

**DEMOCRATISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN LUSOPHONE
AFRICAN STATES: THE CASES OF CAPE VERDE AND MOZAMBIQUE**

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ABSTRACT

Despite promising prospects to political transition towards a democracy, over the last 25 years, Lusophone African states, achieved very different political and economic outcomes in relation to democratization and human development. This thesis investigates the cases of Cape Verde and Mozambique to explore the political transition and democratization processes in both countries to determine what factors support and/or undermine democratization, development, and political stability. The focus of the study is within the institutionalist scholarly tradition, thus considering the correlation between political institutionalism and economic and human development. While Cape Verde has consolidated democratic rule, Mozambique embraces authoritarian rule and became increasingly undemocratic, thus consolidating a form of political hybridity. Drawing on institutionalist and structuralist theories, this study engages quality of democratic institutions and socio-economic indicators in Cape Verde and Mozambique. The research demonstrates that for an effective transition and consolidation of democracy, institutions matter; and they shape the procedural and substantive elements of deepening democracy as well as quality of governance; which are seen as critical elements of economic and human development and quality of governance. In Mozambique, with strong Marxist ideology and military influence the ruling elite captured the state, controlled political and economic power and maintained authoritarian rules that undermine state-building in the democratic tradition and democratic transition. In Cape Verde, political institutions were more inclusive, allowing for greater voice, accountability and control of corruption and consequently democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Political Transition, Democratization and State-Building.

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Abbreviations

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CFM	Mozambique Railways
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIP	Corruption Perception Index
CL	Civil Liberties
CNE	National Election Commission
EIU	The Economist Intelligence Unit
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FH	Freedom House
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IESE	Institute for Social and Economic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INE	National Institute of Statistics
JAACCV	Youth Amilcar Cabral of Cape Verde
LOPE	Law on the Political Organisation of the State
MDM	Democratic Movement of Mozambique
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MPD	Patriotic Movement for Democracy
MPLA-LP	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Labour Party
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OMCV	Cape Verde Women's Organization
OAU	Organisation of the African Union
PAICV	African Independence Party of Cape Verde
PAIGC	African Independence Party of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde
PALOP	Portuguese-speaking African Countries
CSP	Central State Plan
PPI	Indicative Perspective Plan
PR	Political Rights
RENAMO	National Resistance of Mozambique
RNM	National Resistance of Mozambique
ROMOC	Road Transport Center
ROMON	Road Transport North
ROMOS	Road Transport South
TMR	Revolutionary Military Tribunal

UDC	Cape Verdean Democratic Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UPICV	Cape Verde Islands People's Union
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy
WGI	World Governance Indicators
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front



Sources : www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/capeverde and www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/mozambique

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

It has been more than 30 years since the Harvard Political Scientist, Samuel Huntington presented his *waves of democratisation* and analysed patterns of the global spread of democracy. When he presented his analysis, the Freedom House Report estimated that the ratio of the world's democracies rose from 41% to 61%, and the number of the world's population living under "free" or "partly free"¹ political conditions rose from 56 % to 65 % (Freedom House, 2014: 79; Queiroz, 2017: 85). This context was influenced by the collapse of the Berlin Wall², which marked an historical moment in the global history of democracy. However, three decades after the Huntington analysis, scholars are now discussing a democratic reversal, most notably in the Global South, including in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Early 1990's, Lusophone African countries, namely Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tomé e Príncipe, boarded the proverbial train of mass democratic transitions. Three decades later, however, we note that different lusophone African states had different democratic outcomes. Some states (Cape Verde and Sao Tomé e Príncipe) consolidated or strengthened their democracies. While others (Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique) developed hybrid regimes, remaining suspended between a form of democracy and authoritarianism.

¹ Based on the Freedom in the World indicators, a Free Country is "...one where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A Partly Free country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism" (Freedom House, 2014: 59).

² After the Second World War (1945), Germany was divided into two nations (socialist Germany and Capitalist Germany) which led to the polarisation of the world into two blocks. The socialist side, supported by the socialist bloc, led by the USSR, which occupied and dominated all of Eastern Europe, part of Asia and exerted influence in Central America where it had much influence from Cuba. The capitalist Germany, supported by the capitalist bloc, led by the USA, became hegemonic in Central Europe, the American continent and Japan. If on the one hand the division and rivalry between West and East Germany led to their separation by an high wall (the so-called Berlin Wall approved in 1961), on the other hand this division bipolarised the world in political, military and ideological disputes. However, the 1980s were a decade of crises for the socialist bloc, mainly in East Germany where the government was slow in introducing reforms. The economy became bad and worsened the deterioration of the life of the population involved in demonstrations. The solution to the crisis was to open the borders, unify the two Germanys and liberalise the political and economic market. This process of reforms, which meant the defeat of socialism and the victory of liberalism, was called the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War and marked an historical moment in the global democracy.

This study seeks to analyse political transition, democratization and state-building in two Lusophone countries: Cape Verde and Mozambique. The research therefore focusses on the trajectory of democratic political transition in Africa through the lens of state-building processes and institutionalism during the democratic political transition, and its impact on substantive democratisation for democratic consolidation. This chapter also presents the approach and research methods, and finally a short presentation of the chapters.

1.2. Rationale and motivation for this research proposal

Early 1990s, the global spread of democracy resulted in somewhere between 76 and 117 democracies (Diamond, 2011: 2). Hence, Samuel P. Huntington's ground-breaking work on the *waves of democratisation* (1991) analysed the global spread of democracy. The Huntington study evidenced several states that transitioned away from authoritarianism to democracies. These transitions consisted of institutional and structural reforms that transformed military governments, dictatorships, one-party states, and communist states into democratic states with elected governments. The underlying rationale for the global spread of democracy was a common belief amongst academics that democratic rule is the ultimate good (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 56). Hence, the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance was seen as essential to facilitate an improvement in economic performance, facilitate equal redistribution, improve political institutions to strengthen governance, and guarantee basic human rights like liberty, freedom, and franchise (Diamond, 2011: 2).

Seemingly, some countries that embarked on a democratic transition away from authoritarianism stagnate at a point where these are neither authoritarian nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered what Carothers (2002: 9) calls a *political grey zone* and remain suspended somewhere between democratisation and authoritarianism (Steyn-Kotze, 2010: 18). Carothers describes more of a process approach to democratic change, while others like O'Donnell (1992) and Fukuyama (2015) question the linearity of democratisation and transition. Most of the literature still grapples with the question of why some states seem able to become successful, well-functioning democracies (or at least have made some progress towards being a functional

democracy) and why others seem to be regressing in their democratic gains (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 94; Steyn-Kotze, 2010: 19; Carothers, 2002: 15).

Democratisation tends to develop in a sequence of stages, specifically when a transition to democracy is negotiated (Carothers, 2002: 7). For De Villiers (1993: 7) generally, a “transition by transaction” or negotiation will have a period of negotiations; an interim constitution to facilitate a founding election; a founding election; and then a process of institutional reform and democratisation; with the last phase being democratic consolidation (De Villiers, 1993: 7). Thus, the first stage of democratisation entails opening of the political space (a period of political liberalisation), with the most prominent fault line being that between hardliners and soft-liners³. After political liberalisation, the process of democratisation is followed by the collapsing the authoritarian regime and constituting a new democracy through national elections. After the Founding Election, the new democratic institutional architecture is developed and adopted through promulgating a new constitution. Finally, the new democracy needs to move towards democratic consolidation. Here, “democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance, through the reform of state institutions, the institutionalisation of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic ‘rules of the game’” (Carothers, 2002: 7).

According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 159), more than sequential stage, the political transition is a dialectic process, which can (and sometimes do) go backwards or stagnate; as well as move forward along the democratisation trajectory. Regarding to this, (Williams, 1994: 175) recognise that the current “cycle” of democratisation is unprecedented in its depth and duration and may be able to sustain itself in the long term. However, the author highlighted that the changes from the political transition have been significant: the restoration of civil and political liberties, establishing freely contested

³ The word *hardliner* was first used in 1963, from *hard-line*, an adjective used in the 1950s to describe Soviet communism. The notion of hard-line describes a politician who sticks stubbornly to a particular position or policy. It is most common to talk about extreme conservative opinions or politicians who are unwavering in their devotion to a specific idea. While most hardliners have extreme conservative opinions, the word also refers to politicians who are steadfast in their devotion to a specific idea. The “top-down” transition to “democracy frequently results from a split between soft-liners and hardliners in an authoritarian regime. Typically, the dictatorship has come under some sort of pressure, often having to do with declining economic conditions, and soft-liners have come to prominence. Whereas the hardliners tend to be satisfied with the political status quo, soft-liners may prefer to liberalise and broaden the social base of the dictatorship in an attempt to gain allies, strengthen their position in relation to the hardliners, and manage opposition groups. The soft-liners have a choice to make” (Clark, Golder, and Golder, 2018: 4-5).

elections, and increasing new opportunities for political participation. There are, however, some limitations to democratisation, most notably elite dominated transitions. Specifically, economic elites need guarantees that their primary interests will be protected under the new democratic regime to ensure buy-in for the new democratic system. It is what (Williams, 1994: 175) called *elite-dominated or transition from above*. Thus, during the political transition the rule remain in control even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force to remain at least part of their power (Williams, 1994: 175). Additionally, O'Donnell and Schmitter contend that one of the lessons from recent transition are two fundamental restrictions: the property right of elite classes are inviolable, and the armed forces remain key institutional players with certain guarantees on processes to protect their interest (1986: 159).

Data presented by the Freedom House (2015) illustrated that between 2000 and 2015, democracy diffusion stagnated or even declined because the number of countries ranked “not free” increased from 33% in 2000 to 41% in 2014. Hence, Fukuyama (2015) questioned the linear perspective of democratic transition. Fukuyama (2015: 37) argues that all political systems are prone to political degeneration. Older democracies may not be agile enough to meet changing societal needs. As such, Fukuyama believes that liberal democracies will not necessarily remain intact forever. Fukuyama thus argues that, in the process of state-building and democratic transition, states are exposed to several challenges that emerge from unique political and historical trajectories. A country's political trajectory is influenced by both internal factors (autocracy; power dynamics within political institutions and groups, including religious, tribal, and local authorities) and external dynamics, such as global interaction with other states and economic relationships. To explore these issues further, there is a depth of literature that interrogate the effects of institutions and structures on economic and political outcomes. The idea in this literature is not to posit that political order is maintained through liberal notions of good governance but to understand how and why processes, paths, dynamics: the historical institutional nature (democratic or autocratic), the limited availability of resources, the limited tax base and the political contestation over valuable but scarce resources, corruption and clientelism are features of all of less developed countries have differential outcomes on political transition (Khan 2005; North et. al 2007).

Young (1994) and Tar (2010: 45) assert that in most parts of the world, the Third Wave did not result in substantive economic or political reform in terms of freedom and its associated civil liberties. In fact, there are regions or countries who are grouped as part of the Third Wave who transitioned not to democracies, but rather to semi-authoritarian political systems. When this happens, these states maintain a hybrid structure, with the appearance of democracy without embracing democratic values, including free and fair elections and political competition (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 58). These semi-authoritarian systems allow little real substantive competition for political power and minimise principles of accountability; they only leave enough political space for political parties and organisations of civil society to form; for an independent press to function to some extent; and for some political debate to take place, all of which constitutes a violation of political rights (Abel-Malek 1968: 3). Therefore, its democratic functioning is limited to meet some criteria.

A central element of democratic transition is to establish political and institutional stability on a foundation of liberal democracy. Yet, political and institutional stability remain elusive in some Third Wave states, while other states have managed to consolidate and strengthen their democracies. This research draws on a comparative methodology to analyse the democratisation trajectories to reveal the factors that shape the “democratic” outcomes of transitioning states through two case studies: Cape Verde and Mozambique⁴. Each case covers a distinct historical period, namely Portuguese colonial rule followed by a state-building under the single party regime. In the early 1990s, both countries embarked on a transition process to democratise and transform political institutions and structures on the governance principles of political and economic liberalism.

The purpose of this research is to analyse the elements that shape institution building to determine their impact on democratic durability and sustainability in an African context. Two cases are drawn to unpack these institutional dynamics, namely Cape Verde and Mozambique. There is a general perception within the scholarly literature that these countries were, at some point, successful examples of a democratic transition (Cape

⁴ To guide readers, a map illustrating the geographical location of these states was presented and can be consulted at the beginning of this research: Cape Verde and Mozambique.

Verde) and a post-conflict transition (Mozambique). Despite similarities noted early in the 1990s, we note two different “democratic” outcomes. Mozambique has moved from hybrid to authoritarian regime, which degenerated into political instability and military conflict (Orre & Rønning, 2017: 39). Cape Verde strengthened its democracy and systematically continued to strengthen a potentially sustainable democracy, although not without problems (CEDAW, 2017: 43).

The study focusses on the institutional and structural factors that shape democratisation and state-building, teasing out lessons from these two African states. Beyond simply studying conflict and political instability, the research seeks to understand how political and economic factors interact with each other, and how these factors influence democratisation and state-building. What are the structural and institutional (historical, political, and economic) factors that influenced the deceleration of democratisation in Mozambique when compared to Cape Verde?

The underlying assumption is that institutions can be *formal* in the sense of constitutional rules and codified laws (for example, the rule of law, elections, and the separation of powers), or *informal* in the sense of political, social, and cultural norms (Thornton & Cox, 2005: 16). The tensions between formal rules and informal power relations are the source of an unpredictable form of politics at an institutional level, which impacts on the ability of a state to successfully consolidate a democracy. In an assessment of power sharing among different groups, pluralism, and heterogeneity (as discussed in the context of a multicultural society divided by its linguistic, ethnic, religious and political structures, such as in Cape Verde and Mozambique) become relevant analytical dimensions for democratisation, political stability, and state-building.

As part of the structural dimension of analysis, the research examines the links between economic performance and the political transition to democracy, and the political elite as well as national economic interests. Structures are defined as the long-term contextual factors that influence democratic transition and state-building. Examples include economic and social structures, geo-strategic positions, natural resource endowments, histories and ideological tendencies, climate change and technological progress (Fukuyama, 2015: 79). Morlino (2011) studied how the socio-economic factories influence

on countries and their democracy as well as the democratisation trajectory. He studies the changes from a non-democratic regime to a democratic regime in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. For Morlino, the democratic transition begins after the Second World War, with the fall of Nazism (in Germany), fascism (in Italy) and Stalinism (in the USSR). The transition continued in the context of the socio-economic transformations, which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s. The moments of crisis, uncertainty can lead to transition, establishment and consolidation of democracy. Therefore, the author understood that a democratic transition does not follow a linear trajectory and may experience crises or rejections motivated by internal actors (political parties, armed or citizen groups), as well as external actors. Another dimension of the structural analysis results from the basis that there is a relation between historical context, the behaviour of the actors, and structural dynamics that shape the process of democratisation and state-building (Diamond & Morlino, 2004: 16; Fukuyama, 2015: 79). This discussion will set up the relationship between politics, the state and the economy, from a democratisation and state-building perspective in Portuguese-speaking African countries.

1.3. Research objectives

This study aims to understand the institutional and structural factors that shape the political and economic dynamics of political transitions towards democracy and state-building in Cape Verde and Mozambique. For this, the study analyses, assesses, and compares the political and economic contexts that shape the dynamics of democratisation and state-building in two African Portuguese-speaking countries. In addition, the research aims to describe the complex interaction (or lack thereof) of political and institutional reforms as one side of political transition and democratic consolidation. Thus, the study presents a qualitative content analysis of the academic discussions underpinning the structural and institutional foundations of the political transitions away from an authoritarian regime towards democratisation and democratic state-building. In this sense, the research defined and delimited its subject to the institutionalist and structural tradition in political studies. The study thus focusses on the political and economic aspects associated with state building in two historical periods: 1975 to 1990 and 1990 to the present day. The qualitative content analysis is used to simplify both the description and

the explanation of the context, the theories, and the concepts related to state-building, as well as its progress and challenges in scholarly development in this regard. Thus, the specific objectives of this study are:

1. Compare and identify correlations, if applicable, between the political and economic factors that impact and shape the dynamics, trajectory and outcomes of political transition and democratisation in Cape Verde and Mozambique.
2. Determine to what extent political and economic institutions affect each other and how they influence democratic consolidation and/or regression.
3. Unpack the factors that shape the interplay between political and economic dynamics that determine democratic consolidation or regression in Cape Verde and Mozambique to draw out lessons learned from the Lusophone Africa.

1.4. The context of the research

Over the past three decades, the spread of democracy in Huntington's Third Wave Theory was underpinned by the following views: a) democracy is a morally good political system; b) political transition is essential to achieve durable democratic consolidation and political stability on the basis of legitimacy, and c) a long established democracy must also reform if it is to solve its own problems associated with public dissatisfaction and disillusionment (Diamond & Morlino, 2004: 20). After three decades of so-called "democratic" optimism, scholars struggle to explain various democratic transition failures, the perceived retreat of democracy, and the increase in authoritarianism (Plattner, 2016: 17). Questions such as: Why do democracies survive? (Diamond, 2011); Is democracy in decline? (Plattner, 2016); What causes democratisation? Why do democracies fail? (Kapstein & Converse, 2008) seem to dictate the emerging scholarly discourse on democratisation.

In assessing the democratic sustainability of new democracies, modern scholars engage fundamental questions about institutional and structural factors inherent in the historical, political, and economic processes that facilitate democratisation; and about how economic and political aspects contribute to the consolidation of democracy (Lipset, 1959: 79; Mannermaa, Dator & Tiihonen, 2008: 158). This study focusses on two key aspects of democratisation: the formal or procedural prerequisites of democracy (institutions and the

rules that shape the democratic system) and substantive democratisation (examined as desirable outcomes such as wealth distribution, power, justice, equality, and inclusion) (O'Loughlin, Ward & Lofdahl, 1988: 547).

This study argues that democratising states go through various phases that begin with an emergence of the regime; followed by consolidation; its legitimisation; and the potential for substantive crises that may undermine democratic consolidation. This route opposes the sense of linearity proposed by some authors that discuss the path of the Third Wave, who argue that the context of political transition to democracy was not as important as the process of democratisation (Wucherpfenning & Deutsch, 2009:5). Very often, states that engaged in political transitions in the early 1990s faced several challenges that could undermine democratic consolidation. These included centralised institutions, corruption, human right violations, and exclusion. This justifies why Wucherpfenning and Deutsch (2009: 5) argued that, in the early 1990s when African countries were transitioning *en masse* towards so-called liberal democracy, “it is difficult to discern what kind of democracy is emerging in Africa and what unique features will give it depth and sustainability in African conditions”. Chabal echoes Ake’s concerns on why African countries had challenges in building liberal democracies, and identified four difficulties:

In the first place, there is the persistent claim that multi-party elections are controlled and distorted, when not actually rigged, by incumbent regimes. Secondly, there is the nagging doubt that democratically elected regimes intend to subvert the momentum for political liberalization by ruling much as the previous one-party regimes did. Thirdly, there are very obvious limits to the actual democratic nature of functioning multi-party systems, chief of which seems to be that such systems have no place for political opposition. Finally, and most ominously, there is the unavoidable fact that where multi-party elections have failed to bring about genuine improvements, Africans have begun to lose faith in “democracy” (1998: 290).

These challenges justify why several African countries have been less democratic competitive and the reason of improvements in social indicators have been slower. These challenges also explain the reason that in some states, political elites that consolidated power under a military or authoritarian regime, continued to gain successive electoral

victories, both for the state executive and for the legislature (Bratton & Posner, 1999: 98). Brown's (2001) *Authoritarian leaders and multiparty election in Africa* concludes that most authoritarian regimes in Africa that transitioned towards democracy in the 1990s had changed constitutional and legal frameworks, allowed political opposition, and held multiparty elections (Brown, 2001: 732). Despite these reforms, a number of former dictators such as Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, Gnassingbe Eyadéma of Togo, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, Idriss Deby of Chad and Isaias Afwerki of Eritreia, have repeatedly won elections, which legitimated them to continue ruling their countries; demonstrating that, perhaps, their democratic reforms were more superficial than substantial democratic gains for consolidating democracy⁵.

Experiences in developing countries reveal that in most cases, in the context of political and economic transition, state institutions failed to respond to collective societal demands for a just, free, and equal society. These states had problems related to political and economic uncertainty, such as weak state institutions, elite power struggles, political exclusion and marginalisation, which broke down into factionalism and corruption. The developmental trajectories of political institutions and processes during state transformation, and attempts to consolidate democratic institutional development, happened within an environment of crisis and uncertainty (Streeck & Thelen, 2008: 51). Hence, in some African states, the expectations of political transition do not always bring results that maximise and increase the levels of trust, legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of state institutions (Enderle & Guerrero, 2007: 2).

This highlights the role of political institutions in shaping the dynamics of democratisation. Democracy as a political system is built on the institutionalisation of the legitimisation of political power (Weber, 1999) and, as such, new institutionalism is gaining increased traction through a focus on heritage policy (*policy legacy*) and the trajectory (*path dependencies*). Using this approach, it is possible to study the role of political actors in

⁵ Since these leaders came to power, they have installed a regime of terror persecuting their opponents, leading to assassinations, disappearances and politically motivated arrests. This is why in Rwanda for example, Kagame is known as the *hostile reconciling, benevolent dictator, aggressive, uncontrolled & violent*. However, the economic development of Rwanda is considered a *success story*, which has earned him praise for the progress he has brought to the country in his 20 years in office.

democratisation and state-building, as well as the influence of historical heritages in the processes of democratic transition in Lusophone African countries.

1.5. A long-term decline of democracy in the world: Challenges in Cape Verde and Mozambique

Since Lipset (1959) published his article *Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and democracy*, scholars (Huntington, 1991 and 1996; Przeworski, 1991) engaged questions around the relationship between democratisation and economic development, and the effect one has on the other. In their work they explained that economic growth and political legitimacy are pre-conditions for the sustainability of democratic systems. In the context of an emerging democracy, institutions can play important roles in state-building and for stable political life. However, institutions will not necessarily be able to guarantee effective democratic regime performance to facilitate the inclusive economic development needed to transform society (Steyn-Kotze. 2010: 58).

Mozambique and Cape Verde are used as case studies to unpack the dynamics of democratic political transition and state-building in African Portuguese-speaking countries. The study therefore focusses on the trajectory of democratic political transition in Africa through an examination of state-building processes during the transition to democracy and its impact on substantive democratisation for democratic consolidation. Steyn-Kotze (2010: 58) described the interrelationship between political institutions, effective democratic regime performance, and liberal political culture as the three key factors that shape democratic consolidation and sustainability.

Braunfels (2014) explores the role of institutions as fundamental drivers of economic development. They noted that various types of institutions, particularly political (such as executive power constraints) and economic institutions (such as the right to property), and the need to determine how these institutions evolve over time and interact with one another to determine the impact on democratic consolidation. Both political and economic institutions develop two functions. The first is to place constraints on the potential for the authoritarian behaviour of governments. The second is to provide a good environment for

economic activity and development, such as guaranteeing the projection of property rights (Braunfels, 2014: 1-2).

This study focuses on the dynamics of democratic political transition and state-building, with a specific focus on the interplay between political factors (institutions) and economic organisations (wealth distribution, for example) based on Braunfel's (2014) work. His key argument is that improving economic institutions and performance has a very positive effect on political institutions, while political institutions have a positive, but quantitatively smaller, effect on current economic performance. In addition, political stability positively affects future political institutions (Braunfels, 2014: 20). Thus, this study focuses on the interplay between political institutions and economic factors that impact on democratic consolidation with a focus on Lusophone Africa, drawing on the experiences of Mozambique and Cape Verde.

Over the last 25 years, Lusophone African states engaged in transition and democratisation processes, achieving varied outcomes in terms of democratic consolidation. While states such as Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe consolidated their democracies through building effective political institutions, others, such as Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique, seemed to have moved towards a form of hybrid regime, stuck between democracy and authoritarianism (Queiroz, 2017: 182 – 211). This leads to the question: which factors determine the outcome of democratisation in Africa? Furthermore, what is the interplay between economic development and state-building (or establishing effective political institutions) that shapes the outcome of democratisation in an African context? Cape Verde and Mozambique thus make appropriate case studies to explore those questions. Mozambique has not consolidated democracy but rather political hybridity; while Cape Verde seems to have consolidated democratic rule (Mo Ibrahim Index, 2017).

One of the relevant indicators that has been explored to understand the issues raised above is the alternation of political power and political succession. This indicator is evaluated through the dynamics of electoral processes in states in a political transition. Huntington proposed that in the transition process, democracy is consolidated once the

government has lost office twice in any elections after the initial election in which multi-party competition was established. From Huntington's perspective, the acceptance of defeat by the losing party represents a key moment in which democratic institutional procedures become routine in formal political life. This is the point, as Przeworski noted *when the rules of liberal democracy become the only game in town* with its implicit acknowledgement that parties must lose as well as win elections. Huntington's concept of *the two turnover test* thus states that democracy becomes entrenched when the political party that takes power in the Founding Election loses a subsequent election and turns over power to the new winner peacefully; and if the electoral victors peacefully hand over power to the winners of a later election. The table below shows that in 1991, Cape Verde began the process of transition to democracy. By 2016, the country held six legislative elections and experienced political succession of power.

Table 1: Cape Verde - Percentage of votes for political parties (1991-2021)

Round of Elections		MPD	PAICV	Others
First	1991	66.41%	33.59%	
Second	1995	61.30%	29.75%	9.77%
Third	2001	40.55%	49.50%	9.16%
Fourth	2006	44.02%	52.28%	3.67%
Fifth	2011	42.27%	52.68%	5.04%
Sixth	2016	53.58%	37.53%	7.28%
Seventh	2021	48.78%	38.56%	12.66%

Sources: Cabo Verde National Commission for Election. Legislative Elections 2016 and Official Bulletin, Series I, n. 58, 11 Out. 2016

Table 1 shows that, from 1991 to 2021, Cape Verde managed its transition from a one-party system and authoritarian regime to a pluralist system and democratic regime. Power has changed hands regularly and peacefully several times following free and fair elections. This conforms to Huntington's two-turn over test. Cape Verde experienced three peaceful changes in political power (1991, 2001 and 2016) at national and local levels through the electoral system. The two political parties, namely the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) and Movement for Democracy (MPD), respect the electoral outcomes and have not reverted to violence to challenge the election outcomes when one loses power, thus speaking to "democracies becoming the only game in town"

(Linz & Stepan, 1996). Even if in 2011 the PAICV had won the election, Jose Carlos Fonseca from the MPD won the presidential election in the same year. It was a clear demonstration of the power-sharing respecting of the rules of the “democratic game” between the executive and legislative branches that Cape Verde experienced. The change in political power in Cape Verde speaks to a consolidation of political democracy at an institutional level since we note a peaceful change in the parties that govern. This attests to the rule of law in Cape Verde, whose political institutions work, thus strengthening political democracy. Consequently, in December 2004, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) assessed Cape Verde, on three main areas: 1) progress recorded in per capita income, 2) human capital formation, and 3) reducing the economic vulnerability index. Cape Verde “graduated” from least developed status to a middle-income country (African Development Bank, 2012: 18).

The signing of the 1992 General Peace Agreement in Mozambique marked the end of the political conflict that lasted 16 years. Mozambique has not experienced a change in political power and does not conform to Huntington’s two-turn over test (see Table 2 above). FRELIMO (the ruling party) has been in power since 1975 and has become a dominant party (Rønning, 2010: 8; De Tollenaere, 2004: 258). In political sciences and African studies, there is no single definition of what dominant party means, despite a vast body of scholarly work. Some authors (Arian and Barnes 1974, Daalder, 1987, Cox, 1997) define dominant parties and dominant party systems as focusing on control of government or within the legislature. Therefore, “dominant parties are those, which are uninterruptedly in government, either alone or as the senior partners of a coalition, for a long period of time (say three to five decades)” (Cox, 1997: 238). This definition is however contested. Hence, Daalder states that “...dominant parties should not be identified with parties which are perennially in government” (Daalder, 1987: 180).

Perhaps O’Leary (1994) and Jager & Toit (2013) offers the most complete definition, which demands that multiple elements be present.

- *First, “the dominant party must regularly win overwhelmingly more seats in parliamentary or congressional elections than its opponents” Jager & Toit (2013:49).*

- Secondly, *“the dominant party system occurs within a democratic setting and enjoys the support of the majority. A common feature of most dominant party systems is a highly symbolic history and the ushering in of a new political order. Hence, they are continues supported despite non-delivery, mismanagement, corruption, and other factors which would normally cost the political party its ruling seat” (Jager & Toit, 2013). It must be able to stay in government on a regular basis. If it must share power with smaller parties, it is nevertheless the key agent in the political system, with privileged access to the key executive and legislative posts (O’Leary, 1994: 4).*
- Thirdly, *“a dominant party must be chronologically distinguished. It must govern continuously for a long time, although analysts might differ over whether for three or four general election victories, and whether a decade or a decade and a half are the crucial benchmarks of dominance” (O’Leary, 1994: 4).*
- Finally, *“a dominant party must be ideologically dominant: it must be capable of using government to shape public policies so that the nature of the state and the society over which it presides is fundamentally changed” (O’Leary, 1994: 4).*

According to Huntington (1991: 42) the narrative of the liberation struggle remains an effective way to legitimize the position of the dominant party. Thus, “the longer a nationalist party fought for independence, the longer it was able to enjoy the power that came with independence, while in contrast. Hence, many of the nationalist parties, which came into, power only a few years before independence and which won independence easily had a less secure grasp on power after independence (Huntington, 1991: 42). Duverger (1954:308-09) highlights that dominant party occur when its doctrines, ideas, methods, and style coincide with those of the epoch. Thus, according to Duverger, the notion of *domination* is an issue of influence rather than specific strength.

Dunleavy (2010: 5) defines dominant party systems “...as hybrids that combine genuine elections with continuous executive and legislative rule by a single party for at least twenty consecutive years or four consecutive elections”, of which a “...key feature is that elections are meaningful, even though systematic biases in partisan competition...” makes them substantially unfair. The first Mozambican multi-party elections held in 1994 and were won

by the ruling Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party, which also won every subsequent election (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019). Mozambique thus meets the criterion of consecutive successes to qualify as a dominant party system. It is the case where the regime is seen as democratic since “...it is instituted and maintained through regular elections in which multiple parties participate and the dominant party enjoys popular support” (Jager and Toit, 2013: 7).

The Mozambican democratic transition is one of the cases where the ruling party, has been supported over an extended period by the state apparatus, but also by the political power that the party won due to its historical and political influence, despite other opposition political parties that can legally operate in the country (Sumich & Honwana. 2007: 22; Jager and Toit, 2013: 16). The table below shows that in 1994, Mozambique began the process of transition to democracy. By 2014, the country held its fifth legislative election. At national level, the country has never experienced a political alternation and FRELIMO has been in power for forty-four years.

Table 2: Mozambique - Percentage of votes for political parties (1994 – 2019)

Round of Elections		FRELIMO	RENAMO	MDM	Others
First	1994	53.30	33.73	-----	12.97%
Second	1999	48.54	38.81	-----	12.65
Third	2004	62.03	29.73	-----	8.24
Fourth	2009	74.66	17.69	3.93%	3.72
Fifth	2014	55.93	32.48	8.35	3.24
Sixths	2019	73.6%	24.0%	2.4%	0.0

Source: National Commission for Election and Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration: The Electoral Results (2014)

The data show that even with the appearance of a third political party, the MDM in 2009, the Mozambican political system remains polarised between FRELIMO (the ruling party since 1975) and RENAMO (the main opposition party since 1991). One of the reasons for this polarisation is that FRELIMO and RENAMO were the two main parties involved in Mozambique’s transition to democracy (as well as the key role players in the Mozambican conflict). This could point to political polarisation between FRELIMO and RENAMO in

Mozambican society. Even though the national political system remains polarised between these two parties, FRELIMO remains a dominant political party, which has won all general elections and controls the executive, legislative and judicial institutions. The best performance of FRELIMO happened in 2009 when the dominant party reached more than two thirds of parliamentary representation and reinforced itself as a dominant party. Although not winning elections during the transitional process, RENAMO remains a political force with popular support. The 2014 election results revealed that RENAMO'S political performance improved from 17.69% of parliamentary representation in 2009 to 32.48% in 2014. No comprehensive study has yet been conducted to explain these performance differences between the two main political parties in the country. However, the data seem to demonstrate that Mozambique's recent economic crisis (Orre & Rønning, 2017), deprivation of a set of political freedoms (Center for Public Integrity, 2019), corruption (Centre for Public Integrity, 2019; Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2019) and violations of human rights (Human Right Watch Report 2017), can be hypothetically studied to understand why so many voters supported RENAMO in 2014, having improved the electoral results. The 2019 results revealed that Frelimo has increased its legitimacy from 55.93% in 2014 to 73.6% in 2019. Additional studies have to question and need to understand how it was possible for Frelimo to improve its electoral legitimacy in 2019 under a political and economic adverse situation.

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories - this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world's states (micro-states are excluded). The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Based on their scores on a range of indicators within these categories, each country is then categorised as one of four types of regime:

- *“Full democracies:* Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, but also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory. The media is independent and diverse. There is an effective system

of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced.

- *Flawed democracies*: These countries have free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), and generally basic civil liberties are respected to a degree. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including deficits in governance and low levels of political participation.
- *Hybrid regimes*: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent these from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies, most notably in the governance and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread, and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on journalists and the judiciary is not independent.
- *Authoritarian regimes*: In these states, political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is a disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. The media is typically state owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship, as well as no independent judiciary system” (EIU, 2016: 45).

Based on the Democracy Index 2016, Figure 1 shows comparatively the political performance of Cape Verde, classified as a *flawed democracy*, and Mozambique, classified as an *authoritarian regime*.




Figure 1: Democracy Index 2020 - Cape Verde and Mozambique

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 2020

Figure 1 demonstrates that Cape Verde generally performs better in various criteria that measure the democratic gains of states. The EIU (2016) scores Cape Verde higher (7.94) in terms of progresses in election monitoring agencies, transfer of power, and public sector accountability and transparency over the last decade. In this case, Cape Verde is seen as having free and fair elections, guaranteeing and respecting basic civil liberties. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, low levels of citizen's participation in political process, poor social representation and accountability and lack of coordination among the three pillars of power. In the overall score, the EIU scores Mozambique lowest (4.02) in terms of progresses. Mozambique has declined in rule of law, and safety and security over the last decade, affecting electoral processes and other democratic indicators.




Figure 2: GDP: Cape Verde and Mozambique (2007 – 2016)

Figure 2 shows that although the countries followed a similar historical trajectory of political development, in terms of GDP per capita Mozambique is less developed than Cape Verde. It is important to note that, as demonstrated in Figure 2, Cape Verde is a state that controlled and stabilised economic growth over time. From 2014, Mozambique suffered an economic decline in terms of its GDP. This coincides with the deterioration of democracy in Mozambique in 2014, most notably with regards to corruption and human rights. Given this overview, the study thus focusses on the interplay between economic and political dynamics at an institutional level and how this relationship may shape democratisation. Thus, the focus falls on (1) what is the impact of economic development on democracy? (2) Does the transition to democracy favour or hinder economic growth? (3) Does democratic stability depend on economic development? and, (4) To what extent do economic crises erode the bases of democracy's sustainability? These are particularly important considerations to unpack state-building for democracy in an African context.

Two pre-conclusions are relevant in this debate. First, in the continent there is the need to expand the space of fundamental rights and liberties long violated before and after its independence. Second, there is a need to expand social and economic progresses in terms of better standard of living conditions. The demand for political rights and civil liberties are driven forces behind the notion of state-building and democratic principles. Thus, the notion and discussion of state-building and democratization are empty words without meaning for the people, unless they are translated into a real improvement in political and socio-economic standard of the living conditions (Cabral, 1979: 241)⁶.

1.6. Research approach and research methods

One of the key intentions for studying the interplay between economic and political institutions in an African context is to determine to what extent they influence the prospects of democratic consolidation and state-building. This study thus draws on the procedural approach to unpack the dynamics of democratisation. This approach essentially focusses on how the institutional reforms support the creation of democratic political institutions and

⁶ Cabral, A. 1979. National liberation and culture. In *Unity and Struggle: speeches and Writings of Amilcar Cabral*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

its relationship to democratic consolidation. Known as the political institutionalism tradition, it is built on (Dahl 1971: 89) conceptualisation of a polyarchy. For Dahl,

a polyarchy has eight components, or institutional requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other organisations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources of information about politics exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971: 89).

A focus of procedural democracy is the interplay between political institutionalism and economic dynamics/performance for democratic consolidation (Lipset 1959). On the one hand, democratic institutions – political parties, elected representatives, free speech, rights to organise, and the like – provide an institutionalised check on government power (Burnell 1997: 21; Cassen, 1994: 7). On the other hand, economic development on a democratising state's facilitates the institutions to sustain and consolidate democracy.




Figure 3: Correlation between economic and social development and democratic institutions, as well as the dependent variables HDI and democracy

Figure 3 summarises the link between economic and social development, and their correlation with the dependent variable, consolidation of political institutions, and the cross-sectional correlation between democracy and the Human Development Index (HDI) in the period 2005 to 2010. Berggren (2012: 18), considers that the most democratic countries have higher values in their HDI. His work confirmed the hypothesis that democracy is more important for social development than economic growth. In this way, it corroborates with Amartya Sen's theory of development as freedom (1999), since, in its conception, human freedom and development are compatible and interrelated. Related to this discussion, Queiroz (2017: 89) analysed the HDI data published in 2016 and compared it with the outcomes of the democratisation process between 1990 and 2016. The author noted that in African states there is a positive correlation between HDI and democracy. This conclusion results from the fact that states with positive democratic performance (considered free) had higher values in their HDI (the index varies from 0 to 1). Of the 54 African states analysed by the author, none had an HDI considered high (above 0.800). That is, 27 states analysed, equivalent to 50%, denoted medium values (between 0.500 and 0.799). In this group of states, classified with a medium HDI, eight

(30%) were considered *free*. Cape Verde is part of this group⁷ with medium HDI and positive democratic performance because of an open political competition, an environment of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. Another 27 states, proportionally equivalent to 50%, obtained low values. In the group of countries with a low HDI, only two⁸ (7%) are considered *free*, while 12 (45%) are classified as *partially free*, with Mozambique included in this group of states⁹. Another 13 states¹⁰, equivalent to 48%, are considered *non-free*. In the author's analysis, it appears that 15 states (corresponding to 55.5%) that had an intermediate HDI are in a range very close to the low HDI value (between 0.500 and 0.600).

This study draws on the comparative political science tradition or method which Lijphart (1971: 692) defines as the analysis of a small number of cases, entailing at least two observations, yet too few to permit the application of conventional statistical analysis. Collier stated that comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis, which sharpens our "...power of description, and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing it into focus" (1993: 5). According to him, the case study method is central to the comparative method. Much can be learned from making explicit the comparisons that are often implicitly built into case studies. By using the case study method, the study will systematically examine the co-variation between both countries selected, which will help set up the causal analysis between political, institutional, and economic factors that shape processes of democratic transitions and democratisation (Lijphart, 1971: 691).

Collier (1993), Lipset (1994), Wiarda (2000) and Sartori (2005) discuss theoretical, conceptual and epistemological elements that ease the understanding and apply the comparative method to understand democratisation. For them, the comparative method has several advantages in studying social phenomena. One such advantage is that the comparative method is an instrument of scientific analysis that facilitates the definition of

7 In addition to Cape Verde, the following states are part of this group: South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe and Tunisia); while nine (33%) are *partially free* (Comoros, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and finally, ten (37%) are considered *non-free* (Angola, Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania and Swaziland).

⁸ Benin and Senegal.

⁹ In addition to Mozambique, are: Burkina Faso, Coast Ivory, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo.

¹⁰ Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.

the patterns of similarities and differences of the phenomena under study. Another advantage is that the comparative method allows the phenomena under analysis to be better examined, explained and understood. Collier (1993) understood that the comparative method improves the description of the phenomena under investigation and facilitates the construction of concepts and theories that support the research. Wiarda (2000) makes an analysis of the financial cost involved in comparative studies. To him the costs of studying only one country are smaller when compared to the study dedicated to several countries in comparative perspective. However, the author concurs with Wiarda (2000: 1):

comparative politics is a very rich and dynamic field. It is especially rich because its range of inquiry, its laboratory (really a living, ever-changing laboratory) is all the world's political systems. As of this writing, it includes some 190 countries, plus assorted territories, colonies, and other entities.

Regarding the importance of the comparative method, Lipset states that it is “impossible to understand a country without seeing how it varies from others. Those who know only one country know no country” (1994: 1). However, in applying the comparative method one must define and specify what should or should not be comparable. Collier (1993) started from the analysis of the concepts of similarity and compatibility to affirm that the comparisons must be performed between entities in which the attributes are partially shared (similar) and partly not shared (incomparable). Przeworski and Teune (1970) understand that in the comparative analysis of a small number of cases it should be possible to elaborate the research using the *most likeness* or *most difference*. Preferences “vary, not only in the number of cases, but also in the right balance of similarities/differences among them. Two different strategies have been identified: the *most-similar systems design*, in which we compare similar cases, and the *most-different systems design*, where we compare dissimilar ones” (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 8). According to Queiroz (2017: 267), working with similar systems (for example, similar countries, like Cape Verde and Mozambique) facilitates the *ceteris paribus* rule – that is, it reduces the number of *distributing* variables to be kept under control. Within the most-similar systems design the underlying assumption is that factors common to the case

studies are irrelevant in explaining observed differences, focusing instead on the variables that are different.

As López (199) suggest, in the most-different systems design, the choice is in fact to sample different countries in order to identify those independent variables, observed within systems, which do not disturb the assumption of the homogeneity of the total population. The most-different systems design allows for checking if a correlation holds true no matter in which country. This type of analysis focuses on a lower level than the systemic one – most often at the level of individual actors (López, 1992: 273)¹¹. This research assumes that Cape Verde and Mozambique are comparable. To this end, the research compares the two states, and we can easily see that Cape Verde is part of the PALOP islands and Mozambique is part of the continental PALOP. The two countries went through the similar historical and political trajectory. Following Portuguese colonisation, their process of building a post-independence state was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology. During more than 25 years of democratisation, these countries have had different results. If Cape Verde has progressed, politically and economically, in 2017 Mozambique had an intermediate result in its liberal democracy, being considered partially free by Freedom House (2017) and having gone from a hybrid regime to an authoritarian regime (EIU, 2019).

The analysis of the process of democratisation, political transition and state-building in Cape Verde and Mozambique will be conducted considering a specific set of variables referenced in the literature as being essential to explain the success or failure of their transition to liberal democracy. To construct a more complete and holistic analysis, these variables will be analysed from the beginning of the Third Wave of Democracy. That is, an analysis of the political and economic dynamics of Cape Verde and Mozambique in the post-independence period, on the one hand, and Cape Verde and Mozambique, in the context of the political transition to liberal democracy, on the other. Considering the

¹¹ Data on internet use: Steinmety, Jay Politics, Power and Purpose: An orientation to Political Science.

political dynamics in different historical moments¹² of each of the countries, we selected the following analysis variables:

Table 3: Variables to assess democratisation and state-building

Post-Independence	Post-Third Wave of Democratisation
1. State-building and ideological influences.	1. Political liberalisation.
2. Political rights and civil liberties.	2. Political rights and civil liberties.
3. Economic growth.	3. Economic growth.
4. Social development.	4. Social development.
5. Profile of political elites.	5. Creation of democratic institutions.
6. Civil War.	6. Effective alternation of partisan power.

Source: prepared by the author

To understand political dynamics in the post-independence period (1975-1990), the research analyses political and historical processes related to state-building and ideological influences, respect for political rights and civil liberties, economic growth, social development, political elites, and factors of military political conflict. In the early 1990s, Cape Verde and Mozambique began the process of building social, political, and economic stability or instability. Therefore, the main variables of this study are political (political rights, civil liberties, political alternation, and political stability); economic (*per capita* GDP, inflation) and social development (HDI: literacy rate in children under 15 years, overall literacy rate, investment in education, life expectancy and mortality rate).

The structuring question of the research is based on the economic indicators of the Human Development Index (HDI), which assesses three socio-economic pillars: health, education, and the national income pattern. The HDI recognises the dichotomous

¹² In the panel "Colonial Legacy and Democratic Development in African Societies", one of its main results was because the historical past and the colonial legacy are fundamental variables to explain the deterioration of democratic institutions in the post-independence period. This argument is supported by the fact that colonialism has been a dictatorial phenomenon. The colonisers did not teach and apply, in their colonies, democratic values and principles. The autocratic legacy gained new aspects in the post-independence period in Africa. This has hampered the democratic transition processes that began to occur in subsequent years. Another premise recognises that current colonial rulers are now showing little patience or understanding about African politics, largely because of Africa's declining strategic importance in world politics in recent years, forgetting that they were the ones who took away African's dignity and self-respect, "maintaining they were too incompetent to understand their own rights". It was also argued by many participants that colonialism had destroyed indigenous democratic values and institutions without building stable replacements (Kpundh, 1992: 7).

relationship between democracy and progress in socio-economic systems. Therefore, it assumes that people must be at the centre of development to promote their individual skills, increasing possibilities for them to enjoy the freedom to live the life they desire. The research looks at HDI indicators and analyses the dynamics in the health sector in Cape Verde after national independence. The health pillar assesses the creation of conditions to achieve a long and healthy life. This is measured by life expectancy and control of mortality rates. The education pillar measures the role of education in the political system and the results achieved in the sector, after a given period; in this case, 1975-1990. Access to knowledge is measured by the average number of years of education received during life by people over the age of 15 and the rate of literacy or illiteracy. The Gross National Product (GNP) *per capita*, expressed in terms of aggregate income parity in a reference year, measures the pillar referring to standard of living (income).

Finally, looking at the external or international dynamics, the research analyses to what extent international pressures and ideological confrontation influenced democratisation in both countries. A special focus will be given to the process of democratisation, and its main objective is to describe and understand the processes of political and economic liberalisation inserted in the context of democratic transition and state-building. In the context of Lusophone Africa, the different moments of the transition did not happen in a linear way. They have some characteristics with the agglutination of numerous hybrid elements. For this reason, it is important to analyse the causal chain in a dynamic and complex way, interpreting it broadly and interdependently.

During data collection, the research made use of various secondary qualitative database collection methods. The validity of some results was crosschecked through triangulation. Triangulation is a method used by qualitative researchers to check and establish validity in their studies by analysing a research question from multiple perspectives (Guion *et al*, 2011:1). Patton (2002) argued that it is a common misconception that the goal of triangulation is to arrive at consistency across data sources or approaches:

...In fact, such inconsistencies may be likely, given the relative strengths of different approaches. In Patton's understanding, these inconsistencies should not be seen as weakening the evidence but should be viewed as an opportunity to uncover deeper meaning in the data (Guion *et al*, 2011:1).

Triangulation is a useful tool to use in qualitative research, but one should consider the advantages and disadvantages before application in extensive work.

The advantages of triangulation “...include increasing confidence in research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging, or integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the problem” (Thurmond, 2001: 254). This is mainly due to the diversity and quantity of data that can be used for analysis. However, triangulation can be time-consuming. It requires collecting more data which entails greater planning and organisation, and at times, resources can be difficult to access. Other disadvantages include possible disagreement based on investigator biases, conflicting theoretical frameworks, and lack of understanding about why triangulation strategies were used (Thurmond, 2001: 256).

Case studies used creative insight and careful data interpretation to make sense of and explain findings (through tables and charts) that were presented and discussed. It relates to a specific context, who interprets the dynamics and builds a logical argument around an explanation. Further, the evidence may come from sources as diverse as constitutions, laws, political and economic decisions, and documents consulted to provide converging evidence known as triangulation. The key assumption is that validity, in qualitative research, refers to whether the findings of a research are true and certain. It means that the research findings accurately reflect the situation and are certain in the sense that research findings are supported by the evidence.

Presentation of the study

The study is organised as follows. The second chapter describes the philosophical overview of the theories and the concepts regarding democratisation and state-building. Situated at the philosophical level of discussion, this chapter explores the theoretical notion of institutionalism or the procedural approach, state-building, and political transition. This chapter serves to set up an interrelated construction of concepts, definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of democratisation, state-building, and economic development. The second chapter helps to identify and specify

relations among the variables, with the purpose of focusing on and explaining the institutional and structural dynamics of democratisation in Cape Verde and Mozambique.

The third and fourth chapters describes the political and historical processes of transition, state-building, and democratisation in African Portuguese-speaking countries. The third chapter gives specific attention to political transformation in Cape Verde, whereas the fourth chapter focuses on Mozambique. Both present a deep understanding of the trajectory of the state-building processes started after independence, as well as the institutional reforms, structural and historical dynamics, and ideological influences that have an impact on political transition and democratisation. Consequently, in order to determine the path of liberal democratic consolidation theory, it is essential to start with its first overarching influence: its roots from a Marxist system to a liberal democracy. This chapter will help to assess to what extent the predominance of structures and institutional dynamics (inherited from past political and historical processes, influenced by centralism and a monopolistic state) were not removed and have been influencing the political transition to democracy and state-building.

The fifth and sixth chapters highlight the dynamics of economic growth and democratic indicators in the context of political transition and state-building. The fifth chapter gives specific attention to economic growth and democratic indicators in the context of political transition in Cape Verde, while the sixth chapter pays specific attention to Mozambique. The idea is to assess to what extent the dynamics inherited from the past political and historical processes, as well as present ones, have been influencing economic and social development, as well as the consolidation of democratic institutions. Using a comparative and correlational approach, the focus of the research is to have an overall appraisal of the structural and institutional elements that influenced the procedural and substantive liberal democracy that emerged in the context of the Third Wave of democracy, and the transition from authoritarianism to liberalisation/democratisation and state-building in Cape Verde and Mozambique. Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusion of the study.

The study examines the role of political and economic institutions in the state-building and democratization process. It contributes to the debate on political transitions in the African continent, specifically in Cabo Verde and Mozambique. The results of the study are

relevant to the extent that they constitute an advance in the production and construction of scientific knowledge in the areas of Social Sciences, mainly African Studies and Political Science. That is, the study is a basis for construction, deconstruction and advancement in the production of scientific knowledge. The results of the study may be important for international institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United Nations), national institutions (the Government) which are dedicated in supporting the formulation of strategies and public policies. These institutions will understand and be able to make better decisions taking into account the weight of institutions and structures in the processes of political and socio-economic development and growth. It was not our aim to conclude such a complex debate on state-building, democratization and political transition.

The preparation of this study had different levels of limitations, mainly linked to the characteristics of the object of study and access to information. As regards the characteristics of the object of study, Cape Verde and Mozambique are two Portuguese-speaking states and there is little Anglophone literature that analyses the institutional dynamics on these two countries. Access to information became more limited in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic when physical libraries were closed. This did not allow access to books and some scientific journals. The limitation was minimised with the access to virtual libraries that provided some of the information that fed into this thesis. The analysis of some elements of a political nature is quite sensitive, especially in the Mozambican context. Therefore, during the discussions it was important to pay a certain level of attention to prevent perceptions that the study intended to deconstruct the official state narrative produced on the conflicting power relations built in the period following post-independence.. The lack of financial resources was a limitation that did not allow us to make more trips that would have allowed greater interaction with privileged actors in the two countries. This limitation was compensated with meetings held via Skype and other digital platforms.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL TRANSITION, DEMOCRATISATION AND STATE-BUILDING

2.1. Introduction

Democratisation and state-building processes are often regarded as “*a long way to...*” (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009: 9) or an “*unfinished journey*” towards a consolidated democracy (Dahl, 2000: 205). Huntington (1991), O'Donnell (1992), Diamond (1996), and Lipset (1994) initially developed the debate around the context and the trajectory to democratisation. This debate did not exclude the dynamics of democratisation in Africa (Mkandawire, 2011, Meredith, 2010). Two key themes emerge when looking at the dynamics that shape democratisation and its outcomes (Dahl, 2000; Bobbio 1997; Przeworski 2002). The first is whether it is indeed a *fait accompli* that democratic transitions will result in political institutionalism as the rationale for building democratic state institutions where all actors accept “democracy is the only game in town” (Shin and Wells., 2005: 12). This view emphasises the role of institutions in the process of democratisation and state-building. The second theme is that *the trajectory of the transition can be blocked at some points along the way in regimes, which restrict political contest, or can be threatened by military intervention* (Przeworski, 1991: 77; Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009: 9). The emergence of new democracies in several corners of the world has again raised the question of the relationship between economic reform and political liberalisation. What leads to successful democratic consolidation at an institutional level? Should economic reform come first, then political liberalisation; or political reform first, followed by economic change; or both at the same time?

Economists studied the correlation between economic growth and democracy, with varying results and conclusions. Acemoglu *et al.* (2014: 89) summarises much of this research and produces new data showing that “democracy produces growth” (Acemoglu *et al.* (2014: 89). However, their measure of democracy includes not only free and fair elections and political rights, but also several QoG variables, such as the rule of law and other civil and political liberties. The governance system where democracy is implemented determines economic growth. For this reason, the analysis of the relationship between democracy and economic growth must consider the traditions and institutions by which

authority in a country is exercised. This includes an assessment of political stability and violence, as well as the process by which governments are elected, monitored and replaced; an assessment of government effectiveness and the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (rule of law) (Kaufmann *et al.*, 1999: 1).

Kaufmann *et al.*'s (1999) approach to democracy and economic growth has been criticised for the fact that it is largely based on perceptions and thus lacks objectivity (Holmberger, Rothstein & Nasiritousi, 2009: 137). The relationship between democracy and economic performance remains inconclusive since the type of regime is an indicator economic performance. However, several scholars, including Clapham and Gills (1993), resisted the *conventional vision* that assumes democracies are less likely to impose economic reforms when compared to authoritarian regimes. Rather, they highlight that while building social consensus may complicate and delay economic reforms in a democracy, democratisation and economic reforms need to be complementary for successful democratic consolidation (Diamond & Plattner, 2014: 448). This chapter describes the theoretical frame of the study, specifically in relation to state-building, economic development, and democratisation. The chapter explores political institutionalism that underpins the procedural approach of democratisation, state-building and economic development. The overall aim is to set the theoretical framework for the study, and unpack previous scholarship that engages political institutionalism, economic development, and democratic consolidation.

2.2. Theories of political democracy and democratisation

Within democratisation scholarship, political stability and democratic consolidation can only be achieved through building strong liberal democratic political institutions and economic development to improve quality of life (Bunce, 2001: 47). In this context, a responsive government is essential to facilitate state and economic transformation through building efficient and strong democratic political institutions. State-building in this context should be based on the principles of rule of law, separation of powers, a multiparty system, political and civil liberties, constitutionalism, and regular free and fair elections (Bunce, 2001: 47; Gills, 1993: 416). The idea is that strong political institutions based on the principles of democracy require a responsive government that can cater for the needs

of civil society as well as work towards creating an inclusive and equal society (Steyn-Kotze, 2010: 94; Qadar, Clapham & Gills, 1993: 416). As Di Palma (1990) highlighted, the concept of democratic consolidation deals with the consolidation of democratic institutions and transforming state and civil society relationships to be based on inclusivity and democratic principles.

Schmitter and Karl (1991) developed the second argument to support an institutionalist interpretation of democratic consolidation. In their article, "*What democracy is . . . and is not*", they argue that the democratisation process must have a relatively autonomous political society (Schmitter & Karl, 1991: 77). Likewise, democratisation requires that the parties, leaders and institutions be accepted as channels of participation that facilitate interaction between civil society and the state (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 30; Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Third, the rule of law must be respected, consensually accepted, and valued by both civil societies, and by the state itself (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 30). Fourth, with regards to social and economic factors, it is essential that a state bureaucracy provide basic public services to the citizens. Finally, there should be an institutionalised economic society. Thus, they advocate for a set of rules, institutions and regulations, built on democratic principles, accepted by state and civil society, and which would mediate relations between the state and the market (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 30).

2.2.1. The institutional approach to democratic consolidation

Underpinned by the formal rules of the democratic game, political institutions occupy a dominant position in explaining why some countries are more successful than others in creating and sustaining democracy (Rothstein & Tannenbergh, 2015: 77). These scholars regard political institutionalism as a test of the efficiency of governmental systems, democratic processes, and state-building. Thus, an efficient government system includes a strong emphasis on democratisation, participation, support for democratic institutions, and a democratic culture. With regards to this, Fukuyama mentioned that efficient government systems depend on 1) procedural measures, such as the Weberian criteria, what he conceptualises as bureaucratic modernity¹³; 2) capacity measures, which include

¹³ Max Weber analyses the bureaucratic modernity and argues that existing rationalisation in modern societies was strongly influenced by Protestant Ethics. However, the rationalisation and bureaucratic institutions lost their religious foundations, and will be giving all walks of life their own legality, based on internal coherence, without relying on the tenets of a religious nature. So the point of arrival is rationalised humanity that seeks to strip the "gods and demons"

both resources and degree of professionalization of the state bureaucracy; 3) output measures; and 4) measures of bureaucratic autonomy¹⁴ (Fukuyama, 2015: 17). Rothstein and Tannenbergs (2015: 21) quoted Diamond whom argues that *when corruption, nepotism, and clientelism are “deeply embedded in the norms and expectations of” political and economic interaction, it is unlikely that more democracy support is a practical solution to solve it. Rather, there is a need for nothing less than a “revolutionary change in institutions” (Diamond, 2007: 119). Indeed, “in many corrupt countries, rulers who monopolise power, and treat the state as their own patrimony, are succeeded by political competitors with similar ambitions (Fukuyama 2015: 86). Moreover, once in power, they operate in a similar manner in distributing state resources through patronage and nepotism” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006), Rothstein and Tannenbergs (2015: 21)*¹⁵.

A key criticism of the institutional approach to democratic consolidation is the weaknesses of fundamental power relationships that can be hidden in states which have been “hollowed out”, or where one finds merely an institutional democratic façade (Richards, 1996: 71) which is often patrimonial, especially in relation to resource allocation and distribution that may undermine the way democracy works. Therefore, corruption is understood as one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary democratic world. It undermines good governance, impacts negatively on quality of governance, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and economic development, and particularly hurts the poor. The processes of political transition and democratisation have encouraged the entry of new players (such as civil society, political parties and the private sector) into the political and economic field. It has reinforced the thought that there is a link between the quality of democratic

who once lived in reality, seeking to act without any waste that comes from mysterious and incalculable conceptions (Cardoso, 2013: 9).

¹⁴ Capacity to develop independent preferences (‘autonomy of will’) and the (‘relationally’ grounded) ability to translate these preferences into action (‘autonomy of action’). In order to develop autonomy of will, an administration first requires the “administrative cohesion” to overcome obstacles to collective action and to interact with political actors as a unified organisational entity (Mayntz, 1978: 68). Cohesion enables the bureaucracy to develop a “single set of corporate goals”, which allows its members to work toward the same cause (Caughey, Cohon, & Chatfield, 2009: 3). If such an ability is missing, “pockets of autonomy” within the lower echelons of the bureaucracy— at the unit or departmental level—are likely to emerge (Cortell & Peterson 2006: 263; Trondal *et al.* 2012). This restricts the administration’s ability to construct and maintain a common identity and to function as a unified entity working toward the fulfilment of its mandate (Selznick, 1949: 19). The development of an autonomous will also requires what we call “administrative differentiation”, which refers to the bureaucratic capacity to develop preferences that can potentially differ from those of the political principals (Cortell & Peterson 2006: 263).

¹⁵ Downloaded in www.eba.se. Rothstein., B, Tannenbergs, M. 2015. Making Development Work: The Quality of Government Approach. University of Gothenburg. Stockholm.

institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators (Cheeseman, 2018: 47). What is commonly referred to as old institutionalism within the literature sees institutions as stable structures, maintained through historical mechanisms of institutional reproduction (Veblen, 1983: 80). In this way, sustainable institutional models would be those that constantly renew themselves to maintain efficiency and legitimacy as societies change; otherwise, a reform would be necessary or political instability could be inevitable (see Aristotle, Locke, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville). Political institutions are seen as a fundamental tool for the establishment and maintenance of a democratic political regime. This includes constitutions, formal laws, rules, and administrative structures that shape political behaviour of elites, political dynamics and political outcomes that formed the foundation of normative institutionalism¹⁶ (Steimo *et al.*, 1997: 3).

The second school of thought on institutionalism find its origins in a paper published by Veblen in 1983. Veblen proposed new concepts, categories, and causal relationships for the understanding of new factors that shaped the relationship between actors and institutions. According to him, For Veblen (1983: 7), institutions are defined as behaviours/traditions established by common thought, in a generalised way. Thus, habits become collective, generalized, and rooted within political, economic, and social institutions. Hence, Veblen (1983:19) interpreted growth as resulting from interaction between the individual actions and institutions that are sustained by collective habits and social beliefs. In this case, institutionalist theory is less concerned with the results achieved by institutions, but it becomes fundamental to explain it. In other words, institutions are not necessarily intended to improve economic performance, but are essential to its understanding. North (1990: 21) understood that institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction. North's (1990) thinking is also evident in Cheeseman's (2018: 47) book entitled *Institutions and Democracy in Africa*. The key question in the book was *how the rules of the game shape political developments in African countries*. According to Cheeseman, the institutional

¹⁶ Generally, institutions are studied as dynamical patterns of the behaviour of individuals (or any social subject). The changes of institutions are, in normative institutionalism, viewed as a process of adaptation to broader social context (March and Olson, 1989: 19). The process of learning is characterised here by the changes of codes of conduct in organisations – as punctuated equilibria. This framework, with its typical attributes, can create a respectable basis for the study of organisations as complex learning systems (Bolfíková, Hrehová & Frenová, 2010: 153), dynamic systems, and complex adaptive systems (Stacey, 1996: 4).

factors, such as strategies used by authoritarian leaders¹⁷, have influenced the types of party systems that have emerged in Africa's new democracies (Cheeseman, 2018: 37). Sociological or rational-choice approaches highlight how institutional changes can re-shape the behaviour of political leaders and the way in which the society behaves. This school of thought highlights that a) institutions would condition the behaviour of the actors, and b) institutionalised decision-making processes would be the avenue through which political actors made decisions (Cheeseman, 2018: 367). Looking at the role and the way in which actors influence institutions, Veblen (1983: 88) argued that political institutions undermine change and political transformation as elites may be unwilling to engage in state innovation. When studying the relationship between resistance to change and the costs of its adjustment at the state level, the study's departure point is that resistance to change can be influenced by the energy spent to adapt to a new political environment that requires a new set of rules that guide the conduct of actors in political institutions (Veblen, 1983: 88; Cheeseman, 2018: 367).

Veblen (1983: 88) and Kabemba (2011: 39) regard political institutions as the gatekeepers of a set of habits, behaviours, visions, and attitudes of political elites at the state level. These determine the *modus operandi* of institutions and as well as shape elite behaviour and actions that operate within political institutions. The individual habits, behaviours, visions, and attitudes of political elites can influence the juncture of political transition, inhibiting the full democratisation and transformation of state institutions. Thus, the prevailing *rules of the game* or informal institutions that guide the political behaviour of elites at state level, have far-reaching societal implications in the sense that these, in turn, shape political or social outcomes. For successful democratisation at the state level, it is important that the political attitudes of political actors change, and that the informal rules that guide political behaviour adapt to the newly created democratic institutions. In the context of political change, resistance to change from political actors become obstacles to democratic institutional development. Therefore, there is an understanding that informal institutions are closer to clientelistic networks, patrimonialism, and corruption. These

¹⁷ Restriction of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, persecution, torture and death of political opponents and social activists, human right abuses, subversion of the constitutional order through military coups, extension of mandates and manipulation of electoral results.

undermine democratic political institutional development (Veblen, 1983: 88; Hay & Wincott, 1998: 955; Cheeseman, 2018: 27).

However, Huntington (1991: 5) reflected on conflict and development and proposes that institutional instability comes from the failure to meet principles of equality of political participation, multiparty political demands, and broadened mass political participation. These factors undermine traditional sources of political institutions and are the root cause of challenges to creating new bases for political institutions underpinned by legitimacy and effectiveness in a transition context (Huntington, 1991: 5). In essence, Huntington assumes that formal and informal institutions are always in competition. Similarly, Cheeseman's analysis of how the *rules of the game shape political developments in Africa* demonstrates that no formal institution is truly consolidated until it is underpinned by a set of supportive informal norms and practices (Cheeseman, 2018: 27). The author also presents compelling evidence that, where formally independent bureaucratic agencies were established, they boosted investor confidence with positive economic consequences. However, they also find that the process is more successful when backed by broad public and political support, once again demonstrating the significance of informal factors to the development of more viable formal institutions. (Cheeseman, 2018: 27).

Political institutions are human creations, and as such are shaped by the values of political actors within them. Should these actors accept by more conservative values, it can lead to institutional inertia, undermining democratic state-building and institutional transformation (Veblen, 1983: 88). In most African countries, a lack of democratic political consciousness and commitment to a democratic social contract, corruption, the absence of a common political agenda for on economic growth among key stakeholders, and irresponsible as well as weak leadership, coupled with the militarisation of the state, fostered institutional inertia (Kabemba, 2011: 73). Cheeseman recognises that constitutional provision by itself does not always protect citizens' rights, nor provide a good guide for understanding how politics work in practice. It is nonetheless striking that many of the most significant democratic policies, such as the introduction of political decentralisation, anti-corruption, and public sector reforms, are becoming entrenched, but not creating a conducive institutional environment for consolidating and sustaining

democracy at an institutional level (Cheeseman, 2018: 28). Sustainable democratic political institutions are built on the principles of freedom (rule of law, individual liberties, and public voice), control (governmental autonomy, mutual constraints, and vertical accountability), and equality (transparency, participation, and inclusion) that shape institutional practices for the organisation and exercise of public power that contribute to democratic state-building (Kabemba, 2011: 39). Thus, in a liberal democratic sense, political regimes are constructed based on freedom, equality, and control. To this effect, thus, the concept of *equality* is interpreted as political equality, which is a core theme in the institutional development of democratic governments (Dahl, 2000).

The concept of equality is associated with the emergence of modern democracies that impose on the State the need for equal and impartial treatment of all citizens. This is how political constitutions in modern democracies safeguard equality before the law and the protection of individual rights. The development and improvement of universal suffrage is one of the measures of assessing political equality. These elements reinforce the thought that in political, social and economic processes, citizens are treated as equal before the law. Formally, citizens have the same rights and equal influence on political decisions or public policy. The structuring axis of this thinking is that all citizens, regardless of their differences in socio-economic status, should have equal access to political power (Dahl, 2000: 75).

Dahl gave two reasons to justify why political equality is considered a fundamental democratic principle. First, equality as a fundamental principle of democracy is a presupposition of morality, justice and legitimation of institutions (Dahl, 2000; 2006). Thus, principle of equality leads to full inclusion of all citizens in political life. Therefore, equality formally means equal treatment of all citizens by the state (legal egalitarianism), and equal rights to participate in politics and have all preferences equally weighted (Dahl, 2000: 75). Second, individual freedom can also be seen within the minimal or procedural democratic sense where we assume that individuals have the right to self-determination (Dahl, 2000; 2006). Hence, rights to liberty are rights that protect citizens against arbitrary State actions that undermine individual security and freedom. As Beetham suggests, democracy without freedom should be seen as a "contradiction in terms" (Beetham, 2004: 62). The

minimum conditions of freedom in a democracy include freedom of opinion, freedom of association and freedom of information (Spicker.1985: 1).

Political liberties are thus preconditions for citizens to be able to actively influence political decisions (Beetham 2004: 62). Freedoms are not only the primary ends of democratic state-building and institutional transformation. Freedom is also the primary means for equality. Political freedoms, in the form of free speech and elections, help to promote political stability. One also needs to consider broadened social opportunities, in the form of education and healthcare and how broadened social opportunities facilitate economic participation. Freedom and equality can be seen as the most fundamental and driving principles of democracy at an institutional level. Therefore, in 1985, Spicker raised certain questions in his article “Why Freedom Implies Equality”. For Spicker, equality implies the elimination of social, political, and economic disadvantage. However, *freedom* is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Equality of treatment and equality of opportunities are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome can be reconciled with it to some degree. The social dimension of freedom is broader, extending the scope of distribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom. Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality (Spicker, 1985: 1). This aim, guaranteeing as well as optimising and balancing freedom and equality, allows for a further fundamental principle of democratic rule: that of control of political representatives (Rousseau, 1763: 442). Rousseau’s idea is that men are essentially free and equal in the *state of nature*¹⁸. However, the progress of civilisation and the inequality arising from private prosperity destroyed both: first equality and then freedom. According to Rousseau, to restore the complementarity of freedom and equality, a form of direct

¹⁸ Rousseau disagrees with Hobbes who represents the state of nature as a state of war and fear of death that to protect themselves from each other, men must socialise. In Hobbes, socialisation is understood as a natural process because men want to get rid of violence and the fear of death. Rousseau disagrees with the Hobbesian approach and stresses that men in the state of nature lived free and in peace. They were strong, rough and solitary. They did not live in war, because isolated they gathered only what was necessary, there were no disputes, wars, competitions, because men did not need to compete with other men. They understood that nature not only offered everything, but selected the fittest to live under its domination. Perversion occurs when they leave the natural state. Despite living instinctively, man in the state of nature differs from animals by possessing the gift of freedom and perfection. Through freedom men choose their actions and do not remain passive before nature. Through perfectibility they can build instruments and differentiate themselves in nature. The state of freedom changes into a web of unequal dependence between men: one man becomes the slave of another man. Given the inequality in this state, men no longer have sufficient exercise of freedom to choose and determine the best form of association. To be freed from the violence of this state they found a society, but the emergence of this society is born already legitimised by inequality and corrupted by all vices (Rousseau, 1763: 442).

democracy needs to be established whereby citizens constitute a collective body capable of protecting and securing both principles (Rousseau, 1763: 446).

Control of political representatives is an essential principle for democratic consolidation. The key idea here is that people must be able to control their representatives in the government to secure freedom and equality, which means the absence of tyranny and despotism, and to ensure that political elites act on behalf of the citizens. Democratic advances have been verified in the contexts in which there is a responsibility in the relationship between the state and society. Social control and the institutionalisation of democracy contribute very much so that the population creates and develops control mechanisms of this and of the public administration. This also implies that political institutions have such control through the principles of constitutionalism, which essentially entails governance underpinned by rules as opposed to governance by the will of individual leaders. The limits of the executive must be no more than this public will and jurisdiction. Anti-democratic forces must not limit governmental control over policies. The control of the executive over policies, however, must be subject to democratic control and institutional checks and balances.

Ahmad (2010: 51), focussed on political transition with a focus on the African context, where states introduced institutional changes based on the adoption of new constitutions inspired by liberal democratic principles, to inaugurate political transitions towards democracy. This included enshrining the principles of the rule of law, such as separation of power, legality of administration, an effort to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, and equality before the law (Ahmad, 2010: 51). In most cases, political elites controlled the constitutional reforms, thus shaping state-building. This opened the door for political elites to engage in corruption and self-enrichment (Alden, 2001: 35). Democracy does not guarantee transparent governance. Hence, democratic systems are still fighting corruption, even in development countries seen as free of corruption, and most of its citizens are highly dissatisfied with the way governments are attempting the corruption risk (Kubbe, 2017: 45). Those opportunities have caused inequality, exclusion, and the marginalisation of some political and economic actors, such as political parties, civil society, and ethnic groups (Bayart, Ellias & Hibou, 1999: 99). Recognising that institutional change in Africa is a complex process involving different types of political

actors, the study argues that it is important to explain not only how institutions influence actors' behaviour, but also how these actors might, in turn, influence, and possibly change, institutions. Whereas early institutional studies (Enderle & Guerrero, 2007: 2) accounted for actors' agency, later studies tended to overlook the role of actors in facilitating institutional change. Cheeseman (2018: 4) demonstrated different ways in which formal¹⁹ and political institutions matter in the African context. Based on the contribution that some African leaders gave in new democracies (Nelson Mandela from South Africa, Festus Mogae from Botswana are examples), we need to stop thinking negatively of African states and their leaders, and start thinking of their core institutions more seriously (Cheeseman, 2018: 4). Cheeseman further argues that the foregoing account of the state of African politics and of African studies should not be mistaken as a release of all of the insights of the "institutionalless" school, or be taken to imply that formal institutions are now more important than their informal counterparts. For Cheeseman, there is a tendency to underestimate the significance of formal political institutions in Africa, which has had negative impacted on scholars' ability to explain political continuity and change. In this reflection, he states that "...formal institutions have shaped the evolution of informal norms and authority structures and are increasingly constraining the behaviour of African political leaders in a number of countries". However, this does not mean that the formal rules of the political game always triumph, or that formal institutions matter equally across the continent. In many countries, the process of political institutionalisation is in its early stages, and it remains unclear how far it will proceed. In others, the process has not yet commenced, and leaders face relatively few constraints (Cheeseman, 2018: 368).

In studying the institutional arrangements of transitioning states, it is particularly important to consider of national contexts. This helps to clarify how actors influence the changes implemented through political transition; how they contribute to the consolidation of the structures that facilitate state legitimacy, and how the new constitution and laws facilitate democratic state-building. The idea is that, in the context of political and economic reforms, there are historically created, institutionally rooted structures that determine the trajectory

¹⁹ Informal rules, norms and conduct emerge not only from past traditions and from habits influenced by culture, religion and gender. Sometimes they emerge as a response to the weakness of formal institutions that do not function in the interest of certain political, economic or social groups. Informal rules therefore influence the process of functioning or enforcement of formal laws, policies and norms. Formal rules become effective when they codify or regulate informal norms that are already widely accepted (Cheeseman, 2018: 4).

of democratic political development (Enderle & Guerrero, 2007: 2). To some extent, this argument supports the idea that the institutional arrangement normally creates some type of lock-in that follows the pattern of historically constructed institutional developmental trajectories (Bayart, Ellias & Hibou, 1999: 99; Enderle & Guerrero, 2007: 2).

Indeed, Enderle and Guerrero (2007) highlight that there are local factors that determine the formation and function of the newly created democratic state institutions. These factors include the habits, behaviours, and strategies of survival political elites use to maintain power and privilege, as well as the dynamics that shape the relationship between civil society and the state. All these factors determine the results and the complexities of the process of institutional renewal and the changing nature of the state in creating the democratic architecture for institutional renewal and democratic consolidation. It seems that a weak institutional nucleus at the onset of political transition is related to the traditional or historical developmental trajectory of the state. It results in the institutionalisation of structures, and institutional structures stained by corruption, nepotism, patronage, and criminalisation of the state (Huntington, 1991: 5; Enderle & Guerrero, 2007: 2; Lalá & Ostheimer, 2003: 11).

When engaging in a democratic transition through a negotiated settlement, elites would initiate reforms in their constitutional and normative frameworks to open the political space for the previously excluded, as with South Africa's interim constitution of 1993. Liberia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nepal, Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of countries where power-sharing transitional governments facilitated the complex processes of demobilisation and re-integration of combatants, the return of displaced persons, election preparations, and, negotiating interim constitutions. Such reforms focus on separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as well as giving franchise to all citizens to facilitate a founding election. However, Diamond (1996: 53) and Huntington (1996: 17) believe that electoral democracy is a step, but not an end, of democratic consolidation. Thus, the *institutional core* of the emerging democracy is shaped by a government that was chosen to rule by the people. The founding election, therefore, is of extreme importance in the democratisation process, as the new government needs the endorsement of the people before the new democratic society can

be legally and institutionally crafted. The founding election also allows legitimization of the incoming democratic regime (Steyn-Kotze, 2010: 30).

To sufficiently contextualise the study, it is important to focus on the institutional dynamics of state-building during the political transitions that characterised the Cape Verde and Mozambican states during the early 1990s. In that context, the political transitions were given “full marks” through the adoption of new constitutions that incorporated principles of democratic and good governance. The rules of *accountability*, as well as *liability*, were accepted by formal state institutions and by the extra-state actors, such as the private sector and civil society (Held, 2004: 370). Thus, the focus falls on the political institutions of the state, and the associated constitutional formation of the state through the legislature, executive and judiciary (Held, 2004: 370; Rothstein & Holberg, 2014: 5).

2.2.2. The substantive dimension of democracy

For the purposes of this study, the substantive notion of democracy is related to the effect that democracy, as a political system, has as core to the promotion of human well-being (Rothstein & Holberg, 2014: 5). Although a country may introduce constitutional and legal reforms, hold elections, and allow all citizens of age to vote, this characteristic does not necessarily qualify it as a substantive democracy. In a substantive democracy, people play a real role in carrying out their political affairs. The state does not merely set up democratic institutions but creates a functioning bureaucracy and pathways for political participation. This type of democracy can also be referred to as a functional democracy, and can be assessed through social and economic rights which include the right to health or to mental and physical well-being; the right to assistance and social security; the right to work; the right to human dignity; the right to strike; the right to study; the right to healthy a environment and the protection of the environment; and the right to housing. Democracy is generally associated with elections, representation, responsiveness, expediency, accountability, and citizen participation in governance. The major trends have been to set up a market reform, market-based governance, market-based administration, strategic and systemic privatisation, and results oriented reorganisation (Farazmand, 2010:8). Farazmand (2010), Mosher (1968); and Niskanen, (1971) argued that traditional governance systems have outlived their time and are unable to deal with new emergent challenges of the modern world. Governments are inefficient and unresponsive to citizen

demands; and that there are no market signals, no competitions, and no incentives for public bureaucrats to deliver services with high efficiency; and that large government and bureaucracy are a threat to democracy (Mosher, 1968: 520; Niskanen, 1971: 102). These elements suggest different pre-conclusions. First, it is useful to study democracy not as a closed and complete concept, but also as a multidimensional concept, that aggregates political and socio-economic aspects. Secondly, there is a relationship between democracy and socio-economic analytical dimensions defined under Human Development Index: education, health, and others that determine the quality of life.

Although some variation exists among countries regarding social and economic rights, there is general agreement that civil and political rights, coupled with social and economic rights, lead to well-being in society (Doherty & Mecellem, 2012: 97; Rothstein & Holberg, 2014: 5). Thus, for Rothstein and Holberg, the focus falls on measures of state capacity: the quality of government, good governance, and what politics can do to enhance human well-being, with a focus on the interplay between political institutionalism and economic dynamics. Based on social rights, the authors assessed substantive democracy, measuring the following indicators: education or knowledge; political sophistication; active participation; income, attitudes and beliefs about democracy; and political sophistication (Doherty & Mecellem, 2012: 97).

- *Education or knowledge:* Anckar (2002) argues that there is a direct relationship between democracy and literacy rate, and democracy and enrolment in basic education. People with higher levels of education are more likely to understand how democracy works (Doherty & Mecellem, 2012: 97). However, it is also important to recognise that people can be well educated and be indifferent to and not interested in participating in political activities (elections, political events, public meetings, and voting) (Rønning, 2010: 578). The research shall use and compare data related to the levels of literacy in Cape Verde and Mozambique. To what extent does the improvement of literacy rates support democratic strengthening in Cape Verde and Mozambique? The research argues that literacy and democracy interact in dynamic reciprocity. Literacy is conducive to free and critical thinking, inspired by humanist values, and knowledge of political rights and civil liberties. Hence, well-informed public debate and collective decision-making, as well as the people's control over such decisions, are preconditions for democracy to strengthen. Related to this, is

the notion of political sophistication. Citizens with higher levels of political interest are also more likely to spend time learning about and engaging with political content in a critical way. Political cognition literature suggests that higher levels of interest in politics and political sophistication is associated with literacy level. Those who are more interested in politics are more likely to understand democracy in formal, procedural terms (Doherty & Mecellem, 2012: 97; Luskin, 1987: 851). The idea is to assess literacy level in both countries and compare it with political sophistication. These will be useful to understand perceptions of democracy in Cape Verde and Mozambique. Data provided by Afrobarometer that measure public support for democracy would be important in this regard.

- *Active participation:* Democratic theory, and deliberative democratic theory, either implicitly or explicitly accepts the need for widespread citizen participation. It demands that all citizens can participate and that they take advantage of that opportunity. But the empirical evidence collected over the last half century strongly suggests that many citizens do not have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the ways that many democratic theorists demand, and do not participate in anything like the numbers they believe are necessary (Parvin, 2018: 13). Pharr and Putnam, (2000) paid attention to a critical examination of the state of democratic governance. The authors recognised that the last half century has seen regressive trends in world democracy. They understand that in most democratic countries, citizens' trust and interest in politicians and political institutions has declined. People increasingly see politics as a remote arena populated by powers beyond their control, pursuing interests that do not reflect the needs of the public. Political cynicism is widespread and is often accompanied by a disengagement from politics. Where voting is not a legal requirement, participation rates in elections have also declined (Pharr and Putnam, 2000:17). Citizens who have voted in elections, engaged in protests, or organised petition campaigns are more likely to highlight the influence of government policy as essential to democracy (Doherty & Mecellem, 2012: 97). Electoral absence will be the indicator needed to be compared in both countries. Final publication of electoral results from both countries needs to be consulted to make this comparison. For citizens and political scientists alike, this has raised concerns about the well-being and legitimacy of democratic governance in countries where it is more firmly established (Pharr and Putnam, 2000:17).

- *Attitude and beliefs:* The focus here is on the level of support for democracy, with large and specific concepts often associated with democracy (freedom of speech and tolerance, for example). Welzel (2007:352) indicated that emancipative mass attitudes motivate mass actions that demonstrate people's willingness to fight for struggle democratic achievements, either to establish democracy when it is denied or to defend it when it is contested. Scholars such as Dalton (2005, 2006), Norris (1999), and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have used modernisation theory to explain declining levels of trust in political institutions. These authors suggest that voters become dissatisfied with and increasingly critical of the political elite as new value systems and post-material issues (value self-expression and quality of life, such as internet access, gender equality, economic and physical security) emerge in political discourse. This analysis suggests that citizens' preferences, attitudes, and values change as a consequence of the rationalisation, secularisation and bureaucratisation involved in development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 1).

Thus, support for democracy has been linked to attitudes and beliefs generally centred on what people believe about a political system and the levels of support for democratic, civic, and political liberties. Based on Afrobarometer, the research will compare Cape Verde and Mozambique to find out how citizens demand democracy, and how they support democratic institutions and freedoms (Judd & Krosnick, 1989: 107).

- *Income:* The conventional understanding in the political economy literature is that income per capita has a causal effect on democracy (Przeworski & Limongi 1997: 180). The cross-country correlation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy. This outline is consistent with the idea that societies embarked on different political-economic development trajectories at certain critical junctures. However, although income and democracy are positively correlated, there is no evidence of a causal effect (Bogdandy *et al.*, 2002: 673). This central dimension set up a relationship between democracy and income level. The research discusses the notion that income inequality can affect democracy performance. Therefore, the analytical dimension considers the relationship between democracy and economic income at the country level (Anderson & Tverdova 2003:18;

Thomassen & Van der Kolk, 2009:88). In this analytical model, the growth of GDP is explained by a variable that measures the quality of the country's democratic institutions and by its interaction within these models, GDP per capita growth is explained by a variable measuring the quality of the country's democratic institutions and by its interaction with the Gini index (Perotti, 1996: 162).

This analytical dimension starts from two departure points. First, the relationship between income and the extent to which people support a democracy understood in liberal/procedural terms should be contingent: positive when liberal democracy represents the political status quo, but negative when it does not. The second is that the strength of these correlations, in each respective direction, should increase as income inequality also increases (Ceka, B., Magalhães., P. 2017: 15). These elements are relevant to the debate on the crisis of liberal democracy and the illiberal retreat we have been witnessing in many African countries, as well as other regions in the Global South. The argument is therefore based on the assumption that, in established liberal democracies, income inequality reduces commitment to a liberal notion of democracy, but does so particularly among the poor (Ceka, B., Magalhães., P. 2017: 15). Comparing Cape Verde and Mozambique, these indicators will be important to verify the relationship between economic variables and the duration of democratic or autocratic regimes. There is a correlation between incomes, part of the economic variables of the consolidation of liberal democracy.

Table 4: Analytical model for procedural and substantive democracy

Source of analysis	Focus	Variables to measure democracy
Liberal definition of democracy [Schumpeter, Przeworski, Huntington, Dahl, Diamond]	<p>Minimalist: Processes, Rules and Institutions</p> <p><i>Institutional or procedural indicators.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutions. Rule of law. Creation of preconditions for democratic affirmation. Political and constitutional reforms = Constitutions adjusted to modern state shaped by separation of power; political and economic plurality, freedom and equality (centralised state). Constitutional recognition of civil and political rights of citizens or their constituents (non-acceptance of constitution). Quality of political transition = Regularity of election; Acceptance of the process = fair and transparent elections (contested election). Public servant performance = level of corruption and nepotism. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Equal democracy: Voting, multiparty candidates Competitive structures and pluralist elections (free, fair, competitive legislative and presidential elections) (Schumpeter 1943). Checks and balances. Freedom of speech, religion, movement and association. Equal protection of all citizens under the law.
Participatory or liberative democracy [Deherty and Mecellem, Phillips, Barber]	<p>Maximalist: demands to improve outcomes that promote equality among citizen's information, demography, poverty and income.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Equality among citizens: information, education, media. Inclusion and reconciliation of all in the national political agenda (exclusion). Establishment of legal guarantees for political and social actors: state, media and opposition. Socioeconomic equalities including gender. Demographic dynamics and consolidation of democracy. Poverty, income and influence in democracy. Attitudes and beliefs for democracy. Control of public power by citizens. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GDP growth rate. Economic stability/Inflation index. Life expectancy. Birth rate and mortality. Literacy rate by inhabitant. Years of schooling of citizens over 15 years age. Existing resources and sharing by existing groups. Official development assistance. Internal and external pressures for democracy. Poverty, income and influence in democracy.
State-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State has a monopoly on legitimate force. Ability of authority to govern. Deliver goods and services. State legitimacy. Control over security force. Cooperative multiparty system. Social cohesion. Abolish violence opportunities 	

Adapted from analysis developed by Bühlmann, M; Germann, M; Vatter, A (2011)

2.3. Theoretical discussion of state-building

Discussions on state-building are generally framed by four different themes. These relate to the influence of the international development community, the emergence of a new liberal democracy paradigm, the good governance paradigm, and finally, security and development. According to Fukuyama, (2015: 59), in social science there is a perception that state-building is a leading priority for the international development community. Fritz and Menocal (2007: 80) also saw those lessons from past or historical experiences are relevant and should inform thinking about current and future state-building trajectories. Discussing state-building in the geopolitical context, Fritz and Menocal (2007: 85) wrote that during the Cold War, the superpowers were building their ideological and military capacity to maintain internal control and influence and reach out to their rivals. In this context, developing states were seen as having weak institutions to support democratisation and ensure political stability. They therefore received extensive support from the superpowers allocated to the political-military and socio-economic sectors, with a focus on education, health, agriculture, and other sectors (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 85).

The second context that influenced state-building started in the 1980s: the emergence of the new liberal paradigm. Coinciding with the crisis of the socialist system, the emergence of a new cycle of economic liberalisation characterised a wide-ranging deregulation, privatisation, and vigorous globalisation of capital (Cox, 2003: 17; Fukuyama, 2015: 15). This theory proposes that human development is best facilitated through unlocking individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills supported by an institutional framework of strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. State interventions in markets must be kept to a bare minimum. Powerful interest groups in the private sector will inevitably misrepresent and prejudice state interventions, particularly in democracies, for their own benefit (Cox, 2003: 17). Thus the concept of state-building was associated with fiscal discipline, aimed at balancing the public finance budget; redirecting public spending with its major part directed towards health care, education, and infrastructure; tax reform aimed at broadening the tax base; liberalisation of interest rates to be determined mainly by the supply and demand for money; competitive exchange rates favouring economic growth; trade liberalisation; liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment; privatisation favouring competitiveness of the market; and deregulation including the reduction of market entry and exit barriers (Cox, 2003: 17).

The debate on good governance rests on three intellectual traditions. First, neoclassical economics, which provided the intellectual justification for structural adjustment programmes by emphasising the role of markets and the private sector in development processes. In this case, the market and the private sector are not direct providers of economic growth and development, but rather, partners, catalysts, and facilitators (World Bank 1997, 1). Second, is the New Institutional economics developed from the work of Douglas North. New institutional economists argued that getting the institutions right was the most important factor in development and good governance (Rodrik 2004). The last influence was New Public Management, a key driver of state and government reforms that began in the 1970s and 1980s and provided the basis for conceptualizing accountability in the public sector and the role of the private sector in government (Hoffman, 2011: 15). This was based on the belief that the "proven" management techniques of the private sector (rationality, neutrality, efficiency, and productive effectiveness) should be applied to the state and public sector bodies (Pierre, 2009: 596). The key understanding around good governance principles is effectiveness or the ability to implement and achieve desired public policies; efficiency or the ability to achieve a defined policy on a minimum time and resource basis (World Bank, 1997: 120; Hoffman, 2011: 15). These, in turn, have shaped conceptions and in normative values such as accountability and transparency. Ahrens (1999, 18) describes responsibility as one of the few qualities necessary for good management of public resources, an enabling environment for the private sector and a productive partnership between the public and private sectors".

The good governance paradigm influenced the emergence of the third moment of state-building in the early 1990s, when state-building began to re-emerge as the importance of the good governance was increasingly discussed in the light of limited developmental progress and capacity in many states in the Global South. The good governance paradigm put the focus back on the capacities and structures of the state in developing countries and recognised that good governance and strong political institutions are central to development. Hence, the focus was promoting legal reform and anti-corruption measures in loan-receiving countries; to establish well-functioning market economies underpinned by property rights on enforceable contracts; high levels of transparency; and low levels of corruption (Drake, Malik, Xu, Kotsioni, I-Habashy, & Misra, 2001: 10).

Concerns related to security and development influenced the fourth conceptualisation of state-building, and the state was seen as a driver of development. After the infamous 9/11 attacks in the United States of America, where Islamic extremists flew planes into the World Trade Centre, security and development were linked, much like the view that dominated during the Cold War (Murray, 2014: 12). This context emerged when policy makers and scholars flagged underdevelopment in poor and fragile states as a threat to the security of wealthy state. This perspective sees state-building as a steady concern within the international community in the future (Fukuyama, 2015: 68; Bogdandy, Häußler, Hanschmann & Utz, 2005: 585). The idea was that the developing states have poor people who live in fragile situations and in the context of high levels of vulnerability, which creates fertile ground for recruitment into extremist and terrorist organisations. Supporting the development of strong and accountable states was a crucial challenge. After two decades dominated by neoliberal policy thinking, with the market seen as the driving force in economic and social development, the role of the state as a driver of development gained recognition (Paris, 2000: 20). There is little convincing evidence in the literature to suggest that poor people in weak and fragile societies are prone to extremism. Graff (2010) argued that the body of scholarly research thus far failed to establish this, let alone explain how to measure and correlate poverty and state fragility. According to Graff (2010: 77), more convincing is the mounting evidence confirming that poor, weak states are vulnerable to violence and extremism. Graff's arguments explain why anti-American terrorist activity movements, such as Islamic State, Boko Haram, and Al-Shaba, are concentrated in regions and states that are confronted with serious development challenges. (Graff, 2010: 77).

Table 5: Summarising key aspects of state-building

Context of state-building	Key characteristics
International development community Late 1940s-50s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emerged in the context of the Cold War allowing the superpower states to reach their rivals, maintain control and influence under domestic policy. • External actors involved in foreign military, international organisations, development partners. • Domestic actors seen as weak institutions and their perspectives on state-building.
Emergence of new liberal paradigm 1980s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Founded in the neoliberal doctrine of economy and influenced crisis of socialist system. • A wide-ranging deregulation, privatisation and vigorous globalisation of capital. • Strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. • Keep a bare minimum intervention of the State in economic sectors. • Fiscal discipline and redirection of public spending towards healthcare, education, and infrastructure. • Tax reforms aimed at broadening the tax base, privatisation-favouring competitiveness of the market, deregulation including the reduction of market entry and exit barriers.
Good governance paradigm Early 1990s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on institutional capacity. • Development aligned with institutional capacity. • Strengthen state institutional capacity to promote legal reform, anti-corruption. • Loan-receiving countries. • Establish well-functioning market. • Enforceable contracts, high levels of transparency, and low levels of corruption.
Security and development Early 2000s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emerged after September 11th. • Focus on driver of development. • Interconnecting security and development. • Market as the driving force in economic and social development. • Poverty as obstacle to sustainable development. • Poverty impacts weak or fragile states and causes terrorism.

Fukuyama (2015) stated that the success of state-building is a parallel process of nation-building, an often violent and coercive process that took place in all the countries under the umbrella of state expansion and conquest. Thus, state-building refers to *the creation of tangible political and administrative institutions*. Nation-building is another area of study that overlaps with state-building (Bendix 1996: 18). Nation-building, by contrast, is the creation of a sense of national identity to which the individual will be loyal, an identity that will succeed their loyalty to tribe, village, region, or ethnic group. Nation-building requires the creation of intangible institutions such as national traditions, symbols, shared historical memories, and common cultural points of reference. In one word, nation-building requires identity (Dobbins *et al.*, 2007: 89; Ottaway, 2002: 74).

The theoretical discourse related to state-building provides a more inclusive approach that includes issues like welfare provision and basic public services, such as infrastructure, public health, education, protection of property, and security to protect the state from

internal and external enemies (Shah, 2009: 19). State-building is associated with reinforcing the political and governance institutions and working towards good governance to reduce poverty and enhance human wellbeing. A review of the academic literature on state-building reveals how relevant concepts become connected to ideas such as modernisation, democratisation and the transition to democracy, economic development, peacebuilding, and nation-building. These conceptual connections form the foundation of state-building theory. In most literature, the consolidation of state-building can be done through the liberalisation and modernisation of political and economic landscapes (Anten, Briscoe & Mezzera, 2012: 55). On the one hand, this concept supports the idea that state-building is a panacea for good governance, democratisation and development; on the other hand, this assumption hampers the ability of political scientists and policymakers to formulate state-building policies that increase political stability in weak states. Thus, in non-democratic and/or state fragility, there are a lot of obstacles that impact on state-building initiatives.

Weber's thinking is relevant in the debate related to state-building. Weber conceptualised the state as having a monopoly on power, and that legitimate state institutions are fundamental aspects of state-building. The police, judiciary, courts, and other state institutions that must maintain law and order in the state, have either ceased to exist or can no longer operate. In the context of state-building, however, governments have control over the physical territory or have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but the legitimate authority to make collective decisions to provide reasonable public services is also lacking (Weber, 1999: 89). The research assumes that the complexity to achieve a consensual concept of state-building is part of the epistemological discussion, in which social science, as well as African studies, are seen as fields of knowledge in which there is no single way of defining and reaching consensual concepts. Therefore, depending on the perspective of the researcher's analysis, the concepts can take specific features.

Tilly (2003: 19) discusses the context in which an intervention approach for state-building is needed. For Tilly state-building can be seen as a multi-layered and socially embedded approach to strengthening state authority, capacity, and legitimacy across a variety of institutions and domains. As a result, it is important to differentiate among three basic regime types that can be taken as the starting point for identifying state-building strategies:

a) autocracies or one-party systems with strong centralised regimes where one party has strong control (including military control) over security forces and the government; b) cooperative multi-party systems, where different groups or elites have reached an agreement to compete peacefully for political power, but where institutions are weak, and where sometimes unified state control over security forces still has to be established, and c) regimes with polarised, divided elites and parties characterised by a weak ruling party or contested power-sharing, where there is still low-level violence between factions, or the agreement to compete for power peacefully is tenuous at best, and maintained primarily through external pressures (Tilly, 2003: 19).

This research addresses the relation between democratisation and state-building. Therefore, the research interlinks democratisation with state-building to understand whether these two processes have a correlation. The arguments here presented are an appropriate framework for analysing the form of state-building occurring in Cape Verde and Mozambique, through the transition from autocratic state-building in the context of the Marxist approach, with one single party and with all the efforts to homogenise the societies. The research argues that in Mozambique, the almost twenty years of peace hides a false political stability by avoiding opposition and civil society. Paying attention to the Mozambican context, where the peace agreement was signed in 1992 under trust between the principal political leaders, it was recognised that confidence is needed for the central state to become the arbiter of authority, hence strengthening the ability of the state to provide political stability to the country.

In this sense, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 23) summarised three relevant dimensions connected to institutions and state-building. The first is preserving public order. Many countries must confront violence, organised crime, corruption, and a lack of capacity and deficits within the judicial system. If not, governability is at serious risk. A second is ensuring the judicial and electoral independence, and expanding the capacity for independent oversight. The public sector have sufficient power and authority, as well as human resource capacity, to design and implement new policies for socio-economic transformation and inclusion. This requires training leaders with technical knowledge and

political skills, improving the quality of public servants, and establishing effective oversight systems.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter presented the theoretical and methodological elements to help understand, in a comparative way, the process of consolidation of democracy and state-building in Portuguese-speaking African countries. The analytical elements were elaborated on in the review of a vast academic literature that understands that the political transition to democracy goes through different stages from the opening, collapse of the regime, and emergence of the democratic system (Carothers, 2002: 5). As we stated in the theoretical debate, this process is not linear, and it may be exposed to dialectical moments with advances and systematic setbacks. Commitments to political and economic stability, agreements reached among elites for constitutional and institutional reforms conducive to democratic principles, and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections at national and local levels, are all part of a set of stages of the political transition to democracy. Studies on democratisation not only assess the paths and sequence of political transition, but also assess the quality and implications of each stage (Cheeseman, 2014: 4). For this reason, the levels of participation, the levels of representation of different groups in state institutions, and the quality of the elections (free, fair, and transparent), are relevant variables of the analysis of political transition and democratic consolidation. The discussion related to state-building sought to provide a more expansive approach that included issues like welfare provision and basic public services, such as infrastructure, public health, protection of property, and security to protect the state from internal and external enemies (Shah, 2009: 19). In most cases, state-building is associated with the idea that, in reinforcing the institution and working to improve governance and reduce poverty, it is useful to regard violent conflict as a specific condition of state fragility, which requires equally specific policy measures (Anten, Briscoe & Mezzera, 2012: 54). To measure the consolidation of democracy, the research explores indicators linked to procedural (the existence of control mechanisms on the national political system and the fusion of political rights and civil liberties) and substantive democracy (the behaviour of national political elites involved in the process of democratisation, development, and economic growth). For each indicator, the research identifies variables of analysis that will

help understand the determinant factors for the consolidation of democratisation and state-building in the Lusophone African states. These indicators were supported by the discourse related to state-building that provides a more expansive approach that includes issues like welfare provision and basic public services, such as infrastructure, public health, education, protection of property, and security to protect the state from internal and external enemies (Shah, 2009: 19).

CHAPTER 3: CAPE VERDE: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS OF TRANSITION, STATE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATISATION

3.1. Introduction

This chapter pays specific attention to political transformation in Cape Verde. The idea is to understand the trajectory of the state-building processes started after independence, as well as the institutional reforms, structural and historical dynamics, and ideological influences that have impacted on political transition and democratisation. Based on the ideas of liberal democratic consolidation theory, it is essential to start with its first overarching influence: its roots from a Marxist system to a liberal democracy.

3.2. Structure and state institutions in the post-independence

The Cape Verdian state-building process began in the mid-1970s and was influenced by a political elite that was involved from very early; first in the process of liberating the state from the Portuguese colonial empire, and later by Marxist ideology. Inspired by the auspices of Marxism-Leninism and marked by Portuguese colonisation, the state tried to impose a homogeneous model of political organisation on a heterogeneous and stratified society (Fernando, 1997: 551; Queiroz, 2017: 89). The guarantees of a repressive authoritarian system of governance were felt by having difficulties in building a state in Cape Verde. Therefore, in the 1990s, Cape Verde began a long process of political liberalisation (Ramos, 2016: 17). It was a new moment to institutionalise the basic right of citizenship, to be exercised under conditions of freedom, equality, transparency, and responsibility, with due respect for the plurality of views, and in the interest of the polity (Beetham, 2004: IV).

After independence in Cape Verde, there was an institutional apparatus of the state, understood as a public entity, whose power and functions appeared subverted and captured by the private interests of the members of the political party that controlled the entire public sphere. The PAIGC Supreme Fighting Council, published in Official Bulletin No. 1 of 5 July 1975, made clear the PAIGC overlap with the state. The bulletin

acknowledged that independence was only possible due to the struggle triggered by the PAIGC. The Law on the Political Organisation of the State (LOPE), published in July 1975, became a kind of constitution, clarifying the single-party character of the state and the authoritarian character of the regime. Already in its first article it stated that the sovereignty of the Cape Verdean people is exercised in the interest of the popular masses, which are closely linked to the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which is the leading political force in the society (LOPE, 1975: 1). Moreover, the influence of the political party on the executive branch and the functioning of the state was evident in the LOPE, which established that in the act of investiture of their functions by the National People's Assembly, the president of the republic and the prime minister were confirmed in and pledged to exercise their positions with total fidelity to the PAIGC's objectives.

The basis of this democratic institutional paradigm was inspired by the Montesquieu and Weberian doctrines of separation of powers; strengthening security; legitimacy; improving economic opportunities; and wellbeing (Rezende, 1992: 39; Alden, 2001: xxii). Therefore, the underlying foundations of state-building were feasibility; maximising development and institutional growth to facilitate political stability; and the normative values related to the principles of good governance, including transparency, human rights, and a free press, amongst others (Rezende, 1992: 39; Höfling, 2001: 31). In Cape Verde, the marks of the absence of separation of power, as well as the risks and consequences of this, can still be found in Article 8 and Article 13 of the LOPE, which determined that it was up to the National Assembly to elect the president of the republic, who would be the head of state and the supreme commander of the revolutionary armed forces (LOPE, Article 13). This articulation, in theoretical terms, was in contradiction with Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers, which is the source of the assertion of the distinction of the three powers: executive, legislative, and judicial, which is a base of the doctrinal theory of the rule of democratic law. At the judicial level, the PAIGC's marks of dependence and interference were visible. Paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the First Constitution determined the composition of the courts, in which only those who have proven their suitability to exercise the function of judging achievements faithfully can participate in the courts.

At the superstructure of political power in Cape Verde, the following state organs were established: the National People's Assembly; the president of the republic; the government; the courts; and local government bodies. In terms of functionality, this state superstructure carried (through the Constitution of the Popular Republic of Cape Verde, in its Article 70) traces of the Marxist-Leninist ideology as the principle of the party's uniqueness to the state apparatus; where “unity party” shaped the entire state apparatus and placed the state at the service of the PAIGC ruling class. Under the decision-making process, the political guidelines approved by the PAIGC were then legislated and ratified by the National People's Assembly and implemented by the government, under the supervision of the PAIGC, which supported the state. The People's National Assembly was the supreme organ of state power and decided on the fundamental issues of internal and external state policy, organised and controlled the application of the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, and defence and security lines defined by the PAIGC²⁰.

Cape Verde has a society with a heterogeneous composition from an ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious perspective. This heterogeneity led to some hypothetical fears of state disintegration²¹. Therefore, the need to maintain national unity and social cohesion in a heterogeneous society (due to ethnic and religious multiplicity) supported the official narrative in favour of the institutionalisation of a single-party regime (Pereira, 2013: 88). The international community, notably the UN and the OAU, also supported this political monopoly, and were of the opinion that the national liberation movements should lead the new states. In the case of Cape Verde, this argument justified the reason for the PAIGC's political monopoly, assuming sole responsibility for conducting the country's liberation process (Pacheco, 2014: 77). For this reason, the existing political monopoly encouraged the approval of constitutional commands and normative procedures that it gave its leaders. It was the responsibility of the PAIGC to build the new state and allowed the PAIGC leadership to remain in power indefinitely, similar to the African historical tradition, where power was centred on the king, the traditional authority, and his court (Chabal, 2002: 3).

²⁰ Chapter 1, article 50. Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde 1980.

²¹ Cape Verde is made up by 10 islands and 8 islets. The main islands are: Barlaventos (northern island group)—Santo Antao, Sao Vicente, Santa Luzia, Sao Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista, and Sotaventos (southern island group)—Maio, Santiago, Fogo, Brava. Only nine islands are inhabited.

3.2.1. State and dominant ideology

In the period following independence, the Cape Verdean state-building process was supported by the Soviet Union, which inspired the Leninist-Marxist ideology that influenced the constitution, and the other normative instruments that shaped the state administration; and did not allow pluralism and democratisation of the state. The leading policy of society and the state, on the other hand, established a form of state organisation where the exercise of exclusive power in the PAIGC, the leading political force of society, was easily confused with the state. Some internal and external groups emerged against the PAIGC and challenged both the PAIGC's political leadership and Marxist-Leninist ideology²². The prominent movements of contestation were the Cape Verde Islands People's Union (UPICV) and the Cape Verdean Democratic Union (UDC), that even before the official formalisation of Cape Verde's independence opposed the political unity and monopoly which the PAIGC imposed on a heterogeneous and divided Cape Verdean society. The constitutional and legal command in favour of mono-partisanship (the authoritarian model of state governance) created conditions for persecution, arrest, and death or exile abroad. In this monopolistic and authoritarian system imposed by the PAIGC (which at that time controlled all sectors of the state), the opposition forces were not allowed to develop political activities.

Linz and Stepan (1996: 6) highlight that the consolidation of a regime occurs when a strong majority of public opinion believes that procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way of governing collective life in a heterogeneous society, or when support for antisystem alternatives is rather small or isolated from the political regime. Democracy, for Linz and Stepan (1996: 6), is a certain type of relationship between the incumbent party and the opposition parties, characterised by contestation and participation; alternation in power; and *ex ante* uncertainty about outcomes. This theoretical assumption is the basis for understanding the nature of the Cape Verdean state built after independence, shaped by the traces of the authoritarian model. This model was similar to the Portuguese colonial fascist regime, as ideological influence tried to find a homogeneous society that did not meet ethnic plurality, religious beliefs, relationships

²² I care for a bipolarised geopolitics between socialism/communism and capitalism/liberalism. If in 1977 FRELIMO officially assumed a Marxist-Leninist party and influenced all development strategies based on socialism, in Cape Verde, the PAICV never had officially assumed Marxism-Leninism.

between spaces, and knowledge, existing in Cape Verde. In addition to this, the Cape Verdean political regime created effective mechanisms of repression, with persecution, detention, and torture as a means of intimidation, limiting any kind of opposition, and relying on party members and the weak culture of participation.

While the previous section described the elements that marked state-building and the influence of Leninist-Marxist ideology in the post-independence period in Cape Verde, the following section will discuss the qualitative elements of the Cape Verdean political regime during the period under review.

Our main conclusion is that the independent state that emerged in Cape Verde was, since its origin, a military Leninist-Marxist regime with the following characteristics:

- a) The presence of the military in the bureaucratic machine (due to the protagonism of these elements during liberation struggles), which were characterised by having a strong ideological charge with limited technical preparation and were, in most cases, closely related to the hierarchies of “traditional” power.
- b) The weight and hierarchy of the institutions of sovereignty and of defence and security in the organisation of states, secondary to the economy, with the slogan of “politics at the command post”.
- c) The subordination of the state to the highest organs of the single parties and their control by a small number of leaders, while also considering the irregular application of the principle of Leninist organisation that “the party governs the state and society”.
- d) The organisation of states based on military working methods and command lines (Mosca 2001: 68).

3.1.2 PAIGC and PAICV: From hegemonic to dominant political party

Hegemonic parties can be seen as those existing in authoritarian regimes with elections, but where civil and political liberties are violated to such a degree that the system is considered authoritarian. This happened in Cape Verde, where the authoritarian system did not authorise clear divisions between the state and the party, and the party had few to no links with civil society. There, opposition parties were not allowed. When they emerged,

they were under strict control of the hegemonic party with whom they could not compete for control over the government (Caramani, 2011: 244). The alternation of power did not occur since the possibility of a rotation in power was not envisaged (Sartori, 2005). The regime distributed patronage, gathered information, co-opted elites, and bound supporters to the regime (Reuters & Gandhi 2010, 83).

In addition to the deterioration of a set of political rights and civil liberties, and the moderate tendency of the political system, Cape Verde sought to adopt a one-party popular democracy without internal and external competition, largely by the existence of periodic legislative elections, in which it was possible to approve or reject the general constitution of the parliament, while being forbidden the nominal vote. In the meantime, one could only vote “yes” or “no” for the composition of the National Assembly, which later chose the country's president. Accordingly, the president had a five-year term and could be re-elected unrestrictedly. Thus, even in the context of the political monopoly, of deep limitations of political rights and civil liberties, in Cape Verde there were three legislative elections: in 1975, 1980 and 1985, under the sign of non-partisanship. The first legislative election resulted in 95.58% approval for the Constituent Assembly. The second legislative election took place in 1980, with 92.6% approval. The last single-party election was in 1985, with 94.87% in favour, as illustrated in the table below. From 1975 to 1980, the president elected by the legislative body was the same: Aristides Pereira.

Table 6: PAIGC – A hegemonic political party

	1975	1980	1985
Presidential or legislative	Legislative	Legislative	Legislative
Quantity of seats	56	63	83
Quantity of voters	121.724	126.028	143.303
Total votes	105.503	95.486 (75.80%)	98.692 (68.90%)
Invalid votes		125	402
Valid votes		95.361	98.290
Vote “yes”	835 (95,58%)	88.309 (92.60%)	93.252 (94.87%)
Vote “no”	4.668 (4.42%)	7.052 (7.40%)	5.038 (5.13%)

Source: National Commission of Election, 2016

Table 6 illustrates that from 1975 to 1985 there was one single party, PAIGC, the dominant party that controlled the eligibility for public office. Some political movements (UPICV and

the UDC) that had emerged and contested the regime could not establish themselves and build a solid social and political base of support, as their action was prohibited and banned. Another conclusion is that, in the second elections in 1980, there was a strong adherence to the election by the population (75.80%), which proved to be the highest moment of the legitimacy of governance. After the military coup in Guinea Bissau, the Cape Verdean elite decided to separate both countries. In 1985, there was a high abstention rate (31.1%). This was a sign that the regime was running out. A third conclusion is that in liberal democracy, theoretically and conceptually, elections are one of the high points of democracy. The mechanism of legitimation of institutions is based on the principles of competition, universality of suffrage, freedom, independence, and transparency. However, we need to recognise that not all democratic processes are built on these universal principles of democracy. For example, after independence, the PAIGC in Cape Verde underwent legislative elections aimed at legitimising political institutions by maintaining a one-party regime and an authoritarian system of governance.

In 1980 the PAIGC later transformed into the PAICV, establishing in Cape Verde what it claimed was a new type of state and popular democratic system. While party activities became subject to strict limitations, the PAICV tried not to exacerbate political opposition by letting parties “exist” as independent entities. As a hegemonic system, minor political organisations were allowed a minimal presence, so long as they did not constitute an effective challenge to the ruling party. As a sometimes hegemonic and dominant-party or one-party dominant system, the PAICV have successively won election victories and controlled the state over other institutions.

3.2.2. Political rights and civilian liberties in the post-independence

In this context, in 1977 Cape Verde had a moment of significant repression, which under the one-party regime was governed by laws that intimidated citizens, allowing unchecked action by the police services. During this period, there were the arrests of many well-known people in the country, namely: Lulu Marques, Toi de Forro, Titino Boxer, Zeca Matos, Ti Nenê, Manuel Chantre, Mario Leite, and Adelino Leite, among others (Cardoso, 2016: 78). Cardoso connects these events to those triggered in Angola, describing this scenario as follows: the events of 1977, triggered by the unlikely justification for preventing terrorist acts, were aimed primarily at intimidating a community that played a decisive role

in the independence process and was known for its autonomy of opinion and ability to influence the country. The timing chosen for the prisons was perfect (Cardoso, 2016: 73).

The Comparative Survey of Freedom is a methodological²³ tool to monitor the political rights and civil liberties in 165 nations and 62 related territories on an annual basis. In Cape Verde, Freedom House began earlier efforts to record the progress and decline in freedoms during the 1970s in reaction to the deterioration of political rights and civil liberties. To score political rights and civil liberties, each rating of 1 to 7 (with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest) corresponds to a specific range of total scores. Data from the figure below shows that from 1978 to 1990, Cape Verde averaged 5.5 (approximately 6) in Political Rights and in Civil Liberties. Based on this methodology, this meant that Cape Verde had very restricted civil liberties. The political system strongly limited the rights of expression and association, and frequently held political prisoners. They allowed a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free

²³ The Freedom in the World report (1990) presents seven categories and different criteria for ranking Political Rights with a grade from 1 to 7 (1 being the best and 7 being the worst). "Countries or territories with a ranking of 1 are those that hold free, fair and transparent elections. In them, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and the interests of minority groups are represented in State institutions". "Countries or territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker political rights than those with a rating of 1. Public institutions are affected by political corruption. There, political parties and opposition groups are prevented from carrying out their political activities and electoral processes are imperfect. Countries or territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 moderately protect certain state-permitted political rights. However, in certain circumstances, they neglect them to protect the interests of a political elite. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in countries with a rating of 3, 4, or 5". "Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They are governed by authoritarian regimes, often with leaders or parties that initially took power by force and have been in power for decades. In some contexts, the state grants political rights to citizens and may even hold tightly controlled elections". Finally, "countries and territories with a score of 7 have few or no protected political rights due to severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. While some are draconian police states, others may lack a functioning, authoritarian central government and suffer from extreme violence or rule by regional warlords". The Freedom in the World report (1990) also presents seven categories and different criteria for classifying civil liberties. According to the ranking, "countries and territories with a score of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties: freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. These countries have an established legal system that ensures the operation of the rule of law (including an independent judiciary system). They allow freedom of economic activity and tend to strive for equal opportunities for all, including women and minority groups. However, countries and territories with a score of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties due to factors such as limits on media independence, restrictions on trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women". "Countries and territories with a score of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost all civil liberties or strongly protect some civil liberties while neglecting others. Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly limit the rights of expression, association and have political prisoners. They may allow some civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion". Finally, "countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. Their governments or powerful non-state actors allow virtually no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and prisoners, and often control most economic activity" (Freedom in the World, 1990).

private discussion. The system also restricted civil liberties, rights of expression and association, and frequently held political prisoners.




Figure 4: Political rights and civil liberties in the context of one single-party

Freedom House Report: 1978-1990

Political repression and violation of fundamental rights in Cape Verde were not compared with other cases of authoritarian rule on the African continent, where there were frequent civil wars and serious violations of human rights (as is the case in, for example, Angola and Mozambique). Thus, compared to other African countries that adopted the Leninist-Marxist ideology, the authoritarian and repressive Cape Verdean regime was more moderate, and had tried to build a state by managing the values, beliefs, and rivalries of various ethnicities. While maintaining a political monopoly and an authoritarian system of governance, the regime tolerated the existence of some independent party organisations (Cohen, 1991: 114).

This is one of the indicators used to assess the levels of respect for political and civil rights, even human rights. Two aspects will have been crucial to this process that puts Cape Verde in a pioneering position in human rights: a past where capital punishment for common crimes had been abolished more than a century ago; and the fact that (unlike other colonies) the country had never been the scene of war and thus never faced serious military crimes (although the regime tolerated some social segments that seemed inoffensive to political power and posed no danger nor threatened to change political order). However, major challenges regarding freedom and equality were opposed, as the one-party regime constantly violated the right to freedom of political participation.

Some examples of where the authoritarian system of governance tolerated the existence of independent party organisations were the cases of the Institute of Welfare and Judicial Assistance, of some trade associations, and the action of the Catholic Church, which opposed the political regime. Even under the influence of Marxism-Leninism, an authoritarian regime and government, **Cape Verde was one of the African states that, after independence, did not adopt death penalty clauses in its political constitution. Additionally,** Article 35 of the 1980 Constitution already stated that: 1) every citizen has the right to life, and are protected under physical and moral integrity; 2) every citizen enjoys the inviolability of his person and cannot be arrested or punished, except in cases by the forms and with the guarantees provided by law; 3) no-one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and 4) in no case shall there be a penalty of death, life imprisonment, forced labour, or security measures depriving anyone of unlimited or indefinite duration.

The one-party regime in Cape Verde has not allowed the full exercise of all fundamental rights, although important steps have been taken towards “opening up” a certain “social pluralism” and realising socio-economic rights, particularly in health, education, and poverty reduction. Without the institutionalisation of the death penalty, Cape Verde's authoritarian and repressive regime remained more moderate compared to many African states. Although Cape Verde experimented with democratic mechanisms in the process of legitimising institutions and political actors, little progress had been made towards liberal democracy. Alternative sources of information remained under political and ideological control of the state. Even following the Leninist-Marxist model and authoritarian governance, history did not allow the state to adopt capital punishment in its constitution.

3.2.3. Post-independence, institutional and political stability

The presence of civil wars in the post-independence period in Lusophone African countries is one of the main factors explaining social, political, and economic instability, and the consequent complexity in state-building, especially in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. This has contributed to the emergence of scenarios of violence and destruction over a long period. Although the island PALOP (Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe) did not have armed conflicts in their territories, they had internal political clashes

of opposing lines of thought within the political leadership. The institutionalisation of a system of governance that, although authoritarian, was less severe when compared to many political regimes in post-independent Africa, meant that the political, academic, and literary profile offered more clarity and made Cape Verde's elite less prone to conflicting solutions. In addition, the geographical conditions of Cape Verde, being composed of separate islands, do not offer appropriate conditions for the development of military conflicts.

3.3. Cape Verde in democratic political transition

According to Carothers (2002: 7) democratisation tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages. First there occurs the opening, a period of democratic ferment and political liberalisation

...in which cracks appear in the ruling dictatorial regime, with the most prominent fault line being that between hardliners and soft-liners. There follows the breakthrough – the collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic system, with the coming to power of a new government through national elections and the establishment of a democratic institutional structure, often through the promulgation of a new constitution. After the transition comes consolidation, a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularisation of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic “rules of the game” (Carothers, 2002: 7).

This section presents the Cape Verde case study, analysing the variables related to this historical period; the constitutional and institutional dimensions that preconditioned political opening of the country; and the indicators of democracy consolidation (political alternation, election quality, political rights and civil liberties). Based on these indicators, it will be possible to understand the political dynamics of Cape Verde in the 1990s until today. The analysis of effective alternation of power is one of the main aspects that explain the success of a democratic transition. To analyse the results of this variable in Cape Verde, it is necessary to understand the political trajectory of the country since its founding

elections. The alternation of party power is effective, if it is assumed that the president-elect could exercise his entire mandate without any impediments. The quality of the elections will be studied here based on the Freedom House and Afrobarometer data. To measure democratic gains in Cape Verde, we will look at the topic of political rights and civil liberties.

3.3.1. Political liberalisation and democratisation: Processes, challenges and outcomes

In Cape Verde, the opening period of democratic and political liberalisation happened in February 1990, when the PAICV National Council meeting declared its intention to move from a single-party regime to a pluralistic democracy. The collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic system came in July 1990, when the 4th PAICV Extraordinary Congress recognised that the political transition was inevitable. This assumptions illustrate that two thongs. On the one hand, there was mastery of the changes that took place during the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of a new international geopolitics. On the other hand, to proceed with Cape Verde's development. The PAICV Congress recommended that the National Popular Assembly be convened to liberalise the national political field, and to debate and approve the Political Parties Act (PAICV, 1990: 3). The National People's Assembly was convened to confer on the state the principle of political pluralism. To this end, it was agreed to remove Article 4 of the Constitution, which recognised the PAICV as the singly political party.

There followed the breakthrough – the collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic system, with the coming to power of a new government through national elections and the establishment of a democratic institutional structure, often through the promulgation of a new constitution. According to Article 4, the Constitutional Law read: "In the Republic of Cape Verde, the African Independence Party of Cape Verde (PAICV) is the leading political force of society and state". Subparagraph 2(a) of the Constitution was also repealed, which established that, in the performance of its historical mission, the PAIGC exercised its leading role on the basis of the Constitution, namely: a) to establish the general bases of the political, economic, social and cultural defence; and by repealing Article 4 of the 1980 Constitution, the new constitution introduced the title Rule of Democratic Law in Article 2, recognising that the Republic of Cape Verde has

democratic rights based on the principles of popular sovereignty, pluralism of expression and democratic organisation, and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.

Without having joined the international institutions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and without being involved in internal or external conflicts, Cape Verde did not face external pressure for the political reforms that favoured political liberalisation and the transition to democratisation. However, in the early 1990s, the external environment could be imperative and influenced the Cape Verdean political elite. The transitions that were taking place in Africa and Eastern Europe led the PAICV to anticipate possible popular demonstration for political liberalisation (Twining-Ward Louise, 2010: 9). Unlike in other African countries such as Benin and Ivory Coast, which had strong popular protests, general strikes and a considerable level of violence, Cape Verdean civil society did not speak up. Our tentative conclusion is that the opening of the political field and the political transition to democratisation in Cape Verde was a process that proceeded from the direction of the single party without any social influence to prevent them, and without any concrete external pressure to make the transition.

It was the decision of the PAICV to lead the transition process, but it took a different course when the opposition party (MPD) appeared and proved to have strong organisational and bargaining power to the point of being able to neutralise the PAICV's intentions. The Cape Verdean political elite had no deep military alignment. However, the autocratic system of governance forced the opposition elite into exile in Europe, mainly in Portugal. Studying there, this elite was in contact with some political leadership and had networks, which were involved in theoretical and conceptual debates about democracy. These processes gave them the opportunity to discuss and influence the political regime to opening to political liberalisation.

This section described the constitutional, institutional, and external environmental aspects that determined the political transition in Cape Verde. This section did not discuss the qualitative elements of the Cape Verdean political regime in the context of the democratic transition. The following sections deal with this aspect. Elections are relevant indicators in the analysis of democracy and state-building. Transparency and political alternation,

political freedoms, and civil rights are assumptions that research will take to measure the quality of the democratic transition in Cape Verde.

3.3.2. Elections, democracy and effective alternation of political power in Cape Verde

In the scientific school literature, there is a current of thought supporting the argument that the right to vote, expressed through free, fair, transparent, and credible elections, is a condition for the consolidation of liberal democracy (Dahl, 2001: 49). The concern expressed here regarding the quality of electoral processes is related to the threats that, in certain contexts, impose on the durability of democratic institutions. Simply put, in the theoretical and normative framework, elections can be considered as an instrument for regulating competition between parties and electoral candidates, managing conflicts, maximizing the participation of different system actors, and ensuring the legitimacy of the regime. However, elections can lead a society towards greater conflict as well as greater collaboration, which emphasises the fact that democratisation and conflict management processes are closely linked (De Tollenaere, 2006: 78).

Therefore, the sustainability and consolidation of democratic systems depends on the level of commitment, acceptance, adherence, and maximum consensus on electoral system rules (Przeworski, 2000: 19). In liberal democracies, electoral systems determine the rules of the game by which voters express their political preferences, converting votes into parliamentary mandates (in the case of legislative elections) or other political office (in the case of presidential elections). Brito (2000:7) analysed different electoral systems and understood that electoral systems result from the dynamics of political struggles that occur in society involving the main institutional political actors.

In addition to the above arguments, the Italian sociologist and political scientist Bobbio (1986: 15) shows that the notions of consensus and dissension are important in the definition of pluralistic democracy, because democracy is a political system that presupposes such a disagreement, but requires consensus based on competition rules. However, Hyden (1999: 19) operationalised the dimension of the concept of trust studied in the structural perspective of governance and understood as the normative consensus on the limits of action in a political system. Thus, according to this author, the rules of the game are not always legitimately accepted, which presupposes that they cannot achieve

a common goal among the actors in the political field. Due to this complexity of the validity of the rules of the game, trust and accountability appear important in any process of democracy consolidation. Therefore, the more the management of the system is characterised by qualities associated with accountability and trust, the more the authority and legitimacy of the democratic process will be assured.

To build commitment, acceptance, adherence, and maximum consensus on the rules of the electoral system, the Cape Verdean National Election Commission is an independent and permanent body of electoral administration, working with the National Assembly. However, systematic changes and adjustments were included in the Electoral Code. One of the changes was the creation of conditions for the first elections of Local Authorities (Municipal Assemblies) and the consequent development of Cape Verdean municipalisation. Thus, the legislative package published in the First Republic (Laws nr. 47 and 48/III/89, both of 13 July, and Decree - Law No. 52-A/90, of 4 July) were revised. The Cape Verdean Electoral Code followed the essential procedures and guarantees that, in the context of democratic transition, free, transparent and fair elections were held and governmental stability ensured. To build institutional consensus, concept, trust and legitimacy of the electoral processes and results, the law dictates that the members of the National Election Commission are elected by a two-thirds majority of the deputies in office in the National Assembly. These and many other elements mean that Cape Verde can make a successful transition to democracy, and the elections have not been a factor of widespread conflict and instability.

In the meantime, despite the progress and stability factors associated with the electoral process, some official reports recommend the need for their revision, and for the regular improvement of several crucial aspects of the electoral process, starting with voter registration, whose basis of data (which came from the nineties) showed such deficiencies that its rebuilding from scratch was recommended, by conducting a new electoral census. The introduction of the electronic voting system to ensure better transparency was also recommended.

Another structural challenge for the Cape Verde electoral system is associated with electoral abstention. Electoral abstention, according to Freire and Magalhães (2002),

means abstaining, suppressing, refraining from, avoiding. In each election, the official number of abstaining individuals is calculated from the difference between the number of registered members and the number of citizens exercising their voting rights. According to them, abstaining from election does not only mean not voting or not participating in elections; it may also mean not expressing preference for any of the contestants, voting blank or nullifying the vote, by those who wish to express disaffection or distrust in political parties and their authors.

3.3.3. Consolidating democracy by political alternation

Some analysts, who dedicated themselves to the study of the modern state, transitions and democratisation phenomenon, see this alternation as a vote of protest of the electorate (Huntington, 1994), which wanted to show displeasure with the previous political regime, strongly influenced by Marxism, and at the same time, hope and confidence in renovating. This factor tends to show that there was a certain exhaustion of the dominant paradigm that after independence lasted almost decade and a half. This stimulated the collective willing to change the regime and, in the Hobbesian language, establish a new political pact with the state to end the one single-party and democratise the institutions and the political system. The new paradigm in a new political pact achieved through a modern process of legitimation of the institutions of the political system were made profound transformations and (re)configurations of the political and economic field.

Also, in the literature, “there is a widespread assumption that parties play or can play a vital role in democratic consolidation” (De Tollenaere, 2006: 48). In the words of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 89): if there is ever a “heroic” moment for political parties, it comes in their activity leading up to, during and immediately following the *founding elections*, when, for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions (Carothers, 2002: 8). Thus, democratic consolidation is a simple mechanism in which a country has experienced two successive and peaceful transfers of power to much deeper conceptions of what democracy ought to entail (Carothers, 2002: 8). The table below shows that the election held in 1991 confirmed the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the emergence of a new, democratic system, with the coming to power of a new political party, MPD

(Movement for Democracy), through national elections and the establishment of a democratic institutional structure, often through the promulgation of a new constitution.




Figure 5: Electoral results in Cape Verde

Source: Based on data from CNE legislative elections (1991-2021)

This means that as early as the first elections, which were classified as free and fair, Cape Verde experienced a peaceful and effective alternation of power. In 1996, MPD won and Mascarenhas Monteiro was re-elected as single candidate, being supported by both PAICV and MPD. Already in 2001 and 2006, there was a new alternation of power, with the return of PAICV to the political scene in the figure of Pedro Pires (African Election, 2016: 23). In this scenario, it is important to mention that in the second round of the 2001 elections, Pires won by only 12 votes, which already announced the exhaustion of PAICV's legitimacy. In the 2011 and 2016 elections, the MPD won with Jorge Carlos Fonseca after ten years as opposition party. If the first political alternation happened in 1991, the second occurred 2001 and confirmed the second successive experience and peaceful transfer of power. Thus, in the Cape Verdean political scene, since the beginning of democratisation, the effective alternation of party power has been present.

Comparatively analysing the data presented, we note that the six elections to the National Assembly indicate a change in party representation. The new emerging paradigm stimulated the liberalisation and restructuring of the state sector. A new process of renewal of the legitimacy of institutions and actors of the state was conducted in 1995, and the focus of victory remained in favour of the MPD, who won 61.3% of political legitimacy.

3.3.4. Political rights and civilian liberties in the political transition context

The discussion about political rights and civil liberties is part of the democracy and state-building debate that emerged to overcome threats to human dignity posed by oppressive economic and political systems (Donnelly, 1999: 7). Characteristic examples of political rights are equal access to public services, the right to vote, and the right to take part in the government. Civil rights vary from securing the individual's spiritual, physical, economic and legal existence (right to life, privacy and dignity, and physical integrity; freedom of religion, thought, and opinion; right to recognition as a person before the law and nationality; right to own property) via classical freedom rights (liberty of person, freedom of movement, prohibition of slavery, freedom of expression) to detailed procedural safeguards related to the rule of law and fair trial generally (Nowak, 2012: 70). Based on these analytical dimensions, *Freedom in the World 2019* evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries and 14 territories. Each country and territory are assigned between 0 and 4 points on a series of 25 indicators, for an aggregate score of up to 100. These scores are used to determine two numerical ratings, for political rights and civil liberties, with a rating of 1 representing the “most free” conditions and 7 the “least free”. A country or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings then determine whether it has an overall status of Mostly Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.

Table 7: Level of Freedom in Cape Verde 1998-2019

Indicators	1998	2008	2019
Civil Liberties	2	1	1
Political Rights	1	1	1
Freedom Rating	1.5	1	1
Freedom Status	Free	Free	Free

Source: Freedom in the World (1998-2019)

The country respects basic political freedoms and civil liberties, but also tends to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. In this context, the functioning of government is satisfactory. The media are independent and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent

and judicial decisions are enforced. Cape Verde has free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are respected. *Freedom in the World* (1998-2019) reported significant weaknesses in democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture, and low levels of political participation. In terms of civil liberties, it was reported that Cape Verde is seen to have

...freedom of the press, guaranteed by law and generally respected in practice, although Article 105 of the electoral code prohibits media organisations from disseminating opinions on or criticism of parties and candidates after a certain date in the campaign period. Both public and privately owned media are for the most part free and independent from government control. However, public remarks by the culture minister about hiring and programming at state-owned media in 2017 raised concerns about improper government meddling and drew objections from the journalists' union (*Freedom in the World*, 1998-2019).

The media have precarious finances, which affects their ability to undertake investigative reporting projects. A lack of funding has contributed to the closure of a number of privately owned newspapers, decreasing the diversity of information in the print sector (*Freedom in the World*, 1998-2019).

In terms of rule of law, the Cape Verdean judiciary system is reported as being ...independent, though the courts are overburdened and understaffed. Police and prosecutors generally observe legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention. Defence attorneys are provided to indigent defendants. However, due to the limited capacity of the court system, there are often delays in detainees' first hearings before a judge, and many cases are dropped because defendants in detention are denied a timely trial. Law enforcement officials are sometimes accused of excessive force, but perpetrators are often investigated and punished by oversight bodies (*Freedom in the World*, 1998-2019).

This view emphasises the role of institutions in the process of democratisation and state-building. It can thus be argued that some political trajectories to democracy can be blocked at certain points along the way in regimes, which restrict political contest, or can be

threatened by military intervention. However, the Cape Verdean trajectory does not register as a blocked moment. In Cape Verde, the democratic transitions result in political institutionalism and the building of democratic state institutions where all actors accept the “rules” and “democracy is the only game in town”.

3.4. Concluding remarks

The main conclusion of the chapter is that, after independence, Cape Verde adopted structural and institutional principles founded on Marxism-Leninism²⁴, which influenced the institutionalisation of an authoritarian system of governance. The stains of mild authoritarianism are being removed with the institutionalisation of the rule of law in 1991 that is being supported by the will of the country's political elite, which influences transition, state-building, and democratisation. The one-party regime in Cape Verde was more moderate compared to other Lusophone African states. Its ethnic and cultural peculiarity has enabled relative freedom and reduced levels of repression. For this reason, the one-party regime in Cape Verde has accepted that protests can be made, and organisations appear to be unrelated to the party, such as the Institute for Social Providence and Assistance (IPAJ), some trade associations, and even the Catholic Church itself. The experience of political openness that began after independence has facilitated the process of political transition, democratisation, and state-building in Cape Verde. Therefore, in the context of transition, the country has seen improvements in political (political rights and social freedoms), economic (per capita GDP, inflation rate), social (literacy rate, life expectancy and mortality rate) indicators. These comparative data helped to conclude that there is a positive correlation between the evolution of political indicators and economic and social indicators.

²⁴ Some of the first African independence political leaders: Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, Alphonse Massamba-Débat of Congo-Brazzaville, António Agostinho Neto of Angola, Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Luís Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, Manuel Pinto da Costa of São Tomé and Príncipe, Modibo Kéita of Mali and Samora Machel of Mozambique, adopted development policies inspired by socialist ideology. The rhetoric reproduced in the post-independence period received the support of the respective political parties, which found in socialist discourse the tool for legitimizing their political power. Among the African parties which adhered to socialist ideology as part of their political statutes, the following could be mentioned: Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR) of Congo-Brazzaville, Convention People's Party (CPP) of Ghana, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP), Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia, Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) of Guinea, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-RDA) of Mali, (Krutz & Lewi, 2011: 11).

Chapter 4: MOZAMBIQUE: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS OF TRANSITION, STATE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATISATION

4.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the political and historical processes of transition, of state-building, and of democratisation in African Portuguese-speaking countries, with specific attention to political transformation in Mozambique. It strives to provide a deep understanding of the trajectory of the state-building processes started after independence, as well as the institutional reforms, structural and historical dynamics, and ideological influences that have an impact on political transition and democratisation. Consequently, to determine the path of liberal democratic consolidation theory, the discussion will start with its first overarching influence: its roots from a Marxist system to a liberal democracy. The significant conclusion is that the predominance of structures and institutional dynamics (inherited from past political and historical processes, influenced by centralism and a monopolistic state) were not removed and have been influencing the political transition to democracy and state-building. Therefore, compared to Cape Verde, Mozambique has made very slow progress in the process of transition, state-building, and democratisation.

4.2. Structure and state institutions in the post-independence

The Mozambican state-building process began in 1975 and was influenced by political elites that were involved from very early on, first in the process of liberating the state from the Portuguese colonial empire, and by Marxist ideology. Inspired by the auspices of Marxism-Leninism, and marked by Portuguese colonization, the state tried to impose a homogeneous model of political organisation on a heterogeneous and stratified society (Queiroz, 2017: 89). The guarantees of a repressive authoritarian system of governance were felt by having difficulties in building a state in Mozambique. Therefore, in the 1990s, Mozambique began a long process of liberalisation of the political field (Queiroz, 2017: 17). From there the new democratic state recognised an ideal as well as a goal, which was based on common values shared by peoples throughout the world community irrespective of cultural, political, social, and economic differences (Ramos, 2012: 17;

Beetham, 2004: IV). It was a new moment to institutionalise basic rights of citizenship to be exercised under conditions of freedom, equality, transparency, and responsibility, with due respect for the plurality of views, and in the interest of the polity (Beetham, 2004: IV).

The Front for Liberation of Mozambique, which had led the liberation process, governed the state in a hegemonic and monopolistic manner, as well as limiting the possibilities for citizens to express their will outside the institutionally established parameters and limits. Consequently, some sectors of Mozambican society moved away from the ruling party and sought other channels to intervene violently on the political scene, thus contesting the established governance model. The institutional foundations of hegemony and unitary state power were laid down in Article 39 of the Constitution, whereby state institutions were governed by FRELIMO and guided by the principles of unity of power, democratic centralism, double subordination (party and state leadership), local initiative, and permanent contact with the people.

The basis of this democratic institutional paradigm was inspired by the Montesquieu and Weberian doctrines of separation of powers, strengthening security, legitimacy, improving economic opportunities, and wellbeing (Rezende, 1992:39; Alden, 2001: xxii). Therefore, the underlying foundation of state-building was feasibility, maximising development and institutional growth to facilitate political stability, and the normative values related to the principles of good governance, including transparency, human rights, and a free press, amongst others (Rezende, 1992: 39; Höfling, 2001: 31). From an institutional point of view, recognition of Frelimo's liberating role and the importance of Marxism-Leninism were noted in the Preamble of the Constitution. It legitimated and legalised a monopolistic system of government where the hegemonic party was the main agent of transformation. Thus, the analysis of the institutions, their functioning and dynamics, allows for the understanding of the conditions that favour the good functioning of the political systems in a certain historical moment. Constitutionally, the People's Assembly was granted two institutional recognitions, being the supreme organ of the state in the People's Republic of Mozambique and the highest legislative body. In its composition, the People's Assembly was single party, revealing Frelimo's centralising and hegemonic role over the legislative body and the state. In this context, the existence of separate parties runs counter to

national unity and the vanguard of the people, and therefore its right to rule cannot be legitimately questioned.

In addition to the signs of the political party's hegemony over the legislative body, the party democracy reached the executive body. Chapter IV of the Constitution described that the Council of Ministers (executive branch) was subordinate to the party, and as such, it should observe the resolutions of the different branches of the Party Congress, the Central Committee, and the Executive Committee. The Council of Ministers also observed the laws of the National Assembly and its Parliamentary Standing Committee, as well as the decisions of the Head of State. Article 57 of the Constitution reinforced the notion of the double subordination of the leaders (over the party and the state), further confirming the party's hegemony over the state, and consolidated the centralisation of powers at the local state level. Thus, the highest state body in the province was the Provincial Government, chaired by the governor, representing the president of the republic at local level, and reporting to FRELIMO and the government for their activities²⁵.

4.2.1. State and dominant ideology²⁶

From the beginning of the armed struggle against the presence of Portugal (1964) until the independence of the country (1975), internal debates within FRELIMO moved through the dilemma of Marxism-Leninism. It was mainly after the Third Congress of FRELIMO, held in 1977, that FRELIMO was defined and stated as a Vanguard Party (De Vletter, 2012: 12). The FRELIMO Party adopted the standards of Marxism-Leninism, associated with the priority of building a modern and developed nation and the formation of the new man (De Vletter, 2012: 12). There were four reasons for adopting the Marxism-Leninism ideology and cooperating with the USSR. First, it was believed that socialism was an easy way to overcome underdevelopment (Lösch, 1990: 300). Second, it fed into the belief that

²⁵ The imbrication of party and state structures ends up significantly interfering with the functioning and development of public institutions and the stability of the State. Indeed, there are frequent cases of partisan activities in full working hours, forcing the temporary absence of civil servants from their jobs, particularly in local administrations. The implantation of party cells in public institutions is not the only element that crystallises the unfinished character of Frelimo's internal transition from a party-state to a party that conforms to the rules governing the functioning of political parties in a context of democratic construction. Within FRELIMO's own statutes there are other aspects that reflect a logic of placing the party above the State, particularly in terms of the responsibility of the elected and executive. Indeed, Article 76 of the FRELIMO Statutes, approved at the 10th Congress, states that the elected and the executive coordinate their action with the party organs of their respective rank, and are personally and collectively responsible for the performance of their duties in state or local authorities. When it comes to national positions, the elected and the executive will be responsible to the Political Commission (FRELIMO, 2012, art. 76).

²⁶ With or without declared alignment with Marxism-Leninism, these movements, which have more recently become parties, have been profoundly marked by Marxist-Leninist postulates, namely in respect to the forms and characteristics of national democracy. The Soviet vision of the socialist transition is the only one used by the ideological structures of the PAIGC, MPLA-PT, FRELIMO Party and ZANU-PF.

Soviet assistance to developing countries was to create and consolidate political power and promote economic independence (Lösch, 1990: 300; De Veltur, 2012: 12). Third, the USSR was against colonialism, racism, Zionism and other forms of exploitation and discrimination (Cau, 2011: 31; De Veltur, 2012: 12). Finally, there was the recognition that socialist forces that inspired Marxism-Leninism could rationalise the productive system through worker ownership to achieve its full potential in human wellbeing (Daniel, 2016: 224). Samora Machel believed that one of the reasons why socialism would succeed in the early stages of Mozambique's independence was that it had only one party. Similarly, many African leaders embraced socialism as a political ideology and identity (Daniel, 2016: 224)²⁷.

Politically FRELIMO reconstituted itself, abandoning its old guise as a national liberation movement, to adopt that of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. During this period the party worked hard to impose itself on, and take control of, the bubbling cauldron of popular social and political organisation and to direct the striking degree of popular initiative and spontaneity. This was a very complex process, but basically what happened by about 1978 was that the party managed to suppress or bring under its control and direction, a series of independent power bases. The most important of these were structures called *grupos dinamizadores* (dynamising groups or GDs). (O'meara, 1991: 87).

The socialist countries provided logistical support for the war and military training. The Decolonization Committee of the then-OAU had privileged contacts with socialist countries and offered support to Mozambique (Cabaço, 2017: 420). Meanwhile, it was believed that the Western capitalists would increase economic dependence. Another relevant issue is that the ruling elite of the state at the time had had deeply marked experience with challenges to colonialism and the armed struggle, as they became nationalists and revolutionaries. This structured process and context characterised the Mozambican state in the post-independence period (Jafar, 2014: 14).

In fact, since 1975, Mozambique was already thought to have created the foundations of revolutionary power in the former liberated regions. Samora Machel defended the idea

²⁷ Daniel, Inyikalum. 2016 Socialist Ideas of Samora Machel in Mozambique. Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities & Social Science Studies (IJHSSS). A Peer-Reviewed Bi-monthly Bi-lingual Research Journal

that it was necessary to pass from national unity to ideological unity. National unity, present during the national liberation, was characterised by great conflicts within FRELIMO after the crises of 1970. Ideological unity would lead to the creation of a party and the proclamation of popular democracy. The staff of FRELIMO was to adopt Marxist-Leninism, although one must admit that its principles were never sufficiently assimilated. FRELIMO felt that the conditions for socialist transition had already been created, as is clearly reflected in the Congress of 1977. The country's economic decline and FRELIMO's loss of control of extensive rural zones, in favour of RNM armed bandits, would facilitate the rise to power of pragmatism. This led to the signing of the N'Komati agreement, which needs not be analysed here.

Two phases of political evolution are present in Mozambique. One takes place before 1977 in which the dynamics of the national liberation struggle conceals many conceptual weaknesses, and myths are not yet destroyed. In this period, the structure of the movement is consolidated in a vanguard party following the Leninist model adapted to local conditions. The congresses of 1977 optimistically declared an end to underdevelopment in the following decade, an end to the enemy, and the defeat of illiteracy, etc. (De Vletter, 2012: 12). From 1980 onwards, the consciousness of an eminent catastrophe, and a search for the means to fight it, become evident and this process became clearest in Guinea-Bissau in the coup of November 14, 1980.

The homogenisation of society project inspired by Marxism-Leninism revealed too soon a set of challenges and a lot of dysfunctionalities. As a result, FRELIMO's political project aimed at creating the national identity of Mozambique failed to create a homogenous society transcending its heterogeneity. Nor did it solve the inequality that it inherited from the colonial era. It brought forth the opposite reaction to that which it had desired, resulting in polarisation and violence from 1977 to 1992 (Vine, 1995: 15). Therefore, after an armed struggle for independence conducted by FRELIMO, it showed the distinct positions of individuals who participated in the struggle for liberation in the framework of the party. In this context, members and, at the same time, freedom fighters from FRELIMO, disagreed with the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as an ideological line that should be followed. Also, the agglomeration of rural populations in communal villages caused a severe disruption of living conditions, and social, economic and political reproduction, of these populations

(Florencio, 2002: 354; Geffray, 1988: 96). In a clear disintegration between the states established after independence with the non-state actors, the traditional chiefs were seen as opportunists; corrupts who had profited greatly from their role as tax collectors, recruiters of manpower, and local policing agents during Portuguese colonialism (Florêncio & Geffray, 2002: 21; Campos 2009: 80). Some of these challenges related to the Marxist system were questioned, both by Mozambicans who still had a strong connection with the Portuguese colonial government (notably the traditional chiefdoms) and by the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) (Campos, 2009: 79).

The conclusion is that, at the time of political independence in Mozambique, high hopes of fast economic growth and social development were evident. With foreign development aid, the state had to reach proverbial *take-off* in industrialising the Mozambican economy. Following the advice of the various Western advisors, however, did not resolve economic and social developmental challenges. The Mozambican economy remained largely export driven and reliant on foreign aid, loans, and grants. While a growing state bureaucracy manned the state, seeking to raise its own standard of living, as truly "junior partners", a sizeable majority of peasants and workers were unable to reap the fruits of independence (Campos, 2009: 79). These elements led to the systemic violation of a set of political rights and civic duties in the context of Mozambican state-building, both by the state apparatus and by the different internal forces; as well as by foreigners who very early opposed the political regime and the authoritarian system of government established after the independence in 1975. These aspects will be discussed in the following section.

4.2.2. Frelimo: From a hegemonic to a dominant political party

Mozambican history and political processes allowed a hegemonic party to be established in the first phase of the state-building process. However, the transition to democracy and the processes of political transformation that took place after the 1990s have retained within the state the hegemonic party and the ruling party. The hegemonic party can be seen as those existing in authoritarian regimes with elections, but where civil and political liberties are violated to such a degree that the system is considered authoritarian. Such happened in Mozambique, where the authoritarian system does not authorise clear divisions between the state and the party. Opposition parties were not allowed to exist, and the alternation of power could not occur, since the possibility of a rotation in power is

not envisaged (Sartori, 2005). The transformation and transition processes retained historical “stains” from hegemonic parties combined with the dominant party that can be found in semi-authoritarian regimes, but also in democratic states and transitional states. Bogaards (2004: 178) makes a distinction between a dominant party and a dominant authoritarian system. This distinction is based on differences in civil and political liberties. In Mozambique, FRELIMO was, and remains, a dominant party that dominates parliament, has won every presidential election, and has won provincial assemblies and municipalities.

In addition to the deterioration of a set of political rights and civil liberties, and the moderate tendency of the political system, Mozambique sought to adopt a one-party popular democracy without internal and external competition, in large part by the existence of periodic legislative elections, in which it was possible to approve or reject the general constitution of the parliament, while still being forbidden the nominal vote. Accordingly, the president had a five-year term and could be re-elected unrestrictedly. During the one-party period, legislative elections took place only in 1977 and 1986, where one could only vote “yes” or “no” for the composition of the National Assembly. The Marxist and Leninist ideological principles reinforced the values of one single party in the context of internal military confrontation. The National Assembly met once (from 31 August to 1 September 1977), with a provisional composition of 207 deputies chosen by the FRELIMO Central Committee, with a view to approving the legal framework for the first general elections of 1977. In this election, 227 deputies were elected. Until 1986, the National Assembly met twice a year in ordinary sessions, of up to 8 days each session. In 1986, elections were held for the Legislative Assembly (indirect and based on mass meetings across the country). The FRELIMO Central Committee nominated the head of state for unrestricted mandate.

This research understands that the efforts to build a homogeneous society under a specific and heterogeneous characteristic existing in the national territory, and the resistance that this project offered, necessitated the use of force and the installation of an authoritarian state. State pressure aims to impose political power and development planning on society at the expense of a set of political rights and civic duties. This argument is at the centre of the debate about the origin of a military conflict that the state

was exposed to after independence. After independence, FRELIMO sided with a hegemonic party that took power with an ambitious development project, meaning that in addition to the conquest of power, there was also a need to shape the new independent state (Dorman, 2006: 99). During the state-building process, profound challenges were faced in consolidating political rights and civil liberties. The political system imported, in an intact way, important practices, routines and mentalities of the ideology of the colonial state (Young, 2004: 198) and of Marxism-Leninism; aspects against which they had fought, such as the use of violence, authoritarianism, exclusion, the exploitation of man by man, the idea of the existence of first and second citizens (the antisocial), and the continuity of the existence of an internal enemy (the anti-revolutionary), among others (Melber, 2002), which Fanon described in his book *Black Skin, White Masks* (2001).

4.2.3. Political rights and civilian liberties in post-independence

Based on these analytical dimensions, the *Comparative Survey of Freedom* is an institutional effort to monitor the political rights and civil liberties in 165 nations and 62 related territories on an annual basis. In Mozambique, Freedom House began earlier efforts to record the progress and decline in freedoms during the 1970s in reaction to the deterioration of political rights and civil liberties. To score political rights and civil liberties, each rating of 1 to 7 (with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom) corresponds to a specific range of total scores. Data from the figure 6 show that from 1978 to 1990, in the main Political Rights and Civil Liberties Mozambique scored 6.4 for PR and 6.8 for CL, producing a combined average of 6.6. Based on the methodology, this meant that Mozambique had very restricted civil liberties. The political system strongly limited the rights of expression and association, the death penalty was used, and the government frequently held political prisoners.




Figure 6: Mozambique: Political rights and civil liberties

Source: Freedom World (1978-1990)

The data show that from 1984 onwards there was a tendency to improve political rights. One hypothesis to explain this improvement may be associated with the first moments when the Mozambican state began opening economically to multilateral institutions, and to some conditions imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Another explanation may be associated with civil society organisations and the Catholic Church that put pressure on the system for greater respect for political rights and civil liberties. However, even if the system safeguarded political rights, the constitution and laws did not allow the civil liberties of association, expression, manifestation, and others.

In the area of civil liberties, Paredes states that repressive practices and police action by state officials to control Mozambican society was one of the contributing elements to resistance and the negativity of bound memory after independence (Paredes, 2014: 153). The autocratic practices emanating from state agents in this historical period focused on suppressing protests and demonstrations that questioned FRELIMO's political project. This revealed the similarity of the repressive apparatus of the colonial state and of the post-independence socialist state (Paredes, 2014: 154). Although the Constitution of the Popular Republic of Mozambique recognised the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the XXIX Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mozambique institutionalised the death penalty, which was systematically practiced since 1979 against alleged acts of banditry. Within the framework of revolutionary justice, Law 5/83 of 1 April 1983 (the Whipping Law) was also passed with more severe penalties, through corporal torture and the death penalty for some crimes or conduct that went against the national project. Citizens convicted of theft, rape, contraband, or food price

speculation were whipped or shot in public, in what the state called revolutionary justice. During this period, FRELIMO political prisoners Joana Simeao, Uria Simango, Lazaro Nkavandame, Raul Casal Ribeiro, Archangel Kambeu, Julius Nihia, Paulo Gumane and Priest Mateus Gwengere were confined at M'telela Re-education Camp in Niassa Province, northwest Mozambique, and then later shot at the camp.

4.2.4. Post-independence, institutional and political stability

Situated in a hostile regional context, particularly because of the existence of white minority regimes of apartheid (in South Africa) and former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique's independence did not necessarily mean the end of armed violence in the country. Indeed, in 1976, Mozambique began to face a new war, which, having started as an external aggression, later evolved into a civil war, expressing important internal cleavages within not only Mozambican nationalism, but the society itself; in Mozambique in the broadest sense (Cabrita, 2000; Cahen, 2010; Geffray, 1990; Geffray & Pedersen, 1988). The process of agglomeration of rural populations in communal villages led to a strong disruption of the living conditions and of the social, economic, and political reproduction of the populations. This settlement process caused frictions and struggles between sectors of the rural societies themselves, either by defining the building sites of the villages or by controlling consumer cooperatives (Florêncio, 2002: 354; Campos, 2009: 82). The attempt by the state to reorganise the hierarchical relations and social structures already established in traditional contexts was accompanied by the prohibition of cultural and religious manifestations. The feeling of oppression in the countryside caused a large population to start migrating to urban areas, causing an increase in poverty, as well as significantly reducing the country's agricultural production.

In this context, the post-independence administration came to be questioned by Mozambicans who still had a strong connection with the Portuguese colonial government (notably the traditional chiefs). The National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), a group created in 1976 and led by André Matsangaíssa, opposed the Leninist-Marxist ideology and the state monopoly (Campos, 2009: 79). The civil war in Mozambique began in 1976 and ended in 1992. It was one of the most devastating armed conflicts in southern sub-Saharan Africa, which left a destitute, impoverished, heavily indebted, and more dependent country (Jafar, 2014: 3). The conflict received strong support from Rhodesia

and South Africa, which opposed the Mozambican government for assisting the resistance movements against apartheid, which was in force in both countries.

With the end of Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia in 1980, South Africa became the only significant RENAMO supporter in the region (Campos, 2009: 79). Against all official government and FRELIMO narratives, that fought the war based on military means and arguments that attempted to popularly discredit RENAMO and deflate the arguments of the war, during the conflict, a significant part of society joined RENAMO, notably in rural areas. Likewise, in urban areas, opponents disagreed with FRELIMO's sustained development model, dubbed the "Villager State," which focused, among other factors, on the collectivisation of the means of production and the building of communal villages (Campos, 2009: 85)²⁸.

1984 marked an important moment for the conflict. Through the Nkomati Agreement, South Africa had promised to withdraw its support for RENAMO, which had begun to weaken. Three years later, President Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash. In the transition, Joaquim Chissano assumed state leadership in 1986 and began the most violent phase of the conflict, with internationally condemned massacres. The international context influenced the internal dynamic of the conflict: when the USSR fell, financial resources significantly reduced, as illustrated in the following chart.

²⁸ The war hit mainly rural areas, where schools and hospitals were destroyed, students and teachers were kidnapped, and economic infrastructure, such as bridges, roads, canteens and tractors were destroyed. Of the 5.886 primary schools, 3498 (60%) were closed or destroyed. In Zambezia, only 12% of schools continued to function until the end of the war. Of the number of primary-level health posts, which from 1975 to 1985 had risen from 326 to 1195, about 500 were closed or destroyed during the war. More than 3000 rural canteens had been closed or destroyed. It is estimated that about 1 million people died, 1.7 million took refuge in neighbouring countries, and at least 3 million were displaced from their areas of origin. This generated significant economic impacts for the government (Campos, 2009). Thus, the civil war can be considered to have greatly weakened the empirical sovereignty of the State; that is, territorial control, popular recognition and its military defence capacity (Cahen, 2010).




Figure 7: Military investments

Source: Jafar 2014

Jafar (2014) states that, already in the mid-1980s, negotiations with the West deepened, marked by the imminent end of the Cold War, which was characterised as the breakdown of the USSR and socialism and, consequently, the cut-off (Jafar, 2014: 4). In 1987, economic aid from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were based on the following pillars: a) the abandonment of the Marxist political orientation; b) inflation control; c) reduction of the state machine; and d) openness to foreign investments. As a result, military expenditures that had risen between 1980-1985, invested in the war economy, fell, especially from 1988. Without support for military logistics and the pressure to abandon Marxism-Leninism in 1989, FRELIMO acquiesced. The insertion of Mozambique into the capitalist context meant that many of the international resources directed to RENAMO were also mitigated. The international community was interested in ending the civil war, a factor that fostered the beginning of negotiations between both parties in 1990 (Campos, 2009: 78).

The pressure from international institutions (namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to reduce the military budget, the fall of the Eastern Bloc (which supported the logistics and military budget of the FRELIMO government), and the hegemony of the Western Bloc and liberalism that supported RENAMO, aroused FELIMO's understanding that the political regime was unlikely to resist in the context of intensifying RENAMO military incursions²⁹. The survival of this crossroads would depend on the regime's ability

²⁹ With the intensification of the war in the mid and late 1980s, RENAMO came to control almost 80% of the Mozambican territory. The severe droughts that had badly affected the south of the country, the economic recession, the growing

to negotiate with RENAMO for a peaceful solution. The Catholic Church, whose commitment to peace was affirmed in 1988 in Mozambique at the time of the Pope's apostolic visit, supported the feasibility of the pacification project. In his contacts with different entities, Pope John Paul II stressed the need to build a great nation where the pursuit of peace should be built on justice and platonic love, not on the military solution. In a fragmented political and military context weakened by war and slaughter, Pope John Paul II appealed to Mozambicans that the paths of peace should be established on the foundations of tolerance, forgiveness, and reconciliation.

Calling for the need to build a state founded on respect, the Supreme Pontiff stressed the need for all Mozambicans to view existence with serenity, and to look to the future with hope and reconciliation. Thus, a year after the papal visit, new paths for peace began to be designed; the military option that had been in place since 1976 was replaced by dialogue led by the Community of Sant Egidio, an institution belonging to the Catholic Church. Four years later, the Rome Peace Agreement was signed in October 1992. To build a state on the foundations of reconciliation, with amnesty for those involved on both sides of the conflict, the peace agreement established that "there would be the guarantee of individual basic rights, such as: freedom of beliefs, opinion and association; party pluralism; independence of the courts; free and secret elections; respect for civic and human rights (Campos, 2009: 85). There would also be the creation of a national army and the establishment of elections, which took place in 1994.

4.3. Mozambique in democratic political transition

This section aims to present a case study on democratisation in Mozambique, analysing the variables related to this historical period; the constitutional and institutional dimensions that preconditioned political opening of the country; and the indicators of democracy consolidation: political alternation, election quality, political rights, and civil liberties. Based on these indicators, it will be possible to understand the political dynamics of Mozambique in the 1990s until today. The analysis of the effective alternation of power is one of the

decline of the Soviet Union, and the cut in aid, forced the Mozambican government to accept neoliberal impositions in exchange for Western foreign aid, thus abandoning the socialist system for the capitalist system, characterised by a market-oriented economy, private property, and the active involvement of the private sector in the economy (Jafar, 2014: 20).

main aspects that explains the success of a democratic transition. To analyse the results of this variable in Mozambique, it is necessary to understand the political trajectory of the country since its founding elections. For the alternation of party power to be considered effective, the president-elect would be able to exercise his entire mandate without any impediments. The quality of the elections will be studied here, based on the Freedom House and Afrobarometer data. To measure democratic gains in Mozambique, we will look at the topics of political rights and civil liberties.

In January 1990, President Chissano announced the need for a constitutional reform. At the time, the country was going through very tense political and social atmosphere. In addition to a political and military conflict concentrated in rural areas, the country was experiencing a wave of strikes by workers in urban areas. In most cases, the workers were demanding for better salaries and price reductions in a context where the Government had reached an understanding with the International Monetary Fund to introduce the Economic Rehabilitation Program. The country was experiencing an economy weakened by war and natural disasters: drought and floods. The wave of riots that spread in the main urban centres and the fears of riots and "peasant revolts" reinforced the conviction that the solution to the military conflict lay in conversation between the government and Renamo. The first conversation with Renamo began in July 1990. Both parties had been informed by international community that large-scale humanitarian assistance would only be sent if they reached a convincing peace agreement. The government and RENAMO therefore quickly agreed on "guiding principles for humanitarian assistance", promising security for relief operations for both sides in the conflict (Einar Braathen and Aslak Orre. 2001).

4.3.1. Political liberalisation and democratisation: Processes, challenges and outcomes

Mozambique, like a set of Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe), are examples of states where the opening period of democratic and political liberalisation appears in the ruling dictatorial regime, with the most prominent fault line being that between hardliners and soft-liners. Constitutional reforms and the elites who supported the authoritarian regime followed the process. The elite involved in the transition process had been in power since independence. In the Mozambican context,

the liberalisation of the political field was influenced by the internal factors of a fragmented regime: by the ruling elites in disagreement with the autocratic regime. There was also favourable international pressure for political change on the continent. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund imposed conventionalities to reduce the military budget and liberalise the political and economic arenas. At the same time, the socialist bloc that supported the FRELIMO government regime fell in 1989. The hegemony of the Western Bloc and the liberalism that instead supported RENAMO aroused FRELIMO's understanding that the international geopolitics that supported the military conflict was changing.

In 1989, when the Summit of the Heads of States of the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries took place, São Tomé and Príncipe had already endorsed in its Constitution the implementation of the multiparty system (Veiga, 2016: 119). After a constitutional referendum in favour of liberal democracy, Sao Tome and Príncipe held the first multiparty elections in 1991. In 1991, then-President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde followed the same example. Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique resisted the process of liberalisation of their political field. In the book *Minha Vida, Nossa História*, Aristides Pereira reports that the São Tomean position generated disagreement between the leaders of the continental PALOP, considering that the Mozambican and Angolan governments were surprised by the archipelago's political change, as noted in affirmation:

This issue was very much overlooked, especially by Angola and Mozambique. By the way, José Eduardo dos Santos had very close relations with Pinto da Costa, and criticized him harshly, considering the MLSTP decision almost a betrayal to the group, for not having even warned what he ended up doing. Without a doubt, Pinto da Costa was a bit bad. José Eduardo was very hard on him. Then José Eduardo also had to make his opening, albeit unwillingly. The movement was unstoppable, and fortunately for Cape Verde, we were among the first to realize this alongside Sao Tome and Principe, of course (Veiga, 2016: 1).

The collapse of the regime and the rapid emergence of a new, democratic system happened with the establishment of a democratic institutional structure, often through the promulgation of a new constitution. Regarding constitutional change, it is important to note

that since 1989, even before the V Congress was held, FRELIMO had initiated a constitutional revision process, with the aim of making some specific amendments to the Constitution. In January 1990, the FRELIMO political bureau proposed a constitutional text. The proposed text went far beyond a simple revision. It proposed a completely new constitution, marked essentially by the disappearance of the reference to the leading role of the FRELIMO party in the Mozambican socio-political process. Taken into the public debate organised by the government, the new constitutional text was approved by the National Assembly in November 1990. The regime formally abandoned non-partisanship and popular democracy. The 1990 Constitution thus introduced multiparty, constitutional guarantees of individual and collective fundamental freedoms, and the organisation of elections.

Thus, constitutionally, it broke with the emerging paradigm in the context of independence and formalised the right of existence of political parties, and the legal conditions to have separation between legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Thus, the 1990 Constitution reordered a new relationship between state institutions, created the conditions for “polycentrism”, freedom of expression, association, and political organisation of citizens within the multiparty system, and the principle of the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The constitutional transformations transposed in the new Article 2, that had political implications for Mozambican society, are the basis of minimalist democracy (discussed in chapter 2) and gave rise to the advent of the modern and democratic state, based on the need for respect: a) the organisation of the political power, the unitary nature of the state, and the republican form of government; b) pluralist democracy (Dahl, 2000: 48); c) the separation and interdependence of powers, as well as the independence of the courts (Montesquieu, 1748: 985); e) the separation between the churches and the state (initially developed by Machiavelli); and f) the existence and autonomy of local government and the democratic decentralisation of public administration. Based on these principles, the theoretical construction of liberal democracy, the Popular National Assembly instituted the law of the legal regime of political parties, the law for the election of members of parliament and the president of the republic, and the law that recognises the right to broadcast and respond to parties, among others.

This section described the constitutional, institutional, and external environments that determined political transition in Mozambique. It was assumed that the opening of the political field, the political transition to democratisation in Mozambique, was a process that proceeded from the direction of the single party, FRELIMO, influenced by external and internal pressure in a context in which state capacity in military conflict had diminished because of the slowdown in foreign support, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and the affirmation of liberalism. This section did not discuss the qualitative elements of the Mozambican political regime in the context of the democratic transition. The following sections will deal with this aspect. Elections are relevant indicators in the analysis of democracy and state-building. Transparency and political alternation, political freedoms, and civil rights are assumptions that the research will take to measure the quality of the democratic transition in Cape Verde.

4.3.2. Elections, democracy, and effective alternation of political power in Mozambique

In the Mozambican political context, the electoral process resulted from an agreement to achieve political stability and the democratisation of the regime. These processes were negotiated between the two main political actors: the government headed by FRELIMO, and RENAMO. However, almost 25 years after the first election, it is necessary to question the extent to which elections are a real vector for peace, political stability, and democratisation. These issues will be discussed in this section, considering the nature and dynamics of the electoral system, the bodies of the electoral administration, the processes and outcomes that the elections produce, and their consequences for the national political system. However, elections can lead a society towards greater conflict as well as greater collaboration, which emphasises the fact that democratisation and conflict management processes are closely linked (Tollenaere, 2006). The discussion brings to the debate the notion that the consolidation and sustainability of democratic systems depends on the levels of commitment, acceptance, adherence, and maximum consensus on electoral system rules (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 19).

The Italian sociologist and political scientist Bobbio (1986), shows that the perception of the notions of consensus and dissension is important in the definition of pluralistic democracy, because democracy is a political system that presupposes such a

disagreement, requiring consensus based on competition rules. However, Hyden (1999) operationalised the concept of trust as studied in the structural perspective of governance and understood as the normative consensus on the limits of action in a political system. Thus, the rules of the game are not always legitimately accepted, which presupposes that a common goal among the actors in the political field cannot be achieved. Due to this complexity of the validity of the rules of the game, trust and accountability appear important in any process of democracy consolidation. The more the management of the system is characterised by qualities associated with accountability and trust, the more the authority and legitimacy of the democratic process will be assured.

The Mozambican electoral system was initially the result of negotiations between the two parties involved in the armed conflict, and later underwent a consultation process with the remaining national political forces. However, the insignificance of the latter resulted in an understanding between the two major parties, who decided not to facilitate the opening of political space to other movements (Brito, 2000: 3). In this respect, there is a clear problem in Mozambique. In 1994, for example, right in the first elections, RENAMO refused to accept the election results. Only after a negotiation process involving the diplomatic corps accredited in Maputo, and with SADC members, was it possible to convince RENAMO to accept the results. In both 2004 and 2009, RENAMO again refused to accept the election results. In 1999 and 2014, there were violent military conflicts associated with the management of electoral processes. The facts show that the Mozambican electoral system, despite being negotiated between the two largest political forces, is exclusionary and does not offer sufficient guarantees to overcome a lack of confidence. It is a source of potential conflict and instability, challenging democratic transition.

This distrust and need for control gave rise to the systematic accusations of fraud and RENAMO's difficulties in accepting election results. Our conclusion is that, regardless of the concrete problems of discord and potential post-electoral conflicts, and who may be right in the electoral disputes, there is a problem of distrust in the system and particularly the institutions which are most directly responsible for management. Even with the presence of civil society organisations that would supposedly play an arbitrary and consensual role among the main political contenders, the main political parties still seek

greater control over the process and influence of the election results. This has affected the transition process of state-building and democratisation in Mozambique.

In 2012, some signs of exclusion in the political system were highlighted by voices linked to the opposition party. The largest opposition party accused President Armando Guebuza that his intransigence threatened peace and stability, given the escalating levels of political exclusion. As a result, RENAMO relocated its headquarters to the Gorongosa Mountains and their leader remained there because of the army's attempts to capture or kill him. After months of clashes, a hostility cessation agreement was signed in September 2014. It agreed to allow RENAMO candidates to participate in the October election. Tensions rose again after the elections, with RENAMO accusing FRELIMO of fraud and violent suppression of the opposition and demanding direct control of six provinces (initially called "autonomous regions") where they had gained a majority. Meanwhile, as of 2015, the government of Mozambique and RENAMO have begun a new negotiation process to end the resurgent-armed conflict following the 2014 election results. Although some progress has been made in the negotiating process, and on the 6th of August 2019, a Definitive Peace Agreement has been signed, the causes of the conflict existing in Mozambican society is far from reaching a definitive solution. National income redistribution mechanisms and the politicisation of Mozambican public administration excludes and marginalises significant sectors of society. Premeditated errors in the electoral process and affecting electoral outcomes increasingly perpetuate the errors of representation of local elites in state structures.

While the first Mozambican peace agreement was signed in 1992, the civil war (2012 - 2014; from 2015); post-election violence (Montepuez in 2000 and Mocímboa da Praia in 2005); the attacks on state institutions and civilian populations in the Cabo Delgado province (from 2017), are all evidence that Mozambique's recent history of political violence has had a negative political impact. Indeed, the Mozambican process of political transition and democratisation is not peaceful, as the literature has long repeated, and does not produce the desired effects on Mozambican society. The trajectory of the Mozambican political transition has been blocked at some points along the way in regimes, which restrict political contest, or can be threatened by military intervention (Przeworski, 1991: 77; Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009: 9). The questions remain: how

to explain the systematic use of violence in the Mozambican political process? What factors are behind the recurrent political violence in Mozambique? This research starts from these questions to understand the dynamics of political violence and its relationship with the phenomenon of social cohesion in the Mozambican context.

4.3.3. Consolidating democracy by political alteration in power

“How can a person lose elections that he organizes himself?” Moboto Sese Seko's reaction to the defeat of Kenneth Kaunda in the first multiparty elections in Zambia in 1991.

Political alteration of power is often seen as a form of protest vote (Huntington, 1994), as a way of showing displeasure with the previous political regime, strongly influenced by Marxism, while at the same time retaining hope and confidence in restoration. This factor tends to show that there was a certain exhaustion of the dominant paradigm, which after independence lasted almost a decade and a half. This stimulated the collective will to change the regime and, in the Hobbesian language, establish a new political pact with the state to end the single party system and democratise institutions and the political system. The new paradigm, in a new political pact achieved through a modern process of legitimization of the institutions of the political system, were made through profound transformations and (re)configurations of the political and economic fields.

There is a widespread assumption in the literature that parties play (or can play) a vital role in democratic consolidation. In the words of O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 89):

if there is ever a heroic moment for political parties, it comes in their activity leading up to, during and immediately following the founding elections, when, for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions. Thus, democratic consolidation is a simple mechanistic in which a country has experienced two successive and peaceful transfers of power to much deeper conceptions of what democracy ought to entail (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 89).

The figure below shows that, despite of the saturation of the national political system, associated with poverty and economic crises, Mozambique never saw an alteration of political power.




Figure 8: Electoral results in Mozambique

Source: Based on data from CNE legislative elections (1994-2019)

However, as noted above by Moboto Sese Seko in Zaire in 1991, when Kaunda lost the election in Zambia, it is relevant to understand how the government, led by FRELIMO, have been planning to avoid losing elections that they organised themselves. Schedler (2006) states that Mozambique is on the list of authoritarian electoral systems. This framework results from the fact that the state has established electoral competition as the only acceptable game for democratisation. At the same time as the electoral game (the voting contest) was established, two symmetrical meta-games were introduced: the authoritarian manipulation game, in which the ruling party controls the results of the electoral competition, and the institutional reform game, where the opposition party dismantles the undemocratic restrictions that undermine its struggle for votes. This model of authoritarian elections is not a conventional game, in which actors compete within a given institutional framework designed, accepted, based on consensus, and respected by all. They are fluid, adaptable, and disputed games whose basic rules are defined during the election process dispute (De Tollenaere, 2019: 115).

Thus, the fact that FRELIMO was able to lead the democratic transition from the outset, and not allow political alternation, keeping RENAMO blocked, resulted from the fact that it had kept election institutions hostage to the competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO. They have not developed a will for independent political competition. In this way, FRELIMO convinced the opposition, civil society, and the international community that the elections and electoral reforms were aimed at consolidating democracy and the

political system. In fact, reforms had the essential function of maintaining control, ensuring domination and maintaining opposition in the game.

After the supposedly successfully transitioning from war to peace and achieving remarkable levels of economic growth, Mozambique, over several years (since the signing of the General Agreement of Peace in 1992), was creating conditions for the resurgence and reproduction of armed violence. In fact, the “success story” badly camouflaged the increasingly notorious “institutionalisation” of social, political, and economic exclusion, ultimately undermining peace, political stability, and social cohesion. Indeed, in this regard, the 2009 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report draws attention to the dangers of exclusion as follows: “Discrimination and economic and social exclusion create a resentful population among those who are not FRELIMO members. The reality of excluding non- FRELIMO members is that they are marginalised and cannot participate in or take advantage of economic and other opportunities normally available to citizens”. In this sense, the “success story” itself contained a contradiction at all levels. There is no deep transformation in the FRELIMO party, which continues working as a state-party. As an example, under Article 76 of its statutes, FRELIMO continues to oversee the action of state bodies. Incidentally, Cistac, (2013), in his discussion of the three state powers in Mozambique, brings an interesting analysis to the scope of article 76 of the FRELIMO statutes, and their implications for the construction of a democratic rule of law. In his view, article 76 sets the stage for a pre-state system (a neo-patrimonial regime in which the state becomes the instrument or heritage of the ruling party) that hinders the construction of a modern state and consequently, it represents a major setback in the construction of a democratic rule of law (Cistac, 2013: 19).

In addition to the aspects, we mentioned earlier, in late 2017 an armed group launched an attack on state institutions and civilian populations in northern Mozambique. Perpetrated by an unknown group with claims to the practice of radical Islam, this armed attack was a new phenomenon in the Mozambican political process and raises several questions, not only from the point of view of the nature of the group and its motivations, but also regarding the political, social and economic implications of the phenomenon itself for the country. Several national and foreign media have paid attention to the phenomenon since the first attack. The available information on the subject is still scarce. It has been

increasingly difficult for journalists and researchers to access the sites plagued by the attacks. In fact, since the beginning of the armed attacks in October 2017, at least six journalists have been detained: three foreigners and one Mozambican in 2018, and two Mozambicans in 2019 (DW, 2019). The government's official statement announced that the situation is under control. However, the attacks have been intensifying, and a climate of terror among the civilian populations and economic agents in the districts of the north of Cabo Delgado province has been intensified.

4.3.4. Political rights and civilian liberties in the political transition context

In the previous sections, the research mentioned that elections are theoretically a necessary condition for the establishment of democracy and political stability. However, in the specific case of Mozambique, the electoral process is not always a sufficient condition for its consolidation of democracy. To this end, the research agrees with Giovanni Sartori, who states that democracy is not just about gaining the right to vote or be voted for, and establishing legitimate institutions where the supreme rule governing the electoral process defines the outcome. Election is the rule of the majority. Behind this assumption lies the liberal idea that democracies consolidate when they observe a set of political rights and fundamental civil liberties (Colton, *et al.*, 2008: 29).

The above theoretical argument is the basis used by *Freedom in the World 2019* to evaluate the state of freedom in 195 countries and 14 territories. Each country and territory are assigned between 0 and 4 points on a series of 25 indicators, for an aggregate score of up to 100. These scores are used to determine two numerical ratings, for political rights and civil liberties, with a rating of 1 representing the most free, the best conditions, and 7 the least free, the worst. A country or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings then determine whether it has an overall status of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. The following table shows how the Mozambican state has evolved in the protection of political rights and civil duties.

Table 8: Level of freedom in Mozambique 1998-2019

Indicators	1999	2009	2019
Civil Liberties	4	3	4

Political Rights	3	3	4
Freedom Rating	3.5	3	4
Freedom Status	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free

Compiled from Freedom House Report: 1998-2019

The above table represents a context in which the right to form political parties is largely respected. Several parties compete, although most lack resources to campaign effectively and build a public following. FRELIMO, the dominant party, can be found even with elections, where civil and political liberties are violated. As such, the regime is considered authoritarian, as there are signs that the state is closest to an authoritarian regime. The latest EIU report shows that Mozambique has been deteriorating in democratic performance. Last year, the country went from a hybrid state to an authoritarian state (EIU, 2019: 28). Opposition parties are allowed, but under strict control of the hegemonic party with whom they cannot compete for control over the government (Caramani, 2011: 244). With similar characteristics to that of an authoritarian regime, the Mozambican state's political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed.

In terms of the rule of law in this context, there is no clear division between the state and the party, and the party has few to no links with civil society. Patronage networks are deeply entrenched, with various groups competing for state resources. Political power remains generally centralised in the executive branch, which dominates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state. The ruling party controls all state apparatus. Even if some formal institutions of formal democracy exist, these have little substance.

Even if elections do occur, these are not free and fair. Elections are administered by the *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, and the government controls the process by which the CNE members are appointed. The electoral management body, at different administrative levels, is exposed to criticism and is distrusted by opposition parties, who contend that this affects the impartiality of the body. Even with the introduction of a multiparty system in 1990, there was no political alternation. However, opposition parties made major gains in the 2014 elections, when FRELIMO lost 47 seats, while RENAMO gained 38 seats.

The 2018 constitutional reforms introduced some measures to reduce centralisation. But there is no law nor deep debate to de-partisanise the state apparatus that is exclusively and monopolistically controlled by the ruling party. A judiciary susceptible to pressure from the executive branch further complicates attempts to enforce anticorruption laws. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship, as well as no independent judiciary system (EIU, 2018: 45). Corruption remains widespread at the highest levels of government. The anticorruption legal framework is undermined by a variety of ambiguities: misappropriation is not included in the Anti-Corruption Law. The annual report from the general attorney confirmed that the national political system is confronted with problems of corruption, organised crime, and environmental crimes; and there was no juristic progress on hidden debt.

In terms of political rights, the data illustrate that there is a disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. The media are state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. State-run outlets dominate Mozambique's media sector, and authorities often direct these to provide coverage favourable to the government. However, several smaller independent outlets provide important coverage. *Journalists frequently experience government pressure, harassment, and intimidation. This encourages self-censorship* (Freedom House Report, 2019: 2). The government is known to retaliate against journalists who criticize it by cancelling public advertising contracts. Journalists and political commentators appearing on television programs have been the targets of attacks and kidnappings in recent years (Freedom House Report, 2019: 2). In March 2018, Ericino de Salema³⁰, a journalist and political commentator who regularly expressed criticisms of the government on a television talk show, was abducted and

³⁰ Among the forms of violence, summary executions have always been practiced by totalitarian organisations aimed at the elimination of people and the institution of social terror, represented by extermination groups such as death squads (Campbell & Brenner, 2000; Hammer, 2010; Mason & Dale, 1989). These include the death squads in Davos (Oude Breuil & Rozema, 2009), the Philippines Mindanao (Neistat & Seok, 2009) and Northern Ireland (Rolston, 2006). In Latin America, during the 1960s (Klare & Stein, 1974; Mazzei, 2009; Morris, 2010; Oude Breuil & Rozema, 2009), in the context of military regimes, death squads were established as organisations for the purpose of catering to the interests of authoritarian governments, citing in Colombia paramilitary groups responsible for eliminating government opponents (Duncan, 2006; Oude Breuil & Rozema, 2009; Rangel, 2005; Watson, 1990) and, in Uruguay, to support the military government associated with the United States of America against the advance of communism (McSherry, 2007). Therefore, death squads are formed as a form of totalitarian state terrorism, promotion organisations (Stohl, 2006; Wolpin, 1992), with the purpose of maintaining political and social control in a country, such as the police organisation formally associated with the government of the Nazi regime in the 1930s and 1940s (Browder, 1996; Butler, 2004; Langerbein, 2003), GESTAPO, which, among other things, was to eliminate the enemies of that regime (Crankshaw, 2002; Delarue, 2008; Gellately, 1992; Koehler, 2008). Most of these squads operate underground, marginalised in the formal police system, as "support groups" responsible for doing the "dirty work" of ending people who are considered politically, socially or economically inconvenient.

attacked before being left on the side of a road in Maputo (Freedom House Report, 2019: 2)³¹.

4.4. Concluding remarks

After independence, the Mozambican political system adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology as the guideline of the state. The commitment to this ideology was so strong that in 1977, during the 3rd Congress, FRELIMO assumed it as its political and ideological guideline for both party and state. Leninist-Marxist ideology influenced a set of authoritarian and violent practices led by the ruling party, which institutionally controlled and directed the state by limiting a set of political rights and civil liberties. In the late 1980s, influenced by internal and external factors, the Mozambican state began a process of political reform that made possible the paths for democratic transition. Despite some progress, institutional reforms have not caused profound changes in the structuring aspects of the state. The institutionalisation of death squads, which are violent groups operating with state support to crack down on anti-regime actors, is a continuation of the authoritarian practice that prevailed during the one-party period. The systematic violation of political rights and civil liberties, and the deterioration of political indicators, are signs that, in the context of the transition to democratisation, the country has introduced institutional reforms and kept in mind the structuring authoritarian aspects of a past political and ideological practice inspired by Marxism-Leninism.

³¹ See: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/mozambique/freedom-world/2021>

Chapter 5: CAPE VERDE: SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE & LIBERALISATION TRANSFORMATION

5.1. Introduction

The main argument of this chapter is taken from Schumpeter (1961), Huntington (1991) and North (1990), for whom the nature of political institutions determines the performance and builds the bases for development, including economic growth. In the African context, economic factors strongly influenced the transition processes and endorses Linz & Stepan's thesis, who support the idea that stagnation of economy can lead to the failure of a political regime. Nevertheless, for the author, the opposite can also occur. Therefore, a strong economy could be correlated with democratic advancement in the democratic consolidation process, and it is accomplished through a set of institutions and regulations that can regulate the market socially and politically. This means that an efficient state apparatus that is rooted in political and civil society would adopt an economic society predisposed to the consolidation of democracy. As such, a strong economy could be correlated with democratic advancement in the democratic consolidation process (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 13). A prosperous economy can lead to democratisation. This is not a change in the political arena, but a change in economics that triggers the non-legitimation of the authoritarian regime. Thus, economic effects matter for democratisation. Lipset's article is one of the most influential political essays on democracy of the past half-century. This article helps to understand the social bases of stable democracy included in one of the most powerful and enduring themes in comparative politics. His key thesis is remarkable, showing that *the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy*. It is theoretically rich in identifying a nexus of causal factors leading from the level of economic development to the prospects for a stable democracy. The key intervening variables have endured exceptionally well as explanations. To this day, these remain the key socio-economic determinants of democracy. Lipset's thesis is embedded in the larger body of modernisation theory, which mobilises evidence demonstrating that rising levels of income and education have diffuse impacts on attitudes and values, and through them, on political systems. Hence, the hypothesis about economic development

and democracy has since been supported by a vast literature of statistical studies (Przeworski, 2000). In general, most multivariate analysis of the determinants of democracy identifies economic development as a powerful factor. The studies related to the impact of economic development on political change suggest a strong relation between rising levels of economic development and the openness of political success, and between changing social structures and the emergence of political competition (Lipset, 1959: 71). Economic growth is important for maintaining a regime. When a country faces ever-negative levels of growth, the chances of maintaining the regime, whether authoritarian or democratic, are minimal. However, if a country maintains a stable level of growth, the chances for consolidating its institutions increase. Here, a degree of basic socio-political rights is respected. The key institutional arrangements are in place, and the political elite may support a full democratic opening and its consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 7).

This chapter explores the roles of political, economic, and ideological institutions to deepen democracy in the Cape Verdean context, drawing on North's (1990) work. The basis of North's analysis highlights the various types of regimes (institutions) and their influence on the economic performance of a society. To what extent have institutional frameworks shaped economic patterns, and how do they determine a society's political and economic satisfaction? In addition, this chapter will deepen the understanding of economic determinants in contexts of state transformation towards deepening democracy at an institutional level. The focus of this chapter is to unpack and analyse how strongly institutions influence economic performance and vice versa. The analysis of institutional aspects is relevant in understanding how political and economic institutions are affected by, and how they influence, consolidation and/or democratic indicators. This chapter explores the political institutionalism that underpins the procedural approach of democratisation, state-building, and economic development. In the early 1990s, Cape Verde witnessed a disadvantageous socio-political and economic situation, with 10% of its territory classified as arable, and without mineral resources (Bourdet, 2000: 121). These disadvantages were accompanied by a reduction in the limited capacity of the state to provide public goods and services. This led to the exhaustion of the ideological political paradigm of Marxism-Leninism, and inaugurated an emerging paradigm based on the ideals of the liberal theory that directed the Third Wave of Democratisation. The first

moments of the negotiation for opening and transition set up a configuration of the new political field, based on the assumptions of the neoclassical economy, expressed as a firm minimalist conviction of the regulatory and supervisory role of the state in the economy (Carothers, 2002: 7). Finally, this chapter focuses on Cape Verdeans' analysis of economic performance. In this last section, the research analyses the importance attributed to democracy and how it is assessed, considering Cape Verde's economic performance. Turning to the supply side of political and economic transformations, the chapter discusses whether Cape Verdeans think they are getting the expected results from democratisation. The research will focus on attitudes toward democracy, evaluations of governance, institutional trust, and citizen's economic satisfaction. The analysis will be developed taking into consideration two historical moments that affected Cape Verde's political and economic transformations: 1975-1990 and 1990-2019.

5.2. Institutional and structural elements in the socio-economic transformation of the post-independent state

Certain institutional and structural analytical dimensions, in the context of post-independence, political transition and the building of the democratic state in Cape Verde, remain challenges for democratisation and good governance. This chapter examines the impact of a set of ideologies, as well as normative and legal frameworks that the state has adopted within the national and international arena. The key ideological aspect that impacts on institutional design is Marxism-Leninism and the subsequent constitutional design and legal frameworks that shaped political and economic developmental dynamics. By understanding institutional design and the relationship between actors and structures, it is possible to explain how and why Cape Verde moved closer to patterns of engagement that, from an economic and developmental perspective, are significant shapers of state actors. The first Cape Verdean constitution based on principles of pluralism and multipartyism was adopted in 1980. With some democratic characteristics in the political system, Article 4 of the new constitution safeguarded the right to pluralism, and the right to form political parties. It contributed to the organisation and expression of citizens' will and political pluralism, constituting a fundamental intermediating structure for citizen participation in the political environment. Respecting the Montesquieu principle of the separation of powers, Article 46 of this constitution set up the independence of the

legislature and decided on the fundamental questions of the state's internal and external policies. However, less democratic features were found in Articles 11 and 12, which designed the organisation of the economic system in Cape Verde's post-independence context. According to Article 11, private property was recognised, but the state was the exclusive owner of natural goods and services. In Article 12, it was agreed that the national economic system should be governed under the principles of state direction and centralised planning, with control over foreign trade. In the context of the welfare state, the right of citizens to the benefits was accompanied by reciprocal duties. The need for complementarity rights and obligations was particularly great in the fields of work, law and order, education, and the social services.

In February 1981, the first constitutional revision took place, which reversed some democratic gains made in 1980. These revisions intensified the notion of the welfare state, with the state's control over the economy, continuing the basic principle of planning, and of state direction. The state started to have exclusivity in the creation and control of industrial production. The means of information and communication, banks, insurance, infrastructure and fundamental means of public transport remained under state control. Article 4 previously recognised a single-party system, establishing the PAICV as the only political party allowed to govern. At the same time, the PAICV was self-declared the only legitimate party to establish the general guidelines of the state's political, economic, social and cultural programs. The PAICV Political Program expressed the party-state connection and its control over the economy, by stating:

The party is the central ruling nucleus, the first and main institution of political power from which the others sprang; the state, a privileged instrument that the party has to carry out its social, cultural, defence and security economic program, an institution that expresses the popular will, has the means to materialize it through the law (PAICV, 1983: 12-13).

PAICV's hegemonic dominance under the one-party system in Cape Verde, occurred at all levels. Economically, there was strict state control in nationalising and centralising the economic sectors. The state was responsible for directing and guiding the economic system that, in principle, should favour the cooperative sector and a state sector of public companies in the various services (PAICV, 1983: 23). Socially, party dominance was

created through social organisations established to serve as channels for mobilising society and recruiting politicians. Thus, the OMCV (Cape Verde Women's Organization), JAACCV (Youth Amilcar Cabral of Cape Verde), and OPAD-CV (Cape Verde Pioneers Organization) were created. These mass organisations depended entirely on the party, and everyone who wanted to be part of them had to submit to an ideology based on the party's guidelines (Lopes, 1999: 40).

The influence of the single party in Cape Verde was also felt in the cultural and educational spheres. The ideological content from the PAICV was introduced in basic school textbooks, who also controlled the process of selecting scholarships abroad (Cardoso, 2016: 206). Culturally, the party established film restrictions and created an institution, the CIDC (Commission for Cultural Investigation), to carry out such media censorship and control. The media, being state owned, were subordinate to the party, which used them to spread its politics and ideological principles. They served exclusively the single ruling party and were directly tutored by members of the government (Cardoso, 2016: 202). Letters, brochures and leaflets were distributed illegally, criticising the ruling single-party system. There was a single information channel that criticised the government: the *Terra Nova* newspaper, which belonged to the Franciscan friars, and which often criticised and challenged the political and economic regime.

For a better understanding, the research considers the relationship between economics, politics and prosperity, as discussed by Linz and Stepan (1996: 7). To what extent did the set of institutional and structural dimensions make socioeconomic transformations feasible and responsive to the collective demands of Cape Verdeans, developed in the context of the expectations created under national independence? In the context of the work of Schumpeter (1961), Huntington (1991) and North (1990), to what extent does the type of regime (institutions) that succeeded in Cape Verde after independence, determine performance and the arrangement of the foundation for growth and economic development?

5.2.1. Post-independent state institutions: Economics and crises of dominant ideologies

Following independence, many African states adopted Marxism-Leninism. This ideology influenced a strong monopoly on a closed and controlled economy. In Cape Verde, the ideological option must be seen within a historical and political dynamics influenced by international geopolitics. At the time, Eastern European countries, China, the GDR, Cuba and Algeria, supported the struggle unleashed by the PAIGC by providing war materials and allowing some of its militants to train in their countries (Évora, 2009: 37). Even so, the choice of ideological orientation and economic priorities after Cape Verde's independence was not peaceful and built on consensus.

Despite the inter-party union preserved until 1979, ideological divergences emerged among the members of PAIGC, involving two antagonistic and conflicting groups which emerged in the PAICV. The first group supported a more open and pluralist political regime: the Trotskyists. The second was more conservative but had the advantage of being in a higher hierarchical position in the direction of the party. This second group was in the sphere of government and strongly supported the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. They did not allow the creation of other political parties. This ideological divergence triggered a destabilisation within the party. According to Évora, the divergence of ideas within the party occurred because there were no legal alternatives to mediate institutional tensions and conflicts (Évora, 2009: 81).

Cape Verde's socio-economic characteristics and geographical conditions, marked by the dispersion and isolation of the islands, did not allow for a better economic articulation of the country in the region. The fragmented insularity of the ten islands, with a very steep and rugged terrain (in most islands), has extremely heavy effects on the costs of basic infrastructure, services, and essential goods. It reduces internal connections and synergies and constitutes an obstacle to internal movement of people and goods. The country was confronted with an unfair distribution of income; and discriminatory practices, inequalities, and autocracy, inherited from the coloniser, disappeared completely (Évora, 2009: 99). These factors were aggravated by the lack of qualified staff and of external financial support. For this reason, the Cape Verdean state was unable to sustain the monopolistic, centrally planned economy, influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

At this crossroads of challenges, the Cape Verdean political elite ensured the hybrid combination of economic development models, which remained in the period under analysis (1975-1990). This hybrid combination guaranteed the functioning of public and mixed companies under state control. The state controlled and monitored the performance of small independent producers and cooperatives, as well as the private business sector. In this economic arrangement, it was necessary to ensure the efficiency of the state's political direction in the economy and to guarantee the fulfilment of the development objectives. A hybrid development model was adopted, combining some characteristics of liberal democracy, stimulating private sectors, with a monopoly and centralising characteristics of popular democracy. The system was inspired and ideologically oriented by Marxism-Leninism and state centralism, which lost consensus within the dominant elite of the party-state. In this context, the productive system was reformulated and made up of three sectors: a) the dominant sector of public and mixed companies with state control; b) the sector of small independent producers and cooperatives, as well as c) the private sector. However, in its form of structuring and functioning, it was up to the state to ensure the coherence and balance of the productive sectors, within the framework of pursuing the objectives set by the party (SECP, 1983: 74).

This reveals that the regime with totalitarian characteristics had a unifying and strong ideology that combined social, economic, and political plans with strong political leadership based on the charisma of a leader. The systematic adjustments that were made were aimed at protecting both the economic system and the political regime. According to the nature of the regime, the PAIGC initially controlled the right to freedom of economic action and thus constituted itself as a fundamental guardian of economic development. However, the context in which the economic regime was installed was less favourable to its sustainability. For this reason, a hybrid model was adopted, aimed to guarantee the stability of Cape Verde's socio-economic indicators. The Human Development Index, National Institute for Statistics, and V-DEM data have data that show the extent to which these dynamics favoured the effective redistribution of the desired gains in the context of independence. These aspects will be discussed in the following section.

5.2.2. Distributional patterns in the Cape Verdean economy: 1975-1990

The structure of the research is based on the economic indicators of the Human Development Index (HDI), which assesses three socio-economic pillars, namely: health, education, and the national income pattern. The HDI recognises the dichotomous relationship between democracy and socio-economic progress. The key assumption is that, to promote their individual skills and increase the potential for them to enjoy the freedom to live the life they desire, people must be at the centre of development. The research looks at HDI indicators and analyses the dynamics in the health sector in Cape Verde after national independence. The health pillar assesses the creation of conditions to achieve a long and healthy life. This is measured by life expectancy and control of mortality rates and contributes to the improvement of human wellbeing.

The education pillar measures the role of education in the political system and the results achieved in the sector after a given period, in this case 1975-1990. This is expressed as the total number of literate persons in each age group as a percentage of the total population in that age group. The adult literacy rate measures literacy among persons aged 15 years and above, and the youth literacy rate measures literacy among persons aged 15 to 24 years. The result is calculated by dividing the number of literates of a given age range by the corresponding age group's total population and multiplying the result by 100. Alternatively, apply the same method using the number of illiterates to derive the illiteracy rate; or by subtracting the literacy rate from 100% (UNESCO, 1999: 49).

GDP per capita is a measure of a country's economic output that accounts for its number of people, by dividing the country's gross domestic product by its total population (Clark et al. 2007: 103). This is a good measurement of a country's standard of living as it tells how prosperous a country feels to each of its citizens. GDP per capita is a country's economic output divided by its population (Feenstra *et al.*, 2015: 77). It is relevant for the research to highlight that economic growth has raised living standards around the world. However, modern economies have lost sight of the fact that the standard metric of economic growth, gross domestic product (GDP), merely measures the size of a nation's economy and does not reflect a nation's welfare, including inequality. GDP is an aggregate measure that includes the value of goods and services produced in an economy over a certain period. There is no scope for the positive or negative effects created in the process of production

and development. Hence, GDP does not capture the distribution of income across society; something that is becoming more pertinent in today's world with rising inequality levels in the developed and developing world alike. Regardless of the ideological model, Marxism-Leninism is a centrally planned economic system, with intimidating, repressive reforms, and political monopoly. The quantitative data presented in the table below reveal this in the period under analysis.




Figure 9: Cape Verde: GDP per capita 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM, 2017; V-DEM, 2018

With a real GDP per capita of US\$190 in 1975, its economic viability had been boosted, above all, with financial resources from abroad, such as remittances from emigrants, public development aid (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 1980 and 1985, the GDP per capita reached US\$550, having reached US\$900 in 1990 (V-DEM, 2017). Greater centralisation of planning, development policies and strategies allowed monetary control of the national currency and inflation rates. Nevertheless, important structural economic vulnerabilities (poverty, inequality, illiteracy) persisted. However, in 1990, when the political transition was taking place, there was some uncertainty about the future, so the country experienced economic instability in its inflation rate.




Figure 10: Cape Verde. Inflation Rates 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM, 2017, V-DEM, 2018

The inflation rate reached 21% in 1975. Meanwhile, between 1975 and 1990, there were moments of progress and setbacks in controlling the inflation rate. In the beginning, attempts to control the inflation rate were successful, reaching 5.9% in 1985. A deceleration and negative inflation trends were recorded in 1990, when the rate reached 11.1%. As a result, the purchasing power of the national currency declined, with the average price of a basket of goods and services in the Cape Verdean economy increasing over time. Statistics shown in the figure below indicate that literacy rates increased from 1.90% in 1980 to 2.38% in 1985, and reached 3.85% in 1990 (V-DEM, 2017).




Figure 11: Cape Verde: Literacy rate 1980-1990

Source: V-DEM, 2017, V-DEM, 2018

In this analytical variable, the V-DEM has available data from 1980. On average, literacy improved as the percentage of illiteracy dropped from 76.4% in 1975 to 66.8% in 1990. Investing in education was the privileged way of promoting economic growth. Based on the studies of (Carnoy and McEwan, 2000), in African countries, including Cape Verde, the state places itself at the centre of all socioeconomic processes. The state assumes the leading role in all sectors, leading not only the socio-economic development of the country, but also looking for a “new man”, shaped by the education system. It was thus that, in the 1980s, it was possible to draw an updated picture of the situation of education in Cape Verde. The prospective framework, developed in an action plan, was inserted in a long-term development strategy and in the continuity of the actions implemented by the government. Aiming at generalising access to education for all Cape Verdeans, these were implemented in the following years. The plans favoured the improvement of the

teaching staff; doubling the percentage of qualified teachers, an increase of around 120 with the primary teaching course and the in-service training of 250 others who had no qualification. Construction and equipment of at least 200 classrooms continued until 1990, as a way to end the “split over” regime: along with the generalisation of food assistance to children in need. The combination of these elements contributed to the improvement of the education sector.

The average life expectancy increased, while child mortality rates decreased, which implies an improvement in the quality of health, sanitation, and food. Life expectancy was, on average, 56.98 years in 1975 and reached 66.08 years in 1990 (INE, 2015: 22; V-DEM, 2017). Consequently, the infant mortality rate decreased from 110 per thousand in 1975 to 47.30 in 1990 (V-DEM, 2017).




Figure 12: Cape Verde: Life expectancy 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM, 2017

The data show that there was a directly proportional relationship between life expectancy and infant mortality, which decreased in the years following independence.




Figure 13: Cape Verde: Infant mortality 1975-1990

Source: INE, 2015

The socio-economic indicators, presented above, reveal positive trends, which raises questions about the relationship between political factors and socio-economic dynamics in the provision of public goods and services, and the satisfaction of the Cape Verdean population, in the context of a centrally planned, one-party system economy inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology.

During this period, 1975-1990, positive macroeconomic trends were recorded in Cape Verde. Why, in the period under analysis, (1975-1990), one of Marxist-Leninist domination, a centrally planned economy, and a political and economic monopoly, did Cape Verde register high levels of economic growth and development? The data still raise a question: what is the correlation between democracy and development, and economic growth? To what extent does the quantitative method of analysis lead us to the approximation of truth and facts lived in post-independence Cape Verde? The next section will use an analytical dimension to answer these questions.

5.2.3. Crisis and collapse of the welfare state, socioeconomic and dominant paradigm

The research analyses the implications of socio-economic transformation and political-ideological relations in Cape Verde after independence in the period between 1975 and 1990. The elements of analysis are relevant for understanding the socio-economic results or benefits achieved during the political and economic monopoly in Cape Verde. Cape Verde's economy and development process was inspired by the Marxist-Leninist ideology that guided the centrally planned production process. This section analyses the efficiency of the regime (institutions), the performance of economic growth, and development.

Despite the progress in socio-economic indicators, verified in the Cape Verdean political system, the electoral results showed signs of exhaustion and reduced voter confidence, as illustrated in the following figure:




Figure 14: Cape Verde: Eleitoral participation 1975-1985

Source: CABO VERDE. Comissão Nacional de Eleições.

The reduction in electoral support for the PAICV, from 86.7% in 1975 to 75.7% in 1980 and 68.6% in 1985, was a sign that the political pact between the PAICV's ruling elite and the citizens was running out (Reis, 2000: 107). This assumption establishes, at the outset, a relationship between levels of well-being, prevalent among members of a society, and the support it attributes to the political system. In the political dimension, the support of the Cape Verdean political regime, and of the PAIGC, in the first years of independence, resulted from the fact that this party symbolised the struggle against the colonial regime. However, the loss of political support is related to the deterioration of socioeconomic and redistributive gains in national income mainly from 1982 to 1990, as illustrated in Table 9.

What were the socio-economic factors that resulted in the rapid decline in PAICV's levels of political legitimacy? Based on these elements, the research will strive to understand to what extent the progress of economic and social indicators has influenced the political dynamics in Cape Verde. Easton (1965: 126) shows that the explanation of political legitimacy lies in the relationship between the benefits that citizens derive from institutions within a political system evident in increasing levels of human well-being. For Easton, citizens identify themselves with institutions because their political experiences, throughout their adult life, qualifying them to rationally assess their performance. Thus, citizens support political processes, based on the assessment of progress in social and economic areas, and by the extension or deprivation of rights established by law. The data in the following table shows that between 1975 and 1990, the country witnessed a deterioration in socioeconomic and distributive gains among members of a society. These

data help to establish the relationship between socioeconomic and redistributive gains in national income, mainly from 1982 to 1990, and the loss of political support.

Table 9: Cape Verde: Some socioeconomic indicators

Sectors		1975-1981	1982-1985	1986-1990
01	Rural Development	27,9 %	20.2 %	22.0 %
02	Transport and Communication	24.1 %	20.8 %	19.8 %
03	Administrative Reforms	8.5 %	7.1 %	7.6 %
04	Housing, Urbanism & Sanitation	6.6 %	6.7 %	5.7 %
05	Energy & Desalinization	5.8 %	5.9 %	5.0 %
06	Fishing and others activities	5.2 %	3.4 %	3.3 %

Source: Nacional Development Planning (1982-1985 & 1986-1990)

Table 9 presents the structure of public investments and reflects a reference framework close to the concept of human development assistance in Cape Verde after independence. It serves to assess progress in socioeconomic sectors between 1975 and 1990. The table 9 show that some socioeconomic gains deteriorated during this period. In general, the percentages in the table reveal the deterioration of investments in vital sectors of the economy and the society of Cape Verde; namely, administrative reforms (a determining factor for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and the consequent satisfaction of citizens), as well as housing, urbanisation, and basic sanitation. As a result, it excluded citizens from accessing basic goods and services, and put individuals out of control, unable to participate in the normal activities of which they would like to take advantage. These conditions posed a challenge to the economic policies and the Marxist-Leninist ideology intended to build an egalitarian society without social classes.

Additional analysis must be done on the demographic dynamics seen in Cape Verdean society, during this period. The result of the Household Survey (1988-1989) showed an increase in poverty over the decade (1980-1990). Looking at spatial inequalities, the study noted that extreme poverty was mainly rural, where 68% of the poor population lived. Extreme rural poverty had gone from 23% to 30%. The Gini coefficient is an instrument to measure social inequality and according to the methodology, the data varies between 0

and 1. In Cape Verde, the first Gini data are available from 1988 to 1989 and show a worsening of inequalities³² that went from 0.43 during the period of 1988 to 1989 and deteriorated to 0.59 during the period of 2001 to 2002.

In the context of poverty and a lack of understanding about the ideological line to promote development, poverty trends influenced emigration to urban centres, putting pressure on the state's capacity to allocate investments to strategic and vital sectors (Proença, 2009: 27). Point 3 of the table indicates that during the period under analysis, little investment was directed towards the modernisation of the public sector. From 8.5% in the first years of independence, investments to modernise the public sector dropped to 7.6% in 1990. This reduction influenced the levels of efficiency, effectiveness and the quality of public services, and consequently of social development (Reis, 2000: 110). This aspect influenced the collective perception of government transparency and performance, and affected citizens' levels of support, trust and legitimacy in relation to public institutions (Neves, 2002: 44-45).

The process of the provision of goods and services, in addition to having an intermediary role between the government and citizens, is influenced by demographic dynamics. At the time of independence, more than 70% of the young Cape Verdean population was under 28 years old and went from a growth rate of 1.5% in 1980 to 2.4% in 1990 (INE, 2015: 9). Point 4 of the table above shows that investment in the housing sector decreased from 6.6% (1978-1981) to 5.7% (1986-1990), in the context of a mostly young population.

On the one hand, the impossibility of following the unpredictable demographic projections posed challenges to the demands on the formulation of public policies, in the context of poverty and slowdown in investments. On the other hand, the misalignment between the demand and the supply of goods and services affected the state's ability to redistribute income to certain age groups. The analysis of demographic data is relevant to understand

³² Asymmetries: The island of Santiago is the one that most contributes to the national GDP, with a weight of 52.3% in 2002 and 53.2% in 2012. The islands of São Vicente, with 16.1% in 2002 and 15.2% 2012 and Sal with 12.8 in 2002 and 10.8% 2012, follow it. In the same period, the islands that contributed least to GDP were São Nicolau with 2.2% and 2.1%. The islands of Maio with 1.3% and 1.2% and Brava with 1.0% and 0.8 % are next. The island of Boa Vista grew considerably in contributions, from 2.5% to 5.2%. The island of Fogo maintained its position with 5.2% and the island of Santo Antão with 6.7% in 2002 and 6.2% in 2012. The municipality of Praia alone has a weight of 39%, and the other counties of Santiago had a weight of 14% in 2012 under the national GDP.

the demands on the state in the provision of public goods and services, such as housing and urbanisation, to which Cape Verde was exposed in the context of drought and political crisis, and which generated high levels of dissatisfaction and discredited the national political system. Although this element is not very relevant for this research, further studies may pay attention to these issues.

The state experienced a rapid process of demographic transition. In 1980, Cape Verde saw a demographic growth of 1.5%, rising to 2.4% in 1990. In 1970, only 11 Cape Verdeans in every 100 lived in urban areas. Since 1980, there has been a strong internal migration in the form of a rural exodus that resulted in an increasingly accentuated urbanisation process that has impacted the urban population. The urban population represented 44% of the population in 1990 (INE, 2015: 66). The demographic dynamics that imposed pressure on the state in the formulation of public policies and reconfiguration of the patterns of income distribution, reveal the divergence between the aggregate expectations that had been created after independence and the frustration experienced in the early 1980s. The demographic dynamic constituted a challenge in the patterns of redistribution of national incomes and put pressure on social infrastructure. With a school population growing fast, the evolution of the school network had been slow. Thus, many black school-aged Cape Verdean children did not have access to basic education. Consequently, they dropped out of school before finishing primary school (Moura, 2016: 100). As a result of this unequal access to learning opportunities, the regime preserved structures that limited at least some groups from realising their human rights, and transmitting ideologies that legitimated structures, or discouraged people from trying to transform them (Friedman, 1955: 99).

Over the years, the socioeconomic institutions created, as well as the constitutional revisions, laws, and policies, were not able to maintain and sustain political legitimacy. The regime began to show signs of declining legitimacy. The authoritarian tendencies of the regime, along with the lack of an effective renewal of the dominant elite, combined with a centrally planned economic model, disallowed the opening of Cape Verdean politics, and influenced the economic field in the post-independence period. The combination of these political and economic factors culminated in the bankruptcy of the

one-party regime and in the political openness and liberalisation that led to the transition to democracy. This can be seen as affecting the ruling party's legitimacy.

The ideological values inherent in the construction of a revolutionary popular democracy in Cape Verde aimed to ensure the participation of all social and political groups in the construction of a new society free from human exploitation (PAICV, 1983: 85). As such, political power belonged to the workers and peasants, united and directed by the PAICV (Neves, 2000: 202). For Neves, the disinvestment and disorganisation of vital social sectors (such as education and housing for young people) caused frustrations in a context in which the collective expectations built on the immediate benefits that were expected because of the national independence of Cape Verde increased. This influenced the magnitude of trust and legitimacy among citizens, the political elite, and the institutions of the Cape Verdean state.

Over the post-independence period, the Cape Verdean state focused on building strong institutional capacity to promote economic growth across societies marked by deep transformations. Numerous institutional reforms were introduced to help build administrative, fiscal, and regulatory capacity, as well as promote socioeconomic improvement. The institutions' transformation, however, have not translated into the kind of collective expected. To understand why governance reform has been unable to contribute to broader forms of wellbeing, the research analyses the process of institutional reform in Cape Verde. A persistent focus on institutional design has obscured the ways in which strong institution-building reconfigures cross-scalar power relations that mediate state and society expectations. In particular, the reform of inadequate ideologies and development approaches to respond to most general prospects exacerbates internal conflicts, a solution to which was found in a strong institutional pluralism. The reduction in the electoral participation rate (which dropped from 86.7% in 1975 to 68.6% in 1985), and the constitutional and institutional reforms initiated in 1988, were, in a way, already a demonstration that the political and economic system was not doing well in the context of ideological and development crises and that, for its conservation, liberal reforms were essential. The biggest sign of the regime's bankruptcy was on the economic plane, and for many it was because of this failure that the possibilities for opening the political regime in Cape Verde were created.

5.3. Economic liberalisation in the context of transitionology: a smooth transition to the market economy

The Third Wave of Democracy influenced sub-Saharan African states' transition to liberal democracy. As a result, most countries (including Cape Verde) embarked on political and economic transition towards liberal democracy. The transitions were underpinned by neoliberal economic principles, which expressed a firm minimalist and regulatory conviction of the states in promoting growth and socioeconomic development. This introduced a new approach in which citizens have rational preferences among outcomes, individuals maximize utility, and firms maximize profits, acting independently based on full and relevant information. There is a strong body of literature establishing a causal relationship between democratic regimes and their effects on efficiency, and their effectiveness in allocating resources and achieving collective benefits. Acemoglu *et al.* (2015) found empirical evidence of causality between democracy and economic growth. For the authors, democracy, due to the wide sharing of power and resources, widely encourages harmonious social benefits that favour the expansion of socioeconomic activity. However, the validity of this idyllic vision of democracy, and its incentives on socio-economic systems (both in its legal-procedural dimension and in the redistributive-substantive dimension), raises questions and excites academic debates. The empirical data discussed in this section explores the causal relationship between liberal democracy and socioeconomic development in Cape Verde.

5.3.1. Institutional procedures, liberalisation and economic openness

This section explores the political institutionalism that underpins the procedural approach of democratisation, state-building, and economic development. Cape Verdean liberalisation and economic openness was previously followed by political and ideological changes and procedural transformations of processes, rules and institutions approved at the level of the IV Extraordinary Congress of the PAICV, as well as at the National Assembly, through the constitution and other normative instruments. The political agenda and debates that took place at the IV Extraordinary Congress of PAICV was one of the first legal-procedural spaces formally recognising the need for transformation of the state

monopoly and advising that democracy needed to be transformed into a goal in order to proceed with Cape Verde's socio-economic development.

Seeking to assess the inputs and collective demands of the context, a new constitution was approved and came into force in September 1992, legitimising the state's regulatory and supervisory role in the economy. It created favourable conditions for liberalisation and deregulation of the economic market and the political field. To remove the political and economic monopoly, the state limited its involvement in the economic sphere and opened up space for the private sector and civil society. Laws such as Law No. 47/IV/92, Law No. 41/V/97, of 17 November 1997 and Decree-Law No. 24/98, of 29 June 1998 defined the legal framework and basic organisational structure in the context of public sector and economic liberalisation in Cape Verde. Thus, the legal and procedural foundations that guided the emerging paradigm in the search for efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness of the liberal Cape Verdean economy, were erected through the reduction of the weight of the state in the economy, and expansion of the intervention space of the private sector (Guedhani, 2003: 4).

According to Veblen (1983: 88) and Kabemba (2011: 39), these new political institutions worked as gatekeepers of a set of habits, behaviours, visions and attitudes of political elites and economic actors. These determined the *modus operandi* of institutions and shaped the behaviours and actions of the elite that operated within political institutions. The institutional opening of the political and economic field, with the entry of new actors (political parties, the private sector, and civil society), broke the long period of political and economic monopoly and relaunched Cape Verde to a new paradigm based on the principles of neoliberal democracy. The reforms were oriented to market reforms or neoliberal reforms, and included all institutions that promote marketization, privatisation, and free trade. In Cape Verde, this included macroeconomic stabilisation, primarily dialled with inflation; elimination of price controls; withdrawal of subsidies; expansion of foreign trade; and changes in currency convertibility. The institutional reforms included, most notably, privatisation of state-owned firms and changes in the tax, banking, and capital market systems and their legal foundations (Queiroz, 2017: 88). The economic reforms took into consideration the theoretical discussion of accountability developed by Huntington (1996: 96) for whom the danger of minimalist or procedural democracy is that

it is based exclusively on formal and procedural aspects. It ensures that a government is democratically elected, but it does not guarantee that other fundamental principles of democracy – for example respect for political opposition, accountability, and social and economic equality – are incorporated. For this reason, in addition to a strong civil society, an autonomous political and economic society, and a relatively efficient state, the political transition and economic liberalisation adopted the principle of accountability to achieve the consolidation of the democratic regime.

5.3.2. Dynamics, results and implications of socioeconomic liberalisation

The emerging economic paradigm in Cape Verde is part of the liberal theory of democracy and supports the argument that there is a close relationship between socio-economic development and democracy. This is the argument developed by Lipset (1959) and Diamond, for whom the transition from authoritarian regime to democratic governance is a precondition for economic performance. In other words, democratic institutions are fair to ensure equitable redistribution of income and the improvement of quality governance (2011: 2). Other authors argue that economic growth and political legitimacy are preconditions for the sustainability of democratic systems (Berggren, 2012: 18). The structuring axis of the debate is developed on the dynamics of socioeconomic indicators registered in Cape Verde after 1990. After three decades of political transition and procedural changes, which elements can be identified to establish the dichotomous relationship between democratic institution reforms and socio-economic performance?

The following table presents the Cape Verde socio-economic indicators performance in the context of political liberalisation. The main selected indicators presented are social (life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy level), economic (GDP per capita, growth rate and inflation), and Cape Verde's position in the IHD, from 1995 to 2015.

Table 10: Cape Verde: Socioeconomic indicators: 1990-2015

Indicators	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
<i>Life expectancy</i>	66.08	67.71	69.89	72.12	74.09	74.77

<i>Infant mortality</i>	47.3	37.70	30.80	24.00	20.10	18.9
<i>Literacy ≤ 15 anos</i>	62.8%		74.8%		82.8%	87.2%
<i>GDP per capita</i>	1.234	1.139	1.7776	2.204	2.735	6.700
<i>GDP growth rate</i>	2.10%	5.18%	5.63%	5.70%	5.25%	1.5%
<i>Inflation</i>	11.1%	8.4%	-2.4%	0.4%	2.1%	0.1%
<i>HDI</i>		122	195	--	195	195

Source: V-DEM (2017) only has data on all LAS until 2008. Thus, 2016 data were obtained from the CIA website (2020). Table comedy the author with data from V-DEM (2017) and CIA (2020)

Among the socioeconomic analytical dimensions, the health pillar indicators show that in the period of democratic transition, conditions were created to achieve a long and healthy life. Life expectancy rose from 66.08 years in 1990 to 69.83 in 2000, reaching 74.8 in 2015. This is the highest in the entire SSA, alongside Mauritius and Seychelles (Queiroz, 2017: 101). Mauritius and Seychelles are part of the group of African countries with consolidated democratic institutions (EIU, 2016: 9). There is a correlation between countries with a high level of democratic institutions, which consistently have a higher life expectancy. The data reveal a reduction in infant mortality that fell from 47.3 per thousand children deaths in 1990 to 30.8 per thousand children deaths in 2000. In 2015, the mortality rate stood at 18.9 per thousand children (CIA, 2017; World Bank, 2018: 23). More recent data from UNICEF Child Statistic (2017) report that in Cape Verde, infant and maternal mortality decreased substantially in 2015 compared to 2014, representing 15.3 / 1000 (World Bank, 2018: 23). In part, the described characteristics influenced the growth national dynamics. The graphic below displays a growth rate of 2.10% in 1990, which peaked at 5.70% in 2005, and dropped to 1.5% in 2015.




Figure 15: Cape Verde: Growth rate 1990-2015

Source: (HDI, 2015)

During the period under review, 1990-2015, the overall growth rate was 3% (V-DEM, 2017, CIA, 2020). According to the HDI classification, in 1990, Cape Verde was part of the group of countries with a Low Human Development Index, placed in the classification 0.350 – 0.554. This means that the Cape Verdean socio-economic structure presented challenges. Some of these challenges were inherited from the colonial political and historical past. These were aggravated by the financial crisis and economic dependence. Additionally, the state has difficulty in accessing basic resources, such as water and food, due to its insularity (UNDP, 2013: 17). In 2007, Cape Verde improved its socioeconomic performance and was classified as a country with intermediate development, standing in the classification range between 0.555 and 0.699³³. Cape Verde had a heterogeneous characteristic. On the one hand, it boasted relative improvements in its HDI, registered in the health and education sectors. On the other hand, in 2007, the country improved the poverty rates that had gone from 56.8% in 2002 to 45.4% in 2007.

Cape Verde's impressive achievements were based on political stability, sound economic policies and strong institutions that kept the rule of law, sustained its open democracy, and kept corruption under control (Queiroz, 2017: 113). North (1990: 4) analyses the role of institutions and highlights that the type of regime (institutions) determines the economic performance of a society. For this author, the notion of guaranteeing freedoms and property rights, based on the theory of liberal democracy, constitutes a vital link for economic growth. Thus, modern representative democracies play a role in defining and guaranteeing the social freedoms (broader concept) fundamental to economic growth. Therefore, it is not a simple and unidirectional relationship, since institutions (not only economic, but also political and social) matter in the performance of the economy. As previously stated in the theoretical debate, this process is not linear and can be exposed to dialectical moments with systematic advances and setbacks. Commitments to agreed procedural reforms can lead to democratically redistributive results, in turn leading to

³³ There are 12 other African states that are part of this group, among them: Morocco, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Democratic Republic of Congo, E-Swatini, Ghana, Zambia, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Angola, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.

democratic principles. However, studies on democratisation do not only assess the party and sequences, but also the quality and implications of each stage (Cheeseman, 2014: 4).

The socioeconomic aspects brought up in this section aim to identify the correlations between the political institutions and socioeconomic performance factors that affect and shape the dynamics, trajectory and results of the political transition and democratisation in Cape Verde. The study borrowed from Huntington (1996), where, in addition to the procedural aspects, the definition of democracy must include substantive aspects. For this reason, the substantive indicators of democracy require the understanding of new dynamics of internal to political systems that pass for the analysis of other indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, quality of public administration or effectiveness of governance, rule of law, and finally, control and perception of corruption (Worldwide, Governance Indicator, 2017).

5.3.3. Economic liberalisation, Institutional and political performance

The research assumes that in the realms of society, politics and the economy, perceptions matter. Hence, a specific topic is given to judgments about present conditions or past performance and expectations for the future that people have. Perceptions are paramount in the interest-driven realm of the marketplace and the ideological realm of politics. Whether or not attitudes exactly mirror exterior circumstances, an individual's interior perspective forms the basis of any calculus for action. Moreover, consistent with our instinct that all people, whatever their material circumstances, are capable of acute observation and rational thought, we find that, often, public opinion findings reinforce, rather than undercut, the thrust of official aggregate statistics (Afrobarometer, 2008: 4).

For more than five decades, the analysis of the political economy of democracy and development has been widely contested in academic circles and among policymakers. The vast literature on political institutions and economic growth suggests that the slowdown in development is the result of institutional state-building weakness characterised by dictatorships, high levels of corruption and conflicts of interest, weakness of the judiciary, and political and military instability. According to this view, the dichotomy between democracy and socioeconomic development depends on good institutions

(Asongo, 2012: 3). Based on this theoretical assumption, we use data from the Worldwide Governance Indicator (1996-2018) to analyse the consistency of democratic institutions and the progress achieved during the political transition period in Cape Verde. WGI Indicators measure voice and accountability, political stability, government efficiency, rule of law, and corruption control. Based on these indicators, demands for democracy are calculated as an additive scale of both support for democracy and comprehensive rejection of authoritarian systems. The following chart shows data for these indicators in Cape Verde, in the period between 1996 (when the data were initially published) and 2018:




Figure 16: Cape Verde: Worldwide Governance Indicator (1996-2018)

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicator (1996-2018)

The indicators presented in the table above, referring to substantive state-building dynamics in Cape Verde, reveal that, in general, over the period under analysis (1996-2018), the democratisation process achieved and maintains optimal score. Political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, but also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. In general, the functioning of government is satisfactory, and the media is seen as independent and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced. In the context of the transition to democracy, Cape Verde reinforced its institutions to impose, internally, the Weberian concept of a modern and liberal state, based on the legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber, 1999: 17). Unlike some African countries, Cape Verde made a peaceful transition, with democratic elections classified as being free, fair and transparent, and has not experienced coups d'états or

civil wars in its history. Therefore, it was classified as a full democracy (EIU, 2015: 45; WGI 2019). In part, high rates of literacy and the existence of an intellectual political elite committed to the modern values of democracy, favoured the configuration of a progressive view of the state that maintained, in a lasting way, the country's political stability (Barros, 2012: 62).

The second indicator analysed by the Worldwide Governance Indicator refers to government effectiveness and captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The results of the analysis of governmental effectiveness by the Worldwide Governance Indicator (2017) in Cape Verde is like the results of the Afrobarometer report published in 2014. To compare them, the research verified that the results of the graph above illustrates lower performance in effectiveness in Cape Verde, when compared to other indicators (see the green lettuce line in the graph above).

Most of the Cape Verdean population shows high levels of support for democracy, with an average of around 76 percentage points. However, in terms of its functioning, satisfaction has been below 50 percentage points. This indicates that most of the population is not satisfied with the way democratic institutions have worked. It should also be noted that the expression of satisfaction is always at negative levels, even registering a sharp drop in 2014 when only 26% of the population was satisfied with the way democracy has functioned.




Figure 17: Cape Verde: Level of satisfaction with democracy

Figure 17 presents us with a paradoxical situation between support for democracy and satisfaction with its functioning; and the data confirm two things. First, support for democracy is not linear over time. It can increase, reduce, and weaken. Despite the challenges associated with being a small island economy, Cape Verde saw spectacular social and economic progress between 1990 and 2008, driven by political stability, consolidation, and strong political institutions that ensured the control of corruption and maintained the rule of law, as well as an open democracy (Queiroz, 2017: 113). From 2008 to 2015, economic growth slowed significantly, because of the prolonged impact of the global financial crisis. Fiscal measures have not restored growth; on the contrary, these have led to a sharp increase in the level of debt, as noted in Afrobarometer data, in the upcoming graph.

Second, democracy is understood as “the only game in town” (Shin and Wells, 2005: 18). The Afrobarometer assessed whether Cape Verdeans consider authoritarian systems of governing (one-party rule, military rule, and one-man rule) to be better. With several alternatives, most Cape Verdeans reject authoritarian options. These results consolidate with the perception that most of the population agrees with the notion that leaders should be chosen through elections. They agree that multiparty systems are better than non-party systems. These aspects of democratic regimes all ensure voters’ ability to hold their elected representatives accountable. In addition, a near majority thinks that the National Assembly should make the laws, three times more than those who think the president should make them. In Cape Verde, citizens feel it is necessary to have institutions that place checks on their representatives and that allow voters to have a true set of distinct electoral alternatives to choose from.

However, the data confirm the thesis that the diffuse support for democracy clashes with a more concrete and specific assessment of democracy that values and enhances a more substantive dimension of the benefits of democracy. This indicates the prevalence of social and material demands that democracy has yet to overcome. These demands, instead of decreasing, tend to crystallise or increase even further as democracy becomes more long-lived. The Afrobarometer report, published in 2018, confirms that Cape

Verdeans were more pessimistic in assessing the country's socio-economic situation than they had been in 2002, and held a negative assessment of the economic situation in 2014.




Figure 18: Cape Verde: Description of the economic conditions in transition context 2002-2014.

Source: Afrobarometer Round 6: The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Cape Verde

In 2008, a smaller share of people (35%) believed that Cape Verde's economy was performing badly than in the early-2000s. However, the share of people who believed that democracy was not delivering economically increased to 47% by 2014. As illustrated, unemployment, security, and poverty were the biggest problems in the country (Afrobarometer, 2014: 9).




Figure 19: Cape Verde: Key social challenges for democracy assessment

Source: Afrobarometer Round 6: The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Cape Verde

This is aligned with a recent study by Diamond and Plattner (1996) and Acemoglu *et al.* (2014) who argue that the measure of democracy includes not only “free and fair” elections and political rights, but also relative economic effectiveness as proposed in *Economic Reform and Democracy* (Diamond and Plattner, 1996: 18). The data above correlates to examine whether and how strongly satisfaction with democracy among Cape Verdeans is associated with citizens' perceptions of their political freedoms (a type of intrinsic assessment on the demand side) and their views on economic performance and provision of public services (two types of instrumental assessments on the supply side). The findings reveal a much stronger association between economic assessments and satisfaction with democracy. This suggests that, for Cape Verdeans, satisfaction with democracy is more strongly linked to economic performance than to political freedoms. Likewise, service delivery assessments are correlated more to satisfaction with democracy than to perceived freedoms (Isbell & Bhoojdhur, 2019: 11).

In general, the level of support for democracy is assessed through citizens' political participation. It should be noted that this indicator is determined from the electoral acts. Hillygus (2005: 25) states that the idea that education is a primary driver of increased political participation is “largely uncontested,” while Putnam (1995) posits that education “is the best individual level predictor of participation.” The 1991 legislative election stands out, with 75.3% participation, reaching 76% in 2011. A decrease was registered in 2016, reaching 65.9% (CNE, 1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016). There is a series of statistics and debates showing literacy as the basis of citizenship rights, and there are indicators showing that political participation is related to literacy levels. The higher the levels of literacy in a society, the more likely it is to participate in politics. Cape Verde has registered systematic increases in its literacy rate, reaching 71.6% in 1995, which have been systematically improving until reaching 86.8% in 2015 (CIA, 2020), as illustrated in the following figure:




Figure 20: Cape Verde: Correlation between literacy and political participation

Source: Queiroz (2017) and CIA (2019)

From the figure above, there is a “deliberate disengagement” in political participation. According to this, the more-educated Cape Verdean citizenry may decide to disengage from politics when initial political liberalisation efforts prove to be futile (Croke, Grossman, Larreguy & Marshall, 2015: 30). With improving literacy, Cape Verdeans are increasingly critical of the country's political processes. Several factors can explain this trend:

- Non-participation serves as a non-violent form of protest designed to deprive the autocratic regime of enjoying a semblance of legitimacy. The foundation of Huntington's definition comes from Dahl's (1971) typical definition of democracy as polyarchy, which focused on two conceptual dimensions: contestation and participation. Thus, Huntington has defined democracy as open, free and fair elections; limitations on political power; institutionalisation and stability; and electoral competition and widespread voting participation (Huntington, 1991: 7–13). Doorenspleet (2000) argues that Huntington fails to incorporate a dimension of inclusiveness in his definition and conceptualisation of democracy.
- The bipartisanship installed in the country since the democratic transition, with only two major parties in the country, MPD and PAICV, who managed to reach the government and share mandates and the direction of the state.
- The growing literacy of the population, currently at 88.8% (INE, 2015 and CIA, 2015) makes it more demanding on the political system. The weak capacity in the provision of public goods and services, aggravated by the stagnation of the labour market that has difficulty absorbing young people, is in turn aggravated by the

disillusionment with expectations of poverty reduction, improvement of living conditions, and efficiency of the judicial system.

- In addition to economic, social, and political asymmetries, there is an increasing perception of the existence of a corrupt system in the civil service (Ramos, 2016). As Di Palma (1990) highlighted, the concept of democratic consolidation deals with the consolidation of democratic institutions and transforming state and civil society relationships to be based on inclusivity, accountability, and democratic principles.

Corruption appears at the centre of the debate on sustainable democratic institutions. The perception of corruption indexes are used to assess the level of citizens' confidence in relation to political and socioeconomic institutions. Institutional dysfunctions, patrimonialism, limited access order, rent seeking, and a high index of corruption have been increasing, and challenging the African political atmosphere. The legitimacy of institutions depends on the performance of governance, which can be assessed by the level of perception, trust and legitimacy in its relationship with citizens. For this reason, high levels of perceived corruption undermine the socioeconomic development of a state (Kaufmann *et al.*, 1999: 558). It should be noted that corruption is one of the indicators applied to measure the institutions' transparency and trust. Cape Verde is a country with exceptional conditions for political transparency, as evidenced by some important international indicators. The country's historical and geographical specificities seem to point in the affirmative (World Governance Indicators, 1996-2005). However, the following graph shows that Cape Verde, despite improvements, faces challenges in the fight against corruption:




Figure 21: Figure 21. Cape Verde: Corruption Perception Index 2008-2018

Data from Transparency International are in line with data from the Afrobarometer report. According to the data, the perception of corruption in Cape Verde is low, but it has been growing and crosses all sectors. The police and judicial sectors are considered the most corrupt institutions. This finding raises questions about the dividends of political and economic reforms on anti-corruption systems and institutions. A considerable proportion of Cape Verdeans do not feel able or qualified to fight corruption. The media has been weakened in its role in denouncing acts of corruption. Few Cape Verdeans claim to have paid a bribe to access the public services they need (Afrobarometer, 2014: 22). On the other hand, the perception that the government is oriented towards private ends, including small and large forms of corruption, as well as the "capture" of the state by elites and private interests, compromises the economic environment and discourages investment (Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016: 5).

5.4. Conclusion remarks

The Marxist-Leninist model influenced and shaped the institutionalisation of a rigid system of monopolistic state control, nationalising and centralising economic sectors. These institutional contexts, influenced by other structuring factors, resulted in the state adopting a hybrid model of economy, combining the monopoly and liberalism of some economic sectors. However, during the first moments, the hybrid model found trends of improvement in macroeconomic indicators (such as GDP per capita, growth rate, and inflation); while many socioeconomic indicators (such as rural development, transport, communication, housing, education, health, energy, and fisheries) deteriorated. The state was unable to reinforce development and development expectations that were expected in the immediate period of independence. As a result, its legitimacy deteriorated in the following electoral years and liberalisation reforms started at the end of the 1980s.

During the liberalisation period, socioeconomic indicators (life expectancy, the literacy rate, and the HDI improved; as well as infant mortality rates) improved positively and the level of economic satisfaction had risen (Afrobarometer, 2014: 8). The data showed a direct relationship between the improvement of economic indicators and satisfaction with political institutions. The research also found that Cape Verdean citizens evaluate democracy based on the country's economic performance. The research confirms the

thesis that societies that are more educated are predisposed to participate in politics. Fair distribution of socioeconomic resources, complemented with the expansion of political rights, depends on strong political institutions guided by the principles of good governance, including transparency, accountability, government effectiveness, and anti-corruption practices. These substantive elements determine the level of citizens' satisfaction and level of support that citizens can offer to democratic and political institutions.

Chapter 6: MOZAMBIQUE: SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE & LIBERALISATION TRANSFORMATION

6.1. Introduction

Lipset's 1959 article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" helps one to understand the socioeconomic bases of a stable democracy. His key thesis was remarkable, showing that *the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy*. It was theoretically rich in identifying a nexus of causal factors, leading from levels of economic development to education for the prospects of a stable democracy. Lipset's thesis was embedded in the larger body of modernisation theory, demonstrating that rising levels of income and education have diffuse impacts on the transformation of attitudes and values; and through them, on political systems. To this day, these remain the key socio-economic determinants of democracy. Similarly, Huntington (1994) argued that the emergence of liberal democracy depends on high levels of economic welfare; the absence of extreme inequalities of income and wealth; a high degree of social pluralism; an economy based on market forces; great influence on the society of the present states of democracy; and a political culture characterised by a commitment to and tolerance of diversity (Huntington, 1994: 79). For Huntington, improving economic institutions and performance has a positive effect on political institutions, while political institutions have a positive, but quantitatively smaller effect, on current economic performance. Taking Mozambique as the case study, this chapter analyses the importance attributed to political institutions, economic performance and citizens' evaluations of economic performance, and the performance of political institutions. This focus is related to attitudes toward democracy, evaluations of governance, institutional trust, and citizen's economic satisfaction. The empirical basis was developed by considering two distinct historical periods, namely: the period of African independence, specifically of Cape Verde and Mozambique which occurred in 1975 and initiated the construction of the state and the one-party regime; and the crisis of the state in the 1980s, which led to the emergence of a new socio-political paradigm, favourable to the transition to liberal democracy, institutionally initiated in the early 1990s. The theoretical and conceptual framework, the methodological approaches, and the context

stimulated the production of knowledge around the causal relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and their effects on development and socio-economic performance.

Institutions matter decisively in the production of socioeconomic and political results. The institutional school shows that ideological, political, and legal institutions significantly impact on a country's socioeconomic performance. This chapter engages the debate around the structural relationships established between political and economic assumptions in the state transformation process with a focus on Mozambique. The Mozambican case demonstrates that the process of transition and economic liberalisation has apparently strong correlation with political institutions resulting from the reproduction of authoritarian practices by political elites who hold political power. They continue to sustain a monopoly they enjoyed in the past under authoritarian rule, even though there was a democratisation process.

This chapter pays particular attention to the determinants of institutional quality and economic performance. The key idea is that the link between the quality of economic and political institutions is further reinforced as better economic institutions tend to support economic development, and economic development may lead to a demand for better political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013: 98). The institutional analytical variables include the constitutional and legal framework; its interaction in terms of the rule of law and suggesting the idea of separation of powers; checks and balances; transparency; integrity; responsibility in the management of public affairs and accountability (legal and political); and the indicators of autocratic regimes and characteristics of Mozambican economic openness.

6.2. Institutional and structural elements in the socio-economic transformation of the post-independence state

Mozambican state-building was influenced by institutional factors, such as ideology, the constitution and rules; and structural factors, such as power struggles, exogenous-endogenous conflicts, and the profile of the political elite. This section examines the impact of a set of ideologies, as well as normative and legal frameworks, that the

Mozambican state adopted. The key ideological aspect that influenced the institutional framework is Marxism-Leninism, which the dominant ruling political party³⁴ advanced, and the subsequent constitutional project and legal frameworks that shaped political and economic developmental dynamics.

An institutional analysis of CRPM-1975 helps to characterise the marks of Marxist-Leninist ideology: repression, democratic centralism, unity of power, and political monopoly as institutional characteristics of the Mozambican state at independence. Article 2 of the Constitution illustrated that the legislative body had a mono-party composition. According to the abovementioned article, political power belonged to the united workers and peasants. However, they should be directed and represented exclusively by FRELIMO. Article 37, that described the composition and structure of the Popular Assembly, also shaped the Mozambican institutional quality and economic performance. The Popular Assembly was composed of members from the Central and Executive Committee of FRELIMO, by some personalities identified by the party, members of the executive branch (ministers, deputy ministers and provincial governors) and members of the Popular Forces of Liberation of Mozambique. The presence of members of the executive in the composition of the legislative body demonstrates the absence of separation of powers and of a complex check and balance process between the two organs of state power. With the absence of democratic elections underpinned by the principle of multipartyism, there were no horizontal accountability mechanisms. The party thus allowed the subordination of public institutions under a single political party, in line with the Leninist organisation principle that "the party runs the state and society". For this reason, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary were accountable to the party, which imposed legal, disciplinary and ideological orientations.

The state reinforced its role in the production and distribution of wealth, including the control of consumption. Therefore, the ideological matrix of the welfare state was oriented in defence of formal equality. This appears in the CRPM-1975 where work, education, and health constitute the rights and duties of each citizen, and the state promotes the

³⁴ A dominant party system is a political system where only one political party holds government power, confused with the State. Although there are other political opposition parties that can legally operate, they are weak or ineffective, probably due to different forms of corruption, constitutional laws that intentionally undermine the ability of an effective opposition to thrive, and institutions and organisations that support the status quo (Reuter & Gandhi, 2010: 109).

necessary conditions for the extension of these rights for all citizens (Article 31 of the CRPM-1975). Private property and the productive sectors (industry, field and commercial activity, education, and health) were nationalised by the state. Considering these institutional elements strongly influenced by the Leninist-Marxist ideology, it is worth questioning the dynamics of the relationship between the state and citizens, as well as the nature of FRELIMO's horizontal and vertical accountability to citizens. Built on Marxism-Leninism, the Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique founded a one-party state, where only one political party has the right to form the government (Daniel, 2016: 222). Power was not contested at elections, but rather in the political party. The political party's interests and issues were discussed within a highly hierarchical internal framework and following an internal chain of command. Whenever a decision was made, it was transmitted to the bodies immediately below as guidelines and with the indication *Decision Taken, Decision Fulfilled*. Once the party made the decision, it was communicated within the state's political structures. All decisions had to be carried out as per party policy or directive (Shankland & Cambote, 2012: 78). This led to the creation of monopolies made up of large state-owned companies, whose production was determined by the political party in power (Mosca, 2011: 302). Under these circumstances, which institutional mechanisms were established to strengthen relations between the state and citizens, or to consolidate the state's legitimacy as strongly centralised, monopolistic and authoritarian? To answer this question, the research analyses institutional performance and focus on the mechanisms of accountability and transparency imposed during the period under analysis, as well as the dynamics adopted in the search for the integrity of the country's political and economic institutions.

6.2.1. Post-independence state institutions: Economics and crises of dominant ideology

The central issue is the analysis of the quality of institutions in the processes of socioeconomic development. The issue of voice and accountability³⁵ is seen as the extent

³⁵On the one hand, when talking about accountability, public office holders are required to be accountable for the actions they took after carrying them out (ex post) by exposing themselves to appropriate sanctions in case of misconduct, negligence or failure. On the other hand, responsible management requires popular control and the adoption of systematic procedures to consult public opinion and accommodation of interests on the political agenda. In the process of building the State, accountability is an instrument for the active participation of society in public life that allows more control and transparency in the management of public affairs. O'Donnell (1998) distinguishes vertical accountability from horizontal accountability. In the first, society exercises its power to reward or punish its governors and representatives by maintaining or withdrawing power through direct voting in free elections, among other mechanisms of political pressure. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, is defined as that which takes effect through mutual inspection between the powers (checks and balances), through government agencies that control public activity and,

to which a state's citizens can select and change their government, thus limiting executive power (World Bank, 2020: 19). In addition to the issue of voice and accountability, policy stability and the absence of violence are key indicators the World Bank uses to measure good governance. Political trust between the state and citizens, and the legitimacy of institutions associated with integrity in the management of public affairs, are central to good governance. These elements are the basis for the debate on building and consolidating political institutions and economic growth. How did the accountability process work under the one-party system, with the absence of an electoral culture, which limited the political representation of citizens in the state's representative institutions?

The nature of a highly centralised, monopolistic, and authoritarian political system did not allow for the participation of intrastate actors in the national public debate. That is why, at various times, the political system repressed attempts at popular demonstrations, did not allow voices that differed from the regime, and applied harsh measures against practices that were considered risks to the socio-economic development of the state. Thus, it was not possible to institutionalise horizontal accountability with the strong involvement of civil society organizations. In this context of limitations on political rights and civil liberties, the Mozambican state suffered from a crisis of legitimacy in its institutions, aggravated by the deterioration of macro- and socioeconomic development indicators: GDP, HDI, inflation, healthcare, and education (Shankland & Cambote, 2012: 78; Faria, 2019: 7). There was a wave of economic sabotage, fraud in the import of goods, and illegal export of vehicles, tractors and machinery. This was ideologically classified by FRELIMO as deviations of integrity, which deserved repressive state measures (Faria, 2019: 7).

To overcome the political and socioeconomic crisis, FRELIMO's official discourse pointed to the need to strengthen horizontal accountability. There was a public speech to fight against corruption and improve state institutional transparency, and to reinforce accountability. FRELIMO demanded public servants to intensify discipline, control, inspection, and monitoring of government actions to reinforce state and institutional legitimacy, and to improve the state-citizen relationship, to ensure effective and honest

mainly, through the existence of state agencies with power, will and training to supervise, evaluate and punish, if applicable, government agents or agencies (O'Donnell, 1992). In the case under analysis, the institutional configuration did not guarantee a vertical accountability mechanism.

performance to achieve quality in the provision of public goods and services, and judicial integrity. For this reason, Samora Machel (1985) demanded horizontal accountability as a mechanism for legitimising state institutions and their relationship with the citizen. For this reason, in his speech he said, “When there is discipline in the state apparatus, the people identify with their state: the people demand their state directed with discipline. The strengthening of discipline requires the existence of control and inspection measures”.

Two extreme institutional measures were applied to reinforce public integrity and the accountability of public servants and citizens. The first was Law No. 5 of 1983, the Beating Law or *Lei de Chamboqueamento*. This was corporal punishment, seen as a disciplinary instrument, a technique of punishment and justice that produced suffering for citizens. It was applied for certain types of economic crimes classified as violating public integrity: signs of illicit enrichment, price speculation, prostitution, alcoholism, and the like³⁶. In 1979, the Assembly of the People's Republic of Mozambique approved Law No. 2/79 of 1 March (known as the Law against the Security of the People). Article 3 provided for the death penalty, through a public firing squad. Shooting death was a punishment for crimes of high treason, such as price speculation, rape, and armed robbery. The death penalty, aimed at protecting political and economic interests as well as public integrity, was also applied to the military under the name Military Crimes Law (Law No. 17/87 of 21 December). Within the scope of the imposition of the state, the Beating Law and the death penalty were expressions of the authoritarianism to cement FRELIMO's political monopoly, in that the state became an instrument of imposed national terror, which deteriorated the state's legitimacy and political acceptance.

There is another explanation among researchers and practitioners alike that the media has a pivotal role to play in strengthening processes of democratisation (Norris 2008), quality of government, (Färdigh 2013), economic development (Besley & Prat 2006), and

³⁶ From the Provincial Military Command Operative of Gaza, through the Branch of the Recruitment Center of the Chibuto district, the following anomalies were practiced by the head of recruitment, Mr. Pedro Dzimba: 1 he was Beaten and detained; 2 he was found in possession of the following articles: (2) pairs of Adidas shoes from South Africa; (1) equipment from South Africa; (1) skirt from South Africa, (2) shirts from South Africa; (3) soaps from South Africa; (2) toothpaste from South Africa (TEMPO, no 297 - 13 June 1976: 27). Revolutionary Military Tribunal (TMR), created on March 29, 1979, was a political-military structure that supported and legitimized the death penalty, by Decree-Law 3/79 of the Permanent Commission of the Popular Assembly. The main function of TMR was to judge cases of offenses against state security. It had the power to decide on the death sentence and such sentences were widely reported in the local press. For ten years, TMR was the State's main legal institution in the fight against insurgents in government policy. In 1988, the death penalty was imposed by two government initiatives, the first being the Law of Forgiveness, to forgive all those who were on the run from some crimes or had joined RENAMO. RENAMO did not accept it (Amnesty International 2011).

anti-corruption (Spence, H., 2008; Färdigh 2013). Until 1980, cases of corruption were limited, showing firm control over various forms of corruption within the framework of strong discipline (Faria, 2019: 7). The Beating Law and death penalty were signs of the violation of political rights, civil liberties, and human right abuses. This nature of the state, strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, was in contradiction with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) on December 10, 1948. Article III of this declaration asserts: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”. Article V states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Both the Beating Law and death penalty were a clear violation of this international law.

These elements are critical towards understanding that the absence of a democratic institutional core, aggravated by the socio-economic crisis, did not allow an effective representation of citizens and legitimacy of state institutions. However, there was a recognition that overcoming the state crisis involved institutionalising internal accountability mechanisms, transparency in the provision of public goods and services, and accountability. The state’s interventionist, monopolistic nature, influenced by Marxism-Leninism, favoured vertical accountability with internal control imposed on FRELIMO members and public servants. Without effective representation of citizens in state institutions, the pressure mechanisms did not allow the existence of dissenting voices and denied movements of contestation, preventing the implementation of horizontal accountability favourable to greater civil and popular participation.

6.1.2 Distribution patterns: Ideological influence on socioeconomic development 1975-1990

As in many African states, Mozambique, adopted Marxism-Leninism as a political ideology, which influenced a strong monopoly on a closed and controlled economy. Wary of the West, Mozambique found the socialist bloc as a base to start the struggle for its independence. After independence, the state received logistical support and war materials from China, the former German Democratic Republic, Cuba, and Algeria, (Évora, 2001: 37). Additional support for development came from some Western countries (Sweden and Denmark) and some Eastern countries: Germany, the Soviets, Bulgaria, and Romania. These countries were available to support the states that had just freed themselves from

colonial domination and that sought to build the concept of justice based on social equality (Jafar, 2014: 14).

The Mozambican elite believed that Marxism-Leninism was best suited to overcome the legacy of underdevelopment left by the colonial system, and to build an egalitarian society and a welfare state. Aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would support the consolidation of political power and the promotion of economic independence. At the time, the country lacked qualified staff and administrative capacity in state bureaucracy. From 1977, bilateral agreements to support economic projects and credits were signed with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the countries of Eastern Europe. This allowed for the arrival of workers from Latin American communist countries (Chile and Cuba) and thousands of workers from Eastern countries (Germans, USSR, Bulgarians, and Romanians). Under bilateral agreements, the co-workers had a dual mission: a) transmit to Mozambicans the experience of building socialism brought from their countries, and b) to work on specific development projects as specialists or advisers, in the study cabinets, planning departments of ministries, and state-owned companies.

Inspired by the values of Marxism-Leninism and the functions of a one-party state, FRELIMO centralised the economic system. FRELIMO's monopolistic and socialist orientation in many sectors created uncertainty for private investments in the early post-independence period. These actions, in addition to disruption and creating the feeling of revolt, resulted in the abandonment of qualified staff, decapitalisation, and sabotage done by some entrepreneurs (Vieira, 2010: 303). To respond to the new reality of development, the state held a monopoly over the means of production (Maloa, 2016: 772; Vieira, 2010: 303).

In 1976, the nationalisation of income buildings was announced, and private housing leasing was prohibited (Maloa, 2016: 66). This ideology-influenced policy was accompanied by announcements banning private activities that were socially and politically condemned (Roemer, 1994: 772). The Central State Plan (PEC) was the first policy of the Mozambican socialist economy. PEC aimed to acquire financing resources to maintain normal functioning of the state. The dilemma between monopoly and competition, between authoritarianism and economic liberalisation, has always been an

element of internal debate for FRELIMO, which has adopted, at each moment, different nuances of ideological conflict. Large public companies from the colonial legacy became part of the monopolistic and direct state intervention (Roemer, 1994: 772). Two examples of this were the monopoly on air transport companies (the DETA that gave rise to Mozambique Airlines) and Mozambique Railways (CFM). The road transport and passenger companies intervened in by the state were integrated into three major regional monopolies: south, centre and north. The nationalisation of the economy led to a strong concentration of ownership among the political elite, which manifested itself in the integration of many small and medium-sized companies into large state-owned companies (Road Transport South – ROMOS; Road Transport North – ROMON and Road Transport Centre – ROMC). Thus, under the Marxist-Leninism system, the modern Mozambican economy was structured into monopolies, some of which had the competence to control small private activities in the same branch of activity, working simultaneously with business functions of the state. In many cases, the large, modern, industrial enterprise was total or partially appropriated by the state. Even when property remained private, the critical element in determining the level of investments and in choosing another technology continued to be public policy through the state's macroeconomic signals.

These elements are important to understand institutional development over time and must be understood based on the historical specificities of each nation (North, 2005). Institutions, including property rights, stimulate productive investments because they form the structure of society's incentives. In 1979, Mozambique received foreign aid for the Prospective Indicative Plan (PPI). This was approved in 1980 during the FRELIMO Central Committee Meeting and sent to the Popular Assembly for validation. The PPI provided guidelines for the strategic objectives of economic development. The way it was validated, first by FRELIMO and then by the People's Assembly, was a confirmation of the overlap, and strong control and monopoly, of FRELIMO, superimposed on the forefront of state institutions, and on the dynamics of functioning and the political, economic and social processes. The economic option, consistent with the dominant ideology, tended to subvert the inherited structures to build a new type of state and society in which the supreme value should have been the organisation of forms of popular democracy controlled by the party-state (Vieira, 2010: 303). However, there was a mismatch between the ideological option,

the developmental model in a context of popular revolutionary democracy, and FRELIMO projects unable to deal with the economic and social challenges of the context (Cardoso, 2016: 183). Therefore, the PPI was unsuccessful due to a combination of factors, such as the internal situation (the emergence of the destabilisation war, which later turned into a civil war, the effects of natural disasters, and a scarcity of qualified staff) and lack of political buy-in for FRELIMO's political project. This was primarily due to the roll-out of state farms in Mozambique after independence, which failed as the profits from the produce benefited the FRELIMO government/party's elite (Brito, 2019: 117).

Thus, the regime with totalitarian characteristics had a strong, unifying ideology that combined social, economic, and political plans with strong political leadership. The systematic adjustments that were made (from PEC to PPI) were aimed at protecting the ideology and party legitimacy of both the economic system and the political regime. FRELIMO became an all-pervading and all-powerful political entity, monopolising all rights to freedom of economic action, thereby constituting itself as a fundamental guardian of economic development. However, the context in which this economic regime was installed was less favourable to its sustainability. For this reason, the adopted economic model aimed to guarantee the stability of Mozambican socio-economic indicators. The Human Development Index (HDI), National Institute for Statistics (NIS) and V-DEM data have shown the extent to which these dynamics favoured the effective redistribution of the desired gains in the context of independence.

The HDI recognises the dichotomous relationship between democracy and socio-economic progress. The key assumption is that, to promote their individual skills and increase the potential for them to enjoy the freedom to live the life they desire, people must be at the centre of development (Barro & Lee, 2018: 7). The research looks at HDI indicators and analyses the dynamics in the health, education, and national income pattern in Mozambique's post-independence context, as part of wellbeing. The health pillar assesses the creation of conditions to achieve well-being for a healthy life. This is measured by life expectancy and control of mortality rates and contributes to the improvement of human wellbeing. The education pillar measures the role of literacy in the political system and the results achieved in the sector after a given period, in this case, 1975 to 1990. Access to knowledge is measured by the average number of years of

education received by people over the age of 15 and the rate of literacy. These elements help to understand to what extent policies have offered citizens the option to have freedom and improve their living standards. The gross domestic product per capita, measured by the aggregate income parity power in a reference year, measures the standard of living (income) pillar. Combining HDI data with V-DEM data (2017), the research analyses the dynamics of these indicators and the dichotomous relationship between political and economic dynamics in post-independence Mozambique.

To explain and understand the decrease in GDP per capita, Jafar (2014: 14) and Faria (2019: 6) described the economic context of Mozambique in the period under analysis as such:

Between 1980 and 1986, GDP decreased by more than 30%. The annual economic growth, in the same period, reached -20% with more than 5 years of negative growth. Military spending came to represent 12% to 18% of GDP and between 18% and 26% of public expenditure during 1980. External debt increased by almost 500% between 1984 and 1992. Between 1985 and 1993, 63% of foreign direct investment was cancelled due to war and ideological conflict. Exports and imports have declined dramatically and other macroeconomic indicators have proved unfavourable for national economic life. In 1991, 57% of primary schools were destroyed or closed. The main health indicators have decreased for decades. At the international level, we are witnessing the crisis of the socialist economy, which is reflected in cooperation and aid. Western aid is not enough and Mozambique isolates it. Credit lines and technical assistance are reduced and major development projects collapse (Jafar (2014: 14 & Faria (2019: 6).

Under these circumstances, in 1985, the GDP per capita reached \$920.4/year/inhabitant. Between 1984 and 1985, the country witnessed the debt crisis and lost credit credibility in international markets (UNDP, 1998: 51). To mitigate this economic crisis, the Mozambican government signed economic aid agreements with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and sought assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The first signs of economic recovery were evident after 1987, and were reflected in 1990. Mozambique received the first aid agreement instalment in June 1985 (\$45 million). The second instalment came in October 1987 (\$70 million), with the

third in August 1989 (\$90 million) (UNDP, 1998: 105), totalling \$205 million. In 1990, the GDP per capita rose to \$1.113.6/year/inhabitant, as seen in the graph below:




Figure 22: Mozambique GDP per capita 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM 2017

The political pressure of the ideologically charged civil war, in conjunction with the excruciating need for aid and funds to finance imports, compelled FRELIMO to negotiate its first structural adjustment package (SAP) with the World Bank and the IMF in 1986. The series of SAPs that followed required privatisation of major industries, less government social spending, deregulation of the economy, and trade liberalisation. The SAPs, therefore, have essentially focused on creating a market economy built on capitalist and liberal principles. The recovery of GDP per capita *is* part of the scope of the agreement with the World Bank and IMF, that necessitated the liberalisation of industry, commerce, currency and more (Hanlon and Teresa, 2008: 36).

The standard metric of economic growth, GDP, measures the size of a nation's economy and does not necessarily reflect a nation's welfare. Nevertheless, policymakers and economists often treat GDP per capita as an all-inclusive unit to signify a nation's development, combining its economic prosperity and social well-being. Easterlin and Angelescu document the turning points in GDP growth and other indicators of the quality of life. In numerous cases, nations have similar GDP levels or average income levels, yet differ substantially in levels of national health and education. At the same time, some poorer nations fare better than some richer nations in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, and other indicators of well-being (Easterlin & Angelescu, 2010: 21). Hence, greater centralisation of planning, development policies, and strategies allowed monetary control of the national currency and inflation rates. Nevertheless, important structural

economic vulnerabilities (poverty, inequality, illiteracy) persisted. However, in 1990, when the political transition was taking place, there was some uncertainty about the future, so the country experienced economic instability in its inflation rate, representing a reasonable balance under access to income mainly in the most vulnerable Mozambican society.

According to Balbinotto Neto (2016), inflation has an impact on economic growth. Inflation affects both supply and aggregate demand, making it more difficult for families and firms to make the right decisions in response to market signals. When all prices are rising, this difficulty can interfere with the efficient operation of the price system, reduce economic growth, and impose various costs on the economy (such as the costs of basic goods). It affects savings and investment rates, decreasing in the purchasing power of the nation's currency, so the average price of a basket of selected goods and services in the Mozambican economy increased over time. Consequently, reproduced structures of exclusion and marginalisation jeopardize cohesion of the Mozambican society. For the period under review, inflation in Mozambique had slowed.




Figure 23: Mozambique inflation rate 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM 2017; V-DEM 2019

The redistributive policy of the Marxist-Leninist inspired state protected the distribution of state subsidies to education, health and current expenses in the state sector including state-owned companies. These services were expanded to rural areas where these services had not reached before. Education was a free public good and a right, which everyone should benefit from. Between 1975 and 1982, the number of primary school enrolments doubled and then reduced by 20% (Jung, 2011: 59). On average, literacy decreased from 90% in 1975 to 65% in 1990 (Mazula, 1995: 78). The figure below shows

that in 1990, the number of years of schooling for citizens over 15 years of age had reached approximately 1.95%.




Figure 24: Mozambique literacy rate 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM 2017; V-DEM 2019

Low literacy levels did not guarantee the emancipation of society. Limited education prevented the achievement of levels of political sophistication and could not offer citizens theoretical tools to free themselves from the mechanisms of reproduction of domination from the political monopoly. The authoritarian state prevented the education sector from playing a transformative social role to offer citizens the option of political and economic freedom. The average life expectancy expresses the possibility of living more years (which implies an improvement in the quality of health, sanitation, and food). The data show that under the period of analysis, life expectancy in the country increased by an average of 2.08, moving from 41.56 years in 1975 to 43.64 years in 1990 (INE, 2015: 22).




Figure 25: Mozambique literacy rate 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM 2017; V-DEM 2019

The infant mortality rate also decreased by 16.5, when it moved from 171.5 per thousand in 1975 to 155.00 per thousand in 1990 (V-DEM, 2016; INE, 2015: 22), as shown in Figure 26:




Figure 26: Mozambique: Infant mortality 1975-1990

Source: V-DEM 2017; V-DEM 2019

Between 1975 and 1990, development policies were influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consequently, the redistributive policies of a socialist economy, implemented through the PPI, focused on investments in the main social sectors: health, sanitation, family planning, and education. To ensure a fair redistribution of national income and to respond to the collective expectations of citizens, the state nationalised the infrastructures and services provided in the sectors of health and education, and later to other interventions in the economic sectors. Education and primary health care were expanded to rural areas, where 80% of the population was concentrated (INE, 1980: 109). Even under the Marxist-Leninist framework, the state had difficulties in establishing and expanding in some social areas, mainly in the health and education. This did not make it possible for citizens to be better placed at the centre of national development to promote their individual potential and freedoms. At the same time, it reduced the possibilities for them to enjoy the freedom of choice and achieve a better quality of life, as provided for in the HDI: education, health, and living standards.

6.2.2. Crisis and collapse of the welfare state, socioeconomic and dominant paradigm

This section analyses the efficiency of the political institutions, the performance of economic growth, and development. The Mozambican economy and development

process were inspired by the Marxist-Leninist ideology that guided the centrally planned production process. The centralisation of political and socioeconomic processes with strong state intervention, the nationalisation of the means of production, and a state-level economic monopoly did not allow for the creation of a favourable environment to promote private accumulation and the development of the national economy (Mosca, 2001: 71). Under economic crises, state institutions became inefficient. In 1983, the Fourth FRELIMO Congress was the institutional and formal space that began to structure the crisis of the economic development paradigm. The party recognised that the state had less investment in the provision of public goods and services available to the consumer, had less savings, and citizens had a lower standard of living (Boesen & Moody, 1988: 567).

Easton (1965: 126) asserts that political legitimacy lies in the relationship between the benefits that citizens derive from institutions within a political system, evident in increasing levels of human wellbeing. For the author, citizens identify themselves with institutions because their political experiences, throughout their adult life, qualify them to rationally assess their performance. Thus, citizens support political processes, based on the assessment of progress in social and economic areas, and by the extension or deprivation of rights established by law. This analytical assumption establishes, at the outset, a relationship between levels of societal well-being and the support it attributes to the political system. Political support for FRELIMO, in the first years of independence, was premised on the symbolism of the party's struggle against the colonial regime. This political capital allowed FRELIMO to establish the new post-colonial state and recreate political institutions. Political elites were thus central to establishing post-colonial political institutions and societal structures in a post-colonial Mozambique. Indeed, North (2005) and Schmitter (2016) highlight the centrality of elites in establishing the new institutional rules of the game.

In 1986, Samora Machel, president of FRELIMO and of the state, died in a plane crash. Joaquim Chissano succeeds Machel and reconfigured power relations within the party and the state elite. The hard wing of the party³⁷, a defender of socialism and the Marxist-

³⁷ Marcelino dos Santos, former Parliamentarian President; Sergio Vieira, former Minister of Security, Jacinto Veloso, then Minister of Information, Óscar Monteiro, then Minister of the Interior.

Leninist ideology, had lost its internal and external influence in both party and state. The process of constructive engagement with the West had begun cautiously during the Machel legacy. In 1987, economic aid from the IMF and the World Bank arrived. The Government presented the Economic Rehabilitation Program (PRE), supported under the structural adjustment package (SAP). The PRE had four objectives: a) to stop the slowdown in production, b) to guarantee the population in rural areas minimum income, c) to re-establish the macroeconomic balance by reducing the budget deficit, and d) to reinforce the current account balance and the balance of payments. It was thus necessary to adopt a series of neoliberal political measures with a financial, monetary and commercial impact. This included the privatisation of major industries, less government spending, deregulation of the economy, and trade liberalisation, all of which were considered a condition for participating in the market, based on equal opportunities (Faria, 2019: 221).

In 1989, Marxism-Leninism was officially abandoned, redefining state-party relations. Globally, the breakdown of the USSR and Socialism and, consequently, the cut in aid to Mozambique, had a major impact politically and economically (Jafar, 2014: 4). The system of a centrally planned and socialist economy was formally abandoned in favour of an economic order based on the principles of a liberal market, open to new economic actors (point 1 of Article 41 of the CRM 1990). In 1990, the first liberal constitution was approved, replacing the State of Popular Democracy with a commitment to a liberal democracy based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, democracy, and social justice (Francisco, 2012: 83). Constitutional changes were gradually enacted, and at an institutional level, at least, a state-centralised economic monopoly was abandoned. Although the principles and foundations of the Marxist-Leninist ideology was formally removed from the institutional framework, we cannot attribute it as the reason for the economic crisis. Many African states had entered an economic crisis even though they had not followed the Leninist-Marxist experience (Faria, 2019: 7).

6.3. Economic liberalisation in the context of transitology: a smooth transition to the market economy

In the early days of independence, the struggle for equality was part of the strategy to guarantee political rights and civil liberties. After a decade of independence, the state was confronted with experiences of underdevelopment and authoritarianism. The crisis of an inadequate political and economic model favoured the perception of a generalised crisis in the legitimacy of state institutions, and their inability to fully fulfil the developmental promises spread in the context of independence. Therefore, faced with the crisis of state legitimacy, in the mid-1980s, reforms were made in the political and economic framework to replace the interventionist role of the welfare state by liberalising the country's political and economic fields. This was premised on the assumption that the quality of democracy³⁸ would influence the quality of political institutions, and positively impact on socioeconomic development. I assess the extent to which institutional quality drives economic progress by creating an environment conducive to change in the regulatory framework, and the adoption of new paradigms and ways of organising economic production. In terms of the empirical approach, I examine the indicators of human development: health, education, and well-being. The results correlate institutional quality and income quality. However, looking at the Mozambican case, the political and economic monopoly held by FRELIMO, the continuation of authoritarian practices, and the decay of rights and freedoms, create an empty shell of liberal democracy. These relevant elements in the analysis of the relationship between institutions and economic development constitute a challenge to the substantive quality of democracy measured through the indicators of human development, poverty, exclusion, and asymmetries.

6.3.1. Institutional procedures, liberalisation and economic openness

The Third Wave of Democracy influenced sub-Saharan African states' transition to political and economic liberalisation. As a result, most countries (including Mozambique) engaged in political and economic transitions towards liberal democracy. These transitions were underpinned by neoliberal economic principles, to promote economic growth and socioeconomic development. There is a strong body of literature establishing

³⁸ Measured by democratic rule of law (separation of powers, political rights, and civil liberties); the effectiveness of governmental action (independence of institutions, political alternation, cooperation, responsibility); political instability (occurrence of political and institutional conflicts); and accountability (vertical and horizontal); as well as control of corruption (transparency).

a causal relationship between democratic regimes and their effects on efficiency, and their effectiveness in allocating resources and achieving collective economic benefits (Diamond & Plattner, 2014: 8). The empirical data discussed in this section explores the causal relationship between political and socioeconomic transformation processes in Mozambique.

The institutionalisation and adoption of liberal democratic reformist policy principles foreground political pluralism, economic liberalism, and social wellbeing at an institutional level. The 1990 Constitution institutionalised a liberal economy founded on the principles of the democratic rule of law that captures, particularly, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts that ensure enforcement of the rules of society. Paragraph 1 of Article 41 of the constitution states that the economic order of the Republic of Mozambique is based on the valorisation of the labour force, the initiative of economic agents, and the participation of all types of property. The welfare state doctrine changed from one of direct state intervention to a more non-interventionist liberal approach to socioeconomic growth and development.

Thus, the legal and procedural foundations that guided the liberal Mozambican economy were erected through the reduction of the role and influence of the state in the economy, and the expansion of the private sector (Guedhani, 2003: 4). The new paradigm opened the gate for new political and socioeconomic actors (political parties, private sector, and civil society), thus creating a societal structure founded on the principles of pluralism. Economic reforms included privatisation and free trade; ensuring macroeconomic stabilisation, primarily dialled with inflation; elimination of price controls; withdrawal of subsidies; expansion of foreign trade; and changes in currency convertibility. The institutional reforms included, most notably, privatisation of state-owned firms and changes in the tax, banking, and capital market systems and their legal foundations (Queiroz, 2017: 88).

6.3.2. Dynamics, results and implications of socioeconomic liberalisation

The new Mozambican liberal economic paradigm is part of the liberal tradition of democracy and supports the idea that there is a close relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy. Lipset (1959) and Diamond (2011) developed the

idea that transition from authoritarian regime to democratic governance is a precondition for economic performance. Democratic institutions are fair to ensure equitable redistribution of income and the improvement of quality governance (Diamond, 2011: 2). Other authors claim that economic growth and political legitimacy are preconditions for the sustainability of democratic systems (Berggren, 2012: 18). There is a vast literature concerned with configuring the link between the socioeconomic and development correlations with the consolidation of political institutions, as well as the cross-sectional correlation between democracy and the Human Development Index (HDI). Berggren (2012: 18), when assessing the relationship between HDI and democracy, considers that the most democratic countries have higher values in their HDI. The HDI assumes that people must be at the centre of development to promote their individual potential, increasing possibilities to enjoy the freedom to live the life they desire. His work confirmed the hypothesis that democracy is more important for social development than economic growth. It corroborates the theory of development as freedom by Amartya Sen (1999), since, in its conception, human freedom and development are compatible and interrelated. Another important finding is that the countries that carried out their democratic transition between 1990 and 2005 showed significantly higher HDI growth rates when compared to the other countries analysed in the same period (Berggren, 2012: 19).

The research uses the HDI that ranges from zero to one. Countries with Very High Human Development are between 0.800-1; countries with Middle Human Development are between 0.500-0.599. Countries with Low Human Development are between 0-0.499. For the period under review, the HDI of Mozambique increased, from 0.209 in 1990 to 0.435 in 2015, and the value for 2018 was 0.446. However, the country's position in HDI deteriorated and Mozambique remained among the group of countries with Low Human Development. By remaining in this group, it means that during the political transition period, its socioeconomic structure presented a set of challenges inherited from the colonial political and historical past. These are aggravated by the systematic waves of military conflicts, the financial crisis, and economic dependence, whose historical and political transition have not yet resolved. Many other countries evaluated within the scope of the HDI have shown positive results, compared to those achieved by Mozambique (Deaton & Heston, 2008: 409). After three decades of political transition and procedural changes, which elements can be identified to establish the dichotomous relationship

between democratic institution reforms and socio-economic performance? The following table presents the Mozambican socioeconomic indicators performance in the context of its political liberalisation. The main selected indicators presented are social (life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy level), economic (GDP per capita, growth rate, and inflation), and Mozambique's position in the HDI, from 1995 to 2015.

Table 11: Mozambique and socioeconomic indicators 1990-2015

Indicators	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Life expectancy	43.6	45.9	47.5	47.9	49.2	49.9
Infant mortality	155.1	134.5	112.1	89.3	71.1	63.1
Literacy ³⁹ 15anos	1.95	2.13	2.30	2.32	2.35	2.36
GDP ³⁹ per capita	1.113.5	1.085.2	1.503.0	2.057.9	2.399.5	1.200
GDP growth rate	1%	2.5%	1.2%	6.6%	6.5%	6.7% (2018=3.4)
Inflation	43.7	47.7	12.7	6.4	12.7	2.4
HDI			168	168	165	180

Source: V-DEM (2016) only has data on all LAS until 2008. Thus, 2016 data were obtained from the CIA website (2020). Table prepared by the author with data from V-DEM (2016) and CIA (2020). V-DEM (2016) and CIA (2017). Human Development Report 2000-2019

Table 11 demonstrates that the health pillar indicators show that in the period of democratic transition, conditions were created to achieve a long and healthy life. Therefore, life expectancy went from 43.6 years in 1990 to 47.5 in 2000 and reached 49.9 in 2015. Additionally, the statistical data reveal a reduction in infant mortality from 155.1 per thousand children dead in 1990 to 112.1 per thousand children in 2000. In 2015, the infant mortality rate was 63.1 per thousand children (CIA, 2017; World Bank, 2018: 23). Although the neoliberal political measures with a financial, monetary, and commercial impact (which included the privatisation of major industries, less government spending, deregulation of the economy, and trade liberalisation), the country is confronted by high poverty rates, and the indicators of life expectancy and infant mortality rates continue to be among the lowest across SADC (INE, 2015: 18). Compared with countries like Mauritius and Seychelles, they are part of the group of African countries with consolidated democracies and with high life expectancy rates at birth. This is a directly proportional

³⁹ GDP magnitude is an important measure of a country's economic performance. However, for it to function effectively as an indicator of income generation potential and productivity, it needs to be revitalised by the size of the country's population. Thus, the most important performance variable is the gross domestic product per capita, and not the absolute value of the aggregate product.

correlation between the quality of democracy, improvement in socio-economic indicators, and improvement in life expectancy indicators.

The effect of democracy on the economic system, both in its redistributive and efficiency dimensions, established an analytical dichotomy. Authors such as Benabou (1996), Lizzeri, and Persico (2004), point out that the promotion of public good can boost the economy, such as the development of education. The democratic mechanism of universal suffrage favours income redistribution, since, in the event of income inequality, the average voter will have a lower-than-average income, leading him to choose the party that proposes redistribution policies. That is, democracy allows people with lower-than-average income to participate in political life, collectively putting pressure on the government for redistributive policy preferences. In the context of political transition, the domain of education has followed profound institutional changes in trying to adjust the sector to the context of economic liberalisation. Improvements in access to schooling for those over 15 years of age have been reported. From 1.95 years of schooling in 1990, it reached 2.32 in 2015 and 2.36 in 2018. The literacy rate progressively increased from 27% in 1990 to 38.71% in 1997; 48.18% in 2003; 50.58 in 2009; 56.04% in 2015; and 60.66% in 2017 (World Bank, 2020; Literacy Rate 1980-2020).

If on the one hand, literacy rates show a positive trend in the relationship between democracy and socioeconomic sectors, on the other hand, the qualitative analysis raises doubts about the quantitative data achieved and documented in the period of democratic transition in Mozambique. According to market laws, during liberalisation, Mozambican citizens' purchasing power reduced while they started paying tuition fees and other school services at all levels or subsystems of public school. Access to schooling became more difficult, the quality of education decreased, and teachers were less qualified to do their job (Mazula, 1995: 78). These elements show that, in Mozambique, political transformations had a negative impact on the socioeconomic life of citizens. As a result, the UNDP *Inequality in HDI in 21st Century* noted that Mozambique's HDI value for 2018 was 0.446. It put the country in the Low Human Development category, positioning it at 180 of 189 countries and territories, reproducing structures of exclusion and discrimination that jeopardise the cohesion of societies. Mozambique's 2018 HDI of 0.446 is below the average of 0.507 for countries in the low human development group, and below the

average of 0.541 for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan African countries which are close to Mozambique in the 2018 HDI rank, and to some extent in population size, are the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire, which have HDIs ranked 179 and 165 respectively (UNDP, 2019: 3).

The data in Table 11 reveal that the per capita GDP⁴⁰ performance of \$1,113.5 in 1990 reached its record in 2010 by recording a GDP per capita of \$2,399.5, having slowed in 2015 when it dropped to \$1,200. As a result, the growth rate recorded some improvements during this period, as seen below:




Figure 27: Mozambique growth rate 1990-2016

Source: V-DEM, 2017; CIA, 2020

As a result, the growth rate of 1.0% in 1990, which had been accelerating, peaked at 6.70% in 2015, and then dropped to 3.8% in 2016, and 3.4% in 2018 (as can be seen above). Despite the instability of the economic growth rate between 1990 and 2016, the overall rate of growth was 4% (V-DEM, 2018; CIA, 2020). For this reason, in the context of transitology, Mozambique deteriorated its position in the HDI by moving from position 168 in 1995 to position 180 in 2019. The deterioration of the HDI is aggravated by the record of difficulties in promoting a democratic income distribution and an effective reduction of rural poverty (INE, 2018: 58). On the question of liberal reforms, IESE (2019) highlights that the popular uprisings in some Mozambican cities in the late 2010s, in

⁴⁰ One of the main figures of national social accounting is the GD. This is widely used, and consists of a monetary measure of the flows of goods and services produced annually. However, GDP finds it difficult to adequately portray certain aspects (such as domestic labour and defensive spending) and does not have a direct correspondence with the level of well-being, socio- economic inequalities, as well as environmental variables.

protest the high cost of living and the deteriorating levels of poverty, show how far the political discourse to fight poverty is from the reality of the facts, as the levels of poverty are still high (Brito, 2019: 14). There are notable differences in terms of the incidence of poverty between urban and rural areas, and the southern provinces, when compared to those in the centre and north, with the latter being poorer (Cunguara & Hanlon 2012; Arndt *et al.*, 2018; MEF 2016).

After more than three decades of economic liberalisation, the democratisation reforms did not allow an effective economic performance. This raises the question: why, after three decades under political and economic liberalisation, has Mozambique retained a high poverty rate? North (1990: 4), in analysing the role of institutions, highlighted that the type of regime (institutions) determines the economic performance of a society. For North, the notion of guaranteeing freedoms and property rights, based on the theory of liberal democracy, constitutes a vital link for economic growth. Hence, the challenges that the country faces can be discussed under the institutional challenges with which the country remains confronted.

It seems relevant to explore the explanatory role of the quality of institutional change and its impact. Intuitively, the quality of economic and political institutions matters to make democracy function. Opening the economy to international trade and investment is also likely to affect the evolution of a country's economic institutions. In addition, it can be argued that foreign investors may create stronger demand for better institutions (Foley, 2002: 3). However, it does not appear that these theoretical approaches are applied in Mozambique. Here, during the process of economic and political institution-building, FRELIMO's political elite maintained the extension of the political and economic monopoly, managing and controlling foreign investment. They have thus become the owners or shareholders (majority or minority) of the entire business sector of the country. The new economic and political institutions did not prevent the political and economic monopoly inherited from the Marxist-Leninist ideology, one-party system, and autocratic practices. Under this circumstance, FRELIMO remains a dominant and hegemonic party with a Marxist-Leninist influence. Therefore, in the discourse of liberalisation, economic competition is a cosmetic discourse and does not fit the reality of the Mozambican transformative context (Center for Public Integrity, 2019: 41).

Carothers (2002: 6-8) unpacks the conditions underlying political transition to be socioeconomic growth, institutional heritage, and the predisposition of the country's political elites to trigger the political transition. Commitments to agreed procedural reforms can lead to democratically redistributive results, leading to the principles of liberal democracy. However, studies on democratisation not only assess the paths taken, but also the quality and implications of each stage (Cheeseman, 2014: 4). The trajectory of democratic consolidation is not linear and may be exposed to dialectical moments with systematic advances and retreats. It justifies why the processes of consolidation of democracy are confronted with moments of progress and setback. If in Mozambique democratic transition is confronted with a context in which the ruling political elite seems committed to the democratic cause, there remains and reproduces the traces from the old institutionalism structured in the line of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that guarantees the monopoly of political and economic power. Hence, based on Carothers's argument, it seems that Mozambique entered a grey zone and suffers from a weak political pluralism. In Carothers's conception, weak pluralism is the situation of regimes emerging from a political transition; the process remains superficial, the political hegemony of a dominant party, the monopoly of economic processes and *rent seeking*, and the political elites of all countries.

6.3.3. Economic liberalisation and institutional political performance

To measure comprehensive economic institutions, the research uses four World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs): government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption (the remaining two indicators – voice and accountability, and political stability and absence of violence – reflect primarily the strength of political institutions). These indicators reflect the quality of institutions as perceived by expert professionals and economic agents more generally, rather than taking a narrow view of the laws on the books. The WGIs are available annually from 1996 to 2018. Additional to WGIs data, the research uses the Afrobarometer Indicator to access dynamics related to voice and accountability, political stability, governance effectiveness, the role of law and anti-corruption, and capture of the state. In the context of democratic transition, levels of democratic satisfaction are assessed based on the ability of governments to respond to the collective demands of citizens, measured by economic

performance (Moisés, 2011: 345). The World Bank defines the voice and accountability indicator as follows: “Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which country citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Worldwide Governance Indicator, 2017). From 1996 to 2018, Mozambique showed a decrease in the values of this index, as shown in the following table: socio-economic indicators.




Figure 28: Mozambique Worldwide Governance Indicator (1996-2018)

Compiled from Worldwide Governance Indicator (1996-2018)

The indicator that measures political stability refers to the domestic context of the country when democratisation begins. Authors like Mosca share the idea that armed conflicts are intrinsically linked to instability, with the success of democratisation in conflicting scenarios unlikely (Mosca, 2001: 95). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that democracy would therefore serve as an instrument for solving social conflicts, while authoritarian regimes would produce significant systemic distortions with loss of economic efficiency, either because of the favour of oligarchies (through monopolies or obstacles to free competition), or the corruption of the dictatorial government (which does not find instruments capable of punishment).

In the early years of Mozambique’s democratisation process, most of the analysed indicators remained stable, at least until 2004, when the country held the third general elections that marked the end of 18 years of governance of President Chissano, and a new government led by President Guebuza (Mazula, 2005: 5). In 2012, the country started a cycle of military conflicts and political instability. Two hostility agreements were signed (2014 and 2019) and a peace agreement was signed in 2019. A new conflict emerged in

2017, located in the northern part of Cabo Delgado Province. FRELIMO's political and economic monopoly prevents any possibility of political alternation, and the country is politically unstable.

Election observers report cases of maladministration and defects in electoral processes. Although the country has not experienced a *coups d'état* in its post-1990 history, the levels of political exclusion, the absence of power sharing, the prevalence of a dominant and hegemonic party maintaining in its internal structure the state monopoly constructions of political and economic power, expose the country to a situation of political and military instability. The combination of these destructive factors in the political context caused Mozambique to fall from the 115th position in 2017 to the 116th position, at the same time that it changed from a hybrid regime to an authoritarian regime, where the formal institutions of democracy have inadequate significance, infringements and abuses of civil liberties are commonplace, elections (if they take place) are not fair and free, the media is often state-owned or controlled by groups associated with the ruling regime, the judiciary is not independent, and there is omnipresent censorship and suppression of governmental criticism (EIU, 2019: 19). As EIU (2019) and Afrobarometer (2017) show, although less than half of the citizens see democracy as preferable to any other form of government (one party, autocratic, and military regime), the acceptance of authoritarian alternatives is increasing (Afrobarometer, 2019: 1).

Both the WGI (1996-2018) and the EIU (2019: 19) show that from 2012, Mozambique decelerated within the framework of economic and political institutions. Additionally, figure 28 illustrates that less and less Mozambicans believe that the country is going in the right direction, which can confirm the deterioration of economic indicators and the consequent crisis of legitimacy in the country's political institutions. Based on these data, this research observes that during political and economic liberalisation, the Mozambican institutions promoted an extension of the political and economic monopoly, and the institutional and economic development remain affected by tendencies of authoritarian political practices. The weakness of democratic institutions is visible through the deterioration of governance indicators: accountability, political stability, government efficiency, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption regularly reported by WGIs (1996-2018), presented in figure 28.

The figure 28 also shows that in the context of democratic transition, the country recorded weak government effectiveness, assessed by the limited capacity to provide basic services in the areas of sanitation, water supply, electricity, and others. Afrobarometer also assessed Mozambican attitudes toward democracy, governance effectiveness, institutional trust, and economic standing. The Afrobarometer data allow us to see where the public is dissatisfied, thus calling into question the suitability of existing policies and suggesting alternatives. The results of the figure 28 illustrate less performance in government effectiveness in Mozambique. Moreover, the Worldwide Governance Indicator 2018 and the Afrobarometer report 2019 presented similar results.

Based on the Afrobarometer report 2019, Mozambicans have pessimistic perceptions of governance effectiveness. The construction of the collective perception of performance is based on the assessment of economic institutions providing public goods and services. As illustrated below, among the main problems that contributed to a negative perception of government performance, unemployment was the country's biggest problem (Afrobarometro, 2014: 9). This data is worrying when 38.5% of the young population, of working age, account for 46.7% of the population aged 0-14 years (INE, 2019: 31).




Figure 29: Mozambique: Key socioeconomic challenges for democracy

Source: Afrobarometer 2019. Round 7. Citizen's perception of the economy, freedom and democracy in Mozambique

The negative perception of government effectiveness came up again in 2019 when Afrobarometer reported on the economic satisfaction of Mozambicans, as illustrated in the figure 32. The data presented in the figure 29 compare the perception of Mozambicans

on economic conditions in 2015 and 2019. On one side in 2019, 47% of Mozambicans considered that the country's current economic scenario was *reasonably good* or *very good*. On the other side, less and less Mozambicans believe that the country is heading in the right direction. There is a growing feeling that the conditions of economic life are deteriorating from *fairly good/very good* to *fairly bad/very bad*.

Poverty dynamics and human development indicators are other important variables in the analysis of the quality of economic and political institutions in the context of democratic transition. Analysing these variables in the Mozambican liberalisation context, the following graph shows that after substantial setbacks from 1996 to 2014, the poverty rate in Mozambique has skyrocketed in subsequent years. In part, the fragility of economic and political institutions has pushed families into poverty and affected human development indicators (IOF, 2019: 53). This is confirmed by the 2018/19 Household Budget Survey that concluded that the number of Mozambicans in extreme poverty has increased by between 55 and 60 percent since 2015. Additionally, the IOF (2019) reported the deterioration of human development indicators and regional asymmetries. According to the report, more than half of the Mozambican population are poor (MEF, 2015: 152). The chart illustrates regional inequalities and asymmetries in the country.




Figure 30: Poverty and regional asymmetries (Source: MEF, 2019)

Figure 30 demonstrates that northern Mozambique is the region where the incidence of poverty tends to rise more sharply (see the blue line). Like the MEF, the APRM (2009) report denounced Mozambique's exclusion system, economic monopoly, and limited access order. This creates a resentment of marginalisation and the inability to participate

in or take advantage of socioeconomic and other political and socioeconomic opportunities (MARP, 2010: 14). Regional asymmetries are also observed along ethnic and party lines. First, the dominant elite is composed mainly of politicians born in southern Mozambique. Second, 65% of the total investment made in the economy is concentrated in the city and province of Maputo (Mosca, 2011: 77). These feelings of inequality and marginalisation in the Northern provinces were expressed in a study developed by IESE in 2019 when assessing the level of social cohesion in these regions. Based on this study, the current and prospective development projects reinforce regional and intraregional asymmetries. The discovery and exploitation of northern natural resources is seen as an operation planned to extract resources from northern areas to benefit southern Mozambique and its dominant elite. The combination of these factors is at the origin of the different cycles of political violence in independent and post-democracy Mozambique (IESE, 2019: 9).

The following table reveals the general feeling of the deterioration of economic conditions in the context of the democratisation of state institutions. The data presented are relevant to understand the relationship between institutions and socio-economic development in the context of democratisation.




Figure 31: Mozambique: Description of economic conditions 2015-2019

Source: Afrobarometer 2019. Round 7. Citizen's perception of the economy, freedom and democracy in Mozambique

Governments in new democracies legitimate themselves mainly through economic performance (Bratton & Mattes, 2001: 447). Hence, assessments of government effectiveness and satisfaction are based on the performance of existing democratic institutions.

The figure 32 shows a correlation between deterioration of economic conditions (illustrated in the figure above) and less popular support given to democracy between 2002 and 2015. As in Cape Verde, in Mozambique high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy are apparently strongly correlated with negative views on economic and government performance in service delivery, rather than with perceptions of political freedoms (Afrobarometer, 2019: 1). Citizens evaluate democracy based on a comparison of the relationship between collective demands and the support which the system is willing or able to offer citizens in terms of the provision of public goods and services; and the ability of the government to effectively face the problems considered by the citizens (Dahl, 1971: 144; Morlino & Montero, 1995: 234).

The figure 32 illustrates the deterioration levels of satisfaction with democracy. Analysis of the above figure leads to agreement with Di Palma when he states that political dissatisfaction (most frequently in the analysis of democracy) should be seen as an expression of displeasure resulting from the belief that government performance or the political system is not fulfilling the wishes of the citizens (Di Palma, 1970: 30).




Figure 32: Mozambique: Level of satisfaction with democracy

Source: Afrobarometro 2019. Round 7. Citizen's perception of the economy, freedom and democracy in Mozambique

To corroborate, figure 29 illustrates that one of the major concerns associated with democracy dissatisfaction is related to the dynamics of socioeconomic indicators, such as unemployment and service delivery (water supply, electricity, health, transport, education, and others). Education and training abroad may play a key role in strengthening the technical capacity of the government, civil service, and state-owned companies. It depends if they employ many of the returning scholars. This may help to design and implement technocratic economic reforms. Such education, as democracy, is a precondition for strong political, economic, and social institutions. Hence, high levels of education in society, as well as high levels of literacy, are preconditions to support democracy (Lind, 2008: 443). In a context where, for most citizens, a good education is hard to find, they may not be well enough informed to offer reliable opinions and support political institutions, and to profit from the quality of economic outcomes (Lind, 2008: 443). The figure 33 shows the dynamics of literacy and support that Mozambican democracy receives in the context of economic liberalisation. Although there are different indicators to assess political participation (vertical and horizontal accountability, citizenship access to media), in this section, it is evaluated based on electoral participation. Data from the figure 33 show that there is a direct relationship between literacy levels and citizen support for political processes. The data in the figure 33 show that, from a level of political participation in the order of 87.9% (verified during the first elections), there is a tendency to decelerate, which confirms a loss of confidence in elections and democracy.

The Afrobarometer report confirms that there are more citizens seeing elections as less free and fair, subject to illicit practices. Citizens doubt the guarantee of representation of voters' opinions in elections. Therefore, Isbell and Bhoojedhur assert that low levels of participation, in addition to being associated with electoral irregularities, are related to perceptions of corruption that affect the process, which negatively affects satisfaction with democracy (Isbell & Bhoojedhur: 2019: 8).




Figure 33: Mozambique: Literacy rate and political participation (1990-2019)

Source: Afrobarometer 2019. Queiroz (2017); CIA (2019)

It is difficult to establish a correlation between literacy and support for democracy. However, it is interesting to note that the highest levels of political participation were recorded in 1994 (87.9%) and 2019 (66%), after the peace agreements signed in 1992 and 2019. This means that, among Mozambicans, the electoral process is more a sign of support for peace and political stability, than democracy and state-building, as such.

While less democratic regimes may be successful in streamlining rules and regulations governing firms' operations, they appear to be much less successful in controlling corruption and ensuring the rule of law. Hence, corruption appears at the centre of the debate on sustainability and the consolidation of democratic institutions, and the promotion of economic development. For this, the government of Mozambique has endeavoured to approve normative instruments to mitigate levels of corruption. Corruption and a fragile institutionalisation process of liberal democracy that did not follow the bureaucratisation of public administration, have affected the political transition. Mozambique has already signed and ratified most of the international instruments to fight corruption. In 2012, the anti-corruption legislative package was approved at the National Assembly. To what extent do these formal instruments substantially contribute to reducing the corruption perception? On this subject, the Afrobarometer report published in 2019 noted that almost half (49%) of Mozambicans said that levels of corruption in the country had increased (Afrobarometer, 2019: 9). The state has been challenged by a monopoly

of the market that obstructs competition in a liberal market. Data presented in the figure below confirm a deterioration of the Corruption Perception Index.




Figure 34: Mozambique CPI (2012-2018)

Source: Corruption Perception Index 2012-2017

For the last ten years, the state has maintained “historical stains” from neopatrimonialism, rent seeking, corruption, nepotism, bribery, clientelism, exclusion, and limited access order. These practices reinforce a fundamentally structured political order around the prince, reproducing the model of personalised domination and the protection of the ruling elite. The political and economic framework have not reduced the collective perception of corruption.

6.4. Concluding remarks

This chapter analysed institutional quality and economic performance. The initial idea was that institutional quality and economic development reinforce each other in a virtuous circle. The analysis focused on the construction and transformation of the Mozambican state, after independence and in the current context of democratic liberalisation. The birth of the Mozambican state was apparently strongly influenced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology that inspired the country's socio-economic development policies. With a strong ideological burden, the quality of political and economic institutions was affected by the principle of a Leninist organisation that “the party runs the state and society”. This was an economic institutional characteristic that structured the state based on monopoly, authoritarianism, and consequent limitation of political rights and civil liberties. However, even with institutionalised democratic liberalisation in the 1990s, the forms of a monopolistic economy and authoritarianism persist. Hence, in the context of liberalisation, the quality of economic indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and anti-corruption) reveal negative trends following their deterioration. The causality between institutional quality and economic performance is apparent. The combination of these elements reveals that economic and political institutions play a key role in defining socioeconomic potential.

Chapter 7: CONCLUSION

There is widespread debate about the causal relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and the performance of the indicators measuring the access to socio-economic benefits. To better understand the determinants of this causal relationship, questions about the importance of political stability, effectiveness, and the durability of democratic institutions and their effect on socio-economic performance are central. There is a need to reflect on the diverse experiences of states and the key lessons learned. Indeed, the Cape Verdean and Mozambican contexts demonstrate that there is a cyclical relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and socio-economic performance.

The research was based on the foundations of institutionalist and structuralist theories, and discussed the ideological matrix, legal frameworks, and political strategies; and their decisive functions in the quality of democratic institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators in Cape Verde and Mozambique. In addition to the literature review, the research analysed the data from *Afrobarometer*, *Corruption Perception Index*, *Freedom House*, *Polity IV*, *V-DEM* and *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. The research identified the political variables that measure the quality of democracy: democratic rule of law (separation of powers, political rights, and civil liberties); the effectiveness of governmental action (independence of institutions, political alternation, cooperation, responsibility, and responsiveness); political stability (occurrence of conflicts); and accountability (vertical and horizontal); as well as control of corruption (transparency). The non-political variables, such as economic indicators, measured the HDI performance through GDP, inflation rate, literacy level, life expectancy, and child mortality. The conceptual formula for these indicators is based on Guillermo O'Donnell's ideas regarding the quality of democracy that aggregates the quality of political institutions and socio-economic development. Hence, with the predominant theoretical trends in this debate, the research deeply understands the historical and political experiences of each of the case studies, and questions the universalisation of the hypothesis that, faced with the consolidation of political and democratic institutions, there will be better conditions for the

performance of socio-economic indicators. When the research proposed this methodical correlation, empirical studies found that political and democratic institutions in both Cape Verde and Mozambique favoured the establishment of certain standards for political openness and economic competition. However, their applicability and impact on socio-economic performance depend on factors influenced by the historical, political, and ideological trajectory abandoned or still persistent in the institutions, in a context of liberal democracy. In Cape Verde, where the break with the ideological past was most profound (right at the beginning of the political transition), the institutional transformations in favour of democracy have allowed for remarkable political and socioeconomic progress. In Mozambique, where the past Marxist and Leninist ideologies, and authoritarian, centralist and monopolistic practices are still present, the consolidation of democratic institutions and socio-economic performance takes place rather slowly. For both Cape Verde and Mozambique, the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance was seen as essential to facilitate economic performance, facilitate equal redistribution, strengthen political institutions for good governance, and guarantee basic human rights. In both states, the political transition to democracy goes through different stages, from the opening, the collapse of the regime, and the emergence of the democratic system. However, it is not linear, and it may be exposed to dialectic moments with advances and systematic setbacks. Hence, studies on democratisation not only assess the paths and sequence of political transition, but also assess the quality of democracy in each of the stages. Based on this, the research concluded that there is an interdependence between the quality of democratic institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators. In both Cape Verde and Mozambique, the state-building process and the political transition to liberal democracy have always been influenced by the political and historical heritage reproduced by the main actors in the political process, and by the ruling elite that kept control of the state transformation processes at different moments of its transition and institutional transformation. In their different historical and political processes of transformation, state-building and democratisation, the influence of political actors determined the quality of institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators. In Cape Verde, the stains of mild authoritarianism were removed with the institutionalisation of the rule of law in 1991. Institutional reforms were favourable to liberal democracy and socio-economic performance based on constitutionalism, the rule of law, accountability, governance effectiveness, transparency, and anti-corruption initiatives. In

Mozambique, despite some progress, institutional reforms have not led to structural changes at an institutional level, most notably in political and civil rights, in the context of deteriorating economic performance. Therefore, the main conclusion is that, for an effective transition and consolidation of democracy, institutions matter; and they shape the procedural and substantive elements, considered as the conditions and dynamics of development and socio-economic performance. Ideological influences determine the quality of institutions and are determinants for understanding the political and economic vectors that structure development processes and socio-economic performance.

7.1. Political, institutional, and structural determinants in state-building and liberal democracy

Ideological influences and the quality of institutions are determinants for understanding the political and economic vectors that structure development processes and socio-economic performance. Institutions play an important role in understanding socio-economic processes and results. Based on these assumptions, the research understands that the model of political and economic development, based on the authoritarianism of the regime, and economic monopoly as adopted in the context of the construction of the Cape Verdean and Mozambican states, were strongly inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideologies. The orthodox foundations of the ideological doctrine influenced the interventionist nature of the state and effectively limited the scope of political and economic rights. The ideologically inspired constitutional commands placed the ruling parties (PAIGC and the FRELIMO party-state) in a hegemonic position and imposed them as instruments of legitimate domination over society. States inspired by the same ideological matrix presented similar characteristics. In the cases of Cape Verde and Mozambique, the similarity of the political and economic characteristics of the states were based on the secondary characterisation of the economy, with the slogan of "politics in the rank of command" and the subordination of the state to the highest bodies of hegemonic and dominant parties. These elements contributed to state-building, which was out of step with the modern principles of the democratic state.

Political openness (party political consent and constitutional or normative openness) and the structuring of economic processes characterised the transition processes in Cape

Verde and Mozambique. In the first stage, liberal democracy reforms of the authoritarian regime were premised on party political consent and validation. In Cape Verde, the PAICV II Congress held in 1988 put the problem of the political and economic openness of the single party regime on the agenda for discussion. In Mozambique, the FRELIMO V Congress held in 1989 put as a point for discussion on the agenda, the reforms favourable to the quality of democratic institutions. A year later, in 1990, the party officially abandoned its ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism, when it approved the first liberal democratic constitution. This formalised the creation of liberal democratic institutions and included the formation of the National People's Assembly in Cape Verde, and the People's Assembly in Mozambique, thus allowing for the structuring and institutionalisation of liberal democracy. At the time of the political transition, political institutions were built on single-party dominance, and the blurring of the state and the political party. Therefore, democratic norms and values were not consolidated and as such, a commitment to these norms had to be facilitated.

In Cape Verde and Mozambique, democratic institutions built in the context of political transition were underpinned by values and principles of the authoritarianism regime, most notably political centralism, and economic monopoly. This mismatch is explained by the fact that the emergence of democracy is related to the fragility of the political and civil rights structure that was not in line with the principles established after independence, and that was at the root of the crisis of state legitimacy in the 1980s. Overcoming the legitimacy crisis and strengthening socio-economic performance implied changing the structures of power and representation, and the nature of institutions, to ensure the quality of democratic institutions.

7.2. Socio-economic sectors in the analysis of state-building and liberal democracy

In the early stages of state-building, development projects were ideologically influenced and geared towards building a welfare society where the state intervened in the economy by redistributing income, strengthening the consumer power of citizens, and stimulating the monopolistic market; in theory, at least. By its ideological nature, the state controlled and guided public policies on social protection and the provision of health, education,

security, and other social goods considered as social rights. However, the interventionist approach of the welfare state in the economy, and the absence of effective democratic institutions, were unable to maintain the sustainability of development processes, and undermined the legitimacy of institutions and socio-economic performance indicators. The weakness of centrally planned, collectivist socio-economic policies was therefore the root cause of the state's legitimacy crisis of the single party, the institutions, and the regime.

The research notes that the two countries under review followed the same path in the transition to economic liberalisation. The quality of democratic institutions and the socio-economic performance assessed in each country was differentiated by the levels of political openness, stability, and accountability. Thus, out of the need to improve the quality of political and economic institutions, in Cape Verde, the regime accommodated a set of political rights (for example, regular elections and political demonstrations challenging the regime) and tolerated a set of civil liberties (the collective process of formulating aggregate demands coming from some actors and institutions founded without relation to the dominant party). In its dimension of openness and economic liberalisation, the Cape Verdean regime very early reformed the productive sector by ensuring that it was composed of public, mixed up, and private companies through the operation of small independent producers and cooperatives. During the lifetime of the single party, the Cape Verde state adopted a hybrid model of socio-economic development, accepting the particularities of liberal democracy that stimulate private sectors and competition, with a monopoly in some social sectors (water and energy supply) and centralising features of popular democracy. The marks of liberalisation of the economy were combined with the intervening role of the state, with the aim of ensuring the coherence and balance of the productive sectors. In Mozambique, the processes of state-building were established as authoritarian, monopolistic, and centralising measures, such as the creation of re-education camps, concentration of production on farms, and the official delegitimisation of traditional and religious authorities. The institutionalisation of the Communal Villages, the policies of Operation Production, the Law of Whipping and the death penalty (which exposed the deprivation of political rights and civil liberties), and institutional violence, worked in Mozambique in the period following national independence. These institutional features of the political regime shaped the centralising,

monopolistic, and interventionist nature of the state, and expressed the denial of mechanisms to ensure the democratisation of the regime.

However, analysing the two countries, the research concludes that, although the indicators of development and socio-economic performance were influenced by the prevailing ideological orientation of the time, their effect on the economy was felt in different ways. The intensity of centralisation and monopoly in the economy was lower in Cape Verde, where the state had adopted a hybrid development model, combining monopolistic and liberal elements in how the economy would be structured. This hybrid regime model of economy found trends of improvement in macroeconomic indicators (GDP per capita, growth rate, and inflation), and demonstrated improvement in socioeconomic indicators (rural development, transport, communication, housing, education, health, energy, and fisheries). During the liberalisation period, socioeconomic indicators such as life expectancy, the literacy rate, and the HDI improved, and the level of economic satisfaction increased. In Mozambique, a strong interventionist, monopolistic, and economic centralism was accompanied by the formation of state enterprises, the production of which was determined by the state. Even with institutionalised democratic liberalisation in the 1990s, the reforms of the monopolistic economy and authoritarianism persisted. Hence, the quality of economic indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and anti-corruption) reveal negative trends and overall democratic deterioration. For analytical purposes, these elements helped to identify the correlation between political and socio-economic factors that not only impact, but also shape, the dynamics, trajectory, and results of political transition and democratisation in Cape Verde and Mozambique. The key conclusion here is that the fair distribution of socioeconomic resources, complemented with the expansion of political rights, depends on strong political institutions guided by principles of good governance, including transparency, accountability, government effectiveness, and anti-corruption practices. Hence, the research offers a strong evidence that support the classic hypothesis that the quality of institutions is crucial to a country's socio-economic development. The combination of these elements reveals that economic and political institutions play a key role in defining socio-economic development.

7.3. Quality of democratic institutions and socio-economic performance

Through the following table, the research systematises the understanding of the relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and socio-economic performance in Cape Verde and Mozambique, in the context of democratisation from 1990-2018. For analytical purposes, a score of 1 represents the least democratic countries, and a score of 7 the most democratic countries. On the threshold of the 1990s, because of the transformation that had taken place, the two countries started the democratisation process and recorded favourable democratic development scores.

Table 12: The quality of democratic institutions and socio-economic performance

Country	Democracy before 1990	<i>Polity</i> before 1990	Democracy after 1990	Increase in democracy after 1990	Democracy in 2016 (FH)	Democracy in 2016 (FH)	Democracy in 2016 (<i>Polity</i>)	HDI 1990	HDI 2018
Cape Verde	No	-4	Yes	Yes	Free	1	10	0.603	0.656
Mozambique	No	-8	No	Yes	Partly Free	4	4	0.217	0.446

Source: prepared by author based on data from Freedom House (2019)

The data in the table above structure apparently strong relation between the performance of socio-economic indicators and the quality of democratic institutions. The data reveal that the institutional quality of democracy and socio-economic development are mutually reinforcing. The higher the institutional quality of democracy in a state, the better the development of economic indicators and vice versa. In 2017, Cape Verde was classified as a *free* country (having moved from -4 in 1990 to 10 in 2017). Mozambique had also improved its democracy ratings (from -8 in 1990 to 4 in 2017). However, an increase in democratisation does not mean that countries have become democratic, nor that they have successfully consolidated a democracy. This can be seen when the research found that, unlike Cape Verde, Mozambique has not profoundly changed the landscape of its democratic institutions and it has been classified as *partially free*. Because of institutional transformations favourable to liberal democracy, both states have shown improvements in the HDI growth rate compared to the previous period. Analysing the indicators of democratisation and the HDI, the research noted a strong evidences of a relation between

the indicators of political rights and civil liberties, and human development. However, this correlation and interrelationship depends on the context. Cape Verde, whose democratic institutions are of higher quality, improved its position in the HDI from 0.603 in 1990 to 0.656 in 2018. Meanwhile Mozambique, even with some progress, faces weaknesses in its democratic institutions, with poor performance in the HDI, moving from 0.217 in 1990 to 0.446 in 2018. This means that the causality between political rights and civil liberties, and HDI may vary according to the contexts under analysis.

Thus, the following graph complements this analysis by showing that, because of institutional reforms favourable to the quality of democratic institutions, the indicators measuring the HDI have improved, while states have improved the quality of the indicators measuring political rights and civil liberties.




Figure 35: Cape Verde and Mozambique: Political rights and civil liberties 1978-2018

Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Freedom House 2019

In discussing the procedural and substantive elements, the study opened two lines through which we can measure the quality of democratic institutions. In both Cape Verde and Mozambique, citizens assess the quality of democracy based on substantive assumptions measuring socio-economic performance. One can conclude that states faced with limited capacity in the provision of basic goods and services, access to employment, and income aggravate poverty levels (access to food, water, medicine, and energy), negatively impact the main indicators of the Human Development Index (life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, and literacy level) and disqualify the analysis of the quality of democratic institutions. This substantive assessment of democracy and political

performance correlates to and reinforces the argument for a cyclical relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators. Taking Cape Verde and Mozambique as case studies, one can conclude that the quality of democratic institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators are dependent on the combination of a set of procedural (standards and adopted procedures: existence of controlling mechanisms on the national political system, and the fusion of political rights and liberties) and substantive (capacity of the state to provide basic goods and services, employment, education, and health) elements that perfectly combine with the principles of the democratic rule of law: voice and accountability, transparency, control of corruption, and government efficiency.

7.4. Consolidation of the democratic rule of law

The quality of democratic institutions is measured by the level of independence and the nature of political-institutional power relations. The presence of members of the government (central and provincial) and the army in the People's Assembly is the mark of a government system which lacks effective separation of powers between the executive and legislative bodies, which exerts strong political control over the legislature, and the organisation of the state is inspired by working methods and military lines of command. In Mozambique, the extension of authoritarianism and centralism of power in FRELIMO reduced the effectiveness and independence of the political institutions and made it impossible for effective check and balance mechanisms in political decision-making processes. This structural configuration of the political system hinders the institutionalisation of domestic accountability mechanisms and misrepresents the standards that measure democratic rule of law, transforming the executive, legislative, and even the judicial accountability before the party's legal, disciplinary, and ideological structures. The construction of the rule of law must be seen based on a dualism in the approach to the relations between the executive, legislative, and judicial powers; and between them, understood as the state in its relationship with the citizens. It is in this relationship where the research finds the existence of a constitutionally legitimised public power struggling to consolidate the constitutional order of democratic institutions (in Cape Verde); and the political counter-current struggling to deconstruct the principles of separation and interdependence of powers by proposing a centralising power relationship (in Mozambique).

7.4.1. Voice-accountability and control of corruption

At the time of state-building, the electoral model, internal to the single-party, did not allow for effective representation of citizens in state institutions, or for effective political competition. The authoritarian, monopolistic nature of the regime, which limited political rights and civil liberties, did not allow for the emergence of alternative voices that functioned as checks and balances within the state to pressure the government to obtain results and improve transparency, combat corruption, and improve public information. In the context of the crisis of political and economic legitimacy, stemming from the failure to deliver public goods and services, and the deterioration of human development indicators,

horizontal accountability mechanisms were institutionalised which required state officials and members of the government to be held more accountable. However, without vertical accountability, the need was recognised for institutionalising internal accountability and transparency mechanisms controlled internally by parties and state institutions. Under these conditions, the interventionist, Marxist-Leninist state disadvantaged popular participation and prevented recalcitrant voices. The research noted that in the context of a Marxist-Leninist state, the government institutions and their actors were more accountable to the party's disciplinary structures, which imposed commands upon their members and had difficulties in implementing vertical accountability in favour of greater civil and popular participation. The institutional foundation thus did not facilitate inclusive citizenship and democratisation of the national political system. Citizenship arose from constitutional and legal determinations and was not the result of the evolution of collective demands or the evolution of the political conscience of society. Even within a democratisation context, the space for formulating public demands remain repressed, leaving no public space for claiming and expressing opposing ideas. In Mozambique's case, the fear of the power of the authoritarian regime still limits the consolidation of the exercise of citizenship. The citizens, in their relationship with the state, are respected because of obedience to the party-state line that did not allow mutual accountability.

The issue of accountability has been examined in the context of the relationship between the institutions and structures of political power, and their relationship with broader society. This relationship should be seen as an extension of citizens' rights to maintain close vigilance over the use of political power granted to those chosen to govern them, and for governments to be accountable to the citizens who have chosen them. Thus, because of political structures for representation and the separation of powers, assessing the quality of democratic institutions was analysed.

The absence of transparent and democratic electoral mechanisms undermines the existence and functioning of mutual accountability between state institutions and citizens. The lack of an effective parliament resulting from an electoral process, undermines effective mechanisms for citizen representation in state structures and institutions, and does not allow for the independence of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It will also undermine domestic accountability mechanisms. Where this configuration

prevails, the executive, the legislature, and even the judiciary become accountable to the party's legal, disciplinary, and ideological structures. In the Mozambican context, even with democratisation, the quality of institutions cannot guarantee accountability, making them very vulnerable to corruption. This debate, which is central to the theory of democracy, brings to the table the relationship between the representation of citizens in the state, the legitimacy and quality of democratic institutions, and the question of socio-economic development. Based on the elements of institutional analysis, in the period in which the single party predominated, the research found that political legitimacy was negatively affected by the existence of institutions that operated within a rather closed architecture, and did not allow for effective representation of different social groups in state institutions. Exclusion, marginalisation, and the systematic violation of human rights were the source of the military and political conflict that lasted 16 years (1976-1992). On the other hand, the magnitude of confidence, popular support, and legitimacy of political institutions were affected by cyclical factors resulting from the misalignment of policies and strategies, and socio-economic development with the expectations of a development generated after national independence. The combination of these institutional elements was a source of the crisis of the Mozambican state, witnessed in the 1980s and which in the 1990s led to the emergence of the new paradigm of liberal democracy. In the specific case of Mozambique, research has shown that the emergence of the new paradigm of democratisation that began in the 1990s maintains the marks of authoritarianism, centralism, and political and economic monopoly.

7.4.2. Government effectiveness and alternation of political power

The research questions government effectiveness through processes that ensure the consolidation of political pluralism, alternation of political power, and party-political transition. This element was analysed in the light of their electoral results, considering the possibilities for alternation of power, and the opportunity for political party transition to consolidate democratic institutions. The research discussed three indicators for this criterion: boycott of elections, acceptance by the losers, and the qualities of free, fair, and transparent elections. In these three indicators, Cape Verde registered the best scores. The elections so far have been characterised by observation missions as being free and fair, without the occurrence of boycott phenomena, or of non-acceptance of the results by the main political parties. In political and civil rights, Cape Verde scored close to the maximum. However, electoral competition there remains bipolarised and reduced to two parties (PAICV and MPD). The process of institutionalising the electoral system has been accompanied by a deepening of the procedures and quality of democratic institutions. The country combines aspects typical of consolidated democracy (relative predictability of electoral results, alternation of political power, and a transparent electoral system). The Cape Verdean democratic system is more institutionalised in the sense that the political actors (PAICV and MPD) have clear expectations of the political system and develop strategies for electoral competition, based on the principle that certain contours and rules of electoral competition are respected, are stable, lasting, and regarded as legitimate. The MPD won the first multi-party legislative elections in January 1991 with 62% of the vote, governing the country until 2001 and, in the third election in 2001, was defeated by the PAICV, which returned to power, thus ensuring a peaceful and effectively successful cycle of power alternation. This is one of the main aspects that explains the success of democratic transition, where effective alternation of party power has helped legitimise the country's democratic transition, contributing to political institutional quality.

In the Mozambican context, research has shown that the political institutions that do not allow for the consolidation of political pluralism are weak. Government fragility, measured based on the levels of manipulation of political institutions and electoral management bodies, does not allow for the alternation of political power and the consolidation of the political transition. The research found that electoral reforms have been a permanent feature of Mozambican politics since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1994. The

underlying assumption has always been that the reforms would consolidate Mozambican democracy; that transparent, free, and fair elections would be essential to pacify political competition; and that the elections would give all Mozambican citizens a significant voice and representation in the political process. Since the 1994 elections, there have always been ongoing discussions on the legislation governing the elections. New electoral laws were adopted before all election cycles: 1997-1998, 2003, 2007-2008, 2013-2014, and 2018-2019. However, despite all the negotiations and reforms, the elections remain a source of conflict (and even a reason to return to a violent conflict). The levels of public confidence in political institutions have declined. The transition to liberal democracy has not changed the nature of competitive authoritarianism in Mozambique. Recent trends reveal that repression has increased, with systematic public displays of repressive power in peaceful demonstrations, intimidation, politically motivated assaults on the physical integrity of citizens, and murders. These are marks of authoritarianism still present in state institutions in the context of liberal democracy.

Thus, Cape Verde is classified as *free country* (Freedom House), *most improved by scores* (Found for Peace and Failed State Index), and a democratic state (African Economic Outlook, 2017: 11). Meanwhile, regarding the status of democracy and government effectiveness, Mozambique is considered *partially free* (Freedom House), *in danger of collapse* (Found for Peace and Failed State Index) and *authoritarian* (Economic Intelligence Unit) since the transition to democracy, mainly due to the scarce progress in the field of political and civil rights.

Accountability measures in parliamentary structures, the media, and civil society, remain weak and Maputo-centric. Human rights remain a concern in the justice and security sectors, and state institutions are increasingly perceived as corrupt. Some of the political and state elite have been accused of being narcotics traffickers (Chapman, Visser, Rothman, Curran, Gottwals & Lala, 2010: iii; Canhanga, 2014: 15). In addition, there have been instances of abusive use of military violence against civilian and social movements. The weakness of democratic institutions does not allow the improvement of the legal framework that governs the electoral competition in the country. The government's pressure on opposition parties and candidates is constant. Although elections are held regularly, they are neither free, fair, nor transparent; and do not allow for any possibility of

political alternation. Regular multiparty elections ensure the participation of members of the opposition and other civil organisations in the elections and some representation in the assemblies. However, electoral acts do not prevent pseudo-representation derived from fraud in electoral processes, and results in exclusion and systematic violation of the basic principles of liberal democracy. This factor, which prevents a change of political alternation in the national political trajectory, can be a source of persistent conflict and political-military instability in Mozambique.

7.5. Political-military stability

The relative success of the quality of democratic institutions and their socio-economic performance is due to their political stability. Cape Verde's structural characteristics prevent the existence of armed conflicts in its territories (both wars of independence and civil wars). This is explained by the fact that Cape Verde is an island microstate. Apart from the structural characteristics, the level of literacy of its political elite reduces the levels of tension between the political elites and leaves them more favourable to the process of building democratic institutions. Therefore, the absence of armed conflicts has helped Cape Verde to generate greater possibilities for social, political, and economic stability in its territory. This has meant that its elites, who already had a more flexible character, began the process of democratisation quickly and effectively. In explaining the success of Cape Verde's political and military stability, the desire of its population, and the capacity of its institutions and players to carry out successive shifts of political power, stand out. In contrast, in the Mozambican context, since the liberation process, the country has experienced systematic cycles of military conflict, including the war for independence (1964-1974), the civil war (1976-1992), and other conflicts (2013-2016, including a conflict still ongoing since 2017). In the Mozambican case, there is a correlation between these conflicts and a political structure that does not allow for the effective alternation of political power, and which undermines the representation of different groups within the state structure. These factors are at the root of the exclusion of the population from access to national income, regional asymmetries that generate a sense of marginalisation, and the consequent worsening of poverty in the country. These elements reveal that in Mozambique the dynamics of state-building and democratisation have been characterised by the existence of armed conflicts in its territories, the presence of a weakened social

development with low growth rates, and great tensions between its inflexible political elites for democratisation, fragmentation, and regional asymmetries.

7.6. The challenges of the quality of democratic institutions affecting performance of socio-economic indicators

The research summarises this section by focusing on the argument that the quality of democratic institutions and of the socio-economic performance indicators can be influenced by the legacy of the political and past ideologies, the extent of monopoly, and the persistence of authoritarianism, still present in the context of liberal democracy. In the context of the transition to democracy, states have implemented reforms favourable to the quality of their institutions, and to socio-economic development and performance. This is the procedural or minimalist view of the debate, in which democracy is reduced to the political method, with certain institutional arrangements in which decisions are by-products of fights and electoral competitions. However, substantive values can be political rights, civil liberties, and the performance of socio-economic indicators, attached to the democratic process. On this basis, the levels of consolidation of political institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators have made distinct progress, both in Cape Verde and in Mozambique. Despite the existing differences, the results that each state has achieved in the context of the political transition depend on the quality of the democratic institutions, which consequently impact the performance of the socio-economic indicators. Therefore, the differentiation of results raises some concerns about the analysis of factors that influence the political trajectory, the quality of democratic institutions, and socio-economic performance.

The research discussed the socioeconomic factors in the context of national independence and liberalisation transformation. The starting point of the discussion was that the procedural elements of democracy make it possible to satisfy important substantive rights and duties. However, procedural transformation alone do not guarantee the substantive or socio-economic satisfaction of democracy. In certain contexts, the mismatch between minimalist-procedural-institutionalist assumptions and the substantive-structuralism foundations of democracy is still present, after more than three decades of political transition. Thus, procedural, or institutional reforms (the revision of

the constitution and the entire regulatory framework for political and economic liberalisation) do not always bring about profound changes in the procedural and substantive aspects of state-building. There are circumstances in which the practice of authoritarianism remains in the current context of the liberalisation of the political regime and the economic model. The new paradigm based on respect for values that guarantee the interdependence of powers, the accountability of institutions, and the definition of formal and universal mechanisms for legitimising political the power, have been better consolidated in Cape Verde. In the Mozambican context, after more than three decades of political and economic reforms, the changes have shown minimal results and reveal a mismatch between the procedural and substantive presuppositions of democracy, making the initially favourable prediction in the process of building the democratic rule of law impossible. In this context, the political and economic institutions founded under liberal democracy still reproduce authoritarian practices characterised by the partisanship of state institutions, the exclusion of citizens based on party affiliation, strong hierarchisation and excessive bureaucracy in the functioning of public institutions, and the systematic violation of human rights. A fragile process and the lack of effective interdependence of powers is an extension of the absence of the principles of the democratic rule of law. Therefore, one can conclude that the institutional legacy of the authoritarian regime present in the path of political and economic processes at the time of liberal democracy, has given rise to a configuration of the political atmosphere that Carothers (2002) calls dominant power, monopoly, and authoritarianism, which obstructs the consolidation and quality of democratic institutions, and does not stimulate the performance of socio-economic indicators.

At the heart of the teleological foundations supporting economic transition, there was an assumption that democratic institutions offered conditions for the implementation of economic liberalism, which would serve as a tool to boost competition and stimulate the development and performance of socio-economic indicators. Having conducted liberalisation processes and becoming better familiar with the process of liberalisation, the ruling elite of PAICV, FRELIMO, and the state, from the point of view of a monopoly, became the owners or shareholders (majority or minority). This engineering has not allowed the emergence of a truly independent business sector from the party and the state and has distorted the objectives of building a liberal economy based on business

competition. Thus, despite the procedural reforms, in the Mozambican case, the monopoly and state interventionism in the economy, characteristics inherited from the welfare state, are still present in the context of liberal democracy, and have been extended. Thus, because of the weakness of the democratic institutions adopted in the context of liberal doctrine, the extension of the monopoly has not allowed for effective inclusion and competition in both the political and economic fields. The extension of the monopoly of the economy in the context of market liberalisation is reinforced with external financial support allocated through the IMF, the World Bank, and other multi- and bilateral partners, which, in addition to supporting the state budget, are a source of corruption, which has benefited the ruling elite of the state, undermining efforts to consolidate institutions that support the democratic rule of law, the dynamics of accountability, government effectiveness, and the mechanisms adopted in the fight against corruption. This is one of the examples of the authoritarian elites that control the transition process and participate to some extent in the new regime, as it also demonstrates the complexity of consolidated changes from an authoritarian to a democratic government; and can be referenced as one of the limiting factors in the quality of democratic institutions and socio-economic performance.

7.7. Concluding Remarks

In the transition to democracy, states implemented reforms to ensure the quality of their institutions and socio-economic development and performance. The quality of democratic institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators can be influenced by the political and ideological trajectory, the extent of monopoly and the persistence of authoritarianism, which at times are felt even in contexts where states are transitioning to liberal democracy. This is the proceduralist or minimalist view of the debate in which democracy is reduced to the political method, certain institutional arrangements in which decisions are by-products of electoral struggles and competitions. This research recognises that institutions can generate non-optimal outcomes, even if they are designed to avoid them. Meanwhile, substantive values linked to political rights, civil liberties and performance on socio-economic indicators should appear connected to the democratic process. Based on this, it is evident that the levels of consolidation of political institutions and the performance of socio-economic indicators have made distinct progress in both

Cape Verde and Mozambique. Despite the existing differences, the results that each state has achieved in the context of political transition depend on the quality of democratic institutions, the level of consolidation of the Rule of Law, Voice, Accountability and control of corruption, as well as the effectiveness of the government and the alternation of political power. The combination of these elements has an impact on the performance of socio-economic indicators and ultimately influence human development.

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