms of challenges that have been experienced in terms of the implementation of land reform programmes. It will also examine the South African context of land reform in terms of the policies and the legislation supporting the implementation of land reform.

CHAPTER 2: LESSONS LEARNED ON LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION, LEGISLATION AND POLICIES

2.1 Introduction

Africa was colonised by the European settlers through different forms of arrangement, ranging from control through to appropriation, conquests and agreements. South Africa was among the first countries to be colonised in southern Africa and the last to gain its independence. First, it was colonised by Dutch settlers, then by Britain and later by the apartheid regime, which also ruled over Namibia. Overall was Britain the majority of colonial masters who ruled over several countries, including Egypt and South Africa, although the German rule over Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania did not last over long periods. Other countries were colonised by Belgium, Spain and Portugal (AUC-ECA-AFDB Consortium, 2010: 6).

The majority of indigenous South Africans have had their right to own land and resources eroded through land grabs in the past 350 years of South Africa's history (Cousins, 2016: 1). The apartheid government did not only dispossess the black majority of their land and force them into homelands, but also established structures such as traditional leaders to be used to control black people in those areas to be able to source labour and taxes (Fraser, 2007: 840). Through this process, land rights – particularly for women – were severely undermined; spatial inequalities were cast in a capitalist economy through the provision of cheap labour, while land distribution was based on social, race and gender inequalities supported by a legal system that legitimised forced removals (Cousins, 2016: 1).

Dispossession continued thereafter in the pursuit of exploiting labour for mining and agricultural companies, which destroyed a successful agricultural system on which indigenous people depended (Tong, 2014: 21). In turn, the traditional leaders also played a pivotal role in suppressing the resistance and allocating the available scarce land resources. The traditional leaders were also given powers of administration in terms of issuing permits for seeking work in white-owned or zoned areas, a plot of land to settle on or even to seek a government pension (Fraser, 2007: 840). The challenge with the homelands was that there were no apparent land rights and people were living under challenging conditions of abject poverty, malnutrition, unemployment and illiteracy, while on private farms they faced evictions and were deprived of their basic rights and services (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 3).

Land reform is used as a tool to correct the unequal distribution of land due to discriminatory policies in many countries around the world. In the late 19th century, some African countries such as Kenya and Zambia began with reforms on land policies although this was proven to be complex due to the political nature of reforms and the lengthy process of public participation (Place, 2008: 1328).

The current dispensation in South Africa was brought about by legislation to open access to land for occupation and agricultural use by the formerly deprived black majority. This includes the principle that any attempt to correct such access should be brought about by the enacting of legislation, including the amendment of the current property clause in the Constitution, to enable the government to expropriate land for land reform purposes (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 696). However, the property clause was not only meant to protect the current landowners but also the beneficiaries of land redistribution in terms of their rights to use land (Masoka, 2014: 23). The property clause is still being carefully negotiated to prevent the mass exodus of skilled farmers, attract investors with the aim of protecting the economy, and avoid the imminent threat of food insecurity (Leighton, 2015: 2).

The issue of constitutional constraints has been widely discussed since the dawn of democracy, mostly because of the slow pace of land reform and the underachievement of the redistribution programme to meet the set target (Mtero, Gumede & Ramantsima, 2019: 13). Leighton (2015: 3) states that the slow pace of land reform in the country has raised fears among landowners that more drastic measures may be embarked upon, such as the expropriation of land without compensation. Land expropriation without compensation is currently a “hot” topic among stakeholders and the ruling party has since adopted it as its land policy for discussion and consequent implementation (Akinola, 2020: 216). However, most landowners prefer shared ownership where skills can be imparted to the new landowners for continuity and to safeguard the production capacity of the farms (Leighton, 2015: 3).

Aliber (2019: 11) states that if the required amendments to Section 25 of the Constitution are made and the expropriation of land without compensation is adopted as the national land policy, it may not necessarily result in accelerated land redistribution because it may not happen without affecting food security or the national economy on the macro-level. Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (2019: 74) emphasises that the expropriation of land without compensation should happen within the ambit of the law.

2.2 Lessons learned around the world

Around the world, land reform has been used effectively to address inequalities on the Asian continent – in Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In China, land reform has achieved considerable success. On the African continent, land reform implementation continues in Kenya and Zimbabwe; while in the South America, particularly the Latin American countries have not achieved much success (Deininger, Feder, Gordillo de Anda & Munro-Faure, 2003: 14).

China’s approach to land reform and land rights differs slightly from that of the rest of the world. Since its independence, land tenure has evolved through stages. In the 1970s and 1980s, the policy of the Household Responsibility System was introduced, which provided broader land rights to rural

farmers. Through this process, all rural households have access to land, particularly arable land, although there are no written formal land-use contracts. The policy initially supported the 15-year lease term in the 1980s, which was later revised to a 30-year lease term in 1994, although the majority of land users preferred much a longer lease term (Ping Li, 2003: 50).

Despite significant success in distributing land in China, new threats emerged in the form of readjustment in the later years of implementation. This prompted the Land Management Law Committee of the People's Congress to adopt a policy on land adjustments in 1997, which was later revised in 1998. In 2002, the People's Republic of China reached their greatest milestone by adopting the Rural Land Contracting Law, which saw 210 million rural household land rights being secured for 30 years since the adoption of the Household Responsibility System (Ping Li, 2003: 61).

South Africa adopted a market-based land reform system like other countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Brazil, Colombia and the Philippines, which sets the boundaries between the role of the State and the role of the market with an overemphasised political neutrality (El-Ghonemy, 2003: 1). In South Africa, the market-based approach was directed by the macro-economic policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (known as the GEAR programme), whereas it should have been directed by the prescripts of the Constitution (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 8).

Brazilian agrarian reform began in the 1950s and by 1994, after approximately 32 years of implementation, only 300 000 families had benefited from this process. The situation changed for the better and in the period between 1995 and 2001, 584 301 families benefited from the distribution of 18 737 000 hectares of land. This was stimulated by the deterioration of the agrarian situation after the murder of 19 rural workers in *Eldorado Do Carajas*, culminating in the invasion of land by the *Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária* (INCRA). In response to the crisis, the Brazilian government accelerated the distribution of land and began to address the plight of the farm and rural workers; four million more are yet to benefit from the land reform programme (Teafilo & De Prado Garcia, 2003: 21).

According to Cox, Munro-Faure, Mathieu, Herrera, Palmer and Groppo (2003: 1), in Egypt – like in China, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and India – land reform beneficiaries are allowed to own the portion of land on which they work. Egypt's approach to land reform is similar to that of the Republic of Korea. In 1991, Egypt adopted the economic reforms in agreement with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, these reforms resulted in the adoption of market-driven neo-liberal paradigms, which reversed the gains that were achieved, resulting in landlessness, inequality and poverty (El-Ghonemy, 2003: 1).

In Australia, the lack of land reform is not the challenge. The main challenge is the unwillingness or inability to deal with aboriginal people's aspirations on land matters. Despite a stable democracy, Australia is failing to deal with the rights of the small minority of aboriginal people (De Villiers, 2003: 2).

Land reform has political, social and economic objectives and the emphasis on either aspect or each objective is dependent on the prevailing circumstances in the society concerned (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 51). Several countries adopted different approaches and strategies to their land reform initiatives. In African countries where land reform started much earlier, such as in Egypt in 1952, land reform was supported by the World Bank; like in Tanzania and Iran and, to a lesser extent, in Zimbabwe and South Africa before the land expropriation was declared (Makombe, 2018: 1402).

2.3 Lessons learned in Africa

The African continent, unlike other continents, is one where the indigenous population has almost been annihilated by colonisers and for this reason that the African population feels they need land for their physical, collective and cultural survival as a people (Kaapama, 2014: 238). In Africa, land distribution is skewed in favour of European settlers, particularly where they have settled to farm in Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and have carved for themselves a huge amount of land while the indigenous population are left to fend for themselves and a smaller and most probably degraded marginal land (Place, 2008: 1328).

As intimated earlier, the indigenous people of South Africa endured 350 years of land dispossession which left them without key resources of production, deprived of their rights and natural resources (Cousins, 2016: 1). According to Tong (2014: 21), the dispossession of land in South Africa started shortly after 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a refreshment station in the Cape, en route to the Middle East to look for spices in India. The majority of these countries experienced colonialism to varying extents. Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa experienced settlers' colonialism; while in Mozambique and Swaziland, it was to a lesser extent and Tanzania, Lesotho, Malawi and Botswana had very few settlers (Aliber & Kleinbooi, 2010: 2).

Land reform began in the 1950s and gained momentum throughout the 1960s in Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania and Angola. Kenya, Botswana and Swaziland followed in the 1960s; Zimbabwe in the 1980s and South Africa and Namibia in the 1990s (AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium, 2010: 6). The majority of these African countries began their reforms just after independence through different mechanisms which included the nationalisation of corporate originations and settler's lands in Mozambique, Angola and Zambia. In Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Kenya market-based packages

of acquisition and compensation supported by former colonial masters have been used (Byagumisha, 2016: 2).

In Egypt, it was through nationalisation of foreign-owned and settlers' lands, while in the former colonial protectorates of Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland, expropriation of land was used sparingly in the former settlers' owned lands (AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium, 2010: 6). In Egypt, land reform was implemented in 1952, 1961 and 1964, and was characterised by a ceiling of distributed units to beneficiaries. The size ratio was one hectare of irrigated land to 40 hectares being a ceiling to the redistributed lands (El-Ghonemy, 2003: 1).

As suggested earlier, the new wave of land reform came to the fore in southern Africa in the 1990s. This period coincided with the abolishment of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia, the fall of the communist regime in Angola and Mozambique, and the emergence of a radical land reform approach in Zimbabwe (Garcia, 2004: 41). In South Africa, many exiled members of the ruling party were against nationalisation and widespread expropriation on their return due to their experience of the negative impact this had on their host countries' economies, such as Mozambique (Bosch, 2003: 1). Kepe and Hall (2016: 7) argue that the exiled members did not learn much from their experience in Algeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania regarding land reform; in particular, the application of smallholder farming versus the commercialised farming units, the latter having enjoyed greater preference.

In Mozambique, land reform was influenced by international policies, such as the structural reform programme where a country moves from socialism to political pluralism (Norfolk & Liversage, 2002: 2). When the country gained independence in 1975, land was nationalised through the constitution; co-operatives and communal villages were created to organise the population and land users were issued long-term leases where user rights were created from converting property rights and communal rights. The structural adjustment programme and Peace Accord of 1992, which ended 17 years of civil war, gave rise to the national land policy and legal framework for land access that was approved in 1997 (De Quadros, 2003: 1).

Efforts to administer reform in some of the African countries, particularly where land was held by indigenous groups or clans, were met with stern resistance and caused tension that in some countries led to conflict, such as in Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Namibia (AUC-ECA-AFDB Consortium, 2010: 6). Despite efforts to redistribute land, major inequalities still exist in South Africa and Zimbabwe while in Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, economic and social injustice persist (Byagumisha, 2016: 2).

2.4 Land reform in the SADC communities

Land reform in African countries, particularly in the SADC region including South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, has been driven by land redistribution as a means of addressing poverty (Aliber & Cousins, 2013: 140). As mentioned previously, the period of land reform in most African countries began in the 1950s, which coincided with most of the countries gaining independence from colonial rule (El-Ghonemy, 2003: 1). South Africa is by far worse off than its counterparts in the SADC region in terms of land held by the white minority (Adams & Howell, 2001: 1). Some 72% of farms and agricultural holdings by individual landowners is owned by the white minority in South Africa, followed by Namibia at 44% and Zimbabwe at 41%, although the latter has made significant inroads in terms of redistributing its land to the black majority through its radical land reform programme, which by 2001 was standing at 22.5% of the land held by the black majority.

Although land reform in the SADC region has been experienced in several countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, much of the attention has been given to Zimbabwe and South Africa (Ramutsindela & Hartnack, 2019: 196). Both countries were subjected to colonialism that resulted in widespread land dispossession and deprivation, and in both countries, the land question is characterised by a protracted liberation struggle.

Land redistribution in Zimbabwe began in the 1980s, after independence, and lasted until 2000; it was reignited during the now-ruling party of ZANU-PF's preparation for the presidential election in 2002. The radical land transformation in Zimbabwe has been criticised by many analysts, including the development stakeholders such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the Commonwealth (Goebel 2005: 345). In Zimbabwe, land reform has been widely documented by most writers, detailing the brutality of the land evasion by military veterans and ZANU-PF leaders (Mutanda, 2013: 41). This is the consequence of the land question in Zimbabwe, since it was brokered in the Lancaster agreement, which has a stipulation that was influenced by Great Britain as the former colonial power (Goebel, 2005: 350).

Goebel (2005: 345) states that although the two countries – Zimbabwe and South Africa – had the same approach to land reform, the latter may not have experienced the same circumstances as the former; and despite the number of analysts cautioning against large-scale land invasion and systematic land expropriation without compensation the future of land question may not turnout the same way as their neighbours. In South Africa, inclusive land reform was opposed by the landowners who are colonial settlers from Europe until 1994 (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 11). Several African countries have experienced appropriation of land by the white colonial masters and their settlers. This includes South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola in southern Africa, Malawi in Central Africa, Kenya in East Africa and Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa (Byangumisha, 2016: 2).

In Mozambique, the structural adjustment programme and Peace Accord of 1992 that ended 17 years of civil war gave rise to the national land policy and legal framework for land access, which was finally approved in 1997 (De Quadros, 2003: 1). The main purpose of the land law was to facilitate investment and promote the safeguarding of communities through the creation of inheritable user rights called DUAT “*Portuguese Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento dos Tera’s*— “. The DUAT’s main aim was to provide security of tenure to the rural poor as well as to improve their livelihoods, but they have since failed in this regard and the larger part of public land is still regulated by the government. Furthermore, it has gained traction in terms of establishing large commercial farms with protected property rights (Chitanga & Moyo, 2018: 3).

According to Garcia (2004: 43), the dispossession in Namibia began when it was colonised in 1884 and by 1905, indigenous Namibians were only allowed to own land in the segregated area called the Police Zone. The “Native Reserve” was created in 1912. When Namibia gained independence in 1990, 42% of the agricultural land was under the ownership of white commercial farmers. The country went through two colonial periods in the form of German rule and later as a South African protectorate. According to Kaapama (2019: 233), the Nama and the Ovaherero communities suffered waves of dispossession by German rule and by the South African government.

The anti-colonial struggle that brought independence in 1990 was galvanised by grievances of land dispossession and became a key factor in the political and liberation struggle (Kaapama, 2019: 234). According to Adams and Howell (2001: 2), Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s approach to land reform was mostly redistributive-driven by the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle. This was despite the agreement of transferring land to the landless majority and surprisingly promoted that the land property of citizens cannot be taken without compensation. The property rights were legalised into a land policy in Namibia as well as in South Africa in the 1990s. In the case of Namibia, this resulted in most of the land claims of minorities being unresolved as they were challenged by larger overriding claims.

2.5 South African context of land reform

As has been established in the foregoing chapter, the land dispossession in South Africa began in 1650 when the European colonisers, mostly from Britain and Dutch descendants, settled in the Cape and began moving northwards and eastwards (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 3). According to Tong (2014: 21), the dispossession of land in South Africa started shortly after 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a refreshment station in the Cape en route to India, looking to trade in spices.

The main purpose of the 1913 Native Land Act was to segregate the natives to limit them from acquiring and occupying land in general in South Africa (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 683). Although

there was an attempt to alleviate the problem through the Native Land Trust Act of 1936, which assisted black people to acquire land through development trusts, rural development programmes such as betterment planning and other rural development programmes. Nevertheless, it exacerbated the problems by restricting access by the majority in the 1930s and 1940s employing a top-down approach (Seneque, 1982: 7).

The government embarked on the programme of land reform with ambitious targets to address these challenges. Land reform is burdened with political, social and economic issues, which may be the reason why the programme fails to meet its objectives (Bailey, 2007: 61).

Land redistribution beneficiaries, unlike tenure reform and restitution beneficiaries, apply for funds to purchase the land through the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle (Sebola & Tsheola, 2014: 114). The government acts as a facilitator in the “willing buyer, willing seller” initiative. However, the “willing buyer” is not necessarily willing if the market environment is not favourable to them (Karriem & Hoskins, 2016: 333). According to Lahiff and Li (2012: 10), challenges to the “willing buyer, willing seller” approach include the failure of the government to impose land taxes on property acquisitions to dampen prices hikes or extortions, encouraging going concern, and not allowing beneficiaries to implement their own initiatives and in so doing, they effectively protect large farms or operations from subdivision, and lastly to avoid expropriation of land even when it seems necessary, especially where it could be used to finalise complex transactions like in restitution claims.

The *White Paper on Land Reform* of 1997 emphasised that the land reform should achieve national stability and reconciliation through redressing apartheid injustices while underpinning national economic growth by improving the welfare of households and alleviating poverty (DLA, 1997: 7).

Land reform has been slow, with only 4.9 million hectares having been transferred through land redistribution; with an overall total of 8.4 million hectares transferred to PDIs, which is less than 10%, from 1994 to 2018; this is well short of the targeted 30% of the farm land by 2014 (PARLA, 2019: 12). By 2016, approximately 7% of the land had been transferred to black people through either restitution or redistribution, which accounts for less than half of the 30% target that the government has set out. Many stakeholders agree that 20% of the land could be transferred by 2030 through land reform administration (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 71). The failure of land reform to transfer land fast enough to support small-scale farming as an alternative to large-scale farming for food security will be provided by small-scale farming rather than large-scale farming (Greenberg, 2003: 23).

The South African Land Reform programme was introduced as a key programme in rural development with an ambitiously high expectation of increasing rural households’ income and creating large-scale

employment through building the economy (PLAAS, 2016: 29). Over the years, land reform implementation has evolved through different programmes, sub-programmes and strategies with varying results (DRDLR, 2017), but there has been no concrete agreement as to what the problem is and how to correct it (Aliber & Cousins, 2013: 140; Aliber *et al.*, 2013: 1). The current failure in land reform is not because of the lack of the enabling legislation, but the inability and ineffectiveness of the implementation process where capacitating, funding and training for the institutions that deal with land reform can make a considerable difference (Beinart & Delius, 2019: 9).

The new legislation to protect farm dwellers in the democratic dispensation offers protection to farm dwellers in terms of illegal eviction, but very little in terms of legal eviction – which is what the majority of the farm dwellers find themselves faced with, eventually resulting in them leaving the farm, thereby losing livelihoods and their security of tenure (Brooks & Kjelstrup, 2014: 252).

2.6 Key legislation affecting land reform in South Africa

A number of laws affected the history of land distribution in the country and the most prominent one of these is the Native Land Act of 1913, followed by the Group Areas Act of 1950 during the apartheid and the colonial era. In the democratic dispensation, the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, as amended, is the most popular. The apartheid regime legislation such as the Natives Land Act of 1913, Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 (Act 18 of 1936) as well as the Group Areas Act of 1950 laid a foundation for the dispossession of land for black people and the Homelands Policy (Potgieter, 2014: 31).

2.6.1 Native Land Act of 1913 (Act 27 of 1913)

The Native Land Act of 1913 was instrumental in restricting the native people of South Africa to occupy 13% of the land surface, which amounted that time to 1.3 hectares per individual, leaving the European and other descendants to occupy an average of 1 600 hectares per person (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 57).

2.6.2 Native Trust and Land Act of 1936

This was an attempt to alleviate the problem created by the Native Land Trust Act of 1936, which assisted black people to acquire land through a development trust. By the 1930s and 1940s, the top-down rural development programmes such as betterment planning did not make it any easier by further restricting access by the majority in these acquired lands (Seneque, 1982: 7).

2.6.3 Group Areas Act of 1950

The main instrument used by the apartheid government to dispossess black people of their land, in line with the Native Land Act of 1913, was the Group Areas Act of 1950 (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 969).

The Group Areas Act of 1950 did not only dispossess black people of their land, but also destroyed independent black farming communities (Potgieter, 2014: 1).

2.6.4 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act of 1970 (Act 70 of 1970)

Land reform in South Africa is the most debatable subject to date, although a variety of stakeholders and individuals alike agree to its failures yet cannot agree on what should be done and what it should look like (De Sarte & Cousins, 2019: 1). Despite the range of enabling legislation for land reform, according to Kepe and Hall (2016: 48), one law that is still a hindrance to land reform is the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act of 1970, where the term agricultural unit has been a major factor in preventing the farms to be subdivided to accommodate the number of smallholder farmers who are credible and are able to intensify land use and production, which can lead to sustainable livelihoods. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act of 1970, which prevented the subdivision of land in the apartheid era, continues to do so in the new democratic dispensation – which becomes a huge hindrance to land reform in terms of the designing and planning of land reform projects (Mtero *et al.*, 2019: 15).

2.6.5 Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991 (Act 108 of 1991)

In 1991, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991 was promulgated, with the aim of repealing the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Group Areas Act of 1950 (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 687). The abolishment was a result of a negotiated settlement, although some racially discriminative laws were not repealed, such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1952 (Act 51 of 1952) and the Self-Governing Territories Act of 1993 (Act 152 of 1993), avoiding a situation where racially based inequities could be disguised under the Act (Weideman, 2004: 221).

2.6.6 Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993 (Act 126 of 1993)

Land redistribution is driven by the Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993 as amended by Act 58 of 2008. This, however, according to Lahiff and Li (2012: 7), is a means for the Minister to avail funds for the procurement of land, as it provides no further regulations regarding the implementation of land reform. The initial purpose of the Act was to redistribute state land to the dispossessed individuals by racially based laws. This was based on sustainable land use conditions (Weideman, 2014: 222).

Section 2 of the Act gives clarity in relation to land reform as follows:

- To give effect of land and land reform related obligations of the State in terms of Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
- Effect, promote, facilitate or support the maintenance, planning, sustainable use, development and improvement of property contemplated in this Act.

- Contribute to poverty alleviation.
- Promote economic growth and the empowerment of historically disadvantaged persons.

Mtero *et al.* (2019: 80) highlight the need to limit the discretionary powers mentioned in the Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993, particularly about the acquisition of land and provision of support. The authors further suggested that there should be a limit in terms of these activities to rationalise the number of resources allocated for them.

2.6.7 Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 (Act 22 of 1994), as amended

The restitution beneficiaries have lodged their land claims with the Commission of Restitution of Land Rights before the closing date of land claims by 31 December 1998 (Rungasamy, 2011: 27). According to Adams and Howell (2001: 5), approximately 80% of the 67 531 claims logged are urban claims, which may not contribute to the transfer of land as the majority are settled through financial compensation.

2.6.8 Labour Tenants Act of 1996 (Act 3 of 1996)

According to PLAAS (2016), by the cut-off date of 31 March 2001, 19 416 labour tenant claims were lodged, although it is not clear how many of those claims were resolved. As of 2014, 7 834 beneficiaries have received 41 791 hectares of land through the process.

2.6.9 The Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996)

South Africa is a multiparty democratic state and is guided by a modern constitution that provides for a vision of a non-sexist, non-racial and prosperous country that belongs to all. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) gets its mandate from Section 25 (5) of the Constitution, which states that “the State must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis” (Rungasamy, 2011: 4).

2.6.10 Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997 (Act 62 of 1997)

Although the Act was promulgated to protect the vulnerable farm dwellers, since its inception the situation in farms remains dire for the majority of these occupiers (Brooks & Kjelstrup, 2014: 239). The legislation was meant to protect farm dwellers in the democratic dispensation in terms of illegal eviction but very little in terms of legal eviction, which the majority of the farm dwellers find themselves facing, eventually resulting in them leaving the farm and thereby losing livelihoods and their security of tenure (Brooks & Kjelstrup, 2014: 252).

2.7 Land reform policies in South Africa

Several policies govern the implementation of land reform in the country, the most prominent of which is the *White Paper on Land Reform* of 1997. The *White Paper on Land Reform* acknowledged that the current land ownership forms reflect the patterns of the apartheid era in terms of economic and political conditions where landlessness, poverty and insecurity were caused by racially based land policies (DLA, 1997: 7).

2.7.1 *White Paper on Land Reform* (1997)

Land reform programmes are to be enacted by the government to deal with the inequalities in access to land through the three main programmes of restitution, redistribution and tenure reform (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 71; PLAAS, 2016: 4; DLA, 1997: 7). Restitution is driven based on the provisions of the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, as amended, affording the victims of dispossession with an equitable redress which was the actual land, alternative land or financial compensation. Redistribution is guided by the Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993, and tenure reform is driven by the Labour Tenants Act of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997.

The *White Paper on Land Reform* provides for the following:

- Restitution aims to restore the land that was lost due to racial discrimination laws of 1913, through financial compensation where physical restoration seems impractical or physical restoration of the land or alternative land if original land is unavailable.
- Redistribution by settlement acquisition grant for a qualifying household to buy land from private landowners and the State.
- Tenure reform by Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997 and the Labour Tenants Act of 1996 (DLA, 1997: 7).

As suggested earlier, despite the efforts to distribute land, South Africa as a country has the highest inequality in terms of access to land, more so land for farming.

In 2017, the land audit by the DRDLR established that more than 72% of farms and agricultural holdings by individual and private landowners is still owned by white South Africans, 15% by coloured South Africans, 5% by Indian South Africans, 4% by black South Africans and the remaining 4% is owned by other nationalities or is co-owned (DRDLR, 2017: 7). Land reform is confined to rural or farmland and it may be disregarded because more people are migrating to urban areas to look for work and better living conditions, thus the need for land increases in the urban areas, particularly for residential settlements than in rural areas (Beinart & Delius, 2019: 3).

2.7.2 Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development (2001)

The DLA proposed that the planning projects for land reform should be left to the beneficiaries to take responsibility for their future and to protect the environment. This was elaborated further in the DANCED project, which aimed at incorporating planning in land reform, emphasised that the stakeholders assumed to know the needs and priorities of the land reform beneficiaries (DLA, 2001: 26).

2.7.3 Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (2001)

With the introduction of LRAD, the focus shifted from improving livelihoods and the reduction of poverty to the productivity of the land and its economic efficiency. This led to channelling financial resources to fewer people than the previous programmes (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 20). The land distributed under LRAD in most cases retains its initial land use, although sometimes it may change in terms of the degree of use, depending on the capacity of the beneficiaries and the circumstances under which they operate (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 65).

2.7.4 Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (2006)

In 2006, the PLAS was launched after the discontinuation of the LRAD (Nxumalo & Antwi, 2013: 162). The government uses this policy to purchase land and rent out to beneficiaries – unlike in LRAD, the land is transferred to the State and is leased out to beneficiaries for an initial five-year probation period, which is followed by a 30-year lease with a further 20 years renewable option or an option to buy (Hall & Kepe, 2017: 2).

2.7.5 Land and Agrarian Reform Programme (2008)

In the Land and Agrarian Reform Programme document published in 2008 in the *Government Gazette*, it was conceded that the pace of transfer of land to the beneficiaries was slow despite the policies put in place and this raised the question of land reform projects' sustainability (Department of Agriculture [DOA], 2008: 6).

2.7.6 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE)

The Department of Trade and Industry (2008: 14), in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Charter, states that the process of economic empowerment for the black majority must begin with access to land and by effectively and efficiently dealing with access to markets so that rural stability can be ensured. The aim is to assist black people to acquire shares in already established agribusinesses and to increase the number of black people accessing land and agricultural opportunities (Mabuza, 2016: 17). However, unions argue that BEE creates a minority of black elites, while the broader majority of black South Africans remains poor and marginalised (Greenberg, 2019: 10).

2.7.7 Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (2008)

The DRDLR further introduced the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP) to improve land reform with a vision of creating sustainable rural communities that are vibrant and equitable (Sebiloane, 2015: 79). In 2011, the government published a *Green Paper on Land Reform* with the principles of a rural economy that is de-radicalised and land allocation that is democratic and equitable, encouraging production that is sustainable for food security (DRDLR, 2011: 4).

2.7.8 Green Paper on Land Reform (2011)

The *Green Paper on Land Reform* of 2011 raised several pertinent issues of land reform, the most significant of which was the establishment of the Office of the Valuer-General to provide consistent land values, determine financial values for compensation in case of expropriation of land, set norms and standards, provide a valuation guide to government, and create and maintain a valuation database (DRDLR, 2011: 7).

2.7.9 National Development Plan (NDP Vision 2030)

In 2012, the National Planning Commission proposed that, for the land reform to work, certain principles had to be adhered to. These principles included the following (NDP, 2012: 227):

- Enable the transfer of land to beneficiaries without distorting market prices and denting business confidence.
- Ensure sustainable production on transferred land through mentorship and incubators.
- Establish monitoring institutions on land transfers to protect from opportunism.
- Bring land transfers within fiscal realities.
- Offer large-scale commercial farmers and the other agricultural bodies to assist through mentorship and meaningful skills transfer.

The NDP acknowledged the injustices of the past and has an obligation to correct them.

2.8 Expropriation of land without compensation

The expropriation of land without compensation is currently a hot topic among the stakeholders and the ruling party has subsequently adopted it as a land policy for discussion and consequent implementation (Anikola, 2020: 223). According to PLAAS (2016: 30), the government recorded only two cases of effective expropriation in terms of Section 42E by 2014, and in all the cases government revoked the expropriation notice served to the landowners and reverted to the negotiation table.

According to Akinola (2020: 223), the idea of expropriation of land without compensation has been central to the ruling party since 2012, after it was popularised by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political party; it has since gathered support from the masses and subsequently has been adopted

as the policy stance of the ruling party in recent times. If the expropriation of land without compensation becomes a national land policy, it will require the government to make some amendments to Section 25 of the Constitution. It may not necessarily result in accelerated land redistribution, because it may affect food security or the national economy on the macro-level (Aliber, 2019: 11).

Boshof, Sihlobo and Ntombela (2018: 3) state that in the scenario where the expropriation of land without compensation occurs within the ambit of the law, where the incidental costs of the business are paid for to assist the beneficiary of land to continue farming sustainably, the property rights will diminish and this will affect the agricultural, financial and agri-processing sector because of the disinvestment that will follow in the sector and will ultimately affect production, employment and exports.

Kwarteng & Botchway (2019: 99) state that for the much talked about infrastructure development to happen, foreign direct investment is required to, among other things, stimulate the economy, allow for technology transfer, enhance development as well as the capacity-building to use the technology and develop the infrastructure.

According to Anikola (2020: 221), the public opinion and the politicising of the issue associated with the expropriation of land without compensation, among other things, pose a security threat to the government. The expropriation of land without compensation does appear to be not morally right or just – the current landowners are not the same people who benefitted from land appropriation, as the owners who benefitted from the apartheid regime have since passed, 25 years after the abolishment of that discriminatory system (Aliber, 2019: 20). In an issue of the *Daily Maverick* newspaper in 2019, Ben Cousins argued that the expropriation of land without compensation can be done safely by targeting the land that is not used, which the white farmers are protecting.

2.9 Conclusion

Land reform has been contentious in South Africa, mostly because of the unequal distribution of land or access to land for many black South Africans. The unequal distribution of land results from the discriminative legislation enacted by the apartheid regime or even before apartheid was institutionalised by the then National Party in 1948, as some of the legislation such as the Native Land Act dates back to 1913.

Several laws were enacted to support the Native Land Act of 2013, such as the Native Reserve Act of 1936 and the Group Areas Act of 1950. However, some of the legislation was enacted to relieve pressure on the then Bantustans, such as the Native Land Trust Act of 1936.

In 1990, the then transitional government enacted the Land Repeal Act of 1991, which was followed by the Restitution of Land Reform Act of 1994 after the multiparty elections.

Several enactments followed, such as the Labour Tenants Act of 1996, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997, and the Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993 to redress the imbalance brought about by the previous regime.

Several policies were also passed by the democratic government to support the enacted legislation, such as the *White Paper on Land Reform* and the *Green Paper on Land Reform* as well as other policies to support the land reform beneficiaries such as the CRDP and the CASP.

Despite all this effort, land is still unequally redistributed along the racial lines, gender and age groups. This has fuelled heated debate on whether a more radical approach to land reform, such as the expropriation of land without compensation, provides the answer to the land question.

The next chapter will look at land reform in South Africa in terms of the programmes implemented as well as their challenges, but will mainly focus on the redistribution programme and its sub-programmes of LRAD and PLAS.

CHAPTER 3: LAND REFORM PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Introduction

The South African land reform programme has the objectives of equity, efficiency and contributing to the development of the rural economy through access to land, improved land use and land ownership (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 5). The development programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the GEAR programme were initiated in South Africa post-1994 in response to the challenges posed by huge inequality, privation and poverty as a result of the former segregation laws. Land reform is a programme of the government to redress the past racial imbalances, redistribute land to the poor and landless and secure tenure of those who are vulnerable; and in doing so, enable the PDIs to obtain income and participate in the mainstream economy (DLA, 2001: 3; DLA, 1997: 9).

Land redistribution, unlike restitution and tenure reform that are rights-based, entails voluntary participation and is a needs-based programme; therefore, the participants in this programme have limited rights in terms of access to land and land occupation (PLAAS, 2017: 4). The land reform programme adopted a pro-poor approach, which is defined in the PLAS framework of 2006. In terms of the pro-poor approach, government proactively acquires land that is in line with the objectives of land reform and is a bargain to acquire. According to Sen (1999: 1): “development requires the removal of major sources of un-freedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.”

In terms of the land reform programme, restitution and redistribution have experienced a slight movement in terms of transferring land, while the tenure reform has not received much attention from land reform practitioners and authorities alike (Lahiff, 2014: 587). The three main programmes of land reform operate individually due to the lack of legislation and integration between them, which remains the biggest challenge in terms of land reform implementation in South Africa (Mtero *et al.*, 2019: 11).

Land reform involves a variety of role players ranging from government departments to non-governmental organisations and land reform beneficiaries; although they cannot all agree on what programme should achieve, they all have assumptions on why people want land and how their quality of life should be improved by access to land (DLA, 2001: 26). Despite the evidence of failure due to lack of support and poor planning, the major challenge is the evolving agricultural industry characterised by capital-intensive projects as well as unpredictable and volatile global markets, all of which have a major effect on the success of land reform programmes (Lahiff, 2014: 592).

Makombe (2018: 1403) states that the purpose of land reform is to alleviate poverty and increase the productivity of the beneficiaries; however, for these to happen, the agricultural productivity of the land must be improved or at least maintained. Given the fact that the majority of land reform beneficiaries have produced some form of production on their land, it is clear that there is potential, given the fact that most of them have managed to produce with minimal or no support (Chitonge, 2013: 31).

The redistribution programme was designed to afford the PDIs with land to improve their livelihoods as well as for residential purposes (DLA, 1997: 12), although not much has been achieved in terms of meeting those objectives (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 3). The poor majority remains marginalised while the redistribution programme benefits a select few, mostly from the upper-middle class (Hoeks, Azadi, Khachak, Troyo-Dieiguez, Van Passel & Witlox, 2014: 668). One challenge of redistribution is that usually small land parcels are acquired and are further subdivided to cater for a number of farmers, which creates much smaller farm units that, in most cases, are not economically viable (Leighton, 2015: 3). Redistribution farms or projects have business plans as the basis of their operations, SLAG farms have a form of household income ceiling as a qualifying criterion, while LRAD farms required their own contribution and PLAS farms required the signing of a lease contract or caretaker agreement (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 61). The transfer of land, however, will not instantly improve the economic condition of the beneficiaries; but it will over time improve through appropriate usage and investment into the land, through unlocking the opportunities and assisting in income generation (Keswell & Carter, 2014: 250).

3.2 Land reform in South Africa

In a diagnostic report provided by the PLAAS on land reform, it was concluded that land reform in the post-apartheid era has become troublesome and that complexities persist, which renders it a “hot potato” in the public domain. Despite several changes being made to the legal framework, the results have been varying with regard to success and failure in terms of land reform implementation, which has been widely documented (PLAAS, 2016: 15). The relevant departments, apart from struggling with challenges such as fund mismanagement, capacity shortage, administrative complexity and bureaucracy, are doing their best in many instances to provide the support to improve the socio-economic development of farmers and land reform beneficiaries (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 78).

According to Hall and Kepe (2019: 16), land reform in South Africa is constrained by the Land Bank’s approach of “willing buyer, willing seller”, the constitutional settlement of the property clause and the modernist theory of commercial viability that is perpetuated by the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act of 1970. Beinart and Delius (2019: 10) argue that the failure of land reform is not due to the lack of legislative authority or policy, but can be attributed to the lack of capacity in implementation. This could be improved by placing an emphasis on capacitating and funding the relevant institutions that

deal with land and agriculture, as well as the motivation and training of land reform practitioners and agricultural extension officials.

While the purpose of land reform in a South African context is to alleviate poverty, according to Kepe and Hall (2016: 85), land reform is in flux and its intricacies are kept far from public scrutiny, while at parliamentary level its implementation is not accountable to and aligned with the public funds that are used. Despite the efforts by the government to improve the living conditions of the black majority and the poor to alleviate poverty, land reform has been defined as a macro-economic policy that has failed to some degree (Hoeks *et al.*, 2014: 668).

According to PLAAS (2016: 29), there has been a mixture of success and failure regarding land reform in South Africa. Sihlobo and Nel (2016: 78) argue that the relevant departments are doing their best in many instances to provide the necessary support to improve on and contribute to farmers' and land reform beneficiaries' socio-economic development. In Mpumalanga, despite efforts by the department through the allocation in the budget for support of land reform farms, the majority remains unproductive, their infrastructure vandalised and dilapidated, and they are mostly distressed (Masoka, 2014: 5).

The departments include the departments of agriculture, rural development and environmental affairs; and agriculture, forestry and fisheries; and these departments contribute towards land reform through extension support, skills transfer and production inputs. The DRDLR offers youth development and research and production support to farmers and bursaries to PDIs, including the land reform beneficiaries, while research and research support is provided by the Agricultural Research Council (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 78).

Terblanché, Stevens and Sekgota (2014: 101) suggest that using experiences and lessons from successful land reform projects may aid in establishing new farming ventures which are similarly successful. Land reform beneficiaries are people who pursue different livelihood strategies such as diversifying by keeping livestock and planting crops as well as small value-adding activities as part of the challenges they face (DLA, 2001: 27). It is quite evident that land reform is slow and the fact that land reform beneficiaries are not productive or at least agriculturally active, for land reform to work it must be speeded up and the beneficiaries need to have someone to help them to farm or farm on their behalf (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 84).

The challenge is that the majority of land reform farms are acquired as established business concerns when transferred to the land reform beneficiaries, either as restitution or redistribution, but end up collapsing mainly because the beneficiaries are not capacitated to perpetuate these farms activities

since the majority of them are unskilled and illiterate (Sebola & Tsheola, 2014: 120). This, however, does not change the fact that land reform projects have generally failed in terms of their initial project designs (Lahiff, 2014: 591). Attfield, Hattingh and Matshabaphala (2004: 405) state that by addressing issues of equity, justice along with post-transfer support, land reform can contribute to sustainable livelihoods of the land reform beneficiaries and thus lead to sustainable development.

Land reform is diverse in terms of application and implications – not a single land parcel or land reform project is equivalent to another in terms of a combination of several factors including geographic location, the crop that is planted on the land and the institutional arrangement to run the management of the project/land reform farm, so it is difficult to measure the success of each project apart from using its own merits (Keswell & Carter, 2014: 260).

3.3 Land restitution

Restitution policy is guided by the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, as amended. The Act makes provision for the research and validation of a land claim to determine whether the claim is valid or not. It also makes provision to notify the current landowners and beneficiaries in terms of gazetted legal notice and to settle the claim in terms of Section 42D where the landowners, the department and the beneficiaries are in agreement or through a court order where the parties are in dispute (Rungasamy, 2011: 33). The challenge with restitution is that the majority of claims settled so far are urban, which involves financial compensation instead of the return of the physical land in question, because the land in its actual state is not restorable either because is highly developed or is of national interest. This impact negatively on the amount of land transferred to black people (Leighton, 2015: 4).

The majority of land reform beneficiaries are not aware of what is expected of them in their newly acquired land and capacitating will help them to take responsibility and prevent them from deserting the farms (Sebola & Tsheola, 2014: 121). Davies (2019: 18) states that the land reform beneficiaries – particularly of land restitution – become rent collectors, instead of getting the reward from the production in their land which goes to the strategic partners.

The strategic partnership emanated from the restitution projects in an attempt to eliminate the risk of failure of bigger commercial farming operations where the upstream enterprises, such as the consumer of raw material, and the downstream enterprises such as the producer of input material are subjected to the risk of looming retrenchments and prevailing unemployment (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 57). Strategic partnership in the restitution claims operate in the interest of capital and, therefore, do not cater for the needs of the poor and the land reform beneficiaries; and their voices and aspirations remain a wish list (Davies, 2014: 19). Joint venture schemes do contribute to the land reform process, as some of them have similar objectives to land reform. However, their interests are often far greater than their smaller

partners due to power relations (Mayson, 2003: 32). According to Davies (2014: 234), access to resources is related to power relations in the sense that those who control these resources have control over who accesses these resources and ultimately who benefits from the use of these resources.

3.4 Land tenure

Tenure reform can improve the productivity of the land through encouraging investments; this could also increase the profitability of the land when coupled with access to markets and when security of tenure is improved (Aliber & Kleinbooi, 2010: 11). It is one of the land reform programmes that has not received enough attention, in terms of the scrutiny given to the other two programmes of restitution and redistribution. The reason for this could be that it has not much effect in terms of transferring the land to the PDIs and is mainly administrative. Another aspect of tenure reform that has been in the public eye is the eviction on farms by the landowners. A major challenge with tenure reform is that legislation such as the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997 is perceived to be ineffective and there have been calls for it to be scrapped (Weideman, 2004: 221).

Despite the protection of the law in a democratic dispensation, more marginalised groups such as farm dwellers find themselves facing evictions, where farm owners forcefully remove them in the name of establishing facilities such as eco-tourism or game farming (Brooks & Kjelstrup, 2014: 252). Tenure reform beneficiaries continued to struggle with victimisation and illegal evictions from farms, while the majority of them still await the finalisation of their claims. Tenure reform in South Africa is influenced by the separatist planning of the apartheid system, where tenure was influenced by race, colour, urban, rural dweller traditions or other factors (Weideman, 2004: 297).

The majority of land in the former Bantustans is held by the State in trust for the communities' concern, which raises the right to use these lands because the traditional authorities in some of the areas are responsible for issuing permission to occupy certificates for these lands. The validity and legality of these documents become questionable (Byagumisha, 2016: 30). Traditional leaders have played a pivotal tenure role in apartheid-era and democratic dispensation, yet the extent of their administrative powers causes confusion as to which land system they may exercise rights over. However, some still believe that they could exercise their powers to administer land received through land claims; or worse, even source benefits for themselves in these cases (Fraser, 2007: 841).

3.5 Land redistribution

There are different ways of accessing land and different tenure type under the redistribution programme. The government and the beneficiaries are both responsible for identifying the land and, in due course, the government makes funds available for the purchasing of the land in question (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 61). Under government-driven PLAS, the government identifies and acquires

the land and the beneficiaries apply for the land, while under LRAD the beneficiaries identify the land and apply for funds to purchase the land. Under LRAD, the title deed is handed over to the beneficiaries; while under PLAS, the title deed is retained by the State and either a lease agreement or custodianship is entered into with the beneficiaries.

South Africa's land redistribution is politically and ethically founded though economic considerations are lacking (Sebola & Tsheola, 2014: 121). A criticism of land redistribution has been the switching from one programme to the next without solving the challenges of the initial programme (Hall & Kepe, 2019: 2). Furthermore, the lack of legislation as outlined has prompted the government to change using Section 25(5) of the Constitution to change from one policy to another without clear legislation to guide such changes (PARLA, 2019: 14).

The tools and criteria of measuring the success of land redistribution with regard to its impact on livelihoods are lacking, while the collection of data and its subsequent publication is problematic. Quality of life data collected in 2006 was published in 2009 (PARLA, 2019: 13). According to Aliber (2019: 4), the challenge with land redistribution is that the definition of who should benefit lacks clarity. Hence, the programme has moved towards large-scale farming where few people benefit; while small land parcels that could benefit smallholder farming, improving food security and security of tenure, tend to be ignored. Large-scale farming established under the apartheid system, with government support, functioned to privatise commercial assets as a macro-economic policy to mitigate global competition. In due course, galvanised corporate power of agricultural food chains became an obstacle for the democratic government to redistribute land to the black majority (Greenberg, 2003: 23). Land redistribution has changed in terms of policy and implementation over the years, with the main focus on the identification of land to be transferred, the identification and selection of beneficiaries and their inherent rights to the land being recognised (Netshipale *et al* 2017: 58). Kepe and Hall (2016: 19) state that the SLAG and municipal commonage sub-programmes were abandoned in recent years in favour of the LRAD and PLAS sub-programmes with the purpose of creating a class of emerging black commercial farmers.

Land redistribution as a consequence has come to be characterised by several sub-programmes ranging from SLAG, municipal commonages, LRAD and PLAS. To clarify, the distinction between these programmes is that the SLAG and LRAD land is transferred to the beneficiaries, while commonages and PLAS farms are transferred to the State (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 15). The further distinction is that SLAG and commonages involve a bigger group of individuals and is aligned to poverty alleviation, while LRAD and PLAS favour a more economic approach, although fewer people benefit. Redistribution has changed in recent years from acquiring land to transferring it to beneficiary groups in the form of CPAs or families, to a scenario where the land is bought and transferred to black

commercial farmers through LRAD or rented through PLAS for a lease period of 30 years (Beinart & Delius, 2019: 9).

To recap, land redistribution has evolved through the following programmes over the years:

SLAG was implemented from 1995 to 2000, with the main mechanism of providing land to groups where the groups were funded to acquire land through a grant of R15 000, which was raised to R16 500 per family.

LRAD Phase 1 was implemented from 2001 to 2007 with the mechanism where groups or individuals were assisted to acquire land through a grant ranging from R15 000 as a minimum, which could be extended by an own contribution of R5 000; or own labour, or in kind, up to R400 000 subsidy with the own contribution amounted to of R100 000.

LRAD Phase 2 was implemented from 2008 to 2010 with more emphasis on individual farmers than groups, acquiring bigger farms and phasing out the loan component.

PLAS has been implemented from 2010 to the present, with a mechanism where the State acquires land and thereafter identifies beneficiaries who will lease the farm as individuals or as a company for a limited lease period ranging from three to 30 years. Kepe and Hall (2016: 51) suggest that the main purpose of accessing land through redistribution should not be for mere production but for production for sustainable livelihoods to counter the synergy that exists between rural poverty, inequality landlessness and insecurity that may be experienced by black people.

3.5.1 Settlement Land Acquisition Grant

As suggested above in terms of the SLAG, each beneficiary qualifies for R15 000, which was later increased to R16 500, where the beneficiaries pool together the funds to acquire land in what was called “rent a crowd” to be able to afford a sizeable piece of land (Karriem & Hoskins, 2016: 333). The purpose for acquiring the land was for settlement or agricultural production, with the SLAG tied up with the RDP houses to such an extent that any beneficiary of RDP houses was excluded from the SLAG programme (DLA, 1997: 69). While individuals could pool together their grant to be able to acquire a bigger piece of land, the consequence is that it combines people of different backgrounds and interests and usually with little or no skills to use the land effectively (Mabuza 2016: 11).

CPAs were designed to provide a land holding entity for restored and redistributed land on behalf of communities or groups (Cousins, 2016: 3). However, the lack of community awareness of constitutional and democratic processes to run this type of entity, compounded by a lack of support to these structures by the government, rendered them ineffective (Lahiff & Li, 2012: 57). Inadequate

negotiation or a complete lack thereof around the terms of establishing structures such as a legal entity and drafting of a constitution are the major factors contributing to the failure of the majority of land reform structures such as the CPAs and trusts (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 14).

Ramutsindela and Hartnack (2019: 198) state that the government is concerned about the lack of capacity within these CPAs to manage the transferred land. In CPAs and trusts, often the active members representing the entity are not the ones inscribed upon the legal documents, creating administrative difficulties such as accessing funds or entering into contracts (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 11).

In the case where the land reform beneficiaries were organised in a legal entity, such as a trust or a CPA, there is a lot of potential for the more powerful to abuse their power to the detriment of the less powerful, and dissatisfaction among the bigger group may turn into looting and vandalism of farm property and assets (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 11). Nxumalo and Antwi (2013: 162) argue that the SLAG and LRAD sub-programmes have failed to improve the livelihoods of the land reform beneficiaries.

3.5.2 Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development

The LRAD sub-programme was designed to deal with two parts of land redistribution. The first part deals with the land which is bought and transferred to municipalities for the establishment of commonages, while the second part deals with the transfer of land to individuals or groups for agricultural development for grazing or the establishment of community gardens, or to be transferred to groups or individuals for agricultural production (Mabuza, 2016: 13).

Hoeks *et al.* (2014: 659) have summarised LRAD so that the provision of the grant is determined by the own contribution in terms of own cash or in kind, based on a sliding scale. The grant ranges from R20 000 for a minimum contribution of R5 000, which can be equivalent to labour or in kind to a maximum of R100 000 own contribution, which qualifies for a R400 000 subsidy.

The main objective of LRAD was to distribute land and also to capacitate and improve services and infrastructure for the establishment of viable farming ventures (Bailey, 2007: 64).

The objectives of LRAD were as follows (Baily, 2007: 64):

- Increased access to agricultural land by PDIs and to contribute to the redistribution of approximately 30% of agricultural land to black people.
- Decongesting homelands from overcrowding and expanding opportunities for rural women and youth.

- Change the legacy of the past racial and gender ownership of land.
- Facilitating structural change, Improved nutrition and income to black people who want to farm on a small and medium-sized farm.
- Stimulate agricultural growth.
- Creating linkages between on and off-farm income creating activities.
- Empowering land reform beneficiaries to be able to improve their socio-economic well-being.
- Enable the beneficiaries to make better use of their land.
- Promote the environmental sustainability of farms as well as their natural agricultural resources.

According to Aliber (2019: 7), one of the flaws of LRAD was the requirement of a number of participants in terms of numbers for a grant application to qualify for a much higher grant, thus the application would include parties not interested in the process. As a result, land reform in South Africa has favoured large-scale farming and the earlier forms of redistribution were characterised by the dumping of large groups of beneficiaries on big farms without proper support, such as business planning and capital injection for infrastructure and production inputs (Greenberg, 2003: 23).

In addition, for Ranwedzi (2013: 76) the challenge was that the willing seller would eventually abandon the process and sell the land privately due to the fact that the potential beneficiaries were unable to raise enough funds as a co-payment to access the grant towards the payment of the land. Rungasamy (2011: 169) states that in the majority of the LRAD farms, in the majority of the projects the beneficiaries were organised randomly and this led to groups who lacked direction and coherence – purely for the purposes to afford the purchase price of the farm. Large groups usually coupled with the hyper-inflated prices of marginal lands, insufficient support in terms of the allocation of grants in LRAD projects are seen to be the main contributors to failure to establish black commercial farmers (Mabuza, 2016: 13).

The target of transferring 30% of white-owned land in 14 years was set in 2001 by the DLA through the introduction of LRAD to specific individuals or groups for the purpose of agricultural development and non-agricultural enterprises. Although there has been a modest improvement in the living standards of some of the beneficiaries, successful small-scale farming is not easily achievable by all (Keswell & Carter, 2014: 260). The introduction of PLAS offered relief to the majority of struggling LRAD farms, particularly where the land was acquired through a “part grant and part loan” deal and where the funds were transferred, but the selling price was not met. The government would negotiate, pay off the balance and transfer the land to the State, and lease the farm to the beneficiaries (Ranwedzi, 2013: 76).

3.5.3 Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy

In 2006, the DLA promulgated the PLAS, which dealt with the demand and supply of land. The aim of the PLAS to enable the government to take a centre stage in redistribution by proactively acquiring land and supplying the land to the targeted land reform beneficiaries who are black people, coloured people and Indians to fast-track the process (DLA, 2006: 8). By so doing, it was anticipated to accelerate redistribution, acquire land in nodal areas, target high-potential agricultural land and improve on the selection of land reform beneficiaries, as well as to improve land use planning to ensure maximum use (DLA, 2006: 4).

The PLAS framework of 2006 had the following objectives (Ranwedzi, 2013: 2; DLA, 2006: 4):

- To accelerate the land redistribution process.
- To ensure that the DLA can acquire land in the nodal areas and in the identified agricultural corridors and other areas of high agricultural potential to meet the objectives of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa.
- To improve the identification and selection of beneficiaries and the planning of land on which people would be settled.
- To ensure maximum productive use of land acquired.

Despite the clear mechanisms set out in terms of acquisition of land, land reform practitioners in other provinces continued to implement PLAS using LRAD mechanisms where beneficiaries identify land for the department to acquire, they receiving preference regarding land allocation since they identified the land (Ranwedzi, 2013: 79).

The South African land reform programme adopted a pro-poor development approach, which is defined in the PLAS framework of 2006. In terms of the approach, the government target the land, which is advantageous to acquire being suitable for agricultural activities which are in line with the government's interests (DLA, 2006: 5). PLAS was designed to include livelihoods, participatory approaches and integrated development planning (DLA, 2006: 20). Cousins (2016: 4) argues that in terms of PLAS, implementation of the framework only meant the government will buy land and rent it out for three to five years to the beneficiaries.

The DLA (2001: 27) anticipated that using the livelihoods framework the asset base would be broadened, livelihoods opportunities diversified to increase the desired livelihood outcomes and to reduce risk and vulnerability. However, it has not been the case since few of the land reform projects have achieved any level of productivity, some not being operational at all (Mabuza, 2016: 12). The majority of the beneficiaries of PLAS were inactive in the farming operations due to living off the farm or working on a full-time basis (Mahlangu, 2017: 92).

In some provinces, fruit and nut enterprises have experienced severe financial losses and some had to be declared bankrupt. In some irrigation schemes, poorly structured joint ventures on tobacco and fresh produce have been established, although the operating companies are battling to pay dividends to the land reform beneficiaries (PLAAS, 2016: 23).

Farming commercially on a large scale have failed due to project design that is unworkable, although Aliber and Cousins (2013: 140) state that modest improvements have been experienced in some of the land reform beneficiaries' livelihoods by adapting the designed project plans or abandoning them altogether to pursue different livelihood strategies. In the Northwest province, the study by Nxumalo and Antwi (2013: 168) indicates that there is a minimal improvement on some of the key variable indicators of the physical capital livelihood such as access to transport and established markets by 24%. The expectations to produce at a commercial scale for land reform beneficiaries perpetuated by the bias to commercial agriculture has depicted many land users of land reform included as being unproductive and yet they produce sufficient amounts of crops and livestock products to support their families (Chitonge, 2013: 31).

The current form of land reform, particularly PLAS, tends to favour more established individuals than the poor majority for which the programme was intended, because of their inability to secure sufficient capital and lack of credible management capabilities to manage highly commercialised farming units (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 40). For development grants to be allocated, each programme had a different requirement, in the case of PLAS a signed caretaker or lease agreement and in the case of SLAG and LRAD an economically viable business plan (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 61). In the case where business plans existed, they were inaccessible in terms of operations because they required intensive and large projects that were unaffordable to the beneficiaries (Greenberg, 2003: 23).

In some instances, the PLAS sub-programme is used to acquire the land where the rights-based programmes such as the restitution have failed and this results in the scenario where the claim process is prolonged due to the fact that the State will still be required to settle the claim, even though the property has been transferred to the State (Hall, 2009: 83).

3.6 Socio-economic development and sustainable livelihoods

The NDP calls for “increased investment in new agricultural technologies, research and the development of adaptation strategies for the protection of rural livelihoods and expansion of commercial agriculture” (NDP, 2013: 58). In terms of the action plan of the NDP, land tenure will be reviewed as well as services to micro and small farmers, to create security of tenure for communal farmers, particularly women, and to investigate different financing options and vest property rights to land reform beneficiaries (NDP, 2013: 58).

Land reform focuses on acquiring and transferring land, while agrarian reform focuses on post-settlement support and other rural livelihoods which have been neglected. Agricultural livelihoods, however, alone cannot provide the solution that the broader natural resources-based livelihoods offer (PLAAS, 2016: 7).

According to Mabuza (2016: 28), the initial step is to access land, but in most land reform farms, land reform beneficiaries fail to transform the land assets to improve their socio-economic status. For PLAAS (2016: 74), however, the widespread claims that land reform projects failed lack empirical evidence, for they have documented 40% improvement in the livelihoods of redistribution beneficiaries.

Livelihoods encompass a wide range of activities including farming, wages or stipend from employment, farm labour working for own farming operation, and small-scale enterprise (Scoones, 2009: 172). Sustainable livelihoods depend on several factors such as the sustainability of land reform because of the positive correlation between sustainable livelihoods and land reform (Atfield *et al.*, 2004: 408).

Livelihood analysis focuses on adaptation, coping mechanisms, diversification, improvement, transformation and reformation (Scoones, 2009: 172). According to the DLA (2001: 27), the sustainable livelihoods approach takes into account the assets, activities and capabilities of land reform beneficiaries. The success of any land reform initiative depends on its viability and sustainability, although the economic and social viability of land reform has not received much attention in both the redistribution and restitution programmes and this is the reason why the majority of the agricultural land in these programmes are seen to be unproductive (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014: 694).

Sustainability of land reform refers to the way land reform projects achieve the objectives of environmental and economic sustainability and social acceptability, being measured by bio-physical and socio-economic indicators (DLA, 2001: 26). The location of a land reform farm or project is essential to the success and sustainability of the project as the beneficiaries spend a lot of time and resources travelling to and from the project – if the farm is closer to where they live, it means it will be closer to urban settlements and the risk of theft becomes higher (Bradstock, 2007: 256).

The requirement for land reform projects to show sustainability means that land reform programmes should be achieving the objectives that it was intended for in the beginning. According to Jacobs, Lahiff and Hall (2003: 25), there is very limited progress on achieving those objectives. Kepe *et al.* (2003) suggest that perhaps it is too early to judge whether the programme is successful or not. Aliber and Kleibooi (2010) argue that agricultural land reform alone cannot achieve the expectation that is

burdened with such as redressing the dispossession. Hoeks *et al.* (2014: 669) suggest that the sustainability of land reform can be achieved when considering the livelihoods of land reform beneficiaries and the issue of subdividing the farms can increase agricultural sustainability.

The amount of land transferred in relation to the number of beneficiaries is indirectly correlated with poverty reduction and inequality in land redistribution. This means that the more beneficiaries there are in any particular piece of land, the lesser are chances of improving their livelihood and reducing poverty (El-Ghonemy, 2003: 1). Carter (2003: 1) argues that access to land will improve the livelihood of the poor, given the fact that one hectare provided to the poor household will contribute more significantly to their livelihood than the same made available to more affluent households.

Nel and Sihlobo (2016: 73) state that positive growth in the agricultural sector can be achieved through an inclusive socio-economic development of black farmers despite the prevailing negative outlook. It is not clear that access to land can improve household income dramatically because there are dynamics involved and these cannot be proven beyond doubt within a quasi-experimental scenario since people's livelihoods are involved (Carter, 2003: 1).

Lahiff and Li (2012: 24) argue that even in the case where there have been land transfers, the impact on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries has been minimal because of poor support, inadequate designs and project-plans which lead to wide-scale underutilisation. The current model of redistribution does not cater for the poor and the marginalised who do not have capital or experience, but for the more elite group of black commercial farmers. To be of assistance to the poor and the marginalised, ventures or strategic partners are necessary (Beinart & Delius, 2019: 9).

3.7 Post-settlement support on land reform

The pre-settlement and post-settlement support for restitution and redistribution beneficiaries must be provided through diverse programmes of agrarian reform that are decentralised and non-bureaucratic to contribute meaningfully to their sustainable livelihoods (Masoka, 2014: 68). Pre-settlement and post-settlement support is a requirement for sustainable socio-economic development of land reform beneficiaries and to achieve that planning, implementation and settlement must be part of the designed plan (Mabuza, 2016: 30). For post-settlement to work, land reform beneficiaries should not be left to the market forces; the poor must be targeted and supported by appropriate grants (Byagumisha, 2016: 8).

The lack of policy and legislation for both redistribution and restitution post-settlement support has resulted in the lack of coordination between various departments (PARLA, 2019: 13). Legislation is required not only to realign post-settlement support but also to repeal some of the stumbling

legislation such as the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act of 1970, which prevents the subdivision of land into family-sized plots to be farmed sustainably to support each family (Byagumisha, 2016: 8). Lack of or inadequate integrated support from relevant stakeholders' results in many land reform projects suffering from institutional isolation, for instance, the CPA operates on its own without the support of relevant departments (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 14).

Despite the importance of post-transfer support being highlighted as essential for success for the land reform projects – both redistribution and restitution – it has been neglected by the majority of role players. Therefore, the support should be provided as post-settlement support to these beneficiaries of land reform to improve the chances of success (Masoka, 2014: 69). Mabuza (2016: 25) argues that the provision of post-transfer support alone does not guarantee immediate success on the use of the land and receiving economic benefits from such usage, but also requires coordination of the support and commitment of the stakeholders, including the land reform beneficiaries.

Poorly maintained access roads, poor infrastructure such as fencing and housing as well as machinery on these farms remain some of the challenges that are faced by farmers and impact on the general progress negatively on their general progress (Mahlangu, 2017: 92). By introducing transformation in the agricultural sector and inclusive socio-economic development, it is particularly this reason why some land reform beneficiaries have achieved significant successes without any government assistance (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 80).

3.8 Strategic partnerships in land reform

Strategic partnership refers to the joint ventures entered between the private companies and land reform beneficiaries with the intention of transferring skills, maintaining the productivity of the land, generating income for both partners and transfer of land in some instances (Lahiff, Davies & Manenzhe, 2013: 7; Beinart & Delius, 2019: 6). According to PLAAS (2016: 76), there has been a mixture of success and failure with regard to land reform in South Africa, particularly regarding the introduction of business strategic partners in land reform. Such joint ventures include contract or out-grower schemes, share-equity schemes', municipal commonage schemes, share-produce or sharecropping schemes and company-supported schemes.

The problem with the strategic partnerships is that the majority of the companies were formed to address the problem of land reform, but they had no specific experience to refer to and no capital assets to start or maintain production without government support (Lahiff *et al.*, 2013: 64). This resulted in the exaggerated business plans being presented by the strategic partners to the stakeholders, which made it difficult to measure particularly in respect of performance (PLAAS, 2016).

The failure of the strategic partnerships in the land reform arena, particularly with restitution claims, raises more questions than answers and among other things, the intention, motives and expectations of different role-players need to be analysed (Davies, 2014: 25). In the wake of these failures, a new and more participatory initiative has been discovered as the Moletele CPP land claim. Community private partnerships are described as “a lease agreement with a private company based on a business model negotiated along the line of what has been called [community private partnerships]” (Davies, 2014: 25).

Although the joint ventures are part of land reform in terms of their origin and implementation, the DRDLR lacks the mechanisms to monitor what these ventures are doing in terms of implementation of business plans and adherence to prescripts (Mayson, 2003: 2). The prescripts include but are not limited to memorandums of understanding, service level agreements, approved business plans, appointment letters, regulations of the Public Finance Management Act (Act No 29 of 1999) and National Treasury, and any other relevant documentation that is signed before the implementation of strategic partnerships. Strategic partnership land reform beneficiaries have, in some cases, become remote landowners or rent collectors, although the principal investors are profiteering from the ventures (Davies, 2014: 18).

3.9 Conclusion

Land reform in South Africa is implemented through three main programmes of land tenure reform, land restitution and land redistribution. Tenure reform and land restitution are rights-based programmes, while land redistribution is a discretionary programme where the beneficiaries are participating voluntarily.

In terms of implementation of these programmes, tenure reform have not achieved much success over the years, while restitution has made considerable success in terms of disbursing funds through financial compensation model; while on the other hand, the redistribution programme has failed in terms of redistributing 30% of agricultural land by 2014, including the extensions. This has been due to the fact that the redistribution programme has gone through a number of sub-programmes of SLAG, LRAD and now PLAS without proper evaluation of each sub-programme.

The support of the land reform beneficiaries in the redistribution, tenure reform and restitution has not been satisfactory and has been undermined by lack of capacity by various departments, while a limited role by the private sector has been permitted.

The beneficiaries themselves are culpable due to unreasonable expectations that the government will provide the entire resource and support base of the land reform programme.

The next chapter will look at the gathering of data and the presentation of the research results.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Land redistribution programmes have changed form, shapes and sizes over the years and the most significant was the introduction of PLAS as well as phasing out of LRAD sub-programmes. The study aimed to compare both LRAD and PLAS projects and farms in the Emalahleni Local Municipality and to evaluate which of the two sub-programmes best serve the purpose of land redistribution. In terms of the analysis, the study produced the following themes: access to land, organisational development, agricultural production, post-settlement support and sustainable livelihoods.

Access to land is the most critical part of the land reform process; it involves the ability to take physical occupation of the land, the ability to use the land without any restrictions and the ability to plan and execute those plans to achieve agricultural production.

Agricultural production is an important component of a successful land reform project, for without production land reform cannot achieve its objectives. For agricultural production to happen land reform beneficiaries are required to have the skills, human and capital resources and timely and appropriate support since agricultural production is a seasonal phenomenon.

Post-settlement support is an important contributing factor to the success of the land reform farm. It comes in different forms of support and by a variety of stakeholders. The most important support is provided by provincial and national departments of agriculture and to a lesser extent by the local and district municipalities. However, support alone cannot achieve successful land reform programmes without the commitment of land reform beneficiaries.

Land reform beneficiaries employ different or diversified livelihood strategies to survive. It includes keeping livestock for household consumption and selling, growing crops for household consumption and the market, adding value to the livestock and crop products produced on the farm as well as engaging in related services such as tilling the land or transporting produce to the markets for cash. All this should happen under an organised setting that includes organising the land beneficiaries themselves.

Organisational development involves forming a particular hierarchy of individuals in a particular organisation. On land reform farms, organisational development takes different forms of identification from individual farmers to a more organised legal entity.

4.2 Gathering of data

Data-gathering is an important part of the research because it presents the challenges that are there on the ground in terms of the research subject and the participants. There are three main elements to the data collection process, namely the time taken to interview each participant, the participants themselves and the interview schedule.

- **Time period**

Data was gathered over four weeks with an average of two participants per day. The challenge was that the participants in terms of their geographical location were scattered through the whole municipal area, so accessing them required one to move from one farm to the next.

- **Participants**

The initial plan was to interview 16 participants in both the LRAD and the PLAS sub-programmes of redistribution. In the end, the initial number of 16 participants was covered; eight farmers/beneficiaries representing eight farms in the PLAS sub-programme and eight participants representing four farms in the LRAD sub-programme were interviewed.

- **The interview schedule**

An interview schedule was used to examine access to land and organisational structure on the farm, the use of the resources on the farm in terms of production capacity of the farm, the planning and the use of business plans and the support offered by the stakeholders/authorities in terms of post-settlement support. Information was gathered through audio recordings and a concerned form was signed before each interview in consultation with each participant. The information gathered was transcribed and anonymised in accordance with the ethical standards approved. Copies were stored electronically to be used for the purpose of the research. The interview schedule is found on Annexure A on page 84 of this Dissertation.

4.3 Presentation of results

4.3.1 Access to land

As suggested previously, access to land is the most critical part of the land reform process; it involves the ability to take physical occupation of the land, the ability to use the land without any restrictions and the ability to plan and execute those plans to achieve agricultural production. There are different ways in which the land reform beneficiaries access the land both in the PLAS and the LRAD sub-programmes, although it took some form of application for the beneficiaries to be allocated land.

The research shows that there has been a diverse period between the time of application and the actual settlement of farmers on the farm, with some mentioning a period of approximately five years, while others mentioned just under a year.

In the LRAD farms, access to land has not been that long because of the method of submitting applications. Some applicants used the method of own contribution, where the applicant contribute a certain amount of money to qualify for a subsidy, while others used the group application depending on the number of applicants involved, in terms of the basic subsidy of R5 000, which qualifies for R20 000, and the total sum of money pooled together to enable the applicants to afford a bigger piece of land. In some cases, the pooled money was not enough to afford the farm that was offered for purchase, and financial institutions such as the Land Bank was approached to finance the shortfall.

The challenge with this “part grant and part loan” financing is that the majority of the farms, if not all of the farms, did not generate sufficient income to be able to service the loan with the consequence that some of them were then repossessed and sold on private auction. Some of these farms were salvaged and repurchased through the PLAS sub-programme to be reallocated to the same beneficiaries on a caretaker agreement or full rental agreement basis. The challenge with this type of arrangement is that nothing changes in terms of the use of the farm since the same people who failed to produce in order to service the loan are still there on the farm. The only positive aspect of it is that their tenure was secured, though this is not the primary objective of the redistribution programme. This unintended outcome where the farmers whose land repossessed and sold on auction is counterproductive in terms of distributing land to the previously disadvantaged because the land is usually sold to the highest bidder, which in most cases may not be from the PDIs.

In some cases, the land is sold privately, which is not a bad thing because the buyer may have the financial resources and the skills to make it productive. Nonetheless, the risk prevails that the same person may sell the land should they decide to do so and it may end up in the hands of the previously advantaged, and this may again be counterproductive in terms of the land redistribution mandate.

In the case of PLAS farms, one aspect is that almost all the beneficiaries of PLAS were previously farming individually on a particular piece of land or were engaged in some form of farming before getting allocated to PLAS farm. Having at least some idea of what they are trying to achieve in terms of their farming efforts may explain why they may be successful. As one respondent suggests: “It is important for the farmers to grow in terms of the size of operation to at least show any signs of success.”

Some of the applicants, particularly the group applicants who operate as agricultural co-operatives and trusts, have applied in the previous era of LRAD but were only catered for in the new programme of PLAS. The challenge, however, with this type of arrangement is that the group dynamics tend to mimic that of the LRAD, where the majority of the members have since moved on, relocated or found employment or simply just lost interest and are no longer farming. In some cases, these beneficiaries

are adopting a “wait and see” attitude in the hope of something positive on their farm coming about. This type of attitude creates tension among the group members because the more active ones have a feeling that they are being used by the less active ones.

One advantage with PLAS farms is that the State becomes the custodian of the land and, therefore, the farmers or leases may not sell the farm if they choose to change their focus in terms of the business plan. This creates a challenge because even if the farmer’s interest has changed and are no longer interested in farming, they will continue to rent out the farm. This may be the reason why some of these PLAS farms are non-functional and their infrastructure is dilapidated.

Another challenge is that although the PLAS farmers are legitimate occupiers of the land in terms of their contract, they do not have much say in the operations on the land, unlike the rights-based programmes and the LRAD sub-programme beneficiaries who have title deeds to their land. The farmers do not benefit in any way if their farms are sold for any other development such as the building of roads, or any other infrastructure or when the farm is then converted to a mining area. The State controls negotiations and the farmers find themselves on the receiving end of whatever decision is being made as they have no right in terms of land ownership. In the case where a portion or a whole farm is converted to another land use other than agriculture, the beneficiaries of PLAS are not entitled to any compensation because they are not the owners of the land and therefore will be forced to vacate the land or relinquish whatever piece of land that is being developed without any compensation.

4.3.2 Organisational development

As suggested previously, organisational development involves a formation of a particular hierarchy of individuals in a particular organisation. On land reform farms, organisational development takes different forms of identification from individual farmers and individual farmers with their families, to a more organised legal entity such as co-operatives, trusts, private companies, close corporations or CPAs, particularly where groups are involved.

The similarity between the PLAS and the LRAD farms is that there are some farms where a group is operational and others where a family or extended family members are operating the farm.

One of the key success factors in the land reform project/farm is the succession plan. One farmer indicated that the succession plan is that the son will take over the farming operations when retirement comes. This will motivate and encourage hard work to ensure that legacy is left for the children. Another farmer mentioned that the farm is leased to the family as part of an agricultural co-operative, so the family will take over when retirement comes or in the eventuality that they pass on. What is key in the case of these projects/farms is that is they are family businesses where family members are

involved either in the form of a co-operative or a close corporation, except for a case where two or more families are working together. The running of the business is, therefore, dependent on the head of the family as the responsible person for both family and business.

In the case of groups, in both LRAD and PLAS projects power relations are a major factor in terms of decision-making. Those in the committee enjoy the privileges of making most of the decisions on behalf of the majority. On LRAD farms, group dynamics differ from that of PLAS because in LRAD, the groups are bigger and the challenges and dynamics are a bit more complex. In these bigger groups, factions are easily developed and are powerful enough to topple the committee and form new ones, particularly where there are resources that can be exploited to their benefit. Battles become fierce and the aftermath is usually disastrous; opportunistic individuals find opportunities to loot whatever is of value on the farm or may even injure those who are perceived to be stumbling blocks to their illicit behaviour. For this reason, some of these farms, particularly those group-based, become dysfunctional including where those who want to farm become discouraged.

One advantage of LRAD is that the beneficiaries are unable to sell the farm because selling the farm involves all the factions to cooperate; thus, the farm will remain in their hands for as long as they are still fighting and no one will be interested in negotiations to buy the farm. Danger, in this case, lies in whether the farm was purchased with a loan component, the servicing of the loan ceases and the financial institution in an attempt to recover by selling the farm through auction.

In the PLAS projects, the dynamics of the groups usually comes to the fore when decisions are to be made. In terms of the hierarchy, some members' opinions matter more than others and this creates disgruntlement in other members. The disgruntled members do not possess enough power to oppose the decision of the stronger members and find themselves being dragged along in the process, so they resort to being uncooperative. It becomes challenging, especially when the decision involves spending money because people will not be willing to contribute their hard-earned cash to an idea in which they do not believe. The disgruntled members begin to show less interest in the farming operations and gradually withdraw their participation in the activities of the farm, which renders the whole farm unproductive. In most cases where there are groups, the group members contribute their labour to the farm to boost productivity. When productivity drops due to insufficient involvement of the members, the income diminishes or sometimes disappears completely. The farmers are then unable to service their financial obligations such as paying their electricity bill, paying their workers and such; and when the electricity supply is cut, safety and security concerns are raised. Because the farm belongs to the State, the members have no idea of what to do next and leave the arable lands to lie fallow while in some cases the stronger members co-opt commercial farmers to sublease the land, even though this may be illegal in terms of their lease contract.

In the case of individuals on the PLAS and LRAD farms, the decision in most cases lies with the head of the family. Whatever is done is decided upon by the head and the family members oblige. So it is very rare to find the farm completely dysfunctional like in the group scenario. In this case, you find the family is living on the farm and the farmer is doing everything necessary to keep the farm functional. The majority of the farms in the area depends on borehole water and the pumping of water use electricity to do so. In the case of these farms, agricultural production becomes vital to the existence of the farm and the farmers will do everything to keep the farm productive, even if it involves subleasing.

4.3.3 Agricultural production

As reiterated earlier, agricultural production is the key component of a successful land reform project; without production, land reform cannot achieve its objectives. For agricultural production to happen on land reform projects, it requires the land reform beneficiaries to have skills, human and capital resources and lastly time, because agricultural production is a seasonal phenomenon. Crops can only grow during a specific time or season in the year, animals also bear the young ones at a specific time during the year. For the land reform beneficiaries to have production on their farms, they require a balance of these elements.

In terms of agricultural production, there is a clear indication of some form of production on the farms examined in this research. In some farms, they are anticipating increasing or have already increased the production capacity, and some have increased or anticipated increasing their income streams through diversifying or value-add in both LRAD and PLAS projects, particularly the active projects. Farmers plant maize and soya beans for feeding their livestock, some having mentioned that they would like to have a small feedlot to finish off the cattle/weaners/steers on the farm to boost the sale mass before selling them. Some are already using maize that is grown on the farm as feed supplement during the winter months. Others have diversified in the same enterprise value chain by adding small stock to their cattle enterprise or planting vegetables to boost cash flow while waiting for the grain crop to mature.

On LRAD farms, the production is smaller and less robust in terms of intensity and capacity. This is mainly because the LRAD farms are slightly smaller in size than the PLAS farms, and the ratio of individual land is usually lower. The ratio ranges between 10 hectares and 50 hectares per individual farmer, which may be attributed to the farm sizes in the municipality which are slightly smaller than in other places. In terms of economy of scale, the LRAD farms are not as robust as the PLAS farms in relation to the farmer-per-hectare ratio. On both LRAD and PLAS farms, there is some form of agricultural production. This production may vary in terms of size, capacity and intensity.

On PLAS farms, however, the intensity and scale of production are usually higher. The ratio of hectares per individual farmer ranges from 100 hectares per farmer to around 600 hectares per farmer, although in some isolated cases it may go as low as 10 hectares per farmer in the group scenario. The economies of scale favour the PLAS farmers in terms of production and the majority of them benefit from that. There is agricultural production on the PLAS farms and in some isolated cases is as robust as commercial farming.

The majority of the PLAS farms have two or more enterprises on the farm that produces two or more products. In some farms that have animal production enterprises as the main source of income, the farmer has both small stock and large stock. If the farm is crop-producing, grain crops and vegetables or sometimes even hay is produced. Some farmers who produce grain will have few chickens, either broiler or layers, or sometimes even piggeries to use what they cannot sell in terms of their produce or to add value to their produce. Farmers who are producing large livestock will occasionally plant a few hectares of grain to supplement their livestock during winter months or their own hay, which they cut and bale as supplement feed for their livestock during the winter months.

Sometimes is risky to have a lot of enterprises on the farm as it may cause the farmer to lose focus and incur unnecessary expenses that may lead to financial losses. Choosing the enterprises that complement each other carefully remains key to successful farming. One farmer mentioned that although the main enterprise on the farm is grain production, they also keep cattle because the cattle usually use the crop residues such as maize stover after harvest and that minimises the cost of buying feed supplements. The main purpose, however, of keeping livestock is to diversify the income streams. In the years where they experience drought, they sell the cattle to augment the income and therefore the risk is minimised. In the Highveld, the rain season is in summer and if in a particular year the farmers experience drought, it will affect the livestock production enterprise in winter months, so the farmer can sell the cattle earlier before the market is flooded and while the price is still high. Keeping both livestock and producing grains do complement each other as some of the farmers have realised and is helping a great deal to sustain the production on these farms.

On the LRAD farms, agricultural production is not as robust as it is on the PLAS farms, mainly due to access to resources (human and capital) and the capacity of the land in general; as mentioned earlier, the land-to-farmer ratio is small. In the case where the land per farmer is higher, production is only effective because of the lack of production capital needed to acquire production inputs and related machinery. On LRAD farms, the production is mostly for household consumption though may sell if the produce is sufficient enough to cover household needs in terms of use and value-adding.

4.3.4 Post-settlement support

Post-settlement support comes in different forms of support and by means variety of stakeholders. The most obvious of the support is the extension and advisory services, the formal and informal training, the financial support in terms of on-farm and off-farm infrastructure and the agricultural input support including breeding stock for animal production farmers. There was unanimous agreement that government departments do support the farmers in terms of the above, particularly on the active projects.

- **Extension and advisory support**

Both LRAD and PLAS projects receive extensions and advisory support on a regular basis. This kind of support is offered to the active and inactive farmers although the latter may not receive as much because extension officers are not keen to visit farms where nothing is happening.

- **Production inputs support**

Inputs support is offered to both the LRAD and the PLAS project, but only the active ones make use of it because inputs support encourages the farmers to till the land and if the farmer receives the inputs support and did not till the land in a particular year, they may likely not receive the same support the following year. Those who use the land may continue to receive support as long as they continue tilling the land. The challenge with the support is that some farmers suggest that it creates a dependency on the government, because if the farmer knows that they will receive the support, they do not apply themselves in terms of making sure that the crop becomes a success and they could sell and finance the following season's production inputs.

- **Livestock improvement support**

Livestock improvement support is given to both the LRAD and the PLAS farms, although the PLAS farms remain the most likely to receive these in terms of their qualifying criteria because their farms are bigger in size, they have the infrastructure and, usually, they have some form of livestock on the farm to improve.

- **Training**

Formal and informal training is offered to both the LRAD and the PLAS beneficiaries alike, although the LRAD beneficiaries should be more likely to receive the training because of their numbers. However, this is not the case as they seem not to avail themselves for the training.

4.3.5 The role of support

On both PLAS and LRAD farms, the government does not provide support in terms of negotiating for a better price for their produce, getting a loan/production loan or negotiating a good interest rate in terms of a production loan. Some of the private sector role-players offer production loans, but the challenge is that they also handle the selling of the produce, particularly grain.

Support is offered to the farmers who are willing to work, that is the farmer who applies for livestock through a livestock improvement programme. The assessors always advise the farmers to improve veld management practices or infrastructure to improve the chances of qualifying for loans. Some of those farmers can get the necessary support because they do listen and improve their chances, while some farmers do not get support because they do not take the initiative or heed the advice given. Some farmers receive financial support but show no progress in terms of reinvesting the income into the farm that is to finance following seasons' crop or by increasing the breeding stock by buying more heifers after selling weaners. As suggested by one farmer, support should give a farmer a head-start and allow other farmers to benefit. It is not ideal to keep on supporting one group of farmers while others are still waiting indefinitely. Hence the farmers who receive support should be responsible and use the support effectively and efficiently.

Regarding support versus own capital, one farmer emphasises that farming is a business and own capital is necessary regardless of the availability of financial support. There are minimal chances of success that one can achieve with government support only and, therefore, it is critical to have back-up financial resources when operating a farm. Making business decisions also augments the support that the government may provide, for instance diversifying the income streams on the farm. Sometimes no support is not a bad thing at all because some farmers do really well without the support. Some farmers have succeeded without any financial support. The downside of the support is that the farmers become comfortable, and do not apply business principles in the hope that if they do incur a loss, they will get bailed out. On the other hand, if such farmers received support, this could ease some of the hardships that they endured in making their business successful. This may enable some farmers to progress quicker and their productivity increased.

The government cannot provide support alone. A variety of stakeholders are necessary to create favourable conditions for marketing produce and well as sourcing production inputs, providing on and off-farm infrastructure such as the roads and storage facilities. The research shows that some beneficiaries are not receiving adequate support and what they have achieved is through their own efforts, without state support.

4.3.6 Sustainable livelihoods

Land reform beneficiaries employ different or diversified livelihood strategies to survive. Livelihood strategies include keeping livestock for both household consumption and selling, growing crops for household consumption, the market as well as adding value to the livestock and crop products on the farm to engage in related services such as tilling the land or transporting produce to the markets.

The majority of the beneficiaries have two or more enterprises on their farms. On both LRAD and PLAS farms there is some form of production, although it differs in terms of scale and intensity of production. In agriculture economies of scale is important; when the scale of production increases both the income and expenses increase and, in the end, it is a matter of proportions.

On LRAD farms, due to the smaller land-to-farmer ratio, the input costs are generally lower, but so is the income which is determined by the produce. The profit margins become even slimmer so in the end the dividends are so small and rarely compensate the farmer's efforts. The situation becomes even grimmer in the case of groups as a high number of people working for such a small amount of income. On the positive side, if more people are involved in the group's scenario, more people are going to benefit, particularly if the produce is sizeable. Where farmers have planted vegetables, a number of families may have daily access to fresh vegetables or farmers are keeping chickens for meat or eggs; the farmers should have access to meat and eggs on a regular basis.

Similarly, in the case of individual plots or farms of LRAD, the income is marginal. The farmers may look for off-farm income streams such as full-time employment and their attention to farming becomes completely diverted. However, the advantage is that their security of tenure is guaranteed as they have title deeds for their farms.

On the PLAS farm, the group scenario is not that much different to the LRAD, where a lot of people are expecting a return from a small piece of land or the sale of a few cattle or sheep. In the case where the farmers are planting grains, the production costs may outweigh the income, indebting the farmers compared with the situation before they were engaged in land reform and farming. Where debt is incurred, it may not affect the farmers individually as the majority of the farms are operated through a legal entity such as a co-operative or a trust and even a CPA, so the debt is in the name of the legal entity.

4.4 Land redistribution threats

The programme for land under redistribution is under threat due to several factors that are beyond the control of the land reform beneficiaries. The most common threats among others are change of land use, change of land reform programmes, informal and formal subdivision of agricultural land or a change of ownership.

- **Change of land use**

Land that is under land redistribution in coal-producing areas is under threat from mining companies, who target this land under redistribution for mineral deposit exploitation such as coal. In the Emalaheni Local Municipality, the need for coal has increased due to demand for four coal-fired power stations, as well as the export market, and therefore mining companies' prospect for coal continuously and the land under the redistribution programme, particularly PLAS and LRAD, is not spared.

Human settlements are also a major threat to the land under redistribution programmes particularly such land that is closer to the townships. Due to demand for residential land, any vacant land is targeted for the establishment of residential areas, LRAD and PLAS not been spared from particularly the informal settlements.

- **Change of land reform programmes**

The redistribution land reform programme is not a rights-based programme. Therefore, the land under PLAS and LRAD get forfeited to the rights-based programmes of restitution and tenure reform when such programmes target the same piece of land.

- **Subdivision and consolidation**

Land under redistribution, particularly PLAS, is under threat from subdivision and consolidation; especially where the land is under dispute from different beneficiaries claiming legitimacy, i.e. where the land is allocated to the lease and there were long-term occupiers on the land. Subdivision is also used where there are irreconcilable differences among beneficiaries in a group.

- **Change of ownership**

Land under LRAD is under threat where the beneficiaries are concerned they might lose their land to a financial institution, such as the Land Bank, to settle outstanding debt. Some LRAD beneficiaries also sell their land privately when they lose interest in farming. On PLAS farms, in the case where the leasee passes on, the lease is then transferred to the heir which could be the spouse or the elder child.

4.5 Summary

- **Access to land**

In terms of access to land, both PLAS and LRAD beneficiaries have to make some form of application to access land. The waiting period between the application and the actual settlement on the land varies considerably. In some instances, the beneficiaries have had to wait for longer than five years while in some case only waited a couple of months before they receive their land. In PLAS, the individual farmers have had some form of farming experience before occupying the land. The groups, both on LRAD and PLAS had no prior experience of farming.

- **Organisational development**

The individual farmers in both the LRAD and the PLAS farms operate their farms individually or with a legal entity, such as co-operative or with family members or extended family. In the group scenario, the farm is operated with a legal entity such as a co-operative or a CPA. Some groups experienced physical conflicts, while others have experienced tensions, at least when group dynamics such as power relations were at play.

- **Agricultural production**

Agricultural production is prevalent in both the PLAS and LRAD farms, but tends to be more robust on the individual PLAS farms. There are some farms where agricultural production is at a bare minimum. On both the individual farm and the group LRAD farms, agricultural production is very minimal; although it is more organised on the individual rather than the group farms.

- **Post-settlement support**

Post-settlement support is prevalent on both the PLAS and the LRAD farms, but it is more positively received on the individual PLAS farms.

- **Sustainable livelihoods**

A few farms, especially the individual PLAS farms, do generate sufficient income and realise a profit, and thereby can achieve sustainable livelihoods. On both LRAD and PLAS group farms, production is achievable but is insufficient to generate adequate income. Although on these groups farms, production benefits more people than on the individual farms.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

Land redistribution programmes have changed in form, shape and size over the years, and the most significant was the introduction of PLAS as well as phasing out of the LRAD sub-programmes. The study aimed to compare both LRAD and PLAS projects and farms in the Emalahleni Local Municipality and to evaluate which among the two sub-programmes best serves the purposes of land redistribution. In terms of the analysis, the study produced the following themes: access to land, organisational development, agricultural production, post-settlement support and sustainable livelihoods to address the objectives of the research which are: To determine the socio-economic condition of land reform beneficiaries on PLAS and LRAD farms in the district and to investigate the redistribution projects in the municipality; To establish which livelihoods strategies are employed by land reform beneficiaries and whether the support received assisted their agricultural production in the PLAS and LRAD projects; To analyse the factors contributing to the success and sustainability of land reform projects in relation to socio-economic development and sustainable livelihoods and To determine the effectiveness of post-transfer support in dealing with issues of livelihoods and provide recommendations for the improvement of land reform programmes.

The first livelihoods strategy on land reform is access land. Access to land and is the most critical part of land reform processes – it involves the ability to take physical occupation of the land, to plan and execute those plans to achieve agricultural production and to use these lands without any restrictions. There are different ways in which land reform beneficiaries access the land both in LRAD and PLAS sub-programmes, although it always takes some form of application for the beneficiaries to be allocated land. To recap, redistribution farms or projects have some form of documentation as the basis of their operations, SLAG farms have a form of household income ceiling as a qualifying criterion, while LRAD farms required own contribution and PLAS farms require the signing of a lease contract or caretaker agreement (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 61).

In terms of socio-economic development, land reform beneficiaries organise themselves into some form of organization. Organisational development involves the formation of a hierarchy of individuals in a particular organisation. On land reform farms, organisational development takes different forms, from individual farmers farming on their own and/or individual farmers with their families, to more organised groups with a registered legal entity such as co-operatives, trusts, private companies, close corporations and CPAs, particularly where groups are involved. Redistribution has changed in recent years from acquiring land to transferring it to beneficiary groups in the form of CPAs or families to a scenario where the land is bought and transferred to black commercial farmers through LRAD or rented through PLAS for a lease period of 30 years (Beinart & Delius, 2019: 9).

Agricultural production is a major livelihood strategy that land reform beneficiaries employ on land reform farms. It is the key component of a successful land reform project, without which land reform cannot achieve its objectives. Agricultural production contributes directly to the success and sustainability of land reform projects. For agricultural production to happen, it requires land reform beneficiaries to have skills, human and capital resources and time because agricultural production is a seasonal phenomenon. Crops can only grow during a specific time or season in the year, animals also produce offspring at a specific time during the year. For the land reform beneficiaries to have production on their farms, they require a balance of these elements. Chitonge (2013: 31) states that for the fact that the majority of land reform beneficiaries have produced some form of production on their lands, it is clear that there is potential given the fact that most of them have managed to produce with minimal or no support.

Post settlement support is among the factors that contribute to socio-economic development. As alluded to earlier, post-settlement support as has been shown is the main contributing factor to the success of the land reform farms. It is offered by a variety of stakeholders and According to Sihlobo and Nel (2016: 77), post-transfer support is provided through technical and general support services from the departmental extension officers of the provincial and national departments of agriculture and other stakeholders. However, support alone cannot achieve a successful land reform programme without the commitment of land reform beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries who achieved less could have achieved better should they have received support.

To reiterate, land reform beneficiaries employ different or diversified livelihood strategies to survive. Apart from keeping livestock for household consumption and sale, growing crops for household consumption farmers also engage in related services such as tilling the land for other farmers at a fee or transporting their produce to the markets also at a fee. This helps the mutual attainment of sustainable livelihoods. Mabuza (2016: 2) states that the main objectives of land reform are to provide land for PDIs to improve their livelihoods, quality of life as well as improve their food security.

Agricultural production is one of the main livelihood strategies that land reform beneficiaries employ on their lands, organisational development contribute immensely on the success that land reform beneficiaries achieve on land reform farms, post settlement support does promote the socio-economic development of land reform beneficiaries although some beneficiaries does manage to produce with minimal support.

5.2 Discussion of results

The study was conducted in Emalahleni local municipality in the Nkangala district of Mpumalanga province. The sample size of 16 beneficiaries representing 12 farms was purposefully sampled. In terms of selection criteria, four virtually successful farms from PLAS and four virtually unsuccessful farms from PLAS were selected. On the LRAD programme, two virtually successful farms were selected together with 2 virtually unsuccessful farms were also selected. The participants were interviewed using an interview schedule and audio recording were taken. The purpose of the study was explained to the participants and the consent form was signed before interviews. The data was transcribed, translated and analysed. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data and in terms of the analyses the following four themes were generated which are access to land, organisational development, agricultural production and post settlement support.

5.2.1 Access to land

There are different ways in which the land reform beneficiaries access the land both in the LRAD and the PLAS sub-programmes, although it took some form of application for the beneficiaries to be allocated land. The State must take reasonable legislative conditions and other measures within its available resources, which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis (Rungasamy, 2011: 40).

There has been a diverse period between the time of application and the actual settlement of farmers on farms, with some mentioning a period of approximately five years, while others mentioning under a year. Under the redistribution programme, the State and the beneficiaries are both responsible for identifying the land, although, in the end, the government makes funds available for the purchase of the land (Netshipale *et al.*, 2017: 61). According to Aliber (2019: 7), one of the flaws of LRAD was that the requirement of a number of participants in terms of grant application would have a consequence of including all the members of the family; for example, which included the older members of the family who were not interested in the process would be counted as beneficiaries to increase the prospects to qualify for a much higher grant. The research shows that in addition to pooling grants through adding beneficiaries, in some cases where these monies were not enough to afford the farm that was offered, a financial institution such as the Land Bank was approached to finance the shortfall.

A problem arises when the beneficiaries failed to service the loan, the Land Bank would auction the land to recover their investment. Ranwedzi (2013: 76) states that in this scenario, PLAS offered relief to the majority of struggling LRAD farms, particularly where the land was acquired through a “part grant and part loan” deal and where the funds were transferred, but the selling price was not met. The State would negotiate, pay off the balance and transfer the land to the State, proceeding to lease the

farm to the beneficiaries. However, the same beneficiaries were retained and, therefore, the situation did not change, except for their tenure to be secured, which was not the primary objective of the land redistribution programme. In the case of PLAS farms, one aspect is that almost all the beneficiaries of PLAS who are farming individually were previously farming on another piece of land before getting allocated PLAS farms and this is perhaps the reason why they appear to be successful. In the group scenario, however, group dynamics mimic those of LRAD and their farm is barely active in terms of agricultural production. The majority of the beneficiaries of PLAS were inactive in the farming operations due to reasons such as living off the farm or working on a full-time basis elsewhere (Mahlangu, 2017: 92).

5.2.2 Organisational development

As alluded to earlier, organisational development involves a formation of a particular hierarchy of individuals in a particular organisation. The similarity between the PLAS and the LRAD farms is that there are some farms where a group is operational and others where an individual farmer or family members are operating the farm. In some cases, the farm is operated by a group in the form of a legal entity administered by a committee. In the case where the land reform beneficiaries are organised into a legal entity such as a trust or a CPA, those who are in power particularly the executive committee of the legal entity are often perceived to engage in illegal activities or tend to abuse their power. This results in them being perceived to benefit more from the land reform farm. In turn, this usually sparks dissatisfaction among the bigger group who resort to looting or vandalism of the farm properties or assets (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008: 11).

The research shows that with the individual PLAS farmers, one of the key success factors in the land reform project/farm is the succession plan. One farmer mentioned that farming is a family business and succession planning is important. The current form of land reform, particularly PLAS, tends to favour more established individuals than the poor majority, which the programme was intended for because of their inability to secure sufficient capital and their lack of credible management capabilities to manage highly commercialised farming units (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 40).

The other factor it maybe the fact that the majority of them have some form of farming experience which helps them to make good judgment or to take good farming decisions such as diversification of income streams on the farm. The majority of them had farming assets such as livestock, machinery and capital for input cost that they brought along into the PLAS farms, as one of the farmers mentioned that farming is a business and a common business principles is to invest money to make money.

In the groups' projects, the dynamics of the groups usually comes to the fore with decision-making. In terms of their hierarchy, some members' opinions matter more than others and this creates disgruntlement in other members. In the case of groups, in both LRAD and PLAS projects, power relations are a major factor in terms of decision-making. Those in the committee enjoy the privileges of taking most of the decisions on behalf of the majority. According to Davies (2014: 234), access to resources is related to power relations in the sense that those who control these resources have control over who accesses them and ultimately who benefits from their use.

5.2.3. Agricultural production

As alluded to earlier, agricultural production is the key component of a successful land reform project, without which land reform cannot achieve its objectives. In terms of agricultural production, there are forms of production that have taken place on the farms. Given the fact that the majority of land reform beneficiaries have produced something from their lands, it is clear that they have the potential to do better because most of them have produced without support (Chitonge, 2013: 31).

On LRAD farms, the production is smaller and less robust in terms of intensity and capacity. This is mainly because the LRAD farms are slightly smaller in size than the PLAS farms and the ratio of land to individuals is usually lower. The ratio ranges between 10 hectares and 50 hectares per individual farmer, which may be attributed to the farm sizes in the municipality, which are slightly smaller than in other places. Emalahleni Local Municipality is the third-largest in the district in terms of area; it has the largest population of 148 persons per square kilometre and – as the economic hub of the district and bordering the Gauteng province – it accommodates 30.2% of the district's population. The biggest economic driver in the municipality is coal mining and energy generation at 35% and 14.4%, respectively; while agriculture is the smallest contributor at 0.5% of the municipal GDP (Emalahleni Local Municipality Spatial Development Framework, 2015: 43).

In terms of economy of scale, the LRAD farms are not as robust as the PLAS farms in relation to production and farmer-per-hectare ratio. In both the LRAD and PLAS farms there is some form of agricultural production. This production may vary in terms of size, capacity and intensity, but there is some form of production going on these farms. The expectations to produce at a commercial scale for land reform beneficiaries perpetuated by the bias to commercial agriculture have depicted many land users of land reform as being unproductive, despite producing sufficient amounts of crops and livestock products to support their families (Chitonge, 2013: 31).

On PLAS farms, however, the intensity and scale of production are usually higher. The ratio of hectares per individual farmer ranges from 100 hectares to around 1 600 hectares per farmer, although

in some isolated cases it may go as low as 10 hectares per farmer in the group scenario. The economies of scale favour the PLAS farmers in terms of production and the majority of them do take that advantage. There is agricultural production on the PLAS farms and in some isolated cases it is as robust as commercial farming.

5.2.4 Post-settlement support

Post-settlement support as shown by the research to be the major contributing factor to the success of the land reform farms. coming in different forms and by a variety of stakeholders. The most important support is provided by the provincial and national departments of agriculture and to a lesser extent by the local and district municipalities. The most obvious of the support is the extension and advisory services, the formal and informal training, the financial support in terms of on-farm and off-farm infrastructure and the agricultural input support including breeding stock for animal production farmers. The departments include the Provincial Departments of Agriculture, Rural Development and Environmental Affairs; and National Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, which provide extension support, skills transfer and production inputs. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) offers youth development and research, and production support to farmers and bursaries to previously disadvantaged individuals, including the land reform beneficiaries from the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 78).

There has been unanimous agreement that government departments do support the farmers in terms of training, funding for livestock, production inputs, machinery as well as infrastructure and extension and advisory services, particularly on the active project in both the LRAD and PLAS sub-programmes, although the non-active project received some support. In these inactive land reform projects, extension officers are not keen to visit the farms as no agricultural activities are happening due to the lack of commitment on the part of the land reform beneficiaries. The relevant departments, apart from struggling with challenges such as fund mismanagement, capacity shortage, administrative complexity and bureaucracy, are doing their best in many instances to provide the support to improve the socio-economic development of farmers and land reform beneficiaries (Sihlobo & Nel, 2016: 78).

Mabuza (2016: 25) argues that the provision of post-transfer support alone does not guarantee immediate success in terms of the use of the land and receiving economic benefits from such use, but also requires the coordination of the support and the commitment of the stakeholders, including the land reform beneficiaries. However, the manner of support is not always relevant; one farmer mentioned that the emerging/smallholder farmers require a whole lot of support. A lot of off-farm support is still lacking, such as marketing and sourcing financial or technical support from the private sector. Masoka (2014: 5) argues that in the Mpumalanga province, despite efforts by the department

through the allocation in the budget for support of land reform farms, the majority remains unproductive – their infrastructure vandalised and dilapidated, and they are mostly depleted.

5.2.5 Sustainable livelihoods

As alluded to earlier, land reform beneficiaries employ different or diversified livelihood strategies to survive (DLA, 2001: 27). Their strategies include keeping livestock for household consumption and selling, growing crops for household consumption and the market, adding value to the livestock and crop products produced on the farm, as well as engaging in related services such as tilling the land for others or transporting their produce to the markets.

The majority of the farms have two or more enterprises on the farm that produces two or more products. Land reform beneficiaries are people who pursue different livelihood strategies such as diversifying by keeping livestock and planting crops as well as small value-adding activities as part of the complexities they face (DLA, 2001: 27). On both LRAD and PLAS farms, there is some form of production although it differs in terms of scale and intensity of production. With the introduction of LRAD, the focus shifted from improving livelihoods and the reduction of poverty to the productivity of the land and its economic efficiency. This led to channelling financial resources to fewer people than the previous programmes (Kepe & Hall, 2016: 20). However, due to the smaller land-to-farmer ratio, the input costs on LRAD farms are generally lower and so is the income as determined by the produce. The profit margins become slimmer and, in the end, dividends are so small that it rarely compensates the farmer's efforts.

The situation becomes even grimmer in the case of groups, because a high number of people are working for a small amount of income. Nxumalo and Antwi (2013: 162) have argued that the SLAG and LRAD sub-programmes have failed to improve the livelihoods of the land reform beneficiaries. Similarly, in the case of individual plots or farms, the income is usually less impressive. On the positive side, people are involved especially in the group scenario and more people are going to benefit particularly if the produce is sizeable. Kepe and Hall (2016: 51) suggest that the purpose of accessing land should not be for mere production but production for sustainable livelihoods to counter the synergy that exists between poverty, inequality landlessness and food insecurity.

On the PLAS farm, the group scenario is not much different to LRAD; where a lot of people are expecting returns from a small piece of land or the sale of a few cattle or sheep. Large groups usually coupled with the hyper-inflated prices of marginal lands; insufficient support in terms of the allocation of grants in LRAD projects are seen to be the main contributors to failure to establish black commercial farmers (Mabuza, 2016: 13). In the case where the farmers are planting grains, the

production costs usually outweigh the income because of marginal lands and the farmers end up indebted more than before they were involved in land reform or farming. According to PLAAS (2016: 29), despite efforts to distribute land to fight poverty, many land reform projects have resulted in failures that have impacted significantly on the land reform beneficiaries' livelihoods.

5.3 Conclusion

The study of the comparison of the LRAD and PLAS land reform sub-programmes of redistribution in the Emalahleni Local Municipality was executed successfully. Sixteen beneficiaries were interviewed over six weeks and the results as tabulated in Annexure B were comprehensive. Annexure B is found on page 84 of this Dissertation. In terms of the themes generated from the study, threats to land redistribution – although not discussed briefly – are worth being highlighted as they also affect the performance of the whole programme.

The waiting period between sending in an application to the actual occupation of the land ranged between one to five years among the beneficiaries. There are farms where individuals or individual families occupy land that is organised into co-operatives and close corporations. Other co-operatives and CPAs comprise groups ranging between six and 20 members, occupying both PLAS and land LRAD farms. The group dynamics are similar in both the LRAD and PLAS sub-programmes, where power relations and internal conflicts are sporadic within the groups. Agricultural production is prevalent in some of the farms, but it happens to be more robust in some of the individual PLAS farms and faint to almost non-existent in the group LRAD farms. Post-settlement support is prevalent in both the LRAD and PLAS farms, but it appears to be misdirected in the individual PLAS farms. Although production is prevalent in both LRAD and PLAS farms, sustainable livelihoods are only achievable in the individual PLAS farms, although their tenure is not as secure as the LRAD farms due to the lack of title deeds.

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

Land reform is a highly contested debate among academics, politicians and ordinary citizens of the country. The main theme is the inability of the land reform programmes to achieve their mandates, including associated perception. Land restitution has only managed to settle financial compensation claims, which amounts to nothing in terms of land transfers; redistribution only managed to transfer less of the proposed amount of land and, in most cases, of poor quality that is unable to support the intended beneficiaries; while tenure reform has achieved little progress in securing the tenure rights of farmworkers and people living in communal areas (Lahiff, 2014: 587).

Land reform is dynamic, it changes overtime as beneficiaries enter and some exit the programme through voluntary and involuntary process. Some beneficiaries pass on and some lose interest in farming, new lands get added to the programme through acquisitions and some taken away through change in land use. Some lands get divided while others get consolidated while others are recycled from one programme to another through land claim process. Over the years, land reform implementation has evolved through different programmes, sub-programmes and strategies with varying results (DRDLR, 2017), but there has been no concrete agreement as to what the problem is and how to correct it (Aliber & Cousins, 2013: 140; Aliber *et al.*, 2013: 1).

The challenge for land reform, particularly land redistribution, is that the majority of the farms in both LRAD and PLAS have their production potential decreased or at least perceived to have been decreased, (Mabuza, 2016: 12), although there are a few farms where production has been sustained or at least increased. In comparing PLAS and LRAD farms in the Emalahleni Local Municipality, this research found that not all the farms are unproductive. A large number is operating below their production capacity, while a few are operating at full capacity. This suggests that there are production issues that need to be addressed and corrected or enhanced in the interest of land reform. How land reform beneficiaries access land, how they used their organisational structures to improve agricultural production in pursuit of sustainable livelihood – all these factors could contribute to sustainable land reform projects. Sustainability of land reform refers to the way land reform projects achieve the objectives of environmental and economic sustainability and social acceptability (DLA, 2001: 26).

Bailey (2007: 61) highlights the importance of monitoring and evaluation in the implementation of land reform projects. The inclusion of monitoring and evaluation will not only measure the success of land reform, but also give the required feedback to the policymakers in terms of what works and what is not working. Through effective monitoring and evaluation processes can land reform be improved in the allocation of the right beneficiaries and also providing the appropriate support.

6.2. Recommendations

6.2.1 Access to land and organisational development

The government has monopolised acquisition of land and entry into land reform, particularly by previously disadvantaged groups, becomes difficult. Therefore, the government should provide mechanisms to support individuals who want to purchase agricultural land for farming and as an investment. One of the principles of LRAD that was abandoned with the phasing out of the programme, namely assisting individuals to purchase land via subsidies, should be revisited as some businesspeople require land. This could speed up land reform where private individuals are assisted to buy land because currently, the State has monopolised land acquisition through the PLAS sub-programme and not all farmers want to lease land.

Land reform beneficiaries are diverse in terms of their educational background, their skills and their capacity to attract capital. Not all the farmers or beneficiaries will ultimately become commercial farmers. Some farmers will prefer to farm on a small scale and continue to pursue other livelihoods, yet others will want to earn their living out of farming. Small land parcels should not be completely overlooked as they promote small-scale farming – many people will want to engage in farming, particularly the smallholder or emerging farmers. They would want to pursue their chosen careers; but at the same time, farm on a small piece of land to diversify income streams.

The government should target more youth and women to have more access to land. This could benefit the country by creating more opportunities for young people and women in particular by reducing unemployment and poverty. It could also help women to be independent, which could alleviate the current challenges facing the country of children and women abuse as well as femicide.

On the other hand, young people are ambitious because they still have more to achieve, so they would be able to use their land effectively through employing their own labour, unlike where the land beneficiaries are old and can only do that much to keep the farm going. In addition, young people are able to adapt to new technologies such as minimum tillage and the use of greener or cleaner technologies such as low carbon emissions.

6.2.2 Agricultural production and post - settlement support

As shown by the research, the government does provide support and the farmers do appreciate the support that they receive; however, the government cannot provide support alone – it requires a variety of stakeholders to participate in terms of creating favourable conditions for marketing the produce as well as sourcing the production inputs and providing on and off-farm infrastructure such as road infrastructure. Government should create a platform for the private sector to participate in the post-settlement support of the land reform beneficiaries, but at the same time, stricter measures must be

instituted. This includes monitoring the support and ensuring that the land reform beneficiaries are not taken for a ride; and, most importantly, the commitment of the land reform beneficiaries must be up to standard.

The government should come up with performance monitoring for these beneficiaries who have received support to ensure that there is accountability for the public funds used for acquiring land and providing such support. Monitoring of land reform beneficiaries must also improve, and the “use it or lose it” principle must be implemented effectively to ensure that the food security of the nation is not compromised by the implementation of land reform. Farmers who have received financial support and failed to use it to their advantage should relinquish their land to new farmers who have ambition, particularly the youth.

The financial support should be on a sliding scale – one of the principles of LRAD that was abandoned with the phasing out of the sub-programme. The support that the government is providing is not always relevant to the beneficiaries of land reform. Financial support could be provided on a sliding scale like in the case of the provision of funds for acquiring land in the former LRAD sub-programme. Moreover, support should be offered on a demand-based programme. Some farmers require mechanisation, while others require production inputs while some require both. The current blanket support offered by the stakeholders must be redesigned and realigned to support the farmers through request or extensive needs analysis approach.

6.3 Conclusion

When comparing the PLAS and LRAD sub-programmes of redistribution in the district, a number of conclusions are arrived at. For redistribution to achieve its mandate, it cannot continue to operate alone. Both the LRAD and PLAS sub-programmes have their shortcomings and, therefore, the programme needs to be redesigned and aligned to fit the requisites of the redistribution programme.

The redistribution programme is a discretionary programme where the land reform beneficiaries volunteer to participate in terms of access to land. In the case of PLAS, the land reform beneficiaries’ rights to land are not secured. Therefore, if the principles of tenure reform, such as the provision of rights within the framework of long-term occupiers in terms of ESTA Act are incorporated, the rights to land for these beneficiaries should be secured or at least improved. According to Aliber (2019: 4), the challenge with land redistribution is that the definition of who should benefit lacks clarity. Hence, the programme has moved towards large-scale farming where few people benefit, while small land parcels that could benefit smallholder farming – improving food security and security of tenure – tend to be ignored.

As suggested, both LRAD and PLAS sub-programmes have their shortcomings. In the case of LRAD, the individual farms are small and cannot sustain the livelihoods of the farmers within the economies of scale. The positive, however, is that their tenure is secured because the majority of them live on their farms. In this scenario, the farmers have to juggle their farming activities to generate some form of income to keep afloat, leading to looking for off-farm income streams.

The groups, on the other hand, are too large to administer and the income generated on these farms is too low to make any difference to the livelihoods of these farmers. Group dynamics also play a significant role in terms of the success of these groups, because some farms have become operationally dysfunctional. Should the balance between the group dynamics and production be achieved, many people could benefit from this kind of arrangement; and, therefore, these types of group farming should be pursued. Group farming could be used to generate dedicated and passionate farmers who feed into the smallholder category. It can serve to train aspirant farmers, where the authorities can promote one or two farmers in these groups who show potential to benefit.

In the case of PLAS, the same set-up of training farmers on the bigger group farms can work as the research shows that the majority of the group farmers, unlike the smallholder or individual farmers, had no experience of farming before taking over the farms. In terms of the individual farmers, a larger number were producing well on their farms although very few of them are at the point of generating sufficient income or are realising a profit on their farming activities.

Post-settlement support needs to be redesigned and aligned to suit the requirements of the redistribution programme. The research shows that not one farmer's needs are identical to those of another, so the post-settlement support needs to be adapted to suit individual farmers' needs.

In the case of the earlier days of restitution, projects had their own dedicated post-settlement officials in a post-settlement unit, which were later disbanded. The post-settlement unit worked with the farmers to assist them to identify the gaps and recommend training before dispersing funds to implement development in identified projects. As stated by Anseeuw and Mathebula (2008: 11), often the agricultural support or extension support is tailored to the individual or a limited group of farmers; but in the case of land reform beneficiaries, different skills such as community facilitation and project management are required, which some of the extension officers do not possess. However, instead of training the current extension officers to capacitate them to fit in land reform, land reform practitioners or dedicated officials could be employed to work with the land beneficiaries to identify gaps in terms of implementation of their desired projects and to link them with the relevant institutions for further funding or execution of those intended projects. Post-settlement units or similar units could be established to cater for the unique needs of the land reform beneficiaries.

In the LRAD sub-programme, especially in the group set-up, farmers require training in terms of their group dynamics but also require infrastructure support for establishing labour-intensive projects such as piggeries or broiler chicken production or hydroponic vegetable production facilities. The research shows that where the farmers have minimal conflict – they are able to employ sufficient labour if the project can generate sufficient income to be able to pay each member a particular stipend at the end of each month as land reform beneficiaries require income to improve their livelihoods.

The smallholder farmers in the PLAS sub-programme require assistance in securing production loans as well as negotiating agricultural inputs. The majority of them can produce and what they need is to improve their production capacity. Having a dedicated market where they are able to sell their produce in a protected environment will greatly assist them. Currently, they sell their produce in the open market and the conditions are not favourable due to market forces.

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Annexure A: Interview Schedule

**FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES (UFS)
CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CDS)**

Interview schedule

MASTERS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (MDS)

Researcher: Mailetse Masemola
Mobile: 0769800331
E-mail: emmanuel.masemola@yahoo.com
Questionnaire No:

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INTERVIEWER DECLARATION:
I,, declare that I have asked this interview schedule as it has been laid out. I declare that all responses which have been recorded are the true responses of the respondent and that I have fully checked the interview schedule. Signature: Date:

PARTICIPANT CONSENT:
I, agree to take part in the aforementioned survey. I understand that my responses to this survey will be treated with the strictest confidence. I further understand that I will not receive any compensation for taking part in this study. Signature: Date:

Interview Schedule for a farmer/ land reform beneficiary

I. Opening (**Ukuthoma**)

A. My name is _____ and I have been asked to conduct research on behalf of..... for a qualification in MDS. As I have mentioned I thought it would be a good idea to interview you, so that I can better information about you and your farming enterprise.

Ibizo lami ngingu_____obawe ukuthi enze isiqbungululo ngaphasi komkhakha oyi_____ weziqu kuMDS. Njengoba ngitjhile ngaphambilini kuzaba muqondo omuhle ukuthi ngenze ihlolo mubono nani, ukuze ngibe nolwazi ngani Kanye nerhwebo lenu lokulima

B. (**Purpose**) I would like to ask you some questions about your background, some experiences you have with land reform processes, and your farming knowledge, experience and interests in order to learn more about your farming enterprise or land reform project as a land reform beneficiary.

(Ihloso) Benginetjhisakalo yokunibuza imibuzo mayelana nerhono lenu lokusebenza, Kanye nolwazi eninalo mayelana nezomhlabathi, nokgono lokulima, nolwazi nenkanuko ukuze nifunde khudlwana ngerhwebo yezokulima noma yokusetjenzwa kwezomhlaba njengabuzuzi bomhlaba.

C. (**Motivation**) I hope to use this information to help to create awareness about the situation in the farms and to try and inform policy on land reform.

(Ukugquguzela) Nginethemba lokusebenzisa lehlolombono ukunisiza ukwakha umbono onolwazi mayelana nesimo sezokulima begodu sizame nokunazisa ngemigomo yokusetjenzwa komhlaba.

D. (**Time Line**) The interview should take about 25 minutes. Are you available to respond to some questions at this time?

(Isikhathi) Ihlolombono yemibuzo kufanele ithathe imizuzu ematjumi amabili nahlanu. Ingabe nizakukhona ukuphendula imibuzo ngalesikhathi.

(**Transition:** Let me begin by asking you some questions about yourself, when and how you got your farm.)

II Body

1. (Topic) General demographic information

a. Please tell us about yourself in relation to land reform farm, how and when did you get the farm, your organizational structure of the farm, is there is a recognized committee?

2. (Topic) Farming Experiences

a. Please tell us about your farm, what are you farming with, whether the land used to its capacity and if not why?

b. How do you operate your farm, do you have or use a business plan to run the farm, do you have markets and do you realize profit and if not why?

3. (Topic) Post settlement support

a. Describe the support that you receive from the authorities as to what kind and how often extension and advisory services/training /funding, etc. and why do you think is important?

III Closing: Thank you for your time and participation in the study

Annexure B: Table no 1. Research results

No	Demographics		Farming experience							Support			Land reform type			
	Application turn around	Beneficiaries (Group/individual)	Farm size/ ratio	Farming enterprise	used to capacity Y/N	Businessplan availability Y/N	Markets	Income Y/N	Profit Y/N	Extension and advisory,	Financial	Livestock				
1	< 1 year	Individual	680 ha total/ 220 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	YES	YES	Livestock auctions	YES	YES	Yes	YES	YES	PLAS	PLAS SUCCESSFUL		
2	< 1 year	Individual	660 ha total/ 110 ha per beneficiary	Piggery and Grains	YES	YES	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	YES	Yes	YES	YES				
3	< 1 year	Individual	1500 ha total / 750 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	YES	NO	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	YES	Yes	YES	YES				
4	< 1 year	Individual	370 total / 370 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	YES	NO	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	YES	Yes	NO	NO				
5	> 5 years	Group	85 ha total / 7 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	NO	NO	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	NO	NO	Yes	NO	NO		PLAS UNSUCCESSFUL		
6	> 3 years	Individual	345 ha total/ 345 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	NO	NO	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	NO	Yes	NO	NO				
7	> 5 years	Group	230 ha total / 38 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	NO	YES	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	NO	Yes	YES	NO				
8	> 3 years	Individual	170 ha total / 170 ha per beneficiary	Poultry	NO	NO	Hawkers	YES	NO	Yes	NO	NO				
9	< 1 year	Individual	50 ha total/ 50 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	YES	NO	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	NO	Yes	YES	NO		LRAD	LRAD SUCCESSFUL	
10	< 1 year	Group	680 ha tota/ 10 ha per beneficiary	Livestock and Grains	NO	NO	Auctions, AFGRI Silos	YES	NO	Yes	NO	NO				
15	< 2 year	Individual	9 ha total / 9 ha per beneficiary	Poultry and vegetables	NO	NO	Hawkers	NO	NO	Yes	NO	NO			LRAD UNSUCCESSFUL	
16	< 2 year	Group	730 ha total/ 60 ha per beneficiary	Grains	NO	NO	AFGRI Silos	YES	NO	Yes	NO	NO				
Themes	Access to land													Themes		
	Agricultural Production															
							Post settlemnt support									
	Organasational development															