Burden-­sharing  and  Hybrid  Peacekeeping  Operations  in  Somalia   and  Sudan:  A  Critical  Analysis       by   Barbara  Mohale       Dissertation  submitted  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  for  the   Degree     MAGISTER  ARTIUM   in  the     FACULTY  OF  THE  HUMANITIES   (Department  of  Political  Studies  and  Governance)   at  the       UNIVERSITY  OF  THE  FREE  STATE   BLOEMFONTEIN  2015         Supervisor:  Prof.  TG  Neethling   Co-­supervisor:  Mr  Eben  Coetzee     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   First  and  foremost,  I  would  like  to  thank  the  Almighty  God  for  giving  me  faith  and  hope   that   does  not  disappointment,   and   the  passion   that   continues   to  burn   like  a   fire   to   contribute  to  this  field  of  study.    Thank  you  for  making  me  thy  fuel,  flame  of  God.   I  would  like  to  express  my  sincere  gratitude  to  my  advisor  Professor  Theo  Neethling   for  the  continuous  support  of  my  Masters  study  and  related  research,  for  his  patience,   motivation,  and  immense  knowledge.  His  guidance  helped  me  throughout  the  time  of   research  and  writing  of  this  thesis.  I  could  not  have  imagined  having  a  better  advisor   and  mentor  for  my  Masters  study.    I  would  also  like  to  thank  Mr  Eben  Coetzee  for  his   support  and  technical  advice  throughout  the  process  of  the  study.  I  also  want  to  thank   the  National  Research  Fund  (NRF)  for  their  financial  support.     Besides  my  advisor,  I  would  like  to  thank  my  late  colleague,  friend,  and  advisor,  Mr   Joseph  Smiles  for  his  insightful  comments  and  encouragement,  but  also  for  the  tough   questions   which   incentivised   me   to   widen   my   research   from   various   perspectives   before  his  passing.   My  sincere  thanks  also  goes  to  the  African  Centre  for  the  Constructive  Resolution  of   Disputes   (ACCORD)   which   provided   me   an   opportunity   to   join   their   team   as   a   Programme  Officer   in   their   Peacekeeping  Unit.  Without   their   valuable   support   and   opportunities  for  creating  a  platform  to  engage  with  field  practitioners,  it  would  not  be   possible  to  conduct  this  research  without  the  practical  experiences  they  afforded  me.   I  thank  colleagues  from  the  various  international  institutions  I  have  engaged  with,  for   the   stimulating   discussions   regarding   practical   peacekeeping   experiences   on   the   ground.    Also  I  thank  my  friends  from  the  African  Union  (AU)  for  their  support.     I  would  like  to  thank  my  family:  my  parents  (Florina  Mohale,  Ellen  and  Ed  Forti),  my   siblings   (Charly,   Sam,   Belinda   and   Dolly   Mohale)   and   partner,   Daniel   Forti,   for   supporting  me  spiritually  and  being  my  anchors  throughout  the  writing  of  this  thesis.       i     DECLARATION   I,   Barbara   Mohale,   declare   that   the   dissertation,   Burden-­sharing   and   Hybrid   Peacekeeping   Operations   in   Somalia   and   Sudan:   A   Critical   Analysis,   hereby   submitted  for  the  Magister  Artium  degree  in  Political  Science  at  the  University  of  the   Free  State,  is  my  own,  independent  work  and  has  not  previously  been  submitted  at   another  university  or   faculty.  All  sources  that   I  have  used  have  been  duly  specified   and  acknowledged  as  complete  references.  I  further  cede  copyright  of  the  dissertation   in  favour  of  the  University  of  the  Free  State.     Signature:  ......................................   B.  Mohale   20  October  2015                             ii     ABSTRACT     This  study  explores  whether  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations,  or  recent  forms  of  UN-­ AU  co-­operation,  offer  new  prospects  or  opportunities   to   the  challenges   relating   to   international   peacekeeping   in   Africa.   It   further   analyses   whether   the   international   community  is  moving  towards  more  effective  and  legitimate  peacekeeping  operations   when   it   follows  an  approach  of   hybrid   peacekeeping  operations   in  Africa.  Through   historical-­critical  examinations  of  case  studies  of  peacekeeping  operations  in  Liberia,   Burundi,  Darfur,  and  Somalia,  the  study  interrogates  the  evolution  and  practicality  of   key  concepts  such  as  R2P,  mandates  and   legal  underpinning,  and  the  UN  and  AU   architectures  for  peacekeeping  operations.     The   study   found   that   peacekeeping   has   shifted   to   include   the   three   components   (civilian,   police,   and  military),  making  peacekeeping  operations  multidimensional   in   scope  and  approach.    The  cooperative  security  partnership  between  the  UN  and  AU   and  sub-­regional  organisations,  such  as  ECOWAS  in  Liberia  and  AU  in  Burundi,  have   demonstrated  the  significance  of  a  cooperative  venture  towards  lasting  peace.    The   relationship   between   these   two   organisations   -­   the   UN   and   AU   -­   is   of   paramount   importance,   and  must   be   based   on   coherent   and   strategically   structured   relations   which  are  systematically  integrated.     The   implementation   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   offers   new   prospects   or   opportunities   if   the  UN   and  AU   use   the   advantages   these   possess   to   bring   about   peace,   despite   the   challenges   being   faced.   The   study   has   shown   how   limited   traditional  interventions  led  to  the  innovative  hybridisation  but  also  made  the  case  for   the  need   to   refine   the   response.    The  ultimate  conclusion   is   that   the   resource  and   political  constraints  faced  by  the  AU  would  benefit  from  the  solid  shared  international   responsibility  provided  by  the  comparative  advantage  of  hybridisation.       The  study  concluded  that  the  UN  and  AU  relationship  and  cooperation  over  the  past   two   decades   presents   significant   steps   toward   operations   that   would   contribute   to   lasting  peace   in  Africa.    The   lessons  provided  by   the  Liberia,  Burundi,  Darfur,  and   Somalia  cases  offer  an  instructive  foundation  for  both  the  UN  and  AU  to  improve  on   an  evolving  approach.     Lessons   can  be   learned   from   the   conflicts   analysed   in   the     iii     study,  and  the  international  community  has  the  advantage  of  working  towards  better   and  more  refined  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  than  those  conducted  in  Darfur  and   Somalia.                                               iv     OPSOMMING     Dié  studie  doen  ʼn  ondersoek  na  die  vraag  of  hibriede  vredesbewaring  of  hedendaagse   vorme  van  VN-­AU  samewerking  nuwe  vooruitsigte  of  geleenthede  bied  aangaande   die   uitdagings   wat   met   internasionale   vredesbewaring   in   Afrika   verband   hou.   Die   studie   analiseer   ook   die   vraag   of   die   internasionale   gemeenskap   tans   na   meer   doeltreffende   en   legitieme   vredesbewaring   beweeg   deur   middel   van   hibriede   vredesbewaring   in   Afrika.   Aan   die   hand   van   ʼn   histories-­kritiese   ondersoek   met   betrekking   tot   gevalle-­studies   van   vredesbewaring   in   Liberië,   Burundi,   Darfoer   en   Somalië,  ondersoek  die  studie  die  ontwikkeling  en  praktiese  beslag  van  konsepte  soos   R2P,  mandate  en  regsgeldigheid,  asook  die  VN  en  AU  institusionele  raamwerke  vir   vredesbewaring.   Die  studie  het  bevind  dat  vredesbewaring  geskuif  het  om  drie  komponente  in  te  sluit,   naamlik  burgerlik,  polisie  en  militêr,  waardeur  vredesbewaring  multidimensioneel   in   fokus   en   benadering   geword   het.   Die   samewerkende   veiligheidsvennootskappe   tussen  die  VN,  AU  en  streeksorganisasies,  waaronder  ECOWAS  in  Liberië  en  die  AU   in   Burundi,   demonstreer   voorts   die   betekenisvolheid   van   samewerkende   ondernemings   om   volhoubare   vrede   moontlik   te   maak.   Die   verhoudinge   tussen   eersgenoemde  organisasies,  die  VN  en  die  AU,  is  van  die  grootste  belang  en  moet   berus   op   samebindende   en   strategiese   verhoudinge  wat   sistematies   tot   integrasie   gebring  is.   Die   implementering   van   hibriede   vredesbewaringsoperasies   lewer   daarom   nuwe   vooruitsigte  en  geleenthede  waar  die  VN  en  die  AU  die  voordele  wat  sulke  operasies   bied,  kan  aanwend  met  betrekking  tot  die  uitdagings  wat  die  hoof  gebied  moet  word.   Die   studie   toon   hoe   beperkte   tradisionele   intervensies   gelei   het   tot   innoverende   hibridisering  en  wys  ook  op  die  behoefte  vir  verdere  verfyning.  Die  gevolgtrekking  is   dat  die  tekort  aan  hulpbronne  en  politieke  tekortkominge  van  die  AU  kan  baat  by  ʼn   behoorlike  en  gedeelde  internasionale  verantwoordelikheid  vir  vredesbewaring  en  dit   wat  voordelig  is  aangaande  hibridisering.   Die  studie  se  slotsom  is  dat  die  VN  en  die  AU  se  verhouding  en  samewerking  oor  die   afgelope  twee  dekades  betekenisvolle  stappe  verteenwoordig  sover  dit  wedersydse     v     bydraes  betref  om  volhoubare  vrede  in  Afrika  moontlik  te  maak.  Die  lesse  wat  geleer   is  in  Liberië,  Burundi,  Darfoer  en  Somalië  bied  ook  ʼn  fondasie  aan  die  VN  en  die  AU   om  hulle  benadering   te  verbeter.  Lesse  kan  geleer  word  uit  die  konflikte  wat   in  die   studie  geanaliseer  is  en  die  internasionale  gemeenskap  het  nou  die  voordeel  om  te   werk  vir  beter  en  meer  verfynde  hibriede  vredesbewaringsoperasies  na  afloop  van  dit   wat  in  Darfoer  en  Somalië  afgespeel  het.                                         vi       KEY  WORDS     AFRICAN  UNION   BURUNDI   DARFUR   ECOWAS   HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS   LIBERIA   PARTNERSHIP   SOMALIA   SUDAN   UNITED  NATIONS                         vii     TABLE  OF  CONTENTS     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ............................................................................................  i   DECLARATION  ..........................................................................................................  ii   ABSTRACT  ................................................................................................................  iii   OPSOMMING  ..............................................................................................................  v   KEY  WORDS  ............................................................................................................  vii   LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS  AND  ACRONYMS  .........................................................  x   CHAPTER  1:  GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  AND  RESEARCH  THEME  ....................  1   1.1   INTRODUCTION  .......................................................................................................  1   1.2   PROBLEM  STATEMENT  .........................................................................................  5   1.3  AIM  AND  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  STUDY  .................................................................  6   1.4  RESEARCH  QUESTION  ...............................................................................................  7   1.5  RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY  .....................................................................................  8   1.6  LITERATURE  REVIEW  .................................................................................................  9   1.6.1  Literature  on  human  security  and  development  ................................................  9   1.6.2  Literature  on  peacekeeping  operations  ............................................................  10   1.6.3  Literature  on  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  ................................................  12   1.6.4  Data  sources  on  peacekeeping  operations,  with  specific  reference  to  Liberia   and  Burundi  ..................................................................................................................  13   1.6.5  Data  sources  on  peacekeeping  operations,  with  specific  reference  to  Sudan  .......................................................................................................................................  13   1.6.6  Data  sources  on  peacekeeping  operations,  with  specific  reference  to   Somalia  .........................................................................................................................  14   1.7  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  RESEARCH  ...........................................................................  15   1.8  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................  16   CHAPTER  2:  BEYOND  THE  VACUUM:  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORKS  OF   PEACEKEEPING  INTERVENTIONS  IN  SUB-­SAHARAN  AFRICA  .........................  18   2.1  INTRODUCTION  .........................................................................................................  18   2.2  CONCEPTUAL  ORIENTATION  OF  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  TO  PROTECT  .............  19   2.2.1  State  sovereignty,  human  rights,  human  security,  and  development  ...........  21   2.2.2  Intervention  and  human  security  .......................................................................  25   2.2.3  Sovereignty  as  a  Responsibility  ........................................................................  28   2.3  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK  OF  INTERNATIONAL  PEACEKEEPING  .................  29   2.4  MANDATES  AND  LEGAL  UNDERPINNING  FOR  PEACEKEEPING  ........................  32   2.5  INTERNATIONAL  PEACEKEEPING  IN  AFRICA  .......................................................  34   2.5.1  The  UN  peace  and  security  policy  framework  and  architecture  .....................  34   2.5.2  Role  of  the  UN  in  African  peacekeeping  challenges  .......................................  40   2.5.3  The  AU  peace  and  security  policy  and  architecture  ........................................  41   2.5.4  The  need  for  greater  African  agency  in  regional  security  governance  .........  47   2.6  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................  48   CHAPTER  3:  HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS:  TOWARD  JOINT   VENTURES  IN  LIBERIA  AND  BURUNDI  .................................................................  51    viii     3.1  INTRODUCTION  .........................................................................................................  51   3.2  CONTEMPORARY  AU  INSTITUTIONAL  PEACEKEEPING  CONTEXT  IN  AFRICA  52   3.3  AFRICAN  REGIONAL  ORGANISATIONS  IN  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS  ......  55   3.4  TOWARDS  A  COOPERATIVE  VENTURE:  THE  ROLE  OF  SUB-­REGIONAL   ORGANISATIONS  IN  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS  ..................................................  57   3.4.1  From  African  agency  to  United  Nations  mission:  From  ECOMOG  to  UNOMIL   -­  Case  Study  of  Liberia  ................................................................................................  59   3.4.1.1  Historical  Overview  of  the  Liberian  conflict  ..................................................  59   3.4.1.2  ECOWAS-­ECOMOG  intervention  in  Liberia  ...................................................  60   3.4.1.3  The  ECOWAS  non-­consensus  to  intervene  in  Liberia  ..................................  62   3.4.1.4  UN-­ECOMOG  intervention  in  Liberia  ..............................................................  65   3.4.2  From  African  agency  to  United  Nations  mission:  From  AMIB  to  UNIB  -­  Case   Study  of  Burundi  ..........................................................................................................  67   3.4.2.1  Burundi’s  civil  war  and  peace  process  ..........................................................  67   3.4.2.2  Early  intervention  in  Burundi:  Peace  Negotiations  ......................................  68   3.4.2.3  The  Transition  from  AU  to  UN  Mission  in  Burundi  .......................................  72   3.5  CONCLUSION  .............................................................................................................  76   CHAPTER  4:  HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS  IN  AFRICA:  THE  CASES   OF  SUDAN  (DARFUR)  AND  SOMALIA  ...................................................................  80   4.1  INTRODUCTION  .........................................................................................................  80   4.2  CONFLICT  DYNAMICS  OF  DARFUR  ........................................................................  82   4.3  AFRICAN  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  DARFUR  ................................................  86   4.4  INTERNATIONAL  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  DARFUR  ...................................  90   4.5  TRANSITION  FROM  AMIS  TO  UNAMID:  A  HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATION  ...........................................................................................................................................  93   4.6  CONFLICT  DYNAMICS  OF  SOMALIA  .......................................................................  96   4.7  INTERNATIONAL  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  SOMALIA  .................................  99   4.8  AFRICA’S  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  SOMALIA  ............................................  101   4.9  LESSONS  LEARNED  FROM  DARFUR  AND  SOMALIA:  A  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  108   4.10  CONCLUSION  .........................................................................................................  111   CHAPTER  5:  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  .....................................................  114   5.1  SUMMARY  ................................................................................................................  114   5.2  EVALUATION  OF  THE  RESEARCH  QUESTION  ....................................................  118   5.3  CONCLUSION  ...........................................................................................................  126   REFERENCES  ........................................................................................................  128                   ix     LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS  AND  ACRONYMS     ACIRC:     African  Capacity  for  Immediate  Response  to  Crises     AMIB:       AU  Mission  in  Burundi     AMIS:       African  Union  Mission  to  Sudan     AMISOM:     African  Union  Mission  in  Somalia   APSA:       African  Peace  and  Security  Architecture     ASF:       African  Standby  Force     AU:       African  Union     CADSP:     Common  African  Defence  and  Security  Policy     CAR:       Central  African  Republic     CEN-­SAD:     Community  of  Saharan  and  Sahelian  State   CFC:       Ceasefire  Commission     CNDD-­FDD:    National  Council  for  the  Defence  Democracy  and  Force  for  the   Defence  of  Democracy     Codesa:     Convention  for  a  Democratic  South  Africa     CONOPS:     Concept  of  Operations     CPA:       Comprehensive  Peace  agreement     CSSDCA:    Conference  on  Security,  Stability,  Development  and  Co-­ operation  in  Africa     DDR:       Disarmament,  Demobilization  and  Reintegration     DPA:       Darfur  Peace  Agreement       x     DPKO:     Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations   DRC:       Democratic  Republic  of  Congo     EASF:       East  African  Standby  Force     ECCAS:     Economic  Community  of  Central  African  States     ECOWAS:     Economic  Community  of  West  African  States     ECOMOG:     ECOWAS  Monitoring  Group   ESF:       Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  Standby  Force   EU:       European  Union     FARDC:     Forces  Armées  de  la  République  Démocratique  du  Congo     FGS:       Federal  Government  of  Somalia     FNL:       Forces  Nationales  de  Liberation     FRODEBU:     Front  pour  la  Democratique  au  Burundi   ICC:       International  Criminal  Court     ICISS:       International  Commission  on  Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty   ICRC:       International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross     IFRC:    International  Federation  of  the  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent   Societies     IGAD:       Intergovernmental  Authority  on  Development     IGASOM:    Intergovernmental  Authority  on  Development  Peace  Support   Mission  in  Somalia     INPFL:     Independent  National  Patriotic  Front  of  Liberia       xi     IRAs:       Interim  Regional  Administrations     JEM:       Justice  and  Equality  Movement     LAS:       League  of  Arabs  States     MINURCAT:     Mission  in  the  Central  African  Republic  and  Chad     MONUC:    United  Nations  Organization  Mission  in  the  Democratic  Republic   of  the  Congo     MONUSCO:    United  Nations  Organization  Stabilization  Mission  in  the   Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo     MoU:       Memorandum  of  Understanding     NARC:     North  African  Regional  Capability   NATO:     North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization       NCP:       National  Congress  Party     NEPAD:     New  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development     NPLF:       National  Patriotic  Front  of  Liberia     NRF:       National  Redemption  Front     OAU:       Organisation  of  African  Unity     ONUB:     Operation  in  Burundi     PSC:       Peace  and  Security  Council     PSOD:     Peace  Support  Operations  Division     R2P:       Responsibility  to  Protect   RECs:       Regional  Economic  Communities     xii     RMs:       Regional  Mechanisms     RoE:       Rules  of  Engagement     RSFs:       Regional  Standby  Forces     RUF:       Revolutionary  United  Front     SADC:     Southern  African  Development  Community     SANDF:     South  African  National  Defence  Force     SADF:       South  African  Defence  Force   SAPSD:     South  African  Protection  Support  Detachment     SIPRI:       Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute     SNA:       Somali  National  Army     SNF:       Somalia  National  Forces     SNM:       Somali  National  Movement     SOPs:       Standard  Operating  Procedures     SPDF:       Sudan  People’s  Defence  Force     SPF:       Somali  Police  Force     SPLM/A:     Sudan  People’s  Liberation  Movement/Army     SPM:       Ogadeni  Somali  Patriotic  Movement     SSF:       Southern  African  Development  Community  Standby  Force     SSR:       Security  Sector  Reform     TCCs:       Troop  Contributing  Countries    xiii     TFG:       Transitional  Federal  Government     UIC:       Union  of  Islamic  Courts     UN:       United  Nations     UNAMID:     United  Nations-­African  Union  Mission  in  Darfur     UNAMSIL:     United  Nations  Mission  in  Sierra  Leone     UNDP:     United  Nations  Development  Programme   UNHCR:     UN  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees     UNICEF:     United  Nations  Children’s  Fund     UNISFA:     United  Nations  Interim  Security  Force  for  Abyei     UNITAF:     Unified  Task  Force     UNMEE:     United  Nations  Mission  in  Ethiopia  and  Eritrea;;     UNMIL:     United  Nations  Mission  in  Liberia     UNMIS:     United  Nations  Mission  in  the  Sudan     UNMISS:       United  Nations  Mission  in  the  Republic  of  South  Sudan     UNOCI:     United  Nations  Operation  in  Côte  d'Ivoire     UNOL:     United  Nations  Peace-­building  Support  Office  in  Liberia     UNOMIL:     United  Nations  Observer  Mission  in  Liberia     UNOSOM:     United  Nations  Operation  in  Somalia     UNPOS:     United  Nations  Political  Office  for  Somalia     UNSC:     United  Nations  Security  Council      xiv     UNSMIS:       United  Nations  Supervision  Mission  in  Syria     UNSOA:     United  Nations  Support  Office  for  AMISOM     UNSOM:     United  Nations  Assistance  Mission  in  Somalia     UPRONA:     Union  pour  le  Progrès  national     US:       United  States   USC:       United  Somalia  Congress     WFP:       World  Food  Programme     WHO:       World  Health  Organisation                                         xv     CHAPTER  1:  GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  AND  RESEARCH  THEME     1.1  INTRODUCTION     The   United   Nations   (UN),   positioned   as   the   world’s   preeminent   international   organisation   in   the   field   of   international   peace   and   security,   has   borne   the   unique   burden   of  managing   and  mitigating   the   complex   strategic,   political,   economic,   and   humanitarian  consequences  of  conflicts  around  the  world,  but  most  specifically  within   the  African  continent  (Crockatt  2005:113).     The  African  continent  was  affected  by  the  Cold  War  and  continues  to  be  tormented  by   the  burdens  of  political  instability,  religious,  social,  racial,  and  ethnic  strife.    This  has   undermined  Africa’s  long-­term  efforts  for  stability,  peace  and  prosperity.  Thus  the  need   to  consolidate  peace  in  conflict  affected  states  became  an  important  mission  to  the   international   community,   specifically   in   Africa   where   most   of   the   world’s   armed   conflicts  occurred  since  the  early  1990s.    In  the  period  of  1990  –  2004,  fifty-­seven  (57)   conflicts  were  fought  around  the  world  of  which  fifty-­three  were  intrastate  conflicts  in   the  African  continent,  thus,  92%  of  conflicts  in  Africa  (Harbom  &  Wallensteen  2005:   121).   As   a   result,   the   international   community   has   increasingly   considered   UN   peacekeeping  as  an  instrument  to  prevent  or  resolve  wars  and  armed  conflict  of  an   intra-­state  nature  on  the  African  continent  (Witharta  2012:5).       Peacekeeping  is  a  tool  available  to  the  UN  in  order  to  navigate  the  difficult  path  from   conflict  to  peace.    It  can  be  defined  as  the  “deployment  of  a  United  Nations  presence   in  the  field,  hitherto  with  the  consent  of  all  the  parties  concerned,  normally  involving   UN  military  and/or  police  personnel  and  frequently  also  civilians.  Peace-­keeping  is  a   technique   that   expands   the   possibilities   for   both   the   prevention   of   conflict   and   the   making  of  peace”  (United  Nations  Secretary-­General  1992).       Peacekeeping   is   a   concept   developed   by   the   UN,   as   part   of   its   overall   strategic   process  for   the  management  of   international  conflict.   It  was  created  in  1992  for   the   planning,   preparation,  management   and   direction   of  UN   peacekeeping   operations.   The  UN  Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations  (DPKO)  was  created  when  former     1     UN  Secretary-­General  Boutros  Boutros-­Ghali  took  office  in  January  1992,  to  oversee   the  UN  peacekeeping  at  a  time  when  it  dealt  with  several  world  crises,  such  as  the   breakup  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  the  1994  genocide  in  Rwanda,  to  name  but  a   few  (Tharoor  &  Johnston  2001:3).  As  a  result,  he  issued  ‘An  Agenda  for  Peace’,  as  a   report   which   was   designed   with   the   explicit   aim   of   conducting   peacekeeping   operations   in   the   post-­Cold   War   world,   differently   from   traditional   peacekeeping   operations  (United  Nations  Secretary-­General  1992).  It  is  important  to  note  that  before   1992,  peacekeepers  were  active  in  Cambodia,  Somalia,  Angola,  Salvador,  the  Golan   Heights,   Cyprus,   and   on   the   border   between   India   and   Pakistan.     Traditional   peacekeeping  operations  was  heavily  military  based  and  did  not  play  a  direct  role  in   political  efforts  to  resolve  the  conflict.  Their  role  was  simply  to  monitor  and  observe   ceasefires.    However,   at   the   end   of   the  Cold  War,   due   to   intra-­state   conflicts,   the   responsibility  of  peacekeepers  had  broadened.   The  UN  was  overloaded  by  a  multiplicity  of  peacekeeping  operations  of  which  they   had  to  bare  the  financial  burden  amongst  other  challenges.    Thus,  it  was  important  for   the  UN  to  take  significant  measures  and  find  the  required  means  to  ensure  the  success   of  peacekeeping  operations.  To  make  the  UN  more  credible  and  competent  as  a  force   for  peace,  the  Report  of  the  Panel  on  United  Nations  Peace  Operations,  commonly   known   as   the   Brahimi   Report,   was   issued   in   2000.   This   report   “made   recommendations  on  strategic,  political  and  operational  improvements  to  ensure  more   effective   peacekeeping   operations”   (Murithi   2009:3).   It   also   accentuated   concerns,   especially   regarding   adequate   management   and   financial   systems,   to   support   the   increased   number   of   peacekeeping   operations   and   peacekeepers   deployed   internationally  (United  Nations  2000).  This  report,  informally  referred  to  as  the  Brahimi   Report   took   a   critical   look   at   past   peacekeeping   efforts   in   order   to   improve   the   difficulties   the   UN   had   faced   during   past   peacekeeping   operations.     Past   peacekeeping   operations   were   often  marked   by   a   lack   of   clear   guidelines   for   the   required  interventions  and  related  operations,  which  arguably  was  one  of  the  reasons   behind  some  unsuccessful  peacekeeping  operations  such  as  in  Rwanda  (where  the   international  community  stood  by  as  the  slaughter  of  Tutsis  continued),  and  the  case   in  Bosnia  (where  the  UN  declared  safe  areas  for  Muslims  in  March  1992  but  basically   did  nothing  to  secure  them,  thus  the  slaughter  of  Srebrenica  continued).         2     In  March  2007,  the  UN  DPKO  implemented  a  series  of  reforms  recommended  by  the   Brahimi   Report   with   a   view   to   strengthening   its   peacekeeping   undertakings   and   enhancing   the   prospects   of   successful   outcomes.   These   reforms   focused   on   strengthening   the   capacity   of   multinational   peacekeeping   operations   in   order   to   manage   and   sustain   field   operations,   which   has   led   to   complex   peacekeeping   operations  in  the  Darfur  region  of  Sudan  and  in  the  Central  African  Republic  (CAR).     This  was  done  by   focusing  on   integrating  UN  efforts  with   that  of  other  entities  and   functionaries  in  the  field  of  peacekeeping  operations  such  as  the  African  Union  (AU)   (United   Nations   Peacekeeping   2012a).     In   addition,   it   was   noted   that   in   order   for   peacekeeping  operations  to  be  effective,  peacekeepers  should  be  properly  resourced   for  their  tasks  and  functioning  under  clear  mandates  (United  Nations  2000).    This  new   approach   helped   to   clarify   what   UN   peacekeeping   operations   were   pursuing   to   accomplish,  what  kinds  of  forces  were  required,  and  what  conditions  might  necessitate   different  kinds  of  operations.   Given   the   increasing   intensity   and   prevalence   of   intrastate   conflicts   on   the  African   continent,   peacekeeping   operations   have   become   significant   to   the   international   community  for  securing  peace.  Moreover,  as  part  of  a  commitment  to  help  find  African   solutions  to  African  problems,  the  UN  also  had  to  acknowledge  the  need  for  a  regional   organisation  such  as  the  AU  to  play  a  fundamental  role  in  peacekeeping  operations.         Sound  and  clear  mandates  also  had  to  be  adopted  by  regional  organisations.  In  Africa,   the  AU  (and  previously  its  predecessor,  the  Organisation  of  African  Unity  (OAU))  has   increasingly   assumed   responsibilities   for   promoting   peace   and   stability.   This   even   extended   to   sub-­regional  organisations  such  as   the  Economic  Community  of  West   African  States  (ECOWAS),  which  deployed  troops  to  the  civil  war  in  Liberia  in  1993,   where   they  worked  alongside  a  UN  observer   force,  and   thus  became  an   important   peacekeeping  actor  (Segell  2010:26;;  Adebajo  2011:12).  Progressively,  regional  and   sub-­regional  organisations  played  a  significant  role  in  peacekeeping  operations  within   Africa,  such  as   in  Liberia,  Sierra  Leone,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Burundi  and  Sudan’s  Darfur   region   (Adebajo   2011:12).   In   these   operations   the   AU   had   steadily   been   gaining   prominence  as  an  international  peacekeeping  body.    Of  even  greater  significance  is   that  some  of  these  operations  have  gradually  evolved  into  hybrid  UN-­AU  operations,     3     such  as   the  peacekeeping  operations   in  Burundi  and  Sudan  –   thereby   indicating  a   move  toward  closer  co-­operation  between  the  said  organisations  (Kobbie  2008:4-­6).     In  Burundi,  for  instance,  South  Africa,  Mozambique  and  Ethiopia  deployed  troops  to   this  once  war-­ravaged  state  as  part  of  the  AU  Mission  in  Burundi  (AMIB).  In  2004  the   United  Nations  Security  Council  (UNSC)  agreed  to  take  over  AMIB  which  then  became   known  as  the  UN  Operation  in  Burundi  (ONUB).  When  ONUB  was  terminated  in  2006,   the  following  were  among  the  operation’s  major  achievements:  the  disarmament  and   demobilisation  of  fighters,  the  rendering  of  support  to  the  Burundian  electoral  process,   protecting  returning  refugees  and  humanitarian  convoys,  and  facilitating  the  training   of  Burundi’s  police  force  (Adebajo  2011:  78-­79).   Thus  the  nature  of  UN  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa  has  evolved  and  has  broken   new  ground  in  terms  of  the  processes  of  burden-­sharing  between  the  UN  and  African   role-­players  (Adebajo  2011:  xvii).     In  recent  years,  peacekeeping  operations  premised  on  a  greater  measure  of  burden-­ sharing  and  co-­operation  were  most  apparent  in  Sudan  from  2004-­2011,  starting  with   the  AU  Mission  to  Sudan  (AMIS)  operating  in  the  country’s  western  region  of  Darfur.   With  the  collaboration  of  the  AU  and  UN  on  peacekeeping  operations  in  Darfur,  this   operation  was  transformed  into  a  hybrid  peacekeeping  operation,  which  was  officially   established  as  the  UN-­AU  Mission  in  Darfur  (UNAMID)  –  a  peacekeeping  operation   that  was  more  robust  than  AMIS  (Kajee  2010:170).    In  another  significant  development   the  AU  deployed  a  peacekeeping  operation  to  Somalia  in  2007  after  Ethiopia  failed  to   stem  instability  in  Somalia  before  withdrawing  its  troops  from  the  country  in  2008.  The   AU  peacekeeping  operation,  known  as  the  AU  Mission  in  Somalia  (AMISOM),  consists   largely  of  Ugandan  and  Burundian   troops  and  has  since   its  deployment  played  an   important  role  as  a  conflict  management  mechanism  in  the  conflict  dynamics  of  war-­ ravaged  Somalia  (Adebajo  2011:176).       It   is   important   to  note   that   all   the  above-­mentioned  peacekeeping  operations  were   established  on  the  basis  of  the  need  for  better  co-­operation  and  a  greater  measure  of   financial  and  logistical  burden-­sharing  between  the  UN  and  the  AU  in  the  pursuit  of   peace   and   security   in   Africa.     From   a   scholarly   perspective,   it   seems   that   hybrid   peacekeeping  operations  and/or  operations  that  are  premised  on  formal  co-­operation     4     between  the  UN  and  the  AU  offer  new  perspectives  and  possibilities  relating  to  the   challenges  of  multinational  peacekeeping  undertakings  in  Africa  (Malan  1999:45-­61).     1.2  PROBLEM  STATEMENT     Although   peacekeeping   operations   are   often   conducted   in   Africa,   continental   and   institutions  also  play  a  key  role  in  international  peacekeeping  in  the  sense  that  such   entities  are  often  willing  and  able  to  provide  sizeable  deputation  for  UN  peacekeeping   operations.  African  countries  are  more  and  more  likely  to  be  called  upon  to  organize   and  sustain  their  own  peacekeeping  operations  under  the  mandate  of  the  UN.  At  the   same   time,   the  UN   retains   the  most   important   politico-­security   role   on   the   African   continent,   which   vary   across   regions   (and   within   them)   and   warrant   not   only   differentiated  strategies  but  different   capacities.   It   also   faces   the  prospect  of  being   overstretched  in  the  many  operational  areas  of  involvement  (United  Nations  Security   Council  2009).       In  addition  to  the  challenge  of  becoming  overstretched,  the  UN  also  had  to  attend  to   the  legitimacy  of  its  peacekeeping  operations.  China  and  Russia,  for  instance,  rejected   the  prospect  of  a  UN  peacekeeping  operation  in  Darfur,  given  that  such  an  operation   was  considered  as  a  form  of  intervention  –  even  an  exercise  of  American  or  Western   hegemony  in  the  developing  world.    Instead,  the  Chinese  and  the  Russians  supported   “the  hybrid  force  with  an  African  charter  that  emerged  as  the  compromise  solution”,   i.e.  the  creation  of  UNAMID  as  a  joint  UN-­AU  endeavour.      In  the  African  context,  role-­ players  such  as  Ghana  and  Tanzania  also  specifically  pushed  for  the  deployment  of  a   hybrid  peacekeeping  operation  in  this  particular  case  (Adebajo  2011:  207-­208).  As  a   result  of  the  serious  challenges  to  deal  with  Africa’s  conflict  and  security  needs,  the   UN   and   the   AU   have   developed   what   is   referred   to   as   ‘hybrid   peacekeeping   operations’.   In  view  of  the  above,  it  seems  to  be  of  great  importance  to  realise  and  understand  the   need  for  deeper  forms  of  co-­operation  as  an  imperative  to  work  towards  more  effective   and  legitimate  peacekeeping  operations.    In  the  eastern  and  central  parts  of  Africa,   demands  for  effective  peacekeeping  roles  for  the  UN  and  the  AU  have  especially  been   on  the  increase  in  recent  years,  with  major  operations  mandated  in  Somalia,  Chad,     5     and   Sudan.   Whether   the   above-­mentioned   operations   could   be   considered   as   possible  future  models  for  peacekeeping  operations  on  the  African  continent  remains   to  be  answered.  We  should  nonetheless  take  into  consideration  that  it  is  not  a  one  size   fits   all   approach,   as   each   environment   is   different   and   should   be   approached   differently.   The   question   currently   accentuated   is   whether   this   new   approach   of   hybridisation  in  peacekeeping  in  Africa  has  a  better  chance  to  bring  peace  and  security   in  a  country  such  as  Somalia  and  Sudan.       Currently,   this  question  also  extends   to   the  challenges   in  Mali,   as   the  most   recent   international  peacekeeping  operations  challenge  on  the  African  continent.    Whatever   the  answer  to  this  question,  more  can  and  should  be  done  by  the  UN  and  AU  in  pursuit   of  an   integrated  system  of  burden-­sharing   that  will  play  a  meaningful   role   in   future   peacekeeping  endeavours  in  Africa.     1.3  AIM  AND  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  STUDY     Peacekeeping   operations   on   the   African   continent   is   an   important   undertaking,   especially  given  the  fact  that  such  peacekeeping  operations  are  now  conducted  at  a   time   when   African   states   are   taking   greater   responsibility   and   ownership   towards   promoting  peace  and  security  within  the  continent  (Brown,  Cote,  Lynn-­Jones  &  Miller   2001:171).       The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  explore  hybridisation  in  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa   and  other  forms  of  burden-­sharing  as  a  fairly  new  phenomenon  and  prospect  in  the   arena   of   international   peacekeeping   operations,   with   specific   reference   to   the   multinational  operations  in  Somalia  and  Sudan.       In   brief,   the   hybrid   peacekeeping   operation   in   Sudan   and   UN-­AU   co-­operation   in   Somalia  are  both  premised  on  and  coincide  with  the  need  for  better  co-­operation,  more   effective  burden-­sharing  and  robust  partnerships  between  the  UN  and  the  AU  (Malan   1999:45-­61).     Peacekeeping  operations  are  often  carried  out  in  environments  where  there  is  a  fragile   peace  and  also  dependent  on  the  nature  of  the  conflict  and  the  specific  challenges  it   presents.    The  challenges  that  have  faced  peacekeeping  operations  were  seen  in  the     6     exponential  increase  in  spending  in  addition  to  the  global  commitment  relating  to  the   development   goals   of   the   African   continent.     A   report   of   the   Secretary-­General,   A/65/152   of   20   July   2010,   emphasised   the   importance   of   human   sustenance   and   security   policy   focusing   on   people,   development   and   social   issues   as   the   core   for   Africa’s  peace  and  sustainable  development  (Report  of  the  Secretary-­General  2010).       Furthermore,   it   is   important   to  note   that  although  peacekeeping  operations  are  not   explicitly   provided   for   in   the   UN  Charter,   they   are   viewed   as   an   important   tool   or   mechanism  to  maintain   international  peace  and  security  where  armed  conflicts  of  a   serious  nature  are  the  order  of  the  day.   In  view  of  the  above,  this  study  intends  to  provide  insights  and  perspectives  on  the   need  to  address  the  complex  challenges  relating  to  hybrid  international  peacekeeping   operations   in   Africa.     The   analysis   further   intends   to   address   the   interaction   and   cooperation  between  the  UN  and  AU  in   their  peacekeeping  efforts   in  Africa,  and  to   finally  reflect  and  make  recommendations  on  whether  hybrid  operations  or  other  forms   of  contemporary  UN-­AU  burden-­sharing  offer  more  suitable  working  arrangements  to   address   the   challenges   in   conflict-­ridden   African   states   than   conventional   UN   peacekeeping  operations  of  recent  years.    The  case  studies  selected  –  Somalia  and   Sudan  –  will  also  be  used  to  determine  to  what  extent  the  hybrid  operations  or  other   forms   of   UN-­AU   co-­operation   might   serve   as   models   or   parameters   for   future   peacekeeping  undertakings.     1.4  RESEARCH  QUESTION     The  research  question  that  this  study  intends  to  answer  is:  Does  hybrid  peacekeeping   operations  or  recent  forms  of  UN-­AU  co-­operation  offer  new  prospects  or  opportunities   to  the  challenges  relating  to  international  peacekeeping  in  Africa?  Furthermore,  is  the   international  community  moving  towards  more  effective  and  legitimate  peacekeeping   operations  when  it  follows  an  approach  of  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa,   such  as  the  one  in  Sudan  and  previously  in  Liberia  and  Burundi,  or  where  an  AU  force   is  deployed  in  accordance  with  a  UN  Security  Council  mandate,  such  as  the  case  of   Somalia?     7     The  concepts  leading  to  the  above  questions  are  addressed  in  the  study  in  order  to   conduct  a  synthesised  framework  of  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa.     1.5  RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY       The  concept  of  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa  serves  as  a  departure  point   for  the  study.  The  methodological  approach  of  this  study  is  a  historical-­critical  study   based  on  analyses  of  the  literature  on  peacekeeping  operations.    A  historical  critical   study  entails  “interpretation  and  understanding  of  various  historical  events,  documents   and  processes.    It  is  best  understood  as  not  a  series  of  facts,  but  rather  as  series  of   competing  interpretive  narratives”  (Mahoney  &  Rueschemeyer  2013).  Therefore,  the   objective   of   applying   a   historical-­critical   study   necessitates   analysing   why   peacekeeping   operations   happened   the   way   they   did,   why   and   how.     This   would   provide   an   in-­depth   analysis   of   the   key   factors   that   shaped   the   outcomes   of   past   peacekeeping  operations  on  the  African  continent,  offering  critical  lessons  for  future   peacekeeping  efforts  in  Africa.           The  analytical  framework  of  the  study  is  deductively  linked  using  qualitative  analysis,   which  will  add  more  insight  on  the  case  of  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa.   Qualitative   analysis   is   more   pragmatic   than   prescriptive,   because   it   introduces   different   possibilities   of   conducting   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   without   advocating  for  just  one  particular  approach.    This  reiterates  that  there  is  no  one  size-­ fits-­all  model.    Therefore,  qualitative  analysis  can  be  defined  as  “a  process  of  resolving   data   into   its   constituent   components,   to   reveal   its   characteristic   elements   and   structure.  Without  analysis,  reliance  would  entirely  be  on  impressions  and  intuitions   about  the  data  as  a  whole”  (Dey  1993:31).    Specifically,  peacekeeping  operations  that   have  been  conducted   in  Somalia  and  Sudan  between  2004  and  2011  will  serve  as   case  studies  in  determining  the  prospects  to  the  challenges  and  opportunities  of  hybrid   operations  in  Africa.  The  study  will  present  an  in-­depth  understanding  of  the  practice   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   and   a   comprehensive   appreciation   of   its   evolvement  in  a  world  which  bears  little  resemblance  to  post-­Cold  War  expectations.     The  data  to  be  gathered  is  largely  qualitative  in  nature  using  documents  of  the  study   of  peacekeeping  operations  with  a  focus  on  the  hybridisation  in  Somalia  and  Sudan.       Given   the   explicit   focus   on   these   two   cases,   the   study   will   follow   an   ideographic     8     research  strategy.    Secondary  data  sources  will  include  published  documents,  reports,   newspaper  articles  and  reports  regarding  the  mandate  of  operations  and  books.    In   addition,  primary  sources  will  be  utilized  which  include  official  UN  and  AU  documents,   and   relevant   documents   on   the   concept   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   with   reference  to  Somalia  and  Sudan.   The   study   takes   into   consideration   that   the   two   main   case   studies   under   review,   namely   Somalia   and   Sudan,   are   different   in   terms   of   background   and   context   –   specifically  from  a  peacekeeping  perspective.  Sudan  has  a  political  structure  (that  is,   a  government)  that  could  be  used  to  consent  to  intervention,  whereas  Somalia  has  a   very  tenuous  structure.    It  also  takes  into  consideration  that  both  Somalia  and  Sudan   constitute  some  of  the  greatest  peacekeeping  challenges  in  the  contemporary  African   peacekeeping  arena.   This  research  will  therefore  specifically  focus  on  the  post-­Cold  War  period  from  1992   to   2014,   considering   that   this   period   in   the   historical   development   of   international   peacekeeping   offers   important   lessons   from  which   practitioners,   scholars,   analysts   and  students  can  learn  and  enrich  themselves  in  a  scholarly  context.     1.6  LITERATURE  REVIEW   The  literature  and  data  sources  consulted  for  the  research  can  be  separated  into  five   categories:     1.6.1  Literature  on  human  security  and  development     This  category  deals  with  a  broad  underpinning  of  the  concept  of  human  security  and   development   in   terms  of   its   relevance   to   the  context  of  Africa.  Brown,  Cote,  Lynn-­ Jones  and  Miller  (2001),  Malan  (1999),  and  Snyder  (1999)  all  argue  for  the  primacy  of   human   security   over   state   security.     Attention   is   also   paid   to   Cilliers   (2004),   who   focuses  on  a  wider  conception  of  human  security  that  includes  not  only  physical  hurt,   abuse  and  threat,  but  also  hunger,  disease  and  environmental  degradation.    Cilliers   thus   makes   a   vertical   distinction   between   at   least   five   levels   of   security:   personal/individual,   local/community,   national,   regional   and   international   security,   which  will  constitute  part  of  this  study’s  literature  review.  Literature  from  Tschirgi,  Lund     9     and  Mancini  (2010),  Stern  and  Öjendal  (2010)  on  the  security  and  development  nexus   which   assesses   the   promise   and   shortcomings   of   integrated   security-­development   policies  as  a  strategy  for  conflict  prevention  will  be  consulted.    Chandler  (2007)  also   gives  an  account  of   the   framework  of   the  security-­development  nexus  as  a  way   to   achieve  coherent  and  well-­managed  policies.    With  regard  to  international  security,  the   Stockholm  International  Peace  Research  Institute  (SIPRI)  Yearbook  of  2005  and  2012   will  be  taken  into  consideration  as  a  compendium  of  data  and  analysis  in  the  concepts   of  security  and  conflict,  peace  operations  and  conflict  management.    In  addition,  the   African  Standby  Force  (ASF)  will  be  consulted  with  reference  to  the  capability  of  rapid   development   and   its   potential   contribution   to  multi-­layered   security   by   Cilliers   and   Malan   (2005).     Literature   from  Bellamy   and  Wheeler   (2005),   Stahn   (2007),  Orford   (2001)  and  Rubinstein  (2008)  focus  on  the  responsibility  to  protect.    Other  supporting   documents   such   as   the   International   Commission   on   Intervention   and   State   Sovereignty   (ICISS)   report   (2001)   and   Orford   (2001)   focus   on   sovereignty   as   the   responsibility  for  transparency  and  accountability.    Furthermore,  the  original  concept   of   peacekeeping,   with   specific   focus   on   the   legitimacy   and   cultural   inversion   in   peacekeeping,  is  analysed.     1.6.2  Literature  on  peacekeeping  operations     The  second  category  refers  to  the  literature  that  addresses  peacekeeping  operations   in  Africa.  Generally,  peacekeeping  refers  to  the  deployment  of  international  personnel   to  help  maintain  peace  and  security  (Fortna  &  Howard  2008).    The  term  has  emerged   from  traditional  operations  during  the  Cold  War  as  an  instrument  to  monitor  a  ceasefire   between  two  belligerents.    Literature  on  peacekeeping  has  included  efforts  to  contain   or  terminate  hostilities,  while  others  focus  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  conflict  once  a   ceasefire   has   been   agreed   upon.     However,   the   definition   and   practice   of   peacekeeping   has   changed  with   times.     Peacekeeping   operations   have  worked   to   develop  more   sophisticated   approaches   to   the   implementation   of  mandated   tasks,   such  as  post-­conflict  stabilization,  support   to  political  processes  and  peacebuilding,   including  the  restoration  and  extension  of  state  authority  and  the  rule  of  law.     The  definition  in  the  1990  edition  of  The  Blue  Helmets  the  UN’s  review  of  operations,   notes  that  peacekeeping  personnel  deploy  “without  enforcement  powers”  and  refers     10     specifically   to   “international   peace   and   security”   (United   Nations   1990).     Hence,   peacekeeping   was   strongly   established   as   technical   tool   for   maintaining   peace   in   internal  and   interstate  conflicts.    As  a   result,   the   line  separating  peacekeeping  and   peace   enforcement   operations   became   blurred.       Therefore,   Secretary-­General   Boutros   Boutros-­Ghali’s   An   Agenda   for   Peace   which   was   the   principal   policy   document,  drew  a  series  of  activities   for  which  the  UN  should  be  responsible,   from   peacekeeping   to  peace  enforcement   to  peacebuilding.    This  was  an  optimism  and   confidence  of  the  UN  Secretariat  at  the  time.  There  was  a  pervasive  sense  that  finally,   after  decades  of  disagreement,   the  UN  would  be   instrumental   in  resolving  disputes   across  the  world.     The  literature  on  peacekeeping  operations  are  extraordinarily  diverse  and  difficult  to   categorize.    Some  of   the   leading  authors   in   this   regard  are  Tharoor   and   Johnston   (2001),   Arbuckle   (2007),   Durch   and   Berkman   (2006),   Chandler   (2007),   Adebajo   (2011),  Bellamy  and  Williams  (2009;;  2013).  Bellamy  examines  why  states  contribute   peacekeepers,  the  factors  that  inhibit  contributions  and  the  ways  in  which  the  UN  might   strengthen   its   capacity   to   secure   more   and   better   peacekeepers.   In   addition,   de   Coning  (2010)  is  consulted  on  international  peacekeeping.  The  UN  Secretary-­General   reports   to   the  UNSC  on  peacekeeping  operations   for   resolutions  are   also   of   great   significance  as   they  provide  factual  accounts  of   the  activities  of  operations  within  a   given  period,   including  the  Secretary-­General’s  observations  and  recommendations   for  further  action.  Reports  from  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)   are   also   of   scholarly   significance.       Focus  will   also   be   placed   on  Shaw   (2008)   for   international  law  regarding  the  legitimacy  of  peacekeeping  operations.  Furthermore,   Neethling  (2007)  argues  that  the  AU  and  associated  sub-­regional  organisations  do  not   have  the  capacity   to  undertake  complex  peacekeeping  operations  on  their  own  –  a   perspective  which  is  of  vital  interest  to  this  study.  Sriram  (2008)  focuses  on  the  context   of   conflict  prevention   including  peacekeeping  with   the  emphasis  of   the   relationship   between   rule  of   law,   security  and  development,   and  human   rights.  Bellamy   (2004)   states  the  strengths,  weaknesses  and  experiences  of  peacekeeping  operations  that   have  been  written;;  however,  global  politics  or  the  roles  of  peace  operations  within  it   have  not  been  reflected  on.       11     1.6.3  Literature  on  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations     The   third   category   is   closely   linked   to   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations.  There   are   various  sources  relating  to  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations,  including  works  by  Gelot,   Gelot  and  de  Coning  (2012),   in  which   the   importance  of  clarifying   the  exact   role  of   non-­UN   components,   especially   regional   organisations,   in   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   is  discussed.    They   look  at   the  potential  disadvantages  or  difficulties  of   hybrid  peacekeeping  operations.    An  article  by  Aboagye  (2004)  on  how  the  UN  and   the  AU  can  create  a  ‘peace  to  keep’  will  be  consulted  including  ECOWAS  and  the  AU’s   peace  and  security  architecture.    Literature  on  regional  actors  such  as  the  AU,  and   sub-­regional  organisations  are  analysed  in  terms  of  the  security  arrangement  in  Africa   for  peacekeeping  operations.    The  Constitutive  Act  of  the  AU  which  established  organs   such  as  the  Assembly,  the  Executive  Council,  the  Pan-­African  Parliament,  and  various   other  agencies  that  have  more  specialized  functions  will  be  taken  into  consideration.   The  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Establishing  the  Peace  and  Security  Council  of  the  AU   (African  Union  2003),  mandates   to  undertake  security   initiatives  dedicated   to  using   international  cooperation  such  as  the  UN  and  other  institutions  to  achieve  and  promote   peace  and  security  in  Africa  will  be  scrutinized.       The  Brahimi  Report   2000,   on  modalities   for   peacekeeping   operations,  will   also   be   explored.     This   report   explains   the   importance   of   cooperation   and   coordination   between   the   AU   and   UN,   including   how   funding   is   disbursed   for   peacekeeping   operations   (United   Nations   2000).     Hybridisation   is   also   analysed   in   its   ability   to   effectively  secure  peace  in  Africa.    The  study  also  looks  at  secondary  sources  such  as   Bellamy,  Williams  and  Griffin  (2010)  who  focus  on  the  evolving  hybrid  peacekeeping   operations  where   two   institutions   join   their   efforts   to  establish  working  procedures.   Reports  of  the  Secretary-­General  on  the  work  of  the  UN  regarding  hybrid  operations   are   also   of   significance   to   the   study   of   hybridisation   in   peacekeeping   as   a   phenomenon.       Furthermore,  the  study  will  include  literature  from  Murithi  (2007),  Draman  and  Carment   (2001)  on  an  analysis  of   the  evolving   relationship  between   the  AU  and   the  UN,  by   focusing  on  the  establishment  of  a  hybrid  UN-­AU  force  to  stabilize  the  situation  in  the   region.  Murithi  analyses  the  extent  to  which  such  a  hybrid  partnership  exists.     12         1.6.4   Data   sources   on   peacekeeping   operations,   with   specific   reference   to   Liberia  and  Burundi     Scholars   such   as   Dennis   and   Dennis   (2008),   Ikechi   (2003)   and  Wippman   (1993)   researched  extensively  on   the  history  of   the  Liberian  conflict.    Akinyemi  and  Aluko   (1984),   Okeke   (2012)   and   Akindele   (2012)   give   a   detailed   account   on   the   role   ECOWAS  played  to  respond  to  the  conflict  in  Liberia  in  the  quest  to  bring  about  peace.     Furthermore,   Adebajo   (2013)   focuses   on   the   role   played   by   Nigeria   through   the   ECOWAS   Monitoring   Group   (ECOMOG)   which   took   the   responsibility   to   protect   civilians.    He   provides   three   possible   reasons  why  Nigeria   decided   to   intervene   in   Liberia.    The  study  will  further  explore  data  sources  such  as  Aboagye  and  Bah  (2015)   on  the  transition  from  the  African  agency  to  UN  peacekeeping  operation.       The  study  will  also  focus  on  data  sources  on  Burundi,  as  such,  it  will  focus  on  work   done  by  Boshoff,  Vreÿ  and  Rautenbach  (2010)  and  Zartman  (1995)  who  analyse  the   contributions  by  regional  actors  to  the  peace  process  of  Burundi.    African  Centre  for   the  Constructive  Resolution  of  Disputes  (ACCORD)  (2007)  and  de  Coning  and  Lotze   (2013)  give  a  detailed  view  on  the  AU  which  emerged  as  peacekeeping  partner  of  the   continent   and   the   imperative   approach   taken   by   the   Nelson   Mandela   and   Julius   Nyerere   as   facilitators   in   the   peace   process.     Other   authors   such   as   Thobane,   Neethling  and  Vreÿ  (2007)  analyse  the  practical  conditions  that  AMIB  operated  under.     1.6.5   Data   sources   on   peacekeeping   operations,   with   specific   reference   to   Sudan     This   category   consists   of   sources   regarding   peacekeeping   operations   in   Sudan   in   which   peacemaking   and   peacebuilding   have   been   combined   to   pave   the   way   for   peacekeeping.     Literature   on  UN  mandates   and   previous   operations   conducted   in   Sudan  are  considered  in  order  to  establish  the  patterns  that  could  be  avoided  in  order   to  secure  lasting  peace.  The  study  also  includes  UN-­AU  hybrid  operations  in  Sudan   wherein  the  burden-­sharing  for  peacekeeping  operations  by  Neethling  (2009)  will  be     13     explored.     Furthermore,   works   by   Mamdani   (2009),   Murithi   (2013),   Juma   (2003),   Dowden   (2009),   Beswick   (2010)   on   peacekeeping,   regime   security   and   'African   solutions  to  African  problems'  will  be  explored.  Neethling  (2004)  as  well  as  the  Reports   from   International   Peace   Academy   are   of   great   significance   in   assessing   the   operations  that  have  already  been  conducted.  Adebajo  (2011)  is  of  great  importance,   as  he  addresses  the  accounts  for  the  resurgence  of  UN  peacekeeping  efforts  in  Africa   in   the   post-­Cold   War   era,   including   factors   that   determined   the   successes   or   contributions   to   the   failure   of   peacekeeping   operations   with   reference   to   Sudan.     Literature  in  Mickler  (2013),  who  argues  that  UNAMID  represents  on  the  one  hand,  an   important  attempt  by   the  evolving  AU   to  play  a  direct  and  effective   role   in   regional   peace  operations,  and  contains  elements  of  a  viable  model  for  other  potential  hybrid   operations  on  the  continent,  will  be  considered.     1.6.6   Data   sources   on   peacekeeping   operations,   with   specific   reference   to   Somalia     Works  by  the  following  authors  are  relevant:     Thomashausen  (2002)  assesses  the  contemporary  developments  in  the  principle  of   intervention  regarding  the  human  disaster  in  Somalia  including  international  reaction   to  the  situation  of  Somalia.    It  assesses  the  UNSC  acts  and  the  different  resolutions   that  were  conducted  in  Somalia  because  of  the  deteriorating  events  and  lack  of  good   governance.       Work  by  Murphy   (2007)  will  be  consulted,  which   focuses  on  how   the   robust  peace   enforcement  operation  in  Somali  was  conducted.    Murphy  analyses  the  lessons  that   may  be  learned  from  these  operations  in  terms  of  mandates,  command  and  control  of   UN  forces  in  Somalia.    Connaughton  (2002)  and  the  Reports  from  the  International   Peace   Academy   are   of   great   significance   in   assessing   the   operations   that   have   already  been  conducted.     UNSC   mandates   and   Resolutions   are   furthermore   significant   to   assessing   peacekeeping  operations  in  Somalia.    An  article  by  Ramsbotham  and  Pippard  (2006)   and  Wheeler  (2000)  on  the  peacekeeping  situation  and  other  political  developments   in   Somalia   is   also   of   great   significance   to   the   study.     Additional   articles   by   Shinn     14     (2013),  William  (2013),  and  Boutellis  and  William  (2013)  provide  a  critical  analysis  of   AMISOM  towards  creating  peace  and  security  in  Somalia.     1.7  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  RESEARCH     The   study   is   structured   in   a   conventional   way,   being   divided   into   a   theoretical   framework,  a  main  body  and  a  concluding  section  containing  an  evaluation.   Chapter  One  is  of  a  methodological  nature  and  provides  an  introduction,  identification   and   formulation   of   the   research   theme   and   problem   statement.     This   chapter   demarcates  the  study  and  provides  the  methodology  adopted  in  the  research.    The   literature  review  that  forms  part  of  this  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  some  of  the   sources  consulted  to  undertake  the  study.   Chapter   Two   is   of   a   conceptual   nature   and   provides   definitions   of   the   concept   of   human  security  and  related  issues  that  are  of  relevance  to  the  evolution  of  international   peacekeeping  with  special   relevance   to   the  African  context.     It  also   focuses  on   the   evolving   post-­Cold   War   roles   and   policy   frameworks   of   organisations   involved   in   African  peacekeeping,  specifically  the  UN  and  the  AU.    The  AU  policy  framework  on   peace  and  security  is  of  special  interest  as  this  framework  provides  the  basis  for  new   institutional  co-­operation  and  partnerships  between  the  UN  and  the  AU.   Chapter  Three  addresses   the  contemporary  UN  and  AU   institutional  peacekeeping   context  in  Africa.    The  content  of  this  chapter  focuses  on  regional  initiatives  and  non-­ UN  peacekeeping  operations   in  Africa,  as  well  as   regional  organisations  which  are   and   have   been   active   within   the   African   continent.     Attention   is   also   paid   to   the   manifestation  of  UN-­AU  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations.  The  case  of  Burundi  (circa   2000)  and  Liberia  (sub-­regional  organisation  cooperated  with  the  small  UN  observer   force   in  1993)  will  specifically  be  highlighted  as  one  of   the   first  operations  where  a   hybrid  UN-­AU  peacekeeping  initiative  was  conducted  on  the  African  continent.   Based  on  the  above,  Chapter  Four  and  Five  focus  on  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations   in  Somalia  and  Sudan.    These  chapters  will  specifically  explore  the  research  question   of   this  study,   i.e.   is   the  international  community  moving  towards  more  effective  and     15     legitimate   peacekeeping   operations   when   it   follows   an   approach   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   in   Africa,   such   as   the   one   in   Sudan   and   previously   in   Burundi,  or  where  an  AU  force  is  deployed  in  accordance  with  a  UN  Security  Council   mandate,  such  as  the  case  of  Somalia?  UN  resolutions  and  mandates  within  these   countries,  including  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  approach  of  peacekeeping   in  Somalia  and  Sudan  will   be  analysed.    The  cases  of  Somalia  and  Sudan  will   be   focused  on  to  deduce  lessons  from  the  recent  approach  of  hybridisation  and  burden-­ sharing  in  Africa.    In  other  words,  the  study  is  intended  to  determine  whether  hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   and   burden-­sharing   offer   any   insightful,   meaningful   and   practical   perspectives   into   to   the   ongoing   challenges   faced   by   the   international   community   and   African   role-­players   in   the   arena   of   peacekeeping   on   the   African   continent.   Chapter  Six   provides  an  evaluation  and   summary  of   key   findings   that   address   the   research  questions  posed  in  Chapter  one.    This  includes  an  assessment  of  the  utility   of   the   concept   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   and   determines   whether   this   approach  should  be  utilised  for  future  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa.     1.8  CONCLUSION     The  post-­Cold  War  era  sought  a   foundation  built  on  cooperation  among  states  and   within  them.  The  African  continent  has  played  a  significant  role  in  acknowledging  the   importance  of  a  shift  in  the  concept  of  security  from  traditional  state  security  to  human   security.    Conflict  prevention  mechanisms  have  been   initiated  by  both   international   and  regional  role-­players  such  as  the  UN  and  the  AU.    These  mechanisms  embrace   strategies  that  aim  to  improve  the  formula  of  dealing  and  managing  the  outbreak  of   war  and  its  escalation,  thus  peacekeeping  operations.    The  concept  of  peacekeeping   will   never   really   surmount   the   intricacy   of   international   politics   due   to   different   ideologies  regarding  its  operations.  It  remains  one  of  the  focal  challenges  to  both  the   UN   and   the   AU   to   maintain   peace   within   the   African   continent.     The   notion   of   peacekeeping  is  not  a  new  phenomenon  and  several  perspectives  have  been  added   to  the  evolving  concept  of  peacekeeping  operations  worldwide  and  specifically  in  the   African  context.  At  the  same  time,  much  still  needs  to  be  examined  and  learnt  on  how     16     to  effectively  conduct  peacekeeping  operations   in  Africa  within   the  ambit  of   the  UN   Charter.   Hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  remain  one  of  the  greatest  and  complex  challenges   within  the  African  continent.    It  has  faced  diverse  and  significant  changes  ever  since   the  end  of  the  Cold  War  in  order  to  be  consistent  with  the  new  era  and  its  expectations   for  a  better  contemporary  world.    Many  issues  that  face  Africa  remain  to  be  addressed   in   relation   to   finding  a   ‘practical  model’  of  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations.    These   evolving   role-­players   at   the   continental   and   sub-­regional   levels   are   working   and   cooperating  with  the  UN  in  countries  such  as  Somalia  and  Sudan.  There  are  certainly   a  number  of  unresolved   issues   regarding   the  present  and   future  conduct  of  hybrid   peacekeeping  operations  in  the  realm  of  peace  and  security.    Specifically,   it  seems   that   the  modalities,   legal   framework  and  practical   foundations   for   delegating  or   for   sharing  the  responsibility  for  international  peacekeeping  in  Africa  need  to  be  clarified   in  a  practical  and  scholarly  context.  Put  simply,  the  challenge  remains  to  establish  a   legitimate  and  acceptable  basis  for  UN-­African  involvement  in  joint  ventures  so  as  to   ensure   an   appropriate   response   to   situations   where   the   security   of   people   is   endangered.   Thus,   this   study   aims   to   critically   analyse   hybrid   and   burden-­sharing   peacekeeping  operations  in  Somalia  and  Sudan.                                 17     CHAPTER  2:  BEYOND  THE  VACUUM:  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORKS  OF   PEACEKEEPING  INTERVENTIONS  IN  SUB-­SAHARAN  AFRICA       2.1  INTRODUCTION     Concepts   and   perspectives   do   not   emerge   in   a   vacuum.    Concepts   such   as   state   sovereignty,  human  rights,  and  human  security  have  transpired  as  pillars  of  the  post-­ Cold  War  era.    It  is  from  this  framework  that  notions  such  as  the  security-­peace  nexus,   peacekeeping,  peacemaking,  and  peacebuilding  are  explored.       The  end  of  the  Cold  War  raised  prospects  for  international  peace;;  however,  these  were   encumbered  by  civil  conflict  during  the  establishment  of  the  new  world  order.    As  civil   conflict  intensified,  the  international  community  had  to  develop  new  ways  to  resolve   them  and  move  away  from  traditional  approaches  to  conflict.      Thus  peacekeeping  had   to   move   beyond   ceasefires   to   a   more   radical   approach.    With   the   support   of   the   Brahimi   Report   and   the   Agenda   for   Peace,   the   new   approach   of   peacekeeping   crystallised.     As   a   result,   peacekeeping   became   multidimensional   in   nature   and   structures   to   include   the   military,   police,   and   a   civilian   component   which   is   progressively  growing  in  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  mandates.    International   actors  such  as  the  UN  and  continental  actors  such  as  the  AU  have  taken  great  strides   to   maintain   and   develop   peace   and   security.     The   AU,   in   particular,   has   been   undergoing  an   important  phase   in   terms  of   the  definition   it   is  giving   to   its  collective   security   regime,   by   taking   strides   to   develop   peace   and   security   policies   and   architecture.       At   the   most   basic   level   of   accessing   sufficient   the   modalities   towards   peace   and   security  on  the  African  continent,  state  sovereignty,  human  rights,  human  security,  and   development  are  at  the  forefront  of  dialogue  and  much  debate.    Therefore,  the  AU’s   long-­term   evolution   as   an   institutional   framework   proposes   to   address   the   multi-­ faceted   problem   of   security   in   unique   and   innovative  ways.   Thus   the   international   community’s  implementation  of  the  responsibility  to  protect  by  taking  into  consideration   peacemaking,   peacekeeping,   and   peacebuilding   initiatives.     Furthermore,   regional   actors  are  of  importance  in  regional  security  governance  on  the  African  continent.    The   2008  conflicts   in   the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (DRC)  and  Sudan  have  drawn   attention  to  the  role  of  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa.    From  the  beginning  of  2009,     18     the  introduction  of  a  similar  force  in  Somalia  became  a  possibility.    These  operations   have  sparked  great  debate  within  the  international  community  with  the  intersection  of   morality  and  legality.   This   chapter   encloses   an   exploration   of   concepts   related   to   the   evolution   of   international  peacekeeping  with  special  relevance  to  the  African  context.    The  analysis   will  consist  of  the  evolving  post-­Cold  War  roles  and  policy  frameworks  of  organisations   involved  in  African  peacekeeping.    The  UN  and  AU  policy  frameworks  on  peace  and   security   are   of   special   interest,   as   these   frameworks   provide   the   basis   for   new   institutional  co-­operation  and  partnerships  between  the  UN  and  the  AU.     2.2  CONCEPTUAL  ORIENTATION  OF  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  TO  PROTECT     The  African  continent  witnessed  various  conflicts  such  as  that  in  Sierra  Leone,  where   due  to  unrelenting  human  rights  violations  since  1991,  civil  war  erupted  resulting  in  the   death  of  over  50,000  people,  with  over  one  million  persons  displaced.     The  conflict  in  the  Central  African  Republic  (CAR)  exposed  its  people  to  a  similar  fate,   with  thousands  of  people  were  killed,  while  other  fled  to  the  capital  Bangui  in  droves.       During  the  Rwanda  genocide  in  1994,  more  than  800,000  people  died  and  250,000   women  were  raped.  This  period  has  become  known  as  the  darkest  and  most  brutal   killings  of  all   time  witnessed  by  the   international  community.    This   left   the  country’s   population  traumatised  and  its  infrastructure  decimated,  despite  a  small  UN  contingent   which  was  under-­resourced  and  under-­staffed  with  a  limited  mandate.    Additionally,   the   genocide   spilled   over   into   the  DRC   and   resulted   in   hundreds   of   thousands   of   predominantly  Hutu   refugees  pouring   into   its  eastern  provinces,  among   them  were   genocidaires,  remnants  of  the  army  and  militia  that  perpetrated  the  genocide.        These   conflicts   exposed   the   serious   lack   of   intervention   concerns   by   the   international   community  (Jean  2006).     As  a  result  of  these  conflicts,  and  to  ensure  the  international  community  never  again   fails  to  act  in  the  face  of  such  gross  forms  of  human  rights  violations,  the  former  UN   Secretary  General,  Kofi  Annan,  in  his  2000  General  Assembly  report,  challenged  the   international  community  to  reach  consensus  on  how  and  when  interventions  should   proceed  for  the  sake  of  protecting  populations.    In  September  2000,  the  ICISS  was     19     established  by  the  government  of  Canada  to  address  the  concerns  reflected  in  Kofi   Annan’s   report.     In   February   2001,   the   phrase   ‘responsibility   to   protect’   was   recommended  as  a  way  to  circumvent  the  use  of  the  ‘right  to  protect’  or  the  ‘obligation   to  protect’.  In  December  2001,  the  report  ‘The  Responsibility  to  Protect’,  was  released   based  on  the  notion  of  sovereignty  as  a  responsibility  not  a  right  and  with  the  focus  on   the  right  of  humanitarian  intervention  (ICISS  report  2001:2).    The  notion  also  denoted   as   R2P,   centred   on   prevention   and   halting   mass   atrocity   crimes   which   include,   genocide,  war   crimes,   crime  against   humanity,   and  ethnic   cleansing.   This   concept   provided   a   framework   for   the   application   of   tools   that   already   exist,   such   as   negotiation,  early  warning  mechanisms,  economic  sanctioning,  and   the  UN  Charter   with   reference   to   chapter   VII.   In   2004,   R2P   received   renewed   emphasis   with   the   creation  of  the  ‘High-­Level  Panel  on  Threats,  Challenges,  and  Change’.    This  Panel   identified  threats  that  face  the  international  community  regarding  peace  and  security.     As   a   result,   they   released   a   report   entitled   ‘A   More   Secure   World:   Our   Shared   Responsibility’,  based  on  their  findings  and  recommendations.    In  September  2005,   R2P  was  fully  supported  by  the  international  community.    As  a  collective  responsibility,   it   is  grounded   in   the  obligation  of  state  sovereignty,  humanitarian  and  national   law,   regional   actors,   and   the   UNSC   as   an   organ   to   maintain   international   peace   and   security.    This  was  unanimously  adopted   into   the  2005  Outcome  Document  of   the   General  Assembly.       Intrinsically,  this  new  norm  had  three  comprehensive  pillars.    The  first  pillar  declared   the   state   as   the   primary   entity   responsible   to   protect   its   population   against   mass   atrocity.    The  second  pillar  asserted  the  importance  of  the  international  community  to   assist   these   states.     Lastly,   if   the   state   fails   or   is   unable   to   protect,   and   peaceful   measures  are  futile,  the  international  community  has  the  responsibility  to  intervene  for   the  protection  of  civilians.  In  cases  where  peaceful  means  have  been  exhausted,  only   then   would   the   UNSC   consider   the   use   of   military   force   (Global   Centre   for   the   Responsibility  to  Protect  2013).  These  pillars,  while  seemingly  noble,  are  yet  in  doubt   because  of   the  occurrence  where  humanitarian   intervention   is  used  for  self-­interest   and  member  states  are  reticent  to  help,  have  led  to  security  dilemmas.      The  challenge   of  R2P   is   further   fuelled  by   the   international  community’s  confusion  around  what   it   really  means,  and  when  and  how  it  can  be  implemented  to  prevent  and  respond  to   mass  atrocities  executed  against  civilians.    The  need  to  clarify   the  concept  over   its     20     reach  and  limit  is  essential.    Although  it  is  an  attempt  to  negotiate  between  the  respect   of   state   sovereignty   and   the   moral   obligation   for   the   protection   of   civilians,   theoretically,  the  application  of  R2P  needs  great  improvement  due  to  it  being  subject   to  the  whims  of  politics.    According  to  King  (2013:1),  “R2P  often  fails  to  achieve  its   intended  purpose,  igniting  a  storm  of  controversy  whenever  it  is  invoked”.  It  declares   the   limit   of   state   sovereignty   above   the   importance   of   human   rights   and   human   security,  including  development.  The  first  official  use  of  the  doctrine  of  R2P  was  UNSC   resolution  1973  implemented  in  Libya  in  2011,  but  since  2000,  eight  new  operations   have  been  mandated  under  Chapter  7  of  the  UN  Charter,  to  use  “all  means  necessary”   to  protect  civilians  (Gray  2001).   R2P  can  be  interpreted  and  approached  differently  based  on  its  apropos  scope  and   parameters.  On   the   one   hand,   it   can   be   perceived   as   an   infringement   upon   state   sovereignty,   and   an   amplification   of   human   rights   and   the   protection   of   civilians.     States   often   see   R2P   as   a   threat   to   state   sovereignty,   especially   that   advocating   military   intervention   and   translating   this   action   to   interveners   pursuing   their   own   interests  at   the  expense  of   citizens,   states,  and  peacekeeping  operations.    On   the   other  hand,   it   is  a  method  to  reconcile  state  sovereignty  through  rebalancing  it  with   human  rights.  In  the  same  breath,  it  is  a  shift  from  conflict  prevention  to  human  rights   protection.     Much   remains   to   be   done   to   fortify   political   provision,   and   to   build   institutional  capacity,  in  order  to  implement  R2P.  Therefore,  clear  guidelines  defining   the   circumstances   requiring   international   intervention,   and   agreed   upon   by   the   international   community,   must   be   established.   Until   these   steps   are   addressed,   tension   will   persist   between   state   sovereignty,   human   rights,   human   security,   and   development.     2.2.1  State  sovereignty,  human  rights,  human  security,  and  development       Conflict   in  Kosovo  (1999),  Somalia   (1993),  and  Srebrenica   (1995)  demonstrate   the   international  community’s  failure  to  go  against  the  concepts  of  state  sovereignty  and   non-­intervention  to  protect  human  rights.         21     Fundamental  disagreements  between  the  global  North  and  South  was  encountered   throughout   the   1990s.     Those   mainly   in   the   global   North,   argued   for   a   ‘right   to   humanitarian   intervention’,   and   those,   mainly   in   the   global   South,   feared   that   any   recognition  of  such  a  ‘right’  would  mean  a  revival  of  old  imperialist  habits  that  would   put  newly-­won  and  still-­fragile  independence  at  risk.    As  a  result,  state  sovereignty  and   human  rights  continue  to  broil  within  the  international  community  (Evans  2011:78).         Sovereignty  still  remains  rooted  in  the  notion  of  the  non-­interference  of  external  force   in  domestic  affairs,  which  entails   the  absolute  authority  within  a  bounded   territorial   space,   having   an   internal   and   external   dimension.     Internally,   sovereignty   is   unchanging,  having  a  settled  population   that  possesses  a  monopoly  on   the  use  of   force,  making  it  the  supreme  authority  within  its  territory.    Externally,  sovereignty  is  the   gateway  into  the  society  of  states.    Historically,  the  concept  was  used  as  a  method  of   facilitating   and   maintaining   peace   which   was   an   acceptable   practice   in   the   seventeenth  century.    In  the  twenty  first  century,  conventional  norms  regarding  human   rights  changed.    Currently  the  challenge  faced  by  the  international  community  is  states   that  hide  behind  the  concept  of  sovereignty  as  they  commit  human  rights  abuses  and   atrocious  crimes  against  their  populations.    In  this  light,  sovereignty  can  no  longer  be   seen  as  absolute.  A  state  can  no  longer  perpetuate  gross  and  systematic  human  rights   violations  and  presume  impunity.    While  assuring  basic  human  rights  may  seem  like  a   policy  which  all  states  and  societies  can  adhere   to,   it   remains  a  highly  contentious   issue.       For   example,   the   Rwandan   genocide   epitomised   the   way   in   which   state   sovereignty   restricted   the  policies   that  governments  would  consider   in   the  wake  of   human  rights  violations.  Such  behaviour   is   regarded  as  both  politically  and  morally   intolerable.    Consequently,  states  are  not  impervious  to  external  forces  or  influence.     It  is  important  to  rethink  the  notion  of  sovereignty  in  an  epoch  of  interdependence  due   to  global  change.    This   is  not   to   rule  out  sovereignty  entirely,  but   to   recognise   that   there   are   different   forms,   each   performing  more   than   one   function   and   each   state   having  limited  powers  (Hinsley  1989:1).         A  theoretical  paradox  arises  comprising  of  two  notions  as  a  result  of  respecting  state   sovereignty.    Firstly,  it  may  lead  to  international  unity,  and  secondly,  it  can  deteriorate   the  climate  of  human  rights  and  limit  the  ability  to  protect  human  rights  outside  their   borders  (Krasner  2001:2).  Therefore,  sovereignty  is  not  a  concept  that  should  solely   be  viewed  negatively  in  cases  where  it  serves  to  undermine  international  peace  and     22     security,  it  has  positive  aspects  only  if  exercised  correctly.        This  is  brought  about  by   honouring   human   rights.     Simultaneously,   it   draws   on   the   principle   that   sovereign   states   are   responsible   and   accountable   to   the   international   community   for   the   protection  of  their  populations,  and  that  the  international  community  can  act  to  protect   populations  when  national  authorities  fail  to  do  so.    Through  this,  human  security  is   intertwined   with   human   rights,   noting   that   state   security   does   not   automatically   guarantee  individual  security  and  the  respect  for  human  rights.       By  adopting  a  human-­centric  approach  and  supplementing   it  with   the   latter  view  of   limited  power,  a  new  conception  of  state  sovereignty  emerges.    This  approach  involves   state  sovereignty  and  human  rights  exclusively  reinforcing  each  other.      The  advent  of   human   rights   as   a   concern   to   the   international   community   therefore   affects   state   sovereignty,  because  the  agreements  upon  principles  places  clear  limitations  on  the   authorization  of  state  sovereignty  to  act  within  their  borders  (Baylis  2005:300).     The  absence  of  human  security  can  give  rise  to  intractable  crises  that  challenge  both   governments  and  people.  This  is  evident  in  the  conflict  in  Darfur  which  led  to  an  influx   of   refugees   into   Chad   and   contributed   to   the   conflict-­ridden   CAR   (United   Nations   2013).     At   the   same   time,   human   security   underscores   the   universality   and   interdependence  of   a   set   of   freedoms   that   are   fundamental   to   human   life.    Where   sovereign  states  are  either  unwilling  or  unable  to  protect  the  fundamental  freedoms  of   their  citizens,  sovereignty  and  human  rights  come  into  conflict.       Sovereignty  has  become  more  permeable  than  ever  due  to  globalisation  which  has   had  an  enormous  impact  on  the  protection  of  human  rights  and  security.    As  the  world   becomes  a  global  village  due  to  globalisation,  the  emphasis  of  these  two  concepts  are   increasingly  being  highlighted,  both  in  domestic  and  international  policies  which  guide   the  behaviour  of  states  and  individuals  towards  human  security.             In  this  light,  human  security  is  a  concept  coalesced  with  human  development  which   interconnects  peace,  security,  and  sustainable  development.    According   to  Duffield   (2007:  334-­335),  peace  and  stability  abated  due  to  the  increase  in  civil  conflicts,  lack   of   large-­scale   humanitarian   interventions   and   reconstructive   programmes,   which   challenge  old  assumptions  of  security  and  development.      Duffield  further  elucidates   that  development  is  impossible  without  stability  and,  at  the  same  time,  security  is  not   sustainable  without  development.         23     The   security-­development   nexus   is   whereby   security   and   development   become   analytically   inseparable.     According   to   Stern   and  Öjendal   (2010:   6),   “the   notion   of   nexus  seems  to  provide  a  possible  framework  for  acutely  needed  progressive  policies   designed   to   address   the   complex   policy   problems   and   challenges”.   The   need   to   integrate   both   these   concepts   in   post-­conflict   situations   has   become   increasingly   essential   because   of   the   growing   civil   conflicts   and   the   category   of   failed   and   potentially  failing  states.    Often  states  involved  in  these  conflicts  are  underdeveloped,   lacking  an  effective  government  and  state  institution/structures,  and  faced  with  state   corruption.     This   has   led   to   insecurity   and   increased   the   risk   of   violent   upheavals   including   the   inability   to   manage   social   tension   in   a   non-­violent   fashion.     The   framework  of  the  security-­development  nexus  has  been  perceived  as  a  way  to  achieve   coherent   and   well-­managed   policies   regarding   complex   challenges   facing   states   (Chandler  2007:367).    This  is  supported  by  Stern  and  Öjendal  (2010:18),  who  state   that   the   logic   of   the   nexus   can   best   be   demonstrated   as   the   “merging   of   human   development  and  human  security”,  although  there  is  a  plethora  of  reasons  why  this   can  remain  perpetually  out  of  reach.      Stern  and  Öjendal  (2010:19)  further  note  that   efforts  of  achieving  this  nexus  would  breed  impasses/impossible  accounts.   Contrary,   in   order   to   resolve   conflicts   and   sustain   security   and   development,   it   is   imperative   to  determine   the   root   causes  of   conflicts  by   focusing  on   the   sources  of   human  security.    Banditry,  looting  and  inter-­communal  strife;;  hate  crimes;;  the  collapse   of  welfare  systems;;  the  politicization  and  neglect  of  the  military;;  the  unprofessionalism   of  paramilitary  and  police  forces  that  were  once  an  integral  part  of  the  neo-­patrimonial   system;;  state  repression,  oppression  and  corruption;;  poverty;;  hunger;;  and  inequalities   serve   as   some   of   the   root   causes   of   conflict   (Conteh-­Morgan   2005:   70-­71).     The   causes  of  conflict  are  often   incited  and  spread  by  violations  of  human  rights  which   spiral  out  of  control.  As  a  result,  intervention  to  create  peace  and  alleviate  suffering   becomes  a  prerequisite  through  intervention.               24     2.2.2  Intervention  and  human  security     The   African   continent   continues   to   experience   a   disproportionate   number   of   emergency  situations.  Conflicts  such  as  in  the  DRC,  Burundi,  Liberia,  and  the  Darfur   Region  of  Sudan  continue  to  rage.  More  recent  conflicts  such  as  in  Mali,  the  CAR,  and   Uganda   continue   to   fester.   These   situations   have   led   to   the   intervention   of   many   humanitarian  agencies  and  organisations  across   the  continent.    The  prevalence  of   these  deployments  matches  the  pervasive  need  to  address  challenges  arising  from   the  presence  of  humanitarian  actors  and   the  need   for  mutual  understanding  of   the   drivers   and   principles   underlining   the   work   of   major   actors.     As   conflict   evolved,   intervention,   whether   military   for   humanitarian   purposes,   remain   at   the   heart   of   discussions  as   to  when,   if  ever,   is   it  appropriate   to   implement   it   for   the  purpose  of   security  and  the  protection  of  civilians.       Addressing  the  plight  of  conflict-­affected  populations  and  the  threat  of  armed  groups,   managing  open  borders  and  combating  infectious  diseases  are  now  part  of  a  dialogue   for  the  objective  of  protecting  individuals  (Massingham  2009:804).    For  that  reason,   intervention   remains   a   possible   necessity   for   the   protection   of   civilians.    However,   there  are  challenges  which  provoke  dispute  for  and  against  humanitarian  intervention   in  conflict  states.    For  instance,  intervention  took  place  in  Kosovo  and  Sierra  Leone   but  not  in  Burma,  and  in  Libya  but  not  in  Syria.    These  decisions  were  based  on  non-­ consensus  surrounding  the  circumstances  of  the  right  to  intervene  for  human  security,   and  on  who  should  intervene  and  how.    There  are  still  no  clear  guidelines  as  to  how   to   intervene   based   on   a   case-­by-­case   situation.     In   addition,   the   problem   is   exacerbated  by  the  perspective  of  intervention  on  whether  it  is  a  form  of  imperialism   or  opportunism.    Based  on  current  conflicts  depicted  across  the  globe,  it  is  important   to   agree   on   a   practical   framework   for   intervention   taking   ethics   into   careful   consideration.   In   this   light,   intervention   in  pursuit  of  humanitarian  objectives  can  be   considered  legitimate  under  circumstances  that  fall  in  the  realm  of  R2P,  accompanied   by  policies  of  which  intervention  is  assessed  and  monitored.    The  complex  situation   and  environment  in  which  intervention  takes  place  requires  a  pragmatic  assessment   in   order   to   have   coordination   and   collaboration   of   all   the   parties   involved   in   the   intervention.    Therefore,  as  stated  above,  prevention   is  better   than  cure,  conditions     25     should  not  be  worse  off  before  intervention  takes  place.    Thus,  intervention  needs  to   take  priority  over  sovereignty  for  the  purpose  of  human  security.   Nonetheless,  there  still  remains  discord  about  the  extent  and  manner  of  intervention,   specifically,  the  efficacy  of  the  utilisation  of  military  force  to  protect  human  rights.    Yet,   states  are  often  reluctant  to  commit  military  force  to  protect  human  rights,  because  the   use  of  force  to  end  human  rights  violations  poses  a  moral  dilemma.  As  much  as  military   actions  are  prohibited,  under  certain  circumstances,  military  action  can  be   the  best   solution   to   bring   atrocity   to   an   end.     Therefore,   intervention   requires   reasonable   parameters   of   putting   a   halt   to   human   atrocities.     This   includes   the   authority   and   legitimacy   of   the   UNSC.   However,   if   the   decision   to   intervene   occurs   without   the   authority  of  this  organ,  then  such  a  situation  should  be  justified  as  an  extraordinary   emergency  and  accepted  as  the  best  possible  solution  in  a  bad  situation.    For  instance,   the   cases  of  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization   (NATO)   in  Kosovo   in   1999,  where   intervention  was  undertaken  without   the  authorisation  of   the  UNSC,  was  seen  as  a   hard  case.    While  the  UNSC  should  be  the  main  organ  to  authorise  intervention,  there   is  no  definitive  exclusion  of  a  possibility  that  R2P  “might  ultimately  be  assumed  by  the   General  Assembly,  regional  organisations,  or  coalitions  of  states  if  the  UNSC  fails  to   act”  (Stahn  2007:104).  In  fact,  in  Mali,  French  soldiers  intervened  in  the  conflict  after   the  AU  was  not  prepared  to  conduct  an  intervention  operation.  In  other  words,  there   was  no  authority  or  mandate  from  either  the  UN  or  the  AU;;  making  the  intervention   essentially  an  ad  hoc  endeavour  –  which  could  be  potentially  dangerous   if  political   aims   or   outside   national   interest   are   the   main   motivators   or   rationale.     “French   intervention   aimed   to   support   the   Malian   government   by   combating   all   Malian   insurgency  groups,  no  matter  what  their  motivations  were”  (Holmgren  2013).    While   humanitarian   considerations   provide   the   pretext   of   intervention,   the   surge   of   the   French  military  engagement  in  Mali  could  be  more  about  protecting  France’s  access   to  raw  material  and  strategic  resources  on  the  continent,  than  about  saving  lives  or   promoting   democracy   and   development   (Prince   2013).     The   engagement   of   the   French  in  the  Mali  conflict  demonstrated  that  it  was  not  only  an  African  responsibility,   although   an   ECOWAS-­led   intervention  would   have   been   better   placed   to   respond   immediately.    However,  African  partners,  the  European  Union  (EU),  the  US,  and  the   UN  were  divided  on  the  pace  of  the  intervention.    Considering  the  rapidly  deteriorating     26     security   situation   in   Mali,   France   took   the   lead,   although   insisting   that   a   military   intervention  be  led  by  ECOWAS  (Holmgren  2013).   The  dilemma  of  intervention  can  become  a  disguise  for  interference  in  the  affairs  of   sovereign  states.    It  could  also  encourage  secessionists  to  use  violence  to  provoke   intervention-­triggering   human   rights   abuses.     But   if   intervention,   especially   humanitarian   intervention   is   an   unacceptable   assault   on   state   sovereignty,   the   international  community  could  have  never  been  able  to  respond  to  conflicts  in  Sierra   Leone  and  Liberia.    In  cases  where  humanitarian  intervention  is  necessary,  it  is  based   on  moral  obligations  rather  than  political  objectives  (Bellamy  and  Wheeler  2005:560).   However,  the  UN  cannot  respond  to  all  conflicts,  thus  the  importance  of  collaborating   with   regional   organisations   and   non-­state   actors   which   would   lead   to   greater   alleviation  of  human  suffering  in  Africa.       Non-­state   actors   are   gaining  momentum   in   post-­conflict   states   to   alleviate   human   suffering.    These  actors  range  from  UN  agencies,  such  as  the  High  Commissioner  for   Refugees   (UNHCR);;   United   Nations   Children’s   Fund   (UNICEF);;   World   Food   Programme  (WFP);;  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO),  to  the  International  Committee   of   the   Red   Cross   (ICRC)   who   works   in   armed   conflicts,   and   the   International   Federation  of  the  Red  Cross  and  Red  Crescent  Societies  (IFRC)  who  work  in  areas  of   natural  disasters.    These  actors  are  of  great  importance  for  the  protection  of  civilians.     Human   rights   specialists,   for   example,   can   provide   information   on   human   rights   conditions  in  the  country  and  historical  information  on  the  record  of  state  institutions.   Human   rights   personnel   are   also   key   partners   in   building   effective   rule   of   law   structures  and  procedures.  They  can  also  provide  valuable   inputs  on  human  rights   principles  and  standards  for  police  training  curricula.     Humanitarian  workers  are  often  in  contact  with  local  grass-­roots  organizations  and  can   provide  crucial  insights  into  the  population’s  opinions  of  the  police  and  the  military,  and   on  sensitive  issues  such  as  how  to  deal  with  past  human  rights  abuses,  reconciliation,   and  victim  support.  These  are  invaluable  actors,  who  provide  information,  concerning   remote  or  outlying  areas  where  they  are  often  based.             27     2.2.3  Sovereignty  as  a  Responsibility     As  stated  above,   if   the  state   fails   to  protect,   the   responsibility   then  devolves   to   the   international   community,   with   this   development   providing   a   layer   of   protection   for   civilians  (Anghie  2012).     The  concept  of  sovereignty  as  responsibility  is  not  set  as  a  license  to  control  but  as  a   set  of  obligations   towards  citizens.  Currently,  states   that  are  unable   to  govern   their   populations  are  more  of  a  threat  than  stronger  states  that  have  military  and  economic   power.    Despite  weaponry  and  small  armed  groups   that  operate  within  and  across   states,   these   have   a   destructive   capacity   to   mandate   international   attention.     For   instance,  over  15,000  people,  mostly  Muslim  civilians  were  surrounded  and  threatened   by   armed   militia   groups   in   CAR   (Reuters   2014);;   two   people   were   killed   and   24   wounded  in  clashes  between  militias  in  Libya’s  capital,  highlighting  the  rivalries  behind   heavily   armed   groups   that   have   plagued   the   country   since   Muammar   Gaddafi   (Shennib   2013);;   and   in   Sudan,   in   the   South   Kordofans’   Rashad   district   clashes   resulted   in   the   displacement   of   6,700   civilians   (United   Nations   2014a).   These   demonstrate  that  if  states  do  not  manage  the  situations,  they  could  cause  greater  harm   in  the  long  run.    According  to  Orford  (2001:12-­13),  the  state  has  an  onus  “to  preserve   life-­sustaining  standards  for  its  citizens”,  which  is  a  necessary  condition  of  sovereignty.       Sovereignty   is   judged  by   international   law  based  on   its   legitimacy,   therefore,  states   need  to  qualify  based  on  certain  standards  for  it  to  be  recognised  as  a  state.    This  will   then  be  judged  by  the  international  community  against  the  backdrop  of  international   law.    Therefore,  if  states  fail  to  preserve  life,  they  cannot  legitimately  protest  against   international  humanitarian  intervention.   Sovereignty  as  a   responsibility   requires   transparency  and  accountability   that  would   generate  legitimacy,  thus  entailing  the  democratisation  of  sovereignty.    This  concept   is   a   milestone   from   the   traditional   perspective   which   is   gradually   evolving   at   the   international  level.    Thus,  it  is  important  for  state  leaders  to  find  a  balance  between  the   need  for  good  governance  and  interdependence  for  the  implementation  of  sovereignty   as  responsibility  (ICISS  report  2001:13).    Such  a  responsibility  would  entail  protection   and  prevention  of  crimes  against  the  population.    In  the  same  breath,  the  international   community  should  encourage  and  assist  states  to   implement   this  responsibility  and     28     support  the  UN  to  establish  early  warning  capabilities.    In  this  light,  collective  security   or  a  shared  responsibility  with  both  state  and  non-­state  actors  is  of  great  importance.     The  shared  responsibility  can  range  from  working  and  supporting  peacekeepers  which   have  been  used  to  promote  peace  across  the  globe.    Peacekeeping  has  been  used  to   promote  peace  across  the  globe.  However,  due  to  numerous  armed  conflicts  which   hamper  institutional,  social  and  economic  development  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,   several  peacekeeping  operations  have  been  conducted  in  Africa.     The   next   sub-­section   will   therefore   consider   the   evolution   of   international   peacekeeping  as  a   response   to  conflicts,  specifically  addressing   the  different  ways   they   are   mandated,   constructed,   operationalized,   and   implemented.   It   will   also   highlight   the   weaknesses   and   challenges   that   traditional   peacekeeping   operations   face  in  their  response  to  the  dynamic  evolution  of  security  threats  in  Africa.     2.3  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK  OF  INTERNATIONAL  PEACEKEEPING       UN  peacekeeping  has  come  a   long  way   from  military  observers   to  multidisciplinary   activities  to  assist  states  overcome  crises.  Whether  peacekeeping  operations  are  UN   led  or  undertaken  by  regional  entities,  with  the  authorisation  of  the  UNSC,  they  involve   five  principle  activities   that  are   involved,  namely,   conflict  prevention;;  peacemaking;;   peacekeeping;;   peacebuilding;;   and   peace   enforcement.     Focus   will   be   given   to   peacemaking,   peacebuilding   and   peacekeeping.     These   principles   have   been   conceptually  identified  as  three  distinct  activities  in  a  post-­conflict  context  and  that,  if   successful,   peacekeeping  would   lay   the   foundation   for  peacebuilding  activities   (De   Carvalho   and  Ettang   2011:6).     However,   there   are   challenging   conflicts  within   the   African   continent   contributing   to   the   need   for   peacekeeping  operations  with   robust   mandates  for  the  protection  of  civilians.   The   focus  on  Africa  originates   from   its  agricultural  capability  and  natural   resources   that  increasingly  attract  other  governments,  multinational  companies  and  trans-­border   political  movements.  Concurrently,  the  continent  suffers  from  significant  tensions  and   conflicts  that  have  led  to  both  UN  and  AU  interventions  with  an  objective  to  promote   conflict  prevention  and  resolution.           29     The  process  of  conflict  resolution  involves  peacemaking  which  addresses  conflicts  that   are  already  in  progress,  involving  diplomatic  measures.    These  measures  range  from   negotiation  to  mediation  and  arbitration,  in  order  to  bring  hostile  parties  of  the  conflict   to  a  negotiated  agreement  by  using  Chapter  6  of   the  UN  Charter  as  a  benchmark.     Peacemaking  is  a  key  objective  in  the  agenda  of  African  governments  and  regional   organisations  and   initiatives  such  as   the  New  Partnership   for  Africa’s  Development   (NEPAD).  This  objective  has  been  utilised  in  Burundi,  DRC,  and  the  Ivory  Coast  to   establish   peace   and   foster   an   environment   for   negotiations   and   strengthen   weak   peace  processes.     Peacebuilding  has  emerged  as  one  of   the  most  significant  developments  aimed   to   support  the  establishment  of  lasting  peace  in  post-­conflict  societies.  In  the  early  1990s,   the  then  Secretary  General  of  the  UN,  Boutros  Boutros  Ghali  defined  peacebuilding   as   “action   to   identify   and   support   structures   which   tend   to   strengthen   and   solidify   peace   to   avoid   a   relapse   into   conflict”.     Peacebuilding   has   since   expanded   to   go   beyond  mere   efforts   that   seek   to   prevent   the   relapse  of   conflict   to   include   various   activities   such   as   humanitarian   aid;;   governance   assistance;;   (re)building   of   infrastructures;;   and   provision   of   security   conducted   by   peace   providers   (Tschirgi   2004:2).    Furthermore,  it  includes  processes  such  as  conflict  prevention,  management   and  transformation  in  post-­conflict  settings.    Peacebuilding  is  not  a  reactive  approach   which  only  seeks  to  prevent  resurgence  of  violence,  what  Galtung  termed  ‘negative   peace’.   It  aims   to  address   the  underlying   root  causes  of  conflict,  and   to  create   the   conditions  for  human  development  and  for  a  just  and  equitable  social  order,  termed   ‘positive  peace’  (Galtung  1985:12).       The   realisation   is   that   peacebuilding   is   a   multi-­dimensional   or   system-­wide   undertaking  which  has  led  to  the  development  of  frameworks  such  as  the  Secretary-­ General’s  Note  on  the  Integrated  Approach  and  the  AU’s  Post-­Conflict  Reconstruction   and   Development   Framework,   highlighting   a   range   of   peacebuilding   dimensions   including   political;;   human   security;;   development;;   human   rights;;   rule   of   law;;   social   reconciliation:  and  security.  Practically,   there  are   three  elements   that  are  crucial   to   preventing  the  relapse  to  conflict  and  producing  more  buoyant  states  and  societies,   namely,   inclusivity,   institutional  and  confidence  building;;  and  sustained  international   support  (United  Nations  2015).       30     Sustainable   peacebuilding   aims   to   support   the   creation   of   institutions   and   the   establishment   of   reforms   that   support   the   implementation   of   peace   agreements.     Moreover,   peacebuilding   should   be   understood   in   the   context   of   an   increasingly   complex  and   interdependent   conflict  management   system.  While   the  generation  of   multiple  frameworks  is  reflective  of  renewed  and  concerted  efforts  by  national,  regional   and  international  actors  to  address  the  post-­conflict  conundrum,  the  bourgeoning  of   peacebuilding   actors   and   mechanisms   can   be   perilous   especially   if   there   is   no   coordination   and   symbiosis.   However,   the   African   continent   has   had   progress   in   promoting  peace  over  this  period,  occurrences  of  armed  conflicts  and  mass  atrocities   have  declined,  and  despite  effects  of  financial  crisis,  the  Africa  continent  is  managing   to  maintain  an  economic  outlook.    Nonetheless,  there  still  remains  challenges  to  this   effect.   Post-­Cold  War  conflicts  that  are  more  intra-­state  have  shown  to  be  more  complex  and   are  not  solvable  by  military  approaches  alone.    Currently,  conflicts  involve  more  multi-­ functional  peacekeeping  operations  which  are  multidimensional  in  character  such  as   peacekeeping  operations  in  Liberia,  Sierra  Leone,  and  the  DRC.    Thus,  there  is  a  need   to  support   these  countries   to   find  political  settlements   in  order   to  overcome  conflict   through  peacekeeping  efforts.       Peacekeeping   is   seen   from   a   variety   of   perspectives   based   on   the   diversity   of   its   operations.    This  concept  involves  facilitating  a  transition  from  a  state  of  conflict  to  a   state   of   peace.     The   presence   of   peacekeepers   often   comprising   soldiers,  military   observers,  or  individual/civilian  police  encourage  the  prevention  of  arms  in  conflict,  but   instead   use   negotiations   for   peaceful   settlement   of   disputes   (Ahere   2010).     Peacekeeping   performs   different   tasks   to   stop   or   contain   hostilities   and   assists   in   developing  conditions   in  which  peacemaking  can  take  place.    These  peacekeepers   are   deployed   to   monitor   or   supervise   the   implementation   of   peace   agreements   between  the  conflicting  parties  (United  Nations  1990:  276).    However,  peace  is  often   challenged  by  conflicts  over  natural  resources  such  as  gold  and  cobalt   in  the  DRC,   diamonds  in  Sierra  Leone,  and  the  unrest  and  cultural  conflict  in  Sudan.     Peacekeeping   operations   increased   after   the   Cold   War   ended,   with   the   UNSC   authorising   20   operations   between   1989   and   1994,   from   11,000   to   75,000   peacekeepers.    In  the  twenty-­first  century,  the  UN  established  complex  peacekeeping     31     operations  in  Africa,  namely,  in  Burundi  -­  ONUB;;  in  Chad  and  the  CAR  -­  UN  Mission   in   the   Central   African   Republic   and   Chad   (MINURCAT);;   in   Côte   d’Ivoire   -­   UN   Operation   in   Côte   d'Ivoire   (UNOCI);;   in   DRC   -­   UN   Organization   Mission   in   the   Democratic   Republic   of   the   Congo   (MONUC)   and   UN   Organization   Stabilization   Mission  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  (MONUSCO);;  in  Eritrea/Ethiopia  -­   UN   Mission   in   Ethiopia   and   Eritrea   (UNMEE);;   in   Liberia   -­   UN   Mission   in   Liberia   (UNMIL);;   in  Sierra  Leone  -­  UN  Mission  in  Sierra  Leone  (UNAMSIL);;   in  Sudan  -­  UN   Mission  in  the  Sudan  (UNMIS)  in  the  south  of  the  country  and  UNAMID  in  Darfur);;  UN   Interim  Security  Force  for  Abyei  (UNISFA);;   in  South  Sudan  -­  the  UN  Mission  in  the   Republic  of  South  Sudan  (UNMISS);;  and  in  Syria  -­  UN  Supervision  Mission  in  Syria   (UNSMIS)  (United  Nations  2014a).  These  operations  show  the  need  and  the  myriad   cases  of  peacekeeping  around  the  world.   Challenges  to  some  of  the  above  operations  have  caused  interim  UN  peacekeeping   operations   in  Africa,   for   instance   the   ignominy  of  Somalia   in   the  1990s,  which  was   called  ‘Operation  Restore  Hope’.    This  operation  saw  the  withdrawal  of  United  States   of   America   (USA)   troops  which   contributed   to   the   failure   of   the   operation,   leaving   Somalia  without  a  central  government  and  in  a  state  of  lawlessness.    Somalia  became   a  threat  not  only  to  its  population  but  also  to  neighbouring  states.    Furthermore,  the   largest  peacekeeping  operation  in  the  DRC  posed  another  challenge  to  peacekeeping   operations.  These  operations  have  been  conducted  with  no  clear  guideline,  and  the   legal   framework   for   these   operations   still   remains   unclear.     Thus   the   lack   of   a   foundational   legal   framework   of   peacekeeping   operations   underpin   the   challenges   faced  by  peacekeepers  in  the  field  as  they  implement  peacekeeping  mandates.     2.4  MANDATES  AND  LEGAL  UNDERPINNING  FOR  PEACEKEEPING     The  UNSC  has  authorised  robust  and  complex  mandates  for  UN  peacekeepers,  but   these  are  more  robust,  because  of  the  nature  of  multidimensional  peacekeeping  with   the   focus   on   the   protection   of   civilians.     There   is   still   no   reference   made   to   peacekeeping  in  the  UN  Charter  despite  of  the  fact  that  its  implementation  is  growing   around   the   world,   especially   within   the   African   continent.     The   development   of   peacekeeping   has   not   been   clearly   and   strategically   formulated   and   framed   by   international   law.     It   is  driven  by  demands  of   international  political  situations  on  the     32     ground  as  an  ad-­hoc  response.    As  a  result,  the  lack  of  a  legal  framework  has  brought   significant  challenges.       However,  the  UN  derives  the  use  of  peacekeeping  operations  from  Chapter  VI  and  VII   of  the  UN  Charter  including  the  utilisation  of  the  settlement  of  disputes  that  threaten   international  peace  and  security.    Article  33  of  the  UN  Charter,  does  not  give  the  UN   any  right  to  intervene  in  the  peacemaking  process,  but  states  that  parties  are  to  resolve   the  dispute  peacefully.    The  UN  can  make  recommendations  to  the  parties  involved.     If  the  parties  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  disputes  peacefully,  the  matter  is  then  brought   before   the  General   Assembly   or   the  UNSC.     Therefore,   the  General   Assembly   or   UNSC   may   recommend   that   a   peacekeeping   operation   be   launched   based   on   a   political  decision  rather  than  a  legal  one  (Sohn  1984:402-­403.    Under  Article  33  or  any   provision   of   this   Chapter,   consent   of   the   parties   to   the   peacekeeping   operation   is   mandatory.    Without  this  consent,  a  peacekeeping  operation  cannot  be  a  Chapter  VI   operation.     Therefore,   in   cases   where   the   UN   deals   with   a   government   that   has   collapsed  and  has  no  means  on  getting  consent,  peacekeeping  operations  are  then   conducted  under  Chapter  VII  (Sohn  1984:403-­404).       Chapter  VI  provisions  peacekeeping  operations,  but  does  not  give  any  guidance  on   the  details  which  are  to  be  agreed  between  the  UN  and  the  states  involved.    These   agreements  are  legally  binding,  although  the  UNSC  does  not  ratify  them.    Proceeding   under  Chapter  VII,  peacekeepers  can  use  force  in  cases  of  self-­defence  in  order  to   protect  the  mandate.    The  UNSC  is  the  only  organ  that  can  authorise  this,  although   the  General  Assembly  makes  recommendations  for  UNSC  actions.    However,  it  should   act   under   Article   39   of   the   UN  Charter   where   a   threat   to   international   peace   and   security  exists.    Without   this   finding,   lawfully   it  cannot  act  under  Chapter  VII   (Sohn   1984:404).    Grounds  of  Chapter  VII   are   set   out   in  Article  39   (any   threat   to  peace;;   breach  of  peace;;  and  act  of  aggression).    This  article  is  particularly  important  because   it  sets  the  benchmark  for  which  the  General  Assembly  and  the  UNSC  should  operate   in  order   to  utilise   the  chapter.    Under  Article  42,  UN  mandate  can  be  more   robust,   involving  the  use  of  air,  sea,  and  land  force  actions.           33     2.5  INTERNATIONAL  PEACEKEEPING  IN  AFRICA     As   an   important   mechanism   of   the   international   community,   international   peacekeeping   is  essential   for  conflict   resolution.    This   involves   the  military,  civilian,   and   police   components   performing   an   extensive   range   of   duties   that  may   have   a   robust  mandate.     International   peacekeeping   is   envisioned   to   create   a   stable   and   peaceful   environment,   mandated   by   the   UN   and   are   guided   by   principles   of   peacekeeping   operations.     Peacekeeping   operations   have   become   complex   to   accommodate  a  number  of  actors  and  complex  activities,  most  prominent  being  the   UN,   AU,   and   the   EU.     The   increase   of   actors   has   given   rise   to   operations   being   increasingly  diverse  with  different  interests,  approaches,  and  mandates,  which  has  led   to  the  development  of  policy  frameworks  and  architectures.         2.5.1  The  UN  peace  and  security  policy  framework  and  architecture     In  the  aftermath  of  WWII,  the  UN  emerged  as  a  beacon  of  hope  for  a  war  weary  world.     As  the  delegates  of  50  nations  met  in  San  Francisco  to  sign  the  UN  Charter,  no  one   had  predicted  the  need  for  UN  peacekeeping.    But  it  was  not  long  before  the  Cold  War   descended  on  the  world,  making  it  difficult  for  the  UNSC  to  agree  on  matters  of  peace   and  security.    New  ways  to  ease  and  to  address  conflict  had  to  evolve.       In   response   to   the   growing   demand   for   peacekeepers,   the   UN   Department   of   Peacekeeping  Operations  (DPKO)  released  a  2008  manual  which  comprised  lessons   learned   and   basic   principles   from   recent   operations,   for   the   constructive   implementation  of  UN  peacekeepers.       The  first  principle  is  consent,  suggesting  that  UN  peacekeeping  operations  are  often   deployed   with   the   consent   of   the   main   parties   to   the   conflict,   which   requires   a   commitment   and   dedication   to   a   political   process   in   order   to   resolve   the   conflict.   Consent  provides   the  UN  with   the   freedom  to  carry  out   its  mandate.    Without  such   consent,   a  peacekeeping  operation   risks  becoming  party   to   the   conflict   and  drawn   towards   peace   enforcement   actions,   and   away   from   its   fundamental   role   (United   Nations  2014a).    However,  consent  does  not  necessarily  guarantee  that  there  will  be   consent  at  the  local  level,  particularly  if  there  are  internal  divisions  or  weak  command   and   control   systems.     Thus,   universality   of   consent   is   less   plausible   in   volatile     34     situations,  charactised  by  the  presence  of  armed  groups  who  are  not  under  any  control   of  the  parties  or  by  the  presence  of  other  injections/spoilers.   The  second  principle  is  impartiality,  which  is  used  synonymously  and  interlinked  with   neutrality.    UN  peacekeepers  should  be  impartial  in  their  engagement  with  the  parties   to   the  conflict,  but  not  neutral   in   the   implementation  of   their  mandate.    On   the  one   hand,  impartiality  refers  to  non-­discrimination  and  proportionality,  on  the  other  hand,   neutrality   can   be   understood   as   not   taking   sides   with   belligerent   parties.   So   a   peacekeeping  operation  should  not   condone  actions  by   the  parties   that   violate   the   undertakings  of  the  peace  process  or  the  international  norms  and  principles  that  a  UN   peacekeeping  operation  upholds  (Johannessen  2007).   Although   there   is  need   to  establish  and  maintain  good  relations  between  parties,  a   peacekeeping  operation  must  conscientiously  avoid  actions  that  might  compromise  its   image   of   impartiality.   A  UN  peacekeeping   operation   should   not   shy   away   from  an   arduous   application   of   the   principle   of   impartiality   for   fear   of   misinterpretation   or   retaliation.    Failure  to  do  so,  may  undermine  the  peacekeeping  operation’s  credibility   and  legitimacy,  and  lead  to  an  extraction  of  consent  for  its  presence  by  the  parties.   The  third  principle  is  non-­use  of  force.    Except  in  self-­defence  and  in  defence  of  the   mandate,  it  should  be  taken  into  account  that  UN  peacekeeping  operations  are  not  an   enforcement   tool.  However,  with   the  authorisation  of   the  UNSC,  UN  peacekeeping   operations  can  use  force  at  a  tactical  level,  if  acting  in  self-­defence  and  defence  of  the   mandate.   In   certain   volatile   situations,   the   UNSC   has   given   UN   peacekeeping   operations  ‘robust’  mandates  authorising  them  to  use  all  necessary  means  to  prevent   forceful   attempts   to   disrupt   the   political   process,   protect   civilians   under   impending   threat  of  physical  attack,  and/or  assist  the  national  authorities  in  maintaining  law  and   order  (United  Nations  Peacekeeping  2012a).  Although  in  the  field  they  may  sometimes   appear  similar,  robust  peacekeeping  should  not  be  confused  with  peace  enforcement,   as  envisaged  under  Chapter  VII  of  the  UN  Charter.    The  difference  between  these  is   that  robust  peacekeeping  involves  the  use  of  force  at  a  tactical  level  with  the  consent   of  parties.    Peace  enforcement  does  not  require  the  consent  of  parties  involved  and   often   operates   at   a   strategic   or   international   level.     A  UN  peacekeeping   operation   should  only  use  force  as  a  measure  of  last  resort.  It  should  always  be  calibrated  in  a   precise,   proportional,   and  appropriate  manner,  within   the   principle   of   the  minimum     35     force   necessary   to   achieve   the   desired   effect,   while   sustaining   consent   for   the   peacekeeping  operation  and   its  mandate.  The  use  of   force  by  a  UN  peacekeeping   operation   always   has   political   implications   and   can   often   give   rise   to   unforeseen   circumstances.    Judgments  concerning   its  use  need   to  be  made  at   the  appropriate   level   within   an   operation,   based   on   a   combination   of   factors   including   operational   capability,   public   perceptions,   humanitarian   impacts,   force   protection,   safety   and   security  of  personnel,  and  most  importantly,  the  effect  that  such  action  will  have  on   national  and  local  consent  for  the  operation  (United  Nations  2014a).   With   these   principles   as   guidelines   for   UN   peacekeeping   operations,   the   UN   has   carried  out  numerous  peacekeeping  operations.    The  end  of   the  Cold  War  marked   another   watershed,   ushering   in   an   era   of   unprecedented   expansion   in   UN   peacekeeping.    These  principles  marked  a  significant  step  towards  the  clarification  of   the  nature  of  UN  peacekeeping  operations  as  well  as  best  practices.   The   UN   took   a   step   forward   for   maintaining   peace   and   security   through   the   development   of  An  Agenda   for   Peace   report   written   by   former   Secretary-­General,   Boutros  Boutros-­Ghali,  in  1992.  This  report  responded  to  a  request  made  by  the  UNSC   for  an  analysis  and  recommendations  to  strengthen  peacemaking  and  peacekeeping   processes.  The  report  outlines  the  way  the  UN  needs  to  respond  to  conflict  in  the  post-­ Cold  War  world.    The  vital  contribution  of  An  Agenda  for  Peace  was  to  the  modern   understanding   of   peace   and   the   comprehension   of   the   concept   of   post-­conflict   peacebuilding.     It   was   hoped   that   the   post-­Cold   War   era   would   result   in   the   implementation  of  the  UN  Charter’s  ideals  which  include  the  protection  of  human  rights   (Boss  2006:69).    Nonetheless,  peacekeeping  has  been  one  of   the  main  challenges   the   UN   has   faced   since   the   end   of   the   Cold   War   due   to   the   rise   of   civil   wars.       Furthermore,   the   landmark   Brahimi   report   of   2000,   charted   a   renewed   vision,   principles,   and   guidance   that   were  more   robust   and   cost-­efficient   for   effective  UN   peacekeeping.  The  Brahimi  report  provided  recommendations  for  sweeping  changes   in   the   way   UN   peacekeeping   and   associated   post-­conflict   peacebuilding   are   conceived,  planned,  and  executed.  In  alignment  with  Boutros  Boutros  Ghali’s  1992  An   Agenda   for  Peace,   the  Brahimi   report  aimed   to   recommence  pledges  made  by  UN   member   states   to   maintain   international   peace   and   security   (Gray   2001:270).   Furthermore,   it  scrutinised   the  pertinence  of   traditional  pre-­Cold  War  peacekeeping   when   threatened   by   “new   wars”.     As   recommended   by   the   Brahimi   report,   UN     36     peacekeeping  operations  became  more  impartial  and  robust.  Immediate  relief  was  no   longer   the   first   priority   of   the   UN,   instead,   re-­establishment,   development,   and   sustainable  peace  became  one  of   the  main   concerns  of   the  organisation,  which   is   striving   to   facilitate   sustainable   and   lasting   peace.  While   ameliorations   have   been   noted,  the  UN  must  refurbish  the  responsibility  of  member  states  for  future  successes   (Ban  2010).   Although  the  UN  has  successes  and  failures,  its  failures  were  more  the  focus  by  the   international   community.     As   a   result,   in   the   late   1990s,   the   Secretary-­General   released   two   very   sobering   reports   assessing   how   the   UN   dealt   with   the   case   of   Rwanda   and   Srebrenica.   These   reports   reopened   old   wounds   including   the   operational   difficulties   faced   by   the   freshly   launched   peace   operations   and   an   overstretched   UN   DPKO.     They   suggested   a   potentially   destructive   crisis   for   UN   peacekeeping   operations.   The   Secretary-­General,   Kofi   Annan,   decided   that   piecemeal   solutions   to   peacekeeping   problems   would   no   longer   suffice.   In   March   2000,  he  commissioned  a  high-­level  group  of  experts  to  assess  the  weaknesses  of  the   UN’s   best   known   tool   for   stabilizing   recent   conflict   zones,   and   to   offer   practical   recommendations   to   remedy   those   weaknesses   (Durch,   Holt,   Earle,   &   Shanahan   2003).     Current  peacekeeping  operations  are  a  choice  between  “a  more  robust  approach  and   going   home”,   and   states,   if   they   fear   for   their   troops,   will   hesitate   to   intervene   as   demonstrated   in   the   DRC   (Johnstone,   Tortolani   &   Gowan   2005:40).   The   Brahimi   report  recommended  the  use  of  peacekeeping  forces  to  be  robust  enough  to  represent   a   threat   to   belligerents   and   deter   them   from   retroceding   previously   signed   peace   agreements  (Khan  2002:  492-­496).    The  objective  was  not  to  turn  peacekeeping  forces   into  “war  fighting  machines”,  but  to  be  “prepared  to  confront  the  lingering  forces  of  war   and  violence”  (Annan  2000).      This  proposition  was  first  tested  in  2000  by  the  UNSC   resolution  1313,  which  expanded  the  mandate  of  UNAMSIL  (Johnstone  2006).     In  May  2000,  the  Revolutionary  United  Front  (RUF)  withdrew  its  support  of  the  Lomé   Peace  Agreement  and  recommenced  pugnacity  endangering  both  peacekeepers  and   civilians   in   Burundi.   The   peacekeepers   were   unable   to   protect   themselves   or   the   civilians  from  the  militia  attacks  despite  the  robust  mandate  previously  authorised  in   February,  UNSC  resolution  1289.  As  a  result,  the  UNSC  authorised  a  new  mandate     37     to   “deter   and   where   necessary,   decisively   counter,   the   threat   of   RUF   attack   by   responding  vigorously  to  any  hostile  actions  or  threat  of   imminent  and  direct  use  of   force”  (United  Nations  2000).  This  decision  was  provocative  as  it  essentially  blurred   the  line  between  peacekeeping  and  peace  enforcement.  The  Brahimi  report  cautioned   the  concepts  of  consent,  impartiality,  and  minimum  use  of  force  remained  essential  in   peacekeeping  operations.  In  Darfur,  the  partial  failure  of  UNAMID  was  attributed  to  the   inexistent  consent  of  one  of   the   factions  which   forced   troops   to  keep  peace  where   there  was  no  peace  to  keep.  The  2005  World  Summit  reiterated  the  entreaty  of  the   Brahimi  report  and  called  for  the  implementation  of  a  ten-­year  plan  to  build  the  capacity   of  the  AU  for  its  role  in  peacekeeping  operations  (United  Nations  2005).  The  intention   of  the  report  was  not  to  declare  the  UN  the  imperialistic  arbiter  of  good  and  evil  but   rather   to   differentiate   between   neutrality,   the   equal   treatment   of   both   parties,   and   impartiality,  reactivity  unburdened  by  prejudice.  To  favour  neutrality  over  impartiality   has  in  the  past  caused  operations  to  fail.  In  2004,  the  MONUC  operation  in  the  DRC   failed  to  protect  the  town  of  Bukavu  when  the  militias  attacked  it,  killing  more  than  one   hundred  people  (Johnstone  2006).     Peacekeepers  were   criticised   for   having  mistaken   impartiality   for   neutrality.  Rather   than  withdrawing  from  the  DRC,  the  UNSC  revised  the  mandate  to  establish  a  more   robust  force  and  “ensure  the  protection  of  civilians,  including  humanitarian  personnel,   under   imminent   threat  of  physical  violence”   (United  Nations  Security  Council  2008.   Yamashita   (2008:623)   argues   that   impartiality   is   loyalty   to   the   mandate   of   the   operation  and  that  in  the  face  of  genocide,  there  can  be  no  neutrality.  Post-­Brahimi   report  operations  require  peacekeepers  to  identify  potential  spoilers  of  the  mandate   and  take  action  against  them,  using  force  if  necessary.    This  can  be  a  danger  to  the   mandate,   as   governments,   if   they   support   militias,   will   feel   threatened   by   peacekeepers  and  withdraw  their  consent  (Johnstone  2010:39).  The  UN  has  to  both   maintain   a   friendly   relationship   with   governments   by   making   concessions   to   its   mandates  and  remain   impartial  enough  that   it  does  not  appear  as  a  supporter  of  a   non-­democratic  government  that  violates  human  rights.   In  the  DRC  MONUC  was  a   victim  of  a  decrease  in  its  credibility  when  it  cooperated  with  the  Forces  Armées  de  la   République  Démocratique  du  Congo  (FARDC),  also  known  as  the  DRC  armed  forces,   a  necessary  step   for   the  conduct  of   the  operation  but  an  apparent  dismissal  of   the   human  rights  violations  they  had  committed.  Abandonment  of  neutrality  was  prominent     38     in   subsequent   UN   operations.   This   was   a   ground-­breaking   measure   as   it   set   a   precedent   to   the   doctrine   of  R2P  embraced   in   2005   during   the  General  Assembly   World  Summit.   Building  on  the  report,  the  UN  published  the  Capstone  Doctrine  in  2008,  a  document   that  detailed  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  peacekeeping  operations.  It  aimed  to   prevent  shortcomings  similar  to  UNAMID.  The  parties  of  the  conflict  had  to  consent  to   both   the   presence   of   peacekeepers   on   their   territory   and   the   implementation   of   a   political  process  (Johnstone  2010:25).  In  addition,  consent  had  to  be  maintained  by   peacekeepers,  through  deterrence  if  necessary.  This  type  of  consent  was  not  an  ideal   situation  as  it  hindered  the  rapid  development  of  the  local  political  process  that  would   lead  to  sustainable  peace.    In  certain  cases,  the  UN  was  accused  of  overlooking  two   of   its   guiding   principles,   namely,   consent   and   impartiality   which   led   to   doubt   the   credibility,  efficiency,  and  legitimacy  of  the  UN  (Taylor  and  Curtis  2005:407-­409).    Due   to  the  growing  number  of  conflicts,  the  UN  DPKO  was  formed  as  a  UN  department   that  deals  with  peace  operations  as  a  whole.   As  a  result,  the  official  UN  DPKO  was  formally  created  in  1992  when  Boutros  Boutros-­ Ghali  took  office  as  Secretary-­General  of  the  UN.    It  is  an  institution  that  is  primarily   aimed   at   providing   effective   solutions   to   the   evolving   contexts   of   war-­affected   countries.   The   UN   DPKO   supports   various   UN   peacekeeping   operations   by   developing   policy   frameworks   that   respond   to   the   changing   needs   of   both   conflict   situations  and  the  societies  which  are  affected  by  the  conflict.  It  should  be  noted  that   with  its  countless  efforts,  UN  DPKO  has  witnessed  a  number  of  incessant  challenges   which   impacts   the  effective   implementation  of   its  policy   frameworks  concerning  UN   peacekeeping  operations.    Alongside  its  role,  UN  DPKO  works  to  assimilate  efforts  of   the  UN,  government,  and  non-­government  entities  within  peacekeeping  operations.     This   includes   coordination  of   the   three  multidimensional   components   in   operations   (United  Nations  2014a).       Each  peacekeeping  operation  is  not  the  same  and  it  is  therefore  accompanied  by  a   particular   set   of  mandated   tasks.     In   order   to   implement   the  mandate  which   leads   peacekeepers  to  be  exposed  in  the  field,  UN  DPKO  works  to  minimize  the  risks  which   peacekeepers   face   in   the   field.     Taken   into   consideration,   UN   peacekeeping   operations  consist  of  several  aspects  of  the  military,  police,  and  civilian  components.       39     Peacekeepers   may   be   deployed   to   prevent   the   outbreak   of   conflict,   assist   in   the   implementation  of  comprehensive  peace  agreements,  and  even  lead  states  through  a   transition  to  stable  governments.    As  a  result,  it  is  important  that  UN  DPKO  work  with   civil   society   in   the   promotion   of   peace,   democracy,   and   development.     Thus,   strengthening  the  relationship  between  the  civilian  and  military  component,  is  of  great   importance.   The   collection   of   organisations,   mechanisms,   and   relationships   to   manage   and   prevent  conflict   is  what  is  known  as  peace  and  security  architectures.    The  UN  has   pursued  a  path  to  implement  organisational  reforms  in  order  to  adapt  to  the  changing   environment  of  conflicts.     It  adopted  an   integrated  peacekeeping  operation  concept   within  the  UN  system  to  engage  in  its  capabilities  in  a  coherent  manner  though  mutual   strategic  objectives  for  operational  approaches  among  UN  agencies.    The  aim  of  this   reform  was  to  amplify  UN  contributions  to  states  emerging  from  conflict.    Most  of  these   states  were   in  Africa,   as  a   result,   the  UN’s   relation   to   this   continent   needed   to   be   strengthened.       2.5.2  Role  of  the  UN  in  African  peacekeeping  challenges     UN  peacekeepers  have  been  in  the  front  lines  working  towards  bringing  peace  to  the   most  vulnerable  people  and  conflict-­ridden  countries  such  as  Haiti,  Lebanon,  Somalia,   Syria,  Kosovo,  and  Darfur.    Never  before  has  UN  peacekeeping  been  as  large  as  it  is   today,  and  never  before  has  the  UN  been  tasked  to  make  such  broad  contributions  to   peace,  security,  and  development  in  societies  that  have  suffered  from  conflict.       It   is   evident   that  making   peace   is  more   of   a   challenge   than  war.     Since   the  UN’s   establishment,   it   has   been   at   the   centre   of   peacekeeping   operations   and   conflict   resolutions  with  a  vital  responsibility  to  maintain  international  peace  and  security.      The   legitimacy  of  the  UN  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  that  of  its  peacekeepers,  rests  largely  on   its  performance  to  protect  civilians.    It  is  important  that  peacekeeping  be  based  on  a   well-­defined   mandate   and   supported   by   appropriate   resources   and   operational   structures.       However,  lack  of  staff  capacity,  funds,  and  equipment  have  been  one  of  the  causes  of   many  of  the  failures  of  the  operations.  For  instance,  the  calamity  UNAMSIL  attributed     40     the  allocation  of  only  five  staff  in  the  UN  DPKO  to  manage  12,000  troops  in  the  field.   In  2001,  the  UN  DPKO  was  composed  of  only  400  staff  for  58,000  troops  deployed   around   the   world   (Gray   2001:273).   UN   peacekeeping   operations   have   also   been   unsuccessful  due  to  the  lack  of  Troop  Contributing  Countries’  (TCCs)  involvement  and   the  gap  between  the  physical  means  provided  and  the  aims  of  the  operations  which   worsened  due   to   the  war  on   terror   that  began   in  2001.  Bellamy,  Williams  &  Griffin   (2010:279)  argue  that  states  were  also  more  wary  of  deploying  their  own  personnel  in   perilous   areas   because   of   the   number   of   casualties   the   war   on   terror   caused.   Nonetheless,   the  number  of  uniformed  personnel  have  steadily   increased   to   reach   almost  105,394  in  2015,  five  times  more  than  in  2000,  and  the  operations  in  DRC  –  to   mention  only  one  example  –  constitutes  19,452  deployed  on  a   territory  as   large  as   Western   Europe   (United  Nations   Peacekeeping   2012b).     Regardless   of   this   sharp   increase,  troops  are  still  plagued  by  overstretched  peacekeeping  operations  (Gowan   2009:1).   Division  of  labour  through  the  participation  of  regional  and  international  organisations   can  be  seen  as  a  possible  solution   to   the   lack  of  personnel   that   restrains  complex   operations.     Furthermore,  the  UN  is  faced  with  pressing  challenges,  particularly   in   implementing   the  protection  of  civilians’  agenda   in  UN  peacekeeping  operations.  The  crux  of   the   challenge   is   mainly   rooted   in   the   coherent   inability   to   interpret   the   meaning   of   protection  of  civilians.  This  is  because  there  are  still  divergences  as  to  its  meaning  and   application.  At  an  operational  level,  there  is  still  no  agreement  as  to  the  meaning,  its   applicability,  and  how  it  ought  to  relate  to  local  contexts  and  sensitivities.  This  makes   it  difficult  to  train  personnel,  and  thus  becomes  difficult  for  them  to  grasp  their  roles   and   responsibilities   in   carrying   out   their   operational   tasks   (de   Carvalho   and   Lie   2009:2).     2.5.3  The  AU  peace  and  security  policy  and  architecture     The  African  continent  is  confronted  with  a  variety  of  conflicts  during  a  period  when  it   cannot  always  afford  to  depend  on  the  international  community  to  provide  their  needs.     Therefore,   the   role   of   regional   and   sub-­regional   organisations   to   provide   peace   is   important.    For  example,  the  Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC)  and     41     OAU   active   mediation   efforts   in   Angola   which   culminated   in   the   Lusaka   Peace   Agreement  of  1994,  as  well  as   the  1999  Lusaka  Cease-­fire  Accord  on   the  crisis   in   DRC   (although   that  Accord   is   now   faltering).     Furthermore,  ECOWAS  successfully   brokered  peace  agreements   in  Liberia,  and   the  successful   restoration  of  President   Kabbah  to  power,  and  the  continuing  efforts  to  promote  peace  in  Sierra  Leone  through   the  basic  aspects  of  the  Lome  Peace  Agreement  in  1999.      Collective  security  played   an  important  role  and  consisted  of  a  common  commitment  to  the  proposition  that  a   threat   to   peace   in   Africa   or   elsewhere   should   be   considered   a   threat   to   peace   everywhere.  Yet,  there  is  a  recognition  that  the  UN  cannot  do  everything  and  cannot   work   in   a   vacuum,   hence   the   importance  of  Chapter  VIII   of   the  UN  Charter  which   encourages   co-­operation   between  UN  and   regional   arrangements   (working   closely   with   regional   leaders   such  as  Nigeria   in  West  Africa  and  South  Africa   in  Southern   Africa)  and  the  need  to  improve  their  relative  capabilities  in  undertaking  certain  peace   initiatives.  The  latter  has  the  advantage  of  proximity  and  familiarity  with  such  conflicts   in  their  respective  regions  while  the  UN  has  the  advantages  of  universality,  relative   impartiality,  and  greater   financial   resources.    These  regional  actors  work  under   the   umbrella  organisation  of  the  AU.   As  a  successor  of  the  OAU,  the  AU  aimed  to  strengthen  African  unity  and  states  within   the   international   orbit.     In   addition,   it   aimed   to   fortify   regional   security   frameworks   within  its  Constitutive  Act  with  new  legal  underpinnings.    The  AU  has  played  a  vital   role  by  adopting  a  series  of  policies  and  protocols.    In  the  2000  Lome  Summit,  the  AU   adopted  the  AU  Constitutive  Act  as  an  approach  to  prevailing  challenges  of  peace  and   security   on   the   continent.    Guided  by   the  AU  Constitutive  Act,   the  AU  established   seventeen  institutions  to  address  continental  security  and  development.  These  bodies   committed  to  peace  and  security,  were  engaged  under  a  framework  known  as  the  AU   Peace   and   Security   Architecture   (APSA),   intended   to   enable   the   continent   to   find   regional   solutions   to   severe   human   security   challenges   such   as   civil   conflicts   and   violence  against  civilians  (Mickler  2013:491).       Within  this  framework  was  one  of  the  AU’s  most  ambitious  initiatives,  a  fifteen-­member   AU  Peace  and  Security  Council   (PSC)  which  would  approve  armed   intervention   in   cases  of  gross  human  rights  violations  and  unconstitutional  changes  in  government.   The  AU  PSC  is  bestowed  with  the  responsibility  to  be  the  principal  decision-­making   entity  of  the  AU  for  peacekeeping  operations  (Kobbie  2009:10).    Moreover,  the  APSA     42     consisted  of  a  peacebuilding  framework  that  includes  a  ‘Panel  of  the  Wise’  to  promote   mediation  efforts;;  a  rapid-­reaction  ASF  affixed  in  five  regional  brigades;;  a  Military  Staff   Committee;;  a  Peace  Fund;;  and  a  continental  Early  Warning  System.     In   the  same   year,  ‘the  Solemn  Declaration  on  the  Conference  on  Security,  Stability,  Development   and   Co-­operation’   in   Africa   (CSSDCA)   was   adopted   as   a   policy   framework   to   complement   activities   to   be  undertaken  by   the  AU.     Four   years   later,   in   2004,   the   ‘Common   African   Defence   and   Security   Policy   (CADSP)’   was   established   as   a   guideline   for   the  AU.  The  AU  departed   from  the  OAU  and  presented   itself  as  a   far   more   willing   and   even   assertive   interventionist   and   activist   organisation   for   peacekeeping   than   its   predecessor.   Therefore,   the   adoption   of   CADSP   was   to   strengthen   its   commitment   to   develop   consensus   regarding   peace   and   security   in   Africa.    Furthermore,  this  policy  sought  to  address  challenges  faced  by  African  states   holistically  and  collectively,  thus  cooperation  and  coordination  was  and  still  remains   important.    In  addition,  the  policy  would  assist  to  guide  the  direction  of  the  AU  PSC.     In   2007,   the   AU   adopted   the   ‘Declaration   on   the   Framework   for   a   Response   to   Unconstitutional  Changes  in  Government’,  and  it  also  adopted  the  ‘African  Charter  on   Democracy,  Elections  and  Governance’  (Chitima  2012:187).   The   African   continent   has   a   strong   desire   to   build   capacity   to   deal   with   its   own   challenges   through   the   establishment   of   an   ASF.   There   has   long   been   talk   of   implementing  an  ASF,  which  is  still  underway  and  expected  to  be  operational  in  2015,   after  being  postponed  in  2010.  The  AU  appears  to  have  a  new  desire  to  develop  such   capabilities  and  this  is  what  is  being  seen  in  CAR.  There  is  a  desire  to  bring  about  law   and  order  in  the  State  before  the  possibility  of  handing  over  to  the  UN  for  long-­term   stabilisation  projects  such  as  disarmament,  demobilization,  and  reintegration  (DDR)   initiatives,   security   sector   reform   (SSR),   and   institution   building.     This   process   highlights   burden-­sharing   between   the   AU   and   UN   as   a   way   of   collaboration   and   coordination  for  the  purpose  of  peacekeeping.       The  AU  has  initiated  peacekeeping  operations  as  a  tool  for  conflict  resolution  and  has   even   appeared   to   be   a   “pro-­interventionist   organisation”   (Mickler   2013:492).     Its   growing   role   indicates   a   paradigm   shift   from   traditional   peacekeeping   to   a   more   contemporary   peacekeeping   approach.     This   is   also   a   way   to   bring   about   African   solutions  to  African  problems.    Despite  its  role  on  the  continent,  the  AU  faces  a  variety   of  constraints  from  political  and  institutional  limitations  to  conceptual  challenges  that     43     weaken  it  from  being  effective.    It  remains  the  most  prominent  organisation  that  has  a   moral  responsibility  to  contribute  to  peacekeeping  in  Africa.    Thus,  the  African  strategic   environment  serves  as  “impetus  for  an  assessment  of  the  role  and  readiness  of  the   AU   in  peacekeeping  operations”.     This  was   tested   in   the  deployment   of   the  AU   in   Burundi  and  Sudan,   through  political,   institutional,  and  conceptual  dynamics.      This   resulted  in  the  need  for  a  change  in  the  APSA  in  order  to  better  respond  to  conflict.  It   is  imperative  to  analyse  and  comprehend  the  root  causes  of  conflict  in  Africa  before   resolving  them.    “There  is  considerable  uncertainty  about  whether  the  AU  is  ready  to   effectively  respond  to  the  current  evolving  security  reality,  indeed  whether  the  AU  is   able   to   fulfil   its   proper   role   in   managing   contemporary   complex   peacekeeping   operations  in  Africa”  (Kobbie  2009:2).   Realising   that  Africa   needs   to   develop  a  military  mechanism   to   deal  with   common   security  threats,  which  undermine  the  maintenance  and  promotion  of  peace,  security,   and   stability   on   the   continent,   the   AU   adopted   the   ‘Protocol   Relating   to   the   Establishment  of  the  Peace  and  Security  Council’  in  July  2002,  to  establish  a  military   staff  committee  to  advise  and  assist  the  AU  PSC  on  all  questions  relating  to  military   and  security  requirements.  The  Protocol  provides  for  an  ASF  to  enable  the  AU  PSC   to  deploy  peacekeeping  operations  and  intervene  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  AU   Constitutive  Act  (de  Coning  &  Kasumba  2010:10).    The  proposed  ASF  serves  as  the   AU’s  implementation  arm  for  peacekeeping  capacity  and  a  mechanism  to  rapidly  and   efficiently  respond  to  conflict  on  the  African  continent,  which  was  approved  in  2004.     In   January   2004,   African   ministers   of   defence   and   security,   met   at   the   AU   Headquarters  in  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia,  adopted  the  ‘Draft  Framework  for  a  Common   African   Defence   and   Security   Policy’.   The   ministers   reviewed   progress   made   in   developing  an  African  standby  peacekeeping  force,  an  early  warning  system  to  detect   and   prevent   potential   conflicts,   and   to   ensure   rapid   humanitarian   relief   during   disasters.   In   July   2004,   the   AU   Assembly,   meeting   at   the   Headquarters,   formally   adopted   the   defence   and   security   policy   as   Africa’s   blueprint   in   search   of   peace,   security,  and  stability  on  the  continent.       The  ASF   is   an   envisaged   standby   arrangement   that   is   supported   by   the  Regional   Economic   Communities/Regional   Mechanisms   (RECs/RMs).     This   comprises   Regional   Standby   Forces   (RSFs),   namely,   the   North   African   Regional   Capability   (NARC);;   East   African   Standby   Force   (EASF);;   the   Economic   Community   of   West     44     African  States  Standby  Force  (ESF);;  Economic  Community  of  Central  African  States   (ECCAS)  Standby  Force;;  and  the  SADC  Standby  Force  (SSF).  The  challenge  for  the   effective  operationalizational   readiness  of   the  ASF   is   cooperation  and  coordination   between  the  AU  and  the  RECs/RMs.    The  desire  to  move  towards  the  establishment   of   the  ASF  can  be  seen  as  an   important   stepping-­stone   towards  African  unity  and   increased   African   agency   in   the   field   of   continental   peacekeeping.   The   ASF   was   conceived   to   conduct,   observe,   and  monitor   peacekeeping  operations  and   support   operations.   Its   tasks   include   operations   across   the   entire   spectrum,   ranging   from   peacekeeping   to   peace   enforcement.   Although   considerable   progress   has   been   achieved   since   the   conception   of   the   ASF,   its   overall   operationalization   has   been   slower  than  anticipated,  and  has  been  predominantly  focused  on  the  military  aspect   of  peace  operations  (Davies  2014:26)  As  a  result,  little  consideration  of  other  aspects   of  peace  operations,  or  the  lack  thereof,  has  back-­tracked  the  ASF’s  achievement  of   full  operational  capacity,  and  has  prolonged  the  process  of  readying  the  force  for  rapid   deployment.  What  has  become  a  pressing  challenge  for  the  effectiveness  of  the  ASF   is  the  need  to  develop  the  civilian  and  police  dimension  framework,   in  order  for  the   integration   of   multidimensional   peace   operations   into   the   AU   peace   operations   concept.  This  challenge  has  a  spill-­over  effect  on  issues  relating  to  training,  rostering,   and  recruitment  which  hamper  the  various  efforts  pertaining  to  the  rapid  deployment   of  the  ASF.  Its  purpose  is  to  ensure  that  trained  formations  and  troops,  including  police   and   civilian   personnel,   are   rapidly   available   for   deployment   to   AU-­mandated   peacekeeping  operations.    Currently,   the  ASF  has  the  potential  of  facing  significant   challenges  especially  given  the  duration  it  is  taking  to  become  fully  operational.  It  will   need   to   combat   challenges   that   would   impede   its   operation   such   as   coordination,   institutional  capacity  building,  political  will,  funding,  logistics,  training,  and  the  role  of   external  partners.    Although  faced  with  challenges,   it   is   important  to  note  that  there   has  been  great  progress  in  the  development  of  the  ASF,  which  is  presumed  to  become   active  by  the  year  2016.    These  achievements  include  an  annual  continental  training   programme,  harmonised  policy  documents,  improved  training  standards  for  personnel   who  are  to  be  deployed  in  operations  (which  include  the  military,  police,  and  civilian   components   of   the   ASF).     In   order   to   assess   and   validate   the   ASF   in   a   multidimensional  peacekeeping  operation,  a  series  of  decision-­making  exercises  have   been  conducted  in  collaboration  with  the  EU,  where  most  of  the  funding  comes  from.     These  exercises  are  known  as  AMANI  AFRICA  which  followed  a  phased  approach  to     45     ensure  a  systematic  process,  which   is  designed  as  a   training  and  capacity-­building   cycle  for  the  broader  APSA  (Kasumba  &  Debrah  2010:13-­14).       However,  the  APSA  structure  is  too  ambitious  and  complex  for  a  continent  comprised   of  limited  capacity  and  rich  in  political  differences.    APSA  has  been  unable  to  address   the  current  challenges  of  peacekeeping  in  Africa  such  as  in  the  Sahel  and  CAR.    For   instance,  under  the  framework  of  the  APSA,  the  AU  was  incapable  of  fielding  a  credible   intervention  and  was  overtaken  by  the  decisive  response  of  the  French  in  Mali.    The   French   intervened   at   the   last  minute   because   African   regional   organisations   were   paralysed  by  leadership  rivalries  and  a  lack  of  capacity.    Chuter  (2014)  denotes  that   the  speed  and  sophistication  of  the  French  operation,  with  good  intelligence  and  the   use  of  airpower,  made  a  difference.      This  testifies  to  the  weakness  of  the  APSA  and   specifically  the  AU  and  African  regional  organisations.    According  to  Chuter  (2014),   “before  the  APSA  can  function  as  originally  envisaged,   it  requires  extra  time,  effort,   money   and   coordination”.       As   a   temporary   mechanism,   the   African   Capacity   for   Immediate  Response  to  Crises  (ACIRC),  capable  of  acting  rapidly  and  independent  of   external  support  was  proposed.    The  ACIRC  is  aimed  to  be  based  on  a  coalition  of   willing  and  able  African  states  and  financed  by  the  AU  Member  States  on  a  voluntary   basis.    The  rapid  deployment  to  stop  atrocities  is  an  essential  tool  for  the  AU  which  is   often  perceived  as  being  slow  to  act.          The  ACIRC  will  directly  work  through  the  AU,   whereas  the  ASF  is  aimed  to  work  through  the  RECs.    In  addition,  the  ACIRC  will  be   deployed  at  the  behest  of  a  lead  country  with  the  approval  of  the  AU.    Practically,  the   ACIRC  will  be  more  responsive  and  less  of  a  burden  on  the  AU  itself.    However,  this   does  not  mean  that  the  ACIRC  will  function  without  its  drawbacks  such  as  predictability   and  preparedness.   Despite   its   shortcomings   the   AU   has   played   significant   roles   in   Africa   in   order   to   maintain   peace   and   security.     It   has   conducted   peace   operations   in   the   Comoro   Islands,   a   hybrid   operation   with   the   UN   in   Darfur,   and   another   large   operation   in   Somalia.  The  AU  has  since  2003  deployed  peace  support  operations  with  increasingly   complex   mandates   into   volatile   conflict   environments,   including   through   the   deployment   of   the   AMIB   from   2003   –   2004,   which   reflected   a   traditional   and   multidimensional  peacekeeping  operation  where  it  saw  the  AU  and  the  UN  collaborate   (Neethling  2009:45).    The  AU  also  deployed   troops  due   to  a  humanitarian  crisis   in   Darfur  and  eastern  Chad  for  the  AMIS  I  and  II  from  2004  to  2008.    This  peacekeeping     46     operation  presented  many  challenges  such  as  a  restrictive  mandate  and  inadequate   troops   to  cover   the   region.    The   region   faced  massive  human   rights  violations  and   indiscriminate  violence,  which  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  UNAMID  through  the   UNSC  Resolution  1769  in  July  2007  (Sansculotte-­Greenidge  2012:120).    From  2007   to   2011,   Peace   Support   Operations   Division   (PSOD)   operations   in   Somalia   were   predominantly  military-­led.  As  of  2011,  PSOD  has  prioritised  ensuring  an  adequately   staffed  and  resourced  civilian  component  to  oversee  operation  management,  adding   substantive  civilian  and  operation  support  functions  in  AMISOM.   Thus,   cooperation   and   coordination   between   all   parties   involved   is   of   paramount   importance,   which   also   includes   a   partnership   with   the   UN.     In   this   light,   this   partnership  will  depend  on  coherent  and  strategically  structured  relations  which  are   systematically  integrated.    Irrespective  of  some  progress  made  in  UN-­EU  and  UN-­AU   relations,   maintaining   and   enhancing   inter-­organisational   arrangements   for   peacekeeping   operations   remains   a   challenge.   Initiatives  made   by   the   AU   and   its   continuous   commitment   to   peace   and   security   on   the   African   continent   is   to   be   recognised  through  a  deeper  and  an  equal  relationship  between  the  AU  PSC  and  the   UNSC  (Koops  2012:2).    Nonetheless,  this  relationship  remains  unbalanced  due  to  the   AU’s   dependence   on   the   UN   for   resources   and   funding   to   undertake   large   peacekeeping  operations.       2.5.4  The  need  for  greater  African  agency  in  regional  security  governance     The  challenge  of  security  is  more  prominent  on  the  African  continent  than  anywhere   in  the  world.    The  multiplicity  of  armed  conflicts  and  security  threats  has  intensified,   therefore  requiring  support  aspects  on  complex  operations  such  as  in  Darfur  and  CAR.     These  operations  called  for  collaboration  with  the  RECs  such  as  ECOWAS,  SADC,   and   the   Intergovernmental   Authority   on   Development   (IGAD),   to   meet   challenges   faced   in   complex   peacekeeping   operations   (Neethling   2009:42).     These   regional   actors  are  better  suited   to  deal  with  conflict   in   their  neighbourhoods  based  on  their   knowledge  of  African  states.    These  qualities  also  restrain  them,  based  on  the  lack  of   capacity  and  resources,  which  pose  challenges  to  respond  to  conflicts.       Collective   security   by   regional   and   sub-­regional   organisations   have   gained   prominence  in  the  promotion  of  peace  and  security.    They  have  played  a  significant     47     role  in  conflict  prevention  and  management  in  the  region.    Their  level  of  engagement   is  evident   in   its   involvement   in  the  aftermath  of  Kenya’s  disputed  elections  in  2007,   where  diplomacy  and  mediation  led  to  a  swift  resolution  of  the  crisis  and  prevented   further  escalation  of  violence  (Crossley  2011).      Furthermore,  ECOWAS  intervened  in   Liberia   and   Sierra   Leone   in   the   1990s,   as   a   peace   effort   through   robust   peace   enforcement   operations,   which   set   precedent   for   “devolving   peacekeeping   responsibilities  to  African  regional  role-­players”  (Neethling  2009:  44).       ECOWAS’   involvement   in   Liberia   emphasised   the   stabilisation   role   that   regional   organisations  can  play  by   taking  decisive   roles  and  having   the  political  will   to   take   action.    Although,  ECOWAS  faced  challenges,  it  might  have  benefited  from  the  UN’s   political   and   material   support   from   the   onset   rather   than   at   a   later   stage.     The   intervention  in  Liberia  serves  as  a  lesson  of  collaboration  between  both  organisations   which  was  also  exemplified  by   the   response   to   the  conflict   in  Sierra  Leone  (Bamfo   2013:12-­23).    The  role  of  ECOWAS  is  analysed  comprehensively  in  Chapter  3.    The   UNSC  is  committed  to  cooperate  with  regional  organisations  in  order  to  address  the   challenges   of   international   peace   and   security.     Thus,   it   is   evident   that   regional   organisations   can   play   a   larger   role   in   international   peace   and   security   (Boulden   2003:11-­12).       2.6  CONCLUSION     Aristotle  once  said  that  man  is  nothing  but  a  political  animal,  thus  conflict  can  be  seen   as   being   part   of   and   an   unavoidable   part   of   human   interaction.     As   a   result   of   differences   and   perspectives,   conflict   arises,   which   needs   to   be  managed.     If   the   international   community   merely   observes   while   people   get   killed   because   of   the   provision  of  sovereignty,  we  therefore  disregard  the  importance  of  humanity.    In  this   light,   sovereignty   cannot   be   utilised   as   a   right   if   mass   atrocities   are   conducted.     Sovereignty  should  then  be  a  responsibility  for  which  states  can  be  accountable  to  the   international  community  for  its  actions.    If  the  state  does  not  or  is  unable  to  bear  this   responsibility,  it  then  becomes  the  international  community’s  responsibility  to  act  for   the  preservation  of  life.    Thus  the  importance  of  R2P  comes  to  the  fore,  taking  human   rights,   human   security,   peace,   and  development   into   great   consideration.    Despite   some  progress  in  the  spread  of  human  rights,  respect  for  states’  sovereignty  continues     48     to  take  precedence.  The  mass  dissemination  of  human  rights  continues  to  be  slowed   by  the  Westphalian  understanding  of  sovereignty.  States’  internalization  and  reification   of  sovereignty  has  only  exacerbated  the  situation.  However,  the  first  step  has  already   been  taken  by  redefining  sovereignty.  Due  to  conflicts,  it  is  important  that  the  ICISS   report  guide  be  practical  to  what  should  be  done  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis  which  is  fully   thought  through.   The  international  community  learned  from  its  mistake  of  the  Rwanda  genocide  to  never   again  stand  back  and  do  nothing  as  people  are  massacred  and  their  rights  violated.     As   conflict   arises,   so   too   does   the   importance   of   peacekeeping.     Peacekeeping   operations  have  been  guided  by   the   recommendations  made   in   the  Brahimi   report   which  also  include  the  importance  of  peacekeepers  to  abide  by  principles  in  the  field.     The   Brahimi   report   is   not   an   achievement   in   itself   since   very   few   of   the   recommendations   made   were   implemented   or   implemented   properly.   The   report   greatly  contributed  to  the  progress  of  peacekeeping  by  highlighting  its  operational  and   doctrinal   flaws.   The  UN   and   its   partners   realised   the   urgency   of   the   situation   and   produced  a  number  of  reports  designed  to  reform  peacekeeping,  including  the  2008   Capstone   doctrine   that   set   out   the   principles   and   guidelines   for   peacekeeping   operations.  Post-­2000  peacekeeping  is  characterised  by  the  increasing  involvement   of   transnational   and   regional   organisations   that   contribute   to   the   credibility   and   achievability   of   the   mandates.   Moreover,   more   robust   operations   have   stirred   peacekeepers  away  from  neutrality  and  forced  them  to  engage  in  impartiality  so  as  not   to  be  complicit  in  crimes  against  humanity.  Finally,  the  Brahimi  report  was  the  first  step   towards   the   “humanitarianisation”   of   peacekeeping   that   charged   itself   with   peacebuilding  and  development  goals.   Peacekeeping   has   shifted   to   include   the   three   components,   making   operations   multidimensional  in  scope  and  approach.  Security  has  gradually  expanded  from  state   security  to  human  security,  and  now  includes  the  limits  of  borders.    Therefore,  in  order   to  maintain  international  peace  and  security  with  the  focus  on  the  African  continent,  it   has  become  apparent  that  the  UN  cannot  work  in  a  vacuum,  but  needs  the  assistance   of   regional   actors.    Without   this   approach,   the  UN  can  become  overstretched  with   maintaining  peace.    Actors  such  as  the  AU  and  sub-­regional  actors  have  developed   over  the  years  and  have  played  an  active  role  in  bringing  about  peace  on  the  continent.     Therefore,  the  relationship  between  the  two  organisations,  the  AU  and  the  UN,  is  of     49     paramount  importance  if  the  international  community  is  to  take  lasting  peace  seriously,   which   will   depend   on   coherent   and   strategically   structured   relations   which   are   systematically   integrated.     However,   there   still   remains   challenges   to   be   faced   regarding   the  roles  of   these   two  entities   in  peacekeeping  operations,  which  require   coordination,  collaboration,  and  cooperation.    Without  these,  the  roles  are  blurred,  with   a  possibility  of  duplication  of  work  especially  with  the  rise  of  civil  conflicts.         Since  2003,  the  AU  has  deployed  peace  operations  which  have  provided  extensive   experience  in  the  planning  and  conduct  of  peacekeeping  operations  across  a  range  of   deployment  scenarios.  It  has  worked  to  develop  the  ASF  under  the  APSA,  which  would   provide  a  standby  peace  support  operations  capability.    The  AU  under  the  ambit  of  the   APSA   intended   to  enable   the   continent   to   find   regional   solutions   to   severe  human   security   challenges   such   as   civil   conflicts   and   violence   against   civilians.     The   Architecture   structure   is   too   ambitious   and   complex   for   a   continent   comprised   of   limited  capacity  and  rich  in  political  differences.   Peace   operations   in   Africa   have   increasingly   been   tasked   with   the   protection   of   civilians,  and  the  ability  of  these  operations  to  implement  their  mandates  in  this  respect   has   become   increasingly   linked   with   their   legitimacy   and   credibility.   Substantial   challenges  have,  however,  been  faced  in  this  regard,  in  particular  by  the  AU-­mandated   operations   in   Sudan   and   Somalia.   Increasing   the   effective   conduct   of   peace   operations  and   the   implementation  of   protection   in   the   field,   therefore,   requires  an   enhanced  focus  on  the  security  and  rights  of  individuals  affected  by  conflict.                   50     CHAPTER  3:  HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS:  TOWARD  JOINT   VENTURES  IN  LIBERIA  AND  BURUNDI       3.1  INTRODUCTION     Conflict  and  security  threats  have  changed  the  nature  of  peacekeeping  operations  in   the  post-­Cold  War  era,  particularly  in  Africa.    The  continent  continues  to  experience   raging  conflicts  and  crises,  such  as  armed  insurrections  and  domestic  warfare.  These   are  anticipated  to  increase  if  they  are  not  dealt  with  in  a  cooperative  and  coordinated   manner.     For   instance,   Libya   has   faced   the   challenge   of   all-­out-­civil   war   and   catastrophic  state  collapse;;  the  popular  uprisings  in  North  Africa  experienced  violent   protests   due   to   frustrations   of   decades-­long   living   under   authoritarian   and   corrupt   regimes;;  and  the  crisis  in  the  DRC  witnessed  conflicts  over  basic  resources  fuelled  by   different  political  agendas  from  various  national  and   international  states.    Still  more   conflicts  waged  in  Burundi,  Somalia,  and  Liberia.    In  response  a  shift  from  traditional   formations   to  more   robust  and  multidimensional  operations  were  conducted  by   the   UN,  AU,  and  sub-­regional  organisations  of  the  RECs  to  bring  about  peace  and  security   on  the  continent.     In  the  last  few  years  with  the  shift  of  the  OAU  to  the  AU,  African  member  states  and   organisations  seemed  more  committed  and  willing  to  take  responsibility  to  enhance   the  peace  and  security  of  the  continent  by  deploying  troops,  police,  and  civilians  for   peace  operations.    Since   its   inception,   the  AU,   as   the   successor   of   the  OAU,   has   undertaken  peace  operations   in  Burundi,  Darfur,  and  Somalia   to   regulate  conflicts.     Furthermore,  sub-­regional  organisations  such  as  ECOWAS  have  also  played  a  vital   role   through   the   establishment   of   ECOMOG   to   create   peace   in   Liberia.   The   international  community  saw  the  rise  of  countries  such  as  Nigeria  and  South  Africa   take  a  leading  role  towards  peace  on  the  continent.    This  demonstrates  Africa’s  shifting   principle   from  non-­interference   to  accentuating  non-­indifference   in   its  pursuit  of   the   primacy  of  humanity  coupled  with  robust  and  peace  enforcement  mandates.         These  regions  are  accepting  co-­responsibility,  accountability,  and  sharing  the  burden   with  the  UN  to  organise  themselves  and  bring  about  lasting  peace  to  Africa.    By  sharing   the  burden,  the  AU  has  established  operations  that  were  later  merged  with  or  taken     51     over  by  the  UN.    This  hybrid  arrangement  was  first  conducted  in  Liberia  and  Burundi,   which  will  be  discussed  in  this  chapter.   This  chapter  will  assess  key  dynamics  of  regionally-­driven  peacekeeping  operations   in  Africa.    It  will  specifically  interrogate  regional  initiatives  and  non-­UN  peacekeeping   operations  in  Africa,  as  well  as  regional  organisations  which  are  and  have  been  active   within  the  African  continent.    Attention  is  also  paid  to  the  manifestation  of  UN-­AU  hybrid   peacekeeping  operations.  The  case  of  Liberia  (sub-­regional  organisation  cooperated   with  the  small  UN  observer  force  in  1993),  is  a  significant  case  study  because  it  was   the  first  time  that  an  African  sub-­regional  organisation  intervened  in  a  member  state.       Moreover,   focus   will   also   be   on   Burundi   (circa   2000)   which   will   specifically   be   highlighted   as   one   of   the   first   operations   where   a   hybrid   UN-­AU   peacekeeping   operation   was   conducted   on   the   African   continent.     This   chapter   will   serve   as   a   background  foundation  before  the  cases  of  Sudan  (Darfur)  and  Somalia  are  explored   in  Chapter  4.     3.2  CONTEMPORARY  AU  INSTITUTIONAL  PEACEKEEPING  CONTEXT  IN   AFRICA     Peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa  have  increased  in  terms  of  complexity,  goals,  and   approaches.     This   has   led   to   challenges  and  opportunities   by  a  number   of   factors   which  have  reached  a  pivotal  moment.    Conflicts  that  confront  the  African  continent   have  also  necessitated  urgent  changes  to  be  made.    It  is  thus,  becoming  clear  that  the   continent  needs  to  find  ways  to  resolve  these  challenges.   To   show   devotion   to   promoting   unity   and   solidarity   among   African   states,   and   to   proclaim   its  commitment  and  competence   to   the   international  community,   the  OAU   was  established  in  1963.    To  a  large  extent,  the  organisation  was  characterised  by  the   challenges  of  decolonisation.    It  focused  on  eradicating  all  forms  of  colonialism  under   Article  II  of  the  OAU  Charter,  and  to  strengthen  solidarity,  by  coordinating  international   and   regional  cooperation   for  development  under   the   framework  of   the  UN.    Murithi   (2005:3)  notes  that  there  were  challenges  of  flawed  colonial  boundaries  and  fear  of   intervention.     It   is   in   this   context,   then   that   non-­interference   became   one   of   the   principles  of  the  organisation.     52     With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  fluctuating  nature  of  conflict,  it  was  imperative   that  the  OAU  reconsider  and  reassess  its  role  in  Africa’s  development  by  changing  its   priorities.    These  would  include,  but  were  not  limited  to,  multi-­party  democracy,  human   rights,  and  development.    The  most  inimitable  challenges  were  the  prevailing  conflicts   which  impeded  the  continent’s  development.    In  response,  the  OAU  Mechanism  for   Conflict  Prevention,  Management,  and  Resolution  was  adopted  in  1993.    Through  the   new  mechanism,   intervention,  which  was  previously  considered  as   internal  conflict,   became  possible.    But  then  again,  the  organisation’s  prominence  on  non-­intervention   became   the   factor   for   the  mechanism’s   lack   of   effectiveness   (Hestermeyer   2014).     Unfortunately,   the   mechanism   was   ineffective   in   providing   resolutions   to   the   challenges  on  the  continent.    Tragically,  the  African  continent  witnessed  the  genocide   in  Rwanda,  the  collapse  of  state  institutions  in  Somalia,  and  violence  in  other  parts  of   Africa  while   the  mechanism  was  operational.    These  exposed   the   limitations  of   the   OAU   to   address   the   challenges   on   the   continent.     In   reality   and   for   much   of   its   existence,   the   doctrine   of   non-­intervention   positioned   the   organisation   as   a   silent   observer   of   the   atrocities   committed   by   some   of   its   own   member   states.     It   was   perceived   as   an   organisation   that   comprised   of  African  Heads   of  States,   of  whom   some  were  not  legitimately  elected.    This  deleterious  discernment  of  the  organisation   was  further  viewed  by  Murithi  (2005:27),  who  stated  that  the  OAU  was  “an  organisation   that   existed   without   having   a   genuine   impact   on   the   daily   lives   of   Africans”.       Subsequently,   the  OAU  revealed  difficulties   to  progress   the  agenda  of  unity  due   to   non-­consensus  on  strategies  which  were  unclear,  and  also  exhibited  intricacies  due   to  different  economic  and  political  ideologies.    This  questioned  the  OAU’s  credibility   and  the  role  they  were  to  play  to  promote  peace  and  security  on  the  continent.    What   further   threatened   Africa’s   solidarity   and   weakened   the   OAU,   was   the   lack   of   a   common  vision  by  African  leaders;;  financial  contributions  by  member  states  needed   to   effectively   run   the   organisation;;   and   futile   decision   making.     Consequently,   notwithstanding   the  conflicts,  Khamis   (2008:7)   stated   that,   the  OAU  was  unable   to   intercede  in  the  African  state’s  internal  affairs  because  of  the  respect  for  the  principle   of  non-­interference.   On  a  positive  note,  the  work  done  by  the  OAU  enabled  it  to  confer  a  palpable  reality   on   a   united   Africa.     It   gave   its  members   an   opportunity   to   implement   coordinated   positions  on  common   issues,  and   to  defend   the  continent’s   interests.     In  1999,   the     53     OAU  Assembly  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  passed  the  Sirte  Declaration  that   was  called  to  amend  the  focus  of  the  Organisation  in  order  to  make  it  more  effective   and  efficient  to  strengthen  its  capacity  to  meet  the  challenges  it  faced.    African  leaders   then  decided  to  establish  a  new  continental  organisation  that  would  address  the  new   realities   and   eliminate   conflicts   with   the   crucial   objective   of   the   Charter   of   the   continental  organisation  combined  with  the  provision  of  the  Treaty  forming  the  African   Economic  Community  (Hestermeyer  2014).  As  a  result,  the  AU  succeeded  the  OAU   and  was  inaugurated  in  July  2002  at  the  Durban  summit  in  South  Africa.       The  AU  was  in  the  forefront  to  accelerate  and  deepen  the  process  of  economic  and   political  development  on  the  continent.      While  the  OAU  represented  the  politics  of  an   earlier   era,   in   the   quest   to   promote   liberation,   peace,   and   security   on   the   African   continent,  the  AU  appeared  to  be  key  to  rebuilding  post-­Cold  War  Africa.  The  main   difference  between   these  organisations  was   that   the  OAU  was  seen  as  a  union  of   leaders  of  Africa  and  the  AU,  as  described  by  Nzomo  (2003),  was  to  be  a  “union  of   Africa’s  peoples”,  shifting  from  non-­interference  to  non-­indifference.    The  organisation   dedicated  remarkable  efforts  to  create  a  peace  and  security  architecture  to  combat  the   multitude  of  challenges.    It  also  sought  to  combat  armed  conflicts  especially  at  a  time   when   it   faced  an  outbreak  of  extreme  violence   in   the  DRC,  Angola,  Liberia,  Sierra   Leone,   Sudan,   and   Somalia   (Makinda   &   Okumu   2008:1).     The   focus   on   peace,   stability,   security   and   human   rights   encompassed   the   amendment   of   the   AU   Constitutive  Act  to  include  the  right  to  intervene  in  a  member  state  on  humanitarian   and  human  rights  grounds.    This   thus   implemented   the  principles  of  R2P  and  non-­ indifference,   underpinned   in   article   4(h)   and   4(j)   of   the   AU   Constitutive   Act   and   authorised  by  the  AU  PSC  (Murithi  2008:3-­4).   As  security  continued  to  be  a  dire  challenge,  the  AU  engaged  in  peacekeeping  efforts   in  African  conflicts.    The  central  preoccupation  of  these  efforts  is  exacerbated  by  the   joint  responsibility  of  the  UN  and  AU  organisations  to  respond  to  peace  and  security   threats   on   the   continent.     Accordingly,   hybridisation   in   peacekeeping   in  Africa   has   assumed  great  significance.    The  quest  for  peace  and  security  heightened  the  debate   on   the   continent’s   enthusiasm   for   the   complementary   role   that   sub-­regional   organisations  can  play  in  peacekeeping  operations.    Therefore,  in  this  context,  hybrid   peacekeeping   was   born   out   of   both   the   same   objective   towards   peace   and   the   comparative  advantages  of  the  UN,  AU,  and  sub-­regional  organisations.    The  hybrid     54     peacekeeping  arrangement  emphasises  that  no  single  organisation  can  manage  the   intricacies  of  peace  and  security  challenges.       This  approach  to  the  specific  issues  arising  from  peace  operations  does  not  take  place   in  a  vacuum  but  rather  occurs  within  the  context  in  which  the  two  organisations’  efforts   are  stressed  to  address  Africa’s  challenges.    According  to  de  Coning  (2004:23),  this   practice  seems   to  play   into   the  strength  of   the  AU  conflict   resolution  attempts  and   compensates   for   the   weaknesses   of   the   UN   and   regional   and   sub-­regional   organisations.    While   the  AU  was  an   important   actor   to   address   the   challenges,   it   lacked  the  necessary  equipment  and  financial  capabilities   to  advance  the  continent   and  resolve  its  issues.       Despite  its  shortcomings,  the  need  for  the  AU  to  take  an  imperative  position  on  non-­ indifference  was  important  especially  having  to  work  towards  conflict  management  and   resolutions  on   the  continent.    The   implementation  of   the  principle  of  R2P  was   then   executed  when  they  took  the  lead  in  their  first  peace  operation  in  in  the  Great  Lakes   region,  where  Burundi  was  entangled  by  chaos  and  mass  human  rights  violations.    Its   transition   was   characterised   by   ethnic   violence   between   the   majority   Hutus   and   minority  Tutsis  which  was  aggravated  by  the  tensions  between  smaller  rebel  groups   and  transitional  governments.    To  respond  to  the  challenges  faced,  greater  changes   had  to  be  made,  and  capacity  of  regional  organisation  in  peacekeeping  operations  had   to  seriously  be  cogitated.    Before   the  cases  of  Liberia  and  Burundi  are  explored   in   more   detail,   it   is   important   to   review   the   developments   of   African   regional   organisations  in  undertaking  peacekeeping  operations  on  the  continent.     3.3  AFRICAN  REGIONAL  ORGANISATIONS  IN  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS     Resolving   African   conflicts   has   been   challenging   and   has   necessitated   crucial   changes  at  the  international,  regional,  and  sub-­regional  levels.    This  required  a  strong   collective  approach  to  the  various  challenges  faced  on  the  continent.  As  a  result,  the   UN  turned  to  regional  and  sub-­regional  initiatives  to  take  the  lead  in  resolving  conflicts   by   contributing   peacekeeping   forces  under   the  mandate   of  Chapter  VIII   of   the  UN   Charter  (Gray  2005:218).  The  UN’s  role  in  collective  security  reflected  an  institutional   strengthening  of  the  organisation  to  take  action  not  only  for  peaceful  settlements  of   disputes,  but  also  to  enforce  coercive  measures.         55     The  UN  and  AU  have  leaned  towards  hybrid  operations  with  regional  powers  and  the   RECs,  to  play  a  significant  role  in  conflict  resolution  in  Africa.    It  is  therefore  important   to  note  that  hybridisation  is  not  only  limited  between  UN-­AU,  but  involves  UN-­RECs   and  AU-­RECs.    Francis   (2006:96)   remarked   that   the  cooperative  advantage  of   this   hybridisation   arrangement   was   the   regional   and   sub-­regional   organisations’   willingness  to  play  a  fundamental  role  in  maintaining  internal  peace  and  security  on   the  continent,  because  these  conflicts  affect  them  directly  or  indirectly  due  to  the  spill-­ over  effect  they  have.    Such  emerging  strategies  are  a  reflection  of  the  shifting  complex   nature  of  responses  to  conflicts  in  Africa.    This  cooperative  security  strategy  provides   legitimacy  and  possible  exit  strategies,  and  it  also  ensures  that  each  actor  has  a  role   to  play  by  utilising  their  comparative  advantages.   Since  1993,  the  UN  has  cultivated  co-­operation  with  regional  organisations,  leading  to   the  establishment  of  joint  representation  for  managing  conflict  in  Africa.    Because  the   UN  is  so  over-­stretched  owing  to  its  diverse  responsibilities  in  maintaining  peace  and   security   around   the   world,   these   organisations   have   taken   the   responsibility   to   contribute  and  play  a  far  greater  role  in  peacekeeping  operations.    They  provide  the   advantage  of  strengthening  the  understanding  of  the  intricacies  of  domestic  conflicts   and  the  interests  of  various  factions  within  a  particular  domain.    They  also  have  the   lead  to  the  rapid  deployment  of  personnel  to  conflict  affected  areas.    The  collective   approach   also   provisioned   in   the   UN   Charter,   permits   states   to   form   regional   organisations  which  provide   for   the  pacific   settlement  of   disputes  which  has   led   to   collective  security  arrangements  between  the  UN  and  regional  organisations  on  the   African  continent  (Draman  &  Carment  2001).     This  trend  towards  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  could  be  argued  to  go  against  the   notion  of  ‘African  solutions  to  African  problems’,  but  without  external  support  to  sustain   operations,  regional  organisations  initiatives  would  become  impractical.    In  this  light,   the  formation  of  a  partnership  may  offer  a  significant  insight  to  confront  the  challenges   on  the  African  continent.      It  is  worth  noting  that  partnerships  are  easier  said  than  done,   bringing  both  challenges  and  opportunities.    On  one  hand,  they  have  the  potential  to   offer  a  platform  to  advance  pragmatic  solutions  that  build  on  the  capacities  of  each   stakeholder  and  actor.    On  the  other  hand,  these  partnerships  usually  bring  different   conceptions   and   approaches   to   the   conflict   based   on   their   understanding   of   the   conflict.    In  this  context,  they  collaborate  because  they  share  a  common  objective  to     56     create   and   maintain   peace   and   security   which   would   lead   to   cooperation   and   coordination  in  a  hybrid  peacekeeping  operation.     A  range  of  initiatives  have  been  implemented  by  regional  organisations  in  the  form  of   support  to  the  UN,  and  in  return,  the  UN’s  support  for  the  regional  organisations  has   led  to  co-­deployment  or  budgetary  support.    Despite  political  difficulties  that  face  the   regional   organisations,   such   as   lack   of   resources   and   funding,   their   involvement   continues   to   grow,   promoting   subsidiarity.   Similarly,   member   states   have   also   contributed  solutions  to  some  of  the  challenges  faced,  for  instance,  the  role  played  by   Tanzania   and   South   Africa   in   Burundi,   and   the   contributions   made   by   Nigeria   to   ECOWAS   and   ECOMOG   in   Liberia.     These   cases   exemplify   hybrid   peace   arrangements  to  collectively  respond  to  peace  and  security  threats  on  the  continent   (Draman  &  Carment  2001).    Moreover,  they  demonstrate  that  their  actions  did  not  have   the  same  political  decision  making  constraints  such  as  those  of  the  UN.   As   part   of   the   RECs   that   took   initiatives   to   find   conflict   resolutions,   ECOWAS   authorised   an   operation   by   creating   its   military   arm,   the   ECOWAS-­ECOMOG   in   Liberia.     Similar   cases   were   demonstrated   by   SADC   when   it   contributed   in   peacekeeping   operations   by   deploying   troops   to   the   DRC   and   Lesotho   in   1998.     Furthermore,  the  Community  of  Saharan  and  Sahelian  State  (CEN-­SAD)  deployed  a   small  force  in  CAR.    Since  the  1990s,  ECOWAS  has  been  involved  in  peacekeeping   operations  in  Liberia  (1990-­1996),  Sierra  Leone  (1997-­1999),  and  Côte  d’Ivoire  (2002-­ 2004)  (Hannibal  2013:45).       The   focus  of   the  section  below  will  be  on  peacekeeping   intervention  by  ECOWAS-­ ECOMOG  to  restore  peace  in  Liberia.     3.4  TOWARDS  A  COOPERATIVE  VENTURE:  THE  ROLE  OF  SUB-­REGIONAL   ORGANISATIONS  IN  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS     Hybridisation  arrangements  contributing  to  peace  operations  have  taxed  the  ingenuity   of  scholars  and  policy  makers  engaged  in  the  front  line  of  conflict  and  tasked  to  provide   solutions  to  end  instability.    To  operationalize  this  task,  the  need  to  understand  past   success  or  failure  cases  and  contributory  factors  has  always  pinned  over  many  non-­ operational   and   theoretical   adumbrations.   To   this   end,   cases   of   peacekeeping     57     operations  such  as  ECOWAS-­ECOMOG  and  the  peace  processes  in  Burundi  have   often  been  the  subject  of  many  policy  reflections.    Focusing  on  cooperative  ventures   in   Liberia   and   Burundi,   this   section   seeks   to   unearth   its   modalities   against   the   argument,   that  whereas   certain   features  may  have   led   to   the   success  or   failure  of   these  cases,  the  contextual  environment  in  which  they  operated  must  be  given  due   consideration,  especially  by  policy  makers  contemplating  an  operation  configured  and   structured  like  these  cases,  would  breed  success  or  failure.       As  already  explained,  the  UN  shifted  its  focus  on  the  role  that  regional  organisations   can   play   to   maintain   peace   and   security.     This   reflected   the   UN’s   and   regional   organisation’s   commitment   to   solve   post-­Cold   War   conflicts.     This   hybridisation   confronted   the   regional   organisation’s   lack   of   resources   to   carry   out   operations,   thereby  depending  on   the  UN,  while   the  UN   found   the   legitimacy  of  peacekeeping   operations  strengthened  by  the  operability  of  regional  organisations.    The  concept  of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   requires   more   than   just   merging   efforts   of   peacekeeping  operations  together.   Peacekeeping   operations   require   clear   mandates,   international   legitimacy,   and   sufficient   capability.     Furthermore,   they   need   appropriate   organisational   structures   including  cooperation  with  the  actors   involved.     It   is  worthy  to  note  that   in  the  post-­ Cold  War  era,  neither  the  UN  nor  regional  organisations  alone  have  the  full  capacity   to  ensure  successful  peacekeeping  operations.    Without  the  support  of  the  UN  or  a   form  of  collaboration  with   them,   the   implementation  of  peacekeeping  operations  by   regional  organisations  seems  impossible.    Yet,  this  can  also  be  seen  as  a  weakness   because   there   are   legal   and   practical   difficulties   for   regional   organisations   to   cooperate   with   the   UN.     However,   the   latter   cannot   completely   substitute   for   the   former.    Taking  into  consideration  that  despite  the  UN’s  resource  capabilities  that  go   beyond  regional  organisations,  these  regions  have  a  better  knowledge  of  the  causes   of  conflict  which  is  inevitable  for  the  UN.             58     3.4.1  From  African  agency  to  United  Nations  mission:  From  ECOMOG  to   UNOMIL  -­  Case  Study  of  Liberia       In  order  to  emphasise  the  proposition  of  the  actors  and  stakeholders  in  Liberia,  it  is   important   to   contextualise   the   intervention   by   depicting   the   system   into   which   ECOWAS  would  intervene.    Understanding  the  complexities  of  the  Liberian  conflict  is   a   significant   prerequisite   in   order   to   comprehend   how   fallacious   and   successful   ECOWAS  was  in  their  actions  towards  the  Liberian  conflict.     3.4.1.1  Historical  Overview  of  the  Liberian  conflict     The  most  vital  period  for  Liberia,  prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  armed  conflict,  was  during   the   tenure   of   President  William   Tubman   and   President  William   Tolbert,   who  were   descendants  of  freed  slaves.    According  to  Dennis  and  Dennis  (2008:42-­43),  Tubman   was  regarded  as  one  of  Africa’s  first  leaders,  who  was  then  succeeded  by  Tolbert  who   continued  advance  reforms  and  accelerated  them.    In  1980,  a  bloody  coup  by  Master-­ Sergeant  Samuel  Doe  was  organised  to  overthrow  the  new  president.    By  the  mid-­ 1980s,   Doe’s   government   set   in   motion   a   regime   of   human   rights   violations   and   consolidated   power   which   aggravated   ethnic   tension.     During   this   period,   Liberia   received  more  aid  than  ever  before.    Doe’s  close  relation  with  the  US  raised  questions   by  regional  actors  such  as  Libya,  who  supported  the  National  Patriotic  Front  of  Liberia   (NPLF),  led  by  Charles  Taylor  to  commence  war  against  Samuel  Doe’s  regime  (Ikechi   2003:42).    This  resulted  in  Liberia’s  first  civil  war  which  began  from  1989  and  raged   until   1996.     By   the   1990s,   the   insurgency   spread   throughout   the   country,   killing   thousands  of  civilians  and  forced  over  half   its  population  of  2.6  million  people  to  be   displaced,  with  some  600,000-­700,000  seeking  refuge  in  neighbouring  countries  such   as  Guinea,  Cote  d’Ivoire,  and  Sierra  Leone.  Conflict  continued  as  one  section  of  the   NPLF  broke  off  to  form  the  Independent  National  Patriotic  Front  of  Liberia  (INPFL),  led   by  Prince  Johnson,  who  battled  for  control  over  the  capital,  against  Charles  Taylor.     Charles   Taylor   then   took   over   power   and   proclaimed   presidency   after   the   INPFL,   capturing  and  executing  Samuel  Doe  in  the  process.      His  death  did  not  end  the  civil   war  because  Charles  Taylor  refused  to  recognise  anyone  but  himself  as  President.     Throughout  the  1990s,  the  INPFL  and  NPFL  continued  their  siege  of  Monrovia,  with   civilians  caught  in  the  crossfire,  despite  international  calls  for  a  cease-­fire  (Wippman     59     1993:  163).    Given  the  accelerated  conflict  combined  with  the  lack  of  a  UN  requirement   for  a  ceasefire  in  order  to  deploy,  the  contextualised  ECOMOG’s  intervention  in  Liberia   needs  to  be  analysed  in-­depth.     3.4.1.2  ECOWAS-­ECOMOG  intervention  in  Liberia     ECOWAS  was  established  through  the  efforts  of  Nigeria  with  active  support  by  Togo.     This  establishment  found  expression  in  the  rationale  of  the  UN  under  Chapter  VIII  of   the  UN  Charter.    ECOWAS  emerged  as  a  regional  economic  community  in  West  Africa   to  achieve  economic  integration  and  collective  self-­reliance.    As  described  by  Akinyemi   and  Aluko  (1984:4),  ECOWAS  “is  the  structural  embodiment  of  the  peoples’  belief  in   a   collective   attack   against   the   enduring   problems   of   underdevelopment   in   tropical   Africa”.    It  appeared  that  the  sub-­regional  organisation  never  anticipated  dealing  with   security  challenges.    Therefore,  the  Treaty  of  ECOWAS  focused  on  the  challenges  of   ‘Settlement   of   Disputes’.     It   therefore   realised   that   due   to   the   nature   of   the   new   challenges,   its  aim  of  economic   integration  would  be   futile   if   it  did  not  confront   the   security   issues  collectively.    As  a  result,  ECOWAS  signed   the   ‘Protocol  Relating   to   Mutual  Assistance  in  Defence’  in  Freetown.    This  Protocol  was  not  well  developed  and   it  exposed  the  organisation’s  weakness  to  deal  with  security  challenges  in  the  face  of   internal  conflict  (Akindele  2012:5).    The  efforts  outlined  in  the  Protocol  were  rendered   inadequate  against  the  Liberian  crisis  because  the  crisis  did  not  fall  within  the  scope   of  the  Protocol.   As  Golwa  pointed  out  (2009:280),  “as  a  matter  of  conjecture,  one  could  say  that  the   community  at  the  time  of  formation,  did  not  foresee  the  nature  of  the  threat  and  conflict   which   engulfed   the   sub-­region.     Therefore,   precedence   was   given   to   issues   of   economic  integration  to  the  detriment  of  peace  building  or  conflict  management”.    In   the   midst   of   security   challenges,   ECOWAS   had   to   take   responsibility,   even   more   compelling,   because   of   the   disinclination   of   the   OAU   to   intervene   based   on   their   principle  of  non-­interference,  and  the  reluctance  of  the  international  community  to  get   involved  based  on  the  principle  of  sovereignty.       60     ECOWAS’s   involvement   was   arbitrated   in   four   summits,   the   13th   session   on   the   Authority  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government  of  ECOWAS  in  May  1990;;  the  Standing   Mediation  Committee  Meeting  in  July  1990;;  The  National  Conference  in  August  1990;;   and  the  First  Session  of  the  Standing  Mediation  Committee  in  August  1990  (Okeke   2012:40).    These  summits  were   important,  as   they  resulted   in   the  establishment  of   ECOMOG,  because  of  the  need  to  intervene  militarily.    But  its  mandate  was  to  monitor   a  cease-­fire   in  order   to  create  a  stable  environment   for  an   interim  government  and   democratic  elections.    However,  before  the  deployment  of  ECOMOG,  there  was  no   cease-­fire  agreement  in  place  and  no  peace  to  keep  in  Liberia,  yet  they  were  assigned   peacekeeping  duties  (Draman  &  Carment  2001:9).    It  was  therefore  surprising  that  the   NPFL  was   inimical   towards  ECOMOG.    While   those   loyal   to  Samuel  Doe  and   the   INPFL  accepted  the  intervention  by  ECOMOG,  the  NPFL  resisted  any  foreign  troop   deployed  in  Liberia  and  showed  its  discontent  by  attacking  ECOMOG  (Nass  2000:67-­ 68).       ECOMOG  managed  to  settle  in,  however,  its  operation  became  compounded  as  the   country  faced  collapse  and  chaos  was  the  order  of  the  day.      Various  rebel  factions   emerged  to  take  advantage  of  the  progress  made  by  the  NPFL,  and  against  this  tide,   ECOMOG  launched  a  ‘strategy  of  limited  offensive’,  which  would  overpower  the  NPFL   and  bring  order  to  Liberia  (Draman  &  Carment  2001:5).       It   is   imperative   to  note   that  although  ECOMOG  was  referred   to  as  a  peacekeeping   operation,   there   was   no   consent   based   on   the   NPFL’s   resistance   towards   it.     Furthermore,  a  clear  and  enforceable  mandate  seemed  impossible  because  there  was   a  lack  of  peacemaking  effort.    In  retrospect,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  operation  was  a   peacekeeping   intervention   or   a   traditional   multilateral   intervention.   Since   its   deployment,  ECOMOG  alternated  between  peacekeeping  and  enforcement  action  in   the  attempt  to  establish  order.  Francis  (2000:179)  stated  that  the  “consequence  of  the   indiscretion  is  that  the  peacekeeping  operation,  which  never  engaged  in  peacemaking   became  embroiled  in  peace-­enforcement  challenges”.    This  was  demonstrated  when   ECOMOG  not  only  had  to  face  the  NPFL  but  also  the  INPFL,  which  caused  the  shift   from  a  peacekeeping  to  peace-­enforcement  operation.    Adisa  and  Aminu  (1996:86)   further   argued   that   peacekeeping   and   peace-­enforcement  measures   are   essential   incompatible  tenets.    Therefore,  this  operation  was  “disastrous  for  Liberia  and  the  sub-­ regional   organisation”,   because   it   protracted   the   crisis   and   thousands   were   killed.       61     Fortuitously,  there  was  a  turn  of  events,  when  Charles  Taylor  agreed  to  participate  in   the  peace  process  in  Abuja,  Nigeria.    The  Abuja  Accord  paved  the  way  for  inclusivity   in  the  peace  process.    The  approach  initiated  by  ECOWAS  signalled  the  peacebuilding   process   and   the   crisis   came   to   a   halt   with   the   inauguration   of   Charles   Taylor   as   president.    Despite  the  challenges  faced  by  ECOWAS-­ECOMOG,  it  paved  a  way  for   the  investiture  of  an  interim  government,  changing  the  mandate  from  peacekeeping   and  peace-­enforcement  to  peacemaking  (Wippman  1993:169).    However,  lasting  and   sustainable  peace  was  a  challenge  which  needed  further  intervention.     3.4.1.3  The  ECOWAS  non-­consensus  to  intervene  in  Liberia     Military  coups,  social  unrest,  political   instability,  and  economic  crises  have  plagued   many  West   African   countries   since   the   wave   of   independence   swept   through   the   region.    The  ECOWAS  military  intervention  in  Liberia,  was  undertaken  without  a  clearly   defined  legal  precedent,  and  therefore  was  positioned  under  the  concept  of  giants  of   clay  as  a  form  of  a  regional  ‘coalition  of  the  willing’.   Nigeria’s   involvement   in   Liberia   and   its   contribution   to   ECOMOG   prevented   the   peacekeeping  operation’s  failure.    As  Adebajo  (2013:254)  noted,  “Nigeria  was  the  only   contingent  whose  withdrawal  would  have  meant  the  end  of  the  mission”.    This  analysis   is   contextualised   against   the   backdrop   that   most   of   West   Africa’s   countries   are   underdeveloped   and   cannot   contribute   the   same   capacities   as   Nigeria;;   Dowyaro   (2000)  added  that  Nigeria  was  the  only  member  of  ECOWAS  with  capacity  to  support   its   own   troops   effectively.   Nigeria   has   been   a   major   troop   contributing   country   especially  for  the  UN,  and  in  regional  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa,  Asia,  Europe,   and  the  Middle  East  (Adebajo  2013:245).    It  particularly  contributed  in  the  composition   and  finance  of  ECOMOG,  amounting  to  the  majority  of  troops.   The  burden  of  such  a  large  responsibility  to  ensure  ECOMOG’s  survival  also  left  room   for  Nigeria  to  exploit  the  situation  for  its  own  national  interests.  First,  Nigeria’s  decision   to   intervene   is   rooted   in   its   national   foreign   policy   ethos   of   ‘Pax  Nigeriana’,   which   provides  a  cohesive  platform  for  its  national  security  priorities,  attitude,  and  responses   to  foreign  policy  issues  within  the  continent  (Ajayi,  1998:179).    Adebajo,  further  noted   that  “this  peacekeeping  activism  has  been  part  of  a  ‘Pax  Nigeriana’:  Nigeria’s  historical   quest  to  pursue  a  hegemonic  role  and  to  secure  a  permanent  seat  on  the  reformed     62     UNSC”.     Second,   Nigeria’s   role   in   the   Liberian   intervention   set   the   benchmark   of   exerting  its  dominance  in  the  region;;  the  intervention  was  consistent  with  its  own  image   of  Nigeria  as  an  aspiring  political,  economic,  and  military  hegemony  to  the  rest  of  West   Africa.     Third,   Nigeria’s   intervention   positioned   the   country   with   an   opportunity   to   exploit  Liberia’s  natural  resources  (Adebajo  2013:245).       The  modalities  of  Nigeria’s  involvement  in  the  ECOMOG  intervention  have  also  come   under   criticism.     This   originated   from   significant   difference   between   the   ECOWAS   members  as  to  whether  to  intervene  through  force  or  to  use  soft  diplomacy  throughout   the   operation   of   ECOMOG.     These   differences  were  most   prominent   between   the   Francophone  and  Anglophone  blocs  within  ECOWAS,  with  the  Francophone  countries   preferring   the   use   of   negotiations   and   mediation   rather   than   a   military   approach   (Dowyaro   2000).     Despite   opposition   to   the   military   intervention   and   following   a   meeting   in   1996   Banjul,   Gambia,   ECOWAS  was   designated   to   intervene   with   the   support  of  Nigeria,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Sierra  Leone,  and  The  Gambia  (Dowyaro  2000).       The  decision  to  intervene  was  unwelcome  by  Charles  Taylor,  who  saw  the  initiative  as   a   blatant   attempt   to   remove   him   from   power.     He   subsequently   denounced   the   intervention   by   ECOMOG.     Moreover,   some   members   of   ECOWAS   from   the   Francophone   countries,   such   as   Côte   d’Ivoire   and   Burkina   Faso,   opposed   the   peacekeeping  operation  in  Liberia.    Their  position  was  based  on  their  understanding   that  ECOMOG  had  insufficient  competence  to  implement  and  intervene  in  the  internal   conflicts   of   another  Member  State.    As  a   result,   some  ECOWAS  countries   viewed   Nigeria’s   intentions   and   intervention   with   suspicion.   Analyses   of   ECOWAS’   intervention   have   generated   strong   debate,   following   the   establishment   of   the   ECOMOG  peacekeeping  force.     What   seemed   indubitable,   however,   was   that   ECOWAS   and   ECOMOG   were   confronted  with  enormous  challenges   to  achieve   their  mandate   to   restore  peace   in   Liberia.     Particularly,   where   necessary   engagements   contributed   to   international   efforts   to   end   conflicts,   the   sub-­regional   organisation   took   an   approach   of   non-­ indifference.   Yabi   (2010:6)   noted   that   when   Nigeria   decided   to   intervene   through   ECOMOG  in  Liberia  a   few  months  after  Charles  Taylor’s   rebel  movement  attacked   Samuel  Doe’s  regime,  neither  the  victims  of  the  attack  nor  the  Nigerian  government   could  be  defined  as  models  of  democracy  or  observers  of  human  rights.    Nigeria’s     63     troops  began  to  engage  in  questionable  activities  for  a  peacekeeping  contingent  as   rather  than  stand  as  a  neutral  force,  they  took  sides  between  the  factions.         Following   the   intervention,   Nigeria   gained   increasing   recognition   throughout   the   international   system   in   the   areas   of   peacekeeping,   peacemaking,   and   peace-­ enforcement.   On   the   one   hand,   Howe   (1997:419-­420)   criticized   ECOWAS’   intervention   and   Nigeria’s   leadership   role   to   bring   about   lasting   peace   to   Liberia   because  of  the  regime  and  security  interests  of  Ibrahim  Babangida,  who  had  a  great   personal   interest   in   the   development   of   Liberia.     While   Nigeria   denied   these   allegations,   it  persisted  with   its   intervention   in   the  Country,  and   later,  also   in  Sierra   Leone   (Olonisakin   2008:14).     On   the   other   hand,   Dowyaro   (2000)   contended   that   Nigerian-­led   ECOMOG,   proved   to   the   international   community   what   is   possible   if   African  states  mobilize  their  resources  to  address  peace  and  security  threats  on  the   continent.       In  spite  of   reservations  about  Nigeria’s  prominence   in  ECOMOG,   its  overwhelming   contributions  should  be  seen  as  positives.    In  the  overall  analysis,  the  majority  of  West   African  states  acknowledge  Nigeria’s  initiative  in  peacekeeping,  yet  similarly  resent  its   unilateral  military  intercession  and  strategy.  Concerns  about  Nigeria’s  prevalence  and   ‘Pax  Nigeriana’  by  smaller  states  have  been  persevering.  Essentially,  a  few  states  saw   ECOMOG  as  a  Nigerian  instrument  towards  its  own  security  strategy.    In  the  post-­Cold   War  period,   the  security  vacuum  within  West  Africa   initially  gave  Nigeria  expanded   opportunities   to  assume  a   leading   role   in   the  support   of   peace  and  security   in   the   region.    It  is  reasonable  that  without  the  responsibility  of  the  sub-­regional  hegemon,   the   support   for  ECOWAS  and   its   viability   in   the  peacekeeping  operation   in   Liberia   would  have  been  extensively  constrained,  taking  into  consideration  that  ECOWAS  has   no  standing  armed  force  or  military.     Although  ECOMOG  was  able   to   implement   its  unclear  mandate  and  bring  about  a   positive  difference,  it  did  so  with  some  challenges  and  causalities.    Despite  its  success   which  was  attributed  by  and  based  on  the  political  initiatives  of  ECOWAS,  it  was  an   economic  community  and  did  not  have  a  clear  peacekeeping  mandate.    It  is  vital  to   credit  the  Community  on  its  response  to  the  crisis  in  Liberia.    Its  effort  led  inextricably   to  the  conduct  of  its  mandate  despite  the  costs  and  challenges  it  was  confronted  with.           64      3.4.1.4  UN-­ECOMOG  intervention  in  Liberia     The  challenges  ECOWAS-­ECOMOG  created  were   that   it   contributed   to  casualties,   from  4000  to  more  than  150  000,  and  an  estimated  over  one  million  persons  displaced.     ECOMOG  as  a  peacekeeping  operation  lacked  consent  of  a  major  faction  and  it  was   also  not  equipped  to  impose  a  unilateral  solution  as  a  peace-­enforcement  operation.     Moreover,   it   lacked   neutrality   and   impartiality   due   to   shifting   alliances  with   various   rebel  groups,  which  undermined  its  credibility  (Draman  &  Carment  2001:6).       It  was  only  after  the  signing  of  a  formal  peace  agreement  of  Cotonous  in  1993,  three   years   after   the   formation   of   ECOMOG,   that   the   UN   deployed   a   peacekeeping   operation,  the  UN  Observer  Mission  in  Liberia  (UNOMIL)  (United  Nations  2014b).    The   deployment  of  UNOMIL  marked  the  first  time  that  a  UN  peacekeeping  operation  was   undertaken   in   cooperation  with   an  operation   that   had  already  been  established  by   another  organisation.  The  UN’s  role  through  this  peacekeeping  operation  was  part  of   the  Cotonous  peace  agreement  to  support  ECOWAS  in  the  Liberian  crisis.    In  practical   terms,  the  UN’s  contribution  could  be  described  as  minimalist  at  best  and  ambivalent   at  worst.    It  substantively  started  with  the  deployment  of  368  men  which  highlighted  its   strict  adherence  and  importance  to  establish  a  peacekeeping  operation  after  peace   agreements   had   been   established   (Aboagye   &   Bah   2004).   While   ECOMOG   was   actively   involved   in   supporting   the   implementation   of   the   ceasefire   agreements,   it   provided   security   for   the   UN,   and   support   for   the   disarmament   process,   UNOMIL   monitored  the  progress  on  the  ground  and  ECOMOG  operations.    This  showed  the   cooperative  nature  of  two  organisations  in  support  of  a  peace  process.     In  1997  Charles  Taylor  became  the  elected  president,  and  in  November  1997  the  UN   established   the  United  Nations  Peace-­building  Support  Office   in  Liberia   (UNOL)   to   replace  UNOMIL,  whose  mandate  expired  on  30  September  1997.  UNOL  had  the  sole   mandate  of  assisting  the  government  with  consolidating  peace.  Despite  efforts  made   by  UNOL,   Liberia  was  plagued  by   civil   conflict   once  again   after   some   factions   felt   cheated   and   oppressed   by  Charles  Taylor.   This   revealed   that   the   conflict  was   not   eventually  resolved  in  1997,  and  although  it  paved  the  way  for  a  peace  process,  it  did   not   end   the   Liberian   crisis,   nor   did   it   address   the   underlying   factors   that   would   contribute  to  the  relapse  of  conflict.    Nonetheless,  the  parties  reached  a  ceasefire  in   2003  with  the  signing  of  the  ‘Comprehensive  Peace  Agreement’  in  order  to  establish     65     a   transitional   process.     To   support   this   process,   the   UNSC   authorised   the   establishment  of  the  United  Nations  Mission  in  Liberia  (UNMIL)  under  Resolution  1509   to   replace   ECOWAS   forces   (Aboagye   &   Bah   2004).     As   a   result,   the   ECOMOG   operation  in  Liberia  was  re-­hatted  into  UNMIL.    According  to  Ajayi  (2008:3),  prior  to   the  deployment  of  UN  peacekeepers,  the  UNSC  held  several  informal  consultations  in   order  to  assist  ECOMOG,  of  which  some  were  on  the  request  of  ECOWAS,  but  there   was  no  immediate  action.     The  intervention  of  ECOWAS  through  ECOMOG  demonstrates  the  need  for  a  clear   mandate  for  successful  operations.    It  exemplifies  the  requirement  of  a  clear  mandate   suitable   for   the  capabilities  of   the   implementing  organisation.    Although  a  mandate   existed  to  ensure  a  ceasefire  and  to  assist  the  establishment  of  an  interim  government   by  the  Liberian  people,  it  was  too  broad,  encompassing  both  peacekeeping  and  peace   enforcement   objectives.     This  was   exacerbated   by   the   failure   to   take   the   complex   nature  of  the  Liberian  conflict  into  great  consideration.    This  case  study  is  an  indication   that  additional  international  support  to  achieve  mandates  is  needed,  and  the  need  for   a   hybrid   peacekeeping   operation   needs   to   be   clear   and   comprehensible.     It   also   demonstrates  the  significant  role  sub-­regional  organisations  can  play  towards  peace   and  security.   It  is  also  worthy  of  note  that  the  rapid  response  by  ECOWAS  signifies  the  capability  of   a  sub-­regional  organisation  to  save  thousands  of  lives  especially  in  a  country  that  had   spent  years  on  the  brink  of  collapse.    “Responding  to  conflict  early  warning  in  a  timely   manner  might  result  in  increased  instances  of  preventive  deployment  (to  avert  a  major   crisis)  rather  than  full-­fledged  peacekeeping  operations  or  enforcement  action,  which   are  more  cost  intensive”  (Olonisakin  2008:41).   ECOMOG   was   able   to   conduct   a   robust   operation   which   imposed   a   stable   environment.    It  was  faced  with  a  task  of  establishing  political  order,  and  the  UN  came   afterwards   to   consolidate   the   relative   peace   that   had   already   been   established   by   ECOMOG.    Moreover,  their  impact  also  determined  a  number  of  post-­conflict  issues   such  as  reforming  of   the  national  army  and  police.    The  peacekeeping  operation   in   Liberia  indicated  the  region’s  willingness  to  combat  instability,  and  the  impetuses  to   respond   to   conflict   is   unique   due   to   the   cases’   contextual   environment.     Thus   a   collective  response  in  the  case  of  Liberia  points  to  an  austere  truth,  that  this  approach     66     had  the  potential  elements  to  make  a  difference.    It  therefore  highlights  the  importance   of  moving  beyond  a  traditional  outlook  on  conflict  which  has  led  policy-­makers  to  rely   on  ambiguous  mechanical  allegory  of  conflict.    As  a  result,  a  new  approach  requires   an   amalgamation   of   institutional   frameworks   in   order   to   provide   solutions   to   end   instability.     3.4.2  From  African  agency  to  United  Nations  mission:  From  AMIB  to  UNIB  -­   Case  Study  of  Burundi     Burundi  is  a  significant  case  study  in  terms  of  peace-­building  and  conflict  resolution  in   Africa.    Its  ethnic  conflict  history  and  prolonged  conflict  process  is  an  experience  from   which  Africa,  the  international  community,  and  policy-­makers  can  learn  from.         3.4.2.1  Burundi’s  civil  war  and  peace  process       Periodic  violent  conflicts  and  military  coups  have  been  a   facet  of  Burundian  history   since  its  independence  in  1962.    Like  many  states  in  Africa,  the  conflict  in  Burundi  was   rooted  in  political  competition  for  power  based  on  ethnic  lines  between  the  Tutsi  and   the  Hutu.    The  first  civil  genocide  which  erupted  in  Burundi  resulted  in  the  death  of   over  150,000  people,  predominantly   from  the  Hutu  community  who  fled   to  Rwanda   and  Tanzania  (Boshoff,  Vreÿ  &  Rautenbach  2010:  1-­4).    Again,  in  1988,  thousands  of   Hutus   were   massacred   by   the   Tutsi   tribes   which   was   described   as   a   retaliation   following   a   number   of   Hutu   insurgencies.   The   Country’s   first   elected   president,   Francois  Melchoir  Ndadaye,  (a  Hutu  from  the  ‘Front  pour  la  Democratie  au  Burundi’   (FRODEBU)  political  party)  was  ostensibly  assassinated  by  a  cadre  from  the  ‘Union   pour   le   Progrès   national’   (UPRONA)   in   1993.     The   UPRONA   was   the   nationalist   political   party   in   Burundi   supported   by   the   Tutsi   ethnic   group.     This   resulted   in   unprecedented  violence  which  broke  out  causing  the  death  of  over  300,000  lives  and   the  displacement  of  many  more  civilians  (Curtis  2003).       Following  the  failure  of  the  elections,  power-­sharing  became  an  alternative  response   to  the  Burundi  conflict.    According  to  Khadiagala  (2003:217),  “neighbouring  countries   such  as  Rwanda,  Tanzania,  and  the  DRC  bore  the  brunt  of  the  mostly  Hutu  refugees   fleeing  from  the  conflict”.    An  agreement  between  the  FRODEBU  and  UPRONA  was     67     then   signed   in   1994   under   the   auspice   of   the   UN   Special   Representative   of   the   Secretary-­General,  Ould-­Abdallah.    The  1994  Convention  of  Government  temporarily   restored  calm;;  it  lacked  the  capacity  to  address  significant  issues  of  national  structures   and   strategies.     Furthermore,   there   was   no   peacekeeping   force   to   monitor   the   agreement.    Despite   the  accord,  sporadic  violence  continued  and   in  1996,  another   coup  was  conducted  which  reinstalled  Pierre  Buyoya  as  President.    Yet,  in  the  face  of   the  conflict  in  Burundi,  the  international  community’s  response  was  fragmented  (Curtis   2003).       To  address  the  conflict  in  Burundi  and  restore  peace,  negotiation  efforts  began  with   former  Tanzanian  President  Julius  Nyerere  and  was   taken   further  by   former  South   African   President   Nelson   Mandela,   which   resulted   in   several   peace   agreements   between   the   belligerents.   The   early   intervention   in   Burundi   was   of   great   regional   significance  because  of  the  immense  flow  of  refugees,  conflicts,  and  regional  instability   it  fostered,  and,  in  part,  because  of  the  innovative  approaches  to  mediation  and  post-­ crisis  recovery.     3.4.2.2  Early  intervention  in  Burundi:  Peace  Negotiations     The  most  significant  aspect  of   the  conflict  resolution   intervention   in  Burundi  was   its   peace   negotiations  which  was   firstly   conducted   by   Julius  Nyerere,   as   a   respected   figure  in  the  national  and  international  arena.    His  approach  focused  more  on  being  a   facilitator  rather  than  a  mediator.    Given  the  nature  of  the  conflict,  according  to  Butiku   (2004),  this  was  the  best  approach.    He  facilitated  various  phases  of  the  Arusha  peace   process  from  1996-­1999.    During  this  period,  those  present  in  the  negotiations  were   the  UPRONA  party  and   the  FRODEBU,  which  meant  many  parties   involved   in   the   conflict  such  as  the  armed  groups  and  civil  society  did  not  take  part  in  the  process,  but   not  for  Julius  Nyerere’s  lack  of  trying.    Negotiations  broke  down  and  a  military  coup   was  conducted  by  Pierre  Buyoya.     Some   proposed   regional   military   intervention   would   worsen   the   country   and   negotiations  would  not  be  feasible  because  the  warring  factions  would  lose  trust  in  the   process.      Therefore,   in   response   to   the  coup,  nine   regional  governments   imposed   economic  sanctions  which  lasted  from  1996  to  1999.    These  sanctions  had  the  result,   inter   alia,   of   suspending   international   cooperation,   which   compounded   the     68     humanitarian  emergency  in  the  country.    Participants  in  the  peace  process  were  not   prepared   or   capable   of   addressing   root   causes,   and   so   the   conflict   and   violence   continued  (International  Crisis  Group  1998:3).  According   to  Khadiagala   (2003:227),   economic  sanctions  “offered  the  best  mechanism  of  diplomacy  that  could  be  used  in   a  way  that  moved  the  parties  toward  the  desired  outcome”.     The  negotiations  resumed  in  1998.  Julius  Nyerere  implemented  a  negotiation  structure   which  would  eventually  lead  to  agreement  on  the  concept  of  power-­sharing.  The  notion   of   institutionalised  power-­sharing,   based  on  ethnic   quotas,  was  put   forward  by   the   actors  in  the  peace  process  as  an  essential  principle  guiding  the  pursuit  for  a  solution   to  the  Burundi  conflict.    Ayebare  (2014:3)  holds  that  this  structure  failed  to  realize  the   political  and  military  environments  of  the  groups’  involved  in  the  conflict,  and  therefore   the  armed  groups  did  not  participate.    It  is  worthy  to  note  that  power-­sharing  in  itself   cannot  always  create  sustainable  peace  and  may   in   the   future  prove   to  be  a  weak   approach.    Power-­sharing,  however,  proved  to  be  appropriate  for  Burundi,  because   the  country  was  ethnically  divided,  rooted  in  clan  conflict.    It  could  be  argued  that,  inter   alia,  the  conditions  in  Burundi  were  not  acquiescent  for  such  an  approach  to  resolve   the  conflict.    Lijphart  (1991:493)  contended  that  besides  partition  or  secession,  power-­ sharing  is  the  only  feasible  solution  to  conflicts  articulated  in  ethnic  terms.    To  further   support   this   view,   Zartman   (1995:271)   stated   that   power-­sharing   arrangements   contributed  to  peace  by  harnessing  all  factions  to  contribute  in  government.       Nelson  Mandela,  took  over  from  Julius  Nyerere  as  a  facilitator.    He  approached  to  the   mediation  process  from  his  South  African  experiences.    He  further  viewed  institutional   peace  and  security  as  a  means  of  addressing  the  root  causes  of  the  Burundian  conflict.     This  dialogue  led  to  the  creation  of  a  transitional  government  under  which  the  Hutu   and  Tutsi  leaders  could  share  power.   As  an  urgent  need   to  solve   the  conflict,  Boshoff,  Vreÿ  and  Rautenbach   (2010:  14)   pointed   out   that   South   Africa’s   contribution   was   a   humanitarian   effort   which   strengthened  Nelson  Mandela’s   role   as   a  mediator,   and   demonstrated   support   for   peace  and  security  across  the  African  continent.    It  further  substantiated  the  necessity   for   an   African   Renaissance,   and   for   Africans   to   find   their   own   solutions   to   their   problems.   Nelson   Mandela’s   approach   was   built   upon   a   multi-­stakeholder   and   multiparty   forum   for   negotiations,   as   advanced   in   South   Africa’s   Convention   for   a     69     Democratic  South  Africa  (Codesa  –  which  was  a  bargaining  forum  where  all  parties   and  groupings  were  present).     It   could  be  debated   that   this  paved   the  way   for   the   majority  of  rebel  groups  to  be  present  in  the  negotiations,  although  it  took  a  long  time   for  people  to  actually  participate.    Furthermore,  he  applied  an  inclusive  approach  which   involved  non-­state  actors,  mediators,  and  power-­sharing  between  belligerent  parties.   Mandela  also  encouraged  the   international  community   to  pay  close  attention  to   the   Arusha   peace   talks,   which   resulted   in   US   President,   Bill   Clinton   and   Nigerian   President,  Olusegun  Obasanjo  addressing  the  Burundian  conflict  with  the  rest  of  the   world’s   leaders.     This   accommodating   approach   to   the   conflict   emphasised   the   significant  need  for  the  Burundians  to  take  responsibility  for  their  actions.      Paving  the   way  for  a  salubrious  debate  on  relations  to  the  impact  of  the  conflict,  it  led  to  the  signing   of  the  Arusha  Peace  and  Reconciliations  Agreement  in  2000  (ACCORD  2007:18).   However,  the  Arusha  Accord,  did  not  stop  the  civil  war  especially  with  the  same  armed   groups   absent   from   the   negotiations,   and   determined   to   prove   that   no   peace  was   possible  without  their  consent.  Thus,  the  violence  continued.    By  no  means  was  the   accord  a  finished  product,  because  there  were  other  warring  parties  to  the  conflict  that   did  not  sign  the  agreement.    With  the  UN’s  unwillingness  to  mandate  a  peacekeeping   force  to  assist   the  implementation  of   the  Arusha  Agreement,  claiming  there  was  no   peace   to   keep   and   a   comprehensive   ceasefire   in   place,   the   AU   then   opted   to   collaborate   with   South   Africa   to   deploy   troops   in   Burundi.     South   Africa   was   fast   becoming   a   regional   actor   in   peacemaking,   peacekeeping,   and   peacebuilding   in   Africa.   It   deployed   for   the   first   time   under   its   ‘White   Paper   on   Participation   in   International  Peace  Missions’.      The  deployment  of  the  South  African  National  Defence   Force  (SANDF)  marked  South  Africa’s  engagement   in  peace  operations  which  was   also  a  significant  part  for  Mandeala’s  contribution  to  the  Arusha  Agreement.    According   to   ACCORD   (2007:26-­27),   the   South   African   Protection   Support   Detachment   (SAPSD)   was   deployed   “in   great   haste   and   according   to   operational   staff   of   the   SANDF,  amidst  a  general   sense  of   confusion,  which  was   inextricably   linked   to   the   duration  for  deployment  as  well  as  the  preparation  time  and  type  of  deployment”   in   2001,  mainly  in  Bujumbura,  the  capital  city  of  Burundi.    This  was  achieved  through  the   signing   of   a   Memorandum   of   Understanding   (MoU)   between   the   government   of   Burundi  and  South  Africa  with  the  aim  of  supporting  the  implementation  of  the  Arusha   Agreement.    The  reason  for  the  MoU,  came  at  a  time  when  a  ceasefire  could  not  be     70     secured   by   the   AU   and   all   remaining   potential   troop   contributing   countries   had   signalled   their   intent   not   to   deploy   (ACCORD   2007:27).     Following   the   Arusha   Agreement,  Mandela  sought  to  secure  a  ceasefire,  while  establishing  grounds  for  a   transnational  government.    It  was  during  this  period  that  South  Africa  assumed  a  more   central   role   in   the   post-­Arusha   peace   process.     Mandela   was   able   to   encourage   President  Thabo  Mbeki   to  deploy  South  African   troops  on   the  grounds   that   the  UN   “proved  reluctant  to  do  so  until  a  comprehensive  ceasefire  agreement  was  signed”  (de   Coning  and  Lotze  2013:383).    In  addition,  no  other  African  country  was  willing  or  had   the  capacity  to  undertake  such  a  role  on  the  ground.    According  to  Thobane,  Neethling   and  Vreÿ  (2007:81),  the  SAPSD’s  mandate  provided  security  to  leaders  returning  from   exile,   who   were   mainly   Hutu.   The   type   of   protection   was   also   perceived   as   a   bodyguard  role,  which  falls  outside  peacekeeping  functions,  but  was  deemed  essential   especially  for  the  installation  of  the  transitional  government.    The  importance  of  this   was  imperative  in  an  “already  suspicious  political  environment”  ACCORD  (2007:26).     However,  due  to  a  limited  mandate,  the  SAPSP  were  unable  to  play  a  broader  role   and  provide  protection  to  civilians.    This  was  the  last  significant  role  played  by  the  OAU   before  it  was  replaced  by  the  AU  in  2002.   Subsequently,   two   ceasefire   agreements   were   signed   in   2002   to   consolidate   the   peace  process  with  parties  such  as  the  National  Council  for  the  Defence  Democracy   and  Force   for   the  Defence  of  Democracy   (CNDD-­FDD)  and   the  Palipehutu-­Forces   nationales   de   liberation   (FNL)   of   Agathon   Rwasa,   who   did   not   participate   in   this   process  and  further  waged  war.    Non-­participants  were  not  ready  to  focus  on  how  the   negotiations   would   benefit   them.     Because   they   were   accused   of   human   rights   violations,  they  did  not  participate  in  the  peace  processes  earlier  on.    There  was  much   hope  for  the  success  of  the  Arusha  Agreement;;  however,  peace  accords  between  the   government   and   the   armed   parties   failed   to   establish   a   comprehensive   ceasefire   agreement  to  stop  the  fighting.    As  a  result,  ceasefires  were  broken  on  a  daily  basis,   and  violence  persisted.    Ayebare  (2014)  asserted  that  the  Arusha  Agreement  “directly   addressed  the  issue  of  ethnicity  in  Burundi  and  devised  a  power-­sharing  arrangement   that  guaranteed  security  to  the  minority  Tutsi  and  democracy  to  the  majority  Hutus”.   This  represented  different  visions  of  peace  struggles  of  which  neo-­liberal  peacemaking   was   a   contested   terrain   with   long-­term   culmination   of   hostilities   which   were   not   essential  for  the  agenda  (Daley  2007:  333-­352).    In  2004,  South  Africa  continued  to     71     strengthen  the  Arusha  Agreement  to  include  the  remainder  of  the  rebel  movements   that  had  not  yet  signed  the  agreements  implemented  by  President  Jacob  Zuma.    Until   2008,   the   then  Minister   of   Safety   and   Security,   Charles   Nqakula,   was   involved   in   efforts  to  integrate  the  remaining  rebel  movements.   Based  on  what  has  been  discussed,  lessons  can  be  learned  from  the  Burundi  peace   negotiations.    These  lessons  range  from  the  commitment  showed  by  regional  leaders,   inter  alia,  to  African’s  collective  leadership  that  had  the  capacity  to  promote  a  mode  of   politics   that   rejected   coups;;   reconstruction   programmes;;   and   long-­term   peace   processes,  which  led  to  the  importance  of  peace-­building  initiatives.           3.4.2.3  The  Transition  from  AU  to  UN  Mission  in  Burundi     It  is  important  to  note  that  the  AU  emerged  as  a  peacekeeping  partner  on  the  continent.   With  South  African  support  to  assist  in  the  planning  of  the  intervention  in  Burundi,  the   AU   PSC   authorised   the   deployment   of   its   first   peace   operation,   AMIB.     The   peacekeeping  operation  also  incorporated  the  SANDF/SAPSD  personnel  who  formed   the   bulk   of   headquarter   staff   in   2003   (ACCORD  2007:29).     According   to  Agoagye   (2004:11),  it  had  a  strength  of  3,335  personnel  “with  military  contingents  from  South   Africa  (1  600),  Ethiopia  (858),  Mozambique  (228),  as  well  as  the  AU  observer  element   (43)  drawn  from  Burkina  Faso,  Gabon,  Mali,  Togo,  and  Tunisia”.  Thobane,  Neethling   and  Vreÿ  (2007:81)  noted  that  the  deployment  of  troops  showcased  the  AU’s  venture   from   the  OAU  and   its   restrictive   principles,   and   demonstrated   ‘African   solutions   to   African  problems’.    This  peacekeeping  operation  was  the  first  o  exclusively  initiated,   planned  and  executed  by  AU  member  states.     It  was  effectively  mandated   to  build   peace  in  a  fluid  and  dynamic  situation  in  which  the  country  could  relapse  into  violent   conflict  if  the  accords  were  not  implemented  and  monitored  (Murithi  2005:91–95).       This   was   based   on   the   backdrop   that   there   was   no   peace   in   Burundi,   positive   or   negative,   from   the   signing   of   the  Arusha  Agreement   in   2000   until   the   entry   of   the   CNDD-­FDD   into   the  government   in   late  2003.    Following   the  deployment  of  South   African   troops   in   2001,   they   were   reinforced   by   contingents   from   Ethiopia   and   Mozambique  to  monitor  the  implementation  of  the  accord  and  provide  security  for  a   year  and  route  for  the  deployment  of  UN  peacekeepers.    The  AMIB  force  comprised   of   more   than   3   000   troops   contributed   by   these   3   countries   (de   Carvalho,   Jaye,     72     Kasumba   &   Okumu   2010:   68).     The   operation   was   not   limited   to   creating   better   conditions   for   the   UN   deployment,   but   also   played   a   vital   role   by   assisting   the   mediation  team  to  get  all  parties  to  sign  the  Arusha  Agreement.    During  this  period,   the  CNDD-­FDD  had  the  strongest  combat  capacity  of  all  the  armed  groups,  and  after   it   stopped   fighting,   the   violence  and   instability   ended   in  most   of   the   country,  while   continuing  where  there  was  a  significant  presence  of  the  Palipehutu-­FNL.  However,   due  to  the  financial  and  logistical  constraints  by  Ethiopia  and  Mozambique,  the  US,   France,  and  the  United  Kingdom  were  then  involved  in  bilateral  undertakings  to  assist   with  the  deployment,  which  was  done  seven  months  after  the  approval  of  the  mandate,   thus  omitting  the  60  days  of  deployment  date  (Thobane,  Neethling  &  Vreÿ  2007:81).     In  light  of  this,  member  states  had  to  deploy  troops  at  their  own  cost,  thus  becoming   dependent   on   external   funding   and   donors.     This   highlighted   the   AU’s   lack   of   an   appropriate  mechanism  at  the  time  to  solicit  support  from  donor  countries,  which  had   a  great  impact  on  AMIB.    Part  of  this  impact  was  the  financial  difficulty  to  maintain  the   peacekeeping   operation   due   to   its   high  monetary   costs   to   the   TCCs.     The   impact   exposed  the  AU’s  lack  of  experience  and  skills  in  peace  support  operations  which  were   subsequently  compensated  by  the  UN.     The  Arusha  Accords  and  the  transitional  Constitution  that  followed  contained  explicit   commitments   to   human   rights,   freedom,   improved   governance,   and   improved   economic  management.  It  was  the  attainment  of  these,  or  the  lack  thereof,  that  were   the  key  determinants  in  sustaining  and  building  the  quality  of  Burundi’s  peace  since   2003.     Despite  these  shortcomings,  AMIB’s  presence  and  preventative  activities  helped  the   intervention  deter  the  outbreak  of  further  violence  and  provided  a  secure  environment   conducive  for  sustaining  the  peace  process.    It  also  managed  conflicts  in  other  areas   of  the  Country,  notwithstanding  the  persisting  violence  in  Bujumbura.    AMIB  was  able   to  safeguard  refugees  and  shepherd  internally  displaced  people  back  into  the  country   through  the  secure  environment  they  had  created  for  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid.     Furthermore,   it   is   important   to  credit   the  peacekeeping  operation  for   the  work  done   especially  in  the  context  stated  by  Neethling  (2008:4):  “AMIB  has  been  described  as   being  somewhere  between  a  traditional  peacekeeping  and  complex  multi-­dimensional   peacekeeping   operation   as   it   operated   in   a   complex   peacekeeping   operation   environment  with  a  peacekeeping  mandate”.     73     Following  the  inclusion  of  some  armed  movements  in  the  peace  process,  South  Africa   continued   to  advocate  and  negotiate   for   the  deployment  of  a  UN   force   in  Burundi.     According  to  de  Coning  and  Lotze  (2013:383),  “the  cost  of  the  SAPSD  peacekeeping   operation  to  South  Africa  was  an  estimated  $21  million,  and  by  2003,  AMIB’s  operation   cost   soared   to   an   estimated   $110   million”.     Within   this   complex   environment,   it   managed  to  de-­escalate  a  volatile  situation,  stabilise  Burundi,  allowing  it  to  be  taken   over  by  the  UN  peacekeepers  in  2004,  despite  the  host  of  challenges  which  remained   in  the  Country.    AMIB’s  term  came  to  an  end,  the  UN  took  over  leadership  of  AMIB,   establishing  the  UN  Peace  Operation   in  Burundi  (UNUB)   in  June  2004.    AMIB  was   described  as  one  of  the  AU’s  biggest  success  stories  (Boshoff,  Vreÿ  &  Rautenbach   2010:  69).    It  is  important  to  reiterate  that  the  fact  that  the  UN  was  reluctant  to  deploy   troops,  illustrated  the  precarious  security  environment  in  Burundi.    The  peace  process   and  ceasefire  agreements  were  fragile,  and  not  all  parties  to  the  conflict  had  signed   the  accord  nor  consented  to  the  presence  of  a  peacekeeping  force.    Nonetheless,  the   AU  intervened  and  AMIB  managed  the  violent  aspects  of  the  conflict.   On  the  one  hand,  Curtis  and  Nibigirwe  (2010:110)  noted  that  the  transition  from  AMIB   to  UNOB  was  relatively  successful  because  the  necessary  environment  to  deploy  was   created.     On   the   other   hand,),   asserted   that   “AMIB   cannot   be   said   to   have   fully   facilitated   the   implementation   of   the   ceasefire   agreements,   nor  was   it   able   to   fully   ensure  that  the  defence  and  security  situation  in  Burundi  was  stable  and  well  managed   by  newly   created  national  defence  and  security   structures”.    But  based  on   relative   terms,   part   of   its   success  was  because  AMIB   troops   remained   to   serve   under   the   mandate  of  UNOB.    It  also  showed  commitment  and  readiness  of  the  AU  to  act.    The   combined  resources  and  capabilities  from  both  institutions  proved  to  make  a  difference   in  the  Country.    In  conformity,  the  transition  or  handover  from  the  AU  to  the  UN  was   successful,   especially   at   a   time   where   there   was   no   peace   to   keep,   which   demonstrates   the   feasibility   to   approach   peacekeeping   through   regional   initiatives.     When  there  was  no  peace  to  keep,   in  the  case  of  Liberia  and  Burundi,   the  AU  had   created  a  relatively  stable  environment  and  grounds  for  UN  operations  to  take  over   the   peacekeeping   operations.   In   2007,   after   steady   progress   in   Burundi’s   peace   process,  the  UN  withdrew  its  peacekeepers  and  transferred  responsibility  back  to  the   AU,  to  maintain  a  small  task  force  in  support  of  continued  peace-­building  efforts,  while   the  UN  opened  a  peace-­building  office  in  the  Country  to  assist  the  AU  (Murithi  2008).       74     According   to  Hendricks  and  Lucey   (2013:2),   “Burundi  has  successfully   transitioned   into   a   post-­conflict   country,   although   it   remains   very   fragile.   It   is   one   of   the   few   countries  that  the  UN  Peace-­building  Commission  has  been  supporting  since  2006”.   Although  the  UN  took  over  the  operation  from  the  AU,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the   AU  made  considerable  efforts  to  coordinate  its  activities  with  UN  agencies  in  Burundi,   by  establishing  UN-­AU  engagement  to  organize  resources.    This  engagement  involved   receiving   logistic,   technical,   and   administrative   assistance   from   UN   systems.     According  to  Thobane,  Neethling  and  Vreÿ  (2007:83),  “AMIB  was  able  to  stabilise  95%   of  Burundi,  facilitate  delivery  of  humanitarian  assistance,  coordinate  mission  activities   with   UN   presence,   and   provide   protection   to   returning   leaders”.   Overall,   AMIB   performed   relatively  well   operationally,   considering   the  various  constraints   it   faced,   both  on  the  ground  in  Burundi  and  especially  as  the  first  AU  peacekeeping  operation.       The  case  of  Burundi  demonstrates  the  value  made  by  regional  bodies,  albeit  limited,   contributions   of   peacekeeping   interventions.     Furthermore,   despite   the   challenges   faced,   collaboration   between   the   UN   and   regional   organisations   and   actors   was   relatively  successful,  which  enabled  each  actor  to  play  a  significant  role  in  Burundi.  It   provided  the  platform  for  reflections  on  current  and  future  peacekeeping  hybridisation   operations  in  Africa.       What  was  revealed,  was  that  regional  organisations  were  not  only  important  to  create   a  suitable  environment   for  UN  deployment,  but  also   for   rapid  deployment  of   forces   within   its   boundaries   that   require   peacekeeping   (Languille   &   Keef   2004:32).     This   partnership  will  need  to  continue  their  combined  efforts  to  ensure  that  lasting  peace  in   Burundi  prevails.    The  work  in  Burundi  still  continues  as  concerted  efforts  to  ensure   that  peace  carry  on.    The  joint  venture  sets  the  foundation  and  precedent  for  the  most   complex  UN-­AU  peacekeeping  operation  in  Darfur,  which  began  in  June  2004,  and   the  most  recent  one,  AMISOM,  a  force  deployed  in  March  2007.  These  operations  are   to  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  the  following  chapter.           75     3.5  CONCLUSION     The   AU   has   come   a   long   way   since   it   succeeded   the   OAU,   especially   with   the   changing  and  complex  political  and  security  environment  it  was  born  into.    It  has  made   great   strides   in   responding   to   conflicts   and  maintaining   peace   and   security   on   the   African  continent  despite  its  challenges.    As  part  of  the  changing  nature  of  conflicts,   the  organisation  shifted  from  non-­interference  to  non-­indifference,  which  underscores   the  role  Africans  are  playing  to  take  responsibility  for  peace  and  security.    It   further   denotes   accountability   for   the   atrocities   that   transpire.     To   this   end,   the   AU   has   deployed  more   peace   operations  with   increasingly   complex  mandates   into   volatile   conflict  environments.       Extrapolating   from   several   years   of   UN   peacekeeping   experience,   the   ‘High-­Level   Panel  on  Threats,  Challenges,  and  Change’  held  that  peacekeepers  ought  not  to  be   deployed   in   post-­conflict   environments   without   peace   to   keep.   If   the   operation   is   expected  to  both  create  and  keep  peace,  the  operation  ought  to  be  underpinned  by  a   robust   mandate   and   the   political,   financial   and   material   support   to   help   the   peacekeeping  operation  in  achieving  its  mandate.    Therefore,  non-­  indifference  to  the   violence   on   the   continent   has   become   a   principle   of   regional   and   sub-­regional   organisations.       The  case  of  Liberia,  in  retrospect,  was  defined  by  prevalent  conflicts  and  belligerent   factions,  including  the  signed  agreements,  although  the  vital  role  played  by  ECOMOG   throughout   this   process  was   controversial.   ECOMOG’s   involvement   in   Liberia  was   plagued   with   challenges   that   had   persisted   beyond   the   Liberian   intervention.   This   started  from  the  non-­consensus  of  intervention  by  the  members  the  Community.    Its   role  as  a  leading  state  in  the  intervention  was  without  doubt  a  major  contributor  to  the   implementation  of  ECOMOG’s  mandate.    On  the  one  hand,  the  Liberia  case  resulted   in  a  situation  where  ECOMOG  usurped   the  authority  of   the  UN,  which   impeded  on   their  mandate  and  affected  its  credibility.    The  challenge  encountered  by  ECOMOG   and  UNOMIL  raised  questions  about  joint  ventures  of  both  organisations.    On  the  other   hand,   this  example  of   hybridisation   is   important   because  a   regional   institution  was   capable   of   taking   responsibility   for   peace   in   the   region   to   a   point   where   the   peacekeeping  operation  could  be  taken  over  by  the  UN.    The  role  of   the  UN  in  the   Liberian  crisis  was  also   lacking  because   they   failed   to  coordinate   their   intervention     76     with  the  work  done  by  ECOMOG.    The  UN  deferred  to  the  existing  ECOMOG  hierarchy   instead  of  being  neutral.    Given  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  both  actors,  as  part   of   a   holistic   approach   to   address   conflict   on   the   continent   and   build   capacity,   ECOWAS,   as   a   sub-­regional   organisation,   played   a   vital   role   in   peacekeeping   operations.       It  would  be  a  limited  view  to  see  the  ECOMOG’s  intervention  as  a  complete  failure.   ECOWAS   undertook   an   operation   when   there   was   no   precedent   for   sub-­regional   intervention.    It  further  spear-­headed  an  operation  for  both  peacekeeping  and  peace   enforcement  using  its  own  resources  during  the  preliminary  stages  of  the  intervention   in   Liberia.   Furthermore,   contributions   towards   the   operation   in   Liberia   was   greatly   supported   by  Nigeria’s   involvement  which   prevented   the  peacekeeping  operation’s   failure.    It  is  unclear  whether  or  not  an  intervention  by  the  UN  could  have  been  more   successful  by  working  with  regional  organisations  from  the  onset.   If   the  example  of   ECOMOG  is  any  indication,  the  path  to  regional  peacekeeping  is  not  easy.    Taking   into  consideration  that  such  hybridisations  can  be  advantageous  but  can  also  create   more   problems,   ECOWAS   deserve   to   be   credited   for   taking   the   lead   in   Liberia,   especially  when  others  were  not  willing  to.       As   such,   the   AU   steadily   gained   prominence   as   a   competent   peacekeeping   organisation   through   its   work   in   Burundi.     It   is   important   to   view   the   conflict   and   intervention   in   Burundi   in   a   wider   context   of   the  Great   Lakes   region.     The   region   witnessed  intertwined  conflicts  such  as  in  Rwanda,  thus  demonstrating  the  reason  why   regional  actors  are  devoted  to  find  peaceful  settlements  to  conflicts.    Albeit,  several   positive  developments  have  been  conducted  since  the  installation  of  power-­sharing  in   Burundi.       An  interesting  aspect  of  Burundi’s  peace  process  was  the  facilitators’  interpretation  of   the  concept  of  inclusivity.  The  strategy  of  inclusivity  by  both  mediators  embarked  on   including  the  small  and  large  political  parties  in  the  peace  process,  without  overlooking   the  other  based  on   its  size.    During   this  approach  parties  were  encouraged   to   talk   freely  with  each  other.    This  created  an  environment  where  mistrust,  anxieties,  and   concerns   could   be   addressed.     The   stature   of   both  mediators   were   used   to   draw   attention  by  the  international  community  in  order  to  take  a  tough  stance  to  encourage   parties  to  adhere  to  the  agreed  goals  to  reach  an  accord.  Furthermore,  Julius  Nyerere     77     and   Nelson   Mandela   used   their   own   experiences   of   their   respective   countries   to   realise   that,   the   conflict   included   political   and   ethnic   dimensions,   which  made   the   discussion  more   frank,  and  provided   the  platform   to  go  beyond   the  deadlocks   that   impeded  the  negotiations.   The  Arusha  Accords  were  negotiated  by  the  prevailing  political  forces  except  by  the   main  warring  armed  groups,  while  the  post-­Arusha  peace  process  explicitly  focused   on  engaging  the  CNDD-­FDD  and  FNL  and  bringing  them  into  the  Arusha  Agreement.   As  part  of  this  process,  the  South  African  facilitation  team  lavished  much  attention  on   militarily  small  break-­away  factions  from  both  armed  groups,  only  to  shift  their  focus   from  these  factions  once  they  had  signed  up  to  a  ceasefire.  Infuriating  as  all  this  was   to  the  CNDD-­FDD  and  FNL,  it  served  both  to  preserve  the  momentum  of  the  process,   and  to  underscore  the  message  that  participation  was  in  the  best  interest  of  all  actors.   In  addition,  South  Africa,  as  seen  with  Nigeria  was  similarly  influential  in  reflecting  its   political  will,  institutional  strength,  and  resource  availability  in  places  in  Burundi.    The   reason   for   South   Africa’s   response   to   Burundi   was   largely   a   humanitarian   one,   although   it   also   coincided   with   South   Africa’s   post-­1994   role   as   a   regional   peace   broker.  South  Africa  attempted  to  find  a  political  resolution  to  the  conflict  which  was  a   moral  viewpoint  and  based  on  material  interest.    Yet,  during  its  involvement  in  Burundi,   it  was  also  an   inexperienced  democratic  country   focusing  on   its  own  development.     They   ensured   that   the   content   of   the   agreement   was   produced   by   Burundians   themselves,  whether  this  approach  was  more  desirable  to  achieve  lasting  peace  is  still   to  be  seen.  Despite  the  challenges  experienced,  the  peace  process  in  Burundi  has  the   characteristic   of   a   potential   success.     AMIB’s   ability   to   stabilise   the   country   to   the   extent   where   the   UN   was   able   to   take   over,   demonstrated   the   importance   of   its   contribution.     In   addition,   the   troops   contributed   by   the   African   member   states   remained  behind,  re-­hatting  from  ‘green’  to  ‘blue’  helmets,  therefore  highlighting  that   AU/regional  intervention  can  be  turned  into  sustainable  and  beneficial  forces.       Various   lessons   can   be   learnt   from   the   Liberian   and   Burundian   cases,   which   underscore   the   need   for   the   UN   to   get   involved   in   efforts   to   maintain   peace   and   security  at  the  earliest  stage  of  a  conflict,  and  including  collaboration  with  regional  and   sub-­regional   organisations   from   the   onset   of   peace   operations.     The   transition   (or   hand-­over)   of   operations   have   been   effective   and   it   is   worthy   to   note   that   each   partnership  in  an  operation  is  uniquely  defined  by  the  specific  and  contextual  nature     78     of   conflict,   yet   they   could   be   classified   as   successive   or   integrated.     Sequential   operations   such   as   each   of   those   analysed   above,   saw   regional   actors   taking   responsibility  and  leading  in  operations,  particularly   in  circumstances  where  the  UN   lacked  the  political  will  or  did  not  have  the  capacity  for  a  complex  operation.    As  such,   the  AU  proved  itself  a  significant  partner  for  the  UN  in  managing  conflict  situations  on   the  continent.    Thus  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  between  the  UN,  regional,  and   sub-­regional   organisations   could   be   the   key   to   addressing  many   of   the   problems,   under   the   provision   of   the   Chapter   VIII   of   the   UN   Charter.   Given   the   overlapping   objective  and  mandate  between  the  AU  and  UN,  the  collaboration  between  these  two   organisations  may  offer  insights  into  a  new  approach  to  peacekeeping  on  the  African   continent,   which   are   comprised,   driven,   and   financed   through   burden-­sharing.     Accordingly,   hybridisation   has   assumed   great   importance.   Working   together   to   address  peace  and  security  challenges  given  the  growing  regional  operations  seem   most  propitious  despite  both  entities’   resource   limitations  –   the  AU   lacks  resources   and  the  UN  is  limited  by  its  responsibilities  throughout  the  world.    Yet,  they  both  bring   important  skills  and  capacities  to  this  joint  venture.   Since  ECOWAS-­ECOMOG  and  AMIB,  the  AU  has  continued  to  develop  its  operational   and   institutional   capabilities.     To   date,   the   UN   and   the   AU   have   cooperated   on   initiatives,   such   as  AMISOM  and   established   a   joint  UNAMID,   one   of   the   greatest   notable  efforts  in  security  cooperation  efforts  which  are  to  be  discussed  in  Chapter  4.   Obviously,  there  are  challenges  that  are  bound  to  manifest  when  controversial  issues   and   crises   occur.     This   goes   to   say   that   different   models   of   support   to   hybrid   peacekeeping  reveal  that  there  is  no  one  entity  that  can  be  able  to  implement  peace   operations  alone,  including  stabilisation  efforts  for  sustainable  peace.  These  matters   will  be  under  review  in  the  following  chapter.               79     CHAPTER  4:  HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING  OPERATIONS  IN  AFRICA:  THE  CASES   OF  SUDAN  (DARFUR)  AND  SOMALIA         4.1  INTRODUCTION     The  emergence  of  peacekeeping  partnerships  constitutes  an  important  trend  in  conflict   management  on  the  African  continent  over  the  past  two  decades.  This  trend  is  founded   upon  the  realisation  that  no  single  multi-­lateral  institution  is  capable  of  implementing   peace  operations  on  its  own.  The  increasing  size  of  and  responsibilities  included  in   contemporary  peace  support  operations,  especially  considering   the  need   for  peace   operations  to  act  as  stabilising  forces  in  a  conflict  environment,  place  greater  demands   on  the  implementing  institutions  (as  analysed  in  the  previous  Chapter).  Furthermore,   the  enshrinement   of   the  normative   concepts  of   the  protection  of   civilians  and  R2P   within  the  mandates  of  African  peace  operations,  which  in  many  ways  constitute  the   most  basic  essence  of  peace  operations,  necessitates  constant  collaboration  between   various  institutions  to  successfully  achieve  these  responsibilities.     In  order  to  collectively  respond  to  these  challenges,  institutions  such  as  the  AU  and   UN   have   collaborated   to   create   hybrid   peacekeeping   forces.   As   alluded   to   in   the   previous  Chapter,  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  are  collaborative  efforts  between   different  multilateral  organisations  to  implement  peace  support  operations  in  Africa.  In   hybrid  peacekeeping  operations,  the  various  institutions  collaborate  and  complement   one   another   to   enhance   their   comparative   advantages,   share   the   political   and   economic  costs  of  responding  in  order  to  work  towards  an  environment  of  sustainable   peace.  Comprehensively  addressing  the  root  causes  of  given  conflicts,  specifically  as   urgent   but   long-­term   processes,   require   commitments   from   various   actors   to  work   together  in  partnership  –  this  is  best  seen  in  the  peace  operations  in  the  Darfur  region   of  Sudan  and  in  Somalia,  which  serve  as  the  case  studies  for  this  Chapter.   An   examination   of   the   peace   operation   in   the  Darfur   region   of   Sudan   remains   an   important  case  study  because  of  the  complex  root  causes  of  the  conflict,  which  in  part   derive   from   the   cross-­cutting   and   interrelated   issues   of   competition   over   scarce   resources,  to  ethnic,  cultural,  and  racial  codification  of  power  and  influence  in  nomadic     80     and  largely  tribal  areas.    Darfur  is  also  important  because  of  the  different  models  of   support   used   in   the  processes   for  managing  and   resolving   the   conflict.  Darfur   has   endured  several  episodes  of  violent  conflict,  the  most  conspicuous  of  which  emerged   following   the   2003   uprising   of   various   ethnically-­aligned   communities   against   the   Sudanese  government.  The  gross  human  rights  violations  and  urgent  humanitarian   situation  in  Darfur  necessitated  a  comprehensive  international  intervention  rooted  in   the  normative  framework  of  R2P  over  collective  indifference.     The  second  case  study  examined  in  this  Chapter  concerns  the  hybrid  peacekeeping   operation   in   Somalia,   which   serves   to   similarly   highlight   lessons   learned   and   best   practices  emerging  from  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations.  The  current  Somalia  peace   operation,  AMISOM,  is  an  AU-­driven  peacekeeping  mechanism  operating  under  the   mandate  of  and  with  technical  and  financial  support  from  the  UN.  This  distinction  in   the   type  of   hybrid   collaboration  will   lead   to   a   different   but   nonetheless   vital   line   of   analysis.  The  points  to  consider  for  this  case  study  will  include  issues  emerging  from   the   transitions   from   an   AU   to   a   UN   mandated   peacekeeping   operation   and   best   practices   that   surround   the   creation   and   implementation   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations.  Not  all  context  is  the  same,  thus  the  respective  political  situations  of  both   case   studies   will   be   taken   into   consideration   as   important   variables.   Issues   about   coordination,  co-­existence,  and  collaboration  by  all  actors  who  are  attempting  to  bring   about  peace  in  the  country  is  of  great  importance  to  the  following  analysis.     In  view  of   the  above,   this  Chapter  seeks   to  analyse  whether  hybrid  peacekeeping,   especially  recent  incarnations  of  UN-­AU  co-­operation  in  peace  operations  offer  better   prospects  or  new  opportunities  to  comprehensively  respond  to  the  challenges  inherent   in   peacekeeping   throughout   the   continent.   Furthermore,   the   Chapter   will   consider   whether  the  international  community  is  moving  towards  more  effective  and  legitimate   peacekeeping  operations   through   the  hybrid  peacekeeping  operation  approach   (as   evidenced  by  Sudan  and  previously   in  Burundi)  or  where  an  AU   force   is  deployed   under  a  UN  Security  Council  mandate  (such  as   the  case  of  Somalia).     In  sum,   the   study  is  intended  to  determine  whether  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  and  burden-­ sharing  strategies  for  peace  operations  offer  any  insightful,  meaningful,  and  practical   perspectives  into  to  the  ongoing  challenges  faced  by  the  international  community  and   African  role-­players  in  the  arena  of  peacekeeping  on  the  African  continent.     81     4.2  CONFLICT  DYNAMICS  OF  DARFUR     There  have  been  several  conflicts   throughout   the  history  of   the  Republic  of  Sudan,   especially  since  its  independence  in  1956.  These  conflicts  underscore  that  Sudan  has   constantly   been   forced   to   navigate   violent   internal   conflicts,   especially   during   the   periods   of   1956-­1972   and   1983-­2005.   In   order   to   analyse   the   dynamics   and   developments  that  led  to  the  hybrid  peacekeeping  operation  in  Darfur,  it  is  important   to  provide  a  background  to  the  conflict.         Sudan   was   characterised   by   various   socio-­cultural   and   historically   distinct   communities,   to   some   extent   differentiated   along   the   lines   of   Arab   and   non-­Arab   mainly  in  the  North  and  South  of  the  country.  Srinivasan  (2006:4)  makes  the  distinction   between  the  two,  Arab  tribes  are  semi-­nomadic  ‘Abbala’  (camel  herders)  in  the  North   of  the  country  and  the  Western  Darfur  regions.    The  ‘non-­Arabs’  are  identified  as  the   sedentarized  ‘Baggara’  and  as  ‘African’  in  the  South.    According  to  Deng  (2002:70),   the   North   identifies   with   Islam   and   Arabization,   while   the   South   stood   against   a   hegemonic   and   dominant   Islamic   identity.   Since   independence,   the   Sudanese   government   based   in   Khartoum   (in   this   case   also   referred   to   as   the   Khartoum   government),   and   the   main   rebel   movements,   the   Sudan   People’s   Liberation   Movement/Army  (SPLM/A)  and  the  Sudan  People’s  Defence  Force  (SPDF),  engaged   in  a  civil  war  over  power  and  resources.  Prior  to  this  conflict,  Juma  (2003:187)  stated   that,   for  11  years,  the  SPLM/A  and  SPDF  fought   intense  battles  over  the  control  of   territory  in  the  South  and  in  2002,  the  leaders  of  the  two  groups  signed  a  declaration   merging  their  movements.    This  was  two-­fold,  in  a  sense  that  on  one  hand,  it  meant   relative   peace   between   the   two   groups,   and   on   the   other   hand,   they   now   had   a   common  enemy  which  later  proved  to  be  disastrous  for  the  government.   Since   1989,   the   Khartoum   government,   led   by   current   President   Omar   al-­Bashir,   amassed  and  distributed  weapons  throughout  the  country  from  the  exchange  of  the   profits   earned   from   the   country’s   oil   wealth.   This   trade   and   proliferation   of   arms   throughout   the   country   strengthened   the   collaboration   between   the   Khartoum   government  and  various  communities  inside  the  country  as  well  as  with  neighbouring   countries,  thereby  heightening  political  and  security-­driven  tensions.    Throughout  the   1990s,  neighbouring  countries  such  as  Uganda,  Kenya,   the  DRC,  CAR,  Chad,  and   Ethiopia   accommodated   massive   outflows   of   refugees   from   Sudan   who   sought     82     political  asylum  and  refuge  from  the  enduring  conflicts.    However,  these  countries  were   also  facing  challenges  of  their  own:  for  instance,  Juma  (2003:190)  pointed  out  that  “in   Ethiopia,   the  government  of  Mengistu  El  Mariam  was  overthrown;;   in  Somalia,  Siad   Barre’s  government  collapsed;;  in  northern  Uganda  the  internal  insurgency  escalated;;   and  in  Kenya  political  violence  swept  through  the  country”.    These  political  dynamics   created   tensions   with   Sudan,   but   nonetheless   further   strengthened   the   need   for   African   states   to   assume   the   primary   responsibilities   to   prevent   further   conflicts.     Security  further  deteriorated  throughout  Sudan  as  rebel  groups  intensified  their  conflict   with  the  Sudanese  government  for  political  power  and  control  of  the  country.  Many  of   the  rebel  groups’  grievances  derive  from  the  politicization  of  identity  in  Sudan,  namely   between  Arab-­Muslim  communities  (those  affiliated  with  the  Islamist-­driven  and  ruling   National  Congress  Party  (NCP))  and  those  communities  who  were  identified  as  African   (mainly   from   the   Fur,   Zaghawa   and   Masalit   tribes)   and   were   consequently   marginalised   by   the   government.  Other   rebel  movements   such   as   the   Justice   and   Equality  Movement  (JEM),  led  by  Khali  Ibrahim,  and  the  National  Redemption  Front   (NRF)   were   allies   against   the   Arab  military   who   dominated   the   socio-­political   and   security   environment   throughout   Darfur.   Although   the   Northern   region   of   Sudan   benefited  from  the  spoils  of  the  country’s  vast  oil  wealth,  the  Southern  region  (now  the   independent   country   of   South   Sudan)  was   continuously  marginalised   and   became   economically  destitute.  These  socio-­economic  imbalances  throughout   large  parts  of   Sudan   were   further   exacerbated   by   waves   of   famine,   drought   and   desertification   (Zamechic  2008).   In  2002,   two  agreements  were  signed  between   the  Khartoum  government  and   the   SPLM/A  in  Burgenstock,  Switzerland  and  in  Machakos,  Kenya.  The  first  was  the  Nuba   Mountain  Ceasefire  Agreement  which  laid  the  foundation  for  the  second  agreement,   the   Comprehensive   Peace   agreement   (CPA)   of   2005,   which   was   a   landmark   agreement  on  transforming  the  government  and  governance  which  formed  the  basis   of  the  CPA  which  will  later  be  discussed.    However,  none  of  these  agreements  were   respected.    In  February  2003,  the  SPLA  and  JEM  collectively  launched  a  full  scale  war   against   the   Khartoum   government   as   a   common   enemy,   condemning   it   of   wilful   neglect.    In  addition,  the  rebellion  was  incited  by  continuing  economic  marginalisation   and   insecurity.     De  Waal   (2007:1044)   noted   that   the   rebels   appeared   to   take   the     83     Khartoum  government   by   surprise  and  enjoyed   short-­lived  and   relative   successes,   through  the  destruction  of  half  a  dozen  military  aircraft.     The  Khartoum  government  responded  violently  by  enlisting  the  services  of  some  of   the  nomadic  tribes  in  Darfur  loyal  to  its  agenda,  as  well  as  by  deploying  its  own  troops   to  arm  and  enhance  the  capacities  of  the  Janjaweed  militias.    The  Janjaweed  militias   originated  from  the  civil  war  in  Chad  in  the  1980s,  which  comprised  of  the  Sudanese   Government’s  NCP.     “The  government  promised   these   tribes   land   in  exchange   for   their  military  allegiance,  subsequently  turning  the  conflict  into  genocide  by  “Arabizing”   the   issues”   (Freccia   2015).  During   the   responses   to   these   attacks,   the   Janjaweed   militias   subsequently   engaged   in   killings,   abductions,   forced   expulsions,   torture,   systematic  sexual  violence,  and  intentional  destruction  of  resources  such  as  livestock.     Furthermore,  they  waged  a  systematic  operation  of  ethnic  cleansing  against  civilians   who  formed  part  of  the  ethnic  groups  of  the  rebellion.  Dagne  (2010)  stated  that  the   war  resulted  in  an  estimated  2.7  million  people  displaced,  more  than  240,000  people   forced  mainly  into  Chad  and  other  neighbouring  countries,  and  an  estimated  450,000   were  killed.  The  attack  on  the  El-­Fasher  Airport  in  2003,  which  is  the  headquarters  of   the  peacekeeping  operation,  is  considered  to  be  the  starting  point  of  the  current  civil   war  in  Darfur.   It  is  no  surprise  that  the  dynamics  of  the  conflict  in  Darfur  inspired  a  large  amount  of   literature,  although  intrinsically  there  is  still  no  widespread  consensus  on  the  identified   triggers  and  indicators  of  the  Darfur  conflict.  One  could  deduce  the  triggers  being  the   SLMA  and  JEM  or  even  the  Khartoum  government.    While  the  indicators  among  others   are  marginalisation  and  oil.  William  and  Black  (2010:7)  identified  that  first,  the  conflict   originated  from  the  oppressive  nature  between  the  dominant  core  of  the  elites  based   in  Khartoum  and  the  marginalised  zones  of  Sudan,  especially  in  Darfur.  Second,  the   conflict  in  Darfur  is  considered  to  be  an  inevitable  consequence  of  Sudan’s  existence   as   a   turbulent   state   based   on   its   history.     Third,   the   dynamics   of   the   conflict   are   ascribed   to   the   systematic   tensions   between   the   Arab   and   African   populations   of   Sudan   because   it   was   believed   that   their   identities   were   used   to   define   who   had   access  to  resources,  power,  and  development.    In  the  context  of  peace  and  security,   the  Khartoum  government  had  the  responsibility  to  protect  all  of  the  people  living  in  its   country,  but  consciously  and  deliberately  flouted  this  responsibility  by  conducting  an   ethnic  cleansing  campaign.           84     The  Darfur  conflict  appeared  to  be  a  real  test  of  the  international  community’s  resolve   to  move  R2P  to  full  recognition  in  international  law.  A  report  of  the  UN  Office  of  the   High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  noted  that  the  Khartoum  government  “is  failing   to   protect   the   human   rights   of   the   population,   in   particular   the   right   of   life”.     The   Khartoum   government   had   demonstrated   the   lack   of   obligation   to   protect   and   to   prevent  the  atrocities  in  the  Country  under  the  commitment  of  international  law  (UN   OHCHR  2007).  There  were  attempts  for  peace  with  the  signing  of  the  CPA  between   the  Khartoum  government  and  the  SPLM,  which  granted  Southern  Sudan  the  right  to   conduct  a  referendum  to  determine  whether  the  region  would  become  independent  of   Sudan.  The  agreement  provided  power-­sharing  arrangements  between  the  North  and   South  in  the  Sudanese  government  between  2006  and  2011.    However,  the  CPA  did   not  explicitly  address  the  specific  issues  driving  the  conflict  in  Darfur:  the  underlying   factors  of  the  conflict  are  complex  and  intricate  but  are  also  multi-­levelled,  involving   international,   regional,   and   national   elements.   This   intricacy   is   especially   relevant   because   of   the   dichotomy   and   identity   of   Darfur’s   conflict,   which   had   been   characterised  by  its  political  and  historical  affairs  and  not  only  limited  to  North-­South   relations.     As  the  situation  worsened,  the  international  response  to  the  conflict  was  dominated  by   non-­consensus.  The  UN  remained  polarised  and  paralysed   to   take  action  and  also   lacked   resources   and   effective   structures   to   respond   to   security   threats.   Their   response  was   often   not   rapid   enough   but   rather  moderate   and   divided.   For  many   years,  the  lack  of  sufficient  political  will  and  tangible  commitment  by  the  international   community   to   intervene   ensured   the   continuation   of   widespread   attacks   against   civilians.  According  to  Abiodun  (2011:  188-­190),   their   failure  to  act  emerged  from  a   collection  of  diplomatic,  bureaucratic,  and  political  difficulties  that  ultimately  restrained   what   could   be   done.   Udombana   (2007:97)   argued   that   “by   the   time   the   genocide   claims   its   last   victim,   the   UNSC,   which   has   the   primary   mandate   for   maintaining   international  peace  and  security  will  be  suffering  from  resolution  fatigue”.  In  addition,   the  lack  of  interest  to  intervene  was  masked  under  the  motto  of  ‘an  African  solution  to   an  African  problem’.    Given  the  UN’s  responsibility,  it  failed  to  produce  a  swift  response   to   the   ongoing   violence   in   Darfur.     Yet   again,   this   demonstrated   the   UN’s   lack   of   flexibility  and  delayed  approval  of  the  mandates.    As  a  result,  the  UNSC  delegated  the   responsibility  to  the  AU.         85     4.3  AFRICAN  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  DARFUR     The  establishment  of   the  AU   in  2002  was  greeted  with  buoyancy,  and   its  desire   to   support   and   contribute   meaningfully   to   continental   peacekeeping   initiatives   was   perceived   as   an   improvement   from   the   OAU.   The   need   for   the   AU   to   take   this   responsibility  for  responding  to  the  crisis  in  Darfur  was  two-­fold.  First,  it  was  from  the   reluctance  and  difficulties  inherent  in  intervention  by  the  Members  of  the  UN  Security   Council,  especially  due  to  lingering  tensions  due  the  US  withdrawal  from  Somalia  and   the  tragedy  in  Rwanda  in  the  early  1990s.    Secondly,  the  conflict  was  not  only  a  threat   to  Sudan  but  also  had  the  potential  to  spread  to  other  countries  in  the  Horn  of  Africa   region.  Therefore,  it  was  both  prudent  and  necessary  to  contain  the  conflict  within  the   border  of  one  country,  taking  into  consideration  the  logistical  and  financial  prudence.     It  was  not  surprising  when  Idris  Derby,  the  President  of  Chad,  took  the  lead  by  initiating   peace   talks   in   2003.   This   initiative   led   to   the   first   Sudan   ceasefire   between   the   Khartoum  government  and  the  rebel  movements  which  allowed  free  and  unimpeded   humanitarian  access  within  Darfur.  The  AU  deployed  a  small  peacekeeping  operation   to   Darfur   (AMIS   I),   with   the   authorisation   of   the   UNSC   to  monitor   or   oversee   the   implementation  of  the  peace  agreement.  Their  mandate  also  included  patrolling  the   region  and  protecting   civilians  and  humanitarian  operations   from   imminent  danger.   AMIS   also   provided   armed   escorts   to   humanitarian   agencies   on   request.     The   ceasefire  did  not  resolve  the  political  causes  that  were  rooted  in  the  Darfur  conflict.     Nonetheless,  AMIS  I  became  the  only  external  peacekeeping  force  providing  security   to  Darfur  (Brosche  &  Rothbart  2013:118).     The  small  peacekeeping  operation  later  evolved  into  a  stronger  AMIS  II  in  2004  given   the  constant  violence.  The  peacekeeping  operation  was  primarily  authorised  by  the   UNSC  and  led  by  the  AU,  as  it  set  up  to  ‘monitor’  the  ceasefire  through  the  deployment   of   an   AU   ‘Observer’   Mission,   to   become   the   operational   arm   of   the   Ceasefire   Commission  (CFC)  and  to  protect  civilians.  However,  the  AMIS  mandate  was  unclear   when   it  came   to  protecting  civilians;;   the   loose   language  underpinning   the  mandate   concealed  a  lack  of  political  will  by  the  international  community  to  conduct  a  robust   operation,   as   expectations   far   exceeded   its   mandate   and   capability   to   act   as   a   traditional   peacekeeping   force.   This   translated   into   a   tragic   reality   that   AMIS   was   limited  from  doing  more  in  Darfur,  and  if  the  situation  worsened,  it  could  only  use  force     86     in  self-­defence  rather  than  to  protect  civilians.  The  use  of  force  was  unclear  in  its  Rules   of  Engagement  (RoE)  and  Standard  Operating  Procedures  (SOPs)  which  should  have   been  provided  to  its  commanders  and  troops.    The  RoE  was  not  well  communicated   within  the  chain  of  command  and  to  all  the  AMIS  troops.       Although  the  Darfur  Peace  Agreement  (DPA)  was  signed  by  one  faction  of  the  SLA   under   the  guidance  of   the   former  Secretary-­General   of   the  OAU,  Dr  Salim  Ahmed   Salim,   the  agreement  was  by  no  means  a  comprehensive  one.    This  was  because   breakaway   factions   of   the   SPLM   and   the   JEM   refused   to   sign   the   accord,   citing   demands  for  greater  wealth  and  power-­sharing  in  the  agreement  (Pronk  2006).  The   DPA  was   perceived   by   some   analysts   as   being   strong   in   areas   of   power-­sharing,   wealth-­sharing,  and  security  arrangements,  but  it  was  fragile  and  insubstantial.    This   was   supported   in   an   open   letter   from   the   AU   mediators   to   the   members   of   the   movements   who   were   still   reluctant   to   sign   the   DPA,   acknowledging   that   the   agreement  was  not   perfect   and  did  not  meet  all   the  aspirations  of   the  movements   (Explaining   the  Darfur  Peace  Agreement   2006).    Unlike   the  Arusha  Peace  Accord   signed   in   Burundi,   the   DPA   was   for   the   people   of   Darfur,   but   not   by   the   Darfur   (therefore   the   agreement   did   not   speak   to   the   heart   of   the   challenges   facing   the   communities  in  Darfur).    This  was  a  significant  deficiency  of  the  DPA,  as  the  people   were   not   included   in   the   process   and   therefore   the   process   lacked   the   necessary   ownership   by   those   who   would   benefit   the   most   from   its   ratification   and   implementation.   Additionally,   the   DPA   possessed   unintentional   but   nonetheless   detrimental  consequences  that  ultimately  led  to  the  split  of  the  SPLA  and  JEM.       In  order  to  respond  to  the  political  and  security  dynamics  in  Darfur,  changes  had  to  be   made  to  AMIS.    As  a  response  to  continuing  attacks  on  civilians,  the  3,320  personnel   strength  of  AMIS  I  increased  to  7,731,  making  it  AMIS  II  (Jooma  2006:6).  Despite  the   presence  of  AU  peacekeepers   in  Darfur   following  the  establishment  of  AMIS  II,   the   situation   continued   to   deteriorate   as   parties   to   the   conflict   failed   to   terminate   the   violence  as  they  continued  to  break  numerous  agreements.  The  efforts  of  AMIS  II  had   unfortunately   been   insufficient   to   deter   attacks   from   civilians   due   to   internal   and   external  constraints.    By  2007,  it  became  evident  that  AMIS  II  was  neither  large  nor   strong  enough  to  stop  the  violence   in  Darfur.    Furthermore,   the  failed  Tripoli  peace   talks  in  2007  indicated  that  there  was  no  peace  to  keep  in  the  absence  of  a  durable   ceasefire.  A  meeting  was  later  held  to  finalise  the  peace  talks  which  was  followed  by     87     the  meeting  held  in  Arusha,  Tanzania.    This  meeting  resulted  in  the  pledge  for  power-­ sharing  of  resources  and  talks  towards  a  political  solution  to  the  conflict  in  Darfur.    Yet   again,  the  bigger  rebel  factions  were  not  present  in  the  Arusha  meeting.    The  UN  and   the  AU  attempted  to  ensure  the  negotiations  were  both  inclusive  and  comprehensive,   but  the  persisting  conflict  continued  to  hamper  any  progress.    Heavens  (2007)  argued   that   “the   parties   to   the   conflict   in   Darfur   were   [are]   not   yet   prepared   to   enter   into   genuine  political  negotiations”.    It  is  worthy  of  note  that  any  political  solution  is  often   complex   especially   given   the   different   perspectives   and   ideologies   of   what   is   considered  fair  in  the  political  arena.     The  exertions  of  AMIS   II   fell   short   of   changing   the   situation   in   the   region,   and   the   peacekeeping   operation   had   an   insufficient   mandate   and   inadequate   international   support.    The  peacekeeping  operation  bespoke  the  AU’s  lack  of  experience  in  peace   operations,   particularly   in   the  doctrine  of   civilian  protection.  AMIS   I   and   II   failed   to   address  the  root  causes  and  emerging  dynamics  of  the  conflict,  which  contributed  to   the  sustained  violence  while  its  efforts  to  disarm  and  demobilise  the  Janjaweed  (which   was   part   of   its   mandate)   were   futile.   Since   it   was   poorly   equipped,   underfunded,   understaffed,  and  given  the  vast  territory  that  needed  security,  AMIS  II  was  unable  to   protect  civilians.  These  factors  were  some  of  the  challenges  confronted  by  the  AU  and   its   peacekeeping   effort   in  Darfur.     Funding   for   such  peacekeeping   operations   also   remained  a  constant  challenge.  Gottschalk  and  Schmidt  (2004:142)  remarked  that  “a   handful  of  Africa’s  wealthiest  states  are  left  to  bear  the  burden  of  paying  for  the  AU’s   peacekeeping  budgets”.       The  peacekeeping  operation  also  experienced  logistical  shortcomings  and  limitations.   AMIS  lacked  military  equipment  and  support  mechanisms  to  prevent  any  insurgents   in  the  region.  Its  deficiencies  were  also  caused  by  constrained  operational  concepts,   lack  of   resources,  and  strategic  gaps.    The   lack  of  civil-­military  coordination   further   posed   a   challenge   to   the   peacekeeping   operation.     These   challenges   were   demonstrated  when  former  AMIS  sector  commanders  were  assigned  only  four  soft-­ skin   vehicles,   5000   US   dollars   and   two   Thuraya   phones   at   the   beginning   of   the   peacekeeping  operation.    Furthermore,  the  first  250  police  that  arrived  in  Darfur  only   had   four   cars   to   share   between   them,   a   limitation   that   seriously   constrained   the   operation.    Even  Darfur’s  logistics  systems  were  severely  strained  and  the  resources   provided   to  AMIS   I  were  particularly   insufficient   to   fulfil   its   tasks.  These   limitations,     88     which   also   comprised   a   poor   logistical   capacity   and   a   lack   of   or   non-­existing   pre-­ deployment  logistical  plan,  delayed  the  deployment  of  AMIS  II  (Guicherd  2007:16).       According  to  Appiah-­Mensah  (2006:1),  AMIS  did  not  have  the  ability  or  resources  to   implement  its  mandate  and  it  also  lacked  the  logistical  infrastructure  to  manage  bulk   and  urgently  needed  purchases  worth  millions  of  dollars.  Airport  infrastructure,  aircraft   handling   capacity,   including   deteriorating   runway   and   road   conditions   for   the   transportation  of  heavy  equipment,  were  some  of  the  logistical  challenges  facing  the   peacekeeping  operation  (United  Nations  Secretary-­General,  2008).    It  became  clear   that   logistical   planning   fell   secondary   to   political   and   operational   decision-­making   processes.   The   AU   also   required   greater   staff   capacity   to   conduct   effective   coordinated   logistical   planning   on   the   scale   essential   for   such   peacekeeping   operations.    Furthermore,  AMIS  lacked  a  full  self-­sustaining  fuel  capacity  based  on  the   difficulties   to   develop   fuel   contracts   with   Khartoum   government   because   of   their   bureaucracy   in   approving   processes,  which   delayed   and   placed   the   peacekeeping   operation   in  a  vulnerable  position.  Given  the   limitations  by  AMIS  II   to   implement   its   mandate,  its  peacekeepers  came  under  severe  attacks.  They  were  outnumbered  and   clearly   outgunned   in   what   seemed   to   be   an   impossible   peacekeeping   operation.     Gompert,  Richardson,  Kruger  and  Bernath  (2005:5);;  and  William  (2006:9)  pointed  out   that,  for  instance,  the  Janjaweed  force  was  10,000-­20,000  strong  and  AMIS  II  should   have   been   at   least   as   numbered   or   equal   to   12,000-­22,000.     As   the   situation   worsened,  the  call  to  deploy  a  robust  peacekeeping  operation  under  the  mandate  of   the  UNSC  became  a  necessity.     Despite  the  challenges  and  shortcomings  of  AMIS  I  and  II,  the  AU  provided  the  rapid   response   to   deploy,   especially   in   the   face   of   emerging   conflict   and   given   the   international  community’s  resistance  to  intervene.  On  the  one  hand,  according  to  the   U.S.   Government   Accountability   Office   (GAO)   (2006:45),   while   AMIS   II   was   commended  for  improving  the  situation  in  Darfur  and  “reducing  large-­scale  organised   violence”,  it  also  provided  safety  to  a  handful  of  civilians.    On  the  other  hand,  Reeves   (2005)  argued  that  approximately  75%  of  all  villages  were  destroyed  and  AMIS  was   deployed  too  late  to  make  a  significant  difference.    Stopping  the  ongoing  violence  was   just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg;;  it  required  reassessing  the  goals  and  interests  of  the  parties   involved.    Furthermore,  it  was  important  to  have  appropriate  mechanisms  in  place  to   prevent  relapsing  into  conflict.       89     The  reluctance  of  the  international  community  to  deploy  a  large  contingency  under  UN   command  led  to  an  increased  reliance  on  developing  countries  to  contribute  troops.     Most  TCCs  had  been  from  developing  countries,  who  were  often  less  resourced.  The   hesitation  of  the  international  community  to  intervene  in  conflict-­afflicted  states  until  it   is   deemed   absolutely   necessary   (often   after   the   significant   loss   of   lives),   is   a   calamitous  failure  on  its  part.       It   is   important   that   the   UNSC   and   the   international   community   take   into   greater   consideration  that  prevention  is  a  tool  that  is  necessary  and  it  is  more  effective  than  a   cure  to  the  conflicts.  One  of  the  paramount  limitations  of  the  peacekeeping  process   remains   the  reliance  of   the  political  will   from  UNSC  member  states  which  have  the   authority  of  adopting  peacekeeping  resolutions  under  the  UN  Charter.  Furthermore,   veto  powers  are  often  used  by  the  Permanent  Members  of  the  UNSC,  revealing  how   national  interests  often  come  into  play  in  the  UNSC  and  can  consequently  bring  any   draft  resolution  to  a  standstill.  Even  when  a  draft  resolution  is  ratified,  the  process  of   assembling  a  peacekeeping  force  can  take  months,  especially  given  the  dependence   of   the   UN   on   TCCs.     Therefore,   the   UN   peacekeeping   mechanisms   can   be   characterised   as   being   cumbersome   and   slow   to   respond   to   the   dynamics   on   the   ground.   There  was  a  clear  ambition  for  an  early  African  response  to  the  crisis  in  Darfur,  but  the   AU   found   itself   in   a   situation   where   it   was   institutionally   ill-­equipped   and   under-­ resourced  to  resolve  the  conflict  situation  successfully,  or  even  play  a  meaningful  role   in   conflict   facilitation.   The   AU’s   proactive   role   enjoyed  Western   support,   but   as   a   fledgling   continental   organisation   it  was  not  able   to  mobilise   the  necessary   troops,   funds  or  material  to  conduct  a  large-­scale  civilian-­protection  operation.  The  material   constraints  were   especially   evident,   but   the   political   constraints   imposed   upon   the   peacekeeping  operation  also  constrained  it  in  Darfur.   4.4  INTERNATIONAL  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  DARFUR     Despite  their  reluctance,  the  role  played  by  the  international  community  towards  the   provision  of  peace  in  Darfur  remained  essential.  A  peace  agreement  mediated  by  a   number   of   countries   was   brokered   at   the   end   of   2003   between   the   Khartoum   government   and   the   SPLA.     This  was   the   first   of   several   agreements  which  were     90     respected   by   the   warring   factions,   despite   an   AU   presence.     Among   the   central   reasons  for  the  ongoing  conflict  were  Sudan’s  large  oil  deposits,  as  foreign  actors  vied   for  lucrative  concessions,  while  the  wealth  accrued  by  the  Sudanese  government  did   not  result  in  development  throughout  the  country.       The  Darfur  conflict  was  perceived  as  a  threat  to  international  peace  and  security  due   to  the  number  of  deaths,  rapes,  and  destruction  to  property  in  the  region,  in  many  ways   reflecting   similar   trends   to   the   Rwanda   genocide.   In   this   light,   the   UNSC   passed   Resolution  1556,  mandating  the  deployment  of  an  AU  protection  force  to  monitor  the   April  2004  ceasefire.    Mounting  evidence  of  massive  human  rights  abuses  in  Darfur   tested   the   international   community’s  will   and   capacity   to   halt   ethnic   cleansing   and   protect  civilians  (Power  2004).    By  the  end  of  2004,  the  UNSC,  at  a  special  session  on   Sudan  held  in  Nairobi,  Kenya,  called  into  question  the  commitment  of  Member  States   to  follow  through  on  their  earlier  resolutions.  The  international  community’s  responses   to  the  crisis  in  Darfur  came  in  the  form  of  humanitarian  assistance  through  the  UN  and   its  specialized  programmes  and  agencies  such  as  the  WFP,  UN  High  Commissioner   on  Refugees  and  WHO,  (Clough  2005).       Piiparinen  (2007:73)  acknowledged  that  without  the  consent  and  cooperation  of  the   Khartoum   government,   it   was   impossible   for   the  AU   and  UN   troops   to   disarm   the   Janjaweed.    The  need  for  a  robust  peacekeeping  force  through  the  use  of  current  and   additional   UN   resources   was   passed   through   the   UNSC   Resolution   1706,   which   authorised  a  strength  of  more  than  20,000  military  and  civilian  peacekeepers.    The   resolution   made   provision   for   the   military   to   use   force   to   protect   civilians   under   immediate   danger.     However,   the   impact   of   these   efforts   were   weakened   by   the   UNSC’s  internal  impotence  to  implement  its  commitment.  While  the  UNSC  continued   to   threaten   to   intervene   by   imposing   sanctions   against   the   petroleum   sector   and   government  officials,  it  did  not  follow  through  despite  the  ongoing  violence.    President   al-­Bashir  condemned  the  presence  of  the  UN  force  in  Darfur  and  without  his  consent   the   UN   struggled   to   negotiate   a   peace   plan   that   would   gradually   place   UN   peacekeepers  in  the  country.    This  presented  a  limiting  factor  because  the  Khartoum   government   believed   that   the   situation   in   Darfur   was   an   internal   matter,   thus,   the   respect  of  state  sovereignty  which  is  central  to  international  diplomacy.         91     A   call   for   a   humanitarian-­driven  military   intervention   in  Darfur   seemed  be   an   ideal   action  especially  given  the  intervention  which  was  conducted  by  the  NATO  in  Kosovo,   during  the  time  when  the  government  was  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  lives  and  refused   to  halt  human  rights  violations.    Although  their  actions  were  relatively  successful,  the   case   of   Darfur   had   become   much   more   complex.   Even   if   this   was   muted   as   a   possibility,  no  government  was  willing  to  attempt  such  an  excursion  particularly  in  the   face   of   unprecedented   threat   to   the   Country.   Moreover,   China’s   position   of   non-­ interference   in   the   internal   affairs   of   another   country   played   a   significant   role   in   constraining   and   hobbling   the   UNSC’s   effectiveness   (International   Crisis   Group   2006:17).  China  is  Sudan’s  biggest  trading  partner,  and  as  Goodman  (2004)  states,   “it   purchases   64   percent   of   Sudan’s   oil   exports,   and   its   companies   have   invested   billions  of  dollars  in  Sudan’s  oil  industry”.    By  no  means,  was  China  solely  responsible   for  the  UNSC’s  lack  of  action,  however,  it  played  a  significant  part.      Putting  pressure   on  the  Khartoum  government  would  have  blurred  the  lines  between  China’s  model  of   assistance  (fewer  government-­related  strings)  and  the  ‘carrot  and  stick’  approach  by   many   donors.     It   is   an   open   secret   that   the   greater  majority   of   the   peacekeeping   operation  in  Darfur  had  been  funded  mostly  by  foreign  donors,  amongst  them,  the  US,   EU,  Nordic  countries,  Canada,  and  a  host  of  other  bilateral  donors.    This  could  also   have  led  to  a  carrot  and  stick  approach  if  it  was  deemed  necessary  by  those  funding   the  peacekeeping  operations.     As   an   attempt   to   halt   the   violence   and   bring   parties   to   the   negotiation   table,   an   international   mediation   peace   process   took   place   in   2005.     This   process   was   not   enough,   as   violence   continued   and   reconciliation   talks   were   abandoned   due   to   significant  differences  between  the  warring  factions.    The  objectives  and  goals  of  the   factions,  particularly  the  Khartoum  government  which  kept  breaking  what  was  already   a  fragile  peace  deal  established  throughout  numerous  mediation  processes,  remained   difficult   to   assess.     Vehnamaki   (2006:53)   confirmed   that   the   involvement   of   the   Khartoum  government  in  the  violence  was  too  unclear  to  confirm  its  intention.    In  2005,   the   UNSC   authorised   Resolution   1590,   creating   the   UNMIS   under   chapter   VII   to   support   the  comprehensive  DPA.     In  addition,  UNMIS  had   to  evaluate  how  best   to   assist   and   support   AMIS.     As   a   result,   the   UNSC   Resolution   1706   called   for   the   deployment  of  UNMIS  in  Darfur;;  however,  there  was  no  consent  from  the  Khartoum   government  for  the  UN  peacekeepers  to  intervene.         92     What  is  important  to  note  is  that  a  peacekeeping  operation  can  usually  complement  a   political  process,  but   it  cannot  be  a  substitute   for   that  process.    Therefore,   the  way   forward  for  the  ongoing  conflict   in  Darfur  depended  on  a  feasible  political  discourse   and  architecture  among  all  the  relevant  parties.       4.5  TRANSITION  FROM  AMIS  TO  UNAMID:  A  HYBRID  PEACEKEEPING   OPERATION     Although  the  Khartoum  government  initially  opposed  a  UN  peacekeeping  operation,   after   the   conclusion   of   a   peace   accord   between   the   largest   rebel   forces   in   Abuja,   Nigeria  2006,  it  indicated  however  that  it  was  willing  to  discuss  the  involvement  of  the   UN.  In  view  of  this,  the  Khartoum  government  also  made  it  very  difficult  for  funds  to  be   transferred  via  Addis  Ababa,  Ethiopia,   to  AU   troops  on   the  ground.  Practically,   this   created  a  convoluted  route  before  funds  could  reach  AMIS  personnel,  with  the  delayed   remittance   of   funds   caused   some   apprehension   among   the   troops,   and   therefore   resulted  in  low  morale  at  ground  level.  Obviously,  the  lack  of  support  by  the  Khartoum   government  undermined  the  operations  of  AMIS  and  this  did  not  help  the  AU  to  work   towards  a  meaningful  outcome  in  Darfur  (Mansaray  2009:40).   As  a  result,  in  2007  the  UNSC  adopted  Resolution  1769  and  deployed  a  peacekeeping   force  that  ultimately  combined  with  AMIS  to  create  UNAMID.    The  presence  of  a  hybrid   operation  was  only  accepted  on  the  bases  that  the  force  comprises  primarily  of  African   troops  and  if  a  peace  accord  was  reached.    The  cooperation  between  the  UN  and  AU   was  determined  on  the  political  dynamics  of  Darfur,  in  accordance  with  Chapter  VIII  of   the  UN  Charter.       UNAMID   personnel   comprised   a   complement   of   “15,553,   representing   79%   of   the   authorized  strength  of  19,555.  That  number  included  14,948  troops,  346  staff  officers,   64   liaison   officers,   and   195   military   observers”   (United   Nations   Security   Council   2007a).     The   hybrid   peacekeeping   operation   had   greater   resources   and   was   well   equipped   to   address   the   challenges   to   protect   civilians   and   oversee   the   implementation  of  the  peace  agreement.    It  was  also  mandated  to  assist  an  inclusive   AU/UN-­mediated  political  process,  and  to  monitor  the  UN  arms  embargo  which  has   been   in   place   since   2005.   It   was   the   most   expensive   and   largest   peacekeeping   operation  ever  authorised  by  the  UNSC  at  the  time  (United  Nations  Security  Council     93     2007b).     The   joint   operation   also   demonstrated   the   international   community’s   responsibility  to  protect  civilians  in  armed  conflict.    Although  it  might  have  been  too   late  to  implement  the  doctrine  of  R2P  as  envisioned  to  prevent  atrocities,  the  hybrid   peacekeeping   operation   had   the   potential   of   providing   practical   guidance   to   the   application  of  R2P.       The   joint   peacekeeping   operation   replaced   a   previously   African-­led   operation.   UNAMID   currently   works   under   a   unified   command   structure,   a   single   force   commander,   a   single   senior   representative,   and   an   integrated   chain   of   command   agreed  between  both  UN  and  AU.  Given  the  strength,  logistic,  and  financial  resources,   including   its   robust  mandate   to  protect  civilians,   it   is  no  surprise   that  UNAMID  was   more  proactive  than  AMIS.    UNAMID  conducted  daily  patrols  and  community  policing   within  the  limits  afforded  by  its  logistical  capability  which  represented  an  avowal  of  the   peacekeeping   operations’   efforts   to   enhance   its   robust   mandate.     Furthermore,   UNAMID  also  aimed  to  bring  groups  that  were  non-­signatories  to  the  DPA  of  2006  into   the  peace  process  through  diplomatic  and  political  efforts.    It  strove  to  give  effect  to   the  actualisation  of  its  mandate  and  operational  tasks  to  secure  the  security  situation   which  remained  in  a  state  of   instability.  Despite  the  robust  mandate  and  consent  to   accept   a   hybrid   peacekeeping   operation,   however,   the   Khartoum   government   remained  despondent  to  the  involvement  of  the  UN.    They  consequently  attempted  to   impede  the  work  of  the  peacekeeping  operation  by  refusing  to  supply  the  force  with   any  equipment,   therefore   leaving  the  force  to  build   its  own  camp  in  dangerous  and   remote  locations.    Logistically,  there  was  only  one  railway  line  in  Darfur  and  during  the   rainy   season,   the   roads   were   impassable,   making   working   conditions   even   more   difficult  (Mahmood,  2012).   Notwithstanding,  UNAMID  did  not  meet  the  expectations  envisioned.    It  failed  to  utilize   and   capitalise   its   force   strength,   logistical   capabilities,   and   resources   to   protect   civilians.     The   presence   of   the   hybrid   peacekeeping   operation   in   Darfur   had   not   completely   fostered   peace   but   had   improved   the   lives   of   ordinary   citizens   on   the   ground.  However,  the  new  precedent  operation  faced  similar  challenges  as  AMIS  II,   such  as  sourcing  troops  to  be  deployed,  given  the  AU’s  commitment  and  struggle  to   deploy  for  AMISOM.    Despite  the  presence  of  the  force,  Murithi  (2009:13)  pointed  out   that   the  violence  persisted  and  “included  high   levels  of  banditry,  occasional  military   engagements,  ethnic  clashes,  and  deadly  attacks  on  UNAMID  forces”.             94     Internationally,  although  a  peace  agreement  between  the  Khartoum  government  and   the  rebel  movements  was  signed,  this  had  not  stopped  the  fighting  and  concerns  over   the   atrocities   committed   culminated   in   a   request   for   an   investigation   by   the   International  Criminal  Court  (ICC)  to  hold  those  responsible  for  genocide,  war  crimes,   and  violation  of  human  rights  accountable   for   the  atrocities  committed.    The  UNSC   had   taken  strides   towards  pressuring   the  Khartoum  government  and  parties   to   the   conflict  to  end  the  violence  in  Darfur.    Most  significantly,  it  had  instructed  Khartoum  to   disarm   the   Janjaweed   militia.   Since   February   2003,   the   term   genocide   was   often   associated   with   crisis   and   the   word   gained   prominence   around   the   international   community.   The   seriousness   of   events   in   Darfur   was   clear   when   Luis   Moreno   Ocampo,  former  prosecutor  of  the  ICC,  sought  a  warrant  of  arrest  for  President  Omar   al-­Bashir   on   charges   of   crimes   against   humanity,   war   crimes,   and   genocide.   This   charge  also  became  an  obstacle  within   the  politics  surrounding  UNAMID.  Tensions   between   the   hybrid   partners  was   created   by   the  UNSC’s   role   in   the   indictment   of   President  al-­Bashir,  which  could  undermine  efforts  for  lasting  peace  and  reconciliation;;   African   leaders  have  perceived  the   involvement  of   the  ICC  as  a  threat   to  derail   the   peace  process.    The  case  is  similar  to  the  reaction  from  the  arrest  warrant  for  President   Charles   Taylor   in   2003.   Hence   the   interplay   between   justice   and   peace   created   tension  not  only  in  Africa,  but  also  internationally.    In  this  light,  even  though  AMIS  was   cultivated  into  a  UN  peacekeeping  operation,  it  found  itself  embroiled  and  entangled   in   many   of   the   same   political   and   military   challenges   as   the   AU   peacekeeping   operation.   Notwithstanding  UNAMID’s  broad  mandate  to  protect  civilians,  it  was  not  designed  to   create  a  sustainable  solution   to   the  crisis.     In  order   for  Darfur   to  have  a  chance  of   lasting  peace,  a  political  solution  needed  to  be  found  because  it  would  address  the   fundamental   root  causes  of   the  conflict.    Grignon  and  Kroslak  (2008:186)   therefore   argued  that  peacekeeping  operations  were  conducted  on  trajectory  bases  in  order  to   protect  civilians  without  a  political  process  in  place.    In  this  regard,  it  was  pointless  to   deploy   a   peacekeeping   force   if   there   was   no   peace   to   keep.   Given   the   different   dynamics,  scope,  and  landscape  of  conflict,  each  case  was  different  and  would  need   to  be  addressed  according  to  their  specific  context.       95     Lessons  can  be  learned  from  AMIS  and  UNAMID,  especially  those  which  demonstrate   that  troops  alone  are  not  enough  to  ensure  the  ability  to  implement  mandates  to  protect   civilians,   but   would   need   to   be   accompanied   by   a   clear   robust   mandate   and   the   provision   of   mechanisms   and   modalities.   Given   the   deteriorating   security   and   humanitarian  situation  in  Darfur,  UNAMID’s  effectiveness  varied.  On  the  one  hand,  by   late  2008,   it  was  too  slow  and  inadequate  to  provide  tangible   improvements  on  the   ground.  On  the  other  hand,  as  a  hybrid  operation,  it  provided  real  improvements  for   the   ordinary   citizens   on   the   ground,   it   hinged   on   confidence-­building   of   the   local   population  in  Darfur  by  improving  the  security  situation.       According   to   Mickler   (2013:503),   despite   the   various   challenges   encountered,   UNAMID  made  and  continues  to  make  contributions  to  the  security  situation  in  Darfur.     Nonetheless   the   overall   human   rights   situation   remains   a   constant   concern.     Therefore,   the  need  to  strengthen  rapid  response  capabilities,  conduct  patrols,  and   deploy  well  trained  and  equipped  units  is  of  great  importance.       The   international   community   seems   to   be   moving   towards   a   more   effective   and   legitimate  approach  of  hybrid  peacekeeping  in  Africa  as  demonstrated  in  Burundi  and   Darfur.    Therefore,  it  is  important  to  give  a  brief  background  on  the  case  of  Somalia  in   order  to  determine  whether  the  approach  of  hybrid  peacekeeping  and  burden-­sharing   can   offer   any   insightful,   meaningful,   and   practical   perspective   into   the   challenges   faced.     4.6  CONFLICT  DYNAMICS  OF  SOMALIA     Somalia  has  been  torn  by  widespread  conflict  for  decades.    Since  independence,   it   has  struggled  with  civil  conflict,  poor  governance,  economic  exclusion  and  a  lack  of   social   cohesion.   The   country’s   instability   stemmed   from   conflict   between   the   state   structures   executed   during   colonialism,   the   exclusive   and   repressive   politics   that   defined   the   Siad   Barre   era,   and   the   intricate   clan   politics   that   continue   to   play   a   significant   role   in  Somali’s  pastoral   lives  (Little  2003:15).  Mulugetta  (2009:9)  added   that  the  conflict  in  Somalia  emanated  from  the  colonial  era  underpinned  by  Somalia’s   divided   territory.     These   territories   involved   British   Somaliland   and   the   Northern   territory  of  Kenya  (which  was  colonised  by  Britain);;  the  Italians  colonised  Somaliland;;   and   France   occupied   Djibouti.   The   rest   of   the   Ogaden   territory   was   in   between     96     Ethiopia  and  Somalia.    The  post-­independence  regimes,  particularly  the  General  Siad   Barre  (who  took  over  Somalia  through  a  bloodless  military  coup  in  1969)  dictatorship,   pursued  a  policy  to  restore  the  colonially  lost  territories  in  the  neighbouring  nations.   This  led  to  the  Ogaden  War  with  Ethiopia,  first  in  1969,  and  then  later  into  another  full   scale  war  in  1977-­8.    The  war  erupted  during  the  Cold  War  as  Somalia  aimed  to  exploit   a  shift  in  the  regional  balance  of  power  to  restore  the  territory  to  greater  Somalia.  At   the   time   of   the   Cold   War   political   alliances   shifted,   resulting   in   the   Soviet   Union   changing   its   aid   support   to   Somalia   for   subsidising   Ethiopia   (which   had   been   previously  supported  by  the  US);;  this  reversal  compelled  the  US  to  support  Somalia   for  strategic  reasons.  One  of  the  reasons  was  because  Somalia  has  a  long  coastline   on  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Gulf  of  Aden  making  it  one  of  the  most  strategic  countries   during  the  Cold  War  era  to  facilitate  the  water-­base  traversing  the  Middle  East  region.   According   to   Lewis   (2002:209),   their   engagement   with   Somalia   was   of   strategic   importance  because  it  provided  a  geographic  advantage  during  the  Cold  War.  Somalia   lost   the   Ogaden  War   and   retreated   back   across   the   border,   later   for   a   ceasefire   agreement  to  be  brokered  between  the  two  countries.  However,   the  war  weakened   the   autocratic   government   of   Siad  Barre.     Supported   by   the   super   powers   (Soviet   Union  and  US)  during  the  Cold  War  era,  Siad  Barre  kept  clan  rivalries  under  control   through   manipulative,   dictatorial,   oppressive,   and   corrupt   rule   over   the   country   (Murphy  2007:48).  Although  his  regime  was  more  akin  to  a  dictatorship,  some  positive   developments  were   achieved.     He   administered   the   building   of   hospitals,   schools,   universities,  and  handled  humanitarian  emergencies  efficiently  in  the  1970s.     Somalia  also  became  economically  dependent  on  aid  from  Arab  countries.  Although   Somalis  are  not  ethnically  Arabs,  they  identify  more  with  Arabs  than  Africans.    They   joined  the  League  of  Arabs  States  (LAS)  in  1974,  making  them  the  first  non-­Arab  state   to  be  admitted  as  a  member.  Throughout   the  1980s,  Somalia  became   increasingly   dependent  on  its  counterparts,  which  was  important  to  Siad  Barre  in  his  aim  to  side   with  the  US-­led  coalition  of  Arab  states  that  opposed  Iraq  following  the  intervention  of   Kuwait  in  1990.  As  Somalia’s  strategic  importance  to  the  West  weakened,  foreign  aid   was  consequently  withdrawn.  In  addition,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  led  to  a  decline  in   economic  and  political  support.  As  a  result,  power  began  to  splinter  as  local  political   factions  pushed  against  the  central  government.  According  to  Rubinstein  (2008:4),  the   Somali   government   became   non-­functional   and   unable   to   provide   the   day-­to-­day     97     security  for  its  citizens  by  the  late  1980s.  This  left  the  country  without  the  resources  to   maintain  the  patronage  political  systems,  and  as  a  result,  Siad  Barre  lost  control  of  the   country  and  the  army.       The  Somali  National  Movement  (SNM)  and  the  Ogadeni  Somali  Patriotic  Movement   (SPM)  joined  forces  to  create  what  was  known  as  the  United  Somalia  Congress  (USC)   which   led   to   a   rebellion   against   Siad   Barre’s   government   (Omaar   &   Mohamoud   2015:86).   This   insurgency   intensified   into   a   full-­scale   civil  war   in   1988   and   greatly   affected  the  Somaliland  region.  The  government’s  response  was  swift  and  unforgiving.     They  used  increasingly  repressive  tactics  to  suppress  activists  from  all  clans,  killing   50,000  people,  while  650,000  fled  to  Ethiopia  and  Djibouti  (The  Centre  for  Justice  and   Accountability  2014).    By  1991,  Siad  Barre  was  ousted  by  the  USC.    Any  hope  of  a   national  reconciliation  was  dissolved  by  the  division  of  the  USC  into  two  groups,  one   led  by  warlord  Ali  Mahdi  and  the  other  by  warlord  Mohammed  Aideed.    This  sparked   the  clan  warfare  that  Siad  Barre’s  patronage  system  had  explicitly  tried  to  manage.   Other  warlords  emerged,  resulting  in  further   intra-­clan  conflict,   increased  division  of   the  country,  and  the  collapse  of  the  central  government.       Several  factors  and  dynamics  have  a  role  towards  perpetuating  the  conflict  in  Somalia.     The  role  played  by  the  clan  system,  which  has  dominated  Somalia  and  formed  part  of   the  division  of  clans,  had  politically,  socially,  and  economically   fuelled   the  endemic   conflict.     Armed   clashes  were   fought   in   the   name   of   clans,   as   a   result   of   political   leaders’  manipulation   of   clan   allegiances   for   their   own   interests.     The   struggle   for   control,  power,  and  resources  changed  their  boundaries  in  many  parts  of  the  Country   towards   consolidating   their   respective   positions   on   occupied   territories.   Thus,   the   impact  of  the  changed  clan  structures  resulted  in  several  forms  of  conflict  (Wheeler   2000:174).   Since  the  downfall  of  Siad  Barre’s  regime,  the  very  groups  that  ousted  him  began  to   fight  amongst  themselves  for  power  and  the  remaining  resources.    The  country  and   its  people  entered  into  decades  of  protracted  civil  conflict  (Elmi  &  Barise  2006:33-­35).   For  many  analysts,  Somalia  became  a  failed  state,  but  it  is  important  to  note  that  the   collapse  of  the  Country  was  not  due  to  the  end  of  Siad  Barre,  but  was  a  process  which   triggered  it.    His  regime  comprised  improvident  policies,  power,  greed,  and  corruption,   which   had   destructive   long-­term   consequences   in   the   aftermath   of   his   regime.     98     Rubinstein  (2008:5)  defined  the  state  of  Somalia  as  a  “nation  where  public  authority   was  no  more  effective  in  providing  for  the  security  and  welfare  of  the  country”.    Somalia   became  an  impoverished  country  with  limited  resources  (national  economy  depended   on  the  export  of  livestock  and  bananas),  especially  with  the  collapse  of  the  communist   system.  Furthermore,   the   international  community’s  attention  was  more  on  the  Gulf   War  than  the  internal  strife  of  Somalia,  largely  because  the  country  was  not  of  strategic   importance   at   the   time.  Wheeler   (2000:174)   stated   that   Somalia   disintegrated   into   violence  and  destruction  never  experienced  before.  From  1991  to  1992,  the  country   was  torn  by  clan-­based  conflict  and  in  the  capital  city  alone,  25,000  people  were  killed   and   1.5  million   fled   the   country,   along   with   2  million   internally   displaced   persons.   Drought   struck   the   country,   accelerating   the   destruction   of   social   and   economic   infrastructure,  clan-­cleansing,  and  disruption  of  a  steady  food  supply  caused  a  man-­ made  famine  that  ultimately  claimed  approximately  300,000  lives  (Prendergast  2007).         4.7  INTERNATIONAL  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  SOMALIA     It  was  only  in  1992,  following  the  eruption  of  conflict  in  Mogadishu,  that  international   attention  shifted  to  Somalia.    The  UNSC  authorised  the  deployment  of  troops  and  UN   personnel  under  UNSC  Resolution  751,   in  an  effort   to   restore  order  and  safeguard   relief  supplies,  to  oversee  the  general  and  complete  an  arms  embargo,  and  to  provide   security   for  humanitarian  aid.  Resolution  733  declared   the  conflict   in   the  country  a   threat  to  international  peace  and  security,  and  under  the  provision  of  Chapter  VII  of   the  UN  Charter  the  intervention  was  unanimously  adopted  (Wheeler  2000:175).  After   difficult  negotiations,  the  warring  faction  leaders  signed  a  ceasefire  agreement,  which   included  provisions  to  allow  for  a  50  unarmed  UN  monitoring  operation  into  Somalia.   Their  mandate  was  to  oversee  arrangements  for  providing  humanitarian  assistance,   continue  consultations  with  parties  in  Mogadishu,  and  to  work  toward  a  reconciliation   government.   As   a   result,   United   Nations   Operation   in   Somalia   (UNOSOM   I)   was   established  with  the  consent  of  parties  to  the  agreement.       Despite   the  UN’s  efforts,   the   implementation  of   the  mandate   failed  because  of   the   attacks  on  humanitarian  workers  and  the  complexities  of  clan-­based  violence  that  led   to   the   Country’s   continued   fragmentation.   Clark   (1993:218)   stated   that   the   deteriorating  security  situation  prevented  the  delivery  of  food  to  the  starving  people;;     99     relief  flights  were  looted  upon  landing,  and  many  clans  would  burn  the  food  to  prevent   it   from  falling   into   the  hands  of   their   rivals.    As  a  result,  UN  humanitarian  agencies   withdrew   from   Somalia   out   of   fear   for   the   safety   of   their   personnel.   According   to   Wheeler  (2000:175-­178),  thousands  of  Somalis  did  not  die  because  there  was  a  lack   of  aid,  but  because  aid  could  not  be  rapidly  dispersed  due  to  continuing  lawlessness.     In  light  of  this,  the  UN  appealed  to  its  members  to  provide  military  forces  to  assist  the   humanitarian  operation  and  to  use  all  means  necessary  to  stop  the  atrocities.  The  US   responded   to   the   request   to   lead   an   international  UN   force   in   order   to   secure   the   necessary  environment  for  relief  efforts.    However,  troops  were  to  be  provided  on  the   basis  that  an  exit-­strategy  would  be  in  place  for  the  UN  to  take  over  the  peacekeeping   force.   The  UNSC  approved  a  larger  US-­led  military  operation  of  30,000  through  its  Unified   Task  Force  (UNITAF)  known  as  ‘Operation  Restore  Hope’  under  the  administration  of   US  President,  George  H.W.  Bush,  which  replaced  UNOSOM  I.    Wheeler  (2000:184)   noted   that   “Resolution   794   was   acting   under   Chapter   VII   of   the   Charter   [and   authorised]  the  Secretary-­General  and  Member  States…to  use  all  necessary  means   to   establish   a   secure   environment   as   soon   as   possible   for   humanitarian   relief   operations  in  Somalia”.    The  UNSC  further  adopted  Resolution  814,  to  expand  and   strengthen  the  UN’s  role  in  Somalia.    This  became  the  biggest  and  most  expensive   operation   in   the   history   of   the   UN   at   the   time,   amounting   to   1.5   billion   dollars   (Brandbury  1994:25).       The  situation  in  Somalia  necessitated  a  humanitarian  response  rather  than  a  military   intervention.    Therefore,  it  left  room  to  question  whether  a  military  intervention  could   serve  as  a  humanitarian  agency  and  under  what  legal  basis  it  would  be  deployed.     According   to  Clark  (1993),   the   international   response   to  Somalia  prior   to  1992  was   inadequate   and   was   a   half-­hearted   multilateral   measure   that   contributed   to   the   circumstance  of  anarchy  and  exposed  the  failure  of  a  collective  response  to  meet  the   realities  of  the  post-­Cold  War  era.  From  opposing  the  deployment  of  troops  to  leading   in  the  largest  peacekeeping  operation,  it  revealed  the  amount  of  pressure  the  George   HW  Bush  administration  was  under  to  take  action.    Furthermore,  the  media  played  a   significant  role  to  push  the  decision  to  intervene  in  the  Country.  Wheeler  (2000:181)   stated   that   further   reasons   for   the   intervention   in  Somali   included  Bush’s  desire   to   1   00     deflect  attention  from  his  inaction  over  Bosnia  and  to  emphasise  his  vision  of  a  new   world  order.       During  the  intervention,  hundreds  of  Somalis  died  and  two  US  helicopters  were  shot   down  in  a  conflict  between  US  Army  Rangers  and  Somalis  loyal  to  various  warlords  in   the  streets  of  Mogadishu.  The  US  operation  came  to  an  abrupt  end  in  March  1994  and   UN   peacekeepers   withdrew,   having   failed   to   implement   their   mandate   (Heyns   &   Stefiszn,  2006:315).  The  conflict  in  Somalia  persisted,  and  in  March  the  UN  decided   to  transform  the  UNITAF  operation  into  what  came  to  be  known  as  UNOSOM  II.  The   mandate   of   UNOSOM   II   was   to   strengthen   continued   relief   efforts   and,   more   significantly,  to  restore  peace  and  stability,  including  rebuilding  the  Somali  state  and   economy.  Yet,  several  episodes  of   fighting  with   those  who  were  deployed  to  assist   continued  to  deter  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid.    According  to  Contreras  (2012),   “there  were   incidents  where  Somali  civilians  were  not  only  starving,  but  also  being   used  as  human  shields  by  the  warlords  who  were  storing  illegal  weapons  and  breaking   the  cease-­fire  agreements”.         4.8  AFRICA’S  RESPONSE  TO  THE  CRISIS  IN  SOMALIA     Despite  the  absence  of  a  central  government  for  many  years,  some  areas  in  Somalia   experienced   relative   peace,   reconciliation,   and   security   such   as   Somaliland   and   Puntland.    But  this  is  not  to  say  that  a  central  government  was  not  necessary  or  the   collapsed  State  has  not  come  without  consequences   to   the  Somali  people.     It  only   asserted  that  the  conflicts  in  Somalia  could  not  be  exclusively  caused  by  the  absence   of  a  functioning  central  government,  which  may  not  always  be  the  solution  to  conflicts.     It  can  also  be  argued  that  the  attempts  to  establish  a  central  government  in  Somalia   indirectly  intensified  the  conflicts  in  Somalia.  Internationally,  Somalia  is  depicted  and   exaggerated  as  a  State  that  has  only  resonated  in  a  bloody  and  violent  conflict.     In   reality,   fewer   people   died   from   armed   conflict   in   some   parts   of   Somalia   than   in   neighbouring  countries   that  had  central   governments.   In   these  areas,   security  was   better   than   it   was   under   a   government.   According   to   UNDP   (2008:16),   the   same   number  of  annual  deaths  in  Somalia  during  this  period  were  due  to  childbirth  as  were   attributable  to  war,  which  is  roughly  4%  of  the  total  number.    Furthermore,  these  deaths   1   01     were  mostly  combatants,  not  civilians.  But  although  these  were  in  the  northern  part  of   Somalia,  the  southern  part  of  Somalia  was  plagued  by  clan-­conflict.     In  an  effort  to  create  long-­term  stabilisation  and  development  in  Somalia,  to  promote   dialogue   and   facilitate   the   provision   of   humanitarian   assistance,   the   AU   PSC   established  AMISOM  in  2007.  The  peacekeeping  operation  was  mostly  funded  by  the   EU   and   comprised   primarily   of   troops   from   Burundi   and   Uganda.     It   became   an   important   role  player   in   the  developments   leading   to   the   transitional  government  of   Somalia.    The  peacekeeping  operation  has  carried  the  heaviest  burden  of  provisioning   international  solidarity  to  Somalia  since  its  deployment  (Marangio  2012).  Some  of  their   actions   led   to   significant   improvements   in   the   security   situation.   AMISOM   has   a   multidimensional  focus  inclusive  of  political,  humanitarian,  and  civil  affairs,  as  well  as   military  and  policing  components.  These  components  engaged  with  the  Transitional   Federal  Government  (TFG)  and  the  Federal  Government  of  Somalia  (FGS)  to  ensure   decisive  contributions  towards  stabilising  the  country.    In  2012,  the  transition  from  the   TFG  to  the  FGS  was  internationally  hailed  as  a  sign  of  hope  for  a  Country  that  has   been  without  a  central  government  for  more  than  10  years.  Recognition  by  multilateral   financial   institutions   gave   further   indication   that   international   opinions   favoured   meaningful  engagements  with  the  administration  in  Mogadishu  (Murithi  2008:69-­70).   Despite  significant  progress  on  the  political  and  security  fronts,  many  challenges  faced   the  FGS  and  AMISOM  in  the  implementation  of  the  peace  operation’s  mandate.  The   exertions  to  maintain  and  consolidate  the  security  gains  made  by  the  Somalia  National   Forces  (SNF)  with  the  support  of  AMISOM,  remained  a  requirement.  Building  more   professional,   well   equipped   and   motivated   security   forces,   extending   the   FGS   authority,  and  enabling  public  service  delivery  to  the  population  are  also  critical.     The   inception  of  AMISOM  traces  back   to   IGAD  Peace  Support  Mission   in  Somalia   (IGASOM),  which  was  an  operation  designed  by  IGAD  in  2005.  The  lack  of  funding   and  challenges  with  the  neutrality  of  the  TCCs  given  that  most  of  the  potential  TCCs   were  Somalia’s  immediate  neighbours,  led  to  the  inability  of  IGAD  to  deploy  troops  on   the  ground.  IGASOM  was  also  perceived  as  a  US  -­backed  Western  means  to  curb  the   growth   of   the   Islamic   movement.   These   obstructions   led   to   the   establishment   of   AMISOM  (Shinn  2013).     1   02     AMISOM  is  a  unique  peacekeeping  operation  comprised  of  a  wide  range  of   troops   from  African  countries  and  underpinned  by  a  wide  mandate.  AMISOM’s  mandate  is  to   protect  the  transitional  government  (and  now  FGS)  personnel  and  institutions,  conduct   military   enforcement   operations   against   Al-­Shabaab,   and   facilitate   humanitarian   assistance  and  civil-­military  operations.    Furthermore,  the  need  for  AMISOM  was  also   to  facilitate  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid  and  create  conditions  for  the  reconstruction   and  sustainable  development  of  Somalia.  Its  initial  deployment  strength  consisted  of   1,600   Ugandan   soldiers   who   were   later   joined   by   Burundian   troops   in   2007.     Thereafter,  the  peacekeeping  operation  grew  and  evolved,  revealing  the  changing  and   complex  context  on  the  ground.    By  2013,  AMISOM  comprised  a  maximum  of  22,126   uniformed  personnel,  which  was  adopted  by  UNSC  resolution  2124   (2013)   (United   Nations  2013).    Although  the  peacekeeping  operation  is  led  by  the  AU,  it  was  created   with   the  expectation   to  create  a  suitable  environment   for   the  UN  to  eventually   take   over  the  operation.  However,  years  later,  these  conditions  have  not  eventuated  and   the  UNSC  has  continued  to  rely  on  the  AU-­led  peace  support  operation  as  a  pivotal   pillar  in  the  political  and  security  stabilisation  effort  in  Somalia.  Only  in  2015,  the  UN   is  considering  the  possibility  of  deploying  a  UN  peacekeeping  force  in  Somalia.    Based   on  the  conditions  in  the  Country,  is  not  expected  to  be  conducive  to  deployment  until   the  end  of  2016  at  the  earliest  (What’s  in  Blue  2015).       AMISOM   is   unique   because   it   is   characterised   by   an   arranged   model   in   the   international   security   architecture   where   the   international   community   and   regional   organisations   are   working   in   close   partnership   to   advance   political   and   security   interests,   which   can   be   translated   as   a   form   of   hybridisation   (Boutellis   &  Williams   2013).  Not  only  is  AMISOM  supported  by  the  UN  Political  Office  for  Somalia  (UNPOS),   the   UN   Support   Office   for   AMISOM   (UNSOA),   and   the   UN   Assistance  Mission   in   Somalia  (UNSOM),  it  is  also  supported  by  IGAD,  UN  political  operations  and  the  UN   Country  Team  which  coordinates   the  UN  humanitarian  and  development  agencies.     The  UNSC  adopted  Resolution  1722  in  2007  for  AMISOM  to  take  all  necessary  means   to  inter  alia  protect  the  institutions  of  the  TFG  and  support  dialogue  and  reconciliation.     In  early  2010,  analysts,  such  as  Cilliers,  Boshoff  and  Aboagye  (2010)  from  the  Institute   for  Security  Studies,  reported  that  it  was  “unreasonable  to  think,  given  the  weakness   of   its   mandate   and   lack   of   means   and   resources,   that   it   [AMISOM]   could   deliver   anything  resembling  the  conditions  for  peace”.   1   03     In  2012,  the  UNSC  further  adopted  Resolution  2036  in  order  to  reduce  threats  posed   by  insurgents  and  other  armed  opposition  groups,  and  to  create  conditions  for  effective   and  legitimate  governance  across  Somalia  (de  Coning  &  Freear  2015).  This  resolution   enforced  AMISOM’s  multidimensional  strategy,  which  is  based  on  two  approaches:  a   security-­orientated   approach,   which   was   dependent   on   the   improvement   of   the   security  system  and  the  continuing  defeat  of   insurgents;;  and  a  politically-­orientated   approach,  which  was   based   on   the   promotion   of   good   governance.     Furthermore,   AMISOM   is   envisioned   to   play   a   supportive   role   as   it   leaves   the   ownership   of   the   process   to   the   Government   of   Somalia.   The   weakening   of   Al-­Shabaab   and   their   removal   from   the   control   of   strategic   areas,   and   the   protection   of   key   government   figures   (the   former  Transitional  Government   Institutions  and   the  current  Parliament   and  Presidency),  are  the  most  notable  achievements  of  AMISOM.       Al-­Shabaab,  an  Arabic  word   for   ‘the  youth’,  emerged  after   the   invasion  by  Ethiopia   that  ousted  the  Union  of  Islamic  Courts  (UIC)  in  December  2006  who  fought  against   what  they  perceived  to  be  an  internationally-­imposed  TFG.  Further,  Al-­Shabaab  is  also   opposed  to  AMISOM  and  any  UN  presence,  and  determined  on  imposing  its  extreme   version  of  Islam  on  the  country.    The  group’s  nuance  and  complexity  emerged  from   radical  remnants  of  the  UIC.  In  June  2015,  the  AU  troops  at  a  peacekeepers’  base   south  of  Mogadishu  were  attacked  by  Al-­Shabaab,  as  one  of  the  latest  series  of  such   attacks.     Prior   to   this,   Al-­Shabaab   aimed   to   collapse   Somalia’s   government   and   impose  its  own  strict  version  of  Islamic  law,  and  attacked  an  AU  convoy  with  Ethiopian   soldiers  along  the  same  route  (Omar  &  Sheikh  2015).  Al-­Shabaab  has  been  able  to   slow   down   the   progress   of   the   FGS   and   AMISOM   through   the   utilisation   of   asymmetrical  warfare  (i.e.  violent  attacks  and  indiscriminate  bombings  of  civilians)  and   attacks   on   Somali   and   foreign   targets.   Much   of   the   central   and   south   of   Somalia   remains  heavily  under  the  control  of  the  group.   Re-­establishing  the  rule  of  law  and  attaining  sustainable  and  lasting  peace  in  Somalia   has   not   been   easy.   AMISOM   has   been   confronted   with   contextual   and   structural   challenges  that  were  closely  related.  Contextually,  this  referred  to  the  challenges  that   emerged  from  the  recent  political  and  security  situation  in  Somalia.  Structurally,  this   referred   to   the   difficulties   that   AMISOM   have   faced   since   the   beginning   of   the   operation,  which  originated   from   the   institutional  deficiencies  of   the  AU  and  are  no   doubt  also  shared  by  other  AU  peacekeeping  operations  (Segul  2013).   1   04     It  is  evident  that  what  AMISOM  has  accomplished  so  far  can  be  viewed,  for  many,  as   ‘relative   successes’.  With  AMISOM’s   support,   the  SNF  have  effectively   evicted  Al-­ Shabaab  from  most  major  urban  centres  in  southern  Somalia,  including  Mogadishu,   Baidoa,  and  the  port  cities  of  Marka  and  Kismayo.  AMISOM  developed  the  techniques   and  tactics  that  have  enabled  it   to  achieve  sustained  military  successes  against  Al-­ Shabaab,  but  more  still  needs  to  be  done  to  defeat   the  terrorist  group.  As  a  result,   Mogadishu   is   witnessing   an   improvement   in   the   security   realm.   Asymmetric   and   systematic   attacks   in   some   areas   remain   a   reason   for   concern.   Thus,   it   can   be   deduced  that  AMISOM’s  military  successes,  in  those  areas,  remain  incomplete.   Although  AMISOM  has  evolved,  it  has  struggled  with  insufficient  equipment.    It  took   years  to  build  basic  facilities  such  as  medical  support  and  military  amenities.    Through   UN  support,  AMISOM  has  obtained  access  to  a  small  yet  still  insufficient  number  of   outsourced   helicopters   for  medical   evacuation   and   transport   functions.     These   are   important  features  as  troops  are  spread  over  a  wide  area.    In  addition,  AMISOM  has   been   limited   by   resources,   particularly   force   size,   despite   repeated   requests   for   increases  in  force  strength  from  the  AU.  By  2013,  AMISOM  emerged  to  become  the   foundation   of   stability   in  Somalia,  with   the   support   of   a   series   of   partnerships   and   alliances  with  the  Somali  government  forces,  the  Somali  National  Army  (SNA).     AMISOM  has  demonstrated  its  success  in  recent  years  and  has  grown  its  force  in  size,   but  at  the  same  time  it  has  necessarily  relied  on  non-­state  armed  groups  and  forces   across  Somalia,  to  different  degrees  and  at  different  times,  as  AMISOM  continues  to   provide  vital  human  intelligence  and  enhance  population  engagement;;  however,  this   strategy  is  challenged  by  the  independence,  reliability,  and  quality  of  these  non-­state   groups,  which  oftentimes  remained  less  than  the  ideal.  Furthermore,  the  effectiveness   of   AMISOM’s   ongoing   security   and   stability-­oriented   operations   and   efforts   to   consolidate   its  gains   remain  amongst   its  own  significant  challenges.    AMISOM  still   lacks  an  adequate  number  of   civilians  within   its   ranks   to  conduct  a  variety  of  non-­ military  stabilization  tasks;;  furthermore,  the  FGS  does  not  want  AMISOM  to  become   too  involved  with  issues  of  local  governance  and  policing  but  rather  focus  its  primary   efforts  on  dismantling  Al-­Shabaab  (Williams  2013:6).     1   05     AMISOM’s   recent  efforts   to  both  directly  and   indirectly  support   the  consolidation  of   Somalia’s  governance  and  administrative  structures  have  supported  greater  efforts  to   curb  the  scourge  of  war  in  Somalia.  After  21  years  without  a  central  government  and   disparity,  Somalia  is  now  witnessing  a  post-­transitional  situation  that  will  rely  much  on   the  strategic  approach  of  the  AU  PSC  through  the  support  of  AMISOM.  This  process   was  landmarked  by  the  launch  of  an  Interim  Constitution  in  2012,  the  inauguration  of   the   Federal   Parliament   and   the   inauguration   of   Mr   Hassan   Sheikh   Muhamud   as   President   of   the   Federal   Republic   of   Somalia   later   that   year.   These   political   developments   were   considered   milestones   in   the   stabilisation   of   the   country   and   stimulated  hope  that  such  events  could  be  the  inception  of  a  broader  political  process   embracing  all  Somalis  (Segul  2013).       The   deeply   rooted   institutional   legacy   of   corruption   needs   to   be   addressed.     In   addition,   the   weak   and   almost   non-­existent   political   apparatus,   as   well   as   its   effectiveness   in   those  areas   controlled  by   the  government   need   to  be   controlled   if   Somalia  is  to  have  any  change  for  stability.  Furthermore,  the  complexity  of  clan-­based   politics  that  are  preponderant  in  informal,  local,  and  self-­governed  structures  of  power   will  have  to  be  under  a  watchful  eye  (Segul  2013).  Therefore,  AMISOM’s  success  will   partially  depend  on  whether  governmental  structures  are  able  to  deliver  much  needed   pubic  goods  and  services,  and  provide  stability  and  peace  throughout  liberated  areas.   The  immediate  and  perhaps  most  challenging  goal  for  AMISOM  is  to  comprehend  how   to   stabilise   the   ostensive   ‘liberated   areas’   which   can   be   effectively   achieved   and   maintained   according   to   AMISOM’s   scope   and   capacities.   Since   2012,   AMISOM’s   expansion  in  areas  of  operation  has  been  vast.    For  instance,  areas  such  as  Barawe   and   Adale   have   been   liberated   and   according   to   AMISOM’s   Force   Commander,   Lieutenant  General  Silas  Ntigurirwa,  by  2014  the  SNA  and  AMISOM  forces  “control   more  than  80  percent  of  the  territory  of  Somalia”  (AMISOM  Review  2015:4).  AMISOM   will   need   to   promote   its   peace-­building   support   strategy   in   parallel   with   Somalia’s   strategy,  allowing  the  government  to  have  the  necessary  space  to  manoeuvre  in  order   to  be  the  leading  institution  in  the  process.         1   06     Lasting  peace   in  Somalia   requires   that  AMISOM  understand   the   local   initiatives   in   dealing   with   security   in   order   to   support   the   building   of   a   legitimate   and   effective   security  strategy.  The  AMISOM  police  have  the  mandate  to  engage  in  the  capacity   building  of  the  Somali  Police  Force  (SPF)  with  the  aim  of  transforming  it  into  a  credible   body  that  can  provide  security  for  the  population.  So  far,  AMISOM  has  assisted  the   SPF   in  vetting  600  former  Somali  police  officers  with   the  purpose  of   increasing   the   number  of  operational  police  officers  in  the  country.  More  formed  Police  Unit  members   and  equipment  are  required  to  effectively  guarantee  the  rule  of  law  in  Somalia.     Initially,   the   AMISOM   operational   mandate   did   not   include   specific   human   rights   components,  in  line  with  international  standards  for  peacekeeping.  A  shift  of  focus  by   the  AU  and  UN  resulted  in  greater  attention  to  civilian  protection  concerns,  leading  to   a  significant  drop  in  civilian  causalities.       Progress  has  also  been  made   in   the   state   formation  and   federalism  process.  Two   Interim  Regional  Administrations  (IRAs)  have  been  formed  in  Jubbaland  and  in  South   West  of  Somalia.  A  state   formation  process   is  also  underway   in   the  central   region,   while   initial   discussions   have   started   regarding   the   development   of   the   remaining   federal  state  covering  the  Hiraan  and  Middle  Shabelle  regions.  As  these  states  are   being  established,  demands  for  support  in  the  form  of  capacity  building  are  increasing.     Ensuring  inclusivity  in  the  political  process  remains  critical  as  demonstrated  in  Burundi.   Regional  and  local  community  reconciliation  efforts  will  also  need  to  be  strengthened.   Despite  these  improvements,  notable  challenges  remain  and  should  be  addressed  by   AMISOM  if  it  is  to  be  viewed  as  a  legitimate  and  credible  peacekeeping  operation  by   the  Somali  population.    The  ongoing  challenges  in  Somalia  necessitate  an  increase  of   AMISOM’s  strength  and  expansion  of  its  logistical  package.    Therefore,  the  SNA  will   need   to   be   supported   by   UNSOA   through   the   provision   of   food   and   water,   fuel,   transport,  tents  and  in-­theatre  medical  evacuation.    This  support  needs  to  be  provided   only   for   joint   SNA   operations   with   AMISOM   which   are   part   of   AMISOM’s   overall   strategic   concept.     In   light   of   the   progress   attained   in   2014   and   cognizant   of   the   changing  situation  in  Somalia,  a  joint  review  of  AMISOM  is  imperative,  especially  the   implementation  of  the  AMISOM  Concept  of  Operations  (CONOPS)  in  order  to  enhance   the  planning  and  effectiveness  of  the  joint  SNA,  AMISOM  operation  and  cooperation   with  other  partners.    Politically,  the  strategy  of  achieving  any  form  of  stability  before  a   1   07     wider   inter-­Somali   dialogue   is   a   mistake,   therefore,   keeping   Somalia   divided   will   continue  to  exacerbate  the  conflict.       As  a  way  forward,  it  is  important  for  the  UN  and  AU  to  learn  from  the  peacekeeping   operations   that   have   been   conducted   in   order   to   develop   ways   to   improve   their   peacekeeping  initiatives  for  sustainable  and  lasting  peace.    In  this  light,  it  is  important   to   consider   if   lessons   could   be   learned   from   the   case   of   Darfur   which   could   be   applicable  in  Somalia.     4.9  LESSONS  LEARNED  FROM  DARFUR  AND  SOMALIA:  A  CRITICAL   ANALYSIS     Peacekeeping  mandates   have   shifted   to   become   robust   in   response   to   constantly   changing   security   environments.     There   seems   to   be   a   perception   of   Africa   as   a   continent  that  knows  no  peace,  and  where  conflict  is  the  order  of  the  day.  These  are   narrow  perceptions,  which  have  not  recognised  the  positive  developments  that  African   member  states  have  made.       The  cases  of  Darfur  and  Somalia  are  of  great  significance.    They  are  analysed  from   both   the   international   and   African   perspectives,   and   efforts   are   directed   toward   bringing  about  peace,  security,  and  development.  Whether  these  efforts  will  result  in   lasting  peace,  remains  to  be  seen.  As  alluded  to,  both  peacekeeping  operations  have   a  potential  for  success,  if  accompanied  by  a  political  solution.     The  AU’s  response  to  the  conflict  in  Somalia,  mainly  in  the  Mogadishu  area,  adds  a   bleak  perspective  on  the  lessons  learned  from  AMIS.    Similar  to  AMIS,  TCCs  pledged   troops  for  AMISOM  but  failed  to  deploy  to  its  full  capacity.    While  the  AU  expressed   the  overarching  impetus  to  developing  African  solutions  to  African  problems,  its  initial   intention   with   AMISOM  was   to   prepare   the   ground   for   a   future   UN   peacekeeping   operation  (Ramsbothan  2007:270).       Darfur  and  Somalia  are  both  intertwined  by  complex  humanitarian  and  political  crises   which  face  a  strong  opposition  to  intervention.    In  both  cases,  the  UN  spoke  of  a  robust   military  intervention,  however,  this  did  not  come  to  pass  rapidly  enough.  Furthermore,   the  first  few  years  of  AMISOM’s  mandate  were  not  consistent  with  the  tasks  necessary   1   08     on   the   ground,   thus,   without   the   UN   presence,   AMISOM   remained   too   small   to   accomplish  its  tasks.       It  is  evident  that  both  the  case  of  Darfur  and  Somalia  demonstrate  how  valuable  the   political   commitment   of   the   AU   is   to   successfully   manage   and   prevent   conflicts.   However,  the  increasing  propensity  for  AU-­led  interventions  has  been  driven  more  so   by  political  considerations  than  by  the  practical  considerations  of  the  AU’s  capacity.     This  does  not  indicate  that  the  AU  should  only  intervene  when  it  has  capacity.  In  both   cases,  the  AU  responded  to  its  implicit  and  explicit  commitments  to  protect  civilians;;   however,   there  was   a   severe   disconnect   between   their  willingness   and   abilities   to   intervene.     The  same  strategy  in  place  to  combine  efforts  for  Darfur  can  be  applied  in  Somalia.     The  political  context  of  the  Country  and  buy-­in  of  the  population  would  be  imperative   towards  consolidating  the  Country.  It  is  important  to  have  joint  planning  and  training  in   order   for   the   AU   and   UN   to   succeed   in   their   peacekeeping   operation   to   stabilize   Somalia  (Gelot,  Gelot  &  de  Coning  2012:89).       Furthermore,  what  can  be  learned  from  the  case  of  Darfur  and  other  cases  such  as   Burundi  is  an  attempt  of  inclusivity  in  the  political  processes,  which  can  make  a  vital   difference  in  the  current  context  of  any  country.    Furthermore,  the  realities  of  Somalia,   which  are  threatening  and  have  the  potential  to  escalate,  remain  a  constant  challenge.       Hybrid   peacekeeping  operations  and  partnerships,   especially   between   the  AU  and   UN,  appear  to  constitute  evolving  trends  in  efforts  to  find  constructive  peace  support   solutions  to  African  conflicts.  The  complexities  in  Somalia  for  instance,  especially  for   AMISOM,  reflect  a  new  networked  pattern   in   the   international  security  architecture,   where  the  UN  and  regional  organisations  are  increasingly  working  in  close  partnership   to  enhance  political  and  security   interests.  The  number  of  actors  and  the  variety  of   different  development,  diplomatic,  and  security  interventions  thus  make  for  a  complex   and  often  unwieldy  network  of  international  peace  and  security  actors.  The  partnership   can  be  cumulative  -­  combined  efforts  to  shape  the  future  of  peacekeeping.  According   to  de  Cedric  and  Freear   (2015),   this  can  be  seen  as  a  networked-­pattern  of  multi-­ stakeholder  cooperation.   1   09     The  evolution  of  peacekeeping  on   the  continent,  although  adherent   to   international   norms  and  best  practices,  has  led  to  a  more  unpredictable  environment  on  the  ground.   There  is  no  blueprint  for  peacekeeping  operations,  and  the  UN  remains  derelict,  by   not   performing   its   functions   effectively   which   have   resulted   in   complex   logistical   aspects.    The  hybrid  partnership  over  the  years  have  become  more  co-­dependent:  the   UN  has  a  partner  it  engages  with  for  consent  to  intervene  in  states,  while  the  AU  has   a  counterpart  for  financial,  technical,  logistical  and  human  resource  assistance  to  fulfil   their   mandates.   It   is   therefore   important   to   practically   analyse   whether   these   partnerships   offer   any   new   insights   to   the   challenges   faced   on   the   continent.   This   arrangement   could   be   argued   to   be   asymmetrical   and   unparalleled,   based   on   the   mutual  consent  of  both  organisations.  Practically,  both  these  organisations  cannot  be   seen  as  co-­equal,  because  the  UN  is  much  more  experienced,  with  more  resources   than  the  AU.    Despite  this  fact,  the  AU  is  in  a  more  advantageous  position  in  terms  of   being  in  close  proximity  to  the  crisis  of  the  continent  and  it   is  able  to  respond  more   rapidly   than   the  UN.  Moreover,   the  AU  does  not  have  all   the  standards,   rules,  and   bureaucracies  in  place  that  the  UN  has  (de  Coning  &  Freear  2015).       The  approach  of  a  hybrid  partnership  as  demonstrated   in  Darfur  can  be  applied   in   Somalia,   only   if   there   is   coordination   and   collaboration   of   efforts,   from   both   organisations,   including  sub-­regional  efforts,   to  ensure  they  do  not  move  towards  a   paternalistic  approach.    The  regions  should  play  a  fundamental  role,  but  who  is  to  take   the   lead,   remains   a   debate.   The   rhetoric   notion   of   ‘African   solutions   to   African   problems’  is  challenged  by  ongoing  external  funding,  which  not  only  limits  the  space   to  which   the  AU  can  make  decisions,  but   it   has   the   risk  of   creating  a  dependency   syndrome.     Therefore,   because   of   the   prevailing   constraints,   hybridisation   through   burden-­sharing   arrangements   between   the  UN   and   the  AU   seems   to   be   the  most   effective  and  appropriate  approach  for  the  predictable  future.    Practically,  hybridisation   reflects   the   significance   and   legitimacy   of   African   leadership   in   regional   security,   especially   in   the   case   of   Darfur.     Furthermore,   the   resource   and   political   capacity   constraints   faced   by   the   AU   will   benefit   from   a   shared   responsibility   in   peace   operations  based  on  comparative  advantages  (Mickler  2013:507).    Although  the  AU   has   attempted   to   be   more   self-­sufficient   to   end   its   perpetual   and   disruptive   dependence   on   external   funding,   it   has   struggled   to   take   financial   responsibility   in   resolving  the  continent’s  conflicts.     1   10     4.10  CONCLUSION       Efforts  towards  peace,  security  and  development  are  essential  to  any  peacekeeping   operation,   and   the   UN   and   AU   have   confronted   their   own   challenges   toward   maintaining   peace   and   security.   Focusing   on   the   AU,   its   limitations   have   been   especially   demonstrated   in   its   conduct   of   peacekeeping   operations.   AU-­led   peacekeeping  operations  have  been  characterised  by  the  absence  of  clear  articulated   frameworks  for  peacekeeping.    These  challenges  are  further  coupled  with  the  lack  of   capacity  and  effectiveness  on  the  ground,  as  demonstrated  through  AMIS  in  Darfur   and  AMISOM  in  Somalia.     The  root  causes  of  the  violence  in  Darfur  originate  from  its  inter-­tribal  conflict  over  land   and  other  cross-­cutting  factors.  In  this  light,  experiences  in  the  Darfur  crisis  provide  an   imperative  case  study  of  the  international  community’s  commitment  to  peacekeeping   operations,  particularly  in  the  face  of  emerging  humanitarian  crises.     The   challenges  and  atrocities   in  Darfur   are   evidence   that   there   is   no   clear  way   to   translate   the   theories   of   preventive   action   into   effective   and   realistic   practices.   Therefore,   it   is   important   for   the   international   community   to   move   beyond   empty   rhetoric  of  ‘never  again’  by  adopting  a  robust  mandate  and  setting  a  strong  precedence   from   the   onset.   Policymakers   need   to   address   the   assumptions   and   interests   that   impede  the  UNSC  member  states  to  rapidly  respond  to  the  crises  in  Africa.       Furthermore,  the  lack  of  capacity  within  the  UN  and  AU  will  need  to  be  dealt  with  in   order   to   move   towards   resilience.   The   establishment   of   the   AU   was   greeted   with   prominence  and  the  mere  reality  that  it  is  willing  to  undertake  peacekeeping  initiatives   was   a  marked   improvement   from   the   indifference   of   the   OAU.   The   organisation’s   failure   to   address   the   conflicts   in   Darfur   only   validated   the   lack   of   resources   and   capacity  which  impeded  the  protection  of  civilians.    Despite  the  challenges  faced  by   the  organisations,  it  has  seen  relative  successes  towards  its  attempt  to  resolving  and   managing  conflicts  within  the  continent.  The  peacekeeping  operations  conducted  in   Darfur  and  Somalia  have  sparked  great  controversy  towards  political  outcomes  that   are  needed  for  sustainable  and  lasting  peace.     1   11     Although   the   case   of   Darfur   presented   the   AU   with   an   opportunity   to   find   African   solutions  to  African  problems,  this  slogan  or  notion  provides  an  opportune  façade  of   the  international  community  to  commit  their  own  troops  to  Darfur.    Nonetheless,  the   AU,  despite  their  inexperience  in  peacekeeping  operations,  was  able  to  deploy  troops   to  the  Country.    The  UN  could  have  been  a  strong  and  legitimate  actor  in  the  case  of   Darfur,   showing   that   the   international   community   would   not   tolerate   genocide   and   ethnic  cleansing.    Internal  constraints  and  a  lack  of  political  will  have  prevented  it  from   doing  so,  thus  there  remained  a  role  to  be  played  by  African  organisations.   The   ineffective  mandate   of   AMIS   is   one   of   the   fundamental   criticisms   against   the   peacekeeping   operation.   Such   mandates   have   plagued   peacekeeping   operations   since   their   inception,   including   the  surge  of  demands   for  peacekeeping  operations.     However,   a   few   have   failed,   such   as   the   peace   operations   in   Rwanda.     Although   attempts   were   made   to   enhance   the   international   community’s   response   to   the   conflicts,   consensus   was   achieved   to   use   the   Brahimi   Report   as   a   baseline   for   peacekeeping  operations.  AMIS  has  inspired  reflection  on  how  experience  can  guide   future  peace  operations.   Similarly  to  the  AMIB,  the  AU  lacked  funds  and  personnel  for  AMIS,  which  was  also   hindered  by  a  lack  of  logistics,  a  lack  of  capacity  to  address  the  complexities  of  Darfur,   especially  guided  by  an  unclear  mandate,  and  operational  gaps.  As  a  result,  the  first   of   its   kind,   where   UN   peacekeepers   have   explicitly   worked   with   another   regional   organisation,  most  specifically  the  AU,  in  a  single  integrated  operation  funded  by  the   UN  mechanism  and  structure.      Despite  the  fact  that  the  violence  in  Darfur  and  other   parts   of   the   Sudan   continue   to   hinder   proper   operations   of   UNAMID,   there   are   evidences   that   its   legitimacy   is   in   place.   However,   with   reflection   of   the   on-­going   violence,  its  legitimacy  encounters  criticisms  due  to  the  on-­going  violence  in  Darfur.  In   addition,  the  image  of  the  UN  has  been  severely  tarnished,  not  only  by  claims  of  severe   abuse  by  peacekeepers,  but  also  by  its  inability  to  respond  quickly  and  effectively  to   these  events.   Conflicts  over  economic  resources  have  been  a  point  of  contention,  prior  and  post-­ independence,  and   this  has  only  deteriorated   the  cultural   divide   in  Somalia.   In   the   post-­independence   period,   struggle   over   state   power   involved   securing   the   major   economic   resources.  This  coupled  with  economic  mismanagement,  corruption,  and   1   12     failure  to  meet  the  citizen’s  expectations  has  increased  poverty  and  discontent  which   intensified   the  crisis.  The  situation   in  Somalia  needs   immediate   intervention  by   the   international  community.  As  a  result,  both  regional  and  international  organisations  had   a  role  to  play  in  resolving  the  Somali  conflict.   The  AU  was  the  appropriate  mediator  in  the  case  of  Darfur  because  it  possessed  the   regional  knowledge  and  has  the  right  intention  to  find  a  resolution  to  the  conflict.  The   role   it   played  was   partially  motivated   by   the   notion   of   ‘African   solutions   to   African   problems’  –  however,  this  is  not  to  say  that  Africa  is  able  to  do  this  in  a  vacuum.  Cases   such  as  genocide,  mass  murder  and  ethnic  cleansing,  are  not  only  African  problems,   but   international   problems.   Although   the   UNSC   is   limited   by   the   respect   of   state   sovereignty,   it   can  still   take   robust   initiatives  by  supporting  other   regional  actors   to   address  the  conflict  in  Darfur.    At  the  time  of  structural  UNSC  limits,  the  AU  in  spite  of   its  own  challenges  was  the  only  regional  actor  left  to  address  the  situation  in  Darfur,   and  should  be  credited  for  that.   The  experience  of  the  hybrid  peacekeeping  operation  in  Darfur  demonstrates  that  a   transition  from  an  AU  to  a  UN  peacekeeping  operation  does  not  necessarily  present  a   solution   to   Africa’s   peacekeeping   challenges.     While   a   hybrid   approach   to   peacekeeping   offers   useful   possibilities   into   the   AU’s   initiative   to   undertake   peacekeeping   operations,   albeit   jointly   with   the   UN,   the   partnership   falls   short   of   expectation  in  its  implementation.  Hybrid  operations  enhances  the  collaboration  of  one   body   complementing   the   other   according   to   their   comparative   advantage   towards   achieving   sustainable   peace.     The   AU   will   need   to   be   cautious   not   to   lose   this   advantage  by  building  bureaucracies  which  will  slow  down  any  future  deployment  for   a  peacekeeping  operation  in  Africa.   As   a   new   and   growing   approach   to   peacekeeping   operations,   it   is   important   to   determine  what   the  UN-­AU  hybridisation  represents  realistically.    Hybrid  operations   will   continue   to   be   a   major   feature   on   the   peacekeeping   landscape.     The   AU’s   experience  in  Darfur  and  Somalia  proves  that  much  is  still  to  be  improved  in  order  to   deliver   peace   and   security   in   Africa.     It   is   without   doubt   that   the   AU’s   peace   and   security  architecture  is  and  will  continue  to  be  a  fundamental  component  of  Africa’s   solidarity  towards  its  peacekeeping  initiatives.     1   13     CHAPTER  5:  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION     5.1  SUMMARY     The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  analyse  and  assess  whether  hybrid  peace  operations   may  offer  new  prospects  or  opportunities  to  respond  to  the  prevailing  challenges  of   international   peacekeeping   in   Africa.   This   objective   was   formulated   against   the   growing   complexity   of   peacekeeping   operations,   which   have   become   multidimensional  and  robust  in  nature.    The  study  traced  the  evolution  of  the  roles  and   policy  frameworks  of  the  organisations  involved  in  African  peacekeeping  operations,   specifically  the  UN  and  the  AU.    In  addition,  the  study  focused  on  the  regional  initiatives   and   non-­UN   peacekeeping   operations   in   Africa,   as   well   as   regional   organisations   which  are  and  have  been  active  within  the  African  continent.     The  study  specifically  explored  hybrid  peace  operations  in  Darfur  and  Somalia  as  case   studies.  The  entire  investigation  was  contextualised  through  a  literature  review  and  an   analysis  of  Africa’s  engagement  in  peacekeeping  operations.   To  facilitate  this  study,  the  following  questions  were  formulated:     Do  hybrid  peacekeeping  or  recent  forms  of  UN-­AU  co-­operation  offer  new  prospects   or  opportunities  for  the  challenges  relating  to  international  peacekeeping  in  Africa?     Furthermore,   is   the   international   community   moving   towards   more   effective   and   legitimate   peacekeeping   operations   when   it   follows   an   approach   of   hybrid   peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa,  such  as  the  one  in  Sudan  and  previously  in  Liberia   and  Burundi,   or  where  an  AU   force   is  deployed   in  accordance  with  a  UN  Security   Council  mandate,  such  as  the  case  of  Somalia?   The  challenge  of  the  UN  becoming  overstretched  to  maintain  international  peace  and   security,  and  having  to  attend  to  the  legitimacy  of  its  peacekeeping  operations,  formed   the   conceptual   distinction   of   the   research   problem.     Furthermore,   the   challenge   to   address  Africa’s  conflict  and  security  needs  formed  the  basis  of  the  research  problem.     This  included  the  possibility  to  pursue  an  integrated  system  of  burden-­sharing  that  will   play  a  meaningful  role  for  future  peacekeeping  endeavours  in  Africa.       1   14     The  African  continent  formed  the  geographic  demarcation,  whereas  the  post-­Cold  War   period   from   1992   to   2014   formed   the   temporal   demarcation.     The   temporal   demarcation  took  into  account  traditional  peacekeeping  operations  in  which  lessons   might  be  learnt.    The  research  methodology  used  is  a  historical-­critical  study  based  on   analyses  of  literature  in  the  scholarly  field  of  international  peacekeeping  operations.   The  analytical  framework  of  the  study  is  deductively  linked  using  qualitative  analysis.         The  study  presented  an  in-­depth  understanding  of  the  practice  of  hybrid  peacekeeping   and   a   comprehensive   appreciation   of   its   evolution   in   a   world   which   bears   little   resemblance  to  post-­Cold  War  expectations.       The  data  gathered  was  largely  qualitative  in  nature  using,  documents  of  peacekeeping   which   focused   on   the   hybrid   operations   in   Somalia   and   Sudan.   Secondary   data   sources   included   published   documents,   reports,   newspaper   articles   and   reports   regarding  the  mandate  of  operations,  and  books.    In  addition,  primary  sources  included   official   UN   and   AU   documents,   and   relevant   documents   on   the   concept   of   hybrid   peacekeeping  with   reference   to  Somalia  and  Darfur  were  utilized.    The   study  also   focused  on  peacekeeping  operations  in  the  two  countries,  Somalia  and  Sudan,  which   are  different  in  terms  of  background  and  context  –  specifically  from  a  peacekeeping   perspective.  Sudan  has  a  political  structure  (that  is,  a  government)  that  could  be  used   to  consent  to  intervention,  whereas  Somalia  has  a  very  tenuous  structure.       The  study  interrogated  the  international  community’s  belief  that  a  country  can  only  be   at  peace  if  it  has  a  central  government.    The  research  revealed  that  in  the  absence  of   a   central   government   in   Somalia,   Mogadishu   experienced   turbulence,   while   other   parts   of   the   country   such   as   Somaliland   and   Puntland   remained   peaceful.   The   limitation  of  the  study  relates  to  the  ongoing  peacekeeping  operations  in  Darfur  and   Somalia.   It   thus  would  be  premature   to  make  a  conclusive   judgement  on   its   future   prospects  because  the  peacekeeping  operations  in  both  cases  have  not  been  brought   to  finality.   The   significance   of   this   study   is   that   the   conclusions   reached   could   assist   policy-­ makers,  practitioners  and  academics,  as  well  as  other   researchers  and  analysts   to   explore  hybridisation  in  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa  and  other  forms  of  burden-­ sharing,  as  a  fairly  practical  prospect  in  the  arena  of  international  peacekeeping  with   specific  reference  to  the  multinational  operations  in  Somalia  and  Darfur.    In  addition,   1   15     it  could  assist  decision-­makers  at  different  levels  to  develop  a  better  understanding  of   the  complexities  and  considerations  of  the  deploying  authorities  at  higher  international   political  levels,  and  thus  enrich  all  relevant  actors  who  need  to  exercise  responsibilities   with  regard  to  the  complex  challenges  relating  to  hybrid   international  peacekeeping   operations  in  Africa.    Furthermore,   it   is  hoped  that  the  outcome  and  findings  of  this   study  would  facilitate  and  stimulate  further  scholarly  analysis  and  reflection  on  future   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   or   other   forms   of   contemporary   UN-­AU   burden-­ sharing  as  a  suitable  working  arrangement  to  better  address  the  challenges  in  conflict-­ ridden  African  states.   It   is  even  trusted  that   the  research  conducted  could  serve  as   some  kind  of  a  framework  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  hybridisation  may  serve  as  a   model  or  parameter  for  future  peacekeeping  operations.   The   study   commenced   by   looking   at   the   theoretical   framework   of   peacekeeping   intervention   in   sub-­Saran   Africa   based   on   new   institutional   co-­operation   and   partnerships   between   the   UN   and   the   AU.     It   revealed   that   the   respect   of   state   sovereignty   as   provisioned   in   the   UN   Charter   is   important;;   however,   it   cannot   be   utilised   as   a   right   if   mass   atrocities   are   committed.   Sovereignty   should   be   a   responsibility  of  which  states  can  be  accountable  to  the  international  community  for  its   actions.     If   the   state  did  not   or  was  unable   to   take  upon   this   responsibility,   it   then   becomes  the  international  community’s  responsibility  to  act  for  the  preservation  of  life.   Despite  some  progress  in  the  spread  of  human  rights,  respect  for  state  sovereignty   continues  to  take  precedence.       The  study  also  emphasised  that  the  ICISS  report  should  be  practical  and  should  be   implemented  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis.    The  rise  of  conflicts  has  necessitated  the  need   for  peacekeeping  operations,  which  have  often  been  guided  by  the  Brahimi  Report,   especially   in   post-­2000.     The   landmark   Brahimi   report   charted   a   renewed   vision,   principles,   and   guidance   that   were  more   robust   and   cost-­efficient   for   effective  UN   peacekeeping.   It  also  provided  recommendations   for  sweeping  changes   in   the  way   UN   peacekeeping   and   associated   post-­conflict   peace-­building   are   conceived,   planned,  and  executed.  In  alignment  with  Boutros  Boutros  Ghali’s  1992  An  Agenda   for  Peace,  the  Brahimi  report  aimed  to  recommence  pledges  made  by  UN  member   states  to  maintain  international  peace  and  security.  The  vital  contribution  of  An  Agenda   for  Peace  was  to  the  modern  understanding  of  peace  and  the  comprehension  of  the   concept  of  post-­conflict  peace-­building.    The  study  also   revealed   that  Post-­Brahimi   1   16     report  operations  require  peacekeepers  to  identify  potential  spoilers  of  the  mandate   and  take  action  against  them,  using  force  if  necessary.   During   this   epoch,   peacekeeping   has   been   characterised   by   the   increasing   involvement  of  transnational  and  regional  organisations  that  contribute  to  the  credibility   and   achievability   of   the   mandates.     In   order   to   maintain   international   peace   and   security  with  the  focus  on  the  African  continent,  it  has  become  apparent  that  the  UN   cannot  work  in  a  vacuum  but  needs  the  assistance  of  regional  actors.    Without  this   approach,  the  UN  can  become  overstretched  in  terms  of  maintaining  peace.    Actors   such  the  AU  and  sub-­regional  actors  have  developed  over  the  years  and  have  had  a   vital   interest  and  a  critical   role   to  play   in  bringing  about  peace  and  security  on   the   continent.    Therefore,  the  relationship  between  the  two  organisations,  the  UN/AU,  is   of   paramount   importance   if   the   international   community   is   to   take   lasting   peace   seriously,  which  will  depend  on  coherent  and  strategically  structured  relations  which   are  systematically  integrated.   The  study  also  revealed  that  the  AU  has  come  a  long  way  since  it  succeeded  the  OAU,   especially  with  the  changing  and  complex  political  and  security  environment  into  which   it  was  born.  As  part  of  the  changing  nature  of  conflicts,  the  organisation  shifted  from   non-­interference  to  non-­indifference,  underscoring  the  role  Africans  are  playing  to  take   responsibility  for  peace  and  security.  To  this  end,  the  AU  has  deployed  more  peace   operations   with   increasingly   complex  mandates   into   volatile   conflict   environments.     The   peace   operations   were   beset   by   many   logistical   and   financial   challenges,   including  political  and  material  support  and  unclear  mandates.    The  case  of  Liberia   and   Burundi,   as   part   of   the   first   hybrid   peace   operations   to   be   conducted,   have   accentuated   the   need   for   the  UN   to   get   involved   in   efforts   to  maintain   peace   and   security  at  the  earliest  stage  of  a  conflict  and  including  collaboration  with  regional  and   sub-­regional   organisations   from   the   onset   of   peace   operations.     Hybridisation   in   African  peacekeeping  has  involved  both  regional  and  global  peacekeeping  tools  and   resources   toward   peace.   The   concept   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   requires   more  than  just  merging  efforts  of  peacekeeping  operations  together.   The  study  analysed  hybrid  peacekeeping,  especially  recent  incarnations  of  UN/AU  co-­ operation  in  peace  operations.    It  acknowledged  that  the  AU’s  limitations  have  been   especially   demonstrated   in   its   conduct   of   peacekeeping   operations.   AU-­led   1   17     peacekeeping   operations   have   been   characterised   by   the   absence   of   clearly   articulated  frameworks  for  peacekeeping.    The  study  revealed  that  similar  challenges   were   faced   in   both   the   Darfur   and   Somalia   peacekeeping   operations.     These   challenges   include   the   lack   of   capacity   and   effectiveness,   unclear   mandates,   and   limited  resources.  The  challenges  and  atrocities  in  Darfur  provide  evidence  that  there   is  no  clear  way  to  translate  the  theories  of  preventive  action  into  effective  and  realistic   practices.  Therefore,  it   is  important  for  the  international  community  to  move  beyond   empty   rhetoric   of   ‘never   again’   by   adopting   robust  mandates,   and   setting   a   strong   precedent  from  the  onset.  Thus  a  conclusion  can  be  made  in  the  context  of  providing   answers  to  the  research  question.     5.2  EVALUATION  OF  THE  RESEARCH  QUESTION     Do  hybrid  peacekeeping  or  recent  forms  of  UN-­AU  co-­operation  offer  new  prospects   or  opportunities  for  the  challenges  relating  to  international  peacekeeping  co-­operation   in  Africa?     The  international  community  seems  to  have   learned  from  the  darkest  history  of   the   Rwanda  genocide  to  never  again  fail  to  act  in  the  face  of  gross  forms  of  human  rights   violations.    This  resulted  in  a  shift  from  the  right  to  intervene  to  R2P,  because  if  states   fail   or   are   unable   to   protect   human   rights,   the   international   community   has   the   responsibility  to   intervene  for  the  protection  of  civilians.  Notwithstanding  this  notion,   there   is   still   great   debate   on   what   it   means   practically,   when,   and   how   it   can   be   implemented.    The  concept  of  R2P  can  be  useful  to  respond  to  the  atrocities  being   committed;;  however,   it  unfortunately   fails   to  achieve   its   intended  purpose,  and  has   created  confusion  on  its  modalities  towards  implementation.    The  study  revealed  that   this   concept   is   of   a   political   nature   and   requires   more   clarification   to   improve   its   implementation.    Due  to  its  nature,  R2P  can  be  biased  toward  the  countries  in  need  or   the  most  vulnerable  states.    It  is  also  an  infringement  upon  state  sovereignty  and  an   amplification  of  human  rights.    Yet  it  is  a  tool  to  ensure  the  balance  of  both  concepts.     Clear   guidelines  will   need   to   be   defined   in   order   to   expand   on   the   circumstances   requiring  international  intervention.    Despite  state  sovereignty  remaining  rooted  in  the   notion  of  non-­interference  of  external  forces  in  domestic  affairs,   it  can  no  longer  be   seen  as  absolute.    This  study  revealed  that  R2P  is  faced  with  the  challenge  of  state   1   18     sovereignty.    Nonetheless,  implementation  of  this  concept  has  the  potential  to  serve   as  being  responsible  and  accountable  to  the  international  community  for  the  protection   of   the  population.     The   international   community  will   need   to   be   flexible   in   order   to   protect  civilians  based  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis.    Therefore,  human  rights  and  security   should   be   the   primary   focus   as   denoted   by   Kransner   (2001),   Baylis   (2005),   and   Duffield   (2007).     Duffield   (2007)   further   emphasise   the   need   for   a   security-­ development   nexus   as   a   way   to   achieve   coherent   and   well-­managed   policies   regarding  complex  challenges  facing  states.   The  study  revealed  that  there  is  a  lack  of  or  unclear  guidelines  on  how  to  intervene,   support  peacekeeping  operations  that  are  conducted  on  the  African  continent  such  as   the  DRC  and  Mali,  the  use  of  force,  and  the  protection  of  civilians.    Although  the  UN   has   developed   guidelines   for   peacekeeping   operations,   including   implementing   recommendations  from  the  Brahimi  report,  these  need  to  be  practical  to  fit  the  current   situation   faced   by   states.     These   will   need   to   reflect   and   enhance   the   roles   transnational  and  regional  organisations  can  play  to  maintain  peace  and  security.  The   study  acknowledged  that  the  relationship  between  the  UN,  regional,  and  sub-­regional   organisations   is   of   paramount   importance,   and   its   advantage   will   depend   on   coherence  and  strategically  structured  relations  which  are  systematically  integrated.     Moreover,   by   working   together   they   will   reach   far   greater   legitimacy   despite   both   entities’  shortcomings.     Collective  security  can  play  an  important  role  in  terms  of  the  proposition  that  a  threat   to  peace  in  Africa  or  elsewhere  should  be  considered  a  threat  to  peace  everywhere.   Yet,  it  was  evident  that  the  UN  cannot  maintain  international  peace  and  security  in  a   vacuum,  thus  the  growing  role  of  the  AU  and  sub-­regional  organisations.  Guided  by   the  AU  Constitutive  Act,  the  AU  established  several  institutions,  bodies,  and  protocols   to  address  continental  security  and  development  under  the  framework  of  the  APSA.   The  African  continent  continues  to  have  a  strong  desire  to  build  capability  to  address   and  rapidly  respond  to  crises  through  the  establishment  of  an  ASF.  There  has  long   been   talk   of   implementing   an   ASF,   which   is   still   underway   and   expected   to   be   operational   in   the  near   future,  after  being  postponed   in  2010.    However,   the  APSA   structure  is  too  ambitious  and  complex  for  a  continent  comprised  of  limited  capacity   and  diverse  in  political  differences.    The  APSA  has  been  unable  to  address  the  current   challenges  of  peacekeeping   in  Africa  such  as   in  the  Sahel  and  CAR.    The  AU  was   1   19     incapable   of   fielding   a   credible   intervention   and   was   overtaken   by   the   decisive   response   of   the   French   in  Mali.     This   testifies   to   the   weakness   of   the   APSA   and   specifically  the  AU  and  African  regional  organisations.    Therefore,  before  the  APSA   can   function   as   originally   envisaged,   it   requires   extra   time,   effort,   funding,   and   coordination.     In   2015,   due   to   the   slow   developments   of   the   RECs,   delays,   and   setbacks,  an  alternative  solution  to  rapidly  respond  was  proposed.    This  proposal  is   the  ACIRC  which  is  designed  to  be  a  mechanism  available  until   the  full  operational   capacity  of  the  ASF  is  ready.    Discussions  are  however  still  underway.    There  has  also   been  a   trend   towards   increasing  continental  and   regional  ownership   for  peace  and   security   activities.   The   AU   has   been   working   to   strengthen   its   capacity   to   plan,   manage,  and  implement  peace  operations  on  the  continent  through  the  development   and  implementation  of  policies  that  have  assisted  to  advance  the  development  of  the   ASF  and  improve  the  capacity  and  capability  of  the  current  peacekeeping  operations   in  the  implementation  of  their  mandates.   The  study  revealed  that  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  and  complementarity  between  the   UN,  the  AU,  and  the  RECs  when  it  came  to  decision-­making  on  interventions  and  the   division  of  labour,  has  been  given  greater  attention.  A  range  of  initiatives  have  been   implemented  by  regional  organisations  in  the  form  of  support  to  the  UN  and  in  return   the  UN’s  support  to  the  regional  organisations  have  led  to  co-­deployment  or  budgetary   support.    The  lack  of  a  practical  definition  that  would  govern  the  relationship  is  unclear   and   it   is   a   significant   omission.     Despite   political   difficulties   that   face   the   regional   organisations,  such  as  lack  of  resources  and  funding,  their  involvement  continues  to   grow   and   promote   subsidiarity.     There   is   a   need   to   enhance   partnership   and   cooperation  between  the  UN,  AU,  and  RECs,  and  clarify  the  primary  responsibility  of   the  UNSC  and  the  AU  PSC.    Furthermore,  a  more  effective  strategic  partnership  is   needed  to  manage  conflicts  on  the  African  continent.       Hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  do  not  occur   in  a  political  vacuum  but   rather  as  a   collective  effort  by  the  organisations  to  address  the  wide  range  of  peace  and  security   challenges   confronting   international   peacekeeping   in   Africa.     Hybridization   is   characterised  by  various  institutions  collaborating  and  complementing  one  another  to   enhance  their  comparative  advantages,  and  sharing  the  political  and  economic  costs   of  responding  in  order  to  work  towards  an  environment  of  sustainable  peace.    Thus,   comprehensively  addressing  the  root  causes  of  a  given  conflict  requires  commitment   1   20     from  various  actors   to  work   together   in   a   partnership.    Moreover,   coordinated  and   coherent  strategies  would  be  more  optimal  if  accompanied  by  clear  objectives  in  order   to  enhance  peacekeeping  initiatives.    Hybrid  operations  enhance  the  collaboration  of   one   body   complementing   the   other   according   to   their   respective   comparative   advantage  which  will  guide  decisions  to  enhance  peace  operations.  This  approach  to   peacekeeping   introduces   useful   possibilities   into   the   AU’s   initiative   to   undertake   peacekeeping  operations,  albeit  jointly  with  the  UN,  although  the  partnership  falls  short   of  expectation  in  its  implementation.     The  African  continent  is  a  fundamental  part  of  the  interconnected  world  and  the  AU  is   seeming  to  be  a  partner  of  the  UN  in  peacekeeping  operations,  which  is  grounded  in   mutual  responsibility.    But  this  relationship  should  be  seen  as  a  partnership  in  building   the  capacity  for  transformation.    The  mutual  security  arrangement  is  a  foundation  of   the  partnership  which  focuses  on  areas  that  are  critical  to  the  future  of  peacekeeping   operations  on  the  African  continent.    The  AU  will  need  to  be  cautious  not  to  lose  this   advantage  by  building  bureaucracies  which  would  slow  down  any  future  deployment   for  a  peacekeeping  operation  in  Africa.  It  also  needs  to  remain  vigilant  to  ensure  that   it  does  not  descend  into  a  form  of  paternalism  and  dependence  on  external  actors.     Moreover,   regional   organisations   have   and   continue   to   play   a   primary   and   more   fundamental   role   in   peacekeeping   operations.     These   have   proven   themselves   in   responding   to   conflict   on   the   continent   as   demonstrated   in   Liberia   and   Burundi,   especially   in   the   wake   of   the   international   community’s   lack   of   a   political   will   to   intervene  and  rapidly  respond  to  the  atrocities  being  committed.    There  still  remains   challenges  regarding  the  clarity  of  roles,  responsibilities,  and  command  and  control   structures  of   these  entities   in  peacekeeping  operations  which   require   coordination,   collaboration,  and  cooperation.    Without  these,  the  roles  are  blurred,  coupled  with  the   possibility  of  duplication  of  work  especially  with  the  rise  of  civil  conflicts.   The   implementation   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations   offers   new   prospects   or   opportunities   despite   the   AU’s   lack   of   financial   capacity   to   fund   its   own   peace   operations  and  will  rely  on  funding  from  external  partners  and  donors.    Although  there   is   an   understanding   that   the   UN   will   not   intervene   in   a   country   unless   there   is   a   ceasefire  in  place,  it  then  leaves  regional  and  sub-­regional  organisation  in  a  position   where  they  have  to  take  responsibility  despite  their  limitations.    The  challenges  facing   African  states  are  real  and  they  are  many;;  however,  the  needs  to  circumvent  them  will   1   21     not  be  met  with  ease  or  in  a  short  period  of  time.    Furthermore,  the  failure  to  rapidly   respond  is  a  direct  result  of  fragmented  politics  and  failed  policies.    Therefore,  instead   of   the  AU  waiting   for   the   international  community   to   respond,   the  notion  of   ‘African   solutions  to  African  problems’  comes  to  play.    Africans  are  in  the  forefront  to  resolve   conflicts,   keep   the  peace,  and  support   those   in  need,  whether   through  AU  or  sub-­ regionally-­led   operations.   The   initiatives   are   nonetheless   supported   by   the   international   community   such   as   the   case   in   Somalia.   Thus,   hybrid   peacekeeping   between   the   UN/AU   does   offer   new   opportunities   to   the   challenges   relating   to   international  peacekeeping  cooperation  in  Africa  if  they  are  to  use  the  advantages  they   have  to  bring  about  peace.   Is   the   international   community   moving   towards   more   effective   and   legitimate   peacekeeping   operations   when   it   follows   an   approach   of   hybrid   peacekeeping   operations  in  Africa,  such  as  the  one  in  Sudan  and  previously  in  Liberia  and  Burundi,   or  where  an  AU  force  is  deployed  in  accordance  with  a  UN  Security  Council  mandate,   such  as  the  case  of  Somalia?   When   disagreements,   disputes,   and   conflict   arise,   they   frequently   require   the   implementation  of  preventative  measures,  and  often  boots  on  the  ground  to  defuse   the  conflict,  thus  the  importance  of  peacekeeping.    The  growing  demands  and  complex   nature  of  peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa  have  led  to  the  approach  of  hybridisation.       The   study   revealed   that   conflicts   in   Liberia,   Burundi,   Darfur,   and   Somalia   are   not   simply  African  problems  but  are  global  security  challenges  which  require  a  global  and   collective   response.     Hence,   multilateral   partnerships   through   decision-­making   assistance  and  support,  and  the  will   to  contribute  towards  efforts  of  peace,  security   and  development   on   the  African   continent   are   of   great   significance.     Therefore,   to   ensure   this  objective,   states  will   need   to  shoulder   the  burden,  both  by  contributing   troops  and  sharing  the  financial  costs  of  the  operations  provided,  that  peacekeepers   deliver  on  their  mandate  –  it  may  also  bring  a  greater  degree  of  legitimacy  in  the  eyes   of  the  local  population.     The  study  focused  on  the  case  of  Liberia  to  analyse  regional  initiatives  and  non-­UN   peacekeeping  operations  in  Africa  as  a  matter  of  providing  a  historical  analysis  and   perspective  on   the   topic  under   review.    As  one  of   the   first  hybrid  peace  operations   conducted  (sub-­regional  organisation  cooperated  with  a  small  UN  observer  force),  the   1   22     study  interrogated  the  role  sub-­regional  organisations  can  play  to  bring  about  peace   in  Africa,  such  as  ECOWAS  who  acted  under  Chapter  VIII  of  the  UN  Charter.    The   study   revealed   that,   although   the   Community   was   initially   established   to   address   issues   of   economic   integration   and   development,   however   in   the  midst   of   security   challenges   faced,   they   took   responsibility   for  maintaining  peace  and  security   in   the   region.    As  a  result,  ECOMOG  was  established  as  a  military  arm  of  ECOWAS.    Before   the  deployment  of  ECOMOG  in  Liberia,  there  was  no  cease-­fire  agreement  in  place   and  no  peace  to  keep,  yet  they  were  assigned  peacekeeping  duties,  making  it  unclear   whether   the  operation  was  a  peacekeeping   intervention  or   a   traditional  multilateral   intervention.       Thus  the  study  further  revealed  the  importance  for  a  clear  mandate  from  the  outsets   in  order  to  ensure  lasting  peace  for  the  states  faced  with  conflict.    Despite  the  costs   and   challenges   faced,   ECOWAS-­ECOMOG   relatively   succeeded   to   implement   its   mandate,   but   failed   to   create   lasting   peace.   As   reiterated,   the   intervention   of   ECOWAS-­ECOMOG  exemplifies  the  requirement  for  a  clear  mandate  suitable  to  meet   the  needs  on  the  ground.    Responding  to  conflict  in  a  timely  manner  might  result  in   increased  instances  of  preventive  deployment  (to  avert  a  major  crisis)  rather  than  full-­ fledged  peacekeeping  operations,  which  are  more  cost  intensive.    ECOMOG  was  able   to  conduct  a  robust  operation  which  imposed  a  stable  environment.    Moreover,  their   impact   also   determined   a   number   of   post-­conflict   issues   such   as   reforming   of   the   national  army  and  police.    The  peacekeeping  operation  in  Liberia  indicated  the  region’s   willingness  to  combat  instability  and  the  impetuses  to  respond  to  conflict  are  unique   due  to  the  case’s  contextual  environment.    The  study  revealed  that  the  rapid  response   by  ECOWAS  signifies  the  capability  of  a  sub-­regional  organisation  to  save  thousands   of   lives,   particularly   in   a   country   that   has   spent   years   on   the   brink   of   collapse.     ECOMOG  was   faced   with   a   task   of   establishing   political   order   and   the   UN   came   afterwards   to   consolidate   the   relative   peace   that   had   already   been   established   by   ECOMOG.   A   collective   response   in   the   case   of   Liberia   pointed   to   an   austere   truth   that   the   approach  of  hybridisation  has  the  potential  element  to  make  a  difference.    It  therefore   emphasised  the  significance  of  moving  beyond  a  traditional  outlook  on  conflict,  which   has  led  policy-­makers  to  rely  on  an  ambiguous  mechanical  allegory  of  conflict.    As  a   1   23     result,  a  new  approach  requires  an  amalgamation  of  institutional  frameworks  in  order   to  provide  solutions  to  end  instability.   The  study  further  focused  on  Burundi  (circa  2000),  again,  as  a  matter  of  providing  a   historical   analysis   and   perspective   on   the   topic   under   review,   and   to   explore   the   commitment   of   regional   African   efforts   and   actors   in   the   peaceful   settlements   of   conflicts.    Although  several  positive  developments   resulted  since   the   installation  of   power-­sharing   in   Burundi,   what   was   of   great   importance   was   the   negotiation   facilitators’   interpretation   of   the   concept   of   inclusivity   in   the   peace   process.   The   strategy   of   inclusivity   embarked   on   by   both   facilitators,   Julius  Nyerere   and  Nelson   Mandela,  included  small  and  large  parties  in  the  peace  process,  without  overlooking   the  other  based  on   its  size.  Both  used   their  own  experiences   from   their   respective   countries   to   make   discussions   frank   and   provide   the   platform   to   go   beyond   the   deadlocks  that  impeded  the  negotiations.    The  negotiations  did  not  guarantee  lasting   peace,  thus  the  deployment  of  troops  in  Burundi.    AMIB  had  to  stabilise  the  country  to   the   extent  where   the  UN  was   able   to   take   over.     Subsequently   the   peacekeeping   operation  was  able  to  create  an  environment  for  the  deployment  of  a  UN  peacekeeping   force.    The   troops  contributed  by   the  African  member  states,   remained  behind,   re-­ hatting  from  ‘green’  to  ‘blue’  helmets.    This  demonstrated  that  AU/regional  intervention   could  be  turned  into  sustainable  and  beneficial  forces.  The  transition  (or  hand-­over)  of   operations  were  effective  and  it  is  worthy  to  note  that  each  partnership  in  an  operation   is  uniquely  defined  by  the  specific  and  contextual  nature  of  conflict,  yet  they  could  be   classified  as  successive  or  integrated.       In  the  cases  of  Darfur  and  Somalia,  the  study  revealed  that  both  states  demonstrated   how  valuable   the  political   commitment   of   the  AU  was   to   successfully  manage  and   prevent   conflicts.   However,   the   increasing   propensity   for   AU-­led   interventions  was   driven  more  so  by  political  considerations,  than  by  the  practical  considerations  of  the   AU’s  capacity.    This  did  not   indicate   that   the  AU  should  only   intervene  when   it  has   capacity.  In  both  cases,  the  AU  responded  to  its  implicit  and  explicit  commitments  to   protect  civilians;;  however,   there  was  a  severe  disconnect  between  their  willingness   and  abilities  to  intervene.  The  AU’s  response  to  the  conflict  in  Somalia,  mainly  in  the   Mogadishu  area,  adds  a  bleak  perspective  on  the  lessons  learned  from  AMIS.    Similar   to  AMIS,  TCCs  pledged  troops   for  AMISOM  but   failed   to  deploy   to   its   full  capacity.     While   the  AU  expressed   the  overarching   impetus   to  developing  African  solution   to   1   24     African  problems,  its  initial  intention  with  AMISOM  was  to  prepare  the  ground  for  future   UN  operations.  Darfur  and  Somalia  were  both  intertwined  by  complex  humanitarian   and  political  crises  which  faced  a  strong  opposition  to  intervention.    The  same  strategy   in  place  to  combine  efforts  for  Darfur  could  be  applied  in  Somalia.    The  political  context   of  the  Country  and  buy-­in  of  the  population  would  be  imperative  towards  consolidating   the  Country.  The  study  revealed  the  importance  of  having  joint  planning  and  training   in  order  for  the  AU  and  UN  to  succeed  in  their  operation  to  stabilize  Somalia.   The  cases  of  Liberia,  Burundi,  Darfur,  and  Somalia  all  validated  the  role  regional  and   sub-­regional   organisations   can   play   despite   their   limitations,   challenges,   and   shortcomings.     The   study   revealed   some   similarities   in   the   Darfur   and   Somalia   peacekeeping  operations.    For  instance,  AMIS  lacked  military  equipment  and  support   mechanisms  to  prevent  any  insurgents  in  the  region.  Its  deficiencies  were  also  caused   by  constrained  operational  concepts,  lack  of  resources,  and  strategic  gaps.    The  lack   of  civil-­military  coordination  further  posed  a  challenge  to  the  peacekeeping  operation.     Moreover,  years  later,  conditions  in  Somalia  have  not  eventuated  for  a  UN  presence   and  the  UNSC  continues  to  rely  on  the  AU-­led  peace  support  operation  as  a  pivotal   pillar  in  the  political  and  security  stabilisation  effort  in  Somalia.  AMISOM  was  limited   by  resources,  particularly  force  size,  despite  repeated  requests  for  increases  in  force   strength   from   the   AU,   and   they   struggled   with   insufficient   equipment.     These   shortcomings   and   limitations   impeded   the   successful   implementation   of   their   mandates.    Although  the  peacekeeping  operations  provided  real  improvements  in  the   security  situation  for  the  ordinary  citizens  on  the  ground,  the  AU  and  regional  actors   will   need   to   learn   from   the   past   peacekeeping   operations   and   address   their   weaknesses.       This   serves   as   an   important   case   study   because   it   can   provide   the   foundation   for   practitioners   and   decision-­making   personnel   to   focus   on   past   mistakes   of   peacekeeping  operations  in  order  not  to  repeat  these  in  future.    Additionally,  they  will   need  to  attend  to  the  strengths  that  were  able  to  assist  in  implementing  the  mandate   in  order  not  to  re-­invent  the  wheel.       The  study  revealed,  that  in  order  to  efficiently  and  effectively  achieve  the  objectives  of   the  mandate,  the  UN,  AU,  and  RECs  will  need  to  collaborate  toward  ensuring  peace   and   security   on   the   continent.     Thus   hybridisation   will   bring   a   greater   degree   of   1   25     legitimacy  especially  for  the  local  population  that  need  to  be  included  in  order  to  work   towards   peace.    Given   the   peacekeeping   constraints   place   on   the  UN   to  maintain   international  peace  and  security,  the  implementation  of  hybrid  peace  operations  has   become  the  most  effective  and  legitimate  option  for  responding  to  emerging  complex   crises.         5.3  CONCLUSION     In  the  final  analysis,  and  following  the  main  findings  of  this  study,  it  argues  that  the  UN   and  AU  relationship  and  cooperation  over  the  past  two  decades,  presents  significant   steps  toward  operations  that  would  contribute  to  lasting  peace  in  Africa.    The  findings   allude   to   the   need   for   the   refinement   of   a   common   understanding   framework   for   cooperation  and  burden-­sharing.    This  is  more  so  considering  that  hybridisation  takes   place  in  different  policy  and  operational  contexts.       As  an  improvised  response  driven  by  necessity,  more  studies  need  to  be  undertaken   to  fully  explain  the  positive  impact  of  this  cooperation  model.    The  study  has  shown   how  limited  traditional  interventions  led  to  innovative  hybridisation  but  also  made  the   case  of  the  need  to  refine  the  response.    Specifically,  there  is  a  need  to:  harmonise   political  decision  making,  pool  resources,  and  enhance  collective  action  on  the  ground.     The  ultimate  conclusion  is  that  the  resource  and  political  constraints  faced  by  the  AU   would   benefit   from   the   solid   shared   international   responsibility   provided   by   the   comparative  advantage  of  hybridisation.       Considering   the   persistence   of   factors   constraining   effective   peacekeeping   deployment,   it   is  clear   that  hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  are   likely   to   remain  an   important  feature  of  international  response  to  conflict.    The  lessons  provided  by  the   Darfur  and  Somalia  cases  offer  an  instructive  foundation  for  both  the  UN  and  AU  to   improve  on  an  evolving  approach.    The  AU  and  its  chronically  constrained  sub-­regional   organisations   and   member   states   will   be   better   capacitated   by   the   resource   mobilisation   and   burden   sharing   defined   by   hybridisation.     In   the   African   context,   hybrid  peacekeeping  operations  also  specifically  reflect   the  significance,   legitimacy,   and  agency  of  African  leadership  in  regional  security,  as  especially  witnessed  in  the   case  of  Darfur.       1   26     In   the   case  of  Somalia,   the   study   found  a  unique  set   up  of  UN  support   to   the  AU   operation  on  the  ground  without  a  handover  arrangement.    The  component  led  by  the   AU   continued   to   find   political   and   civilian   support   from   the   UN   operations   on   the   ground.    This  cooperation  leveraged  the  international  community’s  engagement  with   the  evolving  administrations  in  Somalia  ensuring  they  were  positively  influenced  to  live   up  to  their  obligations.  The  unique  Somali  context  of  the  AU  fighting  Al-­Shabaab  also   meant   that   the   institutions   building   work   could   be   shielded   from   criticisms   of   AU   limitations  and  mistakes.       Hybridisation   took   a   context-­specific   turn   in   Somalia   where   the   effort   of   the   AU   receives  logistical  support  from  a  specially  created  UN  operation.    All   these  entities   operate   with   clearly   defined   division   of   labour,   roles   and   responsibilities.     More   importantly  the  UN  and  AU  are  cooperating  at  providing  strategic  guidance  to  the  field   operations.     At   the   operational   levels,   there   is   important   interlinking   engagement   ensuring  harmonisation  of  political  and  strategic  guidance.    Thus,  given  the  prevailing   fragile  political  and  security  condition,  a  hand-­over  from  an  AU 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