INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS IN THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME IN NORTH KIVU, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO EMMANUEL TAVULYA-NDANDA TEMBO 2015069772 THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WITH SPECIALISATION IN AFRICA STUDIES CENTRE FOR GENDER AND AFRICA STUDIES THE FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE PROMOTOR: DR MAROYI MULUMEODERHWA CO-PROMOTOR: DR STEPHANIE CAWOOD 30 NOVEMBER 2021 i DECLARATION I, Emmanuel Tavulya-Ndanda Tembo (student number 2015069772), declare that the thesis that I herewith submit for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education. Name: Emmanuel Tavulya-Ndanda Tembo (Student Number 2015069772) Signed: Date: 23 November 2021 ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS “Can you forget the stream that quenched your thirst during a dry season?” (African proverb). Even if one could, I will never forget The University of the Free State. I hereby express my appreciation to all of those who, directly and indirectly, helped me achieve my peace studies at this prestigious university. First and foremost, I am highly indebted to Dr Maroyi Mulumeoderhwa, who journeyed with me from the beginning till the end of this PhD programme. I also thank all those who collaborated with Dr Maroyi to supervise my dissertation, namely, Professor André Keet, Professor Heidi Hudson, and Dr Stephanie Cawood. Indeed, their knowledge, experience, and judicious advice have greatly benefited me throughout my research work. I wish to thank dearly Bishop Sikuli Paluku Melchisédech of Butembo-Beni (DRC) for his paternal solicitude towards me and Bishop Joseph-Mary Kizito, who hosted me in his diocese of Aliwal North (South Africa) during the last phase of my studies. On a special note, I wish to thank my colleague Dr Anne Munene who encouraged me to embark on a PhD programme and never tired of checking on my progress. Profound and heartfelt appreciations also go to those who raised funds for my studies and accommodation in South Africa. I wish to thank the University of the Free State for availing tuition fee bursaries to several masters and PhD students, including me. Research for this dissertation was also supported in part by Open Society Foundations (OSF). May all others who contributed in cash and in-kind find here the expression of my gratitude. Last but not least, I am very grateful to the respondents of my field research. Above all, I would like to thank the office of the governor of North Kivu for permitting me to conduct research in his province. I also thank the late Professor Kä-mama, former director of Pole Institute (Goma, DRC), for opening the doors of his library to me. From the bottom of my heart, I thank all my respondents for their accurate answers and my research assistants for their commitment to the field. God bless you all! iii DEDICATION To the late Mwami Syalandira Anselme and Mwami Mutowa Edward, who strove for peace in their respective goupements of Luongo (Lubero District) and Kamuronza (Masisi District), I dedicate this work. iv ABSTRACT This empirical research was built on the failure of military operations, and formal peacebuilding processes sought to curb the interethnic conflicts revolving around the issues of land, citizenship and political power in the North Kivu province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This study focused on the truth and reconciliation process designed by the Amani Programme in 2008 for the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. It probed the role of the traditional leaders in the said programme for the period between 2008 and 2018. In order to establish its argument, this case study relied on data collected from eleven focus groups and thirty interviews purposively selected. Focus group discussions were conducted among members of CBOs, civil society, field NGOs, church leaders and members of field organisations, while interviews were conducted with traditional/ethnic leaders, church leaders, UN officials, government officials, and members of the civil society. Theoretically, this study used Lederach’s Conflict Transformation Theory and peace education. On the one hand, from the transformative viewpoint, the study's findings revealed that peacebuilding processes failed because they did not consider the local context of North Kivu, which endorses the full participation of the grassroots leadership represented by traditional leaders. On the other hand, this study found that informal and formal education for peace is still insufficient in the province. Clearly, there is a need for change, which is possible if a bottom-up approach is adopted where traditional leaders become the initiators of the reconciliation programme. It is worth noting that traditional leaders have the attribute to manage and distribute land as land question is one of the underlying causes of ethnic conflict in North Kivu. The engagement that restores the bami in their status as peacemakers can significantly change communities’ attitudes and perceptions. There is a strong need to engage the community in more workshops and meetings for reconciliation at the communal level. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page number DECLARATION i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii DEDICATION iii ABSTRACT iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v LIST OF TABLES x LIST OF FIGURES x GLOSSARY xi ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS xiii PART I INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 2 1.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION 2 1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 4 1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 7 1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 8 1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND AIMS 9 1.6 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 10 1.7 THEOTRETICAL APPROACH 16 1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 17 1.9 CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 18 1.9.1 Conflict 19 1.9.2 Interethnic conflict 19 1.9.3 Traditional leaders 25 1.9.4 Truth and reconciliation commission/programme 25 1.10 THESIS OUTLINE 28 PART II LITERATURE REVIEW 30 CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT - INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN NORTH KIVU 31 2.1 INTRODUCTION 31 2.2 THE STATUS OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS 32 2.2.1 The legal status of traditional leaders 32 2.2.2 Traditional leaders and land management 33 2.2.3 Challenges in traditional leadership 35 vi 2.3 UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE NORTH KIVU INTERETHNIC CONFLICT 37 2.3.1 Rwandan immigration and colonial policies 38 2.3.2 Unresolved political issues: Land, identity and power 41 2.3.2.1 Land tenure 42 2.3.2.2 Citizenship and power 47 2.3.3 The involvement of traditional leaders in interethnic conflict 55 2.4 TANGENTIAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT 58 2.4.1 The surge of refugees in North Kivu 58 2.4.2 Revolutionary or invasion wars 59 2.4.3 Insecurity along the Rwanda and Ugandan borders 62 2.4.4 Economic agendas 63 2.4.5 Poor governance 67 2.5 PEACE PROCESSES IN NORTH KIVU 68 2.5.1 Military operations 68 2.5.2 Recurrent formal peace processes 75 2.6 PEACEBUILDING FAILURES 77 2.7 SUMMARY 79 CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 80 3.1 INTRODUCTION 80 3.2 PEACE EDUCATION 82 3.3 CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION THEORY 84 3.3.1 Conflict transformation and local leadership 86 3.3.2 Conflict transformation and reconciliation 91 3.4 TOWARDS A CONTEXTUALISED RECONCILIATION FRAMEWORK (CRF) AS THEORETICAL LENS 95 3.4.1 Genesis of the argument: Criticisms of reconciliation 95 3.4.2 Illustration of the CRF: The Miriki Communal Reconciliation Workshop 102 3.5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESSES 113 3.5.1 Truth and reconciliation around the world 114 3.5.2 Truth and reconciliation in Africa 117 3.5.3 Truth and reconciliation in the DRC 119 3.5.4 Relevance and challenges of TRCs in general 125 3.6 SUMMARY 129 PART III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 132 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 133 4.1 INTRODUCTION 133 4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 134 4.2.1 Qualitative case study research design 134 4.2.2 Study area and sample 139 4.3 DATA COLLECTION 143 4.3.1 Focus groups 143 vii 4.3.2 Individual interviews 147 4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 150 4.5 THE RESEARCH PROCESS 152 4.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVITY/TRUSTWORTHINESS 154 4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 156 4.8 SUMMARY 159 PART IV DATA ANALYSIS 161 CHAPTER 5: TRADITIONAL LEADERS PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS BEFORE/OUTSIDE THE CTPR 162 5.1 INTRODUCTION 162 5.2 TRADITIONAL LEADERS AS CUSTODIANS OF LAND AND TRADITION 162 5.3 BLOOD PACT AND INTERETHNIC MARRIAGE 166 5.4 TRADITIONAL COURT 167 5.5 NYUMBA KUMI COMMUNITY POLICING 172 5.6 PROBLEM-SOLVING AND COOPTATION INTO TRADITIONAL POWER STRUCTURES 174 5.7 OBSTACLES TO BAMI’S PEACEBUILDING MECHANIMS 176 5.7.1 Ethnic prejudice and discrimination 176 5.7.2 Poor land management 179 5.7.3 The involvement of Bami in politics 186 5.8 SUMMARY 190 CHAPTER 6: PEACEBUILDING MECHANISMS OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS WITHIN THE CTPR 191 6.1 INTRODUCTION 191 6.2 PARTICIPANT AWARENESS OF THE CTPR PROGRAMME 191 6.3 RECONCILIATION THROUGH PEACE INITIATIVES AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE CTPR 196 6.3.1 STAREC Programme 197 6.3.1.1 Appraisal of STAREC Programme 201 6.3.1.2 The involvement of traditional leaders in the STAREC Programme 205 6.3.2 Social dialogue as tool to enhance social cohesion 208 6.3.3 Critiques of social dialogue 211 6.4 SUMMARY 214 CHAPTER 7: THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER ACTORS IN THE QUEST FOR INTERETHNIC RECONCILIATION IN NORTH KIVU 216 7.1 INTRODUCTION 216 7.2 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SCHEMES 217 7.2.1 Communicating for peace: Initiatives by Search for Common Ground and La Benevolencija 217 viii 7.2.2 Development for peace: The British International Alert and its joint Development and Livelihood Programme for Reconciliation 219 7.2.3 MONUSCO’S Ilots de Paix (Islands of Peace) 220 7.2.4 USAID/Netherlands, Paillottes de Paix (Shelters of Peace) and Village Peace Committees 221 7.2.5 MONUSCO workshops and ad hoc conferences of peace 224 7.2.6 Appraising the collaboration between international peace initiatives and the Bami 225 7.3 THE APPROACH OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT: BARAZA INTERCOMMUNAUTAIRE (INTERCOMMUNITY OMBUDSMAN) 228 7.4 NGOs AND CHURCHES 236 7.4.1 CRONGD-NK: Identifying and de-activating causes of conflict daily 236 7.4.2 NPRC: Noyau de Prévention et de Résolution des Conflits (Nucleus of Conflict Prevention and Resolution) 238 7.4.3 PAL: Programme d’Action Locale (Local Action Programme) and its strategy of buholo (peace) 242 7.4.4 The Catholic Caritas Programme 247 7.4.5 Pole Institute 251 7.5 SUMMMARY 254 CHAPTER 8: PERCEPTIONS ON THE BAMI’S PARTICIPATION IN THE CTPR AND CHALLENGES FOR THEIR LEADERSHIP 255 8.1 INTRODUCTION 255 8.2 PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS 255 8.2.1 “The bami’s goodwill and participation is not enough to bring change” 255 8.2.2 Popular support for the bami 258 8.3 BAMI’S SELF-REFLECTION 261 8.4 CHALLENGES FOR BAMI LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN RECONCILIATION PROGRAMMES 263 8.4.1 Illiteracy and deficient education 264 8.4.2 Poverty 266 8.4.3 Widespread insecurity 271 8.4.4 Ambiguities in law and administration 272 8.4.5 Calcification of traditional culture 278 8.4.6 Crisis of illegitimacy 282 8.5 SUMMARY 286 PART V CONCLUSION 288 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 289 9.1 INTRODUCTION 289 9.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS: AN OVERVIEW 290 9.2.1 Aim 1: Traditional leaders’ peacebuilding mechanisms before and after the establishment of the CTPR 290 ix 9.2.2 Aim 2: Contributions of other peacebuilding actors towards reconciliation 291 9.2.3 Aim 3: Facilitate an intervention during fieldwork: The Miriki Communal Reconciliation Workshop 292 9.2.4 Aim 4: Areas of collaboration between the bami and other actors in Peacebuilding 293 9.2.5 Aim 5: Perceptions about the bami’s participation in reconciliation programmes 293 9.2.6 Aim 6: Challenges for bami leadership 294 9.3 PARTICIPANT SELF-REFLECTION ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS 294 9.4 STUDY LIMITATIONS AND VALUE 297 9.5 RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 300 9.6 CONCLUSION 300 REFERENCES 302 APPENDICES xvii x LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1: Synoptic comparison of the CTPR and Miriki Workshop Table 4.1: Focus group discussions Table 4.1: Individual Interviews Table 4.3: Phases of Research Table 6.1: Kirumba Engagement Acts LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Amani reconciliation programme Figure 2.1: The Coltan value chain Figure 3.1: The big picture of Conflict Transformation Figure 3.2: Actors and approaches to peacebuilding Figure 3.3: Contextualised Reconciliation Framework Figure 3.4: Peace commitment letter from the Hutu Figure 3.5: Peace commitment letter from the Nande Figure 3.6: Endorsement letter from Mwami Murandya Figure 3.1: Sampling map or study area Figure 5.1: Example of a traditional/village palaver hut Figure 7.1: Baraza Intercommunautaire (Intercommunity ombudsman) Figure 7.2: NPRC operations Figure 7.3: PAL dynamics xi GLOSSARY Amani: Kiswahili term for peace Bahunde, Banyanga, Banande, Batembo, Bakobo, Baofu and Bambute (Pygmies): Some of the ethnic groups in North Kivu Banyarwanda: Generic term for populations of Rwandan ancestry, namely, the Hutu and Tutsi Baporo: Local shortened and mispronounced form of Protestants Baraza Intercommunautaire: Intercommunity ombudsman Baraza: Kiswahili for ombundsman Bashingatahe: Traditional leaders in Burundi Collectivité: French for county Erihaka: Kinande verb meaning to pay land rent Erikumbira: Nande verb meaning to work for someone with an expectation of receiving a reward Groupement: French for sub-county Impuzamugambi: Hutu militia which, together with the Interahamwe, perpetrated genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Induna (plural Izinduna): The assistant chief in charge of conflict resolution in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa. Interahamwe: Rwandan Hutu rebels who took refuge in the DRC after they had perpetrated genocide in Rwanda in 1994 Karunga: Kobo and Nande term for oath and lots casting Kibebu: Nande term used in the rite to detect and identify the suspect who perpetrated a crime. Kikumi: Kobo and Ofu concept for the 10% levied from the murderer’s property to feed his/her victim’s children. Kimia: Lingala term for peace, quietness, calm Leo: Kiswahili term for today Magamba: Traditional rite for reconciliation in Mozambique Maï-Maï: Armed self-defence militias in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo xii Mazembe or Maï-Maï Mazembe: Name of one of the self-defence militias in North Kivu mainly composed of Nande Mufukwo (plural bafukwo): Hunde term for a royal servant Muhabwa (plural bahabwa): Hunde term for vassal Muhako or ngemo: Nande term designating the rent payable by the vassal to landowners Muhimakiri: Ancestral spirit among the Bahambo in Bwito collectivité, Rutshuru District; he is the spirit of abundance, presides over harvests and coronation of the bami. Mukama (plural bakama): Nande concept for landowner under the authority of the mwami. Mukonde (plural bakonde): Hunde term for landowner Mukuyakuya (plural bakuyakuya): Someone who is not a native Musoki (plural basoki): Nande term for vassal Mwami (plural bami): Traditional leader in the Kivu; the highest authority over an ethnic group or clan, county and sub-county; supreme judge and overall landowner in his entity Njuri Njeke: Council of Elders in Meru County, Kenya Nyatura or Maï-Maï Nyatura: Name of one of the self-defence militias in North Kivu mainly composed of Hutu Nyumba Kumi: Kiswahili term for “ten houses;” it is a community policing strategy or local crime prevention programme at local household level Obwenda: Nande term for poisonous beverage given to the group of the accused. Like the kibebu referred to previously, obwenda was another test to know who was guilty and who was not. The guilty person could die in the process. Pole: Kiswahili word used to console a bereaved or afflicted person Umoja: Kiswahili term for unity xiii ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADF-NALU : Alliance Democratic Forces - National Army for the Liberation of Uganda AFDL : Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération ANBP : Afghan’s New Beginnings Programme ANC : African National Congress APCLS : Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain AU : African Union BBC : British Broadcasting Corporation CAVR : Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (de Timor Leste) CBK : Communauté Baptiste au Kivu CBO : Community-Based Organisation CCRCC : Commission Consulative de Résolution des Conflits Coutumiers CEBK : Communauté des Eglises Baptistes au Kivu CIFOR : Centre for International Forestry Research CIRAD : Centre de coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement CIRGL : Conférences Internationales pour la Région des Grands Lacs CLPC : Comités Locaux pour la Paix et la Conciliation CLPD : Comités Locaux pour la Paix et le Développement CNDP : Congrès National pour la Démocratie et la Paix CNS : Conférence Nationale Souveraine ColTan : Colombo Tantalite COMESA : Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CONADEP : Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas CONTRALESA: Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa CPGL : Communauté des Pays des Grands Lacs CRF : Contextualised Reconciliation Framework CRONGD-NK: Conseil Régional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Développement au Nord-Kivu CTPR : Commission Technique pour la Pacification et la Réconciliation xiv CTT : Conflict Transformation Theory CVR : Commission Vérité et Réconciliation CVR : Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliatión DDR : Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DDRRR : Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement DFID : Department for International Development DSP : Division Spéciale Présidentielle EAC : Eastern Africa Community FAC : Forces Acquises pour le Changement FALD/K : Forces Armées pour la Liberation Durable du Kongo FAR : Forces Armées Rwandaises FARDC : Formes Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo FAZ : Forces Armées Zaïroises FDC : Forces de Défense du Congo FDLR : Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda FDP : Forces pour la Défense du Peuple FG : Focus Group FIB : Force Intervention Brigade GDP : Gross Domestic Product HRW : Human Rights Watch ICG : International Crisis Group ICTR : International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda IDPs : Internally Displaced Peoples IGAD : Inter-Governmental Authority for Development IJR : Institute for Justice and Reconciliation IPNCB : Institut des Parcs Nationaux au Congo Belge ISSSS : International Strategy for Support to Security and Stabilisation KNCIC : Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission M23 : Movement of 23 March 2009 (Rebel group in eastern DRC) MAGRIVI : Mutuelle des Agriculteurs de Virunga MIB : Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda xv MLC : Mouvement de Libération du Congo MONUC : Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo MONUSCO : Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo MRRDC : Mouvement de Résistance en RDC NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO : Non-Governmental Organisation NRC : Norwegian Refugees Council NPRC : Noyau de Prévention et de Résolution des Conflits OAU : Organisation of the African Unity OECD : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PAL : Programme d’Action Locale PARECO : Patriotes Résistants Congolais PLO : Palestine Liberation Organisation PNC : Police Nationale Congolaise RCD : Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie RCD-KML : Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani Mouvement de Libération RDC : Republic Democratic of (the) Congo RPF : Rwandan Patriotic Front SED : Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands SGBV : Sexual and Gender-Based Violence SIGAR : Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SNPC : Synergie Nationale pour la Paix et la Concorde SSR : Security Sector Reform STAREC : Stabilisation and Reconstruction TJRC : Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission TRC : Truth and Reconciliation Commission UN : United Nations UNDP : United Nations Development Programme UNICEF : United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UNTAET : United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor xvi UPCDC : Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Défense du Congo UPDF : Uganda People’s Defence Forces URC : Unity and Reconciliation Commission US : United States (of America) USAID : United States Agency for International Development VOA : Voice Of America VPC : Village Peace Committee WRI : World Resources Institute 1 PART I INTRODUCTION Part I introduces the research subject and provides the research background and the thesis outline. Chapter 1 encompasses the general overview of the study. Section 1.1 presents the general introduction of the study. Section 1.2 introduces the Province of North Kivu, its population, the context of war and interethnic conflicts. At a glance, this section demonstrates how the protracted conflict revolved around land, citizenship and power. Sections 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 respectively present the research problem, research questions and research objectives/aims. Section 1.6 provides the rationale of the study, with Section 1.7 summarising the theoretical approach and detailing the relevant theories applied in this study. Sections 1.8 and 1.9 are dedicated to the scope of the study and the clarification of the key concepts. 2 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION The conceptualisation and practice of the truth and reconciliation programme and commission have evolved since the early 1970s. From that time onwards, it has been accepted worldwide as a standard programme to be included in comprehensive peace agreements. The overall objective of truth and reconciliation programmes is the following: to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past abuses; respond to the specific needs of the victims; contribute to justice and accountability; outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; promote reconciliation; and entice participants into building a better country (Misra, 2008; Sooka, 2010). South Africa established and managed the biggest truth and reconciliation commission and programme (TRC), which was emulated by other African countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Freeman, 2006; Wachira, 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). If in South Africa, the TRC was sought to mark the demise of Apartheid and the transition to democracy in 1994, elsewhere in Africa, the context was different as most countries that established truth and reconciliation programmes were emerging from violent armed conflicts. The DRC has established two truth and reconciliation commissions and programmes: the first, that is, the Commission Vérité et Réconciliation (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CVR) was established in 2004 (Freeman, 2006; Wakenge & Bossaerts, 2006) and the second, the Commission Technique pour la Pacification et la Réconciliation (Technical Commission for the Pacification and Reconciliation, CTPR) was instituted in 2008. The latter was established mainly for the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu to cement peaceful coexistence between local communities that have been in a spiral of interethnic conflicts since the independence of the DRC in 1960. This study focuses on the role of traditional leaders in the CTPR for a period of ten years, from 2008 to 2018, to understand the role that traditional leaders play in the reconciliation processes. 3 This research is a qualitative case study located in the field of Africa Studies. It emerged from the researcher’s concern about the ongoing interethnic conflict in his native North Kivu province. Despite military operations and peace initiatives undertaken by local and international actors, in terms of negotiations, constitutional, policy and legal reforms, and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the security situation in North Kivu remains volatile. In explaining peacebuilding failures, Autesserre (2007; 2014) identified three major elements at the source of the unrest in the DRC: the causes of violence, the hypocritical behaviour of actors, and inappropriate peacebuilding approaches. She also found that the causes of violence include regional and national causes of local violence, and their combination has made it difficult to reach peace in the DRC. Regional causes refer to Rwanda’s and Uganda’s continuing involvement in supporting the armed groups. Economic motivations seemed largely to account for Rwanda’s and Uganda’s interest in the eastern Congo, typically because of its massive mineral deposits. The national causes of local violence stem from the transitional government, characterised mainly by distrust among the representatives of the different strata of the transition institutions. Regarding actors, she found that peace processes failed in the DRC because there was little or no cooperation between the high-ranking diplomats, the UN staff members, the political and military leaders and the local leadership; the role of the latter was often nonexistent. Concerning peace approaches, international and sometimes national actors have been employing conflict resolution standard models that do not consider local dynamics or local context (See also Daley, 2006; Kalyvas, 2003). Therefore, this study proceeds from Autesserre’s analysis by drawing attention to the role of the local leadership, local approaches and local context in peacebuilding initiatives. Theoretically, this study will analyse the role of traditional leaders and make recommendations mainly through the lenses of Lederach’s (1997; 2003; 2017) Conflict Transformation Theory (CTT) and peace education. While the CTT endorses the role of grassroots leadership in peacebuilding, peace education aims to help people change their culture of violence into a culture of peace (Ardizzone, 2001). This study also intends to design another approach drawn from the above theories: the Contextual Reconciliation Framework (CRF). Applied to North Kivu, the CRF assumes that the change lies in 4 considering the context. True reconciliation in North Kivu could be carried out by legitimate traditional leaders at the communal level rather than at the national or provincial macro level through concrete informal peace education programmes, such as workshops and meetings for reconciliation, on the one hand, and formal peace curricula in schools with the collaboration of teachers and other actors. This empirical study essentially depended on participants’ responses provided in focus groups and individual interviews. Other sources of information included the interdisciplinary contributions from history, political science, international relations, ethnography, peace and conflict studies. This research employed a thematic analysis. The themes arose from the questions asked during focus group discussions and individual interviews related to the research aims. The themes identified were the following: Traditional leaders’ peacebuilding mechanisms; other actors’ contribution towards reconciliation; areas of collaboration between the bami and other actors in peacebuilding; people’s perceptions about their bami’s participation in reconciliation programmes; and the challenges the bami face in their leadership. The research will conclude with threefold recommendations: communal, political and educational. Reconciliation should be re- invented and be sought at the communal level and designed by the bami. The argument for full involvement of the bami includes better outcomes in terms of ownership of the reconciliation process and capacity building of local communities. However, since the interethnic conflict in North Kivu has had national and regional repercussions, this work of the bami should be supplemented by political solutions in terms of good governance in the country and more regional security cooperation between the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Finally, informal and formal peace education programmes should be designed and delivered to the citizenry. 1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY The study’s background consists of the demographic organisation of the North Kivu population and the ongoing war and interethnic conflict. The population of North Kivu 5 province is estimated at 8.1 million (2015 Estimates).1 It is composed of several ethnic groups clustered into two major groups. The first group consists of local Congolese communities who consider themselves autochthons, namely the Banyanga, Bahunde, Banande, Bakumu, Batalinga, Bahavu, Barega, Bapere, Batembo and Bambuti or Pygmies. The latter, specifically the Pygmies, constitute a group of nomadic hunter-gatherers while the rest are sedentary Bantu people. The second group includes Rwandan ancestry, the Tutsi and the Hutu, commonly known as Banyarwanda (Ndaywel, 1997; Palermo, 2007). The Bantus rely on subsistence farming while the Banyarwanda, especially the Tutsi, practice low scale cattle rearing. Among the Bantus, in the instance of Banande, the land was communally owned on a clan basis, and most economic activities were done on a communal basis. However, even though people collectively worked together, each family owned its own gardens (Magezi, Nyakango & Aganatia, 2004). In sum, land is an asset of economic importance, and its control is the foundation of economic activity, including access to natural resources. Land ownership is one of the main causes of the ongoing interethnic conflict in the province. For these reasons, different ethnic groups, clans, and families are competing/fighting for land claims (Autesserre, 2008; Putzel, 2009). The present conditions in North Kivu province indicate that the province has undergone several forms of conflict, such as the Mulelist rebellion in 1964 (Ndaywel, 1997; Tshimanga Wa Tshibangu, 1976) and the wars of liberation, which successively struck the country in 1996 and 1998 (Prunier, 2009; Reyntjens, 2010; Reyntjens & Marysse, 1996; Turner, 2007).2 However, the sort of conflict that has pervaded the history of North Kivu since the independence of the DRC in 1960 remains the interethnic conflict principally waged between two major groups, namely the indigenous communities and people of Rwandan ancestry (Ngabu, 1996; Willame, 1997). Scholars indicate that the leading cause of tensions 1 Rapports annuels, Division Provinciale de l’intérieur; 2013, 2014 et 2015, Retrieved June 18, 2020 from https://www.ins-nordkivu.org/generales/statistiques/statistiques-demographie-nordkivu.php 2 Pierre Mulele was the Minister of Education in Patrice Lumumba’s cabinet in 1960. He is alleged to be the founder of the Mulelist rebellion also called Simba which from 1964 tried to bring about communism in the DRC. The movement was characterised by violent actions, which claimed several lives (Ndaywel, 1997, p. 613; Tshimanga Wa Tshibangu, 1976, pp. 133-135). https://www.ins-nordkivu.org/generales/statistiques/statistiques-demographie-nordkivu.php 6 is threefold: the issue of Congolese citizenship, power, and land (Autesserre, 2010; Nest, 2006; Reyntjens, 2010; Turner, 2013). According to Turner (2013), ethno-nationalist language has dominated politics in the DRC since the country's independence to the extent that Rwandophones have been marginalised. Thus, North Kivu provides an example of contextualised identities in Africa, as Hudson and Melber (2014) illustrated. They assert that it has become a place of contestations and rejection of Banyarwanda’s claims of belonging to that particular space. By way of consequence, these contestations have taken the forms of ‘rwandophobia’ and ethnic conflicts. Today, the North Kivu province offers a site of confrontation between different militia groups whose formation and administration are pervaded by ethnic patterns. Such were the M233 and its forerunners the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for People’s Defense, CNDP) and Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD-Goma) founded to protect the Tutsi minorities (Reyntjens 2010; Stearns, 2012). The FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda – Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and the Nyatura are mainly composed of Rwandan and Congolese Hutu (Radio Okapi, May 1, 2016). On the side of autochthon Hunde, Nyanga and Nande, there are several groups of Maï-Maï or armed self- defence groups of all denominations (Autesserre, 2007, p. 429). With the involvement of these belligerent groupings, the ethnic conflict in North Kivu provides ingredients for protracted conflicts in terms of threats to identity (Hicks, 2002), dehumanisation of the other (Shriver, 2002) and victimisation of one group by another (Staub & Pearlman, 2002). Regarding the resolution of the North Kivu ethnic conflict, initiatives to reach sustainable peace have fallen short. During President Mobutu’s epoch, military operations were prioritised. Launched in 1991 mainly in Masisi and Rutshuru (the epicentre of ethnic conflicts), the said operations were halted in 1996 by the so-called first war of liberation 3 M23 is an acronym for Mouvement du 23 mars [Movement of March 23, 2009]. It was a rebel military group based in eastern areas of the DRC, mainly operating in the Province of North Kivu. The M23 was formed on 4 April 2012 when nearly 300 soldiers turned against the DRC government, citing poor conditions in the army and the government’s unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal between the government and the M23’s forerunner CNDP (“M23 (militia),” 2013) – see details in the second chapter. 7 led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The period that followed the Second War of Liberation in 1998 was marked by several peacebuilding initiatives, such as negotiations, constitutional, policy and legal reforms and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (ICG, 2001; Mwesiga & Landsberg, 2003; Renton et al., 2009). The latter peace initiative lies at the core of this study. It will be discussed in detail in Section 4.5 as this seeks to understand the role traditional leaders have played in the formal truth and reconciliation processes in North Kivu for the last ten years (2008-2018). Despite this literature, little data or peer-reviewed studies exist on peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC or about traditional leaders. For this reason, the current study relies heavily on unpublished reports from NGOs and media publications, especially from Radio Okapi, a UN-based electronic newspaper. However, the study widely consults secondary sources of information, including books, articles, and media, where available, although they are limited. Nevertheless, these sources provide the historical and political context of North Kivu in which traditional leaders work and explore the root causes of the unrest and various peace initiatives undertaken by other local, national, regional and international actors. It is worth mentioning that the rural land, which is perceived as the source of conflicts in the region, is controlled and allocated by traditional leaders. 1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM This is an empirical study about the role of traditional leaders in truth and reconciliation processes drawn from the case of North Kivu province, DRC. Undeniably, the extent of involvement of these local actors in CTPR processes and the extent of their agency is a contributing factor to their failure or success. Whatever the case, traditional leaders’ role is a double-edged exercise as it is confronted by numerous normative dilemmas. The background to this case study offers a complex array of ethnic conflicts. According to Estrada-Hollenbeck (2001, p. 71), it is not clear who are victims and who are perpetrators since all parties have committed and perpetrated a set of crimes. Yet, according to Autesserre (2010) and Wakenge and Bossaerts (2006), the norm is that the configuration of any TRC should not incorporate people who committed serious human rights violations as their presence would impede the revelation of the truth about the committed crimes. In this 8 sense, the contribution to CTPR processes by traditional leaders who actively participated in the conflict (e.g., organised or funded militias) or who stood by as passive onlookers may seem insignificant. This study argues that membership in CTPR processes can be critical and acknowledges the detrimental effect of the perpetrators’ involvement in the CTPR programme. However, it also emphasises the positive role traditional leaders can play in peacebuilding programmes, especially since they control land, which is a major site of contestation, and they provide justice through traditional courts. Theoretically, one may ask the question to know the real value of traditional leaders’ mechanisms vis-à-vis the universalised liberal peace models or the question of what can be considered bami’s theoretical contribution to the body of peacebuilding approaches. In this regard, this study neither emphasises the discrepancies between traditional methods and liberal peace paradigms nor recommends substituting the latter by the former. By applying a case study method, this research highlights the local context and the attention it deserves while applying peacebuilding mechanisms, hence the Contextualised Reconciliation Framework, which will be generated from the findings of this research. In a nutshell, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by addressing the literature, theoretical and methodological gap over the traditional leaders’ role in the truth and reconciliation programme designed to quell the interethnic conflict in North Kivu province. In fact, this is the first empirical study that investigates the role of traditional leaders in the truth and reconciliation in North Kivu. 1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS This study’s primary research question is: what is the role of traditional leaders within the truth and reconciliation processes designed to foster peaceful co-existence between ethnic communities in North Kivu province? The following secondary research questions will support this primary question: 9 1. What are traditional leaders’ peacebuilding mechanisms within the political context of interethnic conflict in North Kivu before and after 2008, the year in which the CTPR was launched? (Chapters 5 and 6) 2. What mechanisms and strategies are put in place by other stakeholders (such as the UN, field NGOs, churches) to address the interethnic conflict in North Kivu province? (Chapters 2, 6 and 7) 3. What are the field and practical actions undertaken by traditional leaders in communal reconciliation? (Chapter 3) 4. To what extent do traditional leaders cooperate with other actors in the formal CTPR programme, and how are they involved in building peace and/or fuelling conflict? Who is doing what? How? Where? (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) 5. What are the people’s perceptions of traditional leaders’ involvement in the formal CTPR processes? (Chapter 8) 6. What challenges (perceived and factual) do traditional leaders face while participating in the CTPR programme? (Chapter 8) 1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND AIMS Regarding the research questions detailed above, the overall purpose of this study is to add the voices of traditional leaders to the debate on the normative processes of truth and reconciliation intended to transform the interethnic conflict in the North Kivu province. In other words, looking at traditional leaders’ role in the African milieu will help appreciate the extent to which they can impact peace processes in general and truth and reconciliation processes in particular. Also, to offer a critical analysis of peacebuilding mechanisms used by traditional leaders before and after the establishment of the CTPR in 2008. The specific aims are: 10 1. To understand how traditional leaders participated in peacebuilding in the historical and political unstable context of North Kivu province (see Chapters 5 and 6). 2. To assess the contribution of other peacebuilding actors such as the international community, the Congolese government, NGOs, and churches (see Chapters 2, 6, and 7). 3. To facilitate intervention in the field in terms of reconciliation meetings/workshops (see Chapter 3). 4. To determine the areas in which the bami collaborate with the mentioned actors in building peace in the province of North Kivu (see Chapters 6 and 7). 5. To consider people’s perceptions about their traditional leaders’ participation in reconciliation programmes (see Chapter 8). 6. To know the challenges the bami encounter in their leadership in general and while interacting with other peacebuilding actors in particular (see Chapter 8). 1.6 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY This section provides several motives for carrying out this research. These include the following initiatives: Undertake a project that informs and challenges the collective thinking about the protracted interethnic conflict in North Kivu, and advance policy ideas and insights based on the province’s uniqueness; contextualise truth and reconciliation processes; add the voices of traditional leaders to the quest for solutions to the interethnic conflict; cover the gaps in the literature on the involvement of traditional leaders in peacebuilding in North Kivu province; and enhance the reconciliation approach so that it may befit the resolution of ethnic conflicts in North Kivu and other regions in the world, which present the same political, social and cultural features as studied in this research. 11 The first reason for studying interethnic conflict and its transformation in North Kivu is because North Kivu constitutes an atypical case. Compared to other provinces of the DRC, North Kivu is the epitome of identity contestations. In fact, in the 1960s, clashes broke out between the Baluba of Katanga (Balubakat) and the Baluba of Kasai over power-sharing and control of mining fields in the province of Katanga (Kankonde, 1997). In the recent past, in 2002, the Lendu and Hema in Ituri province fought in a bid to seize control of gold- rich areas (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010; Renton et al., 2009). Although all of the ingredients of ethnic conflict in the cases mentioned above are found in the North Kivu case, including issues related to the economic agendas of combatants (Jackson 2002; Samset 2002), the major row is the fight between those who consider themselves autochthonous and Rwandophones over land, power, and citizenship (Turner, 2013). The second reason is that, while other parts of the country are relatively peaceful, North Kivu experiences a protracted interethnic conflict, mostly in its territories of Rutshuru and Masisi, where the Rwandophone population is high (Emizet, 2000; Mathieu & Tsongo, 1998). Therefore, this study intends to draw the attention of local, regional, and international actors to North Kivu and its status as a war-ridden province. Such a volatile situation not only affects the country but also the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The study intends to advance alternative approaches in the quest for lasting peace in the province. Moreover, in its bid to contribute to the resolution of the North Kivu interethnic conflict, this study widens the debate on the current notions of social cohesion, inclusivity, social justice, human rights, and diversity in a changing world. The study also intends to contribute towards policymaking concerning local issues of identity, land and power. In the instance of land, Long (2007, p. 7) stated that “ownership, access to and control of land (and the natural resources associated with them) remain central to peace and policy processes in the DRC.” In line with the above statement, the second reason for undertaking this study is to analyse one of the peacebuilding tools, namely the renowned truth and reconciliation processes, while considering the particular context of North Kivu. This study is built on Séverine 12 Autesserre’s (2010) argument that reconciliation and truth-seeking measures have to be at the core of peace processes in any society experiencing massive human rights abuses and a serious humanitarian crisis. The conflict context of North Kivu has been characterised by a high toll on North Kivutians’ humanitarian, political and economic welfare, which according to Olsson and Heather (2004) and Minani (2008), include deaths, diseases, land and power usurpation, displacement and general destitution of people. As an illustration, a recent report compiled by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2017, p. 6) revealed that as of 30 September 2017, the DRC recorded a staggering 3.9 million displaced persons, including more than 400,000 newly displaced in the prior three months. With over 1 million displaced persons, North Kivu remains the most affected province, while the three most affected territories are Lubero (about 294,000), Rutshuru (about 285,000) and Beni (about 201,000). In another report published on the 7th December 2017, the above mentioned UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2017) indicated that from June to November 2017, almost 526 civilians were killed in the Kivus; 1,087 people were abducted or kidnapped for ransom, and seven incidents of mass rape occurred. Before this period, the war in the DRC, in general, claimed an estimated 5.4 million deaths between 1998 and 2007 (International Rescue Committee, 2007). According to the aforementioned reports, the main causes of displacements and massacres were armed attacks and clashes perpetrated by Congolese armed forces and various local and foreign militias. Other actors involved in the North Kivu include the neighbouring countries: Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. In several instances, especially in 1998 and 2003, Rwanda and Uganda have played a key role in destabilising the DRC more than any other of its neighbouring countries. According to Reyntjens (2010), the undue interventions of Rwanda and Uganda have claimed 8 million lives, including victims of rape. This particular activism and interference in Congolese internal affairs have engendered mistrust and prejudice in the mind of Congolese people, in short, that nothing good can come from Rwanda (Prunier, 2009). Therefore, given that interethnic conflict in North Kivu has become a transboundary issue with regional implications, this research will develop insights for a broader 13 reconciliation and regional integration within the Great Lakes Community, comprising the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. The third reason for this research resides in the need to expand the literature on the transformation of the North Kivu interethnic crisis. The researcher aims to understand the underexplored research area on traditional leaders and their contribution to peacebuilding in North Kivu. Most research on the conflict in the DRC presents generic perspectives and do not focus on specific provinces, the profound analysis of individual actors or particular clusters at the grassroots level, such as civil society, local leadership and their input into peacebuilding. Various studies conducted in the DRC discuss local actors’ contributions, but they are engulfed in the big peacebuilding set pieces at the national level (Autesserre, 2007, 2008, 2010; Emizet, 2000; Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010; Jackson, 2002; Mwesiga & Landsberg, 2003; Ndikumana & Kisangani, 2005; Olsson & Heather, 2004; Prunier, 2009; Renton, Seddon & Zeilig, 2009; Reyntjens, 2010; Samset, 2002; Wrong, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2001). The lack of research on North Kivu alone can be explained by the fact that the whole country was at war during the period between 1996 and 2008. Prunier (2009), Reyntjens (2010), Stearns (2011) and Turner (2007), respectively, refer to this period as the bloodiest war since the Second World War, Africa’s World War and the Great War of Africa. Therefore, the national, regional, and international actors prioritised peacebuilding in the DRC as a whole without paying attention to specific provinces. However, the persistence of war in North Kivu seems to have provided a fresh impetus for recent studies on the province as a separate entity. For instance, Buchanan (2016), Musavuli (2017), and Stearns, through the Congo Research Group’s Report (September 2017), have intensively written about the recent massacres in the Beni district. In their analysis, the three authors opine that the Beni horror is a ‘tree that hides a forest;’ Beni could become the extension of the conflict between the Nande and the Hutu communities, which customarily occurs in the districts of Masisi and Rutshuru. Additionally, Beni could be at the core of the regional geopolitical strategies between Kinshasa and Kigali because, as Musavuli (2017) argues in his book entitled “Les Massacres de Beni. Kabila, le Rwanda et les faux islamistes” 14 [Massacres of Beni: Kabila, Rwanda and the fake Islamists], after the balkanisation of the country, the district would serve as the host territory for migrants from the overpopulated country of Rwanda. The book is a pledge to establish an international penal court for the DRC, a country characterised by the recurrence of human rights abuses. The most exhaustive tome on the conflict in North Kivu, written by Muke (2016), is the book “North Kivu: 25 years of pain.” In his analysis, Muke distinguishes between intraethnic conflict (the conflict within the same ethnic group) and interethnic conflict (the conflict that pits one ethnic group against the other). He claims that for the last 25 years, the history of the North Kivu has been pervasively dominated by the general focus on interethnic conflicts between the Banyarwanda and the coalition of other Congolese ethnic groups. He emphasises that there is no interethnic conflict in the province but only economic cleavages around natural resources owing to several alliances formed between former conflicting parties (see Section 2.4.4). Muke and the studies mentioned above unanimously argue that war in the province can be curbed by the equal distribution of natural resources, the arrest and prosecution of criminals, employment of youth, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) processes, and the promotion of reconciliation between local communities. Notwithstanding the proposed mechanisms to resolve conflict in North Kivu, this study observes that in the column of actors who ought to implement those strategies, analysts downplay the role of individual actors or groups of people at local level but place much emphasis on the role of the macro-society. Lederach (1997; 2003) calls this the top-range leadership of high visibility, namely the state, the regional and international communities. Yet, (Sprey, 1995) believes that the investigation of individual cases can facilitate a better understanding of a phenomenon than generic research. As such, this research aligns itself with the inductive method, which aims at producing reliable empirical results before generalisation. In the DRC, therefore, given the fact that there has been numerous conflicts in different provinces, at different epochs and involving different actors (see Chapter 2), a profound study of each case and local actors who experience the conflict first-hand could help to understand the conflict in North Kivu. Unfortunately, to date, the role played by 15 traditional leaders in truth and reconciliation commissions remains underexplored. There is a lack of empirical research in North Kivu on understanding their role. Thus, this study intends to fill the literature gap by exploring the role of traditional leaders (bami) in truth and reconciliation processes. Once again, the reason behind the choice of bami is that they exert a great deal of power and influence at the community level and, ipso facto, are in a position to impact the truth and reconciliation processes designed to foster peaceful coexistence between ethnic communities in North Kivu. The researcher organised reconciliation workshops in one of the fields where this study was conducted in an attempt to reduce conflict and foster reconciliation between divided communities. This will be further discussed in Section 3.4.2. Considering efforts in peacebuilding at local level, two studies are worth mentioning. Koko’s (2016) study on the role of civil society in conflict resolution in the DRC demonstrates how the civil society organisations were directly involved in both the peace process and the subsequent transitional dispensation designed to resolve the conflict. It, however, shows how their direct involvement in the management of transitional institutions contributed to the weakening of their members as many of their leaders were either directly recruited into existing political platforms or simply decided to establish their own political organisations and join active politics. Another study conducted by Kighoma (2017) on protestant church missions in the context of war in eastern Congo from 1990 to 2011 describes various channels through which protestant churches contributed to peacebuilding. These include the famous “plantation of village churches” that encouraged people from diverse ethnic groups to come together as brothers and sisters or as sons and daughters of the same God. Though abiding by the same principle of looking at local actors such as the above authors, the current study mainly focuses on exploring the role of traditional leaders in peacebuilding. Since power and land are at the centre of contestation between Rwandophones and autochthonous communities, traditional leaders are expected to provide significant contributions to peacebuilding in North Kivu province because of their access to power and land. The few studies and NGO reports on traditional leaders' roles 16 and other local leaders such as the Catholic Church hierarchy in peacebuilding date back to the 1990s. Ngabu (1996) and Willame (1997) recommended reconciliation among ethnic communities but, in their conceptualisation, ignored the role that the bami could and should play in the said reconciliation. Mathieu and Tsongo (1998) and Emizet (2000) highlighted the appeals for peace made by traditional leaders, contributing to a sense of relative peace in 1994. Recent sources indicate that traditional leaders have been participating in workshops for peace, including the Goma Conference held in 2008, which led to the establishment of the Commission Technique pour la Pacification et la Réconciliation (Technical Commission for Pacification and Reconciliation, CTPR) (Minani, 2008). After the Goma Conference, however, no study has ever explored the role of traditional leaders within the formal CTPR processes. Therefore, by investigating and documenting the bami’s efforts in truth and reconciliation processes drawn from the North Kivu case, this study will make a theoretical contribution to the re-conceptualisation of the agency of local actors in peacebuilding contexts. 1.7 THEORETICAL APPROACH Evidence has proved that interethnic conflict in North Kivu has resisted conventional conflict resolution mechanisms (Section 1.1). For Hendricks and Musavengana (2010), progress in one dimension engenders conflict in another. This study argues that the change in the transformation of the interethnic conflict in North Kivu resides in the bottom-up approach whereby the local context is considered, and local actors play a more significant role in the reconciliation process. This study seeks to build on Lederach’s Conflict Transformation Theory (CTT) and peace education to identify new approaches and more empirical insights into local actors' multiple and complex roles in peacebuilding contexts. Lederach (1997; 2003; 2017) identified three types of leadership: top leadership, middle- range leadership and grassroots leadership, where traditional leaders are found. A set of peacebuilding approaches corresponds to each type of leadership. This theory has the merit of acknowledging grassroots leadership's role in peacebuilding and fostering collaboration between the three types of leadership. The second theoretical lens this study will utilise is peace education. The point of intersection between the two theories lies in their views 17 that education is the key to peace. The CTT recommended that training at the grassroots level to reduce prejudice be part of peacebuilding approaches (Lederach, 1997), while Harris (2010) argued that people come to learn about threats of violence through formal and informal education on peace and the strategies to curb it. In addition, this study intends to design another approach drawn from the above theories, namely the Contextual Reconciliation Framework (CRF). Similar to the CTT, the CRF highlights the contribution of the local leadership towards peace. As education for peace, the CRF recommends teaching people about conflict and conflict resolution mechanisms to spread throughout the entire North Kivu province. However, this approach is not competing with Lederach’s CTT but complements his work through the three principles, which the CRF intends to formalise, namely the principle of dignity and equality of actors in peacebuilding, the principle of propitious context and the principle of flexibility and adaptability of peace/reconciliation processes. In other words, the CFR is inspired by the CTT and peace education; however, it is more adaptable to suit local, cultural, social, political, structural, and economic conflict situations. For instance, in the context of North Kivu and given the traditional leaders’ political and cultural position, especially as land custodians, they would be at the front line to educate their own subjects about peace through recurrent reconciliation meetings and workshops. 1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY This study focuses primarily on understanding the traditional leaders' role in the truth and reconciliation programme designed to quell the interethnic conflict in North Kivu province. Thus, the geographical area is limited to North Kivu Province. The research was conducted in five districts: Nyiragongo, Masisi, Walikale, Rutshuru and Lubero, known as epicentres of interethnic conflicts between Rwandophones and indigenous communities specifically, the Bahunde, Banyanga and Banande. The sixth district, Beni, was excluded from the study because, unlike the above five districts, it has no recent record of interethnic conflict. 18 Secondly, in terms of timeline, two epochs are of paramount importance for understanding the role of traditional leaders in peacebuilding. The most pertinent period runs from 2008 when the Technical Commission for Pacification and Reconciliation (CTPR) was established until 2018, which this study purposively chose to appraise the role the Bami played in the CTPR. The other period starts from the independence of the country in 1960 to 2008. This period, especially between 1999 and 2008, was marked by several peace processes to stabilise and reconstruct the country. This period is also crucial to unpack the Bami’s peacebuilding initiatives outside the CTPR. While the Commission Vérité et Réconciliation (CVR) was established for the whole country of the DRC, the CTPR was designed specifically for the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. The Amani Programme4 , which established the CTPR, also addressed other issues such as the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants (DDR), humanitarian endeavours, and socio-economic projects (Minani, 2008, pp. 128-137). These peacebuilding initiatives will help this study to clearly understand the shortcomings to enhance the reconciliation in North Kivu. Lastly, data collection was mainly done through focus groups, interviews and the researcher’s general observation involving 101 participants. Therefore, this study's analysis, findings, and recommendations are limited to the aforementioned participants’ perceptions and attitudes. 1.9 CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS This section defines key concepts found in the study, especially in its title. These keywords are conflict, interethnic conflict, traditional leaders, and truth and reconciliation commission/programme. The interethnic conflict will be broadly debated to grasp its contours, especially its effects in the North Kivu context. 4 Amani is a Kiswahili term that means peace. Amani Programme was set by the Conference on Peace, Security and Development in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu held in Goma, North Kivu (DRC) in January 2008. Due to persistence of insecurity in the aforementioned provinces, the conference aimed at laying foundations for a sustainable peace through specific strategies, such as demobilisation of combatants, humanitarian and socio-econimic projects. For more informationl see Sub-section 3.5.3. 19 1.9.1 Conflict Conflict presents a serious and growing challenge to domestic and international security (Maleska, 2010). It is worth mentioning that conflict is a social phenomenon, an inseparable part of social interactions (Azar, 1990; Simmel, 1955; Wilmot & Hocker, 1988). Being natural in society, conflict, therefore, remains a controversial concept because it can be constructive and destructive, positive and negative. On the one hand, Deutsch (1994) and Wilmot and Hocker (1988) argued that there is no human development without conflict. Conflict is exciting and growth-producing. In the same vein, Interpeace (2016) argued that conflict actually leads to positive change in society. For example, the French Revolution that, despite the loss of lives and goods, brought about democracy in France. On the other hand, however, common assumptions hold that conflict is totally negative, synonymous with pure destruction, pain and hopelessness (Bercovitch, 1984; Wilmot & Hocker, 1988). Indeed, conflict is “a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals” (Coser, 1956, p. 8). Whether positive or negative, conflict is admitted to cause or modify the interest of groups or organisations. This study will adopt the definition of Galtung (1990) and Kriesberg (2007), who describe conflict as a situation in which antagonists pursue incompatible goals. In North Kivu province, those involved in interethnic conflicts, namely the Banyarwanda and indigenous communities, have diametrically opposite interests over the issues of land, citizenship and power. 1.9.2 Interethnic conflict Ethnic conflict, according to Cordell and Wolff (2011, pp. 4-5), is a particular form of the above-defined conflict in which the claim of one party is described in exclusive ethnic terms, and the primary fault line of confrontation is based on ethnic distinctions or discriminations (Horowitz, 2000). Most definitions of ethnic community invoke any group of people characterised by a sense of common sentiments, identity and belonging (Ngūgï wa Thiong’o, 1972). This study follows the expansive definition put forward by Taras (2010, p. 1): 20 [a]n ethnic group or ethnic community can be defined as a large or small group of people, in either traditional or advanced societies, who are united by a common inherited culture (including language, music, food, dress, customs, and practices), racial similarity, common religion, belief in a common history and ancestry, and that exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to a group. This being said, the notion of ethnic conflict raises several views. There are two main different opinions as to whether ethnicity itself constitutes a ground for conflict or, put simply, whether ethnic conflict exists or not. The first cluster of analysts holds that the characteristics of an ethnic community articulated by Taras do not by themselves constitute grounds for conflict. Thus, there is no interethnic conflict but only political, social, economic, cultural, colonial factors that act as catalysts for ethnic confrontations (Cordell & Wolff, 2011; Mamdani, 2001; Muke, 2016). Cordell and Wolff (2011) referred to the conflict in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Cyprus, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kashmir and Sri Lanka, arguing that ethnicity is not the ultimate source of violent conflict. They contended that ethnic conflicts are not conflicts about ethnicity but rather conflicts between ethnic groups that compete with one another over the resources that they consider essential to establish or preserve conditions conducive to the preservation, expression and development of their individual and group identities. Concerning the particular situation of the DRC, Mamdani (2001) advanced the argument that ethnic and tribal differences in the country are not grounded in natural ethnic differences but in the particular history of state formation that engendered political greed and grievances. In his recent book titled “North Kivu: 25 years of pain” (2016), Muke also asserted that war in North Kivu is not interethnic at all but only economic involving natural resources. Makanda (2016, p. 24) concluded that “DRC’s mode of ethnic or tribal profiling are socially constructed concepts that are framed by historical, political and economic factors.” Thus, in the understanding of the above analysts, there is no ethnic conflict per se, but only conflicts between groups of people over political, economic, cultural, and religious rights. Consequently, many groups think they have been deprived of the above rights on the ground of ethnicity. The current study investigated the above factors to understand the interethnic conflict in North Kivu. 21 However, authors such as Ngūgï wa Thiong’o (1972) and Wanjala (cited in Makanda, 2016) agreed on the existence of ethnic conflict. The argument centres around the understanding of the concept of ethnicity, mostly in the African context. First of all, ethnicity evokes positive ideas of identity. According to Ngūgï wa Thiong’o (1972), the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘tribe’ are synonyms. From an anthropological point of view, they evoke positive and natural images of a society defined by kinship and regional ties. Indeed, as Wanjala (cited in Makanda, 2016, p. 23) puts it, “ethnicity is essential to the identity of the individual; that is an immutable fact of history, region and society.” The positive ethnicity spills over beyond one’s group to involve the growth of other communities; it helps cultivate a sense of nationalism and builds the nation itself. Referring to his country, Thiong’o (1972, p. 23) remarked: “to look from tribe to the wider concept of human association is to be progressive. When this begins to happen, a Kenyan nation will be born. It will be an association, not of tribal entities, but of individuals free to journey to those heights of which they are capable. Nationalism, by breaking some tribal shells, will help” (see also Raditlhalo, 2000, p. 83). Other examples of positive ethnicity include strong alliances that still exist between tribes/ethnic groups across Africa. For example, the Senufo and Yakuba in Cote-d’Ivoire and the Samo and Mossi in Burkina Faso whereby people signed pacts of non-aggression (Calvet, 1998). The same can be said about the Turi and Lowa in Tanzania (Shelter, 2010) and the Nande and Hunde in the DRC (Lieven, 1971). In most cases, alliances resulted in ethnic intermarriages, which, in turn, fostered peaceful coexistence between in-laws (Mwagiru, 2000). In sum, the current study posits that positive ethnicity does not lead to conflict; it rather promotes social cohesion and generates agreements between communities, or more precisely, a tacit common ground of understanding. However, invoking the same concepts of ethnicity and tribe can convey a negative idea of conflicts between tribes (Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 1972). For example, since 2007, divisions have affected Kenyan elections along with ethnic and political parties (Kanyinga & Long, 2012; Oculi, 2012). For that reason, the Kenyan National Cohesion and Integration Commission (KNCIC) developed the theme “Positive ethnicity” and called upon 22 people to participate in capacity building projects that address negative ethnicity through dialogue and reconciliation (KNCIC, 2013, pp. 5; 39). Ethnicity can be termed negative when it becomes the main ground for conflict between two or more ethnic groups. The DRC as a country and mosaic of ethnic groups – to use the words of de Saint-Moulin and Tshibanda (2011) and Ndaywel (1997) – has also experienced negative ethnicity. The case is illustrated by past and recent former Equateur province conflicts, such as the conflict between the Enyele and Monzaya over fish ponds (Radio Okapi, 4 September 2013) and between Ngbaka and Ngbandi over the acreage of forest (Radio Okapi, 17 February 2015). These are similar cases of protracted conflict debated in this study, namely, the conflict that pits the Banyarwanda (Congolese citizen of Rwandan origin) against indigenous communities in North Kivu province. The debate on whether ethnic conflict exists or not, cannot be declared over. This study agrees with Taras (2010), who asserted that ethnic conflict exists just like any other conflict based on differences between conflicting characteristics, such as race, culture, religion, politics, social class, and gender. In the same vein, this study found Horowitz’s (2000) contrast of “ethnicity versus modernism” very incisive. Horowitz demonstrated that ethnicity had been studied in the context of modernisation processes, which can be considered from three different viewpoints. The first is to argue that ethnic conflict, being part of an awkward and outdated traditionalism, will be overtaken or even eradicated by modernism. The second is to consider ethnic conflict so deep-seated that it offers no chance for modernism to bloom. The third point is where neither modernism (in the first case) nor ethnic conflict (second case) is the winner but to view ethnic conflict as part or even a product of the process of modernisation. At the end of his analysis of the sources and types of conflict, Horowitz (2000) concluded that ethnic conflict does exist mostly in traditional antipathies which have resisted even the most powerful of modernism solvents. He found that traditional ethnic antagonisms are sometimes founded on ancient and recent events in that there are nontraditional rivalries between communities who made their first encounter under colonial rule while other ethnic antipathies have been created and exacerbated by colonisers. These ethnic rivalries correspond to Blanton, Mason and Athow’s (2001) three 23 periods of time in which ethnic conflicts can be understood, namely the pre-colonial, the colonial and the post-colonial periods, respectively. In the first case of traditional rivalries, Horowitz (2000, p. 98) provided examples of Sinhalese and Tamil conflicts in Sri Lanka and the protracted conflict between Jews and Palestinians, which involved territorial conquests and religion. In Africa, traditional ethnic conflicts correspond to conflicts that precede the colonial era (e.g., those between the Acholi and Langi, and Baganda and Banyoro in pre-colonial Uganda) (Horowitz, 2000; Ingham, 1975) or the war between the Banyarwanda and Bashi in ancient Kivu in the DRC (Reyntjens, 2010). If the main reason for waging ethnic confrontations was territorial expansion in the first place, with time, especially during and after colonisation, the agenda for ethnic conflict became more complex. Prunier (1995) traced the source of the problem to the European mindset. This mindset accepts negative ethnicity or tribalism as a colonial construct. It also assumes that the barbarity and irrationality of African people make them live incorrigibly in tribes that are always at war with one another. Therefore, this situation “provided a ready justification for colonial presence in Africa, it also served to sustain the colonial policy of divide and rule” (Makanda, 2016, p. 22; Prunier, 1995). Furthermore, Blanton et al. (2001, p. 473) asserted that one of the most profound legacies of the colonial period had been ethnic antagonism resulting from the imposition of formal territorial boundaries throughout Africa at the Berlin Conference from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885. Several authors opine that the colonial regime exacerbated some ethnic conflicts or at least laid the foundations for the post-independence conflicts in some parts of Africa (Prunier, 1995; Stearns, 2011; Turner, 2007; 2013). The case in point is Rwanda and Burundi, where the colonisers favoured the Tutsi, providing them with better education and higher governmental positions and salaries while the Hutu and Twa were politically and economically marginalised (Des Forges, 1994; Sullivan, 2005). Such colonial attitudes will be further discussed in the second chapter in relation to the Belgian colonial rule in the post-independence interethnic conflicts in North Kivu (see Section 2.3.1). 24 Ethnic conflict can also transmute into history but still fits contemporary conditions, including the current context of North Kivu.5 Therefore, to understand the conflict between the Banyarwanda and Congolese communities, this study will interchangeably use the concepts “ethnic conflict” and “interethnic conflict”, “traditional leaders”, and “bami.” This study embraces Cordell and Wolff’s (2011) definition, as mentioned above, of ethnic conflict as conflicting parties in North Kivu have expressed their dissatisfaction in terms of the management of the concrete issues of land, citizenship and power (see Section 2.3.2). Regarding eradicating divisions from among societies, primarily in societies where people are divided on the ground of ethnicity, the United Nations and several countries have ratified several mechanisms. These mechanisms include: population transfers, partition or secession, forced integration, assimilation, hegemonic control by a dominant ethnic bloc, federalism, ethnic power-sharing pacts called consociationalism, promoting democracy with fair elections, security, and justice for all regardless of cultural differences (Sullivan, 2005). Lederach (1997) found these strategies somewhat redundant and limited to resolving conflict in divided societies. For him, true reconciliation is the leading solution in the set of ideas and strategies that support sustainable peace. The concept of reconciliation is presented as an alternative to state diplomacy and the central peacebuilding component. This study has been inspired by Lederach’s idea of reconciliation but would like to walk a mile farther by proposing a more contextualised reconciliation that will consider, if not prioritise, local actors (traditional leaders) and local context (land, citizenship and power). 5 Horowitz (2000) and Taras (2010) agree on the fact that politics is the leading source of ethnic conflict: be it politics in the traditional setup or in the modern world, it encompasses all the issues groups fight over. Thus, among other sources of ethnic conflicts, Horowitz (2000, pp.141-228) identified the following: 1) Group comparison: it involves the issues of ethnic distribution of colonial opportunities, such as education, employment and land (fertile or infertile); colonial policy and the promotion of group disparity (e.g., between Tutsi and Hutu); colonial views of group virtues and vices and the binomial the (les) évolués vs backward ethnic groups; the fear of extinction. 2) Group entitlement: under this title are the struggle for preeminence or the politics of domination, group legitimacy based on ethnic claims; traditional rule or earlier domination; right to succeed the colonial power (e.g., the Baganda favoured by the British thought they are the next of kin of the British protectorate of Uganda); group legitimacy and worth (e.g., the Kikuyu in Kenya and Bemba in Zambia are all advanced groups claiming legitimacy given their number and wealth)…Taras (2010, pp.1- 15) summarised Horowitz’s views: according to him, the sources of ethnic conflicts are principally modernisation, nationalism stemming from the medieval time; multiethnic states and democratic instability; and resource competition and ethnic nationalism. Overall, any political issue can make conflict erupt between or within ethnic communities. 25 1.9.3 Traditional leaders It is right and just to articulate the concept of traditional leaders to avoid confusion. In his Conflict Transformation Theory, Lederach (1997; 2003) provided three levels of leadership in pyramid form: top leadership, middle-range leadership, and grassroots leadership (see Section 3.3.1). The latter level comprises local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, community developers, local health officials and refugee camp leaders. Traditional leaders alongside church leaders constitute the local leadership in the understanding of Kibwana (1998), Mwagiru (2000), and Adan and Pkalya (2006), who also referred to them as community leaders. In order to avoid amalgamation and conflation, this study will not use the concept of local leaders to be more explicit. As considered in the study, traditional leaders are different from church leaders and other leaders at the grassroots level. They are those which the Congolese Constitution in its Article 207 refers to as customary chiefs or customary authority (Assemblée Nationale, 2006). In this study, therefore, the standard name of traditional leaders and the local name of Bami shall interchangeably be used to designate those who exert a great deal of power and influence at local level and who, to some extent, are in a position to impact on the truth and reconciliation processes. Although the concept of “traditional leaders” is applied to all leaders from the collectivité to the village, the most targeted subjects for this study are the Bami at the groupement (sub- county) and collectivité (county) levels for the indigenous Bantu communities and the ethnic leaders for the Tutsi and Pygmies, who have no specific territorial entity. 1.9.4 Truth and reconciliation commission/programme According to Freeman (2006), Hayner (2002) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010), truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) share the following characteristics: 1) they are temporary bodies usually in operation for six months to two years; 2) they are officially sanctioned, authorised and empowered by the state; 3) their mandate is to investigate abuses and crimes over a period of time; 4) they focus only on violations committed in the sponsoring state; 5) they are victim-centred; and 6) they usually complete their work with 26 the submission of a report, which receives serious attention from the governmental authorities. After its creation, the TRC is expected to carry out its mandate or programmes, encompassing five main processes according to the trio of authors cited above. The first process consists of taking statements. It also comprises private meetings and interviews primarily conducted by commission staff with persons wishing to make formal statements to the commission. The second process entails using subpoenas, namely, subpoenas to testify and subpoenas compelling production of documents and other objects that are material and relevant and in the custody or control of a person. The third process involves the exercise of search and seizure powers, mainly achieved through both arrest and search warrants. The fourth process consists of holding victim-centred public hearings, in which members of the relevant community are given the opportunity to put questions to perpetrators who confessed to low-level crimes, for TRCs only lay the foundations for future trials on appalling atrocities and war crimes. The fifth process comprises the publication of findings of individual responsibility in a final report (Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2002; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). As stated in Section 1.1 of this study, the TRC in South Africa designed the above processes that emerged after transitioning to democracy from the apartheid regime in 1994. The TRC, later on, became paradigmatic for other reconciliation processes around the world and in Africa, including the CTPR. However, as described in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5.3) of this study, the CTPR did not adopt all the formalities of the TRC, such as truth-telling and public hearings, among others. According to Autesserre (2010), the programme was marred by corruption and an inadequate selection of animators. Thus, the CTPR failed in its original setup and became diffused, as illustrated in the following diagram: 27 Figure 1.1 illustrates the Amani Programme that first established the CTPR, which became unproductive after one year of operation. Subsequently, the same Amani Programme made a substitution for the CTPR with the launching of the STAREC Programme, which continues to operate until today with the support of the United Nations through its International Strategy for Support to Security and Stabilisation (ISSSS). The STAREC has three major components, namely, security, humanitarian and economy, all designed to restore the state sovereignty and bring about reconciliation among the people of North Kivu Province (Bashonga, 2010). Reconciliation would be effected through social dialogues organised either directly by STAREC or by its partners (e.g., field NGOs), and be monitored by the Comités Locaux pour la Paix et la Conciliation (Local Committee for Peace and Conciliation, CLPCs) and the Comités Locaux pour la Paix et le Développement (Local Committee for Peace and Development, CLPDs) in various entities. This is the (truth) and reconciliation programme this study intends to probe, to see whether traditional leaders played any role in the transformation of the interethnic conflict in North Kivu. In other words, the reconciliation programme for this study comprises the efforts of the CTPR, the STAREC, the social dialogues, and other actors, including NGOs and the UN peacekeeping mission. If the CTPR is the leitmotiv that runs through this study, this does not mean it is more important than other reconciliation schemes. It is highlighted because AMANI PROGRAMME Technical Commission for Pacification and Reconciliation (CTPR) STAREC Security Humanitarian Economy Social Dialogues UN (ISSSS) CLPCs/CLPDs Reconciliation Figure 1.1: Amani reconciliation programme (Cabinet du Président, 2008; Minani, 2008; Bashonga, 2010; CRONGD-NK Field Report 001/19) 28 it is at the beginning of the study time-frame, 2008, the year in which it (CTPR) was established. In addition, the CTPR represents the formality of the truth and reconciliation programme while the same programme became less formal and diffused with the advent of STAREC and the involvement of other actors. All of the above reconciliation efforts will largely be discussed in Sub-section 3.5.3 and Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 1.10 THESIS OUTLINE Chapter 1 provides an overview and introduction of the study. It briefly provides the context and the background of the interethnic conflicts in North Kivu and their causes. It deals with fundamental aspects of the study such as the research problem, research questions and overall objective and specific aims, rationale, the scope of the study and clarification of the keywords. As this chapter serves as a general introduction and background to the study, it introduces the themes developed in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the historical and political context of North Kivu. First, it discusses the primary attributes of traditional leaders in land distribution and the resolution of land disputes. It also presents discussions about the following themes: politics and interethnic conflicts; underlying and tangential causes of different conflicts that took/take place in the province; peacebuilding mechanisms undertaken at all levels from military operations to peace agreements of all categories. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the failure of the above-mentioned peace processes. This study assumes that the fiasco was/is largely due to actors’ ignorance of the particular context of North Kivu, which suggests, among others, that the bami fully participate(d) in peace processes. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical tools and generates a more contextualised reconciliation framework (CRF) for the resolution of interethnic conflicts in North Kivu. The framework is the theoretical contribution of this study. It discusses the choice of Lederach’s CTT and peace education as the dual lenses through which the role of traditional leaders in the truth and reconciliation processes are viewed. It also exposes the new approach this study intends to advance to resolve the interethnic conflict in North Kivu, specifically, the Contextual 29 Reconciliation Framework (CRF). Lastly, the chapter examines several truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) and processes around the world and in Africa to demonstrate how context has been fundamental to their success or failure. Also, that the same context could have been considered in the DRC’s TRC and North Kivu’s CTPR. Chapter 4 outlines the research methods used in the study. It presents the research design selected for this study and explores and describes the research methodology. It also discusses how the study was conducted and justifies the data collection methods used, mainly focus group discussions and individual interviews. Chapter 5 is the first of the four chapters discussing the findings according to the main themes, which emerged from the data. Therefore, the chapter explores peacebuilding strategies and mechanisms employed by the bami outside the CTPR. Chapter 6 discusses the role played by the bami within the CTPR programme. Chapter 7 presents the contribution of other peacebuilding actors such as the international community, the Congolese government, NGOs, and churches in the quest for intercommunity reconciliation. It also presents the areas in which the bami collaborate with the mentioned actors in building peace in the province of North Kivu. Chapter 8 explores participants’ perceptions about the traditional leaders’ participation in the reconciliation programme. It also examines the challenges the bami encountered in their leadership in general and while interacting with other peacebuilding actors in particular. Chapter 9 summarises the study findings, including the empirical contribution to the research questions, objectives, and field recommendations. It also proposes several implications of the findings with regard to future interventions and further research. 30 PART II LITERATURE REVIEW Part II comprises Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 presents the actors and facts within the historical and political context of North Kivu. The chapter explores traditional leaders’ status and role in land distributions and land disputes in the first part. The chapter chronologically reviews the literature on the causes of conflict in North Kivu and peace processes so far developed by national, regional, and international actors to transform conflicts in the province. Among these processes, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission will be mentioned. Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual and theoretical framework that guides the study. It presents the literature on peace education, Conflict Transformation Theory, truth and reconciliation commissions, and programmes around the world, in Africa and the DRC, taking North Kivu as its archetype to determine the role of context in the setup of these peacebuilding structures and mechanisms. The importance of context will be emphasised by the Contextual Reconciliation Framework designed in this study for the concrete reconciliation in North Kivu. 31 CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR INTERETHNIC CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN NORTH KIVU 2.1 INTRODUCTION In order to understand any form of conflict, Jabs (2010) recommended that it is helpful to have a basic knowledge of the contextual politics epitomised by the participants' living environment, lifestyle, culture, and inter-group conflict patterns. Cawood (2011) also acknowledged the exigency of the socio-political context that is needed to unpack one’s behaviour and rhetoric. Indeed, to be mindful of the political patterns that gave rise to ethnic conflict and the strategies adopted by actors for its transformation helps identify the gaps in literature and peacebuilding mechanisms. Particularly in North Kivu, it would be difficult to understand the dynamics around truth and reconciliation processes and interethnic conflicts without some understanding of the province's history. Therefore this chapter is a descriptive piece that provides the political context of North Kivu province along historical and chronological lines. In relation to the cultural, social and political context of North Kivu, this chapter first explains the status of traditional leaders who constitute the subject matter of this research. The chapter also discusses the causes of the conflict on the one hand and, on the other, the failures of official peace processes, including truth and reconciliation programmes. Most of these facts have been assessed by several scholars (Autesserre, 2007; 2010; Braeckman 1994; Mathieu & Tsongo, 1998; Prunier 1995; 2009; Reyntjens, 2010; Stearns, 2012; Turner, 2007). This research intends to highlight what might have been overlooked, especially in the area of peacebuilding failures. These failures are largely due to actors’ disregard for the context of North Kivu, which for instance, suggests that local actors, particularly traditional leaders, should play a non- negligible role in peace processes. 32 2.2 THE STATUS OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS Since the land issue pervades the interethnic conflicts in North Kivu (see Section 2.3.2.1), this study deemed it appropriate to clarify who is considered the ‘legal’ landowner thus entitled to manage it. In the subsequent paragraphs, it will be indicated that the land, in general terms, belongs by law to the state. Still, its larger portion, especially in the rural area, remains subjected to the customary law whose guarantors are traditional leaders. Consequently, land management can either constitute a source of conflict or a tool in the hands of the bami to resolve land-related disputes. While this latter point will be largely evaluated in Chapter 5 with participants, this section mainly discusses the legal status of traditional leaders, especially their role in land management. 2.2.1 The legal status of traditional leaders Politically, North Kivu is constituted by villages, clans, and tribes organised under the authority of traditional leaders, commonly known as bami in the eastern part of the country. In Article 1 of Law no.15/015 of 25th August 20156 that fixes the status of customary chiefs (traditional leaders), the bami exert their authority on groupements, collectivités and villages organised based on local customs.7 These territorial entities are below the modern districts that a state officer governs. Also, towns are governed by mayors appointed by the government. Since colonial times towns were constituted in entities under the label of centres extra-coutumiers (extra-customary centres), thus not under the bami’s jurisdiction (de Saint Moulin & Tshibanda, 2011; Prunier, 1995). According to the same Law no.15/015 of 25th August 2015, the exercise of the duties of a traditional leader is subordinated to 1) the existence of a recognised territorial entity 6 Loi Nº 15/015 Du 25 Août 2015 Fixant le Statut des Chefs Coutumiers (Law on the status of customary/traditional leaders promulgated on 25th August 2015). Retrieved September 19, 2018, from https://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Administration.ter/Loi%2015.015.2015.html. 7 The French terms of groupement and collectivité are maintained in their original form because it is how they appear in the political division in the Congolese Atlas (de Saint Moulin & Tshibanda, 2011). The two entities can be compared to the sub-county and county, respectively in the neighbouring Uganda where politically districts are subdivided into counties and counties into sub-counties (Sjögren, 2015). https://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/Administration.ter/Loi%2015.015.2015.html 33 (collectivités, groupements or villages); 2) the presence of a population (such as those invoked in Section 1.2); 3) enthronement in accordance with local custom; 4) investiture and recognition by the competent public authorities. However, of all the ethnic groups in North Kivu, the Pygmies and Tutsi have no specific physical territorial entities. Consequently, they have no mwami (singular of bami) but have only political, ethnic figures who defend their respective interests. The Hutu have only dominion over one collectivité, namely Bwisha in Ruthuru district (Mahangaiko, Mulisi, Murairi & Muhima, 1996; Stearns, 2012). 2.2.2 Traditional leaders and land management In territories under traditional leaders’ jurisdiction, their power is irrefutable. It is epitomised by the fact that their political structure is hereditary (Lieven, 1971; Ndaywel, 1997). Moreover, traditional leaders are largely held in high esteem by their subjects. Even today, the latter seems to be more loyal to their traditional leaders than they are to the central government (Ndaywel, 1997, p. 224). Traditional leaders’ prestige comes from their authority over land and justice management in their entities. On the issue of land, traditional leaders are regarded as land custodians by the oral customary law and other government dispositions. In the Land Law 73-021 of 20th July 1973 on general property regime, land and property regime and security rights regime, Article 388 stipulates: “The land belonging to local communities is the land which these communities inhabit, cultivate or use in any way - individually or collectively - in accordance with local customs and usages.”8 This legal provision is completed by Law no.15/015 invoked above as it emphasises the role of traditional leaders in the management of the community land. Article 10 stipulates: “He [the traditional leader] ensures in accordance with the Law, the protection of land areas that fall under the lands of local communities.” The interpretation of the two legal dispositions could be that traditional leaders have authority over land. This authority derives from their role within the local/ethnic community and each community’s claim over their land in the name of ancestral history. 8 https://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20des%20biens/Loi.73.02120.07.1973.htm https://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20des%20biens/Loi.73.02120.07.1973.htm 34 In other words, being the head of the local community, the traditional leader is entitled to manage the land on behalf of the community. Therefore, despite the nationalisatio