

A history of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South African politics, 2013-2018

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DECLARATION

I solemnly declare that the dissertation report hereby submitted is by me for the Master Artium degree in the Department of History at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein Campus. This work is my independent dissertation and has not previously been submitted by me to any institution or for any university degree whatsoever. I further cede the copy right of the dissertation in favour of the University of the Free State.



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Date: November 2022

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation uses books, chapters in books, newspaper clippings, internet sources and party documents to locate the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) history in South African politics from 2013 to 2018. The dissertation investigates the rationale behind the formation of the EFF and evaluates the political role that the EFF has played in South African politics from 2013-2018. It examines the rationale behind the formation of the EFF, maps the role of the EFF in South African politics, and further evaluates its participation in the 2014 national and 2016 local elections. It further looks into the role of the EFF in parliament and its impact from 2014 to 2018. It concludes that the EFF has played a critical role in South African politics. It illustrates that the EFF has positioned itself in the broader scope of South African politics through its active role in parliament and participation in the 2014 national and 2016 local government elections, respectively. The EFF played a critical role in taking votes from the voting constituencies and others of the ANC. In these two elections (2014 and 2016), the EFF has shown upward mobility, my dissertation compared the two in terms of voter turnout and votes that the EFF got. One noticeable phenomenon is the misuse of democratic centralism, which denies other leaders within the party to appear as equal and as important as Julius Malema.

KAKARETSO

Dipatlisiso tsena di sebedisa mehlodi e fapaneng, ho kenyeleditswe dikarolwana tsa dibuka, dikarolwana tsa di koranta, mehlodi e phatlaladitsweng ke mokgatlo wa Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), dibuka, dikananelo tse fapaneng, le mehlodi ya marangrang e le ho leka ho fuputsa karolo ya EFF dipolotiking tsa Afrika Borwa ho tloha ka dilemo tsa 2013-2018. Dipatlisiso tsena di fuputsana le tshusumetso e bileng teng pele mokgatlo wa EFF o ka thehwa. Dilemo tsa pele tse hlano ha esale mokgatlo ona one o thehwe di bile boima haholo ho baetapele ba mokgahlo. Ho fihlella tsena tsohle, dipatlisiso tsena di tla sheba ka botebo karolo ya mokgatlo dikgethong tsa selemo sa 2014 tsa karakaretso le tsa 2016 tsa bomasepala. Ho sa le jwalo, dipatlisiso tsena di tla tswela pele ka ho lekola karolo eo mokgahlo ona oe bapetseng lemong tse hlano tse fetileng palementeng, re tsepamisitse maikutlo ho tsa tsamaiso ya dipuisano ka hare ho palamente. Dipatlisiso tsena di utullutse hore e fela mokgahlo wa EFF o bapetse karolo e kgolo dipolotiking tsa Afrika Borwa dilemong tse hlano tse fetileng. Mokgahlo wa EFF o bapetse karolo e kgolo ho theoleng dikgetho tsa African National Congress (ANC). Makgetlong a mabedi ao mokgatlo wa EFF o nkileng karolo dikgethong, sena se bontshitse kgolo e tsitsitseng. Enngwe ya dintho tseo eleng tlohaba boroko mokgatlong wa EFF, ke hore tsohle tsa mokgahlo di itshetlehile hodima moetapele wa mokgahlo e leng Julius Malema, mme tshebediso e mpe ya puso kapa matla e ka beha mokgahlo ka mosing.

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I am very much grateful to my supervisor, Dr Clement Masakure and co-supervisor, Dr Lazlo Passemiers, for their unwavering support and wisdom. Positive criticism that came from both of you made this dissertation possible. Both reviewed my work and, at the same time, gave me words of encouragement to focus and push even when it was hard. For the duo, I am grateful and appreciative. Lastly, special thanks to Mrs Carmen Nel for language editing and formatting of this work. This dissertation embodies my views; notwithstanding the abovementioned people, all raised opinions and views are solemnly mine. I take responsibility for any errors and weaknesses that might be contained in this dissertation.

Lastly, I would like to thank all the ancestors of the Soldaat family, *kere dikgomo bakwena*.

Mohau Martin Soldaat

Bloemfontein, Free State, South Africa, November 2022.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMCU	Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BCT	Branch Command Teams
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BPA	Branch People's Assembly
CCR	Centre for Constitutional Rights
CCT	Central Command Teams
CiC	Commander in Chief
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPUT	Cape Town University of Technology
CTT	Central Task Teams
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EFFSC	Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command
FF Plus	Freedom Front Plus
FYL	Friends of the Youth League
HET	Higher Education and Training
ICASA	Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party

MPs	Members of Parliament
NCCT	National Central Command Teams
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NFP	National Freedom Party
NGC	National General Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA	National People's Assembly
NUM	National Union of Mine Workers
PA	Patriotic Alliance
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PCT	Provincial Command Teams
PPA	Provincial People's Assembly
RCT	Regional Command Teams
RPA	Regional People's Assembly
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SAIC	South African Indian Congress
SAPS	South African Police Service
SACP	South African Communist Party
SONA	State of the Nation Address
TUT	Tshwane University of Technology
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UCT	University of Cape Town
UFS	University of the Free State

UKZN	University of KwaZulu-Natal
UNISA	University of South Africa
UP	University of Pretoria
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SU	Stellenbosch University

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

In August 2011, Julius Malema was suspended from the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), the youth wing of the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC asserted that Malema was fomenting divisions within the party and damaging the ANC's image due to the numerous court cases against him, and the public criticism of the ANC's foreign policy.¹ For the ANC to save its integrity, it formed a Disciplinary Committee to assess Malema's conduct. The Committee found Malema guilty and suspended him from the ANC for five years.

Subsequently, in 2013, Malema and suspended ANCYL among others includes Floyd Shivambu, (See Chapter 2) members formed their own political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The EFF was launched in Marikana on 13 October 2013. The reason for choosing Marikana as the birthplace of the EFF was strategic in terms of both time and place. The small platinum mining town of Marikana was where the South African Police Services (SAPS) massacred 34 mineworkers on 16 August 2012, a tragic event that remained newsworthy, both nationally and internationally. The shooting at Marikana occurred under the ANC government and was the first massacre since the advent of democracy in 1994. To the EFF, the ANC government appeared to protect the interests of the Lonmin mining company and neglect the demands of Black workers.

On the other hand, the EFF, in its Seven Cardinal Pillar (see chapter 2), advocate for the nationalisation of mines and doing away with private ownership of mines, meaning they will protect workers over the mine owners. The founders of the EFF asserted that the launch in Marikana was to pay tribute to the victims who were brutally killed by the SAP S and to


¹ In July 2009, Sonke Gender Justice Network took Julius Malema to court when he regarded the claims of Khwezi (pseudo name), who accused Zuma of rape. Malema defended Zuma and said that the act was consensual. However, Khwezi won the case and the court ordered Malema to pay R50000 to any charity home. Afriforum's filled a court case against Malema for singing *dubuli' ibhubu* (shoot the Boer) and *ayasaba amagwala* (cowards fear), they took him to court in 2010 and the high court in Pretoria barred Malema from singing the song. Subsequent to the *dubuli ibunu* case, Malema had verbal altercation with a journalist from Britain when the ANCYL had a media briefing at Luthuli House in April 2010. Malema referred to the journalist Jonah Fisher as a small boy when Fisher asked him about his lavish lifestyle. He further said that rubbish is what Fisher has covered with his pants and accused Fisher of being a British agent.

improve the socio-economic conditions of Black South Africans.² The Marikana massacre, and the failure of the ANC government and the mining company to address the problems faced by the miners, gave Malema and others the perfect opportunity to launch their party and introduce their manifesto.

The emergence of the EFF was, however, not the first time that members of the ANC had broken away to form a new party. During the apartheid era, an Africanist faction led by Robert Sobukwe split from the ANC and formed the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. This trend continued in the post-1994 period. Bantu Holomisa broke away from the ANC and established the United Democratic Movement (UDM) in 1997, while Mosiuoa Lekota left the party in 2009 to form the Congress of the People (COPE). Yet amongst the breakaway parties formed by former members of the ANC, none has been able to haemorrhage support from the ANC during the post-apartheid elections significantly. In the last three national elections, from 2009 to 2019, the ANC has seen a steady decline in support. While none of the opposition parties has singlehandedly taken big margins of votes from the ANC, the joint effort by the opposition parties to oppose the ruling party has had an enormous impact on the ANC's declining votes. This dissertation, among other things, will look at the role of EFF in contributing towards strangling votes from the ANC and its role in South African politics.

Graph 1 on page three shows the voting patterns since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994. The graph compares the voting percentage of the ANC with that of the breakaway political parties. These include the PAC, COPE, EFF, and UDM. As noted from the graph, the ANC has seen a steady decline in support. Unlike other opposition parties that broke away from the ANC, the EFF is the only party that sustained growth during the two national elections in 2014 and 2019.

² F. Shivambu (ed.), *The Coming Revolution*, 2014, p. 26. See also S. Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters; South Africa's Turn towards Populism", *Journal of African Elections*, 14(1), 2014, pp. 35-59.



Graph 1: 1994 to 2019 National Elections Performance.

Data retrieved from: S. Booysen, (ed.), *Voting Trends 25 Years into Democracy: Analysis of South Africa's 2019 Election*. p. 6. Available online at <<https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Elections-Report.pdf>> 2019.

So far, the EFF has been the most successful breakaway party to challenge the ANC.³ The growing support for the EFF played a critical role in leading me to undertake this study to examine why the EFF has been on steady growth. It is for this reason that I investigate the history of the EFF from its inception in 2013 to 2018. As will become apparent, the EFF brought a new culture of populism to South Africa's political space, which was defined by robust debate, challenging the status quo and changing parliamentary decorum. My dissertation focuses on the first five years of the EFF's existence. According to the EFF's constitution, the party must elect a new Central Command Team (CCT) every five years. When the EFF held its First People's Assembly at Soweto in 2013, a temporary CCT was elected, giving it the mandate to fulfil by its constituency. In this dissertation, I examine whether the organisation

³ In 2009, the ANC received 65.90% of the vote, in 2014, 62.15%, and in 2019, their share of the vote declined to 57.50%. In 2009, COPE got 7.42% of the vote. In 2014 COPE's, support decline to 0.67% and, in 2019, to a mere 0.27%. The UDM clinched 0.85% in 2009. In 2014, the UDM's share of the vote slightly increase to 1%, but in 2019, it declined to 0.45%. The power struggles or factionalism in these new parties have exacerbated their losses in the polls. Nonetheless, when the EFF participated in the 2014 national elections for the first time, it received 6.35% of the vote. This percentage increased to 10.79%, in 2019. See, S. Booysen, (ed.), *Voting Trends 25 Years into Democracy: Analysis of South Africa's 2019 Election*. p. 6. Available online at, <https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Elections-Report.pdf>, 2019.

managed to reach its set goals. I also explore the EFF's political impact on South African politics. My dissertation thus provides a detailed examination of the role of the EFF in the South African post-apartheid political landscape.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

To examine the history of the EFF between 2013 and 2018, my dissertation is guided by two central questions:

- i. What were the reasons behind the formation of the EFF and its popularity during the period under study?
- ii. How did the emergence of the EFF transform South African politics at national and local levels during 2013-2018?

The first question allowed me to examine the reasons for the formation of the EFF and explore why it became popular. The second question enabled me to examine the growth of the EFF as an opposition party and assess the results of EFF politics on the broader South African political landscape. The development of the EFF was evaluated through its performance in the 2014 general election and the 2016 local government elections. The dissertation attempted to answer the following sub-questions to assist me in reaching the intended objectives, among others included:

- a. Did the formation of the EFF revitalise leftist politics in South Africa, especially in parliament?
- b. Did the existence of the EFF introduce robust and radical politics in South Africa?
- c. To what extent has the existence of the EFF attracted young people to become more interested in the politics of the country?

With the set sub-questions, this dissertation managed to answer the two central questions about the EFF's existence in South African politics.

1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Despite significant public attention, little academic research has been published on the history of the EFF. Some of the literature produced on the EFF and its leader have been written in a

journalistic fashion or from a political science perspective.⁴ Noteworthy literature has been produced on the political career of Malema. Fiona Forde used her journalistic expertise to write two biographical works on the life and political career of the EFF's leader, Malema. In *An Inconvenient Youth*, Forde examines Malema's early life, from his childhood in Limpopo to his rise within the ANCYL structures until he was elected the Youth League president in 2008.⁵ Forde's other book, "*Still An Inconvenient Youth*," not only provides insights into Malema's early life until he became a leader of his own political party but also examines the early days of the EFF and the young men and women who were central in the party securing twenty-five seats in the parliamentary elections of 2014.⁶ Important as they are in mapping out Malema's life and the early years of the EFF, Forde's books are written in a journalistic fashion, do not go into greater detail about the formation of the EFF and its early years, and ends in 2014. However, these books laid a foundation for me to craft and understand who Malema was before entering the political terrain.

Additionally, Samantha Crowell wrote her 2012 Honours project titled "The Rise of Julius Malema." In her project, Crowell dealt with the leadership crisis in the ANC and Malema's ability to opportunistically hijack civic protests against poor service delivery from the ANC government to popularise himself amongst the youth and poor people in South Africa. Crowell's work dealt much with the persona of Malema and how he popularised himself.⁷ My dissertation will expand on Crowell's work by examining how Malema's populist politics helped to centralise the EFF among the people. It will further expand Crowell's study to understand how Democratic Centralism was used in the EFF to centre the party's politics on Malema. In addition to Crowell's study, Marx Du Preez, a journalist and author, in his book titled *The world according to Julius Malema*, written after Malema's inception as the President of the ANCYL, quotes speeches of Malema and what they inferred. Du Preez further analysed how Malema's utterances could dent the image of the ANC and the ANCYL.⁸ Marx Du Preez's work would add more flesh to examining Malema's populist character and why the EFF deemed it necessary to make him the face of the organisation.

⁴ Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters; South Africa's...", pp. 35-45. See also, F. Forde, *An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the New ANC*, 2011. See also, F. Forde, *Still an Inconvenient Youth*, 2014, and T. Essop, "Populism and the Political Character of the Economic Freedom Fighters - a View from the Branch", *Labour, Capital and Society*, 48(1&2), 2015, pp. 213-238.

⁵ Forde, *An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the New ANC*, 2012.

⁶ Forde, *Still an Inconvenient Youth*, pp. 1-30.

⁷ S.M. Crowell, "The rise of Julius Malema" (Honours *Dissertation*, Wellesley College, Massachusetts, 2012).

⁸ M. Du Preez and M. Rossouw, *The World According to Julius Malema*, 2009.

Apart from its leader, innovative dissertation has also been conducted on the EFF as a political party, commonly focusing the discussion on the concept of populist politics. Anja Koekemoer has examined how the EFF used social media to popularise the party's agenda as part of a more comprehensive study.⁹ As argued by Koekemoer, the target constituency of the EFF was "young people", which in this instance, made social media a relevant platform for the twenty-first-century generation or millennials.¹⁰ Koekemoer's study examines the structural changes in the South African political landscape, from apartheid to post-democratic South Africa, and how the minorities and majority cohabit. Additionally, her study examines how the EFF is manifesting its populist agenda and how they are appealing to the younger generation.¹¹ Koekemoer's work primarily uses news reports and articles, which give a synopsis of events. Furthermore, Koekemoer's work provided me with a base to understand the politics of populism. However, my dissertation will incorporate newly published material to understand and historicise the EFF's populist politics within South Africa's political space.

Sithembile Mbete, a political science lecturer and researcher, evaluated the populist approach of the EFF in her article *The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's Turn Towards Populism*.¹² She contends on the organisation's views as those of the populist, whose agenda is new in the political space of South Africa. In agreement with Mbete, Tasneem Essop's journal article titled: *Populism and the Political Character of the Economic Freedom Fighters* emphasised the nature of populists and located the EFF as a populist organisation. Essop further proposed that Malema and the co-founders of the EFF were opportunistic, as they realised the needs of the disgruntled masses of South African people and used them to galvanise support.¹³

Vishwas Satgar took a different approach and argued that the EFF was not a revolutionary party but a neo-fascist party which does not hold the interests of the working class at heart. Instead, the EFF protects the interests of the middle class.¹⁴ For Satgar, the EFF's voting bloc stems more from the middle class, which subjects the EFF from being the vanguard of the

⁹ Social Media means the utilisation of diverse online tools that facilitate the initiation of the, creation, conversation and dissemination of information between users. It therefore provides users with the capability to develop online relationships or communities where people where people with common interests can communicate, engage, share opinions and knowledge. See, N. Dabula, "The Influence of Political Marketing Using Social Media on Trust, Loyalty and Voting Intention of the Youth of South Africa", *Business and Social Science Journal*, 2(1), 2017, pp. 62-112.

¹⁰ A. Koekemoer, "How the ANC, the DA and the EFF Construct South Africa as a Nation", (M.A dissertation, Stellenbosch University, Western Cape, 2017).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's..." pp. 35-44.

¹³ Essop, "Populism and the Political Character of the Economic...", pp. 213-238.

¹⁴ V. Satgar, "Black Neofascism? The Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa", *Canadian Review of Sociology*, 56 (4), 2019, pp. 592-593.

‘revolution’, as it fails to serve and protect the interests of the working classes, the poor and those living in rural communities, hence most of their votes came from urban areas instead of rural communities as the organisation argues that they want to give the working class land. According to Satgar, the EFF is a self-declared vanguard of the working class, which has failed to organise the working class by creating a trade union for workers, especially the leftist ones.

In contrast, Essop argued that the EFF is more on the countryside or rural areas, consolidating members from poor communities. In her paper, Essop further argued that her interviewees, the mining community in Marikana, said that the EFF was the only party that intended to help them (the poor). The only party with the interests of the mining populations and the poor at heart.¹⁵ Therefore, my dissertation wants to locate the EFF in South African history to provide more analysis of their policy position and how they are used to galvanise support.

Finally, EFF leaders have also published the organisation’s history. To inform the public about the politics of the newly formed EFF, Floyd Shivambu published a book in 2014 titled, *The Coming Revolution*.¹⁶ Shivambu’s book examines EFF’s policies and how the EFF intended to implement its policies. As to be expected, his narrative is more of someone with first-hand information, as he played an important role in forming the EFF. However, such material will be considered cautiously to guard against the book’s bias and corroborate it with other sources. My dissertation will highlight arguments from all angles towards the EFF and its role in South African politics.

While my dissertation builds on the existing literature on the EFF, it departs from it in several ways. Firstly, it moves from a biographical approach in studying the EFF leader towards examining the organisation’s role as a whole in South African politics. In addition, it allows me further to examine the reasons behind the formation of the EFF and to account for its popularity since its formation. Secondly, considering that studies on the EFF thus far have been ahistorical, my work will take a historical approach to the study of the EFF. It will map out the continuities and changes in EFF politics over five years and analyse its implications on the local and national political landscape. In examining the impact of the EFF on the South African political landscape, I will discuss the brief history of the formation of the EFF, the Nkandla issues, the 2014 and 2016 elections, the land question, which the EFF has popularised since its formation in 2013, the EFF in parliament and their brief role in the #FeesMustFall Movement

¹⁵ Essop, “Populism and the Political Character of the Economic...”, pp. 224-225.

¹⁶ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, 2014.

of 2015/2016. The dissertation intends to locate the role and the impact of the EFF on some of these significant events in South African history, which will help with a better understanding of the role of the EFF in South African politics.

1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This dissertation is a desktop study using qualitative historical dissertation methods to analyse primary and secondary material critically.¹⁷ The primary and secondary materials that I consult are in the public domain. These include the EFF's official statements, manifestos, and publications; local and international newspaper articles; blogs by EFF members and political commentators; and parliamentary debates and records. Additionally, I will consult interviews conducted by journalists with EFF members. These interviews are available on YouTube and online archives of media houses such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Newzroom Afrika and eNCA. As this dissertation is contemporary in its nature, much of the information will be sourced from newspaper clippings and recent published material. This evidentiary base provides information on the formation of the EFF's internal politics, the EFF, role of the EFF within parliament, and information on the popularity of the EFF. However, the above sources have limitations and require careful external and internal source criticism.¹⁸ These sources focus less on public opinions about the EFF; however, corroborating sources will help me to reach informed conclusions. Reading and listening to these sources, I am aware of their biases and how they may privilege and sometimes silence information. I thus approach these documents cautiously and read them carefully and critically.

To position the EFF within the broader South African historical landscape, I will also consult relevant published and unpublished secondary sources. These include books, journal articles, dissertation reports, dissertations and dissertation that examine some key issues concerning South African contemporary history. Contemporary sources, however, change over time as things evolve; this makes the dissertation interesting because one can always compare new data with old data and make well-informed decisions. My dissertation engages with the varying debates raised in secondary literature to come up with its own argument and contribution to contemporary South African history.

¹⁷ H. Lune and B. Berg, *Qualitative Dissertation Methods for the Social Sciences*, 2017.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-165.

1.5. CHAPTER OUTLINE

My dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the aims and objectives of the dissertation as well as the methodology used and explores the existing literature gaps. To locate the EFF in South African political junctures, Chapter two examines the formation of the EFF and discusses how the party was received within the South African political and academic landscape. In Chapter three, I looked into the EFF's first National Assembly, where the organisation elected its leadership, as from its birth until the end of 2014, they operated on temporary leadership. Chapter four unpacks the EFF's preparations for and participation in South Africa's 2014 national and 2016 local government elections. The fifth chapter will discuss the role of the EFF in parliament and how they challenged the decorum in the national assembly. Lastly, chapter six will be the conclusion, which will summarise the findings of the dissertation and its contribution to the body of knowledge of contemporary history, particularly of political formations post-1994.

1.6. VALUE OF THE RESEARCH

Besides contributing towards obtaining an MA degree, this dissertation is valuable to those interested in studying the history of the EFF in South African political history and new political formations in post-1994 South Africa. The dissertation is also of importance to history scholars interested in theories such as populism and those interested in the role of emerging 'leftist' movements in post-1994 South Africa. It will also help those in dissertation methods and modes of conducting dissertation, because my dissertation uses different sources, among others includes social media platforms such as twitter, which are used to analyse how political formations exploit them to establish themselves and grow, newspaper clippings, articles, chapters in books and books. The dissertation critically examines the central politics of the EFF and discusses its role in South Africa's broader political history. It contributes to a better understanding of post-apartheid South African politics and society.

1.7. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In conducting this dissertation, I am aware that the sources consulted have biases and limitations depending on who has produced them and the reasons for the production. In reading the sources, I remained objective and did not misrepresent any information. Besides critically

reading these sources, I triangulated the different sources consulted to reach informed conclusions. The work is authenticated by referencing and corroborating with sources. Referencing allowed me to guard against plagiarism and acknowledging other scholars and varying perspectives.

CHAPTER 2

THE FORMATION OF THE EFF

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter highlights the rationale behind the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). It also evaluates the aims and objectives of the EFF by closely examining the founding manifesto of the organisation. The chapter further analyses the ideological identity of the EFF and assesses its radical approach to politics. Additionally, it discusses whether its formation brought any substantive change to the political landscape of post-apartheid South Africa. Lastly, the chapter delves deeper into how other political parties, labour unions and political analysts received the entrance of the EFF into the political arena of South Africa. Therefore, this chapter will provide an understanding of the emergence of the EFF and perceptions around the organisation.

2.2 A SWIFT MOVE FROM THE ANCYL TO THE EFF

While Malema was president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), the ANC's youth wing proposed several policy alternatives at its 23rd National Congress in Johannesburg, which ran from 27 to 30 June 2008.¹⁹ During this National Congress, the ANCYL leadership was determined to revive the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) through political education.²⁰ The NDR was the guiding philosophy document for the ANC and its alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which sought to transfer power to the state. The ANC, COSATU and SACP formed an alliance in 1990 to unite all aspects of society, meaning COSATU mobilised the working class. In the same vein, both ANC and SACP mobilised society in general. According to Anthea Jeffrey, the NDR had two phases, the first phase was to fight colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, by mass mobilisation and making the country ungovernable through protest. The second phase wanted to usher-in economic freedom for all South Africans, which then speaks to the Freedom Charter, all mineral resources beneath

¹⁹ ANC, "ANCYL 23rd National Congress Report", <<http://www.ancyl.org.za/events.php?t=2>>, 2008.

²⁰ J. Netshetinzhe, "The National Democratic Revolution is it Still on Track," *Umrabulo*, 1996, pp. 3-8.

the soil belong to all those who live in South Africa.²¹ This meant the Black majority had political, social and economic control of South Africa. It further intended to transform South Africa into a non-racial, non-sexist, and democratic society where the people control all organs of the state. It aimed to break the shackles of apartheid and infuse national unity in the country.²²

The ANCYL was informed by the NDR and the 1955 Freedom Charter principles, which stated, among others, that “the mineral wealth beneath the soil, monopoly industry and banks should be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole.”²³ Therefore, the ANCYL called for the nationalisation of mines and banks and the implementation of a radical land reform programme.²⁴ Additionally, the ANCYL proposed to explore socialism as an alternative to capitalism. It considered land expropriation without compensation as the only solution to addressing the problem of land ownership in South Africa.²⁵ Concerning mining, the ANCYL resolved that the state must own and manage mineral resources' extraction, production and trade.²⁶

However, the ANCYL's proposal was met with fierce resistance by the ANC leadership. The recommendations by the Youth League exposed the policy deficiency and unwillingness of the ANC leadership to change and challenge the status-quo. Hence, the ANC had to determine its position on the issues related to nationalisation and the impact of its position on investors. Because of the mounting pressure from the ANCYL and how the local media expected the mother body to deal with this issue, the ANC at the National General Council (NGC) of 2010 requested that the National Executive Council (NEC) form Task Team on Nationalisation whose mandate was to examine the feasibility of nationalisation in South Africa. The ANC NEC referred the matter to the Economic Transformation Committee (ETC) which is the

²¹ Expropriation of Land Without Compensation, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-qjjLjULEw>>, 2018. This document was published in 1962 by the South African Communist Party. See, E. Bowl, *The Road to South African Freedom*, 1962.

²² Netshetinzhe, “The National Democratic Revolution...”, pp. 3-5.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ According to Bernard Magubane, the Freedom Charter was a guiding document of the liberation movements, namely the Congress of the People of June 1955. It stipulated that all the land in South Africa should be shared by those who work it. Additionally the multiracial approach of the ANC created a split with the young Africanists in the ranks of the ANC. Hence in 1959 the Pan-Africanist Congress was formed. The PAC advocated that Africa belonged to Africans. See B. Magubane, “The Political Context”, pp. 1-52, in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970)*, see also, Netshetinzhe, “The National Democratic Revolution...”, pp. 3-8. See also, S.J. Mosala, “The National Democratic Revolution in South Africa: An Ideological Journey”, *Koers Journal*, 84(1), 2019, pp. 1-16.

²⁵ W. Franz, “Move to Nationalisation Must go on, Urges Malema”, *Sunday Independent*, 12 February 2012, p. 1.

²⁶ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 8.

subcommittee of the NEC. Max Sisulu was the chairperson of this subcommittee which had to research the feasibility of Nationalisation in South Africa. among scholars, the research panel included Dr Paul Jordan Minister of Department of Trade and Industry, Professor Pundi Pillay of Witswaterand University and Professor Margeret Chitiga-Mabugu of Human Science Research Council.²⁷ The Task Team intended to investigate the possibilities of changing the ANC's policies on nationalisation. However, the Task Team investigation dismissed the idea of nationalisation because the ANC believed that nationalisation was not part of its policy. Amongst other things, President Jacob Zuma, in his state visit to Britain on 04 March 2010, reassured the British authorities that nationalisation in South Africa was not evitable because Britain is one of the most prominent investors in the South African economy.²⁸ This showed that the ANC and ANCYL disagreed on policies that needed to be adopted to better South Africa.

The ANCYL was not happy with the ANC's decision to dismiss the nationalisation policy. The ANC decided to act against the rebellious ANCYL leadership, and their case was referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the ANC to deal with the behaviour of those who called for nationalisation in South Africa and put the name of the ANC into disrepute. Derek Hanekom headed the Committee with the assistance of Collins Chabane, Susan Shabangu, Ayanda Dlodlo, Zola Skweyiya, Valli Moosa and Febe Potgieter. The Committee aimed to investigate the behaviour of the Youth League leaders. It sat from September to November 2011 to deal with the ANCYL leader Malema and his co-accused Floyd Shivambu, Sindiso Magaqa, Kenetswe Masenogi, Ronald Lamola and Pule Mabe. On the recommendations of the Disciplinary Committee, Malema was suspended for five years; Magaqa and Shivambu were suspended for three years, whilst Masenogi, Lamola and Mabe were suspended for 18 months.²⁹ The group of ANCYL leaders were consequently suspended on 10 November 2011 because they brought the ANC into disrepute. Malema was troubled by the decision to be suspended as President of the ANCYL and reacted by saying that he would not take the ANC to court if his appeal was dismissed, which would mark the end of his political career.

²⁷ A. Butler, "Resource nationalism and African National Congress", *The Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy*, 113, January 2013, pp. 11-20.

²⁸ C. Du Bruyn, "No Government Discussion on Mine Nationalisation, Zuma Tells UK Investors," *Mining Weekly*, <<https://www.miningweekly.com/article/no-discussion-on-nationalisation-of-mines-zuma-tells-britain-2010-03-04>>, 2010.

²⁹ S. Mkokeli, "Malema Expelled from the ANC", *Business Day*, 01 March 2012, p. 1.

However, Malema believed that the suspension was part of a factional battles led by ANC President Zuma and argued it was based on intangible evidence.³⁰ He vowed to exercise his political rights by approaching the ANC's Appeals Committee and appealing his suspension. On 2 February 2012, Cyril Ramaphosa, who was the chairperson of the Appeals Committee, announced that Malema's application was unsuccessful and his expulsion would commence immediately after the press briefing.³¹ Malema's political future looked blurry post his expulsion; thus, he had to do everything to keep his relevance in the political climate of South Africa. To maintain political relevance after being expelled, Malema and his counterparts started associating with several political formations that tried to challenge the status-quo. In 2013 — after the expulsion of Malema and suspension of Shivambu, Magaqa, Masenogi, Lamola and Mabe — the group joined Friends of the Youth League (FYL). The FYL aimed to provide Malema and his allies with a political space to express their views to the public.³² Anda Bici, who was the spokesperson of FYL, remarked that the FYL was a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO).³³ He mentioned that its existence was triggered by the expulsion of Malema and the suspension of his two counterparts (Magaqa and Shivambu) from the ANCYL.³⁴ Some members of the ANCYL did not want to associate with FYL, and they were sceptical about it. They saw it as a platform for the expelled ANCYL members to air their political views.

In contrast, other members of the ANCYL, such as Simon Molefe (who was the Gauteng Provincial Chairperson of Youth League) and Klass Mabunda (the Limpopo ANCYL spokesperson), had different views about it. The latter supported the expelled members and the FYL, whilst the former did not recognise the FYL.³⁵ For instance, Molefe argued that the formation of the FYL was counter-revolutionary and primarily aimed at undermining the

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Brown, "Hanekom Heads the Body that Takes Malema to Task", *Business Day*, 16 April 2010, p. 1. However, the ANC's National Executive Committee had the discretion to grant a review, but the Appeals Committee's decision remained as a final decision, thus the accused members were suspended. See also, M. Savides, "The Rise and The Fall of Juju," *Sunday Times*, 05 February 2012, p. 4.

³² C. Twala, "The Road to the Mangaung (Bloemfontein) National Elective Conference of the African National Congress in December 2012: A Political Challenge to the Jacob Zuma Presidency?", *Journal for Contemporary History*, 37(1), June 2012, pp. 213-231.

³³ Bici was a spokesperson of Lebogang Maile, the MEC of Economic Development, Environment, Infrastructure and Rural Development in Gauteng from 17 July 2015 to date (at the time of writing this dissertation).

³⁴ W. Mabona, "Friends of the Youth League Say They Are an NGO", *The New Age*, 20 June 2012, p. 4. See also M. Moloto, "ANCYL member to Sue Malema after Police Manhandling", *Sunday Independent*, 18 April 2010, p. 5; and G. Matlala, "Past Imperfect and Future Unclear," *Sunday Independent*, 6 May 2012, p. 18.

³⁵ N. Modjadji, "Limpopo League Supports Friends", *The Citizen*, 25 July 2012, p. 6. See also N. Modjadji, "ANCYL Distances Itself from New Friends", *The Citizen*, 24 July 2012, p. 3.

authority of the ANC and sought to sow divisions within the organisation in the build-up to the Mangaung electoral conference in 2012.³⁶ FYL appeared to be a platform for expelled members of the ANCYL and gave them political resonance.

On 25 August 2012, Malema and his counterparts launched attacks on the ANC when they addressed the striking miners in Marikana through the FYL. Malema blamed the ANC for the violence and killings that took place at Marikana.³⁷ With time, it became clear that, for the expelled members of the ANCYL to maintain political relevance, they had to form their own political party. According to Shivambu, it was the Marikana mineworkers, especially the rock drillers led by Xolani Nzuzza, who engaged and pushed Malema, Shivambu and the incumbent leaders of the EFF to form a political party.³⁸ Nzuzza was one of the mine-workers at Lonmin in Marikana. The mine workers had numerous meetings with the ex- ANCYL leaders, and in July 2013, mine workers and ex-Youth League leaders called to hold a National Assembly.³⁹ The National Assembly was held on 26 and 27 July 2013 at Uncle Tom’s Hall in Orlando West, Soweto. It was estimated that about one-thousand two-hundred delegates attended the meeting from all provinces in South Africa. The primary aim was to discuss the possibilities of forming a new political party outside the ANC. After two-day proceedings, the First People’s Assembly agreed to establish a new political party named the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The party would strive to seek political relevance to challenge the ANC and other opposition parties.⁴⁰ The newly formed EFF had to find its rightful place in South African politics of the left or the right forces.

According to Malema, who acted as the EFF’s interim leader, the name ‘Economic Freedom Fighters’ came spontaneously from the delegates of the First People’s Assembly.⁴¹ It became mandatory for the assembly to agree on 27 July 2013 to choose and design the organisational signature, which included the party logo, banners, and the constitution.⁴² In a series of interviews with journalist Janet Smith, dated between 25 January and 6 February 2014, Malema defined the EFF as a ‘non-racial organisation’ that fights for equal opportunities and rights for

³⁶ Modjadji, “ANCYL Distances Itself...”, p. 3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 68-69.

³⁹ The National Assembly was to include everyone particularly those who have shown interests in the formation of the EFF. It included the Central Command and the Provincial Central Command teams. The aim was to discuss the best models and processes of how the party’s Cardinal Pillar could be realised. See Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 62-63.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69. See also Forde, *Still an Inconvenient Youth*, p. 157.

⁴¹ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 56.

⁴² *Ibid.*

all South Africans, not just Blacks. He emphasised Blacks because they were the most marginalised group in South African.⁴³ Malema's statement implied that the EFF is not racist but aimed to prioritise and improve the socio-economic conditions of Black people in South African. The First People's Assembly in Soweto agreed that the EFF would officially be launched in Marikana on 13 October 2013. The decision to launch the EFF at Marikana was because the temporary Central Task Teams (CTT) and National Central Command Team (NCCT) wanted to pay tribute to those miners who had lost their lives during the Marikana Massacre of 16 August 2012.⁴⁴ A temporary CTT was set-up to oversee the events leading up to the National People's Assembly, which was to be held in December 2014 (see chapter 3). This team included Malema as Commander in Chief (CiC) and National Convenor, and Mpho Ramakatsa, as a National Co-ordinator. Members of the NCCT were Shivambu, Andile Mngxitama, Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, Fana Mokoena, Leigh Mathys, Pabane Moteka, Hlayiseka Chawane, Sipho Mbatha, Kenny Kunene, Mandisa Makesini and Hlengiwe Hlophe.⁴⁵

The day before the launch of the EFF in Marikana, during the preparations for the big event, Malema participated in the slaughtering of six oxen.⁴⁶ Malema was accompanied by Ndlozi, the spokesperson of the EFF and Phepsile Maseko, who was a member of the Traditional Healers Organisation in the North-West Province.⁴⁷ The process of slaughtering is regarded as sacred and important in African cultures. Most African cultures, particularly among Black people, celebrate birth by slaughtering an animal, and the launch of the EFF was synonymous with the birth of a child. According to Ndlozi, the new baby was born, and the feasting was to take place on Sunday, 13 October 2013.⁴⁸ In addition, Lebogang Seale, a journalist for the *Star*, described Malema's arrival at Marikana as being like a royal affair which was announced by the roaring engines of a motorcade and with the crowd cheering showing happiness and appreciation.⁴⁹ The red-cladded supporters of the EFF covered the hill. Sithembile Mbete stated that the reason why Malema and his compatriots decided to launch the EFF in Marikana was based on emphasising the message that focused on the poor and marginalised miners, whose interests the EFF wanted to represent.⁵⁰ Clearly, Malema and his ex-Youth leaguers were

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228. (These interviews can be accessed in the book *The Coming Revolution* F. Shivambu (ed.) from pp. 208-287).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴⁶ S. Aboobaker, "EFF Launch for Marikana", *Sunday Argus*, 13 October 2013, p. 6.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ M. Montsho, "Malema Slaughters an Ox in Marikana", <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/malema-slaughters-ox-in-marikana-1591016>>, 2013.

⁴⁹ L. Seale, "Frenzy at Birth of a Child at Marikana", *Star*, 14 October 2013, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's...", p. 41.

swiftly moving to establish their own organisation and to continue with ANC/YL ideas. Meaning the EFF became an ideological representation of the ANC/YL.

During his speech to the crowd, Malema emphasised that the EFF would bring hope to the people whom the ANC government had neglected.⁵¹ He saw Marikana as a place where the ANC ‘sold out’ the miners and exhibited its authoritarian character.⁵² When addressing the crowd at the launch of the EFF at Marikana, Malema reminded them about the massacre and the trauma experienced by miners and communities around Marikana. He appealed to the people of Marikana and South Africans in general to be revolutionaries and stated that the launch of the EFF was the beginning of the economic revolution.⁵³ Shivambu described the existence of the EFF as the weapon of the struggle that lay in the hands of the people to resolve their problems.⁵⁴ In Mbete’s view, the launch of the EFF gave impetus to its agenda of being a revolutionary organisation and an alternative to the ANC.⁵⁵ Choosing Marikana as a place to launch the EFF was a strategic move for the EFF. The Marikana massacre was a topic of political standoff, especially among the opposition political parties. Parties such as the DA, COPE, United Democratic Movement (UDM) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) took advantage of the massacre that happened there on 16 August 2012. These parties blamed the ruling ANC for its handling of the incident and likened it to the apartheid government. They argued that the ANC could have contained and adequately responded to the grievances of mineworkers. These parties appeared as though they were the only hope for the people of Marikana, who suffered at the hand of the ANC.

For instance, Justice Pitso, a reporter from the *Star*, wrote that the launch of the EFF in Marikana was like someone preying on a bereaved person instead of respecting their personal space.⁵⁶ Additionally, the Chairperson of the ANC in Western Cape, Marius Fransman, felt that Malema was supposed to have been sensitive to the victims of the shootings and their families instead of exploiting the prevailing situation.⁵⁷ Kuzeka Kusa added that Marikana became important to the EFF because the ANC feared taking political responsibility concerning its role in the Marikana Massacre.⁵⁸ All these political parties projected themselves as an

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Q. Hunter, “Juu Paints Marikana Red”, *The New Age*, 14 October 2013, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 72.

⁵⁵ Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s...”, pp. 41-43.

⁵⁶ P.J. Pitso, “Mine Tragedy: A Reminder of Our Dark Past”, *Star*, 10 September 2012, p. 8.

⁵⁷ S. Mkhwanazi, “Malema Slammed for Being Opportunistic”, *The New Age*, 21 August 2012, p. 3.

⁵⁸ M. K. Kusa, “Malema Scores by Scratching Unhealed Wounds”, *The Herald*, 22 October 2013, p. 10.

alternative to the ANC, thus pleading with the people of Marikana to support them. Popularity politics clearly played a role when the EFF temporary leadership launched the party in Marikana. Should the massacre not have happened at Marikana, the birth of EFF could have been delayed, not have taken place there or not have taken place at all. There were also debates amongst scholars like Mbete, Ralph Mathega and others about the relevance of the EFF in the already congested political space in South Africa. Whilst some scholars felt that the EFF would just be another failed political organisation of disgruntled ANC leaders and members, others saw it as a potentially unique political player that would bring about ‘economic freedom’.⁵⁹ Therefore this dissertation intends to ascertain the role of the EFF in South African politics and to understand if they are contributing positively or negatively.

For the EFF to position itself well in terms of numbers and popularity, it forged an alliance with community organisations. In July 2013, the newly formed EFF met with the September National Imbizo to agree on joining forces. It was decided that September National Imbizo would continue to operate on its own but give support to the EFF and its members were to join the EFF individually.⁶⁰ Thus, the EFF continued to forge alliances with community organisations like the Landless People’s Movement and the Land Reform and Restitution Movement. However, political analyst Mathega was not convinced of this move. He believed that the EFF was just an extended voice of the ANC, because their policies are similar. Consequently these marriages would not last.⁶¹ The move by the EFF was meant to consolidate relations with those who shared a similar vision under the banner of their organisation. In the words of Andile Mngxitama, member of the CCT and EFF representative in parliament, who said that working with the EFF was necessary because, with the creation of the EFF, Malema and his counterparts had already appropriated the left agenda of September National Imbizo politics.⁶² The organisation was consolidating the ground, in order to ensure that it organises the masses towards the leftist agenda.

Mngxitama viewed Malema as someone who was politically versed and saw no need to operate outside Malema’s circles. The September National Imbizo and EFF argued for land expropriation without compensation and the nationalisation of the South African economy’s

⁵⁹ L.T. Solomzi, “EFF is Most Relevant to the Struggle”, *Business Day*, 1 August 2013, p. 1. See also F Mangope, “EFF, AgangSA Only Adding to Next Year’s Election Blockbuster”, *The New Age*, 27 September 2013, p. 18.

⁶⁰ K. Patel and T. Lekgowa, “Getting the EFF up: Malema Making New Friends”, *Daily Maverick*, 16 July 2013, p. 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s...”, p. 40.

banks and other strategic sectors.⁶³ Additionally, as Shivambu stressed, the September National Imbizo believed that the philosophy of Black Consciousness should guide the struggle for economic freedom in South Africa. Shivambu argued “further that the September National Imbizo had found a home in the EFF, which will be represented by the Fanonian character, as their ideological thinking was similar.”⁶⁴ By Fanonian character, Shivambu meant that the EFF would use Martinican intellectual Frantz Fanon’s work as a guideline to liberate Black people from racial bondages of apartheid and colonialism. Fanon, in his 1952 book titled: *Black skin, White masks*, intended to challenge racial superiority within his own nation.⁶⁵ Fanon found himself entangled within the bondages of racism.

Malema added that by Fanonian character, they meant to reinstall value and pride among Black people for Black people to appreciate themselves as equal citizens with their white counterparts in South Africa.⁶⁶ In the words of Fanon, the nationalist bourgeoisie does not intend to break the bondages created and left by the colonisers after independence. Fanon argues that the nationalist bourgeoisie does not seek to break the shackles of colonialism (in South Africa’s case, apartheid). Instead, they strive to maintain what was left by the coloniser without creating new development.⁶⁷ Nationalist bourgeoisie refers to those in political power who do not intend to change the socio-economic life of the former oppressed. They seek to liberate the oppressed but continue with the former regimes' tendencies. This is what is prevalent in South Africa today. The country saw its democracy in 1994, and the government was taken over by Black people through the ANC. Democratic South Africa has produced a pool of Black middle class without economically changing the conditions of the Black majority, who were previously by disadvantaged the apartheid system, and continue to be marginalised by the democratic state. To the latter, the EFF argues that the ANC has failed to change the lives of Black people; thus, the EFF sought to position itself as an alternative. With the intention of the EFF, they intend to use Fanon’s work to challenge the ANC and its betrayal of the revolution of changing Black people's socio-economic conditions.

Additionally, Shivambu argued that the EFF’s Marxist-Leninist-Fanonian character;

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶⁴ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 66.

⁶⁵ F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 2008.

⁶⁶ Julius Malema keynote address at 4th National Students Assembly of the EFF Student Command, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_yBO0liMMQ>, 2022.

⁶⁷ F.Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1961, pp. 159-169.

Challenges the ongoing acrimony from the Eurocentric and racist arrogance of the West. An arrogance is not limited to the right wing, but also afflicts the white left globally. The EFF finally liberates Marxism and Leninism from the racist mind-set that dictates the African, Black experiences must be viewed from the western perspective, and the horrors of anti-Black racism and colonialism are reduced to a mere epiphenomenon.⁶⁸

The EFF, therefore, positions itself as an organisation that will fight for the rights of Black people to fight inequality in South Africa. According to Mngxitama, the call for economic freedom by both the EFF and September National Imbizo was important. The manifesto of both parties tried to appeal to the poverty-stricken and unemployed Black Africans for the following reasons. Firstly, most young Black South Africans were jobless. Secondly, the economy was in the hands of the minority, especially the whites who had benefitted from the apartheid government and were continuing to benefit under the democratic (ANC) government. Lastly, high poverty levels mainly affected the majority of South Africans, particularly the Blacks.⁶⁹ However, it should be emphasised that the economic imbalances in South Africa cannot only be resolved by the process of land redistribution and the nationalisation of banks but requires development and capacitating those who were once marginalised. But the EFF used different methods to galvanise support from those who shared similar views; in one way or another, it was a strategy to position itself to the political landscape of South Africa, which the ANC post-apartheid has dominated.

2.3 THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EFF

For the EFF to position itself within the political landscape of South Africa, it described its founding aims and objectives through Malema's speech. On 11 July 2013, Malema stated that the EFF would be:


The radical left, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement with the internationalists' outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles; the vanguard of community and workers' struggles and will side with the people; will associate with the protest movement in South Africa and will join the struggle that defy unjust laws; and will embrace the radical, not the neo-liberal, interpretation of the Freedom Charter which says South Africa should belong to all who live in it through equal distribution of South Africa's wealth and heritage.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 78.

⁶⁹ E. Mnyandu, "Leadership is Needed to Solve Issues Behind Mine Unrest", *Star*, 17 September 2012, p. 1.

⁷⁰ L. Sorensen, "Populist Communication in the New Media Environment: A Cross-Regional Comparative Perspective", *Palgrave communication*, 48(4), 2018, pp. 3-4.

The above explanation foregrounded the Freedom Charter in South Africa’s post-apartheid era. The historic document was to be used to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich. With it, Malema wanted to attract poor South Africans, the workers and the unemployed by promising and emphasising ‘equality’, something the ANC government had failed to achieve during its time in power.⁷¹ Malema, in October 2008, said that “ours is a grand vision that aims to achieve a society where poverty is eradicated, our people live in peace side by side, free from any form of discrimination and all equal before the law”.⁷² Malema has always envisioned seeing an egalitarian society in South Africa. However, in its study between 2013 and 2017, the South African Human Rights Commission established that the income levels between Black people and white people had widened. It further asserted that the levels of unemployment across all the racial groups in South Africa had also increased. The graph below, which the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) assembled, shows income sources across four racial groups in South Africa; this graph helps because the EFF seeks to break the bondages of Black poverty and fight the national bourgeoisie’s failures to deal creating equality. The Commissions entitled the graph as:



Graph 2: Income sources by race 2015.

⁷¹ R. Tau, *The Rise and Fall of the ANC Youth League*, 2020.

⁷² Du Preez and Rossouw, *The World According to Julius...*, p. 124.

Graph retrieved from: SAHC, “Research Brief on Race and Equality in South Africa 2013-2017”, p. 15, <<https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/RESEARCH%20BRIEF%20ON%20RACE%20AND%20EQUALITY%20IN%20SOUTH%20AFRICA%202013%20TO%202017.pdf>>, 2017.

The graph above shows the income gaps across all the racial groups in South Africa by 2015, which clarifies the level of inequality per race. Black people continue to be the lowest in terms of income revenues generated outside their work place. Additionally, the EFF proposed fighting for economic inclusivity in South Africa, allowing more Black people to participate in the country's mainstream economy. EFF leaders regularly argued that Black people have been treated as though they were foreigners in their own country and that this neglect and alienation contributed to their continued high poverty levels.⁷³ The EFF was inclined to address the land question in South Africa by calling for land expropriation without compensation, nationalising the mines, banks and State Owned Enterprises and promising a minimum wage of R4500.⁷⁴ The aims, as mentioned earlier, and objectives resonated and synergised with the EFF's policies and strategies and were reminiscent of the earlier demands made by the ANCYL during the NGC that was held in September 2010 at Durban. And the EFF intended to use these policies to position themselves in the South African political landscape.

After the inception of the EFF as a political party, the First People's Assembly agreed that Seven Cardinal Pillar would guide the EFF. The first Cardinal Pillar called for the expropriation of land without compensation for equal redistribution meaning the state would be the custodian of the land. The second pillar demanded the nationalisation of mines, banks and other strategic sectors of the economy without compensation. The state would own all the resources. With the third pillar, the EFF aimed to build state and government capacity, which will lead to the abolishment of tenderpreneurship. The fourth pillar intended to advance the need for free quality education, healthcare, houses and sanitation. The fifth pillar protected industrial development from creating jobs, including the introduction of the minimum wage to close the gap between the rich and the poor and promote rapid career paths for Black South Africans in the workplace. The sixth pillar asserted that the EFF would build massive development of the entire African economy and advocate for a move from a reconciliatory approach to justice in the entire continent. The last pillar would ensure that they establish an accountable, corrupt-

⁷³ P. Groenewald, “Julius Malema Brash Politics Undermine the Country and Will Incite Violence”, *Sunday Independent*, 25 August 2016, p. 17.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

free government and society without fear of victimisation by state agencies.⁷⁵ The party tried to push some of these pillars to the ANC by offering them their six per cent of votes in the national assembly so that the ANC could amend the Constitution, see chapter five for further details.

Since its formation, the EFF has inspired various African countries to establish similar organisations, which helps locate the internationalist outlook of the party and build one united Africa as alerted by cardinal pillar six. The emergence of Namibian Economic Freedom Fighters is one example, which was launched on 22 June 2014.⁷⁶ Additionally, there is EFF in Malawi, Zimbabwe and eSwatini. In one way or another can be seen as a project to advance one Africa. With these Seven Cardinal Pillar, the EFF aimed to transform South Africa's socio-economic and political landscape and equally transform the economy of the entire continent. The EFF also sought to break the colonial and apartheid legacy shackles that kept Black South Africans outside the mainstream economy, hence their adoption of the Fanonian character. The EFF's Seven Cardinal Pillar were a redefined and modernised version of the 1955 Freedom Charter, and the Freedom Charter was used as an instrument to justify all the Cardinal Pillar. Shivambu argued that the ANC had betrayed the Freedom Charter principles, which was why economic inequality was increasing in the country. Furthermore, the EFF alluded that the ANC would not realise economic freedom in South Africa because the organisation is obsessed with protecting the interest of 'white monopoly capital'.⁷⁷ Such views suggest that the EFF intends to shift the country's economic dynamics by utilising some policies from the ANC/YL.

According to Malema, the enemy of their revolution was "White Monopoly Capital", a term that emerged in the 1950s and referred to the notion that a white minority in South Africa controls the economy. This concept resurfaced in South Africa after the Bell Pottinger saga of 2016 in South Africa, when myriad emails between his company and the Guptas surfaced. Pottinger intended to utilise media to stir a drift on South African problems, particularly the economic challenges. The intention was to make the South African problem more racial and start chaos; thus, amid the havoc, Guptas would enjoy the luxury of being portrayed as messiahs for Black people's sufferings.⁷⁸ In short, the EFF leaders argued that for the 19 years that the

⁷⁵ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 128-129.

⁷⁶ L. Cloete, "EFF Spreads its Wings to Namibia", *Mail and Guardian*, < <https://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-26-eff-launches-in-namibia/>>, 2014.

⁷⁷ D. Hlophe, "Parties of no Substance", *Pretoria News*, 22 July 2013, p. 8.

⁷⁸ G. Guercia, "How Bell Pottinger PR Firm for Despots and Rogues met its end in South Africa", < <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html>>, *New York Times*, 05 February 2018, p. 1.

ANC ruled, it failed to undo the injustices and economic inequality created by apartheid and colonialism.⁷⁹ The Seven Cardinal Pillar of the EFF moved away from the ANC's reconciliatory stance and neo-liberal interpretation of the Freedom Charter. Instead, the EFF sought to revolutionise South Africa to pursue the agenda of the nationalisation of mines and other strategic sectors of the economy for the betterment of the masses. According to Shivambu, the organisation intends to bring economic freedom to Black people of South Africa, Africa and the rest of the world.⁸⁰ The liberation of Africa is symbolised by the EFF's party signature, which shows a spear covering the rest of Africa.⁸¹ Malema also made it clear that the Cardinal Pillar of the EFF were influenced more by Marxist and Fanonian principles than the Freedom Charter.⁸² Malema contended that Marxist and Fanonian principles were guided by socialism.⁸³ In addition to adopting socialism, the EFF sought to revive and radicalise the political space in South Africa. As indicated in graph two (see page 21), South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Raymond Suttner argued that injustices and inequality in South Africa could only be resolved with the principles of radicalism. Suttner agreed with the EFF manifesto's call that there is a need for radicalism to transform the politics of South Africa and create an inclusive society.⁸⁴ Strategically the organisation defined its character and mission in South African and the entire continent. In its early stages, it strived to position itself well in South African and African politics to ensure that people understood what it stood for and its mission.

2.4 MIXED REACTIONS TOWARDS THE FORMATION OF THE EFF

After the EFF's launch in Marikana, many people, from politicians to analysts to political organisations and labour movements, held different views about the existence of the EFF. The EFF was being recognised either positively or negatively, but the direction of introducing themselves as a party was shaping. When the organisation was formed in 2013, some saw the EFF as an alternative to the ANC. According to the journalist Kuzeka Kusa, some agreed with Malema's views, especially domestic workers and gardeners, who claimed that Malema spoke

⁷⁹ R.P. Ngcobo, "The Revolutionary Programme of African National Congress and its Contemporary Significance – A Communist Analysis", *The African Communist*, 63, 1975, pp. 22-57. See also, Hlophe, "Parties of no Substance", p. 8.

⁸⁰ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 64-67.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁸⁴ Forde, *Still and Inconvenient Youth*, p. 152.

the truth. Kusa argued that no one seems to disagree with Malema, especially the domestic worker and gardeners.⁸⁵ For instance, Solomzi Lungisa engaged Ms Morudu on her blog, Morudu asserted that the formation of the EFF was similar to the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE), which had little in changing the lives of the people of South Africa.⁸⁶ However, Johannes Landman, a political and economic analyst, argued that South Africa needed to have a leftist (EFF) organisation; the ANC has sold out and lost direction for left politics. He further argued that South African politics were dominated by the ANC, a social democratic organisation.⁸⁷

Congruent to Landman, Solomzi continued to argue that the EFF is relevant to today's struggle because it calls for economic freedom.⁸⁸ Soon after the formation of the EFF, Panyaza Lesufi, a member of the ANC provincial executive in Gauteng, wrote an open letter to both the leadership of the ANC and the EFF. In his letter, Lesufi said that the two organisations should set aside their differences and prioritise the people of South Africa. Lesufi further asserted that if the duo could join forces, they would do better in the 2014 national elections and declared that 'personality politics' would destroy the revolution. Lesufi was convinced that if the ANC had managed to negotiate and start a transitional process with the apartheid government, then they could forgive the EFF leadership for leaving the party and beginning an opposition movement. In his plea, he observed that if the EFF and ANC joined forces, they could help the people of South Africa by delivering basic service to the people.⁸⁹ Lesufi recognised and acknowledged the role and position of the EFF in South African politics and that joining forces with the ANC would help develop the country.

On the other hand, the militaristic political jargon utilised within the ranks of the EFF was not taken well by other analysts in South Africa. The EFF employed a different approach in its politics. They utilised militaristic jargon, largely absent in post-1994 South Africa politics, signalling that the organisation aimed to be a separate movement from the others. This was

⁸⁵ Kusa, "Malema Scores by..." p. 10.

⁸⁶ COPE was one of parties that split from the ANC. Mosioua Lekota who was the minister of defense during Thabo Mbeki's tenure. According to Twala, COPE emerged after the Polokwane conference, those who established COPE were loyalists to President Mbeki who was ousted by Zuma faction in 2007. COPE was born in Bloemfontein on the 16 December 2008. See C. Twala, "The Congress of The People (COPE) Leadership Under Siege: The Beginning of the End?", *New Contree*, 61, 2011, pp. 123-147. See also, L.T. Solomzi, "EFF is Most Relevant to The Struggle", *Business Day*, p. 1. 01 August 2013. See also F. Mongope, "EFF, AgangSA Only Adding to Next Year's Election Blockbuster", *The New Age*, p. 18. 27 September 2013.

⁸⁷ The Witness, "EFF Will be Good for South Africa's Democracy", <<https://www.citizen.co.za/witness/Archive/EFF-will-be-good-for-South-Africas-democracy-20150430/>>, 2013.

⁸⁸ Mangope "EFF, AgangSA only adding...", p. 18.

⁸⁹ P. Lesufi, "It's Time for the ANC to get Malema Back in", *Star*, 16 September 2014, p. 9.

demonstrated with the EFF propagating militancy, which explained why its leaders and members would refer to each other as ‘commander’ or ‘commissars’ and ground forces for general members. Post its establishment on 26 June 2013, the temporary leader, Malema, was already referred to as Commander in Chief (CiC). The highest decision taking body is referred to as the War Council. This is where they debate issues and take important decisions about the organisation.

Furthermore, militancy and radicalism were also reflected in the concept of ‘fighters’ in EFF. Unsurprisingly, this militancy and radicalism were also reflected in the EFF’s first political manifesto. The manifesto stipulated that the “EFF was a radical and militant economic emancipation movement that brings together revolutionary, fearless, radical and militant activists”.⁹⁰ To the EFF, the Black majority were powerless voters as long as economic and political power resided in the hands of the white minority.⁹¹ This language, in one way or the other, sought to plead for the courage of members of the EFF. In the same vein, Yunus Carrim, a member of the national council of provinces, argued that the language itself is problematic; the use of Commander in Chief means the power of the organisation is vested in one person, the CiC.⁹² The military jargon used in the organisation was a new language post-1994 in South Africa. Thus the organisation intended to be different from all opposition parties and the ANC. This, in one way or the other, be a distinguishing factor between the EFF and other parties.

Additionally, some political commentators said that the militaristic language employed by the EFF sounded harsh and might trigger violence. For instance, Peter Groenewald asserted that the word ‘fighters’ was undemocratic.⁹³ Similarly, John Kruger, the director of the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR), asserted that the term ‘fighters’ was ambiguous and may well be interpreted as the rebel without a cause. Kruger argued that a ‘fighter’ could mean many things, like someone inclined to fight, a fiery member of the school of debate, or a sports team not admitting defeat despite difficulties or opposition.⁹⁴ However, Malema argued that the political jargon used in politics attracts followers. As the purpose of the EFF was to provide an alternative for the voting people of South Africa, he argued that it was wise to refer to each other as ‘fighters’ rather than positional names like the ‘executives’ because such political

⁹⁰ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 76-77. See also, Groenewald, “Julius Malema Brash Politics Undermine...”, p. 17.

⁹¹ Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s...”, p. 41.

⁹² The Witness, “EFF Will be Good for South Africa’s Democracy...”, 2013.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ J. Kruger, “Economic Freedom Fighters; An Inconsequential Interpretation.” <<https://www.news24.com/MyNews24/Economic-Freedom-Fighters-An-Inconsequential-Interpretation-20130826>>, 2018.

nomenclature gives one an impression that they are untouchable.⁹⁵ Seemingly the continuities of the EFF to create a different identity in the political arena of South Africa persisted.

The ANCYL also joined the fray of those who saw the EFF as a misleading organisation. They believed that an arrogant and egoistical individual led the EFF. The Youth League asserted that they were not scared of the EFF and knew that the EFF would not fool the youth of South Africa.⁹⁶ A similar critique existed among the ANC's senior leadership. When addressing the provincial parliament on 21 May 2014, Free State Premier Ace Magashule stated that the EFF did not resemble anything close to economic freedom fighters. He added that the ANC were the real economic freedom fighters and would redistribute the land to the people. In response to Magashule's comments, the EFF member of the provincial parliament, Mandisa Makeseni, said that they were happy the ANC was willing to follow what the EFF stood and called for.⁹⁷ In addition, the SACP and its Tripartite Alliance partner COSATU also pronounced their position on the EFF. On 2 October 2013, France Nyaka of *New Age* reported that the SACP had appealed to the youth to distance itself from the EFF because the EFF was formed out of bitterness by those who did not want to be disciplined.⁹⁸ In an exclusive interview with Nyaka, SACP spokesperson Lesega Dikgale argued that Malema had formed the EFF to oppose the ANC and its structures.⁹⁹ In the same vein, Zwelinzima Vavi, the Secretary General of COSATU, indicated that Malema formed part of the wealthy right-wing leaders who exploited the weaknesses of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) so that the workers would leave the union. Vavi was worried about the decline of NUM membership, which would negatively affect the Tripartite Alliance.¹⁰⁰

The Tripartite Alliance was not the only political formation interested in commenting on the formation of the EFF. The Democratic Alliance in Gauteng wasted no time expressing its views of the EFF and its policies. Jack Bloom, the leader of the DA in the Gauteng Province, believed that Malema wanted to nationalise everything, land, mines and all the strategic sectors of the economy, which according to Bloom, is not economic freedom but economic slavery. He further argued that minimum wage, as suggested in the EFF's Cardinal Pillar, would contribute

⁹⁵ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 243-244.

⁹⁶ Z. Luphahla, "ANCYL Task Team Unfazed by EFF", *The New Age*, 18 July 2013, p. 25.

⁹⁷ K. Seekoei, "ANC True Economic Fighters", *The New Age*, 22 May 2014, p. 4.

⁹⁸ N. Modjadji, "Economic Freedom Fighters is Bogus Political Party: ANCYL", *The Citizen*, 15 July 2013, p. 4.

⁹⁹ F. Nyaka, "SACP Slams Malema's EFF for Misleading Youth", *The New Age*, 02 October 2013, p. 24.

¹⁰⁰ P. Tau and M. Mogome, "Juju Draws Battle Lines", *Pretoria News*, 24 August 2012, p. 15.

to a high unemployment rate and thus not reduce poverty, as contended by the EFF.¹⁰¹ According to Bloom, the establishment of the EFF and its policies would negatively affect the South African economy, as its suggested minimum wages would lead to increased unemployment since the employers would not be able to afford to pay such salaries”.¹⁰² Various voices raised on issues pertaining to the EFF did nothing but give the party (EFF) stage to boast within the political arena of South Africa.

Academic professionals also joined in raising their opinions about the existence of the EFF. Fiona Forde stated that someone like Malema, who seemed to be financially broke and politically homeless, would do anything to regain political power. Consequently, the only option left was to look radical and be manipulative. She further said that for those who “establish political parties on the bases of personal vendettas like Malema and master minds as Shivambu, no one should follow them.¹⁰³ Kusa suggested that no one seems to disagree with Malema within the ranks of the EFF.¹⁰⁴ Mathega, an independent political analyst, believed that it is often easy to make unrealistic promises. Still, when it is time to govern, people fail to implement what they have been promising citizens.¹⁰⁵ In agreement with Mathega, Prince Mashele, a scholar from the University of Pretoria, believed that if the EFF could implement its policies, investors would soon disinvest in South Africa.¹⁰⁶ In short, the reception of the EFF in South African political space was varied, with some praising the party with others being critical of it.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The expulsion of Malema and other members of the ANCYL exacerbated the growing conflict that existed between ANCYL and its mother body. Taking advantage of the political unrest in 2012 at Marikana, Malema and other disgruntled ANCYL members formed the EFF in 2013, intending to shift the dominant political debate to the radical left. They felt that the ANC had failed to implement its very own resolutions. Opposition parties and political spectators viewed the EFF as a populist movement, particularly in its attempt to appeal to society. The EFF

¹⁰¹ T. Zwane and M. Masote, “The Battle of Ideologies; Economic Freedom to Some Means Slavery to Others”, *City Press*, 26 January 2014, p. 2.

¹⁰² Nyaka, “SACP Slams Malema’s...”, p. 24.

¹⁰³ Forde, *Still and Inconvenient Youth*, pp. 152 – 153.

¹⁰⁴ Kusa, “Malema Scores by...” p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ N. Modjadji, “Malema-Land is Socialist: Analyst”, *The Citizen*, 12 July 2013, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

resolved that it would always be on the side of Black people. Therefore, post its inception, the EFF vowed to show its visibility and presence in the South African political arena. The EFF's interim leadership was elected in Soweto. It led the party until December 2014, when the organisation had its first National People's Assembly to elect the leadership for the next five years. To a large extent, the EFF grounded itself well by defining its aims and intentions about South Africa and the entire continent of Africa. They intend to economically liberate the previously disadvantaged Black South African and thus expand to the continent at large. The following chapter will examine the proceedings of the assembly of 2014.

CHAPTER 3

THE 2014 NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

From 13 to 16 December 2014, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) held its first elective conference, the National People's Assembly (NPA). It was during this three day sitting that the EFF members were to elect their first permanent leadership to serve the organisation for the next five years. This chapter will examine the build-up to the first NPA, where branches of the EFF gathered to elect the party's first Central Command Team (CCT). It will seek to rationalise the importance of such a gathering by the EFF. Additionally, this chapter will scrutinize the proceedings of the assembly and elected leaders for the next five years and examine the rationale behind their being elected as leaders of the organisation. Lastly, the chapter will examine the political mandate of the EFF's first elected leadership.

3.2 CHARACTER AND NATURE OF OFFICE BEARERS IN THE EFF

Every political party has its own set criterion for those who want to be office bearers in the organisation. In the case of the EFF, such a criterion is set before the National People's Assembly, which assesses who is a member in good standing. In a normal situation, it would be required that one's membership fee is entirely paid for one to participate in the election conference. Additionally, the EFF expected its office bearers to be members who associate with practices that upholds the principles of the working class. Members in good standing in the EFF were expected not to hold shares in any company and should not subscribe to capitalist tendencies or sexist chauvinism. The discussion document of the First Peoples' Assembly alluded that an office bearer has to guard against tendencies against the organisation's principles.¹⁰⁷ If an aspiring leader does not possess these characteristics, they should not be elected. According to Lebogang Seale, a *Sunday Independent* journalist, two provinces, Northern Cape and North-West, were unruly and lacked discipline. This was due to the proceedings of the Provincial Command Teams (PCT) gathering, where members of the EFF

¹⁰⁷ C. Du Plessis, "Free Berets do not Win Votes-EFF", *City Press*, 02 November 2014, p. 4. See also, Discussion document; 1st National People's Assembly 13-16 December 2014 University of the Free State, Mangaung, 2014.

were spotted burning the organisation regalia in the North-West province. In the same vein, in Northern Cape, members attended their own gatherings with *pangas* and *machetes* and were seen publicly utilising alcohol. This behaviour was not acceptable in the organisation.¹⁰⁸ Though the selected cases above of North-West and Northern Cape alluded that representatives of their provinces were unduly elected, it leaves a question if the organisation was as well-grounded as it positioned itself.

According to the EFF discussion document of 2014, the organisation proposed that its leaders should ensure that they deal with the following pressing issues: the economy, land, health, education, media, arts and culture, justice and international relations.¹⁰⁹ The EFF proposes that, as an organisation, it is mass-based, meaning it is an inclusive organisation. The people of South Africa should play a critical role in ensuring that they liberate themselves. According to their discussion document on the people's assembly, the EFF reassured its members that "nothing for them without them".¹¹⁰ This means that people should be included by all means necessary in the affairs of the EFF. Hence people accepted the process of the national people's assembly, where members of the organisation were to elect leadership. The EFF argued that the ANC-led government neglected most rural communities by not providing basic services. This justifies why most service delivery protests are more in rural communities than in the cities or urban areas.¹¹¹ Ando Donkers asserts that most protests took place in 2013, mostly in rural communities over urban areas. Donkers continued to argue that people in local communities, in most cases, were unhappy to see people in urban areas enjoying services provided by various municipalities. While deprived of such services, they saw a need to take to the streets.¹¹² The EFF took the opportunity and joined these protests supporting aggrieved communities in order to gain their trust for political gains.

¹⁰⁸ L. Seale, "EFF Braces for Turbulent Conference", *Sunday Independent*, 14 December 2014, p. 5.

¹⁰⁹ Discussion document; 1st National People's Assembly 13-16 December 2014 University of the Free State, Mangaung. 2014.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

¹¹² A. Donkers, "Discussion document", Conference Paper, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309135417_Discussion_document>, 2014.

3.3 BUILD-UP TO MANGAUNG NATIONAL PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY

Representatives of each province attended the EFF’s first NPA in Mangaung. According to the constitution of the EFF, each branch across the country should assemble a Branch People’s Assembly (BPA). These BPAs will elect the Branch Command Team (BCT), which will serve for a period of two years in the organisation at the regional level. All branches will be categorised into regions; therefore, each region will hold a Regional People’s Assembly (RPA), which elects the Regional Command Team (RCT). RCT’s members serve the organisation for a period of three years. Subsequently, the RCTs will assemble a Provincial People’s Assembly (PPA) to elect the Provincial Command Team (PCT). In turn, the PCT will serve for a period of four years. Lastly, all branches or structures across the country will convene to elect the highest decision-making body, the Central Command Team (CCT); they will convene under what is called the National People’s Assembly (NPA), which is held once every five years. The diagram below shows the flow of all assemblies which were convened before the NPA; this diagram represents the road map to the NPA.




Figure 1: Assemblies, from branch level to the National Assembly.

Data retrieved at; EFF 2nd National People’s Assembly 13th – 16th December 2019: Consolidating the ground towards socialist power, pp. 62-63, 2019.

3.4 EFF'S STRUCTURAL ROUTE TO THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

The CCT should comprises of the top six elected officials and forty additional officials, including the president and deputy president, secretary generals of the EFF Women's Command and the EFF Youth Command, and various provincial chairpersons and secretaries.¹¹³ The Women Command and the Youth Command have not been established (at the time of writing this dissertation), which means the CCT is incomplete. In the words of the Party leader, he said the party was not ready to establish both the youth and women command.¹¹⁴ He further said the party should not be rushed as though it was formed 100 years ago.¹¹⁵ The powers of the CTT are not limited but subject to the organisation's constitution, which will allow them to implement the resolutions, policies, directives, decisions, and programmes enunciated by the NPA. To run the organisation's day-to-day affairs, the CCT elects a War Council, which consists of nine members of the CCT who will sit with the selected top six, namely, the President, Deputy President, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, National Chairperson and Treasurer General.¹¹⁶

The EFF adopted Democratic Centralism as a guiding theory of the party. The Constitution of the EFF explains Democratic Centralism as the: "practice of democratic consultation and engagements before decisions are adopted, and once adopted, they are binding on all members and structures of the organisation. The majority rules over the minority, and once the majority has taken a decision, there is no expression of minority reports and perspectives that contradicts the adopted position by the majority".¹¹⁷ Scholars Giorgos Charalambous and Dan Keith asserted that Democratic Centralism has several characteristics, including the application of elective principles to all leading organs of the party from the lowest to the highest and the periodic accountability of party organs to their respective party organisation. Democratic Centralism also emphasizes the subordination of the minority to the majority and a ban on factions.¹¹⁸ Democratic Centralism is one of the many organisational theories the EFF took

¹¹³ See "Economic Freedom Fighters Founding Manifesto, Constitution, Revolutionary Code of Discipline and Public Representatives Code of Conduct", Adopted by Economic Freedom Fighters National Assembly on What is to be Done held on 26 and 27 July 2013, pp. 56-58.

¹¹⁴ T. Mahlakoana, "EFF not yet ready for youth and women's league, says Malema", *Eyewitness news*, <<https://ewn.co.za/2019/11/21/eff-not-yet-ready-for-youth-and-women-s-leagues-says-malema>>, 2019.

¹¹⁵ "Economic Freedom Fighters Founding Manifesto, Constitution, Revolutionary Code of Discipline and Public Representatives Code of Conduct", Adopted by Economic Freedom Fighters National Assembly on What is to be Done held on 26 and 27 July 2013, pp. 56-58.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

¹¹⁸ G. Charakambous and D. Keith, "The Political (non) Distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism", *Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, 25-27 March 2013, pp. 1-10.

from the ANC. Democratic Centralism aligns with the EFF's claim that they want to transfer the means of production from the minority to the majority, which means the state will control these means on behalf of the people.

Members of the EFF went into the first Peoples' Assembly with few proposals to debate. The issue of land was central to these early assemblies, which included the RPA's confirming that expropriation without compensation was the only acceptable solution to the economic problems of South Africa and that it would be upon the EFF to embark on campaigns to ensure that they realised their first Cardinal Pillar. Secondly, the EFF proposed that the assembly should deliberate on the proposal of the Bill on amending section 25 of the constitution to ensure expropriation without compensation. The discussion document further noted that if the national assembly fails to adopt or amend the constitution, the EFF will call a national referendum "to gauge all South African if they should buy land that was stolen from them."¹¹⁹ The discussion document called for a national conference where the land issue was to be discussed by 2015. The assembly also called for a debate on whether a "Back to Land" campaign should allow communities claiming their disposed land to re-occupy their own land through the "land restitution process". The assembly also called for supporting communities that were disgruntled about the land issue, meaning the organisation would encourage people to occupy the land. Lastly, the EFF called for urban agriculture and food gardening activities, proposing that every school and every house must have a vegetable garden.¹²⁰ It was all these policies that the organisation used to sell and popularise its name among the people or voters.

3.5 THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

In his opening remarks, Shivambu, the deputy president of EFF, said that the ANC is engaged in "gatekeeping politics"; the governing party influenced the university to refuse them the venue because their conference was supposed to be held at the Vaal University of Technology (VUT).¹²¹ They were left stranded and had to opt for the University of the Free State (UFS) in Bloemfontein. Malema described Bloemfontein as the home of the EFF. It was geographically positioned in the centre of South Africa, so it would be easy for the constituencies to converge

¹¹⁹ Discussion Document; 1st National People's Assembly 13-16 December 2014 University of the Free State, Mangaung, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ EFF First Elective Conference, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihC5NLJxQIQ>>, 2014.

there.¹²² On 13 December 2014, the first day of the NPA conference held in Mangaung, the assembly adopted the organisation's Constitution and elected the first Central Command Team (CCT). The elected top six of the CCT were: Julius Malema as the Commander in Chief, Floyd Shivambu as the Deputy President, Dali Mpofu as National Chairperson, Godrich Gardee as Secretary, Hlengiwe Hlophe as Deputy Secretary General and Magdalene Moonsamy as Treasurer General. The composition of the CCT was no surprise as most elected members were part and parcel of the EFF's interim leadership, who had been elected in Soweto in July 2013.¹²³ Mpho Ramakatsa, a Free State EFF leader and member of the (temporary) CCT, raised myriad issues during the assembly's first day. Among other things, Ramakatsa said that delegates were changing the nominee's list during the NPA and lamented that the chairing of the assembly by Malema did not leave an open session for members.¹²⁴ According to section 13 of the EFF constitution, the CCT comprises six official members and 35 additional members. According to the organisational report of the EFF, the incompetence of the contracted Electoral Committee, only 34 names were forwarded to the organisation instead of 35 as per requirements of the constitution.¹²⁵

The second day of the assembly was characterised by conflict among members of some provinces. The Free State and Gauteng PCTs disputed the process used to elect the party executive. Mngxitama and the other prominent EFF members of parliament, Khanyisile Litchfield Tshabalala, declined to be nominated by the CCT. According to them, this was due to "reasons of conscience and safety", implying an undercurrent of tensions within the party's leadership structures.¹²⁶ According to *Daily Maverick* journalist R. Poplak, there were also EFF members who were unhappy with how the elections of CCT members unfolded. Poplak asserted that lists of delegates were burned, and only members of Malema's faction were elected to the CCT.¹²⁷ Poplak further suggested that Malema would 'indirectly' direct how

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ L. Matuma, "EFF Elects Top Six Leaders", *Mail and Guardian*, 15 December 2014, p. 4.

¹²⁴ M. Ramakatsa, Letter to EFF "EFF National Assembly Challenges", <<https://www.citizen.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Letter-to-EFF-CIC.pdf>>, 2015.

¹²⁵ The conference elected the following as additional members (commissars): Dr Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, Marshal Dlamini, Leigh-Ann Mathys, Tebogo Mokwele, Mlungisi Rapodile, Dr Lawrence Matsetela, Mmabatho Mokause, Natasha Louw-Ntlangwini, Tseko Mafanya, Dr Suzan Thembekwayo Vuyokazi, Khethabahle Lerato, Duba-Tito, Nazier Paulsen, Portia Malefane, Shirley Mokgotho, Pumza Ntobongwane, Reneilwe Mashabela, Fana Mokwena, Mathapelo Siwisa, Jabavu Sebolai, Thilivhali Mulaudzi, Dr Hlayiseka Chewane, Siphon Mbatha, Sam Mautiase, Nkagisang Mokgosi-Koni, Roger Xalisa, Veronica Mente, Thembinkosi Rawula, Dr Younis Vawda, Thembi Msane, Ciliesta Motsepe, Delisile Ngwenya, Collin Mkhomza, Dumisani Ncongwane.

¹²⁶ Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's...", p. 54.

¹²⁷ R. Poplak, "Burning Berets The EFF People's Assembly Takes a Turn", *Daily Maverick*, 15 December 2013, p. 2.

members were elected, as “he sat like Buddha at the front and would always raise his hand when his favourite candidate was nominated and thus nod to the deputy to lobby support for the nominated candidate”.¹²⁸ This would mean that people on the floor would move with Malema and Shivambu’s candidates. If Malema voted for a particular candidate, those in his faction would follow. It was reported in the *City Press* that at the time of the first NPA, the EFF had two factions. Those from the former ANCYL and those who called themselves ‘Black consciousness people’, referring to former members of the September National Imbizo.¹²⁹ According to *City Press*, the ANCYL (faction) wanted Floyd Shivambu to be elected as the Deputy President, whence the Black Consciousness faction wanted Khanyisile Litchfield-Tshabalala to be deputy. Still, in the end, Shivambu emerged victorious.¹³⁰ From the early stages of the organisation, it was divided; hence at the later stage, the party would witness breakaways by disgruntled members (see chapter 5 for more details). This culture can be associated with what has happened in the ANC since its inception. The EFF is a breakaway organisation which bred breakaway parties; the continuities of the ‘breakaway culture’ tells that the EFF, in many ways, has similarities with the ANC, though they project themselves as a better party than the ANC in particular.

During the assembly’s second day, delegates also focused on political education, particularly party ideology. This was to ensure that members of the EFF understood the ideological grounds of the organisation. Malema delivered this session, the newly and officially elected CiC, during the assembly. In his address, Malema pleaded for unity among members and for them to be careful of detractors and opportunists within the organisation. Malema asserted that “members should be aware that at some stage, they should be led so that they can be trained on how to lead”.¹³¹ Malema’s statement suggests that members should be willing to be ushered into the political arena and leadership. Malema further alluded that the assembly’s theme was “People’s Power for Economic Freedom”.¹³² He subsequently explained the themes of the assembly by breaking down the keywords in this phrase. Malema explained that ‘people’ meant the rejected masses of South Africa, especially the unemployed youth, people living in informal settlements, security guards, cleaners, mine workers, farm workers, and construction workers,

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ City Press, “A Year After its Establishment, The EFF Heads to its First Elective Congress on the back of Violent Provincial Congresses and Allegations of Factionalism”, *IOL* <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/eff-to-elect-new-leaders-1795101>, 2014.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Matuma, “EFF Elects Top Six Leaders...”, p. 4.

¹³² Youtube, “EFF CIC Political Report 1st National People’s Assembly 13-16 December 2014” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvOWaVhI_uw&t=4502s>, 2015.

especially those paid by means of envelopes. Then he elaborated on what he meant by 'power'. Malema explained that power was the ability to change the situation, especially the economic conditions of the masses, to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich. South Africa is classified as the most unequal society in Africa, and it is ranked number ten worldwide.¹³³ According to Patrick Bond, during South Africa's transition period (1990-1999), this country's wealth was directed into the hands of minorities, especially the Black elites and white minorities, through multinational corporations.¹³⁴ The EFF aimed to fight the legacy of the transition period that was referred to by Bond. Malema defined the EFF as a socialist and radical leftist movement. He further said that the organisation was inspired by Black intellectuals like Steve Biko, the broader ideologies of Pan-Africanism and the Internationalist Socialist Movement with the Marxist and Fanonian characters.¹³⁵

The elective conference in Bloemfontein saw it necessary to nurture new leadership and promote gender equity; the EFF introduced a Youth Command Team and a Women's Command Team. The two have not been established to date (time of writing this dissertation). Meaning women and young people are not organised separately in the party. However, the EFF in June 2015 established the Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command (EEFSC); the aim was to organise students at institutions of higher learning which will be discussed in chapter five. On top of the seven Cardinal Pillar, there are fourteen complementary pillars, one of which is the Gender and sexuality question. According to Shivambu, this pillar intends to fight against the oppression of women culturally or by any means. He further suggests that they want to liberate women from all bondages of oppression; they will emancipate them through education against patriarchy and sexism.¹³⁶ All these interventions have not materialised as the women's command has not been established.

For the EFF, what seemed more eminent to the organisation was its growth and stability, as the organisation was a political newcomer. While the EFF was barely one year old, Malema was

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ P. Bond, *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*, 2000.

¹³⁵ Youtube, "EFF CIC Political Report 1st National People's Assembly 13-16 December 2014" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvOWaVhI_uw&t=4502s>, 2015.

¹³⁶ These complementary pillars were solicited to support the main seven Cardinal Pillar of the EFF. The complementary pillars are as follows: Decentralised spatial development and building new cities, public representatives using public services, reduction of benefits for public representatives, progressive internationalism, the sports arts and culture question, the gender and sexuality question, the immigration question, monetary and fiscal stability, priority of energy security and environment, a focus on science and technology, support given to research, innovation and enterprise development, making one city the administrative and legislative capital of South Africa, the transformation of the criminal justice and relationship with the security forces. See Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, pp. 132 and 154.

optimistic that come the 2016 local government elections, his party would take over the Tshwane, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela municipalities. It has to be noted that the EFF sees itself as a mass-based organisation; thus, its target, as argued by its leader, is the urban population. For the organisation to win the election and become grow effectively, Malema reminded all members gathered at UFS hall that some appear as “staff-riders”, those who want to join leadership ranks without having served in the lower structures or in building the organisation, those who did not want to be led and those who were power mongers.¹³⁷ He warned, encouraged and further requested members to show discipline and unity. After two hours of Malema’s speech, he declared the gathering over. Elections were to be held later that evening and the above-mentioned top six were elected and the first Central Command Team.¹³⁸ The assembly was successful, though some of its resolutions have not yet materialised.

3.6 CONCLUSION

In 2014 the EFF organised its first National Peoples’ Assembly, where branches of the organisation were allowed to elect its first leadership from 2014 to 2019. The temporary leadership decided for the organisation to contest the fifth democratic elections in South Africa, which will be discussed in the following chapter four. This chapter argued on the character and the nature of office bearers of the EFF and their conduct, which is unacceptable and still needs to be nurtured. The chapter also indicated that though the party claimed to establish the Women and Youth command, such has not materialised (during the time of this dissertation). The newly elected CCT by EFF’s constituencies had an enormous task at hand to implement their organisation's adopted policies, especially the organisation’s Seven Cardinal Pillar, and to pursue the ANC government to change and amend the constitution necessary to adopt the policy. The following chapter (four) will discuss the performance of the EFF in the 2014 national and 2016 local elections, respectively.

¹³⁷ Youtube, “EFF CIC Political Report 1st National People’s Assembly 13-16 December 2014” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvOWaVhI_uw&t=4502s>, 2015.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 4

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EFF IN THE 2014 NATIONAL AND 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Immediately after the establishment of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013, the party's temporary leadership agreed to participate in South Africa's national elections of 2014. Though the previous chapter has highlighted that the EFF went into the National People's Assembly (NPA) at the end of 2014, the national elections took place in May 2014. The EFF's leadership chose to use Julius Malema as the face of the organisation in preparation for the elections, which played a critical role in the election results of the EFF, as Malema was a known figure in South Africa. This chapter unpacks the decision of the EFF to participate in the national elections. It will establish the rationale behind the EFF's choice to make Malema the face of the organisation. To understand the performance of the EFF, this chapter will further analyse the strategies the EFF used to mobilise for the elections, paying particular attention to its "target" constituency. The chapter will furthermore outline the results of the national election and discuss how they influenced the outcomes of the 2016 local government elections.¹³⁹ Lastly, it will scrutinise the results of the 2016 local government elections and their implications on South African politics. All these will contribute towards locating the role of the EFF in South African politics.

4.2 MOBILISATION STRATEGIES

The EFF decided to make Malema the face of the party for election campaigning. Malema, from the ranks of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), was popular and regularly made news about the political currents of South African. His role in the ANC 2007 Polokwane conference made him known to the people, as he was vocal about the removal of Thabo Mbeki and vouching for Jacob Zuma to be the President of the ANC.¹⁴⁰ After the 2007

¹³⁹ M. Maserumule and M. Ndletyana, "Unmasking the Outcomes of the 2016 Local Government Elections", *Journal for Public Administration*, 51 (3.1), 2016, pp. 442-450.

¹⁴⁰ Twala, in his paper argues that the ANCYL became a kingmaker in ANC politics, particularly the conferences. It was the ANCYL that played a pivotal role in ousting Mbeki in 2007 Polokwane Conference,

Polokwane conference, the Zuma faction came out triumphant, and Malema was elected to be the president of the ANCYL in 2008. He further became popular through the struggle songs he would sing during the ANCYL rallies, as they raised debates around the country.

On the other hand, the decision was guided by the EFF's policy of Democratic Centralism and Malema's political character as guided by the founding manifesto, which allowed Malema to address all matters relating to the organisation to the media and the general public. Malema addressed the EFF press conferences, any official information to the public was relayed mainly by Malema, and Malema spoke at most of the organisational events.¹⁴¹ As a known figure in the South African political arena, it would be easy for people of the country to be familiar with the organisation.

The year 2014 marked 20 years since South Africa attained its democracy from apartheid rule. It was the first time children who were born in 1994; the so-called 'born frees' could participate in the elections.¹⁴² Many of these young people were unemployed; according to Aalia Cassim and Morné Oosthuizen, who used an expanded definition of unemployment, South Africa's youth unemployment rate in 2013 was 63 per cent of the youth labour force (3.2 million individuals). This included those who gave up looking for jobs, those who were not looking for employment and those who were discouraged from seeking jobs.¹⁴³ The EFF decided to target young and unemployed South Africans, especially those eligible to vote. The EFF intended to reach out to these millennials through social media. According to Fortune Maswanganyi, social media "is one new way of supplanting the traditional ways of informing the public".¹⁴⁴ It is one strategy that moves from mainstream media, such as newspapers, television and radio. It is easily accessible to the youth through their mobile phones. Social media allows participants to engage their leaders in what they tweet or share on their media platforms.

until he was made to resign in September of 2008. See C. Twala, "African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL'S) Role as the Kingmaker: A Moment of Post Polokwane Blues?", *Journal for Contemporary History*, 34(3), December 2009, pp. 153-171.

¹⁴¹ Discussion Document; 1st National People's Assembly 13-16 December 2014 University of the Free State, Mangaung, 2014.

¹⁴² C. Schulz-Herzenburg, "Shifting Electoral Trends, Participation and Party Support", *Journal for public administration*, 51 (3.1), 2016, pp. 487-512.

¹⁴³ A. Cassim and M. Oosthuizen, "The State of the South African Youth Unemployment in South Africa" <<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/08/15/the-state-of-youth-unemployment-in-south-africa/>>, 2014.

¹⁴⁴ F. Maswanganyi, "The Role of New Media in the Oromotion of Participatory Democracy in the Local Government Elections of South Africa", in M. P. Sebola (ed.), *Local Government Elections, Politics and Administration*, 2019, pp. 1-14.

One of the strategies that the EFF used was social media campaigns where the organisation appealed to South Africa's "born free" generation and the youth at large. The 'born frees' constituted 40% of the eligible voters.¹⁴⁵ Despite the EFF's best efforts to appeal to young voters, Roger Southall argued that they anticipated results of the 2014 national elections of the EFF could not materialise due to many young people who decided to abstain from the voting processes. According to Mosidi Nhlapo, Barbara Anderson and Marie Wentzel, in the survey conducted, nine per cent of young people who were eligible to vote in 2014 intended to vote for the EFF, and six per cent of the old age were willing to vote for the EFF.¹⁴⁶ Youth that abstained from elections mostly came from the urban areas over rural areas.¹⁴⁷ In 2014, 40.6 per cent of eligible voters abstained, the EFF and other parties besides ANC and DA shared 10 per cent of the voter turnout, and hence the EFF became the third largest political party in 2014, as they got 6.4 per cent out of 10 per cent.¹⁴⁸ As a result, the EFF did not reach its anticipated target of taking over the government but seat on the opposition benches in parliament.

For the organisation to reach out to young people, they aimed to keep the spirit high of mobilising for the 2014 national elections. This resulted in Malema and the EFF's official Twitter account reaching over 30 000 followers.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, the EFF became publicly visible with their distinctive red berets and overalls, which were initially provided for free. However, berets were sold for R100 each to increase the party's finances. The EFF's support-base was initially centred in North-West, the province where the EFF was launched and where the Marikana massacre took place; Limpopo (which is Malema and Shivambu's home province); and Gauteng, where its headquarters are.¹⁵⁰ Malema and Shivambu's Twitter accounts were more significant than their organisations.¹⁵¹ The use of Malema's popularity would, in one way or the other, assist the organisation in gaining votes. However, they performed below what they anticipated, namely to take over the country.

¹⁴⁵ Sapa, "Vote Like Meme it", *City press*, 27 April 2014, p. 5. See also, Sapa, "Do Born Frees Realize it is Vital to Cast Their Vote", *Saturday Star*, 30 August 2014, p. 19.

¹⁴⁶ M. Nhlapo, *et al*, "Trends in Voting in South Africa 200-2014", <<https://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr17-881.pdf>>, 2017.

¹⁴⁷ R. Southall, "The Context of the South African Election of 2014: Prologue of Change". In C. Schulz-Herzenberg and R. Southall, *South African Election of 2014; The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, 2014, pp. 1-19.

¹⁴⁸ F. Cronje, "Our Biggest Voting Bloc, The Don'ts", https://cra-sa.com/products/archive/fast-facts/fast-facts-2014/copy_of_fast-facts-no-05-may-2014, 2014.

¹⁴⁹ City Press, "Red Berets Run Out", *City Press*, 17 November 2013, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

According to the *City Press*, South African voters were more interested in the personalities of political leaders than their political organisations. These individuals became influencers through the content they post and the opinions they share on their social media platforms. Thus their organisation would benefit from the personalities of organisational leaders.¹⁵² In the same vein, Nandi Dabula alluded that various political formations used social media to ensure that they reached out to young people. Dadula further asserted that through social media, politicians could share their opinions and views and directly communicate with their supporters, accountancies and those who follow them on these platforms.¹⁵³ EFF was no exception. They utilised their militaristic political language to reach out to the youth. In most cases, they exposed the wrongs of the ruling party and thus pleaded with the youth to vote for them in power.¹⁵⁴ The EFF used the failures of the ANC to appeal to the disgruntled masses of the people.

According to Wynand Greffrath and André Duvenhage, the road to the 2014 national elections media coverage was dominated by Malema and the EFF.¹⁵⁵ They showed their visibility by popularising the party's signature red berets. EFF leader, Andile Mngxitama, explained this strategy as "replacing money with the people".¹⁵⁶ The EFF wanted to change the narrative of appealing to people by grounding themselves as not corrupt because the ANC has been accused of using state resources for their political campaigns.¹⁵⁷ He emphasised that the people seemed more desperate to receive free berets from the EFF than T-shirts from any other political party.¹⁵⁸ This demonstrates that the political signature of the organisation made it visible and known to the people. On 17 November 2013, the *City Press* reported that EFF's berets had run out because many people wanted to have a beret to show support for Malema and the EFF.¹⁵⁹ The mixed policies of the ANC and internal squabbles, which included, among others, problems related to land reform, corruption and growing factionalism within the ANC, gave the EFF grounds to garner support as it strategically aligned itself with the struggles of striking or protesting people from different communities against poor service delivery.

¹⁵² City Press, "Vote Like Meme It", *City Press*, 27 April 2014, p. 5.

¹⁵³ Dabula, "The Influence of Political Marketing Using Social Media on Trust", p. 63.

¹⁵⁴ Koekemoer, "How the ANC, the DA and the EFF..." p. 45.

¹⁵⁵ W. Greffrath and A. Duvenhage, "South Africa and the 2014 National Election: A Shift to the Left?" in *Journal for Contemporary History*, 39(2) December 2014, p. 213.

¹⁵⁶ City Press, "Red Berets Run Out", *City Press*, 17 November 2013, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

On the other hand, EFF used the Freedom Charter to popularise itself amongst South African voters, especially in 2014. The EFF would utilise the Freedom Charter, a document found by the Congress of the People which among other parties included the ANC, South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) to campaign for votes. Seale argued that the ANCYL counter-attacked organisations like the EFF and the National Union of the Metal Workers to reclaim its rightful position in the politics of South Africa.¹⁶⁰ In agreement with Seale, the EFF would strategically use the failures of the ANC to appeal to the people and would seem to be amongst the people when they protested, like in Mooiplaas, Gauteng, Khayelitsha in Cape Town, Durban in Kwa-Zulu Natal and other places where the party was visible during service delivery protests.¹⁶¹ During the run-up to the 2014 national elections, the EFF made itself visible among potential voters by using low-cost campaigning tools, such as social media. Though the EFF saw itself as a progressive organisation, Mbete saw them as a populist organisation that used the South African crisis to its advantage, especially unemployment (see graph three).¹⁶²

The EFF launched its 2014 election manifesto in Thembisa, Ekurhuleni, on 22 February 2014.¹⁶³ The manifesto spoke to the alteration of the economy and the redistribution of land under the custodianship of the state. It also promised a minimum wage of R4500 per month to workers; declared that labour brokers would be banned under the leadership of the EFF; pledged that there would be no contract workers in the mining and manufacturing industry if the EFF won elections; stated that education would be made accessible and compulsory and, which would be achieved by introducing an education tax on all corporations to fund education; and that government ministers will lose perks.¹⁶⁴ In its manifesto, the EFF promised to advance the needs of the youth, particularly young graduates. According to the founding manifesto of the EFF, more than seven million employable youths in South Africa were unemployed in 2014.¹⁶⁵ The manifesto of the EFF promised living or minimum wages for these individuals if they became part of the government.¹⁶⁶ This manifesto was used as a tool to try and mobilise

¹⁶⁰ L. Seale, "They Turned Themselves Into a Private Army of the Ruling Party", *Star*, 30 May 2014, p. 2.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Mbete, "The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa's...", p. 48.

¹⁶³ F. Haffajee, "EFF's Land Promises", *City Press*, 02 March 2014. pp. 1-2. See also N. Marrian and S. Stone, "DA, EFF Put Jobs at Heart of Election Manifestos", *Business Day*, 24 February 2014, p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ S. Stone, "People Driven State Central to EFF Policy", *Business Day*, 24 February 2014, p. 1. See also P. Rampedi, "Malema Unveils His Ambitious Manifesto: EFF Leader Hardly Mentions ANC and Zuma", *Sunday Independent*, 23 February 2016, p. 6.

¹⁶⁵ "EFF Election Manifesto: Now is the Time for Economic Freedom" <<http://midrandreporter.co.za/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/08/EFF-ELECTIONS-MANIFESTO.pdf>>, 2014.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

the masses to vote for the EFF. At least for some, the EFF campaign was successful. On 05 April 2014, *City Press* interviewed the Polokwane businessman Mashapa Sesera. Sesera explained how he admired the manifesto of the EFF and said:

The EFF strikes me as an organisation that stands for radical change in South Africa [...] I always thought we needed a government with clear, radical policies on economic issues. When the EFF came into the picture, it filled that void for me.¹⁶⁷

Sesera was clearly touched by the EFF's manifesto and its vision of how the party intended to achieve its promises. Additionally, the EFF promised to unapologetically redress the imbalances created by apartheid by enforcing and accelerating the government's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme to benefit Black professionals in the private and public sectors.¹⁶⁸ With this intention, the EFF was clearly courting the Black middle class. Ferial Haffajee, a journalist for *City Press*, indicated that the EFF manifesto was explicit as it spoke to different constituencies, from mine workers to domestic workers, from farmworkers to shop assistants and young professionals and their experiences.¹⁶⁹

Not everyone welcomed the manifesto of the EFF. During the run-up to the elections, there were concerns about the practicalities of the EFF's manifesto. Justice Malala, a political commentator and newspaper columnist, held the view that the EFF's call for nationalisation was a fallacy and would put South Africa in the same predicament as Zimbabwe, where millions had to migrate to neighbouring countries, including South Africa, in search for work and a better life.¹⁷⁰ Some scholars held that Malema was merely experimenting with the call for nationalisation and would fail sooner or later as it happened elsewhere in the world. In Venezuela, for example, Hugo Chavez implemented nationalisation in 2005, which assisted in improving the lives of the poor until he died on 05 March 2013. The experiment started to fail, and Venezuela boomeranged to its pre-nationalisation state when Chavez's successor, Nicolas Maduro, took over on 14 April 2013.¹⁷¹ Venezuelans began to complain about food rationing, soaring crime and gross human rights violations. Maduro changed the country's currency from Bolivars to Dollar to show that the conditions worsened. Maduro did this to try and stop the

¹⁶⁷ C. Prinsloo, "The EFF's Shining Diamond Black Diamonds", *City Press* 06 April 2014, p. 13.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ Haffajee, "EFF's Land Promises...", p. 2.

¹⁷⁰ J. Malala, *We Have Now Begun our Descent: How to Stop South Africa Losing its Way*, 2015, p. 159.

¹⁷¹ M. Belen' Wu, "Issues in Venezuelan Monetary and Economic Forum", *John Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and Study for Business Enterprise*, 62, September 2016, pp. 5-6.

looming crisis in Venezuela.¹⁷² In a way, those who followed the EFF were warned that elsewhere, the proposed policies by the EFF had failed.

The organisation got media attention during the election campaigns because of such opposing views about the EFF and its policies, as they raised the controversial issue of the land, among other things. Malema went to Nkandla on 11 January 2014 and donated a house to the Hlongwane family, who stayed close to President Jacob Zuma's homestead of Nkandla, which had cost the South African taxpayers R245 million. Upon handing over the house to the Hlongwane family, Malema asked the family to tell Zuma, when they see him, that they "belong to Malema".¹⁷³ Through this act, Malema wanted to position the EFF properly in the backyard of the former ANC president. The handover also implied that the family and EFF supporters should discard any ANC advancements.¹⁷⁴ Building the Hlongwanes, a house near Nkandla, can be seen as a calculated political move; as Malema said, "they went to Nkandla to test political intolerance of the ANC".¹⁷⁵ Malema's words were proven correct; when ANC members in Nkandla blocked his motorcade to the Hlongwane family to hand over the house, some threw water bottles at him.¹⁷⁶ The police advised him to utilise an alternative route; ultimately, 30 people were arrested on charges of public violence after the event.¹⁷⁷ It led to some community members applauding Malema and the EFF's actions, with some pleading with Malema to help them set up an EFF branch in KwaZulu-Natal.¹⁷⁸ Though the EFF pulled the particular stunt, the ANC's performance in the province of KwaZulu-Natal was more than 75 per cent of the population voted; the EFF snatched less than two per cent of the 2014 votes. The organisation got two seats in the legislature in the province dominated by ANC and IFP.¹⁷⁹ Some of the populist strategies that the organisation used did not usher in positive results as per their expectation.

¹⁷² Haffajee, "EFF's Land Promises...", p. 2.

¹⁷³ A. Hlongwane, "Will the House Juju Built Survive?", *Sunday Argus*, 19 January 2014 p. 17.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ G. Nicolson and T. Lekgowa, "Malema's Nkandla Gambit Pays Off", *Mail and Guardian*, 12 January 2014, p. 6.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ IEC, "2014 National and Provincial Elections: Kwa-Zulu Natal Results", <<https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Results/2014-National-and-Provincial-Elections--KwaZulu-Natal-results/>>, 2014.

4.3 CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES OF THE EFF DURING THE 2014 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Voting allows the public to air their voices to decide who they trust and who not to trust. Since the EFF went to the national elections with an interim structure, they have experienced some challenges. Therefore, the EFF's First National People's Assembly was organised to deal with all existing and potential organisational challenges moving forward. Senior politicians in the EFF like Malema, Shivambu, Ndlozi and others had succeeded in handling some internal squabbles and kept the organisation in shape and focused on the elections. One of the EFF leaders from Thabo Mofutsanyane district in the Free State, Wonder Sentimile, believed that Malema's dictatorial tendencies would destroy the EFF. Sentimile further asserted that there was no platform for those opposing views in the EFF.

Furthermore, Sentimile argued that no one in the party could challenge or question decisions taken by Malema or Shivambu.¹⁸⁰ Malema did not only refute the claims made by Sentimile but also intimidated Sentimile. He said that such people were 'ANC moles' and retorted that they should leave the EFF or they would be crushed.¹⁸¹ This meant that Sentimile's claims can hold ground if the leader does not refute them. Malema's handling of such critics led to the mushrooming of splinter organisations during the run-up to the 2014 National Elections. In October 2014, Sentimile broke away from the EFF and created a new party called the New Economic Freedom Fighters.¹⁸² Other EFF members like Kenny Kunene were disgruntled about what they termed a "managed democracy" culture in the EFF. Kunene left the EFF and launched his political party, the Patriotic Alliance, on 29 November 2014 in Cape Town.¹⁸³ Another splinter organisation that former members of the EFF established was the Black First Land First, established in 2015 and led by Mngxitama. Mngxitama was manhandled by members of the EFF in Cape Town when he intended to hold a press conference to clarify why he refused to be nominated during the National People's Assembly. The EFF members forced him to remove the party T-shirt, arguing that he was a traitor. Subsequent to the incident, Malema, in an interview with South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) anchor Mpho Tsedu, admitted and said, "members of the EFF were correct in forcing Mngxitama to remove party regalia; no one had a right to oppose the organisation wearing its regalia."¹⁸⁴ In his

¹⁸⁰ Joubert, "EFF Gears up for the First 'People's Assembly'", *Sunday Times*, 14 September 2014, p. 15.

¹⁸¹ K. Kgosana, "Malema: ANC Moles Trying to Destroy EFF", *City Press*, 06 July 2014, p. 4.

¹⁸² K. Seekoei and L. Fekisi, "Dictatorship Will Destroy the EFF", *The New Age*, 14 October 2014, p. 9.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Question Time, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wE6I2lavLRo>>, 2015.

address, Mngxitama said, “Malema was a good leader, but wrong people surround him. How can he be a revolutionary when he wears Louis Vuitton.”¹⁸⁵ Meaning, Malema’s lifestyle does not match that of a revolutionary as he perceives himself. All the above challenges did not deter the organisation from continuing to prepare and contest the elections of 2014.

On the other hand, the ANC used the same approach as opposition parties, tarnishing the image of those who opposed them. The ANC was visibly anti-EFF and made it publicly known. ANCYL convenor Mzwandile Masina belittled the EFF by naming it a ‘Micky mouse’ organisation which did not have any support in Thembisa.¹⁸⁶ Besides the ANC, other parties were also vocally anti-EFF. For example, the National Freedom Party (NFP), which was a breakaway from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), led by Zanele Magwaza-Msibi, described the EFF as a chameleon that seems to be opportunistic.¹⁸⁷ On several occasions, the EFF had to fight court battles with the few resources it had at its disposal. The organisation challenged the Tshwane Metropolitan City’s decision to refuse to allow an EFF rally at Lucas Moripe Stadium just before the elections. However, permission was granted, and the EFF held its rally at Attridgeville. Other problems emanated from the SABC, which took the EFF’s election campaign advert off-air after the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) ruled that the advert intended to incite violence in the communities of Gauteng.¹⁸⁸

During the 2014 National Elections run-up, the EFF also had to deal with financial constraints. In the interviews with Janet Smith on 25 January and 6 February 2014,¹⁸⁹ Malema said that the EFF depended on donations from private individuals for its survival.¹⁹⁰ However, these donations were never disclosed by the party and the funders. To further stabilise its finances and budget, the EFF used merchandise sales for fundraising. Berets were sold at the EFF headquarters in Braamfontein in bulks of a hundred upwards. Each beret was sold for R100; from that amount, R10 was for membership. Malema emphasised that the sales of berets were beneficial to the EFF’s financial stability.¹⁹¹ However, *Sunday Times* reported on 23 March 2014 that the EFF had requested funding from Johan Rupert, a business man based in Gauteng.

¹⁸⁵ Suspended EFF MPs media briefing, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ULseI9WfpE>>, 2015.

¹⁸⁶ W. Mabona, “ANCYL, EFF Descend on: in Tembisa”, *The New Age*, 21 February 2014, p. 4.

¹⁸⁷ N. Mkhize, “Malema Opportunistic with the Deal with Buthelezi”, *Business Day*, 24 January 2014, p. 3.

¹⁸⁸ Q. Hunter, “Eff is Flexing its Muscle”, *The New Age*, 29 April 2014, p. 4.

¹⁸⁹ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 208.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

¹⁹¹ J. Robinson, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: Birth of a Giant”, in C. Schulz-Herzenberg and R. Southall, *South African Election of 2014; The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, 2014, pp. 72-88. See also, Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 239.

This was controversial because Malema had previously claimed that Rupert controlled the ANC and DA during the EFF rallies in Cape Town. Malema further accused him of being part of a conspiracy that led to his expulsion from the ANCYL.¹⁹²


Despite all the challenges raised above, the EFF acquired 6.35% of the vote in the national elections in 2014. This gave the EFF 25 seats out of 400 in the National Assembly.¹⁹³ As a result, the EFF became the second-largest opposition party in parliament behind the DA, even though the EFF was just under a year old. However, this was not a new phenomenon of a breakaway party doing well in its first elections. COPE got 7.43% of votes in the 2009 national government elections; however, in their second debut, which was the 2011 local election, their support declined to 2.1%. In 2016 they further declined to 0.44%, whence the EFF in its second elections, 2016 local elections got about 8.19%, see section 4.3 below; this trend shows the stability of the EFF in South African politics. However, the comparison is made of different elections local and national elections.

Provincially, the EFF performed well against the ANC and DA. As illustrated in graph three below, the EFF got two seats against the ANC's 45 and DA's 10 in the Eastern Cape; it received (EFF) 2 seats against the ANC's 22 and DA's 5 in the Free State; (EFF) 8 seats in Gauteng against the ANC's 40 and DA's 23; (EFF) 2 seats against the ANC's 52 and DA's 10 in Kwa-Zulu Natal; (EFF) 2 seats against the ANC's 24 and DA's 3 in Mpumalanga; (EFF) 2 seats against 20 by the ANC 20 and 7 by the DA in the Northern Cape; (EFF) 1 seat against 14 by the ANC and 26 by the DA in the Western Cape; and in Limpopo and North-West, the EFF got six seats against the ANC's 39 and DA's 3 and 5 against the ANC's 23 and DA's four respectively.¹⁹⁴ Despite this performance, they did not win any province to govern post the 2014 elections but participated in the opposition benches in different legislatures. The EFF, post-2014 national elections, had to begin gearing up for the 2016 local election. Section 4.3 will elaborate further on their performance in the 2016 local elections.

¹⁹² S. Shoba, "EFF Man Sent an Email to Rupert Despite Denials", *Sunday Times*, 23 March 2014, p. 20. See also, Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 236.

¹⁹³ Kgosana, "Malema: ANC Moles...", p. 4. See also J. Smith, "Obstinate Julius is Going Nowhere", *Saturday Star*, 26 July 2014, p. 15.

¹⁹⁴ IEC, "Electoral Commission of South Africa; Ensuring Free and Fair Elections", <<http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Results/2014-National-and-Provincial-Elections--Nationalresults/>>, 2014.



Graph 3: EFF performance per province in 2014.

Data retrieved from: IEC, “Electoral Commission of South Africa; Ensuring Free and Fair Elections”, <<http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Results/2014-National-and-Provincial-Elections--Nationalresults/>>, 2014.

4.4 THE ROAD TO THE 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

The Local Government Elections of 2016 in South Africa were seen as the most challenging elections by election spectators and academics in political science. Many parties contested these elections as compared to the 2011 local government elections in which about 121 political parties and 53757 candidates were contesting throughout the country. In 2016, about 200 political parties with 61000 candidates contested the elections. This shows that the growth of distrust from the ruling party has widened.¹⁹⁵ The ANC was experiencing numerous challenges from community protests and rising factional battles within the party.¹⁹⁶ And the opposition utilised the unravelling Nkandla scandal (which will be discussed further in chapter 5) that

¹⁹⁵ Electoral Commission of South Africa, “Election Report: 2011 Municipal Elections”, <<https://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=3408&name=Elections&LeftMenuId=100&BreadcrumbId=220>>, 2011.

¹⁹⁶ Maswanganyi, “The Role of New Media in the Promotion...”, p. 1.

implicated President Zuma to position themselves correctly.¹⁹⁷ The ANC went into the local government elections of 2016 with more party factional battles rattling the organisation.

Furthermore, the ruling party had been crippled by the tensions within the ranks of the Tripartite Alliance.¹⁹⁸ Corruption scandals emerged, especially those linked to the ANC's top leadership and the Gupta family.¹⁹⁹ Andrew Faull suggested that the people of South Africa had lost hope in the ruling party, especially under the leadership of Zuma, due to the abovementioned issues.²⁰⁰ On top of all these issues, students at all institutions of higher learning in South Africa went to the streets to protest, requesting the government to scrap their debts and suggesting that universities should be 'fee free'. These problems were directed towards the government, which experienced several challenges and had to prepare itself for local elections. During the ANC's 104th anniversary celebration in Rustenburg, President Zuma admitted that the 2016 local government elections were going to be the toughest. He pointed out that the ANC had to do more to improve community services.²⁰¹ The ANC went into the campaigning hampered by many challenges, favouring many opposition parties, including the EFF.

One of the growth measuring barometers for political parties are the election results, especially when they gain numbers instead of losing voters. According to Nomvula Mokonyana, the elections convenor of the ANC, the ANC had spent over R1 billion to run the election campaigns of 2016. According to Ranjani Munusamy, a journalist from the *Daily Maverick*, political rallies during the 2016 local election were filled with promises, politicians kissing babies, hugging grannies in different localities, Blackmailing the vulnerable and giving hope to their constituencies. She further asserted that people were told hot and cold lies, big dreams and empty promises.²⁰² Parties invest a lot of money in going all out to ensure they reach out to different communities. Cherrel Africa argues that several dimensions characterise an excellent political campaign, including how to deliver political messages to the people. Cherrel

¹⁹⁷ U. Engel, "Zupta's Next Nightmare: The South African Local Government Elections of August 2016", *Africa Spectrum*, 2, 2016, pp. 103-115. See also, N. Marriam, "The Tables Could Turn on EFF kingmaker", *Mail and Guardian*, 26 April 2019, p. 7.

¹⁹⁸ H. Mkhabela, "South African Local Election 2016: From One Party Dominance to Plural Democracy", *Etude de L'Ifri*, 2016, pp. 1-48. See also Engel, p. 104.

¹⁹⁹ R. Besseling, "The Slow Demise of the ANC: Political Change, Economic Decline, and State Corruption in South Africa", *Africa Brief Policy*, 18, 2016, pp. 1-7. See also, S. Mbete, "Economic Freedom Fighters' Debut in the Municipal Elections", *Journal for Public Administration*, 51(3.1), 2016, pp. 596-614.

²⁰⁰ A. Faull, "Politics, Democracy and the Machinery of the State" <<http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2016/v0n57a1442>>, 2011.

²⁰¹ Business tech, "Zuma Admits that Elections Will be Tough", <<https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/131224/anc-election-campaign-hits-r1-billion/>>, 2016.

²⁰² R. Munusamy, "LGE 2016: The ANC-DA-EFF Rally Showdown and What They Say to Voters", *Daily Maverick*, 01 August 2016, p. 4.

Africa furthermore suggests that accessibility and good communication channels reach the constituencies and play a vital role in campaigns. Cherrel Africa continued to indicate that whilst constituencies are digesting messages from campaigns, political formations need to keep their campaign messages short, consistency in messages is vital and lastly, to integrate their message to avoid monotony.²⁰³ The EFF was not immune to such a process; they embarked on several rallies trying to convince South Africans why they should allow them to lead a particular ward, municipality or even metros by the end of the elections in 2016. However, the EFF did not take control of any municipality but gained seats in various legislatures.

When the local government elections campaigning began in 2015, the EFF launched its manifesto titled “Our last hope for jobs and service delivery”.²⁰⁴ When the Malema presented this manifesto, he explained that the slogan meant that the EFF was the last hope for the disgruntled Black majority, who had lost hope in the ANC government. Additionally, the organisation was impressed with the support they got in the 2014 national elections and therefore believed that the 2016 local government election was critical because they wanted to position themselves well by being part of legislatures and councils in different communities.²⁰⁵ The EFF employed a different approach when they elected or nominated candidates to stand as councillors. At the branch level, they nominate a candidate that has to be a member in good standing. Branches will forward the list of the nominated candidates to the head office for the War Council or National Work Committee of the party to screen the names, as those names are announced from the head office.

On the other hand, the DA interviews councillors while the PAC’s top leadership elects councillors across the province.²⁰⁶ The approach of the EFF is much different from the above-mentioned political parties. The EFF intended to make people involved in the process of electing candidates that they are a font of instead of imposing. However, the sifting happens at the national level, according to the principles of Democratic Centralism.

After its 2016 local election manifesto launch, the EFF held its first election campaign at Cape Town on 15 May 2016 in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Malema said to the people who gathered in the community hall of Gugulethu that he wanted the EFF to take Cape Town from the DA

²⁰³ C. Africa, “Do Elections Campaigns Matter in South Africa? An Examination of Fluctuation in Support for the ANC, DA, IFP and NNP 1994-2019”, *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, 46(4), 2020, pp. 371-389.

²⁰⁴ EFF 2016 Municipal Election Manifesto, “Our Last Hope for Jobs and Service Delivery”, <<https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/25506/EFF-Manifesto-2016.pdf>>, 2016.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

and give the local people back their land. On Monday, 16 May 2016, as he walked down the streets of Khayelitsha, people received him with open hands, though some were wearing DA regalia, they said that “the DA does nothing for us except to give us these shirts which we use as nightdresses”.²⁰⁷ Malema said that the DA is far worse than the ANC, as in his hometown, Seshego, the ANC collects garbage frequently, whence in Gugulethu, the DA collects garbage once a month. Though the DA portrays itself as a better organisation than the ANC, in this regard, they are worse.²⁰⁸ He said the DA does not like Black people in his effort to canvass people to vote for EFF. Thus they should vote for the EFF.²⁰⁹ Since the EFF did not have a history of governance, they tried to expose the inabilities of various political parties so they could be voted in. According to the DA, mayoral committee member of Utility Services of Khayelitsha, Ernest Sonnenberg, Malema was just on a ‘cheap electioneering’ campaign and “the city has been doing well with service delivery in the informal settlements, though they still need to do more to ensure that they improve the living conditions of their communities”.²¹⁰ Sonnenberg admitted guilty in stating that they still need to do better in their communities, the EFF’s 59 candidates were elected to serve as ward councillors in Khayelitsha, and the DA’s 54 representatives were also elected.²¹¹ Thus the campaigning of Malema in Khayelitsha was not cheap talk, as asserted by Sonnenberg but something that yielded results. This shows the slight growth of the EFF in South African politics.

The EFF’s local election campaign continued on 7 July 2016 in Mahikeng North-West, in a township called Reagile. Campaigning in the North-West province was important as it was the province where the EFF achieved its best result in the 2014 national elections, and it was the province where the organisation was launched in 2013. The North-West province had seen rampant corruption under the premiership of Supra Mahumapelo, and the people of North-West resorted to the streets to show their service delivery dissatisfaction.²¹² Malema would not miss the opportunity to canvass in North-West, as Mbete asserted that populists utilise people’s situations to their advantage.²¹³ He accused the provincial leadership of its highest form of

²⁰⁷ T. Lepule, “Malema in DA Land”, *IOL* <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/malema-in-da-land-pics-2022444>>, 2016.

²⁰⁸ EFF 2016 Municipal Election Manifesto, “Our Last Hope for Jobs and Service Delivery”, <<https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/25506/EFF-Manifesto-2016.pdf>>, 2016.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² S. Gordon and N. Bohler-Muller, “When Anger Reaches the Tipping Point”, *Afro Voice*, 8 May 2018, p. 14. See also, S. Gordon and N. Bohler-Muller, “ANC Holds the key to Efficiency in North-West”, *Pretoria News*, 08 May 2018, p. 6.

²¹³ Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s...”, p. 48.

corruption and lack of service delivery. Malema continued and said that the people of Reagile were unemployed because of nepotism. He further said: “If you’re not their friends or family members, they demand sex; if you are a man, they want a bribe from you. This means you will never be employed because you do not have money”.²¹⁴ Its rallies would be packed to capacity, with people coming to hear what Malema had to say. In one of his speeches, he declared, “I am not here to give you T-shirts or food parcels. I am here to tell the truth, whether you like it or not”.²¹⁵ In this way, the party was asserting itself as the only source of hope to the voters, seeking to position itself as the better organisation that does not have failures.


Near the end of its election campaign, the EFF held its last rally on 31 July 2016 in Polokwane, at Peter Mokaba Stadium; Malema delivered a key note address and asked for people to give his organisation just five years in power to showcase their intentions.²¹⁶ Limpopo is Malema’s home ground, and Peter Mokaba influenced Malema’s political orientations. Its rally coincided with its three (3) year anniversary since the organisation was born in 2013. The election campaigns of the EFF intended to expose the failures of political parties leading various municipalities in the hope that people in those municipalities would see the EFF as an alternative. This was not the case, as post the 2016 local government elections, the EFF did not win one municipality or ward but did manage to gain representation in different legislatures. South Africa’s municipal elections took place on 3 August 2016. The ANC, DA and EFF were the main winners. The ANC dropped from 62 per cent in the 2011 local elections to 53.9 per cent in 2016. The DA increased slightly from 23.9 per cent of the 2011 local elections to 26.9 per cent in 2016. The local government elections of 2016 were the first for the EFF. The EFF became a kingmaker in the 2016 local government election in the hung municipalities of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane. The ANC suffered major loses in North-West and Limpopo, respectively, and these two provinces where the EFF showed great strength and support base growing.²¹⁷ Additionally, the EFF scooped 8.2 per cent of the local government election votes. The below graph demonstrates how these parties performed without decimals:

²¹⁴ Sapa, “Malema Campaigns in Mahikeng” <<https://www.enca.com/south-africa/malema-takes-campaign-to-mahikeng>>, 2016.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ “EFF’s Final Rally Tshela Thupa” <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxO0bf7fsBM>>, 2016.

²¹⁷ P.M.U. Schmitz, “Displaying voter gains and losses: Local government election of 2011 and 2016”, in Peterson, M. (eds), *Advances in Cartography and GIScience*, Pretoria, 2017, pp. 1-15. Available at, <https://dissertationspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/10204/9701/Schmitz_19619_2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, 2017.



Graph 4: 2011 and 2016 Local Government Elections.

Data retrieved from: P.M.U. Schmitz, “Displaying voter gains and losses: Local government election of 2011 and 2016”, in Peterson, M, (eds), *Advances in Cartography and GIScience*, Pretoria, 2017, pp. 1-15. Available at, <https://dissertationspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/10204/9701/Schmitz_19619_2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, 2017.

The above graph shows the ANC’s decline from the 2011 local government election to 2016. They dropped by a margin of eight per cent. The DA has enjoyed a steady increase of close to three per cent, and the EFF can be evaluated with the 2014 national and 2016 local government elections, which was its first. In the 2014 national elections, they gained six per cent; in 2016, they increased to eight per cent. Though these two elections are different, in the national elections, people can vote wherever they are in the country. In contrast, in the local election, people can vote in their respective districts and wards. Additionally, in the local government election, citizens vote for councillors, whence they vote for a ruling party during the national elections.

Mokoko Sebola, a professor at the University of Limpopo, viewed the poor performance of the ANC in the 2016 local government elections as a self-made failure. Sebola continued to argue that the EFF was an emerging political party that appeared to be the healing mechanism for South Africans who had lost hope and were afraid of the *Wit gevaar* or ‘white threat’. Sebola described the *Wit gevaar* as power shifting to the DA from the ANC, which would could the

white minority back in power.²¹⁸ However, Sebola did not see the EFF making strides in the political arena of South Africa; hence he alluded that “the [EFF] is boosting the immune system of the DA to recover from an unknown chronic political disease”.²¹⁹ In reality, the EFF and the DA took a lot of votes from the ANC, especially in the 2016 local government elections. Therefore the EFF increased by two per cent; this shows that they stabilised their growth together with the DA. Post local government elections, Sithembile Mbete questioned the readiness and capabilities of the EFF in leading any municipality, as running a municipality is not similar to singing political slogans.²²⁰ Despite its failure to win any councils, the EFF secured a crucial political position in the 2016 municipal elections, namely that of kingmaker.

4.5 POST-2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

The victory of the EFF after 2016, after the local government elections, became visible when the organisation was represented in various legislatures in different provinces. The EFF, to some extent, emerged as an organisation that intended to implement the policies that the ANC neglected long ago. Sebola observed that Malema’s return to politics was informed by political vengeance since he was expelled from the ANCYL in 2011.²²¹ During the 2016 local government elections, the EFF did not only emerge as a kingmaker. Sithembile Mbete saw them as the trend setters for the South African political landscape.²²² The existence of the EFF added to the number of opposition parties taking votes from the once-off dominated areas by the ANC. Hence Maserumule and Ndletyana purported that the ANC is becoming a rural organisation as they are losing elections in urban areas.²²³ EFF appeared relevant after the 2016 local elections, as they played a key role in decision-making, particularly in the direction that municipalities/metros should take in terms of governance, as they were kingmakers, which makes the EFF look more like an urban party than a rural one.

The 2016 local government election was filled up with coalitions. Susan Booysen alluded that coalitions refer “to political parties cooperating in government, or a legislative body, based on

²¹⁸ M.P. Sebola, “Reflecting on the 2016 Local Government Elections in South Africa: the ANC and EFF’s Dire Need to Strengthen the DA’s Powerhold on South African Politics For “die wit gevaar”, in M.P Sebola (ed.), *Local Government Elections Politics and Administration*, 2019, pp. 1-14.

²¹⁹ Sebola, “Reflecting on the 2016 Local Government...”, p. 1.

²²⁰ Mbete, “Economic Freedom Fighters’ Debut...”, p. 597.

²²¹ Sebola, “Reflecting on the 2016 Local Government...”, p. 7.

²²² Mbete, “Economic Freedom Fighters’ Debut...”, pp, 599-605.

²²³ Maserumule and Ndletyana, “Unmasking the Outcomes of the 2016 Local Government...”, p. 447.

an election outcome. In all cases, parties or agencies hope to achieve common goals through shared strategy”.²²⁴ These coalitions emerged because, in some municipalities, no political parties won the elections, with more than fifty-one per cent of the votes. This stalemate forced political parties to discuss how they could work together to ensure that they co-govern properly. The 2016 local elections resulted in more than twenty-seven hung municipalities, making forming coalitions inevitable.²²⁵ These coalitions included those of parties that differed in ideology and character. For example, the EFF entered into unholy marriage with the DA. This was an unexpected development, but due to the fact that the EFF was the deciding factor, they opted to vote with the DA instead of the ANC; this move was to punish the ANC. Kanoge Mokgosi and Kgothatso Bosi viewed these alliances as risks involving taking hard, unpopular, necessary decisions.²²⁶ The DA and EFF have different views in terms of policies, with the DA being liberal and the EFF asserting itself as a leftist force. The EFF took advantage of the fact that they emerged as the kingmaker; hence their decision was based on punishing the ANC though their political inclination with the DA was far-fetched.

Against this backdrop, the EFF voted with the DA in Ekurhuleni.²²⁷ Unfortunately, the EFF’s decision to form a coalition with the DA was made by its leaders, and the constituencies’ views were disregarded and not even consulted, which negates what Malema said the EFF is the organisation of the people (see chapter three). The EFF further voted with the DA in Tshwane and Johannesburg without going into a coalition, though their ideological thinking was different.²²⁸ Additionally, Mokgosi *et al.* argued that “divisions which ultimately result in parties choosing not to form a coalition with one party or the other are personality-driven rather than ideologically based”.²²⁹ The EFF gave power to the DA, which implied that in politics, coalitions are driven by personalities over rationality; Malema wanted the ANC to feel that they were getting punished. The EFF became the kingmaker in certain metros, which could quantify their political relevance in South African politics.

²²⁴ S. Booyesen, “Coalition and Alliances Demarcate Crossroads in ANC Trajectories”, *New Agenda: South African Journal for Social Science and Economic Policy*, 68, 2018, pp. 6-10. See also, K. Mokgosi, K. Shai and O. Ogunnubi, “Local Government Coalition in Gauteng Province of South Africa: Challenges and Opportunities”, *Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation* 6(1), 2017, pp. 37-57.

²²⁵ Mokgosi, Shai and Ogunnubi, “Local Government Coalition in Gauteng province of South Africa...”, pp. 37-57.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-41.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

The EFF did well during the 2016 local elections, particularly in Tshwane, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. The EFF garnered 11.09 per cent in Johannesburg, 11.23 per cent in Ekurhuleni and 11.63 in Tshwane.²³⁰ Most of the EFF votes came from the ANC, as the DA did well in these metros; thus, the EFF emerged as kingmakers. The DA with 38.37 per cent in Johannesburg, 34.15 per cent in Ekurhuleni and 43.15 per cent in Tshwane.²³¹ The organisation decided to vote with the DA to see the ANC lose control over some of the country's metropolitan municipalities. The performance of the EFF in urban areas looked better than in rural areas; hence the organisation appeared as the kingmaker in the above metros. The loss of control over two metros was a significant blow to the ANC. By joining forces, the EFF and DA managed to oust the ANC only in two metropolitan municipalities, namely Johannesburg and Tshwane. In the City of Johannesburg, the EFF tabled a motion for workers to be insourced, meaning to be directly employed by the city. This happened on 13 February 2018, and in June of the same year, the city insourced about 1600 workers.²³² The EFF, as the kingmaker, used its numbers to influence decisions in the city council. In the words of a members of the city council in the EFF benches, Musa Novela said: "the EFF has been an effective opposition party. We've managed to influence the council in its entirety, including the coalition and other opposition parties to rally behind our proposed motion".²³³ With such strides, the EFF has swiftly positioned itself in the South African political agenda.

The Ekurhuleni metropolitan was under a coalition government led by Mzwandile Masina; this became possible when the ANC married the African Independent Party (AIC) and the Independent Ratepayers Association of South Africa. The EFF in 2016 saw sustained growth and played a critical role in taking votes from the ANC. According to Crispian Olver, these coalition governments were challenging to manage and sustain administratively. In Olver's view, understanding running municipalities became a problem for many metros and municipalities in general where there were coalitions.²³⁴ The coalition government in South

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² K. Motau, "EFF Tables a Motion to Insource All City of JHB Contract Workers", Eyewitness News, <<https://ewn.co.za/2018/02/03/eff-tables-motion-to-insource-all-city-of-jhb-contract-workers>>, 2018. See also, T. Mathe, "Government Should Always Look After its Workers", Eyewitness News, <<https://ewn.co.za/2018/06/30/government-should-always-look-after-its-workers>>, 2018.

²³³ T. Mathe, "EFF Welcomes Insourcing of 1600 Security Guards in Joburg", Eyewitness News, <<https://ewn.co.za/2018/07/01/eff-welcomes-insourcing-of-1-600-security-guards-in-joburg>>, 2018.

²³⁴ C. Olver, "The Impact of Coalitions on South Africa's Metropolitan Administration", in S. Booysen (ed.), *Marriage of Inconvenience: The Politics of Coalitions in South Africa*, 2021, pp. 267-302.

African politics shows that the ANC is slowly losing power. Thus the existence of breakaway parties, including the EFF, has played a critical role in strangling votes from the ANC.

4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the performance of the EFF in the 2014 national and 2016 local government elections. In the national election, the EFF got 25 seats in parliament, meaning the voter turnout for the EFF was good as they reached 6.4 per cent of the total vote. In addition, in 2016, their first local government elections increased from over six percent in the national election of 2014 to over eight per cent during the local election. Though these two elections differ in nature, the EFF, in this case, is benchmarked against its own performance nationally and locally. Out of the local government elections, the EFF emerged as the kingmaker in some key metros, showing that the organisation was becoming important in its own right, particularly in Gauteng, where the ANC lost two metros, as argued above. Their performance during the local government elections led to the party entering into an agreement with the DA. The EFF's participation in South Africa's national and municipal elections had a notable impact on South Africa's political landscape as they became kingmakers in some metros, especially in Gauteng province. The following chapter will examine the EFF's role when they began their parliamentary journey and changed the house decorum.

CHAPTER 5

THE ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN PARLIAMENT, 2014 TO 2018

5.1 INTRODUCTION

On 21 May 2014, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) members were sworn into the national assembly. They arrived at the occasion with men wearing overalls and gumboots, symbolising mine workers. Women Members of Parliament (MPs) were wearing pinafores, representing domestic workers. These MPs were trying to communicate that they represented the working class. This chapter will examine how the EFF changed the decorum of the parliament, discuss the approach and implications of the EFF's conduct in parliament, and assess the impact of its decision to foreground land redistribution. Examining these issues is essential because they were policies of the African National Congress (ANC); however, they had abandoned them, and the EFF raised these issues in parliament, becoming of national discourses. The dominance of the ANC and its partisan politics outplayed itself in parliamentary proceedings, which made it difficult for small parties to challenge their decisions. In addition, the land issue in South African politics has been neglected by the ANC and Democratic Alliance (DA), the two largest political parties. The arrival of the EFF brought back the land question on the table. Hence several processes were started to try and resolve this issue constitutionally without impacting food security and economic stability.

5.2 CHANGING THE DECORUM OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Female members of the EFF wore red domestic workers' clothing or pinafores, while male members wore red working overalls, gumboots and *makarapa* (hard hats), which were symbolic of mine workers. The Secretary of the National Assembly, Masibulele Xaso, suggested that parliamentarians wear and look presentable at all times; the attires of EFF MPS were deemed to be 'no presentable'. In response, the spokesperson of the EFF, Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, said, "parliament is a representation of the people. We want the people to look at parliament and recognise themselves".²³⁵ By 'the people', Ndlozi meant the poor working class

²³⁵ V. Carla, "EFF MP-In-Waiting has a Radical Agenda", *The Citizen*, 19 May 2014, p. 8.

of South Africa. The EFF suggested they wanted to change the face of parliament as they represented the poor.²³⁶ In addition to Ndlozi's words, Malema said that "people in parliament were hiding their stupidity behind ties and that with the EFF's presence in parliament, sleeping during parliamentary sessions would be a thing of the past".²³⁷ Malema was determined that they were to continue wearing their overalls and pinafores to show a representation of the poor and the working class. But the EFF's parliamentary dress code was not appreciated by all. The ANC's secretary general Gwede Mantashe joined the fray on the EFF's behaviour and regalia. Mantashe suggested that parliament should be protected and hooliganism should not be allowed in the assembly. He further argued that the behaviour of the EFF should not be allowed in the assembly.²³⁸ Their organisational regalia appeared as a trend setting to challenge the decorum in parliament.

Besides debates around their attire, Malema promised they would be robust in parliament and would not pass without discussions.²³⁹ The EFF demonstrated their robustness with the Nkandla saga on 15 August 2014. The EFF's MPs requested that Zuma pay back the money for his Nkandla homestead on which state resources were used to upgrade the house. They demanded that Zuma should state the date on which he would pay back the money as was recommended by the then public protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela.²⁴⁰ This resulted in Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, asking the EFF to leave the house.²⁴¹ The decorum in parliament took a different direction, where walking out during parliamentary proceedings became a common tactic employed by the EFF. Walking out during parliamentary sessions was not fashionable before the arrival of the EFF in parliament. Still, the DA, on several occasions, would walk out of the national assembly joining the EFF or on their own. When parliament was opening on 12 February 2015, the DA walked out; when the speaker Baleka Mbete ordered the sergeant at arms to remove EFF MPs, they were reinforced by unidentified personnel, which the DA and the EFF asserted were police. Mmusi Maimane, leader of the DA, said, "the constitution has been violated [...] the speaker cannot escalate the situation by sending in the police. This parliament is a free space; it cannot be the executive that decides on

²³⁶ S. Mkhazisi, "Parliament Rules on Party Regalia", *The New Age*, 20 May 2021.

²³⁷ B. Ndenze, "Neither Ties nor Suits for Team EFF", *Star*, 12 May 2014, p. 4. See also, EFF's Final Tshela Thupa Rally 2016, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxO0bf7fsBM>>, 2016.

²³⁸ L. Seale, "Rein in Hooligans, Mantashe Tell Parly", <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/rein-in-hooligans-mantashe-tells-parly-1754945>>, 2014.

²³⁹ Ndenze, "Neither Ties nor Suits...", p. 4. See also, EFF's Final Tshela Thupa Rally 2016, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxO0bf7fsBM>>, 2016.

²⁴⁰ S. Velaphi, "ANC Ready to Defend Its Mps After EFF Scuffle", *The New Age*, 26 August 2014, p. 24.

²⁴¹ B. Matshaba, "Nothing as Entertaining as Parliament TV", <<https://www.news24.com/drum/celebs/nothing-as-entertaining-as-parliament-tv-20180423>>, 2018.

what to be discussed”.²⁴² Richard Colland and Shameela Seedat purported that people who removed members of the EFF in parliament were not security forces but members of the South African Police Service masquerading as parliamentary security.²⁴³ In addition, the DA was not surprised by the speaker’s decision, citing that she had brought the police to the national assembly chambers and her allegiance to protecting Jacob Zuma. Thus in solidarity with the EFF, the DA decided to also walk out of parliament chanting, “pay back the money.”²⁴⁴ The mood in parliament changed, and opposition parties became fierce.

Mmusi Maimane continued to argue that the reactionary words of the ANC MPs should not be allowed in the National Assembly. The problem of the degenerating national assembly emanates from party allegiance by the former speaker of the national assembly, Baleka Mbete. Maimane believed that Baleka Mbete was not objective; she protected President Zuma instead of allowing him to talk and respond to questions in the house.²⁴⁵ Some debates degenerated into chaos and led to misbehaviour by opposition members. Floyd Shivambu, for instance, showed the Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa the middle finger in parliament. The incident occurred when the national assembly deliberated on the killings of Marikana mine workers. These deliberations included the fact that EFF accused Ramaphosa of killing the people at Marikana.²⁴⁶ The EFF, in some instances, confuses robustness with disrespect, especially in the incident of Shivambu to Ramaphosa.

In their quest to change the decorum of parliament, the EFF introduced a new approach to parliamentary debates. The case of the upgrades to the presidential residence at Nkandla is an excellent example of this shift. The Kwa-Zulu Natal town of Nkandla is the homestead of Jacob Zuma. At first, Zuma argued that a family bond paid for the upgrades to his Nkandla home. However, according to the Public Protector Thuli Madonsela’s state capture report, non-security features were included in the upgrades at Nkandla, and the state paid for them. The report recommended that the president should pay for non-security features. The EFF entered the fray when it got to parliament; they intended to hold the executive accountable; the EFF broke the question of when the president was paying back the money, a slogan which went

²⁴² *Sapa*, “DA walks out of Sona”, <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-walks-out-of-sona-1817348>>, 2015.

²⁴³ R. Colland and S. Seedat, “Institutional Renaissance or Populist Fundago? The Impact of the Economic Freedom Fighters on South African Parliament”, 48 (3), 2015, pp. 319-320.

²⁴⁴ *Sapa*, “DA Walks Out of Sona”, <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/da-walks-out-of-sona-1817348>>, 2015.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ M. Maimane, “Is Baleka Mbete the Right Person to Lead SA in Parliament”, *City Press*, 14 September 2014, p. 9. See also, Seale, “Rein in Hooligans, Mantashe Tell Parly”, <<https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/rein-in-hooligans-mantashe-tells-parly-1754945>>, 2014.

viral on twitter as the hashtag ‘Pay Back The Money’.²⁴⁷ In his response to the first EFF’s State of the Nation Address (SONA) in parliament, Malema assured the ANC caucus that “business as usual has come to an end” and asserted that they were sent to parliament to hold the executive accountable.²⁴⁸

Generally, parliamentary debates are seen as a democratic way of holding the executive accountable, which is the work of the national assembly. According to Lone Sorensen, “disruptions, controversies, and even violence are testing democracy and disintegrating in real-time before the eyes of the nation”.²⁴⁹ In the same vein, Colland and Seedat argued that the South African parliament was essentially one-party, the ANC, and leaders of the National Assembly were partisan to the ANC, which did not hold its executive accountable or provide parliamentary oversight.²⁵⁰ Therefore the EFF aimed at breaking that tradition, the culture of partisan party politics. In the spirit of changing and holding the executive accountable, the EFF raised numerous points of orders to try and pass or contest particular motions. They would do so in terms of Rule 14 C of Parliamentary Rules, which highlighted the point of privilege, allowing a parliament member to stand up and raise an issue emanating from the privilege they enjoy as parliamentarians.²⁵¹ This privilege was used to raise corruption allegations against and the Nkandla saga of the sitting president.

Consequently, the speaker of the National Assembly would request parliamentary security to help remove members of the EFF from the chambers. Such removals would often end-up being physical altercations between members of the EFF and the parliamentary security.²⁵² This became a norm post the arrival of the EFF in parliament; parliamentary decorum fell into chaos that sought to hold the executive accountable. The EFF kept positioning itself well in South African politics and seeking relevance.

Sorensen, an academic scholar in media studies, saw the reluctance of the EFF to cooperate with the national assembly speaker as an act of populism which flourishes through four forms: mediation, visibility, authenticity and efficacy. Populism of mediation thus means that populists appeal for media sympathy to show how those in power misuse it. The EFF utilised

²⁴⁷ A. G. van der Vyver, “A South African Case Study in Social Activism: #Pay Back the Money”, *International Journal of Computing Academic Research (IJCAR)*, 6(5), 2017, pp. 145-154.

²⁴⁸ Julius Malema reacts to SONA 2014 in parliament <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C60hNSZ-F0U>>, 2014.

²⁴⁹ Sorensen, “Populist Communication in the New Media Environment...”, pp. 1-7.

²⁵⁰ Colland and Seedat, “Institutional Penitance or Populist Fundago?...”, p. 321.

²⁵¹ Sorensen, “Populist Communication in the New Media Environment...”, p. 2.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

social media to appeal for public sympathy; they would occasionally update the public on parliamentary proceedings through the use of Twitter.²⁵³ Sorensen continues and explains visibility as the tool utilised by politicians to show general public representation.²⁵⁴ The EFF inevitably portrayed itself as the only organisation representing the poor, the working class and the oppressed. This became visible through their organisation's signature in public and the national assembly. One astonishing aspect is that Malema wore flashy clothing outside the parliament, which Gayton Mckenzie, leader of the Patriotic Alliance (PA), in his open letter directed to Malema, and accused him of camouflaging to be helping the poor, whereas he lives a flashy lifestyle. Mckenzie continued to argue that Malema's words and actions contradict each other. He portrays himself as a revolutionary but lives a life of the bourgeoisie.²⁵⁵

Furthermore, the view of authenticity and efficacy carry the same weight; Sorensen articulated that for the populists, authenticity means staying true to oneself and efficacy, that one is just a servant of the people and whatever they do, they are doing it for the benefit of the people.²⁵⁶ Through their apparel worn in the assembly, they authenticate the representation of the poor, domestic workers, miners and miners. These two populist methods locate the posture of the EFF within the ranks of populism and those who claim to be the agents of change for the poor. Sorensen further argued that populists undermine the elite and managers by intentionally breaking the laws and constructing their own, a practice that the EFF normalised in the National Assembly.²⁵⁷

The EFF would raise countless points of order and refuse to listen when provided responses. During one of the debates in the National Assembly, the then deputy speaker Lechesa Tsenoli had to furiously stop Ndlozi from talking by saying, "*Dula fatshe wena*" (Hey you, sit down!).²⁵⁸ The implication was the breaking of protocol, which sought to undermine the rules in the National Assembly. When raising issues, the EFF often focused on matters of national interest. This included the proposal to debate the Rhodes Must Fall, and Fees Must Fall social movements.²⁵⁹ On 21 October 2015, when the Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene was going to

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ Drum digital, "Letter to Julius Malema by Gayton Mckenzie", <<https://www.news24.com/drum/News/letter-to-julius-malema-by-gayton-mckenzie-20170728>>, 2015.

²⁵⁶ Sorensen, "Populist Communication in the New Media Environment...", p. 4.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁵⁸ EFF Ndlozi, "The Minister Sleeping on Job", <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALrdmkg9RM0>>, 2016.

²⁵⁹ The student protest that took place in 2015/2016, where students from all South African Universities went to the streets to protest against the university fees hike proposed by the then Minister Dr Bongikosi Nzimande. The protest were student led without any political affiliations. Student felt the plight on embarking on the

present the mid-term budget speech, EFF members rose to the point of addressing the Deputy Speaker Thoko Didiza. They were not given a chance to speak. Instead, the presiding officer encouraged the Minister to continue with his speech; at that moment, members of the EFF took out placards written: “Fees Must Fall”. They began chanting “Fees Must Fall” until the presiding officer ordered the parliamentary protection unit to remove EFF members from the national assembly.²⁶⁰ As Sorensen alluded, such behaviour is often associated with the high nature of populism and grind standing, which sought to dominate the politics of the EFF.

The Rhodes Must Fall, and Fees Must Fall Campaigns were inspired by the act of Chumani Maxwele, a University of Cape Town (UCT) student who defaced the statue of Cecil John Rhodes.²⁶¹ The defacing of the Rhodes statue resembled an act against colonialism, imperialism and apartheid oppression in South Africa.²⁶² Social media played a massive role during the student protests, as the act of Maxwele was followed by #RhodeMustFall and #FeesMustFall on Twitter.²⁶³ Young people, particularly university students, dominated these campaigns. The universities where such student protests took place included the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Pretoria (UP), Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT), Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), Durban University of Technology (DUT) and the University of the Free State (UFS).²⁶⁴

The Fees Must Fall Campaign became popular after the fee increment of 10.5 per cent was announced by the Minister of Higher Education, Blade Nzimande, for the year 2016. Due to this pronouncement by the Minister, protests broke out at South African universities. The protesters were also fighting for the insourcing of underpaid university workers.²⁶⁵ In other institutions, protesters raised an issue of transformation in the institution, particularly the language policy and institutional symbolism. They proposed that English should be the only

protest by themselves without any interference or hijack of any political organisations. However they EFF associated itself with the dejected masses of the students.

²⁶⁰ EFF Removed From Parliament Again, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53iKRRkjym5A>>, 2015.

²⁶¹ Rhodes was one of the wealthiest men in South Africa during the nineteenth century. He was a Prime Minister of Cape Colony and played a central role in establishing mining industry. His achievements became possible through the use of terror and cruelty. See, J. Grobler, “State Formation and Strife” in F. Pretorius, (ed), *A History of South Africa: From the Distant Past to the Present Day*, 2015, pp. 185-187.

²⁶² N. G. Wessels, “#FeesMustFall: Discourse Hidden in Plain Sight”, (M.A Dissertation, Tilburg University, Brainport, 2017).

²⁶³ Wessels, “#FeesMustFall: Discourse...”, p. 7.

²⁶⁴ J. Jansen, *As by Fire: The end of South Africa*, 2017.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

medium of instruction. The UP and Stellenbosch University (SU) followed suite in terms of language policy and transformation.²⁶⁶

The politics of EFF's radical approach did not only end in parliament, but they cut across the other institutions of power. With the pronouncement of minister Nzimande, the Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command (EFFSC) vowed to close all institutions of higher learning and colleges, beginning with Tshwane and escalating to the rest of the province. The student command threatened to close UNISA campuses because the university abounded their agreement in November to insource workers. The UNISA main campus in Pretoria was indeed closed due to security threats by a member of the EFFSC.²⁶⁷ The EFF joined the strikes through its student body, the EFFSC, which would later become popular in most campuses of South Africa. The EFFSC was established on 15 June 2015, given powers by section 17 of the EFF's constitution. The EFFSC is guided by its own seven Cardinal Pillar, drawing from the mother body.²⁶⁸ This shows the growing visibility of the organisation within the structures of the society.

5.3 THE EFF AND THE LAND

The EFF's land policy can be connected to its leadership's time in the ANCYL. The idea of land occupation and expropriation without compensation became popular after the 2009 conference of the ANCYL and the ANC's 53rd National General Council (NGC) in Durban. Even though the ANCYL under Malema knew that socialism was not the policy of the ANC, at the 2009 ANCYL policy conference, the congress suggested that the government should nationalize mines and land. According to the ANCYL, land expropriation without compensation was the only measure to address the land-ownership monopoly by whites in

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

²⁶⁷ S. Lowman, "Leopold Scholtz on #Feesmustfall- Quality Disappears in the Face of Ideology", *BizNews*, 10 October 2016, p. 5 See also, Dispatchlive, "EFF Student Body Threaten to Shutdown of all Unisa Campuses", <<https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2016-01-13-eff-student-body-threatens-to-force-shutdown-of-all-unisa-campuses/>>, 2016.

²⁶⁸ The Cardinal Pillar of the student command are: 1. Mobilising students behind the struggle for economic freedom, embodied in the EFF Founding Manifesto. 2. Pursuit of radical higher education transformation with the aim towards free, quality and well-resourced education. 3. Championing the interests of students and all workers in institutions of higher learning. 4. Building a dynamic relationship between students and community struggles and campaigns. 5. Participating in progressive international campaigns and programmes. 6. Promoting academic and research excellence and progress. 7. Contributing to intellectual and ideological discourse in a manner that seeks to promote the struggle for economic freedom. See the "Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command Constitution: Free Quality Education and Well-Resourced Education for All" accessible at < YouTube, "Julius Malema asks for advice from Thabo Mbeki about Zuma", <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INDXixxKPbI>>, 2017.

South Africa.²⁶⁹ Regarding mines, the ANCYL Conference resolved that the state must own and manage the extraction, production and trade of petroleum and mineral resources, metals, iron ore, steel and coal.²⁷⁰ The ANC did not commit to the conference resolutions; hence people like Malema and Shivambu were suspended from the organisation when they raised them in the ANC.

After the formation of the EFF and its installation in parliament, they raised a motion on the issue of land expropriation without compensation and the amendment of Section 25 of the constitution. According to the EFF, they proposed that the state should own the land and lease it out to those who want to utilise it for 25 years.²⁷¹ Shivambu asserted that whites occupy 80% of South Africa's land, which they did not bring along to South Africa from Europe or buy from anyone.²⁷² Ideologically, the EFF asserts itself as a socialist movement that rallied for inclusivity in South Africa, particularly regarding the economy.²⁷³ In 2015, the EFF intensified its programme for land by encouraging its members to grab vacant land, especially in townships, for settlement. This call was in contrast to what Malema preached in January 2009, when he said, "We agree with on land redistribution, but we think it should not be done at the expense of the suffering people".²⁷⁴ This call was an effort to use the poor people to advance the land policy of the EFF. The EFF members grabbed fallow land in ward 13 at Seshego Polokwane, Malema's hometown.²⁷⁵ The EFF members did this after Malema called for people to take unused land. The Ekurhuleni municipality took Malema to the North Gauteng court, demanding that a court order be issued to stop Malema from making these utterances.²⁷⁶ Also, in Durban, EFF members occupied land near the highway (N2). According to the provincial

²⁶⁹ W. Franz, "Move to Nationalisation Must Go On, Urges Malema", *Sunday Independent*, 12 February 2012, p. 1.

²⁷⁰ Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 8.

²⁷¹ Sapa, "The Hot-Button of Land Reform", *City Press*, 20 April 2014, p. 4.

²⁷² The policy allowed those who had the land, particularly the white minority, to sell the land to those who were willing to buy. The seller was able to determine the property prices even if the price was not based on market price. The policy was adopted in 1997 in order to complement the macro-economy strategy of the ANC. Most people rejected this approach during a Land Summit that was held in July 2005 with the exception of a predominately white farmer's movement known as AgriSA. AgriSA saw the willing buyer willing seller policy as a fair deal to land redistribution in South Africa and the ANC presumably. For further reading see M. Aliber, "Unravelling the Willing Buyer, Willing Seller Question" in B. Cousins and C. Walker (eds.), *Land Divided Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st Century*, p. 145. See also E. Lahiff, "Willing Buyer, Willing Seller: South Africa's Failed Experiment in Market-led Agrarian Reform, *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (8), 2007, p. 1579. See also, Shivambu, *The Coming Revolution*, p. 10.

²⁷³ Sapa..., "The Hot-Button of Land Reform", *City Press*, 20 April 2014, p. 4.

²⁷⁴ Du Preez and Rossouw, *The world according to Julius...*, p. 119.

²⁷⁵ P. Tau, "Malema's Neighbours Occupy Land", *City Press*, 04 December 2016, p. 5.

²⁷⁶ I. de Lange, "Court Blocks EFF Land Grabs in Ekurhuleni", *The Citizen*, 22 September, 2015, p. 4.

member of the EFF, it was the provincial policy that people should occupy vacant land.²⁷⁷ Peter Groenewald, a member of Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), argued that these land grabs were to instigate violence in the country and promote racism against white farmers.²⁷⁸ The DA leader Maimane was also not happy with the proposal of the EFF that they are inciting violence in the country, and the ANCYL said that Malema belongs in jail for his reckless utterances.²⁷⁹ Both FF Plus and DA sought to worry about their constituencies, as Groenewald asserts that the act of the EFF will incite violence between white farmers and land grabbers. But the EFF was more willing to change the political dynamics of South Africa, where most Black people do not have residential land.

It was on 27 February 2018 when the EFF brought the motion of land expropriation without compensation in parliament through its caucus leader Malema. In his motion, Malema said that the constitution should be amended to allow South African people to have access to land, with the state being the custodian of the land. The organisation even offered the ANC its six percent of its votes, which would give the ANC a two-thirds majority to amend the constitution.²⁸⁰ On 03 November 2017, Given Mokhari, a television anchor, hosted a live talk show on PowerTalk, with President Thabo Mbeki; Malema was amongst the audience and asked Mbeki about the unresolved issue of land redistribution. In his words, Malema said: “The willing buyer willing seller policy, which was adopted under your leadership Mr President, has failed to resolve the land issue”.²⁸¹ He further added that “even if there was a willing buyer, our people could not buy because they do not have the buying power”.²⁸² Mbeki said that the land issue is complex, and though Malema is sloganeering and looking for votes, he does not have to. Mbeki said that numerous issues need to be resolved pertaining to land. In his response, Mbeki asked that vast tracts of land lie fallow in the Eastern Cape, thus saying that people need tractors and fencing land, among other things.²⁸³ The EFF enacted debates on land issues, which they have realised is beyond sloganeering for elections but a complex issue that requires due processes to be followed.

²⁷⁷ Sapa, “EFF Stages Land Grabs in Ballito”, <<https://www.news24.com/News24/EFF-stages-land-grab-in-Ballito-20150412>>, 2015.

²⁷⁸ Sapa, “EFF Bid to Have Law Declared Unconstitutional”, *Daily News*, 08 November 2016, p. 2.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ G. Whittles, “EFF Knows What it Wants on Land”, *Mail and Guardian*, 02 March 2018, p. 2.

²⁸¹ YouTube, “Julius Malema Asks for Advice from Thabo Mbeki About Zuma”, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INDXixxKPbI>>, 2017.

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

Following the adoption, the Constitutional Review Committee was tasked in February 2018 to conduct public and oral submissions from an ordinary member of society and had to report back to parliament in August 2018.²⁸⁴ The motion of land expropriation without compensation is part of the EFF's seven Cardinal Pillar, which states that the land should be in the hands of the states. The aforesaid matter was then agreed to, and the governing party established a committee that would host public meetings to hear all South Africans' views regarding the amendment.²⁸⁵ The policy shifts in the ANC show the impact of the EFF in the politics of South Africa and the pressure they have put on the ANC. Nevertheless, during the consultation process of the ad hoc committee, many people did not welcome the amendment of the constitution. The primary concern around the issue of land was centred on food security and property rights. When the committee visited the township of Botshabelo, located 60 kilometres east of Bloemfontein, people raised concerns regarding food security, their houses and land during the consultative sessions.²⁸⁶

The representative of the Barolong Bo-Seleka Traditional Council in Thaba-Nchu said that the council have been consistent in their submission relating to the land question in South Africa. The representative argued that the land issue should be addressed to include people in the decision-making process instead of treating them as passive participants. Another speaker from Mangaung, Kabelo Moreeng, stated that the Free State government had previously introduced several projects that failed to transform society. For instance, Moreeng mentions that the Teacher College, Nursing College, shopping complex, Naledi Sun Casino in Thaba Nchu have all collapsed under the government's watch. Moreeng argued that adopting the land expropriation bill would result in disaster. Therefore he opposed the land reform.²⁸⁷

King Goodwill Zwelithini of the Zulu people pronounced that the land under the Ingonyama Trust would not be expropriated. He stated he was ready to unleash his subjects in fighting against land expropriation.²⁸⁸ Malema alluded that they were happy with the King's reaction, and it should not be treated as special as it contributes profoundly to the emotive discussion of

²⁸⁴ A. Jeffery, "Empowering the State: Impoverishing the People", *South African Institute of Race Relations*, 2018, p. 7.

²⁸⁵ The Committee was co-chaired by Vincent Smith and Lewis Nimadi, with additional members including Manhole Motshega and Francois Beukman all from the ANC, Floyd Shivambu of the EFF, James Selfe and Glynnis Breytenbach both from the DA. See, Land Expropriation without Compensation <http://www.senwes.co.za/media/Global/documents/PDF/Senwes/2018/Houseview/Land_EX_Infomation_May2018.pdf>, 2018.

²⁸⁶ Expropriation Bill Public Hearing Botshabelo, Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fG7YMFpuQtU&t=3388s>>, 2021.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁸ B. Mbanjwa, "Never, Not When Am Still Alive", *The Star*, 05 July 2019, p. 1.

land expropriation. Malema further added that people who are worried about South Africa going the Zimbabwean route of land redistribution should be at ease as the South African process is unique and shows that democracy is at the centre of this debate. He asserted that there were no public hearings in Zimbabwe where everybody was consulted for land restitution to take place.²⁸⁹ In 2018, the ANC government decided to halt the public hearings and set up the Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the constitutional amendment for land expropriation without compensation.²⁹⁰ The Ad Hoc Committee intended to try and understand if Section 25 of the Constitution that deals with the property clause can be amended. The critical issue around the clause was to ensure that land could be expropriated without any form of compensation, especially if it was to be used for the public interest. According to the ANC, neglected buildings in the central business district and land lying fallow, among others, will be expropriated without any form of compensation”.²⁹¹ The process of consultations was to enable the government to amend the constitution, particularly Section 25, which will allow the government to expropriate land without compensation. The EFF brought this issue to the table for discussion, and they have ceded to the bureaucratic processes instead of doing it chaotically.

It was because of the popularisation of the land issue by the EFF that the ANC in 2017 at Nasrec adopted land expropriation without compensation and free higher education amidst the student protests in 2017, a couple of days before the ANC leadership conference.²⁹² According to the ANC, land expropriation without compensation would assist in speeding up the process of land redistribution in South Africa.²⁹³ The ANC argued that land expropriation without compensation aimed to adopt this mechanism as long as it does not harm the country's economy, food security is maintained, and agricultural production is safe. Land expropriation without compensation can be adopted. In February 2018, 241 parliamentarians voted for the land expropriation motion without compensation against 83 votes.²⁹⁴ The ANC succumbed to pressure from the EFF to adopt the land expropriation, though the outgoing president Jacob Zuma announced the decision.

²⁸⁹ Malema on Land Expropriation, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9uZ8Q4Zxvqk&t=446s>>, 2018.

²⁹⁰ R. Mahlaka, “Why Land Bill Was Withdrawn”, *The Citizen*, 30 August 2018, p. 22.

²⁹¹ Sapa, “Afriforum Publishes Soon to be Expropriated Farms”, *The Citizen*, 13 August 2018, p. 8.

²⁹² Batsani-Ncube, “Governing From the Opposition?: Tracing the Impact of EFF’s Niche Populist Politics on ANC Policy Shifts”, *Africa Review*, 13(2), 2021, pp. 199-205.

²⁹³ Jeffery, “Empowering the State: Impoverishing...”, p. 6.

²⁹⁴ M. Zulu, “Homes Will not be Expropriated-EFF”, *The Citizen*, 05 May 2018, p. 8.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The existence of the EFF in parliament and South African politics has played a critical role in pushing the land issue in South Africa. The South African parliament became a battle of ideas and was no longer dominated by one political organisation (the ANC); it changed the decorum. The EFF appeared with its mining and domestic work regalia, which did not resemble the usual way of dressing in parliament. It was ultimately accepted, and to date, they still wear their worker regalia when they go to parliament. Parliamentary debates changed from modest to robust and radical engagements. The EFF raised the Nkandla issue when it was not popular in parliament, and it was through the use of parliamentary rules that their persistence in engaging this issue continued. Though they were manhandled or evicted in parliament, whenever they came back, and the president was in parliament, they would always ask, “when are you paying back the money”. The party raised a motion on land expropriation without compensation, and the ANC government established a committee that visited various communities to gauge their views about amending the constitution. The party has positioned itself well in South African political scenery and has played a critical role in ensuring its presence is felt in parliament.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examined the history of the EFF since its establishment in 2013 until 2018. The EFF came into existence after the expulsion of Julius Malema, and other members of the ANCYL. They were expelled for various reasons, including putting the ANC's name into disrepute and pushing for policy alternatives that the ANC had failed to adopt. Malema and other expelled ANCYL members used the Marikana massacre of August 2012 to keep their political relevance. The miners needed a political alternative, and Malema and some former ANCYL members established the EFF through consultation that took place in June 2012.²⁹⁵ The EFF was formed in 2013, intending to implement the ANC's neglected policies, especially those captured in the Freedom Charter.²⁹⁶

The EFF operated with an interim leadership until December 2014. This interim leadership shepherded the party through the national elections campaign of 2014. While preparing for the 2014 national elections, the EFF had to deal with breakaways and internal discontent. Some members of the EFF, like Wonder Sentimele accused Malema of acting like a despot in the organisation, hence the emergence of New Economic Freedom Fighters. In late 2014, during the EFF's First National People's Assembly, some nominees declined to be part of the organisation's leadership; Andile Mngxitama, claimed that it was through his consciousness that he did not want to be part of the Central Command Team. He raised the fact that Malema is not a true reflection of what he claims, by living a lavish lifestyle.²⁹⁷ Meaning some members of the EFF were unhappy with how the temporary leadership, in particular Malema, conducted itself during the First People's Assembly. This dissertation has established that emerging factions in the EFF added to the continuation of the breakaway culture of South African politics.²⁹⁸

Despite an uncertain start, the EFF contested the national government election in 2014. The organisation used Malema as the face to campaign for the elections, because of the media focus on Malema and his former popularity with the ANCYL.²⁹⁹ After the 2014 national elections,

²⁹⁵ See p. 11.

²⁹⁶ See p. 20.

²⁹⁷ See p. 33.

²⁹⁸ See pp. 64-69.

²⁹⁹ See p. 39.

the EFF got 25 seats in the National Assembly, which was a notable achievement for a party that participated in the elections just a year after its birth.³⁰⁰ The party did not despair but forged forward and participated in the 2016 local government elections. Close to 200 political parties contested the elections of 2016 as compared to 121 in 2011. The EFF had to prove itself in ensuring that the outcomes of those elections become better than those of 2014. The organisation used social media to market much of its election campaigns, and managed to obtain eight per cent of the vote for the 2016 local elections.³⁰¹ This result shows that the organisation was growing and readying itself to participate in South African politics. Though they did not gain control of any municipalities or wards, eight per cent allowed the EFF to participate in several legislatures and became the kingmaker in several metros.

When the party members were to be sworn in parliament, they shocked other parliamentarians. They were sworn in parliament with men wearing work suits, gumboots and *makarapa*. In addition, women were wearing pinafores; their apparel resembled them being representatives of the working class and the poor.³⁰² They raised issues such as land expropriation without compensation and free higher education, which had been not discussed in parliament to further challenge the status quo. They challenged the Nkandla Saga involving president Zuma, who benefited unduly on the upgrades in his homestead. They would engage in quarrels with the speaker or the deputy speaker of the national assembly using various points of order to divert discussions to the Nkandla saga. The EFF significantly changed the parliamentary decorum since their installation in parliament in 2014 and continued to challenge the parliamentary proceedings throughout.

During the first five years since its establishment, the EFF has played a notable role in shaping South African politics. The newly formed party reinvigorated leftist political debate to the South African political landscape. This leftist agenda included, among others the issue of land expropriation without compensation.³⁰³ In February 2017 the EFF leadership raised a motion on land expropriation without compensation; for it to happen, section 25 of the constitution has to be amended. In order to amend the constitution, through the influence of the EFF, the ANC government established an Ad Hoc Committee to conduct public hearings to amend the constitution. The party leaders worked hard to publicly associate with events that played a critical role in the national discourse. The insourcing of workers in Johannesburg is one

³⁰⁰ See p. 45.

³⁰¹ See p. 49.

³⁰² See p. 59.

³⁰³ See pp. 65-66.

testimony of how the party sought to bring changes to South African politics.³⁰⁴ When students across the country went to the streets to protest against fee hikes, the EFF in parliament staged a picket, in support of the students. After their initial five years of existence, the EFF continued to play a critical role in South African political discourses. Their election outcome has been steadily growing instead of declining like other breakaway parties such as COPE. Therefore the role of the EFF became visible in South African politics in general, and has undeniably changed post-apartheid's political development.

While this dissertation provides a detailed overview of the EFF's first five years of its existence, and analyses its impact on South Africa's political landscape, further dissertation needs to be conducted on the EFF Student Command, the EFF's relationship with South Africa's working class and organised labour, and the party's subsequent evolution. A detailed comparative study of the EFF's performance in the 2014 and 2019 national elections and the 2016 and 2021 local government elections can also provide a valuable insight into the political identity and strategies of the party, and reveal important changes in post-apartheid South African politics.

³⁰⁴ See p. 55.

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