Dependencies and decentralised government for the governance of housing delivery in Mangaung

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DECLARATION

I, Malefetsane Daniel Mokoena, declare that the thesis herewith submitted for the doctoral degree qualification Doctor of Philosophy, with specialisation in Development Studies at the University of the Free State, is my independent work and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.

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Signature: Date: 6 June 2022

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late parents LESIHLA and MANINI, who inspired and taught me (from an early age) to be steadfast in my convictions. To my wife DISEBO, my son MABOTE and my daughters MATUBATSI and MATLALA. I love you so much and hope you have forgiven me for denying you quality time during my study period. I am grateful that you understood. You were patient and provided me with some fun throughout my writing process. GOD BLESS.

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I GIVE ALL GLORY TO GOD.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates dependencies and decentralised government for the governance of housing delivery in Mangaung over three decades. Housing governance remains a challenge to most local authorities. The study uses the evolutionary governance theory to conceptualise the research and understand the concepts of housing governance and the evolution of housing policy over time. This thesis relies on data collected from semi-structured interviews and policy documents and uses the evolutionary governance theory to show evidence of path, goal and interdependencies in housing governance in Mangaung with adverse results. Accordingly, the thesis brings forward a unique contribution to housing delivery scholarly work, emphasising some underlying dependencies in housing governance.

Keywords: Decentralisation; Urban management; Governance; Government; Housing delivery; Policy implementation.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
BNG	Breaking New Ground
DoH	Department of Housing
DoHS	Department of Human Settlements
HA	Housing Act
HDA	Housing Development Agency
HSDG	Human Settlements Development Grant
HSP	Housing Sector Plan
HWP	Housing White Paper
IDP	Integrated development plan
IDT	Independent Development Trust
IHSP	Integrated human settlements plan
IRDP	Integrated Residential Development Programme
ISUS	Mangaung Informal Settlements Upgrading Strategy
LG	Local government
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MLM	Mangaung Local Municipality
MMM	Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NHF	National Housing Forum
NUSP	National Upgrading Support Programme
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACN	South African Cities Network
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
UISP	Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme

CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE SCENE

1.1 Introduction

Where people work and live matters. The apartheid planning regime consigned the majority of black South Africans to places far from work, socio-economic amenities and the benefits of participating in the economy (National Planning Commission 2012). The post-apartheid housing delivery programme has been one of the South African government's most prominent tools for spatial transformation and social investments since 1994. The post-apartheid government has delivered 3.2 million houses and 1.1 million serviced sites in response to this history. Additionally, between 1994 and 2015, the private sector delivered 1.2 million new houses (South Africa. Department of Human Settlements [DoHS] 2019a). Approximately 73% of the houses provided by the private sector were in the entry-level sector of small houses (less than 80 m^2), flats and townhouses. The Discount Benefit Scheme delivered ownership to 360 000 households who previously rented these from the government. Furthermore, the government funded the construction of 127 000 institutional units (rental housing), upgraded 71 000 hostels or community residential units and delivered 13 000 units through the Finance-Linked Subsidy Programme between 1994 and 2018 (DoHS 2019a). The percentage of the population in formal houses increased from 64% to 80% and those in traditional houses declined from 18.2% to 5.5% between 1996 and 2016. The percentage of households living in informal dwellings also decreased from 16% in 1996 to 13.6% in 2016. Finally, nearly 1.2 million households have received funding from the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme since 2004 (DoHS 2019a).

The government designed the housing subsidy programme as a national programme that provincial and local governments had to implement in conjunction with local communities. Although there is a substantial body of research on the housing policy, local level institutional and governance assessments of the housing programme remain limited. Some of the exceptions in this regard include studies on the Bloemfontein-Thaba Nchu-Botshabelo region (Mangaung) during the first five years of post-apartheid housing delivery (Marais and Krige

1999) and on eThekwini (Charlton 2003), Matjhabeng (Marais and Wessels 2005), and Cape Town (Graham 2006; Amin and Cirolia 2018; Cirolia and Scheba 2019).

South Africa has a sophisticated decentralised local government system that operates within the constitutional principle of cooperative government (South Africa 1996a). It is a system that enjoys constitutional and legislative authority (Siddle 2011). Decentralisation refers to the transference of authority from a higher level to a lower level of government (Crook and Manor 1998; Sharma 1989; Brinkerhoff and Afzar 2010). Decentralisation signifies a reversal of centralisation, allowing for autonomous local government (Reddy and Maharaj 2008; Stanton 2009). Decentralised governance allows for a complex mix of national policies and local applications. Housing policy is one example. Despite a substantial body of research evaluating housing policy in South Africa (Khan and Thurman 2001; Tissington 2010; 2011), these relationships and cooperative government relationships linking policy and application through different spheres of government have not received much attention.

1.2 Problem statement

It is more than 25 years since democracy and the introduction of the post-apartheid housing policy, and the relationship between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system is still a challenge (Mokoena and Marais 2007). According to Hydén (2016), the literature mainly evaluates decentralisation in specific sector programmes. Further, most literature on decentralisation focuses more on expectations and discourse than on practice and outcome or the evolution of governance responses (Hydén 2016). Other contributions focus on the rationale for decentralisation (Ndegwa 2002; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2019).

Centralism weakens local government institutions and renders local governments incapable of delivering services (Mutahaba and Pastory 2015). Despite relatively high levels of decentralisation, it hinges on strong cooperative government in South Africa. Cooperative government requires that all spheres of government should cooperate in mutual trust and good faith by (1) fostering friendly relations; (2) assisting and supporting one another; (3) informing one another and consulting one another on matters of common interest; (4) coordinating their actions and legislation with one another; (5) adhering to agreed-on procedures; and (6)

avoiding legal proceedings against one another (South Africa 1996a). However, the state has modified cooperative government practices since its implementation (Symes 2005). Cooperative government has become a phrase that means “cooperation in governance” or even “corporate governance” (Hall, Symes and Luescher 2002:108).

The decentralised government system in South Africa placed urban management and governance at the forefront of local development. Through decentralisation, new responsibilities for planning, housing, economic development and social services have become local government responsibilities and required local governance responses. Tensions between different spheres of government have accompanied decentralisation (Siddle 2011). For instance, there is little room for local government innovation regarding the housing process and practice. The provincial government controls housing development and developers at the local government level (Ley 2009). Additionally, the national government’s intervention in local government affairs and administration through legislation like the Municipal Financial Management Act, 2003 (South Africa 2003) complicates policy implementation within a decentralised government system (Moya 2011) and affects service delivery. For instance, the Supply Chain Management directives published in the Government Gazette, Vol. 479, No. 27636, on 30 May 2005 (consistent with the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003) obligate the local government to contract for public goods and services in ways that are “fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective”. However, these regulations have often been confusing and cumbersome (South Africa. National Treasury 2015:5). At the same time, service delivery efficiency in most South African municipalities still has to improve (Mhelembe and Mafini 2019). Also, most municipalities' accountability and performance have deteriorated (South Africa. Auditor-General 2019).

Further, the obligation placed on the provincial government to delegate the housing function (power) while retaining oversight responsibilities creates tension and grounds for disagreements between spheres of government (Kessy and McCourt 2010). This arrangement is a disconnection between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system and reflects interdependencies in the implementation process.

Furthermore, within the context of local politics and provincial power play, the Free State provincial government instituted a minimum house size of 40 m² in 1994. Through the minimum housing size policy, the Free State was one of the provinces that deviated from national policy (Free State Department of Local Government and Housing 1995), inadvertently locating houses on the periphery of Mangaung. For Van Assche, Beunen and Duineveld (2014), understanding these (power) dynamics has become a challenge for contemporary governance.

In addition to the concerns about housing, urban management and decentralisation, housing policy assessment has largely taken place at the national level. For example, Huchzermeyer (2003) outlines the macro-economic path dependency of the South African policy on decision-making in the mid-1980s. Yet the assumptions that she make does not consider the decisions taken by various spheres of government.

Therefore the research questions are:

- How did Mangaung manage and govern housing policy and delivery since the transition to democracy in 1994?
- How do path dependency concerns in a national sphere play out in the local government?
- Are the current ways researchers articulate path dependency in housing policy and application comprehensive enough to explain local government decision-making?
- How do goal- and interdependencies affect path dependencies in housing governance and do goal- and interdependencies receive enough attention in housing governance and policy assessments?

1.3 Aim and objectives of study

The study investigates the dependencies between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system in Mangaung. Considering this aim, the study has the following objectives:

- to examine the development context and content of the South African housing policy since the colonial period against the background of the research problem;
- to assess the South African housing policy application through different spheres of government, focusing on Mangaung and the following housing programmes between 1994 and 2020:
  - project linked Subsidy Programme,
  - Informal Settlements Programme, and
  - Mega or catalytic projects (Integrated Residential Development Programme [IRDP])

The study aims to develop policy recommendations and provide new insights on dependencies in the governance and management of housing in the local sphere.

1.4 Case study area

The Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (Mangaung) is the study area. Three reasons are important in choosing Mangaung as the study area: Mangaung (whose economy depends on its provincial capital status and its role as a regional service provider for small towns in central South Africa and neighbouring Lesotho) is one of eight metropolitan areas in South Africa. Yet, its population (one of the smallest metros with about 800 000 people), population density and economy are substantially smaller than South Africa's largest metros. Also, Mangaung is an important Free State provincial city that contributes about 31% to the provincial output (Subramanyam and Marais 2022). Finally, the Free State provincial government's housing policy decisions influenced Mangaung's housing delivery over many years (Marais and Wessels 2005).

The Municipal Demarcation Board established the Mangaung Local Municipality (MLM) in 2001. Before this demarcation, the various Transitional Local Municipalities managed the individual urban settlements. In 2011, the Municipal Demarcation Board declared Mangaung a metropolitan municipality and in 2016, it added the Naledi Local Municipality and Soutpan. Although the government declared Mangaung a local authority in 2001, the case study will include the period since 1994, using the 2011 boundaries and finally the 2016 boundaries.

1.4.1 Situational analysis

The number of households in Mangaung is 265 561 and the total population was 787 803 in 2016 (Statistics South Africa 2016). About 65% of the total households reside in Bloemfontein, 31% in Botshabelo and Thaba-Nchu, 3% in the other small towns in the municipality and 2% in the farm areas. Historically, access to the Bloemfontein urban area (the main economic centre) depended on three complementary processes, namely separate suburbs for different race groups in terms of the Group Areas Act (Bloemfontein for whites, Heidedal for coloureds and Mangaung Township for black South Africans), state-provided housing units for black South Africans and displaced urbanisation (Krige 1991). The Integrated Human Settlements Plan (IHSP) estimates that 47 informal settlements provided shelter to about 31 143 people in 2016 (MMM 2016). Out of this number, 54% is in Bloemfontein, 26% in Botshabelo, 11% in Thaba Nchu and 9% in other areas.

1.4.2 Spatial challenges

There are spatial challenges in Mangaung. Mangaung consisted of the main white urban area of Bloemfontein, an apartheid created black township of Botshabelo (situated 55 km east of Bloemfontein) and the predominantly Tswana speaking town of Thaba Nchu (situated 12 km east of Botshabelo) (Marais 2008). Krige (1991: 104) describes Mangaung as a "microcosm of apartheid planning"; Thaba Nchu as "an exclave of 'independent' Bophuthatswana", Botshabelo as "an ethnic city for the Sotho, a catchment area for canalised urbanisation and surplus black people in the province", and Bloemfontein as "one of the ideal apartheid cities". With Botshabelo located 55 km east of Bloemfontein (along a major access route running in a north/south direction), spatially, this urban node gives rise to a linear urban form. Spatial fragmentation creates a problem for most southern communities. They must travel as far as 8 km to access the socio-economic opportunities that have developed largely to the northern parts of the town (MMM 2019a:32). This spatial form represented the single biggest long-term challenge for planning in Mangaung (South African Cities Network [SACN] 2011).

Other typical apartheid planning features included three industrial development nodes, daily commuting and long-distance migrants. Mangaung has a fragmented spatial form and this apartheid planning has meant the city's urban areas developed according to race, divided by

industries, buffer strips and railway lines. Although the merger of these three towns or urban areas in 2001 created an opportunity to integrate planning (as Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu have always been one functional area), finding appropriate and effective ways of integrated planning for higher urban densities remains a challenge.

The merger of the Naledi Local Municipality (a category B municipality consisting of the small towns of Vanstadensrus, Dewetsdorp and Wepener) and Soutpan (another small town in Masilonyana Local Municipality in the Lejweleputsa District) with Mangaung, "added 3 500 km² and 75 000 residents (of whom approximately 30 000 were living below the poverty line) to Mangaung" (Subramanyam and Marais 2022: 12). The merging of small towns exacerbated existing strategic planning and fragmented spatial form challenges in Mangaung and brought significant service backlogs.

Figure 1.1 provides the location of the study area within South Africa and the Free State Province. Figure 1.2 provides the evolution of Mangaung municipal boundaries from 2011 to 2016.



Source: Municipal Demarcation Board (2015)

Figure 1.1: Location of the study area within South Africa and the Free State Province



Source: Municipal Demarcation Board (2015)

Figure 1.2: The evolution of Mangaung boundaries 2011–2016

1.5 Theoretical and conceptual framework of the study

I use several main concepts in the thesis. Below I provide the definitions:

Decentralisation refers to the transferring of responsibility and authority for public functions from the central government to local governments (Siddle 2011). Decentralisation transfers powers, functions and resources to local government. Practically, decentralisation is about balancing the centre's demands and the periphery's claims. Thus, at the heart of decentralisation is the relationship between the various government levels (Devas and Delay 2006) and the balance of power between these levels (Falleti 2005).

Urban management refers to a process of integrated and deliberate decision-making (Cheema 1993) and a process through which the activities of the people interact with each other and with the city's governance (Bačlija 2013).

Governance refers to the making of collectively binding decisions in a community and implementing these decisions (Van Assche et al. 2014). The evolutionary governance theory offers a theoretical framework for analysing and explaining governance by focusing on dependencies and how these evolve and understanding the relationship between markets and the state. The evolutionary governance theory's concept of a governance path shows how history and context can explain rigidity in collective decision-making (Van Assche et al. 2014). Further, this theory identifies three types of dependencies relevant to this thesis: path dependency, goal dependency and interdependencies.

Furthermore, **housing**, or **general living spaces**, refers to the construction and assigned usage of dwellings, buildings collectively or houses to shelter people (Mbambo 2018). The study's conceptual framework makes refence to three closely linked housing programmes constituting the focus area: project-linked subsidy, informal settlements upgrading and integrated residential development programme (IRDP) or megaprojects (South Africa. Department of Human Settlements 2009). Initially, South Africa used an inflexible project-linked subsidy programme to upgrade informal settlements far from socio-economic amenities (Huchzermeyer 2004b). In 2004, informal settlements upgrading programme was introduced and the IRDP replaced the project-linked subsidy programme in 2009 to allowed for planning and development of integrated housing projects.

Dunn (1981:46) defines the term **policy** in the following words: "series of more or less related choices, including decisions not to act made by government bodies". According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:447–448), "**policy implementation** encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives outlined in prior policy decisions". Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) distinguish between the concepts of implementation and impact and observe that implementation studies ask "Why did it happen?" whereas impact studies ask "What happened?" Answers to these questions are critical for this study and assist our understanding of the relationship between policy and implementation within a decentralised government. Figure 1.3 provides a conceptual framework for the study.



Figure 1.3: Conceptual framework of the study

Table 1.1: A diagrammatic representation of the study

CHAPTER 2 & 3	CHAPTER 4	CHAPTER 5, 6 & 7	CHAPTER 8
Theoretical constructs and framework	Literature review	Mangaung case study	Interpretation and generalisation
Urban management	Evolution of the South African housing policy	Project-linked programme	Synthesis of the research findings, recommendations, the significance of the study and areas of further research
Evolutionary governance theory and dependencies		Informal settlements programme	
		Mega/catalytic projects programme (IRDP)	

1.6 Methods

This section introduces the methodological approach taken to address the research objectives.

1.6.1 Paradigm

The study is rooted in critical realism. Bhaskar's (1975) seminal work, *A realist theory of science*, lays the foundation for developing critical realism. Bhaskar questions the deductive nature of social science thinking and the positivist approach. Critical realism is critical of objectivism in positivism and emphasises the relationship between agents and the role of agents (Benton 1998). At the same time, critical realism does not adhere to post-modern notions that provide a minimal range of fixed explanations. Critical realism tries to balance what is real and interpret such reality. Lawson (2003) argues that a critical realist ontological perspective is indispensable for illuminating issues in housing policy and a prerequisite for comparative explanatory research. For example, in a compact social (rental) housing project/development in the Netherlands and a sprawling home ownership-based housing project/development in Australia, Lawson explains the causes of these completely different ways in which housing for the majority of the population has been provided in these two countries (Næss 2008). Thus, the critical realism paradigm fits well with the topic of housing research.

Also, case study research design links well with critical realism (Beynon 1979; Burawoy 1979). The provision of housing and housing systems are real and should be described. Yet, the study will also interpret housing provision and housing systems. Critical realism aligns well with evolutionary governance theory by emphasising complexity and causality.

1.6.2 Approach

The study uses a mixed-methods approach. The rationale for the mixed method is that the quantitative analysis provides a general understanding, while the qualitative data and their analysis refine and explain those statistical results (Ivankova, Creswell and Stick 2006). The main idea is to triangulate different methods. Triangulation increases the credibility and validity of research findings (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2000). The triangulation technique uses two or more data sources and can help increase validity (Denzin 1978). Also,

mixed-methods help to understand this topical area in greater depth (Hoover and Krishnamurti 2010). Mixed-methods also increase the confidence in findings and provides more evidence while offsetting possible shortcomings of using a single approach (Caruth 2013). Importantly, this study undertakes the sequential approach where the qualitative phase (experience and interpretations) follows the quantitative phase (numbers) (Creswell 2013). The main feature of the sequential design is the use of quantitative and qualitative methods, one after the other. Most often, findings from the first method feed into the design of the second (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2006). The qualitative findings of the second phase will contextualise the quantitative and qualitative data of the first phase (Creswell, Plano-Clark, Gutmann and Hanson 2003). Further, qualitative data can improve and enrich the findings (Taylor and Trumbull 2005) and generate new knowledge (Stange 2006). Figure 1.4 shows the two phases of the study.



Figure 1.4: Two phases of the study approach

1.6.3 Design

The study uses a descriptive case study design. A descriptive case study defines a real-world problem and provides essential facts about it. It describes the important people and groups involved in the problem, their actions, thoughts, and opinions (McDonough and McDonough 1997). The evolutionary governance theory as a theoretical framework for the study fits the case study designs. The evolutionary governance theory allows for the understanding of the people and institutions involved in the problem, their actions as well as change in local responses to governance and management of housing delivery since 1994. For Watson,

Duminy, Andreasen, Lerise and Odendaal (2014) case study is a methodological approach for understanding and intervening in complex environments and processes. Flyvbjerg (2001) emphasises the importance of the case study for its ability to capture and convey detailed, contextualised knowledge. A case study offers both a challenge and an opportunity to generate knowledge about the causes, modalities or outcomes of a real-world problem that extends beyond the immediate boundaries of the case (Watson et al. 2014). A particular case is analysed to shed some light on or open new areas of inquiry concerning a broader collection of cases (Gerring 2007).

1.6.4 Quantitative data collection

Quantitative data collection took place through the building of datasets, mapping of population settlements and settlement change in Mangaung from Statistics South Africa. Although working with this secondary data was convenient and economical, the reality is that some relevant information may not have been readily available or may not have been collected (Boslaugh 2007). Whereas this posed a challenge in data collection, the databases on housing delivery, housing allocations and housing finance by Mangaung and other spheres of government supplemented the data from Statistics South Africa. These databases provided the contextual information that assisted with the two qualitative approaches to the study.

1.6.5 Qualitative data analysis

The study uses two primary sources for the qualitative data. First, the study uses document analysis of municipal and policy documents since 1994. As Eisner (1991:110) asserts, document analysis provides “a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility”. By examining and analysing information and documents collected, the researcher corroborates findings across data sets and reduces the impact of potential biases that can exist (Patton 1990). I shall use thematic analysis to analyse these documents. Thematic analysis is a method for qualitative data that systematically identifies, analyses and provides insight into repeated patterns of meaning (themes) across a dataset (Braun and Clarke 2012; Kiger and Varpio 2020). The thematic analysis allows an understanding of the potential of any issue more widely (Braun and Clarke 2012; Marks and Yardley 2004). It enables the researcher to determine the “relationships between concepts and compare them with the replicated data”

(Alhojailan 2012: 40). Kiger and Varpio (2020:2) argue that thematic analysis is an "appropriate and powerful method to use when seeking to understand a set of experiences, thoughts, or behaviours across a data set". Annexure A lists the most important policy documents consulted and analysed.

1.6.6 Interviews and sampling

I conducted 30 semi-structured key-informant interviews. These semi-structured interviews included 14 interviews with former and current Mangaung councillors and officials of Mangaung in the Human Settlements, Planning and Infrastructure Departments; 6 with former and current officials from Human Settlements in the Free State Province; 3 with the National Human Settlements Department; 2 with the Parliamentary Human Settlements Portfolio Committee; 1 with the National Council of Provinces; 2 with the private sector developers and 2 with the built environment consultants. In mixed-methods research, semi-structured interviews are useful, supplement and add depth to other approaches (Adams 2015). The study used purposive sampling, intentionally selecting specific individuals with knowledge and experience with the phenomenon of interest (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2011). Employees of Mangaung, the Housing Development Agency, the Free State and the national Departments of Human Settlements were selected. Also, former employees, councillors and former councillors of Mangaung, representatives from the South African parliament and Free State legislature participated. As the study focuses on policy and implementation, occupants of housing units were deliberately excluded. The contact details and information for the key informants were readily available in the public domain because they were public servants. The study interviews were carried out during the Covid-19 pandemic period. In some instances, the Covid-19 restrictions prolonged the process (of conducting interviews), as some key-informants were only available during certain times. The data obtained through the interviews was analysed through thematic analysis.

1.7 Ethics

I adhered to all ethical and legal regulations applicable to the study at the University of the Free State and the MMM. MMM and the University of the Free State Ethics Committee authorised the data-gathering processes. Respondents signed consent forms.

1.8 Outline of the study

The thesis can be outlined as follows:

- **Chapter 2: Urban Management – International Perspectives** provides an urban management understanding and discusses the importance of the concept within the urbanisation context. To understand urban management, one needs to understand the components of the urban fabric (Dempsey, Brown, Raman, Porta, Jenks, Jones and Bramley 2010) and its spatial configurations (Anderson, Kanaroglou and Miller 1996). As Ding and Lai (2012) argue, the urban management concept integrates two different elements: cities and management. Urban management coordinates and integrates public and private actions and makes cities more competitive, equitable and sustainable. Urbanisation and decentralisation programmes require effective urban governance.

- **Chapter 3: Evolutionary Governance Theory** provides a framework to explain governance evolution (Beunen, Van Assche and Duineveld 2015; Van Assche, Beunen and Duineveld 2014). Understanding governance evolution has become one of the most critical challenges for contemporary governance or urban management. The chapter highlights three dependencies: path, goal and interdependencies and emphasises governance instead of management. Governance is collective and binding decisions, like policies and strategies that actors and institutions (national, provincial and local governments) make.

- **Chapter 4: South African Housing Policy Development** focuses on the evolution of the housing policy in South Africa before, during and post-apartheid. The chapter traces the origin and development of the current housing policy and the processes leading to its adoption. It examines the main strands of thinking that the government under late apartheid developed within the three sectors of the South African society that debated and engaged with the question of government-subsidised housing in the policy arena as sectors responded differently to the housing injustices resulting from racially discriminatory policies.

- **Chapter 5: Housing Subsidies and Housing Governance in Mangaung** examines housing subsidies and housing governance in Mangaung. The chapter focuses on the project-linked Subsidy Programme, later known as the Integrated Residential Development Programme, in the Mangaung case study. Importantly, the chapter shows how national and provincial decisions affect housing delivery at the local government level.

- **Chapter 6: Informal Settlements Upgrading** discusses informal settlements and informal settlements upgrading in Mangaung. Whereas the chapter investigates informal settlements upgrading and how Mangaung managed and governed informal settlements between 1990 and 2020, there are linkages between informal settlement upgrading and housing delivery within the South African housing policy context. Also, the chapter assesses how local responses often deviated from national policy directions, sometimes with surprising and innovative results and at times to the detriment of local people.

- **Chapter 7: From Housing to Integrated Human Settlements** investigates the evolution from housing to integrated human settlements (IRDP or megaprojects). The chapter focuses on the mega or catalytic projects programme through the IRDP and the persistent struggle for integrated development in the MMM. It further analyses how housing and urban socio-economic amenities (integrated development) reduce commuting distances between residential areas and the workplace, facilitate better use of underutilised and/or vacant land and introduce environmentally sensitive development management.

- **Chapter 8: Principal Findings and Recommendations** synthesises the main findings of the research in an integrated and coherent manner to assist and improve our understanding of the relationship between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system and assess the theoretical value of evolutionary governance theory.

CHAPTER 2
URBAN MANAGEMENT – INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 Introduction

This thesis aims to improve the understanding of the complex relationship between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system (see Chapter 1). The decentralised government system allows for the transfer of power to local bodies, thus putting urban management in the spotlight (Reddy, 2006). Urban management is a concept commonly used alongside urban development. Urban management gained importance because of the increased urbanisation and a wave of decentralisation programmes (Van Dijk 2008). This chapter examines the literature on urban management and its application in Africa. The chapter starts by providing an overview of the historical phases of urban management. Next, I define urban management, followed by a discussion of urban management and sustainable development. Lastly, urban management problems in Africa conclude the chapter. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the outline of the chapter.



Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of Chapter 2

2.2 Historical phases of urban management

Urban management is not a new concept (Chakrabarty 1998; Cheema 1993). Urban management is associated with local governments in the neoliberal era (Bačlija 2011; Davey, Batley, Devas, Norris and Pasteur 1996) and is rooted in local government reform and the

geographical concept of urban managerialism in the 1970s (Bačlija 2010). However, it only flourished as an institutionalised concept from the mid-1980s when several international donor agencies used it in the developing world (Jenkins 2000). Brenner (2004a) maps out how urban management has developed over four different phases:

- Spatial Keynesianism
- Fordism
- Urban entrepreneurism and glocalisation
- Metropolitan regionalism

2.2.1 Spatial Keynesianism (early 1960s–early 1970s)

The spatial Keynesianism period emphasised equal employment opportunities and living standards between regions (Brenner 2004b). The national state's spatial and macro-economic policies focused on aggregate economic growth (Mitchell and Juniper 2005; Goodwin and Painter 1996) to create spatial equality in countries (Breathnach 2010). Policies encouraged the establishment of industrial areas in lagging regions to mitigate uneven economic development (low growth regions) (Brenner 2004a; Stohr 1989). Governments incentivised large firms to relocate branch plants to the peripheral areas (Rodriguez-Pose 1998). The national economy was the primary focus and local and regional economies were sub-units of a relatively auto-centric national economy (Brenner 2004a; Goodwin and Painter 1996). Local and regional governments had to implement central government-funded public services and apply central government socio-economic policies within their operational districts in this system (Loughlin 2001). These policies brought regions and localities under state control and dependence (Martin and Sunley 1997). Due to the rapid growth, many urban cores and growth poles overheated (Brenner 2004b). Inter-territorial and inter-scalar distributional struggles increased as peripheral regions demanded central state subsidies. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, several city regions created diverse consolidated metropolitan institutions (Sharpe 1995). Metropolitan areas helped reduce administrative inefficiencies within expanding urban agglomerations and rationalise the welfare service provision (Brenner, 2004b). They served as an important coordinating administrative tier within the centralised hierarchies of the Keynesian welfare state (Brenner 2004b). Under Keynesianism,

governments wanted to spread wealth across geographic areas (Goodwin and Painter 1996) through top-down approaches (Brenner 2004b; Savitch and Kantor 2002). These policies were seldom questioned (Hall and Hubbard 1996). Industrial decentralisation, urban deconcentration (the process of population decentralisation) and spatial equalisation formed the foundations of spatial Keynesianism (Brenner 2004a). By the early 1970s, it was apparent that these policies were not successful. Table 2.1 provides the state spatial process of critical elements.

Table 2.1: State spatial process key elements

State spatial process	This process implies that state geography is a presupposition, arena and an outcome of a continually changing social relations. State spatiality is not a thing, container or a platform, but a conflictual, socially produced and dynamically evolving matrix of socio-spatial interaction. The spaces of state power are not merely 'filled' as if they were given territorial containers. Instead, state spatiality is produced and transformed through socio-political struggles in several institutional sites and various geographical scales. The transformations do not represent simple, unilinear transitions from one stabilised regulatory framework to another. They entail, instead, a path-dependent layering process in which inherited and emergent projects of state spatial regulation interact conflictual at various spatial scales.
Territoriality or territorial reconfiguration	This aspect of state-space refers to the changing configuration of state territoriality and the evolving role of borders, boundaries and frontiers in the modern interstate system. This aspect encompasses the changing geographies of state territorial organisation and administrative differentiation within national jurisdictional boundaries.
Spatial targeting	Refers to mobilising state policies, public investments and financial subsidies to modify or transform social conditions within specific jurisdictions and at particular scales.
Spatial equalisation	Refers to the national state's spatially-oriented macro-economic policies focused on aggregate economic growth combined with state attempts to create spatial equality across the surface of a country.
State spatial selectivity	Each historical formation of state institutions and policies tends to privilege particular spaces, locations, and scales within a given national territory and neglect, marginalise or exclude others. Such selectivities are continually modified as inherited formations of state spatial organisation interact with the emerging political strategies to create new geographies of state policy and political-economic life.
State spatial restructuring	Imply inherited patterns of state spatiality are rarely, if ever, destroyed through processes of state spatial restructuring. Instead, newly projected spatial arrangements are superimposed upon entrenched patterns, morphologies, and scales of state spatial organisation during periods of systemic change. Consequently:

	• The organisation of state-space at any historical conjuncture represent a multi-layered territorial mosaic in which the political geographies established at different moments in history are densely intermeshed. • The evolution of state spatiality is firmly path-dependent insofar as many of its characteristics may be reproduced, reinforced and even locked in during historical evolution. Despite this path dependency of the evolution of state spatiality, systemic transformations of state spatiality may occur when inherited forms of spatial selectivity are significantly modified to create qualitatively new geographies of state territorial organisation and state regulatory activity.

Source: Brenner (2004b:456)

2.2.2 Fordism (early 1970s–early 1980s)

Fordism developed in the early 1970s (Lipietz 1994). Under Fordism, the state concerned itself less with managing the economic problems and spreading growth benefits (Werna 1995). Fordism minimised the role of the national state. Urban national policies had to address the structural problems of declining industrial regions and cities. The national redistributive policies of spatial Keynesianism came to an end and local states and cities had to fend for themselves. The national and local fiscal crises created struggles over the appropriate balance of growth versus redistribution. According to Lipietz (1994), two blocks developed: the conservative and the modernist. The conservative block committed to spatial Keynesianism and the modernist block aspired for a new model of development (oriented towards a systemic reorganisation of inherited regulatory arrangements). These different opinions created conflicts and a new way of governing (Lipietz 1994).

In contrast to traditional postwar forms of spatial and regional policy, national urban policies under Fordism had to address the specific socio-economic problems of large cities: mass unemployment, labour reskilling, capital flight and infrastructural decay (Przeworski 1986). Following the recession of the 1970s, national governments rationalised government expenditures and national grants and reduced subnational administrative levels (Brenner 2004b). These new forms of fiscal strictness caused local governments to depend more on locally collected taxes, service charges, user fees (Mouritzen 1992) and economic development projects (Przeworski 1986). The national fiscal squeeze of the 1970s also pressured localities to seek new sources of revenue through local economic development

projects (Brenner 2004b). ‘Bootstraps’ plans and strategies to promote economic growth below without heavy reliance upon national subsidies replaced Keynesianism (Bullmann 1991). These plans and strategies included land-assembly programmes, land-use planning schemes and firm-based initiatives, area-based, sectoral and job creation measures (Parkinson 1991). The 1970s was a transitional period characterised by struggles between two blocks: one concerned with preserving the nationalised institutional infrastructures of spatial Keynesianism and the other with decentralised frameworks.

2.2.3 Urban entrepreneurialism and glocalisation strategies: round I (1980s)

Glocalisation originates from the two conflicting terms: globalisation and localisation (Racoma 2018; Robertson 1992). Gobo (2016) defines glocality as experiencing the global through local lenses or locally. It refers to the presence of both particularisation and universalisation. For Meyrowitz (2005), we live in glocalities and Ritzer (2003) agrees that pure global or pure local no longer exists. Each glocality is unique and influenced by global trends and global consciousness (Radhakrishnan 2010). By the 1980s, the world had changed and the political-economic restructuring altered urban realities (Brenner 2004b). This phase saw the rise of the first-wave glocalisation strategies. National states promote economic capacities and advanced infrastructure in globally competitive cities and regions. The Fordist development model intensified, leading to a new state of spatial restructuring and territorial reconfiguration (Brenner 2004b) (Table 3.1). Place and jurisdiction-specific forms of territorial administration became prominent. Local states acquire a crucial role in promoting local economic development and place-marketing strategies. However, these strategies had neither successfully resolved the deepening problems of economic stagnation nor restored the conditions for a new growth cycle (Brenner 2004b). There were rising unemployment and industrial decline within cities and regions. Most national governments abandoned traditional Keynesian (managerial-welfarist forms) and introduced macro-economic monetary and fiscal policies (Barlow 1991). Many local states downsized the welfare state bureaucracies. This restructuring saw local economic initiatives triggering systemic governance failures. The preconditions for municipal Keynesianism diminished as localities and metropolitan governments were forced to fend for themselves in securing a sound fiscal base (Mayer 1994). Mayer (1994) notes several important realignments of urban management:

- local authorities were constrained to proactively and extensively engage in local economic development projects;
- local welfarist model and collective consumption policies and plans were marginalised or subordinated to production-oriented policies; and
- new methods of local governance, like public-private partnerships, increasingly prevailed.

By the late 1980s, urban entrepreneurialism became the new form of governing (Harding 1997). It has various political forms (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993) and enhances city competitiveness (Harvey 1989). Local governments adopted policies that made them globally attractive. The transformation to a post-industrial economy went hand in hand with neoliberal state restructuring and economic globalisation (Forrest and Wissink 2017). As national governments abandoned the traditional Keynesian economics and adopted neoliberal strategies, the state fiscal priorities pushed the fiscal and social responsibilities to localities (Peck and Tickell 2002). Unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, the state did not prioritise spatial equality. The state prioritised their most competitive places. However, this focus on competitiveness and the main urban areas increased social inequality and exclusion (Dardot and Laval 2013). Decentralisation continued as numerous place-specific policies and institutions emerged. Brenner (2004a) identifies five institutional restructuring initiatives organised by national governments to establish a new and more competitive infrastructure for urban economic growth.

First, local governments received increased authority in determining local tax rates and new revenue-raising powers (Przeworski 1986). Second, governments devolved new planning, economic development, social services, and spatial planning to subnational governments (Parkinson 1991). Third, many governments also redefined national spatial planning systems. For example, economic priorities like structural competitiveness superseded and replaced the traditional welfarist priorities. Fourth, governments introduced new territory and area-specific policies and institutions. These new policies and institutions included airport development agencies, investment agencies, business zones, training and enterprise councils, urban development corporations, and development planning boards. These policies had to enhance

socio-economic assets within cities (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). Fifth, the forms and functions of local states changed. Whereas postwar local governments had been devoted primarily to various welfarist forms of service delivery, these new entrepreneurial institutions promoted economic development. These institutional changes redefined urban management and transformed the state's approach to spatial development.

2.2.4 Metropolitan regionalism and glocalisation strategies: round II (post-1990s)

Metropolitan regionalism had to address the failures of the urban management of the 1980s. Regionalism refers to political decentralisation and regional autonomy or territorial autonomy demands within unitary states (Cooke and Morgan 1998). This phase created new layers of governance to address regulatory deficits and governance failures and rescale the first-wave glocalisation strategies (Brenner 2004b). National states targeted metropolitan regions rather than cities. Governments rejuvenated metropolitan institutions for coordinated programmes of regional economic development. Metropolitan areas became sites for projects intended to modify the geography of state regulatory activities (Keating 1998). The range of urban decision-makers expanded. For example, the myriad of new actors like the accountants, auditors, investment analysts, consultants and independent financial advisors replaced the local bureaucrats. These new role players operated locally, nationally and internationally. Also, outsourcing has grown. Actors and institutions had also increased (Forrest and Wissink 2017). There was a downscale of government responsibility and re-commodification of welfare (Brenner 2004b), and municipalities acquired increasing fiscal and financial autonomy. These municipalities shifted their priorities from welfare distribution to creating wealth, fostering cooperation with private actors and prioritising market-oriented strategies (Hall 1993). Moreover, metropolitan institutions acquired new roles in various governance aspects. Governments mobilised new institutional forms and strategies to manage economic regeneration. With increased cooperation between municipalities and private actors, intermediaries like regional development agencies and area consultative committees (by the Commonwealth Government) became prominent (Barnes and Prior 2009; Carlen 2008). The entrepreneurial city replaced the re-distributional city (reflecting the postwar Keynesian social contract) and competition, choice and capital accumulation overrode social welfare agendas.

Modern big cities dominated by the financial and service sectors presented a different challenge to urban management.

2.2.5 Synthesis

After World War II, social democratic governments based on centralised systems, welfare transfers, and public service provision characterised planning and urban management. These governments practised the conventional Keynesian macroeconomic management while implementing the national industrial policies. These practices were feasible as most economies at the time were self-contained. The economic production was in the hands of various indigenous enterprises. This combination of welfare transfers, public service provision, and branch-plant industrialisation constituted the so-called spatial Keynesianism designed to equalise employment opportunities and living standards. Local and regional governments delivered centrally funded public services and applied central government socio-economic policies (Loughlin 2001). The stagnation and recession periods of the 1970s and 1980s changed the politics. In both the United States and United Kingdom, the electorate elected conservative governments that pursued neoliberal economic programmes. These programmes dismantled the welfare state and emphasised the primacy of monetary policy over employment policy, privatisation, deregulation and entrepreneurialism through the supply-side economic policies (Brenner 2004b). The transfer of administrative and political functions from the national to regional and local levels became prominent (Loughlin 2001; Parkinson, Harding and Dawson 1994). This trend resulted from the bottom-up demands for administrative and political devolution of powers and functions and the desire of central governments to create effective and flexible urban management systems (Keating 1998). The transfer of responsibility to regional and local governments was inevitable as the national state became unable to maintain the welfare state (Brenner 2004b; Jones 2001) and part of a process of "hollowing out" whereby states were losing their capacity to control (Brenner 1998). The decline of older industrial regions that accompanied Fordism collapse and the concentration of newer forms of economic activities in metropolitan areas demanded new types of policies (Brenner 2004b). Werna (1995) points to restructuring the modes of production, the associated changes in the regime of accumulation, emphasising the locality, and society's increasing complexity and fragmentation. So, these new policies involved

devolving new revenue-raising powers, planning and economic development functions to regional and local governments. Cities were becoming more autonomous in creating their strategies for development. Cities became the “engines of growth” and attracted investors and highly specialised labour (Hall 1993). The new types of policies created new governance structures at the regional and local government levels, which involved the development of coalitions with the business sector and other stakeholders on infrastructural investment matters. Investment in infrastructure had to improve attractiveness of areas to potential investors and increase competition between regions (Breathnach 2010). Therefore, the decentralisation of government functions was a centrally devised and designed strategy to enhance aggregate national competitiveness (Breathnach 2010).

Regional centres acted as gateway cities and direct links with the global economy. Changes include the hollowing-out of the state, devolution of roles and responsibilities to regions, and regional economies’ increasing participation in the global markets (Loughlin 2001). New structures of great complexity have replaced the Fordist hierarchies of power. While this inevitably weakened the national state's regulatory capacity, they retained considerable functionality. They continued providing an institutional framework (and, to some extent, financial assistance) to support city regions to improve their capacity to compete in the global economy and attract mobile investments (Brenner 1998; Ward and Jonas 2004). In the context of urban management, it appears likely that regionalised globalisation strategies shall further intensify the geographic differentiation of state space and development unevenness. Table 2.2 provides a schematic summary of the broad periodisation of urban management restructuring, focusing on state spatial selectivity, urban-regional regulations and the major conflicts and contradictions from 1960 to post-1990.

Understanding urban environments are critical because through coordinated efforts (to tackle people’s problems), urban management makes cities more competitive, equitable, and sustainable (Van Dijk 2006). Also, a deeper understanding of urban management’s association and connection with urban development is equally crucial for urban people’s economic and social well-being (Ding and Lai 2012). Thus, there is a new agenda for revitalised urban managerialism in this context.

Table 2.2: Periodisation of urban management restructuring from 1960 to post-1990

HISTORICAL FORMATION	FORM OF STATE SPATIAL SELECTIVITY	FORM OF URBAN-REGIONAL REGULATIONS	MAJOR CONFLICTS AND CONTRADICTIONS
Spatial Keynesianism: (early 1960s-early 1970s)	The national state's spatial and macro-economic policies combined a focus on aggregate economic growth with an attempt to create spatial equality across the surface of a country	Urban managerialism: local states operate as agents of welfare service provision.	Urban cores and growth poles may overheat due to rapid growth and physical expansion
	National economy is viewed as the primary terrain for state action. Governments incentivised large firms to relocate branch plants to regions to address the equal distribution of wealth and livelihoods throughout the nation-state.	Metropolitan institutions served as an important coordinating administrative tier within the centralised hierarchies of intergovernmental relations that prevailed within the Keynesian welfare state	Inter-territorial and inter-scalar distributional struggles proliferate as peripheral regions intensify their demands for central state subsidies
Fordism (early 1970s–early 1980s)	Urban national policies address the structural problems of declining industrial cities and regions.	Gradually, the national redistributive policy relays are retrenched, inevitably forcing regional and local states to fend for themselves under uncertain conditions.	National and local fiscal crises ensue as struggles intensify over the appropriate growth and redistribution balance.
	Fordism minimised the role of the national state as a locus of political-economic coordination.	A new 'bootstraps' politics of endogenous growth emerges in crisis-stricken industrial regions: the goal is to mobilise customised policies to confront space-specific forms of economic decline.	Different opinions between the conservative and the modernist bloc created conflicts at different spatial scales and generated highly uneven consequences. These conflicts led to a new way of governing emanating from the territorial formation that combines elements of the two blocs
Urban entrepreneurism and glocalisation strategies: round I (the 1980s)	The rise of first-wave glocalisation strategies: national states promote the reconcentration of economic capacities and infrastructure into the most globally competitive cities and regions within their territories	Urban entrepreneurialism: local states acquire a crucial role in promoting local economic development and place-marketing strategies	Intensified uneven development: rising unemployment and industrial decline within cities and regions
	Place and jurisdiction-specific forms of territorial administration are critical sites within many strategic urban regions	Metropolitan institutions are abolished or downsized in conjunction with welfare state restructuring.	Local economic initiatives trigger systemic governance failures due to a lack of supralocal policy coordination

Metropolitan regionalism and glocalisation strategies: round II (post-1990s)	The rescaling of glocalisation strategies: national states target large-scale metropolitan regions rather than cities or localities as the most appropriate scales for economic rejuvenation	Metropolitan regionalism became a critical site for significant projects to modify the geography of state regulatory activities	The crisis tendencies and governance failures of first-wave glocalisation strategies are rescaled but remain chronically unresolved on a national scale
	New scalar layers of state-space address some of the regulatory deficits and the governance failures associated with first-wave glocalisation strategies	Metropolitan institutions acquire new roles in various aspects of crisis displacement, interscalar management and meta-governance	
		Municipalities shift their priorities from welfare distribution to wealth creation, fostering cooperation with private actors and prioritising market-oriented strategies	
		The entrepreneurial city replaced the re-distributional city (reflecting the post-war Keynesian social contract). The period emphasised competition with choice and capital accumulation overriding social welfare agendas	

Source: Brenner (2004b:479–480)

2.3 Towards a definition of urban management

Urban management entails local government. Yet, it is not the exclusive responsibility of the public sector agencies and involves relationships between government and non-governmental actors (Rakodi 2003). Urban management does not have a specific definition (Stren 1993). The meaning and content depend on people's perceptions and political-social demands (Momeni, Shamskooshki and Javadiana 2011). To understand urban management, one needs to understand the components of the urban fabric (Dempsey et al. 2010) and its spatial configurations (Anderson et al. 1996). Features of the urban fabric include urban settlement types, central business districts, suburbs, and a metropolitan area's morphological attributes at all scales (Williams, Burton and Jenks 2000). The word urban varies within continents and countries, from one country and culture to another (Anthony 2012). Urbanists generally use one or more of the following criteria to define urban areas: political boundaries or administrative criteria (for example, an area within the jurisdiction of a municipality or town), population density, a threshold population size, economic function or the presence of urban

characteristics (for example electric lighting, paved streets, sewerage and so forth) (United Nations 2005). Some urbanists understand urban as a presupposition, a medium and an outcome of intensely conflictual, continually producing, reconfiguring and changing capitalist social relations (Harvey 1978). Several aspects characterise urban management. For example, urban management depends on urban space and it is a specific approach to urban development (Werna 1995). Urban management also deals with accelerated urban change and links urban development with sustainability (Davidson and Nientied 1991). Furthermore, Ding and Lai (2012) argue that the urban management concept integrates two seemingly different elements: cities and management.

2.3.1 Elusive nature of the concept

Urban management is an elusive concept (Stren 1993; Mattingly 1994) because practitioner and academic contributions to the debate have not converged (Bačlija 2010). The first group of authors considered urban management broadly "to be a process in which all interested parties (citizens, non-governmental organisations [NGOs], government, investors, etc.) took part to make the workings of a city meet their needs" (Bačlija 2013: 6). The literature notes the concept's vagueness and several agents' acceptance of its broad meaning (Werna 1995). The use of the term in the donor context also assisted in approving the overall concept (Paprosky 1993). Therefore, donors have kept the idea loose, but this generates problems in implementation.

According to Devas and Rakodi (1993), donor agencies are not neutral but have their own constituencies and agenda to satisfy. In short, there are complicities, whether implicit or not, between the research community, policymakers and donors, which perpetuate the present state of affairs. Although this is the case, Stren (1993:137) proposes the term "urban management" be preserved and given substance as it has been part of the academic agenda for decades and has little potential for survival "within the rapidly changing international marketplace of development ideas". Notwithstanding, urban management remains an essential tool in city affairs.

2.3.2 Critical elements and definition

The initial work on urban management came from Rex (1968), Pahl (1970; 1975; 1979) and Williams (1976; 1978). Since then, an array of disciplines has contributed to the definition. Urban management is broad and covers many functions (Williams 1978; Werna 1995). For example, it specifically refers to public and private managers and includes societal informal urban management systems (Davidson and Nientied 1991). The vagueness exists because of definitional ambiguities and because many policy papers use the term without explanation (Stren 1993; Urban Management Programme 1991). Urban management manifests in different forms under different environments and the conceptual elusiveness results from the dynamic nature of urban development.

The literature points to unique critical elements. Originally, Pahl (1975) suggested that urban managers distribute scarce urban resources. The focus was on urban managers and their distributive role in urban development and less on society. Pugh (2000) added a second component, sustainable growth. Pugh (2000) argues for the comparative assessment of environmental, economic and social patterns and possible alternatives. Sustainable development[1] requires respecting and building upon local cultural values and knowledge of local traditions(Willis 2001). As Meadows (1999) argues, a more fully integrated, sustainable development and design processes would piggyback on the inherent wisdom of residents, co-create place-based designs and systems, and build evolutionary capacities. Local governments were seen as mere implementers of international and national policy commitments but are also active players in middling between global policy agenda and community action (Barnett and Bridge 2016).

A third element has been the introduction of urban management for urban competitiveness (Van Dijk 2006). As urban hierarchies shifted, many cities faced severe competition (Begg 1999). The competitiveness of firms and economic performance were important determinants of the competitiveness of cities. Urban competitiveness was concerned with their firms'

[1] The UN's 1987 Brundtland Report, defines sustainable development as the ability to meet ''the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'' (WCED 1987).

economic well-being and the well-being of their residents, social cohesion, and long-term sustainable development (Begg 1999).

Several researchers tried to provide a definition. Sharma (1989:48) argues that urban management is "the set of activities that shape and guide urban areas' social, physical and economic development. The main concerns of urban management would be an intervention in these areas to promote economic development and well-being and ensure essential services". Clarke (1991) added urban management as a tool for economic development and functional governance. Government and non-government organisations (including communities) must collaborate to implement policies and programmes (Cheema 1993). Urban management must further take responsibility for achieving city objectives (Mattingly 1994). In this sense, the scope of urban management increased to include what needs to be done, arrange execution, and then ensure execution of the city's development.

Churchill (1985) believes urban management takes a new and richer meaning. It no longer refers only to systems of control but also to activities of the inhabitants interacting with each other and city governance. Later Davey (1993) supported the importance of private initiatives in achieving city objectives. Urban management must coordinate and integrate public and private actions to tackle city problems (Davey 1993). Urban management must facilitate the participation of all relevant urban actors in the implementation (Bramezza 1996). Urban management strengthens government and non-government organisations' capacity, identifies policy and programme alternatives, and implements optimal results. The challenge of urban management is to effectively respond to the issues and problems of individual cities to enable them to perform their functions. Accordingly, Mabogunje (1993) views urban management as a test of efficiency and effectiveness in the management of cities. Urban management refers to infrastructure provision, ranging from clean water to roads and housing. Overall, urban management remains a complex process involving several societal spheres and different scale levels (Brenner 1998, 1999, 2000; Swyngedouw 1996, 1997). In conclusion, Richardson (1993) sees three tests for urban management success: (i) the ability of city managers to implement a declared spatial strategy, (ii) deliver basic and bulk infrastructure services to a rapidly growing urban population, and (iii) maintenance and operations of existing infrastructure and services.

Reaching an academic consensus on a definition for urban management remains vital. Mattingly (1994) believes that a more precise notion of urban management within the academic community could benefit the concept. This research subscribes to five dominant and critical urban management fundamentals:

- managing urban development for sustainability[2] using appropriate knowledge and skills coordinated from the public sector, the private sector and the community;
- implementing affirmed urban development strategies in delivering basic and essential services to the urban populace;
- using technical, human and financial resources effectively and efficiently and implementing urban policies, plans and programmes to achieve urban objectives;
- developing, managing and coordinating resources to promote economic development, societal well-being, solve urban problems; and
- flourishes and succeeds within capacitated institutions and healthy urban environments.

2.3.3 Institutional capacity-building

Urban management and transformative urban policy require institutional capacity-building. Yet, institutional capacity building is complex. For the World Bank (2006), the institutional capacity building includes organisational strengthening, skill upgrading and procedural improvements. It occurs by acquiring resources (knowledge, human, networks, financial, systems and culture) and integrating them to change individual behaviour and institutional operations effectiveness (Langaas, Odeck and Bjørvig 2007). McGill (2001) argues that urban management is likely to make an impact if seen as holistic and integrated and supports urban and institutional capacity building. Urban management requires strengthening institutional capacity to achieve sustainable cities (United Nations 1996; Organisation for Economic

[2] The long-term balance between the environment, society and economic growth – a world where natural systems and human can continue to exist and thrive in tandem over a long period of time (Williams 2009).

Co-operation and Development 2006) and should form part of cities' development strategies (World Bank 1995; United Nations Development Programme 1996).

Severe institutional capacity gaps constrain urban management. Laryea-Adjei (2000) points to institutional weakness and inappropriate and inadequate skills in urban governance. Unfavourable institutional environments and insufficient human and organisational capacities are the main factors for failure (Peltenburg, De Wit and Davidson 2000). Creating institutional capacity for urban management requires conceptualising and developing strategies rooted in well-defined urban development strategies.

2.3.4 Criticism

Urban management theory and practice have not escaped criticism. Stren (1992) criticises the sectoral approach of the Urban Management Programme of the United Nations as inadequate in addressing the increasing complexities of urban growth. He advocates a more conceptually diverse concept of urban management and an inter-sectoral approach. The lack of a thoroughly developed urban management concept results in scattered interventions (Werna 1995).

Other critics characterise urban management as elusive (Bačlija 2013; Mattingly 1994). Although a necessity, the concept of vagueness makes urban management difficult to coordinate, especially in developing countries (Arefi 2013; Paprosky 1993). There is also no agreement on the meaning of urban management. The main reason is that the concept and its (re)conceptualisation stretch beyond a single discipline or a normative definition (Bačlija 2013). Thus, it is difficult to classify urban management as a framework for academic study or theory (Williams 1978). Urban management lacks the credentials of being classified as a paradigm either because of its interdisciplinary nature or terminological misuse (Kuhn 1970).

2.4 Urban management and sustainable development

The importance of urban management and sustainable development requires new approaches (Sachs 2012). The Brundtland Report, published in 1987, provided the institutional framework for sustainable development. Brundtland defines sustainable development as meeting "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to

meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED] 1987:15).

The essence of urban management is the ability to respond to society's present and future needs (Shoja and Heidari 2015). Sustainable development revolves around the human environment and focuses on economic opportunity through environmental considerations and social justice.

The urban environment is an essential determinant of health (Ompad, Galea and Vlahov 2007). The United Nations Agenda 21, the Sustainable Development Goals and the Millennium Development Goals sought to address development challenges. In particular, the United Nations defined 17 Sustainable Development Goals to address the global challenges of environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, climate, prosperity, and peace and justice (Mondini 2019). These objectives are interwoven and involve the sustainability dimensions on a global scale. In the context of urban transformations, Sustainable Development Goal 11, "Sustainable cities and communities", plays a particular role in considering the relationship between communities and their living spaces. Cities are complex systems with high energy consumption and environmental impact and deplete high quantities of natural resources (Booth, Hammond, Lamond and David 2011). Cities should play a critical role in urban sustainability by (for example) opposing climate change and reducing emissions into the atmosphere (Amendola 2016). Accordingly, cities should aspire for social inclusion and compatible city design with the surrounding environment (Mondini 2016). Consequently, urban management should emphasise the inclusivity of the public and private sectors (Shoja and Heidari 2015). Other important factors include the availability of safe, adequate and affordable housing, the protection of cultural and natural heritage, the adoption and implementation of integrated plans and policies toward inclusion, resilience to disasters and resource efficiency, adaptation and mitigation to climate change (Mondini 2019).

Cities are symbolic elements for defining and achieving sustainable development. Sustainability uses urban transformation to mitigate environmental impacts in this context. Cities must create sustainable communities in response to urbanisation (UN-Habitat 2016). Cities should manage urban development, increase economic growth, improve social inclusion, create jobs and offer better livelihoods, promote the decoupling of economic

growth and living standards from environmental resource use, protect regional and local ecosystems, reduce both rural and urban poverty and reduce pollution (Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2013). Sound infrastructure investments, urban land-use systems, and urban development facilitate the Sustainable Development Goals' achievement and reduce poverty. Without vigilant urban management and sustainable development, slums can expand and cities can fail to generate jobs (Buttenheim 2008; Cooper, Aslam and Othman 2016). Inequalities and exclusion increases and areas become vulnerable to environmental and climate changes (Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2013).

Consequently, building environmentally sustainable communities pivots on progressive and successful devolution of developmental responsibility to local government (National Planning Commission 2012).

2.5 Urban management problems in Africa

Urban management's ability to respond to society's present and future needs represents one of its critical components. Across the globe, cities play a critical role in urban sustainability (Amendola 2016). In this context, and consistent with the study's intent, it is critical to tease out some of the issues affecting sustainable development and good governance in the African urban environment. Urban environments are multi-faceted, diverse, dynamic, complex and evolving (Bai and Imura 2000; McMichael 2000), as are the underlying policy development and implementation features. Understanding the complexities challenging sustainable development and good governance within African cities is vital for policy development and implementation.

Africa is the world's second-largest continent and the second most populous, with 1.3 billion people after Asia. It is home to 17.20% of the world's population (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 2019; United Nations 2016, 2019). Africa's colonial history has had a distinct influence on current urban problems (Adebayo 2002), while a post-independence period created new problems (Arefi 2013).

2.5.1 Colonial and post-colonial planning scars

Planning is a valuable tool for dealing with city problems. Planning implies identifying problems, exploring and analysing alternative courses of action, and making decisions (Rakodi 2001). Planning must improve urban connectivity, productivity and livability (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones 2010). Colonial planning systems have influenced planning in Africa. For example, colonial administration had to serve the economic and administrative needs of the mother country (Goodfellow 2013). Where cities already existed, the coloniser imposed European settlements adjacent to them. Furthermore, colonial cities influenced economic restructuring that exploited the colonies (Lynch, Nel and Binns 2020). Colonial cities seldom made provisions for indigenous populations. Colonial planners used the planning frameworks from Europe because they wanted to escape European cities' environmental challenges and congestion. The application of garden city principles was common (Njoh 2008). Garden city principles emphasise the natural environment, high-quality, affordable housing, and people should work in beautiful, healthy, and sociable communities. In practice, these ideals created unintended consequences. Health concerns formed the basis for planning decisions. These health concerns perpetuated segregation and ignored the urban development needs of indigenous people. Often, the colonisers prevented the urbanisation of the indigenous population (Njoh 2002, 2010). Njoh (2010:369) argues that "urban planning is not the benign, objective and value-neutral tool for promoting the functioning of the built environment that it professes to be. Rather, it serves as a viable instrument for realising the imperialistic cultural goals of Westerners". Consequently, city designs only catered for a small portion of the European elites. These cities could not cope with the rapid urban population growth after World War II. After independence, these cities struggled to provide resources, housing, infrastructure and economic and planning systems.

In many African cities, up to 80% of city populations live in slum conditions (Davis 2006). Although there are exceptions, planning institutions struggle to deal with this reality. The planning and management systems find it difficult to coordinate investments or manage the spatial form of cities. One of the sources of difficulty includes the adoption of inappropriate regulatory codes and planning models imported from developed countries or inherited from colonial regimes (Goodfellow 2013) and capacity and resource constraints (Lall, Wang and da Mata 2006).

African cities share features that create daily challenges for residents and constrain urban development (Lall, Henderson and Venables 2017). Three of the features are worth mentioning. First, they are congested. Overcrowding implies that urban population growth outpaces investment in infrastructure, economic, social and institutional development. Investments in infrastructure mismatch the growth of the population. Schünemann (2016) perceives that unplanned, overcrowded settlements with marginalised urban poor contribute to social ills. A mismatch between infrastructure investments and congested settlements can contribute to infectious diseases. In contrast, garden city planners assumed that overcrowding was the source of health problems, but they were ignorant of the mismatches between investments in infrastructure and overcrowding. Second, African cities are disconnected. Generally, cities have developed as pockets of small and fragmented neighbourhoods. Consequently, these cities lacked reliable transportation, thus limiting workers' access to job opportunities while disadvantaging firms' access to available labour and skills (Atash 1993).

Lastly, the dominance of spatial planning in the African context is questionable. Often, African planners used the master plan concept from Europe. The master plans or blueprint plans specified desired urban development patterns 15–20 years ahead (Devas 1993). The fixed nature and long-term planning approaches of master plans are not sensitive to change and, therefore, not helpful to urban development in Africa. Farvacque and McAuslan (1992) argue that master plans take too long to prepare, do not offer guidance in implementation, and seldom evaluate development costs. Master plans paid little or no attention to the necessary resource allocations and the financial feasibility of the plans.

Consequently, new and progressive planning approaches emerged (Allmendinger 2002; Albrechts 2005). Examples include consensus-building (Innes 2004), communicative planning (Healey, Khakee, Motte and Needham 1997) and public-private partnerships. These approaches deal with the growing complexities of planning processes (Edelenbos and Klijn 2007). The growing number of participants, the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the future-oriented form and the character of spatial planning guide these new approaches. Thus, collaborative arrangements have become popular (De Vries, Beunen, Aarts, Lokhorst and Van Ark 2013). These collaborative arrangements have a legally binding agreement that recognises and governs the rights and duties of the parties (Albrechts 2004).

2.5.2 Weak property rights

Property rights are crucial in land transactions (Barzel 1997). Property rights are foundational to economic processes and play an essential role in land development. There is evidence that property rights formalisation and issuing title deeds have beneficial effects on people's propensity to secure finance and invest (Smith 2004).

Clear property rights are crucial and a precondition to the emergence of strong land markets, whether formal, customary or informal (Lall et al. 2017). Many African cities struggle with overlapping, inconsistent and sometimes contradictory and outdated property rights systems. Even where clear land rights or formal titles exist, ownership mapping and geographic information are inaccurate and cause disputes (Lall et al. 2017). For example, only 10% of rural land in sub-Saharan Africa is registered (Byamugisha 2013) and in West Africa, governments have the title for up to 3% of the land (Toulmin 2005). Poor documentation, inefficient land administration mechanisms, lack of transparency, and low capacity of professional land surveyors are common (Byamugisha 2013). The lack of a sound property registration system prevents urban land markets from optimal functioning (Lall et al. 2017).

Complex property rights systems are common in the continent. Often the local chiefs or family elders consent to the property rights (Lall et al. 2017). For instance, local chiefs or family elders may confirm rights based on the length of the presence or stay (long-term presence) under the customary property rights systems (Bernard, Bird and Venables 2016). Occupiers cannot convert these rights into free or leasehold or use them as collateral. Consequently, legitimate land transactions and developments are complex (World Bank 2015). It implies developers cannot buy downtown land for conversion from low-density residential properties to higher-density apartments or even build clusters of new commercial structures, which means a capital loss for local governments.

Nevertheless, the situation is changing. African countries, including South Africa, clarify land rights and strengthen land administration (South Africa 1996a; World Bank 2015). There are also attempts to improve and streamline land registration (Byamugisha 2013), upgrade tenure security among informally settled populations (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in

Africa 2013) and develop hybrid regimes to make customary and formal administration more compatible (World Bank 2015).

2.5.3 Quality of urban life

Quality of urban life has no agreed definition (El Din, Shalaby, Farouh and Elariane 2013). El Din et al. (2013) argue that quality of life is the satisfaction in one's life that comes from having good health, comfort, and good relationships rather than from money. It includes personal satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the cultural or intellectual conditions. It refers to daily living enhanced by clean air and water, wholesome food, enjoyment of free open spaces, conservation of natural resources and wildlife, protection from radiation and toxic substances and security from crime. It encompasses a person's energy and power to enjoy life and prevail over life's hardships irrespective of the handicaps.

Psatha, Deffner and Psycharis (2011) say that creating quality of life is the direct or indirect objective of policies, research and public investments. For Psatha et al. (2011) and Beck (2009), services like health services, quality of the urban environment (recreation areas, urban green spaces), employment opportunities, family and marital status indices, social networks, income and income distribution, leisure resources, level of education, crime, social inequalities and social exclusion influence the quality of life.

Health literature has reported a positive relationship between green spaces and the quality of life in cities (Henwood 2001; Morris 2003), but there are similar findings from economics (Crompton 2005; Mansfield, Pattanayak, McDow, McDonald and Halpin 2005), planning (Swanwick, Dunnett and Woolley 2003; Lake, Townshend and Alvanides 2010) environmental disciplines (Bird 2007; De Ridder 2004) and lastly from the literature on vulnerable groups (Watson, Pichler and Wallace 2010). Even though future improvements in urban poverty reduction are likely, the number of poor people without services such as water and sanitation will increase (Schünemann 2016). Often, amenities are better in cities than in rural areas. Consequently, living standards are higher in villages and towns than in rural locations and have improved even further in cities (Gollin, Kirchberger and Lagakos 2017; Schünemann 2016). However, inequalities exist between individuals and neighbourhoods (Henderson, Shalizi and Venables 2001) and access to infrastructure varies within and

between regions and localities (Madu 2007). Households' movement to cities implies better facilities than in rural areas (Gollin et al. 2017). Thus, adequate access to such facilities is synonymous with quality of life (Altschuler, Somkin and Adler 2004) and satisfies the basic needs of urban residents (Forrest and Kearns 2001).

2.5.4 Urbanisation and population growth

Urbanisation and population growth are unstoppable phenomena (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2009; Satterthwaite 2009). The challenge is in preparing for urbanisation and population growth rather than avoiding or excluding people from cities. Urbanisation is the proportion of a country's urban population and population (urban) growth refers to the increase in the number of people living in towns and cities (Ledent 1982; Njoh 2010; Anthony 2012). Urbanisation and population growth projections show that another 2.5 billion people will be added to the world's urban population by 2050, with nearly 90% of the increase concentrated in Africa and Asia (Abedini and Khalili 2019; UN-Habitat 2010).

Cities remain centres for agglomeration economies, technology, innovation, investment- and economic growth (Adebayo 2002). In contrast to other parts of the world, economic development does not always accompany African urbanisation (Cheema 1993; Schünemann 2016). Urbanisation can be positive and negative (Wong, Tang and Van Horen 2006). On the positive side (the urban premium), urbanisation often contributes to economic growth and better living standards (Mitlin 2008; Zhao 2004). However, urbanisation can also result in congestion, pollution, social conflicts, high unemployment rates, environmental degradation, urban poverty, food and nutrition insecurity and health disparities (Chakrabarty 2001; Satterthwaite, McGranahan and Tacoli 2010; Anthony 2012).

Rural to urban migration is both a socio-economic phenomenon and a spatial process involving the movement of people from rural areas into cities. This migration can be permanent or semi-permanent. Although migration processes are not new (Ajaero and Onokala 2013), the increasing voluntary movement of low-skill and low-wage workers from rural areas to more developed urban areas is unprecedented in Africa (Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] 2006). The literature provides rural-urban inequality in wealth and the continued neglect and degradation of rural environments as the reasons for urbanisation/

(Madu 2007). Migration can promote inclusive, integrated and sustainable development in origin and destination (International Labour Organization 2018; United Nations 2019). The African urban population is growing rapidly (Lall et al. 2017; UN-Habitat 2016). However, the local government's capacity to manage urban growth in Africa is weak (Lai 2019; Myers 2011) and has not kept pace with the changing urban environment (Shekhar 2019). The inability to manage organic urban population growth and in-migration leads to unviable settlements outside the cities (Cervero 2001).

Table 2.3 provides a comparison of the continent's population.

Table 2.3: Comparison of the continent's population

Name	2020 population	% of the world's population	Annual population growth rate	Density (km^2)
Asia	4 641 054 775	59.54%	0.86%	104.11
Africa	1 340 598 147	17.20%	2.49%	44.24
Europe	747 636 026	9.59%	0.06%	33.78
South America	430 759 766	5.53%	0.83%	24.15
North America	368 869 647	4.73%	0.62%	14.93
Oceania	42 677 813	0.55%	1.31%	5.03

Source: United Nations (2019)

Table 2.3 shows that Africa is the second largest of the continents after Asia, with over 1.3 billion people as of 2019. The continent accounts for 17% of the world's population, with a 2.49% annual population growth rate.

Table 2.4 provides Africa's population forecast over the next three decades.

Table 2.4: African population forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % change	Yearly change	Urban population %	Urban population	Africa's share of the world population	World Population	Africa rank
2020	1 340 598 147	2.54 %	31 631 873	43.8 %	587 737 793	18.2 %	7 794 798 739	2
2025	1 508 935 218	2.39 %	33 667 414	46.3 %	698 148 943	19.4 %	8 184 437 460	2
2030	1 688 321 099	2.27 %	35 877 176	48.8 %	824 013 801	20.6 %	8 548 487 400	2
2035	1 878 193 685	2.15 %	37 974 517	51.4 %	966 329 885	21.1 %	8 887 524 213	2
2040	2 076 749 529	2.03 %	39 711 169	54.2 %	1 125 161 515	23.4 %	9 198 847 240	2
2045	2 281 452 464	1.90 %	40 940 587	57.0 %	1 299 953 249	24.8 %	9 481 803 274	2
2050	2 489 275 458	1.76 %	41 564 599	59.8 %	1 488 920 045	26.3 %	9 735 033 990	2

Source: United Nations (2019); Worldometer (2019)

Table 2.4 shows that Africa will have the second-highest population growth rate for the next three decades. The continent's share of the world population will increase to 26% in 2050. At the same time, the urban population will increase from 43.8 % to 59.8 % in 2050, and this growth will pose a challenge for urban management. However, population growth in Africa does not always go hand-in-hand with an increase in formal employment. This increased growth without employment results in increased vulnerability and urban poverty (Bryceson and Potts 2006). The further implication of this mismatch is the inevitable decrease in the sustainability of land use and the ecosystem, inadequate housing facilities, the creation of unplanned sprawl, insufficient drainage, sewerage problems, traffic congestion and the lack of other amenities (Parry, Ganaie and Bhat 2018; Shekhar 2019). All these factors put pressure on urban management (Kazil and Ali 2015). Accordingly, Schünemann (2016) identified four interventions if Africa's population is to benefit from the urban transition, namely:

- improved urban governance and urban planning;
- up-scaled investments in infrastructure to expand service provision, particularly for the poor;
- accelerated economic (structural) transformation to boost productivity and achieve economic growth. This is important for productive employment opportunities to tackle inequality and exclusion, especially for young people; and

- rural economies and urban markets linkage.

2.5.5 Corruption and governance

A simple definition of corruption is impossible (Waite and Allen 2003). Corruption is a global problem but sometimes more devastating in Africa because economies are small and the impact bigger (Katsios 2016; Rose-Ackerman 2004). The United Nations (2004) defines corruption as active and passive bribery of foreign and domestic public officials. The World Bank defines it as: "the abuse of public office for private gain" (World Bank 1997:8) but ignores corruption in the private sector (Ofusu-Amaah, Soopramanien and Uprety 1999). Sayed and Bruce (1998) emphasise elements of illegality and occupational power for personal, group or organisational gain in the definition. While Robbins (2000:440) brings the perspective of rights, stating that "corruption is an institutional system in which rights are dissolved in exchange for gifts.". In short, it is the payment or exchange of benefits or favours to receive a distinct gain or treatment not available to others.

The literature notes that corruption is widespread in Africa (Owoye and Bissessar 1992; Smith 1971). Although corruption originates from the colonial era, it manifested more in the struggle for political leadership and African leaders' desire for absolute power during the post-colonial period. The struggle for political leadership and the desire to retain control of life became the main objectives of many African leaders (post-1960s and 1970s) (Owoye and Bissessar 1992). There is a link between corruption and power (Sayed and Bruce 1998). The link manifests in power holders' moral behaviour and the overall political health of a society and its institutions. The behaviour of some African leaders is such that they prefer to rule not through state institutions such as parliament or constitutions but by exercising patronage systems. This wielded enormous power and authority, allowing them to subjugate or defeat all relevant institutions and prevent the required checks and balances common to good governance (Owoye and Bissessar 1992). As a result of their autocratic leadership embedded in their power, leaders helped lay the unstable foundation of corruption and bad governance felt in their economies. Figure 2.2 depicts leadership and institutional structure in Africa.



Source: Adapted from Owoye and Bissessar (2012)

Figure 2.2: Leadership and Institutional Structure in Africa

The effects of corruption

Corruption has corrosive societal effects that hinder the proper functioning of public agencies (Klitgaard 1998). Corruption undermines the rule of law and democracy, violates human rights, erodes the quality of life, distorts markets, contributes to unemployment, conflicts and instability in the continent (Schünemann 2016) and exhibits in both the administrative and political arms of the states (Gray and Kaufmann 1998). It marginalises vulnerable members of society. It causes economic underperformance and delays poverty alleviation efforts and development (Jespersen 1992).

Poor governance

Though many African countries did not have stable local governments in the colonial or early post-independence eras, there was a shift towards decentralisation, improved urban management and local democracy from the 1980s (World Bank 1993a). However, this process was uneven, partial and sometimes reversed (Andrews and Schroeder 2003). Meagher (2011) argued that the hasty and partial decentralisation of African public authorities resulted in weak, disorganised and inadequately trained staff. Their expected supportive role to political parties worsened their situation and poor governance became evident (Obeng-Odoom 2017).

Wagener (2011) and Obeng-Odoom (2017) provide good and poor governance characteristics. Table 2.5 captures these distinctions.

Despite Africa having experienced two forms of governance liberation, they remain stuck in the middle of a third one (Mills and Herbst 2012). Sequentially, the first form was the struggle for independence from colonial rule. Second, the liberation from dictatorships and power-hungry leadership that emerged from independence. The third form is a struggle to get proper democratic governance. Owoye and Bissessar (1992) concur that lousy governance in Africa manifests in the long list of dictatorial leaders, undemocratic elections and non-free media.

Table 2.5: Good governance versus poor governance

GOOD GOVERNANCE	POOR (BAD) GOVERNANCE
Voice and accountability	Political instability and violence
Participation	Unconstitutional conduct
Democratic rights	Interference of the military
Freedom of press	Political terrorism
Government effectiveness	Regulatory burden
Transparent administration	Incompetent personnel
Credibility	Market unfriendly policies
Ability to compromise	Ineffective judicial control
The rule of law	Graft
Enforceability of contracts	Corruption
Predictability of courts	State capture
Respect for the institutions	Rent-seeking

Source: Wagener (2011:175)

Corruption and poor governance have had devastating effects on African cities' urban management. These have created inequalities in access to services and inadequate opportunities for investment, discouraged foreign firms from investing and forced businesses to close. Research shows that trade openness and competitiveness promotion (Ades and Di Tella 1997), law enforcement strengthening (Lambsdorff 2003), inequalities reduction (You and Khagram 2005), decentralisation (Mayfield 1985; Roodt 2001), good governance (Katsios 2016), citizen participation (Momeni et al. 2011) as requirements to reduce corruption, improve governance and impetus to develop.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the evolution of urban management over four different phases. The chapter outlined the evolution of the forms and functions of postwar local governments. Postwar local governments emphasised welfare service delivery. However, new government institutions had to be entrepreneurial in metropolitan regionalism and promote economic development. These reforms required a clear division of functions and responsibilities at both government levels (national state and local government) and a degree of autonomy. Autonomy would give local government the responsibility for the quality and quantity of the services offered. These institutional changes redefined and repositioned urban management in relation to spatial development. Therefore, understanding urban management's association and connection with spatial/urban development became crucial for urban people's economic and social well-being. The reforms meant a new agenda for urban management. The traditional urban management style of 'taking control, taking charge, directing' had lost momentum in the modern urban context. Yet, urban management remained controversial and criticised for illusiveness and its association with master planning.

Further, the chapter described the urban management problems in Africa. It demonstrated that problems facing African states and cities are multifaceted, interrelated and require a holistic response. Urbanisation remains a central challenge. Urbanisation requires the building of institutional capacities at local government levels for the formulation, implementation and maintenance of urban development programmes, for greater financial autonomy (as well as responsibilities) to local governments and to promote increased participation of the private sector and the community sector.

The the next chapter presents the evolutionary governance theory as a theoretical framework to unpack and support the analysis of the governance dynamics. Contemporary urban management literature prefers urban governance over urban management (Da Cruz, Rode and McQuarrie 2019). Urban governance provides participation from different actors, namely, government actors, private actors, NGOs, and citizens (Avis 2016). As the evolutionary governance theory will demonstrate in Chapter 3, governance is not determined by state actors only, but involves private actors, formal and informal institutions and those in civil society, whether these are large corporations or individuals.

CHAPTER 3
EVOLUTIONARY GOVERNANCE THEORY

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 outlined multiple components that underlie urban management and its importance within a decentralised government system. Decentralisation requires effective governance. This chapter lays out the framework proposed to study governance. The evolutionary governance theory provides a framework to explain governance and its evolution (Van Assche et al. 2014). The theory emphasises the changing nature of governance, how societies make sense of reality, non-linear connectedness and the power play between the actors involved. Governance evolution uncovers the importance of adapting and adjusting plans and policies accordingly and providing the “requisite flexibility and suppleness of action” (Paquet 1999; 2001:189). Many plans, policies and procedures fail because they do not fit the reality or misrepresent the situation or the way of coordinating policies and practices, or because they interpret new situations in light of old governance experiences (Van Assche et al. 2014). The volume of research on governance has increased in the past decades, which underlines the importance of this subject (Beunen, Van Assche and Duineveld 2013). This chapter starts with conceptualising governance. It then discusses the evolutionary governance theory framework, its core concepts and the fundamental concepts shaping the governance paths development. Lastly, the chapter looks at the evolutionary governance theory dependencies: path dependency, interdependency and goal dependency. Figure 3.1 provides a chapter overview.



Figure 3.1: Schematic representation of Chapter 3

3.2 Conceptualising governance

The concept of governance is complex and a clear definition has been elusive (Pierre and Peters 2000). It "comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences" (United Nations. Committee of Experts on Public Administration 2006:3). Within the network literature, governance has to do with horizontal interactions by which various private and public actors at various government levels coordinate their actions and interdependencies to effect public policies and deliver public services (Pierre and Peters 2000). Peters and Pierre (1998) state that governance includes creating public-private partnerships, spreading networks in public policy, diminished state control, and using innovative policy instruments. Authority is no longer centralised and hierarchical in the governance framework (Meehan 2003), and public administrators and government are no longer solely and exclusively in control. Thus "to govern, moves from acting through vertical chains of command and accountability in a hierarchy of institutions to become a facilitator or regulator of what goes on in the public space in order to try to solve problems" (Meehan 2003:3).

Numerous definitions of governance have been provided, as the following discussion will indicate. For Rakodi (2003), governance is the action and manner or system of governing in

which boundaries between organisations, the private and the public sectors have become permeable. Beunen, Van Assche and Duineveld (2016:20) describe governance as the "taking of collectively binding decisions for a community in a community, by governmental and other actors". In other words, it is the act of coordinating collectively binding decisions by actors, using informal and formal institutions that coordinate tools, policies, plans and laws. Governance is not determined by state actors only; it involves private actors, formal and informal institutions and those in the civil society, whether these are large corporations or individuals. These actors outside government have an essential but not deterministic influence on the emergence or making of rules of interaction (Van Assche et al. 2014). Jessop (2002:41) says that governance is the "art of complexity" resulting from a multi-actor perspective.

Some researchers (Avis 2016; Davies 2011; Kersbergen and Waarden 2004) have emphasised the shift from the term "government" to "governance", arguing that the term governance is broader, more flexible and includes individuals, governmental and non-governmental actors, economic and social forces, formal and informal institutions and relationships. This broad definition does not imply that governments do not matter anymore. Governance is not limited to democracies and it does not guarantee a perfect democracy (Luhmann 1995) and can be good or bad (Wagener 2011). As Van Assche et al. (2014) argue, governance could not be a recipe deduced from theory or a set of empirically observed best practices. It has a perspective on the future as it assembles new visions and absorbs stories of a better future. Stories or governance content shape daily interactions and negotiations, forming rules of interaction or simple institutions that can become more complex and formal. The above definitions emphasise the complexities associated with governance. As Klijn and Koppenjan (2012:12) put it, "today's complex, globalized and networked society represents one of the most pressing challenges facing governments and their governance structures".

Figure 3.2 provides a diagrammatic presentation of governance complexity.



Source: Avis (2016:6)

Figure 3.2: Diagrammatic presentation of governance complexity

Overall, the concept of governance remains complex. Governance complexity is rooted in configurations of institutions and actors, including governmental and non-governmental actors, formal or informal and invisible actors not present on any official flow chart of decision-making (Beunen et al. 2015). These actors can clash and struggle over how the long-term vision or future presents itself. For example, there can be conflict about the most likely scenarios and forecasts and how decision-making is aligned. These potential conflicts are real, considering that governance simultaneously focuses on an area, a topic, a group, an organisation, and a political or administrative structure (Klijn and Skelcher 2007).

By including issues like leadership, the rule of law, the relation with markets, and the role of informalities, governance has a long tradition that includes literature as old as Aristotle (384−322 BC) and Machiavelli (1469–1527) (Mancuso, Marwah and Aytak 2006). While Aristotle and Machiavelli had lasting views regarding political ideals and citizenship, Moum (2016) argues that these philosophers both had thoughts about creating a perfect environment in a stable and secured country. The city functions as a political community or partnership in Aristotle's view. Accordingly, the city aims to avoid injustice, ensure economic stability and create a possibility for the citizens to lead a good life. Aristotle described six forms of

government, three healthy and three perverted or corrupt. Among the good are kingships, aristocracies and polities, and among the perverted are democracies, oligarchies or minorities and tyrannies (Baron 1961; Hartman 2011). Machiavelli had distinctive thoughts regarding the policy of the state and its ruler. He set out guidelines for the forms of government and how to maintain control over them.

The above discussion attests that governance is complex and dynamic. Understanding governance dynamism requires a theoretical approach that addresses its complexity and dynamic character. The evolutionary governance theory framework comes in handy as it shows "how to entirely and continuously restructure governance to facilitate new understandings of broader changes in society, and new understandings of the spaces for intervention" (Beunen et al. 2015). This thesis understands governance as evolutionary; both institutions and actors co-evolve, and one cannot understand the current governance without understanding its history and the history of external and internal relations. A history of "external pressure, e.g. by a provincial government, has internal effects, while, e.g. long-standing struggles between elite factions lead to a pattern of inclusion/exclusion of actors and knowledge" (Van Assche, Deacon, Gruzmacher, Jones, Lavoie, Granzow, Hallstrom, Summers and Parkins 2016:224). Thus, governance refers to making collectively binding decisions in a community by diverse actors, outside and inside government, with informal and formal roles and implementing these decisions (Van Assche et al. 2016).

3.3 Evolutionary governance theory framework

The evolutionary governance theory is a theoretical framework for explaining and analysing governance and its evolution (Beunen et al. 2015). Evolution denotes "a process of change in a system whereby both internal mechanisms and external forces create the path and both structures and elements of the system change over time" (Van Assche et al. 2017:224). Developed by Belgian planner Kristof van Assche, Martijn Duineveld and Raoul Beunen, the theory provides a novel perspective on the way markets, governance and societies evolve. Theoretically, the approach draws on many sources, including the biological evolutionary theory, post-structuralism, social systems theory, actor-network theory and institutional economics (Van Assche et al. 2014).

First, the evolutionary governance theory originates from the biological evolutionary theory, specifically the version developed by two biologists, Varela and Maturana (Maturana and Varela 1980). They conceived the idea of autopoiesis (self-creation), wherein everything in a biological system is the product of the evolution of that system. For Magalhães and Sanchez (2009), autopoiesis primarily distinguishes living and non-living systems. King (1993) argues that in the social sciences, autopoiesis has been developing into a new theoretical paradigm and Von Krogh and Roos (1995) suggest that it offers the platform for a new general systems theory. Although Mingers (2001) argues that autopoiesis cannot be wholly applied to social theory, some fundamental autopoiesis principles are applicable, for instance, the principle of an organisation's operational closure (Magalhães and Sanchez 2009). This argument is premised on the assumption that throughout the whole hierarchy of systems proposed by Boulding (1956), all systems levels exhibit organisational closure characteristics (Magalhães and Sanchez 2009). Autonomous systems do not have a set of inputs and outputs but rather an internal coherence resulting from a system's inputs and outputs interconnectedness (Varela 1984). In this respect, organisational closure "requires some form of self-reference, whether material, linguistic, or social, rather than the more specific process of self-production" (Mingers 2001:111). For Magalhães and Sanchez (2009), organisational closure and self-referentiality are critical criteria that clearly define social systems. The various institutional systems and sub-systems making up a social system tend to become closed domains of communication while maintaining strong forms of interdependence (structural links) because they rely on each other in performing many societal functions.

Second, the social systems theory borrowed the concepts of operational closure and autopoiesis from the biological evolutionary theory. However, the social systems theory used communications as the element of an autopoietic theory of society (Luhmann 1989; Maturana and Varela 1992). Social systems are ongoing processes of interpretation and re-interpretation of internal communications and the external environments (Luhmann 1989; Mingers 1995). Social systems govern their transformation processes through communications (Teubner 1989).

Third, within the evolutionary governance theory, the social systems theory is compatible with Michel Foucault's discourse theory version. Both the social systems theory and the

discourse theory offer a framework analysing the communicative processes shaping historically dependent discourses that produce the conditions for their transformation (Luhmann 1995). For Aakansha (2017), discourse is a dynamic form of social practice constructing the social world, individual selves, and identity. Discourse is the study of how people communicate about people, things and the social organisation of the society, and it helps to shape what we think and know at any point in time. However, discourse does not just mean thinking and producing meanings. It consists of the conscious and unconscious nature of the body. Discourse helps shape an individual's ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and identities. Based on different discourses, every person’s identity is unique, different and flexible and every person contributes something unique and different to society. Thus every individual internalises different social dialogues which shape them.

Fourth, Van Assche et al. (2014) understand post-structuralism as maintaining that the scientific community seeks to measure and construct models of the natural world and scientific knowledge. Post-structuralism is either a continuation or a rejection of structuralism, which proposes that one may understand the human culture using a structure modelled on language that differs from concrete reality and from abstract ideas that mediate between the two.

The fifth influence is from the new institutional economics. New institutional economics as an interdisciplinary enterprise combines economics, organisation theory, law, sociology, political science and anthropology to understand the institutions of political, social and commercial life. New institutional economics explains what institutions are, what purposes they serve and how they arise and change (Klein 1999). It is interested in the social, political and economic institutions that govern everyday life. It follows strict methodological individualism, always expressing its explanations regarding individuals' goals, plans, and actions.

The last influence comes from the actor-network theory. The actor-network theory assumes that every actor is already a network of many other actors. It highlights that the ability to act is not a feature or characteristic of one’s nature of being, for example, a human species, an object, or anything else. Rather, the ability to act is a relational feature (Bencherki 2017) and

suggests that the work of science is not fundamentally different from other social activities (Latour 1987).

Contributions by these theoretical frameworks enabled the presentation of an evolving governance perspective and showed how understanding governance as continuously restructuring also allows for a new understanding of broader changes in society and a new understanding of the spaces for intervention. Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the theoretical frameworks that shaped the evolutionary governance theory.



Figure 3.3: Theoretical frameworks that shaped EGT

3.3.1 Distinct nature of the evolutionary governance theory

The evolutionary governance theory is different from other governance theoretical approaches for several reasons. First, it emphasises non-linear causality, which refers to causation where cause and effect flow bi-directionally or in two directions between two or more systems or elements. The essential feature or characteristic here is (the idea of) feedback that an effect can create a cause, but at the same time, this cause can create an effect in the first system (Van Assche et al. 2014).

Second, the evolutionary governance theory understands governance as evolutionary, marked by dependency. All elements of governance like people, networks and social systems are subject to evolution. All these elements and their dependencies co-evolve, and many are the product of governance itself (Van Assche et al. 2014). Actions, communications and decisions of people and the strategies of actors create differences that contribute to the development of structures and patterns in governance.

Third, the evolutionary governance theory draws on different theories and combines them into a single framework, leading to a concept that explains a broad range of observed governance changes. The theory presents a middle ground between new classical economics and social engineering. On the one hand, social engineering tries to build efficient structures of society for maximum satisfaction and minimum friction or waste. On the other hand, neoclassical economics assumes that the consumer's first concern is to maximise personal satisfaction (Weintraub 1985).

Fourth, for Beunen et al. (2016), the evolutionary governance theory links up with the literature on the complexity theory, social-ecological and complex-adaptive systems by emphasising the processes and mechanisms that drive social evolution and other theories that include notions of non-linearity, complexity and uncertainty.

Fifth, the evolutionary governance theory offers a perspective on how institutions, markets and societies evolve (Van Assche et al. 2014). It further sets out a framework for understanding how actors, objects, subjects, formal and informal institutions, and knowledge are in continuous co-evolution. In this context, the focus is on how different dependencies influence the evolutionary course and how different evolutionary pathways are created and influence each other's development.

Sixth, following the argument made by Luhmann (1995), the evolutionary governance theory places governance in the functional domain of politics. It understands politics as a mode of communication, specialising in preparing collectively binding decisions and producing and using instruments serving that purpose.

Finally, with its emphasis on governance's constant transformation and dependencies of governance processes, mechanisms and institutions, the evolutionary governance theory distances itself from conventional conceptualisations of governance (Beunen et al. 2015).

Overall, the evolutionary governance theory challenges the understanding of governance structures, practices and roles and highlights the process and interactional dimension of governance in which institutions, actors and mechanisms constantly co-determine each other. It emphasises the activity of differently positioned actors at various scales, in terms of those who need to comply with rules, those who need to understand others and those who need to cooperate and advise (Beunen et al. 2015).

3.3.2 Evolutionary governance theory criticism

The evolutionary governance theory emphasises three types of dependencies: path, goal and interdependency. Its concept of path dependency has not escaped criticism (Kay 2005). First, the focus on the fact that history matters is often without a clear understanding as it does not even unpack how the decision-making process has changed over time. Second, path dependency neglects to explain the change in its emphasis on stability. Third, the path-dependency theoretical framework seldom considers normative principles (Mahoney 2000).

Some economists argue that path dependence has occurred a few times in history and do not recognise many of the processes considered by literature as path-dependent (Madsen 2016; North 1990; Rizzello 2004).

3.4 Paths and dependencies

A path is something dependent, subject to change, varies under the circumstances and leads to certain places, not others. It leads to future possibilities and options created through the past actions of governance actors (Van Assche, Deacon, Gruezmacher, Summers, Lavoie et al. 2017). The object moving along the path, for example, the local community or people and the surrounding landscape, determine possibilities. Each community is different, and one way of determining that difference is through governance paths. The origins of governance paths usually lie in unique cultural and historical contexts. Therefore, it is inevitable to emphasise previously produced structures and elements as pre-conditional for reproducing

existing governance pathways. The governance path refers to "the specific evolution of governance in a community" and requires a careful reconstruction of its "identity and implications for possible futures" (Van Assche et al. 2017:225). For Van Assche et al. (2017), the governance path concept draws attention to two issues: the importance of history and the rigidity of making collective decisions when planning a community's future. Simply defined, a governance path is a series of governance configurations that evolve. Each step in the evolution and governance configuration reveals a slight difference in the stakeholders or actors engaged, in the forms of narratives and knowledge that inform it and in the relationship between informal and formal institutions involved.

Dependencies also shape governance paths. While dependencies communicate rigidity in governance path evolution, they are crucial concepts within the evolutionary governance theory, build on institutional economic concepts and are a critical explanatory factor in governance evolution (Van Assche et al. 2014). Dependencies create rigidities but do not imply determinism (that previously existing causes entirely determine all events). However, dependencies also create flexibilities with options and a measure of contingency and freedom. The focus on both rigidity and flexibility toward the governance path means one should understand the history of governance before planning interventions. It also means examining existing relationships and dependencies: path, goal and interdependency. Figure 3.4 presents the interplay between three types of dependencies leading to path creation.



Source: modified from Van Assche et al. (2014)

Figure 3.4: A framework of dependencies leading to path creation

Figure 3.4 presents three sets of dependencies identified as path dependency, goal dependency, interdependency and their interaction. This interaction relates to how actors depend on each other, resulting from past interactions and shaping visions for future development and how these visions are implemented. The three dependencies together do not limit space for change and understanding them can clarify the degrees of freedom in path creation (Van Assche et al. 2014).

3.5 Path dependency

The concept of path dependency in the evolutionary governance theory explains how choices and decisions made today and in the future depend on choices and decisions made in the past (Van Assche et al. 2017). Path dependencies are legacies from the past that limit and enable decision-making currently. In practice, certain institutions, actors and stories that historically had an influence can continue to exist or linger on. They have left such bad memories and experiences that anything like them is now disqualified or excluded.

3.5.1 Origins

Officially, path dependence started to be applied in economics in 1985. However, some previous contributions pave the way for applying path-dependence in economics (Antonelli 1995). In the social sciences, economists developed the notion of path dependence by focusing on the evolution of technology and institutions (David 1985; North 1990). Originating in natural sciences, the path-dependence concept appeared in economic theory in the mid-1980s (Gigante 2016). Path-dependency was first theorised in political science in the early eighties. Policy studies and institutional economics adopted it from political science (North 1990; Ostrom 1990) and more recently, urban planning researchers are using it (Rast 2009).

The use of path-dependency in new institutional economics has a rich history. It relates to events or sequences in which a particular economic process cannot shake free from its past states influence (David 1985). For North (1992), new institutional economics attempts to incorporate the theory of institutions (defined as rules) into economics. North argues that institutions reduce uncertainty in human exchange. Institutional path dependencies exist because of network externalities, economies of scale and complementarities. In simple terms,

the individuals and organisations with bargaining power resulting from the institutional framework and network have a crucial stake in perpetuating the system.

The economics literature on path dependency emphasises the role of technological change and the intrinsic features of economic organisations (David 1985). Furthermore, this literature stresses the interplay with the external environment governing the current and future development path (Antonelli 1995; Gigante 2016). Path dependencies can have very different natures and be singled out through various elements.

3.5.2 Critical elements of path dependence

It is possible to theorise about past governance legacies in many ways. One of those is through path dependence theory. Path dependence is the generic term designating legacies from the past influencing governance in the present. Researchers use it to explain how historical legacies can shape current realities. In this context, seven elements used by researchers are essential.

First, an institutional path begins with a critical juncture – a particular moment with a heightened probability of at least two alternative paths. To be recognised as a critical juncture, an event or choice must have a causal impact on future events (Capoccia 2016). Critical junctures are events or choices that constitute important turning points and form a key explanation for the policy or institutional change. Capoccia (2016) argues that a critical juncture is synonymous with unsettled or turbulent times. These junctures are critical because it becomes increasingly difficult to return to the initial or original point where multiple alternatives are still available (Mahoney 2000). As events move down the path, self-reinforcing mechanisms strengthen the initial step in a particular chosen direction and change becomes more restricted (Awortwi 2010).

Second, it is useful in analysing path-dependence autopoiesis (a system's ability to reproduce and maintain itself by creating its parts and other components). Autopoiesis is at the core of a shift in perspective about biological phenomena and the term allows for a refined articulation of different types of legacies in system reproduction (Van Assche, Duineveld, Verschraegen, During and Beunen 2011b).

Third, path dependency refers to any legacy from the past that influences the current governance systems. It explains the evolution of a governance configuration from its previous state to its current situation (Van Assche et al. 2011b). Once a particular path is chosen (for example, a private property regime), it becomes difficult to abandon this path (for example, in favour of a common property regime). Governance regimes tend to stick to the same path. Reasons for sticking to the same path include the high costs of changing a path, difficulties in changing majority discourses, or a particular governance path being part of an interdependent web of rules.

Fourth, path dependency can explain how a historical legacy can shape the current reality or understand how legacies from the past can shape future choices (Van Assche et al. 2016). Crouch (2010:112) argues that path dependency explains how "successive generations of political and social actors have difficulty departing from patterns set by their predecessors". For example, the historical legacy may determine or influence the pattern of current developments due to the availability of infrastructural services close by or in that area.

Fifth, path dependency does not provide the means to predict the future by analysing the past (North 1990). The past is static. The future is changing. In development, the analysis of the community's needs in the past may not guarantee what the same community will need in the future.

Sixth, path dependence recognises historical contingency in that anytime, events can follow multiple paths leading to different outcomes. At the same time, it recognises the role of strategic action in shaping new paths and influencing the course of events (Garud and Karnøe 2001).

Finally, path dependence recognises that discernible structures act as carriers of history, which afford different sets of constraints and opportunities in shaping the pace and direction of change (North 1990). Håkansson and Lundgren (1997) conceptualise aspects of path dependence in terms of paths in time and paths in space. Paths in time refer to the interlocking chains of causation constituting historical processes and account for the individuality or uniqueness of paths. Paths in space refer to path dependence's structural and positional elements and focus on how structures and elements act as carriers of history.

By reflecting on past legacies, path dependency explains and compares alternatives. A more detailed assessment and the link between path dependency, actors and institutions are worth discussing for an accurate comparison. While David (1985) was concerned with the evolution of technology and institutions in the development of path dependency, North (1990) used path dependency in describing the history of capitalist institutional development. It emphasised the notion of 'lock-ins'. Importantly, Arthur (1989) uses the term 'lock-in' (within the path dependence context) to explain that path dependency appears deterministic. Thus one could deduce the idea that it is possible that some choices at a particular moment (with a probability of at least two alternative paths) are 'regrettable' and could have been avoided; yet, once people have made choices, they get stuck in the process.

While work on path dependencies initially emphasised the notion that history matters, today, it emphasises persistent reinforcement of current realities and slow change (often inflexible) and is applied in various research fields (Bergek and Onufrey 2014).

Perceptive proponents of path dependency (namely, Barney 1995; Berman 1998) often distinguish between institutions: the constitutional or macro level, the decision-making level and the policy level(Kay 2005). Historically, most studies have focused on the constitutional or macro-level (Pierson 1993), and today, increasing attention is devoted to the other two levels (Kemp 2000). Path dependency is of value for policy analysis because it acknowledges the historical legacy of policy and that policy decisions accumulate over time. It emphasises the complexity of policy analysis and considers the total policy system and subsystems (Kay 2005).

3.6 Interdependency

Various other theories have recognised the interdependency theory. The governance network theory (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012), institutional economics (Greif 2006; North 2005) and the social systems theory (Luhmann 1995) are the most prominent. For instance, most network researchers agree that interdependency is the core factor initiating and sustaining networks (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Scharpf 1978). Interdependence is rooted in path dependence as current actors, institutions, and their relations result from past and previous interactions (Greif 2006). However, interdependence represents a potential source of rigidity in the governance

path. At one point, governance viability hinges on the relationship(s) between the actors or stakeholders involved. Relationships with certain actors or stakeholders may be necessary to avoid obstruction, or they might facilitate access to expertise, resources or labour (Van Assche et al. 2017).

Similarly, institutions and actors can become interdependent when they develop alongside one another. For example, laws and lawyers are part of the same process of institutional development and innovation. The concept of interdependency explains the interactions between actors on different pathways (Van Assche et al. 2016) and how the actions and decisions of one actor within an institution depend on others (Alexander 2001). It refers to the restriction on the action of an actor imposed by relations with others (International Institute for Innovation in Governance 2020). It can, among others, arise from specialisation, resource distribution, knowledge distribution, and power distribution. It can use formal and informal rules and it can organically emerge. Van Assche et al. (2016:21) point out that "actors depend on other actors and institutions at one point in time, while institutions depend on actors for their production and reproduction". These elements of interdependencies require an amount of cooperation and the display of responsibility and trust from the actors. In the process, there will be power play and possible conflicts.

3.6.1 Cooperation

Awareness of interdependence between the local communities can lead to cooperation, creating interdependence. The literature shows that the nature of cooperation differs. Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, and Otten (2007) explored the role of legitimacy and power on the tendency to cooperate. Some studies found that the powerless are more likely to cooperate than the powerful (Tjosvold and Okun 1979). Other studies demonstrate that the powerful cooperate easier (Van Dijk and Vermunt 2000; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg and Wilke 2001). In politics, especially in elections, for example, politicians are more powerless than the citizens and beyond elections, they are more powerful than ordinary community members. In both instances, there is a measure of interdependence. However, the varying effects depend on how the actors see the various power influences as appropriate at that particular time.

3.6.2 Power

Essential to interdependency are also the concepts of power and influence. Many researchers have defined power as being capable of influencing others (French and Raven 1959; Weber, Henderson and Parsons 1947). Some have even defined power as an actual influence, such that power occurs when a person directly changes another person's behaviour (Tjosvold and Okun 1979). Interactions among actors depend on power relations, or power and relations, the way actors respond and the nature of institutions. For example, power often involves influencing or putting pressure on others to engage in behaviour to help the powerful accomplish their objectives. Often a sense of entitlement is part and parcel of having power (Lammers and Galinsky 1979). For example, Mills (1956) points to the adverse effects of power by arguing that America, after World War II, was ruled by the "power elite", a click of political, economic and military leaders who secretly decided on the course of the country and severely undermined democracy. In this way, rightly or wrongly or regardless of how debatable this could be, America was influenced in a particular direction. Thus, in these formulations or instances, power is linked to energy - literally and metaphorically (Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee 2003). One can think of control over resources. For example, as a potential source of influence in the same way that energy can be stored and later released. Power is the ability to be uninfluenced by others (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi and Gruenfeld 2006). Power and influence shape the degree of interdependence among actors.

3.6.3 Trust

Interdependencies require trust to proceed. The level of trust among actors or stakeholders can hamper the progress of a community project or even lead to the project's cancellation. The importance of trust in understanding relationships and interactions has been part of debates and scientific studies for decades and originates from organisation studies and adjacent fields (Tyler and Kramer 1996). In these fields, trust portrays various characteristics among actors. It is a lubricant for cooperation and an essential mechanism for decision-making processes (Bachmann, 2001), a way to reduce complexity and cope with uncertainty (Luhmann 1979). Trust reduces uncertainty because actors or institutions take each other's interests into account. It facilitates investments in uncertain collaborations among interdependent actors or institutions with divergent and conflicting interests. It also reduces the necessity of complex

contracts and improves the possibility of actors sharing information and developing innovative solutions (Lane and Bachman 1998).

3.6.4 Conflicts

A community is never without problems, differences and conflicts (Van Assche et al. 2017). Building sustainable communities require a fair amount of interdependence among actors or stakeholders. For example, a community project requires shared decision-making. In collective decision-making, forms of expertise compete, actors and identities compete and versions of the past, present and future compete, thus brewing a fertile environment for confrontation and conflict. Here, trust is vital to overcome conflicts and smooth the process between interdependent actors. Another scenario is that conflict among interdependent actors or stakeholders is not always bad. Van Assche et al. (2017) argue that conflict has some value. For example, by harnessing the diversity of opinions, conflict can help to adapt governance to improve response to changing circumstances. Also, differences of opinion can induce new thinking and produce new things, ideas, identities and communities. At the same time, tensions and disagreements can provoke more participation and engagement among participants, thus opening up new opportunities and solutions. Lastly, conflict can enable visioning and strategising that was previously impossible. The ushering in of democracy in South Africa was fast-tracked by (existing) conflict at the negotiating tables and the looming conflict in communities.

3.7 Goal dependency

Goal dependency explains how shared visions or future goals can affect decision-making in the present (Van Assche et al. 2014). Shared visions or goals manifesting in policies, plans and tradition can create dependence on the future (Luhmann 1989; Verdery 1996). For example, actors can develop a future strategy, which will influence the coordination of decisions in the present. For Van Assche et al. (2016), a shared vision is essential to create “buy-in” of all actors. Goal dependencies can change over time as well (Van Assche et al. 2017). For example, developers or contractors and landscapers can distort a design accepted by the people. However, the people might embrace the result so much that it becomes recognised as heritage quickly.

Van Dijk (2011) argues that shared visions by the important actors bring about governance change. Put differently, visions in the form of plans, policies, and laws agreed to by the majority of actors represent visions for the desirable future of the community. Even though plans may not play out precisely as intended, they still affect governance (Van Assche et al. 2014). The effect or impact of these visions and plans on community development has a lot to do with how they are incorporated into future interactions by the existing actors.

Another example of how shared visions of the future can impact decisions made in the present is that of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDGs are a universal call to action to protect the planet, and improve the lives and prospects of everyone, everywhere. All United Nations Member States adopted the 17 SDGs in 2015 as part of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, which set out a 15-year plan to achieve the goals. These are visions for the future affecting governance – an excellent example of goal dependency. They are goals for the future but affect decision-making in the present. Actors devise a future strategy, which influences the coordination of decisions presently. SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) in the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 influences today's urban governance decisions.

It is important to note that the desired future may not necessarily realise in the same way that actors conceptualised it. Developing the desired future does not magically bring that future about in the same way that drawing a plan does not necessarily make it a reality (Healey 2006). A plan or policy can be eagerly desired or longed for, but communities can interpret it differently from the original intent of decision-makers. Yet, in various ways, the plan or policy can become performative in that it can create realistic effects. It can become a reality because a coalition of powerful actors or institutions supports the goal or the plan receives legitimacy resulting in implementation. Another scenario is that it is possible that within the broader community, the rules stemming from the shared goal or vision become deeply embedded, so an attempt to deviate becomes hard. The goal becomes a reality more quickly.

It is important to distinguish between the terms performance and performativity. In the first instance, the performance within the governance context can have rhetorical effects going beyond governance. These effects beyond governance can result from the nature of governance, the effect of collectively binding decisions, and shifting actor or institution

configurations and power and knowledge configurations. In other words, how governance is structured can easily facilitate the communication of its achievements (goals or visions) or its performance to the community. Performativity is usually understood as the self-fulfilling prophecy of discourse; things become accepted as true and real due to prior discourse (Butler 1997). Success or failure can become widely accepted because of strategic performance (Van Assche et al. 2012). This means that the acknowledgement of success or failure can be internalised and appreciated by the community on the delivery or failure to deliver the plan or vision. Another way of looking at this is that when the community is expecting something (for example the successful delivery of a community project) and this expectation realises, the acceptance is likely to show how they behave.

Second, performance and performativity do not imply each other but usually influence each other (Bal 2002). For example, the real effects of visions, policies and plans (actual implementation and achievement of goals) are attributable to performance and partly how governance is functioning and organised.

Third, simple and less sophisticated governance configurations are likely to achieve goals and implement visions to deliver projects (performance) quicker than heavy and complicated governance arrangements (Foucault 1982).

In summary, shared goals or visions can be drivers of institutional evolution. Actors that co-evolve operate based on imperfect images of past, present, future, self and environment (Luhmann 1995). Their actual operations experience constraints from dependencies they do not fully grasp. On the other hand, goals embodied in plans and policies only have effects when existing actors and institutions incorporate them in their future actions or interactions, which may be constrained by the path and interdependencies if not fully understood. A shared goal might be unimplementable because of unknown and unacknowledged interdependencies and past legacies. Moreover, new path dependencies and interdependencies come into play in the implementation process, with new actors entering the space and modifying the goal dependencies, other effects of the shared vision and the reality.

3.8 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to advance a framework for the analysis of governance within a decentralised government system. Decentralisation requires effective governance and puts urban management on the spotlight. The evolutionary governance theory explains and analyses governance and its evolution. Thus, figure 3.5 presents the connection between urban management and evolutionary governance theory. By honing this connection, a comprehensive framework is established to fully encapsulate the complexities and intricacies of the politics involved in policy and implementation within a decentralised government system.



Figure 3.5: Author's conceptual framework

Also, this chapter critically assessed the evolutionary governance theory. I conclude with five points about the evolutionary governance theory applicable to this study.

First, understanding governance requires a theoretical approach that addresses governance's complex and dynamic character. The evolutionary governance theory provides this perspective and offers novel ways of conceptualising governance and its elements. It illustrates a relational conceptualisation of governance by focusing on the participation of actors and institutions at various socio-spatial scales. Furthermore, it helps to understand how actors, institutions, and discourses are continuously in co-evolution and co-creation.

Second, the evolutionary governance theory views governance as an act of management, not an orderly designed top-down imposition of decision-making process. Actors, institutions and elements are constantly "becoming", shaping each other and co-evolving.

Third, each governance path is different and unique in its path dependencies, goal dependencies and interdependencies. Each form of dependence is considered an aspect of governance path rigidity. Yet, the interplay of these dependencies also creates flexibility. The interplay of these dependencies creates a unique complexity that the actors cannot fully grasp using their strategic and cognitive skills and cannot be fully managed using the power relations governing the case and the institutions at hand.

Fourth, the chapter emphasised that any attempt to intervene in governance starts with understanding the context because governance is conceptualised as dynamic and evolutionary. All elements of governance are subject to evolution.

Finally, the evolutionary governance theory provides a toolbox of diverse and broad theories that can help to understand governance evolution. To exist, governance must be actively and continuously reproduced. Changes in particular elements of governance depend on their interaction with other elements (interdependency) and their embedding in structures resulting from the same evolutionary process.

Thus, with the theoretical framework contextualising evolutionary governance presented in this chapter, there will be better understanding of the empirical analyses presented in the forthcoming chapters. Before the empirical analyses, the next chapter maps out the evolution of the housing policy in South Africa before, during, and post-apartheid. Post-apartheid policies discussed in Chapter 4 are intent on achieving urban socio-spatial integration.

CHAPTER 4
SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the evolution of the South African housing policy. The evolutionary governance theory (discussed in Chapter 3) shows that one cannot discard history in planning. This chapter analyses how the current South African housing policy is rooted in history (path-dependent) and how goals and inter-dependencies affect the housing policy. The evolutionary governance theory views policy as a statement of intent by government actors, community organisations, public institutions and the private sector, which eventually becomes law (Holsti 1995).

Many researchers have analysed the history of the housing policy in South Africa (namely Goodlad 1996; Prinsloo 1995; Tomlinson 1998). By discussing the history of the housing policy development, I do not intend to add anything new to existing historical interpretations. However, I frame the housing policy development within the evolutionary governance theory and decentralisation. This chapter demonstrates that the South African post-apartheid housing policy has dependencies cutting across the different housing policy evolution phases. Apart from the path dependency traits, the policy has examples of goal- and interdependencies. Further, the chapter lays the policy foundation for analysing housing governance in the remaining chapters. It emphasises how housing policy dependencies developed over time and has two main sections: housing policy before and after 1994. A section on the evolutionary governance theory and housing policy in South Africa concludes the chapter. Figure 4.1 outlines the chapter.



Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of Chapter 4

4.2 South African housing policy before 1994

Colonial and apartheid governments had long-term implications for housing and housing policy related to black people in South Africa (Evans 1997; Hendler 1992; Mabin 1992). The section distinguishes between three subperiods: the colonial period (1910–1947), the apartheid period (1948–1989) and the neo-apartheid period (1990–1994). However, one should avoid these phases' rigid demarcation. There are threads of continuities that tie the different phases together. In some cases, a new phase may merely mark the tightening of these threads, while in other cases, there may be more distinct breaks from previous patterns (Maylam 1990:58).

4.2.1 Colonial period: 1910–1947

Urban racial segregation was a prominent feature of urban life before unification in 1910 (Davenport 1985). The Union of South Africa unified the Orange River Colony, the Cape Colony, the Transvaal and the Natal Colony. The unification created a centralised state with limited, decentralised functions and powers and mostly without black people's political rights[3] (Mabin 1992). The government regulated black people's residential quarters and movement (Gusler 2000). The garden city planning paradigm (which emphasises greenbelts and different land uses for different economic activities) played an important role in ensuring residential

[3] Before the Union of South Africa in 1910, elections in the Cape Colony were conducted based on qualified franchise. This meant two things: i) the right to vote was limited only to men meeting literacy and property qualifications; ii), the right to vote was not restricted based on race. This was different from the other South African colonies. E.g, in the Orange River Colonies and Transvaal, the franchise was limited by law to white men. In Natal the franchise was limited to white men in practise although not in law. The coloured population was removed from the voter's roll in 1950.

and racial segregation and health concerns laid at the basis of the segregation (Mabin and Smit 1997).

The Union Native Labour Regulation Act in 1911 entrenched racial segregation. The Union Native Labour Regulation Act made it a criminal offence for Africans, but not for whites, to break a labour contract and the Land Act in 1913 restricted black people from owning urban land in many South African cities[4] (Beinart and Delius 1986). Irrespective of the restrictions, urban migration among black people accelerated due to industrial growth in the early 1920s (Delius 1980). Consequently, the Housing Act of 1920 (the first housing act passed in South Africa) availed funds to local governments to build housing for the poor (South Africa 1920). The Act created a fund for municipalities to borrow to support construction at a low-interest rate. The government provided funds to construct subsidised houses and thus created a housing subsidy system (Mabin 2020). A Central Housing Board oversaw housing projects and allocated projects based on race (Maylam 1995). Most of the beneficiaries of this legislation were the "poor whites" segment of the population. In 1921, the Stallard Commission investigated African migration into towns or cities and the emergence of squatter settlements. The commission recommended that the stay of black people in urban areas had to be limited to the duration of their employment. This recommendation laid the basis for the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 (Vosloo 1976).

This rapid growth of African urbanisation drew greater state attention. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 represented the central state's first significant intervention in managing African urbanisation by setting aside housing stock for Africans (South Africa 1923). According to the Act, white municipalities had to (i) establish segregated locations for Africans, (ii) implement a rudimentary system of influx control, (iii) set up advisory boards to process local issues affecting Africans, albeit without any power to change policy, and (v) institute native revenue accounts for income derived from rents, fines, beer-hall sales and fees levied from Africans (Maylam, 1990). The framework provided a uniform national system of "native administration" and used municipalities as the central state's local agents (Abbott 1994).

[4] Alexandra had landownership; was never resettled elsewhere and remained a black township, in its current location. Alexandra was an exclusively black freehold area (Sikakane 1977). The specific conditions of the second proclamation of Alexandra, in 1912, set private property acquisition and ownership in the township apart.

The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 further enforced racial segregation, tightened control and centralised decision-making. The national government directed surplus black labour in urban areas to rural areas and local authorities received increased powers to evict. Additionally, the Act gave the Minister of Native Affairs the right to compel a municipality to implement any section of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act (Davenport 1971). The 1945 Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act tightened influx control and regulated blacks' access to urban areas. The Act permitted blacks to permanently reside in an urban area only if the person could prove having stayed there since birth, has worked for the same employer for at least ten years or has stayed lawfully in the area for 15 years (South Africa 1945). Although blacks were allowed to build their own houses, it was on rented sites. The state encouraged blacks to reside on farms or permanently in homelands or (state) public rental housing (Todes 2008; Wessels 1989).

By 1948, a long history of racial segregation had been established. Since unification, the colonial government nurtured racial segregation and manipulated blacks for party gain and to defend white supremacy (Simons and Simons 1969). The segregation took place on two levels: in the urban areas and by keeping black people in rural areas by enforcing influx control. Although some legislation was instrumental in creating segregation, urban segregation was not fully enforced by law. This state of affairs would change rapidly since 1948.

4.3 Apartheid period: 1948–1979

The apartheid state reinforced many of the colonial patterns of segregation by legislation. The Population Registration Act of 1950 enforced the racial classification of the population and laid the platform for urban segregation (Mabin and Smit 1997). The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 took urban segregation further by establishing Bantu Authorities in the regions dominated by state-appointed chiefs and headmen. These were generally in the rural areas of South Africa. Grand apartheid meant that black people had to find political rights in these areas, which became homelands or self-governing areas. By the late 1940s, African urbanisation increased rapidly because of a surge in industrialisation (Gusler 2000). This rapid increase in black people's urbanisation rate promoted the Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, to note in 1950 that white South Africa was (now) being overrun by a black stream

(Price 1991:15–16). Consequently, the apartheid state tightened influx control policies (Bonner 1990). The tightening of the influx control mechanism went hand in hand with the mass roll-out of public housing (mainly in former black township houses) (Mabin and Smit 1997). Municipalities supplied these houses based on the system created by the 1920 Act (Mabin 2020). Once urban renewal occurred, influx control had to prevent urban decay (Ehebrecht 2014). Furthermore, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 compelled local authorities to remove people from informal houses in urban "native villages" (Harrison 1992). The Group Areas Act of 1952 built on the garden city principles and reinforced existing segregation. To counter the urban housing problem and provide for black people in the rural areas, the apartheid state (Department of Native Affairs) introduced site and services schemes with a 30-year leasehold tenure in the former Bantustans[5] in 1955 (Wessels 1989). According to the apartheid ideology, large African townships on the edges of white towns would cease to exist when the African peoples lived in their own "homelands" (Geldenhuys 1981). Between the 1960s and early 1980s, the apartheid state implemented a policy of resettlement to force black people to move to rural homelands and their designated urban (group) areas (Turok 1976). Accordingly, the black population in the Bantustans increased from 39% to 53% of the total South African population (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Black population in Bantustans

	1960	1970	1980
Total South African population	11 506 900	15 468 100	20 971 800
Black population in Bantustans	4 440 200	7 481 900	11 055 600
As % of total South African population	38.5%	48.3%	52.7%

Source: Simkins (1983)

However, this state of affairs would not hold. As the demand for labour increased, the apartheid state had to reconsider its stance on urban black people and influx control. Civic

[5] The homelands or Bantustans were established by the apartheid governmentto accommodate the majority of black people who were denied the opportunity of living in the urban areas of South Africa. The homelands or Bantustans were a major administrative strategy or mechanism for the removal of black people from the South African political system using many policies and laws that apartheid created. The idea was to separate black people from white people, and give black people the responsibility of running their own independent governments. This strategy denied the majority of black people the protection and rights a black person could have and enjoy in South Africa. In other words, homelands or Bantustans were established for the removal of the black people in white South Africa.

(community groups) opposition to these policies mounted. The struggle against the apartheid system accelerated from 1973 and the Soweto uprisings in 1976 revived resistance towards forced removals, racial separation, low wages and unequal services (Mabin 2020). Subsequently, this opened space for other new role players to contribute to urban housing. The Anglo American Corporation formed the Urban Foundation in 1977 to improve the quality of life in black townships following the Soweto uprising in 1976 (Gilbert 2002). The Urban Foundation was a non-profit organisation funded by the private sector. Its mandate included shaping legislation on urbanisation, housing financing and production strategies. The Urban Foundation sought peaceful structural change within the apartheid state housing framework and promoted black homeownership schemes. The foundation hoped that such reforms would bring stability to the townships (Urban Foundation 1990). Black homeownership had to produce political stability among the black middle-class because of a free-market ideology. Homeownership would help to resist militant tendencies (Bond 2000). Furthermore, the Urban Foundation's role aligned with the apartheid state's desire to shift black housing provisions to the private sector.

The foundation influenced the government to rethink the 99-year leasehold scheme. They proposed self-help housing based on full land ownership (Urban Foundation 1987). The foundation's self-help idea entailed the prospective homeowner assuming the responsibility of managing the construction of his own low-cost home. These Urban Foundation initiatives would influence new post-apartheid housing development later.

4.3.1 Decline of apartheid: 1980–1989

By the early 1980s, the urban and housing policies of the apartheid state had come under pressure (Bernstein 1992). The apartheid state started to initiate slow reform. For example, the erosion of the Group Areas Act was noticeable by the mid-1970s. Experiencing pressure from chronic housing and land shortages, residents started to occupy white group areas on a large scale, making eviction unfeasible (Mabin 1992). Attempts to forcibly remove and resettle communities had drawn local and international criticism, so the apartheid state became reluctant to evict people (Swilling, Humphries and Shubane 1991).

Black local authorities

Resistance made the apartheid state acknowledge the inevitability of black urbanisation. At the same time, this period saw the relaxation of apartheid segregation (Royston 2002). Consequently, the government implemented the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 (Oldfield and Zweig 2010). The black local authorities system sought "autonomy over time" for African local authorities (Evans 1988:52). Accordingly, the local authorities became responsible for administering housing. However, the new system reinforced the racially segregated local government system (Evans 1988). The black local authorities had significant formal municipal powers and were responsible for some of the most unpopular actions. These unpopular activities included the collection of rent, increased rental charges, the eviction of defaulters, and the allocation of houses (Muller and van Rooyen 1994). Allocating these responsibilities to an official of the black local authorities deflected the blame for controversial government policies away from the central state (Shubane 1991). The black local authorities maintained a narrow and exclusionary definition of "legal" residents. This included back people qualifying under Section 10(1) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act to live in the city. It excluded thousands of "illegal" residents. Further, the black local authorities favoured permanent township dwellers' interests over people's interest in backyard shacks, hostels and informal settlements (Mayekiso 1996). As Todes and Walker (1991) argue, the notion of qualified access to housing stratified urban black Africans into the "haves" and the "have-nots" and entrenched artificial divisions between "insiders" and "outsiders".

Consequently, the black local authorities became the target of community resistance. Housing was one of the causes of the apartheid state's downfall because of the organised rent boycotts and widespread civil unrest.

Role of the private sector

In response to the reigning state of anarchy (civil unrest), a Government Circular Minute No.1 of 1983 supported a more significant private sector role in low-income housing delivery and government facilitated community self-help initiatives (Lombard 1996:16). In contrast to earlier policy, the government created favourable conditions for the private sector's participation (Ruggunan 2016). Private sector involvement meant mortgage access for

township dwellers for the first time. However, there were unintended consequences such as increased social stratification. Primarily, this saw small, middle and upper-income groups or elite residential areas developing adjacent to the squalor of the older townships. Later this created a "Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY) phenomenon in which communities expressed concern about the change in the neighbourhood, that ranged from the presumed characteristics of newcomers in the area to concerns over neighbourhood impacts like traffic and building form (Affordability and Choice Today 2009). Furthermore, Hendler (1989) found that as the private sector increased the number of houses, the number of people able to afford them decreased. Lemon (1991:22) comments that the apartheid state felt content withdrawing from directly supplying black housing in the 1980s to concentrating on the supply of bulk infrastructure and land, leaving low-cost housing to the private sector. New areas that began as site-and-service schemes expanded rapidly (Harber 2011). Meanwhile, informal practices like "backyard rental" grew (Gilbert, Mabin, McCarthy and Watson 1996).

As many households in state-owned housing stopped paying their monthly rent in the mid-1980s, the state initiated a process to sell the approximately 500 000 state-owned rental houses as part of the Big Sale (Emdon 1993). The state hoped to stimulate the emergence of a black housing market. This homeownership initiative had to stabilise townships (Mabin and Parnell 1983). The offer had both coercive and attractive elements to it. On the one hand, blacks who did not buy faced steep rent increases. On the other hand, those interested were offered houses below the building cost. Sales were slow due to lack of loan finance, black households' low incomes, opposition from township political groups and tardiness in surveying sites (Hardie and Hart 1986:17–20). The sale of rental stock to promote ownership would continue under the discount benefit scheme in the 1990s. Today most houses have been transferred to individuals.

By the mid-1980s, pressure mounted on the apartheid state to relax influx control. This pressure resulted in removing racial restrictions on residential location, fast-tracking site-and-services schemes and introducing the notion of orderly urbanisation (Tomlinson 1998). Orderly urbanisation meant the urbanisation process would be planned, directed and controlled. There would be incentives and restrictive measures comprising legislation and ordinances (South Africa 1986:71).

The Housing Act of 1920 accomplished a housing subsidy that lasted over a century in South Africa (Mabin 2020). As the apartheid state policies and legislation succumbed to civic pressure from the mid-1970s, they relaxed influx control measures and promoted homeownership through, among other things, the Big Sale. Simultaneously, the private sector assumed a more significant role in housing development, contributing to societal stabilisation. Furthermore, the Urban Foundation's mooted self-help scheme showed more significant household involvement. The stabilisation notion saw the private sector domination in housing delivery.

4.3.2 Neo-apartheid: 1990–1993

The origins of South Africa's new housing policy since 1994 is a prominent topic in academic literature (Huchzermeyer 2001a; Marais and Krige 1999; Tomlinson 1998). At the same time, there was a process to developing policy and many factors influenced the new South African housing policy.

4.3.2.1 De Loor Commission

In 1990, the apartheid state established the South African Housing Advisory Council under Dr J.H. de Loor. The council had to advise, review existing housing policies and formulate a national housing policy (Lombard 1996). The process resulted in the De Loor Report in 1992 (Gilbert 2002; Prinsloo 1995). The De Loor Commission established several departure points for subsequent policy development: (i) the state is responsible for the achievement of housing goals and not the private sector, (ii) increase of government spending on housing services to at least 4.8% of GDP, (iii) establishment of a single national housing authority responsible for policy, strategy and monitoring activities (iv) establishment of a National Finance Corporation responsible for allocating funding, (v) once-off capital subsidy allocation to the lowest income level groups to provide security of tenure and essential services (Institute of Housing of Southern Africa 1992:2).

The 1992 De Loor Report promoted the delivery of low-cost sites, home-ownership and self-help initiatives (South Africa Housing Advisory Council [SAHAC] 1992). The De Loor Report proposed four categories of assistance to beneficiaries on a sliding scale depending on household income levels. The scheme started with providing a site with basic services and

alternatives, increasing income levels linked to decreasing subsidy amounts. The housing assistance package anticipated that the private sector developers would respond to market demand (Lombard 1996). The Housing Finance Corporation was essential in implementing the housing assistance policy proposals. Their primary function was to issue securities and provide collateral warranties. They would facilitate or provide loans for the development of bulk infrastructure or serviced sites and land acquisition. Financial support was available for technical assistance to beneficiaries, project preparation, upgrading of informal settlements and urban renewal (SAHAC 1992:346–347). In line with the World Bank's thinking, the De Loor Commission argued that allocation decisions and production should be left to market forces while the state plays an enabling role (World Bank 1993b; Lombard 1996). The commission argued that to bring this about, the housing sector should be merged into the market economy through increased spending, thus facilitating change in demand and leading to a redistribution of income that would stimulate growth and job creation (SAHAC 1992:33–34).

4.3.2.2 Independent Development Trust

The South African government established the Independent Development Trust (IDT) in 1990. The IDT was established as an independent grant-making trust to manage and disburse state-allocated funds and assume a broader, community-based public character (Robinson, Sullivan and Lund 1994). Additional aims included working for cities and towns' political, economic and social re-integration. It normalised settlement patterns and created economically and socially viable, positive living environments (Khan 2010; Nuttall 1997). The IDT launched its capital subsidy scheme in 1990. The independent status of the IDT was necessary because the apartheid state had limited legitimacy in the black communities. The IDT’s once-off subsidy of R7 500 was a significant change in solving the housing problem. They introduced a subsidy for the lower end of the market, a greater emphasis on community involvement, only sites and services (initially), and a focus on ongoing development and homeownership. This subsidy was only available to households with a monthly income of less than R1 000 (Marais 1994). The IDT’s vision was to provide the basic services to many households and make them affordable for the end-beneficiary by subsidising the services (Charlton 2006; Swilling 1998). For example, in 1990, the Urban Foundation’s Informal

Settlements Division, the City of Durban and the IDT implemented the first large scale *in situ* upgrading of the Bester's Camp project with the IDT providing a flat-rate state capital subsidy (Adler and Oloefse 1996). The upgrading project delivered infrastructure (site and services) and freehold tenure (ownership) to 6 500 households between 1990 and 1995. The infrastructure consisted of communal water standpipes, electricity connection to each site, ventilated improved pit latrine toilets, gravel roads and footpaths (Charlton 2006). Between 1990 and 1994, the IDT delivered standardised serviced sites to about 100 000 households (Huchzermeyer 2001a; Khan and Thurman 2001).

An important consideration within the IDT was the regional allocation of funds. In contrast to housing finance under apartheid planning, the IDT located most projects in South African urban areas. Only ten of 107 projects were in former homeland areas (Palmer Development Group 2000). Projects in the Free State were in Bloemfontein (as opposed to Botshabelo), Bethlehem (as opposed to QwaQwa), Welkom, Sasolburg and Ladybrand (Marais 2003). However, the IDT's approach did not escape criticism. For example, (i) the IDT was not providing houses, (ii) there was private sector dominance in the projects, (iii) a lack of or low community participation in specific projects, (iv) a lack of flexibility regarding the end-product, (v) the programme provided toilets in the veld, and (vi) community leaders viewed site-and-service as a sub-standard form of housing delivery that should not take place in a post-apartheid era (Bond 2000; Gusler 2000). Despite these criticisms, the targeted subsidy of the IDT reached many poor households. The IDT's approach provided the baseline infrastructure for future housing delivery in post-apartheid South Africa (Marais 2003).

4.3.2.3 National Housing Forum

The National Housing Forum (NHF) originated from consultative processes in the 1990s. In June 1991, the Consultative Business Movement hosted the National Development Workshop to address post-apartheid housing in South Africa (Rust 1996). In August 1991, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the IDT brought together several relevant organisations to address the violence and under-development of the country's migrant labour hostels and crowded peri-urban dormitories (Rust 1996:6). These consultative processes led to the launch of the NHF on 31 August 1992 with a mandate "to negotiate policies and initiatives to help redress historical imbalances and meet future needs for shelter" (Mackay

1996:135). Consequently, the NHF brought together a wide range of actors and institutions to develop a post-apartheid housing policy (Lalloo 1999; Mackay 1996; Tomlinson 1998).

However, the balance of power within the NHF "favoured the business interests which generally acted in concert with the state and parastatal institutions" (Lalloo 1999:38–39). Nine of the 16 founding members of the forum were busines representatives or were pro-business. This dominance by business meant the business-friendly approaches dominated the new housing policy (Huchzermeyer and Karam 2016). Furthermore, the NHF used expertise from various actors and institutions and operated in an environment (already) invested with views emanating from the 1990 De Loor Commission. Some commission members became members of the NHF, creating a basis for the continuity of ideas in the new housing policy. Matthew Nell was a "member of the De Loor Task Team" (Rust, 1997:90) and "a former employee of the UF" (Gilbert 2002:1923). Rust (1997) lists Nell as the chairperson of the NHF's coordinating committee. Furthermore, Nell "appointed the majority of technical experts" from the ranks of the Urban Foundation at the NHF (Gilbert 2002:1923) who controlled and dominated most of the proceedings (Bond 2000:133 and 247) to the dismay of the civil society (Ntlonti 1997:17). Although the apartheid state was reluctant to co-operate, interpersonal relationships developed between representatives of different institutions instrumental in the development of the housing policy (Rust 1996).

In this context, the NHF had to resolve: (i) the sector's bloated institutional framework as it impeded resolving the country's housing crisis and needed reform, (ii) the apartheid state subsidy policy, and (iii) an issue of a single, non-racial housing ministry with regional jurisdictions across the country (Gusler 2000). The Housing Arrangements Act of 1993 created a single, non-racial National Housing Board with provincial boards (Jenkins 1999). The NHF agreed to the targeted capital subsidy scheme (Adler and Oelofse 1996). The primary debate was about the subsidy amount, the type of subsidy, and the end-product (Marais 2003). Initially, some representatives argued for a subsidy in the vicinity of R30 000 and the provision of rental accommodation and rental subsidies. Some construction businesses supported rental accommodation, reducing their risk because the state would act like developers. At the same time, these debates took place against the background of what was affordable regarding the country's fiscal realities (Tomlinson 1998). It then became apparent

that rental accommodation or a subsidy of R30 000 would not reach enough people. The target of one million houses meant that the subsidy had to be kept small (Marais 2003).

Finally, the NHF determined the subsidy amount considering the housing allocation in the South African national budget. The NHF assumed that this allocation would rise from 1.8% in 1992 to 5% by 1999. The De Loor Commission had earlier advocated increased government spending on housing to 4.8% of the gross domestic product. The available resources released over five years by such an assumption were divided by one million. Consequently, it would be possible to provide one million houses during the first five years with a subsidy of R12 500 (for households earning less than R800 per month). Households with an income of more than R800 per month would receive a smaller subsidy. The end-product envisaged from a subsidy amount of R12 500 would be a serviced site, a rudimentary housing structure or a flat, the *in situ* upgrading of a settlement and a title deed (Tomlinson 1998).

Adler and Oelofse (1996) and Tomlinson (1998) argue that the housing policy represented an incremental approach and that the policy is a victory for the width-over-depth (more-for-less). However, this policy decision of width-over-depth would become a significant bone of contention. Although the NHF acknowledged the impact of apartheid on South Africa's urban settlements (Abrahams and Rantete 1996), it did not provide future regional investment guidelines. For example, there were no guidelines for dealing with the ex-homeland and the different categories of former white urban settlements. Admittedly, it was vague rural housing proposals (Rubenstein, Otten and Dolny 1996). The NHF shifted the focus of subsidies to lower-income people. The importance of budgetary constraints in determining the subsidy's size reflects the World Bank's neoliberal approach to housing policy development.

Therefore, the NHF package that guided the new housing policy contained: (i) a sliding scale capital subsidy, (ii) the provision of a serviced site, though the subsidy was available for alternative rental or purchase options associated with. and (iii) secure tenure (ownership) (National Housing Forum [NHF] 1994a). A home loan was advised as a supplement to buying a home.

4.3.2.4 Civic contribution to the new housing policy debates

During the transition period (1990–1993), the civic movement contributed to the housing debate. The concerns of the civic movement include a lack of housing, high rental tariffs, illegitimate local government structures and the deterioration of economic conditions (Maseko 1997). The Mass Democratic Movement viewed housing as a basic human right, reiterating the 1986 White Paper on Urbanisation (Gusler 2000). The Mass Democratic Movement advocated for the democratisation and a redistributive approach in the housing policy within which the state build the houses (Cross 1995; Gilbert 2002). In this sense, the approach of the Mass Democratic Movement resembled the spatial Keynesianism paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s. After 1990, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) contributed to public policies, including those on the development and the reform of the local government and advocated establishing genuine local governments accountable to the people. SANCO negotiated local government reform through the Local Government Negotiating Forum in 1993, which led to the Local Government Transition Act in 1994 (SANCO 1994).

Lastly, the South African Homeless People's Federation formed in 1994, believed that the urban poor could solve their homelessness and pressured the government to support participatory approaches (Bolnick 1996). Working with the People's Dialogue NGO, the South African Homeless People's Federation had a network of grassroots organisations (some 250 community groups that had built connections over time) to address the needs and development of the poor living in informal settlements. Self-help played a crucial role in the movement's development approach (Parnell and Hart 1999), and the NHF agreed that serviced land is essential for poor households (Lombard 1996; NHF 1994b).

4.3.2.5 Reconstruction and Development Programme

Concurrently with the NHF process, the African National Congress (ANC) developed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as its policy guideline. The RDP resulted from a consultation process with people at the grassroots level from the late 1980s (Leroke 1996) and stressed a people-driven development approach (ANC 1994). After its release, the RDP developed into ANC's formal policy programme setting out the broad transformation vision with targets (ANC 1994; Turok 1995). The RDP document mentions the concept of subsidies, but apart from stating one million houses within five years targeted

at the poor, it is vague (Marais 2003; Van Zyl 1994). Furthermore, the RDP proposed that "sufficient affordable rental housing stock should be provided to low-income earners who choose this option" (ANC 1994:24). In contrast to the findings and proposals of the NHF and IDT practice, the RDP had a vision of a standardised house (Marais 2003). Tomlinson (1998:139) articulates the emphasis on a standardised house in the following words: "In line with its view that 'housing is a right', the ANC in its RDP describes a minimum housing standard – not simply a serviced site – and proposes that the cost of such a housing option would be borne through a government subsidy, blended with a loan from private sector resources vis-à-vis (to be established) national housing bank". Van Zyl (1994) argued that the RDP envisaged basic needs were much higher than the Basic Needs Approach.

Additionally, there seemed to be a conflict between the RDP and NHF as the RDP used low-income people's needs as its point of departure. Simultaneously, the NHF stipulated the actual amount of money available (Marais 2003). This inherent conflict between the need on the one side and the available resources on the other remains a bone of contention. Consequently, SANCO, in anticipating the conflict between needs and resources, wrote: "The biggest challenge facing us as an organisation is to ensure that the government implements the RDP. This will not make us popular with our comrades in government as they have limited means to address unlimited needs. Be that as it may, we must influence government budgets in this direction" (SANCO, quoted in Seekings 1997:24–25).

4.4 Post-apartheid policy (1994–)

In April 1994, the Government of National Unity came into power and implemented the NHF housing policy proposals. This section focuses on these proposals that triggered a South African housing policy and practice change.

4.4.1 Initial ideological changes

The late Mr Joe Slovo, a former South African Communist Party leader, was appointed National Minister of Housing. Slovo had not been part of the NHF, but his Director-General, Mr Billy Cobbett, was a member. Marais (2003) argues that Slovo's non-participation at the NHF and his socialist background were reasons to expect conflict between him and the policy

proposals of the NHF. Slovo's initial comments reflected this conflict. He emphasised that the majority of South Africans (estimated at approximately 70%) were poor (earned R0–R1 500 per month) and had no hope of securing credit to supplement their subsidies (NHF 1994b). To meet this need, Slovo announced changes to the policy framework negotiated at the NHF and raised the subsidy amount from R12 500 (suggested by the NHF) to R15 000 for the lowest income category (NHF 1994b; Lombard 1996). These changes had extra financial implications. They negatively affected the one million target in five years.

4.4.2 Botshabelo Housing Summit

The minister's initial changes at the NHF plenary in August 1994 developed further at the Botshabelo Housing Summit in October 1994. For the first time, a South African democratic government outlined and debated its overall housing policy proposals (The Sunday Times Newspaper 1995 as cited in Lombard 1996). The object was to finalise the Housing Accord as a prelude to releasing a Housing White Paper. Representatives decided to increase housing's share of the total state budget to 5%. The overall delivery goal was to a peak housing delivery at 350 000 units per year within five years to reach the government target of one million houses (South Africa. Department of Housing [DoH] 1994a; Marais 2003). The Botshabelo Accord committed housing stakeholders to incrementalism and a mortgage indemnity scheme to safeguard commercial banks, establish a national housing finance corporation and land release programme for housing (The Weekly Mail and Guardian 1994 as cited in Lombard 1996). This commitment is carried from previous interactions as the De Loor Report (1992) had advised establishing a national finance corporation responsible for the optimal allocation of available funding. The NHF proposed a mortgage indemnity scheme to encourage commercial banks or formal sector financial institutions to lend to lower-income groups.

4.4.3 Housing White Paper

The Housing White Paper (HWP), published in 1994, confirmed the government's pledge to expand the end-user capital subsidy scheme (DoH 1994b; South Africa 1994). The HWP made available six mechanisms: project linked, individual, institutional, consolidation, discount benefit scheme and hostel upgrading programme. The HWP represents the housing

policy of the post-apartheid government, although rooted in the NHF. The HWP reflects the priorities of the current government, forms the basis for basic needs and corrects the principles in the Constitution (1996)[6] and the Housing Act (1997)[7] and is considerate of resource constraints (Nattrass 1994). The HWP states the following national housing vision: "Government strives for the establishment of viable, socially, and economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational, and social amenities, within which all of South Africa's people will have access on a progressive basis, to:

- a permanent residential structure with secure tenure[8], ensuring privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and
- portable water, adequate sanitary facilities, including waste disposal and domestic electricity supply" (DoH 1994b:19).

The HWP proposed increasing housing's share of the total government budget to 5% and increasing housing delivery sustainably to a peak level of 338 000 units per year within five years, and reaching the target of one million houses in five years (period beginning 1994). The targeted capital subsidy scheme remained the tool and the path to achieving this goal. This once-off state capital subsidy scheme is managed through the National Housing Subsidy System on a sliding scale depending on household income (Charlton and Kihato 2006). The subsidy comprised the provision of a free-standing housing unit provided free of charge on an ownership basis. The project linked subsidies and individual subsidies were the most popular[9].

The subsidy scheme was consistent with the initial intention of a starter house (basically a site-and-services) model with a house added on top (Charlton and Kihato 2006; Tomlinson 1998). The emphasis on the fiscal realities in the HWP differed from the RDP focus (Marais 2003; DoH 1994b). The HWP admits that the housing environment is as essential as the house

[6] Neither, Schedule 4B or 5B of the Constitution of the RSA (1996) include housing as a local government matter. Yet, municipalities could assume that role, through the principle of devolution. While the Constitution of the RSA (1996) does not directly allocate the housing function to local government ; it provides a clear route for municipalities to take on this responsibility through the principle of devolution.
[7] The Housing Act is the supreme housing law in South Africa. It replaces all previous housing legislation, and it clarifies the different roles and responsibilities of the three spheres of government in respect of housing.
[8] The national government has passed several laws to give effect to security of tenure: The Extension of Security and Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the Rental Housing Act 50 (1999), and the Prevention of Illegal Evictions Act 19 (1998) were created to provide security of tenure and to uphold Section 26(3) of the Constitution.
[9] Up to the end of March 2004, a total number of 3 726 projects had been approved in terms of the various housing subsidy instruments. Of this total, 81% is project-linked subsidy projects, with 7% individual and 4.5% institutional housing subsidy projects (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2006).

itself in satisfying the occupant's needs and requirements. In this sense, the HWP defines housing as "a variety of processes through which habitable, stable, and sustainable public and private residential environments are created for viable households and communities" (DoH 1994b:18–19). For the first time in South African housing policy development, the concepts sustainable and housing environment reflect the international emphasis on sustainable development. Also, the RDP (a policy aimed at providing poor communities with houses and basic services like potable water and sanitation on an equitable basis) became the first step toward the sustainable development of low-income housing (Gardner 2003). These policy frameworks (HWP and RDP) echo the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987:43), which defines sustainable development as "Development which meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Table 4.2 provides the initial subsidy bands per income group (DoH 1994b).

Table 4.2: Initial subsidy amounts per income group and policy width over depth

Joint spouse monthly income (Rands)	Subsidy (Rands)	% of households	Approximate no. of households
0–800	15 000	39.70%	3.30 m
801–1 500	12 500	29.00%	2.41 m
1 501–2 500	9 500	11.80%	0.98 m
2 501–3 500	5 000	5.60%	0.46 m
>3 500	0	13.9%	8.30 m

Source: DoH (1994b); Trusler (2009); Marais (2003)

Adjustable by 15% (based on area, not project), at the sole discretion of the provincial housing development board, for topographical, locational and geotechnical reasons. On the 1 April 1998, the two income brackets [R0–R800 and R801–R1 500] merged resulting in R15 000 housing subsidy available to households with a joint income of R1 500 or less monthly. Simultaneously, the housing subsidy was increased by R1 000 per each category from March 1999.

Table 4.2 shows that the first two subsidy bands would reach the largest number of households. However, various tensions developed. Marais (2003) and Tomlinson (1998) list aspects of these tensions which correspond with interdependency in the evolutionary governance theory:

- The first conflict was about the subsidy's size. The newly elected Members of Executive Councils in the provinces raised questions (Mackay 1996). They argued that the RDP promised the electorate proper houses and that the subsidy of R15 000 would not offer a proper house. This conflict undermined the consensus reached by the NHF.

- A related conflict developed about the norms and standards. The minimum housing setting contrasted the initial HWP, with no norms and standards. The Free State Province challenged the national policy and had a different standard of 40 m² set and dominance.

- Bureaucratic logjams arose from the institutional restructuring processes in the mid-1990s. These institutional restructuring processes resulted in severe capacity problems in local and provincial government offices.

Furthermore, the HWP underwent three critical shifts since its adoption in 1994:

- Initially, the shift from **quantity to quality**: The one million houses dominated the housing programme within five years. At the same time, the quality of these houses became an issue that challenged the original goal (DoH 1996; 2000). The Housing Act of 1997 introduced minimum norms and standards restricting the housing subsidy portion spent on land and services[10]. Second, the government extended the National Home Builders Registration Council brief to include all houses in 2002[11].

- In April 2002, the **beneficiary responsibility** was that the households that did not wish to help build their homes contributed R2 479[12]. The beneficiaries had to contribute "sweat equity" or their labour (DoH 2002).

- **Interpretations of secure tenure:** The "participants in the NHF, and after that, departmental officials, interpreted the goal of 'secure tenure' (captured in HWP of

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[10] In April 2002: Subsidy amount raised from R16 000–R20 300. Expenditure on servicing remained 46%, with R9 400 allowed, and R10 900 + R2479 for top structure.

[11] Formerly, the NHBRC's brief was limited to ensuring that houses costing between R20 000 and R250 000 were covered by the warranty.

[12] The extent to which the housing subsidy has given rise to a sense of entitlement has always been a concern to the government and its critics. On the one hand, those eligible for the subsidy were obviously entitled to state support for something they had previously been denied. On the other, international standards and best practice (Gilbert 2002) suggested that the success of a capital subsidy depended on some form of personal investment.

> 1994) as a reference to ownership" (Rust 2003:15). Some analysts have argued the emphasis on ownership has been one-sided (Gilbert et al. 1996; Morange 2002). Notwithstanding the mention in the HWP of alternative forms of tenure and the need for choice, rental and cooperative tenure have been consistently de-emphasised by policy (Rust 2003). Therefore, the DoH's acknowledgement of rental as a primary tenure option was an important policy shift.

Consequently, the targeted capital subsidy scheme was labelled unresponsive to variations in demands. These demands changed because of the changing nature of households due to urbanisation and the impact of HIV/AIDS (Tomlinson 1999). This was because households sold their housing units for cash, rented them out, or occupied them like dormitories with little or no sense of ownership and commitment towards improving them or building a community. Simultaneously, the political pressure to achieve the numerical target of one million subsidised houses in the first five years (initially outlined in the RDP) perpetuated urban sprawl (Mbambo 2018; Pieterse 2004). The houses targeted serviced sites, primarily provided through the IDT programme at the periphery of towns and cities, reinforcing apartheid spatial planning. The focus on the numerical targets remained central to policy and practice for a long time.

4.4.4 Breaking New Ground

The national subsidy programme's implementation reached one million in seven years (Shisaka Development Management Services 2011). From 2001, the delivery of subsidy units shifted from private sector delivery to the public sector with an expanded role for local government. Initially, provincial governments and municipalities took the responsibility for structuring projects and appointing small scale builders to implement them (Shisaka Development Management Services 2011).

Many researchers have criticised post-apartheid housing policy and practice through the capital housing subsidy (such as Bond and Tait 1997; Charlton and Kihato 2006; Huchzermeyer and Karam 2016). The geographical location of most of the house was on the periphery of existing townships on land first acquired and zoned for township development under apartheid (Charlton and Kihato 2006). Furthermore, perpetual spatial segregation,

urban sprawl and marginalisation of the poor drew concern (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions [COHRE] 2008). Responding to these implementation difficulties and criticisms, the Department of Housing (DoH) revised its policy. It developed "A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements", referred to as Breaking New Ground (BNG), in 2004. BNG sought to redevelop the housing policy and instruments more effectively (Ehebrecht 2014). The BNG restates the DoH's vision as being "to promote the achievement of a non-racial, integrated society through the development of sustainable human settlements and quality housing" (DoH 2004:7).

However, there have been debates about whether the new plan departed from previous policy directions and whether the instruments mooted in the plan can deliver sustainable settlements (Napier 2005). Foremost, BNG comprised a significant paradigm shift in housing delivery. It required structuring projects, emphasising location, proximity to amenities, and comprehensive access to infrastructure services and socio-economic facilities. Furthermore, housing projects must accommodate households with different incomes and offer a range of housing products. Tomlinson (2005; 2006) believes BNG represents a shift from breadth to depth and quantity to quality. These aspects of BNG described significant shifts in the programme. Further changes in BNG instruments include:

- There was a shift from houses to sustainable human settlements. The DoH (2004:12) states that "well-managed entities in which economic growth and social development balance the carrying capacity of the natural systems on which they depend for their existence and result in sustainable development, wealth creation, poverty alleviation and equity."
- BNG calls for greater cooperation and coordination between spheres of government to achieve improved efficiency and efficacy in housing delivery (moving beyond providing basic shelter to achieving sustainable settlements) (Ehebrecht 2014; Napier 2005).
- Introducing a phased development regime to housing projects (IRDP), thus providing the basis for long-term consolidation (of housing and livelihoods) and restructuring. Integration and spatial restructuring are critical to sustainable human settlements "utilising housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human

settlements, in support of spatial restructuring" (DoH 2004:7). There is an institutional dimension as integration is both intra-governmental (within a sphere of government) and inter-governmental, requiring integrated planning and coordinated investment.

- Municipalities are conceded a more critical role through "overall responsibility for housing programmes in their areas of jurisdiction, [and] through a greater devolution of responsibility and resources" (DoH 2004:21).
- Renewing the focus on partnerships and placing communities at the centre of development processes.
- Enhancing the participation of NGOs in support of communities, the private sector (for example, the financial sector and the large construction groups which had withdrawn from the state-assisted housing sector due to low-profit margins), all in partnership with the public sector to fast-track housing delivery at scale (Napier 2005).
- Housing assets: BNG introduced the subsidy house as an asset for the first time. It states that in "ensuring property can be accessed by all as an asset for wealth creation and empowerment" and supporting the functioning of the entire residential property market to reduce duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the first economy residential property boom and the second economy slump (DoH 2004:7−10). The emphasis on mechanisms that address the needs of low-income (no income) households shifted to include an additional area of activity around interventions at the higher end of the market (Napier 2005).
- The BNG houses are bigger (40 m^2) and better, have two bedrooms with better finishes, and more flexible design options. However, as this "minimises the need for immediate improvements and extensions, it might affect self-help incremental housing consolidation and might decrease incentives for individual household investments" (Adebayo 2011:11–12).
- Upgraded informal settlements: BNG recognised the need to upgrade informal settlements for the first time post-apartheid policy. The BNG calls for the eradication of informal settlements and urban inclusion: "informal settlements must urgently be integrated into the broader urban fabric to overcome spatial, social and economic exclusion" (DoH 2004:12).

- Scaling up the social housing programme, such that the programme's importance to upgrade and integrate city development is recognised. The BNG sees this form of tenure as enhancing "the mobility of people and promoting an integrated society" (DoH 2004:18).

Furthermore, BNG calls for the transfer of state land and land owned by parastatal institutions to municipalities at no costs, a new funding mechanism to finance land acquisition and a new strategy to acquire privately-owned land (DoH 2004; Pithouse 2009). Figure 4.2 summarises the policy change and the BNG objectives.



Source: Napier (2005)

Figure 4.2: Summary of critical objectives of the BNG

Figure 4.2 groups the BNG policy objectives in social, economic, spatial or environmental influences. BNG completed moving from developer-driven delivery to municipal delivery and placed a substantially increased emphasis on the state's role (DoH 2004). Regarding the IRDP, BNG shifted the requirement from delivering houses to integrating integrated human settlements. Initially, municipalities and provinces had difficulty interpreting and understanding how to implement the policy. Sustainable human settlements emphasise the socioeconomic integration of housing. In February 2009, the government published the revised housing code and set out the underlying policy principles, guidelines, norms and standards applicable to housing programmes. The code shifted government policy away from

municipal driven subsidy projects. The revised housing code introduced the IRDP to replace the project linked subsidy programme (South Africa. Department of Human Settlements [DoHS] 2009; Tissington 2011). Moreover, the BNG re-introduced the Enhanced People's Housing Process, a self-help housing scheme from the early 1990s. The Community Residential Units Programme replaced the National Hostel Redevelopment Programme and targeted low-income households and individuals earning between R800 and R3 500 per month. The BNG and the National Development Plan- (National Planning Commission 2012, Chapter 8) are similar in spatial restructuring measures and the National Development Plan does not record any significant policy changes. Figure 4.3 provides an overview of the South African housing policy changes between 1994 and 2019.



Source: Huchzermeyer and Karam (2016)

Figure 4.3: An overview of South African policy development timelines 1994–2019

Figure 4.3 outlines the South African housing policy changes and the new direction towards developing sustainable human settlements, reflective of evolutionary governance. Table 4.3 provides the South African housing policy changes before and after 1994.

Table 4.3: South African housing policy changes before and after 1994

Housing component versus era	Before 1994				After 1994	
	1910–1947	**1948–1979**	**1980–1989**	**1990–1993**	**1994–2004**	**Post-2004**
	Colonial	**Apartheid**	**Decline of apartheid**	**Neo-apartheid**	**New policy direction**	**New housing vision**
Policy	Racial and spatial segregation. Separate development	Racial and spatial segregation. Separate development	White Paper on Urbanisation (1986). Orderly urbanisation. Racial and spatial segregation remained	Framing response to racial and spatial fragmentation: De Loor, IDT, NHF and RDP	Creating unified housing markets: HWP; RDP and National Norms and Standards, 1999 (National Housing Code, 2000, revised in 2009)	BNG: spatial integration, sustainability, efficient and balanced integrated urban settlements. The concurrence of NDP with BNG on spatial restructuring
Legislation	Natives Land Act of 1913	Housing Amendment Acts of 1948 & 1949	Black Local Authorities Act of 1982	Housing Arrangement Act of 1993	RSA Constitution of 1996	Social Housing Act of 2008 Housing Development Agency Act of 2008
	Housing Act of 1920	Population Registration Act of 1950	RSA Constitution Act of 1983	RSA Interim Constitution of 1993	Housing Act of 1997 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE Act)	
	Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923	Group Areas Act of 1950	Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986			
	Colour Bar Act of 1926	Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951				

	Native Administration Act of 1927	Native Urban Areas Amendment Act of 1952			Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (amended by Act 43 of 2007)	
	Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937	Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953				
	Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945	Housing Amendment Acts of 1957, 1966 & 1978				
Implementation (programme)	Racially segregated housing programme for the poor whites segment of the population. Garden city principles as well as self-help schemes.	Racially segregated housing programme for the poor is sustained. Forced eviction and relocation to townships or homelands. Garden city principles, site and services programme as well as self-help schemes	Site and services programme as well as self-help schemes	Self-help and assisted self-help schemes, in situ upgrading, site and services	Self-help and helped self-help schemes, informal settlement eradication, location and services, a portion of a single house.	Self-help and assisted self-help schemes, Upgrading Informal Settlements Programme (UISP), site and services, in situ upgrading.
					Project-linked Subsidy Programme	Integrated Residential Development Programme (IRDP)
					Consolidation subsidy	Enhanced People's Housing Process (EPHP)
					The People's Housing Process	Social Housing Programme (SHRA 2008)
					Discount Benefit Scheme	

					Institutional Housing Subsidy Programme (IHSP)	
					Hostel upgrading programme	
Local government perspective & reality	Racial and spatial segregation. Centralised government. Local government is a segregation tool and disempowered (with no financial resources to solve the housing problem). White municipalities established segregated locations for Africans. And used as the central state's local agents.	Racial and spatial segregation. Centralised government. Local government is a segregation tool and disempowered (with no financial resources to solve the housing problem).	Racial and spatial segregation. Centralised government, but local authorities became responsible for administering housing under their control but did not lay down any specific regulations, collected rent and conduct evictions. The local government continued as a disempowered, discredited and targeted segregation tool.	Dysfunctional localities. Institutional and Local government reforms. They are dismantling racial and spatial segregation.	Institutional reforms and establishment of genuine local government. Dismantling of racial segregation. Decentralised governance system.	Integration and sustainable cities. Mixed-use approaches and partnerships.
					Unintended consequences of subsidy scheme: fragmented spatial environment impacting service delivery.	Decentralised governance with an emphasis on the role of local government through accreditation and assignment of housing functions.
					The connection between spatial and social integration is not realised in cities.	Citizen participation and accountability are encouraged.

Source: Author (2020)

4.5 Evolutionary governance theory and housing policy in South Africa

The post-apartheid housing policy has path, goal and interdependencies cutting across the different periods of policy evolution. Grindle (2005) says the South African housing policy represents configurations of interests, institutions, actors and legacies. The pre-democratic period created dependencies. Below, I discuss two dominant path dependencies: goal dependency and interdependencies. Most literature focuses on path dependencies and ignores the other two.

First, colonial and apartheid housing policies created racially segregated cities. South Africa's first national public housing finance scheme passed into law, sustained racial preferences. For example, the Housing Act of 1920 provided loans of public money to construct dwellings for the poor whites segment (South Africa 1920). The enacting of the Group Areas Act in 1950 further reinforced racial segregation. Post-apartheid housing policy found it extremely difficult to break from segregation. Prioritising poor people meant that housing delivery focused on or near former black township areas. Berrisford (2011:248) notes that "The same laws used to implement apartheid's grand plan of segregation and inequality remain the tools used by planners across the country to determine…land development projects". Despite policy intention, the contrary, the inability to break with the spatial patterns of apartheid (or colonial planning framework) is an example of path dependency.

The second path dependency stems from the NHF favouring the capital subsidy programme. The capital subsidy originates from World Bank policies and the Urban Foundation applied it in the trial of projects in the mid-1980s. The De Loor Report proposed a capital subsidy while forming the IDT site and services schemes (1992–1994). The capital subsidy has remained the cornerstone of post-apartheid policy since 1994 (Table 4.4).

The individual title is the third path dependency in policy and originates from thinking in the mid-1980s when the apartheid government disbanded its rental housing policy. Today, the model of a single household with a detached house on an individual plot in a planned township still constituted the main housing delivery model. This continuity between the old and new orders centred on ownership confirms the path dependency of the new housing policy.

Another example is incremental self-building methods. Although on a limited scale, the colonial and apartheid governments had already used incremental self-building methods. For example, the early site and service scheme addressing the housing needs of 10 000 people in Soweto was tested in the post-war years and other similar self-building initiatives followed in the decades after that (Ehebrecht 2014). In the 1980s, other housing projects were initiated, for example, in Khayelitsha township (Cape Town). Based on these experiences, IDT initiated another pilot scheme during the transitional phase in 1991, which "provided 100 000 serviced sites for incremental self-building and was based on a capital subsidy scheme. These experimentations influenced the approach adopted in the post-apartheid era" (Adebayo 2010:2–3; 2011:5).

The one million target for the first five years set in 1994 is an example of goal dependency. The target was in response to dealing with the urban crises created under apartheid. Despite good policy intentions, the focus on this goal meant that most government-built houses since 1994 or large-scale housing developments through ownership-intensive capital housing subsidies are on the periphery of existing townships. These developments are on sites and services, or land first acquired or zoned for township development under apartheid or located adjacent to or beyond the existing townships (Charlton and Kihato 2006; Harrison, Huchzermeyer and Mayekiso 2003; Khan and Thring 2003). The numerical value undermined the governance network approach emphasising that policy and public services' outcomes are consequences of many actors and institutions (Agranov and McGuire 2003; Mandell 2001).

Healthy co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations have proven essential for housing delivery. Although housing is a concurrent function of national and provincial governments, the delivery happens at the local government level. However, local governments have little financial resources to solve the housing problem (Hargreaves, Hearn and Little 1985). The provincial government depends on the national state to provide funding relief for housing and this is reflective of interdependency among the spheres of government. The government has stalled the implementation of the provisions in the Constitution (1996) and the Housing Act (1997) for the devolution of housing powers and functions to local government and the allocation of the associated funding.

The three spheres of government failed to work together. In this sense, interdependence represents rigidity in the governance path and the powerlessness of local government in this situation. So, the

national government's monitoring role (of local government performance against housing delivery goals) and the provincial support to municipalities in their duties regarding housing development has meant governance viability hinges on cooperation across the spheres and between the actors and institutions involved.

Second, although housing delivery requires a network of interdependent actors, they may choose strategies and interventions based on their perceptions of the world and subsequently have different views on problems and solutions (Schön and Rein 1994). The evidence points to a dysfunctional cooperative government system, intergovernmental relations and power play. Consequently, community protests and conflicts affect the local government sphere. Usually, dysfunctional municipalities[13] are placed under administration and this implies that the level of trust and cooperation among actors and institutions (citizens and local government) fades, and public accountability to carry out specific tasks is negatively affected.

Table 4.4 compares various elements of housing policy and dependencies.

[13] A municipality that is unable to deliver on its mandate is referred to as dysfunctional. In his 2018 budget statement, the former Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Zweli Mkhize described a "well-functioning municipality" as one characterised by stability, a functional council and oversight structures, with consistent spending of the capital budget, unqualified audit outcomes and good financial management (Mkhize 2018).

Table 4.4: Comparison of various elements of housing policy and dependencies

Housing policy element	Before 1994			After 1994		Reflections on dependencies
	Before 1948	1948–1989	1990–1993	1994–2004	Post–2004	
Segregation	Segregation legislated: segregated cities and neighbourhoods.	Segregation legislated: Segregated cities and neighbourhoods.	Abolition of segregation laws. Segregated cities and neighbourhoods persist.	Integration legislated: Segregated cities and neighbourhoods persist	Integration legislated: Segregated cities and neighbourhoods persist.	Path
Location of shelter and form (density)	Low density shelters located mainly on the outskirts of towns and cities.	Low densities shelter located mainly on the outskirts of towns and cities.	Low-density settlements. Extensions of existing townships and perpetuation of peripheral settlement.	A mixture of well and poorly located settlements on the outskirts of towns and cities. Low to medium densities emerge.	A mixture of well and poorly located settlements on the outskirts of towns and cities. Low, medium, to high densities, emerge.	Path and goal
Movement restrictions	Influx control	Influx control tightening, relaxation (orderly urbanisation) and repeal.	Free movement of people between rural and urban areas.	Free movement of people between rural and urban areas	Free movement of people between rural and urban areas.	Goal: undo apartheid
Sites and services	Poor whites housing with sites and basic services. Backyards with services.	Site and services in Bantustans.	Standardised serviced sites mainly in fast urbanising towns and cities.	'Starter house' and standardised serviced sites. A beneficiary can expand over time on serviced land.	It phased development (based on the sites and services model) to housing projects that provide the basis for consolidation.	Path
Subsidy type or availability	Generic housing subsidy availed to the poor whites	Housing subsidy system for public sector rental as well as site and services.	Once-off capital subsidy is available: IDT: Project for new site and services. NHF: Project-linked, institutional, informal settlement upgrade, site and services, in situ upgrading, a portion of a house.	Once-off targeted capital subsidy is available. Various subsidy instruments are in place: Project-linked, institutional, individual, consolidation, PHP. Discount benefit scheme.	Once-off capital subsidy targeting poor people available: IRDP, institutional, PHP, individual, consolidation, relocation assistance. Informal settlement upgrade.	Path
Tenure	Combination of two systems: a loan farm system and free-market principles.	30-year leasehold in 1955. And a 99-year leasehold after 1976. Ownership in the late 1980s.	IDT: Freehold (Individual ownership). NHF: Freehold (Individual ownership)	Freehold (Individual ownership) as well as rental.	Freehold (Individual ownership) as well as rental.	Path
Role of the private sector	Housing finance and development.	Private sector housing production and housing finances.	Housing finance and development.	Housing finance and development. Private sector developer-driven delivery (1995- ± 2001)	Housing finance and private sector participation in partnerships.	Path
Role of the national government	Limited role in low-income housing but housing for state-employed railway workers. Later in 1923 state set aside regulated housing stock for blacks. Forceful removals persisted.	The mass roll-out of public housing in peripheral township areas by the state. Removal of informal settlements. Site-and-service schemes by the government. Role of facilitator.	Public finance (subsidy) for sites and services. Facilitator of state site-and-service schemes.	Public housing finance using the subsidy providing site and services. Public sector driven delivery (2001–2004). Eradication of informal settlements.	Public housing finance. Delivery of mega-projects of which the subsidised housing is one component. Upgrading of informal settlements.	Path and interdependence
Mode of housing delivery	Private sector	Public or private sector	The private sector for IDT. NHF used: developers, utility companies, CBOs, NGOs, provincial and local governments	The private sector dominates housing delivery (1995–2001). The public sector dominates delivery (2001–2004)	The private sector in partnership to deliver human settlements. Both the public and the private sectors are critical in delivering mixed houses.	Path and interdependence
Role of local government	Local government (LG) has no financial resources to solve the housing problem. LG depends on the national state to provide funding for housing.	LG has no financial resources to solve the housing problem. LG depends on the national state to provide funding for housing	LG has no financial resources to solve the housing problem. LG depends on the national state to provide funding for housing.	LG has no financial resources to solve the housing problem. LG depends on the national state to provide funding for housing or devolution the housing function.	LG has no financial resources to solve the housing problem. LG depends on the national state to provide funding for housing or devolution the housing function.	Interdependence
	Accountable to the national state.	Accountable to the national state. Targeted for the failure to deliver housing services.	Transitional period. Discredited for service delivery failures and undergoing transformation.	Equal sphere of government at the coalface of housing services delivery and community protests (conflict).	Equal sphere of government at the coalface of housing services delivery and community protests (conflict)	Interdependence

Source: Author (2020)

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the South African housing policy changes since the early 1900s. In the 20th century, racial segregation became prominent and continued during apartheid. Most urban studies research focuses on the unique situation apartheid created, especially in the social, political and economic sectors.

This chapter assessed the historical literature on housing policy development and associated urban struggles due to the apartheid capitalist state's discriminatory policies. The housing policy has path, goal, and interdependent examples in the quest to understand the housing situation. A critical juncture has been the Urban Foundation's approach to housing in the mid-1980s, implemented at scale by the IDT through the path-dependent capital subsidy, producing low-density and undifferentiated free-standing houses. The models espoused in earlier policy thinking of single household, detached dwelling units situated on their plot with full freehold tenure are implicit in the post-apartheid policy. More importantly, although housing policy changes later provided for integration, failure to address community integration is rooted in policy dependencies. The one million target for the first five years set in 1994 is an example of policy goal dependency. It is noteworthy that ongoing pressures to fast-track housing delivery, originating from the goal dependent one million houses reinforced peripheral housing developments, sacrificing the people's housing process and community participation in the housing delivery process (DoHS 2019a; Landman and Napier 2010). Another consequence of target chasing or numerical value has been the fading of the private-public partnership spirit of the Botshabelo Accord.

However, essential post-apartheid policy shifts did take place. The shifts from quantity to quality and houses to sustainable human settlements were critical. Furthermore, the private sector's role in providing housing for lower and middle-income families diminished over the years (the public sector becoming dominant). The relationship with the construction industry became more contractor based and less partnership-oriented. The chapter demonstrated that spatial challenges persist in localities despite firmer policy instruments to address integrated settlements.

The next chapters probe the spatial location of housing projects and human settlements sustainability since the introduction of the housing policy post-1994. Housing subsidies and the project-linked subsidy programme discussions in Chapter 5 are essential as they dominate

informal settlement upgrading initiatives and constrain the achievement of sustainable urbanisation and integration in Mangaung. Therefore, the chapters on housing subsidies and housing governance, informal settlements upgrading and IRDP are interlinked and depict change towards achieving sustainable human settlements and improved communities' quality of life. The chapters also analyse how dependencies and power relations play in the local government housing governance agenda.

CHAPTER 5
HOUSING SUBSIDIES AND HOUSING GOVERNANCE IN MANGAUNG

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 discussed the South African housing policy development within a decentralised governance system. Section 156(4) of the South African Constitution (1996) and subsequent legislation (for example, the Housing Act 1997 and Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000) set out the framework for housing governance and decentralisation. However, the 1994 HWP (Chapter 4) paid little attention to local government participation in housing, resulting in private sector developers dominating initial housing delivery (Khan and Ambert 2003)[14]. Although housing delivery occurs locally, housing policy and implementation depend on the provincial and national levels. Chapter 4 examined these interdependencies among spheres of government for housing delivery. This chapter analyses housing delivery using the housing subsidy programme in Mangaung from 1994 to 2020.

Following housing policy dependencies discussed in Chapter 4, this chapter shows how these dependencies affect housing delivery and governance in the local government sphere. The chapter focuses on the project-linked subsidies[15] in Mangaung and distinguishes three phases of housing delivery: Phase 1 (1994–2003), Phase 2 (2004–2014) and Phase 3 (since 2015). Before discussing the delivery of project linked subsidies using the different phases above, I provide an overview of the legal obligation of housing from the local government sphere. A detailed analysis of housing delivery in Mangaung then follows under the headings: Funding municipal housing projects; Systemic issues with projects standards, infrastructure and processes and co-operative governance failures (Figure 5.1).

[14] Chapter 4 discussed fragmentation and racial segregation at local government level extensively. This crisis at local government led to the national reform process which took place in the Local Government Negotiating Forum in 1990. These debates framed the Local Government Transition Act of 1993. This Act fell short of providing a blueprint for a new local government system, it did sketch a process for change and a base for the White Paper on Local Government: 9 March 1998.

[15] I acknowledge that housing delivery has also taken place through other subsidy programmes. However, in this chapter I am concerned only with the project-linked subsidy, as it contributed about 55% of investment in Mangaung (Table 5.2).



Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of Chapter 5

5.2 Local government's obligation for housing delivery

Section 153 of the Constitution (1996) and other local government legislative frameworks (for example the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 2000) give municipalities the planning authority and an obligation to participate in national housing programmes and implementation (South Africa 1996a; 2000). Neither schedule 4B nor 5B of the Constitution include housing as a function of local government. However, the Constitution provides a route for a municipality to pursue this function through devolution[16]. Section 154, read together with section 156 of the Constitution (1996), establishes the principle of devolution, requiring that "national and provincial governments support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their affairs" (s154). The national and provincial governments must assign municipality functions that would most effectively be administered locally if the municipality can (s156) (South Africa 1996). The Housing Act of 1997[17] (HA) sets the framework for the administration of the national housing programmes and describes the roles and responsibilities of each sphere of government. A critical feature in the HA is the principle of devolution, promoted in the Constitution. Notably, the HA stipulates that municipalities prepare Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and take reasonable steps within the housing legislative framework to ensure that inhabitants of their areas of jurisdiction access adequate housing (South Africa 1997).

[16] The Accreditation Framework of 2012 (revised in 2017) outlines the process municipalities must follow to take on housing responsibilities. The devolution process starts with the delegation of certain clearly defined housing functions for the administration of national housing programmes, leading to the assignment of all the housing functions by formal proclamation in the Government Gazette by the Premier.

[17] Although the legislative framework for the assignment of municipalities to administer national housing programmes on behalf of provinces has its roots in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, national has passed other legislations which provide for the devolution (decentralisation) of power; namely; The Municipal Systems Act, 2000, the, the Finance and Fiscal Commissions Act, 1997, Housing Act, 1997, the Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 and the Inter-Governmental Relations Framework Act, 2005.

5.2.1 Integrated Development Plan

The Local Government Transition Act, the Second Amendment Act of 1996, introduced the IDP to assist local authorities' transformation and fulfil the RDP objectives (Harrison 2001; South Africa 1996b). However, there was little clarity about the IDP contents and the Local Government Transition Act and Second Amendment Act of 1996 did not provide guidance. With the passing of the Municipal Systems Act (2000), the role of local government in planning is entrenched. For the first time, the Municipal Systems Act included a chapter that dealt with the IDP and provided statutory regulation regarding the principles that should guide the IDP process and minimum content (South Africa 2000). However, it is only since 2002 that municipalities have completed an IDP compelled by the Municipal Systems Act. Municipalities are required to produce five-year IDPs, updated annually to:

- provide a long-term vision for the development of a locality;
- strengthen democracy through citizen participation in the planning process;
- promote coordination between the local, provincial and national governments;
- align the human and financial resources of the municipality with strategies; and
- allocate resources to political priorities through annual and medium-term budgeting processes.

IDPs are critical to human settlement planning and serve to institutionalise the type of multi-sectoral thinking and planning necessary to deliver human settlements (South African Cities Network [SACN] 2014a). IDPs receive funding through the municipal budget, which receives national and provincial transfers, municipal own funding and borrowing. Therefore, the IDP is the primary planning instrument that guides alignment between the sectors and spheres of government. In addition, it serves as a mechanism for prioritising projects, as the budget must be aligned to the IDP and the Housing Sector Plan (HSP) (Ambert 2004; South Africa 2001).

5.2.2 Housing Sector Plan

The HA (1997) provides that housing planning must be part of the IDP process. The BNG (2004) notes that municipalities must include their HSPs in their IDPs and integrate their human settlements programmes and projects within their three-year capital investment plan, as required by the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003. The BNG also recognises that municipalities will require institutional reform and capacity building (Chapter 4). The

inclusion of the HSP as part of the IDP is a critical shift for housing governance. It places local government at the forefront of governing housing delivery (DoHS 2019b).

The HSP strengthens participatory democracy in housing delivery and the housing code prescribes the contents of the HSP. The HSP must ensure that basic services are provided to residents, set housing targets, identify land for housing, enable conducive environment for housing development, plan and coordinate land and housing development (DoHS 2009).

Figure 5.2 outlines the five critical phases of the HSP:



Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007a)

Figure 5.2: The five critical phases of the HSP

- Phase 1 entails the assessment of the existing housing demand, details on priority issues, problems and their causes, as well as available resources.
- Phase 2 strategises ways of achieving the priorities identified in the first phase.
- Phase 3 involves project negotiation (project design, location, services and facilities and beneficiaries) and conditions.
- The alignment of project proposals with the priorities, objectives and strategies constitute Phase 4. In essence, this phase consolidates the first three phases into a draft HSP document.

- Phase 5 provides the community and stakeholders with an opportunity to engage with the draft document and make comments or propose adjustments before Council approval.

The HSP details how the municipality will implement housing programmes within the IDP (Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality [MMM] 2003:12). Once the local municipality approves the HSP, it hands it over to the provincial IDP office to be rolled into the provincial plan to achieve alignment (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b).

Figure 5.3 provides these critical linkages between municipal IDP, the HSP and provincial plans.



Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007a)

Figure 5.3: Linkages between municipal IDP, the HSP and provincial housing plans

Figure 5.3 explains two critical issues in housing delivery: municipal housing projects and priorities (originating from the community) inform provincial annual and multi-year plans, and the alignment is vital as it conveys housing planning and development (governance) requires cooperation and cordial inter-governmental relations between the three spheres of government. So, through the HSP, the municipality must take the lead in housing delivery (DoHS 2019b). Most key informants reiterated this relationship. For example, a local government interviewee says that "the HSP is a deadlock-breaking tool ensuring human settlements projects and programmes can be implemented based on resources". Another said the "HSP identifies the

poorest areas and those without services and consequently prioritises municipal spending". The general feeling is that housing governance efficacy implies prioritising the community's needs and the HSP is a vital tool.

Yet, several public sector respondents criticised the IDP process. For example, a provincial respondent feels “In theory, the IDP is an important document reflecting bottom-up planning and consultation on the development. However, in practice, it is often a compliance exercise, exclusionary and inaccessible to most poor communities". There is inadequate attendance at IDP meetings and limited public participation. A local government IDP officer states that “ward consultative meetings for identification and prioritisation of community needs are often violent, thus affect free and fair public participation in the IDP processes”.

5.3 Funding municipal housing projects

Mangaung funds planning and housing projects through municipal revenue, unconditional grants and conditional grants. The Division of Revenue Act[18] accompanies the national budget and sets the framework for financial arrangements and equitable division of revenue raised nationally for all spheres of government (DoHS 2019b). The equitable share assists municipalities with the delivery of basic services and the Human Settlements Development Grant (HSDG)[19] funds the human settlements programmes (including project-linked subsidies) at the municipality (South African Local Government Association [SALGA] 2017). Once the Free State provincial government has allocated subsidies to the municipality, the municipality allocates to various housing projects. Table 5.1 shows funds allocated to housing subsidy programmes in Mangaung between 1994 and 2020.

[18] The Division of Revenue Act sets the distribution of state funds to provinces and localities annually and provides allocations certainty to municipalities for multi-year budget planning
[19] Schedule 5 grant, funding the implementation of the national housing programmes in the municipality (including the project-linked subsidies) through the provincial Department of Human Settlements. Unless the housing function is fully assigned to a municipality, the province controls the HSDG disbursements.

Table 5.1: Funds for housing subsidy programmes in Mangaung, 1994–2020[20]

Housing subsidy programmes	Amount at the time of investment (ZAR)	Percentage at time of investment	Investment at 2020 value	Percentage at 2020 value*
Project-linked	2 075 833 367	50.2	3 292 407 590	55.0
IRDP	982 807 575	23.7	1 171 130 180	19.6
Community residential units	500 473 015	12.1	664 449 692	11.1
Institutional subsidy	266 283 647	6.4	368 653 179	6.2
Project-linked – essential services	139 539 860	3.4	187 921 671	3.1
Project-linked – People's Housing Process	64 104 705	1.5	117 006 492	2.0
Rectification programme	61 728 004	1.5	81 200 715	1.4
Consolidation subsidy	29 892 250	0.7	71 083 771	1.2
Individual subsidy	6 666 773	0.2	11 481 494	0.2
Discount benefit scheme	2 952 982	0.1	7 211 545	0.1
Relocation assistance	4 456 937	0.1	6 680 949	0.1
Rural housing programme	3 406 476	0.1	4 915 546	0.1
Financed linked individual subsidy programme	148 800	0.004	166 656	0.003
Total	4,138,294,391	100.0	5,984,309,479	100.0

Source: DoHS (2020)

(*The annual national inflation percentages are used to obtain 2020 values. The percentages change because the inflation rate changes from year to year)

Most notably, Table 5.1 shows that in the 2020 values, the various housing subsidy programmes invested nearly R6billion in Mangaung from 1994 to 2020. The municipality is estimated to have contributed an additional R1.3billion in 2020 values to this amount through infrastructure investments (more details below). Investment in project-linked subsidies is the largest at 55% of this value. However, Mangaung realised the emphasis on project-linked subsidies meant the continuation of spatial segregation (Chapter 4) and fewer informal settlement upgrading initiatives (Chapter 6). This startling reality prompted the review of the *status quo* and the IRDP. While the IRDP replaced the project-linked subsidies in 2009, Mangaung did not use them before 2011. This continued use of project subsidies deviated from BNG's focus on sustainable human settlements rather than housing. There seem to be different reflections from interviewees on the delay in introducing the IRDP. Respondents from the municipality submit two reasons: being used to the project-linked system and the unsuitability of the IRDP for smaller infill projects within existing urban areas like Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. The challenge with the IRDP implementation is to achieve integration obligatory for

[20] Mangaung Local Municipality was established in 2001 and became metropolitan municipality in 2011 by incorporating Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. In 2016, Naledi (Dewetsdorp, Van Stadensrus and Wepener) and Soutpan were added to the metro. The figures in Tables 5.2 include allocations to these areas before 2016.

this programme (Chapter 7). Table 5.2 provides an overview of housing delivery in Mangaung for project-linked subsidies.

Table 5.2: Number of project-linked subsidised houses in Mangaung: 1994–2020[21]

Year	Bloemfontein	Botshabelo	Thaba Nchu	Dewetsdorp/ Soutpan/ Van Stadensrus/ Wepener	Mangaung total	Free State allocation	Mangaung as % of Free State allocation
Phase 1: 1994–2003	**18 066**	**3 468**	**3 081**	**993**	**25 608**		
1994–2003 % (2016 boundaries)	70.5	13.5	12.0	3.9	100.0	**89 135**	**28.7**
1994–2003 % (2001 boundaries)	73.4	14.1	12.5	n.a.	100		27.6
Phase 2: 2004-2013	**11 454**	**8 080**	**5187**	**2 475**	**27 196**		
2004–2013 % (2016 boundaries)	42.1	29.7	19.1	9.1	100.0	**104 009**	**26.1**
2004–2013 % (2001 boundaries)	46.3	32.7	21.0	n.a.	100		23.8
Phase 3: 2014–2020	**360**	**0**	**0**	**219**	**579**		
2014–2020 % (2016 boundaries)	62.2	0	0	37.8		**10701**	**5.4**
2014–2020 % (2001 boundaries)	100	0	0	n.a.	100		3.4
Total	**29 880**	**11 548**	**8 268**	**3 687**	**53 383**		
Total % (2016 boundaries)	56.0	21.6	15.5	6.9	100.0	**203 845**	**26.2**
Total % (2001 boundaries)	59.8	23.4	16.8	n.a.	100		24.4

Source: DoHS (2020)

Table 5.2 shows that Mangaung delivered over 53 000 houses (26% of the project-linked subsidised houses in the Free State) between 1994 and 2020. The most significant number of houses was delivered during phase 1 and accounted for 25 608 housing units, with Bloemfontein receiving 72%, Botshabelo 14% and Thaba Nchu 12% of the total. The subsidy allocation used the 60:20:20 policy between the regions (Mangaung Local Municipality 2003a). This regional subsidy allocation policy did not please the councillors from Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. The number of councillors from Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu in the ANC

[21] Mangaung Local Municipality was established in 2001 and became a metropolitan municipality in 2011 by combining Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. In 2016, Naledi (Dewetsdorp, Van Stadensrus and Wepener) and Soutpan were added to Mangaung. Figures in Tables 5.3 include allocations to these areas before 2016.

caucus is powerful. In 2004, a new council decision set this ratio at 50:25:25 (Mangaung Local Municipality 2004). This policy change benefited Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu during phase 2 when their housing delivery increased to 31% for Botshabelo and 20% for Thaba Nchu, respectively (Table 5.2).

Although phase 2 delivered more housing units at 27 196, it accounted for 26.1% of the Free State allocation, which is les than the 28.7% in the first phase. The decrease in percentage from 28.7% to 26.1% is because the provincial allocation increased substantially, from 89 135 housing units to 104 009 units during phases 1 and 2. Phase 3 delivered at least 579 housing units with no housing allocations in Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. It is noteworthy that across the phases (using 2001 municipal boundaries), Bloemfontein received 60% of the total housing units, followed by Botshabelo at 23% and Thaba Nchu at 17%. The delivery of these houses helped reduce the number of people living in informal housing between 1996 and 2011 from 36 000 to 33 000 (Statistics South Africa 2013). As a result, the percentage of households in informal housing dropped from 23% to 14%. Mangaung's share of the provincial allocation declined over the three phases, from 28.7% to 26.1% to 5.4%.

5.4 Systemic issues with projects standards, infrastructure and processes

Chapter 4 discussed the path-dependent capital subsidy programme. The small subsidy size enabled the government to reach more people (breadth) rather than providing bigger houses for fewer people (depth)[22]. This initial consensus at the NHF was not long-lived, as some newly elected provincial government Members of the Executive Council (MECs) challenged it. For example, the Free State Province deviated from national guidelines and stipulated a minimum housing size of 40 m² (Marais and Krige 2000)[23]. The minimum housing size in the Free State initially went unchallenged (1994–2000). Developers used the subsidy mainly for constructing the houses as serviced stands were available. With the establishment of the Mangaung Local Municipality in 2001, the municipality's housing department realised that this approach would make it difficult for the municipality to develop new serviced stands and recover some costs. After negotiations with the Free State Provincial Government in 2003, the Mangaung Council approved to recoup R4 per square metre for serviced stands. Amounting to R1 600 for a stand of 400 m², this represented only about 10% of the cost of a serviced stand in 2003. In contrast, the national guideline for infrastructure at the time was R13 000 per stand. However, if the

[22] This decision was effectively taken at the National Housing Forum (1992–1994), which developed a post-apartheid housing policy.
[23] According to the Mangaung HSP, most RDP houses provided under the government's new housing subsidy scheme from 1994 conform to the provincial policy of a minimum 40 m² house (Mangaung Local Municipality 2003a:19). The national government approved a minimum housing size of 30 m² only in 1999.

municipality did not recover its investments in serviced stands, it would eventually run out of serviced stands. The situation became worse in 2007 when the Free State Provincial Government enforced a flat rate of R1 500 per serviced stand in the municipality[24]. A local political respondent likened this provincial attitude to big brother syndrome intent on dictating the rules of the game. The introduction of Operation Hlasela[25] by the Free State Provincial Government in 2009 meant that Mangaung did not receive any funding for serviced stands. Consequently, the housing delivery became an unfunded mandate. The above situation had five main consequences in Mangaung[26] (Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5).

First, housing delivery was concentrated in areas where stands were available even with no services. Overall, the levels of infrastructure access were low. For example, in Bloemfontein, a comparison of the data for phases 1 and 2 shows that the situation deteriorated. In phase 1, 12% of the project parcels[27] had houses with no water available on the stand, and in phase 2, this increased to nearly 30%. Project parcels without electricity increased from 8% to 13%, and projects without sanitation increased from 46% to 48%. There was a slight improvement in the streets with complete services from phases 1 to 2. In phase 1 in Botshabelo, 99% of project parcels had access to electricity, which increased to 100% in phase 2. Also, houses with water available on the stand increased from 84% (phase 1) to 88% (phase 2). In Thaba Nchu, 76% of the project parcels had no sanitation in phase 1, which increased to 90% in phase 2. However, access to electricity was 100% in this region and 51% of the project parcels had water in the yard.

[24] The erven size varied from 350 m^2 to 600 m^2 in Mangaung. The bigger (erf) size meant lesser subsidy for the top structure with implications for the 40 m^2 house. A flat rate also minimised the administrative work as it is easy to calculate per stand

[25] Operation Hlasela was the provincial government's attempt to increase housing delivery in the Free State after 2009. But it is rife with allegations of corruption and non-delivery.

[26] The five main consequences in Mangaung violated provisions in the the IDP and the HSP (phases 1 and 2).

[27] In this table the term project parcels is used. The reason is that allocated projects had different locations or parcels. I analysed these elements or each of these different parcels within a project.

Table 5.3: Consequences in Mangaung: Bloemfontein

Infrastructure levels and location characteristics	Phase 1 (1994–2003)		Phase 2 (2004–2013)	
	N	%	N	%
Electricity available	84	92.3	105	86.8
Electricity not available	7	7.7	16	13.2
Electricity total	***91***	***100***	***121***	***100***
Water: Full	36	39.6	43	35.5
Water: Basic	44	48.4	42	34.7
Water: None	11	12.1	36	29.8
Water total	***91***	***100***	***121***	***100***
Sewer: Full	27	29.7	41	33.9
Sewer: Basic	22	24.2	22	18.2
Sewer: None	42	46.2	58	47.9
Sewer total	***91***	***100***	***121***	***100***
Streets: Full	1	1.1	5	4.1
Streets: Basic	90	98.9	116	95.9
Streets: None	0	0.0	0	0.0
Streets total	***91***	***100***	***121***	***100***
Infill / Buffer developments	27	29.7	31	25.6
Periphery	64	70.3	90	74.4
Location: Total	***91***	***100***	***121***	***100***

Source: DoHS (2020); Author

Table 5.4: Consequences in Mangaung: Botshabelo

Infrastructure levels and location characteristics	Phase 1 (1994–2003)		Phase 2 (2004–2013)	
	N	%	N	%
Electricity available	86	98.8	97	100
Electricity not available	1	1.1	0	0
Electricity total	***87***	***100***	***97***	***100***
Water: Full	73	83.9	85	87.6
Water: Basic	14	16.1	12	12.4
Water: None	0	0	0	0
Water total	***87***	***100***	***97***	***100***
Sewer: Full	6	6.9	3	3.1
Sewer: Basic	81	93.1	94	96.9
Sewer: None	0	0	0	0
Sewer total	***87***	***100***	***97***	***100***
Streets: Full	0	0	0	0
Streets: Basic	87	100	97	100
Streets: None	0	0	0	0

Streets total	***87***	***100***	***97***	***100***
Infill / Buffer developments	24	27.6	21	21.6
Existing township	63	72.4	71	73.2
No township	0	0	5	5.2
Location: Total	***87***	***100***	***97***	***100***

Source: DoHS (2020); Author

Table 5.5: Consequences in Mangaung: ThabaNchu

Infrastructure levels and location characteristics	Phase 1 (1994-2003)		Phase 2 (2004-2013)	
	N	%	N	%
Electricity available	46	100	81	100
Electricity not available	0	0	0	0
Electricity total	***46***	***100***	***81***	***100***
Water: Full	36	78.3	41	50.6
Water: Basic	10	21.7	40	49.4
Water: None	0	0	0	0
Water total	***46***	***100***	***81***	***100***
Sewer: Full	6	13.0	4	4.9
Sewer: Basic	5	10.9	4	4.9
Sewer: None	35	76.1	73	90.1
Sewer total	***46***	***100***	***81***	***100***
Streets: Full	0	0	0	0
Streets: Basic	46	100	81	100
Streets: None	0	0	0	0
Streets total	***46***	***100***	***81***	***100***
Infill / Buffer developments	0	0	0	0
Existing township	46	100	60	74.1
Periphery (rural and no township)	0	0	21	25.9
Location: Total	***46***	***100***	***81***	***100***

Source: DoHS (2020); Author

Second, although ownership is the cornerstone of the capital subsidy, 5.2 % of the project parcels were constructed with no township register in Botshabelo during phase 2. This number is 26% in Thaba Nchu during the same phase. The 26% of project parcels were outside the urban edge (rural), where stands were available without the township register. The lack of township registers meant these properties were not registered at the deeds office and could not be classified as assets for wealth creation for people, conflicting with the BNG provision (Chapter 4).

Third, to get the largest possible amount that the project-linked subsidy programme could offer, developers focused on the lowest income households (because the subsidy was higher for them) (Mokoena and Marais 2008) and ensured their applications made provision for an additional 15% for geotechnical problems. One local political respondent stated that "focus on larger subsidy amount affected communities' equitable access to the subsidy programme and promoted housing 'sales' in my areas" as those who received houses could easily be lured into selling their houses (for economic reasons) to the better-off and return to informal settlements. Another political informant argued that "the focus on the lowest income households created inconsistencies and concentration of pockets of poverty in my ward". A municipal official insists that "neglecting other subsidy bands of the project-linked subsidy meant total dependence on the indigent grant, which has become difficult to administer". Figure 5.4 shows the average amount of the project-linked subsidies in Mangaung, 1994–2013.



* Some years are missing because there were no subsidy allocations to Mangaung for those years

Source: DoHS (2020)

Figure 5.4: Average amount of the project-linked subsidies used in Mangaung, 1994–2013

As serviced stands started to run out in Mangaung by 2004, there was a rapid increase in the amount allocated for project-linked subsidies to counter the problem of making stands available. Figure 5.5 illustrates the housing subsidy inflation and the consumer price index critical moments. Accordingly, in 2003, the national inflation equalled housing inflation. By 2004 and beyond, the inflation of project-linked subsidies for housing became higher than national inflation and increased faster. This increase in the subsidy amount was a national trend, but it was a way to obtain more money to help develop stands. But the growth of the subsidy beyond national inflation would not be viable in the longer term.



Source: DoHS (2020)

Figure 5.5: Housing subsidy inflation versus CPI

Furthermore, the focus on housing size in 1994 ultimately increased the number of projects on the periphery in Mangaung. As a deliberate political decision to increase the amount of money available per house, the minimum housing size did not consider location. However, Huchzermeyer (2001b) saw this trend primarily due to the inflexible capital subsidy entrenched in the project-linked subsidy. I think the emphasis on housing size played a role. Tables 5.3−5.5 divide the spatial characteristics of each housing project into three groups:

- infill (projects challenging the planning ideas of the Group Areas Act or located in former buffer strips),
- peripheral (located on the urban periphery), or
- outside the urban edge (going beyond the urban boundaries set in the official planning documents).

Only 30% of Bloemfontein-based project parcels from 1994 to 2003 were infill projects, whereas from 2004 to 2013, the percentage decreased to 26%. Most projects in Bloemfontein were on the periphery: 70% in phase 1 (1994–2003) and 74% in phase 2 (2004–2013). On the other hand, Botshabelo had 28% infill projects during phase 1 and 22% during phase 2. The majority of project parcels in Thaba Nchu took place in existing townships: 100% in phase 1 and about 74% in phase 2. About 26% of the project parcels exist outside the urban edge (periphery) on land commonly known as “Trust land” in rural Thaba Nchu.

5.4.1 Housing target

As discussed in Chapter 4, the HWP committed 5% of the national budget to housing delivery to develop one million houses in five years. The dependency on the numerical value warranted rapid delivery to ensure broad access to housing and relied predominantly on the project-linked subsidy. This supply-driven approach meant the private sector developers accessed these subsidies to develop serviced houses on freehold tenure sites. Although building one million houses through the subsidy instrument in the first five years of post-apartheid rule was a central feature of the housing policy, the government did not reach the target (the programme constructed about 700 000 houses). However, the overall nationally determined target or goal later dominated the municipality's implementation strategy. As the HSP identifies land for housing, one local government interviewee said that “the one million houses target has undermined the HSP intent on projects location” as houses were provided contrary to the HSP guidelines. Provincial governments, municipalities and developers were pressured to reach the one million mark. Although the target usually gets blamed for shoddy construction practices, there are other implications. The one million target meant housing is delivered as quickly as possible without regard for spatial restructuring (compaction, integration, efficiency) and equity. The Financial and Fiscal Commission (2012) found that municipalities followed a one size fits all approach despite substantial policy flexibility. In their desire to meet the target, implementers took the easiest route.

In Mangaung, new housing developments took place wherever stands were available to avoid the time-consuming nature of opening township registers. The subsidisation of infrastructure depleted Mangaung's land development fund. A critical local political respondent believes “the provincial minimum housing size policy, combined with the housing target, contributed to poor infrastructure standards in the municipality”. Another argues the two (provincial minimum housing size policy and the housing target) were “politically motivated and no sufficient time was allocated to scrutinise the long term implications” (for example, the quality of houses). The municipality has not received new subsidies since 2012/2013, especially in Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. Instead, the province prioritises and implements the rectification programme[28] to repair and rectify state subsidy houses’ structural defects. The rectification programme implementation framework proposes management at national and provincial levels (DoHS 2012b). About 10% of the province controlled HSDG funds for the rectification

[28] The intention of the national rectification programme is to correct the defects of the subsidy houses emanating from poor workmanship that does not meet the technical requirements specified by the National Home Builder Registration Council and the South African National Standards . Structural defects were observed on a number of subsidised low-income houses built between 1994 and 2010 and this situation necessitated the DoHS to implement the rectification programme post-2010.

programme. The decision to prioritise the rectification programme at the expense of the existing housing backlog of about 31 000 housing units in the municipality (the current housing backlog in the IDP, MMM 2017b) reflects power play interdependencies among spheres of government. Table 5.1 shows at 2020 value that the rectification housing programmes invested over R81 million in Mangaung from 1994 to 2020. This amount represents 1.4% of the municipality's total housing subsidy programme investment (Table 5.1).

5.5 Cooperative governance failures

Mangaung is expected to take the lead in determining housing needs and demand and negotiating the housing supply location to facilitate spatial restructuring. However, these ideals are difficult to attain without the contribution of other spheres of government. Chapter 3 referred to this as interdependency. In many cases, there is insufficient integration across spheres and a general inability to forge collaborative and workable partnerships or to find common ground for joint action. Mokoena (2005) and Mokoena and Marais (2007) reflect on some of these failures, which include:

- the unplanned (ad hoc) provincial allocation of housing subsidies stifles local governments' ability to plan long-term;
- the lack of appropriate mechanisms to negotiate subsidies and confusion over how to improve allocations;
- Mangaung's limited control over the appointment of developers; and
- The difficulty of mastering multi-year planning in housing development.

5.5.1 Problems with the assignment of housing function

The most critical feature of the assignment is that the national DoHS will transfer the HSDG directly to the assigned municipality instead of flowing to the provincial department and then being gazetted and transferred to the accredited municipality by the province. Mangaung wanted to undertake the housing function to circumvent the province's historically dominant role in housing delivery and the resulting intergovernmental relations failures. The issue is that accreditation is a recognised status of Mangaung by the MECs for Human Settlements. While the municipality has met specific criteria and standards, it requires additional capacity support before assuming full responsibilities to administer the housing function. To be accredited and

finally assigned the housing function, Mangaung must apply to the MEC, whom delegates any other national housing programmes after assessing and confirming capacity. Even though Mangaung was a priority municipality for accreditation (hired appropriate staff and put in place systems to take on the new responsibilities) and obtained levels 1 and 2 accreditation[29] on 19 April 2013[30], no MEC has yet approved Mangaung's delegation of housing functions. There are two challenges: a perceived lack of capacity at the local government level and a subtle disinclination of national and provincial governments to relinquish their powers and functions to local government (Sithole and Manthosi 2017).

Although the national DoHS wants to assign housing functions to local government, this does not always occur. For more than seven years (since 2013), the province has not committed to the accreditation process. The provincial government has not formalised delegations of housing functions associated with level 2 accreditation. The current institutional arrangement for the assignment of the housing function has three main problems. First, the HA (1997) gives powers to the MEC for Human Settlements, but the national government has no legal role in the accreditation process. This arrangement makes the MEC the referee and player in the accreditation process. Second, the assignment of the housing function is not in the HA (1997) but in the Constitution (1996) and the Municipal Systems Act. As one national respondent says, "excluding the assignment of the housing function in the Housing Act of 1997 rendered the assignment process deferrable". Third, the MEC determines if capacity is available or not at the municipality at the backdrop of parting with the power to disburse the HSDG. An informant from the legislature says, "with the bulk of the HSDG destined for projects in Mangaung, it is unlikely the MEC will easily give away the power to allocate subsidies", and this is the problem. In the current arrangement, MECs are not prioritising the accreditation process. Thus one national interviewee proposed the "revision of the legislative framework to relocate the assignment responsibility to national, in consultation with provinces and local government".

In conclusion, there is a consensus that assigning the housing function to the eight metros will mean that the bulk of the human settlements' functions will be centralised at the local level. This achievement will facilitate the integrated planning of ancillary municipal functions, like water, electricity and sanitation. In this regard, the devolution of the housing function will not

[29] Level Two accreditation allows municipalities to undertake Level One functions: namely, conduct "beneficiary management, subsidy budget planning and allocation, priority programme management and administration as well as evaluate and approve specific "housing projects against pre-determined project criteria", and undertake the "housing subsidy registration function for all national and provincial housing programmes" (DoHS 2012:15-16).

[30] Minister Tokyo Sexwale signed the accreditation certificates (levels 1 and 2) on the 10 April 2013 and the MEC (MS Mlamleli) on 19 April 2013.

only improve performance in the human settlements sector but will also contribute to improved management of urbanisation (Chapter 2) and the built environment.

5.6 Capacitation and accreditation funding commitment

The local government's capacity to work alongside and assist the other government spheres in housing delivery has become critical. Despite the allocation of competencies being distinct in specific spheres, judicial interpretation has imposed participatory functions, particularly housing delivery. One of the critical principles of the Accreditation Framework is funding certainty for accredited municipalities to implement national housing programmes (DoHS 2012a). The framework recognises that funds must follow function, meaning if the municipality is expected to carry out a housing function (for example project-linked subsidies) on behalf of the province, it must receive adequate funding. Despite Mangaung obtaining levels 1 and 2 accreditation and engaging with the province through accreditation implementation protocol, the province has not delegated housing functions to give the municipality the status to perform the role. Subsequently, the municipality has been unable to entirely spend capacity funding (operational) allocated for accreditation-linked activities because of uncertainties, continuous changes[31], no progress beyond level 2 and no advancement in the delegation of provincial functions to the municipality. This situation remains the same today. The Free State Province allocated operational funds to Mangaung from 2012/13 (the year the municipality received levels 1 and 2 accreditation) as follows:

- 2012/13: R3 million
- 2013/14: R5 million
- 2015/16: R3 million, and
- 2017/18: R2 million.

Mangaung received a R13 million conditional grant between 2012 and 2018 to develop capacity for the delegation of housing functions. Yet, the housing functions remained with the province. The municipality spent 57% of this allocation on capacity building to date and 43% is available to spend on accreditation-linked activities. As this is a conditional grant, the municipality can only use it on accreditation-related activities within the municipality. So, non-performance of the accreditation programme impacts the accreditation budget allocation.

[31] The original Framework for the Accreditation of Municipalities adopted in 1996 provided for three levels of delegation. It was revised in 2012 to separate the processes of accreditation and assignment. The Medium Term Strategy Framework Outcome 8 target called for 21 municipalities to be accredited at different levels and six metros to be assigned by 2014. In July 2014 HS MINMEC resolved and kept the process in abeyance. New national seamless phased approach towards assignment was developed, prioritised all eight metros and called for a shift to programme-based accreditation. The latest revised assignment framework for municipalities is dated March 2017.

There was no accreditation funding allocation in 2014/15 and 2016/17. According to the province, Mangaung's under-expenditure on previous years' allocations constitutes the reason for non-allocation. On the other hand, the municipality states it is primarily due to the "funds being disbursed towards the end of their financial year" (Mangaung cited in SALGA 2017:19). Also, the municipality mentions non-delegation of the housing functions as the reason. Notwithstanding these reasons, the accreditation process has come a long way and there is a lack of appetite on the part of the national government and the provinces to assign the housing function if this national department's Initial Implementation Plan Roll-Out commitment is anything to go by (Table 5.6):

Table 5.6: Initial implementation plan roll-out[32]: national and provincial commitment

Date	Activity	Stakeholders
24 October 2005	Work session	Provincial Housing Departments
27–28 October 2005	Work session	Heads: Provincial Housing Departments
14 November 2005	Work session	MINMEC[33]
November 2005	Work sessions	Municipalities
November–December 2005	Invite/facilitate accreditation applications from priority municipalities	Provincial Housing Departments
October 2005–February 2006	Negotiations: The development of Municipal Plans and the processing of accreditation applications	National and Provincial Housing Departments
30 March 2006	Level 1 accreditation	Priority municipalities

Source: DoH (2005)

The point made in Table 5.6 is that despite commitment for accreditation level 1 for Mangaung as a priority municipality, it was granted seven years later in 2013. The non-formalisation of delegated functions post-2013 has caused tension between Mangaung, the provincial and national governments because of repeated underspending and roll-over budgets. Key informants have various views. A provincial informant states, "the province stands to lose housing budget allocation authority if it gives housing responsibilities to Mangaung". Another provincial interviewee blamed the slow accreditation process on "personality clashes and political egos", sustaining the status quo of poor delivery of social (housing) services evident

[32] The author has been part of municipal accreditation process since 2005.
[33] MinMEC is a forum led by the national HS Minister and attended by the MECs responsible for the delivery agreement (HS) in their respective provinces and their Heads of Department.

through continuing community protests. On the other hand, a national respondent felt the problem “is the lack of legislation that forces the MEC to approve the accreditation process if conditions are fulfilled”. Finally, a legislature member identified two critical issues: first, there are “no consequences for failure to deliver accreditation”, and second, no “institutional rearrangement ever took place to position government for this inevitable change”. He also cited “housing leadership turn-over”, even if the same political party impacts the accreditation process. New officials do not necessarily submit to earlier agreements as nothing forces them to do so.

5.6.1 Problems with housing projects coordination

The IDP and the HSP enjoin Mangaung and the province to cooperate and align development plans to coordinate services for impact. As the 2007 Provincial Housing Lekgotla asserts: the “lack of cooperation” between these two spheres (own) affects housing delivery in Mangaung (Free State Department of Local Government and Housing 2007:6–7). Roles and responsibilities are deliberately blurred, as the province takes decisions that contradict the IDP, often without the municipality's consent. Mangaung experienced provincial decisions which contradicted local plans. For example, Operation Hlasela planned to demolish the old houses in the Batho location. In contrast, Mangaung HSP wanted to restore these units but had to accept the Free State Provincial Government's plan to rebuild or stand to lose the subsidy allocation.

In another example from Operation Hlasela, the provincial Department of the Premier in the Free State hired a contractor to demolish council-owned houses in Heidedal[34]. The demolition went ahead without council approval and demolition certificates from Mangaung. The municipality had to provide the demolition certificates retrospectively and find accommodation for the evicted people. The provincial attitude undermined cooperative government principles.

The appointment of developers and contractors by the Free State Provincial Government also created conflict. Provincially appointed small contractors delivered shoddy construction work in Mangaung during 2008/2009. The province carried out tender processes and appointed building contractors, leaving Mangaung little or no authority to engage these contractors when they underperform. Without the authority to intervene in under-performing projects,

[34] Heidedal is an apartheid created coloured suburb in the city of Bloemfontein.

Mangaung risks a backlash from the community for lack of and poor quality delivery. The provincial official interviewed insisted "there is political interference in the contractor appointments" and recent empirical evidence in the media. Reported cases involve the rigging of the tender process and collusion between construction firmsor contractors and administrators to inflate costs, thus rendering housing development slower. About 2 766 houses (paid under the project-linked subsidy programme as progress payment housing project) were incomplete or under construction in Mangaung during 2018/2019 (Housing Subsidy System [HSS] 2020). As Mangaung is dependent on accessing the funds for housing development, it had to deal with the complaints and after-effects. Moreover, local councillors are left to explain why housing delivery is not happening in their wards and do not have answers. Since most communities are unaware of where housing goods and services originate, they target local government when issues from housing developments arise. Across the spheres, informants agree that the lack of service delivery (including housing delivery) is the root cause of community protests in municipalities. A local political informant maintains that "poor housing delivery and corruption rank consistently as significant issues for protestors in Mangaung".

The demand for housing and the uncoordinated way of implementing housing projects affected cooperative governance, intergovernmental relations, and undue housing delivery pressure. Potentially, this level of interdependence represents the source of rigidity in the governance path. At one point in time, what is possible in governance hinges on the relationship(s) between the actors and institutions involved (Chapter 3).

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the governance of housing delivery in Mangaung from 1994 to 2020 within the cooperative government context. Partnerships between spheres of government, sector departments and line departments are crucial for housing governance efficacy. This chapter has shown that the provincial sphere shows little regard for the consequences of the decisions it takes for Mangaung and has no intention of developing a strong local government system.

For the local government to work alongside and assist the other government spheres in housing delivery, it needs capacitation (institutional or organisational strengthening). Although the local government may not be responsible for any service delivery bottlenecks or backlogs and the thwarted expectations of material betterment held in the community, it remains at the

forefront of service delivery. Yet, the municipality cannot quickly grasp and deliver on the evolving (changing concepts, relations and approaches) human settlements mandate. So, the municipality's institutional and human capacity building needs should be prioritised.

Although this chapter noted the desire to shift towards a supported and empowered local government to implement government housing programmes, the evidence demonstrated that the intent is challenged, as national and provincial governments are reluctant to devolve powers and functions to local government. Part of the reason is that dependencies frame the South African housing policy (Chapter 4). Also, the chapter has shown that embarking on project-linked subsidies has had long-term negative implications for Mangaung. Infrastructure standards declined, some houses were built where no township had been established, the housing subsidy inflation increased rapidly, more housing was built in peripheral locations, and ultimately the number of houses delivered in Mangaung decreased. Further, the interdependencies between the different government spheres have led to power play, with Mangaung unable to stand its ground. The prioritisation of the rectification programme at the expense of the housing backlog is one example of the municipality appearing powerless and at the receiving end. Furthermore, the chapter highlighted various examples where the Free State Provincial Government overturned decisions (cost recovery on stands services, accreditation, rebuilding houses in Batho, and demolishing council houses in Heidedal) or was unwilling to accept the proposals of Mangaung. Mangaung being so dependent on accessing the funds from the national government has had to compromise and this unfortunate situation has implications for the principle of cooperative government. Within this context, the Chapter 6 analyses informal settlement upgrading in Mangaung. The focus is on the Upgrading Informal Settlements Programme (UISP). The reason is that the housing subsidy has increased substantially and greater emphasis is placed on the UISP, providing serviced sites and community participation.

CHAPTER 6
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS UPGRADING

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter noted the limitations in informal settlement upgrading in Mangaung and South Africa. Harrison (1992) points to historical reasons for developing and destroying informal settlements (Chapter 4). However, informal settlements continue to develop (Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006), posing a challenge for the post-apartheid government (COHRE 2005). Huchzermeyer and Karam (2006:4) argue that "the need for illegal occupation of land and informal dwelling arrangements stems from a deep marginalisation and exclusion from formal access to land and development". Informal settlements reflect the plight of poor households expressed through the self-allocation of housing (Huchzermeyer 2004a; 2006). Although there have been exceptions, the apartheid government resisted the development of informal settlements (Chapter 4). This resistance often resulted in the demolition of informal settlements and forced removals (Platzky and Walker 1985).

Chapter 5 provided an overview of housing delivery in Mangaung and emphasised the various paths, goals and interdependencies. Housing standards set by the Free State Provincial Government had substantial implications for access to services and the location of projects. This chapter evaluates how the municipality managed informal settlements[35] between 1994 and 2020. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 alluded to how the path-dependence of capital subsidy focused on homeownership, limited community participation, discouraged informal settlements from upgrading and located projects on the urban periphery (Charlton 2006; Huchzermeyer 2004b; Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006). The question is how these factors played a role in Mangaung.

Although many case studies investigated informal settlement upgrading, few studies investigated how a local government has managed informal settlement upgrading over three decades. Against this background, this chapter assesses informal settlements upgrading in Mangaung between 1990 and 2020. I start by discussing the early interventions in informal settlements, 1990–2003, followed by a discussion of the attempt to eradicate informal settlements after 2004. In the next sections, I discuss the upgrading of informal settlements in

[35] In this chapter the term informal settlements is used interchangeably with slum. Many housing sector policy documents do use these terms interchangeably as well.

Mangaung, 1990–2020, and the dependencies in informal settlements upgrading conclude the chapter (Figure 6.1).



Figure 6.1: Schematic representation of Chapter 6

6.2 Early South African interventions in informal settlements: 1990–2003

Informal settlements became a reality in the early 1990s as people invaded open land (Botes, Krige and Wessels 1991; Marais 1994). The apartheid government was under pressure to respond to these land invasions. The first response toward informal settlement upgrading came through site and services in the mid-1980s. The Urban Foundation provided basic services (usually water standpipes and a pit latrine) and secure land tenure (Charlton 2006; Forster and Gardner 2014). The Cato Manor Development Association also upgraded key settlements, like Cato Crest (Cirolia, Görgens, van Donk, Smit and Drimie 2016).

The apartheid government dropped the orderly urbanisation policy and established the IDT in 1992. The IDT used the Urban Foundation recommendations and initiated the first large-scale upgrading of informal settlements (Chapter 4). Essentially, the IDT used the capital subsidy of R7 500 per household to provide water, sanitation, electricity and ownership. The IDT provided approximately 100 000 households in informal settlements with site-and-services between 1992 and 1994 (Huchzermeyer 2006; Tomlinson 2006). Huchzermeyer (2004b) argues that the state blindly followed the neoliberal policy advice of the Urban Foundation in establishing the IDT (see also Bond 2000). Huchzemeyer's (2004b) assessment notices the following problems with the capital subsidy. First, the IDT projects displayed limited community participation and control because of private sector dominance. Second, favouring the private sector led to a technocratic approach and a one-size-fits-all solution prioritising greenfield developments. Third, only 28% of the IDT projects were upgrading projects and the

remainder were greenfield projects. Finally, resettlements were common. Marais and Ntema (2013) state that the IDT projects had a limited impact on the apartheid spatial structure of South African urban areas.

Despite the criticism, the post-apartheid state did not develop a comprehensive informal settlement upgrading policy. The new post-apartheid housing policy introduced in 1994 assumed that the housing subsidy scheme (project subsidies as a capital subsidy) would also apply to informal settlement upgrading. Huchzermeyer (2004b) contends that much of the criticism associated with the IDT remained applicable in the post-apartheid housing policy and practice. For the first decade (1994–2003), South Africa used an inflexible informal settlements policy intervention that allowed little community participation and offered fixed products (Huchzermeyer 2004b).

As I have pointed out in Chapter 4, there is evidence of path-dependence in the general housing policy and informal settlement upgrading. The continuation of the capital subsidy, homeownership and the poor housing location are the most prominent path dependencies. The major focus on numerical targets, an example of goal dependency, also negatively affected community participation and led to an under-utilisation of the capital subsidy for informal settlement upgrading. These dependencies were also applicable in informal settlement upgrading.

6.3 Shift from eradication to upgrading post-2004

The Millennium Development Goals' obligation to achieve slum- or shack-free cities required a policy response from South Africa. Millennium Development Goal 7, Target Eleven states that cities should not have slums. This target is relevant to African cities where 70% or more of the population resides in informal settlements or slums (UN-Habitat 2003). The South African government wanted to achieve slum- or shack-free cities (Huchzermeyer 2004b). For example, Minister Sisulu indicated in 2005 that the state had adopted 2014 as a national target for informal settlement eradication (Sisulu 2005).

Second, the Grootboom court case[36] in 2001 contributed to the prioritisation of informal settlement upgrading. The Grootboom judgment created a legal rationale for a new approach to informal settlement upgrading. The state was obliged to take action to meet the needs of the

[36] A critical feature in the Grootboom judgment is that "the Constitutional Court enjoined the state to develop a reasonable, comprehensive, coherent, flexible and effective housing policy that gives due regard to socio-economic context of poverty and deprivation; takes into account the availability of resources; takes a phased approach, including making provision for short-, medium- and long-term needs; allocates responsibilities clearly to all three spheres of government; responds with care and concern to the needs of the most desperate; and free of bureaucratic inefficiency or onerous regulations" (Wilson 2009:270–290).

homeless, those living in conditions of poverty and intolerable housing. The judge found that (despite large scale housing delivery), the housing programme failed to accommodate people living in desperate housing needs (Foundation for Human Rights 2016; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001).

Third, following the first ten years of housing delivery, the DoH re-orientated its policy focus to informal settlements by 2004. The BNG argues that "informal settlements must urgently be integrated into the broader urban fabric to overcome spatial, social and economic exclusion" (DoH 2004:18) and identified a need to "shift the official policy response to informal settlements from one of conflict or neglect, to one of integration and co-operation, leading to the stabilisation and integration of these areas into the broader urban fabric" (DoH 2004:24). To operationalise this shift, the government introduced the UISP in 2004. The UISP emphasises incrementalism. Incrementalism stands in contrast to linear approaches (namely plan, build, occupy), is product-focused and is fixated on formalisation (Cirolia et al. 2016). Incrementalism offers several important benefits, for example:

- Incremental upgrading (embracing small changes over a long time) is more flexible and responsive to affected communities' needs, demands, and aspirations.
- It is less disruptive, building on the existing assets in settlements (like social networks and layouts).
- Adaption can easily take place through the incremental upgrading process.
- It emphasises multi-stakeholder participation and decision-making. Importantly, incremental upgrading can incorporate contested visions and conflicting actions (Wakely and Riley 2010).

However, the downside of incremental upgrading is that the state leaves projects unattended on the assumption the community is now responsible for driving the upgrading process (Cirolia et al. 2016).

Furthermore, municipalities could plan *in situ* upgrades for the first time rather than focus on replacing informal settlements in a standardised fashion. Municipalities could now quantify costs (as opposed to receiving a fixed amount) and apply for the appropriate funding for land purchase, land rehabilitation, land regularisation, services, and basic social and economic facilities (Pithouse 2009). This new approach was also the first attempt at multi-year projects,

emphasising the incremental nature of upgrading. This process enabled a municipality to respect grassroots initiatives and minimise disruption of communities. The programme made specific provisions for participatory layout planning and community empowerment and created a basis for social inclusion and response to poverty and vulnerability (DoH 2004; Huchzermeyer 2006). In 2010, President Jacob Zuma signed the performance contract with the Minister of Human Settlements (the department's name changed in 2009 from Housing to Human Settlements), Tokyo Sexwale (Fieuw 2015).

This performance contract formed part of Outcome 8[37] of the 2010–2014 Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks. The two main targets were: (i) The upgrading of 400 000 households in well-located settlements with access to basic services and secure tenure by 2014 (roughly 30% of the 1.2 million estimated households living in informal settlements; with the UISP being the primary instrument for upgrading), and (ii) the DoHS would support the plans of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs intent on achieving the following service standards: access to sanitation up from 69% to 100%, water services from 92% to 100%, electricity from 81% to 92% and refuse removal from 64% to 75% (DoHS 2010). However, the government linked the delivery targets in the performance agreement with the five-year cycle of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. The performance agreement stressed three further issues: coordinated municipal and provincial service delivery, the need for integrated development planning and good urban management as part of informal settlement upgrading (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa [SERI] 2012). However, implementation was difficult. The National Development Plan noted the "ambivalence across government" and the need to develop mechanisms for *in situ* upgradings that include "institutional capabilities to manage processes like incremental tenure, infrastructure and shelter upgrade and the development of appropriate regulations, in a participatory and empowering way" (National Planning Commission 2012:273).

6.3.1 Investing in sectoral capacity for upgrading: National Upgrading Support Programme

The National Upgrading Support Programme (NUSP) provided institutional support to the UISP. It developed in partnership with the World Bank Institute, the Cities Alliance, the United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank in 2008. NUSP had to fill a

[37] Outcome 8: Sustainable Human Settlements and Improved Quality Of Households' Life has four outputs: improving access to basic services; upgrading 400 000 accommodation units within informal settlements; facilitating the provision of 600 000 housing units within the gap market (FLISP) for the people earning between R3 500 and R12 800; and identifying well-located public land for affordable and low-income housing.

critical void in capacity building, technical support and the sharing of project learning. The NUSP resulted from the UISP assessment, which indicated significant blockages (DoHS 2014a:24;). Not only were projects blocked, but comprehensive informal settlement response strategies at the local and metropolitan government levels were absent from IDPs and HSPs (Fieuw 2015). In 2010, only the KwaZulu-Natal province had a comprehensive informal settlement upgrading strategy, resulting from the Project Preparation Trust's professional work (Housing Development Agency [HDA] 2014).

Initially, the NUSP supported 48 municipalities (about 600 informal settlements). The objective was to upgrade all informal settlements (Forster and Gardner 2014:18). In the first phase of the programme (2010–2014), NUSP provided technical support to 53 municipalities focusing on the categorisation and rapid assessment of informal settlements. The NUSP assisted municipalities in formulating informal settlement strategies and allocating resources to the strategies. The NUSP also paid attention to settlement level plans, the informal economy, community livelihood strategies and protocols for community engagement (HDA 2014). However, not everybody experienced the efforts of the NUSP positively. For example, provinces and cities experienced the NUSP as an interference (Huchzermeyer 2011).

So, despite the policy changes, provincial governments, municipalities, and other actors remained rooted in past practices, which is a good example of path dependence.

6.3.2 Categorisation of informal settlements to identify developmental pathway

The UISP Toolkit (Misselhorn 2017) categorises informal settlement upgrading at the programme level to identify and understand informal settlements within a particular province or municipality. The categorisation should help identify broad types of developmental responses that are appropriate and achievable. There are four main categories of developmental response to the UISP regarding the addressing of basic infrastructure.

Table 6.1 provides the categorisation guideline.

Each of the four categories in Table 6.1 aligns with specific responses in the informal settlements upgrading process, namely:

- CATEGORY A – Imminent full upgrade: site viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading (land, bulk services, topography, environmental considerations, geotechnical, and so forth, are all in place). The project is implementation-ready (land

secured or imminent, town planning approvals and township establishment secured or imminent, all project funding secured).

- CATEGORY B1 – Incremental upgrade with essential services: interim basic services (eventual full upgrade when resources and timing permit). The site is viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading. The project is NOT implementation-ready.

- CATEGORY B2 – Deferred relocation with emergency services: emergency basic services (eventual relocation when time and resources permit). The site is not viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading. There is no urgent need for relocation (for example, material and immediate threat to safety through flooding, slope instability, toxic waste exposure, and so forth).

- CATEGORY C – Immediate or imminent relocation: urgent need for relocation (for example, material and immediate threat to safety through flooding, slope instability, toxic waste exposure, and so forth).

Table 6.1: Categorisation of settlements to identify developmental pathway

FULL CONVENTIONAL UPGRADE (category A)	
Developmental pathway	Rapid formalisation consists of full services, formal housing and formal tenure (for example, title deeds), requiring prior land acquisition, formal town planning and environmental approvals.
Rationale	Site is viable (developable) and appropriate for purposes of formalisation.
	Project is implementation-ready (full upgrading can commence rapidly – land is secured, feasibilities complete, plans approved etc.).
	Formalisation is appropriate and will not result in significant adverse consequences (for example significant partial relocations or other livelihood impacts).
INCREMENTAL UPGRADE WITH ESSENTIAL SERVICES (category B1)	
Developmental pathway	Provision of essential services[38] and other incremental upgrading arrangements leads to eventual formalisation or other permanent less formal settlement solutions.
Rationale	Site is viable and appropriate for purposes of permanent settlement.
	Project is NOT implementation-ready for formalisation (there will be delays due to such factors as land acquisition, de-densification or bulk services provision).
DEFERRED RELOCATION WITH EMERGENCY BASIC SERVICES (category B2)	

[38] Such essential services (also known as interim services) will usually consist of improved road and footpath access, standpipes, and some form of improved sanitation (for example VIPs or communal sanitation blocks), electricity, fire protection and solid waste removal. In addition, key social services (schools and primary health care) should also receive attention. Sufficient preliminary planning is desirable to maximise the extent to which interim services can be incorporated into the final settlement solution.

Developmental pathway	Provision of emergency basic services[39] but NOT leading to eventual formalisation; but more likely leading to eventual relocation (when and if a suitable relocation site is obtained and developed).
Rationale	Site is NOT viable or appropriate for purposes of formalisation or permanent settlement.
	There is NO urgent need for relocation (absence of serious health and safety threats, which cannot be mitigated in the short-term through basic services provision).
IMMEDIATE RELOCATION (category C)	
Developmental pathway	Rapid relocation to a site which is already or imminently ready and available.
Rationale	Site is NOT viable or appropriate for purposes of permanent settlement or formalisation.
	There is an urgent need for relocation due to serious health and safety threats which cannot be adequately mitigated in the short-term through basic services provision.
	An appropriate relocation destination is currently or imminently ready and available.

Source: Adapted from HDA (2014)

If relocation has to take place, the NUSP requires a relocation plan. The relocation plan must include: development scenarios, enumeration and statistical results of the affected community, a database indicating the number of households, settlement conditions, maps that demonstrate the different variables, results of consultative processes with communities, land availability analysis and relocation schedule, anti-invasion mechanisms, risk-mitigation measures and a resettlement costs and budget outline (DoHS 2015b; DoHS 2016).

6.3.3 Recurring Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme tensions and contradictions

Chapter 3 has shown how tensions and contradictions are a sign of interdependencies and contributes to governance path-dependence. The UISP recognises that a community has "deep-rooted knowledge of its development needs and preferences" and that this knowledge should be "harnessed to ensure that township design […] is targeted at satisfying the actual needs and preferences" (DoHS 2009:30). However, informal settlement upgrading processes have been slow with conflict and contradictions (Smit 2006). The process involves different actors (public, private and NGO) with different frames of thinking, making it difficult to set a development route (Smit 2006). Despite clear legislative and policy guidelines on the UISP, inconsistencies, contestations, rigidities and conflicts exist.

[39] Such emergency services may be at a similar or at a lesser level to category B2 interim services. Because the settlement will eventually be relocated, it is not essential to undertake preliminary planning work (although it may in some cases be beneficial). The purpose is not only to alleviate an emergency situation, but also to provide quality of live improvements where settlements are unlikely to be relocated for some time to come.

First, there are tensions between the UISP guidelines and political rhetoric in the public discourse. The political rhetoric endorses repressive approaches to eliminate informal settlements. The aggressive tone of settlements eradication, often used in government campaigns, create the impression that slums dwellers are unwanted and illegal (Huchzermeyer 2006; 2010). This political focus on slum eradication persists despite evidence that upgrading informal settlements is "responsive to poverty, vulnerability and leads to social inclusion" (Huchzermeyer 2006:49). Although a shift toward informal settlements upgrading is acknowledged (Huchzermeyer 2013), and there are examples of good practices (Isandla Institute 2014), this policy shift has been contradicted and inadequately implemented because "local politicians gain votes by promising full RDP houses" (Cities Support Programme 2016:31).

Second, there is no consensus on what informal settlement upgrading constitutes. Foster and Gardner (2014:27) state that "the definition of informal settlements, and upgrading entails, is still unclear". This lack of clarity is evident from the varied interpretations of how project managers define upgrading at the project level.

Third, provincial and local government departments often repackage housing projects and report them as informal settlement upgrading (Fieuw 2015). For example, in reporting the achievement of the five-year targets under Outcome 8 (upgrading households in informal settlements); the DoHS' 2013/14 annual report states that by 31 December 2013; 407 463 households were "assisted utilising mainly the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme, the Integrated Residential Development Programme (Informal Settlements), the Enhanced People's Housing Process Programme and the Rural Housing Programme" (DoHS 2014b:31). However, a closer inspection reveals that the UISP accounts for only a small portion of the upgrading target as most of the target consists of conventional housing projects (Fieuw 2015).

Fourth, several studies show that appropriate participation is elusive and represents a contested space as slum dwellers struggle to make their concerns and voices heard (Huchzermeyer 2006, 2009; Misselhorn 2008; Mistro and Hensher 2009). Generally, the implementation is crude top-down, with little regard for participatory processes (Huchzermeyer 2006).

Lastly, relocation remains a common response. The common relocation application comes despite the UISP stating that it should be the last resort (Tissington 2011; Ziblim 2013). Although relocation embraces a wide range of strategies, "all are based on perceptions of enhancing the use of the land and property upon which slums are located or housed" (UN-

Habitat 2003:131). Slum communities have had little voice or options regarding their relocation (Cross 2006; Huchzermeyer 2004b; Vermeulin 2006). The above conflicts create interdependencies.

6.4 The upgrading of informal settlements in Mangaung: 1990–2020

This section starts by providing the migration and population context in Mangaung.

6.4.1 Migration and population changes in Mangaung

Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide the Mangaung migration and population changes and the growth of the Mangaung population, households and households living in informal houses.

Table 6.2: Mangaung migration and population changes 1996–2011

Year	Bloemfontein					Botshabelo	ThabaNchu	Mangaung
	White	Black	Coloured	Asian	Total	Total	Total	Total
1996	100 531	228 223	30 573	845	358 066	172 348	77 455	607 869
2001	77 648	296 013	31 172	861	405 695	175 561	79 981	660 937
2011	81 980	381 819	36 482	2 638	504 657	181 172	73 570	759 399

Source: Marais, Ntema, Rani, Lenka and Cloete (2016); MMM (2020)

Table 6.2 shows that the post-apartheid government normalised the urbanisation process, allowing people to settle in places of their choice. For example, although Botshabelo's population increased from 172 348 in 1996 to 181 172 in 2011, the annual increase of 0.3% between 2001 and 2011 was lower than South Africa's annual national population growth of 1.4%. At the same time, Thaba Nchu experienced negative population growth from 77 455 in 1996 to 73 570 in 2011. Yet, black people in Bloemfontein increased from 228 223 in 1996 to 381 819 in 2011.

Table 6.3: The growth of population, households and households living in informal houses, 1996–2016

	1996	2001	Growth rate (p.a) (1996–2001)	2011	Growth rate (p.a) (2001–2011)	2016*	Growth rate (p.a) (2011–2016)
Population	607 869	660 937	1,7%	759 399	1,5%	787 930	0.8%
Households	153 203	185 013	4.2%	231 921	2.5%	265 561	2.9%
Households in informal houses	34 778	43 811	5.2%	32 747	-2.5%	31 143	-1.0%

Source: MMM (2020); Statistics South Africa (1996; 2001; 2011; 2016)

[*Includes Naledi areas (Wepener, Dewetsdorp and Van Stadensrus) and Soutpan into Mangaung: 2016].

According to Table 6.3, Mangaung's population increased from 607 869 in 1996 to 759 399 in 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 1996; 2001; 2011). Yet, Mangaung recorded a decline in the population growth rate from 1.7% between 1996 and 2001 to 0.8% between 2011 and 2016. Although the overall households increased from 153 203 in 1996 to 231 921 in 2011, informal houses decreased from 34 778 to 32 747 over the same period. This decrease is partially the result of the government's housing programme. With the incorporation of the former Naledi areas and Soutpan into Mangaung in 2016, the population rose to 787 930.

The Mangaung[40] Integrated Human Settlements Plan (IHSP) shows that the greatest housing backlog is in the south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein (MMM 2016:33).

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the densely populated south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein, with 2011 and 2016 boundaries, respectively.Figure 6.4 provides informal settlements growth in the south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein from 1990 to 2020.



Source: Statistics South Africa (2011)

Figure 6.2: The densely populated south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein (population per ward: 2011 with 2011 boundaries)

[40] Mangaung defines informal settlements as "areas that are not formally planned but are occupied illegally by the dwellers" (MMM 2013:13)



Source: Statistics South Africa (2011; 2016)

Figure 6.3: The densely populated south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein (population per ward: 2011 with 2016 boundaries)



Bloemfontein 1990: A

Bloemfontein 2013/14: B

Bloemfontein 2020: C

Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007a); MMM (2013; 2016)

Figure 6.4: Informal settlements growth in the south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein: 1990–2020

The evidence shows that 71% of households in informal settlements are in Bloemfontein, 24% households in Botshabelo, 4% households in Thaba Nchu and 1% in the former Naledi areas and Soutpan (Statistics South Africa 2016). Although nationally, the target was to eradicate informal settlements by 2014, informal settlements have increased in Mangaung. For example, Mangaung's informal settlements figures rose from 28 informal settlements in 2013 to 47 informal settlements in 2019 (MMM 2020a:58), representing about a 60% increase. This increase is largely attributed to the slowness of informal settlements upgrading, the development of new settlements and the incorporation of the former Naledi and Soutpan into Mangaung in 2016. Many informal settlements in Mangaung are located on state land. In this regard, a local political respondent states that "with authority to upgrade dispersed across different spheres and departments of government, it is difficult for Mangaung to intervene instantly". Seeing that these interdependencies represented rigidity in the governance path, flexibility, pragmatism, and an innovative approach are essential for resolving this issue site-by-site.

6.4.2 Mangaung: early intervention perspective: 1990–1993 [Phase 1]

With the release of political prisoners early in 1990, the Mangaung Civic Association encouraged land invasion (Marais 1994). Namibia, Kopanong, J.B. Mafora and Freedom Square became some of the first informal settlements in Bloemfontein in the early 1990s (Botes et al. 1991; Marais 1994). When the IDT announced its capital subsidy scheme in March 1991, the Orange Free State regional office of the Urban Foundation and the Mangaung Civic Association applied for upgrading funds. According to Marais (1994:15), the "project in Freedom Square and Namibia was one of 104 projects across South Africa" and one of the largest, involving 4 132 sites with a funding allocation of R31 million (Griffin 1996; Van Rensburg, Botes and de Wet 2001). Between 1992 and 1994, the IDT funded projects provided ownership, water and waterborne sanitation and electricity access to 4 132 individual stands in Freedom Square (Marais and Krige 1997). Between 1996 and 1999, the consolidation subsidy[41] of R7 500 provided two-roomed houses to all the households (Marais, Van Rensburg and Botes 2003). There has been a substantial body of research on Freedom Square. It is the only example of longitudinal research on one settlement in South Africa over three decades. This body of work includes two master's degrees, two PhDs and several papers (for example, Botes 1999;

[41] The consolidation subsidy is available to a beneficiary who has already received assistance through a government subsidy to acquire a serviced residential site under the pre-1994 housing subsidy scheme. The consolidatiojn subsidy is applicable to serviced sites obtained on the basis of ownership, leasehold or deed of grant and must be utilised to construct or upgrade a top structure on the relevant property.

Botes, Stewart and Wessels 1996; Marais 1994; Marais and Krige 1997; Marais and Ntema 2013; Ntema 2011; Sinxadi 2020). There are three important lessons from the upgrading of Freedom Square (Marais and Ntema 2013). It was the first land expansion for low-income people in Bloemfontein since 1968. Second, it challenged the racially-based planning approach of the apartheid state and its contribution to spatial infilling in the region. Third, it challenged the racial-based planning approach as the upgrading occurred on land earmarked to expand Heidedal (a formerly coloured residential area). The spatial infilling is visible in the many people (about 20%) in Freedom Square from Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu.

6.4.3 Informal settlements approach in Mangaung: 1994–2003 [Phase 2]

There was no informal settlement strategy during phase 2. The assumption was that the project subsidy would facilitate the upgrading of informal settlements. The lack of a strategy and reliable information made informal settlements difficult and inconsistent interventions. However, the municipality set the eradication of the backlog as a target in the IDP (Mangaung Local Municipality 2003b) and had several innovative ways to deal with informal settlements.

Delinking ownership from the capital subsidy

As mentioned earlier, the main criticism of the housing subsidy programme was that it had a fixed product, did not facilitate informal settlement upgrading, limited community participation and focused on homeownership. Countering this criticism, Mangaung[42] had an innovative approach to informal settlement upgrading. First, Mangaung formalised land separate from the housing development process. This was possible because of the available planning and surveying funds (provided from own funding) and intergovernmental grants. For example, in the Free State, the Department of Local Government and Housing had agreed with the Department of Land Affairs to avail R24.8 million for the "upgrading of informal settlements…in the Free State" (Free State. Department of Local Government and Housing 1998:36–37). Mangaung used its funding and the intergovernmental grant to create 32 263 erven (Mokoena 2005; Mokoena and Marais 2007). Mangaung followed the following process.

The ward councillor and ward committee assisted housing officials in identifying and listing families on informal stands. The municipality captured the information on the municipal housing database. The township application, approval and the pegging of sites followed. Upon

[42] A reminder that up to 2001, Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu had separate transitional local councils.

finalising the Surveyor General's plan, the municipal officials visited each site to confirm data on the list. After this confirmation, the occupant received a "call form" to visit the housing office for a site permit (sign the occupation agreement). The site permit or permission to occupy is an official document that conveys occupation rights on the property to the occupant under the terms and conditions specified in the document (Annexure C). This way, the occupant received occupational rights and the right to purchase the site from the municipality when the township registers and services were in place and the land price was determined. This process was possible because the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act of 1991 converted such tenure rights (site permit or permission to occupy) into ownership. The municipality dealt with any dispute arising from site allocation through the dispute resolution process within the council's administration (Mangaung Local Municipality 1998). The municipality created an interim land management system that provided security of tenure to the beneficiary without linking it directly to ownership, which, according to Huchzermeyer and Karam (2006), is an important first step in informal settlement upgrading. Although full ownership would materialise later, this system provided the new urban resident tenure security (Mokoena and Marais 2007). It demonstrates that innovation and local application were possible. Seeing that to qualify for a subsidy at the time required an applicant not to own a property, the municipal interim land management system provided an effective way of circumventing the disqualification of occupants later based on property ownership. At the same time, the system laid the foundation for the project subsidy. Full transfer of ownership materialised once the housing subsidy allocation occurred and the contractor completed the construction of the house. A local political informant points out that "prior conferring of occupation rights" through interim land management processes "provided an upfront sense of ownership on the part of the occupants, but also minimised corruption related to site allocations". Moreover, tenure security outside of housing project implementation facilitated quicker housing delivery and minimised disputes. Even though this process was municipal-led, communities played a critical role in resolving disputes (volunteer information) regarding who should receive the site. However, their participation and input in the final adjudication of the dispute have been limited.

Tackling the need for well-located housing

The provision of well-located land and the cost were major stumbling blocks. Mangaung emphasised two land issues: formalising land occupations on open land inside the former black township of Mangaung and securing land for informal settlement development toward the east

of Bloemfontein. First, Mangaung successfully implemented infill projects in well-located land within the existing township (public open spaces) as informal settlements. Urban public open spaces make urban areas attractive (Cilliers, Diemont, Stobbelaar and Timmermans 2011:215) and foster resilience in urban areas (Li, Sun, Li, Hao, Li, Qian, Liu and Sun 2016). However, rapid urbanisation and the occupation of these open areas by informal dwellers posed challenges. In Mangaung, rapid urbanisation and land invasion in the early 1990s has mostly been on these open spaces (Botes et al. 1991; Marais 1994). The invasion of these open spaces created informality within the formal township. The first response was to convert these occupied areas into residential areas. This represented an example of infill spatial planning or informal settlement upgrading. The motivation included increasing the urban layout efficiency, encouraging walkability and capitalising on existing infrastructure. Table 6.4 provides the public open spaces rezoned from other land uses into residential areas during this period.

From Table 6.4, Mangaung facilitated 7 336 housing opportunities through the capital subsidy within existing areas in Mangaung township as infill (*in situ* upgrading) projects by 2004 (Table 6.4). However, the municipality passed a resolution in 1998 (Council Resolution EC15.17: 18 August 1998) which stated that the municipality would not accommodate and provide infrastructural and town planning services for people who occupy urban open spaces (Mangaung Local Municipality 1998). Mangaung had considered urban public open space an important aspect of achieving sustainable neighbourhoods.

Figure 6.5 provides infill spatial planning between 1994 and 2004.

Table 6.4: Rezoning of urban open spaces from other land uses into residential areas in Mangaung post-1994

Former urban open space in Mangaung Township	No. of erven created	Year	Township	Previous zoning/function
Tambo Square I and II	223	2000	Batho	Business and Park
Thabo Mbeki I and II	54	2000	Batho	Park
Peter Mokaba	46	2000	Bochabela	Community facility
Shuping I and II	145	2000	Batho	Community facility
Solomon Mahlangu	33	2000	Batho	Park
Isithwalandwe	159	2000	Batho	Park
Codesa I	63	2000	Bochabela	Community facility
Codesa II and III	251	1999	Bochabela	Community facility
Joe Slovo	697	1998	Phahameng-East	Community facility
Kagisho Square	165	1999	Phahameng	Park
Kathrada I and II	157	1999	Phahameng	Community facility
China Square	97	1998	Kagisanong-Buffer	Farm
Sejake/Lekota	526	1998	Kagisanong-Buffer	Community facility
Lozipho I and II	40	1999	Kagisong	Community facility
JB Mafora III	1053	2001	Kagisanong-Buffer	Farm
Namibia North	1517	1997	Kagisanong	Farm
Albert Lithuli	569	1998	Kagisanong	Public open space
Extension V	189	1999	Kagisanong	Community facility
Noordkamp III	80	1999–2003	Kagisanong-Buffer	Farm
Freedom Square Ext	238	1998	Kagisanong-East	Farm
Kgatelopele	43	1998	Phahameng-East	Community facility
Thipe Square	54	1999	Kagisanong	Park
Lusaka Square	43	1987–2000	Batho	Community facility
Maphikela	83	2000	Batho	Community facility
Dark City	585	1999	Phahameng	Community facility
Silver City	183	1999	Phahameng	Community facility
Lapologa Square	43	1999	Kagisanong	Park
Total (Infill projects)	**7 336**			

Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2004)



Source: MMM (2022)

Figure 6.5: Infill spatial planning: 1994–2004

Apart from infill spatial planning in this period, the municipality acquired state land to formalise informal settlements on state land (greenfield developments). Although state land existed in all the regions, securing land for informal settlement development toward the south-

east of Bloemfontein was the most pressing. Table 6.5 shows the state land acquired by the municipality post-1994 for housing development.

Table 6.5: State land acquired by Mangaung for greenfield development: 1994–2012

Land description	Extent/no. of sites
Farm Turflaagte 881	516 ha
Farm Liege Valley 1325	272 ha
Portion 2, 4, 5 Rocklands 684	1 713 064 ha
The remainder of farm Rodenbeck 2972	7 108 723 ha
Grassland Phase 2	1 986 133 ha
Grassland Phase 3	1 342 000 ha
The remainder of farm Jerusalem 1757	275 253 ha
The remainder of farm Hatfield 993	50 418 ha
Erf 22001 Mangaung ext 2 (Mapikela)	45 667 ha
41 plots in Grassland, each measuring about 42 827 ha each	1 755 907 ha
30 plots in Rodenbeck, each measuring about 42 827 ha each	1 284 810 ha
The remainder of farm Botshabelo 826 (Sections A, B, C, D, E, F, and G)	77 928 303 ha
Portions of farm Botshabelo 826 (11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21)	22 797 897 ha
The remainder of farm Dankbaar 206 Thaba Nchu	2 189 738 ha
Portion 1 of the farm Toekomslaagte 676 Thaba Nchu	1 713 064 ha
Portion 2 of the farm Zaaibult 440 Thaba Nchu	856 532 ha
The remainder of farm Fontein Draai 232 District Thaba Nchu	4 420 903 ha
The remainder of portion 1 of the farm Zaaibult 440 Thaba Nchu	856 532 ha
Thaba Nchu ext 25 Ratau	253 sites
Selosesha ext 26	238 sites
Selosesha ext 27	374 sites
Selosesha ext 14	827 sites
Selosesha ext 15	361 sites
Selosesha ext 17	427 sites

Source: MMM (2012b)

In Bloemfontein, the municipality acquired 2 344 175 hectares of state land; 10 072 62 hectares in Botshabelo and 7 867 467 hectares in Thaba Nchu for informal settlement upgrading and housing development (Table 6.5 and Figure 6.6).



Source: MMM (2022)

Figure 6.6: State land acquired by Mangaung for greenfield development: 1994–2012 (A=Bloemfontein, B=Botshabelo, C=Thaba Nchu)

One of the key informants in Mangaung land and property management states that "all state land was transferred to Mangaung through a deed of donation". The deed of donation meant that Mangaung did not have to pay for the land. More significantly, a deed of donation precedes and is required to issue a new certificate of title in the donee's name at the Registry of Deeds. Through this cooperation between the state and Mangaung, the municipality acquired the title to state property to benefit ordinary citizens. Although interdependency can cause rigidities in collective decision-making, it can also facilitate development. For example, before transferring title to Mangaung, the authority had to issue title deeds on state land in the municipality's area of jurisdiction with the provincial Department of Public Works. One key respondent states that "it took longer to finalise land transfer transactions when the approval authority was located at different spheres of government". This emphasises the interdependencies between spheres of government.

Figures 6.7, 6.8; 6.9 and 6.10 show the extent of state land in the three regions and the categorisation of state and municipal properties according to the Mangaung valuation roll (MMM 2017c).



Source: MMM (2017c)

Figure 6.7: The extent of state land in Mangaung



Source: MMM (2017c)

Figure 6.8: The extent of state land in Bloemfontein



Source: MMM (2017c)

Figure 6.9: The extent of state land in Botshabelo



Source: MMM (2017c)

Figure 6.10: The extent of state land in Thaba Nchu

6.4.4 Regulating informal settlements in Mangaung: post-2004 [Phase 3]

Although BNG introduced the UISP in 2004, Mangaung did not implement the UISP until 2013 with the advent of the Mangaung Informal Settlements Upgrading Strategy (ISUS). Like other provinces and cities, Mangaung did not change its approach to informal settlement upgrading. Misselhorn (2008:10.) notes that "in-situ informal settlement upgrading is …challenging and complex…, this being one of the reasons it is often neglected in favour of other more 'quick fix' approaches like green-fields development combined with relocations". A human rights socio-economic case in 2011 contributed to the development of ISUS and informal settlements by-laws in Mangaung in 2013.

Socio-economic rights in Mangaung: Sibuyile Park Informal Settlement incident

On Thursday, 03 February 2011, the South African Human Rights Commission received a complaint from Sibuyile Park residents, an informal settlement in Mangaung (Figure 6.11). The Sibuyile Park residents alleged Mangaung failed in its constitutional and statutory obligations to:

- make an application to the Provincial Government to request the proclamation of the area as a township;
- provide basic services like water, sanitation and refuse removal; and
- apply to the Provincial Government to upgrade the area on a priority basis in the National Housing Code (South African Human Rights Commission 2011:3).

The South African Human Rights Commission upheld the complaint of the residents. The commission found that the "deprivation of basic municipal services and the lack of provision of ablution facilities to residents of Sibuyile Park constitute a violation of their right to human dignity" (South African Human Rights Commission 2011:45–46).

This ruling had three implications for the municipality and the province. First, Mangaung had to prioritise the community's basic needs and ensure that each community member had access to basic municipal services pending the upgrading. Second, Mangaung had to provide the commission with the minutes of community meetings held. Third, Mangaung had to provide the commission with a plan to upgrade the informal settlement in line with the National Housing Code within three months. It also read that "the Free State Department of Human Settlements is directed to assess infrastructural and housing development needs of



Figure 6.11: Sibuyile Park informal settlement

communities in informal settlements in the Free State, and furnish the Commission with a Report within 6 (six) months of the outcome of its consideration" (South African Human Rights Commission 2011:47–49).

At the same time, the South African Human Rights Commission ruling had four implications. First, it highlighted the complexities of informal settlement upgrading. The national directive promotes a people-centred incremental upgrading approach based on detailed plans for access to basic services and socio-economic facilities. Second, it uncovered a lack of cooperation between the municipality and the provincial government in applying the UISP. Third, the findings demonstrate that power dynamics, lack of political will, financial constraints, and institutional deficits affect the implementation of policies. Finally, the ruling shows that litigation has become a tool to find resolutions and reflects on interdependencies in policy implementation.

6.4.5 Informal Settlements Upgrading Strategy

Following the South African Human Rights Commission ruling, Mangaung developed an ISUS in 2013. This new strategy had to "assist the Metro in making sure that all activities in informal settlement upgrading are working towards the same goal, thereby assessing and adjusting the Metro's development trajectory in response to a dynamic environment" (MMM 2013:6). The ISUS has the following objectives:

- To prioritise the upgrading of informal settlements with an emphasis on basic social and economic infrastructure services, community empowerment and security of tenure;
- To promote the progressive upgrading of informal settlements through incremental *in-situ* upgrading in desired locations and relocation where development would not be desirable or feasible;
- To provide linkages between the municipal Spatial Development Framework (SDF) and the location of informal settlements, upgrading projects; and
- To ensure the alignment between the IDP, informal settlements upgrade priorities and the budgeting processes (MMM 2013).

As pointed out earlier, most informal settlements were within the existing townships and at the edge of these townships (although there are variations in the three regions). Many of these

informal settlements have access to the existing township services (roads, socio-economic infrastructure, water and sanitation) and rudimentary services. Many of these settlements are earmarked for public spaces like parks, schools, and healthcare facilities on state land.

The ISUS requires that the settlement is in an area of an approved IDP, within the urban edge and that the settlement's land is suitable for permanent occupation. If unsuitable, funding is available to rehabilitate the land. Rehabilitation examples include steep slope engineering and stormwater intervention. These measures reduce vulnerability and indirectly preserve existing socio-economic structures and minimise relocations. Yet, in practice, Mangaung is relocating about 2 500 Caleb Motshabi informal settlement residents to Klipfontein, a farm initially purchased for cemeteries in Bloemfontein. Caleb Motshabi was invaded in 1997. The municipality purchased the farm (Caleb Motshabi) for informal settlement upgrading and created about 7 502 residential erven during 2008–2009. Since then, the Caleb Motshabi settlement experienced constant invasion and the number of households grew to about 10 000 in 2018, which was more than the available residential erven. Some of the households settled on the Bloemwater bulk water pipe servitude.

It became necessary and urgent that Bloemwater relocate the bulk water pipe servitude. Although the municipality purchased the adjacent Klipfontein farm for cemeteries in 2018, it became the site for relocation. Whereas the farm Klipfontein has no approved township, lies outside the urban edge and is not approved for informal settlements relocation, three reasons led to the farm Klipfontein relocation decision:

- First, the political pressure to relocate households settling on a live Bloemwater bulk pipeline in Caleb Motshabi informal settlements;
- Second, the lack of readily available alternative suitable land for relocation; and
- Finally, Klipfontein had already been purchased, albeit for cemeteries, and is adjacent to the existing Caleb Motshabi informal settlement, and thus the existing practical choice for relocation.

In Mangaung, the upgrading responses consider the scale of informal settlements, locality and categorisation for appropriate response. Manguang adapted the national informal settlements upgrading policy framework. Table 6.6 shows the municipal categorisation and upgrading responses for informal settlements.

Table 6.6: Mangaung categorisation and upgrading responses for informal settlements

Category		Criteria	Developmental Response	Tenure
A	Imminent full upgrade	Site viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading (land, bulk services, topography, environmental, geo-tech etc., all in place). Project is implementation-ready (land secured or imminent, town planning approvals/township establishment secured or imminent, all project funding secured)	Full upgrading, including delivery of full infrastructural services, top structures and tenure (including formal township establishment). Where land is scarce, promote densification. It is critical to ensure integrated local spatial planning and action to access key social services like education and health care.	Individual and formal (either a title deed or locally administered alternative which is upgradeable to full title)
B1	Interim basic services (eventual full upgrade when resources and timing permit)	Site viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading (land, bulk services, topography, environmental, geo-tech may be available). BUT: Project NOT implementation ready (that is, it cannot be expedited in the next year or two due to, for example, lack of available funding, land not yet secured, bulk services not yet in place).	Interim basic engineering services appropriate to the settlement's needs and conform to long-term upgrading plans/layout to avoid wasted expenditure (for example, standpipes, communal sanitation or on-site sanitation, basic road access or footpaths). This must go hand in hand with other critical service interventions like fire protection, solid waste removal, and access to basic health and education services.	Collective, informal and functional (via municipal classification and recognition)
B2	Emergency basic services (eventual relocation when time and resources pert)	Site NOT viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading NO urgent need for relocation (for example, material and immediate threat to safety through flooding, slope instability, toxic waste exposure)	Emergency, basic engineering services are appropriate to the basic needs of the settlement but typically to a lower level than for B1 and do not need to conform to long-term upgrade layout (for example, standpipes, on-site sanitation or portaloos). This must go hand in hand with other critical service interventions like fire protection, solid waste removal, and access to basic health and education services.	Collective and functional (via municipal classification and recognition)
C	Imminent relocation	Site NOT viable and appropriate for long-term upgrading AND: Urgent need for relocation (for example material and immediate threat to safety through flooding, slope instability, toxic waste exposure). Relocation destination available (either	No action on the site in question. Participative and consultative process required with residents, including site visits to potential relocation destinations. Where the relocation destination is a temporary transit facility, site feasibility is to be conducted and emergency funding secured. Temporary transit facilities should only be utilised where this is	Not applicable – if relocation destination a housing project then as Category A, transit camp or tenure only.

		in-situ upgrade or greenfields project with unallocated sites OR site for emergency transit camp and emergency funding available)	unavoidable as they often pose major challenges to relocates and tend to become permanent or semi-permanent.	

Source: MMM (2013:41)

Table 6.6 is consistent with the NUSP framework for informal settlements upgrading. Practically, 20 informal settlements fall under category A in Mangaung, 17 under category B1, nothing under category B2 and 10 under category C out of the 47 informal settlements (MMM 2019b). The municipality upgraded nine informal settlements to phase 3 (individual household sewer and water connections), including 6 810 households since the advent of the ISUS in 2013. Table 6.7 provides the register of the informal settlements and the upgrading response. Figure 6.12 provides the mapping of the informal settlements.

Table 6.7: Register of informal settlements and the upgrading response: 2004–2020[43]

No	Settlement name	Property description	Region	Estimates: no. of households	Category	Top structure	GPS Coordinates
1	Bloemside 9&10	Heidedal Ext. 30, 31, 32	Bloemfontein	4200	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175358
2	Sonderwater 1	Heidedal Ext. 15	Bloemfontein	91	A	Y	-29.172005, 26.264923
3	Sonderwater 2	Heidedal Ext. 15 (erf 5975)	Bloemfontein	117	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175359
4	Kgatelopele	Slovo (Erf 8844, 9260)	Bloemfontein	132	B1	Y	-29.145236, 26.248413
5	Thabo Mbeki	Erf 28561, 28562 & 28747	Bloemfontein	73	B1	Y	-29.181058, 26.175366
6	Magashule Square	Erf 37333 Freedom Square	Bloemfontein	51	B1	Y	-29.167518, 26.255725
7	Namibia Cosmos	Erf 27778 & 27921	Bloemfontein	51	A	Y	-29.169718, 26.241500
8	Marikana	Erf 27578	Bloemfontein	101	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175364
9	MK Square	Erf 8362, 50345, 50344)	Bloemfontein	490	A	N	-29.174448, 26.241214
10	Khayelisha	Grassland 4	Bloemfontein	2500	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175361
11	Lusaka Square	Erf 55066	Bloemfontein	23	C	N	-29.132483, 26.226734
12	Rankie Square	Phelindaba (Next to buses)	Bloemfontein	12	C	N	-29.187373, 26.244818
13	Turflaagte ZCC	Erf 39688, 39701, 39702, 39482, 53820	Bloemfontein	92	A	N	-29.197262, 26.261174
14	Matlharantlheng	Farm Rodenbeck	Bloemfontein	3108	B1	N	-29.176312, 26.301606
15	Maditlhabela	Farm Rodenbeck	Bloemfontein	938	B1	N	-29.192869, 26.273727

[43] **Mapping of informal settlements**: The three datasets used in the informal assessment include the 1990, 2013–14 and 2020 national land-cover datasets. The 1990 national land-cover dataset, is based on 30 x 30 m raster cells. The 1990 land-cover dataset has been created using semi-automated modelling procedures analyses of the Landsat 4/5 imagery. The 2013–14 analysis used the Landsat 8 imagery. The 20 m resolution, raster format South African National Land-Cover 2018 and 2020 datasets have been generated from automated mapping models using multi-seasonal 20 m resolution Sentinel 2 satellite imagery. A desktop assessment completed the process of compiling the land-cover dataset. A 72 classification framework was used to identify different land-cover classes. Examples include Woodland/Open bush, Thicket /Dense bush, Grassland and Low shrubland. Informal settlements were classified as Urban informal (open trees / bush), Urban informal (dense trees/bush), Urban informal (low veg / grass) and Urban informal (bare) in 1990 and 2013/2014 and residential informal (bush), residential informal (tree), residential informal (low veg / grass) and residential informal (bare) in 2020. Areas with these attributes or characteristics were extracted from the different datasets and presented in red on the maps. 2016, 1990 South African National Land Cover Dataset, Data User Report and MetaData, © GEOTERRAIMAGE – 2014. 2021, South African National Land-Cover 2020 Accuracy Assessment Report (Public Release Report), the Department of Environment, Forestry & Fisheries (DEFF)

16	Caleb Motshabi/Kgotsong	Turflaagte 881 and Liege Valley 1325	Bloemfontein	7500	A	Y	-28.221741,26.243878
17	Saliva Square	Erf 35180, 8323 Freedom Square	Bloemfontein	124	C	Y	-29.181058, 26.175363
18	Jacob Zuma Square	Erf 37321 Freedom Square	Bloemfontein	117	C	Y	-29.181058, 26.175365
19	Mkhonto Square	Erf 32109 Turflaagte	Bloemfontein	111	B1	Y	-29.181058, 26.175362
20	Bloemside Phase 7	Bloemside Phase 7	Bloemfontein	1138	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175360
21	Kaliya Square	Erf 22860, 22861, 22862	Bloemfontein	27	C	N	-29.187256, 26.246169
22	Winkie Direko	Turflaagte	Bloemfontein	118	C	N	-29.189281, 26.249601
23	Sibuyile	Turflaagte	Bloemfontein	84	C	N	-29.183854, 26.246273
24	Gatvol	Heidedal	Bloemfontein	250	C	N	-29.131201, 26.244191
25	Tambo Square	Erf 54680, 54681, 54682	Bloemfontein	37	C	N	-29.129597, 26.234695
26	Codesa and Joe Slovo	Bochabela & Joe Slovo	Bloemfontein	147	C	N	-29.151619, 26.251527
27	Botshabelo West	Botshabelo West	Botshabelo	3700	B1	Y	-29.181058, 26.175351
28	Section L	Section L1124	Botshabelo	500	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175356
29	Section M	Section M808	Botshabelo	99	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175353
30	Section E	Section E1905	Botshabelo	36	A	N	-29.256032, 26.712271
31	Section H	Section H 412; 447;1785; 1810	Botshabelo	111	A	N	-29.205243, 26.722733
32	Section G	G735; 736; 737	Botshabelo	69	A	N	-29.2412213, 26.7093083
33	Section T	Section T2473	Botshabelo	35	A	N	-29.2622153, 26.7149952
34	Section K	Section K 1541; 2479; 2489; 2490; 2491; 1692; 2259; 2131	Botshabelo	490	A	N	-29.2411, 26.7092
35	Section C	Section C 2465;2466	Botshabelo	49	B1	N	-29.241259, 26.708737
36	Section R	Section R	Botshabelo	2250	B1	Y	-29.181058, 26.175352
37	Section J	Section J2301	Botshabelo	54	A	N	-29.221910, 26.699107
38	Section H	Section H960	Botshabelo	38	B1	N	-29.205243, 26.722733
39	Morolong	Thaba-Nchu Ext 27	Thaba-Nchu	390	A	Y	-29.181058, 26.175357
40	Ratau	Thaba-Nchu Ext 40	Thaba-Nchu	119	B1	Y	-29.232718, 26.817013
41	Ratau Hlambaza	Thaba-Nchu Ext 40	Thaba-Nchu	77	B1	N	29.241246, 26.829627
42	Zone 1	Selosesha Ext 17	Thaba-Nchu	429	B1	N	-29.167237, 26.781592
43	Seroalo	Thaba-Nchu Ext 26	Thaba-Nchu	111	B1	N	-29.210813, 26.790504
44	Van Stadensrus	Van Stadensrus	Van Stadensrus	9	B1	N	-29.981201, 27.006291
45	Dewetsdorp	Dewetsdorp	Dewetsdorp	38	B1	N	-29.596450, 26.680791
46	Wepener	Wepener	Wepener	156	B1	N	-29.719741, 27.015556
47	Soutpan	Soutpan	Soutpan	93	A	N	-28.731932, 26.114776
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS: 30 485 at 3.1 people/household							

Source: MMM (2017a)



Figure 6.12: Mapping of informal settlements in Mangaung

Table 6.7 represents Mangaung's intended responses to informal settlements through the ISUS. However, the application of the ISUS has criticism. One key informant says that "despite the fact that ISUS has assisted the budget planning for informal settlements, streamlined interventions in informal settlements upgrading for the first time, it was developed in isolation". The ISUS did not consider that most informal settlements in Mangaung are located within existing townships. It becomes a problem if an informal settlement is provided with basic services through the UISP when the existing township does not have such services. Often, communities within the existing township stop such a project as they feel overlooked. For example, the installation of water services at Botshabelo West was met with objections from the older, existing and adjacent Section F (in Botshabelo). Although the ISUS addresses the main ideas of the UISP and NUSP, it deviated from the NUSP guidelines on community participation. The NUSP processes emphasise signing a social compact (an agreement of cooperation and commitment) between a municipality and the representative community committee of an informal settlement. Yet, Mangaung works directly with the ward councillors and the ward committees and does not use the social compact. The councillor's role meant that community participation contradicts the tenets of the UISP. A key municipal informant said that the "social compact is commendable where active NGOs represent the aspirations of informal settlements residents", suggesting that Mangaung does not need to focus on it.

In conclusion, programmes and strategies (such as the UISP and ISUS) implementation require cooperation and cordial inter-governmental relations among all spheres of government. This is an excellent example of interdependency between spheres of government. Also, the South African Human Rights Commission case bear testimony to these interdependencies and the extent they facilitate or inhibit the governance path.

6.4.6 Synthesis

The ISUS deviates from national UISP guidelines regarding the Social Compact[44] within the informal settlements upgrading process. The deviation from concluding the social compact with the community representative partner has five main consequences. First, Mangaung informal settlements communities are deprived of social capacity building opportunities to develop their essential livelihoods strategies during and post-settlement upgrading processes. Second, the non-conclusion of the social compact with the community representative partner

[44] Social compact is an agreement of cooperation and commitment between a municipality and the community representative partner of an informal settlement. It is different from a normal legal agreement and should be seen within the context of the broader social contract between state and civil society.

makes two assumptions: i) that the community trust the ward councillor and ii) that the ward councillor is familiar with the day-to-day issues within a settlement. There may be a weak or poor relationship between the ward councillor and the occupants of an informal settlement. In this case, community participation (the essence of informal settlement upgrading) may be compromised. Third, Mangaung creates incoherent community participation and an imbalance in the upgrading process and refutes informal settlements residents to be shaping their own living spaces. Finally, the lack of a social compact weakens the alignment between municipal goals and community needs; it side-lines social inclusion and limits community empowerment required for ongoing operating, maintenance and urban management issues post upgrading.

Since there are different informal settlement upgrading approaches, Table 6.8 compares some of the main activities against different phases of informal settlement upgrading in Mangaung.

The municipality's role in informal settlements upgrading was limited in the first phase and increased in the next two phases. While community participation and consultation are supposed to be at the centre of informal settlement upgrading, it has been limited in Mangaung until the advent of the ISUS. The transitional phase of local government (until 1999, the local government remained subject to the precepts of the transition process as the Local Government Transition Act of 1993 regulated it) resulted in civic structures (for example, Mangaung Civic Association; the Upgrading Community Trust) dominating and representing the needs of the community. Even during the ISUS era, the ward system (ward councillor and ward committee) drives the informal settlements upgrading process. The use of the ward system means Mangaung overlooks informal settlement residents' (own) capacity and initiatives which must be recognised, respected and combined with municipal plans for the upgrading processes to be effective. The involvement of informal settlement communities and the need to give them a voice at key stages of the process are basic principles and tenets of the UISP.

Table 6.8: Comparison of the main activities against different phases of informal settlement upgrading in Mangaung

MAIN ACTIVITIES VERSUS THE DIFFERENT PHASES	1990–1993 (Phase 1)	1994–2003 (Phase 2)	Post-2004 (Phase 3)
Municipality participation.	Limited municipality participation (in transition) and the role of the Mangaung Civic Association were more prominent.	Active municipal role through the stand-alone interim land management system.	Active municipal role through permission to occupy or ownership land management system.
Nature of community participation or the initial engagement with the local community.	The Upgrading Community Trust (elected democratically) represented the community (community representative partner).	Private sector dominance. Limited engagement with the local community. Ward councillors and ward committees play the role of community representative partners.	Engagement with the local community gradually improved and became obligatory with ISUS. ward councillor and ward committee play the role of community representative partner.
Municipal informal settlements upgrading plans and strategy.	No informal municipal settlements upgrading plans and strategy.	*Ad-hoc* categorisation of informal settlements for upgrading with no municipal informal settlements upgrading plans and strategy in place.	Improved and mandatory categorisation of informal settlements for upgrading and Council approval. Also, an informal settlement upgrading strategy developed and approved in 2013.
Nature of incrementalism: issues of tenure and services.	Site and services: ownership.	Consolidation: site and services, plus top structure for ownership.	Site and services, plus top structure for ownership. An incremental upgrading approach also emerges.
The planning regime: alignment with IDP and SDF.	Bloemfontein structure plan and metropolitan transport plan.	Mainly infill spatial planning within the urban edge.	Expansion, including peripheral greenfield development projects, some of which were outside the urban edge.
Conflict with existing land use.	Previous zoning or function in conflict with invaded land for settlement and warranted rezoning.	Previous zoning or function mainly in conflict with existing land use and warranted rezoning.	Natural growth warranted the rezoning of farmland into residential land.
Relocation versus *in situ* upgrading.	Invasion of open spaces warranted *in situ* upgrading, with limited relocation.	*In situ* upgrading, with limited relocation to state acquired land on the south-eastern Bloemfontein.	A combination of *in situ* upgrading (on invaded land) and relocations through ISUS.

Source: Author (2020)

In 2013 the ISUS incorporated the national UISP guidelines and focused on four interrelated areas: the provision of basic services, tenure security, health and safety and emphasis on residents participation. The ISUS introduced the informal settlements categorisation model (upgrade plan) adopted in the UISP and upgraded nine informal settlements to phase 3 (individual household sewer and water connections) for 6 810 households. Simultaneously, the residents of these nine informal settlements received permission to occupy, which the municipality upgraded to full ownership rights. Also, the municipality ensured the nine informal settlements are habitable, are land fit for upgrading and that there is waste and refuse collection.

The critical point is that the four interrelated ISUS focus areas require the municipality and informal settlement communities to work together to organise and act to ensure improvements are protected, maintained, operated and sustained. Consequently, through infill planning (*in situ* upgrading) and greenfield development, Mangaung provided adequate housing to the community.

6.5 Dependencies in informal settlements upgrading

The BNG prioritised informal settlements *in situ* upgrading through the UISP. The literature has noted that despite this liberal policy framework, very little has been tangibly achieved in inclusive, participatory and incremental upgrading (Huchzermeyer 2011:170–171; Pithouse 2009:1–2; Tissington 2011:89). The following dominant dependencies (five path dependencies; two interdependencies and two-goal dependencies) have contributed to the lack of significant informal settlements upgrading.

The first noticeable path dependence is the Urban Foundation’s concept of site and services, borrowed from the World Bank approach of the 1970s. The post-apartheid housing policy continued this path and sites and services still constitute a large part of what housing policy delivers. Also, using the IDT capital subsidy in Mangaung in the early 1990s to upgrade 4 132 informal settlements in Freedom Square provides yet another evidence of the housing policy path-dependency regarding informal settlement upgrading.

Second, in the ISUS, there are historical dependencies that deviate from the intent of the UISP. For example, Mangaung does not accept social compacts, narrowing the community participation processes. It assumes that the councillor and ward committee can do this better.

This tactic has little regard for community participation in informal settlement upgrading and reflects path dependency.

Also, municipalities and provinces generally refrain from incremental upgrades, preferring to leap from pure informality (with no services, no tenure rights and no formal structures) to pure formality (with formal top structures/houses, full ownership rights and formal bulk infrastructure and services). Municipalities are reluctant to abandon or depart from tried and trusted standard layouts, tenure models and the delivery of basic services (Cirolia et al. 2016). There is little regard for informal settlement communities' needs and aspirations in this path-dependent process.

Third, relocations or evictions of informal settlements display interdependencies leading to resistance and protest (conflict). For example, the Sibuyile Park informal settlement residents in Mangaung resorted to the South African Human Rights Commission to relieve their plight (imminent relocation and lack of service delivery) with the municipality and the province. Generally, communities have approached lawyers for assistance, which has led to the increased use of courts and defensive litigation to challenge state action (examples of interdependency) (SERI 2014).

Also, although the judicial guidance for urban policy in South Africa began with the Grootboom judgment in 2000 (and there are subsequent court cases) and incorporated the liberal in-situ upgrading of informal settlements into the housing policy, it reflects interdependencies among spheres of government. Municipalities must often provide alternative places to stay under the right to adequate housing if evictions occur. For instance, several court cases[45] have burdened municipalities with a duty of giving effect to the right of access to adequate housing by making alternative accommodation available if an eviction leads to homelessness. The case law clarifies that municipalities must act to provide alternative accommodation to evictees. Municipalities cannot rely on the escape hatch of national or provincial responsibility (the notion that housing is a national and provincial concurrent function) (SERI 2013).

The government plan to eradicate informal settlements by 2014 is an example of goal dependence. The eradication process is feared by slum dwellers and often results in worse life conditions due to the distance of the relocation sites from socio-economic amenities and

[45] Baartman v Port Elizabeth Municipality 2004 (1) SA 560 (SCA); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC); Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and Another 2010 ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010)

livelihoods. Other concerns include the brutal way evictions and relocations occur, the disruption of social networks, schooling and livelihoods, and in some cases, even worse access to necessities like water and shelter (COHRE 2005). For example, relocating the Caleb Motshabi informal settlement to the farm Klipfontein in Mangaung worsened their situation. The farm Klipfontein has no access to sanitation services and electricity, including sufficient public lighting and there are no socio-economic amenities like schools, clinics, and so forth, in the area. The residents must risk crossing the busy R702 road to access these services.

Lastly, the major focus on numerical targets (an example of goal dependency) negatively affected community participation and led to an under-utilisation of the capital subsidy for informal settlement upgrading.

6.6 Conclusion

Managing informal settlements and informal upgrading remains a relevant requirement for local government. Although confined to outlying areas where the average disposable incomes are low, informal settlements remain part of the urban fabric. Initially, the housing policy did not fully understand and appreciate the dynamic nature of informal settlements and clubbed interventions in the existing capital subsidy framework. The dynamics within informal settlements suggest that upgrading programmes must consider the different tenure options and engagement with different stakeholders. The involvement of informal settlement communities in upgrading and the need to give them a voice at key stages of the process is a basic principle of the UISP and an example of interdependencies. Litigation has forced the government to reconsider relocations and evictions and has catalysed communities to push for implementing the UISP. Further, partnerships formed around litigation have strengthened the ability of communities to negotiate practical solutions for their needs and have influenced decision-makers.

The UISP instrument promotes integrated urban development, empowerment and social cohesion. This is critical considering rapid urbanisation, poverty, widening socio-economic inequalities and ever-increasing urban unemployment. Yet, there is an urgent need to address the gap between the reality of implementation and the policy rhetoric. Further, the interdependencies between the different government spheres rooted in state land contributed to slower informal settlement upgrading processes in Mangaung. Mangaung had to seek approvals from state departments to develop on state land.

The lack of clarity in the criteria for incorporating settlements in municipal IDP and the limited community involvement in the settlements upgrading process, deserve the urgent attention of policymakers. Effectively, the chapter pointed to the following: the need to reform the urban land system and prioritise the IRDP; the need to develop and implement pro-poor land strategies; the need to push for *in-situ* informal settlement upgrading and incremental settlement; the need to pursue greater participation by communities and access to information; the importance of promoting community-based development and an urgent need to unlock well-located land to accommodate the urban poor, particularly those households who will be relocated due to de-densification of informal settlements once upgraded. There is sufficient evidence in this chapter that the UISP assists the principle of spatial restructuring carried forward in Chapter 7. Therefore the IRDP or megaprojects discussed in Chapter 7 demonstrate the post-apartheid government's intent to achieve socio-spatial integration and densification.

CHAPTER 7
FROM HOUSING TO INTEGRATED HUMAN SETTLEMENTS: THE ROLE OF MEGAPROJECTS

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 revealed how decades of colonial and apartheid urban planning informed by goal dependent racial segregation had left their imprint on South African cities. The post-apartheid government countered racial segregation by focusing on spatial integration and densification. Policy documents like the HWP (1994), Development Facilitation Act (1995) and HA (1997) advocated for integrated development, higher densities, the effective use of public infrastructure and socio-economic development. Despite good intentions, progress has been slow. The mass delivery of housing since 1994 seldom challenged the historical spatial legacies (Swilling 2010). In Chapter 4, I referred to these historical legacies as being path-dependent.

Mangaung found it difficult to create integrated housing development and bridge the historical racial divide (Chapters 5 and 6). State investment in the low-income sector failed to drive integrated human settlements or stimulate inclusive private sector engagement (SACN 2014a). Against this background, this chapter examines the effect of megaprojects or catalytic[46] projects (IRDP) as an instrument for integrated human settlements. BNG (2004) promotes a shift from smaller-scale housing developments to megaprojects (Chapter 4). This chapter investigates the tensions between the different actors and their interests in megaprojects.

Drawing on related international and national research, I argue that the relatively small population size of Mangaung, compared to other metros, affected the implementation of megaprojects. Further, I argue that the IRDP is a complex, political, multi-layered programme open to ambiguity and misinterpretation. This chapter discusses the origin, international and South African perspectives on megaprojects. Mangaung's growth, sprawl dynamics and compaction, 1994–2020 conclude the chapter (Figure 7.1).

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[46] The definition of catalytic projects falls in the ambit of the universal definition of adequate shelter as coined in the Habitat Agenda. "Catalytic projects can range from mega scale inclusionary neighbourhoods to seemingly small but high impact interventions. The underlying principle of all of these is that they are all spatially targeted interventions whose main objective is to: intervene to deliberately restructure settlement patterns"; and to create impact on the environment (DoHS 2015:147; 152). In this chapter I use megaprojects and catalytic projects interchangeably as it is the case within the human settlements sector (see for example Sisulu 2015:3). The IRDP is the instrument to deliver megaprojects/catalytic projects in South Africa.



Figure 7.1: Schematic representation of Chapter 7

7.2 Megaprojects: the origin and international perspective

It is possible to categorise the development of megaprojects into four phases: the development phase: 1930s–1950s; the urban renewal phase: 1950s–1960s; the transition phase: 1960s−1970s; and the period post-1970.

7.2.1 Development phase: 1930s–1950s

The economic decline in the United States (and elsewhere) during the Great Depression[47] in the 1930s laid the foundation for megaprojects. This economic decline increased the speed at which people moved into city centres to find work. Slums and urban decay became a problem (Miller and Hobbs 2002). The solution was urban renewal. Consequently, megaprojects gained momentum.

7.2.2 Urban renewal phase: 1950s–1960s

By the 1950s, many cities resorted to urban renewal initiatives like public transport regeneration, slums clearance and inner-city revitalisation (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003). The need for public transport combined with replacing slums with business districts and tourist attractions provided the rationale for urban regeneration. The increase in air travel resulted in cities hosting large numbers of people. Convention centres lured people to cities to spend their disposable income (Sidrauski 1967). The increase in sports stadia and the emergence of tourist

[47] The Great Depression was a long and severe worldwide economic downturn that began in the United States during the 1930s. The timing and impact of the Great Depression varied across the world; starting in 1929 in most countries and lasting until the late 1930s. It was the deepest, longest and most widespread depression of the 20th century.

attractions further assisted urban renewal initiatives. Most of these megaprojects were completed easily. For example, the United States government commonly removed people from slum areas to make space for businesses or infrastructure. These processes were largely unchallenged (Sogg and Wertheimer 1966). Project sponsors and planners were often autocratic, with little opportunity for affected communities to contest projects.

7.2.3 Transition phase: 1960s–1970s

The main lesson from this era was that megaprojects could not take place without proper consultation with the affected people (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003). Public opinion began to turn against megaprojects. The Civil Rights Movement, Citizen Participation and Environmental Activism were the three main challengers (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003). Although people were concerned about urban renewal and slum clearance, lower-income areas, occupied predominantly by minority race groups, linked megaprojects to racism. Slum clearance was seen as racist and led to riots against the United States government (Button 1978). Local resistance often meant that bureaucrats would not agree to a slum-clearing because of the risk of inciting more riots (Parrock 2015). The state realised that the implementation of the megaproject had to change.

7.2.4 Post-1970

Although retail development, specifically festival malls, gained traction during the 1970s, it was in the 1980s that this idea flourished. Unlike a strip mall or shopping complex, a festival mall offers various products and stores. Such malls encouraged customers to spend more time in one location. By the late 1980s, the world had changed considerably from the early 1970s and urban entrepreneurialism of the 1990s was the new form of governing (Chapter 2). Local governments had started transforming themselves into market-friendly agents whose main goal was to form alliances with investors for local economic development promotion (Jessop and Sum 2000). Local governments became entrepreneurial in three distinct ways.

First, the focus of the city agenda shifted from social policies to economic plans (Harvey 1989). As a result, the function of local governments also changed from delivering social welfare services to promoting economic development.

Second, public-private partnerships became popular ways of boosting local economies. Main actors included elected politicians, chambers of commerce, landowners, local bankers, utility

developers, and others whose self-interest could be realised through these collective actions of urban redevelopment (Harvey 1989).

Third, these public-private partnerships were proactive, business-friendly and innovative. City marketing, image-making, land-use design and competition with other localities were common (Jessop and Sum 2000).

Under the urban entrepreneurialism of the 1990s, many metropolitan regions in Europe generated internal coherence and partnerships (public and private) (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez 2002). Increasingly, large urban and regional projects contributed to regionalisation and competitiveness. Moulaert, Swyngedouw and Rodriguez (2001) argue that most urban megaprojects were dominated by the entrepreneurial city's narrow neo-liberal aspirations and warned against new élite formations. The authors also criticise the lack of social policy and democracy in new urban developments and the poor integration of large urban projects in broader urban processes and planning systems (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw 2003; Swyngedouw et al. 2002).

Megaprojects definitions, elements and characteristics

Altshuler and Luberoff (2003:2) define a megaproject as a project which is "physical, public and very expensive". These projects are usually significant construction projects[48]. The projects are public, funded mainly by governments or government agencies, with a smaller private investor. Megaprojects are costly, with a minimum cost threshold ranging between $250 million and $1 billion (Flyvbjerg 2009).

Steinberg (1987) characterises megaprojects as having high development costs and long development periods, often encompassing technical and economic uncertainty and becoming political symbols, which may hold great prestige for governments. Burballa-Noria (2018), Frick (2005; 2008), Sutherland, Sim and Scott (2015) provide a more detailed megaprojects definition, reflecting on six distinct elements and characteristics:

- **Complexity and uncertainty**: Complexity is a seldom-acknowledged feature that contributes to the risk and uncertainty of megaprojects. Complexity and uncertainty have implications for project design, funding, construction process and the success rate.

[48] It is noteworthy that some projects have become less focused on infrastructure development and more on examining scientific problems. Good examples of this are projects like the Square Kilometre Array (a collaboration of satellites and telescopes between South Africa, Australia and New Zealand) and the large Hadron collider in Meyrin, Switzerland

Often this complexity originates from the required multidisciplinary inputs from many organisations.

- **Large size** refers to the visibility and size of the development, involving significant changes in the area. This considers not only the size of the development but also the scope.

- **Captivating symbolism**: Apart from the size aspect, megaprojects involve substantial "design and technical accomplishments" (Frick 2008:240). Megaprojects may also entail and be presented as aesthetic gains.

- **Cost and time**: Megaprojects require large sums of money; these sums are often underestimated. The projects are implemented over a longer period, over five years.

- **Controversial nature**: These megaprojects have political rhetoric and want to see the impact.

- **Control**: This characteristic refers to the significance of the decision-making process and the managerial aspect of the development. It accounts for the actors involved, those that can exercise leadership and those that have a voice in the whole process or the different phases. The projects attract a high level of political interest or public attention. They are marred with a lack of certainty in their governance, conflicts and poor cooperation between partners.

Table 7.1 depicts what constitutes megaprojects and provides megaprojects' characteristics and descriptions.

Table 7.1: What constitutes megaprojects: characteristics and description

Element	Characteristic and description
Colossal (size)	Large scale project (enormous scope); technologically and logistically demanding. Involves a significant change in the area where it is developed.
Captivating	Despite the size, megaprojects involve substantial 'design and technical accomplishments'. They may also entail and/or be presented as aesthetic gains.
Controversial	This feature responds to the impacts that the development generates or is seen to generate concerning the local communities and the environment. It also points to political rhetoric.
Cost	Between $250 million and $1 billion (R1 000 million). Quite often, sums are underestimated.
Time	Long duration but program urgency (Exceeds five years long period).
Success	Different objectives. Fail to meet time schedules, cost estimations and anticipated project outcomes. Poor performance in terms of environment, economy, and public support. This leads to cost overruns and lower-than-predicted and expected revenues that hinder economic growth instead of improving or advancing it.
Complexity	It is a seldom-acknowledged feature that contributes to the risk and uncertainty innate to megaprojects. This has implications in terms of its design, funding and construction process. Requires the management of numerous complex activities. And contains a significant element of technological innovation. Megaprojects are unique, no megaprojects are similar.
Control	This characteristic refers to the significance of the decision-making process and the managerial aspect of the development. It accounts for the actors involved, those that can exercise leadership and those that have a voice in the whole process or the different phases.
Impacts	Socio-political impacts (community, environment) and state budgets.
Stakeholders and shareholders	Attract a high level of political interests or public attention. Marred with conflicts and poor cooperation between partners.

Source: Author (2021); Adapted from: Frick (2005); Grün (2004); Zidane, Johansen and Ekambaram (2013)

Megaprojects are known for their complexity and uncertainty (Salet, Bertolini and Mendel 2013). Several reasons contribute to these problems. The complexities are rooted in the projects' technically demanding, dynamic, and transformative nature (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003; Salet et al. 2013). Uncertainties result from risk, potential conflict and poor cooperation between diverse partners or actors (Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis and Veenswijk 2008). Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) argue that because the stakes are high and with competing interests, actors' struggles over project authorisation, planning, and implementation often lead to project

rescheduling and budget overruns. Similarly, the visions and interests inherent within megaprojects are also diverse (Gualini and Majoor 2007). New actors may join, changing projects. Majoor (2011) emphasises that while these large-scale development projects involve many political players (actors), there could also be differences between the stated intentions about the project and what finally happens on the ground or in reality. As megaprojects are medium to long-term, they encounter political, economic, and social changes. Overlapping interests commonly constrain (*cause rigidities*) progress and increase uncertainty. Shortcomings of megaprojects include a contribution to further socio-spatial inequalities, cost overruns, corruption and wasteful expenditure (Flyvbjerg 2007; Vento 2017). Despite the megaprojects' complex processes, more balanced and equitable outcomes are possible (Bornstein 2010; Salet 2008).

7.3 Megaprojects in South Africa

The megaprojects approach in South Africa emerged from the BNG policy in 2004 to address sub-standard housing, housing backlogs and persistent urban segregation (DoH 2004).

7.3.1 Towards megaprojects

Ten years of post-democracy housing delivery under the 1994 housing policy and strategy resulted in the extensive provision of state-subsidised formal housing (Charlton 2009). Yet, this national housing programme failed to adequately achieve its goals of developing integrated sustainable human settlements and addressing housing backlogs (Chapters 4, 5, 6). It did not help to reconstruct the geography of apartheid, as the legacy of sprawling, fragmented, racially divided cities continued (Sutherland, Sim and Scott 2015). In adopting the BNG in 2004, the government shifted its development focus towards "addressing settlement inefficiencies through the development of integrated human settlements which contribute towards more compact settlement form and provide a range of housing and social-economic opportunities" (DoHS 2009:9). The DoHS' emphasis changed to promote densification and integration. Projects had to be located on suitable land, support inner-city regeneration and urban renewal and improve the quality of the house whilst developing socio-economic infrastructure (DoHS 2014c). BNG[49] states that "utilising housing as an instrument for developing sustainable human

[49] The concept of integration is broad and incorporates various inter-related aspects. For the purposes of this study, emphasis is placed on spatial integration in terms of locational proximities to socio-economic opportunities, and public services and amenities normally provided by urban centres. However, there is also an institutional dimension as integration is both intra-governmental (within a sphere of government) and inter-governmental, requiring integrated planning and coordinated investment.

settlements, in support of spatial restructuring" (DoH 2004:7). In 2009, the Housing Code introduced the IRDP to replace the project-linked housing programme and facilitate all-inclusive human settlements in well-located areas (DoHS 2009). Then in 2014, the National Human Settlements Minister, Lindiwe Sisulu, officially announced a shift from small-scale infill to megaprojects of 15 000 units by saying; "after reviewing housing delivery from 2005 to 2014, we have concluded that we need to change our approach and move from small projects of 200 houses to megaprojects of integrated housing mix to cater for different incomes and needs" (Sisulu 2014a:2). The minister meant houses for the indigent, rental units, gap housing, social housing, bonded and serviced stands, ensuring integration of different income groups and races (DoHS 2014c). The minister went on to say, "MinMec[50] have decided to embark on megaprojects because, in this way, the economies of scale will be in our favour. In these megaprojects, there will be a collaboration of all three spheres of government" (Sisulu 2014b:9). The minister emphasised the policy shift and elucidated: "we will identify 50 National Priority Projects across South Africa that will deliver mega integrated and sustainable human settlements. MEGA is the keyword, as these projects will deliver BNG houses (30%), Gap houses (20%), rental accommodation (20%), social housing (10%), serviced sites (20%) and economic and social amenities" (Sisulu 2014a:3).

The IRDP intended to facilitate housing provision in well-located areas, creating convenient access to urban amenities, places of employment and social cohesion (Tissington 2013). While the IRDP projects are earmarked for an existing township where undeveloped land is available or unoccupied vacant land, the IRDP plans and develops integrated human settlements comprising various land uses. The IRDP provides land acquisition and servicing land-uses like recreational and commercial stands and low, middle and high-income groups. The IRDP also provides phased area-wide planning and construction of integrated housing projects. There are two phases involved in the planning and development of the projects. The first phase encompassed planning, acquiring land, establishing a township and providing serviced stands like residential, commercial and business, comprising various price ranges. In addition to being holistically integrated, it must ensure diversity of potential beneficiaries in the project (Tissington 2010). The second phase provided housing construction for qualifying low-income beneficiaries and the sale of stands to persons who do not qualify for subsidies (Tissington 2011). Thus, the IRDP addresses the aspects of economic, social, environmental and spatial

[50] The Minister and MECs

integration lost under the apartheid settlement planning and subsequently not adequately executed in current low-income housing projects.

7.3.2 Rationale

Several reasons contributed to the policy shift from small-scale infill to megaprojects (DoHS 2014c; Sisulu 2014a, b). First, there was frustration over the declining rate of housing delivery. Second, large projects could meet the demand for housing through economies of scale. Scaling up housing delivery became important and entrenched in housing practices and evolved into consistent rhetoric politicians and officials used. As Ballard and Rubin (2017) allude, megaprojects are intuitively appealing considering the ever growing housing backlog because they appear as muscular "big hit" interventions, more visible than small-scale projects. Third, state-led city-building is a catalyst for development. The minister notes: "We call these 'catalytic projects' because they will trigger massive investments by the private sector and have huge economic spin-offs. We assess that our investment, estimated at R90 billion over five years, will trigger about R150 billion from the private sector. Hundreds of thousands of jobs will be sustained and thousands more created" (Sisulu 2015:4).

Fourth, there was a concern about the state not meeting housing expectations. Large projects had to fill this void. In her parliamentary budget speech in 2014, the minister noted that a fifth of all community protests was related to housing (Sisulu 2014b). The South African Local Government Association study found that 38% of the respondents (their member municipalities) viewed the state's failure to keep housing promises as a concern. The minister committed to building "1.5 million housing opportunities, located in quality living environments by the year 2019" (DoHS 2015a:147) to reduce the 2.3 million housing backlog (Petterson, 2014). The minister said, "[t]he waiting list requires us to do nothing less than that… We can't go into 30 years of freedom with a huge backlog" (Sisulu, 2014, quoted in Merten 2014). The minister required the Housing Development Agency (HDA)[51] to play a prominent role.

Lastly, the expectation was that megaprojects would reduce the cumbersome intergovernmental relations (Cirolia and Smit 2017; Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Megaprojects must foster collaborative planning (Millstein 2011). For example, the minister said that implementing megaprojects is a way of "helping to streamline the working relationships

[51] The HDA is an agent of the national DoHS established in 2009 to identify, acquire, hold, plan and dispose of well-located land and buildings for the development of human settlements (South Africa 2008).

between national, provincial and local government" and between different sectors within government (Sisulu quoted in South Africa. Department of Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation 2014).

South Africa has a long history of mega-scale housing developments. There were developments in the early post-apartheid era, including Bramfischerville, Cosmo City, Lufhereng, N2 Gateway, Waterloo and Cornubia. When the minister announced megaprojects in 2014, several unhinged[52] lead projects of the 2004 BNG policy were underway (Cirolia and Smit 2017; Haferberg 2013; Millstein 2011; Sutherland et al. 2015). The Minister states: "in 2004, we established the N2-Gateway Project as a national MinMec project, funded by all nine provinces…to test the State's ability to build on a large scale" (Sisulu 2014b:8). Ballard (2017) argues that the new direction announced in 2014 meant that Cornubia, N2 Gateway project and Cosmo City would shift from being relatively unusual projects (projects implemented not expressly following any specific housing subsidy programme) to the norm.

7.3.3 Megaprojects criticism

Megaprojects have received criticism. Megaprojects' implementers often avoid and violate established good governance practices, transparency and participation. These behaviours are sometimes out of ignorance or because they see such practices as counterproductive to getting projects started (Loraine 2007). Although the number of houses in each project might sound large, these numbers are often revised as the projects are implemented, and megaprojects take many years to plan, which means that it does not necessarily lead to increased developments (Sutherland et al. 2015). Turok (2015) also questions why 15 000 units were a critical threshold, as no rationale was offered for these units. Accountability is a common problem in megaprojects. With a construction lifespan of ten years or more, it is unlikely that the same politician who agreed to the project will still be in the same position (Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg and Rothengatter 2003). Also, planners and managers often lead projects without enough experience, and that keeps changing throughout the lengthy project cycles of megaprojects, it leaves leadership and accountability weak (Flyvbjerg 2014).

[52] I use unhinged to imply projects implemented not expressly in accordance with (or linked to) any specific housing subsidy programme.

7.4 Mangaung growth, sprawl dynamics and compaction: 1994–2020

Despite adopting the BNG (2004) and introducing the IRDP (2009), Mangaung did not implement the IRDP until 2011.

Mangaung residents were forced under apartheid planning to occupy backyard dwellings and newcomers to the city invaded land since the early 1990s (Chapter 6). Although post-apartheid planning policies encouraged higher densities and discouraged sprawl (Newton 2010; Tan and Klaasen 2007; Todes, Weakley and Harrison 2018; Tonkin 2008), the south-eastern quadrant of Bloemfontein experienced extensive urban sprawl (Chapter 6). Concurrently, high-income growth has happened in the north-western Bloemfontein central business district since the early 1990s (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b). Figure 7.2 shows the development patterns in Mangaung in the first two decades since 1990.



Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007b)

Figure 7.2: Mangaung development patterns

Figure 7.2 shows the polarisation of settlement development in Mangaung. The development shift towards the north-western areas of Bloemfontein, away from the traditional central business district, has contributed to the central business district's decline and increased travel distances. The continued urban sprawl contrasts with the policy emphasis on densification. The merger of Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu into the Mangaung Local Municipality

in 2001 had to counter the spatial fragmentation of apartheid planning (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b). Also, the merger confirmed the socio-economic links and people's mobility between these centres or regions. For example, studies show that between 10% and 20% of the people in low to middle-income housing previously lived in Botshabelo (Marais and Ntema 2013; Marais, Hoekstra, Napier, Cloete and Lenka 2018).

This relocation from Thaba Nchu and Botshabelo is a form of spatial infilling. However, this sprawling development pattern created a backlog in providing land, services, social, and commercial facilities. In contrast, the central business district, with many of the services and socio-economic facilities needed, remained underutilised (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b). With the approval of the IDP in 2007, Mangaung sought to improve "the spatial integration…by reducing the separateness of these development patterns of the CBD, south-eastern, north-western areas, Botshabelo, Thaba Nchu and the rural areas" to contribute to Mangaung's long-term sustainability (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b:37).

Achieving this integration would reduce the competing pressures between development patterns while reinforcing the soundness of the primary city structure, its inherent strengths, and development patterns (Mangaung Local Municipality 2003a).

Towards spatial integration and densification

In Mangaung, spatial integration and densification had become an important urban development strategy "to address the issues of city sprawl" (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b:43). Given the number of people relocating from Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu to Bloemfontein, the urban area should have been more compact to maximise opportunities. The intention was not only for "residential densification but also for people to be part of, and have ready access to, a wider urban system in which the broader range of day-to-day needs can be met" (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b:43). This would also contribute to redressing structural and spatial inequalities. Moreover, more concentrated nodal developments were envisaged, well-connected by public transport. The nodes and activity spines are the greatest access to a wide range of urban opportunities. Mixed-use development and spatial clustering should occur along the radial routes and those connector or ring routes between the radial routes and at nodal points.

Mangaung sought to address the polarisation of settlement development within Bloemfontein and between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. Development towards the east and

the south of the central business district was encouraged. This intention gave rise to the "balanced city" idea by identifying seven land parcels. It would use existing social and physical infrastructure services in the inner city, the northern and south-western areas and exploit spatial opportunities in other parts of the city.

These opportunities would provide investment choice of "residential and economic developments…in underutilised areas" (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b:33). Even though land parcels were identified in Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu, large scale projects (IRDP) were only feasible in Bloemfontein (Chapters 5 and 6). Migration patterns from Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu to Bloemfontein also justified large scale projects in Bloemfontein.

Figure 7.3 shows Mangaung's intention to change development patterns for spatial integration.



Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007b)

Figure 7.3: Mangaung's intention to change development patterns for spatial integration (orange and yellow mean future development opportunities and existing developments, respectively)

Figure 7.4 sketches the envisaged "balanced city" structure in Mangaung.



Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007b)

Figure 7.4: The Balanced City notion in Mangaung

7.4.1 The rationale for megaprojects introduction: post-2011

Mangaung struggled to internalise and institutionalise the transition from project-linked subsidies to the IRDP. There are three reasons. First, understanding the IRDP has been a challenge. For example, central to the IRDP is the concept of integrated development. Integrated development contains a mix of housing typologies and tenures, incomes and social and age groups that enable social inclusion. Furthermore, Mangaung's population size is substantially smaller than the bigger metros[53], contributing to the municipality's difficulty justifying megaprojects. It was challenging to secure coordination across spheres and departments and appropriate intergovernmental implementation support.

Second, the Free State province and the municipality did not have sufficient capacity to introduce and implement the IRDP. Instantly, the IRDP policy (which was designed as a

[53] In terms of the population estimate per metro (based on Statistics South Africa Community Survey Data of 2016); the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality has an estimated population of 4 949 347; Cape Town metro: 4 005 016; eThekwini metro: 3 702 231; Ekurhuleni metro: 3 379 104; Tshwane metro: 3 275 152; Nelson Mandela Bay metro: 1 263 051; Buffalo City metro: 834 997 and Mangaung metro: 787 803 (Statistics South Africa 2016).

two-phased delivery mechanism[54]) required the developer (a municipality or a provincial department where the municipality lacks capacity) to administer projects and manage the development process in terms of the provisions of the programme. The municipality or the provincial department were not geared towards this.

Lastly, the IRDP (with the initial 15 000 units threshold) appeared to be suited for big cities. The larger cities had a more substantial demand for housing at this scale. Mangaung is a small metropolitan city.

Despite the reasons cited above, there was a compelling case for raising density levels and seeking greater urban efficiencies. First, Mangaung was concerned about the overall decline in housing delivery. The peripheral location of low-income housing developments was problematic (Chapter 5). Furthermore, the levels of unemployment were high. For example, although unemployment prevalence was higher among females (about 41%) than males (about 33%) in 2011, the overall unemployment rate was about 38% in Mangaung (MMM 2011).

Second, with the current problems of integration and the settlement pattern realities, Mangaung needed to review urban growth on three levels: (i) finding appropriate ways of spatial integration between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu, (ii) reducing commuting between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu (SACN 2004), and (iii) planning for "higher density in respect of housing development to ensure the economical utilisation of existing land and services" (Mangaung Local Municipality 2003a:37). Further, the case for higher densities revolved around three primary arguments in the municipality. The first argument was that a more sustainable city (environmentally and financially) had to be created. To this end, Mangaung supported higher density development to maximise the use of existing infrastructure.

The second argument was that higher economic densities promoted productive efficiency and agglomeration economies. The large concentrations of customers, firms, suppliers and competitors enhance flexibility, innovation and productivity (Rosenthal and Strange 2004; Storper and Venables 2004). The final argument was that higher density is essential for social

[54] Phase 1 includes all the necessary planning and land acquisition necessary to secure well located land. It also includes the legal processes to obtain development approval (township establishment), environmental approval and other necessary approvals. Included in the township establishment phase is the design of the layout of the project and the location of sites for different typologies of housing and different economic groups, sites for schools, community facilities, shops and business sites and parks and open space. Phase 1 also includes the installation of internal services. Internal services are delivered to all properties including the commercial and market/bonded houses and not only the subsidised housing areas. The installation of internal services presumes that there is access to bulk infrastructure and should it not be readily available this must be planned for and financed (by the necessary responsible authorities) as part of Phase 1.
In Phase 2 house construction for subsidy beneficiaries commences, as does the sale of stands to non-qualifying beneficiaries. Sites for commercial and social development are also sold so that facilities and amenities can be provided at the same time as the house construction. Hence, Phase 2 requires strong co-ordination of all the stakeholders who will be developing their land so that schools, clinics, shops, parks and community halls can be built at the same time as the subsidy houses, the rental housing, the finance-linked houses and the private sector, affordable housing. Coordination across spheres and departments, implement support and appropriate intergovernmental relations are essential.

inclusion, integration and economic development. Consequently, the municipality identified mixed-use projects with a large scale housing component to create employment, address housing backlogs and produce integrated human settlements. On 30 September 2011, the Mangaung Executive Mayor, Thabo Manyoni, outlined the reasons for the megaprojects (IRDP). During his inauguration speech, the mayor committed the municipality to integrated development through "de-racialising the built environment,…accelerated release of land for large scale projects of …Vista Park and Hillside View, to bring integration and create economic opportunities" (Manyoni 2011:13). The Mangaung housing development policy shifted towards the IRDP. The municipality's change towards creating newly integrated neighbourhoods countered the ongoing peri-urban developments that perpetuated racial and economic segregation (Chapter 5). The mayor committed to review the SDF to provide guidelines on future megaprojects and to "direct new developments eastward to integrate both Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu" through the N8 Corridor Development[55] (Manyoni 2011:12–13). Megaprojects would be central to existing strategic development plans (for example, the IDP). Mangaung's existing strategic development plans aligned with other spheres of government development plans. The IDP objectives aligned with the national government's 2014 human settlements targets (Chapter 6). The mayor framed megaprojects within a broader desire to create new cities and emphasised the identification of new land. This is an example of goal dependency.

7.4.2 Anchoring the vision of megaprojects

Pinson (2009) argues that megaprojects are, in most cases, an integral part of a strategic plan or city vision. Mangaung's vision and central location anchored the megaproject programme. The mayor envisioned Mangaung becoming "a progressive municipality that is … globally safe and attractive to live, work and invest in" (Manyoni 2011:9). Achieving this vision meant departing from fragmented development approaches (small-scale housing projects) to investing in the IRDP. Although the application of the IRDP in 2011 was intended for spatial integration and compaction of Mangaung, there are pockets of existing examples of spatial integration and compaction in Bloemfontein. For example, the studentification[56] of suburbs (for example Universitas and Brandwag) contributes in this respect (Ackermann and

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[55] The N8 (National Roads) links Bloemfontein-Botshabelo-Thaba Nchu. Although, functionally, the N8 corridor fulfilled this aim between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu, historically it was used to separate black and white people. The the N8 corridor was the only lifeline that connected these two ethnic entities with Bloemfontein. This road was important for the dormitory township of Botshabelo as in 1987, 55% of its inhabitants worked outside the area. To sustain this spatial distortion and to ensure that poor blacks were kept at a distance, a subsidised commuting bus service/system was introduced between Botshabelo, Thaba Nchu and Bloemfontein.

[56] A process where the original residents neighbouring tertiary institutions are gradually displaced due to an in-migration or inflow of students causing spatial dysfunctionality where, ultimately, only the needs of students subculture are catered for.

Visser 2016). Other examples include using the former buffer strips for low-income housing (Mokoena and Marais 2007). The low-income suburb called Sejake between Hamilton industries and Rocklands township promoted a mixed-land use development pattern (Marais 2021). The development of Vista Park 1, in the southern part of the central business district, is an example of infill development that is expanding towards the Uitsig (suburban) residential area. The Freedom Square informal settlement upgrading between Heidedal and the former Mangaung Township in the mid-1990s also represents a form of infill development (Ntema, Massey, Marais, Cloete and Lenka 2018).

However, the extensive new low-income housing projects undertaken in Thaba Nchu and Botshabelo (Mokoena and Marais 2007) and the higher-income settlements towards the west of Bloemfontein constituted examples of continued fragmentation. So, consistent with the tenets of BNG, Mangaung needed to address these spatial challenges through partnerships modelled on public and private sector investments.

7.4.3 Description and spatial details of the megaprojects

The municipal strategic development tools detailed the required interventions to address the shortcomings. The municipal IDP, SDF, Built Environment Performance Plans and IHSP guide spatial transformation, inclusivity, mobility, integration, economic development, location and the implementation of megaprojects (IRDP).

Figure 7.5 shows the spatial location of four (Airport Development Node; Hillside View; Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3) megaprojects (IRDP) in Mangaung.

Although Mangung's intent to develop a node at the airport is explicit in the 2001/2002 IDP and subsequent development frameworks (Mangaung Local Municipality 2006), the Airport Development Node[57] concept plan only began in 2012. The mayor opened the Airport Development Node in April 2013 (after the comprehensive preliminary technical analyses, planning and urban design) to create economic activity and human settlements in the city's eastern part. Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View were allocated for development through a tender process in 2012.

[57] The Airport Development Node is the first significant development of the N8 corridor project and dates back to the first Mangaung IDP and the Free State Provincial Development Plans.



Source: Mangaung Local Municipality (2007b)

Figure 7.5: Spatial location of four megaprojects (IRDP) in Mangaung

Figures 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 show the layout plans of the four megaprojects (Airport Development Node; Hillside View; Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3).



Figure 7.6: ADN megaproject (Phase 1)



Figure 7.7: Hillside View megaproject



Figure 7.8: Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 megaprojects

Mangaung allocated Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View for development based on the Land Availability Agreement, signed between the municipality and the turnkey developers in 2012–2014. The Land Availability Agreement is a contract between the city (original landowner) and the developer in which a specific land parcel is secured for the benefit of the people or developer. At the same time, the ownership remains with the original landowner. There are three essential features of the Land Availability Agreement:

- The Land Availability Agreement outlines the parties to the contract, their roles and responsibilities;
- It contains the terms and conditions on which the land is made available (to the developer) for development; and
- It outlines the development targets, financial obligations, breaches and conditions for contract termination.

The megaprojects are in the underdeveloped southern and eastern parts of Bloemfontein, the central business district, on municipal-owned land and within the urban edge[58]. In terms of the IDP and the SDF, the objective was to locate "higher density residential environments within the urban edge, near employment opportunities through the development of … 11 500 new houses … in the underdeveloped areas" (Mangaung Local Municipality 2007b:48). Consequently, the projected yield of the four megaprojects is about 25 400[59] new housing opportunities (which is higher than the 2007 IDP and the SDF projections of 11 500 new houses) at an approximate R110,8 billion.

7.4.4 Megaprojects implementation and impact assessment

Megaprojects improved urban efficiency, enticed growth and investment, and fostered spatial transformation. Notably, at the city level, transformation is seen as "a spatially defined, socially embedded process; … an interrelated series of materially driven practices, whereby the form, substance and overall dimensions of urban space are purposefully changed to reflect the principles of a more equitable social order" (Williams 2000:169). This would mean that spatial transformation relates mainly to those efforts to address the physical manifestations of

[58] The urban edges is a demarcated line to direct, control and manage the outer limits of any development. The urban edge is meant to establish limits or the boundary beyond which urban development should not be allowed. Also, to demarcate land that can be provided with urban services (roads and storm water, sewer system, streetlights and water) to accommodate the expected growth of the urban area for a defined period.

[59] The literature explained that in megaprojects, the number of houses might sound large. However, these numbers are often revised during projects implementation as megaprojects take many years to plan and realise (Sutherland et al. 2015)

apartheid planning (Oranje 2014; SACN 2014b) to improve people's quality of life by meeting the need for inclusivity, access and mobility and economic development (Ovens 2013; Turok 2014).

7.4.5 Locational significance and partnerships

Although the Airport Development Node is somewhat peripheral, Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View are infilling spatial planning megaprojects. All four megaprojects are located on municipal-owned land, maximising existing infrastructure assets for the citizens. To comply with the IRDP tenets, the Mangaung Council approved the four megaprojects as restructuring zones on 29 March 2017. Restructuring zones are municipal identified geographic areas (through a council resolution), with the concurrence of the provincial government (for targeted and focused investment), for purposes of social housing programmes and designated by the minister in the government gazette for approved projects (South Africa 2008). Restructuring zones are essential because, as a component of megaprojects, social housing must be close to socio-economic facilities and income-generating opportunities within urban restructuring zones (Social Housing Regulatory Authority [SHRA] 2017; Turok, Scheba and Visagie 2022). In effect, the social housing restructuring zones achieve: (i) spatial restructuring through bringing lower-income households into areas where there are significant socio-economic opportunities from which they would otherwise be excluded because of the land market dynamics on the one hand and the effects of land use planning instruments on the other hand, (ii) social restructuring by promoting a mix of racial classes, and (iii) economic restructuring by promoting job creation and spatial access to economic opportunity. The stringent criteria for ministerial approval[60] for restructuring zones often cause delays. For example, the Mangaung Council approved the four megaprojects areas as restructuring zones on 29 March 2017 and the national DoHS only gazetted these areas on 1 October 2021. Megaprojects require multidisciplinary inputs from many organisations, another reason for project implementation delays.

To facilitate the successful implementation of the projects in Mangaung, the mayor envisaged the establishment of "a planning forum…that includes the…province" (Manyoni 2011, cited

[60] The approval criteria are as follows: the provision of a clear and sound restructuring logic in motivating the application; clear specification of restructuring outcomes and indicators; satisfactory identification of outputs considered necessary to achieve restructuring outcomes; successful incorporation of restructuring zones into the normal planning activities or processes of the applicant municipality; specification of adequate zone management arrangements and satisfactory consultation with existing or affected residents.

in MMM 2012a:51). This upfront acknowledgement of the province's role in megaprojects was vital as implementation requires partnerships beyond the private sector.

Spatial transformation and integration

The various spatial transformation aspects are important considerations, including accessibility and spatial integration. Table 7.2 provides spatial transformations detail per project.

Table 7.2: Spatial transformation and integration details per project

Vista Park 2	Vista Park 3	Hillside View	Airport Development Node
• Located south of the central business district next to the existing industrial area and social amenities. • A good example of spatial transformation and infill. • Use of previous buffer zone to integrate two parts of the city. • Promotes compaction and densification. • Designs and housing typologies promote compaction and densification. • Easy access to economic opportunities and public transport. • Mixed-use development is integrated into the existing urban fabric.	• Located south of the central business district next to the current industrial area and social amenities. • A good example of spatial transformation and infill. • Use of previous buffer zone to integrate two parts of the city. • Promotes compaction and densification. • Designs and housing typologies promote compaction and densification. • Easy access to economic opportunities and public transport. • Mixed-use development is integrated into the existing urban fabric.	• Located south of the central business district next to the existing industrial area and social amenities. • A good example of spatial transformation and infill. • Use of previous buffer zone to integrate two parts of the city. • Promotes compaction and densification. • Designs and housing typologies promote compaction and densification. • Easy access to economic opportunities and public transport. • Mixed-use development is integrated into the existing urban fabric.	• Peripheral project. • Located east of the central business district next to the airport and with limited social amenities. • Forms N8 corridor link between the central business district, Mandela View, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. • Promotes spatial transformation. • Integrates into existing airport precinct, Estoire and Raceway Park developments. • Design and housing typologies promote compaction and densification. • Provides mixed uses and typologies and includes new industrial stands integrated with human settlement development.

Source: Author (2021)

Whereas the Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View projects are situated south of the Bloemfontein central business district, the developments are well connected to the

Bloemfontein central business district to the north and the N1 through O.R Tambo Street (M30). The developments share seven features: spatial transformation and infill, use of previous buffer zones to integrate two parts of the city, promotes compaction and densification, designs and housing typologies promote compaction and densification, easy access to economic opportunities and public transport and mixed-use development integrated into the existing urban fabric (Table 7.2). Furthermore, the developments are accessible from the Jagersfontein Road off-ramp connected by Vereeniging Road through the Fleurdal-Uitsig suburbs to the east, and there is an existing residential area on the northern edge of the sites and a large current industrial area (Hamilton) (MMM 2012a; MMM 2016). These three megaprojects (Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View), although at different stages of development, provide three categories of single houses for three distinct income groups: (i) a monthly income of up to R3 500 (this is low income for persons who qualify for RDP housing); (ii) a monthly income of R3 501–R22 000 (which relates to the credit-linked or FLISP housing subsidy also referred to as “gap housing”); and (iii) any income higher than the categories above (access to bonded houses, which are available to anyone who can pay instantly or can access a home loan through the commercial banks,that is, has a monthly income of more than R22 000) (MMM 2020a). Importantly, the allocation of housing units within these megaprojects would not be ward specific, but intended to benefit citizens throughout the municipality. Figure 7.9 shows photos of the typical Hillside View project layout, depicting the low-income compartment (left), credit linked houses and actual low-income houses.

Source: Author (2018, 2021)

Figure 7.9: Photos of the actual Hillside View project layout (taken 11 September 2018); a credit-linked house (top-right) and low-income houses (bottom-right) taken by the researcher during fieldwork (11 July 2021)

There are also proportions of land allocated to blocks of flats or social housing rental units. These developments also offer three storeys RDP walk-ups (low-rise multi-unit dwellings) for the first time. The right mix of units is a critical success factor. Although the blend will vary for each project and will depend, among other things, on the location of the project, the essential criteria for formulating this mix is to achieve sustainable development. Essentially, there must be sufficient households that pay rates to make the provision of services by the municipality viable. The right mix of units also attracts retail, commercial and other non-residential investments and contributes to creating a viable secondary market. For example, the high proportion of subsidy units may raise issues of development sustainability. It is suggested that the best mix for an integrated development is one-third fully bonded units, one-third partially subsidised units and one-third fully subsidised units (Ehlers and Limacher 2008).

The Airport Development Node is situated along the N8 highway, adjacent to the Bram Fischer International Airport and connected to the other three developments (Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View) through the M10. Despite being somewhat peripheral, the Airport Development Node conceptualisation was deliberate. In terms of development deliverables, the Airport Development Node's objective, among other things, is to assist "spatial…integration" of Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu (MMM 2012a:58). The mayor stated that the "City's uppermost catalytic project" aims to address the erroneous apartheid spatial framework that has designated Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu nodes as mere labour reserves for Bloemfontein (Manyoni 2015:23). The Airport Development Node wants to ignite the linkage of several nodes: the central business district (CBD), Airport Node, Mandela View, Botshabelo-Thaba Nchu, thus facilitating a continuum of development along the N8 corridor. The mayor's remarks during the launch of the Airport Development Node in April 2013 pointed to the second intention of this project implementation: the desire to rekindle Mangaung's economy. The project carries R100 billion worth of investment into Mangaung's economy (MMM 2012a; Kock 2013). Although the Airport Development Node is not yet awarded for development, Mangaung has already made initial infrastructure investments. The node consists of two main phases. The first phase is the southern part situated below the N8 Airport Interchange. The second phase is the northern part, located around the north-eastern boundary of the Bram Fischer International Airport. The development comprises Phase 1 of the project, approximately 650 ha and Phase 2, about 880 ha (MMM 2012a; 2020; MMM 2016). The bulk infrastructure installation is complete, and phase 1 town planning processes are undertaken and funded by the HDA.

Projects assessment and evaluation

Seven assessment and evaluation elements are considered: accessibility (location), leveraging state assets for development, contracting arrangements, layout plans and urban designs, socio-economic integration, public open spaces and development progress. First, the assessment of Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View projects established that the three infill projects are easily accessible from the Bloemfontein central business district and the N1 through the Jagersfontein Road off-ramp connected by Vereeniging Road. The projects are located south of the Bloemfontein central business district on municipal land, available for development. This means there was no upfront land cost associated with the land release for these projects. Although each project adheres to the basic principles of the IRDP, the procurement and contracting protocols for each megaproject differ based on a set of negotiated parameters between Mangaung and the turnkey developer.

Second, the street patterns and land-use zoning schemes that define these three megaprojects' internal composition follow typical planning ideals for layout and internal structure. Chapter 4 labelled this inability to break with the spatial patterns of apartheid (or colonial planning framework) an excellent example of path-dependency. The street designs do not provide for broader sidewalks and cycle lanes. Third, there is provision for socio-economic facilities (health, education, business, commercial and community) and public open spaces for all kinds of urban activities. One provincial officer states that although "there is 'better' integration of different housing classes, with the low-income across the street to credit-linked houses, they are still compartmentalised and do not co-exist alongside each other". The same provincial officer adds that it is more of a "combined housing megaproject than mixed housing megaproject". Furthermore, the private sector informant reiterates that while the top structure construction work is advanced regarding Hillside View, with about 800 completed housing units 95% occupied, there are no social facilities like schools and clinics. The non-availability of social facilities is an indictment of cooperative governance. The provincial Departments of Education and Health are still not part of the "supposed to have been established planning forum". The private sector developer confirms that "the province is not coming to the party and undecided on building schools, which is detrimental to the development". Fourth, Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 are far behind schedule with the infrastructure installation – ten years after the official projects site hand-over in 2011. The projects had a 15 years completion horizon. There are three challenges in Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3: funding availability and flow, intergovernmental coordination to enable simultaneous investment in residential units

and non-residential facilities and the extent to which the private sector investment occurs. Even though the HDA (a national public sector development agency accountable to the National Minister of Human Settlements through its board) is given the dominant role in megaprojects (IRDP) implementation, it cannot bridge funds or raise additional sources for funds. A provincial key informant raised an irony in this adjusted institutional arrangement. He argued that the "HDA is given the leading role in megaprojects (IRDP) implementation in Mangaung, yet the Minister of Human Settlements placed the Agency under administration on the 14 December 2018". The evidence is that the "Minister undertook this step to strengthen governance, and turnaround the cash-flow financial deficit that the agency was suffering" (HDA 2020:7).

Examining the Airport Development Node, there are several critical elements. Like Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View, the node is located on municipal land. If successfully carried out, the project will likely generate positive economic effects in additional property rates revenue from new development. Potential social and environmental benefits are evident in shortened distances between residential tenants and the Bloemfontein central business district work locations, social or cultural services land uses including education, social services, recreation and high-quality greenspace along Bloemspruit.

The original investment into the industrial stands infrastructure was a conditional grant from the National Treasury. Although the industrial stands are available to private investors, very few of these stands have been sold to private-sector investors. Also, Mangaung has not realised or attracted any other funding sources for the Airport Development Node and none of the node's two phases is allocated for development. The project readiness assessment conducted in 2018 established that the development has no clear objectives and no analysis has determined market-supportable development potential in the project (Cities Support Programme 2018). Practically, if market demand analysis (once conducted) suggests a lack of demand or very low demand, Mangaung has to reimagine the scope or timeline of the project. Also, "a lack of clear project objectives might reduce the likelihood that the project remains a clear municipal priority over time, which will be crucial to secure private sector involvement, especially after a long period of inaction at the ADN site" (Palmer Development Group 2022:5).

Table 7.3 outlines the assessment and evaluation of the projects against the seven elements.

Table 7.3: Comparative assessment of the four megaprojects against contracting, restructuring zones, spatial transformation and integration aspects

Project v Feature	Hillside View	Vista Park 2	Vista Park 3	Airport Node
The signing of the Land Availability Agreement)	22 November 2012	18 February 2015	11 September 2014	Not applicable
The signing of the Service Level Agreement	10 July 2014	09 September 2015	11 September 2014	Not applicable
Restructuring zones (council resolution)	29 March 2017	29 March 2017	29 March 2017	29 March 2017
Restructuring zones (Gazetted – Social Housing Policy and Social Housing Act of 2008)	01 October 2021	01 October 2021	01 October 2021	01 October 2021
Accessibility (location)	Located south of Bloemfontein central business district (about 7 km). Residents can easily and affordably access various parts of the city and different services. The transportation network supports the integration objectives (Jagersfontein Road off-ramp connected by Vereeniging Road, M30, N1)	Located south of Bloemfontein central business district (about 6.5 km). Residents can easily and affordably access various parts of the city and different services. The transportation network supports the integration objectives (Jagersfontein Road off-ramp connected by Vereeniging Road, M30, N1)	Located south of Bloemfontein central business district (about 6.5 km). Residents can easily and affordably access various parts of the city and different services. The transportation network supports the integration objectives (Jagersfontein Road off-ramp connected by Vereeniging Road, M30, N1)	They are located east of Bloemfontein's central business district (about 11 km). Residents can easily and affordably access various parts of the city and different services. The N8 and M10 (Rudolf Greyling off-ramp connects N1) transportation networks support the integration objectives
Leveraging state assets	Project using municipal-owned land for the delivery of a social good. Maximising the use of existing infrastructure assets for the citizens	Project using municipal-owned land for the delivery of a social good. Maximising the use of existing infrastructure assets for the citizens	Project using municipal-owned land for the delivery of a social good. Maximising the use of existing infrastructure assets for the citizens	Project using municipal-owned land for the delivery of a social good. Maximising the use of existing infrastructure assets for the citizens
• Socio-economic integration • Mixed land uses and incomes (and housing	Infill planning with mixed land use: Stands for commercial and/or business use availed, as well as stands for housing typologies: 6000 housing opportunities: CRU/Social housing, FLISP/GAP and rental	Infill planning with mixed land use: Stands for commercial and/or business use availed, as well as stands for housing typologies: 5 600 housing opportunities: CRU/Social housing, FLISP/GAP and rental	Infill planning with mixed land use: Stands for commercial and/or business use availed, as well as stands for housing typologies: 5 100 housing opportunities: CRU/Social housing, FLISP/GAP and rental housing, bonded	It caters for expansion and is a good example of spatial transformation. The industrial stands and human settlements development provide an integrated approach for capital investment on Bloemfontein's eastern

opportunities to be created)	housing, bonded units, BNG housing and multi-storey units. A good example of spatial transformation and low to medium density development. Compartmentalised housing types.	housing, bonded units BNG housing and multi-storey units. A good example of spatial transformation and low to medium density development. Compartmentalised housing types.	units, BNG housing and multi-storey units. A good example of spatial transformation and low to medium density development. Compartmentalised housing types.	side. 8 700 housing opportunities: Social housing, FLISP/GAP and rental housing, bonded units and multi-storey units. A good example of spatial transformation is medium to high-density development.
Quality public spaces	Development has safe, clean and accessible public spaces (parks, roads and pavements)	Development layout provides for accessible public spaces.	Development layout provides for accessible public spaces.	Development layout provides for accessible public spaces.
Innovative urban designs (regenerative development and the ecological mindset)	Development is sensitive to environmental challenges like water scarcity, greening and recycling; it uses solar energy to save on electricity. The BNG housing beneficiaries receive trees and gardens watered through groundwater. No water harvesting initiatives	Development is yet to commence.	Development is yet to commence.	Development is yet to commence.
Safety	Development has sufficient public lighting active spaces for residents. Neighbourhood and housing designs enhance security. The site for SAPS is 2.1 km away.	Development is yet to commence.	Development is yet to commence.	Development is yet to commence.
Investment potential to alleviate unemployment (R)	Value R3.9 billion.	Value R3.7 billion.	Value R3.2 billion.	Value R100 billion.

Source: Author (2021)

While the Airport Development Node represents one of the largest municipal-owned and driven projects (megaproject) since 1994, it is the most complex involving multiple stakeholders: the Airports Company South Africa, Civil Aviation Authority, South African Air Force, Air Traffic Navigation Services, Transnet, PRASA, SANRAL, Surrounding Private Developers, the Mangaung community, various Free State provincial and national departments (Manyoni, 2012). The literature explained earlier that this level of interdependency leads to undue delays in an already lengthy process and possible project cost overruns (Bruzelius et al. 2003).

Dilemmas and megaprojects paradox in Mangaung

The four megaprojects in Mangaung are different from the conventional project-linked subsidies (Chapter 5) regarding their complexity, level of aspiration, lead times and stakeholder cooperation and involvement. Although Mangaung allocated Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View simultaneously as the first megaprojects (IRDP turnkey developments) in 2011, implementation has been slow. While Hillside View has been the most advanced, the projects have different development dynamics and complexities. A critical private sector informant states that "lack of coordination and cooperation between officials from the province and [sic] MMM is the cause of delay in respect of Vista Park 2 and 3". She further states that "the problem has been ongoing for years with no apparent prospects of any improvements". Another private sector informant says that "there is no proper coordination as each sphere still acts like a tier of government, neglecting interrelatedness and interdependency espoused in the constitution". A provincial respondent raised political will and support for Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 projects as the cause for the delay. For example, at the tabling of the budget and 2016–17 IDP on the 31 May 2016, the mayor stated, "we will spend R3.998 million in implementing…the following projects:

- Township establishment for all the regions of the City (R8.5 million),
- Brandkop 702 engineering services (R50 million),
- Cecilia Park Land Development (R50 million),
- Development of Airport Development Node Phase 1 (R1.977 million),
- Township Establishment New Township (R33.5 million),

- Hillside View (R112 million provided by the provincial government), and
- Vista Park 2 and 3" (Manyoni 2016:10).

Again, there is no budget commitment for Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 in the mayor's 2016 budget speech. Yet Hillside View receives R112 million budget allocation from the provincial government, proving a lack of political support for Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 megaprojects at local and provincial levels. The literature explained this earlier as overlapping interests which may facilitate or constrain progress. For example, the province has dominated the implementation of the Hillside View megaproject. Despite the clear origin (conceptualisation and ownership), procurement and packaging of the three megaprojects (Vista Park 2, Vista Park 3 and Hillside View), there is conflict about who should lead the project in Hillside View. During President Cyril Ramaphosa's visit to the Hillside View megaproject on 26 October 2019, the province (Premier) led the delegation instead of the municipality (Executive Mayor). Steinberg (1987) explained this by saying megaprojects can become political symbols to bolster political stature as they hold great prestige for implementing government sphere (own).

In terms of demand and occupancy rates, Hillside View is a success. Without strong political and financial support, the project would not have achieved its current development state. The financial support translated into comparatively low prices for houses constructed in the initial phases of the development. Considering the real estate market level in the surrounding area of Bloemanda, "the bonded units sold very well" according to the private sector informant. There are three additional important reasons for the low prices of houses in the Hillside View development. Mangaung made land available for the development at no upfront cost. Instead, the developer would service 30% of the single residential and 30% of the general residential at their own expense and later hand the serviced sites back to the municipality. Mangaung installed bulk services, with the developer obliged to contribute to the bulk services much later. The provincial DoHS made a portion of the capital subsidy grant available to install internal services in the low-income section of the development. Conversely, in the old apartheid population groups, Hillside View is still very homogenous, with black Africans dominant.

It is not yet possible to determine if the IRDP implementation has changed how Mangaung and the province plan housing projects and the extent to which they embrace integrative development principles.

7.4.6 Dependencies in megaprojects

The dominant dependencies (two paths, two goals, and two interdependencies) are prevalent in megaprojects. However, the IRDP replaced project-linked subsidies in 2009. Mangaung's delay in introducing the IRDP in 2011 exhibits path dependency on the project-linked subsidy programme. The failure to depart from the colonial planning and spatial patterns of apartheid in the Hillside View project's layout reflects path dependency on the colonial planning framework.

Mangaung's desire to achieve integrated and sustainable housing developments through identifying new land for megaprojects is an example of goal dependency. Another example of goal dependency is the municipality's pursuit of high densities and a compact and balanced city.

On the other hand, the literature shows that the poor performance of megaprojects is the result of their intrinsic characteristics such as complexity, a large number of people involved and political influence (Marrewijk et al. 2008). This provides evidence that interdependencies lead to rigidities in the governance path.

Lastly, cooperative governance issues hamstrung the successful implementation of the Airport Development Node, Vista Park 2 and 3 megaprojects. For example, the lack of cooperative decision-making (a good example of interdependency) led to the lagging in these projects. Cooperative governance requires the cooperation and coordination of priorities and budgets across interrelated functions and sectors.

7.5 Conclusion

Large scale human settlement projects, reflective of a megaproject approach to addressing poor quality in South African cities, emerged from the BNG in 2004. This means that persistent urban segregation and poor housing integration with other socio-economic facilities contributed to the evolution of housing policy in 2004. The housing programme did not contribute to the spatial transformation of cities and towns. Thus, the shift from housing to the delivery of large-scale human settlements sought to achieve socio-spatial integration and better living spaces conducive to livelihoods.

Not all large scale human settlement projects or megaprojects necessitate the same complexity. They deal with a frequently changing context with different interests, purposes, constraints and

ambitions. Further, this chapter demonstrated the significance of the partnership (an excellent example of interdependency among actors in housing delivery) between government, building contractors, private sector developers and financing institutions in implementing large-scale human settlements (IRDP) and economic development. The IRDP narrative, over the last 16 years, emphasises the achievement of mixed-income housing (housing units with differing levels of affordability for people from different ethnic and income groups), delivered integrated accommodation, and increased the private sector investment in housing delivery for low-income households. A critical feature is that private market houses and affordable rentals form the core of the development. Therefore, developments should be structured to obtain sufficient income from these homeowners to enable the municipality to service the area and ensure good urban management.

The chapter exemplified traits of dependencies. South Africa has a long history of mega-scale housing developments. There is path dependency in the large-scale human settlements projects (IRDP) as they existed from the early post-apartheid period. Also, megaprojects' building designs and layout plans exhibit a conventional approach. Some regenerative development practices (technologies) like rainwater harvesting and urban food gardens are conspicuously missing. A more integrated, holistic and sustainable development designs framed in regenerative practices would draw out the inherent wisdom of residents, co-create place-based designs and eventually build evolutionary capacities of whole living systems (Mang and Reed 2012; Russell 2013).

Also, the South African housing policy's path-dependency on international sustainability standards focuses primarily on "environmental constraints, limits and resource depletion" (Venter, Marais and Morgan 2019:3) to the detriment of ecological and social development perspectives crucial to regenerative development or practices (Lyle 1994). Gibbons (2020), Luederitz, Lang and Von Wehrden (2013) and Wallner, Naradoslawsky and Moser (1996) view social-ecological communities as the foundational building blocks and pillars of sustainable cities and regions.

The heart of megaprojects is partnerships. As a result, the chapter has shown that partnerships have contributed to delays and conflicts (rooted in socio-political interests), affecting implementation. Consistent with the interdependency notion, these examples have caused rigid governance paths. Megaprojects (found in their definition) exhibit another example of interdependency.

Now that Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have provided empirical evidence on dependencies, the next chapter outlines principal findings and recommendations drawn from this research project.

CHAPTER 8
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

This case study investigated the dependencies between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 demonstrated how various dependencies influence policy development and implementation. This chapter provides the main findings, recommendations and significance of the study. The chapter concludes with areas of further research.

8.2 Chapter summary

Chapter 2 provided an overview of urban management and the importance of the concept in the context of urbanisation. Urban management is a relatively new concept, institutionalised in the 1980s and 1990s. Urban management coordinates and integrates public and private actions and makes cities more competitive, equitable and sustainable. Urbanisation and decentralisation programmes require effective urban management. Decentralisation is often associated with neoliberalism. However, the notion of strategy embedded in decentralisation could also challenge neoliberalism and modernity. Furthermore, there has been a shift from a narrow focus on urban management (the 1980s) to the broader concept of urban governance (2000s).

Consequently, in Chapter 3, the focus shifted towards governance with a discussion of the evolutionary governance theory. The theory provides a framework to explain governance and its evolution. The evolution of governance is central to the case study research design as it investigated changing governance patterns over the past 26 years. The chapter emphasises governance as opposed to management only. Governance is collective and binding decisions, like policies and strategies that actors (national, provincial, local governments and communities) make. It highlights three dependencies: path, goal and interdependencies. The term path dependency explains how historical decisions influence current governance decisions. Importantly, any path starts at a critical juncture, usually when a governance structure makes a decision. This decision affects several follow-up decisions, making the new decision path dependent on previous choices. Historical decisions act as carriers of history that

affect the pace of change or contribute to the inability to change. The path dependency examples in this study include the colonial planning framework, capital subsidy, ownership and site and services.

Goal dependency refers to how governance decisions become dependent on common goals. Shared goals can create a dependency because it is difficult to deviate or imagine an alternative. For example, the Millennium Development Goals (refined to become the Sustainable Development Goals) have created a worldwide framework for development. This might blind some countries from fully understanding their development context because the United Nations has provided a framework. The significance of the goal dependency concept in this study is that setting goals and how actors use them might lead to rigidity in some cases.

Lastly, interdependencies refer to the relationships between actors and how these relationships can either be positive or negative. The interdependencies concept helps to explain that relationships between actors depend on previous interactions. The danger is that these relationships might create rigidity. For example, two actors could have a long-term relationship that benefits both but blinds them to changing circumstances and prevent adjustments. Interdependencies can also be positive. Markets require, in addition to the competition, cooperation to function. For example, the property market requires long term relationships between banks, property agents and lawyers. These dependencies can depend on formal or informal rules (or a combination of these) and trust. Yet, interdependencies can also result in power play, mistrust and conflict, preventing change.

Chapter 4 discussed the South African city as a product of colonial and apartheid planning. The post-apartheid government pursued various strategies to reverse the effects of racial planning, which influenced the housing policy. The chapter analyses these changing policies and strategies. The chapter shows how dependencies accompanied the South African post-apartheid housing policy evolution. Apart from the path dependency traits, the policies had elements of goal and interdependencies. Moreover, the chapter assessed attempts to integrate the apartheid city, rebuild the townships, create employment opportunities, provide housing and urban amenities and introduce urban management policies.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are empirical chapters that analysed qualitative and quantitative data, policy and planning documents, and semi-structured interviews with 30 key informants. Chapter 5 examined housing subsidies and housing governance in Mangaung. The chapter analysed interdependencies among the three spheres of government in housing delivery

(national, provincial and local government) by applying the housing subsidy programmes (1994–2020). The chapter illustrated how national and provincial decisions affect housing delivery at the local government level. For example, the provincial government's decision to only build houses of 40 m² in 1994 has had long term implications (goal dependencies) for housing delivery in Mangaung. The power play between the provincial and local governments (interdependencies) also affected housing delivery and the autonomy of Mangaung. Furthermore, the goal dependencies associated with the numerical target for housing delivery since 1994 have also played a crucial role. The chapter concluded that despite substantial levels of decentralisation, there is evidence that local autonomy is hard to materialise.

Chapter 6 investigated informal settlements upgrading and how Mangaung managed and governed informal settlements (1990–2020). There is ample evidence of path, goal and inter-dependencies in informal settlement upgrading. Path-dependencies are visible in the long-term reliance on the capital subsidy that delivered ownership. In the early 1990s, the IDT used the capital subsidy to upgrade informal settlements. Again, the capital subsidy became the primary mechanism in post-apartheid housing delivery, contributing to informal settlement upgrading in Mangaung. It was difficult for Mangaung to move away from the fixed development outcomes and the capital subsidy. The capital subsidy, introduced in 1994, primarily focused on the house (product). The housing product is an example of goal dependency as the initial target was to build one million houses between 1994 and 1999. There is also evidence of interdependencies that influenced informal settlement upgrading. The Mangaung and the Free State Provincial Government's Sibuyile Park informal settlement dispute laid with the South African Human Rights Commission is one example of how housing and settlement issues have become interdependent of human rights and law. But, these dependencies stretch further in that an appropriate local strategy is also dependent on good inter-governmental relationships with the provincial government. Finally, these interdependencies also assume relevant community participation processes as a foundation for informal settlement upgrading.

Chapter 7 investigated the evolution from housing to integrated human settlements (IRDP or megaprojects). The chapter analysed how housing and urban socio-economic amenities (integrated development planning) reduce commuting distances between residential areas and the workplace, facilitate better use of vacant or underutilised land and introduce environmentally sensitive development management. Specifically, the emphasis is on efficient and sustainable urban centres, critical to poverty reduction and equitable society. There is evidence of interdependencies that influence the delivery of integrated human settlements

(megaprojects). Megaprojects are cutting across many territories (spheres and government departments) and decision-making takes long. These factors might cause rigidities during the implementation. For example, the Hillside View project has no planned schools. The provincial Department of Education is undecided on building schools in this area. The lack of cooperation and coordination between the Free State Provincial Government and Mangaung led to rigidities. For example, Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 are lagging in development because the Free State Provincial Government and Mangaung failed to budget sufficiently for the projects. The chapter shows how interdependencies among spheres of government or government departments retards (slow down) the integrated development planning process (policy implementation).

8.3 Main findings of the study

This section summarises six main findings.

8.3.1 Dependencies create rigidities

Five dominant dependencies create rigidities in this case study. The capital subsidy programme created inflexibilities that inhibited informal settlement upgrading and pushed housing delivery toward the periphery of cities. The application of the capital subsidy programme reinforced the focus on the housing product, overemphasised full title and resulted in the poor location of housing products. Mangaung was slow to implement this new approach (UISP) to informal settlement upgrading. It was a report from the South African Human Rights Commission that changed the Municipality's approach.

Post-apartheid spatial and housing policies wanted to create higher densities and prevent racially segregated housing. The dependence on the capital subsidy and homeownership did not help to develop higher densities, efficient public infrastructure use, or improve housing location. This rigidity in the subsidy system resulted from the goal dependency in the system. Mass housing delivery through capital subsidy seldom challenged the historical spatial legacies, creating rigidities in achieving integrated human settlements. Mangaung found it hard to develop integrated housing development and bridge the historical racial divide (Chapters 5 and 6). Also, the national government set the numerical goal of one million housing units for the first five years of democratic government. This numerical target negatively affected community participation. The numerical target also undermined the governance network

approach, which emphasises that outcomes of policy and public services are consequences of many actors and institutions.

The 40 m^2 minimum housing standard set by the Free State Provincial Government created rigidities. The minimum housing standard forced developers to favour cheap peripheral land over well-located land to comply with the minimum housing size. The minimum housing size and the requirement to co-fund it (from the Mangaung housing development fund) without receiving a return created another rigidity: Mangaung could not develop new serviced stands in good locations. The depletion of the housing development fund reduced the flexibility Mangaung had and created new rigidities. The 40 m^2 had the following consequences: lower infrastructure and houses where services were available in the Mangaung township. These trends further reinforced the spatial fragmentation in Mangaung. The minimum housing size prevented Mangaung from creating integrated and sustainable human settlements.

The interdependency between Mangaung and other spheres of government created rigidities in implementing the IRDP projects. For example, the lack of cooperative decision-making between different spheres of government (an interdependency) led to slow progress in the Airport Development Node, Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 developments. The evolutionary governance theory continued to explain rigidities associated with collective decision-making (multiple actors) in large-scale housing governance. Housing is a concurrent function of national and provincial governments (with local government application), but this requirement in legislation created rigidities in large-scale housing governance at the local level. Mangaung is dependent on the Free State Provincial Government to prioritise and release funds for development. The Free State Provincial Government's failure to budget appropriately for these projects hampered its implementation. Mangaung has limited financial resources to solve the housing problem and depends on other spheres of government in this regard.

8.3.2 Interdependency undermines local government plans and strategies

This study provides sufficient evidence that interdependency between spheres of government undermines local government plans and strategies. For example, the Free State Provincial Government's insistence on the 40 m^2 minimum housing standard undermined the Managing IDP. Chapter 5 demonstrated that while the IDP is rooted in integrated development, the 40 m^2 minimum housing standard promoted fragmentation and delivered houses on the periphery, far from socio-economic facilities. Another example is that Mangaung's HSP identifies land for development, sets housing targets, coordinates housing development, and provides basic

services to residents. Yet, in Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu, the Free State Provincial Government's minimum housing size policy encouraged development in areas where services were not available.

Also, the Free State Provincial Government undermined various attempts to accredit Mangaung to implement national housing programmes. The accreditation process (introduced by BNG) gives local governments greater autonomy. Mangaung’s accreditation would mean municipal independence from the Free State Provincial Government. No MEC has yet approved Mangaung's full accreditation and the delegation of housing functions. By not allowing accreditation, the provincial government maintains an influence at the local government level. This means that the provincial government keeps Mangaung dependent on its priorities without being accountable to the voters in Mangaung.

Furthermore, the complex mix of the national housing policy directions and local applications requires capacitated local government. Chapter 5 showed that both the national and provincial governments are not keen to build the requisite capacity for housing governance. The national and provincial governments' reluctance to build local capacity undermines the object of developmental local government. As the study has shown, incapacitated and weak local government is vulnerable and easily acceded to provincial demands.

Other examples demonstrating how the Free State Provincial Government undermined Mangaung’s plans and strategies include the provincial government overturning Mangaung’s cost recovery decisions on stands services. If the municipality did not recover its investments in serviced stands, it would eventually run out of serviced stands and the ability to fund and deliver new serviced stands from municipal finances. Chapter 5 showed that interactions (interdependencies) between the Free State Provincial Government and Mangaung have primarily led to power play, with Mangaung unable to stand its ground against the Free State Provincial Government. The Free State Provincial Government prioritised the rectification programme over the housing backlog as outlined in the IDP and the HSP. The powerlessness of Mangaung is visible in the municipality accepting these grants despite it not being a priority. Due to limited financial resources, Mangaung was dependent on accessing funding from the Free State Provincial Government and had to compromise. This compromise shattered municipal plans with implications for the principle of cooperative governance.

Also, the Free State Provincial Government's appointment of a contractor to demolish and convert council-owned rental housing stock in Heidedal into ownership is a further example

that interdependency undermines local government plans and strategies. Even though the Mangaung IDP strategy promoted the provision of the rental tenure option, the provincial government replaced the rental housing units with ownership. The demolition went ahead without council approval and demolition certificates from Mangaung. The municipality had to provide the demolition certificates retrospectively and find accommodation for the evicted people. In another example, the Free State Provincial Government overturned the municipal IDP strategy to rebuild and retain the historical character of (dilapidated) houses in Batho. Instead, the Free State Provincial Government demolished and replaced these run-down houses with new RDP houses. Mangaung was so dependent on accessing funds from the other government spheres that it compromised its policies, plans and strategies.

These examples prove that interdependency undermines local government plans and strategies.

Table 8.1 summarises the different interdependency elements undermining local government plans and strategies and their application in this study.

Table 8.1: Interdependencies undermining local government plans and strategies

Interdependency element	Applications in this case study
40 m² minimum housing standard	The Free State Provincial Government's pursuit of a 40 m² provincial policy undermined Mangaung's IDP and delivered housing at the periphery. Also, the minimum housing standard encouraged houses where services were not available.
Accreditation to assume the housing function	Despite achieving levels 1 and 2 accreditation, no FS MEC has yet approved Mangaung's delegation of housing functions. By not allowing accreditation, the provincial government maintains an influence at the local government level. Mangaung is dependent on provincial priorities without being accountable to the voters through the IDP implementation.
National housing policy directions and local applications	National housing policy directions and local applications require capacitated local government. National and provincial governments are not keen to build the requisite capacity for housing governance. Weak local government is vulnerable and easily accede to provincial demands.
Cost recovery plans on the servicing of stands to deliver 40 m²	The Free State Provincial Government overturned Mangaung plans and strategies (decisions) on cost recovery on stands services. In the long run, Mangaung's financial reserves are depleted, compounding the shuttering of further plans to provide goods and services to the voting populace.
Rectification programme prioritisation	The Free State Provincial Government prioritised the rectification programme over the housing backlog prioritised in the IDP and the HSP in Mangaung
Altering plans to provide various tenure options	The Free State Provincial Government overturned the Mangaung plan to provide various tenure options and demolished some of the rental housing properties in Heidedal, replacing them with new RDP houses.
Overruling IDP strategy to rebuild the houses in Batho	The Free State Provincial Government overturned Mangaung's plans to rebuild the houses in Batho to retain their historic character. Instead, the houses are demolished and replaced with new RDP houses.

Source: Author (2021)

8.3.3 Various path dependencies influenced housing delivery in Mangaung

The concept of path dependency draws attention to the importance of historyand the rigidity of collective decision-making. Various chapters in the thesis have reflected on several path-dependencies that influenced housing delivery in Mangaung.

Table 8.2 provides an overview of path-dependencies that influenced housing delivery in Mangaung.

Table 8.2: Various path-dependencies influencing housing delivery in Mangaung

EGT principles	Nature of path-dependency	Applications in this case study
Path-dependency	Macro-economic	Colonial and apartheid housing policies created racially segregated cities where the government designed neighbourhoods by race. Despite the democratic policy intention to the contrary, the inability to break with the spatial patterns of apartheid (or colonial planning framework) represents an excellent example of path-dependency (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7).
		The capital subsidy programme formed the post-apartheid housing framework's critical element. The capital subsidy remained the cornerstone of the post-apartheid policy since 1994 (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7).
		The individual title model of a single household with a detached house on an individual plot in a planned township with ownership rights (entire freehold tenure) still constituted the main housing delivery model post-1994 (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
	Created by Free State provincial government	The 40 m² minimum housing size policy, determined by FS provincial government, had a path dependency element of placing houses on the periphery.
	Created by Mangaung	The slow introduction of the IRDP sustained the application of path-dependent project-linked subsidies and peripheral location of housing projects. Mangaung held onto historical project-linked subsidies without complying with the revised policy direction under BNG to create sustainable human settlements and mixed-income developments.

Source: Author (2021)

Specifically, Chapter 4 highlighted aspects of path dependency (how historical decisions influence current governance decisions). For example, while the colonial and apartheid housing policies created racially segregated cities where the government designed neighbourhoods by race, the post-apartheid housing policy (through the capital subsidy) was unable to break with the spatial patterns of apartheid (or colonial planning framework). Huchzermeyer (2001a; 2004b) argues that the capital subsidy scheme on an individual plot in a planned township with ownership rights has been instrumental in reinforcing this historical spatial pattern of apartheid planning. As the capital subsidy had a fixed amount, Mangaung

applied in areas where land cost was the lowest. Most houses were constructed in or beyond former black townships and on the periphery.

While this is a valid argument, this study has shown that a more nuanced argument is applicable and that path dependency is not only linked to macroeconomic realities. For example, the Free State Provincial Government's insistence on 40 m² in 1994 ultimately increased the number of projects on the periphery. The insistence on the minimum housing size of 40 m² drove provincially appointed contractors to prefer and develop at the periphery where land was cheaper. While Huchzermeyer (2001a) saw this trend as primarily an outcome of the inflexible capital subsidy entrenched in the project-linked subsidy programme, I found that the Free State Provincial Government has also contributed to the peripheral location of housing in Mangaung. Therefore, this thesis does make a considerable contribution to the existing research by showing how local governance and planning have contributed to existing patterns.

Another example of path dependence is Mangaung's reluctance to embrace the IRDP. The slow introduction of the IRDP in Mangaung sustained the application of path-dependent project-linked subsidies and peripheral location of housing projects. Mangaung held onto historical project-linked subsidies without complying with the revised policy direction under BNG to create sustainable human settlements and mixed-income developments.

8.3.4 Cooperative government principle is under threat

Housing governance within a decentralised government system in South Africa requires the spheres of government to work together in the spirit of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. The South African Constitution (South Africa 1996) sets out principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. Spheres of government within a decentralised government system must exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not infringe on the government's geographical, functional or institutional integrity in another sphere. They must also cooperate in mutual trust and good faith (Chapter 1). This study shows how provincial governments continue to creep into local government affairs by controlling housing developments for developers and contractors. For example, the appointment of small contractors in Mangaung by the Free State Provincial Government in the 2008/2009 financial year slowed down housing delivery and offered shoddy construction practices. The province carried out tender processes and appointed building contractors, leaving Mangaung little or no authority to engage these contractors when they underperform and without the authority to intervene in poorly or underperforming projects.

Mangaung risked a backlash from the community for poor quality products while dealing with the complaints (Chapter 5).

The study also discussed the lack of cooperation, poor relationships and power display (threat to cooperative government principles) between Mangaung and the Free State Provincial Government in 2011 about the UISP application. Through the adverse findings by the South African Human Right Commission, Mangaung and the Free State Provincial Government were compelled to cooperate in providing basic municipal services to Sibuyile Park residents.

Further, withholding accreditation of the housing function created discomfort in the local government sphere. Mangaung wanted responsibility for the housing function to circumvent the province's historically dominant role in housing delivery. Despite Mangaung being a priority municipality for accreditation and achieving levels 1 and 2 accreditation, the Free State Provincial Government has stalled the implementation. No MEC at the Free State Provincial Government has approved Mangaung's delegation of housing functions, constraining housing delivery in the municipality.

Lastly, Chapter 5 showed that interactions between the Free State Provincial Government and Mangaung have primarily led to power play. Mangaung cannot stand its ground against the Free State Provincial Government in most cases. For example, the Free State Provincial Government prioritised the rectification programme over the housing backlog in Mangaung. Despite not being a priority, Mangaung's weakness is visible in accepting the rectification programme grant. Due to limited financial resources, Mangaung was dependent on accessing funding from the Free State Provincial Government and had to compromise. This compromise has implications for the principle of cooperative government.

8.3.5 Capital subsidy allows for some flexibility

The application of the capital subsidy programme overemphasised the full title and resulted in the poor location of housing subsidies. While the literature alludes to inflexible capital subsidy entrenched in the project-linked subsidy programme, there is evidence that the macroeconomic path dependency described in the literature has been applied more flexibly in Mangaung. Mangaung had a stepped approach and used the capital subsidy instrument innovatively and flexibly for informal settlement upgrading (1994–2003). The municipality delinked the housing subsidy and the land development processes, creating flexibility. The municipality created an interim land management system that provided security of tenure to the beneficiary

without linking it directly to ownership (Chapter 5). The municipality innovatively and flexibly provided people with tenure security and funded this through their budget and inter-governmental grants. The municipality designed the interim land management process in such a way that the transfer of ownership only occurred after the completion of the house. So, unlike the popular trends and interventions with informal settlements in the first ten years of democratic South Africa, Mangaung created some flexibility in the capital subsidy application. Although this process was municipal-led, communities played a critical role in resolving disputes (volunteer information) regarding who should receive the site.

8.3.6 Evolutionary governance theory has value for single case studies

The evolutionary governance theory provides a framework for understanding governance changes over time. In this study, the theory understands Mangaung's governance changes over 30 years (1990–2020). It clarifies how a decision (change proposition) about one issue may lead to other problems or complications over time. For example, the decision by the Free State Provincial Government on a minimum housing size in 1994 affected housing delivery negatively in Mangaung up to 2020. Although the houses were larger, they had lower levels of infrastructure. Mangaung built these houses where services were available in the Mangaung township, reinforcing spatial fragmentation reminiscent of the apartheid era. Informal settlement upgrading received little attention in Mangaung until 2013.

Also, the evolutionary governance theory helps to explain that change is slow. It enables the realisation that there are implications if things stay the same rather than change when change is necessary and inevitable. For example, although the government adopted the BNG in 2004, its tenet, the IRDP, only replaced the project-linked subsidies with the National Housing Code amendment in 2009. Mangaung only introduced the IRDP in 2011, demonstrating slow change. The slowness to change from project-linked subsidies to the IRDP is evidence of slow change. The continuation of project-linked subsidies had complications for Mangaung over time. Mangaung's failure to comply with the revised policy direction under the BNG postponed the city's integrated and sustainable human settlement development. In short, as Mangaung failed to change from project-linked subsidies to the IRDP on time, it has not achieved mixed-income housing and the development of integrated and sustainable human settlements.

8.4 Recommendations

Based on the literature reviewed, the theoretical framework discussed, lessons learnt, and most importantly, the empirical findings of this study, the researcher presents some crucial recommendations for consideration. Table 8.3 provides the outline of the study's main findings and recommendations.

Table 8.3: Outline of the main findings of the study and recommendations

Main finding	Chapter	Key recommendation
Dependencies create rigidities	1, 4, 5, 6, 7	There should be further research examining and evaluating the interplay between dependencies in the SA housing policy.
Interdependency undermines local government plans and strategies	1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7	The national government should review the institutional arrangements limiting effective policy implementation across spheres of government.
		The national government should enforce compliance with established roles and responsibilities of spheres through appropriate regulations.
Various path dependencies influenced housing delivery in Mangaung	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	There should be further national research investigating best practices associated with path dependencies to enhance/re-design public policy frameworks.
Cooperative government principle is under threat	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	The national government should ensure compliance with the cooperative government principle and the concept of separation of powers.
		The institutionalisation of partnerships between spheres of government (as well as between line and sector departments) for housing governance.
The capital subsidy allows for some flexibility	5, 6	The national government should encourage flexible use of the capital subsidy in smaller (housing) projects.
The evolutionary governance theory has value for single case studies	1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	

Source: Author (2021)

8.4.1 National government should review the institutional arrangements limiting effective policy implementation across spheres of government

While spheres of government co-exist within the spirit of trust and cooperation, this study has found that interdependencies weaken local government plans and strategies. The study has identified perpetual silo approaches and big-brother attitudes. Also, the study found that spatial challenges persist in localities despite firmer policy instruments to address integrated settlements. Furthermore, this study emphasised that for the local government to work alongside and effectively assist the other government spheres in housing delivery, deliberate and focused capacitation is needed. This requires a relook at the current intergovernmental arrangement for effective housing governance. So, to keep pace with the changing concepts, relations, and approaches within the evolving human settlements mandate, the national government should scrutinise the current support programmes to local government and intergovernmental relations across spheres to improve municipal institutional and human capacity as a priority. This means that the national government should simply review the current institutional arrangements limiting effective policy implementation across spheres of government. This is possible because the national government regulates, makes laws and sets policies for effective services provision. As a regulator, the national government can develop a system of rules designed to resolve conflicting ideologies and protect the rights of individuals and institutions (e.g. local government).

The reviewed measures should introduce differentiated and outcome-based capacity support to local government, designed within a cooperative government context (instead of the existing generic license). Outcome-based capacity support to local government may be vital for improving human settlement delivery. I propose a shift from the current relationship between the province and the municipalities driven by compliance and based on reporting and perceived control to one focused on support, coordination and monitoring, which are critical to the success of the human settlements agenda.

8.4.2 National government should enforce compliance with established roles and responsibilities of spheres through appropriate regulations

The local government may not be solely responsible for service delivery backlog or bottlenecks and the thwarted expectations of material improvement and betterment held in the community. Yet it remains at the forefront of service delivery. While local government has the right to govern (on its initiative), the local government affairs of its community are subject to national

and provincial legislation. There has been unregulated interference by national and the province in local government affairs. As this study has demonstrated, the Free State Provincial Government has compromised or impeded Mangaung's ability or the right to exercise its powers to perform its functions. Therefore, I propose that, through appropriate regulations, the national government enforce compliance with constitutionally established roles and responsibilities of government spheres. Compliance enforcement may leave little room for power play in carrying out service delivery functions among spheres. Compliance enforcement may also improve inter-sphere coordination and communication necessary for a more complex housing planning and delivery requirement.

8.4.3 National government should ensure compliance with the cooperative government principle and the concept of separation of powers

Cooperative government anchors decentralisation. Decentralisation maximises, amongst other things, development impact nationally. Yet, findings have shown that decentralisation is highly politicised and has mixed development effects. There are often vast gaps between the expected and the realised benefits of decentralisation. Given that decentralisation occurs within a cooperative government context, the national government should comply with the cooperative government principle and the separation of powers. It may be necessary to reconcile decentralisation with the performance arrangements between the President and the Ministers and between the latter and provincial MECs. Also, while legal frameworks may be available, much change needs to occur between actors and institutions. Specialised training and support for actors may enhance compliance. Specialised training and support can provide valuable assistance and information on adjusting strategies and institutional frameworks for effective decentralisation.

8.4.4 Institutionalisation of partnerships between spheres of government (as well as between line and sector departments) for housing governance

To enhance cooperative government principles, I propose the institutionalisation of partnerships between spheres of government (as well as between line and sector departments) for housing governance. Partnerships between spheres of government are crucial for housing governance. I propose the signing of memoranda of understanding or implementation protocols between transacting institutions to anchor or hinge these partnerships for effective housing governance. Effective partnerships may enhance the alignment of development priorities across the spheres. The institutionalisation of partnerships implies municipalities should have

strong planning units to effectively coordinate planning frameworks, mandates, programmes and projects across spheres and alignment of functions. Also, municipalities should have strong and sufficiently resourced research units to identify and investigate rigidities in policy implementation at the local government level.

8.4.5 National government should encourage flexible use of the capital subsidy in smaller (housing) projects

While the IRDP replaced the project-linked subsidies in 2009, evidence suggests smaller housing projects cannot embrace the IRDP. In Mangaung, the project-linked contributions remain relevant in smaller towns and housing projects. However, the focus on the house as an end-product, greenfield developments, inflexibility in the development process, limited community participation and strict guidelines to keep to as dominant features of this process must be minimised. The national government must relook the framework to encourage flexible use of the capital subsidy in smaller (housing) projects. The capital subsidy process must allow beneficiaries to freely express their choices or preferences within the transparency and accountability guidelines governing the use of public funds.

8.5 Significance of the study

Chapter 5 and 6 of the study have been submitted for publication in the edited collection, respectively, as follow:

Mokoena M., Marais L., Masithela N. & Venter A. 2022 (under review). Governing low-income housing delivery in Mangaung. In: Rubin M., Klug N. & Charlton S. (Eds.). *Housing through a governance lens*. S.l: s.n.

Mokoena M., Marais L., Masithela N. & Venter A. 2022 (accepted). Governing informal settlements in a South African metropolitan municipality: The case of Mangaung. In: Nubi T. (Ed.). *Informality and inequality in urban Africa: Imperatives for research, policy and practice*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Furthermore, Chapter 6 was also presented as a conference paper and at the time of submission of the thesis, Chapter 7 was under review for presentation as a conference paper. Additionally, the study makes five main contributions: theoretical, evolutionary governance theory, methodological, policy-related and the South Africa literature on housing.

Additionally, the study makes five main contributions: theoretical, evolutionary governance theory, methodological, policy-related and the South Africa literature on housing.

8.5.1 Theoretical significance of the study

Theoretically, the study contributes to an understanding of governance using theoretical constructs from urban management and the evolutionary governance theory. Understanding governance requires a theoretical approach that addresses governance's complex and dynamic character in totality. Yet, most research has focused on the path dependency of the housing policy and practice. Path dependencies are associated with how the state interprets its housing responsibility, related to neoliberal trends. Furthermore, very little work considers the interdependencies in intergovernmental relations or the goal dependencies. This study has provided a more balanced assessment of dependencies while also providing a new interpretation of post-apartheid housing governance and delivery at the local level. At the very least, the study places housing within the governance domain.

8.5.2 Value of the evolutionary governance theory

The evolutionary governance theory provides a framework for understanding slow change. For example, the theory understands slow governance changes in Mangaung post-2004. Although the BNG was adopted in 2004 and the IRDP replaced the project-linked subsidies with the National Housing Code amendment in 2009, Mangaung only introduced the IRDP in 2011, demonstrating slow change. The theory explains the slowness to change from project-linked subsidies to the IRDP.

Also, the evolutionary governance theory explains how a decision about one issue may have unintended consequences over time. For example, the decision by the Free State Provincial Government on a minimum housing size in 1994 had negative implications for housing delivery in Mangaung up to 2020. Though the houses were larger, they had lower levels of infrastructure built where services were available in the Mangaung township, reinforcing spatial fragmentation reminiscent of the apartheid era.

Lastly, the evolutionary governance theory explains rigidities and complexities associated with collective decision-making (multiple actors) in housing governance. For example, the interdependency between Mangaung and other spheres of government created rigidities in implementing the IRDP projects in Mangaung. The lack of cooperative decision-making between different spheres of government (an interdependency and associated concurrent

function complexities) led to slow progress in the Airport Development Node, Vista Park 2 and Vista Park 3 developments.

8.5.3 Methodological contribution to housing governance

The government designed the housing subsidy programme as a national programme that provincial and local governments implement with local communities. While a substantial body of research has reflected on the housing policy, local level institutional and governance assessments of the housing programme remain limited. South Africa has a sophisticated decentralised local government system and cooperative government arrangements. However, policy applications through different spheres of government have not received much attention. It is these gaps that this study fills using a triangulating and sequential mixed-methods approach to analyse and understand housing governance. Importantly, this study undertakes the sequential process in which another qualitative data collection explains quantitative and qualitative data.

8.5.4 Policy-related significance

The study has two important policy implications: First, housing policy in South Africa has not achieved the envisaged outcomes. Achieving the desired outcomes in the housing sector remains challenging, and it is virtually impossible within the evolving municipal planning framework in South Africa. The municipal planning framework has evolved into a complex inter-relationship of multiple plans covering different sectors and timeframes. Most plans (but not all) relate to human settlements. Indeed, housing policies should take cognisance of these complexities and develop specific guidelines for housing governance within a decentralised system. Second, the study found that dominance in many municipal plans (IDP, SDF, built environment performance plans) has rethought the role of housing and human settlements in spatial restructuring to create better-integrated cities. This has been difficult to achieve because of the rigidities created by interdependencies. Undoubtedly, local plans, policies and strategies need to recognise this problem and influence plans at a higher sphere; in other words, influence provincial and national policy to align with local priorities and needs within the evolving context. Consequently, the contribution of this study concerning policy has been to unravel these intricacies to improve our understanding of the complex relationship between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system.

8.5.5 Contribution to South African literature on housing

The South African housing policy assessments quickly show the path dependencies of the housing policy. Often research relates the capital subsidy and its links to macroeconomic policy guidelines to the neoliberal policy guidelines from the World Bank and business-like policies developed in the mid-1980s. This case study shows how a minimum housing size policy, determined by another sphere of government, has similar path dependencies. Embarking on this policy had long-term negative implications for Mangaung: infrastructure standards declined, some houses were built without establishing the township register, the housing subsidy inflation increased rapidly, more housing was built in peripheral locations, and ultimately the number of houses delivered in Mangaung decreased. The long-term risk is that housing delivery might move away from supporting low-income households.

Another contribution is that the South African literature on housing views the capital subsidy entrenched in the project-linked subsidy programme as inflexible to informal settlement upgrading. I found elements of flexibility of the capital subsidy in Mangaung. Mangaung used the capital subsidy instrument innovatively and flexibly for informal settlement upgrading between 1994 and 2003.

8.6 Areas for future research

In conclusion, I encourage further research to be undertaken, motivated by the evidence from this study and by outlying aspects met while doing the research. These marginal aspects were either not prominent enough or provided enough evidence to back up a befitting argument.

Firstly, the evolutionary governance theory offers a theoretical framework for explaining and analysing governance by focusing on the path, goal and interdependencies. Evidence has shown that the interplay between dependencies causes rigidities in housing governance. I, therefore, propose further investigation examining the interaction between these dependencies to minimise their impact and rigidity aspects in housing governance (policy implementation in South Africa) through an appropriate policy framework development. The reason is that the interplay of these dependencies creates unique complexities that cannot be fully grasped by the actors using their strategic and cognitive skills and cannot be fully managed using the institutions at hand and the power relations. Understanding the interplay between path dependence, goal dependence and interdependence in housing policy and practices is critical

for new housing provision models. Further research in this space will contribute knowledge on the impact of interactions between dependencies, which is an area this study did not cover.

Second, further national research investigating best practices associated with path dependencies to enhance or re-design public policy frameworks. For example, Mangaung's innovative approach to using the capital subsidy is worthy of being the best practice. National research should unravel more such best practices to enhance the housing policy framework.

Also, the study referred to power relations, knowledge elements broadly and their association with actors and institutions, formal and informal – with each of these elements shaping and influencing each other in a governance path. For example, knowledge is not only limited to expert knowledge but encompasses local understanding and traditional (indigenous) knowledge. As narratives structure all sorts of power and expertise in evolutionary governance, it is critical to recognise and comprehensively understand this because governance is not an orderly or organised set of top-down decision-making processes imposition but an act of management. So, in this act of managing, power relations and knowledge consist of layers upon layers of stories influencing the behaviour and understanding of a community, the leadership decision-making, and how they collectively envision a prosperous community.

Furthermore, the research on megaprojects seldom covers all aspects and challenges in managing these projects. Most of the studies on megaprojects focus on poor managerial performance. In addition, there are no practical means available to improve their arrangement to meet time and cost constraints. Giezen (2012) points to a lack of articles addressing the comparative analysis of time delays in megaprojects, even though there is a strong relationship between delays and cost overruns. Thus, it is essential to enlarge the research on megaprojects to reflect on their effects, impacts, relevance, and sustainability.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has put significant pressure on relationships between state authorities, civil society and non-state actors. Various legal (planning) requirements governing housing might need to be changed, regulatory and bureaucratic procedures may need to be simplified or amended. Indeed, understanding these new requirements brought about by this exogenous shock (using comparative studies) is critical to bolstering effective partnership and commitment among spheres of government (including with the communities).

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ANNEXURE A: LIST OF MOST IMPORTANT POLICY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED AND ANALYSED

- Various Mangaung Integrated Development Plans
- Different Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plans
- Council resolutions and minutes, Mayoral Committee minutes, Joint Section 80 Committees: Human Settlements, Economic and Rural Development and Infrastructure minutes
- Various Mangaung Consolidated Annual Reports
- Various Municipal Finance Management Act Financial Reports
- Quarterly Budgets and Performance Assessment Reports
- Public Participation information on IDP, MTREF and budget policies
- Various Integrated Human Settlements Plans
- Various Spatial Development Frameworks
- Various Built Environment Performance Plans
- Various Mangaung Housing Policies
- Informal Settlements Upgrading Strategy
- Mayoral Budget Vote Speeches and By-Laws
- Various Provincial Growth and Development Strategies
- Free State Premier Budget Vote Speeches
- Free State Human Settlements MEC Budget Vote Speeches
- Various Free State Human Settlements Strategies and Policies
- Various Provincial Department of Human Settlements Annual Performance Plans
- Different Provincial Multi-Year Housing Development Plans
- National Human Settlements Policies, Strategies and Legislation
- Human Settlements Minister Budget Vote Speeches and Parliamentary documents
- Information from workshops and conferences at the provincial and the national level

ANNEXURE B: RESEARCH STUDY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Study Approval number: UFS-HSD2020/2045/222

Title of study: Dependencies and decentralised government for the governance of housing delivery in Mangaung

Government decentralisation and objectives of the study

Demographic, Generic and Sector-Specific Questions

1. What is your age? (broad range)

   Please tick (X)
   - Under 34
   - 35–44
   - 45–54
   - Above 54
   - Prefer not to say
2. What gender do you identify as?
   - Male
   - Female
   - ________ (Short answer space)
   - Prefer not to answer
3. What is your highest educational qualification?

   Please tick (X)
   - High school
   - Trade school
   - Post-school diploma or equivalent
   - Bachelor’s degree
   - Master’s degree
   - PhD or higher
   - Prefer not to say

4. What is your current employment status?

- Employed full-time
- Employed part-time
- Retired
- Prefer not to say

5. Where are you working? (e.g. Free State Province: Human Settlements Department)

6. How long have you been exposed to working with the national, province and municipality on housing delivery/housing issues, and what has been your experience?

   [Relationships between the three]

Please tick (X)

- Under 10 years
- 10–15 years
- 16–20 years

Above 20 years

7. Area of your work experience? (e.g. policy development; policy implementation; legislature etc)

8. How long have you been in the housing & human settlements sector or closely involved in the sector's operations?

Please tick (X)

- Under 10 years
- 10–15 years
- 16–20 years
- Above 20 years

9. In your experience, is the decentralisation of the powers from national to local government?

   a) A good or bad thing? [please elaborate]

   b) Is it working or not? [please elaborate]

   Kindly give your opinion on how national and local government could improve their relations in policy implementation.

10. In your opinion, why has decentralisation of the housing function (assignment of the housing function through the accreditation process) provided for in the constitution not taken place in the South African municipalities?

11. In your opinion, is the government (national, provincial and local) institutional arrangement (formal government organisational structures to formulate and implement policies) consistent/in sync with the decentralised system of governance in SA

    Kindly substantiate your response

12. Would you agree that the passing of legislation like the MFMA (2003) is a form of centralisation of powers by the national in a decentralised system in South Africa?

    Kindly substantiate your response.

13. What do you understand about co-operative government concerning housing delivery and what has been your experience?

14. In your experience (and given practical dealings and interactions), do you think politicians and bureaucrats at national and provincial spheres of government fully understand the difference between tiers and spheres of government when interacting with local government and why?

15. According to your experience and understanding of decentralisation and the constitutional provisions in this regard, are officials and politicians delivering the constitutional intent of decentralisation?

    Kindly substantiate your response

16. In your view and experience, are the arrangements to design housing policy nationally and implement locally satisfying local needs and healthy for local requirements?

    Kindly substantiate your response

17. Have you ever experienced disagreements, tensions, conflicts or misunderstandings between the different spheres of government in a decentralised governance system and what do you think were the causes?

18. The obligation placed on the provincial government to delegate the housing function while retaining oversight responsibilities creates structural tension between the province and the local government. It constitutes a disconnection between policy and implementation within a decentralised government system. Would you agree with the statement or not and why?

19. In your view, do you think that the decentralisation of housing functions is well understood and fully supported by the National and Provincial Human Settlements Departments?

    Kindly substantiate your response.

20. There is a view that the current institutional arrangement where the local government implement housing policy, the province provides support and the national monitors and evaluates is not fully understood by those involved. Do you agree with this statement or not and why?

21. In your view, at what stage do bottlenecks occur in the delivery of housing: (i) project identification, (ii) project packaging, (iii) project approval, (iv) beneficiary management and why?

    Please elaborate

22. In your view, between a Local Council, Province and National, who should have powers to monitor housing policy implementation?

    Kindly substantiate your response

23. Conclusion: there is a view that the constitutional provision of housing is a concurrent function between provincial and national governments that complicates the relationship between policy and implementation within a decentralised government.

    What is your comment?

Between questions 24 and 25, which scenario best explains your experience: Kindly substantiate your response

24. Did the following and necessary processes fully take place to legitimise decentralisation:

    (i) A conscious political decision to embark on the decentralisation process,

    (ii) The necessary reforms being defined and promulgated,

    (iii) Redistribution of authority, resources and accountability;

    (iv) The emergence of Local government as a fully-fledged institution with decision-making power, offering space for public participation, and greater accountability

    (v) As a result, do we see reinforced local support for the improved system, such that it can reasonably be said that at that point, local governance was a "going concern?"

25. Did the following and necessary processes fully take place to legitimise decentralisation:

    (i) The elite announce decentralisation reforms;
    (ii) Some reforms are then defined and promulgated;
    (iii) Redistribution of authority, resources and accountability to localities is announced;
    (iv) At this point, several patterns emerge: incomplete statutory reform prevents effective control; resources are retained or captured by central actors; resources are consumed paying for salaries; local councils are ineffective because of low levels of education, poor organisation, infrequent meetings, internal division and executive dominance; local institutions are designed to maintain

central control; and /or local elites dominate local governance from behind the scenes;

(v) This results in poor performance and non-accountability, which discourages local support;

(vi) Local governance remains weak as a consequence;

(vii) Recentralisation occurs (indirectly through the passing of legislation like, for example, MFMA).

ANNEXURE C:
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN STUDY

I, ____ (participant name), confirm that the person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

I have read (or it was sufficiently explained) and understood the study as explained in the information sheet. I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty (if applicable). I am aware that the findings of this study will be anonymously processed into a research report, journal publications and/or conference proceedings.

I agree to the recording/telephonic/Zoom/Teams data collection method.

I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Full Name of Participant: ____

Signature of Participant: ____________________________________ Date: ____________________

Full Name(s) of Researcher(s): ____

Signature of Researcher: Date: ____________________

ANNEXURE D:
PERMISSION TO OCCUPY DOCUMENTS

1

PERMISSION TO OCCUPY (PTO) A RESIDENTIAL ERVEN
TUMELLO YA HO DULA SETSHENG SA BODULO

1. Surname /Sefane (Occupant/Moahi) ____________________
2. Full names /Mabitso ka botlalo ____________________
3. ID Number/ Dinomoro tsa bukana ya boitsebiso ____________________
4. Married in/out Community of property/Nyalano ka kopanelo/ntle le kopanelo ya dithoto le
5. Initials and Surname of Spouse/Lebitso le sefane sa molekane ____________________
6. ID Number of Spouse/Nomoro ya bukana ya boitsebiso ya molekane ____________________
7. Site Number/Nomoro ya setsha__________Block/ Bolokong ba ____________________
8. Name of Employer/ Lebitso la mohiri ____________________
9. Address of Employer/ Aterese ya mohiri ____________________
10. Salary/Mokgolo ____________________
11. Name of Employer of the spouse/ Lebitso la mohiri wa molekane ____________________
12. Address of Employer/ Aterese ya mohiri____________________
13. Salary/Mokgolo____________________

Name of dependants/Mabitso a ba hlokomelwang:

NAMES & SURNAME /MABITSO LE SEFANE	IDENTITY NUMBER	RELATIONSHIP	SEX

Singature of Occupier: ____________________ Signature of Spouse/Molekane____________________

Name and Surname of Authorized official____________________

Signature of Manager: Informal Settlements & Beneficiary Management ____________________

Wittness:1. ____________________
Witness: 2. ____________________

Official Date Stamp
Setempe sa lefapha

PO Box 3704, BLOEMFONTEIN 9300, Hostel 1, 55088 Dr Belcher Road Mangaung.
Tel: (051) 409 6636, Fax: (051) 409 6637, E-mail: masabata.makhetha@mangaung.co.za Website: www.mangaung.co.za



BOIKANO BA MOAHI/ DECLARATION BY OCCUPANT

NNA/I ____ KE TIISA HORE KE FUMANTSHITSWE TUMELLO YA HO DULA SETSHENG SA//DECLARE THAT I HAVE BEEN GRANTED PERMISSION TO OCCUPY SITE NUMBER ________________ BOLOKONG BA /SECTION____________________________. KE HLALOSEDITSWE LE HO UTLWISISA DIPEHELO TSE LATELANG/THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO MY SATISFACTION:

1. SETSHA SE SENANG LENGOLO LA MOBU KE THEPA YA MMASEPALA ESENG YA KA/ SITE WITHOUT TITLE DEED OF ANY OTHER PERSON REMAINS THE PROPERTY OF THE MUNICIPALITY NOT MINE.
2. DITOKELO TSA HO DULA TSEO KE DI FUWENG DI TLA FETOLWA HA QETO E JWALO E TJHAELLWA MONWANA KE MMASEPALA/ PERMISSION TO OCCUPY CAN BE UPGRADED TO FULL RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP BY MUNICIPALITY
3. HANG HA KE SA HLOLE KE DULA SETSHENG SE SENANG LENGOLO LA MOBU KA NTLE LE HO TSEBISA MMASEPALA, SETSHA SEO SE TLA KGUTLELA HO MMASEPALA HANG HANG MME SE TLA ABUWA HO YA KA MOLAO WA TSA MATLO / IMMEDIATELY WHEN I VACATE A SITE ISSUED TO ME BY PERMISSION TO OCCUPY, I FORFEIT THAT RIGHT, AND MUNICIPALITY WILL RE-ALLOCATE THE SITE AS PER THE HOUSING WAITING LIST
4. SETSHA SE NANG LE LENGOLO LA MOBU KE THEPA YA MONGA SONA MME SE TLA TJHENTJHWA FEELA HA HO LATETSWE MOLAO MAQWETHENG A INGODISITSENG HO ETSA MOSEBETSI ONA (CONVEYANCER) MME MMASEPALA YENA A KA FANA FEELA KA LESEDI LA DI TSAMAISO/ SITE WITH TITLE DEED IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TITLE OWNER AND THE OWNER CAN TRANSFER THAT PROPERTY ONLY WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF REGISTERED CONVEYANCER WHILE THE MUNICIPALITY CAN ONLY GIVE THE INFORMATION REGARDING THE STATUS OF SUCH PROPERTY.

E SAENETSWE KE MOAHI/SIGNED BY OCCUPIER____________________KA LA/ON THE_____ KGWEDING YA/DAY OF________SELEMONG SA/ IN THE YEAR __________ HO LA/AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

MOHLANKA WA MMUSO/AUTHORISED OFFICIAL: ___________________ KA LA/ON THE _____ KGWEDING YA/DAY OF________ SELEMONG SA IN THE YEAR __________ HO LA /AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

DIPAKI/ WITTNESSES:

1. __________________________
2. __________________________

YA NETEFATSWA KE MOTSAMAISI WA LEFAPHA LA MATLO/APPROVED BY THE HOUSING MANAGER: _______________ LETSATSI LA/ON THE_____ KGWEDING YA/DAY OF_____ SELEMONG SA/IN THE YEAR_______ HO LA/AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

SETEMPE SA LEFAPHA/ OFFICIAL STAMP:

PO Box 3704, BLOEMFONTEIN 9300, Hostel 1, 55088 Dr Belcher Road Mangaung.
Tel: (051) 409 6636, Fax: (051) 409 6637, E-mail: masabata.makhetha@mangaung.co.za Website: www.mangaung.co.za

AT THE HEART OF IT ALL

ANNEXURE E:
LETTER OF APPROVAL FROM ETHICS COMMITTEE

GENERAL/HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (GHREC)

22-Feb-2021

Dear Mr Malefetsane Mokoena

Application Approved

Research Project Title:
Dependencies and decentralised government for the governance of housing delivery in Mangaung

Ethical Clearance number:
UFS-HSD2020/2045/222

We are pleased to inform you that your application for ethical clearance has been approved. Your ethical clearance is valid for twelve (12) months from the date of issue. We request that any changes that may take place during the course of your study/research project be submitted to the ethics office to ensure ethical transparency. furthermore, you are requested to submit the final report of your study/research project to the ethics office. Should you require more time to complete this research, please apply for an extension. Thank you for submitting your proposal for ethical clearance; we wish you the best of luck and success with your research.

Yours sincerely

Dr Adri Du Plessis
Chairperson: General/Human Research Ethics Committee

Adri du Plessis

Digitally signed by Adri du Plessis
Date: 2021.02.22 15:24:04 +02'00'

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ANNEXURE F: CONFIRMATION OF EDITING

Nicolene Barnard

Proofreading | Technical Editing | Metadata Specialist | Indexing

PO Box 26959, Langenhovenpark, 9330 | 073 339 7739 |
Nicolene.Barnard1@gmail.com

4 June 2022

CONFIRMATION OF EDITING

I hereby confirm that I have done the technical layout and editing for the following thesis:

Student: Malefetsane Daniel Mokoena
Title: Dependencies and decentralised government for the governance of housing delivery in Mangaung
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy (Development Studies)
Department: Centre for Development Support, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of the Free State

My work for the student included the technical layout of the document, as well as language editing for grammar, punctuation, spelling, and sentence structure. I tried to keep as much as possible of the student's own writing style while making sure that the student's intended meaning was not altered in the editing process. I also checked the list of references making sure that dates, spelling, and names used in the text are consistent with those listed in the reference list.

I have a B.Bibl. (Hons.) Degree and have been working as a cataloguer, metadata specialist and librarian for 30 years. I am an expert in the field of bibliographic information and resources. I have also completed a 10-week Copy-Editing course at the University of Cape Town.

Disclaimer: The ultimate responsibility for accepting or rejecting the changes and recommendations rests with the student and I cannot be held responsible for any layout or language issues that might have emerged as a result of subsequent amendments to the text.

Yours sincerely,

Nicolene Barnard