Islamist Violent Extremism and the Fragile African State: The Case in Kenya Benjamin Mokoena Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) in Political Science, in the Department of Political Studies and Governance, in the Faculty of Humanities, at the University of the Free State. July 2022 Supervisor: Professor Hussein Solomon i DECLARATION I, 2017562824, Benjamin Mokoena, declare that the thesis that I herewith submit for the qualification of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) in Political Science, in the Department of Political Studies and Governance, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, is my own independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education. 29 July 2022 Copyright © 2022 University of the Free State All rights reserved ii ABSTRACT What we know, and how we know about state fragility, Islamist violent extremism (IVE), and countering Islamist violent extremism (CIVE), is fiercely contested. It is no different in the case of state fragility, IVE, and CIVE, in the context of Kenya. The research aim was therefore to critically examine the relationship between state fragility, IVE, and CIVE (the case), in Kenya (the context). The Fragile States Index (FSI) was used as an analytical measuring instrument of state fragility. The research design is an explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal, and contextualised case study, enabling a theory- based, empirical, retroductive, and deductive-inductive analysis. Three purposeful and snowball sampling-based research methods (elite interviews, field research, and a literature and data study) enabled triangulation within and between data sources. Kenya, as a veritable setting, was purposefully selected for being representative of the case. State fragility is defined by underperformance, misperformance, insecurity, violence (structural, direct, and cultural), fault-lines, and institutional failure at macro, meso, and micro levels of the state. The properties of state fragility, inclusive of the social structures that subsist in the fragile state, have causal capacity and tendency, providing not only the context and opportunity for, but actively generating Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CIVE, hence the failure of CIVE. The conduct of IVE and CIVE, in turn, help to compound state fragility. The combined observable outcome in Kenya are the persistent insecurity dilemma, the fragility trap, and the conflict trap. True to the new-wars paradigm and entangling a congeries of state and non-state actors, IVE and CIVE are a mixture of ‘war, crime, and human rights abuses’, which both add division and deepen division in an already divided society. True to its intractable nature, the long-war in Kenya will not be won by hard power. Much rather, it may be resolved by a negotiated social contract founded on inclusive social structures, institutions, norms, and values. In placing the fragile African state, in this case Kenya, at the centre of the discourse on state fragility, IVE and CIVE, the study makes a significant and original scientific contribution. It reveals the debilitating and conflict-generating properties of state fragility that initiate the causal chain that yield both IVE and impediments to CIVE. CIVE must therefore first account for and weigh the conditions and constraints created by state fragility. The study has also exposed the dangers of ineffective and counterproductive CIVE that privilege regime survival and bolstering state institutions over social cohesion and state legitimacy. Kenya reveals causal sequences (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms) that shed light on similar contexts in sub-Saharan Africa. This is greatly significant given iii the growing levels of state fragility and Islamist violent extremism, and the persistent challenges of CIVE in this subregion. KEY WORDS State fragility, Islamism, Islamist violent extremism, countering Islamist violent extremism, Kenya, radicalisation, deradicalisation, terrorism, counter-terrorism, the long-war, resilience, state-building, Critical Realism, single-embedded-longitudinal case study. iv OPSOMMING Beide wát ons weet, en hóé ons weet van staatskwesbaarheid, gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme (GIE) en bestryding van gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme (BGIE), word steeds vurig in akademisese sirkels gedebatteer. Dit is geensins anders met staatskwesbaarheid, GIE en BGIE in die konteks van Kenia nie. Die navorsingsdoel was gevolglik om die verwantskap tussen staatskwesbaarheid, GIE en BGIE (die geval) in Kenia (die konteks) krities te ondersoek. Die Kwesbare Staatsindeks (KSI) is as analitiese meetinstrument van staatskwesbaarheid aangewend. Die navorsingsontwerp is ‘n verhelderende, enkel-ingebedde, logitudinale en gekontekstualiseerde gevallestudie, wat ruimte laat vir ‘n teoriegebaseerde, empiriese, retroduktiewe en deduktief- induktiewe analise. Drie doelmatige en sneeubalsteekproef-gebaseerde navorsingsmetodes (elite onderhoude, veldwerk, en ‘n literatuur- en datastudie) het ruimte geskep vir triangulering binne en tussen inligtingsbronne. Kenia, as ‘n outentieke geval, is doelmatig as verteenwoordigende gevallestudie geselekteer. Staatskwesbaarheid word gedefinieer deur onderprestasie, wanprestasie, onveiligheid en gewelddadigheid (struktureel, direk, kultureel) se breuklyne, en institusionele mislukking op makro-, meso- en mikrovlakke van die staat. Eienskappe van staatskwesbaarheid, die sosiale strukture wat heers in die kwesbare staat ingesluit, openbaar kousale vermoë en geneigdheid, wat nie alleen die konteks en geleenthede vir GIE skep nie, maar ook aktief beide GIE en belemmernisse teen BGIE genereer, en sodoende die mislukking van BGIE tot gevolg het. Die gedrag van GIE en BGIE, op hul beurt, dra merkbaar by tot staatskwesbaarheid. Die gesamentlike waarneembare uitkoms hiervan in Kenia is die voortslepende onveiligheidsdilemma en die kwesbaarheids- en konflikslokvalle. Getrou aan die neo-oorlogsvoeringsparadigma en verwikkeling van ‘n warboel van staats- en nie- staatsakteurs, manifesteer GIE en BGIE in ‘n ongesonde mengsel van “oorlogs-, misdaads- en menseregtemisdrywe” (‘war, crime, and human rights abuses’) wat samelewingsverdeeldheid beide aanwakker en verdiep. Die komplekse aard van lang-oorlog (long-war) in Kenia beteken dat ‘n oplossing nie met absolutêre mag bereik sal word nie, maar veel eerder deur ‘n onderhandelde ooreenkoms gebaseer op inklusiewe sosiale strukture, instellings, norme en waardes. Deur die kwesbare staat, in hierdie geval, Kenia, sentraal tot die diskoers oor staatskwesbaarheid, GIE en BGIE te plaas, maak hierdie studie ‘n betekenisvolle en oorspronklike bydrae tot die wetenskap. Dit openbaar die verlammende en konflikskeppende eienskappe van staatskwesbaarheid wat die kousale ketting van gebeure aktiveer wat beide GIE en belemmernisse tot BGIE aan die gang sit. In BGIE moet v die voorwaardes vir, en beperkinge teen staatskwesbaarheid oorweeg word. Hierdie studie het ook die blootlegging van oneffektiewe en teenproduktiewe BGIE, wat regimeoorlewing en versterking van staatsinstellings voorop stel ten koste van samelewingskohesie en staatslegitimiteit. Kenia as gevallestudie openbaar ‘n kousale orde van gebeure (met kousale patrone en meganismes) wat lig werp op vergelykbare kontekste in sub-Sahara Afrika. Dit is hoogs betekenisvol in die lig van groeiende vlakke van beide staatskwesbaarheid en gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme, en die voortslepende uitdagings met BGIE in hierdie substreek. SLEUTELBEGRIPPE Staatskwesbaarheid, Islamisme, gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme, bekamping van gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme, Kenia, radikalisering, deradikalisering, terrorisme, anti-terrorisme, die voortslepende oorlog/langoorlog, weerstandigheid, staatsopbou, Kritiese Realisme, enkel-ingebedde- longitudinale gevallestudie. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The study was developed with the supervision of Professor Hussein Solomon. I am foremost indebted to Professor Solomon for his invaluable insights and the little nudge now and then. I, nonetheless, take full onus for the study, including any errors, shortcomings, or omissions the study may contain. I must pay homage to my discipline. As Aristotle argues in The Nicomachean Ethics (350 BCE), Political Science is the master-science. In studying interacting and multi-layered phenomena, as this study does, Political Science (as the master-science and a juncture discipline) enables us to synthesise conceptual-analytical-theoretical frameworks, instruments, and perspectives, beyond the confines of individual disciplines, enabling us to draw from International Relations, and History, Sociology, Geography, Economics, Psychology, and other disciplines (including Astrophysics). I further pulled from the cumulative body of knowledge in several fields of study, linking political thought, political- economy, geopolitics, social psychology, security studies, development studies, policy and planning, conflict resolution, and (critical) terrorism studies. I also extracted from the two developing study fields of violent extremism and CVE, whose focus is identity-based (mostly religious, racial, and ethnic) movements and organisations that often espouse violent means in seeking to fashion the state and society in accordance with the imperatives of their political-ideology. Within the ambit of violent extremism (VE), the focus of this study is the political-religion-based Islamist violent extremism (IVE). I must also acknowledge methodologists involved in case study designs and methods, including Robert Yin, John Gerring, Alexander George, Michael Gibbert, and others, whose body of work continues to ensure the scientific rigour of case study research designs and methods. In the same breath, I must acknowledge Critical Realism, the philosophy of science, as identified with philosophy of science scholars such as Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Sayer, Margaret Archer, and others. Critical Realism provides the philosophical validation and rationale for this study’s case study research design and methodology. Lastly, I must also acknowledge the support during the course of this study from my first alma mater, Stellenbosch University (SU), and my second alma mater, the University of the Free State (UFS). Benjamin Mokoena ORCID® https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2521-4550 Email benjaminmokoena@sun.ac.za July 2022 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2521-4550 mailto:benjaminmokoena@sun.ac.za vii ACRONYMS1 7/7 The 7 July 2005 London bombings 9/11 The 11 September 2001 attacks in the US ACLED The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project ACSS Africa Center for Strategic Studies ADF Allied Democratic Front2 AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia ASALs Arid and Semi-Arid Lands ATMIS African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (replaced AMISOM in April 2022) ATPU Anti-Terrorism Police Unit AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQC affiliate) AQC al-Qaeda Central (popularly known as al-Qaeda) AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq (the precursor of IS) AQY al-Qaeda in Yemen (merged with al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in 2009 to form AQAP) AU African Union CAPs (CVE) County Action Plans CDI County Development Index CEDMAC Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalised Communities CEFs (CVE) County Engagement Forums CI Counter-Insurgency CIPEV Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence CIPK Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya CORD Coalition for Reforms and Democracy CPI Corruption Perceptions Index CR Counter-Radicalisation CRA Commission on Revenue Allocation CSM Citizen Support Mechanism CT Counter-Terrorism CVE Countering (Islamist) violent extremism (CIVE) DDRR Deradicalisation, Disengagement, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration3 1 Contained herein are the most significant acronyms that are referenced in the study. 2 An insurgent-terrorist group from Uganda that is based in the DRC, and together with Ansar al-Sunnah from Mozambique, reportedly constitute Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP). 3 A CVE process akin to the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process in peace operations. viii EAAQ East Africa al-Qaeda (one of the precursors of al-Shabaab) EDI Ethnic Diversity Index FFP Fund for Peace FHI Freedom House Index FSI Fragile States Index G7+ The group of 7+ (an organisation representing a group of states that self-classify as fragile and conflict-affected. Initially seven, currently 20, member states) GCP Gross County Product GEM Global Extremism Monitor GSAVE Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism (formally replaced GWOT in 2005) GWAC Global War Against Crusaders GWOT Global War On Terror GTD Global Terrorism Database GTI Global Terrorism Index HDI Human Development Index ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice IDI Inclusive Development Index IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IEP Institute for Economics and Peace IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IHDI Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index IIAG Ibrahim Index of African Governance (popularly known as the Ibrahim Index) IMF International Monetary Fund IPK Islamic Party of Kenya IS Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS, i.e., Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIL, i.e., Islamic State in Iraq and the Levante) ISCAP Islamic State in Central Africa Province (IS affiliate, includes Ansar al-Sunnah from Mozambique, and elements from the DRC) ISKP Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS affiliate) ISS Islamic State in Somalia (IS affiliate) ISSP IGAD Security Sector Programme ISWAP Islamic State in West Africa Province (IS affiliate, and a faction of Boko Haram) ISW Index of State Weakness ix JMC Jamia Mosque Committee KADU Kenya African Democratic Union KANU Kenya African National Union KDF Kenya Defence Forces KLFA Kenya Land and Freedom Army (pejoratively known as ‘Mau-Mau’) KIPPRA Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis KNBS Kenya National Bureau of Statistics KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights KPU Kenya People’s Union KSh Kenyan Shilling MENA Middle East and North Africa MPI Multidimensional Poverty Index MRC Mombasa Republican Council MYC Muslim Youth Centre (changed the name to al-Hijra in 2012) NAMLEF National Muslim Leadership Forum NARC National Rainbow Coalition NCIC National Cohesion and Integration Commission NCTC National Counter Terrorism Center NFD Northern Frontier District NFDLA Northern Frontier District Liberation Army (NPPPP’s military wing) NIS National Intelligence Service NPPPP Northern Province Progressive People’s Party NPS National Police Service NSCVE National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism NUKEM National Union of Kenyan Muslims OAU Organisation of African Unity OPHI Oxford Poverty and Human-Development Initiative PCVE Preventing and countering (Islamist) violent extremism (PCIVE) PHDI Planetary-pressures-adjusted Human Development Index POCA Proceeds against Organised Crime Act POCAMLA Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act PREG Index Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups Index PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act PTS Political Terror Scale x PVE Preventing (Islamist) violent extremism (PIVE) RAI Resource Allocation Index RRT Rapid Response Team RVE Radicalisation into (Islamist) violent extremism (RIVE) SCI Social Cohesion Index SDGI Sustainable Development Goals Index SFI States of Fragility Index SLAA Security Laws Amendment Act SPI Social Progress Index START The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism SUPKEM Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims TJRC Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission The West The set of countries found in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania regions4 UN United Nations UNDESA UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNDP UN Development Programme UNHCR Kenya UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Kenya UNSDSN UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network VE (Islamist) violent extremism (IVE) WHI World Happiness Index WG Whole-of-Government (the dominant approach in CVE and in building resilience [state-building] in fragile states. The WG approach is comparable to the ‘integrated approach’ of the United Nations in peace operations) WS Whole-of-Society (a civil society-based approach in CVE. The WS approach is ancillary to the WG approach) 4 The West is a contested conception that is employed, among other contexts, in the context of the exploitation and dominance of fragile states (and historically colonial states), in associations with Christianity as a religion, and in the context of the foreign support of what are deemed as ‘apostate’ and/or ‘unaccountable’ ‘non- Western’ governments. These ‘non-Western’ governments are classified as ‘Western puppets’, ‘Western proxies’, or similar conceptions. Within Islamist violent extremism, as an ideology and a movement, ‘the West’, as symbolised by the US and its allies, is often equated with al-adou al-baeed (the far enemy) and dar al-harb (the house of war and injustice). ‘Non-Western’, ‘apostate’, and/or ‘unaccountable’ governments are classified as al-adou al-qareeb (the near enemy). Jihad (‘armed struggle’) is waged against these far and near enemies. See Translated Words below. The Global Terrorism Index categorises ‘the West’ (in the context of right-wing extremism and terrorism) in Western Europe as referring to Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, Vatican City, and historically West Germany (1970-1990). In North America, the West refers to Canada and the US, and in Oceania, it refers to Australia and New Zealand (IEP, 2020a:61). xi TRANSLATED WORDS5 Ahlu Sunnah Waljama’a (ASWJ) people of the Sunnah and community6 al-Adou al-Baeed the far enemy al-Adou al-Qareeb the near enemy al-Hijra the Emigration. Al-Shabaab’s branch in Kenya (known as the Muslim Youth Centre, i.e., MYC, before 2012) al-Hakimiyya the sovereignty of God (Allah), (at the age of enlightenment), hence the Islamist view that God (Allah) is the highest political-governmental and legal authority (not only the religious or spiritual authority) al-Jahiliyya the age of ignorance. The opposite of al-hakimiyya, i.e., the period before the revelation of Islam (i.e., at the age of enlightenment), or a period defined by the rejection of the divinity and authority of God (Allah). Islamism often equates al-jahiliyya with secularism. al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya the Islamic Group Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta’ala God (Allah), Glory to Him, the Most High. Abbreviated as Allah SWT. al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) the Islamic Union (another precursor of al-Shabaab) al-Ittihad Mahakem al-Islamiyya Islamic Courts Union, ICU (another precursor of al-Shabaab) al-Qaeda the Base (or the Foundation). Formal name is The World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Also known as al-Qaeda Central (AQC) Amir commander Ansar al-Sunnah supporters or protectors of tradition. Also known as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ). Pledged allegiance to IS in 2019 5 There is variation in the spelling of some of these translated words. I use the most common spelling. These translated words are referenced at respective sections of the study. 6 A Somalia-based Sunni-Sufi group that supports moderate Islam and is opposed to Wahhabism and Salafi- Islamist organisations such as al-Shabaab. The group was aligned with the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) but has since clashed with both federal government forces and al-Shabaab. The group is not to be confused with Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) of Mozambique. ASWJ of Mozambique itself is not to be confused with al- Shabaab of Somalia, as ASWJ (a.k.a. Ansar al-Sunnah) is sometimes referred to as al-Shabaab in Mozambique. xii Caliphate a transnational Islamic polity, as initially established by Prophet Muhammad (the Medina model), or as established after his death in 632 by his Caliphs Caliph successor or deputy, as in ‘successor to Prophet Muhammad’ or (contentiously) ‘deputy to God (Allah) on earth’ dar al-Harb the house of war and injustice, where Islam does not prevail and/or Muslims are oppressed dar al-Islam the house of Islam and peace, i.e., ‘the Islamic world’. Where Islam prevails and/or there is an Islamic government or an Islamic state dar al-Sulh the house of conciliation and truce. Where, although the state is not under an Islamic government and it is not an Islamic state, Islam is freely practised Fitrah primordial faith, denoting an innate submission to God (Allah). Islamism often equates fitrah with Islam itself, sees Islam as ‘the original and only true religion’. Gaidi Mtaani On Terrorism Street (an al-Shabaab publication) Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya the Islamic Resistance Movement (popularly known by the acronym, Hamas) Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen the Mujahideen Youth Movement (popularly known as al- Shabaab, i.e., the Youth). Al-Shabaab is an AQC affiliate Harambee all pull together (the state motto of Kenya) Islam the religion Islamic having the features of Islam, or being adherent(s) of Islam, i.e., Muslim(s) Islamism the ideology or the movement-organisation. Islamism seeks to return to al-hakimiyya, to establish Islamic states (or the Caliphate), and to enforce the Sharia in such states7 7 Whereas there is a distinction between Islamist groups that espouse violent means and those that espouse peaceful means in achieving the shared intention and objectives of Islamism as a movement and ideology, this study focuses on the violent strand of Islamism. With the focus on the violent strand of Islamism, ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist violent extremism’ are then used as equivalents, and therefore used interchangeably in this study. Furthermore, although having distinct denotation, but interacting, and acting in complementary manner, Salafis, Islamists, jihadis, mujahideen, and takfiris, are also used collectively in this study. By illustration, Salafi-takfiri- mujahid-jihadi attributes coexist in al-Shabaab as a single Islamist organisation that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and East Africa, based on (perceived) Islamic values and the Sharia (see Chapters 4 and 6). xiii Islamist having the features of Islamism, or being adherent(s) of Islamism Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (AQC affiliate, known by the acronym JNIM) Jamhuri republic (Jamhuri Day or Republic Day is 12 December. A national holiday marking independence in Kenya) Jihad struggle (spiritual or armed). Islamism mostly equates jihad with an external ‘armed struggle’ or ‘holy war’, i.e., jihad Asgar (‘the lesser jihad’), as opposed to an internal spiritual struggle, i.e., jihad Akbar (‘the greater jihad’) Jihadi(s) lslamist (radical, militant) activist(s). At times used interchangeably with Mujahid/Mujahideen Jihadism an Islamist doctrine based on the belief that jihad, in the sense of ‘armed struggle’ or ‘holy war’, is a personal duty of every Muslim to defend Islam or Muslims, or to fight foreign occupation, apostate rulers, and injustice. Islamism perceive/proclaim jihad as the only way to create Islamic states (or the Caliphate). Jihadism is based on the writings of Islamist ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982) Jimbo/Majimbo administrative district(s) or region(s) Kafir/Kuffar unbeliever/unbelievers Linda Boni Protect Boni (i.e., Boni Reserve. Part of Boni Forest in Kenya) Linda Nchi Protect the Nation Madaraka power (Madaraka Day or [political] Power Day is 1 June. A national holiday marking internal self-rule in Kenya) Madrassa Islamic school Manyatta village or settlement Muhadharas public inter-and-intra-religious preaching-debates Mujahid/Mujahideen Islamist fighter/fighters Mungiki A (Kikuyu) militia in Kenya Qutbi(s) adherent(s) of the Islamist doctrine called Qutbism. Based on the teachings of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) xiv Qutbism an Islamist doctrine. Among other things, advocate for ‘perpetual jihad’ as a ‘personal duty’ for every Muslim. Qutbism is often equated with Jihadism Quran the central religious text in Islam Salaf ancestors or predecessors. The first three generations of Muslims, starting with the generation of Prophet Muhammad (the Salaf and the Caliphate are seen as embodying the Golden Era of Islam, i.e., the epitome of Islam) Salafi(s) adherent(s) of the Islamic doctrine and movement called Salafism Salafism an Islamic doctrine and movement. Exalts the Salaf view and practise of Islam, and their way of life, and calls for an Islamic renaissance and for all Muslims to emulate the Salaf Shahada an Islamic creed: I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah Sharia canonical law in Islam Shifta bandit (pejorative name for the NFDLA and NPPPP) Sunnah traditions and practices (as established by Prophet Muhammad). The Sunnah is a model for Muslims to follow Takfir excommunication. Takfir is declared against apostates of the Muslim faith, values, and Sharia rule, or unbelievers who live in al-jahiliyya (the age of ignorance), justifying the use of violence against both Takfiri(s) adherent(s) of the Islamist doctrine based on the view that it is a duty to excommunicate apostates and unbelievers Takfirism the Islamist doctrine based on the practise of takfir Talib/Taliban student/students. Formal name is Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan8 Ummah (global) Muslim community Usalama security 8 The Afghan Taliban should not be confused with Kenya’s Taliban. The Kenyan Taliban is a Luo militia that has been involved in political violence and criminal activity, including their participating, with Mungiki (a Kikuyu militia) and others, in the 2007/2008 post-elections violence that brought Kenya to the precipice of a civil-war. xv Wahhabi(s) adherent(s) of the Islamic doctrine and movement called Wahhabism. Wahhabism is based on the teachings of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) Wahhabism an Islamic doctrine and movement. Among other things, advocating for religious orthodoxy, traditional Islamic values, and a return to the way of life of the Salaf, Wahhabism is at times equated with Salafism, or originating from Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism is often seen as a subset of Salafism xvi GRAPHS, FIGURES, TABLES AND MAPS Page Graphs and Figures Fragile States Index, Kenya overall trend: 2005-2019 13 Conceptualising and designing the study 30 Conceptualising the research design 52 Data analysis coding scheme 65 Conceptualising the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism 66 Conceptualising the relationship between state fragility and impediments to CVE 67 Conceptualising Islamist violent extremism 152 Countering Islamist violent extremism conceptualised 215 Global Terrorism Index, Kenya: 2001-2019 277 Gross Domestic Product growth in Kenya: 2004-2019 316 Human Development Index, Kenya: 1990-2019 317 Corruption Perceptions Index, Kenya: 1996-2019 333 World Happiness Index, Kenya: 2012-2019 335 Political Terror Scale (PTS-S), Kenya: 1990-2019 386 Freedom House Index, Kenya: 2000-2019 396 The theorised causal sequence between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE 429 Tables Terrorist attacks and terrorism deaths, 2002-2019: the most impacted regions 7 Fragile States Index: fragility ranges and measuring scale 118 State fragility and terrorism: 2015-2019 119 Fragile States Index, Kenya indicators and scores: 2005-2019 120 Fragile States Index indicators 122 Cohesion indicators 124 Economic indicators 125 Political indicators 126 Social indicators 127 xvii Cross-cutting indicator 130 Global Terrorism Index: terrorism impact ranges and measuring scale 138 The nine pillars of the CVE architecture of Kenya 288 Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya: 2010-2019 300 The theorised causal sequence between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism 309 Gross County Product in the arc of insecurity 318 Life expectancy in the arc of insecurity 338 Monetary and multidimensional poverty in the arc of insecurity 339 Social Progress Index, Kenya: 2010-2019 341 Cooking fuel by type in the arc of insecurity: firewood and charcoal 342 The theorised causal sequence between state fragility and impediments to CVE 381 Social Cohesion Index in Kenya 399 Maps The arc of insecurity in Kenya 49 The fragile and volatile neighbourhood of Kenya 121 Islamist terrorist incidents in Kenya: 2010-2019 301 The Northern Frontier District of Kenya 305 Multidimensional Poverty Index 2020: MPI values per region in Kenya 319 xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DECLARATION…………………………………………………………………………...……………………….…………………….........i ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………….....................................................ii KEY WORDS…………………………………………………………………………………….....................................................iii OPSOMMING (Abstract)…………....…………………………………………………………..............................................iv SLEUTELBEGRIPPE (Key Words)……………………………………………………….....................................................v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..........................................................................................................................vi ACRONYMS………………………………………………………………………………................................................……….vii TRANSLATED WORDS……......................................……………………............................................................xi GRAPHS, FIGURES, TABLES, AND MAPS………………………………...............................................................xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................................................................xviii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………............................................1 1.1 BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………….....................................................1 1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION…………………………………………………………............................................10 1.3 THE CENTRAL PROPOSITION…………………….…………………………………….......................................12 1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION..............................................................................................................14 1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES…………………………………………………………………........................................15 1.6 RESEARCH AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE…..………………………………………............................................15 1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY……………………………………..........................................18 1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………………………............................................18 1.8.1 Key Concepts....................……………………….....………………………....................................18 1.8.2 Theories and Methodologies on State Fragility, Islamist Violent Extremism, and Countering Islamist Violent Extremism................................................................23 1.8.3 The Relationship Between State Fragility, Islamist Violent Extremism, and Countering Islamist Violent Extremism................................................................25 1.9 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY...............................................................................................26 1.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS……………………………………………………………............................................29 xix CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY…………………………….......................................30 2.1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………..…………………………….........................................30 2.2 CONCEPTUALISING AND DESIGNING THE STUDY…………………………....…...................................30 2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN……………………………………………………………………….........................................31 2.3.1 The Case Study Design…………………………………………………………………………………………….31 2.3.2 The Explanatory Case Study…………………………………………………………………………………....34 2.3.3 The Philosophical Validation and Rationale for the Case Study Design……………………39 2.3.4 Spatial and Temporal Variation and Analysis in Explanatory Case Studies……………….47 2.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY…………………………………..……………………….......................................55 2.4.1 Case Selection……………………………………………………………………......................................55 2.4.2 Data Collection…………………………………………………………………….....................................58 2.4.2.1 Multiple Sources of Evidence……………………………………….................................58 2.4.2.2 The Case Study Database………………………………………………..............................63 2.4.2.3 The Chain of Evidence………………………………………………....................................63 2.4.3 Data Analysis……………………………………..………………….…………….....................................64 2.4.3.1 Stages in Data Analysis……………………………………………….................................64 2.4.3.2 Data Analysis Strategies………………………………………….....................................67 2.4.3.3 Data Analysis Techniques…………………………………………………...........................69 2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS………………….………………………………..………….........................................71 CHAPTER 3: STATE FRAGILITY: THEORY AND APPLICATION…..…………............................................75 3.1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………................................................75 3.2 WHAT IS STATE FRAGILITY?...............................................…………………….................................75 3.3 THE STATE FRAGILITY-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS.........................................................84 3.4 THE CRITICISM AGAINST THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF STATE FRAGILITY…………...........92 3.5 THE VALUE AND UTILITY OF STATE FRAGILITY AS A CONCEPTUAL-ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE..................................................................113 3.6 THE APPLICATION OF STATE FRAGILITY: THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX.....................................117 3.6.1 Indicators and Measurement…………………………………………………….............................117 3.6.2 Cohesion Indicators...................................................................................................124 3.6.3 Economic Indicators..................................................................................................125 3.6.4 Political Indicators.....................................................................................................126 xx 3.6.5 Social Indicators........................................................................................................127 3.6.6 Cross-cutting Indicator..............................................................................................129 3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS……………………………………………………………….......................................130 CHAPTER 4: ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM: ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES...........137 4.1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….................................................137 4.2 ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM.............................................................................................138 4.2.1 Conceptualising Islamist Violent Extremism..............................................................141 4.2.2 Islamist Violent Extremism as Ideology and Movement............................................158 4.2.2.1 Religion as Central to the Human Condition.................................................159 4.2.2.2 Existential Threats to Islam and Muslims......................................................166 4.2.2.3 Extremism of Thought and Extremism of Method........................................167 4.2.3 The Intention and Objectives of Islamist Violent Extremism.....................................169 4.2.3.1 The Creation of Islamic States/Caliphate......................................................169 4.2.3.2 The Enforcement of the Sharia.....................................................................171 4.2.4 Inconsistencies and Irreconcilables within Islamist Violent Extremism ………………….173 4.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES.............................................176 4.3.1 Analytical Frameworks..............................................................................................176 4.3.1.1 The Clash of Civilisations…………………………………………………………………………..177 4.3.1.2 Globalisation and Uncertainty………………………………………….………………………180 4.3.1.3 Local Conditions………………………………………………………………….…….……………..182 4.3.2 Theoretical Perspectives...........................................................................................184 4.3.2.1 Psychological Approaches............................................................................184 4.3.2.2 Instrumentalist Approaches.........................................................................188 4.3.2.3 Organisational Approaches..........................................................................192 4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................................196 CHAPTER 5: COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE STATE-OF-THE-ART....................199 5.1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….................................................199 5.2 THE ORIGINS OF CVE: COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM..........................199 5.3 ENDING VIOLENT ISLAMIST CAMPAIGNS…………………………………………………………………………..204 5.3.1 Repression and Decapitation………………………………………………………………………………..206 xxi 5.3.2 Failure and Reorientation………………………………………………………………………………….…208 5.3.3 Success and Negotiation………………………………………………………………………………….……209 5.4 COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM.......................................................................212 5.4.1 CVE Conceptualised..................................................................................................213 5.4.2 The CVE-Security-Development Nexus.....................................................................221 5.4.3 CVE Approaches and Programming...........................................................................223 5.4.3.1 Whole-of-Government and Whole-of-Society Approaches and Programming…………………………………………………………………………….……….……223 5.4.3.2 Offensive and Defensive Approaches and Programming..............................226 5.4.3.3 Ideological and Communicative Approaches and Programming..................228 5.4.3.4 Political and Social-Policy Approaches and Programming............................229 5.4.4 The Evaluation of CVE Approaches and Programming...............................................231 5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................................234 CHAPTER 6: ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM, CVE, AND THE FRAGILE STATE IN KENYA….............…237 6.1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………..............................................237 6.2 KENYA AS A VICTIM OF EXTERNAL TERROR ATTACKS……........................................................238 6.3 ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE FRAGILE STATE IN KENYA......................................239 6.3.1 Authoritarianism and Centralisation.........................................................................240 6.3.1.1 Contesting the Constricted Democratic Space in Kenya……………….……………242 6.3.1.2 Secession in North-Eastern and Eastern Regions……………………....................247 6.3.1.3 Secession in Coast Region……………….………..…….…....………….........................249 6.3.1.4 The Third Wave of Islamist Violent Extremism in Kenya…………………………...251 6.3.2 Constitutional Reforms and Devolution....................................................................255 6.3.2.1 Devolution and the 2010 Constitutional Framework………….......……………….257 6.3.2.2 Devolution and Persistent Challenges…………...…………………………………………258 6.4 THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA...................................................259 6.5 NEW-WARS AND THE LONG-WAR……………………………………….................................................264 6.5.1 New-Wars in Kenya………………………………………………………………………………………………264 6.5.2 The Long-War in Kenya…………………………………………………………………………………………265 6.6 ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS AND COMBAT UNITS IN KENYA...............................271 6.6.1 al-Qaeda, East Africa al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab.......................................................272 6.6.2 Muslim Youth Centre/al-Hijra...................................................................................274 xxii 6.6.3 Jaysh Ayman and the Saleh Nahban Brigade.............................................................275 6.7 MAJOR ISLAMIST TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN KENYA SINCE THE 1990s.......................................276 6.7.1 Nairobi (1998) and Mombasa (2002)..……………………………………................................278 6.7.2 From Westgate Mall (2013) to 14 Riverside Complex (2019).....................................279 6.8 COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE FRAGILE STATE IN KENYA...............282 6.8.1 The Securitisation of the State…….............................................................................284 6.8.2 Renewed Authoritarianism and Centralisation.........................................................285 6.9 COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA.......................................................286 6.9.1 The CVE architecture of Kenya………………………………………………………………………………286 6.9.2 The All-Government Approach and Programming....................................................291 6.9.3 The All-Society Approach and Programming.............................................................293 6.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................................295 CHAPTER 7: STATE FRAGILITY AND ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA…............................298 7.1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………..............................................298 7.2 THE ARC OF INSECURITY AND ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM…………...................................298 7.2.1 Islamist Terrorist Activity in the Arc of Insecurity…………………………………………..………299 7.2.2 Explaining Islamist Terrorist Activity in the Arc of Insecurity…………………………………302 7.3 STATE FRAGILITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM………………..307 7.3.1 Cohesion Indicators...................................................................................................311 7.3.1.1 Cohesion Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes…….…………………….…311 7.3.1.2 Cohesion Indicators as Drivers…………………………………………………….……………312 7.3.2 Economic Indicators..................................................................................................316 7.3.2.1 Economic Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes…….………….……….…316 7.3.2.2 Economic Indicators as Drivers…………………………………………………………………326 7.3.3 Political Indicators.....................................................................................................328 7.3.3.1 Political Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes…….…………………..….…328 7.3.3.2 Political Indicators as Drivers……………………………………………………………………329 7.3.4 Social Indicators........................................................................................................332 7.3.4.1 Social Indicators as Context and Permissive Causes…….……………………….……332 7.3.4.2 Social Indicators as Drivers…………………………………………………….…………………334 7.3.5 Cross-cutting Indicator..............................................................................................344 7.3.5.1 The Cross-cutting Indicator as Context and Permissive Cause……………….……345 xxiii 7.3.5.2 The Cross-cutting Indicator as a Driver……………………………………………...……..348 7.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................................354 CHAPTER 8: STATE FRAGILITY AND COUNTERING ISLAMIST VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA…......363 8.1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….…………...................................................363 8.2 THE ARC OF INSECURITY AND IMPEDIMENTS TO CVE............................................................365 8.2.1 Impediments to CVE in the Arc of Insecurity………………....................................………365 8.2.2 Explaining Impediments to CVE in the Arc of Insecurity………….........................………378 8.3 STATE FRAGILITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPEDIMENTS TO CVE..................................381 8.3.1 Cohesion Indicators and Impediments to CVE...........................................................385 8.3.2 Economic Indicators and Impediments to CVE..........................................................390 8.3.3 Political Indicators and Impediments to CVE.............................................................393 8.3.4 Social Indicators and Impediments to CVE................................................................398 8.3.5 Cross-cutting Indicator and Impediments to CVE......................................................402 8.4 INCREASED STATE FRAGILITY IN KENYA?................................................................................408 8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................................413 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION………………………………………….………………………........................................426 9.1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………............................................426 9.2 SUMMARY..............................................................................................................................426 9.3 CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................................448 REFERENCES................................................................................................................................459 APPENDICES................................................................................................................................523 1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND This study is an examination of the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism (CVE) in Kenya. Whereas the time order in this relationship is initiated by the generative powers of the ‘Big Bang’ of independence in 1963, which released a causal pathway of secession and violence (structural, cultural, and direct) in the former Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Coast Region, and pitted state fragility against ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya, the temporal demarcation is contemporary Kenya, encompassing the third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s. The temporal demarcation is the end of 2019. The timeline in explanation-building nonetheless covers relevant developments after 2019 and beyond.9 The research design is an explanatory, single-embedded, longitudinal case study. The case is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism and CVE. Kenya is a representative laboratory, containing and demarcating the controlled conditions under which the case is studied.10 The first reflection in conducting this study is that Islamist violent extremism and CVE are inseparably linked. The latter is contingent upon the former, and both feed off each other. Arguably, Islamist 9 The colonial NFD includes the post-independence North-Eastern Region, i.e., Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir counties, and the northern part of Eastern Region, i.e., Marsabit and Isiolo counties, and what used to be Moyale district. Moyale district has since been partitioned between Marsabit and Wajir counties. Partitioned from Somalia by British colonialism, the NFD was dominated by ethnic-Somalis and had hoped to be reincorporated into post-independence Somalia. Coast Region incorporates six counties, viz., Tana River, Lamu, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, Kwale, and Mombasa, and is dominated by Muslims. It was governed separately from Kenya by British colonial powers. Similar to the former NFD that wished to be reincorporated into Somalia, Coast Region had hoped for its own independence after 1963. The Kenyan state has denied both aspirations of secession since 1963. Instead of receiving independence or local autonomy, both regions were subsequently marginalised and securitised, and dissent was repressed by the centralised government system of the newly independent state. The Kenyan government then reduced Kenya to a one-party state until 1991. Between 1964 and 1982 Kenya was a de facto one-party state, and between 1982 and 1991 Kenya became a de jure one-party state. The current third wave of Islamist violent extremism since the 1990s, seeking to create an Islamic state in East Africa, including in Kenya, incorporates the continued insecurity and frustrated aspirations of ethnic-Somalis and other Muslims in Kenya since independence in 1963 (see Chapters 6 to 8). Regarding the waves of Islamist violent extremism, Otenyo (2004:77-78) identifies three waves of Islamist terrorism in the modern era: the first wave starting after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the second wave starting after the 1979 Iranian revolution; the third wave started in 1991 and is mainly associated with al-Qaeda and its affiliates (and the Palestinian Intifada). I reference these waves in various and relevant parts of the study. The temporal demarcation being set at the end of 2019 aims largely to enable the uniform coverage of multiple, parallel, and interacting longitudinal data sources used in the study. This demarcation does not limit explanation-building, which is valid beyond 2019. 10 A case may be either a physical entity or a conceptual phenomenon. In this study, the case is the latter. State fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE are aspects of security not unique to Kenya. Yet, examining their relationship in the context of Kenya generates a particular causal logic, i.e., causal pathway or causal sequences (with causal patterns and causal mechanisms), and therefore analytic generalisation, that may be applied in similar contexts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 2). 2 violent extremism is the leading challenge to secularism, to the coexistence of diverse societies, to peace and security, and to law enforcement. Islamist violent extremism, an ideology and a movement, manifests in extremist narratives, and ultimately political violence, most notably Islamist terrorism, all of which are evidenced in Kenya. Islamist violent extremism also finds expression in wider violent campaigns, including Islamist insurgencies and Islamist proto-states, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa in central and southern Somalia, northern Nigeria, and northern Mali, and in other parts of the world, including parts of Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. CVE, consequently, remains one of the most vexing policy and strategy challenges facing governments and the community of states. There are fierce scholarly contestations about what we know, and how we know what we know, concerning state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE. Which political, economic, and social conditions, whether generated by state fragility or otherwise, spawn Islamist violent extremism? To which CVE approaches and programming does Islamist violent extremism respond? Which CVE approaches and programming are effective, or conversely, ineffective, or counterproductive? How do you evaluate the effectiveness of CVE? Why are some fragile states incubators of Islamist violent extremism and others not? Is state fragility a driver and an enabler of Islamist violent extremism, an impediment to CVE, or are these spurious relationships? What are the indicators of state fragility? How is state fragility measured? Are all states not fragile in some form or degree, therefore nullifying the very notion of state fragility, or at least significantly devaluing state fragility as a conceptual- analytical framework and a theoretical perspective? The answers to many of these and other related questions are subject to conjecture, open to contestation, and often not demonstrable. A caveat before proceeding. The concepts violent extremism (VE) and countering violent extremism (CVE) apply to varied identity-based ideological categories, including ethnic, right-wing (racial), and religious, categories. Furthermore, the concepts VE and CVE are often used without distinction between what they represent. When these concepts or their abbreviations are used in this study, they refer exclusively to the context of Islamism, unless stated otherwise. It is also critical to make the distinction between Islam (or Islamic) and Islamism (or Islamist). These concepts are closely related, yet not equivalent. In fact, extremely few adherents of Islam are Islamists, but by definition all Islamists are adherents of Islam (i.e., are Muslims), even though they espouse a very particular and not broadly shared view of Islam within the global Ummah (i.e., Muslim community). Mozaffari (2007:17, 21-23) and Borum (2011a:10-11) point out that whereas Islam refers to the religion, Islamism refers to a (regressive) totalitarian religious-political ideology, a movement-organisation, and/or a form of 3 government. Islamism, drawing from a specific view and interpretation of Islam that is not shared by most Muslims, has come to be associated with terrorism, insurgency, and proto-states.11 With the surge in Islamist violent extremism (IVE) or Islamism since 9/11, scholarly discourse positions religion and politics central to this phenomenon. Borum (2011a:9) maintains that this is because Islamist violent extremism, as an ideology and a movement that is closely associated with political violence, including terrorism and insurgency, is “what many believe to be the most serious contemporary threat to global security”. There are, however, alternative views. In Chasing ghosts: the policing of terrorism, Mueller and Stewart (2016) contend that the threat of terrorism has been grossly overstated. Mueller and Stewart (2016:3-7) compare post-9/11 counter-terrorism to the hysteria accompanying the witch hunts during the Middle Ages in Europe (circa AD 476-1453), and the hysteria of the ‘communist craze’ in the US during the Cold War (1947-1991). Mueller and Stewart (2016:2) likens most counter-terrorism efforts to chasing ghosts and maintain that post-9/11 counter-terrorism has been unnecessarily “expensive, exhaustive, bewildering, chaotic, and … paranoia inducing”. From the traditional state security perspective as well as the human security perspective, the literature and empirical evidence on terrorism as an exaggerated security threat abound. In this regard Wilson and Thomson (2005:332-333) found that in the 29 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), annual deaths from road accidents were 390 times more than the average annual deaths from terrorism in those countries. In the US alone, the number of deaths in 2001 from road accidents was equal to 9/11 deaths for every 26 days of 2001. That is 11 Applying violent extremism (and CVE) to varied identity-based ideological categories, Zariski (1989) looks at ethnic extremism in Western Europe among ethnic minorities, including Ulster Catholics, Spanish Basques, and Corsicans in France, that have used terrorism in the fight for, mostly, ethnic separatism. Ellis (2015) looks at right-wing (racial) extremism in Canada, focusing on three right-wing groups that use terrorism in pursuit of racial supremacy, viz., Klu Klux Klan (KKK), Church of the Creator (COTC), and Skinheads. Religion-based violent extremism includes Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamist extremism. Pratt (2010) focuses on Christian extremism as typified by the Christian right in the US, New Zealand, and Australia. An example of the Christian right is the group called Phineas Priesthood that have used terrorism, including the bombing of government buildings and abortion clinics, in pursuit of upholding their brand of Christian values. Pratt (2010: 442, 449) finds that Christian extremists are passive, assertive, or impositional, and concludes that impositional extremists such as Phineas Priesthood are the most likely to engage in violence and terrorism. Marshall (2004) and Denoeux (2013) look at Hindu extremism in Nepal and India. Groups such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in India and Nepal Defence Army (NDA) in Nepal, have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism against Christian and Muslim minorities in their bid to establish Hindu states in India and Nepal. Gunasingham (2019) looks at Buddhist extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Groups such as Bodu Bolu Sena (BBS) in Sri Lanka and Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar have been involved in state-sponsored terrorism against Christian and Muslim minorities in their bid to establish Buddhist states in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Within these categories (as intimated above), the focus of this study is identity-and-religion-based violent extremism. The particular focus is Islamist violent extremism (IVE) as represented by Islamist-Salafi-takfiri-jihadi groups that engage in terrorism, such as al-Shabaab, al- Qaeda Central, Islamic State, and others, whose objectives are the creation of Islamic states (or the Caliphate), and the enforcement of the Sharia, i.e., Islam’s canonical law, in such states (see Chapter 4). 4 almost 3, 000 deaths every 26 days. The Global Burden of Disease Study 2019 and data from the World Health Organisation (WHO) show that almost 800, 000 people die from suicide every year. This translates to one person dying from suicide every 40 seconds, more than the global annual deaths from conflict, terrorism, and homicide combined (IHME, 2019; WHO, 2019).12 In addition to terrorism as an exaggerated security threat, the linked danger and fear of terrorism itself has also been misused to justify questionable government conduct in what has been termed the economy of danger. Salter (2003:116, 121, 125) defines the economy of danger as the political employment of the danger of terrorism, or perceptions of such danger, as a commodity or resource, to justify questionable government policies and actions, and to supress dissent against such policies and actions. The case in Kenya also presents evidence of terrorism, by al-Shabaab in particular, as an exaggerated security threat, as well as the employment of the economy of danger. To illustrate, in a study of the origins of insecurity in Kenya, Atta-Asamoah (2015:7, 9) found that between 2008 and 2014 al-Shabaab accounted for only nine percent of all incidents and fatalities linked to insecurity in Kenya. A massive 91 percent of these incidents and fatalities were credited to other actors, including Kenya’s own security forces and organised militias. Related actions like detention without trial, disappearances, renditions, and refoulment, all in violation of international law and Kenyan law, including Kenya’s Constitution, are linked to the employment of economy of danger in Kenya (see Chapters 6 to 8). Given the foregoing, Islamism, and its expression terrorism, do remain vexing security challenges. The Institute for Economics and Peace maintains that since 9/11 “the number of Salafi-jihadist groups has more than doubled, their membership has tripled, and they are present in more countries than ever before” (IEP, 2019:82). Based on Global Extremism Monitor (GEM) data, in January 2016 there were 16 Islamist terror groups active in 21 countries. Between July and September 2016, there were at least 39 religious extremist groups in 41 countries, responsible for 662 terrorist incidents. In 2016 more than 70 countries either ‘expended efforts in battling extremism or suffered violence from it’ (Ahmed et al, 2016:11; CRG, 2016:2). The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) also records similar levels of terrorist violence. Based on GTI data, at least one death from terrorism was recorded in each of 69 countries in 2017, down from 79 countries in 2016. In 2017 there were 19 countries that each recorded over 100 deaths from terrorism, and five had more than 1, 000 terrorism deaths per country. Driving much of the world’s present terrorist activity are Islamist groups. In 2017, four of these groups, viz.: Boko Haram, based in Nigeria; Islamic State (IS), at the time based in Iraq and Syria; al-Shabaab, based in 12 The literature on terrorism as an exaggerated security threat includes Downs (2017), Mueller (2005, 2006), and Byman and Shapiro (2014). 5 Somalia; Taliban, based in Afghanistan, were responsible for 10, 632 fatalities, i.e., 56.5 percent of all terrorism deaths in 2017. Al-Shabaab were credited with the deadliest attack in 2017, killing 588 people in a bomb attack in Mogadishu, Somalia (IEP, 2018:2, 10, 14-15). At least one death from terrorism was recorded in each of 72 countries in 2018, and 103 countries had at least one terrorist incident in the respective countries, but only three countries recorded more than 1, 000 terrorism related deaths per country. As in 2017, four Islamist groups were credited with most terrorist activities in 2018. Taliban, Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), an IS affiliate that operates mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Boko Haram, were credited with 9, 223 deaths, i.e., 57.8 percent of all terrorism deaths in 2018. Taliban were responsible for most of the twenty deadliest terrorist attacks of 2018. The worst attack killed 466 people in Ghazini, Afghanistan, and the second worst attack killed 330 people in Farah, Afghanistan (IEP, 2019:2-3, 10- 11, 14, 15, 17). Eighty-nine terrorist groups carried out attacks in 63 countries in 2019, recording at least one terrorism death in each of these countries. Still in 2019, at least one terrorist incident was recorded in each of 90 countries, and in 16 countries between 100 and 1, 000 terrorism deaths were recorded. As in 2017 and 2018, four Islamist groups were responsible for most terrorist activities in 2019. Taliban, IS, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab were responsible for 7, 578 deaths, equating to 55 percent of all deaths by terrorism in 2019. Islamic State was responsible for the deadliest attack of 2019. In multiple locations in Sri Lanka, on Easter Sunday, in eight coordinated suicide attacks, IS killed 266 people, and injured more than 500 others (IEP, 2020a:4, 10, 12, 14-15, 41, 52, 94). Terrorism related deaths have steadily increased over time, yet there is some decline in the recent past. In the period between 2002 and 2019, from less than 5, 000 terrorism deaths in 2002, there were over 10, 000 deaths in 2007, and almost 30, 000 deaths in 2015. From 2015 figures, in 2017 these figures had declined to 18, 814 deaths, and in 2018 there were 15, 964 deaths, down from a record 33, 555 terrorism related deaths in 2014. In 2019 the numbers have continued to decline, with 13, 826 terrorism related deaths recorded. Most deaths by terrorism since 2011 were reported from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. These three countries account for 61 percent, i.e., 106, 228 (out of 174, 286), of deaths by terrorism between 2011 and 2019. Since 2004 Iraq was the country globally most impacted by terrorism as reflected on the Global Terrorism Index. The number of terrorist related deaths in Afghanistan exceeded those from Iraq for the first time in 2018. In 2019, Afghanistan held the first position on the Global Terrorism Index. Since 2015, Nigeria has occupied the third position on the index. In 2018, Afghanistan alone accounted for 7, 379 similar fatalities, i.e., 46 percent of all 6 terrorism related deaths. In 2019, Afghanistan again recorded the most deaths at 5, 725, i.e., 41 percent of all terrorism related deaths (IEP, 2019:12, 35, 2020a:4, 12-13, 40, 2020b:The Internet).13 Global terrorism has also had immense economic costs. According to Frey et al (2007:2), there are four economic impacts of terrorism. Terror attacks: (1) “derogate a country’s capital stock, both human and physical capital”; (2) “divert foreign resources away from the affected countries to other destinations … [including] the tourism industry and foreign direct investment”; (3) “induce a higher level of uncertainty and, thereby, distort the resource allocation within a country through changes in individuals’ savings, investment and consumption behaviour”; (4) cause “heightened security measures [which] increase transaction costs and draw away resources from more productive use”. The criteria for calculating the economic impact of terrorism are based on direct financial cost from terrorist attacks. The cost is linked to four resultant factors, viz.: (1) deaths; (2) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses; (3) property destruction; (4) injuries (IEP, 2019:30, 2020a:32, 39).14 Based on the forgoing criteria, in the period between 2000 and 2019, the economic impact of terrorism ranged from US$9.3 billion in 2000, to 81.4 billion in 2001 (mostly attributed to 9/11), and 13.7 billion in 2002 (all in constant 2019 US$). In 2004 this figure was US$20.6 billion, and by 2013 it was 80.4 billion, peaking at 115.8 billion in 2014, and decreasing to 99.6 billion in 2015. In 2016, this figure dropped again to US$97.9 billion, 55.8 billion in 2017, and 35.1 billion in 2018. In 2019, the figure was US$26.4 billion (IEP, 2020a:30-31). Like terrorism deaths, peaking at a record 33, 555 in 2014, the economic impact of terrorism, as may be expected, also peaked in 2014 at US$115.8 billion. There are also indirect costs associated with terrorism as Frey et al (2007) intimate above. These indirect costs, some incalculable, are linked to terrorism’s impact on, for example, economic growth, trade, financial markets, tourism, business investment, informal economic activity, security spending, insurance costs, counter-terrorism, and spending on refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Unlike the immediate and direct economic cost indicated above, the indirect economic cost of terrorism has longer-lasting, further-reaching, and much higher impact. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that the long-term indirect economic cost may be as much high as 10 to 20 times higher than the original and immediate direct cost (IEP, 2014: 45-46, 2019:32-33, 2020a:30, 34). 13 Where there are discrepancies in the data, I deferred to the latest data on the 2020 Global Terrorism Index report (IEP, 2020a) as well as the 2020 Global Terrorism Index interactive map (IEP, 2020b). 14 To illustrate, of the US$26.4 billion economic impact in 2019, deaths accounted for 61.2, GDP losses 35.2, property destruction 2.5, and injuries 1.1 percent (IEP, 2020a:31-32). The 9/11 attack is the single terrorist attack in history with the largest economic impact, at US$67 billion, in constant 2018 US$ (IEP, 2019:19). 7 While it is popularly perceived that there is a general increase in global terrorist activity, the real increase is highly variable, and mostly particularised and geospatially concentrated. To illustrate, of the 20 countries most impacted by terrorism in 2015, not one was from either Western Europe or North America. In 2016 the same status was reported. In 2017 the ten countries that accounted for 84 percent of all deaths from terrorism were located in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. In 2018, the ten countries that represented 87 percent of all deaths from terrorism were again located in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The ten countries that account for 80 percent of all deaths from terrorism in 2019 are also located in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East (IEP, 2016:10; 2017:10; 2018:13, 2019:13, 2020a:13). Yet, research, funding, scholarly discourse, news coverage, and CVE efforts, have not reflected this reality. Instead, the West remains the focus and locus of scholarly interest in and concern about terrorism. In an opinion piece aptly titled Are some terrorism deaths more equal than others?, Sullivan (2016:The Internet) poses the following two relevant questions: “ISIS kills 30+ in Brussels: Big story, page 1. ISIS kills 30+ in Baghdad, small story, page 6, below the fold. What does this tell us about newsroom biases?”, and “Western terrorism victims get humanised with individual profiles but not victims from Asia/Africa events? What gives? Resource allocation?”. The observable reality is that terrorism is concentrated in the fragile states that are mostly found in sub-Saharan Africa and some isolated parts of the world, including South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). See Chapter 3 and below. As shown below, terrorism occurs in MENA, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and then Asia Pacific, Eurasia, Europe, South America, North America, and Central America and the Caribbean: Created from Global Terrorism Index data (IEP, 2020a:43-44) MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa therefore account for 93 percent of terrorism deaths globally between 2002 and 2019. Between 2002 and 2019, sub-Saharan Africa had comparably more deaths from terrorist attacks than all other regions impacted by terrorism. This suggests that the main objective of these attacks in sub-Saharan Africa are people, not infrastructure. These terrorism deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, 49, 791 in total, translate to an average of four deaths for every attack, Terrorist attacks and terrorism deaths, 2002-2019: the most impacted regions MENA 37, 553 attacks 96, 360 deaths South Asia 37, 154 attacks 74, 087 deaths Sub-Saharan Africa 12, 567 attacks 49, 791 deaths Europe 4, 531 attacks 2, 558 deaths South America 2, 390 attacks 1, 925 deaths Asia-Pacific 8, 685 attacks 7, 350 deaths North America 514 attacks 296 deaths Russia and Eurasia 2, 522 attacks 3, 812 deaths Central America and Caribbean 204 attacks, 237 deaths 8 compared to an average of 2.6 deaths for every attack in MENA and two deaths for every attack in South Asia. In contrast, in the same period, Asia-Pacific, Europe, South America, and North America, had more terrorist attacks than terrorist deaths. This suggests that the main targets in these four regions are infrastructure, not people. Russia and Eurasia, and Central America and the Caribbean do not have significant differences in the number of attacks versus the number of deaths. Sub-Saharan Africa has recorded almost 50, 000 terrorism deaths since 2002, with 4, 996 deaths in 2017, a further 4, 523 in 2018, and another 4, 635 in 2019. In 2018 MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 91 percent, i.e., US$29.94 (out of US$33) billion, of the world economic impact of terrorism, with sub-Saharan Africa alone accounting for 37 percent, i.e., US$12.17 billion (in constant 2018 US$). In 2019, MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 86 percent, i.e., US$22.8 (out of US$26.4) billion, of the world economic impact of terrorism, with sub-Saharan Africa alone accounting for 47.1 percent, i.e., US$12.5 billion (in constant 2019 US$). This is a developing trend. Terrorist activity is shifting away from MENA since 2018, with South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa accounting for more than 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in 2019. With the growing levels of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 3), and the related growing levels of Islamist terrorism, seven of the ten countries with the biggest increase in terrorism deaths in 2019 are in sub-Saharan Africa. Six of the ten countries responsible for 80 percent of terrorism deaths in 2019, are also in sub- Saharan Africa. In 2019, Islamic State (IS) also shifted their focus to sub-Saharan Africa. The deaths attributed to Islamic State in 2019 increased by 67 percent in the subregion, with 49 percent of all IS attacks also occurring in the subregion (IEP, 2018:37, 2019:31, 37, 2020a:4-5, 13-14, 33, 50).15 The foregoing places sub-Saharan Africa right at the centre of Islamist violent extremism and CVE. This centrality, is induced by the prevalent drivers and enablers of Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in the subregion, including the “burgeoning youth population, persistent lack of educational, housing and vocational opportunities, long-simmering grievances among marginalised populations, and location on heavily trafficked routes” (Aldrich, 2014:524). Islamist violent extremism, finding expression through terrorism, has accordingly taken root on the subcontinent. With Nigeria topping the list on the subcontinent and placing third on the Global Terrorism Index since 2015 (see 15 Most terrorist activity credited to Islamic State (IS) in Africa is perpetrated by IS ‘provinces’ and affiliates in Africa. The most active of these ‘provinces’ in sub-Saharan Africa are Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). ISCAP includes Ansar al-Sunnah from Mozambique and other elements from the DRC (the Allied Democratic Front, i.e., ADF, though these linkages are contested), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a faction of Boko Haram. Another major ‘province’ is Islamic State Sinai Province (ISSP) which mainly operates in Egypt. Affiliates include Islamic State Somalia (ISS), Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) which mainly operates in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Islamic State Algeria (IS Algeria), and Islamic State Libya (IS Libya). See: Zenn, 2020:The Internet; IEP, 2020a:5, 17, 27, 29, 47, 50, 53-59; ICG, 2021:21-22). 9 pp. 3-5 above), Islamist violent extremism has also taken root in Kenya since the 1990s. Aronson (2013:24) contends that Kenya is “a hub for terrorism, violent extremism, and factionalism”. Kenya has an average medium impact score of 5.04 (out of 10.00) on the Global Terrorism Index between 2001 and 2019. Reflecting the world trend of a peak in terrorism in 2014, Kenya also records an all-time high score of terrorist activity at 6.60 (high impact) in 2014 on the Global Terrorism Index (IEP, 2020b:The Internet). Terrorism has also had a tremendous economic impact in Kenya, estimated at US$1.27 billion in constant 2019 US$ between 2007 and 2019, with an estimated loss of 8.9 percent of GDP as contributed by the informal economy between 2007 and 2015. In response to the threat of terrorism, securitisation spending between 2007 and 2016 in Kenya is estimated at US$20.95 billion in constant 2017 US$, divided between: internal security (11.727); military expenditure (7.730); private security (1.211); security agencies (0.279). Kenya’s securitisation expenditure in 2019 alone is estimated at US$1.5 billion in constant 2019 US$ (IEP, 2020a:35, 37; UNDP, 2020a:5-6, 24). Whilst the nature and extent of terrorism have varied and progressively involved various actors in Kenya since the 1970s, including terrorism by ethnic militias and terrorism by Kenya’s own state agents, the focus of this study is on Islamist terrorism and responses to Islamist terrorism since the 1990s in Kenya. The study appropriates the definition and measurement of terrorist activity, by varied non-state actors, as employed in the Global Terrorism Index. Terrorist activity consequently refers to (1) attacks, (2) fatalities, (3) injuries, (4) damage to property, and (5) impact. The first four elements are calculated annually, and the fifth element, impact, is calculated over a five-year period (IEP, 2019:90-91, 2020a:96-97).16 Regarding lslamist terrorist activity as such, Otenyo (2004:77-78) identifies three waves of Islamist terrorism in the modern era, starting (1) after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, (2) after the 1979 Iranian revolution, and (3) since 1991, mainly associated with al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the Palestinian Intifada. In the third wave, the seven cases of major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya are: the 1998 US Embassy attack, the 2002 Mombasa attacks, the 2013 Westgate attack, the 2014 Mpeketoni attack, the 2014 Mandera attacks, the 2015 Garissa attack, and the 14 Riverside complex attack in 2019 (see Chapter 6, section 6.7 Major Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya since the 1990s). Islamist violent extremism is linked to various accounts, including state fragility. Gaining currency since the 1990s, the properties of state fragility are said to have generative capacities and tendencies, 16 In 2022 the Index changed its main data source from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to TerrorismTracker, and changed its methodology, now measuring terrorism in terms of annual attacks, fatalities, injuries, and hostages (not damage to property anymore), weighted over five years (IEP, 2022:2, 88-90). The Index was not issued in 2021. I use the dataset, methodology, and definition of terrorism, as used on the Index up to 2019. 10 breeding and incubating varied development and security challenges, including Islamist violent extremism (see Rice, 2001; Williams, 2007; Devlin-Foltz, 2010; Carter, 2012; Plummer, 2012; Solomon, 2013, 2016; Aldrich, 2014; ACSS, 2016). The central proposition of this study is that, in Africa, state fragility (1) provides the context (setting), (2) offers the opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), and (3) generates (causes or drives) Islamism and impediments to CVE, and hence the failure of CVE. It is also common currency that the African state, on average, offers and generates varied levels of fragility and insecurity. Africa is seen as the part of the world where state fragility is most prevalent and most embedded, most persistent, with far-reaching outcomes. Patrick (2006b:29) affirms that fragile states “do often incubate global threats, but this correlation is far from universal”. Not all fragile states in Africa, accordingly, incubate Islamist violent extremism. In the 49 states in sub-Saharan Africa, Islamist violent extremism has taken root markedly in Nigeria, Somalia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Niger, Chad, and the Ivory Coast.17 1.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION Given the extent and persistence of Islamist violent extremism and the challenges of CVE in Kenya, the pertinent question to ask is: Which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya? There is expanding, yet piecemeal and often conflicting literature on Islamist violent extremism and CVE in Kenya. Said divergent literature underlines the contention in this study that what we know and how we know in regard to the question of which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya? has thus far mimicked the fable of the six blind men and the elephant. There are varied versions of the fable. As the story is told, a group of blind men touch an elephant in a bid to learn what it is. They all touch different parts of the elephant, and each come to different conclusions about what an elephant is like and therefore what it is. Variedly and variously, the elephant is described as a wall, snake, spear, tree, fan, or rope. The result thus is total disagreement and misrepresentation about the single, indivisible, factual reality of the elephant. Denzin (2009) applies the tale of the blind men and the elephant in the context of the discourse on evidence-based research, an approach advocated and followed in this study. Shabtai (2016) employs 17 I use a geographical classification of countries south of the Sahara Desert and thus also include Mauritania and Sudan on the list of the 49 states in sub-Saharan Africa. This classification is also used on the Corruption Perceptions Index (see Transparency International, 2020a:11). There are, however, differences in classification. The IMF and the World Bank list only 45 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, classifying Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Mauritania as part of MENA (Middle East and North Africa). In contrast, the Comoros, although a member of the Arab League like other MENA countries, is classified as part of sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF uses this 45- states classification on their World Economic Outlook Database (see IMF, 2019:The Internet). 11 the fable in an analysis of future wars. Shabtai (2016:316-317) concludes that the struggle by Islamist violent extremism represents one aspect of what future wars will look like, long confrontations that will be defined by strategic attrition, and hence the characterisation of Islamist violent extremism as ‘the long-war’ or ‘the forever-war’. True to the analogy of the six blind men and the elephant, accounts of Islamism in Kenya are divergent, piecemeal, and in many respects, presented in problematic ways. One account frames Islamism in the context of the ‘global struggle’ between the Christian West and the Islamic world, viz., Otiso’s (2009) Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism. This account features in various literature, including Otiso (2009), Blanchard (2013), Gaidi Mtaani (2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b), Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014), Ali-Koor (2016), and Mabera (2016). Another account links the local context to the development of Islamism in Kenya, stressing aspects of state fragility, but not linking those aspects to state fragility as such. Stressing the local context, Botha (2014c:125) maintains that “most militant groups among these Muslim communities fight for their local interests - political and cultural autonomy and economic justice”. Allan et al (2015:36) link Islamist terrorist activity in Kenya to some indicators of state fragility, including the failure to modernise security agencies, the lack of investment in intelligence and policing capabilities, corruption in security forces, and relative poverty. Looking at the 1998 US Embassy attack in Nairobi, Williams (2007:4) highlights the role of a failing state (former Sudan), and a collapsed state (Somalia at the time). Various authors link Islamist terrorism to the alienation and marginalisation of Muslims in Kenya, most being ethnic-Somalis (Prestholdt, 2011; Linborg, 2016; Ahaya and Onyango, 2018). Similarly, Burbidge (2015) lists various factors of contention raised by Muslims in Kenya. In North-eastern Region, these factors include land for cattle grazing, access to water points and markets, cattle rustling, and a poorly regulated border with Somalia. In Coast Region, the factors include the manipulation of title deeds for political ends, not recognising Muslim customary courts, and youth unemployment. Imitating the fable of the six blind men and the elephant, Van Metre (2016) identifies six accounts in Kenya: (1) youth recruitment based on unemployment, financial incentives, and victimisation; (2) radicalisation by Imams and preachers, and divisive muhadharas (i.e., public inter-and-intra-religious preaching- debates); (3) the presence of al-Shabaab sleeper cells; (4) tensions and communal violence between Muslim and Christian communities; (5) the insularity of ethnic-Somalis and Somalia’s refugees, who are often viewed with suspicion; (6) intra-Muslim factionalism, characterised by moderates versus extremists. Botha’s (2014b, 2014c, 2015) account highlights the radicalisation of individuals in Kenya through political socialisation by Islamist leaders and Islamist organisations such as al-Shabaab. 12 The foregoing accounts illustrate the varying and often divergent explanations, which have until now, at best, revealed only partial glimpses of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. The account in this study links Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE to state fragility. State fragility promises to reveal the elephant (i.e., Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE) for what it is, in all its complexities, in a coherent, systematic, comprehensive, manner. It is only with the true identification of the elephant that Kenya may deal productively and effectively with the challenges of Islamist violent extremism and CVE, as well as the conditions, constraints, and consequences of state fragility. It is critical to have such a realistic understanding of Islamist violent extremism. Failure to do so has led to the ineffective and counter-productive CVE that is observable in Kenya and elsewhere to date. 1.3 THE CENTRAL PROPOSITION While regarded as more stable than many African countries, an economic and political hub in East Africa, Kenya has shown distinct signs of state fragility over an extended period. Since its inception in 2005, the Fragile States Index is key as an analytical tool and measure of such state fragility. The index uses a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) method, triangulating qualitative data, quantitative data, and expert validation. This method, developed in the 1990s, was first intended to measure conflict risk. Since 2004 it is used to also measure state fragility. Since 2006 Kenya has received alert (90.0 - 99.0) and high alert (100.0 - 109.9) scores on the Fragile States Index (FFP, 2017a:24, 2017b:3- 5, 2018:28, 2020c:39-40). State fragility in Kenya reached a record high in the post-election crisis of 2007/2008 after the disputed results of the December 2007 presidential race between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. Starting at the end of 2007, the height of the crisis was at the beginning of 2008. Kenya received a score of 93.4 in 2007, jumping to 101.4 in 2008 and to 100.7 in 2009 on the Fragile States Index (FFP, 2020b:The Internet). Blanchard (2013:7-8) and Mabera (2016:368-369) contend that the post-election crisis brought Kenya to the brink of a civil war, leaving more than 1, 300 people dead and more than 700, 000 internally displaced. This bloodletting was followed by a constitutional crisis when the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted several Kenyan leaders in 2011 for crimes against humanity, for their alleged involvement in the violence. The indicted leaders included, since 2013, the sitting President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. In 2011 they were Minister of Finance and Minister of Education respectively. In 2015 the ICC dropped the charges against Uhuru Kenyatta and in 2016 against William Ruto, largely on the basis of insufficient evidence to support their alleged involvement in the post-election crisis of 2007/2008. 13 The evident state fragility in Kenya is reflected in the aggregated and disaggregated scores that Kenya annually receives on the Fragile States Index. On a scale of below 20.0 to a maximum of 120.0 on the Fragile States Index, Kenya has the best aggregated fragility score of high warning at 88.6 in 2005, the worst score of high alert at 101.4 in 2008 and at 100.7 in 2009, and an average alert score of 96.2 between 2005 and 2019. Alert (90.0 - 99.0) is the third highest fragility range on the Fragile States Index, indicating heightened state fragility and heightened conflict risk. The annual aggregate fragility scores and ranking between 2005 and 2019 on the Fragile States Index in Kenya are shown below:18 Created from Fragile States Index data (FFP, 2020b:The Internet) Whereas the aggregate fragility scores above paint an overall bleak picture, it is in the disaggregated indicators where the most salient conflict-generating and debilitating properties of state fragility in Kenya are uncovered. For the period 2005 and 2019, out of 12 main indicators on the index, Kenya scores the worst in the following nine indicators on average (each scored out of 10.00): demographic pressures (8.8); factionalised elites (8.7); group grievances (8.4); state legitimacy (8.2); refugees and internally displaced persons, i.e., IDPs (8.1); uneven economic development (8.0); external intervention (7.9); security apparatus (7.8); public services (7.8). The latter two share the eighth position. Significantly, Kenya scores worse with uneven economic development (8.0) as opposed to economic decline (7.1) in the period under review (FFP, 2020b:The Internet). Later, in the contexts of Chapters 3 and 6 to 8, I return to these indicators, the Fragile States Index, and Kenya’s fragility scores. Given the foregoing, the central proposition of this study is that state fragility (X-construct or explanans), does not only provide the context (setting) and opportunity (enablers or permissive causes), but also generates (drives or causes) Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE (the binary Y-construct or explanandum). The state fragility indicators define not only the social, economic, and political pressures faced by Kenya, but also the Kenyan state’s (in)capacity to deal with these 18 See Chapter 3, section 3.6.1 Indicators and measurement, for the complete 11 fragility ranges and the measuring scale as used on the Fragile States Index. 88.6 91.3 93.4 101.4 100.7 98.7 98.4 99.6 99.0 97.3 98.3 96.4 97.4 93.5 90.3 88 90 92 94 96 98 100 102 2005 (33) 2006 (31) 2007 (26) 2008 (14) 2009 (13) 2010 (16) 2011 (16) 2012 (17) 2013 (18) 2014 (21) 2015 (20) 2016 (22) 2017 (17) 2018 (25) 2019 (29) Fr ag ili ty S co re Year (Ranking) Fragile States Index, Kenya Overall Trend: 2005-2019 14 pressures. The Kenyan state is both agent and structure, and in this sense agency and structure are real entities that have causal capacity and tendency. This is the essence of the agency-structure relationship or debate in social theory. This debate is often framed around dichotomies like free will versus socialisation or individual choice versus social context. Wendt (1987:337-339) explains that agency relates to human agents, and structure relates to organisations or social structures created by human agents. Agents and structures act and interact, and the properties of both are relevant in explanation-building. Wendt (1987:339) further maintains that the state is conceptualised as both agent and structure, or otherwise the state is conceptualised as “a structure of political authority in which government agents are in turn embedded”. Critical Realism maintains that social structures such as government institutions and other organisations, have and develop emergent properties, i.e., “they exercise their own causal powers, independently of the agency which produced them” (Bakewell, 2010:1696). In this study, it is not the state but the nature of the state (i.e., state fragility) that is the unit of analysis. It is thus both agency and structure (as contained within the nature of the state, i.e., state fragility), that explain Islamist violent extremism as well as impediments to CVE.19 Th central proposition of the study is that the properties of state fragility generate popular discontent (i.e., grievance or injustice) that is carried along a pathway (i.e., causal sequence) that is encapsulated and fuelled by Islamist and Islamised dissent and violence. These properties of state fragility that have causal capacity and tendency also create impediments to CVE. Gurr (2011b:ix) therefore contends that to explain political violence (of which Islamist terrorism is one form) or to seek ways of building peace, one needs to understand: (1) popular discontent, and the justifiability and utility of political action flowing from such discontent; (2) group organisation, and the group’s capacity to act; (3) the regime’s ability to repress or channel popular discontent; (4) international support, for both the regime and the group. These four factors that Gurr (2011b) highlights, and other related factors, including the agency- structure relationship, provide the foundation for explanation-building in this study. 1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION In the problem formulation, the following central question is posed: Which factors explain Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE in Kenya? The central proposition ascribes these factors to the properties of state fragility. These properties of state fragility, deriving from internal socio- economic and political environments, as well as the external environment, have causal capacity and 19 I further address the conceptualisation of the agency-structure relationship in the context of Chapters 2 to 5, and the agency-structure relationship as empirical reality in Kenya in the context of Chapters 6 to 8. 15 causal tendency. Given the central proposition, the study seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is state fragility?, as linked to varied permutations of underdevelopment and insecurity, particularly Islamist violent extremism and impediments to CVE, (2) What is Islamist violent extremism?, (3) What is CVE?, (4) How are Islamist violent extremism and CVE evidenced in the fragile state in Kenya as an explanatory setting?, (5) What is the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism?, (6) What is the relationship between state fragility and CVE? The central research question, based on the context of Kenya, is formulated as: What is the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism in Kenya? 1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES Given the above questions, as well as the central research question, the study presents related research objectives. The first research objective of the study is to analyse state fragility as a conceptual-analytical framework, as a theoretical perspective, as well as the cause, the explanans (the X-construct) to the explanandum (the binary Y-construct). The explanandum, the observed outcome or effect, is the development and sustainment of both Islamist violent extremism and the impediments to CVE. The second objective is to outline Islamist violent extremism as well as its linked analytical frameworks and theoretical perspectives. The third objective is to sketch the state-of-the- art pertaining to CVE. The fourth objective is to outline and analyse the manifestations of Islamist violent extremism and CVE in the fragile state in Kenya as an explanatory context and a unit of analysis. The fifth research objective is to probe the relationship between state fragility and Islamist violent extremism in Kenya. The sixth research objective is to examine the relationship between state fragility and CVE in Kenya. The seventh and final research objective is to reach findings or conclusions pertaining to the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and CVE, in the context of Kenya (and other applicable contexts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa). 1.6 RESEARCH AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE Given the research question, the aim of the study is to critically examine the relationship between state fragility, Islamist violent extremism, and countering Islamist violent extremism, in Kenya. Recent studies have focused on pull factors and push factors explaining the radicalisation of individuals towards Islamist violent extremism. Factors in this context referring to varied micro level drivers of radicalisation, and the process of micro level radicalisation. Said recent studies include, among others, Hassan (2012), Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2014), Botha (2014c, 2015), Allan et al (2015), Rink 16 and Sharma (2018). In contrast, as outlined in section 1.3 The central proposition, this study employs the construct of state fragility in explaining the factors that make groups and communities amenable to Islamist violent extremism. These factors, emanating from internal political, economic, and social environments, and from the external environment (as defined on the Fragile States Index), predate the formation of any Islamist organisation and relevant related pull factors, including the influence of Islamist ideologues and recruitment, or micro radicalisation as such. These factors that are embedded in state fragility are also shared and constant, whereas radicalisation is a highly personal and variable matter. It is collective agency, found in social structures, that account for Islamist violent extremism. The submission of this study therefore is that Islamist violent extremism is a group pursuit, based on collective discontent, mobilisation, and action. Even the so-called lone-wolf terrorist acts on behalf or believes to be acting on behalf of a collective, a shared idea, ideology, or grievance. Micro radicalisation can only find logic and meaning in meso radicalisation and macro radicalisation as offered by the social structures that subsist in the fragile state. It is consequently artificial to abstract the individual from the context of group and community discontent. It is also artificial to abstract the Islamist ideology and the terror group from the context of the state that generates the political, economic, and social conditions that give rise and impetus to Islamist violent extremism, and from the context of the state from where the conditions and constraints in CVE are found and generated. Based on the premise that the