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South Africa's role in the promotion of democracy and good governance in Africa to
drive economic development

by

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements in respect of the Master's Degree
Qualification in Governance and Political Transformation in the Department of
Governance and Political Studies in the Faculty of the Humanities at the University of
the Free State

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Date of submission: 31 July 2023

DECLARATION

I, **Muthundinne Curtis Singo**, declare that this research study is my original work submitted as a requirement to fulfil the Master of Arts in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of Free State.

I declare that this work is submitted for the first time at this University and has never been submitted to any other University to obtain a degree.

The academic sources used or quoted are acknowledged.

DEDICATION

Considering this being the first Master's Degree in the Masingo Family, I dedicate my work to my late Father, Mukosi Abel Singo, Grandfather Mukosi William Singo, Grandmother Thidziambi Singo, Makhadzi, Maria Singo-Murovhi and the ancestors of Masingo and Vhatavhatsindi.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The blessings and guidance of God are, for no small measure, thus forever appreciated with great humility. His presence during this Master's Degree project gave me strength and determined my discipline in every task I undertook as the bible says, we look upon him to achieve all we ask for.

I am deeply grateful to Professor Sethulego Matebesi, who, as my supervisor, shared enormous political and governance experiences. His understanding of the contemporary African political realm invigorated my determination to complete this project successfully. Though the task was daunting, Prof Matebesi 's guidance and confidence in my writing skills and understanding of economic diplomacy reasserted my strength from the word go.

This project would not have been successful without the understanding of my daughters and sons; therefore, sincere gratitude to Udivhazwothe, Ndiene Andisaho, Mukundi-Curtis Junior and Muvhusi Abel-Junior. They understood the purpose of this project, which made their father present but absent. Mrs Elisa Singo, my mother, became a widow at 32. Her resilience after losing my father determined my path as she stood up and ensured I prioritised my studies. She has always wished that I attain a qualification at this level in her lifetime.

I am also appreciative to all those who have always been supportive directly or, in another way, contributed to this project, including my colleagues at the DIRCO and Diplomatic Society. The University of Free State Programme Staff and University of Pretoria library officials' support was of no small measure.

A special thanks for the support by Mr Lehlohonolo Manoto, a fellow MA student, as we met during the challenging times of our studies and formed a solid brotherly bond driven by our determination to add NQ Level 9 to our academic profiles.

ABSTRACT

Good governance has been receiving global attention as studies suggest that its effectiveness equates to developing any member states, prompting countries and governments to align themselves with tenets of good governance to realise economic development. However, though the concept of good governance is widely underscored as a mechanism through which countries can achieve development objectives, the situation in Africa is different. African countries are battling development, which impacts people's socio-economic status. Good governance is failing because of the governance system that breeds political instabilities and democratic deficits; this is even though, as a mechanism, good governance will ensure that the continent scurries towards achieving its regional developmental plans. Thus, a voice of reason must emerge to inspire confidence and lead the developmental trajectories of the continent; hence, since democratisation and reintegration into the global society, South Africa has been involved in developing the continent through the African Agenda.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
ACSA	Airports Company of South Africa
AEC	African Economic Community
AFCONE	African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BNC	Bi-National Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DIA	Department of International Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DTIC	Department of Trade Industry and Competition
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EUPSC	European Union Peace and Security Council
FTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
GCIS	Government Communication Information System
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GPA	Global Political Agreement
JCC	Joint Commission for Cooperation
JPC	Joint Permanent Commission
LHWP	Highlands Water Project - Phase II
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NDP	National Development Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NERSA	National Electricity Regulator of South Africa
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PICI	Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Agency
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
UFS	University of Free State
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UP	University of Pretoria
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO World Trade Organization

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

1.1 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY

The persistent state of poor governance in Africa and the post-apartheid South Africa's commitment to promoting good governance in the continent informed this proposed study. There is a notion that good governance in Africa is nothing new, as it is enshrined in the objectives and policies of the African Union. Thus, promoting good governance undertaken by South Africa in Africa finds expression in the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act adopted in 2000. Article 3(a) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted at Lome, Togo, in July 2000, promotes democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance (Akokpari, 2004:244). To this effect, the Constitutive Act established organs of the AU and set as its objectives the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance (Aggad & Apiko, 2017:1).

Therefore, this study is timely as it amplifies the above desires and focuses on one of the fundamental aspirations listed in the African Union Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 raised the expectation that 'Africa shall have a universal culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law (Hungary, 2016:3). This was emphasised by Schultes (2018:1), arguing that the key to Africa's political and economic transformation as envisioned by Agenda 2063 is enshrined in Aspiration 3: "an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law". This a confirmation that Africa has poor good governance trajectories, hence South Africa's quest for good governance projects. According to Akokpari (2004:244), good governance is conceived as a system of administration that is democratic, efficient, and developmental-oriented. Keping (2017:6) affirmed that good governance is active and productive cooperation between the state and citizens, and the key to its success lies in the powers participating in political administration. However, though good governance appears critical in Africa, it has remained elusive for years. The available data proves that good governance has been widely contextualised to amplify its importance in economic development. Asef and Huang (2015:136) believe it is essential to achieving multidimensional poverty

reduction goals. As for Singh, Ansari and Singh (2009:1110), good governance is a dynamic concept encompassing a fast-changing political, social and economic milieu and the international environment and conditions of operational governance. Moreover, Schoeberleini (2020:2) insists that good governance has repeatedly been identified as crucial to achieving sustainable development and inclusive growth, making governments accountable to their citizens, and successfully tackling corruption-related challenges. Rahman (2016:1) believed that good governance conveys the qualitative dimension of governance, indicating an effective, efficient, participative, or democratic government.

It is apparent that good governance has, since its inception, evolved; that it has managed to move onto the agenda of many international organisations at the end of the Cold War, the same time when calls for democracy and better government were becoming louder (Woods,1999:39). Equally so, Nanda (2006:269) underlined that good governance came into vogue in the 1990s with the World Bank leading charge and has since assumed the status of a mantra for donor agencies and donor countries for conditioning aid upon the performance of the recipient government; this capitulated that good governance is critical, and Africa, as a continent needing developmental support from the institutions of global governance, ought to prioritise this concept. Therefore, doing so will give Africa an advantage in getting help for economic development.

The proponent of good governance, Prabakarem (2011:1), asserted it as a mechanism for global institutions of governance to engage with Africa, being applied as a conditionality for receiving international funding assistance such as credit or grants. This view amplifies the importance of good governance, and its subscription and enforcement will position the continent in good standing for financial support because Africa is exposed to poor governance. It is essential to highlight that since the study focuses on South Africa's role in promoting good governance in Africa, it is worth reiterating that the African Union is committed to promoting good governance in its plans. For that reason, the good governance promoted by South Africa in Africa is against entrenched challenges derailing good governance and economic development. Does this raise many questions about why South Africa is more determined to promote good governance in Africa?

The above prompted Mkandawire (2007:679) to assert that poor governance hinders African economic growth painstakingly. Such an assertion was influenced by the World Bank report published in 1989, which categorically declared: "Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a governance crisis". However, despite these challenges, Adejumo-Ayibiowu (2015:7) contend that good governance is being celebrated and has become the prescript of international development partners for all obstacles facing developing countries, including stagnated growth, poverty, and insecurity.

It is thus clear that there are gaps in Africa's governance agenda, resulting in narrow information on promoting good governance as a mechanism for economic development. Hence, questions about why South Africa is involved and what it achieves. Likewise, concerns about whether South Africa's promising governance approaches indicate a country punching above its weight. However, there are views that South Africa's promotion of good governance in Africa manifests that the dividends of democratisation are enormous. Still, the question remains, is the good governance South Africa desires to see shaping in Africa openly interconnected to economic development? This question is relevant as Africans live in misery, notwithstanding the elucidation that good governance includes principles necessary to consolidate democratic management with participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, consistency, fairness, and the rule of law (Toksoz (2008:4).

As a result, the researcher is triggered that since the democratisation transition in 1994, South Africa has been dominating public discourse, generating connotations about promoting good governance projects in Africa, which determines the significance of the study showcasing South Africa's relentless promotion of good governance as a catalyst for economic development.

Khadiagala (2015:1), in this context, expanded that promoting democracy, human rights, and good governance in Africa has featured prominently in South Africa's foreign policy since democratisation. Thus, the researcher believes this study is an opportunity to assess Pretoria's righteous commitment to a prosperous continent by promoting good governance to propel economic development. With that in mind,

Mbaku (2020:24) underscored that Africa would not achieve its social and economic targets if good governance remained challenging. From this perspective, the study will zoom into the positive impact of good governance, which South Africa is expanding amidst challenges of political instabilities. The National Development Vision 2030 explicitly promotes well-being, and development guides South Africa's international relations. It uplifts its people, protecting the planet for future generations and ensuring the prosperity of the country, the region, and Africa (National Planning Commission, 2011:215). The study accounts for good governance that contributes to economic development cognisance of political, defence, and economic diplomacy instruments South Africa uses to implement foreign policy in Africa. Lastly, the study builds on existing literature about linkages between good governance and the country's domestic interest, unpacked as linked with the continent. Careful attention is on South Africa's good governance agenda in Africa during the Presidency of Mbeki, Zuma, and now Ramaphosa, considering the foundation laid by Dr Mandela's Presidency.

1.2 BACKGROUND

When this project was started in 2022, South Africa was celebrating the 28th anniversary of Freedom following the political transition in 1994, which ended the country's pariah status and being a skunk of the world. When South Africa celebrated such a democratic milestone in 2022, it should be noted that the dawn of democracy changed the country's international outlook, hence the Pan Africanism approach towards Africa. As a ruling party, such a tactic cannot be isolated from the African National Congress (ANC) history. Under the ANC, South Africa has consistently placed Africa at the centre of its stated foreign policy objectives (Games, 2017:2). Therefore, it is transparent and predictable that the ANC-led government would prioritise promoting good governance as a catalyst for economic development in Africa. Thus, Saunders (2014:223) asserts that South Africa's identification as an African country and its relations with fellow African countries lie in its foreign policy.

The focus on Africa was heavily emphasised because South Africa's destiny is intertwined with theirs; our peoples belong with each other' (Graham, 2012:405). South Africa's meaningful role is justified in promoting democracy and good governance as a catalyst for Africa's economic development, confirming that 'when

South Africa sneezes, Africa catches flu'. The policy choices advocating for the immediate neighbours and the continent demonstrate South Africa's link to Africa. This indicates the country's consciousness that her development would not yield any results if Africa's challenges and development plans were overlooked. It was apparent that before undertaking her envisaged leadership position in Africa, South Africa was already in a position for the role envisioned by Dr Nelson Mandela that it would occupy her rightful place in global affairs with Africa as a priority (Mandela, 1993:88). This led to the investment of enormous resources in expanding the democratic project taking advantage of and exploiting peaceful political transition experiences backdrop.

It is worth stressing South Africa's peaceful transition because it has always been referenced as a mechanism any fellow African countries experiencing political challenges ought to mirror. This approach is consistent with the foreign policy document published by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in 1996. The adopted paper argues that "the Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of their development; therefore, interaction with them as a partner and an ally, not as a regional superpower so that what is achieved politically, security and economically should be balanced and mutually beneficial." This contention was consistently heightened in the white paper on South Africa's foreign policy published in 2011 by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), titled Building a Better World.

Furthermore, the Diplomacy of Ubuntu outlined a foreign policy that seeks to create a "better Africa and better world". Thus, Pretoria's involvement in Africa saw pragmatic steps undertaken to implement foreign policy objectives predominantly in Africa as a thrust focus. Mixed reactions followed this from pundits and academia like Blumenfeld (2014:15), arguing that South Africa: In Africa' but still not 'of Africa'? This assertion was in between and added a voice to the country's foreign policy implementation, opening criticism of the country's African destiny. However, Sidiropoulos (2007:3) shared that a critical factor of the new South African policy was to confirm and emphasise its African identity – that it was part of the continent, not simply an appendage of Europe or the West. Hence, policy choices embody a country's ambition for a leadership role in Africa against being a source of political, security, and economic instabilities pre-1994, urging South Africa to advocate for the African Agenda,

cognisance of the challenges at hand because of political instability, poor governance system and destabilising deadly conflicts. South Africa's involvement in promoting democracy and good governance in Africa saw the continent leading initiatives to transform and redefine its outlook, followed by the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union in 2001. As Maloka (2013:5) mentions, by the end of the Mandela presidency, a more elaborate Africa policy was in the making, thanks to the "African Renaissance" drive, which was led ideologically and politically by Thabo Mbeki following his "I am an African" speech to the South African parliament in 1996. Such unfolded when the country was still young in the Organisation of African Unity quarters, having joined it just after the 1994 political transition. Hence, Dr Mulemfo (2005:7) believed that all this was done in the hope of "a continental structure better suited for the 21st-century challenges and globalisation and geared to the goal of the realisation of Africa's renaissance". Consistently, South Africa raised its voice through a more focused prioritisation of the African Continent, which is amplified by Khadiagala (2015:3), that through former President Mbeki, SA injected into ideas of the African Renaissance, which was founded on four pillars:

- continental integration through the African Union;
- political revival through democracy and good governance and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM);
- economic revival through New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD);
- peace-making initiatives to reverse the scourge of civil wars.

However, only a little show the efforts towards good governance advocated in the continent, thus creating an information gap because the overall developments were reversing the institution's impact on promoting good governance; hence, Africa is currently suffering a widespread economic crisis and political disorder (Chabal, 2002:448). These challenges are not deterrent to South Africa's quest for good governance through the Africa Union and other regional bodies, as when prospects to serve as the Chairperson of the African Union sufficed in 2000, Pretoria was more than ready. As the Chairperson of the African Union, South Africa became influential in the developmental trajectories of the newly transformed African Union (Makokera, 2015), placing South Africa in a better position to advance national interests through the structures of the African Union, as demonstrated by her role in the establishment of critical initiatives.

Here, we witnessed South Africa's contribution to peace missions and conflict resolution to steer the continent toward good governance and economic development. Furthermore, having been instrumental in establishing the New Partnership for Africa's Development, South Africa was at the forefront of advocating for economic development through mega projects that link Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs). However, threats are likely to impact democratic practices, which are critical in promoting democracy and good governance because of the competition for foreign-policy interests and regional and global geopolitics, which are increasing (Leininger, 2019:2). The study observes how Pretoria is navigating such an environment with enormous challenges resulting in Pretoria playing a significant role in peace and security missions in the continent with the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) under the auspice of the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) as part of the SADC brigade. Singo (2014:13) claims in this context that South Africa is cognisant of the reality that her well-being is linked to the continent's prosperity; hence, peace brokering, and mediation are undertaken.

To this effect, SANDF's path in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique etc, cannot be disregarded. According to Akokpari (2016:3), the mediatory role of South Africa, a regional leader, has been visible in Burundi, Zimbabwe, CAR, DRC and Lesotho. He emphasised that in Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, and the Ivory Coast, Pretoria mediated on behalf of the AU. At the same time, it represented the SADC in its mediation efforts in Zimbabwe and Lesotho. In addition, South Africa deploys human capital to the African Union Commission and other regional bodies to strengthen the prioritisation of the continent. South Africa put forward its former Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission (Makokera, 2015:117). Dlamini-Zuma's leadership of the AU Commission has played a critical role in formulating Agenda 2063, which sets out specific objectives for Africa over the coming fifty years.

These attest that South Africa has been generous in pursuing good governance and has devoted more efforts to the continent, its structures, and initiatives to advocate economic development. Recently, South Africa has been at the forefront of the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), culminating with a South African bureaucrat,

Wamkele Mene, as the first Secretary-General of the ACFTA reflecting confidence in South Africa's leadership capabilities because about 121 candidates from across the continent applied for the Secretary-General of AfCFTA post (Tankou,2020:01). Before his appointment, Mene (2021:4) claimed that South Africa's approach to continental and regional integration is to support a development-oriented integration process. Furthermore, the outbreak of the global COVID pandemic exhibits the country's commitment to the region's well-being, having been a Chairperson of the African Union amid COVID. Finally, it is worth noting that South Africa was unanimously elected to chair the African Union in January 2019 by all AU member states when pessimism was rife, with observers arguing that South Africa's influence was waning on the continent (Singo, 2020:12).

Briefly, the study builds on the existing literature regarding South Africa's role in Africa whilst assessing South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development in Africa. The question, however, still needs to be asked? Can a democratic project be a "one size fits all"? The peculiar nature of colonial history, politics and economic scales in Africa may require that an examination of the coherency between democracy and development be conducted. Can a country have good governance in the absence of democracy? Is there any mutual relationship between systems of dictatorships and economic growth?

The mini dissertation will adopt a multidimensional explanation of these concepts as they affect one another or if one can exist exclusively without impacting the other. South Africa has been at the forefront of this democratisation project since 1994. However, is SA influence still a force to reckon with to deliver tangible economic results? Does the continent still take South Africa's leadership role seriously? These issues will be ventilated by assessing the opportunities and challenges facing South Africa in implementing the democracy project. Can democracy and good governance be force-fed mainly for economic development, or should there be willingness? Ideally, it cannot; therefore, South Africa needs a carefully crafted strategy to continue to get buy-ins on the continent.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The problem statement is the basis of this study, and according to Miles (2016:2), the problem statement provides the (a) rationale for the study and (b) uses data and research to confirm the need to address the problem in the study. For decades, the African continent has been unabatedly riddled by non-existence or relatively weak political, economic, and governance challenges holding up development. These persistent challenges impact Africa's quest for growth (Sako, 2016:7). Scholars and pundits have amplified that "Africa is messy economically, politically, and socially, and her people remain mired in the deadly grip of poverty, squalor and destitution while buffeted by environmental degradation and brutal tyranny". Building on the same assertion, King & Lawrence (2005:5) maintained that since breaking chains of colonial rule, African nations have grappled with a formidable new challenge, namely combating the deep-seated and intractable civil conflicts that have devastated many countries, undermined economic and social development in large parts of the continent.

Furthermore, the absence of a democratic process, even though the early 1990s signalled the spreading of democracy, is a problem troubling the continent (Dalglish, 2009:52). This is an affirmation of the existing gap that, despite South Africa's efforts, the continent continuously faces pressing issues impacting on continent's developmental aspirations. As a result, the Lagos Action Plan, African Union Consultative Act, New Partnership for Africa's Development, African Peer Review Mechanism, African Continental Free Trade Area and the AU Agenda 2063 need to be understood more as rhetorics. There is optimism that despite the misery, there have been steady improvements in Africa's electoral and liberal democracy levels since 1989 (Celliers, 2020:244). However, Africa still suffers a gap between the growing demand for democracy and good governance and the shrinking supply (Fomunyoh, 2005:18). Good governance has long been a significant impediment to African economic development (Fuso, 2018:2). The 1981 Bretton Woods Institutions Report informed this that argued on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, known simply as the "Berg Report," poor governance was highlighted as a primary culprit responsible for Africa's poor state of economic health. Therefore, the research problem of the envisaged study is that the African continent

is facing democratic, good governance challenges, which are obstacles to economic development. Although the third wave of democracy in the 1990s saw several African countries adopting it, governance challenges persist. As a result, South Africa has been advocating for the continent's prosperity by promoting good governance upon democratisation. Still, the scars of the erosion of democracy, poor governance, and lack of economic development in Africa are profoundly entrenched and visible.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

The study addresses the poor governance in Africa and post-apartheid South Africa's commitment to promoting good governance as a catalyst for economic development. The following question will guide this. To what extent has the 1994 political transition in South Africa contributed to the country's quest for democracy and good governance as a catalyst for economic development in Africa?

The above main research question will be broken down into sub-questions:

- Did the political transition in South Africa shape the country's approach toward advancing democratic governance in Africa?
- What is the state of democracy, good governance and economic development in Africa prompting South Africa's prioritisation?
- What are South Africa's initiatives to advance economic development in Africa?

1.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.5.1 Aims of the Research

This study evaluates South Africa's foreign policy desire to promote democratisation and good governance, hopefully leading to Africa's economic development. The aim is driven by the fact that when South Africa attained democracy and reintegrated into global affairs, expectations were high on the country's international posture and approach. Dr Mandela prompted this on the eve of democratisation that the post-apartheid South Africa would, upon democratisation, occupy its rightful position in global affairs with the Southern African Community Development (SADC) and Africa in general as a launchpad (Mandela,1993:89). In implementing its foreign policy objectives, it became more apparent with Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as a foreign minister, arguing in 2001 that "Africa constitutes the highest priority in South Africa's

foreign economic policy, and government regards its long-term political and economic destiny to be indissolubly linked with that of the broader African region" (van Wyk, 2004:114). The foreign policy discussion paper published by DIRCO in 2011 titled *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu* outlines that South African foreign policy seeks to create a "better Africa and better world" (DIRCO, 2011:2). This assertion builds on the country's national interest, which aims to address the challenges of eradicating poverty, developing the people, and creating prosperity in South Africa and the Continent. Against this background, the study seeks to build on the existing literature to assess and describe good governance in Africa and why South Africa is involved. To what extent has her involvement in promoting democratic governance as a catalyst for economic development yielded results?

1.5.2 Specific research objectives:

The study's primary objective within South Africa's foreign policy trajectories is to assess and analyse why efforts are undertaken to ensure Africa's democratic governance and economic development. This objective will be supplemented by the following:

- To establish and contextualise the political transition and the democratic foreign policy approach toward Africa.
- To analyse and assess the state of democratic governance against economic development in Africa.
- To identify and assess the relationship between concepts of democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development.
- To investigate if South Africa's efforts and initiatives to promote democracy and good governance for economic development in Africa are yielding results or are just a myth.

1.6 LITERATURE STUDY

When a country transitions, it attracts attention from groups and member states interested in its affairs and how such change will impact the international agenda and their national interest. So, following years of being a pariah state, South Africa's political transition attracted global attention as the advent of democracy meant a new

foreign policy guided by principles and values enshrined in the democratic dispensation Constitution. To this effect, Dr Nelson Mandela's foreign affairs journal article envisioned the foreign policy that the African National Congress-led democratic government would pursue while in power. These undertakings drew attention, led by mixed views in the discourse about South Africa's democratic foreign policy implementation and the country's quest to promote democracy and good governance for economic development in Africa. South Africa's successful and largely peaceful negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy is one of the most significant periods in the country's modern historical trajectory. However, this was against the background of the democratic project in South Africa, which necessitated her integration into global affairs.

Therefore, in setting out her global agenda, South Africa's prioritisation of Africa occurred when the world was going through critical transitions, marking the end of unipolar whilst ushering in a multipolar order. The developments allowed South Africa to implement a foreign policy showing a pragmatic shift from being a pariah, hence much scholarly attention. Worth noting is that scholars extensively debated the democratic foreign policy formulation efforts, initiatives, implementation, and engagement motives to promote democratic good governance and economic development in Africa. These views are reviewed against the background of the country's historical past of apartheid and being absent from the global space (Graham, 2012:416).

Against this background, Mills, Obasanjo, Biti and Herbst (2019:9) argued that the continent has been governed for so long by those seeking to prevent mass political participation and Freedom of association, both in the colonial period and much of the post-independence era. This assertion was informed by their understanding that democracy has a better long-term record of promoting economic development. It gives a snapshot of the environment in which South Africa envisages achieving its democratic, governance and economic development project on the continent. On the other hand, Barber (2005:1083) affirmed South Africa's reintegration as a long-overdue moment, arguing that "the central-western states were eager for Pretoria to adopt a continental leadership role. Such a view was not a coincidence as Hamill (2018:69) attested that" the whole world looks to South Africa as the critical model for

resolving intractable conflicts after the experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy. This assertion resonates with Mandela's argument on the eve of democracy that "the time for South Africa to take its rightful position globally has come.

Also, from May 1994, South Africa acceded or was readmitted to 16 multilateral organisations, including the United Nations (UN), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity(OAU) and the Commonwealth, which is crucial as they occur against the background, where for decades, the unjust system of apartheid drifted the country away from global affairs, drew attention and thus, the transition happenings were opined about from a different angle (van Wyk, 2004:120). Furthermore, the political transition in South Africa was a turning point with the election of the first black president in 1994, and it was hailed internationally as a watershed in Africa. As a result, South Africa immediately turned outward, seeking to help fellow African states and regions with their complex conflicts' (Clark,2016:37). Ngombane's assertion resonates profoundly with Mandela (1993:90), who advanced that South Africa cannot escape its African destiny and failure to devote energies to the continent; South Africa will also fall victim to the forces that brought ruin its various parts. However, such undertakings were not overriding, even though Africa was the focus. There was an element of self-doubt about its approach and suspicion from other African states (Barber, 2005:1083).

South Africa's commitment and capabilities in promoting democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development face a range of pessimism and optimism. In this regard, it was argued that the country's foreign policy implementation manifests a country punching above its weight. However, what remains critical is that South Africa's political and economic engagement in the continent was within the context of the new foreign policy approach, which, though it meant reintegration into global affairs, was more concerned about the well-being of Africa. These developments led to a foreign policy whose evolution advocates for democracy, governance, and economic growth in the African Continent, which has registered progress even though it draws pundits' criticism on its African approach, with many questioning its strategy and intention.

Van Wyk (2004:106) emphasised South Africa's intention on the continent, arguing that Mandela's presidency made Africa the central focus of its foreign policy. The

defining feature of the post-apartheid political economy has been the country's rapidly growing role across the African Continent (Alden & Soko, 2005:368), building on Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma's contention that "Africa constitutes the highest priority in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign economic policy, as the government regards its long-term political and economic destiny is indissolubly linked with that of the broader African region" (van Wyk 2004:104). Also, Laden and le Pere (2004:286) describe South Africa's prioritisation or putting Africa at the centre of post-apartheid foreign policy as a priority for the democratic government. That special recognition was given to southern Africa, where South Africa had held economic sway for over a century.

1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Peniel (2016:1), the research design is prepared to collect and analyse new data for interpreting the already available facts in a new way, thus outlining a plan for collecting and analysing data. As for Thakur (2021:2), the function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables you to effectively address the research problem logically and as unambiguously as possible. Therefore, research design always determines the kinds of analysis that are to be done to get the desired results through articulating the required data, methods to be used to collect and analyse the data, and how they will answer the research questions (Asenahabi, 2019:78).

This study will examine and evaluate South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance as a catalyst for economic development in Africa. Therefore, it is worth emphasising that South Africa has been highly entrenched in the efforts to promote democracy as a panacea for the governance challenges confronting the continent, which presumably link to a lack of economic development. Against this background, qualitative research will be the proper design for this study, considering its alignment with its aim. Therefore, descriptive research will be used to describe the phenomenon or idea of the study. Descriptive research deals with the relationship between variables, the testing of hypotheses, and the development of generalisations, principles, or theories with universal validity (Pahad, 2019:7).

Two basic descriptive research studies for collecting data are cross-sectional and longitudinal. However, for this study, a cross-sectional study will be preferred.

According to Kate Ann Levin (2006:1), a cross-sectional study design is used when the purpose of the study is descriptive. Kessmodel (2018:388) claims that cross-sectional studies are characterised by collecting relevant information (data) at a given point in time.

1.7.1 Sampling

Sampling is a critical component of any piece of research because of the significant impact that it can have on the quality of research findings (Mujere, 2016:108). Two types of sampling methods are generally used in social research: probability sampling and non-probability sampling (Lopez & Whitehead, 2012:124). Non-probability sampling, which is applied or utilised in a qualitative study, will be a sampling method to allow the researcher to recruit specific populations to investigate South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance in Africa as a catalyst for driving economic development. This method may also be considered when little time is available, as in this case (Maree 2008:172). Moreover, purposive sampling is the technique to be used to provide rich, in-depth information on the research topic.

1.7.2 Data Collection/Sources

As highlighted, the data required for this study was gathered through qualitative methods and is in words, not numbers, as applied in quantitative methods. The data collected were from primary and secondary sources collated from books, news reports, journals, research reports, published articles-opinions, and online sources comprised of eBooks through the University of Pretoria (UP), Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) library facility as the researcher undertook the study whilst based in Pretoria. Arrangements were made by the University of Free State (UFS) library for students to access the UP library.

1.7.3 Methods

According to Abosede (2016:114), Parahoo argued that a research instrument is "a tool used to collect data in a study being undertaken, and researchers employ several methods for collecting empirical materials in qualitative. Maree (2008:34) was, in this context, of the view that Qualitative research studies usually rely on the following basic methods of gathering data which the researcher will use:

1.7.3.1 Documents Review

Maree (2008:81) emphasised that when documents are used as a data-gathering technique, the focus will be on all written communications that may shed light on the phenomenon you are investigating. Therefore, as pointed out, the data collected was through materials from the University of Pretoria Library, DIRCO Library, and official South African government websites.

1.7.3.2 Observations

This qualitative research method is a systematic process of recording the behavioural patterns of participants, objects, and occurrences without necessarily questioning or communicating with them (Maree 2008:82). Therefore, on a daily purpose, the researcher observed the behaviour of South Africa's government, parliament, and leaders in the efforts to promote democracy and good governance in Africa to gather data.

1.8 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Content analysis: This method of analysing gathered data is vital for this study because it is a systematic approach to qualitative data analysis that identifies and summarises message content (Maree, 2008:101). So, the researcher applied content analysis in this study by gathering information from the sources to analyse and interpret it to make the study meaningful.

1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

The researcher was mindful of the ethics in conducting research and obtaining ethical information for use in any study. So, since the study approach is qualitative and focuses on gathering, the data collected from primary and secondary sources are collated from books, news reports, journals, research reports, published articles, opinions, and online sources comprised of eBooks. Therefore, there was no need for the study to be subjected to the required ethical processes at the University of Free State to achieve ethical approval.

1.10 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT

Chapter 1: Introduction/ Background and Research Methodology

This chapter briefly introduces the research topic and underlines the reasons for undertaking the study whilst also highlighting the research methodology that the analysis applies to investigate South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance for economic development.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives

In this chapter, theoretical perspectives to the study will be laid out. Therefore, identified dominant theories in international relations will be explored to draw a link with the role South Africa is undertaking to promote democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development. In this regard, National Interest, Democracy, Good Governance and Economic Development will be explored.

Chapter 3: Political Transition and post-apartheid foreign policy towards Africa

This chapter looks at the political transition in South Africa, gives context and analyses the democratic evolution against decades of the apartheid system, which isolated the country for years. Assess foreign policy formulation and implementation since the democratic dispensation, particularly the prioritisation of the African Continent and how SA has replicated her political transition experiences and democratic project on the continent as a mechanism for economic development. In this regard, initiatives undertaken, and partnerships established are assessed.

Chapter 4: The State of democratic governance and economic development in Africa

This chapter focuses on democracy, governance, and economic development during the political transition period in South Africa. It is crucial to delineate the study during the abovementioned period, as it is when SA involvement in Africa can be traced, allowing for analysis of the research and account for the environment in which post-apartheid foreign policy focuses. Assess linkages between the concepts of democracy and good governance as far as economic development is concerned. In other words,

a question such as the benefits of stable democracy and good governance are answered or whether democracy is enough for development. How did SA prioritise these concepts in her quest for economic development in Africa, and which methods have supported her quest?

Chapter 5: South Africa's engagement mechanisms for economic development in Africa

This chapter explores South Africa's involvement in Africa through economic relations as established since democratisation. Analyse and assess if South Africa's quest for democratic governance is yielding results and whether it contributes to the continental developmental objectives. It is just a myth that Pretoria is disguising whilst fulfilling her interest. To this effect, the country's involvement in the structures of the SADC and AU, wherein she advocated for democratic governance and economic development, is reviewed.

Chapter 6: Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter details all the findings and evidence presented in line with the research objectives and the topic while indicating whether the research is achieved and what is set out.

CHAPTER 2 :
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, NATIONAL INTEREST,
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will analyse the theoretical perspectives of economic development, national interests, democracy, and good governance as they form the critical basis of this study. These concepts will, through discussions, explain what they entail through definitions, characteristics, origins, and evolutions to supplement their roles in economic development. Therefore, it is imperative to focus more deeply on the perspectives of democracy to have a meaningful direction on how it positively contributes to this effect.

The perspectives on national interests, democracy, good governance, and economic development are critical and cannot be overlooked as they have laid a foundation upon which this study will expand. This chapter will briefly give context to the meaning of democracy whilst defining it as a concept, explaining its genesis, description, and evolution since its inception. Also, the impact and linkages with the national interest, good governance and economic development will be unpacked and explained holistically. The discussion would also not ignore forms of democracy that will be discussed to give context to the concept of democracy while also focusing on national interests as they are critical in pursuing any country's national interests; thus, it is worth unpacking.

2.2 DEFINITION AND ORIGIN OF DEMOCRACY

Historically, democracy was an essential concept in the political discourse around 1900 and was the name of a particular part of the political spectrum (Nevers, 2018:418). Therefore, Tripathy (2010:254) believe democracy is characterised by an axiomatic civilised form of government that people can have only when they arrive at the ultimate level of civilisational advancement. Huber and Stephens (1999:759) argued that in democracy, representatives should have regular, free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. An indication of the responsibility of the state apparatus to the elected representatives of the people and guarantees Freedom of expression

and association. Others believe "democracy is a great 'hurrah' word of modern times, from being associated with mob rule at the beginning of the nineteenth century, democracy had become the objective of every 'civilised' nation by its end."

Against this background, it is worth noting that the concept of democracy can be traced to Greek history. Greeks were the first political people in the history of humankind; they were the first to create states in which the administration and the making of policy were the rights and duties of the citizens (Ehrenberg, 1950:515). Makulilo (2017:50) observed that the concept of democracy has been equated with rule by the people from the earliest times, representing a belief in autonomy or self-determination for individuals and the collectivises to which they belong. Nevertheless, since its inception, the concept of democracy has been subject to various public discussions and interpretations, considering how it has been expanding and stalling. As the basis, Saxonhouse (1997:255) argues that in ancient Greece, where it was first coined, democracy had an unpleasant meaning, connoting something akin to mob rule, which can be equated with the fact that, by nature, the practice of democracy brings together people hence Connolly's assertion above. Later, since Connolly's claim, Raaflaub (2007:155) emphasised that democracy comes from Greek and means rule by the people.

Demonstrating democratic expansion, Fukuyama (2015:399) argued that the number of democracies worldwide increased from 35 to 120, some 60 per cent of the world, between 1970 and 2010. This progress prompted Huntington's (1991:12) assertion that the democratic "third wave" building on the Second Wave occurred after World War II and was preceded by the first wave, which began in the 1820s, till the end of the nineteenth century. Though democracy has progressed and expanded successfully, Larry Diamond in Fukuyama (2014:400) argues there was a recession during the Third Wave in 2005. The recession is a result of the electoral fallacy. A simple form of democracy with which the United States and its democratic allies have been far too comfortable (Litonjua; 2011:57). The decline led to a trend toward a democratic fourth wave manifested by the political unrest in, for example, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. The decline reversed the gains; between 1985 and 1995, scores of countries transitioned to democracy, bringing widespread euphoria about democracy's future (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010:2).

Remarkably, the idea of democracy has existed since ancient Athens, but it did not become institutionalised until the eighteenth century (Fukuyama, 2015:401). The definition of democracy thus cannot be isolated from the Greek conception, which laid a basis upon which inferences are made. Emphasis is on the people's government by emphasising the importance of people-centred processes and decision-making, reflecting democratic practices. Shifa and Jinglei (2008:623) supported that in democracy, people are integrated with the power of and right to governing and cannot be comprehended without reference to this power and privilege.

As for Sultana (2012:27), the emphasis is on people because it means that political power is in the hands of the whole adult population and that no similar group has the right to rule. According to Fukuyama (2014:401), Abraham Lincoln argued in 1863, emphasising democracy as a government of people by the people and for the people, which has a background from leaders who even led respected and proponents of democracy. Also, democracy is a set of processes constituting a 'system' of governance with related 'sub-systems' such as electoral systems and political parties. The resilience concept, more broadly, is essential for informing the assessment of democracy globally (Sisk, 2017:2). From the South African perspective, Mandela (1993:26) described it as a system that is based on the majority principle and requires that the rights of political and other minorities are safeguarded. As a result, Breakfast, Mekoa and Maphazi (2015:32) stressed that democracy is a system of government based on the following vital ideals:

- Citizens are free to choose, check and replace their leaders, active participation in politics and civic life, protection of the citizen's human rights, and the rule of law, in which the law is the procedure for all citizens.

This is consistent with extensive enunciations of democracy as the people's government. Oladele (2020:5) believes democracy is exceptional as many countries strive for a state of governance in which the people have a say in the running of affairs that concern their economic, social and well-being. However, it is believed that one of the reasons is that sometimes a democracy will fail unless its citizens act maturely despite inclinations tempting them in another direction (Singer, 2018:2). On the other hand, some argue that democracy is no guarantee for development though it is a positive step towards growth. Fayemi (2009:104) highlighted that from an aspect of the economy, the condition of a state could be a potential cause or consequence of

democracy rather than a feature of democracy itself. As good as it is, democracy, thus, requires a set of institutions through which its ideals and aspirations can be expressed and made to bear fruit (Béteil, 2012:33). Such conception further advanced Beckman's (2001:2) concept that democracy has four distinct referents: political institutions, ideals of collective self-rule, normative principles of legitimacy, or justice and egalitarian attitudes and norms. These contentions are a testimonial that even democracy is not immune to challenges; hence, despite attaining democracy, some countries remain undemocratic. Also, there is a view that the accurate index of democratisation of a polity is the degree to which the States do not stand like a behemoth over society throttling its Freedom (Patnaik, 2020:9). This brings an element of accountability amongst the principles of democracy which are advanced within the context of this concept. The state is seen as a critical player.

As highlighted above, democracy has been broadly defined from different perspectives, yet the meaning is the same as the government seeking to advance the people's interests. Though there is consensus on its purpose, democracy is under threat as negative intentions distort its applications and undermine its principle of the rule of law. For example, Kubbe and Engelbert (2017:2) point out that high levels of corruption undermine democracy as rare resources are diverted from disadvantaged people, which, in essence, damages the rule of law, social justice and law trust of citizens in political institutions and processes.

2.3 FORMS OF DEMOCRACY

2.3.1 Liberal democracy

Liberal democracy refers to political systems that attempt to frame rules that maximise the well-being of all or impost citizens (Yunusa, 2013:66). Liberal democracy provides certainty in political procedures because it is premised on the rule of law and rational and responsible bureaucracies". Thus, it is a relatively straightforward and durable definition of the rights and responsibilities of citizens and political institutions (Yanusa, 2013:67). Barber (1984:4) reasoned that liberal democracy is based on premises about human nature, knowledge, and politics that are genuinely liberal but not intrinsically democratic. As quoted in Makulilo (2017:57), Ruboko emphasised that

democracy in the liberal sense essentially implies the defence, promotion and protection of the capitalist system and the domination of the world by imperialism. Thus, liberal democracy's conception of the individual interest undermines the democratic practices upon which individuals and their interests depend. Zakaria (1997:23) pointed out that liberal democracy is not about empowering people but protecting their liberties and allowing them to pursue their interests unimpeded. Huber and Stephens (1999:761) opined that the bourgeoisie in liberal democracies contributes to the move toward democracy, insisting on its share in political power through parliamentary control of the state. However, the bourgeoisie is hostile to democratisation when its interests seem threatened. Considering the above, Barrington Moore (in Fakuyama, 2015:403) observed, "No bourgeoisie, no democracy". This assertion strengthens the importance of the extent to which the bourgeoisie plays in expanding democracy globally; hence, it is linked to economic development.

Litonjua (2011:54) believed that liberal democracy is about liberalism, which essentially argues that individual rights are universal, inviolable, and inalienable. Briefly, Yunusa (2017:67) highlighted that Liberal democracy refers to the political system in which there are attempts to frame rules that maximise the well-being of all or impost citizens. Galston (2018:5) stressed that liberal democracy had triumphed in practice and principle and was construed as the legitimate form of government. On the other hand, Litonjua (2011:56) believes that it might be easy to create political parties and competitive elections but challenging to construct the liberal foundations on which to erect liberal democracies. Though liberal democracy has progressed, challenges were not examined and were highlighted by scholars. For example, Galston (2018:5) shared that liberal democracy faces multiple external challenges from ethnonational autocracies and regimes claiming to be based on God's word rather than the people's will. Other challenges are driven by populists who, at all costs, seek to drive a wedge between democracy and liberalism, claiming that liberal norms and policies weaken democracy and harm the people.

2.3.2 Participatory democracy

The evolution of participatory democracy has prompted scholars' views and has noted that it is more concerned with participation and brings into play citizens to participate in the democratic process. To this effect, Aragonès and Pagés (2009:1) argue that participatory democracy is a collective decision-making process combining direct and representative democracy elements. Therefore, citizens can decide on policy proposals, and politicians assume the policy implementation role. On the other hand, Cunningham (2002:46) believed that participatory-democratic theory is the opposite of catallaxy. Such is informed by the fact that participatory democracy sets itself against all versions of liberal democracy that see active politics as the domain of government and interest group leaders. The goal of participatory democracy is to achieve the most directly democratic forms of governance in neighbourhoods and the city. Roussopoulos (2004:146) argues that such an approach could lead to the fundamental necessity of political constitutions for cities, returning rule and wealth to their communities.

The above view indicates that the electorate can monitor politicians' performance simply by comparing citizens' proposals with the policies being implemented by those entrusted with such responsibilities. As a result, the discretion of politicians could be more robust. Aragonès and Pagés (2008:5) argue that in this system, the extent to which citizens can affect policy and determine social priorities is directly aligned with the degree to which they choose to involve themselves in the process. The concept of democracy is heavily criticised for its intention and prompted Massuh (1998:77) to highlight that democracy efforts are not at all sinister. Some believe democracy has proven to satisfy the majority's will without sacrificing minorities and favours equality without ignoring differences. However, Timothy (2017:3) argues that the contention is that economic challenges could cut both for and against democracy. This assertion is informed by the fact that challenging economic times lead to demands for enhanced democracy and protests, providing impetus for greater participation and inclusion of the marginalised in governance structures. To this effect, South Africa is an excellent example of participatory democracy, as the Constitution of the Republic is explicit. Established in 1996, the Constitution allows the Constitutional state to provide the most progressive model of a recent attempt to develop a participatory democracy

(RSA Constitution, 1996). Accordingly, Section 57(1) of the 1996 Constitution explicitly references South Africa as a representative and participatory democracy. Also, Section 59(1) determines that Parliament must allow the public to participate in policy-making processes. Public participation in South Africa is undertaken through a participatory process spearheaded by the National Electricity Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) to determine the price increase in electricity costs. Such participatory processes are undertaken because the "People's Parliament" requires an institution that prioritises and seeks active engagement with the public and is receptive and responsive to the needs of the people (Corrigan, Turianskyi & Gruzd, 2011:153).

2.3.3 Representatives Democracy

The term 'representative democracy conveys the complexity, richness, and uniqueness of the political order of the moderns, an original synthesis of two distinct and, in certain respects, alternative political traditions (Urbinati, 2012:23). As for Beyme (2012:50), representative democracy received attention even during the second wave of democratisation and proved so superior that few critics thought it necessary to examine. Day (2021:01) argues that representative democracy constitutes an original form of government and is in no way like electoral democracy to the extent that conditions make representative democracy a form of political participation which can activate various forms of control and supervision of its citizens. On the contrary, this form of democracy correlates to or has elements of the Ancient Roman Empire, wherein individuals were given the right to express their opinions on political aspects efficiently (Pinzani, 2006:271). Accordingly, in the Ancient Roman Empire, again, during that time, if the government wanted to decide anything involving citizens' lives, a general meeting would be organised. Every citizen should attend it and make decisions (Urbinati, 2012:24). South Africa is a perfect example.

The manifestation of representative democracy as processes undertaken toward decision-making in the republic are enshrined within the aspect of the definition and characterisation of this concept. Breakfast et al. (2015:33), representative democracy is designed to make political representatives make confident decisions and policies after consulting their constitutions. With the above assertion, representative democracy occurs in the case of South Africa when citizens elect candidates to serve their interests in law-making through institutions such as Parliament, Provincial

Legislatures, Municipal Councils, etc. Those elected officials, called electors, are the ones to propose and approve laws based on the interests of the public they represent.

It is through an understanding of the precepts of representative democracy that citizens have manifested impatience towards the political representatives whom they have elected to serve their interests in decision-making bodies, so much so that they even call for their removal as they have deviated from representation. Briefly, representative democracy should be analysed, considering its most critical features; according to Urbinati (2012:23), representative democracy has four main components:

- The people's sovereignty is expressed in the electoral appointment of the representatives;
- Representation as a free mandate relation;
- Electoral mechanisms to ensure some measure of responsiveness to the people by representatives who speak and act in their name; and
- Universal franchise grounds representation on an essential element of political equality.

2.4 NATIONAL INTERESTS

The concept of national interests has universality; therefore, discussion on its pragmatism must be made distinct from the universal perspectives, whether practised in South Africa or elsewhere. Thus, national interests have been widely evaluated, generating diverse academic viewpoints. In Nuechterlein's (1976:247) consideration, national interest has been used by politicians to describe the aspirations and goals of sovereign entities in the international arena ever since the founding of nation-states. Strikingly, Morgenthau (1949:210) highlighted that the country's interests influence foreign policy; therefore, there cannot be a successful foreign policy not justified by national interests. Similarly, Metea (2020:75) asserts that foreign policy orientation is based on the concept of national interest as it implies the basic guideline of all actions a state undertakes in its external policy. Metea supports Jean's (2005:107) assertions that national interests express wider choices of foreign policy aimed at guaranteeing the prosperity and security of the citizens, maintained through the values and worldview a state wishes to assert in cooperation or competition with other states (Jean, 2005:10).

Whilst giving meaning to national interest during the 19th century, Morgenthau (1949:107) used the notion of the United States of America. He argues that the US foreign policy is bipartisan in that it is supported by the majority of Congress regardless of party affiliation. Such an observation emphasises that foreign policy resonates profoundly with the national interest, which reflects what the people desire for their country. On the other hand, Rice's (2000:62) projection of American national interests has been defined by a desire to foster the spread of Freedom, prosperity, and peace. Also, Kristol (1996:16) believes that with enemies, it is easier for a great power to articulate a foreign policy in the presence of the enemy. Thus, in the public discourse, Russia is considered an enemy of the United States of America (US). Hence, US foreign policy is influenced by the determination to marginalise Russia's expansion of its ideology.

Unsurprisingly, Kristol is settled with national interest being defined in terms of plain military security- or maintaining a balance of power amongst other nations that are potential enemies or competitors for world status. Giving more meaning, Nuechterlein (1976:249) describes these vital national interests as follows: (i) Defence interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state and an externally inspired threat to its system of government. (ii) Economic interests: enhancing the nation-state's economic well-being with other states. (iii) World Order interests: maintaining an international political and economic system in which the nation-state feels secure, and its citizens and commerce operate peacefully outside its borders. (iv) Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the people of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good (Nuechterlein, 1976:249).

These characterisations of national interests were not out-of-the-way as Farah Naaz (2012:3) underscored that it emerged with the evolution and arrival of the nation states in the world and is what the states seek to protect or achieve about each other; this was supplemented by Asimov (2021:6244), who argued that national interest has long been manifested as a category used by political leaders to unite citizens towards achieving socioeconomic development. Equally, state national interests are formed following the state's geopolitical situation and resource capabilities, which consider the intersection of many intertwining, interconnected, mutually complementary, conflicting,

multidirectional structures, interests, and preferences (German, 2021:709). As for Landsberg (2012:16), national interest is used both as an analytical device to identify the goals pursued by the states and as an all-encompassing concept used to justify governments' policy preferences and actions.

2.5 GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.5.1 Definition and Evolution of Good Governance

Good governance cannot be discussed without reiterating the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who noted, "Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor for eradicating poverty and promoting development"(UN:1997). Against this background, it is evident that good governance must be noticed if development is desirable; thus, Jindal (2014:113) believed that, with good governance, the number of developmental schemes could improve the citizens' quality of life. Since its inception, this good governance concept has been very critical and has managed to move onto the agenda of many international organisations at the end of the Cold War (Woods, 1999:1).

Leftwich (1993:606) pointed to two parallel meanings of good governance, which often overlap with the first associated with the World Bank, which interprets it in primarily administrative and managerial terms. The second meaning is related to Western Governments that are more political. Equally so, Świstak (2016:45) emphasised that the term "good governance" made its first formal appearance in the agenda-related documents of the World Bank in the early nineties. Retrospectively, good governance helps strengthen democracy and human rights, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, reduce poverty, improve environmental protection and sustainable use of natural resources, and increase confidence in government and public administration".

Lack of good governance does not inspire confidence as it slowly erodes. Świstak (2016:46) argued that implementing good governance contributes to building trust in society for actions taken by public administration. Vymětal (2008:7) claimed that its origin could be found in managerial disciplines describing how to tackle problems. Accordingly, since the early 1990s, the notion of "good governance" as necessary for sustainable development and poverty reduction has gained widespread currency,

especially among international organisations (Simonis, 2004:1). Ekundayo (2017:154) refreshed that good governance theory developed from a set of principles first introduced by the World Bank in relating with and in assisting developing or third world countries. Furthermore, the World Bank usually requires good governance practices, among others, as a condition from the developing countries.

Therefore, the discourse on the importance of good governance as a panacea for many of the challenges confronting global society was also construed from the perspective of the African continent. Professor Eddy Maloka, the Chief Executive Officer of the South Africa-based APRM Secretariat, emphasise that good governance is the solution to the problems that we have on our continent (Maloka, 2018:16). This observation informs Maloka's assertion of the continent's peace and security challenges, primarily the manifestation of governance challenges such as how we manage our elections concurring with the negative perception cast over the practicality of good governance in the continent, as challenges seem to lead toward poor governance exploiting the absence of capable governance captains.

Leftwich (1993:610) highlighted that the first contemporary public appearance of the notion of good governance came in a 1989 World Bank report on Africa. The report argued that a governance crisis is underlying Africa's development problems. Gisselquist (2012:1) pointed out that corrupt bureaucrats and politicians baldly hinder development efforts by stealing aid contributions or misdirecting them into unproductive activities in poorly governed countries. From the European perspective, Świstak emphasised that good governance is a component of the democratic system. It allows dialogue, debate, political participation, and the protection of individual rights provided by independent legislation, which are the key elements. The above assertion does not isolate the governance approach from the global phenomena influenced by the characteristics thereof. Therefore, Świstak (2016:51) asserted that the result of the debate on good governance was the publication of the White Paper "European Governance" by the European Commission (EC) in 2001.

The EC suggested five main criteria for "good governance", which relate to the following: – openness, – participation, – accountability, – effectiveness, – coherence. The EU embracing good governance affirms the early claims that this concept has found itself on the agenda of international organisations. Noteworthy and worth noting

is that as a block, the EU comprises well-developed countries that uphold good governance within their democratic systems. Thus, in further defining good governance, Abdullatif (2019:5) argue that this concept occupies a central stage in the development discourse, is considered the crucial element to be incorporated into the development strategy and is universally accepted. Equally, the "World Bank sees good governance as how power is exercised in managing a country's economic and social resources for development". The above assertion challenges us to comprehend the importance of good governance and economic development. Existing literature has developed arguments linking the above concepts; hence, their discussions cannot be separated. Also, it reaffirms that countries that lack sound governance are unlikely to see nor enjoy development prospects as they get preoccupied with challenges because of a lack of good governance.

2.5.2 Aspects of Good Governance

It is worth emphasising that good governance has a mechanism through which its existence and evolution can be identified; according to Ekundayo(2017:155), it has eight significant characteristics as follows:

- i) **Participation:** This could be direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Participation needs to be informed and organised, meaning Freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organised civil society on the other.
- ii) **The rule of law:** Good governance requires fair legal frameworks enforced impartially. It also requires complete protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities.
- iii) **Transparency:** This means that decisions and their enforcement follow rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those affected by such decisions and their enforcement.
- iv) **Responsiveness:** Good governance requires institutions and processes to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.
- v) **Consensus-oriented:** Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved.

- vi) Equity and inclusiveness: A society's well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society.
- vii) Effectiveness and efficiency: Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal.
- viii) Accountability: Accountability is a crucial requirement of good governance. Governmental institutions, the private sector, and civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and their institutional stakeholders.

According to Toksöz (2008:2), good governance is a new approach that includes all the principles necessary to consolidate democratic management and the rule of law. On the other hand, Vymětal (2008:1) argues that good governance is primarily defined by a list of basic principles introducing the fundamentals of the concept and is frequently used as the miraculous cure for many diseases of current complex societies. Thus, Zlătesc and Marinică (2020:194) believed that good governance requires active citizen participation, citizen involvement and cooperation in elaborating and implementing public policies to maintain the democratic values that underpin the rule of law.

For Bekoe (2005:8), good governance refers to the ability of the government to administer policies effectively and transparently, honour human rights and the rule of law and adopt democratic principles, indicating that the inability to administer policies efficiently is a recipe for poor governance. As a result, it will infringe on the rights of the people, as manifested by developments in several African countries wherein good governance remains a foreign concept and elusive. The evolution of good governance has been widely accepted and construed as essential to peace, economic growth and development (Abdellatif, 2019:2). Joseph (2001:101) pointed out that good governance espouses Freedom of information, a solid legal system and efficient administration backed by political mobilisation of the disadvantaged through movements or political parties. Singh and Singh (2012:221) believed that besides being utterly prevalent in the rule of law, it also prescribes adequate democratisation. The above contention amplifies the assertions that good governance is most likely to succeed where democracy is the system of governance.

2.5.3 Economic Development

The concept of economic development is very critical to any country; thus, its progress is essential. However, this concept does not exist in isolation but with the links with democracy and good governance as the basis upon which economic development strongly depends, as their absence creates challenges which hinder development. Debates on economic development cannot be separated from processes that impact any economy as they influence growth to enhance the socioeconomic well-being of society. Against this background, since its inception, the concept of economic development has been widely discussed to give meaning to its being through definitions. Scholars such as Porter (1998:77) argue that economic development is a long-term process of building several interdependent microeconomic capabilities and incentives.

Przeworski (1999:143) highlighted that economic development improves the likelihood of democratic survival through its impact on several crucial intervening variables. This effect highlighted the strength and vigour of civil society, the relationship between the state and society, the class structure, the political culture and the linkage to the international system. Others believed that quantitative cross-national could not be ignored as they consistently find that a country's level of economic development is associated with the extent to which the political system manifests democracy. However, Abdellatif (2003:14) observed that the existing evidence on the links between democracy and economic growth does not support the idea that increased democracy causes growth.

Abdellatif builds on Leftwich's (1993:605) emphasis that at the core of development is the confident assertion that good governance and democracy are the necessary conditions for growth in all societies. Economic development proves a high correlation with democracy, as highlighted throughout. Therefore, one of the more persistent relationships enunciated in the sociology of development is the positive correlation, if not causation, between democracy and development (Litonjua, 2011:51). Even though there is a correlation between democracy and development, negativity cannot be ignored as several authoritarian countries were seen as progress casting the wrong aspersion to the correlations between democracy and development, provoking debates on why democratising economic development can occur without democracy.

2.6 CONCLUSION

The discussed concepts are critical to the nation's aspiration as they have proven to be interlinked. It became clear that should these concepts be applied interchangeably; the outcomes would be tangible as starting with the national interest, they play a window picture of desirability. However, national interests require that the environment is conducive for it to have a meaningful impact; hence, countries are practising democracy, and it has been proven throughout the discussion that it is a critical system of governance that presents opportunities for the national interest of any nation to be advanced. It also became clear that once democracy is a system of governance, efforts toward economic development are conducive to undertaken; hence, an inference could be made that economic development becomes elusive without democracy. Furthermore, good governance cannot be realised without democracy, so economic growth becomes a challenging dream. Therefore, the discussion outlined that these concepts of democracy, national interest, good governance, and economic development overlap for good purposes.

CHAPTER 3 :

THE POLITICAL TRANSITION AND DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

South Africa's political landscape and its involvement in Africa will be incomplete should discourse disregard and not reflect on the events that most people in the country were subjected to, such as the apartheid regime-imposed segregation policies to exclude the black nation. The acts of brutality and exclusions drew international attention, resulting in institutions such as the United Nations declaring apartheid a crime against humanity. As a result, establishing the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid in 1962 was a clear message to the regime that its brutality was being observed and noticed in the interests of the suffering masses of South Africa (UN:1981). Therefore, Boraine (2014:23) denoted that the UN had supported introducing an arms embargo while supporting boycotts and sanctions against South Africa, including sports and economic sanctions. By being placed in the discussion of the UN proceedings, it was increasingly clear that the apartheid system had lost its survival networks.

Subsequently, several member states glanced at South Africa with eagle eyes. They called against the apartheid regime's actions persistently upsurged, resulting in South Africa being subjected to economic sanctions, negatively impacting the country's economic strengths, whilst the African National Congress mobilised the international community. Landsberg (2012) informed that Chief Albert Luthuli initiated calls for sanctions, arguing for sanctions against the apartheid regime and for harsh punishment of the racist government who committed the 'cruelty' at Sharpeville. The ANC forged relations with fellow liberation movements in Africa and communist countries such as the USSR, Cuba, etc. Against this background, this chapter will unpack the events that led to the democratisation and highlight how the advent of democracy in 1994 influenced the democratic South Africa Foreign Policy implementation, mainly focusing on Africa. In so doing, the foundation for understanding why Pretoria is determined to pursue the African Agenda and to what extent the country has prioritised the continent.

3.2 POLITICAL TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The events leading to the political transition in South Africa enticed global attention with doubts about the transition prospects and concerns that the country was likely to plunge into civil War as the killings of blacks rose, which was exacerbated by the killing of the South African Communists leader Chris Hani by the members of the white right wing. Notwithstanding those concerns, the political transition was affirmed as the most impressive case study of peaceful evolution. Ngomane and Flanagan (2003:267) contended that when it comes to a peaceful transition to a democratic society, no country compares to South Africa. Moreover, according to Turok (2008:33), this transition was well coordinated, arguing that the period 1990-94 in South Africa was politically dominated by negotiations, culminating with the end of the apartheid regime.

Optimistically, Inman and Rubinfeld (2013:1) saw the political transition to a genuinely multi-racial democracy as one of the significant political events of the century. Noteworthy, the political transition in South Africa has been widely regarded as the positivity of the negotiations and created a culture of negotiation that imbued the entire nation (Williams, 2015:363). With these acknowledgements, South Africans have acquired expertise and confidence in resolving even the most challenging issues around a table through the peaceful transition. These assertions were not in vain as they were amplified by Adetiba (2020:78), contending that South Africa in 1994, and against all odds, successfully transitioned to an inclusive government. Furthermore, Adetiba boosted that transition, signalling an end to the apartheid system with the election of the first black President—Nelson Mandela—South Africa redesigned and remodelled its foreign policy principle toward the rest of Africa and Southern Africa.

Others claimed South Africa's political transition from apartheid is widely acclaimed as an example of a successful transition that avoided the predicted bloodbath and political chaos. Similarly, Habib (1995:50) observed that "the world's media screamed with headlines celebrating the successful transition. According to Masipa (2018:2), the momentous occasion in 1994 brought hope, aspirations, and opportunity to the historically oppressed, excluded, and disadvantaged South Africans to practice their democratic right for the first time. Singo (2014:13) amplified during the 20th celebrations of freedom that the success of the fifth democratic elections inevitably sent a clear message that South Africans were ready to deepen the footsteps of

democracy imprinted by the first President, Dr Nelson Mandela. As for van Wyk (2019:413), the transition was a good posture from the international perspective and directly impacted the country's global status.

The political transition in South Africa necessitates establishing a democratic government after years of being ruled through regimes led by the Afrikaner nationalists and English imperialists. According to Venter (2011:1), the successive, white-led governments, whether Afrikaner nationalists, English imperialists or reconciliations-oriented, pursued policies of social segregation and political disempowerment of black people. These manifested and triggered a sense of retaliation and pressed Africans to organise themselves against what they observed as injustices in their country at the behest of the migrants, Afrikaners and English. Thus, Venter (2011:6) argued that, from the start of the Union of South Africa, black nationalists objected to founding a white-dominated state and excluding black people from political decision-making.

The swift formation of the ANC by a mission-educated elite represented the first attempt to organise resistance along genuinely national lines to overcome inter-ethnic divisions and to secure the support of the Chiefly aristocracy (Southall, 2013:28.) The essential defining characteristic of segregation and apartheid was, of course, racial discrimination and exclusion (Davies, 2021:11). With that assertion in mind, founding the Native National Congress as an umbrella upon which blacks would come together to counter the apartheid elements directed at them in the country of their birth was a positive move. For many years, black citizens endured white hegemony under colonial and apartheid rule, having been relegated to the humiliating position of secondary citizens in their homeland, painting a clear picture of the sufferings black citizens have been subjected to through segregation policy and the brutality of apartheid (Ngomane & Flanagan, 2003:267).

Holdt (2013:589) states that the transition to democracy in South Africa appeared to mark a break in the violent confrontations of the apartheid era and provide a broad basis for the mediation of social conflict, including a redistribution of political, social, and economic power through the institutions of constitutional democracy. Therefore, progress toward democratic transition was inevitable. According to Devenyns (2018:4), between 1990 and 1994, the political transition towards a democratic non-apartheid society was deliberated in official negotiations, initially called the multiparty

CODESA negotiations. Hence, Graham (2012:5) was confident that South Africa's successful and peaceful negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy is one of the most significant periods in the country's modern historical trajectory.

It is worth noting that the political transition took place when the world was also experiencing its unique dynamics, which led to unprecedented complexities in foreign relations. It is worth emphasising that the above developments occurred when the world was going through some transition necessary for a democratic infant to be part of global affairs, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism. Such developments presented a problem as communist countries such as the USSR played a significant role in the democratic dispensation and supported the African National Congress's liberation efforts.

3.3 THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY AND AFRICA AS A THRUST FOCUS

3.3.1 SA Foreign Policy since democratisation

With the advent of democracy, anticipation and expectations were high that democratic South Africa would break away from the legacy of the apartheid government. According to Landsberg (2010:8), South Africa's foreign policy after apartheid has primarily been driven by what may be dubbed the diplomacy of transformation. Devenyns (2018:4) believed that with the advent of democracy and a new foreign policy, South Africa transformed from being a global and continental pariah to a respected actor in international affairs. These positive developments were not in seclusion but were consistent with the African National Congress's vision that the ANC-led government would implement a foreign policy whose objectives were envisioned and found expression in the Freedom Charter of 1995. To this effect, the Freedom Charter proclaimed that there should be peace and friendship, emphasising that South Africa shall be a fully independent state that respects all nations' rights and sovereignty (Turok:2008).

From there, it was clear that the ANC-led government would undoubtedly break away from the regime destabilisation of foreign policy implementation and respect neighbouring countries rather than bullying them. Hence, it was not a coincidence that in 1977, while addressing the MPLA congress in Luanda, Oliver Tambo unequivocally emphasised the Freedom Charter proclamation, stating that we seek to live in peace with our neighbours (Zuma, 2011), an indication of the foreign policy founded upon the

pillars of human rights, the promotion of democracy worldwide, respect for justice and international law, and peace as the goal for all nations and foreign relations.

The ANC articulated a foreign policy component to its political strategies from the onset; therefore, the Freedom Charter further speaks about foreign policy through a clause which argues that 'There shall be Peace and Friendship (Landsberg, 2012:25). He further stressed that such determination was pragmatized through mobilising international solidarity and fighting for the self-determination of black South Africans and other peoples under the gripping yoke of colonial domination, which became a hallmark of ANC global strategy. Breakfast and Nkosi (2009:523) observed that the Freedom Charter directs the ANC-led foreign policy to embrace peace and friendship. Accordingly, South Africa will strive to maintain world peace and settle international disputes through international dispute negotiations.

As for le Pere (2014:6), South Africa's moral infrastructure in foreign policy is an Afrocentric one "rooted in national liberation. That affirms that when South Africa attained its democracy, it undertook to reconstruct itself from pariah status to a responsible global developmental state. The ANC Ready to Govern stated that it will contribute to the democratisation of international political and economic relations and help secure a global context to cooperate on a democratic basis with its neighbours in the region and further afield, enjoining South Africa to contribute towards regional integration, stability, and development through economic cooperation with its neighbours in Southern Africa with an appreciation of a shared history. The former late Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ebrahim Ebrahim, unambiguously amplified that "the roots of our foreign policy extend well beyond the historical events of 1994" (Ebrahim, 2013:24). He argued that it draws inspiration from the Freedom Charter and other landmark decisions- and events that formed the rich tapestry of the historic struggle for freedom (Ebrahim, 2013:24). This is an indication that the ANC-led democratic South Africa will be part of the global society espousing the determined rules and regulation. Such views were also expressed by Nganje (2021:7), contending that as early as 1994, the ANC laid out the fundamental principles and values upon which a democratic South Africa would conduct its foreign policy. According to Landsberg (2012:26), the importance of foreign policy started to show up towards the first democratic elections in 1994. He stressed that the ANC asserted its international vision through a comprehensive document entitled 'Foreign

Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa. As Landsberg alluded, this foreign policy document offered to promote a people-centred foreign policy that would mirror the ANC's long relationship with the international community and 'reflect the rich tapestry of their international heritage'.

South Africa's foreign policy drew much attention as, during the negotiations to end apartheid and bring democracy to South Africa, behind the scenes, the ANC was forced to address a few other issues, including its foreign policy (Graham, 2012:414). These developments allowed South Africa to redefine its foreign policy; hence, it was based on high moral values and a sense of identity that stemmed from its historical legacy. She further expanded that in the 1990s, South Africa took several initiatives that reflected its commitment to an ethical foreign policy and significantly contributed to its international relations. Striking, on the eve of the democratic dispensation, Mandela envisioned South Africa's democratic foreign policy outlook, arguing for South Africa to occupy its rightful position in world affairs (Mandela,1993:88). This, in essence, affirmed South Africa's readiness for any challenges coming with its reintegration into the international arena.

Dudley emphasised that Mandela's vision led many observers to predict that South Africa would promote democracy and human rights throughout the continent. On the other hand, Marathon (2012:1) asserted that South Africa's foreign policy had come a long way to carry out a foreign policy that primarily focused on protecting white minority rule in an increasingly hostile regional and international environment. As a result, South Africa returned to world affairs with an unclean slate with the inheritance of the baggage of the apartheid state government policy of regional destabilisation, which affected its neighbours negatively (Sidiropoulos, 2007:2). Consistently, Landsberg (2010:14) believed that apartheid and colonialism left deep scars on the domestic and international political and socio-economic landscape, including poverty, inequality, and social trauma, which typically run along race lines. Moreover, these forms of brutality were formalised with the establishment of the National Security Council in 1971 and a strategy to integrate foreign and defence policies to counter the Marxist conspiracy targeting countries accused of sheltering ANC guerrillas (Chabara, 1997:10).

Against the above historical context, it was important that democratic South Africa's policy choices had to mirror domestic challenges and imperatives as well as the rapidly

changing world order. Accordingly, the ANC 2012 Strategy and Tactics document concurred with asserting the complex nature of South Africa's circumstances in 1994: "Our transition took place in a global climate that was hostile to progressive policies. This, coupled with the stagnant economy, deep inequalities and systemic underdevelopment inherited from the apartheid years, imposed limitations on our options to effect rapid fundamental change". Nevertheless, South Africa showed commitment to realising a vision of a united, peaceful, and prosperous Africa (ANC, 2012).

Despite mixed reactions regarding South Africa's foreign policy implementation, according to Habib (2013:60), the democratic transition ushered in a fundamental transformation of its foreign policy. This indicates optimism that the democratic transition was not pointless but an opportunity through which post-apartheid South Africa will amplify to rebuild a country that is transformed from its pariah status. Schraeder (2001) noted that South Africa's pariah status ended in 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected President. For Hamill (2018:20), the sworn-in of Mandela as the President on 10 May 1994 presented South Africa with an opportunity to enjoy unprecedented global standing, which was an asset in the foreign-policy toolkit of any state. However, Qobo and Dube (2015:145) state that South Africa's foreign policy has undergone various changes since the first democratically elected government in 1994 and is inclined toward a normative thrust. In essence, South Africa's foreign policy implementation can be assessed with the realist school of thought as more pragmatic approaches became the hallmark of the country's engagement with the world.

According to Manan (2017:178), realists agree that foreign policy only serves the national interest in international politics and is seen together with the national interest in the struggle for power and the state's survival. Considering the above, successive democratic administrations have sought to forge a new identity for the country in the global system of states whilst also contending with post-Cold War and domestic challenges (Hendricks & Majozi, 2021:61). To that effect, Pretoria has displayed some resilience, balancing the growing domestic challenges. However, as the Constitution of the Republic dictates that the President is the custodian of the country's foreign policy, all these foreign policy activities were under the Presidency of Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma and Ramaphosa.

3.3.2 The Presidency of Mandela (1994-1999)

According to Brites and Padilha (2017:149), the election of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1994-1999) opened the way for South Africa to seek the reorientation of its foreign policy toward the African continent. During Mandela's presidency, foreign policy direction raised more hopes than despair in this context, as Nganje and Oyedele (2021:1) argued that under Mandela, South Africa's post-apartheid conception of peace diplomacy was introduced. However, Border and Mills (2011:2) could have been more impressed, arguing that the reality has been somewhat less optimistic than human rights activists had hoped. Brites and Padilha (2017:163) further argued that the country had to construct a regional policy as its primary objective to overcome neighbours' historical distrust at the regional level. However, challenges could not be discounted as Mandela's presidency's foreign policy implementation was construed as shifting towards hegemonic.

Despite all these, Mandela's administration was prosperous compared to apartheid as the country managed to have 30 diplomatic missions in 1996 and 124 missions in 2018 and was part of 45 international organisations (Otavia, 2017:173). Landsberg (2012:25) pointed out that the Mandela government realised that its respectability abroad would come from credibility at home and, as such, worked on strengthening and consolidating its young democracy. The Mandela presidency focused on issues of reconciliation and rehabilitation against the background of the apartheid legacy, which has destroyed many people's lives through actions of brutality. Hence, Graham (2012:5) observed that Mandela's quest for human rights was not in isolation. Still, an emphasis on the historical declaration of the importance of human rights in the Freedom Charter reflects that during the struggle and in exile, emphasis was on the moral nature of its struggle against apartheid, which became the foundation on which the country's foreign policy can be assessed. Thus, Mandela's presidency enhanced the country's position globally through coalitions and alliances with the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement to break out of the isolation in which it had been trapped under the apartheid regime (Soulé-Kohndou, 2013:1). As for Mpungose (2018), Mandela reintegrated South Africa into the global community, restoring a positive image of South Africa in institutions like the UN and the SADC.

3.3.3 The Presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008)

According to Otavio (2017:171), the Presidency of Mbeki saw South Africa as the beacon of hope to the challenges impacting the African continent's well-being. Hence, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania refers to him as one of the most outstanding emissaries of Africa in dealing with African problems. He will go down as one of the most outstanding leaders of our continent (Ndlovu & Strydom, 2016). Part of the Mbeki enigma was that he mixed a passionate commitment to Africa with a Western urbanity – the latter often emerged in his public discourse (Vale & Barrett, 2009:452). His views were amplified by Zenawi in the "Thabo Mbeki I Know" that "Thabo Mbeki brought to the African table an extraordinary intellect. Hence, assessing Mbeki's Presidency, Ndlovu & Strydom (2016) believed that the "glory days" of South African foreign policy were synonymous with his administration. Thus, under Mbeki's tutelage, the country's international standing was second to none, making significant strides in the international political arena.

Landsberg (2010:139) saw Mbeki as the chief champion of new continentalism as he thought to influence the inter-African system, not in the direction of supranationalism or federation, but towards functionalism and a rules-based continental order. He argued that from 1999 to 2008, Mbeki elevated Africa to the top of his foreign policy agenda and assumed the foremost champion of the continent's political and socio-economic development agenda (Landsberg, 2012:26). As for Maimela (2019:14) regarding foreign policy practice, a clear conception of South Africa's national interest in Africa began to emerge under the Mbeki administration and was defined in terms of the 'African Agenda'. Thus, "Mbeki's foreign policy was underscored by his continued drive to reposition South Africa in the global system while maintaining a more Africanist foreign policy outlook," explaining why Mbeki was seen as the Champion of the African Agenda. Furthermore, during his presidency, South Africa became more involved in the continent's post-conflict and reconstruction development programmes (Singo, 2014:16).

Such undertaking aligns with his I am an African speech, which indicated readiness to work with other African governments despite their unsavoury democratic credentials. However, the rapport he nurtured in Africa prompted an expression of disappointment and dismay by African leaders when Mbeki was recalled a few months before the end

of his second term as the President. Obasanjo pointed out that his recall from the office remains regrettable, though he continues his assignment on the continent Ndlovu & Strydom (2016). The disappointment was that Mbeki would seem unapologetic in engaging with the developed nations to promote the African Agenda. Therefore, his unceremonial removal from the office would impact his work promoting the continent's global interests.

Domestically, Mbeki transformed the country's economy so that it grew by six per cent, giving it more strength to pursue a foreign policy driven by domestic interests. However, regionally, Mbeki was accused of keeping a blind eye to the human rights issues in Zimbabwe to the extent that he was charged with protecting President Robert Mugabe's dictatorial attitude through his quiet diplomacy approach. Nathan (2011:362) observed that Mbeki's presidency has the most apparent inconsistency between South Africa and its commitment to democracy and human rights. This argument was informed by the country's position towards Zimbabwe, which undermined its principle that underpins foreign policy implementation, particularly regarding human rights and the promotion of democracy. Vale and Barrett (2009:447) supplemented this by stating that Mbeki's foreign policy approach to Zimbabwe was equally baffling.

Similarly, Mahant (2012:11) emphasised that Mbeki's policy toward Zimbabwe was the most puzzling of all his foreign policy approaches. However, Mbeki justifies his approach to defending Mugabe by accusing the 'white world' of a 'stubborn and arrogant mindset that always must lead with its demands determining what everybody else does (McKinley, 2004:358).

The Presidency of Thabo Mbeki saw more pragmatism through the prioritisation of the African Agenda anchored on the basis that South Africa cannot be an island amid a high level of poverty in the continent. Ngcayisa (2020:12) supported that Mbeki left a lasting imprint on the country's political landscape and is accredited with founding institutions like the NEPAD and AU and reinventing the African Renaissance. As for Bongmba (2004:293), Mbeki's call for an African Renaissance cannot be isolated from his 'I am an African' speech of 8 May 1996 to the Constitutional Assembly of South Africa as hinted at what the Renaissance project symbolised. Such observation is informed by an understanding that Mbeki evoked the emotional, conceptual, and political connections necessary for a Renaissance through the speech. These

assertions support arguments that South Africa is an essential interlocutor for Africa in global fora and a leader in reconstructing Africa's institutional architecture (Ngcayisa: 2020:16).

Also, Soulé-Kohndou (2013:1) argues that during Mbeki's presidency, South Africa's foreign policy was characterised by its closer engagement with emerging economic powerhouses such as Brazil and maintaining relations with India and China. Strikingly, besides his successes, Mbeki's presidency also had some damage to clean from the presidency of Mandela, particularly the Nigeria relations since he made a decision construed as un-African. Hence, Mahant (2012:5) pointed out that Mandela's response to Abacha's regime's execution of the opposition leader was a challenge his foreign policy endured. As a result of Mandela's decision, Mbeki had to massage relations with Nigeria, and to date, they are very cordial; some argue that he left a respected foreign policy globally and continentally. More work was done multilaterally and bilaterally through the African Agenda, which must be addressed whenever Mbeki's foreign policy is assessed. On the other hand, there is a contention that the albatross of South Africa's multilateralism has been the unsuccessful attempts at quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe (Nganje & Ayodele, 2021:11).

3.3.4 The Presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009-2018)

When Jacob Zuma became the President of South Africa, the country's foreign policy was not likely to break away from his predecessor's approach, centring around Pan-Africanism. Accordingly, Zuma reiterated the same themes that formed essential leitmotifs of South Africa's foreign policy since 1994 (le Pere, 2013:1). Expectations were that there would be some consistency likely to occur as Zuma's affirmation was that South Africa has done very well in terms of foreign policy implementation. Le Pere further amplified that Zuma inherited a strong foundation of international engagements and external relations held together by the country's moral capital and political stature mortar. Not much difference was expected from Zuma's foreign policy approach, as during his tenure as the Deputy to Thabo Mbeki, he was more involved in some of the undertakings as an envoy. As a result, Landsberg (2010:228) pointed out that the Zuma government set out to implement its African- strategies under the label of African advancement, suggesting a remarkable degree of continuity with the foreign policy strategies of the previous decade.

The above assertion was spot on, as when Zuma became the President, South Africa was a well-respected country on the continent; however, when he left the office unceremonial- just like Mbeki, foreign policy was in tatters. Salo (2018:1) critically argued that when Zuma took over the reins as President of South Africa, this political leadership turned into mixed consequences for South African Foreign policy. To that effect, South Africa lost a significant degree of the international stature it had painstakingly built up during the Mbeki years. Also, it was under Zuma's Presidency that the demise and killing of Muhamad Gaddafi through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorising the No-Fly Zone, and South Africa supported it (Hammil, 2018:12). Therefore, Onyekwena (2019:1) assert that former Zuma's Africa policy did not have a clear direction—moreover, deficiencies under his administration casted integration with other African countries.

Furthermore, van Nieuwkerk (2018:5) argues that though some achievements were during Zuma, corruption and nepotism, during which well-connected individuals extracted favours, became the order. Onyekwena (2019:2) further highlights that Zuma needed to position South Africa to lead the continent, either in driving continental agendas or credibly representing Africa in global circles, such as the G20. The aftermath negatively impacted South Africa's standing as the continent's leader, manifested during Mbeki's presidency. According to Hill (2018:5), going against the foreign policy principles, the Zuma intended to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) after failing to arrest Omar Al Bashiri whilst attending AU despite the warrant of arrest, which compelled all the signatories, including South Africa, that at the time was hosting the AU. Landsberg (2012:27) added that the Zuma government set out to champion a national interests-oriented foreign policy to benefit the people. However, he battled the challenge of reconciling moralistic approaches to foreign policy with utilitarian, economic self-interest considerations.

As for Soko (2021:3), Zuma's presidency brought a new meaning to corruption and cronyism, asserting that he outsourced presidential authority to the Gupta family. Thus, the foreign policy needed to articulate a more straightforward approach aligned with South Africa's normative values, developmental role, and commercial interests (Soko, 2021:42). However, despite the myriad of challenges, Zuma has some take-offs as the country hosted the first-ever world cup tournament in the African Continent, served as the non-permanent security council member and joined the BRICS. Soulé-

Kohndou (2013:1) argues that South Africa's BRICS membership represents a diplomatic success for the Jacob Zuma government. Mpungose (2018) amplifies that the country's membership in the BRICS grouping of emerging markets was a crowning achievement for the Zuma administration in 2011. This assertion was driven by the fact that the membership allows the country to potentially advance its national interests, develop infrastructure, promote regional integration, and give substance to its interests in South-South cooperation.

3.3.5 The Presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa (2018 to date)

According to Hill (2019), President Cyril Ramaphosa came to office in 2018; he promised a clean and transparent government. Thus, it revoked the values of Nelson Mandela's ethical leadership spirit, breaking away from the moral decay that had enveloped Jacob Zuma's squandered decade in government. Therefore, Ramaphosa's foreign policy direction cannot be construed as disregarding the domestic interests it emphasised heavily during the maiden State of Nation Address in 2018. To this effect, Ebrahim (2018:1) believed that Ramaphosa Sona clearly articulated national priorities to improve economic growth, increase business confidence, woo investors, and expand trade, accomplishing the National Development Plan's aspiration of creating jobs and reducing poverty. Thus, Salo (2018:2) states that at the beginning of his term, Ramaphosa announced his bid to attract 100 billion dollars (R1.2 trillion) in foreign direct investment. Therefore, his visits to the United Kingdom secured R857 million of that target and \$10 billion from a state visit to Saudi Arabia.

It is worth emphasising against this background that Ramaphosa's presidency came through the "new dawn" ticket promising the glory days of Mbeki's era regarding consolidation of the African Agenda. However, though intentions were clear, his presidency faced enormous tasks. He had to ensure loyalty to the continent by visiting almost all the regions in the first year of his presidency. To this effect, Otavio (2021:87) argues that Cyril Ramaphosa came when South Africa faced challenges such as rising unemployment, growing social inequality, low growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and limited government capacity to expand investments in social areas. Hence, Nganje and Ayodele (2021:19) pointed out that Ramaphosa's presidency

coincides with significant socio-economic turbulence in South Africa, a situation made worse by the coronavirus pandemic.

Also, it is with no doubt that the domestic situation has been negatively impacted as the country has gone through some years of impunity, impacting its capabilities with state resources having been looted through corruption. Also, the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic has severe repercussions for his presidency and his commitment to lead the continent. It is too early to conclude on the success and failures of his presidency regarding foreign policy implementation. However, the political instability in Swaziland poses a risk also the Ukraine-Russia conflict, which is a significant test for SA foreign policy under Ramaphosa. However, the broad contours of Ramaphosa's foreign policy are becoming visible, and it is likely to prioritise commercial ties and support for regimes over their people in Africa (Hamil, 2019).

3.4 THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AS SOUTH AFRICA FOREIGN POLICY THRUST FOCUS

Salo (2018) illustrates that South Africa's foreign policy prioritises the African Continent and is matched by an allocation of resources to the continent. To this effect, a study conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs concluded that 30% of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's budget is allocated to operations on the African continent. Therefore, it is undoubtedly that post-apartheid South Africa sees itself as part of the continent despite the pre-democratic South Africa's posture and attitude. It is thus essential to underscore that South Africa is in Africa and is a central economic hub that contributes immensely to the continent's development despite its history of being a destabilising actor. Africa is at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy implementation, building on the relations forged during the struggle against apartheid; hence, the prioritisation of the continent is not coincident. Sidiropoulos (2007:2) emphasised that South Africa is portrayed as an essentially regional power in Africa.

It is increasingly seen as a significant global player in the debates about reforming the global governance architecture and creating a fairer international order. Therefore, positioning Africa's centrality in implementing South Africa's foreign policy on the continent and engaging in Africa's development has become a *raison d'état* for South African foreign policy since the end of apartheid. "South Africa's foreign policy towards

the Southern African region, Africa and the global South presented a new ideological dimension that shaped South Africa's bilateral relations with the changed world order" (Alden & le Pere, 2000:286). Ebrahim (2012:260) clarified that South Africa's approach to her neighbourhood cognises that she cannot exist as an island in an ocean of poverty and instability, hence enormous investments to energise Africa's renewal through championing the African Renaissance.

Octavia (2017:182) believed the country's African Agenda should be understood as the phase of growing the African Renaissance. Equally, the African Renaissance enabled South Africa to have a more international role as it bitterly expressed that it engages with the developed countries to advance the African Agenda (Salo, 2018). Since the democratic dispensation in 1994, South Africa's foreign policy evolution has consistently asserted the importance of prioritising South Africa's relations with the rest of the African continent (Ebrahim, 2015). As for Marathon (2012:1), South Africa established itself as a critical actor in the region, acting as a mediator and sending peacekeeping troops to conflict zones. Thus, South Africa launched ambitious plans to develop the continent and guide the reforms leading to the rebirth of the African Union. Also, Deputy Minister of International Relations Alvin Botes would argue that "our foreign policy draws on the spirit of internationalism and is intertwined with our pursuit of a better Africa in a better world". Botes supported Landers' (2018:17) view that South Africa has taken its rightful place on the continent and has contributed immensely towards Africa's peace and security guided by Pan-African ideals. Such arguments were supported by drawing inferences from the country's commitment to the continent's rebirth. In this regard, Landers (2018:18) asserted that South Africa would continue to contribute to the revival of our continent and usher in a new era where Africa would be free from the bondage of colonialism and apartheid.

Hengari (2014) refreshed that, since the fall of apartheid in 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has prioritised the development of Africa and achieved its African Agenda objectives, intensifying strategic relations with key African countries, finding expression in the country's practical efforts on the norms of the continent's renewal underpinned by democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Therefore, Mbeki managed to craft and articulate a grand vision for South Africa in the international community and the African continent with a further articulation of the African Renaissance (Salo, 2018). Also, Landsberg and Kondlo (2013:16) gave more impetus

to the country's African Agenda, arguing that it stresses good neighbourliness and non-hegemonic relations with fellow African States. It has become the cornerstone of South Africa's engagements with the continent based on mutual beneficiation, and it is in the country's interest to see the continent's economic development.

South African Foreign Policy is anchored through domestic priorities aiming to consolidate regional integration with particular emphasis on improving SADC's political and economic integration. Thus, implementing a foreign policy that extends the national interests indicates that Africa is the thrust focus. Henceforth, Laden and Le Pere (2006:52) argue that Africa is a central tenet of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy implementation.

Africa has been a priority for South Africa's foreign policy implementation, generating mixed scholarly reactions. Thus, Hill (2018:5) is pessimistic that South Africa has struggled to translate its power into tangible foreign policy gains, and its record in Africa has punctuated high-profile failures. However, South Africa's approach desires to make Africa- and Southern Africa- in a particular theatre of South Africa activism to promote regional development and participate constructively in multilateral institutions (Laden & le Pere, 2006).

These assertions indicated that South Africa set new parameters defining its foreign policy towards Africa, emphasising that South Africa prioritises Africa because its development is linked to the continent. For Qobo and Dube (2015:149), South Africa strongly emphasised Africa's renewal or renaissance, with the critical impulse of this idea being the African National Congress' consciousness of history. The expression of the continent in South Africa's foreign policy implementation is not out of a vacuum; hence, the Foreign Policy White Paper was published in 2011 by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. DIRCO (2011) states, "Since the advent of democracy, the country has prioritised an Afro-Centric foreign policy "rooted in national liberation" and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism".

Virk and Paterson (2014:2) observed that the successive South African administrations have been acutely sensitive to a need to overcome the legacy of the regional destabilisation policy pursued by the apartheid regime. Hence, Qobo (2015:160) argued that Africa is a centrepiece of South Africa's foreign policy, with

greater weight placed on Southern Africa, including efforts to accelerate and deepen regional integration. This development projects South Africa as the responsible global player engaging in the continent's interests. However, progress in the Africanisation of South Africa's foreign policy also has some challenges influenced by domestic challenges, which led to the spate of xenophobia attacks against fellow African citizens residing in South Africa.

Hendricks and Majozi (2021:66) amplified that xenophobic attacks have impacted South Africa's credibility in promoting an African agenda on other Africans living within its borders. Despite that, according to Adebajo (Salo, 2018), Mbeki "encouraged South Africans to embrace an African identity and sought to promote the continent's political, economic and social renewal. Therefore, a spate of Xenophobia or Afrophobia attacks against fellow Africans dented South Africa's prospects of leading the continent and its image globally.

3.5 KEY ACTORS OF THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY AND PRIORITIES IN AFRICA

According to Landsberg (2010:95), South Africa's post-apartheid government, led by President Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC), was not merely interested in reconstructing the state and crafting a new national interest paradigm. Instead, this indicated that democratic South Africa was aiming high regarding its foreign policy with expectations that more stakeholders would be considered in its formulation. Hence, Landsberg (2010:95) and others chant that South Africa was just as committed to redesigning the republic's foreign policy and international relations. Noteworthy, the Republic of South Africa's Constitution of 1996 is explicit that the President is responsible for South Africa's foreign policy regarding appointing the heads of South Africa's diplomatic missions, conducting inter-state relations and entering into international agreements (DIRCO, 2023).

For Nganje (2021:2), the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) makes it clear that the President is the custodian of South Africa's foreign policy while it mandates the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the formulation and execution of South Africa's foreign policy. Therefore, with such a Constitutional proclamation, South Africa's foreign policy ought to be well-coordinated and aligned through critical structures in its implementation and accountability.

3.5.1 The Democratic Parliament of the Republic of South Africa

The Parliament of South Africa must be more involved in the country's international agenda and direction. Stiftung (2014:5) pointed out that the Parliament has a proud tradition of engagement in South Africa's foreign policy. As a result, the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation is involved in debates on economic diplomacy and human rights, shaping the country's approach toward international relations. The leading legislative actor within the foreign policy realm is the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, and it holds well-attended legislative hearings at which established tradition now requires the appearance of executive branch officials to answer questions related to South African foreign policy. It is through the Parliament that foreign policy is debated and adopted after meeting the consultation process; hence, a White Paper on Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Ubuntu was approved and is now the basis of the country's foreign policy implementation. According to Schraeder (2001:230), this emphasised that Parliament is a final state actor that has emerged as an essential foreign policy and plays a critical oversight role that goes beyond the foreign policy prerogatives enjoyed by legislatures during the apartheid (1948–94) and pre-apartheid (pre-1948) eras. This background prompted van Nieuwkerk (2018) to underscore that in a robust democracy, the role of Parliament is to hold the executive accountable. However, over the past few years, Parliament's oversight role went by the wayside, overridden by the overwhelming role of the governing party.

3.5.2 South Africa's National Interests

With the advent of the democratic dispensation, the new South Africa must define its national interest to inform its foreign policy implementation. To this effect, Hendricks and Majozi (2021:51) pointed out seven principles upon which the country's post-apartheid foreign policy would be based, namely human rights, the promotion of democracy worldwide, respect for justice and international law, and peaceful mechanisms to resolve conflicts. These principles reflected the country's national interests and what would influence the foreign policy of a newly democratic South Africa. To this effect, the African National Congress' foreign policy laid a foundation as its 1994 foreign policy reflected the interests of the continent of Africa, interdependence, and cooperation (ANC, 1994). Therefore, democratic South Africa

had to accept this background and the fact that national interest has a universal consensus worth replicating. Thus, South Africa's desire to fulfil its citizens' domestic priorities and well-being is linked to the continent, with the overriding catchphrase of national interests being the driving force focus. Thus, South Africa's desire to fulfil its domestic priorities and the well-being of its citizens is linked to the continent, with the overriding catchphrase of national interests being the driving force. Aziz (1996:196) summarised that it should interest everybody in the country. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) should be able to constantly draw from the knowledge and opinions of the nation in formulating foreign policy informed by the fact that, after all, national interest aims to protect and promote the interests of the citizens in the global community.

It is worth emphasising that DIRCO's strategic plan highlighted that South Africa's future is inextricably linked to the continent (DIRCO, 2010), affirming that it is in South Africa's interest for a continent to strive and develop; hence, the country has invested enormous resources in peacekeeping and conflict reconstruction and development programmes since 1994. Stiftung (2014:15) argued that South Africa's national interests are rooted in the country's Constitution and history, spelling out the values we aspire to, which we also wish to propagate through our foreign policy practice. Such was in line with Matjila as he contends that South Africa's foreign policy is integral to the country's national plans for socio-economic development as a core- national priority and interest (Muller,2012:03). Equally, Maloka (2013:12) believed that South Africa's national interests and strategy should address each dimension of national interests, including their vital/secondary levels. Maloka's view is important as national interests are critical as there is no country whose foreign policy is made from nothing. Noteworthy, foreign policies are implemented to serve the country's desires, which some argue are domestic interests.

Landsberg (2010:87) argues that South Africa grappled with a set of national strategic aims that would help overcome centuries of white minority domination and decades of institutionalised apartheid and repression, indicating that foreign policy must have some set of crucial drivers that resonates profoundly with the nation the country is acting on behalf of; hence, even during the apartheid regime, white people's interests were preserved. Landsberg (2010) further asserted that during the era of white

domination and apartheid (1910-89), the main objectives of successive governments were to guarantee white security and survival as the overriding national interests. Noteworthy, national interests as the key driver of the country's foreign policy implementation are common as governments have been vociferous in preserving their domestic.

Larry Diamond (2016:19) succinctly argued that in the case of the United States of America, guiding the foreign policy priorities are the safety of its citizens, the security of its borders, an extension of its power and the advancement of its economic interests in trade, investment, and natural resources. So, it is not coincident that South Africa enunciated that the country's domestic interests inform her foreign policy implementation. It is worth pointing out that he recently published a framework document on South Africa's national interests and its advancement in a global environment. According to the paper, promoting our national interest globally must achieve South Africa's national goal of reviving and growing the economy to levels set in the National Development Plan Vision 2030.

As for the DIRCO Minister, Dr Naledi Pandor, national interests stress that the Constitution's values, principles, and socio-political and socio-economic ambitions are the critical foundation for national interests (Pandor, 2022:6). Pandor's assertion is an affirmation that South Africa's national interests are drawn from the country's Constitution and aimed at improving the people's lives. This contention builds on Landsberg's view that domestic politics shape foreign policy in direct ways and could, therefore, significantly constrain foreign policy manoeuvrability. Thus, Pandor (2022:7) further pointed out that in giving meaning, we have defined our national interest as encompassing national sovereignty and constitutional order, the safety of our citizens, economic prosperity and a better Africa and world.

3.5.3 The Democratic Department of Foreign Affairs-Dirco

A foreign ministry is foremost among state institutions that engage on behalf of a state with the international community, thus conveying a critical message to the world about that state's internal and external relations (van Wyk, 2019:12). Therefore, democratic transition inverted changes in government structure those ministries crucial in advancing the democratic foreign policy, previously tainted by the brutality of the

apartheid regime. Against this background, Otavio (2017:182) stressed that in South Africa's international relations, expectations were high for the Department of Foreign Affairs to undergo drastic changes and transformation.

When South Africa ushered in a new era in 1994, changes were inevitable in structures such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, an administration and implementation hub of the country's foreign policy—the anticipated changes regarding how the Department of post-apartheid South Africa should be. Thakur (2015:515), these debates focused on composition, nature, and ideological thrust. As for Schraeder (2001:229), institutional change revolved around restructuring the Ministry to ensure it assumes one of the leading roles in formulating and implementing foreign policy. With the integration process undertaken, there were two different organisational cultures comprised of the old DFA and the Department of International Affairs (DIA) of the African National Congress (ANC) (Thakur, 2015:516).

Noteworthy, ANC diplomat and long-serving party's Secretary-General Alfred Nzo was appointed the first democratic South Africa Foreign Minister with Aziz Pahad, who was part of the party's foreign policy draft group during the negotiation towards apartheid. The new Minister and the Deputy Minister would have to balance the existing mechanism that has been there for decades while undertaking transformation. The integration the country was undergoing as far as foreign policy is concerned necessitated that there should be transformation even at the department level. In his arguments in support of transformation into a new South Africa, Thakur (2015:517) saw the bureaucracy involved in the change from pigmentocracy to representocracy. Schraeder (2001:229) stressed that a process was undertaken to create a new department integrating the best and the brightest diplomats from the foreign service of the apartheid regime, the ANC's DIA, and the foreign ministries of the four homelands.

These developments indicated that the task ahead was crucial; the transformation was inevitable, judging from the country's reputational damage due to apartheid policies. Similarly, the democratic Government's Foreign Affairs Ministry had an enormous task as, together with the Finance and Defence, the Ministry enjoyed cabinet seniority (Wheeler, 2006:1). Therefore, Pahad (1996:196) highlighted that the Department is emerging from the cocoon forced around it by apartheid and is taking up the challenges and possibilities of a young democracy in a world with vigour. Aziz's

assertion was an affirmation of the road ahead and commitment of the political will to ensure that the Department is structured in a manner suitable for its environment. For Selebi (1999:211), the transformation was not only about race, colour, or gender but efficiency and effectiveness, empowering officials to make the right choices and do things the best way. He further emphasised that this will ensure that officials of the Department have a common understanding of the focus areas and why they work for the Department and represent the country abroad. To this effect, Nzo (1999) raised concern that the Department, though committed to fiscal discipline, budget in the financial year 1997/1998 declined from R1,289 million to R1,137 million, which challenged the democratic government's foreign policy ambitions, considering the foreign currencies in the operation of the Missions globally. Also, as the transformation process unfolded, challenges prevailed, impacting the DIA representatives.

The DIA representatives admitted were only matriculated or lower, relying more on on-the-job training, whilst DFA required a university degree as a minimal condition of recruitment (Thakur, 2015:516). These concerns resulted in the establishment of the Independent Institution of Diplomacy to capacitate those still needing to be qualified for the DIA. However, despite progress in transforming foreign affairs, criticisms were not spared. Thakur observed that the Ministry and Minister Nzo received a barrage of criticism for failing to provide the moral leadership the world expected from South Africa (Thakur, 2015:517). Scholars reasoned that the new government was inexperienced and preoccupied with the domestic imperatives of national reconciliation and the transformation of state departments. Others believed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, needed more dynamism and vision. However, the dominant apartheid-era officials in the Department were still dazzled by the light of democracy and an open world with high expectations of South Africa.

Having succeeded Nzo as Minister, Dlamini-Zuma believed that the challenges confronting the Department when it pursues foreign policy objectives require transformation. Therefore, she highlighted that those measures are in place to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for change (Dlamini-Zuma, 2000:194). This undertaking signalled proper coordination ahead of the Department to pursue the foreign policy objectives. As a result, the 2000-2005 strategic plan outlined that it is derived from the broad foreign policy objectives of the government as outlined in its international relations, peace, and security programme. The strategic plan further

enunciated that the Department requires a strong coordinating capacity and global presence as the lead agency responsible for managing South Africa's international programmes.

Such proclamation was not in isolation but emphasised that when Mandela left Robben Island prison after 27 years of incarceration, 29 governments had South African representation. However, before his inauguration in May 1994, the number of foreign representatives had shot up four and one-half times to 136, which is a diplomatic history of any Power; the sheer volume of this change was unprecedented (Thakur, 2015:514). In the 2003-2005 strategic plan, the Department would further highlight that South Africa maintains diplomatic relations with countries and organisations through 96 missions in 85 countries globally and accredited about 160 on its shores. These positive developments notwithstanding that apartheid foreign affairs sought to justify and protect an authoritarian apartheid political system disenfranchising the black majority (Schraeder, 2001:5). This was emphasised in the 20 years review that under apartheid, the focus of the departments that dealt with foreign affairs, defence, trade and industry, and intelligence was on securing the apartheid state (Government, 2015:2). According to Stiftung (2014:9), the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No.108 of 1996, mandated the Minister of Foreign Affairs is mandated and entrusted with the formulation, promotion and execution of foreign policy.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry has evolved since 2008 and was renamed the Department of International Cooperation (DIRCO, 2011). Arguing on the rationale for renaming, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane downplayed perceptions of the likely foreign policy shift because of the name changes. Thus, she pointed out that "the renaming was largely motivated by international trends which require states to emphasise cooperation over competition, and collaboration over confrontation" (Landsberg, 2014). Nkoana-Mashabane (2009) further argued that these structural changes aim to advance our central objective of creating a better life for all South Africans. Van Wyk (2019:13) believed the name change was designed to illustrate the Department's intention to 'redefine its role in building more profound and more expansive relations to advance South Africa's national interests.

Also, Zuma's choice of Nkoana-Mashabane as a Minister was highly criticised, with Mangcu arguing that she was little known; however, Zuma countered that she was not strange to the ANC and the foreign policy establishment in South Africa (2019). Therefore, expectations were high because she understands the department machinery at the Head Office and abroad; she will steer the Department consistently with her predecessors. However, DIRCO has progressed and regressed to this effect, noting that during Nkoana-Mashabane's tenure, scandals regarding embezzlement of the African Renaissance Funds and the US non-existence resident occurred. To this effect, the current Minister expelled the Director-General and Chief Financial Officer years after Nkoana-Mashabane had been redeployed.

Equally so, during Nkoana-Mashabane's tenure, DIRCO was expected to lead the establishment of the South African Development Agency (SADPA) following the ANC Polokwane resolution. According to Besharati (2013:31), when the ANC convened in 2007 at the July Policy Conference and later the 52nd National Conference of the ANC in December of the same year, it discussed establishing SADPA. For Nkoana-Mashabane (2012), SADPA will deepen South Africa's foreign policy impact and influence through coordinated development initiatives on the African continent. Equally, DIRCO (2014) also argued that SADPA would enable South Africa to introduce innovative new approaches to development cooperation in Africa. Thus, briefing the Portfolio Committee, Ambassador Nkosi highlighted that the establishment of SADPA represented a significant development in the architecture of South Africa's foreign policy (DIRCO, 2015). However, SADPA still needs to be operationalised, raising concerns about the Department's capabilities.

The abrupt end of Jacob Zuma's presidency necessitated changes, with Maite Nkoana-Mashabane replaced by Lindiwe Sisulu, who had a short period in the Department. She led the charge in reviewing the country's foreign policy, which observers saw as infringing on the President's Constitutional power regarding foreign policy direction. When the fifth administration ended, Cyril Ramaphosa became the President of the Republic and appointed Dr Naledi Pandor as the Minister of DIRCO. Pandor became the Minister of the Department when the country's financial position could have been better; many prioritisations were made, impacting the Department's capacity. Though there is progress, challenges are inevitable because of the environment in which it operates.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Foreign Foreign policy as the mechanism is a platform through which a country advances its interests; therefore, the political transition in South Africa has presented the country with opportunities to reshape its outlook. The discussion outlined the historical context in which the genesis of the country's foreign policy can be traced to answer the research question of how the political transition came about. The evolution of South Africa's foreign policy has, per the discussion, gone through a range of stages, and the arrival of the colonists must be noticed; hence, the debate sketched that historical context.

The formation of minorities and their successive evolution impacted the black minority, which, as a result, saw a need to be united to defend against the injustice in their own country. The formation of the African National Congress was also an impetus for the country's foreign policy. Since its inception, the ANC has managed to advance the interests of the minority through international mobilisation, shaping its foreign policy, which later became the country's foreign policy. Therefore, the discussion showed how the initial foreign policy undertakings became the basis upon which the democratic government implements its foreign policy objectives. During the talks, it was evident that the current foreign policy has some level of coherence despite some challenges from Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma and Ramaphosa's presidency, which, in essence, proved that the environment in which South Africa operates has complications as it ought to distinguish between its national interests, which are informed by democratic principles and the solidarity informed by the support the ANC received during the struggle against apartheid.

The discussion gave an overview of the country's prioritisation of the African Continent, which is part of proving that it cannot exist outside of it; hence, more resources and efforts were placed through the African Agenda as an overriding objective of the country's foreign policy implementation. Furthermore, the African Agenda has emerged in the discussion as a mechanism that the democrats sought to achieve when engaging with developed nations; hence, it was instrumental in founding the continent's blueprint for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Briefly, South Africa's foreign policy has made strides in building on the basis laid down

by the forbears of the liberation movements, as the discussion detailed how reference is always made to the Freedom Charter document, which envisioned South Africa's foreign policy was experiencing.

CHAPTER 4 :
AFRICA AT A GLANCE: STATE OF DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to give an overview of the African Continent through an assessment of the state of democracy, good governance, and economic development. The chapter is informed by the objectives of the study, which envisage a deeper understanding of South Africa's quest to promote democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development. So, the Democracy South Africa seeks to advance as a basis for economic growth and good governance in Africa has a meaning and origin that cannot be overlooked. Vodovnik (2017:5) stated that the definitive history of democracy typically begins in ancient Greece. As a result, most scholars of democracy as an ideology still maintain that it was only in Greece that a bridge was built between the people's will and their government. It was underlined that for the Greeks who invented democracy, it meant gathering in the public space, the agora in the fifth century B, larger Pnyx in the fourth, making laws based on an agenda selected by an assembly of five hundred citizens (Landemore, 2020:1).

Onyalo (2020:10) opined that the end of autocratic rule in 1974 and communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 produced a welcome convergence towards a universally accepted definition of democracy. Thus, Larry Diamond stressed that Huntington defined a "wave of democratisation as a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes. These transitions occur within a specified period and significantly outnumber shifts in the opposite direction (Huntington, 1997:1). Democracy is a governance configuration moulded by a given culture's general values, biases, prejudices, and nuances precisely because democracy is a system of government that allows the citizens to decide their desires and necessities via free, fair, and periodic multiparty elections (Schmitter & Karl, 1997:4).

Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018:9) expressed that democracy is a system of government with regular, free and fair elections in which adult citizens have the right to participate in the democratic processes. The overhead view also expanded that democracy is a

system of self-rule that maximises liberty, ensuring freedom of speech, especially public political discourse, as it cannot be restricted (Stanley, 2015:38). This assertion emphasises the importance of embracing democracy for any country to determine its endeavours. Noteworthy, Landemore (2020:1) argues that democracy is etymological "people's power" and, as a regime form, means rule in all can share equally, emphasising the importance of people at the core of any democratic dispensation; therefore, any efforts to ignore such importance will eat at the heart of the meaning of democracy.

Also, Stapelbroek (2013:2) traced democracy back to the eighteenth century, wherein it was recognised as a curse word until the very end of the century. This assertion was informed by the fact that when a strand of American Republicans attempted to distinguish their views from other Republican ideas and adopted the term democracy. Undisputedly, the state of democracy, economic development and good governance in Africa has been in the spotlight, prompting mixed reactions, with scholars painting the disheartening picture of despair as far as democracy in the continent is concerned. As construed, Africa is a hopeless continent, though others concluded that the continent's prospects are enormous.

This chapter will attempt to give both sides of the coin regarding democracy, good governance, and economic development in the continent. It is arguable and worth emphasising that Africa has, within the context of the above concepts, come a long way since the end of colonialism and the subsequent founding of the Organisation of the African Unity. It is thus evident that democracy does not work solely but is linked with good governance and economic development. Reasons are advanced that democratisation makes the environment conducive for good governance and economic development to thrive. The chapter thus gives a clear view of Africa's governance mechanisms, highlighting the impending factors for good governance and the milestones since the inception of this concept in the African realm.

The chapter will expand on the continent's state of economic development to explore its extent, notwithstanding hampering challenges and their root causes. Conclusions will, through discussions, be drawn regarding democracy, good governance, and economic development in Africa to give meaningful account. Also, the determinants such as coup de tat, corruption, third terminism, and lack of democratic practices

contributing to the challenges confronting the continent promoting narratives that it is decaying will be discussed. Briefly, the discourse regarding Democracy in Africa should be undertaken considering that the African continent has been under colonial rulers for years.

The inception of Democracy in Africa and its evolution during the 18th century will not be overlooked. However, contrary to other scholarly convictions on the advent of democracy, which they primarily associate with the Ancient Greeks, Reiter (2021:1) argues that democracy started in Africa. His contention is informed by aspects of democracy which advocate for self-rule. According to him, such is an affirmation that democracy started in Africa before the arrival of colonisers ruling themselves.

4.2 STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

It is rational to highlight different connotations of democracy as the basis for the discussion. Democracy is seen as an analytic concept, a normative ideal, a political prescription, and an empirical description (Williams, 2003:339). For Mozzafar (1997:7), the democratic process in Africa cannot be divorced from the Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's assertion of the "third wave" of democratisation. Strikingly, Africa was colonised for years until the 1960s when it gained independence; thus, Ake (1993:240) argued it was a bitter, disappointing phase upon which Africa's democratic movement is based. Ake's view is not in isolation as scholars have expressed disappointment with the missed opportunity by the continent's forbears to assert a democratic foundation upon independence from the colonisers; instead, they nurtured dictators.

Arguments thus emerged, prompting others to argue that the prognosis for democracy on the continent has been historically highly unfavourable (Munetsi, 2011:4). Though the above assertion affirms negative undertones, others hold different views. As a result, Lancaster (1992:148) argues that upon attaining independence in the 1960s, most African countries inherited democratic political systems that the colonial powers hastily put in place, amplified by the fact that Democracy in Africa has been shaped by the colonial forces that ran Africa until decolonisation, as began in the 1960s (Schuster, 2002:1). Others, such as Bradley, argued that Africa's conceptions of democratisation had been marred by Western precepts of democratic rule and

institutions, such as the need for political parties and what they ought, or ought not, to do to be viable democratic players.

Schuster (2002:1) further argued that Africa has attempted to follow the European model of democratic governance; however, legitimacy is mysterious as African states are characterised by corruption and autocracy, which could be inferred from an observation that by the end of the first decade of independence, most African countries had lapsed into party-party dictatorship or military despotism (Idowo, 2012:149). However, the same narrative shows that by 1960, most African countries had become independent, and nine had formed one-party regimes (Bates, 2010:1136). As a result, a picture has been painted depicting and confirming scholarly observations; indeed, democracy as an ideology is a foreign concept in Africa. Thus, it was highlighted that democracy started in the 1970s with political liberalisation in Southern Europe, Latin America and some South-West Asian nations (Ngarhodjim, 2009:77). Then, seven more governments imposed single-party rule by the mid-1970s. However, things changed with the collapse of the defunct Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the gleeful emergence of the US and its allies, resulting in the invention of the unipolar global powers that pressured military and one-party dictatorships, including personal rulers (Tar, 2010:81).

These developments relatively gave sense to the trajectory of democratic solidity in Africa, which situates its renaissance on the tearing down of the Berlin Wall that demarcated Western Europe from Eastern Europe following the end of WWII (Udogu, 2016:5). This is critical because it was observed within the continent's forbears that the United States and the former Soviet Union used Africa as a battleground to fight ideological and, in some cases, real proxy wars. As a result, they destabilised governments across the continent (Kaunda, 2008:9). The implosion of the USSR led to the balkanisation of this vast Empire, and collapsed communism was a primary reason for the democratic revival in Africa. So, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of one of the superpowers, a light of hope which may bring peace, stability and democracy to sub-Saharan Africa was rekindled (Gleu, 1997:97). Also, Democracy in Africa during the 1990s period, a powerful backwash of popular demonstrations for re-democratisation flooded the corners of the Continent (Decalo, 1992:7). This, in essence, necessitated Africa not to miss the opportunity presented

by the third wave of democratisation as contextualised by the American Political Science Professor in his narration of the "Third Wave". According to Clapham, such developments reshaped the African political order into forms which would be startlingly at variance with those through which most of the continent has been governed since independence.

The 1990s saw profound democratic reforms swept across the entire continent, including South Africa, which for decades has been under an unjust regime of apartheid (Tar, 2010:82). According to Sarsar (2012:21), African countries have had a less than satisfactory democratic record, essentially caused by both external and internal factors. For this reason, Gleu (1997:97) advanced that Sub-Saharan Africa has endured the most horrendous dictatorships for the last three decades. Moreover, the overthrow of these dictatorships has been hampered by interference from superpower politics. As for McDonald (2013:780), if there was a posturing of democracy during the first decades of independence, it was dominant-party democracy, but that was only a euphemism for autocracy.

Paradoxically, most African states experienced democratic transitions following the third wave of democratisation that spread across the region in the 1990s, characterised by multiparty elections, tolerance for opposition tolerance, media freedom, protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law (Akinyetun, 2022:89). Nevertheless, the state of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has remained poor because authoritarian regimes continue characterising the region, which contains seven of the 15 lowest-ranked countries in the World (Economic Intelligence, 2021:45).

4.2.1 Challenges of Democracy in Africa

The challenges confronting Africa are well-documented and continue to influence public discourse, generating various opinions. Africa's democratic challenges and current problems cannot be separated from colonialism and global developments, which have prompted the conviction that democracy is under siege. Brenya and Au-Gyamfi (2015:29) thus assert that Africa's problems are rooted in the continent's relations with Europe over 300 years, even though the Europeans seem unable to accept the impact of their imperial control with good grace. As Clapham (1993:430)

contends, the biggest obstacle to Democracy in Africa lay in the profound statism of African political systems wherein African leaders at independence inherited states rather than nations.

The changes brought by the democratic dispensation, which took place in many African countries, were seen from different angles, and others, such as Khagram (1993:65), were of the view that its transition was likely to leave extant social and economic inequalities that are intact, which are genuine. It is worth highlighting that ordinary Africans expected a better life following independence. Still, the post-independence period has proved utterly disappointing (Reddy, 2008:471), asserting that despite independence, Africans still need to be independent as independence fails to transform their social well-being. As for Saka, there has been noticeable progress as far as the democratic transition is concerned; however, strengthening democratic values and practices and advancing the democratic project in Africa remains daunting.

The above assertion finds better expression from the fact that coups happening in Africa are worrying as the continent saw a decline in coups and attempted coups in the first two decades of the 21st century; by contrast, there were about 20 coups per decade in the 1960-2000 period. However, to date, the continent is being ransacked by authoritarian regimes, which gave rise to a notable development in 2021, which saw the number of coups on the African continent. To this effect, West Africa was leading in terms of coups, as in 2021, the military seized power in Mali and Guinea, and a coup was also attempted by elements of the military in Niger (Economic Intelligence, 2021:53). These developments further exacerbated the challenges that democracy is undergoing in the African continent as these coups result in intractable conflicts.

These developments validate daunting observations that Democracy in Africa is not out of a vacuum. The continent is the battleground of conflicts and home to many dictators reluctant to hand over power. This assertion contradicts Hamid's view that at the core of democracies, they offer one essential advantage: they allow for peaceful alternation of power and the regulation of existential conflict. Others like Chukwuemeka (2022:3) argue that a high level of civil society's absence amplifies the democratic challenges Africa is facing. This assertion is informed by the fact that the

definition of democracy, as defined by scholars, has an element of participation requiring that governments become governments of people by people.

The civic society non-participation is viewed as a threat to democracy because extremists and demagogues exploit it to ascend to leadership positions. Hence, Faloyin believes that since the independence movements of the 50s and 60s, most African nations have contended with a man who does not know when to quit. As a result, such observations as the list of long-serving presidents through democratic manipulation are rife in Africa. To this effect, President Museveni of Uganda and President Nkurunziza of Burundi are two recent examples of leaders acting in this fashion; this is mainly because, as argued by scholars, the African region has also lacked robust institutional mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing democratic values.

Fukuyama and McFaul (2007:4) highlighted that the institutions of democracy also prevent abusive governance while constraining bad governance and providing a mechanism for removing corrupt or ineffective rule. However, developments in Africa are contrary to this notion, as the challenges the continent is experiencing cannot be divorced from weak institutions that are failing to protect democracy. As a result, some African countries struggle to deepen and institutionalise democracy and deal effectively and comprehensively with government impunity associated with abusing executive power and violating human rights (Mbaku, 2020:1). These adverse developments are unfolding even though, as a success of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Union has, in its preamble, outlined its objectives. According to the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000 and entered into force on 26 May 2001, the following objectives have been identified as they speak to the purposes of this chapter:

- achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- promote and defend common African positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

- promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- promote and protect human and peoples' rights by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and international negotiations; and
- promote sustainable economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies.

Contrarily, the AU's legislative, judicial, and technical organs need to be stronger, especially relative to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which comprises the leaders of its 55 member states (Nantulya, 2022:1).

4.3 THE STATE OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Assessing the state of good governance in Africa cannot be undertaken without noting the evolution of democracies and economic development since the continent's independence. Christensen and Laitin (2019:31) opined that in their first half-century of self-rule, newly independent African states had lagged behind the rest of the World regarding economic development, establishing effective governance to secure social order by consolidating democracy. This assertion, therefore, gives a picture of why the continent is where it is currently as far as governance is concerned. As for Wani (2015:189), African countries have taken some necessary and bold initiatives on governance as one of the essential factors for sustainable economic growth and development for alleviating poverty.

Stoberg (2005:1) highlighted that governance is the delivery of political goods to citizens. The better the quality of that delivery and the greater the quantity of the political goods being delivered, the higher the level of governance everywhere and at every jurisdictional level, not just in Africa. Faloyin stated that Africa had faced the brunt of this unbalanced treatment like a governance monolith with a concentration of savage warlords. The African Union, a continental body, highlighted that governance is linked to ruling and control, precisely the exercise of power and refers to the practice of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels (AU, 2000:5). The AU further accentuate that "Good governance" has the following major components: legitimacy, whereby the government has the consent of

the governed; accountability that ensures transparency and answerability for actions; respect for law and protection of human rights; and competence, which consists of effective policy making, policy implementation and service delivery.

On the other hand, Hydén (2019:32) argues that governance entails creating and managing systems that allow for the authoritative use of power to create social order and move society forward – and the responses that follow from such interventions. Though optimistic about governance, Hydén (2019:47), in the same vein, argues that one of the challenges in Africa regarding governance is that most people are not part of a formal system that compels them to comply with public law and regulations. However, where they participate, they have exposed the weakness of the states, which are; as a result, weak governance institutions as they have been weakened to advance the interests of the few.

The Peace and Security Council Report of 2021 is explicit that governance problems on the continent revolve around states' management, resulting from the inability of many leaders to manage economies properly, diversities and political inclusion (ISS, 2023:1). The report further highlights that the level of trust in state institutions and their capacity to execute essential functions, particularly the provision of the public good, has been reduced to the level at which they need to add meaningful value. According to a World Bank study of Sub Sahara Africa, "the problem of Africa's development is a crisis of governance because of the selfish interest of some state officials, who have served in one capacity or the other and have deliberately refused to give an account of their activities while in office (Zeufack, 2022:1). Therefore, despite the myriad of challenges regarding governance in the continent, the establishment of institutions such as the African Peer Review Mechanism. The challenges of institutions to safeguard the democratic project in the continent were also observed in 2009 by President Obama, prompting him to argue whilst in Accra, Ghana, that Africa no longer needs strongmen—it needs strong institutions (Joseph, 2009:1). This observation invigorated the idea that Africa, to prosper, should strengthen its institutions as the basis to get its democratic project in shape.

4.3.1 The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African continent's poor governance track record has contributed negatively and created negative perceptions that those developed nations who might be handy in the continent's development trajectories become sceptical and reluctant to provide capital support. Therefore, African governments undertook to improve their political and economic governance regimes and manifestly established the African Peer Review Mechanism (Bing-Pappoe, 2010:2). Subsequently, in 2002, the African Heads of State, through the Durban Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, established a regional institution called the APRM (Manby, 2009:217).

It was thus underscored that the APRM is an instrument voluntarily acceded to by the general membership of the AU as an African self-monitoring mechanism (Jonas, 2012:429). APRM seeks to assess the governance challenges which have affected Africa's development several years after independence and monitor African governments' commitments to the AU's Declaration to promote good governance (Jiboku, 2015). The establishment of the APRM was cognisant of the challenges the continent is experiencing because of poor governance; however, countries are forced to subject themselves but do so voluntarily. Worth noting is that APRM was established as an autonomous entity of the AU, which is a mutually agreed instrument, willingly acceded to by the AU Member States as an African self-monitoring mechanism of good governance (APRM, 2021).

The above assertion was amplified by the fact that African leaders recognised the "imperatives of good governance for human security, political stability, high economic growth sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration" (Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). However, countries wishing to accede to the APRM must first notify the chairperson of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), heads of state and government implementation committee, and deposit a signed memorandum of agreement with the NEPAD Secretariat in South Africa (Jonas, 2012:429).

The APRM aims to promote the ideals of good governance and widespread participation of Africans at all levels of governmental and development activity –

national, sub-regional and continental – to further the AU/NEPAD objectives. Since its inception, the APRM has seen positive responses and out of a possible fifty-three African states, as of March 2012, the number of APRM members is standing at thirty-one, with the expected accession of Niger and Guinea raising the number to thirty-three, a figure accounts for 76% of Africa's population (Jiboku, 2015). The APRM has the mandate to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform with the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards and to achieve mutually agreed objectives in socio-economic development contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (APRM, 2021).

4.4 THE STATE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

It is worth highlighting from the onset that economic growth is a critical element for development. It has been the main engine for poverty reduction globally and for Sub Sahara Africa (Fosu, 2018:4). However, African economic growth has evolved since colonialism with much imperialist influence as they seek to preserve their economic interest. Therefore, due consideration should be given to the fact that the African continent is a result of the imperialists whose objectives did not include the socio-economic development of Africa (Baah, 2003:1). Scholars have opined on the potential which Africa economically, with some arguing that should things get done right, the continent will make a meaningful contribution to transforming the socioeconomic well-being of her people. This assertion was further denoted that the continent has a gift of nature with potential economic prospects; she is reckoned as the most underdeveloped among all the world continents (Ikechukwu, 2016:12). He further emphasised that what appears to be the main reason for the lack of development finds expression not in the absence of efforts but in efforts being directed towards the wrong direction.

Le Pere and Ikome (2009:5) highlighted that Africa's economic development and growth history had been characterised by failed experiments, poor planning, and impractical orthodoxies. To this effect, it is argued that the continent was left at the mercy of states and ruling elites who could not meet the challenges of rising expectations from their citizens and the imperatives of sound policy design and implementation. It is undoubtedly that Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced twenty

years of virtually uninterrupted growth since the mid-1990s. Such growth was combined with more excellent political and macro-economic stability in the region; this record has unseated the deep sense of 'Afro-pessimism' that dominated the 1980s–2000s and replaced it with a more optimistic one (Van Waijenburg & Frankema, 2018:543). Mensah and Özer (2016:2) gave a different perspective, arguing that Africa's early 1960s was a fresh start as some countries gained political freedom from colonial rule.

Considering that it is being bedevilled with a series of development challenges impacting the socio-economic conditions of its people, the African continent undertook economic and development initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Regional Integration and African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). This development prompted scholars to opine optimistically about the African continent's developmental ambitions and see such initiatives going in the right direction.

4.4.1 The New Partnership for Africa's Development

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was initiated to overcome Africa's problems, such as underdevelopment, poverty, undemocratic regimes, and lack of cooperation between African states (Boston, 2011:1). Different scholars highlighted the same view; therefore, Momoh and Saka (2015:2) also amplify that NEPAD was launched in 2001 as an African-owned and African-led strategic; framework for the socio-economic development of the African continent. This framework was seen as a development programme based on acknowledging Africa's crisis and the continent's deadlock regarding development and integration into the global economy (Kaba, 2004:22). As a result, the African Union ratified NEPAD to address the development problems of Africa using a new paradigm developed by the Africans that use African resources (UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2005:15). The establishment of the NEPAD occurred when the continent had numerous development frameworks that yielded different outcomes despite being good on paper.

The above assertion was better expressed by Kaba, who highlighted that NEPAD was not the first African development strategy; in 1980, the continent adopted the Lagos Plan of Action; however, it failed because it lacked the necessary support from the

international community. Nevertheless, despite the Lagos Plan's failure, since its adoption, there have been renewed efforts by domestic and external actors to transform the continent and improve the African people's ability to engage in sustainable development in the new century (Mbaku, 2004:391). It was encouraging that African leaders congregated to harness their strategies out of the challenges of poverty and other developmental issues, which gave birth to NEPAD (Edward, Gambo & Yakubu, 2014:202). This undertaking manifests determination on the part of the continent leaders and an indication that a solution to the problems confronting the continent was needed and could be found. The birth of NEPAD generated a wide range of scholarly views, with others arguing that NEPAD is a homegrown strategy for Africa's development; however, others needed to be more convinced about its originality, doubting if it is a homegrown strategy. As a result, Cornwell (2002:24) stressed that NEPAD is a pledge by African leaders based on understanding the pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place the continent on a path of sustainable growth and development.

Melber (2002:8) believed that NEPAD emphasised the "common vision and a firm and shared conviction to anchor the programme in "the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from under-development malaise (Melber, 2002:8). As for Mashele (2006:1), the birth of NEPAD was positive and has created a sense of optimism that life will be better in the years ahead in Africa. However, even though Mashele was optimistic about NEPAD as a game changer that will help Africa jet-propelling its developmental agenda, his assertion ignored that the continent had seen many socio-economic initiatives with similar objectives. The question was how NEPAD would be an exceptional case that would differ from the continent's initial undertakings, such as the Lagos Action Plan. Such observation amplified the reasonable expectations that some scholars expressed construing the founding objectives of NEPAD. The expressed optimism was informed by the goals of NEPAD, which in the founding documents highlighted that it aimed to:

- Ensure broad-based African ownership, responsibility and leadership for African development;
- To make Africa attractive to both domestic and foreign investors;

- To unleash the continent's economic potential– target an average GDP growth rate of over 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years;
- To ensure that the continent achieves the agreed Millennium Development Goals;
- To increase investment in human resource development;
- To promote the role of women in all activities and
- To promote sub-regional and continental economic integration.

Therefore, despite these explicitly outlined objectives, pessimism was at its height with negativity on the feasibility of NEPAD, prompting Bostan to argue that NEPAD initiators were conscious that these ambitious objectives would only be achievable if several priorities were fulfilled. These are peace and security; Democracy and governance; political, economic, and corporate governance; regional cooperation and integration; and capacity building (Bostan, 2011:3). Landsberg (2012:1), NEPAD's supporters, viewed it as Africa's 'Marshall Plan' and a proper development strategy of the AU. Its architects view it as an African Programme tailored by Africans for the continent's development. Mabula (2007:30) emphasised that African leaders recognise NEPAD as an essential vehicle to facilitate the continent's transition from underdevelopment to development and from exclusion to inclusion into the mainstream of a rapidly globalising world. There has been remarkable progress in positioning NEPAD globally, as argued that there has been the strengthening of partnerships with the rest of the World.

The African Union 2021 assessment highlights that NEPAD has engaged the G20, G8, OECD, FOCAC, TICAD and the UN system on new development cooperation and aid architecture for Africa (AU, 2021:2). These positive developments were worthwhile, as it was argued that NEPAD has already made significant progress in reaching some of its aims, particularly in African ownership, leadership, and debt cancellation (Khati, 2006:25). Moreover, these developments prompted the recently appointed Chief Executive Officer of the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD, Nardos Bekele-Thomas, to argue that leaders in the continent have come to see NEPAD become a reality (African Leaders, 2022:1).

Assessing the 20 years of NEPAD, the Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on NEPAD, H.E. Mr Salah Elhamdi, stated that NEPAD is still playing a pivotal role in Africa's development (NEPAD, 2021:1). This view amplified the importance of institutionalisation of the AUDA-NEPAD as it will ensure that regional and continental development programmes are coordinated. As for Dr Akinwumi A. Adesina, the African Development Bank President, "the African Development Bank stands fully ready to continue to provide strong support and help mobilise a lot more support for AUDA-NEPAD as it continues with new strategy, and of course, the African Union Commission" (AFDB, 2021:1). Such undertakings from the development bank's Chief Executive Officer indicate the financial support the NEPAD receives to implement its programmes.

Notwithstanding the progress registered, NEPAD is not immune to challenges; therefore, it is argued that NEPAD faces formidable challenges: forging new partnerships, dismantling trade barriers, and political dictatorships (Khati, 2006:1). Moreover, "one of the major reasons for the slow progress with the implementation of NEPAD may be capacity constraints, including institutional, human, and financial" (RCM-Africa, 2007:28).

4.4.2 Regional Economic Integration

The concept of regional integration has discussed generating different perspectives and meanings. Therefore, Udensi (2023:93) believes that regional economic integration involves agreements between countries that usually include eliminating trade barriers and aligning monetary and fiscal policies. From the same perspective, Balassa (2013:318) opined that regional economic integration is both a process and a state of affairs often occurring among neighbouring nations. Finally, Toriola (2021:5) intensified that regional economic integration is a process in which neighbouring states agree to upgrade cooperation through common institutions and rules. As for Okwatch (2023:4), regional integration is critical as it fosters international and regional collaboration because it leapfrogs trade barriers that impede the movement of people, goods, services, and expertise.

Against this background, it is essential to highlight that as far as Africa is concerned, the continent has, since independence, embraced regional integration as a critical

component of its development strategies. In the same context, Marinov (2014:9) stressed that regional integration in Africa had been a priority goal of both African governments and international donors since independence. To this effect, several regional integration arrangements have been undertaken. According to Nkomo, Mthombeni and Lehong (2020:1), since the 1960s, the OAU and its successor institution, AU, have sought to advance the ideal Pan-Africanism and the interdependence and economic integration it encompasses.

The continent has been disintegrated, and its efforts to realise economic development are impacting; therefore, initiatives to implement regional integration will go a long way. In this regard, the continent has been hard at work developing initiatives to promote regional integration. These undertakings are not in isolation. The African Union has "identified economic cooperation and integration as the engine to propel African development" (Chingono & Nakana, 2008:398). As a result, regional economic communities are pillars of continental integration and development. According to Qobo (2007:2), from the beginning of the decolonisation process in the 1960s, establishing sub-regional economic communities was a significant part of Africa's development strategy. Hence, Marinov (2014:9), African leaders are increasingly interested in speeding up the process of creating an economic African Economic Community (AEC) by developing initiatives for harmonisation and cohesion of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (FTA) COMESA-EAC-SADC.

Equally so, the post-independence era saw African governments embracing the idea of regional integration, initially mainly for political reasons and later as a development strategy (Tanyanyiwa, 2014:103). Such undertakings were intended to rise above the challenges of small markets and landlockedness and to benefit from economies of scale in production and trade. These include establishing the African Union and creating various Regional Economic Communities (RECs), pursuing integration through free trade and developing customs unions and a common market (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Anyanwu & Conceição, 2014:3). Thus, regional integration has been argued as coming together of countries to achieve large markets for themselves, reap the benefits of economies of scale, and attain coherent political cooperation (Avong & Garba, 2021:94).

Even with the optimism on regional economic integration, it is argued that Africa's record is not impressive because many RIAs have yet to do much to promote intra-regional trade (Hartzenberg, 2011:3). As for Qobo (2007:3), expectations were high that just like other regions which are reaping the benefits of regional economic integration, it is widely acknowledged that Africa's integration efforts have thus far failed to bear satisfactory fruit. However, there have also been some takeaways from the continent's efforts to promote regional economic integration that gives hope.

4.4.3 African Continental Free Trade Area

The historic African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) signed at Kigali in 2018 was a positive development towards the initial intentions of the continent forebearer after independence Schmieg (2020:1). The PWC believes that the AfCTA was established to create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of persons, capital, and investments. Also, in its 2020 report, the World Bank estimated that by 2035, real income gains from full implementation of the agreement could be 7% or nearly \$450 Billion. Equally, Schmieg (2020:5) argued that the realisation of the AfCTA is a positive move as intra-African trade offers excellent potential to establish regional value chains and boost growth and development. To emphasise the significance of the AfCFTA, Signé and van der Ven (2019:1) stated that AfCFTA would be the World's largest free trade area since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Furthermore, they stressed that under a successfully implemented AfCFTA, Africa will have a combined consumer and business spending of \$6.7 trillion in 2030.

Noteworthy is that following the adoption in 2018, about 24 countries had deposited their instruments of ratification, and in 2022, there were about 54 signatures, of which 43 (80%) had deposited their instruments of ratification (Okwatch, 2023:2). He further underscored that the AfCTA is designed to deepen integration, foster trade and investment, enhance the mobility of capital and labour, and support the industrialisation development of the dynamic services sector. On the other hand, Nkomo et al. (2020:2), the AfCTA agreement aims to progressively eliminate barriers to intra-African trade by resolving the overlapping membership of regional economic communities.

Others argued that "the implementation of the AfCTA has significant potential to catalyse Africa's post-pandemic recovery by promoting trade liberalisation and enabling structural transformation. De Melo (2019:1) was sceptical about the progress because the entry of the AfCTA before negotiations were completed created uncertainties as the Treaty will only bind the signatories. However, his pessimism has yet to refocus the optimism as others emphasised that the AfCTA is an ambitious trade pact to form the World's largest free trade single market of 1.3 billion people. Views on the optimism of the AfCFTA cannot be disregarded as they are signals that the African continent has pressed the right button towards being One-Africa economically. In this regard, Velde (2021:2) elaborates that the AfCFTA will essentially supplement the African Union Agenda 2063, which aims to transform African economies by increasing intra-continental trade and investment. Munyati (2022:1) states that accelerating the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) would provide the region with much-needed stimulus and drive the region's long-term recovery and growth.

Thus, this development has reinvigorated the determination that Africa embraces regional integration as an essential component of their development strategies since independence (Geda & Yimer, 2022:2). The birth of the AfCTA was heralded with optimism that scholars and pundits expressed different opinions, inspiring hope for the continent, which has always been construed as despair. Fagbayibo (2020:5) stated that adopting the agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 21 March 2018 continues to receive overwhelming support across the continent. He further underscored that should it get appropriately implemented, the projection is that the AfCFTA will be the most extensive free trade arrangement in the World, increasing intra-African trade and stimulating Africa's economic development and global positioning.

Furthermore, the AfCFTA can significantly increase income and welfare for its member countries; thus, it is estimated that African countries could reap long-term income gains from reducing trade barriers in the context of the AfCFTA (Abrego, de Zamarocoy, Gursoy, Nicholls, Perez-Saiz & Rosas, 2020:9). According to Knebel, Peter and Saygili (2018:5), the CFTA is widely seen as a crucial driver for economic growth, industrialisation, and sustainable development in Africa. The importance of this

initiative was acknowledged in how African countries responded, with forty-four out of the fifty-five member states of the Union signing the Treaty establishing the AfCFTA (Cofelice, 2018:32). Furthermore, Okwatch (2023:1) stressed that the AfCFTA is projected to bring together a \$3 trillion borderless market. Therefore, it could be instrumental in reversing current poverty, inequality, and growth trends on the continent.

According to the UNCTD's 2021 Africa Economic Development report, the AfCFTA will place Africa on an inclusive and sustainable growth path. Similarly, the PWC strengthened that the AfCFTA could be instrumental in addressing trade and economic development needs as it presents an untapped opportunity for facilitating trade in Africa. As for Pollen (2021:2), the advent of the AfCFTA allows the African continent to speak with one voice in trade negotiations. It is worth emphasising that Africa also engages with developed economies. Therefore, with the AfCFTA in force, the continent will sell to World One Africa with an organised plan. Though optimism was rife during its inception, the AfCFTA faced the challenges of coronavirus, which, according to the International Monetary Fund, threatened to throw the continent off its strides (Moore, 2021:4).

4.5 CONCLUSION

The discussions on Africa's democratic governance and economic development, within the context of the objective of this study, paint a mixed picture. It is evident that though Africa has made strides in economic development, good governance, and democracy, the discussions prove that the continent has many challenges that hamper its initiatives. Therefore, persistent failure to address them will further impact her developmental trajectories. It is a fact that countries that safeguard and embrace democracy are thriving in economic development, as where there is political stability, developments speedily occur except in some isolated situations. Africa should move from democratic rhetoric and embrace regional plans on democracy, development, and security to ensure that peace and stability cut across. Therefore, this chapter has briefly highlighted the challenges, milestones, progress, and shortcomings the African continent should prioritise to move from the periphery. It is pertinent that African leaders domesticate democratic principles that talk about democracy as the government of people by people rather than being self-centred leaders who only care

about themselves rather than the people, mainly because the African continent needs more transformational leaders willing to transform the continent rather than their selfish interest of staying in power forever without changing the socio-economic conditions of the people. Briefly, this chapter highlighted that Africa should start practising what it resolved on economic development, good governance, and democracy using the institutions that have been established as mechanisms to address challenges that impact its trajectories so that it can no longer be construed as despair.

CHAPTER 5 :
SOUTH AFRICA'S ENGAGEMENT MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This study project focuses on South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance to drive economic development in Africa against the protracted challenges impacting development prospects. The chapter aims to respond to the core of this dissertation project. As a result, it takes cognisance of the discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, which gives an account of the environment South Africa is navigating as it aspires to drive economic development in Africa. It is worth emphasising that the democratic dispensation in South Africa armed it to determine the role it ought to undertake in Africa's political and economic well-being, cognisance that her development cannot be separated from that of the region.

Therefore, expanding South Africa's role in the continent will be twofold, focusing on the country's political and economic engagement with the continent bilaterally and through the regional structure, ensuring that the study zooms into the country's engagement through the African Union and its structures, such as New Partnership for Africa's Development, Africa Peer Review Mechanism, African Union Peace and Security Council, Regional Integration, and AfCTA and through economic and political bilaterally in place. It should be emphasised, though briefly highlighted in Chapter 3, the essence of South Africa's prioritisation of the African Continent in its foreign policy implementation; this chapter will seek to be more pragmatic, investigating all the efforts South Africa has been and continues to undertake in the continent.

As a result, this will enable the study to examine if South Africa's efforts and initiatives to promote democracy and good governance for economic development in Africa are yielding results or are just a myth. However, it will also be critical that an overview of South Africa's political and economic is highlighted to give a sense of the country's strength within the context of the concepts it wishes to export to the continent. A few countries tied with South Africa will discuss political relations with Africa, such as

Nigeria, Ghana, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

5.2 OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA

The Republic of South Africa's engagements with the African Continent through political and economic arrangements since 1994, after the ushering of democracy occurred against the background of the country's historic injustices of apartheid, which resulted in the country's isolation. Scholars have put different perspectives on the aftermath of the advent of democracy, with others positioning South Africa as a panacea for Africa's political and economic conundrum. In this regard, Miller (2004:176) argues that, with the democratic dispensation in 1994 in South Africa, the country was poised for leadership for the new African Renaissance.

Since the apartheid legacy created the impression that South Africa is construed as not being an African country, Saunders (2014:223) was of the view that the transfer of power to the black majority in 1994 led the government to start to identify itself as an African country and asserted its relations with Africa in the foreign policy implementation. According to Alden and Soko (2005:368), one of the defining features of post-apartheid South Africa's political economy was the country's rapidly growing economic role across the African continent. Such assertion amplifies the optimistic narratives about South Africa's post-apartheid prospects concerning its relations with Africa politically and economically. However, despite their optimism, Alden and Soko (2005) further argued that despite the reunification of democratic South Africa with the continent, the country has been struggling to gain acceptance of its position beyond its immediate hinterland.

The above attests that the mistrust between South Africa and fellow African countries dating during the apartheid years cannot be quickly eroded. However, Adetiba (2020:79) argued that South Africa's successful transition from the obnoxious apartheid system to an inclusive democratic government in 1994 was met with joy by the continent. Such observation affirmed other scholars' observations, hence the optimistic narratives about the country's prospects. As for Pfister (2000:1), the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994 and the end of the Cold War in Africa set new parameters defining South Africa's foreign policy towards the African continent,

attesting to the scholarly views that post-apartheid South Africa has consciously chosen to relate to the continent differently from its predecessors through its engagements with it. To this effect, democratic South Africa prioritised developing bilateral political and economic relations, especially with African countries and since 1994, it has signed 624 agreements and established 40 bilateral mechanisms (RSA, 2014:148).

5.2.1 South Africa's Political Engagements with Africa

It is worth highlighting from the onset that South Africa's political engagements with the African continent are anchored on the country's foreign policy, which, during the political transition, broke from the country's apartheid of isolation. Accordingly, South Africa's engagements focus on Africa to promote development, resolve conflict, and build an environment where socioeconomic development can occur (RSA, 2010:306). To this effect, South Africa's foreign policy implemented in 1994 put Africa at the centre of its implementation and embraced relevant national priorities by strengthening bilateral cooperation with individual countries in Africa. According to DIRCO (2019), South Africa's bilateral relations with African countries are historical and fraternal with some countries; thus, the country has a wide diplomatic presence on the continent, currently standing at forty-seven (47) Diplomatic and Consular Missions in Africa. Moreover, the country desires to consolidate and strengthen bilateral cooperation and promote political, economic, and social relations. To this effect, South Africa has identified eleven (11) countries with which the structured bilateral mechanisms have been elevated to the level of the annual Bi-National Commissions (BNCs), all chaired by Heads of State (DIRCO, 2019).

Furthermore, the government's twenty years review since the advent of dispensation alludes to the fact that, after 1994, South Africa faced the task of repositioning itself in the region, on the continent and in the world, with a shared interest in peace, stability, and prosperity elaborating what has been outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan document that, is strengthening bilateral relations through, among other things increasing South Africa's diplomatic representation remains a high priority (DFA, 2004:8). As a result, South Africa utilises planned, structured bilateral engagements to strengthen and expand political, economic, and social cooperation (DFA, 2007:5). Therefore, guided by the foreign policy objectives, particularly Africa

as a thrust focus, South Africa has since 1994 strengthened bilateral relations with several African countries, which during the political transition were at their lowest owing to the apartheid government destabilisation. In this context, these relations are conducted through bilateral agreements ranging from the Bi-National Commission (BNC) led at the Head of States level, the Joint Permanent Commission (JPC), and the Joint Commission for Cooperation (JCC). These are mechanisms South Africa utilises to engage with fellow African counterparts, comprising political, economic, security, defence, immigration, development, social and humanitarian (DFA, 2004:9).

To this effect, the African strategy which South Africa is pursuing is anchored on three focal areas, which are political, economic, and socio-cultural; thus, the country seeks to maintain its political influence through partnerships with like-minded countries on the Continent (DIRCO, 2017:11). According to the 2011 government delivery outcome 11, South Africa, as an integral part of the African continent, seeks to assert itself on the global stage in a manner that advances the African agenda (RSA, 2011:6). As a result, South Africa has strengthened relations with key countries in different Regional Economic Communities in the continent. For example, regarding the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South Africa has bilateral relations with the Republic of Ghana. The relations are growing thus elevated to the Presidential level, and President Cyril Ramaphosa and President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo witnessed the signing of an agreement to establish a Bi-National Commission (BNC) chaired by Heads of State (SANews, 2019). It should be noted that the BNC between the two countries replaced the Presidential Joint Cooperation Commission, a mechanism that has facilitated engagement between them to date (RSA, 2019).

5.2.1.1 South Africa's Bilateral Relations with Nigeria

In addition, another economic giant in the ECOWAS, Nigeria, has strong bilateral relations with South Africa, which were conducted through a BNC signed in 1999. According to Nagar (2012:13), the year 1999 marked the heights of the two countries' relations, with Obasanjo becoming Nigeria's civilian President whilst Mbeki succeeded Mandela as South African President. As a result, relations between the two countries began to improve, with the two leaders forging a close relationship building from when Mbeki headed the ANC office in Lagos between 1977 and 1978 (Nagar, 2012:13). To this effect, the two economic giants in Africa there has been making efforts to

strengthen their ties more with the inauguration of the BNC between both countries. Noteworthy is that the BNC aims to promote trade and investment, provide a forum for building strategic bilateral relations, and serve as a vehicle for consolidation of the African agenda. The relations between the two African economic giants progressed since the signing of the BNC (Alabo & Achinulo, 2020:331). Noteworthy was when, in March 2002, a Nigeria/South Africa business summit was held on the sidelines of the fourth BNC meeting to foster stronger economic relations. This was followed in February 2003 by signing twenty key bilateral agreements covering science and technology, agriculture, information-sharing, heritage issues, defence, and immigration (Paterson, 2012:14). However, despite positive developments between the two countries, tensions could not be discounted as in 2005 they started to emerge over foreign policy issues (Nagar, 2012:15).

The tensions between the two countries are very complex; hence, Adebajo (2019:1) stressed that the two countries have strong views about each other. To this effect, he noted that Nigerians often complain about the ingratitude of South Africans in not acknowledging their role in the anti-apartheid struggle and complain that South Africa's companies are ubiquitous in the Nigerian market. On the other hand, South Africans complain about Nigerian involvement in drug trafficking and fraudulent scams. In contrast, its companies complain about bureaucratic obstacles and a lack of infrastructure, making doing business in Nigeria difficult (Adebajo, 2019:1). However, bilateral political relations between South Africa and Nigeria are strong. The two countries are considered necessary on the African continent in advancing the vision of Africa's political and economic renewal (Ebegbulem, 2013:32). To this effect, the two countries led developmental trajectories as witnessed during Mbeki and Obasanjo presidencies.

Closer home in the SADC, as highlighted by several scholars and accentuated in government policy documents, SADC is a priority for democratic South Africa's developmental trajectories, a BNC existing with Zimbabwe signed in April 2015. According to DIRCO, the BNC Agreement stipulates that the two countries should meet annually. It is further argued that the BNC mechanism with Zimbabwe strives to provide the strategic impetus to drive bilateral relations to a significantly higher level. South Africa also signed an agreement establishing a BNC, which will be convened

annually. This framework for cooperation elevated the two existing bilateral cooperation frameworks, namely the Joint Permanent Commission on Cooperation (JPCC) and the Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation on Defence and Security (JPCDS), from the Ministerial level to the Head of State level (SANews, 2012).

5.2.1.2 South Africa's Bilateral with Mozambique

Through geographical arrangements, Mozambique is among the frontline states with long relations with South Africa; therefore, democracy ushered a new leaf in the two country's concerns. According to the official statement issued by DIRCO in 2011, South Africa and Mozambique continued to enjoy a strong relationship based on geographical proximity and historical ties. Therefore, South Africa and Mozambique have long enjoyed solid diplomatic ties, and these cross-sectoral relations go back almost a century. Thus, economic investment and collaboration date to the establishment of the Maputo Development Corridor in the early 1990s (Gqada, 2012:3). To effect, there have been some efforts on economic collaboration between South Africa and Mozambique within the context of the 1997 Heads of State Economic Bilateral Forum, chaired by the respective presidents (GCIS, 2003:313).

The Heads of State Economic Bilateral Forum and Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation (JPCC) ensure the maintenance of sound political and economic relations between South Africa and Mozambique (RSA, 2007:281). The relations between the two countries were boosted in 2011, with President Jacob Zuma and President Armando Guebuza committing themselves to upscale cooperation from the JPCC to the BNC (Gqada, 2012:3). To this effect, twenty-five agreements cover various spheres of cooperation between the two countries; these include Maputo harbour, agricultural development, natural gas trade, de-mining, the Maputo Development Corridor, a joint water commission, promotion and reciprocal protection of investment, and customs administration (GCIS, 2015:282).

According to GCIS, South Africa and Mozambique share cooperative and friendly political and economic relations in a bilateral and multilateral context. Trade between the countries is increasing, with 57.2% of Mozambique's imports from South Africa.

About 26.2% of Mozambican exports are destined for the South African market (Gqada, 2012:4).

5.2.1.3 South Africa's Bilateral with the Kingdom of Lesotho and Eswatini

The most significant and visible beacon reflecting South Africa's bilateral relations with Lesotho is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which, in today's terms, qualifies as a NEPAD project. According to DIRCO official documents, the Lesotho Highlands Project was started in 1986 as a joint venture to supply water to South Africa, especially the rapidly growing urban population in Gauteng, and to meet Lesotho's electricity needs. The project delivers about 780 million cubic metres of water to South Africa a year; thus, the two countries have agreed to engage in a strategic partnership to assist Lesotho in accelerating economic development to raise its status from that of a least-developed country. Subsequently, in June 2005, South Africa and Lesotho signed the Agreement on Scientific Cooperation, aimed at sharing South Africa's successes in technologies related to poverty reduction and wealth creation at the community level (DIRCO, 2021). To date, President Cyril Ramaphosa is building on his predecessors' role in consolidating the relations between the two countries.

Furthermore, South Africa and Lesotho's engagement is within the confines of the JBCC; however, in 2020, Minister Naledi Pandor met with the Lesotho counterpart and concluded by affirming the two countries' presidents' instruction that the relations should be elevated to the BNC Level (DIRCO, 2020). In addition, another Kingdom in the SADC, Eswatini, engage with South Africa through a Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation comprised of sectors such as Home Affairs, Police, Defence, Economic Development and Humanitarian. However, despite the South African government's concern over the political environment in Swaziland, the two countries have co-operated on several binational projects (Ngubentombi, 2003:149).

5.2.1.4 South Africa's Bilateral with Kenya

In the same vein, in the East Africa Community (EAC), though there are existing bilateral relations with Kenya, on a positive note in 2021, there have been calls for the elevation of the Kenya-South Africa Joint Commission for Cooperation (JCC) to BNC (DIRCO, 2012) which is advanced because there is enormous potential the two countries can harness through deepening bilateral ties between the two countries at

the level of the BNC. Doing so will streamline the economic and political partnership between Kenya and South Africa.

It is worth emphasising in this regard that by Hosting his Kenyan counterpart, President Mwai Kibaki, in Pretoria, President Mbeki heightened South Africa's commitment to the relations with Kenya. Mbeki argued that "the trade imbalance between Kenya and South Africa is rather big at 20 to one in South Africa's favour. Therefore, "a great deal needs to be done to encourage greater flows of Kenyan products into the South African market and greater flows of investment from South Africa into Kenya" (IOL, 2003). This assertion amplifies that South Africa believes its relations with fellow Africans are based on mutual interest and benefits.

Though there have been some positive developments in the two countries relations, there have been challenges since Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. During the Mandela era, he failed to get off a plane to meet with the Kenyan delegation led by foreign affairs minister Kalonzo Musuyoko, who had to receive him at Jomo Kenyatta Airport. Even when Thabo Mbeki became the President, the same incident occurred with excuses of him being asleep and tired being repeated, as during the Madiba incident (Mureithi, 2012). South Africa established diplomatic relations with Kenya in 1992, with a Joint Commission for Cooperation Agreement enabling the highest form of bilateral engagements conducted at the Ministerial level (DIRCO, 2021). Kenya and South Africa have substantial untapped potential for trade. Kenya ran a trade deficit of KSh40.1 billion in 2021 – that is the difference in value between what Kenya bought from South Africa (KSh44.07 billion) and the KSh3.96 billion worth of goods that it sold there (Odhiambo, 2023).

History has also played a role in weakening trade between the two states. Kenya did not support South Africa's liberation from apartheid-like others did. Therefore, the lukewarm relationship that has characterised past diplomatic engagements implies that South Africa may not have forgiven Kenya for that history (Iraki, 2023). The cold diplomatic relations between the two countries sometimes take the form of tiffs, which on several occasions manifest at international forums where the two countries have been bitter rivals, as was witnessed during the election of the chair of the African Union Commission (Kwayera, 2012). Kenya refused to support South

Africa's candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, precipitating a stalemate that lasted more than six months till February (Iraki, 2023). Despite these challenges, South Africa and Kenya are taking steps to promote bilateral relations and pursue strategic and political objectives. On 9 November 2022, the South African President visited Kenya and held talks with President William Ruto to explore areas of mutual interest and cooperation (Erasmus, 2022). To this effect, the two countries agreed on a reciprocal visa-free entry deal that will be rolled out from January 2023. Kenyans can enter South Africa visa-free for up to 90 days per calendar year. Eight bilateral agreements signed in 2021 preceded these positive developments. They included MoUs on transport, health, diplomatic consultations, training, tourism, and migration.

5.2.1.5 South Africa's Bilateral with the Democratic Republic of Congo

South Africa's relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo can be traced from just after the advent of democracy in South Africa, with the Mandela administration getting involved in the DRC's prevailing situation. However, 2004 marked the turn of the two countries' bilateral relations as a Bi-National Commission (BNC) was established as a strategic mechanism to facilitate bilateral cooperation and partnership between the two countries (Mokuena, 2004). Subsequently, the two countries convened the 2nd BNC in 2005, and the Heads of State agreed to continue providing practical support to move the DRC transitional process forward (RSA, 2005).

5.2.1.6 South Africa's Bilateral with Burundi

Besides South Africa's involvement in the conflict resolution in Burundi, the two countries engage at the bilateral level. Minister Naledi Pandor recently undertook a Working Visit to the Republic of Burundi to co-chair an Inaugural Burundi – South Africa Joint Commission for Cooperation (JCC) (DIRCO, 2022). Such undertakings by the two reflect the importance attached to the relations between the two countries. According to DIRCO (2012), the JCC between the two countries provides a platform for South African institutions to explore further cooperation with Burundi in existing and new areas. Minister Pandor believes the Inaugural Session of the JCC will rekindle and further enhance and consolidate the cordial and fraternal relations between our countries. It is a fact that the two countries' concerns cannot be divorced from the role South Africa played in supporting Burundi. To this effect, Burundi achieved peace and stability, culminating in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords. Therefore, the

following economic sectors have been identified as South Africa's priorities: agriculture, food processing, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure development, oil and gas, energy, mining, waste management, packaging, and tourism (Pandor, 2022:1).

5.2.2 South Africa's Role in Mediation and Peace Building, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Development Programme in Africa

According to Southall (2006:280), it is evident that since its transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa became increasingly drawn to resolving conflicts and promoting peace and stability on the broader African continent. As for Malan (1999:2), the South African approach to conflict resolution has hitherto been strongly informed by its history and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts. To this effect, the conflicts in the DRC have boosted South Africa's morale. According to official government documents, since the beginning of the conflict in the DRC in August 1998, South Africa has played an active role in attempting to bring peace to this vast country and the Great Lakes region of central Africa (RSA, 2003:332).

Nyuykonge and Zondi (2017:108) saw South Africa as positioning itself as a crucial role player in efforts to manage security threats in Africa, thus contributing resources to peacebuilding endeavours. Equally, Hendricks (2016:9) argues that South Africa's conflict management approach expresses confidence as it is called upon to manage conflicts in many African countries, being labelled an African voice globally. He further stressed that post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding represent another important aspect of South Africa's conflict management repertoire. To this effect, South Africa has, however, gone beyond peace-making and peacekeeping to assist with creating the conditions for sustainable transitions (Hendricks, 2016:14).

The country's engagement with Africa involves strengthening bilateral relations through effective structures for dialogue and cooperation, support for peace, security, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives (Sidiropoulos, 2007:3). As a result, participates in implementing Africa's peace and security agenda and managing peace missions. However, in Neethling's (2002:1) view, South Africa's input in the African debate on peacekeeping had been limited because the country was relatively inexperienced in peacekeeping and because of the perceived reluctance to deploy

troops in conflict situations. Equally, Celliers (1999:4) believed that SA's engagement in Africa was wrongfully timed as it was when the continent was clearly in a crisis.

Pahad (2006:5) exclaimed that South Africa's engagement in conflict resolution and mediation comes from a strong realisation that South Africa would have to become an active participant in peace operations. He argued that a few factors were considered, including the country's location and being a new African democracy; thus, numerous countries regarded him as an ideal candidate to play a vital role in peace operations, specifically regarding Africa. According to Southall (2005:162), South Africa's involvement in Burundi was part of the country's picture of a much grander strategy for Africa and the importance of the Burundian peace process. In this regard, it is argued that South Africa's involvement in the Burundi peace process was a fundamental model for resolving intractable conflicts after the experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy.

5.2.2.1 South Africa's Involvement in Burundi Conflicts

South Africa's involvement in Burundi is through the country's good relations heightened with Burundi, as demonstrated by the leading role of the South African Government in the peace negotiation process that culminated in the signing of the peace agreement (Hendricks, 2016:25). South Africa's considerable historical investment in supporting peace and security in Burundi is widely regarded as one of the clearest examples of the country's commitment to a principled and value-based foreign policy.

On a positive note, South Africa's commitment to conflict resolution was amplified by the country's contribution towards the establishment of peace and stability in Burundi, including the deployment of SANDF troops with an African peace mission in Burundi, now recapped as the UN Operations in Burundi. South Africa has also financially supported the election process by, for example, providing election material for the 2005 referendum and elections. As for Mutangadura and Singh (2019:3), South Africa's role in contributing to peace and security in Burundi is rooted in the country's facilitation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and subsequent involvement in leading its implementation. This exciting display of institutional

acrobatics was only made possible through the swift arrival of 700 South African troops, sent with the utmost urgency by Nelson Mandela (ICGR, 2002:6). Also, along with Ethiopia and Mozambique, South Africa committed troops to Burundi under the auspices of the African Union (AU) to monitor a plan for an end to the conflict which was laid down by the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of 28 August 2000 (Southall, 2005:114).

There was also a view that South Africa's response to Burundi was humanitarian. However, efforts were made to find a political solution because it is believed that Burundi is important from a moral standpoint and the material interests of South Africans (ACCORD, 2007:17). Moreover, Southall (2005:162) argues that South Africa's involvement in Burundi was part of the country's picture of a much grander strategy for Africa; and the importance attached to the Burundian peace process. In this regard, it is argued that South Africa's involvement in the Burundi peace process was a fundamental model for resolving intractable conflicts after the experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy.

5.2.2.2 *South Africa's mediation efforts in Zimbabwe*

It is a fact that national interests informed South Africa's involvement in mediation in Zimbabwe, the geopolitics of the SADC region and notwithstanding South Africa's commitment to a peaceful Africa. Against this background, Mhandara and Pooe (2013:5) highlighted the necessity for South Africa's involvement. They argue that Zimbabwe became trapped in a ditch of multifaceted crises pronounced in the contest for political power between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Such assertion was highlighted in South Africa's policy documents that Zimbabwe is experiencing political instability owing to the lack of progress in resolving political challenges between the Movement for Democratic Change and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (RSA, 2007:284). These impasses led to the country's economic downward spiral, and the call for reforms became the order against the ZANU-PF-led government.

South Africa's interest is to see a thriving and stable Zimbabwe, as its economic collapse would probably see an influx of legal and illegal migrants into South Africa.

This situation could further strain service delivery (Chikohomera, 2019:1). However, McKinley (2003:2) states that the cumulative effect of South Africa's policy approach between the 2000 parliamentary elections and the presidential elections in March 2002 was to institutionalise Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis effectively. This assertion exposes South Africa's intentions to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe and amplifies the critics against the country's approach. Despite being regarded as the critical external player in the Zimbabwe crisis, South Africa's policy of quiet diplomacy towards Mugabe has been severely criticised by the West and within South Africa. To this effect, the country's efforts were disregarded because Western countries expected South Africa to be harsher towards the ZANU-PF government (Adelmann, 2004:251).

Despite the criticisms against South Africa's approach, there was also confidence as Mathye (2013:1) argued that one of the qualities that made South Africa a suitable candidate for mediating in Zimbabwe was that South Africa is Zimbabwe's biggest trading partner. Thus, it was not a coincidence that South Africa deliberately did not apply coercive diplomatic measures such as diplomatic and economic sanctions (van Wyk, 2002:180). Though many in South Africa and abroad are of the view that South Africa is the most robust and most influential country in the region, it was, however, accused of not adopting as clear-cut a position towards Mugabe as it does towards other conflicts in Africa (Ngubentombi, 2003:151). Although publicly reported as representing good neighbourliness, South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has travelled a tortuous route since the watershed elections of 27 April 1994 in South Africa (Rupiya, 2003:151). However, South Africa's involvement yielded positive results as mandated by the SADC to mediate. To this effect, the South African-led dialogue between the involved parties led to the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which led to relatively credible harmonised parliamentary and presidential elections on 29 March 2008 (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013:8).

According to Mutisi (2011:4), the GPA is a watershed agreement that witnessed ZANU PF and the two MDC formations resolve to consolidate peace and reconstruct the country's shattered economy and political landscape. In essence, this accentuated the importance of South Africa's engagement in conflict resolution and mediation in Zimbabwe, and thus, its realisation added some impetus to the country's stature. In

this context, the South African facilitation team has always been optimistic about the power-sharing pact while dismissing crisis reports in the dialogue (Herald, 2010). However, despite South Africa's enormous role in realising the GPA, the road towards implementation became challenging, prompting further involvement through the SADC process. Subsequently, GPA ended the post-2008 elections violence (Campell, 2012). After that, however, cracks started to show up, undermining South Africa's role.

In this regard, responding to Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane's insistence on complete reforms before the polls, Mugabe's highest decision-making body, the politburo and former Information minister Jonathan Moyo hit back, telling her to 'shut up' (Africa Report, 2012). Such a response to the South African minister from the Zimbabwean minister manifested the complications of the Zimbabwean political dynamics and questioned their commitments to the GPA. To this effect, Zimbabwe remains marginalised by developmental and financial institutions, with sanctions from the European Union and other Western countries persisting as there has yet to be progress on the reforms agreed on in the GPA. As a result, Ngubentombi (2003:147) argued that since the February 2000 referendum, the economic and political crisis in the country has accelerated, bringing the second most developed economy in Southern Africa to the verge of economic collapse. To this end, there have been misconceptions about whether South Africa has failed in Zimbabwe. However, Mathye (2013:3) believes that South Africa's facilitation in Zimbabwe has broadly managed to meet the objectives of the mandate set out by the leaders of the SADC. This assertion is because South Africa's primary goal for the facilitation team was to seek a solution through a negotiated settlement that the Zimbabwean people could call their own.

To understand South Africa's mandate, it is refreshing to note that during the early period of the Zimbabwe crisis, SADC did not give itself any mediation role in Zimbabwe but referred to the AU at its Sharmel-Sheik summit in June 2008 (Cawthra, 2010:29). To this effect, the AU directed that SADC be put in charge of mediating a solution to the crisis thus SADC's mandate thus came directly from the AU. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) brought about the inclusive "power sharing" government in Zimbabwe, resulting from a long, drawn-out SADC mediation process provided a litmus test for the regional body's capacity to resolve conflicts using mediation as a constructive and non-violent tool (Modeni, 2012:24).

5.2.2.3 South Africa's conflict resolution and reconstruction programme in the DRC

The DRC stands out as an example of South Africa's emerging bandwidth in peace diplomacy, including PCRDC and its initiatives in the DRC have in some instances gone beyond what it had intended to do, encompassing a wide-ranging role, even beyond its demonstrable capacities (Hengari, 2016:3). This assertion is supported by the fact that South Africa's intervention in the crisis in Zaire (as the DRC was then called) is construed its first major diplomatic initiative on the continent (Tonheim & Swart, 2015:2). As for Malan (1999:2), a stable and peaceful DRC is a foreign policy priority for Pretoria. The country's contribution to an international peace operation must be meaningful and visible. Therefore, Pretoria's investment in conflict resolution, mediation, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction development was not a coincidence but aimed to advance the country's national interest as a continent that is not peaceful threatens growth (RSA, 2007:181). To this effect, Hendricks (2016:22) accentuated that South Africa was, and remains, a critical factor in conflict management in the DRC as it played the roles of peacemaker, peacekeeper, peacebuilder, and peace-enforcer. However, Hendricks (2016:25) also expressed some misgivings. In this regard, he argues that the South African representatives engaged in peace-making and peacebuilding in the DRC failed the women of the DRC, both at the level of ensuring their representation in the negotiations and in the institutions that were to be formed to govern their lives.

It is worth noting that the DRC made significant strides in the 2000s compared with the late 1990s when it was teetering on the brink of total collapse. Presidents Mandela and, to a greater degree, Thabo Mbeki both played a decisive role in canvassing for peace in the DRC (Hengari, 2016:3). Though much as far as conflict resolution and reconstruction has been made by South Africa and widely discussed by scholars, Nyuykonge and Zondi (2017:115) brought an interesting aspect. Therefore, they argued that South Africa's support and export of technical knowledge in economic development and trade have DRC to increase their national incomes by increasing the utility of national endowments such as mines and water reserves, affirming that South Africa is interested in preserving regional peace and stability to promote trade and development and avoid the spillover effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood

(Sidiropoulos, 2007:6). Building on the relations between the two countries and South Africa's commitment to assist the DRC, the two countries recently established collaborative scientific and technological projects and programs through the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the sidelines of the World Science Forum (DST, 2023:205).

5.2.2.4 South Africa and African Union

South Africa's role in the African Union (AU) finds better expression in the country's White Paper on Foreign Policy stresses Pan-Africanism and south-south solidarity as central principles for the country's international engagements (DIRCO, 2011:8). The White Paper explicitly argues that South Africa's committed to a) intensifying its engagements with the AU, b) advocating for the role of the AU as the primary organisation for coordinating continental positions with development partners and c) advancing common African positions through bilateral activities and other international fora. Noteworthy is that in 1994, after the first fully democratic elections, South Africa was officially admitted as the 53rd Organisation of African Unity (OAU) member at a summit held in Tunis, Tunisia (Burger, 2002:268). To this effect, South Africa participated actively in all activities and structures, such as the Secretariat, the Centre for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the Central Organ, the Council of Ministers, and the Annual Summit (RSA, 2003:260). Such undertakings reflect South Africa's commitment to being an active member of the OAU; hence, it was at the forefront of the transformation.

The South African government's twenty-year review highlighted that South Africa contributed to two tangible elements of the African Renaissance during the first decade: the transformation of the continental political architecture with the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU). Emphasising during a public lecture, Deputy Minister Llewellyn Landers argued that the country undertook to place the continent's interests at the centre of democratic South Africa's foreign policy. He stressed that South Africa viewed the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the current AU as an essential and required shift in focus (DIRCO, 2015:5). Accordingly, South Africa's involvement with the AU has primarily focused on the following:

- Promoting the AU as a continental institution of governance and development;
- Helping to establish and strengthen the AU Commission to implement decisions by the AU Assembly and the AU Council;
- Hosting the Pan African Parliament (an institution of the AU) since 2005, NEPAD Agency and APRM Secretariat since 2001, and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE); and
- Contributing to establishing the AU Peace and Security Council, which deploys peacekeeping missions, among other activities.

Worth noting, South Africa was the last member to join the OAU, two months after the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela in 1994; thus, it was seen as the final piece of the jigsaw puzzle to fall into place and complete the map of independent Africa (RSA, 2014:370). Therefore, the determined role South Africa played in the creation of the African Union in 2002 was highly emphasised (van Nieuwkerk, 2014:5). According to the twenty-year review, since becoming the 53rd member, South Africa has become increasingly active in peace and security (RSA, 2014:370). Thus, it helped African countries to set up institutions, such as the Independent Electoral Commission's participation in election observation missions and establishing functional civil services. To this effect, South Africa's experience in post-conflict and reconstruction programmes became the basis for influencing the country's approach (RSA, 2015:307). Accordingly, the government's 20-year review emphasised that South Africa played an integral role in forming the AU's institutions, policies, and procedures, such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). The AU PSC is underscored as an approach the country envisaged to promote the AU as a continental institution and strengthen the commission by implementing decisions of the AU assembly and council (Lucey & Gida, 2014:3).

The contingent established a mechanism that carries a genuine promise of achieving *Pax Africana* with the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) (Sidiropoulos, 2007:6). Therefore, since its establishment, the PSC has made remarkable progress in providing leadership in Africa's search for peace and security. Most notably, the PSC offered Africa a mechanism for taking the lead on the continent's peace and security agenda

(Landsberg, 2002:8). The progress made has been evident in the role the PSC has played in dealing with unconstitutional changes of government in about a dozen African countries, in brokering peace in countries such as Sudan and Kenya, and in launching peace support operations such as in Darfur and Somalia (Dersso, 2013). As part of South Africa's commitment to peace and security on the continent, the country's role in the African Union Peace and Security Council must be considered, as it is through this structure that it has contributed to conflict resolution on the continent. Emphasising the importance of the Peace and Security Council, Mbeki argued that all of us are convinced that this will help us to respond more effectively to the imperative to move the entirety of our continent to a situation of peace and enhanced safety and security for all our peoples (Mbeki, 2003). As a result, South Africa made the ratification of the PSC Protocol a priority for President Mbeki's year chairing the organisation. As a result, the Department of Foreign Affairs began lobbying other member states to ratify the protocol, as 27 needed to do so for the protocol to enter into force (Sturman, 2004:15).

According to Tazoach and Tametong (2021), South Africa contributed immensely to the related protocol to establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, and entered into force in December 2003. According to the government, the country was afforded the honour and responsibility of chairing the Council during May 2011, thus presiding over attempts at pertinent issues in the continent (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa's Chairmanship navigated two critical engagements with African Union partners through the annual joint consultations with the EUPSC and the UNSC (Dersso, 2013). On the other hand, in 2015, the African Union Member States adopted Agenda 2063 as an overarching framework for addressing past injustices and realising the Pan-African vision of an integrated and prosperous Africa (AU, 2015).

South Africa rose to the occasion and committed to realising this continental framework. Therefore, the country supports the development objectives and aims of Agenda 2063 to strengthen African cooperation and integration and promote inclusive development, peace, and security (DIRCO, 2017). This undertaking further manifests South Africa's commitment to a stable and prosperous continent by forging developmental objectives in a peaceful environment. DIRCO further argue that Due to

the alignment of Agenda 2063 and the National Development Plan (NDP), one can safely say the implementation of Agenda 2063 is already integrated with South African Government Plans and Programmes (DIRCO, 2018).

The South African government emphasised that the aspects contained in Agenda 2030 are aligned with the NDP, which seeks to address the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequality (DIRCO, 2018). DIRCO's strategic document 2020-22 stressed that South Africa supports the development objectives and aims of Agenda 2063 to strengthen African cooperation and integration and promote inclusive development, peace, and security. Accordingly, it is evident that due to the alignment of Agenda 2063 and the National Development Plan, the implementation of Agenda 2063 is already integrated into South African Government Plans and Programmes (DIRCO, 2020).

5.2.2.5 South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa's Development

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched amid much pomp and praise in 2001 and promised to usher in the economic emancipation of the continent and people of Africa (Lwanda, 2006:1). NEPAD was underscored as a holistic, integrated, sustainable development initiative for the economic and social revival of Africa involving a constructive partnership between Africa and the developed world (Mkhulu, 2002:2). It was thus argued that NEPAD is, without doubt, a noble initiative derived by the political leaders of Africa to the benefit of the ordinary citizenry of the continent (Kgosiginitso, 2005). According to the South African government, NEPAD was conceived to combat Afro-pessimism and advance the socio-development of our continent. We have always emphasised that achieving our goal of developing Africa will also depend on how well we do in eradicating conflicts on our continent (RSA, 2010). Therefore, within the context of NEPAD, South Africa has also helped African countries to set up institutions, such as the Independent Electoral Commission's participation in election observation missions, establishing functional civil services and using South Africa's experience in post-conflict and reconstruction programmes (RSA, 2015:307).

According to Rob Davies (2010:3), South Africa seeks to support the continent's economic revival and socio-economic development, as the NEPAD envisages. To this

effect, South Africa would contribute to the cross-border infrastructure development through the Spatial Development Initiative methodology and support NEPAD for the Spatial Development Plan (DTI, 2010). Landsberg (2002:5) affirmed that South Africa made tremendous progress in helping the continent to articulate NEPAD as the continent's development blueprint. In this regard, the country's African agenda posited a pivotal role for South Africa in crafting a socioeconomic development plan for the continent, and it was a particular developmental project at that: the modernisation of African states and regions. Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sue van der Merwe, highlighted that South Africa has been at the forefront of developing the NEPAD in collaboration with key African countries, which was informed by an understanding that NEPAD, as Africa's premier development programme, will be handy in mobilising international, continental, and regional support for NEPAD; and supporting the NEPAD structures and processes (DFA, 2007). South Africa's role in the conception of the NEPAD gave meaning to the concept and the pursuit of African solutions to African problems (DIRCO, 2015:6). This assertion, in essence, reflects South Africa's commitment to advance NEPAD prioritise in the interest of the continent to ensure that the continent's solutions are home-brewed. Thus, receiving credentials of the NEPAD Secretariat Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Dr Ibrahim Assane Mayaki Deputy Minister Ebrahim was explicit that South Africa is ready to work with him to ensure that the continental public is made aware of the development and successes of NEPAD implementation (RSA, 2009).

Accordingly, NEPAD has showcased its achievements to African leaders; therefore, the Chief Executive Officer, Dr Ibrahim Mayaki, spelt out fourteen critical results achieved by the Agency and its development partners in the last twelve months. These plans include a concrete roadmap on African rural transformation – The Rural Futures Programme- championed by President Yayi Boni of Benin, which targets ten countries and will be implemented this year (NEPAD, 2014). The NEPAD secretariat is domiciled in Johannesburg, South Africa; thus, it speaks volumes about the continent's trust in South Africa and its capabilities. Such capabilities can also be expressed through actions such as South Africa's proposal, which gave birth to the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICl). The PICl is to accelerate regional infrastructure development enabled through the political championing of projects, and

its objective was to ensure that the projects were implemented within five years (NEPAD, 2020:5).

According to President Jacob Zuma, the PICI, the significant outcomes we strive to achieve are upgrading infrastructure and removing impediments to trade flows, including regulatory and administrative constraints to transport and transit systems (RSA, 2010). Nkoana-Mashabane accentuated that South Africa played an important role in enhancing infrastructure development on the continent by spearheading the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative, launched in 2010. She argued she highlighted that South Africa champions the North-South Road and Rail Development Corridor, a trade access corridor from Durban through Dar es Salaam to Cairo (DIRCO, 2014). Accordingly, the North-South corridor will facilitate the movement of goods and means of production through increased economic infrastructure connectivity, which will contribute to the growth of intra-Africa trade.

To this effect, South Africa was tasked to champion the North-South Corridor/Rail Project. The North-South Road, Rail and Related Infrastructure Corridor: (a) South Africa to become the hub for the manufacture and supply of Rail Stock for Africa (AU Resolution), (b) The Beitbridge Border Post, connecting South Africa and Zimbabwe. (c) The Inga III Hydropower Project; South Africa, DRC, Namibia, Botswana and Angola (d) The Lesotho Highlands Water Project – Phase II (LHWP); South Africa and Lesotho (NEPAD, 2020:9). Accordingly, President Ramaphosa reported to the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI) Luncheon on 8 February 2020 that on all four of the projects South Africa leads, substantive and excellent progress was reported.

5.2.2.6 South Africa and the African Peer Review Mechanism

The evolution of the APRM finds expression in South Africa's pursuit of the African Union objectives regarding good governance. The role South Africa played in conceptualising and creating the continent's prominent governance promotion and monitoring instrument is in correlation with the days of President Thabo Mbeki's "African Renaissance" in the early 2000s. To this effect, South Africa houses the APRM secretariat and has injected millions into supporting the system over the years (Grozud, 2020). South Africa joined the APRM in 2003 and underwent its first country

review in 2007, followed by three progress reports subsequently followed (SAIA, 2022). In this context, South Africa highlighted its willingness and readiness to share experiences and expertise in strengthening and deepening peer review across the continent (RSA, 2007).

According to the country's review report, South Africa is to be commended for its leading role as one of the founding nations of the NEPAD vision, which led to establishing the APRM programme on good governance in March 2003. The review undertaken thus far reflects South Africa's commitment to the APRM as an instrument created by African leaders for self-assessment and to focus efforts on entrenching democratic values and good governance (DPSA, 2023:8). In this context, Deputy Minister Landers accentuated that South Africa has championed the establishment of the APRM as a voluntary mechanism to deepen democracy and good governance on the continent (DIRCO, 2015). This assertion accentuates South Africa's role in ensuring good governance in the continent, which is becoming a practice.

When in 2020, President Ramaphosa began a two-year tenure as the chairperson of the APRM, he reaffirmed the country's readiness for the challenge and thus told diplomats that South Africa would be primarily responsible for driving the APRM's good governance agenda (Grozud, 2020). To this effect, in his acceptance speech, President Ramaphosa emphasises that South Africa will support the good governance and democracy agenda, leveraging the excellent work of the APRM. Therefore, he argues that South Africa will engage those Member States that still need to ratify to achieve universal accession by 2030 (RSA, 2020), amplifying the extent to which South Africa is determined to go to ensure that the continent sings from the same hymn book as far as the APRM is concerned.

5.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA

South Africa's economic interests can only be assessed by taking cognisance that it is the continent's most stable and advanced economy, thus construed as the gateway to the continent and hence is regarded as a hope for Africa. Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu (2004:345) gave the historical context of South Africa's investment in Africa, arguing that it has been the largest investor in the Southern African region for decades. It is worth noting that South Africa's economic advancement in Africa is crystallised in

strategic policy documents on the country's economic development, such as the Trade Policy and Strategic Framework, National Development Plan Vision 2030, New Growth Path, and Industrial Policy Action Plan are the basis (DTI, 2009:7).

To amplify South Africa's economic expansion in Africa, the government, during the year 2016, launched Trade Invest Africa, an initiative to increase South Africa's exports and investments to the rest of Africa (DTI, 2018). As for Alden and Soko (2005:368), South Africa's economic engagement in Africa ranges from its immediate neighbours to the farther geographic extension of the continent. This assertion expands Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's argument that Africa is the highest priority in South Africa's foreign policy as the government regards its long-term political and economic destiny as indissolubly linked with the broader continent (DFA, 2001).

According to the DTI, this draws inspiration to the proclamation in the country's foreign policy document that South Africa's development is inextricably linked to the development and stability of Africa and Southern Africa. South Africa is Africa's most industrialised economy, the region's principal manufacturing hub, and the leading service destination. Thus, it is better positioned to change the continent (InvestSA, 2018). Such an undertaking amplifies that South Africa's involvement with the rest of Africa has increased significantly since 1994. Scholars have argued that South Africa enjoys economic opportunities and has an advantage in Africa. Makgetlaneng (2003:89) pointed out that South Africa is relatively more developed socio-politically, economically, financially, technologically, and in terms of human resource development and trade than all other sub-Saharan African countries. Equally so, he further underscores that South Africa's geographical proximity to the internal markets of other Southern African countries provides South African suppliers with advantages through lower transportation costs and relatively shorter delivery distances. Grant (2011:4) underscored that economic diplomacy had become a priority for South Africa's foreign policy, and initiatives have been implemented to achieve the objectives of the DIRCO work programme. Thus, Trade exports, foreign direct investment and public-private partnerships have mushroomed in many parts of the continent (Akinboude & Lalthapersad-Pillay, 2005:242).

It was further highlighted that many South African firms provide the financial impetus for the infrastructural development and rehabilitation of African economies (Akinboude

& Lalthapersad-Pillay, 2005:243). To this effect, DIRCO's strategy underscored that in 2002, Africa became the third largest market for South African goods and has grown significantly, surpassing Europe and Asia in 2009 and 2015, respectively (DIRCO, 2020). As a result, exports of goods to the African continent rose significantly from R 9 66 billion in 1994 to R 301 45 billion in 2015, and exports are highly concentrated within the SADC, accounting for an average of 77 per cent of total goods from South Africa. Despite notable progress in South Africa's economic expansion, Makokera (2015:5) argues that South Africa's economic-diplomacy initiatives in the rest of Africa face particular challenges. These challenges are a result of being perceived as an arrogant, hegemonic actor by the rest of the continent (Makokera, 2015:6). However, South African firms continue to invest heavily in developing the infrastructural base in the rest of the continent (Akinboade & Lalthapersad-Pillay, 2005:260). For example, South Africa's electricity corporation (Eskom) has established a significant presence in the electricity sector of 30 African countries.

One of the most talked about and arguably controversial tools which the South African Government uses to pursue commercial diplomacy is business delegations accompanying the President on his official state visits to other countries (Grant, 2004:5). To this effect, whenever a President undertakes state visits or hosting the counterparts in South Africa, Business Forums are organised with a view to forge economic cooperation and signing of business deals between State Owned Entities. However, Qobo (2015:1) needed clarification about the type of economic diplomacy the programme is undertaking, arguing that it needs coordination between DIRCO and other role players and, as a result, signed deals are just dusting as there are no follow-ups on implementation. However, contrary to Qobo's assertion, Miller (2004:176) argued that South Africa's economic expansion was heightened because many countries hoped that South Africa's financial strength as a semi-industrialised country would benefit the continent.

South Africa's investment and trade foray into Africa had been spurred by the country's championing of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Alden & Soko, 2005:370). These initiatives build on the country's investment, which, according to SAIA (2006:20), South Africa was listed as the second biggest investor in the SADC region with an investment of R14.8 billion, with multi-state deals leading at R27 billion.

During the year 2002, South was listed as having made lucrative investments, which included \$1.1 billion by Sasol in the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique; \$860 million by BHP Billiton, the IDC and Mitsubishi in the expansion of Mozal II; \$142 million by Vodacom in Tanzania and a further \$139 million in the DRC (Games, 2003:12). Furthermore, \$56 million was spent by Sun International on its hotel in Zambia; \$53 million by Pretoria Portland Cement Zimbabwe on merger activity in Zimbabwe; \$6 billion by power parastatal Eskom Enterprises on the Inga project in the DRC; and \$20 million by South African Airways for its stake in Air Tanzania. Increasingly, South African companies are going into big projects on the continent as joint ventures with large international companies. South African Airways (SAA) is investing in joint ventures with African airlines in air transportation. In addition, the year saw SAA launch a new airline to offer direct flights between Johannesburg and Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar and Kilimanjaro, owning 49 per cent ownership in this venture (Games, 2003:12). Equally, the South African Airports Company (ACSA) undertook renovations of the Maputo International Airport. It was managed by ACSA for 25 years, with the Mozambique Airport Company as a junior partner (Iafrica.com, 2004).

The investment activities of Transnet are highlighted. As a manifestation of the country's economic expansion in Africa, particularly linking with the neighbouring countries, Transnet signed and unveiled an ambitious Inter-Railway initiative that will see a collaboration between Transnet Freight Rail and Swaziland Railway realised. According to Asefovitz (2017:1), the two-country partnership will see the construction of a 150km railway line from Lothair (Mpumalanga) to Sidvokodvo (Swaziland). The DTI (2019:21) project has already created opportunities on both sides of the border between the two countries. During the railway line construction, approximately 3000 and 6500 jobs will be created in South Africa and Swaziland. Business opportunities to R894 million in South Africa and R1.7 billion in Swaziland will be made. Many more indirect job opportunities will be formed through the project (DTI, 2006:21). These efforts find expression in what DIRCO emphasise that exports of goods to the African continent rose significantly from R 9 66 billion in 1994 to R 301 45 billion in 2015.

5.3.1 South Africa and Regional Integration in Africa

Miller (2004:184) asserts that the regional omnipresence of South Africa and its multinational corporations' integration role is an essential feature of post-apartheid Southern Africa. Against this background, Landsberg (2014:164) states that South Africa's prioritisation of SADC should be viewed within the context of South Africa regarding regional economic communities (RECs) as the pillar institutions of the continental union. To this effect, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane highlighted that South Africa's regional integration quest is 'informed by a commitment to contribute towards the transformation and realignment of SADC to a Regional Economic Community that will meet the challenges of globalisation (DIRCO, 2011). The government's delivery agreement outcome 11 is explicit that South Africa and the region's countries stand to gain from enhanced regional integration, including more significant trade resulting from increased market size and investor confidence (RSA, 2011). The country's resolve informs this about the continent's regional integration and undertaking initiatives to amplify the implementation of regional integration as a panacea for the continent's developmental problems (Mashabane, 2011). These assertions were not isolated but found the basis from the post-apartheid commitment to advance regional integration.

The RSA 2003 Yearbook underlined that South Africa's development is intertwined with that of the southern and African regions; therefore, the country seeks to industrialise the regional and continental economies to develop its manufacturing capacity. As a result, South Africa's efforts at ramping up industrialisation must be integrated with the overall framework of the SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap. This development reaffirms that since 1994, South Africa has prioritised strengthening SADC and regional integration (Dlamini-Zuma, 2004). To this effect, the country's regional integration strategy emphasised that South Africa is committed to enhancing regional economic integration and cooperation. According to the DTIC (2010:13), the country's regional integration aims to build larger regional markets and achieve economic growth and development in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Such undertaking accentuated that South Africa has sought to nurture regional integration at three levels: SADC, SACU and TFTA between the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and SADC (RSA, 2014).

On the other hand, South Africa facilitates its trade by engaging in multiple preferential engagements, including negotiating to deepen regional integration (SADC) extending inter-regional trade, namely COMESA-EAC-SADC (Walaza, 2014:2). This exacerbates the fact that since 1994, South Africa has organised the SADC, offering to it the spirit and embodiment of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (Asuelime & Enaifoghe, 2018:135). Correspondingly, it was heightened that South Africa has significant interests in the region and regional integration; thus, it assumes a vital role in SADC and the Africa Union, critical regional economic and collaboration institutions (Amos, 2010:126). Such observation speaks to the fact that at the heart of South Africa's external trade policy has always been efforts to rejuvenate the country's economy through the promotion of regional integration and cross-border trade and investment (Alden & Soko, 2005:370). Therefore, hosting President Uhuru Kenyatta, President Ramaphosa gave more impetus to the country on the above, arguing that 'as two leading economies from respective regions [Southern and Eastern Africa], South Africa and Kenya have a crucial role to play in driving continental integration (Presidency, 2021). Such a claim is informed by the two countries' existing regional value chains that can be integrated by deepening bilateral economic relations and, specifically, more direct collaboration in mutual-interest industrial and infrastructure projects (Presidency 2021).

Similarly, addressing the Limpopo Investment Conference, Ramaphosa pointed out that South Africa's National Infrastructure Plan aims to support the integration of African economies and the development of intra-Africa regional value chains (SA News, 2021). This undertaking indicates the extent to which South Africa is determined as far as regional integration is concerned. Moreover, President Ramphosa further argues that South Africa has decided to use every means, including participation in global forums, to consolidate regional integration. To this effect, he emphasised that South Africa is working with its fellow African countries to establish the Continental Free Trade Area, which would fundamentally transform Africa's economies and consolidate its position in the global trading system (Council for Foreign Relations, 2018). Such a profound commitment from a President whose country is construed as the giant economy in the continent sheds light on the importance that South Africa attaches to regional integration and the continent's development.

5.3.2 South Africa and the African Continental Free Trade Area

The decision to implement the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has undoubtedly reinvigorated and fast-tracking the African continent's quest for regional integration as it represents a remarkable achievement, a collective commitment to harnessing the potential of trade to drive growth, create jobs, and uplift the lives of millions of people across the continent. It is worth highlighting that in 2012, leaders of the African continent commenced a bold decision to establish AfCFTA and the action plan for boosting intra-Africa trade. According to Pandor (2021), expectations were high that South Africa would lead this quest as a big economy with advanced infrastructure and an advocate for regional integration. As a member of the AU, South Africa endorsed the AfCFTA negotiations when they were launched during the 24th AU Assembly in 2015 in South Africa (SARS, 2021). Pursuantly, in 2019, an agreement establishing the AfCFTA came into effect and thus launched in January 2021, and all the African Union states have signed the Agreement except Eritrea. As of February 2021, 36 African Union states, including South Africa, have ratified the Agreement (Paulino, 2021). The AfCFTA seeks to reduce tariff barriers on goods traded between African countries to give African-made goods an advantage over goods produced elsewhere in the world (Patel, 2021:5). In this regard, Patel further boosted as 54 African countries have signed the agreement, and 36 African countries have ratified it through their domestic processes, including South Africa, and deposited their instruments for ratification.

The AfCFTA agreement symbolises a new dawn for the continent, represents immense growth opportunities for African markets, and paved the way towards the defragmentation of African economies and, in so doing, connected 1.3 billion people across the continent (Mtshali, 2021). Noting these developments, President Ramaphosa appealed to countries yet to the AfCFTA agreement to do so and urged for a speedy resolution of outstanding issues whilst also making a clarion call for the domestication of the landmark trade framework (Philip, 2021). This further manifests South Africa's commitment and willingness to be at the forefront of the prospects of the AfCFTA as far as economic integration and development of the continent are concerned. According to the DTIC (2020:3), the full implementation of the AfCFTA will create opportunities to expand South Africa's African trade beyond SADC to East,

Central, West and North Africa. It is worth noting that, in 2019, around 26% of SA's global exports were destined for the rest of Africa, and 80% were to SADC countries.

Phume (2023:1) amplified that the benefits and opportunities the AfCFTA have brought to South Africa are remarkable and, therefore, will expand our market access, enabling our businesses to reach over 1.3 billion consumers across Africa. This assertion has sparked a surge in trade, allowing our entrepreneurs and enterprises to explore new markets, boost exports, and increase revenue. Mtshali (2021) believes that through AfCFTA, South African exporters will face reduced tariff barriers and experience increased demand for their cross-border sales into other African markets. As a result, this would benefit South African exporters of finished goods, with critical opportunities being the export of machinery and equipment, chemicals, iron and steel products and vehicles. On the other hand, Milo (2021) believes South African importers would, through AfCFTA, regional access markets in Africa to source goods closer to where they will be consumed, with positive potential spin-offs for shorter transit times.

5.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter aimed to assess democratic South Africa's engagement mechanisms for economic development in Africa. Considering the above, this chapter has observed important aspects of South Africa's role in the economic development of the African continent, informed by the country's national interest as the basis for its foreign policy towards the continent. These interests, which inform South Africa's involvement, are intertwined with those of the continent. Therefore, South Africa needed political stability, as development remains a dream without stability. To this effect, South Africa, upon democratisation, got involved in conflict resolution, mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction programmes in several countries on the continent, as highlighted throughout the chapter discussions.

The chapter exposed the positive role of South Africa by consolidating and strengthening political relations with the continent. Such ties are being turned into a partnership for economic development through a structured mechanism that guides the engagements between South Africa and the African continent. The discussion further highlighted South Africa's knowledge that without solid regional institutions, the

continent will always face challenges threatening democracy, governance, and economic development. As highlighted, South Africa prioritises strengthening the African Union, SADC, and other regional economic communities and further commits resources for those institutions to function optimally.

The chapter's discussions heightened the country's understanding that development can only occur in a conducive environment. They highlighted initiatives South Africa undertook in response to the conflict ravaging the continent whilst negatively impacting economic growth. Therefore, it is now clear, as per the chapter, that South Africa is cognisant that it cannot be an island in the sea of poverty, hence its prioritisation of the African continent in its developmental trajectories, which is inextricably linked to those of the continent. Therefore, the chapter highlighted the economic initiatives, which included South Africa's entities being at the forefront of Africa's development by establishing themselves in the continent, notably the role Eskom, SAA, Shoprite, MTN and others are playing in Africa, amplifying the country's economic relations with the continent.

The chapter underscored how the country needed to participate in the continental efforts to take Africa from despair by participating intensely in regional structures and initiatives. As a result, South Africa is always available when requested to participate in any initiatives aimed at challenging situations faced by fellow African countries and support any initiatives being initiated at the continental level, such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which it has ratified to show commitment to regional integration. Briefly, the chapter has highlighted the objectives of South Africa in the continent, which are aimed at propelling a peaceful and developed Africa as espoused in Agenda 2063. Therefore, South Africa has undoubtedly put itself at the centre of African solutions to African challenges.

CHAPTER 6 :

CONCLUSION, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The study sought to assess and make sense of the Republic of South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance in Africa to drive economic development since the democratic dispensation. The assessment was undertaken considering that the post-apartheid South African foreign policy's implementation broke the back of the apartheid foreign policy implementation. Worth emphasising is that the apartheid foreign policy approach was to destabilise the African continent as it thrived on dismantling the activities of the liberation movements' quest for democracy in South Africa.

Against this background, though there may have been some positivity of the apartheid South Africa in the continent, the extension of its domestic interests of continuing to unleash injustices overshadowed everything as the brutality undertaken at home was also released in the neighbouring countries suspected of supporting liberation movements. It is a merit accenting that democratic South Africa's foreign policy objectives, particularly the African Agenda, informed the country's engagement in Africa.

The study investigated the extent of democratic South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development. As a result, emphasis was on South Africa, which emerged in 1994, with its prioritisation of the continent, the state of Africa's democracy, good governance, and economic development. The study investigated these critical issues to make sense with an understanding of the manifestations of South Africa's prioritisation of the African Agenda, which has been underscored as the country's thrust focus in foreign policy implementation.

The study's result shows South Africa's efforts on the continent. It considers dissenting views and perceptions on whether the country's engagement in Africa is driven by hegemonic or non-hegemonic being created in the post-apartheid South Africa's African Agenda.

6.2 FINDINGS

The study has scrutinised an enormous volume of scholarly views about the state of democracy, good governance and economic developments in Africa, government positions, strategic plans, and policy documents and, out of such process, made the following findings:

As underscored in Chapter 3 of this study, one can conclude that the political transition and the subsequent advent of democracy in South Africa allowed the country to reposition itself and contribute immensely to the well-being of the African continent. The study has debunked myth and resistance to reality that since democratisation, South Africa has successfully taken a route that places itself at the centre and has made strides to become the voice of reason in the African continent's political developments. The study highlighted that, though challenging, South Africa uses a transitional experience model to resolve conflicts in the continent through mediation and post-conflict reconstruction development programmes. To this effect, South Africa's budget is allocated to support the country's security and peacekeeping missions, mediation, conflict resolution, and post-conflict resolution reconstruction development programme. However, the conflict that the continent faces seems to be unique in that the South African transitional experience model, which it is trying to export to the African countries infested with conflicts, is not one size fits all as most of these countries are plagued by civil wars which South Africa never experienced during the struggle against apartheid complicating South Africa's efforts as it intends to use its political transition as a model through which the conflicts it gets involved in the continent.

The African continent faces enormous democratic challenges that inevitably impact good governance and economic development, thus derailing much-needed progress in economic development, which will take the continent from despair. The high levels of poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of action on good governance are strongly instigating the current unimpressive situation that Africa is battling. These critical drives are mainly due to the continent being overwhelmed with several defunct national democracies. These failures are a result of dysfunctional democracies that are inevitably derailing the continent's efforts to jet-propel initiatives that are aimed at

driving economic development to free the people from abject poverty, which cannot be emphasised.

The study further finds that because of dysfunctional democracies, dictatorship persists unabatedly with presidents who have overstayed their welcome and loot the little resources that may, if used optimally, be handy in transforming the people. Also, conflicts are proving to be the obstacle in the transformation of the continent, with military interferences being the order prompting the unconstitutional removal of the president replaced by military rule, which, in essence, undermines the democratic values the continent and South Africa seek to promote. The study further uncovered that the situation is complicated by the actions of the so-called significant manner, which are essentially dictatorial and manipulate the little imagined form of democratic principles that ought to be strengthened.

The study found that efforts are being made at the regional level through the African Union supplemented by the Regional Economic Communities. However, though there are bold plans and strategies, they fail as the environment could be more conducive as they are construed as encroaching on the space of the presidents' unwillingness to abide by any prescripts of the rule of law; this is manifested by the fact that even though the AU has outlined programmes and plans following the Constitutive Act concerning democracy, good governance, and economic development, they are being undermined. As a result, those undermining its programmes at the AU stages ensure that processes are stalled for their nefarious intentions. These have reduced the continent structures, such as the AU as talk shops, with others seeing the AU Commission as a toothless body, hence the rise of the unconstitutional governments castigated by the removal of seating presidents castigated by the military juntas. As Chapter 4 has zoomed into the state of democracy, good governance and economic development in Africa, the environment in which South Africa seeks to promote the same concepts for the betterment of the continent, one is convinced that post-apartheid South Africa is navigating against difficulties. Therefore, South Africa's efforts cannot be appraised without a knowledge of the environment in which it operates as the study found in Chapter 4 that the continent is an obstacle to its development as it is failing to adhere to the primary conditions toward growth, which peace, democracy, good governance and the rule of law.

The depth of the discussion in Chapter 5 about South Africa's political and economic engagements leads to a conclusion that though there are good intentions for South Africa's prioritisation of the continent, the country's efforts are often resisted, resulting from mistrust of the country's intentions and fears that South Africa is trying to hide behind support driven by hegemonic intentions. As a result, some countries snub South Africa over the international actors who were their former colonisers and contributors to their misfortune and destabilisation as they fund rebels destabilising governments through conflicts. South Africa's engagement in conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo fitted within the framework of the African Agenda, an overriding objective of South Africa's foreign policy implementation. The approach South Africa took to advocate peaceful resolution and contribution to conflict resolution, peace, and stability in the continent, a condition for Africa's development, has been emphasised in policy and practice. However, a lack of consistency showed up.

The study found that the country's involvement in conflict resolution began after the democratic transition, with the Presidency of Mandela having started to get involved in conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo; however, its first attempt was not realised as it immediately withdrew in 1999. Despite the experience in the DRC during Mandela's presidency, the country focused on peacebuilding to showcase that SA acted in good faith using transitional experiences and abundant resources. It was found during the study that such an undertaking presented an opportunity for South Africa to assist fellow African countries as it got support during the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

According to the study, though Mandela's presidency was transparent about its intentions in the continent's challenges, Mbeki's presidency was more pragmatic and driven by the African Agenda passion, which saw South Africa being more involved in the conflict resolution in the continent, in particular, the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the study further finds that though South Africa has made it clear that where there is no peace, democracy, governance and economic development remain a dream, the country's efforts were construed as driven by economic interests as bilateral economic agreements were being signed in margins of conflict resolution missions. The reality is that governments are commercialising their foreign policy implementation that they are turning their bilateral relations into commercial relations;

therefore, the study found that such conceptions about South Africa's involvement cannot be discounted as its development is intertwined with that of the continent that it needs some cooperation that will see the continent developing together.

The study concurred that whenever state visits to African countries are undertaken, a business delegation always accompanies the president. Therefore, engagement with the continent showed some form of gravitation of commercial diplomacy with thinking of material gain through the private sector strides as the country contributed to the peace efforts in that country. However, the study found some inconsistency in the country's approach to the continent's pressing issues since President Jacob Zuma became president in 2009 as he took solid personal interests in engaging with the continent. Thus, the study found that President Zuma's cronies replaced all the good work during his predecessor's terms, with his cronies at the forefront of securing oil deals. Also, despite having inherited a solid foundation on South Africa and Africa's engagements, his administration's approach could have been more straightforward as to whether it was intended for the benefit of the country or the people who are closely and loyal to him.

As a result, many questions were triggered regarding South Africa's foreign policy implementation, which in the paper is very clear on paper; however, it needs more innovation in performance, which exposes why South Africa's involvement in the continent is not bringing returns, though the enormous resources were spent there during its engagements; therefore, there should be some form of returns. Furthermore, the study found a coordination problem in implementing South Africa's foreign policy. The responsibilities have been left to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation instead of being coordinated with the economic ministries (DTI, Economic Development, and Treasury). There needs to be more economic intelligence in implementing South Africa's foreign policy, which is another challenge, as economic experts are not brought on board when ministers meet with counterparts to take advantage of those engagements.

The study further finds that South Africa's efforts are also being constrained by stretching domestic imperatives, which are also being burdened by the influx of foreign nationals from African countries running away from their volatile countries because of political instabilities and economic misfortunes caused by dysfunctional governance

systems. The study finds that though South Africa is leaving to its national interests, which proclaims that its development is inextricably linked to that of the African continent, such a notion is overshadowed by resource constraints. It was increasingly evident throughout the study that South Africa's efforts in the quest for economic development in Africa are being impacted negatively by the country's overstretched domestic developmental trajectories and challenges.

There is a disjuncture between South Africa's developmental policies and those of the African countries that South Africa strives to assist politically and economically. As a result, they feed into wrong narratives and perceptions about South Africa as hegemonic or non-hegemonic in the continent since a lack of in-depth scholarly work exhibits South Africa's success in the continent, hence flawed narratives.

Coordinated communication on South Africa's national interests in correlation with the country's political and economic engagements in Africa is needed, which has opened a vacuum, necessitating negative perceptions that must be clarified. It was thus found that despite challenges due to lack of communication, South Africa's engagements in promoting democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development correlate with the theoretical perspectives on democracy, national interest, good governance, and economic development. However, how it is explained does not correlate with the reality of what is happening because they are different voices on the same matter and impart different interpretations. As highlighted in the national interest theoretical perspectives in Chapter 2, it is evident that South Africa's national interest definition correlates with the theoretical national interest perspective. However, there are efforts to ensure that South Africans are educated about the country's national interests as far as the country's involvement in the continent is concerned, hence the perception that the country's government is wasting resources that can be handy in transforming its people. In essence, this disregards the notion that South Africa's developmental aspirations are inextricably linked with those of the continent, and as such, the notion that when South Africa catches the flu, the whole continent sneeze is being disregarded. However, it was also found that South Africa's economic engagements with the continent bilaterally and regionally have some take-offs as its parastatals are more involved, contributing immensely to the development and creating much-needed opportunities for the countries in despair. Also, South Africa's role in the continental structures to advocate much-needed development is

evident; however, it is constrained as more support is needed from fellow African countries, and it can achieve anything.

Furthermore, South Africa is advancing in providing the continent with much-needed leadership, as manifested by the leadership of a South African as the Secretariat of the African Free Continental Trade Agreement, reaffirming South Africa's capabilities as envisioned in 1994 by President Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president that the time for South Africa to take its rightful position in the world has come. The role the country played amid the global pandemic of COVID-19, which climaxed coincidentally with South Africa's chairmanship of the African Union, manifestly allowed the government to lead the continent against the threats of the global pandemic in the history of humankind.

6.3 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY

The study will amplify the debates and widen views on South Africa's foreign policy towards Africa, particularly the country's involvement in promoting democracy and good governance informed by the objective of wishing to see development in the continent. It is thus evident that though not fully comprehensive, this study has cemented on the foundation and will be the basis upon which, whenever introspections are made about South Africa's engagements in Africa, it is a reference which is informed by the fact that the study has unpacked how South Africa is advancing its national interests, which are an extension of domestic priorities that are inextricably linked to those of the continent. Thus, the study will be used to make inferences and help understand the commercialising of countries' foreign policy implementations, which is becoming a global trend. It will give impetus, help debunk misconceptions about South Africa's misconstrued hegemonic tendencies, and strengthen understanding of why countries pursue political and economic relations. As it was not easy to get relevant information, the study has contributed to the literature on South Africa's role in Africa within the context of the country's foreign policy since the advent of democracy in 1994. Therefore, it is undoubtedly that the study will contribute positively and broaden knowledge on the link between democracy, good governance, and economic development, which South Africa is determined to export to Africa.

6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Undoubtedly, critical pointers are coming out of this research that require consideration. Therefore, South Africa must decisively introspect on spillovers of its approach towards economic development in Africa as though they are not significant; they are creating negative perceptions impacting the post-democratic Africa policy.

South Africa has done tremendously well in the continent despite the hostile environment of conflicts unique to the pre-1994 South African conflicts. In this regard, South Africa should develop a mechanism to count negativity on its foreign policy implementation, particularly the African Agenda that resulted in the notion of hegemonic tendencies by democratic South Africa. Proper coordination regarding foreign policy messaging is required, and all the entities involved in the country's foreign policy implementation should speak with one voice.

South Africa should consider investing more in research to constantly realign its policy intervention towards Africa, as the challenges that the African continent is experiencing are evolving dynamically and cannot be continuously engaged from the same perspectives. There should be a defined programme to reach out to South Africans to educate them on why South Africa is so determinedly involved in Africa's political and economic development. Doing so will remedy being subjected to uninformed opinions.

There is a skills deficit within South Africa's diplomatic services; therefore, South African diplomats should be well-equipped on issues about economic diplomacy through training that is in line with global trends. There is a need for institutionalising working with economic experts to pragmatise policy decision-making regarding economic diplomacy. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation, economic cluster ministries, and the economic experts from the business community should work together and set a clear strategy to ensure South Africa takes advantage of existing relations to address economic needs.

As the lead department on implementing South Africa's foreign policy, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation should have a strategy unit that will assist in planning and strategising how the foreign policy implementation supplements what is on paper. Doing so will introduce the culture of thinking about strategising and ensure that the country's involvement in conflict resolution is not driven by events as

they occur in the continent but guided by a strategy in place. An activities-based approach to foreign policy implementation, a current phenomenon, will be avoided; the events are currently defining strategy rather than strategy-defining events on crucial foreign policy interests on the continent.

6.5 CONCLUSION

The study assessed South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development in Africa, which it is part of. Since the study was done through the review of books, documents, scholarly publications, policies, journal articles, and opinions of pundits, the approach taken as per Chapter One was a qualitative method that, in essence, focuses on words rather than numbers. The chapter highlighted the problem statement, objectives, research questions, layout of the study and literature review. To this effect, all aspects of Chapter One became the guiding principle through which the study was undertaken as the research envisioned.

Chapter Two overviewed the theoretical perspectives relevant to the study's topic. Such an undertaking ensured that the assessment in all the preceding chapters was guided by theory and, in essence, correlated what was being assessed and the discussed perspectives. To this effect, the discussed views have assisted the researcher in balancing the reality of South Africa's role in promoting democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development as theories laid a foundation for the current discussions.

Chapter three of the study gave an account of South Africa's political transition in 1994, considering that before the transition, the country was destabilising, with its relations with African countries being bullying. Therefore, the study underlined how the political transition became handy to South Africa's focus on the continent and underscored that South Africa, as part of the continent, must be part of it through pragmatic action. In this regard, guided by democratic principles, the country modelled a government whose practice was influenced by the rule of law, breaking away from the apartheid regime. As a result, Chapter Three outlined the transformation of the democratic South African institutions aligned with the democratic norms, in particular, the constitution of the country, which is ranked the best globally.

Chapter Four presented the state of democracy, good governance, and economic development in Africa; this was important as such discussion gives an overview of the environment where South Africa seeks to promote democracy and good governance as a mechanism for economic development. Considering the limitations of due time, the study highlighted the challenges, prospects, and efforts that the African continent is undertaking in those three aspects, which are the core of the study.

Chapter Five, which is the core of the study, presents the pragmatic initiatives that the Republic of South Africa is undertaking within the study's focus. The chapter overviewed the political relations South Africa is advancing with the continent and its role to ensure that the continent is peaceful and has political stability, as in their absence, the development will be forever impacted. The chapter also highlighted the relations with selected countries in the continent, which have dominated public discourse to debunk the myth driving perceptions out of the discourse. The chapter explained South Africa's role in promoting the same path through Continental bodies such as the African Union and its structures, such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, African Peer Review Mechanism, Regional Integration, and the African Free Continental Trade Agreement. Also, the study further highlighted the economic role that South Africa is playing on the continent with its companies making roads, which, in essence, amplifies its resolve for economic development in Africa.

Briefly, Chapter Six presented the findings, implications, contribution, recommendations, and conclusion of the study.

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