JCH 2012 Volume 37 Issue 2

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Browsing JCH 2012 Volume 37 Issue 2 by Subject "Angola"

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    Die repatriasie van die EBO-4: die lokalisering en opgrawing van die grafte van vier Suid Afrikaanse soldate in die EBO- distrik, Kwanza Sul, Angola, 1975-2012
    (Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2012) Boshoff, Willem
    The final phase of the history of Operation Savannah, the 1975–1976 South African military involvement in Angola dawned when remains of three of the four South African soldiers who were left in Angola, were repatriated during June 2012. The graves of the deceased, the Ebo-4, were found in 2006 and locals who were involved in the burials confirmed the veracity of the sites and the events. After years of research and negotiations, a team made up of relatives, members of the Ebo Trust and a professional team of archaeologists and a forensic anthropologist left for Ebo in May 2012. The excavations were abrubtly terminated by the Angolan authorities and the team had to leave Angola, only to be invited back to Angola two weeks later. Remains of three individuals were located in one grave and excavated, while a second grave site yielded no mortal remains. The mortal remains were interred in niches at the SADF Wall of Remembrance at the Voortrekker Monument on 8 July 2012.
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    ItemOpen Access
    Die repatriasie van die Ebo-4: die lokalisering en opgrawing van die grafte van vier Suid-Afrikaanse soldate in die Ebo-distrik, Kwanza Sul, Angola, 1975-2012.
    (Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2012) Boshoff, Willem
    The final phase of the history of Operation Savannah, the 1975–1976 South African military involvement in Angola dawned when remains of three of the four South African soldiers who were left in Angola, were repatriated during June 2012. The graves of the deceased, the Ebo-4, were found in 2006 and locals who were involved in the burials confirmed the veracity of the sites and the events. After years of research and negotiations, a team made up of relatives, members of the Ebo Trust and a professional team of archaeologists and a forensic anthropologist left for Ebo in May 2012. The excavations were abrubtly terminated by the Angolan authorities and the team had to leave Angola, only to be invited back to Angola two weeks later. Remains of three individuals were located in one grave and excavated, while a second grave site yielded no mortal remains. The mortal remains were interred in niches at the SADF Wall of Remembrance at the Voortrekker Monument on 8 July 2012.
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    Suid Afrika se strategiesie posisie en die "Slag van Cuito Canavale", 1987-1988
    (Faculty of Humanities, University ot the Free State, 2012) Scholtz, Leopold
    The purpose of this article is a critique of the strategic approach to the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale by the leadership of the South African Defence Force (SADF). The article starts with an analysis of South Africa’s strategic position on the eve of the campaign in 1987. It concludes that the country was internationally isolated, and that it would have to fight basically alone against FAPLA (the Angolan Army), PLAN (Swapo’s army), and possibly also the Cuban forces in Angola – in other words, an overwhelming force. At the same time, the white South Africans viewed the war as an existential struggle which they could not afford to lose. Against the above-mentioned background, the thinking in SADF circles is then analysed. It is shown that leading SADF military thinkers were of the opinion that any campaign would have to be well thought through and concluded quickly, before international pressure became unbearable. Against a much stronger enemy, it was also thought that a brutal head-on clash would be unwise, and that South African forces would have to follow Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach”. The article subsequently analyses the haphazard way in which the SADF became sucked into the campaign. In the beginning, no clear political objective existed, the South Africans became involved incrementally, they naïvely tried to keep their involvement secret, and threw their indirect approach convictions overboard and opted for exactly the brutal frontal attacks against which their leading thinkers previously warned. The final conclusion is that, although the SADF fared extremely well on a tactical and operational level, their strategic handling of the campaign was not good.
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    ItemOpen Access
    Suid-Afrika se strategiese posisie en die "Slag van Cuito Cuanavale", 1987-1988
    (Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2012) Scholtz, Leopold
    The purpose of this article is a critique of the strategic approach to the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale by the leadership of the South African Defence Force (SADF). The article starts with an analysis of South Africa’s strategic position on the eve of the campaign in 1987. It concludes that the country was internationally isolated, and that it would have to fight basically alone against FAPLA (the Angolan Army), PLAN (Swapo’s army), and possibly also the Cuban forces in Angola – in other words, an overwhelming force. At the same time, the white South Africans viewed the war as an existential struggle which they could not afford to lose. Against the above-mentioned background, the thinking in SADF circles is then analysed. It is shown that leading SADF military thinkers were of the opinion that any campaign would have to be well thought through and concluded quickly, before international pressure became unbearable. Against a much stronger enemy, it was also thought that a brutal head-on clash would be unwise, and that South African forces would have to follow Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach”. The article subsequently analyses the haphazard way in which the SADF became sucked into the campaign. In the beginning, no clear political objective existed, the South Africans became involved incrementally, they naïvely tried to keep their involvement secret, and threw their indirect approach convictions overboard and opted for exactly the brutal frontal attacks against which their leading thinkers previously warned. The final conclusion is that, although the SADF fared extremely well on a tactical and operational level, their strategic handling of the campaign was not good.