

**THE IMPACT OF CADRE DEPLOYMENT ON  
SERVICE DELIVERY:  
THE CASE OF MOPANI LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES IN  
LIMPOPO PROVINCE,  
SOUTH AFRICA**

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PROVINCE,  
SOUTH AFRICA**

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## DECLARATION

I, **Tuma Moses Magomane**, hereby declare that this extensive mini-dissertation for the Programme in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of the Free State (Bloemfontein) is my own original work and has not been submitted by me or any other individual at this or any other university. I also declare that all reference materials, used for this study, have been properly acknowledged.

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Finally, Theodore Roosevelt once said; *“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. Credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust, sweat and blood, who strives valiantly...and who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming... but who knows that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat”*.

I thank you!

*‘Mokgalaka’*

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ABET</b>	Adult Basic Education and Training
<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>ANCYL</b>	African National Congress Youth League
<b>BBBEE</b>	Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment
<b>CDW</b>	Community Development Worker
<b>CEO</b>	Chief Executive Officer
<b>CODESA</b>	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
<b>COSATU</b>	Congress of South African Trade Unions
<b>DA</b>	Democratic Alliance
<b>DBSA</b>	Development Bank of South Africa
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>DPLG</b>	Department of Provincial and Local Government
<b>DWAF</b>	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
<b>EECF</b>	Employee Equity Consultative Forum
<b>EECP</b>	Employment Equity Consultative Forum
<b>EPWP</b>	Expanded Public Works Programme
<b>FET</b>	Further Education and Training
<b>GTM</b>	Greater Tzaneen Municipality
<b>HIV</b>	Human Immune Virus
<b>HR</b>	Human Resources
<b>IDASA</b>	Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa
<b>IDP</b>	Integrated Development Plan
<b>LED</b>	Local Economic Development
<b>MDB</b>	Municipal Demarcation Board
<b>MFMA</b>	Municipal Finance Management Act
<b>MGT</b>	Magister in Governance and Political Transformation
<b>MMD</b>	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
<b>MLM</b>	Maruleng Local Municipality
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Partnership for Africa Development

<b>NLM</b>	National Liberation Movement
<b>NDR</b>	National Democratic Revolution
<b>NPA</b>	National Prosecuting Authority
<b>PBF</b>	Progressive Business Forum
<b>RSA</b>	Republic of South Africa
<b>SAA</b>	South African Airways
<b>SACP</b>	South African Communist Party
<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>SALGA</b>	South African Local Government Association
<b>SAPS</b>	South African Police Services
<b>SMME</b>	Small Medium Enterprise
<b>TLC</b>	Transitional Local Council
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>VIP</b>	Ventilated Improved Pit latrines
<b>WSA</b>	Water Service Authority
<b>WSP</b>	Water Service Provider
<b>ZANU-PF</b>	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

### 1.1. Introduction

Service delivery protests fall amongst the major challenges faced by South Africa's local and district municipalities seventeen years after the democratic dispensation. While the nature of protests varies from one municipality to another and from one province to another, the solution to the problem has remained a challenge due to political and administrative factors at national, provincial and local levels of government. While the available resources might not be enough to address the imbalance, deployed cadres (politicians and civil servants) in some way or another find themselves in a dilemma of having to carry out a service delivery mandate as required, whilst grappling with a lack of adequate skills and expertise.

Yende (in City Press, 2011a:2) reflects that "the appointment of party loyalists who do not have the qualifications and skills needed in key council positions have been identified as one of the main causes of poor service delivery, which in turn has sparked community protests in many parts of the country". Pycroft (2000:147) warrants that numerous municipalities across the country are struggling to maintain existing service provision levels to previously disadvantaged communities. Furthermore Venter and Landsberg (2006:157) maintain that as long as councillors can take politically motivated irresponsible decisions without incurring any accountability, municipalities will be burdened with poor financial management.

The Republic of the South Africa (RSA) is a unitary state that is characterised by the supremacy of the Constitution. It is within the RSA Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) whereby local government is recognised as the focal point of service delivery. Provision is made by Section 152 (b) which reaffirms that local government has to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. Whereas section 195 (1a, e and f) lays out the principles of public administration including; a high standard of professional ethics that must be promoted and maintained, that

people's needs must be responded to, the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making, and finally public administration must be accountable.

It has been noted that public accountability is amongst the cornerstones of a democratic government. This demands that public office bearers must be accountable and responsive to the needs of the public as required by the law without favour or prejudice. Therefore successful implementation of services demands professional skills and legislative compliance with existing stipulations governing the local sphere including; the Municipal Systems Act, the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act, which serves as guidelines for the successful implementation of services. At present there is a deteriorated level of trust amongst citizens and council officials due to allegations of corruption, graft and nepotism in municipalities, country villages and townships. According to Duvenhage (2005:2) 136 of the 284 municipalities in South Africa are chronically ill, contributed to critical questions about the political transformation in South Africa.

The current government seems to grapple with the administrative imbalances of the past whereby a lack of skills and ineptitude in municipalities are the order of the day. According to Mafunisa (2003:93) the post-1994 political developments predictably resuscitated the debate on the relationship between political office bearers and senior public servants. As part of the transformation agenda, the challenge for the ruling party was to transform the public service in a manner that would ensure that the ruling party programmes are translated into government or executive policy. However the critical question was how one ensures that the public service becomes an effective instrument for delivering on the mandate of the party in power, thus the public service is called to execute what is, essentially, a political mandate. The problems of skills and expertise were outlined to be amongst the factors contributing to poor service delivery.

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011:65) asserts that “[w]orldwide political change varies from state to state and from society to society, to the effect that billions of people are confronted every day with the divergent and often conflicting demands of a changing political environment. These changes and concomitant

demands would include renewal in terms of post-industrialisation, the renaissance idea (New Partnership for Africa Development / NEPAD and the African Union) as put forward by amongst others Thabo Mbeki; improved living standards, better service delivery, industrialisation, modernisation and greater political freedom as embodied by the striving for the democratic ideal". The change process political, economic or social cannot go without challenges. Huntington (1968b:7) attests that in many modernising countries, governments are not able to perform the first function much less the second. The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Apart from a lack of skills and competency in municipal strategic areas, recruitment of incompetent people based on party connections tends to aggravate the service delivery situation in South Africa. A lack of administrative and technical skills could be amongst the factors contributing to poor service delivery at municipal level, thereby leading to public protests over services. Harris (1986:120) advises that the law is supposed to be the "reason unaffected by desire" as Aristotle put it. There is nothing more repellent than corruption of law by political ideology.

Administrative challenges have rocked many municipalities across the country which resulted in poor service delivery. Evidence is given by Yende (in City Press, 2010a:11) that only nine Mpumalanga municipalities received clean audit opinions for the 2007/08 financial year. The inability of Mpumalanga municipalities to handle their finances properly has been identified as the central cause of the wave of recent service delivery protests in the province. This resulted in their failure to provide residents with services such as water, electricity and sanitation.

The impact of cadre deployment on service delivery could be regarded as a challenge facing the three spheres of government. Politicsweb (2010:2 of 6) quoted the president as saying, "[w]e needs to develop a new public sector cadre. There are those placed in positions of responsibility that do nothing to address the concerns of the people they are meant to serve, either through incapacity or unwillingness. Where people are found to be incapable of performing the tasks assigned to them, we must work with speed to either capacitate such people or replace them with more capable people. We have to study our public service regulations and ensure that they enable, and not hinder us in our drive to achieve these goals". In countries such

as Canada, deployment is done properly and in transparent manner. The Treasury Board of Canada (2001:2) reflects that deployments are to be made in a fair, reasonable and transparent manner, taking into account the needs of organisations and the legitimate career interests and aspirations of employees.

## **1.2. Problem statement**

The problem statement is the impact of cadre deployment on service delivery, with specific reference to Mopani Local Municipalities in the Limpopo Province. Given the nature of the research topic, it becomes imperative to first look at the concept of “cadre deployment” because of its relevance to local government and public administration. AllAfrica.com (2010:1 of 4) defines cadre deployment as the process by which cadres are brought into effective action, with “deploy” having a military connotation. While the Oxford dictionary (2005:200) defines “cadre” as a small group of people who are specially chosen and trained for a particular purpose, or a member of the group. By “group” it could refer to members belonging to the same political party by virtue of their party membership or alliance in pursuance of a common cause.

Furthermore the Oxford dictionary (2005:392) defines “deploy” as a way to move soldiers or weapons into a position where they are ready for military action. From the above definitions, it can be argued that party “cadres” from the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance partners, being the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African Communist Party (SACP), appear to be the beneficiaries of the cadre deployment policy irrespective of their merit and skills. This has been evident in situations whereby party membership and loyalty are placed above merit and skills, resulting in poor performance in managing state institutions for party political gain. The sad reality is that, outside the ruling party’s ranks there are skilled and competent people to carry out public tasks, but they are side-lined on the basis of incompetent cadres who are meant to serve the party rather than public interests. This becomes a problem because poor service delivery

affects the majority citizens in the country who have the right to basic services from the government.

In addition the military connotation attached to the concept “deploy”, means only loyal party members and stalwarts stand the chance of being deployed to strategic positions without taking into cognisance merit, capacity and skills. Ultimately a political deployee could be moved from one point to another without looking at his/her performance, because the aim is not to serve the public but to fulfil the interests of the party that made deployment. The fact that cadre deployment is meant for political reasons, in which the deployed cadre works according to the party mandate, becomes a cause for concern, with specific reference to the deteriorating levels of poor service delivery.

Cadre deployment is a policy of the ANC that cannot be ignored, but how the process is carried out remains questionable. Hoffman (2010a: 1 of 5) highlights that cadre deployment has long been a policy of the ANC-led alliance, which has governed South Africa since 1994, that safe party hands should be placed on all of what it calls “levers of power” in society. In support of the above statement, Breytenbach (2006:175) establishes that the ANC has a central deployment committee closely linked to party executives, who are responsible for making appointments ranging from provincial premierships to those in state-owned enterprises.

While the successful implementation of the cadre deployment policy has to be in accordance with the law, Wessels (2002:47) argues that the function of the state is to ensure its citizenry security of life and limb. The governing structure of society (the state) may not have the moral right to establish laws that fail to muster the support of the general populace or that are not in the best interests of its citizenry, yet have the power to enforce these laws. Party cadres within the public service are obliged to serve the political party and their masters, the system contrary to Section 195 of the Constitution.

According to Hoffman (2010a: 2-3 of 5) by its very nature, cadre deployment sets up a conflict of interest situation that enmeshes both deployees and deployer. Some cadre deployment committees of the ANC sit in a smoke filled room and decides whom the party should deploy and where. For Hoffman deployment does not have a top-down centralist flavour to it because of its military connotation and the methodology used explains why candidates for party posts are always reticent about pushing themselves forward. Basically the ethos according to Hoffman is that loyal party cadre's do what the party expects of them, not what they want to do for the party. The above assertion could be a reflection that party loyalty is above merit and skills when deployments are made, which is a potential danger for poor service delivery and maladministration.

Heywood (2007:46) defines meritocracy as rule by the talented and that rewards and positions should be distributed on the basis of ability. It can be argued that the current system cannot sustain service delivery if merit is not given preference when appointments are made. In the long run, the system could lead to a state collapse. While Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011:65) argues that political decay denotes a negative political development as associated with an inability to guarantee order, stability, security, good governance, and good government in the general interest. Political and institutional decay occurs in a political environment where the state as dominant political institution functions ineffectively, but particularly in circumstances where patterns of political instability (coups d'état, revolutions and civil wars) threaten or sometimes even overshadow the authority of the state as the sovereign institution. Some commentators have long called for the professionalisation of local government.

Ntliziywana (2009:25) held the view that the problems faced by municipalities partly lie in the appointment of staff with inadequate formal qualifications, expertise and experience. This is despite the fact that municipalities are complex organisations that require a cadre of leadership with sound organisational experience, "familiar with overseeing large organisations, substantial budgets, complex legal requirements and sophisticated technical decision-making", for their effectiveness. While the Local Government Survey (2005) cites corruption, financial mismanagement, overpayment

of the under qualified and underperforming managers, infrastructure and service delivery backlogs were identified as the major causes of poor service delivery in local municipalities.

According to Midgal (in Weiner and Huntington 1987:409) the power of appointment that lies in the hands of state leaders involves more than merely dismissing people from positions. Appointments are a source of patronage that can be doled out selectively to prevent the development of centres of power within the state itself. The result is that some third world states take on an almost familial character displaying many of the characteristics of much less bureaucratised and complex patrimonial systems. Probably the most popular method is to appoint top agency officials who have deep personal loyalties to the state leaders. Based on the above analysis, consideration will be diverted to the aims of this study in an attempt to explore alternative solutions to the problems of poor service delivery as impacted by cadre deployment.

### **1.3. Aims of the study**

This is a descriptive and exploratory study that seeks to investigate the consequences of cadre deployment on service delivery within Mopani local municipalities, Limpopo Province. The study will focus on the credibility, in terms of skills and capacity, of deployed cadres in local government with relevance to service delivery. Being exploratory and descriptive in nature, research findings will explore viable solutions to poor service delivery at municipal level, because it will seek to explore the means through which the problem could be explored. Ultimately for the purpose of narrowing the research problem in order to become manageable and researchable, attention will be given to the following local municipalities falling within the Mopani District in Limpopo Province:

- Maruleng Municipality;
- Greater Tzaneen Municipality;
- Ba-Phalaborwa Municipality;
- Greater Letaba Municipality; and

- Giyani Municipality.

In order to establish the extent and linkage of cadre deployment on service delivery, case study and interviewing techniques will be applicable to municipal officials, community development workers (CDW), councillors, ward committees, community leaders and ordinary citizens. The study will further scrutinise the relevance of cadre deployment to service delivery in order to arrive at maximum efficiency and objectivity. This will be achieved through data analysis as per the municipalities' and district's integrated development plan (IDP's).

#### **1.4. Research methodology**

Babbie and Mouton (2001:647) define methodology as “the methods, techniques, and procedures that are employed in the process of implementing research design or research plan, as well as the underlying principles and assumptions that underlie their use”. Blurtit.com (2011:1 of 2) defines research methodology as a system of collecting data for research projects. This refers also to the validity of research data, ethics and reliability. In order to maintain adequate levels of scientific investigation, scientific knowledge will be applied.

According to Calhoun, Light and Keller (1995:584) science is defined as a method for establishing reliable and useful knowledge about natural and social phenomena. In light of the above definition, scientific knowledge will be applied in order to arrive at maximum efficiency and objectivity in researching the identified problem. The study will aim to be descriptive as well as exploratory in order to establish the impact of cadre deployment on service delivery with a view to explore solutions. Descriptive strategy will be undertaken through the application of sample surveys with a view to validate data. Further research strategies will involve a combination of deductive and inductive logic derived mainly from the following dominant schools of thought, phenomenological and critical research traditions.

According to Calhoun, Light and Keller (1995:22-23) phenomenology is defined as a school of philosophy that focuses on large scale generalisations about social

behaviour. In order to narrow the research problem, general theories and concepts about the research problem will be applied. Descriptive strategy will attempt to describe service delivery levels encountered within the identified municipalities with a view to identify solutions to the problem. Basically, qualitative research will entail detailed, verbal descriptions of characteristics, cases, settings, people or systems obtained through a series of interactions, interviews and observation of research subjects.

### **1.5. Research design**

Trochim (2006:1) maintains that research design provides the glue that holds research projects together and is used to structure research and shows how major parts of research works together. For that purpose, the research design will represent a combination of descriptive and exploratory strategies. Of primary importance will be a descriptive focus where an attempt will be made to portray the impact of cadre deployment in each municipality falling within the Mopani District and the nature through which cadres are deployed.

The approach to this study will be exploratory in order to explore alternative solutions to poor service delivery associated with the ineptitude of deployed cadres. The approach to the exploratory study will be qualitative and will be achieved through a case study and interviews, whereby the study will attempt to provide an interpretative understanding of the phenomenon or event. Inductive methods (moving from the particular facts to the general) will be applied, while data will be gathered through interview processes and synthesised into a coherent and consistent picture. With the impact of cadre deployment on service delivery, the approach to the study will be qualitative. Thompson (2007:1) outlines qualitative research as a technique that is primarily concerned with “why” something happens.

The research design will further represent a combination of descriptive and exploratory strategies, combined with qualitative techniques of data gathering. While Hancock (1998:2) points out that qualitative research is concerned with the opinions, experiences and feelings of individuals, thereby producing subjective data and there

will be no attempt made to manipulate the situation under study. Research data will be collected through direct encounters with individuals and organisations in the form of case studies and interviews. Calhoun *et al.* (1995:28) define qualitative research as the type of research that employs a variety of statistical techniques in order to establish relationships between variables and to test causal connections. In order to test the hypotheses, researchers need facts, statistics, study results and other pertinent information. Furthermore the research method will be qualitative with a combination of exploratory strategy because new insights or information will be explored. Central concepts and constructs will be explicated through a literature survey for the purpose of arriving at the priorities for further research. For the purpose of arriving at maximum efficiency and objectivity in researching the identified problem, research will comprise of the following research chapters:

**a) Introduction and motivation**

This section provides the introduction, motivation, aims, methodology and the general overview of the study. The section will further provide an overview of how the study will be carried out, including research aims, research design and literature survey.

**b) Cadre deployment and its practical manifestation**

This section will outline the practical manifestation of cadre deployment including the legislative framework of cadre deployment, examples where cadre deployment was a problem and the implications of cadre deployment on service delivery.

**c) Cadre deployment as management strategy**

This chapter will focus mainly on cadre deployment as a management strategy including public management, political management, opposition management strategy and resource management strategies.

#### **d) Case study**

This chapter will provide a snapshot of the Mopani District and its municipalities which includes Maruleng, Ba-Phalaborwa, Giyani, Greater Tzaneen and Greater Letaba. The section will also entail communication and interaction with municipal officials, councillors, community leaders, community development workers and citizens within the affected wards/villages falling under Mopani District Municipality in Limpopo Province.

#### **e) Findings, conclusion and summary**

In this section, research findings will be scrutinised and summarised thereby leading to conclusions. Calhoun *et al.* (1995:32) guide that the final step in the research process is to draw conclusions based on the results of analysis. Depending on what patterns have emerged, the hypothesis may be confirmed, rejected or left unsettled. This chapter finally presents research findings from case studies conducted, as well as recommendations/alternative strategies explored.

Unilearning (n.d.:1) maintains that the main function of this (conclusion) section is to restate the main argument. It reminds the reader of the strengths of the argument: that is, it reiterates the most important evidence supporting the argument. This section further outlines the significance of research findings, the implications of research conclusions for the topic and for the broader field, including limitations to the study approach and other factors of relevance that impact upon the topic but fell outside the scope of the study and future suggestions in terms of future research will be outlined in this section. Ultimately the main focus will be on the findings, conclusion and recommendations.

### **1.6. Literature survey**

Heywood (2007:16-17) establishes that critical theory is rooted in neo-Marxism and has extended the notion of critique to all social practices, drawing on a wide range of influences. Squidoo.com (2011:1-2) defines a literature survey as a body of text that aims to review the critical points of current knowledge including substantive findings as well as theoretical and methodological contributions towards a particular topic.

This also refers to secondary sources that do not report any new or original experimental work. The literature review entails a simple summary of sources, but it usually has an organisational pattern and combines both summary and synthesis to give a new interpretation of old material or combine a new with an old interpretation.

Blurtit.com (2011:1 of 2) outlines a literature survey as the documentation of a comprehensive review of published and unpublished work from secondary sources and data in the areas of specific interest to the researcher. With computerised databases now readily available and accessible, a literature search becomes much speedier and easier and can be done without entering the portals of a library building. While Calhoun *et al.* (1995:8) outline that critical thinking entails going behind surface appearances, asking why and how events could happen or conditions could persist and evaluating the possibility of social change.

Kerlinger (1986:152) defines theory as a set of interrelated constructs or concepts, definitions and propositions that represents a systematic view of phenomena. As a result it specifies relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena. Further theoretical perspectives were drawn mainly from liberal democracies - strong states, weak states and failed states - for the purpose of arriving at maximum research efficiency. Finally, primary sources of information shall entail the state of local government affairs across municipalities in South Africa, with reference to their strengths and weaknesses. From the above theoretical guideline, the following learning materials were consulted for the purpose of arriving at scientific truth and objectivity:

- Books;
- Internet sources;
- Newspaper articles;
- Journals; and
- Completed research essays and articles available online.

In addition to the above learning materials, the following existing legislation added value to this research as supplementary learning materials:

- South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996);

- Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998);
- Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000 as amended); and
- White Paper on Local Government (1998).

Finally, IDP documents for Mopani Local Municipalities will receive attention. In the subsequent chapter an attempt is made to explore the practical manifestation of cadre deployment which includes the legislative framework of cadre deployment, examples where cadre deployment was a problem, the relevance of cadre deployment to local government and the implications of cadre deployment on service delivery. The next chapter will focus on the practical manifestation of cadre deployment which will entail the following, legislative framework of cadre deployment, examples where cadre deployment was a problem, and the relevance of cadre deployment to local government including its implications.

## CHAPTER 2

# THE PRACTICAL MANIFESTATION OF CADRE DEPLOYMENT

### 2.1. Introduction

Cadre deployment in practical terms is visible in various state departments and in other organs of the state where party cadres from the ANC-led government and their alliance partners are in charge of public administration. Despite the pitfalls of the system, the ANC continues to deploy cadres at all strategic areas including the diplomatic corps.

Ndlangisa and Mboyisa (in City Press, 2011g: 6) maintain that President Jacob Zuma's use of diplomatic posts to solve domestic political problems could weaken the country's position in international affairs, according to geopolitical analysts. Since he came to power in 2009, Zuma has used diplomatic posts to get rid of political headaches or to award loyalists. Former sports minister *Makhenkesi Stofile* (ambassador to Germany), former labour minister *Membathisi Mdladlana* (Burundi), former public works minister *Geoff Doigde* (Sri Lanka) and former minister for women, children and people with disabilities *Noluthando Mayende-Sibiya* (Egypt), are all examples of where the diplomatic service was increasingly used expediently. While on the same report, the director of the Institute for Global Dialogue, *Siphamandla Zondi* said "...the common practice is to choose politicians with the skill and expertise needed for successful diplomacy rather than dumping failed ones". On the same topic Professor Chris Landsberg, head of the Politics and Foreign Policy Department at the University of Johannesburg, says "we must depoliticise and professionalise the diplomatic services".

However Duvenhage (2003) asserts that change can also mean decay or regression, which can generally be seen as the opposite of what is associated with "development" (in all its forms). In fact, it seems that trends of political decay in certain parts of the world are setting the tone and that which is associated with

“development” is often overshadowed by the former (political decay). Political decay as a pattern of political change is therefore an important phenomenon of our time – a phenomenon on which very limited research has been done so far. Meanwhile attempts to explore the professionalisation of local government establish a nexus between the lack of service delivery or poor performance and the concomitant outbreak of violent protests; on the one hand, and the poor or lack of capacity to deliver, on the other. This in turn, is aggravated by cronyism, nepotism and political interference in municipal appointments. The problems, as diagnosed, suggest that part of the solution lies in staffing municipalities with competent individuals. This means the professionalisation of the system by substituting the cadreship deployment practice with the appointment of people with expertise, experience and savvy (Ntliziywana, 2009:29).

The practical manifestation of cadre deployment becomes visible by the successes and failures of the deployed and the influence the party has over deployed cadres. Mafunisa (2003:85) displays that the definition of the roles and responsibilities of senior public servants in a democratic country have long been a matter of debate. It has been a central concern of literature in the United States from the beginning of public administration, and remains so to this day. Zille (2011:1 of 2) collates cadre deployment to a system whereby party loyalists are dispatched to do the ruling party’s bidding in the public service, local government administration and independent state institutions; and has entrenched the ANC’s power and created a closed circle of party cronies who reap the spoils of office.

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011:66) warns that at present Zimbabwe is experiencing serious politico-economic problems with patterns of political decay that are clearly visible. In the run-up to South Africa’s third general election the idea of an African renaissance is often forced into the background by unprecedentedly high levels of violent crime, corruption, severe financial management problems in certain public sectors, non-payment for services and the inability of the public sector to deliver regular and quality service – especially on certain provincial and municipal levels.

Hornby (1978:696) indicates that transformation entails making a great change in the appearance or shape. This change can take place peacefully or in a violent manner. It can be a change that takes place gradually or simultaneously. In political terms transformation deals with the changes of the government (if peaceful, it is called evolution but if it involves violence, it is called revolution) politically, economically and socially.

According to Duvenhage (2006a:294-295) political change in southern African states refers to a process of multi-party elections without the necessary institutionalisation of democratic procedures. The socio-political and socio-economic indicators point towards unfavourable prospects for the institutionalisation of democratic procedures in southern African states. An important pattern of political change after initial free and fair elections is the gradual (incremental) collapse of democratic procedures to make way for “delegative democracies” with one-party domination or even dictatorships. In this regard, the situation in Zimbabwe has degenerated further than in states such as Namibia, South Africa and even Zambia where multi-party elections have been more recent.

According to Brooks (2004:3) under a system in which party dominance has been won within the democratic rules of the game, the dominant party therefore has to function within the boundaries of the democratic system. Within this system there are rules and institutions which administer checks and balances on the abuse of power - although it should be noted that their effectiveness is dependent upon how advanced such a system is, and the effectiveness and autonomy of mechanisms and institutions.

Joubert (2009:4) outlines that there is a common thread that combines the two problems of inefficient regulations and inefficient government. This common thread is composed of the intertwined issues of a lack of skills and a lack of accountability that permeates South Africa’s public service. Both the direct provision of services by government and the regulated provision of services by private companies are negatively influenced by a lack of capacity in the public sphere. As a country where many important policy actors are using the phraseology of “developmental state”

more and more often, it is very important to note that a developmental state can only succeed if the public service is highly skilled, professional and politically independent; without a skilled, professional and independent public service, state-led development will not perform optimally. Mazrui (1995) reflects that in order to assess whether a state has failed, we must first identify the basic functions of the state. Six functions seem to be crucial: sovereign control over territory; sovereign supervision of the nation's resources; effective and rational revenue extraction from people, goods and services; the capacity to build and maintain adequate national infrastructure (roads, postal services, telephone systems, railways, and the like); the capacity to render such basic services as sanitation, education, housing, and health care; and the capacity for governance and the maintenance of law and order. However when we look at Africa with these functions in mind, according to Mazrui, it is clear that many states are in trouble. In an attempt to unpack the impact of the cadre deployment policy, the next section will focus on the legislative framework.

## **2.2. Legislative framework of cadre deployment**

According to Ntliziywana (2009:34) the Municipal Systems Act (MSA) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) are the primary pieces of legislation that give effect to the constitutional principles of a high standard of professional ethics in municipal administration. They also envisage the enactment of regulations that give substance to these principles. The MSA complements the provisions of section 195(1) of the Constitution by setting forth basic values and principles governing local public administration. It provides that the administration of a municipality must be organised in such a manner that it is responsive to the needs of the residents and facilitates a culture of public service and accountability among staff without fear or prejudice.

Du Toit and Nel (1996:132) illustrate that the sovereignty of the Constitution means that all organs of state and citizens are bound by the Constitution. The above statement concurs with the views of Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000:5) who maintain that the objectives of the Constitution are to determine the authority and functions of government and to organise the affairs of the nation.

Davis (2010:1 of 2) held the view that “cadre deployment is unique to political parties (like the ANC) and steeped in the Leninist tradition of democratic centralism. This principle commits every cadre to defending and implementing the will of the party leadership wherever he or she is deployed, and even if it means acting outside the Constitution and the law. The main parties in Britain and the US are not found on the principle of democratic centralism”.

Brooks (2004:1) indicates that the implications of a dominant party system for the successful consolidation of democracy, has long been an issue of interest amongst political scientists in democracies and the world over. In a context in which one party dominates the political landscape and faces little prospect of electoral defeat; concerns arise surrounding the possibility of declining government response to public opinion, loss of accountability, the overall erosion of democratic principles and development of authoritarian methods of rule.

According to Hoffman (2011b:2 of 5) “the fundamental problem with cadre deployment is that it is not transparent, nor it is accountable. It has long proved itself not to be responsive to the needs of ordinary people, many of whom resort to service delivery protests because the currently deployed cadres are so unresponsive to their needs. The cadres in the public administration have been described by the Courts as behaving as if they are at war with people that they are meant to serve.”

Midgal (1988:4) points out that weak state dynamics point to a limited ability to exercise social control and amounts to a limited ability and even an inability to penetrate society or sections thereof, to regulate social relations within the society and to exploit human and natural resources. Currently there is no clear legislative framework governing the implementation of cadre deployment, except it being a party policy.

Yahoo answers (2011:1) reveals that in a strong state, government and the rule of law provide a stable political/social/economic environment where citizens can plan and build and invest for the future. In a weak state, the environment is too

unpredictable for future planning, so most citizens can only subsist. Harris (1986:1) dissuades that the law is supposed to be “reason unaffected by desire” as Aristotle put it. There is nothing more repellent than corruption of law by political ideology.

According to Trollip (2011a:1 of 2) the ideology of cadre deployment therefore effectively robs the civil service of any possibility of professionalism. The ANC’s policy of cadre deployment – which is largely responsible for the significant damage to our public institutions – has recently been defended by both the government and the ruling party as well founded policy beyond reproach. Both of these defences are significant for two reasons: first, they suggest a certain level of denial and an inability to properly identify the substantial harm caused by the practice; second, they are borne of the same ideological drive – the desire to centralise and control power – that underpins the ANC’s developmental state; and until that vision is properly recognised as destructive and anti-constitutional, cadre deployment will clearly continue to inform the ANC’s policy and practice, to the detriment of service delivery and good governance. Finally the next section will outline examples of cadre deployment since the new dispensation.

### **2.3. Examples where cadre deployment was a problem**

The practical manifestation of the cadre deployment policy is a problem to opposition political parties, the ruling ANC and the state. Certain members such as Dr Aaron Motsoaledi and Malusi Gigaba within the ruling party seem to be divided by the system of cadre deployment, but without reaching amicable solution to the problem. Businessday (2009:1 of 2) quotes the deputy Minister and ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) in the ANC Today saying, “it is clear in some municipalities that the issue of deployment has been thoroughly abused to the great detriment of municipalities ... Comrades have distorted the deployment strategy and perverted it to suit ignoble ends. The result is that the policy appears inherently flawed and vulnerable to abuse. Gigaba states that some of the people deployed as mayors, speakers and chief whips are clearly incompetent to occupy these positions and that when they fail to perform or ‘become arrogant and big headed’, it is because they know they will be shielded by those who deployed them. However the greatest

injustice is committed when patently incompetent and unqualified people are deployed into the administration as municipal managers, chief financial officers and heads of certain services such as local economic development, technical services and others”.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) (2010:2 of 10) shows that cadre deployment is a system of posting senior ANC figures to key positions of power and influence in the public service. Legislative and policy proposals that seek to centralise power and place even greater powers of control under the authority of the national government represent the formal dimension of this renewed drive by the ANC to dominate all aspects of public life and establish party hegemony over South African civil society.

According to Ntliziywana (2009:28) further evidence of political interference was uncovered in the appointment of municipal staff in a recent court case in the Eastern Cape. *Mlokoti v Amathole District Municipality* dealt with the appointment of a poorly qualified candidate for the municipal manager post over a candidate who displayed the requisite qualifications. The council of Amathole District Municipality and the regional structure of the ANC were slammed for colluding in a perverse deployment strategy. This strategy resulted in a less qualified individual being appointed as municipal manager despite the availability of an outstanding candidate; qualified personnel are often overlooked for political appointments.

Davidson (2010:2) argues that the state is currently struggling to fulfil some of its basic functions such as keeping its citizens safe from crime, providing quality education and health care, generating sufficient electricity and delivering essential services. As a result the functionality of cadre deployment committees is based mainly on the promotion of the ruling party’s interests rather than the public’s. Mafunisa (2003:86) outlines that the ANC has deployed some of its members to key public sector positions with a view of promoting loyalty and service delivery. The ANC further believes that effective service delivery depends on people who understand and are loyal to its policies and programmes.

Trollip (2011a:1 of 2) reflects that since 2001 at least R262.1 million has been awarded to parastatal bosses, who have delivered little but almost always left in dubious circumstances, for example:

- the R8 million settlement received by former South African Airways (SAA) CEO Khaya Ngqula, after he was fired for his role in the R1-billion tender rigging saga in 2009;
- In 2004, the former SAA CEO Andre Viljoen received R3, 6 million on top of a salary of R2, 2 million and a performance bonus of almost R1-million;
- During Viljoen's last two years at the helm of SAA, the company made losses amounting to R15 billion;
- Before that in 2001, former SAA CEO Coleman Andrews received a record-breaking golden handshake of R232 million, even though the airline posted a net loss of more than R 700 million for that year;
- In 2009 the SABC paid R11 million to its former group CEO, Dali Mpofo, who took the SABC to court after he was suspended for suspending the then head of SABC news and current affairs, Snuki Zikalala;
- Former Denel chief executive Victor Moche, who was fired from his position by Public Enterprises Minister, Alec Erwin, walked away from the parastatals with a golden handshake of about R 3 million in 2005; and
- Land Bank CEO Alan Mukoki received R 4, 5 million after he quit in 2007 amid reports of R2 billion worth of fraud. Not only are taxpayers paying millions to get rid of poorly selected cadres, but billions of rands have been paid out to parastatals that are failing to properly manage public money.

In a related illustration of an example where cadre deployment was a problem, Lorimer (2011:1) mentions the ineptitude of Mr Sohena as follows – a history of flouting tender procedures and of signing contracts illegally, a proven record of running up costs involving damage to at least 4 vehicles rented at municipal expense, a history of signing office lease agreements without authorisation, a record of attending unnecessary workshops and meetings in big cities, flying to these workshops and meetings in business class and staying in expensive five-star hotels and a record of driving municipalities into bankruptcy. For Lorimer the ANC cadre deployment policy dooms municipal government to failure.

Further evidence is given by Kimemia (2011:1) who outlines that a certain Sipiwo Sohena has been seconded as the acting Municipal Manager for the ailing Mbhashe L. Municipality of the Amathole District. Yet this is a character that had allegedly left a trail of corruption and maladministration in the two municipalities where he worked previously – being the Nelson Mandela Metro and the Sundays Valley municipality. In the latter, he was fired for having been found guilty on 11 charges of corruption and mismanagement.

According to Joubert (2009:4) South Africa's public service is not on the level that is required for a developmental state to succeed. As a result the lack of skills and accountability are the main contributory factors to the fact that 1 of the 34 large public entities audited by the Auditor General in the 2008/09 report received a clean audit. Hence departments haven't had clean audits for more than eight years including; Health, Home Affairs, Labour, Land Affairs, Public Works and Defence – these being some of the more glaring examples of the entrenched incapability to properly administer their respective areas of authority. Joubert asks why the people who are responsible for all these problems are not held accountable. Not only are they not held accountable – sometimes they even receive performance bonuses! However this is not only the case at national level, but it is well known that individual municipalities are also riddled with problems whereby only 6 out of 283 municipalities received a completely clean audit report for the 2007/08 financial year.

However Joubert (2009:6) establishes that professionalism implies that a person should be able to use his own intellect, experience and training to make decisions based on the facts, while giving appropriate feedback to supervisors who can then adjust their own orders accordingly. Unfortunately deployed cadres are expected to work like machines and if they deviate from what the party's central tells them to do, they will be removed, regardless of whether they improved service delivery or not.

According to Huntington (1968b:8) the level of political community a society achieves reflects the relationship between its political institutions and the social forces which comprise it. Despite the ANC having deployed some of its members to the so-called

“levers of power”, the policy is not immune to challenges. It is argued that deployment has gone to an extent of deploying party members to employment opportunities that only last for a shorter period, such as the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). Another challenge could be the unemployment rate that has reached alarming proportions, whereby the ANC wants to grab every job opportunity to the benefit of loyal members and supporters.

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011:74) reflects that a period of weak political management and inability to properly address demands from a changing political environment can encourage patterns of political erosion (gradual incremental political decay). This means that political decay moves through the identified phases of friction, dynamic equilibrium and disequilibrium to the point of system collapse. A classic revolution such as associated with France (1789), Russia (1917) and Mexico (1910) corresponds with the run-up to a system collapse. Aristotle in Huntington (1968c:56) argues that “the cause of sedition is always to be found in inequality”. Therefore political inequality is, by definition, almost inherent of political instability.

Furthermore a problem which is experienced by most new democracies, including South Africa, is growing expectations which cannot be met. The inability of newly elected democratic governments to meet the expectations of society often pave the way for authoritarian forms of government and even praetorian politics. In essence, democratic procedures are developed to replace dictatorial forms of government and do not imply automatic economic prosperity and growth. Unrealistic expectations regarding democracy are in itself a factor which inhibits the institutionalisation of democratic tendencies (Duvenhage 2006b:295). Midgal (1988:206-237) asserts that where the weak state syndrome is dominated by a political strategy in which influential persons (politicians) are manoeuvred to restrict growing political power bases in which non-merit-based appointments are the order of the day, political dirty tricks are allowed to occur quite openly, administrative activities are fully politicised, and corruption and malpractices are rife. Seen in the extreme, conditions associated with political implosions may emanate from the situation, and the survival of the state may be under threat. In this regard, states such as Sierra Leone, Somalia and even

Rwanda may serve as examples of weak states that find themselves on the brink of collapse.

According Heywood (2007:30) liberal democracy is defined as a form of democratic rule that balances the principles of limited government against the ideal of popular consent. Its “liberal” features are reflected in a network of internal and external checks on government that are designed to guarantee liberty and afford citizens protection against the state.

#### **2.4. The relevance of cadre deployment to local government**

The White Paper on Local Government (1998:2) asserts that transformation for developmental local government requires a further process of administrative reorganisation to gear municipalities to meet the considerable challenges of social, economic and material development in all communities. Such a process cannot hope to succeed unless management, organised labour and other stakeholders develop a common vision and work together to achieve it. There are real differences of interest and conflict is inevitable. However, conflict and differences can act as constructive forces in organisational transformation, provided that there is agreement on the objectives and vision which drives change.

Chapter 6 of the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) determines that municipalities will have a performance management system to promote a culture of performance management amongst the political structures, political office bearers, councillors and administration. The performance management system must ensure that the municipality administers its affairs in an economical, effective, efficient and accountable manner. Section 139 (1) (a-b) of the Constitution reaffirms that when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation, the relevant provincial executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation including; issuing a directive to the Municipal Council, describing the extent of the failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its obligations by assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that municipality to the extent necessary;

maintain essential national standards and to prevent that municipality from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or to the Province as a whole (Section 139 (1) (b) (i) and (ii)).

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 201:83) argues that patterns of political decay are the direct result of unstable factors and their manifestation in the identified social, political, economic and international context of identified society. Joubert (2009:4) maintains that cadre deployment robs the civil service of, especially at local level, the link that is supposed to exist between a local authority and the people living in that area. When officials are simply appointed by decree of the central party office and their authority is not embedded in the local constituency, people lose the link that they should have to the local authority. As a result people do not feel that they can legitimately air their views on what the local authority is doing, because the people who are administering the policies are not embedded in the community and simply do what the national leadership instructs them to do for fear of losing their deployments.

According to Mbeleni (2011:1) if one looks at how local government has performed over the past 10 years, as much as some gains have been made in providing housing and some basic infrastructure, the pace at which that has happened has been extremely slow. Corruption and inequality appear to have sky-rocketed in local municipalities under the leadership of the ANC. Many strategies have been devised to turn the situation around but with little success. Cadre deployment continues to be at the centre-stage of a flawed transformation, leading to the employment of ill-qualified staff. Local politics have also thoroughly undermined public participation forums at local level and rendered them ineffective. The legislative framework that regulates municipalities has also come under fire in various platforms, with municipal officials claiming that it is rather complex and cumbersome, and makes too many requirements that take the time of officials away from finding strategic ways to respond to the needs of the citizens.

Ndlangisa (in City Press 2010b:5) shows that the underlying causes of protests are almost invariably the same: lack of adequate housing or shoddy workmanship, lack

of sanitation, lack of tarred roads, unresponsive and unaccountable municipal councils. Hence it is generally accepted that in some cases these grievances are used as a facade to mask intra-party political rivalries as local politicians jostle for positions in municipalities. The above statement concurs with the survey carried out by Idasa which reflects that 89% of citizens in local and district municipalities were dissatisfied with service delivery despite government efforts. The survey found that dissatisfaction is “partly caused or at least reinforced by politicians making unrealistic promises and thus raising expectations regarding free services to unrealistically high levels” (Ndlangisa in City Press 2011i:4).

Huntington (in Duvenhage 2004:42) outlines that the term political institutionalisation seems to mean the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. The capacity displayed by the institutions to regulate conflicts among social forces and to provide solutions, contribute to the legitimacy and credibility of political institutions, which may serve as a sign of political development. The establishment of effective institutions in states that have a society in transition, such as South Africa, should therefore have priority. The effectiveness of institutions may be determined in terms of the degree of support that they enjoy, as well as the level of institutionalisation.

Ntliziywana (2009:23) reflects that during the period of 2004 to 2006, numerous municipalities across South Africa, particularly in the Black and Coloured townships were marred by mass protests, marches, demonstrations and violent confrontations. A wave of service delivery protests erupted in townships across South Africa over shoddy housing and poor public services. As at 20 July 2009, the police reports recorded that in no fewer than 20 towns, disgruntled residents have taken to the streets in the past four weeks. The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) recently reported that there have been 63 protests. Residents in townships resorted to venting their anger and frustration by violent protests, in some instances demanding that their towns be withdrawn from certain municipalities due to lack of services therein. These continued countrywide community protests is an expression of a deep malaise within the realm of governance in the country and, more

particularly, at the local level. Service delivery protests were widespread in the years between 2004 and 2006.

InternAfrica.org (2010:1 of 57) revealed that the on-going service delivery protests paint a negative picture of South Africa locally and abroad. The protests leave one with an impression that government is failing to deliver basic services to the people, especially at local government level. At local government level, most municipalities are failing to deliver basic services. There is no doubt that the culture of so-called cadre deployment and nepotism is contributing a great deal to municipalities' inability to service communities. Cadre deployment and nepotism are common in that skills and experience are not requirements for one to be appointed. The sad reality is that beneficiaries of both nepotism and cadre deployment are appointed to key strategic positions. It is a fact that the majority of these people fail to perform.

According to Heywood (2007:172) insists that "the very ubiquity of local government reflects the fact that it is both administratively necessary and, because it is 'close' to the people, easily intelligible. Moreover, elected local politicians have a measure of democratic legitimacy that enables them to extend their formal powers and responsibilities". In a related assertion, Marx (in Heywood 2007:384) argues that the power-bloc model of bureaucracy was seen as a mechanism through which bourgeois interests are upheld and the capitalist system defended.

Du Toit (1995:23) maintains that strong states are those with high capabilities. Consequently they are more likely to succeed in achieving this domestic hegemony. The measure of their success is the establishment of a unified network of social control. This is achieved by means of a universal set of rules which prescribes the conduct of relations between one individual and another and between individuals and the state. De Vos (2010:1 of 33) justifies that living in a constitutional democracy can be unsettling and complicated – especially if one has not embraced the values underlying a functioning constitutional democracy. In such a democracy all role players must accept that there are competing views of what constitutes the public good.

According to Rossouw (2011:1 of 4) the government's State of the Cities Report paints a bleak picture of the state of South Africa's major municipalities, saying local government is one of the least trusted public institutions and municipalities are "remote and unresponsive". The report also delivers a stinging verdict on the failure of cadre deployment, remarking that senior councillors and councillors are often political appointments "and lack the skills required to do their jobs properly". While on the same report, Carriem, the deputy minister of co-operative governance and traditional affairs outlined that, "it is the poor, the ANC constituency that suffers most with incompetent senior municipal managers. The report notes that local government has been criticised for its lack of openness, unresponsiveness and poor consultation and its standing in society has deteriorated over the past decade. It is one of the least trusted public institutions in the country".

Again the SowetanLive (2011:2 of 7) quoted Madikizela-Mandela saying "the country-wide protests were consequences of a dream deferred", adding that the protest over ANC candidate lists was a manifestation that the ANC had deviated from the Freedom Charter's declaration that "The people shall govern". Madikizela-Mandela reiterated that people are refusing to remain victims of broken promises and that the shadow of disappointment was written on their faces. On the same report, the Director of UNISA's Centre for African Renaissance Studies, Gutto was quoted as saying, "service delivery suffers because people are put in positions based on their loyalty to party leadership and not because of their integrity and capability. When we have a system that supports cadre deployment, and not national interest then we have a big problem". He further said that it was correct for leaders to accept that they did not do well, but the question is how we correct it? Harrison (2001:110) indicates that the reconstruction of local government was one of the greatest challenges facing South Africa's new ANC-led government. Apart from the high level of fragmentation caused by apartheid, local government in South Africa suffered severe problems in terms of status, finance, capacity and legitimacy.

Huntington (1968b:7) establishes that in many modernising countries and governments are not able to perform the first function much less the second. The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. While

Matlala (in Sowetan 2011a: 9) reports that Limpopo premier Mathale has urged the newly elected councillors to serve as mediators between the government and the communities to ensure quality service delivery. In the same report, Limpopo MEC for Local Government and housing, Lekganyane was quoted saying “we want our councillors to come out of the training understanding their roles so that they can perform what is only expected of them and leave managerial and administrative work for those who know better. A lack of knowledge on the part of councillors has over the years resulted in retarding progress, dysfunctional municipalities that gave rise to community protests”.

Nguyen (2005:4) argues that state failure is said to occur when “the basic functions of the state are no longer performed and when legitimate power, law and political order have fallen apart”. In another report published (in Sowetan 2011b: 4) Zille reveals that the “Eastern Cape recorded the highest level of irregular expenditure in the past financial year amounting to R2, 7 billion. It is particularly infuriating considering that the Eastern Cape had R500 million of its municipal infrastructure grant withdrawn by the National Treasury because the Province failed to spend the money. It is bizarre in this context that the municipality said it ran out of money”. Waldner (in City Press 2010c:5) illustrates that the quality of government services rendered to the people is a national disgrace, based on thousands of complaints addressed to the office of the Public Protector. The 16 136 complaints received by the watchdog in 2010 cover a wide spectrum, ranging from the inappropriate conduct of officials to corruption, abuse of power and wastage of public funds. Furthermore Matlala (in Sowetan 2011b: 7) indicates that a poor municipality in Limpopo that was declared a disaster area in 2010 has become a hatching ground for theft of borehole pumps. The municipality spent over R20 million since 2009 on boreholes to supply water to areas hit by drought, but some officials are allegedly hell-bent on failing the system by stealing borehole equipment.

The Witness (2010) revealed that political interference, infighting, illegal instructions and nepotism were all identified by the Minister for Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Shiceka, as responsible for local government service delivery failure. Whereas deputy minister, Carim, last year criticised the incestuous

relationship between party and state at municipal level. The “long-suffering ratepayers of Msunduzi Municipality know full well the consequences of ANC cadre deployment”. The end game is almost in sight with the province poised to exercise its constitutional right to invoke section 139 (b) and administer the city.

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011) maintains that weak states have a limited ability to enforce political rules. Rampedi (in City Press 2010d:10) outlines that scores of rural villagers in Limpopo are still experiencing a water crisis nearly a year after the Mopani District Municipality issued multi-million-rand tenders for the supply of boreholes and maintenance of pumps. It is alleged that most of the 49 companies which shared contracts worth R25 million between August and September 2009 did shoddy work, supplied low-capacity machines and drilled boreholes in the wrong places. Hence beneficiaries to this tender were local ANC cadres and activists.

Nyalunga (2006:18) avows that it is clear that local government stands to inherit growing responsibility for service delivery, primarily because South Africa has inherited a public sector marked by fragmented and gross inequalities at all levels of state activity. It is, however, widely acknowledged that local government is also marked by some dramatic deficiencies in terms of its capacity and structure to meet those demands of service delivery. Pityana (2011:3) reveals that South Africa is witnessing a transition from the politics of social justice, liberation and public service; to that of personal wealth accumulation, concentration of political power and hegemony. He went on to highlight that we are fast becoming gripped by the politics of cronyism and patronage. At times political connection and loyalty rank ahead of technical and administrative competency for business and roles in government.

Whereas Du Toit (1995:27) demonstrates that weak societies are defined by their low levels of social control. Furthermore the prevailing strategies of survival advanced by social organisations are prone to collapse. These strategies find new adherents, either because they have little bearing on the actual conditions people have to face up to in everyday life, or because the organisations that sponsor them are subject to internal strains or external pressures. Human (1998:126) guides that good strategists must have intimate knowledge of the context in which they operate

and be able to translate this understanding into practical actions that will ensure long-term effectiveness of their organisations. This means that a good strategist must be competent in a number of diverse skills.

According to Sokomani (2010:1 of 2) “other misgivings around the feasibility of having municipalities achieve clean audits by 2014, shows very little reason to be optimistic about the willingness of deployed cadres to take kindly to Zuma’s municipal depoliticisation initiative, resistance is likely to be encountered...Such a trend cannot be healthy for the public service in the long run”.

The ServicePublication (2011:2 of 6) quoted Botha as saying “affiliation and nepotism, rather than skills and merit, result in turning municipalities into poor to mediocre institutions and political playing fields where the capacity, passion and commitment to serve the community is totally absent”. As a result the lack of performance management and monitoring combined with the unwillingness or inability to maintain discipline led to many “politically connected” employees becoming a law unto themselves. In most municipalities, political and managerial leadership is perceived to be poor by all groups of stakeholders, resulting in a lack of vision and indecisiveness on important issues. As a result administrative staff are often entangled in party politics and are therefore not seen as impartial in resource allocation and service delivery, (Memela, Mautjane, Nzo and Van Hoof 2008:6-7).

Neuberger (1974:173) highlights that it must be emphasised that the prolonged existence of a regime does not prove its success or that its overthrow is necessarily a result of its failure. Sometimes cruel, corrupt, and inefficient governments survive for decades while reform-minded, popular governments are overthrown within months. Franco’s Spain, for example, has achieved little success in the realm of social and economic progress although it has succeeded in surviving for more than thirty years. Ultimately the next section will outline the implications of cadre deployment on service delivery.

## **2.5. Implications of cadre deployment on service delivery**

One major implication of cadre deployment on service delivery is reflected by the inability of the deployed cadres to deliver on the services or tasks assigned to them, except carrying out the party mandate. According to Hoffman (2011:2-3 of 5) by its very nature, cadre deployment sets up a conflict of interest situation that enmeshes both deployees and the deployer. Some cadre deployment committees of the ANC sit in a smoke filled room and decide whom the party should deploy and where. For Hoffman “deployment does not have a top-down centralist flavour to it because of its military connotation and the methodology used explains why candidates for party posts are always reticent about pushing themselves forward”. Basically the ethos, according to Hoffman, is that loyal party cadre’s do what the party expects of them, not what they want to do for the party. This is all well and good for political positions, but it simply does not work for the state and private sector.

Palmer (1989:226) guides that in order to explain the fragility of democratic regimes in developing areas, it is necessary to consider a variety of problem areas including; the capacity of democratic regimes to assure all major participants in the political process that democratic procedures will be enforced in both the present and the future, the level and intensity of ideological divergence within a society, the political behaviour of the masses, and the capacity of democratic regimes to come to grips with the economic and social problems confronting their respective societies.

Huntington (in Duvenhage 2004:42) asserts that “political institutionalisation” means the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability. The capacity displayed by the institutions to regulate conflicts among social forces and to provide solutions, contribute to the legitimacy and credibility of political institutions, which may serve as a sign of political development. The establishment of effective institutions in states that have a society in transition, such as South Africa, should therefore have priority. The effectiveness of institutions may be determined in terms of the degree of support that they enjoy, as well as the level of institutionalisation.

It can be argued that the system of cadre deployment if not properly handled, could lead South Africa into a failed state. Rice (2008:1) reflects that “we have learned that nearly 60 countries – over a quarter of all UN members – are unable to meet the basic requirements of statehood. Most of the world’s weakest states are in Africa, but the problem affects countries from Haiti to Yemen, Burma and Nepal. Afghanistan is a fully failed state, second only to Somalia. These two along with the Democratic Republic of Congo, fail to fulfil core state functions. By our measure Iraq has become the world’s fourth weakest state, just one notch above Congo and below Burundi, Sudan and Zimbabwe...”

Du Toit (1995:27) reflect that a regime represents a specific component within the state consisting of values, norms, rules and procedures; and structures of authority which shape the ordering of power within and between the different organisational sites of the state. Furthermore various ways of securing state predominance has been employed. Non-merit appointments, as the second set of tactics, also aim to achieve the objective of maintaining a coherence of interests between state leaders and their subordinates. In this matter three categories of non-merit appointments are identified - being appointment based on personal loyalty to state leaders, co-optation of potential rivals (such as established strongmen) who may wish to build power centres within the state, and the so called “ethnic bargain”. Heywood (2007:448) defines corruption as a failure to carry out the “proper” responsibilities as a result of the pursuit of private gain.

Rampedi (in City Press 2010e:1) reports that the Greater Letaba Municipality in Limpopo allegedly fired its technical manager because she queried shoddy work by SGL Engineering Projects, a company which is majority-owned by the ANC Youth League president, Julius Malema. An insider at the municipality told City Press that Kruger was given the boot in August 2007 after SGL complained that she was “too harsh” on them. While Maponya (in Sowetan 2011c:7) outlines that allegations of corruption have emerged following reports of jobs for pals in the Limpopo Department of Health’s Mopani District. This follows reports that officials conducting interviews for posts that were advertised had preferred their relatives and friends. Of concern were allegations that some of those interviewing candidates were not

supposed to be on the panel, while some of those who had been hired did not feature on the short-list of candidates.

In a related report (in City Press 2011b: 5), Public Protector Thuli Madonsela said, “[w]e are bleeding billions through corruption in the tender system and through contracts that don’t go on tender.” Areas of great concern were cited as the shocking abuse of power in government departments and the way departments managed labour relations. While Mokone (in Sowetan 2011d: 5) establishes that the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs has set up an internal unit to tackle corruption in municipalities and to tackle what they called “municipal corruption”.

Duvenhage (2006:295) establishes that another pattern of political change is a situation in which democracy is used as a mechanism to resolve conflict, with or without success. In Angola this process was not as successful as in Mozambique. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Swaziland and to a lesser extent Tanzania the third wave of democracy has not yet been experienced. Tanzania and Swaziland have, thus far, only experienced mild forms of liberalisation. The movement towards “delegative democracy” and party domination in South Africa are dangerous signs that cannot be ignored.

IDASA (2010:1) guides that developmental local government is intended to have a major impact on the daily lives of South Africans and should seek a new focus on improving the standard of living and quality of life of the people. Huntington (1968b:24) argues that political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. As a result morality requires trust, trust involves predictability and predictability requires regularised and institutionalised patterns of behaviour. However without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and realise its common interest. Therefore the capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.

Haffajee (in City Press 2010f: 13) reflects that, “because a party political badge has become a requirement to getting a tender, it squeezes other black business out of the preferential procurement system, which can result in political instability...Hence the purpose of the tender system is no longer geared towards providing effective state services but towards creating a generation of tenderpreneurs. Finally winning state tenders which result in windfall profits has changed the culture of the governing ANC where bling has taken over the simplicity and grassroots identity of the party which won South Africa’s freedom”.

Myburgh (2009:1 of 3) outlines that, “at present there is no organisation save that of corruption, no system save that of chaos, no test of integrity save that of partisanship, no test of qualification save that of intrigue”. In conclusion, the practical manifestation of cadre deployment is a challenge facing the public service and opposition politics in South Africa since the dawn of the democratic dispensation. Unfortunately Heywood (2007:84) argues that the electorate can decide which elite rules, but cannot change the fact that power is always exercised by the elite.

## **2.6. Conclusion**

Rotberg (n.d.:8 of 26) warns that Zimbabwe is an example of a once unquestionably strong African state that has fallen rapidly through weakness to the very edge of the abyss of failure. All Zimbabwe lacks in order to join the ranks of failed states is a widespread internal insurgent movement directed against the government. While Venter and Landsberg (2006:157) maintain that, as long as councillors can take politically motivated irresponsible decisions without incurring any accountability, municipalities will be burdened with poor financial management.

Memela *et al.* (2008:1) guide that governance is not just about how a government and social organisations interact and how they relate to citizens, but it concerns the state’s ability to serve citizens and other actors, as well as the manner in which public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are exercised. The quality of governance could be measured in terms of how well various actors handle the rules that make up the basic dimensions of the

political regime. In the next chapter the focus will be on cadre deployment as management strategy including political management, opposition management and resource management strategies.

## CHAPTER 3

# CADRE DEPLOYMENT AS MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

### 3.1. Introduction

Beach (in Schwella, Burger, Fox and Muller 1996:68) defines management development as a systematic process of training and growth by which individuals gain and apply knowledge, skills, insights and attitudes to manage work effectively. From this definition, management development should clearly be a process anticipating the organisation's future management needs while allowing employees to develop their careers accordingly. Management development is in this instance, linked to career development.

Cadre deployment is at the root of management including political and public administration. From the branch level party cadres are deployed to a variety of party political tasks while in government cadres are deployed to serve the interests of the public, irrespective of their skills and expertise. Hence the motive behind all deployments is to secure and protect political power. Furthermore loyal party cadres are also given the opportunity to be nominated as ward and party councillors in local and district councils.

Dess, Gregory, Lumpkin and Marilyn (2005:1 of 2) outline strategic management as consisting of the analysis, decisions, and actions an organisation undertakes in order to create and sustain competitive advantages. This definition captures two main elements that go to the heart of the field of strategic management. First, the strategic management of an organisation entails three on-going processes: *analysis*, *decisions*, and *actions*. That is, strategic management is concerned with the analysis of strategic goals (vision, mission, and strategic objectives) along with the analysis of the internal and external environment of the organisation. Next, leaders must make strategic decisions.

From the above assertion, it can be argued that cadre deployment is a strategy for managing resources through political means. This is reflected by the appointment of party loyalists and awarding of government tenders to the politically “connected” without following tender procurement procedures.

Swanepoel, Erasmus and Schenk (2008:13-14) establish that “strategizing refers to making strategy, which is based on strategic thinking. An easy way to simplify and understand ‘strategy’ and ‘strategic’ is to think of them in relation to tactics. As when playing a game of chess, there is an overall game plan, but as the game progresses certain moves are made depending on what the opposition is doing. If one thinks and acts tactically, it is of short-term nature but geared to fit with the strategy”.

Huntington (1968b:1) asserts that the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interests of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based.

Further evidence of cadre deployment as management strategy is reflected by the deployment of party cadres at all strategic areas. This strategy aims to strengthen the political power base as another strategy to stay in power for a long time. Human (1998:111) defines strategy as actions taken by a relatively autonomous organisation or group in order to perform a specific task. As a result distinction between policy and strategy is important as it underlines the notion that the strategic apex within the revocracy must act within a broad policy framework. It can be noted that the lack of managerial skills in managing state institutions is a critical challenge faced by the government in the current dispensation, and this has been a challenge in the previous regime.

According to Mafunisa (2003:93) the South African public service has, historically, been highly politicised. When the National Party came into power in 1948 it deployed its loyal members to different senior positions in the public service. Officials deployed

were those who understood and were loyal to the Party's policies of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, language and sex. It was difficult to separate the National Party (as the government of the day) and the public service. Suffice to the above statement, the ANC followed suit when it assumed power in 1994.

According to Waruiru (2007:2) "most black African nations that gained independence after Ghana followed its path by establishing one-party dictatorships... In many of the cases, the winning political party at the independence elections used its majority in the national parliament, to pass legislation outlawing the existence of opposition political parties. This left the ruling party with a monopoly of power".

While Kimemia (2011:1) reflects that ANC cadre deployment is at the root of the current malaise and indifferent service delivery. There is a well-founded feeling that those who engage in corruption and blatant abuse of power will rarely be punished, provided they are "good comrades" who are politically connected. Even where they are clearly unsuitable for senior managerial positions, the ruling party has literally forced municipalities to employ them, often to disastrous effect.

Palmer (1989:128) asserts that change tends to be cumulative, reciprocal and discontinuous. Change tends to be cumulative in the sense that the frustrations and conflicts unleashed by a myriad of sources of social change in the third world accumulate until they reach a point at which they overwhelm the capacity of traditional political leaders to rule effectively. The reciprocal nature of change refers to the fact that the circle of change is perpetuated and expanded by the tendency of the diverse forces of social change in order to reinforce or to feed upon one another, while the process of change is itself discontinuous. In order to democratise a strong, autonomous state the regime needs to be adapted to allow for citizens to get access to free and unrestrained participation in, and contestation for, the political power *within* the state.

Duvenhage (2005:12) indicates that "the execution of political transformation, especially during the implementation phase implies the political control together with the accompanying capacity to administer the political plan. Serious signs of political

decay such as vigilantism, poor service delivery, crime escalation and low levels of political institutionalisation of local government in the provinces are becoming more obvious indicating a weak state syndrome.” Whereas political transformation is defined “as rapid, progressive, comprehensive and fundamental political change of society (stemming from an unacceptable political past) in the form of central planning (social and political engineering) accentuating the managing of political change in general and of conflict management in particular” (Duvenhage, 2005:5).

Du Toit (1995: 49) articulates that a strong autonomous state can be identified by the extent to which citizenship, rules of social control and resulting survival strategies are applied to individuals within the state in a non-discriminatory manner. The state assumes a neutral stance towards social differentiators, such as ethnicity in determining criteria for membership of the state, as well as in determining the substance and quality of such membership.

In order to shift away from a racially politicised administration into the new system, adequate skills and expertise are needed on the part of the deployed. Furthermore management is about planning and implementation of services to the people. Section (153 a-b) of the Constitution guides that a municipality must structure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, to promote the social and economic development of the community and to participate in national and provincial programmes. In terms of the above constitutional guideline, one tends to argue that proper skills and management could result in efficient planning and finally lead to effective implementation of services.

Ntliziywana (2009:46) guides that employment contracts can be used as one of the measures to enforce compliance with the competency requirements. In this regard, section 57(1) of the Systems Act read with Regulation 2(1) of the Performance Regulations provides that municipal managers or section 56 managers can only be appointed as such in terms of employment contract. This employment contract is subject to the terms and conditions of the Systems Act as well as the Municipal Finance Management Act.

Gildenhuis (1997:61) asserts that public accountability as a very strong principle in democratic public financial management. In a democratic government and administration, public accountability requires that elected political representatives as well as public officials give account in public of all financial transactions. In this respect the assumption is that secrecy with regard to public financial management conceals maladministration and corruption. The principal proposition is that all public institutions, which are financed from public funds, should be held responsible and should account in public for the honest, efficient and effective expenditure of the public money. Finally in the subsequent section further attention will be given to public management.

### **3.2. Public management strategy**

According to Schick (2003:1-2) every successful public management reform is an amalgam of opportunity, strategy and tactics. Strategy also entails implementing actions and the commitment to give the change process essential support and resources. Consequently the successful management of public institutions could be determined by efficient and effective strategic management.

Heathfield (2011) defines human resource management as the function within an organisation that focuses on the recruitment of, management of, and providing direction for the people who work in the organisation. Effective Human Resource Management (HRM) enables employees to contribute effectively and productively to the overall company direction and the accomplishment of the organization's goals and objectives. It can be further argued that the South African public sector did not go without service delivery challenges.

According to Olaopa (2011:10 of 27) Strategic Human Resource Management is a concept that is used to describe the transformation in the role of the human resource manager. It refers to an approach to the management of the people employed in an organisation that recognises the critical role they have to play in creating a vision of the future for the organisation, setting challenging goals, analysing their

environment, understanding the drivers of competition in their chosen business, developing strategies to realise the vision they defined and mobilising resources to implement the strategies and achieve the goals set.

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011:71) defines dynamic equilibrium as a situation where an environmental crisis (whatever the definition) can result in undetermined dynamics (unpredictable change), which makes abnormal demands on the abilities (capacities) of the system. In times of dynamic equilibrium a pattern known as system defection can come to the fore. This amounts to the inability of the state to deliver proper and quality services in specific areas, which results in other institutions outside the public sector (sometimes the corporate sector) beginning to take over this task. When conditions of dynamic equilibrium are encountered, the critical functions of the political system such as law and order, the penal system, defence, health, education and other essential bureaucratic and administrative affairs are under great pressure and even exhibit the inability to deliver essential services.

Ntliziywana (2009:36-37) guides that the first competency requirement giving effect to the constitutional principles of professionalism enunciated above is higher education qualifications. Both the Performance Regulations and the Competency Regulations prescribe minimum qualifications for the appointment of the municipal staff at a management level. This means that the appointment of municipal staff is made subject to the candidates meeting predetermined qualification standards. It is therefore important that the person appointed to the post of a municipal manager has the relevant skills and expertise to perform the duties associated therewith. With regards to the qualification requirements for senior managers and chief financial officers, the Competency Regulations and guidelines for each of these officials make a distinction between different categories of municipalities. In relation to a municipality, senior managers are defined as the managers referred to in section 56 of the Systems Act. Cloete (in Gildenhuis 1997:56) outlines that one of the traditional cornerstones of democracy is the fact that each political representative, as well as each public official, is subject to accountability. This means that each of them should give account in public for his activities. It is generally accepted that they

should display a sense of responsibility when performing their official duties, in other words their conduct should be above reproach so that they will be able to account for their acts in public.

Duvenhage (2006:265-266) argues that political strategic factors can also contribute to the successful institutionalisation of democratic values. Three less important matters must be singled out namely; the manner (modus) in which institutionalisation occurred; the timing of the imitative; and political leadership. It is a well-known fact that a revolutionary modus, in which political violence dominates, seldom if ever results in democratisation. In fact the more restricted the levels of violence, the greater are the chances of successful institutionalisation of democratic values.

Shively (1995:284) establishes that under a system of bureaucracy; in which members of the public administration are appointed and promoted on the basis of their qualifications for the job they are meant to do; that special requirements of training or experience are set for the position; administrative procedures are standardised so that relatively little is left to individual officials' biases or passions. Finally there are clear lines of command that are established, in which an order from high official goes to a lower official, who then passes the order on to the next level.

Du Toit (1995: 30-31) guides that if civil society must prevail over the state, then it must serve as the source of democratic values, norms and practices, and the logical sequence is for civil society to inaugurate the democratic regime and to sustain it. Again if the state is to prevail, then the state itself must act as the force that nurtures the growth of civil society and that establishes the democratic regime.

Levin (2002:12) argues that the value system underpinning the public sector needs to be corruption-resistant since managerial and technical solutions, whilst important, cannot succeed on their own. Du Toit (1991:60) maintains that under conditions of a modern representative form of democracy, the idea of democratic accountability has been institutionalised through a range of public institutions created for this purpose. Important institutions in this regard, include and are included in the legislature, the judiciary, the executive, administration, and media.

In defining a political institution, Huntington (in Duvenhage 2004:33) states that a political institution refers to an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders and thus promoting communication among two or more social forces. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means of defining and realising its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests. A society with highly institutionalised governing organisations and procedures is, in this sense, more able to articulate and achieve its public interest.

Gildenhuis (1999) highlights that state decay can take on at least three different forms: in a soft state corruption is endemic; a weak state is characterised by deep internal cleavages; and a failed state suffers from the collapse of official institutions and of law and order. Although each of these has been the subject of considerable academic enquiry, the three forms are seldom examined in combination.

Huntington (1968b:86) made the assertion that modernisation and social mobilisation, in particular, thus tend to produce political decay unless steps are taken to moderate or to restrict its impact on political consciousness and political involvement. Most societies, even those with fairly complex and adaptable traditional political institutions, suffer a loss of political community and decay of political institutions during the most intense phases of modernisation.

Green (1988:5) establishes that a state is legitimate only if, all things considered, its rule is morally justified. The exercise of authority is among the means which states characteristically use to attain their objectives. Duvenhage (2004:43) expresses that the primary problem of politics is the development of political institutions behind social and economic change. As a result the failure of such political institutions to keep track of changes requires the institutionalisation of such institutions to be effective in terms of the transition of the societies.

The Zimpolitical blogspot (2008:3) warns that from what happened in Zimbabwe since the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) came into

power 31 years ago; the country is now in a class of its own. It cannot be regarded as a developing country as all pointers indicate that all sectors of the economy are moving albeit in a negative direction. Zimbabwe therefore categorically fits in a class of failed states. There is no possibility of resurrection under the present leadership that has proved to run out of ideas to rejuvenate the country to a path of economic recovery. Finally they view the country as a private limited that exists to generate profits for themselves at the impoverishment of the majority of the plebs.

Human (1998:126) cites that good strategists must have intimate knowledge of the context in which they operate. They must also be able to translate this understanding into practical actions (strategies, in other words) that will ensure the long-term effectiveness of their organisations. This means that a good strategist must be competent in a number of diverse skills. Heywood (2007:395) outlines that the perceived need to control the bureaucracy reflects a wide range of concerns. Most, importantly, unchecked bureaucratic power spells the demise of representative and responsible government. Hence for political democracy to be meaningful, appointed officials must in some way be accountable to the general public.

The Free State Times (2011:3) reflected that ANC mandarins, right from Luthuli House to the different regional headquarters of the party, would want us to believe that the “candidates” they put forward through their infamous deployment committees are the best they could find within their so-called movement. Yet there is nothing that is further from the truth. The rank and file of the ANC is populated by progressive (and often young) women and men who have the papers (read knowledge, skills and attitudes) to fix the problems of South Africa, once and for all, but they are never given a chance by a political party that seems extremely keen to entrench and perpetuate a culture of kleptocracy. Finally the next section outlines the relevance of cadre deployment to political management strategy within the realm of power.

### **3.3. Political management strategy**

Mosher (in Gildenhuis 1997:59) differentiates between objective and subjective responsibility. For Mosher objective responsibility refers to the formal responsibility of one person or institution to another person, whereas subjective responsibility refers to the sense of responsibility a person has for the assignment. Subjective responsibility does not coincide precisely with objective responsibility as it sometimes causes serious problems for public officials, because what may be expected of them in terms of objective responsibility may clash with what they experience as subjective responsibility.

Alan and Ball (2000:100) maintain that all political parties have philosophical bases, no matter how blurred and no matter how divorced from the actual political behaviour of the party these foundations may be. The ideology may be important for party workers and voters to justify their commitment to the party, but also serves to distinguish from others and allows the party to attempt to organise public opinion in a given ideological or policy direction.

Cloete (1994:167) made an analysis on the personnel systems developed under different political milieus as follows; the autocratic, democratic, the spoils, and merit systems; the autocratic system is found in countries where the people are divided into classes and where public service posts (particularly the higher-grade jobs) are reserved for aristocracy. This system was in force in Britain until a democratic system of government was established; the democratic system refers to where public officials are elected to office by voters. The system applied to specific public service posts in the United States of America; the spoils system refers to where the political party which gains power after an election regards public service posts as booty to be taken at will and distributed among its supporters. This system applies to a small number of top public service posts in the United States of America; and the merit that implies that everyone who has the prescribed qualifications may apply for appointment in vacant public service posts. Those found to be the best qualified and best suited to the posts are then appointed.

Jeffery (2010:4 of 6) outlines that the greatest injustice is committed when patently incompetent and unqualified people are deployed into administration as municipal managers, chief financial officers, and heads of technical services. Furthermore the abuse of state power remains evident in cadre deployment as well as in javelin throwing and other instances of corruption and nepotism.

The Amandlawonye wikispace (2001:4) outlines that the National Democratic Revolution's most critical act is the creation of a legitimate state which derives its authority from the people, through regular elections and continuing popular participation in the process of governance. While Huntington (1968b:198) argues that in a society without effective political institutions and unable to develop them, the end result of social and economic modernisation is political chaos.

The Zimpolitical blogspot (2008:3) reveals that it is unassailable that the problems that beset Zimbabwe today primarily stem from ill-governance and grand corruption on the part of those who wield political power, self-aggrandisement and poor economic policy planning. The resultant effect has been the downward spiral and unprecedented levels of the Zimbabwe economy. This resulted in the decline of quality service delivery in terms of health, education, finance, justice administration and a whole lot of services. And who suffers? Obviously the majority of the ordinary people are the ones who are reduced to mere inanities. The ANC (1998:2) establishes that the state guarantees and regulates property relations and rules of political, economic and social engagement in society. In doing so, it promotes specific social interests. Therefore, it should in its composition and outlook reflect these interests, and afford the classes and strata it represents the wherewithal to carry out their objectives.

Mazrui (1995) made a comparison between anarchy and tyranny by arguing that; every African government walks the tightrope between too much and too little government. An excess of government becomes tyranny; too little government becomes anarchy. Either can lead to a failed state, and either may lead to the collapse of the state. For example Somalia under Siyad Barre was a case in which tyranny ultimately led to the collapse of the state; anarchic conditions in the Congo

(now Zaire) in the 1960 nearly destroyed the new postcolonial state, which was saved by the United Nations (UN).

Human (1998:46) establishes that for democracy to work, communities need to think democratically on an everyday basis. Transformation is of no value unless it also involves the transformation of the mind. In South Africa, an essential social transformation is needed. This must be transformed to a culture of self-reliance. This social transformation should focus on giving back to South Africans the conviction that they can act to change and control their own destinies.

Trollip (2010:2) cites that the destruction associated with cadre deployment affects all levels of governance, right down to local government level, a fact acknowledged by government itself. In support of the above view, President Zuma stated that “One of the challenges in local government is the confusion between political and administrative roles. We are of the firm view that municipal employees should not hold leadership positions in political parties”.

Wertheim (2010:3 of 4) indicates that the ANC won political control of the country, but it lost out on the governing capability. By 2010 the ANC just does not have the governing capital to attend to all the needs of society. As a result, large areas of society have become void of any governing capabilities – in technical terms society has become governmentally empty. For Wertheim, the ANC commands a sound political majority, but signifies no governing presence within the key functions of government. With this, the broad outlines of the failed state have also come to South Africa as the structures for good governance have become destabilised. Consequently, when the government is in crisis, the whole of society will reflect the nature of the crisis.

According to Olaopa (2011:18 of 27) “[t]he *vision* of the capable developmental state in Africa is one that is committed first to ensuring a better life for all its citizens; that promotes *popular participation* and the *indigenous ownership* of its entire development agenda; whose public service is *people-oriented*, based on *meritocracy* and driven by service to its citizenry, that has *sound systems* of public administration

at all levels of government; has *transparency and accountability* to its citizenry and to its institutions as central tenets; has a sound macro-economic framework; that *eradicates poverty* and surpasses the minimum standards; *implements* its continental commitments on governance and public administration; mobilises, budgets and manages its *public finances* effectively; and is underpinned by *democratic politics*".

Rotberg (n.d.:4 of 26) maintains that weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling expectations in some areas and performing poorly in others. But they need not flunk all of them to fail overall, particularly since good security weighs very heavily, and high levels of internal violence are associated directly with failure and the propensity to fail. Strong states unquestionably control their territories and deliver a full range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens. Human (1998:114-115) maintains that strategic management should be oriented towards the long-term effectiveness of an organisation, rather than simply a reflection of the ideas of particular individuals who lead it at present. Good strategic decisions are those that will serve the institution and its needs, and not the particular wishes or beliefs of the current leadership. Likewise, good strategists are able to see beyond their own particular wishes and hopes. They see themselves as serving both the institution and the community.

Blake (2011: 4 of 64) reveals that it is important to note that the poor strength of the ANC is weakened by their poor rendering of services in African communities. Leon (2010:13 of 32) outlines that countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa embraced democracy at the start of the majority rule, but only Botswana's democratic record remains strong. Zimbabwe became a dictatorship after a short experiment with democratic rule; while Kenya's democratic record is patchy at best. Worryingly, South Africa's democracy is under threat. These cases represent the range of Africa's experience with democratisation.

Myburgh (2009:1 of 3) argues that power over appointments and promotions was (largely) taken out of the hands of politicians and placed in the care of a non-partisan civil service commission. This is known, at least in the United States, as the "merit

system". The implementation of this system in the British and American civil services solved problems those countries (and their intellectuals) have forgotten they ever had. The ANC formally got rid of merit as the overriding criterion in the appointment of public servants.

Venter and Landsberg (2006:169) maintain that public-policy making is intimately linked to the exercise of power. The allocation and citing of power in particular political systems determines who makes the decisions, and the extent of autonomy of decision-making that will be exercised in the process.

Midgal (in Weiner and Huntington 1987:430) maintains that resources and prerogatives of the state affect the way society is organised, and they help maintain a particular sort of social and political stability. Heywood (2007:389) establishes that all state bureaucracies are in some way organised on the basis of purpose or function. The most significant feature of these functionally defined bureaucracies is the degree of centralisation or decentralisation within them.

Zille (2009b:1 of 3) reflects that for a democracy to work, power must be held to account. Power abuse must be checked and prevented. For this reason, the institutions of state (such as the courts, the electoral commission and the broadcaster) must be genuinely independent from the ruling party. Cadre deployment is deliberately designed to destroy the "separation of powers" and ensure that the institutions of the state act in the party's interests. It has been evident in most instances that cadre deployment is the most efficient tool used by the party in power to control and manage power at all levers of power.

Sidimba (in City Press 2011a:4) reports that Youth Development Agency's top brass are now all African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) leaders, despite the fact that membership into the institution is open to all irrespective of party political affiliation. De Wet (2010:200) indicates that one characteristic peculiar to all authoritarian systems is the denial of significant political rights or privileges to most members of the political body. As a consequence, minority rule prevails in the sense that ultimate, as well as immediate; control of the government is confined to a small

proportion of the total adult population. Policies are decided by officials who are neither legally nor politically responsible to the general public – only to the minority who enjoy a monopoly of governmental power.

The ANC (1998:4) reiterates that transformation of the state entails; first and foremost, extending the power of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on. This is in contradiction with the provisions of the Constitution which characterises most of these bodies as independent and non-partisan. Control by democratic forces means that these institutions should operate on the basis of the precepts of the Constitution; they should be guided by new doctrines; they should reflect in their composition the demographics of the country; and they should owe allegiance to the new order.

The Prison Censorship (2011:2 of 3) highlights that the theory of democratic centralism asserts that in any group, a lack of discipline on the part of members of an organisation can be destructive to that organisation. People need to be counted on in order for work to run smoothly and as efficiently as possible. In an organisation whose goal is to seize power from the bourgeoisie, discipline and unity are essential if it is to have any chance of success. Recognising that everyone's personal lives have repercussions for the organisation as a whole, the discipline of centralism allows the party to make rules to minimise the potential damage to the party.

Armstrong (2011:1 of 4) outlines that democratic centralism is one of the most abused and misunderstood terms in the Marxist vocabulary. For decades the Stalinist Communities parties invoked "democratic centralism" to justify tight bureaucratic discipline. The democratic element totally disappeared from the Stalinist version of democratic centralism, which was really bureaucratic centralism. Decisions were made at the top, usually under direction from Moscow, and handed down as orders for the membership to carry out. De Wet (2010:147) guides that power is always limited, meaning that; its range depends upon the situation, government regulations, ethical standards and present or future competition.

Wertheim (2010:3 of 10) maintains that over the past decade in its essence governance – the relationship between government and the governed – has been eroded. Four election victories have provided the ANC government with a solid majority in parliament. This has boosted the profile of the ANC and there is little doubt about its political capital. The latter enabled the ANC to introduce its policy of transformation as mechanism to rectify the apartheid injustices of the past. Huntington (1968b:24) outlines that political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. For Huntington, morality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and predictability requires regularised and institutionalised patterns of behaviour. However without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and realise its common interest.

According to Waruiru (2007:1 of 10) pure democracy is a system that works well in particular cultures, and not all cultures are equally capable of building harmonious democratic societies. If the Bush administration had been interested in studying the track record of democracy-building efforts in tribal cultures, they should have studied the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the introduction of pure democracy 50 years ago resulted in disaster for the people of the region.

Myburgh (2009:1 of 2) establishes that the practical means by which the party ensures “iron discipline” prevails by concentrating control over appointment and promotion in the hands of “deployment committees”. The effect of this is to severely limit any real debate because all positions (within party and state) are controlled or confirmed by the party leadership which proposes policy. For this purpose, the party’s central, regional and local committees maintain lists of positions. Ultimately the ANC’s national working committee established the national deployment committee in November 1998. The cadre policy and deployment strategy, adopted at the same time to guide the work of the committee, lists as its objectives; the strengthening of “political and administrative control” over legislatures, party structures, and the civil service; and of ANC Leadership in “all parastatals and statutory bodies” and “in all other areas of social activity”.

MedSearch (2011:1 of 2) reported Health Minister, Aaron Motsoaledi, arguing that; teachers, nurses and even clerks whose highest qualification is a matric certificate are running SA's public hospitals, according to a competency study of hospital CEOs undertaken by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA). The study was requested by Health Minister, Aaron Motsoaledi, who has promised to fix the management crisis in hospitals, including removing under qualified and poorly performing CEOs and delegating more powers to management to perform elementary but essential functions. Motsoaledi said the cause of the appointment of unqualified hospital CEOs was a combination of bad policy and political patronage. A misguided policy, implemented after 1994, and said that because hospitals should be run "on business principles" it was no longer necessary for CEOs to have a clinical background. Anyone with management skills could apply for the job and only the second-in-command, a clinical manager, needed a medical background. But the abuse of the policy caused appointments to go badly awry.

Heywood (2007:84) argues that the electorate can decide which elite rules, but cannot change the fact that power is always exercised by elite. This quadrant-based depiction of political power is useful in that it demonstrates some variations in either the exercise of popularly accountable decision-making processes, or in the concentration of policy power away from public scrutiny by unresponsive policy elites.

Zartman (1995:10) outlines features of state collapse as follows; that government malfunctions by avoiding necessary but difficult choices. As a result, such measures mount in urgency and difficulty, facing the state with a governing crisis. Decisional avoidance can take place either because of institutional incoherence, in which the mechanisms of government are inadequate to their challenges, or because of political flabbiness, in which the politicians themselves are incapable of biting the bullet; the incumbents practice only defensive politics, fending off challenges and reducing threats, concentrating on procedural rather than substantive measures. Hence such measures include both repression and concession, both taken to get

opposition off their back. Probably the ultimate danger sign is when the centre loses control over its own state agents and begins to operate on their own account. Officials' exact payments for their own pockets, and law and order are consistently broken by agents of law and order, the police and army are becoming gangs and brigands.

The Zimpolitical blogspot (2008:2) establishes that many theories have been put forward with regard to the downfall of Zimbabwe, which until the inception of the land reform in the late 90's was regarded as the leading example of a successful ascent and developing democratic country destined for greater heights in Africa south of the Sahara. Today Zimbabwe is a country that is riddled with grand corruption, economic meltdown, shrinking democratic space and also poor service delivery in terms of health, education and other services. This has resulted in untold suffering for the masses of the people who are still bearing the burden of this. A labyrinth of state institutions has been reduced to a sham. The educational and health sectors have been hard hit by large scale migration of labour to greener pastures in the region, in particular South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. Universities and colleges are now being manned by less qualified lectures and in some cases other departments and faculties have been closed down due to a lack of qualified personnel.

Davidson (2010:1) outlines the features of a developmental state as follows:

- A centralised administration with much power vested in the hands of the executive;
- An interventionist attitude, where the executive routinely involves itself in all levels of government and every aspect of the state administration;
- Huge capital expenditure; and
- A large expanding bureaucracy; and centralised control over the economy and its administration, the result of which is the stifling of competition and the constraining of the market.

However the next section reflects on how cadre deployment is used as a management tool for controlling opposition politics through state resources.

### **3.4. Opposition management strategy**

According to Heywood (1997:230) political parties have a major role to play in any country's political system, while Huntington (1968b:144) maintains that power is something which has to be mobilised, developed, and organised. While the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) outlines the enshrinement of multi-partyism. Section 1 of this Constitution provides that: "the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law; (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voter's roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, and responsiveness and openness."

According to Waruiru (2007:2 of 10) most of the black African nations that gained independence after Ghana followed in its path by establishing one-party dictatorships. In many cases, the winning political party at the independent elections used its majority in the national parliament to pass legislation outlawing the existence of opposition political parties. Hence this left the ruling party with a monopoly of power. As a result this trend challenged the widely held notion that pure democracy leads to more freedom.

Mashele (2011:37) reflects that by means of state resources, opposition parties are either sledge-hammered into nonexistence, or they are only allowed marginal space in which to play. To the masses the message is clear: you can only live under the dictatorship of no alternatives! In some contexts, opposition parties are their very own enemies. They are incapable of analysing the substantive degeneration of society and of projecting themselves as an alternative to the prevailing decay. They are unable to fashion politics of societal regeneration. Hence the main weakness of opposition parties in post-colonial African societies is that they are formed and led by illegitimate people: either by whites who benefited from colonialism and apartheid, or by black leaders who were part of the ruling party but jumped ship due to internal party squabbles. Chiroro (n.d.:103) argues that except in the long-standing

democracies of Botswana and Mauritius, the environment in Southern Africa has never been conducive to the growth of opposition politics. In dominant party systems such as that in Zimbabwe, every effort has been made to thwart opposition growth and the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system has not favoured the growth of a strong opposition. Furthermore the political landscape of Southern Africa is littered with parties of different sizes, strengths and levels of acceptability. However, regional institutions such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have not played their part in ensuring a place for opposition parties in their deliberations pertaining to governance and economic development (Chiroro n.d.:111).

Midgal (in Weiner and Huntington 1987:410) reflects that another basis for appointment to state positions is co-optation of those who might otherwise develop threatening power centres outside the state organisation. According to Gentle (2011:2) the ANC has tried so desperately to be “the great South African party”, the natural party of governance, technically competent and showing statesman-like qualities. The latter includes the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, the sunset clauses, the concessions to white capital, the merging with Nats (Nationalist), including “Die Stem” in the national anthem, sending *Tony Leon* to Argentina as ambassador, giving a Deputy Minister position to the Freedom Front’s Pieter Mulder, committing to consultation on everything, supporting the Springboks...the list goes on.

Chiroro (n.d.:117) maintains that in a dominant-party system, opposition parties in Southern Africa have to overcome three obstacles in their battle for visibility and effectiveness: institutional and structural barriers to political visibility; the fight for the hearts and minds of the electorate, which is largely comfortable with the devil it knows; and the fight to maintain a constant flow of resources and membership, since most opposition parties are not publicly funded.

Leon (2010:16) maintains that Mugabe’s government commenced with wholesale changes to the Constitution, including the removal of some legal guarantees to the commercial farmers in the event of an expropriation. During the 1990s, Mugabe used a combination of methods to minimise both opposition activity and support. He vastly

inflated the public service payrolls and parastatals to provide jobs and patronage for his followers. Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou (2010:358) assert that it is recognised that in greater circles opposition political parties in both developing and developed countries have an insurmountable task to achieve in ensuring and enhancing democratic processes.

Some Facebook comments (2011:1) reiterate that “Moloto will not be the first, and undoubtedly the last, senior opposition party figure to be offered and take up a diplomatic posting. There was no speculation that about the implosion of the Democratic Alliance when senior office-bearers and former leaders took up postings such as Sandra Botha (Czech Republic), Douglas Gibson (Thailand), and Tony Leon (Argentina). As with the aforementioned, Moloto’s capacity and continued popularity in Limpopo has unfortunately made him the latest ‘victim’ of the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment as the ruling party continues with its attempts to eliminate any threats to its ‘god-given’ mandate, including through the redeployment of political opponents”.

Duvenhage (2006:294) advises that the institutionalisation of democratic procedures in South Africa and many other Southern African states will depend on the ability to shed the tendency towards one party domination. In this respect the successful interpretation of opposition politics within democratic procedures is essential. States such as Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and even Botswana are proof that party domination cannot continue indefinitely. The problem in most Southern African states is that democratic procedures are often tools for replacing one dominant party government with another.

Carolin (2010:1) warns that if opposition politics in South Africa continues to be dominated by small political personalities that represent partisan minority interests then their advances will be slow and insignificant, posing innumerable threats to democratic constitutionalism. Duvenhage (2004:43) establishes that increasing participation exceeds the capacity of the existing political institutions. The result is a legitimacy crisis which leads to political instability, and in this way promotes the process of political erosion and decay in many developing countries.

Napier (n.d 117) maintains that despite the reforms in many countries, opposition parties generally remain weak. There are many reasons for this, including recalcitrant incumbents in government who stop at nothing to obstruct, weaken, harass and divide opposition parties and deliberately create uneven playing field. Another reason is the lingering belief that the single “vanguard party” is the best mechanism to bring peace and prosperity to their respective countries. Opposition political parties are seen as obstacles to achieving these goals. However the next section will attempt to outline cadre deployment as resource management strategy.

### **3.5. Resource management strategy**

According to Schwella *et al.* (1996:3) public resource management is aimed at managing resources allocated by politically legitimate means to public institutions in the most effective and efficient way. It seeks to attain the policy goals and objectives of constitutional government structures, and the most important public resources are human, financial, information and natural resources. However the effective, efficient and productive management of public resources is subject to political, economic and social imperatives. Du Toit (1995:41) demonstrates that control of the state yields symbolic and tangible rewards. The symbolic reward lies in the affirmation of the group worth of the incumbents of state power; relative to all other subordinates within the state.

Grobler, Warnich, Carrell, Elbert and Hatfield (2006:6) outline that in a fast-paced global economy change is the norm. Environmental, social and technological change, the increased internationalisation of business and the increased scarcity and cost of Human Resources (HR) can only mean that long-term planning is risky but absolutely essential. This process is called strategic management because it involves making those decisions that define the overall mission and objectives of the organisation, and determining the most effective utilisation of its resources, and creating, crafting and executing the strategy in ways that produce the intended results. Furthermore business strategy is management’s game plan. Without one,

management would have no road map to follow and no action plan to produce desired results.

The ANC (1996:2) reiterates that given the nature of the Apartheid system, the notion of the state as an instrument of repression assumed special prominence. This necessitated that there should be placed within the state bureaucracy people whose tasks related directly to the execution of the function of repression, including the control of the population as a whole. Duvenhage (2003) asserts that an important feature of an environment in which political structure is dominant is the presence of order and regularity, which implies that political actions are carried out according to, laid down rules (procedures).

Venter *et al.* (2006:86) grouped state interventions into four primary categories or collective functions being; power functions, security and protection function, economic and redistribution functions. These functions are evident in the form of public goods and services that are provided by the state in order to provide a suitable environment in which individuals, groups and societies can strive to maintain or improve the quality of their lives.

The ANC (1998:3) maintains that central to the issue of the role of the state is the question of public resources and their utilisation. Thus an important indicator of control of state power is the capacity or otherwise to set rules for the accumulation and employment of capital. Indeed, the current state is restructuring the budget in line with the objectives of the new ruling bloc; it is restructuring assets in the hands of the state along the same lines; it is setting out the framework within which capital is accumulated and allocated through measures such as Competitions Policy, Labour Legislation, and Procurement Policy. Anstey (2006:17) asserts that structural imbalances occur where there is actual or perceived inequality of control over resources, ownership and resource distribution. Structural imbalances over resource distribution could be reflected by flaws associated with the adjudication of the tendering system within government institutions.

Leon (2010:20 of 32) argues that the Black Economic Empowerment policy has also created rent-seeking that had a corrupting effect on the governing party. In 2007, Kgalema Motlanthe, the then secretary-general of the ANC who was to become the President of South Africa after Mbeki's demise, admitted that "this rot is across the board... [A]lmost every project is conceived because it offers certain people a chance to make money".

Ntliziywana (2009:34) avows that the administration must take measures to prevent corruption, ensure an equitable, fair, open and non-discriminatory working environment. Furthermore, the municipal administration must be organised in such a manner that the roles and responsibilities of managers and other staff members are aligned with the priorities and objectives of the municipality's integrated development plan. Section 72 of the Systems Act enjoins the national minister responsible for local government to make regulations dealing with capacity building within municipal administration.

Haffajee (in City Press 2010f: 13) reports that the state tender system is one of the few avenues open to black people to enter the economy. Civil servants in business are therefore likely to take the political heat of the battle against graft and tenderpreneurship while politicians will continue in business. On that assertion, she warns that; "because a party political badge has become a requirement to getting a tender, it squeezes other black business out of the preferential procurement system, which can result in political instability. Hence the purpose of the tender system is no longer geared towards providing effective state services but towards creating a generation of tenderpreneurs. Ramphele (in City Press 2011c:21) argues that Limpopo is not the only province plagued by procurement irregularities that amount to the looting of public resources. Mpumalanga has several cases of corruption that remain investigated. Kwazulu-Natal has its own dramas, with pending cases of corruption in the health procurement processes. The Eastern Cape is often in the media for such cases, including the alleged arson of a health supply services storage facility earlier this year. Ramphele warns that "we ought to be concerned about the apparent lack of distinction between right and wrong".

Geldenhuys (1999) outlines corruption is a central characteristic typical to soft states. It is a deviation by politicians or officials from their formal duties by means of their illegitimate use of public roles and resources for private advantage. Corruption is a century-old and worldwide phenomenon which is found in all types of political systems, democratic and authoritarian, and industrial and developing states.

Sapa (in Sowetan 2011e:6) outlines that municipalities in the North West are in a state of financial anarchy. According to the Auditor-General, Terence Nombembe's report; "the information ... indicated that the North West local government crisis has deepened and that a lack of capacity, caused by vacancies and the deployment of incompetent ANC cadres, has led to a state of financial anarchy. Even the very expensive appointment of consultants to manage the financial affairs could not succeed to stop the free-falling of North West municipalities."

Tshehle (in Sowetan 2011f:7) reported that, the North West MEC for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Paul Sebegoe, was concerned about the performance of municipalities in the province. Only 10 out of 24 municipalities in the province have submitted their financial statements for audit. According to the MEC, "a shortage of skilled officials in appropriate positions, especially finance will be my top priority". Furthermore "inadequate record management and inability to produce quality financial statements had a serious impact on the progression of the municipality".

Sorensen (2004:79) outlines that; third world states have weak and ineffective institutional and administrative structures, being controlled by state elites who do not primarily seek to provide public or collective goods. However the state apparatus is rather a source of income for those clever enough to control it. Ultimately the spoils of office are shared by a group of followers making up a network of patron-client relationships. Waldner (in City Press 2011d:4) establishes that a sizeable chunk of money wasted by municipal officials last year went into the pockets of officials and their family members. Auditor-General Terence Nombembe's Consolidated General Report on Local Government outcomes 2009/10 paints a dismal picture of the way in which municipalities execute their financial responsibilities. Hence the details of the

report according to the Auditor-General revealed the following findings based on irregular, unauthorised and wasteful expenditure were outlined as follows:

**a) Irregular expenditure**

Contracts to the value of R139 million were awarded to state employees. Municipalities awarded contracts to the value of R76 million to people in their employ, which included 19 councillors, a mayor and municipal manager. Further contracts to the value of R110 million were awarded to close family members of municipal employees, with five councillors, three mayors and two municipal managers. There were probes into 87 (more than a third of) municipalities for supply chain management irregularities, fraud or financial misconduct.

**b) Unauthorised expenditure**

The report revealed that 110 municipalities and two municipal entities incurred another R 5 billion unauthorised expenditure – almost double the amount of R 2.7 billion in the 2008/9 financial year. So bad are their financial systems that municipalities managed to identify only about (R 2.7 billion) of the unauthorised expenditure (spending that is not in accordance with the purpose of a budget vote) themselves. Significant increases in unauthorised expenditure occurred in Gauteng (235%), Eastern Cape (61%), North West (39%) and Western Cape (65%). Gauteng accounted for 33% (R 1.7 billion) of unauthorised expenditure and the Tshwane metro for a staggering R 1.5 billion.

**c) Wasteful expenditure**

A total of 105 municipalities and 16 municipal entities incurred R 189 million in fruitless and wasteful expenditure (spending in vain which would be avoidable had reasonable care been exercised), compared to R 128 million in the 2008/9 financial year. Mashaba (in Sowetan 2011g:6) reports that the Executive Mayor of the Fezile Dabi District Municipality in the Free State, Max Moeketsi Moshodi, has R55 million worth of assets that could not be traced, no supporting documents for R4, 4 million worth of car allowances and R2, 9 million of “other allowances” that were dished out to staff; and R7, 5 million spent buying or upgrading assets that had never been

recorded in their books; and 200 diaries worth about R1 000 bought for management.

Trevor Manuel (in City Press 2011b:5) reflects that “we must accept that despite the adequate allocation of funding, we fail to deliver quality services, especially to the poor”. In a related report, Ndlangisa (in City Press 2011e:5) wrote that; “corruption diverts resources for socio-economic rights to a few who are able to manipulate it. Corruption undermines the rule of law and thrives in an environment where there is no accountability. It is an affront to the values of our Constitution”.

Olaopa (2011:2) asserts that the capacity challenges confronting Africa could be summarised to include the following: human resources remain grossly under-utilised and in some cases unutilised; uncoordinated and fragmented approaches to human resource development; lack of data on training needs; uncoordinated training programmes; lack of sectoral and organisational training guidelines/policies; inadequate linkages between training output and the labour market requirements; inadequate support for training end users; wastage and misplacement of personnel; and lack of monitoring mechanisms to determine the capacity and productivity of the trained personnel to contribute meaningfully to national development. All these ultimately brought about ineffective service delivery.

The Witness (2010:1) argues that people do not simply want services. They also desire to have a say in how and where these services are provided. Protests are a sign of increasing awareness that democracy’s promise of grassroots involvement has been drowned beneath a wave of materialism, greed and entitlement driven by the political elite.

### **3.6. Conclusion**

According to Ntliziywana (2009:27) the combination of inexperienced, poorly qualified staff; with similarly inexperienced councillors creates fertile ground for irregularities, malpractice and ineffective expenditure. While Huntington (1965a:403) advises that the more unified and coherent an organisation is; the more highly

institutionalised it is; the greater the disunity of the organisation; the less its institutionalisation. The next chapter's focus will be on case studies with specific reference given to the identified Mopani Local Municipalities in the Limpopo Province.

# CHAPTER 4

## CASE STUDY

### 4.1. Introduction

Neale, Thapa and Boyce (2006:3) define case study as a story about something unique, special, or interesting – stories about individuals, organisations, processes, programs, neighbourhoods, institutions, and even events. The case study gives the story behind the result by capturing what happened to bring it about, and can be a good opportunity to highlight a project's success, or bring attention to a particular challenge or difficulty in a project. Furthermore the primary advantage of a case study is that it provides much more detailed information than what is available through other methods, such as surveys, whereas it allows one to present data collected from multiple methods such as; surveys, interviews, document review and observation in order to provide complete story.

Schram (in Schurink 2009:814) distinguishes between three types of case studies as being intrinsic, instrumental and collective case studies. The intrinsic case study focuses on the aim of gaining a better understanding of a particular case or situation, while the instrumental case study is used to provide insight into the phenomenon, and finally the collective case study focuses mainly on comparisons between cases and concepts in order to validate theory.

Furthermore Creswell (in Schurink 2009:814) reflects that a case study can be regarded as an exploration or in-depth analysis of a “bounded system” (bounded by time and place) over a period of time. However the case being studied may refer to a process, activity, event, programme or individuals. While Neale *et al.* (2006:5) establish that the process for conducting case study research follows the same general processes as is followed for other research and includes the following steps: plan, collect data, analyse data and disseminate findings.

The AssadPam (n.d.:9) reflects that progress that has been made with access to basic services since 1994 is directly attributable to the critical role that our democratic municipalities have played. The above statement is motivated by the following examples: universal access to water supply increased from 59% of total households in 1994 to 86% by April 2007, universal access to sanitation increased from 48% in 1994 to 73% by April 2007. In 1994 30% of houses in South Africa had access to electricity and by 2006/07 this figure had increased to 73%, from 1994 to 2006 a total of 2,243 million houses were delivered, at an average of 249 290 units per annum. While national government has set policy objectives, norms and standards for these services, the actual delivery programmes and budgets are directly managed by municipalities.

According to the statistics provided by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (as it was then) in September 2005, of the 284 municipalities only 203 managed to provide sanitation to their residents, less than 60%. In a similar vein, 182 municipalities fell short of providing refuse removal to even 60% of their residents. Moselakgomo (in Sowetan 2011h:8) reports that Thaba Chweu Municipality in Mpumalanga cannot account for R 3, 5 million it had been paid in a property transaction. Thaba Chweu is already being investigated by the South African Police Service (SAPS) directorate for priority crime investigations by the Hawks over R 7 million in pre-paid electricity sales that have not been accounted for.

According to Ntliziywana (2009:23-24) during the period 2004 to 2006, numerous municipalities across South Africa, particularly in the Black and Coloured townships, were marred by mass protests, marches, demonstrations and violent confrontations. A wave of service delivery protests erupted in townships across South Africa over shoddy housing and poor public services. In some areas, factors like poor service delivery, unacceptable living conditions and weak management had resulted in failed development projects; whilst corruption and nepotism are cited as root causes of the problem. The combination of poor service delivery, managers' comparative affluence amid residents' poverty and their inability to account for the municipalities finances were and still are provocative of these protests. According to Hartley (2011:1) almost 20% of municipalities – the sharp end of service delivery across the nation – failed to

spend even half of their municipal infrastructure grants in the 2009/2010 financial year. More than R2 billion is lying in municipal bank accounts, rather than tarring roads or building waste water treatment plants. Many municipalities have been torn apart by service protests that have seen significant damage to the infrastructure that was in existence.

Memela *et al.* (2008:6-7) outlines that most municipalities, political and managerial leadership is perceived to be poor by all groups of stakeholders, resulting in a lack of vision and indecisiveness on important issues. As a result administrative staff are often entangled in party politics and are therefore not seen as impartial in resource allocation and service delivery.

Potter (2004:2) indicates that the state's responsibility is to deliver political goods – security, health and education, economic opportunity, good governance, law and order, and fundamental infrastructure requirements (transport and communications). States fail when they are no longer willing or able to carry out these functions. On the other hand "sovereignty as a responsibility" requires that states provide the appropriate standard of political goods and services to ensure the protection and wellbeing of their citizens.

Ntliziywana (2009:22) argues that with regard to the commitment to provide access to clean running water by 2008, the DPLG figures indicated that of the 283 municipalities 155 could not provide water to 60% of their residents. The failure to meet the access to water target was confirmed by the Water and Sanitation Audit Report released in March 2009. This report highlighted several concerns. One of these concerns relates to the fact that 85% of the country's wastewater treatment works have a limited remaining useful life. In addition, 90% of water treatment works are dilapidated. The reports further highlighted that while Limpopo, Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal have the biggest water backlogs, the water quality in Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North West, and Northern Cape is below the acceptable health level. This records another failure by local government to live up to expectations. According to Anstey (2006:346) the energy of organisational change is usually triggered by an awareness that a system cannot continue in its current form. A sense

of unease develops in the face of a current crisis or a recognition that one is on the way. If an organisation is to change, people within it are required to behave differently. It is critical that this energy be harnessed and finds expression in behaviours focused on clear change goals and strategies.

Akinrinade (2011:1) maintains that in a number of states, notably Nyerere's Tanzania, the adoption of a single party system was indeed an honest attempt to address a potentially dangerous situation. In the post-independence era, several African states have witnessed serious threats to their national cohesion and have confronted great challenges to their sovereign status. However, the argument was soon corrupted by various authoritarian leaders who sought to advance personal agendas of power and other forms of primitive accumulation, such that the single party system emerged in most African states as an instrument for the perpetuation in power of a particular clique that has managed to capture the commanding heights of their countries' political structure.

According to Huntington (1968b:4) throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America there was a decline in political order, an undermining of the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of government. There was a lack of civic morale and public spirit and of political institutions capable of giving meaning and direction to the public interest. Not political development but political decay dominated the scene.

Mathekga (2006:2) emphasises that it is necessary to secure services of properly qualified accountants and project managers to ensure that local government projects are properly budgeted and ultimately implemented properly. The presence of skilled managers is also critical in order to make certain that local government councils adopt sound programmes of action to forge links between service delivery and economic development. On this front, the government is correct to emphasise a lack of capacity as the main problem at local government level. However, technical capacity is not sufficient to ensure optimal functioning of local government. As a result, for the local government system to live up to its potential, it depends not only on the availability of skilled personnel and financial resources but also on the role played by communities in the structures.

Muthambi (2009:1) outlines that; less than a year after the newly appointed mayor of the Greater Giyani Municipality, Cllr Doris Mathebula, was officially sworn into office she faced accusations of nepotism. Mathebula is accused of trying to build her empire in the municipality by allegedly appointing her relatives to key positions. This came after the ANC Youth League in the Greater Giyani accused Mathebula of abusing her position by appointing Magic Masingi as the new municipal manager to fill the position vacated by Silence Makhubele. According to the spokesperson for the ANCYL in the Greater Giyani area, Sydwell Mabunda, “the league is calling for resignation of the mayor as she had failed to act as a true leader, by appointing her son, Musa Mathebula as manager for the project management unit on a three-year contract. She (Doris Mathebula) also tried to appoint her nephew as her personal assistant, but was stopped after it was discovered that she had conducted the shortlisting process herself”.

Matlala (in Sowetan 2011i:6) reports that angry residents of Sekhukhune in Limpopo have told their mayors and councillors to make water provision a priority or else face eviction. The residents accused their mayors and councillors of drawing fat salaries at the end of each month, while thousands of community members die from cholera and other water borne diseases. In another report, Matlala (in Sowetan 2011j:7) outlines that “streets and community roads in Bolobedu have turned into dongas and streams because the Greater Tzaneen Municipality is waiting for someone to die before re-gravelling them, a resident said. Over the past 10 years streets were only graded when there was a funeral in a particular family or when there was a government function”.

Business Day (2009:1) maintains that the ruling party’s cadre deployment policy is starting to threaten the country’s stability. It is only now starting to dawn on the ANC leadership that the system is a recipe for disaster. The spate of service delivery protests in recent months, many driven by card-carrying members of the ANC and its alliance partners, has been a big wake-up call for the government. The depth of concern is reflected in comments made by senior party leaders, including secretary-

general, Gwede Mantashe, Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, and even President Jacob Zuma.

Ntliziywana (2009:46) advises that employment contracts can be used as one of the measures to enforce compliance with the competency requirements. In this regard, section 57(1) of the Systems Act read with Regulation 2(1) to the Performance Regulations provides that municipal managers or section 56 managers can only be appointed as such in terms of the employment contract. This employment contract is subject to the terms and conditions of the Systems Act as well as the MFMA.

For Amundsen (2000 in MGT 548/748 2011:177) “favouritism” was defined as a mechanism of power abuse that implies “privatisation” and a highly biased distribution of state resources, no matter how these resources have been accumulated in the first place. Favouritism is the natural human proclivity to favour friends, family and anybody close and trusted. Furthermore favouritism is related to corruption in so far as it implies a corrupted (undemocratic, “privatised”) distribution of resources, whereas corruption strictly defined is about the accumulation of resources.

Du Toit (1995: 38) expresses that strong web-like societies maintain structures of social control which tend to undermine the emergence of civil society. When strongmen succeed in imposing their own sets of survival strategies, the resulting tangle of societal rules inevitably becomes parochial, discriminatory and even contradictory, instead of universal. The value of citizenship is constantly open to question and the comprehensive jurisdiction claimed by the state is continuously subverted. Since their respective survival strategies are incompatible, contending strongmen are not bound by common constraints in confronting one another or the state, and the civil conduct of public disputes becomes a highly improbable outcome. Incidents of protests over cadre deployment were observed in Maruleng, whereby angry community members ordered the mayor and the speaker to step down.

Maponya (in Sowetan 2011c:7) mentions that allegations of corruption have emerged following reports of jobs for pals in the Limpopo department of health’s

Mopani district. This follows reports that officials conducting interviews for posts that were advertised had preferred their relatives and friends. Of concern were allegations that some of those interviewing candidates were not supposed to be on the panel, while some of those who had been hired did not feature on the short-list of candidates. According to a circular of the department dated 18 June 2010, posts for drivers, ward attendants, cleaners, linen store assistants and laundry aids were advertised. But surprisingly a community liaison officer from Maphutha-Malatji Hospital, *Onny* Rammalo, was involved in the process of shortlisting and interviewing candidates; to ensure that his relative identified as NH Rammalo got employed. Furthermore Sello Mohlala, who was on probation and not qualified to conduct interviews for any post in government, was also involved. The report went on to outline that, Obed Moagi who is the chairperson of the Thabo Namane ANC branch, also brought a relative identified only as Moagi M.S into the department's employ.

Ntliziywana (2009:24) points out that qualified personnel are often overlooked for political appointment. While Section 27 (2) of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000) stipulates that there should be an alignment between District Municipality IDPs and those of Local Municipalities to ensure that their IDPs are mutually linked and can inform each other.

Docstoc.com (n.d.:page 1 of 1) shows that volunteers of Makhushane clinic outside Phalaborwa took their protest to the streets accusing their councillors of nepotism. This followed after four people were employed for malaria control without the community being informed. The employed people were due to receive training at Maphutha Malatji Hospital in Namakgale, but volunteers stopped malaria trainers. The shop steward of malaria control, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal, said "community members said the posts were politically motivated, hence the deployment and protest against the deployed. It was said Ward 11 councillor of Makhushane, Mavis Malesa, failed to consult the ANC branch executive committee or the community and deployed her sibling".

In an unrelated report, Matlala (in Sowetan 2011k:7) highlights that a poor municipality in Limpopo, declared a disaster area last year, has become a hatching

ground for theft of borehole equipment. The municipality spent over R20 million since 2009 on boreholes to supply water to areas hit by drought, but some officials are allegedly hell-bent on failing the system by stealing borehole equipment. Municipal manager, Tim Maake, said the district had a population of about 1, 2 million people, the majority of whom depend on water from boreholes and that delivered in municipal trucks. He said the district needed about R270 million to address the chronic water shortage.

Furthermore De Bruyn (in Letaba Herald, 2011:9) reported that despite corruption at the Tzaneen testing grounds, no steps are being taken against the culprits. This is according to a municipal source who stated that after being found guilty of fraud, two municipal officials are back at work, suffering no repercussions for their actions. Despite this, Viki Mandzini, the wife of Bricks Mandzini (ANC regional secretary in Mopani) is back at work. According to COPE chairperson, Solly Mkhathshwa; “we want transparency. The municipality must not protect her (Manzini) because she is the wife of the ANC regional secretary. We have a feeling that she is going to survive because she is the wife of an ANC leader”.

Ntliziywana (2009:26-27) reflects that a survey conducted by the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) revealed that many municipal managers have less than five years of municipal experience. This accounted for 57% in the Limpopo province, 48% of municipal managers in the North West province, 48% of Free State managers, 34% of Eastern Cape managers and 33% of Gauteng managers. The MDB national report further indicated that only 62% of district and local municipal managers have a university degree. Only 60% of financial managers have a university qualification, mostly in finances. Furthermore the response of government to the skills shortage was the introduction of programmes that are aimed at accelerating infrastructure development in underdeveloped areas and improve service delivery. The Municipal Infrastructure Grant and Expanded Public Works Programme are seen as the financial drivers to accelerate the former and to address the skills gap. Project Consolidate, a means through which government wanted to enlarge local government capacity, was aimed at tackling “the lack of qualified

managers, professional and technical personnel”. This is an indication that government is committed to making local government work.

Edwards (2008:90) maintains that intergovernmental relations is intended to promote and facilitate co-operative government and decision making by ensuring that policies and activities across all spheres encourage service delivery to meet the needs of the citizens in an effective way. For the purpose of arriving at efficient and objective scientific research, the case study has been selected in order to verify the methodology (situational analysis), ontology (situational reality) and the epistemology (knowledge analysis).

The State of Local Government Report (2009:36), asserts that to execute the intentions of plans, the principle of alignment of local plans remain the key thrust of intergovernmental development planning. From a theoretical point of view, the case study forms the basis upon which qualitative research design has to be carried out. With the research topic, the impact of cadre deployment on service delivery; case studies have to be carried out within the identified local municipalities in Mopani District of Limpopo Province. In an attempt to investigate the consequences of cadre deployment on service delivery, the following municipalities were identified for the case studies: Maruleng, Greater Tzaneen, Ba-Phalaborwa, Greater Letaba and Giyani.

## 4.2. Brief overview of Mopani District Municipality

The Mopani IDP (2007/2008:21) shows the geographical division of Mopani district municipality as follows:

Local Municipality	Total Area	Urban Area	Villages	Wards
Greater Tzaneen	3240 km <sup>2</sup>	5	125	34
Greater Letaba	1891 km <sup>2</sup>	3	79	23
Greater Giyani	2967, 27 km <sup>2</sup>	1	89	25
Ba-Phalaborwa	3004.88 km <sup>2</sup>	5	11	14
Maruleng	324.7 km <sup>2</sup>	1	21	10
District Management Area (DMA)	10993.98 km <sup>2</sup>	-	5 Camps	-
<b>Mopani / Total</b>	<b>2 2421.83 km<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>15</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>106</b>

*Source: Northern Province Spatial Rationale*

The Mopani District municipality is situated in the North-eastern part of the Limpopo Province, 70 km from Polokwane (main city of the Limpopo Province). It is bordered in the east by Mozambique, in the north, by Zimbabwe and Vhembe District Municipality, in the south, by the Mpumalanga Province through Ehlanzeni District Municipality and, to the west, by Capricorn District Municipality and, in the south-west, by Sekhukhune District Municipality. The district has been named Mopani because of abundance of nutritional Mopani worms found in the area. The district spans a total area of 2 242 183 ha (22 421.83km<sup>2</sup>), with 15 urban areas (towns and townships), 325 villages (rural settlements) and a total of 106 wards. The Mopani District, by virtue of the Kruger National Park as a District Management Area, is part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, the park that combines South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:20).

#### **4.2.1. District level of education**

The Mopani IDP (2007/2008:22-23) maintains that the literacy levels in the Mopani District are very low. As much as 37.8% of the adult population (other than 20 years of age) has not received any form of schooling with a further 13.7% only having completed some form of primary education. These figures imply that more than 50% of the adult population can be regarded as functionally illiterate. Conversely, only 12.7% of the adult population in the district has completed their matric and 6.5% any form of higher education. The Mopani district has a very low, but improving, level of education with 41.9% of the population older than 20 years having no education in 1996, improving to only 37.8% in 2001. This implies that many people in the district have a poor level of education and therefore lack proper skills and knowledge needed in the formal labour market. This has a bearing on their employability, the general economy and their ability to pay for services.

#### **4.2.2. District employee rate**

People in the Mopani district are employed in the following sectors: Farming, Industry, Mining, Trade, Government, Transport, Manufacturing, Construction and Energy. The Government Sector is the largest employer in the district e.g. 39% of the employed in Greater Giyani work for government. The second largest employer in the Mopani district is the farming sector with 25.9% of the employed people. This however, is not the case when considering the municipalities separately with the mining sector employing the second largest portion of the Ba-Phalaborwa population (19.5%). Greater Giyani has the highest level of unemployment with 36.8% of the population not being employed. The number of people unemployed as a percentage of the total population is the lowest in Greater Letaba with only 28.0%. It is however important to note that of the unemployed people in the district, approximately 60% are women (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:23).

#### **4.2.3. Socio-economic status**

The Mopani IDP (2007/2008:30) reflects that Limpopo is the second poorest province in the country. Approximately 77% of the population lives below the poverty income line, and the province also has the lowest HDI (Historically Disadvantaged Individuals at 0.485) in the country. Although the number of unemployed people has

declined, the percentage of people with no income in Mopani is still higher than that of the Limpopo Province. With regards to education the percentage of people with no education has declined from 30% in 1996 to 22% in 2001 in the Mopani District.

Anstey (2006:17) asserts that structural imbalances occur where there is actual or perceived inequality of control over resources, ownership and resource distribution. This is often aggravated by the issues of power and authority in which in which the groups use their capacity for control to entrench positions of authority. The Capricorn and Mopani district are seen as the main economic engines of the province, with Polokwane, Phalaborwa and Greater Tzaneen identified as the principal economic centres. There is a large gap between the urban and rural municipalities. Of particular concern is the low level of service delivery to communities within the former homelands in the Eastern Cape, North West and Limpopo Provinces as well as rural areas of Kwazulu-Natal.

#### **4.2.4. Water**

The Mopani district is characterised by low rainfall, especially in the lower-lying areas of the district, namely, Greater Giyani and Ba-Phalaborwa. This results in limited water resources culminating in severe water shortages and regular drought conditions. Subsequently, there is stiff competition between the different water users such as agriculture, mining and forestry. To this end, water use for domestic purposes becomes critical. The main surface water resources for Mopani district are Letaba River catchment and all its tributaries. There is a huge potential for usage of borehole water as an augmentation to the surface water resources (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:35).

Section 156(1) of the Constitution provides that “a municipality has the executive authority and the right to administer” the functions in schedules 4B and 5B. The service delivery mandate of local government is therefore, dictated and circumscribed by the functions and powers set out in these schedules. These services include: electricity and gas reticulation, fire fighting services, municipal health services, municipal public transport, storm water management system in built in areas, and water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply system

and domestic waste-water and sewage disposal. Schedule 5B, in turn, contains the following services: cemeteries and crematoria, cleansing, municipal roads, and refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal (Ntliziywana, 2009:19).

#### **4.2.5. Sanitation**

Lack of access to basic sanitation services has created massive environmental and health problems in both rural and urban areas in the district. The fact that nearly all villages in the district do not have RDP level sanitation constitutes a major risk in terms of ground water pollution. The main types of sanitary systems used in the district are water-borne sewerage (flush toilets), septic tanks, Ventilated Improved Pit latrines (VIP), French drains and ordinary pit latrines to no basic services at all. Water-borne sewerage is mainly found in towns and townships, septic tanks are mainly on privately owned properties like farms, hotels, etc. with the rest primarily found in rural areas. Most people in the district use pit latrines, followed by those without any sanitation services at all. The situation is worse in Greater Giyani with 54% of the households not having access to any sanitation. Greater Letaba has the highest usage of pit latrines at 51.5%, while flush toilets are more prevalent in Ba-Phalaborwa with 39.8%, which correlates with the availability of piped water within the houses. The district municipality has the constitutional responsibility to provide access to sanitation services (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:37).

#### **4.2.6. Refuse removal**

Most people in Mopani reside in rural areas where municipalities do not remove waste. Residents in these areas dispose of refuse on their own, often in an uncontrolled way. This practice has adverse consequences for their health. The percentage of households whose refuse is removed weekly by the municipality increased from 13.4% in 1996 to 15.2% in 2001. While this figure is very low it should be considered that more than 70% of the population of Mopani District reside in rural areas, where the municipalities have thus far not delivered such services. It is therefore not surprising that 59.7% of the households in Mopani district utilised their own dump in 1996, this increased to 61.5% in 2001 (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:38).

Limpopo boasts the highest percentage of people living in formal dwellings (83.2%) but is the only province to score below 50% on the status index – this is because it only provides formal dwellings to 23% of its population and waste removal to 18.8% of its population (Empoerdex n.d:2 of 6).

#### **4.2.7. Health and social development**

The challenge of the health sector in South Africa is to develop a unified national health system capable of delivering quality health care to all citizens efficiently and in a caring environment. The provision of health facilities to all settlements in the district is a problem because of the large number of settlements (varying in size), with the majority of them being relatively small and scattered throughout the district. A simplified calculation of the number of people per hospital per local municipality would not provide a true reflection of the actual situation, as hospitals provide services to communities across municipal boundaries. The availability of hospitals on a district municipality level for the total population in the district is a better indication of the availability of hospitals. There are 7 district hospitals and 2 regional hospitals, 7 health centres and 93 clinics (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:47).

The historic imbalances in South African society resulted in the majority of our people living without land and housing, access to safe water and sanitation for all, affordable and sustainable energy sources, illiteracy, poor quality education and training, poor and inaccessible health services. Here is the socio-analytic reflection of Maruleng Local Municipality. About 89.72% of all households are residing in a formal dwelling and 4.6% households reside in either informal or traditional dwellings. The housing backlog is estimated at 2527 (Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:43).

Maruleng is a Sepedi word derived from the name of the fruit “marula” which is indigenous in Limpopo. The name means a place of Marula. The Maruleng municipality is situated in the South eastern quadrant of the Limpopo province within the Mopani District Municipal Area of jurisdiction. The Maruleng municipality is bordered by the greater Kruger National Park to the east, the Ba-Phalaborwa and Tzaneen municipalities to the north, the Lepelle-Nkumpi municipality to the west, and Tubatse and Bushbuckridge to the south. Maruleng is characterised by typical

lowveld vegetation. To the south municipal area borders the Drakensberg escarpment. Although resources within the boundaries of the municipal area are scarce, the local of natural resources (in terms of game and nature reserves) within its boundaries as well as on the perimeter of its boundaries offer many opportunities for development. The main access points to the municipal area are Klaserie and the Strijdom tunnel in the south, Ofcolaco in the west and Mica in the north. The town of Hoedspruit is the administrative and economic centre of the area. Hoedspruit is 74km south of Ba-Phalaborwa (R40), 135km north-east of Lydenburg and 225 km from Polokwane. It has one major urban area (Hoedspruit) which harbours 2.3% of population and 36 communities which harbour 88.7% and farms which harbour 9% and a total of 12 wards. Hoedspruit also houses South African Air Force Base. The Maruleng municipal area is approximately 3247 km<sup>2</sup> (Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:9).

#### **4.2.8. Challenges**

The majority of people in Maruleng are located far away from the economic hub of the municipality, namely Hoedspruit. The town is the economic node of the municipality surrounded by privately-owned land which is not readily available for new development. There is a general shortage of technical skills in the area and most of rural communities get jobs in Tzaneen and Phalaborwa and thus promoting economic activities outside their municipality. The municipality has a small revenue base and it is not able to meet some of its constitutional obligations. Another major challenge is financial resources to maintain the existing infrastructure which the Municipal Infrastructure Grant does not cater for (Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:12).

The success of local economic development is tied to the provision of basic and other types of infrastructure to the people. The provision of adequate municipal infrastructure remains a challenge throughout the municipality. The Maruleng municipality is characterised by low rainfall. This results in limited water resources culminating in severe water shortages and drought conditions. There is stiff competition amongst different water users. Water for domestic purposes becomes crucial (Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:34).

#### **4.2.9. Future municipal plans**

- Ensure that all communities have access to clean portable water by 2014;
- Ensure that all communities have access to electricity by 2014;
- Ensure that unemployment is halved by 2014;
- Provide access to housing;
- Create job opportunities and reduce poverty rate through infrastructure development, service delivery, procurement and Support for SMME's and Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment;
- Provide universal waste removal to all communities;
- Acquire more resources to provide and maintain the existing and proposed infrastructure; and
- Integrated planning and service provision in rural areas.

(Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:14).

#### **4.2.10. Education**

There are 38 primary schools, 1 combined school and 23 secondary schools. There are also approximately 32 000 learners in schools. Hoedspruit which is the economic hub of the municipality doesn't have a public secondary school. The teacher pupil ratio is 1:43 on average in primary and 1:39 in secondary schools, although the norm is 1:35 in secondary schools and 1:40 in primary schools. Learner: teacher ratios are substantially higher than the national norm. There is a serious shortage of schools, and more specially, classrooms in both primary and secondary schools. Infrastructure such as electricity, water, sanitation is also needed in many schools. There are 12 Early Childhood Development and 61 ABET Centres. The municipality does not have a single institution of higher learning hence the shortage of skills in the area. The municipality has a backlog of 66 classrooms. The municipality recorded a grade 12 pass rate of below 40% in the 2010 academic year (Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:45).

### **4.3. Greater Tzaneen Local Municipality**

The Greater Tzaneen Municipality is situated in the eastern quadrant of the Limpopo Province within the district's area of Jurisdiction, together with Greater Giyani, Ba-Phalaborwa, Maruleng and Greater Letaba. Polokwane to the west, Greater Letaba to the north, Ba-Phalaborwa and Maruleng to the east, and Lepelle-Nkumpi to the south, border the Greater Tzaneen Municipality and Giyani border. The Greater Tzaneen Municipality comprises a land area of approximately 3240 km<sup>2</sup>, and extends from Haenertsburg in the west, to Rubbervale in the east (85km), and just south of Modjadjiskloof in the north, to Trichardtsdal in the south (47km). The municipal boundaries form an irregular, inverted T-Shape, which results in certain developmental implications for the municipality, and more specifically the distance to markets, difficulties in respect of service provision, and constraints to implementing the development strategy of the municipality. The Greater Tzaneen Municipality area encompasses the proclaimed towns of Tzaneen, Nkowankowa, Lenyenye, Letsitele and Haenertsburg. In addition, there are 125 rural villages, concentrated mainly in the south-east, and northwest, of the study area. Almost 80% of households reside in these rural villages. The municipal area is further characterised by extensive and intensive farming activities (commercial timber, cash crops, tropical and citrus fruit production); mountainous, inaccessible terrain in the west and south, and un-even topography (gentle slopes) to the north and east; areas with exceptional natural beauty, with considerable untapped tourism potential (Maruleng IDP 2011/2012:25).

#### **4.3.1. Population of the Greater Tzaneen Municipality**

The Census Statistics of South Africa of 2001 (StatSA 2001) reflects that the Greater Tzaneen Municipality had a total population of 375 588 comprising of 171 119 males and 204 469 females. Females outnumber males considerably as they comprise 54.4% of the population. This is attributed to the migrant labour system and the fact that females normally outlive their male counterparts. Young people between the ages of 0 – 35 constitute 74% (277 935) of the total population of the municipality. The rest of the 26% comprise of the aged population who are in their late thirties and pension. This demonstrates and confirms that young people and women constitute the majority of the population within the municipality. The economic potential

therefore lies within the available younger generation of the municipality that is still strong and could be retained for local job opportunities. According to the Statistics South Africa 2007 Community Survey, the population of the municipality is put at 349 086 which might be misleading. We would therefore rely on the 2001 census population results for purpose of our planning processes (Tzaneen IDP 2010/2011:15)

#### **4.3.2. Water challenges**

The Tzaneen IDP (2010/2011:23) establishes that the service agreement as entered into by both parties has not been honoured extensively since its inception. The reason being the delay is being experienced by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry personnel transfer process and lack of operational financial assistance. The WSP is in principle still responsible for the former Transitional Local Council area, whilst the Water Service Authority is partially providing the service to the rural segment of the Greater Tzaneen Municipality area. The Tzaneen IDP (2010/2011:15) reflects on the following challenges:

- The WSA/WSP arrangement has in principle created a financial burden to Greater Tzaneen Municipality as the WSP since it is basically responsible for the provisioning and maintenance of services for its entire area of jurisdiction with limited financial assistance from the WSA;
- The former TLC area has wholly been neglected in terms of maintenance and replacement of ageing infrastructure as what is collected within this area is not mainly being re-invested back to the area but rather used to cover the rural segment without any form of subsistence; and
- The lack of Water Sector Plan as required by Water Services Act 108 of 1997 poses a challenge in terms of efficient and effective planning.

#### **4.3.3. Electricity**

The Greater Tzaneen Municipality currently distributes, under license, to an area approximately 3500 km<sup>2</sup> in extent. The distribution area does not correspond with Councils Municipal jurisdiction area. The two main areas of difference is the general areas of Nkowankowa, Lenyenye and Southern most areas, which are serviced by Eskom, but fall within the Tzaneen Municipal area. The Municipality has bulk supply

points to these areas at Nkowankowa and Lenyenye T-Off. This second general area of difference is that of Letsitele (farming area), Eiland and Gravelotte, which forms part of the Ba-Phalaborwa Municipality, but has electricity supplied to it by the Greater Tzaneen Municipality. GTM has also bulk supply points to Eskom's licensed distribution area at Spitzkop (Segwashe – Polokwane Municipality) and Five (5) at Selwane and 2 at Majeje (Ba-Phalaborwa Municipality), (Tzaneen IDP 2010/2011:30).

#### **4.3.4. Employee Equity Plan**

The Tzaneen IDP (2010/2011:77) establishes that the Greater Tzaneen Municipality has an Employment Equity Plan and targets which was approved by Council during May 2000. The Plan was implemented with effect from 1 July 2000 and, inter alia, deals with identified employment barriers as well as targets to achieve representation. During June 2006, the Employment Equity Plan was revised and new targets were set for demographic, gender as well as disability representation for the period 2006/2011. An Employment Equity Consultative Forum (EECF) was also established and trained with the main purpose of consulting on employment barriers and making recommendations on solutions to Council and to oversee the execution of the project.

#### **4.4. Ba-Phalaborwa Local Municipality**

Ba-Phalaborwa Municipality is situated in the North-Eastern part of South Africa in the Limpopo Province. Ba-Phalaborwa' close proximity to Mozambique implies that the Municipality has to forge socio-economic relationships with its sister municipality (Xai-Xai) across the border (Ba-Phalaborwa IDP 2010/2015:52).

Ba-Phalaborwa Municipality is a predominantly rural medium capacity local Municipality. It consists of 23 villages and three towns (namely Gravelotte, Namakgale Lulekani and Phalaborwa) (Ba-Phalaborwa IDP 2010/2015:56). The town of Phalaborwa and the nearby Namakgale/ Lulekani towns and surrounding villages constitute the major population concentration area in Ba-Phalaborwa. Another smaller rural concentration is Selwane/Nondweni with the tourist resort of

Eiland nearby. The area has a unique natural environment comprising conservation areas and ecotourism development together with the bordering Kruger National Park. This and the large mining development form a key economic driver. Although mining is presently the largest sector in Ba-Phalaborwa and created many job opportunities it can also become a constraint in the future. All mines have certain production expectancy and will eventually close. There is a large amount of land in Ba-Phalaborwa that is currently under land claims. This is land that can potentially be developed for especially tourism (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:26).

#### **4.4.1. Human Resource Management (HRM)**

The Ba-Phalaborwa IDP (2010/2015:51) reveals that human resources management objectives, strategies, policies, and programmes are clearly stated, but there is still a need for an institutional plan in order to address both current and future personnel demands. The Municipality is gradually adopting strategic human resources planning to ensure that HR objectives are consistent with the organisation's vision, mission, objectives, strategies, policies and programmes.

#### **4.5. Giyani Local Municipality**

Greater Giyani Municipality is located in the North of the Mopani District Municipality with Giyani as its only town. Giyani is also the home of the District Municipal Offices and previously housed the administrative offices of Gazankulu homeland. Giyani town is the largest centre of population concentration, employment opportunities, shopping and recreational facilities in the local municipality. The economic activity that mostly takes place in Greater Giyani both formal/informal are: small-scale agriculture (maize, vegetables, tomatoes, and beef), services, and transport and retail development. There are however, number of factors impacting on the economic growth such as geographical location (distance to markets), shortage of skills, poor infrastructure, climatic conditions and diseases. The municipality has potential for tourism and conservation development due to the existing natural heritage sites through the area, mining, latent farming schemes, processing of natural products (mopani worm and marula fruit) (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:26).

There is a smaller percentage of economically active population in Greater Giyani than in Greater Tzaneen and Ba-Phalaborwa. Only 48.2% of the population is economically active. This can also indicate that people from this group might migrate to other local municipalities inside or outside the district to find work. Giyani has a large number of rural settlements that are scattered and not easily accessible as the road conditions are bad. This can cause problems for economic development as it will concentrate on economic growth points where there are large concentrations of the people. Finally the Greater Giyani Local Municipality has the smallest villages in the District with an average number of 2639 people per settlement, (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:33).

#### **4.6. Greater Letaba Municipality**

The Greater Letaba Municipality area is the smallest local municipality in the district in terms of land area and is situated in the west of the Mopani District. The Municipality incorporates the proclaimed towns of Modjadjiskloof, Ga- Kgapane and Senwamokgope, which are situated in the South. Resources are relatively scarce throughout the municipality. The municipality is, however, situated in close proximity of other natural resources at its border with Greater Tzaneen. The Tzaneen and Haenertsburg areas attract tourists due to their natural beauty, dams, waterfalls and nature reserves. The south part of the municipal area comprises mountainous terrain, which precludes urban development. Approximately 5% of the land area is covered by residential development, whilst 30% of the land area of the Letaba Municipal area is taken up by agricultural activity. These include tomatoes (central), Timber (south and south east), game and cattle (central and north west), (Mopani IDP 2007/2008:25).

#### **4.7. Sampling and methodology**

Babbie and Mouton (2001:647) define research methodology as “the methods, techniques, and procedures that are employed in the process of implementing the research design or research plan, as well as the underlying principles and assumptions that underlie their use”. To maintain high and professional levels of scientific investigation, scientific knowledge must be the point of departure! The

essence of scientific knowledge according to Babbie and Mouton's (2001:647) view is "...statements scrutinised, on the best supporting evidence gained through the application of rigorous methods and techniques". On that note, community development workers, traditional leaders, councillors, current and former municipal officials and ordinary citizens within the identified municipalities were selected for the interviews. The interview occurred through a face to face interaction with a view to reach a deliberate purpose.

According to Turner (2010:1) interviews provide in-depth information pertaining to participants' experiences and viewpoints of a particular topic. Often times, interviews are coupled with other forms of data collection of information analyses. Bless (1995:106) establish that "an interview involves direct personal contact with the participant who is asked to answer questions". Interview respondents were drawn mainly from the respective wards within the territory of Mopani District municipality being; Maruleng, Ba-Phalaborwa, Greater Tzaneen, Letaba and Giyani municipalities. The interview was designed around key questions in order to address the aim as outlined in Chapter 1 of this research. Furthermore the interview questions were tailored depending on the respondent' situation.

In brief the following questions were systematically directed to the identified respondents as follows:

#### **4.7.1. Interview questions directed at Municipal Officials/Managers**

- As the head of Municipal administration, are you satisfied with staff competency in terms of the required skills and expertise?
- From your experience as Municipal manager, would you say cadre deployment is good for effective service delivery?
- What measures needs to be taken in order to improve service delivery situation?
- Why do people resort to public protests as a means to resolve service delivery problems?

- While it is confidential not to divulge some people's personal details; were you satisfied with personnel who reported to your office in terms of their expertise and qualifications?

#### **4.7.2. Interview questions directed at Community Development Workers (CDW's)**

- Being a CDW in this municipality, are you convinced that the municipality has reached its service delivery target in terms of IDP's (Integrated Development Plan)?
- How best can the municipality address the problems of service delivery?
- Do you think the municipality has employed the relevant people to the strategic areas such as finance, administration, corporate and human resources and why?
- While cadre deployment is important for every political party that holds adequate power, what can you say are the disadvantages?
- Finally what can you recommend about cadre deployment policy?

#### **4.7.3. Interview questions directed at Traditional leaders/Head-men**

- Being the headman and the trustee of the land, are you satisfied with the municipal service delivery levels rendered in your area?
- Are you satisfied with skills and competency of the municipal workers in your municipality? If not, what can be done to improve the situation?
- Are you involved or informed when local labourers are recruited in projects affecting your ward/area?
- Since projects are sometimes given to your community, is the handing over of such projects if any, properly communicated to you or just completed without formal handing over?
- What could be your advice to the government about poor service delivery?

#### **4.7.4. Interview questions directed at Ward Councillors/Councillors within the affected ward/area falling within the Mopani District**

- As the Ward Councillor in this ward, are you satisfied with the level of government services rendered to the community? If not what can be done to improve the situation?
- Why do people regard service delivery protests as the viable means to resolve poor service delivery related problems?
- If you were to be given the powers to recruit labourers to one of the community projects; or being on a panel interview in the municipality, how would you go about this process?
- As a public servant assigned to the community, do you think the municipal personnel are properly skilled to render the municipal administration?
- If the answer to the above question is NO, what can you suggest about future recruitment of personnel in the municipality?

#### **4.7.5. Interview questions directed mainly to ordinary citizens**

- Being the resident of this ward, are you satisfied with the level of service delivery rendered to you? And if not what can be done to improve the situation?
- Do you regard public protest as a real method to resolve poor service delivery and why?
- Are you satisfied with the manner in which recruitment of workers in community related projects and the municipality is made?
- What is the involvement of personnel within the municipal administration?
- Do you think the municipal personnel are skilled to render efficient services to communities?
- If the answer to the above question is NO, what can you suggest about improving the quality of service delivery in your ward/area?

#### **4.8. Data analysis**

Macintosh (1996:1) defines data analysis as a body of methods that help to describe facts, detect patterns, develop explanations, and test hypotheses. It is used in all of the sciences. It is used in business, in administration, and in policy. According to WiseGeek (n.d.:1) data analysis is defined as a practice in which raw data is ordered and organised so that useful information can be extracted from it. The process of organising and thinking about data is a key to understanding what the data does and does not contain. There are a variety of ways in which people can approach data analysis, and it is notoriously easy to manipulate data during the analysis phase to push certain conclusions or agendas. For this reason, it is important to pay attention when data analysis is presented, and to think critically about the data and the conclusions which were drawn.

Based from the above assertion, data was gathered through the interview process; with permission requested from all the interviewees. A group of interview participants were selected as follows from the identified local municipalities in Mopani District Municipality: ordinary citizens, community development workers, village head-men, officials, councillors and some members of the ward committee. Hence the purpose behind qualitative research interview is to establish the consequences of cadre deployment on service delivery.

According to Olaopa (2011:2) asserts that the understanding of public management as activity as well as the structure and processes of government implies that the public service is intimately tied with the wider society and the citizenry. The progress of the public service is therefore measured in terms of how well the public servants are trained to be able to carry out their tasks of providing the public goods that would make the life of the people meaningful. It is in this sense that the idea of professionalism and capacity building serve as the test of genuine development for African states.

From the face to face interaction with research subjects through interviews, the different views were outlined in accordance with interview questions. According to

De Beer (2011), the former Municipal manager in Maruleng, cadre deployment is good in certain areas. However deployment should not stay political. Furthermore service delivery should be the vision and mission of each employee. Consequently co-operation is the key word, with such an attitude the municipalities will thrive considerably. Phaleng (2011), of ward 21 in the Greater Letaba Municipality, establishes that the municipality has not done enough to address service delivery in terms of services like, electricity and water despite money being available for those services. He cited cadre deployment as the underlying cause of corruption, nepotism which ultimately results into poor service delivery. Phaleng proposed that cadre deployment has to be removed so that deployments have to be made on the basis of merit and skills.

Shikwambane (2011), of ward 11 in Maruleng, felt that for the government to sustain better services to the people, it has to appoint people on the basis of skills and not on party political connections. Apparently Shikwambane reflected that service delivery protests is the only means through which the masses voice their anger to the government. Furthermore there is no transparency when certain posts are filled, in municipalities and this happens because party interests are always above the needs of ordinary citizens. In the case of Maruleng, skills do not matter most when deployment is made. Evidence is reflected by the mass protest in November 2006, whereby residents called for the removal of the mayor and the speaker due to their alleged involvement in nepotism, dictatorship, maladministration and suppression of opposition parties.

Crous (2004:586) guides that well-managed organisations commit time and resources to clarifying their vision and mission. In another interview Rasekgothoma (2011), a Community Development Worker (CDW) at ward 18 Selwane (Phalaborwa), maintains that the municipality has achieved partially in terms of service delivery. The reason being municipalities are in most instances, side-line community stakeholders in matters of governance, and this bears a negative impact on service delivery. Again by virtue of administrative challenges in municipalities, skilled people were side-lined when deployments are made. This is reflected by the failure of the deployed cadres in carrying out administrative tasks. Consequently

skills and merit have to be prominent when appointments are made. According to Ramphele (2008:166) poor co-ordination between different levels of government is another capacity challenge facing the government. Mashele (2011:46) connotes that the bad record of black leaders in managing important institutions, unfortunately, does disservice to the collective yearning of black people to control the major institutions that regulate people's lives. When black leaders take over the state; they run state organs aground by deploying incompetent political agents who have neither respect for professionalism nor regard for corporate governance. These deployees act carelessly, banking on guaranteed political support from powerful black politicians.

Another CDW, Malatji (2011), revealed that the service delivery level is not up to standard 17 years after the democratic dispensation. Hence service delivery improvement could only be possible if municipalities could move away from employing incompetent party cadres. Malatji gave an example whereby their Local Economic Development (LED) Co-ordinator at Ba-Phalaborwa municipality has grade 12 as the highest level of education, which is not enough for the LED position. Ultimately consideration of party membership above of citizens' interests when appointments are made will continue putting municipalities in a chaotic state.

Another resident, Monyepabe (2011) of ward 9 in Maruleng, held the view that the level of municipal service delivery is not satisfactory. This is aggravated by the failure of party deployees to draw a line of separation between the party and state. Furthermore deployed cadres have an attitude to discriminate while putting party (ANC) interests above public interests. For Monyepabe, the ANC has to refrain from hiring on party membership and consider employing on merit and skills if service delivery is to be improved. Hence stakeholders have to be involved in matters of governance in order to enhance effective services to the citizens.

Venter *et al.* (2006:146) maintain that the local community must also become involved in the drafting of an IDP. To this end it is required that a municipality, through a public participation exercise, should develop a process for ensuring the on-going involvement of all stakeholders, and that the procedural aspects are

properly attended to. Hence many of the needs identified will not necessarily be an obligation of local government. This means that within the concept of co-operative government as espoused in Chapter 3 of the Constitution; it is incumbent upon municipalities to act as conduit for such needs that do not fall within the scope of local government, to the other spheres of government whose responsibility they are.

Head-man Shayi (2011) of ward 11 Maruleng, held the view that government has done enough in improving the lives of the people. He denotes that from the area falling under his territory, service delivery is up to standard in terms of water, RDP houses and tarred roads while there are minor challenges. The head-man mentioned that there is workmanship in matters of good governance between the ward councillor and the entire ward, which is not the case in many areas. Ultimately the headman proposed that there is a need for capacity building to the municipal employees in order to deliver on the best services to the people.

Ndlangisa (in City Press 2011f: 30) reports that municipalities cannot improve service delivery without the participation of the communities they govern, says Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Deputy Minister Yunus Carrim. The deputy minister says public consultations need to be improved so they truly include the opinions of residents so as to avoid creating a situation where people resort to violence to express their grievances.

According to Rakgoale (2011) the CDW based in Maruleng, indicate that the municipality is on track with service delivery except strengthening the link with community stakeholders in order to achieve service delivery objectives. For the municipality to succeed in meeting service delivery targets, skilled people need to be employed to strategic areas addressed by merit and skills, not only on party loyalty. According to Rakgoale, party loyalty and membership are not enough for effective governance and service delivery.

Ntliziywana (2009:46) advises that the municipal council needs to be rigid and formalistic when it comes to higher education qualifications and work related experience in the appointment of municipal managers and other financial and supply

chain management officials because the proficiencies just outlined come with experience and acquired skills, they are not inherent. The complexity of leading the municipality demands that the municipal manager has sound knowledge and capacity to lead the entire municipality and thus give effect to the principles of public administration relating to a high standard of professional ethic as well as effective, efficient and economic use of resources. From the research findings, cadre deployment is no longer focusing on strategic deployments, but it includes general workers.

Councillor Shai (2011) of the Democratic Alliance in Maruleng asserts that cadre deployment will not succeed with the country's deteriorating level of service delivery. From what he observed as a councillor during the past 10 years, it is an attempt by the ANC-led government to create "dependency". It is only education through the establishment of FET colleges (Further Education and Training), that can liberate the people of Maruleng from poverty. With regard to cadre deployment, Councillor Shai indicated that it has contributed negatively towards efficient service delivery. He gave an indication that the ruling party needs to deploy skilled and competent cadres irrespective of political affiliation. Without skills and merit, government is going nowhere.

According to Mafunisa (2003:88) the politicised bureaucracy model indicates that, the elected office-bearers have a mandate to control the public service. In this context, there is no distinction between politics and administration, and between party and state, party structures impose administration decisions on administrators. The bureaucratic model also implies that rewards and appointments are made on the basis of blind allegiance to the ruling party by public servants, and not on the basis of a merit system.

Seroto (2011), a former councillor of ward 16 at the Greater Tzaneen municipality, argues that cadre deployment has a negative impact on service delivery because merit and skills are undermined. Secondly the awkwardness of the wards/areas that were made for political reasons makes it difficult for service delivery programmes to be implemented because the wards/areas are not orderly arranged. As a result

people resort to service delivery protests as the only way to communicate with government.

Human (1998:48) maintains that another potential problem with the process of social transformation is that of access to citizens. In South Africa at present, hundreds of people are writing papers about and suggesting policies for the “people” and the “community” without ever themselves going into these communities. Sadly, “the people” and “the community” are all too often not consulted or even heard. It is impossible to transform society without the active involvement of the people in this process. Councillor Mokgalaka (2011), of ward 18 at Ba-Phalaborwa municipality, held the view that government has to do more in order to address the challenges of service delivery. While condemning service delivery protests, he outlines that people have to explore other avenues instead of vandalising public property. With cadre deployment, Mokgalaka outlined that skilled people are needed while those who are currently deployed, needs capacity.

Cameron (2010:18) asserts that the cadre policy and deployment strategy was introduced by the ANC in 1997, with a view to advocate political appointments to senior positions in the public service. The strategy made no reference to the need for administrative competence, while similar deployment structures exist at the provincial level in respect of provincial and local management appointees. Ultimately deployed cadres find themselves above the organisational code of good practice by not accounting to the organisations where they work, but to the political party that deployed them. This creates administrative tension in instances where organisational discipline has to be restored, because the person in charge of restoring discipline could find himself at war with the party in charge of deployment.

Another resident, Sodi (2011) of ward 29 in the Greater Tzaneen, indicated that she is not really satisfied with service delivery at ward level. Seventeen years after the democratic dispensation residents have no proper roads and water. Regarding cadre deployment, the municipality has to employ skilled people who will improve service delivery other than deploying incompetent people without skills. A similar view is held by Twala (2011) who outlines that government has not done enough to improve the

lives of residents at ward 29. Poor service delivery is aggravated by a shortage of water and poor residents buy water from wealthy families. She advised that recruitment of unqualified cadres in the municipality has to be abolished because qualified youth are battling to get employment.

According to Ntliziywana (2009:13), the recent spate of service delivery protests buttresses the need to explore options to improve competencies and the work ethic of municipal staff in an attempt to improve service delivery. Professionalisation and personnel development in the municipal administration might go a long way in addressing the poor and sometimes lack of service delivery and consequently augment the developmental mandate of local government. This is all the more important given that the services that municipalities deliver have a direct and immediate effect on the quality of the lives of the people in the communities. One of local government's key priorities is quality service delivery. Excelling in service delivery requires capable, committed and loyal staff that can translate vision into action. The attraction, development, retention and deployment of competent staff necessitate this study to adopt a focused approach to the professionalisation and personal development of municipal administration, with particular focus on senior managers in the local government sphere. This is in keeping with the Constitution which provides that public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.

Palmer (1989:282) maintains that the performance of bureaucracy is disrupted by constant political meddling in the execution of bureaucratic affairs. Politicians bend the rules to benefit friends and supporters. They want "special favours". Expediency dictates acceding to their requests. Politicians and bureaucrats view political favouritism as inevitable. On that note Palmer argues that, not all authorities on the subject regard bureaucratic as an impediment to performance. Some see it as the only to move a rigid, lethargic system. The Sowetan (2011g:12) reported that new regulations will soon be implemented to correct anomalies related to skill levels and the competency of managers in public hospitals. Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi said, "From now on our hospitals will be managed by appropriately qualified and competent managers at an appropriate designation". He said, "hospitals were not

designated in accordance with uniform norms and standards, as was the practice internationally, and this caused confusion. In some instances you find that a hospital is managed by a person who is at clerical level, we need to correct these anomalies. The regulations would specify that no hospital is managed by a person below the level of director-general in the public service. They will ensure that people who are appointed to manage public hospitals are suitably qualified for the job”.

Venter *et al.* (2006:150) establish that, in many municipalities politicians are embarking on a spending spree, and in the process stripped assets from accumulated reserves and wiped out the working capital. Consequently, funds had to be borrowed from financial institutions, and these institutions are now loath to advance further funds, as they perceive municipalities as high-risk borrowers. While knowledgeable senior treasury officials have left local government in large numbers, creating a void that cannot easily be filled. Sound financial management requires a high degree of financial expertise and without such expertise; financial mismanagement becomes inevitable, thereby exacerbating an already complicated situation.

#### **4.9. Conclusion**

Duvenhage (2006:278) establishes that the weak state concept refers to the inability of a state to carry out social control, in other words the inability of the state to penetrate society, to regulate societal relations and to exploit or distribute resources. While Hoffman (2010a:2) asserts that “the Constitution has subordinated all organs of state to a new regimen of openness and fair dealing with the public. However the Constitution does not make any provision for cadre deployment; on the contrary, state employees are entitled to fair labour practices and to the benefit of good human resource management practices. Apparently opacity, cronyism and patronage displace openness, fairness and accountability when smoke filled back rooms are the venue for appointment (deployment) of members of the public administration”. Finally Ntliziywana (2009:20) asserts that South Africa has now established a system of “wall to wall” local government, responsible for basic service delivery and facilitating social and economic development at a local level. Service delivery is one

of the core duties of municipalities upon which performance and effectiveness assessments are based. This means that in every square meter of the territory of the Republic, there must be a local authority ready to deliver services to every citizen in the Republic. In practice, however, the efficiency and effectiveness of municipalities in discharging their basic service delivery obligations is under serious question. The next phase will look at the findings of cadre deployment and attempt to recommend measures leading towards successful implementation of the cadre deployment practice.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

Calhoun *et al.* (1995:32) guide that the final step in the research process is to draw conclusions based on the results of the analysis. Depending on what patterns have emerged, the hypothesis may be confirmed, rejected or left unsettled. This section deals mainly with research results as per the selected topic, “the impact of cadre deployment on service delivery, the case of Mopani local municipalities in Limpopo Province”. Chapter one provided an introduction, motivation, aims and the methodology of the study including a general overview of the study. The section further provided an overview of the study which included a research design and literature survey.

Chapter two dealt with the practical manifestation of cadre deployment under the ANC-led government, with typical examples where cadre deployment was and still is a problem. Furthermore the relevance of cadre deployment to local government was outlined in contrast with the legislative framework. Chapter three focused mainly on cadre deployment as management strategy under the ANC-led government, with regard to power control and management strategies, public management, resource management, including opposition management strategies. Chapter four provided an overview of Mopani Local Municipalities namely; Maruleng, Ba-Phalaborwa, Giyani, Greater Tzaneen and Greater Letaba. The interview process took place between municipal officials, councillors, community leaders, community development workers and ordinary citizens were interviewed in order to reflect on their views in terms of service delivery and cadre deployment. This section marks the final chapter of this research project, findings are scrutinised in order to explore solutions to the identified research problem.

## 5.2. Findings

From all the identified local municipalities (Maruleng, Ba-Phalaborwa, Greater Tzaneen, Greater Letaba and Greater Giyani) under the ANC led government in Mopani District of Limpopo Province; research findings revealed that cadre deployment bears a negative impact on service delivery. This revelation is supported by the deployment of party cadres who do not have the skills and expertise to fill strategic positions that demands skills and accountability.

Hoffman (2011b:2) argues that “the fundamental problem with cadre deployment is that it is not transparent, nor it is accountable. It has long proved itself not to be responsive to the needs of ordinary people, many of whom resort to service delivery protests because the currently deployed cadres are so unresponsive to their needs. The cadre in the public administration have been described by the Courts as behaving as if they are at war with people that they are meant to serve...”

The continual practice of cadre deployment practice has in many instances, resulted in the non-performance of the deployed which results in poor service delivery and public protests by disillusioned citizens. According to Mashele (2011:46) deployees act carelessly, banking on guaranteed political support from powerful black politicians. Midgal (in Weiner and Huntington 1987:413) outlines that appointments based on personal loyalty, co-optation and ethnic bargaining can further limit the ability of states to make binding rules in a society. Existing literature on cadre deployment policy under the ANC led government revealed that cadre deployment bears a negative impact on service delivery. This is despite the existing records of poor service delivery in various municipalities across the country.

At Maruleng Local Municipality findings reveal that the HIV/AIDS Officer who is actively involved in ward activities; is being appointed with matriculation certificate while a Bachelor's Degree or equivalent qualification was the minimum entry requirement. Furthermore it has been revealed that the Director for Community Services at Maruleng has a Standard 8 certificate while the minimum requirement for the post was a B Degree or equivalent. This means political loyalty and party

connections were above merit when these appointments were made. This has been a practice at all Mopani local municipalities whereby party activism becomes the major criterion for deployment. The same happens to the appointment of communication officer and municipal managers who are all teachers by profession. The technical manager does not have formal technical qualifications except N2 plumbing certificate.

The above findings could serve as a reflection in many municipalities across the country. Furthermore at all the ANC wards in Mopani local municipalities, except where opposition parties are in control of the ward, ward committees were elected on the basis of party activism without following guidelines as laid by the Municipal Structures Act. It has been found that in order to be considered for deployment, one needs to be associated with ward councillors or party members from the powerful factions who yield adequate political power or who have influence with the upper structures of the party. Apparently professional skills and expertise do not matter most when deployment is made, what matters is party loyalty. The same process is applicable when government tenders are awarded to bidders without following the procurement procedures.

Mashele (2011:26) provides a scenario whereby, “getting a job in this municipality, everyone knows that you need to be related to the mayor, or to some senior official, or to be a party activist. It is not as if the township under consideration has not produced educated and talented young people with university degrees in finance, administration, engineering or such sought-after areas of specialization. The educated sons and daughters never return to their township; they are repelled by the rampant nepotism and cronyism that is ubiquitous in the municipal system. Hence the chief financial officer is ‘strategic deployee’ of a political party, although he has had no formal training in finance. The head of administration is a trained theologian who led many marches when the country was still under apartheid”.

The above scenario depicts the devastating effect of cadre deployment on service delivery which in turn gives rise to public protests. Ultimately cadre deployment is

being used as a survival strategy for friends and relatives operating in the name of a political party while the main objective of politics as an activity has been forgotten. It has been revealed that all Mopani local municipalities have human resource management systems in place that guide proper recruitment and selection. However for the benefit of the ANC led government, recruitment and selection procedures are ignored in pursuance of party loyalists.

According to Mashele (2011:27) “municipal positions are first debated at night in a branch meeting of a political party and arrived at in an unwritten resolution as to who must get the job. Having thus decided, the municipal manager was instructed by the branch of a political party to ensure that the politically preferred candidate secures the job. As an experienced agent in perversity, the municipal manager sets official processes in motion. He pays an enormous amount of money to place an advertisement in a newspaper to invite educated citizens to apply for a position that the municipal manger knows only too well has already been decided upon. Driven by the suspicion that there could still be a modicum of fairness in the municipality, well-meaning citizens forward their applications. They spend long nights reading and researching in preparation for interviews. Finally, the interviews are conducted and the candidate whose name was approved that night in a branch meeting accordingly gets the job. The above scenario represents the highly politicised model of the municipal system, dated back from the apartheid system to date”.

The LED Officer at Ba-Phalaborwa Local Municipality was considered for appointment with a matriculation certificate in a post that needed someone with an equivalent of a Degree/Diploma as entry requirement. It is alleged that the motive for appointment was mainly nepotism and party loyalty. The tendency to sideline skilled and competent people for party loyalists is a cause for concern. The acting municipal manager at Ba-Phalaborwa Local Municipality is a deployee who is a teacher by profession. The question of skills and expertise becomes questionable when existing legislations governing the municipal environment becomes a difficult exercise to the deployee.

Venter *et al.* (2006:147) guide that local economic development is a great challenge for municipalities, especially those that for many decades have been historically disadvantaged, that often lack even the most basic infrastructure and where poverty levels are extremely high. While Mashele (2011:26) reflect that “the chief financial officer is a ‘strategic deployee’ of a political party, although he has had no formal training in finance. The head of administration is a trained theologian who led many marches when the country was still under apartheid...”

According to Venter *et al.* (2006:150) the Municipal Manager as accounting officer can be held accountable in terms of Chapter 8 and Section 61 of the Municipal Finance Management Act, and also Section 55 of the Municipal Systems Act. However the problem is that politicians (who are more often than not the root cause of financial mismanagement) cannot be held accountable, except for certain highly irregular matters. Even the Auditor-General’s auditing powers and the contents of the audit report are relatively meek and mild, in terms of Sections 15 and 20 respectively of the Public Audit Act (Act 25 of 2004), which replaced the Auditor-General Act (Act 12 of 1995).

The Greater Tzaneen Municipality has all the systems in place and is one of the best performing municipalities in Mopani and it has its revenue base. Of the five local municipalities in Mopani District, Greater Tzaneen could be regarded the best in terms recruitment and placement of personnel because professionalism and skills are considered when strategic positions are filled. As the ANC led municipality, it is not immune from cadre deployment practices as pitched in other municipalities as far as deployment of cadres and awarding of tenders are concerned. Hence this practice gives rise to the challenges of service delivery.

Trollip (2010b:1) maintains that the centralisation of power by the ANC through legislation and policy changes constitutes a multi-faceted strategy on the part of the ruling party to entrench its power, clamp down on dissent and ensure that its leaders can gain access to state funds. It represents the formal manifestation of the “closed crony society”, the mantra of the current ANC administration that seeks to concentrate access to jobs and tenders in the hands of a small, elite cabal of ANC

leaders. In a closed crony society, every facet of life, from what you read in the newspapers to your choice of healthcare provider, to who you choose to represent you at provincial and local government level, is determined by the priorities and prejudices of the ruling ANC elite.

Research findings reveal that most general workers in these municipalities were recruited along party lines and not on merit. Findings reveal that these general workers are active members of the ruling party at the branch level who do not have formal qualifications needed by the job market. This has been evident in Mopani local municipalities, including Maruleng and at Sekororo Hospital where members of the public were outraged over the appointment of 'cleaners' who are loyal to ANC ward and regional structures. At Maruleng the biological daughter of the chairperson of the portfolio committee on finance, was appointed as clerk serving on the same committee. Findings of this kind tend to aggravate service delivery situation because the manifest function of the municipality becomes tampered with the latent function.

Another senior official at the Greater Tzaneen Municipality who requested to be anonymous for fear of being victimised that; posts are advertised with all recruitment processes being followed. But the final decision as to who must get employed is taken by the District Office irrespective of the candidate suitability. The same strategy is applicable to other Municipalities which fall under Mopani District.

Mashele (2011:122) argues that the breed of "intellectuals" we have in South Africa fear two things: truth and solitude. In the contest between political correctness and truth, our intellectuals support the former and starve the latter. They are so fearful of the truth that you can hardly differentiate them from diplomats. When they see a mess in political parties, they call it challenges. When they hear politicians insulting each other, our thinkers say there are differences.

According to Huntington (1965a:411) a society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excess of personal and parochial desires. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means of defining and realising its common

interests. Therefore the capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.

While Lekganyane (2005:10) reflects that; “we are ashamed and reluctant to watch news these days because people that we hold in high esteem are forever appearing as alleged corrupters or corrupted. Municipalities are turned into corruption playing fields where all these money mongers converge and set the ‘scheme and fixture’”. Gildenhuis and Knipe (2000:77) establish that local governments are faced with many difficult challenges in ensuring service delivery to all residents within the areas of jurisdiction. In order to meet those challenges, public office bearers are expected to be developmental and enforce their constitutional obligations rather than personal concerns.

According to President Zuma (2011:4) cadre deployment forms part of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) “[w]e reiterate what we said in our 2007 Strategy and Tactics document that we place high premium on the involvement of our cadres in all centres of power. ANC cadres have a responsibility to promote progressive traditions within the intellectual community, which includes our universities and the media. We also need their presence and involvement in key strategic positions in the State as well as the private sector, and will continue strategic deployments in this regard”.

Despite the ANC’s defence on cadre deployment policy, the latest pitfall is reflected by the suspension of Police Commissioner General Bheki Cele and the removal of Shicelo Shiceka (Minister for Co-operative Government and Traditional Affairs) and Gwen Mahlangu Nkabinde (Minister of Public Works) by President Zuma due to allegations of unlawful procurement for police buildings.

News24 (2011:1) reflected that National Police Commissioner General Bheki Cele has been suspended pending the outcome of an investigation into "unlawful" police lease agreements, President Jacob Zuma announced on the 24<sup>th</sup> October 2011. According to Zuma “[i]n August, I informed the national commissioner, General Bheki Cele, of my intention to institute a board of inquiry to look into the allegations of misconduct, in relation to the procurement of office accommodation for the South

African Police Service, as per the findings and recommendations of the public protector," Zuma told reporters in Pretoria.

Baurer (2011b:1) outlines that President Jacob Zuma acted to protect South Africa's integrity in the firing of ministers Sicelo Shiceka and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, and suspension of Police Commissioner General Bheki Cele. Shiceka and Mahlangu-Nkabinde were relieved of their duties and Cele was suspended following intense public scrutiny after damning reports by Public Protector Advocate Thuli Madonsela into several actions the ministers undertook while in office. Shiceka, now ex-minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, came under fire for misusing state funds, which included undertaking a trip to Switzerland to visit a former girlfriend convicted of drug trafficking, as confirmed in a report released by Madonsela in September 2011.

The Mail and Guardian (2011a:1) reports that ANC secretary general, Mantashe, said "there was nothing wrong with the highly criticised system of cadre deployment. Deploying cadres is not a flawed conceptual system.... it would not be a sin to give black people operational exposure" as part of correcting imbalances created by the apartheid regime. Critics of cadre deployment claim it puts incompetent and unqualified people in critical positions. Mantashe said "[w]e believes that there is nothing wrong with the concept. It helps to address the situation we inherited in 1994 and we are not ashamed about that". He (Mantashe) went on to say cadre deployment was a corrective action aimed at helping black people take responsibility in full. However it was important that people met the basic requirements of the post and performed well in the selection process. The Zimpolitical blogspot (2008:1) reflects that Zimbabwe as we know it today is a pale example of a gloomy shadow of the same post-colonial state which was characterised by relative economic growth notwithstanding the violent disturbances that took place in those early formative years. For the past decade the country has been falling tremendously into the conundrums of economic doldrums. These economic difficulties instigated the flight of capital, massive migration of both skilled and unskilled labour force to other countries both regionally and internationally, and also daunting deterioration in the standards of living of the generality of the population due to poor service delivery

from various sectoral institutions of the state. At Maruleng Local Municipality the debtor Clerk in the Department of Finance is the biological daughter of the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Finance, this practice amounting to nepotism.

Mashele (2011:56) outlines that “this political rot from the township and rural municipality to the central party office and government is well-known in our society. People are scared publicly to express deprecation. It becomes only a subject of secret discussions in private spaces, while society continues to die a slow death. People are afraid to speak out against the general socio-political decay because they know the ruling party is powerful; the party can switch off the tap that brings water to one’s kitchen, the party has the power to issue an order for people’s wives not to be employed in the public sector and in some sections of the private sector”.

Pityana (2011:4) indicates that the ruling party and the state were seen as the only vehicle through which transformation could be pursued. The country’s history of popular participation was submerged in the rush for access to state resources. With this realisation the politics of opportunism and self-service began to take root. The party had failed to nurture a new breed of “young bright minds capable of leading in a legitimate, accountable fashion”. In such circumstances opportunism thrives “as sound and reasoned thinking gives way to popularism”... Even more importantly, we must accept that a culture of entitlement has been bred by the politics of promise and dependency that has characterised the post-apartheid era. At the same time Pityana says that “government must work with civil society and communities, and empower the latter to be active citizens in taking responsibility for the development of their communities”.

Anstey (2006:359) reflects that leadership is a complex concept with as many definitions as there are theorists. While effective leaders reflect certain common attributes they are in many senses defined by those who follow them and the results that they deliver. Leadership then can only really be understood in the context of groups. It is with and through groups, teams and organisations that leaders achieve results. While groups may be mobilised in various ways, it is increasingly recognised

that participative styles are the most effective in developing capacity and commitment for goal achievement. Hence this does not imply an abdication of responsibilities, weakness or indecision.

Duvenhage (2003) (in MGT 548/748 2011:74) defines system collapse as a situation whereby the state structure has become the drowning person within the dynamics of a fast-changing political environment and where order and regularity specific to system patterns (the politics of structure) make way for a different “regularity” and “order” that can be associated with chaotic systems. At ward 11 in Maruleng, the community was informed of the establishment of a clinic since from mid-2010.

To date (2011) the clinic has not yet been started and no one is taking responsibility. Furthermore Maruleng has no institution of higher learning such as a university or FET (Further Education and Training) college, despite it being prioritised in 2010/2011 IDP. This aggravate service delivery situation because potential party cadres are groomed up in a situation where education becomes a privilege not a right. To date nothing has happened and no one takes responsibility. According to Duvenhage (2006:73) successful political leadership may be measured in terms of the political strategy and tactics that are employed.

Deployment of incompetent cadres led to three white elephant projects in Maruleng municipality identified as, the atchar factory, stone crushing and cultural village. Insufficient research into these projects led to wasteful expenditure in unused buildings at taxpayer’s expense.

Ntliziywana (2009:40) advises that work-related experience is the second competency requirement prescribed by Regulations. The Regulations not only prescribe a higher education qualification, but also work-related experience to enable the municipal managers and officials to capably and diligently discharge the responsibilities and perform the tasks conferred upon them by the Constitution, the Systems Act, the MFMA and other legislation applicable to local government. In essence, they must also have the skills and knowledge acquired informally through exposure and practice. They must know what the rubric says and the practical

implication thereof. They must have the confidence acquired through experience when executing their responsibilities. In this regard, Performance Regulations and Competency Regulations contain similar provisions to the effect that the municipal manager must have a minimum of five years' experience at senior management level.

Pityana (2010:5) reiterates that administrative authority often succumbs to political pressures at all levels of government. Incompetent people are often appointed to strategic roles to facilitate the procurement of goods and services from well-connected but unsuitable providers at exorbitant costs. Managers often cannot act against civil servants who are incompetent but politically well-connected for fear of repercussions. Furthermore Pityana added that a "state that is unable to openly explain and justify its actions, and protect itself from the scourge of corruption, can never serve the imperative of social transformation, or its people".

Anstey (2006:362) asserts that organisations should build a culture of performance. If the imperatives for change were rooted in competitiveness, then the change process should very actively be managed to engender a culture of delivery – the intention is not simply to build a supportive environment, but one that is goal-directed and committed to success. Duvenhage (2004:43) argues that a lack of political institutionalisation makes it impossible for political institutions to accommodate new inputs and demands (caused by political participation). Alan and Peters (2005:235), affirm that post-communist systems have not yet been able to free themselves from many of their former organisational problems. There is no longer party control but there is still a necessity to employ the old administrative personnel despite structures evolving along liberal democratic lines; there is often no other source of the expertise necessary to manage a complex political system. While in the remaining authoritarian political system, especially those in the third world, the key characteristics are relatively large size, corruption and patronage of bureaucracies.

According to Brooks (2004:1) the implications of a dominant party system for the successful consolidation of democracy, has long been an issue of interest amongst political scientists in democracies the world over. In a context in which one party

dominates the political landscape and faces little prospect of electoral defeat, concerns arise surrounding the possibility of declining government response to public opinion, loss of accountability, the overall erosion of democratic principles and development of authoritarian methods of rule.

Lekganyane (2005:10) hint that, “corruption within governments has reached a ceiling and people who are supposed to be opposing it, thrive from it. They hate those who advise them from desisting from it...Men and women of responsibility have completely forgotten of what is expected of them as leaders. Our government’s intention of upgrading the lives of the poor is now being frustrated by looters who are bent on self-enrichment at the expense of masses. Poverty is still rife within communities despite the good intentions of our government. South Africa has relative money that can develop its people but thugs who are dressed in sheep skins, derail the good programmes...” Whereas (Winter and Bellows 1992:64) asserts that a government which fails to protect individuals’ rights to liberty and property violate the trust level and it could not claim obedience to its citizens.

Rotberg (n.d.: 8) warns that Zimbabwe is an example of a once unquestionably strong African state that has fallen rapidly through weakness to the very edge of the abyss of failure. All Zimbabwe lacks in order to join the ranks of failed states is a widespread internal insurgent movement directed against the government. While justice delayed is justice denied, cadre deployment has long proved to be against Section 195 of the Constitution that outlines the principles for sound public administration practice. On this note *Vuyo Mlokoti v/s Amathole Municipality* is a case in point. Further to indicate that poor performance in local government result mainly from the ineptitude of party cadres who do not have skills and expertise in local government affairs except being a party activist with sound political connections with the ruling elite.

Duvenhage (2006b:277) warns that the degree of government, which may be measured in terms of institutionalisation criteria, emphasises a route of change from political order and stability to political decay (chaos and anarchy), or vice versa. Easton (in Heywood 2007:19) avows that a political system comprises of “inputs”

which refers to the demands and support within the political system, whereas “outputs” entails decisions and actions of government which generate “feedback” and shapes people’s demands.

Hoffman (2010b:23) maintains that much of what is going wrong with service delivery can be attributed to unsuitably deployed cadres, corruption and the concomitant pervasive disconnection with the values and principles of the Constitution which currently inform the public administration. The corruption of the new South Africa started with the arms deals and, because of the position of those involved, has permeated far too many facets of service delivery in the public administration. The tender system is open to abuse, bribery is endemic and kick-backs on contracts or services seem to be expected all too often. Unless and until the allegations of corruption in the arms deals are properly, openly and accountably dealt with, this albatross will continue to affect the rate of service delivery detrimentally. Far too much energy is expended covering it up, energy which would be better spent running the country properly and in accordance with the Constitution. A dysfunctional criminal justice system is incapable of dealing with matters of this gravity in the normal course of its duties.

Interafrica.org (2011:1 of 57) maintains that the on-going service delivery protests paint a negative picture of South Africa locally and abroad. The protests leave one with an impression that government is failing to deliver basic services to the people, especially at local government level. Similarly, communities have the right to demand basic services from government. At local government level, most municipalities are failing to deliver basic services. There is no doubt that the culture of so-called cadre deployment and nepotism is contributing a great deal to municipalities’ inability to service communities. Apparently cadre deployment and nepotism are common in that skills and experience is not a requirement for one to be appointed. The sad reality is that beneficiaries of both nepotism and cadre deployment are appointed to key strategic positions. It is a fact that the majority of these people fail to perform.

Duvenhage (2003 in MGT 548/748 2011:83) warns that in the South African political context, as well as in many other political contexts, the presence of phenomenon

that can be associated with political decay is at times clearly visible and that emphasises the necessity for remedial political measures to counter their negative effect. In the interest of successful political transformation the reality of political decay in our society must be actively addressed.

Finally the research findings reveals that, ruling party has proven beyond reasonable doubt that it is failing to differentiate between the party and state. In many occasions deployed cadres do not separate their role as government officials and party members. This creates problems when IDP feedback is to be given to communities because they confuse government occasion with a political rally. To some of the citizens with a clear understanding of politics, ultimately they refrain from attending government functions or events. By distinguishing between the party and the state will assist the ruling party not to meddle with public administration when deployments are made. Apparently separation of the state and party is of utmost importance because some of the features characterizing the South African state entails; multiparty democracy and a non –racial state. This is reflected by involvement of ANC members and supporters in the recruitment and selection of employees to suit the party interests. Despite the shortage of skilled personnel in municipalities, qualified citizens are often sidelined and are no longer willing to apply for advertised posts. This result from the interference of ANC and the alliance partners (COSATU and SACP) with public administration about who should get appointed with the influence of deployment committees. As a result putting job adverts on daily newspapers is nothing but to formalise the process.

Ntliziywana (2009:27) asserts that the combination of inexperienced, poorly qualified staff with similarly inexperienced councillors creates fertile ground for irregularities, malpractice and ineffective expenditure.

Ratshibai (2011:1) that the problem that the cadres have is the use a “wholesale approach” (a system where cadres will just go and pick up a bunch of comrades who support them without even checking the skills or qualifications they have). Many people are in positions that they don’t even understand, particularly in government departments, because they were given those positions without even being assessed

if they can perform in that particular job. Just because a person can read or write does not mean that person can become a Municipal Manager or a Receptionist for that matter. Our government should start screening prospective employees for both hard skills and soft skills. They must also implement a system or have one HR Department that is independent to deal with the employment of government employees. The problem of cadre deployment is the reason we have poor service delivery and no sustainable job creations, since people who are supposed to come with ideas to boost the employment rate are the ones who are unemployed.

Rossouw (in City Press 2011) reports that “[i]t took the world by surprise when they woke up in September to find a new government had taken power in Zambia – and not an ounce of blood was shed. Twenty years of being in government came to an end for the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) this year (2011)...locals said they grew tired of the rampant corruption that the government did not even bother to hide...They (Patriotic Front) judged government only according to what they saw around them – which in Zambia was neglect, decay and a culture of leaders stealing from government. The leadership became complacent, thinking that 20 years of rule no one would dare to take up the challenge of change, but they misjudged the frustration of the youth”.

### **5.3. Conclusions**

Despite having one of the best Constitutions in the world, South Africa under the ANC led government undermines the constitution. Cadre deployment policy is opposed to Section 195 which reaffirms the principles for efficient public administration. Under no circumstances does cadre deployment policy merge or align with section 195. Court rulings have ruled out against this policy as contradicting with the provisions made by the constitution. Despite the call to review the cadre deployment policy, the ANC continue to make use of the policy. Hence the ANC is not the state but a political party.

The current political crises are dictated by the previous activities of the past. Like what the former National Party did in 1948 when they took power by deploying party cadres into strategic position, the ANC followed suit. It is unfortunate because the

NP took time before their corruption was exposed unlike the ANC whose signs of political decay became visible within 17 Years. Realising that the public has lost confidence in the total administration of government in terms of high levels of corruption, government passes the secrecy bill. The bill seems to deter the media from interfering with government classified information so that government corruption could not be exposed by the media. This draconian bill was adopted in Zimbabwe after President Robert Mugabe took the reins and the country is currently in social, political and economic crises.

According to Smith (2011:1) the African National Congress (ANC) says it needs to update apartheid-era legislation safeguarding “valuable information by all organs of state,” and has been emboldened by the revelations of wrongdoing at the *News of the World* and the crisis of press regulation in Britain. But opposition parties, civil society groups and the media warn of an existential threat to freedom of expression, a pillar of the progressive constitution drawn up under former President Nelson Mandela. The Congress of South African Trade Unions, usually an ANC ally, claims the bill puts too much power in the hands of government.

Mangcu (in City Press 2011i:6) asserts that democracy is a continuous process of course correction or what Franklin Delano Roosevelt described as “bold, persistent experimentation”. Haffajee (in City Press 2011:21) asserts that the ANC has become a party in a permanent tussle for position, where factionalism is rampant and assumption of motive riotous. According to Huntington (1965a:403) the more unified and coherent an organisation is, the more highly institutionalised it is - the greater the disunity of the organisation, the less its institutionalisation. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group.

For the purpose of research limitation, existing literature have explored research on the challenges of governance faced by the ANC, principles of good governance as a tool for promoting good public administration in Africa – some comparative views, municipal services partnerships for effective and efficient service delivery, an evaluation of ward committees in entrenching public participation, the challenges or problems facing districts and local municipalities in Limpopo Province in relation to

co-operative government in South Africa, transforming service delivery in rural areas and finally the professionalisation of local government, to mention just a few.

Hence little research has been done about the implications of cadre deployment on service delivery due to a lack of co-operation by some of the deployed cadres in government for fear of victimisation. From an exploratory point of view there is a need to conduct further research in this area on both party and government level in order to explore alternative solutions that will save the party and state from absolute collapse.

Heywood (2007:224) argues that if legitimacy helps to ensure political stability and the survival of a regime, when legitimacy collapses the result is likely to be either a resort to repression or far-reaching political change. Whether change marks progress or decay, growth or decline, it is the product of one of two processes: evolution or revolution. Evolutionary change is usually thought of as reform, gradual and incremental improvements *within* a social or political system. Reform therefore represents change within continuity, the reorganisation or restructuring of, for instance, an institution, rather than abolition or replacement.

Finally successful local government at district and local levels needs to be guided mainly by existing legislations; including Section 195 of the Constitution outlining the basic principles of public administration. Service delivery protests is an indication public administration needs to be capacitated with skilled personnel and experienced politicians who are able to read, write and interpret the statutes in accordance with the law. As of one of the emerging countries on the African continent, South Africa requires skilled people to sustain the economy and to deliver on the basic services. Unless the system is reviewed and guided by legislation, South Africa will soon follow the failed African states with Zimbabwe as a case in point.

Waruiru (2007:10 of 10) warns that there is a real danger that the country may join the long list of failed democracies in Africa. Unless a new generation of enlightened black leaders committed to promoting property rights and free market economic policies emerge, South Africa's future looks bleak.

#### **5.4. Recommendations**

Despite the ANC's denial on the impact cadre deployment on service delivery by some incompetent party cadres, urgent policy review is required to rescue South Africa from collapse. For the ANC to succeed in efficient and effective public administration and management, deployment committees at all levels should strive to maintain a balance between party cadres and members of the public who possess adequate skills to do the job regardless of their political affiliation. Furthermore skills and qualities of party cadres deployed in public administration and other organs of the state need to be reviewed to ensure compliance with Section 195 of the Constitution. In order to address the imbalance caused by cadre deployment; the district municipalities in collaboration with the provincial department of local government should conduct skills audit with all municipal employees. Where there is no compliance in terms of skills, replacements have to be made for the benefit of the country and its citizens.

Despite proper systems having put in place for successful local government and service delivery, municipalities continue to obtain poor audits. This might be aggravated by a variety of factors such as corruption and ineptitude of party cadres deployed in municipalities. For the sake of service delivery, qualified financial officers and municipal managers have to be employed rather deploying a teacher to the position that requires extensive skills and expertise. However for those who have been mistakenly considered for those strategic positions in municipalities, training through short courses is recommended. Proper education and training will enable party cadres deployed in municipalities to effectively read and interpret statutes in accordance with the law.

The Local Government Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000:2) aims to provide for the core principles, mechanisms and processes that are necessary to enable municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of local communities; and to ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all, to define the legal nature of a municipality as including the local

community within the municipal area, working in partnership with the municipality's political and administrative structures.

Human (1998:111) defines strategy "as actions taken by a relatively autonomous organizations or group in order to perform a specific task. As a result distinction between policy and strategy is important as it underlines the notion that strategic apex within the revocracy must act within a broad policy framework". It is therefore recommended that ANC deployment committees at national, provincial and local spheres has to comply with the statutory laws when party policies are made because South Africa is a unitary state characterized by the supremacy of the Constitution.

The attempt by president Zuma to bar politicians from holding senior positions in municipalities was nothing but an attempt to neutralise opposition political parties and the public outcry in terms of getting employment opportunities in municipalities. Ndlangisa and Matlala (in City Press 2010h:1) reported that President Zuma wants to bar politicians from holding senior municipal management jobs – a clear sign that the policy of cadre deployment has harmed local government.

Despite amendment to the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) on 5 July 2011, political interference in local government will be minimal. In terms of section 56A (1) of the Municipal Systems Amendment Act, limitation is provided that, "a municipal manager or manager directly accountable to the municipal manager may not hold political office in a political party, whether in permanent, temporary or acting capacity". While the amendment is silent about political meddling with administration to those are already deployed in municipalities wielding adequate political power; it is recommended that a line of operation be drawn between municipal administration and the political office in line with guidelines and legislations governing public administration.

Anstey (2006:342-343) establishes that organisational transformation is a complex process requiring simultaneous work along many different tracks and an ability to coordinate this work and align resources across many fronts in order to achieve identified goals. In short, transformation is a multi-track change process demanding

attention to issues of organisational direction, the identification of new business opportunities, customer delivery, and the mobilisation of people to optimise the redesign of organisations. The value of such a model is that it captures the complexity of change processes and reflects on the importance of managing their interaction. Hoffman (2010c:5) argues that cadre deployment can work, provided competent cadres are chosen. At the root of many of the problems facing our country at present is a lack of appreciation of the difference between party and state.

Furthermore Anstey (2006:356-357) guides that effective leaders read situational demands and have a repertoire of styles that they employ accordingly. In addition, it is clear that change agents then should look for guiding coalitions with a range of relevant competencies – a leadership team that can provide direction and drive, build organisations, hold people together for joint effort and build their competencies for future success...Managers develop capacity to achieve plans by creating an appropriate organisational structure, staffing with qualified people, communicating plans, delegating responsibilities and monitoring implementation; while leaders align people, creating coalitions of personnel who understand the vision and are committed to it.

Human (1998:126) guides that good strategists must have intimate knowledge of the context in which they operate. They must also be able to translate this into practical actions...that will ensure the long – term effectiveness of their organisations. This means that a good strategist must be competent in a number of diverse skills (Human 1998:126). Heywood (2007:26) defines government as the institutional processes through which collective and usually binding decisions are made, while the functionalist approach to the state focuses mainly on the role of state institutions. In order to arrive at an effective and efficient local and co-operative governance to be achieved, the following existing legislations should serve as guidelines; South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), Municipal Structures (Act 117 of 1998), Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000 as amended), Public Service Act of 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994), Public Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 1999), the Public Service Regulations of 2001, IDP guidelines and White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service of 1995. Finally the success of local

government in both district and local municipalities will be determined by efficient planning and management informed by existing legislation. Compliance with statutes will further assist deployment committees including ward committees to operate in accordance with the law at all government levels. While political interference in public administration is detrimental to democracy, it may result into maladministration, corruption, nepotism and graft which are threats to democratic states like South Africa.

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