



THE STORY OF JESUS AND THE BLIND MAN

A SPEECH ACT READING OF JOHN 9

Acta Theologica Supplementum 21

Hisayasu Ito



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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1. Previous studies on John 9	1
2. Purpose of the study	5
3. Structure of the study	10
3.1 Considerations	10
3.2 Terminology	11
3.3 Reference system	11
3.4 Technical glosses and abbreviations	11
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY	13
1. Speech act theory and related approaches	14
1.1 Speech act theory	14
1.1.1 Indirect speech act	14
1.2 Taxonomy and mutual contextual beliefs	16
1.2.1 Taxonomy	16
1.2.2 Mutual contextual beliefs	16
1.3 Principles of conversation	17
1.3.1 Cooperative Principle and four maxims	17
1.3.2 Textual Rhetoric	18

1.3.3 Interpersonal Rhetoric	19
1.4 Pratt's display text	20
1.5 Van Dijk's macrospeech-act structures	21
1.5.1 Macrostructures	22
1.5.2 Macrorules	23
1.5.3 Speech act sequences and macrospeech acts	24
1.6 Ironic speech acts	26
1.7 Conclusion	35
2. Incorporation of other approaches	35
2.1 Colon analysis	36
2.1.1 Basic procedures	36
2.1.2 Explanation of the numbering system used in the schematic presentations	37
2.2 Narrative criticism	38
2.2.1 Rhetorical levels and associated personages	38
2.3 Reader-response criticism	42
2.3.1 Temporal quality of narrative	42
2.3.2 Victimisation of the implied reader	43
2.4 Historical criticism	43
2.4.1 Social-scientific criticism	44
3. Speech act analysis	46
3.1 Advantages of speech act analysis	46
3.2 Disadvantages of speech act analysis	49
3.3 Previous New Testament studies utilising speech act theory	51
3.4 Contributions and approach of the study	54
3.4.1 Contributions to be made by the study	54
3.4.2 Basic reading scheme	58
CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL SURVEY OF JOHN 9	60
1. Appropriateness conditions	60
2. The cooperative principle, and interpersonal and textual rhetorics	61
3. Three presumptions	61
3.1 Linguistic presumption	61
3.2 Communicative presumption	64
3.3 Presumption of literalness	64

4. General mutual contextual beliefs presumed in John 9	64
4.1 Mutual social beliefs	67
4.1.1 Honour and family	67
4.1.2 Challenge and response	68
4.1.3 Family life	68
4.1.4 Secrecy	69
4.1.5 Healing	70
4.2 Mutual geographical beliefs	71
4.3 Mutual religious beliefs	71
4.4 Mutual forensic beliefs	72
4.5 Mutual story beliefs	75
4.5.1 Short summary of mutual story beliefs	75
4.6 Relationships between the author and the reader	76
5. Johannine symbolism	76
5.1 Light and darkness	79
5.1.1 The author's perspective	80
5.1.2 The reader's perspective	82
5.1.3 The characters' knowledge	83
5.2 Water	83
5.2.1 The author's perspective	84
5.2.2 The reader's perspective	87
5.2.3 The characters' knowledge	88
6. The motif of suffering	88
CHAPTER 4: SPEECH ACT READING OF JOHN 9	91
1. Introduction	91
2. Overall structure	92
3. Cluster A: The dialogue between Jesus and the Disciples (9:1-7)	92
3.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	92
3.1.1 Blindness and sin	92
3.1.2 Miracles	93
3.1.3 Siloam	97
3.1.4 The 'I am' statements	97
3.1.5 Relationships between the characters	103

3.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	104
3.3 Microspeech acts	106
3.3.1 The first subcluster (9:1-5)	106
3.3.2 The second subcluster (9:6-7)	136
3.4 Macrospeech acts	151
4. Cluster B: The dialogue between the blind man and the neighbours (9:8-12)	153
4.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	153
4.1.1 Poverty and the patronage system	153
4.1.2 Relationships between the characters	154
4.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	154
4.3 Microspeech acts	157
4.3.1 The first subcluster (9:8-9)	157
4.3.2 The second subcluster (9:10-11)	175
4.3.3 The third subcluster (9:12)	183
4.4 Macrospeech acts	187
5. Cluster C: The dialogue between the Blind Man and the Pharisees (9:13-17)	190
5.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	190
5.1.1 Prophet	190
5.1.2 Relationships between the characters	192
5.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	192
5.3 Microspeech acts	195
5.3.1 The first subcluster (9:13-15)	195
5.3.2 The second subcluster (9:16-17)	214
5.4 Macrospeech acts	246
6. Cluster D: The dialogue between the Jews and the Blind Man's parents (9:18-23)	247
6.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	247
6.1.1 The synagogue	247
6.1.2 Jewish expulsion	249
6.1.3 Relationships between the characters	252
6.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	253
6.3 Microspeech acts	254
6.3.1 The first subcluster (9:18)	254

6.3.2 The second subcluster (9:19-21)	262
6.3.3 The third subcluster (9:22-23)	287
6.4 Macrospeech acts	302
7. Cluster C': The dialogue between the Jews and the Blind Man (9:24-34).....	306
7.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	306
7.1.1 Relationships between the characters	306
7.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	306
7.3 Microspeech acts	310
7.3.1 The first subcluster (9:24-25)	310
7.3.2 The second subcluster (9:26-27)	320
7.3.3 The third subcluster (9:28-34)	336
7.4 Macrospeech acts	374
8. Cluster B': The dialogue between Jesus and the Blind Man (9:35-38)	378
8.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	378
8.1.1 The Son of Man	378
8.1.2 Relationships between the characters	382
8.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	382
8.3 Microspeech acts	384
8.3.1 The first subcluster (9:35-36)	384
8.3.2 The second subcluster (9:37-38)	399
8.4 Macrospeech acts	414
9. Cluster A': The dialogue between Jesus and the Pharisees (9:39-41)	418
9.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs	418
9.1.1 Jesus' judgment	418
9.1.2 Relationships between the characters	419
9.2 Overview and structural analysis chart	420
9.3 Microspeech acts	422
9.3.1 The first subcluster (9:39)	422
9.3.2 The second subcluster (9:40-41)	431
9.4 Macrospeech acts	448
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	449
1. Summary of this speech act reading of John 9	449

1.1 The relationships between the clusters	449
1.2 Microspeech acts used in John 9	453
1.3 Macrospeech acts in the story of John 9	455
1.4 Survey of communicative strategy in John 9	458
1.4.1 The use of interpersonal and textual rhetorics	458
1.4.2 The use of other strategies	461
1.4.3 Johannine symbolism in John 9	462
1.4.4 Irony in John 9	465
1.4.5 The motif of suffering in John 9	468
1.4.6 Conclusion of the discussion of the communicative strategies used in John 9	471
2. Supplement: Portrait of the real readers in John 9	471
2.1 Geography and language	471
2.2 Judaism and related Jewish beliefs and practice	472
2.3 Social setting	472
2.4 Tone of the narrative – Jewish and Christian traits	473
3. Evaluation of the method used in the study	474
3.1 Positive points	474
3.2 Points for improvement	475
APPENDIX 1	477
APPENDIX 2	479
APPENDIX 3	484
APPENDIX 4	486
APPENDIX 5	491
APPENDIX 6	494
BIBLIOGRAPHY	495

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As fifteen years have passed since I submitted my dissertation, I have had to update the material I used to some extent. However, the main thrust of the book has not changed, despite the update. This suggests that, initially, the direction of my research may have been correct. At that time, there were ongoing discussions on the relationship between Literary Criticism and Historical Criticism. However, the current tendency is to view these two perspectives as complementary. It is hoped that my speech-act approach shows an integrated approach of the two perspectives, as one good example of using the findings of Historical Criticism in Literary Criticism. It may, to some extent, be similar to what Bennema (2009:20) might call “historical narrative criticism”. Of course, it is not exactly similar, because my main methodology differs from his.

It is likely that every country that practises New Testament studies displays distinctive traits in, for instance, methodology, theology, style and language. South African New Testament scholarship, in general, is very enthusiastic about, and receptive of new methodologies. This usually concerns the exploration, adaptation and utilisation of a possible approach for elucidating biblical texts from a new and different angle. The fact that South African scholars use a wide variety of methods was obvious in a Congress held in 1988, and in publications on New Testament methodologies (Hartin & Petzer 1991) result from this Congress. Scholars view a speech-act approach favourably.

Since I had the privilege of, and opportunity to study in such an atmosphere, the outcome of my work reflects South African scholarship to a great extent (positively, I hope) and also differs from studies conducted elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, it is not purely South African. I am Japanese, born into a Buddhist family, and converted to Christianity in my university days, followed by seminary education in a Master of Divinity programme in the United States of America. It is thus likely that this work does not fully represent any particular country’s traits of scholarship, and may produce a mixed flavour. It would be my honour and joy if this study were read bearing these aspects in mind.

Most doctoral candidates agree that their dissertations are the products of the joint endeavours of themselves and their supervisors. This

was indeed true of my dissertation. In this sense, I am still very grateful to Rev C Saayman, my supervisor, for his timely advice and suggestions, leading me to rightly appreciate the depth and width of John's Gospel. I fully enjoyed the discussions we had concerning the issues presented in my work. I am also very grateful to Prof. S.J.P.K. Riekert, my co-supervisor, for his guidance and insights related to this project. Without them, this dissertation would not have been completed. I am tremendously indebted to them, although I bear full responsibility for the errors and inadequacies contained in this work.

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NOTES ON ARTICLE PERMISSION

This book uses my articles below, in whole or part.

1. The following articles of mine were originally published in *Neotestamentica* and are used with permission.
 - Johannine irony demonstrated in John 9: Part 1. *Neotestamentica* 34(2):361-371, 2000.
 - Johannine irony demonstrated in John 9: Part 2. *Neotestamentica* 34(2):373-387, 2000.
2. The following articles of mine were originally published in *Acta Theologica* and are used with permission.
 - Command or petition?: A speech act analysis of the parents' utterances in John 9:21cd. *Acta Theologica* 20 (2):88-110, 2000.
 - The significance of Jesus' utterance in relation to the Johannine Son of Man: A speech act analysis of John 9:35. *Acta Theologica* 21(1):57-82, 2001.
 - Narrative temporality and Johannine symbolism. *Acta Theologica* 23(2):117-135, 2003.
3. The following article of mine was originally published in *AJBI* and is used with permission.
 - Macrospeech act for John 9. *Annual of the Japanese Biblical Institute* 25/26:49-90, 2001.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON JOHN 9

Since the enigmatic nature of John's Gospel has attracted a great deal of attention from many scholars, numerous studies of this Gospel have been produced. Each endeavour to understand the Gospel demonstrates its own uniqueness, and utilises one of various methodological approaches to suit its particular research purpose. Methodologically, however, modern critical research on this Gospel can be roughly divided into two categories, namely historical approaches and literary approaches, which some scholars further divide into ideological (theological) approaches. One should bear in mind that these categories are merely a simple and provisional depiction of the complex research done on the Gospel. It is thus difficult to classify all works neatly into one of these categories.¹ Since comprehensive bibliographies concerning Johannine research are available to us,² in this section I wish to concentrate more on particular research on John 9.

Recent research on John 9 indicates the same trend. Therefore, studies of John 9 have been conducted either from a historical perspective or from a literary viewpoint. However, literary studies appear to be recently gaining a stronger foothold over historical studies (Stibbe 1993:10). This point will be illustrated in the following paragraphs, starting with historical research.³

One of the most important monographs in Johannine scholarship and in studies of John 9 is certainly Martyn's book ([1968] 1979), *History and theology in the Fourth Gospel*.⁴ In part one of his book, Martyn particularly examines the story of the blind man to form his central thesis that the struggle of the Johannine community with the synagogue shaped this

1 For a view which considers these two methods mutually exclusive, cf. comments by Frye 1957:315; Ryken 1974:27, 39; Gros Louis 1982:13, 20; Kingsbury 1986:1; Powell 1990:96; De Boer 1992:38; Stibbe (ed.) 1993:1. Since the 1990s, another trend that views these two methods as complementary emerged. For more discussions on this, cf. section 2 in this chapter and section 3.4 in Chapter 2.

2 Carson 1983, 1989; Kysar 1985; Smalley 1986; Van Belle 1988; Porter & Gabriel 2013.

3 I wish to point out that the absence of references to works written in languages other than English is not due to negligence, but due to the language problem.

4 The third edition was published in 2003, and is the latest version.

Gospel.⁵ Regarding this thesis, a number of studies refer to John 9.⁶ In this regard, however, very few works construe the text of John 9 itself (e.g., Smith 1986; Rensberger 1988; Menken 2001). Fortna (1970) examines the text of John 9 in relation to the 'signs source' (e.g., Bultmann 1971), and Nicol (1972) investigates the σημεῖα traditions and their Johannine redaction, referring to John 9. Concerning the law in the *Fourth Gospel* (Loader 2002, 2005), Pancaro (1975:1) attempts "to determine the meaning and function given to the Law by Jn and the precise role it plays in the theological structure of his Gospel". In addition, John 9 is construed in relation to Jesus' Sabbath violation and the charge of his false teaching (Lincoln 2000). In his massive monograph, which explores the history, literature and theology of the Johannine community, Painter ([1991] 1993) analyses John 9 in relation to the Light of the world (and the enigmatic Son of Man) to elucidate the quest for the Messiah. In terms of short essays, Porter (1966) argues that John 9:38-39a could be a liturgical addition to the text. In Lieu's (1988) essay, the history of the Johannine community is traced through the theme of blindness. In the process, John 9 is touched upon, because this story is one of only two places in the Gospel in which the term *blindness* is explicitly stated.⁷

In contrast to historical studies, an increasing amount of research on John 9 in recent years constitutes literary-oriented studies. The majority of these works fundamentally follow Culpepper's (1983) literary and narrative approach to John's Gospel described in his book, *Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A study in literary design*. This is still the fundamental textbook for such studies (cf. Thatcher & Moore 2008). According to his aim "to contribute to understanding the gospel as a narrative text, what it is, and how it works", Culpepper (1983:5) investigates the Gospel, including John 9, in terms of the narrative aspects: narrator, narrative time, plot, characters, implicit commentary, and the implied reader. A few critics make the story of the blind man the main object of their endeavours and attempt to analyse it as a unified narrative. It appears that Resseguie (1982) is one of the first scholars to have done such a literary-critical analysis of John 9. His aim is to demonstrate how the form and content of John 9 are closely interwoven to form a superb literary unity. Basically following Resseguie, Dockery (1988) carries out a narrative discourse study of John 9. Painter (1989) construes John 9 as one of the so-called

5 For a more detailed discussion on this thesis, cf. section 6.1.2 and the section on 'CS' in 9:22 in Chapter 4.

6 E.g., Barrett 1975; Kimelman 1981; Meeks 1985; Freyne 1985; Joubert 1993; Van der Horst 1994; Wenham 1997; De Boer 2001; Olsson 2005; Klink 2007.

7 Hartsock (2008) analyses the story of John 9 in relation to blindness in the ancient world.

rejection stories. Holleran's (1993a, 1993b) set of two articles is still the most extensive treatment of John 9 from a narratological perspective. He deals with the background and presuppositions for a narrative analysis of the text in the first article, and presents an insightful detailed narrative reading in the second one. Du Rand (1991), on the other hand, represents those scholars who regard John 9 and 10 as a literary unit by scrutinising a syntactical and narrative coherence between these two chapters. In works that treat John 9 as part of their analysis, Dodd ([1953] 1968), after reconstructing the background and examining the leading concepts of the Gospel, elucidates its argument and literary structure (cf. O'Day's 1995:509 comment on Dodd). O'Day (1987) explains four Johannine texts from a literary and narrative perspective, as an aid for preaching, in which John 9 is also analysed.

In terms of characterisation as one of the narrative aspects, Bishop (1982) explores some characters' encounter with Jesus in the New Testament, and analyses the blind man as an example. Staley (1991) examines two Johannine miracle stories in John 5 and 9 from the perspective of ancient Hebrew modes of characterisation, and demonstrates how this characterisation enriches our reading of Johannine characters. Furthermore, the title *the Son of Man* can be investigated as a characterisation of Jesus. Moloney (1978) explores the use and meaning of the Johannine Son of Man in the relevant texts, and thus examines John 9 in this regard.⁸ The 'I am' sayings can also be examined in the same way. However, since John 9:5 (cf. v. 9) does not represent the pure formula of these sayings, the text of John 9 is usually not scrutinised (cf. section 3.1.4 in Chapter 4). An exception is Coetzee's (1986) essay concerning the text in relation to John 8. In addition, the following scholars contributed to the current development of research done on Johannine characterisation, and some of them analysed the blind man in the process: Conway (1999, 2002), Beirne (2003), Howard (2006), Bennema (2009) and Skinner (2013). In addition, many critics attempt to research the identity and function of the Jews in the Gospel (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:18). Some of them examine the Jews referred to in John 9 in a separate section in the process.⁹ Perhaps, as a culmination of such character studies in John, a recent publication is worth noting: *Character studies in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative approaches to seventy figures in John* (Hunt et al. 2013).

8 Cf. also Smalley 1969; Pamment 1985; Burkett 1991; Müller 1991; section 8.1.1 in Chapter 4.

9 E.g., Bratcher 1975; De Boer 2001; De Jonge 2001; Resseguie 2001; Brant 2004; Tolmie 2005; Hulen 2009.

In terms of implicit commentary, several scholars emphasise the symbolic value of John 9. In his shorter essay, Painter (1986) starts with a discussion with Haenchen about a source-critical issue in John 9, and proceeds to a theological analysis of the text, referring to the relations between the Johannine community and the synagogue. More importantly, however, his essay deals mostly with his symbolic interpretation of John 9, with reference to Johannine symbols (cf. his other essay on Johannine symbols, Painter 1979). Grigsby (1985) explores the symbolism of Siloam in relation to John's 'living water' motif. Some recent monographs draw from the text of John 9 as part of their research. Koester (1995) deals with Johannine symbolism in the entire Gospel, such as light and darkness, and seeks to reveal its meaning and mystery (cf. Dodd [1953] 1968; section 5 in Chapter 3). Koester's (2006:415-416, 419-420) article again refers to John 9, though not in detail, and describes the dynamics of darkness. Jones (1997) and Ng (2001) attempt to investigate the use and meaning of the symbol of water in the Gospel (cf. section 5.2 in Chapter 3). Coloe (2001) analyses the temple symbolism in the Gospel. On the other hand, Lee (1994:161) deals not with individual symbols but with the entire story of John 9 as the best example of symbolic narrative. She also examines five other symbolic narratives in the Gospel, in which there is a remarkable level of coherence between form and meaning based on the Evangelist's theology. Her basic insight regarding the story of John 9, however, has already been pointed out by Riga (1984:168) who contends that this story "is a symbolic narration of the journey of faith to Christ as the light of the world".

Similar (but not identical) to symbols, the Johannine miracles as signs can also be perceived as implicit commentary.¹⁰ In his very short essay, Mackintosh (1925) compares the miracle stories of John 5 and 9, referring to their synoptic parallels. Wilkinson (1967) and Carroll (1995) analyse Jesus' miracle performed on the blind man from a healing perspective (cf. section 3.1.2 in Chapter 4). Salier (2004) analyses the *semeia* in the Gospel, also referring to John 9.

Still with reference to implicit commentary, Duke studies irony in the Gospel as a literary device that serves as a form of appeal and as a weapon. Duke (1982:243) contends that we cannot grasp the Gospel without a proper understanding of Johannine irony. He considers John 9 to be one of the two great episodes in which irony is skilfully employed, and thus analyses this story from this perspective (cf. section 1.6 in Chapter 2). Others also address irony in John 9, but the scale is limited.¹¹

10 However, the works followed do not necessarily construe John 9 from this viewpoint.

11 E.g., Culpepper 1983:175-176; Kotze 1985:60; Myers 1988:8-9; Botha 1991d:212, 214; Thatcher 1999:74-76; Steyn 2008.

In addition to the above bodies of work, there are other studies of John 9 that fall outside these two categories.¹²

Many commentaries on John's Gospel have also been produced. Although it is difficult to allocate all the commentaries to the two categories, as in the case of the monographs and short essays, I shall attempt to classify them in a footnote for the sake of reference.¹³

The above brief survey of past studies of John 9 is by no means exhaustive, but sufficient since the main purpose, in this instance, is to give an indication of the trends and approaches that have thus far been followed in the study of John 9.

2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Some significant points emerge from the survey in the previous section. *Firstly*, there does not seem to be any monograph-length research on John 9, with the exception of Wright (2009) who offers a figural reading of John 9.¹⁴ This present state indicates that there is a paucity of detailed studies on John 9. *Secondly*, as Painter ([1991] 1993:305) states, "[i]n

12 Poirier (1996) analyses the punctuation in John 9:3 from a linguistic perspective to yield a more cogent reading of the narrative. Menken's (1985) thesis is unique in that he argues that John makes use of numbers of syllables and words for the composition of his Gospel. John 9 is selected as one of five passages to prove this thesis. Brodie (1981) compares the stories of John 9 and 2 Kings 5 as a successive work in following Bostock's (1980) basic insight, and concludes that the similarity of Jesus to Elisha reflects a conscious reworking of the story of Naaman on the part of John. Derrett (1997:254) proposes that the anointing of clay on the blind man's eyes in John 9:6 "is to be explained in the light of Isaiah 6:10 and 20:9". Cho (2006:187-202) employs a relatively longer elucidation of John 9 as an example to make his thesis of Jesus as prophet.

13 The following commentaries emphasise historical aspects: Westcott [1882] 1978; Godet 1893; Strachan 1941; Howard & Gossip 1952; Hoskyns 1947; Barrett 1955; Wiles 1960; Brown 1966; Odeberg 1968; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980; Morris 1971; MacRae 1978; Minear 1984; Haenchen 1984; Beasley-Murray 1987; Bruce [1983] 1994; Carson 1991; Witherington 1995; Keener 2003; Köstenberger 2004; Michaels 2010, and so forth. Commentaries with a specific emphasis on source-critical issues are those of Bultmann (1971) and Temple (1975). Lindars ([1972] 1981) writes a form-critical commentary. The following are literary-oriented commentaries: Olsson 1974; Ellis 1984; Kysar 1984; Countryman 1987; Grayston 1990; Servotte 1992; Stibbe 1993; Brodie 1993; Howard-Brook 1994; O'Day 1995; Culpepper 1998; Brant 2011, and so forth. The following commentaries use integrative methods: Lincoln 2005; Neyrey 2007, and so forth.

14 The purpose and method of his work are clearly different from those of mine.

recent studies John 9 has been used as a crux for the interpretation of the Gospel". Martyn's work and the related studies of his thesis evidently exhibit this fact. Therefore, John 9 is usually used as important evidence or as a point of departure for these discussions. As pointed out earlier, this implies that only a few researchers have attempted to study the passage itself, from a historical point of view, since the publication of Martyn's book. *Thirdly*, although a few works (including commentaries) analyse John 9 from a narratological perspective, there is hardly any linguistic and pragmatic research on the subject. Poirier's (1996) work focuses on only one passage. Du Rand (1991) examines John 9 from the viewpoint of general linguistics and literary science, but his main focus is to explore the coherence between John 9 and 10. Half of his essay also conducts a narratological reading. *Fourthly*, although Johannine irony began to receive scholarly attention since the works of Duke (1982) and Culpepper (1983), irony in John 9, which is often said to be rich in irony, has not yet been fully exposed.¹⁵ Other scholars have also researched Johannine irony, but do not address irony in John 9 at all (e.g., MacRae 1973; O'Day 1986a, 1986b; Moore 1989). In a sense, this situation is ironic. *Fifthly*, Painter ([1991] 1993:5) is of the opinion that "Martyn has demonstrated the dramatic development of scenes in the telling of the story of the healing of the lame man ... and of the blind man. More work needs to be done in this area". The above points can be rephrased as follows:

- a. It appears that there is no monograph-length study of John 9.
- b. It appears that historical studies of John 9, relating to the issues of the Johannine community, have come to an end or are currently exhausted.¹⁶
- c. John 9 has not yet been examined from a linguistic perspective, particularly a pragmatic one. The appreciation of John 9 as dramatic literature will perhaps improve if it is also analysed from this angle.
- d. An analysis of irony in John 9 is especially overdue.

Therefore, the time appears to be ripe for an analysis of John 9 from a pragmatic viewpoint in a detailed study.¹⁷ In this sense, this study can be categorised within a group of studies based on literary approaches. Accordingly, this study is based on the premise that the *Fourth Gospel* in its entirety (and all its parts) should be perceived as a literary whole. However, I further wish to place this present study within a body of research that has

15 It seems that I am the only one thus far who has analysed Johannine irony thoroughly in John 9. Cf. the two articles by Ito 2000b and 2000c in association with this present study.

16 For a more detailed discussion about this, cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:22; cf. also Brodie 1993:6.

17 This was still the case in 2013 when I was preparing this book.

emerged in recent years. This body of work can be distinguished from the two dominant types of studies (those operating from within either historical or literary approaches) and is unique in the following sense: despite the rivalry between historical and literary approaches, some scholars attempt to establish a harmonious relationship between the two approaches, based on the conviction that New Testament scholarship needs to employ both approaches for a comprehensive understanding of the ancient biblical texts. This attempt increasingly gained scholars' attention at the time my dissertation was submitted in 2000, and it has, as Klink (2007:36) mentions, continued to develop: "Over the last decade several studies in the FG have integrated literary and historical methods to the text of John". Culpepper (2008:40) also states: "One of the interesting refrains of the essays ... is the call for dialogue between historical and narrative criticism and for a reconsideration of questions of historicity, composition history, and the Johannine community." According to Stibbe (2008:165), "[o]ne of the tasks for the future is to integrate the diachronic or historical methods of interpretation with more synchronic methods (such as narrative criticism)".¹⁸ Among those scholars who are concerned with this attempt in their studies of the *Fourth Gospel*,¹⁹ the following are representative examples of supporters of a speech act approach: Combrink (1988:195), Saayman (1994, 1995), Motyer (1997a:27-28), and Tovey (1997:23). My present study also seeks to join in this attempt, perhaps not as strongly, but in a more moderate fashion.²⁰

18 This kind of view is further supported by Cho 2006:65-66; Conway 2008:91; Reinhartz 2008:57; as well as in some other articles in Thatcher & Moore (2008) and Bennema 2009:20.

19 E.g., Painter [1991] 1993:5; Du Rand 1991:96; De Boer 1992; Stibbe 1992:1-2, 1993a:18-19; Davies 1992:7; Lee 1994:184; Ball 1996:18; Orchard 1998; Hakola 2005; Lincoln 2005; Cho 2006; Neyrey 2007; Bennema 2009, and so forth. Cf. Smith's 1986 work which is already concerned with both historical and literary aspects. Regarding similar attempts other than those concerned with the Fourth Gospel, cf., e.g., Robbins 1995, 1996; Du Plessis 1996.

20 My attempt is 'moderate', because my speech act approach does not reject historical research. Rather, it respects and uses the results of such research. Furthermore, this approach does not seek to establish a combined method. Rather, I intend to make a small contribution to this new endeavour by specifically using speech act theory, which stresses the importance and role of context in understanding the meaning of a text. The context in this theory can be explored not only at the level of co-text (the literary context), but also at the level of historical context. It has the obvious advantage of attempting to minimise the gap between two approaches. Briefly, this is my contribution to Johannine scholarship. For more discussions on this, cf. section 3.4 in Chapter 2.

In order to discuss the purpose and delineation of this study, I wish to answer an important question first: What kind of literary methodology should be employed? In other words, which method is suitable to meet the need described above in relation to research on John 9, and which method will appear to contribute the most to Johannine scholarship in this regard? As mentioned earlier, current New Testament scholarship focuses more on text-immanent approaches than on historical approaches, which once prevailed in this scholarship. In this trend, which began in the 1970s, new literary approaches gradually gained the attention of many scholars. *Speech act theory* also emerged as a useful exegetical approach, which originated in secular scholarship and developed mainly under the auspices of disciplines such as the philosophy of language, linguistics and pragmatics. A few studies have, in fact, applied this theory in practice, analysing specific biblical texts more comprehensively (cf. Botha 2007:291). This is also true as far as Johannine scholarship is concerned. Accordingly, there is thus far a paucity of work on the Gospel of John. As a matter of fact, I am at this point only aware of the works of Botha (1991a) and Tovey (1997), except for limited and short analyses such as the studies by Wendland (1985), Saayman (1994, 1995) and Tolmie (1995).²¹ Much remains to be done in this respect.

The purpose of this study is, therefore, to analyse, in detail, the text of John 9 from a speech act perspective, with the emphasis on how language functions in order to determine whether or not such an analysis leads to acceptable and valid results as an interpretation of the text.²² However, I would expect that this study could possibly yield a new understanding of the way in which gospel narratives such as John 9 are carefully constructed

21 For a brief review of these works, cf. section 3.3 in Chapter 2.

22 Although it is desirable that John's Gospel in its entirety should be examined through the lens of speech act theory, it is not feasible to do so in a monograph by following my particular approach. Chapter 9 has, therefore, been chosen for the following reasons: 1) the suffering theme described in John 9 (especially vv. 1-7) initially caught my attention because of a personal interest in this area. 2) The structure and content of John 9 is organised beautifully in the dialogue scenes. This means that speech act theory as an approach to human communication could be best utilised in this episode. 3) The historical situation behind John 9 (especially v. 22) appears to be a challenge to this comprehensive approach. 4) Tovey (1997) has already analysed the entire Gospel from a similar speech act perspective. 5) Speech act theory is successful not only on the level of macro-level analysis, but also on the level of micro-level analysis, where the dynamics of human communication are best portrayed. It is my contention that a speech act approach should also be suitable for such a detailed analysis. (For more detailed discussions about points 4 and 5, cf. section 3.3 in Chapter 2.)

by the implied author for the implied reader. The reason for this expectation is twofold.

Firstly, my 'new and different perspective' will give a new understanding of how the communication takes place in the text from a linguistic perspective, and this understanding is new for John 9, because this text has not been analysed as such previously.²³ It is my vague misgiving, however, that this kind of new approach will probably not be satisfactorily appreciated when evaluated from the traditional perspective. If my readers seek 'new' results in the same way in which the traditional approaches have offered so far, they will likely be disappointed. Perhaps a new approach should be evaluated according to a new criterion. Furthermore, speaking of newness, my speech act approach can be considered comparatively new in the sense that it takes historical contexts into account, thus differing from the so-called traditional text-immanent approaches.

The second reason can be drawn from the fact that the speech act works cited earlier proved, in my opinion, that the application of speech act theory to biblical texts has successfully contributed to a better understanding of the texts studied. For instance, the majority of the reviewers of Botha's work, in which he applied this theory to the text of the Samaritan woman in John 4, with special reference to Johannine style, favour his method as innovative and appreciate the way in which he analysed the communication between the implied author and the implied reader. Nobody rejects the study as invalid, despite the fact that some reviewers commented that Botha left some important points untouched (e.g., Rosenblatt 1993:569-570). Another example: Saayman demonstrated the competency and strength of this theory in analysing the controversial text of John 3 as a macrospeech act, discussing crucial points with the major scholars of other approaches. He suggested an alternative reading of the text based on this new perspective. *Lastly*, Du Plessis (1991:136) remarks on the great potential of this theory in *Text and interpretation: New approaches in the criticism of the New Testament*: "The real future of speech act theory in New Testament research ... lie[s] ... in the support the theory gives to the exegesis of individual texts. Especially in the fields of Johannine studies and the Sermon on the Mount a rich harvest may be reaped."

23 As pointed out earlier, the theory I employ in this study is speech act theory in the context of modern literary theory. It was developed by Austin and Searle in the philosophy of language and it has been used to study the function and use of language in speech situations. The theory indicates that speaking an utterance can also be viewed as performing an action of human behaviour. As applied to this study, the theory should be used to analyse mainly the conversations and speeches in the biblical texts from a new and different perspective, differing from the traditional approaches such as historical criticism.

3. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

This study is organised as follows. Chapter 1 offers an introduction to the study. Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical aspects and attempts to establish the methodological framework. In other words, I shall introduce, *first*, the major concepts of speech act theory briefly, with a view as to how these concepts can be utilised in a practical analysis. *Secondly*, I shall describe the ways in which other approaches can be incorporated in this speech act approach. Since speech act theory mainly deals with direct speech acts, some theoretical basis for applying this theory to a narrative text will necessarily be offered. *Thirdly*, I shall examine the advantages and disadvantages of a speech act analysis in order to seek a more plausible way in which to employ this approach. Moreover, I shall briefly survey speech act studies in New Testament scholarship for the purpose of comparison with this study; suggest possible contributions this study could make to Biblical scholarship, and specify the basic reading scheme of this study to scrutinise the text of John 9.

The following chapters will constitute a practical application of the approach, namely a speech act analysis of John 9. In Chapter 3, a contextual survey will be conducted in order to examine John 9 as a whole in terms of the key notions of the approach such as 'Appropriate Conditions', 'the Cooperative Principle', 'Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics', 'Linguistic Assumptions', 'Mutual Contextual Beliefs', and so forth. Chapter 4 will attempt to provide a detailed speech act reading of John 9, and thus constitute the heart of this study. Chapter 5 will conclude the study with my summaries of such a reading.

Before closing this first chapter, I wish to draw my readers' attention to a number of considerations pertaining to the study, namely my terminology, reference system, and technical glosses.

3.1 Considerations

- a. Kysar (1984:12) points out: "The question of the historical Jesus within the narratives and discourses of the Fourth Gospel is fraught with monstrous difficulties". The analysis contained in this study makes no pretence of differentiating between the accurate records of Jesus' life and words and the attribution of them to Jesus by the early church. Instead, this study simply acknowledges Jesus' actions and words as reported in the Gospel.
- b. The whole of John 9 as the unit of analysis will be based on the Nestle-Aland 27th edition of the Greek New Testament. This indicates that text-critical and source-critical factors are fundamentally exempt from this research.

3.2 Terminology

- a. The main character in John 9 is *the blind man*. He is no longer blind after Jesus healed him. For the sake of convenience, however, he is referred to as *the blind man* even after he recovered his sight.
- b. In this study, the terms *the real author* and *the real reader* will refer to the flesh-and-blood author(s) and the flesh-and-blood reader(s) respectively. The simpler forms *the author* and *the reader* will *always* refer to the *implied* author and the *implied* reader respectively (for the definitions of these terms, c.f. section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2).

3.3 Reference system

- a. Basically, I shall use the Harvard reference system with some modification. As a rule, this system completely excludes footnotes, but I shall use them when necessary in order not to interrupt the flow of my argument in the running text, especially whenever such an explanation, in principle, exceeds more than a line.
- b. My insertions in quotations shall be indicated as follows: "... [analysis] ...".
- c. My usage of italics in quotations shall be indicated as follows: "... *analysis* [italics mine] ...". In addition, italicised words and phrases from original sources are maintained.
- d. When a *section number* is mentioned in parenthesis and/or footnote, the number will refer to a section in the same chapter, unless otherwise specified. For example, the phrase 'cf. section 3' refers to section 3 in the same chapter in which the phrase appears, whereas the phrase 'cf. section 3 in Chapter 5' refers to section 3 in a different chapter, in this case, Chapter 5.
- e. In the Bibliography section, the list is recorded according to *Acta Theologica* style.

3.4 Technical glosses and abbreviations

- a. In terms of English, British spelling is chiefly followed. In '-ise/-ize' spelling, preference is given to the '-ise' spelling.
- b. All biblical quotations are taken from the New American Standard Bible, unless specified. For instance, the New Revised Standard Version is used in the section on 'Light and darkness' (section 5.1 in Chapter 3). Biblical verses or phrases in italics indicate my own translations.

c. The following abbreviations will be used in parentheses and footnotes:

cf.	see
v.	verse
vv.	verses
CS	Communicative strategy
GA	General analysis
IA	Illocutionary act
MCB	Mutual contextual belief
PA	Prelocutionary act
The analytical outline	The analytical outline for ironic speech acts
KJV	King James Version
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NIV	New International Version
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
RSV	Revised Standard Version
TEV	Today's English Version

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

To begin with, I shall briefly explain my own speech act approach. As Patte (1988:88) mentions, “speech act theory does not offer any clear method which could be directly applied to the study of the texts”; it is thus crucial to establish one’s own methodological framework before applying this theory. Therefore, I have developed a methodological framework to work with this study.

Since speech act theory itself provides many different views on its main topics,¹ I shall limit myself to utilising primarily Searle’s *speech act theory* in conjunction with *Bach and Harnish’s taxonomy* and *mutual contextual beliefs (MCBs)*, *Grice’s principles of conversation*, *Leech’s pragmatic approach (Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics)*, *Pratt’s display text* and *Van Dijk’s macrospeech-act structures*. Because I have adopted a mixture of theoretical viewpoints into my approach, it will be referred to as ‘my’ speech act approach or analysis to distinguish it from other similar approaches (and it will, of course, NOT be referred to as ‘the’ speech act approach). In addition, since John 9 is abundant in ironic expressions, I have developed an *analytical outline for ironic speech acts* to identify and describe irony from a speech act perspective and to apply it to our text.

In addition, I shall utilise some notions from *colon analysis*, *reader-response criticism* and *narrative criticism*,² including *Chatman’s (1978)*

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- 1 Speech act theory is a theory that generates other theories, and it is, therefore, not easy to discern its boundaries and relationships with other similar disciplines. When Botha (1991a) employs speech act theory for his ‘experimental’ analysis of the pericope of the Samaritan woman in John’s Gospel, he does not explicitly distinguish between approaches from speech act theory and those from linguistics (specifically from pragmatics). He treats them under one heading, speech act theory, as his work indicates. Yet it is not altogether exceptional for speech act theory to include such insights from linguistics, for Searle himself utilises some of them in his arguments, especially in those relating to indirect speech acts. Nevertheless, he does so with a cautionary indication that they do not initially belong to speech act theory.
 - 2 In this sense, this study will, to a certain extent, overlap with the results of studies done within this narratological approach (e.g., Resseguie 1982; Holleran 1993a, 1993b).

narrative-communication model, in order to complement my speech act approach (cf. section 2).

Since the focus of this section is, as mentioned earlier, to set up my own methodological framework formulated from diverse aspects of speech act theory, I shall *not* attempt to provide a detailed presentation of the concepts, history and development of this theory, because the majority of the above theories are well documented.³ However, I shall note some important points and introduce new concepts that need more clarification for my readers. My own framework can be divided into two main categories, namely speech act theory and its related approaches (cf. section 1), and other approaches (cf. section 2).

1. SPEECH ACT THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES

1.1 Speech act theory

In analysing an utterance, Austin ([1962] 1976:109) introduces three constituent elements, namely *locutionary act* – the act of saying something; *illocutionary act* – the act in saying something, and *perlocutionary act* – the act performed by saying something. Speech act analysis mainly deals with the last two acts. An illocutionary act is an utterance performed with illocutionary force such as asserting, arguing, advising, promising, and so forth. A perlocutionary act should be basically limited “to the *intentional* production of effects on (or in) the hearer. Our reason is that only reference to intended effects is necessary to explain the overall rationale of a given speech act” (Bach & Harnish 1979:17). In order to account for a successful performance of a speech act, Searle ([1969] 1980:57-61) sets out an explicit set of conditions, known as *felicity conditions*, introducing four such categories: propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition.

1.1.1 Indirect speech act

In human communication through language, people use both direct and indirect communication. If a speaker makes an utterance to convey one meaning only, there is no indirect speech act involved. However, if the speaker intends to convey more than one meaning and implies more than

3 For these aspects, cf. Austin [1962] 1976, 1985; Searle [1969] 1980, 1976, [1979] 1981, 1985; Grice 1975, 1978; Pratt 1977; Bach & Harnish 1979; Van Dijk 1980, 1981; Amante 1981; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983; Stubbs 1983; Kock 1985; Combrink 1988; White 1988; Haverkate 1990; Du Plessis 1991; Botha 1991a, 1991d, 1991e, 2007; Houston 1993; Yule 1993; Neufeld 1994; Cook 1995; Tovey 1997; Briggs 2001a, 2001b; Wolterstorff 2001; Ward 2002; Childs 2005.

what he says, he utters an indirect speech act. According to Searle ([1979] 1981:115), in an indirect speech act, a speaker “means what he says, but he means something more as well. Thus utterance meaning includes sentence meaning but extends beyond it”. In this analysis, Searle ([1979] 1981:115, 143) indicates that an indirect speech act differs from metaphor and irony. However, a relatively recent approach concerning irony in speech act theory is to consider that “all ironic speech acts are indirect speech acts” (Botha 1991c:227; cf. also Amante 1981:80). This aspect will be clarified later in the section on ‘The analytical outline for ironic speech acts’ (cf. section 1.6).

As far as the mechanism of indirect speech acts is concerned, Searle ([1979] 1981:31) states that “one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another”. In other words, “the utterance has two illocutionary forces” (Searle [1979] 1981:31). However, Leech (1983:38-39) concludes that Searle’s concept of a direct speech act underlying an indirect speech act is an unnecessary construct. His criticism of Searle indicates the existence of an intractable problem in the notion of indirect speech acts, even though Searle already provides *the inferential strategy* as a solution to the problem (cf. Searle [1979] 1981:32-35). Levinson (1983:278) echoes this, stating that the problem of indirect speech acts is a threat to the very existence of the speech act theory.⁴ Naturally, this problem will also influence my speech act analysis of John 9, especially the identification of the occurrence of indirect speech acts in the text. Therefore, I would like to mention a few precautions for dealing with indirect speech acts.

- a. Even if an utterance has more than two illocutionary acts, it does not necessarily mean that it comprises an indirect speech act. This can be explained by Searle’s ([1969] 1980:70) comment: “Both because there are several different dimensions of illocutionary force, and because the same utterance act may be performed with a variety of different intentions, it is important to realize that one and the same utterance may constitute the performance of several different illocutionary acts.”
- b. The context in which an utterance is spoken plays a prominent role in identifying an indirect speech act. The same utterance, which is an indirect speech act in a certain context, may not be an indirect speech act in a different context.
- c. Levinson (1983:270) mentions an essential property of inference theories: “For an utterance to be an *indirect* speech act, there must be an inference-trigger, i.e. some indication that the literal meaning and/or literal force is conversationally inadequate in the context and must be ‘repaired’ by some inference.”

4 For an extended discussion of this problem, cf. Levinson 1983:263-283.

1.2 Taxonomy and mutual contextual beliefs

1.2.1 Taxonomy

As for the classification of illocutionary acts, there is no consensus among speech act theorists due to the lack of a unified categorising standard.⁵ However, since one's classification of a given speech act is indicative of how s/he understands the meaning and use of an utterance, I consider it important to categorise it according to some or other taxonomy. I shall follow Bach and Harnish's taxonomy (1979:39-55), because their taxonomy is, in my opinion, the most comprehensive and the least confusing one.⁶ They present six general categories of illocutionary acts and divide them into *communicative illocutionary acts* and *conventional illocutionary acts* (cf. the diagram of taxonomy in Appendix 1).

1.2.2 Mutual contextual beliefs

Bach and Harnish (1979) redefine, what we generally call, the shared knowledge between speaker and hearer as mutual contextual beliefs (MCBs). They help us understand and interpret an utterance, and give a clue as to the inference the hearer makes. Examples of MCBs are social, cultural, religious knowledge, knowledge of the specific speech situation or of relations between two parties, and so on. Bach and Harnish (1979:4-5) call such "information 'beliefs' rather than 'knowledge', because they need not be true in order to figure in the speaker's intention and the hearer's inference". Furthermore, they introduce three presumptions, which facilitate communication between the speaker and the hearer. These are basically mutual beliefs which "are shared not just between S [speaker] and H [hearer] but among members of the linguistic community at large" (1979:7). Bach and Harnish (1979:7-12) present the following three presumptions: *linguistic presumption*,⁷ *Communicative presumption*,⁸ and *Presumption of literalness*.⁹

5 Botha (1991a:66) rightly observes that "the fact that there is no consensus as to the delineation of different categories or even the number of speech acts must at all times be kept in mind, a flexibility must at all times be observed."

6 However, I may use different taxonomies suggested by other scholars if they suit a certain portion of my analysis better. See Botha's comment above.

7 The mutual belief among the linguistic community presupposes that they are familiar with the language and are able to manage it properly.

8 The mutual belief among the linguistic community presupposes that, when the speaker is saying something to the hearer, "he is doing so with some recognizable illocutionary intent" (Bach & Harnish 1979:7).

9 The mutual belief among the linguistic community presupposes that, if the speaker is saying something literally to the hearer, then he is speaking literally.

1.3 Principles of conversation

In this section, I shall simultaneously introduce Grice's principles of conversation and Leech's pragmatic approach (especially, *Interpersonal* and *Textual Rhetorics*), because these are well-related concepts.

According to Leech (1983:15-17), a speaker has both the illocutionary force and certain social goals in making an utterance. Leech clarifies these social goals in terms of two types of rhetoric: *Interpersonal Rhetoric* and *Textual Rhetoric*. Under each category, he introduces various pragmatic principles and maxims in which he also includes Grice's *Cooperative Principle* (CP) and its *four maxims* (cf. the diagram of *Interpersonal* and *Textual Rhetorics* in Appendix 2). Whenever one or more of these principles and maxims is flouted, an *implicature* will be needed to arrive at the extra meaning of an utterance. Botha (1991a:48) explains: "Implicatures are unstated propositions which a reader is able to deduce from what is actually stated by means of convention, presuppositions and the like. It helps to give explanations of why users of language are able to read "between the lines" as they so often have to do."¹⁰

1.3.1 Cooperative Principle and four maxims

Grice introduced Cooperative Principle (CP) and Maxims of conversation in his article *Logic and conversation* (1975). Grice (1975:45) explains that the Cooperative Principle is a general principle which "participants will be expected (*ceteris paribus*) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged". Briefly, participants recognise "a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction" in conversation (Grice 1975:45). In accordance with the Cooperative Principle, four maxims should also be observed. Grice (1975:45-46) identifies them as follows:

If it is obvious to the hearer that the speaker could not be speaking literally, the hearer has to seek the non-literal meaning of that utterance.

10 Grice (1978:113) construes this implicature by presenting three possible elements: "what is said, what is conventionally implicated, and what is nonconventionally implicated".

Maxim of Quantity,¹¹ Maxim of Quality,¹² Maxim of Relation,¹³ and Maxim of Manner.¹⁴

As far as the above Cooperative Principle and maxims are concerned, I shall mention some remarks. *Firstly*, we should not forget Grice's (1975:46) gloss that "other maxims come into operation *only* [italics mine] on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied". *Secondly*, Leech (1983:84) points out that the maxims of Quality and of Quantity "frequently work in competition with one another" in actual conversation. He further explains that "the amount of information s [speaker] gives is limited by s's wish to avoid telling an untruth" (Leech 1983:84). Grice (1975:49) himself calls this a *clash*. From a logical perspective, this is obvious, yet we must be made aware of it. *Thirdly*, the *flouting* of the maxims "result in a number of so-called figures of speech such as metaphor, hyperbole, meiosis, irony and so on" (Botha 1991a:69; cf. also Grice 1975:53). *Lastly*, Botha (1991a:69) reiterates that the Cooperative Principle and maxims can be both un/intentionally non-fulfilled.¹⁵

1.3.2 Textual Rhetoric

In terms of pragmatics, the word *rhetorical* means "the study of the effective use of language in communication ... [t]he point about the term rhetoric ... is the focus it places on a goal-oriented speech situation, in which s uses language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of h [hearer]" (Leech 1983:15). Leech (1983:15) uses this term as a countable noun, for the Rhetorics are meant for a set of conversational principles in relation to their functions. Since the textual function of language is a means of constructing a text, he adopts Slobin's four principles of Textual Rhetoric (with their maxims) as follows:¹⁶

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- 11 Be economical: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
 - 12 Be sincere. Be true: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
 - 13 Be relevant: "Make your conversational contribution one that will advance the goals either of yourself or of your addressee" (Leech 1983:42).
 - 14 Be perspicuous: Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief. Be orderly.
 - 15 For reference, Grice (1975:49) provides four examples of intentional failures.
 - 16 For a more detailed version of this diagram, cf. the Diagram of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics in Appendix 2.

Principle	Maxim
Processibility	End-focus
	End-weight
	End-scope
Clarity	Transparency
	Ambiguity
Economy	Reduction
Expressivity	Iconicity

1.3.3 Interpersonal Rhetoric

Since the interpersonal function of language is “an expression of one’s attitudes and an influence upon the attitudes and behaviour of the hearer” (Leech 1983:56), this is a means to explain the relationship between sense and force of utterances in human communication.¹⁷ There are seven major principles with various maxims.¹⁸

Principle	Maxim
Cooperative Principle (CP)	Quantity
	Quality
	Relation
	Manner
Politeness Principle (PP)	Tact
	Generosity
	Approbation
	Modesty
	Agreement
	Sympathy
	Phatic
Irony Principle (IP)	n/a

17 Leech (1983:17) defines *sense* as “meaning as semantically determined”, and *force* as “meaning as pragmatically, as well as semantically determined”.

18 For a more detailed version of this diagram, cf. the Diagram of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics in Appendix 2.

Principle	Maxim
Banter Principle (BP)	n/a
Interest Principle	n/a
Pollyanna Principle	n/a
Morality Principle	n/a

I now offer some remarks concerning Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics.

Firstly, Leech (1983:83) points out:

In being polite one is often faced with a CLASH between the CP and the PP so that one has to choose how far to 'trade off' one against the other; but in being ironic, one EXPLOITS the PP in order to uphold, at a remoter level, the CP.

Secondly, some utterances (e.g., orders) are innately impolite, and others (e.g., offers) are innately polite. According to Leech (1983:83-84),

[n]egative politeness therefore consists in minimizing the impoliteness of impolite illocutions, and *positive politeness* consists in maximizing the politeness of polite illocutions [italics mine].

Thirdly, the maxim – Be clear – belongs to the two Rhetorics. The Clarity Principle in Textual Rhetoric “consists in making unambiguous use of the syntax and phonology of the language in order to construct a clear TEXT” (Leech 1983:100). The Manner Maxim in Interpersonal Rhetoric

consists in framing a clear MESSAGE ... which is perspicuous or intelligible in the sense of conveying the intended illocutionary goal to the addressee (Leech 1983:100).

Lastly, the following advice by Du Plessis (1985:31) concerning the Politeness Principle is relevant in this instance: “*In our present study where we deal with texts which are the product of a culture very far removed in time and customs of our own, the principle should be implemented with extreme caution.*” In my opinion, however, this advice is relevant not only to the Politeness Principle, but also to the remaining principles, especially those of Interpersonal Rhetoric.

1.4 Pratt's display text

In her book *Toward a speech act theory of literary discourse*, Pratt (1977) remarks that any types of communication, including literary works, are initiated and utilised because the information contained in such a communication is supposed to be new and/or interesting. She terms these characteristics

assertibility and *tellability*; literary texts that possess such qualities are identified as 'display texts' (Pratt 1977:132-151). Pratt (1977:136) states:

In making an assertion whose relevance is tellability, a speaker is not only reporting but also verbally *displaying* a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating it, evaluating it, and responding to it ... He intends them to share his wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration of the event. Ultimately, it would seem, what he is after is an *interpretation* of the problematic event, an assignment of meaning and value supported by the consensus of himself and his hearers.

This notion of display text is crucial in analysing biblical texts such as John's Gospel, because the Gospels can also be classified as display texts. However, compared with mutual contextual beliefs, which are, to a large extent, socially and culturally determined, appropriateness conditions, assertibility and tellability are more universal in the nature of language communication. Pratt (1977:140) makes an interesting observation concerning tellability:

We expect narrative literary works to deal with people in situations of unusual conflict and stress, unusual for the characters if not for us.

This seems to be exactly what is happening in the story of John 9. In order to ascertain the validity of this assumption, I shall examine the text from this perspective, too.

1.5 Van Dijk's macrospeech-act structures

Our aim is to study how ... complex forms of behaviour are *organized*, both in social and in cognitive terms ... How do people *plan*, *execute*, and *control* complex interaction? How do they *observe*, *understand* or *interpret*, *process*, and *memorize* complex interaction? (Van Dijk 1980:135).

Van Dijk wrote his book *Macrostructures* in 1980 with the intention of addressing these issues. These questions echo the basic questions of speech act theory. In fact, Van Dijk analyses speech acts from his own perspective as *macrospeech acts* or *global speech acts*. This concept is vital as it contributes to our understanding and interpretation of a biblical text as a perfect unit or whole. Van Dijk's (1980:10-11) main points concerning these acts can be summarised as follows:

[M]acrostructures in the theory of social interaction are needed to account for the fact that participants plan, see, interpret, and memorize actions both locally and globally. In communicative

verbal interaction, first of all, this means that we speak of *pragmatic macrostructures* to account for the *global speech act* being carried out by a sequence of speech acts.

Although it is impossible to investigate every detail in this citation, I shall use the above as a basis from which to explore the topic of macrospeech acts further. *Firstly*, I shall examine the question as to what macrostructures are. Thereafter, I shall turn my attention to macrorules, speech act sequences and macrospeech acts.

1.5.1 Macrostructures

Macrostructures are “higher-level semantic or conceptual structures that organize the ‘local’ microstructures of discourse, interaction, and their cognitive processing” (Van Dijk 1980:v). These *microstructures* denote local information such as “the meanings of words, phrases, clauses, and simple actions” (Van Dijk 1980:13) and “all those structures that are processed, or described, at the *local* or short-range level ... In other words, microstructures are the actually and directly ‘expressed’ structures of the discourse” (Van Dijk 1980:29). After defining these terms, Van Dijk (1980:80) proved that “*each macrostructure is entailed by its underlying microstructure*”. How is he able to reach such a conclusion? He has used the *macrorules* to make such a point and utilises it as device. According to Van Dijk, the macrorules are “general rules that link textual propositions with the macropropositions used to define the global topic of a fragment. These rules are a kind of semantic *derivation or inference rules*” (1980:46).¹⁹ By applying the macrorules to microstructures, therefore, we are able to find a global topic (as a macrostructure) that “keeps the text *globally coherent*” (1980:41). It would be no exaggeration to say that this global coherence of a text is the most important notion of macrostructures, for Van Dijk (1980:105) explicitly demonstrates, as their main function, that “macrostructures define the global coherence of a text”.

In order to observe how macrostructures define the global coherence of a text, let us scrutinise a few of their functions. *Firstly*, macrostructures organise complex (micro-) information. *Secondly*, they reduce complex information, defining “the relations between the microlevels and the macrolevels in terms of various *reduction rules*” (Van Dijk 1980:14). *Thirdly*, in the process of defining higher-level or global meaning derived from lower-level meanings, they construct “*new meaning* (i.e., meaning that is not a property of the individual constitutive parts). Hence, as their crucial function, macrostructures allow additional ways of *comprehension* for complex information” (Van Dijk 1980:15). Furthermore, the aspect that

19 For reference, propositions are the “semantic structures defining texts, action, and cognition, both at the micro – and the macrolevel” (Van Dijk 1980:16).

macrostructures may be found in several levels, which is not a function but an essential trait, is noteworthy. Van Dijk (1980:84) mentions the following on this point:

The highest level contains the macropropositions representing the text as a whole that cannot be further reduced by macrorules. The lowest level in general holds for short sequences of sentences (e.g., those of one paragraph) ... Finally, for very short texts (e.g., those consisting of one or two sentences), the macrostructure may be identical with the microstructure (by application of a ZERO rule).

1.5.2 Macrorules

As mentioned earlier, the device Van Dijk uses for seeking macrostructures is macrorules. They play a significant role in his analysis, for without them macrostructures cannot be properly obtained. When he explains them, he also adds a gloss that the “macrorules are abstract semantic mapping or inference rules and not cognitive rules or strategies. They ... merely define the linguistic-semantic notion of a ‘global meaning’ or ‘topic’ of a discourse” (Van Dijk 1980:82). The specifications of these rules are as follows:

- a. *Deletion* (negative nature): “It deletes all those propositions of the text base which are not relevant for the interpretation of other propositions of the discourse” (Van Dijk 1980:46-47). This rule has two subcategories:
 - i. *Weak deletion*: It “deletes irrelevant detail” (Van Dijk 1980:47). The irrelevant details are “details that do not contribute to the construction of a theme or topic” (Van Dijk 1980:47).
 - ii. *Strong deletion*: It deletes “locally relevant detail” (Van Dijk 1980:47) and specific presuppositions of propositions (Van Dijk 1980:82).
- b. *Selection* (positive nature): It “selects from a text base all propositions which *are* interpretation conditions (presuppositions) of other propositions in the text base” (Van Dijk 1980:47). The zero rule can be a variant of this rule.
 - i. *Zero rule*: It “yields the same proposition at a macrolevel which occurs in the microlevel. The ZERO rule is especially important in all kinds of (very) short discourses (e.g., one-sentence discourses) where microstructure and macrostructure simply may coincide” (Van Dijk 1980:49).

- c. *Generalization*: It abstracts “from semantic detail in the respective sentences by constructing a proposition that is conceptually more general” (Van Dijk 1980:47).
- d. *Construction*: It constructs a new proposition, “involving a new predicate to denote the complex events described by the respective propositions of the text” (Van Dijk 1980:48). The “constructed macroproposition [by this rule] is equivalent to the joint sequence of propositions of the text” (Van Dijk 1980:83).

I shall make the following supplementary observations. *Firstly*, the above definitions fail to clarify the difference between Generalization and Construction, because both rules function to construct a new proposition. In Generalization, each proposition entails another proposition. Construction, by contrast, involves the joint sequence of propositions, which entails another proposition (Van Dijk 1980:80). *Secondly*, just as macrostructures have different levels, so macrorules also operate at different levels. “This means that we cannot speak about ‘the’ or ‘one’ macroproposition of a text, but should specify the *level* of each macroproposition” (Van Dijk 1980:49). *Thirdly*, Van Dijk (1980:65) is obviously right when he states, “Crucial ... is that the macrorules select or construct those propositions ... that are indeed socially most *important* or *relevant*”. *Fourthly*, as for the ordering of macrorules, Van Dijk (1980:75) suggests the following provisional sequence when macrorules are applied to the actual analysis: Weak Deletion, Generalization, Construction and Strong Deletion. Since Selection is the positive formulation of the Deletion rule (Van Dijk 1980:47), it thus goes with (Strong) Deletion. Finally, the “generalization or the construction operations ... allow us to obtain an *interpretation* or an *evaluation*” (Van Dijk 1980:74). This is a simple statement, but its implication is profound for our intention: to achieve a sound interpretation of a text.

1.5.3 Speech act sequences and macrospeech acts

The action sequences in relation to speech acts are known as speech act sequences. The latter means that

a number of speech acts of certain language users in the same situation may be taken as a unit of which the member speech acts somehow “belong together,” whereas previous and following speech acts or speech acts by other participants do not belong to the sequence (Van Dijk 1980:181).

What condition determines which speech acts belong together? One decisive factor is *conditional dependence* and this is “one of the typical ways speech acts may be connected in sequence” (Van Dijk 1980:182).

Conditional dependence signifies two major functional relations between speech acts:

- a. *Relative*: Appropriate “conditions may be *relative*: A speech act may not be appropriate in isolation but may function in a sequence of speech acts” (Van Dijk 1980:182) (E.g., a motivation for a request as the next speech act.)
- b. *Functional*:
 - i. *Explanation*: Assertions “about conditions of any kind that are put after other speech acts usually have an explanatory function” (Van Dijk 1980:183).
 - ii. *Conclusion*: Some speech acts “function as *consequences* that may be stated or commanded in the form of conclusions (... with initial so)” (Van Dijk 1980:183).
 - iii. *Correction, Contrast, or Protest* (Van Dijk 1980:183): These relations show that the (subsequent) speech acts that follow the preceding speech acts function as a correction, a contrast, or a protest, respectively.

In these relationships, we could say that “speech act sequences may further be *goal-directed*; that is, the sequence is connected such that each following speech act is accomplished with the purpose and the intention to reach a sequential result or a sequential goal” (Van Dijk 1980:181). If we recognise this intended goal in a speech-acts sequence, “we may apparently assign one *global speech act* to a sequence of speech acts, under certain conditions (e.g., in case other speech acts are subordinate, preparatory, explanatory, or auxiliary)” (Van Dijk 1980:184). Hence, we can conclude that macrospeech acts (or global speech acts) are macrostructures of certain speech-acts sequences of a discourse.

One of the key issues of macrospeech acts can be summed up in the question: “How do we arrive at the global speech act?” (Van Dijk 1980:193). Just as macrostructures may operate at several different levels, so do macrospeech acts and macrorules. The latter function to bring macrospeech acts from the lower level structures. Again, these macrorules serve to “delete irrelevant details and generalize and construct global actions” (Van Dijk 1980:184-185).

In this instance, I wish to make two remarks regarding macrospeech acts. *Firstly*, it is possible for a speaker to perform several macrospeech acts in a conversation or other discourse, because there may be some consecutive stages or phases of the global speech act induced by several turns in the speech-acts sequences (Van Dijk 1980:192). *Secondly*, Van Dijk (1980:192) also points out:

[W]e do not merely have speech acts but speech interaction and therefore either we must say that there is a *primary* global speech act, of one speaker, such that other participant is involved by *cooperation* in the successfulness of this global speech act or we must assume that in conversation each global speech act has also a global counterpart, resuming the speech acts of the other participant.

1.6 Ironic speech acts

Dodd ([1953] 1985:357) praises John 9 as “rich in the tragic irony of which the evangelist is master”. Culpepper (1983:73) maintains that “John 9 with its seven scenes, marks a new level of literary achievement as it ties the discourse material to the sign and weaves the whole into a delightful ironic and dramatic unit”. Duke (1982:180) regards John 9 as one of two great episodes in the *Fourth Gospel*, “in which the author so skillfully employs the full range of his ironic art”. Yet, as Botha (1991) points out in his two articles, *The case of Johannine irony reopened I & II*, astonishingly few criticisms of Johannine irony have been produced thus far, and the identification and description of irony in literary works need vast improvement. Turner (1996:3) identifies with the current consensus on the issue: “The definitions of irony throughout history give a clear picture of confusion concerning the concept”. For this current problematic situation, Botha (1991c:221) suggests an additional perspective, namely that “speech act theory might offer a very helpful method of dealing with irony” and argues in favour thereof. In response to his plea for continued research on the ironies of the *Fourth Gospel* (Botha 1991c:231), *I wish to present a theoretical yet experimental framework as an explanation of irony from a speech act perspective and to apply it to the text of John 9. No critics, according to my knowledge, have employed such an approach to the text of John 9 yet. My approach would, therefore, contribute to Johannine research, if my attempt is indeed the first of its kind.*

Past theoretical discussions on irony in general and from a speech act perspective ²⁰ need not be repeated in this instance, as more detailed discussions are beyond the scope of this present study. In addition, the insights gained from their discussions can be utilised in order to formulate a method. In the light of these points, I wish to present the outline of a methodological framework for identifying and describing irony. Where necessary, I shall provide brief notes afterwards.

20 For these discussions, cf. Muecke [1969] 1980, [1970] 1973; Booth 1974; Amante 1981; Roy 1981; Duke 1982; Culpepper 1983; O’Day 1986; Haverkate 1990; Botha 1991b, 1991c; Abrams 1993, Turner 1996.

Analytical outline for ironic speech acts²¹

A. Preliminary steps for identifying ironic utterances:²²

When you notice that something is not right or true in the literal interpretation (meaning) in an utterance, is there any clue to interpret it differently?

- i. Is there any use of some form of the word 'irony' (Amante 1981:83)? (E.g., Is it not ironic that ...)
- ii. Is there any indication of some contradictions? O'Day (1986:26-29) suggests three areas in which to find this:
 1. In the relationship between text and context, does the text indicate any conflict with mutual contextual beliefs (physical environment)?
 2. In the relationship between text and co-text, does the text indicate any conflict with the context created literally by the implied author (co-text: linguistic environment)?
 3. In the relationship between text and text, is there any disparity evident in different levels of the particular text itself, e.g., any abrupt change in style or tone, the use of words with double meanings and textual ambiguity, and the use of rhetorical questions, understatement, overstatement, parody, paradox, repetition, and metaphor?
- iii. Do you suspect any violation of the sincerity conditions, especially of the Quality Maxim?
- iv. Do you suspect any violation of other Maxims?
- v. Are there more than two illocutionary forces in the utterance?
- vi. Does the utterance observe the Irony Principle?
- vii. Is there any interpreter of the text who suggests or suspects that the utterance is ironic?

If the answer to any of the above questions is 'yes', the utterance may be further analysed using the following steps in order to determine whether it is an ironic speech act or not.

B. Verifying steps for identifying ironic utterances: Go through all the steps below, unless otherwise stated:²³

21 Cf. Appendix 3 for a short version of this outline.

22 O'Day (1986:25) correctly observes that "signals to irony are often difficult to detect, because the essence of irony is to be indirect". O'Day (1986:26) further states that "any catalogue of signals to irony will always be only suggestive, never a definite list". Therefore, my list is only suggestive, not exhaustive, but hopes to provide a useful guideline.

23 When the items of preliminary steps for identifying ironical utterances are compared with those for verifying steps, there are some overlaps. For example,

- i. Identify the following three participants, bearing in mind the two levels of communication (story and text): Ironist, Observers, and Target (or Victim). (One should note that, in the case of situational irony, there is basically no ironist. (cf. Turner 1996:7).
- ii. Classify the utterance according to the types of irony.
 1. Verbal irony: The irony intentionally used by the ironist in his speech.
 2. Situational irony: The irony induced by some disparity or incongruity in an event.
 - a. Dramatic irony: The irony perceived by “the observer’s knowledge of what the victim has yet to find out” (Culpepper 1983:168).
 - b. Irony of events: The irony derived from the outcome of an event which is neither expected nor desired.
 - c. Irony of self-betrayal: The irony resulting from the victim’s utterance or action which unconsciously shows his own ignorance, weakness, errors, or follies.
 - d. Irony of dilemma: The irony occurring in a dilemma or some other impossible situation.
- iii. Find the nature of oppositions (choose one according to the irony concerned):
 1. Counterfactual propositional or lexical oppositions, e.g., a simplex reversal plot (which is the opposition in “which the projected expectations *A* are negated at some point so that a proposition *P* becomes not *P*” (Amante 1981:81).
 2. Pragmatic opposition (any violation of Maxims/conditions). This “opposition occurs when there is a surface mismatch between the experience and the appropriateness of the articulation about the experience” (Roy 1981:413).
- iv. If the utterance falls into the category of situational irony, skip this step iv) and directly go to step v). If the utterance falls into the

some contradictions in the preliminary steps (A-ii) correspond to counterfactual oppositions in verifying steps (B-iii-1). However, they serve different purposes. The items in the preliminary steps are meant to detect an occurrence of irony, since it is, in fact, not easy to find irony in an actual text. The verifying steps substantiate the occurrence of irony by checking and describing the nature and characteristics of that particular irony. In addition to the above two steps, the identification of irony would be completed with the final step.

category of verbal irony, test it by applying the following ironic speech act condition):²⁴

1. Prove it using Propositional Content Conditions (using the reference rules):²⁵
 - a. “In the utterance of the ironic speech act (Ir) the speaker must successfully refer to some entity *X*” (Amante 1981:84).
 - b. “Propositions *P* and *P'* must both identify *X* as their common referent” (Amante 1981:84).
2. Prove it using Preparatory Conditions:
 - a. “The speaker believes the audience can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues in *P* and *P'* and/or contextual clues” (Amante 1981:85).
 - b. “The speaker intends to create a counterfactual speech act” (Amante 1981:85). “This blocks misfires of the type caused by unintentional ironic passages ... But it is difficult to *prove* irony is unintentional or intentional” (Amante 1981:85). Therefore, Amante modifies this rule as follows.
 - c. “The speaker (ironist) takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act” (Amante 1981:85).
3. Prove it using Sincerity Conditions:
 - a. “The Speaker believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain” (Amante 1981:86).

24 Some ironical speech act conditions do not apply to situational irony. Muecke ([1969] 1980:42) mentions: “Situational Irony does not imply an ironist but merely ‘a condition of affairs’ or ‘outcome of events’ which, we add, is seen and felt to be ironic.” In other words, there is generally no speaker in this irony who intentionally makes an ironic utterance. Thus, when this type of irony is analysed, step B-iv) can be omitted from the procedure. In essence, this type of irony is not a case of intentional verbal irony (ironical speech act) with which our speech act analysis is mainly concerned.

25 As far as B-iv-1 is concerned, some conditions which Amante refers to in his article are not mentioned in this outline, because they are either self-evident (such as one of the textual rules: “The Ironic Speech Acts (Ir) is uttered or written as part of some Text” (Amante 1981:81-84) or overlap somehow with other steps (this is the case with some of the propositional content rules within a simplex reversal plot). The outline should not be long and confusing. Therefore, only the reference rules from the propositional content conditions are incorporated into these steps. This general principle is often also applied to the other conditions.

- b. “Thus the sincerity rule, whether it specifies a belief or a desire (as most do), of the illocution is negated and is in some way inoperative” (Amante 1981:86).
- 4. Prove it using Essential Conditions:
 - “The utterance of *Ir* [ironic speech act] counts as the undertaking of deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act” (Amante 1981:88).
- v. Classify the utterance according to the speech act taxonomy:
 - Use the scheme of Bach and Harnish’s (1979) taxonomy. Exclude conventional illocutionary acts (Effectives and Verdictives), because “they are incompatible with ironic interpretation” (Haverkate 1990:89). No sincerity condition applies to them. In addition, “they cannot be performed nonliterary” (Bach & Harnish 1979:118).
- vi. What is the speaker’s intended meaning or message?

If the utterance is successfully analysed according to the above steps, it can be concluded that the utterance is ironic.

- C. Final step in identifying ironic utterances: Determine what perlocutionary act is performed by this ironic utterance. In other words, how does this ironic utterance function in the particular text?

Notes on the outline

Firstly, the question of two or more illocutionary forces in an utterance (see A-v) is included in the preliminary steps because of the understanding that all verbal ironic speech acts are indirect speech acts (Amante 1981:80; Botha 1991c:227). However, Searle ([1979] 1981:115, 143) differentiates indirect speech act from metaphor and irony. His different view may be derived from his definitions of indirect speech acts and irony. According to Searle ([1979] 1981:143), irony is an utterance “where the speaker says one thing but means the opposite of what he says, and indirect speech acts where the speaker says one thing, means what he says, but also means something more”. A more traditional definition of irony is “saying something other than what one means” (Roy 1981:411). In light of these definitions, strictly speaking, irony is different from indirect speech act, as Searle points out. But it is also true that ironic speech act has more than two illocutionary forces. In this limited sense only, as a result, it can be said that all verbal ironies are indirect speech acts.

Secondly, in the item of three participants (B-i) in verifying the steps for identifying ironic utterances, the two rhetorical levels (the character level and the implied author-reader level) in the narrative (cf. section 2.2.1)

should, in my opinion, be distinguished from a so-called double-layered or two-storey phenomenon of irony. The two-storey phenomenon of irony indicates that at “the lower level is the situation either as it appears to the victim of irony (where there is a victim) or as it is deceptively presented by the ironist (where there is an ironist) ... At the upper level is the situation as it appears to the observer or the ironist” (Muecke [1969] 1980:19). New Testament scholars such as Culpepper (1983:165-180), Duke (1982), and O’Day (1986), who have dealt with Johannine irony, do not appear to clearly differentiate these two concepts. This prevents them from adequately accounting for Johannine irony, as Botha (1991b:214-218, 1991c:222) rightly points out. In my understanding, Botha’s (1991b:214) remark that “[i]f we look at the utterance on the level of the characters in the text, the question arises as to where the ‘double storied’ character of this utterance lies”, suggests the necessity of such a distinction for the analysis of irony. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I would like to elucidate some points involving this distinction:

- a. In the case of verbal irony, the location of an ironic utterance goes well with the level of the ironist. For instance, when the ironist is one of the characters in the story, the ironic utterance resides at the level of characters (e.g., John 9:27b).
- b. In the case of situational irony, in which there is basically no ironist, the location of an ironic utterance depends on the level of the observer, for the utterance becomes irony when the observer perceives it as such. For instance, when the observer is the implied reader, the ironic utterance is considered as being at the text level (e.g., John 9:16a).
- c. In the majority of cases of both verbal and situational ironies, these two concepts can overlap. This means that the lower and upper levels in the double-layered phenomenon of irony perfectly correspond to the character and text levels, respectively (e.g., John 9:16a).
- d. In some instances of verbal irony, it is possible that all three participants reside at the character level. Simultaneously, the double-layered phenomenon of irony can be described only in this character level. In a case of self-irony, which is different from the irony of self-betrayal, the ironist can simultaneously be the victim and the observer. This shows the need to distinguish between the two levels of communication and the double-layered phenomenon of irony. This kind of distinction is somewhat similar to Muecke’s distinction between Simple Irony and Double Irony: “It is, I think, profitable to distinguish ‘Simple Irony’, in which the opposition is solely between levels, and ‘Double Irony’ ... in which there is also a more obvious opposition within the lower level” (Muecke [1969] 1980:20).

Furthermore, this double-layered phenomenon of irony becomes a basis for the element of detachment in an ironic situation. The ironist or observer may experience some kind of superiority over the victim. This phenomenon also leads to an important feature of irony: a contrast between appearance and reality. Turner (1996:4) sums up this feature in an interesting way, stating that “the ironist presents an appearance and pretends to be unaware of a reality, while the victim of the irony is unaware of a reality and deceived by an appearance”.

Thirdly, one should note that it is very difficult (cf. B-ii), if not impossible, to achieve a definite classification of irony “because of the very dynamic and flexible character of irony” (Turner 1996:3). This character causes irony to take various forms and to be still developing in terms of its conceptualisation (Turner 1996:4). As illustration, the following are the approximate numbers of types of irony which various critics have identified: four (Haverkate 1990), five (Culpepper 1983:168), six (MacRae 1973), at least seven (Duke 1982; Botha 1991b:210-212), eight (Booth 1974:235), and at least thirty-one (Muecke [1969] 1980:v-vi, 44, 99). Turner (1996:5-7) categorises seven types of irony in Chapter Two of his book, but refers to at least twenty different types in the endnotes. These numbers indicate that a classification of irony is, in fact, a reflection of one’s perspective of the nature, character, function or use of irony. In other words, as Booth (1974:233) proposes, the “domains of irony will be mapped differently depending on one’s critical purposes and principles”. Therefore, my list of the types of irony that will be employed in this study consists of two major types and four subtypes. It reflects my purpose of analysing a biblical narrative as literature. Since the list is not a closed one, other types may sometimes be utilised for more clarification. The ensuing paragraph describes such an example.

Culpepper (1996:194) states that the issue as to whether Johannine irony is stable or unstable has become pivotal in its interpretation. Booth (1974:5-6) first introduces the four marks of stable irony as follows:

- a. It is intended;
- b. It is covert;
- c. It is stable or fixed (the reader is not invited to undermine it with further refutations and reconstructions), and
- d. It is finite (the reconstructed meanings are, in some sense, local and limited).

Johannine irony in the text of John 9 may also be examined from this angle.

As far as propositional and pragmatic oppositions (B-iii) are concerned, Roy's (1981) thesis that the notion of opposition must be extended to include both propositional opposition and pragmatic opposition gives an important insight into our understanding of irony in this instance, especially its nature and occurrence. She indicates that some ironic utterances cannot be sufficiently elucidated by the traditional definition of irony, which basically deals with lexical or propositional opposition, by using the example of "That was a curb you just drove over" (Roy 1981:412). Thus she argues for the need for pragmatic opposition to account adequately for other instances of irony. Botha (1991c:231) supports her, stating that "by also including the notion of pragmatic opposition, it now becomes possible to accurately describe and identify ironies which our previously limited methodology would not allow". Hence, it is necessary to include the aspect of pragmatic opposition for a better understanding of irony.

The final step should determine what kind of perlocution is intended by the ironist, since it is assumed that he has a certain purpose or anticipates some effect on the hearer when he utters an ironic speech act. Otherwise, the ironist does not need to make such an utterance. Amante (1981:91) proposes an interesting observation regarding the effect of an ironic speech act:

Irony is one particular kind of figurative use which does affect illocutionary force: its effect is additive at both the sentence level and at the level of rules. Ironic speech acts are what I call *affective* speech acts ... Affective acts thus are neither pure perlocutions nor pure illocutions; instead they are a blend of both.

Amante (1981:92) also mentions that this affective effect

on the audience of irony is a response of sorts. Irony consists of a variety of contradiction or opposition; the recognition of this state causes the audience to reprocess the illocutionary act. The affective effect draws attention to the language itself and focuses on the message.

Amante's distinctive point, to put it boldly, is that the hearer's primal concern in his response is not the perlocutionary *act*, but the utterance itself. For instance, when the hearer does not really understand an ironic utterance initially, he needs to go back to the same utterance again in order to figure out the real meaning. This is, according to him, not a pure perlocution but a perlocutionary-like effect (Amante 1981:89). This is indeed interesting, but it is, in my opinion, more an explanation of the process of decoding of irony than of the effect of irony. Moreover, Amante (1981: 90-91) implies that the

notion of this affective effect is greatly strengthened by a point of view that some illocutionary acts do not have perlocutions:

Praise usually has no perlocution attached to it in isolation ... *Praise* can take unassociated perlocutions because its speech act rules do not require a future action by either speaker or hearer: it is amenable to contextual 'suggestions'. That is, perlocutions can be added. Perhaps one of the effects of irony is also to add perlocutions to speech acts which normally do not have them.

However, I am of the opinion that praise usually has a certain perlocution – making the hearer feel good. Some critics mention that a promise does not usually have an intended perlocutionary effect (cf. Austin [1962] 1976:126; Searle [1969] 1980:71). Others claim that the perlocution of promise can be that the speaker intends the hearer to *believe* that his utterance obligates him to do something (Bach & Harnish 1979:50). I would opt for the latter view. However, speech act theorists such as Austin ([1962] 1976:110), Cohen (1973), Leech (1983:226) and Levinson (1983:237) debate *the issue of the relationship between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts*. Therefore, it would be premature to use it in this present study, even though the notion of affective speech acts is worth considering. It is important for this study that the effect of irony can still be discussed within the framework of the notion of perlocutionary acts. An ironic speech act is indeed designed to achieve a certain purpose.

Function and use of irony

As to the function and use of irony in John's Gospel or generally, some scholars have made the following statements:

- Muecke ([1969] 1980:232): Irony as a rhetorical device to enforce one's meaning, a satiric device to attack, and a heuristic device to make one's interpretation clearer.
- Roy (1981:409): Irony as "an individual, or psychological, strategy of control, and as a social device for group cohesiveness".
- Duke (1982:56-65): Irony as appeal and weapon.
- Culpepper (1983:180): Irony as "a net in which readers are caught and drawn to the evangelist's theology and faith".
- O'Day (1986:30): Irony as a way of involving readers in the communication process of the text.
- O'Day (1986:31): Irony as "a mode of revelatory language. It reveals by asking the reader to make judgments and decisions".

- Botha (1991c:230): Irony as “a device for controlling and manipulating readers”.
- Turner (1996:47): Irony as “a means of expressing frustration, fear and antagonism”.
- Turner (1996:47): Irony as deconstruction and reconstruction.

Lastly, in the actual analysis of ironic utterances, the order of the steps, as specified, should be followed. However, the procedure may perhaps not be followed exactly in all instances, because an analysis of irony is not as simple as it would seem from the above. It may sometimes be impossible to maintain the intended order. It is hoped that the analytical outline will show what kind of elements of irony must be considered in the actual analysis, and that should be the main purpose for this outline.

1.7 Conclusion

In this section, I have presented the basic concept of speech act theory and provided some relevant insights from linguistics, especially from pragmatics, in order to utilise my approach for an analysis of biblical texts with the emphasis on language functions and meanings. One should bear in mind, however, the basic difference between the analysis and the meaning of an utterance. Roughly speaking, Austin and Searle analyse *utterance* and introduce three different kinds of acts to describe it, whereas Grice and Leech deal mainly with the *meaning of utterance*. They identify two kinds of meanings: literal-specific meaning, and implicature (Grice) or pragmatic force (Leech). The subtle yet basic difference between the two parties is derived from their different perspectives. Hence, speech act theory itself contains a range of differing views on main topics. Therefore, the discussion in this instance will not be exhaustive. It is hoped, however, that the methodological concepts introduced in this section will provide a sufficient basis to analyse a given text. In conclusion, I shall sum up the thesis of my speech act analysis in the following question: How does the implied author write an account (or make an utterance) in order that his intention may be recognised by the implied reader and that his intended result may be achieved on the same reader?

2. INCORPORATION OF OTHER APPROACHES

In this section, I shall not focus on the concepts, history and development of the approaches I wish to utilise, but rather on the formulation of part of the theoretical framework for the speech act analysis thus far proposed. I shall, therefore, emphasise how some notions from other approaches can be employed for the approach followed in this study, providing brief

definitions and indicating limitations of those concepts. In this limited sense only, I shall discuss colon analysis, narrative criticism, reader-response criticism and social-scientific criticism.

2.1 Colon analysis

In my speech act reading of John 9 (cf. Chapter 4), I shall present structural analysis charts (in the sections on 'Overview and structural analysis chart') based on colon analysis, which has become known as South African discourse analysis. As Snyman (1991:89) points out, however, "the description must not be absolutised as though it represents *the* structure of a text ... It rather represents no more than the exegete's interpretation of the structure of the text". Therefore, the analysis in the sections on 'Overview and structural analysis chart' merely shows one possible way of seeing a structure of the given text. For the purpose of this study, I shall pay more attention to the analysis of the surface structure of the text, and this will be reflected in the structural analysis charts.²⁶

2.1.1 Basic procedures

Although the actual analysis seems to be rather complicated, the steps involved in implementing this colon analysis are rather simple. To start with, the text will be divided into basic structural units called *cola* (singular, *colon*). Pelser and others (1992:i) state:

The basic element of this method is the *colon* as the smallest semantic unit of discourse, consisting of a *noun phrase* and a *verb phrase* which can either be explicitly or implicitly present in the surface structure. In

26 Colon analysis is flexible in the sense that the scholar's choice of emphasis, whether considering syntactic or semantic aspects of the text to be more relevant and important to the specific purpose of his study, can be accommodated. This is incidentally attested by the way in which scholars define the term *colon*. Louw (1982:95), the chief exponent of colon analysis, defines the term *colon* "quite specifically in terms of syntactic structure". Yet he makes it clear that the ultimate purpose of this analysis is primarily semantic (Louw 1982:95). Louw himself admits that some people may experience some difficulties initially, for example in terms of its superficial discrepancy. Some analysts define the term *colon* as a syntactical or grammatical unit (e.g., Louw 1982:95; Kruger 1982:2; Black 1987:176; Lemmer 1988:41; Tolmie 1993:403), while others consider it more of a semantic unit (e.g., Riekert 1981:7-10, 1983:29-34; Pelser *et al.* 1992:i). This is also confirmed by the fact that, although Louw (1982:73-80) and Kruger (1982:4-5) seem to place more importance on (semantic) deep structure in this analysis than on (syntactic) surface structure, Combrink (1979:3), Snyman (1991:87) and Tolmie (1993:403) state that the aim is mainly to analyse the surface structure of a text.

a more complex form both these components of the colon can be elaborated or qualified respectively by means of embedded adjectival or adverbial sentences, clauses, and phrases, provided that they are grammatically linked to one aspect only – either to the noun or to the verb phrase.

The second step will be to demarcate the cola into units, clusters, or pericopes – basically according to semantic contents. In order to indicate the semantic and/or syntactic relations between cola and within a colon,²⁷ lines will be drawn to the left of the text. To the right of the text, another line will be drawn to show the cluster divisions as well as some rhetorical features. When the various semantic relationships are discussed, stylistic and structure markers (Snyman 1991:90), and the systematic outline developed by Nida and others (1983:102-103) can be utilised. In dealing with cohesion, the theme or pivotal point of a cluster or unit also needs to be identified.

The final step will be a synthesis based on the previous steps. In this instance, I shall describe the relationships between the clusters, and attempt to evaluate the cohesion of the entire text, in particular.

2.1.2 Explanation of the numbering system used in the schematic presentations

The whole numbers or integers show main clauses, and the decimal fractions show subordinate clauses. There are some cases in which the decimal fractions plus asterisks (*) also express main clauses. The number used for verse reference is basically accompanied by the indicator verse (e.g., v. 1), except for the customary indicator such as 9:1. Regarding the other features, the parenthesis { } indicates an ellipsis, and a word inside the parenthesis is my insertion. The line of five dots indicates that some words have been omitted in that particular position in order to describe a syntactical relationship more clearly. In these instances, the missing words are usually supplied in the expansion that follows. Grammatical (word) analysis is not generally done on repeated words. This also applies to related words derived from the same root word in Greek, unless they are significant enough to be noted.

27 When the relationships between cola are discussed, as Tolmie (1992:15) states, “it is important to note that no consistent approach is used by the scholars practising discourse analysis” (for such an example, cf. *Neotestamentica* 11). Furthermore, consistency in the schematic presentation of an analysis is not always possible (Kruger 1982:2). However, one should at least attempt to do one’s best in this respect.

2.2 Narrative criticism

The overall aim of narrative criticism for the study of the *Fourth Gospel* is, as Culpepper (1983:5) states, “to contribute to understanding the gospel as a narrative text, what it is, and how it works”, presupposing that the Gospel of John is a unified narrative. Therefore, my speech act analysis on the text of Chapter 9, which has a similar purpose, will benefit greatly from some concepts offered by this narrative-critical approach.²⁸

The text of John 9 is perceived as part of a narrative consisting of *story* and *discourse*. Chatman (1978:23) defines these terms as follows: “Story is the content of the narrative expression, while discourse is the form of that expression”. Kingsbury (1986:2) puts those terms in more simple words: “the ‘story’ is ‘what’ is told, whereas the ‘discourse’ is ‘how’ the story is told”. From this angle, in my opinion, the *story* of John’s Gospel depicts the life of Jesus, the Son of God, from his pre-existence glory to his final glorification, with specific emphasis on his earthly life. The *discourse* of this Gospel is how this story of Jesus’ life is told, expressed, and communicated.²⁹


2.2.1 Rhetorical levels and associated personages

The narrative-communication model

Since a “narrative is a communication” (Chatman 1978:28) between two parties, the identification of sender (authors) and receiver (readers) in the narrative text becomes essential for our study. For this identification, I shall present my own model for which I am indebted to Chatman (1978:151) and Staley (1988:22).

28 For recent developments and discussions of Narrative Criticism, cf., e.g., Resseguie 2005; Merenlahti 2005; Iverson & Skinner 2011; Soulen & Soulen 2011.

29 The term ‘discourse’ is, as Culpepper (1983:53, footnote 2) points out, frequently used among Johannine scholars to designate a text of monologue and dialogue (e.g., the farewell discourse). The term should, therefore, be used with caution. In this study, I will from now on use the term ‘discourse’ in the usual senses, such as monologues, unless otherwise specified.



Basically, the narrative world inside the box is the object of my analysis. In this instance, it is important to remember three glosses. *Firstly*, all the personages in the box are fictional and are not referred to as flesh-and-blood individuals.³⁰ *Secondly*, since there seems to be no practical advantage of making a distinction between implied reader and narratee,³¹ as far as the understanding of our text is concerned, I shall not employ the notion of narratee.³² *Finally*, as Botha (1991a:115, 1991d, 1991e) points out, it is important to distinguish between *the implied author-reader level*, which is sometimes called *the text level*, and *the character level or story level* in the text analysis.

Real author and real reader

The term *real author* will be used to indicate the flesh-and-blood author responsible for writing and completing the finished form of narrative accounts of John's Gospel, including editors, if any. Conventionally, the real author of John's Gospel is often referred to as *the Fourth Evangelist* (Du Rand 1994:14). The real author of this Gospel has not yet been

30 For discussions of these terms, cf. Iser 1974; Chatman 1978; Culpepper 1983; Petersen 1984; Du Plessis 1985; Lategan 1985, 1991; Du Rand 1986; Combrink 1988; Van Tilborg 1989; Botha 1990b, 1991a; Lemmer 1991; Van Aarde 1991; Tolmie 1995; Du Plessis 1996; Semeia 48.

31 Staley (1988:43) defines *narratees* as "the ones to whom narrators address comments"the , and they, like narrator, are optional.

32 In fact, as Staley (1988:13, 43) points out, Culpepper's treatment of the implied reader in relation to the narratee is perplexing. Staley (1988:41) indicates that it is difficult to differentiate implied reader from narratee. Yet he himself tries to establish their differences according to their knowledge at a given moment in the story (Staley 1988:41-45), and "the rhetorical effects of extradiegetic-heterodiegetic narrators and their narratees" (Staley 1988:46). Ultimately, he sees no reason in making a distinction between implied reader and narratee in his "future discussions" (Staley 1988:47; cf. also Koester 1996:7).

identified with unquestionable certainty. The history of the investigation into the authorship displays its difficulties. Although some implications in this regard may be suggested during the course of my speech act analysis, the actual identification of the real author is beyond the scope of this study.

The term *real reader* will be used to refer to any flesh-and-blood reader who reads the text of John's Gospel. While existing since the time of completion of the text until the present, the original historical readers are considered to be those for whom the real author wrote (for such a clue, cf. John 20:31). They can be reconstructed by "other first-century documents ... social and historical knowledge and literary conventions of the time, or ... the reader's role as laid down in the text" (Culpepper 1983:206). The real reader resides at the top rhetorical level with the real author, as mentioned earlier. This is the only rhetorical level located outside the text.

Implied author and implied reader

The *implied author* is a fictional author who is literally created by the real author as his second self and who "must be inferred from the narrative" (Culpepper 1983:16). The implied author has "to educate, entertain, or persuade the implied reader [by using] the text's strategies and manipulative ploys (e.g., the roles of narrator and narratee, characters, focalization, irony, metaphor, allusion)" (Staley 1988:29). Staley (1988:27) states that "the term ... refers most generally to that sense of author which is communicated through the choice of narrative medium, and that which remains in the audience's memory even when the author is absent".

Kingsbury (1986:36) defines the *implied reader* as an "imaginary person in whom the intention of the text is to be thought of as always reaching its fulfillment". He is a fictional reader constructed in the reading process of the text, and he is situated at the same rhetorical level as the implied author, one level lower than the real author-reader level. Every rhetorical device or feature employed by the implied author in the text is aimed at this implied reader. He is, of course, not a hypothetical original reader.³³ In this study, the simpler forms *the author* and *the reader* will always refer to the implied author and the implied reader, respectively.³⁴ In other words, simple forms of 'the author and the reader' will never refer to the flesh-and-blood real author and reader.

33 In this study, the pronouns *he/his/him* instead of *she/her*, especially with reference to the implied author and reader, are used for the sake of convenience alone, and indicates no gender prejudice.

34 I often use the term *John* to denote the implied author. In some instances, *John* will also be used to designate the *Fourth Gospel*.

Narrator and narratee

The *narrator* is the fictional speaker or voice created by the implied author to tell a story, and he is usually situated one rhetorical level lower than the implied author. While his existence may be optional, the narrator does exist in the *Fourth Gospel*. Culpepper (1983:16) points out: “In John, the narrator is undramatized and serves as the voice of the implied author”. He also describes the narrator by using so-called five planes of the narrator’s point of view: omniscient, omnipresent, retrospective, reliable and stereoscopic (Culpepper 1983:20-34). Furthermore, Culpepper (1983:34) defines the relationships between the narrator and Jesus as follows: the “narrator ... serves as an authoritative interpreter of Jesus’ words”. Kingsbury’s (1986:35) comment on Matthew as the narrator can also apply to the narrator in John’s Gospel. In the light of this application, the narrator in John 9 sometimes uses the historical present (e.g., John 9:12, 13, 17) for the double purposes of portraying the character’s action more vividly and having characters interact directly not only with other characters, but also with the reader.

In his analysis of John 4, Botha (1991a:82) predetermines that he follows “Culpepper in not distinguishing between implied author and narrator and between implied reader and narratee ... this would mean that the levels of implied author/reader and narrator/narratee coincide and can thus be analyzed as one”. I would agree with Botha regarding the treatment of the rhetorical levels, but disagree on the distinction between implied author and narrator. In my opinion, the narrator should be distinguished from the implied author in terms of their characteristics, since one of the great differences between the implied author and the narrator is that the narrator “can be ‘seen by’ or ‘shown to’ the reader; implied authors cannot” (Staley 1988:39). *Secondly*, while the narrator is responsible for telling a story, “the implied author can *tell* us nothing. He, or better, *it* has no voice, no direct means of communicating. It instructs us silently, through the design of the whole, with all the voices, by all the means it has chosen to let us learn” (Chatman 1978:148; cf. also Lategan 1991:148). Since these observations by Staley and Chatman are found to be valid in this study, it becomes necessary to maintain this distinction for the analysis of John 9. In this analysis, however, my view is that the narrator and the implied author belong to the same rhetorical level. After all, the narrator is a voice of the implied author.

Characters

Character is the last term of the communication model to be defined. “The term ‘character’ refers to a category of existents which inhabit the story world of a narrative and mimic human beings” (Staley 1988:47).

In order for any narrative to be successful, convincing characterisation is necessary. Thus characterisation “has to do with the ways in which an author brings characters to life in a narrative” (Kingsbury 1986:9). In contrast to his treatment of narratee, Culpepper’s (1983:101-148) observations on characters in John are very insightful and helpful. He speaks of how the reader should view the characters, such as that the reader should “consider the characters in terms of their commissions, plot functions, and representational value” (Culpepper 1983:102), or that in “John’s narrative world the individuality of all the characters except Jesus is determined by their encounter with Jesus” (Culpepper 1983:104). In fact, his seven categories of characters based on their responses to Jesus are very informative (Culpepper 1983:146-148). For instance, the blind man in Chapter 9 belongs to the fourth category of belief in Jesus’ words.

2.3 Reader-response criticism

Lategan (1991:151) comments on reader-response criticism: “The importance of this approach is that it creates an intense awareness of the reading process and provides a framework within which the diverse aspects of this process can be integrated.” Therefore, one of the most important goals of this approach is to interpret the text from the perspective of the temporal quality of narrative and to elucidate its rhetorical effects on the reader (cf. Staley 1988:8-9). Based on this observation, I wish to employ two concepts from this approach, namely the temporal quality of narrative and the victimisation of the reader.

2.3.1 Temporal quality of narrative

A central contribution of reader-response criticism is the interpretation of the text through the analysis of *narrative temporality* or *linearity*. Critics make note of and/or use this linearity trait.³⁵ The notions of narrative temporality and linearity can be best explained in relation to a significant difference between implied author and implied reader (Tolmie 1995:20, 39-40, 1999:8-9). While the implied author knows the whole story at any given moment, the implied reader only knows what he has read up to the given time (Staley 1988:35). This can also become an important aspect in a speech act analysis.³⁶ Therefore, when dealing with the text of John 9, I shall

35 See Iser 1974; Rimmon-Kenan [1983] 1994; Culpepper 1983; Resseguie 1982; Staley 1988; Van Tilborg 1989; Botha 1991a; Tolmie 1995; Estes 2008.

36 Botha (1991a:85) states the following in relation to his analysis of the text of John 4: “The amount of information available to the readers at this stage in the narrative must be kept in mind if one is to analyze the speech acts and their perlocutionary effects in the fourth chapter adequately.”

assume that the implied reader is perfectly aware of what has happened in the story up to the ninth chapter, including a vast amount of information given in the Prologue (which the characters in the story do not possess).

There are a few interesting functions of narrative temporality. *Firstly*, in relation to my last remark, Staley (1988:47) makes the fascinating observation that one “of the major effects of a text’s rhetoric and of our enjoyment in reading comes precisely from the interplay between the characters’ knowledge and that of the implied reader”. As will be noted, this interplay becomes a logical basis upon which the implied author builds most of the ironies in the text. *Secondly*, this temporality or linearity creates the rhetorical devices of suspense and astonishment (Staley 1988:34).

2.3.2 Victimisation of the implied reader

Another significant contribution of reader-response criticism to the study of the *Fourth Gospel* indicates that the relationship between implied author and implied reader is far from simple (Tolmie 1995:48-49). Staley (1988) illustrated the complex nature of their relationship, especially through the technique known as *reader victimisation* or *reader entrapment*: at an initial stage, the implied author gives the implied reader only limited information about the story so that certain knowledge, perspectives or expectations may be formed in the mind of the implied reader. In the next stage, additional significant information is revealed to the implied reader with the purpose of correcting his first perspective or expectation. This correction leads to the final stage where the implied author wins back the allegiance of the implied reader once again. Hence, the implied reader is forcefully guided towards the goal that the implied author intends to achieve in the communication. When this literary device of reader victimisation is used in the texts, it is usually associated with other literary devices such as irony and/or misunderstanding (cf. Botha 1990b:45; Thatcher 1999:55). In my study of this Gospel, I assume that the implied author uses this technique in order to guide the implied reader to a higher and deeper dimension of faith.

2.4 Historical criticism

The relationship between historical criticism and my speech act analysis is not identical to the relationship described thus far. The main concern of this relationship is not with the utilisation of some methodological concepts for my theoretical framework, but with the results or insights gained from historical investigation for a better understanding of the text. The reason is that, as mentioned earlier, a speech act approach emphasises the importance of contexts such as historical, social, cultural, religious, linguistic,

literary, and so on. Accordingly, it can accommodate and apply, instead of discard, insights from other approaches such as historical criticism. In particular, some valuable data concerning the Palestinian society of the New Testament times from social-scientific criticism will be of great assistance.

For the sake of clarity, the term *historical criticism* in this study does not point to any specific approach such as a source-critical approach or a form-critical approach, and is thus used as an umbrella term to designate historical approaches, in general, as opposed to literary approaches. Speaking of contrast, the fact that a speech act approach should deal with social and historical contexts suggests that this approach operates on a premise that differs from previous literary approaches such as structuralism. It has the obvious advantage of attempting to minimise the gap between two approaches (cf. also Ashton 1994:208), “particularly when ... the focus remains on the finished form of the document” (De Boer 1992:41). White (1988b:54) states that “because of the importance of felicity conditions, a speech act theory of literature would have to place Biblical literature in its social and even historical context, thereby bringing together the literary and historical perspectives”. I wish to make a meaningful contribution to recent endeavours that attempt to integrate different methodological approaches in order to obtain a more comprehensive exegetical approach. In my observation, as mentioned earlier, this endeavour is currently gaining more strength (cf. section 2 in Chapter 1). However, my position regarding the essential question of which is supposed to be the dominant factor in the interpretation of the text, the internal information in the text or the contextual information outside the text, remains identical to that of Du Plessis (1996:343) who states that the internal material is the conclusive factor.

2.4.1 Social-scientific criticism

With reference to social-scientific criticism,³⁷ I would like to mention three remarks for this study. *Firstly*, since I am not an expert on this form of criticism, I shall follow Elliot’s (1993:35) view of social-scientific criticism as one of the historical-critical methods. It is, therefore, placed under the heading of historical criticism. One should bear in mind, however, that it has been expanded and improved from historical-critical approaches

37 For its theory and practice, including its related works, cf. Troeltsch [1911] 1931; Edersheim [1967] 1976, [1971] 1981; Jeremias [1969] 1975; Weber 1978; Malina 1981, 1982, 1984, 1996; Meeks 1983; Theissen 1983; Kee 1986; Stambaugh & Balch 1986; Borg [1987] 1991; Mouton & Marais [1988] 1990; Pilch 1988; Craffert 1989; Elliott 1993; Esler 1995; Osiek & Balch 1997; Botha 1999, numerous articles in *Biblical Theology Bulletin*, and *Semeia* 35 (1986) and *Semeia* 37 (1986).

(Elliot 1993:13, 15) and that “there are a number of significant differences between these two approaches” (Botha 1999:2).³⁸

Secondly, one of the most important facets of this criticism is “the fact that it utilizes models and model building” (Botha 1999:4). However, I do not intend to use models for my analysis, because it is beyond the scope of this study. I do intend to apply its insightful findings to it simply, yet carefully, for a better understanding of a given text (cf. some cautionary remarks in Du Plessis (1996)).

Thirdly, I wish to draw attention to the relationship between social-scientific criticism and the field of Johannine studies. Since the emergence of this criticism in the mid-1970s (Segovia 1995:374), many studies have been published in Johannine scholarship.³⁹ Neyrey’s studies in John’s Gospel probably require separate attention, for he has already published several insightful works in this field (1981, 1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2007). If one includes the literature on the sectarian nature and social history of the Johannine community, the list will be extensive. Thus Segovia (1995:375) concludes that “cultural criticism has had a major impact on Johannine studies”. On the other hand, Botha (1999:1) views the current situation in a different light: “The social scientific revolution in New Testament studies has hardly impacted on Johannine studies at all.” In fact, compared to a considerable number of studies this criticism has produced for the other areas in the New Testament, such as Synoptic Gospels introduced in Elliott’s (1993:138-174) comprehensive bibliographies, Johannine studies occupy only a small portion of the list. The way in which this relationship is judged ultimately depends on one’s point of view. In my opinion, however, a great deal of work can still be done to contribute to Johannine scholarship by exploring social-scientific criticism (for a recent comment on this, cf. Kysar 2002:29ff.).

38 Cf. Botha 1999:2-4 for the contrasts he points out.

39 To name but a few, the social-scientific works which principally deal with the *Fourth Gospel* are Meeks 1972; Woll 1981; Malina 1985, 1994; Domeris 1988; Domeris & Wortley 1988; Rensberger 1988; Karris 1990; Von Wahlde 1995; Van Tilborg 1996, Malina & Rohrbaugh 1998. The recent publication “*What is John?*”, vol. 2 (Segovia 1998) has added several articles to the list (Neyrey 1998; Reinhartz 1998; Rensberger 1998; Schottroff 1998; Segovia 1998). Those works which pay attention to the cultural and social of the Gospel or touch upon some parts of the Gospel text to illustrate theoretical aspects of the criticism in a section of their works are Fiorenza 1983; De Klerk & Schnell 1987; Domeris 1991; Cassidy 1992; Esler 1994; Koester 1995; Robbins 1996, and so forth.

3. SPEECH ACT ANALYSIS

3.1 Advantages of speech act analysis

Although various scholars, who believed in its potential for their chosen research fields, have developed and utilised speech act theory for the past fifty years, New Testament scholarship, in general, and Johannine scholarship, in particular, have not fully enjoyed its advantages. Since I use this theory as my methodological approach, I shall list some of the advantages in doing so briefly. As Botha (1991e) has already published an insightful article on this topic, my list will be based on his work. However, I shall add some modifications and my own items.

- a. *Unit of analysis:* The basic methodological approach can be the same for analysing a unit regardless of its size, whether it is a single word, a sentence, a paragraph, or an entire document. Therefore, *the text, as a whole or as a small section, can be analysed in a very unified manner.* This brings a sense of consistency to the analysis. I shall illustrate this advantage in terms of microspeech acts and macrospeech acts within the story of John 9 (cf. Chapter 4).
- b. *Significance of context:* Since this approach necessitates the identification and utilisation of specific speech situations in order to elucidate the use and meaning of utterances in a communication process, it recognises the importance of contexts – historical, social, cultural, religious, linguistic, literary, and so on (cf. also Combrink 1988:194). Accordingly, it respects and appreciates, instead of neglecting, insights from other approaches such as historical criticism. The investigation of these contexts will be reflected especially in ‘Contextual survey’ in Chapter 3 and ‘Specific mutual contextual beliefs’ discussed in Chapter 4.
- c. *Text type of analysis:* This approach does not choose any specific text in the analysis. Hence, it can treat all types of literary texts in terms of communication. Botha (1991e:295) contends: “The problematic distinctions between so-called ordinary’ and ‘poetic’ language are no longer valid distinctions in the study of the texts.” Thus this approach has great potential for biblical scholarship as a whole.
- d. *Utilisation of insights from other literary approaches:* As introduced in the last section, I can also utilise additional extra-linguistic insights derived from narratology and reader-response criticism in my speech act analysis. This is due to the fact that some of the sub-purposes or concepts of these approaches and of the speech act approach overlap. For instance, the notion of a perlocutionary act is closely linked to the reader-response analysis in terms of the effect or

- response a text evokes in the reader. Most importantly, they share a common interest in how language functions.
- e. *A new communication analysis*: As this approach claims systematised sets of conditions and principles of human behavior in communication based on the postulate that “speaking a language is engaging in a rule governed form of behavior” (Searle [1969] 1980:22), it provides a communication analysis in a more comprehensive or at least novel way.
 - f. *Weapons of speech act approach*: A speech act approach has descriptive apparatus such as the notions of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts and of implicature, which make “it possible to explain the *process* of how certain meanings are arrived at” in the communication (Botha 1991e:298). For this reason, this approach can furnish a clearer explanation than the previous formalist approaches which lack appropriate tools to explicate such a process (Botha 1991e:297).
 - g. *Evaluation of utterance*: As this approach deals with an utterance not in terms of true or false, but mainly in terms of success, appropriateness, or effectiveness, a new way of understanding a text is possible. *This creates a different and fresh appreciation of human communication in the texts*. For instance, this approach can even reveal a significance of failed communication between the participants in a dialogue (e.g., cf. section 6.4 in Chapter 4).
 - h. *Responsibilities of author and reader*: In light of the distinctive postulate that speaking a language is a rule-governed behaviour, both author and reader are required to act according to the ‘rules’ in their communication process. As a result, *this approach regards the responsibilities of both author and reader as very important*. This renders a new perspective on their communication. “Readers feel and expect that the writer is under an obligation to make his text worthy of their attention, and they are thus willing to allow the writer some freedom and bring their own behaviour into line with what can be expected of an audience” (Botha 1991e:299). This assures the critic of a text in which every utterance is meaningful in some way or another and worthy of his close attention.
 - i. *Intentionality*: As Botha (1991a:66) and Tovey (1997:78) point out, speech act theory can discuss and highlight the intention of the implied author in the literary work without falling into the trap of “intentional fallacy”, because some kind of intentionality is inherent in the very nature of an illocutionary act. *Such an intentionality can be analysed in this theory in a more responsible way than previously practiced*.

- j. *A new way to examine irony*: Irony is a very powerful literary device. On the other hand, it is also a very complex concept that has confused many readers of literary works. As Botha (1991b, 1991c) convincingly argues, *speech act theory can provide a new tool to understand irony better* (see section 1.6).
- k. *Religious speech acts*: Since all utterances in religious settings can be viewed as religious speech acts, all biblical texts need to be considered religious (speech) acts accordingly (Evans 1963; Patte 1988:92). Historical research focuses mainly on reconstructing the history behind the Gospel as well as that of Jesus and his contemporaries. Literary approaches are primarily concerned with aesthetic literary aspects of the texts. In these trends, *re-appreciating and re-focusing upon the religious nature of biblical texts via a speech act approach could yield new insights in a more comprehensive way, "without falling into the trap of subjectivism"* (Patte 1988:96). The reason for this is that this approach views the intentionality of a text according to the 'rules' (cf. also item i above). Patte (1988:95) states that "using a speech act theory approach means that when studying religious acts and religious discourses, the primary concern should be to account for the subjectivity of the religious practitioners or of the authors of a religious text".
- l. *Language distinction*: From a narratological perspective, Chatman (1978:162-163) recognises another advantage: "The theory of speech acts provides a useful tool for distinguishing the language of the narrator *vis-à-vis* his narrative audience from that of characters *vis-à-vis* each other." What he probably means is that the communication between the narrator and the narratee or the implied reader can be differentiated from that between the characters by means of speech act theory, and especially by an analysis of illocutions. In this distinction, Chatman (1978:165) goes on to point out that the characters reserve a wider range of illocutions than the narrator. It is hoped that the result of speech acts used in the story of John 9 will prove this point (cf. section 1.2 in Chapter 5).
- m. *Tone of narrative*: According to Gros Louis, one of the major concerns of literary critics is the notion of tone. He defines this notion as "the narrative's relation to its subject or its attitude to its subject, as well as the narrative's relation to us as audience. Is the narrative condescending or apologetic? Does it seek to arouse our interest in a topic, to excite our emotions, to compel us to action, to make us sad or happy?" (Gros Louis 1982:18). In this regard, a speech act analysis is very useful.

It is hoped that all of the above-mentioned advantages are manifested in this study. This may not necessarily be the case, because the main purpose of this study is not to prove all these advantages, but rather to analyse a specific biblical text from a speech act perspective.

3.2 Disadvantages of speech act analysis

In her book review on Botha's (1991a) monograph, Rosenblatt (1993:570) criticises him for failing to indicate any of the limitations of speech act analysis. Although he hints at a condition on page 63, he never gives any concrete indication. Therefore, her criticism appears valid. Since the last section has presented the advantages of speech act analysis, it is also necessary to outline its disadvantages.

- a. *Diversity within the approach:* Since speech act theory generates other theories (though this may be considered an advantage), it is difficult to discern its boundaries and its relationships with similar disciplines. Botha (1991d:279) comments that "the field of speech act theory is extremely divergent and to some extent very technical with approaches ranging from the language-philosophical to the pragmatic". Therefore, as mentioned earlier, it is crucial to establish one's own methodological framework before actually applying this approach. It is hoped that the methodological framework of this study will give a good example of the possibilities, following in the footsteps of scholars who have previously successfully employed this approach.
- b. *Poor adoption rate:* The above disadvantage has resulted in few biblical scholars being interested in employing this speech act approach, even though they can be informed about the potential or the advantages of this approach (cf. Thiselton 1997:97, footnote 3). Another contributing factor to this poor adoption rate is that this approach does not guarantee to yield particularly new benefits, as Burridge (1993:263) rightly states. It rather confirms the insights that have been noted previously, only from a different angle. While it is true that this happens frequently, it is also true that this approach sometimes demonstrates its distinctiveness and does so in a more intriguing way. I would contend that this is a valuable approach which can yield good results if one faithfully follows the procedures of this method from the beginning. It is hoped, therefore, that this study will encourage other biblical scholars to seriously consider this approach as one of their potential methodologies. Furthermore, the application of this theory inevitably employs the use of technical language. This may be another reason for its poor adoption rate. In fact, the research produced by using speech act theory tends to receive criticism on

this point (e.g., Burrige 1993:263). However, any scientific method perhaps requires some technical terminology and this is especially true of new approaches developed in recent years. Most of the technical terms can be understood without further difficulty, if these are presented more comprehensively. It is hoped that the charts and diagrams accompanying this study, such as 'Diagram of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics', will help the readers of this study in this regard (cf. Appendices).

- c. *Major problems:* Searle ([1979] 1981:vii) identifies the outstanding problematic areas of speech act theory as follows: "metaphor, fiction, indirect speech acts, and a classification of speech acts". I have already briefly touched upon the issues of indirect speech acts and of taxonomy of speech acts in sections 1.1 and 1.2.⁴⁰
- d. *Other problematic issues:* As indicated in section 1.6, there is no clear-cut solution as to *the issue of the relationship between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts* (cf. also Cohen 1973; Stubbs 1983:152). Levinson (1983:237) calls this the issue of "uptake". Hirsch (1976:26) indicates that there is another unresolved tension in this speech act theory, namely that between intentionality and conventionality (cf. also White 1988a:12). In addition, there is the issue of the relations between illocutionary force and illocutionary force indicating device (Stubbs 1983:158). Sperber and Wilson (1986:243-254) mention some problems or limitations of this theory from the viewpoint of their relevance theory. However, in my opinion, not every argument is convincing.⁴¹ More minor problems may exist. However, these issues do not pose any serious problem in the utilisation of this theory. A discussion about these theoretical issues is beyond the scope of this study.
- e. *Not a self-sufficient approach:* It is not surprising that a speech act approach on its own is not perfectly suited to analyse every aspect involved in a study of the texts. In fact, it is best used when other approaches are also applied to provide additional insights. According to Patte (1988:91), "speech act theory and reader criticism are a necessary complement to those approaches which are exclusively text centered".

40 For a discussion of the problems of indirect speech acts, cf. also Levinson 1983:263-276.

41 For a more detailed discussion of this relevance theory, cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986; Blakemore 1992; Gutt 1992; Wilson & Sperber 1992; Wilson 1994; Wendland 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Jucker 1997; Carston & Uchida 1998; Clark 2013.

3.3 Previous New Testament studies utilising speech act theory

As stated earlier, speech act theory does not provide a first-hand, clear-cut methodology. Each critic, therefore, has to establish his own framework to deal with texts. This present study is not the first-time application of speech act theory to the text of John's Gospel. Therefore, it is necessary and profitable to briefly examine previous studies done by several Johannine scholars, as well as some selected works in the remainder of New Testament scholarship.

Presently, speech act theory is used in a handful of studies in Johannine scholarship. Botha's (1991a) research is the first work to use a speech act approach as its main thrust in the studies on John's Gospel. Botha produces this monograph with two aspects, namely to explore Johannine style from a historical, theoretical, and practical point of view, and to attempt a comprehensive speech act reading of a specific pericope, John 4:1-42. His methodology depends on the concepts of Grice (1975), Searle ([1969] 1980), Leech (1983), Bach and Harnish (1979), Pratt (1977), Lanser (1981), and so forth. His reading demonstrates that speech act theory is indeed a very handy tool in understanding the dynamic communication of the text, with some additional insights which the traditional exegetical methods cannot provide. This approach further offers some important observations regarding Johannine style.⁴² Furthermore, in a set of two short essays, Botha (1991b) examines the current situation regarding Johannine irony and raises it as an issue. In his subsequent article, Botha (1991c) suggests an additional perspective which speech act theory might offer as a solution to this problematic situation.

In a series of two shorter studies, Saayman (1994, 1995) approaches the episode of Nicodemus from a speech act perspective (John 3:1-21). This poses a serious interpretational problem. He attempts to suggest a solution to the problem: the coherence of this section can be maintained, because Jesus has a definite goal in the conversation with Nicodemus. He argues for this view by applying the concept of macrospeech acts, which organise microspeech acts in the text. His methodology is based on the concepts of Austin ([1962] 1976), Searle ([1969] 1980), Bach and Harnish (1979), Van Dijk (1980, 1981), and so on.

The main subject of Tovey's (1997:15) monograph is concerned with the Johannine point of view. Tovey (1997:30) has a strong interest in the role and activity of the implied author, and utilises speech act theory to determine the implied author's purpose, which can be inferred from the structure of

42 See also Botha's (1990a) article which is an abstract from his research.

the Gospel. His book does not deal with a specific passage, but analyses the entire Gospel in order to understand the nature and description of its literary speech situation (Tovey 1997:30-31). His methodology mainly depends on Austin (1962), Grice (1975), Searle ([1969] 1980), Pratt (1977) and Lanser (1981). He uses Stanzel's (1984) theoretical (narrative) model instead of Chatman's (1978:30, 52-58).⁴³

The works that utilise speech act theory as part of the research in relation to John's Gospel are the studies of Wendland (1985, 1992) and Tolmie (1995). Wendland's (1985) motivation for writing his book is to explore the best possible approach to the dynamic equivalent translation of the Bible. Since he maintains that "Bible translation is a particular instance of language use in a given speech community" (Wendland 1985:1), the discipline of sociolinguistics appears to contribute mostly to this task. He thus utilises speech act theory as a sociolinguistic method to analyse direct speech or direct discourse of the Bible, for instance, John 4:7-26. In his short essay, Wendland (1992) also examines the Lord's prayer in John 17 from a speech act perspective (as one of his methods). He emphasises the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of Jesus' prayer in the process. In his narratological study, Tolmie (1995:98-117) employs speech act theory, especially Bach and Harnish's taxonomy, for the purpose of classifying the verbal acts found in John 13:1-17:26.

As far as the Johannine Epistles are concerned, in his monograph Neufeld (1994) construes the Christological confessions and ethical exhortations in 1 John by employing speech act theory as a new or alternative approach to this text, because the historical contexts do not provide an adequate basis for a satisfactory interpretation (1994:vii, 2). Neufeld (1994:111, 133-136) argues that the author of 1 John created a specific speech act circumstance so that what the author claimed and wanted to convey to the readers might catch the attention of, and be welcomed by the readers. The author's speech acts had a "rhetorical power to transform the readers' expectations, speech and conduct" (Neufeld 1994:133). His methodological proposal is based on Austin ([1962] 1976) and Evans (1963) in discussion with Derrida (1977a, 1977b). Turning to the Revelation, Thompson (1992) investigates the relationship between the interpretation, and the language and context of this book through 'speech-acts criticism' developed by Skinner (1970).

In the synoptic studies, Thiselton (1970) introduces some facets of speech act theory in his analysis of the parables of Jesus, such as the parable of the Unjust Steward (Lk 16:1-13; cf. also Thiselton 1994).

43 I have already published several articles in relation to speech act analysis on John's Gospel. See Ito 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2009, and 2013.

Du Plessis' (1985) unpublished doctoral dissertation also investigates the textual communication of the relation between sender, parable and receiver in selected synoptic parables, making use mainly of Leech's pragmatic approach. His work proves the usefulness of the notion of Leech's Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics in the communication analysis.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Du Plessis (1988) analyses Luke 12:35-48 from the same speech act perspective, but he focuses more on the concept of implicature to examine Peter's question and Jesus' answer to it. In his short essay, Combrink (1988) theoretically discusses a speech act approach for the purpose of arriving at a responsible reading of biblical texts. His discussion is made in relation to the interpretation of Luke 12:35-48. Cook's (1995) monograph deals with the (macro-) structure and persuasive power of the Gospel of Mark from a perspective of linguistic criticism and speech act theory. Among the methods he employs, his use of the notion of macrospeech act (governing speech act) is very significant in elucidating the Gospel text as a whole, because the understanding of an entire text as a governing speech act sums up the smaller speech acts that make up the whole of the text (Cook 1995:7, 331-333). Unique is his linguistic outline of Mark which is delineated according to its communication frames and several narrative markers (Cook 1995:137-179). Upton (2006) also makes an interesting speech act reading of the three major endings of the Gospel of Mark, comparing them with Xenophon's fictional tale.

As far as New Testament research is concerned, after having studied under Austin, Evans contends that modern theology needs a new logic that deals with non-propositional language, because "God's self-revelation is a self-involving activity ('His Word is claim and promise, gift and demand'), and man's religious language is also a self-involving verbal activity ('obedient, thankful confession and prayer')" (Evans 1963:14; cf. also Briggs 2001a). In order to verify his contention, he employs Austin's theory of performative language to examine the biblical conception of creation, dealing also with its New Testament ideas.

For the introduction of speech act theory or its theoretical discussions for New Testament studies, in his series of two articles, Botha (1991d, 1991e) aims to outline some basic principles of this theory and to explore some possible contributions, which this theory can offer to New Testament exegesis. In his short essay, Botha (1991f) also discusses the issue of style in New Testament research in relation to this theory. More recently, Botha (2007) introduced the overall trends of how biblical scholars employ this theory. In this instance, I should also note that Semeia 41 (1988) devotes an entire issue to the examination of the relationship between speech

44 Cf. also Du Plessis's (1987) article which is derived from this dissertation.

act theory and biblical criticism.⁴⁵ It suggests potential contributions and possible problems when this theory is applied to biblical hermeneutics. Examples of this approach are taken from the Old Testament. This volume includes short essays by, for instance, White, Hancher, Patte and Buss (cf. also Thiselton's works 1974, 1980).

Among the New Testament works, written in languages other than English, which utilise speech act theory, the following studies are worth considering: Aurelio (1977), Arens (1982), Snyman (1983) and Jacobs (1985).

3.4 Contributions and approach of the study

3.4.1 Contributions to be made by the study

From the above brief survey, I wish to make some significant observations with reference to this present study. *Firstly*, in the field of Johannine scholarship, particularly in research on John's Gospel, nine out of ten studies (including this study) that use this approach worldwide appear to have been made in South Africa or the Southern Africa region (one exception is Tovey's work). As far as the remaining works in New Testament scholarship are concerned, Du Plessis, Combrink, Snyman and Jacobs are also South African. Indeed, linguistic approaches are a strong feature of South African scholarship. It is hoped that this study, conducted primarily in South Africa, will make a small contribution to the scholarship.

Secondly, in the 1980s, speech act analysts tended to utilise speech act theory as "speech act exegesis" (Patte 1988:99-101) to make a detailed analysis or to analyse small segments of biblical texts.⁴⁶ It may be coincidence, but the 'trend' of speech act analysis in New Testament studies in the 1990s seems to place more emphasis on the macro-level or macrospeech acts of biblical texts.⁴⁷ Although this present study also utilises the notion of macrospeech acts to understand the text as a whole, I am equally interested in the analysis of the text in great detail where the dynamics of human communication is portrayed. The interactions between characters in the micro-level often display an intriguing human drama through their individual utterances with intentions, emotions and subtle nuances. This is true of John's Gospel, which is often described as a document of conflict between light and darkness, belief and unbelief. It is my contention that speech act theory is one of the best ways among

45 On this topic, cf. also Briggs 2001b; Wolterstorff 2001; Ward 2002; Childs 2005.

46 For example, cf. the studies of Snyman 1983; Jacobs 1985; Du Plessis (1985, 1987, 1988); Wendland (1985); Botha (1991a).

47 For instance, cf. the works of Saayman 1994, 1995; Neufeld 1994; Cook 1995; Tovey (1997).

modern literary methods to approach a narrative story such as John 9. Therefore, the aim of this study is to continue to demonstrate the validity of this approach and to develop it further by reclaiming its value for a detailed analysis of biblical texts (cf. Combrink 1988:194; Botha 1991f:81-82). To my knowledge, John 9 has never been elucidated as such previously.

Thirdly, with reference to the attempt to utilise historical and literary approaches simultaneously, as indicated earlier (cf. section 2 in Chapter 1), this present study also seeks to join this attempt to a moderate degree, because my speech act approach does not reject historical research; rather, it respects and uses the results of such an endeavour, and because this approach does not seek to establish a combined method vigorously from the two. One of the aims in this study is, rather, to determine whether or not this speech act approach brings the same kind of result in the interpretation of John's Gospel, especially John 9, as that of other historical approaches such as Martyn's thesis. My attempt is, therefore, not as strong as that of Stibbe (1992), but it goes beyond the boundary of the text-immanent approach. More clarification is required in this instance.

It seems that there may be two ways, from a perspective of literary approaches, to attempt to show a harmonious relationship in which literary and historical approaches can complement each other in the text analysis. One is that a literary critic consciously uses historical contexts suggested from the results of historical research for the interpretation of a given text (Stibbe 1993b:6). Stibbe's works are good examples of this (e.g., Stibbe 1992, 1993a:106-109, 112). The second way is that, after a careful literary analysis, a critic can suggest a possible real-world situation. Kingsbury (1988:459) states:

[O]ne of the principal contributions narrative criticism can make to Gospel studies is perhaps elementary but crucial: to alert the interpreter both to the literary existence of the 'world of the story' and to the importance of scrutinizing it. Once one fully understands the 'world of the story', one can then move to a reconstruction of the 'world of the evangelist'.

The reason for this is that the main object of literary approaches is the text itself (Culpepper 1983:5), and literary approaches operate on the following basic premises. Gros Louis (1982:14) points out that, while "we are certainly aware of the findings of biblical scholarship, we do not seek to explain any aspects of the text with the help of extraliterary information". De Boer (1992:38) reaffirms this, stating that a literary approach "cannot allow its practitioners to go beyond or outside of the text". That is why these approaches are called text-immanent approaches. Viewed from these criteria, my speech act approach goes beyond the boundaries of

these approaches. However, I do not intend to reconstruct history through a 'window' of the text. However, after its completion, literary analysis can suggest and point to a real world behind the text (e.g., Kingsbury 1986). De Boer (1992:41) contends: "The method [of narrative criticism] itself, of course, is ahistorical, but its results ... can be fruitfully applied in historical-critical endeavors and exercises, particularly when ... the focus remains on the finished form of the document". In this sense, it can be said that literary approaches may complement historical approaches, or vice versa. This is where this particular study resides. Duke (1982:8) also attempts to do this in his last chapter on irony and the Johannine context, with a cautious qualification that "[i]t is dangerous business to move from literary analysis to historical judgment". Thus a critic should not claim, but rather suggest a historical situation.⁴⁸

Reflecting upon the above views, there is a valid possibility that literary approaches may contribute towards attaining a more complete meaning of the text coupled with the study of historical approaches. Although this study does not hold the optimistic view that one can perfectly reconstruct the original-historical world by fully understanding the 'world of the story', my observation is that text-immanent approaches can at least suggest or identify similarities or parallels between the 'world of the story' and the original-historical world. Harner (1993:v) also supports this view and proposes that such similarities "remind the reader that the narrative world is not a theological abstraction but a reality that has significant points of contacts with the empirical world". In this regard, then, this study may be able to explore the life situation of John's own day, especially an aspect of the Johannine Christians' conflict with the synagogue, by examining the language used in the story. In turn, such scrutiny may help to show a more complete picture of why John recorded his own account of Jesus' life, while making the narratives more alive and interesting.

In conclusion, the method of this study basically follows the second way, but it also takes historical data into consideration in the literary analysis. I shall not attempt to reconstruct the history of the Johannine community in the analysis, but use the results of historical research as aids to interpretation. Culpepper (1983:5, 11) is of the same opinion, but he does not implement this view in his analysis, because his narrative method, unlike that of Stibbe (1992:12), does not necessarily require him

48 For a different wave of this new trend, cf. Hakola 2005:33: "The three-world model is an attempt to create a holistic context which makes it possible to utilize and combine different methodological approaches that are mostly kept apart in the study of the New Testament The three-world model is based on a distinction among a literary work's *text world*, *symbolic world* and *the real world* behind the text'.

to do so (cf. Chapters 7 and 8 in his book). In my opinion, however, speech act theory demands taking historical contexts into account, differing from the so-called traditional text-immanent approaches. Speech act theory stresses the importance and role of context in understanding the meaning of a text. The context in this theory can be explored not only at the level of co-text (the literary context), but also at the level of historical context.⁴⁹ However, this does not mean that this study also examines the real communication between the author(s) and the real readers. Rather, as indicated earlier, I shall consciously avoid making any claim to the historical context, but rather attempt to elucidate only what the text itself says and indicates. This is why my depiction of the reader will not go beyond the description of the implied reader. I shall consciously attempt not to refer to the historical or original reader. In other words, this study does not endeavour to indicate any relationship between the implied and the real readers in the analysis itself. Reference to the original readers is, in my opinion, a task that can and will be done after a literary analysis, except the case of 9:22.⁵⁰

Other contributions

In order to better highlight some of the other possible contributions of this study, I wish to compare it with previous studies individually. *Firstly*, the emphasis of Botha's approach seems to be more on findings about perlocutionary acts in the text than those about illocutionary acts, and Botha (1991a:83) explains the particular reason for this in his book. However, the main thrust of speech act theory lies in the analysis of the illocutionary aspect of the text. Therefore, although the aspect of perlocution can never be neglected, I shall focus relatively more upon *the illocutionary aspect of the text*.

Secondly, although some scholars (e.g., Saayman 1994, 1995; Cook 1995; Tovey 1997) deploy the notion of *macrospeech acts*, this study seems to be the first study to explicitly apply the *macrorules* developed by Van Dijk (1980). These rules can provide a tool to determine and understand a meaning in the macro-level, and show how it is possible to achieve a macrospeech act.

Thirdly, speech act theory appears to be equipped for a better understanding of irony. It is my contention that speech act theory can indeed provide a new tool to account for the nature, use and function of

49 For this insight, I am greatly indebted to Rev. C. Saayman, who analyses the text from the same perspective. Cf. Saayman 1994, 1995.

50 For this reason and discussion, see the analysis on this verse in section 6.3.3 in ch 4.

this concept. It is hoped that the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (cf. section 1.6) can prove its usefulness in this study.

This study hopes to offer a good possibility of integrating different methods – narrative criticism, reader-response criticism, and South African discourse analysis – into the main speech act approach in order to develop a more plausible critical approach. After all, all of these small contributions work together to achieve the prime contribution: *a detailed elucidation and a fresh appreciation of the story of John 9.*

3.4.2 Basic reading scheme

This section delineates the way in which I intend to conduct a speech act analysis. The speech act reading of John 9 (Chapter 4) consists of three sections: introduction, main body and conclusion. Introductory remarks concerning the text of John 9 will be made in the sections ‘Introduction’ (cf. section 1) and ‘Overall structure’ (cf. section 2). As the main body, I shall divide the text into seven clusters and examine it/them accordingly (cf. sections 3-9). In each cluster, I shall first introduce specific mutual contextual beliefs, which appear to have a significant bearing as background for the specific cluster. Then, the section on ‘An overview and structural analysis chart’ will provide an overview as well as a structure of the text based on colon demarcations.

In the next section on ‘Microspeech acts’, I shall examine the utterances as individual speech acts (microspeech acts) according to the colon demarcations presented in the structural analysis charts. My basic reading scheme in this ‘microspeech-acts’ analysis will be as follows: A) General analysis; B) Illocutionary act; C) Perlocutionary act; D) Communicative strategy, and E) Summary. *General analysis* will introduce text mainly concerned with grammatical, syntactical and structural studies as well as with important themes or focal points that should be addressed before proceeding with the analysis in the remaining reading scheme. In the course of this ‘General analysis’, I wish to deal with such elements as word order, punctuation, the mood of the verb, the so-called performative verbs (Searle [1969] 1980:30; Yule 1996:49-50), syntax (Searle [1979] 1981:20), and so forth, implicitly pointing to *illocutionary force indicating devices* (IFIDs). Although these devices are very helpful in determining illocutionary forces of given utterances, this subsection primarily attempts to better understand the content of the text. *Secondly*, I shall try to determine *illocutionary act* for the utterance. One should note that it is crucial to distinguish between its content and its function – indicated by the illocutionary force – when determining an illocutionary act (Searle [1969] 1980:31, [1979] 1981:1, 1985:128). One should also note that the phonological aspect of a biblical

text, which sometimes gives clues to identify illocutionary force, cannot be dealt with, as this aspect is fundamentally lost to modern-day readers (Botha 1991a:84). *Thirdly*, I would also like to examine *perlocutionary act*. These three analyses should reveal the intention of speakers (e.g., implied author or characters in the text) or the goal of the utterance contained in a specific speech act. The fourth subsection will scrutinise the *communicative strategy* of the speakers (e.g., the implied author, the narrator and the characters), in order to identify how the speakers organise their speech acts to enhance communication with the hearers (e.g., implied reader or other characters). If the speakers employ any special literary device or technique (e.g., irony or reader victimisation) for effective communication, I shall indicate this in this fourth subsection. *Finally*, I shall close this ‘microspeech-acts’ analysis with a *summary*.

After this reading scheme to be used for microspeech acts, I shall also attempt to analyse *macrospeech acts in each cluster*. *Lastly*, in the conclusion (cf. section 1.3 in Chapter 5), I shall analyse *macrospeech acts in the entire story* to complete this speech act reading of the text.⁵¹

51 To arrive at macrospeech acts, I shall use Van Dijk’s notions of macrostructures, as well as macrorules such as Deletion, Selection, Generalization, and Construction Rules (cf. section 1.5).

CHAPTER 3

CONTEXTUAL SURVEY OF JOHN 9

1. APPROPRIATENESS CONDITIONS

The question of which conditions and rules are required for successful conversation is important for a speech act analysis. Appropriateness conditions provide an answer to this question. Searle suggests felicity conditions for individual speech acts. For conversational purposes, Grice suggests the Cooperative Principle; Leech submits Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics; Bach and Harnish pose three presumptions and mutual contextual beliefs, and Pratt adds the notion of display text. These concepts are all realisations of appropriateness conditions. Before closely analysing the text of John 9, this chapter will consider the entire story itself in the light of these conditions. As part of this consideration, Johannine symbolism and the motif of suffering will also be discussed.

As for these appropriateness conditions, I would like to remind my reader again that my speech act approach recognises the importance of contexts, namely historical, social, cultural, religious, linguistic, literary, and so on, because the contexts for a specific speech situation play an important role in interpretation, especially in determining the meaning of a certain utterance, passage or section (cf. *Significance of context*, section 3.1 in Chapter 2). Findings and insights concerning these contexts from previous works, including those from historical criticism, will greatly help my analysis. Therefore, I shall attempt to identify the most plausible contexts for John 9, summarising the views of other scholars, conversing with them,¹ and providing my own assessments, where necessary.² It is hoped that identifying the most plausible contexts could form a basis for a moderate example of the attempt to combine the use of historical and literary approaches. This is a strength of my approach, and should not be viewed as a redundant representation of arguments by secondary sources.³

1 However, the engagement and evaluation of such scholars' views are not my main concern in this instance. In addition, the examination of primary sources is beyond the scope of this literary study. Again I would like to make use of the contributions of previous historical research.

2 I shall deal with these conversations and my own assessments in more detail in the text analysis in Chapter 4.

3 Nevertheless, if my reader is familiar with the contextual background and only if s/he is aware of the knowledge the reader and characters of the Gospel

2. THE COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE, AND INTERPERSONAL AND TEXTUAL RHETORICS

- a. The characters that participate in the conversations are assumed to be observing the *Cooperative Principle* and other principles of both Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics.
- b. The author and the reader are assumed to be observing the *Cooperative Principle* and other principles of both Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics.
- c. When the author and the reader are not observing the *Cooperative Principle* and other principles, the notion of implicatures will help the reader determine the meaning of an utterance.

3. THREE PRESUMPTIONS

As observed earlier (cf. section 1.2 in Chapter 2), Bach and Harnish (1979:7-12) suggest three presumptions that facilitate communication between speaker and hearer. Yet these mutual beliefs “are shared not just between S and H but among members of the linguistic community at large” (Bach and Harnish 1979:7). The following pages will show an application of the notion of these presumptions to our text.

3.1 Linguistic presumption

The mutual belief held by the characters in John 9 (who are apparently Jewish) presupposes that they are familiar with the language and are able to speak it correctly. The same presupposition holds true for the communication between the author and the reader. Although Greek is the only language of communication on the author-reader level, the language used by the characters at the particular point in their conversations is difficult to discern and can only be assumed to be either Hebrew, Latin, Greek (cf. John 19:20) or Aramaic. Since Aramaic is believed to be the common everyday language of the Jewish people (Wise 1992:435), it is plausible that the blind man and his neighbours may have used Aramaic. On the other hand, when the characters conversed with the Jewish authorities, it is probable that they did so in Hebrew, for this was still the language of religious and legal matters (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:88; Du Rand 1994:18). When the disciples and the blind man talked with Jesus, they may have interacted either in Aramaic or Hebrew. Many scholars (e.g., Brown 1966:cxxix; Smalley 1978:61; Du Rand 1994:18) currently

possess at a given moment (e.g., just before or during the story of John 9), s/he is welcome to skip the following sections.

support this view, asserting that Christians and other Jews in first-century Palestine spoke Aramaic and Hebrew widely. The use of the words ‘Rabbi’, ‘Messiah’, ‘Rabboni’, and so on in the *Fourth Gospel* points to the usage of the Hebrew language among the characters. Wise (1992:440) argues: “Greek was well known among the upper classes even in outlying areas of Judea ... Greek, as the official language of the eastern Roman Empire, was everywhere in the East regarded as a prestige language”. However, it appears that Greek was not used on a daily basis. With regard to Latin, which was seldom spoken in Palestine, it is unlikely that the characters spoke Latin in Chapter 9 (cf. Stambaugh & Balch 1986:87-88; Wise 1992:434-444; Du Rand 1994:18-20). The most important issue to accept, in this instance, would be that communication between the characters, as well as between the author and the reader, was made possible in these languages.

Relating to this linguistic presumption, the topic of John’s style of writing must be addressed. Botha expands the meaning of the term *style* in his work by dealing with it from a pragmatic perspective (Botha 1991a:188). The term *style* will be employed, in this instance, in its narrower sense, because the discussion will be restricted to the narrow framework of linguistic presumption – proper management of the language. Therefore, *style* describes literary devices and grammatical features only (including vocabulary in the *Fourth Gospel*). Since the analysis of style in John 9 in this sense is, to a great extent, dealt with in the section on ‘General analysis’, the observation will be very briefly confined to John’s grammatical peculiarities and Semitisms.

The analysis in the section on ‘General analysis’ (in Chapter 4) is in itself sufficient to reveal that John’s Greek is rather simple, yet possesses good quality, as displayed by the various literary devices such as *inclusio*, *chiasm*, *parallelism*, *repetition*, *omission*, *compactness*, and so on. Barrett (1955:5) comments: “It is neither bad Greek nor (according to classical standards) good Greek ... the style remains not only clear but very impressive, charged with a repetitive emphasis and solemn dignity which are felt even in translation.” Schnackenburg ([1968] 1984:110) represents other critics in saying: “As regards the Greek itself, scholars have often noted its simplicity, the absence of long periods, of the compound words and the attributive adjectives favoured elsewhere, the laboured progress, the preference for parataxis and asyndeton and so on.” Another characteristic identified by Barrett (1955:5) is that “[t]he Greek style of the fourth gospel is highly individual. It closely resembles that of 1, 2, and 3 John ... otherwise it stands alone in the New Testament”. In order to exemplify his observation partly, if not entirely, the items below

describe some of John's peculiar usage of the Greek language (cf. also Schnackenburg [1968] 1984:105-111):

- Du Rand (1994:20) points out that the “vocabulary of the Gospel of John is limited in comparison to the Synoptic Gospels”. This is characteristic of John's style and is recognised by many critics such as, among others, Carson (1991:23). Barrett (1955:5) concurs that “John's vocabulary is very small, but even so many of his most frequently used words occur comparatively rarely in the synoptic gospels”. The following words, among others, are more frequently used in John than in the Synoptics (Barrett 1955:5-6): εἶμι (9:5, 9); ἔργον (9:3, 4); Ἰουδαῖοι (9:18, 22); κόσμος (9:5, 39); κρῖνειν (9:39); μένειν (9:41); πέμπειν (9:4); τηρεῖν (9:16); φῶς (9:5).
- The following words are very rare in John in comparison with the Synoptics (Barrett 1955:6): βασιλεία, δαιμόνιον, δίκαιος, δύναμις, καλεῖν, λαός, παραβολή.
- The frequent occurrence of the coordinate conjunction (or particle) οὐν, is mostly used as a narrative link (9:7-8, 10-11, 15-20, 24-26) (cf. also Barrett 1955:5; Du Rand 1994:21).
- The exegetical ἵνα (ὅτι) is more often used than the common final use of ἵνα ὅτι (9:17, 30) (Du Rand 1994:21).
- The frequent usage of ἐκεῖνος (9:9, 11, 12, 25, 28, 36, 37) (cf. also Barrett 1955:5; Du Rand 1994:21).
- The partitive use of ἐκ with the genitive (9:16, 40) (cf. also Barrett 1955:7).
- The οὐ - ἀλλά construction with a following ἵνα is only found in John 1:8; 9:3; 11:52, and 1 John 2:19 in the New Testament (Barrett 1955:7).

Since the first part of the 20th century, it has been suggested that John's language is influenced by Semitisms. Barrett (1955:8) explains that “[m]ost students of the gospel are disposed to allow some Semitic influence upon the Greek of the gospel, but the degree of influence postulated varies from critic to critic”. Thus it would be acceptable to conclude that “John was written in Greek from the start, even though the language displays many Semitisms or Semitic colouring” (Schnackenburg [1968] 1984:110). Where is this colouring evident in John? Here are some examples:

- Striking is the use of Semitic vocabulary such as rabbi (9:2), Messiah, manna, Rabboni, ἀπεκρίθη καὶ εἶπεν (9:30, 36), πᾶς before a conditional particle, and so on (Schnackenburg [1968] 1984:107; Du Rand 1994:19).
- The frequent usage of grammatical parataxis (repeated usage of καί) “is as characteristic of Aramaic as it is rare in good Greek. The adversative use of ‘and’ is also Semitic” (Barrett 1955:8) (9:6-7, 11, 15, 27, 30, 34,

36; 1:10-11; 8:57; 10:12; 16:22, and so forth (cf. also Schnackenburg [1968] 1984:109; Carson 1991:23; Du Rand 1994:19).

- Asyndeton (the sentences are often placed side by side without a conjunction and even without *καί*), one of John's traits, "also is common in Aramaic" (Barrett 1955:8) (1:40; 2:17; 7:32; 8:27; 9:9; 21:3, and so on (cf. also Du Rand 1994:20-21).

More examples can be added to this list. But the significant point is clear: there is a distinctive Johannine language style, and the author and the reader, in particular, are supposed to be able to understand and manage his language properly, including the idiosyncrasies in the Gospel.

3.2 Communicative presumption

The mutual belief among the author and the reader, the narrator, and the characters in the narrative presupposes that, when the speaker is saying something to the hearer, the speaker has some discernible illocutionary intent in his utterance.

3.3 Presumption of literalness

The mutual belief among the author and the reader, the narrator, and the characters in the narrative presupposes that, if the speaker is saying something to the hearer literally, the speaker is speaking literally. If it is obvious to the hearer that the speaker could not be speaking literally, the hearer must seek the non-literal meaning of that utterance.

4. GENERAL MUTUAL CONTEXTUAL BELIEFS PRESUMED IN JOHN 9

As indicated in section 1.2 in Chapter 2, mutual contextual beliefs can be regarded as knowledge shared by the participants in their conversation. These beliefs help the characters or the reader understand and interpret the speaker's utterance in the narrative, and include *social and cultural knowledge, knowledge of relations between two parties, knowledge of specific speech situations* (Botha 1991a:71), *background knowledge such as schemata, frames, or scripts* (Yule 1996:85-87), and *religious knowledge, social norms, practices, rules*, and so forth. I shall use the term *mutual contextual beliefs* in a broader sense.⁴ For the present purpose, mutual social, geographical, religious, forensic, and story beliefs will be identified, in this instance, for the context and co-text of Chapter 9. They will be

4 In fact, its notion is much broader than that of Bach & Harnish (1979:4-5).

termed *general mutual contextual beliefs*⁵ as opposed to knowledge of specific speech situations and relations between two parties, which will be discussed according to the seven dialogue scenes in the sections termed *specific mutual contextual beliefs*.

Before proceeding with the discussion, I wish to note the following factors. *Firstly*, the idea of utilising social (and historical) context for a speech act analysis, which is, to a large extent, a text-immanent approach, is not a new enterprise (cf. Saayman 1994, 1995; Cook 1995; Tovey 1997), but the method followed in this instance, integrating social and historical data into the text analysis, intends to present a valid model of all the possibilities. Insights into the social context of John 9 are drawn from the endeavour of so-called social-scientific criticism. *Secondly*, Elliott (1993:11), among others such as Malina 1982; Esler 1994:21-25; Koester 1995:27, suggests the indispensability of exposing such social data for the purpose of understanding an ancient text. He illustrates this point by warning that it is dangerous to attempt to understand social and cultural contexts of a biblical text uncritically with the modern perception of 20th century, for it leads to “the twin errors of an anachronistic and ethnocentric reading of ancient Mediterranean texts”. *Thirdly*, Hanson (1994:183) points out:

The social spheres or domains addressed by social scientists (politics, economics, religion, kinship) are never discrete entities that operate in isolation from one another – they are interactive in every society. But beyond interaction, one sphere may be *embedded* in another. By this I mean that its definition, structures, and authority are dictated by another sphere.⁶

Some scholars even state: “In the world of the New Testament only two institutions existed: kinship and politics. Neither religion nor economics had a separate institutional existence or was conceived of as a system on its own” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:396). This observation indicates that this should be borne in mind when social-scientific insights are incorporated into the text analysis.

Fourthly, I wish to present my assumption regarding the reader in John 9. This forms the theoretical basis upon which will be built every mutual belief between the author and the reader. It will, therefore, be an important assumption. Traditionally, this kind of assumption would be called “the readership of the Gospel”. Together with the authorship, the

5 Most of the beliefs identified in this section will be referred to again for extensive analysis in my speech act reading of the text.

6 For an in-depth discussion on how these spheres are interrelated, cf. Hanson’s (1994) article.

issue has generated heated debates in Johannine studies. These debates are further linked to the issues of the background and purpose of the Gospel. This section will not engage in these discussions as such. Rather, my assumption should be considered as a point of departure to account for the establishing of mutual contextual beliefs shared by the author and the reader.

As far as the readership in the Gospel is concerned, two sets of axes can be extrapolated: believers and non-believers, and the Jews and the Gentiles (the Samaritans could be included in this category). Further combinations are possible, including the Jews and believers or non-believers, on the one hand, and the Gentiles and believers or non-believers, on the other. Four groups can, therefore, be formed. It is theoretically possible that the readership could include all four groups in the Gospel, in general, and in Chapter 9, in particular. However, as far as Chapter 9 is concerned, the most likely readership from the reading of this chapter would be Jewish Christians (cf. Karris 1990:104; Koester 1996:9). They appeared to be a single, monochrome and homogeneous group. Therefore, I intend to treat the readers in John 9 as a single reader (used as a collective noun). This assumption is based mainly on the Jewish and Christian traits of this Chapter:

- The characters in this Chapter all appear to be Jews, and Jesus was always the centre of their topics (cf. my analysis in Chapter 4).
- Jewish thought on the relationship between sin and suffering was raised in 9:2.
- The allusion to the “I am” sayings in 9:5 presupposes the reader’s knowledge of the Old Testament (e.g., Ex 3:14; Is 41:4).
- The issue of the breaking of the Sabbath was important to the characters in 9:13-16.
- The Jews’ decision in 9:22 was directed at those members of the Jewish synagogue who would confess Jesus as the Christ.
- The arguments in the characters’ debates, especially the references to Moses and God (9:24-34), reflect Jewish thought.
- The Jewish understanding of the expressions *the prophet* in 9:17 and *the Son of Man* in 9:35 is quite possible.
- The confession of belief in the Lord indicates a Christian character in 9:38.
- A seemingly anti-Jewish tone displayed in Jesus’ judgment, which passed on the Pharisees in 9:41, implies that the author favours Christians.
- The reader appears to be very familiar with the Old Testament and Jewish thought based on the deduction that the author uses these ideas with hardly any explanation.

These traits do not exclude, of course, the possibility that sympathetic readers could be found among the non-Christian Jews (cf. Brown 1979:168-169). But the real difficulty with my assumption of this readership appears to be the translation of the word *Siloam* in 9:7. It suggests that the reader does not know the significance associated with the term, and that he knows only Greek. However, if Jewish Christians as the reader lived outside of Palestine, this fact could possibly explain this translation. Or, this translation could be an indication of diversity in the readership (cf. Culpepper 1983:211-227). However, these counter arguments do not invalidate the overwhelming evidence above altogether.

Lastly, I should point out clearly for the sake of argument in this study that the reader will be treated as a first-time reader of the Gospel. The notion of *narrative temporality*, therefore, applies to mutual contextual beliefs (for this notion, cf. section 2.3 in Chapter 2).

4.1 Mutual social beliefs

The following mutual social beliefs may shed some light on the story of the blind man.

4.1.1 Honour and family

The central social value of the Mediterranean society in biblical times was honour-shame (Malina 1981:25-50; Esler 1994:25). This value pervades every aspect of social life. One's honour was directly proportional to one's social standing. Thus the acknowledgment of honour by others was of crucial and any community member generally endeavoured to avoid shame at all costs.

Honour could be granted through natural ascription by being born into an honourable family, or by it being bestowed by someone who was sufficiently honourable and powerful, or by acquiring it by engaging in the ceaseless game of challenge and response (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:76; Esler 1994:25). One vital aspect was that honour was "not honour unless publicly claimed, displayed and acknowledged" (Neyrey 1995:141). Another important factor was that, although an individual could gain honour, all family members normally shared honour as a collective unit (Neyrey 1995:141). Essentially, therefore, no individualism existed in this value. Therefore, "[p]arents socialize their children to be absolutely loyal to their biological kin group, since every member of the family shares the family honor and one member's misbehavior shames the entire group. The life prospects for everyone in the family depend on solidarity in protecting family honor" (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:300). Moreover, when arranged

marriages were made, both families of bride and groom were “very careful to assess the wealth, worth and honour of a family with whom a marriage is contemplated” (Neyrey 1995:143). Briefly, it was essential to maintain one’s honour in the ancient society.

In light of the above, it takes little imagination to understand that the loss of honour and status in Palestinian society had tremendous influence both on family life and on the life of individual family members. “His name would be reviled, his reputation held up to rebuke and his character calumniated” (Neyrey 1995:148). The person who lost his honour would lose his standing in the community. Hence, neither business was conducted nor marriage arrangements made for those who lost their honourable status (Neyrey 1995:148). It is obvious that this loss of honour had implications more fatal than the mere loss of wealth (Neyrey 1995:154). This has, of course, some significance for our text.

4.1.2 Challenge and response

The result of the social game called challenge and response seriously affected one’s status thereafter. If the challenger won the match, honour was credited to him. If, on the other hand, he was defeated by the receiver, he reaped shame. In this honour-shame society, the consequence of such a game was literally “a matter of life and death” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:76-77). Equals usually competed in this game (Esler 1994:28), and its form was not restricted to public debate and the like only. Giving and receiving gifts was perceived as a positive gesture in this game. An insult was interpreted as a negative challenge. Hence, the implementation of challenge and response influenced every area of life, either positively or negatively (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:76-77). The serious nature of this game may be one of the factors that contributed to characterising this culture as very competitive (Esler 1994:27).

Intense dialogue between Jesus and the Jews in John 8, especially in 8:31-59, is a good example of challenge and response (Esler 1994:87-88). So is the conversation between the blind man and the Jews in the interrogative situation (John 9:24-34). These conversations are heated up because the Jews’ honour was at stake in the social and cultural context.

4.1.3 Family life

In New Testament times, the family was a basic social unit based on kinship (Elliott 1993:129). A typical family consisted of the male family head, his wife and their children, including the children’s families. “It not only was the source of one’s status in the community but also functioned as the primary economic, religious, educational, and social

network. Loss of connection to the family meant the loss of these vital networks as well as loss of connection to the land” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:201). One of the most important aspects is that families in antiquity were patriarchal and the father’s authority was, therefore, fundamental for its existence (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:300). Under his authority, the males played the public role for their entire family, and the females managed the internal affairs in the household. As such, “[s]ocially and psychologically, all family members were embedded in the family unit” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:179).

On the matter of children, Malina & Rohrbaugh (1992:118) report: “Children had little status within the community or family. A minor child was on a par with a slave, and only after reaching maturity was he/she a free person who could inherit the family estate.” Moreover, it is surprising to know that over 70% of children grew up without one or both parents before attaining puberty (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:117).

As far as the relationship between mother and son is concerned, a bride would not gain her place in the household where her husband’s family lived until she gave birth to a child, particularly a son. Perhaps and therefore, this precondition, in conjunction with the custom that boys were nurtured by their mothers entirely in the women’s world until reaching puberty, caused mother and son to develop a strong connection that remained the closest bond in the family (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:300). In other words, “a son would grow up to be his mother’s ally and an advocate of her interests within the family, not only against his father but against his own wife ... Thus the wife’s most important relationship in the family is that to her son” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:30).

4.1.4 Secrecy

A publication by Neyrey (1998) on an aspect of secrecy in the *Fourth Gospel* adds considerably to our understanding of mutual contextual beliefs. His essay may be a first attempt at presenting a comprehensive view of the dynamics of information control in the *Fourth Gospel*, examining the manner in which dynamics contribute to distinguishing both the group boundaries between outsiders and insiders, and the social hierarchy within the Johannine group. The author uses information control as one of the key elements for characterisation, namely to assign unique roles to main and supporting characters based on “who knows what, and when” (Neyrey 1998:87-105). In fact, this particular aspect is not a new observation, but Neyrey’s work is perceived as unique in the sense that he deploys the sociology of secrecy and information control in order to examine the nature of characters. He also draws attention to the fact that the ancient family,

kinship, and group established on a certain agenda kept their secrets for maintenance, development, and survival (Neyrey 1998:106). Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:203-204) explicate this secrecy as follows:

In the honor-shame world of the Mediterranean, family reputation meant everything. It had to be guarded at all costs, and all members of the family had to be watched ... to ensure that nothing went awry. Scandal or suspicion could endanger the family's place in the community ... Since honor is largely determined by public opinion, it becomes critical that the public learn nothing that might damage a family's reputation. Secrecy becomes an internal family necessity at the same time that it is socially unacceptable ... Secrets that might damage reputation are thus guarded by lying, deception, or whatever strategy is necessary to protect it.

This knowledge will provide a key to our understanding of the text, especially of the dialogue between the parents and the Jews (John 9:18-23).

4.1.5 Healing

Pilch (1992:26) points out that “[h]ealing is a culturally defined and culturally determined phenomenon”. The most important perspective regarding healing and sickness in the New Testament world is, therefore, that “one’s state of being was more important than one’s ability to act or function” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:71; Pilch 1992:30). Although this may be a significant mutual contextual belief between the author and the reader, it is even more crucial for modern readers, because it differs radically from the perceptions of modern Western culture. Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:210) go on to report:

Anthropologists carefully distinguish between *disease* – a biomedical malfunction afflicting an organism – and *illness* – a disvalued state of being in which social networks have been disrupted and meaning lost. Illness is not so much a biomedical matter as it is a social one. It is attributed to social, not physical, cause. Thus sin and sickness go together. Illness is a matter of deviance from cultural norms and values.

This helps us understand the major role played by ancient healers. They focused on restoring a patient’s social standing (healing) rather than on restoring his malfunctioning organs in the biomedical sense (curing) (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:71). Briefly, remember that, in the first-century Mediterranean world, there was a clear distinction between disease and illness, and between curing and healing (Van Eck & Van Aarde 1993:37).

4.2 Mutual geographical beliefs

In the narrative world, the characters have common knowledge of particular places. For instance, when Jesus commanded the blind man to go to the pool of *Siloam* in 9:7, they both knew its location. The fact that the neighbours did not request the blind man to explain the reference to the pool in 9:11 also indicates that they were familiar with it. The pool was situated on the southwestern slope of Ophel (the city of David) near the junction of the Tyropoeon Valley and the Valley of Hinnom, and its source was the spring of Gihon in the Kidron Valley (Bruce [1983] 1994:210; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:243; Rousseau 1995). When the neighbours took the blind man to the Pharisees in 9:13, and when the Jews summoned the parents in 9:18 and the blind man in 9:24, they all knew *the place* where the Pharisees and the Jews could be found. Since the Pharisees “formed closed communities” (Jeremias [1969] 1975:247, 251), perhaps it was not difficult to find them. In Jerusalem, the Temple was probably a frequent meeting place for the Pharisees and the Jews (Edersheim [1967] 1976:214).

By contrast, there is apparently no significant mutual geographical belief shared by the author and the reader. When Jesus commanded the blind man to go to the pool of Siloam, the narrator deliberately translates the meaning of Siloam. This gesture leads us to suspect that the reader is not familiar with the place.

4.3 Mutual religious beliefs

Since all the characters appear to be Jews, they must have known the rules of the Sabbath day – both the expectations and the prescriptions. The Jewish authorities were more familiar with the details of *the Sabbath laws* than the general public. Nevertheless, every Jew was presumably aware of the basic concepts of Jewish Law.

In 9:17, when the blind man answered the Pharisees’ question by saying that Jesus was a *prophet*, nobody asked him to clarify himself. When Jesus asked the blind man whether he believed in *the Son of Man* or not (9:35), the latter asked who the Son of Man was, but not what he was. Moreover, when the blind man finally recognised Jesus to be the Son of Man, he worshipped Jesus. Thus the characters seemed to share the same ‘beliefs’ concerning the notions of the prophet and of the Son of Man. I shall examine these notions in more detail in specific mutual beliefs in sections 5.1.1 and 8.1.1 (Chapter 4), respectively.

The characters all knew about *Moses* when the Jews mentioned his name in 9:29. One scarcely has to mention that they all knew something about the *God* of Israel (e.g., 9:31).

These observations suggest that the characters, the author and the reader are all aware of the basic aspects of Judaism. There seems to be no need for the author to explicitly explain the religious context in the text.

4.4 Mutual forensic beliefs

The narrative of John 9, especially verses 13-34, is often regarded as the form of a trial (Dodd [1953] 1968:354).⁷ In fact, this trial form is a literary trait evident throughout the Johannine story of Jesus (Trites 1992:879-880).⁸ With regard to this forensic motif in John, one should, of course, not forget the discourse of the work of the Holy Spirit (especially 16:7-11) and the narrative of Jesus' trial (18:12-19:16). In this section, I shall discuss the forensic elements as a *frame* and *script* (Yule 1996:85-87) to our text. However, considering the nature of these dialogues in John 9, greater emphasis will be placed on the Jewish trial form than on the Roman form.

I wish to examine the question as to whether or not there was an established court or court procedure in Jewish society. According to the Old Testament, it appears that, in ancient Israel, a trial was held in the place where God chose (Dt 17:8). This means that people went to the priests and the judges (Dt 17:9). In the time of Moses, Moses was also the supreme judge (Ex 18:13). He delegated his authority to the officials whom he selected as judges (Ex 18:14-26). When people had disputes, they went to these judges. Consequently, the place where they held their 'offices' was considered the court.

According to Harvey (1976:46), Jewish legal procedure was markedly different from modern western practice. *Firstly*, Jewish trial procedure was much less formal. It was not necessary for the accused to appear before a formally constituted court in order for a trial to take place (Harvey 1976:46). This may be a factor that makes it difficult to clearly categorise whether a trial was official/formal or not (cf. section 5.3 in Chapter 4).⁹

7 Cf. also Resseguie 1982:298; Ashton [1991] 1993:226; Holleran 1993b:365.

8 Cf. also Meeks 1965:481-482; Lincoln 2000:4; Chapter 1). Neyrey (1998:92) points out: "The most common formal element of the Johannine discourses seems to be that of a forensic trial of Jesus. A conservative reading of the document indicates that Jesus is first put on trial in 5:16-18, which trial is continued in 7:14-52, 8:12-59, 9:13-34, 10:21-39."

9 Harvey (1976:46) provides more clarification on the procedure in Old Testament times: "[J]ustice was 'at the gate' of the city (Amos 5.15) and was administered by the 'elders', that is, the leading citizens in the place (Deut. 19.12), who might be called upon at any time (as in Ruth 4.1-12) to arrest an offender (Deut.19.12), determine his guilt (Deut. 25.7-9), and either carry out the punishment themselves (Deut. 22.18-19) or command the witnesses of the deed to do so

In later times, priests or scribes took the place of the elders, and local sanhedrins (courts) were even organised under the supervision of the great Jerusalem Sanhedrin (Harvey 1976:46). However, even in New Testament times, the principle remained the same. People, usually witnesses, went to priests or (Roman) officials after their attempt to correct the offender's sin had failed (Harvey 1976:48; Derrett 1972:181). As long as the judge(s) and the witnesses were assembled, with or without the accused, in one place such as a gate of a town or village (cf Dt 17:5), or a market place (Ac 16:19), the trial could be conducted. In Jesus' trial case (Catchpole 1971; Winter 1974), Jesus was brought to the house of the high priest (Mt 26:58; Lk 34:54; John 18:13) and the Praetorium (John 18:28). In addition, he was taken to the Sanhedrin (Mt 26:59; Mk 15:1; Lk 22:66; O'Neill 1970), which was also used as the Supreme Court when the charge became extremely serious (cf. Ac 5:21; 6:12; 22:30; 23:28). Twelftree (1992:731) makes an informative report: "From the death of Herod the Great, Galilee and Perea were separate administrative regions so that the civil jurisdiction of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin did not extend beyond Judea. Thus while Jesus remained in Galilee, the Sanhedrin had no judicial authority over him." Although numerous theories about the Sanhedrin have been proposed as a result of the conflicting sources and various terms, it is generally agreed that Jerusalem had at least one Sanhedrin (Twelftree 1992:729). This invites the interesting question as to whether any controversial dialogue depicted in John 9 was held at this Sanhedrin or not (for this issue, cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:13).

Secondly, it appears that the role of witnesses was of greater importance in Jewish forensic processes. A Jewish court was not equipped to investigate evidence (Harvey 1976:47). The admissibility and competence of witnesses were often the dominant factors in deciding a case. The judges were merely present to ascertain the reliability of the witnesses (Harvey 1976:47). Thus, more so in a Jewish trial than in the case of a modern trial, "[c]onsiderable attention will be placed ... on the veracity of the witness and on their character ... testimony from an honorable, educated, prominent person simply commands more credibility in forensic situations than that of a slave, a woman, or an uneducated person" (Neyrey 1987:511; Harvey 1976:47).

Thirdly, in hearings according to Jewish custom, normally at least two witnesses had to supply evidence to prove the legitimacy of the charge.¹⁰

(Deut. 21.18-21). There were, of course, superior courts to which more difficult cases might be referred (Deut. 17.8-13)."

10 Cf. Dt 17:6-7; 19:15; Nm 35:30; Mt 18:16; 2 Cor 13:1; 1 Tm 5:19; Heb 10:28; Trites 1992:877.

However, Harvey (1976:47) reports: "It could happen in certain cases that there might be only one witness." He indicates that this was also a distinctive character of Jewish procedure (Harvey 1976:47). In order to win such a court case, it would be better if the witness were a person who was well respected in society, or if the claimant supported his claim on oath, calling God as his witness. Since the witness's role bore such weight, grave penalties were imposed if he gave false evidence (Harvey 1976:49).¹¹ Although the duration of a trial probably varied according to the seriousness of the charge brought before the court (e.g., ranging from petty theft to murder), all trials essentially ended after the judge's verdict.

John 8:12-59 provides a good example of the forensic argument. While Jesus is the speaker who takes on the role of the defendant, the Pharisees and Jews are the hearers who act as the prosecutors. The paternity of Jesus would be the main argument (Stibbe 1993:99). In this argument, Jesus uses the notion of the light of the world to enhance his personal credibility. This credibility is the key concept concerning the speaker as a witness, and Aristotle calls it *ethos* (Stibbe 1993:100). As the argument proceeds, the author reveals the irony that these roles will be reversed and Jesus, the judged, will become the judge (Neyrey 1987:535, footnote 50).

According to Neyrey (1987:541), it is interesting to know that "trials function as status degradation rituals whereby an interest group attempts to label someone a 'deviant' and to impose censure and penalties by virtue of a process which publicly defames the alleged 'deviant'". In this respect, a trial could be considered part of the game of challenge and response in the ancient society.

11 Neyrey (1987:535) presents the Roman judicial process, which differed in many points from Jewish procedure, and suggests the following as the formal elements of a typical trial: a judge, plaintiffs, a norm of judgment or law with punishment, testimony from witnesses, a judge's *cognitio* and forensic proof. Like witnesses, the judge was one of the most important elements in a trial, and his task was to assemble and establish a court case, and to investigate the charge properly (Neyrey 1987:511). In other words, "[t]he judges solicit testimony, shift evidence, and make inquiry – all to discover the secret of whether the accused is guilty or innocent" (Neyrey 1998:92). For this reason, the identity and authority of the judge should be revealed at the beginning. Particularly in a Roman trial, the judge's *cognitio* was important in that the judge evaluated "the testimony of the plaintiff in response to the charges" (Neyrey 1987:510). Attorneys were sometimes employed to help their clients' cases (Ac 24:1). In general, "[e]ach side presents witnesses, offers evidence and pleads its case" (Trites 1992:879).

4.5 Mutual story beliefs

The information which the reader received about the characters, the events, the relationships between the characters, and so on, up to the ninth chapter, also helps him decode the text better and, therefore, needs clarification. I shall refer to this information as *mutual story beliefs*, shared by the author and the reader, which are determined by the narrative temporality.

4.5.1 Short summary of mutual story beliefs

In this subsection, I provide a short summary of mutual story beliefs concerning three major characters, namely Jesus, the disciples and the Jewish authorities, based on my own reading. This summary helps us understand what the author wants to communicate to the reader through the story thus far.

- a. Jesus' divine identity has been emphasised both by his own words and deeds as well as by others' words, including the narrator's comments. He was pre-existent, created all things, performed signs, and possessed complete knowledge. He was equal with God, had a strong relationship with the Father, and because of this relationship, he had the authority to judge.
- b. Jesus was sent by the Father to come into the world with clear purposes such as granting the right to become children of God, revealing the Father, taking away the sin of the world, manifesting his glory, giving eternal life, coming as the bread of life and the light of the world, making disciples, doing the Father's will, passing judgment, saving those who believe in him, and so on.
- c. Jesus was not subject to Jewish laws.
- d. The 'I AM' sayings with a predicate nominative (6:35, 51; 8:12) indicate Jesus' function (role) rather than his identity, whereas those sayings without an image (4:26; 6:20; 8:24, 28, 58) primarily express his identity.
- e. Some people responded by believing in Jesus, but others did not, as summarised in 1:11-12.
- f. The open attack of the Jewish authorities on Jesus started from his healing on the Sabbath in Chapter 5. The Sabbath controversy was, therefore, one of the big issues which made them hostile towards him.
- g. Jesus took up the Sabbath issue when he discussed it with the multitudes (Chapter 7). The conflict between Jesus and the Jewish authorities gradually became intense. The Jews were even determined to kill him.

- h. Jesus made it clear to the Jewish authorities through his deeds and words that he came from above and that God the Father sent him, yet they did not want to accept it.
- i. Jesus severely criticised the Jewish authorities, especially the Jews, for their unbelieving attitudes.
- j. Jesus explained judgment to the Jewish authorities on at least two occasions (Chapters 5 and 8).
- k. Jesus often indicated that the Jewish authorities were already judged and would be judged in their sin.
- l. The Jews showed their hostility towards Jesus more than did the Pharisees.
- m. Jesus interacted with the Jewish authorities more often than with his own disciples.
- n. Although the disciples showed their faith in Jesus, they did not fully understand him, or spiritual matters. They were still 'disciples' who needed to learn.
- o. The disciples were willing to follow and help Jesus, and participated in his ministry.

4.6 Relationships between the author and the reader

More relationships can be assumed between the author and the reader from the reading of the Gospel up to the ninth chapter. These relationships are important in establishing the speech context.

- To the reader, the author appears to be an authoritative interpreter of Jesus, and is thus considered to be trustworthy.
- The author endeavours to identify with the reader.
- The author intends to guide the reader to make a full commitment to Jesus in faith.
- The relationship between the author and the reader is not always so simple because of the author's use of a literary device, namely the so-called technique of reader victimisation in narratives such as 4:1-42; 7:1-10 (cf. section 2.3 in Chapter 2).

5. JOHANNINE SYMBOLSIM

According to Culpepper (1983:149-202), symbolism is one of the ways in which the *Fourth Gospel* silently yet effectively communicates with the reader. In conjunction with misunderstanding and irony, symbolism

displays “the signature of the evangelist’s insight and art” (Culpepper 1983:199). Dodd ([1953] 1968:143) states that the *Fourth Gospel* is “bound together by an intricate network of symbolism”. Macgregor (1928:xxv) claims that “[n]o understanding of the Gospel is possible without an appreciation of the part played by symbolism”. Similarly, the story of John 9 cannot be fully understood unless one can appreciate the way in which the author interprets and uses symbols in this narrative, because “John 9 is particularly significant for an understanding of John’s symbolic discourse” (Painter 1986:55; cf. Lee 1994:11-12, 161-162).

Per definition, a symbol is basically a (concrete) element that expresses an abstract or transcendent concept, connecting two different realms (cf. Culpepper 1983:182, 187).¹² “In Johannine terms, symbols span the chasm between what is ‘from above’ and what is ‘from below’ without collapsing the distinction” (Koester 1995:4). According to Du Rand (1994:250), “[s]ymbolism is an attempt to present the divine communication in an understandable way”.

The question of the classification of symbols does not enter into the discussion in this instance.¹³ It will suffice to introduce the distinction between two types of symbols, namely core and supporting symbols. Koester (1995:5) suggests this distinction and points out:

Core symbols occur most often, in the most significant contexts in the narrative, and contribute most to the Gospel’s message. For example, the repeated statements identifying Jesus as ‘the light of the world’ (1:9; 3:19; 8:12; 9:5; 12:46) establish light as a core symbolic image with darkness as its counterpart. Other elements such as day and night and sight and blindness play an important supporting role in the text through their relationship to light.

Culpepper (1983:189) identifies light, water, and bread as the three core symbols of the Gospel: “Each of these points to Jesus’ revelatory role and carries a heavy thematic load”. By contrast, Ashton ([1991] 1993:516) views life as the central symbol of the Gospel, and light, water, and bread as the three most important subsidiary symbols. The former coincides with

12 It is crucial that symbols be distinguished from signs, metaphors, parables, allegories or motifs. For a discussion of this issue, namely the relationships between symbol, metaphor, sign, motif, parable and allegory, cf. Stemberger 1970; Ricoeur 1976:45-69; Schneiders 1977a, 1977b; Culpepper 1983:181-189; Snodgrass 1992:593-594; Van den Heever 1992; Du Rand 1994:250; Lee 1994:23-35; Koester 1995:4-7; Jones 1997:12-14; Lemmer 1998; Zimmermann 2006. Cf. also more articles in Frey *et al.* (2006).

13 For the subject, cf. Culpepper 1983:184-190; Du Rand 1994:251-253; Zimmermann 2006:20-23.

my own understanding, because a symbol should be more concrete than abstract. The 'life' as a symbol cannot be seen, touched nor consumed like the other three symbols. Either way, the author uses the core symbols as one of the primary means to illustrate and convey the utmost significance of Jesus to the reader. Supporting symbols are, in turn, employed to reveal the significance of the core symbols (Koester 1995:6).

A crucial question concerning Johannine symbolism in this study is: How do the symbols function in the *Fourth Gospel*, especially in John 9? In dealing with this particular question, I intend to use the terms *function* and *purpose* interchangeably (or loosely) in this section. In his essay *John 9 and the interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (1986), which is mainly based on his earlier article *Johannine symbols: A case study in epistemology* (1979), Painter (1986) devotes over half of the essay to examining Johannine symbols (in which he separates the purpose of the symbols from their function). Painter (1986:52) points out:

In John 9 the symbols are shown to have three purposes. First, they are intended to deal with the problem of unbelief ... Secondly, those who do not believe in Jesus are confronted with the symbols by which they interpret their own lives. Because the point of reference has been changed this is a radical attack on man's understanding of himself ... The symbols express the judging character of the revelation. While they enable faith to see, they condemn unbelief to blindness.

Thirdly, the symbols bring a new understanding about God through Jesus to those who believe (Painter 1986:46): "The symbols are the means by which Jesus is disclosed in such a way as to evoke faith or provoke unbelief". The symbols naturally contain the elements of both revelation and concealment, as in the case of the parables (Du Rand 1994:250).

The central focus on Christ in Johannine symbolism has been widely recognised, as Culpepper (1983:189), among others,¹⁴ points out that "Jesus himself is the principal symbol of the Fourth Gospel, for he partakes of the being of God and reveals Him in this world". However, from the standpoint of the underlying structure of the symbolic system in the Gospel, Koester's (1995) thesis is worth noting. He proposes the twofold structure of Johannine symbolism. The theme of Christology lies at the primary level of meaning, and that of discipleship at the secondary level. "The movement from Christology to discipleship is apparent in symbolic images and actions throughout the Gospel" (Koester 1995:13). He also draws attention to the story of the blind man in order to illustrate his thesis:

14 Scheneiders 1977a:373; Leon-Dufour 1981:454; Painter 1986:55; Du Rand 1994:35; Lee 1994:21; Van der Watt 2000.

“On a primary level the miracle is christological; by enlightening the eyes of a man blind from birth, Jesus demonstrates that he is truly ‘the light of the world’” (9:5). On a secondary level, the passage is about discipleship. A substantial part of the chapter explores what it means to “see the light, both physically and through the eyes of faith” (Koester 1995:14-15). I wish to examine the claims of both Painter and Koester concerning the function of symbols as my analysis proceeds (for this result, cf. section 1.4.3 in Chapter 5).

As far as the literary context of Johannine symbolism in John 9 is concerned, Lee (1994:163) proposes (cf. also Milne 1993:136):

The two images of light and water are part of the ritual symbolism of Tabernacles, where on each morning of the feast, water was drawn from Shiloam and taken in procession to the Temple, and each evening lamps were lit in the Court of the Women to illuminate Jerusalem. It is in this context that Jesus revealed himself to be the giver of living water (7.37-39) and light of the world (8.12). Both themes, and particularly the latter, form the background for the narrative of John 9.

Painter (1986:56) makes a similar observation, namely that John’s use of symbols is to be understood in the context that Jesus as the light of the world came to expose and overturn the power of darkness and give sight to the blind. The ensuing subsections address the images of light and water.

5.1 Light and darkness

It has been argued that the *Fourth Gospel* has a close relationship with Jewish thought (the Old Testament, Rabbinic Judaism, Qumran) and/or with thought systems other than Judaism (Platonism, Stoicism, Hermetic literature, Gnosticism, Philo, Mandaean writings). The connecting links are established through the same kinds of terminology and/or images/concepts they employ (e.g., dualism, light and darkness, knowledge, Logos, Wisdom, Word, brotherly love, and so on). In this section, I cannot and shall not address all of these relations. Considering the symbols of light and darkness as well as Jewish orientation in John 9 (Barrett 1975:18, 69-70; Ball 1996:259, 268 regarding the ‘I am’ sayings), I shall only suggest the potential Jewish influence on the text.¹⁵

15 For the relationships of the Gospel with this philosophical and religious thinking, cf. Dodd [1953] 1968:10-285; Meeks 1965; Yamauchi 1973; Barrett 1975; Lindars [1972] 1981:35-42; Smalley 1978:41-68; Nickelsburg 1985; Beasley-Murray 1987:liii-lxiv; Painter [1991] 1993:33-60, 2005; Scott 1992; Willett 1992; Evans

5.1.1 The author's perspective

Firstly, the symbols of light and darkness are discussed from the author's perspective. The light and darkness imagery is one of the most striking motifs in the *Fourth Gospel*. This motif is introduced, from the outset, in the Gospel's Prologue. Light symbolises the power and presence of God, and it is closely associated with the life and Logos (1:1-5; Dodd [1953] 1968:269). In Jewish thought, Logos further points to the wisdom of God (Carter 1990:37-39; Johnson 1992:482), and Wisdom is, in turn, linked not only to God's creation (Pr 8:22-31; Wis 9:9),¹⁶ but also to the Torah (Sir 24:23, 25; 1 Bar 3:36-4:4).¹⁷ "Many Jews and Samaritans understood that the wisdom of God was localized in the Law of Moses, which was often identified as a source of light" (Koester 1995:128-129). The Torah, the Law of Moses, is also called the Word of God (Ps 119:105; Is 2:3; 5:24; Mi 4:2).¹⁸ In the Prologue, Jesus is depicted as the incarnate Word, the light of all men (1:4, 14) as well as the agent for the revelation of God (1:18). This light gives life (1:12-13). One should note that, in the Gospel, all of these aspects signify the person and work of Jesus Christ (Shirbroun 1992:472).

Based on the relationship between Jesus and Wisdom, it is likely that the author of the Gospel also implies that Jesus is a new 'Torah'.¹⁹ In the

1993; Du Rand 1994:42-49, 2005; Smith 1995:10-20; Onuki 1996:165-170; Neufeld 1997; Draper 1997; Kanagaraj 1998:64-181; Endo 2002; Aune 2003.

16 Cf. also Burnett 1992:877; Koester 1995:128.

17 Cf. also Dodd [1953] 1968:85; Painter 1986:49; Carter 1990:47.

18 Cf. Johnson 1992b:482.

19 There is some support for this view. In connection with the light image, David states in Psalm 27:1: "The LORD is my light and my salvation." Just as Carter (1990:47) remarks that "in early Judaism ... Torah was regarded as the dwelling place and embodiment of wisdom", Jesus was also described as the dwelling place and embodiment of Logos, the Wisdom figure (Jn 1:14). Nickelsburg (1985:83) proposes the following: "The functional equivalence of Torah and Jesus, or the sage and Jesus the teacher, is not accidental. John underscores both the parallel and the contrast between his theology and traditional Jewish wisdom theology" (cf. Dodd [1953] 1968:83). Nickelsburg illustrates his point by quoting John 1:17: "For the Law was given through Moses; grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christ." This contrast is further revealed in some episodes of Jesus' controversies over the Torah such as in John 5:9-18, 7:16-24 and 9:13-34 (Nickelsburg 1985:83). Finally, the imagery of Jesus as the true vine in John 15 may strengthen this argument, for Wisdom is depicted as a vine bearing fruit (Sir 24:17-19) and the vine is frequently used as a symbol of Israel (Ps 80:8-14; Jr 2:21; 6:9; 8:13; Ezk 15:1-8; Hs 10:1; Whitacre 1992:867). In Jesus "the life of the new Israel (the true vine) has come to birth" (Smalley 1978:90; Ball 1996:260). Through the symbols, as Painter (1979:34) mentions, "the evangelist implies that the expectations and hopes of Judaism are fulfilled in Jesus".

remainder of John's Gospel, the image of light corresponds to many of the concepts described in the Prologue. In 3:18-21, light brings judgment; this may emphasise John's realised eschatology (Smalley 1978:236; Du Rand 1994:34). Concerning 3:19-21, Von Wahlde (1995:382) states: "The image of light becomes the symbol of Jesus' public ministry." In 5:35, the author refers to John the Baptist in connection with light (cf. 1:6-8). The supporting lamp symbol, in this instance, indicates "the role of the Baptist and the superiority of Jesus" (Culpepper 1983:191). Jesus himself revealed explicitly to the Pharisees that he is the light of the world (8:12). This is the climax in the entire Gospel narratives in terms of the identification of Jesus as the light (Culpepper 1983:191). This is echoed in 9:5, where Jesus similarly reveals himself, but this time he speaks to his disciples. In 11:9-10, the author retrospectively refers to the images of light, day and night in order to link the two greatest signs (Chapters 9 and 11) in the Gospel (Smalley 1978:183). After these signs, the author makes Jesus utter words of exhortation to believe in the light in order to evoke faith (12:35-36), and the purpose of his mission as the light as a conclusion of the book of signs (12:46). The term *light* does not reappear explicitly after this verse, and only some allusions to 'light' are mentioned, such as torches, lanterns (18:3) and charcoal fire (18:13).

Likewise, the most striking similarity between Qumran and John 9 depicts God as light (1QH xviii.29; John 9:5). The *Community Rule* (1QS cols 1, 3, 4) also mentions the dualism of light and darkness among other similar terminology (Smalley 1978:31; Du Rand 1994:48-49; Smith 1995:16). However, in my opinion, the Old Testament in which light is also regarded as a significant motif, provides a more satisfactory background to John 9. There is no doubt that the author uses this rich heritage rooted in Judaism in order to convey his vital message about Christ to the reader (Shirbroun 1992:472). For example, Jesus as the light of the world can be observed against the background of Isaiah 9: "The people who walked in darkness have seen a great light; those who lived in a land of deep darkness – on them light has shined" (NRSV Is 9:2). With regard to 9:6-7, Koester (1995:138) states: "Christians regularly understood it as a prophecy concerning the Davidic messiah. They connected it with Isaiah's references to the messianic servant of the Lord who was to be the "light of the nations" (Isa. 42:6; 49:6)". The following Old Testament passages also mention the image of light: Genesis 1:3-5; Job 33:28, 30; Psalm 36:9; 104:2; 118:27; Isaiah 2:5; 9:1-2; 42:6-7; 49:6; 60:1-2, 19-20; Zechariah 14:7.

As the counterpart of light, darkness symbolises the powers that rebel against God, namely sin and evil (Koester 1995:125). Although these aspects of darkness are only implicitly referred to in the Prologue (1:5, 10-11), they are gradually exposed as the Gospel is unfolding.

In John, sin is perceived as unbelief and human opposition to God. The unbelief and opposition become increasingly evident in the Jews' hostility towards Jesus along with the development of the story, and reach their climax in Jesus' crucifixion. Backstage, evil powers are also at work. The author depicts these 'dark' powers with the term *devil* in 6:70, 8:44 and 13:2, *Satan* in 13:27; *the ruler of this world* in 12:31, 14:30, and 16:11, and *evil one* in 17:15. Furthermore, darkness captures an image of death as the ultimate result of physical and spiritual sin. *Sheol* or *Hades* is described as the place of deep darkness (Ps 88; Koester 1995:127). "Light and judgment are interrelated concepts in this Gospel, for light causes division or separation so that light and darkness cannot coexist" (Resseguie 1982:302).

As noted earlier, Koester (1995:5) perceives light and darkness as core symbols because of the recurring statements depicting Jesus as the light of the world. These symbols are further elaborated by other supporting symbols such as day and night, sight and blindness (Koester 1995:5), which also play a significant role in John 9. The symbols of sight and blindness, in turn, represent the realms of faith and unbelief, knowledge and ignorance (Stibbe 1993:110, 127). These symbols, made up as pairs, are very significant in understanding the Gospel, and are especially referred to as Johannine dualism.²⁰ They can be distinguished from the symbols without overt opposites such as water, bread, wine, and so forth (Jones 1997:13; cf. Culpepper 1983:200).

The core symbol of light, with darkness as its counterpart, makes a vast contribution to describing Jesus in conjunction with other significant motifs. Barrett (1955:296) states that "light" is not a metaphysical definition of the person of Jesus but a description of his effect upon the cosmos; he is the light which judges and saves it". All humanity will be judged based on their reaction to the Light, for "all who encounter him will be exposed under the searching light of truth" (Koester 1995:133).

5.1.2 The reader's perspective

Secondly, the symbols of light and darkness are discussed from the reader's perspective. From his reading up to Chapter 9, the reader is assumed to have knowledge of most of the important implications provided by the light imagery. He is aware of the related significant notions of life, Logos, Wisdom, Word, the Law of Moses, and so forth in the Prologue, and of Jesus' ministry (including judgment) and his identity described in terms of the light symbol in the first eight chapters. The reader also appears to

20 For this subject, cf. Ladd 1974:223-236; Barrett 1982:98-115; De Klerk & Schnell 1987:259-263; Ashton [1991] 1993:205-237; Du Rand 1994:25-27.

understand the Old Testament background to the light motif well. However, the reader does not have knowledge of the use of the images of light, day and night, to link the two miracle stories in John 9 and 11, and the use of light and darkness in Jesus' summary of his ministry (Chapter 12). The majority of the expressions referring to dark powers are not yet available to the reader.

5.1.3 The characters' knowledge

Lastly, the characters' knowledge is assessed. When Jesus uttered the statement that he was the light of the world (9:5), he would have known the full implications of this symbol. His interlocutors were his disciples. They did not appear to possess the important information relating to the light imagery described in the Prologue and to know the references to the symbols of light and darkness in 3:18-21. The text does not state clearly whether the disciples were also listening to Jesus' remark about John the Baptist in relation to light (5:35) and Jesus' 'I am' saying (8:12). As they appeared to be very familiar with the Scripture (cf., e.g., 1:45; 2:17, 22), they could recall the Old Testament background of the light symbol.

5.2 Water

The development of ancient civilisations was closely associated with water, for it was so basic to human existence that no civilisation could survive without it. In this sense, human history was a history of acquiring and controlling water to some extent, and ancient societies knew the indispensable value of water. The same holds true for Palestinian society. Burge (1992:869) states: "The arid climate of Palestine and the absence of major rivers for agriculture gave a unique value to water in its culture." This unique value of water gives rise to the symbolic usage of water in the *Fourth Gospel*. It has been said that Johannine symbolism, including water, was taken from both the fabric of everyday life and Judaism (Painter 1986:49; Culpepper 1983:188; Koester 1995:7). "The image of water appears surprisingly frequently and with the most varied associations of any of John's symbols. There are conversations about water, water pots, rivers, wells, springs, the sea, pools, basins, thirst, and drink" (Culpepper 1983:192). Jones (1997:12) provides a list of images which many religions associate with water, namely creation, divine powers, rites of initiation, life, sexuality, wisdom, knowledge, and/or purity. People find it easy to imagine the images water produces. However, for this reason, the symbol of water, being one of the core symbols in the Gospel, is less consistent and less unified than those of light and bread (Culpepper 1983:192-193; Koester 1995:155).

5.2.1 The author's perspective

Of all the images of water, as Koester (1995:156) points out, “[t]he significance of water is almost always connected with washing or drinking”. As for drinking, Jesus says in a loud voice, “If any man is thirsty, let him come to Me and drink” (7:37; 4:10, 14).

Here water is a symbol for that which satisfies man's search for life and a fundamental emphasis is that those who *drink* the water that Jesus *gives* have eternal life, life that does not end. Jesus is the *giver* of the life-giving water and *drinking* is a symbolic description of believing (6.35). The water which Jesus gives is the life-giving Spirit (Painter 1986:45).

Burge (1992:869-870) echoes this: “If water symbolized life, cleansing, refreshment and renewal, it comes as no surprise to learn that it symbolized the Holy Spirit (Is 44:3-4; Ezek 36:25-26) ... It symbolizes the spiritual renewal promised in the OT prophets and offered in Christ.” As far as washing is concerned, water is linked with John's water baptism (Painter 1986:45) and with the baptism with the Holy Spirit (Culpepper 1983:193) in Chapters 1 and 3; with the Jewish custom of purification (Chapter 2); with the washing of the blind man's eyes (Chapter 9), and with the foot-washing of Jesus (Chapter 13). Koester (1995:13) considers that “this ‘washing’ provides a complete cleansing (13:8, 10)”. Briefly, it is important to remember that the symbol of water should be understood Christologically (Koester 1995:156). For that is the way in which the author utilises water, namely to reveal Jesus' identity and role.

I find it appropriate at this point to refer to an important issue regarding *Johannine sacramentalism*, especially baptism in relation to the symbol of water (but not so much other ‘sacraments’). Some critics draw attention to the fact that the term *sacrament* is not known to the New Testament.²¹ Hence, Lindars (1970:50) insists that this fact must be borne in mind when addressing this issue. The issue itself is derived from the observation, as Matsunaga (1981:516) points out, that the Gospel contains some allusions to the sacraments through the symbols and the related texts, but lacks the explicit accounts of the baptism of Jesus, and of the institution of the baptism and the Eucharist as in the Synoptics.²² As far as this issue is concerned, some scholars have expressed the opinion that the *Fourth Gospel* is sacramental.²³

21 Lindars 1970:49; Barrett 1982:81; Brown 1984:88, footnote 126; Smith 1995:155.

22 Mt 3:13-17; 26:26-29; 28:16-20; Mk 1:9-11; 14:22-25; Lk 3:21-22; 22:14-20.

23 E.g., Schweitzer 1931:352; Hoskyns 1947:365; Cullmann 1953:102-105; Dodd 1963:184; Brodie 1993:356; Matsunaga 1981:523; Paschal 1981:155; Rensberger 1988:65, 81. Barrett (1955:69) even states that the *Fourth Gospel* is the most

Others perceive that John is anti-sacramental.²⁴ The remaining scholars are between these two poles.²⁵ As previous historical studies on this issue are available to us,²⁶ I wish to examine various opinions concerning the text of the *Fourth Gospel*, specifically that of John 9.

There has been a schism among scholars in the attempt to interpret the story of the man born blind from a sacramental viewpoint, particularly through the water imagery. As mentioned earlier, Brown (1966:380-382, 1984:90) and Cullmann (1953:102-105) are among those, including the Church Fathers, who follow a sacramental interpretation. Porter (1966-67:390-394) argues that John 9:38-39a could be a liturgical addition to the text, because he believes that the addition was made particularly for the preparation for baptism and its practice, as well as for the use for the early lectionaries. Jones (1997:234) makes an interesting, if not a new, observation that, since the confession of the blind man (9:38) “follows his washing in the pool, any interest in baptism expressed here would support the tradition of baptizing infants more than that of believer’s baptism”. On the contrary, Carson (1991:365) exclaims: “Attempt to see in this washing an elaboration of baptism (e.g. Brown, 1.380-382) are far less convincing.” Koester (1995:180) follows: “A baptismal interpretation of the blind man’s washing lends itself to pastoral application but goes beyond the Johannine context.” Painter who recognises sacramental overtones in the Gospel still

sacramental of all the Gospels. Moreover, Cullmann (1953:102) reports that the interpretation which associates the story of John 9 with baptism was quite regularly made by the Church Fathers such as Irenaeus, Ambrose and Augustine (Hoskyns 1947:363; Porter 1966-1967:391; Brown 1966:381; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:257; Riga 1984:170).

- 24 E.g., Kysar 1976:108; Painter 1986:44; Carson 1991:365; Koester 1995:180. Perhaps those scholars who are not convinced of the sacramental aspects in the Gospel share the same doubt with Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:258) when he questions John’s motive: “If he had intended to allude to baptism, would he not have had to leave clearer signs of this? There is no really convincing basis in the text for crediting the evangelist with the intention of employing baptismal symbolism”. Matsunaga (1981:516) lists the critics who take an anti-sacramental approach: R. Bultmann, E.F. Scott, G.H.C. Macgregor, W.F. Howard, P. Gardner and J.D.G. Dunn.
- 25 E.g., Smith 1995:156; Jones 1997:232, 237. In my view, Bultmann (1955:58-59) does not necessarily consider John’s Gospel anti-sacramental, but he is of opinion that the sacraments play no role in the Gospel. He holds that the ecclesiastical redactor was responsible for the few sacramental references in the Gospel (Bultmann 1971:138, footnote 3).
- 26 For an overview of previous studies on the subject, cf. Porter 1966-1967:390; Matsunaga 1981; Rensberger 1988:64-66; Jones 1997:26-28. Cf. also the above footnotes.

rejects such an idea as far as this story is concerned. He proposes that, “while the Gospel as a whole suggests that John’s symbolism has some relation to the sacraments, the evidence does not point to a sacramental interpretation of this sign. Rather the evangelist has re-interpreted the sacraments in terms of his understanding of symbols” (Painter 1986:44). He believes that “[w]ater is used as a symbol because of its fundamental significance for human life. It is not to be understood in terms of baptism as the reference to *drinking* shows” (Painter 1986:45).

That the miracle took place at the pool of Siloam seems to give no end to the discussions. It is indeed difficult to decide unequivocally, because the text uses symbols in which revelation and concealment are inherent. Porter, who makes his comment on the basis of the interpretation of the Church Fathers and catacomb art, hesitates to give his final word on the issue based on the text. Instead, he expresses his concern as follows: “Whether or not the evangelist himself intended a baptismal interpretation of the story is open to question” (Porter 1966-67:390). In his observation of the scholarly debates, Rensberger (1988:65) puts the matter as follows: “Not surprisingly, and not necessarily wrongly, scholars’ own theological commitments and overall understandings of Johannine theology have often tended to sway the exegesis of particular passages.” My impression of the debates agrees with Rensberger’s assessment. That may be why scholars’ conclusions differ, even if they address the same relevant texts such as this story as well as John 3 and 13 with respect to the rite of baptism, and John 6 and 15 with respect to the Eucharist. Although the remainder of this section presents my own position on the issue, conversing mainly with Jones (1997), this should accordingly merely be regarded as a conclusion.

In his monograph *The symbol of water in the Gospel of John*, Jones (1997:232) finds that there is hardly any interest in the sacraments, especially in baptism, intentionally expressed in the Gospel. He raises questions concerning the blind man’s washing in the water:

But if this action referred to or prefigured baptism, why does the narrator first have Jesus spread mud made with saliva over the man’s eyes and why does he have him go to the pool by himself? The man born blind appears to wash himself and thus is both the subject and the object of the washing (Jones 1997:234).²⁷

27 As far as these questions are concerned, Cullmann (1953:104) indicates that “in the earliest days of Christianity the act of Baptism was bound up with the laying on of hands, and in this connexion the double act of the laying on of the clay and the washing in Siloam constitutes an analogy”. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:257) also points out that “[t]he putting of clay on the eyes, described in 9:6, 11 ... could be a reminiscence of the baptismal anointing”. Although the man’s

Jones (1997:232, 237) goes on to offer his conclusion that the *Fourth Gospel* is neither anti-sacramental nor positively affirms the institution of baptism. The primary aim of the Gospel, including the narratives involving the symbol of water, is to evoke faith, and the author of the Gospel treats interest in the sacraments as of secondary importance to faith (Jones 1997:237). For Jones, apart from the symbol's utmost significance for Christology (Jones 1997:230), everything comes down to a call for a decision (Jones 1997:230-231), even regarding John 9, "[b]aptismal imagery cannot be ruled out of the narrative, but the focus is on faith" (Jones 1997:234).

My own view nearly corresponds with Jones' understanding, except for one subtle yet critical point. In my opinion, the author is more inclined to affirm the sacrament of baptism, not boldly, but gently. Positive affirmation quietly exists, as Barrett (1982:96-97) expresses, "in the back of his mind". As pointed out by Grigsby (1985:228, 235), if the author consciously links Siloam's water with the living water motif in John 7 (cf. section 3.1.3 in Chapter 4), it is very likely that the author also connects the symbol of water in Chapter 9 to the baptismal rite, because the living water motif signifies the cleansing from sin – washing in water (Grigsby 1985:232-233). As noted earlier in Rensberger's (1988:65) comment, however, it is the critic's judgment (based on his theological commitments and overall understanding of Johannine theology) that determines to what extent he would like to see meaning(s) in the symbol. Again, does the author refer to a sacramental baptism through the symbol of water? In other words, does this symbol support or negate the sacramental aspect of the church? In conclusion, the issue can be settled for now by citing Smith's (1995:156) remark: "Probably it would be correct to say that the water imagery of the Fourth Gospel alludes to baptism without referring to it. It evokes the liturgical act without being exhausted in it." I would agree with this remark, and this appears to be what the author wants to convey to the reader in John 9.

5.2.2 The reader's perspective

As the symbol of water has been discussed from the author's perspective thus far, two more important questions remain concerning the issue of Johannine water symbolism (cf. Ng 2001). The first question is: How much

self-washing may not be analogous to the anointing, there may be at least two reasons why Jesus sent the blind man to the pool alone. One is to demonstrate Jesus' extraordinary power of healing at a distance (Brown 1966:372; O'Day 1995:654). As in the second sign of healing the official's son in 4:46-54, Jesus did not necessarily have to be bodily present to perform a miracle. The second is that Jesus may have tested the blind man's faith. It is likely that Jesus wanted to see how the man would respond (to his commands), just as Jesus tested Philip before the sign of feeding the five thousand (Jn 6:6).

of the symbol does the reader know when he reads the story of John 9? For argument's sake, one should assume that the reader knows its possible background, purpose, function and the relevant information accumulated up to Chapter 9, and is therefore able to adequately discern the meaning it represents. Culpepper (1983:194) avers that the important understanding of the symbol of water was virtually completed by John 5.

5.2.3 The characters' knowledge

The second question is: How much do the characters know of the symbol of water? Three groups of characters appear to be on stage in 9:6-7: Jesus, his disciples, and the blind man. Since Jesus performed the miracle and commanded the blind man to go and wash in the pool, Jesus should be fully aware of this symbolism. However, the knowledge of Jesus' disciples appears to be limited. They were not present when John the Baptist referred to water in association with baptism, cleansing and the Holy Spirit (John 1:26, 31, 33), nor when Jesus had a dialogue with the Samaritan woman concerning the water Jesus would give (Chapter 4). The text does not state explicitly whether they had either heard Jesus' conversation with Nicodemus, when Jesus mentioned water and the Spirit (3:5), or been present during Jesus' interaction with the paralysed man when Jesus healed him (especially 5:7). However, it is likely that they had listened to Jesus' discussion with the Jews concerning his flesh and blood (6:52-58; cf. 6:59, 67) and his 'preaching', on the great day of the feast, regarding living water (7:37-38). Furthermore, they were with Jesus when he turned water into wine (2:1-11). Hence, they were supposed to know that Jesus was the source and giver of good wine, living water and eternal life (Culpepper 1983:193). As they were familiar with Jewish culture and Judaism (cf. section 3.1.4 in Chapter 4), they appeared to know the Jewish custom of purification and the Old Testament background to this water symbol well. As far as the blind man is concerned, he did not appear to know the relevant information made available in the first eight chapters of the Gospel. The text of 9:6-7 also leaves no clue as to the man's inner understanding of the water imagery, but he had some good knowledge of the Jewish religion (cf. 9:30-33). It is, therefore, possible that he may also have some knowledge of the Jewish custom of purification and the Old Testament background for this symbol.

6. THE MOTIF OF SUFFERING

As far as symbolism is concerned, a motif is defined as a recurring cluster of either one or a number of symbols. However, the notion *motif* is not necessarily restricted only to symbols. A motif can also be a recurring cluster of either one or a number of ideas, themes, or even keywords.

In John 9, at first glance, it is reasonable to assume that the blind man had been suffering due to his being blind from birth (Barclay [1955] 1975:37; cf. Lindars [1972] 1981:341). He was even depicted as a blind beggar. Therefore, some expositors detect the theme of suffering in this story,²⁸ because suffering, in this instance, can be identified as a theme symbolised by the character of the blind man. However, my hypothesis is that the story will eventually disclose that not only the blind man, but also other characters had been suffering in one way or the other. If this is true, we may find an important motif of suffering intended in this story. To my knowledge, *no monograph or essay has thus far scrutinised suffering as a motif in the story of John 9*. For this reason, I shall propose the theme of suffering as an important motif in the story.

Boice (1977:20-26) deals with the problem of pain/suffering in his exposition of John 9. He scrutinises three purposes of suffering from a biblical perspective: it is corrective; it is constructive, and it is to God's glory (Boice 1977:23-26).

- a. Suffering is *corrective*: "God sends some pain in order to get us back on the path He has set before us ... The first thing we should do ... is to ask God whether or not it is intended for our correction. If it is, then we need to confess our sin or waywardness and return once more to the path set before us" (Boice 1977:24). This point may involve the issue of unbelief.
- b. Suffering is *constructive*: "God is able to whittle away that which is unpleasing in our lives and form the character of the Lord Jesus Christ within us" (Boice 1977:24). Affliction is a factor in our growth (Boice 1977:25).
- c. Suffering is *to God's glory*: Some suffering is solely "that the grace of God might be revealed in the life of the Christian" (Boice 1977:25). (E.g., Job, Lazarus, the blind man) [*Italics mine*].

Of course, some people may not understand Boice's proposal, especially with the third purpose, mainly from a humanitarian perspective. Expecting such objections, Boice (1977:25) summarises these objections in his own words: "Would God permit a man to be struck with total blindness throughout the better part of his life so that in God's own time He might become the object of a miracle performed by the Lord Jesus Christ?" In responding, Boice (1977:25-26) draws attention not only to the spiritual battle between the powers of light and darkness, but also to God's sovereignty and perfect love.

28 E.g., Howard & Gossip 1952:610-612; Gutzke 1968:105; Boice 1977:20-26; Milne 1993:137-138; Brodie 1993:346-347.

My speech act analysis will employ these three purposes of suffering as an axis of coordinates when I examine some important instances of this motif of suffering. Although this axis may not be the best of its kind, it makes sense to me and seems to be the only one available for this study at this point. After completing this analysis, the above hypothesis will be addressed again (cf. section 1.4.5 in Chapter 5).

CHAPTER 4

SPEECH ACT READING OF JOHN 9

1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 9 of John's Gospel, which belongs to the book of signs, is placed within the broader co-text where the controversy between Jesus and those who opposed him, especially the Jewish leaders, gradually became more intense. The polemic started at the Feast of Tabernacles in Chapter 7, and continues between Jesus and his opponents in Chapter 8. In 8:12, Jesus said, 'I am the light of the world' and referred to the theme of light and darkness. The miracle portrayed in Chapter 9 is a perfect example of this statement. Furthermore, additional inquiries about the ongoing issues of his origin and identity are made in this chapter.

In Chapter 10, the same issues are discussed in a different manner. For instance, not only does 10:21 explicitly refer back to the miracle event, but also the relationships between Jesus, the blind man, and the Jewish authorities are and depicted in the figures of speech. While the thieves and hirelings destroy the sheep, the good shepherd protects and gives life to his own sheep. Being an independent and complete story in itself, Chapter 9, still fits well into the present co-text.¹

The author of this Gospel does not intend to furnish the exact date and location of this miracle story. Although this information seems to be of little importance to him in this instance, one can nevertheless assume this from the co-text. The date was sometime between late September/early October and late December, as can be inferred from the references to the Feast of Tabernacles in 7:2 and to the Dedication Festival in 10:22. The location was somewhere in Jerusalem, as can be inferred from the fact that Jesus left the temple in 8:59 and, from the narration, that he was walking after that in 9:1. Some critics assume that it is the temple area (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:240; Jones 1997:165).

1 Cf. also Smalley 1978:195; Moloney 1978:142-145; Resseguie 1982:295, 303; Culpepper 1983:73; Holleran 1993a:11; Lieu 1988:83; Menken 1985:195. For a discussion of considering Chapters 9 and 10 as a literary unit, cf. Dodd [1953] 1968:356-357; Beasley-Murray 1987:148-149; Beutler & Fortna 1991:3; Du Rand 1991:94-98; Tolmie 2005:388; Menken 1985:190-191.

2. OVERALL STRUCTURE

The forty-one verses of Chapter 9 can be divided into 52 cola. These cola can be separated to form seven different clusters based on their semantic contents.² More significant is that these seven clusters can be viewed as a chiasmic arrangement: 9:1-7; 9:8-12; 9:13-17; 9:18-23; 9:24-34; 9:35-38 and 9:39-41.³ This rhetorical feature itself reveals the author of this Gospel as an extraordinary literary artist (cf. Haenchen 1984:41-42). As a matter of fact, this chiasm is based on the seven dialogues between the characters, and each dialogue presents very intriguing and vivid interactions between the two (groups of) participants.⁴ This fact is probably one of the reasons why this Chapter as a whole has such a dramatic effect on the reader.⁵ Because of the chiasm, the seven clusters can be referred to as cluster A, B, C, D, C', B', and A', respectively (cf. my structural analysis chart in Appendix 4).

3. CLUSTER A: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN JESUS AND THE DISCIPLES (9:1-7)

3.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

3.1.1 Blindness and sin

The particular interest in the story of the blind man addresses the issue in terms of blindness and sin. In this instance, I wish to discuss this issue from the perspective of the relationship between human suffering and sin.⁶ There is no doubt that the characters (Jesus, his disciples and the Jewish authorities) in the narrative of John 9 share the common understanding regarding the connections between sin and suffering held by Jewish people in those days. Blomberg (1992:301) comments on Jesus' utterance to the man healed at the pool of Bethesda in 5:14: "Jesus presumes the common Jewish view that illness was a punishment for sin". When Buttrick (1979:338)

2 Cf. also Martyn [1968] 1979:26-27; Resseguie 1982:295; Culpepper 1983:73; Mlakuzhyil 1987:116-117, 205. For six-scene structure, cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:239; Lindars [1972] 1981:341-352; Brodie 1993:343-344; Holleran 1993a:12-14. For a fourfold syntactic division, cf. Du Rand 1991:98. For a threefold division, cf. Westcott [1882] 1978:143-151; Hoskyns 1954:351-352; Lee 1994:164-165.

3 Cf. also MacRae 1978:124; Duke 1982:181-182; Dockery 1988:15; Stibbe 1993:105. For a different demarcation, cf. Howard-Brook 1994:211-214.

4 For the principle of duality, cf. Culpepper 1998:174; Martyn [1968] 1979:26-27; Painter 1986:36; Dockery 1988:15; Brodie 1993:344.

5 Smalley 1978:196; Painter 1986:36; Mlakuzhyil 1987:115; Howard-Brook 1994:212.

6 For the issue of blindness in the ancient world, cf. Salier 2004:114-117.

gives his exposition on the account of the healed leper in Matthew 8:1-4, he states: "The rabbis usually regarded it [leprosy] as a direct punishment for various sins." Quast (1991:72) points out the background: when "a child was born with a sickness, the traditional retributive link between sin and suffering was challenged". This traditional link can be traced back to Old Testament passages such as Exodus 20:5 (also Nm 14:18; Dt 5:9; Is 65:7; Jr 32:18), which indicates that the fathers' sins were the cause of the punishment of the children; Job 4:7-8 where the retribution based on cause and effect is suggested, and Genesis 25:22 with Psalm 58:3 which helps to build the implication that sin could be induced by the babies even in their mothers' wombs (Brown 1966:371; Ps 51:5). Barrett (1955:295) further refers to the case that "when a pregnant woman worships in a heathen temple the foetus also commits idolatry". Edersheim's ([1967] 1976:163) remark reinforces Quast's point and mentions that "children benefited or suffered according to the spiritual state of their parents was a doctrine current among the Jews ... And sickness was regarded as alike the punishment for sin and its atonement". Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:496) comments on the possibility that "malformations and physical illnesses present from early childhood were explained and used as the basis for admonitions to a pure married life". On the other hand, I wish to point out that there was a counterargument against this commonly held view: "From as far back as the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel there was opposition in Israel to the idea that children have to pay for the sins of their parents" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:241; cf. Jr 29-30; Ezk 18:1-4, 19-20). Furthermore, the vast majority of expositors agree that the gnostic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul was not under consideration in the exchange between Jesus and his disciples in 9:2-3.⁷

I can conclude that the view in question was common in the days of both the characters and the author. This means that the reader is also aware of this link between human suffering and sin.

3.1.2 Miracles

The subject of miracles has undoubtedly provoked one of the most heated discussions in New Testament studies. In such discussions, scholars often express their concern about the danger of viewing the miraculous events in the first century CE from our modern point of view (Vorster 1986:49;

7 Cf. Wis 8:19-20; Plummer [1882] 1981:204; Bernard 1928:325; Hendriksen [1954] 1973:73; Bultmann 1971:330-331, footnote 8; Morris 1971:478, footnote 7; Haenchen 1984:37; Trumbower 1992:97. For general comments on this issue, Carson (1991:361) mentions additional biblical references: Job; Psalm 89:32; Romans 1-2, 3:10ff.; 2 Corinthians 12:7; Galatians 4:13.

Pilch 1992:30; cf. Elliott 1993:11). Drawing attention to a distinction between miracles and miracle stories, Vorster (1986:48) stresses that “the miracle traditions in the New Testament were meant to serve as propaganda for faith in Jesus and in Christianity” (cf. Theissen 1983:259). Following this view, I shall discuss, in this section, the way in which the author presents miracles as signs in comparison with the synoptic presentation of miracle accounts. In addition, I shall refer to the knowledge of the reader and the characters concerning Jesus’ miracles and the author’s use of some finer details (e.g., spittle).

At the outset, I shall introduce the definitions of miracles and miracle stories. “In biblical scholarship the English word *miracle* normally denotes a supernatural event, that is, an event which so transcends ordinary happenings that it is viewed as a direct result of supernatural power” [Blackburn’s italics] (Blackburn 1992:549). On the other hand, “*miracle stories* denote[s] relatively self-contained narratives in which an individual miraculous happening constitutes the, or at least a, major focus of the account” [Blackburn’s italics] (Blackburn 1992:549). In the realm of Johannine miracles, Blackburn (Blackburn 1992:555) makes a good observation: “Jesus’ miracles ... are set within the context of the one grand miracle, the incarnation of the Logos” (John 1:14). This observation is significant in two ways. It provides an overall framework for Johannine miracles and it suggests that the focus of Johannine miracles is Christological (Fortna 1970:228). Barrett (1955:63) echoes this: “The miracles once grasped in their true meaning lead at once to the Christology, since they are a manifestation of the glory of Christ (2:11)” (cf. also Nicol 1972:119-122). The difference in their emphasis on the Christological aspect of miracle stories is recognised between John and the synoptists. In the Synoptic Gospels, his miracles are frequently designated as *δυνάμεις*, mighty works or deeds, which emphasise Jesus’ extraordinary power and often point to the manifestation of the kingdom of God (Blackburn 1992:555-556; Culpepper 1998:21). According to Theissen (1983:280), “The combination of eschatology and miracle in Jesus’ activity is distinctive ... Jesus sees his own miracles as events leading to something unprecedented. They anticipate a new world”. By contrast, John records only a few selected miracles (cf. John 20:30; Fortna 1970:100-101) and repeatedly describes these as *σημεῖα* signs. The signs are used to point primarily to Jesus’ identity as the Christ, the son of God, and have the specific function to evoke faith in him (Blackburn 1992:556; Salier 2004:117-119). They demonstrate markedly “the character and power of God, and partial but effective realizations of his salvation” (Barrett 1955:64). John also refers to Jesus’ miracles as his works (cf. Nicol 1972:116). “As such, they are also the works of God himself; there is a complete continuity between the activity of Jesus and the activity of the Father (cf., e.g., 5.36;

9.3; 10.32, 37f.; 14:10)” (Barrett 1955:63; Carroll 1995:135). In addition, I consider it important to clarify a further difference in terms of the effect of Jesus’ miracles. Since we can consider Johannine miracles themselves to be eschatological events (Barrett 1955:64), the significance of the miracles is not hidden from those who encounter the miracles. Therefore Johannine miracles demand a response from the witnesses, either to believe or not at the time when the miracles are performed (e.g., John 2:11; 4:53; 5:16; 6:14; 9:16, 18, 38; 11:45). Conversely, as Barrett (1955:64) points out, in the synoptic miracles “the eschatological significance of the ministry of Jesus is a hidden thing, which will be understood only in the eschatological future; thus the signs (in the sense of miracles) are for the present secret signs. Even the disciples fail to understand them (Mk 8:17, 18, 21)”.

Some details of Jesus’ miracle

Regarding some details of Jesus’ miracle of giving sight to the blind man, I wish to highlight three items, namely spittle, mud or clay, and the act of anointing, because this miracle, among all the miracles Jesus performed in the Gospel, seems to be the only incident where Jesus performed some particular actions during the miracle. The question then follows: Is there any significance in the author’s depiction of these items?

“In antiquity spittle was believed to be of medical value” (Barrett 1955:296; Salier 2004:116). Theissen (1983:63) maintains that spittle appeared in the healing stories of blindness (Mk 8:22-26; John 9:1-7), because it was deemed as a remedy for eye disease. In his report, healing substances such as spittle “were rubbed into the eyes of the blind and those with eye-diseases” (Theissen 1983:63). However, spittle was not only used for such treatments. Theissen (1983:93-94) states that “spittle can also be used in exorcisms, though there it seems to belong more to the ‘gesture of spitting as a sign of contempt’, which continues to have an aggressive significance in our own day”. This spitting gesture may have some significance in the story of John 9 concerning the ancient game of challenge and response (cf. section 4.1.2 in Chapter 3 and the analysis on ‘CS’ in 9:6). In addition, strictly speaking, Jesus did not use his spittle alone in the healing. He used it to make mud, “a healing paste out of spittle and earth” (Theissen 1983:94). This is interesting when comparing this Johannine miracle with Mark’s miracle story (8:22-26), where Jesus gave sight to a blind man only by anointing his spittle on his eyes. In that instance, Jesus did not need to make mud. But the author particularly mentions mud. As will be noticed, the author’s reference to making mud plays a crucial role in the plot of his story. The mixing of mud would constitute a double violation of the Sabbath laws in conjunction

with Jesus' healing itself on the Sabbath.⁸ Furthermore, it was common that some kind of healing touch was involved in many miracles,⁹ and the laying on of hands was a usual form (e.g., Mk 5:23; 7:32; 8:23-25; Ac 28:8). It is obvious that the Johannine Jesus in 9:6 also touched the eyes of the man born blind. We can consider this action to be the laying on of his hands, as in the case of Mark 8:23-25. The main reason for touching is that "the touch transfers miraculous vital power to the sick person" (Theissen 1983:62). The healing touch also assures the recipient that the healer is doing something for his benefit. In the story of John 9, Jesus' touching or anointing, with his command to wash in the water of Siloam, should be regarded as the proof that the miracle was ultimately performed through Jesus' power (Beasley-Murray 1987:156).

The knowledge of the reader and the characters

I shall now discuss Jesus' miracles from the reader's perspective. From his reading up to Chapter 9, the reader knows the miracles Jesus performed at Cana (2:1-12), at Capernaum (4:43-54), at Bethesda (5:1-18), on a mountain (6:1-15), and on the Sea of Galilee (6:16-21). In addition, the reader is assumed to know that these miracles are signs that point primarily to Jesus' identity as the Christ, the Son of God, and demand a response from the witnesses, including the reader himself. However, the reader has no knowledge of greater signs than those Jesus would still perform in Chapters 9 and 11.

How much do the characters know of Jesus' miracles? The characters who were present in cluster A are Jesus, his disciples and the blind man. There is no need to mention Jesus' knowledge about his miracles. The disciples witnessed the majority, if not all, of his miracles until Chapter 9: the text explicitly tells us that they were with Jesus when Jesus performed his miracles at the wedding (2:2, 11), on the mountain (6:3), and on the sea (6:16-21). At the two healing miracles (4:43-54; 5:1-18), the text does not clearly report their presence, but we can presume that they were with Jesus. This means that they were perhaps the best witnesses of his miracles and responded to them positively (e.g., 2:11). By contrast, the blind man did not witness Jesus' miracles at all, for he was blind and his meeting with Jesus in Chapter 9 appeared to be his first encounter with Jesus.

8 Cf. Resseguie 1982:298; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:242. For more discussion of this, cf. the analysis on 'CS' in 9:14.

9 E.g., Mt 9:29; 20:34; Mk 1:31; 3:10; 5:27-31, 30, 41; 7:33; 8:22; Lk 14:4; 7:14; Ac 3:7.

3.1.3 Siloam

In this section, I shall discuss possible beliefs regarding the term *Siloam* based mainly on Grigsby's (1985) essay. According to Grigsby, it is assumed that the characters and the reader are aware of the symbolic role of Siloam's waters. They would have regarded Siloam's waters as cultic (to be used for a ritual purification) as well as "living" (Grigsby 1985:228). Brown (1966:372) endorses Grigsby's view concerning the cultic aspect: "Mentioned in Isa viii 6, the water of Siloam was used in the water ceremonies and processions of Tabernacles. Rabbinic sources mention it as a place of purification". As for the living aspect, Grigsby (1985:228) suggests that the status of Shiloam's water "as 'living water' ... was especially prominent during the feast of Tabernacles, the backdrop for the John 9 episode". In addition, "the Rabbinic discussion about the 'sign of Siloam' ... that the free-flowing fountain of Siloam signifies God's blessing – especially in the Messianic age" would also have been known to them (Grigsby 1985:229). Based on these observations, he further examines the symbolism of Siloam in relation to the living water motif in the Gospel, introduced for the first time in the episode of the Samaritan woman. He suggests three significant aspects of this symbolism (Grigsby 1985:232-234): Siloam's waters symbolise Jesus' works to endow eternal life; to cleanse from sin, and to provide living water as the Messiah. The reader is, of course, aware of the close link between living water and the Spirit mentioned in 7:37-39 (Jones 1997:174). *Lastly*, I wish to point out how Siloam's waters relate to Jesus' miraculous healing of the blind man. Like the Rabbinic discussion earlier, the sign of Siloam is reflected in this miracle which signifies God's work as his blessing. In other words, Siloam's symbolism is realised in this magnificent miracle including its effects on the man born blind described in the entire chapter. Although the success of the miracle is attributed solely to Jesus' power, Siloam's waters play a substantial role in the meaning (significance) of the miracle.¹⁰

3.1.4 The 'I am' statements

The frequent occurrences of the Greek formula *ἐγώ εἰμι* and the way in which it is used in the *Fourth Gospel* have made many scholars investigate its meaning in the text and its significance in Johannine theology.¹¹ Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:79) demonstrates the remarkable comparison with its usage in the Synoptics. Any reader of John's Gospel is constantly reminded that Jesus' 'I am' sayings are significant expressions, which

10 Cf. Anderson's (2006:162) comment on the recent archaeological discovery about the pool.

11 E.g., Schweizer 1939; Dodd [1953] 1968:93-96; Brown 1966:533-538; Harner 1970; Bultmann 1971:225-226; Neyrey 1988:213-220; Ball 1996.

the author uses for an effective communication with the reader (Bernard 1928:cxxi). John 9 also contains such an expression in verse 5, although this instance is debatable as to whether this is a 'pure' formula or not (cf. the analysis on 'GA' in 9:5). However, this expression is the repetition of 8:12, which is a real occurrence of the Johannine 'I am' statements (cf. Tenny 1981:101), and the author most likely alludes to the ἐγώ εἰμι complex of ideas in 9:5. Hence, the analysis of 9:5 also requires an examination of these sayings.¹² The way in which the reader understands these sayings up to Chapter 9 greatly illuminates his comprehension of Jesus' expression in 9:5. To begin with, since the expression in 9:5 appears to belong to the 'I am' sayings with an image, I wish to point out the instances of these sayings (with the emphasis on the occurrences from Chapters 1 to 9):

- a. The 'I am' sayings with an image (from Chapters 1 to 9): 6:35, 48, 51; 8:12; 9:5.
- b. The 'I am' sayings with an image (from Chapters 10 to 21): 10:7, 9, 11; 11:25; 14:6; 15:1, 5.

Among the seven 'I am' sayings with an image in the Gospel, only two (the bread of life and the light) are recorded in the first nine chapters. One should note that Jesus uttered these two sayings in the context of his discussions with the 'Jews': in the discussion of the bread of life (6:22-71), and of the light of the world and Abraham's true children (8:12-59). These sayings appear to be a very important theme in these dialogues (Smalley 1978:90). More importantly, these sayings are closely linked to his signs (Du Rand 1994:94; Ball 1996:146). In order to understand their importance, I shall scrutinise an overall picture of the Johannine 'I am' statements, *first*, from the author's perspective.

The author's perspective

The ἐγώ εἰμι sayings in the *Fourth Gospel* are employed in various ways as well as in different forms. Ball (1996:146) observes: "The great variety of settings in which the words ἐγώ εἰμι are used by the Johannine Jesus show that it is a phrase which pervades the whole Gospel. It is restricted neither by audience nor by religious context." This diversity makes it difficult to categorise these sayings clearly.¹³ Nevertheless, I shall employ a more

12 The phrase ἐγώ εἰμι in 9:9 should be excluded, because they are not Jesus' words.

13 Bultmann (1971:225-226) defines four different uses of ἐγώ εἰμι based on formal considerations: 1) The *presentation formula* ... which answers the question: "Who are you?" By the use of ἐγώ εἰμι, the speaker introduces himself as so and so; in this instance, ἐγώ is subject ... 2) The *qualificatory formula* ... which answers the question: "What are you?", to which the reply is ... "I am the sort

conventional categorisation in which Ball (1996:14) combines Brown's second and third categories in footnote below: the 'I am' sayings without an image (*the absolute use*) and the 'I am' sayings with an image (*the predicate use*).¹⁴ This categorisation may correspond well to the meaning of the formula in the Gospel. The meaning of the formula can be explained in various ways.

Generally speaking, "while the 'I am' sayings *without an image* point to formal parallels in the Old Testament to explain Jesus' identity, the 'I am' sayings *with an image* point to conceptual parallels to explain Jesus' role among humanity" (Ball 1996:260). This distinction is valid yet not rigid, because Jesus' identity may be dominant in the meaning of the absolute use, whereas his role may be in that of the same form, and vice versa (Ball 1996:260). Regardless of whether the emphasis falls on his identity or his role, the main purpose of the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings is thus to reveal to the reader who Jesus is and what he does in relation to his believers and the world (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:89; cf. Coetzee 1986:173).¹⁵ The 'I am' sayings "have the particular advantage of making the saving character of Jesus'

of man who ...". In this instance, ἐγώ is subject... 3) The *identification formula* ... in which the speaker identifies himself with another person or object. In this instance, ἐγώ is subject ... 4) The *recognition formula* ... to which the reply is: "I am he". In this instance, ἐγώ is the predicate ... However, Brown (1966:533-534) categorises the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings into three grammatical types: 1) The absolute use with no predicate: "I am". 2) The use where a predicate may be understood, even though it is not expressed: "It is I" (Jn 6:20) or "I am he" (Jn 18:5). 3) The use with a predicate nominative: seven instances such as John 6:35, 51; 8:12 (cf. 9:5); 10:7, 9, 11, 14; 11:25; 14:6; 15:1, 5. Both Bultmann and Brown's classifications serve to elucidate the "I am" sayings in their own ways.

14 According to Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:79), the ἐγώ εἰμι formula appears 26 times in the mouth of Jesus, as distributed between John 4 and 19. Two forms occur evenly: "13 times used absolutely and 13 times used in connection with a predicate" (Coetzee 1986:170).

15 Speaking of his identity and role, the same idea can be expressed in a slightly different manner. Tolmie (1995:75, footnote 32) states: "These sayings ... are used in the Gospel with the purpose of making important christological and soteriological statements". In light of the connotation in Tolmie's remark, the word *christological* is essentially parallel to Jesus' identity and the word *soteriological* to his role. Tolmie (1995:75, footnote 32) continues: "Christologically the "I am" sayings (and especially the absolute use of "I am") are used to present Jesus as speaking in the same manner in which Yahweh revealed himself in the Old Testament, thereby stressing the unity between Father and Son" (cf. also Brown 1966:537; Burge 1992:356). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:88) puts it this way: "Jesus is God's eschatological revealer in whom God utters himself". "Soteriologically, these sayings are used for

mission visible in impressive images and symbols. The different images are simply variations on the single theme, that Jesus has come so that human beings may have life, and have it in abundance" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:88; Smalley 1978:90).

I shall examine the meaning of the 'I am' sayings *with an image* in relation to Johannine symbolism. As mentioned earlier (section 5 in Chapter 3), Koester (1995:13) suggests the twofold structure of symbolism used in the Gospel: "The primary level of meaning concerns Christ; the secondary level concerns discipleship The clearest examples are the 'I am' sayings of Jesus." This structure, too, matches the description of these sayings as being Christological and soteriological. The interface between discipleship and a soteriological aspect in this relationship is an abundant life, which Jesus gives to his followers (who will have such life by discipleship).¹⁶

After a detailed literary study of the usage of these sayings in the text of John, Ball (1996:146-160, especially 157-160) makes several concluding remarks. I shall refer to only those remarks that appear to be relevant to this section. *Firstly*, he avers that literary studies of the 'I am' sayings "confirm the conclusions of Schweizer about the essential unity of the Gospel" (Ball 1996:157), despite their divergent usage in the Gospel. *Secondly*, "this approach has confirmed Zimmermann's view that there is a closer interaction between the predicate and the unpredicated sayings than has been granted in studies which have created a strict separation based on form" (Ball 1996:158). *Lastly*, he asserts that these sayings contribute considerably to the characterisation of the Johannine Jesus. In his own words, "[t]hese literary studies have shown the dominance of Jesus as the main character of the Gospel" (Ball 1996:159, 255). His other important comment, not as a conclusion, but in terms of a methodological consideration, is that literary studies of the Johannine text will guide a critic to discern a correct background for further understanding these sayings (Ball 1996:160). This is important, because the critic ought to have legitimate criteria to delimit his research on the topic, namely on the possible background of the ἐγώ εἰμι sayings in this instance.

characterising Jesus as God's agent, the mediator of salvation, who brings life to man" (Tolmie 1995:75, footnote 32; cf. also Du Rand 1994:94).

16 Painter (1986:49) contends: "In the 'I am' statements the symbols were given a new point of reference, setting Jesus on opposition to the Jewish understanding of the knowledge of God. Where the Jews affirmed that Israel knows God in and through the Law the evangelist declared that the believer knows God in and through Jesus (1.17-18)."

Burge (1992:355) considers three areas for possible background, namely non-Jewish sources, the Old Testament and Palestinian Judaism. Hermetic literature (Deissmann 1927:134-142; Burge 1992:355), Mandaeen writings (Schweizer 1939:46-82; Meeks 1965:487-491; Bultmann 1971:225-226, footnote 3) and Gnosticism (MacRae 1970) chiefly represent non-Jewish sources in this instance (cf. Bernard 1928:cxvi-cxxi; Barrett 1955:242-243). However, scholars such as Brown (1966:535-538), Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:83-86) and Smith (1995:112) agree that Palestinian Judaism and the Old Testament, in particular, should be perceived as the correct background.¹⁷ More specifically, as for the absolute use of the formula, “two Old Testament backgrounds have been proposed, in each of which God identifies himself by saying ‘I am’ (Septuagint: *ego eimi*)” (Smith 1995:112). One is Exodus 3:14 (cf. Dt 32:39), and the other is the reiterated usage of Second Isaiah (41:4; 43:10, 13, 25; 46:4; 47:10; 48:12; 51:12; 52:6; cf. 46:9; 48:17).¹⁸ With regard to the predicate sayings in John, Brown (1966:535) avers that these sayings “are adaptations of OT symbolism (bread, light, shepherd, and vine are all used symbolically in describing the relations of God to Israel)”. The reason why Brown says so lies in the fact that it is difficult to trace any specific Old Testament passages as the clear-cut background (Smith 1995:112; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:8).¹⁹

17 Ball (1996:259) confirms this point: “The Gospel itself provides clues which point to the Old Testament and Judaism as the correct conceptual background for the use of ἔγω εἰμι”. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:86) echoes: “In sum, the self-presentation which is vital to a saying of the reveler, ἔγω εἰμι that is, in the absolute form, was probably taken from the revelation formula used by Yahweh in the Old Testament, and the imagery too probably comes mainly from the Old Testament and Judaism”. Therefore, he continues to assert that God’s uniqueness and exclusiveness described in the Old Testament revelation formula are strongly evident in Johannine “I am” sayings (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:83).

18 Brown (1966:536) is of the opinion that “the use of *ego eimi* in LXX of Deutero-Isaiah came to be understood not only as a statement of divine unicity and existence, but also as a divine name” (cf. also Dodd [1953] 1968:94; Burge 1992:355). The divine uniqueness refers to God’s claim that “I am Yahweh and there is no other” (Brown 1966:536). From these backgrounds, “it is quite possible that John thinks of *ego eimi* as the divine name given to Jesus” (Brown 1966:537). “Furthermore the words in Isaiah were spoken exclusively by the LORD. By the application of such words to the Johannine Jesus, an identification with the words and salvation of the God of Isaiah is ” (Ball 1996:258; cf. also Harner 1970:6-15, 57).

19 Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:84) explains: “[T]he images themselves can be very easily placed in a Jewish or Palestinian context, and also occur to some extent in rabbinic literature (the light of the world, the spring, bread), in the Qumran texts (the way), in apocalyptic (resurrection) and other texts (bread of life, Jos, *Ant*). On the other hand, divine self-predications with such images do

Nevertheless, if one considers these Johannine metaphors as a development of the revelation formula, numerous possible comparisons can be suggested as in the following examples (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:84): shield (Gn 15:1), healer (Ex 15:26), keeper (Is 27:3), the first and the last (Is 41:4; 44:6; 48:12), saviour (Is 43:11), shepherd (Ezk 34:12) and helper (Hs 13:4).

The reader's perspective

I wish to clarify Jesus' expression in 9:5, in conjunction with the pure Johannine saying in 8:12, from the reader's perspective. According to Culpepper (1983:219), "the reader has extensive knowledge of the Old Testament". This suggests that the reader is able to understand adequately the meaning of the light of the world when Jesus revealed himself as such.²⁰ That is to say, the reader may be able to understand Jesus described in the 'I am' sayings in Chapters 8 and 9 as "the bringer of revelation and salvation" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:85).

not occur, and such relevant examples as can be found in the Old Testament are not adequate parallels."

- 20 Ball (1996:260) observes: "The reader who knows the Old Testament sees two levels to Jesus' words and reinterprets the surface level of meaning in the light of the deeper meaning which the Old Testament gives to Jesus' words." *Firstly*, "[t]he ἔγώ εἰμι carries with it the solidarity of Christ with God" (Dodd [1953] 1968:96). "Beyond all doubt Jesus makes the radical claim in Jn 8(-9) of his unique unity with Jahweh, the God of the Covenant" (Coetzee 1986:174). Not only does Jesus claim such unity, but he also claims to bear the divine name when he utters these sayings (cf. Burge 1992:356). *Secondly*, according to Schweizer (1939:117), the "I am" sayings with an image should be considered as "real speech", but not as allegory or parable. "This means that the 'I am' sayings do not simply compare Jesus with various images but actually unite Jesus with them" (Ball 1996:13-14). Jesus is not simply like a light (parable), but he is the light. Likewise he is not simply a light (allegory) but *the* light. *Thirdly*, "[t]he absolute sayings seem to refer to a particular context: that of Isaiah 40-55. This same context also forms the basic background to the sayings with an image in 8.12 ..." (Ball 1996:265). "By way of his *EGO EIMI* sayings in Jn 8(-9) Jesus clearly in a very special way identifies Himself to be the long awaited messianic Servant of the Lord ... prophesied in Is 42-43" (Coetzee 1986:174; Brown 1966:372 emphasises Is 49:6 for Jesus' self-description as the suffering Servant in connection with the light). Likewise, Ball (1996:260) remarks that "it was the role of the Servant of the LORD in Isaiah to be a light to the nations. Thus, when Jesus claims to be that light, he implicitly assumes the identity of the Servant".

The characters' perspective

In 9:5, there are two (groups of) characters on stage: Jesus and his disciples. Since Jesus was the speaker, Jesus should have known the meaning and significance of this saying. As examined earlier (section 4.5 in Chapter 3), the characterisation of the disciples, in this instance, can basically follow their general description established up to Chapter 9. In light of their general description, the disciples appeared to have good knowledge of the Old Testament and Jewish thought.²¹ This suggests that the disciples were presumably able to sufficiently understand the meaning of the light of the world. Moreover, the dialogue scene (9:1-5) gives no indication to jeopardise this assumption.

Lastly, I should point out that, when the ἔγώ εἰμι sayings are uttered, they embody a double nature of revelation and concealment, as is the case with parables and symbolism. More precisely, the sayings will either evoke faith in the revealer or provoke unbelief against him. John 8 demonstrates the latter response in the unbelieving Jews who judged Jesus as an ultimate blaspheming offender. Conversely, John 9 depicts the former response in the faith of the blind man who believed in Jesus and thus identified Jesus as the light of the world.

I have thus discussed the mutual contextual belief of the 'I am' statements. For the sake of analysis, one should note how much of these sayings the reader and characters correctly understand.

3.1.5 Relationships between the characters

At the end of each specific set of mutual contextual beliefs in the seven dialogues (clusters), I shall discuss the knowledge of the specific speech situations and of the relations between the two parties in the narrative. In addition, I shall present this discussion in such a way that this knowledge should be valid for both the author-reader level and the character level.

With respect to cluster A, one point should be made clear. As indicated in the analysis below, this dialogue structurally comprises two interactions between the characters. One is the interaction between Jesus and his disciples, and the other is between Jesus and the blind man.²² Therefore,

21 For instance, Andrew called Jesus the Messiah (1:41), and Philip described Jesus as the one who was written in the Law and the Prophets (1:45). Nathanael knew the symbolic meaning of the fig tree (1:48-49). The disciples could recite an Old Testament passage (2:17). Peter confessed that Jesus was the Holy One of God (6:69).

22 I have titled Cluster A as such, because 1) no explicit verbal conversation takes place in the latter interaction, and 2) there is a strong relation between the two

I shall describe this knowledge separately for these two interactions, but I shall not do so in the other clusters.

- a. The knowledge held for the specific conversation between Jesus and his disciples is as follows:
 - The relationship between Jesus and his disciples was one of teacher-pupil or master-disciple. Thus Jesus was superior to them.
 - Both parties (Jesus and the disciples) knew that the man was born blind.
 - Both parties basically knew the one who sent Jesus.
 - Both parties basically knew the concept of sin.
 - It is assumed that the disciples knew Jesus' self-disclosure that he was the light of the world and his ensuing statement that anyone who follows him shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the light of life in 8:12.
- b. The knowledge held for the specific conversation between Jesus and the blind man is as follows:
 - In terms of social status, Jesus was superior to the blind man who was a beggar.
 - Jesus and the blind man had no personal relationship prior to their encounter.
 - Because of the healing, the relationship between Jesus and the blind man became one of healer-healed, similar to that between physician and patient. Thus Jesus was also personally superior to him.

3.2 Overview and structural analysis chart


I shall make some remarks concerning the overview of cluster A (cf. also the structural analysis chart in Appendix 4):

1. There is an *inclusio* in this section. Both cola 1 and 10 focus on the man who is blind from birth. Secondly, I find a certain contrast in this *inclusio* in terms of the man's physical conditions, that is, both his inability and ability to see.
2. Blindness and sight are two major motifs in this cluster, most likely, in the entire chapter.²³

interactions in terms of semantic content.

23 I shall attempt to clarify this point later. Cf. Brown 1966:377; Culpepper 1983:191-192.

Structural analysis chart for cluster A



- Grammatically, most of the verbs used in the conversation are in the present tense, whereas all the verbs used to describe the events are in the aorist tense (cf. Dockery 1988:17). This fact suggests that, when the author portrays the events, he treats them as having definitely happened in the past. However, when he records the utterances, he employs the verbs in the present tense so that the words of the characters may come alive as if they were speaking right now. Granted that the use of the present tense is a conventional way to record utterances, it does cause their conversations to be displayed very vividly, creating more fascination.
- As Nida and others (1983:44) point out that “compactness is often combined with other rhetorical features, especially parallelism and ellipsis”, the same holds for parallelism, in this instance. Phonetic parallelism is found among the main verbs of cola 4 to 10, except colon 9: ἔπτυσεν, ἐποίησεν, ἐπέχρισεν (εἶπεν), ἀπῆλθεν and ἦλθεν. Syntactic parallelism is also found between cola 4 to 6 and 8 to 10, for these cola have no explicit

nominal parts and are connected by the same conjunction *καί*.²⁴ These cola are all linked by means of an additive-different (consequential) relationship. Another parallelism can be detected between subcolon 2.1 and 3.1. These parallelisms are structural evidence for the cohesion of this cluster.

5. Just as Jesus' healing actions were described in three parts, the reactions of the blind man were also depicted in three parts. This contrast may not be a coincidence, but the author's intentional arrangement.
6. As far as this cluster is concerned, my view does not correspond with that of Jones (1997:167) who states regarding verses 6-7 that "the primary focus of attention is on the relationship between healer and the one healed, not on the act itself". The reason for this is that, as will be noted, the work of God through Jesus' healing action should be the pivotal point in this cluster. The relationship between the two will be highlighted in more detail in cluster B' (9:35-38), when the blind man makes his commitment to Jesus.
7. Significant structural markers include the following: blind, (to) sin, (to) work, to send, day, night, light, and to see (sight).

All these aspects contribute to the cohesion of this cluster.

3.3 Microspeech acts

I shall make the following analysis according to the basic reading scheme (cf. section 3.4.2 in Chapter 2).

3.3.1 The first subcluster (9:1-5)

9:1 Καὶ παράγων εἶδεν ἄνθρωπον τυφλὸν ἐκ γενετῆς.

a) General analysis²⁵

Colon 1 is the setting of the event in the narrative structures in which it is told that Jesus and the disciples (by an obvious induction from colon 2), who were walking together on a road somewhere in Jerusalem, saw a man who had been blind from birth. The conjunction *καί* indicates that this story

24 Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:240 notes the frequency of *καί* in 9:1-7 as striking.

25 In this section, I shall use the terminology used in Colon Analysis (section 2.1 in Chapter 2), such as colon and subcolon, and mainly delineate the grammatical, syntactical and structural aspects of the text based on my Structural analysis chart in Appendix 4.

has some relationship with the previous chapter (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:240; cf. Brown 1966:371, 376), showing the temporal progression. The present nominative masculine participle *παράγων* indicates, along with the inference from the co-text, that the subject is Jesus.

Subcolon 1.2* is the main clause of the sentence, and portrays what Jesus noticed on the way. The author introduces the blind man to the reader for the first time in this portrait. In subcolon 1.2*, the narrator, by using the prepositional phrase *ἐκ γενετής*, mentions that the blind man's blindness was congenital.²⁶ This detail 'blind from birth', not merely 'blind', is very important for the plot of the entire story. Thus, this verse 1 renders: *And while he was passing by, he saw a man blind from birth.*

b) Illocutionary act

The text before us begins with the narrator's voice; the narrator attempts to inform the reader of the setting of the event which is about to take place, as analysed earlier. The aorist indicative verb *εἶδεν* expresses the subject's action with certainty. This implies that the narrator's attitude in describing the setting may be strong. In light of these points, I shall classify this utterance as an *illocutionary act* belonging to the category of *constatives*, further subclassified as an *informative*.²⁷ Bach and Harnish (1979:42) present the complete schema of informatives as follows:

Informatives: (advise, announce, apprise, disclose, inform, insist, notify, point out, report, reveal, tell, testify).

In uttering *e*, *S* informs *H* that *P* if *S* expresses:²⁸

- i. the belief that *P*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* form the belief that *P*.

When this schema is applied to the text in this section, the following result is obtained:

In uttering that *And while he was passing by, he saw a man blind from birth*, the narrator informs the reader that Jesus saw a man born blind if the narrator expresses:

- i. the belief that Jesus saw a man born blind, and
- ii. the intention that the reader forms the belief that Jesus saw a man born blind.

26 This phrase only occurs in this instance in the New Testament (Plummer [1882] 1981:204); it is a Greek expression. The Semitic expression would be: "from his mother's womb" (Brown 1966:371; Lindars [1972] 1981:341).

27 For the definitions and taxonomy, cf. the Diagram of taxonomy in Appendix 1.

28 *e* = expression, *S* = speaker, *H* = hearer, *P* = proposition.

As the narrator appears to express his belief and intention, as described above, the utterance would be a successful informative speech act.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *perlocutionary force* of this narration is to get the reader to accept the way in which the story is about to start, because this is the starting point of the event. The story cannot continue, unless the reader accepts the narrator's explanation. Even if the reader cannot determine by himself whether, as the narrator claims, the man whom Jesus saw was really a blind man or not, there is no need to doubt it at this point, because it can be assumed that the *Cooperative Principle* (cf. section 1.3 in Chapter 2) is now being observed between the narrator and the reader. Moreover, the narrator has no reason to want to lose the reader's confidence in him as a reliable narrator; that confidence that has been established thus far in the first eight chapters. Rather, the narrator needs to re-establish his trustworthiness when he is about to introduce a new story to the reader. In this sense, it is imperative for the narrator to uphold the *Cooperative Principle*, especially the *Maxim of Quality* (be true), in order to achieve an adequate perlocutionary act.

d) Communicative strategy

1. At first glance, the narrator seems to break the *Maxim of Ambiguity* under the *Clarity Principle* of Textual Rhetoric by not specifically identifying the subject of the sentence, which is Jesus. However, this is not the case in this instance, for the narrator already mentions Jesus' name in the last sentence in 8:59: ἦραν οὖν λίθους ἵνα βάλλωσιν ἐπ' αὐτόν· Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἐκρύβη καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ.
2. Although Beasley-Murray (1987:153) suggests that there is a time gap between 8:59 and 9:1, in the narrator's eyes the story in Chapter 9 continues, without a doubt, from the story related in Chapter 8. Thus, he considers it more important to follow the *Maxim of Reduction* under the *Economy Principle* by not repeating Jesus' name. This is a basic example of what Leech (1983:67) points out, namely that "the Economy Principle is continually at war with the Clarity Principle".
3. Viewed from the perspective of the continuity from Chapter 8, the narrator further observes the *Processibility Principle* in the present text. He especially follows its *End-Focus Maxim* by putting new information, that Jesus saw a man blind from birth, at the end. Many critics²⁹ take note

29 Barrett 1955:296; Bultmann 1971:330; Morris 1971:477; Painter 1979: 27; 1986:34.

of Jesus' initiative in this miracle story.³⁰ Holleran (1993b:354) represents their opinions, stating that "from the start the emphasis is entirely on his initiative". By contrast, those who are in need usually approach Jesus for his mercy in most miracle stories in both the Synoptics and the *Fourth Gospel* (e.g., 2:3; 4:47; 11:3).

4. The fact that the narrator does not give an elaborate account of the setting is indicative of his intention to create suspense in the story. This can be explained in terms of the *Maxim of Quantity* (making your contribution as informative as is required). Is the text under consideration as informative as is required for the story's setting? Generally speaking, one can describe a setting by using the 5 W's: who, when, where, what, and why. A few questions may consequently come to the reader's mind. When did Jesus see this blind man? Which road or where was he walking? Why was he passing by? What was the blind man doing at that time? These are some of the curious questions. The narrator, however, provides hardly any information in a short sentence on the setting. From a narratological point of view, Jones (1997:162) points out that "the comment that he was 'passing by' suffices to denote a change of scene". Obviously, the narrator thinks that this is enough for the reader, at least for the moment. There is no need to doubt that the other side of the *Maxim of Quantity* is operative: "do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice 1975:45). Because of this textual strategy, the narrator is successful not only in involving the reader in the narrative story with suspense, but also in taking the reader to the heart of the story from the beginning. This strategy enables the reader to focus, even more closely, on the disciples' question in the next verse.

5. As far as the *Maxim of Quantity* is concerned, the most important contribution by the narrator in verse 1 is the disclosure of the secret of the blind man. The man was blind, and his blindness occurred at his birth. His suffering is, and *the theme of suffering* is, therefore, introduced at the outset (cf. Boice 1977:35). The reader has no way of knowing this secret, unless the narrator relates it from his omniscient perspective. This bears considerable significance for the development of the story. Without this narration, the disciples' question in the next verse would make little sense. The same holds for the conversation between his parents and the Jews in verses 18-20. Lindars ([1972] 1981:341) is of the opinion that John "wishes to present the healing, not as an act of restoration, but as a creative act by him who is the Light of the World". The narrator enhances and contributes to the reader's understanding of the story to a great extent, while observing the *Maxim of Quantity*.

30 For the miracle story form, cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:24-25. For a comment on this story as a pronouncement story, cf. Staley 1991:64.

6. Regarding the significance of the fact that the accusative noun *ἄνθρωπον* has no article, Howard-Brook (1994:214-215) is of the opinion that the absence of the article indicates that this usage can be meant as the whole of humanity, de-emphasising the particularity of the individual – the blind man, in this instance. Duke (1982:182) and Dockery (1988:17) also point out this aspect (cf. Barrett 1955:294). Painter (1986:42) draws attention to the fact that the omission of *τίς*, which is used in 5:5, and John's choice of word *ἄνθρωπος* instead of *ἄνθρω*, make this interpretation most likely. If this view is combined with the fact that no name is given to the blind man, this will strengthen the argument (cf. also Koester 1995:64). As far as family life in Palestinian society is concerned, Stambaugh and Balch (1986:84) state: "Sons were named at circumcision." Thus it is logical to assume that the blind man had his own name. But the author in this chapter does not provide his personal name, unlike the chapters that record the names of the individual characters.³¹ The absence of his name is most likely because the author may intend, in addition to inviting "the reader's subjective identification with the unnamed characters" (Beck 1993:143), to accentuate that all humankind is spiritually blind from birth (until they receive the light which shines in the darkness) (cf. also Pink [1945] 1968:63; Morris 1971:477; Duke 1982:182).

7. Lee (1994:186) warns, however, not to "import the later doctrine of original sin into the narrative". She points out: "In v. 3, Jesus rejects the link between blindness and sin ..." (Lee 1994:186). As will become evident later, when the disciples and Jesus spoke of a possible connection between blindness and sin, they were not discussing original sin as such, but a particular, tangible sin that may have caused his blindness, just as she rightly observes that "the narrative is not concerned with original sin" (Lee 1994:186). However, in my opinion, the point that all are spiritually blind from birth is not an importation of the later doctrine, but an insight gained from both the text and Johannine thought. The author does not give any reason for the existence of darkness in the Prologue, but he presupposes its existence (John 1:5). When the Johannine Jesus stated that "the truth shall make you free" (8:32), Jesus presupposed that the Jews had been enslaved. Jesus even pointed out that they were of their father the devil (8:44). Some scholars³² suggest that, in John, the Jews may be representative of humankind or 'the world', especially of those who sit in darkness. Therefore,

31 E.g., John, Andrew, Simon Peter, Philip and Nathanael in Chapter 1; Nicodemus in Chapter 3; Judas in Chapter 6; Lazarus, Mary, Martha and Thomas in Chapter 11; Caiaphas in Chapter 12; Malchus, Annas and Pilate in Chapter 18; the Marys and Joseph of Arimathea in Chapter 19.

32 E.g., Bultmann 1971:86; Bratcher 1975:402; Nickelsburg 1985:83; Trites 1992:879; Du Rand 1994:52; Smith 1995:56.

the above point corresponds to a prevalent theme in Johannine ideology, and is not the importation of the later doctrine of the Church. Culpepper (1983:191) also agrees, stating that all are born blind in Johannine thought (cf. also Barrett 1955:294; Du Rand 1994:26).

e) Summary

The theory of speech acts successfully determines the narrator's utterance as an informative speech act. The narrator employs the *Cooperative Principle* and various *Maxims* (*Quality, Quantity, Reduction and End-Focus*) to introduce this intriguing story effectively to the reader.³³ The theme of suffering is also introduced. The reader should accept the way in which the story began by knowing the information provided by the narrator. The reader is expected to view the narrator as wholly reliable.

9:2 καὶ ἠρώτησαν αὐτὸν οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες, Ῥαββί, τίς ἥμαρτεν, οὗτος ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῆι;

In this verse, the basic reading scheme concerns two different utterances: the utterance of the narrator and that of the disciples. I shall first deal with the narrator's utterance.

a) General analysis

The encounter with the blind man made the disciples curious about his blindness. Thus, colon 2 opens the first dialogue that occurred between Jesus and his disciples. In fact, this marks the starting point of both the first subcluster and the happenings of the entire chapter. Accordingly, colon 2 describes the disciples' question to their master, and 2.1 relates the content of their question, with the complementary remark of 2.1.1. Colon 2 is rendered: *And his disciples asked him, saying,*

b) Illocutionary act

The intention of the narrator is to tell the reader who initiated the conversation and of whom they asked the question. Thus, this utterance also constitutes an *informative speech act*. The narrator does not provide the detail, as in the previous verse, in order to emphasise the disciples' initiative in striking up the conversation.

33 For a summary of the overall significances or effects of using these Principles and Maxims in the analysis, cf. section 1.4.1 in Chapter 5.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader must notice the identity of the interlocutors and their important role in this conversation (see below).

d) Communicative strategy

1. Intrigued by the miserable situation of the man born blind, the man they also noticed, the narrator introduces the disciples' question. The first matter that needs to be clarified is who were the disciples. How many disciples were walking with Jesus? As pointed out earlier, the reader has some knowledge of the disciples. He knows their characteristics as accumulated by reading the eight previous chapters thus far. This is the reason why the narrator introduces the disciples without any explanation. For an answer to the second question, however, the reader has to infer it from the immediate co-text. As a result, it can only be said that there were most likely not many disciples (Bernard 1928:324 is positive in including the Twelve), because they could hear each other speaking while walking together. However, in the narrator's eyes, these observations are not important, for the narrator also adheres to the *Economy Principle* in introducing the disciples. He could have furnished more information, but he chose not to do so. What is more important here then? It is agreed that one of the literary characteristics of the *Fourth Gospel* is that Jesus usually takes the initiative and starts the first utterance of the conversation.³⁴ In this instance, however, the disciples, not Jesus, initiated the conversation. Although Jesus took the initiative in the healing itself, the disciples opened the actual conversation. This is important, and similar to the basic conversational form of the Synoptic Gospels (for a discussion of the dialogue form, cf. Dodd 1963:316-319). Hence, the narrator's introduction of the disciples at this point is very concise and straight to the point.

2. I should note that, from this point onward, I shall omit the reading scheme (except for the section on 'GA') concerning the narrator's introduction to the characters' conversation for the remaining analysis of Chapter 9, since the results will most likely remain similar. The *illocutionary act* of introduction is mainly *informative*, providing information such as who the speaker is, and/or to whom does the speaker address himself. The *perlocutionary act* is for the reader to understand such information in order to decode the speaker's utterance more correctly. The introductory narration is, therefore, important as "stage direction" (Saayman 1992:15), explaining the setting of the particular speech situation. Consequently, the introductory narration will be discussed as part of the usual analysis

34 1:38, 43, 47; 2:16; 4:7; 5:6, 14; 6:5, 20, 67; 7:37; 8:12; 9:35; 11:7; 12:44; 18:4; 19:26; 20:15, 19, 26; 21:5, 10, 15.

on each utterance, but not as a separate object of analysis. This kind of introduction can be found in verses 3, 6-12, 15-17, 19-20, 24-28, 30, 34-41.

I shall now examine the disciples' utterance.

a) General analysis

In subcolon 2.1, the vocative noun Ῥαββί is probably the conventional word for the disciples when they tried to get attention from Jesus (cf. Bernard 1928:324). The subject of the sentence is expressed by the interrogative pronoun τίς, and the aorist active verb ἤμαρτεν signifies the action. This important word provides a base for the formulation of *the theme of sin* in this chapter (cf. Brodie 1993:357). The disciples thought that the man's blindness must have come from either the blind man's own sin or his parents', because he was born blind. Rensberger (1989:44) is of the opinion that the question as to who is a sinner dominates the entire chapter (cf. also Owings 1983:74).

In 2.1.1, the subordinate conjunction ἵνα and the aorist passive subjunctive verb γεννηθῆ form a result clause (Barrett 1955:295; Morris 1971:477, footnote 5; Bruce [1983] 1994:209). Its content is the result of the action referred in the main clause. What the disciples really wanted to know was the reason for his blindness out of (e.g., theological) interest, assuming that there should be some relationship between sins and physical affliction. Their thoughts may have reflected the common understanding of the connection between sin and suffering among Jewish people at that time. Semantically, this assumption becomes the underlying focal point in the deep structure of this subcluster (for a discussion of deep structure, see Louw 1982:73, 77). The translation of this utterance (the propositional content) would be: *Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, with the result that he might be born blind?*

b) Illocutionary act

The disciples' utterance is a question as to the cause or reason for the man's blindness. In speech act theory, an utterance is evaluated not in terms of whether it is true or false, but primarily in terms of success or failure. In order to evaluate the utterance as such, I shall take into account certain felicity conditions. Searle ([1969] 1980:67) provides a scheme of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a speech act of question as follows:

Propositional content condition: Any proposition or propositional function.

Preparatory condition: S does not know 'the answer', i.e., does not know if the proposition is true, or, in the case of the propositional function, does not know the information needed to complete the proposition truly. It is obvious to neither the S nor the H that H will provide the information at that time without being asked.

Sincerity condition: S wants this information.

Essential condition: It counts as an attempt to elicit this information from H.

Since these conditions are the criteria for a successful utterance, I shall examine the disciples' question as follows:

Propositional content condition: It is obvious that the disciples' question satisfies this condition.

Preparatory condition: The disciples do not know the answer. It is obvious to neither the disciples nor Jesus that Jesus will provide the information at that time without being asked.

Sincerity condition: The disciples want this information.

Essential condition: It counts as an attempt to elicit this information from Jesus.

It is obvious from the above that the disciples' question satisfies the above conditions and that it is, therefore, a *successful question speech act on the character level*. Briefly, the disciples had the intention to obtain information from Jesus which they did not have at the time of inquiry. They sincerely wanted to know who was responsible for his congenital blindness. How they came to know of his condition is a mystery. The author leaves no clue. *Regarding the illocutionary force on the text level*, the author intends to ask the reader the same question as the disciples did in order to observe whether the reader also shares the same kind of perceptions of the relationship between sin and suffering.

c) Perlocutionary act

Since the disciples' question is a question speech act, this entails that Jesus was brought to the position where he needed to provide a successful answer, because he was legitimately asked according to the rules of language. Accordingly, Jesus should provide a sufficient answer to their question, indicating whose fault it was that caused the blind man to be blinded. The reader should also answer the question for himself, indicating whether or not he also shares the same views concerning the issue of sin and suffering.

d) Communicative strategy

When discussing a character's utterance, we would, as a rule, analyse it on two levels, namely *the communication on the character (or story) level* and *the author-reader (or text) level* (cf. section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2). I shall now discuss *the communication on the character level*.

1. It is noteworthy that the disciples' question may be observing the *Interest Principle* of Interpersonal Rhetoric. According to Gros Louis's (1982:20) suggestion that it is helpful for a literary critic to ask, "Why does the narrative have this particular character saying these particular words at this moment?", we should also ask why did the disciples ask this particular question of Jesus when they saw the blind man? Was it usual for them to ask that kind of question whenever they saw a person with any physical defect? Even if their question reflected upon the common understanding of the relationship between sin and suffering among Jewish people at that time, as examined earlier (section 3.1.1), it was probably unusual to ask the question explicitly in the way they did. I assume that, when one saw a physically disabled person whom one did not personally know, one's normal reaction would have been just to have sympathy in the first instance. When the disabled person was poor, as in the case of the blind man who was described as a beggar in verse 8, one may also have considered giving alms to the weak person. In fact, "giving alms to the poor was part of normative Jewish piety" (Karris 1990:22). This Jewish practice is reflected in the synoptic Jesus who encouraged *his followers* to be generous towards the poor (e.g., Mt 5:42; 6:3; 19:21; Mk 6:37; 10:21; Lk 9:13). What is even more fascinating is that "[i]t is the Johannine Jesus, on the other hand, who, along with his disciples, has money and gives alms to the poor".³⁵ It suggests that Jesus and his group appeared to engage fairly often in this pious act (cf. Karris 1990:22-32). In this instance, the disciples only uttered this aloof question, and did not give alms to the blind beggar. This may be unusual, and their question itself could be considered rude. Accordingly, in asking such a question, the disciples may have committed what Pratt (1977:182) calls an "unintentional failure" of the *Politeness Principle*, especially of the *Sympathy Maxim*. However, or rather therefore, their question is simultaneously "unpredictable, and hence interesting" (Leech 1983:146). It is tellable and, therefore, observes the *Interest Principle* at the expense of the *Sympathy Maxim*.

2. In addition, social-scientific data may shed more light on the disciples' inquiry. "Because people in antiquity paid little attention to impersonal cause-effect relationships and therefore paid little attention to the biomedical aspects of disease, healers focused on persons in

35 Karris (1990:26) avers this based mainly on his analysis of Jn 12:5-8 and 13:29.

social settings rather than on malfunctioning organs in the biomedical sense. Socially rooted symptoms rather than adequate and impersonal causes bothered people” (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1992:71). This may be one explanation for the disciples in 9:2 not being concerned with their sympathy or impression of the man’s blindness, but the question addresses a social (and theological) issue.

3. As far as the *Cooperative Principle* is concerned, the disciples’ question appears to fulfill all four maxims. But, is that really the case? Of the four maxims, only the *Relation Maxim* (be relevant) may need some scrutiny. This Maxim demands relevance of an utterance in a verbal exchange. Is it relevant for the disciples to ask Jesus such a question, namely who has sinned? Did they really expect that Jesus could answer their question? Was Jesus the right person to provide the answer? Did Jesus really know the personal history of the man whom he had just seen on the road? If Jesus was not in the position to answer the disciples’ question in any way, their question is considered, what Austin ([1962] 1976:16) calls, a “misfire”. This means that their question is not an appropriate one to ask Jesus. This entails either an unintentional failure or a violation of the *Relation Maxim* on the part of the disciples. However, the disciples seemed to be confident of Jesus’ ability to answer the question. It is reasonable to suppose that their association with him up to this event could have made them confident of their master. Since they had already witnessed or heard his signs in his impressive discourses, especially the incident where Nathanael was amazed by Jesus’ knowledge (1:47-49), it would not be strange if they had a special confidence in the capacity of his knowledge and deeds. As a result, the disciples were also observing the *Relation Maxim*.

4. At this point, I shall discuss *the communication on the author-reader level*. There is one set of important issues left concerning verse 2 before scrutinising Jesus’ reply in the next verse.

- i. Was it really a normal perception in Jesus’ days that physical affliction somehow resulted from one’s sinning?
- ii. Was it also true in the author’s own days?
- iii. Is correcting such a view one of the reasons why the author wanted to write this story?
- iv. In what way is the motif of suffering employed in this verse?

5. We have already noted the answers to the first and second questions in the section on ‘Blindness and sin’ (section 3.1.1). Once more, the view concerning the close connection between sin and suffering was common in the days of the characters and of the author. As far as the third question is concerned, Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:241) states: “The questioners

here – and behind the disciples we can see early Christians groups with their questions (cf. 14:8, 22) – are oppressed by a problem to which they know no satisfactory answer.” This could be a possible motive for the author to write this story. Schottroff (1998:176) is of the opinion that “[i]n the Johannine communities there were discussions about sexual ethics (9:2-3; 8:37-44) carried on within the framework of the corresponding Jewish discussions. The disciplining of sexual practices within marriage was rejected (9:3).”

6. The way in which *the theme of suffering* is employed in question iv is unique and subtle. The focus is not on the suffering of the blind man as such, but on the general perception concerning the link between sin and suffering represented by the disciples. Anyone who upheld this common belief, including the characters and the reader, may have suffered from this negative perception of affliction. Once they experienced any form of suffering such as physical deformity, illness, misfortune, disaster, broken family, and even loneliness, they would further suffer as a result of an unpleasant search for the cause. They would be mentally and spiritually tortured. Suffering brought on further suffering. After all, they were living in “a sin-infected universe” (Barclay [1955] 1975:38). This suffering beneath the surface may be even worse. Therefore, as will be noted in the next verse, the purpose of the suffering theme, in this instance, would be corrective (cf. section 6 in Chapter 3) in the sense that the dominant view needed to be challenged and reconsidered.

e) Summary

The disciples queried Jesus about the man’s congenital blindness based on the common assumption of the possible relationship between sin and suffering. In order to focus on the issue described in their question, the author makes particular use of the *Economy*, *Politeness* and *Interest Principles* as well as the *Relation Maxim*. The themes of sin and suffering are still evident in their utterance. I shall now pay full attention to Jesus’ answer in the next verse.

9:3 ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς, Οὐτε οὗτος ἥμαρτεν οὔτε οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ,
ἀλλ’ ἵνα φανερωθῇ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ.

As mentioned in the analysis of the previous verse, the reading scheme of the introduction to the conversation by the narrator will be omitted from this point onwards. The analysis will only be concerned with the characters’ utterances.

a) General analysis

Led by the disciples' inquiry, Jesus' answer is provided in colon 3. According to the colon demarcations, colon 3 is supposed to be examined altogether as a unit of analysis. However, his answer in colon 3 can be divided into three smaller units, subcola 3.1-3.2, 3.3-3.4 and 3.5, and each smaller unit can be perceived as a microspeech act. Accordingly, the analysis will be conducted separately on each microspeech act, for it is feasible and profitable to analyse it this way. In conclusion, these microspeech acts will be mapped into a macrospeech act to indicate that colon 3 should indeed be treated as a unit of analysis.

1. Let us scrutinise the first smaller unit, subcola 3.1-3.2. Subcolon 3.1 provides the direct answer to the disciples' question, whereas subcolon 3.2 gives the ultimate spiritual answer. In 3.1, the sentence construction, utilising two of the same negative conjunction οὐτέ makes it clear that neither the blind man nor his parents were responsible for his blindness. Besides this conjunction, the remaining words in 3.1 are basically the same as the vocabulary employed in subcolon 2.1. Thus, this repetition in 3.1 may emphasise its meaning semantically.

2. In 3.2, the adversative conjunction ἀλλ' indicates a dyadic-contrastive relation between this and the last subcolon according to Nida's scheme (Nida *et al.* 1983:103). The subordinate conjunction ἵνα and the aorist passive subjunctive verb φανερωθῆ form a purpose clause (Plummer [1882] 1981:204; Bruce [1983] 1994:209). It is also significant that there may be an ellipsis in this subcolon (Barrett 1955:295), since the ἵνα clause is a subordinate clause. Although there are other possibilities (Morris 1971:478, footnote 10; cf. below), it is likely that the Greek verb ἦν can be supplied as its main clause. The syntactic ellipsis may "serve to make the text somewhat more concise" (Nida *et al.* 1983:34).

3. Since "the punctuation and the versification, both added centuries after the original text of the gospel was written, are a form of interpretation" (Temple 1975:173), it is also possible to read the text differently. Newman and Nida (1980:299) suggest that the ἵνα clause can be taken as result and as purpose.³⁶ Moreover, Temple (1975:173-175) offers an intriguing translation based on the argument that the full stop can be put at the end of subcolon 3.1, and the comma instead of the full stop at the end of subcolon 3.2. His translation reads: "Neither did this one sin, nor his parents. But in order that the works of God be shown in him we need to work the works of the one having sent me while it is day" (Temple 1975:169; Morris 1971:478,

36 Cf. also Richardson 1959:124; Sanders & Mastin 1968:237; Tenney 1981:102; Witherington 1995:182-183.

footnote 10; Poirier 1996:293-294). In that case, one does not need to account for the ellipsis.

4. My own translation would be along the lines of the customary translation: *Neither this man nor his parents sinned, but (it was) in order that the works of God might be manifested in him.* This interpretation is better, because it connects Jesus' act of healing more directly with God's works. It is not, as Temple (1975:175) suggests, merely an act of Jesus' compassion. Furthermore, it can provide a more satisfactory answer to the disciples' question, by offering an alternative view to human suffering. Thus, their teacher Jesus directly answered their inquiry in the first part, and a new revelation was bestowed from the perspective of God in the second part. Jesus' answer, in this instance, denied their assumption about the relation between sin and suffering in the man's congenital blindness, and perhaps satisfied their theological interest more than they expected. Jesus' answer may further imply that Jesus was teaching not to limit their minds with stereotyped perceptions. Jesus might have added, "Open your minds, or you shall become like the Pharisees." However, this new revelation (at least to the disciples) easily transcends the boundary of human understanding, yet it may simultaneously represent an eternal truth: the works of God may be manifested in human afflictions. Since this concept contains a profound implication, it could be the pivotal point that binds this cluster together in a strong cohesive manner. Briefly, Jesus' utterance renders: *Neither this man nor his parents sinned, but (it was) in order that the works of God might be manifested in him.*

b) Illocutionary act

Since Jesus was asked a legitimate question by the disciples, he now had the responsibility of providing a successful answer. Therefore, the *illocutionary point* of this utterance would be to explain or state. Based on these points, including the above analysis, the *illocutionary act* of this utterance becomes one of *responsive*. Bach and Harnish (1979:43) present the schema of responsives as follows:

Responsives: (answer, reply, respond, retort)

In uttering *e*, *S* responds that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that *P*, which *H* has inquired about, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believe that *P*.

When this schema is applied to the text in this instance, the following is the result:

In uttering *Neither this man nor his parents sinned, but (it was) in order that the works of God might be manifested in him*, Jesus responds that the man was born blind in order that the works of God might be manifested in him, if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that the man was born blind in order that the works of God might be manifested in him, which the disciples have inquired about, and
- ii. the intention that the disciples believe that the man was born blind in order that the works of God might be manifested in him.

Since Jesus appears to express his belief and intention just as described above, the utterance would be a *successful responsive speech act*.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *perlocutionary act* is for the disciples to understand and accept the answer Jesus provided. In fact, Jesus used two steps in order for them to do so. *Firstly*, Jesus gave them a direct answer to their question in the first clause, denying that either the blind man or his parents sinned in this case. *Secondly*, Jesus also needed to supply new information concerning the man's blindness in the second clause, which reveals that God would work through Jesus for the sake of the blind man.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, O'Day (1987:58) rightly observes that, although the disciples inquired about the cause of his blindness, Jesus' answer explained the purpose (cf. also Brown 1966:371). The question then arises: Is Jesus' utterance a violation of the *Maxim of Relation*? It is a violation, strictly speaking, in that his utterance has no direct relevance to the primary end of the question, but Jesus' answer is still within the permissive range as an answer to them and, therefore, it is still a good and satisfactory answer. In fact, none of the disciples subsequently demanded another reply from Jesus. To put it differently, since the illocutionary act of the disciples' question is to gain information as to who was responsible for his blindness, Jesus answered it by saying that God was ultimately behind it all.³⁷ Hence, it can be mentioned that Jesus' utterance is not a violation of the *Relation Maxim*.

37 For a discussion of theodicy, cf. Westcott [1882] 1978:144; Dodd 1963:187; Bruce [1983] 1994:209; Haenchen 1984:37; Dockery 1988:17; Rensberger 1989:44; O'Day 1995:653. Bernard (1928:325-326) elucidates this verse with the doctrine of predestination.

2. Moreover, as the disciples' question was asked out of theological interest, Jesus answered it from the same perspective. Jesus revealed what God's role was in human affliction. In this sense, Jesus was observing the *Maxim of Relation*. This is probably an example of Leech's (1983:42) gloss that the *Maxim of Relation* has been criticised for its vagueness. Leech (1983:42) offers a clearer definition thereof, stating that one should make "your conversational contribution one that will advance the goals either of yourself or of your addressee". In accordance with this definition, Jesus definitely succeeded in upholding the *Maxim of Relation*.

3. As for the other Maxims, since it is obvious that Jesus was also observing the *Maxims of Quantity, Quality and Manner*, his answer in this verse was a very successful utterance. Furthermore, Jesus' answer was unpredictable and interesting to the disciples who needed to learn more about spiritual matters. His answer was beyond their imagination, for their question originally demanded only an answer as to whether either the blind man or his parents had sinned. In this sense, his answer contributed towards enhancing the quality of their conversation through the operation of the *Interest Principle*.

4. In accordance with the three purposes of suffering (cf. section 6 in Chapter 3), the suffering of the blind man is a perfect example of the third purpose (to God's glory). Not only did Jesus verbally do so in this verse, but he also proceeds to demonstrate it in verses 6-7.

5. *Regarding the communication between the author and the reader*, in colon 3 the author uses Jesus' name for the first time in Chapter 9. The use of his name is delayed for the purpose of the author attempting to focus the reader's particular attention on Jesus' answer.

6. Moreover, the author is observing the *Processibility Principle* in order to make it easy for the reader to decode Jesus' utterance. For this purpose, the author seems to uphold all three maxims of the *Processibility Principle* in Jesus' first utterance. Since new information is given at the end of the utterance, the author is observing the *End-Focus Maxim*. As "complex constituents are placed at the end of" the utterance (Leech 1983:65), the *End-Weight Maxim* is also being observed. Because negative operators (οὐτε...οὐτε) precede the other logical elements in the utterance, the *End-Scope Maxim* is also being adhered to.

7. For the sake of the reader, the author may also be attempting to correct the wrong traditional view concerning the relation between sin and suffering, which the reader may still hold (cf. section 3.1.1). If so, the *perlocutionary act* for the reader is for him to understand and accept that the cause or reason for human suffering is not necessarily related to sin.

This may be epoch-making or, if not, at least good news for readers of all times. For instance, if a person is experiencing some kind of suffering, he certainly should not need to feel punished by God as people often do. Because such a person sometimes tries to find the reason so desperately, he unnecessarily connects his suffering to wrongs, which he thinks he may have done in the past. However, the author assures the reader through Jesus' words that this is not always the case. There are cases of suffering that God uses to good purpose. This understanding is often hidden for many years from the person concerned. The person suffering not only has to ask God why it happens to him, but also for what purpose it happened. This may cause a great paradigm shift in his perception of human suffering, and it may often reveal part of the reasons for suffering, just as the disciples were told. When one finds a positive purpose in one's suffering, it is possible that one would also find some kind of consolation. This may be the reason why many readers of all times have found encouragement in this utterance of the Johannine Jesus.

e) Summary

In his responsive speech act, Jesus intended to answer the disciples' question, and to provide new information concerning the blind man's suffering. The information comprises the purpose of his blindness. The disciples should understand and accept the answer Jesus provided, because his answer is convincing. The author may be trying to correct the wrong traditional view, which the reader may still hold, and to let the reader know that the cause of or reason for human suffering is not necessarily always related to sin. The reader may be convinced that Jesus was not an ordinary human teacher, for he surprised the disciples and the reader with his answer comprising this unique view. For effective communication, Jesus especially employed the *Relation Maxim* and the *Interest Principle*. The author, on the other hand, uses all three maxims of the *Processibility Principle* for the same purpose.

9:4 ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με ἕως ἡμέρας
ἐστίν· ἔρχεται νύξ ὅτε οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐργάζεσθαι.

a) General analysis

The second smaller unit made up of 3.3-3.4 (and the third smaller unit in 3.5) elaborates on the concept that the works of God may be manifested in human afflictions described in subcolon 3.2. Subcolon 3.3 mentions the necessity and urgency of doing God's works within the limitation posed

by 3.3.1. It is obvious that, in John's Gospel, the one who sent Jesus was God the Father (e.g., 3:16-17, 34; 5:36-37; 7:16-18; 8:28-29, 42). In terms of a shift in grammatical structure for the sake of emphasis, 3.3 is important because only this subcolone throughout this cluster A employs the first person plural pronoun ἡμεῖς in Jesus' speech. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:241) considers it a striking feature (cf. Barrett 1955:295). But, who were 'we' here then? It is most likely that the term *we* refers to Jesus and his disciples, because he wished to involve them in doing the works of God (cf. 20:21).³⁸ Verse 4 is rendered as follows: *We must work the works of the one who sent me, as long as there is day, night is coming, when no one is able to work.*

b) Illocutionary act

Although, structurally speaking, Jesus spoke this utterance partially in response to the disciples' question, it does not, in fact, constitute his direct answer to the question. Indeed, this utterance is Jesus' comment flowing from the words 'the works of God' in his previous utterance. Therefore, in this sense, this is not a responsive speech act, but a special instance in which two kinds of *illocutionary acts* are performed: one is *commissive*, and the other is *directive*. The reason will become obvious from the following analysis. The commissive act can be further analysed as a *promise*. Bach and Harnish (1979:50) present the following schema of promises (where *A* = action):

Promises (promise, swear, vow)

In uttering *e*, *S* promises *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that his utterance obligates him to *A*;
- ii. the intention to *A*, and
- iii. the intention that *H* believes that *S*'s utterance obligates *S* to *A* and that *S* intends to *A*.

When this schema is applied to the utterance, it reads as follows:

In uttering that *We must work the works of the one who sent me*, Jesus promises the disciples to do the action if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that his utterance obligates him to do the action;
- ii. the intention to do the action, and

38 Cf. also Brown 1966:372; Haenchen 1984:38; Beasley-Murray 1987:155; Carson 1991:362; O'Day 1995:653; Dodd 1963:188; Lindars [1972] 1981:342; Martyn [1968] 1979:28.

- iii. the intention that the disciples believe that Jesus' utterance obligates Jesus to do the action and that Jesus intends to do the action.

Hence, this utterance appears to be a *successful speech act of promise*. As Jesus was superior to the disciples, the directive illocutionary act of this utterance can be subcategorised as a *requirement*. The schema of requirements, proposed by Bach and Harnish (1979:47), is as follows:

Requirement: (bid, charge, command, demand, dictate, direct, enjoin, instruct, order, prescribe, require)

In uttering *e*, *S* requires *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that his utterance, by virtue of his authority over *H*, constitutes sufficient reason for *H* to *A*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* do *A* because of *S*'s utterance.

When this schema is applied to the text in this instance, the following is the result:

In uttering that *We must work the works of the one who sent me*, Jesus requires the disciples to do the action if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that his utterance, by virtue of his authority over the disciples, constitutes sufficient reason for the disciples to do the action, and
- ii. the intention that the disciples do the action because of Jesus' utterance.

As described earlier, this utterance also appears to be a *successful speech act of requirement*. Howard-Brook (1994:216) comments on this verse, though his terminology is not derived from a speech act perspective, that "the call is not an option but a requirement". Briefly, Jesus had the intention that he and his disciples should do the works of the Father now, for the time was limited. The author also wants the reader to participate in God's work himself.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *perlocutionary force* of this utterance has two aspects coinciding with each illocutionary force performed. *Firstly*, as regards Jesus' promise, the disciples should believe that Jesus' utterance obligates him to do the action. *Secondly*, the disciples should accept the challenge issued by Jesus and carry out the actual work, understanding the urgency of the work. There is an element of warning in this challenge – Jesus tried to warn them in order to get them to work diligently. The reader is also asked

to understand the nature of Jesus' mission as well as to participate in his work, by starting to believe in Jesus, if necessary.

d) Communicative strategy

1. Since *the communication levels* cannot be clearly differentiated in the analysis of this verse, I shall analyse the communication process without distinguishing between these two levels. Jesus' utterance in this verse observes all the Maxims of the *Cooperative Principle*, except the *Manner Maxim*. There are basically two possible ambiguous expressions: one concerning the *works*, and the other regarding the words *day* and *night*.

2. To begin with, the word *work* (both noun and verb) is one of the author's favourite expressions. Barrett ([1955] 1975:5) counts this word thirty-five times in the *Fourth Gospel*, while the Synoptics use it only sixteen times. The repeated usage suggests that the author has assigned some peculiar usage for the term. In order to ensure this, at least the following verses from my suggested categories should be taken into account (viewed from the author's perspective):

- i. In the words of the narrator: 3:19-21.
- ii. In the conversation between Jesus and the Father: 17:4.
- iii. In the conversation between Jesus and the disciples: 4:34; 9:3-4; 14:10-12; 15:24.
- iv. In the conversation between Jesus and the multitude: 6:27-30; 7:21.
- v. In the conversation between Jesus and his brothers: 7:3, 7.
- vi. In the conversation between Jesus and the Jews: 5:17, 20, 36; 8:39, 41; 10:25, 32-33, 37-38.

Most of the author's use of the word, including the usage in 9:3-4, relates to the divine work done by the Father or Jesus. In fact, out of thirty-four occurrences, only six are used to denote meanings other than the divine works, such as the human deeds. This sufficiently suggests that the author's characteristic usage of this word emphasises divine works. O'Day (1995:653) further categorises John's usage as follows: "'Works' ... has two ranges of meaning ... both of which occur in vv. 3-4. Firstly, as in v. 3, 'works' describes what Jesus does as the one through whom God's works are accomplished (cf. 4:34; 10:25, 37; 14:10; 17:4). Second, the Fourth Evangelist also defines God's work as belief in Jesus ... and this is the usage in v. 4." Through Jesus' words, John summarises the definition of the latter's divine work in 6:29: *This is the work of God, that you believe in Him whom He has sent*. From this observation, the expression 'the works of God' is not ambiguous to either the reader or the disciples to

whom Jesus was speaking in 9:3-4 (cf. 4:34; 6:29). Furthermore, notice the repetition of this word, recorded four times in Jesus' answer (vv. 3-4). Needless to say, this repetition emphasises the importance of *the works of God* as one of the themes in this instance. Smith (1995:165) also contends that the work becomes the principal point.

3. *Secondly*, since the expressions *day* and *night* may be a typical Johannine contrast³⁹ and figurative usage, the exact meaning of the expressions may not be revealed only from the syntactic structures of the text. This is undoubtedly very ambiguous because these expressions cannot be taken literally as referring to the 24-hour system. Relatively speaking, this verse is more difficult for modern readers than for people in the ancient world to comprehend, for ancient people knew that they could not do their works during the night. What are the images of day and night referring to then?

According to my calculations, the word *day* is used seventeen times with the general and usual meaning in John (e.g., 1:39; 2:1, 12, 19, 20; 4:30, 43; 5:9; 9:14). Regarding the various 'symbolic' meanings of *day*, six occurrences refer to the last day (6:39-40, 44, 54; 11:24, 48) while approximately twice to Jesus' day of crucifixion (8:56; 12:7). As opposed to Jesus' resurrection days, which are referred to three times (14:20; 16:23, 26), the days of his earthly ministry are alluded to only twice – where both day and night are used most figuratively. This is a striking usage of these words in John. In the instances in 9:3-4 and 11:9-10, the author seems to use them to link chapter 11 with Chapter 9 (Smalley 1978:183). Moreover, as far as the word *night* is concerned, it is utilised four times in the usual way (3:2; 13:30; 19:39; 21:3). But, as mentioned earlier, night is used figuratively in 9:4 and 11:10, implying the period in which Jesus would be physically absent from the earth. The vast majority of critics⁴⁰ are satisfied with the view that *night* refers to Jesus' departure and death. Night "has a negative connotation throughout the Gospel of John" (Saayman 1994:7).

4. Enough has been said to indicate that the expressions *day* and *night* in 9:4 are difficult and ambiguous to understand for the reader who has only read the Gospel up to this verse. Consequently, Jesus' utterance here flouts the *Manner Maxim*. In other words, this flouting is an indication that the utterance should not be taken literally, because the "flouting of the ... maxims result in a number of so-called figures of speech such as metaphor, hyperbole, meiosis, irony and so on" (Botha 1991a:69). In this particular

39 Cf. Dodd 1963:186, footnote 2; he suggests that this antithesis is primitive-Christian rather than Johannine.

40 E.g., Barrett 1955:295; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:242; Dörmers 1991:226; Von Wahlde 1995:382; Koester 1995:126.

case, the expressions *day* and *night* in 9:4 are examples of symbolism (cf. also section 5.1 in Chapter 3). Culpepper (1983:192) points out that “John 9 also confirms the symbolic use of day and night as subordinate symbols which evoke the core symbols, light and darkness.” It is, therefore, interesting to note that the additional meaning of the utterance can be attained not in the usual way by utilising an implicature deduced from the immediate co-text, but from, as noted earlier, an analysis of the usage of those words in the whole Gospel.

5. Why then did Jesus (for that matter, the author ultimately) use the expressions *day* and *night*? An elucidation may be required in order to justify the use of these symbols. According to my analysis, this has to do with the plot of the author concerning ‘Jesus’ hour’. The author has the definite plan to ‘build a drama’ in his Gospel, and ‘Jesus’ hour’ is one of the devices he uses for that purpose (Culpepper 1983:92). All the references concerning ‘Jesus’ hour’ from 2:4 to 8:20 do not explicitly tell us what kind of hour this refers to. He finally explains the meaning of the hour in 12:23: the hour is the time when the Son of Man is glorified. The author attempts to keep the reader suspended in understanding ‘Jesus’ hour’ until 12:23 in order to have greater dramatic impact on the reader’s mind. Perhaps the same kind of dramatic effect is expected when the symbols day and night are used, especially when the reader reaches 11:9-10. By using such metaphorical language, the author describes the importance and urgency of the works of God (Carson 1991:362). Von Wahlde (1995:382) points out: “The image of light becomes the symbol of Jesus’ public ministry (e.g., 1:4-5, 9; 3:19-21), and such light constitutes a day of twelve hours during which Jesus will not be arrested (9:4-5). When darkness or night comes, however, he will be put to death.”

6. As promised in the section on ‘Johannine symbolism’ (section 5 in Chapter 3), the purpose and function of the symbols of day and night will be examined according to Painter and Koester’s claims. Painter (1986:52) proposes three purposes of Johannine symbols. However, the day and night imagery used, in this instance, does not directly reflect Painter’s purposes. The important fact that the symbols serve to evoke faith or provoke unbelief appears to play no role, for the symbols of day and night are primarily used to depict the importance and urgency of God’s works. Only the third purpose, namely that the symbols bring a new understanding about God through Jesus, can be connected with the day and night imagery in terms of God’s works.

On the other hand, Koester’s thesis that the theme of Christology lies at the primary level of meaning in Johannine symbolism and that of discipleship at the secondary level perfectly portrays the symbols of day and night.

Koester (1995:145) states: “Jesus was saying that he had a certain period within which to do his work on earth. A span of time – a ‘day’ – had been appointed for him to carry out his ministry before death came at nightfall. The same was true of the disciples, who ... would have a limited time in which to carry out the work God had given them.”

7. The symbolism of day and night could provide a reference to *the motif of suffering* in this story. As noted earlier, Jesus’ death – the severest form of suffering – was anticipated particularly in the night imagery. Michaels (1984:150) mentions that “the darkness is the hour of his Passion”. Jesus himself knew his impending death at the end of his earthly ministry and its effect upon himself, even when he uttered the words in 9:4. However, it is striking that the theme of suffering in connection with Jesus’ sacrificial death, portrayed in the Synoptics,⁴¹ fades into the background in John’s Gospel. In fact, the hour of his death on the cross is described as the hour of his glory (12:23; 17:1; Smalley 1978:224). Even if, in 11:38, “Jesus’ emotion rises again when he approaches the tomb and when he considers his own death” (Culpepper 1983:111), Jesus still controlled the situation and acted on a higher commitment to the glory of God (11:40). Even when Jesus said, “Now My soul has become troubled” (12:27), he did not indulge himself in self-pity, but immediately expressed his determination to do the work of God for ‘the hour’. The author describes Jesus’ death and his emotions very distinctively when compared with the synoptic portrayal. As Culpepper (1983:111) rightly observes, “this aspect of his characterization fits with John’s insistence that Jesus was the incarnation of the pre-existence *logos*. He is ‘not of this world’ (8:23; 17:14)”. The suffering theme is, therefore, not overly stressed in Jesus’ death, as one would expect. This is how the author characterises Jesus in this Gospel.

8. Regarding the violation of the *Manner Maxim* in Jesus’ utterance, such a violation often creates the impression that the speaker can say what is unpredictable or what has news value. The content of his utterance is new and shocking, for Jesus revealed that there was a time limit within which he and his disciples had to do the works of God. There would be a ‘night’ when no man could work. That would be a fearful time. For the people who would work for God, this was essential information. Hence, Jesus’ utterance observes the *Interest Principle* to make their conversation more interesting.

e) Summary

Jesus intended to tell them that he and his disciples should do the works of the Father now, for the time was limited. His utterance, therefore,

41 E.g., Jesus’ agonising prayer in Gethsemane in Mt 26:36-46; Mk 14:32-42; Lk 22:39-46.

constitutes the speech acts of both promise and requirement. The author may want the reader to believe in Jesus while such an opportunity is given, because Jesus defined the work of God in such a way in 6:29. The author also wants the reader to participate in God's work himself. This utterance is, therefore, directed at both the disciples and the reader. In addition, the author may intend to produce a great dramatic effect on the reader's mind by using metaphorical language such as the supporting symbols of day and night. While this device makes the story more interesting, it necessitates the flouting of the *Manner Maxim*.

9:5 ὅταν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ᾧ, φῶς εἶμι τοῦ κόσμου.

a) General analysis

Subcolon 3.5 discloses something important about Jesus' identity through his own words in relation to the previous statements in his answer. The main clause is 3.5.2*, which indicates Jesus' own portrayal of his identity and role. The 'I am' statement in 8:12 has an article before the noun φῶς, while 3.5.2* does not have one. Westcott ([1882] 1978:145) argues on the basis of the omission of this article that "Christ is 'light to the world' as well as 'the one light of the world'". However, Morris (1971:479, footnote 14) draws attention to the fact that "in the New Testament definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article" (cf. Harner 1970:50). Nevertheless, the author does not use the famous formula ἐγώ εἶμι in this instance, unlike the similar expression in 8:12. Thus, this statement may not be classified as one of the 'I am' sayings.⁴² These points may imply that the connotation of 3.5.2* differs from that of 8:12, even though the meaning (translation) is the same. Plummer ([1882] 1981:205) states that there is a difference between 8:12 and 9:5 in the sense that "it is not Christ's Person, but the effect of His presence that is prominent here". Jesus' portrayal of himself includes the temporal limitation, as in 3.3.1, and the limitation is described extensively in 3.5.1. As the prepositional phrase ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ in 3.5.1 comes before the verb ᾧ, the phrase may be emphatic. The temporal conjunction ὅταν denotes the indefinite simultaneous action. Plummer ([1882] 1981:205) points out that this conjunction "is important; it shows the comprehensiveness of the statement". Notice the repetition of the term *world*. Jesus' answer as a whole reveals that Jesus as the light of the world would do the works of God. This appears to be *the main theme* of

42 Cf. Bultmann 1971:331; Lindars [1972] 1981:343; Bruce [1983] 1994:210; Smith 1986:45.

the entire chapter.⁴³ Carson (1991:363) is of the same opinion and states, regarding verses 4-5, that “these verses are crucial precisely because they signal to the reader how the healing of the blind man is to be understood. It is not just a miracle; it is a sign, the work of the Father, mediated through the sent one, to shed light on those who live in darkness”. Briefly, Jesus portrayed himself in verse 5, which reads as follows: *While I am in the world, I am the light of the world.*

b) Illocutionary act

For the same reason mentioned in the analysis of the preceding utterance, this utterance is not a responsive speech act. However, it is difficult to determine the taxonomy of this utterance, as there are a few possibilities such as assertive, descriptive, informative, or even confirmative. It is difficult to find the most suitable category for this utterance viewed on its own. In these instances, it may be helpful to consider “the point of the utterance: *why* it is said” (Van Dijk 1980:195). This question would be best approached by examining the relationship between this and the previous utterances, as Jesus’ words in verses 3-5 form a speech act sequence. Indeed, Van Dijk (1980:197) states: “We take a conversation as a sequence of speech acts, having a global pragmatic point and a schematic superstructure organizing it.” In light of everyday conversation which “has a rather clear schematic superstructure” (Van Dijk 1980:196), this speech act sequence seems to pertain to the major category called *topic of the conversation* (Van Dijk 1980:196). There are three subcategories under this major category. Van Dijk (1980:196) explains these as follows:

- i. *Topic Identification*: It focuses attention on the major theme and point of the conversation.
- ii. *Topic Discussion*: It may take embedded arguments or narratives, accusations and defences, or congratulations and thanks.
- iii. *Topic Closing*: It closes the topic section with a summary, recognition, gratitude, and so on.

My analysis suggests that Jesus’ utterances in verses 3-5 follow this scheme exactly. The utterance in verse 3 identifies the major theme or the main topic of Jesus’ reply, stating that his blindness was for the works of God to be performed. Jesus’ further comment about the works of God in verse 4 develops the topic discussion, revealing the importance and urgency of such works. The last utterance in verse 5 concludes Jesus’

43 Cf. Barrett 1955:292; Lindars [1972] 1981:337-338. Dodd ([1953] 1968:358) formulates the theme as the judgment of the light in action. Lee (1994:166) views verse 5 as central; cf. Domeris 1991:226.

reply with his brief summary that he was the light of the world that would carry out the works of God. Hence, the utterance in verse 5 functions as the closure, giving an indication of the purpose of the utterance.

There is another way of scrutinising the relationship between the utterances, namely from the perspective of, what Van Dijk (1980:182) calls, *conditional dependence*, which signifies two major functional relations between certain speech acts. According to this concept (cf. section 1.5.3 in Chapter 2), the way in which Jesus' three sentences in verses 4-5 are connected may be *functional*. This means that each of the second and third utterances has an *explanatory function* in relation to the first utterance, explaining why they must work within the limited time. While the second utterance provides one reason (that night was coming), the third gives the other reason (that Jesus was the light of the world as long as he was in the world). Now it becomes easier to define the illocution of these explanatory speech acts. The illocution is for Jesus to substantiate or justify his previous statement in verse 4. Therefore, the speech act of Jesus' utterance in verse 5 would be *confirmative*.

The above conclusion is further supported by the *Maxim of Relation*, which also displays an aspect of the relationship between the utterances in verses 4 and 5. Although there are no common words between these utterances, they are strongly connected by the expressions "as long as there is day" in verse 4 and "while I am in the world" in verse 5. Both of these expressions point to the same time period when Jesus was physically present on earth. Accordingly, it is possible to transform the content of these two verses as follows: we must do the works of God during the daytime when Jesus is the light of the world. When the light has gone, we can no longer do the works because the darkness of the night takes over the world. Furthermore, the relationships between the symbols of day and night, and those of light and darkness, are also now more evident. Briefly, these two verses are purposefully linked by the *Relation Maxim*.

Bach and Harnish (1979:42-43) present the full schema of confirmatives as follows:

Confirmatives: (appraise, assess, bear witness, certify, conclude, confirm, corroborate, diagnose, find, judge, substantiate, testify, validate, verify, vouch for)

In uttering *e*, *S* confirms (the claim) that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that *P*, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believes that *P* because *S* has support for *P*.

When this schema is applied to this utterance, it reads as follows:

In uttering “While I am in the world, I am the light of the world”, Jesus confirms that Jesus and the disciples must do the works of God within the limited time if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that they must do the works of God within the limited time, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that the disciples believe that they must do the works of God within the limited time, because Jesus has support that they must do the works of God within the limited time.

As a result of the above schematisation, the utterance can be considered a *successful speech act of confirmative*.

c) Perlocutionary act

The disciples should recognise Jesus as the light of the world, perceiving the implication of Jesus’ statement. They should use this statement to understand his previous remark more clearly. The reader should also accept Jesus’ claim, and continue to enhance his perception of the Johannine Jesus.

d) Communicative strategy

1. In terms of its success, the utterance does not appear to violate any of the *Maxims on the character level* (see below, however). Rather, the utterance enhances Jesus’ contribution to the present conversation by following some of the *Maxims* most effectively. For example, the utterance can be measured satisfactorily by means of the *Maxims of Quantity* and *Reduction*. Both *Maxims* deal with the economy of the utterance. This means that Jesus’ utterance, in this instance, is very economical without sacrificing the quality of the message which Jesus wanted to convey to the disciples. His utterance is concise, impressive, and straight to the point. Especially when its Greek sentence is examined, the *Reduction Maxim* of the *Economy Principle* is operating in the utterance. As noted earlier, the personal pronoun ἐγώ and the article το are deleted in this instance when compared with the same statement by Jesus in 8:12. But the overall meaning (or the quality of the message) remains the same.

2. *The communication on the author-reader level* should also be highlighted. As another example of the success of the utterance, it can also be mentioned that the *Maxims of End-Focus* and *End-Weight* are utilised remarkably well, because the author places the new and ‘heavy’ information that Jesus was the light of the world towards the end of the

utterance. Whenever these Maxims are observed, the processability of the text increases, according to Leech (1983:64).

3. The utterance which contains Jesus' own claim that he was the light of the world observes the *Interest Principle* in the sense of having news value and unpredictability especially for the disciples. When Jesus uttered the same statement in 8:12, it is likely that he primarily addressed it to the Pharisees. Even though it can be assumed that the disciples were there with Jesus and that they would have heard him make this claim, it was then that the disciples heard such a claim directly from their master for the first time. On the other hand, it is the fourth time that the reader is informed about Jesus as the light (1:4-9; 3:19-21; 8:12); therefore, the claim is not new to him. However, it can still be considered that Jesus' utterance as a whole possesses good news value even for the reader because of the time limit mentioned in the subordinate clause in the beginning: while Jesus was in the world ...

4. The expression of Jesus' utterance involves symbolism or metaphor, and such figures of speech always at risk of flouting the *Manner Maxim*. Since the elements of revelation and concealment are, as noted earlier, inherent in symbolism (and metaphor), the success of the utterance depends on that of the communication between the speaker and hearer. If the hearer fully understands the expression, the figures of speech become a powerful tool to communicate the profound meaning intended by the speaker. However, if the hearer fails to comprehend the expression, the utterance becomes not only meaningless, but often also harmful, because the failure ultimately affects the hearer's understanding of other utterances in respect of those particular figures of speech. The question is: Which is the case of Jesus' utterance? At first glance, his utterance seems to be easily understood: Jesus is the light of the world. Yet the real issue is not the overall comprehension of the utterance, but the more specific understanding of the 'meaning' contained in the expression of *light*. In what way does the *light* signify and describe Jesus?

The theme of light in the Fourth Gospel has generated numerous scholarly discussions and investigations, especially in connection with the origin of this ancient document. Perhaps no single study can adequately describe the pregnant concept of light used in this Gospel. However, as an attempt, some of the important aspects of this concept have already been explored as a guide or introduction in the section on 'Light and darkness' (section 5.1 in Chapter 3), particularly the usage of light in the Gospel and its Old Testament background. Based on these points, I shall briefly scrutinise more specific insights in relation to Jesus' utterance.

When Jesus uttered that he was the light of the world, as pointed out earlier (section 5.1 in Chapter 3), the reader is supposed to remember the Prologue that includes some important references to the *light*. This light imagery immediately leads to other significant ideas such as Logos, Wisdom, God's Word, Torah, creation, life, and revelation. If the reader understands these ideas correctly, he will ultimately conclude that Jesus was talking about his unique role and divine origin (Koester 1995:6). In addition, from his memory of reading the Gospel until Chapter 9, the reader can retrieve the information concerning Jesus' words and deeds, which has something to do with the light imagery. The reader must recollect the information at least in 3:19-21 and 8:12, where the light is depicted in terms of judgment and salvation. Culpepper (1983:191) contends: "Light is not only the revelation of the *logos*; it reveals the nature of all who come in contact with it, and the judgment upon each person is determined by his or her response to it. Light shines in darkness. It reveals. It also exposes". It is important to note, however, that the above information did not appear to be available to the disciples, for the texts do not record their presence when the information was released.

When the disciples heard that Jesus was the light of the world in this verse, they should recall the Old Testament background of the light symbol. They appeared to be very familiar with the Scripture (cf. 1:45; 2:17, 22). The book of Isaiah might have helped them understand Jesus' statement. In addition, Koester (1995:141) points out: "An important biblical text that connects the presence of God with light and the feast of Booths is Zechariah 14." He continues, stating that "according to John's Gospel, Jesus was the light of the world, the one in whom the hopes of the festival of Booths were realized. He was the light that manifested the presence of God, and he was the one in whom the nation of the world would come to know the power of God" (Koester 1995:142). In addition, drawing from other relevant Old Testament passages (cf. section 5.1 in Chapter 5), we can concur with Koester's (1995:139) remark that "by claiming the title 'light of the world', Jesus announced that he was indeed the Messiah and the prophet like Moses foretold in the Scriptures. Through Jesus, the Messiah, the righteous rule of God would extend to the nations; and, through Jesus, the prophet, the peoples of the world would come to know God's will and walk in his ways". Of course, the reader is also meant to remember this information from the Old Testament, for one cannot afford to neglect the Old Testament background of this symbolism (cf. also Brown 1966:535, 537).

5. The above observations have shown concisely the way in which the *light* signifies and describes Jesus. To sum up, *first*, when Jesus uttered this 'I am' saying, Jesus claimed his unity with the God of the Covenant in the Old Testament and to bear the divine name. *Secondly*, Jesus was the

true light that enlightens every man (John 1:9). Jesus judges and saves the world. *Thirdly*, Jesus identified himself to be the long-awaited messianic Servant of the Lord prophesied in the Old Testament, particularly in Isaiah 42-43. Hence, he brought salvation and revelation. Although Jesus' earthly mission was restricted by the time frame mentioned earlier, this time limit could obviously not restrict the essence of his claim. While the disciples were short of the information from the Gospel itself, the reader is expected to know the relevant information sufficiently in order to understand the 'meaning' contained in the expression of *light*. Hence, the *Manner Maxim* in the light imagery is partially flouted in relation to the disciples, but it is kept intact with reference to the reader.

6. As a regular procedure in the analysis of Johannine symbolism in this study, the purpose and function of this symbol is also examined according to Painter and Koester's claims (cf. section 5 in Chapter 3). Unlike the day and night imagery, Painter's three purposes will be well attested by this symbol of light. As discussed earlier, this symbol displays "the judging character of the revelation" and "bring[s] a new understanding about God" (Painter 1986:52). This light imagery deals in detail with the issue of unbelief. If one meets Jesus as the light, he inevitably has to make a decision as to whether to follow him or not (Jones 1997:18). As for Koester's thesis, no reference needs to be made, for the light symbol in this verse is already employed to demonstrate his thesis (cf. section 5 in Chapter 3). Therefore, this symbol affirms their claims rigorously.

e) Summary

Jesus intended not only to tell his disciples that he was the light of the world, but also to substantiate his previous utterance by this statement. Hence, his utterance is a confirmative speech act, and the *Relation Maxim* helps identify it. In addition, Jesus' statement is successfully elevated by the operation of the *Maxims of Quantity, Manner, Reduction, End-Focus* and *End-Weight* as well as by that of the *Interest Principle*. The disciples and the reader should accept Jesus' claim. With this statement, the author tells the reader primarily of Jesus' role and implicitly of his identity. *Finally*, the author attempts to prepare the reader for Jesus' next healing actions, for the healing itself would be the manifestation of the work of Jesus as the light of the world.

As promised earlier, verses 3-5 (colon 3) are analysed together in terms of a macrospeech act. By the *Construction Rule*, the microspeech acts in verses 4 and 5 entail a new proposition that Jesus, the light of the world, should do the works of God. This new proposition is further linked to the responsive speech act in verse 3 by the same *Construction Rule*, and thus

entails another proposition that the works of God might be manifested in human afflictions through Jesus, the light of the world. Since Jesus made the utterances in verses 3-5 in response to the disciples' question, he intended to communicate his answer to them. Thus, considering this speech situation, a macrospeech act for colon 3 as a whole would be *assertive*. Jesus intended to assert that the works of God might be manifested in human afflictions through Jesus, the light of the world.

3.3.2 The second subcluster (9:6-7)

Colon 4 starts the second subcluster, which ends with colon 10. This subcluster presents Jesus' healing actions upon the blind man. The section can be divided into two units. While cola 4-7 show both Jesus' physical and verbal actions, cola 8-10 tell of the reactions of the blind man to the previous actions of Jesus. The semantic relationship between these units is reason-result. In accordance with the typical categories of narrative structure suggested by Van Dijk (1980:115), cola 4-7 can be called a *complication* and cola 8-10 a *resolution*.

9:6 ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἔπτυσεν χαμαὶ καὶ ἐποίησεν πηλὸν ἐκ τοῦ πτύσματος καὶ ἐπέχρισεν αὐτοῦ τὸν πηλὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς

a) General analysis

The complication (cola 4-7) describes a series of procedures surrounding Jesus' healing actions. The narrator's utterance in cola 4-6 (v. 6) particularly reports Jesus' physical actions in the healing process. These cola, therefore, form a unit of analysis. Verse 6 renders: *After he had said these things, he spat on the ground, and made mud of the spittle, and anointed the mud on his eyes.*

b) Illocutionary act

The utterance in question forms a speech act sequence and, in order to understand it, we should use the *macrorules* in our approach (cf. section 1.5 in Chapter 2). Each of the clauses that depicts Jesus' actions is an individual speech act. However, the initial speech acts are performed to establish the conditions for the subsequent ones. The order of the speech acts cannot be reversed. The last speech act, therefore, shows the goal of the utterance. In other words, the preceding auxiliary speech acts may be deleted by the *Deletion Rule*, and the last speech act becomes a *global speech act*, of which the propositional content would be that Jesus anointed the mud on the blind man's eyes. In this sense,

the *End-Weight Maxim* can be observed in the utterance, for ‘heavy’ information comes at the end. However, the *End-Focus Maxim* is not kept intact, because all the information revealed in this utterance is new. For this reason, every individual speech act performed, in this instance, may be informative. The taxonomy of this global speech act may, therefore, also be *informative* under the category of Constatives, for the narrator intends to inform the reader about Jesus’ healing actions. According to the schema of informatives,

In uttering that “*and anointed the mud on his eyes*”, the narrator informs the reader that Jesus anointed the mud on the blind man’s eyes if the narrator expresses:

- i. the belief that Jesus anointed the mud on the blind man’s eyes, and
- ii. the intention that the reader forms the belief that Jesus anointed the mud on the blind man’s eyes.

As the narrator appears to express his belief and intention as described earlier, the utterance is a *successful informative speech act*.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should accept the way in which the story is told by taking note of the information provided by the narrator. The compact description, in this instance, keeps the reader’s interest and motivates him to continue reading.

d) Communicative strategy

1. At the start of the sentence, the narrator provides the setting for the miraculous actions of Jesus. However, the narrator intends to not only give the setting, but also show that there is a direct relationship between Jesus’ actions and his previous words. In other words, the narrator contributes towards developing the story by means of the *Relation Maxim*. This means that the narrator relates what Jesus would do to the blind man to what Jesus’ answer to the disciples in the previous verses. What would happen to the blind man from this point onwards would be proof of Jesus’ words. The author and the narrator intend to demonstrate that there was strong consistency in both Jesus’ words and deeds, compared to the Jewish authorities in the story who, as will be shown, displayed no integrity in their words and actions.

2. The narrator’s portrayal of Jesus’ actions is very brief and compact. When Jesus applied the mud on the blind man’s eyes, the narrator could have added more details such as the facial expressions of Jesus, the

blind man, and the disciples; the color or nature of the mud; the way in which Jesus anointed the mud; what the blind man was thinking, and so forth. The narrator could have related Jesus' meeting of the blind man face to face. Did Jesus summon the blind man to him, or did Jesus go to where the blind man was sitting? These details are missing, but it can be concluded from a speech act perspective that this is the way in which the narrator wants to describe the event. In other words, although Jesus' healing actions depicted in this verse are not an elaborate account such as a cooking recipe, the narrator does not fail to describe what was happening. Nida and others (1983:44) refer to a rhetorical feature of compactness, stating that "compactness involves packing into the fewest possible words the maximum amount of meaning". The narrator's depiction of the event, in this instance, is a good example of this compactness, and it is "a particularly important aspect of ancient rhetoric" (Nida and others 1983:23). The narrator therefore upholds the *Quantity Maxim* for the effectiveness of the narrative.⁴⁴ The portrayal by the narrator is neither too short nor too long. The narrator is good at creating suspense by not giving an elaborate account of the healing process. In terms of the effect on the reader, the compactness of this example could be compared to that of the famous inscription displayed in Caesar's Pontic triumph, "I came, I saw, I conquered". The reader's interest is caught and he is more involved in the story.

3. The following question, induced by the operation of the *Interest Principle*, may occur to the mind of any critical reader: Was it really necessary for Jesus to do these actions in order to heal the blind man – to spit on the ground, to make clay of the spittle, and to apply the clay to his eyes? Four out of the seven signs in the Gospel concern physical healing, including Lazarus' resurrection. In comparison with these signs Jesus performed, he generally uttered some words, such as his utterances in 11:41-43 before he raised Lazarus, when he was about to do a sign. Even if Lazarus' case is excluded from our consideration because of narrative temporality, there are still two miracle accounts to which the reader has access before Chapter 9. In these two miracles recorded in chapters 4 and 5, Jesus again healed the sick persons through his words only. But the sign, in this instance, appears to be the only incident when Jesus performed particular actions in the healing process, which can be considered a trait of this miracle. The reader cannot predict such healing actions through his knowledge of the previous miracles. Hence the actions themselves are interesting to the reader. Simultaneously, we can conclude that Jesus did not, in fact, need to do anything in order to heal the blind man. This leads to another question: Why did Jesus perform these actions? This enigma may

44 According to the *Quantity Maxim*: "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice 1975:45).

linger in the reader's mind until it is solved (some answers have already been suggested in section 3.1.2).

4. The solution to this enigma can be scrutinised in terms of several aspects: in relation to the blind man, the medical or magical aspect, the ancient game of challenge and response, the Sabbath issue, the creation story, and miscellaneous aspects.

Firstly and perhaps most importantly, Jesus performed these actions for the sake of the blind man. As mentioned earlier, spittle was perceived as having medicinal value in ancient Palestine. Barclay ([1955] 1975:42) proposes that "Jesus took the methods and customs of his time and used them. He was a wise physician; he had to gain the confidence of his patient". The action of anointing involved the laying on of hands. "Nowhere in the New Testament has the laying on of hands a threatening character; it is always a gesture of help, radiating power ... even in the non-Christian world of antiquity the laying on of hands was regarded as a specific gesture of healing" (Theissen 1983:92). And "[t]he touch of a friendly hand would be reassuring" (Tenny 1981:101). In addition, Jesus' actions as a whole may have helped the blind man open up his heart to Jesus. Some expositors (e.g., Hendriksen [1954] 1973:75; Tenney 1981:101; Milne 1993:139) comment that Jesus' actions may prepare the blind man to accept what Jesus aimed to do for him.

5. *Secondly*, as far as the medicinal and magical aspects are concerned, Theissen (1983:93) affirms that spittle was a (perhaps only) medicinal remedy in New Testament times. Fasting saliva, especially, was considered to be more effective (Bernard 1928:327). Thus "[s]pecial healing powers were attributed to spittle" (Haenchen 1984:38), and Jesus' spittle "would bless rather than curse" (Culpepper 1998:175). Yet Brown (1966:372) points out that "[t]he use of spittle ... left him open to a charge of engaging in magical practice" (cf. also Barrett 1955:296). Jesus' opponents may have made the accusation that, because of his use of spittle, Jesus was "guilty of adopting the tricks of an illegal sorcerer" (Smith 1986:47).⁴⁵

6. *Thirdly*, Theissen (1983:93-94) indicates that spittle was used not only as a means of cure, but also as "a sign of contempt". Jesus' act of spitting on the ground could, therefore, be associated with the ancient game of challenge and response, regardless of whether Jesus intended to insult somebody or not at this point. For Palestinian Jews, any bodily fluid, such as saliva, was considered ceremonially unclean (Lev 15:8; Howard-Brook 1994:217). Carson (1991:364) mentions that Jesus was challenging the social and religious values of the Jewish authorities by breaking their

45 For the possibility of such an interpretation, cf. also Jn 9:24.

taboos and using unclean saliva as part of his treatment. By breaking their taboos “Jesus is making a claim to have religious authority” (Carson 1991:364). In the game of challenge and response, in light of the Jewish honour-shame society, the Jewish leaders had to take Jesus’ challenge seriously.

7. *Fourthly*, as far as the Sabbath issue is concerned, Bultmann (1971:332) contends that “[t]he detailed description of Jesus’ preparations for the healing are very likely intended to show clearly that his action constituted a breach of the Sabbath laws” (cf. also Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:242; Resseguie 1982:298; Holleran 1993b:358-359). Morris (1971:480, footnote 17) even suggests several technical breaches of the Sabbath such as the making of clay; the anointing of clay on the eyes, and the healing on the Sabbath. Incidentally, Holleran (1993b:359) maintains that “the description remains important to the narrator for establishing in the subsequent debates that the healing was due to Jesus’ action, not just to washing in the Pool of Siloam’.

8. *Fifthly*, Jesus’ action of making the clay may be a significant allusion to the creation of man. “There was an exegetical tradition among the Church fathers that the clay made of spittle and earth recalls the forming of the first human being from the dust of the earth in Gen 2:7 (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:496; Morris 1971:480-481; Carson 1991:363). Lindars ([1972] 1981:343) regards this point very highly and is convinced that the healing was not “an act of restoration, but as a creative act”. Culpepper (1998:175) reiterates that it was “an act of new creation, to create sight for him” – for the blind man.⁴⁶

9. *Lastly*, some expositors find more significant points. As noted earlier (section 5.2 in Chapter 3), Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:257) proposes that “[t]he putting of clay on the eyes, described in 9:6,11 ... could be a reminiscence of the baptismal anointing” (cf. also Cullmann 1953:104). This view may be confirmed by the act of washing in the pool in the next verse. This provides a clue to the Gospel’s sacramental aspect. In addition, in this healing scene, Jesus and the blind man remind us of the essential relationship between God and his people. Howard-Brook (1994:217) observes the powerful scriptural overtones in the phrase from Isaiah 64:8-11 that “we are clay”.

46 Cf. also Tenny 1981:101; Cho 2006:191; Bernard 1928:328 who quotes Irenaeus for the same view.

e) Summary

The narrator's utterance is an informative global speech act describing Jesus' healing actions. In determining the nature of this speech act, the *Deletion Rule*, the *End-Weight* and *End-focus Maxims* are employed. The communication between the author and the reader is greatly enhanced by the execution of the *Relation Maxim*, the *Quantity Maxim* and the *Interest Principle*. Mutual contextual beliefs such as the knowledge of the Old Testament, the usage of saliva in the ancient society, challenge and response, the Sabbath laws, baptism, and so on play an important role in understanding the significance of Jesus' actions. The reader is left with a dramatic thrill and anticipation for the next verse.

9:7α καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ, Ὑπαγε νίψαι εἰς τὴν κολυμβήθραν τοῦ Σιλωάμ [ὃ ἐρμηνεύεται Ἀπεσταλμένος].

a) General analysis

Colon 7 portrays Jesus' verbal action of healing. The contents of his words is described in the smaller unit of 7.1-7.2; 7.1 only contains one word, the present imperative verb ὑπαγε. This is the first time the imperative mood is used in this chapter. Subcolon 7.2 also has another imperative verb νίψαι, and the mood of these verbs strongly indicates the illocutionary force of Jesus' utterance. "The asyndetic juxtaposition of two imperatives may be a sign of Semitism" (Barrett 1955:297; Bultmann 1971:329).

I wish to make three remarks concerning colon 7. *Firstly*, Jesus instructed the blind man exactly what to do: "Go, wash in the pool of Siloam", according to the New American Standard Bible. Since the prepositional phrase points to the place to which the motion of the imperative verb directs, this phrase should be attached to the imperative verb ὑπαγε rather than to νίψαι. While most English translations of this verse, however, are rendered as in the New American Standard Bible, my own translation would consequently be, "Go to the pool of Siloam, wash!" (Plummer [1882] 1981:206; Bernard 1928:328). However, this is admittedly the result of syntactic consideration only. *Secondly*, the washing and the pool may bear a symbolic importance to point to Jesus' healing power (cf. Culpepper 1983:195). Some scholars even suggest a deeper symbolic meaning. For instance, as Grigsby (1985:227) suggests, the washing in the pool is a symbol of the believer's salvific 'bath', and implicitly it "would thus become a universal command to all unbelievers to wash in the fountain of cleansing waters at Calvary". Although the extent of possible symbolic meanings is disputed, the symbolism, in this

instance, undoubtedly indicates another mute communication between the author and the reader. *Thirdly*, 7.2.1 explains the meaning of the name Σιλωάμ in Greek.⁴⁷ Its significance lies in the meaning itself, *Sent* (Cullmann 1953:104). It is obvious that the narrator makes every effort to translate this in the parenthesis in order to relate the blind man to this particular pool (the one that was sent by Jesus) as well as to relate Jesus to his identity, the one who was sent by God (Resseguie 1982:297; Carson 1991:365; Brodie 1993:347). His effort surely draws the attention of the reader. This point is also confirmed structurally in terms of shifts in sentence structure. Nida and others (1983:37) state clearly that “the interruption of a sentence structure by the intrusion of an explanatory expression is bound to carry considerable impact”. Briefly, colon 7 is rendered as follows: *and he said to him, “Go to the pool of Siloam (which is translated, Sent), wash.”*

b) Illocutionary act

It is customary to consider the imperative verbs in colon 7 to be commands. The following questions arise. Do these verbs really express Jesus' commands, in this instance? If so, how does one prove this? Or, are they not advices, exhortations or entreaties? To answer these questions, speech act theory can provide a simple and clear standard. Since the possibility of a command occurs to our mind as a result of the grammatical feature, the schema of requirement by Bach and Harnish (1979:47) used in the analysis of 9:4 will be employed again, and examined to note whether the utterance fits the schema.⁴⁸

In uttering “*Go to the pool of Siloam, wash*”, Jesus requires the blind man to do the action if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that his utterance, by virtue of his authority over the blind man, constitutes sufficient reason for the blind man to do the action, and
- ii. the intention that the blind man does the action because of Jesus' utterance.

Since Jesus appeared to express his belief and intention as described earlier, the *illocutionary act* of Jesus' utterance would be one of *requirement*. The key to this understanding is the fact that Jesus was superior to the blind man who was a beggar. Briefly, Jesus intended to command the blind man to go to the pool called Siloam and to wash his eyes there. The

47 For the issue of the narrator's translation of Siloam, cf. Hoskyns 1954:354; Brown 1966:372-373; Haenchen 1984:38.

48 For a lengthier discussion on determining illocutionary force of this kind, cf. the analysis on 'IA' in 9:21cd.

author may have intended to ask the reader whether he is also ready to receive such a command (or any command for that matter) from Jesus.

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should follow Jesus' command to go and wash his eyes, even without expecting that something wonderful would happen to him, because only Jesus' utterance should suffice for him to act upon it. The reader should also expect something to happen once the blind man obeyed Jesus' command, for the author intends to create more interest in the reader's mind concerning Jesus' healing of the man.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character level*. In the analysis of the previous utterance, the peculiarity of Jesus' healing actions is discussed mainly in relation to his other miracles in the Gospel. The utterance in this verse, on the other hand, provides a clue to the necessity of his actions. The fact that Jesus made the mud and applied it to the blind man's eyes became a prerequisite for the blind man to wash his eyes. It became certainly more logical and dramatic for him to wash the dirt from his eyes than to simply rinse them. Seen from this angle, the *Maxim of Relation* connects the two verses.

2. As far as the content of Jesus' command is concerned, Jesus adhered to the *Manner Maxim*, which adds to the clarity of the message in the utterance. The blind man was told exactly what he had to do, and there was no room for any misunderstanding. If the blind man did not know the place of the pool of Siloam, Jesus would, of course, have violated the *Manner Maxim*. In such a case, Jesus should have directed the blind man there. But this was certainly not the case, for the blind man did not find it difficult to go to the pool for cleansing.⁴⁹ That is exactly why Jesus uttered the command the way he did, without adding any unnecessary explanations.

3. Another observation about this command is that this utterance may partially follow the *Banter Principle*, about which Leech (1983:144) mentions that "banter is an offensive way of being friendly". The use of a command often involves a certain risk that the hearer can easily be offended, even in the case where the hearer is aware of the speaker's authority over him. Jesus could have conveyed the same message in a softer way by using an

49 Cf. a comment about this pool that "The pool at Siolam has no known healing properties and is in fact quite a distance and a difficult walk for the man to undertake" (Salier 2004:112-115).

advice form. However, in Jesus' utterance, in this instance, he employed the command form to order the blind man whom he had just met and with whom he had had no prior personal contact. His command could, therefore, have been experienced as rude. In the particular co-text with Jesus' compassionate intent, however, the command established a bond or intimacy between Jesus and the blind man, observed through the *Banter Principle*. Leech (1983:144) adds that "the more intimate the relationship, the less important it is to be polite. Hence lack of politeness in itself can become a sign of intimacy", especially since the command was uttered not for Jesus' sake, but in the blind man's own interest. Viewing Jesus' command from this perspective, the utterance became much easier for the blind man to follow because the offensive point of the utterance now changed into a sign of compassion or friendliness. The blind man probably appreciated Jesus' command specifically aimed at his need.

4. *On the text level*, the reader may not know the location of the pool and the translated word for Siloam,⁵⁰ for the narrator deliberately translates the meaning of Siloam for the reader. However, it is likely that the reader is able to understand the significance of the name attached to the pool once the name is translated, for the narrator does not explain the symbolic role of Siloam's waters. As examined earlier (section 3.1.3), the symbolism of Siloam is pregnant with information relating to the reader's understanding of Jesus and, especially, Jesus' roles, namely to endow eternal life; to cleanse from sin, and to provide living water as the Messiah.

5. At first glance, the narrator's explanatory intrusion appears to flout the *Economy Principle*. The addition of his translation seems to disturb the literary style of compactness, which the narrator used for effective interaction with the reader thus far. However, if the reader's understanding of Jesus is exceedingly increased by the symbolism of Siloam, the intrusion expresses a great deal and, therefore, clearly upholds the *Economy Principle*.

e) Summary

Speech act theory successfully identifies Jesus' utterance as a command (a speech act of requirement), thus obliging the blind man to follow his command. Perceiving Jesus' command as the climax of his treatment of the blind man on the part of Jesus, the reader's attention to the drama now reaches a thrilling climax, filled with suspense. In order for the author to bring the reader into this stage, the author utilises the *Maxims of Relation* and *Manner*. However, it is the author's significant usage of

50 Cf. an interesting observation by Salier (2004:112): "The reader might have expected Jesus to send the man to Bethesda because of the earlier account" in Jn 5.

Banter and Economy Principles that builds up the intensity of the drama most intriguingly.

9:7b ἀπήλθεν οὖν καὶ ἐνίψατο καὶ ἦλθεν βλέπων.

a) General analysis

The resolution, made up of cola 8-10, portrays the reactions of the blind man in direct response to Jesus' instruction in colon 7, and this reason-result relationship is indicated by the inferential coordinate conjunction οὖν in colon 8. Although this resolution consists of three individual cola, the latter are strongly connected and form a unit of analysis.

In the blind man's reactions, the author records no words from the man. There was no dialogue between Jesus and the blind man. However, this does not mean that there was no interaction between them. Rather, there was silent and affirmative communication between them. There is indeed no indication that he disliked what Jesus did nor that he showed any hesitation to carry out Jesus' instruction (cf. Bernard 1928:329). He simply agreed and followed the order. Not his mouth, but his reaction said, "Yes, Jesus, I will do it." Then, *he came to see* now for the first time in his life. At the same time, Jesus demonstrated his power over physical disability. These two points are the focal points of this second subcluster. However, this does not suggest that these are two totally different focal points. Rather, they simply display the different sides of the same coin. Briefly, these cola read as follows: *Therefore, he went away and washed, and came to see.*

b) Illocutionary act

From a speech act perspective, these three cola constitute a sequence of three microspeech acts. Therefore, this sequence can be assigned a global speech act, for the initial speech acts are performed to establish the conditions for the subsequent ones. More specifically, the first two acts specifically explain the final result. The sequence of these actions as a whole forms the preparatory conditions for the last speech act which becomes the main result or goal of the entire sequence of speech acts. In other words, these auxiliary speech acts may be deleted by the *Deletion macrorule*. The last speech act, therefore, becomes a *global speech act* by virtue of the *Zero Rule*. The ultimate result is that the blind man came to see. As such, the narrator describes what the blind man did after receiving Jesus' command and its result. From these observations, it can be concluded that the narrator intends to inform the reader of how the blind

man gained his new sight. In this speech situation, it is only reasonable to take this utterance as *informative*. In fact, this observation can be tested by applying the schema of informatives to the utterance, as was the case for the analysis on 'IA' in 9:1 (Bach & Harnish 1979:42):

In uttering that *Therefore, he went away and washed, and came to see*, the narrator informs the reader that the blind man followed Jesus' command and received his sight if the narrator expresses:

- i. the belief that the blind man followed Jesus' command and received his sight, and
- ii. the intention that the reader forms the belief that the blind man followed Jesus' command and received his sight.

As the narrator appears to express his belief and intention as described earlier, the utterance would be an *informative speech act*.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should wonder at what Jesus could do. Jesus was not simply an ordinary man. This should lead the reader to think seriously of who Jesus really was, in the light of Jesus' previous statement that he was the light of the world.

d) Communicative strategy

Although an individual point of argument in the communicative strategy can be assigned to a specific level of communication, keeping the levels rigidly apart will distract the flow of the discussion. The discussion will, in this instance, not separate *the communication levels*.

1. As discussed earlier, one of the purposes of Jesus' healing actions in verse 6 was to induce obedience in the heart of the beneficiary. This purpose has been realized in this instance. Unless one reads the story carefully, this point may be easily overlooked because of the narrator's simple and terse portrayal of the blind man's reactions. In this miracle story, Jesus did not give any explanation as to why the blind man should follow his command, but expected him to obey (Jones 1997:166). The blind man trusted Jesus because of Jesus' appropriate actions before the command was addressed to him (cf. section 3.1.2). In addition, the blind man would have lost nothing even if something miraculous such as the healing had not happened (cf. Jones 1997:175). Dodd (1963:183) states, "the co-operation of the patient is demanded. His readiness to obey the command of Jesus is an essential element in the cure, and is in fact a measure of his faith, though John does not use the term". Gutzke (1968:105) formulates the same point differently: "the man had some part

to play in getting the answer from God". Dodd (1963:183) continues: "The fact that he goes to Siloam unaccompanied ... by Jesus, supported only by his own faith and determination, makes the contribution of the patient to his own recovery more marked."

2. The narrator depicts an epoch-making event of the man born blind who receives new sight in an amazingly ordinary manner (cf. 9:32; Culpepper 1998:175). The simplicity of the narrator's portrait may leave the reader with some questions. For instance: How was the blind man able to go to the pool of Siloam (cf. Bultmann 1971:333, footnote 1)? Even if he knew where the pool was, he was still blind on the way to the pool. Did he have a helper? It is not known from the text whether he had a helper to take him there or not. However, since many of those who cannot see can go places without any help, it is not impossible that the blind man could go to the major sites by himself in the area where he had lived for a long time (cf. Bernard 1928:329).

However, the point is that this lack of information does not affect the story at all. Once again, rather, this is precisely how the author wants to describe the story. The author disregards the details of the event so that he may place more emphasis on Jesus' sign itself. He is not interested in depicting the manner in which the blind man managed to go to the pool, to find the water, and to wash his eyes. But he is interested in portraying the blind man's obedience and the miraculous power that Jesus displayed through this sign. If this observation is correct, the *Quantity Maxim* – being economical – is adhered to in this utterance. In addition, on the level of Textual Rhetoric, this utterance conforms to the *Economy Principle* when the actions of the blind man are described. For example, there is no noun or pronoun to show that the subject is the blind man in Greek, because the verbs indicate this to be the case.

3. There is a more important question concerning the utterance: *Did the blind man really come to be able to see?* Once more, the narrator describes such an outstanding and marvelous event using very plain words. There are neither modifiers nor catchy phrases to convey the greatness of the miracle. Editors of modern magazines and newspapers will probably disapprove of the simple way in which the narrator records this event. However, according to my analysis, this brevity rather attests to the truthfulness of the miracle. In other words, the simplicity is the result of the author's carefully calculated writing to gain maximum literary effect through the words of the narrator in order to establish the verisimilitude of the story.

4. Despite the above observation, speech act theory can provide a more logical solution to the same question. Since the narrator tries to establish his reliability before the reader in this first section of the story, there is no reason to doubt that the narrator attempts to keep the *Cooperative Principle*. The narrator is especially not expected to flout the *Maxim of Quality* at this point. As a result, the narrator is telling the truth or at least telling what he believes to be true. It is only logical to accept that the blind man did receive his sight. Concerning the manner of the healing, Bernard (1928:329) and Wright (2009) doubt that “the cure was instantaneous”. However, in my opinion, it could have been instantaneous, because the text does not deny this possibility, especially taking into account the blind man’s own testimony in verse 11.

5. Regarding this question, it is worth quoting Ryken’s (1974:38-39) remark about the relationship between literary criticism and miracle stories.

It is a fallacy of literary criticism to regard the supernatural element in biblical literature as something to be discarded. Whether one believes or disbelieves in the supernatural and miraculous is a religious issue, but how a literary critic treats the supernatural is a literary matter. It is a critic’s task to make the distinctive features of the ‘world’ of the given literary work come alive for the reader ... If ... the literary world of a work is conceived as one in which supernatural activity is real and constant, the critic’s task is to preserve and enhance the reader’s response to the miraculous.

6. When Ryken’s view is admitted, the literary critic finds it easier to accept the miracle whereby the blind man received his sight at face value. This conclusion may also justify other points. The utterance of the narrator at this point upholds the *Interest Principle*, for it discloses something interesting or miraculous. This particular miracle had great news value, which would astonish many people later. In terms of the way in which the narrator discloses this interesting phenomenon, he places the information about the result of the man’s having washed at the end of the utterance. This means that the narrator keeps the *End-Focus Maxim* and the *End-Weight Maxim* intact. As such, the narrator effectively communicates the important point of the story to the reader.

7. Is the reader able to comprehend the full significance of receiving sight? A blind Christian minister in Japan once spoke of the differences between the effect of regaining sight and the effect of receiving sight for the first time. According to him, although receiving sight may bring the same kinds of joy, happiness, and convenience to blind people, they experience the world differently for the first time. For those who lost

their sight after knowing some world, regaining their sight means that they are merely returning to the world they once knew. However, for the person who comes to see for the first time in his life, receiving his sight means that the world he sees now is a whole new world which he has not experienced previously. Perhaps this would hold true for the blind man in the story. His eyes were opened for the first time. More significant is that they were opened by Jesus' miracle. What a joy! What an honour! What an experience! Therefore, the full implications of receiving sight for the blind man may be beyond the reader's perception, but the reader does understand the significance of his receiving his physical sight for the first time in his life after he had suffered long enough.

8. According to Jones (1997:166), "[i]n such a terse report, the repetition of the action of washing seems significant". This suggests the operation of the *Expressivity Principle*, which holds that "the emphasis of repetition has some rhetorical value such as surprising, impressing, or rousing the interest of the addressee" (Leech 1983:69). Although this repetition serves to impress the reader, the implication of washing itself is far more significant in my opinion. In what way does this washing enrich the reader's understanding of the text? At least four aspects can be explored.

9. In the act of washing, *first*, the author implicitly refers to the need for spiritual cleansing of all human beings (e.g., cleansing from sin). Hendriksen ([1954] 1973:76) contends that "for spiritual cleansing one must go to the true Siloam". "[T]he true 'Siloam', is Christ, 'sent' by the Father to enlighten the world. That is certainly the sense in which the evangelist wishes his readers to understand the whole episode – the narrative and the ensuing dialogue" (Dodd 1963:184). Dodd ([1953] 1968:357) explains: "As men enter the true life by birth from water, so they receive the true light by washing with water."

10. *Secondly*, the man's new physical sight was bestowed (immediately) by the action of washing off the dirt from his eyes (and, of course, ultimately by Jesus). Is the reader also meant to detect any reference to spiritual sight in this instance? In my opinion, the answer is 'yes' (cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:30, footnote 24). However, it was not yet full-blown spiritual sight, but it was the starting point. Just as the man's physical sight started to allow him to see things gradually, he started to see spiritual reality progressively. This can be well illustrated by his growing perception of the person of Jesus (cf. 9:11, 17, 33, 38).⁵¹ The theme of spiritual sight is very important to the author (Stibbe 1993:109).

51 Cf. also Plummer [1882] 1981:207; Morris 1971:486; Boice 1977:46; Resseguie 1982:302; Trumbower 1992:97. For further discussion of this, cf. the analysis on 'CS' in verse 17b.

11. *Thirdly*, Dodd (1963:184) points out the significance of this act of washing in all the healing stories in the four Gospels: “There is ... no other healing *pericopé* where washing is a part of the process of cure.” Thus many expositors regard the healing of Naaman by Elisha in 2 Kings 5:1-14 the closest parallel story,⁵² closer than any of the other synoptic healing narratives.⁵³ Brodie (1981), following Bostock’s (1980) thesis, argues successfully in favour of John’s conscious effort to parallel the healing of the blind man to that of Naaman in his essay, *Jesus as the new Elisha: Cracking the code*. Despite a strong resemblance between these two stories, one of the major differences is the contrast in the attitudes of the ‘patients’. While Naaman protested and was unwilling to obey at first, the blind man differed in this respect (Hendriksen [1954] 1973:76; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:243). Again Jesus’ preparatory actions may have made it easier for the blind man to obey without question (cf. 2 Kgs 5:11).

12. In the same article mentioned above, Brodie (1981:41) points out that “[t]he *baptismal symbolism*’ which is found in John 9 by church tradition and by commentators is balanced by the fact that Naaman is cured by baptizing (*ebaptisato*) in the Jordan”. This brings us to the last yet substantial point – the issue of a sacramental baptism in the context of the water symbolism in John 9. This is part of the broader debate on Johannine sacramentalism. Since we have already discussed this issue (section 5.2 in Chapter 3), suffice it to say that the author appears to gently and quietly affirm the sacrament of baptism, appealing especially to water symbolism.

13. Hence, the repetition of washing in verse 7 has significantly enriched the reader’s understanding of the text. It appears that this can be perceived not only in the adherence to the *Expressivity Principle*, but also to the *Quantity Maxim*. The *Quantity Maxim* is observed in the way in which the author implies much more than he actually says while keeping his contribution no more informative than is required.

14. In an evaluation of water symbolism in this passage, Painter and Koester’s claims (section 5 in chapter 3) will be re-examined. As far as Painter’s three purposes are concerned, since the water imagery points to spiritual cleansing from sin, the symbolism certainly deals with the problem of unbelief as the ultimate sin in Johannine terms,⁵⁴ confronts those who do not believe, and brings a new understanding about God through Jesus who was the true Siloam to which a sinner must come for cleansing. Hence,

52 Brown 1966:372; Sanders & Mastin 1968:239; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:243; Bultmann 1971:333, footnote 1; Culpepper 1998:175.

53 Mt 9:27-31; 20:29-34; 21:14; Mk 8:22-26; 10:46-52; Lk 18:35-43; cf. Dodd 1963:181; Lindars [1972] 1981:339; Painter 1979:26; O’Day 1995:652.

54 Cf. also Owings 1983:95; Trumbower 1992:98; Stibbe 1993:110; O’Day 1995:664.

Painter's claim is well attested. With regard to Koester's thesis, the symbol of water is impressively connected to the theme of both Christology and discipleship. The name of the pool was Siloam, symbolising the one who was sent by the Father. Washing in the water of Siloam signifies spiritual cleansing, which anticipates spiritual sight and growth in Jesus' disciples. His obedience to Jesus and baptism may be associated with the man's washing with Siloam's water.

e) Summary

The sequence of the narrator's utterances is an informative global speech act that depicts how the blind man gained his new sight. The intention is that the reader should be surprised by the outcome of the event as well as by the character of Jesus who brought about this miraculous healing. The verisimilitude of the story depends on the narrator's reliability, which is argued through the operation of the *Quality Maxim*. The *Interest Principle*, the *Maxims of End-Focus* and *End-Weight*, and the *Expressivity Principle* all contribute to the author's effective communication with the reader. But, above all, it appears that the *Quantity Maxim* plays a significant role in this communication.

3.4 Macrospeech acts

Firstly, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the character level*. The first matter to be noticed is that the conversation between Jesus and the disciples is described in the question-answer form used in the utterances (cf. O'Day 1987:57). The so-called *turn-taking* is being observed in this conversation (for turn-taking, cf. Yule 1996:72). This question-answer form is directly reflected in the speech acts employed in their utterances (vv. 2-3), which are the microspeech acts of *question* and *responsive*. What type of speech act is of greater importance and contributes more to the construction of the theme or global topic in this cluster A? The answer should be the speech acts of responsive, mainly for the following two reasons. One reason is that Jesus, the disciples' master, was the one who answered their question. The other reason, in terms of the content, is that Jesus' answer carried much more significance in theological and Christological implications than their question, and played a more crucial role in the interaction between Jesus and the blind man. In other words, the messages contained in Jesus' response (including vv. 4-5) that the works of God would be manifested in the blind man and that Jesus was the light of the world, strongly link the conversation between Jesus and the disciples to that between Jesus and the blind man. Therefore, a macrospeech act of this section could be arrived at by deleting the disciples' question using the *Deletion Rule* and by constructing a new proposition from the remaining microspeech acts using the *Construction Rule*. As a result, a

macrospeech act for this entire section would be *assertive*, in that Jesus intended to communicate that the works of God would be manifested in human affliction, as in the case of the blind man, through Jesus, the light of the world. One should note that the theme of suffering is introduced from the outset. Viewed from this macrospeech-act angle, the communication between the characters has been very successful thus far.

In light of the discussion of the specific mutual contextual belief surrounding miracles (section 3.1.2), a few significant points can be noted concerning the miracle. To begin with, according to the definitions of miracle and miracle story, the account described in this cluster A, particularly in 9:6-7, is considered a genuine miracle story, and the supernatural event depicted in this story can be rightly called a miracle. Secondly, the miracle performed by Jesus displayed the glory of Christ, and this miracle as Jesus' sign points fundamentally to his identity as the Christ (cf. Meeks [1972] 1986:149). The focus of the miracle is thus Christological. Finally, the aim of this Christological sign is to evoke faith in Jesus. Although cluster A does not record such a result yet, it will come to light in later clusters.

Secondly, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the author-reader level*. The author, by mouth of the narrator, uses only *informative speech acts* in the narration. This suffices to suggest that the author wants to tell the reader a story. However, the content of the narration, in conjunction with the words of the characters, is indicative of what type of story will be presented to the reader. In this sense, a *macroproposition of the macrospeech act* on the author-reader level would be almost similar to that on the character level, but a *macrospeech act* would be *informative* instead of *assertive*. In this instance, the different speech act categories between the story and text levels can be established. In the informative macrospeech act, the author intends to make the reader believe that Jesus, who was the light of the world, could manifest the works of God in human affliction by the way he opened the blind man's eyes. Moreover, through the micro- and macrospeech acts in this section, the author immediately wants to induce the reader's interest in the story he has just begun. The author, therefore, creates suspense and thrills in the reader by means of the language he uses, evokes astonishment in the reader by portraying the unusual event, and introduces the narrator as the reliable guide for the story. As for the character Jesus, the author establishes his authority, identity, mission, and ability before the reader. Specifically for this purpose, the author makes full use of Johannine symbolism and the 'I am' statements. Some of the mutual contextual beliefs also contribute, significantly yet implicitly, to the effective communication between the author and the reader, especially in helping the text reveal its deeper meaning. As such, the *perlocution* of this cluster is to persuade the reader to start reading the miraculous story

of Jesus, securing the reader's involvement in the narrative right from the start as well as in the next section. Vorster (1986:52) comments:

A miracle story, and likewise every single miracle story in the New Testament, is some person's narration and interpretation of the particular miracle. And whenever one tells a story, one does so from a particular perspective and for a particular purpose ... A miracle story is a speech act (linguistic action). It is not simply a physical act.

4. CLUSTER B: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE BLIND MAN AND THE NEIGHBOURS (9:8-12)

4.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

4.1.1 Poverty and the patronage system

It is a common understanding among social-scientists that the terms 'poor' and 'poverty' do not exclusively refer to the economic situation in the ancient Mediterranean society (Neyrey 1995:140). Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:251) point out: "The 'poor' are persons unable to maintain their inherited honor standing in society because of misfortune or the injustice of others. Being poor meant being defenseless, without recourse. It meant being in danger of falling below the status at which one was born." Poverty was closely linked to the honour-shame system of the day. Being powerless and susceptible to loss was thus considered 'poor'. "People who are maimed, lame, blind, and the like are 'poor', regardless of how much land they might own" (:48). It is misleading to consider 'poor' and 'poverty' only from the economic perspective in terms of ancient society (Neyrey 1995:144).

According to Neyrey (1995:139), there is a distinction between two Greek terms, both of which are commonly translated as 'the poor man'. He points out: "A *ptochos* ... is a person reduced to begging, that is, someone who is destitute of all resources One gives alms to *ptochos*. A *penes* who has little wealth yet has sufficiency, is not called 'poor'" (Neyrey 1995:140). Luz (1989:231) echoes this: "The basic rule is: The *πένης* has to work, the *πτωχός* has to beg." Although the author of the Gospel employs neither of these words in Chapter 9, from this distinction the blind man in our text belongs to the category of *πτωχός*. On the other hand, his parents presumably belong to the category of *πένης*, for they were not begging on the streets. The neighbours perhaps saw 'this family' as a unit, and thus did not attach much honour to this family due to the blind son.

One possible way in which a person could maintain or elevate his position in Roman Palestine was to enter into a patron-client system. This may have been necessary or profitable, especially for those who were of poor status. The system “was a relationship based on a strong inequality of power in which, nevertheless, both sides gained, the client by obtaining social, economic and political resources from the patron, the patron by obtaining useful loyalty and honour” (Esler 1994:35). The ancient belief that “all goods and resources are in scarce and limited supply” (Elliott 1993:131), held especially by the peasants, may have accelerated one’s consideration of affiliating oneself with a powerful patron for survival.

Since the patronage system consisted of social relations of generalised reciprocity and the patron bestowed the client’s position as a favour, not everyone could acquire such a position. If a needy person, especially one with physical disabilities, could not enter into the system, he had to find another solution. In Jewish society, some people were regarded as beggars in those days. The blind man in our text was one of them. Persons in weaker positions such as the physically disabled, children without parents, and so on, tended to become beggars. Jeremias ([1969] 1975:111-112) confirms this: “It is typical of Jerusalem that a large section of the population lived chiefly or entirely on charity or relief.” This was made possible by a common belief that giving of alms was an important part of Jewish piety, which supported the acts of charity by both religious and public communities and pious individuals (Jeremias [1969] 1975:126-134).

4.1.2 Relationships between the characters

The knowledge held for the specific conversation between the blind man and the neighbours is as follows: In terms of social status, the neighbours and spectators were superior to the blind man who was a beggar; both parties (the blind man and the neighbours) are assumed to have known each other on a personal level, and both parties are assumed to have known that the man called Jesus existed.

4.2 Overview and structural analysis chart

This cluster consists of three sets of conversations between the blind man and those who knew him, specifically his neighbours. As each conversation can be considered a unit, this cluster is structurally very simple. At the level of smaller units, however, the structures are more complex.


The structure of each conversation is in question-answer form (cf. Du Rand 1991:99). In terms of the number of sentences, or rather the number of words, the comparison between the utterances of the people

and those of the blind man in this cluster may reveal an interesting fact. The following chart illustrates this point:

The number of words

Subclusters (dialogues)	The neighbours' utterances	The blind man's answer
First	Many	Few
Second	Few	Many
Third	Few	Few

Structural analysis chart for cluster B



This diagram presents the author's skillful arrangement of dialogues or proportionate distribution of words.⁵⁵

Several remarks need to be made concerning this cluster as a whole:

1. The three major conversations between the blind man and his neighbours in the form of question-answer sequences all begin with an opening question initiated by the neighbours. This point leads to two observations. The one observation is obvious, namely that there is a certain literary pattern of presentation designed by the skillful author. The second observation is that it is semantically that the neighbours seemed to be more excited about the miraculous incident than the blind man himself.
2. The repetition of coordinate conjunctions is noted in the first sentences of all three conversations.
3. Personal, demonstrative, possessive or relative pronouns are used frequently throughout the cluster. This may strengthen the cohesion of the text.
4. The shift of focus can be detected. While the first conversation talks of the blind man's identity, the second speaks of the healing process. The topic of the third dialogue is the present location of Jesus (cf. Holleran 1993b:360-361). In this instance, the focus is gradually shifted from the blind man to Jesus who healed him.
5. There is a strong unity between the three conversations despite the shift in focus. The first conversation tells of the beneficiary of Jesus' miracle; the second relates the process of his miracle, and the third attempts to seek Jesus' present status after his miracle. Jesus was, therefore, always the centre of the conversations, even if he was not physically present.
6. Colon 16 is basically a repetition of cola 4-10. This synonymous parallelism reinforces the other semantically, and indicates the strong link between clusters A and B.
7. This cluster also contains an *inclusio*. At the level of the subclusters, both the first and the third subclusters portray that the blind man was interacting with his neighbours. At the cola level, both 11 and 18 refer to the blind man.
8. There are significant structural markers such as to say, to beg (beggar), to know, to go, to wash, he, they, therefore, and.

Hence, these points may contribute to the cohesion of this cluster.

55 For a detailed discussion of numerical literary techniques in John, cf. Menken 1985, especially pp. 189-213 for John 9.

4.3 Microspeech acts

4.3.1 The first subcluster (9:8-9)

Based on the observation of the neighbours' opinions and the blind man's reply, cola 12-14 should form a unit. This unit serves as a set of answers to the question in colon 11, which, on its own, forms the other unit in the first subcluster.

I wish to make several remarks regarding the coherence of this first subcluster:

1. All the sentences have basically the same structure. The word order is subject, verb, and complement, strongly suggesting structural parallelism.
2. Their utterances are introduced syntactically by either the subordinate conjunction $\delta\tau\iota$ or the direct quotation without using any introductory word. These syntactical forms also form two pairs, as indicated in the structural chart earlier: i) 11.2 and 13.1 versus ii) 12.1 and 14.1. This fact shows the syntactical contrast.
3. Pair i) also carries a negative connotation because of the negative particles $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\chi$, whereas pair ii) carries an affirmative connotation. These pairs also show the semantic contrast.
4. All the main verbs in the main clauses are imperfect verbs of $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$, which show the progressive actions portraying vividness (cf. Morris 1971:482, footnote 23). This is a remarkable repetition of the same word.
5. All the verbs in the characters' utterances use the present tense verbs of $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\mu\iota$ also bringing vividness and suspense into the dialogue sequences. One should note another repetition in the use of the verbs.
6. Because of the three repetitions of the third person verb $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ in cola 11-13, the first person verb $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\mu\iota$ in colon 14, may be highlighted.
7. The theme of this subcluster can be summed up in two words, namely 'his identity' (cf. Menken 1985:206). The people around the blind man were talking about who he was. The blind man simultaneously continued answering them as to who he was as well (for this aspect, cf. the analysis below).

Hence, these seven points contribute to the coherence of this section.

9:8a Οἱ οὖν γείτονες καὶ οἱ θεωροῦντες αὐτὸν τὸ πρότερον ὅτι προσαίτης ἦν ἔλεγον,

a) General analysis

Although the introductory narration for the characters' utterances has basically been omitted from the analysis since verse 3 (cf. the remark on this matter in the analysis on 'CS' in 9:2), it is important to examine the narrator's introduction in this instance. For the same reason, this narrator's utterance is analysed separately, despite the fact that verse 8 constitutes an independent colon.

Cola 11-14 make up the first conversation between the blind man and the neighbours. In colon 11, the conjunction οὖν connects clusters A and B, specifically referring to the fact that the blind man received his sight. This conjunction indicates an additive-different relation between the clusters. The nominal part of the sentence is long, for the author categorises the subjects and loosely explains them. The noun γείτονες with its article and the articular participle phrase οἱ θεωροῦντες αὐτὸν τὸ πρότερον refer to two kinds of people.⁵⁶ The function of 11.1, which is a further description of the blind man, causes some concern for translators. Bultmann (1971:333, footnote 7) mentions: "Burney (78) thinks that ὅτι is a mistranslation of ...ἕτε." "But this is unnecessary", as Bernard (1928:330) says, and he proposes to translate it as "because" (cf. also Barrett 1955:297; Morris 1971:482, footnote 22). It may also be possible to consider 11.1 a subclause which is in apposition to the pronoun αὐτόν, as my translation reads below (cf. Hendriksen [1954] 1973:77, footnote 57). The neighbours were very curious and were wondering whether the blind man was the one whom they knew as a beggar. They seemed to wonder about his identity. They were merely talking about him, and were not directly trying to ask him, for the verb ἔλεγον in this colon has no indirect object such as αὐτῷ. Nevertheless, he was the central topic of their conversations. Therefore, colon 11 with 11.1 is rendered as follows: Therefore, the neighbours and those who previously saw him that he was a beggar were saying.

b) Illocutionary act

The narrator intends to tell the reader who initiated the conversation, and thus the utterance is an *informative speech act*. This time, the narrator, on behalf of the author, provides limited information not only about the identity of these people, but also about their relationship to the blind man, in order to clarify the speech situation.

56 For the sake of convenience, I shall hereafter use the term *neighbours* to refer to these two groups of people.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should notice the change of scene, for the author introduces new characters on stage. The author also intends to draw more attention from the reader by introducing these unusual characters in the story and to surprise the reader with the new information that the blind man was a beggar.

d) Communicative strategy

1. The narrator's sudden introduction of the neighbours (and spectators) is an indication of the change of scene. Two observations can be presented. *Firstly*, Morris (1971:482) avers: "The mention of the neighbors probably indicates that the man went home" (cf. Plummer [1882] 1981:206). *Secondly*, "[t]he neighbours and other people ... appear appropriately as the first witnesses" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:246). The narrator's introduction is, therefore, not so much an abrupt, but a pertinent strategy. As such, the neighbours and the blind man become the main characters in this section. The simultaneous appearance of two actors on stage is a well-known technique in constructing a dramatic episode, and the author utilises this technique called *the law of stage duality* throughout the story of John 9 (Martyn [1968] 1979:26; cf. also section 10.3).

2. In this introduction, the omniscient narrator identifies the characters who were about to speak on the occasion. The narrator provides hardly any information about their identity and relationship to the blind man. It is very brief because the narrator adheres to the *Quantity Maxim*. The narrator describes that only some were his neighbours, and that the others were those who had seen the blind man as a beggar. At this point, the narrator does not explicitly indicate whether they witnessed the miracle themselves or whether they had heard of what had happened to the blind man. Only when the reader reads verse 10, in the middle of the characters' conversation, does the neighbours' question in that verse indicate that they knew nothing of the miracle. Since they were not present in the first cluster, where did they come from? In continuing from the first section, the narrator seems to have his own strategy by leaving room for the reader to work out all these details. Iser (1974:280-281) calls this lack of information "gaps" (cf. also Patte 1988:100; Harner 1993:v; Tovey 1997:21). Indeed, the author only provides the necessary information. This stimulates the reader's imagination, and is one of the fun elements in reading a story.

3. As far as this introduction of the characters is concerned, the author enhances the reader's interest by using the *Interest Principle*. This is the

only occurrence of the Greek word *γείτονες* in the entire Gospel.⁵⁷ The use of this word in itself is indicative of unpredictability. Hence, mentioning the neighbours catches the reader's attention as an unusual development of the story in the Gospel.

4. The author uses an effective strategy in this utterance. One should note the repetition of information concerning the blind man in the utterances in this verse, namely that the blind man was a beggar. The question arises: Why does the author place this same information in both the narrator's and the characters' dialogue? Should the author adhere to the *Morality Principle* that encourages one not to "reveal information he ought not reveal" (Bach & Harnish 1979:64)? In other words, does it not suffice to reveal it only in the neighbours' utterance? Will it have more impact on the reader's mind if the neighbours rather than the narrator disclose this information? As far as this question is concerned, this seems to make no difference to the story, even if the narrator does not introduce those who saw him as a beggar. The character of the neighbours is sufficient to play the role of dialogue partner to the blind man. Then, again, why does the author need to reveal this information right before the characters' utterance? The answer should lie in the author's strategy for effective communication. The author releases this information beforehand to enable the reader to determine the neighbours' utterance from the same perspective held by the author. Through this disclosure, the reader now possesses an evidential clue to the question as to which character was telling the truth in the ensuing discussion in verses 8b-9.

5. This disclosure also provides a basis for the 'silent' communication between the author and the reader, especially regarding irony. The *irony* results from the gap between the author's and the reader's knowing the real identity of the blind man, unlike some of the characters. As will be noted later, one of the author's goals in using irony is to invite the reader to become one of the insiders against uninformed characters such as the neighbours as outsiders.⁵⁸ The author, therefore, controls certain information in order to accomplish his communicative goal.

6. The *Reduction Maxim* under the *Economy Principle* is also at work in this utterance. The author shortens the text by means of pronominalisation. Leech (1983:67) states that "this reduces the amount of time and effort involved both in encoding and in decoding".

57 For this, I used *BibleWorks for Windows, ver 3.2* (Bushell 1995). In the remainder of the New Testament, only Luke uses it three times in 14:12; 15:6, 9 (cf. also Howard-Brook 1994:218).

58 I shall deal with this irony in more detail later in the analysis of verse 9:9b.

e) Summary

The informative speech act is used for the narrator's utterance to identify the initiators of the dialogue. However, in order to activate the reader's imagination, the narrator does not describe them in detail. In this utterance, the *Maxims of Quantity and Reduction*, the *Principles of Interest, Morality and Economy* are observed for effective communication between the author and the reader. At this point, the author also establishes a basis to create irony for later use.

9:8b Οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ καθήμενος καὶ προσαιτῶν;

a) General analysis

It was natural for the neighbours to wonder, because the incident was a great phenomenon. Subcolon 11.2 describes the topic of their arguments and this concise question form sums up their wondering thoughts. With the question mark, the negative particle οὐχ forms a question that expects the answer 'yes' (cf. Wenham 1965:75; Morris 1971:482; Holleran 1993b:361). In 11.2.1, the present participles καθήμενος and προσαιτῶν may indicate the habitual actions (Fowler *et al* 1985:288). Hence, the people asked: *Is this man not the one who used to sit and beg?*

b) Illocutionary act

Although the sentence-type of the utterance of the neighbours (including the spectators) is interrogative, it aims to suggest a possibility concerning the man's identity. Levinson (1983:274-275) recognises such a function of the interrogative sentence-type, stating that "interrogatives can be used with the illocutionary forces of 'real' questions, 'exam' questions, rhetorical questions, requests, offers, suggestions, threats and for many other functions, without over-riding some 'literal force'". It is thus possible and indeed appropriate to think that the function of the utterance can, in this instance, be considered to be that of a suggestion, because the neighbours seemed to be almost certain that the man was a beggar. This is indicated by the way in which they formulated their question. As noted earlier, the question expects an affirmative answer. But they did not try to explicitly declare it in order to avoid the embarrassment, should they be wrong. Plummer ([1882] 1981:206) explains this aspect: "The opening of his eyes would greatly changed him: this added to the improbability of a cure made them doubt his identity." For these reasons, they used the interrogative sentence, which can be perceived as an *indirect speech act*. Indirectness would express their mixed feelings perfectly.

According to Yule's (1996:54-55) definition, an utterance can be an indirect speech act when the sentence-type of the utterance does not directly correspond to its communicative function. In this instance, as noted above, the interrogative sentence-type does not express the function of question. Searle's *inferential strategy* will be used to explain this indirect speech act (cf. Searle [1979] 1981:32-35). In indirect speech acts, the speaker intends to accomplish two illocutionary acts: primary (utterance meaning) and secondary (sentence meaning) (Searle [1979] 1981:33-34). From the co-text, along with the *Quality Maxim*, the primary illocutionary act performed in this utterance could be *suggestive*. This means that the neighbours suggested the man's possible identity by performing the secondary illocutionary act of asking a question (*question*). Consequently, the goal of this utterance is to suggest that the man whose eyes were opened by Jesus was the beggar who used to sit and beg. This would not embarrass them, even if they made an incorrect observation. The schema of suggestives by Bach and Harnish (1979:43-44) is as follows:

In uttering *e*, *S* suggests that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that *P*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believes that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that *P*.

When the schema is applied to the text, the following is the result:

In uttering "*Is this man not the one who used to sit and beg?*", the neighbours suggest that the blind man was a beggar if the neighbours express:

- i. the belief that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that the blind man was a beggar, and
- ii. the intention that the hearers believe that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that the blind man was a beggar.

As the neighbours appeared to express their belief and intention, as described above, the utterance would be a *suggestive successful speech act*. They intended to identify the man whom Jesus had just healed. The author wants to ask the same question of the reader to test his understanding.

c) Perlocutionary act

The hearers in the story should reply to the question, indicating their own answers. But the reader should respond with the affirmative answer based on his knowledge gained from the previous cluster. The author wants to

invite the reader to become one of the insiders versus the neighbours as outsiders, because of their uncertainty about the man's identity.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character level*. Whenever an indirect speech act is used, the *Manner Maxim* always seems to be at stake, because ambiguity is inherent in the nature of an indirect speech act. It is ambiguous in the sense of deniability (cf. Saayman 1994:13). In other words, the primary illocutionary act can be deniable.⁵⁹ Moreover, the major proponent of speech act theory, Searle (1969:31), himself even admits the problem posed by an indirect speech act: How is it possible for the speaker to say or for the hearer to understand such an indirect speech act? Therefore, whenever the speaker utters an indirect speech act, the *Manner Maxim* is always jeopardised. The same holds true for the utterance under discussion. In addition, the *Clarity Principle* in the domain of Textual Rhetoric is also flouted for the same reason.

2. What then is the benefit or necessity of using such a risky indirect speech act? It is interesting to note that, although the use of indirect speech acts is generally motivated by the speaker's politeness (Searle [1979] 1981:36; Leech 1983:108; Yule 1996:56), this does not seem to be the case in this instance. Leech (1983:82) points out that, in practice, "unless you are polite to your neighbour, the channel of communication between you will break down"; strictly speaking, politeness was still observed even in a casual talk exchange such as this. This was not the main reason for their employing an indirect speech act. According to my analysis, the indirect speech act performed by the neighbours, in this instance, was rather motivated by the uncertainty caused by their astonishment, that is, they could not identify the man with full conviction.

3. *On the text level*, the utterance of the neighbours contributes to developing the story through the *Relation Maxim*. In the previous cluster, especially at the end, the focus was on the blind man. At the beginning of this section, the focus is again on the blind man on account of the neighbours' remark that he is the beneficiary of the miracle. This remark initiated the entire discussion that dominates this section.

59 For instance, when a wife tells her husband, "my birthday is just around corner, with the implication in her mind that she wants some present from him, he says, "Don't worry, honey. I already bought something for you". Then, if she becomes a little ashamed of having said such a thing, she may try to deny her implication: "No, dear. I meant that I am turning thirty on my next birthday. That worries me so much". In this way, the primary illocutionary act can be deniable.

4. Regarding the above point, the reference to the blind man in this utterance (and in the narrator's previous utterance) discloses something that has news value. The blind man was a beggar. He had not only been blind from birth, but he was also poor in an economic and social sense. This fact could fascinate the reader. A few questions may arise in the reader's mind: What kind of relationship did this man have with his family?⁶⁰ Did his family not take care of such a poor man? Conversely, could the blind man contribute to production as a family member, especially considering that, as Malina and Rohbaugh (1992:396) maintain, the family "was both the producing and the consuming unit of antiquity (unlike the modern industrial society, in which the family is normally a consuming unit but not a producing one)"? The answer to the question may have a negative connotation in a normal sense, if not being outright negative. He had difficulty working and being a client to a patron, which was a common practice in those days, for he was a blind person who could not serve the patron's needs well. Perhaps sitting by the roadside as a beggar was the only 'productive' means the blind man had (Cf. Morris 1971:482; Bruce 1983:211). Carson (1991:365) states that "[a] congenitally blind man was unlikely to be able to support himself by any means other than begging".

Another social datum may also illuminate his activity. "At seven or eight years of age ... boys are abruptly and harshly thrown into the hierarchical and authoritarian world of men. There they are required to repudiate every trace of femininity" (Malina & Rohbaugh 1992:300). The blind man was already of age (9:21). The harsh reality was that the blind man had to sit and beg alongside the road for, even if he was blind, he needed to contribute to the family income or support himself. This hardship is another instance of *the motif of suffering* in the story, and this suffering may be constructive in forming the blind man's character (cf. Rm 5:3-4). Ultimately, this would lead to the manifestation of God's glory.

Among the Jewish people in ancient Palestine, wealth was considered a sign of being blessed by God and poverty was the opposite (Davids 1992:703). However, this very poor man had received God's favour and mercy. The works of God were manifested neither in the neighbours nor in the spectators, but in this cursed man. The fact that he was a blind beggar would be one of the most interesting aspects to the reader as well as the characters in the story themselves. Thus, the utterance observes the *Interest Principle* to a great extent in order to advance the goal of the author in his communication with the reader.

60 The text, especially 9:18-21, indicates that the man had parents, but appeared not to be married.

e) Summary

The neighbours intended to identify the man whom Jesus had just healed. They used an indirect speech act to avoid embarrassment, but did so with the risk of jeopardising the *Manner Maxim* and the *Clarity Principle*. The hearers should reply to the question to the best of their knowledge. The author wants to ask the reader the same question to test his understanding. He uses the *Relation Maxim* and the *Interest Principle* to interact effectively with the reader, specifically disclosing the blind man's (past) hardship.

9:9a ἄλλοι ἔλεγον ὅτι Οὗτός ἐστιν,

a) General analysis

According to my colon demarcations, colon 12 (v. 9a) is clearly distinguished from colon 13 (v. 9b). The microspeech-act analysis on these cola will, therefore, be done separately. However, this 'general analysis' examines these cola together for the sake of argument alone because of their strong ἄλλοι – ἄλλοι construction.

As pointed out earlier, the question asked by some of the neighbours was not the kind of question that demands an answer from a specific person. Rather, they were discussing the matter with one another. This is proved by the construction ἄλλοι – ἄλλοι in cola 12-13, which could be better translated as *some – others*. “ἄλλοι – ἄλλοι probably only makes a distinction among the last-named Perhaps the intention is to contrast the questioners with a second and third group with firm views” (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:297, footnote 23). In both cola, the imperfect verb ἔλεγον further implies that they were having a continuing discussion (cf. Morris 1971:482). Since the main clauses of the two cola are identical, they form a syntactic parallelism. Although both 12.1 and 13.1 provide the contents of what people were saying concerning the blind man, the ways in which the contents are syntactically introduced different and are juxtaposed to each other. In these two cola, accordingly, the contrast between the people's opinions is highlighted. Thus the translation of the ἄλλοι – ἄλλοι construction should be *some – others* in order not to minimise this contrast. Their views were clearly divided (cf. Hoskyns 1954:355; Resseguie 1982:298). The translation of verse 9a would be as follows: *Some were saying, “He is the man,”*

b) Illocutionary act

In response to the suggestive speech act in the last verse, this utterance expresses some of the neighbours' agreement. Thus this utterance is

an *assentive speech act* in the category of Constatives. The schema of assentives by Bach and Harnish (1979:43) is as follows:

Assentives: (accept, agree, assent, concur)

In uttering *e*, *S* assents to the claim that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that *P*, as claimed by *H* (or as otherwise under discussion), and
- ii. the intention (perhaps already fulfilled) that *H* believe that *P*.

When this schema is applied to this utterance, it reads as follows:

In uttering, *He is the man*, some people assent to the claim that the blind man is the beggar if some people express:

- i. the belief that the blind man is the beggar, as claimed by the neighbours, and
- ii. the intention that the hearers believe that the blind man is the beggar.

As some people appeared to express their belief and intention, as described earlier, the utterance would be a successful assentive speech act. Some of the neighbours intended to express their opinion, agreeing with the previous claim that the blind man might be the beggar, because the man became the centre of their discussion. The author may intend to provide the reader with a correct answer in this utterance.

c) Perlocutionary act

The hearers (the remaining neighbours) should concur with the view expressed by this utterance, and should thus acknowledge that the blind man was indeed the beggar. The reader should also acknowledge this fact.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, all four Maxims seem to be observed in this utterance. The *Manner Maxim*, in particular, is kept intact because of the straightforward expression. Another significant feature in this and the next two utterances in verse 9 is that the characters adhere to the *Quantity Maxim*. Their utterances are very brief in that they did not make their "contribution more informative than is required" (Grice 1975:45). In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, for the same reason, the *Economy Principle*, especially the *Reduction Maxim*, is also observed well in these utterances. The characters got straight to the point they wanted to make. The lack of unnecessary elaboration in the utterances creates a sense of enthrallment and surely puts the reader at ease when reading the story.

2. *On the text level*, this utterance causes some of the hearers to consider the opposite opinion described in the next utterance. The author's communicative strategy is to illustrate the prominence of Jesus' miracle by creating a controversy over the blind man by means of this utterance.

e) Summary

The utterance made by some of the neighbours is an assentive speech act that asserts their opinion, agreeing with the previous claim that the blind man might be the beggar. The intended perlocution on the character level is that the hearers should concur with this opinion, but the real perlocution is, as shall be noted below, that the hearers should disagree. Concerning the communicative strategy, the *Maxims of Manner* and *Quantity*, and *Reduction* are used in this utterance.

9:9b ἄλλοι ἔλεγον, Οὐχί, ἀλλὰ ὅμοιος αὐτῷ ἐστίν.

a) General analysis

In 13.1, the particle οὐχί may be emphatic, because it stands at the beginning of this utterance made by the remaining neighbours. The connotation by the phrase ὅμοιος αὐτῷ is subtle. The neighbours denied that the man was the one they knew, but admitted that he was, in fact, just like him. They found it difficult to believe that he was the same person because of the external change in him (cf. Calvin 1979:372; Tasker [1960] 1981:124; Fenton [1970] 1979:107, footnote 9). Thus, verse 9b reads: *Others were saying, "No, but he is like him."*

b) Illocutionary act

Despite the intended perlocution of the speakers in the previous utterance, the other characters' response was negative. They had a different assessment, and intended to oppose the previous opinion, which identified the man as the beggar. However, they admitted that the man resembled the beggar. Accordingly, the illocutionary force of this utterance is one of *dissentive*. The schema of dissentives by Bach and Harnish (1979:43) is as follows:

Dissentives: (differ, disagree, dissent, reject)

In uttering *e*, *S* dissents from the claim that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the disbelief that *P*, contrary to what was claimed by *H* (or was otherwise under discussion), and

- ii. the intention that *H* disbelieve that *P*.

When this schema is applied to this utterance, it appears as follows:

In uttering that “*No, but he is like him*”, others dissent from the claim that the blind man is the beggar if others express:

- i. the disbelief that the blind man is the beggar, contrary to what was claimed by some people, and
- ii. the intention that some people disbelieve that the blind man is the beggar.

As others appeared to express their disbelief and intention, as described above, the utterance would be a *successful dissentive speech act*. The author may also intend to describe the prominence of Jesus’ miracle by means of this utterance.

c) Perlocutionary act

The hearers should accept the opposite viewpoint described in this utterance. But the story will reveal that the hearers would not need to change their opinion, for the man himself would disclose his identity in the next utterance. The perlocution on the text level is to impress upon the reader the prominence of Jesus’ miracle with this utterance.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *primarily the communication on the story level*. Why did the others not claim more strongly that he was definitely not the beggar? In other words, why did they place their opinion in the present surface structure? As can be noted, their utterance is formulated with the risk of violating both the *Manner Maxim* of Interpersonal Rhetoric and the *Maxim of Ambiguity* of Textual Rhetoric. This means that the utterance contains a certain ambiguity. There could be a reason for such an ambiguous expression. To consider their reasoning, others were likely to have considered any straightforward disagreement as rude and offensive in the discussion with the people they knew, even though they tried to say what they believed to be true. That is the reason why they used a kind of euphemism. While they seemed to be upholding the *Cooperative Principle*, specifically *Quality Maxim*, they were also observing the *Pollyanna Principle*. They tried to avoid causing unpleasant feelings in the hearers as far as possible. This is also an indication that they endeavoured to adhere to the *Agreement Maxim*, in order to minimise disagreement between self and other. It is thus most logical to believe that their desire to uphold these

two Maxims and the one Principle made them take the risk of violating the *Maxims of Manner and Ambiguity*.

2. I shall discuss *the communication dominant on the text level*. *Firstly*, the dissentive speech act is not only successful, but also interesting. The way in which their dissension is expressed may be unpredictable and subtle. The expression conveys a positive nuance despite the fact that the response itself is negative. In this sense, the *Interest Principle* is at work in this utterance and brilliantly captures the perplexity of these characters. The reader is meant to understand this facet. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:246) comments that any miraculous event “provokes scepticism (even in people of the evangelist’s time!), and a division of opinion”. However, I would say that this is particularly so in the case of this healing miracle (cf. John 2:11; 5:53; 6:14; cf. also 5:16; 11:45-46, 53), because it was a great miracle of which they had never heard previously (John 9:32).

3. The peculiarity of this great miracle is further enriched by the light imagery. Resseguie (1982:298) states: “The dualistic imagery of light and darkness is reflected in the divided opinions, and the tone of opposition created by the imagery becomes concrete in the contrasting opinion.” This skepticism and divided opinions may point indirectly to *the motif of suffering*. The reason is twofold. The fact that the neighbours could not come to faith easily means, in Johannine thought, that they would remain in sin and darkness. They would continue to suffer in this state of affairs. The other reason is that the divided opinions are likely to have caused unpleasant feelings in all the neighbours who participated in the controversy. Since the author does not use the term *schism*, in this instance, as in the case of the Pharisees (9:16), no one knows exactly how intense or bad the division was. One can tell, however, that there were uncomfortable emotions among the neighbours to some extent. Furthermore, Martyn ([1968] 1979:30, footnote 25) points out another significance of the relationship between this miracle and the divided opinion: “The man’s neighbors and acquaintances, fellow members of the synagogue, are divided in their appraisal of the situation ... The motif of divided opinion among the synagogue members is quite important.” Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:246) does not miss this point either: “The perplexity of the ordinary people continues in a different form in the Pharisees (v. 16)”.

4. *Secondly*, concerning two responses from the neighbours (9:9a, 9b), Dockery (1988:17) suggests: “Ironically, both answers are correct. He is *both* the same person *and* a new person who is ‘like him’” (cf. also Duke 1982:183). Figuratively speaking or on different levels, this statement is true (Holleran 1993b:361). He became a ‘new and different’ person, with a whole new world in front of him. But, strictly speaking, that is not the case,

because the illocution of the suggestive speech act in verse 8 seeks an answer to the question as to whether or not the healed man was the beggar who used to sit and beg. And the answer is and should be that he was the 'same' man. Otherwise, one of the author's effective communicative strategies, especially in this second response, would be lost.

5. The important rhetorical device, in this instance, is the use of *irony*, which is indicated by the conflicting relationship between the text and co-text (cf. step A-ii-2) according to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2). Three participants and types of irony should *first* be identified (steps B-i and B-ii). Since the speakers of the utterance expressed what they believed to be true (in other words, the utterance adheres to the *Quality Maxim*), the characters did not intend to utter an ironic statement. The utterance does not constitute verbal irony on the character level, but situational irony on the text level. The ironist would be the author, the target would be those characters that made the utterance, and the observer would be both the author and the reader. This is *dramatic irony* perceived through the observer's knowledge of what the characters had yet to find out, namely the fact that the healed man was indeed the one who used to beg (cf. also Holleran 1993b:361). This fact is important. This is why Dockery's earlier statement jeopardises the reader's understanding of the author's important device of irony, and should therefore be evaluated with caution. This irony functions "as a way of involving readers in the communication process of the text" (O'Day 1986:30), and as a social device to increase "group cohesiveness" (Roy 1981:409) in the relationship between the author and the reader. Moreover, the author wants to place the reader on a higher level of knowledge than the characters by using irony. Incidentally, since it is intended, covert, fixed and finite, this Johannine irony is stable (cf. Culpepper 1996:194).

e) Summary

The remaining neighbours rejected the idea that the healed man was the same person whom they had known before as a beggar, by uttering a dissentive speech act. The hearers should respond to this speech act and change their view. Perhaps the reason for their formulating the utterance this way may be motivated by their politeness towards the other party. They uphold the *Maxims of Quality and Agreement*, and the *Pollyanna Principle* at the expense of the *Maxims of Manner and Ambiguity*. The author uses the *Interest Principle* and dramatic irony to enhance communication and solidarity with the reader.

9:9c ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν ὅτι Ἐγὼ εἰμι.

a) General analysis

In contrast to their confusion, the blind man himself was, of course, confident about his identity. He opened his mouth for the first time in this Chapter to speak the words in colon 14 in answer to their curiosity. Needless to say, the formula ἐγὼ εἰμι reminds the reader of the ‘I am’ sayings of Jesus, which have a great significance theologically. However, the question as to how significant the man’s reply is in employing the same formula is debatable. This issue is taken up in the analysis on ‘Communicative strategy’ below. This colon would be the climax of the first subcluster. Verse 9c renders: *That man was saying, “I am (the one).”*

b) Illocutionary act

The neighbours clearly showed their divided opinion concerning the man’s identity. Because he could not help telling the truth in this situation (cf. ‘CS’ below), and in order to end the division among them, the blind man *finally* spoke up for himself, saying only two Greek words, ‘Ἐγὼ εἰμι’. The blind man’s utterance also attests to the fact that the author is, as mentioned earlier, good at keeping the *Maxims of Quantity and Reduction*. Yet, these two words remarkably contain what the blind man should say and what the author wants to say. In these two words, the blind man revealed his identity with full conviction. The blind man’s utterance is, therefore, a *confirmative speech act*. According to the schema of confirmatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42-43),

In uttering that “*I am (the one)*”, the blind man confirms that he is the same person if the blind man expresses:

- i. the belief that he is the same person, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that the neighbours believe that he is the same person.

The truth-seeking procedure, in this instance, would be the man’s own testimony, and this evidence is as solid as rock. As a result of these observations, the utterance is a successful confirmative speech act. The blind man intended to confirm that he was the beggar. The author also intends to reconfirm the knowledge the reader already possesses of the man’s identity.

c) Perlocutionary act

The neighbours should accept the personal confirmation of the blind man. The perlocution directed to the reader is to reassure him of the blind man's identity, and that the reader should take note of the words the blind man used.

d) Communicative strategy

1. As noted earlier, the neighbours clearly showed their divided opinion concerning the man's identity. In this state of affairs, the author vividly depicts the present confusion among them. Perhaps the best thing for them to do in this situation would be to ask the man himself about his identity, but they simply did not do so. Why? Because the blind man may have been listening to their discussion. He knew that they were talking about him, and that they could not finalise the matter. Perhaps the people's eyes were now fixed on the blind man's mouth. The illocution of their staring at him and of the discussion demanded that he say something. They did not need to ask the question verbally. However, is this a violation of the *Quantity Maxim* on the part of the blind man, because he answered without being asked?

2. In reply to the above question, one should ask whether it was necessary for the blind man to speak up. As mentioned earlier, this is the first instance in which the blind man opened his mouth after his eyes were opened (as well as in Chapter 9 as a whole). This can be considered the first significant effect of the healing. As mentioned earlier (section 4.1.5 in Chapter 3), in terms of ancient healing accounts, it was more important that a patient's social standing be restored than restoring his malfunctioning organ(s). A man who had been voiceless in society and used to sit and beg became a person who could stand up and speak up for himself among his people in society. This should be regarded as an amazing and positive outcome of the healing event in light of the man's personal change. It may be even more important that his voice put an end to the ongoing debate as to whether or not he was the same person who used to beg. They recognised his voice. This means that his existence as a member of society was also recognised. Thus, Jesus' healing resulted not only in the blind man's physical and personal change, but also in a change in his social status. In the eyes of his neighbours, he was no longer a man without voice (cf. Staley 1991:65). If he did not speak up, especially voluntarily, he would still have been a voiceless man, and the healing would not have been completed. The author believes it necessary that the blind man should express himself at his own discretion. It was imperative for the blind man to speak up. In this sense, the blind man's utterance is not a violation of the *Quantity Maxim* in this co-text.

3. The blind man's expression itself may need our attention in the communicative strategy. Is there any significance in the use of *ἐγὼ εἰμι*? If so, what is it?

On the character level, since the blind man's expression was a simple affirmation of his identity (Burkett 1991:149 note 2), it is likely that the words have no significant meaning attached to the utterance, unless the blind man and his neighbours were aware of Jesus' statement in verse 5 and they consciously tried to connect to it. However, from the co-text, it was most unlikely that these conditions would be met (cf. also Lee 1994:173).

4. *On the text level*, as examined in section 3.1.4, the reader knows a great deal about the significance of the *ἐγὼ εἰμι* formula spoken by the Johannine Jesus. It is quite understandable that the author takes advantage of this. However, the majority of commentators do not take this seriously and conclude that there is no significance in the man's usage.⁶¹ Bernard (1928:330) remarks: "This is a simple affirmation of identity, not to be confused with the mystical use of *ἐγὼ εἰμι* in Jn." Barrett (1955:297) even warns: "This simple use of the words warns the reader against assuming that *ἐγὼ εἰμι* was necessarily to John a religious formula." Of course, these commentators correctly assert that the man's usage is not the same as that of Jesus and it has, therefore, no theological connotation. However, as the expression has the usual connotation, this does not necessarily mean that it has no significance. In my opinion, there are at least three significant points in the man's utterance designed by the author, especially from a literary perspective.

Firstly, the author may appeal to the mutual contextual beliefs shared with the reader for further implications of this utterance. The reader remembers that, in Jesus' 'I am' sayings, Jesus claims to have unity with God and to bear the divine name. Jesus also identifies himself to be the long-awaited messianic Servant of the Lord. Numerous Old Testament passages illuminate the person and work of Jesus with regard to the *ἐγὼ εἰμι* formula. Such rich information is stored in their mutual beliefs concerning the 'I am' sayings (cf. section 3.1.4). It is inconceivable that the author does not make use of this rich information when he deliberately puts the words *ἐγὼ εἰμι* in the man's mouth. What then does the author have in mind when he has the blind man speak as Jesus did? It appears that the author intends to have the blind man, who was in the process of becoming a model disciple (this aspect will be discussed in more detail later), imitate the words of Jesus, for the first level of discipleship starts with the imitation of one's

61 Eg., Brown 1966:373; Fenton [1970] 1979:107, footnote 9; Morris 1971:482, footnote 24; Lindars [1972] 1981:344.

master (cf. Stibbe 1993:112). By giving exactly the same vocabulary of Jesus to the man, the author encourages the man to speak up for himself. Some encouragement was probably required for the man to reveal his real identity, especially to admit that he was a beggar. Undoubtedly, some people would try to hide such a shameful past if they were in his shoes. By providing Jesus' vocabulary, the author reassures the reader that Jesus would support the man. Brodie (1993:348) contends: "It is often said that this very human *Ego eimi* has nothing to do with the God-related *Ego eimi*. But the context suggests otherwise ... from a literary point of view, the man's *Ego eimi* is an echo of the divine *Ego eimi*" (cf. Marsh 1968:380; Howard-Brook 1994:219). That is the reason why the blind man could take the initiative to speak up, even though he was not explicitly asked to answer. The man's voice would have sounded firm. As such, the imitation of Jesus' words might have given the blind man confidence in who he was. Perhaps he no longer needed to be ashamed of being a beggar. Now he could say loudly that he had been a beggar. Whether he was a beggar or not was no longer his concern. What counts is that God had found him. He could now take healthy pride in himself, maybe for the first time in his life. It is true that, when a person meets God, he begins to understand his real identity as well as the purpose of his existence. That may be the reason why the blind man confidently admitted his former identity.

5. *Secondly*, in relation to the above observation, the author may intend to let the reader perceive some connection between the blind man and Jesus (cf. Holleran 1993b:361). In subsequent scenes, the blind man discusses matters boldly with the Jewish authorities. In so doing, the blind man displays courage and tactics similar to Jesus'. The root of these qualities can be found right here in the man's words ἐγώ εἰμι. His utterance was a prelude to his personal development. These two men would face the challenge of the Jewish leaders in a similar way.

6. *Thirdly*, critics spot a significant feature that verses 8-34 "comprise the longest absence of Jesus in John's Gospel" (Duke 1982:183; Rensberger 1988:42; Holleran 1993b:364). However, the author does not allow the reader to forget about Jesus easily. Even though Jesus was absent from the narrative for a long time, he was always the focus of the story. The author uses some devices in order to leave Jesus in the centre of the reader's mind at all times (cf. Stibbe 1993:107). The blind man's expression is most likely one of them. The expression certainly reminds one of Jesus.

7. The blind man's utterance at this point has a part to play in the deeper understanding of the story. Although it appears that historical or theological interpretation is not designed to find such significance, a literary approach can detect it. The author intentionally chooses this particular formula to

create a good impact with the blind man's reply, because "the phrase on the lips of the blind man is a surprise to the reader" (Stibbe 1993:111). In this instance, the operation of the *Interest Principle* makes the story more fascinating.

e) Summary

Having heard the neighbours' conversation, the blind man intended to confirm that he was the beggar. The neighbours should accept the blind man's personal confirmation. The story indicates that this was indeed the case, thus ending their controversy. The perlocution directed to the reader is to reassure him of the blind man's identity, in that the author wants to remind the reader of the significant implication of Jesus' 'I am' sayings upon the blind man's answer. In the man's utterance, the *Maxims of Quantity* and *Reduction* as well as the *Interest Principle* are working efficiently.

4.3.2 The second subcluster (9:10-11)

9:10 ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτῷ, Πῶς [οὖν] ἠνεώχθησάν σου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί;

a) General analysis

In the first subcluster, the number of words used in the neighbours' utterances is higher than that in the blind man's. By contrast, a higher number of words are used in the blind man's utterances than in those of the neighbours in this second subcluster. Viewed from a different angle, like the utterance of the blind man in subcolon 14.1, subcolon 15.1 also comprises only one sentence for the question of the neighbours. Structurally, this contrast is interesting and calculated.⁶² The main clause confirms that the question in subcolon 15.1 was spoken directly to the blind man. He was asked about the manner or process of gaining his sight. In 15.1, the conjunction οὖν is placed in a bracket in the Greek text, perhaps because it is already used in the main clause in 15. The interrogative adverb πῶς specifies the purpose of the question. Thus this verse reads as follows: *They were, therefore, saying to him, 'How then were your eyes opened?'*

b) Illocutionary act

Searle ([1969] 1980:31) points out that "except in yes-no questions a speaker asking a question does not express a complete proposition". Thus, the propositional content of this utterance would be that "your

62 In this regard, Menken's Table III is very informative, cf. Menken 1985:194.

eyes were opened by ...?" From the interrogative sentence-type and its propositional content, the utterance of the neighbours is most likely a speech act of question. According to Searle's (1969:67) necessary and sufficient conditions for questions:

Propositional content condition: In uttering "How then were your eyes opened?", it is obvious that the neighbours' question satisfies this condition.

Preparatory condition: The neighbours do not know the answer. It is obvious to neither the neighbours nor the blind man that the blind man will provide the information at that time without being asked.

Sincerity condition: The neighbours want this information.

Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from the blind man.

From the above observation, I can conclude that the utterance of the neighbours would be a *successful speech act of question*. The neighbours had the intention to ask a question in order to obtain information that they did not have at that point as to how the blind man's eyes were opened. It is important to note that "[t]he fact that man's sight had been restored is not challenged; it is only the *manner* of the cure is in question" (Bernard 1928:330). There seems to be no explicit illocution directed to the reader.

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should give an adequate answer to their question, relating the process of how Jesus opened his eyes. The author, however, wants to impress the reader, and invite him to be one of the insiders against the neighbours (as outsiders) through the shared knowledge about the event.

d) Communicative strategy

1. The neighbours' utterance, in this instance, requires more scrutiny than is customary, because this is the utterance in which two separate accounts are especially necessary for the communication between the characters and for that between the author and the reader, respectively. This is due to the fact that the reader already knows the answer to this particular question, whereas the neighbours did not know. For the sake of convenience, the next utterance in verse 11 is also examined simultaneously, for these two utterances form a question-answer pair and can be treated simultaneously.

2. *On the character level*, the two utterances (in vv. 10 and 11) present no specific problem. They observe nearly every conversational principle. They are economical, sincere, relevant and clear. They are a typical textbook

case of communication. However, *on the author-reader level*, the two utterances flout a couple of conversational principles. Since the question demands an answer that has already been provided, the repetition is unnecessary and uneconomical. In this regard, the utterances transgress both the *Quantity Maxim* of Interpersonal Rhetoric and the *Economy Principle* of Textual Rhetoric.

3. The *Interest Principle* is also flouted, because the utterances hardly appeal to the reader. They have no unpredictability or news value for the reader. For this reason, the utterances appear to have no relevance to the reader. In this sense, flouting of the *Relation Maxim* is suspected. These utterances on the author-reader level are problematic.

4. Nevertheless, as mentioned in section 3.1 (Chapter 2), a speech act analysis presupposes that the author has the responsibility to make every utterance of the text somehow meaningful for the reader. All the parts of the narrative are, therefore, worthy of the reader's attention. From a speech act perspective, the more problematic an utterance, the greater the need for, and role of this approach. How should these utterances be measured? Our strategy should be to deduce the additional meaning of the utterances by using the concept of implicature (cf. section 1.3 in Chapter 2). Accordingly, what is the implicature of the flouting of the Principles and Maxims in these utterances? Since both the author and the reader know how the blind man received his sight, the aim of the utterances is obviously not to pass on new information. Rather, the repeated reference to the miracle serves to establish the reality of the healing (cf. Haenchen 1984:39). In addition, the idea is to impress the greatness of the miracle upon the reader once again.

e) Summary

After accepting the man's testimony about his identity, the neighbours' concern shifted to the miracle itself. They (*first*) intended to ask a question as to how his eyes were opened, and hence their utterance is a speech act of question. The blind man should provide a sufficient answer to their question, for their utterance is made according to the rules of language. On the character level, the utterance observes nearly every conversational principle. On the text level, by contrast, the utterance flouts the *Maxims of Quantity* and *Relation* as well as the *Principles of Economy* and *Interest*. Thus, the notion of implicature is used to explore the meaning of these violations.

9:11 ἀπεκρίθη ἐκεῖνος, Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ λεγόμενος Ἰησοῦς πηλὸν ἐποίησεν καὶ ἐπέχρισέν μου τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ εἶπέν μοι ὅτι Ὑπάγε εἰς τὸν Σιλωάμ καὶ νίψαι ἀπελθὼν οὖν καὶ νιψάμενος ἀνέβλεψα.

a) General analysis

Colon 16 does not use the imperfect of the verb λέγω, but uses the aorist verb ἀπεκρίθη in the main clause for the first time in this cluster. This may imply the simple action that the blind man was going to provide the correct answer once to all, in contrast to the speculations in which people were constantly wondering about who he was (indicated by the imperfect verbs in cola 11-13). This may mark an important shift in the dialogue sequences. In other words, a change of topic in the conversations is due to take place. The topic is now the past incident, namely how the blind man was healed.

The blind man's answer is recorded in subcola 16.1-16.6; 16.1 starts with his introduction of Jesus, who made the mud in the early stages of the miracle. However, the omission of Jesus' action of spitting on the ground should be noted. In this subcolon, Jesus, as the subject, is referred to by the nominative noun ἄνθρωπος. This describes the blind man's present understanding of Jesus – he perceived Jesus as a man (cf. Barrett 1955:297). The aorist verb ἐπέχρισεν, in subcolon 16.2, occurs only in this instance and in verse 6, and nowhere else in the New Testament (Barrett 1955:297; Lindars [1972] 1981:345; Newman & Nida 1980:304). His first answer in 16.1-16.2 related that *the man who is called Jesus made mud and anointed my eyes*. There is no indication in the text as to how and when the blind man acquired Jesus' name, but he knew it somehow (cf. Holleran 1993b:362). This is important in the development of the story, because he only knew his miracle worker's name. For the time being, he had to assume who had healed him until he met his benefactor again later. The unit consisting of 16.3.1 and 16.3.2 describes the blind man's quotation from Jesus' utterances in the healing miracle. As such, subcola 16.1-16.3 form a unit, describing once again both the physical and verbal healing actions of Jesus.

The blind man's reactions are again reproduced in 16.4-16.6 as a unit. As this unit is the restatement of cola 8-10, the syntactic construction of this unit remains basically the same. However, the difference lies in the change of the mode of the verb. *Firstly*, subcola 16.4-16.5 use the participles of the original verbs instead of the customary indicative forms. *Secondly*, colon 16.6 employs one indicative verb ἀνέβλεψα instead of ἦλθεν with the complementary participle βλέπων. The aorist indicative verb ἀνέβλεψα shows

the culminative-simple action as the result (Fowler *et al.* 1985:289-290).⁶³ The conjunction οὖν in subcolon 16.4 connects the two units (16.1-16.3 and 16.4-16.6), referring to Jesus' instruction to go and wash in 16.3.1-16.3.2. This naturally creates strong cohesion in the blind man's answer. Briefly, verse 11 renders as follows: *That man answered, "The man who is called Jesus made mud and anointed my eyes and said to me, 'Go to Siloam and wash.' So after I went away and washed, I received sight."*

b) Illocutionary act

The blind man's utterance in this verse consists of a sequence of several speech acts. However, it is not difficult to assign one global speech act to this sequence of speech acts, for the entire sequence is clearly goal-directed. This means, as Van Dijk (1980:181) explains, that "the sequence is connected such that each following speech act is accomplished with the purpose and the intention to reach a sequential result or a sequential goal". This utterance is a good example. The sequential goal is to relate how the blind man received his sight. Each proposition is as follows: the man who is called Jesus made mud; Jesus anointed my eyes; Jesus said to me, "Go to Siloam and wash"; so after I went away, I washed, and I received sight. Therefore, by the *Construction Rule*, the joint sequence of these propositions entails a macroproposition: "this is the explanation of how I received my sight", or, "in this way I received my sight". In other words, every speech act, except the last one, functions as an explanatory speech act in order to attain the final goal of receiving sight. As a result, the global

63 Three comments may be made on this verb. *Firstly*, there have been different views concerning the meaning of the verb. Brown (1966:373), among others (e.g., Morris 1971:482, footnote 25), states that this verb, which means "literally 'to see again', is used in vss. 11, 15, 18, with the wider connotation of receiving sight". Conversely, Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:497, footnote 24) is of the opinion that "ἀναβλέπειν should not be taken as implying 'see again'; here it means simply 'become sighted'" (cf. also Barrett 1955:297; Bultmann 1971:334, footnote 8). My judgment would opt for the latter view, because the man was born blind. *Secondly*, Hoskyns (1954:355) mentions: "The word also means 'to look up' and John may use it with the idea in mind that the man came to look up to Jesus" (cf. also Morris 1971:482, footnote 25). But this is unlikely, because Jesus appeared not to go to the pool with him (cf. Plummer [1882] 1981:206). When the man's eyes were opened, Jesus was not near him. The assumption that Jesus was with him when his new sight was given would contradict the man's ignorance about Jesus' whereabouts. Plummer ([1882] 1981:207) also points out that this meaning "does not suit vv. 15 and 18, where the word occurs again". *Thirdly*, Bernard (1928:330) correctly observes: "The aor. ἀνέβλεψα would suggest that the man was cured immediately after the washing in the Pool of Siloam".

speech act of the utterance in this verse is *responsive*. The utterance is designed as the answer to the neighbours' question. In light of Bach and Harnish's schema of responsives (1979:43), the blind man appeared to express his belief of how his eyes were opened in his utterance, and his intention that the neighbours would believe his utterance. Therefore, it is a successful speech act. Briefly, the blind man intended to answer the neighbours' question sincerely. In his answer, except the part where Jesus spat on the ground, the blind man explained exactly what happened, just as the narrator portrayed the event. Therefore, this indicates that the narrator and the blind man share the same viewpoint. The author may intend to reconfirm the reader's knowledge of the process of the healing miracle by virtue of this utterance.

c) Perlocutionary act

The neighbours should accept the blind man's answer, even though what he described was extraordinary, because his answer was based on what really happened in the story. The perlocution directed to the reader is to confirm his knowledge of the process of the miracle by supplying the blind man's own testimony. The reader should accept the trustworthiness of the blind man because of his honest answer.

d) Communicative strategy

1. Besides the point made regarding the utterances in verses 10 and 11 in the above analysis, I should note two more points regarding the blind man's utterance: one for the story level, and one for the text level. *For the communication between the characters*, the goal of this utterance may be enhanced by the employment of the *Interest Principle*. The neighbours heard what had happened to the blind man for the first time, and it must have been fascinating to them. Although the blind man did not intend to surprise the neighbours, they would have been surprised at hearing of such a miracle. It is important to register at this point that the man's testimony concentrated chiefly on what Jesus had done rather than on who he was (cf. also Pink [1945] 1968:75). The person of Christ would emerge later.

2. *For the communication between the author and the reader*, it appears that the author's repetition of Jesus' utterances is not merely an exact duplication, but a calculated repetition. Holleran (1993b:362) explains that "the man's quotation of Jesus' words lacks the vividness and urgency of the narrator's double asyndetic imperatives Ὑπαγε νίψαι", replacing them with the plodding, more temporally descriptive Ὑπαγε εἰς τὸν Σιλωὰμ καὶ νίψαι'. As noted earlier, the duplication of the same information results in a number of breaches of the conversational principles. However, from a

different angle, this reiteration has a positive side, namely the adherence to the *Expressivity Principle*. One of the concerns of this Principle is the emphasis on repetition that “has some rhetorical value such as surprising, impressing, or rousing the interest of the addressee” (Leech 1983:69). The blind man’s utterance surely is of rhetorical value to the reader by virtue of the recurrence of the same content described in verses 6-7.

3. As pointed out earlier, it is unusual that the blind man disclosed Jesus’ name to the interlocutors upon their demand, for the text does not record how and when the blind man acquired Jesus’ name. Some expositors such as Brown (1966:377) and Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:246) simply refer to this fact. Bultmann (1971:333-334) and Holleran (1993b:362) draw attention to the contrast with the healed paralytic in 5:13 and comment that the blind man at least knew the name of his benefactor (cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:31, footnote 26). Only a few scholars attempt to suggest some possible explanations. For example, Carson (1991:366) proposes that the blind man had learned of Jesus’ name from the talk of the time (cf. also Howard-Brook 1994:219). What can a speech act approach offer to explain this strange introduction of Jesus’ name by the blind man?

4. From a speech act perspective, the reader should be given sufficient information to understand some of the characters’ words or deeds. If the reader is not given this information, it means that the author flouts the *Maxim of Quantity*. Consequently, an implicature will be required to explicate such a flouting. The following question should be asked in this regard: Why did the blind man have to mention Jesus’ name at this particular moment? In other words: What does the author want to accomplish by putting Jesus’ name on the blind man’s lips in this second set of the question-answer sequence? The co-text, especially the *Relation Maxim*, will help answer this question. In the first set of the question-answer sequence (vv. 8-9), the blind man is the central topic. In the third set (v. 12), Jesus becomes the centre of the narrative topic. In order to uphold the *Relation Maxim*, the author needs something to connect the first and third topics in the second set of the dialogue. Putting Jesus’ name on the blind man’s lips is certainly a good, if not the best way. As such, the topic shifts smoothly from the blind man to Jesus. Since the reader knows who opened the blind man’s eyes, the author’s flouting of the *Maxim of Quantity* should no longer be such an issue to the reader. In addition, as observed earlier, the author uses devices to remind the reader of Jesus in his absence from the story (cf. the analysis on ‘CS’ in 9:9c). The use of Jesus’ name, in this instance, may be another case of such a device. From these observations, the reference to Jesus’ name is an indication of how the author employs language.

5. As indicated earlier, the comparison between the blind man and the paralytic in Chapter 5 often becomes a scholarly subject (e.g., Bultmann 1971:338, footnote 1, 339; Staley 1991; Brodie 1993:354-355). In fact, Carson (1991:366) avers: "The colour in the two personalities testifies not only to the Evangelist's stylistic versatility, but also to the differences in people to whom Jesus ministered." Culpepper (1983:139-140) draws interesting and extensive parallels between them. However, one of the significant differences should be noted in respect of this verse. The report of the identity of their healer is the end of Jesus' role for the lame man, but for the blind man it is only the beginning of his important role in the story (cf. Holleran 1993b:363).

6. Another aspect that deals with the *Quantity Maxim* is the omission of Jesus' action of spitting on the ground in the man's reply. Does this omission make a difference (cf. Gros Louis 1982:18)? Haenchen (1984:39) is of the opinion that the reader knows this omitted information and "should not be bored with the repetition". The omission may also be for the sake of compactness. However, Pink ([1945] 1968:76-78) provides a more plausible explanation. He considers the man's congenital blindness: "Being blind he could not see what the Lord did, though he could *feel* what He *applied!*" From the perspective of the blind man's condition before he was healed, the narrative displays its genuineness as designed by the author, even when considering small details such as these. In this instance the man's utterance adheres to the *Quality Maxim*: "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence" (Grice 1975:46). Silence often speaks for itself, and the *Quantity Maxim* is upheld in this particular sense.

e) Summary

The blind man replied sincerely to the neighbours' inquiry, using the global responsive speech act. The neighbours should accept his honest answer, and this appears to be the case. On the story level, the adherence to the *Cooperative Principle* and the operation of the *Interest Principle* are evident in his utterance. However, on the text level, as noted in the analysis on the last utterance, the utterance flouts the *Cooperative Principle*. Nevertheless, the *Expressivity Principle* is kept intact, and the *Relation Maxim* plays an essential role regarding the introduction of Jesus' name, in which the *Quantity Maxim* is suspended. The latter, in conjunction with the *Quality Maxim*, is observed regarding the exclusion of Jesus' action of spitting. The author admirably demonstrates his literary skill in his communicative strategy.

4.3.3 The third subcluster (9:12)

This subcluster, made up of cola 17-18, presents the third conversation between the blind man and his neighbours. In terms of the number of words, this unit has the fewest words of all the subclusters. In fact, the question-answer form, in this instance, contains only one sentence each for both question and answer.

9:12a καὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ, Ποῦ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος;

a) General analysis

The conjunction καὶ in colon 17 shows an additive-different relationship between this and the preceding cola. At the same time, it may also connect the third subcluster with the second one, suggesting the continuation of their conversation. 17.1 provides the content of the neighbours' question that was asked directly of the blind man, and they inquired about the present location of the wonder worker. The interrogative adverb ποῦ signifies the purpose of their inquiry. Thus, verse 12a reads: *And they said to him, "Where is that man?"*

b) Illocutionary act

This inquiry of the neighbours is once again a speech act of *question*. The analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for this question (Searle 1969:67) is similar to that of the utterance in verse 10 and will, therefore, not be repeated. The analysis shows that this utterance is also a successful speech act. The neighbours intended to ask another question in order to obtain the information they did not have at that point, namely where Jesus was. The author intends to shift the focus of the story from the blind man to Jesus.

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should adequately answer their question, indicating the whereabouts of Jesus. The reader should move his attention from the blind man to Jesus as the author intends.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character and text levels* together for the sake of the argument. Since the name of Jesus is mentioned in the previous utterance, the question of the neighbours is now concerned with something about the man who opened the eyes of

the blind man. Thus, their question, which adheres to the *Relation Maxim*, contributes towards advancing their conversation. However, the content of the question is rather unique. Immediately upon hearing of the process of the miracle, they asked about the whereabouts of Jesus. From a literary perspective, in general, and a speech act view, in particular, why did the neighbours not ask the blind man about other details or express any skepticism, such as why Jesus made the mud; why the man had to go to the pool of Siloam; why the man did not use the water from a well; whether the man actually believed, in the first instance, that Jesus could do something for him; whether the man really believed afterwards that Jesus had opened his eyes? These questions should follow logically. Of course, it would be a good question to ask where they could find Jesus at that time so that they might question Jesus himself for confirmation of the event. There is no doubt about this. However, they 'only and suddenly' asked where Jesus was, as if there were no other questions to ask. This may evoke more interest in the reader's mind through the operation of the *Interest Principle*.

2. The uniqueness of this question can be discussed further from a different angle. Many commentators (e.g., Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:246; Bruce 1983:211) remark that the neighbours also wanted to question Jesus personally. Others describe their inquiry as "a natural desire to meet the man who had performed such an astonishing miracle" (Carson 1991:366). Scholars who are more critically concerned with this particular question point out that "[t]he neighbors' question may be quite important to the author. Cf. 7:32-36; 13:33" (Martyn [1968] 1979:31, footnote 27). This is even more important if the question is examined in light of the Johannine community where Jesus was no longer present (Sloyan 1988:116). Holleran (1993b:363) is seeking an implicit reference in the question "to the departure of Jesus and the sending of the Spirit/Advocate in 16,5-11". Therefore, though the question appears to be simple, the significance of the question to the reader cannot be underestimated.

3. In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, the *Reduction Maxim* is employed to shorten the text by means of pronominalisation (using the pronoun ἐκεῖνος). The way in which this pronoun is used in the characters' utterances in 7:11 and 9:28 may indicate that ἐκεῖνος also comprises the derogatory sense of "that fellow" (Holleran 1993b:363; cf. Plummer [1882] 1981:206). Holleran (1993b:363) contends: "If so, then the onlookers are hardly better disposed to Jesus after hearing the man's witness than were 'the Jews' ... (7,11) or the Pharisees ... (9,28)." The text does not clearly project the clear-cut attitude of these neighbours towards Jesus and the blind man. They appeared neither hostile nor friendly (cf. v. 13).

e) Summary

The speech act of question by the neighbours intends to ask a question in order to obtain information from the blind man once more. He should answer them, indicating the whereabouts of Jesus. The author intends the reader to shift the story's focus from the blind man to Jesus. Their utterance observes the *Relation Maxim*, and the *Interest Principle* is operative for the reader.

9:12b λέγει, Οὐκ οἶδα.

a) General analysis

In response to their question, the blind man replied in colon 18. He again that he only knew the name of Jesus. Those who knew Jesus well (e.g., his disciples) were able to imagine when and/or where he used to go, such as the temple where he taught, the remote mountainside where he prayed, and so on. However, he did not have that kind of knowledge. This colon, therefore, marks the first reference to *the motif of knowledge and ignorance* in this Chapter by using a related word οἶδα. What is more significant, in this instance, is the way in which the author records this response from the blind man. In colon 18, the author uses the historical present verb λέγει to portray the vividness of his reply (Fowler *et al.* 1985:288). The author also makes use of the intensive perfect verb οἶδα in subcolon 18.1 to stress the present state of his ignorance (Fowler *et al.* 1985:292). Moreover, he omits the object of the verb οἶδα for the sake of compactness. In this instance, the omission can easily be reconstructed from the context, as the phrase “where that man (Jesus) is”. Therefore, this verse reads: *He said, “I do not know.”*

b) Illocutionary act

This is another *responsive speech act*. According to Bach and Harnish's schema of responsives (1979:43), it is obvious that the blind man expressed his belief that he did not know the answer, and his intention that the neighbours would believe that he did not know the answer. Therefore, it is a successful speech act in its own right. The blind man sincerely intended to answer the neighbours' question directly. That is the reason why he honestly confessed his ignorance.

c) Perlocutionary act

The neighbours should accept the blind man's answer, even though it would not meet the purpose of their inquiry. The perlocution directed

to the reader is to convince the latter that the blind man's knowledge of Jesus was still limited at this point. The reader should also acknowledge the author's endeavour to establish the trustworthiness of the blind man.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, one should note that this utterance is an *unintentional failure* of the *Maxim of Relation*, because it does not contribute towards advancing the conversational goal of the neighbours. In other words, the utterance does not meet the *perlocution* of the neighbours' question. The blind man was supposed to adequately answer their question as to where Jesus was. Due to his ignorance, he was not able to tell them Jesus' whereabouts, but only that he did not know. This answer is indicative of his present state, namely that he was still distant from Jesus (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:247). Barrett (1955:297) avers: "The blind man has much to learn before he makes the confession and offers the worship of v. 38." Even though the reader may observe something from the man's utterance in line with the above comment, the utterance itself, from a speech act perspective, fails as an answer and results in it becoming the major reason for the termination of the conversation between the neighbours and the blind man. The neighbours appeared to show no more interest in the man as a source of further information. One should note that this utterance may be a good instance of Searle's ([1969] 1980:54) gloss that a speech act is *defective* when "a condition may indeed be intrinsic to the notion of the act in question and not satisfied in a given case, and yet the act will have been performed nonetheless".

2. In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, since the blind man omitted the object of the verb οἶδα, the *Reduction Maxim* is employed to shorten the utterance by ellipsis (also the *Quantity Maxim* in the domain of Interpersonal Rhetoric). This verb is one of the key words in the Chapter, for "the theme of knowledge (οἶδα 'I know') is closely related to sight (εἶδον 'I saw'), both being derived from the root ἴδ – [or *weid-*], the foundation of vision and wisdom words" (Dockery 1988:18; cf. also Duke 1982:184).

3. *On the text level*, there is a narrative purpose to end this section with a rather disappointing conclusion that the blind man did not know where Jesus was (Holleran 1993b:363). This disappointing impression on the reader indicates the operation of the *Interest Principle*, because the reader probably does not expect the blind man's answer to this effect; the utterance is, therefore, unpredictable. Holleran (1993b:363-364) suggests four ways in which the narrative develops from this man's answer. *Firstly*, the man's ignorance became a basis for his future knowledge about Jesus. *Secondly*, his self-confessed ignorance would highlight what he really

knew at a later stage. *Thirdly*, the man's lack of knowledge at this point may be one of the author's communicative strategies aimed at the reader: "The reader must walk with the man born blind through the narrative to discover the answer. The reader is ignorant too and still has something to learn" (Holleran 1993b:364). *Lastly*, the reader's present discomfort that he shares the man's ignorance will be dissolved at the end of the story by Jesus' revelation (John 9:41). By terminating their conversation, the author prepares the reader for the next dialogue scene between the blind man and the Pharisees.

e) Summary

The blind man replied sincerely to the neighbours' question with a successful responsive speech act in its own right. However, the utterance is an unintentional failure with reference to the *Relation Maxim*, for he could not provide satisfactory information to them. This appears to lead to the end of their dialogue. The motif of knowledge versus ignorance is also introduced in this Chapter for the first time. The utterance is further characterised by the employment of the *Reduction Maxim* and the *Interest Principle*.

4.4 Macrospeech acts

Firstly, I shall discuss *the communication on the story level*. It is more obvious than in the previous cluster that this section is made up of utterances of the question-answer form. The speech acts employed in this section reflect this trait. While the secondary illocutionary act in verse 8b is a question speech act, the assentive, dissentive, and confirmative speech acts in verse 9 can be regarded as responsive speech acts in a broad sense. The speech acts used in the characters' utterances are either question or responsive. Hence, this section displays a typical conversational structure.

From a speech act perspective, at least one interlocutor must have a definite plan in mind in the dialogue, and steer the conversation accordingly (Saayman 1994:3). However, in contrast to the clear structure in this section, there appears to be no clear *macrospeech act* designed by the neighbours (and spectators) as the interrogators, except that they wanted to know what happened to the blind man. The reason for the failure to have any significant macrospeech act on the part of the interrogators may lie in the fact that they were more than two people, enough to form at least two groups. To aggravate matters, they were not always unanimous in their opinions. They certainly found it difficult to organise, plan and control the conversation together. They appeared to be motivated and united only by the curiosity caused by the visible change in the beggar. They asked their questions haphazardly. The blind man answered them spontaneously. There was no

serious discussion between them. Therefore, the conversation between them was neither particularly good nor bad. It was simply casual talk. More importantly, this will highlight the seriousness of the next talk exchange between the blind man and the Pharisees in contrast.

Secondly, I shall discuss *the communication between the author and the reader*. If the above analysis is correct, some questions arise. If it was not an important conversation, why does the author record this dialogue in the narrative? Is it because he cannot afford to lose any present dialogue to make up the impressive seven scenes? Although this may be true, the reason should not be as simple. Lindars (1970:61) sums up a well-known literary technique employed in the Gospel: "It is characteristic of his literary technique to single out particular items from the traditions which are available to him, and to blow them up into larger units." I propose to call this technique *Johannisation* (cf. Moloney 1978:151). If Fortna's (1970:70-74) thesis that the signs source in Chapter 9 is identified in verses 1-8 (except a possible exclusion of vv. 4-5) is valid, this *Johannisation* is evident in the remainder of the Chapter. This means that the author deliberately creates the present scene, making the story more significant and interesting. As far as a speech act approach is concerned, it is better to deal with this kind of issue in terms of the *Maxim of Relation*. What is the relevance of this section to the previous and subsequent sections? How does this cluster contribute towards advancing the goal of the author in the narrative? What is the significance of this cluster? These are the kind of questions that need to be answered.

There are, according to the analysis, at least four significant points that relate to this issue. *Firstly*, by portraying the casual talk between the neighbours and the blind man, the author wants to emphasise the prominence of Jesus' miracle. This is indeed a significant role. It was a great miracle, enough to create a controversy over even the blind man's identity (in this instance not the identity of the healer). The man who was healed became the central topic of the day among the people. *Secondly*, by an implicature that the neighbours raised no objection to the miracle, deduced from "reading between the lines" in verses 11-12, the author establishes in the mind of the reader that there is no doubt that the miracle literally took place. This confirms the miraculous event. This is how this cluster contributes to the ultimate goal of the author in the narrative. Unlike the synoptic miracle stories, "[t]he purpose of the scenes ... is not to record people's amazement or their praise of God, but to confirm the fact of the healing and its testimony to Jesus" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:246). This confirmation involves the man's identity, the healing method, and the theological consequence (Jesus' divine origin) (Schnackenburg [1968]

1980:246).⁶⁴ *Thirdly*, despite the confirming purpose of the section, it is also true that the narrator portrays the neighbours' reaction in the way that "[t]hey were so astonished at such a cure that some of them refused to believe that this was the man who had been blind" (Morris 1971:482). This fact implies that "'darkness' does not easily recognize light, even when overwhelmingly confronted with its beauty" (Summers 1979:109; cf. also Pink [1945] 1968:73-74). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:247) may rightly observe that "the reader is meant to recognise that even so great a 'sign' cannot compel faith (cf. 12:37)". *Fourthly*, by depicting the divided opinions among the neighbours, the author prepares the reader for the coming division among the Pharisees in the next section (cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:30, footnote 25; Resseguie 1982:298; Bultmann 1971:333). Just as the first point links this cluster to the previous one, this fourth point connects the present cluster to the next one.

From the above observations, a *macrospeech act* in this cluster on the text level would be *confirmative*, in that the author intends to validate the great miracle by means of the plain talk exchange. The *perlocution* is to impress the reader with the techniques employed by the author in the confirmative macrospeech act; to reassure the reader that the miracle worker was indeed Jesus, and that the man healed was indeed the blind man who used to sit and beg. It is mainly through the past hardship of the blind man that the author again draws attention to the motif of suffering.

As a brief survey of 'Communicative strategy' in this cluster, the narrator cultivates the reader's imagination via the operation of the *Maxim of Quantity* (v. 8a). The neighbours use an indirect speech act to avoid embarrassment, and the author employs the *Relation Maxim* and the *Interest Principle* to interact effectively with the reader, especially in disclosing the blind man's (past) hardship (v. 8b). The neighbours' utterance in verse 9b may be motivated by their politeness to the dialogue partners. The author uses the *Interest Principle* and dramatic irony to enhance the communication and solidarity with the reader (v. 9b). In verse 9c, the author reminds the reader of the significant implication of Jesus' 'I am' sayings for the blind man's answer. In this cluster too, the observance and violation of various conversational Principles and Maxims enhance the communication between the characters and the narrator, and between the author and the reader. In this regard, it is notable that, while the utterance in verse 10 observes nearly every conversational principle on the character level, the same utterance flouts the *Maxims of Quantity* and *Relation* as well as the *Principles of Economy* and *Interest* on the text level.

64 Cf. Holleran (1993b:360-361) who makes a slightly different observation and poses the present whereabouts of the healer in the place of theological consequence.

The notion of implicature is employed to explore the meaning of these violations. The author intends to shift the focus of the story from the blind man to Jesus by using the neighbours' question in verse 12a. In verse 12b, it appears that the termination of their dialogue is a result of the blind man's unsatisfactory answer to their question.

Briefly, the miracle performed by Jesus is clearly established in this cluster. The reader is fully suited with an unshakable veracity of the miracle and the persons involved in that miracle, before moving into the trial scenes where the Jewish authorities attempt to discredit these facts.

5. CLUSTER C: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE BLIND MAN AND THE PHARISEES (9:13-17)

5.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

5.1.1 Prophet

Perhaps no one would disagree with the view that "when the word 'prophet' is used in the Gospels it most often refers to the OT prophet" (Hawthorne 1992:638). Although we should not neglect to examine in detail what exactly is meant at every occurrence, it may not be wrong to consider a general type of prophet described in the Old Testament when this term appears in John's Gospel. Hence, this section will explore a possible conceptual background for the use of the word *prophet* in John's Gospel, and the knowledge of the reader and the characters concerning this.

As depicted in the Old Testament, prophets worked alone (cf. the Prophetic Books) or ministered as groups or schools of prophets (1 Sm 19:20; 2 Ki 2:3-7; 4:38). Deuteronomy 18:18-22 defines the word *prophet*. As Hawthorne (1992:636) points out, "OT prophets were people who had a special encounter with God and who, as a result, received a message directly from God" (Is 6; cf. Nm 22:8-9; 1 Ki 22:14). They served to bring God's message mainly to the people of Israel and to their kings (Barclay [1955] 1975:51), in or without association with the priesthood (Jr 1:1). Barclay ([1955] 1975:45) further observes: "In the Old Testament a prophet was often tested by the signs he could produce" (e.g., Moses in Ex 4:1-17; Elijah in 1 Ki 18; cf. also Brown 1966:373; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:248). They also "had the ability to see what others could not see, especially things concerning the divine will" (Hawthorne 1992:636). The Holy Spirit bestowed these qualities upon them. Hawthorne (1992:636) endorses this, stating that "the hallmark of a prophet ... was [his] inspiration by the Holy Spirit. They were a 'Spirit-bearing people'" (2 Sm 23:2; Ezk 2:2; Mi 3:8). As a

consequence, the prophets preached (or ministered) with God's authority, and "[i]t was this that gave weight and significance to their message" (Hawthorne 1992:636-637). For this reason, it was not the prophet himself who was important, but rather the message of the Lord (Mt 1:22; 2:5, 15, 23; 21:4; Lk 1:70; 18:31; 24:25; John 6:45). One should note that there were two kinds of prophets, namely true and false prophets. Jesus often warned of the danger of the false prophets, because they would lead the elect astray (Mt 7:15; 24:11, 24; Mk 13:22; Lk 6:26; Meeks 1965:75-87).

In contrast to the general description of prophet, we should investigate a more specific understanding of the term in relation to its messianic significance. When the characters used the term *the* prophet (John 1:21, 25; 6:14; 7:40), "they presumably had in mind the prophet like Moses, whom God would raise up from among the people and to whom the people would listen (Deut 18:15). This eschatological prophet would inaugurate the age of salvation" (Hawthorne 1992:639). The identification of this prophet, such as Moses, often raised the controversies as in the case of both John the Baptist (1:21, 25) and Jesus (6:14; 7:40-43).⁶⁵

Jesus can be perceived as a prophet based on his words and deeds, and he regarded himself as a prophet (Martyn [1968] 1979:120; Hawthorne 1992:640). The aspect of Jesus as a prophet would be a significant mutual contextual belief among the characters, the author and the reader. Jesus pronounced God's message (e.g., John 3:34; 7:16/14:10; the slash indicates the narrative temporality) and prophecy (e.g., 1:51; 6:28). He exclusively used the amen formula, "Amen, I say to you" (e.g., 1:51; 3:3, 5, 11; 5:19, 24-25; 6:26, 32, 47, 53; 8:34, 51, 58), equivalent or similar to the introductory formula of the OT prophets, "Thus says the Lord" (Hawthorne 1992:640-641). He had an ability to see in terms of supernatural insight by the Spirit (e.g., 2:24-25; 6:15, 64). He performed miracles (e.g., John 2; 4; 5; 6; 9). He was designated as a prophet (4:19; cf. 6:14; 7:40-43). It is significant that, on account of the signs Jesus performed, people (6:14) and the blind man (9:17) called Jesus *the* or *a* prophet. He commented on himself as a prophet (4:44). All this proves the case. It is thus important to remember that Jesus was indeed a prophet, but more than a prophet. He was the Son of God (e.g., John 1:34, 49; 3:16, 18, 36; Hawthorne 1992:641). Jesus himself and John fully understood this (e.g., 5:19-23, 25-28/10:36; 13:31; 20:31). The reader is also aware of these significant points, for he has read most of the important passages mentioned earlier. However, in this cluster, the characters on stage, especially the Pharisees, did not appear to know or accept this aspect of Jesus' identity. Although the blind man appeared to know the concept of prophet and designated Jesus as a prophet

65 For a more detailed discussion, cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:102-128.

in 9:17, he was not yet exposed to Jesus' full identity. He appeared to say that Jesus was merely one of the prophets (for further discussion, cf. the section on 'CS' in v. 17b).

With reference to the relationship between prophet and the Law, Pancaro (1975:29, footnote 64) mentions: "Some Rabbinical texts ... hold that prophets have power over the Law; other texts ... hold that no prophet can say anything that had not been written in the Torah ... and that their words and deeds have to be in conformity with the Torah." I shall point out two different views. Morris (1971:486, footnote 32) opts for the former and tenders concerning the blind man's reply in John 9:17: "If this is as early as New Testament times it will make the man's rejoinder very significant". However, I would agree with Pancaro (1975:29, footnote 64) who opposes Morris' remark, stating that the principle that "[n]o man (not even a prophet) is above the Law' is a basic assumption for John and his whole reasoning is based upon this premise. His contention that Jesus' power over the Sabbath shows him to be the Son of God has meaning only within this context".

The meaning related to the term 'prophet' will shed some significant light on our understanding of the text.

5.1.2 Relationships between the characters

The knowledge held for the specific conversation between the blind man and the Pharisees is as follows:

- In terms of social and religious status, the Pharisees were superior to and more authoritative over the blind man. This was confirmed by the fact that he was brought before them by his neighbours for interrogation.
- Both parties (the blind man and the Pharisees) were assumed to know that the healing took place on a Sabbath.
- Both parties knew that the man known as Jesus existed.
- There was a division among the Pharisees because of Jesus who healed the blind man.

5.2 Overview and structural analysis chart

This cluster depicts the dialogue between the blind man and the Pharisees. The best option may be to sever this cluster into two subclusters, based on the following observation. The first subcluster, cola 19-22, portrays and repeats the past healing event with the setting of a new scene, while the

made according to the question-answer format that is characteristic in the dialogues throughout the story (cf. cola 11-14). Therefore, this conversation provides a shift in dialogue form, and thus increases markedness. This markedness involves a clear contrast between the opinions.

3. There is a sense of progression in the conversations. In terms of the semantic contents, the preceding conversations provide the basis for the subsequent conversations. The first conversation in cola 21-22 shows the completed healing event. The second in cola 23-24 is built upon the reflection of the healing event. The third in cola 26-27 is attempted as a result of the confusion portrayed in the second conversation. Therefore, these conversations as a whole are recorded in a progressive manner.
4. The frequent usage of both the coordinate conjunctions and the pronouns can be found in all cola, except colon 19, which has no conjunction. Their usage strengthens the cohesion in the cluster.
5. I shall make two remarks concerning the second subcluster, in particular. *Firstly*, there may be another way to divide this subcluster. In the present demarcation, this subcluster comprises two units. However, it is also possible to divide this into three units, cola 23-24, colon 25, and cola 26-27. The reason for this is that colon 25 could stand independently without being part of the first unit. This means that this colon may keep equal distances from the other two units. In this alternative colon division, the first unit depicts the confusion among the Pharisees, and the second comments on the divided situation. This comment leads to the Pharisees' other inquiry in the last unit. This alternative also seems to be valid.

Secondly, the present tense verbs are used in all the conversations, except the aorist verb in 26.1.1, which describes Jesus' healing actions in the past. This is another indication that this second subcluster describes new developments. This type of verb usage provides a lively sense of vividness in the conversations.
6. Significant structural markers are as follows: to say, to see, to open, the Pharisees, Sabbath, (this) man, eyes, blind, how, again, he, they, therefore, and.

These aspects may contribute towards making this cluster cohesive.

Concerning clusters B and C as a whole, one can find a structural chiasm in these clusters. The units consist of cola 11-14 (vv. 8-9), 15-16

(vv. 10-11), 17-18 (v. 12), 19-22 (vv. 13-15) and 23-27 (vv. 16-17) that form this chiasm (cf. structural analysis charts for clusters B and C).

The chiasm in John 9:8-17

Units	Tentative titles	Verses
α	The identity of the blind man	8-9
β	The process of the miracle	10-11
γ	The present status of Jesus	12
β'	The process of the miracle	13-15
α'	The identity of Jesus	16-17

Viewing the chiasm, the centerpiece of this section is unit γ . The focus is always on Jesus. This chiasm may contribute towards establishing cohesion in these subclusters (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:245 treats vv. 8-17 as a unit).

5.3 Microspeech acts

5.3.1 The first subcluster (9:13-15)

This subcluster can be further divided into two units. Cola 19-20 present the narratological setting, and cola 21-22 provide the blind man's new dialogue with the Pharisees.

9:13: Ἀγούσιν αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς Φαρισαίους τὸν ποτε τυφλόν.

a) General analysis

Colon 19 tells of the people's action to take the blind man to the Pharisees after they questioned him. The historical present verb Ἀγούσιν is "used ... for the sake of vividness" (Newman & Nida 1980:305) and the author has no need to provide an explicit subject now, for there is a sense of continuation from the previous cluster. The fact that there is no conjunction also suggests the same point. The previous co-text indicates that the subject was the neighbours and those who previously saw the blind man. This colon and the last cluster may be linked by means of an additive-different

(consequential) relationship. The adverb *πότε* indicates the change that took place within him. With this colon, the new scene is set before the blind man. This colon gives the following narration: *They brought him, formerly the blind man, to the Pharisees.*

b) Illocutionary act

The narrator intends to introduce a new scene by describing the neighbours' action after they interrogated the blind man. This utterance is thus *informative*. The narrator has his belief and intention in informing the reader that the neighbours brought the blind man to the Pharisees. Thus, the utterance correctly follows the schema of informatives, and is successful.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should accept the change of scene and become interested in a new development of the story by the narrator's introduction of the Pharisees.

d) Communicative strategy

The narrator's utterance, in this instance, appears to indicate no significant *communication between the characters*, for it merely depicts a fact in the story. Thus, our attention will rather focus on *the communication on the text level*, which will reveal several significant points.

1. This narrator's utterance poses two questions in relation to the *Maxim of Relation*. *Firstly*, the narrator suddenly introduces the Pharisees without any details in this new section. Why would this be? One reason would be that the reader has stored the information (knowledge) about the Pharisees from the story up to Chapter 9. To the reader's mind, therefore, it may not be so sudden. The reader might find it interesting to discover mention of the Pharisees' in this pericope, because until this chapter there is more reference to the Jews as the Jewish authorities than to the Pharisees. The narrator surprises the reader by the operation of the *Interest Principle* (unpredictability). On the other hand, the information stored by the reader is mostly concerned with the matters derived from the interaction with Jesus. The author hardly tells of the Pharisees' identity, work, and relationship with the general public, and hardly needs to inform the reader about the Pharisees. The *Maxim of Quantity* with the immediate co-text, in this instance, may imply that the reader knows about them to a great extent. It can be concluded that the lack of sufficient information about the Pharisees is due to the fact that the reader is already familiar with the characters. The aim of this strategy of not providing full details

of the Pharisees may be to create suspense and to attempt to involve the reader at the start of a new section.

2. The second question reads: *Why did the neighbours suddenly decide to take the blind man to the Pharisees?*⁶⁶ Scholars suggest several answers that can be summarised as follows.

- a. Holleran (1993b:365) proposes four possible reasons to obtain some official judgment about: the reality of the cure; the true identity of the man; the issue of the Sabbath, and the identity and credentials of Jesus who effected the cure.
- b. O'Day (1987:62) points out that they brought the man to the Pharisees because the order of the neighbours' world was disrupted.

In addition, I wish to propose two additional reasons:

- c. In adherence to the practice among pious Jews that a person who was (miraculously) healed was supposed to go to the priest and to give offering according to the Law.
- d. Out of fear for the Jewish authorities.

As there is no need to explain Holleran's proposal, O'Day's and these suggestions will be further commented on before probing this issue in more detail.

O'Day's argument may be derived from the assumption that the neighbours were not happy with the wonderful change that happened to one of the less prominent members of the community (cf. also Staley 1991:66). They might have felt threatened by the emergence of a new rival in their competitive society. This seems likely on investigation of the social dimension of ancient Palestine. This fallen world contains two evils. Some people become joyful on seeing a neighbour's misfortune. On the other hand, people often become jealous when a neighbour is blessed (e.g., inherits a fortune, or receives some kind of prize). They cannot simply rejoice with the blessed. The Apostle Paul also needed to exhort Christians in Romans 12:15: "Rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with those who weep." Briefly, was this the reason for the neighbours' action in this instance? O'Day replies 'Yes'.

The evidence of my first suggestion can be found in the Synoptics. Jesus recommended the healed leper to do this as a testimony to the people in Matthew 8:4 (cf. Mk 1:44; Lk 5:14). Hence, it is possible to think that the neighbours' action was according to this custom. If this was connected with ritual purity, moreover, it would be a good ground to take the blind

66 For a discussion of the possibility that the people who took him were other than the neighbours, cf. Hendriksen [1954] 1973:80; Morris 1971:484.

man to the Pharisees because ritual purity was associated more with the Pharisees than with the other Jewish groups (Westerholm 1992:125). The second option is as follows: It might also be possible that the fear for the Jewish authorities compelled the neighbours to take such an action. They might have been desperate to report to them about the great miracle with tangible proof (which was the blind man himself). They would have been even more desperate if they knew that the healing took place on a Sabbath day.

As for the assessment of the issue, the reality of the cure has already been established in the last section, and the way in which the narrator describes the Pharisees' responses in verse 16 also indicates that they no longer appeared to doubt reality. The issue of the healed man's true identity is not even mentioned in this section. A certain practice according to the Law was observed in the case of the cure for leprosy (Lv 14:1-20; Edersheim 1958:356-361), but it appears that it was not observed in the case of the blind man, since the Mosaic Law makes no mention about the case of the cure for blindness.⁶⁷ Therefore, these possibilities can be eliminated from the consideration.

Holleran (1993b:365) concludes that the reason would be to acquire official judgment predominantly about the issues of the Sabbath and Jesus' credentials. I would agree with this conclusion with some qualification. *Firstly*, I would agree with the reason for acquiring official judgment, in general. In the last cluster, the neighbours witnessed the change in the blind man, and asked how his eyes were opened and where the healer was. Although they obtained an answer to the first question, they received none to the second. At this point, they had to decide whether or not to take the healing event further. They could abandon the event because it was a great miracle. According to Bultmann (1971:334), the Pharisees "were the authorities to whom one had to turn on such occasions". They were "men of mature judgment who can examine the case" (Martyn [1968] 1979:31; Tenney 1981:103). "[T]hey, being familiar with the Torah and its interpretation, had the right to make authoritative decisions" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:247). After all, they "were their religious leaders, and should know about this extraordinary event" (Beasley-Murray 1987:156; Morris 1971:484). The reader may wonder, "Why not mention the Sanhedrin, or at least the scribes and Sadducees?" (Carson 1991:366). It

67 Cf. the Mosaic Law which only mentions the blind people in relation to the qualification for priesthood in Lv 21:18.

is likely, as some critics argue,⁶⁸ that the Pharisees were acting as official representatives of legalistic official Judaism (or the Sanhedrin) and that “it is unlikely that the crowds were attempting to elicit a judicial opinion from the highest court in the land. They simply wanted advice from their local synagogue leaders” (Carson 1991:366).⁶⁹ Thus, the aim of the neighbours’ action was to obtain official judgment about the miracle, in general. However, the reader understands this as the wrong course of action (Bultmann 1971:334; Holleran 1993b:365).

Secondly, I would agree with Holleran on the issue of Jesus’ identity and credentials because of the author’s communicative intention as the reason. If the most probable motive of the author to write this Gospel is to bring the reader to adequate faith in Jesus as the Son of God and the Messiah, his first task would be to reveal Jesus’ real identity convincingly enough for the reader to believe in him. This miracle story is a good opportunity for the author to do that. The author should, therefore, organise the story according to this line. He plans this section in such a way that he focuses on Jesus’ identity and credentials; this is especially supported by the Pharisees’ question at the end of the dialogue in verse 17: “*What do you say about him that he opened your eyes?*”

Thirdly, official judgment about the issue of Sabbath as a reason still needs to be discussed. Lindars ([1972] 1981:345) tenders: “It is not because of the breach of the Sabbath, in spite of the next verse (v 14). We have to assume that the people want a more careful enquiry simply to establish the truth of what the man claims.” It has been argued, however, that the neighbours’ action was more than simply a careful inquiry (cf. also Staley 1991:68-69). One may need to seek a more satisfactory explanation. As far as the Jewish forensic process is concerned (cf. section 4.4 in Chapter 3), when people witnessed a possible violation, it was the duty of the witnesses (as required by the law) to initiate proceedings, to inflict the penalty and to see to it personally that the sentence was carried out (Harvey 1976:48-49). Otherwise, they would fail in their duty. This sufficiently justifies the neighbours’ action. From this observation, my view would not agree with Beasley-Murray’s opinion (1987:156): “They were not to know that bringing the healed man to the Pharisees would result in his undergoing a trial and expulsion as a sinful man” (cf. also Carson 1991:366). However, the neighbours were not so naïve (cf. O’Day 1987:62). They were fulfilling what they were supposed to do as witnesses. The text does not clearly indicate whether the blind man was taken as a witness or as the offender

68 E.g., Dodd [1953] 1968:79; Hendriksen [1954] 1973:79; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:247; Pancaro 1975:19.

69 Carson also indicates that all scribes belonged to the Pharisees in John’s day.

(cf. Pancaro 1975:19). As shall be discussed later (in 9:15), the blind man could have violated the Sabbath law himself. In case he was brought as a witness, the neighbours' action could still be vindicated because the trial could be held with or without the accused. The Sabbath issue was thus the reason for their action (cf. Newman & Nida 1980:305; Kysar 1984:49).

When people take certain action, this is often not motivated by a single cause. There could be several other reasons with different levels of importance as to why the neighbours brought the blind man. In the judgment of this study, the neighbours' action was further motivated by their fear for the Jewish authorities. Since the time when Jesus healed the paralytic in Chapter 5, the Jewish authorities' opposition to him became intense. In Chapter 7, the Jews were seeking to kill Jesus (7:1). The Pharisees (and the chief priests) sent officers to seize him (7:32), and they called him a deceiver (7:47). In Chapter 8, the Jews and Jesus had a heated debate. As the result, the Jews were sufficiently offended to attempt to stone him in the Temple (8:59). As the day when the neighbours took the man was "not on the day of the cure, but on a later day" (Bernard 1928:331; Morris 1971:484), the incident at the Temple might have reached the neighbours' ears. They may also have been aware of the aggressive attitude of the Jewish authorities towards Jesus, as described in previous chapters. In this situation, tremendous fear would have been cultivated in the minds of the general public, such as the neighbours, by any association favourable to Jesus. The narrator already portrays such fear for the Jews among the crowds in 7:13. It was even intimidating for the neighbours to know the penalty for the expulsion (9:22). Therefore, when the neighbours witnessed the miracle performed by Jesus upon the blind man, they not only considered it as their legal duty to bring the matter to the Pharisees, but also strongly felt fear for the Jewish authorities. By taking this particular action, they could display their loyalty to the authorities.

The reasons for the neighbours' action to take the blind man to the Pharisees may be concluded as follows: they did so, because (the order indicates the levels of importance), they wanted to obtain some official judgment about the issue of the Sabbath, the identity and credentials of Jesus, they were afraid of the Jewish authorities, the order of the neighbours' world was disrupted.

The suggested reasons are not verifiable with absolute certainty. Nevertheless, they would provide a likely and natural interpretation. Hence, the rules of language, specifically the *Relation Maxim*, demand some explanations concerning this narrator's utterance.

3. Another remark concerning this utterance is that the text is shortened by the *Maxim of Reduction*, which uses pronominalisation and omits the

explicit subject of the sentence in Greek. In the eyes of some expositors (e.g., Hendriksen [1954] 1973:80; Morris 1971:484) this latter aspect obscures the identity of those who took the blind man to the Pharisees, and provides a basis for their arguments, as pointed out earlier.

4. The author employs a very significant communicative strategy in the next three dialogues (from clusters C to C') to portray the intense discussions among the characters, starting from this section. As noted earlier under 'Mutual forensic beliefs' (section 4.4 in Chapter 3), many scholars find this narrative to be in the form of a trial. On the other hand, some critics such as Morris (1971:484) observe that "neither the proceedings nor the sentence read like the account of formal proceedings and it may be better to think of an unofficial inquiry"; others (e.g., Temple 1975:169-177; Tenney 1981:100-106; Servotte [1992] 1994:47-50) do not even refer to this judicial form in their commentaries. Bernard (1928:331) mentions that "[t]he questioning ... had to begin all over again, for this was an official inquiry" (cf. also Boice 1977:43). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:247) maintains that "[t]he questioning of the cured man by the Pharisees is meant to look like a real hearing ... they are following a thought-put procedure". However, Pancaro (1975:16-17, footnote 34) warns against the interpretation of John 9 as the faithful reproduction of a court case, and contends that "[s]uch an approach to Jn 9 is doomed to failure". He avers that John uses the judicial background to make a brilliant dramatisation mainly for theological interest. According to this study, the author describes the story as *the trial scene* so that the author may increase the sense of thrill and suspense in the reader's mind. The reader will endeavour to listen to the characters' words more carefully, for he knows the importance of each word used by the characters. The reader will attempt to observe their actions more closely, for the way in which they act and talk often bears a considerable significance to their testimonies. It is not surprising that the court case story receives increasing enthusiastic attention from the reader. Dodd ([1953] 1968:357) sums it up: "As sheer drama, this trial scene is one of the most brilliant passages in the gospel, rich in the tragic irony of which the evangelist is master" (cf. also Kotze 1985:60).

5. When the text is read on this level, one may expect that the blind man would suffer again, this time as either the accused or as a witness in a courtroom. This may be viewed as a prelude to the man's ultimate suffering later in a dialogue scene.

e) Summary

The narrator's utterance is an informative speech act that describes the setting for the new dialogue between the blind man and the Pharisees.

This dialogue is presented as a trial scene. The reader should accept the change of scene and become interested in the new development of the story. Although there appears to be no significant communication on the character level, several important points have been explored concerning the *Maxims of Relation, Quantity and Reduction*, and the *Interest Principle* on the text level. The utterance also indicates the motif of suffering in this section.

9:14 ἦν δὲ σάββατον ἐν ἡ ἡμέρᾳ τὸν πηλὸν ἐποίησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ ἀνέωξεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

a) General analysis

The unit consisting of verses 13-14 (cola 19-20) constitutes the part of the narrator's telling according to narrative criticism. Colon 19 provides the occasion of the dialogue and colon 20 is the narration that reveals the hidden information. When the narrator's voice prevails in some part of a story to portray events, that part can be called the *narrator's telling*, in comparison to *narrator's showing* (Stibbe 1993:15).

The narrator inserts an explanatory remark in colon 20, which is essential for the expansion of the story (for this impact on the reader, cf. 'CS' below). The conjunction δέ shows a loose connective, which is translated as *now*, rather than as *and* or *but*, because there is no direct relation to the prior sentence and this colon is a narratological insertion (not a late insertion). The aorist verb ἀνέωξεν in 20.2, occurs for the first time and is employed on the level of the surface structures to designate the result of the miracle differently. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:247) contends: "The use of the active form ἀνέωξεν in this instance, is also deliberate, since it brings Jesus into prominence as healer and sabbath-breaker.: Thus, the narration in this verse renders: *Now it was a Sabbath on the day when Jesus made the mud and opened his eyes.*

b) Illocutionary act

The narrator intends to reveal important information (that the day when Jesus healed the blind man was a Sabbath day) to the reader, for excitement as well as for the development of the story. Hence, the utterance is an *informative speech act*.

c) Perlocutionary act

The author intends to persuade the reader that the Sabbath issue becomes a springboard for the story's development; thus, the reader should understand the implication of this important information and should appreciate the forensic tone of the narrative.

d) Communicative strategy

1. Although the narrator's utterance aims to serve the reader's understanding, it also implies at least one significant point for the characters of the Pharisees *on the story level*. The important information disclosed, in this instance, is very valuable to the Pharisees, as the other characters, including the blind man, Jesus, the neighbours, and Jesus' disciples, knew that the healing took place on a Sabbath. The Pharisees, representatives of the Jewish authorities and the strictest sect of Judaism (Ac 26:5; Phlp 3:5-6), would most likely find fault with someone breaking the Sabbath law. Verse 15 explicitly states that they were interested in interrogating the blind man because of this Sabbath issue. This news value for the Pharisees is indicative of the operation of the *Interest Principle* in the utterance. This may be the reason why the narrator did not disclose this information until now, so that the narrator could link the Sabbath issue to the Pharisees.

2. I shall discuss *the communication on the text level*. That very day when Jesus opened the blind man's eyes was a Sabbath. The author could have recorded this information at the moment when the blind man gained his sight, but he withheld it until this new scene, thus producing maximum impact on the reader (cf. Salier 2004:113). This information may further increase suspense in the remainder of their conversations, and it may control the tone of the remainder of the cluster. Carson (1991:367) avers: "Though some see this as a late intrusion into the narrative (e.g. Becker, p. 315), the suggestion overlooks the fact that this detail governs much of the ensuing discussion" (cf. also Lindars [1972] 1981:345; Beasley-Murray 1987:156). Regarding the narrator's report about the Sabbath, Culpepper (1990:205) points out in 5:9: "By withholding this information and supplying it just at this point, the narrator forces the reader to review the healing from a new perspective which catches the reader by surprise." This is the author's aim. Jones (1997:168) suggests another plausible explanation of this delayed information: "[T]he narrator moves the reader to celebrate the healing before mentioning this technically troublesome point ... Before the authorities have any dealings with the man, the narrator has made the reader sympathetic toward him." For the author, moreover, "[t]he introduction of the Sabbath issue marks the transition from the evangelistic use of the

miracle story to a use in controversy with the synagogue” (Painter 1986:58, footnote 21) and “from the story of healing to the pronouncement of judgment” (Barrett 1955:292; cf. Staley 1991:64), and from a mere miracle story to a dramatic court case story.

3. One may suspect that withholding the important information about the Sabbath breach from the reader until now involves the author’s communicative strategy, namely the technique of reader victimisation. In fact, Thatcher (1999:57) claims that this is the case in this instance and calls it specifically “the Sabbath Trick”. However, I would rather conclude that this technique is not found in this case, for this incident does not fit its definition given in section 2.3 (Chapter 2). This technique aims to form a certain knowledge, perspectives or expectations about the story in the reader’s mind at an initial stage, and then to correct his first perspective or expectation by supplying additional significant information. However, in this incident, no perspective or expectation to be corrected is formed beforehand in the reader’s mind. As noted earlier, the author, by using this important information, aims to create suspense and impact on the reader and to control the narrative tone. Moreover, when this literary device is used in the texts, it is usually associated with other literary devices such as irony and/or misunderstanding. No such device is detected in this utterance.

4. The narrator’s utterance is formulated in such a way that the adherence to some principles of Interpersonal Rhetoric makes it very dramatic and effective. *Firstly*, the narrator keeps the *Manner Maxim* in order to convey his message clearly to the reader. There is no room for misunderstanding concerning the day on which the cure took place. *Secondly*, more important is the fact that the narrator surprises the reader by the operation of the *Interest Principle*. The content of the information unquestionably had immense news value. It was unpredictable. Without this information, the story cannot maintain the high tension and suspense whereby the narrator attracts the reader to the entire story, in general, and to this section, in particular. *Thirdly*, the *Morality Principle* has a strong relationship with the *Interest Principle* in this utterance. As this Principle encourages the speaker not to “reveal information he ought not reveal” (Bach & Harnish 1979:64), the narrator does not tell any more than he has already told. For instance, he does not disclose the details as to which Sabbath of the month it was nor whether or not it was more significant than other Sabbath days. By contrast, the narrator introduces the Sabbath in 5:9 with respect to a feast of the Jews in 5:1, and highlights the Sabbath in 19:31 as a special Sabbath during the Passover Feast (cf. Carson 1991:622). Although there might be nothing special about the Sabbath in 9:14, the narrator does not

reveal more than is, in fact, revealed in this instance. Hence, the narrator controls the important information for the communication with the reader.

5. *Fourthly*, as in the case of the last utterance, the *Maxim of Relation* sheds light on an interesting aspect of the author's language strategy. Both utterances in verses 13 and 14 can be considered the setting for the conversation that follows. For argument's sake, let us observe what happens if the utterance in verse 14 is placed before that in verse 13. When the order of these utterances is reversed, the utterance in verse 14 most likely becomes the major reason why the neighbours brought the blind man to the Pharisees, namely the Sabbath breaking. However, when the utterances are placed in the same order as in the text, the Sabbath breach becomes another reason why the Pharisees asked the question to the blind man. As a result, the utterance in verse 14 is linked to the next utterance rather than to the previous one.

As illustrated above, the way in which these two utterances are placed would make a difference regarding meaning and co-text. The present order of the text indicates that the author has his definite plan to organise the story, which suggests how the reader should read this narrative. Like Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:92) states regarding the healing of the sick man in Chapter 5 that the author's "aim was to develop the confrontation with the Jews from the starting-point of the conflict over the Sabbath", the author, in this instance, develops the theme of Jesus' identity as well as the motif of schism among the Pharisees "from the starting-point of the conflict over the Sabbath" issue.

6. In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, I shall make one minor comment. It appears that the *End-Focus Maxim* (the part of a clause that contains new information should be placed at the end) is transgressed in this utterance, but this happens exactly as the conditional portion of the Maxim states, "if the rules of the language allow it" (Leech 1983:22). In Greek and English, the word *Sabbath* comes at the beginning of the sentence according to the rule of the emphatic sentence structure. Therefore, it does not really break the Maxim. Incidentally, the word *Sabbath* comes at the end of the sentence in Japanese!

7. The *Quantity Maxim*, with particular reference to the word *Sabbath*, raises some questions. From the illocution of this utterance, the reader understands that Jesus broke the Sabbath law and that this will be the topic for a while at least. But exactly to what extent does the reader understand this breach of the Sabbath? In other words, how many individual violations is the reader able to identify? Does it really suffice to

mention the word *Sabbath* for communicating the fact and seriousness of the breach?

As for *the first (and second) question*, the text indicates two violations: making clay and the act of healing (giving sight). “The mention of the ‘clay’ is important for the assessment of the case since the ‘kneading’ of clay was one of the forms of work forbidden on the Sabbath” (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:247; cf. also Barrett 1955:298). Likewise, healing on the Sabbath was illegal, unless a life was in danger (Barclay ([1955] 1975:45; Newman & Nida 1980:305). In addition, critics found more violations. According to Lindars ([1972] 1981:346), “the *carrying* of ‘water enough to rub off an eye-plaster’ was forbidden”. Carson (1991:367) mentions that anointing the eyes could be a transgression (cf. also Jones 1997:170). Beasley-Murray (1987:156) suggests that the use of fasting spittle might also be a transgression. Holleran (1993b:366, footnote 150) points out another possible violation. If the blind man’s journey to the Pool was more than the legally permitted distance, Jesus’ command and its fulfillment would constitute another breach. Since the reader is assumed to be familiar with the Sabbath regulations (cf. ‘Mutual religious beliefs’ in section 4.3 in Chapter 3), he will take note of these infractions. However, the issues as to which specific regulations were actually broken or as to which breach should receive more prominence, have been debated without reaching consensus (cf. also Holleran 1993b:365, footnote 146). The point is that Jesus broke the Sabbath law. And the punishment for Sabbath-breaking was, according to the Old Testament (Ex 31:14-15; 35:2; Nm 15:32-36), the death penalty (Harvey 1976:52; Westerholm 1992:716).

With regard to *the last question*, the narration does not explicitly state that Jesus violated the Sabbath law. It simply mentions that a Sabbath was the day when Jesus healed the man. If a person does not know anything about the Sabbath regulations, he would take the statement at face value. The significance of the narration cannot be recognised. It would carry no more significant value than a remark such as it was a Tuesday when John went shopping. The question as to whether it suffices to only mention the word *Sabbath* for communicating the fact and seriousness of the breach has a meaning only in this sense. If it suffices, the narrator’s utterance observes the *Quantity Maxim* to a great extent. If not, the utterance flouts this Maxim. Since it is obvious that the reader understands the fact and seriousness of Jesus’ Sabbath breach, the utterance observes the *Quantity Maxim*. It is economical in that the narrator makes his contribution as informative as is required and not more revelatory than is required. It is neither too long nor too short.

e) Summary

The narrator's utterance is again an informative speech act, which reveals very important information to the reader. The perlocution persuades the reader to view the Sabbath issue as the central topic and to understand its profound implication. Regarding the *Quantity Maxim*, Jesus' possible Sabbath violations have been scrutinised. The introduction of the Sabbath issue at this point is a brilliant strategy, and serves to communicate some significant points to the reader. Similarly, the author upholds various conversational principles to send his messages effectively to the reader, such as the *Principles of Interest and Morality*, and the *Maxims of Manner and Relation*.

9:15a πάλιν οὖν ἡρώτων αὐτὸν καὶ οἱ Φαρισαῖοι πῶς ἀνέβλεψεν.

This type of introduction by the narrator can normally be omitted from my speech act analysis because its function is similar to that in verse 2. However, I shall retain my 'General analysis' on this verse 15a, because it contains a fair amount of significant information. Moreover, following on the section on 'General analysis', I wish to make a few remarks concerning this verse.

a) General analysis

The next unit, made up of cola 21-22, especially the characters' utterance part, can be called *narrator's showing*. This means that the narrator pulls himself from view and allows characters to speak in most parts of a given narrative. This unit introduces the dialogue between the blind man and the Pharisees. In colon 21, the adverb πάλιν functions superbly in describing the interrogation (by the Pharisees this time) as a repetition. Some scholars comment that "πάλιν simply refers back to v. 10" (Bultmann 1971:334, footnote 2; cf. also Newman & Nida 1980:306), "though the speakers are different" (Lindars [1972] 1981:345). I would agree with Boice (1977:44) who observes that obviously the Pharisees had already heard the story. Staley (1991:66) mentions that the neighbours had already reported the event to them. This is indicated by the way in which the Pharisees asked the question, "Again, therefore, the Pharisees also were asking him how he received his sight" (9:15). If they had not heard it yet, they should have asked, "Why have your neighbors brought you here?" (Staley 1991:66). However, it is doubtful that the Pharisees had also heard the details such as the particular process of healing, for they specifically asked after this aspect. One can assume that the neighbours only reported the essence

of the event, not the details. The word order of this sentence may be important, because the verb and the object come before the subject. This may indicate that the words οἱ Φαρισαῖοι are in an emphatic position, stressing that this time the Pharisees questioned him. 21.2 points to the content of their question, concerning the way in which he gained his sight. Although it appears that this content is trivial repetition, this is not the case. The Pharisees asked about the process of his healing with the clear purpose to determine who the miracle worker really was. This purpose will be revealed later in the next subcluster when the topic of their conversations focuses on the identity of the miracle worker once again. Colon 21, therefore, provides the circumstance of the interrogation: *Again, therefore, the Pharisees also were asking him how he received his sight.*

This utterance implies that there is a gap in terms of the knowledge held by the Pharisees and that of the reader. *On the character level*, the author uses the conjunction οὖν to link this utterance to the previous utterance (containing the information as to the basis for the Pharisees' interrogation, namely the Sabbath breaking). It was the first time that the Pharisees asked the blind man. They did not yet know how he had gained his sight. The conjunction οὖν, therefore, indicates the operation of the *Relation Maxim* to connect these utterances (vv. 14 and 15). *On the text level*, however, the reader already knows what happened to the blind man. Therefore, the words πάλιν and και, are employed especially for the reader's sake.

Since the content of the Pharisees' question is simply a repetition for the reader, the author's intention with this repetition will be discussed in the next utterance.

With regard to the judicial drama of this scene, the forensic elements should be identified. "The one-time blind beggar stands before his betters, to be badgered into denying the one thing of which he is certain. But the defendant proper is Jesus Himself, judged *in absentia*" (Dodd [1953] 1968:357). The Pharisees acted as the judges. It appeared that the blind man, as a witness whom the Jews later called 'Jesus' disciple', would manage Jesus' defence. Pancaro (1975:17) considers this significant. The charge was Jesus' possible Sabbath violation (Bernard 1928:331), as in 5:16; this could result in capital punishment.

9:15b ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς, Πηλὸν ἐπέθηκέν μου ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς,
καὶ ἐνιψάμην, καὶ βλέπω.

a) General analysis

Colon 22 comprises subcola 22.1-22.3 as a unit, which functions as the blind man's answer to the Pharisees. 22.1 has two significant points. The first point is of syntactic nature. There seems to be a distinctiveness of Johannine writing style in his genitive construction. In 22.1, the word order of the prepositional phrase μου ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς is unusual, and the genitive μου is in an emphatic position (for this discussion, cf. the section on 'GA' in 9:6). The second point concerns the author's choice of term: this time Jesus' healing action is indicated by the aorist indicative verb ἐπέθηκεν, which is a substitute for the word ἐπέχρισεν used in verses 6 and 11. In addition, regarding the blind man's own action in 22.2, the author chose to use only one middle voice verb ἐνύψαμην, which shows the intensive use to stress the subject's role in producing action (Fowler *et al.* 1985:295). It can be translated as *I myself washed*. As the outcome of their actions, the present tense verb βλέπω in 22.3 is markedly used to accentuate the present state of the blind man's condition, namely that he can now see. This verse reads: *And he said to them, "He placed mud on my eyes, and I myself washed, and I see."*

b) Illocutionary act

As the blind man's utterance, in this instance, is basically a repetition of that in verse 11, the analysis will have nearly the same outcome. The striking difference between them, however, would be that, this time, the utterance retains an illocutionary force for the reader, although there are also minor differences. The utterance again consists of a sequence of some speech acts: he placed mud on my eyes; I myself washed, and I see. Like the man's earlier utterance, it has a sequential goal as to how the blind man received his sight. Therefore, by the *Construction Rule*, the macroproposition would be: Hence I received my sight. Every speech act, except the last, functions as an explanatory speech act in order to attain the goal. As a result, the *global speech act* of this utterance is *responsive*. According to Bach and Harnish's (1979:43) schema of responsives, it is obvious that the blind man expressed his belief as to how he came to see, and his intention that the Pharisees would believe his utterance. Therefore, it is a successful speech act of responsive, and the blind man intended to sincerely answer the Pharisees' question. However, he omitted some details and emphasised his own role in the healing process more in this utterance than in the previous answer to the neighbours. The author hereby intends the reader to become aware of the difference between the man's answers then and now.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Pharisees should accept the blind man's answer as he stated it, and not link the healing to the Sabbath regulations. The reader should notice the author's careful construction of the man's utterance, and recognise the effort by the blind man for the sake of Jesus. The author thus intends to show the blind man's effort to support or protect Jesus.

One should note that the blind man's reply, in this instance, clearly differs from that in verse 11 on one point. Although his two utterances are both responsive speech acts with the illocution to answer the question, the perlocution of each utterance differs. While the perlocution of his reply in verse 11 is to convince the neighbours that his explanation of the process of the cure was true, the *intended perlocution*, in this instance, is to convince the Pharisees that the miracle worker did not do anything wrong, implying and hoping that his healing would not constitute the Sabbath breach. Unfortunately, however, this intended perlocution would not be realised, irrespective of how well the blind man stated it. The cure on the Sabbath day itself was the violation, unless it was a matter of life and death, *according to the Jewish interpretation of the Sabbath Law*.⁷⁰

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level, first*, the appeal made by the blind man might have been valuable, if not interesting, to the Pharisees. In this sense, the blind man's reply contributed to their conversation, and drew a great deal of attention from the Pharisees by the performance of the *Interest Principle*. Secondly, the *Maxim of Quality* is adhered to in his utterance, for the blind man gave them a sincere answer. At least, what he described as the answer was true. However, thirdly, his answer falls short of the complete description, and there are some significant omissions in the blind man's reply, namely Jesus' actions to spit on the ground, to make mud, and to command him to go and wash, and Jesus' name as well as that of the pool of Siloam where he washed. Do these omissions violate the *Quantity Maxim*? They are indeed violations if the Pharisees knew that his information was incomplete. But the irony is that the Pharisees did not know it. They were satisfied with his reply for the time being. They asked no more questions about the miraculous event; this implies that they accepted his explanation and the reality of the miracle (cf. Holleran 1993b:366). Briefly, the blind man's utterance is no violation on the character level. Regarding these omissions, it is surprising that only ten words are used in subcola 22.1-22.3 to describe the great miracle. Compactness as a rhetorical feature operates

70 Cf. also Edersheim 1958:176; Brown 1966:373; Westerholm 1992:716; Douma 1996:113.

in this instance with the author's careful selection of the words. In this sense, this utterance also observes the *Economy Principle*.

2. As noted earlier, the examination of the blind man's utterance should be made in conjunction with the narrator's last utterance (v. 15a). Many fascinating observations can be drawn from this on the text level. Firstly, though the *Interest Principle* indicates the contribution of the blind man's reply towards the ongoing conversation on the story level, this *Interest Principle* might be violated on the text level due to the repetition of the content. This principle might diminish the reader's interest, because the reader already knows what the blind man would probably say. At first glance, the repetitious utterance is predictable for the reader. The same holds true for the Pharisees' question. However, when the man's utterance is closely scrutinised, it manifests different qualities. Secondly, as far as the reader is concerned, it is already the third time that he hears the explanation of the manner of the healing (cf. also 9:6-7; 9:11). This clearly flouts the *Quantity Maxim* and the *Economy Principle*. Why does the author break these Maxims? What does the author want to communicate to the reader by these floutings? According to Botha (1990:4), "[i]n a literary speech situation flouting is always valid for the communication between implicit author/narrator and reader/narratee". In other words, it is assumed from a speech act perspective that the author has something to say to the reader, even when the author transgresses the Maxims, because the author still maintains the *Cooperative Principle* overall. More correctly put, the author wants to communicate something especially by virtue of the transgressions.

3. It appears that there are two main reasons for the repetition. Firstly, these two utterances employ the *Expressivity Principle* to impress the astonishing miracle on the reader. This means that the author is concerned more with effectiveness than with efficiency in this communication. The second reason is more important. This repetition should be viewed in conjunction with the Sabbath issue. Even if the message of the blind man's reply is nearly similar, the Sabbath issue coerces the reader to review the cure from a new perspective, as mentioned earlier. The discussion now becomes an entirely new issue. In this discussion, it is profitable to take into account another flouting of the *Quantity Maxim* in the blind man's utterance on the text level. It is flouting because the blind man's omission of some details becomes the transgression as soon as a person such as the reader perceives it.⁷¹ However, the author demonstrates his prudence and subtlety, particularly in this transgression for the communication

71 One should note that this reference to the *Quantity Maxim* by his omission should be distinguished from that to the same Maxim by the author's repetition.

with the reader. Due to the risk of the Pharisees considering the cure by Jesus to constitute a Sabbath-breaking, the blind man, by the author's strategy, organised his explanation very cautiously so that they might not perceive it as the breaking of the Sabbath Law. Unlike the healed paralytic in Chapter 5, the blind man endeavoured to protect the one who gave him mercy. His omission in his reply was indicative of this protection. In this regard, the blind man's utterance uplifts the *Morality Principle*, in that he did not reveal information he should not reveal (Bach & Harnish 1979:64). In addition, he not only omitted some details, but also emphasised his own role in the miracle, namely the washing of his eyes by himself, in order not to endanger Jesus in any way. If these observations are right, the repetition by the author makes good sense. Briefly, the author repeats the explanation of the healing account so that the reader may appreciate the intentional change in the blind man's explanation (compare v. 11 with v. 15). This is the dynamics of the author's language strategy and demonstrates the insight that a literary approach can achieve.

4. To elaborate on the last point, Holleran (1993b:366) reaches the same conclusion, though he does not employ speech act terms, which by the compression of the details the man was attempting "to minimize or disguise the offense of the Sabbath violation involved". Even Boice (1977:44) recognises the effective function of language, in this instance, and remarks that the blind man's terse reply shows that his testimony to the Lord was improving, as indicated by his tactics to shorten the answer. However, critics who do not engage normally in literary approaches, easily overlook the power of language strategy in these details. Or worse, this may result in a superficial reading of the text. For instance, Carson (1991:367), who is respected for his excellent scholarship and critical towards "new criticism" (Carson 1991:38), comments on this verse: "Apparently the Pharisees launched a serious inquiry. *Doubtless the healed man gave them a full report.* John records only a condensed version" [italics mine]. This is what Carson assumes, but is not what the text indicates (cf. vv. 6-7, 11). It is usually true, as Carson (1991:66-67) points out, that "any responsible observer could draw reasonable conclusions about what Jesus knew, or his disciples did not ... from the actions they took and/or the words they spoke". However, even if one is a responsible observer, he sometimes falls short of drawing reasonable conclusions. If there is a reliable linguistic model that can alert and help an interpreter detect the author's device or strategy, it will enhance a balanced reading. As has been argued, the harmonious utilisation of both historical and literary approaches would lead to a better understanding of the text, because each approach can address the text from its own vantage point.

5. Another device used by the author in this man's utterance can be identified and described by literary approaches. A speech act approach, in particular, among other literary methods, is equipped to do this well. Another device of the author, as indicated earlier, is irony. It is interesting that no critic has yet mentioned the occurrence of irony in this instance. One reason is that, unless the blind man's tactics to condense his report are not recognised, this irony will not be identified. Another reason is that this irony is not as significant as that of the next utterance (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:16). I shall now briefly examine this irony to elucidate it.

According to the steps for identifying ironic utterances, as outlined earlier (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), the ironist, observer(s) and victim should be clarified. Since the blind man as the speaker sincerely answered and seemed not to intend to make an ironic utterance, this appears to be situational irony. As a rule, there is no ironist in situational irony; this is the case in this instance. The observers of this irony are the author and the reader; the victims are the Pharisees. Because this irony is based on the observers' knowledge of the victim's lack of knowledge about the full description of the healing event, it is classified as dramatic irony located at the text level. The nature of pragmatic opposition is linked to the flouting of the *Quantity Maxim*. Verifying steps v) and vi), and the final step were already answered earlier.

6. Lastly, again one may find the motif of suffering in this verse. In this trial scene, the Pharisees were interrogating the blind man with a view to at last succeeding in arresting and condemning Jesus legally. This was at least the second time that Jesus broke the Sabbath Law. For the Pharisees as 'pious Jews', it was unforgivable and had to be condemned. Their interrogation was serious and their attitude must have been hostile first, towards Jesus and, secondly, towards the blind man who was in a witness position for Jesus. In this instance, one can note the opposition from the darkness when the light shines in darkness in Johannine terms. Any opposition is linked to suffering on the part of the oppressed or attacked. If God gives grace and faith to the oppressed and they respond properly, opposition will sharpen their testimony, as in the case of the blind man, and guide them to a deeper understanding of faith in Jesus (Boice 1977:47). This suffering has a constructive purpose in terms of the growth of faith.

e) Summary

This utterance is a global speech act of responsive, and the blind man intended to give a sincere answer to the Pharisees' question. The Pharisees should accept his answer as he described it. On the story

level, this utterance adheres to the *Interest* and *Economy Principles*, and the *Quality Maxim*. On the text level, the utterance flouts the *Principles of Interest* and *Economy*, and the *Quantity Maxim* in two different ways, because the utterance is a repetition and contains the omission of some details. However, the author deploys these transgressions to communicate effectively with the reader about the blind man's strategy to protect Jesus. For this same purpose, the author also uses the *Principles of Expressivity* and *Morality*, as well as dramatic irony. In this trial scene, the motif of suffering is again noted.

5.3.2 The second subcluster (9:16-17)

This second subcluster sketches new developments since both the last conversation and the last healing event. The development of the blind man's perception about Jesus is disclosed, especially in contrast to the confusion of the Pharisees' understanding of the same person. This subcluster, therefore, can be divided into two units that describe these two items. The first unit consists of cola 23-25, which tells of the Pharisees' confusion. The second unit, made up of cola 26-27, highlights the blind man's new perception. All, except colon 25, record their conversations.

9:16a ἔλεγον οὖν ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων τινές, Οὐκ ἔστιν οὗτος παρὰ θεοῦ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ὅτι τὸ σάββατον οὐ τηρεῖ.

a) General analysis

The unit consisting of cola 23-24 and colon 25 forms a smaller unit under this subcluster. While cola 23-24 constitute a category of *narrator's showing*, colon 25 is that of *narrator's telling*. In colon 23, the conjunction οὖν indicates that colon 23 is linked to the last unit by an additive-different (consequential) relationship, especially referring to the blind man's answer in colon 22. After the Pharisees themselves heard his answer, two contrasting opinions emerged as their response. The nominal part of 23, ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων τινές, strongly implies such a division when it is contrasted to the nominal part of 24, ἄλλοι. The parallelism between 23 and 24 is antithetical. The appearance of other constructions is noted for the second time since cola 12-13. The Greek is a great deal clearer in this instance, for the construction is not ἄλλοι – ἄλλοι but τινές – ἄλλοι. One should note that the prepositional construction ἐκ plus a genitive case, such as ἐκ τῶν

Φαρισαίων is found most commonly in Johannine literature.⁷² This seems to be one of the author's favourite expressions.

The initial response in colon 23 represents the opinion of the skeptical group. This group concluded that Jesus did not come from God, because he did not obey God's command to keep the Sabbath holy. They did not like Jesus' violation at all, because they were blindly strict in observing their fundamental laws. Their comment, 23.1, is a direct quotation introduced by no particular word. However, it is interesting to note the word order in this sentence. The prepositional phrase *παρὰ θεοῦ* is placed in the middle of the nominal part *οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος*. "This unusual order may be intended to emphasise "man". This is probably meant contemptuously (cf. NEB: "This fellow")" (Morris 1971:485, footnote 29; cf. also Barrett 1955:298; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:248). They were saying that Jesus was not an agent of God (cf. Bernard 1928:331). In this instance, the topic is shifted from the process of healing to Jesus' identity. 23.1.1 explains the reason for their skepticism. This is indicated syntactically by the conjunction *ὅτι*, denoting *because*. The word *τηρεῖ* is "a favourite verb with Jn" (Bernard 1928:332; cf. also Duke 1982:122). Briefly, this verse renders: *Some of the Pharisees were, therefore, saying, "This man is not from God, because he does not keep the Sabbath."*

b) Illocutionary act

From the content of their utterance and the stage setting by the narrator's introduction, its illocutionary force is very clear, in that the Pharisees intended to conclude that the miracle worker was not from God, based on their observation that the miracle worker did not keep the Sabbath.⁷³

Because of the illocutionary force, as determined above, this utterance of the Pharisees would be *confirmative*. When the schema of confirmatives

72 According to *BibleWorks for Windows*, ver 3.2 (Bushell 1995), there are 165 occurrences of this formula in John's Gospel alone, compared to 82 times in Matthew, 67 in Mark, and 87 in Luke. Even the Book of Revelation has 135 occurrences.

73 Du Rand (1991:99) comments: "According to the speech acts the reader knows that it is a positive statement on Jesus' identity although it is used as a remark anticipating the answer". Du Rand's view is not so clear as to in what sense it is a positive statement. Perhaps he considers that the function of this sentence is equivalent to that of a type of question that expects the answer 'yes'. However, this is not an interrogative sentence. His view would contradict the remainder of the utterance "because he does not keep the Sabbath". Therefore, my view differs from his, as indicated above.

applies to the text in this instance (for this schema, cf. the section on 'IA' in 9:5), the following is the result:

In uttering that “*This man is not from God, because he does not keep the Sabbath*”, some of the Pharisees confirm (the claim) that the man who healed the blind man is not from God if they express:

- i. the belief that the man is not from God, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that the hearers believe that the man is not from God, because they have support for (the claim) that the man is not from God.

As Bach and Harnish (1979:46) define truth-seeking procedure “as observation, investigation, or argument”, the procedure in this utterance should be the Pharisees’ observation that the miracle worker did not keep the Sabbath. Accordingly, this utterance is a confirmative speech act. As a result, having heard the blind man’s answer, in conjunction with their own observation, some Pharisees attempted to judge the miracle worker by referring to his origin. At the same time, they intended to defend their authority as defenders of God’s laws, in that they implicitly claimed that they were from God.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *perlocution* of this utterance is to persuade the hearers that the miracle worker was not from God. The hearers should accept this discredit concerning him made by some of the Pharisees (Jones 1997:148), and acknowledge their authority and judgment as the defenders of God’s laws. The author invites the reader, by virtue of the irony of the Pharisees’ utterance (cf. the section on ‘CS’ below), to be a knowledgeable insider against the Pharisees as outsiders. Thus, the author wants to induce in the reader a negative attitude towards these Pharisees who practised their judgment on appearances.

d) Communicative strategy

1. From a speech act perspective, the Pharisees’ utterance is a very successful speech act. *Firstly*, this utterance is very clear in its illocutionary force, as mentioned earlier, and thus follows the *Manner Maxim* to a great extent. Because of this direct and transparent relationship between the text and the message expressed in the narrative, the *Transparency Maxim* under the *Clarity Principle* would praise this utterance. *Secondly*, it also indicates that some of the Pharisees were very sincere in expressing their thought. They said what they really believed concerning this miracle

worker. In this sense, the utterance uplifts the *Quality Maxim*. *Thirdly*, this utterance motivates the ensuing discussion, and thus enhances the characters' conversation with intensity and enthusiasm. This is made possible with the help of the narrator when he mentions the day of the cure, namely the Sabbath in verse 14. When some of the Pharisees again referred to the Sabbath issue in this verse, the *Relation Maxim* boosts the development of the story by virtue of the word *Sabbath*.

2. Thus far, this utterance was analysed mainly on the story level. When the scrutiny of this utterance on the text level is initiated, one finds more interesting, subtle, and silent communicative strategies, designed for the reader. There are three significant strategies: the characterisation of the Pharisees, the ironies, and the enigma concerning Jesus' healing action.

3. Firstly, this utterance is unique in the sense that it clearly shows the Pharisaic character in their first response immediately after listening to the blind man's explanation. Although their faces might have displayed their amazement, their very first remark was that of condemnation that the miracle worker was not from God, directly relating the miracle to the Sabbath Law. When the neighbours heard of the cure from the blind man, their first response was rather innocent; they asked where the miracle worker was, implying that they also wanted to see him. In comparison with this reaction, the Pharisees' response seemed to be unusual, and their utterance surprised the reader by means of the *Interest Principle*.

It would be illuminating, moreover, to characterise the Pharisees from this unusual response. They appeared to always evaluate anyone or anything in terms of the laws and regulations (cf. Tolmie 1999:18), considering the fact that they were not even informed, strictly speaking at this point, that the miracle worker was Jesus. This characterisation echoes their portraits elsewhere in the synoptics (e.g., Mt 15:1-2; 19:3; 23:35-40; Mk 7:5; Lk 5:30; 6:2; 11:38; 18:11-12). The Jews in John 5:10-18 demonstrated the same trait. Culpepper (1990:206) comments on this pericope: "The Jews are presented here as bound to the law. Because they cannot see beyond the law, they oppose Jesus." Westerholm (1992:611) also points out that "[t]he Pharisees emerge ... as an organized party of members committed to a particular understanding of Israel's Law, maintaining its practice themselves and advocating its adoption by others".

4. *Secondly*, this characterisation assists in mentioning the Pharisees' self-consciousness. They were obviously sitting in the judgment seat, from which they would exercise their authority as religious leaders. When they did so, they considered themselves the defenders of God's laws, implicitly claiming that they were from God. However, the reader already

knows that they were not that kind of people. Jesus' debate with the Jews, including the Pharisees in Chapter 8, evidently demonstrates it. The author, therefore, has tactically presented the Pharisees as the ones who did not know who they really were. This might be *irony*, which the author uses effectively to make the story more interesting. Therefore, this can be regarded as a clue for the occurrence of irony, and this utterance is worthy of detailed analysis by way of *the analytical outline for ironic speech acts* (cf. section 1.6 in Chapter 2).⁷⁴

- a. Some contradiction (section A-ii-2) and simplex reversal plot (section B-iii-1) (these section numbers correspond to those of the analytical outline):

It is, in fact, misleading to portray the Pharisees' ignorance about themselves as the content of this irony. Although their ignorance is a significant point derived from the utterance, it is not the precise description of the proposition stated in the utterance. According to the outline, there is an incongruity in the relationship between text and co-text as an indication of the presence of irony in this utterance. Strictly speaking, the Pharisees who made this utterance were convinced that the miracle worker was not from God. However, the reader knows that the miracle worker was Jesus who came from God. This contrast should be the propositional opposition in this utterance.

- b. Three participants and types of irony (section B-i)

According to the outline for ironic speech acts, three participants of irony need to be identified, bearing the two levels of communication in mind. *On the character level*, the Pharisees, as the speakers, appeared to be sincere in their remark, and not intending to employ an ironic utterance. There is no clue to think otherwise. Therefore, this is not verbal irony; in fact, there is no ironic utterance on the character level at all. This utterance is a successful confirmative speech act, as analysed earlier.

However, *on the text level*, the reader, as the observer, is able to discover that the Pharisees unconsciously exhibited their ignorance about a fact in their utterance, namely that the miracle worker did come from God. In this sense, their utterance is *irony of self-betrayal*, and they were the victims of their own words. Of course, the utterance implies no ironist. Furthermore, there is another type of situational irony in this instance, namely *dramatic irony*. The victims (target) are the Pharisees and the

74 The following section separations of the analysis on irony are used for clarity's sake, because this is the first rigid application of the analytical outline. However, these subsections will not appear hereafter, not only because of the stylistic reason, but also so as not to impede the flow of arguments.

reader is the observer, because this irony can be perceived by the reader's knowledge of what some of the Pharisees have yet to find out about the miracle worker. However, these ironies are, in essence, two sides of the same coin of this ironic utterance.

Nevertheless, the most important type of irony in this utterance is not yet fully exposed. It is *verbal irony*, on the lips of the Pharisees, intentionally used by the author as the ironist to achieve a certain aim on the text level. The observer would be the reader, and the target would be some of the Pharisees in the story. Since this irony is not yet established as a successful ironic utterance, I shall examine it by applying ironic speech act conditions.

c. Ironic speech act conditions (section B-iv)

According to the outline, the irony must meet two conditions regarding *propositional content conditions* (section B-iv-1).

“In the utterance of the ironic speech act (Ir), the speaker must successfully refer to some entity *X*” (Amante 1981:84).

“Propositions *P* and *P'* must both identify *X* as their common referent” (Amante 1981:84).

In the Pharisees' utterance, the author successfully refers to this man (the miracle worker) as entity *X*. The counterfactual propositions would be similar to those of the situational ironies. Thus *P* is that this man is not from God, and *P'* is that this man is from God. Indeed, these propositions both identify this man as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions also give basically two conditions, for the third condition is the modification of the second in the outline (section B-iv-2).

“The speaker believes the audience can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues in *P* and *P'* and/or contextual clues” (Amante 1981:85).

“The speaker (ironist) takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act” (Amante 1981:85).

The utterance under investigation can answer 'yes' to both conditions. The author believes that the reader can detect the disparity by the contextual (strictly speaking, co-textual) clues provided by his reading up to this chapter. *Secondly*, the author is definitely responsible for creating this speech act.

Sincerity conditions require the following condition to be met (section B-iv-3).

“The Speaker believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain” (Amante 1981:86).

Being aware that what the Pharisees said is false, the author makes them say it nonetheless. He disbelieves the proposition predicated, and thus the sincerity rule for the illocution does not obtain.

Now the result of *essential conditions* applied for this utterance can be formulated as follows (section B-iv-4). The utterance of the Pharisees counts as the undertaking of deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

d. Taxonomy and the ironist’s intended meaning (sections B-v and B-vi)

The ironic utterance created by the author is an *assertive speech act* (on the text level), for the author has a strong belief and his intention is that the reader should continue to hold a similar belief. The belief expressed in proposition *P*, the opposite of what is said, is that the miracle worker was from God. This belief is the author’s true intended meaning for the reader.

e. To summarise, both the author and the reader share the same truth about the miracle worker. Yet the author superficially betrays the expectation of the reader via the words of some of the Pharisees. However, because of the information obtained from the previous chapters and the co-text in this instance, the reader can easily detect that the author is flouting the *Maxim of Quality*, namely “Do not say what you believe to be false” (Grice 1975:46), and that the author does not abandon his belief about the truth. Therefore, the reader can infer that the Pharisees’ utterance created by the author is an ironic speech act designed for the reader. It is intended, covert, fixed and finite. We can thus conclude that this Johannine irony is stable.

f. Perlocutionary act of this irony (section C)

This ironic utterance on the text level draws the reader’s attention back to the language of the Pharisees once again, and expects him to focus on the message by his active involvement in the decoding process. Through this effect, the reader must perceive that the author is expressing a qualifying judgment on the Pharisees, condemning their belief as untrue. This creates a sense of detachment between the reader and the Pharisees. The reader is further asked not to make the same mistake the Pharisees made concerning the miracle worker, but to form a knowledgeable group with the author. In this instance, the irony is used very effectively to strengthen the bond between the author and the reader.

5. As the *third significant strategy* of the author on the text level, one enigma appears to overwhelm the reader's mind regarding this utterance. Why did Jesus put himself in this difficult position, where he could be accused of being a serious offender of the Sabbath Law, which all the Jewish people respected? Some commentators (e.g., Barrett 1955:298; Carson 1991:367) consider that the principle behind the Pharisees' judgment in this utterance could be found in Deuteronomy 13:1-5. Brown (1966:373) explains that "even a wonder worker must not be believed but be put to death if he tends to draw people aside from the way which God commanded".

As Jesus was familiar with the Law (e.g., John 8:17; 10:34; 15:25; cf. Mt 22:35-40), he no doubt also knew the Decalogue. He was aware of the prohibition of works on the Sabbath as well as the punishment that would come with its transgression (Ex 20:8-11; 31:12-17; Dt 5:12-15). Jesus already knew from the previous experience in Chapter 5 that he would face severe opposition should he heal someone on the Sabbath again. Why did Jesus again transgress the Sabbath law on this occasion? It is doubtful that he did not know that the day was a Sabbath, for it was too risky to forget that profaning the Sabbath was a capital offence. For the sake of argument, even if Jesus did not know the day, the disciples would have reminded him thereof. Hence, we can most reasonably conclude that Jesus deliberately chose that day to cure the blind man, just as he did for the man at the pool of Bethesda on the Sabbath.⁷⁵ This view is further supported by the fact that Jesus was aware that the healing itself would constitute 'work', since he himself mentioned in 9:3 that the works of God might be manifested in the blind man. Therefore, being aware of the Sabbath issue, Jesus dared to perform the miracle (cf. Calvin 1979:374; Morris 1971:484).

The riddle of the cure on the Sabbath is not yet fully answered. What was the Johannine Jesus really thinking when he healed the blind man, knowing that his action might result in capital punishment? Did he already decide to give up his life in this incident, because he would die on the cross? No, this is not likely, for he could not yet die. Jesus knew that 'hour' (e.g., John 2:4; 7:6, 8; 12:23, 27; 13:1; 17:1). He still had to prepare the disciples for his coming departure (cf. Chapters 13-17). Did he attempt to challenge anyone or anything by his action? Did he want to teach an important lesson by virtue of the cure on the Sabbath? Yes, it is most likely so. What was it, then?

75 This point can be deduced from the implications of Jesus' utterances in Jn 5:17 and 7:21-24.

There could be two major lessons regarding Jesus' transgression of the Sabbath Law. *Firstly*, Jesus probably intended to teach the disciples about the urgency of God's works through this action. Indeed, Jesus' utterance in verse 4 creates a sense of urgency, in that "[t]he works of the day and of night can not be delayed even for a short period of time, for the night and the darkness may come at any time. For this reason the healing of the blind man cannot be postponed one day" (Resseguie 1982:296). God's works cannot always wait for the appropriate time. Jesus' disciples need to do the works, even when some influential people oppose them. In this regard, they should focus on God, and not turn to other people. They should not pay attention to what other people would say, but to what God would want them to do. In Mark 3:4, Jesus insisted "that doing 'good' can never be wrong on the Sabbath" (Westerholm 1992:719). The Johannine Jesus also indicated a similar line of thought in 7:21-23. In Acts 5:29, Peter and the apostles appeared to learn the lesson, stating that they must obey God rather than men in doing God's works. Paul also encouraged Timothy to preach the word both in and out of season (2 Tm 4:2). Hence, Jesus' healing on the Sabbath became a good example for his disciples.

Secondly, Jesus (for that matter, the author ultimately) might intend to reveal that the Pharisees were spiritually blind by virtue of this Sabbath issue. It is noteworthy that Jesus and the Pharisees did not share the same understanding of the Sabbath Law. The Jewish religious leaders, represented by the Pharisees, followed the guidelines of the Sabbath set by legal experts (e.g., the Scribes). The goal of these legal experts was "to spell out the duties of God's people by defining the terms and limits of God's revealed commands" (Westerholm 1992:716). It is not an issue that they accept the view that they started to do their task with a good and pious intention, which was reflected in every detail.⁷⁶ These legal experts were certainly honouring God and the fourth commandment. However, the religious leaders made the mistake to consider these traditions of the 'ancients' more authoritative than the Scripture itself (Mt 15:3-6; Edersheim 1958:177; Douma 1996:118). They not only tried to follow these traditions for themselves, but also taught the Jews a distorted teaching on this important issue. As a result, they became hypocritical in their walk with God. Indeed, on no fewer than three occasions, Jesus reproached their hypocritical attitudes (e.g., Mk 7:1-13; Mt 15:1-9; 23:1-35; Lk 11:37-52; 13:10-16). McKay (1994:191) summarises Justin's comment on this topic as the result of spelling out their duties: "And he reveals that what he identifies as the Jews' response to God on the sabbath is nothing other

76 For instance, the forbidden work on the Sabbath was classified into at least 39 major groups, which was indicated in the *Mishnah* (Edersheim 1958:177; Brown 1966:373; Douma 1996:117).

than their idleness. In his view Jews do nothing for God on the sabbath, nothing active, that is.” The principle of the Jewish religious leaders was good, but their practice was not.

On the other hand, Jesus rightly interpreted the ‘spirit’ of the Sabbath regulation demonstrated in the Mosaic covenant. He did not distort the principle of the Sabbath rest. He promoted the essence of the Sabbath observance, by applying it to his own context. *Firstly*, Jesus as the Son of God had the “authority to interpret the divine will” (Westerholm 1992:719). Thus, Jesus made it clear that the Son could and should also work even on the Sabbath, because the Father was always working (John 5:17). He thus implicitly claimed to be equal with God, as the opponents rightly perceived (5:18). Pancaro (1975:29) paraphrases the author’s point of view concerning the Sabbath issue as follows: “The question is not, ‘Can Jesus be a man of God and notwithstanding that still work on the Sabbath?’ but, ‘As Son of God *must* Jesus not work also on the Sabbath?’”. *Secondly*, he expressed an additional view in John 7:21-23, namely that doing good deeds or acts of mercy would be more commendable not only on weekdays but also on the Sabbath, because such an activity, according to Carson (1991:316), “is the fulfillment of the redemptive purposes of God set forth in the old covenant”. Particularly as far as blind persons are concerned, as Koester (1995:145) points out, God promised to open their eyes himself (Is 29:18; 35:5; 42:16; Ps 146:8), or to send his messianic ‘servant’ to do the same (Is 42:6-7). Jesus’ healing on the Sabbath appeared to break the Law, but his action was no doubt the action that the Messiah was supposed to perform, consistent with the expectation of the Scriptures. The Lukan Jesus in 14:1-6 also silenced the Pharisees by using the same kind of logic over the Sabbath issue (Lk 6:6-11; 13:10-17; cf. also Mt 12:9-14; Mk 3:1-6). The synoptic Jesus stated this point on helpful deeds more explicitly than the Johannine Jesus did.⁷⁷

7. Hence, “[w]hat Jesus was doing on the Sabbath was certainly in conflict with the Jewish *interpretation* of the law” verbalised in, for instance, the *Mishnah*, but not with the Sabbath Law itself (Douma 1996:113; cf. Pancaro 1975:51). It is significant in this regard that Jesus spoke of the law as ‘your law’ to the Pharisees and the Jews (John 8:17; 10:34). To summarise, it is apparent that the accusation made by the Pharisees in

⁷⁷ The synoptic Gospels provide two additional prominent accounts of Jesus’ understanding of the Sabbath Law. Jesus taught in Mark 2:27-28 that the Lord of the Sabbath was the Son of Man, and that the Sabbath was for the sake of man. While the former has a strong link with the first view expressed by John 5:17-18 in terms of Lordship and divine authority, the latter with the second view indicated by John 7:21-23 in terms of acts of mercy for man’s benefit.

9:16a, namely that Jesus violated the Sabbath Law, was not a breach at all (cf. Pancaro 1975:30). Even making mud and other specific breaches could be conceded. It is rather revealed that the Pharisees' interpretation was simply the hypocrisy derived from their spiritual blindness; they could not see the divine purpose of the issue nor correct their present and/or past mistakes (cf. Carson 1991:368). This inevitably leads to Jesus' statement at the end of this story in verse 41 that the Pharisees were blind and thus their sin remained. For this exposure, Jesus dared to take the opportunity to cure the blind man on the Sabbath (cf. Harvey 1976:76).

e) Summary

The utterance of some of the Pharisees is a confirmative speech act on the story level, and keeps the *Maxims of Manner, Transparency, Quality* and *Relation*. It is an assertive speech act on the text level, uplifted by the operation of the *Interest Principle*. Having heard the blind man's answer, in conjunction with their own observation, the Pharisees tried to judge the miracle worker, concluding that he was not from God. However, their misunderstanding about the nature or misinterpretation of the Law drew their conclusion. They were indeed overconfident about their practice concerning it. At the same time, they were ignorant about the work of God. With this information in mind, the author uses irony in order to invite the reader to come even closer to the author, and to strengthen the solidarity in a privileged group that shares the same information about the miracle worker which some of the Pharisees did not possess. It appears that the willful ignorance or blindness of these Pharisees made them say this kind of judgmental utterance.

9:16b ἄλλοι [δέ] ἔλεγον, Πῶς δύναται ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτωλὸς τοιαῦτα σημεῖα ποιεῖν;

a) General analysis

As far as colon 24 is concerned, it is interesting to know that the author's careful selection of the demonstrative pronoun ἄλλοι shows *others* of the same kind, not others of a different kind, which can be expressed by ἕτεροι (Fowler *et al.* 1985:326). The adversative conjunction δέ in the parenthesis functions as a loose connective, *but*. Hence, this colon and colon 23 are connected semantically by a dyadic-contrastive relationship.

Subcolon 24.1 has no introductory word, due to its syntactical parallelism with colon 23. It might be better to translate the words ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτωλός

in subcolon 24.1 simply as a *sinful man*.⁷⁸ One should also note that “[t]he word ἁμαρτωλός occurs only in this chapter in John” (Bernard 1928:332; Barrett 1955:298), and then only four times (vv. 16, 24, 25, 31) (Morris 1971:485, footnote 30). Pancaro (1975:46) makes an insightful observation with reference to this: “The accusation the Pharisees move against Jesus in Jn ... is stronger and more direct than that we have in the Synoptics ... In the Synoptics Jesus is accused of associating with ‘sinners’ (in the strict sense of the word); he is never accused of being a ἁμαρτωλός, but only a φίλος ἁμαρτωλῶν.” The accusative plural noun σημεῖα is, needless to say, important in the author’s vocabulary, and indicates that the Pharisees were already aware of other signs performed by Jesus (e.g., Chapter 5).⁷⁹ Although they were aware of them, they basically “try to ignore them (John 5) or deny them (John 9)” (Pancaro 1975:23). In light of the Pharisees’ responses in cola 23-24, the reader is meant to notice that they no longer doubted the reality of the miracle (Newman & Nida 1980:306; Holleran 1993b:366). Thus, this verse reads: *Others were, however, saying, “How can a sinful man perform such signs?”*

b) Illocutionary act

In a different context, their question could be used as a real question to obtain new information. However, this question does not meet any of the preparatory, sincerity and essential conditions (for these conditions, cf. the section on ‘IA’ in 9:2), because the other Pharisees already heard the blind man’s answer in verse 15. Thus, it is not designed as a real question. The immediate co-text shows, however, that this utterance was uttered in the Pharisees’ discussion, which aimed to determine whether or not the miracle worker was a sinner. The *Relation Maxim* guarantees that this utterance was especially planned to respond to the previous remark made by some of the Pharisees. Therefore, it is only logical to take this interrogative sentence as a *rhetorical question*, expressing an emphatic declaration that the miracle worker was not a sinner.

78 The majority of the English translations of the words are rendered as a *man who is a sinner*, as in KJV, NRSV, NASB, and so forth. In these versions, these two words are treated like a relative pronoun clause. However, the word ἁμαρτωλός should rather be regarded as an adjective that functions to modify ἄνθρωπος, as the gender, case, and number of this word exactly follow those of the modified word. Another reason is that there is no article for the word ἁμαρτωλός in this instance. It contradicts the general rule that, when an adjective is used as a noun, an article usually precedes it (Wenham 1965:48). NIV (1984) interprets it this way.

79 Cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:248; Lindars [1972] 1981:346; Newman & Nida 1980:307; Tenney 1981:104.

Since, in the rhetorical question, the sentence-type does not directly correspond to its communicative function, this utterance should be construed as an *indirect speech act* (cf. Yule 1996:54-55). The primary illocutionary act of this utterance is one of *disputative*. The speakers intended to oppose the claim which some of the Pharisees made previously, by way of performing the secondary illocutionary act of *question*. Because the speakers here were trying to oppose the former Pharisees, the speakers that the man who healed the blind man was from God, based on their recognition that the wonder worker performed an incredible sign. The difference between a dissentive speech act in verse 9:9b and a disputative one here lies in the point as to whether there is any reason not to believe the previous claim. When there is any tangible reason, as in the case here, that the miracle worker performed a sign, the speech act should be classified as disputative (Bach & Harnish 1979:45). The schema of disputatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:43) is as follows:

Disputatives: (demur, dispute, object, protest, question)

In uttering *e*, *S* disputes the claim that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that there is reason not to believe that *P*, contrary to what was claimed by *H* (or was otherwise under discussion), and
- ii. the intention that *H* believe that there is reason not to believe that *P*.

When this schema is applied to this utterance, the result is the following:

In uttering 'How can a sinful man perform such signs?,' the speakers dispute the claim that the man who healed the blind man is not from God if they express:

- i. the belief that there is reason not to believe that the man is not from God, contrary to what was claimed by the hearers (or was otherwise under discussion), and
- ii. the intention that the hearers believe that there is reason not to believe that the man is not from God.

As the speakers appeared to express their belief and intention as described earlier, the utterance is a successful speech act of disputative.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *intended perlocution* is for the hearers to change their view concerning the miracle worker. However, it appears that this intended perlocution was not realised, for the narrator reports in the next utterance the division among the Pharisees caused by these opposing views. The author,

however, invites the reader to agree with the speakers' conclusion, not necessarily with their reasoning. The reader should continue to strengthen his own positive view about Jesus by (the implication of) the speakers' utterance in this instance.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, this utterance is analysed as an indirect speech act. The use of indirect speech acts is generally motivated by the speaker's politeness (Searle [1979] 1981:36; Yule 1996:56). However, in this instance, it appears that the speakers do not use it out of politeness, for their rhetorical question should be conventionally regarded as an emphatic declaration. In the utterance as such, there is no reason why they should be polite. The most likely reason for the use of the indirect speech act is that the speakers tried to employ the rhetorical question (as an indirect speech act) in order to express their emphatic declaration aimed at inducing the hearers' agreement. In other words, their motivation for its use was effectiveness in their language for the sake of persuasion. It could be the most effective way of speech under the disputative circumstance.

2. Moreover, because this utterance is not a normal question, but a rhetorical one, the Pharisees' second response seems to represent the opinion of a believing group. The rhetorical question is an important rhetorical device that reveals a shift between verbal content and intent. In this device, "the form does not match the function" (Nida *et al.* 1983:39), and the rhetorical question is asked not for acquiring new information nor for an answer. Rather, it is "a way of implying an audience's agreement with the declaration" (Nida *et al.* 1983:167). Consequently, this second group is assumed to be a believing group who knew the answer to their own question well. They were confident to say that this man was not a sinful man, because he performed such a sign. However, whether they believed or not that he came from God is a different matter, and it cannot be determined explicitly, in this instance, since the text does not say exactly. However, it is at least obvious that this Pharisaic group had a more positive attitude toward Jesus than the former one did.

3. In addition, how does the *Manner Maxim* relate to this rhetorical question? My observation is, as mentioned earlier (in the section on 'CS' in 9:8b), that whenever there is an indirect speech act, the *Manner Maxim* always seems to be at stake, because ambiguity in the sense of deniability is inherent in the nature of an indirect speech act. As far as the rhetorical question is concerned, the *Manner Maxim* can be kept intact. A rhetorical question should be and is conventionally used as an emphatic declaration. An *emphatic declaration* does not suit ambiguity. As long as it

is conventionally used as an emphatic declaration, the speaker's message is very clear. Hence, the *Manner Maxim* in relation to the rhetorical question cannot be violated, but rather kept intact. This paradox in the concept of indirect speech acts could be investigated further.

4. There is apparently at least one violation in the domain of Interpersonal Rhetoric in this utterance. Since this utterance is a disputative speech act, it inevitably violates the *Agreement Maxim* of the *Politeness Principle*. The more the speakers transgress the Maxim, the more powerful its illocutionary force becomes. The next utterance shows that this illocutionary act was powerful enough to cause a division among the Pharisees. On the contrary, the more powerful the illocutionary force becomes, the less the perlocutionary effect becomes, especially in this instance. As pointed out earlier, its perlocution is that the speakers intended to persuade the hearers to change their view and to agree with the new claim offered by the speakers. However, the hearers already decided about the miracle worker, and there seemed to be no room for them to change their view. In such a speech situation, the more the speakers impose their opposing view on the hearers, the more the intensity of the hearers' opposition may become and the less the real perlocution may be actualised. It may be a risk that a speaker takes when he utters a disputative speech act.

5. *On the text level*, one should note that the second view expressed in this utterance is not biblical. "The principle that a sinner cannot work miracles is *not* universally attested in biblical tradition" (Brown 1966:373).⁸⁰ Carson (1991:368) concludes that "the second argument is worthless, even if the conclusion is sound". This means that the utterance is evaluated as false. This is a crucial point in traditional exegesis. However, in our speech act analysis, the second argument is not "worthless", for this approach addresses an utterance not in terms of true or false, but mainly in terms of success, appropriateness, or effectiveness. *A new way of understanding the text* is possible. This creates a different and fresh appreciation of human communication in the text (cf. section 3.1 in Chapter 2). The following discussion will serve not only as part of the text analysis, but also as illustration.

6. In the last utterance (v. 16a), one aspect of the Pharisees' characterisation suggests that they appeared to always evaluate anyone or anything in terms of the laws and regulations. If this is correct, the reader will find the others' opinion more interesting, because they did not seem to reflect this characterisation. The speakers of this utterance (v. 16b) obviously evaluated

80 Cf. also Barrett 1955:298; Morris 1971:485, footnote 30; e.g., Ex 7:11; Dt 13:1-5; Mt 7:21-23; 24:24; 2Th 2:9.

the miracle worker in terms more of the sign he performed than of the laws. Strictly speaking, they focused on the success of the miracle performed, not on the legitimacy of the performance on the Sabbath. In fact, if the miracle worker had failed to give sight to the blind man, they probably would have joined those who were condemning the miracle worker for breaking the Sabbath, seeing that making mud was considered work, according to Jewish interpretation (Resseguie 1982:298).

However, the fact that the miracle worker performed a successful sign now changed and even persuaded the other half of the Pharisees. They listened to the silent voice that whispered to them that they should reconsider the matter, which they actually did. This may invite the reader's astonishment. In this process, they adopted a different criterion that the assessment should be made on the success or failure of the sign one would perform, rather than on the one, which the former Pharisees used. As a result, they concluded that the miracle worker was not a sinner who defiled the Sabbath Law. This different criterion and contrasted conclusion surely surprise the reader, and make him more interested in the story. The author entertains the reader well by means of this utterance in relation to the implementation of the *Interest Principle*. Holleran (1993b:366-367) puts the same logic as follows: "... how they view the signs is crucial. To view them as works in violation of the Law is to see Jesus as a 'sinner'. To view them as miracles or signs which are works of God is to see Jesus as one who is 'from God'"(cf. Pancaro 1975:20; Lee 1994:174).

7. *Irony* would be another illustration derived from the second argument in connection with a fresh appreciation of textual communication. Only a few critics (e.g., Duke 1982; Culpepper 1983:175; Botha 1991b:214) have indicated the occurrence of irony in this instance, but no one has ever attempted to describe this irony. According to *the analytical outline for ironic speech acts* (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), an instance of irony is suspected by a possible conflict with mutual contextual beliefs (A-ii-1), the use of rhetorical question (A-ii-3), and the existence of two illocutionary forces in the utterance (A-v). This qualifies that this case of irony should be further examined in accordance with the next verifying steps. Because of the particular nature of this irony, the order of these steps may not be followed exactly (cf. the last annotation pointed out in the analytical outline). Since there is no indication that the speakers (the other Pharisees) of this utterance broke the *Quality Maxim*, they did not intend to create an ironic utterance. Therefore, the irony should fall under the category of situational irony, and it can be perceived based on the speakers' lack of knowledge about biblical tradition. Being familiar with the Old Testament, the reader and the author possess the knowledge that even a sinner can perform miracles, of which the speakers as the victims

were not aware. Hence, this is again *dramatic irony*. The observers are both the author and the reader, and the irony is located at the text level. What is striking in this irony is the way in which the author depicts these speakers: the Pharisees who claimed to be the religious leaders as well as the experts of the Law uttered such a faulty remark in the official trial! A more remarkable observation is the fact that no Pharisee appeared to detect this problematic expression later, although no one knows the exact reason. Perhaps they were so occupied with the controversy itself. Or perhaps it may be, although this is doubtful, that they simply did not know. Either way, the reader is greatly surprised by this dramatic irony.

Hence, the second argument of the Pharisees is not worthless, but effective, even phenomenal, in the communication between the author and the reader.

8. *Lastly*, as shall clearly be seen in the next verse, this Sabbath charge against Jesus as the central issue thus far, which was crucial in my speech act analysis, would be replaced exclusively by the issue of his identity and credentials. Brown (1966:379) remarks that “whereas in ch. v the Sabbath motif dominated the story of the healing of the paralytic, it is really only incidental in the development of ch. ix; for ... the Sabbath question fades into background. In these interrogations the real issue is whether or not Jesus has miraculous power and, if he does, who he is” (cf. also O’Day 1987:63; Carson 1991:367). Linguistically, in general, this utterance as rhetorical question functions as a hinge to turn the focus of the interrogation from the method of the miracle to the identity of the healer (cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:32). In particular, it is the word *sinner* that makes this transition smooth, for this word draws attention to what kind of man the miracle worker (seemingly) was. After an intensive discussion of this vocabulary (Pancaro 1975:30-51), Pancaro (1975:51) concludes: “In the OT and Judaism, to say that a man is a ἁμαρτωλός is more serious than to say he has committed ‘sin’ or is in a state of ‘sin’”. When Jesus appeared to violate the Law, he was regarded as a sinner, not in an immoral sense but in the most technical sense (Pancaro 1975:51, footnote 178).

e) Summary

On the story level, the utterance is an indirect speech act with the primary illocutionary force of disputative and it may keep the *Manner Maxim* despite the form of rhetorical question. The speakers intended to persuade the hearers to change their view concerning the miracle worker at the expense of the *Agreement Maxim*. Although uttering the speech act was successful, the real perlocution would not be realised due to the hearers’ strong mindset. On the text level, the author surprises the reader through

the operation of the *Interest Principle* and the use of dramatic irony, and thus continues to stimulate the reader's active involvement. Moreover, this utterance functions as a hinge to turn the narrative focus from 'how' to 'who' questions in the miracle.

9:16c καὶ σχίσμα ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς.

a) General analysis

Colon 25 tells of the narrator's comment derived from the divided opinions among the Pharisees. The use of the conjunction καὶ is an indication for this inference, connecting this colon to the last two cola by means of an additive-different (consequential) relationship. As the subject σχίσμα has no article, it displays a possible general quality instead of a specific one. This word is used three times in this Gospel (7:43; 9:16; 10:19), denoting a division among people. Morris (1971:485, footnote 31) suggests that "σχίσμα does not denote a schism in our sense of the term, but rather a dissension. It is a division within the group not a splitting off from the group". For this particular meaning, no instance of this word is found in the synoptic Gospels. It is only employed three times in 1 Corinthians (1:10; 11:18; 12:25) outside of John's Gospel in the New Testament. In this instance, the author of this Gospel evaluates their situation and tells that the Pharisees were confused over the identity of the miracle worker. The author thus reports in his exact words: *And there came a division among them.*

b) Illocutionary act

As the narrator is expected to follow the *Relation Maxim*, he is saying something that is relevant to the present discussion among the Pharisees. Therefore, even if he uses the *Reduction Maxim* to uplift the *Economy Principle* in the domain of Textual Rhetoric, the pronoun *them* easily finds its referent, the Pharisees. The narrator intends to report to the reader on the outcome of the speech exchange among the Pharisees in the last two utterances. Specifically, the narrator portrays the division that existed among the Pharisees, resulting from the controversy over the Sabbath issue including the identity of the miracle worker. Accordingly, this utterance of the narrator is again *informative*.

c) Perlocutionary act

By using the informative speech act, the author intends to impress the reader with the greatness of the miracle and of the issue derived from it.

The reader should be aware of the division among the Pharisees as well as of the cause of such a division.

d) Communicative strategy

1. As mentioned earlier, the narrator intends to inform the reader about the result of the discussion among the Pharisees. The report states that the members of the Pharisees could not come to terms with each other, and thus caused a schism among them. This implies that the discrepancy caused by the issue over the Sabbath breach was too great to be rectified. Some scholars (e.g., Dodd [1953] 1968:80; Carson 1991:367, footnote 1) suggest that the two views manifested in this division were similar to the arguments of the two famous schools of Hillel and Shammai. Although it may be speculative, it is perhaps instructive to explore a link of this division to these schools. However, our immediate concern is how this schism relates to the textual strategy in terms of the reader. The issue of this schism was fairly complex to such a degree that a united group of people such as the Pharisees experienced division among themselves. In fact, Edersheim ([1967] 1976:213) introduces the Pharisees as “the most closely-connected religious fraternity”. Jeremias ([1969] 1975:247) also reminds us of “the fact that they formed *closed communities*”. Josephus (*Jos BJ* 2.166) even points out that “[t]he Pharisees are affectionate to each other and cultivate harmonious relations with the community”. A division occurred among this group of people. This is worthwhile reporting and has news value. Hence, the narrator uses the *Interest Principle* to surprise the reader who is also assumed to know the Pharisees’ solidarity trait.

2. As usual, the narrator’s information is very limited. The narrator only reports that there was a division among the Pharisees. The narrator does not reveal more information, such as the nature of the division. Was it severe or negligible? Did it last long or end soon? Was the division equal with regard to the number of supporters for each viewpoint? Was the cause only the issue of Sabbath breaking and its related matters such as the identity of the miracle worker, or were there any hidden causes, such as previous or long-standing matters that were triggered by the Sabbath issue? Was there any psychological influence upon the Pharisees due to the division? What was the people’s reaction to their schism? The narrator keeps silent on these affairs. The reader has to exercise his imagination if he wants to know. The reader has no clue as to whether or not the narrator is observing the *Quantity Maxim*. From the narrator’s point of view, however, the answer is that the narrator keeps it intact, as he always does, in order to create suspense and increase the impact on the reader by virtue of such a succinct description (in this instance, the *Economy*

Principle is also upheld). In addition, Du Rand (1991:99) rightly observes that the function of this schism “is an implicit appeal to the reader to make his own decision”.

3. The story of John 9 is often compared with the healing story of the paralytic (John 5) for their extensive parallels (cf. Culpepper 1983:139-140). A relevant striking contrast would be that there is no reference to a schism among Jesus’ opponents in John 5. This fact highlights the authorities’ dilemma even more in this blind man’s story (Bultmann 1971:334; Pancaro 1975:20). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:248) proposes a possible reason for this unique state of affairs: “Jesus’ work of revelation drives them into greater despair and perplexity (cf. 11:47). Revelation has a critical function.” If this view is correct, this revelation created an uncomfortable and critical situation among the Pharisees. It indicates that they were also suffering in their own way (cf. also Rensberger 1988:43). The fact that their suffering arose from their own religious pride and blindness enhances this tragedy. In this instance, *the motif of suffering* occurs again. However, this suffering differs from that identified thus far. This suffering is the result of unbelief. It resulted from sin in Johannine terms. In the case of such a suffering, unless the sufferers realise its cause and are willing to change the way in which they have lived their lives, their suffering will remain as the suffering without hope. They may need to return once more to the path that God set before them so that they may have life in abundance (John 10:10). They need to have faith in Jesus. If and only if they do so, their suffering will have a meaning, a definite corrective purpose (Boice 1977:24).

4. The authorities’ schism may lead to an instance of situational irony, and there could be two ironies. One is *irony of dilemma*, because of the dilemma in which the Pharisees were placed. In this instance, the Pharisees are the victims, and the observers are the author and the reader. This irony of dilemma is perceived on the text level, and used as a means of expressing frustration (cf. Turner 1996:47) and as a way of involving the reader in the communication process of the text (cf. O’Day 1986:30). Another irony is the *irony of event*, which derives from the outcome of the event that is neither expected nor desired. The Pharisees as the victims were facing the undesired outcome, namely a schism. The author and the reader are the observers, and this irony is also located on the text level. The function or effect of this irony would be similar to that of the irony of dilemma. However, it may also be used as “a mode of revelatory language” whereby the reader judges the character of the Pharisees (cf. O’Day 1986:31).

e) Summary

The narrator intends to report the result of the discussion among the Pharisees to the reader. This informative speech act should impress the reader with Jesus' sign that caused the unusual schism among the Pharisees as a further development of the story. The author, through the narrator, creates suspense and impact on the reader by using the *Principles of Interest and Economy*, and the *Quantity Maxim*, as well as ironies of dilemma and event. Once again, the motif of suffering is present; however, it is significant that the Pharisees' suffering was different in nature.

9:17a λέγουσιν οὖν τῷ τυφλῷ πάλιν, Τί σὺ λέγεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἠνέωξέν σου τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς;

a) General analysis

The second unit of cola 26-27 presents the conversation between the blind man and the Pharisees for the second time in this cluster. The confusion caused by the issue of Jesus' identity was great enough to bring a division among the Pharisees. It was great enough for one group not to come to terms with the other. It appears that they were unable to settle the issue by themselves. They thought it a good idea to directly ask the blind man, hoping that he would provide a satisfactory answer to the problem. Colon 26 depicts this circumstance. The conjunction οὖν in 26 especially indicates that the question they were about to ask the blind man was a direct reaction to the odd situation described in colon 25 (by a logical-reason-result relationship). Since they were so eager to ask, the historical present verb λέγουσιν may be used for vividness to portray such a reaction. 26.1 is the main content of their question, *what do you say about him?* This question is in the direct quotation form, and the interrogative pronoun τί shows the specification of their purpose of inquiry. Syntactically, it is employed as the object of the verb λέγεις, for it is the neuter accusative case. Therefore, this means *what* rather than *who* or *why*. 26.1.1 is somewhat difficult to analyse, especially for determining the function of the subordinate conjunction ὅτι.⁸¹ I would prefer to consider it as the so-called epexegetical ὅτι. As such, it

81 Barrett (1955:298) states: "Burney ... found here a mistranslation of the Aramaic particle" (cf. also Bultmann 1971:334, footnote 7). "But it is not necessary to appeal to an Aramaic original here" (Bernard 1928:332; cf. also Newman & Nida 1980:309). Two more possible solutions can be proposed. The first possibility is the function as a normal conjunction, indicating a reason. NKJV and NASB take this view and it is, accordingly, translated as *since* or *because*. The second is that this conjunction is used to make an emphatic sentence, and so the ὅτι

introduces a clause that is in apposition with the personal pronoun αὐτοῦ in the main clause. The author already uses it the same way in colon 11.1. This means that this usage is not foreign to him. Another reason is that this usage describes the person concerned with additional information in the most direct way. Morris (1971:484, footnote 28) writes: "Notice that John, as is his habit in repetition, describes the man in different ways." Their question concerned Jesus' identity. This is significant, because nobody thus far asked this kind of straightforward question about his identity. The questions people had asked previously concerned how his eyes were opened, or where Jesus was. At this point, finally, the Pharisees came to the crucial issue: *They said, therefore, to the blind man again, "What do you say about him that he opened your eyes?"*

b) Illocutionary act

Since there are a few cases in which the interrogative sentence-type expresses a function other than a question, it is necessary to discern whether or not this utterance expresses the communicative function of question. It is appropriate to put it on the test according to Searle's (1969:67) essential and sufficient conditions for question (cf. the section on 'IA' in 9:2):

Propositional content condition: It is obvious that the Pharisees' question meets this condition.

Preparatory condition: 1. The Pharisees do not know the answer. 2. It is not obvious to both the Pharisees and the blind man that the blind man will provide the information without being asked.

Sincerity condition: The Pharisees want the information.

Essential condition: Can be considered an attempt to elicit this information from the blind man.

As the utterance of the Pharisees meets all the above conditions, it can be concluded that it is a speech act of *question*. They were using the interrogative sentence to elicit information from the blind man. This observation suits the immediate co-text where the present concern of the characters on stage is that of the identity of the miracle worker. They were debating whether or not he was a sinner. Regarding the illocution for the reader, the author may intend to ask the reader the same question.

clause is translated as *it was your eyes that he opened*. NIV (1984) and the New Revised Standard Version take this view.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *intended perlocution* is for the blind man to give an adequate answer to the Pharisees' question, expressing his own perception about the miracle worker. The reader should also answer this question for himself, so that the answer may help strengthen his belief in Jesus.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, concerning the identity of the speakers, Newman and Nida (1980:308) suggest that "the reference is probably to the group of Pharisees who were opposed to Jesus". However, the observation based on the *Relation Maxim* strongly suggests that it was most likely the entire group of Pharisees (v. 15) who consisted of both sympathetic and hostile groups, because the conjunction οὐν, which operates on the *Relation Maxim*, refers back to their division in the last utterance. It indicates that both groups were equally interested in the man's reply. Not only the hostile group, but also the sympathetic one wanted to hear the man's assessment with a view to ending their controversy. I am of the opinion that it is more logical to separate these groups after this initial interrogation (for this aspect, cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:18).

2. The *Relation Maxim* mentioned earlier will be examined from a slightly different viewpoint. The narrator reports the schism among the Jewish authorities caused by their differing understanding of the miracle worker in the last utterance. They were unable to settle the issue by themselves, because the issue was not simply a Sabbath breach (which was a big issue in its own right), but also a greater issue as to the identity and authority of the miracle worker, who happened to be Jesus. They knew that Jesus had been receiving a great deal of attention from the crowds, who were impressed by his mighty deeds and teachings. The multitudes were even wondering whether or not this Jesus might be the Prophet or the Messiah (7:40-43). Moreover, the Pharisees themselves had an intense debate with him about his authority (8:13). What this amounts to is that the issue became great, both in depth and in width. The issue now turns from the Sabbath breach to Jesus' identity. As noted earlier (in the section on 'CS' in 9:16b), many critics⁸² explain the Pharisees' question in that the central focus was no longer the Sabbath issue, but a Christological issue as to Jesus' origin, identity and authority. The issue became a problem for the Pharisees. They probably thought that it was a good idea to directly ask the blind man, who was directly involved in this issue. In this sense, the

82 E.g., Brown 1966:373; Martyn [1968] 1979:32; O'Day 1987:63; Carter 1990:42; Carson 1991:367.

Pharisees' utterance keeps the *Cooperative Principle* intact on the story level, especially the *Relation Maxim*.

3. On the text level, however, the content of their question makes it clear that their act of inquiry was unusual for the Pharisees as the judges in this trial. In a trial in which the jury system is not employed, the judge presides over a court case, assesses relevant information given by witnesses and makes a verdict on the case. The act of passing judgment should be the most important task of the judge. It appears from the story, however, that the Pharisees could not make a judgment about Jesus' identity or credentials and that, therefore, they asked the question concerned to the blind man. In a sense, they were incompetent as the judges. According to Jewish forensic process, in which the role of witnesses was more prominent than that of judge (section 4.4 in Chapter 3), their questioning was not out of character for a judge. What is more extraordinary is the fact that, as respected, educated and honourable figures, the Pharisees were asking the opinion of a man who was an uneducated and a despised beggar in society. The neighbours brought the blind man to them, because the Pharisees were perceived as men of mature judgment. As a rule, the Pharisees would not do that, because it would bring a shame on them in the honour-shame society. Morris (1971:485) indicates: "It is a measure of their perplexity and division that they ask the man what he thinks of Jesus ... The request is the measure of their embarrassment." This peculiar move should surprise the reader; thus the *Interest Principle* operates in this utterance on the text level. Holleran (1993b:367) considers it "ironic". He explains very briefly how it is ironic and how it affects the reader, but does not describe the nature of this irony. I shall now do so.

4. According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), the instance of irony is suspected by a critic's suggestion (A-vii) and a potential conflict with mutual forensic belief (A-ii-1), as described earlier. In the next verifying steps, this irony would fall under the category of situational irony, because it appears that the Pharisees did not violate the *Quality Maxim* and thus they did not intend to make an ironic utterance. The above observation about the Pharisees' unusual move indicates that the irony most likely resulted from the victims' (the Pharisees) utterance, which unconsciously showed their own weakness. Hence, this irony can be classified as *irony of self-betrayal*. Because of their incompetence to assess the matter, they asked the blind man, "an *am-ha-aretz*, one who is ignorant of the law (cf. 7:49)" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:248; cf. also Carson 1991:368). However, it appears that they were not aware of the implication of their utterance, which would ultimately be apprehended by the reader. The reader would share the role of the observer of this irony

with the author, and the irony is thus located at the text level. Concerning the final step (C), where the irony's function is to be examined, Holleran (1993b:368) makes an interesting observation: "The question for the reader becomes at this point: Who is really 'blind' here?" The Pharisees who did not really know the identity of the miracle worker attempted to determine it fruitlessly, but the blind man would demonstrate his competency in understanding the matter. The author, therefore, invites the reader to a more careful reading, helps the reader appreciate the depth of the story, and enhances communication through this irony.

5. For the sake of discussion, I shall examine *the communication on the story and text levels* together. In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, this utterance appears to transgress three maxims. Since the main point of the utterance is expressed not in the second clause, but in the first clause in Greek, the utterance jeopardises the *End-Focus Maxim* and the *End-Weight Maxim*. However, it appears that the rules of language do not allow this to be formulated in the reverse way. Hence, it is difficult to say that there is a transgression in this regard. On the other hand, it is apparent that this utterance breaks the *Economy Principle*, for the second clause is, in fact, a repetition of verse 15a (and of v. 10, especially for the reader). The fact remains that the message can still be communicated without the second clause. The text can at least be shortened if the speaker uses a noun such as the miracle worker instead of the present clause structure. What is the reason for the breach of the *Economy Principle*? Similarly, what is the reason for the flouting of the *Quantity Maxim* in the domain of Interpersonal Rhetoric? Of course, the first possible reason is to clarify the referent (Jesus) more explicitly. This is acceptable, but not really convincing. There are two additional reasons. One lies on the character level, and the other on the author-reader level. On the character level, the breach may be for the sake of emphasis. The characters of the Pharisees emphasise the miracle worker by adding this particular explanation. On the author-reader level, however, the fact that the Pharisees had no problem with the reality of the miracle will be reinforced in the reader's mind once again (cf. also the sections on 'GA' in v. 16b and 'CS' in v. 15b). Seen from this angle, the flouting of the *Quantity Maxim* communicates more than simply what the speakers said.

e) Summary

The Pharisees intended to ask the blind man a question so that they might obtain useful information, which would, it is hoped, end their controversy over the miracle worker's identity. If their speech act of question is successful, they would be able to elicit the blind man's answer. In this utterance, the transgression of the *Economy Principle* and the *Quantity*

Maxim plays a minor part. Of more importance is that the author deploys the *Relation Maxim*, the *Interest Principle* and the irony of self-betrayal in order to expose the Pharisees' incompetence resulting from their blindness as their weakness.

9:17b ὁ δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι Προφήτης ἐστίν.

a) General analysis

What was the blind man's answer to the most important question? Colon 27 discloses what he thought. Syntactically, the main clause in 27 is basically similar to that in colon 22, and this time it is without the indirect object αὐτοῖς. In subcolon 27.1, the answer itself is introduced by the conjunction ὅτι, which shows a direct quotation. Like his previous answer in subcolon 14.1, this answer is very brief and uses only two words. The compactness increases the impact of the message. Consequently, the message was so clear that no one could miss what he wanted to say: *He is a prophet*. This is a new development in the plot of the story. Thus, this verse reads: *And he said, "He is a prophet."*

b) Illocutionary act

As the Pharisees' previous inquiry is uttered successfully according to the rules of language, it demands the blind man to respond to it. Hence, the speech act of this utterance is *responsive*. When Bach and Harnish's (1979:43) schema of responsives applies to this text, the following will be gained:

In uttering "*He is a prophet*", the blind man responds that Jesus is a prophet if the blind man expresses:

- i. he belief that Jesus is a prophet, which the Pharisees have inquired about, and
- ii. the intention that the Pharisees believe that Jesus is a prophet.

As the blind man appeared to express his belief and intention, as described above, the utterance is a successful speech act. The blind man intended to give a sincere answer to the Pharisees' question according to the best of his knowledge. The author intends to provide more information to the reader about the blind man's perception of Jesus' identity. This time the man said that Jesus was a prophet.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Pharisees should accept the blind man's answer just as he described it. In his answer, the blind man establishes the position of Jesus. The reader should understand the man's reply to the Pharisees and evaluate the man's level of perception about Jesus by virtue of this utterance.

d) Communicative strategy

1. The blind man's answer is very short. One may suspect the possible violation of two conversational Maxims, namely the *Quantity Maxim* and the *Manner Maxim*. In order to determine this, at least three questions need to be answered. What did the blind man precisely mean by a prophet? How much did the Pharisees understand his answer? And how much does the reader understand his answer? For the sake of discussion, *the communication on the story and text levels* will be examined concurrently.

2. In answering the above questions, it is helpful to note the utterances made by the characters concerning a *prophet* in the story so far, and to investigate the mutual religious belief between them as well as between the author and the reader. There may be six relevant verses up to Chapter 9.⁸³

- i. The passages that contain no article before the word *prophet* in Greek: 4:19, 7:52.
- ii. The passages that contain the article before the word *prophet* in Greek: 1:21, 1:25, 6:14 and 7:40.

On the surface, it seems to be easy to discern the difference between two sets of references to the term *prophet*. The word without the article may be used to refer, in general, to a man of God who speaks God's message to his people in times of need (Bultmann 1971:89). The word with the article may point to the specific figure (cf. specific MCB on 'Prophet' in section 5.1.1). However, the fact is that this discernment is not so simple, as demonstrated by the different views of commentators. For example, Martyn ([1968] 1979:120, 130) basically considers all the references to *prophet* in the *Fourth Gospel* as a reference to a Prophet such as Moses (cf. Dt 18:15-18). In addition, leading critics⁸⁴ take the view that the prophet in 7:52 refers to the Prophet Moses, based on arguments derived from the context and textual criticism, even though

83 It is interesting to note that the term *prophet* only occurs in the Book of Signs in the *Fourth Gospel*, according to inspection using *BibleWorks for Windows ver 3.2*, Bushell 1995.

84 E.g., Brown 1966:325; Martyn [1968] 1979:115; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:161; Bultmann 1971:312.

there is no article with the term, according to the vast majority of readings (Brown 1966:325).

With regard to 4:19, the Samaritan woman told Jesus that she realised that he had special knowledge from God. O'Day (1986:67) rightly observes: "Jesus' revelation of his knowledge of her true marital status leads the woman to declare him to be a prophet (v. 19). One could compare the woman's response to that of Nathanael in 1:45-51." O'Day's observation provides one significant point. She ponders that the Samaritan woman used the term *prophet* only in a general sense. O'Day further indicates that the woman's response was different from that of Nathanael who confessed that Jesus was the Son of God and the King of Israel. In her words, "[t]he woman's profession of Jesus as a prophet, while not a recognition of his full identity, is a step in the right direction" (O'Day 1986:67). Therefore, it is acceptable to take the woman's usage of the term *prophet* as a mere designation for special people such as prophets (cf. also Carson 1991:221). Other critics such as Brown (1966:171) and Martyn ([1968] 1979:120) suggest that, in this instance, the prophet could mean the Prophet such as Moses.

On the other hand, as far as the passages containing the article for the term *prophet* are concerned, the point is obvious. The reference to the prophet in 1:21, 25; 6:14; 7:40, has scholarly consensus: it points to the special eschatological prophet, most likely the Prophet such as Moses.⁸⁵

3. Whether or not one agrees with the above consensus is not the issue. The issue is whether the characters and the reader understand the meanings of those utterances in the way in which the speaker intended in the story. If the issue is viewed from this angle, one important matter becomes evident. Both the characters and the reader appear to understand the exact meanings. In the cases of 4:19 and 7:52, for instance, the hearers did not deny nor oppose the speakers' utterances. If an utterance is difficult to understand, the narrator usually adds some remarks to help the reader comprehend it (2:19-21, 7:37-39, 8:25-27). However, the narrator does not attempt to do so in this instance. In 1:21, 25, and 6:14, both John the Baptist and Jesus understood the speakers' utterances. As far as the reader's familiarity with Judaism is concerned, Culpepper (1983:221) states that "[t]he expectation of the 'prophet' (1:21, 25) or 'the prophet who is to come into the world' (6:14) seems to be sufficiently clear also; no explanation is given". Finally, the way in which the hearers reacted to the utterance of 7:40

85 E.g., Brown 1966:49, 234; Martyn [1968] 1979:112, 132; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:18, 157; Bultmann 1971:89, 305; Bruce [1983] 1994:145, 183; Carson 1991:143, 271, 329; Hawthorne 1992:639; Sanders & Mastin 1968:180.

indicates that the speakers' meaning was well understood. Therefore, it is acceptable to say that the characters, the author and the reader share the same mutual religious belief concerning the prophet, and that their communications are, therefore, successful.

Similarly, the narrator gives no explanation to the blind man's reply, and there is no indication for the hearers to misunderstand his utterance. It is no exaggeration to say that the characters of the Pharisees and the blind man as well as the author and the reader still share the same mutual religious belief in the present conversation in 9:17. They can all understand what the blind man said.

4. Only one question remains: What exactly did the blind man mean by a prophet? As noted earlier, Martyn ([1968] 1979:113, 120) is inclined to say that the term *prophet* on the lips of the blind man is used to designate Jesus as *the Mosaic Prophet*.⁸⁶ However, Lindars ([1972] 1981:346) contends: "There is no suggestion here that the Prophet of Dt. 18 is meant. On the other hand even to say that Jesus might be a prophet comes near to acknowledgment of him as the Messiah ... This fact comes to the surface in verse 22" (cf. also Richardson 1959:126). Although I agree with Lindars' first point (cf. also Beasley-Murray 1987:157), I doubt the reference to the Messiah. One reason is that verse 22 appears to have nothing to do with the man's confession. If the blind man meant a prophet as the Messiah and the Pharisees recognised his utterance as such, he should have been expelled at this point. But his expulsion would happen only in verse 34. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:248) also suggests rightly: "It is unlikely that the term 'a prophet' has a messianic significance, since the cured man is first brought to this sort of faith by Jesus himself" (cf. also Holleran 1993b:367; Moloney [1976] 1978:147, footnote 34). At this stage, his increasing faith in Jesus was not yet adequate level (cf. Meeks 1965:53). Therefore, my view echoes that of scholars such as Bultmann (1971:334), Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:248) and Carson (1991:368) who point out that the term is employed in a general sense. One of the reasons for this is that there is no article attached to the term (cf. Menken 2001:452). The other reason is that there is no indication in the story that the blind man's usage of the term meant only a prophet, as mentioned earlier. Briefly, Holleran (1993b:367) sums up this view: "Doubtless this designation is meant in a quite general sense, without specific Messianic meaning, and perhaps by comparison with Elijah or Elisha (cf. esp. 2 Kings 5) refers simply to Jesus' extraordinary God-given power" (cf. also Bernard 1928:332; Barrett 1955:298; Temple 1975:176).

86 Cf. Menken 2001:452-456 and Cho 2006:204 who consider this term as the expected Jewish eschatological prophet.

5. In light of the above analysis, the possible violation of two conversational Maxims, the *Quantity Maxim* and the *Manner Maxim*, can be finally determined. The blind man's answer is short, but it is sufficient to be able to successfully convey the meaning to the interrogators. "He has a gift for succinct statement, and puts the essence of the matter in one terse sentence" (Morris 1971:485; cf. also O'Day 1987:63). It is economical and clear for both the characters and the reader. Thus, the blind man is not violating, but observing these two Maxims in his utterance.

We have examined thus far the meaning of the blind man's utterance in relation to the *Maxims of Quantity* and *Manner*, but this does not mean that its analysis is completed. I shall thus investigate the effect and evaluation of his utterance in more detail.

6. Despite the compactness of the blind man's answer, it should have a fairly huge impact on the story level. In fact, how many Pharisees thought of hearing the word *prophet* from the blind man's lips? They might have expected to hear such words as a sinner, Sabbath breaker, miracle worker, or man from God. But the blind man did not use any of those words to describe Jesus. Of course, the answer was still relevant, but they might have been surprised to hear the term *prophet* from him. In this regard, the utterance of the blind man seems to observe the *Interest Principle* to enhance his communication with the other characters.

7. In addition, some expositors (e.g., Barclay [1955] 1975:45) believe that the Pharisees' last question demanded the blind man to indicate to whom he was loyal. He took Jesus' side. It was a risk for him, so why did he do it, unlike the paralytic in Chapter 5? There may be at least three possibilities:

- i. The fact that Jesus gave him his sight impressed him a great deal, and he was grateful to Jesus.
- ii. Jesus also opened his spiritual eyes, so that he could realise that there was a life beyond or different from what the Pharisees as the religious leaders taught.
- iii. When the man was a blind beggar, he was stepped on and despised by the Pharisees because of his 'curse' and low status in society. He was, therefore, not loyal to them (Boice 1977:44). It is unlikely that he respected the Pharisees as his neighbours who brought him to them for their opinion.

In my opinion, all the above might have contributed to his position. Nevertheless, only the first explanation seems to be highly plausible, and the other two are of a speculative nature.

8. Nearly every scholar considers the evaluation of the blind man's confession to be positive. Although Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:248) draws attention to the man's brave aspect and O'Day (1987:63) to his innocence and open-mindedness, The majority of the critics comment on this regarding the man's spiritual growth. Morris (1971:486) remarks: "[F]or him 'prophet' was probably the highest place he could assign to a man of God. His answer puts Jesus in the highest place he knew". Bultmann (1971:334) proposes that "Jesus' miraculous power has made on him the same impression as did Jesus' miraculous knowledge on the Samaritan woman (4.19); yet as in the case of the woman, so here, this confession is only the first step. Certainly, such a step is important enough" (cf. also Holleran 1993b:367). The man's confession indicates the growth in the man's faith (cf. Boice 1977:46; Witherington 1995:183).⁸⁷

9. Despite the above, we need to consider how the reader can know whether it was a step in the right direction? Not many expositors demonstrate why it was the right step. Perhaps one explanation could be that scholars, especially those whose methods are not based on literary approaches, are basically not interested in such a question. Of course, they occasionally comment on the function of language in their analysis, but it is fragmentary, not systematic at all. From a literary perspective, the inquiry as to how the reader understands and evaluates the character's utterance and deed at a certain point of time in the story is very important (Gros Louis 1982:20). From a pragmatic viewpoint (e.g., a speech act angle), the question as to how the reader accounts for the process of achieving such an understanding is not without significance (Van Dijk 1980:135). Therefore, I shall elucidate the topic as to why the man's confession was a step in the right direction.

Traditionally critics, regardless of the methods they use, focus on the man's growing faith in Jesus, as depicted in 9:11, 17, 33, 38 (e.g., Plummer [1882] 1981:207; Morris 1971:486; Boice 1977:46).⁸⁸ In 9:11, the blind man referred to Jesus merely as "the man who is called Jesus"; in 9:17, as "a prophet", and in 9:33, as the man who came from God. Finally, in 9:38, the blind man worshipped Jesus as the Son of Man. From this observation and the observation of its climax in verse 38, in particular, they refer back to verse 17 and explain that his confession was indeed a right step towards

87 "[I]t is a step in the right direction, an improvement over his 'the man called Jesus' (v. 11)" (Carson 1991:368); cf. also Meeks 1965:53; Newman & Nida 1980:309; Duke 1982:185.

88 Cf. also Resseguie 1982:302; Beasley-Murray 1987:161; Dockery 1988:22; Painter [1991] 1993:305; Trumbower 1992:97; Brodie 1993:353. Cf. also a recent character study on the blind man in Bennema 2009:136-144.

an adequate faith. Although this is one good way to elucidate the text, it might be problematic. When the reader reads verse 17, he has not yet read the remainder of the chapter. The movement of going forward and coming back (also perhaps skipping some material in between) is an awkward reading process. It also violates the notion of narrative temporality in the reading process (cf. section 2.3 in Chapter 2). This ultimately destroys the author's organisation of the narrative and strategy for his communication with the reader.

A speech act approach can provide a plausible solution to this problem. This approach can explain the 'mechanism' of how the reader can understand or evaluate the man's confession by virtue of the notion of mutual story belief (cf. section 4.5 in Chapter 3). The reader possesses a fair amount of knowledge about who Jesus was from his reading up to Chapter 9. The Prologue is especially helpful in this respect. From this mutual story belief, the reader already knows that Jesus was the one sent by God in the ultimate sense of the word. Indeed, Jesus was the Son of God (e.g., 1:49; 3:16). Thus, the reader has the criteria of evaluation. When the reader encounters the man's confession, he can decode the meaning and evaluate its significance. The reader can tell that the man's confession demonstrates not its final stage, but a middle stage on the way to the conclusive understanding. The reader does not need to engage in an awkward reading.

10. With respect to the above argument, the notion of mutual story belief may help strengthen the bond between the author and the reader, because the reader possesses real knowledge about Jesus' identity, which the blind man would not yet have. This means that the reader is on a higher level than the characters in the story in terms of such knowledge. Accordingly, the author wants the reader to continue to believe what he already knows about Jesus; this is more than merely that Jesus was a prophet.

11. While the author allows the blind man to utter the successful speech act, he does not plan to end the controversy nor the story. The author does not make the blind man's reply effective enough to dismiss the Pharisees' suspicion (cf. Dockery 1988:18). Thus, the story inevitably proceeds to the next important stage.

e) Summary

The blind man intended to give a sincere answer to the Pharisees' question concerning the identity of the miracle worker. His simple utterance is not a violation of any of the Cooperative Principles, but proves that it is a sufficient and successful speech act in this specific speech situation. In addition, the content of this responsive speech act might have surprised

the Pharisees by the Interest Principle. The notion of mutual story belief plays a significant role in the reader's evaluation of the man's utterance containing the term *prophet*. While his reply was successful, it was not effective enough to end the controversy.

5.4 Macrospeech acts

Firstly, I shall discuss a macrospeech act on the character level. Since it seems to be difficult to find a global topic of this cluster, I wish to propose a hypothesis, for the sake of argument. The hypothesis is that the global topic of this section would be that the characters, especially the Pharisees, were attempting to determine the identity of the miracle worker in the trial. To verify this, I shall use macrorules. The informative speech acts in 9:13 and 16c are to be eliminated by the *Deletion Rule*, for they do not directly contribute to the construction of the topic. The *Generalization Rule* constructs a new proposition that the Pharisees asked a question to the blind man, from the informative speech act in 9:15a and the question speech act in 17a. In addition, the same rule constructs a new proposition, from the disputative speech act in 9:16b, that the miracle worker was not a sinner. The *Selection Rule* retains the informative speech act in 9:14 and the responsive speech act in 17b as the important propositions that contribute to the construction of the topic. Finally, by means of the *Construction Rule*, the responsive speech act in 9:15b makes a new proposition that the man was the miracle worker, and the confirmative speech act in 16a entails that the man was a sinner. These observations show that the hypothesis, namely that the characters were attempting to determine the identity of the miracle worker, can indeed be adopted as the global topic of this cluster. Accordingly, the *macrospeech act* of this cluster would be *descriptive*. This means that the dialogue took place in the forensic process for identifying the man who healed the blind man. In light of the macrospeech act, however, the communication between the characters has not been so successful in this scene. The reason for this is that the identity of the miracle worker was not fully exposed, and that some of the Pharisees were apparently not satisfied with the blind man's answer in the very last utterance in this section, taking the narration at the beginning of the next cluster (9:18) into consideration. Moreover, the division in 9:16c indicates that there was a communication breakdown between the characters.

Secondly, I shall discuss a macrospeech act on the author-reader level. The author, via the narrator, uses only the *informative* speech acts in the narration part of this cluster. Therefore, the same conclusion that is observed in the first cluster can be drawn in this instance, namely that the author intends to tell a certain story to the reader. In this story, the

author demonstrates that the identity of the miracle worker was such a big issue that it caused a schism among the most united religious fraternity known as the Pharisees. Furthermore, the author intends to disclose the positive perception of the blind man about the miracle worker who, the blind man confessed, was a prophet. This confession was a step in the right direction, even if it was a primitive one. Therefore, the *macrospeech act* on the text level would be *informative*. The *perlocution* of this cluster is thus to astonish the reader by the new and fascinating information, particularly about the day when the miracle took place, the schism and the blind man's confession. In addition, this is to convince the reader that the identity and credentials of Jesus were the central concern, especially towards the end of this scene. The man's confession serves to align the reader more with the blind man, and to reassure the reader that the mutual story belief, which the reader holds concerning Jesus, is valid and helpful. Hence, the author maintains the reader's interest and secures the reader's further involvement in the story.

Incidentally, a *speech act approach* has proved its usefulness in the text analysis, especially in how language functions. This is demonstrated especially in the analysis of irony; of the Pharisees' utterance in 9:16b; of the evaluation of the man's confession, and of the significance of the Sabbath issue in this narrative, for which the traditional approaches could not adequately account.

6. CLUSTER D: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE JEWS AND THE BLIND MAN'S PARENTS (9:18-23)

6.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

6.1.1 The synagogue

Stambaugh and Balch (1986:48) point out the following:

The Greek term *synagoge* ("assemblage") generally referred to a group of people, a community, or a congregation. Meetings were often held in private houses while the group was small, but normally ... the local Jews would eventually acquire a house or other site for their communal activities. This was called a synagogue or a *proseuche* ("place of prayer").

In New Testament times, the Jewish synagogue had various functions (cf. Olsson 2005). As mentioned earlier, it was a place of Jewish religious life where the assembly gathered on the Sabbath and holy days for worship

and prayer (Yamauchi 1992:781).⁸⁹ It also functioned as an educational school for studying the Torah and as a community centre for their social life. They often met there for “specific reasons like baking unleavened bread or for more general purposes of conviviality” (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:49). Some disciplinary actions may also have taken place in the synagogue (Mt 10:17; Mk 13:9; Yamauchi 1992:783). The most important activity was “the reading and interpretation of scripture” (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:85). As for the number of Jewish synagogues, Edersheim ([1967] 1976:253-254) states that “at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, that city had not fewer than 480, or at least 460, synagogues” (cf. also Yamauchi 1992:782).

There was a hierarchical organisation in the synagogue communities: from spiritual leaders and chief teacher, to elders (executive committee members), secretary, and attendant (similar to deacon) (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:49; cf. Yamauchi 1992:782). When the Johannine community had a controversy with the synagogue, it is most likely that these leaders would represent the synagogue.

However, one should note that the Jewish synagogue provided a primal basis for the first missionaries and Christian leaders to spread the Christian message as well as to gain a livelihood for themselves through contacts within the synagogue. An “important social function of the synagogue was to provide a sense of belonging and to facilitate contacts” (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:49). In other words, their message was, *first*, addressed to the Jews and the Gentiles attached to such a Jewish community (Stambaugh & Balch 1986:54-55). *Secondly*, in the synagogue, specific seats were assigned to merchants and craftsmen such as goldsmiths, tentmakers, and so on, enabling newcomers to contact those who practised the same kind of work to their benefit. On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand how, when these Christian leaders mentioned that Jesus was the promised Messiah (e.g., Ac 2:36; 3:20; 5:42; 9:22; 17:1-3; 18:4-5; 18:26-28), they received bitter opposition from the synagogue leaders who ultimately realised the threatening nature of their message against the unity of the synagogue communities.

The above information clearly shows that life around the synagogue represented Jewish community life. Although it was not altogether impossible to live physically without any association with the synagogue, as some were forced to live in that way, it was extremely difficult to make a meaningful life religiously, socially, and economically without it.

89 For the relationship between the Temple and the synagogue, cf. Edersheim [1967] 1976:265-280.

6.1.2 Jewish expulsion

The Jews' decision depicted in John 9:22 (cf. also 12:42; 16:2) is one of the most debated issues in Johannine studies, especially since the publication of Martyn's ([1968] 1979) excellent work *History and theology in the Fourth Gospel*. Hence, this has led to one of the most heated discussions in the scholarly exploration concerning the origin and history of early Christianity. Martyn ([1968] 1979:24-36, especially 30) proposes that John's Gospel, especially John 9, indicates the two-level drama: the 'back there' level, which was the time of Jesus' ministry, and the contemporary level, which was the time of the *Sitz im Leben* of the Johannine community. As strong evidence, Martyn ([1968] 1979:38) appeals to the expressions of a) *the Jews*, b) *had already agreed*, c) *the messianic confession of Jesus*, and d) *the expulsion from the synagogue*, which are all found in 9:22 (for more evidence, cf. Martyn's book). In addition, Martyn concludes, as Okure (1988:13) sums up, that "the present Gospel was written to console and strengthen the faith of the Johannine community after the trauma of its ejection from the synagogue following the promulgation of the Birkat ha-Minim ... introduced by R. Gamaliel II at the Council of Jamnia (ca. A.D. 90)". However, many critics no longer adhere to this Jamnia hypothesis.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, Martyn's significant and overall insight that the Gospel speaks of the historical circumstances of the Evangelist's time remains the fundamental understanding of the text. Carson (1991:361) remarks that "most scholars discount the details, yet still hail the work as a valuable support of the received tradition".⁹¹

This section focuses on the knowledge which the characters and the reader are supposed to have concerning the expulsion from the synagogue. The following question may help us understand the issue: Does the text of John 9 refer to the situations of both Jesus' earthly ministry and John's own day?

Scholars who advocate the view that the text *only* refers to the historical situation of the Johannine community contend, as Koester (1995:64) states, that

[t]he statement as it stands seems to be a creative anachronism. There is little evidence that a group of Jewish authorities made a formal agreement to expel Christian Jews from the synagogue during Jesus' own lifetime, but the farewell discourses do say that

90 E.g., Kimelman 1981:235; Horbury 1982:60; Katz 1984:48-53, 63-76; Beasley-Murray 1987:153; Rensberger 1988:26; Carson 1991:371; Joubert 1993:361; Painter [1991] 1993:73, 77. For a more recent discussion, cf. Klink 2008:101-104.

91 Cf. also Whitacre 1982:7; Rensberger 1989:22; Reinhartz 1998a:117; Klink 2008:100.

expulsion from the synagogue would be a threat for Jesus' disciples after his return to the Father (16:2).⁹²

Accordingly, this is naturally followed by the conclusion that the Johannine community's conflict with the synagogue shaped this Gospel.⁹³

In contrast to this dominant opinion, there are scholars who express other views. *Firstly*, critics who express skepticism or hesitancy towards the suggestion to refer to the later day situation are Dodd ([1953] 1968:80), Morris (1971:488, footnote 35) and Reinhartz (1998a:134), because no definite information concerning the details is available. *Secondly*, others hold that the Gospel speaks not only of the situation of the Johannine community's struggle, but also of the oppositions experienced in Jesus' own time.⁹⁴ *Thirdly*, although there are few scholars, I shall also refer to their view which is worth noting. These scholars⁹⁵ promote the view that the Jews' decision may not need to be anachronistic at all. Hengel (1989:117) demonstrates that the fact that Jesus had an intense debate with the Jewish leaders and was crucified by them is a sure indication of the existence of such a critical situation in Jesus' own time. Carson (1991:372) is of the opinion that Messianic fever "might well have been enough for some authorities to invoke bans and threats of excommunication in various local synagogues" (cf. also Michaels 1984:153). *Fourthly*, Davies (1992:299-301) argues that the story of John 9 should be taken as an illustration or example for biblical texts such as John 10 and Luke 6:22, and that believers were encouraged to build a strong Christian community. She states that "the structure of a narrative takes on a dynamic of its own, irrespective of historical veracity" (Davies 1992:301). On another front, "With humility and good humor", Reinhartz (2008:72, 76) recently proposed that the expulsion passages might function only as a graphic warning against synagogue participation.⁹⁶

92 Cf. also Barrett 1955:299; Brown 1966:380; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:250; MacRae 1978:126; Resseguie 1982:299; Painter [1991] 1993:314; Saayman 1994:8; Smith 1995:48-49.

93 Cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:37-62; Brown 1979:23; Smith 1986:53; Painter 1986:36, [1991] 1993:129; Rensberger 1988:22. De Boer (2001:278-279) suggests that Johannine Christians' debate was made not with, but within the synagogue.

94 Barrett 1955:79; Nicol 1972:145; Beasley-Murray 1987:153; Stibbe 1992:61; O'Day 1995:657; Okure 1988:259-261.

95 E.g., Bruce [1983] 1994:215-216; Hengel 1989:116-119; Carson 1991:360-361, 372; Wenham 1997:156.

96 In relation to this, cf. a recent discussion on the composition and readership of John's Gospel in Bauckham 1998:147-73.

The issue as to whether or not the Jews' decision is anachronistic depends, to a large extent, on one's understanding of this expulsion, especially regarding its nature, duration and scope. There could basically be three possibilities for this expulsion: "(a) ... the minor ban of about a week's duration; b) ... a more formal banishment lasting thirty days ... (c) ... the solemn curse or excommunication imposed by Jewish authorities, permanently excluding one from Israel" (Brown 1966:374).⁹⁷ Those who follow the anachronistic mention that this was formal, permanent and nationwide, or even worldwide, as long as the synagogues existed.⁹⁸ Conversely, those who consider it less anachronistic maintain that the decision was informal and local, and not necessarily permanent.⁹⁹

Let us again examine Martyn's evidence derived from the expressions in 9:22. The term *Jews* could refer to the opponents of both Jesus and the Johannine community. The messianic confession of Jesus, in connection with the wording *had already agreed*, most likely points to the situation of John's day only. Available evidence before us concerning the expulsion from the synagogue cannot determine the details. But, in light of the content of the story in John 9, the Jews' decision appeared to be formal, because of the forensic tone and setting of the narrative, and permanent, because of the utmost fear of excommunication. It is uncertain whether or not the scope of this exclusion was local, for the narrative leaves no clue to resolve it. As a result of these brief observations, both situations of Jesus' time and John's day could involve the action of expulsion in some way or another. Nevertheless, admittedly, the separation between Christians and 'the Jews' becomes ever clearer and deeper towards the end of the first century CE (Wenham 1997:149; Reinhartz 1998a:135; Klink 2008:117).

Taking into account the above arguments (of course, the above discussions can by no means be exhaustive) and the qualification that the details cannot be reproduced with absolute certainty (Rensberger 1988:26; Stibbe 1992:61), I would agree with the view that the text refers to the situations of both Jesus' earthly ministry and John's own day. In other words, the author relates to and deals with the *Sitz im Leben* of the Johannine community by depicting an account during the time of Jesus'

97 Cf. also Edersheim [1971] 1981:183-184; Newman & Nida 1980:311; Plummer [1882] 1981:208.

98 E.g., Barclay [1955] 1975:47; Brown 1966:374, 380; Martyn [1968] 1979:38-62; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:250; Nicol 1972:144; Lindars [1981] 1992:133; Freyne 1985:129; Painter [1991] 1993:314; Koester 1995:64.

99 E.g., Plummer [1882] 1981:208; Sanders & Mastin 1968:242; Morris 1971:489; Bruce [1983] 1994:215-216; Carson 1991:367, 372.

ministry,¹⁰⁰ and this account does not necessarily need to represent every detail of what exactly happened then. Therefore, I would consider *John 9* as a two-level drama in the sense that it aims to describe the life of both Jesus including his immediate followers, and the Johannine community concurrently in an artistic narrative. In my opinion, the language of the text points in this direction (for more on this point, cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:22).

Finally, the reference to the Jews' agreement in 9:22 presupposes that the characters such as the Jewish authorities and the parents knew of the existence, nature, duration and scope of such an agreement. If the parents as ordinary people knew it, the neighbours and others should also have known it. However, the narrator's way of presenting this information in the text suggests that the reader does not know this decision, which is said to have been agreed upon in Jesus' time.

6.1.3 Relationships between the characters

The knowledge for the specific conversation between the Jews and the blind man's parents is as follows:

- In terms of social and religious status, the Jews were superior to and more authoritative over the parents, because the parents were summoned by the Jews for interrogation.
- Both parties are assumed to have known that the man was of age.
- Both parties are assumed to have known that the man called Jesus existed.
- Both parties are assumed to have known the Jews' agreement expulsion.


This cluster presents the dialogue between the Jews and the blind man's parents. Only one conversation between them is recorded. The remainder of the cluster explains the circumstances under which the dialogue took place, in a way that the narration is provided before and after their conversation. Structurally, this cluster can be divided into three subclusters. The first subcluster is colon 28, which shows the setting for their dialogue. The second subcluster is made up of cola 29-30 and presents their exact dialogue, which appears to be the centre of this cluster both structurally and semantically. The last subcluster, composed of cola 31-33, is the explanation by the narrator of the reasons why the parents answered in the way they did. The important dialogue is, therefore, structurally sandwiched

100 Cf. Stibbe 1992:61; Reinhartz 1998a:133-134; Orchard 1998:50; Tsuchido 1998:55; Menken 2001; Kysar 2002:114-115; Kerr 2002:19-23; Klink 2008:115. Painter ([1991] 1993:74) also seems to express the same view.

or wrapped by the *narrator's telling* both at the beginning and in the end (cf. Menken 1985:208).

6.2 Overview and structural analysis chart

Structural analysis chart for cluster D



I shall make seven initial remarks for this cluster D.

1. The frequent usage of both the coordinate conjunctions and the pronouns can be observed throughout the cluster. In this sense, the author seems to be conscious about cohesion. Regarding this trait, the author uses a coordinate conjunction in every main clause in

this cluster, except colon 31.¹⁰¹ Colon 31 may, therefore, indicate an important change in the story, as will be noted below.

2. The question-answer form in the dialogue brings a dramatic element to this cluster, even though the cluster is made up of both the dialogue and the narration.
3. The reference to the healing miracle may continue to remind the reader of the works of God.
4. The references to the identity of the miracle worker in the parents' answers and to the Jews' decision concerning Christ also remind the reader that Jesus' identity was still the centre of the whole issue.
5. There is an *inclusio* between the first and the last cola (cf. section 6.3.3).
6. Du Rand (1991:100) points out that "[t]he build-up in verses 18-21 is arranged in a parallel". The repetitions (e.g., son, to see, born blind) and the frequent reference to the blind man are remarkable and emphasise the sign by Jesus (Du Rand 1991:100).
7. There are significant structural markers such as the Jews, not to believe, parents, to know, to see, son, born blind, he, his, him, and therefore.

Hence, these aspects may contribute towards making this cluster cohesive.

6.3 Microspeech acts

6.3.1 The first subcluster (9:18)

The complex sentence in colon 28 forms this first subcluster on its own. In 28, the main clause basically has three subclauses forming two units. While the first two subclauses, 28.1 and 28.2, form one unit, the next subcolon 28.3 forms the other unit. In terms of their relationships to the main clause, the first unit is the object of the main verb *ἐπίστευσαν*, and the second displays a qualificational-setting (time) relationship. The first unit consists of 28.1, and 28.2 discloses the contents of what the Jews did not believe, namely that he had been blind and had received his sight.

101 In colon 33, the prepositional phrase *διὰ τοῦτο* plays the same function as other coordinate conjunctions.

9:18 Οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν οὖν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι ἦν τυφλὸς
καὶ ἀνέβλεψεν ἕως ὅτου ἐφώνησαν τοὺς γονεῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ
ἀναβλέψαντος

a) General analysis

The conjunction οὖν in 28 indicates the continuation from the last cluster, especially referring to the blind man's answer in colon 27, by means of a logical-reason-result relationship. This conjunction and the negative attitude of the Jews towards him, indicated by the content of 28, may imply that his answer was not acceptable to them. Thus, the main clause tells of their unbelief concerning the blind man. Although the importance of the antithesis of belief and unbelief is gradually disclosed as the story develops, this is the first time in this Chapter that the explicit word for this theme is mentioned. The thematic word is the aorist verb ἐπίστευσαν.

Subcolon 28.3, the second unit, is the temporal adverbial subclause that limits the action of the main verb by introducing its relation to time. In other words, the beginning of the action in this subclause becomes the point at which the main verb's action ends.¹⁰² The addition of ὅτου, which sometimes follows the conjunction ἕως, makes no difference to the meaning. In terms of the author's choice of sentence structure, Louw (1982:77) points out that, "if the author wishes to say something (deep structure) he will choose a specific form (surface structure) in which to say it". This statement may help us note the significance of why the author chooses this particular sentence form for colon 28. In fact, he could have expressed the same semantic content in a different form, such as that the Jews believed him when they called his parents. He has other choices, but chooses the form he used in this instance. Why? It is most likely that the author has a clear picture of what he wants to convey to the reader. The author may intend to stress the unbelieving attitudes of the Jews.

Another point I wish to note is the use of the articular participle τοῦ ἀναβλέψαντος in 28.3.1. Since this may modify the preceding word αὐτοῦ as an adjective more comprehensively than a simple adjective, it is best translated by a relative pronoun clause. Thus, the entire subclause 28.3 is rendered as *until they called the parents of him who had received*

102 The temporal subordinate conjunction ἕως usually works with a verb with subjunctive mood, and they corporately express such an indefinite end boundary action (Fowler *et al.* 1985:272). In this instance, the verb ἐφώνησαν is not in the subjunctive, but in the indicative, which means that this subclause refers to something that has happened in the past. This can be called a definite end boundary action instead (Fowler *et al.* 1985:272).

his sight. Barrett (1955:299) points out that “αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀναβλέψαντος may be an Aramaism”, but the phrase is, as Brown (1966:373) comments, “repetitious and awkward”. Lastly, I should mention the following regarding this subcluster. Semantically, why did the Jews summon *his parents* in particular?¹⁰³ Why did they not call one of the neighbours or his relatives for more investigation? As the Jews were not satisfied at all with the blind man’s answer, they were anxious to find anything that might minimise or even destroy his testimony (cf. Pink [1945] 1968:82; Morris 1971:486; Boice 1977:49). Under these circumstances, his parents were the best choice for the Jews, because they were the ones who really knew him the best, especially concerning his congenital blindness.¹⁰⁴ The Jews may have expected that the parents would reveal some secrets about their son, which nobody else knew. This expectation may be disclosed in their dialogue in the next subcluster. In the meantime, this verse renders: *The Jews, therefore, did not believe concerning him, that he had been blind and had received his sight, until they called the parents of him who had received his sight.*

b) Illocutionary act

The narrator intends to inform the reader of the circumstances of the next dialogue between the Jews and the blind man’s parents. The narrator’s utterance is, therefore, a speech act of *informative*.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should accept the way in which the narrator introduces the new dialogue, which logically follows the previous scene. The narrator intends to create suspense by not giving any detailed introductions of either the Jews or the parents. Thus, the reader is supposed to understand the basic characteristics of the Jews from his reading up to this Chapter.

d) Communicative strategy

Since the narrator’s utterance describes the event in the story world for the sake of the reader’s understanding, I shall discuss *the communication on the character and text levels* simultaneously. The introduction of new

103 In this instance, the use of the words οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ occurs for the second time since it appeared in cluster A. The word “γονεῖς occurs in Jn. only in this chapter: the word in the N.T. is always used in the plural” (Bernard 1928:333; cf. also Howard-Brook 1994:222). As the characters on stage, they were introduced for the first time in this instance.

104 Cf. Bultmann 1971:329, footnote 3; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:249; Bruce [1983] 1994:214; Carson 1991:368.

characters such as the Jews and the blind man's parents indicates that this dialogue constitutes a new scene. The author continues to deploy *the principle of stage duality* to focus on the dialogue between these characters in this scene. The author lets the narrator play a significant role in this utterance, specifically in the following ways.

1. Firstly, is this new scene totally independent from the previous one? Or is there any relevance between this dialogue and the previous one? The answer is: the narrator connects this new and the previous dialogues by upholding the *Relation Maxim*. Upon hearing the blind man's reply that the miracle worker was a prophet, the Jewish authorities (represented by the Jews) did not believe his answer, perhaps became even more hostile, and suspected collusion between Jesus and the patient (Bernard 1928:332). Mainly because of their unbelief, though they may also seek a solution to the dilemma (Carson 1991:368; Culpepper 1998:176), the Jews decided to summon the parents of the blind man for more information about the healed person. Hence, the narrator establishes a smooth transfer between these two scenes. One should not forget, however, that two aspects of the narrator's point of view make this possible. One aspect is omniscience, his psychological point of view (Culpepper 1983:21). The narrator provides the Jews' internal view that they did not believe the blind man. Without this inside information, the *Relation Maxim* cannot function properly in this utterance. The other is reliability, an ideological point of view (Culpepper 1983:32). However, the meaning of the term should be, as Culpepper (1983:32) notes, distinguished "from both the historical accuracy of the narrator's account and the 'truth' of his ideological point of view". In this reliability, the narrator's "function is to facilitate communication of the author's ideological or evaluative system to the reader" (Culpepper 1983:32). In other words, the narrator presents the correct value system whereby the reader can evaluate the characters' speeches and actions. The narrator shows in verse 18 that the blind man's perception of the miracle worker was correct, and that the Jewish authorities were supposed to believe the blind man's reply. The reader should, therefore, welcome this narrator's reliability, for the narrator bestows his instructions on how the reader should read this particular narrative story. It is a 'lamp' to the feet of the reader. In order for the reader to accept the narrator's reliability, the narrator is assumed to be observing the *Quality Maxim*.

2. Secondly, the narrator repeats the same description of the blind man (who had received his sight). Is the narrator flouting the *Quantity Maxim*? To answer this question, it would be helpful to view this aspect in the domain of Textual Rhetoric. It seems that the narrator makes an effort to clarify the person (signified by the pronoun αὐτοῦ) by means of the repetition at the

beginning of this new section. In this sense, the narrator appears to uphold the *Clarity Principle* at the expense of the *Economy Principle*. However, there are two objections to such an interpretation. In the Greek text, why does the narrator use the pronoun αὐτοῦ in the first instance (notice that the narrator upholds the *Reduction Maxim*) if he wants to clearly identify the person concerned? The narrator could have simply used the designation, the blind man. Similarly, why does the narrator need to clarify the blind man despite the fact that the reader knows the blind man from his reading up to this point? Based on these objections, one can conclude that the narrator is not trying to clarify the person. The narrator is, therefore, not upholding the *Clarity Principle*. Rather, he is observing the *Expressivity Principle* in order to emphasise the blind man's state of affairs before and after the miracle, prior to the start of the interrogation by the Jews. If this is correct, the answer to the original question as to whether or not the narrator is flouting the *Quantity Maxim* should be affirmative. The narrator prefers expressivity to quantity in this depiction.

3. Thirdly, the narrator's utterance in the domain of Textual Rhetoric also observes the *End-Focus Maxim* of the *Processibility Principle* by placing new information, namely that the Jews ultimately summoned the parents (although the fact that they did not believe the blind man in the beginning is also new information to the reader). Moreover, this utterance adheres to the *End-Scope Maxim*, for the negative particle οὐκ appears in the first part of the utterance (in fact, at the very beginning of the Greek sentence). On the other hand, there could be another possible violation of the *Clarity Principle*. The utterance would have been clearer or would have shown a direct relationship between message and text if the narrator had expressed the same semantic content in different surface structures: the Jews believed the blind man's reply (to a certain extent?) when they called his parents. It is easier for the reader to decode the message this way, for the utterance can be formed in a way that is not negative, but in affirmative. In this sense, the narrator's original utterance flouts the *Sub-Maxim of Negative Uninformativeness*. This Sub-Maxim "implies that a negative sentence will be avoided if a positive one can be used in its place. Moreover, it will imply that when negative sentences ARE used, it will be for a special purpose" (Leech 1983:101). This special purpose would be that the narrator chooses expressivity over clarity, in this instance.

4. The fourth contribution of the narrator to this utterance has something to do with the *Manner Maxim* of the Interpersonal Rhetoric domain. In this verse, the author's use of the word 'Jews' is striking. While this term is frequently used in the *Fourth Gospel*, this is the first time it is employed in this Chapter. Thus far, only the word 'Pharisees' is used to denote the

Jewish authorities (in Chapter 9). The following questions arise. Why does the author suddenly use the word 'Jews' in this instance? Is there any significance in his employing this term instead of the term 'Pharisees'? Is the author introducing a new group of characters in the scene? Or does he want to distinguish between the roles of the Jews and those of the Pharisees?

Generally speaking, the term 'Jews' designates the people of Israel or the Jewish people, as opposed to non-Jewish people. Obviously, this is not the case in this instance, for all the characters in the scene appear to be Jewish. One must, therefore, find the meaning in a narrower sense. Some may answer 'yes' to the fourth question, stating that, while the Pharisees may represent the group of people that play the role of the Jewish religious authorities, the Jews may denote the group of people that perform the role of the Jewish political authorities. However, it is known that the Jewish religious authorities were almost identical to the political figures in those days. In fact, the high priest acted as the head of the Sanhedrin, the supreme judicial and administrative council of Israel. Hence, it makes no sense to distinguish their roles in this way.

Although the term 'Jews' in this Gospel is used in various ways, in the majority of cases it refers to the Jews that are hostile towards Jesus, especially the Jewish leaders, according to Von Wahlde (1982:45, 47-49, 54; cf. Bratcher 1975:404). This also seems to be the case, in this instance. It is certainly ambiguous and confuses the reader when the characters' designation changed from the Pharisees to the Jews without any warning, while the narrator seems to let them play the same kind of role. Even if Schnackenburg's (1980:249) view that by making the change "the evangelist certainly intends to indicate the official character of the interrogation" is accepted, the narrator is surely transgressing the *Manner Maxim* in this instance (cf. also Holleran 1993b:368; O'Day 1995:656). With this kind of transgression, an implicature is essential to determine what is being communicated.

5. According to Leech's (1983:41-42) Heuristic Analysis as a means to arrive at an implicature, the first step is to form a hypothesis about the aim or intention of an utterance with the help of background information regarding the context and background assumptions that the speaker is adhering to the usual conversational principles. To apply this step to this utterance, particularly to this term, I propose a hypothesis that the Jews, in this instance, were one of the Pharisaic groups who were present when the division arose in the last cluster. This hypothesis can be formed for the following reason: in the last cluster, it is reported that there was a division among the Pharisees. They were mainly divided into two groups:

the skeptical and the believing groups. If this observation is correct, one can assume that the people who summoned the parents of the blind man in verse 18 may be this skeptical group, because the conjunction and the content of the main clause indicate their unbelieving attitudes towards the blind man's claim. The probability is that the author may try to maintain this division and identify the people who summoned the parents by providing a terminology especially for them. In this particular co-text, the Jews may, therefore, not denote a new group, but rather the group of people who were the skeptical Pharisees portrayed in the last cluster.

The second step is to check the hypothesis against available evidence. As the narrator is assumed to be observing the *Quality Maxim*, the use of the term 'Jews' is no mistake; it is intentional. As the narrator is assumed to be observing the *Quantity Maxim* in the sense that the narrator has no need to add extra information, the utterance itself is complete. As the narrator is assumed to be observing the *Relation Maxim*, the utterance reflects the content of the previous section as the immediate co-text (background). This means that there is some connection between these Jews and the characters in the previous cluster, as strongly indicated by the inferential conjunction $\text{o}\delta\upsilon\text{n}$. The main characters on stage in the previous section were the Pharisees and the blind man. It is logical to assume that the Jews had something to do with the Pharisees, not with the blind man. The last question arises. In what way did the Jews relate to the Pharisees?

The original hypothesis tells us that the Jews were one of the Pharisaic groups present at the time of the schism. The division most likely occurred between two groups who were skeptical and believing. Because of the Jews' unbelieving attitude, one can assume that only the skeptical and hostile Pharisaic group was referred to as the Jews in this new section. This is an implicature derived from the narrator's flouting of the *Manner Maxim*, and this can suit the present co-text without posing any huge problems. Therefore, this can be, what Leech (1983:42) calls, the default interpretation, which may not be the perfect but the most likely interpretation. Holleran (1993:368) states that "from this point on the narrator speaks no more of 'sympathetic Pharisees'". In addition, some scholars (e.g., Morris 1971:485; Duke 1982:185; Dockery 1988:18) support this kind of conclusion.

6. The above observation also conforms to the larger co-text. It may be helpful to remember some insights about the Jews from the sections on 'Mutual story beliefs' (section 4.5 in Chapter 3). The open attack of the Jewish authorities, especially the Jews, on Jesus started with his healing on the Sabbath in John 5. Therefore, the Sabbath controversy became one of the serious reasons that made them hostile towards Jesus. The intense

conflict between Jesus and the Jewish authorities gradually developed. The Jews were even determined to kill him. Jesus severely criticised the Jewish authorities, especially the Jews, for their unbelieving attitudes. The Jews showed their hostility towards Jesus more than the Pharisees did.

7. Traditionally, the majority of the critics believe that the term 'Jews', in this instance, is interchangeable with 'Pharisees'.¹⁰⁵ Brown (1966:373) maintains: "The variation is not sufficient indication that the descriptions of the interrogations come from different hands" (cf. also Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:248; Bultmann 1971:334, footnote 5; Carson 1991:368). My own observation does not go beyond this traditional view, but clarifies the term further. However, my observation differs from a more rigid view such as Tolmie's (2005:388) remark that Ἰουδαῖοι refers exactly to the same group of characters that are portrayed in 9:13-17". Tolmie (2005:388) comes to this conclusion based on "the fact that it is rather difficult to find a convincing argument" for changing the term. He divides past suggested explanations into seven groups (Tolmie 2005:388):

- i. The author likes to vary his terms.
- ii. It indicates that the author addresses contemporary issues in the Johannine church.
- iii. It is the result of the editorial process.
- iv. It is an attempt to indicate the official character of the interrogation.
- v. 9:18-23 comes from a different source.
- vi. The emphasis on the quality of unbelief evokes this identification.
- vii. It may be an indication of the radical hardening of attitudes.

The fact that there has been no convincing argument may be because no satisfactory explanation has been explicitly offered for this phenomenon. Within this present state of affairs, I propose the following:

The author intends to identify the Jews who interrogated the parents as the unbelieving group among the Pharisees.

As argued earlier, as far as the story of John 9 is concerned, the last view would make most sense to me for this change of title in terms of the author's (narrator's) language strategy. I shall indicate, at a later stage, that this view would be in harmony with another change of title in 9:40. One may object to my method to restrict this conclusion only to John 9, for these terms are used throughout the *Fourth Gospel*. However, such a method should not be considered invalid when dealing with terms that are employed differently

105 E.g., Barrett 1955:299; Marsh 1968:383; Westcott 1978:147; Tenney 1981:104; Smith 1986:46; Rensberger 1988:42; Lee 1994:162; Resseguie 2001:139.

depending on the context (cf. Von Wahlde 1982:33, 47; Davies 1992:290). For instance, Bratcher (1975:404) contends that the expression of the Jews should be analysed and translated in each occurrence, and, according to his method, he summarises four different meanings for the term in the Gospel.¹⁰⁶

e) Summary

By way of the informative speech act, the narrator intends to report the circumstances of the new dialogue between the Jews and the blind man's parents to the reader. The author allows the narrator to contribute to the aim of the utterance both by adhering to the *Maxims of Relation, Quality, End-Focus and End-Scope*, and the *Expressivity Principle* and by flouting the *Quantity and Manner Maxims*, the *Clarity and Economy Principles* and the *Sub-Maxim of Negative Uninformativeness*. The *Manner Maxim* plays a significant and covert role in the author's change of the term *Jews*. By using these communicative strategies, the author again draws the reader's attention and interest at the beginning of this new scene.

6.3.2 The second subcluster (9:19-21)

This second subcluster records the conversation between the Jews and the blind man's parents in the question-answer form. According to this form, this subcluster can be divided into two units. The first unit, colon 29, records the Jews' question to the parents, and the second, colon 30, gives the parents' answer to them. Remember that this subcluster is the centre of the cluster. It shows a new development in the story.

9:19 καὶ ἠρώτησαν αὐτοὺς λέγοντες, Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς ὑμῶν, ὃν ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι τυφλὸς ἐγεννήθη; πῶς οὖν βλέπει ἄρτι;

a) General analysis

In colon 29, the conjunction *καὶ* links this and the previous sentences by means of an additive-different (consequential) relationship, indicating that the Jews' inquiry is a natural course of events derived from their summons. The aorist verb *ἠρώτησαν* in conjunction with another aorist verb *ἐφώησαν* in

¹⁰⁶ This same diverse use of the term by the author has generated a great deal scholarly debate (e.g., Bratcher 1975; Lowe 1976; Von Wahlde 1982, 1995:381; Ashton 1985; Cook 1987; Culpepper 1987; Pippin 1996; Beutler 2001; Collins 2001; De Boer 2001; De Jonge 2001; Reinhartz 2001; Tomson 2001; Tolmie 2005; Hakola 2005:10-15; Hylén 2009:113-130. For a list of such studies, cf. also Von Wahlde 1982:54, footnote 1).

28.3 suggests that this interrogation of the blind man's parents happened once as a simple action, not as a repeated action.

Subcola 29.1 and 29.2 form a unit, which describes the contents of their inquiry. In 29.1, the Jews inquired about the issue of the identity of the blind man, in which they asked two items. While one is a simple question as to whether or not he was their son, the other is whether or not he was born blind. These are 'confirmative' questions and appear to be introductory inquisitions. Although they are introductory, the impression is that the way in which they are asked seems to be complex. As mentioned earlier, the Jews may have expected strange, if not outright contradictory information against the blind man's testimony from the parents' answers to their elementary questions. When the Jews asked about his blindness, they added the words *ὃν ὑμεῖς λέγετε* in 29.1.1 to suggest that the parents only claim that their son was born blind. This implies that he had perhaps not been blind from birth. The emphatic *ὑμεῖς* particularly implies that the Jews did not believe it (Plummer [1882] 1981:208). They seemed to be trying to dig into the details by asking basic questions. Barrett (1955:299) remarks that the phrase "*ὃν ὑμεῖς λέγετε ὅτι τυφλὸς ἐγεννήθη* is a mixed construction".

Before the parents answered the question in 29.1, the Jews asked another question in 29.2. When a question is asked, the answer usually follows immediately. Thus, in reality, it could be that these questions were not asked simultaneously, but on two separate occasions or in sequence. For the sake of compactness, however, the author may have combined them. At any rate, in our present text, the Jews asked these questions on one occasion. The content of the second inquisition once again concerns the way in which the blind man gained his sight. Holleran (1993b:366) avers how "is the typical question of unbelief" (cf. also 9:15, 21, 26; 9:10). The present indicative verb *βλέπει* serves to emphasise the present state of the blind man, namely that he can see. The adverb *ἄρτι* further increases such a notion, denoting *now*. This means that the author lets the interrogators ask the same kind of question three times (9:10, 9:15, 9:19). These appeared in a row since cluster B. This question is, therefore, important and strengthens the cohesion between the clusters. By now, the reader knows the process of his gaining sight, while the Jews in the story did not appear to know the details of this. As mentioned earlier, if these Jews were the skeptical and unbelieving group, they should have known this, because they were also present when the Pharisees interrogated the blind man. Another problem must thus be solved. Why did they ask the same kind of question again? Maybe they had a hidden agenda and wanted to obtain a different answer to that of the blind man (cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:249). Hence, they tried to ask his parents the same question. Therefore, the questions the Jews asked in colon 29 displayed their desperateness to find some

information prejudicial to both the blind man, and ultimately Jesus. This verse thus reads: *And they asked them, saying, "Is this your son, about whom you say that he was born blind? How then is he able to see now?"*

b) Illocutionary act

The Jews basically asked the blind man's parents two different kinds of questions. The first is a real question, in which the speaker wants to know the answer (Searle [1969] 1980:66). The second question is an examination question, in which the speaker wants to find out whether the hearer knows the answer (Searle [1969] 1980:66). These Jews had already asked the blind man the same question in verse 15 and they, therefore, knew the answer from the blind man's perspective. Yet, they wanted to find out whether the parents knew, and if so, to hear their answer. Accordingly, these utterances are successful speech acts of *question*.

However, these utterances have an additional illocutionary force. The Jews had a hidden agenda as their primary aim in asking these questions, namely to deny the miracle. The possible reasons for the Jews' interrogation of the parents have been mentioned in the course of the analysis in the last utterance. What about the purpose of their interrogation? The focus is on what was the Jews' specific intention in summoning the parents. Since the Jews had already heard the miracle event from the man directly involved, one can assume that they were not simply interested in obtaining further information. The fact that they did not believe in the man's answer suggests that their action appeared negative or hostile. Hence, it is most likely that they intended to deny the miracle by discrediting the blind man's testimony in the trial (cf. Pink [1945] 1968:82; Boice 1977:49; Morris 1971:486). "Probably they want to hear divergent views and play them [the blind man and the parents] off against each other" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:249). They may want to discover some mistakes in the previous witnesses, including the neighbours (Carson 1991:368-369). They "now cross-examine the parents, in strict fashion" (Bernard 1928:333) by asking "three questions in legal form" (Plummer [1882] 1981:208). If this observation is correct, the additional speech act of these utterances would be *assertive*. The schema of assertives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42) is as follows:

Assertives: (affirm, allege, assert, aver, avow, claim, declare, deny (assert ... not), indicate, maintain, propound, say, state, submit)

In uttering *e*, *S* asserts that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that *P*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believe that *P*.

When this schema is applied to these utterances, the following is obtained:

In uttering “*Is this your son, about whom you say that he was born blind? How then is he able to see now?*”, the Jews deny that the miracle happened if the Jews express:

- i. the disbelief that the miracle happened, and
- ii. the intention that the parents do not believe that the miracle happened.

As the speakers appeared to express their disbelief and intention, as described earlier, the additional speech act of these utterances is assertive. However, the two illocutionary forces do not imply that this utterance is an indirect speech act, because it does not need to be “repaired” (cf. Levinson 1983:270; section 1.1 in Chapter 2). Briefly, in these utterances, the Jews intended to ask the parents about three legally relevant questions: the identity of the blind man, the state of his blindness at birth, and the process of his healing (cf. Holleran 1993b:369). In asking these questions, the Jews intended to deny the miracle, as deduced and inferred from what was said in their utterances.

c) Perlocutionary act

The parents should answer the Jews’ questions adequately, explaining truthfully that their son was born blind and relating what happened to him when he met the miracle worker. The additional intended perlocution of the Jews on a different level is not so much concerned with changing the parents’ belief about the miracle event, but more with procuring some evidence from the parents to support what the Jews wanted to believe or do, namely the denial of the miracle.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character level*. From a speech act perspective, the Jews’ second question poses somewhat of a problem, for they already knew the answer to the question regardless of how they obtained it. Even though their question can be regarded as an examination question, it still violates the *sincerity condition* in one sense and violates the *Quality Maxim*. Our speech act analysis needs to explain this violation by *implicature*. It would be better to examine it by taking their first question into account.

It was indicated in the previous cluster (cf. the section on ‘CS’ in 9:17a), from the way in which the Pharisees formulated their question to the blind man, that those Pharisees *seemed* to admit the reality of the healing. This indication is significant to some extent, because it allows two possible

options concerning the interpretation of these utterances. If the Pharisees admitted the fact of the miracle, why did the Jews ask the blind man's parents questions that would lead to their further doubting the reality of the miracle? Concerning their second question, why did they need to ask such a question that violates the sincerity condition?

Firstly, one possible explanation would be that the Jews were not yet fully convinced of the reality. They still found it difficult to accept the occurrence of the miracle. From a different angle, the Jews may have changed their approach in order to deal with the issue, for the approach to appeal to the Sabbath-breaking in the previous scene had failed, even in their eyes (cf. Duke 1982:185). They now tried to deny the miracle itself by asking about the identity of the blind man as well as his blindness from birth. Was he really their son, and was he born blind? They may have felt the need to confirm what they had heard. One way of doing so would be to find out whether the parents would give an answer compatible with their son's reply.

Secondly, the other explanation would be that, while they conceded to the fact of the healing, they asked these questions mainly because they wanted to discredit the testimony of the son (cf. Sanders & Mastin 1968:241; Fenton [1970] 1979:108; Michaels 1984:152). They had to achieve a certain aim in their utterances. In their opinion, they admitted the reality of the miracle, but did not want to accept this fact. Hence, they may have hoped that the parents would reveal something that could be used against his testimony.

These two explanations are *particularised conversational implicatures* carried by the saying of what was said. It is obvious that there can be more than one explanation. I would favour the latter implicature on account of the Jews' repetition of their second question. However, there is more to it than simply choosing the better explanation of the two. Although the two explanations indicate a difference in the Jews' attitude towards how they saw the reality of the miracle, there is hardly any significant distinction in terms of the aim of their utterances. Both explanations propose the negative purpose of their wanting to deny the miracle. Nevertheless, their aim was clear. However, the parents may have found it difficult to recognise this aim, because this was their first interrogation by the Jews. This means that the parents could not suspect any violation of *Conversational Maxims*. The violation of the *Quality Maxim* can only be perceived on the text level, and the *implicatures* are only meant for the communication between the author and the reader of the text (cf. Botha 1991a:69).

2. In the field of Textual Rhetoric, the Jews' utterances reduce the number of words used by virtue of the *Reduction Maxim*, through pronominalisation.

3. *On the text level*, the above analysis can reveal more about the communicative strategy, namely that, as a result, the reader is more drawn to the story's development, because the story becomes increasingly unpredictable and interesting by operation of the *Interest Principle*. As far as the above two explanations are concerned, it is important to notice that the *Relation Maxim* is assumed to be observed in the previous and present scenes in order to arrive at such *implicatures*.

e) Summary

The Jews asked the blind man's parents two questions with the aim of denying the miracle or discrediting the blind man's testimony. This aim is implicated by the violation of the conversational rules, especially the *Quality Maxim*. However, this illocutionary act with its associated perlocution was not realised by the parents, for the implicatures are meant for the reader. The author also deploys the *Relation Maxim* and the *Interest Principle* to create more interest in the reader.

9:20 ἀπεκρίθησαν οὖν οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶπαν, Οἴδαμεν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς ἡμῶν καὶ ὅτι τυφλὸς ἐγενήθη

a) General analysis

Colon 30 is the other unit under this subcluster. It discloses the parents' answers. One of the parents took the initiative to provide their answers. The structure of this colon is slightly complex. It can be further divided into two units. 30.1-30.3, containing the direct answers to the Jews' questions, whereas the second, 30.4-30.6, provides the parents' suggestion to the Jews. The former can be further divided into two smaller units, 30.1 and 30.2-30.3, according to what the parents knew and did not know about their son. Therefore, the analysis will be conducted according to these smaller units: 30.1 (v. 20); 30.2-30.3 (v. 21ab), and 30.4-30.6 (v. 21cd).

The conjunction οὖν in 30 indicates the continuation from the last colon by means of a logical-reason-result relationship. Newman and Nida (1980:310) remark that this conjunction is "characteristic of John's style". In this colon, there are two main verbs, ἀπεκρίθησαν and εἶπαν. Although, in such a case, the sentence should have two colons instead of one, this particular case is an exception. Louw (1982:110) explains this, stating that this is a case of referring to fundamentally the same and single activity by two verbal means. He adds that this can be justified based on the common Semitic usage of such expressions. The subject of these verbs, οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ, is recorded for identification with emphasis.

What the parents knew about their son is contained in 30.1. The perfect tense verb *οἶδμεν* shows the intensive use to stress the present state of their knowledge (Fowler *et al.* 1985:292). They were certain that the blind man was their son, and that he was born blind. Their certainty is indicated by the indicative mood of the two verbs *ἐστίν* and *ἐγεννήθη*. Concerning the latter verb, this aorist passive verb of *γεννάω* is used, in this instance, with the meaning of *being born*, but the only difference of the verb's usage in comparison with that of 2.1.1 is the mood. While the verb, in this instance, is in the indicative showing certainty (Fowler *et al.* 1985:297), the same verb in 2.1.1 is in the subjunctive, showing probability (Fowler *et al.* 1985:298). The predicate nominative noun *υἱός* with its article is modified by the genitive pronoun *ἡμῶν*, which emphasises their relationship. Therefore, the narrator records the parent's answer in this verse as follows: *Then his parents answered and said, "We know that this is our son, and that he was born blind."*

b) Illocutionary act

It is obvious that the speech act of this utterance is *responsive*, because of its content and function, as indicated under 'General analysis'. When Bach and Harnish's (1979:43) schema of responsives is applied to the text, the following is obtained:

In uttering "*We know that this is our son, and that he was born blind*", the parents respond that the blind man is their son and was born blind if they express:

- i. the belief that the blind man is their son and was born blind, which the Jews have inquired about, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that the blind man is their son and was born blind.

Therefore, the parents intended to give a sincere answer to the Jews' question, in accordance with the conversational rules. However, there seems to be no illocution for the reader in this utterance, for the reader already knows this information.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *intended perlocution* of this utterance is to confirm the facts concerning the blind man by responding to their questions. The Jews should, therefore, accept the parents' answer. The perlocution for the reader is to impress him by reconfirming the blind man's identity and his birth defect.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, the parents' utterance does not violate any of the Conversational Principles nor Maxims in the domain of Interpersonal Rhetoric. In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, this utterance keeps all four Principles intact. As it retains a direct and transparent relationship between the message and the text, and as it is easy to decode, it observes both the *Clarity* and the *Processibility Principles*. The *Economy Principle* is adhered to because the text is shortened by virtue of pronominalisation without impairing the message. Although the parents' utterance was a simple answer, its implication was profound. They confirmed that the blind man was their son and had been born blind. The Jews could no longer deny the reality of the miracle, despite the intended perlocution of their last utterance. This is ironic, and the fact of healing was now fully established as a result of this parents' reply (cf. Sanders & Mastin 1968:241; Bruce [1983] 1994:214; Carson 1991:369). However, in the story, the Jews' unbelief appeared to prevent the Jews from overtly accepting this reality of the healing despite the parents' solid testimony (cf. also the analysis of this in the section on 'CS' in 9:26).

2. *On the text level*, the author seems to have a textual strategy to reconfirm the blind man's identity and his birth defect for the reader via the parents, so as to highlight the certainty and power of the healing miracle once again. Because of the repeated information, the utterance has some rhetorical value in impressing the reader. Hence, it adheres to the *Expressivity Principle*, and the reader will again be surprised at Jesus' healing power. Since the parents' answer contains the same information as that which the reader already heard, it has no news value for the reader. In this sense, the utterance flouts the *Interest Principle*, and discourages the reader's interest. The tone of tension in the interrogation scene for the reader will be relieved for a while.

3. As pointed out earlier, *irony* can be detected from a speech act perspective. According to my knowledge, no critics have mentioned the occurrence of irony in this instance. According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), the irony may be indicated by the conflicting relationship between the text and co-text (cf. step A-ii-2). Since the parents' utterance upholds the *Quality Maxim*, they did not intend to use irony. Therefore, the utterance does not constitute verbal irony on the character level, but it does constitute situational irony on the text level. This is an instance of *irony of event* derived from the outcome of the interrogation that the Jews did not want (step B-ii-2-2). The Jews wanted to deny the miracle, but the parents' utterance has, ironically enough, established its reality. Hence, the Jews were the victims, and the observers would be both the author and the reader (there is no ironist). This

irony functions as a means of portraying the Jews' frustration (cf. Turner 1996:47) and as a heuristic device to clarify the reader's interpretation of matters that were not so simple to the Jews (cf. Muecke [1969] 1980:232). As this is not intended, it may not be stable irony.

e) Summary

The parents' utterance is a straight answer to the Jews, thus a typical speech act of responsive. It appears to uphold all the conversational rules, except the *Interest Principle*, on the text level. With their answer, the fact of the miracle was now fully acknowledged (not necessarily by the Jews). Its implication was immense, and leads to an instance of irony of event. The author, however, does not use any other elaborate literary technique to produce such an effect, but simply allows the parents to confirm the facts about their son.

9:21ab πὼς δὲ νῦν βλέπει οὐκ οἶδαμεν, ἢ τίς ἠνοιξεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἡμεῖς οὐκ οἶδαμεν

a) General analysis

In 30.2 and 30.3, we are informed of what the parents did not know. Therefore, these subcola form a smaller unit. 30.2.1 contains the content of their ignorance. They did not know how he gained his sight. The focus is again on their son's present status.

A repetition between 29.1-29.2 and 30.1-30.2 is structurally important. This repetition is a synonymous parallelism. Although there are some minor omissions and changes of certain words and punctuation, the basic contents, the word order, and the use of words are markedly identical in these sentences. Regarding the parallelism between 29.2 and 30.2.1, the author changes the adverb from ἄρτι to νῦν. Bernard (1928:333) indicates that "ἄρτι is a favourite word in Jn., and signifies 'at this moment', as distinct from the vaguer νῦν, 'at the present time'". The author may also have a clear purpose for changing the coordinate conjunction from inferential, οὖν, to adversative, δε. The latter conjunction in 30.2.1 is used to contrast their ignorance with their knowledge in 30.1. As a result, the author places more emphasis on a sharp antithetical parallelism between 30.1-30.1.2 and 30.2.1-30.3.2.

The sentence structure of 30.3 merely repeats that of 30.2, so that these subcola may form a strong unit. In these structures, the objects of the verbs are placed at the beginning of the sentences, and the word order

suggests that the contents of the parents' ignorance may be emphasised. Their ignorance was recorded in 30.3.1, namely that they did not know who had opened their son's eyes. This is a striking point in their ignorance, for the parents voluntarily added this remark, which the Jews did not even ask for. The author specifically identifies the referents who made such a remark in 30.3.2* for the sake of emphasis, by adding the nominative personal pronoun ἡμεῖς for the first time in the parents' answers. Bernard (1928:333) also points out that "[t]he parents repudiate with special emphasis any knowledge of the healer". Therefore, this verse reads: *But how he now sees, we do not know; or who opened his eyes, we do not know.*

b) Illocutionary act

Although it cannot be denied that all utterances in verse 21 fall into the category of *responsives*, due to their syntactical structures in this co-text, it is more analytical to probe from a semantic point of view. If the parents really did not know what had happened to their son, according to their utterances' literal meaning, they would merely be asserting their ignorance of the details of the healing event. The *additional illocution* of their utterances would be *assertive*. However, these utterances are not indirect speech acts, because there is no indication that the literal meanings expressed in them are inadequate in this co-text. There is no need for these to be rectified by some inference (cf. Levinson 1983:270). Since the Jews as the hearers accepted the parents' literal answer (indicated by v. 24) *on the character level*, the utterances can be concluded as (responsive) assertive. The following is the application of Bach and Harnish's (1979:43) schema of assertives on this text:

In uttering "how he now sees, we do not know; or who opened his eyes, we do not know", the parents assert that they do not know about the process of the miracle and the miracle worker if the parents express:

- i. the belief that they do not know about the process of the miracle and the miracle worker, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that the parents do not know about the process of the miracle and the miracle worker.

However, *on the author-reader level*, the other side of *Presumption of Literalness* should perhaps be applied to the utterances. If it is obvious to the hearer (in this instance, the reader) that the speaker could not be speaking literally, the hearer must seek the non-literal meaning of that utterance. Strictly speaking, the parents did not try very hard to answer the Jews' second question in verse 19. It is my contention that the parents appeared to be avoiding giving a specific account of the son's recovery,

even though they were fully aware of how their son gained his sight. They should have known this, because they were his parents! Besides, the larger co-text tells us that the miracle was a hot issue among the neighbours and the spectators as well as among the religious authorities. In this situation, the parents of the son, who was the sole beneficiary of the miracle, could not have been totally ignorant about the issue. Most expositors concur that the parents knew that the healer was Jesus.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, one could consider the matter in this way, since the narrator in verse 22 strongly implies such a notion by reporting: “His parents said this, because they were afraid of the Jews”. It is possible that, if they were not afraid of the Jews, they may have been honest about what they knew. However, it is a fact that they feared the Jews. Therefore, in this situation, it was clever to say, in a sense, that they knew nothing about the healing event so that they might be dismissed as unreliable witnesses (cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:33). Currently, politicians who are interrogated during investigations into supposed corruption still use this strategy of ‘ignorance’. This could make them appear stupid, but it may perhaps be the best way to avoid any accusations, for then no clues are left for further interrogations. If the parents used this kind of strategy (it would not matter whether they did so unconsciously or intentionally), it means that they would have voluntarily admitted or confessed that they were totally ignorant, despite the fact that they possibly knew. When the reader perceives this aspect, it is most likely that the *speech act* of their utterances *on the text level* becomes *concessive*. This is a special case in that an additional illocution is identified separately on the text level. Bach and Harnish (1979:43) give the schema of concessives as follows:

Concessives: (acknowledge, admit, agree, allow, assent, concede, concur, confess, grant, own)

In uttering *e*, *S* concedes that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that *P*, contrary to what he would like to believe or contrary to what he previously believed or avowed, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believe that *P*.

When this schema is applied to this text, the following is gained:

In uttering “how he now sees, we do not know; or who opened his eyes, we do not know”, the parents admit that they do not know about the process of the miracle and the miracle worker if they express:

107 E.g., Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:249; Boice 1977:50; Bruce [1983] 1994:215; Carson 1991:369; Holleran 1993b:369-370.

- i. the belief that they do not know about the process of the miracle and the miracle worker, contrary to what the parents previously believed, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that the parents do not know about the process of the miracle and the miracle worker.

To summarise, the parents intended to let the Jews know that they did not know the details of the healing event. Their utterances have three illocutions: responsive, assertive (on the story level) and concessive (on the text level).

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should accept the parents' response. However, the author invites the reader to question the parents' answer, suggesting that there is something wrong with their reaction. In other words, the author intends to annoy the reader with the concessive speech act. In doing so, the author lets the reader wonder why the parents deliberately replied that they did not know the details, despite the fact that they as the parents of the healed man were supposed to know. The reader is thus compelled to read the story further.

d) Communicative strategy

1. In these utterances, there are many violations and adherences of the conversational rules, making these utterances complex and significant. I shall discuss *the communication on the character level*. Firstly, these utterances violate the *Quantity Maxim* in two ways. If the parents knew the details of the miracle, as strongly suggested above, they uttered less than they were required to say by this principle. The other way of violation is that the parents voluntarily told the Jews that they did not know who opened their son's eyes, information for which the Jews did not even ask. The parents said more than they were required to say. Why, then, did the parents include such a remark? Was it really necessary for them to add it? For the level of surface structures, the answers to these questions would be as follows. It could be difficult and nearly impossible to explain the first question. As for the second question, it was unnecessary. However, regarding the level of deep structures, the answer to the latter would be 'yes'. Providing the reason for this would also answer the previous question. That is, one can assume that the parents would become very aware of the change in their son's visual condition as well as of the reactions of the neighbours and the Pharisees to him at least from the scenes in which those people questioned their son. In these scenes, their questions also concerned the identity of the miracle worker, especially in colon 26 in the

last cluster. Accordingly, the parents should also have known what the central issue was in this whole incident. They were, therefore, fully aware of what the Jews really wanted to know. They thus felt the need to express their ignorance about the wonder worker, even before being asked. At any rate, this identity question cannot be avoided. It is likely that the Jews would have asked such an identity question afterwards if it did not emerge at that time.

2. *Secondly*, these utterances were very clear in the expression. No one can misinterpret them, and thus the *Manner Maxim* is kept intact. *Thirdly*, if the parents knew the details of the miracle, their response was insincere. These utterances may result in the violation of the *Quality Maxim*. The most likely scenario deduced from this co-text is that, despite the fact that they knew the details of the miracle, they were so afraid of the Jews that they could not tell the truth. In addition to the critics mentioned earlier (in the section on 'IA'), Hendriksen ([1954] 1973:86), Michaels (1984:153) and Witherington (1995:184) also observed this. However, the fact that, technically, the parents could not testify about the miracle in the proceedings cannot be dismissed, for they were not eye-witnesses and had no first-hand knowledge (cf. Morris 1971:487; Lindars [1972] 1981:346; Beasley-Murray 1987:157).

3. *Fourthly*, these utterances demonstrate that the parents tried their best to deal with the Jews whom they feared, because they attempted to avoid silence in the interrogation. Strong fear often discourages a person to speak up and forces him to be quiet. Yet, the parents, in this instance, did not stop talking, and their utterances therefore observe the *Phatic Maxim* under the *Politeness Principle*. *Fifthly*, there is another way of viewing the parents' answer. It is possible, but not likely, that the parents may have answered for the sake of not only themselves but also their son. For the sake of their son, the parents did not give any information that might connect their son and Jesus. The parents did not reveal the information they should not reveal, by feigning their ignorance about the event. If we can suppose this, it means that the parents took the side of their son, protecting him from the Jews. In this case, these utterances adhere to the *Morality Principle*.

4. *On the text level*, from the point of view of the relationship between the parents and the son, it appears that the *Interest Principle* comes into play. Although parents are generally supposed to be aware of important changes in their child's life or development (if not everything about the child), the parents, in this instance) expressed that they did not know important information about their son. Their ignorance shows unpredictability, and hence their utterances are interesting to the reader. However, when the text

is closely examined, their ignorance was, in fact, due not to ignorance, but to fear. They pretended to know nothing.

To understand the parents' utterances, an aspect of secrecy in the honour-shame world of the Mediterranean may shed some light on the subject. As introduced in the section on 'Secrecy' (section 4.1.4 in Chapter 3), secrecy was regarded as an internal family necessity to protect a family's reputation in the community. Perhaps the status of the blind man's family was very low in their community, for they "were so poor that their son had to make his living by begging!" (Hendriksen [1954] 1973:87). Moreover, 'poverty' in ancient society was not only related to the economy but also to power and honour. Thus, it is understandable that the parents would not want to lower their position further by being expelled from the synagogue and the community. The association of their son to Jesus became a secret that had to be preserved at all costs. Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:204) report: "Secrets that might damage reputation are thus guarded by lying, deception, or whatever strategy is necessary to protect it."

5. In the domain of Textual Rhetoric, all the principles in my list are operative in these utterances (for the Diagram of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics, see Appendix 2). *Firstly*, on account of the clear message, these utterances adhere to the *Clarity Principle* and the *Processibility Principle* remain intact. *Secondly*, in both utterances, the new and heavy information (we do not know) is placed at the end (in the Greek text), the *End-Focus* and *End-Weight Maxims* are observed to enhance the quality of the utterances. *Thirdly*, through the use of pronominalisation, the *Reduction Maxim* is also adhered to in these utterances. *Fourthly*, because of expressive repetition of information (we do not know) the *Expressivity Principle* is operating in the set of these utterances. This repetition leaves a strong rhetorical impression of the message on the hearers at the expense of the *Economy Principle*. Moreover, from the vantage point of Greek grammar, the use of ἡμεῖς violates the *Economy Principle* for the sake of emphasis.

6. Dockery (1988:20) remarks on this verse: "The humor and irony is overwhelming, for again the parents' stammering fear has boxed in the Jews." It is also because the "dilemma of the authorities is brought out by the double οὐκ οἶδαμεν of the parents, who mercilessly leave the authorities with the responsibility for their own judgment" (Bultmann 1971:335; Barrett 1955:299; Carson 1991:368). Since Dockery's remark qualifies a criterion for identifying a possible instance of irony (step A-vii), the parents' utterances are scrutinised according to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2). One should note that the utterances meet more qualifications for analysis (step A-ii-3, A-iii, A-iv and A-v). There may be

at least two ironies: one concerns the parents, and the other relates to the Jews.

7. As far as the first irony is concerned, although the parents' utterances violate the *Quality Maxim* (step B-iv-2-c), it appeared that they did not take responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act (step B-iv-2-3). In other words, it is logical that the parents, who so feared the Jewish authorities, were not in a position to employ irony in talking to them. Thus the utterances do not pass the test when the ironic speech act conditions (step B-iv) are applied. This entails that the irony should not be verbal irony, but situational irony, which could possibly be an instance of irony of self-betrayal (resulting from their weakness) or of dilemma (step B-ii-2). I would opt for the latter if a choice had to be made between the two, because the situation of dilemma in which the parents were placed was affecting them strongly in the way they said their utterances. Hence, the parents are the victims and the observers are the author and the reader. This *irony of dilemma* is perceived on the text level, and is used as a means both of expressing fear (cf. Turner 1996:47) and of involving the reader in the communication process of the text (cf. O'Day 1986:30).

8. As far as the second irony is concerned, this would be another instance of situational irony for the same reason mentioned earlier. This time, the victims are the Jews as Bultmann (1971:335) identifies them in the dilemma. The author and the reader are the observers; this irony is also located on the text level. As in the case of the first irony, there are two possibilities: irony of dilemma or of events (the Jews did not expect this outcome; they thought that the parents knew something about the healing). I would also opt for *irony of dilemma*, in this instance, for my view coincides with the above critics' remarks. This irony may be used as a means to express the Jews' frustration (cf. Turner 1996:47) and as "a mode of revelatory language" whereby the reader passes judgment on the character of the Jews (cf. O'Day 1986:31). It may also function "as a social device for group cohesiveness" regarding the author and the reader (Roy 1981:409).

9. These ironies of dilemma indicate the occurrence of *the motif of suffering* in the present text. The suffering experienced by the parents and the Jews may have a corrective purpose in order for them to return to "correct faith" in the God of Israel (cf. Boice 1977:24).

Various adherences and violations of the conversational rules are certainly indicative of the importance of these utterances in this text. In particular, the violation of the *Quality Maxim* and the fulfillment of the *Morality Maxim* lead to the suspicion of some hidden agenda or unspoken difficulty on the part of the parents. However, this implication should be explored further in

the analysis of the next utterances, for the parents' utterances are closely connected with the ensuing ones. Their treatment as such gives a clearer picture of the events.

e) Summary

The parents' utterances are classified as a speech act of responsive and assertive on the story level and as a concessive speech act on the text level. The parents intended to provide some kind of superficial answer to the Jews' question, but they did not seem to reveal the whole truth. This leads the reader to doubt the sincerity of the parents in responding to the Jews. As far as the Jews are concerned, they were to accept the parents' answer at face value. The reader should notice the significance of these utterances due to the observation and violation of a number of conversational rules. Their significance can also be observed by virtue of the irony and the motif of suffering. Hence, the author deploys diverse communicative strategies to make the story more exciting for the reader.

9:21cd αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσατε, ἡλικίαν ἔχει, αὐτὸς περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λαλήσει.

a) General analysis

Subcola 30.4-30.6 tell of the parents' suggestion to the Jews (cf. the exact illocution of their utterances below). Subcolon 30.4 summarises the parents' suggestion that the Jews themselves should ask their son what they did not know. The word ἐρωτήσατε is an aorist imperative verb, and thus usually denotes a command. This verb is one of *Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices*. In this case, however, is it really a command? Or is it perhaps a suggestion? Or is it a petition? This is an area where speech act analysis typically plays a significant role in understanding the text, because simple grammatical analysis cannot provide an adequate answer. Pratt (1977:86) also confirms this point:

Speech act theory provides a way of talking about utterances not only in terms of their surface grammatical properties but also in terms of the context in which they are made, the intentions, attitudes, and expectations of the participants, the relationships existing between participants, and generally, the unspoken rules and conventions that are understood to be in play when an utterance is made and received.

Therefore, I shall scrutinise the illocutionary force of their utterances more extensively in the following subsection.

Subcola 30.5-30.6 explain the reasons why the Jews should ask their son directly. While 30.5 mentions that the blind man was mature enough to relate his own story, 30.6 conveys the parents' confidence that he would speak for himself. Or, at least, the parents hoped to assure the Jews that he would speak. The noun *ἡλικίαν* denotes *years* or *span of life* by itself. However, the words *ἡλικίαν ἔχει* in 30.5 form an idiom meaning *to be of age*. Bernard (1928:333) reports that "*ἡλικίαν ἔχει* is a good classical phrase". *ἡλικίαν ἔχει* is often followed by an infinitive expressing what the person in question is of fit age to do. In this instance, the infinitive is provided: either "to respond rationally to inquiry" or "to make legal response" (Barrett 1955:299). In 30.6, the future tense verb *λαλήσει* predicts an indefinite simple action (Fowler *et al.* 1985:290). The author may intend to make this action more definite by using the indicative future tense for the parents' words, because the author does not use a verb with the present subjunctive mood (the mood of probability or indefiniteness) (Fowler *et al.* 1985:298). The mood of the verb is also one of the *Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices* (Searle [1969] 1980:30; Yule 1996:49-50). Thus the parents said: "*Ask him; he is of age, he shall speak for himself.*"

b) Illocutionary act

Traditionally, the general communicative function of the imperative sentence is a command or a request (Levinson 1983:263; Yule 1996:54). However, strictly speaking, this level of information does not at all help us analyse the intended meaning of the utterances spoken by the parents. In order to find it, we need to determine the illocutionary force of their utterances. When one reads the text, it is not difficult to tell that the utterances are not meant as a command, because, in order to classify an utterance as a command, the preparatory condition requires the speaker to have some kind of authority over the hearer. However, since it is obvious that the parents did not possess any superior authority over the Jews, these utterances cannot be a command. It suits our analysis better to change one of the previous questions as follows: What is the nature of their utterances, advice or petition? Holleran (1993b:370) takes it as a suggestion.

In the case of suggestions or advice, "what the speaker expresses is not the desire that *H* do a certain action but the belief that doing it is a good idea, that it is in *H*'s interest" (Bach & Harnish 1979:49). According to Searle ([1969] 1980:67), "[a]dvising is more like telling you what is best for you". It is not likely that the parents meant the words to the Jews to be advice, because the alternative action which the parents 'suggested' was not in the Jews' interest, but in the parents' own interest. As they did not want to answer the questions themselves, they were trying to find a way of

escape, because of their fear of the Jews. Indeed, they were in no position to give advice.

Why did the parents speak to the Jews in the way described in the text? The most likely scenario is that the parents were asking or begging the Jews to release them from the unpleasant situation. They were put in the position of responsibility to answer any questions the Jews may ask in their interrogation. The parents were afraid of saying something that would make the Jews believe that they were also followers of the wonder worker, Jesus. The immediate co-text, especially verses 22-23, supports this scenario. In addition, the majority of critics who comment on verse 21 cd attribute the parents' utterances to their fear of the Jews.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, their utterances should be considered a request or petition, and thus the speech act would be *requestive* under the general category of *directives* according to Bach and Harnish's (1979:47) taxonomy. Searle ([1969] 1980:66) lists felicity (necessary and sufficient) conditions for a speech act of request as follows:

Propositional content condition: Future act *A* of *H*.

Preparatory conditions: 1. *H* is able to do *A*. *S* believes *H* is able to do *A*. 2. It is not obvious to both *S* and *H* that *H* will do *A* in the normal course of events of his own accord.

Sincerity condition: *S* wants *H* to do *A*.

Essential condition: Count as an attempt to get *H* to do *A*.

When the utterances are analysed according to these conditions:

Propositional content condition: The Jews' future act of asking the blind man.

Preparatory conditions: 1. The Jews are able to ask the blind man. The parents believe the Jews are able to ask the blind man. 2. It is not obvious to both the parents and the Jews that the Jews will ask the blind man in the normal course of events of their own accord.

Sincerity condition: The parents want the Jews to ask the blind man.

Essential condition: Count as an attempt to get the Jews to ask the blind man.

Hence, the parents' utterances meet these conditions, and are thus a successful speech act. In order to validate the conclusion that the illocutionary force of their utterances is requestive, another issue must be solved. Strictly speaking, verse 21 cd contains three Greek sentences. Since each sentence, being an utterance, is assumed to have its own speech act,

108 E.g., Marsh 1968:383; Michaels 1984:153; Du Rand 1991:100; O'Day 1995:657.

how can we arrive at such a conclusion? In this instance, the concept of macrospeech acts should be used.

When we examine the three sentences, the first utterance, "Ask him", would be requestive, as analysed earlier. The second utterance, "he is of age", could be *descriptive*, and the last, "he shall speak for himself", should be a *predictive* speech act. However, these utterances constitute a sequence of speech acts that can be assigned one global speech act with one major purpose. Since the second and third utterances are explanatory speech acts regarding the first, they can be deleted in accordance with the *Deletion macrorule*. Consequently, the *global speech act* of these utterances may be said to have one major intention, namely requesting. Thus they should be classified as a *requestive*.

Briefly, the parents intended to beg the Jews to release them from the interrogation, implying that they no longer wanted to have anything to do with this matter (Neyrey 1998:93). The parents intended to opt out of the conversation. However, the author intends to shift the reader's attention from the parents to the blind man once again.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should accept the parents' request to let them go. The reader should understand the parents' situation and await the story's development in the next section with a sense of thrill and suspense.

In the next dialogue scene, the Jews interrogated the blind man once again, at the parents' request. The Jews seemed to take no offence from the parents and simply accepted their utterances as a petition.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, the parents were responding to the Jews in the interrogation. As for the *Cooperative Principle*, all four Maxims seem to be observed in the parents' utterances. However, a further scrutiny of the *Relation Maxim* may be necessary. One of the aspects of this Maxim (be relevant) is kept intact. Because the parents said that they did not know the information the Jews required, it was logical for them to think that the Jews should ask the person who knew the information. In addition, this maxim states: "Make your conversational contribution one that will advance the goals either of yourself or of your addressee" (Leech 1983:42). In terms of the goal of the parents to opt out of the conversation, this Maxim is upheld in their utterances. The Jews aimed to obtain the necessary information from the parents. However, this is not likely to be accomplished, for the parents begged them to talk to their son.

2. As far as the *Politeness Principle* is concerned, the parents' utterances do not observe the *Tact Maxim* and the *Generosity Maxim*. Their petition did not minimise the cost to the Jews despite the fact that the *Tact Maxim* tells the speaker to minimise the cost to the hearer (Leech 1983:132). When the parents could not answer as required, the Jews had to make an effort to interrogate the son again. Although the *Generosity Maxim* tells the speaker to minimise the benefit to self (Leech 1983:132), the parents were to receive the greatest benefit from the action of the Jews. In this sense, they were not polite. However, the parents adhered to the *Phatic Maxim*, which encourages the speaker to avoid silence or keep talking (Leech 1983:141). When one understands the parents' extremely difficult position in relation to the Jews, one could accept the fact that the parents would keep their silence in order to save themselves and their son. This could be one tactic in such a dilemma. However, the parents did not prefer silence, and explicitly begged the Jews in their utterances.

3. The parents' utterances also indirectly violate the *Tact Maxim* in relation to their son. His cost and trouble were surely increased by their request to the Jews. Concerning his ability to be interrogated, the majority of the commentators agree that the expression "he is of age" indicates that the blind man was at least thirteen and was able to give legal testimony according to Jewish law.¹⁰⁹ However, one wonders exactly how old he was. Was he thirteen or older?

In my opinion, he was older than thirteen. Stated boldly, he was perhaps in his twenties. This is speculation, but the available evidence strongly suggests this. *Firstly*, the use of the term *ἄνθρωπον* in 9:1 is one indication. If the author refers to a child of thirteen years or less, he should have used the term *παῖς* as it signifies "a boy between 7 and 14 years" (Brown 1975:283). Although this word (4:51), and its related words *παιδίον* (4:49; 16:21) and *παιδάριον* (6:9) are found in this Gospel, he uses the term *ἄνθρωπον* to refer to the blind man.

Secondly, the term *son* in 9:19-20 does not necessarily signify a young boy, for adult males could be called sons in New Testament times. In fact, Malina and Rohbaugh (1992:349) indirectly endorse this: "Men were to some degree under the authority of their mothers throughout life, and any man who disobeyed his mother, even in adulthood, was considered dishonorable". And "[t]he emotional bond between mothers and sons ... remains the strongest such tie in Mediterranean life" (Malina & Rohbaugh 1992:300). Thus, the use of the word *son* does not refute the notion that the blind man was grown-up.

109 E.g., Barrett 1955:299; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:249; Lindars [1972] 1981:347; Bruce 1983:215; Beasley-Murray 1987:157; Carson 1991:369.

Thirdly, the most important factor under discussion may be the ability of the blind man to argue with the Jewish authorities in the next dialogue scene (9:24-34). The way in which he conversed with them displays his wit, courage, knowledge and eloquence. It is unreasonable to think that a thirteen-year-old boy had such qualities, even in a society in which adulthood began in the early stages of male life. According to Malina and Rohbaugh (1992:27, 300), at the age of seven or eight, adulthood was considered to begin in New Testament times because it was the time when a boy would enter the world of men: "But the movement was social rather than psychological" (Malina & Rohbaugh 1992:27). Adulthood was perceived in terms of social structure, not in terms of personal or psychological development. In order to have an intense discussion with authorities in the way the blind man did, one needs to be mature enough as a person. Attaining adulthood in Palestinian society does not guarantee that a person could reason well with others. Thus, the notion of early adulthood does not favour the notion that the blind man was approximately thirteen. Rather, his ability shows that he was older than that.

Furthermore, Osiek and Balch (1997:64) report that the gap was generally recognised between a young man's physical and social maturity in the Roman world: "he assumed an adult toga about sixteen but had to wait well into his twenties before being taken seriously". They also state that "in the Roman republic and early empire, there had been laws prohibiting young men from assuming offices before their twenties" (Osiek and Balch 1997:64). It is conceivable that the essence of the above information can apply to Palestinian society. The fact that the Jews took the issue concerning the blind man seriously strongly suggests that he was treated as a full-grown adult. Hence, the blind man could have been in his twenties.

As a result, although the uncertainty about his age still remains, he could have been a great deal older than thirteen. In this sense, I would agree with Morris (1971:487) who states that the expression "he is of age" probably refers to the age of being able to reason rather than that of legal responsibility.

4. In keeping with real-life stories, this story also contains complex aspects of human life. We can point out, for example, that the parents' behaviour was not costless to themselves, despite all the benefits they may have gained from their request. Malina and Rohbaugh (1992:118) state that children in Palestinian society were supposed to provide security and protection for their elderly parents. If the blind man had not regained his sight, it might have been unrealistic for the parents to expect any security and protection from him in their old age. However, after the healing he might have been able to take care of his parents. Nonetheless,

the parents chose to opt out of the interrogative situation at the expense of their son, instead of acquiring security and protection in the future. This ultimately means that they would abandon their own son. They judged that the present predicament was much harsher than the future problem. Nevertheless, their judgment also cost them a great deal. This shows the complexity of human life, and is indeed indicative of how the parents' situation was disastrous for them.

5. I shall now discuss *the communication on the author-reader level*. Duke (1982:186) finds irony in the parents' utterances, as far as their fear of the Jews is concerned. However, he does not provide any details as to the kind of irony involved, nor how it functions in the story. At first glance, one may find sarcasm, a form of irony, in these utterances. The parents would then be saying sarcastically, "Do not ask us about this. You are wrong to come to us anyway. Instead, why don't you ask our son yourselves?" This is improbable. The parents did not share equal status with the Jews of whom they were too afraid. Thus, according to my analysis, the irony, in this instance, is not verbal irony but *irony of dilemma*. This is inferred from the dilemma in which the parents, as the victims of this irony, were compelled to answer the Jews' questions, on the one hand, and not to answer, on the other. Since the observer of the irony is the reader, the irony is located at the text level (the author-reader level). It is not as significant as verbal irony. However, it helps the reader understand the parents' difficult position and interpret their utterances accordingly. The reader should sympathise with the parents and should do so with all those who experience the same kind of predicament, if the story of John 9 is a two-level drama, as Martyn ([1968] 1979) suggests. Nevertheless, in the narrator's comment in verse 22, the author indicates that the parents' action is not recommended for the reader.

Another irony may be identified regarding the use of reader victimization. I shall discuss this later. It can be *dramatic irony*, in which the irony can be perceived by the author's knowledge, as both the ironist and observer, of what the reader as the victim has yet to find out.

6. In the field of Textual Rhetoric, the parents' utterances uphold the *Economy Principle* by using the *Reduction Maxim* (pronominalisation). The parents designated their blind son as *he* or *him*. Morris (1971:487) comments on the significance of these pronouns: "In avowing their ignorance of the identity of the Healer they use the emphatic pronoun" (cf. also Plummer [1882] 1981:208). Although the utterances also seem to observe the *Transparency Maxim*, due to a direct and transparent relationship between the message and the text, they seem to transgress the *End-Weight Maxim*,

because more important information is not placed at the end, but at the beginning of the utterances.

7. In the field of Interpersonal Rhetoric, the parents' utterances surprise the reader. This constitutes an instance of the operation of the *Interest Principle*. *Firstly*, Malina and Rohbaugh (1992:179) point out: "Socially and psychologically, all family members were embedded in the family unit. Modern individualism simply did not exist. The public role was played by the males on behalf of the whole unit, while females played the private, internal role." If what they describe of the respective roles of males and females in New Testament times is correct, the author's use of the term *parents* surprises the reader, because the husband and wife were fulfilling a public role together in this interrogation. In "a patriarchal social structure in which the male household head held precedence" (Barton 1992:100), the head of the household was supposed to come to the fore and act as the representative for the whole family. It is thus logical to assume that the blind man's father articulated the utterances, even though the author attributes the utterances to the parents.

Secondly, although the parents' answers in subcola 30.1-30.3 may be what the reader is able to anticipate from the previous events, their petition is probably not what the reader can expect by simply following the story. The reasons for this are twofold. One reason is that the reader does not know of the Jews' shocking agreement that is about to be exposed. The other reason is that the reader does not really know what kind of parents they were. The reader cannot, therefore, predict their (re-)actions and thoughts (for this aspect, cf. the next paragraph). In this sense, the author breathes 'fresh air' into the ongoing drama and creates more suspense. Subcola 30.4-30.6, especially subcolon 30.4, can be considered as *the highest focal point of this entire cluster D*. The parents who were being focused on on stage tried to get the interrogators to focus on their son.

Furthermore, it is more interesting, in this instance, that the parents' message betrays the reader's expectation. The parents are supposed to be protective towards their children. According to social scientific data relating to Palestinian society in New Testament times, "[c]hildren were the weakest, most vulnerable members of society. Infant mortality rates sometimes reached 30 percent. Another 30 percent of live births were dead by age six, and 60 percent were gone by age sixteen" (Malina & Rohbaugh 1992:117; Osiek & Balch 1997:67). It is amazing that a physically disabled person such as the blind man could have survived thus far in a society of this nature. Hence, the fact that the blind man was still alive may be indicative of his parents' love and protection. Yet they handed the responsibility to answer the Jews over to their own son. As pointed out earlier, they tried

to get out of the troublesome situation at his expense. This cold attitude is extremely surprising. However, the author will inform the reader of the reason for their cold attitude in the next verse. Nevertheless, the author tactically discloses the reason only after surprising the reader first.

One should note that some critics make severe comments on the parents' cold attitude in their request. Rensberger (1988:47) criticises the parents:

The terrible perfidy of this remark is perhaps the most shocking thing in the entire story. The parents have not only tried to shield themselves from scrutiny, they have deliberately turned the inquisitors' attention back upon their own son, knowing full well that he will be subject to the very sentence that they themselves are afraid to face.

Howard-Brook (1994:224) even considers their attitude a sin: "It is not just their denial of knowledge, but their passing the buck to their son that is their 'sin'". However, Hendriksen ([1954] 1973:86) offers an opposite opinion: "It is possible that the intimate knowledge which these parents had with respect to the talents and character of their son – his ability to defend himself, ready wit, and courage – had something to do with their desire *to let him speak for himself*." In my opinion, this may be possible, but unlikely, because, if this were the case, the parents could have provided their own answers to the interrogators' questions. In this case, the parents' feelings of fear would have nothing more to do with their reply, for the basis of Hendriksen's opinion lies not in the parents' situation, but in their son's potential capacity. The narrator's explanation in the next verse will not make a great deal of sense. Therefore, it is more likely that the parents' request manifests their cold attitude, as analysed thus far. To this, Morris (1971:487) adds: "Their reply is characterized by timidity and a complete readiness to submit to the authority of their questioners." Rhetorically, the parents "serve as a foil for their son in the following scene, who will show himself to be of sterner stuff" (Holleran 1993b:371).

8. In relation to the above observation concerning the *Interest Principle*, we should pay attention to an important communicative strategy of the author. The starting point of this strategy is the fact that the parents, by uttering their request, attempted to disengage themselves from the dialogue with the Jews. They were unwilling to cooperate, as is required by the *Cooperative Principle*. Of course, this jeopardises the *Cooperative Principle*. However, the reader's position at this point, brought about by the parents' (sudden and unusual) request, is of more significance. Since the beginning of this Chapter, the reader has shared privileged information with the author which the characters in the story often did not have. However, for the first time in this narrative, the author entraps the

reader or manipulates him by not providing information about the reason for the parents' petition. Both the author and the parents (and, of course, the Jews) know of the astonishing agreement by the Jewish authorities mentioned in verse 22. Only the reader does not know this (*dramatic irony*). The profound effect is that the parents' request surprises the reader. The intended perlocution of this reader '*victimization*', to use Staley's (1988:95) term, is to make the reader re-examine the way in which he should read the story; force him to explore any possibilities of deeper meaning in the text; make him understand how severely the Jewish opposition against Christ affects ordinary people such as the parents; make him grasp how difficult it is to obey God rather than to obey (authoritative) men, and, most of all, make him realise how significant this fourth scene is in the entire narrative of Chapter 9, as this special technique of reader victimisation is used only in this fourth scene. The author thus designs the whole structure of his narrative in order to have the maximum rhetorical impact on the reader. On account of this, it is worth noting that my speech act analysis also supports the view that *this fourth scene is central in the structure of Chapter 9*.¹¹⁰

e) Summary

The theory of speech acts successfully determines and describes the parents' utterances in John 9:21cd as a requestive global speech act: petition. The parents wanted to escape from the burdensome situation by begging the Jews to interrogate their son and not them. In their utterances, while the *Politeness Principle* plays a significant role in the characters' organisation of their speech act, the important factor that enhances the communication between the author and the reader is not irony, but the observation of the *Interest Principle* and the technique of reader victimisation. The author thus effectively increases the reader's interest in the story.

Because colon 30 constitutes an independent colon, a global speech act should be determined for verses 20-21. From the above analysis, their utterances in verses 20 and 21ab can be considered responsive speech acts. Their utterances in verse 21cd are a requestive global speech act. In this sense, it is difficult to find a global speech act that embraces these two speech acts, for the reply and the petition are two different acts. However, considering that their petition was articulated in the process of replying to the Jews, the sequence of these different speech acts can be mapped into

110 For more discussion on the centrality of this fourth scene, cf. section 10.1; MacRae 1978:126; Duke 1982:186; Stibbe 1993:105-106.

a *responsive global speech act* by the *Construction Rule*. This means that the parents replied to the Jews with direct answers as well as their petition.

After hearing their request in the dialogue, it may be natural for the reader to have a negative or awkward impression of the parents. Some questions would arise in his mind. How could the parents react like that? They should have taken action in order to protect their own son. Instead, they seemed to abandon their responsibility as parents. What kind of parents were they? The narrator will answer these questions in the next subcluster.

6.3.3 The third subcluster (9:22-23)

The power of the omniscient narrator is demonstrated throughout this third subcluster, in which he explains the reason behind the parents' strange behaviour. In his explanation, this subcluster can be divided into two units. The first unit is cola 31-32 and exposes the shocking information shared among the characters. The second unit is colon 33, which can be regarded as an appendix. However, this colon is structurally important for two reasons: it functions as the closure of this cluster and it forms an *inclusio* in this cluster with colon 28. The contacting points (or parallels) between cola 28 and 33 in this *inclusio* can be the words *his parents* and *him* who is identified as the blind man. The *inclusio* increases cohesion within a given unit.

9:22 ταῦτα εἶπαν οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ ὅτι ἐφοβοῦντο τοὺς Ἰουδαίους·
ἤδη γὰρ συνετέθειντο οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ἵνα ἐάν τις αὐτὸν
ὁμολογήσῃ Χριστόν, ἀποσυνάγωγος γένηται.

a) General analysis

Although each colon of the first unit, namely colon 31 and 32, is an independent colon, these cola are so closely connected that they will be treated as a unit of analysis.¹¹¹ Colon 31 mention the direct reason for the parents' strange response: *they were afraid of the Jews*. The object of the main verb εἶπαν is the accusative plural pronoun ταῦτα, and it may be conventionally translated as *this*, despite the plural form. This pronoun may summarise what precedes in subcola 30.4-30.6; thus colon 31 is linked to them by means of a logical-reason-result relationship. The conjunction ὅτι in 31.1 introduces the parents' reason, denoting *because*. The key word is the

¹¹¹ In fact, the majority of English Bibles link these sentences by either 'colon' or 'semicolon'.

imperfect verb ἐφοβοῦντο which demonstrates a continuous action of fearing (Fowler *et al.* 1985:288-289).

The above reason certainly does not provide an adequate explanation, because the riddle of why they feared should also be solved. The conjunction γάρ, in colon 32, indicates a logical-reason-result relationship between colon 32 and colon 31, introducing an explanation sentence. The pluperfect middle indicative verb συνετέθειντο suggests that the action of the verb is already completed with certainty, emphasising the subject of the action. This verb is again one of Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices. The subject οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι and the verb with the adverb ἤδη add considerable significance to the Jews' decision (cf. 'The Jewish expulsion' in section 6.1.2).

The embedded clause, 32.1, basically mentions the content of their agreement. One should note that the ἐάν clause in 32.1.1 is the subordinate clause of the ἵνα clause in 32.1 and is placed in the middle of the same clause in the Greek text. The structural analysis chart of colon 32 displays this syntactic relationship. Regarding the nature of the subclause in 32.1, the majority of English translations of this clause do not hint at a purpose force and simply translate it only as the object of the main verb συνετέθειντο (e.g., KJV; NASB; RSV). However, the subordinate conjunction ἵνα plus the subjunctive mood verb γένηται should form a purpose clause, in this instance (Fowler *et al.* 1985:285). Consequently, this clause may indicate not only the content, but also the purpose, and should be rendered as such. The co-text is also inclined favourably to this view. This purpose clause is also indicative of the illocutionary force of this utterance. The use of the word ἀποσυνάγωγος which occurs only in this Gospel in the entire New Testament, is salient (Bernard 1928:334; Nicol 1972:144; Lindars [1981] 1992:132). In this Gospel, it is used only three times (12:42; 16:2). Does the author's choice of this word reflect any particular (historical) situation at the time of his composition of this Gospel? As this historical question is a fundamental issue in understanding John's Gospel, it was already discussed in the section on 'The Jewish expulsion' (section 6.1.2). In addition, since a speech act approach will also address this, I wish to discuss it in more detail in the section on 'Communicative strategy' below. In 32.1.1, the conditional conjunction ἐάν plus the aorist subjunctive verb ὁμολογήσῃ, forms a conditional clause.¹¹²

Hence, colon 32 reveals the shocking information against those who tried to publicly confess Jesus as the Messiah. In this sense, this colon should be regarded as a *pivotal point in the cluster*, because it is assumed that this information had a tremendous influence on the characters.

112 Although the subject of 32.1 is not explicitly mentioned, it refers to the subject of 32.1.1, which is anyone (who would publicly confess Jesus to be Christ).

For those who opposed Jesus, it was a pleasant and assuring decision that should have been explained to the people of Israel. For the blind man's parents, it was a real and present threat that might endanger their existence, because it was common knowledge that anyone, who would be expelled from the synagogue, would also be excluded from society. He was not allowed to have any social or family life. He would be socially dead. This adequately explains the parents' strange response.

From these observations, this verse is rendered as follows: *His parents said this, because they were afraid of the Jews; for the Jews had already agreed so that, if anyone would confess him to be Christ, he might be put out of the synagogue.*

b) Illocutionary act

The narrator intends to reveal to the reader important information that makes sense of the parents' abrupt petition in the last utterances. However, this information was kept secret up to this point in order to have a strong effect on the reader. This information is given in such a way that the subsequent speech act (the second utterance) explains the former speech act (the first utterance). Although the second utterance is also an indispensable piece of information for the story, it may be deleted by the *Deletion macrorule* to assign one global speech act to this sequence of speech acts in this instance. Or, as each of the utterances is an informative speech act, the sequence of these speech acts can form a new informative speech act by virtue of the *Construction macrorule* (e.g., the parents stated this, because they were afraid of the Jews' agreement). In my opinion, this second approach is more acceptable, and the important proposition of the second utterance need not be deleted. However, be that as it may, the narrator's utterances in this verse can be considered a speech act of *informative*; it correctly follows the schema of informatives and is thus successful (cf. this schema in the section on 'IA' in 9:1).

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should be surprised and enlightened by the narrator's information about the Jews' threatening situation which Jesus' followers were facing. In other words, the reader should understand the reason for the parents' strange response and sympathise with them in their efforts to escape from this difficult position by begging the Jews to interrogate their own son.

d) Communicative strategy

1. The narrator's comment, in this instance, is "a most interesting commentary" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:248), and is aimed at making the reader understand the story. The author's communicative strategy will be discussed mainly *on the text level*. In the field of Textual Rhetoric, the utterances uplift the *End-Focus Maxim* and *End-Weight Maxim*, because the new information is placed towards the end of the text. The Greek clause ἄποσυνάγωγος γένηται is, in fact, has a strong meaning. Moreover, these utterances adhere to the *Reduction Maxim* by virtue of pronominalisation.

2. In the field of Interpersonal Rhetoric, the informative global speech act of the narrator is a successful example of how the *Relation Maxim* enhances the communicative goal of the speaker. By the unexpected response of the parents in the last utterances, the reader is completely lost in the narrative, wondering what is happening in the story. This betrays the reader's expectation that the parents should protect their child from any trouble. He has no clue as to where the story is heading. To him, the story now becomes unpredictable. He is no longer walking with the author. Reader 'victimization' degrades him to a lower level. However, the author prepares to do something about the gap between himself and the reader. The author allows the narrator to fill the gap with his narration (cf. Holleran 1993b:370). The *Relation Maxim* rigidly operates in this narration. The narrator explains the exact reason for the parents' unusual request. When the reason is unfolded to the reader, he should be simultaneously astonished and relieved by the information supplied. He can now grasp the situation. His uneasiness regarding his position in the communication process with the author will fade away. The author once again lifts the reader to his former position in terms of knowledge about the story. Thus, the author excites the reader's emotions, and deepens his interest in the present story. This is much more effective in the communication process than to merely disclose the important information plainly. In this particular way, the author observes the *Relation Maxim* (be relevant): "Make your conversational contribution one that will advance the goals either of yourself or of your addressee" (Leech 1983:42).

3. As briefly explained earlier in the section on 'Pratt's display text' (section 1.4 in Chapter 2), Pratt (1977:132-151) strongly argues for the notion of *display texts* to describe the characteristics of literary works. Pratt (1977:140) states that we "expect narrative literary works to deal with people in situations of unusual conflict and stress, unusual for the characters if not for us". *It is one of my contentions* that this seems to be exactly what is happening in the story of John 9, in general, and in this verse, in particular, and that this narrative can thus be classified as display texts. In order to substantiate this assumption, I shall examine

the narrator's utterances in this verse according to the following two characteristics of display texts: *assertibility* and *tellability*. Generally speaking, Pratt (1977:138) mentions that assertibility and tellability mean that information contained in an utterance is new and interesting. In this sense, these characteristics are in accordance with the *Interest Principle*.

As for assertibility, Pratt (1977:134) further clarifies it, saying that "for an assertion to be appropriate, it must not be obvious to both speaker and hearer that what is being asserted is true. Or, put another way, an assertion will be inappropriate unless there is a real or supposed chance of its being false". As far as tellability is concerned, "information does not have to be new to be tellable; it only has to be unusual or problematic: (Pratt 1977:137).¹¹³ If it is unusual or problematic, it has news value. Therefore, it can be displayed. In my opinion, this trait is also manifested in our text.

In verse 22, the narrator interrupts the progress of the story with the statement concerning the Jews' shocking decision, which displays the characteristics of both assertibility and tellability. In the mind of the reader who has been encouraged by the author thus far to have strong faith in Jesus, what the author is saying, in this instance, via the narrator is not likely to be true. It should be false. If it is true, it discourages the reader. In other words, such an agreement may not have taken place, and it is more likely that there would not have been any problems. However, the narrator, who has been reliable and trustworthy, claims that there was. Thus, the information is assertible and tellable. This information vividly portrays the characters' difficult and problematic situation. With this tellability, the author is exactly aiming at, what Pratt (1977:136) describes as, the goal of the speaker (cited here again for the sake of clarity):

In making an assertion whose relevance is tellability, a speaker is not only reporting, but also verbally *displaying* a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating, evaluating, and responding to it. His point is to produce in his hearers not only belief, but also an imaginative and affective involvement in the state of affairs he is representing. He intends them to share his wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration of the event.

113 For instance, one should consider the plain remark, "Mr. X went to the hospital yesterday". Under normal circumstances, it is natural for a sick person to go to see a doctor. This remark is not assertible nor tellable. However, if Mr X has been known for years as the person who hates to go to hospital and does not, in fact, irrespective of how ill he is, then the information that he went to the hospital becomes not only assertible but also tellable. In other words, it is possible that he would not have gone to hospital, and it is extremely likely that he would not have and problematic that he did.

It is , from the beginning of Chapter 1 up to this point, that any action against the belief in Christ is not the behaviour that the author expects. This is one of the essential viewpoints of the author. In our text, the author, by displaying the astonishing state of affairs, intends the reader to adopt the same viewpoint. He is trying to share his wonder and terror about the decision with the reader, and invites the reader to contemplate, evaluate, and respond to it positively. Although the recommended behaviour for the reader is not verbally expressed yet (this will be revealed later in the sixth scene), the author probably wants the reader to stay calm and be faithful to his faith in Christ, even if there is severe persecution. By using the display text in this manner, the author communicates more than what the narrator says.

With regard to the earlier discussion of the display text, the text suggests that the *motif of suffering* is attached to the Jews' decision. For Jesus' followers, this was considered a severe persecution against them. According to Boice's (1977:23-26) three purposes of suffering (cf. section 6 in Chapter 3), their suffering, in this instance, is constructive in that they were encouraged to attain a more adequate faith. In addition, the Jews' decision indicates that they were also suffering, because they found it necessary to make such an agreement against their once fellow synagogue members. For the Jews, if Jesus did not lead their people astray (John 7:47; 11:47-48), the Jews would not have had to impose such a decision on their own people. From the Gospel's perspective, the Jews' suffering is corrective in that they might come back to 'correct faith' in the God of Israel.

4. As far as the *Manner Maxim* is concerned, the narrator's utterances have two aspects. The utterances flout it, due to the usage of the term *Jews*, for all the characters in this story were Jewish people. Yet the narrator uses this collective word, thus confusing the reader. However, as analysed earlier (the section on 'CS' in 9:18), this term points to the Jewish authorities (the same term in v. 18 signifies a more specific group within the Jewish authorities). Lee (1994:175) comments on these authorities: "The parents' fear and the threat of expulsion in 9:22 form the negative characterisation of the Jews." On the other hand, the same utterances keep this Maxim intact in a different aspect, as the message expressed is very explicit. No one could miss it. Similarly, the *Clarity Principle* in the field of Textual Rhetoric also operates in the storyteller's utterances.

5. In connection with the *Quantity Maxim*, the author's strategy of *secrecy and information control* is highly effective in his communication with the reader. The author controls the information in the narrative in order to surprise the reader, to fill the gap in the reader's knowledge, to leave a

clue to the reader's understanding of the story, to provide an ideological perspective from which the reader can interpret the story correctly, and so on. To maximise the impact on the reader, the author chooses the time, the place, and the amount of information given according to his plan and organisation. The reader has already been exposed to this kind of information control in verses 1 (a man blind from birth), 3-5 (Jesus' statements), 8 (a beggar), 14 (Sabbath), 16 (schism), 17 (prophet) and 22 (the Jews' decision) thus far (cf. 9:29, 31-33, 35-37, 39, 41). It is striking that John's Gospel is fully organised with a high level of secrecy and information control (cf. Neyrey 1998:87-105). When the author and the reader share the controlled information, the reader becomes an insider with the author. However, when the information is tightly controlled and is not revealed to the reader, the reader becomes an outsider, except in the case of reader entrapment (cf. Neyrey 1998:92). Undoubtedly, one of the author's most controlled pieces of information in this Gospel is the Jews' decision described in this verse.

6. Johannine scholars have used the present text extensively in order to examine and understand the background of the composition of the Gospel and the formation of the community for which the Gospel was written (cf. 'The Jewish expulsion' in section 6.1.2). It is my contention that any scholarly work that studies John 9, particularly 9:22, will be inadequate unless it deals with this issue regardless of what kind of method is used. However, this has been the area in which historical approaches play the dominant and significant role, because this issue is fundamentally a historical question. Literary approaches simply do not have an adequate tool to address such an issue. More precisely, literary approaches are designed to explore the text's aesthetic aspects and meaning "which lies on this side of it, between mirror and observer, text and reader" (Culpepper 1983:4). Thus, literary critics are not concerned with historical issues. As noted in Resseguie's (1982:299) comment on John 9:22, "the narrative intrusion serves to identify the *Sitz-im-Leben* of the Fourth Evangelist, but it does not fit into the present narrative. However, if the intrusion is seen as a rhetorical device on the part of the narrator, it does fit smoothly into its context. The parents are a foil for the action of the healed man in the subsequent scene."

It is very useful to examine a text from literary approaches that identify and describe how a story is told, for this aspect has been neglected by historical criticism (cf. Stibbe 1992:5). The object of literary critics' endeavour is biblical narrative which, as Stibbe (1992:12-13) points out, is "a report in story-form of past history". In my opinion, it will be incomplete if a critic completely disregards the historical issues in biblical narratives, especially regarding a text such as John 9:22, 12:42 and 16:2; yet if he deals with it

only from a literary perspective and without discussing historical issues, which the text seems to raise, it makes one wonder whether that does justice to such texts.

It is one of my theses that a speech act approach has something to offer to this problematic situation. Since speech act analysis emphasises the importance of context, it inevitably has to deal with historical context in order to better understand such a biblical text. This is obviously an advantage (cf. section 3.1 in Chapter 2), and differs from previous literary approaches that do not have an inherent relevant tool to address the problem. At least a speech act approach does not need to restrict itself to historical issues as other text-immanent approaches do on account of “an art-for-art’s-sake mentality” (Stibbe 1992:12). This speech act approach may shed new light on the issue in this present text, by either confirming or calling into question previously held views (cf. Culpepper 1983:11).

Nevertheless, my analysis has to follow the methods that are permitted within this speech act approach, and cannot freely investigate historical issues as historical approaches do. Therefore, in my speech act analysis, the historical issue in this present text can be reformulated into the following question: Do the narrator’s utterances, in this instance, observe the *Quality Maxim* (be sincere)? That is, does the narrator say what he believes to be true? In order to scrutinise this question, the rhetorical level of *the real author-reader* needs to be analysed, as the context, especially the historical context, plays a crucial role in determining this specific question concerning verse 22. However, one should remember that this is the only exceptional case in taking this level into consideration in my speech act analysis of John 9. I wish to provide some notes to control our discussion.¹¹⁴

As is obvious from the definition, a text-immanent approach does not engage in the so-called historical issues. As mentioned earlier, one of the advantages of speech act analysis is that, while being a text-immanent method, it can utilise social and even historical context for a better understanding of the text because of the importance of felicity conditions in the speech event. In other words, it can employ historical and social data as aids to interpretation here (Culpepper 1983:11).

114 One needs to be cautious when dealing with ancient documents such as our present text; one’s knowledge of the context is rather insufficient. One can try to reconstruct a context, through historical investigation, which may point to the actual context, but one can never claim that it is ‘the true context’. As a rule, one can only suggest a possibility.

The above question relating to the *Quality Maxim* has two rhetorical levels to consider. One is the author-reader level, and the other is the real author-reader level. So far, when the terms *author* and *reader* are mentioned, they have simply meant the author and the reader. In this particular analysis of this verse, for the sake of clarity, I shall not abbreviate these terms.

I shall address the issue in the following order: i) Discuss the issue from the author's perspective; ii) Discuss the issue from the real (historical) author's perspective by utilising the insights (historical reconstruction) gained from the historical investigation, and iii) Compare the results and arrive at some conclusion.

Firstly, the issue is discussed from the author's perspective. Since the narrator is the voice of the author (cf. section 2.2 in Chapter 2), the narrator observes the *Quality Maxim* if the author keeps it intact. Thus, the issue can be examined and discussed from the author's perspective.

The author constantly depicted the conflict between Jesus, including his followers, and the Jewish authorities in the story until now, especially from Chapter 5. The author will continue to do so in the coming chapters. The author even uses the same Greek word ἀποσυνάγωγος which is employed in 12:42 as well as in 16:2. These two texts also describe the opposition to those who believed in Jesus. Therefore, the conflict between Jesus (and Christians) and the Jews is one of the author's important themes in this Gospel. Moreover, all the co-texts of three instances of this Greek word give no clue as that the author is not telling what he believes to be true. Therefore, the author is observing the *Quality Maxim* in the narrator's utterances.

Secondly, the issue is discussed from the perspective of the real author, who is thought to be the flesh-and-blood author responsible for writing this particular narrative account. As discussed earlier in the section on 'The Jewish expulsion' (section 6.1.2), our main attention, in this instance, will be paid to the dominant view among the Johannine scholars, despite the current consensus that rejects the Jamnia hypothesis. Martyn ([1968] 1979)¹¹⁵ remains the prominent advocate for this view. According to him, the Jews' agreement of expulsion from the synagogue refers to the conflict between the Johannine community and the Jewish synagogue at the time when the Gospel was written. This historical view provides a definite basis to deal with the issue in question. In light of this, the real author blatantly fails to fulfill the *Quality Maxim* in the narrator's utterances (which tell of the Jews' decision), because the real author makes the author tell something

115 Cf. also the third edition of this book, published in 2003.

that did not, in fact, happen in the story time. The question arises: What is the reason for this serious rule-breaking on the part of the real author? Speech act theory believes that this rule-breaking communicates more than simply what is mentioned in the utterances.

In this instance, the flouting of the *Quality Maxim* indicates that the real author had something to say to the real reader, particularly as he was considered to be the original-historical reader for whom the real author wrote the Gospel. A few points can be suggested for this 'something'. The real author may intend:

- to tell his understanding of the seriousness of the *Sitz im Leben* in which the real reader was placed.
- to show his sympathy with the real reader in the conflict.
- to give encouragement by telling that such a life situation was peculiar not only to the real reader, but also to anyone who would wish to truly believe in Jesus, as indicated in the story.
- to give assurance that such a life situation could strengthen the real reader and lead him to a more adequate faith.
- to exhort one to confess one's faith openly despite persecution or difficulties.

All of these points indicate that the real author wished to relate strongly to the real reader. The last three points, in particular, may express the real author's *perlocution* in the narrator's utterances. With this real author's strong wish, the story strikes the heart of the real reader, and becomes relevant, to the greatest extent, to the real reader. Accordingly, the narrator's utterances uphold the *Relation Maxim*. In addition, the real author would observe the *Sympathy Maxim* (maximise sympathy between them) of the *Politeness Principle*. The real author was very sensitive to the needs of the real reader, and knew how to secure and enhance the real reader's active participation in the story. For this reason, the real author dared to flout the *Quality Maxim*.

Thirdly, our task is to evaluate the above two observations concerning the perspectives of the and real authors. The vast majority of scholars consider that this text reflects the time when the Johannine community had finally separated from the synagogue (cf. Bauckham 1998). Even if one accepts the different view, which coincides with my view, that the text aims to describe not only the life-situation of the Johannine community, but also that of Jesus, including his immediate followers. Concurrently, the narrator's utterances analysed from both the real and the author's perspectives can yield the same result, namely that the authors intend to acknowledge the difficult life situation of the readers and to encourage

them to endure the affliction. Whether the real author flouts the Quality Maxim or the author observes the same Maxim, does not change this result. Either way, the narrator's utterances make the meaning of the text plausible and deeper.

Incidentally, to discuss this issue with reference to my earlier view, the real author seems more concerned with the application that could be derived from history's implication (or with the relevance of Jesus' historical ministry) to the reader's life situation than with the history itself. Like modern preachers who often make a relevant application (and meaning) for their congregations from the elucidation of biblical texts, it is highly probable that the real author would have had the same purpose for his own community. These community members, who are considered a constituent part of the group of the real reader (for this aspect, cf. section 2 in Chapter 5), did not appear to know the Jews' decision imposed in Jesus' time, if the knowledge of the reader is taken as an index to that of the real reader. In light of this, the real author encourages the real reader by informing the difficult life situation in Jesus' time. The problem experienced by the real reader is not new, but something that Christians in the first generation also endured. Thus, the real reader should also be courageous and persistent. Even if the real author uses some anachronistic expressions in the process of giving a message to the real reader, this does not necessarily indicate that the real author would distort the 'history'. He may have had a different level of understanding of history in that he does not write every detail of the event faithfully, but only the core or essence of that particular event boldly (cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:250).¹¹⁶ For instance, Nicol (1972:145) suggests that, in John's theology, "the historical Jesus and the exalted Christ living in the Church are identical, and therefore, he is concerned about the essential unity of the persecution of Jesus and of the Church. He writes history as a two-level drama, at the same time alluding to the present" (cf. Martyn [1968] 1979:30, 150-151; Hagerland 2003).

Although there is general consensus as to the relationship between the *Sitz im Leben* of the Johannine community and the composition of the Gospel, historical investigation seems to reach a dead end in identifying the exact historical event described in this verse (cf. Reinhartz 2008:76). This is indicated by the diverse interpretations proposed by various scholars thus far. Unless new evidence is produced, any attempt to reconstruct and interpret it historically does not go beyond the speculation. Thus, the

116 As an example, one could report to a church minister, who happened to be absent in a particular worship service, that there were 800 people present in the service, even though there were only 796. In this description, the reporter is not distorting history, but telling the core of the event.

historical issue around this verse will remain unsettled at least for now.¹¹⁷ However, literary appreciation combined with the historical issue in this verse does not seem to be exhausted yet, as my analysis shows. In this instance, I wish to state that *a speech act approach still has something to offer, something that is a different and fresh appreciation of the text.*

e) Summary

The narrator intends to provide the reader with the important information about the reason why the parents spoke their previous utterances. The author may attempt to induce the reader's sympathy towards the parents, but may not necessarily attempt to justify their behaviour. Rather, the author wants to tell his understanding about the difficulty dealing with the serious opposition, and may intend to identify himself with any reader who is experiencing a similar kind of difficult situation. The reader should realise that any open commitment to Jesus will result in this state of affairs. The author employs various conversational Principles and Maxims, the notion of display text and the motif of suffering in order to communicate effectively with the reader. In addition, through the argument by the *Quality Maxim*, speech act analysis proves its usefulness even in the interpretation of the text that necessitates consideration from the historical context. The real author intends to acknowledge the difficult life situation of the real reader and encourages him to endure the affliction by flouting the Quality Maxim.

9:23 διὰ τοῦτο οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ εἶπαν ὅτι Ἠλικίαν ἔχει, αὐτὸν ἐπερωτήσατε.

a) General analysis

In Colon 33, the narrator gives another explanation concerning the parents' strange answers. The prepositional phrase διὰ τοῦτο in the main clause, is a type of idiom, like an inferential conjunction, that denotes *for this reason*. *This reason* refers to cola 31-32 (cf. Bernard 1928:334). The recitative subordinate conjunction ὅτι in 33.1, introduces a direct quotation of the parents' words. In 33.2, this conjunction may be omitted as an ellipsis. The content of the quotation is similar to that in subcola 30.4-30.5. In fact, subcola 33.1-33.2 are a reminder or appendix for the reader;¹¹⁸ without this

117 For a relatively new view that "reads John 9 as a self-understanding of the Johannine Christians rather than as a direct history of the community", cf. Hakola (2005:21-22) who advocates this view with Reinhartz 1998a.

118 From this point on, again the author and the reader mean the author and the reader, respectively.

colon, the reader can still understand the content of the story. Therefore, this verse reads: *For this reason his parents said, "He is of age; ask him."*

b) Illocutionary act

The narrator's introduction regarding the parents' words differs, in this instance, from an introduction described in my analysis of verse 2. The aim of this introduction is more than simply to introduce the speaker, for the prepositional phrase *διὰ τοῦτο* has a distinctive role in expressing a reason-result relationship between verses 22 and 23, as analysed earlier. In this utterance, the narrator confirms the reason for the parents' seemingly strange response in verse 21. Therefore, the speech act of the narrator's utterance would be *confirmative*. The application of Bach and Harnish's (1979:42-43) schema of confirmatives to this is as follows:

In uttering "For this reason his parents said, 'He is of age; ask him'", the narrator confirms (the claim) that, for this reason, the parents said so if the narrator expresses:

- i. the belief that, for this reason, the parents said so, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that the reader believes that, for this reason, the parents said so because the narrator has support for (the claim) that, for this reason, the parents said so.

As truth-seeking procedure, in this instance, refers to the Jews' agreement in the last verse, this utterance is a successful speech act of confirmative.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should appreciate that the narrator confirms the reason for the parents' answer in verse 21. Due to the repetition of their answer, the reader should perceive the importance of the information about the Jews' decision in the plot of the story and should recognise the closure of the dialogue between the parents and the Jews.

d) Communicative strategy

As the narrator's comment, in this instance, aims to help the reader understand the story, I shall mainly discuss *the communication on the text level*.

1. *Firstly*, the most notable communicative strategy employed in this utterance is the repetition of the parents' utterances in verse 21: "Ask him; he is of age." The reproduction of the same information jeopardises both the *Quantity Maxim* in the domain of Interpersonal Rhetoric and the *Economy Principle* in the domain of Textual Rhetoric. This is a very serious

offence if the beginning of the narrator's utterance in verse 22 is also taken into consideration: "His parents said this because ..." Accordingly, the utterance in verse 23 is nearly entirely made up of the vocabulary used in the previous utterances. In the surface structure, it appears that the narrator merely reverses the order of the phrases to make this utterance. At first glance, the reader may be disappointed by this replication. The reader may even find it unnecessary, because he can still understand the story without this utterance. In this sense, the *Interest Principle* is also flouted, for the repeated information has no news value.

Why does the narrator make such a repetition? The reason may be that he has a higher motive for this. At the expense of the *Quantity Maxim*, the *Economy Principle* and the *Interest Principle*, the narrator highlights the *Expressivity Principle*. This means that the narrator is more concerned with effectiveness in terms of the expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication. By means of this duplication, the narrator may attempt to leave a great impression on the reader that the Jews' agreement was so important in the plot of the story. This point can be strengthened by the structural repetition found between colon 33 and colon 30, in particular subcola 30.4-30.5 in the second subcluster. This repetition is a synonymous parallelism. As far as subcola 33.1-33.2 are concerned, Plummer ([1882] 1981:209) suggests that "[t]his is the right order here". Bernard (1928:334) comments: "Note that the order of the words has been changed Jn. is not punctilious in his narrative about reproducing the exact words or the order of words." More precisely, however, this change in word order is due to another rhetorical feature, *chiasm*, which is also involved in this repetition.

John 9:21	30.4	αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσατε,	: a
	30.5	ἡλικίαν ἔχει,	: b
John 9:22	31	ταῦτα εἶπαν οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ	: c
John 9:23	33	διὰ τοῦτο οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ εἶπαν	: c
	33.1	ὅτι Ἡλικίαν ἔχει,	: b'
	33.2	αὐτὸν ἐπερωτήσατε.	: a'

These features not only contribute to the cohesion in this cluster, but also impress the message that the author wants to convey to the reader. Hence, the author does not merely organise the utterance without thinking. Rather, he consciously and carefully places these words on the narrator's lips for the aesthetic achievement. Of course, the repeated message remains clearer and stronger in the reader's mind. Furthermore, in this repetition,

the author wants to find the end for the present forensic dialogue between the parents and the Jews.

2. *Secondly*, this utterance observes the *Manner Maxim*, as the message expressed is very perspicuous. Thus, the *Ambiguity Maxim* (avoid ambiguity) of the *Clarity Principle* in the field of Textual Rhetoric is also adhered to. The perfect fulfillment of these Maxims is secured by the narrator's omniscient knowledge of the parents' inside information. Otherwise, the narrator must add an obscure expression such as *perhaps* or *probably* to the utterance. The fact that the narrator is confident in unfolding this information teaches the reader how to evaluate the Jews' agreement in relation to the parents. The author uses this engaging communicative strategy for the reader.

3. *Thirdly*, due to the reason-result relationship between verse 22 and this verse, the *Relation Maxim* also operates in this utterance. However, if the utterances in verses 21 to 23 are examined together, they reveal that this *Relation Maxim* is kept not only between verses 22 and 23, but also between verses 21 and 23. This observation gives rise to an interesting question. Why did the parents themselves not reveal the reason for their request: ask their son? In other words, why does the author use the narrator instead of the parents to reveal this important information of the Jews' decision? Inferred from the parents' difficult position, a likely explanation would be that they themselves could not tell the Jews their reason. Stambaugh and Balch (1986:49-50) point out: "In several ways ... the synagogue strengthened the Jews' sense of themselves as special and separate. The community offered a place where the rules of the Torah – circumcision, the Sabbath, the festivals, the dietary laws – were respected and enforced. The commitment of the individual to the group was strengthened by the sense of special separateness in a place that was cut off from the world outside but was open to its influence."

The parents' life was deeply rooted in the Jewish way of living. It is conceivable that they found it difficult to deny their own identity and heritage. For practical reasons, they were unwilling to be separated from the synagogue (cf. the topic on synagogue in section 6.1.1). They could not even imply this situation to the Jewish authorities because, if they did so, the Jews might have given them more trouble. In other words, the weakness, limitation and selfishness of the parents as human beings made them react in the the way described in the text. They gave their best answer. This is the reason why the author must place that particular reason on the narrator's lips.

4. The above observation regarding the parents' weakness leads to another significant point. A Japanese proverb, originating in an ancient Chinese story, "Ningen banji Saiou ga uma" means that whatever happens

to a person resembles the experience of the horse of Saiou (the name of a character in the story). The proverb means that no one knows what happens to a person next. A bad event or matter sometimes turns out to be good, and vice versa.¹¹⁹ What is described in this proverb did, in fact, happen to the blind man. His parents' answer, caused by their weakness, was bad news for the blind man. In fact, he was abandoned by his own parents (Stibbe 1993:112). However, the parents' weakness ultimately revealed a way for their son to establish his own self-identity and self-confidence (Matsumoto 1997). The reader will notice his change in the next dialogue scene between the blind man and the Jews. Yet the reader will know the ultimate outcome in the sixth scene. After the Jews' interrogation of the blind man, he would be expelled from both the community and his parents' home. This sad event would lead to his personal and real encounter with Jesus. The blind man would finally find real peace in his heart when he meets Jesus. The worst tragedy turned out to be the best encounter in his life.

5. *Lastly*, despite the flouting of the *Economy Principle* in this utterance, the *Reduction Maxim* is still observed by virtue of pronominalisation.

e) Summary

With this utterance, the omniscient narrator intends to confirm the reason for the parents' unexpected attitude in verse 21. Since the utterance of this storyteller appears to be simply a replication of the previous utterances, it gives an initial impression that the utterance is not important. However, the message contained in this utterance remains firmly in the reader's mind due to its repetition. The *Expressivity Principle*, the *Manner* and *Relation Maxims* are used for this purpose. As a result, the reader's mind is thus prepared for the next intriguing dialogue between the Jews and the blind man.

6.4 Macrospeech acts

1. *Firstly*, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the character level*. The forensic conversation between the Jews and the blind man's parents in this cluster is also a typical dialogue structure, the question-answer form. Accordingly, this fact reflects on the speech acts used for the characters in this instance. The speech act of the Jews' utterances in verse 19 is question, and that of the parents' utterances in verses 20 and 21 is basically responsive. The Jews asked the parents about the identity of the blind man, the state of his blindness at birth, and the process of his healing.

119 English equivalent proverbs may be: Inscrutable are the ways of Heaven. Or, a joyful evening follows a sorrowful morning.

Therefore, the *global topic* of this section would be the blind man who was healed by the miracle. Although they answered half of the Jews' questions, the parents refused to answer the remaining questions. The parents were unwilling to continue to talk with the Jews, because they feared them. Thus, the Jews' aim for this interrogation could not be achieved. Since the characters on the scene failed to have a meaningful conversation, it is difficult to determine a macrospeech act in this section on the character level.

However, it is important to remember that a narrative must be coherent. In other words, a story must make sense. In order to make sense of the story, the narration part often plays a significant role. This is true of this present cluster.¹²⁰ When the narrator intrudes and explains a certain speech situation for the character's utterance, the reader understands the story and finds coherence in it. This further indicates that sometimes no macroproposition nor macrospeech act can be found on the story level.

2. *Secondly*, I wish to discuss a *macrospeech act on the text level*. The narrator's utterance should also be considered. The *Construction Rule* constructs a new proposition from the utterances in verses 18 and 19 that the Jews wanted to ask the parents about the reality of the miracle. In addition, the *Construction Rule* creates another new proposition from the parents' utterances in verses 20 and 21 that the parents partially answered the Jews' questions. The *Construction Rule* makes a new proposition from the narrator's utterances in verses 22 and 23 that the Jews' shocking decision was the reason for the parents' inadequate answer. One should note that this narration is very important in building up coherence in this section. These three propositions are located at a higher level above the lowest level within the framework of macrostructures. A macroproposition needs to be constructed from these propositions at the highest level. By using the *Construction Rule*, a macroproposition could be formulated as follows: the Jews' agreement led to the parents' inadequate answer to the Jews' question about the miracle event. This defines a global topic that coherently organises this section on the text level. Consequently, a

120 The following example illustrates the point just mentioned. A husband returns home and joins his wife who is watching a TV programme. This programme is about to portray a conversation between two workers in a factory. Worker X is telling his colleague Y about how terrible their boss is. Worker Y responds to him: "Did you watch yesterday's rugby game? Springboks beat All Blacks!". At this point, worker X does not understand Y's remark at all, because Y's remark is totally irrelevant to his previous utterance. Of course, the husband does not understand it either, and finds no coherence in their dialogue. The wife then explains to her husband that their boss is standing right behind worker X. In this example, the wife's explanation is equivalent to an important narration in a story.

macrospeech act of this section would be *informative*: the author reveals the important information about the Jews' agreement to the reader and explains how this information affected the characters' behaviour (cf. 'Macrospeech acts in John 9' in section 1.3 in Chapter 5).

3. As a brief survey of communicative strategy in this cluster, the observations and violations of various conversational Principles and Maxims enhance the communication between the characters, the narrator, the author and the reader. This point is discussed with other literary techniques. In verse 18, the author allows the narrator to contribute to the aim of the utterance by both keeping and flouting various conversational rules. Among them, the *Manner Maxim*, in particular, plays a significant role in the author's change of the term *Jews*. In verse 19, the author deploys the *Relation Maxim* and the *Interest Principle* to create more interest for the story in the reader. With the parents' answer in verse 20, the fact of the miracle was fully acknowledged. Its implication leads to an instance of irony of event. In verse 21ab, the reader should notice the significance of the parents' utterances due to the observations and violations of many conversational rules. Their significance can also be perceived by the ironies and the motif of suffering. While the *Politeness Principle* plays a significant role in the characters' organisation of their speech act in verse 21cd, the important factor that enhances the communication between the author and the reader is not irony, but the observation of the *Interest Principle* and the technique of reader victimisation. In verse 22, the author again employs various conversational Principles and Maxims, the notion of display text and the motif of suffering in order to communicate effectively with the reader. Furthermore, by virtue of the *Quality Maxim*, speech act analysis proves its usefulness even in the interpretation of the text that requires one to consider the historical context. The message contained in the narrator's utterance in verse 23 remains firmly in the reader's mind by virtue of the repetition, which uses, in particular, the *Expressivity Principle*, as well as the *Manner* and *Relation Maxims* for this purpose. As such, the author effectively increases the reader's interest in the story.

4. *On the text level*, there are a few significant insights regarding this cluster as a whole. *Firstly*, how should one account for the failure of the communication between the characters on the text level? Although the Jews tried to increase their knowledge about the miracle event by interrogating the blind man's parents at the beginning of this section, they failed to achieve their goal. Their knowledge remained as it was, for the parents simply confirmed what the Jews already appeared to know. There is hardly any significant change in terms of the Jews' knowledge between the beginning and the end of the section. The question is: How does this failure enhance the communication between the author and the reader. The fact that the *Cooperative Principle*

is not adhered to on the character level does not necessarily mean that the same Principle is flouted on the text level. Rather, in literature as in this story, it is imperative to assume that the *Cooperative Principle* is, in general, always adhered to on this text level. If not, it may result in a situation where the reader quits reading and closes the book. Based on this assumption, therefore, the answer is as follows: the failed communication between the characters requires the author to provide an adequate reason for this failure. If not, the author would be accused of flouting the *Quantity Maxim*. The author in our text does not fail to provide the reason. More precisely, the author makes use of this opportunity to provide the reader with the information about the Jews' agreement, because it is the most important information in this cluster. This affects, moreover, the development of the remainder of the narrative. The author undoubtedly uses the characters' failed conversation for achieving his goal in the communication with the reader.

5. *Secondly*, in order to find more significant points, one should ask the question as to how the *Relation Maxim* functions in this instance. In other words, what is the significance of the informative macrospeech act of this cluster in relation to the other sections of the story? The observation in the last paragraph is one way to put it, for the revealed information adds more tension and thrill to the rest of this entire narrative. Another way is to view this cluster as the centerpiece of the whole narrative structure in John 9. One can argue the centrality of this section based on the observation that this section contains a significance that the parents were the most reliable source, besides their son, to testify to their son's state of affairs prior to and after the miracle. This bears considerable weight and importance in the story as proof of the success of Jesus' miracle. As mentioned earlier (in the section on 'CS' in 9:20), the reality of the miracle is fully established with the parents' testimony in this central section, even before the eyes of the Jews (cf. Duke 1982:186). Moreover, Stibbe (1993a:106) points out that this section "is the only point in the chapter where the narrator's voice becomes intrusive, where the narrative turns for a moment from 'showing' to 'telling'". Stibbe intends this to explain the centrality of this section (for further discussion, cf. section 1.1 in Chapter 5). This is a different way of describing a significance of this informative macrospeech act in this cluster.

6. *Thirdly*, the macrospeech act in this cluster enhances the communication between the author and the reader by observing the *Interest Principle*. The reader who reads this section for the first time can never anticipate the outcome in the way in which it is described in the text. No one can imagine that the Jews' questions in verse 19 become the starting point for revealing the shocking and crucial information of the Jews' decision. This is unpredictable, and hence interesting.

7. *Lastly*, the *perlocution* of this section is similar to that of verse 22. The author intends the reader to understand and sympathise with the characters in difficult times. In turn, the author intends to encourage and exhort the reader by means of the story. Since the story in this section does not develop so much on the character level, the reader is more drawn into the story in the next section, due to the preservation of this status quo. On this point, Staley (1991:67) states that “the reader must also wait in suspense before hearing the Pharisees’ reaction to the healed man’s declaration, ‘He is a prophet’”.

7. CLUSTER C’: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE JEWS AND THE BLIND MAN (9:24-34)

7.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

7.1.1 Relationships between the characters

The knowledge held for the specific conversation between the blind man and the Jews is as follows:

- In terms of social and religious status, the Jews were superior to, and more authoritative over the blind man. This was confirmed by the fact that they summoned him for interrogation.
- Both parties (the Jews and the blind man) knew that this was the second interrogation.
- Both parties knew that the man born blind gained new sight on a Sabbath.
- Both parties are assumed to have known that Jesus was the one who had brought about this change in the man.
- Both parties are assumed to have had a basic religious understanding about God, Moses, and God’s dealing with sinners and righteous men.
- Both parties are assumed to have known that nobody could have opened the eyes of a person born blind.

7.2 Overview and structural analysis chart

Among the scenes of John 9, which critics (e.g., Dodd [1953] 1985:357; Duke 1982:180; Culpepper 1983:73) praise for its skilful usage of rich irony, this forensic dialogue scene between the blind man and the Jewish authorities undoubtedly represents the best of its kind. Scholars applaud this section in terms not only of irony but also of its literary quality as a whole. For instance, Brown (1966:377) states: “The blind man’s confutation of the Pharisees in vss. 24-34 is one of the most cleverly written dialogues


in the NT.” Morris (1971:490) comments: “This is the most spirited part of the chapter.” Pancaro (1975:47) suggests: “Jn 9,14-34 presents Rabbinical reasoning in its purest form (especially vv. 24-34).” Holleran (1993b:371) draws attention to a more specific reference to a motif: “The motif of knowledge ... and ignorance ... now becomes basic to the structure of this scene. What the authorities claim to know or not know is contrasted with what the former blind man claims to know or not know” (cf. also Culpepper 1983:175; section 4.1 in Chapter 3). Under these circumstances, this scene dramatises the rising of a believer and the falling of unbelieving authorities (Duke 1982:187). The story succeeds in portraying the lively account of intense and dangerous interaction between them, and in attracting the full attention of the reader. This fierce debate scene is the heart of the ongoing trial.

More specifically speaking, in the previous dialogue scene, the Jews could not obtain any useful information concerning the healing event. This was expected to emerge from the dialogue with the blind man’s parents. However, the parents asked the Jews to question their son directly. The Jews thus decided to interrogate him for the second time. This cluster portrays such interactions between the Jews and the blind man. This longest cluster includes eleven verses. Structurally, this cluster contains three major interactions between the parties, as well as the introduction and the conclusion for this section. In accordance with this structure, three subclusters can be formed in this cluster. Some initial observations can be made for cluster C’.

1. There could be an *inclusio* in this section. Cola 34 and 42 refer to both the Jews and the blind man. In addition, when comparing the first (9:24) and the last (9:34) verses, the utterances in these verses belong to the Jews. These utterances also include the related words of sin (ἁμαρτωλός and ἁμαρτία). Moreover, the phrase καὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ appears in both verses. Based on this evidence, this *inclusio* is strong.
2. There is an antithesis between *in* and *out* in this *inclusio*. While in colon 34 the blind man was brought *in* before the Jews, in 42 he was thrown *out* of their presence.
3. The dialogue between them as a whole is not merely a juxtaposition of questions and answers. There is a sense of progression from one utterance to another in the dialogue. The author seems to control the flow of the discussion so that he may lead it towards revealing a sharp contrast between them. In fact, it becomes evident that the fundamental difference between the two parties manifested in the end.

4. The author often makes use of effective rhetorical devices such as repetition and contrast in this cluster. Although all instances of these devices may be referred to in the related cola, one weak repetition concerning the reference that someone opened the eyes of the blind person between subcola 40.1.2 and 40.3.1 should be pointed out. In terms of repetition, the Jews' claim that they had God's authority to conduct this interrogation is indicated by the reiterated *οἶδαμεν* (vv. 24, 29), stressed by the recurrent pronoun *ἡμεῖς* (vv. 24, 28, 29), and by their appealing to their ancestral teacher, Moses (vv. 28-29) (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:250).
5. The grammatical analysis indicates that all verbs used for the narration are in the aorist tense. Of course, the narrator is reporting the story in the past. On the other hand, the verbs in the dialogue appear in different tenses such as present, imperfect, aorist and perfect. This means that the contents of the dialogue became increasingly complex as the story developed. This fact also provides fascination and adds to the dramatic impression.
6. The remarks up to the fourth point mentioned in cluster D (in section 6.2) can also be applied to this cluster. These four points pertain to the frequent usage of both the coordinate conjunctions and the pronouns; the dialogue formed by the question-answer form; the reference to the miracle, and Jesus' identity as the central issue.
7. Significant structural markers include: to say, to know, to answer, to do or make, to open, to hear, we, you, he, they, therefore, and, Moses, God, Jesus' origin (where he is from), man, this or that fellow, disciples, sinner, eyes, blind and sin.

These all contribute to the strong cohesion of the cluster.



7.3 Microspeech acts

7.3.1 The first subcluster (9:24-25)

9:24 Ἐφώνησαν οὖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ δευτέρου δις ἦν τυφλὸς καὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ, Δὸς δόξαν τῷ θεῷ ἡμεῖς οἴδαμεν ὅτι οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτωλὸς ἐστίν.

a) General analysis

The conjunction οὖν in colon 34 indicates that this subcluster is a continuation of the last cluster D, specifically referring to the parents' suggestion in colon 33 by means of a logical-reason-result relationship. Since the Jews were not satisfied with the outcome of the parents' interrogation, they summoned the blind man once again. The prepositional phrase ἐκ δευτέρου, helps denote this repeated action. Therefore, colon 34 as a whole provides the setting for both the first dialogue and the remainder of their interaction in this cluster.

The Jews once again initiated the first dialogue, but they did not approach him with an interrogative sentence. Instead, they used a command form in an effort to open their mouths. The conjunction καὶ in colon 35, links this to colon 34 by means of an additive-different (consequential) relationship. In fact, colon 35 follows 34 chronologically, and refers to the content of their first utterance in the interrogation. 35.1, a sentence in the imperative mood, introduces the content. It is a direct quotation. The embedded sentence in 35.2 provides another possible content as to what the Jews said to the blind man. It is interesting to note that the Jews did not ask him a question this time, but rather made use of a simple statement of what, they thought, they knew: "*We know that this man is a sinner*". Of course, "this man" refers to Jesus, because he was still the centre of the issue. The conjunction ὅτι in 35.2.1, introduces the object of the main verb οἴδαμεν in 35.2. This verb is emphatic (Morris 1971:491; Lindars [1972] 1981:347) and expresses a "confident assertion" (Resseguie 1982:299). In addition, the verb *to know* is one of the key terms in this cluster because of its repetition (cf. vv. 25, 29, 30, 31). In 35.2.1, the word ἁμαρτωλός is the predicate nominative noun. Like Isaiah 53:12 portrays the Suffering Servant, namely that "he was numbered with transgressors", Jesus is indeed counted among sinners, in this instance. Based on these observations, this verse reads: *Therefore, they called the man who had been blind for the second time, and said to him, "Give glory to God; we know that this man is a sinner."*

b) Illocutionary act

When the reader reads the first utterances by the Jews, he may initially be puzzled by them. One should remember that this was the blind man's judicial interrogation conducted by the Jews. In such a situation, the inquisitors' first utterance usually starts with a question regarding the issue concerned. But their utterances were not of this nature. This was also the second interrogation, as they had already questioned him in the first session. Therefore, there was no need for any introduction, and their tactic, in this instance, was to focus on the issue. They may have thought it a good idea to pressurise him from the start of this session. Accordingly, they started with the first utterance: *Give glory to God*.

The first utterance, in general, "was an oath formula used before taking testimony or a confession of guilt (Josh vii 19: I Esdras ix 8)" (Brown 1966:374; Newman & Nida 1980:312). With respect to the usage in this instance, it is not meant to be "[g]ive the praise for your cure to God, not to Jesus" (Barrett 1955:300; Morris 1971:490; Lindars [1972] 1981:347). Moreover, since "[t]he Pharisees did not admit the reality of the cure yet, they could not urge him to praise God for the cure" (Dodd [1953] 1968:81). Therefore, "[t]he formula seems to be an exhortation to full and frank confession of the truth" (Dodd [1953] 1968:81).¹²¹ More precisely, it would be "a command to the man to confess his sin, i.e. the sin of lying as to his blindness and subsequent healing by Jesus, and to admit that the authorities are right and that Jesus is a sinner" (Beasley-Murray 1987:158; Bultmann 1971:336, footnote 1; Carson 1991:372-373). One should note the word *command* in Beasley-Murray's comment, and the fact that he is the only scholar cited above who uses this exact word, besides Duke (1982:187). Nevertheless, the other scholars express a similar kind of idea. This is the traditional exposition of this verse. A speech act approach will draw the same conclusion, but in a very distinctive way (cf. below).

Each of the Jews' utterances, in this instance, has its own speech act. These utterances can be assigned to one global speech act by the *Generalization Rule*, which constructs a new proposition. The first utterance, a command, is a speech act of *requirement* with the purpose of ordering the blind man to testify that Jesus was a sinner, for the Jews had the necessary authority over the blind man. The second utterance is a pure assertion of what the Jews claimed to know (*assertive*), and forms an explanatory speech act in answer to the first utterance. Thus, this explanatory speech act can be deleted by the *Deletion macrorule*. Hence, these utterances pertain to one global speech act of *requirement* and a

121 Cf. also Bernard 1928:334; Morris 1971:490; Bruce [1983] 1994:216; 1 Sm 6:5; Ezzr 10:11; Is 42:12; Jr 13:16; 2 Cor 11:31.

new proposition can be formed as follows: the blind man should tell the Jews that Jesus was a sinner.

In this instance, one should note that these utterances are, in fact, *indirect speech acts*. To cite Searle (1979:115), in indirect speech acts, a speaker “means what he says, but he means something more as well. Thus utterance meaning includes sentence meaning but extends beyond it”. Moreover, in indirect speech acts, as mentioned earlier, a speaker intends to accomplish two illocutionary acts: a primary illocutionary act (utterance meaning) and a secondary illocutionary act (sentence meaning). In the first utterance, the secondary illocutionary act is literally to give glory to God, containing the original implication that the hearer should speak truthfully (cf. Jos 7:19). However, the Jews’ primary meaning was that the blind man should state that Jesus was a sinner – the primary illocutionary act. In the second utterance, while the secondary illocutionary act is that the Jews claimed that they knew that Jesus was a sinner, the primary illocutionary act is similar to that of the first utterance. Briefly, the Jews primarily intended to order the blind man to testify that Jesus was a sinner, and the blind man seemed to understand this illocution from the way in which he answered them in the next verse. Hence, *a speech act approach is unique in the process of analysis, but does not necessarily contradict the traditional exposition. It can elucidate the text with a new and fresh appreciation.*

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should obey the Jews’ command to testify as they wished. The author intends to provide the reader with the correct knowledge concerning Jesus by means of irony (cf. the section on ‘CS’ below), so that the reader may continue to strengthen his faith in Jesus. Thus, the reader should avoid the same kind of mistake the Jews made. The reader should also bear in mind that sound faith requires true knowledge of the one whom the reader trusts.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character level*. The fact that the Jews did not start with a question and that they employed an Old Testament formula for their opening statement is very significant. In indirect speech acts, the *Manner Maxim* (avoid ambiguity) is usually at risk (cf. the section on ‘CS’ in 9:8b). This also holds true for the Jews’ utterances in this instance. This violation would make the hearer (the blind man) wonder why they violated it. In Jewish forensic proceedings, this must have been very serious not only for those on trial, but also for those involved in the trial,

regardless of whether they participated as judges or witnesses, to call God as witness. If they failed in their duty, this would invite grave consequences (Harvey 1976:57). This would be a great strategy to put enormous pressure on the blind man when the Jews appealed to this formula by forcing him to speak the truth in the name of God. This was most likely the reason for their violation and for using indirect speech acts. It is interesting to note that the motivation for their employment of indirect speech acts is once again not politeness,¹²² but their strategy to exert some pressure on the blind man.

2. On the other hand, viewed from another angle, this violation is the exact reason for their fulfilment of the *Relation Maxim*. In that sense, their utterances are relevant to the present interrogation. In addition, they uphold the *Quality Maxim*, because the Jews appeared to be saying what they believed to be true. From their point of view, “[t]hey speak with the responsibility and authority of Judaism, and correctly. There is no doubt ... that Jesus had transgressed the Law, and therefore was in the technical sense a *ἁμαρτωλός*” (Barrett 1955:300; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:251). The fact that this is not entirely true (cf. the section on ‘CS’ in v 16a), and that the reader knows otherwise (cf. this aspect below) has already been discussed.

3. Regarding *the communication on the text level*, the violation of the *Manner Maxim* on the character level is linked to the transgressions of the *Processibility Principle* and of the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity* under the *Clarity Principle* on the text level. The Jews’ utterances are ambiguous; therefore, the reader takes more time to decode the message. It is easier to grasp the message in the alternative phrases that “speak the truth” or “confess your sin” than in the original expressions that “give glory to God” or “we know that he was a sinner”. However, as examined earlier, the latter expressions are effective in that they have a greater impact on the hearer. In this regard, the Jews’ utterances uphold the *Expressivity Principle*. By using pronominalisation, the *Reduction Maxim* is also upheld in the same utterances.

4. *Furthermore*, the original expressions are unpredictable to the reader and, hence, the utterances uphold the *Interest Principle*. This observance of the *Interest Principle* is strengthened further when the reader perceives more literary devices in the utterances. Brown (1966:374) and Holleran (1993b:371) point out a possible *play on words*. Holleran (1993b:371) states that “the author may well mean the reader to grasp the irony of how the man in the end does ‘give glory to God’ by witnessing to the very opposite of what is asked of him here. Indeed ... it is impossible to ask

122 Cf. Searle [1979] 1981:36; Leech 1983:108; Yule 1996:56; section on ‘CS’ in 9:8b.

the man to glorify God and discredit God's Son at the same time". The subsequent scene reveals that the blind man would indeed give glory to God through his confession of faith in Jesus (Duke 1982:123). The author wishes to teach the reader what it really means to give glory to God.

5. Because the reader knows the identity of Jesus better than the Jews, this gap in their knowledge creates fascination in the reading process. In connection with Holleran's remark above, some critics (e.g., Duke 1982:122; Culpepper 1983:175; Stibbe 1993:111) regard the Jews' utterances as Johannine irony. According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), this irony may be identified by the following indications: a conflicting relationship between the text and co-text (step A-ii-2); the use of words with double meaning and textual ambiguity (step A-ii-3); the violation of some Maxims (step A-iv); two illocutionary forces (step A-v), and some critics' notice (step A-vii). Since the Jews' utterances uphold the *Quality Maxim*, they did not intend to employ irony. Thus, these utterances do not constitute verbal irony on the character level, but situational irony on the text level. More precisely, this is a case of *dramatic irony* perceived as a result of the reader's knowledge of what the Jews have yet to discover (step B-ii-2-a). Based on their false knowledge, the Jews as the character in question related that they knew that Jesus was a sinner. They uttered their belief sincerely according to the best of their knowledge. The present indicative verb ἐστίν in their second utterance, indicates the Jews' certainty of their knowledge about Jesus. But human certainty is not always perfect. This is the core of the irony. As the observers, the author and the reader know the truth, namely that Jesus was not a sinner, but he was the Son of God sent by the Father; this fact is made clear to the reader from the beginning of this Gospel, the Prologue. This knowledge by the author and the reader makes the Jews' utterances ironic, for the Jews as the victims did not know Jesus' true identity, and yet they claimed to know everything about Jesus. For them, the utterances were not ironic. But when the reader notices such Johannine irony, Culpepper (1983:180) observes that it is "more like a net in which readers are caught and drawn to the evangelist's theology and faith", especially to the evangelist's Christology, in this instance.

6. Another irony involved in the Jews' utterances is *irony of self-betrayal*; this unconsciously displays their own ignorance of God's business. In this irony, the Jews in their unconscious minds, as Duke (1982:187) points out, "invoke the name of God to deny the work of God". While there is no ironist, the Jews are again the victims. The author and the reader observe this irony. O'Day's (1986:31) suggestion seems true for this irony, that it is "a mode of revelatory language. It reveals by asking the reader to make judgments and decisions", and in this instance the reader is meant

to pass judgment on the Jews' unbelief. In this sense, Duke (1982:232) rightly observes that "unbelief is the greater antagonist of the drama and so the primary object of the irony". This judgment would contribute to strengthening and deepening the reader's faith.

e) Summary

The Jews' utterances constitute indirect speech acts with the primary illocutionary force of requirement. In the utterances, for effective communication, the *Maxims of Quality* and *Relation* are upheld, but the violation of the *Manner Maxim* in relation to the indirect speech acts is significant on the story level. While the *Processibility Principle* and the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity* are flouted, the *Principles of Expressivity* and *Interest* as well as the *Reduction Maxim* are kept intact on the text level. The dramatic irony and irony of self-betrayal serve their purpose for the reader's enjoyment and understanding (of the author's perspective of Jesus). However, in the interrogation, the blind man appears to be under enormous pressure from the Jewish authorities. The reader's attention is now drawn to the man's next reaction.

9:25 ἀπεκρίθη οὖν ἐκεῖνος, Εἰ ἁμαρτωλός ἐστιν οὐκ οἶδα ἐν οἶδα ὅτι τυφλὸς ὢν ἄρτι βλέπω.

a) General analysis

Structurally, subcola 35.1 and 35.2 form a unit and express the contents of what the Jews said. Cola 34 and 35 form another unit on a higher level. At the same level, colon 36 tells of the blind man's reply to the Jews; it contains a smaller unit consisting of subcola 36.1-36.2* and 36.3, which describe the contents of his answer.

The conjunction οὖν, in colon 36, connects the Jews' words in 35 to the man's reply in 36 by means of an additive-different (consequential) relationship. His answer in subcola 36.1-36.2* and 36.3 is basically divided into two parts according to his knowledge. While the former speaks of what he did not know, the second tells of what he knew. In this instance, a *semantic contrast* may be intended. In addition, the blind man was able to distinguish between speculation and fact. In this sense, his answer was very objective. In 36.1, we should discern whether this subclause is a conditional clause or something else. Usually, the subordinate conjunction εἰ plus the present indicative verb, as in this subclause, form a conditional protasis. However, the lack of apodosis (main clause), which usually comes with its protasis in conditional sentences, suggests that this subclause

may not be a conditional clause (Wenham 1965:166). As the verb $\alpha\lambda\delta\alpha$ of the main clause in 36.2* usually requires its object, the $\epsilon\iota$ clause should be the object, in his instance, which may be emphatic. The conjunction $\epsilon\iota$ may function like the conjunction $\epsilon\lambda\tau\epsilon$, denoting *whether* (Wenham 1965:224). There is a negative particle $\omicron\kappa$ before the main verb. Thus, 36.1 and 36.2* verbalise the content of the blind man's ignorance.

There may be two possible explanations for the use of the subordinate conjunction $\delta\tau\iota$ in 36.3.1. One is that it introduces the object of the main verb $\alpha\lambda\delta\alpha$ in 36.3. The other is that it may introduce the subclause that is in apposition with the previous noun $\xi\nu$. The latter is preferred, for the main verb $\alpha\lambda\delta\alpha$ usually takes only one object; in this case, it is the accusative neuter noun $\xi\nu$ in 36.3. This noun may be emphasised. 36.3.1 and 36.3.2* together stress the present state that the blind man can see now. Therefore, this verse is rendered as follows: *So that man answered, "Whether he is a sinner, I do not know. One thing I know that, although I was blind, now I see."*

b) Illocutionary act

Although the narrator introduces the blind man's utterances as his answer to the Jews, these would be a *global dissentive speech act* rather than a responsive, because the illocution of the Jews' previous utterances is not a question, but a requirement. In this instance, the blind man was unwilling to meet their requirement, for he did not believe personally that Jesus was a sinner. Thus, the blind man expressed his disagreement. In his first utterance, the blind man refused to give his view as to whether or not Jesus was a sinner, despite his previous reply that he was a prophet (v. 17). In this sense, the first utterance would be a *retractive speech act*. In my opinion, the blind man's logic is exactly what Carson (1991:373) observes: "At least to this point in the discussion, he is prepared to leave that question to the theological experts. But one thing he does know, and this point he will not relinquish: he was blind, and now sees." In his second utterance, the blind man that Jesus could not be a sinner. More precisely, the man expressed his disagreement (the primary illocutionary act of dissentive) by stating his knowledge (the secondary act of assertive). Therefore, the second utterance would be an *indirect dissentive speech act*. Since these two utterances constitute a sequence of speech acts, we can assign one global speech act to this sequence by applying the *Strong Deletion macrorule* to the first utterance, because this utterance is a locally relevant detail (cf. section 1.5 in Chapter 2). The first utterance can be deleted, because it is a preparatory speech act for the second. Hence, these utterances are considered to be a dissentive global speech act.

When the schema of dissentives by Bach and Harnish (1979:43) is applied to the utterances in this instance, the following is the result:

In uttering “*Whether he is a sinner, I do not know. One thing I know that, although I was blind, now I see*”, the blind man dissents from the claim that Jesus is a sinner if the blind man expresses:

- i. the disbelief that Jesus is a sinner, contrary to what the Jews claimed (or was otherwise under discussion), and
- ii. the intention that the Jews disbelieve that Jesus is a sinner.

To sum up, the blind man’s utterances are a successful dissentive global speech act. The blind man very politely intended to oppose the Jews’ claim that Jesus was a sinner by means of an indirect speech act. The author intends to portray the blind man as a normal and intelligent human being who was able to converse reasonably with educated people such as the Jewish leaders.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should accept the meaning of the blind man’s utterances, namely that Jesus was not a sinner. It is expected that the polite and intelligent remarks the blind man made to the Jewish authorities should impress the reader.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, the blind man’s first utterance may partially violate the *Quality Maxim*. As inferred from the man’s statement in verse 17, the man did not appear to believe that Jesus was a sinner. His utterance, namely that he did not know, is obviously doubtful. However, he may have tried to prevent himself from saying that for which he lacked adequate evidence, because he did not yet have full perception of Jesus at this point. In this respect, he may be right when he said that he did not know. These observations point to a partial breach of the *Quality Maxim*.

2. The man’s second utterance is a complete violation of the *Manner Maxim*. As in the case of the last utterances (v. 24), the blind man also used an indirect speech act and violated the *Maxim*. However, the motivation behind their use indicates a significant difference between these indirect speech acts. The Jews deployed their indirect speech acts to serve an aggressive motive, namely to exert some pressure on him. Still, the man seems to use an indirect speech act for the sake of politeness. As noted earlier, he intended to express his disagreement to the Jews. However, he did so in an intelligent manner. Bernard (1928:334) comments: “The shrewdness and obstinacy of the man reveal themselves in his answer”.

Since the blind man sensed that the Jews had already made up their minds concerning Jesus, the man tried to be as polite as possible so as not to offend them too much. In this sense, the *Agreement Maxim* of the *Politeness Principle* operates in this utterance (minimise disagreement between self and other). He tried to distinguish between fact and speculation. Whereas he could have objected and testified that Jesus was not a sinner, but a prophet, as he said in verse 17, the man avoided making a clear statement by indicating his uncertainty regarding Jesus' identity as an expression of 'speech' despite his own belief concerning Jesus. At the same time, the blind man did not want to forget to mention the grace of the healing brought by Jesus. In this instance, he experienced a dilemma between his belief and politeness. In order to solve this dilemma (and perhaps in order to prevent the Jews from detecting his dilemma), he uttered a euphemism.¹²³ In this euphemism, the man's second utterance adheres to both the *Pollyanna Principle* and the *Relation Maxim*.

3. One should remember that the Jews did not ask the blind man any specific questions; they merely expressed an elusive command and statement. What was the purpose of their utterances? As a rule, it is not easy to understand the purpose behind these ambiguous utterances. But the blind man was ready to answer them without missing their point. This implies that he was sufficiently wise to understand their language and the meaning of their utterances. This fact is remarkable, considering that he had been blind from birth in the society of the first century CE. Unlike the modern society, there were perhaps no institutions or organisations that helped disadvantaged people such as this blind man, in gaining an education. The fact that he used to sit and beg indicates that he was not able to do a regular job. He may not have had any special job skill(s). Considering these factors, it is surprising that he could engage in such an intelligent dialogue with the Jews who probably had some kind of formal education. Even more surprising is that, in their subsequent dialogues, he would embarrass or vex these Jews with his arguments. The author starts the blind man's characterisation with a low profile, gradually revealing the quality of the blind man, for example his intelligent personality, particularly from this scene. Resseguie (1982:300) remarks on this: "The narrative development of the healed man's character is actually the development of his personhood."

4. It appears that *the communication on the text level* in this verse is similar to that in the Jews' utterances (v. 24). While the blind man's first

¹²³ Leech (1983:147) defines this as follows: "[O]ne can disguise unpleasant subjects by referring to them by means of apparently inoffensive expressions"; thus, the Jews' indirect speech acts in verse 24 are not a euphemism.

utterance upholds the *Reduction Maxim* by virtue of pronominalisation, the transgression of the *Manner Maxim* on the story level is again linked to the breaches of the *Processibility Principle* and of the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity* on the text level. The man's second utterance is obscured by its indirect speech act. Moreover, as this utterance has no news value, because the reader already knows the content, the *Interest Principle* may be flouted.

5. On the other hand, if the blind man's dilemma is perceived as irony, this means that the same Principle is uplifted in this sense. It can be suspected that the word *dilemma* may, in fact, be an instance of *irony of dilemma*. As examined earlier, the blind man was placed in a dilemma in which he was torn between his belief and politeness. His apparent desire not to offend the Jews made it difficult for him to relate what he believed concerning Jesus. In addition, it is conceivable that he may have thought that he did not want to fight openly with the authorities because of the Jews' decision (v. 22). This situation is a good example of irony of dilemma (step B-ii-4) in accordance with the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2). While no ironist is involved in this irony, the author and the reader, as observers, comprehend the fact that the blind man was the victim. This irony can be considered a means of expressing frustration (Turner 1996:47). It will help the reader note the man's difficulty in the judicial proceedings. Even as a witness, it was not a pleasant to be interrogated by the authorities. *The motif of suffering* also occurs in this instance. The perlocution of this irony may be to invite the reader to align himself with the blind man and to teach him how to deal with similar situations, should they befall him.

6. *Lastly*, the blind man's second utterance regarding Jesus' healing opens a way for the reader to ponder an important issue relating to the Law. Barrett (1955:300) states that "the Law itself was now superseded" by Jesus because of the two given facts – a healing act and breaking the Sabbath (cf. also Brown 1966:374). This means that "Jesus abrogates sabbath law precisely because he is from God" (Duke 1982:132). Of course, this also indicates that Jesus was not a Sabbath-breaker (cf. this relevance to the Jews' last utterances in v. 24). Barrett (1955:300) contends that "[t]he Law in condemning Jesus had condemned itself (Gal. 3:10-14); this theme forms the theological basis of the present chapter. The Law condemns itself, and so do its exponents, when they try and condemn Jesus". Even if the reader still does not fully understand this aspect, he will do so as the story develops. This adds more knowledge to the reader's understanding of the story.

e) Summary

The blind man intended to oppose the Jews' claim that Jesus was a sinner by uttering a dissentive global speech act. In his utterances, the man tried to maintain his politeness towards the Jewish authorities by using an indirect speech act, the *Agreement Maxim* and the *Pollyanna Principle*, while upholding the *Relation Maxim*. However, for that purpose, his utterances inevitably violate the *Maxims of Manner* and *Quality*. This invites the flouting of the *Processibility Principle* and the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity* on the text level. The *Interest Principle* is both jeopardised and upheld in different ways. The irony of dilemma and the motif of suffering help the reader understand more of the blind man's speech situation. Whether or not the intended perlocution of the man's utterances was realised by the hearers will be disclosed in the next utterances of the Jews.

7.3.2 The second subcluster (9:26-27)

Even from the first dialogue in this second interrogation, the Jews could not find any falsehood in the blind man's statements. Yet they were stubborn and could not accept his answer; they had to continue their interrogation. They asked a few questions. The second subcluster, therefore, provides another dialogue with the question-answer form: the Jews asked questions and the blind man answered them. Accordingly, there are two units: cola 37 and 38.

9:26 εἶπον οὖν αὐτῷ, Τί ἐποίησέν σοι; πῶς ἤνοιξέν σου τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς;

a) General analysis

The conjunction οὖν in colon 37 indicates the continuity from the last subcluster. The relationship between cola 36 and 37 is logical-reason-result. The contents of their questions are expressed in subcola 37.1 and 37.2. The first question in 37.1 focuses on Jesus' activity. The second question in 37.2 is a similar question as in 37.1. Although the surface structures, the specific sentence forms in which the author chooses to express, are different, the semantic content in the deep structures of the expressions is nearly similar in both questions. Nevertheless, the second question may focus more on the procedures of the healing miracle. Incidentally, this second question is a synonymous repetition of subcolon 15.1. To compare and generalise, while the question is formed in a passive voice sentence in 15.1, the question in this instance is formed in an active voice sentence,

with more emphasis on the subject of the action. However, the real meaning is almost exactly similar in the repetitious relationship between them. By this time, the question of the process of healing is being narrated three times in all (9:10, 15). This suggests that the narrative emphasises the healing event, which lends greater cohesion to the story as a whole. Hence, this verse renders: *Then they said to him, "What did he do to you? How did he open your eyes?"*

b) Illocutionary act

As the Jews could not obtain what they really wanted, namely the blind man's own testimony that Jesus was a sinner, and could no longer openly deny the reality of the miracle, they appeared to change their strategy in their interrogation of the blind man. They were still in control of the dialogue. The Jews asked the blind man two questions directly this time, perhaps with the hope that some illegitimate procedure of the miracle, such as breaking the Sabbath law, would emerge again. Hence, the Jews' utterances, in this instance, are obviously *question speech acts*. This was meant to be the first step in their new interrogation strategy.

However, their utterances constitute another *indirect speech act*. This means that the illocutionary force of questions should be regarded as the secondary illocutionary act of the utterances. Unlike the speech situation in which the Jews asked the blind man's parents the same kind of question (v. 19), in this present dialogue both the speakers and the hearer knew that the speakers had already heard the answer to the questions. This inference trigger would immediately lead the hearer to suspect inadequacy of the literal meaning or force of the speakers' utterances. The meaning or force must, therefore, be rectified (cf. Levinson 1983:270). The inference strategy will be used to rectify the meaning or force (section 1.1 in Chapter 2). In indirect speech acts, the speaker intends to accomplish two illocutionary acts: a primary illocutionary act (utterance meaning) and a secondary illocutionary act (sentence meaning) (Searle [1979] 1981:33-34). From the co-text along with the *Relation Maxim* (the Jews were obliged to use the utterances relevant to this speech situation), the primary illocutionary act performed in the Jews' utterance, in this instance, could be that of *requestive*. This means that the Jews intended to ask the blind man to tell them who Jesus was. By questioning the manner of 'how', the Jews were, in fact, asking the identity of 'who'. Brown (1966:379) endorses this view: "In these interrogations the real issue is whether or not Jesus has miraculous power and, if he does, who he is." The schema of requestives by Bach and Harnish (1979:47) is as follows:

Requestives: (ask, beg, beseech, implore, insist, invite, petition, plead, pray, request, solicit, summon, supplicate, tell, urge)

In uttering *e*, *S* requests *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:

- i. the desire that *H* do *A*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* do *A* because (at least partly) of *S*'s desire.

When this schema is applied to these utterances, the following is the result:

In uttering "*What did he do to you? How did he open your eyes?*", the Jews request the blind man to tell who Jesus is if the Jews express:

- i. the desire that the blind man should tell them who Jesus is, and
- ii. the intention that the blind man should tell them who Jesus is because (at least partly) of the Jews' desire.

As it is possible that the Jews expressed their desire and intention, as described above, these utterances can be assigned a requestive speech act. According to this, the Jews had the intention to ask the blind man to tell them who Jesus was by asking him the same kind of questions again. The author invites the reader to note the wrong motive of the Jews in their utterances.

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should answer the Jews' questions in a way that would provide sufficient information to satisfy their intention. The author may try to test the reader on how he should react to such questions if he were in the blind man's position. Therefore, the reader should observe the Jews' subtle strategy and consider how the reader himself should react to the questions. Hence, the author may induce more interest in the reader's mind, thus encouraging him to continue reading.

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character and text levels together*. The two questions in the Jews' utterances basically belong to the same semantic realm, and denote only one point, namely the process or manner of the healing. This point is, in fact, a repetition of their earlier question (v. 15). Schnackenburg's ([1968] 1980:251) comment that the repeated 'tests' were the Jewish way of hearing evidence may be right. However, this repetition seems to provide more insight. From a speech act perspective, this duplication establishes the transgressions of the *Quantity Maxim* in the domain of Interpersonal Rhetoric and the *Economy Principle* in the domain of Textual Rhetoric. As usual, these transgressions will tell us more than what is said in the utterances.

2. When the Jews listened to the blind man's answer (v. 25), they may have been frustrated, as pointed out earlier, because they could not draw the wanted information from him and seemed unable to find any weakness in his reply. At the same time, "the authorities suspect that something has been kept hidden from them" (Carson 1991:372; cf. also Bultmann 1971:336). Staley (1991:68) elaborates on this: "It is precisely because he didn't tell them the whole truth earlier that the Pharisees are becoming more and more exasperated and are still asking him the same questions!" And "the very repetition of their question is an index of their desperation" (Holleran 1993b:373). The above transgressions inform the present emotional state of the Jews, namely desperation.

3. In this emotional state, the Jews were trying to find a way to achieve their aim with this interrogation. However, perhaps due to their desperation and closed minds (cf. below), they did not appear to be able to produce an excellent strategy. They simply restated the same question. This was not entirely wrong; a return to the basics is one way of breaking through the status quo. Yet, there is a certain risk attached to this, because it inevitably invites a repetitious expression in the procedures. Unless it is perceived as a means to impress, it leaves the interlocutors with a negative impression and causes them to beware of the speakers. This is what happened in the present story. Therefore, although the message of the Jews' questions was successfully communicated to the blind man on the surface, they failed to gain the necessary information, as will be observed in the next verse. Why? Because the blind man simply would not provide it, precisely and partly for the above reason. The analysis of this failure is not that simple. The reason for this failure is also due to the problematic nature of their utterances (cf. below).

4. *Firstly*, the utterances meet neither the preparatory condition pertaining to questions, namely that the speaker does not know 'the answer', but the Jews had already heard it before, nor the sincerity condition that the speaker does, in fact, want this information (for these conditions, cf. the section on 'IA' in 9:2). Thus, the Jews really had to accept any kind of information from the blind man, but they were not open to what he had to say. They had already made up their minds to the extent that they would only accept a certain kind of information, the information that would enable them to achieve their purpose. They were not really listening to him. They were not open-minded towards, but closed to the truth (Duke 1982:187). They were insincere in questioning him, and therefore their utterances violate the *Quality Maxim*. Their speech act of question thus fails, and is classified as *abuses* in Austin's ([1962] 1976:16) term. This was an 'abuse' on the part of the Jews derived from their authoritative position. They misused the questions. Therefore, their utterances become defective. In the next verse,

the Jews face the counter attack of the blind man who was sufficiently intelligent to detect their wrongful intentions.

5. *Secondly*, their utterances are *indirect speech acts*. As in the case of the last two verses, this leads to the breach of the *Manner Maxim* on the character level and the flouting of the *Processibility Principle* and of the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity* on the text level. *Thirdly*, as the reader already knows these questions and their answers, they are boring him, thereby causing the *Interest Principle* to be flouted. Conversely, if the reader notices some rule-breaking in the Jews' utterances and their implications, the reader may find more amusement in the communication process. This could be an example of the same *Interest Principle* at work. *Fourthly*, a specific function of the *Relation Maxim* needs to be scrutinised as to whether it is upheld or flouted, for it is slightly ambiguous. Since it was assumed earlier that one aspect of this Maxim (to be relevant) is operative in their utterances in determining the primary illocutionary act, I wish to deal with the other aspect of this Maxim, namely conversational contributions to the goals of either the speaker or the hearer (Leech 1983:42). I shall examine this conversational contribution in terms of the purpose of their utterances below.

6. When expositors comment on this verse, the majority of the critics focus on elucidating the purpose of the Jews' utterances. A typical example is that their questions "may have been to confuse him [the blind man], and to see if he contradicted his first statement, which would discredit his evidence" (Beasley-Murray 1987:158).¹²⁴ Even if the formulation differs, the basic arguments held by these scholars reveal the same point. The Jews "were trying to trip him up in his testimony" (Carson 1991:373). Their aim was "to get the man's withdrawal from his earlier support for Jesus and come out against him" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:251) and "to get the man to repudiate Jesus" (Witherington 1995:184). Smith (1986:47) suggests more specifically: "Their apparent attempt to get at the facts may betray a suspicion that because Jesus has used spittle in the act of healing he is therefore guilty of adopting the tricks of an illegal sorcerer." All these remarks seem to point to the same conclusion: the Jews "were trying to deny the miracle" (Plummer [1882] 1981:209). Consequently, they were not seeking to acquire new information (Morris 1971:491), but their questions were meant to entrap the blind man. This line of reading is not highly likely. But, in this new scene, they could no longer deny the reality of the miracle, because the parents had guaranteed it in the previous scene. That is the reason why the Jews appeared to change their strategy from focusing on

124 Cf. also Bernard 1928:335; Sanders & Mastin 1968:243; Bultmann 1971:336; Holleran 1993b:373.

the miracle itself to stressing the sinfulness of the miracle worker (v. 24). In this instance, the utterances were most likely made in conjunction with this strategy. This is strongly indicated by the emphasis placed on the subject of the sentences – Jesus, the miracle worker. Their utterances are formulated in the active (the active verb is used) in comparison with the question in verse 10. Therefore, as the analysis on ‘Illocutionary act’ above shows, it makes most sense to consider that the main purpose of the Jews’ utterances would be to elicit information as to who Jesus was. It does not necessarily have to be viewed as a trap. If my reading is correct, the *Relation Maxim* would then be observed because their utterances contribute to the goal of the Jews as the speakers. Incidentally, it is most likely that this purpose also coincides with the main purpose of the trial in this scene.

As indicated earlier, traditional expositions do not comment a great deal on this verse. Some critics even omit their explications, due to the repetitious content of the Jews’ questions (e.g., Brown 1966:374; Lindars [1972] 1981:347-348). However, *a speech act approach could have a great deal to say in terms of communication rules, for the more problematic an utterance is, the more significant it becomes.*

e) Summary

The Jews intended, in indirect speech acts (with the primary force of requestive), to elicit information as to who Jesus was by repeating the questions they had already asked previously. Numerous violations of conversational rules demonstrate the problematic nature of their utterances (e.g., the *Principles of Economy, Processibility and Interest*, and the *Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Manner, Transparency, Ambiguity* and an *abuse*). However, these violations alert the reader to read more carefully. As compared with these violations, the adherence to the *Relation Maxim* is significant in determining the purpose of their utterances.

9:27a ἀπεκρίθη αὐτοῖς, Εἶπον ὑμῖν ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἠκούσατε τί
 πάλιν θέλετε ἀκούειν;

a) General analysis

How did the blind man respond to the same questions the Jews had already asked previously? Did he reply to them with the same kind of answers he had already given? The answer is found in colon 38. This colon can be divided into two units: 38.1-38.3 and 38.4. The first unit tells of his direct answer to their questions, while the second unit describes his question derived from the impression he received from their questions.

Semantically, the conjunction *καί* in 38.2 indicates a dyadic-contrastive relationship between the two subcola, despite the use of the word *and* in the translation. Thus, he continued to say, “*and you did not listen*”. His words in this subcolon 38.2 suggest the Jews’ unbelieving attitudes and their stubbornness. The man himself who had been healed testified to what had really happened; yet they would not accept it. Perhaps, it would be in vain for the man to testify before these people. As a result, the blind man decided to answer them by means of an interrogative sentence. In subcolon 38.3, the interrogative adverb *τί* may mean not *what*, but *why*, based on the context. Hence, his first question for the Jews is: *Why do you want to hear again?*¹²⁵ The blind man was puzzled, because the Jews continued to ask, but never tried to listen. Their minds were closed due to their prejudice. His perplexed feeling made him ask such a question of them. In the light of these points, verse 27a is rendered as follows: *He answered them, “I told you already, and you did not listen. Why do you want to hear again?”*

b) Illocutionary act

This verse is another good example of an *indirect speech act*. The Jews’ question in the last verse apparently annoyed the blind man, because they continued to ask the same kind of question, one that he had already answered in verse 15. Therefore, the blind man began to suspect the purpose or motive behind their question. Otherwise, he would have answered normally, that is, explaining how Jesus opened his eyes. He did not do so. Since the author, as argued earlier (in the section on ‘CS’ in 9:25), depicts the blind man as an intelligent person in this dialogue scene, one can say that the blind man somehow detected the wrongful intention in the

¹²⁵ The majority of English translations, such as KJV, NASB, and so on, insert the word *it* for the object of the verb in this sentence, but the Greek text does not have such an object.

Jews' question. The blind man thus became defensive. He thought twice, and decided not to answer them this time. However, he did not openly reject their inquiry in order not to jeopardise the *Cooperative Principle*, and rather pointed out plainly that, although they did not see to listen, he had already given them the answer. Along the same line of argument, he uttered an interrogative sentence to tone down his negative reply in order to maintain his politeness towards the Jews. At the same time, in this particular speech situation, the blind man's question appears natural, and caused no problem in the minds of ordinary people, whereas the Jews did not listen nor believe the blind man's answer before, why did they still want to hear it from him again? Accordingly, while the secondary illocutionary acts of his utterances are *assertive* and *question*, the primary illocutionary acts are *responsive*. This helps us consider that these utterances can be treated as a unit or as one global speech act. This global speech act can be formulated by the *Construction macrorule*, which creates a new proposition (in connection with the primary illocutionary act) out of the joint sequence of propositions (in connection with the secondary illocutionary acts). The following could be examples of the new proposition: you cannot expect me to answer the same question twice, or I do not want to answer that question again. When the schema of responsives (Bach & Harnish 1979:43) is applied to this text, the following will be gained:

In uttering "*I told you already, and you did not listen. Why do you want to hear again?*", the blind man responds that he does not want to answer it again if the blind man expresses:

- i. the belief that he does not want to answer it again, which the Jews have inquired about, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that he does not want to answer it again.

As the blind man appeared to express his belief and intention, as described above, the utterances would be a successful *global speech act of responsive*. In brief, the blind man intended not to answer the same question twice, suspecting that the interrogators' attitude was wrong. The author wants the reader to understand why the blind man used the indirect speech acts in his response, and wants him to form a positive attitude towards the blind man accordingly.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should accept the response that the blind man did not want to answer the question again, but should simultaneously appreciate the way in which he expressed his intention. The reader should not criticise the blind man for not providing the Jews with a straight answer by perceiving

his feelings and the politeness he still maintained towards them. Rather, the reader should sympathise with the blind man's position, and form a positive attitude towards him.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, some scholars assume that the blind man became angry after he was asked the repeated question by the Jews. For example, Bernard (1928:335) contends that the blind man 'now becomes irritable, and turns on his questioners'. Duke (1982:187) avers: 'Weary of this pointless repetition, the man born blind accuses them of being deaf.' Then, it is most likely that the blind man's question to the Jews here can be taken only as his irony: (he would say) 'you are not willing to listen to me, but, then, why do you want to hear again?' However, according to my reading, he was not aggressive yet at this point. His utterance is frank and merely means that the Jews did not pay attention before (Brown 1966:374; also Newman & Nida 1980:313). He was still calm and was making every effort to engage in a reasonable conversation with them. As analysed above, he even employed indirect speech acts to remain polite towards them, and thus upheld the *Approbation Maxim* (minimise dispraise of others) under the *Politeness Principle* at the expense of the *Manner Maxim*. He specifically used a question form in order not to accuse the Jews but simply to indicate his annoyance to them. And his question was partly uttered to honestly ask the Jews' intention with their reiterated question because he suspected a hidden agenda. Here, his utterance upholds the *Relation Maxim*.

2. *On the text level*, the man's utterances flout the *Processibility Principle* as well as the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity* again because of the indirect speech acts. Moreover, since the Jews asked the same question as in the last verse, the reader becomes interested in the blind man's reply. His response does not appear to betray the reader's expectation. It was realistic, reasonable and even comical. Perhaps the reader would find it agreeable and amusing. In this sense, the *Interest Principle* is operating well in these utterances.

e) Summary

The blind man primarily intended to respond to the previous question by the Jews, implying that he did not want to answer it again, while remaining polite (the fulfillment of the *Approbation Maxim*). He also wanted to query the intention behind their question (the adherence to the *Relation Maxim*). For these reasons, he deployed the indirect speech acts, thus adding to the interest value of the story (the *Interest Principle*). However, this results

in the violations of the Maxims of Manner, Transparency and Ambiguity, as well as the Processibility Principle. The blind man still continued to speak to the Jews.

9:27b μή και ὑμεῖς θέλετε αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ γενέσθαι;

a) General analysis

The blind man's next question in subcolon 38.4 appears to be a sarcastic remark. It starts with the negative particle μή. This particle is, as a rule, used in hesitant questions or questions expecting the answer 'no' (Morris 1971:491; Newman & Nida 1980:313; Holleran 1993b:373). Barrett (1955:300) contends that this particle makes a "cautious assertion". The conjunction και may be the adjunctive use in this case, denoting *also* (Fowler *et al.* 1985:267). The infinitive γενέσθαι completes the verbal idea. It appears that the blind man is asking them with extreme irony (for this irony, see the section on 'CS' below): "You do not wish to become his disciples too, do you?"

b) Illocutionary act

1. From the observation that the tag question of the blind man expects the answer 'no' from the hearer, I wish to address two points. *Firstly*, the illocutionary act of this utterance is *question*. *Secondly*, by the nature of this tag question, this utterance violates the *sincerity condition*, which maintains that the speaker wants information from the hearer unconditionally. But the blind man did not want the Jews' real answer, because he expected only a negative one. Therefore, one can logically assume that he must have had a more important and different reason for asking this tag question. In other words, the meaning or force of this utterance must be rectified (cf. Levinson 1983:270). Therefore, this utterance is another example of an *indirect speech act*, and the illocutionary act of question is now perceived as the secondary illocutionary act whereby the primary illocutionary act can be performed. What is the primary illocutionary act of this utterance? There are two possible choices: *suppositive* and *requestive*.

2. I can suggest two reasons for considering the primary illocutionary act to be *suppositive*. *Firstly*, in suppositives "S is likely to have the perlocutionary intention that H is to expect S to take up a discussion of P or its consequences" (Bach & Harnish 1979:46). The possible observation that the blind man, in this instance, appeared to discuss with the Jews their motive for the repeated question in verse 26 corresponds with the above explanation concerning suppositives. From a general impression of his

utterances in verse 27, he could have thought that they had asked the same question again, because the Jews wanted to become Jesus' disciples, thus placing more emphasis on what Jesus could do. *Secondly*, suppositives do not need a sufficient reason to suppose something. In this regard, a distinction should be drawn between suppositives and suggestives, for there is a similarity between them. Both belong to the same subcategory in taxonomy, which expresses a weaker belief than assertives do. However, the distinction lies in the fact that suppositives express an even weaker belief than suggestives, which require a sufficient reason for belief. Suppositives do not require a sufficient reason, but that the consequence of the belief should be worth considering. For this reason, the blind man's utterance is a great deal closer to suppositives than to suggestives, because his question is uttered, based not on any apparent reason, but solely on his supposition. From the above observations, the primary illocutionary act may be suppositive. Nevertheless, this supposition, used as a strong point in conclusion, is ironically a weakness of the hypothesis, because this supposition is simply one possible way in which to examine the utterance. I shall indicate later that there are other ways of scrutinising the utterance from different angles. The schema of suppositives by Bach and Harnish (1979:44) is as follows:

Suppositives: (assume, hypothesise, postulate, stipulate, suppose, theorise)

In uttering *e*, *S* supposes that *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that it is worth considering the consequences of *P*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believes that it is worth considering the consequences of *P*.

When this schema is applied to this text, the following will be gained:

In uttering "*You do not wish to become his disciples too, do you?*", the blind man supposes that the Jews wish to become Jesus' disciples if the blind man expresses:

- i. the belief that it is worth considering the consequences of the supposition that the Jews wish to become Jesus' disciples, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that it is worth considering the consequences of the supposition that the Jews wish to become Jesus' disciples.

3. Another option regarding the primary illocutionary act of the blind man's utterance would be *requestive*. Requestives are one of the subcategories of Directives that express "the speaker's attitude toward

some prospective action by the hearer and his intention that his utterance, or the attitude it expresses, be taken as a reason for the hearer's action" (Bach & Harnish 1979:41). If this utterance is a requestive speech act, what would the blind man's attitude be towards some prospective action by the Jews? By uttering this speech act, the blind man may have tried to challenge the Jews to a debate. He invited them to engage in his argument. In other words, he requested them to argue with him. In order to verify this claim, I shall deal with two issues. One is whether or not the idea of challenge corresponds with that of requestives. The other is that one may wonder whether this view is unjustified. Was the blind man such a strong person that he may dare challenge the powerful authorities of that time?

Regarding the first issue, the speaker who requests the hearer to do something should be in a lower position than the hearer. Indeed, the blind man was in such a position (cf. section 7.1.1). Can such a person challenge the people who are superior to him? Theoretically speaking, he should not do that, for he definitely creates a problem and/or endangers his own existence. However, this often happens in a complex real-life situation. Some people dare to challenge their (political and religious) superiors; history abounds with such examples. The bottom line of this issue would be that there is no perfectly suitable category to describe this specific kind of speech act. In my opinion, the category of requestives is the best possibility at present, according to Bach and Harnish's taxonomy.

In order to answer the second issue, I shall scrutinise it in more detail. Although the first part of the man's utterances in the same verse, as discussed in the last utterances, still reserves some politeness, this particular utterance sounds harsher to the Jews. He became aggressive. The more the blind man interacted with the Jews, the more he realised their unbelieving and stubborn attitudes. As analysed earlier (in the section on 'GA' in 9:27a), the man himself who had been healed testified to what had really happened; yet the Jews did not accept it. This man must have felt hopeless in testifying before these authorities. As a result, he would finally have decided to make some sarcastic remark (cf. also Koester 1995:64), as irony, including sarcasm, is often used as a means to express one's frustration (Turner 1996:47). Duke (1982:232) comments: "Irony is precisely the appropriate instrument when reasoned argument has been set aside". This, and the breaking of the sincerity condition, constitutes sufficient evidence to suspect that this utterance may be ironic (there are more indications thereof by following steps A-ii-3, A-iv, A-v and A-vi). If this is indeed an ironic utterance, considering its primary illocutionary act to be requestive would not be unjustified. Consequently, the ironic aspect of this utterance should be identified and described, bearing in mind the issue at hand, namely to determine the primary illocutionary act.

4. According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (cf. section 1.6 in Chapter 2), three participants and types of irony should be identified (steps B-i and B-ii). Since the blind man spoke this utterance to the Jews, he is the ironist and the Jews are the target. The irony is located on the character level. The observer would be both the author and the reader. As it appears that the ironist intentionally uses the irony in his speech, this should be an instance of *verbal irony*.

There are some contradictions in the relationship between text and co-text in this utterance (step A-ii-2). Since the Jews explicitly stated to the blind man that the miracle worker was a sinner (v. 24), none of the Jewish authorities would even have considered becoming a disciple of that sinner (cf. John 3:1). The blind man was aware of this implication of their statement. Yet, he asked them whether they wished to become his disciples. This fact was a signal to the Jews that his question was not sincere and should not be taken literally. In this instance, pragmatic opposition determines the ironic effect (step B-iii-2). The blind man violated the *Quality Maxim* and possibly also the *Relation Maxim*, because he changed the topic of the conversation. He started a new phase of conversation with the completely different topic of discipleship. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:251) also points out: “The evangelist wants to bring back the idea of discipleship (cf. 8:31)” (cf. also Duke 1982:128).

The next analytical step involves ironic speech act conditions (step B-iv). As this verbal irony does not operate by virtue of neither propositional nor lexical opposition, propositional content conditions and the first preparatory condition do not apply to this case (steps B-iv-1 and B-iv-2-a). The second preparatory condition states (step B-iv-2-c): “The speaker takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act” (Amante 1981:85), and the blind man’s utterance meets this condition. The *Quantity Maxim* helps explain this. The blind man’s utterances in verse 27 constitute his response to the Jews’ question in verse 26. If he did not wish to argue with them, he would have omitted the last ironic speech act from his response. His first two utterances in verse 27 adequately convey the message that he no longer wanted to answer their questions. If he only wanted to say that, the *Quantity Maxim* compels him to remain silent. Communication breakdown would have occurred. However, he wished to start arguing with them by adding his ironic speech act, thus breaking the *Quantity Maxim*. It is thus logical to consider that the blind man’s ironic remark was intentionally aimed at them.

As for the sincerity condition (step B-iv-3), I indicated earlier that his utterance adheres to the ironic speech act condition. As the conclusion by essential conditions (step B-iv-4), the utterance of the blind man amounts

to deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act. In addition, in light of the above scrutiny, this irony is intended, covert, fixed and finite. This would be a stable Johannine irony.

5. The blind man's utterance has now been established as verbal irony. The ironic aspect of this utterance will contribute to determining its primary illocutionary act and his true intended message. My view would be that its primary illocutionary act is requestive, not suppositive, for the following reasons. *Firstly*, irony can be used as a satiric device to attack (Muecke [1969] 1980) or as an apparently friendly way of being offensive (Leech 1983:144). This function of irony corresponds with the notion of requestives, in which the blind man was challenging the Jews. This could be the true message which the blind man was intentionally but indirectly conveying to them. He now became a strong man who could stand up to an argument, if necessary. According to Resseguie (1982:300), "No longer is he that nameless blind man ... now he is confident of his own identity, and he confronts the religious authorities." Although, *secondly*, the general impression of his utterances (or the way in which the blind man formulated his speech) in verse 27 can form the basis of the blind man's supposition that the Jews may have wanted to become Jesus' disciples, this supposition cannot be justified when the remainder of the co-text is taken into account. The Jews would not have expressed such a wish, for they were convinced that the miracle worker was a sinner. This eliminates a potential suppositive speech act.

When the schema of requestives is applied to this text, the following will be gained:

In uttering "*You do not wish to become his disciples too, do you?*", the blind man requests the Jews to engage in his argument if the blind man expresses:

- i. the desire that the Jews engage in his argument, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews engage in his argument because (at least partly) of the blind man's desire.

6. Before drawing a conclusion on the primary illocutionary act, I should point out another issue. One may suspect that the blind man's utterance could be his rebuff, namely a sarcastic comment in which he merely wanted to exact retribution. In this instance, his utterance could be *assertive*, emphasising it more as a strong sarcasm. Reading this utterance as such is perhaps unlikely on account of the following observation from the author's perspective. If the author allows the blind man to opt out of the conversation at this point, the climax of the intense debate scene between the man and the Jews would be lost. From this point onward, their debate becomes fierce and dramatic (vv. 28-34). The man's argument in the debate is worth

reading. That is the 'juicy' part of this cluster. There is no way that the author could allow the man to utter this sarcasm without further intention, because the man's challenge and the Jews' response are integral to the story's development.

7. Hence, the primary illocutionary act of this utterance is indeed *requestive*, in that the blind man wished to argue with the Jews about the motive behind their repeated question, knowing that the Jewish authorities would take his verbal irony as a challenge. The author wants the reader to understand why the blind man made such an utterance in his response to the Jews, and to notice, once again, the blind man's intelligence and strength in his ironic expression and strategy.

c) Perlocutionary act

Since the blind man's utterance has two illocutionary forces, the Jews should first answer his question adequately and then accept the blind man's challenge to debate by recognising the irony in his utterance. The reader should note the changes in the blind man's self-consciousness and in his attitude towards the Jews, and should evaluate his ability to start arguing by using his verbal irony. In addition, for the reader's faith, the author may wish to warn the reader to re-examine his own position in relation to Jesus by asking two questions: Are you really Jesus' disciple, too? Can you show the same courage as that of the blind man?

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level, first*, the blind man's utterance is an expression of *irony*, and this irony is one of the important shifts between content and intent. Nida and others (1983:41) state that in irony "one does not mean precisely what is said, but the content indicates the shift in intent". As it was obvious to the blind man that the Jews were so occupied with their own religion and with keeping their positions, he never dreamed that they would abandon their own faith and become Jesus' disciples. For the Jews, to become Jesus' disciples was an unthinkable idea and something to be abhorred. Yet the fact that he asked them such a question clearly indicates that he intended to make an ironic comment.¹²⁶ This fact now heats up their conversation, thus making the story increasingly interesting by upholding the *Interest Principle*.

2. *Secondly*, the author portrays the development and strength of the blind man in terms of his character by virtue of his utterance (the entire

126 Cf. also Barrett 1955:300; Lindars [1972] 1981:348; Newman & Nida 1980:313; Beasley-Murray 1987:158; Carson 1991:373; Holleran 1993b:373.

utterance in v. 27). Thus far, the blind man has been portrayed as a passive figure who only utters his words when he is questioned. He now takes the initiative in the conversation and steers the direction of the dialogue (cf. Jones 1997:169). This marks a significant change in the communicative strategy.

3. *Thirdly*, as examined earlier, the blind man's verbal irony can be regarded as his challenge to the Jewish authorities. Bultmann (1971:336) states that he treats the insincerity of their inquiry with "the greatest possible irony". Bernard (1928:335) contends: "He could not refrain from this ironical gibe, which he must have known would irritate the Pharisees". He was now challenging the leaders openly. In ancient Mediterranean society, the social competition of challenge and response was regarded as a matter of life and death (cf. section 4.1.2 in Chapter 3). Equals usually competed with one another. However, in this instance, a man of low status in the community challenged the authorities, in one of the highest positions. He did so during the official legal proceedings. These facts make this competition even more serious. The reader can hardly wait to read the Jews' response.

4. *On the text level, first*, some scholars have raised an issue as to whether or not the blind man counted himself among Jesus' disciples. Morris (1971:491) takes the man's word 'too' as evidence for the positive view. Plummer ([1882] 1981:209) states that his word means not "as well as I" but "as well as His well-known disciples", and maintains that "the man has not advanced so far in faith as to count himself a disciple of Jesus". Lindars ([1972] 1981:347) shares the same view with Plummer, as far as his faith is concerned. Regardless of whether or not the man himself was conscious of this, the Jews deemed him as Jesus' disciple (v. 28). The character of the blind man is depicted and functioned as "his disciple" to represent Jesus in this controversy with the Jews. As far as the blind man is concerned, however, there is no indication that he agreed to the Jews' dichotomy of discipleship (v. 28). He could have conceived that a genuine disciple of Moses can concurrently be Jesus' disciple. In fact, the author wants to share this view with the reader (John 1:45; 3:14; 5:46; 7:23). Bultmann (1971:337) avers that the man was indeed a genuine disciple of Moses.

5. *Secondly*, the blind man's utterance observes the *Manner Maxim* in the sense that there is no ambiguity in the proposition stated. The content of the utterance is very clear, and there is no room for the hearers to miss the point of the question. It is, however, very interesting if one takes into account that this utterance is an indirect speech act, because ambiguity is usually inherent in indirect speech acts. The reason for this

unusual observation lies in the fact that this particular indirect speech act is formulated at the level, not of the proposition, but of illocutionary force. This fact further indicates that, at the illocutionary level, on the contrary, this *Manner Maxim* is violated as a result of this indirect speech act, which, in this instance, is his ironic expression. According to the *Irony Principle* adhered to in this utterance, “If you must cause offense, at least do so in a way which doesn’t overtly conflict with the Politeness Principle. Allow the hearer to grasp your offensive point by implicature” (Leech 1983:82). One criterion of irony in relation to this utterance is to mean “something different from what you say” (Haverkate 1990:97). Therefore, the use of irony must involve ambiguity. The same holds true for the domain of Textual Rhetoric. In the blind man’s utterance, the *Clarity Principle* with its two maxims, namely the *Transparency Maxim* and the *Ambiguity Maxim*, is observed between message and text at the propositional level. However the same principle, now in conjunction with the *Processibility Principle*, is flouted at the illocutionary level, due to his ironic expression. In addition, for reference sake only, the utterance upholds the *Economy Principle* by virtue of the *Reduction Maxim*, which makes use of pronominalisation in the expression ‘his’ disciples.

e) Summary

The primary illocutionary act of the blind man’s utterance is, by way of performing the secondary illocutionary act of questioning, that the blind man wished to start arguing with the Jewish authorities. This bold utterance is verbal irony and another instance of stable Johannine irony. From a speech act perspective, this irony is an indirect speech act in which the author utilises various conversational principles and maxims to establish it as an effective literary device for his communication with the reader. It is also noteworthy that the analysis of irony in the utterance can contribute to determining its illocutionary force. In addition, the author hides a signal in this irony concerning the personal development of the blind man; this hidden signal, in conjunction with the utterance itself, makes the story even more interesting. To my knowledge, no scholar has studied the irony in this instance as thoroughly as in this study.

7.3.3 The third subcluster (9:28-34)

After the second conversation, both parties became increasingly excited. They gradually realised the difference in the positions held by each party and what each party tried to accomplish through the interaction. The Jews, in particular, appeared to become emotional upon the blind man’s remarks and appeared to rapidly judge him. This third subcluster depicts the intense conversations between the Jews and the blind man, and portrays the Jews’

harsh treatment of him as the outcome of their discordant arguments. This subcluster is the last of their conversations in this cluster and therefore climactic. It can be divided into three units, cola 39, 40, and 41-42.

9:28 καὶ ἐλοιδόρησαν αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπον, Σὺ μαθητῆς εἶ ἐκείνου,
ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ Μωϋσέως ἐσμέν μαθηταί

a) General analysis

The Jews apparently understood the blind man's sarcasm and became furious. In colon 39, the author delineates their furious emotions by using the extraordinary word ἐλοιδόρησαν, meaning *to revile*, the only place in the four Gospels where it appears (Plummer [1882] 1981:209). The Jews' aim was to finally embarrass and destroy him. While the first conjunction καί in 39 links the Jews' reaction to his last remarks in 38 by means of a logical reason-result relationship, the second one simply connects the two verbs in the sentence. The contents of their abuse are recorded in the subsequent subcola. The contents in the direct quotations form two units, subcola 39.1-39.2 and 39.3-39.4. The first unit tells of their direct answer to his last question and the second is an explanation of their answer. Thus, colon 39 is examined according to each unit.

The Jews did not answer his question with a mere 'yes' or 'no', but with statements. In subcola 39.1-39.2, they said, "*You are that man's disciple, but we are Moses' disciples*". Their critical notion is evident from the present indicative verb εἶ in 39.1, for they seemed to be certain in their judging the blind man as Jesus' disciple, even though they did not know him very well. People manifest, generally speaking, this kind of tendency of being quick to pass judgment on others when they are extremely angry. It was at least true in this instance. More importantly for our purposes at present is that "Jesus and Moses, with their disciples, are intentionally thrown into sharp contrast" (Barrett 1955:300).¹²⁷ The genitive adjective ἐκείνου, referring to Jesus, "conveys a suggestion of contempt" (Bernard 1928:335).¹²⁸ In contrast to the first statement (39.1), subcolon 39.2 depicts their proud statement of being Moses' disciples. This was the position they wished to hold. The present indicative verb ἐσμέν helps convey their proud notion that they certainly were Moses' disciples. The contrast they wanted to effect is further highlighted by the nominative pronoun ἡμεῖς and by the adversative conjunction δέ. One should note that the genitive

127 Cf. this contrast structurally in the structural chart (cf. section 7.2 and Appendix 4).

128 Cf. also Morris 1971:491; Newman & Nida 1980:314; Carson 1991:372; Holleran 1993b:374.

noun Μωϋσέως has the article τοῦ, probably adding emphasis or distinction. Based on these observations, this verse reads: *And they reviled him, and said, "You are that man's disciple, but we are Moses' disciples."*

b) Illocutionary act

The last utterance of the blind man in an interrogative sentence is a very successful speech act, for the utterance is aimed at eliciting the Jews' response. In other words, this is a good instance of the intended perlocution being realised in the real perlocution. Therefore, as the blind man expected or even more than he expected, the Jews accepted his challenge and retorted by reviling him. They were ready to argue with this man. The narrator's choice of the word *to revile*, which describes the furious reaction of the Jews, is indicative of the Jews' state of mind. They meant by their words: "No, we do not want to become Jesus' disciples. We are totally happy with the present situation that we are Moses' disciples. You can just go ahead and follow that sinful man!" Hence, the illocutionary force of the Jews' utterance is both *responsive* and *disputative*. However, it is not an indirect speech act, for the meaning does not need to be rectified. It has two illocutionary forces. Briefly, the Jews intended to answer the blind man's question furiously; thus the Jews' utterance keeps the *Relation Maxim* intact. However, the author wants the reader to judge the issue as to which party was the real disciple(s) of God and why. The author invites the reader to make the right decision.

c) Perlocutionary act

The verb *revile* indicates that the perlocution of the Jews is to finally embarrass and destroy the blind man. He should be surprised and discouraged about, or even afraid of both the manner and content of the Jews' response. The reader should understand their response and their state of mind as well as the sense of parody displayed in situational irony (for this irony, cf. below).

d) Communicative strategy

1. I shall discuss *the communication on the character level*. In 'General analysis', I pointed out that the word *his* (disciple) conveys a sign of contempt. This, in conjunction with the narration, suggests that the Jews' utterance denotes a strong nuance. Carson (1991:373) remarks that "they respond by hurling insults", possibly with the aim of intimidating the blind man. The utterance then violates the *Politeness Principle*, particularly the *Approbation Maxim* (minimise dispraise of other).

2. Next, I shall discuss *the communication on both the character and the text levels simultaneously*. *Firstly*, the contrast which the Jews' utterance highlights between Jesus' disciples and Moses' disciples also adds more intensity to its meaning. In this sense, the utterance deliberately breaks the *Agreement Maxim* (minimise disagreement between self and other). The Jews wanted to distance themselves from the blind man and thus intended to create a dichotomy of discipleship and to demonstrate two points: i) only Moses' disciples were authentic and could acquire God's approval, and ii) Jesus' disciples were a sinner's group and nobody before God and the Jews. In this instance, "Moses and the Law are set over against Jesus and his teaching; the authority of Moses is indisputable, the authority of Jesus is spurious" (Beasley-Murray 1987:158). Of course, Jesus' disciples, including the blind man, understood it differently. However, since the Jews formulated the argument in this way, "[m]en must now ally themselves with either the new Moses or the old" (Barrett 1955:300; cf, also Lindars [1972] 1981:348). This dichotomy increases the reader's fascination, and may draw the reader deeper into the story; thus, the *Interest Principle* is operative. Moreover, as for the reader, "[w]hat is at stake ... is a profoundly hermeneutical question: How is the antecedent revelation to be understood with reference to the new revelation in the person and teaching of Jesus the Messiah?" (Carson 1991:374). As far as this question is concerned, the author has already indicated some of his views on Moses to the reader (1:17-18, 45; 3:14; 5:45; 7:23).

3. *Secondly*, the Jews' self-designation, Moses' disciples, should be examined according to the *Manner Maxim*. Is this expression perspicuous to the blind man and the reader? As mentioned in the section on 'Mutual religious beliefs' (section 4.3 in Chapter 3), the characters and the reader know Moses well. The reader has already been exposed several times to the figure of Moses.¹²⁹ In this sense, the *Manner Maxim* is adhered to.

4. *On the text level, first*, when the utterance is examined as it is, it is a very appropriate or successful speech act. It observes four Principles with their five Maxims. Because of the clear relationship between the message and the text, the utterance upholds the *Clarity Principle* with its *Transparency* and *Ambiguity Maxims*. Because the reader finds it easy to decode the utterance, and new and strong information (we are Moses' disciples) is placed at the end of the text, it upholds the *Processibility Principle* with its *End-Focus* and *End-Weight Maxims* intact. Because of the use of the pronoun, the *Economy Principle* with its *Reduction Maxim* is upheld. Moreover, because of the contrast, the *Expressivity Principle* is

129 In addition to the above references, 5:46; 6:32; 7:19, 22; 8:5, it is noteworthy that in John the reference to Moses only appears in the first nine chapters.

operative within the aesthetic aspect of the text. Note that this utterance does not appear to flout any rule in the domain of Textual Rhetoric.

5. *Secondly*, if the Jews' utterance is isolated from the co-text and examined independently, its illocutionary force is most likely assertive. However, the speech situation in this instance indicates that its force is more than assertive. In fact, it cannot be assertive. Because of the co-text, the utterance should be perceived as responsive. It is designed to be the answer to the blind man's last utterance. Because of the narrator's comment, it conveys a nuance of strong aggressiveness and hostility directed at the blind man. Why? Because the Jews detected the expression of irony in his last utterance and accepted his challenge. The debate between them was inevitably heated up, because the Jews' honour was at stake in the honour-shame society. Thus the force of *disputative* is present in the Jews' utterance. This is how the author leaves significant clues, guiding the reader to understand the utterance (and the story) in a specific way as planned by the author.

6. *Thirdly*, Botha (1991d:214) indicates a possible occurrence of irony in this instance. Why? The reader who has been provided with some information about Moses by the author thus far may suspect a contradiction in the Jews' self-designation, Moses' disciples. These constitute indications for an instance of irony (steps A-ii-2 and A-vii; steps A-iv and A-v), according to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2). However, since the Jews' utterance does not transgress the *Quality Maxim*, the Jews did not intend to employ irony. Therefore, their utterance would be an occurrence of situational irony on the text level. If the reader's suspicion is correct, this utterance could be dramatic irony and/or irony of self-betrayal. Before pursuing this further, the reader's knowledge needs to be ascertained.

According to the reader's knowledge about Moses thus far (cf. also 'Mutual story beliefs on Jesus' in section 4.1 in Chapter 3), there is no evidence to justify the Jews' dichotomy of discipleship. In fact, Moses wrote of Jesus, and Jesus indicated that to believe Moses means to believe Jesus (5:46). Jesus was fulfilling the Law of Moses (7:22-23). Moses was the one who would accuse the Jews (5:45), for they did not carry out the law of Moses (7:19). The Jews themselves should have borne these insights in mind, because they were told to them directly. Beasley-Murray (1987:158) contends that "the reader of this Gospel knows ... Moses is not an opponent of Jesus but a witness to him, and therefore a witness against the Jews who reject Moses' testimony to Jesus in the Law" (cf. also Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:251; Culpepper 1983:175). Van der Watt (1985:81) also suggests: "'John's Gospel, Old Testament figures like Moses, Abraham,

and the prophets are held in high esteem. Although Jesus is contrasted with Moses, it is never that Moses belongs to the darkness ... The contrast between Moses and Jesus is therefore not negative ... it is rather a contrast of intensity.”

In light of the reader’s beliefs, we can conclude that the irony, in this instance, is not dramatic irony, but *irony of self-betrayal*, for this is not perceived through the reader’s knowledge of what the Jews had yet to find out (step B-ii-2-a). The Jews also had this information, but were not willing to accept it, preferring to adhere to their own understanding of Moses. This was an error due to their unbelief. Therefore, this irony of self-betrayal results from the victims’ (the Jews) utterance, which unconsciously shows their own error (step B-ii-2-c). There is no ironist, and the observers are the author and the reader. The Jews did not grasp the truth about Moses correctly, yet they proudly claimed that they were his disciples. This is comical and interesting. Thus this irony perhaps serves “as a way of involving readers in the communication process of the text” (O’Day 1986:30) and as “an individual, or psychological, strategy of control, and as a social device for group cohesiveness” (Roy 1981:409). In addition, it invites the reader to approach the author’s theology and faith (Culpepper 1983:180). Some scholars take this expression of disciples of Moses and Jesus as another reference to the conflict between the synagogue and the Johannine community.¹³⁰

e) Summary

The striking aspect of the Jews’ utterance, in this instance, is its violations of the *Approbation and Agreement Maxims*. This is their open attack on the blind man in the debate. That is the reason why the speech act is mainly disputative. The majority of conversational rules are kept intact in the utterance, as noted earlier, and the message becomes clear as a result. Furthermore, the irony of self-betrayal adds a sense of parody and suggests more implications in the utterance, deepening the implicit communication between the author and the reader.

130 E.g., Brown 1966:380; 1984:104; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:251; Martyn [1968] 1979:39; Beasley-Murray 1987:158; Carson 1991:374.

9:29 ἡμεῖς οἶδαμεν ὅτι Μωϋσῆι λελάληκεν ὁ θεός, τοῦτον δὲ οὐκ οἶδαμεν ποθεν ἔστιν.

a) General analysis

Subcola 39.3-39.4 provide the reason for the Jews' statements. The author presents two contrasting reasons. These contrasts (in 39.1-39.4) not only add emphasis, but also increase cohesion in the unit. The author seems to excel at employing this kind of rhetorical device in order to achieve deeper meaning, while using plain words to describe a conversation or event. The first reason is written down in 39.3, and tells of what the Jews knew: *we know that God has spoken to Moses*. God's direct address to Moses is frequently mentioned in the Pentateuch (Barrett 1955:301; Lindars [1972] 1981:348; Ex 33:11). In subcolon 39.4, the other reason reveals what they did not know in contrast to their existing knowledge. The pronoun *τοῦτον* occurs at the beginning of the sentence, suggesting that it may be in an emphatic position.¹³¹ The meaning of 39.4 is: *but as for this man, we do not know where he is from*.

The issue at stake regarding the reasons mentioned by the Jews is the authenticity of the figures. They claimed that Moses was an agent of God, because God had spoken to him. But they disqualified Jesus by saying that he was nobody. Nobody knew his origin or identity. They even counted him among the sinners, not among decent Jews (cf. colon 35). Therefore, they also imply that the blind man who tried to defend Jesus should also be regarded as one of the sinners, because he was, according to them, Jesus' disciple. Their assertion was a harsh insult both to Jesus and to the blind man.

Before proceeding to colon 40, one should note that the author may use another rhetorical device in colon 39. There may be a chiasm in 39.1-39.4:

¹³¹ Barrett (1955:301) is of the opinion that “*τοῦτον* is attracted out of its proper position in the indirect interrogative clause into the principal sentence”. It is difficult to discern its function due to the syntax of the sentence. There are two possibilities. One is that this pronoun may be the object of the main verb (*οὐκ οἶδαμεν*). If so, the subsequent clause in 39.4.1 may stand in apposition to the pronoun, explaining something about him. The other possibility is that it may be the adverbial accusative case, intending to denote in what respect something or someone is described (Fowler *et al.* 1985:318). However, there is a sense of limitation in this usage. The majority of English translations hold this view. The sub-clause in 39.4.1 may become the object of the main verb *οἶδαμεν*. The latter seems to be preferred, because it results in a smoother translation.

John 9:28	39.1	Σὺ μαθητῆς εἶ ἐκείνου,	: a
	39.2	ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ Μωϋσέως ἐσμεν μαθηταί	: b
John 9:29	39.3	ἡμεῖς οἶδαμεν ὅτι Μωϋσεὶ λελάληκεν ὁ θεός,	: b'
	39.4	τοῦτον δὲ οὐκ οἶδαμεν πόθεν ἐστίν	: a'

The chiasmic pattern emerges around the lexical (and semantic) parallels between the related subcola. The sentences b and b' share the same words ἡμεῖς and Μωϋσέως. The sentences a and a' share the same referent, Jesus, because both pronouns ἐκείνου and τοῦτον refer to him. As mentioned earlier, there are also two sets of contrasts between a and b, and between b' and a' in this chiasm.

To summarise, this verse is rendered as follows: “*We know that God has spoken to Moses, but as for this man, we do not know where he is from.*”

b) Illocutionary act

As in the last utterance of the Jews, this utterance also contains contrastive statements that emphasise the distinction they wanted to make. The distinction concerns the credibility or authenticity of the contrastive figures, namely Moses and Jesus. To the Jews, Moses came from God because God spoke to him, but Jesus came from nowhere, definitely not from God, because no one knew Jesus' origin nor identity. They were certain of this, for the speech act of their utterance, in this instance, is both *assertive* and *disputative*. Constatives, in general, including these two, express a belief (Bach & Harnish 1979:44). The Jews sincerely believed Jesus' unknown origin. Thus, the utterance adheres to the *Quality Maxim*. The illocutionary force of responsive is depreciated, for this utterance serves as an explanation (or reason) for their last utterance (v. 28). In the explanatory utterance, the force of assertive gains more strength.

Because of the contrastive relationship, these two statements express antithetical meanings on the surface. These should be treated as a unit from a speech act perspective, because their sequence may be goal-directed and entail one global speech act in terms of the *Construction Rule* (this constructs a new proposition). Accordingly, what the Jews truly wanted to convey was their claim that they were disciples of Moses, not of Jesus. They elaborated on the same point described in their last utterance. They may intend to offer their counter-opinion to the blind man regarding his previous claim that Jesus was also a prophet (who came from God) (v. 17). Therefore, in this instance, one global speech act of the Jews' utterance is *disputative*. Briefly, the Jews intended to argue with the blind man by stating Jesus' origin and identity. However, their point of dispute was rather weak, due to their lack of true knowledge. The author intends to

teach the reader how to interpret the Jews' utterance by virtue of irony, and to bring the reader closer to his viewpoint again.

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should take the Jews' utterance as a counter-challenge to his understanding of Jesus. The reader should recognise the use of irony in the Jews' utterance, and consider it to be the author's device to help him understand the Jews' utterance and to draw him closer to the author's viewpoint.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, the Jews used the same strategy as in the last utterance, which highlighted the contrast between Moses and Jesus. Again, they elevated the status of Moses, but dishonoured that of Jesus. Therefore, their utterance also violates the *Approbation* and *Agreement Maxims*. These violations strengthen the intensity of the utterance.

2. The observations of the four Maxims (*Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner*) under the *Cooperative Principle* enhance the effectiveness of the utterance in conveying the message to the hearer, the blind man. The utterance is concise, but straight to the point. It expresses what the Jews believed to be true. It is relevant and perspicuous. It is thus an appropriate speech act.

3. *On the text level*, the quality of this text can also be attested by the adherence to the *Clarity Principle* with its *Transparency* and *Ambiguity Maxims*, the *Processibility Principle*, and the *Reduction Maxim*. The relationship between the message and the text is clear.

4. However, in this instance, the most significant communicative strategy would be another Johannine irony that can be identified on the text level. Both the author and the reader know that Jesus came from God, the Father. Yet the Jews asserted that they did not know it. This is indicative of an occurrence of irony (cf. steps A-ii-2; A-iv, A-v and A-vii.). Since it appears that the Jews uttered what they believed to be true and had no intention to use irony, this would again be a case of situational irony. Concerning Jesus' origin, the author has already told the truth to the reader on many occasions.¹³² In 7:27, some of the people of Jerusalem said that they also knew where Jesus was from (but they did not know where the Christ was from). The fact that the people who were not the rulers knew Jesus' origin strongly indicates that the Jewish leaders also knew it. But

132 E.g., the Prologue, 3:2, 17, 34; 5:36; 6:33-38, 51; 7:29; 8:23, 42; cf. also 'Mutual story beliefs on Jesus' in section 4.1 in Chapter 3.

this inference will not be required. The Jewish authorities themselves were also supposed to know this truth by the information that was told directly to them (e.g., 5:24, 36-38; 7:16; 8:23, 26, 29, 42; cf. 5:17-18). Therefore, in this instance, their utterance reveals another instance of *irony of self-betrayal* (step B-ii-3). This is perceived from the victims' utterance, which unconsciously demonstrates their own error. The observers are again the author and the reader, and this irony is located at the text level.

5. This irony has various implications. It may be designed as "a means of expressing antagonism" (Turner 1996:47) and may further highlight the contrast depicted in the utterance. It serves as "an heuristic device to make one's interpretation clearer" (Muecke [1969] 1980:232). A clearer interpretation would be that the irony exposes the Jews' ignorance, which drew them even more into a state of spiritual blindness. Bultmann (1971:336) remarks that their ignorance "confirms Jesus' saying that his origin is hidden from them (8.14; 7:28)". Beasley-Murray (1987:158) avers: "Ignorance as to the origin of Jesus is the fount of their misguided opposition to Jesus: He comes from God with a revelation from God, and so with God-given authority." However, the Jews did not comprehend God's revelation or his works (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:251). Yet, they were so proud of being the disciples of Moses to whom God spoke face to face (Ex 33:11; Nm 12:2-8; cf. also Bernard 1928:335). Therefore, this irony further invites the reader to judge the Jews' unbelief, displayed by their ignorance. Through this judgment, the reader is drawn more to the author's side. In this sense, the irony is also used as a social device for group cohesiveness (Roy 1981:409).

6. *Lastly*, in light of the above observations, it is significant and interesting to note that "both 7:27 and 9:29 are simultaneously false and ironically true" (Carson 1991:373; cf. Barrett 1955:301; Holleran 1993b:375). Witherington (1995:184) concludes that "with irony, speaking more truth than they realize, they say that they do not know" Jesus' origin (cf. also Duke 1982:188). Certainly, this irony says more than what the utterance says. On this point, the reader can observe the operation of the *Interest Principle* in this utterance.

e) Summary

By using the same line of argument as in the last utterance (comparison between Moses and Jesus), the Jews intended to argue with the blind man. They continued to argue due to his breaking the *Maxims of Agreement* and *Approbation*. To get the message across to him, however, their utterance keeps the *Cooperative Principle* intact. The reader is meant to have a deep

understanding of their utterance by virtue of their irony, which means more than what it says. The author's communicative strategy works perfectly.

9:30 ἀπεκρίθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς, Ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστίν, ὅτι ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε πόθεν ἐστίν, καὶ ἤνοιξέν μου τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

a) General analysis

Upon receiving the Jews' harsh insult, the blind man answered them in colon 40. His answer can be divided into four independent semantic points in the following four units: subcola 40.1, 40.2, 40.3 and 40.4. The blind man's most important set of statements is thus described in these four units. I shall now proceed with the analysis, according to these units.

The main clause in this colon can be considered to be one colon, because the aorist verbs ἀπεκρίθη and εἶπεν basically portray the same activity. Subcolon 40.1 depicts his sarcastic astonishment after hearing the Jews' answer in colon 39, in conjunction with his first response to it. The prepositional phrase ἐν τούτῳ in 40.1 may be emphatic, as prepositional phrases usually follow the verb; in this instance, it starts the sentence. This phrase is a Johannine phrase (Barrett 1955:301), and indicates the sphere of his astonishment, referring to the Jews' previous comment, especially in 39.4. This sphere is further delineated by the embedded sentence 40.1.1. The adjective θαυμαστόν in 40.1 is a strong word.¹³³

His amazement basically consisted of two items, as displayed in 40.1.1 and 40.1.2. The conjunction ὅτι in 40.1.1 introduces two clauses that are in apposition with the articular adjective τὸ θαυμαστόν, explaining these two items. Regarding the first item, his complete surprise stemmed from the Jews' ignorance about Jesus. As usual, the perfect verb οἴδατε serves to stress this present state of their ignorance, along with the particle οὐκ. The blind man identified the people who were ignorant by adding the second person plural pronoun ὑμεῖς (cf. Morris 1971:492; Plummer [1882]

133 As for the conjunction γάρ, there seems to be no consensus among the English Bibles concerning its function. This conjunction is most frequently used as a causal one. However, this usage does not fit the present co-text. Hence, the NIV takes it as an exegetical conjunction, meaning *now that is*. The NASB interprets it as an interjection, *well*. The RSV does not even attempt to translate it. The KJV provides an obscure word, *why*. Although it may still be acceptable to view this as an inferential conjunction (Bernard 1928:336), the emphatic usage may be preferred in this instance, meaning *indeed* or *certainly*, because this sentence expresses the blind man's amazement.

1981:210). In addition, 40.1.1.1 describes the specific content of their ignorance, and thus the blind man said, “*you do not know where he is from*”. Basically, 40.1.1 is a synonymous repetition of 39.4. He mimicked them and duplicated their exact words, except for the subject that was added in his sentence. This is one of the reasons that his amazement is considered sarcastic. Concerning the second item, he tried to remind them of what Jesus had accomplished, as if he were saying that it was an amazing thing for the Jews not to remember that Jesus had opened his eyes. He pointed out that there was a big gap between their ignorance and the facts of the miracle. This point leads to two rhetorical features, namely contrast and irony (for this irony, see the section on ‘CS’ below). The contrast is indicated by the semantic contents and the conjunction *καί* in 40.1.2, which functions in an adversative rather than an additive manner (cf. Barrett 1955:301). One should note that 40.1.2 is basically a synonymous repetition of 26.1.1, which is an utterance from the Pharisees (these Jews included). His astonishment, therefore, also emerged from their typical stubborn and unbelieving attitudes. For this reason, his amazement would sound sarcastic. Therefore, the entire verse is translated as follows: *The man answered and said to them, “In this, indeed, here is the astonishing thing, that you do not know where he is from, and yet he opened my eyes.”*

b) Illocutionary act

Like the perlocutionary act of the Jews’ last utterance points out, the blind man took their utterance as a challenge and responded to them with his sarcastic remark; this was, in fact, an expression of astonishment. In this astonishment, the man’s utterance performs a few different illocutionary acts. This is not an indirect speech act, for its meaning does not need to be fixed. One of the illocutionary acts would be *descriptive*, for the blind man described the contradiction in the Jews’ perception of Jesus. Despite the fact that Jesus opened his eyes, the Jews did not accept that Jesus came from God. “The ‘amazing thing’ is not faith, but unbelief!” (Beasley-Murray 1987:158; cf. also Morris 1971:490; Carson 1991:374). The man’s astonishment captures this unbelief. The schema of descriptives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42) is as follows:

Descriptives: (appraise, assess, call, categorize, characterize, classify, date, describe, diagnose, evaluate, grade, identify, portray, rank)

In uttering *e*, *S* describes *o* as *F* if *S* expresses:

- i. the belief that *o* is *F*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* believe that *o* is *F*.

When this schema is applied to this utterance, the following is the result:

In uttering “*In this, indeed, here is the astonishing thing, that you do not know where he is from, and yet he opened my eyes*”, the blind man describes the Jews’ perception as amazing if the blind man expresses:

- i. the belief that the Jews’ perception is amazing, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that the Jews’ perception is amazing.

As the blind man appeared to express his belief and intention, as described above, the utterance would be a successful speech act of descriptive. Another illocutionary act would be *assertive*. The man’s astonishment denotes a very strong assertion that the Jews should definitely know Jesus better. In addition, there is at least one more illocutionary act. Many scholars notice that “the ironical surprise is similar to that of Jesus in 3.10” (Lindars [1972] 1981:348).¹³⁴

Even though the speech situation in 9:30 is obviously different from that in 3:10, the speech act performed in these two utterances is similar. In 3:10, Jesus, superior to Nicodemus, taught him about spiritual rebirth. In 9:30, the blind man, inferior to the Jewish authorities, voiced his astonishment to them directly in the dispute. But these utterances have a disputative illocutionary force. The blind man was advocating his point in the argument in the form of astonishment. His utterance, therefore, causes a comical and ironic twist. Dockery (1988:21) states that “the man sarcastically and humorously responds”. Culpepper (1983:175) considers the man’s utterance “the dull blade of sarcasm”. I shall return to this irony. We have observed that the speech situation suggests that another illocutionary act of this man’s utterance is again *disputative*.

To summarise, the blind man intended to express his amazement to the Jews, pointing out the contradictory nature of their perception of Jesus. The blind man regards it as funny and shocking that, although Jesus opened his eyes, the religious leaders did not know where Jesus was from. The author wants the reader to agree with the blind man’s amazement and support the blind man in their dispute.

134 Cf. also Brown 1966:375; Duke 1982:188; Dockery 1988:21. Saayman (1994:16) rightly observes concerning 3:10: “As an expression of *astonishment* (expressive speech act “*I can’t believe that you do not know*”) verse 10 amounts to a *reproach* (“*You should have known*”) and can even be seen as a (mocking) *denial* (constative speech act, namely a disputative) of Nicodemus’s position {“*You pretend to be [with reference to οἶδαμεν (we know) in verse 2] but...*”} (cf. Van Tilborg 1988:10; Pancaro 1975:87: “The polemical undertones can hardly be denied”).”

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should note the point of the blind man's astonishment and start asking themselves what was wrong with their perception. In other words, *his intended perlocution* is that they should feel shamed by his descriptive speech act. They should reconsider their position and opinion as a result of his assertive speech act. He further intended to persuade them to comply with his understanding through his disputative illocution. In addition, the reader should take the blind man's side in their debate by sharing his amazement. Hence, the author intends to convince the reader to continue reading.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, the blind man's utterance observes the *Maxims of Relation* and *Manner* very closely. It takes the reference to Jesus' origin as the point of contact to link to the Jews' previous utterance. It forms his counter-argument well. The blind man did not hesitate to talk to them about the unpleasant subject at all. The message is very explicit.

2. Bernard (1928:335) remarks that the blind man 'is now thoroughly angry, and he goes on to argue in his turn, shrewdly enough, beginning with a mocking retort'. Although the man may have been very angry because of their revilement, the text does not indicate this explicitly. Even if he was thoroughly angry, he did not appear to lose his temper. His argument was very 'cool'. His response seemed to be calculated, and is in fact magnificent and climactic irony (Holleran 1993b:375). In fact, his utterance still upholds the *Irony Principle*, encouraging the speaker, if he must cause offence, to do so at least "in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle]" (Leech 1983:82). Leech (1983:144) explains this aspect that irony "is an apparently friendly way of being offensive". Evidently this is exactly what the man did.

According to the verifying steps in the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), three participants should be identified (step B-i). It is obvious from the above observation that the blind man is the ironist and that this irony is located on the story level. The victims are the Jews and the observers are both the author and the reader. Most importantly, this is an instance of *verbal irony*, which is intentionally employed by the ironist (step B-ii-1). The nature of opposition in this irony would be counterfactual propositional opposition (step B-iii-1), in that the projected expectation that the Jews claimed that Jesus was not from God, is negated at some point. Thus the proposition that Jesus was not from God becomes that Jesus was from God. This opposition will further be tested by applying

ironic speech act conditions (step B-iv): (proposition *P* = that Jesus was not from God, proposition *P'* = that Jesus was from God)

Propositional content conditions (step B-iv-1): In the man's utterance, propositions *P* and *P'* identify Jesus as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions (step B-iv-2): i) The blind man believes the Jews can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues ('not') in *P* and *P'* and contextual clues (Jesus opened his eyes). ii) The blind man takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act.

Sincerity conditions (step B-iv-3): The blind man believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain.

Essential conditions (step B-iv-4): The man's utterance counts as the undertaking of deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

Thus the man's utterance under consideration is now established as verbal irony. It is intended, covert, fixed and finite. This can also be called stable Johannine irony. Holleran (1993b:375) avers: "The emphatic ὑμεῖς not only throws *their* ignorance into bold relief, but implies with subtle irony that *he* may know more than they". Steps B-v and C are already indicated in the analysis on 'Illocutionary and perlocutionary act' above. However, if we add more, this irony serves as "a satiric device to attack" (Muecke [1969] 1980:232; cf, also Turner 1996:47) and similarly as "appeal and weapon" (Duke 1982:56-65). The blind man was now full of courage to face the vicious authorities.

3. *On the text level*, the operation of the *Expressivity Principle* prevails for the sake of impression in the repetitious expressions, "where he is from" and 'he opened my eyes', than that of the flouting of the *Economy Principle*. However, in the man's utterance, the *Reduction Maxim* under this *Economy Principle* is upheld through pronominalisation. The problematic nature of the conjunction γάρ, in terms of its function, partially transgresses both the *Processibility* and the *Clarity Principles* (cf. the section on 'GA' above).

4. The blind man's counter-attack on the Jews in his verbal irony may be anticipated by the reader based on the latter's observation in v. 27, but it surely surprises the reader that the man did in fact respond with courage and wit. The reader will find this to be a fascinating difference between the man and his parents in the last scene. In this sense, the *Interest Principle* is actively at work.

5. Significant in the narration is the author's usage of the noun ἄνθρωπος to refer to the blind man. The author does so seven times in Chapter 9.

It is used in someone's utterance whenever the author wishes to refer to Jesus (9:11, 9:16, 9:24, 9:35). It is, however, used in the narrator's voice whenever the author wishes to refer to the blind man (9:1, 9:24, 9:30). When the author uses it as such, he always does so markedly, trying to draw the reader's attention. *No scholar seems to have previously mentioned this insight*. For example, in 9:1, the author introduces the blind man using this word for the first time, because it is crucial to the story. As 9:24 also marks a significant point in the plot of the story, the author reintroduces the blind man using the same word in the second interrogation by the Jews. In 9:30, the blind man is about to make his most important set of statements in the dialogues with the Jews. This is the reason why the author makes use of this word once again, not simply a pronoun, to warn the reader not to miss what the blind man had to say.

e) Summary

The blind man intended to fight back against the Jews by uttering the disputative speech act. However, his utterance also displays other illocutions, namely descriptive and assertive. Although each illocution has its own distinctive perlocution, the general perlocution would be to persuade the Jews to comply with the man's view. In addition, the blind man effectively used verbal irony in attempting to achieve this goal. Among the conversational rules, the adherence to the *Irony Principle* would be most significant in this utterance.

9:31 οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἁμαρτωλῶν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἀκούει, ἀλλ' ἂν τις θεοσεβῆς ἦ καὶ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιῆ τούτου ἀκούει.

a) General analysis

The blind man's second statement in subcolon 40.2 is based on the consensus among the Jewish people, assuming that the group consisted of the priests, the leaders and the community at large (cf. Morris 1971:492), concerning a truth regarding the relationship between God and his people. According to Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:252), this may also refer to the future Christian community (cf. also Brown 1966:380). This assumption is derived from the perfect first person plural verb οἴδαμεν. The substance of this statement primarily includes two points. The conjunction ὅτι in 40.2.1 introduces these two points. The first point in 40.2.1 describes God's first principle in dealing with sinners, namely that *God does not hear sinners*. As for the second point, 40.2.4* is the main clause and the apodosis of the afore-mentioned conditional clauses. Based on the observation that

there is an adversative relationship between 40.2.4* and 40.2.1 and that they form a unit, in this instance, there may be an ellipsis in 40.2.4*. The subject, God, and his action in 40.2.4* are indicated by the present verb ἀκούει. The person heard is signified by the pronoun τούτου, referring to the godly person in the conditional clauses. The sentence may focus on this man, because the pronoun is in an emphatic position. Briefly, the blind man expressed: *We know that God does not hear sinners, but if anyone is devout and does his will, he hears this man.*

b) Illocutionary act

As noted earlier, there are two propositions in the blind man's utterance. One is that God does not hear sinners. The other is that God hears godly people. Although these propositions are in contrast to each other, they can, for the sake of analysis, be transformed into one *macroproposition* by the *Construction macrorule*: God hears and helps not a sinner, but a godly person. As in the case of the last utterance, when the debate becomes intense and probes the topic increasingly deeper, the force of an individual utterance seems to become complex. It is not unusual to have various illocutionary acts in one utterance. This is the nature of the man's utterance in this verse.

Firstly, the blind man continued to build his case against the Jews by appealing to the common religious beliefs shared by Jewish people. It is striking that the man used the verb ὀδοῦμεν, 'we know'. He did not say, 'I know'. Through an implicature, the blind man may mean that his statement was not only his conviction, but also a timeless truth every decent Jew may share regarding God. Thus, the above macroproposition constitutes a norm. Therefore, its illocution would be *descriptive*: the blind man described the beliefs as a norm. *Secondly*, by virtue of another implicature, the man's utterance is meant as a strong assertion that the Jews should also know this. Hence, the illocution would be *assertive*. *Thirdly*, the blind man intended to teach the Jews about (or, at least, remind them of) the basic principles of God's attributes, because the macroproposition constitutes a norm and the Jews should know this; yet they did not appear to know this. In this case, his utterance would be an *informative* speech act. *Fourthly*, his utterance was nonetheless made in the speech situation of the intense debate. The force of *disputative* cannot be ignored. Hence, the man's utterance exhibits at least four illocutionary acts (but not an indirect speech act). Relatively speaking, the force of disputative seems to be dominant in the utterance.

Briefly, the blind man intended to remind the Jews of the basic principles of God's attributes in case they forgot such principles. The author also

intends to teach or inform the reader of the relationships between God and his people in the blind man's utterance.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should accept God's principles as expressed by the blind man, and apply them to the present issue concerning Jesus. The reader should learn or be reminded of how God deals with his people. The reader should also understand that these were commonly held principles among Jewish people.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, the blind man's utterance appears to break no conversational rules. Instead, all four Maxims of the *Cooperative Principle* seem to be kept intact in the utterance. This utterance, regarding the *Relation Maxim*, continues to talk of the work of God through which God's people know that God hears them. This is also a reference to Jesus' work in the blind man. Moreover, by virtue of the phrase "we know", the man endeavoured to relate to the Jews' arguments in verse 29 (cf. also Brown 1966:375; Newman & Nida 1980:314). The phrase also introduces "a maxim which no one will dispute" (Bernard 1928:336; cf. 3:2; 1 John 5:18). As far as the *Manner Maxim* is concerned, the message will not be misconstrued if the phrase "God does not hear sinners" is understood correctly. Barrett (1955:301) explains: "It is of course not denied that the penitent prayer of a repenting sinner is heard; it is the hypothetical prayer of one who has no intention of offering obedience that is disregarded" (cf. also Newman & Nida 1980:314-315). "'Sinners' refers to those unwilling to reform" (Brown 1966:375). The concept in this phrase appears to be a major religious belief among Jewish people (e.g., Job 27:8-9; 35:12-13; Ps 66:18; 109:7; Is 1:15). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:251-252) also points out that this is "an idea which occurs frequently in Jewish writings". There is no indication in the text that the characters on stage wrongly understood this concept. Hence, the *Manner Maxim* remains intact.

2. What of the other proposition that God hears the righteous? This concept also appears to be a major mutual religious belief among Jewish people (e.g., 1 Chr 5:20; Ezr 8:23; Ps 6:9; 65:2; 66:19-20; Pr 15:29; John 16:23-27; 1 John 3:21-22). Again, Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:252) indicates that, in this instance, the blind man's words were similar to a rabbinic saying. More importantly, perhaps the man had Jesus on his mind when he uttered this. The reader knows that the man was right about Jesus, for "Jesus 'did the will of God' is a frequent thought in Jn For the answer always given to His prayers" (Bernard 1928:336).

3. As far as the blind man's phrase mimicking the authorities is concerned, Holleran (1993b:375) comments that "his adoption of οἶδαμεν, which has served as a leitmotif of the authorities' pronouncements (vv. 24, 29), is triply ironic". Stibbe (1993:106-107) also finds parody in the phrase and regards the man's utterance as heavily ironic. Their remarks suspect an occurrence of irony in this instance (step A-vii of 'The analytical outline' in section 1.6 in Chapter 2). Other factors are also indicative of its occurrence (e.g., step A-ii-2, A-ii-3, A-v and A-vi). According to the verifying steps, if the blind man intended his utterance to be ironic, it would be *verbal irony* in which the ironist is the man and the victims are once again the Jews (steps B-i and B-ii-1). This irony would be located on the story level. The observers are the author and the reader. The nature of opposition in this irony would be counterfactual propositional opposition (step B-iii-1). The projected expectation that the Jews should know where Jesus is from is negated at some point: the proposition that everyone knows that God hears and helps not a sinner but a godly person, becomes that everyone does not know that God hears and helps not a sinner, but a godly person. I will further test this opposition by applying the ironic speech act conditions (step B-iv): (proposition *P* = that everyone knows that God hears and helps not a sinner, but a godly person, proposition *P'* = that everyone does not know that God hears and helps not a sinner, but a godly person).

Propositional content conditions (step B-iv-1): In the man's utterance, propositions *P* and *P'* identify the belief that God hears and helps not a sinner, but a godly person, as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions (step B-iv-2): i) The blind man believes the Jews can the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues ('not') in *P* and *P'* and contextual clues (God heard Jesus). ii) The blind man takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act.

Sincerity conditions (step B-iv-3): The blind man believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain.

Essential conditions (step B-iv-4): The man's utterance counts as the undertaking of deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

Thus the man's utterance under consideration is now established as verbal irony; it is also intended, covert, fixed and finite. This means that the utterance is another stable Johannine irony. It further indicates that the utterance upholds the *Irony Principle*: the blind man overtly caused offence to the Jews. Holleran (1993b:375) again remarks: "The man has moved from οὐκ οἶδα (v. 12), to ἐν οἶδα (v. 25), to οἶδαμεν (v. 31)!" But the Jews did not appear to have knowledge of even the basic principles of God. "So

the final irony of the man's *οἶδαμεν* serves to contrast the authorities' 'lack of knowledge with the knowledge of believing Jews'" (Holleran 1993b:376). By virtue of this irony, the blind man was mocking either their ignorance or their unbelief. They were either stupid or stubborn in that they did not want to recognise Jesus' miracle according to the principles of God.

4. In addition, there is another irony in this utterance *on the text level*. This would be *irony of events* derived from the outcome of an event that is neither expected nor desired. From the religious leaders' perspective, the fact that an uneducated person such as the blind man was teaching (or reminding) them of basic theology was neither expected nor desired. Therefore, the victims are the Jews, but there is no ironist. This irony is located on the text level and is observed by both the author and the reader. It serves as a device for involving the reader more deeply in the communication process of the text (O'Day 1986:30), because this amuses the reader. The *Interest Principle* is operative in this sense.

5. One should note that the blind man's utterance does not seem to flout any of the textual rules. Instead, the majority of the Principles are kept intact. *Firstly*, because of the contrast portrayed in God's dealings with his people, the *Expressivity Principle* is working for the sake of the aesthetic aspect of the text. *Secondly*, as usual, the *Reduction Maxim* is kept by virtue of pronominalisation. *Thirdly*, because of a direct and transparent relationship between the message and the text, the utterance adheres to both the *Processibility* and *Clarity Principles*, especially the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity*. As for the *Processibility Principle*, its two *Maxims (End-Weight* and *End-Scope)* are also upheld because of the way in which the text is presented. From a speech act perspective, this utterance appears to follow the rules thoroughly in order to achieve the communicative aim.

e) Summary

The blind man appealed to the common Jewish religious beliefs to argue with the Jewish authorities about their misperception of Jesus. Although his utterance exhibits different illocutionary forces, the disputative force would, therefore, be the strongest. His use of the phrase 'we know' is very significant, and causes an occurrence of verbal irony that is a mute yet powerful communication device to convince the Jews. The observation of various conversational rules in the utterance and the use of irony, in particular, increase the level of the reader's attention.

9:32 ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος οὐκ ἠκούσθη ὅτι ἠνέωξέν τις ὀφθαλμοῦς τυφλοῦ γεγεννημένου

a) General analysis

The blind man's other comment is described in 40.3. In this main clause, the prepositional phrase ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος is problematic. In fact, this phrase is a rare expression (Plummer [1882] 1981:210; Bernard 1928:336).¹³⁵ The original phrase, in this instance, contains three words, yet its meaning is not so clear from simply adding the linear elements. If done so, the following will result: *from the age*. However, the syntactical relationship suggests that the preposition ἐκ and the genitive noun together often describe time, specifying the point of time from which departure is taken, as in the case of ἐκ γενετῆς in colon 1.2*. This explanation helps us arrive at its proper meaning, *since the beginning of time*. Bernard (1928:336) presents another solution, namely that the author sometimes uses ἐκ and ἀπό, interchangeably. He suggests that the phrase ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος should be similar to the phrase ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος. After the negative particle, the main verb ἠκούσθη, aorist passive indicative, may be dramatic aorist which may be used to state the present reality with the certitude of a past event for emphasis (Fowler *et al.* 1985:290; cf. also John 13:31). In light of the above information, the blind man was making a very strong statement by saying that *since the beginning of time it has never been heard*. He emphasised the significance or rarity of Jesus' miracle, namely that nothing like it had ever happened previously. The content of whatever has never been heard of previously is elaborated upon in subclause 40.3.1 as the object of the main verb, and is introduced by the conjunction ὅτι. The object of the aorist verb ἠνέωξέν in the subclause, ὀφθαλμοῦς does not have an article. This is noteworthy because, whenever this word is used in this Chapter, it is always accompanied by the article. Without the article, this word adds indefiniteness to the content of his comment and therefore does not refer to any historical person's eyes. In addition, the word is modified by the participle phrase τυφλοῦ γεγεννημένου. The phrase may, therefore, be translated like a relative pronoun clause, *the one who was born blind*. Based on these observations, the blind man made the following statement: "Since the beginning of time it has never been heard that anyone opened the eyes of the one born blind."

135 A more common expression would be ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος. Bultmann (1971:337, footnote 3) is of a different opinion.

b) Illocutionary act

The blind man proceeded to present his arguments in the trial before the Jews, and did so in the form of statements. The illocutionary force of this utterance would, therefore, still be *disputative*. However, there is a stronger illocutionary force in his utterance in which he endeavoured to make only one point: he bore witness to the observation that no one in the history of humankind but Jesus could have opened the eyes of anyone born blind. Lindars ([1972] 1981:349) states: "There is perhaps here again a hint of the creation of light, the first act in the creation of the world (Gen. 1.3). Thus Jesus' act 'manifests the works of God' (verse 3)." Hence, his utterance would be a *confirmative* speech act. The blind man expressed not only his belief, but also that he believed it as a result of his observation by virtue of some truth-seeking procedure. In this case, it would be the man's own testimony and knowledge. According to the schema of confirmatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42-43),

In uttering that "*Since the beginning of time it has never been heard that anyone opened the eyes of the one born blind*", the blind man confirms that only Jesus could open the eyes of the one born blind if the blind man expresses:

- i. the belief that only Jesus could open the eyes of the one born blind, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that the Jews believe that only Jesus could open the eyes of anyone born blind.

As the blind man appeared to express his belief and intention exactly as described above, this utterance is a successful confirmative speech act. He intended to bear witness to the observation that no one but Jesus could have opened the eyes of the person born blind. As will become evident, he uttered this testimony to provide a direct basis for his conclusion in the next utterance. The author intends the reader to accept the blind man's testimony and tries to prepare the reader for the final conclusion, which the blind man was about to bring.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Jews should acknowledge the blind man's observation, and consider its implication: Jesus performed a phenomenal miracle. The reader should also acknowledge the blind man's observation at face value, or at least understand the point the blind man wanted to make by virtue of this utterance.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, perhaps the most important aspect of the blind man's utterance is the verisimilitude of its content. He claimed that no one had ever opened the eyes of anyone born blind until now. Was his claim true? The answer to this question will indeed influence his credibility. And if this was not true, rhetorically his statement may become hyperbole, which involves a shift between communicative intent and verbal content. The Scriptures promised "that God would send his prophetic or messianic 'servant', who would be the 'light of the nations, to open the eyes of the blind' (Isa 42:6-7)" (Koester 1995:145; cf. also Is 29:18; 35:5; 42:16; 61:1-2; Ps 146:8). The Old Testament does not record any miracles of giving sight to persons born blind.¹³⁶ From this perspective, the blind man uttered the truth. Therefore, his utterance upholds the *Quality Maxim*. As a result, the Jews would be forced to acknowledge his claim, regardless of whether or not they would do so.

However, although the Old Testament does not contain such a record, other ancient documents somewhere in the world could tell a similar story. As long as this possibility is not denied with full certainty, historical approaches may need to investigate the matter further. In this case, the issue will remain open. But, *to the advantage of the speech act approach followed in this study, the approach does not deal with the issue in that way, for the Quality Maxim can settle the matter adequately*. If the blind man testified to what he claimed to the best of his knowledge, his utterance is successful and the issue can be closed, because the communicative aspect, namely that he had said what he believed to be true is what counts. There is no evidence that he said so falsely. Indeed, as for the blind man, the two indicative verbs in this sentence imply that he was at least relating something that, to the best of his knowledge, he firmly believed. Therefore, his argument was very convincing.

2. Furthermore, his utterance keeps the *Relation* and *Manner Maxims* intact. His logic displays a consistent flow of arguments (for this aspect, see the section on 'IA' in 9:33). The message is very clear. There is no ambiguity in his dialectic. In addition, the *Approbation Maxim* is also adhered to in his utterance. It maximises praise of the other, in this case, of Jesus. The blind man placed Jesus at the top of the list of miracle workers.

3. On the text level, just as his utterance keeps the *Manner Maxim* on the story level, it also observes the *Clarity Principle* with its two *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity*. However, because of the problematic

136 Cf. also Painter 1986:33; Carson 1991:374; Witherington 1995:180; Koester 1995:144.

nature of the prepositional phrase ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος, this utterance may partially transgress the *Processibility Principle*.

4. The blind man's claim to the rare and extraordinary phenomenon of Jesus' miracle, may have news value for the reader. If so, the *Interest Principle* is operative. Perhaps the reader is once again impressed by the blind man's clever claim.

e) Summary

As his communicative strategy, the blind man drew attention to the incredible nature of Jesus' miracle in this utterance. The main illocutionary act is, therefore, confirmative, and the intended perlocution is that the Jews should acknowledge his claim and reconsider their view of this miracle event. The Old Testament could attest to the truthfulness of his claim. Accordingly, the *Quality Maxim* is upheld, increasing the value of his argument. The reader is pleased to observe the blind man's cleverness and expects his conclusion with a sense of excitement.

9:33 εἰ μὴ ἦν οὗτος παρὰ θεοῦ, οὐκ ἠδύνατο ποιεῖν οὐδέν.

a) General analysis

In subcolon 40.4, the blind man drew his conclusion based on his previous statements. Therefore, this conclusion would be the focal point of the cluster. He made his closing argument like a defending attorney in the final scene of a court case. It was very concise and short, but it was sufficiently significant to impact on those who heard it. In 40.4.1, the conjunction εἰ plus the imperfect indicative verb ἦν form a past conditional clause (Wenham 1965:167). However, one should note that there are two unusual sentence constructions in 40.4. *Firstly*, if this protasis is a condition that is contrary to fact, the apodosis usually contains the particle ἄν. However, this apodosis does not contain such a particle. Bultmann (1971:337, footnote 4) observes that it has been omitted. Despite this, the proposition stated in the sentence is obviously false (cf. Newman & Nida 1980:315). *Secondly*, an unusual negative particle μὴ is used in 40.4.1. This particle is, as a rule, used in all moods except the indicative (Wenham 1965:208), but the usage, in this instance, deviates from the usual. Nevertheless, this undoubtedly negates the original content.

The apodosis of the last conditional clause is recorded in 40.4.2*. The imperfect indicative third person singular verb ἠδύνατο expresses the subject's ability to perform an action, and indicates that the subject refers

to Jesus. “Note the emphatic double negative” in this main clause (Morris 1971:492, footnote 45). This is partly because the object is the numeral οὐδέν, and there are consequently two negatives. In Greek, however, two negatives do not cancel each other out as in English, but rather form the strongest negative possible. In light of the above observations, the blind man concluded: “*If this man were not from God, he could do nothing.*”

b) Illocutionary act

1. Since all his previous utterances are essentially building up to the point the blind man tried to make in his last utterance, this last utterance entails the conclusion of his argument. To use a forensic term, he was now making his closing argument. It is striking that he used a conditional sentence form for this purpose. From this fact, the illocutionary act would be *suggestive*, as he expressed his point hypothetically (for suggestives, cf. the section on ‘IA’ in 9:8b). For this reason, the meaning of the utterance needs to be rectified, whereafter it is possible to arrive at his conclusion which demonstrates that Jesus came from God. This is another instance of an *indirect speech act*. The suggestive speech act, therefore, becomes its secondary illocutionary act. Lindars’ ([1972] 1981:349) comment indicates the occurrence of an indirect speech act: “The conclusion, that Jesus is from God, is put in negative form; cf. 5.30. It is the affirmation to which all the dialogue has been leading” (cf. also Bultmann 1971:337; Carson 1991:375).

What is the primary illocutionary act? The conditional sentence under consideration conveys a very powerful assertion, which is, of course, similar to the conclusion mentioned earlier. In this sense, the primary illocutionary act is *assertive*. However, it could be *confirmative*, and this then functions as an extension of the assertive, as the blind man had support for his conclusion in addition to his belief and intention (cf. Bach & Harnish 1979:46). This support or truth-seeking procedure refers to his own testimony: the blind man was proof of Jesus’ ability to do something incredible. This confirmative speech act follows the schema of confirmatives by Bach and Harnish (:42-43) and is, therefore, successful. Briefly, the blind man intended to conclude his arguments by saying that Jesus came from God by virtue of his confirmative speech act. The author invites the reader to assent to the blind man’s view and to have greater conviction in believing in Jesus.

2. Since the blind man’s answer has been scrutinised according to the four units, I shall discuss its global speech act, because verses 30-33 structurally constitute one colon.

As noted earlier, each unit in the blind man's answer demonstrates his penetrating insight. *The first unit (a disputative speech act)* reports his sarcastic astonishment that seems to be mocking the Jews' ignorance. *The second (a disputative speech act)* discloses his ability to cite a certain religious maxim most effectively for his argument, and at the same time proves his correct understanding of who God is. Although he may not know the details of the Law, unlike the Pharisees (Jews) to whom he is talking, he did understand the most important concepts of God. The fact that the person, who used to sit and beg, was now reminding the religious leaders of something within their specialty is comic and ironic. Since the first two units may be somewhat argumentative, *the third (a confirmative speech act)* emphasises practical evidence derived from his memory to strengthen his argument. Finally, *the last unit (a confirmative speech act)* draws the conclusion that all three units lead and attest to one and only verdict: Jesus was sent from God to do his will. His statements are semantically coherent and structurally cohesive. This is equivalent to a *macroproposition* of this colon, which can also be determined by virtue of the *Construction Rule*. From this macroproposition and the speech situation of debate, a *global speech act* of the man's answer would be *confirmative*. Like his fourth utterance, his own testimony supports this global speech act. Resseguie (1982:300) observes: "This scene ... marks the development of the healed man as a person in his own right. His irony leads to sarcasm, and his sarcasm opens the way for him to lecture the religious authorities on some basic theological principles".¹³⁷ Hence, these four units are closely connected and developed for one purpose, namely to show Jesus' origin and identity.

c) Perlocutionary act

Although the blind man used the conditional sentence to express his point hypothetically, he intended, as the *perlocutionary act* of his utterance, to persuade the Jews to agree to his view concerning Jesus, and to renounce their negative and hostile attitude towards both Jesus and himself. The author also records the blind man's conclusion, in conjunction with his extended arguments in verses 30-32, in order to encourage the reader to stand up for his belief against any difficulties or persecution that may threaten him, just as the blind man displayed his courage before these hostile Jews.

137 For his cleverness, cf. also Staley 1991:68; Brown 1966:377.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, since the blind man's utterance is an indirect speech act, it violates the *Manner Maxim* in terms of ambiguity. However, the utterance is formulated in such a way that the *Relation Maxim* is upheld. An aspect of this Maxim (contribute to advancing your communicative goal) is evident in the way in which the blind man formulated this utterance in concluding his arguments. His implicit reference to the miracle healing specifically links the utterance to his previous utterance (v. 32) by virtue of another aspect of the Maxim (be relevant).

2. The perlocution of the blind man's utterance is to convince the Jews that Jesus came from God. Lieu (1988:83) comments that the blind man is "the only person in the Gospel other than Jesus himself to describe Jesus as 'from God'". Although the message of his utterance was successfully communicated, he failed to convince them with his confirmative speech act. Instead of accepting his conclusion, as will be noted in the next verse, they rejected him completely and cast him out. This failure was attributed not to any deficiency in satisfying any felicity conditions of the illocutionary act at this point, but to the perlocutionary act. He failed to evoke the *perlocutionary effect* on them. This simply means that he could effect no change in the Jews' attitude or view. But the root of this failure is more serious. It was obvious, since the start of their conversation (v. 24), that these two parties neglected to observe the *Cooperative Principle*, which encourages "participants [to] recognise a common purpose, or at least a mutually accepted direction in conversation" (Grice 1975:45). Because both parties aimed to change the other party's view, they did not share any common purpose or direction in their dialogue. For this reason, they constantly violated the *Politeness Principle*, especially the *Maxim of Agreement* which aims to minimise disagreement and maximise agreement (Leech 1983:132). In this type of conversation, communication is doomed to disappointment and failure. However, the reader is meant to detect the following: "Faith in Jesus is tied to the recognition that he has been sent by God, and unbelief is simply the refusal of that recognition. The former blind man shows himself ready for the final step of faith to follow, while the authorities, persisting in their ignorance of Jesus' origin, are ready only for the verdict Jesus will pronounce upon their blindness" (Holleran 1993b:376).

3. *On the text level*, in terms of ambiguity caused by an indirect speech act, the man's utterance flouts the *Principles of Processibility and Clarity* with its *Maxims of Transparency and Ambiguity*. The utterance could have been clearer or shown a direct relationship between message and text if the blind man uttered the same semantic content in different surface structures such as the following: surely I believe that Jesus came from

God. It is easier for the reader to decode the message, for it is possible to frame the utterance in an affirmative and straightforward way, rather than using the negative and conditional sentence form. In this sense, the man's original utterance also flouts the *Sub-Maxim of Negative Uninformativeness*. This Sub-Maxim "implies that a negative sentence will be avoided if a positive one can be used in its place. Moreover, it will imply that when negative sentences ARE used, it will be for a special purpose" (Leech 1983:101). This special purpose would be that, in this case, the blind man chose expressivity over clarity. In other words, his motive for using the indirect speech act was "effectiveness in a broad sense which includes expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication, rather than simply with efficiency" (Leech 1983:68). This expression again displays the author's rhetorical technique. His utterance upholds the *Expressivity Principle*. Hence, the speech strategy, which the blind man used for this utterance and his argument as a whole, was a very intelligent and effective one, and showed that he possessed the capacity to do so. The author characterises the blind man very highly in this dialogue scene.

4. This use of negative and conditional sentence forms for the blind man's conclusion is perhaps surprising to the reader. In this sense, this man's speech strategy may effectively betray the reader's expectation of him, and attracts the reader's attention by operation of the *Interest Principle*. As part of his strategy, the utterance also upholds the *Reduction Maxim* by virtue of pronominalisation.

e) Summary

The blind man intended to conclude his arguments by telling the Jews that Jesus came from God by virtue of his confirmative speech act. For effectiveness, the man deploys an indirect speech act in his utterance, and observes the *Expressivity Principle* and the *Relation Maxim* at the expense of several other conversational rules such as the *Processibility Principle*, the *Maxims of Manner, Transparency and Ambiguity*, and the *Sub-Maxim of Negative Uninformativeness*. The reader may find the man's closing argument convincing, but the intended perlocution is not realised due to the Jews' stubborn unbelief.

9:34a ἀπεκρίθησαν καὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ, Ἐν ἁμαρτίαις σὺ ἐγεννήθης ὄλος καὶ σὺ διδάσκεις ἡμᾶς;

a) General analysis

The blind man's arguments were very logical and convincing, without any weakness, with the result that the Jews did not seem to be able to even attempt any counter-argument. They avoided addressing the exact issue, and tried to focus on, so to speak, a character attack on him (cf. Tenney 1981:105). This is portrayed in colon 41 and 42, in conjunction with the outcome of their interaction.

Colon 41 is the Jews' reaction to the blind man's statements in colon 40. Although the author does not use a strong word such as the term *ἐλοιδύρησαν* in colon 39, they were probably furious when they answered him. This is indicated not by the narration, but by the content of their reply. The content includes two components that are depicted in subcola 41.1 and 41.2. Syntactically, the adjective *ὄλος* in 41.1 is awkward. This nominative adjective should modify a nominative noun (Fowler *et al.* 1985:333); yet there is no suitable noun in this sentence. Hence, there is no option to consider that this adjective modifies either the pronoun or the verb. The latter is smoother for translation. Some English translations such as the NASB and the NRSV accordingly treat it as an adverb to modify the verb. Grammatically, however, it is more acceptable that it modifies the pronoun, denoting *all of you* or *the whole person of you* (cf. Wenham 1965:58). There is hardly any semantic difference between the two views; it may be a matter of preference. One should also remember that this construction is not so unusual in Greek syntax. The use of the word *ὄλος* can be similar to that of the demonstratives, and it is placed in the predicate position (Barrett 1955:302). After all, the Jews attacked the blind man in their first response by saying "*you were born entirely in sins*". Unlike Jesus' view, they assumed convincingly that his blindness resulted from his own sins or those of his parents. They tried to dismiss his legitimate argument with their illegitimate insult.

The second response of the Jews is recorded in subcolon 41.2. The conjunction *καὶ* indicates an additive-different relation between 41.1 and 41.2. These two subcola form a unit. Again, the pronoun *σὺ* in 41.2 is used for emphasis, as the verb *διδάσκεις* follows it. Bernard (1928:337) observes: "Every word is scornfully emphatic" (cf. also Plummer [1882] 1981:210). Although Newman and Nida (1980:316) comment that "trying to teach is the real meaning of the verb", the present verb *διδάσκεις* seems to imply that the action is progressive-continuous (Fowler *et al.* 1985:288). This may

well explain one of the reasons for the Jews' subsequent violent action in colon 42. This may be speculation, but they may have believed that, if the blind man remained with them, he may have continued to teach them. If so, they did not need his teaching; they needed to get rid of him. From these observations, verse 34a is rendered as follows: *They answered and said to him, "You were born entirely in sins, and are you teaching us?"*

b) Illocutionary act

Despite the fact that the blind man was sufficiently intelligent to be able to effectively present his arguments before the Jews, the perlocution of his arguments did not effect any change in the Jews' attitudes towards either Jesus or himself. In the analysis of the previous utterance, the reason for this is examined by virtue of the breach of the *Cooperative Principle* in their specific speech situation. However, the Jews' utterance at this point reveals that this was due to the blind man's fault. He was a complete sinner, yet he tried to teach 'righteous' religious leaders such as themselves (of course, the reader knows that this is not the real reason). Perhaps they might have reasoned, "No one, especially a sinner like him, can persuade or change us! And he certainly crossed the line this time." From their perspective, they undoubtedly found him guilty of everything. He was guilty of defending Jesus, of lecturing them, and of being himself (a sinner). Hence, in the first utterance, the Jews passed judgment on the blind man for the fact that he was born blind, because he and/or his parents had sinned. Of course, this differs completely from Jesus' view in verse 3.

With reference to the second utterance, in a different context, their question could be used for real questions in order to obtain new information. However, the question does not meet the sincerity and essential conditions relating to a question speech act (for these conditions, cf. the section on 'IA' in 9:2), because they did not care whether or not the man would answer. Perhaps they did not even intend to listen to his answer. This is demonstrated by the fact that they did not wait for the man to respond, but threw him out immediately (cf. v. 34b). It is not designed as a real question. Therefore, it is only logical to take this interrogative sentence as a *rhetorical question*, expressing an emphatic declaration that is used to both warn the blind man and end the dialogue. Since the sentence-type does not directly correspond to its communicative function in the rhetorical question, the utterance should be classified as an *indirect speech act* (cf. Yule 1996:54-55). The primary illocutionary act of this utterance would then be *assertive*, in that the Jews alleged, "You do not teach us!". They succeeded in conveying this message to the man by performing the secondary illocutionary act of *question*. A new proposition can be created from both their first and second utterances by virtue of the

Construction Rule: “you who were born in sin do not teach us!” Therefore, these utterances could be considered one global speech act with an *assertive* illocutionary force.

However, it appears that more predominant illocutionary force(s) exist(s) in this global speech act than the assertive. There are two further possibilities. One is that the illocutionary force could be disputative, for the two utterances formed part of the intense discussion. The Jews were still disputing the blind man’s claim. When the schema of disputatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:43) is applied to these utterances, the following will occur:

In uttering “*You were born entirely in sins, and are you teaching us?*”, the Jews dispute the claim that Jesus came from God if the Jews express:

- i. the belief that there is reason not to believe that Jesus came from God, contrary to what was claimed by the blind man (or was otherwise under discussion), and
- ii. the intention that the blind man believes that there is reason not to believe that Jesus came from God.

As far as the content of this schema is concerned, when it is said that there is reason not to believe that Jesus came from God, what would this reason be? The reason the Jews pointed out in their utterances is that the blind man was not worth being heard. It further indicates that his testimony or arguments would thus have been false. This observation may substantiate the possibility that the Jews’ utterances are a global speech act of disputative. The other possibility is that of dissentive. The Jews rejected the man’s claim that Jesus came from God (for the schema of dissentives, see the section on ‘IA’ in 9:9b). Of the two, I would opt for the dissentive speech act, because the co-text, in this instance, suggests that the Jews were also concluding the argument at this point and intended to disengage from the dialogue. The *dissentive* force seems to suit this particular speech situation better. In my opinion, the disputative force implies having a continued discussion. Therefore, the Jews intended to reject the blind man’s previous claim about Jesus’ origin and identity. Since they seemed to realise that they were not able to refute his arguments with their logic, they changed their strategy in dealing with him. They decided to no longer accept him as a witness and conversational partner. Rather, they wanted to dismiss him as a sinner who did not deserve fair treatment. With this, the author may intend the reader to notice and condemn the Jews’ unfair treatment of the blind man.

c) Perlocutionary act

As in verse 28, the blind man should be surprised and discouraged, or even intimidated by the harsh tone and content of the Jew's utterances. The blind man should become silent before them. The reader should disagree with the Jews' authoritarian treatment of other people and learn how to deal with other people in conversation by virtue of the Jews' mistake. The reader should also sympathise with him and fully support the position of the blind man.

d) Communicative strategy

It is characteristic of the Jews' utterances that they violate most of the normal conversational rules. This makes these utterances very significant. For the sake of discussion, *the communication on the character and text levels* is examined simultaneously.

1. *Firstly*, their utterances transgress all four Maxims of the *Cooperative Principle*. As far as the *Quality Maxim* is concerned, when the Jews said that the blind man was born entirely in sin, they uttered something for which they lacked adequate evidence. They probably said this because he did not concur with their view and even had the audacity to lecture them. The reader knows that the Jews' claim was false, because Jesus explicitly denied this possibility (v. 3).

2. As far as the *Relation Maxim* is concerned, they violate it in two ways. In the blind man's arguments, the central focus was on whether or not Jesus was from God. In this line of discussion, the Jews should have responded directly to this particular issue. Yet, they avoided or abandoned the issue and proceeded with the credibility of the blind man as their new focus in the conversation. At this point, they transgressed this Maxim. Furthermore, one should remember that the Jews' purpose or goal with this interrogation was to elicit the information as to who Jesus was (cf. the sections on 'IA' and 'CS' in 9:26). Viewed from this broader perspective, their utterances do not at all contribute to this goal. The way in which they uttered these words indicates that they had relinquished this goal. It appears that they no longer cared for it. All they cared about at this point was to get rid of this man who dared to teach them something within their field of expertise. They would even do so by taking up a topic irrelevant to their goal, being fully aware that it was not going to help them achieve it. In this instance, they violated the *Relation Maxim*. Even if their goal was to deny the miracle or to trip the blind man, as other critics suggest, this violation inevitably occurs. One should note that, when they consciously or unconsciously decided to violate this Maxim, they also most likely decided to opt out of the dialogue. When they were about to do so, "the Jews find

it convenient to believe that the man's blindness was due to sin" (Barrett 1955:302; cf. also Brown 1966:375; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:252; cf. v. 2). This idea appealed to them because they could dismiss the blind man as an unreliable witness.¹³⁸ They could close this case as they wished. At least, they would have thought so. However, they did not realise that, in order to conclude the cause of his blindness, this would lead them to have to admit his congenital blindness and therefore also Jesus' miracle.¹³⁹

3. The above observation leads to another instance of irony, because they reopened the court and interrogated the man once again in order to avoid this kind of conclusion in the first place (cf. Salier 2004:113). Therefore, this is both *irony of events* and *irony of self-betrayal*. The former irony is derived from the outcome of the event, which is neither expected nor desired. The latter results from the victims' (Jews') utterances, which unconsciously reveal their own error. These are both situational ironies; there is no ironist. The observers are the author and the reader in both cases and these ironies are located on the text level. It is likely that these serve to clarify the reader's interpretation (Muecke [1969] 1980:232) as well as to require the reader to pass judgment on the unbelieving Jews (O'Day 1986:31). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:252) points out: "It is the blindness of people who insist on their own cleverness and authority."

4. I already discussed two possible reasons that could explain why the intended perlocution of the blind man's previous arguments was not realised (although the second reason was false; cf. the section on 'IA' above). Another probable reason could be suggested from the reader's perspective. The reader who reads this Chapter up to this verse knows that the real reason is the Jews' stubborn nature and unbelief. The man's perlocution was legitimate; their reaction was illegitimate. Hence, the examination of the violation of the *Relation Maxim* discloses interesting communication in the story.

5. The Jews' utterances in the question form, which aim to make an assertion, cause some ambiguity that jeopardises the *Manner Maxim*. On the other hand, the message of the utterances appears to be conveyed unmistakably to the blind man. In this respect, the same Maxim is upheld to some extent. With reference to the *Quantity Maxim*, the last point which the Jews wished to make is not explicitly stated, but in their second utterance. It disguises the phrase to the effect that, "You should not teach

138 For aspects relating to witnesses, cf. 'Mutual forensic beliefs' in section 4.4 in Chapter 3.

139 Cf. also Morris 1971:493; Bultmann 1971:337; Beasley-Murray 1987:159; Carson 1991:375; Holleran 1993b:377.

us!". Strictly speaking, according to this Maxim, such a phrase should be spelled out. Their utterances therefore violate this Maxim.

6. *Secondly*, it is obvious that the Jews transgressed the *Approbation Maxim*. The content of the first utterance is open dispraise of the blind man. It is a strong statement and a barometer of their anger and desperation. In addition, the Jews' rejection of the man's claim suggests another violation of the *Agreement Maxim*. The level of their disagreement appears to be the ultimate.

7. *Thirdly*, the *Pollyanna Principle*, which advocates that participants prefer a pleasant topic to an unpleasant one in a conversation (Leech 1983:147), is flouted in their first utterance. To be born in sin was not a pleasant topic. This same Principle even encourages one to use terms such as *a bit*, *a little* or *rather* in order to tone down the level of unpleasantness (Leech 1983:147). However, their first utterance uses the term *entirely* to increase the unpleasantness.

8. *Fourthly*, the violations of the *Approbation Maxim* and the *Pollyanna Principle*, in conjunction with the Jews' anger, are indicative of their attitude to insult the blind man. By this strong insult, some kind of emotional damage could be expected in the man. In this sense, perhaps the man experienced suffering. If any motif of *suffering* can be perceived in this instance, this suffering would have a constructive purpose, in that the man's character could be strengthened by virtue of this suffering.

9. *On the text level* alone, *fifthly*, in connection with the partial violation of the *Manner Maxim*, their second utterance further transgresses the *Principles of Processibility* and *Clarity*, and the *Transparency Maxim* because of the indirect and opaque relationship between message and text (assertion *via* question).

10. As scrutinised earlier, their utterances are problematic and break various rules. Nevertheless, at least the *Expressivity Principle* is observed for aesthetic and rhetorical value in the second utterance. In other words, the question form is employed for the sake of impact on the hearer. It is more effective in terms of impression than a mere assertion form. In addition, their utterances include pronouns and, therefore, appear to uphold the *Reduction Maxim*. However, strictly speaking, this Maxim is not adhered, because the pronouns are only conventionally used for the speakers and the hearer in direct speech.

e) Summary

The primary illocutionary force of the Jews' indirect speech act is most likely dissentive, in that they intended to reject the man's claim that Jesus

came from God. In addition, the analysis of the problematic nature of their utterances, by checking against various conversational rules, reveals that their intention was to no longer continue interrogating the blind man. They had decided on a way to end this trial, namely by dismissing him as an unreliable witness and by insulting him. The motif of suffering can be detected in this insult. By virtue of their utterances, the author intends to highlight their stubborn unbelief and unfairness. This will explain their action in the next verse.

9:34b καὶ ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἔξω.

a) General analysis

Colon 42 is the narrator's voice, and tells of the final conclusion of this cluster as well as of the immediate outcome of the ongoing conversation between the Jews and the blind man. The conjunction καὶ displays an additive-different relationship between cola 41 and 42. The aorist active verb ἐξέβαλον implies that the subject, which refers to the Jews, is actively involved in the action. This compound verb and the adverb ἔξω reinforce one another semantically. Bernard (1928:337) suggests that this phrase is typically Johannine. The result is, accordingly: *And they cast him out.*

b) Illocutionary act

Based on the fact that the Jews violated the *Cooperative Principle* in the conversation in order to retain their authority as the Jewish religious leaders, the blind man should no longer continue the dialogue with them. There was no room left for reasonable conversation. In fact, the Jews' determination was so strong that they physically cast the blind man out at once, the way they did verbally in their previous speech act. They did not even give him an opportunity to respond. Lindars ([1972] 1981:349) explicates that the man's exclusion brought "the examination to an abrupt end ... indicating the final refusal of the Pharisees to believe". In this utterance, the narrator intends to report such an action and to tell the reader that the entire dialogue between the Jews and the blind man had failed, indicating how the Jews ended the dialogue by their authoritarian action. Thus, this short utterance by the narrator can be categorised as an *informative* speech act. The latter correctly follows the schema of informatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42) and is thus successful.

c) Perlocutionary act

The reader should acknowledge that the conversation between the Jews and the blind man failed, and he should be surprised at their harsh treatment of him. The reader should also sympathise with the blind man in his dismissal.

d) Communicative strategy

Since the narrator's utterance aims to achieve the reader's understanding of the story, I shall discuss the communicative strategy primarily *on the text level*.

1. The Jews acted upon their intention displayed in their last utterances, namely to terminate the interrogation and to pass a final verdict on the present judicial case. In accordance with their last utterances, their actual verdict was that the blind man was found guilty of the charge of creating a grave controversy and providing false testimony as a witness. The punishment was expulsion. The first step was the physical removal of the guilty from their court. Dodd ([1953] 1968:359) comments: "The Pharisees have expelled from God's flock the man whom Christ Himself enlightened. They are scattering the sheep whom Christ came to gather." As Neyrey (1987:537) points out, the "judgment is described as an act of separation". However, the reader will find this verdict to be a one-sided and partial sentence. However, it was completely acceptable and appropriate to the Jews, for the man had been a sinner from birth. They may have thought that, if they settled the issue this way, they could maintain their honour as the religious leaders in the community, a position strongly challenged by the blind man. It was essential for them to win the case by any means. As long as they proceeded with the matter according to 'their procedures', arguments in the trial did not matter a great deal because they were the judges. This further indicates that anything was allowed as long as their status and the established order were safely preserved. Nobody could 'mess' with them. If somebody tried to do so, he would be hurt. This is exactly what happened in the story.

2. At least three implications can be derived from their action to cast the man out. *Firstly*, the blind man had a better understanding of the event than the Jews and was better at putting religious knowledge into practice, because the Jews' attitude appeared to be emotional and short-tempered. *Secondly*, with respect to the evaluation of their arguments, it is obvious that the victory was his. Nobody among the Jews was able to openly refute his logic. *Lastly*, the Jews had no choice but to cling to their authority as the final resolution in order to end this embarrassing discussion.

3. In contrast to the Jews' last utterances, the narrator's utterance follows the normal conversational rules. In the field of Interpersonal Rhetoric, *first*, it observes the *Maxims of Quantity, Quality, and Relation*. It is economical, sincere and relevant. It also adheres to the *Manner Maxim* on the story level. It is sufficiently perspicuous to describe what the Jews decided to do to the blind man. On the text level, this same Maxim appears to be flouted in the utterance. Commentators differ in determining the exact meaning of the expression, 'they cast him out'. Generally speaking, scholars' opinions are divided into two categories: this expression refers either to the (formal) expulsion from the local synagogue, or to an informal exclusion, perhaps from the Jews' presence. Those who take the former view to the extreme consider that "the man's affirmation in verse 33 is equivalent to a confession of faith in Jesus as the Messiah" (Lindars [1972] 1981:349; Ashton [1991] 1993:227). Many critics agree that the man born blind "was eventually expelled from the local synagogue",¹⁴⁰ even if they do not explicitly mention how verse 33 should be viewed in relation to the confession in verse 22. Conversely, those expositors who take the latter view object to the former because of either of the following two reasons or a combination thereof. One is that if it were a formal expulsion, it would have required a decision of the Sanhedrin (Bernard 1928:336). The other is that the expression is too vague, and the man had not confessed Jesus as Christ (Plummer [1882] 1981:211). Either way, it "is not a formal excommunication but simply ejection from their presence" (Brown 1966:375; cf. also Resseguie 1982:300; Witherington 1995:389, footnote 51). However, the majority of those critics who do not regard it as formal still maintain that this expression is used with a *double meaning* and is symbolic of the later excommunication from the Jewish religious community (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:252).

4. As far as the above issue is concerned, an important question to literary critics is perhaps: Why does the author (*via* the narrator) not use the word ἀποσυνάγωγος if he means it as a formal expulsion from the synagogue? The word is already available to him in verse 22. If the author uses this word in considering the formal expulsion, the utterance under consideration would not have flouted the *Manner Maxim*. If it can be assumed that the author is upholding this Maxim and still uses the word ἐξέβαλον, the meaning would point to the second view above. However, there is another alternative to consider: if the author opines that the word ἐξέβαλον also embraces, as Bultmann (1971:336, footnote 4) considers, the meaning of the word

140 Koester 1995:19; Hendriksen [1954] 1973:79; Barrett 1955:302; Morris 1971:493; Bultmann 1971:336, footnote 4; Nicol 1972:144; MacRae 1978:126; Moloney 1978:149; Bruce [1983] 1994:219; Michaels 1984:152; Staley 1991:68; Carson 1991:375; Neufeld 1997:137.

ἀποσυνάγωγος, the first view is possible without necessarily transgressing the *Manner Maxim*. This coincides with my own understanding. In this case, the narrator's utterance still keeps this Maxim, while it refers to the blind man's expulsion from the local synagogue.

5. *Secondly*, the reader may be surprised at the Jews' action of expelling the blind man, not only the action itself, but also its impulsive tone. This may also surprise the blind man. As mentioned earlier, they did not even give him an opportunity to say anything. As far as the man was concerned, he may have thought that this trial would continue for at least some time, because he had just completed his arguments. In the natural course of events, the Jews should have responded to him. In this respect, their action was unpredictable and the narrator's utterance, therefore, indicates the operation of the *Interest Principle*. The author may have thought to remind the reader of a complex reality of life in which a situation may get worse even if one does the right thing such as standing up for one's own beliefs. Lindars ([1972] 1981:347) states: "John speaks of the cost of discipleship in terms of the conditions with which his readers were familiar." The fact that the blind man was treated badly indicates *the motif of suffering*. In addition, the author invites the reader, through depicting their action, to form an even more negative attitude towards the Jews.

6. *Thirdly*, in the field of Textual Rhetoric, the utterance can be praised, because it seemingly transgresses no rules. Rather, it upholds the *Principles of Processibility, Clarity and Economy*. It is easy to decode, clear to comprehend and short to describe. The *Maxims of Transparency and Reduction* (by virtue of pronominalisation) are also likewise observed.

e) Summary

In this informative speech act, the narrator intends to inform the reader on how the Jews put an end to this interrogation scene, and how their conversation with the blind man failed. In reporting their action, this speech act upholds most of the conversational rules. Moreover, my analysis concludes that the utterance, in this instance, refers not only to the blind man's physical exclusion from their presence, but also to his expulsion from the local synagogue. The intended perlocution is to surprise the reader with the outcome of the event and for the reader to sympathise with this brave man who had been treated so badly by the Jews.

7.4 Macrospeech acts

1. *Firstly*, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the character level*. This cluster portrays the fierce debate between the Jews and the blind man concerning the miracle worker, Jesus, in the judicial proceedings. As observed earlier (in the section on 'CS' in 9:33), they, in fact, did not share any common purpose or direction in their exchange. From the outset (vv. 24-25), their conversation was not amicable. The Jews changed their strategy and asked him the repeated question. Again, their dialogue failed and they reviled him (vv. 26-29). The blind man then presented his brilliant argument, but in vain. Their dialogue was abruptly terminated (vv. 30-34). Hence, their discussion demonstrated that each party had a different interest and understanding of Jesus. The characters were unable to come to a unanimous conclusion on the issue. This resulted in failed communication between the Jews and the blind man.

From the above observation, we should conclude that there is no macrospeech act on the character level (cf. 'Macrospeech acts in John 9' in section 1.3 in Chapter 5). However, this does not mean that their failed communication is worthless. Rather, this failure will highlight more significant and implicit communication between the author and the reader.

2. *Secondly*, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the text level*. In a story, one can assume that the author wishes to achieve a certain aim. Even in failed communication on the story level, the author assigns a certain role to each character in order to achieve this aim. In this present story, this aim appears to be to discover Jesus' identity by determining Jesus' origin. Let us consider this for a moment as the hypothesis for a possible macrospeech act on the text level and examine the characters' utterances from this angle.

Among the Jews' utterances, the requirement speech act in verse 24, which talks of Jesus' identity as a sinner, and the disputative speech act in verse 29, which deals with Jesus' origin, move up to the next macro level by virtue of the *Selection Rule*, because they contribute to the construction of the global (or main) topic in this instance. The remaining utterances (vv. 26, 28, 34) will be eliminated by virtue of the *Deletion Rule*, as they do not directly contribute to the construction of the topic. Among the blind man's utterances, the disputative speech act in verse 30 and the confirmative speech act in verse 33 directly refer to Jesus' origin and, hence, indicate Jesus' identity. His dissentive speech act in verse 25 also implies Jesus' identity based on what Jesus did for the man. These are placed on the next macro level by means of the *Selection Rule*, because they also contribute to the construction of the topic. His remaining utterances (vv. 27, 31, 32) will be eliminated by means of the *Deletion Rule*. By virtue of

the *Generalization Rule*, the retained Jews' utterances (vv. 24, 29) propose, in general, that Jesus must be a sinner. This macroproposition moves up to the next higher level. The *Construction Rule* creates a new proposition from the blind man's retained utterances, namely that Jesus must have come from God. This also goes up to the next higher level. However, as these two macropropositions contradict each other semantically, no new macroproposition can be formulated. One should note at this point that the suggested hypothesis embraces and describes both macropropositions, which address Jesus' identity and origin. Since the main purpose of the trial had something to do with Jesus' identity, as analysed in the utterance of 9:26, the communicative goal could most likely be to discover (or identify) Jesus' identity by determining Jesus' origin. The author intends to confirm to the reader that the blind man's perception of Jesus is correct: Jesus was not a sinner, but the one who came from God. The reader will also notice that this corresponds with his understanding thus far, gained from the present co-text and his reading up to this scene in the Gospel. As a result, a *macrospeech act of this cluster would be confirmative*, based on the blind man's testimony (argument) as a truth-seeking procedure (Bach & Harnish 1979:46).

3. Still on the text level, the author deploys some significant communicative strategies for the reader. Most importantly, the literary device of *irony* is admirably used throughout this cluster. A significant point from a speech act perspective is that there is hardly any violation of the conversational rules in the blind man's utterances. Even when he used verbal irony, he did not violate the *Politeness Principle*, because he observed the *Irony Principle*. By contrast, the Jews constantly transgressed the *Politeness Principle*, as they overtly and verbally abused him in their argument. This implies that they did not use irony. The reason for this would be that they perhaps did not need to be polite to the blind man. A more plausible reason would be that the author characterises the blind man as being more intelligent than the Jews, because the use of irony requires intelligence. This observation corresponds with the description of their debate scene where the man's argument was far better and more convincing than that of the Jews.

4. The use of irony requires separate comments. In this dialogue scene, we have identified at least eight instances of situational irony (cf. 'Chart of irony in John 9' in Appendix 6). The victims of these ironies throughout were always the Jews, except on one occasion when the blind man was the victim of the irony of dilemma (v. 25). This indicates that situational irony is most often used to expose either the Jews' lack of knowledge or their unbelief. An intriguing insight will emerge from this when it is combined with the analysis of verbal irony in this scene. Duke (1982:243) confidently

states that, "if we do not grasp the irony we do not grasp the Gospel. Yet it is precisely here that it must be recalled, irony is by its very nature beyond grasp". Therefore, Duke (1982:243) concludes that John uses irony in order to capture Jesus who is beyond our understanding. It is best to describe the infinite with an infinite literary device. I would agree that his remark captures the most significant use of irony in this Gospel.

In comparison with this use, however, the author's use of irony in this scene leaves a distinctive imprint. All three verbal ironies used by the blind man served as a satiric device to criticise the Jews, especially their ignorance of the truth. It is most likely that the author uses both a verbal irony and situational ironies in this cluster to reveal the Jews' unbelief and inadequacy to grasp the true knowledge.

5. The effect of such use of irony on the reader is perhaps limitless. Culpepper (1983:179) avers: "Never is the reader the victim of irony. On the contrary, inclusion is the strongest effect of John's irony." He goes on to state that "John's irony is calculated ... primarily to include readers among the circle of believers committed to the evangelist's theology" (Culpepper 1983:180). In addition, Duke (1982:241) suggests: "Although irony chooses us, so to speak, it also demands our active involvement Part of the power of the Johannine irony, then, is that it so forcefully engages us in what we read." The analysis on this cluster has also repeatedly pointed out these same points. Furthermore, the author uses irony to vividly depict the characters' frustration, dilemma and antagonism, to clarify the reader's interpretation, and to invite the reader to pass judgment on the characters' utterances and actions. This is secret communication designed for the reader. The author's use of irony is, therefore, rich and rewarding.

6. The personal development of the blind man described in this scene may be beyond the reader's expectation. In the first cluster A, he was simply a poor figure sitting along the roadside greatly disadvantaged by blindness. He did not utter a single word. In this present cluster, he not only conversed with the Jewish authorities with his eyes open, but also with courage and intelligence. In a sense, his experience of suffering in this trial may contribute to his personal development (for further discussion, cf. section 1.4.5 in Chapter 5). Even if the observation made in cluster D that the parents' weakness ultimately opened a way for their son to establish his own self-identity and self-confidence is accounted for, his development in such a short period of time is incredible. This is unpredictable and thus interesting. This surprises the reader by virtue of the operation of the *Interest Principle*. As Stibbe (1993:107) points out, the blind man cannot be described fully by means of the theory of characterisation, and is beyond the categories of "flat" and "round".

7. *Lastly*, what message does the author primarily intend to convey to the reader with this dialogue scene? The *perlocution* of this cluster would be similar to that of verse 33. The author intends to ask the reader to continue in adhering to the truth about Jesus, which the reader already knows, and to encourage the reader to fight for this belief against any difficulties or persecution that may threaten the reader, by depicting the courage of the blind man before the hostile Jewish authorities in the trial. The author's invitation to the reader to share the same perspective of the blind man concerning Jesus should also constitute good advice, namely that the reader should not make the same mistake as the Jews did.

8. CLUSTER B': THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN JESUS AND THE BLIND MAN (9:35-38)

8.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

8.1.1 The Son of Man

It is often pointed out that John's Gospel dramatically differs from the Synoptics. As Culpepper (1998:13) states, this Gospel "has its own language and idioms, its own chronology of the ministry of Jesus, its own view of Jesus' identity and works, and its own theology". The famous term *Son of Man* is not an exception to this trait. Although the author's use of this term is, of course, not totally alien to synoptic usage, some of the issues debated in Synoptic scholarship do not enter into Johannine scholarship.¹⁴¹ For instance, the author regards the Son of Man basically as a title and an expression of Jesus' self-designation (Smith 1986:48; Burkett 1991:16). According to Burkett (1991:16), two most important issues regarding this title in Johannine studies are its possible background and Christological significance. These two issues suit the present topic of this section. Of course, the focus has to be narrowed down in order to examine the mutual contextual beliefs concerning this term both between the characters and between the author and the reader in John 9. The Gospel explicitly refers to this phrase in the following passages: i) 1:51; 3:13, 14; 5:27; 6:27, 53, 62; 8:28; ii) 9:35, and iii) 12:23, 34c, 34d; 13:31.¹⁴²

Firstly, I shall discuss the Son of Man from the author's perspective. What does the author mean by this expression? How does the author use this phrase in his communication with the reader? In other words, for our understanding of the specific text of John 9, the identity and role (or function) of the Son of Man in the Gospel should be explored. To begin with, the role will be scrutinised in order to determine the identity. Based on theme, I propose to classify the 13 references into four groups:

a. The descent/ascent motif – incarnation, crucifixion, exaltation and glorification: 1:51; 3:13, 14; 6:62; 8:28/12:23, 34c; 13:31. In this group, I shall further subdivide the passages into three categories (the list is not mutually exclusive): a-i) those references that specifically indicate the Son of Man's glorification: 12:23; 13:31; a-ii) those references that address only the ascent motif: 3:14; 6:62; 8:28; 12:34c, and a-iii) those references that express the descent/ascent motif in general: 1:51; 3:13. The passages in

141 For a recent survey of the scholarly discussions on this term, cf. Burkett 2000; Brown 2003:252-259.

142 The division is made to highlight narrative temporality.

category (a-i) tell of the glorification of the Son of Man and God the Father. They are connected to the specific hour indicating the time when Jesus would complete his work on the cross. This glory was shared by Jesus and the Father before the world existed (17:5; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:403), and Jesus manifested the Father's name and revealed God by performing the works of God, especially through his signs (e.g., 2:11; 9:3-7; 11:4, 40; 17:1-6). The Johannine portrayal of the Son of Man in relation to his glory differs from that of the Synoptics. The synoptic writers emphasise Jesus as an apocalyptic 'Son of Man' who is to receive future glory (Ladd 1974:157). In other words, Jesus will come again with great power and glory as the Son of Man (e.g., Mt 16:27; 19:28; Mk 8:38; 14:26; Lk 9:26; 21:27; cf. also Marshall 1992:776). According to Burkett (1991:7), "[t]he Johannine 'Son of (the) Man' is not an apocalyptic figure" (for this comparison, cf. below).

All the references in group (a-ii) describe the Son of Man's journey to the heavenly world by employing the expression *lifting up*, except for 6:62 which uses the word *ascend*. Although scholars debate the issue as to which facet of his journey is referred to in the expression *lifting up*, they generally agree that it has a double meaning (Stibbe 1993:57, 137). For instance, it refers to "both the crucifixion and exaltation of Jesus" (Smalley 1969:291; cf. also Carson 1991:201; Moloney 2005:186). According to Ashton ([1991] 1993:364-366), it implies crucifixion and specifically resurrection. Saayman (1995:44) comments on 3:14: "There is ... no indication that the reference is to the ascension of Jesus. If a double meaning is intended, it concerns the glorification on the cross" (cf. also Moloney 1978:62; Bruce 1982:51). "For John the 'lifting up' of the Son of Man is the visible aspect of his 'ascent' into the heavenly world and ... also of his installation in power and saving authority" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:400). At least they all perceive the starting point of this *lifting up* in Jesus' death on the cross (cf. also Lindars 1983:146). However, one should note that the Johannine Son of Man does not bear the motif of suffering of the title as is evident in the synoptic portrayal.¹⁴³ As far as this synoptic emphasis is concerned, Marshall (1992:776) states that "Jesus speaks of the impending suffering, death and resurrection of the Son of man ... The sufferings of Jesus are clearly linked to his role as the Son of man; they are not mentioned explicitly without some reference to him as the Son of man". It may be important for the text of John 9 to note Moloney's (1978:140) remark on 8:28: "The title appears to be deliberately chosen by John for use in this context of revelation and judgment. It is Jesus, the man who lived, preached and was lifted up upon a cross, who is the unique revelation of God among men."

143 E.g., Mt 12:40; 17:22; 20:18-19; Mk 8:31; 9:12, 31; 10:33-34, 45; Lk 9:22; 18:31; 22:22; cf. also Kümmel 1972:87; Ladd 1974:155-157; Bruce 1982:56; Brown 1966:84.

The general descent/ascent motif is contained in the passages of group (a-iii), but these references also pose some interpretational problems. For example, 1:51 mentions ascending before descending concerning the angels' activity (Brown 1966:84). In 3:13, the use of the perfect tense is problematic (Brown 1966:132), and the stories of the saints who went up to Heaven raise another issue.¹⁴⁴ Saayman (1995:39) states that "as far as v 13 is concerned, the usual interpretation was that it asserts that Jesus is the only one qualified to reveal the realities referred to in v 12". In addition, "it refers to the pre-existence, incarnation and ascension of the Son of man" (Smalley 1969:290). Brown (1966:133) contends that "only in John is the Son of Man portrayed as descending ... The whole purpose of vs. 13 ... is to stress the heavenly origin of the Son of Man". Burkett (1991:175) provides possible background for the descent/ascent motif associated with the title: i) Jacob's dream (Gn 28:12; cf. also Dodd [1953] 1968:245; Pamment 1985:59); ii) what is attributed to God in Proverbs 30:4 is attributed to the Son of Man in John 3:13, and iii) the Word of Yahweh (Is 55:1-3, 10-11) in connection with John 6:26-62.

b. The authority given by the Father to execute judgment: 5:27. This category is unique among the Johannine Son of Man sayings. This uniqueness generates scholarly controversy as to whether or not one of the traits of this title in John is apocalyptic. In terms of the Son of Man as a figure of heaven, judgment and the future, Martyn ([1968] 1979:139) proposes that "John 5:27 appears to be the most 'traditional' Son of Man saying in the whole of the New Testament". In this sense, many scholars find the apocalyptic Son of Man described in the Old Testament as a plausible source. "The background to the Son of man tradition in the Fourth Gospel is probably to be located primarily in Daniel 7 (cf. especially verses 13f.) and Psalm 80 (cf. verse 17); in both of these passages the figure of the Son of man represents the community of Israel, vindicated after suffering" (Smalley 1978:94).¹⁴⁵ As far as Daniel 7 is concerned, the title "came to be used as a title of dignity of Jesus" (Marshall 1992:781). This kind of understanding is similar to that of the synoptic Son of Man.

On the other hand, while this eschatological background remains, some critics understand John's strong emphasis on the present aspect of the Son of Man (cf. Barrett 1955:302-303). Smith (1986:48) indicates: "Although in John it has lost much of its apocalyptic coloration (cf. Daniel 7), it is still a

144 Gn 5:24; Heb 11:5; 2 Ki 2:1, 11; cf. also Meeks 1965:324-334; Brown 1966:145; Carson 1991:200.

145 Cf. also Dodd [1953] 1968:245, footnote 1; Brown 1966:220; Martyn [1968] 1979:137-139; Moloney 1978:219; Lindars 1983:155; Ashton [1991] 1993:340; Painter [1991] 1993:322-323; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:107, 113.

term of dignity, not of humiliation” (cf. also Harris 1994:119). Rhea (1990:69) and Burkett (1991:173-174) also conclude that John has no knowledge of an apocalyptic ‘Son of Man’ title or concept in relation to Daniel 7:13. As Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:112) rightly observes, the judgment in 5:27, in connection with the notion of judgment in both 5:22 and 24, denotes “the present judgment that is passed on all men who reject faith and close themselves to the Son’s call (cf 3:18)”.¹⁴⁶ The author’s emphasis on this present judgment by the Son of Man seems to be more strongly linked to Jesus’ judgment of the Pharisees in 9:41.

c. The power to grant eternal life: 6:27, 53. The role of the Son of Man is apparent. These verses (6:27, 53) refer “to the personal bearer of the divine life, also to the saving gift of life which he conveys, and also to the Eucharist in which this shared life and personal link with the mediator of salvation are established in a special way” (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:38).

d. The object of inquiry: 9:35/12:34d. The Son of Man sayings do not provide any additional meaning to our understanding of the title. In 12:34d, the multitude simply asked the identity of the Son of Man. In 9:35, Jesus inquired from the blind man whether he would believe in the Son of Man. At this point, this question only suggests that the Son of Man could be the object of one’s faith.

Based on the above observations, what kind of picture does the author present of the identity of the Son of Man in the Gospel? The Johannine Son of Man would be the one who comes down from heaven with absolute authority and reveals and glorifies the Father by performing the works of God. Upon his return, the Son of Man will share in this glory again. His most important work is to lay down his life on the cross as the Father planned so that those who look up to him may have eternal life. However, even before he completes this final work on earth, the Son of Man brings judgment to the world in his present revelatory mission.

Secondly, I shall discuss the Son of Man from the reader’s perspective. From his reading up to Chapter 9, the reader is assumed to have knowledge of most of the identity and role of the Son of Man, as examined earlier. The reader does not know the explicit reference to the glorification in 12:23 and 13:31. Hence, the reader is not aware of the exact time of this glorification. He has information regarding the Son of Man’s heavenly origin, his signs and judgment as revelations and his authority to judge which is granted by the Father. It is through the Son of Man that a believer may obtain eternal life. In addition, the reader can infer the Son of Man’s

146 For a detailed discussion on the tension between realised and futuristic eschatology manifested in 5:25-29, cf. Van der Watt 1985.

pre-existence, incarnation and crucifixion implicitly. Therefore, when the reader reads Jesus' question in 9:35, the reader will most likely grasp the overall meaning of the title used by Jesus.

Lastly, I shall examine the character's knowledge. In 9:35, there are two characters on stage: Jesus and the blind man. Since Jesus is the speaker, Jesus should know what he is talking about. However, we do not know how much the blind man knows about the Son of Man from the surface structure of verse 35. To determine the man's knowledge seems to be guess work, but it is not impossible to measure it to some extent. However, this has to be done in the text analysis where the co-text supplies more information.

8.1.2 Relationships between the characters


The knowledge for the specific conversation between Jesus and the blind man is as follows:

- In this cluster, the blind man encountered Jesus for the first time with his eyes now open, but it was, in fact, their second encounter.
- The text does not mention clearly whether or not the blind man recognised the person who came to talk to him as being the same person who had healed him.
- To start with, Jesus was the healer and the blind man the healed in the relationship between the characters. Ultimately, it became a relationship between the Lord and his believer/worshipper. In either case, Jesus was superior to the blind man.
- Both parties are assumed to have known a suitable action after believing the Lord was to worship him, because it appeared to be natural for the blind man to worship Jesus and Jesus did not reject the man's worship.

8.2 Overview and structural analysis chart

Jesus heard the news that the Jews had ended the second interrogation of the blind man by casting him out. As if Jesus was waiting for this opportunity, he tried to contact the blind man for the man's own sake. It is, of course, extremely important for the plot of the story that Jesus finally comes back on stage to be in the spotlight again (cf. also Lindars [1972] 1981:350). This cluster describes the dialogue between Jesus and the blind man in two subclusters, cola 43-45 and 46-48. The first subcluster portrays the first part of their conversation, and the second subcluster represents the second part.

Structural analysis chart for cluster B'



I shall note several points regarding this cluster.

1. The cluster can be divided structurally into two subclusters, but it is also possible to divide the cluster into three parts from a semantic point of view. The three parts are an introduction (setting), a main dialogue, and a conclusion, corresponding to cola 43-44.1, 44.2*-47, and 48. This is possible because the semantic contents in the main dialogue are strongly connected inwardly.
2. There is a possible chiasmic arrangement in the main dialogue.

9:35 44.2.1 Σὺ πιστεύεις εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; : a
 9:36 45.1.1 Καὶ τίς ἐστιν, κύριε, ἵνα πιστεύσω εἰς αὐτόν; : b
 9:37 46.1-46.2 Καὶ ἐώρακας αὐτὸν καὶ ὁ λαλῶν μετὰ σοῦ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν. : b'
 9:38 47.1 Πιστεύω, κύριε : a'

The chiasmic pattern emerges around the semantic (and lexical) parallels between the related subcola. Sentences a and a' share the same root words πιστεύω. The phrase τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and the word κύριε share the same referent, Jesus. Sentences b and b' also share the same referent, Jesus, by virtue of the words κύριε and αὐτόν in b, and αὐτόν and ἐκεῖνός in b'. The conjunction καὶ occurs in both sentences. In addition, there are two sets of question-answer forms in this chiasm: between a and a', and between b and b'.

3. The cluster also has an *inclusio*. Both cola 43 and 48 mention the characters on stage, namely Jesus and the blind man.
4. The cluster serves as the conclusion and climax of the miracle story in which Jesus and the blind man were the two main characters throughout. Dockery (1988:22) states: "The affirmation by the man in verse 38 ... is both the peak of the discourse and the pinnacle of the man's gradually developing faith" (Duke 1982:190 holds the same view on the second part). Moreover, when the miracle story is viewed from this angle, there is a delightful *inclusio* between the beginning and the end of the story. In cluster A, Jesus healed and physically opened the blind man's eyes. In cluster B', Jesus also opened the blind man's spiritual eyes so that he might perceive the spiritual truth. In this sense, Jesus was the light of the world who illumined the world by doing God's work in this way. As mentioned in 'Introduction' (section 1), this perfectly illustrates his statement in 8:12. Jesus said, "I am the light of the world; he who follows Me shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the light of life".
5. The frequent use of both the coordinate conjunctions and the pronouns can be observed once again throughout the cluster. The author is notably fond of using *καί* in this cluster. He uses it six times out of the seven occurrences of coordinate conjunctions.
6. Regarding the tenses of the verbs, the fifth remark, pointed out in cluster C' (section 7.2), can also be applied to this cluster. It infers that the author is consistent in his style of writing.
7. Significant structural markers include: to say, to believe, you, he, and, the Son of Man, Jesus and Lord (sir).

Considering all these aspects, the cluster also displays strong cohesion.

8.3 Microspeech acts

8.3.1 The first subcluster (9:35-36)

The first subcluster can be divided into two units: subcola 43-44 and colon 45. The unit of subcola 43-44 depicts Jesus' question and its setting, thus forming a unit of analysis. Colon 45 describes the blind man's reply to Jesus' question.

9:35 Ἦκουσεν Ἰησοῦς ὅτι ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἔξω καὶ εὐρών αὐτὸν εἶπεν, Σὺ πιστεύεις εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου;

a) General analysis

Although no detail is provided as to how Jesus heard the news of the blind man, the narrator simply records that fact and uses it as the setting of their conversation. The content of the news is elaborated on in 43.1. This is an exact duplication of colon 42. This synonymous parallelism plays a role in establishing the link between the current and the previous clusters. However, the relationship between colon 42 and 43 is logical-reason-result. The author usually supplies a conjunction to establish such a link between clusters at the beginning of each cluster, but there is no such conjunction in this instance – a striking fact (cf. 9:1, 8, 18, 24, 39; 9:13). Briefly, colon 43 narrates that *Jesus heard that they had cast him out*.

When Jesus heard the news, he apparently tried to find the blind man. Hoskyns (1954:359) indicates that the author uses the word εὐρίσκω to describe Jesus' conscious effort to meet the man. The meeting was not accidental. The aorist participle εὐρών in 44.1 also shows the temporal-adverbial use describing the circumstances for Jesus' first utterance to the man (Fowler *et al.* 1985:307). The conjunction καὶ links cola 43 and 44 by means of an additive-different relation. The main verb of colon 44 is the aorist active verb εἶπεν, suggesting that Jesus was taking the initiative and started the first utterance of the conversation in this instance (cf. Barrett 1955:302; Moloney 1978:150; Holleran 1993b:377). One should bear in mind that this could be one of the literary characteristics of the author in the dialogue form (for more on this trait, cf. the section on 'CS' for the narration in 9:2). In the Synoptics, it is not Jesus, but an interlocutor who initiates a dialogue in most instances (Dodd 1963:317).

The content of Jesus' utterance is described in 44.2.1, and his utterance signifies a crucial personal question. This question is directed to the blind man, and it is emphasized by the nominative pronoun σύ (cf. also Westcott [1882] 1978:149; Morris 1971:494; Holleran 1993b:377-378). Barrett (1955:302) rephrases: "Do you, over against those who have expelled you, believe?" And "[t]he form of the question presupposes an affirmative reply" (Bernard 1928:337; cf. also Morris 1971:494, footnote 48). The verb πιστεύεις is the keyword in this question. It should even be perceived as a keyword in the entire chapter as soon as one of the major themes in the story is recognised as belief/unbelief.¹⁴⁷ Equally significant is the

147 For references to this theme, cf., e.g., the sections on 'GA' in 9:18, 36, 38a, on 'IA' in 9:30, and on 'CS' in 9:20, 24, 29, 31, 33, 34.

expression *the Son of Man*, a special term referring to Jesus in the Gospel (cf. section 8.1.1). According to Van der Watt (1985:73), the verb πιστεύω is used 98 times in John. However, 9:35 is the only place where this verb is used explicitly with the Son of Man (cf. Barrett 1955:302; cf. 3:15). Holleran (1993b:377, footnote 219) phrases a similar point differently: “The only two New Testament passages where the Son of Man is made the *object of faith* are here and in Jn 3,14-16.” Therefore, in this instance, the use of this term is striking. Briefly, this verse can now be translated as follows: *Jesus heard that they had cast him out, and when he found him, he said, “Do you believe in the Son of Man?”*

b) Illocutionary act

Cluster C’ depicted the blind man’s victory over the Jewish authorities in the fierce debate on the issue of Jesus who had healed the man. However, on the surface, the blind man – the winner – was cast out as if he were the loser. Barrett (1955:302) describes this situation: “he has not yet understood what has taken place, or come to faith to Jesus. Jesus, therefore, taking the initiative (cf 5.14), as he must, *finds* the man” (cf. also Moloney 1978:150). When he found the man, Jesus asked him a simple yet crucial question. The interrogative sentence type of Jesus’ utterance corresponds to its communicative function of question, that is, to elicit information from the hearer (Yule 1996:54-55). In other words, Jesus was sincere in wanting to know the blind man’s answer to his question. Therefore, Jesus’ inquiry would be a speech act of *question*. Bach and Harnish (1979:47) sketch the schema of questions as follows:

Questions: (ask, inquire, interrogate, query, question, quiz)

In uttering *e*, *S* questions *H* as to whether or not *P* if *S* expresses:

- i. the desire that *H* tell *S* whether or not *P*, and
- ii. the intention that *H* tell *S* whether or not *P* because of *S*’s desire.

When the schema is applied to this utterance, the result is as follows:

In uttering ‘Do you believe in the Son of Man?’, Jesus questions the blind man as to whether the blind man believes in the Son of Man or not if Jesus expresses:

- i. the desire that the blind man tell Jesus whether he believes in the Son of Man or not, and
- ii. the intention that the blind man tell Jesus whether or not he believes in the Son of Man because of Jesus’ desire.

Since Jesus appeared to express his desire and intention, as described above, the utterance can be considered a successful speech act of

question. Incidentally, should this utterance be examined using Searle's ([1969] 1980:67) essential and sufficient conditions for a speech act of question (cf. the section on 'IA' in 9:2), those conditions would also be met. Briefly, Jesus intended to ask the man, whom Jesus had healed previously, a simple yet profound question as to whether or not the man would believe in some significant figure. The author also intends to ask the reader the same kind of question as to whether or not the reader really believes in Jesus.

c) Perlocutionary act

The blind man should respond adequately to Jesus' question, by indicating whether or not he was willing to believe in the Son of Man. The reader should also answer in a similar manner so that he may strengthen his existing faith.

d) Communicative strategy

1. For the sake of argument, I shall discuss *the communication on both the character and the text levels simultaneously*. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:253) comments on this verse: "Jesus' question ... also contains a promise: if he believes in Jesus as the Son of man, Jesus will take him with him into his glory. Of course, the man cannot yet understand this – and so he asks again – but the reader is meant to understand that Jesus intends to give the man not just sight, but also "the light of life".

I would not object to this remark, but intend to draw attention to the part that the blind man would not grasp Jesus' promise in his question. Schnackenburg perhaps assumes, from the fact that the man asked Jesus again, that the man could not understand the promise. As will be examined below, the main reason why the man asked Jesus again in verse 36 is that the man did not understand the identity of the Son of Man, not the promise as such (cf. also Hare 1990:106). Therefore, Schnackenburg's explanation is inadequate. However, *a speech act approach has an advantage, in this instance, and is able to elucidate the matter more adequately*. This speech act approach provides a far better tool than mere guessing. From a speech act perspective, the reason why the man did not understand is simply that the promise described by Schnackenburg is contained neither in the illocution nor in the perlocution of Jesus' utterance. Obviously, the hearer cannot detect an element that is not present in the speaker's utterance. As far as the reader is concerned, however, the reader is able to detect this promise, or more precisely, to deduce such an implication from all the information stored up to this moment. The reader has the ability to utilise this information in order to understand the character's utterance more

adequately. But the blind man simply did not possess such information and could, therefore, not understand it.

2. Jesus' utterance is a simple and clear question, and, in this sense, his utterance observes the *Manner Maxim*. Simultaneously, the phrase *Son of Man*, which Jesus used in his question, appears to violate the *Manner Maxim*, particularly because Jesus did not use a clearer term that was available to him, such as 'me' or the Son of God. One should note, in this instance, that the *Quantity Maxim* is also involved in this issue. If Jesus had said more than he, in fact, did in this utterance, this issue would possibly not have existed. For instance, if he said, "I am the Son of Man. And do you believe in the Son of Man?", the blind man would not have had to ask Jesus another question for clarification. Hence, even when this issue is scrutinised in terms of the *Manner Maxim*, the *Quantity Maxim* should not be ignored. The latter is not an issue raised only by a speech act approach. From a literary-critical perspective, Burkett (1991:166) raises the issue in the following two questions: "Why is it introduced in the middle of a story portraying Jesus as the Light?" and "Why, as nowhere else, is it the object of a confession of faith?" For the sake of contrast, the same issue is raised in a more simple form from a historical point of view. Why not the Christ, the Lord, or the Son of God (Moloney 1978:150; Carson 1991:376)? This question becomes even more striking with the observation that not the phrase *the Son of God*, but rather the term *the Son of Man* should be the original reading in the text (Brown 1966:375; Bultmann 1971:338, footnote 3; Moloney 1978:149). But the heart of the matter remains the same. The question as to why Jesus (for that matter, the author) uses this particular title is scrutinised in order to account for the issue relating to the *Manner Maxim*. Many scholars have offered various answers to this question. I intend to outline their proposals and briefly examine each one of them, including my responses in some instances. I shall then present my concluding remarks.

- a. The use of this title was a customary way of confessing faith. Hare (1990:106) indicates that this is unlikely: "As we have seen (1:49), the Messiah was popularly designated 'the Son of God', but 'the Son of Man' was not a recognized Messianic title ... The man to whom Jesus spoke was evidently puzzled" (Bernard 1928:338). In John's Gospel, a more common expression in the use of confession would be the Son of God (e.g., 1:34, 49; 3:18; 11:27; 20:31).
- b. There is no significant difference between the Son of Man and the Son of God. Some expositors (e.g., Richardson 1959:128; Marsh 1968:388-389) claim that there is no important difference in meaning in this context between the use of the Son of Man and that of the Son of

God. Marsh (1968:388-389) considers the matter as such, because of his understanding of the Son of Man as “the heavenly, the archetypal man”. In his case, both phrases refer to Jesus’ divine Sonship. Moloney (1978:150) criticises this view, stating that “[t]his is hardly a satisfactory solution”. Burkett (1991:167) provides a more convincing reason for the view that the Son of Man, in this instance, means the Son of God, because “as the Son of God, the Son of the Man is the Light begotten from the light of God” (cf. also Dodd [1953] 1968:244; Martyn [1968]1979:134, footnote 193). While other people designated Jesus as the Son of God, Jesus preferred to call himself the Son of Man (Burkett 1991:167). This view contradicts the passages in which Jesus designated himself as the Son of God (e.g., 5:25; 10:36; 11:4).

- c. The Son of God is reserved especially for the other passage (10:36). “John is probably saving up ‘Son of God’ for the climax in 10:36” (Lindars [1972] 1981:350). Even if this view, namely that the author carefully selects the expression, is credible, it still does not explain why the author chooses the Son of Man.
- d. The Son of Man is meant to be Christ. Other critics (e.g., Hoskyns 1954:359; Morris 1971:494; Du Rand 1985:30) contend that the Son of Man is supposed to mean Christ, especially to the blind man and to a group of disciples to whom the man would belong as a result of his confession. If the author then intends to refer as such to the figure expressed in the Son of Man, why does he not use the term *Christ*? He already used this term in 9:22.
- e. The use of this title is designed for use in puns. This proposal is one of my suggestions. There may be a *pun* on the word *man*. The blind man was introduced at the beginning of this Chapter as “a man” born blind (v. 1). This man with his eyes open was now meeting the Son of Man face to face. It may be one of the author’s ideas to use this title in this instance. This possibility cannot be dismissed, since Stibbe (1993a:54) describes a contrast between Jesus and Nicodemus in much the same way (John 3:1, 13-14). Duke (1982:191) also suggests: “In view of the man’s remark in v. 11 ... and the Pharisees’ contemptuous use of ‘man’ for Jesus in vv. 16, 24, ‘Son of Man’ in v. 35 serves a crucial ironic function, fulfilling and expanding the healed man’s word and mocking the contempt of his accusers.” According to Duke, this is an ironic expression, not an instance of irony. This point should, therefore, also be classified as referring to puns.

- f. The use of this title is linked primarily to Jesus' humanity. Other researchers¹⁴⁸ attribute the use of the Son of Man primarily to the emphasis on Jesus' humanity (e.g., his incarnate state). Although Jesus' humanity is imperative to form sound Christology, John's characterisation of Jesus places more emphasis on his divine side throughout the Gospel (Culpepper 1983:106-112). In this immediate co-text, where the blind man would worship Jesus as a result of his confession in the Son of Man (9:38), this phrase seems to point to Jesus' divinity rather than to his humanity (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:38b; cf. also v 33). Hence, formulated to a fault, is there any need to highlight Jesus' humanity in this co-text?
- g. According to many commentators,¹⁴⁹ the use of this title is closely linked to the theme of judgment in 9:39-41. This proposal corresponds to the authority of judgment given to the Son of Man in 5:27. The only problem associated with this view would be, as Burkett (1991:166-167) also points out, that while the 'judgment' in the co-texts (9:35-41) strongly emphasises the present judgment (cf. Bultmann 1971:338), many supporters of this view consider the Son of Man to be the apocalyptic-eschatological judge.¹⁵⁰ To solve this problem, Martyn ([1968] 1979:141) appeals to his two-level drama theory and proposes a solution: "It is precisely the contemporary level of the drama which makes clear that judgment by the Son of Man takes place essentially on earth and in the present, not in heaven and in the future." As an alternative, Lindars ([1972] 1981:351) suggests that "the future judgment ... is anticipated in the confrontation with Jesus in his incarnate life; the response to Jesus *now* determines his verdict as Son of Man in the future". These solutions may be valid, and cannot be ignored. However, as indicated implicitly earlier (cf. section 8.1.1), my view coincides more with Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:112) who argues that the 'judgment' in 5:27 also denotes the present judgment.
- h. The use of this title is due to circumlocution. This relates the issue of Jesus' circumlocution; there are two versions. The first version is presented by Bultmann (1971:338): "The indirectness of the dialogue – due to the fact that Jesus does not ask straight out, 'Do you believe in me?' – is designed to show the difference between the healed man's

148 E.g., Westcott [1882] 1978:149-151; Dodd [1953] 1968:244-247; Moloney 1978:213, 220; Pamment 1985:58-59; Hare 1990:111; Lee 1994:185.

149 E.g., Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:253; Morris 1971:494, footnote 47; Lindars [1972] 1981:350-351; Bruce [1983] 1994:219-220; Beasley-Murray 1987:159.

150 E.g., Brown 1966:375; Martyn [1968] 1979:140-141; Sanders & Mastin 1968:106, 244; Carson 1991:376; Lee 1994:168, 186.

previous recognition of Jesus and the confession which is now required of him.” Bultmann (1971:338, footnote 7) goes on to say that this title “was a naïve way of referring to Christian faith”.

The second version seems to be simple and plain, yet is one of the most plausible solutions. John 9:35 is a case of circumlocution, a non-titular use of Son of Man (Müller 1991:291). It is a self-designation derived from a unique speech situation. As pointed out earlier (section 8.1.2), the blind man, with his eyes opened, encountered Jesus for the first time in this cluster. It is unlikely that the blind man recognised Jesus as his benefactor, because he had not seen Jesus until now. In this situation, Jesus could not say, “Do you believe in me?” (cf. also Lindars 1983:151). Jesus had to reveal himself to the man before the man could place his trust in Jesus. The man had to come to know that Jesus was the one who could give abundant life in faith. In this respect, Jesus appeared to connect this life-giving role to the title of the Son of Man, indicating a strong connection between the use of the title in 9:35 and the other Son of Man sayings in the Gospel, in particular 6:27 and 53 (cf. also Müller 1991:294).

From the above discussion, I suggest that Jesus’ choice of the phrase *Son of Man* can be explained more adequately by combining proposals e, g and h, namely for the use of puns, for the theme of judgment and for circumlocution.

3. We are now in a better position to determine the original issue regarding a possible violation of the *Manner Maxim* in Jesus’ utterance. Since this is a very complex issue, I shall propose two sets of possibilities to account for this:
 - a. In relation to the reader, the *Manner Maxim* is either violated or observed. At first glance, the *Manner Maxim* may be violated because Jesus did not use a clearer term, as mentioned earlier. If this is violated, it indicates that the author has something significant to communicate to the reader, and the reader is called upon to detect this significance by virtue of implicature. This means that this significance is greater in meaning than mere adherence to a Maxim. However, I would opt for the view that Jesus’ utterance does not flout the *Manner Maxim*, because the upholding of this Maxim seems to be more important than a message that can be conveyed by breaching it in this specific speech situation. In this instance, it is important that the author has faith in or trusts the reader’s understanding of the utterance. Although Jesus used the phrase *Son of Man* which contains charged concepts, the reader is assumed to be able to understand all the concepts (of course, only those concepts which are presented up to Chapter 9). At least all three

solutions (proposals) described above should be conceivable to the reader. In this instance, one gloss should be made. Strictly speaking, the reader has not yet read the next scene of verse 35. The reader will soon understand the link between the title and the theme of judgment when he reads 9:39-41 (cf. also section 8.1.1).

- b. In relation to the blind man, the *Manner Maxim* is either violated or observed. As indicated earlier (section 8.1.1), the question as to whether or not the blind man comprehended this title is more difficult. The confusion in this issue is demonstrated by two opposing views. Burkett (1991:165) remarks: "The man probably does not understand the title (cf. 12:34), but he shows himself willing to believe in anyone Jesus recommends and asks to know who this person is" (cf. also Westcott [1882] 1978:151; Bruce [1983] 1994:220; Rhea 1990:47). Conversely, Hoskyns (1954:359) comments: "He understands the significance of the title" (cf. also Howard-Gossip 1952:619; Barrett 1955:302; Bultmann 1971:338; Haenchen 1984:40). The former view can be conceivable if one imagines how much this blind man knew about this specific title. The man's arguments in 9:30-33 indicate that this man knew the God of Israel to some extent. In light of the text including the first eight chapters, however, the man hardly knew the Son of Man sayings. How, then, was he able to understand?

The latter view is equally possible, thus confusing the issue. In 9:36, in the present co-text, the blind man asked, "Who is he?" after Jesus' question in 9:35. His inquiry was aimed not at the description, but at the identification (cf. Carson 1991:376; cf. also the sections on 'IA' and 'CS' in 9:36). The question of who the Son of Man was, or even where he came from, may still be acceptable, but the question regarding what he was is not within the scope of the man's original inquiry. The fact that the man did not enquire separately about the meaning of the Son of Man may imply that he did understand the phrase, at least in his own terms. Based on what he said in the previous dialogue scenes thus far, he would have understood the Son of Man as someone who was not a sinner, but rather a prophet, someone who was devout and tried to do God's will, someone who came from God as God's agent and someone who had opened his eyes. The man's portrayal shares some common elements with the descriptions of the Son of Man, such as descending from heaven and glorifying the Father through performing God's works, especially signs (cf. section 8.1.1). The man could even have taken the title as referring to someone extremely special. Most importantly, the author appears to be completely satisfied with the man's final answer in verse 38. There is no indication that the man's understanding of the title was inadequate.

Hence, it is difficult to decide the issue. However, if we take the author's communicative strategy in depicting the event in this particular co-text more seriously than the man's supposed knowledge,¹⁵¹ the answer seems to be in favour of the latter view that the man understood the title adequately. From the perspective of Interpersonal Rhetoric, this conclusion can prevent Jesus' utterance from being accused of violating the *Morality Principle* (a speaker does not ask for information he should not have). If Jesus knowingly asked the blind man something the man could not grasp, Jesus would have transgressed this Principle. It is crucial for Jesus to uphold the *Cooperative Principle*, especially the *Quality Maxim*, in this speech situation, in which Jesus was attempting to draw a prospective believer to himself. As a result, Jesus' utterance aimed at the blind man may not and should not violate the *Manner Maxim*.

4. I shall discuss two remarks pertaining to *only the communication on the character level*. *Firstly*, why did Jesus ask this particular question of the blind man? This is an important question in terms of the *Relation Maxim*. The answer would be that it was for the sake of the man's faith and because Jesus' question is closely connected to one of the most essential issues in the entire story, namely Jesus' identity. In fact, their ensuing conversation will prove this connection (cf. vv. 36-38a).

Secondly, when Jesus found the blind man, Jesus approached him with no greeting prior to his utterance. It is remarkable that there was no introductory or social talk in which people usually engage in order to create intimacy before becoming involved in such a serious or personal question and that Jesus immediately proceeded to the heart of the dialogue. It is interesting to note that Jesus used the same conversation opener when he met the Samaritan woman in 4:7 (Botha 1991a:115-116; cf also 1:43, 47; 5:6; 6:5; 18:4). Botha (1991a:116) uses McLaughlin's term *topic initiating openings* to describe this particular type of interaction. It is difficult both to adequately reconstruct the social norms of that time, and to determine whether Jesus was observing the *Politeness Principle* at the start of their conversation. One should consider this for a moment.

The story thus far reveals that the blind man did not know a great deal about the person who had healed him. Although the man assumed that Jesus was a prophet (v. 17), the only thing the man seemed to know for certain is that his name was Jesus (v. 11). He perhaps did not even know Jesus' face. From this, it becomes apparent that the blind man in 9:35 had no idea as to who was talking to him. In this case, one should approach

151 His knowledge is inevitably limited, because the blind man appears as a character in this Chapter only.

such a person with some kind of introduction about oneself. In this case, Jesus should and could have introduced himself as the miracle worker who had opened his eyes. It is even more desirable to do so, especially when one takes into account that the authorities cast this man out. He was indeed rejected by all. If someone is experiencing such a difficult time, it is highly probable that he would become emotionally defensive. He would find it difficult to face any serious or personal questions, let alone answer them. Yet Jesus was straightforward and did not introduce himself to the man. The man would probably have been puzzled when Jesus, a complete stranger, simply walked up to him and asked him the question,¹⁵² "Do you believe in the Son of Man?" This is strange, even rude. Perhaps because of the problem the man had experienced, Jesus may have approached the man without any small talk in order to proceed immediately with his question. The blind man was very familiar to Jesus. A secret bond existed between the two of them, even though the man himself was not aware thereof. Again (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:7a), Jesus acted in this specific situation in accordance with the *Banter Principle*, namely "the more intimate the relationship, the less important it is to be polite. Hence lack of politeness in itself can become a sign of intimacy" (Leech 1983:144).

5. I shall now discuss *the communication on the text level*. I wish to note several points in terms of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics. The use of the *Son of Man* in Jesus' utterance may be unpredictable and fascinating to the reader, indicating that the *Interest Principle* is operative in this utterance. This phrase also makes Jesus' utterance an economical one, for this short title is rich in connotations. Hence, the utterance observes the *Economy Principle*. Because this significant title is placed at the end of the utterance, the *Maxims of End-Focus* and *End-Weight* are observed. However, although the reader is able to fully understand the significance of the title, to do so requires more decoding time than usual, because the reader needs to decipher the meaning from the vast information resources. In this sense, the *Processibility Principle* is jeopardised. As in the case of the *Manner Maxim*, there may be a breach of the *Clarity Principle* with the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity*. If the reader understands the title adequately, these rules need not be transgressed.

e) Summary

Jesus intended to ask the blind man whether or not he was willing to believe in Jesus. However, Jesus used the phrase *Son of Man* to designate himself. The above analysis concludes that the *Manner Maxim* is not

152 The blind man might have remembered Jesus' voice. Nevertheless, Jesus could still have introduced himself to the man.

necessarily violated by Jesus' choice of this title both on the character and the text levels, as both the blind man and the reader would understand the title. The perlocution is for the man to answer Jesus' question adequately. In order to effectively communicate the point of the question, the author adheres to the *Principles of Morality, Economy and Interest*, and the *Maxims of Quality, Relation, End-Focus and End-Weight*. It appears that only the *Processibility Principle* and the *Quantity Maxim* were breached.

9:36 ἀπεκρίθη ἐκεῖνος καὶ εἶπεν, Καὶ τίς ἐστιν, κύριε, ἵνα πιστεύσω εἰς αὐτόν;

a) General analysis

Semantically, colon 45 forms one colon despite the presence of two verbs ἀπεκρίθη and εἶπεν, which require no explanation, as the author uses them frequently in this Chapter. However, the subject is emphasised by the demonstrative pronoun ἐκεῖνος, referring to the blind man. The man's answer is elaborated on in subcolon 45.1. The conjunction καὶ is somewhat ambiguous because, on the surface, there are no antecedent words or sentences to be connected in the man's reply. It appears that the blind man simply tried to relate his answer to Jesus' question. A more difficult problem is the meaning of the vocative noun κύριε, in relation to the same word used in colon 47. Is there any difference in meaning, as most translators and commentators suggest, in order to notice a development in the man's understanding of Jesus from colon 45 to 47?¹⁵³ If this development is to be noticed, the noun in 45 should merely be a conventional and polite form of address, meaning *sir*. The same word in 47 should then indicate that the blind man called Jesus *Lord* (just as he would believe later that Jesus is his Lord). There is a big difference. This observation is strongly recommended and the co-text strongly favours it. A question still remains. Why does the author use the same word to express the different meanings, while other alternatives are available to him, such as διδάσκαλε, ραββί, ἐπιστάτα, δέσποτα, and so on? There is, therefore, a slight possibility that the author may have the same meaning in mind when using this word (cf. Barrett 1955:302; cf. also 'CS' below).

The other words in the main clause in 45.1 are the interrogative pronoun τίς and the present verb ἐστίν. This means that the blind man answered Jesus with a qualification inquiry about the Son of Man, saying, "And

153 E.g., Brown 1966:375; Newman & Nida 1980:318; Carson 1991:377; Holleran 1993b:379.

who is he, sir?” To answer one question with another question is often regarded as a rhetorical technique, and this is indeed the case in 45.1. Furthermore, the inquiry comprises a purpose subclause, indicated by the subordinate conjunction *ἵνα* and the aorist subjunctive verb *πιστεύσω*.¹⁵⁴ The prepositional phrase *εἰς αὐτόν* shows the direction of the verb’s action as in colon 44, referring to the Son of Man. Hence, there is a synonymous repetition between cola 44.2.1 and 45.1.1. This shows that they are closely linked. 45.1.1 describes the blind man’s purpose, “*in order that I may believe in him*”. Bernard (1928:338) states: “There is an ellipsis before *ἵνα*, which has full telic force” (cf. also Morris 1971:494, footnote 52). It has the meaning of (tell me) in order that ... The man’s question shows at least two issues. *One* is that he already indicated a positive attitude towards faith. *Secondly*, despite his willingness to believe, he did not yet know the one in whom he wished to believe. Consequently, his question sounds plausible and is accurate. The theme of belief is expressed in this man’s question and is contrasted to that of unbelief in the attitude of the Jewish authorities. Based on these points, this verse is rendered as follows: *That man answered and said, “And who is he, Sir, in order that I may believe in him?”*

b) Illocutionary act

In the last verse, Jesus asked a question, simple in form yet profound and serious in meaning, which usually demands either the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Instead, the blind man asked Jesus a question for clarification. This unconventional response will be examined later. However, our concern, in this instance, is the man’s illocution. Although the blind man showed a very positive attitude towards believing in the Son of Man, as expressed in his utterance, the man apparently needed to clarify one important matter before he could answer Jesus and make a commitment. The man had to know who the Son of Man was. His utterance served as an inquiry and can, therefore, be a speech act of question. According to Searle’s (1969:67) necessary and sufficient conditions for questions (cf. the section on “IA” in 9:2):

Propositional content condition: It is obvious that the blind man’s question satisfies this condition.

Preparatory condition: 1. The man does not know the answer.
2. It is obvious to neither the man nor Jesus that Jesus will provide the information at that time without being asked.

¹⁵⁴ This verb could be the future indicative, but essentially there is no difference in meaning. Both verbs with *ἵνα* convey a future, simple action. Morris (1971:495, footnote 51) considers it to be the aorist.

Sincerity condition: The man wants this information.

Essential condition: Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from Jesus.

The blind man's question meets the above conditions and is thus a successful speech act of *question*. Briefly, the blind man intended to acquire new information by asking Jesus a clarifying question about the Son of Man, indicating his desire to believe in him. The author intends to affirm to the reader that the blind man was correct in attaining adequate faith. The author also shows how one should ask a relevant question in order to gain true faith.

c) Perlocutionary act

Jesus should provide the blind man with an adequate answer to his sincere inquiry aimed at clarifying the identity of the Son of Man. The reader should praise the blind man for his desire to believe in the Son of Man and for the question he asked correctly. The perlocution is for the reader to be reassured that the blind man was moving in the right direction of faith.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level, first*, the purpose clause, "in order that I may believe in him", in the man's utterance plays a significant role in indicating the genuineness of his inquiry and in expressing his desire to relate to Jesus' last utterance. Hence, this role attests to the fulfilment of the *Quality* and *Relation Maxims* in the man's question. One should note that he already displayed a positive attitude towards faith in his utterance. He wanted to believe in someone, because of what he had experienced as a man who had suffered and was healed; yet he needed to identify the right person for his faith. One should note this spiritual dilemma in the man. One's faith is usually evoked when or after one finds someone trustworthy. Not vice versa. Nobody is able to have faith legitimately without knowing the object of his belief. Jesus' disciples believed Jesus at Cana, because they came to know what kind of person he was by seeing his glory (John 2:11). So did John the Baptist's two disciples, the Samaritan woman and her villagers, the royal official and his household at Capernaum, Martha and people at the Lazarus' incident, and so forth. It seemed, however, that the man himself did not become aware of this truth until Jesus asked him a question in verse 35. The man had to realise this truth. Perhaps to meet this need, Jesus questioned the man and caused him to seek the Son of Man.

2. *Secondly*, as promised earlier, the blind man's use of the vocative κύριε should be taken as a polite form of address, meaning *sir*

(cf. Newman & Nida 1980:318), based on the specific speech situation in this instance. One should bear in mind that the blind man did not know the person with whom he was talking. He did not yet recognise that this person was his benefactor as well as the Son of Man. There was no need for the man to use the word *κύριε* in the divine sense of 'the Lord'. However, perhaps he could perceive that this person knew something he himself did not know, something which was important to the man himself, as this person made an effort to utter such a significant question (v. 35). This superiority in knowledge on the part of Jesus caused the man to be polite towards his interlocutor. Specifically, the man wanted to know more and needed to 'request' information from this person. The man, therefore, addressed Jesus as 'Sir', thereby upholding the *Politeness Principle*.

3. *On the text level, first*, I shall examine the unconventional response of the blind man. The conversation between Jesus and the blind man in 9:35-38 is analysed structurally as a chiasm (cf. section 8.2). From a linguistic perspective, this structural formulation in their particular conversation can be called *adjacency pairs*. Such adjacency pairs are characterised by *question-answer sequences* (Yule 1996:77-78). However, what makes their conversational pattern more interesting or unique is that one question-answer sequence is formulated within another (Qi – Qii – Aii – Ai). This middle pair is called an *insertion sequence* (Yule 1996:77). The delay created by this insertion sequence "symbolically marks potential unavailability of the immediate ... expected answer. Delay represents distance between what is expected and what is provided. Delay is always interpreted as meaningful" (Yule 1996:78). Delay may also create suspense as well as portray and explain the speech situation of the blind man very realistically. Although he was willing to believe in the Son of Man (v. 36), he could not immediately provide his answer to Jesus' question (v. 35), because he did not know the identity of this figure. That is the reason why the man asked a question to clarify the identity of that person. Jesus then answered his question first (v. 37). By understanding Jesus' answer, the blind man was finally ready to reply to Jesus' initial question (v. 35). In this instance, the man's utterance at the start of this insertion sequence conveys a significant meaning and makes the conversation vivid and interesting. The reader may find that the *Interest Principle* is operative in the man's utterance.

4. *Secondly*, it is strange that the blind man asked Jesus, who indeed was the one, about the identity of the Son of Man. Duke (1982:190) thus finds a peculiar Johannine irony in the man's utterance. According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), this irony can be identified by using two indications, namely a conflicting relationship between the text and the context (step A-ii-1) and one critic's

notice (step A-vii). Since his utterance upholds the *Quality Maxim*, the man did not intend to use irony. The utterance, therefore, constitutes not verbal irony on the character level, but situational irony on the text level. In accordance with the verifying steps, this is considered *dramatic irony* perceived by virtue of the reader's knowledge of what the man has yet to find out (step B-ii-2-1). This makes the blind man the victim, and the observers are the author and the reader who know that Jesus is indeed the Son of Man (step B-i). In this dramatic irony, the more sincere the man was in asking his question, the more ironic the utterance becomes. At this point, the observers smile. Duke (1982:190) calls this *irony of identity* and identifies two more occurrences thereof (4:19-26; 20:14-16). He remarks on this irony that "a character not knowing who Jesus is, addresses him as κύριε and makes reference to Messiah/Son of Man/Jesus — thought to be absent. In all three Jesus then quickly reveals himself in the most appropriate way" (Duke 1982:190). Perhaps the main objective of this irony would be to get the reader more involved in the communication process of the text.

5. *Lastly*, observed are some conversational rules in the field of Textual Rhetoric. The vocative noun κύριε, which generally stands at the beginning of the sentence, stands at the end of the main clause in the man's utterance (cf. Bernard 1928:338). This has an emphatic effect, as required by the *End-Focus Maxim*. This utterance further upholds the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity*, as the message expressed in the text is perspicuous. It also adheres to the *Reduction Maxim* by virtue of pronominalisation.

e) Summary

The blind man intended to ask Jesus a crucial question about the Son of Man. The man's regard for this importance is evident in the fact that he was careful in upholding the *Maxims of Quality* and *Relation*, as well as the *Politeness Principle*. The man was being careful, particularly because he was asking a question that required him to answer either 'yes' or 'no'. This unconventional response is examined in terms of the notion of adjacency pairs. In addition, the author wants to show the reader that the blind man was correct in attaining adequate faith by virtue of the operation of some rules of Textual Rhetoric and irony of identity.

8.3.2 The second subcluster (9:37-38)

The second subcluster can also be divided into two units: colon 46 and subcola 47-48. Colon 46 describes Jesus' reply to the blind man's question. The unit formed by subcola 47-48 depicts the man's answer and his subsequent action, thus forming a unit of analysis.

9:37 εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Καὶ ἑώρακας αὐτὸν καὶ ὁ λαλῶν μετὰ σοῦ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν.

a) General analysis

The conversation between Jesus and the blind man in this second subcluster is closely linked to that in the first subcluster. The semantic contents may, in fact, be inseparable. Since, in colon 45, the blind man asked Jesus a question, Jesus was about to reply to his question in colon 46. The content of Jesus' answer consists of two parts of a direct quotation that form a unit in subcola 46.1-46.2. In 46.1 "[t]he perfect ἑώρακας describes an experience lasting into the present and has here, as in 14:7, 9 and 20:29 (Thomas) primarily a present sense" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:254; cf. also Bultmann 1971:339, footnote 1). Duke (1982:190) is of the opinion that "Ὁράω, in contrast with βλέπω elsewhere in this story, probably hints that this sight is now more than merely physical". The conjunction καί, is somewhat ambiguous again. However, Bultmann (1971:339, footnote 1) proposes: "The use of καί-καί is characteristic for the Evangelist, cp. 7:28; 12:28. The second καί ... introduces a climax, 'and precisely he who ...'" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:499, footnote 48 agrees on the first part). The conjunction may also be functioning as an adjunctive, meaning *also* (some English translations, e.g., the KJV and the NASB, use the word *both* for it). This implies that Jesus said to the blind man, "Though you have seen the miracle worker, *you have seen the Son of Man also.*"

The other part of Jesus' answer, in 46.2, has an additive-different relationship to the first part. The conjunction καί points to that fact. The sentence in 46.2 is syntactically somewhat complex, because it contains the articular participle phrase ὁ λαλῶν μετὰ σοῦ. Since it explains the referent more comprehensively, it is best translated with a relative pronoun clause (Fowler *et al.* 1985:306). The clause is, therefore, rendered as: *the one who is talking with you*. The present participle λαλῶν is used substantivally to serve as the predicate nominative, simultaneously indicating the present continuous action (Fowler *et al.* 1985:306, 288). This action may be contrasted to the completed action in 46.1. The main subject of the sentence is emphasised by the demonstrative pronoun ἐκεῖνός, referring to the Son of Man. It is worth noting that Jesus was speaking in the third person and with confidence. Bultmann (1971:339, footnote 1) also states that "it is particularly striking here, since it refers to the speaker himself" (cf. also Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:499, footnote 50). However, it is not unusual for Jesus to address himself in this way, especially when he associates himself with the specific term, the Son of Man (e.g., 1:51; 5:27; 8:28; 12:23). The second part of Jesus' answer is: *and he is the one who*

is talking with you. Jesus was now revealing his identity to the blind man. Although Jesus described himself figuratively as the light of the world in subcolon 3.5, he now explicitly announced that he was the Son of Man. This is the focal point expressed in Jesus' own words, as this is a key statement about one of the most critical issues in the entire Chapter. The verse describes it thus: *Jesus said to him, "You have seen him also, and he is the one who is talking with you."*

b) Illocutionary act

As required by the perlocutionary act of the blind man's previous utterance, Jesus intended to answer the blind man's inquiry as clearly as possible. Therefore, the speech act of Jesus' utterance is *responsive*. Jesus also revealed the identity of both the Son of Man and his own in his answer so that he might become the object in whom the blind man should believe. Jesus declared that he was the one (cf. Barrett 1955:303). In this sense, his utterance could be *assertive*. Furthermore, a more dominant illocution would be *confirmative*. This functions as an extension of assertive, for Jesus had support for his declaration in addition to his belief and intention (cf. Bach & Harnish 1979:46). This support or truth-seeking procedure, in this instance, refers to the fact that the blind man saw the Son of Man and heard him speaking. According to the schema of confirmatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42-43):

In uttering "You have seen him also, and he is the one who is talking with you", Jesus confirms that he is the Son of Man if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that he is the Son of Man, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
- ii. the intention that the blind man believes that he is the Son of Man.

As Jesus expressed his belief and intention as described above, this utterance is a successful speech act of confirmative. The utterance is not an indirect speech act, because it need not be 'rectified'. The author intends to disclose Jesus' identity, which has been the central issue of this story, but only to the character of the blind man and the reader.

c) Perlocutionary act

Jesus intended for the blind man to recognise Jesus as the Son of Man. Concurrently, Jesus established his divine position in the man's eyes. The perlocution for the reader is to reassure him that Jesus was indeed the Son of Man.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the story level*, Jesus intended to provide the blind man with an adequate answer so that the man might have no further doubt regarding the identity of the Son of Man. As will be attested in the blind man's next reply (v. 38), Jesus' utterance contains sufficient information to change the man's life. Hence, Jesus' utterance upholds the *Quantity Maxim*. Moreover, since the blind man did not know that the Son of Man was Jesus himself, Jesus' disclosure of his identity was unpredictable and a surprise to the man. In this respect, the *Interest Principle* is operative in Jesus' utterance. In addition, Jesus' message indicates that "this is the first time he has been able to see the fact of Jesus; and he learns that he is actually looking on the Son of Man!" (Beasley-Murray 1987:159; cf. also Morris 1971:495). "This was one of the first blessings" after gaining sight for the first time (Bernard 1928:338). "For John this is the real purpose of the gift of sight" (Brown 1966:375).

2. Many commentators note the similarity between this utterance and Jesus' reply to the Samaritan woman in 4:26.¹⁵⁵ There is indeed a similarity, but the difference between the two is also striking. In 4:26, Jesus employed the 'I am' formula, whereas, in this instance, Jesus' utterance does not use that formula, but refers to himself in the third person. In this case Jesus did not say, "I am the Son of Man", but rather "He is the one". From a speech act perspective, this constitutes a violation of the *Manner Maxim*. Of course, the blind man understood the message well despite this 'indirect speech'. However, the man's comprehension is not the issue, in this instance. The point is: Why did Jesus formulate his utterance in the third person? What is the significance of this indirectness? Schnackenburg's ([1968] 1980:254) suggestion is not as incisive as usual, but he contends that the 'I am' formula "is perhaps deliberately avoided, because the Son of man can only be seen obscurely by faith (cf. 14:9) or because for the Son of man the formula has a connection with exaltation". It appears that this is not the only reason for Jesus' indirectness. In fact, Jesus used a 'double' indirectness in this cluster. He used the expression *Son of Man* in verse 35 and the pronoun ἐκεῖνος at this later point. Is this because of Jesus' humility? That is not likely, because the Johannine Jesus or the Johannine Son of Man is hardly ever described in this way, at least not to the same degree as in the Synoptics (cf. Harris 1994:119). My view of the matter is similar to that of Burkett (1991:166): "The reason for this indirect reply becomes clear when it is recalled that the episode has illustrated Jesus' identity as the Light-Word ... The formerly blind man has both seen the Light and heard the Word." Jesus appeared to deliberately create a sense of distance or

155 Bernard 1928:339; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:253; Beasley-Murray 1987:159; Carson 1991:376; Holleran 1993b:378.

aloofness between the blind man and the Son of Man in order to convey the divine majesty in the identity of the Son of Man more visibly, as if Jesus were saying, “Normally the Son of Man exists far from you. People cannot gain access to him easily. But that same Son of Man is here with you and is talking to you right now”. Lindars ([1972] 1981:351) also comments: “His use of the third person to speak of himself increases the sense of distance, and so of overpowering majesty”. Jesus’ indirectness communicates more to the blind man than a direct expression could. There is no doubt that the ‘I am’ sayings can also convey an awareness of divine majesty, but it is doubtful whether the ‘I am’ formula could have had the same effect in this co-text. In this instance, one should note that, if this reading is correct, Jesus’ utterance is a transgression of the *Modesty Maxim* (Minimise praise of self).

3. *On the text level*, Jesus’ utterance is interesting to the reader because of its indirect nature. The reader is likely to raise the same question: Why did Jesus utter the indirect speech? This means that the *Interest Principle* is also operative at this text level in the utterance. In addition, this indirect speech invites breaching the *Principles of Processibility* and *Clarity*, and the *Maxims of Transparency* and *Ambiguity*. The *Reduction Maxim* is still intact by virtue of pronominalisation.

e) Summary

The main speech act of Jesus’ utterance is confirmative, in that Jesus intended to affirm that he was the Son of Man. The utterance is best characterised by its indirect manner of speech which results in several violations of conversational rules on both the story and the text levels. With these violations, Jesus aimed to convey the divine majesty in the identity of the Son of Man, implying that it was wondrous that the blind man was speaking with this special figure at that moment.

9:38a ὁ δὲ ἔφη, Πιστεύω, κύριε·

a) General analysis

Although subcola 47-48 form a unit, these cola are addressed independently, since the man’s action depicted in colon 48 is significant in its own right.

If colon 46 is the focal point in terms of Jesus’ own words, colon 47 may be another focal point expressed in the blind man’s words. This colon describes the man’s reply to Jesus’ revelation in colon 46 (cf. ‘IA’ below). In colon 47, the masculine definite article ὁ functions as a demonstrative

pronoun and may mean *this one* (Fowler *et al.* 1985:326). The conjunction $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ meaning *and*, indicates an additive-consequential relation between cola 46 and 47. The aorist verb $\xi\phi\eta$ is very rare in this Gospel (it occurs only in this instance and in 1:23; cf. also Brown 1966:376; Lindars [1972] 1981:351). Therefore, one could consider that this word may be used to highlight this particular confession of the blind man. Briefly, colon 47 records: *and he said*. Porter (1966-67) suggests that verses 38-39a are a liturgical addition to the text (cf. also Brown 1966:375; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:254, 499, footnote 51; Lindars [1972] 1981:351). However, “most commentators and translators consider it an integral part of John’s Gospel ... Its omission from some ancient manuscripts is perhaps explained by a desire of some scribes to unite the teaching of verse 37 and 39” (Newman & Nida 1980:318; cf. also Steegen 2010).

The short content of his confession is written in the embedded sentence in subcolon 47.1. In Greek, it is expressed in only two essential words $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\omega}$ and $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\epsilon$. When it is taken into account that $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\epsilon$ is the vocative noun, the author uses only one word, $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\omega}$, to describe the blind man’s confession as the climax to the theme of belief. The author literally makes use of the fewest possible words to depict the charged concept. This compactness is again proof of one of his great rhetorical features. The controversial vocative word $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\epsilon$, though it generally stands at the beginning of the sentence, follows the present indicative verb $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\omega}$. However, the vocative word, in this instance, seems to be neither controversial nor complex, because the literal meaning of the word *Lord* is suitable within the co-text. It is obvious that the word may add some emphasis to the confession. The blind man confessed, “*Lord, I believe*”. He finally found and encountered the right person for his faith. “It is clear that the confession is vital to a correct understanding of the whole chapter, as it forms the climax of the man born blind’s gradual progress to true faith” (Moloney 1978:150). Thus this verse is rendered as: *And he said, “Lord, I believe.”*

b) Illocutionary act

1. Jesus’ last utterance reveals that he is the Son of Man. In reply to this, the blind man said, “*Lord, I believe*”. There is a leap in the communication between these two utterances, because the man’s utterance is not a conventional response to Jesus’ words. An element of moral choice seems to be involved in the man’s utterance. Simply put, the man could have replied differently. He could have said, for instance, “*You say so, but I do not, nor will I, believe it*”, indicating his disagreement. Or, “*Oh, you are the Son of Man. What a surprise!*”, indicating his astonishment. Or, “*I’m sorry that you are the Son of Man. I did not notice*”, indicating his apology.

Therefore, it is interesting that the man replied in the way in which it is related in the text. The following question then arises: Is this the man's spontaneous and accidental response, or does a certain conversational rule or structure require the man to answer this way? The latter would be the case. One should remember that the entire dialogue in this cluster is organised in adjacency pairs (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:36). Hence, strictly speaking, the man's utterance at this point should be his reply to Jesus' original question in verse 35. His reply should, therefore, be expressed as either 'yes' or 'no'. He replied in the affirmative (although he omitted the 'yes' part). Hence, the man indicated his intention to believe in Jesus. From this observation, the man's utterance would thus be a *responsive* speech act.

2. The illocution of this utterance does not need to be restricted only to the category of responsive, and the illocution does, in fact, appear to express more than this. Remarkably, it seems to be difficult to determine an additional speech act, despite its concise form. Candidates for a possible illocution would be: i) promise under the category of Commisives; ii) accept under the category of Acknowledgments; iii) effective, and iv) assertive, concessive, assentive and confirmative (these belong to the category of Constatives; cf. also section 1.2 in Chapter 2).

As far as possibility (i) is concerned, the blind man was making a commitment to Jesus in this utterance, since the blind man had now come to know Jesus' true identity. Therefore, at first glance, his utterance could be a speech act of *promise*. When this utterance is analysed according to Searle's ([1979] 1981:44) necessary and sufficient conditions for promise, the following is gained:

Propositional content condition: The blind man predicates a future act of his believing in Jesus.

Preparatory condition: 1. The blind man is able to (perform to) believe in Jesus. 2. Jesus wants the blind man to (perform to) believe in Jesus.

Sincerity condition: The blind man intends to believe in Jesus.

Essential condition: Counts as an undertaking by the blind man of an obligation to believe in Jesus.

There are two issues concerning these conditions. The utterance does not meet the propositional content condition nor the essential condition, since the blind man's speech act is neither a future act nor counts as an obligation. Perhaps one should seek a different speech act category for this utterance.

As far as possibility (ii) is concerned, as mentioned earlier (sectio 1.2 in Chapter 2), the fact that there is still no consensus among speech act theorists concerning the taxonomy of speech acts, shows that even Bach and Harnish's taxonomy is not perfect. Even if one tries to find a possible illocution in a group such as *acknowledgements*, the utterance still does not fully suit the category. For instance, some Christians say that to believe Jesus is to accept him as Lord. The man's confession at this point can be construed in the same way. Therefore, one can say that for that specific meaning the illocution is *accept*, a subcategory of *acknowledgements*. However, Bach and Harnish (1979:53) use this subcategory differently, because, within their taxonomy, the category *accept* entails acknowledging an acknowledgement. Briefly, the entire category of *acknowledgements* is not suitable for this utterance.

In addition to mapping an utterance onto one of the communicative illocutionary acts, it is simultaneously possible to map the same utterance onto one of the conventional illocutionary acts categories.¹⁵⁶ A group of *effectives* is also a possible category in under which this man's utterance could fall. According to Bach and Harnish (1979:110), *effectives* "effect changes in institutional states of affairs". They bring forth facts in "utterances that, when issued by the right person under the right circumstances, make it the case that such and such. This is a matter not of causality, but of mutual belief. An utterance counts as an act of a certain sort in virtue of being mutually believed to be an act of that sort" (Bach and Harnish 1979:113). In light of this definition, if the blind man's act in the utterance "Lord, I believe" constitutes the necessary condition for him to take part in a believing community which accepts Jesus as Lord, then his utterance changes his position. The blind man would be allowed to become a member of that community by virtue of this particular utterance on condition that his speech act is mutually recognised as such by Jesus and the man. If this is the case in this instance, one could propose an additional category to the taxonomy, for instance *religious confessions*. However, this does not seem to be the case, for neither the text of John 9 nor the entire text of the *Fourth Gospel* can confirm that this exact utterance was, in fact, the formula for such an initiation (cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:254). When the utterance is understood to say that the man believed that Jesus was the Son of Man, no other such instance is recorded in the Gospel (cf. the section on 'GA' in 9:35). A more common expression to be used in confession would be the Son of God. Therefore, the man's utterance is not conventional (cf. also Servotte [1992] 1994:49). Hence, technically speaking, this possibility should be eliminated.

156 Cf. an example of the policeman's utterance "You are under arrest" in section 1.2 in Chapter 2.

I shall now return to the classification of constatives once again. As mentioned earlier, the illocutions of assertive, concessive, assentive and confirmative are examined as possibilities (iv). Of these four categories, an *assertive* seems to possess the highest possibility, since this category is described by the verbs such as to affirm, to allege, to avow, to declare, and so forth (Bach & Harnish 1979:42). The class of *concessive* is suggested by the verbs such as to acknowledge, to confess, to admit, and so on, and also appears to be very likely. However, “[a] concessive expresses a belief contrary to what S would like to believe or contrary to what he previously believed or avowed” (Bach & Harnish 1979:45). Thus, this class does not correspond to the man’s belief. An *assentive* expresses a speaker’s agreement with a certain claim made by a hearer (Bach & Harnish 1979:45). This is possible if the man’s utterance expresses that the man agreed to Jesus’ claim that Jesus was the Son of Man. In fact, the man appeared to concur with it. Concerning a *confirmative*, since this can be an extension of assertive, this category is also possible. Nevertheless, it is my impression from the analysis done thus far that the assentive and confirmative are best represented in an argumentative speech situation such as that of cluster C’ (9:24-34). If this observation is correct, these categories do not suit the present conversation between Jesus and the man.

3. To conclude this discussion, it is most likely that an additional speech act in this utterance would be *assertive*. The following is the application of Bach and Harnish’s (1979:43) schema of assertives to this text:

In uttering “Lord, I believe”, the blind man avows that the man believes that Jesus is the Son of Man if the blind man expresses:

- i. the belief that the man believes that Jesus is the Son of Man, and
- ii. the intention that Jesus believes that the man believes that Jesus is the Son of Man.

Since the blind man appeared to express his belief and intention as described above, the utterance can also be considered an assertive speech act. Briefly, the blind man intended to start believing in Jesus as Lord with his commitment to follow and trust him. The author intends to invite the reader to follow the blind man’s lead and to put his complete trust in Jesus.

c) Perlocutionary act

Jesus should be glad and excited to hear the blind man’s response and intention to believe in Jesus. This is the purpose for which Jesus tried to find and talk to the man in the first place. The reader should, by virtue of

the man's example, accept the invitation from the author to follow Jesus and start making a full commitment to Jesus.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, when the blind man responded to Jesus' last utterance, the man merely said, "Lord, I believe". He omitted the object of what he was willing to believe. This lack of information appears to jeopardise the *Quantity Maxim*. It also brings the *Manner Maxim* into play, for the message can be obscured due to insufficient information. However, if the message is not impaired despite this omission, these Maxims are not considered to have been violated. The question as to whether or not the message of the man's utterance is adequately communicated to Jesus plays a decisive role in determining the issue concerning possible violations of these Maxims. Viewed from the present speech situation, Jesus appeared to understand the man's message and intention conveyed through the man's utterance. As noted earlier, the man's utterance at this point is, in fact, his answer to Jesus' question (v. 35). If that is the case, the object omitted by the man can be easily provided, "I believe in the Son of Man". There is no indication that Jesus understood it differently. As a result, these two Maxims are not at all transgressed. Based on this result, this utterance upholds the *Economy Principle* in the domain of Textual Rhetoric. After all, it is very economical. Nevertheless, its connotation is necessarily deep. Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:252) explain it sociologically: "Far more frequently the words 'faith', 'have faith', and 'believe' refer in the New Testament to the social glue that binds one person to another. They point to the social, externally manifested, emotional behavior of loyalty, commitment, and solidarity."

2. One of the illocutions of the man's utterance would be that the blind man expressed his agreement with Jesus' statement that Jesus was the Son of Man, as analysed above. This utterance thus upholds the *Agreement Maxim* (maximise agreement between self and other). This utterance also seems to adhere to the *Quality Maxim*. This is not indicated verbally, but through the man's subsequent action of worshipping Jesus. This is a crucial aspect of this utterance, as the success of his speech act depends substantially on his sincerity.

3. *On the text level*, the man's utterance includes the vocative κύριε. This same vocative has already been discussed in 9:36, and it was concluded that it was used there merely as a polite form of address. How about, in this instance, then? Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:254) doubts the existence of Christological significance in this vocative noun, and considers the usage

to be the same as in 9:36. However, many critics think otherwise.¹⁵⁷ In this instance, it could and should mean 'Lord'. My analysis has concluded that the blind man adequately understood the title *Son of Man* (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:35). According to this reading, it is natural to take this vocative as Lord. It further means that the blind man also confessed Jesus as Lord. Hence, this is an indication that the author wants to depict a spiritual development in the man's understanding of Jesus.

4. In this utterance, the blind man finally came home in a journey of faith. The author seems to have orchestrated everything in this story to lead up to this important point. Barrett (1955:303) comments: "The sign and its interpretation are now both complete: the blind man has received physical sight, and has also, through Jesus the light of the world, seen the truth and believed in Jesus as the Son of man." As noted earlier (in the section on CS' in 9:17b), the blind man displayed his growing perception of the person of Jesus. His confession at this point constitutes the climax of his understanding. The author effectively uses what Resseguie (1982:302) terms *the technique of comic movement*, which portrays the man's growing perception of Jesus, to help the reader adequately understand the character Jesus. From a speech act perspective, this can be perceived as the operation of the *Relation Maxim* on a larger scale. All instances of recognition expressed by the blind man relate to one another. The author has the reader join the blind man on a journey of faith in order that the reader may "move slowly toward the confession the narrator finds most adequate instead of having to accept it all at once" (Jones 1997:167). Moreover, the man's confession in this utterance has special news value for the reader, since the latter anticipated this exact moment with thrill and suspense, and it has finally arrived. In this sense, the utterance also secures the work of the *Interest Principle*.¹⁵⁸

e) Summary

The blind man intended to confess that Jesus was the Son of Man, responding to Jesus' original question in 9:35. His confession is considered the climax of his spiritual growth. In depicting this climax, the adherence to the *Quality Maxim* seems to be the most important rule among the various conversational rules that are operative in his terse speech act, such as the *Maxims of Agreement and Relation*, and the *Principles of Interest and*

157 E.g., Brown 1966:375; Lindars [1972] 1981:351; Newman & Nida 1980:318; Carson 1991:377; Holleran 1993b:379.

158 Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:254) points out, that "[t]he man's confession of faith here and now in the Son of man is also a contrast with Jesus' unbelieving opponents, who will not recognise his divine nature until they have 'raised him up' (cf. 8:28)."

Economy. The author encourages the reader to follow the blind man's steps and to place his complete trust in Jesus.

9:38b καὶ προσεκύνησεν αὐτῷ.

a) General analysis

Colon 48 is the last colon in this cluster. Structurally, these subcola 47-48 form the second subcluster with colon 46. Semantically, colon 48 tells of the consequence of the blind man's belief. The author records this for the purpose of concluding this cluster and to serve as proof of his genuine faith. The blind man manifested the genuineness of his faith by immediately performing a typical religious action: worshipping. The conjunction καὶ links this colon to the previous one by means of an additive-different relationship. The aorist verb προσεκύνησεν describes a constative-simple action on the part of the subject, the blind man (Fowler *et al.* 1985:290). Within Johannine usage in the Gospel, this verb is always employed for portraying divine worship.¹⁵⁹ This act of worship therefore indicates that the man recognised Jesus not only as the Son of Man, but also as God whom he should and wished to worship. Painter ([1991] 1993:305) avers: "The understanding of the Son of Man as a figure to be worshipped is distinctively Johannine." Thus this verse renders: *And he worshipped Him.*

b) Illocutionary act

As analysed earlier, this narrator's voice tells of the blind man's action immediately after his confession of belief in Jesus. This portrayal goes very well with the man's previous utterance. The speech situation and the content of the narrator's utterance thus indicate that the speech act of this utterance would be *informative*. This informative speech act follows the schema of informatives by Bach and Harnish (1979:42; cf. also the section on 'IA' in 9:1), and is thus successful. Briefly, the narrator intends to tell the reader that the act of worship was the first thing the blind man had to do after confessing faith in Jesus as Lord, and that Jesus did not refuse it. The author intends to suggest that the reader should do the same and wants him to commend the blind man's immediate appropriate response.

159 Cf. 4:20-24; 12:20; Bernard 1928:339; Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:254; Bultmann 1971:339, footnote 3; Morris 1971:495; Beasley-Murray 1987:159.

c) Perlocutionary act

The *perlocution* aims to impress the reader with the blind man's immediate and appropriate response, and to encourage the reader to follow the example of the man's total commitment to Jesus (cf. Salier 2004:114).

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, the blind man's act of worship indicates that the man upheld the *Approbation Maxim* (maximise praise of other) in relation to Jesus. Expositors have various explanations for this point. For instance, "[t]his is the standard OT reaction to a theophany (Gen xvii 3), and John uses the same verb, *proskynein*, in iv 20-24 to describe the worship due to God (also xii 20)" (Brown 1966:376). "The man's action is not the expression of formal adoration of Jesus, but of the honour due to the God-sent bringer of salvation which itself gives honour and adoration to God. It shows the man's advance from his Jewish faith (vv. 31-33) to Christian faith" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:254; cf. Beasley-Murray 1987:159). The blind man now gave glory to God in the true sense of the expression (Bultmann 1971:339, footnote 3; Holleran 1993b:379; Köstenberger 2006:104). "[T]he Evangelist ... doubtless understands that the healed man is 'worshipping' better than he knew" (Carson 1991:377). In addition, Morris (1971:495) draws attention to a significant point: "This is the only place in this Gospel where anyone is said to worship Jesus." Malina and Rohrbaugh (1998:174) illustrate this action, saying that the Greek term *προσκυνέω* "is widely used in antiquity to describe the gesture of falling down before a person and kissing the hem of his garment, his feet, or the ground on which he walked. This is what clients did when asking favors of a patron"

2. *On the text level*, in the field of Interpersonal Rhetoric, the narrator's utterance keeps the *Cooperative Principle* intact. It is economical (*Quantity*), true (*Quality*), relevant (*Relation*) and explicit (*Manner*). In the field of Textual Rhetoric, this utterance appears to flout no rule, and thus adheres to the *Principles of Processibility, Clarity and Economy*, and to the *Reduction Maxim* by virtue of pronominalisation. In this respect, the text is an appropriate utterance. From a conversational point of view, the author intends to use the narrator's words as a closure to end the present dialogue between Jesus and the blind man. The man's confession and his act of worship bring the story to its final phase, in which the blind man and the reader are united as one to believe in Jesus.¹⁶⁰

160 Steegen (2010:532) states that the "worship of the Johannine Jesus can hardly be seen as a goal in itself. Instead, it is an acknowledgement that the Father is made known in the person of Jesus". Although his arguments seem convincing, I still hold the view, as I argued earlier, that the man's worship is the climatic goal

3. In connection with the *Interest Principle*, in terms of the news value of this utterance to the reader, I wish to make three remarks. *Firstly*, the significance of the blind man's confession and worship would be recognised at a deeper level in the reader's mind when the reader observes the man's action against the background of ancient Mediterranean society. It is striking that the blind man confessed his faith in the Son of Man and worshipped Jesus as an independent individual apart from his own family, if modern individualism, as Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:179) point out, simply did not exist in ancient society. It is even more striking when one notices the man's peculiar situation. His everyday livelihood appeared to depend on his family, for he was a blind beggar (for this aspect, cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:8b). It is doubtful whether the man's economic and family status would change dramatically after receiving his sight. One can assume that he was still dependent on his family. Despite this peculiar situation, he still decided to become a disciple of Jesus, being aware of what would happen to him. To believe in Jesus would bring the Jews' decision into practice (9:22). As a result, the blind man was ultimately excluded from the local synagogue. His parents preferred to remain in the synagogue community. Their opposing decisions would divide the man's family, although the text does not explicitly state this. Barton (1992:226) points out: "In a culture where individual identity was defined in terms primarily of the household group to which the individual belonged, it was inevitable that allegiance to Jesus as 'Lord' ... would have an effect on family ties and family life ... conversion and Christian belonging also threatened the family." In the *Fourth Gospel* there are no explicit references to divided households due to Jesus, as in the Synoptics (Mt 10:34-37; Lk 12:51-53; 14:26). As far as these synoptic accounts are concerned, Neyrey (1995:150) states: "Anyone who does not hate the family group (with its social standing, land and wealth) cannot find affiliation, status and respect in Jesus' group ... the issue focuses on the source of honour, either from family or Jesus. Loyalty either to family or to Jesus occasions the choice." This remark is also useful in the blind man's case and it helps us realise that the fact that the blind man chose to follow Jesus would divide his household. The consequence of such an action would cause him "suffering as physical (hunger) as it is social (mourning, begging, being an outcast)" (Neyrey

or the result of his belief in Jesus, and that is the reason why, in this instance, it occupies a more important place than in the manifestation of the Father in Jesus. The theme of belief and unbelief underlies the story of the blind man throughout (and, for that matter, in John's Gospel as a whole) and cannot be underestimated. In addition, although I acknowledge the significance of Steegen's argument concerning the distant stories such as John 4, I maintain that, as a unit of story, what is told in the content as well as in the immediate context is more important than some interconnections.

1995:150). This also means that the man was now entirely on his own. The man's trust and security had to move from the synagogue, the community, and even from his parents, to Jesus. Speaking from a synoptic viewpoint, the blind man took up his own cross to be Jesus' disciple (cf., e.g., Mt 10:38). Hence, the man's decision had profound implications for his own life as well as for that of his family. The *theme of suffering* can be found in the division in his family. In the author's opinion, an ideal disciple is one who follows Jesus to secure Jesus' favour and approval, even if it means that he loses everything in his family and community to which he was born. He should not fear the separation from his basic kinship network. This idea may, in the author's own terms, be equivalent to the synoptic view of faith in Jesus.

The man's divided family can also be explained in terms of the ancient social value of honour and shame. As noted earlier, the blind man was 'poor', because he was begging and belonged to the category of *πτωχός* (cf. section 4.1.1). He had to accept that he did not have honour. He was socially oppressed, miserable, dependent and humiliated. He was indeed impoverished economically, socially and culturally. On the other hand, his parents were not 'poor', because they were not begging, and thus belonged to the category of *πένης* in this sense. The significant difference between them would be that the blind man had no honour, whereas the parents, at least in their minds, still maintained some kind of honour. It is reasonable to think that the parents were motivated to keep their honour. Although they probably did not enjoy full honour, due to their son's poverty, they were still maintaining the status they had at that time. They were trying to retain their social standing among the neighbours and to remain within the established community. The difference between them was presumably their backgrounds that separated their ways. Furthermore, this separation in his family was perhaps deepened further by the blind man's confession, because this most likely brought shame on his parents. Regarding ancient Mediterranean society, Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992:300) observe: "Parents socialize their children to be absolutely loyal to their biological kin group, since every member of the family shares the family honor and one member's misbehavior shames the entire group. The life prospects for everyone in the family depend on solidarity in protecting family honor." If this is true, what the blind man did undoubtedly went against the social value at that time.

Secondly, Bernard (1928:339) comments on the blind man at this point: "In his case, faith followed immediately on the 'seeing' of Jesus, in marked contrast with the case of the multitude in 6:36" (cf. also Carson 1991:376). The man's confession and act of worship demonstrate the first quality of discipleship (e.g., to follow immediately). The man set a good example. This

has news value for the reader. Hoskyns (1954:359) maintains that this was “a meeting which issues in discipleship” (cf. also Lindars [1972] 1981:350).

Thirdly, one of the most significant points concerning his worship would be that Jesus accepted the blind man’s act of worship and did not refuse it. This is as noteworthy for the reader as was Jesus’ own confirmation of his identity. From the time when Jesus performed the miracle on the blind man, the central issue in this story has been the identity of Jesus. In this verse, Jesus explicitly revealed his identity and heavenly origin not with words, but this time by means of his passive action of receiving a man’s worship (cf. 9:37).

e) Summary

The narrator intends to inform the reader of the blind man’s appropriate action when he believed in Jesus. This immediate action indicates that he was a model disciple and that his future as a disciple of Jesus would be very bright. By contrast, his relationship with his family would presumably have suffered as a result of the division caused between the man and his parents, because of his disloyalty to his own family in choosing to be loyal to Jesus. A most important piece of information contained in this utterance is the fact that Jesus fully received the man’s act of worship, for this implicitly signifies who Jesus really was. The narrator’s utterance is successful and does not appear to flout any conversational rule.

8.4 Macrospeech acts

1. *To start with*, I shall discuss *a macrospeech act on the character level*. In this cluster, Jesus and the blind man were only characters on stage and it appears that these interlocutors recognised “a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction” in their conversation (Grice 1975:45). This means that they were observing the *Cooperative Principle* from the outset and contributing together in order to achieve a certain goal in their conversation. Jesus, who initiated their conversation and took control thereof, defined this aim. In this kind of ‘friendly’ conversation, it should be easy to identify a macrospeech act. In addition, the notion of adjacency pairs in this cluster also contributes considerably to the anatomy of their conversation.

In determining a macrospeech act, it is important to remember the specific speech situation. The narrator informs us that, when Jesus heard that the blind man had been cast out, he tried to find the man, because Jesus had to achieve a specific aim in meeting this man. This aim is closely linked to a macrospeech act in this cluster. From the observation of Jesus’

two utterances in verses 35 and 37, *Jesus' goal* with this meeting could be formulated as follows: to draw the blind man to Jesus as one of his believers. This is explicitly demonstrated by Jesus' question speech act (v. 35). Jesus proceeded straight to the heart of his business. Instead of providing a direct answer to Jesus' question, the blind man responded with his own question speech act (v. 36), as he was lacking important information. His attitude, as in his utterance, especially in the purpose clause, indicated his willingness to contribute to Jesus' goal, regardless of whether or not the man was aware thereof. Jesus then replied to the man and provided the required information in a confirmative speech act (v. 37). The man was satisfied with Jesus' information and could finally answer Jesus' original question (v. 35), confessing in his assertive speech act, "Lord, I believe".

In light of Jesus' goal, the *Strong Deletion Rule* can eliminate the insertion sequence (vv. 36, 37), as the latter functions as preparatory speech acts. These speech acts are performed to establish the condition necessary for the subsequent speech act (v. 38). That is the reason why these can be eliminated. The remainder of the utterances (vv. 35, 38) can be used to construct a macroproposition by virtue of the *Construction Rule*. Accordingly, a *macroproposition* could be that the blind man believes in the Son of Man, because both utterances focus on the man's belief in the Son of Man. When this macroproposition is examined in conjunction with the specific speech situation, especially the aim of the dialogue mentioned earlier, a *macrospeech act on the story level* would be that Jesus intended to challenge the blind man to become a believer and to commit himself fully to faith in Jesus, the Son of Man (cf. also Hare 1990:105-106). One can assume that Jesus wanted to instil faith in the blind man's mind, knowing all the things which he had experienced.

2. Our next task is to classify this macrospeech act, for the analysis would not be complete without it.

Three possibilities could be presented for its taxonomy: a) requestive, b) requirement and c) advisory. One should note that all three belong to the general category of *Directives*, for Jesus expressed his intention that his attitude be taken as a reason for the blind man to become a believer (cf. Bach & Harnish 1979:47). In possibility (a), Jesus would request the man to become a believer. In requestives, a speaker has a desire and intention that a hearer does something for the speaker. The co-text does not explicitly disclose his motivation for the aim of this meeting, but Jesus did not appear to ask the man to do anything for Jesus' sake. Rather, Jesus had done something great for the man thus far and appeared to wish to do more for the man. Possibility (a) is, therefore, unlikely. In possibility

(b), Jesus would command the man to become a believer. As pointed out earlier (section 8.1.1), Jesus was superior to the blind man. Therefore, Jesus could command him, if he elected to do so, as he did before (v. 7). However, in terms of requirements, a hearer cannot normally refuse an order from his superior. The hearer is not allowed to say 'no' once the order is issued. But this is not the case in this instance. The blind man was given freedom of choice. In possibility (c), Jesus would advise the man to become a believer. In advisories, "what the speaker expresses is not the desire that *H* do a certain action but the belief that doing it is a good idea, that it is in *H*'s interest" (Bach & Harnish 1979:49). In my opinion, this category suits this present speech situation. Accordingly, a *macrospeech act* would be *advisory*, in that Jesus intended to challenge the man to become a believer for the man's own sake. As far as this challenge is concerned, the blind man boldly confessed his belief in Jesus, the Son of Man.

Hence, the conversation between Jesus and the blind man was conducted with great success. The interaction ended with the scene of the blind man worshipping Jesus.

3. *Next*, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the text level*. As Culpepper (1983:34-43) observes, in the *Fourth Gospel*, Jesus' overall point of view basically corresponds to that of the narrator. Furthermore, both points of view reflect the author's ideological point of view (Culpepper 1983:43). As far as this cluster is concerned, this seems to be true. This means that Jesus, the narrator and the author all share the same specific perspective. What is this perspective? This perspective would be as follows: just as Jesus intended to challenge the blind man to become a believer, the author appears to speak much the same language to the reader and is encouraging the reader to continue to believe in Jesus. This would help identify a macrospeech act on the text level.

I shall now examine this macrospeech act in detail. As pointed out earlier (in the section on 'IA' in 9:35), the author intends to ask the reader the same question that Jesus asked in verse 35 (Do you believe in the Son of Man?). The author then shows the correct way of asking a question in order to attain true faith in verse 36 (Who is the Son of Man?). The author asserts and reassures the reader that Jesus was indeed the Son of Man (v. 37), and finally invites the reader to follow the man's example by believing in the Son of Man (v. 38). Perhaps, on the text level, all these speech acts combine to construct a macroproposition by virtue of the *Construction Rule*, for the joint sequence of these speech acts is the key to its identification. The reason why verses 36 and 37 are not eliminated on the text level lies in the difference between the blind man and the reader

in terms of their knowledge of the identity of the Son of Man. While the man did not know ‘who’ the Son of Man is, the reader knows that the Son of Man is, in fact, Jesus. Therefore, a *macroproposition* would be that the reader continues to believe in the Son of Man. When this macroproposition is analysed from the author’s perspective in this cluster, as mentioned earlier, a *macrospeech act* on the text level would be *advisory*, in that the author intends to challenge the reader to continue to believe in Jesus, even under difficult circumstances. The *perlocution* of this cluster for the reader is then to accept the author’s challenge to continue to believe in Jesus and to strengthen his faith more firmly by being encouraged by the example of the blind man. Beasley-Murray (1987:157) emphasises a strong confession: “The Evangelist wishes to inspire the readers of the Gospel to a courageous confession like that of the healed blind man” (cf. also Nicol 1972:146). Painter (1986:40) relates more to the reader’s presumed specific situation and states that the author intends “to encourage those who remained within the synagogue to confess their faith courageously, to face excommunication, and to join the Johannine community” (cf. also Carson 1991:375).

4. In this cluster, the author deploys various communicative strategies to induce the reader’s interest in the story and to communicate his messages effectively to the reader. In addition to the use of various *Principles* and *Maxims of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics*, for instance, verbal irony and puns (v. 35), adjacency pairs and dramatic irony (v. 36), the comic movement (v. 38a), and so forth are used. Among such strategies, the use of the title *Son of Man* would be the most significant. Since its significance has been discussed in the analysis on microspeech acts, one critic’s comment is reproduced, in this instance, to illustrate an aspect of significance: “By asking whether the man believes in the ‘Son of man’, the author both provides a suitable introduction for the following statement about judgment and renews the reader’s awareness of the other aspect of Jesus’ mission, his death on a cross” (Pamment 1985:63). Of course, the rich connotation of this title deepens the reader’s understanding of the narrative. The author designs a clear contrast in the relationship of this cluster with cluster C’. Resseguie (1982:300-301) states that “we have the contrast of the blind man’s being cast out and then found by Jesus, the contrast of rejection and acceptance” (cf. also Stibbe 1993:112). My analysis indicates that this rejection may include the man being abandoned by his own parents. A psalmist states: “Though my father and mother forsake me, the Lord will receive me” (Ps 27:10 – NIV). The Johannine Jesus states: “All that the Father gives Me shall come to Me, and the one who comes to Me I will certainly not cast out” (John 6:37).

9. CLUSTER A': THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN JESUS AND THE PHARISEES (9:39-41)

9.1 Specific mutual contextual beliefs

9.1.1 Jesus' judgment

The theme of judgment is very important in the story of John 9, as indicated in the analysis thus far, and as will be demonstrated in the analysis of this last cluster. The author refers to this theme several times in the Gospel. Therefore, I first wish to briefly examine the concept of judgment from the author's perspective. I shall then identify the information provided by the author up to Chapter 9. The texts which explicitly refer to the theme of judgment, either by the noun *judgment* or the verb *judge* or *condemn*, are tentatively classified (in my own way) according to the following aspects:¹⁶¹

- a. Jesus' mission of judgment: 3:17; 5:22, 27, 30; 8:15b-16, 26/9:39/12:31, 47-48.
- b. Result of judgment: 3:18-19; 5:24, 29.
- c. Judgment as the works of the Father and the Holy Spirit: 8:50/16:8, 11; (cf. 12:31).
- d. Human judgment: 7:24, 51; 8:15a/18:31; 19:13.

Since 9:39 refers to the theme of judgment in terms of Jesus' mission, categories (c) and (d) are not directly relevant to our investigation and can, therefore, be excluded. In category (a), the dominant idea in Jesus' mission seems that, because Jesus is given the authority to judge by the Father, his judgment is just and true (5:22, 27, 30; 8:16, 26). With this authority, Jesus comes into the world (3:17; 9:39; 12:47). However, the purpose of his coming has two contradictory dimensions. 3:17 and 12:47 explicitly mention that Jesus comes to save the world, and that he does not come to judge. 8:15b specifically strengthens the second point. Conversely, 9:39 reveals that Jesus comes to judge.¹⁶² How to account for this seemingly contradiction in the purpose of Jesus' coming would be one important issue (for this issue, cf. the analysis on 'IA' in 9:39).

161 The passage of 8:10-11 is omitted because of the textual problem, and the division by slash '/' is made for highlighting narrative temporality.

162 If the word that Jesus speaks represents or symbolises Jesus himself in 12:48, Jesus would be the judge who will come to judge. However, this verse seems to be the only reference explicitly mentioning the eschatological time frame in this category. In this respect, this verse can be excluded from the present consideration.

In category (b), generally speaking, these four verses mainly refer to the result or fate of judgment. Two criteria will cause this result. One criterion is a particular person's response to Jesus, whether or not he believes in Jesus (3:18; 5:24). The other is his deeds, whether good or evil (3:19; 5:29). Van der Watt (1985:72-73) rightly observes on 5:29 that "a completely different basis for receiving life (and judgment) is described. The decision between life and judgment is taken on the basis of the *quality* of a particular person's *deed*. This is a unique statement in this gospel". John 3:19 could be argued along this line of thought.

From the reader's perspective, the passages of 9:39, 12:31, 47-48 are not available for the reader's knowledge. The reader, therefore, only knows that Jesus comes to save the world with his authority of judgment which is just and true. However, Jesus does not appear to use this authority. Rather, judgment is made according to the two criteria. One should note that, when the reader comes to read 9:39, this will surprise him because it seems to be inconsistent with 3:17 and 8:15b.

What about the characters' knowledge, particularly that of the Pharisees? They inquire from Jesus about his statement in 9:39. As Jesus speaks to the Pharisees in Chapter 8, they are meant to know that Jesus does not judge anyone (8:15b). However, if he does judge, they hear Jesus saying that his judgment is true (8:16). In Chapter 5, if the Pharisees are included among the Jews, they may know that, based on the two criteria, judgment is executed (5:24, 29). As the Pharisees do not appear to be present in Chapter 3, they perhaps do not know the purpose of Jesus' coming into the world, whether he comes to save or judge (3:17). Hence, they hear the content of Jesus' message in 9:39 for the first time.

9.1.2 Relationships between the characters


The knowledge held for the specific conversation between Jesus and the Pharisees is as follows:

- Although Jesus had been the subject of their discussions, this was the Pharisees' first personal encounter with Jesus in this Chapter. However, one can assume that not all the Pharisees were present.
- In terms of (earthly) religious and present political status, the Pharisees, who were the Jewish authorities, were assumed to be in a higher and more authoritative position over Jesus, for Jesus was simply a miracle worker. However, in terms of social and future political status, Jesus was assumed to be superior to them, because the people tried to make him king (cf. John 6:15). At least, Jesus was more popular among Jewish people than they did.

- Therefore, the earthly relationship between Jesus and the Pharisees, especially in terms of their status, cannot be determined precisely, but it appears to be an equal relationship. However, the Pharisees' role was to ask and Jesus' role was to answer their question. In this respect, Jesus played the role of teacher and the Pharisees that of pupils.
- However, the reader knows that Jesus as the Son of God possessed the divine authority in the ultimate sense.
- Both parties (Jesus and the Pharisees) were meant to know the notion of sin(s).

9.2 Overview and structural analysis chart

Structural analysis chart for cluster A'



Since the story of the blind man is completed with cluster B' (Bernard 1928:339; Barrett 1955:303; Culpepper 1998:178), this cluster can be considered an appendix to the miracle story. The blind man as a main character no longer appears explicitly in the scene. Yet, the dialogue between Jesus and the Pharisees uncovers another significant notion about the theme of sight and blindness. Jesus would further disclose some relationships between sin and blindness. Moreover, the forensic trial scene continues until Jesus would pass the final judgment on the Pharisees. For these reasons, this dialogue is intimately related to the body of the miracle story, and this cluster should thus form part of Chapter 9 in this Gospel.

Structurally, this cluster can be divided into two subclusters, colon 49 (Jesus' statement) and cola 50-52 (the Pharisees' question and Jesus' answer), based on the consideration that cola 50-52 are connected to each other more closely than colon 49, due to the question-answer form.

Furthermore, in this cluster, the author draws a final conclusion for the entire Chapter, and establishes a semantic link with the first cluster A. "In the opening scene the disciples asked Jesus to make a judgment concerning the cause of blindness. That judgment, however, was deferred so that the narrative could show the reader the true cause of blindness" (Resseguie 1982:301). In doing so, the author allows the character Jesus to summarise the meaning of the entire preceding episode.¹⁶³ Concurrently, the focus is more on the effect of the Light on those who reject this Light, because its effect on those who receive this Light is already manifested in the man born blind (cf. Morris 1971:496). In this sense, this cluster portrays a very impressive dialogue. Several remarks can still be added to the overview of this last cluster:

1. This cluster also has an *inclusio*. In both cola 49 and 52, Jesus was the one who talked. The antithesis of sight and blindness occurs in both cola.
2. Throughout this dialogue scene, the themes of judgment, sin, blindness and sight are interwoven. The motif of Jesus' coming into the world as his mission in colon 49 is also significant. However, the most important theme appears to be that of judgment.
3. Two major contrasts can be found. A positive/negative contrast is expressed in the statements between 49.1.1 and 49.1.2. There is another contrast between 52.1.1-52.1.2* and 52.1.3-52.1.4.
4. Although the absolute number is not so high, the usage of both the coordinate conjunctions and the pronouns is relatively high.
5. As far as the tenses of the verbs are concerned, the fifth remark mentioned in the section on 'Overview' (section 7.2) in cluster C' can also be observed in this cluster.
6. Significant structural markers include: to say, to see, we, you, and, Jesus, sin and blind. Particularly the words βλέπω and τυφλός are important, for these belong to the same semantic subdomain (Louw & Nida 1988, 1:281; cf. also Bultmann 1971:340). In addition, the repetitions of words are remarkable, such as the related words of βλέπω, and ἁμαρτία, and τυφλοί.

For these reasons, this cluster also shows strong cohesion.

163 Cf. also Bernard 1928:339; Barrett 1955:303; Beasley-Murray 1987:160; Burkett 1991:166.

9.3 Microspeech acts

9.3.1 The first subcluster (9:39)

9:39 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Εἰς κρίμα ἐγὼ εἰς τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον ἦλθον, ἵνα οἱ μὴ βλέποντες βλέπωσιν καὶ οἱ βλέποντες τυφλοὶ γένωνται.

a) General analysis

The main clause in colon 49 is a normal construction for the meaning *and Jesus said*. The conjunction *καί*, links this and the last cluster by means of an additive-different (consequential) relationship. One should note that, when Jesus is referred to as the subject in the narration (not in the dialogue), the author does not use a pronoun to refer to him, but explicitly specifies his name for identification or emphasis since the time of Jesus' reappearance in the last cluster.

The content of Jesus' utterance, elaborated on in subcolon 49.1, depicts the purpose of his mission to the world. The prepositional phrase *εἰς κρίμα* expresses the purpose of the subject's action, and may be emphatic due to its placement in the sentence (cf. Newman & Nida 1980:318). The fact that no article is attached to the noun *κρίμα* seems to imply its general quality (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1985:320). Barrett (1955:303) points out that "κρίμα occurs here only in John, though the verb *κρίνειν* and noun *κρίσις* are common" (cf. also Bernard 1928:339; Lindars [1972] 1981:351). The word *κρίσις* normally denotes the act of judging (Bultmann 1971:340, footnote 5). "His coming means a *κρίμα*, 'a sentence or judicial decision', technically equivalent to *κρίσις*, Jesus in practice exercises the judicial activity, *κρίνειν*, mentioned in 5:22-23, 27a, 30" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:255). There seems to be no significant difference between the meanings of these two words in this instance (cf. Bultmann 1971:340, footnote 5). Louw and Nida (1988, 1:555) list these two words in the same subdomain. The nominative pronoun *ἐγώ*, referring to Jesus (Bernard 1928:340), emphasises the subject of the action. Although the word *world* is one of the author's favourite terms and occurs in fifty-seven verses in this Gospel, the combination of *this* and *world* only occurs in eight verses, including this one.¹⁶⁴ It purports that the author may be stressing the sphere on which Jesus judges, particularly relating to the present co-text. This means that the term *this world* may suggest the negative side of the world, full of unbelieving attitudes, and

164 This is according to *BibleWorks for Windows, ver 3.2* (Bushell 1995).

darkened by its blindness. The aorist indicative verb ἦλθον signifies the subject's action and expresses certainty (Fowler *et al.* 1985:297). Thus, 49.1 is rendered as *For judgment I came into this world.*

Jesus explains more about this judgment in his own terms by adding two subclauses in 49.1.1-49.1.2 that form a semantic unit. If so, these embedded sentences can be regarded to be in apposition with the phrase εἰς κρίμα in the main clause, both describing the purpose of Jesus' (first) coming. Although the conjunction ἵνα plus a subjunctive verb generally form either a purpose or a result clause, the construction in this instance is a purpose clause, according to his argument for judgment (cf. Carson 1991:377; Sanders & Mastin 1968:245, footnote 2). Since there is a negative particle, the first purpose is, that those who do not see may see.

In 49.1.2, the conjunction καί shows an additive-different relation in the unit, and indicates that this subclause also belongs to the main clause in 49.1. These relationships reveal that the conjunction ἵνα may be omitted as an ellipsis in this sentence. The subject is the articular participle phrase οἱ βλέποντες. Although the function is the same, there is no negative particle. One should note that this is the third time in colon 49 that the author deliberately repeats the related word of βλέπω. The repeated words reinforce one another semantically. The verbal part in 49.1.2 is represented by two words. The aorist verb γέγωνται denotes the action of the subject, and the adjective τυφλοὶ completes the force of the verb. The second purpose thus claims that those who see may become blind. This may be the exact meaning when Jesus talked of judgment in the narrowest sense of the word (for a broader meaning, cf. the next section below). Regarding the implication of Jesus' words in this unit, it is now clear that Jesus did not mean it physically or literally, but rather spiritually or religiously. The antithesis of sight and blindness is manifested in his statement, and is linked to another contrast, that of belief and unbelief. This ultimately leads to the core symbols of light and darkness. "At the heart of the dualistic imagery of light [night?], darkness, and blindness, on the one hand, and of day, light, and sight, on the other, is the concept of judgment" (Resseguie 1982:301). Hence, this concept of judgment in this verse could express the main theme of the narrative (Resseguie 1982:301; cf. also Dodd [1953] 1968:358). Lee (1994:171) also avers that "everything hinges on v. 39, which contains the central dynamic of the narrative", for the interplay between belief and unbelief determines the outcome of the narrative. Concurrently, this is a focal point in this cluster. In the next subcluster, the author illustrates these implications in the dialogue with the Pharisees.

Consequently, verse 39 is rendered as follows: *And Jesus said, "For judgment I came into this world, in order that those who do not see may see, and that those who see may become blind."*

b) Illocutionary act

It seems, from the conjunction καί in colon 49, that Jesus was still talking to the blind man when he described his mission to the world in his utterance. However, this was not necessarily the case, for the man does not appear in this scene at all. More important is Jesus' statement itself which serves as Jesus' own exposition of the miracle event that influenced not only the life of the blind man but also that of the Jewish authorities. The statement also indicates how the judgment would work.

What did Jesus mean when he stated in 49.1.1-49.1.2 that "in order that those who do not see may see, and that those who see may become blind"? In this co-text, 'sight' symbolises a believing heart. Carson (1991:378) contends: "John is again stressing the point that a certain poverty of spirit (cf. Mt 5:3), an abasement of personal pride ... and a candid acknowledgment of spiritual blindness are indispensable characteristics of the person who receives spiritual sight, true revelation, at the hands of Jesus". On the other hand, 'blindness' points to the inability "to perceive spiritual and divine realities ... To be blind is to not believe, which leads to total blindness and delivers people up to the power of darkness" (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:255; cf. also Bultmann 1971:341). In addition, Lindars ([1972] 1981:352) is of the opinion to include the willful refusal to understand in the meaning of blindness. Moreover, some commentators make a similar comment, which is also presented in connection with 9:1 (cf. the analysis of 'CS' in this verse), that, in fact, all humankind are blind (e.g., Calvin 1979:391; Bultmann 1971:341; Culpepper 1998:178). Morris (1971:497, footnote 58) points out that the phrase καὶ ἅμεις may suggest this. "But all men were blind only in a *temporary* sense; through the coming of light both seeing and blindness receive a new and *definitive* meaning. This is what judgment means" (Morris 1971:341; for a more detailed discussion, cf. Morris 341-342).

Newman and Nida (1980:319) elucidate this judgment from a different angle, and state that the judgment "means essentially 'to indicate distinctions between people' may be satisfactory in this co-text. However, the term judge does not refer here to pronouncing condemnation or innocence, nor is it a reference to final judgment. It is a reference to the exposure of sins" (cf. also Moloney 1978:156). I would agree with their view, except for one point: it is possible that this judgment could also refer to the pronouncement of verdict (cf. also Bernard 1928:339, footnote 83;

Hoskyns 1954:360; Carson 1991:377). It will become evident that Jesus would pass his judgment on the Pharisees in verse 41, which means the pronouncement of ‘sentence’.¹⁶⁵ Concerning the distinctions between people, Dodd ([1953] 1968:208, 357) also states that light brings judgment, in the sense that it discriminates between those in darkness and those in light. This idea is already pointed out implicitly in the light and darkness imagery in John 3:19-21 (cf. Barrett 1955:303). Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:255) ponders:

The final thrust of the saying is its statement that the paradoxical reversal of the situation is to divine decree (ἴνα). What appears in 3:19 ff as an ordinary fact resulting from human guilt is here declared to be the divine will. The same event can be looked at, as it were, both from below, in terms of human nature, and from above, as the result of God’s ordinance.

The above observations may help solve a surface contradiction between Jesus’ statement in this verse and some of Jesus’ other utterances about his mission to save the world such as in 3:17 and 8:15.¹⁶⁶ As pointed out earlier (section 9.1.1), the question concerning this is: Did Jesus come to save or to judge? Many commentators contend that, in fact, there is no contradiction (e.g., Bruce [1983] 1994:220), for these utterances just exhibit two sides of the same coin. A dominant explanation would be as follows: those earlier utterances (especially 3:17) accentuate God’s saving purpose (cf. Newman & Nida 1980:319). When Jesus offers salvation to the world, some listen to him and others reject him. For those who reject him, his coming into the world inevitably becomes the judgment, for there are only two choices, namely to be saved or to be condemned. In other words, “their unbelief becomes a judgment on them through their own guilt (3:18b; 12:48). This judgment leads to a division among people, and this factor is present here as in 3:19” (Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:255; cf. also Bernard 1928:340; Morris 1971:496). “Even 3:17 is immediately followed by 3:18-21” (Carson 1991:377). Brown (1966:345) offers basically the same interpretation, but with a different emphasis: “Although these texts [5:22; 9:39] seem to contradict the first group [3:17; 12:47], they simply expand the notion of provoking judgment which is in the context of the first group. The passage ... viii 15-16, is one example that spans the two groups and has the idea of both.” Brown (1966:345) thus holds that “the statement that Jesus does not come to condemn does not exclude the very real judgment

165 Cf. also Resseguie 1982:301; Carson 1991:378; cf. an elucidation of this verse below.

166 Cf. the characters and the reader cannot account for 12:47 because of narrative temporality.

that Jesus provokes". Brown appears to emphasise more the active role that Jesus played in judgment. I agree with this.

From the above discussions, including the analysis on 'General analysis', this utterance would best fit into a category of *assertive* speech acts, and is a statement in which Jesus explained his role as judge. One should note that the *Deletion Rule* can eliminate the purpose subclauses in the latter part of this utterance, for they explain 'judgment' in the main clause. The following is the application of Bach and Harnish's (1979:43) schema of assertives on this text:

In uttering "*For judgment I came into this world, in order that those who do not see may see, and that those who see may become blind*", Jesus asserts that for judgment Jesus comes into this world if Jesus expresses:

- i. the belief that for judgment Jesus comes into this world, and
- ii. the intention that the hearers believe that Jesus believes that for judgment Jesus comes into this world.

As it appears that Jesus expresses his belief and intention as described above, this utterance would be an assertive speech act. Briefly, Jesus intended to make known that he came to the world for judgment. He also intended to explain why the sign of opening the blind man's eyes was performed. The author wants to tell the reader about the nature of Jesus' mission and about what will happen if Jesus comes to the reader's own life.

c) Perlocutionary act

The hearers, whoever they were, should recognise the purpose of Jesus' mission, and be alarmed by the judgment Jesus brought. The reader should further be aware of Jesus' mission and judgment and of the implications for him. The reader should be able to figure out the characters to whom Jesus was referring in his statement. This identification may enhance the reader's interest for the story.

d) Communicative strategy

1. For the sake of discussion, I shall examine *the communication on both the character and the text levels simultaneously*. The way in which this dialogue scene starts seems to imply that Jesus' utterance could be a monologue. If this is so, Jesus had no intention to communicate the message contained in his utterance to anybody, and thus the Pharisees in the next verse simply happened to be there to ask their question. In this case, there is no communicative strategy involved in Jesus' utterance. However, the way in which this scene develops and comes to its own

conclusion suggests that Jesus intended to have this conversation with the Pharisees. This fits better into the author's overall plan to organise the entire Chapter, as mentioned at the beginning of this section. "With artful restraint the author withholds the word judgment (κρίμα) until the last scene, a brilliant correspondence to the sudden turning of the tables, though that process, like the κρίμα, has been silently at work from the beginning" (Duke 1982:194). It is, therefore, crucial to examine some of the communicative strategies that Jesus as well as the author used to convey his message.

2. *Firstly*, Jesus' statement, in this instance, is normally classified as one of the ἤλθον-sayings that describe his mission.¹⁶⁷ Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:255) avers: "There is little point in looking for a basis in the history of the tradition for the ἤλθον-saying, since the whole utterance, even with the addition εἰς τὸν κόσμον τοῦτου can be seen to be a Johannine product." As far as this ἤλθον-saying in verse 39 is concerned, it appears to be sincere, economical, and relevant to the blind man's previous utterance, in particular (v. 38) as well as to the story up to this scene, in general. Barrett (1955:303) contends: "The primary intention of the saying is to bring out the underlying meaning of the miracle and 'trial', which is also the meaning of the ministry of Jesus as a whole". Thus, Jesus' utterance keeps all the *Cooperative Principles* intact, except the *Manner Maxim*. It appears to violate this Maxim because of the metaphorical expression of sight and blindness. As far as this expression is concerned, Barrett (1955:303) maintains: "The language is in part borrowed from a number of Old Testament passages, notably in Isaiah".¹⁶⁸ This could mean that this expression is widespread in the Old Testament and Jewish thought (cf. Bultmann 1971:340, footnote 4). This implicates that the Pharisees should also be familiar with this expression. If so and if they understood its meaning, Jesus' utterance does not violate the *Manner Maxim* in this particular case.

3. Regarding the metaphorical expression above, the purpose and function of the symbols of sight and blindness in this instance and in verse 41 (as the same symbols are used in verse 41) are examined simultaneously, according to Painter and Koester's claims (cf. section 5 in Chapter 3). With reference to Painter's three purposes, these symbols are closely connected with the concepts of belief and unbelief (cf. the section on 'IA' in this verse). As Painter (1986:52) points out, "while they enable faith to see, they condemn

167 Barrett 1955:303; Jn 10:10; 12:46f.; 18:37; Jn 5:43; 7:28; 8:42; 12:27; 16:28; 17:8. For similar synoptic sayings in Mk 2:17; Mt 5:17; Lk 12:49, cf. also Beasley-Murray 1987:160.

168 E.g., for the gift of sight to the blind, cf. Is 29:18; 35:5; 42:7, 18; for the blinding of those who see, cf. Is 6:10; 42:19; cf. also Lindars [1972] 1981:352; Lieu 1988:85; Carson 1991:377; Jn 12:40.

unbelief to blindness". Since these symbols are used as part of Jesus' mission (v. 39) and judgment (v. 41), they bring a new understanding about God through Jesus. Therefore, the use of these symbols attests to Painter's claim. As for Koester's thesis, these symbols are primarily connected to the theme of Christology and secondary to that of discipleship, for they are used to describe Jesus' mission in verse 39 and the Pharisees' spiritual state in verse 41. This spiritual state was strongly linked to their response to Jesus. When to have 'sight' is considered as a starting point of faith in Jesus, the sight imagery clearly relates to *the theme of discipleship*.

4. *Secondly*, compared to the author's normal usage of *the world* (e.g., 1:9; 3:17, 19; 6:14/10:36; 11:27; 12:46; 17:18; 18:37), the phrase *this world* is striking and occurs for the first time in the Gospel (Bultmann 1971:340, footnote 1). This fact is likely to surprise the reader, and the *Interest Principle* is thus operative in Jesus' utterance. It appears that the change emphasises more the darker dimension of the judgment (cf. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:255; cf. also John 8:23; 12:31; 16:11).

5. *Thirdly*, regarding Textual Rhetoric, because Jesus' utterance is ambiguous in using the metaphorical expression (cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:255), it flouts the *Maxims of Ambiguity* and *Transparency*. Even though the hearers understand the meaning of the expression, Jesus could have said it more clearly, for example, "that those who are willing to believe may understand spiritual realities; and that those who are not willing may not grasp these". In addition, because the hearers need to take more time to decode this expression, the *Processibility Principle* is transgressed. Furthermore, this utterance is formulated in such a way that most important information is provided in the beginning (for judgment I came into this world), jeopardising the *End-Weight Maxim*. However, perhaps the most significant aspect is that Jesus' utterance operates on the *Expressivity Principle* and possibly also on the *Iconicity Maxim*, which "invites the user, all other things being equal, to make the text imitate aspects of the message" (Leech 1983:68), in that the metaphorical expression may emphasise the expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication. The operation of these rules serves to evoke the hearers' interest. In fact, Jesus' utterance would draw the Pharisees' attention and interest effectively, as indicated in the next verse. In other words, Jesus deliberately chose to utter his utterance as he did, in order to induce the hearers' response, although his utterance flouts a number of conversational rules.

6. *Fourthly*, Duke (1982:191) remarks: "The irony of ch. 9 is summarized in Jesus' sayings of v.39." He does not explain this irony. It is interesting

to observe that few scholars make note thereof.¹⁶⁹ May it be because the irony is self-evident? If self-evident, then how? Could Jesus' saying be an ironic utterance, for it summarises the irony of John 9? I shall now describe this irony. According to the verifying steps (in 'The analytical outline' in section 1.6 in Chapter 2), three participants should be identified (step B-i). If this is an occurrence of irony, Jesus should be the ironist, since Jesus was the speaker. If Jesus referred to the blind man using the phrase "those who do not see" and to the Pharisees using the phrase "those who see", the victims would most likely be the Pharisees because of the result of judgment (to become blind). This irony is located on the character level, for its location is to be determined by the level of the ironist (cf. section 1.6 in Chapter 2). The observers would be both the author and the reader. As the ironist appears to use this irony intentionally (cf. below, however), it should be *verbal irony* (step B-ii-1). The nature of opposition in this irony would be counterfactual propositional opposition (step B-iii-1), of which there are two. The first would be that the projected expectation that those who are blind cannot see is negated at some point, so that the proposition that those who do not see may become more blind becomes that those who do not see may see. The second would be that the projected expectation that those who can see are not blind is negated at some point so that the proposition that those who see may see more clearly becomes that those who see may become blind. Applying ironic speech act conditions will further test these oppositions (step B-iv).

The first one is: (proposition *P* = that those who do not see may become blind more, proposition *P'* = that those who do not see may see).

Propositional content conditions (step B-iv-1): In Jesus' utterance, propositions *P* and *P'* identify "those who do not see" as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions (step B-iv-2): i) Jesus believes that the hearers can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues in *P* and *P'* as well as contextual clues (the words 'blind' and 'see'). ii) Jesus takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act.

Sincerity conditions (step B-iv-3): Jesus believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain.

Essential conditions (step B-iv-4): Jesus' utterance counts as deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

169 According to my knowledge, Bultmann (1971:340) and Salier (2004:114) seem to be the only authors to notice this irony besides Duke; cf. Culpepper 1983:175-176.

The second is: (proposition *P* = that those who see may see more, proposition *P'* = that those who see may become blind).

Propositional content conditions (step B-iv-1): In Jesus' utterance, propositions *P* and *P'* identify "those who see" as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions (step B-iv-2): i) Jesus believes that the hearers can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues in *P* and *P'* as well as contextual clues (the words 'see' and 'blind'). ii) Jesus takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act.

Sincerity conditions (step B-iv-3): Jesus believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain.

Essential conditions (step B-iv-4): Jesus' utterance counts as the undertaking of deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

From the above analysis, Jesus' utterance under consideration may now be regarded as verbal irony. However, this interpretation of Jesus' utterance as verbal irony is not without issues: i) the uncertainty about the ironist's intention; ii) the ambiguity as to the victims; iii) non-conformity to the definitions of irony, and iv) the violation of the *Irony Principle*.

Concerning i and ii, the interpretation of this irony is based on the assumption that Jesus intended to have a conversation with the Pharisees when he uttered this statement. The ironic interpretation is only possible if this assumption is correct. As pointed out earlier, there is still a slight possibility that his utterance could be a monologue or was intended for the ears of the blind man. This aspect also affects the establishment of the Pharisees as the victims. It is further doubtful that they perceived themselves as the legitimate hearers of Jesus' utterance. It is further equivocal that the Pharisees could detect the disparity between the counterfactual propositional oppositions. These two items bring the above preparatory conditions into question.

Regarding iii, according to Searle ([1979] 1981:143), irony is an utterance "where the speaker says one thing but means the opposite of what he says". Roy's (1981:411) definition is "saying something other than what one means". However, the content of Jesus' utterance does not appear to suit these definitions. Jesus meant exactly what he said. Thus, his utterance has only one illocutionary force, and this fact does not correspond with the observation that all verbal ironic speech acts either are indirect speech acts (Amante 1981:80; Botha 1991c:227) or have more than two illocutionary forces (cf. section 1.6 in Chapter 2).

As for iv, based on the *Irony Principle*, irony should not conflict overtly with the *Politeness Principle* (Leech 1983:82). Jesus' utterance is a straightforward expression and does not attempt to convey the message covertly. This openness creates a problem, for it does not correspond to the idea of irony.

In conclusion, based on the above observations, especially from item iii, Jesus' utterance is not verbal irony. This utterance simply contains an ironic and paradoxical expression.

7. *Fifthly*, Jesus' utterance may imply the motif of suffering. On the one hand, the people who do not see may experience some kind of suffering because of physical or spiritual blindness. This suffering would be resolved when Jesus comes. On the other hand, those who see may become blind and may experience the same kind of suffering as formerly blind people, or even worse, from the time of Jesus' coming. Judgment, the purpose of Jesus' mission, may thus be linked to the *motif of suffering*.

8. *Lastly*, the reader can hardly miss grasping the meaning of Jesus' statement, as the reader has just witnessed the realisation of the mission work on the man born blind. In this sense, the significance of Jesus' utterance lies more in the Pharisees' understanding of Jesus' mission in terms of its implication for them. Holleran (1993b:380) remarks on the Pharisees that "the characters in the story have yet to learn how these words of Jesus apply to them". Although the Pharisees will reappear on the scene in the next verse, it is already in this verse that Jesus' saying would be interesting to the Pharisees. In this regard, the *Interest Principle* is covertly at work in this utterance, with reference to the Pharisees.

e) Summary

Jesus' utterance is an assertive speech act, in that Jesus intended to assert that he came into this world for judgment. The hearers, including the reader, should recognise the purpose of Jesus' mission. Jesus' utterance prefers expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication to efficiency in the metaphorical expression of sight and blindness. Therefore, the utterance upholds the *Expressivity Principle* at the expense of the *Maxims of Ambiguity, Transparency and End-Weight*, as well as the *Processibility Principle*. The *motif of suffering* further enriches the connotation of this utterance.

9.3.2 The second subcluster (9:40-41)

The second subcluster (9:40-41) has two units, cola 50-51 and colon 52. While the first unit provides the Pharisees' question to Jesus, based on

Jesus' previous statement about his mission, the second provides Jesus' answer to them.

9:40 Ἦκουσαν ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων ταῦτα οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ
ἄνθρωποι καὶ εἶπον αὐτῷ, Μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τυφλοὶ ἐσμεν;

a) General analysis

Cola 50-51 constitute verse 40, and thus form a unit of analysis. Since colon 50 and the first part of colon 51 are the narrator's introduction of the speakers, this type of introduction can be omitted from this present speech act analysis because its function is similar to that in verse 2 (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:2). However, I shall do the general analysis of this introduction as it contains a great deal of significant information.

In colon 50, the verbal part is expressed by means of the two words that are separated by the prepositional phrase ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων. The first word is the aorist verb ἤκουσαν, and the second is the pronoun αὐτά, directly referring to Jesus' statement in colon 49. The nominal part is somewhat more complex. There may be two possibilities concerning the function of the word οἱ. One is that this is regarded as the definite article, especially acting to form a relative clause with the participle ἄνθρωποι. In this case, this participle shows the substantival use to serve as the subject (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1985:306). The other is that this is considered as the relative pronoun, and its antecedent may be Φαρισαίων. Although there should not be a great deal of difference in translation, the first option may be preferred, because the second would manifest an odd relationship syntactically with the antecedent (and the word οἱ does not have an accent in the accented Greek text, in which the relatives always have an accent). This relative clause contains the prepositional phrase μετ' αὐτοῦ. This phrase denotes the idea of accompaniment, but does not necessarily mean right there beside him (cf. Schnackenburg [1968] 1980:499, footnote 57). It implies neither any kind of alliance (Barrett 1955:303) nor any attachment of discipleship (Bernard 1928:340). This relative clause is further connected to another prepositional phrase ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων, and together they form the nominal part. All these points help render colon 50 as follows: *Those of the Pharisees who were with him heard these words.*

In colon 51, the conjunction καὶ shows an additive-consequential relation between this and the last colon. 51.1 mentions the content of their question. The conjunction καί, is the adjunctive use, denoting *also*

(cf. Fowler *et al.* 1985:267). The subject is doubly emphasised by the pronoun ἡμεῖς, referring to the Pharisees themselves. The first word in the sentence is the negative particle μή, which indicates that the question they asked is a hesitant question or one that expects the answer 'no' (Bernard 1928:340; Morris 1971:497, footnote 58; Holleran 1993b:380). They did not want to believe that they were blind, yet they were not so certain whether that was the case. In this instance they exposed their mixed feelings. This may be one reason why they asked, "We are not blind too, are we?" Consequently, verse 40 reads: *Those of the Pharisees who were with him heard these things and said to him, "We are not blind too, are we?"*

b) Illocutionary act

As analysed above, the utterance of these Pharisees is a hesitant question or a question that expects the answer 'no'. This means that it is not a 'real' question. I have already examined this type of question in 9:8b (cf. the section on 'IA' in this verse). Like the utterance in 9:8b is an indirect speech act, the Pharisees' utterance, in this instance, is also an *indirect speech act*. When the Pharisees heard Jesus' statement in the last verse, they appeared to understand its meaning well. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) observes that "they realise very well that he means spiritual blindness". They were wondering whether they also belonged to the group who would become blind. Based on the form of their question, they were almost certain that they did not belong to such a group. However, the Pharisees did not try to say it confidently in order to avoid the embarrassment, should they be wrong. For these reasons, they formulated their utterance in a kind of interrogative sentence, mainly to assert that they were not the ones who would become blind, as well as secondary to obtain Jesus' confirmation, or his opinion about their assessment. What these points amount to is that the primary illocutionary act of their utterance would be *assertive*, and the secondary illocutionary act would be *question*. This indirect speech act is a good way to express their mixed thoughts perfectly. Their expressed belief and intention were not strong. This primary illocutionary act of assertive follows the schema of assertives (Bach & Harnish 1979:43; cf. also this schema in the section on 'IA' in 9:38a), and is successful.

Briefly, some of the Pharisees intended, *first*, to assert that they were not the ones who would become blind and, *secondly*, to ask Jesus a question about the matter. In other words, they thought that they knew the answer, but they did not trust it. The author intends to lead the reader to ask himself the same kind of question, in order to make sure of his spiritual state.

c) Perlocutionary act

Jesus should recognise the Pharisees' assertion and provide them with an adequate answer to their inquiry, thus clarifying their spiritual state. The reader should reply to the author's question. The author also wants to invite the reader to become his knowledgeable insider against the Pharisees, by virtue of the irony that some of the Pharisees, who were supposed to be religious leaders, did not know their own spiritual state (for this irony, cf. below).

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, and as examined in the analysis of 9:8b, the Pharisees' utterance, being an indirect speech act, violates the *Manner Maxim* due to its ambiguity. What is the significance of this violation? Why did the Pharisees use an indirect speech act? Bernard (1928:340) states: "Some Pharisees ... interjected the scornful question". My view would differ from this comment. If they wanted to make a scornful remark to Jesus, more suitable expressions would have been available. For instance, "Jesus, you are stupid! What you said is really nonsense". This means that they would not have had to utter an indirect speech act to insult Jesus. However, the use of this indirect speech act, in this instance, suggests that the Pharisees might have wanted to convey a subtle nuance in their message. As pointed out earlier, while they thought that they were not the ones who would become blind, they were not absolutely certain about it. In this sense, the point proposed in the analysis of 'Communicative strategy' in 9:8b also holds true for this instance: the motivation for the speakers' use of an indirect speech act is not out of politeness, but rather their uncertainty about their own self-image.

2. Where did these Pharisees come from? Although the narrator tries to explain that they were with Jesus, it is the reader's impression that they were not with Jesus in the preceding dialogue between Jesus and the blind man. In fact, the conversation between Jesus and the blind man in the cluster B' should have taken place in private, for Jesus deliberately sought out and found him (v. 35). The circumstances did not seem to allow the presence of other people. "We are not told how and why some of the Pharisees were with Jesus" (Morris 1971:496-497). "Their presence seems a bit contrived in the setting pictured in vs. 35" (Brown 1966:376). This perhaps constitutes a violation of the *Quantity Maxim* by the narrator.

I would like to suggest two solutions. One is that Jesus' dialogue with the Pharisees took place in a different setting, for instance, a different location and time, assuming the leap between verses 38 and 39. According to Morris (1971:496) "[i]t is difficult to think that the Pharisees would have

witnessed the man's act of worship without some protest. It seems more probable accordingly that Jesus' words are spoken a little later". The other is that Jesus would find and talk with the blind man privately in a public place. These Pharisees accidentally heard only Jesus' last statement. Commentators such as Bernard (1928:340), Bultmann (1971:339), Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) and Carson (1991:377) basically agree with this view. In this case, the blind man either withdrew himself from the scene or remained there quietly. Although Morris' comment is plausible, I would opt for the latter view, because it seems more important for the narrator to establish a strong link between this and the last cluster (as well as the remainder of the Chapter). In fact, this can be strongly detected by means of the narration in verse 40. One should also remember that the conjunction *καί*, in verse 39 indicates the temporal progression from the last cluster to the present one. One can argue that the narrator could have given more details for the occasion, but he somehow ignores it. All he wants to make clear is that perhaps the dialogue in this cluster needs to be treated in detail along with the miracle story in the same setting of the last cluster, and that it should be done as compactly as possible. Lindars ([1972] 1981:352) avers that "John has lost sight of the needs of the story, and is more concerned with the theological issue". I would not go so far as to say that the author lost sight, but the conclusion is similar. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) also mentions: "The evangelist introduces them without bothering much about the situation. He is interested in the transparency of the scene". These may be the reasons for the narrator's breach of the *Quantity Maxim*.

3. The next question is raised: Who were these Pharisees? This appears to suggest another breach of the *Quantity Maxim*. Were they the same people pointed out in verse 13? They most likely were, because the author provides no further description of them, in this instance, and the article before the word *Φαρισαίων* indicates its function to refer to the noun previously mentioned. If so, according to observations stated earlier in this study about the Pharisees and the Jews (cf. the analyses of vv. 16a, b, c and 18), the term *Pharisees* refers to both the believing and the skeptical groups.¹⁷⁰ This means that, in this instance, the Pharisees also included these mixed people, but probably not as many. Obviously, this point may shed some light on the identity of the Pharisees.

As noted earlier, if the Pharisees in this Chapter are considered to include members of both the believing and the skeptical groups, in essence they may represent three types of people, namely the Jews who were helplessly

170 One should remember that the latter group, especially signified by the term *Jews*, summoned the parents and then the blind man.

blind and extremely hostile to Jesus; a group of people who were skeptical in every sense, and an undetermined believing group who were inclined to show their believing attitudes towards Jesus, neither completely nor publicly. Howard-Brook (1994:229-230) also suggests that the identity of the Pharisees could here be Jesus' secret believers from among the Pharisees. One may consider them to be double-minded men, unstable in all their ways (Ja 1:8). One can assume that the first group was not present when they asked Jesus in verse 40, for two reasons. One is that, if they were the ones who asked, the author would not have had to alter the terminology from 'the Jews' to 'the Pharisees'. The other is that the Jews would and could not have asked such a question in any case, because they did not believe Jesus' words and it would never have crossed their minds to question their own spirituality. Therefore, the Pharisees who displayed their mixed and confused feelings, in this instance, were members of the second and third groups. This description of the Pharisees suits the present co-text. It was conceivable for them to ask Jesus such a question, because they were skeptical about everything, including their present spiritual status. They also wanted to believe that they were religious, but they did not have total confidence in themselves. That is the reason why they asked, "Are we not blind too, are we?" In this respect, the Pharisees' utterance itself upholds the *Relation Maxim*, because their question is very relevant to Jesus' utterance in verse 39 in terms of spiritual blindness.

In addition, regarding the Pharisees' identity, a critic may suggest an alternative theory. Based on the question that expects the answer 'no', one can argue that the Pharisees were totally confident that they were not blind. This false confidence resembles the tendency displayed by the Jews in cluster C'. Hence, the Pharisees could be the same people referred to as the Jews, who cast out the blind man in verse 34. There is a problem in this theory, while it also clashes with the analysis of the above indirect speech act. Arguments against it can again be based on the Pharisees' confidence. The text in verse 39 is not so clear as to say to whom Jesus was telling his mission statement. It is likely that Jesus tried to tell it to the blind man in the first place. If this was not the case, at least he did not try to tell it to the Pharisees, either. Why, then, did the Pharisees, such confident spiritual people, have to utter such a question to Jesus? Linguistically, why did they use a question form? Their question does not seem to agree with their confidence. Rather, they could have said it in a different way if they wanted to respond to Jesus so eagerly. A hypothetical example may be "Jesus, whatever your mission is, you do not need to come to us, because we are totally fine without you". Therefore, it is unlikely that the Pharisees here were those confident Jews.

4. *On the text level*, the indirect speech act used in the Pharisees' utterance flouts the *Processibility Principle* and the *Maxims of Ambiguity* and *Transparency*. It requires more time for the hearer to decode, and there is no direct and transparent relationship between the message and the text.

5. Some scholars detect an instance of irony in the Pharisees' utterance.¹⁷¹ Thus, this may be another instance of irony in this cluster. According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), this irony can be further identified as follows: 1) the use of an indirect speech act (ambiguity) (step A-ii-3); 2) the violation of some Maxims (step A-iv), and 3) two illocutionary forces (step A-v). Since the Jews did not intend to use irony, their utterance should be a case of situational irony on the text level. As Resseguie (1982:303) rightly observes, “[t]he characterization of the religious authorities keenly illustrates their tragic fate because they believe that they do see when in fact they are the ones who are blind to who Jesus is. It is with tragic irony that they ask at the end of the trial, ‘Are we also blind?’”. Therefore, this is *irony of self-betrayal* resulting from the utterance of the Pharisees as the victims, who unconsciously show their ignorance (step B-ii-2-3). Some Pharisees, who were supposed to be religious leaders, did not know their own spiritual state. Simultaneously, for the same reason, this is *dramatic irony* and can be perceived by the reader's knowledge of what the Pharisees have not yet find out (step B-ii-2-1). “The irony of these questions is the fact that ... the speaker is expecting the answer ‘no’, while the reader knows that the answer is ‘yes’” (Stibbe 1993:111). The victims are the Pharisees. Both ironies are located on the text level, and the observers are the author and the reader. These ironies serve as a mode of revelatory language whereby the reader judges, thereby involving the reader in the communication process of the text (O'Day 1986:30-31). These further strengthen the bond between the author and the reader as “a social device for group cohesiveness” (Roy 1981:409).

e) Summary

The Pharisees' indirect speech act invites the transgressions of the *Maxims of Manner*, *Transparency* and *Ambiguity*, and of the *Processibility Principle*. Its two illocutionary forces, assertive and question, brilliantly portray their mixed and somewhat confused thoughts on their own spiritual state. It is significant that this uncertainty about their self-image becomes a basis for establishing their utterance as two situational ironies.

171 E.g., Resseguie 1982:296, 303; Culpepper 1983:171, 175-176; Botha 1991d:214; Stibbe 1993:111; Holleran 1993b:380.

The author uses these ironies for group cohesiveness. However, in order to obtain these effects, the author flouts the *Quantity Maxim* in introducing these Pharisees from nowhere.

9:41 εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Εἰ τυφλοὶ ἦτε, οὐκ ἂν εἶχετε ἁμαρτίαν· νῦν δὲ λέγετε ὅτι Βλέπομεν, ἡ ἁμαρτία ὑμῶν μένει.

a) General analysis

Colon 52 depicts Jesus' answer to the Pharisees. These are Jesus' last words of this dialogue scene as well as of the entire Chapter. The author carefully and prudently places the final conclusion on Jesus' lips. The content of Jesus' answer is divided into two parts. While the first part, 52.1.1-52.1.2*, is expressed by means of a conditional sentence, the second, 52.1.3-52.1.4, is a declaration. These two parts form a unit. In the first part, 52.1.1 indicates the protasis, for the conjunction εἰ plus the imperfect indicative verb ἦτε make a past conditional clause. Together with the particle ἂν in the apodosis, this construction purports the condition contrary to fact. 52.1.2* provides the apodosis. The fact that no article is used with the accusative singular noun ἁμαρτίαν displays its general quality (see Fowler *et al.* 1985:320), therefore not referring to individual sinful deeds. This apodosis has the negative particle οὐκ. Accordingly, this conditional sentence is rendered as *if you were blind, you would have no sin*. Since the statement was false, Jesus told the Pharisees that they were under the control of sin, because they thought that they could see. There is no need to mention that their sight was not a spiritual one.

In order that the meaning is obvious to the Pharisees, Jesus added to make a very straightforward statement in the second part. In 52.1.3, the conjunction δέ shows a dyadic-contrastive relation between this and the last sentence. The adverb νῦν emphasises the present assessment of the Pharisees about themselves, modifying the present indicative verb λέγετε. This verb implies their certainty about their own assessment. This assessment is described in 52.1.3.1, and the direct quotation as its content is introduced by the recitative conjunction ὅτι. It is interesting to note that the content is simply expressed by means of one word βλέπομεν. It is very compact, yet very precise. It firmly manifests the theme of sight. This present verb denotes a habitual or continuous action (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1985:288), and mentions that the subject refers to the Pharisees. Therefore, Jesus summed up their assessment for argument sake, saying, "but now you say, 'We continually see'". The following questions arise: When did the Pharisees explicitly say that? When and how did Jesus hear

it? Again, the text does not mention exactly. However, it implies that Jesus was aware of all of the religious leaders' interrogations about the blind man as well as the overall process and outcomes. That may be why Jesus immediately sought and found him after his removal from their presence in verse 35. From this evidence, Jesus assessed the situation and what they were thinking, and thus he could make such a summary. It was indeed a correct summary. Therefore, the statement displays Jesus' unique ability to conclude that the Pharisees now thought that they could see.

Jesus' straightforwardness arose more from his final remark than from the previous sentence. In 52.1.4, the verbal part is explained by the present indicative verb μένει, which shows a progressive-continuous action (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1985:288). This word is the author's favourite and is usually employed in a positive sense;¹⁷² However, in this instance, the author uses it very negatively. The nominal part of this sentence consists of three words. The subject is the singular noun ἁμαρτία with its article ἡ. The genitive pronoun ὑμῶν indicates that this sin was the Pharisees' sin. Since the term *sin* is also singular, it may point to the general nature of sin that they shared as a collective group of people. Hence, in Jesus' mind, the Pharisees, in this instance, represented the entire community of Pharisees, who were stubborn and unbelieving. They were blind spiritually, and their sin would remain. This is a relationship between blindness and sin by virtue of the axis of unbelief. It is not exaggerated to say that wherever sin remains, guilt and condemnation also remain. In this sense, Jesus' statement about the Pharisees here could be considered as a perfect example of judgment as his mission to the world.

As noted earlier, the second part of Jesus' answer in 52.1.3-52.1.4 is semantically exactly similar to the first part in 52.1.1-52.1.2* The difference between them is the way in which the author puts the same meaning in the different surface structures. In other words, in the deep structures these two parts express the same semantic meaning. Yet, in the surface structures the two parts exhibit a syntactical contrast. It is proved by the adversative conjunction ἔ in the second part. Therefore, the connotations clearly become different. The technique the author uses here is a significant rhetorical feature, which increases the impact on the meaning (for more discussion on this, see 'CS' below).

From the above observations, verse 41 renders: *Jesus said to them, "If you were blind, you would have no sin. But now you say, 'We see,' your sin remains"*.

172 Cf. Barrett 1955:304; Jn 6:56; 14:17; 15:4, 10, 16; 3:1; 3:36.

b) Illocutionary act

In response to the Pharisees' question in the last verse, Jesus was meant to answer with a 'yes' or a 'no', but he did not give the expected answer. As noted earlier, the first part of Jesus' utterance uses a conditional sentence, whereas the second part consists of two normal sentences. All these sentences work together to answer the question. In fact, the last sentence plays a major role as his answer, where Jesus clearly stated that the Pharisees have sinned. This implies that they were "those who see" according to verse 39, and therefore his answer would be that the Pharisees were the ones who would ultimately become blind. Therefore, this utterance is another good example of an *indirect speech act*. Jesus was answering their question by making a statement. In this respect, his utterance jeopardises the *Manner Maxim*. The primary illocutionary act of Jesus' utterance is *responsive*. To determine its secondary illocutionary act requires more scrutiny. Is it an accusation, rebuke, judgment, warning, declaration, advice, or something else?¹⁷³ The analysis of this study will reveal that not one, but two speech acts are involved in this utterance. One is found on the character level, and the other on the text level.

On the text level, *first*, this utterance can be a *verdictive* speech act. This is a conventional illocutionary act, and the first time such a speech act is used.¹⁷⁴ The *illocutionary point* of this speech act would be that judgments "by convention have official, binding import in the context of the institution in which they occur" (Bach & Harnish 1979:111). Since both the author and the reader know that Jesus was the Son of Man who was given authority to execute judgment by the Father (5:27), Jesus was in the right position to pass judgment on the Pharisees. Consequently, for both the author and the reader, Jesus' utterance, in this instance, is deemed to have official and binding import in the context of the divine institution, where God the Father oversees. Furthermore, in terms of the content of his utterance, Jesus meant what he said literally. He spoke straightforwardly to the Pharisees face-to-face, "Your sin remains." This fact echoes a comment by Bach and Harnish (1979:118): "In general, conventional illocutionary acts must be performed literally, since the conventions that govern them specify what must be *said*, not meant". In this verdictive speech act, the *direction of fit* would be words-to-world.¹⁷⁵ Hence, Jesus' utterance is a successful speech act of verdictive, thus a judgment.

173 Bernard (1928:34) views this as a reproach. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) views this as a rebuke. Carson (1991:378) mentions that it is a warning.

174 Speech acts analysed thus far are all communicative speech acts.

175 Searle ([1979] 1981:19-20) terms these speech acts "assertive declarations and proposes that they have two directions of fit: assertive and declarational. In my opinion, the two directions of fit are redundant in Jesus' utterance.

As far as this verdictive speech act is concerned, I wish to clarify one matter, for its connotation is somewhat different to that of the term used by Bach and Harnish (1979:119): “Conventional illocutionary acts, through resulting in institutional change, are not necessarily final. These changes can be reversed, the act that effected them rescinded. In the case of verdictives, the judgment of the umpire or the court may be challenged or appealed”. However, Jesus’ judgment is not the kind to be challenged or appealed to. His judgment is final, and cannot be reversed. The difference is that Jesus’ judgment is rooted in the divine institution; it is not derived from a human institution. We can assume that God’s judgment is perfect, and needs no adjustment. In this respect, since the term ‘verdictive’ does not fully suit Jesus’ utterance, I propose to term this kind of speech act a *divine verdictive*, if permissible (cf. Searle [1979] 1981:18 has an exceptional class of “supernatural declarations”). Of course, this phenomenon is peculiar to the religious language.

Secondly, one should note that this utterance cannot be a verdictive on the character level. According to Bach and Harnish (1979:115), “[a] verdictive would be merely a constative if it had no institutional import of the sort described. However, verdictives do have this import and can have it only in virtue of being mutually believed to have it”. On the text level, Jesus’ utterance has the institutional import by virtue of being mutually believed by both the author and the reader. On the story level, although the fact that the Pharisees asked Jesus a question in verse 40 implies that they had some idea that Jesus was not simply an ordinary man, this does not mean that the Pharisees as the hearers knew Jesus’ real identity. As mentioned earlier (section 9.1.1), if the Pharisees were included in the Jews in John 5, the Pharisees might have heard that Jesus was given some authority from God. However, it is doubtful that they seriously believed Jesus’ words (cf. John 5:47). Rather, one can assume that they still did not know him very well. There was no convention that was mutually recognised by both Jesus and the Pharisees. One can conclude that Jesus’ utterance is not issued in the right context for a verdictive speech act. Like Bach and Harnish (1979:115) point out, Jesus’ utterance would merely be a constative. In fact, the utterance could be classified as a confirmative on the character level. Jesus appeared to judge the Pharisees based on his observation of their ignorance about their own spiritual state (as some truth-seeking procedure). This confirmative speech act correctly follows the schema of confirmatives (cf. this schema in the section on ‘IA’ in 9:9c), and is successful. The secondary illocutionary act is thus *confirmative*. Briefly, Jesus intended to answer the Pharisees’ inquiry by judging the Pharisees concerning their state of sinfulness and blindness. Although both the author and the reader know that Jesus’ utterance bears this notion

of judgment, the Pharisees could not perceive it. Hence, Jesus intended merely to confirm their sinfulness on the story level. Moreover, the author intends to point out to the reader that spiritual blindness with regard to Jesus is dangerous and leaves one in sin.

c) Perlocutionary act

The Pharisees should accept Jesus' answer. Although Jesus' utterance did not sound like a judgment to them, they should be surprised and terrified by Jesus' affirmation that their sin remains with them. In other words, the perlocution warns them by virtue of the judgment. After hearing Jesus, they should attempt to banish their sin (e.g., to abandon their unbelief about Jesus) as soon as possible. The reader should grasp another relationship between sin and blindness (cf. 9:2-3). The perlocution for the reader is to convince him that Jesus, who had authority to judge, exercised his judgment when he came to the world, and to invite the reader to come to Jesus with a believing heart in order to secure his salvation.

d) Communicative strategy

1. *On the character level*, some scholars (e.g., Duke 1982:191-192; Botha 1991d:214; Carson 1991:378) suggest the possible occurrence of irony in this instance. If there is an instance of irony in this verse, it should be in the first conditional sentence, because the latter part of Jesus' utterance is a 'straight' statement. Irony should be uttered covertly (Leech 1983:82). According to the analytical outline for ironic speech acts (section 1.6 in Chapter 2), this irony may be further identified by means of several indications: 1) the use of paradoxical expression and repetition (step A-ii-3); 2) the violation of the *Quantity Maxim* (step A-iv); 3) three illocutionary forces (step A-v), and 4) the adherence to the *Irony Principle* (step A-vi). According to the next verifying steps, three participants should be identified (step B-i). As Jesus was the speaker, Jesus should be the ironist. As Jesus was speaking to the Pharisees, the victims should be the Pharisees. This irony is located on the character level. The observer would be the reader. As the ironist seems to use this irony intentionally, it should be *verbal irony* (step B-ii-1). The nature of opposition in this irony would be counterfactual propositional opposition (step B-iii-1), of which there are two. The first one would be that the projected expectation that religious leaders were not supposed to be spiritually blind is negated at some point so that the proposition that the Pharisees were not spiritually blind becomes that the Pharisees were spiritually blind. The second would be that the projected expectation that religious leaders were not supposed to have sin is negated at some point so that the proposition that the Pharisees did not have sin becomes that the Pharisees had sin. Applying

ironic speech act conditions (step B-iv) will further test these oppositions. The first one is: (proposition *P* = that the Pharisees were not spiritually blind, proposition *P'* = that the Pharisees were spiritually blind).

Propositional content conditions (step B-iv-1): In Jesus' utterance, propositions *P* and *P'* identify 'the Pharisees' as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions (step B-iv-2): i) Jesus believes that the hearers can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues in *P* and *P'* and contextual clues (the word 'blind'). ii) Jesus takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act.

Sincerity conditions (step B-iv-3): Jesus believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain.

Essential conditions (step B-iv-4): Jesus' utterance counts as deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

The second is: (proposition *P* = that the Pharisees did not have sin, proposition *P'* = that the Pharisees had sin).

Propositional content conditions (step B-iv-1): In Jesus' utterance, propositions *P* and *P'* identify 'the Pharisees' as their common referent.

Preparatory conditions (step B-iv-2): i) Jesus believes that the hearers can detect the disparity between *P* and *P'* and assists them by providing lexical clues in *P* and *P'* and contextual clues (the word 'sin'). ii) Jesus takes responsibility for creating a counterfactual speech act.

Sincerity conditions (step B-iv-3): Jesus believes that the sincerity rule for the illocution in which *P* occurs does not obtain.

Essential conditions (step B-iv-4): Jesus' utterance counts as deliberately creating a superficially counterfactual speech act.

It is important to note that this verbal irony must be a communicative illocutionary act, because a conventional illocutionary act (divine verdictive) is not compatible with ironic interpretation (step B-v). As analysed earlier, the fact that this irony is located on the character level is in accordance with the fact that Jesus' utterance is a confirmative speech act (of communicative speech acts) on the character level.

The message of this irony intended by Jesus would be that the Pharisees were spiritually blind, meaning that they were sinful (step B-v). This message brings the *Approbation Maxim*, the *Principles of Pollyanna* and *Irony* into play. Jesus' utterance containing this irony violates the first two rules, for it dispraises the Pharisees and is unpleasant to their ears. However, in order to minimise his offensive point, Jesus' utterance observes the *Irony Principle*: "If you must cause offense, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle]" (Leech 1983:82).

From the above analysis, Jesus' utterance can be considered to be verbal irony. It appears to be an intended, covert, fixed, finite, and seemingly stable irony. The perlocution for the Pharisees is to warn them about their sin and blindness, and to prepare them for the next verdict, which Jesus was about to bring (step C). Furthermore, this verbal irony may function as a rhetorical device to enforce Jesus' meaning, a satiric device to attack the Pharisees, and a heuristic device to clarify the Pharisees' and the reader's interpretations (Muecke [1969] 1980:232). This is also a mode of revelatory language, in which the reader is asked to judge the Pharisees (O'Day 1986:31). Incidentally, this verbal irony attests to the observation that all verbal ironic speech acts are indirect speech acts (Amante 1981:80; Botha 1991c:227).

2. I shall now examine *the communication on both the character and the text levels simultaneously*. Firstly, both the first part of Jesus' utterance, which is the conditional sentence, and the remainder of the utterance semantically express the same meaning. Thus, the latter part of the utterance is a repetition of the former, as was observed earlier. This is a semantic repetition, and repetition as such "not only marks a theme but adds emphasis" (Nida *et al.* 1983:28). From a speech act perspective, this repetition is perceived as a transgression of the *Quantity Maxim* in the field of Interpersonal Rhetoric, and of the *Principles of Economy and Processibility* in the field of Textual Rhetoric. These transgressions are significant, for they imply that Jesus wanted to convey something more than merely what he said. In this respect, one should also remember that, in this repetition, the *Expressivity Principle* and possibly the *Iconicity Maxim* are observed. According to this Principle, Jesus' utterance places more emphasis on the expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication whereby the speaker, Jesus, wanted to surprise and impress his hearers. Hence, the purpose of this repetition is to provide a great impact on the Pharisees. Briefly, as an overall communicative strategy of Jesus, the content of his utterance (verdict) and this repetition play a major role in leaving a strong impression on the Pharisees.

3 *Secondly*, it is interesting to observe the relationship of Jesus' answer to the expectations of both the Pharisees and the reader. As the Pharisees' question expects the answer 'no', they expected Jesus to say that they were not spiritually blind. The reader expected Jesus to reply that they were spiritually blind, based on his reading this Chapter which constantly depicts the Jewish authorities' ignorance and blindness as to Jesus. To these expectations, Jesus replied, "If you were blind, you would have no sin". This may mean, in general, that blindness can be restored, when it is truly acknowledged and needs to be cured (cf. Calvin 1979:393). It is important to realise, however, that Jesus specifically meant that, since the

Pharisees were spiritually blind, although they were not blind in the physical sense, they had sin. This corresponds to Jesus' statement in 9:39 that "those who see may become blind". In the next sentence, Jesus confirmed the same point with a different expression: "But now you say, 'We see', your sin remains". As for the phrase "But now you say, 'We see'", Carson (1991:378) plainly explains that the Pharisees were satisfied with the light of the law as interpreted by their traditions; consequently, they rejected the true light when it shone upon them. Thus, their sin would remain. With respect to the Pharisees, Jesus' answer is not what they expected and this has news value for them. With regard to the reader, Jesus' reply is what the reader expected. Therefore, the *Interest Principle* is operative in this utterance more in respect of the Pharisees than in respect of the reader. Because of the verse's paradoxical expression, critics' comments on this verse demonstrate its perplexity. Morris (1971:497) states that "Jesus' answer is paradoxical and probably highly unexpected. The Pharisees doubtless expected Jesus to say that they were blind". Duke (1982:191-192) avers that "... so we are certain that Jesus will tell them they are blind ... To our surprise – and surely theirs – the tactic is changed. Jesus agrees with them. They are not blind". Bernard (1928:341) contends that Jesus meant, "No, you are not wholly blind; that is the worst feature of your case". When one reads such comments, it is imperative to find the perspectives from which these critics analyse the text, because their points of view determine their interpretations in this kind of paradoxical expression.

4. *Thirdly*, does this paradoxical expression constitute a violation of the *Manner Maxim*? In other words, do the Pharisees and the reader understand Jesus' utterance well? In order to answer this question, Jesus' utterance must be scrutinised in more detail.

As briefly mentioned earlier, Jesus' answer as a whole has two aspects: i) the Pharisees were spiritually blind, and ii) they had sin. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) proposes that "the answer gives specific content to the blindness Jesus is talking about: it is a fundamental refusal on the part of human beings to expose themselves to God's revelation, and has its origin in human arrogance and false self-images". Bernard further (1928:341) points out: "Their self-satisfaction prevented them from seeing what they *ought* to have seen in Him" (cf. also Riga 1984:173). Their sin was caused by their own moral choice, because "they have enough spiritual knowledge to be responsible" (Morris 1971:497). His answer raised a question of guilt and was a rigid evaluation of the very nature of the Pharisees.

In the details of Jesus' utterance, the reference to *the theme of remaining* is significant. This theme "is common in John, but here it is sin that remains rather than a gift of God" (Brown 1966:376). In this instance, the

theme is used in a negative sense, as in John 3:36 (Carson 1991:378). As far as the term *sin* is concerned, in this instance, what does it signify? As observed earlier (in the section on 'GA' above), this term may point to the general nature of sin, which the Pharisees shared as a collective group of people. However, it could also be true, as Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) mentions, that "[t]he 'sin' of the Pharisees is illustrated by their attitude towards the man born blind, boundless and impenetrable rejection of God's messenger and hatred of him and his worshippers. In the fourth gospel this is sin itself (cf. 8:21; 15:22, 24; 16:9; 19:11)" (cf. also Barrett 1955:304). The sin lies not "in the blind man or his parents, nor in Jesus' breach of the Sabbath, but in the insistent refusal of the authorities" to see the true light (Holleran 1993b:381; cf. also Moloney 1978:148-149; Beasley-Murray 1987:160). This is the reason why their sin remained. From the Pharisees' point of view, if their sin remained, they would reap its consequences (e.g., condemnation, separation from God). In this regard, they would suffer, despite the fact that this was their own responsibility. In this instance, the *motif of suffering* obtains. Some commentators¹⁷⁶ mention the synoptic saying about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (e.g., Mk 3.29) in respect of this verse. However, I would agree with Lindars ([1972] 1981:352) who states that "their behaviour is unforgivable. But this is not what John means". In this instance, the text leaves no indication of this blasphemy against the Holy Spirit.

As far as the reader is concerned, he is able to understand the meaning of the paradoxical expression, and its reference to the Pharisees as representatives of the Jewish authorities. One reason for this is that Jesus' utterance here is similar to his utterance in verse 39. In addition, the reader is meant to recognise Jesus' statement as the conclusion of this miracle story, based on a few observations. *Firstly*, the theme of blindness and sin is evident both in this and the first cluster A. *Secondly*, Jesus finally declared that it was not the blind man nor his parents, but the Jewish authorities with whom sin remained.¹⁷⁷ *Thirdly*, if the reader reads the next utterances (John 10:1ff.), he will be exposed to very different terminology such as sheep, door, thief, shepherd, doorkeeper, voice, strangers, the amen sayings, and so forth.

With reference to the Pharisees, since the author does not record their reaction to Jesus' utterance, it cannot be said for certain that they understood it very well. This silence could, in fact, be an indication that they understood it well, because they did not object to it, as they would

176 E.g., Bernard 1928:341; Barrett 1955:304; Brown 1966:376; Carson 1991:378.

177 For further discussion on the relations between this and the first clusters, cf. section 1.1 in Chapter 5.

do as a rule (cf. 9:18, 24, 34). Furthermore, Jesus' answer appeared to sufficiently answer their question. If they were not confident in their own assessment, as pointed out earlier, they may not be able to say anything back to Jesus who confidently passed his judgment on them. Hence, the *Manner Maxim* in relation to the understanding of Jesus' utterance by the reader and the Pharisees does not appear to be violated.

5. *Fourthly*, Jesus' utterance keeps the *Maxims of End-Focus* and *End-Weight* intact, because the relatively new and very important information, Jesus' verdict, is placed towards the end of the utterance. It is significant that "it was not Jesus on trial but the Pharisees" (Dockery 1988:23; cf. also Duke 1982:194). "With the verdict given, the trial is now completed" (Resseguie 1982:301; cf. also Culpepper 1998:178).

6. *On the text level* only, in comparison with the blind man's *progressive perception* of Jesus, as pointed out earlier (cf. the analysis in 'CS' in 9:17b), the Jewish authorities demonstrated their *progressive depreciation* of Jesus. According to Morris (1971:486), "the Pharisees, starting with the view that Jesus is not from God (v. 16), question the miracle (v. 18), speak Jesus as a sinner (v. 24), are shown to be ignorant (v. 29), and finally are pronounced to be blind and sinners (v. 41)" (cf. also Boice 1977:46). From a speech act perspective, this can be perceived as the operation of the *Relation Maxim* on a larger scale. Every portrait of the Jewish authorities relates to one another. The author helps the reader understand the characters more adequately. This is one of the author's superb techniques to enrich the story and enhance his communication with the reader.

e) Summary

In an indirect speech act, Jesus intended to answer the Pharisees' question (responsive) by passing judgment on them (confirmative and divine verdictive). The perlocution is to warn the Pharisees about their sin and spiritual blindness. In order to communicate these messages impressively to them, Jesus' utterance uses various rhetorical devices and conversational principles. In the verbal irony, although it violates the *Approbation Maxim* and the *Pollyanna Principle*, it observes the *Irony Principle*. In the repetitive expression, it breaks the *Quantity Maxim* and the *Principles of Economy* and *Processibility* in order to keep the *Expressivity Principle*. Jesus' utterance as a whole adheres to the *End-Focus* and *End-Weight Maxims*, as well as the *Interest Principle*. There are also references to the themes of remaining and suffering. This utterance appears to be very plausible as a final climax and conclusion of this intriguing story of the Light that shone in this world.

9.4 Macrospeech acts

Firstly, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the story level*. This cluster is basically made up of the question-answer form. Despite the fact that the Pharisees asked Jesus a question, Jesus appeared to initiate and control this conversation. The reason for this is that the assertive speech act, as Jesus' statement in verse 39, provides an opportunity and ground for the Pharisees' inquiry in verse 40. A microproposition in verse 39 that Jesus came to this world for judgment, and a microproposition in verse 41 that the Pharisees were spiritually blind and thus their sin remained, entail a new macroproposition by virtue of the *Construction Rule* that Jesus came to judge the Pharisees' blindness and sin. Thus, the global topic would be the purpose of Jesus' mission. Based on these observations, a *macrospeech act on the story level* would be *confirmative*, as in the case of verse 41, in that Jesus intended to confirm the Pharisees' blindness and sin in his mission. Schnackenburg ([1968] 1980:256) points out: "Through all specifically first-century polemic, this story exposes a fundamental feature of human behaviour."

Secondly, I shall discuss a *macrospeech act on the text level*. The basic outline of this section for the reader on the text level is fairly similar to that on the story level, for no important narration affects the global topic in this instance. Thus, the global topic would also be similar to that on the story level. Accordingly, as analysed in verse 41, a *macrospeech act on the text level* would be *divine verdictive*, in that Jesus intended to pass his judgment on the Pharisees. In addition, it appears that the author has a slightly different aim in mind. Based on the global topic, the author's aim in this cluster would be to reveal the purpose of Jesus' mission to the reader. In this sense, an additional *macrospeech act* would be *informative*, in that the author intends to reveal that Jesus came for judgment. Beasley-Murray (1987:161) endorses these points: "The two features of revelation and judgment develop side by side, and ...exemplify what happens when the Light shines in the world." The perlocution on the text level is also fairly similar to that of 9:41. This is to convince the reader that Jesus, who had the authority to judge, exercised his judgment when he came to the world, namely to invite the reader to come to Jesus with a believing heart for securing his salvation.

The story of the blind man is a vindication of Jesus' promise in 8:12. The story of the Jewish authorities, presented in this cluster, is an attestation of Jesus' threatening prediction in 8:24-25, "... unless you believe that I am *He*, you shall die in your sins" (cf. Moloney 1978:149).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

1. SUMMARY OF THIS SPEECH ACT READING OF JOHN 9

Chapters 3 and 4 presented a detailed analysis of the story of John 9 from a speech act perspective. I shall summarise my analysis by combining some important aspects in the following sections.

1.1 The relationships between the clusters

A discussion of the relations between the clusters involves justifying the colon demarcations of the text. Since each cluster has been analysed, I am now in a better position to do so. Although John 9 is divided into seven clusters in this analysis, other options could be considered. One of the best ways to determine other options is to scrutinise some of the major translations of the Bible, like Snyman (1991:91) does for the Letter to Philemon. The following six versions, including my own divisions, are compared for this purpose:¹ New Revised Standard Version (NRSV); New International Version (NIV); New American Standard Bible (NASB); New Japanese Bible (Shinkaiyaku); King James Version (KJV); Today's English Version (TEV), and my own divisions. The demarcations are introduced in the following diagram:²

Diagram of demarcations

Version	Verses
NRSV	1 – 12//13 – 34//35 – 41
NIV	1 – 12//13 – 34//35 – 41
NASB	1 – 12//13 – 23//24-34//35 – 41
Shinkaiyaku	1 – 12//13 – 23//24-34//35 – 41
KJV	1-7; 8-12; 13 – 34//35-38; 39-41

1 For a detailed survey of divisions, cf. Menken 1985:227-228.

2 The semi-colons and the double slashes are marked for minor and major breaks, respectively.

Version	Verses
TEV	1-7; 8-12//13-16; 17-23; 24-34//35-38; 39-41
My own	1-7//8-12//13-17//18-23//24-34//35-38//39-41

The diagram indicates that all seven divisions, except KJV, agree on two major breaks between verses 12 and 13, as well as between verses 34 and 35. KJV also shows a minor break between verses 12 and 13. Both NRSV and NIV indicate the same structures, and have three major parts. The demarcations by NASB and the New Japanese Bible are identical and display four major parts. KJV only has two major parts, containing five minor parts. TEV and my own divisions share the same number of breaks without considering whether the breaks are minor or major. The only difference between them is in the third break where the breaking point differs. TEV notes the end of the third part at verse 16, while my own divisions consider it at verse 17. The TEV break is rather unique. Hence, while certain breaks are widely accepted, others show the different ways of understanding the flow of the text.

Brodie (1993:344) suggests the criterion of physical movement as the clearest structural marker, which is “an indication that a scene is ending or beginning, someone either comes or goes or is called or is thrown out ... (in vv 7, 13, 18, 24, and 35)”. His point is plausible, but the demarcation cannot be determined solely on this ground, and not on any other single criteria. It should be combined, taking into account content and other literary features such as other structural markers (e.g., key words), *inclusio*, the principle of duality, and so forth.

It is apparent from the diagram that my own divisions have the highest number of cluster demarcations. This is mainly because of the chiasm found in the text, as mentioned earlier (cf. section 2 in Chapter 4). Therefore, my demarcations can basically be justified once this chiasm is legitimately recognised. Each cluster describes the conversations between the characters. In these dialogues, the chiasmic pattern emerges around the thematic, lexical and semantic parallels between the related clusters. I shall discuss this to demonstrate this point.

Clusters A and A' refer to the main character of Jesus, and the motifs of coming and sending of Jesus (9:4, 39). The disciples, both of Jesus and of Moses (the Pharisees), are also present in both clusters. These clusters also share the themes of sight, blindness, sin, the works of God (because Jesus' mission was to do the works of God), and the world. Hence, these clusters use, as keywords, the related words of Ἰησοῦς (9:3, 39, 41), τυφλός (9:1, 2, 39, 40, 41), ἁμαρτία (9:2, 3, 41), κόσμος (9:5, 39), and βλέπω (9:7, 39, 41).

Moreover, it is significant to note that all these points serve as evidence for the *inclusio* formed between the first and last clusters in this Chapter (cf. also section 9.2 in Chapter 4).

Clusters B and B' share the same keywords that refer to Jesus, namely Ἰησοῦς (9:11, 35), ἄνθρωπος (9:11, 35), and ἐκεῖνος (9:12, 37). The meaning of the term καθήμενος (9:8), to sit, is linked to that of the word προσεκύνησεν (9:38), to kneel down. There is a contrastive association concerning the blind man's knowledge. In cluster B, the man still did not know Jesus well. When he was asked where Jesus was, he answered "I do not know" (v. 12). In cluster B', however, he came to know Jesus well enough to believe in Him. The theme of knowledge is strongly evident in both clusters; the identity of Jesus is the focal point in this knowledge. The physical presence of Jesus is also a key to these clusters. In cluster B, Jesus disappeared from the scene to reappear in cluster B'. This means that, except for the blind man, Jesus gets the narrative focus in cluster B', but when Jesus is not present in B, the focus shifts to other characters, the neighbours.

Since the Jewish authorities interrogated the blind man in clusters C and C', these clusters are linked to each other. In terms of characters, the blind man and the Jewish authorities, the Pharisees in C and the Jews in C', are present in both clusters. The identity and origin of Jesus are the focal points in both interrogations. The most important question was whether or not Jesus was a sinner. The question as to whether or not Jesus came from God was also the main dispute. In order to better understand these disputed points, the Jewish authorities in both clusters asked the blind man the same question concerning the process of the healing miracle (9:15; 9:26). This same question led the man to respond differently in the different situations. While he obediently answered what happened to him in C, he refused to answer and rather challenged them in C'. In addition, both clusters refer to the themes of blindness, sight, sin, and sign. Therefore, these clusters also share related words, namely ἀνοίγω (9:14, 17, 26, 30, 32), βλέπω (9:15, 25), ποιέω (9:14, 16, 26, 31, 33), ὀφθαλμός (9:14, 15, 17, 26, 30, 32), ἄνθρωπος (9:16, 24) which refers to Jesus, ἁμαρτωλός (9:16, 24, 25, 31, 34), τυφλός (9:13, 17, 24, 25, 32), and θεός (9:16, 24, 29, 31, 33).

The main feature of this chiasm is cluster D. At first glance, this seems hard to believe, because the characters on stage, the parents and the Jews, were not the main characters in the story. Lee (1994:164-165) divides John 9 into three acts (9:1-7, 8-34, 35-41), under which she finds eight scenes in all. She claims: "There is a distinct advantage to this structure as against the more common suggestion of seven scenes in a chiasmic pattern" (Lee 1994:164). She argues that to focus on this study's cluster D

(which is her Act 2, scene 3) “as the center of the narrative ignores the escalating of hostility which is the main feature of Act 2 and in which the fourth scene [9:24-34] is the most important” (Lee 1994:164). Her argument, however, is not convincing, because the climax of the Jews’ hostility is best captured and expressed not in cluster C’ (9:24-34), but rather in cluster D, which contains the Jews’ astonishing decision in verse 22. In this instance, their determined hostility towards Jesus and his followers is depicted in extreme terms. To focus on cluster D does not necessarily ignore their hostility, but enhances our understanding of their harsh and strongest attitude. In addition, although she further proposes to put a considerable weight to Acts 1 (9:1-7) and 3 (9:35-41) in relation to the above issue (Lee 1994:164-165), to take cluster D as the main feature does not ignore the importance of the points of contrast and similarity between Acts 1 and 3.

Furthermore, without cluster D, it may be true that the story would lose a great deal of its suspense, thrill and excitement, because the crucial information that a person’s confession of Christ would lead to his expulsion from the synagogue underlies the entire story and plays a significant role in the plot and development of the story. For example, the strength of the main characters’ confrontation with the antagonists, the Pharisees and the Jews, originates from the intense relationship with these Jewish authorities. Although this relationship is best portrayed in the dialogue in cluster C’, the fiercest relation as its climax is expressed in cluster D, as mentioned earlier. The parents’ strange behaviour is conceivable when this information is released. This can even explain the reason why the neighbours brought the blind man to the Pharisees in verse 13 in cluster C, because they might also have been afraid of the Pharisees (for this argument, cf. the section on ‘CS’ in 9:13). Likewise, when the blind man asked the Jews whether they also wished to become Jesus’ disciples, they reviled the blind man (v. 28) and cast him out (v. 34). The reader may be puzzled by their overreaction, wondering why they were so angry with the blind man. However, the reader understands the Jews’ reaction, because they were the ones who decided to use such an agreement in order to harm those who wished to associate themselves with Jesus. In addition, this information may highlight the profound significance of the blind man’s faith in Jesus in verse 38. Hence, cluster D contains crucial information regarding the entire story, and should thus be regarded as the central structure (cf. also section 6.4 in Chapter 4).

In order to explore another side of the relationships between the clusters, I shall examine the way in which Chapter 9 is organised. On the level of the blind man, the protagonist of the story, this Chapter may be organised on the basis of a logical-means-purpose relationship. Basically, Jesus healed the blind man so that he could see both physically and spiritually. On the

level of Jesus, the other main character, this Chapter may be schematised in terms of a logical-means-result relationship, because Jesus, by virtue of the healing of the blind man, revealed his identity. He also accomplished his mission as judge, especially with regard to both the blind man and the Jewish authorities. On the level of the Jewish authorities, this Chapter may be organised on the basis of a logical-reason-result relationship. Because they rejected Jesus, the man from God, they became blind and were thus declared guilty. Finally, despite all these unique relationships between the clusters, including the chiasm, it is a relief and amazing to know that the story as a whole develops according to a typical temporal progression. Hence, the entire narrative is organised cohesively. After all, I hope that all the above arguments will help justify my own cluster demarcations of Chapter 9 of John's Gospel.

1.2 Microspeech acts used in John 9

Based on the speech acts used in this story (cf, 'Diagram of speech acts used in John 9' in Appendix 5), I shall discuss some significant points.

To begin with, on the character level, when the five utterances of the neighbours in cluster B are examined, three of these are question speech acts. It can, therefore, be said that question speech acts are dominant. Likewise, when the Jewish authorities' (the Jews and the Pharisees) utterances in clusters C, D, C' and A' are scrutinised, six out of ten also constitute question speech acts. On the other hand, five out of seven utterances of the blind man in clusters B, C and B' (excluding C') are responsive speech acts. Similarly, two out of three utterances of the parents in cluster D indicate responsive speech acts. These figures demonstrate the roles assigned by the author to specific characters in the story. The neighbours, along with the authorities, play the role of interrogators, and the blind man and his parents respond to these interrogators. This question-answer form basically makes up the story. The way in which the author organises this narrative can also be perceived by glancing at the speech acts used in the story.

Secondly, a few clusters display some peculiarity. Among the dialogues conducted between the characters, those in cluster C' are distinctive. In this cluster, a wide variety of speech acts are used to depict the heated debate between the blind man and the Jewish authorities: assertive, descriptive, informative, confirmative, dissentive, disputative, responsive (so far, all Constatives), requestive, question and requirement (these three are Directives). In addition, all the utterances have more than two illocutionary forces, including the cases of indirect speech acts. These facts indicate that the language of the characters appears to become very complex in

order to increase its rhetorical power, especially in the case of attempting to persuade the opponent(s). To put it differently, this is attested by the utterances used by the Jewish authorities. As mentioned earlier, more than half of their utterances are question speech acts. In cluster C', however, this proportion of question speech acts decreases to less than half, and the majority of their utterances include more than two illocutionary forces. In addition, this same point is even more strongly certified by the blind man's utterances. As noted earlier, the majority of his utterances, except in cluster C', are responsive speech acts. In cluster C', particularly in verses 30-33, his utterances use various kinds of speech acts and have more than two illocutionary acts. In 9:31, his utterance even has four illocutionary forces. The tendency exhibited in cluster C' is quite striking.

When examining clusters A, B' and A' (where Jesus appears), it is obvious that the question-answer format is also followed in these clusters. In clusters A and A', Jesus responds to the inquirers (the disciples and the Pharisees). In cluster B', Jesus takes the initiative of asking the blind man a question. This marks a uniqueness of this cluster. When Jesus answers (vv. 3, 37, 41), two out of three utterances possess more than two illocutionary forces (vv. 37, 41). It may be a characteristic that only his utterances in verses 4 (requirement), 7a (requirement) and 35 (question) are Directives and not Constatives, compared to his remaining utterances.³

On the text level, it is a definite trait that all the narrator's utterances are informative speech acts. The narrator intends to tell a certain story to the reader. As mentioned earlier (section 3.1 in Chapter 2), Chatman's (1978:165) remark that the characters reserve a wider range of illocutions than the narrator, is well attested in this story. In addition, it is noteworthy that only 9:23 has an additional speech act that is confirmative in the particular speech situation (cf. the section on 'IA' in 9:23). Besides the narrator's utterances, the characters' two utterances also have illocutionary forces on the text level. The Pharisees' utterance in 9:16a has an additional illocutionary act of assertive, resulting from the irony designed by the author on the text level. The parents' utterance in 9:21ab also has an additional illocutionary act of concessive, because only the reader (and, of course, the author) can perceive this particular illocutionary force on the text level.

3 Verse 4 has an additional speech act of promise, which belongs to a commissive category.

1.3 Macrospeech acts in the story of John 9

In this section, I shall first examine the use of macrospeech acts (cf. 'Diagram of speech acts used in John 9' in Appendix 5), and I shall discuss a macrospeech act for the entire chapter later.

On the story level, macrospeech acts have been identified as follows: cluster A – assertive, C – descriptive, B' – advisory, and A' – confirmative. No macrospeech acts can be identified in clusters B, D and C' and, in the case of clusters D and C', result from the failed communications between the characters. In the case of cluster B, there is no responsible speaker who controls the dialogue. In an assertive macrospeech act in cluster A, Jesus makes an important statement about the works of God by the light of the world. In a descriptive macrospeech act in cluster C, the characters are attempting to identify the man who healed the blind man. It is important to note that their dialogue has failed, but this is not failed communication, either. It is simply inadequate or insufficient in reaching the communicative goal. In an advisory macrospeech act in cluster B', Jesus challenges the blind man to become a believer for his own sake. In a confirmative macrospeech act in cluster A', Jesus confirms the Pharisees' blindness and sin. Therefore, diverse macrospeech acts are employed to depict the different and unique dialogue scenes in the story. The various uses of macrospeech acts make this narrative very interesting.

On the text level, relatively speaking, macrospeech acts are used in a more unified way. Four out of seven macrospeech acts turn out to be informative (cluster A, C, D and A'). Two are confirmative macrospeech acts (cluster B and C'), and an advisory macrospeech act is identified in cluster B'. These can be juxtaposed as follows:

- a. In an informative macrospeech act in cluster A, the author informs the reader that Jesus, the light of the world, can manifest the works of God.
- b. In a confirmative macrospeech act in cluster B, the author intends to validate the reality of Jesus' miracle.
- c. In an informative macrospeech act in cluster C, the author reveals that the identity of the miracle worker is an adequate issue to cause a schism among the Pharisees.
- d. In an informative macrospeech act in cluster D, the author discloses the important information about the Jews' decision that anyone who confesses Jesus as Christ will be cast out of the synagogue.
- e. In a confirmative macrospeech act in cluster C', the author confirms that Jesus is not a sinner, but the one who came from God.

- f. In an advisory macrospeech act in cluster B', the author challenges the reader to continue to believe in Jesus.
- g. Cluster A' has two macrospeech acts: informative and divine verdictive. In an informative macrospeech act, the author tells that Jesus came into this world for judgment. In a divine verdictive macrospeech act, Jesus intends to pass his judgment on the Pharisees. However, on the story level, the Pharisees do not recognise this aspect.

One should note that Jesus is always the focus or the main topic in these macrospeech acts. In comparison with the fact that all the narrator's utterances are informative microspeech acts on the text level, it can be noted that not all of the author's macrospeech acts are on the same level of informativeness. This indicates that the author's use of speech acts is different from that of the narrator. The author uses the narrator strictly as a storyteller. In addition, the author consciously uses the narrator's monotone speech acts and a variety of speech acts employed by the characters in order to achieve a specific aim in the narrative. What is this aim? In other words, what can be defined as a macrospeech act for the entire story of John 9? In this instance, I shall employ the macrorules to determine this.


By virtue of the Construction Rule, the informative and confirmative macrospeech acts in clusters A and B entail the proposition (i) that Jesus, the light of the world, manifests the works of God in his miracle. By the same Construction Rule, the informative and confirmative macrospeech acts in clusters C, D and C' entail a new proposition (ii) that the identity of Jesus is that of the Christ who came from God. Similarly, by virtue of the Construction Rule, the divine verdictive and informative macrospeech acts in cluster A' make a further proposition (iii) that Jesus' mission to the world is judgment. All these new propositions move up to the next higher level. The advisory macrospeech act in cluster B' also goes up to a higher level by virtue of the Zero Rule (iv), because of its importance and distinctiveness among the rest of macrospeech acts.

According to the Construction Rule, propositions (i) and (iii) entail a new proposition (v) that Jesus, the light of the world, manifests the works of God in his miracle and judgment. This new proposition (v) and proposition (ii) can be combined and entail a macroproposition according to the Construction Rule – that Jesus, the light of the world who came from God, manifests the works of God. Based on this macroproposition and the advisory macrospeech act (iv), a macrospeech act for the entire Chapter 9 would be that the author challenges the reader to continue to believe in Jesus, the light of the world, who manifests the works of God. Therefore, this macrospeech act would also be advisory. The perlocution

is for the reader to accept the author's challenge to continue to believe in Jesus for the reader's own sake. This is a religious speech act in which the reader is asked to become involved in the language the author utters (cf. Evans 1963:14; Patte 1988:92). This religious macrospeech act, with its underlying microspeech acts, guides the reader to a better understanding of Jesus, and a bolder confession of faith. It is important to note that this macrospeech act is in accordance with the author's framework depicted in the purpose statements of the Gospel written in 20:30-31. In other words, the story of John 9 can be regarded as evidence for substantiating the main purpose of the author in the Gospel (cf. also Tovey 1997:87). Incidentally, this macrospeech act can be further used to support the view that the phrase "ἵνα πιστεύ[σ]ητε" in 20:31 means "that you may continue to believe" (cf. Smalley 1978:138-139; Smith 1986:84; Carson 1991:661-662).⁴

The following diagram displays the process of achieving this macrospeech act in John 9.

Diagram of a macrospeech act in John 9



4 For detailed discussions of the Gospel's purpose see, for instance, Brown 1966:lxvii-lxxix; Lindars [1972] 1981:56-63; Barrett 1975:8-19; Smalley 1978:122-149; Painter [1991] 1993:119-131; Carson 1991:87-95; Du Rand 1994:49-55; Tovey 1997:84-97 and many commentaries on this Gospel.

1.4 Survey of communicative strategy in John 9

The aim of this section is to briefly survey the important communicative strategy employed in John 9. As I have scrutinised such strategies in great detail in the text analysis, I shall implement this from a different angle: to observe how particular strategies have helped analyse the communication that has taken place on both the story and the text levels. I shall investigate the use of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics, other strategies, symbolism, irony and motifs (or themes) separately.

1.4.1 The use of interpersonal and textual rhetorics

In the text analysis, I examined the communication between the characters, the author, the narrator and the reader in the narrative of John 9 according to Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics. There are mainly two ways of doing this:

- a. The observation of the rules of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics indicates that the language is used as it is supposed to be used, in the sense that the speakers are trying to contribute to the goal of a conversation by means of their utterances.
- b. Breaking these rules indicate that the language is not used as it is supposed to be used. This means that the speakers are either unwilling to contribute to the goal of a conversation, or trying to communicate more than what is said. Breaking rules becomes very important, especially in the latter case, where the notion of implicature is used to explore the meaning of the violations.

It may not be necessary to provide examples of the adherence to these rules, as the majority of the utterances do adhere. The Jews' utterance in verse 34 portrays the typical example of speakers violating the conversational Principles and Maxims with a view to opting out of the dialogue. The Jews' utterance violates the *Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, Manner, Approbation, Agreement and Transparency*, and the *Principles of Pollyanna, Processibility and Clarity*. It nearly breaks every conversational rule. On the other hand, as far as the above rule-breaking case is concerned, an indirect speech act is a good example of the subcase where the speakers are trying to communicate more than what is said. An indirect speech act usually occurs with the transgressions of the *Maxims of Transparency and Ambiguity* under the *Clarity Principle*, and of *Manner* under the *Processibility Principle* (e.g., vv. 27b, 41). The neighbours' indirect speech act, for example, is used to avoid their embarrassment (v. 8a). In verse 40, the Pharisees' indirect speech act serves to brilliantly portray their mixed and confused thoughts about their own spiritual state.

All of the above examples indicate a way in which a speech act analysis is conducted in order to examine the communication process in the text. I shall now examine the contribution of each conversational rule to the text analysis of John 9.

Interpersonal Rhetoric

- a. The *Quantity Maxim* helps the reader comprehend the specific speech situation and examine how the narrator cultivates the reader's imagination (vv. 1, 8a). This Maxim also uncovers the speakers' attitudes in terms of economy in their utterances (e.g., vv. 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15ab, 23).
- b. The *Quality Maxim* helps establish the narrator's role as the reliable guide for the reader (vv. 1, 7b). This Maxim also reveals the speakers' attitudes in terms of sincerity when they speak (e.g., vv. 8b, 9b, 15b, 18, 19, 21ab). By virtue of the argument of the *Quality Maxim*, a speech act analysis proves its usefulness even in the interpretation of the text, which necessitates the consideration from an historical context (v. 22).
- c. The *Relation Maxim* helps explain the relevance of the characters' and narrator's utterances in the specific speech situations (e.g., vv. 2, 3, 6, 11, 13, 14, 22, 27b). The author uses this Maxim to interact effectively with the reader, especially to disclose the blind man's (past) hardship (v. 8b). This Maxim construes the motive of the Pharisees' question in verse 17a. This Maxim also helps highlight the significance of cluster D in relation to the remaining clusters (cf. section 6.4 in Chapter 4).
- d. The *Manner Maxim* discloses the nature of the speakers' utterances (e.g., vv. 4, 7, 14, 16a, 21ab, 23). This Maxim plays a significant role in the author's changing to the term *Jews* (v. 18). This Maxim also helps examine how the characters and the reader understand the expression of *the Son of Man* (v. 35).
- e. The *Politeness Principle* plays an important role in the parents' organisation of their speech act in verse 21cd.
- f. The *Tact* and *Generosity Maxims* uncover the parents' attitude in their answer to the Jews (v. 21cd).
- g. The *Approbation Maxim* helps understand the function of irony (v. 41; cf. v. 28, 34).
- h. The *Modesty Maxim* may enrich the meaning of Jesus' utterance in verse 37.
- i. The *Agreement Maxim* helps analyse the neighbours' motive to make their utterance in verse 9b, which is their politeness towards their dialogue partners. The violation of this Maxim helps highlight the

speakers' intention to persuade the hearers to change their views regarding the miracle worker (v. 16b).

- j. The *Sympathy Maxim* helps explain the disciples' attitude in their question (v. 2), and uncovers the author's sensitivity towards the needs of the reader (v. 22).
- k. The *Phatic Maxim* explains the parents' attitude in their reply to the Jews (vv. 21ab, 21cd).
- l. The *Politeness* and *Irony Principles* describe the significant usage of verbal irony in the blind man's utterances (vv. 27b, 30, 31). By contrast, the lack of the use of irony by the Jews can be explained by their constant breach of the *Politeness Principle*, for they overtly and verbally abused the blind man when they attacked him (cluster C').
- m. The *Banter Principle* explains Jesus' motive and attitude expressed in his utterances to the blind man (vv. 7a, 35). The *Banter* and *Economy Principles* also help analyse the intensity of the drama (v. 7a).
- n. The *Interest Principle* reveals how the author entertains the reader through the Pharisees' utterance in verse 16b and through Jesus' utterance in verse 37. This Principle uncovers how the author surprises the reader through the narrator's utterance in verse 16c (cf. also vv. 21cd, 35). This Principle also explains how the author creates more reader interest in the story (v. 19).
- o. The *Pollyanna Principle*, in conjunction with the *Agreement Maxim*, helps analyse the neighbours' motive for making their utterance in verse 9b; this indicates their politeness towards their dialogue partners. This Principle also helps clarify the use of irony (v. 41).
- p. The *Morality Principle* explains the blind man's omission of some details of the miracle event in verse 15b. This Principle also explains the terse narration (v. 14) and the parents' attitude in their reply to the Jews (v. 21ab).

Textual Rhetoric

- a. The *Processibility* and *Clarity Principles* reveal the perspicuous nature of the characters' utterance (e.g., vv. 21ab, 27b).
- b. The *End-Focus* and *End-Weight Maxims* stress the significance of the language formation (e.g., vv. 3, 6, 7b, 21ab, 35).
- c. The *End-Scope Maxim* highlights the significance of the language formation (e.g., vv. 3, 18).
- d. The *Transparency Maxim* reveals the nature of the language used in the characters' utterances (e.g., vv. 16a, 21cd).

- e. The *Ambiguity Maxim* helps prove the perspicuous nature of the narrator's utterance in verse 23. This Maxim also reveals the ambiguous expression in the language (e.g., vv. 9b, 27b).
- f. The *Economy Principle* sheds some light on the narrator's intrusion in verse 7a (cf. also v. 23). This Principle also helps the reader understand the terse language used by the characters (e.g., vv. 20, 27b, 35).
- g. The *Reduction Maxim* explains the motive for the use of pronouns (e.g., vv. 1, 8a, 13, 15c, 21ab, 21cd, 37).
- h. The *Expressivity Principle* elucidates the repetitions in the characters' and narrator's utterances more adequately (e.g., vv. 7b, 15b, 21ab, 23).
- i. The *Iconicity Maxim* may explain the imitative aspect of the message in Jesus' utterances (vv. 39, 41).

1.4.2 The use of other strategies

Other significant communicative strategies in John 9, from a speech act perspective, include:

- a. The author uses mutual contextual beliefs to enhance communication with the reader. For instance, in order to understand the significance of Jesus' actions, mutual contextual beliefs such as the knowledge of the Old Testament, the usage of saliva in ancient society, the challenge and response, the Sabbath laws, baptism, and so forth play an important role (v. 6). The mutual conceptual belief concerning Jesus' 'I am' sayings helps the reader understand the significant implication of the blind man's answer in verse 9c. The mutual religious beliefs in the use of the terms *prophet* (v. 17b) and *the Son of Man* (v. 35) help the reader understand the meanings in the characters' utterances.
- b. The author's strategy of secrecy and information control is used in the narrator's utterance concerning the Jews' decision, in verse 22, to maximise its impact on the reader. The introduction of the Sabbath issue in verse 14 is a brilliant strategy of information control, and communicates a few significant points to the reader.
- c. The important factors that also enhance the communication between the author and the reader are not irony, but the observation of the *Interest Principle* and the technique of reader victimisation (v. 21cd).
- d. The notion of display texts describes the assertibility and tellability of the story of John 9. These are especially shown in the narrator's utterance in verse 22.
- e. For more effective communication with the reader, the question-answer form, the scheme of topic of the conversation (vv. 3-5, cf. the analysis

of v. 5), the techniques of puns (v. 35), adjacency pairs (v. 36), and so forth are used.

- f. The progression of the blind man's perception of Jesus (the comic movement) and the progressive depreciation of Jesus by the Jewish authorities are used to highlight their peculiar responses to Jesus. From a speech act perspective, these techniques can be analysed by means of the notion of mutual story belief (cf. the analysis of v. 17b) and the operation of the *Relation Maxim* (cf. the analysis of vv. 38a and 41).
- g. A rhetorical question is used to express an emphatic declaration of the Jewish authorities in verse 16b (cf. also v 34b).
- h. In addition, the use of *inclusio*, chiasm, contrast, parallelism, repetition, and so forth throughout John 9, helps the author create a masterpiece of literature.

Although there is an overlap with some of the items mentioned above, it is worthwhile to compare the above observations and the author's strategies elucidated by means of other methods, for instance, narratology and reader-response criticism. From a narratological perspective, Resseguie (1982:303) summarises: "Because the form and content are so carefully woven together, John 9 is a superb piece of literature. Dualistic images, contrasting opinions, opposing movement of plot, and diverse characterizations all work together to show the reader the interrelationship between light and judgment". Stibbe (1993a:106) highlights the author's technique of "showing" and "telling" in cluster D (cf. section 6.4 in Chapter 4). According to Du Rand (1991:103), "Chapter 9 ... starts with a blind man and ends with the 'blind' Pharisees. The whole chapter acts as a hinge from chapters 5-8 to chapter 10". In addition, Martyn ([1968] 1979:26) points out the author's use of the law of stage duality throughout the story of John 9 (cf. the analysis of 9:8). From a perspective of reader-response criticism, Staley (1991:68) contends: "As in the case of the bedridden man of John 5, careful attention to repetition, the interplay of narration and direct speech, and the dynamics of reading in John 9 have revealed hidden nuances in the Johannine art of characterization". From a theological point of view, the theological concept that God is speaking to man through Jesus, "is etched sharply against the background of John's perceptive presentation of humanity in all its color and concreteness. At this he is a master, and it is nowhere more apparent than in the story of the man blind from birth" (Smith 1986:51).

1.4.3 Johannine symbolism in John 9

This section aims to summarise Johannine symbolism used in John 9 as one of the author's communicative strategies. Symbolic expressions usually

invite violations of the *Manner*, *Ambiguity*, and *Transparency Maxims* and the *Processibility* and *Clarity Principles* (cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:4, 5, 39, 41). Yet, the fact that the author deploys the symbols despite this indicates that the symbolic expressions can convey his message more effectively or significantly than the conventional expressions. In fact, as analysed in the text analysis, a great dramatic effect is cultivated for the reader by the use of metaphorical language such as the supporting symbols of day and night, not to mention, the core symbol of light (vv. 4, 5). The way in which the symbolic expressions of sight and blindness are formulated in Jesus' utterance is motivated more by the expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication than by efficiency (v. 39). We can, therefore, conclude that the author employs symbols to enhance communication with the reader.

Purpose and function of the symbols used in John 9

As indicated in section 5 in Chapter 3, the purpose and function of the symbols used in John 9 have been examined according to Painter (1986:52) and Koester's (1995:12-15) claims in the text analysis. I shall now review important instances of the symbolic expressions from this angle.

With reference to Painter's explanation of the three purposes of Johannine symbols, the day and night imagery used in 9:4 does not directly reflect Painter's purposes. Since these symbols are primarily used to describe the importance and urgency of God's works, it appears that the important factor, namely that the symbols serve to evoke faith or provoke unbelief, plays no role. Only the third purpose, namely that the symbols elicit a new understanding of God through Jesus, can be connected with these symbols in terms of God's works. On the other hand, Koester's thesis that the theme of Christology lies at the primary level of meaning in Johannine symbolism and that of discipleship at the secondary level, perfectly portrays the symbols of day and night, for these refer to the works of Jesus and the disciples.

Unlike the day and night imagery, Painter's three purposes are well attested by the symbol of light in 9:5. This symbol depicts "the judging character of the revelation" and provides "a new understanding about God" (Painter 1986:52). This imagery of light also deals in detail with the issue of unbelief. As for Koester's thesis, the light symbol in this verse is a good example to demonstrate his thesis.

Painter's claim is further confirmed in the water imagery in 9:7. As this symbol points to spiritual cleansing of sin, the symbolism certainly deals with the problem of unbelief as the ultimate sin in Johannine terms, confronting those who did not believe, and leads to a new understanding of God through Jesus as the true Siloam. With regard to Koester's thesis,

the symbol of water is impressively connected to the theme of both Christology and discipleship. The pool of Siloam symbolises the one who was sent by the Father. Washing in the water of Siloam signifies spiritual cleansing, which anticipates spiritual sight and growth in Jesus' disciples.

With reference to Painter's three purposes, the symbols of sight and blindness in 9:39 and 9:41 are closely connected with the concepts of belief and unbelief, the judging character of the revelation, and a new understanding of God. The use of these symbols, therefore, attests to Painter's claim. As for Koester's thesis, these symbols are related primarily to the theme of Christology and secondarily to that of discipleship, for these symbols are used to describe Jesus' mission in verse 39, and Jesus' judgment and the Pharisees' spiritual state in verse 41. 'Sight' is linked to a starting point of discipleship.

From the above observations, Koester's thesis of the twofold structure of Johannine symbolism must be agreed to: Christology and discipleship. This is clearly disclosed in 9:4-5, portraying Jesus as the light of the world, and referring to the work of God as the works that both Christ and his disciples should carry out.¹ The symbols of day and night are also closely associated with Jesus and God's work; hence, with the idea of discipleship. The symbol of Siloam in 9:7 also points to Jesus, the sent one, and to the obedience of a disciple, the man born blind. In addition, it was revealed how the images of sight and blindness in 9:39-41 enhance our understanding of salvation and judgment, and how these images convey the implicit messages about Jesus and discipleship. Those who can perceive and follow Jesus as the Messiah are the ones who have sight. Those who cannot 'see' this truth are the blind, and are thus condemned. These significant points remain powerfully in the reader's mind by virtue of the use of these symbols.

As it proceeds, this analysis elucidates and clarifies Painter's three purposes of the symbols in John 9. Indeed, the symbols addressed the problem of unbelief, and displayed their judging character of revelation. They brought a new dimension of understanding God through Jesus. In this respect, another remark by Painter (1986:53) should be added: "The purpose of the symbols is not only to reveal God through Jesus, but also to restore the image of God to man". The Jewish authorities distorted the perception of God, as demonstrated in their understanding of the Sabbath law as well as in dealing with Jesus. The symbols in the narrative, particularly that of light, have signified the way in which the characters and the reader are meant to comprehend God in the Father and in the

1 Of course, this does not suggest that the disciples were involved in the healing of the blind man.

Son. Therefore, these symbols affirm their claims rigorously, with a rare exception (v. 4).

Another important aspect is that the symbols do not only reveal, but also conceal the transcendent concepts from those who cannot see beyond the symbols. “The effectiveness of the symbols is dependent on perception ... The symbols are used to enable the blind to see, but the meaning of the symbols can only be known by those who see that they point beyond themselves to the revealer and through him to God” (Painter 1986:54). In addition, Koester (1995:27) points out: “It has often been noted that the root meaning of the word *symbol* is ‘to put together’, and in John’s Gospel the symbols help to disclose how apparently contradictory ideas can be brought together” [Koester’s italics]. For example, the symbol of the light of the world is used to reconcile (or elucidate) the contradictory idea of acceptance and rejection evoked by the one who was sent by God (Koester 1995:28).

Hence, Johannine symbolism in John 9 is used effectively to communicate the author’s viewpoints to the reader.

1.4.4 Irony in John 9

Firstly, according to my analysis (cf. ‘Chart of irony in John 9’ in Appendix 6), there are many instances of irony in John 9. In fact, this Chapter features twenty-nine occurrences of irony altogether. This is sufficient proof that John 9 is rich in irony (Dodd [1953] 1985:357). *Secondly*, there are many situational ironies: twenty-four out of twenty-nine ironies. All these situational ironies can only be perceived on the text level, and the reader’s knowledge is a key to understanding these ironies.

Of all the situational ironies, dramatic irony is the most used form of irony in this Chapter, and occurs eight times. This irony can be perceived by the observer’s knowledge of what the victim has yet to find out. Out of eight instances, the Jewish authorities fall victim to irony five times, based on their ignorance about the miracle details (v. 15b), religious truth (v. 16b), Jesus’ identity (vv. 16a, 24) and their own spiritual state (v. 40). They are the major targets of Johannine irony. The neighbours turn out to be the victims once, concerning the identity of the healed man (v. 9b). The blind man also becomes the victim once regarding the identity of the Son of Man (v. 36). The most striking victim would be the reader (v. 21cd), for the reader is not meant to be the victim of irony in John’s Gospel (Culpepper 1983:179). In verse 21cd, unlike the author, narrator and characters, the reader does not know the specific reason for the parents’ answer.

The most remarkable phenomenon is that the Jewish authorities are the victims in four instances of irony of event and in seven instances of irony of self-betrayal. In ironies of event, the characters' utterances reveal what the Jewish authorities do not expect, nor desire. There was a schism among the Jewish authorities in verse 16c. They wanted to deny the miracle, but the parents' reply to their question established the reality of the miracle (v. 20). In verse 31, the blind man was teaching a religious truth to these religious authorities. In verse 34a, the authorities unconsciously reconfirmed the reality of the miracle healing in dismissing the blind man. In ironies of self-betrayal, the Jewish authorities' own utterances unconsciously reveal their own ignorance, weakness, errors or follies. They uncovered their ignorance of Jesus' identity (vv. 16a, 29), God's business (v. 24) and their own spiritual state (v. 40). They also revealed their errors in referring to Moses (v. 28) and to the blind man's sinfulness (v. 34a). They even exhibited their weakness that they could not determine an issue by themselves (v. 17a). These ironies silently penetrate the reader's mind, conveying the author's negative perspective on the Jewish authorities. The irony is indeed a powerful tool in the communication process.

The author's slightly different usage of irony, on the other hand, is evident in five instances of irony of dilemma. The Jewish authorities are made the target only twice in this irony, when they disagreed with the identification of the miracle worker (v. 16c) and when they were left with the responsibility of their own judgment (v. 21ab). The parents also experienced a dilemma and became the victims in this irony (vv. 21ab, 21cd). The blind man also had to choose between his own belief and politeness towards the Jewish authorities (v. 25).

In terms of the number of occurrences, verbal irony is not as significant as situational irony, of which there are only five instances in John 9. However, in terms of both function and effect of irony, verbal irony may be more significant than situational irony. From a speech act perspective, the striking feature of verbal irony would be that this type of ironic utterance has more than two illocutionary forces. Although Amante (1981:80) holds that "[i]ronic speech acts clearly are indirect speech acts", this study reveals that this is not entirely true (cf. also section 1.6 in Chapter 2). In fact, three out of five verbal ironies identified in John 9 are not indirect speech acts (vv. 16a, 30, 31). More than two illocutionary forces can be detected in these three ironies, and verbal irony in verse 31 even has four illocutionary forces.

The author (v. 16a), the blind man (vv. 27b, 30, 31) and Jesus (v. 41) use instances of verbal irony. As Duke (1982:188) and Culpepper (1983:175) indicate, the blind man is the typical and major *ἄρρω* in John 9. The ironies

of the blind man's wit and personality also develop as the story proceeds. The reader finds increasing strength and confidence in the man. On the contrary, the role of the Jewish authorities, as the *ἀλλοζων*, also gradually increases (Duke 1982:232; Culpepper 1983:175). It is remarkable that, in every instance, these verbal ironies target the Jewish authorities. These ironies mock and condemn the authorities and their perception about Jesus and their spiritual blindness. The author effectively uses these ironies to draw the reader's attention to the language used by the characters to strengthen the bond between the author and the reader.

Another significant point in the use of irony in John 9 is that, in some instances, the characters' utterances involve more than two kinds of irony. Verbal and situational ironies occur simultaneously in verses 16a and 31, whereas more than two situational ironies occur in verses 16a, 21ab, 21cd, 24, 34a and 40. Furthermore, as examined in my analysis, two verses comprise ironic expressions, but are not ironies themselves. Jesus uses the term *Son of Man* in verse 35, and Duke (1982:191) considers that this term "serves a crucial ironic function". However, it should be regarded as a device of puns on the term *man*. Although Bultmann (1971:340) finds irony in verse 39, my analysis indicates that Jesus' utterance in verse 39 merely contains an ironic and paradoxical expression and is thus not an instance of irony.

I examine the issue relating to the stability of Johannine irony in John 9, for this is an important issue in its interpretation (Culpepper 1996:194; Thatcher 1999:54ff.). My analysis indicates that all verbal ironies in John 9 are stable. These are intended, covert, fixed and finite. However, all situational ironies are construed as unstable ironies in the sense that there is basically no ironist and thus these are not intended. Viewed from a different angle, the author being the ultimate designer of these ironic situations, the result may not be the same (cf. Moore 1994:43-64; Thatcher 1999:54).

Extended irony in John 9, which the author designs throughout this cluster, concerns Jesus as judge.² Since the incident of the miracle, Jesus and the blind man were always on trial. In this trial, the Jewish authorities mainly played the role of judge. However, Jesus became the ultimate judge when he stated the purpose of his mission in verse 39. This fact represents strong irony that reflects negatively on the former judges, because the one whom they were judging was now the judge before them. Jesus as the judge passed his judgment on them (v. 41). Ironically, throughout this Chapter, as in John 8, these authorities were the opposite of what they thought (Ball 1996:85).

2 Concerning 'extended irony', this study follows Duke's (1982:66) definition.

Culpepper (1983:169-175) discusses and lists six major objects of John's irony. The first three objects, namely the rejection, origin and identity of Jesus,³ are well attested as far as John 9 is concerned. In fact, the fundamental irony of the Gospel, namely that the Jewish authorities rejected the Messiah they eagerly expected because they could not 'see' Jesus' real origin and identity, is also central to the irony of this Chapter (Culpepper 1983:169). As Duke (1982:191; cf. also Karris 1990:48) points out, the ironic aspect of John 9 is summarised in verse 39: "For judgment I came into this world, in order that those who do not see may see, and that those who see may become blind."

1.4.5 The motif of suffering in John 9

I shall examine how the motif of suffering is used as one of the author's communicative strategies to make this story more significant.

In my analysis (in section 1.3), a macroproposition for the entire John 9 is identified as follows: Jesus, the light of the world who came from God, manifests the works of God. This indicates, as Dockery (1988:14) points out, that the motifs of revelation and judgment that form the basis of the entire Gospel, are also essential to the story of John 9 (cf. Morris 1971:475). Therefore, admittedly, the motif of suffering is not the most important motif in this story. However, just as without bones a person cannot hold his entire body, he cannot move his body properly without muscles. Similarly, once the 'bones' (the motifs of revelation and judgment) of the narrative are identified, it is important to examine the 'muscles' that effectively 'move' the narrative. In this instance, the motif of suffering is used as 'muscles' to move the events of the narrative towards the author's desired end. This motif, which underlies the entire narrative (for this observation, cf. below), not only helps the reader comprehend more important motifs of revelation and judgment, but also brings excitement and thrill to the story. I shall briefly recapitulate these points, especially the latter one.

In 9:1, in the first cluster A, the theme of suffering is introduced from the outset in the narration that a man was born blind. In verse 2, the issue of suffering is described in the disciples' question concerning the link between sin and his blindness. Their question reflects the common Jewish understanding of suffering, and their negative perception should be corrected in the sense that this is not always necessarily the case. Otherwise, people would be trapped and forever suffer from this negative understanding. In verse 3, Jesus provides an alternative answer to this suffering issue. The blind man's suffering was not caused by sin, but was for the sake of God's work. To prove this, Jesus performed a healing sign

3 The last three objects are Jesus' ministry, Jesus' death, and discipleship.

on the man. Jesus' answer and miracle perfectly correspond to the third purpose, namely God's glory, of Boice's (1977:25) proposal (section 6 in Chapter 3).

Cluster B reports the harsh reality when the blind man had to sit and beg alongside the road (v. 8). This hardship is another instance of the motif of suffering in the story, and this suffering helps form the blind man's character. In the divided opinions among the neighbours (v. 9), the motif of suffering is in two forms. One is that the divided opinions may have caused unpleasant feelings in all the neighbours who participated in the controversy. The other is that some neighbours remained in a state of unbelief towards God's work, even after witnessing the healing of the blind man. This means that they would also remain in sin and darkness.

In cluster C, the blind man underwent the first interrogation by the Jews. The fact that the man was brought to the Jews in verse 13 reveals that his appearance before the authorities was not his idea. He was, to a certain extent, forced to appear before them in the trial setting. This indicates another instance of the motif of suffering. As the trial proceeded, their interrogation became serious and their attitude was considered to be hostile – first towards Jesus and, secondly, towards the blind man who was a witness for Jesus. In this instance, one should note the authorities' opposition; any opposition is linked to suffering on the part of the oppressed or criticised. This suffering is constructive in terms of the man's growth of faith (v. 15b). In verse 16, Jesus' work of revelation and judgment created an uncomfortable and critical situation among the Pharisees, for the schism set in. This indicates that they were also suffering in their own way. Since this suffering was a consequence of their own unbelief, this suffering could result in a corrective purpose.

Cluster D portrays the Jews' interrogation of the parents. The motif of suffering may be depicted most explicitly in this cluster. Three different ironies of dilemma in verse 21, in which the parents and the Jews are the victims of irony, indicate the occurrence of the motif of suffering. Their suffering may have a corrective purpose for them. The Jews' decision in verse 22 gives rise to the motif of suffering in two ways. For Jesus' followers, the decision was viewed as a fierce persecution against them. This suffering was meant to be constructive in that they were encouraged to attain a more adequate faith. From the Jews' perspective, they were also suffering, because they were required to make such an agreement against their once fellow synagogue members because of Jesus. From the Gospel's point of view, the Jews' suffering is corrective in that they might come back to the 'right faith' in the God of Israel.

In cluster C', the heated trial scene also provides some instances of the motif of suffering. This motif can be found in the actions and utterances of both the blind man and the Jews. Because of the intense debate, their attitudes and language also became fierce and aggressive. From the blind man's perspective, first, the fact that the man had to reappear in court is in itself indicative of the man's suffering. As pointed out earlier (in the section on 'CS' in 9:13), nobody enjoys being judged or having to testify in a trial in which the life of the person who helped him is at stake. This interrogation was not his first time. The man was then asked to testify to what he did not want to tell (v. 24) and was annoyed by the repeated question (v. 26). When he started arguing with the Jews (v. 27b), he was reviled (v. 28). It was perhaps a painful experience, thus implying the man's suffering. After he made his logical arguments, he was once again severely insulted and physically cast out (v. 34). If the blind man were meant to undergo suffering in this trial again, his suffering would have a constructive purpose, in that this suffering could strengthen the man's character. In fact, his personality and confidence developed. From the Jews' perspective, because of the parents' reply in the last cluster, the Jews had to interrogate their son again. In the process, they were challenged by the former blind beggar (v. 27b), and had to hear the man preach to them about matters on which they were supposed to be experts (vv. 30-33). This was perhaps a humiliating experience for them. In this sense, they also suffered at the trial. The motif of suffering is not always emphasised, but it silently underlies cluster C'.

In cluster B', there seems to be no significant instance of the motif of suffering because this cluster portrays the scene in which Jesus leads the blind man to attain a higher degree of faith. Nevertheless, verse 35 refers to the man's expulsion, thus implying his suffering.

Cluster A' compellingly picks up the motif of suffering. The purpose of Jesus' mission to this world is judgment, which separates people. Although the word *separation* itself implies the motif of suffering, the real suffering referred to in verse 39 is that of those who may become blind because of Jesus' judgment. The utmost suffering is further described in Jesus' verdict in verse 41, in which Jesus, who has the authority to judge, declared the Pharisees to be guilty in sin. Those who cannot see the Light will suffer in the fullest sense of the word.

From the above observations, it can be concluded that the motif of suffering indeed underlies the story of John 9. This motif not only helps the reader gain a better understanding of the motifs of revelation and judgment, but also profoundly enriches the story. The hypothesis proposed earlier (section 6 in Chapter 3), that the story will ultimately disclose that not only

the blind man but also other characters were suffering to some extent, is verified. This motif of suffering should be recognised as one of the author's important communicative strategies in the story of John 9.

1.4.6 Conclusion of the discussion of the communicative strategies used in John 9

By the form and content of this narrative, the author intends to depict how a person can become a true follower of Jesus. In addition, a Christian may deal and argue with his opponents, as is the case with the Jewish authorities in this instance. At the same time, the author intends to demonstrate how unbelief can lead a person to slip into darkness, even without recognising this 'fate'. The points that the author attempts to convey are designed to persuade the reader to develop a more adequate belief in Jesus by writing this brilliant piece of literature. The story of John 9 is indeed an affirmation and illustration of Jesus' self-revelation that he is the light of the world (John 8:12; 9:5).

2. SUPPLEMENT: PORTRAIT OF THE REAL READERS IN JOHN 9

Thus far, and particularly in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study, the focus of attention has been on the story of the blind man. As pointed out earlier (section 3.4 in Chapter 2), my contention is that this speech act analysis, as a literary approach, can suggest or identify similarities or parallels between the world of the story and the original historical world. The story's content and the way in which the story is told can shed light on the nature of the real readers and their historical situations.⁴ In this section, I shall pay attention to the real readers of John 9.⁵ In the process of discussion, the reader is taken as an index, even if only in approximation, of the real readers. However, I shall limit the discussion to that which can be suggested only from the text analysis of John 9. Therefore, I shall present the discussion based mainly on the reader's knowledge (or lack thereof) in the following areas: geography and language; Judaism; social setting, and tone of the narrative.

2.1 Geography and language

The text of John 9 itself is testimony that the real readers only know Greek. This is indicated by the translation of the word *Siloam* in 9:7, which further

4 For similar approaches, cf. Culpepper 1983:205-227; Kingsbury 1986:120-133.

5 The inference for the real author cannot be formulated, because John 9 alone does not provide sufficient information (cf. Tovey 1997:269-270).

suggests that the real readers do not know the significance of the meaning associated with the term. In addition, the term *Christ* instead of the term *Messiah* is employed in verse 22 for the real readers (cf. John 1:41). However, the real readers appear to have the ability to appreciate the use of symbolism (e.g., light, darkness, day, night, sight, blindness, water), themes and motifs (e.g., revelation, judgment, suffering), and irony.

2.2 Judaism and related Jewish beliefs and practice

A Jewish common belief on the relationship between sin and suffering is raised in 9:2. The allusion to the 'I am' sayings in 9:5 presupposes the real readers' extensive knowledge of the Old Testament, if its full significance is to be grasped. The real readers also understand, to some extent, the significance of breaking the Sabbath in 9:14-16. The arguments in the characters' debates in cluster C' reflect Jewish religious understanding. In verse 24, the Jews used an Old Testament oath formula, 'Give glory to God'. In verses 28-29, they proudly presented themselves as Moses' disciples. In verse 31, the expressions used by the blind man, "God does not hear sinners" and "God hears the righteous", are major Jewish beliefs and well attested by the Old Testament. The use of some special phrases, such as *prophet* in 9:17, *Christ* in 9:22 and *the Son of Man* in 9:35, also indicates the real readers' considerable knowledge of Jewish religious terminology. Briefly, the real readers appear to be very familiar with the Old Testament and Jewish thought based on the fact that these ideas are used in the text with hardly any explanation. Furthermore, the real readers understand that the dialogues portrayed in the text (e.g., clusters C, D, C') are conducted in the form of Jewish forensic proceedings. In addition, concerning the blind man's begging in verse 8, the real readers know that giving alms to the poor was a common Jewish practice.

2.3 Social setting

The text of John 9 strongly indicates that the social setting of the real readers was one of intense conflicts. This text analysis suggests that the synagogue ban described in 9:22 also refers to the historical situation in which the real readers found themselves in conflict with the Jewish synagogue. Painter (1986:49) also contends: "The evangelist's use of symbols was shaped in the struggle with the synagogue". The place of the real readers was perhaps both within and outside the synagogue. In other words, although some were already separated from the synagogue, others were still connected with it. There is ample evidence to support this. For example, there was a clear distance between Jesus' group and the Jewish authorities. This can be inferred from the fierce debate between the blind

man and the Jewish leaders in cluster C' (especially v. 28; Brown 1984:104) as well as from the dialogue between Jesus and the Pharisees in cluster A'. In addition, the text depicts people, like the parents, who could not openly separate themselves from the authorities. On the other hand, the example of the blind man serves to encourage those people to openly believe in Jesus (cf. Brown 1979:72).

2.4 Tone of the narrative – Jewish and Christian traits

It appears that all the characters in this Chapter are Jews. The Jews' decision in 9:22 was directed at members of the Jewish synagogue who would confess Jesus as the Christ. There is no reference either to the Gentiles (cf. John 12:20; 18:28ff.) or to the Samaritans (cf. John 4). Jesus was always at the centre of their discussions. In the text, he is progressively described as Jesus as the man, a prophet, the man who came from God, the Son of Man and Lord. In particular, the blind man's confession of believing in Jesus in 9:38 and calling Jesus Lord strongly indicates a Christian character. A seemingly anti-Jewish tone displayed in Jesus' judgment, which he passed on the Pharisees in 9:41, may imply the Gospel's favour for Christians.

Based on these observations, the real readers of John 9 would most likely be Jewish Christians who were in conflict with the synagogue.⁶ A macrospeech act for the entire John 9, which was analysed earlier (section 1.3), is aimed at these Jewish Christians. The perlocution of this macrospeech act is, therefore, to persuade the readers to accept the challenge to continue to believe in Jesus for their own sake. Duke (1982:235) is of the opinion that "the Gospel is written to confirm and strengthen faith, to inspire ongoing fidelity, and – in Vouga's phrase – "to persuade believers to become Christians"". Brown (1966:lxxv) cites the blind man as the hero in John 9 – "John is inviting the Jewish Christians in the Diaspora synagogues to follow his example" (cf. also Von Wahlde 1995:382). These views correspond to a commonly held conclusion relating to the Gospel that "John was written for a particular community of believers" (Culpepper 1983:225).⁷ Hence, this study has managed to suggest the life situation of the Johannine Christians who were in conflict with the synagogue, by examining the language used in the story. One qualification is, however, that the result of this study restricts this life situation not only to that of John's

6 Cf. also Martyn [1968] 1979:50-62; Brown 1979:71-73; Karris 1990:104; Stibbe 1993:112-113; Du Rand 1994:59; Koester 1996:9; Kysar 2002:24; Klink 2007:202.

7 Bauckham (1998:147-73) states that the readership of John's Gospel might be "the broad collectively of believers in Christ". Cf. also Bauckham's (2007:113ff.) discussion.

own day. As indicated in the text analysis on 9:22 (cf. also section 6.1.2 in Chapter 4), my view is that John 9 is a two-level drama in the sense that it aims to simultaneously describe the life situations of both Jesus (including his immediate followers) and the Johannine community.

3. EVALUATION OF THE METHOD USED IN THE STUDY

This study explored *The story of Jesus and the blind man: A speech act reading of John 9*. Its main purpose was to make a detailed analysis of the text of John 9 from a speech act perspective, emphasising the function of language, and to observe whether or not this analysis also conveys acceptable and valid results as an interpretation of the text. In order to accomplish this purpose, I set up a methodological framework in Chapter 2. The aim of this chapter was to present the major concepts of speech act theory, some important insights from other approaches for complementing this method, some advantages and disadvantages of speech act analysis, my contributions, and my reading scheme (section 3.4 in Chapter 2). Chapters 3 and 4 constitute a practical application of this speech act approach to the text of John 9. In chapter 3, a contextual survey was conducted with regard to key notions such as 'Appropriate Conditions', 'the Cooperative Principle and Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics', 'Linguistic Assumptions', 'Mutual Contextual Beliefs', 'Johannine Symbolism' and 'the Motif of Suffering'. Chapter 4 examined in great detail the communication that takes place on both the story and the text levels of John 9. Although this analysis does not explain all the aspects of this communication, it has scrutinised at least most of the important aspects in the communication process and represented a speech act reading of the text. It has analysed how the author, by virtue of the narrator and characters, organises language so that the reader may recognise his intention and meaning and his intended result be achieved on the reader. The sections on 'General Analysis', 'Illocutionary Act', 'Perlocutionary Act', 'Communicative Strategy' and 'Macrospeech Acts in the Story of John 9' were used for this particular analysis.

3.1 Positive points

As an evaluation of the method, in light of the analysis conducted thus far, *a speech act approach could be regarded as a useful exegetical approach* for the following reasons. *Firstly*, this analysis demonstrated the validity of such an approach and developed it further in the reading of a biblical text. In fact, the result of this analysis coincides with a widely accepted view concerning the Gospel's purpose, as pointed out in section 2. *Secondly*, as postulated earlier in the section on 'Approach of the study' (cf. section 3.4

in Chapter 2), speech act theory is, in my opinion, one of the best ways among modern literary methods in approaching a narrative story such as John 9, where the dynamics of human communication is vividly portrayed in the way in which the interactions between characters often display an intriguing human drama by virtue of their individual utterances with intentions, emotions and subtle nuances. For instance, communicative strategy used in John 9 was elucidated more comprehensively and systematically than previously, as shown in the analysis of the use of Interpersonal and Textual Rhetorics, symbolism, irony, motif, and so on. *Thirdly*, the concept of macrospeech acts was successfully used in order to identify important meanings of some sequences of microspeech acts, every dialogue scene as well as the entire Chapter. *In addition*, this speech act approach has shown the possibility of simultaneously using historical and literary approaches in a moderate way. In the process of its text analysis, historical data was integrated as historical contexts to help explore the meanings of given texts. After completing the text analysis, I suggested a possible situation of the original-historical world (section 2).

Hence, this study has indicated that a speech act approach can elicit a fresh appreciation of biblical texts such as John 9 and contribute to a better understanding thereof.

3.2 Points for improvement

Although, as evaluated in the last subsection, the method used in this study proves to be a useful exegetical approach, it does have aspects that can be elaborated on and/or improved in the future. The following paragraphs address these aspects.

As far as the studies of John 9 are concerned, *firstly*, historical investigation seems to reach a dead end in identifying the exact historical event described in verse 22. However, this does not necessarily mean that no more evidence can be found. The exploration for more reliable evidence may still be a topic for future studies. The more reliable evidence we have, the better we can determine the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in the text.

Secondly, this study suggested an experimental outline for identifying and describing irony in John 9. This outline is designed to be as practical and as concise as possible, and it appears to work very well when examining ironies used in John 9. However, since irony is a very dynamic and rich literary device, it is impossible to describe every aspect of the nature and function of irony in such a concise outline. It may be expected that a better analytical framework for the scrutiny of irony in literature can be produced in the future.

Thirdly, the approach offered in this study is by no means an attempt to nullify or replace all other methods of exegesis. Since speech act theory can generate various ways in approaching biblical texts, this study intended to provide and has offered a useful example of the possibilities. This study attempted to present a satisfactory method. However, there could be room for refinement and improvement in this example. For instance, there may be ways in which to reduce technical terms for an easy adoption of this approach by other exegetes.

Fourthly, as mentioned earlier (in the section on 'CS' in 9:16b), a paradoxical relationship between an indirect speech act and a rhetorical question could be investigated further. An indirect speech act normally violates the Manner Maxim, because ambiguity in the sense of deniability is inherent in its nature (for a detailed discussion, cf. the section on 'CS' in 9:8b). However, a rhetorical question, which can be construed as an indirect speech act, is conventionally used as an emphatic declaration; this does not go well with ambiguity. In this sense, should a rhetorical question not be treated as an indirect speech act, or as an exception to the notion of indirect speech acts?

Fifthly, as far as indirect speech acts are concerned, scholars suggest that their use is generally motivated by the speaker's politeness (Searle [1979] 1981:36; Leech 1983:108; Yule 1996:56; 9:25, 27a). However, my text analysis reveals that this is not always the case. For instance, the indirect speech act performed by the neighbours was motivated by the uncertainty caused by their astonishment (9:8b). Their motivation for its use was an attempt at effectiveness in their language for the sake of persuasion (9:16b). The motivation for the Jews' use thereof was their strategy to exert some pressure on the blind man (9:24). The Pharisees' usage appeared to be triggered by their uncertainty about their own self-image (9:40). In light of these results, possible motivation for the use of indirect speech acts can be elaborated on and explored further (cf. Levinson 1983:356-364; Leech 1983:23-24).

Finally, as noted earlier (in sections 1.2 and 3.2 in Chapter 2), it is often difficult to classify speech acts. In fact, there are cases where this study has to be satisfied with the present taxonomy, even if this means that provisional conclusions do not perfectly suit any of the suggested categories (e.g., 9:27b), and where a new category needed to be created (e.g., 9:41). Although it seems to be impossible to present a perfect taxonomy that can describe all kinds of speech acts, there is certainly room for improvement in this area.

APPENDIX 1

DIAGRAMS OF TAXONOMY OF SPEECH ACTS

Terms and definitions are taken from Bach and Harnish 1979.

a) Communicative illocutionary acts¹

These “are acts of expressing attitudes” (1979:116). To express an attitude means for speaker to *R(reflexive)-intend* the hearer to take speaker’s utterance as reason to believe that the speaker has the attitude (1979:15, 57).

b) Conventional illocutionary acts

These speech acts “effect changes in institutional states of affairs” (1979:110). They “are identified by the speaker’s utterance and the conditions of utterance, with R-intention unnecessary” (1979:118). “A convention is a mutually recognized means for doing something, counting as such only because mutually recognized” (1979:109).

Effectives	They bring forth facts in “utterances that, when issued by the right person under the right circumstances, make it the case that such and such. This is a matter not of causality but of mutual belief” (1979:113).	E.g., to appoint, to ordain, to suspend, to resign
Verdictives	They are “determinations of facts, natural or institutional, which have official consequence” (1979:113). They are “judgments that by convention have official, binding import in the context of the institution in which they occur” (1979:111).	E.g., to call a runner out, to find a defendant guilty
	Essentially, they are “acts of appraising, assessing, grading, ranking, and estimating the value of something” (1979:112).	E.g., to convict, to certify, to clear

1 See next page.

a) Communicative illocutionary acts

Constatives	The expressions of “the speaker’s belief and his intention or desire that the hearer have or form a like belief” (1979:41).	Assertives	Retractives
		Predictives	Assentives
		Retrodictives	Dissentives
		Descriptives	Disputatives
		Ascriptives	Responsives
		Informatives	Suggestives
		Confirmatives	Suppositives
		Concessives	
		Requestives	Prohibitives
		Questions	Permissives
Directives	The expressions of “the speaker’s attitude toward some prospective action by the hearer and his intention that his utterance, or the attitude it expresses, be taken as a reason for the hearer’s action” (1979:41).	Requirements	Advisories
		Promises	
		Offers	
Commissives	The expressions of “the speaker’s intention and belief that his utterance obligates him to do something (perhaps under certain conditions)” (1979:41).	Apologise	Thank
		Condole	Bid
Acknowledgements	The expressions of the speaker’s feeling toward “the hearer or, in cases where the utterance is clearly perfunctory or formal, the speaker’s intention that his utterance satisfy a social expectation to express certain feelings and his belief that it does” (1979:41).	Congratulate	Accept
		Greet	Reject

APPENDIX 2

DIAGRAM OF INTERPERSONAL AND TEXTUAL RHETORICS: FULL VERSION

The following diagram has been prepared for this study. Terms and definitions are taken from Grice 1975:45-46 and Leech1983:22-147, unless otherwise stated.

INTERPERSONAL RHETORIC		Maxims	Definitions and/or explanations
Cooperative Principle (CP)	Quantity	Be economical. a) "Make your contribution as informative as is required." b) "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required."	Be sincere. Be true. a) "Do not say what you believe to be false." b) "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence."
	Quality		
	Relation		"Be relevant." "Make your conversational contribution one that will advance the goals either of yourself or of your addressee."
	Manner	Be clear, or explicit (perspicuous). a) "Avoid obscurity of expression." b) "Avoid ambiguity." c) "Be brief." d) "Be orderly."	
Politeness Principle (PP)	Tact	"a) Minimize cost to other. b) Maximize benefit to other."	
	Generosity	"a) Minimize benefit to self. b) Maximize cost to self."	

INTERPERSONAL RHETORIC	
Approbation	<p>Maxims</p> <p>Definitions and/or explanations</p> <p>“a) Minimize dispraise of other. b) Maximize praise of other.”</p>
	<p>Modesty</p> <p>“a) Minimize praise of self. b) Maximize dispraise of self.”</p>
	<p>Agreement</p> <p>“a) Minimize disagreement between self and other. b) Maximize agreement between self and other.”</p>
	<p>Sympathy</p> <p>“a) Minimize antipathy between self and other. b) Maximize sympathy between self and other.”</p>
	<p>Phatic</p> <p>“a) Avoid silence. b) Keep talking.”</p>
	<p>Irony Principle (IP)</p> <p>“[I]rony is an apparently friendly way of being offensive (mock-politeness)”. “If you must cause offense, at least do so in a way which doesn’t overtly conflict with the PP.” Allow the hearer to grasp your offensive point by implicature. “The ironic force of a remark is often signaled by exaggeration or understatement”. Exaggeration (hyperbole) and understatement (litotes or meiosis) are “actually used to deceive the addressee”. The function of the IP is to keep “aggression away from the brink of conflict”. The implicature of the IP: What s says is polite to h and is clearly not true. Therefore what s really means is impolite to h and true. “The ironic force of a remark is often signaled by exaggeration or understatement”. Exaggeration (hyperbole) and understatement (litotes or meiosis) are “actually used to deceive the addressee”.</p>

	Maxims	Definitions and/or explanations
		<p>The function of the IP is to keep “aggression away from the brink of conflict”.</p> <p>The implicature of the IP: What <i>s</i> says is polite to <i>h</i> and is clearly not true. Therefore what <i>s</i> really means is impolite to <i>h</i> and true.</p>
Banter Principle (BP)		<p>Banter “is an offensive way of being friendly (mock-impoliteness)”.</p> <p>Underpoliteness “can have the opposite effect of establishing or maintaining a bond of familiarity”.</p> <p>The “more intimate the relationship, the less important it is to be polite. Hence lack of politeness in itself can become a sign of intimacy”.</p> <p>The implicature of the BP (the opposite of that of IP): “What <i>s</i> says is impolite to <i>h</i> and is clearly untrue. Therefore what <i>s</i> really means is polite to <i>h</i> and true”.</p>
Interest Principle		<p>“Say what is unpredictable, and hence interesting ... [C]onversation which is interesting, in the sense of having unpredictability or news value, is preferred to conversation which is boring and predictable” (cf. Tellability).</p>
Pollyanna Principle		<p>It “means postulating that participants in a conversation will prefer pleasant topics of conversation to unpleasant ones”. (This elucidates the motivation for litotes.)</p> <p>It uses terms such as <i>a bit</i>, <i>a little</i>, <i>rather</i>, when minimising adverbials of degree .</p> <p>“The negative aspect of this principle is ... EUPHEMISM: one can disguise unpleasant subjects by referring to them by means of apparently inoffensive expressions” (e.g., pass away = die).</p>
Morality Principle (This could be a Maxim.)		<p>“The speaker (in speaking) behaves morally, that is, S:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> does not reveal information he ought not reveal, does not ask for information he should not have, does not direct <i>H</i> to do/tell something <i>H</i> should not do/tell, does not commit himself to do something for <i>H</i> that <i>H</i> does not want done” (1979:64).
INTERPERSONAL RHETORIC		

TEXTUAL RHETORIC		Maxims	Definitions and/or explanations
Processibility Principle			“[T]he text should be presented in a manner that makes it easy for the hearer to decode in time. A text (in contrast to a message) is essentially linear and time-bound”. This principle also applies “to syntactic and semantic aspects of the text”.
		End-Focus	“[I]f the rules of the language allow it, the part of a clause which contains new information should be placed at the end.”
		End-Weight	It “induces a syntactic structure in which ‘light’ constituents precede ‘heavy’ ones”.
		End-Scope	“[L]ogical operators such as a negative operator or a quantifier precede, rather than follow, the elements (including other logical operators) which are within their scope”.
Clarity Principle		This “Principle might be regarded as subordinate to the Processibility Principle”.	
		Transparency	“Retain a direct and transparent relationship between semantic and phonological structure (i.e. between message and text)”.
Economy Principle		Ambiguity	“Avoid ambiguity”.
			“If one can shorten the text while keeping the message unimpaired, this reduces the amount of time and effort involved both in encoding and in decoding. As this description implies, the Economy principle is continually at war with the Clarity principle”.

TEXTUAL RHETORIC		Definitions and/or explanations
Maxims	Reduction	<p>“Reduce where possible”:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. by pronominalisation, b. by substitution by other pro-forms, e.g., do, so, c. by ellipsis (or deletion).
Expressivity Principle	Iconicity	<p>This is “concerned with effectiveness in a broad sense which includes expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication, rather than simply with efficiency”. This principle operates because of “expressive repetition, where the emphasis of repetition has some rhetorical value such as surprising, impressing, or rousing the interest of the addressee”.</p> <p>It “invites the user, all other things being equal, to make the text imitate aspects of the message”.</p>

APPENDIX 3

The analytical outline for ironic speech acts: Short version

A. PRELIMINARY STEPS FOR IDENTIFYING IRONIC UTTERANCES

When you notice that something is not right or true in the literal interpretation (meaning) in an utterance, is there any clue to interpret it differently?

- i. Use some form of the word 'irony'.
- ii. Is there any indication of some contradictions?
 1. In the relationship between text and context.
 2. In the relationship between text and co-text.
 3. In the relationship between text and text.
- iii. Can you suspect any violation of the sincerity conditions, especially of the Quality Maxim?
- iv. Can you suspect any violation of other Maxims?
- v. Are there more than two illocutionary forces in the utterance?
- vi. Does the utterance observe the Irony Principle?
- vii. Is there any interpreter of the text who suggests or suspects that the utterance is ironic?

If the answer to any of the above questions is 'yes', the utterance may be further analysed using the following steps to determine whether or not it is an ironic speech act.

B. VERIFYING STEPS FOR IDENTIFYING IRONIC UTTERANCES

Go through all the steps below, unless otherwise stated.

- i. Identify three participants, considering the two levels of communication (the story and the text levels): Ironist, Observers, and Target (or Victim).
- ii. Classify the utterance according to the types of irony:
 1. Verbal irony
 2. Situational irony:
 - a. Dramatic irony

- b. Irony of self-betrayal
 - c. Irony of events
 - d. Irony of dilemma
- iii. Find the nature of oppositions (choose one according to the irony concerned):
 - 1. Counterfactual, propositional or lexical oppositions.
 - 2. Pragmatic opposition (any violation of Maxims/conditions).
- iv. If the utterance falls into the category of situational irony, skip step iv) and directly go to step v). If the utterance falls into the category of verbal irony, test it by applying the following ironic speech-act conditions:
 - 1. Prove it using Propositional Content Conditions.
 - 2. Prove it using Preparatory Conditions.
 - 3. Prove it using Sincerity Conditions.
 - 4. Prove it using Essential Conditions.
- v. Classify the utterance according to the speech-act taxonomy.
- vi. What is the speaker's intended meaning or message?


If the utterance is successfully analysed according to the above steps, it can be concluded that the utterance is ironical.


C. FINAL STEP IN IDENTIFYING IRONICAL UTTERANCES


Determine what perlocutionary act this ironic utterance performs. Or, how does this ironic utterance function in the particular text?


APPENDIX 4


Structural analysis chart for John 9











APPENDIX 5

Diagram of speech acts used in John 9

		On the story level			On the text level			
		Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Verdictives
Cluster A								
9:01	N				informative			
9:02	CO		question					
9:03	CJ	responsive						
9:04	CJ		requirement	promise				
9:05	CJ	confirmative						
9:06	N				informative			
w	CJ		requirement					
9:7b	N				informative			
MA		assertive			informative			
Cluster B								
9:8a	N				informative			
9:8b	CO	suggestive	(question)					
9:9a	CO	assertive						
9:9b	CO	dissentive						
9:9c	CB	confirmative						
9:10	CO		question					
9:11	CB	responsive						
9:12a	CO		question					
9:12b	CB	responsive						
MA		N/A			confirmative			

Abbreviations: N: narrator, CJ: Jesus (C: character), CB: the blind man, CA: the Jewish authorities, CO: the other characters, MA: macrospeech act of the section.

In the case of indirect speech acts, the secondary illocutionary act is placed in parenthesis.

Mark * indicates that the particular speech act involves two utterances.

		On the story level			On the text level			
		Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Verdictives
		Cluster C						
9:13	N				informative			
9:14	N				informative			
9:15a	N				informative			
9:15b	CB	responsive						
9:16a	CA	confirmative			assertive			
9:16b	CA	disputative	(question)					
9:16c	N				informative			
9:17a	CA		question					
9:17b	CB	responsive						
MA		descriptive			informative			
		Cluster D						
9:18	N				informative			
9:19	CA	assertive	question					
9:20	CO	responsive						
9:21ab	CO	responsive & assertive				concessive		
9:21cd	CO		requestive					
9:22	N				informative			
9:23	N					informative & confirmative		
MA		N/A			informative			

		On the story level			On the text level			
		Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Constatives	Directives	Commissives	Verdictives
Cluster C'								
9:24	CA	requirement (*assertive)						
9:25	CB	dissentive (assertive)						
9:26	CA	requestive (question)						
9:27a	CB	responsive (*assertive/question)						
9:27b	CB	requestive (question)						
9:28	CA	disputative & responsive						
9:29	CA	disputative & assertive						
9:30	CB	descriptive, disputative & assertive						
9:31	CB	informative, descriptive, assertive & disputative						
9:32	CB	confirmative & disputative						
9:33	CB	confirmative & assertive (suggestive)						
9:34a	CA	dissentive & assertive (*question)						
9:34:b	N			informative				
MA		N/A		confirmative				
Cluster B'								
9:35	CJ		question					
9:36	CB		question					
9:37	CJ	responsive & assertive, confirmative						
9:38a	CB	responsive & assertive						
9:38b	N			informative				
MA			advisory		advisory			
Cluster A'								
9:39	CJ	assertive						
9:40	CA	assertive (question)						
9:41	CJ	responsive (confirmative)						(divine verdictive)
MA		confirmative		informative				divine verdictive

APPENDIX 6

Chart of irony in John 9

		On the story level	On the text level			
Utterances		Verbal irony	Dramatic irony	Irony of events	I. of self-betrayal	I. of dilemma
Cluster A						
Cluster B						
9:9b	CO		X			
Cluster C						
9:15b	CB		X			
9:16a	CA	X-no ISA but 2IF	X		X	
9:16b	CA		X			
9:16c	N			X		X
9:17a	CA				X	
Cluster D						
9:20	CO			X		
9:21ab	CO					X X
9:21cd	CO		X			X
Cluster C'						
9:24	CA		X		X	
9:25	CB					X
9:27b	CB	X- ISA				
9:28	CA				X	
9:29	CA				X	
9:30	CB	X-no ISA but 3IF				
9:31	CB	X-no ISA but 4IF		X		
9:34a	CA			X	X	
Cluster B'						
9:35	CJ	*(X)				
9:36	CB		X			
Cluster A'						
9:39	CJ	*(X)				
9:40	CA		X		X	
9:41	CJ	X-ISA				
Subtotal		5	8	4	7	5
Total				29		

Abbreviations: N: narrator; CJ: Jesus (C: character); CB: the blind man; CA: the Jewish authorities; CO: the other characters; ISA: indirect speech act; IF: illocutionary force.

Mark *() indicates a possible occurrence of irony, but it is not irony according to my analysis.

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