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The urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare

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Declaration

I, **Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa**, declare that the thesis that I herewith submit for the degree *Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in Development Studies* at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.



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26 June 2023

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Dedication

This thesis dedication is to:

My Mother Margaret

*A strong and gentle soul who taught me to trust and believe
in challenging work and that so much
could be done with so little.*

My Daughter Tanatswa

*The reason for my existence
Go forth and pursue your educational dreams.
Live life to the fullest and make your educational journey second to none.*

Abstract

Street trading is critical for urban-based livelihoods, especially with increasing urbanisation and limited jobs in the formal sector. Vendingscapes are socioeconomically and politically contested lived-in spaces with repression and violent occurrences. Studies that look at street trading have tended to focus on the economic and monetary aspects of the sector. This study is unique because it investigates the value of the sustainable livelihoods approach, a framework commonly applied in rural contexts to explore street traders shaping their livelihoods within macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties. The focus is on the lived experiences and responses to government brutality. The five sustainable livelihood approach tenets – the vulnerability context, assets, policies, institutions, processes (PIPs), livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes – were analysed from the street traders’ perspective.

The study used a case study design with a qualitative approach. The data collection techniques included key informant interviews, semi-structured interviews to allow vendors to express their lived experiences, non-participant observation, systematic actions and behaviours measurement and archival data analysis, including policy analysis. Thematic data analysis occurred throughout the study, showing emerging patterns and relationships.

The study concluded that street trading in Harare is thriving amid an intensifying everyday struggle. Vendors are becoming more uncertain and vulnerable as Zimbabwe sinks into socioeconomic turmoil due to foreign currency crises, increasing isolation, poverty, runaway inflation, tax evasion and unemployment, among many challenges that increase the vulnerability context and informality. Zimbabwe should enact informal sector-specific legislation as vendors show their agency by minimising the risks of arrest and confiscating goods. The study’s main contribution is a detailed analysis of vendors’ livelihood strategies that circumvent government brutality.

Keywords: capability; informal sector; livelihood; sustainable livelihoods approach; sustainable livelihoods framework; vendor

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CA	Capability approach
CBD	Central business district
CCC	Citizens for coalition change
CoH	City of Harare
DFID	Department of International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
GDI	Gender-related development index
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEM	Gender empowerment measure
GII	Gender inequality index
GNI	Gross national income
GNP	Gross national product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HCC	Harare City Council
HDI	Human Development Index
HMP	Harare Municipal Police
HRT	Harare Residents' Trust
ICT	Information and communication technologies
IE	Informal Economy
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IS	Informal Sector
MDC–T	Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NDS	National Development Strategy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSSA	National Social Security Authority
OHS	Occupational health and safety
OM	Operation Murambatsvina
PIPs	Policies, institutions, and processes
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RTCP	Regional Town and Country Planning Act
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme

SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SLA	Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
SLF	Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
UCA	Urban Councils Act
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	United States dollar
VAZ	Vendors Association of Zimbabwe
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WIEGO	Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front
ZimAsset	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socioeconomic Transformation
ZimStat	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZWL	Zimbabwean dollar

Chapter 1

SETTING THE SCENE

1.1 Background

The informal sector is a universal phenomenon that holds opportunities and challenges in the global south and global north . The definition of the informal sector is illusionary, the study focuses on the main characteristics of the informal sector i) no formal registration ii) difficult to measure iii) easily hit by pandemics like Covid-19 especially women iv) important for socioeconomic development and v) safety net for the marginalised (WIEGO, 2022; Recchi, 2021) [see 1.8]. Reasons for the development of the informal sector in Africa include limited economic development (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007), limited expansion opportunities in the formal sector (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2018), structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing [WIEGO], 2014), political instability and environmental degradation (World Bank, 2016). However, the informal sector often serves as a safety net for marginalised people (Chen, 2006, 2020). More than 90% of all new jobs created in Africa are informal (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2018). The informal sector is not capital-intensive, does not require high-level skills and absorbs poor people (Chen and Carré, 2020; ILO, 2002). The informal sector in Africa is heterogeneous as agricultural activities, self-employment and women are dominant (Chen, 2018; Maloney, 2004).

Informality is a permanent feature of many economies (Schneider and Enste, 2003). Africa's informal economy is big business. For example, the informal economy contributes to 72% of total employment (ILO, 2020) and 75% of the non-agricultural employment in sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2018). In the 1990s, approximately 93% of new jobs created in Africa were in the informal sector, contributing to 41% of the gross domestic product (GDP) (ILO, 2016). However, there is a wide variation among countries. For example, the informal sector contributes under 30% of the GDP in South Africa and above 60% in Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (ILO, 2020). Often, governments and multilateral institutions like the World Bank and ILO undervalue the role of the informal economy and, in some cases, actively prevent it from developing (ILO, 2018). However, the informal sector alleviates poverty and contributes to economic productivity (Chen, 2018; Fourie, 2018).

1.2 Government responses to the informal sector

Despite the socioeconomic and political contribution of the informal sector, the responses from governments vary. African states often repress the informal sector (ILO, 2018). For example, the Ghanaian government has many repressive strategies, like continuing the colonial-era municipal by-laws. Opposition to informality is sometimes violent in the global south (WIEGO, 2022).

Many factors drive the antagonism to informality: child labour, dismissal without notice and compensation, forced overtime, limited or no social benefits like health insurance, low job security, low wages, non-payment of decent wages, unsafe working conditions and tax evasion (Chen, 2012, 2018; Williams, 2004). The informal sector and urbanisation link as people move to urban areas. Informality shapes African cities spatially (Kamete, 2020). The absorption of the educated into the informal sector led Fantu Cheru (2002:16), an eminent political economist, to observe that

a closer look at the Informal sector in Africa provides a glimpse of achievements if Africa's economies' financial policies were more attuned to the continent's everyday realities.

The informal sector is community-based (with indigenous management, entrepreneurial and employment practices), and its forms of organisational hierarchy, internal hierarchies and rules resist and defy state domination. Some African governments now incorporate the informal sector in their planning (Cheru, 2022). For example, the informal sector is undergoing reformation and regulation overhaul in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The authorities have designated space for weekend markets on streets with low traffic, kiosk construction on various corners, registered and licensed vendors to protect their rights and interests, and provided alternative open spaces for entrepreneurs displaced from the street, roadsides, and markets (Cheru, 2022). Often, displacements lead to revolts (IMF, 2018); therefore, the Addis Ababa example provides a progressive approach to accepting the informal sector. To formalise the informal sector in Uganda, the Ugandan government developed a simplified registration process and a one-stop registration service, significantly reducing the registration process (ILO, 2018).

1.3 Informal sector in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has gone through socioeconomic and political crises over the last two decades. Some scholars argue that this is due to the country's internal mismanagement of the economy

and politics (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011; Rogerson, 2016), while others bring in external factors interfering with the internal processes of Zimbabwe (Ndawana, 2022). Informality in Zimbabwe is a strategy for privatisation, liberalisation, and limited job opportunities in the formal sector (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011; Njaya, 2014). Informality growth is due to the economic meltdown in the country (from 1999 to date) and economic structural adjustment programmes (1991–1995). The structural adjustment programmes have led to civil service retrenchment, industrial collapse and decay, substantial layoffs, unbudgeted costs for war veterans' appeasement, and associated inflation (Dube and Chirisa, 2012). The Zimbabwean military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) worsened the precarious situation, leading to budgetary constraints, overspending, and spiral inflation (IMF, 2017). More than 90% of Zimbabwe's economy is informal, the second highest after Bolivia (ILO, 2018).

In Zimbabwe, the informal sector contributes 48% to the GDP and 42% to national employment (ILO, 2020). In Harare, 58% of employment is in the informal sector, with more than 50 000 being daily informal traders (ILO, 2018). Within this context, people have to secure their livelihoods under harsh realities. In Harare, people face many challenges, including economic decline, poverty, and formal unemployment (Dube and Chirisa, 2012). One way the urban people are coping and adapting is through informal sector trading. Thousands of vendors occupy the streets of Harare. The government views it as a danger, a political problem, and an economic nuisance. The City of Harare (CoH) views the informal sector as not complying with the country's laws, especially Harare's by-laws.

A wide range of research has been done on the informal sector in Zimbabwe which include:

- doing a SWOT ([S]trengths, [W]eaknesses, [O]pportunities, and [T]hreats) analysis of challenges faced by women involved in informal cross-border trade in Mutare (Manjokoto and Ranga, 2017);
- discussing the formalisation of the informal sector in Zimbabwe (Uzhenyu, 2015);
- analysing the effects of the informal sector on water, sanitation, and hygiene service provision in Norton, a commuter town, 40 km west of Harare (Shekede, 2016);
- assessing the impact of the informal sector on the current Zimbabwean economic environment (Chidoko et al., 2011);
- linking Harare and Johannesburg through informal cross-border entrepreneurship (Tawodzera and Chikanda, 2017);

- mapping spatial locational trends of informal economic enterprises in Harare (Gumbo et al., 2020);
- reflecting on the multistakeholder dialogue on formal and informal forms of public transport in Harare (Mbara et al., 2014);
- analysing the resistance and resilience of informal traders in Bulawayo (Moyo, 2018);
- discussing tax evasion in the informal sector (Masarirambi, 2013);
- assessing the scope, variants, and direction of the informal sector in the economy of Harare (Dube and Chirisa, 2012);
- promoting the informal sector as a means of sustainable development (Mbiriri, 2010) and job creation (Njaya, 2015); and
- integrating vocational skills and knowledge systems at the Magaba informal metal industries in Zimbabwe (Muchabaiwa, 2012).

However, these studies have only partially focused on the role of the informal sector in creating urban livelihoods. The researchers pointed out that the informal sector exists and warrants attention particularly street vending. Street vending is the public retail or wholesale trading of goods and services from one or several fixed places in streets and related public axes, e.g., alleyways, avenues, and boulevards (Urban Councils Act of Zimbabwe, 2002). This thesis uses interchangeably street vendors, peddlers, hawkers, street practitioners, informal traders or street traders.

Research confirmed that vending has diverse challenges, with the two main challenges an economic meltdown and the colonial urban by-laws that have remained the same since independence in 1980 (Dube and Chirisa, 2012; Kamete, 2017; World Bank, 2017).

1.4 Research problem and research question

The above background emphasised the importance of government responses to the informal sector. Responses from the government towards the informal sector in many parts of Africa and, more specifically, in Zimbabwe have been inappropriate. These responses do not account for the informal sector as a mitigating factor to the economic decline. Also, it contributes to the informal economy's growth by mismanaging the formal economy, colonial by-laws, and renewed attempts to force the informal sector off the streets (Al-Jundi, 2022; Njaya, 2015).

Vending in Zimbabwe dates back to the colonial era when it was prohibited. There are historical and operational challenges of street trading . Irrespective of the changing socioeconomic and political circumstances, colonial laws and by-laws are still used. Existing examples include the Town and Country Planning Act of 1946, the Urban Councils Act of 1973 (with minor revisions in 1995/6), the Vagrancy Act of 1960, and the Vendors and Hawkers By-laws of 1973 and 2013. These laws do not consider the informal sector to create urban livelihoods for thousands of informal traders. The literature reviews also provided an overview of the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) to understand the complexity of urban livelihoods. The following research question guided the study:

How do informal sector practitioners in Harare's central business district shape their livelihoods to deal with the uncertainties related to the macroeconomy and the regulation of informal traders?

1.5 Aims and objectives of the study

The overall aim of the study was to investigate the value of the SLA for studying the informal sector and how vendors in Harare's central business district (CBD) shape their livelihoods within the context of the macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties. Considering the overall aim, the objectives of the study were formulated as follows:

1. To **assess** the role of the informal sector in Africa and the response of governments over the past 50 years.
2. To **analyse** various theoretical approaches toward the study of the informal sector in Africa and the potential of the sustainable livelihoods approach as a tool for studying the informal sector.
3. To **examine** the policy approaches to street vendors in Harare since the 1960s.
4. To **describe** the nature and scale of street vending in Harare.
5. To **evaluate** the following aspects of the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) among street vendors in Harare:
 - 5.1 The vulnerability context within which street vendors find themselves.
 - 5.2 The assets street vendors create or build on.
 - 5.3 The policies, institutions and processes that street vendors need to overcome.
 - 5.4 The livelihood strategies of street vendors.
 - 5.5 The livelihood outcomes for street vendors.

6. To *identify* the policy recommendations for an effective informal sector in Harare.

1.6 Scope of the study

The study focused on the Harare CBD, namely, spaces between Simon Muzenda Street (formerly Fourth Street) to the east, Robert Mugabe Road to the south, Chinhoyi Street to the west, and Samora Machel Avenue to the north (Figure 1.1). There are an estimated 50 000 street vendors in this area. This is the only study focused on street vending in this area [see 1.3 for what other researchers looked].

1.7 Harare – A brief

Harare's name is from the Shona inhabitants *Neharawa*, who occupied The Harare Kopje is a hill at the foot Harare's commercial area. Harare, a colonial city, officially called Salisbury until 18 April 1982, is in the north-eastern part of Zimbabwe at coordinates 17°5'5"S, 31°'4"E. It is at an elevation of 1 490 m on a high-lying plateau with an area of 960.6 km². Harare's population is 2 427 209 (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency [ZimStat], 2022), with a population density of 2 540 km². Harare was founded in 1890 by the Pioneer Column, a military force in the British South Africa Company service, organised by Cecil John Rhodes. It was named Fort Salisbury after the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury. Harare was proclaimed a municipality in 1897 and a city in 1935, the capital of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963. After that, it became the capital of Southern Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was previously known (Tanyanyiwa, 2015).

Local governance is traceable to 1890 with the establishment of the Salisbury Sanitary Board in 1891 and its formalisation through the Municipal Law of 1897. The Law implied European settlers as first-class citizens, with Coloureds and Asians in the second position, and Black people on the lowest social ladder. Between 1890 and 1980, the colonial state advantaged European Settlers economically, politically, and socially, a scenario that changed in 1980 when the postcolonial state pursued redress of class, gender, and race imbalances. Harare ranks number three out of the ten least liveable cities globally regarding health care, infrastructure, and stability; in 2022, Harare was the most expensive city in Africa (The Economist, 2022).

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Harare was called *The Sunshine City* due to its multi-ethnic character, orderliness, pleasant weather, and warm climate. Hordes of street vendors and litter now characterise streetscapes, despite Harare being Zimbabwe's nerve centre, its capital and primate city with the following functions: administrative, communications, educational, financial, industrial, judicial, and political (Tanyanyiwa, 2015). The Greater Harare metropolitan area comprises five urban local authorities: the CoH, Chitungwiza Municipality, Norton Town Council, Ruwa Town Council, and Epworth Local Board, and a significant rural grouping living in the Borrowdale–Domboshawa–Bindura Corridor. Bindura is 88 km away from Harare. Bindura is the provincial capital of the Mashonaland Central Province, the Chitungwiza–Marondera Corridor, the Goromonzi–Marondera Corridor, Enterprise Road/Mutoko Road–Murewa Corridor, and the Shamva Corridor, the Harare–Chivhu Corridor, and the Harare–Norton Corridor. (Figure 1.1).

CITY OF HARARE DESIGNATED VENDINGSAPES MAP




Figure 1.1 City of Harare designated vendingscapes map

The Greater Harare has an estimated area of 1 800 km² and a population of about four million, with an annual growth rate of two percent (ZimStat, 2022). Harare is a rapidly growing and expanding metropolis that attracts migrants from all the country’s provinces and from

elsewhere. Harare ranks number three out of the ten least liveable cities globally regarding health care, infrastructure, and stability. In 2022, Harare was the most expensive city in Africa (The Economist, 2022). It has a floating population of more than one million people commuting to trade and work. Harare's livelihood strategies depend on going beyond formality (*Kukikiya* in the local Shona language), even for those employed in the formal sector. Harare's informal sector contributes about 40% of gross value added in construction, manufacturing, retailing, and transport (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2021).

1.8 Conceptualisation and definitions

The informal sector is heterogeneous, as shown by various definitions, disciplines, and paradigms (Fourie, 2020). The thesis uses the WIEGO definition;

The informal economy refers to owner/operator usually working from home of a varied set of economic activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers without state protection and regulation (formal contracts); the businesses rely on indigenous resources, small-scale operations, and unregulated and competitive markets with skills gained outside the formal educational system, e.g., blacksmithing arts and crafts (WIEGO, 2014: 8).

Historically, economists did not focus much on informal activities, and recognition only came in the 1950s and 1960s. Lewis (1954) first used the concept of the informal sector to examine people employed outside the formal sector through his economic development model. Before that, sociologists and anthropologists dominated research on informality (Blau and Scott, 1963). Hart (1973) was the first to define the informal sector from an anthropological view. He outlined the decisive role of the informal economy. However, there were previous studies on street economies by Whyte (1943) in London and the United States. The work of Bromley (1978), Castells and Portes (1989), De Soto (1989), MacEwen-Scott (1979) and Moser (1978) popularised informal economy and development planning. The ILO (2002:23) defined informal employment as follows:

All employment arrangements that do not provide individuals with legal or social protection through their work, thereby leaving them more exposed to economic risk than the others, whether or not the economic units they work for or operate in are formal enterprises, informal enterprises, or households.

A standardised definition of the informal sector remains an illusion, though Table 1.1 provides an overview of the dominant ones.

Table 1.1 Various definitions of the informal sector

ILO (2018:10)	A job-based concept comprising “ <i>all remunerative work (i.e., both self-employment and wage employment) that is not registered, regulated or protected by the existing legal or regulatory framework, as well as non-remunerative work undertaken in an income-producing enterprise.</i> ” It comprises all informal jobs conducted by informal sector enterprises or households.
Castells and Portes (1989:12)	“ <i>A process of income generation characterised by one central feature: it is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which regulation applies to similar activities.</i> ”
Chen (2018:27)	The informal sector, as an economic reality, is comprised of informal enterprises (i.e., unincorporated, unregistered, and small, mostly without employees).
Hart (1973:17)	Employment beyond government service, factories, and large-scale commercial ventures.
Hussmanns (2005:3)	Informal enterprises are private unincorporated enterprises (excluding quasi-corporations), in other words, enterprises owned by individuals and are not involved as separate entities independently of their owners, and for which no complete accounts are available that would permit a financial separation of the production activities of the enterprise from the other activities of its owner(s).

From the definitions above, the informal sector operates outside of formal regulations. The definitions point to four characteristics of the informal sector, which are 1) private independent businesses; 2) the low level of organisation, low productivity, and small scale; 3) owned by individual household members, several members of the same household, and or independent partnerships and cooperatives who own and operate them; and 4) goods and or services produced that are for sale or exchanged. Some scholars view the informal sector as legally and economically sound instead of engaging in criminal activities, for example, drug trafficking. Table 1.2 shows the various adjectives and nouns used to describe the informal sector.

Table 1.2 Adjectives and nouns used to denote the informal sector

Adjectives				
Agorism	Hidden		Parallel	Underwater
Black	Invisible		Peripheral	Under the table
Cash-in-hand	Irregular		Precarious	Unexposed
Clandestine	Marginal		Second	Unobserved
Concealed	Moonlight		Shadow	Unofficial
Dual	Non-observed		System D	Unorganised
Everyday	Non-official		Submerged	Unrecorded
Ghetto	Occult		Subterranean	Unregulated
Grey	Off-the-books		Twilight	Untaxed
			Underground	Working for cash
Nouns				
Activity	Economy		Sector	Work
Economic activity	Employment			

Source: Adapted and modified from Bello et al. (2011), Feige (1989), Hussmanns (2005), ILO (2002), Johnson et al. (1997), La Porta and Shleifer (2008), Vo and Pham (2014) and Williams (2004).

Researchers and bureaucrats use different names for the informal sector, namely black market, clandestine activities, hidden criminal sector, informal household sector, irregular sector, parallel economy, people’s economy, petty commodity trade, second shadow economy, subsistence sector, transient subterranean sector, underground economy, informal underworld economy and a world turned upside down (Feige, 1989; Hussmanns, 2005; ILO, 2002; Johnson et al., 1997; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Vo and Pham, 2014; Williams, 2004).

Informal sector activities include commercial sex work, illegal tuckshops, money changing, street entrepreneurship, vending, and urban agriculture (Chen and Carré, 2020; Hart, 1973). The informal economy has four main categories (Machemedze , 2018). These are

- ❖ Consultancy services where a fee is paid for the third-party service provision in advisory and implementation e.g., faith healers.
- ❖ Illegal activities are activities forbidden and punishable at law e.g. manufacture and circulation of prohibited goods and forged products e.g., drug dealing and trafficking.
- ❖ Semi-regulated SMEs are small to medium scale industries that provide employment, entrepreneurship and innovation skill to communities and whose governance is not entirely regulated; they include limited liability companies (LLCs) , partnerships, S corporations and sole proprietorships, Examples of semi regulated SMEs are salons and transport operators.

- ❖ Unregistered informal business - some firms in the global south are informal but viable entrepreneurs e.g., fruit vendors. Lack of registration is due complex regulations (De Soto ,1989). Informal business owners adopt a survivalist approach as they seek wage employment (Tokman, 1978). Figure 1.2 shows the categories of the informal economy activities.




Figure 1.2 Categories of informal economy activities

Source: Machemedze (2018)

1.9 Methods

The SLA provides a framework for research and policy to better understand the informal sector. The data collection tools are informed by the SLA (see Table 1.3). This section focuses on the SLA, research philosophy and methods used , principles behind them to advance an approach that tallies with research objectives.

1.9.1 Theoretical frame: Sustainable livelihoods approach

The sustainable livelihood approach (SLA) provides a framework for research and policy to better understand the informal sector. The SLA has its roots in the capability approach (CA) of Sen and Nussbaum, who emphasised functional capabilities as a measure of human well-being

instead of economic utility (Nussbaum, 1988, 2011). Sen (1995, 2005) argued that one should not ask people what they need; instead, one should ask what capabilities they have. In his view, functioning refers to achievement by an individual. Achievement comes through resources that are available to an individual. Health and safety are examples of functioning and an opportunity through a capability. For example, to sustain good health, there is a need for proper nutrition and vaccines (Nussbaum, 2005). Poverty is a by-product of deprived capabilities, including limited educational opportunities, poor governance, and inadequate income. These factors determine a person's general happiness as defined by access to material and non-material components (Nussbaum, 2011). Sen saw the CA as a general framework that evaluates people's quality of life, enhancing their freedom. The SLA/CA are inherently qualitative hence the choice of methods in 1.9.4). In Nussbaum's (2011) view, the focus on capabilities should be rooted in justice that respects human dignity. Krantz (2001:1) aptly put the importance of the SLA as follows:

The SLA attempts to go beyond the conventional definitions and approaches to poverty eradication. These were too narrow because they focused only on certain aspects or manifestations of poverty, like low income, or did not consider other vital aspects, like vulnerability and social exclusion.

1.9.2 Research philosophy

This exploratory study is context-specific to street vending in the Harare CBD by discovering what is taking place, seeking new insights, and clarifying issues (Burns and Groove, 2001). Hermeneutic phenomenology is a philosophy and method suitable for studying the context and lived experiences of informal sector practitioners. It combines hermeneutics, the art or theory of interpretation, and phenomenology, the study of describing phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Habermas, 1988). The hermeneutic phenomenological paradigm is a critical, dialogical, inclusive, interpretive, qualitative, reflexive, naturalistic, and subjective approach that contextualises phenomena (Creswell, 2012). Hermeneutic phenomenology aims at understanding the nature and meaning of human experiences, beliefs, feelings, relationships, mores, thoughts, and values (Yin, 2011).

Qualitative approach

The SLA was the conceptual framework that guided this study. SLA research is primarily qualitative (Scoones, 1998; Department for International Development (DFID), 2001). Qualitative research applies to describing an experience or phenomenon that is not well

conceptualised, understood, or articulated (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2013). Experience was imperative for the phenomenon that required the voice of the actor or the individual (the informal sector practitioner) who had first-hand knowledge of the phenomenon and whose story helped in understanding a complicated experience. Qualitative research goes deeper into the problem by unlocking motivations, thoughts, and opinions and understanding the underlying reasons (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). The social realm defines for the qualitative researcher what people know or do not know. Information is obtained through interaction within a given perspective as defined by certain norms and mores. Cassell and Symon (1994) argued that the established truth is an illusion, while different social actors decode meanings.

Furthermore, Cassell and Symon (1994) argued that every individual has an inherently peculiar lifeworld. A natural setting is one of the main facets of qualitative research. The environment and behaviour are symbiotic (holistic). Transparency means that the roles of the researcher and the researched are clearly defined. A livelihood analysis shows a range of qualitative data collection tools (Kilmuir et al., 2002). Based on the SLA, data were collected centred on a) the vulnerability context, b) livelihood assets, c) policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs), d) livelihood strategies, and e) livelihood outcomes. Table 1.3 shows five primary elements of the SLA and their meaning, focus, and form of analysis.

Table 1.3 Data collection and generation methods based on livelihood analysis

Data collection focus area	Meaning of the focus area	Focus, methods, and form of analysis
Vulnerability context	The external and internal factors that affect people’s livelihoods, for example, seasonality and shocks	Demographic data, cultural, environmental, socioeconomic, and political context
Livelihood assets	“Things” in a production process, which serve as a basis of power, for example, financial and human assets	Asset surveys and resource mapping
Policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs)	PIPs create and enforce laws that guide the informal sector	Narratives from critical informants and vendors (rules, norms, practices, challenges)
Livelihood strategies	Increase in the range of assets to which a person can access types of capital that improve livelihood security	Mapping of vending patterns showing employment and income
Livelihood outcomes	Livelihood outcomes are the outcomes of livelihood strategies. e.g., higher income reduced vulnerability and self-esteem	Cause–effect diagrams. Study of historical changes over time

Source: Adapted and modified from Neeffjes (2000).

1.9.3 Case study design

A case study is an examination of a social phenomenon that takes place either within the bounds of a single social system, or within a small number of social systems, like those of individuals and communities (the case) (Swaborn, 2010). A case study is a research design that entails an empirical investigation of a specific contemporary phenomenon within its actual context using a variety of sources of evidence (Robson, 2002:178). Context boundaries between the phenomenon are essential for a case study; questions like *how? what? when? where?* and *why?* help one understand the background (Yin, 2003). The particular case of Harare provided an opportunity to observe and analyse the livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in its CBD. A case study represents a depth of data rather than breadth. Consequently, results are only sometimes generalisable to other cases (Yin, 2003, 2013).

1.9.4 Data collection tools

Triangulation combines data or methods so that diverse viewpoints can illuminate a topic (Cassell and Symon, 1994; Yin, 2007). All data collection tools have innate biases and limitations (Greene et al., 1989). Data triangulation involves various kinds of sources of information by starting with secondary sources before going to primary sources, for instance, data is obtained from communities, families, groups, and individuals for validation (Carter et al., 2014). Investigator triangulation uses team research to collect data to compare findings and check the efforts of individual investigators (Denzin, 1989; Mikkelsen, 1976). Methodological triangulation uses multiple data collection methods to enhance data integrity (Kopinak, 1999). The primary data collection tools were literature review, key informant interviews, semi-structured interviews, and observation. The within-method triangulation uses multiple data gathering techniques through a single research paradigm (Hussein, 2009).

In contrast, methodological triangulation and between-method triangulation is the combination of two data collection methods, for example, in interviewing key informants, the gestures of the interviewees complemented the observation process (Denzin, 1978; Yin, 2013). Theoretical triangulation refers to integrating multiple theoretical perspectives on street vending (Yin, 2007). Environmental triangulation included researching within different environments over eight months, from September 2019 to August 2020. Three data collection methods in the case study validated the data by projecting and interrogating the research problem through:

- Archival and secondary data (including a policy analysis).
- Semi-structured interviews.
- Structured participant observation.

These three methods generated data from audio recordings, field notes, and transcripts. Figure 1.3 shows secondary and empirical data collection, including data processing and analysis (results), as well as the conclusions and recommendations from the study.




Figure 1.3 Research strategies for literature and empirical review

1.9.5 Secondary sources of data - Archival research and document review

Secondary data is part of the literature review, including data from existing literature like journals, published books, newspapers, magazines, diaries, biographies, letters, reports, doctoral and master’s theses, and other grey literature. Document review is a means of data collection, consisting of reviewing existing documents or records that provide insights into a setting that cannot be observed or noted in another way (Creswell, 2012). In this study, three steps were taken to conduct a literature review: a) sources to search and selection of literature on the informal sector; b) instrumental reading, namely classifying the selected sources by research questions and objectives; and c) categorisation and critical writing, bringing out arguments for the research questions through dialogue with literature, Zimbabwe government documentation and legislative documents.

1.9.6 Primary data sources

Primary data collection was done in the field (Yin 2011, 2013). Data collection occurred during September 2019 to May 2023 was after Ethics Approval (Appendix A). First, there was an open-ended questionnaire preparation with a different set of questions for each group of participants. These questionnaires were semi-structured interviews with vendors, business persons and CoH officials. The participants' anonymity was through each interviewee was given a generic name with a numeral (e.g., Vendor 1; HCC 2 and NAVUZ 1)[See Appendix O and P].Data collection was through key informant interviews, semi-structured interviews, and non-participant observation.

a) Semi-structured interviews

A semi-structured interview is a dialogue between two people that involves open-ended questions with less attention to planned questions (Creswell, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998) [Appendix H]. Fifty traders were the unit of analysis. The semi-structured interview questions translated into Shona the local language, were used for appreciation and understanding (Appendix I). Responses were typed and recorded on a tape recorder for transcription and analysis. A two-phase approach sampled street vendors. The CoH helped to identify the main vending zones within the CBD.

b) Key informants

Key informant interviews are qualitative in-depth and open-ended data collection tools to provide descriptions that promote better insights into the livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare (Creswell, 2007). To obtain detail on vending in Harare, key informant interviews were purposively sampled based on referrals from individuals and various stakeholders as outlined in Appendix L The attention focused on specific characteristics of a particular interest population that enabled answering the research questions (Appendix K). Appendix L shows the 20 key informant interviewees and the justification for their selection. Collected responses were directly typed and recorded on a tape recorder for later transcription and analysis. Questions included demographic profile, relationship with vendors [see Appendix K].

c) Non-participant observation

Observation involves systematically selecting, watching, and recording the behaviour and characteristics of living beings, objects, or phenomena (Creswell, 2002). There is no researcher's active participation (see Appendix M). This method is used to understand a phenomenon by entering the community or social system involved, while staying separate from the activities being observed. The observation occurred in the morning, mid-morning, midday, afternoon, and night (time triangulation). Activities were noted on the non-participant observation template as they appeared (see Appendix M). Three types of observation were used: 1) Descriptive (unstructured) observation, which is observing anything and everything; data collected in this case were minutiae. 2) Focused (semi-structured) observation where the observer followed the participants' intuitions. 3) The selective and systematic (structured) observation where reference was made to the research objectives /questions (Yin , 2017) . All three observation methods were used in triangulation to obtain detail information [see Appendix E].

Observation included: space (physical places); actors (people involved); activities (the set of related acts people did); objects (the physical things that were present); time (the sequencing that took place over time); goals (the things people tried to accomplish) and feelings (the emotions felt and expressed). Observation triangulation increases objectivity and validity.

1.9.7 Sampling

Non-probability (non-random) sampling techniques helped to select 50 vendors and 20 key informants. The case study approach means a small and informative sample (Neumann, 2005). Purposive (judgemental) sampling enabled judgement to select critical informants and vendors to answer the research question(s) and met the objectives of the study. Purposive sampling acknowledges that some informants provide more relevant insights than others; researchers invite those perspectives into the study (Creswell, 2003, 2012). Key informants' selection was based on street governance actors role i.e., the Zimbabwe Republic Police , Harare Municipal Police and space barons . Convenience or non-probability sampling was used to select fifty vendors at vendingscapes like the entrance to chain stores and bus termini. Vendors were chosen based on availability, participation willingness , easy access and geographical proximity and the researchers thrust to cover Harare's CBD [see Fig 1.1].Convenience sampling is biased; generalisation may be flawed, but with slight variation in vendor population and activities in Harare, such samples were functional.

1.10 Qualitative data management and analysis

All the interviews transcribed, the researcher is fluent in Shona and English. Data cleaning took place before the analysis. The three-stage interactive structure for data analysis was used (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Qualitative data analysis identifies new connections and underlying themes by describing, explaining, and building theory from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1997). A theme captures data exposure concerning the research questions and expresses patterned meanings in the data set. The emerging themes enable contrasts and comparisons based on data reduction, for instance, putting names on excerpts. First, data reduction as an ongoing, iterative process resulted in summaries, coding, and numerous data visualisations. Second, data were condensed by taking additional notes and categorising them into themes. The data revealed patterns that were noted for additional analysis (Creswell, 2012; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Third, additional thematic analysis of the data was done to confirm any new themes. Thematic analysis was for documented and transcribed interview data to capture emerging themes. Interview fragments coding was to repeat themes, and final theme naming was in tandem with data and literature. Data analysis was done throughout the fieldwork and thesis writing phases (see Appendix N). Text, graphs, pictures, and tables were used as data displays to highlight new patterns and connections.

1.11 Access to participants

Access to participants followed appropriate cultural and bureaucratic procedures. The CoH and the Officer Commanding of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) in Harare provided clearance letters. Permission was granted for the study (see Appendices C and E). An introductory seminar explained the goals of the research to the research participants. The emphasis was that this was a doctoral study to eliminate any misinterpretation that participants may have had. A baseline survey was done to appreciate issues at stake by getting to know and be known in the Harare CBD, meaning that the baseline survey explored specific ideas for questions that followed after the interviews and helped the participants to think about issues before they showed up for interviews.

1.12 Pilot study

Pilot fieldwork (pre-operation exposure) was used to 1) evaluate the validity/relevance of the interview questions; 2) become familiar with local leadership and the people (taming the

research environment); 3) establish contacts with CoH officials and other stakeholders; and 4) identify places where the informal sector operates in the Harare CBD. Five vendors, one businessman and one Harare Municipality official took part in the pilot study (see Appendices H and L). After the pilot vendor questions were reduce and rearranged to minimise response fatigue.

1.13 Ethical considerations

Research ethics are not merely gaining approval from an institutional ethics review board but also in broader reflections to ensure that the research design, conduct, and outcome are sensitive to local contexts and broader ethical responsibilities. The ethics committee at the University of the Free State (UFS) approved the study (UFS-HSD2019/1287) on 28 August 2019 (Appendix A). Research involving human subjects follows four fundamental ethical principles, namely: respect (people's right to self-determination and full disclosure); beneficence (an obligation to act to benefit others and to maximise benefits); non-maleficence, and justice (fair treatment of human subjects).

The study was guided by ethical principles which included participant safety, free and informed consent, confidentiality, anonymity, research validity, and worth. Mutual respect was shown because the study was *with* participants and not *on* them. Ethical reflections shaped the research design, interview guide planning, data collection, data scrutiny and explanation, and ethical reporting of research findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Robson, 1993). The interviewees were informed that the study was meant for academic purposes. The participants received complete contact details of the researcher for further information or clarification; they were free to report any ethical anomalies to the UFS. The consent forms (see Appendices F, G [translated to Shona] and J) clearly stated that participation was voluntary, and participants were free to join or terminate their participation at any time during the research (De Vaus, 2002; Robson, 1993). Only the researcher could match a specific response to an individual (respect for anonymity and confidentiality through anonymisation). this protected the individual in cases where they gave confidential information. Hard data copies were stored under lock and key in the Geography and Environmental Studies Department at the Zimbabwe Open University where I work and soft data in a password protected computer .

1.14 Limitations

Street traders' experiences partially reflect the totality of Harare's and Zimbabwe's informal practitioners' economic and social prospects in the local and national economies towards livelihood provisioning and integrated urban planning policies and programmes. The fieldwork of the study was undertaken during the Covid-19 pandemic and focused on Harare. It would have been plausible to capture the views of street traders in Zimbabwe's second largest city, Bulawayo, or any other city in the country or within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with similar characteristics to Harare. Literature point to similarities in Southern Africa's cities' short-term livelihood gains and organisational strategies focusing on short-term solutions instead of the long-term vision of formalised small and medium enterprises. Zimbabwe has been on the edge of a debilitating economic situation with a socioeconomic and political instability trajectory over the last three decades with an exaggeration of events on the ground. Such a context is an intrinsic limitation on datasets, although the study can be generalisable to Zimbabwe due to the demographic diversity of the participants. Zimbabwe's unemployment is 95%; however, the government believes that informal practitioners are employed, yet it remains vindictive to the informal sector (Machemedze, 2018). This study is a springboard for developing this or similar studies. A key strength of the study is that it informs informality's extent as Harare's livelihood source.

1.15 Thesis structure

The thesis has eight chapters that are strongly associated with the research question and research objectives. This section gives an overview of the flow and logical development of the thesis.

Chapter 1 (*Setting the scene*) presents an outline of the broader objectives of the thesis, the context around the purpose of the objectives, the methods and ethical considerations.

Chapter 2 (*The informal sector: Theoretical perspectives*) summarises the literature on the informal sector discourses. It provides a deeper justification for the research through a contextual understanding of the theoretical representation of the informal sector. The chapter further focuses on the development of the informal sector, its classification and characteristics, and theories attributed to its development. The chapter concludes by synthesising the contemporary debates on the informal sector.

Chapter 3 (*Informality: An African perspective*) focuses on the informal sector from a global perspective and Africa. It provides evidence-based literature on the importance of the informal sector in Africa. Furthermore, the chapter summarises the benefits and limitations of the informal sector in various African countries, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, and South Africa.

Chapter 4 (*Sustainable livelihoods approaches in urban areas: A conceptual synopsis*) is a more detailed discussion of the study setting by exploring the SLA as a conceptual approach that informed and guided the study on urban livelihoods in Harare's informal sector. The origins of the SLA (from Sen's Capability Approach), its development, applicability, strengths, and limitations are discussed. The SLA helps to create, enhance, and sustain the livelihoods of the poor, hence its adoption in this study.

Chapter 5 (*Historical and policy analysis of Zimbabwe's informal sector*) delineates the historical perspectives on the development of the informal sector in Zimbabwe. The development and growth of the informal economy in Zimbabwe from 1980 to date, including the urban planning laws and policies that impact the informal sector in urban areas (policy analysis). The chapter concludes by analysing urban planning challenges in the informal sector.

Chapter 6 (*Vendor assets, vulnerability context, policies, institutions, and processes*) explores the structure and nature of vending (interview data) and its effectiveness as a livelihood strategy and are discussed based on the state and governance of vending. The potential for organising workers in the informal economy in Harare and associated challenges are also explored.

Chapter 7 (*Vendor livelihood strategies and outcomes*) focuses on the factors determining livelihood strategies and the effectiveness of outcomes and how these factors compare to the globally identified factors. The discussion focused on critical contextual challenges to vending in the Harare CBD. Finally, the chapter discusses the sprucing of vending towards sustainability and enhancement of livelihood outcomes.

Chapter 8 (*Main findings and recommendations*) concludes by relating the different meanings and insights from the study into an integrated whole. The chapter considers implications for theory and practice by answering *So what?* The findings are related to practical, informal sector planning and management to make tangible contributions to Zimbabwe (the idea of transferability).

1.16 Conclusion

Chapter 1 sets the tone of the thesis through unravelling the study's background , the research problem and research question, informal sector tenets, the research methodology and the Harare's vendingscapes . The chapter ends with the thesis structure. Chapter 2 delves further focusing on informality's theoretical perspectives briefly discussed in Chapter 1.

Chapter 2

INFORMAL SECTOR: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 Introduction

The tenacity and resiliency of the informal sector foster academic and development discourse. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN) are in line with including the informal sector in discussions about development. The SDGs, which were adopted by all UN members in 2015, will be in effect until 2030. SDG adoption emphasised the need for all people to work together to eradicate poverty and manage the environment so that people can coexist with nature. In order to change the world, it is crucial to achieve at least five of the 17 goals that affect the informal sector most as espoused by the Zimbabwe government:

SDG 1: *No poverty: End poverty in all its forms everywhere.*

SDG 5: *Gender equality: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.*

SDG 8: *Decent work and economic growth: Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all.*

SDG 10: *Reduced inequalities: Reduce inequality within and among countries.*

SDG 11: *Sustainable cities and communities: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable.*

Because of the increasing global urbanisation, the role of urban areas in promoting the SDG agenda has become critical. The informal sector accommodates most non-agricultural employment in low- and middle-income countries, yet it needs to reflect the transition to resilient economies. This chapter discusses two main questions that helps in understanding SDGs:

1. How did the informal sector develop historically?
2. What are the theories attributed to the development of the informal sector?

Chapter 2 explores the contemporary debates on the informal sector, starting with the historical development of the informal sector, followed by schools of thought, holistic conceptual models

that focuses on current perspectives on the development of the informal sector and lessons learned from theories of the informal sector.

2.2 Historical perspectives on the development of the informal economy

Chen (2007) divided the evolution of thinking in the informal sector over a four-phase period. These phases are:

- **Phase 1: Incubation years:** The period between 1950 and 1960 marked the birth of informality with Lewis's study of the traditional sector (Lewis, 1954; see also Chen, 2007, 2018).
- **Phase 2: Dispersion years:** Keith Hart (1973) coined the term *informal sector*. He renamed the traditional economy to the informal economy during his study of rural migrants in Ghana.
- **Phase 3: Officialisation years:** From the 1980s to 1990, structural adjustment programmes dominated thinking about the informal sector (Chen, 2018).
- **Phase 4: Growth and expansion years:** Since the 1990s, the emphasis has shifted to finding links between the formal and informal sectors (Chen, 2018; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).

The discussion below provides an overview of the development of each of the four phases.

2.2.1 Phase 1 – Incubation: 1950–1960

The informal sector develops as a concept (i.e., incubation years). Lewis's work in 1954 laid the foundation for thinking about the informal economy (see also Castells and Portes, 1989). Lewis referred to the informal sector as the "traditional sector". For Lewis, the informal economy absorbed excess labour, which the formal sector could not do. This absorption of surplus labour included petty traders, smallholders, and casual wage workers (Lewis, 1954). The main idea was that the formal sector would absorb people working in the informal sector over time. Theorists did not see a connection between the formal economy and modern capitalist development as they viewed the informal sector as peripheral (Fourie, 2018). The central assumption was that with the right mix of economic policies and resources, the informal sector would develop into a modern economy, and these policies would formalise informal jobs (Hart, 1973). After World War II, the industrial expansion in Europe, Japan, and North America

reinforced the idea that the informal sector would develop into a modern economy (WIEGO, 2014).

Mainstream economists viewed the informal economy as survivalist activities. Ironically, Marxists held the same views in the 1970s (Lebrun and Gerry, 1975; Leys, 1973). Both mainstream economists and Marxists saw that the informal economy depends on the formal sector, although they differed on whether modernisation was the solution to formalisation. Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987) argued that three underlying assumptions laid the foundation for thinking about the informal economy during Phase 1: 1) With the emergence of capitalism, the informal sector will formalise and transform from its transitory and peripheral nature; 2) The informal sector operates at subsistence-level activities, and incomes are usually meagre; and 3) The informal economy is a component of weak economies, reiterating the first assumption that it will formalise through capitalist development.

Phase 1 contributed to the acceptance of the informal sector (World Bank, 1989). The dualistic thought has separate informal and formal sectors, although there has always been interdependence between the formal and informal sectors. The main activities are conducted for subsistence outside the purview of a country's economic policy. As a result, there was never any relationship between the formal and informal economies; it was unregulated and unregistered (Hart, 1978). The informal sector symbolised marginality and a surplus labour reserve pool, contributing to crime in inner cities by small-scale, informal producers and street traders (Lewis, 1954). Small-scale entrepreneurs needed to be registered and receded with modern industrial growth. However, those who worked in the informal sector made huge profits because they did not pay statutory obligations like taxes and licences (Castels and Portes, 1989); for small-scale traders formalisation was a business cost.

2.2.2 Phase 2 – Dispersion: 1970–1980

The informal sector concept became more popular. The phrase *informal sector* was first used in 1971 by British anthropologist, Keith Hart (Chen, 2005, 2012). During his investigation of rural migrants in Ghana, the traditional economy was renamed as *the informal economy* (Hart, 1973). Hart concluded that the majority of migrants engaged in informal activities despite external obstacles and capitalist dominance. These informal activities contributed to Ghana's economy. However, some researchers challenged this view (see Lindell, 2010; Miraftab, 2009). For these scholars, the informal sector was insignificant and economic growth would lead to

the formal economy, absorbing informality. For those following the ideas of Hart, developed, and developing countries were different, and the informal economy in developing countries played an important economic role (Hart, 1973).

By the 1970s, the formal sector failed to expand in the economies of developing countries due to economic disintegration and the global recession (De Soto, 1989). At the same time, limited financial resources, corruption and bureaucracy hampered state-led development (Weiss, 1987). These factors laid the basis for the introduction of structural adjustment programmes and the introduction of neoliberal perspectives. Because of these structural adjustment programmes, the informal economy continued to grow (Mlambo, 1995).

By the 1970s, the neoliberal perspective became the dominant way to conceptualise the informal sector. Unlike marginal economists, neoliberalists argued that the informal economy is a dynamic endogenous entrepreneurial-orientated sector that can create jobs and economic growth. The informal sector is a product of state intervention as the state channelled too many resources to the formal sector. The neoliberal perspective has since been further developed by the World Bank and later brought to the fore by De Soto's book *The Other Path* (1989). From the World Bank's perspective, the informal economy has inherent business-like skills and administrative structures. Informal enterprises can take off in economically unstable situations with excessive state restrictions or political instability. The prerequisites were free-to-market enterprises, economic deregulation, and infrastructure that aids production (De Soto, 1989; World Bank, 1989). However, opposing views also developed.

For example, the ILO (1972) took a reformative approach. This approach considered the potential of the informal sector, its challenges, and limitations. For example, the ILO emphasised the informal sector's low incomes, low productivity, limited skills, and inadequate technology. In this respect, the ILO (1972) argued for increased state intervention, access to resources, removing barriers that limit production, and the informal sector's recognition as important policy issues (see also Bromley, 1990). There was no empirical evidence to suggest that excessive state regulation led to the informalisation of the economy (De Soto, 1989). Some countries with high control but few informal activities were Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United States (ILO, 2016).

2.2.3 Phase 3 – Officialisation: 1980–1990

In the officialisation phase, the informal sector incorporated a period of sustainable growth and the realisation of human potential (Chen, 2012). Many developing countries experienced structural changes to their economies in the 1980s and were forced to borrow money from the IMF or the World Bank due to high debt. Borrowing from these institutions came with conditions and led to structural adjustment programmes. In turn, structural adjustment programmes curtailed government spending.

In many cases, structural adjustment programmes were responsible for lower state investment and the growth of the informal sector (Chen, 2012; Mlambo, 1995). There is a direct link between structural adjustment programmes and employment growth in the informal economy (Weiss, 1987). Globalisation, the process by which businesses started operating globally, contributed to the informalisation of several industries and countries (Standing, 1999). Benefits in the informal economy were limited, and hourly wages were low (Portes et al., 1989). Workers who lost their jobs in the formal economy resorted to the informal economy. For example, in Latin America and Asia, the economic crises and inflation in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in large-scale job losses (ILO, 2018).

Marxists' ideas on the informal economy also developed during this phase and reacted to the neoliberal views (De Soto, 1989). The Marxist response assumed that ordinary people are exploited by capital because they sell their products to get money and that their inclination to the informal sector is part of the industrial reserve of employers, waged and unwaged labourers and owner-operators (Gerry, 1987). Capitalist development led to increased informalisation in the 1980s. The informalisation approach emphasised the socioeconomic and historical process of the informal economy.

The informal economy is a product of institutional decay and evasion after World War II due to economic challenges, like depression, increased debts and inter- and intra-competition within countries (Castells and Portes, 1989; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). Production in the informal sector is the result of a capital search for lowering employment costs through labour flexibility. Households turn to informality to augment their livelihoods, which are negatively affected by declining wages and increased unemployment in the formal sector (Benicia, 1991; Roberts, 1991). Informalisation is shaped by economic conditions like structural adjustment programmes, which remove capital from government-related businesses. Weiss (1987) said that a country's socioeconomic and political facets contribute to developing the informal

economy. The development factors include diverse small-scale operators, a labour force comprising vulnerable ethnic communities, youth, women and youth, and a distinct social network. Within the informalisation approach, four key features define the informal sector in Africa: informal sector labour, informal social networks, relationships with the formal sector, and the state's functioning in the informal economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Portes et al., 1986). Weiss (1987:10) summarised this aptly:

Without formal institutional mechanisms, how are workers recruited and mobilised to cooperate or collude in illegal, unstable, and often highly exploitative transactions? Because it operates outside the protective sanctions established by the government and trade unions, the underground economy depends on informal control mechanisms. These mechanisms consist of social connections and personal and kinship allegiances, which ensure the flow of labour market information and connect the employer to a supply of 'trustworthy' labour.

2.2.4 Phase 4 – Growth and expansion: 1990s onwards

The informal sector and the formal sector link (Chitimira, 2021). The informal sector grew enormously, and employment opportunities increased during the 1990s (Horn, 2009). The informal economy contributed significantly to economic growth, accounting for half of non-agricultural employment in most developing countries (World Bank, 2018). For example, the non-agricultural employment helped as much as 82% of jobs in South Asia (ILO, 2018). The main contribution during these phases was the recognition of the links between the formal and informal economies. Policymakers, activists, and researchers from various fields, like economics, gender studies, geography, history, industrial relations, sociology, political science and urban planning, were interested in the informal sector. Schneider (2016) argued that research on the informal sector during this phase focused on the following aspects:

- Size and composition of the informal economy.
- The drivers or causes of informality.
- Consequences of informality in terms of welfare or productivity.
- The linkages between informality and formality.
- Growth, poverty, and inequality in the informal sector.

In the twenty-first century, limited employment opportunities, high rates of urbanisation, and population growth have contributed to the development and growth of the informal economy (Chen, 2007, 2012; Williams, 2007). Furthermore, in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa,

corruption is endemic, contributing to the cost of formalisation. Regulatory barriers further compound the problem of access. Other inhibiting factors to formalisation include limited training and educational prospects in developing countries, infrastructure decay and the demand for cheap goods and services (Lindell, 2010). Williams (2006, 2007) viewed informal work as fortifying, compared to the social and spatial disparities of formal employment. The 1990s saw continued structural adjustment programmes (Mlambo, 1995; Williams, 2006, 2007), which contributed to informality because of government and parastatal civil service. The former president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, summarised the situation in the following words “*The IMF does not care whether you are suffering from economic malaria, bilharzia or broken legs; they will just give you quinine*” (Mlambo, 1995).

There are similarities between the formal and informal sectors, for example, criminal tendencies, are common in both sectors (WIEGO, 2001). Thus, the informal sector is not an unlawful or illegal activity. Some informal enterprises are dynamic; some are stable, while others expand and produce beyond survival. Informal enterprises are affected by economic, social, and legal policies just as much as formal enterprises (Chen, 2012). The informal sector links to the formal sector by producing for, trading with, distributing, and providing services to the formal economy (Fourie, 2018). Informality mirrors waning formal employment due to structural adjustment and global competition (Chen, 2018; Mlambo, 1995). Informality reflects a failure by formal firms to absorb labour and their aversion to doing the same, and therefore, it has non-standard wage workers and self-employed entrepreneurs. In the 1990s, the informal sector was a feature of economic transition and capitalist industrialisation (Horn, 2009). The informal economy is increasing with new industrial growth by providing employment, goods, and services to lower-income groups (ILO, 2018). Consequently, its contribution to GDP is quite significant. Table 2.1 summarises the historical and contemporary views of the informal sector from the 1950s to the present (Chen, 2007, 2012; WIEGO, 2001).

Table 2.1 Historical and contemporary views of the informal sector

Key indicators	Historical views (1950s to 1990s)	Contemporary views (1990s+)
Crime typology	Street traders perpetuate crime in inner cities.	In both the formal and informal sectors, criminals are a menace.
Economic performance	Activities and services are for subsistence and thus is not a subject of economic policy.	Informal enterprises are stable, expanding and dynamic, and produce beyond survival. Informal enterprises are affected by economic policies.
Economic connectivity	There is no association between the formal and the informal economy.	There is a symbiotic relationship between the informal and formal sectors. The informal economy linkages to the formal economy are producing for, trading with,

Key indicators	Historical views (1950s to 1990s)	Contemporary views (1990s+)
		distributing, and providing services to the formal economy.
Economic growth	The informal sector does not contribute to economic growth.	The informal sector helps the economy and needs assistance.
Employment status	The informal sector symbolises a reserve pool of surplus labour.	Informality mirrors waning informal employment due to structural adjustment and global competition. It reflects the failure of formal firms to absorb labour and their unwillingness to do the same.
Legal status	The informal economy has entrepreneurs who are illegal and unregistered. They try to avoid regulation and taxation.	The informal sector is not a criminal or legal economy but comprises non-standard wage workers, entrepreneurs, and self-employed persons. Goods and services produced are legal, although through irregular or unregulated means. Entrepreneurs and the self-employed would want barrier removal and enjoy more stable jobs and workers' rights.
Level of modernity	The informal sector is the traditional economy that will remove itself from modern industrial growth.	The informal sector is a feature of economic transition and capitalist industrialisation. The informal economy is expanding with modern industrial growth. It accounts for over 80% of new jobs in Africa. About 90% of India's labour force population is in the informal sector.
Level of production	The informal sector is only marginally productive.	The informal economy is efficient and resilient; thus, creating jobs. It provides employment, goods, and services to lower-income groups. Its contribution to GDP is quite significant.
Level of regulation	The informal economy is unregulated.	Some informal enterprises, like street trading, are controlled. Rules become a tool of harassment and control, not a way to encourage economic contribution; thus, employers of informal workers often avoid complying with labour legislation.
Registration status	The informal sector has unregistered businesses.	The informal sector comprises informal enterprises, informal jobs, casual day labourers, domestic workers, industrial outworkers, and other non-standard workers in both informal and formal firms.
Regulation by government	To regulate the informal economy is unnecessary interference with its workings.	Globalisation has led to the active role of governments in regulating the economy in general. Legislation helps spruce governments, investors, local enterprises, and workforce relations.
Scale of production	The informal economy consists of street traders and very small-scale producers.	The informal sector comprises various informal arrangements: resilient old form and emerging new ones.
Tax compliance	Many working in the informal economy are wealthy because they are unregulated and untaxed.	Incomes are lower in the informal economy than in the formal one due to micro-entrepreneurs who hire others. Informal wage workers, especially industrial workers, are impoverished.

Source: Adapted and modified from Chen (2007, 2012) and WIEGO (2001).

The preceding section explored the historical development of the informal sector. The following section focuses on the schools of thought regarding the origin and development of the informal sector.

2.3 Schools of thought

Section 2.2 discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the informal sector. The informal sector has received the attention of academia, development practitioners, government, non-governmental organisation (NGOs), and policymakers since the 1950s (Chitimira, 2021). The informal sector is diverse and multifaceted. Four dominant schools of thought are common in literature on the informal sector: the dualist, structuralist, legalist, and voluntarist schools (Castells and Portes, 1989; Chen, 2012; De Soto, 1989; WIEGO, 2014). Also, there is a further school of thought that is emerging - the inclusionist perspective (Lindell, 2010; Miraftab, 2009; Mitlin, 2008; Watson, 2009). The schools of thought are presented here with particular attention on the background, general view and focus, policy response, critical evaluation, and conclusion. The ongoing deliberations on the prevalence of the informal sector mirror the diverse thoughts in economic and social sciences. Practically, these schools of thought provide a partial explanation of the origins of the informal sector. For the sake of analysis, the theories are discussed separately.

2.3.1 Dualist school

a) Background

Both the ILO (1972) and Hart (1978) are proponents of the dualist school of thought, also known as the reformist economic school or residual theory (the oldest theory that compares the formal and informal sectors) (Chen, 2012, 2015). The proper study of the informal sector originated from Lewis's (1954) two-sector model. This model emphasised dualism: the industrial sector in urban areas and its associated unemployment, like a firm-centred economic sector, and a subsistence sector based in the countryside, which is related to underemployment and hidden employment, like the bazaar economy (Lewis, 1967).

b) General view and focus

Dualist thinking accepts that the formal and informal sectors exist along with one another. The formal sector often excludes workers in the informal sector (Hart, 1978). Furthermore, the informal sector develops because of the inability of the formal sector to provide jobs. The dualist school emphasises the traditional, survival and limited nature of the informal sector. Furthermore, the dualist approach emphasises that the informal sector offers safety nets during economic uncertainty (Sethuraman, 1976). Consequently, the informal sector will continue because of the imbalances between population growth rates and growth rates of industrial

employment and the gap between people skills and economic opportunities (Hart, 1973; ILO, 1972; Sethuraman, 1976). Under dualism, the role of the government is to provide a conducive platform that leads to employment creation.

Dualism vanished after industrial development, hence the need by academics and policymakers to understand whether this happens. The dualists have two distinct economies: the formal (thought of as advanced and therefore modern) and the informal (outdated and thus traditional). As this study suggests, the informal sector is diverse and unique but is related to the formal sector. Researchers like Williams and Round (2008) saw the informal economy as separate from the formal economy but as a buffer for the poor and marginalised, although with very few, if any, linkages with the formal sector; commonly referred to as the “marginalisation thesis” (Williams, 2006, 2007). The marginalisation thesis views the informal economy as peripheral to industrial development and transitory.

c) Policy response

Policymakers view the informal and formal sectors as opposite sides in a continuum (Hart, 1978; ILO, 1972). The informal economy disappears as a country develops; hence it becomes residual, a sign of “underdevelopment” (Potts, 2008). The residual nature is why some governments have repressed the informal economy. Governments, therefore, ought to create more formal jobs by providing financial services to informal enterprises. Excess labour is absorbed in the informal sector, a claim that has stood the test of time (Chen, 2015). Unemployment is due to capitalism that has tended to substitute human labour with technology in the formal sector (Quijano, 1972). Dualists argue that formalisation is inevitable to achieve economic development and, therefore, formalisation. For policymakers, formalisation means regularisation. However, the informal sector considers getting a business license and paying expensive taxes (Chen, 2005). This idea of regularising the informal sector is called the “formalisation thesis” (Williams, 2006, 2007).

The dualists presuppose the informal economy an urban phenomenon. Informalisation is driven by people outside the formal economy, like retrenched formal workers, womenfolk, and migrants (ILO, 2018). The debates on informality grew out of the realisation that it is a reality and a permanent feature of many economies (Chen et al., 2004). The informal economy is a product of capitalism and globalisation that is resilient and contributes to GDP and the gross national product (GNP) (Chen et al., 2004). Both the formal and informal sectors can be a measure of the economic development of a country.

d) Critical evaluation

The dualist theorists posit that informal practitioners are marginal, hence the need to formalise. The approach to formalisation assumes that informal sector workers join this sector due to the shortage of formal jobs. Recent academic research shows that people consider autonomy, flexibility, freedom, and job availability in choosing the industry and type of employment they want to join (Gerxhani, 2004). In the Global North, where the formalisation debate originated, significant numbers of people engaged in the informal economy on a self-employed basis (Chen, 2015, 2018). On a global scale, informality has surpassed formality in growth (Chen, 2018; Potts, 2008). The orthodox dualism view has been rescinded (Gerxhani, 2004). Informalisation is essential because it uses resources that could be considered waste into meaningful products, for example, used tyres to make sandals. In the Global South countries like Bolivia, the informal sector has been dominant, with more than 90% of employed people being in this sector for years, and the formal sector has been peripheral (World Bank, 2018). The view that informality is peripheral becomes a fallacy because the sector is growing resiliently, coexisting with the formal sector (Chen et al., 2004; Potts, 2008).

e) Conclusion

A dualist viewpoint is that the informal sector is marginal and transitory; a clear divide exists between the formal and informal sectors. Thus, dualism is a partial transition from rural to urbanised economies. Informality wanes as employment opportunities open due to modernisation and the expansion of traditional markets. The informal sector cannot absorb surplus labour due to its limited modern technology. Dualists perceive informality as expensive, inept, and risky for economic growth.

Consequently, informal enterprises must formalise; however, informal operators cannot formalise because of the inequities between population growth and current industrial employment and the differences between the skills base and economic opportunities. The limited linkages between the formal and informal sectors and the ties between the government and the informal sector make it difficult to formalise. According to the dualist's perspective, the government must provide a conducive environment with the necessary infrastructure, business development services, credit, and social services to informal operators.

2.3.2 Structuralist school

a) Background

The by-product theory is another name for the structuralist viewpoint. A by-product of the formal sector is the informal sector. The theory was developed by Moser (1978) and Castells and Portes (1989) with research on petty traders and producers, subcontracted workers, and casual workers. The structuralist school believes that informal businesses are inferior to those that are formal.

b) General view and focus

The structuralist school emphasises the exploitation of informal workers because, under capitalism, informal workers reduce the input and labour costs of large capitalist enterprises and increase the effectiveness of their businesses by paying less tax (Castells and Portes, 1989). Formal firms reduce their labour costs by underpaying workers and thus increase their competitiveness and profits. The government must remove the unequal relationship between the formal sector and the subordinated producers and workers to create employment for excess labour (Moser, 1978). Structuralist thought tends to be reductive as there is so much focus on the structure of informality instead of its functionality (Chen, 2007, 2012). The structuralists resent the dualist perspective by offering an alternative approach that views the informal as complementary and mutually dependent on the formal sector. It is the structural changes in an economy that bring about widespread changes.

c) Policy response

The structuralists believe that the informal and formal sector complements each other through diversity in producing goods and services (Castells and Portes, 1989). Similarly, capitalism is rooted in the commercial sector, especially in retail. In contrast, as the informal sector thrives as an outlet to dispense goods and services provided by the capitalist enterprises, the situation exhibits the intricate relationship between the formal and informal sectors (Fourie, 2018). Firms are economically advantaged in the formal system and use informal traders to distribute goods and services (Castells and Portes, 1989). Informality is due to deindustrialisation, but it provides survival opportunities for the poor. Informality is more resilient, as the ILO and World Bank argued during SAPs, recession, and state intervention (Mlambo, 1995; Williams, 2007). The testimony in countries that adopted the IMF and World Bank-directed economic recovery programmes and SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s were bad (Mlambo, 1995). In sub-Saharan

Africa, some countries that adopted SAPs in the 1990s are Angola, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The structural changes and conditionalities dictated by the IMF and the World Bank brought many people into the informal sector (Mlambo, 1995; Potts, 2008). Furthermore, to reduce costs, some formal businesses operate informally, especially in developing countries, a view commonly referred to as the “marginality thesis” (Williams, 2007).

d) Critical evaluation

The informal sector is predominant in the marginal populations of a country as a survival strategy. Informal work is perceived to be strong among the marginalised and the poor. On the contrary, informality has numerous conventional activities that people use in challenging times (Debrah, 2007). Again, in some countries like Bolivia and Ghana, informality is “mainstream” and the formal economy is “marginal”, for example, in Bolivia, more than 95% of the working population and about 63% of the GDP is derived from the informal sector (IMF, 2018). In the Netherlands, formally employed people participate more in informal activities. France, Germany, and Britain have also questioned the marginality thesis. However, this line of thought seems true in sub-Saharan Africa, where activities and incomes are still marginal in the informal sector. High inflation levels, business closures, downsizing, neoliberal economic reforms, and globalisation are critical structural changes leading to workers focusing more on the informal sector. Informality and formality make up the entire economy. Informality is a permanent feature of capitalism where the means of production, land labour capital and technology are in the hands of a few (Navarro, 2008). Industrial subcontracting is essential in informal enterprises, but in developing countries, it is irrelevant because economic actors have informal means of generating income.

e) Conclusion

According to structuralists, informality is a different way for capitalists to use labour. More detail is required regarding the novelty of the unorganised sector. In the production process, formal labour, not informality, is new. There are two major contributions from structuralists to the discussion of the informal economy: First, they emphasised that the informal economy serves to support the globalisation supported capitalist system by maintaining market competitiveness, as producers work to cut production costs (Castells and Portes, 1989). Second, more people are employed in the informal than the formal sector. An individual’s utility of income is higher in the large informal sector market where goods and services are cheap.

Similarly, capitalists employ casual labour to cut costs, especially in the globalisation milieu with stiff competition.

2.3.3 Legalist school

a) Background

The legalist perspective, also known as the neoliberal approach, was promoted by Hernando de Soto (1989, 2000). De Soto (1989) argued that there was a bias towards informal entrepreneurs and enterprises. The informal economy comprises astute entrepreneurs who avoid formal registration costs, time, and effort. Informal entrepreneurs need legal rights to convert assets into official property. In this perspective, informality results from hostile and unreasonable regulations and legal environments that create barriers to entering the formal sector (De Soto, 1989).

b) General view and focus

From a procedural view, informal enterprises need to regularise. In regularisation, the informally held capital can become real once the government protects property rights (De Soto, 1989). From the dualist and structuralist perspectives, the informal sector could be more productive due to the low human capital regarding skills (Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Thus, informal businesses cannot afford the statutory obligations and therefore resort to informality (De Soto, 1989, 2000). Failure to pay statutory obligations is due to excessive state regulations stifling private enterprise development and growth. Businesspeople are rational; they weigh the costs of informality, formality, and related expenses. The informal sector is thus either an alternative or legalist way to avoid registration and other bureaucratic tendencies (Grabrucker et al., 2018).

A thriving economy meets the basic needs of the poor. Nonetheless, the market could be more efficient in allocating and distributing resources (Fourie, 2018). The poor suffer because they are in the informal sector. When the demand and supply market scenarios are left to control and determine the distribution of resources, the rich will get more affluent and the poor more miserable (De Soto, 1989). Growing inequality and social injustice will become deep-rooted. The government regards some goods and services as merit goods, which are those that deserve extensive public finances, for example, roads.

The social injustices can only be improved by the resistance to overregulation so that people can get into an alternative route to the formal economy, which is the informal one (the surrogate one) (Chen, 2005).

The development and growth of the informal economy are part of the revenge strategy to circumvent state regulation and bureaucracy (Chen, 2018). Formalisation complexity has contributed to the prevalence and resilience of informality (Williams, 2005). There is an inverse relationship between formality and informality, where a formality decline usually accompanies informality growth. In the Global South, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, many micro-scale enterprises operate illegally to avoid costs.

c) Policy response

Laws and regulations should be simplified and strengthened to encourage the formalisation of enterprises. Debureaucratisation and deregulation of informality should be geared towards limited state intervention but expanding the responsibilities and opportunities of individuals by redesigning and eliminating contradictory, inconsistent and unnecessary laws. Current and relevant legislation must be updated to fit present reality; for instance, the formalisation processes should be accessible to all within a reasonably defined period and costs.

d) Critical evaluation

Very few informal businesses regularise (Fourie, 2018). Consequently, there should be more concern about state control and regulation. Regularisation promotes bribery and corruption from the state and state-related authorities (Chen, 2015, 2018; De Soto, 1989). Informal sector practitioners avoid exploitation, so they continue to be casual. State bureaucracy reduction or eradication helps the informal sector to regularise and thrive (WIEGO, 2014). Joining the formal economy has economic challenges, for instance entry barriers, namely the cost of formalisation, including the cost of leaving the informal economy, officially registering a business, and maintenance barriers. Maintenance barriers are costs that a formal enterprise has through formal operations. Formalising enterprises is complicated, costly, intimidating, and time-consuming, particularly for poor people.

e) Conclusion

There are two main hurdles to formalisation: excessive bureaucracy that creates cost and barriers; and a lack of property rights for those who decide to remain formal. Unwarranted bureaucracy means complying with many laws and regulations. Property rights and their allied

tools (bills of exchange, bonds, contracts, patent rights, promissory notes, and stock shares) generate income; in contrast, the lack of property rights needs to be improved in tools essential for capital accumulation and expanding business relationships. Adherence to laws results in lost business days, although rules are necessary for redressing market imperfections and better planning of public and private activities. In practice, laws are costly to the poor but protect wealthier groups with more robust legal protection. Legal protection is a privilege of the formal sector, which the informal sector does not regularly enjoy; informality breaks the legal obstacles to economic emancipation and participation.

2.3.4 Voluntarist school

a) Background

The voluntarist philosophy (also known as the poststructuralist theory) emerged after structuralism. Levenson and Maloney (1998) and Maloney (2004) are the leading proponents of this school of thought. The main argument of the voluntarist perspective is that informal sector practitioners volunteer to go the informal route to evade production costs, regulations, and taxation (Levenson and Maloney, 1998). In contrast to the legalist school, voluntarists do not purport to have been crushed by cumbersome state registration processes (Chen, 2018). The origins of this theory lie in neoclassical and neoliberal economics, as proposed by Maloney (2004). The approach emphasises the importance of self-employed people in the informal economy.

b) General view and focus

The voluntarist school standpoint is more focused on business exit from the formal sector into the informal one, namely, informal entrepreneurs always make a calculated decision to exit the formal system (Maloney, 2004). The exit is due to overregulation and control by the state. Maloney (2004) saw the informal economy as entrepreneurs who operate informally to avoid taxation, regulations, electricity and rental fees and other associated costs of formal operations (Chen, 2012; Maloney, 2004). The prices are perceived to be prohibitive and a threat to profits and business expansion.

c) Policy response

Governments mostly want to regularise the informal sector. The drive towards formality desires to increase the government's tax revenue base. Also, governments want to reduce unfair competition between informal and formal enterprises by levelling the playing field.

Consequently, there is a need for regularisation (Fourie, 2018). Established formal businesses must honour statutory obligations like taxes, pension schemes and social protection policies. Similarly, the informal sector should also comply with legislative requirements.

d) Critical evaluation

There is a relationship between the voluntarist school of thought and poststructuralist thinking. Poststructuralist thinking postulates that an individual makes cautious choices to follow the natural route due to social capital, networking, and the need to revive oneself. Furthermore, individuals go the informal route in response to neoliberalism (Chen, 2012). Individuals volunteer to go the informal way, although they know that local authorities are usually vindictive of the informal sector activities. The cruel nature is evidenced by the seizure of business items, arbitrary arrest, running battles and harassment. Improving the relations between informal sector practitioners and local authorities is critical to the growth of informal sector businesses (Fourie, 2018; Grabrucker et al., 2018).

e) Conclusion

Informal entrepreneurs operate informally after calculating the relative costs and benefits of remaining formal or becoming informal. Opportunistic informal producers and traders usually decide to go informal after a SWOT analysis of the costs and benefits of informality and formality. For targeted intervention, local and central governments should evaluate why some firms and people decide to go the informal route. State bureaucracy and onerous statutory obligations like taxes and levies are significant challenges towards formality.

2.3.5 Inclusionist school

a) Background

The inclusionist school emerged due to the growing literature on informality (Assan and Chambers, 2014). The perspective focuses on the economic and political linkages between formality and informality. The chief proponents of this perspective are Lindell (2010), Miraftab (2009), Mitlin (2008) and Watson (2009). The inclusionist philosophy focuses on the political agency of poor informal dwellers and workers in cities, their role as organised citizens and grassroots collectives that shape relationships within a community. Links that are created either delay or enhance poor women and men from being included or excluded from a residence in the city and deriving livelihoods (or working) from it.

b) General view and focus

According to exclusionists, the informal economy develops because of anti-poor policies, rules, and governance structures that prevent the poorest producers and traders from accessing formal employment, necessary urban services, and liveable urban environments (Watson, 2009). The poorest and most marginalised informal producers and traders in an urban area are the focus of the inclusionist viewpoint. Because urban areas are expensive, some people are either excluded or allowed to live there. Affordability in urban areas is measured based on housing, land, and access to services. However, what is adequate is sometimes unaffordable, for example, low-cost sanitation is only available in some informal urban settlements. Including casual workers in planning urban areas is often disempowering and inequitable (Lindell, 2010). It is usually the rich that decide for the poor.

c) Policy response

From a pro-poor urban planning perspective, there are contestations between formality and informality (Miraftab, 2009). Collective mobilisation among informal producers and traders is necessary to reduce the hegemonic practice of resistance and inclusion of informal workers. The local government should be held accountable for improving the welfare of poor urban workers and dwellers. Property rights are not very important from an inclusionist perspective, although these are in the legalist school. Property rights are unnecessary for the inclusionist realm because becoming formal does not benefit the poor. The inclusionist school focuses on a collective organisation that is optimistic about resisting the economic dominance of large businesses (Mitlin, 2008).

d) Critical evaluation

Incongruent with the structuralist school, the inclusionist school points out the limitations of the domination and oppression of people by the capitalist system, especially the urban poor. The zeal and enthusiasm of the poor enable them to produce local solutions to their problems with support from the state and civil society. Informal–formal linkages are *zones of contestation* where *inconsistent judgments* are ordinary. The inclusionist school must embrace the ecocity concept, where environmental issues are integrated into urban life. Furthermore, inclusionists do not value the relationship between the economy and social needs, or the need for residents' participation in civic matters and the connections between a people's culture and nature.

e) Conclusion

Urban planning should be inclusive; local authorities should do it with residents. Inclusion is essential to cater to men, women, the poor and the marginalised, usually in the urban informal sector. Informal workers do not get recognition like their formal colleagues as economic actors that need local and central government recognition and protection incorporated into financial and urban planning. Planning must pay close attention to and incorporate the informal sector to fully recognise the rights of those who depend on this economy for their livelihoods, especially as a survival tactic. Urban areas should have an economy organised around social needs; governance should be participatory and negotiated publicly through extensive consultation and deliberative programmes. Table 2.2 summarises the five schools of thought on informality.

The theories on the origins and development of the informal sector are essential to ascertain governments' attitudes and responses to the informal sector. Usually, in any country, half-truths about these theories may be evident since they are neither comprehensive nor exclusive (Chen, 2018). Thus, the residual impacts of these theories are visible in the informal sector discourse. In the twentieth century, emerging scholarships on the informal sector focused on employment and enforcement issues (Assan and Chambers, 2014). The current debates on the informal sector focus on various types of informal work and the holistic conceptual models (Section 2.4), and the formalisation debate. The informal sector is multifaceted as it consists of informal self-employment (employers in informal businesses and self-employed persons) and informal wage employment (employees of informal enterprises and paid domestic workers) (Chen, 2018). Chen further argued that informal employment includes work in small and unregistered enterprises that rarely cover workers through social protection. The holistic conceptual models, as Chen advocates, focus on the employment issue in terms of the quality of employment and the number of people employed. Likewise, economists view the informal sector as a buffer for the unemployed in times of an economic crisis (Fourie, 2018). The current debates on informality explain that formal and informal economies are interdependent (WIEGO, 2020). The informal sector needs regularisation so that it can pay statutory obligations. The holistic models, as described in Section 2.4, attempt to capture the main facets of informality regarding employment status, a feat the five schools of thought in Section 2.3 should have considered.

Table 2.2 Key features of the primary schools of thought on the informal sector

School of thought and proponents	Dualists	Structuralists	Legalists	Voluntarists	Inclusionists
Propounded by:	ILO (1972), Hart (1973), Sethuraman (1976) and Tokman (1978)	Castells and Portes (1989); Moses (1978)	De Soto (1989, 2000)	Levenson and Maloney (1998); Maloney (2004)	Lindell (2010), Mirafab (2009), Mitlin (2008), Watson (2009)
Who they focus on	People engaged in traditional and survival activities	Petty traders and producers, subcontracted workers, casual workers	Informal entrepreneurs and enterprises	Self-employed, male entrepreneurs in informal enterprises	The political agency of poor informal dwellers and workers in cities
How they view the informal economy	As independent from the rest of the economy, essential to people who live in poverty as a safety net	As subordinated informal enterprises, workers reduce the input, labour costs of large capitalist enterprises and increase their effectiveness	It comprises astute entrepreneurs who avoid the costs, time, and effort of formal registration. They need legal rights to convert assets into formal property	As made up of entrepreneurs who operate informally to avoid taxation, regulations, electricity and rental fees, and other costs	Collective mobilisation among informal residents and workers as a counter-hegemonic practice of resistance and inclusion
Causality	Exclusion of informal operators from current opportunities is due to a) imbalances between the growth rates of the population and that of modern industrial employment; and b) a gap between people's skills and the structural economic opportunities	Informality is due to capitalist growth, like an attempt by formal firms to reduce labour costs and increase competitiveness, the reaction of formal firms to the power of organised labour, state regulation through taxes, legislation and global competition	A hostile legal system leads to informal activities and informal, extra-legal norms. Cumbersome government rules and procedures create barriers to formalisation and stuff that stifle informal entrepreneurs	Informal operators who operate informally of criminally after cost-benefit analysis of informality relative to formality. Informality is a choice to enjoy the benefits of informality	Anti-poor policies and regulations and increasing neoliberal systems of urban governance
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ease of entry • Reliance on indigenous resources • Family ownership of enterprises • The small scale of operations 	Informality is perceived as universal, heterogenous, increasing, and systemically linked to capitalist/formal firms.	An aggressive reception from the legal system leads to informal activities and extra-legal norms. Prohibitive costs of becoming formal due to registration and license fees.	Cost of formality (avoided): payroll taxes and social protection contributions. Benefits of informality: A way to earn income while avoiding costs of formality	The informal sector results from anti-poor policies, regulations, and governance systems that exclude the poorest informal producers and traders from accessing formal employment, essential urban services, and

School of thought and proponents	Dualists	Structuralists	Legalists	Voluntarists	Inclusionists
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour-intensive and adapted technology • Skills acquired outside the formal school system • Unregulated and competitive markets 	There are structural barriers – not just bureaucratic barriers to formalisation and vested interest in the formal economy – promoting informal arrangements	<p>Cost of remaining formal: Taxes, compliance with laws and higher rates for public utilities. Cost of illegality to the economy: Avoidance of fees and penalties as well as tax and labour.</p> <p>Cost of the absence of proper law to informal workers: Limited or no property rights, enforceable contracts, and benefits from the formal sector</p>		space in the city to live and work
Policy responses	Governments should create more formal jobs by providing financial services to informal enterprises	Governments should redress the unequal relationship between the formal sector and subordinated producers and workers	Informal enterprises regularised to unleash their productive potential and convert their assets into actual capital	Governments ought to regularise informal enterprises to increase their tax base and reduce unfair competition by informal enterprises	Holding local governments accountable to poor urban dwellers and workers in the process

Source: Modified and adapted from Assan and Chambers (2014), Castells and Portes (1989), Chen et al. (2004), De Soto (1989), ILO (1972), Maloney (2004), WIEGO (2011)

2.4 Holistic conceptual models – Current perspectives on the development of the informal sector

A holistic conceptual model approach means thinking about the broader picture, like demonstrating a scheme comprising the composition of concepts for people to explore, know, understand, or simulate a subject that the model suggests. A holistic conceptual model believes that the parts of an entity are intimately interconnected and understandable only by reference to the whole (Chen, 2011, 2018). Thus, new thinking on the informal sector uses models that capture the critical components of informality and the different factors that drive it rather than just theories, as outlined in Section 2.2. In Section 2.4.1, the discussion focuses on the WIEGO Model, the World Bank Model of Informality (2007), and the Ravi Kanpur Model as the new and emerging models that holistically explain the origins and development of the informal sector.

2.4.1 WIEGO network model of informality


WIEGO is an international NGO formed in 1997 (Chen, 2012; WIEGO, 2001). It is a global action-research-policy network focusing on four themes:

- Increasing the status of the working people living on or below the poverty line in the informal economy.
- Constructing and reinforcing organisations of informal workers.
- Enhancing research and statistics on informal employment.
- Promoting fair and appropriate labour, social protection, trade, and urban policies.

Globally, there are five main categories of employment classification based on economic risk and authority (Chen, 2018). These categories are employers, employees, own-account workers, unpaid contributing family workers, and members of a producer cooperative (Chen, 2011). WIEGO added two more categories to the standard classes: casual day labourers and industrial subcontracted workers.

According to the WIEGO framework, there are six different employment statuses: employers, informal wage workers (regular), own-account operators, informal wage workers (casual), industrial outworkers/homeworkers (subcontracted workers) and unpaid but helpful family workers (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Hierarchy of earnings and poverty risk by employment status and gender



Source: Chen (2012)

WIEGO published two reviews at the end of the 1990s, one based on the literature at the time (Sethuraman, 1998) and the other on the most recent statistics (Charmes, 1998). The connection between informality, poverty, and gender was the main topic of discussion. WIEGO obtained data sets from South Africa, Ghana, India, Egypt, and El Salvador (Chen et al., 2005). The employment statuses of the five countries are segmented according to gender, average income, and risk of poverty in Figure 2.1. However, these countries lacked data on sporadic day labourers and industrial outworkers. As workers moved down the employment ladder, their average earnings decreased and their likelihood of living in a low-income family increased.

Chen, the co-founder of WIEGO and its international coordinator, named the WIEGO Model. Chen was the principal author of the report that first developed the model. The WIEGO model has four dominant schools of thought, the dualists, legalists, structuralists and voluntarists (see Section 2.3) and how the schools shape the four Es:

1. Exclusion (dualist perspective)
2. Entry (barriers) (legalist perspective)
3. Exploitation (structuralists perspective)
4. Exit (voluntarists perspective) (Chen, 2012, 2018).

The informal sector is explained by the WIEGO model using exit and exclusion. The model accomplishes this by making use of the schools of thought from the unofficial sector covered in Section 2.2. In Segment 1 of the documentary about informal employment, a legalist viewpoint arguing for excessive regulation, depicts a situation in which workers either leave the formal economy or encounter barriers to do so. Segment 2 shows their employers taking advantage of a situation where informal workers do not have formal employment the hostile legal environment fosters informality. The second segment illustrates a dualist viewpoint in which there is an imbalance between the demand for and supply of labour. Segment 3 illustrates a situation in which own account operators may occasionally need to be included and encounter obstacles when attempting to participate in the formal economy. Casual day labourers and industrial outworkers (those who work outside the premises of their employer) may be excluded from and exploited in Table 2.3, Segment 4 because they are located so far away from the employer. Segment 5 depicts a situation where industrial outworkers (i.e., contractors or employees), work from home or elsewhere and therefore cannot be designated a business premise.

Formalisation excludes and exploits industrial outworkers although they are provided with the means of production by the factory or contractor. Finally, in Segment 6, the head of the family business may underpay contributing family members; hence they may be excluded and exploited regarding formality, for example, provided family members are excluded from state benefits. The exclusion of family members from state benefits is a calculated decision by informal entrepreneurs to exit the formal system, a typical voluntarist perspective. In general, each section of informality relates to two causal frameworks, the exclusion, or the exploitation factor (WIEGO Network Holistic Framework, n.d.). A summary of the WIEGO Model of six different segments by the status of employment is provided in Table 2.3:

Table 2.3 Segmentation of informal employment (by employment status) and causal explanation

Segments of informal employment	Primary causal explanation
1. Informal employers may choose to exit from or face barriers to entry into the formal economy	Exit + Entry barriers
2. Informal employees + casual day labourers + industrial outworkers who do not have benefits associated with regular employment and are exploited by employers or their contractors	Exclusion + Exploitation
3. On account operators may be left out of or face barriers to entry into the formal sector	Exclusion + Entry barriers
4. Casual day labourers	Exclusion + Exploitation

5. Industrial outworkers	Exclusion + Exploitation
6. Unpaid contributing family workers do not get state benefits along with other family business members. The family head or other family members exploit family workers regarding the allocation of labour and benefits within the family	Exclusion + Exploitation

Source: WIEGO Network Holistic Framework (n.d.).

2.4.1.1 *Income and gender inequalities in the informal sector*

The informal economy literature widely shows that income and gender inequalities pervade. Gender and income disparities exist in the informal economy (Grabrucker et al., 2018). This circumstance is independent of the physical environment or the particular activity or occupation. As seen in Figure 2.1, there are variations in income earnings in the informal economy. The WIEGO Model of Informal Employment is used to illustrate gendered income disparities (WIEGO, n.d.). Employers typically earn the most money, with their employees, more regular informal wage workers, own account operators, casual informal wage workers, industrial outworkers, and unpaid family members following in decreasing order (Chen, 2007, 2012).

Women unnecessarily work in low-paying or unpaid informal jobs, like those at home, in families without pay, in the workplace, and as informal wage workers (Chant, 2010, 2013). Men also tend to work in jobs that pay more, like those that are employers and regular wage workers. Additionally, women perform most unsafe paid work (Chen et al., 2004). Compared to employers, women are more likely to work in family-orientated businesses in developing nations. Unfortunately, for women, unpaid domestic work within the home is not shown in Figure 2.1. Likewise, the relationship between women and poverty is blurred; women from high-income households have substantial unpaid domestic duties (WIEGO, 2022).

2.4.2 World Bank -Economic agents

Three pairs of economic agents drive informality (World Bank, 2007). First, informality is the result of inadequate human capital. Micro-firms with limited growth potential only engage with the state if there are high barriers to entry. Some firms partially register their workers and sales to avoid taxation; others go the informal route. Second, informality results from opportunistic evasion due to avoidance of labour codes, illegal activities, tax evasion, subcontracted production, and an unprotected workforce. Defensive evasion responds to a bureaucratic, captured, and weak state. Passive avoidance is due to the existence of the premodern economy with informal or non-state institutions. Third, formal regulations are optional for informal

operators and workers who have always been informal. Therefore, the exit is an inappropriate label. Some workers in the informal sector are out of work due to labour market segmentation, where the workers fail to get formal jobs in the formal sector. Also, enterprises cannot formalise because of onerous entry regulations. Firms fail to employ more people due to the formal sector's excessive tax and regulatory burdens.

2.4.3 Ravi Kanbur Model

Ravi Kanbur is a renowned development economist and formerly director of the World Development Report (Chen, 2012). Kanbur advocates that

anti-poverty plans must underscore 'empowerment' (assisting the poor's capacity to influence state institutions and social norms) and security (reducing the costs of financial shocks for the ordinary people) as well as an opportunity (increased access to assets by the poor (Kanbur, 2009:8).

In 2009, Kanbur postulated a conceptual framework rooted in four types of economic responses to the regulation of the economy, namely:

- A – Stay within the ambit of the law and comply (formal).
- B – Stay within the purview of the regulation but do not comply (informal and illegal).
- C – Adjust activity to move out of the ambit of the law (unofficial).
- D – Outside the purview of the regulation in the first place, so no, there is no need to adjust (informal).

For Kanbur, assigning B, C and D the same label as *informal* hides more information than it reveals. These are distinct categories with distinct economic characteristics related to the regulation because disaggregation allows for more accurate policy analysis (Chen, 2012). Informality fades with development. Informality has either remained stagnant or increased although it is often viewed as bad and associated with low incomes and poverty (Fourie, 2018; Kanbur, 2009). The current focus on global scholarships in the informal economy is on employment and enforcement. There is jobless growth due to technological advancement, and the informal sector employs many people. However, there is a need to maintain law and order. In the same vein, the focus of current informality debates is that informal sector activities should formalise. Having looked at the development of the informal sector, Section 2.5 focusses on the economic, political and social advantages and disadvantages of the informal sector.

2.5 Informal sectors importance

aniels (2004) maintains that to understand the informal sector requires an understanding of what the formal sector is. The ‘formal’ sector is waged labour within a framework of rules and regulations, usually devised and implemented by the state, on working hours, minimum wages, health and safety of the social obligations of employers and employees”. The informal sector falls outside the ambit of the definition and do not conform to a legal authority (Castells and Portes,1989). Since the 1970s, the informal sector has developed as a term in contradistinction to the formal sector. The binary of formality and informality often views informality as unfavourable. The colonial conception that formality and informality are contraries still lingers in developing countries. Governments prefer formality over informality (Chen , 2018). Development practitioners measure economic progress by the degree of informality. Informality signifies low levels of development although it can be a springboard towards entrepreneurship (Hansenne, 1991).

Informality is unregulated, unstable volatile and survivalist with negative attributes like crime, illegality, tax evasion, undeclared labour and unregulated businesses (ILO, 1972; Bangasser, 2000). The current policy mantra discourse focusses on linkages between the formal and informal economies (Chen, 2012). The linkages are through suitable legal and regulatory frameworks in conjunction changes in registration and taxation policies. Table 2.4 summarises the main distinctive characteristics of the formal and informal sector.

Table 2:4 Distinctive features of the formal and the informal sector

Formal sector	Informal sector
Barriers to entry	Ease of entry
Capitalist enterprise	Family ownership
Fixed wage	No wage relation, uncertain earnings
Fixed working hours (overtime at times)	Uncertain hours
Formal training	Skills acquired outside formal education
Formal working contract	No formal working contract
Important technology	Adaptive technology/labour-intensive
Legal protection	No legal protection
Often unionised	Non-unionised (with some exceptions)
Permanent employment	No permanent employment
Regular employment	Irregular employment
Regulated markets	Unregulated/competitive markets
Uses foreign capital	Reliance on indigenous resources
Within government policy	Outside government control

Source: (Chen, 2012; Daniels, 2004 & Castells and Portes, 1989) with modifications

The classification of the formal and informal sectors is flawed; it fails to highlight three tenets that are important for social protection and insurance in the informal sector, i.e., 1) the formal sector is frequently experiencing informalisation 2) the diversity within the informal sector and 3) the connectivity between the formal and informal areas. In the formal economy, jobs are gradually subcontracted or done on a piece-rate basis leading to the proliferation of the informal sector. Table 2.5 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the informal sector (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.5 Summary: Advantages and disadvantages of the informal sector

• Advantages of the informal sector	• Disadvantages of the informal sector
Economic	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informal sector activities may help in maintaining competitiveness and flexibility of production • Growth is supported and encouraged • Informal sector puts downward pressure on wages in the formal labour market • Lower prices for goods and services in the informal sector • Generation of substantial personal income • Low labour costs characterise the informal sector • High productivity of capital <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Survivalist-orientated, especially in a crisis – On-the-job training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited development strategy and growth in the informal sector • The informal sector causes distortions in economic indicators, for example, unemployment rate, inflation rate and growth rate. • Tax evasions and associated challenges, like budget deficits and increases in tax rates • Unfair competition for the national and international formal sector • Work in the informal sector is often characterised by low productivity and low incomes • Prevalence of low, irregular and poverty wages and income • The informal sector is negatively related to the provision of public goods due to the falling national revenues
Social	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informal sector activities provide families with employment, enabling them to meet their basic needs and increase their well-being • It offers freedom and opportunities for initiative and creativity • It is a better alternative, even though poorly paid and unprotected, than being dependent on state benefits or starving 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No or limited social benefits and security • Participants in the informal sector have poor working conditions • No taxes or social security contributions compared to participants in the formal sector • No freedom of association
Political	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The informal sector is a safety valve for public dissatisfaction and social tensions • Informal sector activities tolerated/promoted for political patronage. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Misleading statistics of the state of the economy to policymakers • Informal sector operations increase corruption and political lobbying with adverse consequences, i.e., politicians manipulate informal workers to gain mileage

Source : adapted and modified from Chen 2018 and (Castells and Portes,1989)

2.6 Lessons drawn from theories of the informal sector

The theories on the development of the informal sector show overlap in the way the informal sector is perceived. No single theory explains informality due to the extensive structural forces and regulations that drive informality. The causes and existence of informality are multifaceted. The self-employed may decide to operate informally to avoid being registered and paying taxes. Others end up working in the unorganised sector due to necessity, socialisation, or tradition. To lessen informality, policymakers can lower transaction costs and registration barriers. The decline in formal wage employment and the informalisation of previously formal jobs are the main causes of the rise in informal wage employment. Informalisation grows by some employers that retain a small essential workforce to cut costs like contributions to social security or pensions, payroll taxes and other statutory obligations. Workers may want to preserve their jobs by colluding with their employers to evade regulatory requirements.

Each of the schools of thought may contain an element of truth (Discussed in Section). The theories primarily represent ideological and philosophical viewpoints; hence they are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Each school of thought provides a causation theory (Chen, 2012). Although these schools of thought are essential, the interest is not in the macro-economic or ideological reasons for understanding the informal sector. Instead, the benefit of this research is understanding the livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in the Harare CBD. Despite the value of these schools of thought, they have yet to say much about the lives and experiences of informal sector practitioners. The main questions that these schools of thought do not answer are:

- What effort do people put in?
- What vulnerabilities do they have?
- How do they respond to risks and shocks (for example, government regulations)?
- In simple terms, how do informal sector practitioners survive?

The questions above have led to developing the holistic conceptual models described in Section 2.4. The holistic conceptual models attempt to give a comprehensive overview of the origins and development of the informal sector models, whether computational, conceptual, graphical or mathematical, simulate reality and are inconclusive. Models can forecast the future, but their main drawback is that they are *idealisations* or *simplifications* of reality and thus cannot replace reality, hence the inherent weakness of holistic models (Chen , 2018).

The subsequent discussion on the historical development of the informal sector unravelled the strengths and limitations of the informal sector. Formal training costs are high in Zimbabwe, but the informal sector enables people to acquire skills, employment, and social security, irrespective of their educational and socioeconomic status. Informality can also be transitional to the formal economy. However, informality is associated with competition, corruption, and violence, although street vendors have coping and adaptation strategies to curtail economic and humanitarian challenges amidst high informality, limited structural transformation, low investment, misallocation of productive resources, price and exchange rate instability, and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) substantial quasi-fiscal activities (RBZ, 2008).

2.7 Conclusion

The origins, formalisation and measurement of the informal sector aroused the interests of academics, policymakers, and practitioners. The complexity of the concept of informality has influenced the competing agendas of different stakeholders. A universally acknowledged definition of the informal sector is an illusion. A widely agreed definition would have made it easier to compare measurement methods. The problem of double counting could be reduced or eliminated. An attempt to succinctly measure the informal economy is only possible through multiple ways; research validates data collected between distinct phases of the economy in each country. The various schools of thought that explained the origins of informality show the sector's dynamism.

The informal sector operates differently in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, even though they are all called the developing (Global South) and the developed world (Global North). However, a nation's socioeconomic, political, and historical circumstances shape the degree of informality (Castells and Portes, 1989). The theories, schools of thought and holistic models tried to give various dimensions through which the informal economy develops in the Global South. The informal sector needs to explain the different facets inherent in this sector, especially the genesis, reasons for the proliferation of the sector, methods of measuring the informal sector and the associated impacts. Informality in the global south is more complicated than what all these theories explain. Chapter 2 looked at the informal sector origins, development , opportunities and challenges, Chapter 3 shift to informality from an African perspective.

Chapter 3

INFORMALITY: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter discussed the theoretical perspectives associated with the informal economy. This chapter investigates the informal sector and its evolution in Africa. African economies performed well after independence. However, the informal economy was inconvenient for postcolonial governments, and governments expected it would disappear with modernisation. Consequently, African policies discouraged the informal sector (directly and indirectly). This chapter discusses the changing attitudes and policies of African states towards the informal sector in urban areas.

Recent policies on the informal sector in Africa are dualistic. This dualism is visible in two contrasting ways: On the one hand, policies promote capital-intensive, dynamic, and modernised production systems. On the other hand, policies must deal with an economy characterised by subsistence agriculture, family labour, low productivity levels, low technology use, marginal precapitalist modes of production and simple operations and production patterns. African governments initially followed the approach of colonial powers to dismantle the informal economy. Although there has been an increasing realisation of the role of the informal sector in socioeconomic development over the last two decades, urban planning laws and land use zoning have remained unchanged since colonial times (Meagher, 1995; Sparks and Barnett, 2010).

In some cases, there is even harassment of informal entrepreneurs. Two questions arose: Does development require eradication or collaboration with the informal economy? And: Should the informal sector be curbed or supported? The responses of African countries towards the informal sector have been inappropriate and do not recognise its potential.

3.2 Profiling Africa's informal economy

Africa's informal economy is diverse because of colonialism, its history, engagement with the global economy, and governance's nature after independence (Kassem, 2014; Kumi and Mensah, 2017). The population of sub-Saharan Africa is about 1.1 billion, with 41% of sub-

Saharan Africans living in extreme poverty (Global Trends, 2019). Recently, there has been a reduction in armed conflicts, democratic transitions, economic growth, macroeconomic stability and the increased informalisation of economies (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2019).

In sub-Saharan Africa, informal employment contributes to 86% of men’s and 92% of women’s total employment (ILO, 2018). The ILO (2017) estimated that 82% of the population of sub-Saharan African does not have access to social protection. Furthermore, informal employment accounts for 60% of all urban jobs and 90% of all new jobs in urban areas (ILO, 2016; World Bank, 2018). There are variations among African countries. For example, in South Africa, the informal economy employment is under 30%, while in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, it is above 60% (IMF, 2018). Several African countries faced exponential growth in informality in the last decades as informality became the ‘*generalised mode of metropolitan urbanisation*’ (Roy, 2005). Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of informal employment as a percentage of non-agricultural employment for 30 African states range from 90% in Togo and Benin to 34% in South Africa (Figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1 Percentage of total non-agricultural employment in Africa

Source: (ILO, 2018)

3.3 Development of Africa's informal sector

The precolonial and colonial eras shaped Africa's informality, but there were no uniform patterns across Africa (Mkandawire, 2007). Most West African countries gave free rein to informal businesses. However, criminalising the informal sector was common under colonial rule (Mkandawire, 2005, 2010). The following subsections focus on the evolution of the informal sector in Africa.

3.3.1 Precolonial (before 1800)

Although not uniform across Africa, the precolonial era consisted of an informal economy dominated by artefacts, arts and crafts, small-scale farmers and miners, construction, traditional healers, wood, and stone carving through local resource use (Kiaga and Leung, 2020; WIEGO, 2014). Barter trade was more common than wage employment. Furthermore, the informal sector needs more organisation and representation (Kiaga and Leung, 2020). Some African societies were vast empires with kings in charge who had virtually unchecked power and no concept of the separation of powers, resulting in a centralised state with a convoluted system of government (Conyers, 2007). The king, his advisors and councillors had executive, judicial and legislative roles in Ancient Egypt in North Africa, Mali and Songhai in West Africa, Nubia, and Axum in Northeast Africa and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa. The king was the chief executive, judge, and lawmaker who collected revenue and tribute from the informal economy through the army and trade control (Conyers, 2007; Mkandawire, 2010). African societies were decentralised. On the eve of colonial rule, about 33% of African states lived in decentralised communities (Mkandawire, 2010). Africa's decentralised states often had groups of neighbouring towns or villages without political connection with a larger kingdom. Most decentralised societies did not have a traditional leadership system; their informal economies operated outside state control (Conyers, 2007).

3.3.2 Colonial period (mid-1800s to mid-1900s)

Colonial rule controlled the informal sector through urban planning laws that were anti-poor (Kamete, 2017). The colonialists viewed the informal sector as marginal in developing commercial and industrial zones (Conyers, 2007; Mkandawire, 2007). Several factors affected the informal sector negatively: bureaucratisation, corruption, demoralisation, lack of socioeconomic infrastructure conducive to productive economic activity, police harassment and racist licensing laws (Rogerson, 2016). The introduction of capitalism in the colonial states

fuelled the development of the informal sector (Amin, 1974). The capitalist state emerged through three mechanisms: (i) labour reserves (Southern Africa), (ii) the cash economy (*I'economie de traite*) (West Africa) and (iii) and concession-wing companies (Congo, equatorial Africa) (Mkandawire, 2007).

(i) Labour reserves were common in Southern Africa (Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe). Labour reserves (pools of the unemployed and underemployed) were created in Southern Africa's rural areas to limit Black people's entrance into the urban areas (Conyers, 2007). Southern Africa has a small informal sector because of historically low levels of urbanisation (Mkandawire, 2007). Southern African cities had extensive *locations* or *compounds*, planned and regulated housing schemes covered by such laws as the Rhodesian Natives' (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (Alexander, 2012) that controlled urbanisation (Alexander, 2012). Pass laws, native reserves creation, forced labour (*chibharo*), and the Vagrancy Acts (Alexander, 2012) curtailed the African movements into white areas. Africans were either fully employed in the "White" economy or lived in "Tribal Trust Lands". Blacks were only allowed in urban areas as workers but not as urban dwellers (Kamete, 2017). Southern Africa's informal activities were few due to their detachment from the main commercial and industrial areas and zoning laws (Kamete, 2017; Kiaga and Leung, 2020), with the illusion that there was no unemployment to justify a limited informal sector (Clarke, 1978). However, Africans had small *underground* informal businesses in the townships like *shebeens*.

(ii) The creation of the informal sector also resulted from cash crop economies in West Africa. The prevalence of the informal economy in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Leone results from a tradition of entrepreneurship (Mkandawire, 2005). West African countries are mostly cash crop economies due to plantations created during the colonial period. The primary function of colonial states was to ensure spontaneous informal sector growth in the cash economy. During the early colonisation, forced labour and compulsory deliveries of commodities from the indigenous population were common (Morange, 2015). Colonial governments forced the indigenous people to sell at the market. Although the colonialists had adequate capital, they never directly entered cash crops. Instead, they sold and exchanged plantation produce (Munro, 1976; Rodney, 1972). Several indigenous intermediaries collected produce from small-scale producers for onward selling, thus creating the informal sector, which

resulted in the emergence of African capitalists and a range of small informal economic activities, for example, small repair workshops and retail shops (Munro, 1976).

(iii) African concessions (the right to operate specific businesses) as allocated by colonial powers created brutal labour control and criminalisation systems (WIEGO, 2014). Concession economies meant that the whites controlled the sectors that Black people could enter by criminalising the informal sector (Megersa, 2020b). Concession economies were common in Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, the DRC, Gabon, and Rwanda (Central Africa).

Colonial governments discouraged permanent urbanisation (Kamete, 2017). The discouragement entailed restrictive and segregated housing and labour policies (Rogerson and Beavon, 1980). The perception was that British ruled colonies were more democratic, allowing for the informal sector development in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe (Conyers, 2007). Labour export expanded Europe's manufacturing industry (Meagher, 2014). Labour export deprived the informal sector of growth, and land taxation forced people to work informally (Fourie, 2018; Meagher, 2014). Those working in the informal sector were considered non-workers, thus limiting the informality basis (Hart, 1973; ILO, 1972).

3.3.3 Postcolonial era and the informal economy

Most post-independent African countries had centralised governments (Conyers, 2007). It is possible to distinguish between four phases.

3.3.3.1 Phase 1: Market-driven model (1950 to 1960s)

Most postcolonial governments implemented a market-driven, pro-growth macroeconomic model (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). Policies in the informal sector were absent. Agricultural investment targeted export-orientated productions to the detriment of subsistence farmers. Higher education and financial programmes (credit facilities and bank loans) focused on formal and financial policies. Small-scale producers remained outside the formal, regulated structures.

3.3.3.2 Phase 2: Searching for alternative models (1970s)

The 1970s were tumultuous. Stagflation was prominent, a combination of slow economic growth and high inflation brought on by oil prices. Some governments reverted to alternative models to expand economic growth and accept the role of the informal sector in economic development. Informal firms grew with cheaper products (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). Julius Nyerere's (Tanzania) philosophy on informalisation through *Ujamaa* (Swahili for extended

family) and self-reliance-*Ujamaa* is an example (1964 to 1985). The *Ujamaa* foundations were traditional African values, communalism, familyhood and self-employment (the informal sector) enshrined in Catholic social teachings (equality, freedom, and unity). *Ujamaa* called for the nationalisation of banks and industry. For Nyerere, urbanisation depended on wage labour and was unsustainable. However, industrial production fell by more than 50%, and a formal output fall led to the creation of more informal firms (Mkandawire, 2015). *Ujamaa* influenced other African leaders to embrace the informalisation of economies through production localisation for self-reliance. Examples were:

- Jomo Kenyatta's White Paper on Africanisation (Kenya).
- Kenneth Kaunda's humanism (Zambia).
- Kwame Nkrumah's social revolution (Ghana).
- Milton Obote's *Common Man Charter (Move to the left)* (Uganda) (Obote, 1969).

Kenyatta's White Paper on Africanisation focused on transformational Africanisation commerce policies. After independence, Kenya compelled rich Asians to distribute and retail to Africans (Mkandawire, 2015). Jobs held by expatriates had to be filled by Kenyans. Informal enterprises got credit, and new government banks supported African entrepreneurs in the informal economy (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). After Kenyatta's departure, the industry collapsed because of trade liberalisation that led to rapid informalisation (Mkandawire, 2010).

Kaunda's ideas on *Humanism* (1967 to 1991) were a form of African socialism (Schwettmann, 2020). Kaunda's *One Zambia, One Nation* policy implied economic stability through informal and formal sector linkages within indigenisation. Zambia's Third National Development Plan from the late 1970s until 1984 assumed it would reduce unemployment by self-employment in the informal sector (Sekwat, 2000). Kaunda increasingly became dictatorial in the 1980s. Zambia was worse off economically, with a more significant informal sector than at independence in 1964 (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). Bankruptcy, illiteracy, nationalisation, Zambianisation, political bias, poverty and moral decadence, religious discrimination and structural adjustment policies led to the closure of formal firms and the emergence of informal ones; currently, informality is about 90% (ILO, 2018).

Nkrumah's philosophy on *African Socialism* from the 1950s to 1960s created African socialism dependent on the informal sharing of economic resources (Bretton, 1966). Nkrumah emphasised African identity, classless society and social development anchored on a large public sector. He also promoted the union of African states. The financial crisis in the 1970s

hampered Ghana's economic growth despite improved social outcomes. For example, there were increased enrolment rates for primary school, mass literacy programmes, primary health care provision and informal industrial development. African leaders pledged to promote indigenous entrepreneurial, technical, and human resources and technological capabilities; informality increased (The Monrovia Declaration, 1979). In the Lagos Plan of Action (1980 to 2000), African leaders agreed to support self-sufficiency through the development of low-cost rural technologies, indigenous entrepreneurship, low-cost energy resources and strengthening a model for the industrial development of small-scale industries and *artisan* enterprises that increased informality (Schwettmann, 2020).

Obote's ideas on the *Common Man Charter (Move to the left)* were a policy direction between 1968 and 1971 that introduced a unitary republican government based on the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1968. The idea was to vest political and economic democracy in people and move to socialism, with nationalist overtones where government policies and budgeting were pro-poor, emphasising their livelihoods (The Common Man Charter, 1969). As a result of the global socioeconomic crisis and the paradigm shift to market-driven approaches of the pro-poor programmes, informalisation increased in Uganda.

3.3.3.3 Phase 3: Structural adjustment policies and the informal sector (1970s to 1990s)

Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) (1980–1999) occurred in Africa because of the 1970s economic crisis due to increasing oil prices and rising unemployment that led to a high cost–push inflation, a period of stagflation (Mlambo, 2005). SAPs were loans from the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank to reduce economic crises and improve a country's economic organisation, boost international effectiveness, and restore the balance of payments (Mlambo, 1995; World Bank, 2018). The adoption of SAPs was due to economic distortions in the formal sector. The rationale of SAPs was to redress distortion and increase economic efficiency by creating an enabling environment (IMF, 2018).

African countries' coercion to implement SAPs came with the following conditionalities: increase in agricultural producer fees, tight credit control, devaluation, relaxation of foreign exchange controls, removal of government subsidies, increase in interest rates, privatisation, withdrawal of protectionism measures, cuts in public expenditure, public sector retrenchments and introduction of user fees (IMF, 2018; Mlambo, 1995). The conditionality effects severely affected all countries' economic and social sectors, including Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Mkandawire, 2007; Mlambo, 1995). However, SAPs were

detrimental to the informal sector because they depended on the formal sector for their inputs, for example, equipment, raw materials, and tools, which became expensive, thus eroding savings and production capacity.

SAPs led to economic decline, wage employment reduction, and the propensity for relatively cheap informal sector goods and services. Retrenched people entered the informal sector (see Chapter 5). Increased participation in the informal sector came from children, school dropouts, school leavers and children. Because of inflationary pressures and rising unemployment, the demand for urban informal sector products fell. Removing local and national government regulations constraints due to induced poverty, increased the demand to join the informal sector in new locales initially reckoned unapproved or unlawful (Mhone, 1993). Informal enterprises could not innovate. Thus, the need for imported inputs declined as prices increased due to the falling of real incomes and inflationary devaluation.

3.3.3.4 Phase 4: Post-structural adjustment policies (2000+)

Phase 4 runs from 2000 to date with the liberalisation of all African economies. Liberalisation focused on economic growth, good governance, poverty reduction strategies, prioritising the private sector and social equity (Mkandawire, 2007). Neoliberal policies are biased towards the capital, underplay labour concerns, and focus on big businesses rather than micro-enterprises. There is a substantial focus on policy directions and regulations. Policies and regulations seldom cover the informal sector. For example, Zimbabwe's informal sector is outlawed (Hawkins, 2001). There are no or insufficient enforcement mechanisms where policies and restrictions exist for the informal sector. Dualism, the double interdependence of economic procedures in the same political framework, focused on the promotion of the urban informal economy in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (see Table 3.1). In the colonial epoch, formal and informal employment dualism focused on the promotion of the urban informal economy in the 1970s and stretched to the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.

3.3.3.5 Phase 5: Covid-19 and Africa's informal economy (2020+)

The World Health Organization proclaimed Covid-19 as a global pandemic on 11 March 2020. Pre-Covid-19 statistics indicated that more than 82% of Africa's population did not have social protection (Megersa, 2020a). Covid-19 increased Africa's unemployment rates. The result was 40 million new poor people in Africa (Africa Research Bulletin, 2020). Covid-19 measures include lockdowns; public gatherings ban; border closures; closures of bars, hotels, markets,

restaurants, shops, and workplaces; travel prohibitions and social distancing measures (African Development Bank, 2020). Other notable measures included curfews, physical distancing, quarantines, stay-at-home orders, systematic quarantines for incoming visitors, travel bans, and wearing masks (Brimmer et al., 2020). These measures reduced the economic opportunities for informal economy actors who relied primarily on personal contact with customers. Some countries, like Liberia, banned all street vending. Africa's weak economies put restrictions on handling citizens' livelihoods without a clear strategy for livelihood enhancement (Africa Research Bulletin, 2020). Lockdowns resulted in social unrest due to hunger and poverty, and when prolonged, they could lead to defiance and illicit activities (African Development Bank, 2020). Covid-19 restrictive measures had several consequences for the informal sector; they reduced revenues for informal workers. On the other hand, they expanded the number of people dependent on the industry because formal workers lost jobs and joined the informal sector (African Economic Bulletin, 2020). In Uganda, food vendors were allowed to remain in markets, although periodic lockdowns affected traders' livelihoods (Megersa, 2020).

African institutions that help the poor and vulnerable were grossly underfunded, with little or no support from the government (African Development Bank, 2020). In Egypt, "stimulus policies" did not include the informal economy. Zimbabwe's social protection system did not cater for informal workers (Kaseke, 2011). Measures to allow street traders to operate were absent. Lockdowns, shutdowns and sheltering in businesses tended to restrict the underprivileged whose livelihoods depended on an open economy (African Development Bank, 2020). Some daring street traders defied the lockdown, which resulted in a crackdown, excessive force, beatings, arbitrary arrests, illegal seizures, and destruction of goods (Schwettmann, 2020). However, Covid-19 measures in Mauritius, Morocco and South Africa helped the informal sector. Practical steps included cash transfers to the poor and public health spending (Megersa, 2020). The following section focuses on strategies that were taken by some African countries to open their economies after Covid-19 closure.

a) Sustainable strategies for reopening economies in Africa

African governments' responses to Covid-19 are varied. (See Table 3.1 for initial response measures from selected African countries).

Table 3.1 Initial informal sector policy actions of selected African governments to counter Covid-19

Country	Actions
Algeria	Postponed the declaration and payments of income taxes for individuals and small and medium enterprises
Burkina Faso	Suspension of government fees charged to informal sector operators for rent, security, and parking in urban markets
Cameroon	Exception of taxis, motorbike taxis and petty (informal) traders from withholding tax for the second quarter of 2020
Côte d' Ivore	Establishment of a support fund for the informal sector of USD 171 million (0.3% of GDP)
Kenya	Nairobi locked down, and other countries, for example Kajiado, Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale, introduced their lockdowns. Kenya and South Africa have had the most extended restrictive policies
Lesotho	Increasing cash transfers for three months to the vulnerable, for example children, a person with a disability, older people, and informal sector workers
Nigeria	The unveiling of monthly conditional cash transfers of USD 52 to registered vulnerable households for four months. The Central Bank of Nigeria unveiled a USD 130 million credit facility for families and small and medium-sized enterprises
Sao Tomé	Granting financial assistance to workers who lost jobs in the formal and informal sectors
South Africa	Workers under a certain threshold received a small tax subsidy for four months, while vulnerable families temporarily received higher social grants for six months. Unemployed workers not receiving grants or unemployment benefits received USD 23 monthly
Togo	Introduction of a new mobile cash transfer programme (NOVISSI) for support provision to informal workers for three months
Zimbabwe	The government unveiled a USD 720 m stimulus recovery package in May 2020. However, the government's responses still needed to be revised. Informal workers have become poor or extremely poor in some cases. The response plans are enhancing laboratory testing capacity, national coordination and surveillance, risk communication and community engagement, support to the country's entry points, rapid response teams and case management

Source: Adapted and modified from Megersa (2020), Schwettmann (2020), and the World Bank (2020).

In Ethiopia, informal workers worked from home, with some producing facemasks. In Mali, the European Union was doing a similar project through the informal production of masks for the urban transport sector (Brimmer et al., 2020; Resnick et al., 2020). By routinely sanitising and disinfecting their market areas and providing new market spaces, Ghana and Mozambique helped food traders maintain their businesses (Brimmer et al., 2020). Trade unions representing informal workers were roped in the conversation towards the reopening of the economies (Schwettmann, 2020).

Senegal and Rwanda created alternative market spaces by drawing distance lines (for social segregation), and install handwashing stations (African Development Bank, 2020). In South Africa, advocacy groups for undocumented workers have been successful in forcing the government to include undocumented workers in policies. *Spaza* shops (informal shops

operating from a vendor's residence) and unlicensed food vendors are now required to hire undocumented workers as needed (Fourie, 2018). Local governments in Kenya and Namibia reduced market fees for black markets, and Namibia stopped charging them any fees. The National Bank of Rwanda stopped charging for all mobile money transfers so that businesses could switch to contactless payments and stop dealing with cash (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2020). Both Ghana and Uganda followed suit. During the Covid-19 lockdown, Mauritius created the Wage Support Scheme to provide financial assistance to independent contractors who were not registered with the nation's revenue authority (World Bank, 2020).

b) Reopening of economies under Covid-19

African economies with sizable informal sectors suffered from Covid-19. Since they are often not registered with the government, informal workers and businesses need access to government benefits. Informality is associated with poor public health and medical resources, inaccessible financial systems, non-participation in decision-making, poor law enforcement and working conditions, poverty, and weak legal and social safety nets. These vulnerabilities have weakened livelihoods. The mandatory (partial or total) Covid-19 confinement rules meant that informal workers stopped working for some time, with disproportionate effects on vulnerable populations like people with disabilities, as well as young men and women (AFDB, 2020; WIEGO, 2020). Because of corruption and unstable public finances, Covid-19 saw several government policy measures, albeit on a smaller scale, limiting cash transfers and small business support (see Table 3.2). The strict confinement of populations is incompatible with lifestyles, informal settlements, and poverty. Urban issues that informal businesses in Africa faced, like access to water, toilets, sewers, the age of the sewers, waste collection, and safe housing, made them vulnerable to Covid-19 (World Bank, 2020).

There are differences between knowledge of the disease and informal sector response measures due to heterogeneity between the different sectors of activity, age, gender, and income. Financial constraints limit informal workers from applying hand washing, physical or social isolation, quarantining, face masks and full and partial lockdown time restrictions (Brimmer et al., 2020). To reduce infection risks, uninfected workers who did not test positive for Covid-19 left the unorganised labour force. However, Covid-19 infections continued. Appropriate health-related conditions were a precondition for opening economies under Covid-19 to support informal workers and firms, as in Box 3.1.

Box 3.1 Criteria for a country's readiness to reopen economies

1. Capacity to carry out widespread testing increases, including prioritising patients with symptoms, their close contacts, health workers, people at risk, and those returning to work.
2. Comprehensive enforcement and compliance capacity for reopening guidelines.
3. Disinfectants and cleaning capacity availability.
4. Embracing distancing guidelines, including floor marking and signage.
5. Falling death rates from the virus.
6. Growth in the number of critical care hospital beds made available.
7. Inclusive information dissemination and training on hygiene measures area available.
8. Measures to screen large numbers of asymptomatic patients and identify immunity.
9. Number of patients requiring intensive care below the target for capacity for seven days.
10. Availability of protective equipment like masks for the entire population.
11. Sustainability in case reductions for at least 14 days.
12. Increase in respirators per adult population.
13. Tracing at least one or two percent of contacts for infected individuals.

Source: Adapted and modified from Brimmer et al. (2020) and the World Bank (2020).

Disparities in policies and interventions in Africa are due to the capability of policy enforcement, pressure on urban livelihoods, previous experience with related health pandemics and the public's perceived vulnerability to Covid-19 (WIEGO, 2020). Detailed information on the effectiveness of informal business revitalisation programmes was non-existent with the exception of broad economic and health interventions. The Covid-19 crisis is ongoing, and policymakers have yet to design effective, sustainable interventions. However, poverty leads street traders to defy lockdown regulations (they continued trading under adversity) in most of Africa, for example, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zimbabwe (African Development Bank, 2020; Megersa, 2020).

3.4 Africa's informality: Supportive measures

Some governments provide an enabling environment to develop and implement appropriate policies by connecting with critical stakeholders, enacting policies, and plans, harnessing local knowledge, and incremental infrastructure development management (Heintz and Posel, 2008; Mkandawire, 1986). In some African countries, hostility towards the informal sector is declining. For example, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe recognise trade unions for informal workers (Van Dijk, 1997b). The informal economy challenges are developing inclusive, innovative, and supportive policies that appreciate the informal economy's value (Kamete, 2017). Supportive informality measures include the following:

3.4.1 Multisectoral action plans

Several countries, including Angola, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania, have integrated sectoral plans for the informal sector. Ghana's overall development strategy has long-term measures of by-law enforcement, several hawkers markets, environmental sanitation, provision of water, and toilet facilities (Brimmer et al., 2020). Additionally, the CBD market was relocated with the support of the traders, and vendor associations were strengthened, registered, and trained. Ethiopia's capital city of Addis Ababa planned areas for weekend markets on streets with little traffic, building hundreds of kiosks for displaced people to rent out at various locations throughout the city, and registering and licensing vendors to protect their rights and interests. Additionally, they offer business owners who are displaced from the street, the side of the road, and markets alternative open spaces (IMF, 2018; Naas and Jafke, 2004).

3.4.2 Registration procedures simplification

The government in Addis Ababa provides a progressive registration of the informal economy. Similarly, Uganda has simplified the registration process (ILO, 2018). Informal enterprises are informed about the benefits of registration, registration fees and taxes through a short registration procedure. In 2017, the Central Bank of Egypt brought individuals and enterprises in the informal economy to the banking system to entice customers with products that may suit them. After the 2011 Arab rising, Egypt got policy direction from the IMF and World Bank to guide the private sector to boost and promote employment and economic growth by providing a one-stop-shop facility for receiving permits to reduce registration bureaucracy (IMF, 2018). Online registration made the registration process easier, although it was challenging to register 94 million people (Abou-Ali and Rizk, 2015).

3.4.3 Informal economy innovations

Informal entrepreneurs replicate and reproduce products from each other and from imported products. In the informal economy, on-the-job learning (in-house) in the informal economy aids intergenerational knowledge and technology transmission. The informal sector is essential for its inventions, entrepreneurship and technopreneurship potential. Ancient Egyptian inventions were from the informal economy, for example, black ink, cosmetics, government, mathematics, irrigation systems, library, medicine, mummification, pyramids, solar calendar, toothpaste, wine, and written language (hieroglyphics) [Abou-Ali and Rizk, 2015]. In Malawi

and Zimbabwe, worn-out car tyres are used to make sandals, mats, slings, and other accessories. Innovations go beyond material production; the Gasabo district in Rwanda advised, facilitated, mobilised, negotiated, and organised communities, districts, financial institutions, government, informal trader youths, and women in creating the Duhahirane Gisozi Cooperative through participatory local governance, with replication potential (Brimmer et al., 2020).

3.4.4 Government informality recognition

An acknowledgement of informality is often important. In Bamako (Mali), the informal workers' mandate was to manage the markets in Commune I in the 1970s; a commune is the third-level administrative unit led by a commune council. Communes as delegated administrative authorities increased tax collection of informal traders and the municipality win-win partnership that improved the working environment (hygiene, sanitation, water access, hygiene, and sanitation) (Chacaltana, Leung and Lee, 2018). South Africa's nine provinces have informal economy policies (Fourie, 2018). Current programmes for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) are biased towards small and medium-sized enterprises that have bypassed micro-enterprises and the informal economy (Rogerson, 2004; 2017). The eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality in Durban had the first Informal Economy Policy that gave rise to the South African National Informal Economy Forum to recognise informality. eThekweni has local economic development policies and by-laws for the informal economy and has invested in ablution facilities, business units and support centres, cleaning and security services, container parks, electricity, flea markets, kiosks, and kiosk markets, refuse collection, storages, shelters, and water in the informal sector (Rogerson, 2016).

3.4.5 Governments' promotion of informality

Some African policymakers recognise the role and importance of the informal sector. Arusha in Tanzania provides loans and alternative business premises to informal sector actors, showing that improving the city without disrupting livelihoods is possible (Levine, 2014). Acknowledging that criminal activities exist in both formal and informal sectors and that the informal sector may also contribute to the fiscus through appropriate and well-designed taxation laws. Various countries have formalised the informal sector through better government services, effective regulatory frameworks, enabling an improved business environment to access loans, good governance, technology, and infrastructure. The government should raise awareness on the role of development partners, for example, WIEGO and multilateral

organisations like the ILO and the World Bank, towards the formalisation process, social protection promotion, small and medium-sized companies support because they are the key to Africa's informal economy (WIEGO, 2020). Policymakers should distinguish between the informal sector and the informal economy for a comprehensive regulatory framework in Rwanda (Kanyenze, 2020).

3.4.6 Information access and availability

Some African countries have large data sets of the informal sector. The datasets include disaggregated data on actors' characteristics, challenges, employment impact, informal company productivity, tax collection, working conditions, unionisation, and organisation. A robust Labour Market Information System focuses on employment and the labour market. In sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritius and South Africa have periodic employment surveys (Kanyenze, 2020). Similarly, the informal sector is increasing in the official statistics of a few countries, like Nigeria and South Africa (Fourie, 2018). Table 3.2 summarises urban informality promotion policies in Africa from the 1970s to the post-Covid era (2000+).

Table 3.2 Summary: Urban informal economy promotion policies in Africa

Indicator/Year	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	Covid-19 era (2020+)
Government thrust	Government creates an enabling environment	Structural adjustment programmes and economic deregulation	Development of the private sector and use of branch organisation use	Competitive private sector development Solve illegality	Following health protocols for Covid-19 reduction
Availability of loans	Provision of credit and marketing opportunities	Liberalisation and legalisation	Local and regional decentralisation to create sustainable economic conditions	Incorporating informality	Grants and loans to small and medium enterprises
Informality promotion	Technical help, technologies, vocational and technical training	Deregulation policies at different government tiers	Using current informal organisations	Deregulation of local government through provision of infrastructure and space	Acceptance of the informal sector in some countries, for example, the unionisation of informal workers

Source: Adapted and modified from Van Dijk (1997a)

3.4.7 Right to the city

Right to the city is a concept focusing on accessibility, democracy and inclusivity about power marginal and poor to cocreate and transform independent urbanscapes (Lefebvre, 1968). Lefebvre's right to the city was taken up by social movements, geography and urban planning in the 1990s. Right to the city include civil, cultural, economic, environmental, political, and social, rights protected in international conventions, covenants, rights and treaties (Lefebvre, 1996). Citizens freedom to create and recreate urbanscapes and themselves is the most valuable human right (Harvey, 2003). The right to the city demands, citizens access to public space, affordable housing, displacement and gentrification protection and urban governance participation; these tenets address spatial inequalities from capitalist control and urbanscapes commodification (Harvey, 2008).

Contemporary urbanism is diverse, it has many aspects including street trading. The right to the city attacks urban enfranchisement through citizens' urban politics. Urban complexity requires a new planning paradigm, one that includes urban livability diversity (Roy, 2005). Informality is vital in the urbanscape due to its socioeconomic and political contributions. The poor's urbanscapes displacements are through gentrification, policies, institutions and processes (PIPs) and utilities privatisation that disenfranchises because urban development is driven by corporations and markets (Lefebvre, 1996). In the global south, the right to the city privileges the elite, thus urbanscapes should have values rather than exchange values because citizens have rights to urbanscapes (Lefebvre 1996). Every citizen should diversely contribute to urban development despite governance actors' denial of the right to the city (Harvey, 2003). It remains obscure (1) what the right to the city means and (2) how it resolves disenfranchisement challenges in global souths' urbanscapes and Harare.

3.5 Africa informality: Repressive measures

African governments show hostility to informality in the last forty years because the rich operate in a formal economy where they pay taxes and other statutory obligations (Kamete , 2020). In contrast, people living in poverty are in the informal economy where they do not pay taxes (Kiaga and Leung, 2020). The following section shows hostility to the informal sector in some African countries.

3.5.1 Hosting international events

Many African governments have developed a “masochistic” approach to the informal economy. Their attitudes are aggressive, combative, and impulsive (Rogerson, 2016). They stigmatise and penalise the informal economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Chen and Fourie, 2020). Africa’s responses to informality are a continuum from violent repression and sustained evictions. Various events trigger attacks on informality, for example, anniversaries and international dignitaries’ visits to Africa, and also South Africa’s hosting of the FIFA 2010 Soccer World Cup. Zimbabwe’s hosting of the 12th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting saw the informal sector destroyed by state authorities, and the same happened when the country hosted the 6th All-Africa Games in 1995. Similarly, Zimbabwe’s 2005 *Operation Murambatsvina* (Get rid of rubbish) was a radical and violent destruction of informality (Kamete, 2007; Tibaijuka, 2005). The motive was to formalise the informal economy, although it appeared to be an unattainable venture (Tibaijuka, 2005) and continuing persecution of street vendors (Rogerson, 2016). Other examples include Blantyre’s *Operation Dongosolo*” (Clean Up) (Riley 2014) and *Operation Clean Sweep*, Johannesburg, South Africa (Bénil-Gbaffou 2016). In addition, there have been various clean-ups of various magnitudes in Accra (Steel et al. 2014), Kampala (Young, 2017), and Nairobi, Kenya (Morange, 2015), *Operation clean up* in Kisumu, Kenya in 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2014 (Racaud, 2018), in Nigerian cities (Onodugo et al. 2016), *Operation Clean Sweep* in Windhoek, Namibia; *Operation Dongosolo (Clean-Up)* in Blantyre and Lilongwe, Malawi (Tonda and Kepe, 2016).

The operations declined Africa’s informal economies. The 2008 fiscal crisis saw interest in the African property market; the clean-up void led to urban land grabs to develop Dubai and Shanghai look-alike projects. Politicians support these to gain prestige and wealth. These projects are new versions of urban informal workers’ marginalisation and exclusion from open and public spaces (Watson 2014).

3.5.2 Systematic marginalisation of the informal sector

Informality has little recognition and protection from the state but falls within its punitive arm that imposes constraints through various laws and by-laws (Rogerson, 2016). The lack of recognition and neglect negatively affects informal sector practitioners as central and local governments must embrace informality (Naas and Jafke, 2004). In Africa, being legal is expensive due to taxes, registration fees and other statutory obligations; thus, staying in the

informal sector makes business sense (Meagher, 2014). Africa's informality manifestation is a challenge due to data deficiency, for example, motorcycle drivers in Cameroon are part of the economy, but there needs to be data capture on their potential. African informal economies are remnants of the colonial period, where there was importation into colonial territories during the colonial and postcolonial periods. Creating dual states (two sets of economic institutions) impacted Africa. African states are antagonistic and ambivalent rather than supportive of the informal sector (Adebayo, 1990; ILO, 2018). Africa's policy reactions to informality differ in measures to enforce formalisation or evict vendors. Factors contributing to the antagonism include child labour, dismissal without notice and compensation, forced overtime, limited or no social benefits like health insurance, low job security, low wages, non-payment of decent wages, unsafe working conditions and tax evasion (Williams, 2004; World Bank, 2020). The informal economy is creating a broader urbanisation crisis as people move to urban areas in the hope that Africa's economies and financial policies coordinate with the continent's everyday realities (Cheru, 2002).

3.5.3 Outdated colonial laws

African countries set up repressive strategies, like continuing the municipal by-laws of the inherited colonial era that fail to consider the potential economic contribution of the informal sector. The informal economy protests in Accra and Egypt changed the informal economy. The Arab Spring was anti-government demonstrations, armed rebellions, and political turmoil in the Middle East and North African region in late 2010. Oppressive regimes-built protests and a led to a low standard of living. Dissents began in the Tunisian capital, Tunis. The causes of the Arab Spring were corruption, demographic structural factors, dictatorship, economic decline, extreme poverty, human rights violations, and unemployment, leading to an informal upsurge (Radsch, 2013). The need to transform the economy was fundamental for the Egypt uprisings since the formal economy was non-functional.

3.5.4 Bureaucracy and corruption

Most of Africa, including South Africa and Nigeria – Africa's largest economies – have corruption and bureaucracy that undermine state legitimacy, service delivery, and sustainable development goals. Corruption let Africa down through economic losses and inefficiency, infrastructure failures, personal loss, intimidation and inconvenience, poverty and inequality, public and private sector dysfunctionality, and rigged economic and political systems. South

Africa's focus on the informal is biased with the periodic anti-foreign blitz. Most South African municipalities fail to provide local economic, development-friendly, and inclusive informal economy policies due to non-acknowledgement of the sector's significance and local and national bureaucracy (Kalule-Sabiti et al., 2007; World Bank, 2020). South Africa's national policies do not fully embrace the informal economy due to frosty relationships between governments and municipalities, poor representation of the informal sector at government level, failure to acknowledge the roles women play, and limited coordination between municipalities and within local government structures (Casale, 2004).

3.5.5 Financing access and insurance

Most small to medium-sector enterprises need the collateral required by lending institutions – a lack of property rights and collateral limits informal sector businesses' access to credit in the formal sector. Access limitations for banking services are common in Africa's informal sector; 370 million are unbanked (Megersa, 2020). Financial exclusion is expensive; this makes informal workers vulnerable to usurious and predatory lenders. For example, informal economic groups known as Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) in Tanzania and Stokvels in South Africa, keep informal workers' savings with the potential to make loans available. Traditional banks need to be more responsive to informality due to cumbersome processes, far-off branches, high transaction charges and failure to link with an innovative mobile payment that enables customers to complete financial transactions from their mobile phones (Chacaltana et al., 2018). Many informal workers turn to family, fellow workers, and moneylenders for credit. Moneylenders levy substantial interest rates, which destroy informal enterprises. Banking facilities cater to the formal sector; thus, a lack of appropriate policies creates blocks for insurance access to informal enterprises; hence informality at the market and the weather is a mercy (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2011).

3.5.6 Poor occupational health and safety

Informal worker units are small scale, engage in non-waged and unorganised work processes, fall outside labour arrangements, are largely unregulated and unregistered, and fall outside state regulations and control. Resources to implement occupational health and safety measures are also lacking and must reach the informal economy. Governments often suppress the informal economy because of child and bonded labour, gender inequality, lack of access to drinking water and sanitary facilities, essential health services, low-quality nutrition, and precarious

housing (Chen, 2004, 2005). The informal economy's vulnerability to disease is high because their homes have dual roles – as home and workplace – with the propensity for undesirable living and working conditions. Informality associated with disease, low productivity, and poverty led to its suppression, for example, cholera outbreaks in 2017 in the DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia. South Sudan, Sudan and Zambia have been exacerbated by rising informality due to anthropogenic factors, for example, crude hygiene practices, human migration, poor sanitation, and trade. Like elsewhere, there was informal economy suppression in Africa after 11 March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared Covid-19 a global pandemic (see Section 3.10).

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3.6 Africa's informal economies: Transition to formality

The formalisation of the informal economy is essential in the African policy agenda due to decent work deficits, enterprise development instability, lack of the rule of law, limited inclusive development, little or no social protection, non-contribution to public revenue and violation of workers' rights (ILO, 2020; WIEGO, 2015). The policy agenda originates from the ILO Recommendation No. 204 (*R204 Transition from the informal to the formal economy*, 2020) and the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (SDG 8: *Decent Work and Economic Growth*) (UN, 2015). The R204 is a significant step toward decent work because of its grounding in a unified framework and rights-based approach (ILO, 2020). The African Union

Commission, an arm of the African Union, developed a joint framework for operationalising the R204 in association with the ILO. Target 8.3 encourages development-orientated policies to support production and job creation (UN, 2015). Several policy approaches support formalisation: business support, changing legal frameworks, organisation, registration, representation, social protection, and taxation to enhance income security, livelihoods, and entrepreneurship (WIEGO, 2015).

Box 3.2 ILO Recommendation No. 204 (Transition from the informal to the formal economy)

- VII. Freedom of association, social dialogue and employers' and workers' organisation's role*
1. Informal economy's freedom of association and collective bargaining in trade unionism.
 2. Creating an enabling environment for employers and workers to organise collective bargaining and social dialogue participation to formalisation.
 3. Membership and services extension to workers and economic units in the informal economy.
 4. Promotion and participation of employers' and workers' representatives in trade unionism.
 5. ILOs technical assistance supports employers' and workers' representatives' capacity towards workers and economic units transitioning to formalisation.

Source: ILO (2020)

Formal systems could be more functional in some African countries due to economic and political barriers (Kiaga and Leung, 2020; Rogerson, 2016). Formalisation is through compliance with local laws and international labour standards, formal labour market institutions, registration and unionisation of informal workers and employers, and social security coverage (Kiaga and Leung, 2020). For most African countries, there needs to be more of these conditions. The artisanal and small-scale mining formalisation in Ghana began in 1989 through introduction of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and the enactment of the Precious Mineral Marketing Corporation Law (2019) with a mandate to buy all precious minerals; over 300 artisanal and small-scale miners were licensed and supported by the Minerals Commission. In Nairobi, Kenya, a similar licensing scheme included the municipality building the Muthurwa Market to reduce hawkers' problem challenges. In Bamako, Mali, the emergence of the new Commune I paved the way for a friendly relationship between informal actors and municipal authorities. Formalisation intensification led to a tax collection increase. In the Gasabo district in Rwanda, informal street vendors' formalisation was through the DuhahiraneGisozi Cooperative establishment, loan provisions, and the Rwandese government playing a critical role in licensing, and a symbiotic partnership between informal actors and the municipality. The South African Local Government Association introduced a pro-street trading

developmental policy towards the informal economy amid poor communication among various stakeholders (Fourie, 2018). In Arusha, Tanzania, municipal officials softened friendly policies to allow informal economy policies and actors to operate and get loans and alternative business premises (Meagher, 2014).

A comprehensive and context-specific formalisation approach is challenging to informal firms and employers since it is contextual, needs defining steps and requires effort. Informality is permanent (Fourie, 2018). It is difficult for informal employers to adhere to labour regulations; adherence entails incremental formal legal benefits and protection, which are costly and time-consuming (ILO, 1991). Sequential formalisation may be the option, for example, registration followed by tax and labour compliance. Informal employers are unable and unwilling to comply (Chen et al. 2004, 2005).

In some cases, workers have informal agreements although they are in the formal sector, a scenario common in a globally competitive environment. Suppliers are increasingly becoming small informal enterprises with informal contracts and subcontracts; the same applies to families or single people who do not hire workers but avoid bureaucratic registration and regulations. Box 3.3 summarises transitional challenges to formality.

Box 3.3 Transition challenges from informality to formality

1. Absence of a focal coordinating point or authority with overlapping mandates (Ministries responsible for labour, local authorities, small and medium enterprises, and youth).
2. Fragmented interventions are often supported by development partners raising questions regarding their sustainability.
3. Limited integrated package of interventions.
4. Incomplete and partial information and analysis on informality; groping in the dark interventions.
5. Little voice and representation.
6. One-size-fits-all interventions.
7. Policy ambivalence to targeted sectors.

Source: Chacaltana et al. (2018); Chen (2004, 2005).

The ILO (2018) envisaged decent and productive work for all employees, although informality causes economic and social barriers to the mainstream economy to remain. The formal and informal economy link through forward and backward linkages; their systematic assessment is needed. In Africa, informal sector formalisation is limited by data paucity, heterogeneous informality, limited holistic interventionist experience, little or no household surveys, poor

livelihood characteristics assessment, for example, primary services access, gender-disaggregated data, spending patterns, and vulnerability. Economic planning and statistical analysis present challenges as well. The ILO (2018) further envisaged decent and productive work for all employees, although informality causes economic and social barriers to the mainstream economy to remain. The formal and informal economy link forward and backward linkages; therefore, their systematic assessment is necessary (Kanyenze, 2020). In several countries, governments’ ambivalences in informality are either supported or attacked. In Africa, data paucity, heterogeneous informality, limited holistic interventionist experience (for example, poor planning, little or no household surveys and statistical analysis), assessment of inadequate livelihood characteristics (for example, primary services access, gender-disaggregated data, spending patterns, and vulnerability) limit informal sector formalisation (Kanyenze, 2020). Table 3.3 summarises the strategies for the transition from informality to formality

Table 3.3 Strategies for the transition from informality to formality

Strategy	Examples
Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Automation /upgrading. • Compliance culture • Special regimes
Incentives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fiscal subsidies • Public services /public procurement access • Social security coverage • Tax refunds
Productivity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An enabling environment through macro policies • Interventions at the micro firm level • Sectoral and chains-level meso-policies
Regulations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procedures simplification • Social dialogue improvement • Training in information dissemination

Source: Adapted and modified from Chacaltana et al. (2018)

3.7 Africa’s informal and formal economy: Linkages

There is a connection between the informal and formal sectors. There are five critical informal–formal linkages described below: backward linkages, credit linkages, customer linkages, forward linkages, and technology linkages.

Backward linkages are where formal sector firms supply inputs to those in the informal sector. The separation between the informal and formal economies is illusionary; the two are a

continuum with backward linkages (Chen, 2006; Fourie, 2018). The links connect the flow of raw materials, equipment, finance and consumer goods and services from formal to informal enterprises. The inputs for backward linkages include consumer goods, equipment and machinery, expertise, finance, information, and raw materials. Challenges occur where the formal sector business is the sole supplier. Under such circumstances, exploitative and monopolistic prices appear. In Dakar, Senegal, access denial to indigenous inputs led to the informal sectors being subservient to the formal sector suppliers (Chacaltana et al, 2018).

Credit linkages entail cases where the informal sector gets credit from the formal sector. Availability of finances needs to be improved in the informal sector. Formal sources of finance still need to meet the credit needs of informal enterprises (Chen, 2006). Africa's conventional banks require financial security, liquidity maintenance, the optimal rate of return, and minimisation of lending risk; the requirements are not suitable for meeting the informal sector's credit needs (Fourie, 2018). A financial system that is tolerant of informality and managed by the informal sector will lessen these challenges. Informal workers have devised money-spinning or credit access in most of Africa, especially in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa (Fourie, 2018).

Customer linkages involve people buying goods and services from the informal and formal sectors. Urban customers buy from both the informal and formal economies. There is a situation where the formal sector captures the market initially controlled by the informal sector through price and quality reduction to appeal to low-income groups (Chacaltana et al., 2018).

Forward linkages refer to the supply-side connections between formal sector firms buying inputs from the informal sector and vice versa. There are limited forward links, for example, when conglomerates and government agencies or departments subcontract production to the informal sector or directly acquire their goods and services. Formal sector contracts due to an economic downturn result in increased import competition and slackened demand, hence informality slowdown through the forward linkages (Chen and Carré, 2020).

Technology linkages convey expertise from the informal to the formal economy and vice versa. The informal spirit in Kenya, known as *jua kali*, created clusters of economic activities whereby producers and traders set up shop close to each other and get recognition from competitors, labour, customers and support services, for example, credit providers (Chacaltana et al., 2018). Some of the most significant manufacturing clusters are technology, creativity, relationships, and reason, for example, Gikomba in Nairobi, Kenya, and the *Suame* magazine

in Kumasi, Ghana (WIEGO, 2014). In Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, resourceful informal engineers make goods from trash, for example, sandals from old car tyres and oil lamps from soup cans (Chacaltana et al., 2018).

3.8 Africa's informality: Bellagio International Declaration of Street Vendors

Street trading dynamism and Pan-Africanism compelled African governments to attend Italy's Bellagio International Declaration of Street Vendors in 1995. The declaration urged governments to develop national policies for hawkers and street traders and recognise their contribution to socioeconomic development and their protection and livelihood guarantees. The declaration advocated for the country's national policy for hawkers and traders to be part of the broader structural policies through appropriate, non-formal and participatory mechanisms. The declaration promotes inclusive vendor participation in local governance with all stakeholders like civil society, local authorities, NGOs, pedestrians, police street governance actors, street vendors and hawkers (The Rockefeller Foundation , 1995). The declaration views street trading as uneven distribution of wealth; thus, African cities need to liberalise street trading, as in Durban, South Africa. The declaration acknowledged informal economy (vendor) challenges like mental and physical torture of traders and resultant riotous situations, property rights and monetary losses, public policy inconsistencies and vendor proliferation (including children). Africa's national and local governments were encouraged to equip, regulate, and train street traders to participate in the cityscape ecosystem through inclusive measures for children, the disabled, and women vendors, legal access to public and open spaces for vendor usage, access to credit and financial services, and relief measures in disaster situations (Chen, 2020). Through the African Union leadership, African governments were to form a national policy for vendors as a part of the broader structural policies and legalising vendor status by licence and permit issuance, enactment of laws, and provision of hawking zones in urban plans and the act is operational today (The Rockefeller Foundation , 1995; Chen , 2020).

3.9 Africa's informal economy: Organisation and unionisation

Africa's informal economy workers organise trade unions for cohesion and alliance-building around common threats (WIEGO, 2014). Unionisation is essential for information dissemination and international campaigns: for example, at local and international conventions,

WIEGO and the StreetNet International *World Class Cities for All Campaign* (Chen, 2020). Africa's informal workers have types of organisations:

- Multi-trade, area-based associations are those where members share similar standards, for example, beautifying their surroundings, thus limiting the attention of local governance actors like police, health, and trade inspectors (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). Especially in Durban, South Africa, and Accra, Ghana, informal workers clean their trading spaces daily to lessen conflict with municipal authorities.
- Neighbourhood associations led by elected leaders or volunteers are independent, voluntary neighbourhood networks that meet at defined times to shape an area's identity (Chen, 2018). Neighbours' acquaintances cooperate and propose solutions to challenges. Neighbourhood associations are increasingly becoming major urban political players as they demand a stake in the daily management of cities to improve their communities through citizen participation for liveability enhancement.
- Solidarity groups are informal workers with shared cultural, ethnic, geographic, and religious beliefs (Chen & Carré, 2020). As a result of their self-organisation, they have also established micro-credit and savings facilities to assist each other in times of happiness and bereavement, for example, communal revolving loan funds through the *Partnership for Productivity* in Kenya give inadequate but valuable services to women.
- Trade-based associations consist of informal workers who share the same trading interest. They deal with the same intermediaries and suppliers or interact with government departments for regulatory procedures (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). In addition, informal workers face the same challenges in accessing assets, markets, and services.

Informal economy workers' organisations (for example, own-account workers, employees, and apprentices) are heterogeneous (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). Informal workers' voices are marginal to be heard by employers, governments, and international agencies like the ILO. Informal workers are sometimes not considered workers at law by other workers, themselves, trade unions, and policymakers (UNDP, 2012; United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2010). Africa's informal worker unionisation challenges are weak leadership, lack of management skills and self-confidence, patriarchal culture, and personal conflicts. In

some cases, feminist galvanisation has slowed unionisation by focusing on women's needs at the expense of informal economy workers.

The Tanzania Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers organises informal workers into unions with equal participation for paid-up members following the ILO R204 (2020). The Tanzanian Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers has a proactive approach to an inclusive, informal economy to widen trade union activism (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2010). The Sierra Leone Labour Congress assists in registering informal economy operators into trade unions and their membership with the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. Informal workers are 93% of the workforce, ranging from bike riders, fishers, general transport workers, minibus drivers, musicians, photographers, and traders (ILO, 2019). They are all registered with and have established township, district, regional and national structures. The Ghana Private Road Transport Union accepts membership from all workers and operators in the transport sector. The Ghana Trades Union Congress created the Union of Informal Workers Association, whose mandate is the organisation of various informal economy workers (Ghana Statistical Service, 2011, 2014).

In Uganda, like Zimbabwe, labour legislation neither recognises nor covers informal economy workers (UNDP, 2021). Uganda's Amalgamated Transport and General Workers' Union opts to keep the informal economy workers and operators at arms-length from formal union structures. At the same time, the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions has associate members – the Zambia Informal Economy Association and the Association of Vendors and Marketers in Zambia – to cater for more than 90% of the labour force in the informal economy (Mitullah, 2003). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions created the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economic Association, since approximately 95% of the labour force is informal employment (World Bank, 2018). In Benin, the *Union Nationale des Syndicats des Travailleurs du Bénin* supports informal caterers, hairdressers, and tailors to sell products to large clients through joint marketing (ILO, 2019).

3.10 Conclusion

Africa needs constructive and appropriate policy engagement with informal economies. The current approaches are the de-legitimisation and suppression of informal economic institutions. Macroeconomic policy frameworks have created a dualist economy that has failed to protect the rights of informal workers. The duality of the economy tends to disadvantage people living

in poverty, especially women, due to patriarchal hegemony and neoliberal philosophy. The neoliberal framework disallows government intervention in the day-to-day running of the economy, leaving the informal sector under-resourced, unprotected, and unregulated. In the last three decades, the debate was whether the informal economy is a survivalist marginal sector or an economy's vibrant entrepreneurship venture (Chen and Carré, 2020). Recognising and supporting informal workers is necessary for secure and productive livelihoods. The stigmatisation of informal units, workers, and activities as illegal, non-productive, and excluded from economic planning and policies makes Africa's informal livelihoods insecure and less productive. Policy reforms are required for viable unionisation to ensure integration, recognition, and validation of opportunities that improve the livelihoods of informal workers, as well as the coexistence of formal and informal economies.

In some African countries, the voice of the informal sector is beginning to be heard in policymaking for livelihood enhancement by various actors, like academics, lawyers, NGOs, and urban planners. Africa's urban local authorities should transition from regulators to enablers to create an amicable relationship with the informal sector (Skinner and Balbuena, 2019). Infrastructure provision for the informal sector is necessary, for example, public markets, serviced working premises and vending stations. Continuous dialogue between local authorities and informal sector representatives helps city planning and designation of vending stations. Chapter 3 focus is on informality from an African perspective through informality's growth , antagonism , characteristics of people and activities in informality and barriers to transformation; Table 3.4 summarises Africa's informal economies based on the above tenets.

Table 3.4 Summary: Key features of Africa's informal economies

Reasons for growth	Reasons for antagonism	Characteristics of people	Characteristics of activities	Barriers to transformation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoidance costs of formal operations costs • Regulatory entry challenges into the formal economy • Decreased formal employment. • Ease of entry • Ease of management • Government support • Incidences of jobless growth • Increased urbanisation • Increasing demand for low-cost goods and services • Informalisation of formal businesses • Labour intensive • Lack of growth in the formal sector • Limited education and training opportunities • Economic hardships and poverty • Promotion of small, medium, and micro-enterprises • Reliance on locally available resources • Slow economic growth • Supportive policies and legislation, e.g., the designation of vending sites • The tax burden of the formal sector • Unregulated and competitive markets • GDP contribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High involvement of women putting them at risk • Inadequate knowledge of the contribution of the informal economy • Tax evasion • Limited access to the economics of scale • Little or no training of workers • Low demand for informally produced goods and services • Low job security • Low wages (especially for women) • Poor access to finance/loans • Limited/no access to banking services. • Poor infrastructure in informal enterprises • Incidences of child labour • Limited vending space • Cityscape defoliation • Criminality elements • Corruption incidences • Some sub-Saharan African governments do not recognise the importance of the informal sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of official protection and recognition • Children, i.e., those below 18, are employed in the sector • A high percentage of women are employed • Trade-union limitations • Little job security • Longer working hours • Low income and wages • Lower levels of education • Minimal / no fringe benefits • Non-coverage by minimum wage legislation • Limited / no social security system. • The predominance of own account and self-employment work • Minimal rights to the city, political rights, and collective bargaining power • Minimal economic prospects, • Vulnerability to local and central police attack • Women are over-represented in low-income activities and under-represented in higher-income activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of credit or other support and protections • Competitive markets • Ease of entry • Individual or family-owned • Labour-intensive and adapted technology • Family ownership of enterprises • Reliance on locally available resources • Small-scale operation • Unregulated markets • Few jobs in the formal sector due to globalisation • A weakening growth of formal employment • Informal economy outweighing the formal economy in some countries. • Common in both urban and rural areas • Increasing informalisation of formal jobs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confiscation of stocks • Cumbersome registration procedures • Eviction • Extortion • Hostile enforcement agencies • Inflexible standards • Inaccurate information does not allow sound planning; this may make policies less effective • Informal businesses create a culture where formal enterprises are tempted to refrain from following the law • Informal employment weakens collective bargaining, hence worsening workers' rights • Loss of state revenue may cause a rise in taxes. • Further expansion of the informal economy • Stringent rules • Tax avoidance results in a loss of revenue for the state, which hinders the government's ability to pursue development initiatives • Undeclared work skews statistics (like employment figures)

Source: Adapted and modified from Bhorat et al. (2014), Chen (2012), Schulpen and Gibbons (2001) and WIEGO (2014)

Chapter 3 focused on the informal sector from a global perspective and Africa. Chapter 4 builds on the informal sector premised on the SLA as a conceptual approach that informed and guided the study on urban livelihoods in Harare's informal sector and the origins of the SLA (from Sen's Capability Approach), its development, applicability, strengths, and limitations.

Chapter 4

SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS APPROACHES IN URBAN AREAS: A CONCEPTUAL SYNOPSIS

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 extends the theoretical views on the informal sector and informality from an African perspective by building on informality sustainability. The informal economy sustains Zimbabwe's workforce because it is a diverse, complex, and growing activity area. There is increasing recognition that the informal sector can be more innovative, resilient, and resource-efficient than its formal equivalent. Hence, Amartya Sen's CA (the precursor to the SLA) has become central in the development discourse manifestations of poverty because human capabilities drive economic growth, poverty reduction, and well-being improvement. This chapter further discusses the origins, development, applicability, strengths, and limitations of the SLA concerning Harare. The chapter begins with the genesis of livelihood thinking and concludes with how the SLA informed the study.

4.2 The origins of livelihood thinking

Livelihood thinking dates to five decades earlier than the first mainstream work on sustainable livelihoods by Chambers and Conway (1992). The scholarship by Amartya Sen was instrumental in this respect.

4.2.1 Amartya Sen's capability approach

The SLA has its roots in the CA (also known as the *capabilities approach* or *Capabilitarianism*). The CA is an economic theory developed in the 1980s as an alternative to welfare economics (Robeyns, 2016; Sen, 1985). Economist-philosopher Amartya Sen developed the approach, and philosopher Martha Nussbaum expanded it. Nussbaum brought ideas that traditional approaches excluded, namely the economics of welfare (Robeyns, 2016). Sen and Nussbaum emphasised functional capabilities as a measure of human well-being instead of economic utility (Nussbaum, 1988, 2011).

The CA is a framework for evaluating and assessing individual wellbeing and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals for social change. Capabilitarianism

is highly interdisciplinary and focuses on the plural or multidimensional aspects of wellbeing. The CA approach highlights the difference between means and ends and substantive freedoms (capabilities) and outcomes (achieved functionings) (Sen, 2005:20, see also Sen, 2011; Robeyns, 2016).

Sen (1992) suggested that people should be asked what capabilities they have instead of what they need. In Sen's view, functioning refers to achievement by an individual (Sen, 1995, 2005). Achievement determination is by resources available to an individual, for example, education and health. For an individual to achieve a functioning, an opportunity must be present through a capability, for example, good health depends on nutrition (Nussbaum, 2005). Poverty, therefore, results from deprived capability (Sen, 1992). Deprivation develops through limited educational opportunities, poor governance, and inadequate income (Nussbaum, 2011).

CA focuses on what individuals are capable of doing. CA consists of two key claims: The freedom to achieve happiness is of primary moral importance, and the freedom to achieve happiness is understood in terms of people's capabilities, namely people's real chances to do and be what they have reason to value. CA is concerned with creativity, equality, political liberty, and the right to one's own opinion (Nussbaum, 2019). CA conceptualises a standard of well-being (in terms of functionings) and freedom from well-being (in terms of capabilities). Functionings and capabilities describe inequality, poverty, quality of life and social change (Nussbaum, 2011). In moral and political philosophy, CA is a human development framework (Sen, 1999) focused on the following:

- **Development:** Creating an enabling environment for people to live creative, healthy, and long lives, namely, expanding people's fundamental liberties.
- **Justice:** Actions following the requirements of some law through four different types of justice: distributive (determination of who gets what); procedural (determination of the fair treatment of people), restorative (restoration of relationships to rightness) and retributive (the focus is on punishment for wrongdoing).
- **Well-being:** The state of happiness in terms of quality-of-life indicators like connections, education, food, health, housing, income, political voice, and social networks.

Some aspects of CA date back to Adam Smith, Aristotle, and Karl Marx (see Nussbaum, 1988, 1992; Sen, 1993, 1999), although Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum developed the approach. CA implies that the freedom to achieve well-being is a matter of what people can do and be

and the kind of life they can lead effectively (Qizilbash, 2008; Robeyns, 2005, 2016; Sen, 1992, 2009). Sen saw CA as a general framework that evaluates people's quality of life and freedom. Similarly, Nussbaum's (2011) ideas centred on justice and respect for human dignity and welfare.

a) Components in measuring capability

Sen's (2010) position on capabilities revolves around what people can do and be. For Sen, people's well-being does not depend on the commodities they have or their utility. Personal items need to provide more information about someone's life, like a bicycle as a source of transport, which may not be relevant to someone without legs. CA focuses on what individuals realistically achieve in terms of *functionings* and *capabilities*. An individual's capability is the freedom to select between various functioning combinations between the different kinds of life that the person considers essential (Sen, 2005). The following components initially measured capability (Nussbaum, 2001):

- Importance of genuine freedoms in the evaluation of an individual's benefit.
- Variations in people's ability to modify resources into value-added products.
- The diversity of actions that promote happiness.
- The cooperation between materialistic and non-materialistic factors in valuing human welfare.
- Numerous opportunities in society bring about anxiety.

Sen's CA consists of various components of a good life and depends on distribution principles (Beyazit, 2011). Good life depends on capabilities, choices, freedom, functioning, and opportunities. Furthermore, Nussbaum (2001) included affiliation, bodily health, bodily integrity, control over one's environment, emotions, imagination, life, other species, play, practical reason, senses, and thoughts as basic needs. CA promotes quality of life through sustainable development that enhances human dignity and rights (Sen, 2005). As described below, functioning's and capabilities are essential elements that determine human welfare.

b) Key terms in the capability approach: Functioning's, capabilities, and agency

The following vital terms anchor CA.

i) Functionings

Functionings are the state of an individual's beings and doings (Sen, 1992). For example, when a person can sell, this is an example of a situation where he can sell. Living is a set of interrelated functionings that are states and activities constitutive of a person's being, like being calm, happy, healthy, and safe, having an excellent job and having self-respect. Functionings are part of the capabilities referred to in CA. Functioning is what people may want to be, or should be capable of, and do (Sen, 1992). A person's chosen combination of functionings is their overall capability set.

ii) Capabilities

The amount of useful functioning that a person can access in reality is referred to as their capacity (Robeyns, 2003, 2005; Sen, 2005). Capabilities, like various operating combinations of health, literacy, and political affiliation, determine a person's capacity to choose the life one values. Consequently, a capability is a freedom (see Table 4.1). The different combinations of functionings that a person is capable of achieving are called capabilities. Capabilities are influenced by both internal and external factors; they show a person's opportunity and capacity to produce worthwhile results (Sen, 2001). The freedom of choice is important to the capability set because it affects a person's quality of life rather than achievements in and of themselves (Sen, 1992). More opportunities to accomplish things that people value and have good reason to value are provided by freedom. A person's well-being depends on how their lifestyle came to be, so understanding the process by which things happen is crucial when evaluating freedom, for example, how they choose to eat or not determines whether they fast or experience starvation (Sen, 1992). The sum of a person's functionings constitutes their actual accomplishment; their capability set, or the freedom to select between different functioning combinations, and represents their opportunity to freedom (Sen, 2001). A prerequisite for capabilities is that some functionings play a dual role. Education, a healthy diet, and mental and physical well-being are a few examples of these functionings.

iii) Agency

The act of bringing about change is referred to as agency, and the evaluation of its success is based on one's values and goals; in other words, the agency evaluates what a person can do in accordance with their conception of the good (Sen, 2001). The organisation determines one's capacity to personally select the behaviours they value, a decision that may not be related to their personal well-being (Nussbaum, 2011). Fasting is a decision that may be harmful to one's

health. Therefore, a person acting as an agent is not always motivated by a desire for well-being. Agency is defined as a person’s capacity to engage in social, political, and economic activities. Assessing one’s capacities and any political, social, or economic obstacles to obtaining substantive freedoms requires agency (Sen, 1991). Concern for agency emphasises that well-being should be accompanied by participation, public discourse, democratic practice, and empowerment. Agency grows hand in hand with the expansion of important freedoms. People need to be able to associate, receive an education, express themselves, and speak in public without being afraid for their lives.

The bicycle case clarifies how the various concepts of functionings, capabilities, and agency are related: A person who owns or accesses a bicycle (a resource) may cycle it to town, thus valuing mobility (a functioning). The bike cannot create functioning mobility if the person cannot cycle. Owning or access to the bicycle (resource) accompanied by the ability to balance makes the capability for a person to move around. If the bike takes people to and from the supermarket, this capability adds to their happiness or utility. The pleasure results in an individual’s anticipated change by their joy:

**Resource (bicycle) → Functioning (mobility) → Capability (to cycle) → Utility
(pleasure) → Agency (change)**

c) Sen’s five instrumental freedoms

There are five types of instrumental freedoms: economic freedom, political freedom, protective security, social opportunities, and transparency guarantees (Sen 1999; 2005) (see Table 4.1). The five freedoms provide a foundation for a democratic society and define broad, universal, moral, and ethical principles that nurture development initiatives; accordingly, poverty results from the lack of one or all freedoms. Freedom helps in the development process as more choices open. Development does not necessarily mean increased incomes or per capita incomes. Instead, *“Development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms (lack of freedom) that exposes people with limited opportunities of exercising their reasoned agency”* (Sen, 1999:12).

Table 4.1 Sen’s five instrumental freedoms and how they relate to the informal sector

Type of freedom	List of freedoms	Limits to the informal sector freedoms
Economic freedom	The open labour market, protection from bondage, access to product markets, saving opportunities, stable business ethics, and	Loans from moneylenders, individual disabilities, no access to credit, no access to

	people's chances to have and use economic resources or entitlements	training facilities, no access to markets, no or limited ability to mobilise sources of finance
Political freedom	Freedom of participation in public discussions, political representation, institutional arrangements, democracy, the liberty to scrutinise and criticise authorities, free press, and multiparty elections	Absence of assessments required to inform policymakers about capabilities and potentials of development, limitations on access to law-and-order services, constraints on access to information, no protection against eviction
Protective security	Emergency facilities, shelters, and arrangements for protection from extreme deprivation, social protection for vulnerable people	No access to networks, no access to emergency food, limitations to access shelter
Social opportunities	Good health, primary education, childcare	No access to health care, constraint to access essential services like water and schooling
Transparency guarantees	Absence of corruption, the mechanism for seeking justice, access to police protection, mutual trust	No facilities to report a crime, for example unreported theft and rape

Source: Adapted and modified from Sen (1999, 2005)

Table 4.1 shows the freedoms associated with a democratic society based on comprehensive, universal, moral, and ethical foundations. Sen (2005) proposed that freedoms tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely. Development increases people's freedoms by enlarging their choices brought about by economic, political, social, and technological transformations that empower people to choose and realise social justice (see also Robeyns, 2005).

4.2.2 Creating capabilities: Nussbaum's human development approach

Nussbaum later modified Sen's work on capabilities when she identified the following capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000, 2011):

- People co-existence with nature, for instance, respecting other species.
- Control of one's political participation and material environment, freedom of association and expression, acquisition of own property and guaranteed property rights, right to employment, freedom from unwarranted search and seizure.
- Education has sufficient freedom of expression to create through senses, imagination, and thought-informed decisions on education, health, scientific training, and freedom of religious exercise.
- Emotion and a healthy lifestyle that is free from fear.
- The ability to have good health, including reproductive health, nourishment, and the need for adequate and decent shelter.

- A definite life, meaning to have an average life expectancy.
- Membership relates to social interaction and non-discrimination based on caste, ethnicity, national origin, race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation.
- Bodily integrity relates to safety, freedom from assault and reproductive choices, adequate nutrition, and shelter.
- Play, the enjoyment of recreational activities, the ability to play and laugh.
- Practical reason, reflecting on and planning one's life.

Nussbaum (1988) argued that her list was justified because it focuses on the basic tenets of life. Nussbaum's primary focus was on the dignity of humanity as espoused by her ten fundamental capabilities stated above, whereas Sen focused on freedom. Nussbaum's primary focus is on the 'sufficientarian' principle (minimum requirements of justice). To promote justice and human dignity, entitlements and capabilities should be fair. A life devoid of capabilities is incomplete, for example, fasting for religious reasons should be respected for making that choice even if he dies of hunger. The Human Development Index (HDI) of the UNDP (2000) borrowed some tenets of the capability's framework. The HDI is a compound index that measures average achievement in three relevant standards of economic development indexed on educational achievement, income levels and life expectancy.

a) Strengths of the capabilities approach

Human capabilities are drivers of economic growth, poverty reduction and the improvement in socioeconomic well-being. The importance of CA follows.

- CA is flexible; it views people differently, including how they use resources to produce outputs. The CA can be compared culturally, economically, and politically across countries because it takes a multidimensional approach. Human development incorporated the idea that growth is focused on increasing capabilities and hence "expanding people's choices". Countries with similar functionings are at different levels of development because of some aspects of neglected well-being in other countries. Hence, aggregate achievement differs.
- CA helps analyse the inherent connection between people and capabilities (Sen, 1999); people differ physiologically in age and gender. People have defined needs to achieve functionings, although some disabilities like blindness, may not be easy to mitigate, irrespective of assistance. The environment affects whether the environment is clean

and affected by weather changes. Similarly, there are differences in socioeconomic conditions in countries due to differences in the availability of education, security, social capital and variations in relational perspectives.

- Generally, CA is viewed as a flexible and versatile framework. It is not a precise theory of individual well-being but a valuation of social arrangements and the crafting of social change in society (Qizilbash, 2008; Robeyns, 2005; Sen, 1992). Incomes and capabilities are mutually exclusive. CA illustrates genuine opportunities instead of emotional issues like happiness and wealth. So, CA measures an individual's wellness now and in the future and evaluates an individual's functioning and capabilities (Sen, 2005).
- Finally, CA offers an alternative way of measuring well-being and human development.

b) Limitations of the capability approach

Scholars have questioned the epistemological basis of Nussbaum's CA theory. CA is intellectualised, and more is needed to explain a set of current global overlapping consensus (Qizilbash and Clark, 2005). The moralist perspective, philosophical orientation and the legal connotations of CA are discriminatory of what governments can do and consequently miss salient features like measuring the quality of life (Alexander, 2008). Nussbaum (2004) argued in defence that the components of her theory can be verified and implemented in all countries as they are globally applicable.

Well-being varies from person to person, and it is not easy to measure happiness. There is a danger of narrowing the scope of joy when it is vaguely estimated because happiness is subjective (Clark, 2005). Although people value what they want, external factors also determine control over fairness in participation and the endowment of resources. The concept of a good life does not mean the same to everyone. In Sen (2005) view, people can use resources as functionings differently. People will always have discrepancies in physical capability to track the life they have reason to see as worthy. Sen (1993) acknowledged that the CA is under-theorised. Sen (1985) argued that CA is not a justice theory; instead, it is a conduit through which to evaluate absolute freedom in terms of making individual choices. One's freedom may also affect the freedom of others; hence, from this view, CA is too individualistic. In CA, communal values, for example, shared language, set of norms and values and the political

structure, need to receive adequate attention, although the values are essential in developing social capital.

Contrary to Sen, Nussbaum (2011) said that freedom is an element of power in any just society, and it must be limited to a certain degree, as some freedoms are good while others are bad. Freedom is thus an element of power. Similarly, HDI has received criticism for being limited in scope. Education, income level and life expectancy are not the only determinants of human development. well-being is multifaceted and thus difficult to measure; it embraces many aspects, like the doctor-patient ratio. However, albeit its limitations, the CA led to the development of HDI, as explained below.

4.3 Capability approach, Brundtland Commission and the First UNDP Human Development Report

The capabilities and functionings provided by the HDI framework were developed by Sen and Mahbub ul Haq in 1995 (Malik, 2014). These two authors also produced the four pillars of human development, which are empowerment (the ability and power to make choices), equity (equal access to available opportunities), productivity (human labour productivity) and sustainability (constancy in the availability of opportunities). Sen influenced how economists, health practitioners, philosophers and political theorists think by giving an alternative to measuring human welfare, for example, the Genuine Progress Indicator. Sustainable development is a political discourse from CA through the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987:8):

Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains two key concepts: 'needs the essential requirements of the world's poor, overriding given priority; and technological and social organisations' limitations on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.

The WCED said that pursuing sustainable development requires a political structure tolerant of citizens participation in decision-making and an economical design that creates sustainable wealth through social schemes that provide conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanisms. Also, a production system that acknowledges the ecological footprint promotes sustainable development. The anchored system is a technological system that pursues research and development endeavours. Finally, a global system that supports sustainable patterns of trade and finance through a flexible organisational structure that enables self-correction is

invaluable in achieving sustainability (WCED, 1987). Much of the SLA shared sustainable development literature with The First UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 1990). The HDI reports on individual and household health, education, and well-being (Section 4.4.1). The Brundtland report reflected the primary ingredients of the Sustainable Livelihood Approach (SLA) by focusing on people living in poverty and their necessities, the significance of civic participation, the importance of self-reliance and sustainability and the ecological impact of people on the planet. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development culminated in the 17 SDGs in 2015 (UN, 2015). The SDGs were born at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 to have universal goals that limit humanity's economic, environmental, political and social challenges and were adopted by world leaders in 2015 (UN, 2015).

4.4 Capabilities-based indices

The UN uses five leading indices based on CA to measure welfare. The main index is the Human Development Index (HDI used in the Human Development Report together with other measures like the Gender- Development Index (GDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Human Poverty Index.

4.4.1 Human Development Index

The HDI is an index that measures a country's economic development and economic welfare. It uses the education index (mean and expected years of schooling. HDI also measures the income level index (gross national income [GNI]) in Purchasing Power Parity per capita (how much a country's currency buys in terms of a global benchmark typically in US dollar) and life expectancy index (average life expectancy compared to overall expected life expectancy) measured by GNI per capita. An HDI score of 1 (one) shows a high level of economic development, and a score of 0 (zero) is deficient. The HDI has limitations because it excludes many factors, for example, dimensions of equality, gender, and participation. However, it provides a rough idea of comparing economic welfare between nations and its GDP. GDP is a tool that guides businesses' strategic decisions, investors, and policymakers. It provides an economic snapshot of a country by approximating the size of the economy and growth rate in terms of goods and services worth produced in a country in a particular period (Klasen and Schüler, 2011; UNDP, 1990). HDI varies widely within countries, for example, HDI scores are higher in the Mashonaland regions of Zimbabwe than the Matabeleland regions due to tribal

politics and resource endowments (ZimStat , 2022). HDI shows long-term changes, like life expectancy and short-term changes. A higher national wealth does not necessarily indicate welfare. GNI may not necessarily increase economic welfare; it depends on the spending patterns, for example, a country may have a high HDI score although its resources go to non-productive sectors like defence.

Similarly, a country's widespread inequality may be concealed by a higher GNI per capita. High levels of inequality exist in some nations with higher real GNI per capita, like Saudi Arabia. For comparisons of welfare, HDI displays nations with comparable GNI per capita but varying degrees of economic development (ZimStat , 2022).

4.4.2 Gender Development Index

An index that gauge's gender equality is called the Gender Development Index (GDI). The GDI is an expansion of the HDI that takes gender into account. GDI measures differences between male and female achievements in three areas of human development: health, education, and control over economic resources. It addresses gender gaps in education, like female and male anticipated years of school attendance for children and female and male average schooling years for adults ages 25 and older. Data that has been broken down by gender is used for each dimension. Life expectancy at birth for both men and women encapsulate the aspect of health. Two indicators assess education: male and female expected schooling years and derived income from resource control by males and females. GDI is used exclusively with the HDI score; hence on its own, it cannot measure gender gaps (UNDP, 1990)

4.4.3 Gender Empowerment Measure

The GEM is an index designed to measure gender equality. GEM focuses on women's empowerment in each country, namely, women's employment in high-ranking economic positions, seats in parliament, and share of household income (Klasen and Schüler, 2011). GEM captures Nussbaum's central capabilities, like affiliation, control over one's environment, senses, imagination and thought.

4.4.4 Gender Inequality Index

According to Klasen and Schüler (2011), the GII quantifies gender inequality. To calculate the costs of gender inequality on human development, GII looks at factors like empowerment, labour force participation, and reproductive health. Affiliation, environmental control, senses,

imagination, and thought are some of Nussbaum's ten fundamental abilities that are represented in GII.

4.4.5 Human Poverty Index

The Human Poverty Index measures poverty based on absences that prevent people from living long, healthy, and productive lives with a respectable standard of living (Klasen and Schüler, 2011). It is a non-income-based index. HDI includes social exclusion, denying individuals from accessing various opportunities, resources, and rights ordinarily available to others, for example, civic engagement, due process, democratic participation, employment, health care, and housing.

4.5 Sustainable livelihood approach

The CA, espoused by Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000), provides human development discussion. Social arrangements set the development tone through peoples capabilities and freedoms expansion to attain valuable beings and doings (functionings) than they previously had. The capability–livelihood approach suggests that: *Well-being is measured by what individuals can do (capabilities) rather than what they do (functionings) (Sen 1992:95)*. The SLA framework helps to understand how people living in poverty create their livelihoods (DFID, 1999). The SLA is based on two premises: First, people are active agents that make choices and formulate strategies (the actor-orientated premises). Second, people's possibilities and choices are a product of culture, institutions, politics, and power (the political economy premises) (Scoones, 2009). These two premises refute the view that people's well-being depends only on income (DFID, 2000; Levine, 2014). Initially, the SLA had a rural and agriculture focus emphasising technocratic solutions to development. However, applying the SLA as a planning tool in urban and rural areas is possible. Urban applications have occurred (Babere, 2013; Farrington et al., 2002; Rakodi, 1997).

Globally, urban poverty is increasing due to net migration and the perceived advantages of urban areas (ILO, 2019). On the contrary, there are limited livelihood possibilities because planners must take people living at or below the poverty line in mind when designing urban areas (Levine, 2014). The challenge of urban poverty has led to the use of the SLAs because they

- view poverty as multifaceted;

- acknowledge that the livelihood strategies of people experiencing poverty are constantly changing;
- focus on capital assets and their wise or unwise use; and
- recognise the role of PIPs in the people–livelihood nexus (Chambers and Conway, 1992; Scoones, 2019).

The SLA provides the following analytical framework: vulnerability context, livelihood assets (financial, human, natural, physical and social), PIPs, livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes (DFID, 1999; Scoones, 1998). The SLA operates at the micro (local), meso (national or district) and macro (regional or global) levels and covers complex governance, policy, policy processes, service delivery, social and political organisations, social norms, and social relations (Carney et al. 2008; Scoones, 2001, 2009). The application of the SLA to individuals, groups of people, villages, and districts are usually associated with households (Scoones, 2019). The question then is: What is a livelihood? Chambers and Conway (1992:7) defined a livelihood as follows:

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for living. A livelihood is sustainable and can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain, and enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation, which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in short and long-term.


People experiencing poverty should be empowered to create wealth by crafting policies that spruce up their institutional environment and assets (Scoones, 2015). The SLA has triple uses (Ashley and Carney, 1999; Chambers and Conway, 1992; Chapman and Slaymaker, 2001; Kollmair et al., 2002):

- **Analytical framework** (see Figure 4.1): The SLF is an analytical framework (people–livelihood-centred) to poverty as a development challenge.
- An overall **development objective** to enhance the livelihoods of people experiencing poverty.
- A set of underlying **development principles**, which are 1) building on strengths of an individual’s inborn strengths and the need to enhance one’s potential, while at the same time removing one’s limitations; 2) dynamism: livelihoods and institutions that shape people’s lives are diverse; 3) holistic: to understand people’s livelihoods, it is appropriate to understand the macro environment; 4) macro–micro links: development

is focused on either the macro or the micro-level; sustainable development thrives when there are strong linkages at the macro policy level; 5) people-centred: the livelihoods approach focuses on people and not resources; and 6) sustainability: a resilient livelihood that survives under threat from external shocks and stresses.

Following the three main aspects of the SLAs, people play different roles in the SLF (Levine, 2014):

- As testers (applying the SLA on the ground and producing results).
- As developers (increasing and spreading the notion of SLA to improve its significance).
- As champions (encouraging and supporting commitment to the idea of SLA).
- As communicators (stating the SLA in ways that increase its appeal to diverse audiences).
- As interpreters (relating the SLA to its various issues and situations and as advocates (creating more support for SLA use).



F = Financial capital P = Physical capital S = Social capital
H = Human capital N = Natural capital

Source: Adapted from Carney et al. (1999)

Figure 4.1 Sustainable livelihood framework, incorporating rights, perspectives and urban adaptations

Livelihoods research focuses on different people doing different things and the reason for such i.e., bringing the SLF to life, *an operational map for research using a SLF* (Figure 4.2). The livelihood chain ranges from goals to outcomes, influenced by assets, identity, PIPs and vulnerability context with determined by power relations (Levine, 2014). People's goals, strategies, activities and outcomes do make it easier to appreciate livelihood possibilities perception. Influences on people's identity are due to self-perception and how others perceive them, institutions and organisations' perception of them; all important for livelihood choice (Levine, 2014). Identity is multifaceted, it includes age, class, education, ethnicity, gender, political allegiance and religion (human capital, social capital and vulnerability in Figure 4.1). People have more than identity. Similarly, perceptions of the same context differ, including the ability to cope and adapt. People are rational agents who define their destiny bases on abilities, identity, power, wealth and treatment by institutions, organisations and policies (Carney, 1999).




Figure 4.2 Operational map for research using a sustainable livelihood framework

Source: Adapted from Levine (2014)

People's livelihood strategies depend on

- ❖ What are (different) people doing to make a living?
- ❖ And why are they doing what they are doing?

The following section focuses on the central tenets of the SLF (as in Figure 4.1), starting with the vulnerability context.

4.5.1 Vulnerability context

The vulnerability context (“the context”) [see Figure 4.1] refers to exogenous factors beyond an individual’s influence that impact their assets and livelihood opportunities as determined by economic, environmental, political, and social aspects, either negatively or positively (DFID, 1999). The context of vulnerability consists of two parts: an outer side of shocks (like seasonality) and an inner side (hopelessness brought on by a lack of resources and ability to address problems) (Carney, 1998; Moser, 1996). The context – internal or external – determines shocks like diseases and conflicts, crucial trends like demographic and technological trends, and seasonality, for example, variations in prices and employment opportunities. People who experience poverty can do little to influence their context although development agencies can increase resilience by offering short-term relief, like access to insurance and increasing institutional responses (DFID, 1999).

Context influences people’s identities and perceptions. Identity originates from age, class, education, ethnicity, gender, political allegiance, and religion. (Farrington et al., 2001; Levine, 2014). Identity describes how people see themselves and how others perceive them, for example, men, women, and youth. The context is not static. People experience context differently because of different abilities, identities, relative power, and wealth, all within the PIPs realm (Levine, 2014). The SLA focuses on their identity and perceptions to understand people as rational agents.

a) Implication of the vulnerability context in urban areas

The SLA initially focused on the rural context although its components equally apply in urban settings. Cities are culturally, economically, physically, and socially diverse. Commercialisation is higher in urban areas; most basic goods, like accommodation and food, are obtained or rented through the market, whereas these are free or cheap in rural areas. People living at or below the poverty line lack tenurial rights and essential social services (e.g., health and education) or financial services (e.g., bank loans). They are often excluded from decision-making and harassed by local authorities (Levine, 2014). Urban areas are increasingly becoming zones of social innovation, experimentation, and governance. Municipalities are engines of urban development, sustainable growth, and innovation. If urban areas have limited

assets, there may be a need to transform PIPs to expand people's livelihoods in terms of intended objectives, scope, and priorities for development. Harare's spatial planning is rigid in accommodating an ever-evolving urban economy.

4.5.2 Access to capital and livelihood assets

Livelihood assets are essential to pursuing livelihood outcomes [see Figure 4.1]. The DFID (1999) divides asset capitals into five groups (see Table 4.2):

- Human capital: The quantity and quality of knowledge and labour existing in a household.
- Natural capital: The worthiness and amount of available natural resources.
- Financial capital: Savings and regular inflows of money.
- Physical capital: The arrangement, implements, and tools used for increasing production.
- Social capital: Social resources, networks, mutual trust, mores and support (see also Farrington et al., 2001).

The political landscape determines access to and control over assets. So, political capital should be the sixth capital. Political capital uses politics and governance to improve livelihoods (Scoones, 2018). However, politics could be both an asset (e.g., civic participation and the right to be heard) and a liability (marginalising the people living in poverty). Some assets contribute more effectively to the attainment of livelihood outcomes. In contrast, it is possible to substitute others, for example, the substitution of finances for human capital through employers working for themselves rather than hiring employees. The ultimate objective of SLA is to improve the ability of people living in poverty to access the five capitals so that their livelihood outcomes are improved (DFID, 1999).

Similarly, people who use assets only sometimes own them. Instead, people have various levels of access to and control of assets. Different people have various levels of asset needs; economic, environmental, institutional, political, and social factors determine the use, access and management of assets (Scoones, 2019). Assets can be valuable or detrimental to people, depending on the context, for example, in conflict and power struggles, assets like diamonds can be a curse. It is possible to add a separate box for relative power or vulnerability (Collinson, 2003), and the assets box could be assets or liabilities (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2003). Correspondingly, the SLA views human capital purely economically and overlooks relevant

tenets like people's psychology and personality, risk aversion and conformity to social mores and norms (Levine, 2014).

a) Implication of the asset base on urban areas

Urban areas are commoditised, and there is exchanged labour for cash (Chen, 2013), and often, people convert assets into money to get consumptive goods. This reality can lead to an underestimation of urban poverty. Usually, government programmes have better coverage in urban areas regarding access to education, health, and housing. However, natural resources are scarce in urban areas; fishing can be significant in some coastal cities. The use of river water for washing and even drinking in cities may also be a substantial capital. Housing, an essential asset for the poor in urban areas, is vital for shelter, reproductive purposes, and income generation, for example, renting out rooms or using the space as a workshop area (Chirisa, 2013). Housing ownership opens access to other assets, for example, social capital like residential and community social networks. Opportunities also arise from human capital (the importance of housing on health), financial assets (collateral for credit and reduced costs if location makes ease of access to employment), and political capital (community-based organisations have advocacy roles and so make demands from the state). Social capital is a critical resource for the urban poor, particularly in crises, for information dissemination on jobs and finding accommodation. The SLA needs to pay more attention to power, yet urban areas are centres of influence to maximise human agency and freedom (Sen, 2005).

Table 4.2 Livelihood / Capital assets

Assets/Capitals	Explanation	Examples
Economic/ financial capital	The capital base is essential for the pursuit of any livelihood strategy	Access to credit, cash stock, debts (formal/informal), saleable assets, pensions, remittances, savings, subsidies and wages
Human/people capital	Skills and abilities of people, including leadership abilities	Capacity to adapt, the ability to work, creativity, educational standards, facilities, experience, health status, inventiveness, knowledge, nutritional levels, skills/labour, physical capability
Natural capital	These are natural resource stock services from which resource flows and valuable services are derived for livelihoods promotion	Biodiversity, natural resource stocks (air, soil, water, genetic resources), land and produce, vegetation, trees and forest products and aquatic resources, wild foods and fibres, wildlife, environmental services (hydrological cycle, pollution sinks)
Physical/built capital	The physical infrastructure supports individual and community efforts	Buildings, electricity, machinery, markets, railways, production equipment and technologies, roads, schools, shelter, tools, traditional and modern technology, vehicles
Political capital	Citizens' perception of their participation and trust (distrust) in their political systems and their leadership	Formal and informal (patronage) links with officials and politicians, for example demonstrations, political representation, mechanisms for freedom of participation in decision-making and leadership, democracy, the liberty to scrutinise and criticise authorities, free press, and multiparty elections
Social/cultural capital	The social resources from which people draw when pursuing different livelihood strategies that require coordinated actions	Associations, affiliations, standard rules and sanctions, formal and informal groups, friendship, mutual understanding and support, networks and connections (kinship, neighbourhoods, institutional arrangements, shared values and behaviours, social claims, social mores and norms, and social relations)

Source: Adapted and modified from Chambers and Conway (1992), DFID (1999) and Scoones (1998, 2001).

4.5.3 Policies, institutions and processes

PIPs (formerly transforming structures and processes in the DFID SLA) comprise institutions, organisations, policies and legislation (Levine, 2014). The relationship between PIPs (as conduits or as barriers) determines access to various assets used in pursuing livelihood

strategies[see Figure 4.1] . The impact of PIPs on livelihoods is described in the following sections, starting with institutions:

a) Institutions and livelihoods

An institution is “any form of constraint that humans devise to shape human interaction” (North, 1991:4). Institutions are essential for understanding livelihoods. Institutions refer to a pattern of regularised behaviour anchored by society’s mores, norms, and rules (Giddens, 1979; Schoenecker, 2023). Formal and informal institutions exist (Berry, 1989; North, 1990). Informal institutions are traditions entrenched in social practices and anchored on cultural, economic, and political tenets, which operate through agreed standards. Examples include codes of conduct, conventions, culture, good habits and manners, guidelines, kinship, mores, norms, religions, traditions, and values, like commitment, goodwill, responsibility, trust, and volunteerism.

Informal institutions are essential in developing countries because formal institutions need to be better established. For example, the law operates within a particular social context, or the judiciary can manipulate the rule of law to benefit a specific class, gender, or ethnic interest (Leach et al., 1997). Formal institutions are state-enforced rules and include laws, rules, and regulations. Formal institutions are the backbone of the development process through the executive, legislature, and judiciary. Organisations are the “players of the game”, and institutions are the “rules of the game”, to use a sports metaphor. The rules that people use to organise all types of repetitive and structured interactions, like those within churches, families, businesses, governments at all scales, markets, neighbourhoods, private associations, and sports leagues, are known as institutions (Ostrom 2005). Institutions set forth the conditions under which certain actions are permitted, required, or prohibited, along with the associated penalties for noncompliance. Rules and institutions are often used interchangeably (Ostrom, 2005).

Institutions determine limitations and *enable actors* to achieve sustainable livelihoods. Often, there are contestations, negotiations, and trade-offs because procedures, values and rules influence the processes of livelihood change (Leach et al., 1997; Schoenecker, 2023). The development of any economy is a product of the interaction between institutions (rules of the game) and organisations (the players) (North, 1994). Table 4.3 compares formal and informal institutions.

Table 4.3 Formal and informal institutions compared

Institutions	Formal institutions	Informal institutions
Type of exchange	Impersonal	Personal
Approach to rules	Rule-of-law	Rule-in-use
Character of the rules	Written	Unwritten
Nature of exchange	Contracted	Non-contracted
Time of schedule	Specified	Non-specified
Actor premise	Organisational goal	Shared expectations
Implications of agreement	Precise compliance	Ambiguous execution
Transparency	Potentially open to	Closed and confidential
Conflict resolution	Third-party body	Self-enforcement

Source: Hyden (2008)

The institutional environment comprises three formal entities, namely economic (management of capital resources), political (the direction of power balance, participation requirements, and the method of participation in government), and regulatory (regulations, rules and policies created by the judiciary) (Holmes et al., 2013). Economic institutions like the central bank, shape a country's financial resources and include the demand and supply of capital through taxation, tax returns and borrowing decisions (Fischer, 1993). Political institutions can either be autocratic or democratic. Autocracy leads to instability and the possibility of a revolution due to manipulating people's will (Holmes et al., 2013). In a democracy, there is citizen participation through lobbying or pressure from interest groups (Hillman et al., 2004).

By working with political institutions, regulatory institutions set the tone for rules and procedures to control a country's resources, property rights and the general organisation of economic activities. Regulatory institutions improve or reduce economic growth by creating diverse institutional environments (Holmes et al., 2013). Institutional voids can sometimes appear (Holmes et al., 2013). Voids are common in developing countries due to weak institutions. Institutional intermediaries may be public, for example, parastatals or civil organisations, like NGOs. Voids limit the functioning of markets due to erroneous regulations, inept judicial systems and the scarcity or absence of information (Khanna and Palepu, 2010).

b) Organisations and their role in transforming PIPs

An organisation refers to "groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives" (North, 1991:5). With institutions as societal rules of the game, organisations are

the game players (North, 1990). Organisations exist in *working rules* that explain and give meaning to organisations (Etzioni, 1975). An organisation can be a private firm, a government department, or an NGO. Organisations are complex; people only sometimes share goals; some pursue their own instead of shared goals (Fowler et al., 1993). Organisations are open systems with different management structures and individuals with various needs. Organisational culture is essential to share mores, values and beliefs and deal with clients, customers, and staff relations. An organisational culture entails coordinating working people, namely delegating, and supervising duties. Organisational culture is unique; it may be visible in dress code, working hours, promotion procedures and leadership style (Fowler et al., 1993).

There are several types of organisations: coercive, utilitarian, and voluntary (Etzioni, 1975) (Table 4.4). Table 4.4 compares the three based on membership benefit type and connectedness.

Table 4.4 Profiling formal organisations

Criteria	Voluntary/Normative	Coercive	Utilitarian
Benefit of membership	Intangible benefit	Corrective benefit	Tangible benefit
Type of membership	Volunteer basis	Required	Contractual basis
Feeling of connectedness	Shared affinity	No affinity	Some affinity

Source: Etzioni (1975)

Coercive organisations force people to join, especially after a punishment. In coercive organisations, internees live a controlled lifestyle where resocialisation takes place. Utilitarian organisations are those people who join to get a material reward. For example, in church groups, fellow members help each other during sickness. In voluntary or normative organisations, people join voluntarily to pursue a common interest. Joining a trade union is a good example. Related to formal organisations are bureaucracies.

Bureaucracy is an idealised representation of reality that describes characteristics (Michels, 2016) The government is an example of bureaucracy, but all formal organisations are bureaucracies. The Iron Rule of Oligarchy characterises big organisations; for example, managers are elites. Bureaucracies have a defined hierarchy of authority with a clear reporting structure, a clear division of labour specialisation, explicit rules (rules are defined, written down and standardised) and impersonality (removal of human character) (Weber, 1922).

c) Policies and legislation

Relevant policies and legislation complement organisations for them to improve the lives of people living in poverty. Policies are essential in any organisation because they help to enhance accountability (acceptance of responsibility); clarity (clearness on how, and expectations, and from whom and by whom); consistency (adherence to principles); efficiency (proficiency in performance), and guidance (the act of directing to achieve objectives) thereby augmenting the voiceless in policies, legislation, and institutions (Clark and Carney, 2008; Levine, 2014).

d) Implications of PIPs in urban areas

Institutions and organisations in urban areas serve the poor; hence the links through various by-laws (micro-level policies) and macro-level policies like structural adjustment programmes [SAPs] (macro-level policy). The design of most metropolitan areas needs to have the people experiencing poverty in mind. The development of the informal sector has brought several people into the cities of the Global South. Urban local authorities often need help to provide for the needs of these people due to planning deficits.

4.5.4 Livelihood strategies

A strategy refers to guiding principles that people initiate to attain specific goals (Levine, 2014) (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.5 for examples of livelihood strategies). Similarly, the activities people do are their living plans. Activities are daily coping initiatives (responding to shocks in the short term) and adaptation initiatives (improving situations in the long term) to diverse situations and needs based on objectives and values within a defined, comprehensive strategy (Richards, 1985). Usually, livelihoods research involves a focus on policies for improving people's livelihoods. Therefore, strategies are explored based on two questions:

- What are (different) people doing to make a living?
- Why are they doing what they are doing?

Standard SLF diagrams indicate that assets, choices, opportunities and PIPs and changes in the vulnerability context shape livelihoods (DFID, 1999). The results of these strategies in terms of livelihoods follow; however, strategies do not suggest that a specific economic reality dictates what everyone tries to do or whether the things they do, will determine the results (Levine, 2014). What people do depend on operational policies, government investment, and their judgement and perceptions of what they can do. People count on their age, education,

ethnicity, geographical location, political allegiance, power, and wealth. From this perspective, the exploration of livelihood strategies entails three questions:

- What were people's goals?
- What strategies did they choose?
- What did they do?

Intentions will only sometimes materialise because activities are dependent on daily circumstances. Understanding livelihood strategies requires an iterative process that includes backward and forward movement between aims, initiatives, and undertakings. The question arises: Why are they doing this and not that? The response would be: Why are *they* doing this when *others* are doing that? Hence, the performance of livelihood is not always akin because of the

- competing or complementary objectives due to different economic opportunities;
- goals and strategies that may demand trade-offs and compromises;
- objectives that cannot always be coherent;
- plans that can be disturbed and reformulated in light of changing circumstances;
- plans that may be idealised; and
- potentially conflicting objectives, for example, the need to balance social and economic activities.

The vulnerability context, assets, and PIPs as boxes on the SLF are social constructs (Levine, 2014). These boxes seem to have little in common. Instead, livelihoods research should use people's decisions as reference points to understand the forces (economic, environmental, political, and social) shaping livelihoods. The same applies to all boxes in the SLF. A livelihood perspective should have a comprehensive focus on PIPs (the political economy) (Chambers, 1997; Levine, 2014). Table 4.5 shows livelihood strategies and examples.

Table 4.5 Livelihood strategies

Strategies	Explanation	Examples
Collective support and external representation	Negotiation with local authorities and civil society for better opportunities	Communal kitchens and communal childcare
Disposal	Discarding/clearance of an asset	Sale of land to compensate for a consumption shortfall or to release funds for investment
Expenditure-reducing/sacrifice	Failure to invest time and resources in promoting reciprocal social relations, thereby reducing the ability to draw on social capital	Children withdraw from school due to the inability to pay fees Scavenging Walking and thereby cutting on transport cost
Income-enhancing/investment	Increasing the chances of getting more income	Urban agriculture Renting out rooms
Investment in securing more of an asset	Promotion of security and allowing for diversification or intensification of activities	Maximum use of partitioning of vending space
Livelihood protection	Activities to help prevent a decline in livelihood security	Early warning systems Food for work programmes
Livelihood provisioning	Direct provision of basic needs, usually in emergencies	Food aid Cash transfers
Livelihoods promotion	Activities to improve household resilience	Livelihood diversification, for example from vending to urban agriculture
Substitution of one asset for another	Replacement of one asset by another	Compensating for the declining income by increasing inputs of physical capital

Source: Adapted and modified from Chambers (1997) and Moser (1998)

a) Implication of livelihood strategies on urban areas

Diversification is a key strategy for the poor to improve their standard of living. This includes formal waged employment, informal trade, and service activities, with different family members participating in various industries and economic sectors. Diversification lessens reliance on a single source of income, which reduces vulnerability to certain stresses and shocks. A household may not be able to devote enough time or resources to each activity to make it profitable, although they may fail to specialise if they participate in too many activities. Resulting from the wide variety of livelihood options, people who live in poverty have more

ways to escape poverty in urban areas than in rural ones (Levine, 2014). The underdeveloped urban areas are connected to governance structures through infrastructure and services provided by urban organisations like municipalities. Likewise, the failure of programmes like SAPs impacts the urban poor more than their rural counterparts (see Chapter 5). Cities frequently need to meet the needs of people living in poverty, which results in their marginalisation (Moser, 1998). Urbanisation thus presents opportunities and challenges to these urban people.

4.5.5 Livelihood outcomes

The results of livelihood strategies include increased income, physical security, political empowerment, self-esteem, and decreased vulnerability (Farrington et al., 2001). Livelihood outcomes feed into PIPs and assets [see Figure 4.1]. Successful strategies build the asset base, and unsuccessful strategies deplete it, which increase vulnerability. Livelihood outcomes either create virtuous or vicious cycles. Pursuing livelihood outcomes need more objectivity and difficulties in translating outputs and indicators of growth and conflict outcomes. Occasionally, development agencies try to level the playing ground to attain positive outcomes.

For people living at or below the poverty line, livelihoods are externally driven and dependent on PIPs. As Clark and Carney (2008) said, the SLA is vital for the transference from poverty and upgrading to more viable livelihoods. The SLA also explains how and why people are affected differently by a crisis, for example, it helps in trend analysis and discovering essential differences between socioeconomic groups. The SLA focus on understanding what people do and why they do it, while strengthening positive aspects and mitigating limitations. Assessing how people are doing (livelihood monitoring) can measure how people's lives are affected. Framed personal objectives are stated for a variety of reasons, like to boost social status of for personal pleasure. Understanding broadened livelihood outcomes include economic and non-economic successes regarding what people are trying to do and how they spend their time and resources.

a) Implication of livelihood outcomes in urban areas

The measurement of livelihood outcomes depends on the context and the parameter(s) people use; this needs to be revised when comparing people, especially in urban areas, because of diversified livelihoods (Farrington et al., 2001). The suggested sequential analysis outline is in the following section to fully understand SLAs and livelihood outcomes.

4.6 Suggested sequential analysis for the sustainable livelihoods approach

Reduction in challenges facing the implementation of the SLA starts with what people do to make a living. Similarly, there should be an enquiry as to why they have made those choices, and how their options and strategies were contextually determined. The suggested sequences are:

- Viewing the SLA as an analytical framework (people–livelihood-centred) for a development challenge (multidimensional poverty).
- What exactly needs to be understood?
- Which questions need to be answered?
- What are different people doing to make a living? (At household level and individuals within households.)
- Why have people made choices? (Their objectives and perceptions of possibilities as influenced by their identities.)
- How are people’s choices and the livelihood activities of PIPs shaped?
- How are people doing in terms of the livelihood activities they are pursuing? (Are they becoming better off? Are they becoming more secure/resilient? Do they feel safer? Have they met their objectives?)
- Get the process right by working with all partners to develop a vision and agree on the results.

4.7 Value of the sustainable livelihoods approach

Environmental longevity is the quest for globalisation. Businesses should look at their impact on the environment through conscious awareness and change of strategies and techniques (WCED, 1987). There is cooperation between sustainability and capability (Sen, 1992). Goodland (1995) argued that one way of looking at sustainability is centred on economic, ecological, and social realms, as shown in Figure 4.3. Following the SLA, a livelihood is sustainable when it can survive with and recuperate from stressors and shocks and continues to survive or augment its capabilities and assets at any given time and in future through upholding the natural resource base (Chambers and Conway, 1992; Sen, 2005). Three pillars guide sustainability:

- **Economic sustainability** promotes long-term economic expansion without having a negative effect on the community's social, cultural, or environmental aspects (Elkington, 1997). The goal of economic sustainability is to keep the capital intact, while raising living standards and making the best use of available resources to sustain long-term business profitability. The quality and amount of growth are important in sustainability. The interdependence of social capital (relationships among people) and natural capital (ecological systems), as well as the idea that both human and environmental systems should be preserved, are all part of current global thinking. The idea that bigger is better and growth is profitable is challenged by the new economics if it results in the degradation of ecological systems (UNDP, 1990). Achievement of economic sustainability is when there is optimal use of resources. Businesses are profit-orientated; they must earn money to offset costs and, at the same time, invest. Similarly, enterprises attain economic sustainability when they plan, build their asset base, improve their brand and reputation, and manage their risks, for example, through appropriate training and development (Goodland, 1995). With limited or no economic sustainability, a business will not cover the social and environmental segments of sustainability.
- **Environmental sustainability** adds value to the quality of the environment (WECD, 1987). Environmental sustainability aims at increasing human welfare by protecting natural capital, for example, land and water. Businesses should lessen or mitigate harm to the environment (green companies), for example, by using solar and wind energy in industry. Environmental sustainability is achieved through the 6 Rs: recovery, recycle, reduce, reuse, repurpose and reuse. The 6 Rs have commonalities, like cutting down waste, conserving natural resources, and redirecting resources where they are genuinely needed. The main features of environmental sustainability include greening the world by creating eco homes, environmentally conscious communities and obtaining sustainable food and renewable energy; all achieved through sustainable production.
- **Social sustainability** refers to how people live together, including societal provisions and prospects for a better future in terms of being autonomous, the realisation of individual potential, contribution to governance issues, citizenship and service to society, equal justice, dissemination of knowledge and creation of an enabling environment for society to flourish (Goodland, 1995). Social sustainability is achieved

when formal and informal systems, structures, relationships, and processes (social capital and networking) offer opportunities for capacity building, resulting in liveable communities that are democratic, diverse, and inclusive. Sustainable development aims at improving social capital through cohesion, honesty, reciprocity, and relationships among people. Social sustainability depends on information, laws and shared ideas of equality and rights.




Figure 4.3 Three sustainability realms

Source: Goodland (1995)

Global residents ought to preserve the world for future generations. They did not inherit the earth from their forefathers but borrowed it from their children. This advice calls for futuristic thinking. The basis of the sustainability discourse is stewardship. The 3 Ps are the three realms of sustainability, namely: People (social responsibility of an organisation to people), Planet (the degree to which a business has been environmentally responsible) and Profits (profit and loss of an organisation) (Elkington, 1994, 1997). The 3 Ps influence a business's environmental, financial, and social performance over time.

Similarly, the triple bottom line is an accounting system that measures sustainability (Elkington, 1997). The triple bottom line refers to the social and environmental contract between the community and businesses. The business needs to improve the health, punctuality, and job satisfaction of workers (Elkington, 1997; Goodland, 1995). Most organisations do not fully embrace the triple bottom line for fear of ethnocentrism; they fear that they may have to

forego certain things and time that has to be devoted to the extra task towards environmentalism. To improve environmental stewardship, it is essential that institutions and organisations (PIPs) implement genuine, wide-ranging reforms to reach sustainability (DFID, 1999; Goodland, 1995).

The SLA is vital for the transference from poverty and upgrading to more viable livelihoods, irrespective of asset size; the review of the current trends, like climate change, is necessary to strengthen people's resilience to improve certainty on the ground (Scoones, 2020). The SLA explores how and why people are affected differently by a crisis; hence it helps in trend analysis and discovering essential differences between different socioeconomic groups. The SLA focuses on understanding what people do, the reasons behind what they do, strengthening lively doings and mitigating limitations.

One of the significant strengths of the SLA is its focus on assets as opposed to vulnerability analysis; hence it is multifaceted and thus multidisciplinary. The SLA empowers people experiencing poverty and sees them as decision-makers with the potential to set their own priorities (Morse et al., 2009). The SLA examines the various combinations of possible means of subsistence from a historical perspective. This method emphasises the significance of macro and micro linkages while encouraging a creative tension between various levels of analysis. Similarly, SLA acknowledges the need to expand beyond limited sectoral perspectives and emphasises the connections between various economic sectors (Ellis, 2000). It urges a review of daily activities and calls attention to interpersonal relationships. The DFID (1999) approach stands out because it brings out the relationship between environmental sustainability and context-specific poverty from a multidimensional perspective, for example, cultural, ecological, economic, political, and social perspectives.

The SLA frees development practitioners from conventional approaches by viewing individuals or communities as heterogeneous. Entry points to the community are multiple; institutions guide these through linkages between the micro, the macro and the formal–informal channels. The livelihoods of the poor are understood by exploring factors that enhance and inhibit livelihood outcomes and their relationships, objectives, scope, and priorities for development initiatives (Morse et al., 2009). Interventions by development partners quickly understand livelihood analysis through the SLA. The crucial roles played by PIPs are emphasised through development initiatives that are people-centred, responsive, participatory, multilevel, and conducted in partnership with the public and private sectors. As visualised in

the SLA, a symbiotic relationship between people and the external environment always influences livelihood strategies and outcomes.

4.8 Limitations of the sustainable livelihoods approach

Some scholars argue that the SLF is “too complicated to be useful” (Levine, 2014). Factors that influence livelihoods are multifaceted, and so is life. Complex questions arise in a bid to understand people’s livelihoods (see Section 4.3). Although SLA is multidimensional, it needs to be more explicit on culture. There is little mention of culture per se, although there is an essential consideration for communities (Tao et al., 2010). Generally, development agencies perceive culture to be detrimental to progress (Daskon and Binns, 2010).

Similar to this, criticism of the SLA is based on the premise that assets (including culture) are unique to an individual but extend beyond the level of the household (Bebbington, 1999). Seasonality, trends, and shocks are not covered in a vulnerability context in the SLF (Ellis, 2000). The effects of negative livelihood outcomes on shocks are not clearly correlated with one another. Livelihood analysis underestimates and circumvents the central tenets of the vulnerability context, for example, macroeconomic trends, like inflation, conflict, violence, and gender relations. However, conflict is inevitable in every institution, and so are gender relations, power, politics, governance, and environmental change inequalities (Levine, 2014; Ludi and Slater, 2007; Scoones, 2009). Additionally, the undervaluing of the significance of arrows on the SLF, and that more attention is on material assets and economics (the boxes) at the expense of PIPs. However, livelihoods are not only about material conditions of life (Carr, 2013).

The SLA anticipates the generalised and incremental growth of capital assets. The livelihoods of one group can be harmed by the advancement of another, but the SLA has severely minimised this risk (Scoones, 2016). The SLF tends to oversimplify reality, especially by downplaying the multidimensional fact of livelihoods. The livelihoods perspective as a methodological issue risk losing the real focus because more time, financial and human resources are needed to develop a comprehensive differentiated livelihood analysis (Scoones, 1998). There is no guide in the SLA to classify some individuals as inferior. Poverty is relative; it varies from one context to the other. The SLA does not recognise the role of informal structures and processes affecting asset access. Access is dependent on social capital. In the developing world, attempts to put women at the forefront of development initiatives are cursory

(Morse et al., 2009). Furthermore, the sectorial grouping of government ministries and development projects should be revised. The grouping of government ministries by sector is incongruent with the SLA.

Although relevant in the developmental discourse, the issue of participation needs to be better addressed in the SLA. Various participation levels range from community manipulation to citizen control of development initiatives (Arnstein, 2004). The basis of SLA hinges on participation, yet sensitive questions may lead to falsification that distorts livelihood outcomes. In the SLF, the word *sustainable* seems to be overused. The qualifier *sustainable* appeals to many unanswered questions, like: Sustainable for whom? And: By what criteria? Moreover, is sustainability measured over the long term or short term? The dimensions of poverty are multifaceted; assets are not necessarily the various capital types. Poverty is estimated based on a lack of assets because social relations between people and politics may otherwise influence them. The SLA claims to be people-centred, yet people's roles must be clarified. There seems to be more emphasis on quantitative categorisation. Numbers may mislead people, although quantification resonates with statistics that mainly appeal to policymakers (Scoones, 2016).

There are other critical considerations excluded in the SLAs, for example, leisure. Leisure can influence the distribution of resources, for example, the number concept (people working together as a group) enables people to work and do leisure concurrently. It is problematic to measure and analyse the capitals within SLA; each capital contains various elements, which take more work to measure (Scoones, 2018). Similarly, social capital is difficult to measure (see Ben Fine's book *Social Capital versus Social Theory*, 2001). Another question is: Is it possible to measure all these capitals concurrently, or is one measured first, followed by another and or others? Furthermore, it is crucial to identify the substitutability of various capitals, for example: Is financial capital able to replace natural capital, and if so, what with consequences? Moreover, is this desire for sustainability to be achieved?

Another burning question is: After the SLA, then, so what? Do the people have the capacity to liberate themselves? Do they have more livelihood options? Furthermore, are they capacitated enough? In Africa, social capital needs to be better developed. Community is an illusion because everyone is heterogeneous (Carney et al., 1999). As a participatory method, the SLA also focuses on representation like other approaches. Nevertheless, the main issue is that those involved in doing the SLA are different from the actors involved in the information to bring about change. Ultimately, the SLA becomes an end, with lengthy written reports and papers in

academic journals without corresponding efforts to improve people's livelihoods. The SLA does not cover the issue of globalisation. Todaro (1995) commented that when America catches a cold, the entire world sneezes. The vulnerability can be assessed, albeit with much difficulty, due to its volatility at macro, meso and micro scales. At the household level, history analyses shocks and the vulnerability context. Still, sudden events, like *coup d'état* (political instability), drought, hurricanes, an outbreak of disease, and rampant inflation, are difficult to mitigate.

The SLF diagram is simplistic; reality is far more complex, and so are people's lives. The SLA "belongs to the group of a holistic approach that seeks to capture the enormous complexity of development problems, but do so at the cost of focus, depth and analytical clarity" (Vanillin, 2002:251). To fully understand the SLA, interdisciplinarity is needed, which is a challenge. The analysis is usually descriptive (what people do and have) instead of critical analysis (why do people have what they have and do what they do), thereby only serving the interests of those driving the SLA. The UNDP's (2000) measurement of the HDI (based on the SLA) is futile because it focuses on education, health care and income, which leads to compressed life due to data scarcity. The expanded SLA should encompass various aspects of human well-being, like education, environmental conditions, governance, health, housing conditions, longevity, employment, and social relationships (Grasso, 2002). Overemphasis on income should not be at the expense of these elements of human welfare.

4.9 How did the sustainable livelihoods approach inform the study?

4.9.1 Sustainable livelihoods approach

The SLA is inherently qualitative and advocates for data collection in an integrated and interdisciplinary approach through triangulation, which helps validate data. The SLA informed the research design and the organisation of data into subthemes. Also, the SLA views people as active actors with assets and capabilities, which results in various livelihood options. The discussion of the SLA gave focus and scope to analysing the literature and discussing the results. For livelihoods, options open to people and culture (beliefs, identity, festivals, language, and traditions) are essential to Harare's urban livelihoods. However, it may not have economic value but is vital regarding well-being and vendor choices.

Defined power and power relations are not evident in the SLA, for example, intra-individual power relationships, women's empowerment, and women's powerful influence on urban livelihoods as shaped by vending. In this vein, the SLF appears neutral in power dynamics,

although power and its dynamics are critical in influencing livelihoods and poverty (Levine, 2014; Scoones, 2019). There need to be more historical factors in the SLF. However, the importance of these factors could be implied from shocks, patterns, and seasonality in the SLF, for example, what could be the main reason Zimbabwe ranks number two in the world after Bolivia in terms of vending? In the Zimbabwean context, the political capital factor is included in the study through the critical engagement on citizenship, enfranchisement and membership in ruling and political opposition parties in Harare.

Organisational change is necessary for SLA use in urban areas; there should be participatory and decentralised urban planning. Participatory planning increases the options for the poor through transforming PIPs and creating a working group of bilateral, multilateral agencies, national partners and NGOs who support SLAs (micro–macro linkages). Participatory planning is a challenge for most urban areas, for they are used for top-down approaches. The SLA is inherently qualitative (predefined research agenda demanding), vulnerability and PIPs cannot be quantified, and priorities and rationales of the poor are obtainable through qualitative approaches (see Chapter 1). Urban areas are administrative and political decision-making centres; hence SLA seeks the support of various agencies in Harare so that it is in tandem with both local and central government aspirations (Carney et al., 1999). Due attention was given on the focus of the study and ethical implications. The SLA gave a synopsis through which the livelihoods of informal practitioners in Harare are shaped and understood, in the sense of the SLF that is a simplified version of the multidimensionality of livelihoods; hence the livelihood-based CA (Figure 4.4).




Figure 4.4 A livelihood-based capabilities framework from a sustainability perspective

Source: Adapted and modified from Lienert and Burger (2015).

4.9.2 Livelihood-based capabilities

The capability–livelihood approach is an economical, moral, and participatory framework suggesting that well-being is measured by what individuals can do (capabilities) rather than what they do (functionings) (Sen 1992:95). People have abilities and assets which they develop to help improve their lives to create a sustainable livelihood that copes with and recovers from shocks and stresses by remaining the same or increasing (Scoones, 2016). The capability–livelihood approach views people as enterprising. It attempts to understand household livelihood endowments and individual well-being. This study explores and evaluates the capability–livelihood approach to street trading in the Harare CBD, where insecurity and vulnerability are associated with the business. The CA and the SLA are familiar with development studies; their combination and linkages are innovative. The capability–livelihood perspective is essential:

First, and most significantly, it is a development, economic, participatory, and moral framework that informs efforts to promote economic development and poverty alleviation (Sen, 1992).

Second, it is a normative framework providing an alternative to welfare economic approaches to well-being; that is, being comfortable, happy, and healthy. The focus is on an individual's ability to achieve valuable functionings in life, namely belongingness, success through a sense of purpose, and freedom to live a worthwhile life (Lienert and Burger, 2015; Sen, 1992).

Third, it is impossible to understand a micro business enterprise as detached from the household within its location. There is livelihood improvement detection in the household, positively impacting the sustainability of street trading.

4.10 Conclusion

The CA, with its capabilities and functionings, is a handy assessment instrument to assess how well-off people are. However, for future opportunities and change, the SLA is drawn to enrich the CA concerning “what to sustain” and “how to sustain”, in other words, people are active agents with the ability to change their lives. The CA and the SLA (collectively, the capability–livelihood approach) view well-being beyond economic aspects and income as a poverty indicator. One can be in a worse situation than those with less income who have access to health and educational facilities if they earn more but have less access to them. Capital assets are direct contributors to one's capability space, while macro conditions create a wider opportunity space and micro conditions influence decisions and livelihood strategies; a combination between means and capabilities as ends of the human well-being and quality of life metric that provides analytic dimensions. The CA allows people to choose based on good life indicators.

The SLA includes the techniques that people use to survive as well as their resources (both material and social). The sustainability component implies that people or communities deal with and get through times of stress and crisis while maintaining or even increasing present-day capabilities and resources. Thousands of Zimbabwe's residents who are vulnerable and those living in poverty live, work, trade, and produce at informal markets. The informal private sector is more significant than the formal sector as an employer. The SLA focuses on how those marginalised by the formal economy create, expand, and sustain livelihoods in the informal sector. Various perspectives on the informal sector include environmental degradation, human

rights abuses, lost revenue, low productivity, and unfair competition. However, others associate it with entrepreneurship, flexibility, and resilience, hence the multidimensional SLA (Scoones,2020). Similarly, the SLA views poverty from a multifaceted perspective focusing on livelihood promotion and ways like diversity in income sources and the resources an individual requires to live. The SLA adopts a systems approach to the conceptualisation of livelihoods through the following:

- Goods or capital that people need.
- Means by which people earn a living.
- The desired context support.
- Factors that could strengthen subsistence resilience in moments of stress and crisis.

These significant distinctions make the SLA more compelling in the study of the informal sector in Harare, compared to conventional development models like GDP and GNP. The SLA was thus a suitable conceptual framework to guide the study. Chapter 5 focuses on Zimbabwe's historical and policy terrain, namely policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs) and how they enhance or retard the informal sector.

Chapter 5

HISTORICAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF ZIMBABWE'S INFORMAL SECTOR

5.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe is urbanising, and so is poverty induced by economic malaise. Urban livelihoods are threatened by the prices of changing commodities and depressed purchasing power. The danger for livelihoods is due to stagnant salaries and wages, currency devaluations, food shortages, fuel, electricity, and unemployment. By 2008, 96% of low-income urban residents had insecure livelihoods, contributing to the rapid growth of informal sectors (IMF, 2018). The lack of decent and secure employment, liquidity challenges and other payment modes led to price distortions. Limited livelihood access by the urban people who live in poverty is due to past and current policies. Laws and regulations limit their use of assets and increase their vulnerability.

This chapter explores the informal sector's historical development and policy analysis in Zimbabwe from colonisation in 1890. The informalisation results from historical factors like residential segregation and hawker by-laws. Understanding the policies and legislation is essential because local and central governments remain hostile towards the informal sector and do not value its contribution to socioeconomic development and employment. The chapter explores six distinct phases in the informal sector's growth, focusing on the main pieces of legislation before colonisation, during colonisation and in the postcolonial era. The six phases provide an overview of the economic, environmental, legal, political, and social circumstances associated with the informal sector development. This is followed by an informal sector policy–governance–livelihoods analysis.

Growth in Zimbabwe's informal sector is related to Zimbabwe's urban development and stretches over a six-phase period (Munzwa and Wellington, 2010; Wekwete, 1994). The six phases are (see Table 5.1):

- Phase 1: Pre-independence period, 1892–1979.
- Phase 2: Hope after colonialism, 1980–1990.
- Phase 3: Decade of economic reform and trade liberalisation, 1991–1999.

Phase 4: Decade of economic collapse and “restoring order”, 2000–2008.

Phase 5: Government of National Unity, 2009–2014.

Phase 6: Post-Government of National Unity Epoch, 2015 to present.

5.2 Phase 1: Pre-independence period, 1892 to 1979

Zimbabwe’s colonial heritage has influenced its physical and economic landscape. Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital became a town under the British colonial administration in 1890. Harare’s population comprised European and Asian (primarily Indian) settlers. Since its establishment in 1890, the British colonial administration adopted urban plans that were technocratic and designed to create an orderly urban environment centred on the segregation of African, Asian, and European populations (Wekwete, 1988, 1994).

Colonial planning in Harare affected the evolution of the informal sector in the city. All Zimbabwe’s civilisation begins in Harare -*When Harare sneezes , Zimbabwe catches a cold.* Early residential segregation created a dual city that barred the African population from the CBD and the economy. There were two cities: the planned formal city of colonial rulers and the unplanned informal city of the “natives” (Wekwete, 1998). Residential segregation led to the emergence of African suburbs like Mbare (1907), Highfields (1930) and Coloured Zimbabweans, or Coloureds as they are popularly referred to, as persons of mixed race claiming both African and European ancestry and whose neighbourhoods are Arcadia, Braeside, Cranborne and St Martins (1902, initially as a leisure zone). There were also separate suburbs for whites in Avondale (1903), Borrowdale and Highlands (the early 1920s). The residential divide gave a wrong perception of the informal sector. In the whites-only areas, informality was absent. In contrast, in Black communities,’ the municipal authorities viewed it as chaotic and violating the city’s aesthetic and sanitary standards (Kamete, 2017). Informal activities were unrecognised, mistrusted and condemned by the colonial state (Kanbur, 2014).

The development of the informal sector mirrors the history of urbanisation in Zimbabwe (Wekwete, 1988). Before 1890, Great Zimbabwe, Khami and Dhlohdlo were the main cities. The cities collapsed 400 years before colonisation (Munzwa et al., 2007). Precolonial states were primarily informal, for example, poor people working for the rich to get food. In the colonial period, the first urban settlements resulted from military forts constructed by the British South Africa Company during Zimbabwe’s occupation. The settlements were exclusively for white people and included Fort Tuli (now Beitbridge), Fort Victoria (now

Masvingo), Fort Charter (later Enkeldoorn, now Chivhu) and Salisbury (now Harare) (Munzwa and Wellington, 2010; Wekwete, 1994). Four primary urbanisation stages influenced Zimbabwe's informal sector during the pre-independence period (Wekwete, 1994).

5.2.1 First stage of urbanisation, 1890–1939

The first stage of urbanisation saw Harare's fixed establishment by white settlers to explore Zimbabwe. The settlers found that the anticipated minerals were limited. Most turned to farming, created in regional serviced towns like Chegutu, Chinhoyi, Kadoma, and Marondera. Other urban areas like Bindura, Kwekwe, Redcliff and Shamva developed because of mining operations. Five pieces of legislation affected urban areas during this period: The Towns Management Ordinance of 1894, The Municipal Act of 1897, the Public Health Act of 1924, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Natives Registration Act of 1936.

The Towns Management Ordinance proclaimed that only the European Settlers could own urban houses (Wekwete, 1988) and only a few Black men employed by whites were allowed to live in urban houses. Women accompanying their husbands to urban areas and other relatives were kept from working (formally or informally). The Municipal Act of 1897 established local authorities and created a planning system (finance and functions). The Municipal Act converted Harare and Bulawayo into municipalities with racialised residential areas. Whites lived in the suburbs, and Black people were on the periphery. The segregation of the residential regions led to the racial division of labour and access. Blacks could not be in white areas unless they had passes. Neither of these two laws allowed for informal economic activities (Wekwete, 1989).

The Public Health Act of 1924 limited the informal sector's expansion by requiring it to adhere to strict rules concerning selling food (Alexander, 2012). The Public Health Act emphasised standards and modernity. Effectively, the Public Health Act was the first town planning legislation and further reinforced segregation and viewed racial integration as a health threat. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 divided the land between Black people and whites to consolidate land division on racial grounds. The Act restricted areas of operation for the informal sector because of the land division between Blacks and whites. Blacks created informal workplaces not recognised by the local authorities. Like the Land Apportionment Act, the Native Registration Act of 1936 strictly controlled the Black male workers' movement. Violations resulted in arrests, fines, and imprisonment with hard labour, while tighter restrictions were applied to women. The migration of males depended on employment

availability. For example, without evidence of a job and an accompanying pass, they were not allowed in urban areas (Alexander, 2012). Thus, there was little presence of informality in urban areas.

5.2.2 Second stage of urbanisation, 1940–1952

The second stage signified urban expansion and growth in the manufacturing industry. The state invested in significant corporations like the Electricity Supply Commission, the Cold Storage Commission, the Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company, the Rhodesia Sugar Refineries and the Rhodesia Railways. The boom in the manufacturing industry increased formal employment and sparked urbanisation. Between 1947 and 1950, the country had 5 000 annual in-migrants from Europe (Munzwa and Wellington, 2010). Consequently, European residential areas snowballed. African domestic labourers were in great demand (Wekwete, 1989). To cater to more Black people, The Urban Areas Registration Act of 1946 authorised municipalities to set aside Native Urban Areas for African housing for those not housed on white employers' premises. Under the Urban Areas Registration Act, the government created Harare's Black townships, like Old Tafara and Old Mabvuku, in the early 1950s. As white people formalised, Black people's existence depended on informality, not owning land, temporality, and security legislation.

5.2.3 Third stage of urbanisation, 1953–1964

The 1950s and 1960s were periods of urban consolidation. Politically, it marked the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, composed of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). As the capital of the Federation, Harare got more investments. These benefits included the construction of the Kariba Dam, the University of Zimbabwe, Harare and the Mpilo referral hospitals. African domestic labourers were in demand as new urban settlements grew. The Deeds Registries Act of 1959 compelled whites to register land they owned in the Deeds Registrar's office. This requirement did not apply to Black people. Black people were not allowed to own land, and the lack of land registration created informal land parcels for Blacks (Alexander, 2012).

The Vagrancy Act of 1960 focused on controlling urban areas. Black people were not allowed in urban areas without an identity card, labour contract or a pass. Violations of the act resulted in arrests of people who failed to prove that they were gainfully employed or had sufficient means of subsistence. The Vagrancy Act did not recognise formal and informal work linkages,

urban and rural linkages, and Africans crammed in townships. The government often arrested short-term visitors to urban areas (Alexander, 2012). African leaders blamed the state for the vagrancy swoops and urban joblessness. Black consciousness led to uprisings when the government enacted The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act in 1960. This Act suppressed all forms of civil unrest, for example, it infringed on people's assembly, expression, freedom of association, movement, and trading in the informal sector.

5.2.4 Fourth stage of urbanisation, 1965–1979

The Rhodesian government proclaimed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. This declaration meant that Britain no longer had colonial control over Rhodesia. It was a self-governing state. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence resulted in the economic and political isolation of the country due to sanctions. Rhodesia became inward-looking and focused on import substitutions as their approach to industrialisation to counter sanctions. The manufacturing sector grew rapidly. Whites manipulated labour statistics to make it appear that there were labour shortages in the formal sector in an effort to demonstrate that this sector could employ everyone. This manipulation of statistics controlled the growth of the informal sector. As formal employment increased, the demand for housing in townships increased simultaneously. The informal sector was insignificant due to national protective policies (as discussed in section 2.2.2), but where it did grow, female employment was dominant (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013).

Industrial and residential expansion meant that planning became critical. The primary planning legislation enacted during this phase was the Regional Town and Country Planning Act (RTCP) of 1976. The earlier and current RTCP continued to be the basis of urban development. It was guided and controlled by an expert and local plan. The RTCP had few provisions for resident participation in civic affairs. The RTCP granted local authorities the ability to control development, including street trading, as well as the ability to purchase land, including trading space. The Department of Physical Planning also received administrative and legal authority under the RTCP. The RTCP granted local governments the authority to plan, regulate development, and establish the framework for administrative planning.

5.3 Phase 2: Hope after colonialism, 1980–1990

Zimbabwe inherited a small informal economy in 1980, which accounted for less than 10% of all workers (ILO, 2017). Prior to 1980, the Zimbabwe Liberation War (Second Chimurenga or

Rhodesian Bush War) the 1966 to 1979 guerrilla war which ended white-minority rule during this period the small informal economy was caused by three factors (existence of the black market and refusal to acknowledge the problem of unemployment (Mlambo, 2014). The dual and enclave nature of the Zimbabwean economy, with a focus on formal urban policy formulation and programmes, was the first factor in defining the informal economy's existence and role. Males dominated the formal, dual economy, which was also shielded by national policies. It coexisted with a female-dominated informal economy that was largely ignored. Second, the historical restriction on the emigration of Black people played a role. Third, the Rhodesian government manipulated statistics to show the nation's labour shortages. The previous administration denied the existence of the black market and refused to acknowledge the problem of unemployment (Mlambo, 2014).

The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980, was established through an act of the British Parliament and given to Zimbabwe. The constitution emphasised constitutional supremacy, national reconciliation, national reconstruction, and the end of the racial divide. The post-independence era marked the deracialisation of urban areas, and some colonial laws were relaxed and removed. The repulsion of twenty-eight acts by the Riddell Commission of 1981, including those that prohibited informal activities like the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the Native Registration Act of 1936, and the Urban Areas Registration Act of 1946, laid the foundation for expanding the informal sector. According to Mlambo (2014), the Zimbabwean government tolerated the informal sector. However, this emphasised growing the formal sector to drive the economy. The new government's first policy was in 1981, entitled Growth with Equity, with its main objective to restructure the economy to increase employment and promote investments. From 1980 to 1990, the formal sector boomed, meaning the government needed to pay more attention to the informal economy. The closure of the first decade of independence signified recession, scepticism, and adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which was synonymous with the growth of the informal sector.

In the 1980s, Zimbabwe had the most robust economy in the SADC (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016a). The manufacturing sector was strong, and the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company was among Africa's largest iron and steel plants (Ndiweni and Verhoeven, 2013). However, the vibrant economy came under pressure after independence. Many white people left the country, leaving inexperienced personnel to run the public and private sectors. In the late 1980s, the economy shrank because of its interventionist policies and unfavourable

protectionist measures (Choruma, 2016). By the late 1990s, Zimbabwe experienced increased urban poverty (Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016b; Rogerson, 2016). This increase in urban poverty forced people into the informal sector. As part of the protectionist measures, the government introduced the minimum wage policy to assist low-paid workers. The government promulgated The Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) of 1985 to give fair wages, stipulated the eight hours per day working time, and provided health and safety regulations. The requirements in the Labour Act did not refer to the informal sector.

To deal with the growing poverty, the government established the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) in 1989. This statutory corporate body gave the Minister of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare a mandate to design social security schemes to benefit all who were formally employed. Informal workers were left out. At that stage, 94.5% of the working population was in the informal sector, without social security (ZimStat, 2018). The NSSA had two obligatory social security schemes: the National Pension Scheme and the Workers Compensation Insurance Fund. Retirees older than 60 were supported by the National Pension Scheme. Workers who were harmed or killed in workplace accidents or who contracted illnesses at work were compensated by the Workers Compensation Insurance Fund.

5.4 Phase 3: Decade of economic reform and trade liberalisation, 1991–1999.

Phase 3 saw Zimbabwe adopting ESAP in 1990, which had strict conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. These included lifting price controls, moving towards accurate interest rates (much higher than those that existed), devaluing the currency, reducing the civil service, and removing government subsidies on social services like education and health (Mlambo, 1995; Muchadenyika and Williams, 2016b). ESAP led to industry closure, loss of employment and rampant inflation. Several other factors compounded these problems, including trade embargoes, sanctions related to land reform, and poor economic planning by the government (Moore, 2017). A combination of the above factors contributed to the growth of the informal sector. There were increased health and education service charges and unbudgeted expenditures towards gratuities for war veterans in the same period. The gratuities were paid on 14 November 1997, the day called Black Friday, when Zimbabwe's dollar lost 72% of its worth against the US dollar. Black Friday signified inflation and the Zimbabwean

economy's downward spiral, creating the world's second-largest informal economy after Bolivia (IMF, 2017).

The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) was introduced in Zimbabwe in 2002 and amended in 2007. POSA was implemented to forbid demonstrations by war veterans who demanded payment for war damages and protection from financial difficulties (Rogerson, 2016). If the police believed it was necessary to do so in order to prevent public disorder, POSA gave them the authority to impose a three-month demonstration ban in a given area. Only public gatherings that have been announced seven days in advance were permitted. It was uncommon to give such permission to civil society organisations, labour unions, or opposition parties. POSA criminalised the organisation of public gatherings without such consent. The ZRP had arbitrary policing powers leading to the curtailment of association rights, freedom of expression and assembly, movement, and trading. POSA was the most repressive legislation that later laid the foundation for repressed action against the informal economy (Madhuku, 2010).

The establishment in 1999 of the Movement for Democratic Change –Tsvangirai (MDC–T), under the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions Secretary-General Morgan Tsvangirai, attracted workers. The MDC-T was a coalition of civic groups critical of the government. Trade unions were the bedrock of opposition politics because of their community and work influence in response to the deteriorating economic situation. Trade unions were critical of the introduction of ESAP in 1991, the state's high-handedness of the ordinary people, the payment of unbudgeted gratuities to war veterans in 1997, and Zimbabwe's troop deployment in the DRC in 1998 (IMF, 2018; UN, 2009). In 1998, Zimbabwe spent at least USD 300 million daily on the deployment of soldiers in the DRC (UN, 2009).

Moreover, the fast-track land resettlement programme from 2000 led to international isolation and disenfranchisement. The lack of investment increased informalisation. In 1994, Statutory Instrument 216 of 1994 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act allowed non-residential activities in residential areas and the deregulation of hairdressing, tailoring, bookbinding, and wood or stone carving as the economy plunged. Consequently, informal sector activities increased in residential areas. The revision of the Urban Councils Act of 1973 became imminent, and the government therefore revised the Urban Councils Act in 1996. The Urban Councils Act establishes and administers municipalities. It undertakes development planning through the acquisition of land for town planning. For example, Statutory Instrument 216 of 1994 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act of 1996 provided for non-

residential activities in residential areas. However, the Act does not allow for citizen participation and multiple functional land use zones, including street vending. The Act provides for the creation of master plans and local plans, including the designation of vending sites and granting local authorities to enact by-laws, for example, the Harare (Hawkers) By-laws of 2013 and the Harare (Vendors) By-laws of 2014. The RTCP Act permits planning responsibilities to urban councils provided by the Urban Councils Act, extracted from the RTCP the zoning of vending sites within a metropolitan area. The Statutory Instrument 216 enactment in 1994, and the subsequent development of by-laws in 2013 and 2014, show double standards by the Harare City Council (HCC). HCC wants licensing fees and taxes from informal workers, yet they want to avoid recognising their social and economic impact.

5.5 Phase 4: Decade of economic collapse and “restoring order”, 2000–2009

The period between 2000 and 2009 is the “lost decade” (Sachikonye, 2009) or a “crisis decade” (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011). At the beginning of the 2000s, Zimbabwe experienced a further economic downfall that led to poor social services and infrastructure provision, a high unemployment rate, abuse of human rights, hyperinflation, scarcity of essential commodities and increased politically driven violence (Rogerson, 2016). Non-adherence to planning resulted in urban cleansing through evictions and demolition as responses to spatial unruliness (Kamete, 2008). The exclusion of the poor from “urbanity” removes them from civilisation and society. Control of urban space creates confrontation and conflict because space control meant domination and power. Cities should cater for the poor and the rich, the formal and informal sectors within the *right to city* movement (Kamete, 2017).

In many instances, the informal sector violated planning legislation. The violation of Zimbabwe’s planning laws arose due to the economic structural adjustment programme, lawlessness, and government actions (Mlambo, 2005). The government became vindictive of the informal sector in implementing Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) in 2005 (Tibaijuka, 2005). The clean-up targeted the informal sector and curtailed livelihoods. The disruption of livelihoods was evident in the demolition of flea markets, informal housing, and tuckshops. However, the real motive was to destroy the urban power base of the opposition (MDC–T) (Kamete, 2017). The operation was condemned globally due to the massive displacements of the poor. In June 2005, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, sent his

special envoy, Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka of the UN-Habitat, to investigate the scope of the Zimbabwean Government's evictions of informal traders and people believed to be squatting (UN, 2009). The report states that about five million people were affected, with 700 000 losing their livelihoods (Tibaijuka, 2005). The operation left more than 300 000 homeless and 80% of citizens living below the poverty datum line (Tibaijuka, 2005). Operation Restore Order disrupted many livelihoods by destroying informal sector infrastructure like tuckshops and vending stalls. According to the Tibaijuka report, operation Murambatsvina was indiscriminate, unjustified, and caused suffering to people (Tibaijuka, 2005:17).

The economic meltdown created increased inflation and cash shortages in the banks. The talks between the government and the opposition led to the promulgation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) to arrest economic challenges. In November 2008, Zimbabwe had one of the worst inflation rates in the world, at 79.6 billion percent month-on-month inflation and a foreign debt of more than USD 6 billion (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2008). The Zimbabwean dollar was demonetised as a result of the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. The US dollar, the South African rand, and the Botswana pula were the three major currencies in January 2009 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2009).

From 1999 to 2009, the economic meltdown led to more than four million people emigrating from the SADC region to countries like South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and some going further afield, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011). Remittances contributed to livelihoods. The migration led to industrial decline as an experienced and skilled workforce left. The result was the increased informalisation of the economy, as 90% of the working class operated in the informal sector.

Zimbabwe's persistent challenges in the late 2000s resulted in a growing informal sector. The government intervened through the Food and Food Standards Act of 2001. The Act provided the legislative environment for food sales, importation, and manufacture. However, informal food vendors cannot adhere to the strict and rigid standards of the Act. The Food Hygiene by-Laws of 1975 and Hawkers and Street Vendors by-laws of 1978 were incorporated into the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 2015. This was done to control cooked food vending. Government motivated the by-laws by protecting against the spread of infectious diseases like tuberculosis. As the economy continued to decline, vendors did not care about adhering to the established standards. Due to the economic downturn and a lack of enforcement, restaurants,

food outlets, and vendors did not abide by the health standards set forth in the by-laws (Tanyanyiwa, 2015).

The scattering of legislation pieces across various ministries and aligning these pieces of legislation led to The Environmental Management Act of 2003. The Environmental Management Act created the Environmental Management Agency, which aims at promoting the sustainable management of resources and ensures a clean environment. However, the informal sector could not comply with the Environmental Management Act statutes due to abrupt incomes and no environmental management training. These laws included an environmental impact assessment on informal sector activities, and the costs were prohibitive for the sector. In the same period, the government promulgated the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33) of 2008. The Act supported indigenisation, economic empowerment of indigenous Zimbabweans, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund, and the Empowerment Charter that created loan opportunities for the informal sector. The informal sector received support from these initiatives through loans from the Small Enterprises Development Corporation. The law gave indigenous Zimbabweans the right to take over 51% of shares in foreign-owned companies. An indigenous Zimbabwean is any person whose discrimination on racial grounds before 1980 was evident (Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, 2008).

5.6 Phase 5: Government of national unity, 2009–2014

Around 2000, signs of a fading Zimbabwean economy began to emerge. The economy reacted to certain occasions and government initiatives, like the 1997 War Veterans' Compensation and the fast-track land reform programme. Between 1990 and 2009 there were a number of events, including the devaluation and eventual demise of the Zimbabwean dollar, an economic depression, high unemployment, hyperinflation, and an expansion of the unorganised sector. The crisis received international backlash and calls for the ruling party – the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (Zanu–PF) and the main opposition parties to talk, intensified. The talks brokered by South Africa culminated in the GNU, which came into force on 13 February 2009. Regarding the GNU, significant milestones were achieved, as explained below. One milestone was the introduction of multi-currency with the US dollar as the main currency, the South African rand, and the Botswana pula. There was stability and restoration in the

financial and formal sectors; hence, the informal sector decreased. The GDP grew by 10.6%, and inflation declined to less than 5% in 2013 from a record high of 2 310 000% in 2008 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2015). The economy stabilised with the advent of the GNU in 2009 but regressed after the GNU. The economic growth rates since the GNU's founding have significantly decreased, falling from 10.6% in 2012 to 4.5% in 2013, 3.1% in 2014, 2.7% in 2015, and 1.7% in 2016 (Choruma, 2016).

The revision of Constitution of Zimbabwe in 2013 led to the amendment of Zimbabwe's standard law system. Section 64 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, entitles every person to an occupation, profession, or trade. This section qualifies the right by regulating the practice of a profession and career. Local and central governments use Section 64 to curtail the informal sector, Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014 (Harare's vendor by-laws), and the Public Health Act (Chapter 15:09). However, the informal traders' rights rely on section 86 of the Constitution, which limits fundamental human rights and freedoms. The new Constitution provides a new framework recognising the informal sector. However, the rights of informal workers should not infringe on the rights and freedoms of other workers.

Zimbabwe does not have specific legislation on the informal sector. The current legislation controls and outlaws the informal sector through socioeconomic and environmental laws. The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, improved the instruments to control the informal sector. The case law that applies and interprets the relevant law, regulations and circulars issued by government officials or regulatory agencies was enhanced to enforce statute laws. Such rules include statutory instruments, which are delegated and are secondary legislation (Madhuku, 2010). Specific regulations are decrees, judicial decisions or orders and statutory instruments, for example, a ban on street trading as in Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014.

5.7 Phase 6: Post-government of national unity epoch: 2015 to present

After the end of the GNU, socioeconomic and political challenges re-emerged. Because of these difficulties, revisions were made to Zimbabwe's Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) of 2015, including a Supreme Court decision that permitted employers to fire employees with three months' notice but with no retrenchment benefits. Employees were at the mercy of unscrupulous employers who abused the statutory right to terminate a contract on notice; employees preferred to go into self-employment, leading to the expansion of the informal sector (Mucheche, 2017). The retrenchment of about 20 000 workers increased the informal

sector. Similarly, Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016 imposed stringent import controls that affected informal cross-border traders. The statutory instrument was the forerunner of the violent demonstrations between 4 and 6 July 2016. About 95% of Zimbabweans now rely on the informal economy for their livelihoods. This is due to the country's growing informal economy (Choruma, 2016).

The flawed social welfare system and lack of poverty reduction programmes forced the poor to resort to the informal sector. About 95% of Zimbabwe's economy is informal (ILO, 2018). The informal sector contributes 48% and 42% of the GDP and national employment. In Harare, 58% of all employment is in the informal economy, with more than 50 000 informal traders needing transaction space (ILO, 2018). In 2020, Zimbabwe's crisis intensified in the form of currency devaluations, debilitating liquidity crunch, dwindling foreign direct investment, erratic water supply worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic, foreign currency shortage, low-capacity utilisation, shortages of food, fuel, and electricity, soaring prices, and unemployment (Sloothier, 2020).

Several recent policies have placed further pressure on the informal sector. The 2016 National Social Protection Policy Framework is focused on developing a workable and durable social protection system to alleviate extreme poverty by empowering and fostering resilience in low-income, vulnerable, and disadvantaged households (National Social Protection Policy Framework, 2016). In law, the informal sector does not have formal social protection. Informal workers use public spaces like street pavements and open spaces. They are squatters by the Deeds Registry Act (Chapter 20:05) because they need a detailed description of the registered operational area of land supported by a map. Deeds have conditions attached to them, for example, uses that are allowed or not allowed in a particular area, and informal activities are outlawed (Wekwete, 1987). Furthermore, the Deeds Registry (Chapter 20:05) needs to recognise the multipronged use of urban land, including informal sector use.

The Public Health Act (Chapter 15:09) of 2018 controls public health challenges; for example, prohibiting vending of cooked food. This legislation is a challenge to food vendors because the two acts protect established white and Asian businesses that have long been in business and are established compared to emerging informal sector enterprises. Small and black-owned businesses are harassed or closed for failure to meet set standards. Thus, the Act inhibits the growth of informal sector entrepreneurs by limiting stationary informal workers and reducing congestion and views the informal sectors as non-compliant with the country's laws. Zoning

regulations prohibit non-stationary commercial activities in the city, effectively outlawing the informal sector. The Harare by-laws of 2014 state that:

No person shall engage another to carry the business of hawking unless he or she has a valid hawker's employer's license. No hawker shall remain stationary conducting business for more than 15 minutes and provided that after 15 minutes, he or she shall not be in a position within the radius of 100 meters from the place at which he or she was at the commencement of the 15 minutes.

Issuance and or renewal of the hawkers' license is dependent on the council's opinion on the good standing of the hawker. Such opinions are biased against informal traders. Furthermore, the Harare (Vendors) By-laws of 2014, also known as Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014, is a government initiative to manage vendors who had occupied Harare's streets *en mass*. The Statutory Instrument imprisons a person found guilty of contravening individual sections of it for up to a maximum of one year. The Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014 describes a vendor

as any person who holds a permit or lease agreement issued in terms of Section 5 and carries on the business of selling goods or foodstuffs within a vending site. A vending site is any land or premises set aside by the Council to provide a place for the sale of any goods or foodstuffs and shall be classified into various categories as specified in the First Schedule.

However, some questions arise. Are vendors in the Harare CBD included in the aforementioned definitions? What does it signify legally, if not? Are merchants engaging in criminal activity right in front of the HCC? If vendors operate illegally, does it mean that "associations" representing them are unlawful? Did the HCC issue permit to all vendors? The HCC allows vendors to operate at the doorsteps of legitimate shops that pay council rates in violation of various acts like the 1996 Acts, namely the Deeds Registry Act, the RTCP and the Urban Councils Act, leading to frequent police raids.

5.8 Policy–governance–livelihoods analysis of Zimbabwe's informal sector

Humans are rooted in spatiotemporal histories based on. mobility ,political socioeconomic transitions to understand livelihoods (Levine, 2014) . The distinct phases and legislation discussed above need to be revised from the SLA addressed in Chapter 4. In the remainder of the chapter, these realities are framed within the SLA approach.

5.8.1 Harare's vulnerability context

Harare's vulnerability context is intricate. It results from competing interests, conflict, demographic trends, economics, formal and informal institutions, informal power dynamics and politics (local, national, and regional). The self-identified vulnerability of informal workers is characterised by high debt, irregular employment, unemployment, a lack of adequate and timely credit support for their businesses, and low salaries. It is difficult to comprehend the precise nuances of these aspects; so, an alternate strategy is to start with the lives of the informal workers, followed by an analysis of the backdrop, the institutions, and the social and political dimensions of the implications of their livelihood choices. Before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, segregation laws and policies ensured that people of colour were restricted to townships and excluded from requisite education and business skill acquisition. Precolonial legislation and the current inept government undermine education, training, and livelihood opportunities for the poor. Such limitations on employment opportunities led Harare's residents to turn to the informal sector. Initially, Harare's design was for less than half a million people; but now there are two and half three million (ZimStat, 2022). The non-upgrading of infrastructure and services is a concern to cater to such a large population.

5.8.2 Policies, institutions, and processes

PIPs show how institutions, politics, power, and processes shape livelihoods. The PIPs are multifaceted and influence the livelihood chain (activities and outcomes, goals, perceptions of possible and strategic choices). The controversial nature of Zimbabwean politics manifests through unconstitutional practices, including restrictive legislation that diminishes participatory spaces and limits livelihood options and civil liberties, for example, the Public Order and Security Act of 2002. The citizens-state rift stems from arbitrary decision-making processes, corruption, and human rights violations (Levine, 2014). Furthermore, informal workers face challenges that include confiscation of goods, harassment from the municipal police and the ZRP, lack of representation, periodic raids, robbery and the payment of bribes and sexual harassment.

The colonial government outlawed informal activities to create an impression of economic stability and formal employment to keep the Black population under control (Chigudu and Chirisa, 2020). Also, some colonial laws have cosmetically changed but still frustrate informal sector activities, for example, the RTCP, the Urban Councils Act and the Public Health Act.

The current legislation, including statutory instruments, make the informal sector's operations difficult and illegal, limiting livelihood options. Informalisation promotes the right to work as advocated by the ILO and Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013. PIPs define the informal workers coping and adaptation options by enabling or inhibiting, creating, or constraining livelihood options and outcomes (Chen and Carré, 2020). The perception that the informal sector is illegal is an illusion and an act of double standards in Harare because the informal and formal sector co-exists and complement each other. Harare uses the legalistic perspective to make informal activities appear illegal and maintain the supremacy of the rule of law (Azuela, 2006; Chigwenya,2020).

Zimbabwe experienced tumultuous and unprecedented socioeconomic and political challenges in the last two decades, with challenges like poverty, unemployment, and underemployment, leading to informality growth (Kamete, 2020). Zimbabwe's building and planning laws, as enshrined in the RTCP, emphasise cleanliness, monofunctional neighbourhoods, and order that stresses control, health, security, and amenity. The standards are too complex for the informal sector, which has insecure tenure. Thus, commoditised cityscapes are expensive. Informal workers need help to pay monthly fees, rates, and rent (Kamete, 2010; Rogerson, 2016). Harare's setback regulations and zoning ordinance contribute to the informal worker's vulnerability and insecurity (Tanyanyiwa, Marais and du Plessis, 2023; Chigudu and Chirisa, 2020).

5.8.3 Assets or capitals

The differentiated capacities of Harare's informal sector shape livelihoods. Assets are built over generations; the historical exclusion of Black people played a role in their limited assets. Initially, Blacks were not allowed to own houses. A house is an asset for renting out and an avenue for selling merchandise. Volatile laws exacerbated the situation, and their application is detrimental to the informal sector, which means that asset-building requires stable laws in tandem with the Constitution. The capacities of informal workers include financial capital and income from the sale of labour, which are the most critical assets for the informal worker (Mlambo, 2014). Salaries are low because of a devalued currency and an underperforming economy. Harare has a large, educated workforce pool from its colleges and universities. Limited financial capital in the informal sector is due to collateral constraints due to non-registration and lack of security, so informal workers cannot support the financial houses; hence they cannot purchase the required stock for their business.

The country's infrastructure has been deteriorating due to a lack of maintenance. Informal workers live in informal homes far from their operational areas, thus increasing transport costs. A house is the leading economic resource for informal workers to access income-earning opportunities, assets and income-earner for owners and space for production. Harare's informal practitioners are tenants who needed help to afford to buy or build their own house because of the strict building laws enshrined in the RTCP and the Urban Councils Act. The political capital (the ability to influence PIPs and maximise human agency and freedom) is at its lowest ebb because of the World Bank and IMF operations: anti-poor and Zanu-PF's kleptocratic and dictatorial leadership. Social capital consists of networks of mutual assistance that people can use to acquire loans and information (Chen and Carré, 2020; Scoones, 2019). Without a comprehensive national social protection policy, informal workers in Harare operate their own savings clubs where individuals access loans and grants in dire situations like a funeral. The informal sector faces endogenous and exogenous factors, for example, poverty, conflict, and oppression, leading to asset limitations and risks. Asset and capital deprivation are due to policies like the Deeds Registry, the RTCP and the Urban Councils Act that limit their attempt to lead prosperous lives, for example, forced removals from street pavements, periodic arrests, and merchandise seizures.

5.8.4 Livelihood strategies

A livelihood is a collection of behaviours and guiding ideals that help people accomplish their objectives, whereas adaptive strategies are long-term changes in behaviour patterns brought on by a shock or stress; coping strategies are immediate responses to a single shock, like the loss of a significant earner's job (Scoones, 2019). Informal activities are a permanent survival strategy, especially for the poor. Informal workers' livelihood strategies include livelihood protection to augment livelihood security, for example, early warning systems, livelihood provisioning in emergency scenarios and livelihoods promotion, for example, informality to improve household resilience. Informal sector activities are limited strategies due to oppressive laws like POSA and the Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014 / the Harare (Vendors) By-laws 2014. Informal workers' livelihood strategies are economic policies, for example, the economic structural adjustment programme limited livelihood options. Understanding Harare's anchorage for informal workers' livelihood strategies hinges on three questions:

1. What were the informal workers' objectives?

2. Why are informal workers in the informal sector, and why are they doing what they are doing?
3. What are informal workers doing to make a living?

What informal workers plan to do (idealised) only sometimes tally with their earlier intentions because of laws, reformulation of plans, compromises, rules, shocks, and stressors like currency devaluation and distortions. What are the informal worker's options that have yet to be encouraged, and what are those that are possible? What strategies informal workers see and what they eventually do, depends on their perceptions of what they can realistically do within the legal confines.

5.8.5 Livelihood outcomes

The livelihoods in Zimbabwe are from labour markets through making and selling goods and services. However, the contribution to livelihoods of Harare's informal sector must be clarified (Njaya, 2014). The growing wealth disparities between the rich and the poor, divided and fracturing cultures, and environmental changes are all to blame for the degraded livelihood aspirations. The limited research on the informal sector's contribution to Zimbabwe's economy resulted in inappropriate policy interventions. The regulatory authorities should provide a supporting legislative and policy framework, like the National Social Protection Policy Framework of 2016, which fosters an atmosphere for earning respectable livings in the informal sector. The policy should amend and repeal restrictive laws and enact appropriate laws that legitimise informal sector zones through a consultative participatory process. Livelihood outcomes embrace contextual economic and non-economic dimensions of livelihoods as intimately interrelated (Farrington et al., 2002). Indicators of livelihood outcomes include how informal workers meet their livelihood objectives, economic successes (food security, consumption, and income), livelihood security and future investment, coping and adaptation to new livelihood options, and their choices and resilience. It is essential to focus on how better Harare's informal workers have become and what has transformed their livelihood outcomes, which is the ability to relate the livelihood outcome and the livelihood strategy choice, including associated costs. Virtuous and vicious cycles are products of such livelihood outcomes.

5.9 Summary

The preceding discussion highlighted the historical and contemporary laws influencing the informal sector and the reasons for its growth. Boxes 5.1 and Table 5.1 summarise Zimbabwe's

urbanisation, policies and laws and their effect on the informal sector growth from colonisation to date. The informal sector has been increasing since colonisation. During the colonial era, the subdued informal industry was due to oppressive laws and job opportunities created by import–substitution industrialisation; thus, the informal sector was salient. Repealing several laws at independence in 1980 saw the informal sector grow, although local and national governments do not recognise it. The evidence of the non-recognition of the informal sector is the flawed legislation that inhibits its growth.

Box 5.1 Drivers of Zimbabwe's informal sectors' development and growth

The following factors contributed to the development and continued growth of the informal sector:

1. The state creates conditions where informal economic activity becomes a necessary form of livelihood support and punishes those who engage.
2. The dual and enclaved nature of the economy: In colonial Zimbabwe, the formal economy belonged to whites and was highly protected, significantly during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence to strengthen the import substitution strategy. The marginalised informal sector was for Black people. The marginalisation of the informal sector state continued after independence.
3. The mass exodus of white people who controlled the formal economy before 1980; they immigrated to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the UK.
4. Repulsion of 28 acts by the Riddell Commission of 1981 included those prohibiting informal activities.
5. ESAP brought many challenges: reduced civil service, the collapse of the domestic industrial sector, substantial layoffs, declining real incomes and falling urban–rural remittances. The retrenched redirected their efforts to the informal sector.
6. Net in-migration: Urban population grew rapidly in the 1990s for two reasons: net in-migration and natural increase. Likewise, the informal sector grew as the industry needed help to cope with the new entrants into the labour force.
7. Economic crisis/meltdown (1997–2008, 2017 to present): The worst meltdown was between 1997 and 2008, with challenges like acute shortages of inputs, especially fuel, raw materials, and immediate inputs, almost all sectors operated below compete capacity levels, company closures, waning international competitiveness, high operating costs, infrastructural deficiencies, and retrenched workers.
8. The government's foreign currency control in the 1980s – the allocation of foreign currency led to corruption and the emergency of briefcase companies and businesspeople because it was insufficient. The shortage of forex led to informal trading in forex.
9. Increasing enrolment at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels: 300 000 school leavers are churned out annually with no corresponding industrial growth. The only option for school and university leavers is to join the informal sector.
10. Technopreneurship versus entrepreneurship: Zimbabwe emphasises the formation of business (entrepreneurship) at the expense of technical skills acquisition (technopreneurship) that drives the industry.
11. Source of livelihood for the majority in Zimbabwe, especially in the current milieu where the economy is dithering.
12. Flexible specialisation and global chains: Formal enterprises are unable to absorb labour. More firms are decentralising through flexible specialisation, forming small companies, some of which remain informal and in various workstations.

Table 5.1 Phases of Zimbabwe’s urbanisation, policies and laws and their effect on the informal sector

Phases	Name of policy/act	The intention of the policy/act	Effect of the policy/act on the informal sector
<p>Phase 1: Pre-independence period: 1892 to 1980</p> <p>Before 1890 informal activities thrived in cities like Great Zimbabwe. No or very little informality, urban areas a preserve of the whites.</p>	The Towns Management Ordinance of 1894	Local authorities had the power to set aside land for native occupation and <i>control</i> its habitation, i.e., to prevent urbanisation.	The increased concentration of the informal sector in the <i>native</i> locations and its control by allied legislation.
	The Municipal Act of 1897	The Act established local authorities, i.e., the municipal system regarding town planning (finance and functions). The Act later became the Urban Councils Act.	With the municipal system in place, the restricted movement of traders who violated planning laws ensued, and those who sold wares had to pay taxes.
	Public Health Act of 1924	To govern vending of cooked food and to promote health. The intention was to protect established White and Asian businesses while subjecting small Black-owned businesses to harassment for failure to meet prescribed standards	Black informal food vendors could not meet the prescribed standards; hence they were forced to close their shops due to overregulation.
	The Urban Areas Registration Act of 1946	Municipalities had to set aside Native Urban Areas for African housing for those not housed by white employers through segregation.	Africans became squatters. They could not get loans since they did not have collateral; they had to sell wares to enhance their livelihoods and pay statutory obligations.
	Deeds Registries Act of 1959 (amended, Act 15 to 1980)	Whites had to register land they owned in the office of the Deeds Registrar. Black people were not allowed to do the same.	Black people could not register in their trading places. They were squatters and faced eviction. Informality declined.
	The Vagrancy Act of 1960	The Act controlled and regulated Black population traffic in urban areas. The Act deprived Blacks of their livelihoods; only males were allowed in urban areas; women’s movement was restricted.	The denotation of informal workers as squatters thus destroys their livelihoods, resulting in a reduced informal sector.
	The Food and Food Standards Act of (1971)	It governed the vending of cooked food and the selling point. It intended to protect established White and Asian businesses while subjecting small Black-owned businesses to harassment for failure to meet prescribed standards.	Municipal or national police evicted informal food vendors. Tight regulation and control are through economic, policy and legal instruments set by the national government.

Phases	Name of policy/act	The intention of the policy/act	Effect of the policy/act on the informal sector
	The Urban Councils Act of 1973	Obligatory and permissive functions of local authorities are defined, i.e., developmental, financial, planning, governance, and regulatory processes.	Informal sector control and regulation is through various by-laws related to the Urban Councils Act.
	Vendors and Hawkers By-laws of 1973	The Act controlled the sale of consumed foods in urban areas.	The banning of the sale of consumed food in the informal sector.
	Food Hygiene by-laws of 1975	To safeguard the health of the people who consume food in restaurants and canteens.	The consumption and informal sale of consumed food were banned and over-regulated.
	The Regional, Town and Country Planning Act of 1976	Land use planning is only for mono-functionally zoned urban forms. The practice is the consultation of landowners with title deeds and retailers in the planning process.	Regional and urban plans consider mixed land use patterns and the growing informality.
	Hawkers and Street Vendors by-laws of 1978	To control the practice of illegal vending. Vending is allowed when licensed.	With the arrest of street traders, trading declined primarily for those without a trading license.
Phase 2: Hope after a legacy of colonialism: 1980-1990	The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980	Had an entrenched and justiciable declaration of rights, i.e., freedom of assembly and association, conscience, expression, and movement, including the right to work and protect the law.	Informality increased, albeit on a small scale, as the young government employed more people and industry expanded.
1981: Repulsion of 28 Acts by the Riddell Commission that prohibited informal activities. 1980s: Governments foreign currency control, its shortage led to informal trading. 1980-1990: Population increase meant informal sector growth. The industrial	Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) Act of 1983 now Small and Medium Enterprises Development Corporation (SMEDCO), revised in 2014	To finance and promote micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME), and cooperatives development	Lending and capacity building of MSME, informality increased
	The Labour Act (Chapter 28:01), 1985	Provided the prevention of trade disputes and unfair labour practices; regulated and controlled collective job action.	Promotion of fair labour standards in the informal sector and employees' participation in decisions affecting their workplace interests. There was the protection of informal workers; thus, informality stabilised.

Phases	Name of policy/act	The intention of the policy/act	Effect of the policy/act on the informal sector
expansion could not match the rising population	National Social Security Act (Chapter 17:04), 1990	The National Social Security (NSSA) administers social security schemes where employers and employees in formal employment must make monthly pensions and workers' compensation and insurance contributions.	NSSA does not cover informal sector workers; hence, they are not compensated when sick, injured, or dead. The situation is contradictory because more than 90% of Zimbabwe's workers are in the informal sector.
Phase 3: The decade of economic reform and trade liberalisation: 1991-2000 The informal sector began to grow after 1990. Informality increased due to the loss of jobs, in the civil service.	Statutory Instrument 216 of 1994 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act	The Statutory Instrument allowed for the development of non-residential activities in residential areas, e.g., bookbinding, hairdressing, tailoring, and wood, or stone carving, which were deregulated.	Informality increased significantly in residential areas and the CBD.
	Deeds Registries Act (Chapter 20:05), 1996	Establishes the Deeds Registry and maintains public records about the transfer of rights and ownership of land and property—regulation of official records of the transactions that occur when land changes hands.	Informal workers could arbitrarily be removed from their operation areas since they are not landowners, compromising their sustainability.
	The Regional Town and Country Planning Act (Chapter 29:12), 1996	Provides for local authorities' planning by promoting amenities, convenience, general welfare, health, order, and safety. The RTCP requires the consultation of landowners with title deeds and retailers with licenses in the planning process.	The non-consultation of informal players in developing by-laws and market areas' planning militates against their ability to shape governance structures. Current by-laws and regulations exclude and criminalise street trading.
	The Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), 1995/6	Establish municipalities and towns and their administration by local boards and municipal and city councils, including by-laws.	Local authorities enact laws and by-laws that are vindictive to the informal sector. The informal sector is controlled and regulated by municipalities.
Phase 4: Decade of total economic collapse and "restoring order": 2000-2009	Food and Food Standard Act (Chapter 15:04), 2001	The Act provides for the manufacture, importation, and sale of food in a pure state and bans the sale of food incorrectly described.	The consumption/sale of consumed food was banned and over-regulated in the informal sector.
	Public Health Act (Chapter 15:09), 2002	Improve health and well-being, e.g., water, sanitation, and life expectancy improvements. Controlling public	Vending on cooked food was outlawed. Street trading is allowed only at designated places

Phases	Name of policy/act	The intention of the policy/act	Effect of the policy/act on the informal sector
Zimbabwe became an informal economy; most formal institutions and organisations were malfunctioning. Epic growth of informality, 90% unemployment due to the economic meltdown		health challenges are ‘nuisances’ or those conditions or premises harmful to health.	
	The Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), 2002	To provide for the establishment of municipalities and towns and their administration.	Gave impetus for vending control through the various statutory provision and policing by local and national police.
	Public Order and Security Act (Chapter 11:17), 2002	The law gave ineffable powers to the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP).	The police could unilaterally arrest, harass, and confiscate the vendors’ goods, thus suppressing their rights.
	The Environmental Management Act (Chapter 20:27), 2003	To provide for the sustainable management of natural resources and protection of the environment.	The informal sector’s restriction was due to strict sustainability measures enshrined in the Act that the informal sector cannot meet.
	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005	The changes removed judicial authority from determining land acquisition disputes.	Chaos emerged, and the informal sector grew amidst the reigning confusion.
	Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter 14:33), 2008	To aid with initiatives to further domesticate the economy and give native Zimbabweans more economic control.	Gave impetus for the further growth and expansion of the informal sector through the indigenisation drive.
Phase 5: Government of national unity / Zimbabwe’s coalition government era: 2009–2013 Informality subsided due to socioeconomic and political stability and international recognition and support.	Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of 2013	The constitution has a chapter on devolution and decentralising powers and functions to local authorities and the right to work.	The constitution entitles every person to any profession, trade, or occupation and recognises that street trading is an occupation. Economic challenges expanded the informal sector.
	Harare (Hawkers) By-laws 2013	Residents were banned from selling their wares in the Harare CBD.	Street trading increased as vendors flouted the Statutory Instrument due to economic challenges.
	Statutory Instrument 159 of 2014, Harare (Vendors) By-laws 2014	The Statutory Instrument aimed to decongest the street of Harare from vendors.	The Statutory Instrument limited vending and was crafted by the colonial vision of an ideal city – the view of Harare’s informal sector as abnormal, disorderly, haphazard, and suppressed.

Phases	Name of policy/act	The intention of the policy/act	Effect of the policy/act on the informal sector
Phase 6: Post-government of national unity epoch: 2015 to present. Epic growth of informality due to the economic decline	Statutory Instrument 5 of 2015/ Labour Amendment Act of 2015	The Statutory Instrument protected employees against arbitrary dismissal by employers. Termination of employment followed an employment code.	The informal sector expanded as more people became self-employed.
	The National Social Protection Policy Framework of 2016	Creating a viable and sustainable social protection scheme to reduce extreme poverty through empowering and building resilience.	According to law, the informal sector does not have formal social protection. The framework is to address the anomaly.
	Deeds Registries Amendment Act of 2017	Respond to the challenges faced in the immovable properties, like illegal transfers, property losses and expensive lawsuits.	Electronic registers minimised fraud in the informal sector to secure property rights and notarised powers of attorney.
	The Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) of 2017	Control of the development and governance of urban areas	Provided for monofunctional urban zones that do not recognise mixed land use patterns and the growing informality.
	Public Health Act (Chapter 15:17) of 2018	To create conditions for and promote health and health care institutions' actions to prevent, diagnose, and treat disease, thereby improving family and community health.	By-laws emerging from the Act do not allow vending of cooked foods and restrict the selling of certain foods.

5.10 Conclusion

Chapter 5 outlined Zimbabwe's current and historical laws, regulations, and urbanisation dynamics that influence informal activities and urban livelihoods. The main findings from the chapter are:

- The Rhodesian settler rule left behind a robust infrastructure and import–substitution sectors that benefited from substantial state assistance. The same could apply to the informal sector.
- Zimbabwe's informal economy can promote the SDGs in the reconstruction process. Informality should be part of Harare's cityscape. Infrastructure should be multipurpose to cater to informal and formal businesses, for example, streets and parkades as weekend trading spaces. The Deeds Registry Act, the RTCP and the Urban Councils Act restrict this endeavour.
- The informal economy continues to be Zimbabwe's lifeblood, hence the need for inclusive policies. Zimbabwe's laws, by-laws and policies are incongruent with the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, that pledges rights to work and collective rights to public space and livelihood enhancement. The legislature and judiciary should be so solid that no laws are antagonistic to the Constitution, for example, the Constitution guarantees the right to a job.
- Establishing informal enterprises as unlawful is an illusion; formal and informal businesses co-exist in Harare. The factors militating against reform are from the political pathology fuelled by insecure leadership. Zimbabwe should return to constitutionalism and the rule of law to expand the informal sectors' livelihood options. Also, national institutions need to be restored, including the executive, legislature, judiciary, and economic reform and reconstruction programmes.
- The huge informal sector in Zimbabwe is evidence that governmental policy has failed. Zimbabwe needs to transition to a universal social insurance system to lessen risks shared by all workers if it wants to eliminate informality. The delinking of accessing quality social insurance from workers' status in the labour market will improve their welfare.

Changing the current legislation is a complicated and herculean task. Zimbabwe's current laws and regulations are used with other regulatory agencies to suppress the informal sector. The informal sector needs a bottom-up, incremental, flexible, and economically conversant approach. Informal operators understand their operational context, and they challenge *How should we derive our livelihoods? And who is planning our livelihood options?* Moreover, *whose interests are served by the local and national authorities' plans.* (Chen and Carré, 2020). Self-employment forms most livelihoods in Zimbabwe. The new self-employed city should be inclusive, readapted, and reformulated; otherwise, the informal sector remains under the state's punitive arm but peripheral to its protective arm. Chapter 6 focuses on the empirical evidence of vendor assets, vulnerability context, and PIPs of informal sector practitioners in Harare.

Chapter 6

VENDOR ASSETS, VULNERABILITY CONTEXT, AND POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 analysed a theoretical framework on informality focusing on its historical development, characteristics, and theoretical debates attributed to its development. Chapter 3 provided an African perspective on understanding African informal economies and Chapter 4 discussed the genesis of sustainable livelihood thinking, tracking it back to Capabilitarianism. Chapter 6 builds on the SLA to analyse how street vendors create their livelihoods within their vulnerability context within the existing PIPs (see Figure 6.1). This analysis takes place against the historical overview of the informal sector in Zimbabwe, where the PIPs appear to restrict the informal sector (Chapter 5).




Figure 6.1 Aspects of the sustainable livelihoods approach in Chapter 6
Adapted and modified from Carney et al. (1999)

6.2 Vendor livelihood assets

Chapter 4 discussed the five capitals associated with the SLA. In this section, the focus turns again to these capitals associated with vendors in Harare.

6.2.1 Human capital

Human capital refers to workers' experience and skills as they sell their labour (see Chapter 4, on various capitals/assets). Human capital indicators include age, education, gender, health, nutrition, language, origins, physical strength, skills, and training (Table 6.1). Housing and physical infrastructure add to human assets.

Table 6.1 Street vendors' profiles

Age				
Gender	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Number
Female	20	50	36.35	23
Male	19	47	32.52	27
Total				50
Marital status	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage	
Did not to say	2	4.0	4.0	
Divorced	4	8.0	12.0	
Married	34	68.0	80.0	
Single	9	18.0	98.0	
Widowed	1	2.0	100.0	
Total	50	100.0	100.0	
Experience in years				
Gender	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Number
Female	1	18	9.04	23
Male	1	26	6.67	27
Total	2	44		50
Educational level				
Education	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage	
Form 1	1	2.0	2.0	
Form 2	4	8.0	10.0	
Form 4	38	76.0	86.0	
Form 5	1	2.0	88.0	
Form 6	3	6.0	94.0	
Grade 7	2	4.0	98.0	
University	1	2.0	100.0	
Total	50	100,0	100.0	

The youngest vendor in the study was a 19-year-old, while the oldest was 50 years of age. The average age of the vendors was 34 years. In this study, the men started street vending earlier than the women, as the average female age was 36 years compared to 32 years for males when they started vending. Most of the vendors (34) were married and had families and dependents.

Table 6.1 shows that 27 (54%) of the vendors were male and 23 (46%) females. Interviews revealed that a vendor had two children with an average of five people per household. As the study used nonprobability sampling, the interviewee selection appeared to have favoured men because women are underrepresented early morning and late evening as they tend to household duties i.e., Zimbabwe is patriarchal.

Most vendors (38) reached Form 4; an Ordinary Level General Certificate in Education popularly known as O-Level. The O-Level qualification is a requisite for formal employment. A Grade 7 graduate, a prerequisite to proceed to O-Level, can read, write, and perform basic mathematical calculations. All vendors have post-primary education (Post Grade 7, the terminal primary school level). The most educated vendor had a first degree.

The most seasoned street vendor had been selling for 26 years, while the least experienced had just been doing so for a year. Eight vendors had previous work experience related to their current trade, with two stating that they had been vending since they were young. One vendor said they initially worked for a clothing vendor, and another worked in a shop. These vendors had the advantage of knowing where to get stock. The average vendor experience is eight years, while most of them (15) have been vending for between 6 and 10 years. Females had more vending experience than males. Even though the males started vending earlier than women, the women remained vending for longer. Men may move to more lucrative enterprises or fields like the popular gold panning, which is more difficult for women who usually also have caregiving responsibilities.

Shona speakers dominated (49/50), as only one vendor spoke Ndebele (a prominent language in Matabeleland, southwest of Harare). Most vendors (38) were born in Harare or towns and villages within a 200 km radius from Harare, pointing to a long urban history. All vendors, besides one who lived in Waterfalls, a medium-density suburb, lived in low-class, high-density suburbs like Budimir (4), Chitungwiza (8), Epworth (9), Eastview/ Gazebo (7), Glaudina (2), Glenview (3), Kuwadzana (2), Mabvuku (2), Mbare (5), and Stoneridge (7).

The working histories of the street vendors are diverse. Most (31) were unemployed before they started vending. Ten were housecleaners, garden workers, or involved in menial jobs. Vendors were in low-paying formal employment, like teaching, fast food, construction, and newspapers and magazines. Although teaching is a professional career, teachers earned less

than USD 200 per month (a comparative salary in 2018 was USD 563). Street vendors supplement low wages in formal jobs. For example, SV12 said:

I started vending from savings; today, I do primary school teaching and street trading.

Most vendors (27) started vending using their savings. However, 17 received assistance from relatives and friends, an example of using their social capital. SV11, a housecleaner before but now selling diapers and chocolates, said:

It is more profitable to work in the streets; I earn more than being a housecleaner.

Another vendor who left formal employment at a major newspaper outlet, was selling clothes, and said she started vending while in formal employment due to low entry barriers. Vending is an attractive survivalist strategy for people living at or below the poverty line, who are urged to work independently without being bound by formal business laws.

6.2.2 Physical capital

Physical capital is the tangible, human-made objects invested in producing goods (see Chapter 4). Vendors' physical capital includes cash, land or their homes, open spaces, pushcarts, canvas, plastic sheets for displaying merchandise, storage, and even whistles blown to warn of impending raids. Housing is an asset used by vendors to trade and store their wares. Most vendors live in high-density suburbs, do not own their houses, and are in a place where rentals are about USD 30 per room per month. One vendor who stays in Waterfalls, a medium-density suburb, paid about USD 60 per month. Vendors cannot buy houses or afford monthly payments towards the purchase of residential stands as this is beyond their earnings. This inability means that they often do not have collateral. Six vendors owned houses in Epworth, Southlea Park, and Stoneridge but do not have a title deed.

Urban public space is a vital vendor asset, but they have little control over these spaces due to limited control because they do not buy trading space and are therefore dependent on what is available on the day. These spaces on streets and sidewalks are important assets (assets of location) because they provide access to customers. Verandas of formal shops offer cover against adverse weather conditions. Because of their large numbers, vendors can alert each other in the vendingscapes, providing security as they can detect suspicious activity and report crime by alerting fellow vendors and the ZRP. SV4 said:

The streetscapes are part of us; we are alert to thieves and the presence of street governance actors.

Vendors use push carts, improvised stalls, and plastic or a cloth sheet fixed on the ground for easy parcelling in case of raids. (A more detailed discussion follows in Chapter 7.) Although these physical assets are important, they are arranged for ease of mobility.

Merchandise assets include cash to give customers change, fruits and vegetables, clothes, lotions, stationery, toys, phone accessories, toiletries, medical tablets, sweets, cigarettes, diapers, animal medication, and airtime (see Table 6.2). Physical assets include illicit products like skin-lightening creams like Diprosone Cream, Epiderm and Movate. SV37 said:

We sell goods and services in demand, and we are not worried about the after-effect.

The packages displayed at their stalls are fake and do not hold the product but are available on request. The risk of raids means that vendors must think carefully about their stock (see Chapter 7).

Most vendors (28) said that access to these physical assets (stock) is dependable as they restock from local suppliers. Those who sell clothes, fruits, and vegetables get their supplies from Mbare Musika and nearby farming areas. Vendors obtain lotions, groceries, and phone accessories from downtown at tuckshops, or from Dubai and Chinese shops in Zimbabwe. Similarly, vendors obtain the same products from wholesalers like Bhadella, Gain, and Mohammad Mussa. Drinks are obtained from Coca-Cola, Varun Beverages, and Mbare Musika (the oldest African township). Mbare functioning markets create collaborative relationships and networks and supply fresh fruit and vegetables. Vendors source clothes and stationery from Zambia, South Africa, and Tanzania. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the goods and services sold by vendors participating in this study.

Table 6.2 Goods and services sold by vendors

Field	Frequency	Percentage
Fruits and vegetables	14	28%
Multiple products	7	14%
Airtime and phone accessories	6	12%
Change money	5	10%
Clothes	5	10%
Stationery	5	10%
Toiletries	5	10%
Shoes	2	4%
Animal health products	1	2%

Total	50	100%
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Table 6.2 shows that most street vendors (14) sell fruits and vegetables. The main products are tomatoes and greens. Seven vendors sell various products; one stall may have snacks, cigarettes, chocolates, corn snacks (*maputi*), and drinks. The variety of products (assets) helps vendors spread their enterprise risk. For example, customers may want to buy cigarettes but then buy sweets and chocolates to mask the smell. Demand for shoes and animal health products is small, with only one vendor providing these goods.

Vendors spend an average of about USD 400 per month on new stock, but some spend up to USD 1 500 per month. However, many had stock purchases for USD 20 per month or below. The average replacement cost of the stock (moveable assets) was USD 200. Money changers had the highest replacement cost. They needed at least USD 500 per month. Most vendors had extra money to bribe the police, buy lunch and pay for transport. Having financial assets to deal with harassment is central to vendor asset management strategy.

All the vendors said they could access water and toilets within 20 m from their stands. They either pay for these facilities or get access through formal businesses. The relationship with formal businesses also provides physical storing assistance during raids, although most vendors (39) did not need it. SV1 summarised this relationship:

A few formal businesses help us hide our merchandise during impending raids, and they also provide us with water and toilets.

Some vendors sought storage from saloons, shops, and offices, while others opted for overnight guards, paying up to USD 1 per night for this service. The evidence points to the coexistence between formal and informal businesses, with formal businesses providing ample access to physical assets (storage space).

6.2.3 Natural capital

Natural capital is stocks of natural assets like air, geology, soil, and water (see Chapter 4). The main natural assets for vendors are open spaces and the land of their streetscapes and vendingscapes. (Sometimes, this is engineered, but for this study, it is classified as physical assets.) Furthermore, well-located urban land has been commodified by multinational companies resulting in limited space for vendors.

Natural capital like land that can be exploited for production, is frequently accessible through a place of habitation. Thirty-one vendors had small plots in open spaces near their residential places where they planted staple food, namely maize and sweet potatoes. SV41 referred to:

A small vegetable garden where vegetable production is for home consumption and sale.

However, open spaces are limited. Often these spaces are children's play areas. Furthermore, natural assets are subject to pollution from motorised transport, drainage coagulation, flash floods, and poor sanitation, while city officials claim that vendors contribute to the problem. HCC1 official thought that vendors contributed to this reality by saying:

The environmental agenda is at odds with vendor livelihoods of the urban poor due to their social and economic being non-prioritisation, e.g., vendors use charcoal, a prohibitive cost to the environment. Furthermore, building regulations are not environmentally friendly; they use materials that consume more production and transportation energy.

The HCC's official statement signifies that vendors are not welcome in the city. Like everybody else, vendors contribute to the HCC's environmental challenges. Harare is increasingly struggling to keep green spaces, as the demand for built-up areas increases. However, the responses from vendors showed the intrinsic value of open space. The environmental agenda explained by the official above was at odds with vendors' livelihoods because poverty demands increased natural resource extraction.

6.2.4 Financial capital

Financial capital refers to monetary value used in pursuing future revenue like assets needed to provide goods and services (see Chapter 4). The limited financial capital available for vendors results from the inability to access loans (Mupunga, 2022). Housing and business premises may help as collateral for developing financial assets. However, most vendors (27) started their businesses using savings from formal employment or through small incremental profits. SV38 explained this process:

My daily sales had diminished due to increasing vendors, and consumers had little disposable income. I sell small items like Jiggies, Maputi, and sweets. My profit is USD 1. It takes time to accumulate sufficient capital for my family's needs.

Vendors are hesitant to get a loan for fear of failing to repay it. Only one vendor, who sells children's clothing and household accessories, received a bank loan. Twenty-six vendors had received financial support from friends, relatives, and spouses. One vendor, a woman who sells body lotions, began her business after receiving a loan from a neighbour with a repayment

period of two months with no interest in the spirit of good neighbourliness (*Chemai nevanochema* in the local Shona language). Most of the vendors (42) valued their merchandise as an important asset, but they did not have the capital to buy high-value stock, which might give them higher returns. Only a few vendors have land and property but cannot use it as collateral as they do not have the title.

The majority of the vendors (44) felt their financial capital was declining or stagnating, while six reported increased financial assets. Responses like this were common e.g., SV19:

Life was tough for most people as they did not have disposable income to purchase wares.

During Covid-19, the government banned street trading resulting in increased competition after Covid-19 regulations were lifted. As a result of inflation, Zimbabwe has had US dollars and local currency shortages, and plastic money, like business transactions without using cash, has become common (Marjoke and Gukurume, 2023). However, the use of plastic money was a drawback to vendors because they could not buy Point of Sale machines because of its cost. SV23 said:

The cash crisis is a bore. We do not have Point of Sale machines. I use mobile payment service platforms from Zimbabwe's mobile networks payment solutions from my mobile phone, i.e., EcoCash (Econet), OneMoney (NetOne) and TeleCash (Telecel), and from other similar platforms like MyCash (Pick n Pay) InnBucks (Simbisa Brands) as payment methods, although they come with transaction charges. I accept bank transfers because I have a bank account with CBZ Bank. Had I not improvised, I would go home empty-handed.

Six vendors (SV1, SV11, SV17, SV30, SV31 and SV50) felt their profits increased, for example, SV31 pointed out:

Demand for forex has increased as it is a safeguard from inflation; hence his business is growing.

Vendor exclusion from banking services means relying on informal financial sources and social capital, like friends, moneylenders, relatives, and rotational saving clubs like *Mikando*, also known as *merry-go-rounds* or *tontines*. These examples refer to forming a group to

pool financial resources and help each other when needed. Members pay a small amount ranging from USD 5 to USD 20 into a kitty each day, week, or month; the kitty is then given to one of the members, chosen either by lot or in an agreed order; the last member gets their kitty, and the cycle begins.

Inflation is soaring in Zimbabwe, resulting in cash shortages. However, Zimbabweans use mobile phones to transfer funds and pay a premium to get currency. More than 80% of all

monetary transactions are through mobile money (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2020). Many people no longer use banks because of stringent account opening requirements, especially for the informal sector, and they cannot dispense cash, more so to their account holders, making cash vending lucrative.

6.2.5 Social capital

Social capital is when two or more people work collectively through mutual relationships, norms, shared identity, trust, and values to achieve a common purpose (see Chapter 4). Vendors are good at building networks and connections. These social networks result from personal and social organisation membership, suppliers, and buyer relations. There were seven explicit examples of social capital from the interviews:

First, vendors have links with the authorities that buffer them against eviction. SV41 said:

Connections increase my profits. During raids, unlike others, I remain in the vendingscapes thus, competition subsides.

Vendors who do not have connections with the ZRP and the Harare Municipal Police (HMP) said they are sometimes driven off the streets to reduce competition, thus enriching a few.

Second, social networks also assist in bulk buying. Bulk buying enables cheaper products and increases profits. SV41 said:

Sometimes we buy our merchandise as a group to get good bargains.

SV48 explained:

We save bus fare and profits. One of us makes orders on our behalf and gets economies of scale through bulk buying. Social networks are cost-cutting. They increase profits.

This ability to buy in bulk through groups of informal traders is crucial to the viability of these informal businesses. The quote above also shows business acumen in the respondent's understanding of economies of scale.

Third, there was evidence that vendors collaborate to change regulations. They link with influential people like government ministers, members of parliament, and councillors. SV32 said:

We need to connect with influential people to reduce urban violence because it destroys our assets.

These relationships give street vendor associations a voice in their interests. Furthermore, public demonstrations help to protect their right to work in public spaces. SV2 said:

We unite in our resolve to demonstrate our displeasure with how governance actors treat us, although we fear reprisals.

Vendor associations and NGOs also control vendor political affiliations by influencing HCC and central government elections and allegiance to Zanu–PF and MDC–T (now Citizens for Coalition Change [CCC]).

Fourth, vendor networks also assist when the authorities start to enforce regulations. Respondents said they support each other by sending messages or adopting communications signals to limit raids and confiscations. This network acts as an early warning signal to all members.

Fifth, vendors rely on trusted relations with their customers, suppliers, and family, including *Mikando* membership. Having five or six members in a rotational savings club requires trust. Otherwise, if one member disparages, the club collapses. This also applies to customers given goods on credit. SV10 said:

Customers buy from me daily. I am even willing to give them stuff on credit because I know them well and they always honour their obligations.

Sixth, there is also an existing social network with formal businesses despite some animosity. Formal businesses are sometimes sympathetic to vendors by providing storage facilities, shelter during impending raids and adverse weather like rain, ablution facilities, and wide shared streetscapes. Sometimes, vendors sell on behalf of a formal business.

Finally, suppliers (farmers, supermarkets, wholesalers, and tuckshops) supply goods and services to vendors, and as relations and trust deepen, vendors get goods on credit, especially perishable products like fruits and vegetables. Local credit providers drop collateral requirements and use *know your customer* as collateral because they will have been buying from the same suppliers over time. Vendors' social capital is critical in enhancing livelihood security because formal and informal businesses collaborate.

6.2.6 Political capital

Political capital is the goodwill, influence, and trust that politicians create with the public; also, part of social capital as the two capitals overlap, like vendors do not trust politicians (see Chapter 4). Vendors noted two kinds of political capital:

First, representative political capital refers to a politician's influence in developing policies. Street vendors and Zanu–PF have a relationship of reciprocity and clientelism in which politicians protect vendors from municipal raids to buy votes. Ruling party leaders assure the vendors that their concerns will be solved if they vote for them, especially during election campaigns. For example, the CCC pushed for vendor evictions. Zanu–PF officials rallied against it. Grace Mugabe, the former first lady, spoke out against vendor harassment. Mugabe said vendors were part of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socioeconomic Transformation (ZimAsset), an economic blueprint to empower the majority. Grace Mugabe's remarks "legalised" street trading by advocating for vendor emancipation so that Zanu–PF could regain the waning political support in urban areas. In this respect, SV13 said:

We all sang that everyone should listen to the nation's mother – Munhu were kuna Ama, hailing her role in supporting street traders.

Further evidence of the political nature of vending is visible in that vendor harassment resumed after the 2017 coup when President Mugabe was toppled.

Second, reputational political capital refers to the politicians' credibility as assessed by the public and the legislature. There is political polarisation in HCC because CCC oversees administrative functions, while Zanu–PF controls the central government (see Chapter 5). There is interference in the HCC functions by the central government, thus creating problems for street vendors because of political shenanigans to secure their trading spaces (Maringira and Gukurume, 2022). Vendors remain divided along political party allegiances as more than twenty of the sampled vendors were party-carrying card members for Zanu–PF and CCC. SV6 said:

Politicians promote street vending to gain political support; vendors are rarely high on the governmental priority list. I have two party cards, one for Zanu–PF and another for CCC. The future is unknown, and I use each whenever it suits me.

The colonial legacy and the postcolonial governance affected street trade through legal frameworks. Top-down local government structures influence policymakers' elections and appointments, whose schemes are critical for the prohibition or acceptance of street trading. With political rights and civil liberties curtailment, street traders cannot claim legitimacy for their sector.

6.2.7 Knowledge and information capital

Knowledge and information capitals are intangible business assets for goal achievement, customers and competitors, processes, products, regulatory licenses, and workers' knowledge data and information (see Chapter 4). Vendors must know where to sell, get goods, settle, and business risks. However, access to such information is a challenge. All vendors felt vending-related laws and information were incomprehensible. Sv49 , for example, said:

Information, especially by-laws that affect our businesses, are written in legal and technical jargon, which is difficult to understand by all but professionals. Besides, we are not well educated.

At law, street trading is illegal. Hence, there are no government initiatives to train street traders on business ethics, corporate responsibility, fairness, loyalty, personal responsibility, respect, social and environmental responsibility, and trustworthiness. Information capital helps vendors navigate specific business challenges and improve business decisions, increasing working processes, sharing power, and supporting personnel.

A second knowledge gap is that vendors are often unaware of their rights and the rules that apply on issues like tenure and eviction. Laws are contradictory, and it is often hard to figure out the implications. SV45 vendor said:

We need help to interpret the laws that affect street trading since so many impact our sector.

Effective business support can also help to fill information gaps. Yet, there is currently no business support for street vendors and their population is a *guestimate*. There is a lack of publicly accessible, recent research on street vendors. SV35 said:

There is no training for street vending, but there are organisations, like Mikando groups, where there is business discussion and income management.

These informal *Mikando* groups play a key role in developing business skills, there is no formal government support for broader economic development because informal vending is illegal.

Technology has changed how, what, when, where, and why the young, the so-called digital natives, generation tech, *iGeneration*, and millennials promote sales through the media and information and communication technologies (ICT), for example, mobile phones, radio, and television. SV18 said:

It is now optional to sell in the vendingscapes because I can advertise online, i.e., Twitter, SMS, WhatsApp and YouTube. Online advertising is costly and is a preserve for young vendors.

6.2.8 Synthesis

The interviews with vendors revealed asset indicators used to measure development and growth over time, identifying a specific asset, as shown in Table 6.3. The assets are interconnected, multifaceted, and systems-based through cultural, ecological, economic, institutional, political, societal, and technological dimensions. The assets enlarge, enlarging vendors' choices and well-being, thereby improving their capabilities and agency. Human assets achieve benefits when combined with other assets, like vendor relation stakeholders, for example, the use of technology for advertising. ICTs have improved the organisation of vendingscapes and enhanced productivity, for example, inventory control, accounting services, and management capabilities that enable vendors to increase through cost reduction, for example, customisation, image, negotiation capacity, quality, timelines, and variety.

Table 6.3 Vendor asset indicators for development and growth

Assets	Indicators
Equipment	Access, use, and management options; cost; ownership
Environment	Drainage; house and workplace smoke; occupational health and safety, sanitation; waste removal and recycling
Finance	Credit access; pay equity; existence of savings and credit organisations; <i>Mikando</i> savings; wages/income
Health	Health facilities, the incidence of HIV/AIDS; life expectancy; under-five mortality, incidences of water-borne and air-borne diseases
Infrastructure	Pay toilets, electricity; water accessibility, roads, street lightening, shelter, transport services
Knowledge	Access to information; educational facilities; indigenous skills; innovation; peer training
Land	Cost; equitable access; tenure security; women's land ownership rights
Security	Corruption; crime; evictions; police presence; political violence; raids; robberies; street lighting
Shelter	Cost; overcrowding/occupancy; quality; rental housing incidences; tenure security; women's ownership rights
Social capital	Access to politicians, local and central government; community-based organisations; churches; collective action; NGOs working in the area; producer and trade associations
Time	Community time; daily tasks by gender; learning time; leisure time, trading time
Workplace	Availability, cleanliness, costs, home-based and community-based enterprises; incidence, security

Street traders are heterogeneous. There are differences in asset portfolios, vulnerability context, PIPs, livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes. Variations depend on whether individuals are less or more vulnerable, female or male, young or old, own work or working for somebody, and the traders' location and residential place. Figure 6.1 summarises the vendor's livelihood assets.




Figure 6.2 Street vendor's livelihood assets

6.3 Vendor vulnerability

Vendors face tough situations, including harassment, merchandise confiscations, raids, salient local authority, and workplace insecurity.

6.3.1 Street trader's residency in informal settlements

Economic challenges increase rural–urban migration and the consequent problems like poor living conditions and informal settlement growth. Informal settlements are a sanctuary for poor people, although they lack access to potable drinking water, essential sanitation services, tenure security, appropriate per-person living space, as well as sturdy, architecturally sound homes (UN-Habitat, 2016).HCC said :

An average family of eight members shares a single room. To give a semblance of privacy, the families partitioned the rooms with cardboard boxes, sofas, cloth, and other imaginable materials.

The condition in which the families live not only presents a fire hazard but is also a health time bomb, whose scale of devastation could eclipse the loss of the 2009 cholera epidemic (CoH, 2012).

The above description is standard in other informal settlements, which is why in 2008/9, Zimbabwe had the worst cholera outbreak that killed about 4 000 people (World Health Organization, 2009). The foundational infrastructure of informal settlements, vendors' workplaces, and old Harare suburbs, like Mbare, warrant immediate upgrading. Informal settlement residents survive on vending, sculpturing, and touting, among others, because of resources available near their residency and other illicit activities like drug trafficking, illegal brewing and selling of beer, and prostitution.

6.3.2 Health vulnerabilities

Health vulnerabilities like limited access to inexpensive health services, an increase in diseases and injuries, illness and exposure connected to recurring and chronic diseases, as well as poverty, are associated with street merchants' residences in informal settlements. SV22 said

Our workplaces are unsafe, lack access to ablution facilities, clean and safe water, and sanitation facilities, and are open to rain and sunlight. We are at risk from vehicular accidents. Drainage systems block waterlogging during the rainy season. Effluent discharge from car washing and solid waste accumulation is challenging.

Because of their poverty and low income, vendors have limited resources and limited access to health care and insurance. Zimbabwe does not have a universal health insurance policy. Medical aid plans that are offered privately are expensive, have a narrow scope, and are out of reach for suppliers. Vendor injuries, like after a police chase, are expensive as they have no medical cover. Most rely on cheaper local and central government health facilities although often do not have adequate personnel and medicine stocks.

6.3.3 Harassment and violence

Harassment and violence against vendors are common. Interviews revealed that vendors face three violence types, similar to those of Bourdieu (1991). First, everyday physical violence involves misunderstandings between vendors and intimidatory and manipulative behaviour to

maintain vendor control, for example, humiliation, insults, and ridicule (emotional and verbal abuse). SV17 alleged:

Sometimes I lose my stuff to fellow vendors because of jealousy and greed.

Physical violence occurs when street governance actors use objects like button sticks to control vendors' actions. Sexual violence is when public officials ask for sexual favours from female vendors. SV4 bemoaned:

On several occasions, HMP and ZRP ask for sexual favours in exchange for freedom, confiscated wares, and bribe payment.

Verbal and financial abuses are common. Street governance actors use derogatory words when dealing with vendors, although they solicit bribes from the same vendors. SV16 asserted:

Violence originates in the family when an individual has inadequate resources, e.g., the ZRP and HMP are poorly paid, and they use violence to get bribes from us.

Vendingscapes are contestation zones because of competing uses. One vendor said that streets have multiple uses, but they expect pedestrians not to “*step on the merchandise*”.

The urban space has daily ambiguities, contestations, market demolitions, and violent eruptions. Vendors are not only victims of harassment and violence, but they are also actors with agency recognition (Sen, 2015; Dzawanda and Matsa, 2023). Street spaces are thus regularly (re)appropriated and (re)organised. Kamete (2009:916), a renowned urban scholar, said:

Zimbabwe's planning system and planners are at the forefront of vendor evictions, and the planning system serves as “the handmaiden of state repression”; an orderly and planned city is a central belief for many, with street vendor evictions done to impress the public.

Second, structural violence emanates from the economic, political, psychological, and social structures or institutions that inhibit citizens from meeting basic needs. The authorities often arrest vendors and take them to the Harare Central Police Station. They go to jail until they pay a fine or bribe. SV24 said:

I pay USD 1 or \$2 to ZRP and HMP to get my stuff back, receipts are not issued on arrest to promote bribes; sometimes I lose all my stuff; raids are immoral, we get injured along with our children and customers.

SV23 claimed:

We get injured and disabled when fleeing from the ZRP and HMP.

This harassment often involves confiscating their goods, impacting their available assets. There was substantial evidence in this respect and responses like the one above was common.

Third, laws that inhibit vending are examples of symbolic violence. The irony is that these laws applicable today originate from the colonial period. Vendors accept humiliation due to low economic status, for example, the class question depends on the status and whether they own rented property (Chakunda, 2023). This is a further form of symbolic violence, also known as symbolic domination.

6.3.4 Inadequate vending spaces

Physical and locational risks limit vending operations. Vendors operate from sidewalks, streets, traffic intersections, parks, and municipal markets. Vendors blame inadequate municipal amenities, with SV5 stating:

Our government does not provide infrastructure like ramps for the disabled, there is no public drinking water in Harare and ablution facilities are few.

Vending sites do not shield vendors from rain, sun, and wind. No compatible infrastructure (lack of ramps, no concrete surfaces) and sanitation facilities exist. Litter, uncollected rubbish, and potholed streets and roads have become health challenges and hamper business operations. Consequently, cholera and typhoid are common in Harare during the rainy season. Pools of stagnant water in the streets are the source of mosquito breeding. Vendors cited shortages of bins, containers, and workforce to clean Harare. SV3 described the situation as “*dirty and cleansing is irregular*” and “*We can quickly get ill*”.

6.3.5 Limited financial access

The stringent requirements for opening a bank account contribute to vendors keeping cash at home. About 80% of Zimbabwe’s population is financially marginalised and lacks access to affordable finance (see 4.5.3). Limited access to finance means that traders cannot buy bulk goods and end up trading in low-value goods. Low-value goods have small profit margins that inhibit business expansion. SV11 complained:

We end up borrowing from a loan shark who charged high interest, making it difficult for us to service the loan.

People who give loans at exorbitant interest (the *loan sharks*) are exploitative in asking extremely high interest rates. Clients leave fridges, television sets, and vehicles as surety; there

are goods forfeiture when one fails to service or pay off the loans. Microfinance firms and legal entities under the Banking Act charge punitive interest rates. Vendors cannot meet bank loan requirements and rely on traditional rotational savings schemes like *Mikando* (see 6.1.4).

Money transfers in Zimbabwe are expensive. Vendors prefer US dollar cash trading to avoid conversion from US dollar to Zimbabwean dollar and vice versa because of money platform charges. Vendors can get 30–50% less cash during currency conversions. SV19 alleged:

We are short of money. The conversion of RTGS [Real Time Gross Settlement] into USD and vice versa has arbitrage opportunities that disadvantage us.

Between 2009 and 2013, there was economic stability as the US dollar was the main currency. People reluctantly used the Zimbabwean dollars because, in 2008, hyperinflation initiated the scrapping of the depreciating Zimbabwe dollar (RBZ, 2008).

The reintroduction of Zimbabwean dollars in 2019 gave birth to the currency crisis as inflation increased. Vendors receive little recognition or support from local and central governments, yet they pay between USD 1 and USD 3 daily to HCC. Trading fees are too high because the HCC amenities are dilapidated. SV33 said:

HCC revenue inflows do not address our concerns like toilets which results in open defecation in the alleys.

Other vendors do not want to pay levies because the HCC does not provide the requisite infrastructure, like shades. SV27 said:

HCC abuse, arrest, confiscate our goods, harass us, yet they tax us.

Vendors believe they earn an honest living and should get government support by allowing them to coexist with formal enterprises as there are markets for their goods and services.

6.3.6 Policy misalignment and vendor marginalisation

Vendor registration and regulation, zoning of vendingscapes, and civic participation by vendors are prerequisites for urban development (Ncube, 2023). Vendor marginalisation increases because they are unsure which ministry to approach and because of the ambiguities of the regulations (see Chapter 5). These ministries include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing; Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and

Medium Enterprises Development; Ministry of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation and Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.

. SV22 said:

It is confusing; we do not know which government ministry or department to approach if we have challenges. Too many laws and ministries relate to us, and it takes time to master them.

Central and local governments and NGOs should have vendor programmes that make them aware of the various laws that impact them. Similarly, various organisations deal with vendors: Employers' Council of Zimbabwe, National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe, the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Corporation (SMEDCO), Vendors Initiative for Social and Economic Transformation, Zimbabwe Chamber of Small and Medium Enterprises, Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations, Zimbabwe Informal Sector Organisation, Zimbabwe Informal Traders' Association, and Zimbabwe Vendors' Association. These organisations have diverse interests and alignment with Zanu–PF, the ruling party, and some with CCC, the main opposition party. Media houses controlled by the elite and the government project an adverse view of vendors. In the recent past, three newspapers had glaring headings:

- *Feature: Running battles with police push vendors into night trading (Ncube, 2023).*
- *Vendors continue to defy regulations (Herald Correspondent, 2021).*
- *Zimbabwe to street vendors: Pack Up, Clean Up, Ship Out! (Quist-Arcton, 2015)*

Contrary to the three headlines above, SV23 commented:

I have an undergraduate degree in Development Studies from one of the local public universities; thousands of young people are into informal trading, and I am one of them. There are no jobs.

Media houses portray vending negatively. They view vending as a deterrent to Harare's aesthetic, order, and security.

6.3.7 Crime and theft of goods from public spaces

Vendors commonly lose their wares to theft. The lack of storage space is the main reason. Guards can protect wares, but these costs sometimes exceed daily earnings. Payments of USD 1 each night are frequently seen. Vendors estimated this amount to be 30–40% of daily income, eroding profits. Vendors also experience theft from HMP and ZRP through confiscations. SV16 said:

We lose stuff from fellow vendors, pedestrians, and street governance actors. Sometimes we employ security guards.

Unlike in the formal sector, where employees are vetted, this does not apply to street traders, who run their businesses with a criminal background and are liable to thieving. Women are more vulnerable to crime.

6.3.8 Corruption

Corruption is a challenge to Zimbabwe's informal sector. Officials manipulate policies that promote rent-seeking activities. The interviews showed four common forms of corruption: bribery, clientelism, extortion, and nepotism. Bribery occurs when vendors give official money or goods and services to obtain favourable treatment. A common example is that officials at the HCC do not provide receipts but protect the same vendors during raids. Another example involves stolen goods. The vendors often need bribes to open a docket and subsequent investigations with the ZRP. SV28 said:

The ZRP and HMP get bribes to limit confiscating goods and removal from their selling points. Harare's licensing authorities sometimes demand kickbacks to obtain an operating licence or a working place in the designated areas.

SV11 said:

HMP patrols in the morning, afternoon, and evening make life difficult for us, for they always demand bribes. The situation has now become pejorative. ZRP and HMP patrols are for getting bribes rather than restoring order in the streetscapes and vendingscapes because vendors go back as a survivalist strategy.

Clientelism involves vendor registration as an implicit or explicit *quid pro quo*. Vendors get licences due to loyalty and political support as more people lose jobs and go vending. SV7 said:

My political affiliations were scrutinised before registration [and] I had to show my Zanu-PF membership card before the authorities provided the licence.

Extortion is visible when officials use power to threaten the citizenry, with women more vulnerable. SV49 said:

Corruption is a source of promiscuity. For us women, failure to give kickbacks amounts to "a thigh" for trading rights.

Some unscrupulous male officers demand sexual favours for failure to abide by laws as a protection alternative to desperate vendors.

Favouritism is rife, and new vendors have challenges because space barons demand bribes and favour their friends and relatives, giving them lucrative vendingscapes. SV43 boasted:

Some have relatives within ZRP and HMP, so we get a shortened processing time and do not pay certain taxes and bribes. New vendors and those not connected cannot get lucrative vendingscapes and obtain goods that are in scarce supply.

Political affiliation is important and helps connect to the right people. Corruption arises when vendors and officials deviate from their obligations; officers demand kickbacks and vendors bribe and become active corruption participants. HCC does not get taxes and revenue for city upkeep and maintenance, adding to the vendor's vulnerability due to poor amenities. Corruption threatens national growth and development as vending operations that scale down to SME status, boosts the economy. The strengthening of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission validates its constitutional obligation.

6.3.9 Vendingscapes insecurities

Vendors, whether trading at designated or undesignated vendingscapes are unsecured. In this context, SV6 said:

We cannot go to the designated sites, as they are far from the CBD and human traffic; similarly, we bribe to operate at undesignated spaces.

Trading at undesignated spaces leaves vendors at the whims and mercy of street governance actors. Although removing vendors from the streetscapes to designated spaces is easier, customers do not necessarily follow. Strictly operating at designated sites is risky. SV19 said:

Planning for designated sites was not consultative; we will have pointed out their disadvantages.

Vendors are clipped but use secure location-specific strategies to bypass insecurities like hiding excess merchandise and operating at undesignated spaces at the corner of Robert Mugabe and Leopold Takawira (one of main and busiest corners), as shown by Plate 6.1.



Plate 6.1 Vending at an undesignated space

Source: Tanyanyiwa, 2022)

Street vendors are abused and neglected by law (Kamete , 2020). Colonial laws to keep Black people at cityscapes peripheries are still active because of their non-alignment with the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. The vendors are in subalternity due to inadequate agency, visibility, and voice. The study situates the subaltern vendors' vulnerability position where street governance actors treat them as enemies and nuisance. Figure 6.3 summarises the vendor's vulnerability context.




Figure 6.3 Summary: Harare vendor vulnerability context

6.4 Policies, institutions, and processes (PIPs)

Zimbabwe's policy-making framework focuses on the formal economy. The informal sector is criminalised, discriminated against, ignored, trivialised, and suffers human rights violations. Harare's Vision 2025 and mission statement is:

A world-class city status by 2025 through providing first-class service and promoting a conducive environment for investment through stakeholder participation and the creation of high-performance teams (CoH Strategic Plan, 2012–2025).

The vision is incongruent with informal street traders with tenure insecurities. Vendors remain marginal as they lack an active voice due to various PIPs at local and national levels. PIPs are reinforced by neoliberal motivations and urban planning imported ideas that neglect the local urban planning context with pervasive informality and poverty. PIPs should address current urban challenges than exacerbate them.

6.4.1 National policies and street vending

By-laws and other stipulations, like statutory instruments, prohibit vendors from selling in the streetscapes and vendingscapes (see Chapter 5). Traders intending to conduct vending activities should apply to HCC for space allocation in the designated vending sites. SV23 said:

The government is not concerned with our welfare. There are no jobs. Even if laws stop us from trading, we continue. Whenever the government decides its policies, they do not consider us, yet we try to eke a living just like everyone else. The repeal of the earlier policies to support indigenisation led to the National Development Strategy (NDS I 2021–2025), which outright neglects vendors and other informal traders.

Vendors sell at malls, parking lots, shopping centres, street corners, street pavements, and traffic lights with human traffic. Vendors defy laws and create tension with street governance actors. HCC1 lamented:

Vending conflicts and threatens shops because it contradicts Harare's by-laws which designate vending spaces. Vendors create economic, environmental, political, and social problems for the city. We understand their hardships, but they should be law-abiding.

Vendors trade in front of traditional shops, like Choppies, OK, and Pick n Pay. SV38 bragged:

We sell in front of departmental shops as shopping malls like Eastgate are a no-go area. The elite mall and shop owners, like Old Mutual Properties, do not allow us to trade at and on their property and control the institutions and processes with little regard for the vendors.

Harare has a list of by-laws (see Chapter 6) and offences within its enforcement realm in compliance with the Urban Councils Act.

Vendors know they need licences, but they decry the cumbersome and bureaucratic processes. Hence, they would instead operate without one. More transparency by-laws lessen street vending risks. Thus, legal reforms are necessary for productive and sustainable vending. Harare could learn from countries like India, where legal reforms are ongoing and have led to vendors accessing social programmes (Kiaga and Leung, 2020; Chitimira, 2023). SV47 said:

We want to register our small business, but it is a bureaucratic, costly, and slow process. One must pay to access registration papers.

Vendors get a reasonable income, although levies, taxes, and rates are high. HCC does not provide basic shelter, lighting, secure area, storage facilities, toilets, waste removal, water, street vendor groupings, and training in market intelligence. Vendors are aware of national and local laws that bind them. The informal street vendor views self, a target of abuse and neglect. In the postcolonial era, the subalternity that Black people endured under colonial systems was transferred to the merchant class (Kamete, 2020). Vendors are kept in subalternity, where they lack agency, visibility, and voice, as part of the colonial regime's strategy to keep Black people on the periphery of urban life.

6.4.2 Vendor registration challenges

There are three legislative challenges in vendor registration from the interviews: non-compliance, cumbersome registration processes, high cost of registration, and an appropriate regulatory environment. Section 4.5.3 already provided some evidence of this. In this section, the focus is on the vendors' responses to this reality.

Noncompliance is reflected in that most vendors do not have a valid trading permit. This is due to the cumbersome registration process and costs (e.g., fees, levies, and rentals). Some vendors do not want to obtain licences because they prefer undesignated spaces. However, licensing eases the way of doing business and the lack of a license makes the vendors vulnerable. SV29 said:

Street governance actors always request to see our vendor's card or hawkers' licence; failure to produce results in an arrest.

Onerous licensing regimes are costly and promote corruption (Section 4.5.3). Appropriate licencing and law reforms can make productive vending that creates employment and revenue generation, improve well-being, and increase goods and service provision.

Many respondents complained about the cumbersome registration process. SV2 grumbled:

We want to register, but the process takes long and even if we register, we always bribe the HMP and ZRP. At times it is better not to register because my name will be in the CoH database, making it easier for them to follow up if I fail to pay vendor fees for selling a box of tomatoes.

Licences do not protect vendors because of corruption, especially when they operate outside the licencing zone. Therefore, the hawker's licence limits the vendor's operational areas and their arrest vulnerability. Plate 6.2 shows the Hawkers' licence and vendor card.



Plate 6.2 Pushcart Vendor Hawkers Licence **Plate 6.3 Vendor card**

Source: Tanyanyiwa (April 2022)

Vendors’ experiences with local laws and by-laws relate to prohibitions, reflecting the PIPs challenges. SV30 said:

Harare by-laws are inaccessible; they should come and educate us on how we should operate. The application and interpretation of local urban laws are one of thou shall not, more than this is how to benefit from your urban residency.

The lack of communication by the CoH during the creation, amendment, and administration of the law and the ensuing policy disagreement, like when addressing vendors, are to blame for vendors’ ignorance of the requirements, The Minister of SMEs concluded.

Let us not forget that those vendors out there are as human as you are. Chasing them out without any visible place planned for them is inhuman. There are about 2,9 million Zimbabweans who have started their businesses and there are over three million Small-Medium Enterprises, which means there are Zimbabweans who have more than one enterprise (Nyakudya, 2017).

From a vendor’s perspective, laws are *not for us or ndezvavo / ngokwabo*, in Shona and Ndebele, respectively. Local law copies are not readily available, when available they are in English, and in legal jargon (see Plate 6.2). The creation and implementation of by-laws are contentious because Harare lacks the resources to hire qualified employees, make regulations

widely known, and conduct pertinent research, resulting in some knowledge–practice gap and the high demand for streetscapes and vendingscapes.

Zimbabwe has no national policy on street vending, a policy lacuna tragedy (section 4.5.3 and Table 5.1). Vendors kept on refereeing to ZimAsset and the indigenisation policy. Similarly, Harare does not have a master plan to conceptualise the layout and guide future development. HCC has not integrated street vending into the mainstream economy. SV17 said.

We are peripheral economy players because there is no specific policy that deals with street trading. We do not know where the laws about vending come from, HCC, politicians, and ZRP sent different communications.

Zimbabwe needs a sustainable vending framework to ensure the sector’s viability as the CBD is vendor inundated where they suffer illegality tragedies showing the economy’s underlying challenges. Street governance actors cannot overlook legal structures violation in the name of poverty.

6.4.3 Street trading planning challenges

Harare does not acknowledge vending in local government policies because informal vending is illegal. There are no official records on vendor contribution to revenues and GDP quantification, let alone vendor population. There are no local economic development vending-friendly policies, by-laws, or planning and efforts toward a national vendor policy. Harare deals with street traders on by-law formulation based on the restrictive view of the problem and pejorative perceptions that marginalise, this means, no reference to street trading in official planning. NGO2 commented:

Harare disparages, despises, and criminalises street trading; despite this aggressive approach, it escalates.

CoH planners perceive vending as a spatial problem, hence central government cannot put sustainable policies in place because of vendor representation and the instability, vulnerability, and proliferation of associations, hence their tendency to fight for power, recognition, and support (Nani , 2020). Discordant CoH structures cannot facilitate, implement, manage, and monitor street trading. Harare should combine law enforcement, infrastructural and spatial policies with a business approach to create a street trading enabling environment, as UN-Habitat (2006) says:

Policy analysis should move beyond the conventional debate [of formalisation] and focus on appropriate regulation, that is, the simplification and streamlining of national

regulations and municipal by-laws that are required to (a) promote the development and gradual regularisation of the urban informal economy, (b) improve its operational efficiency and (c) strengthen its income-enhancing effects on the urban poor.

Zimbabwe is far from achieving Vision 2030 of an upper-middle income economy because it does not fulfil the three main conditions of good institutions, macroeconomic stability, and structural transformation.

6.4.4 Vendor exclusion from social protection services

Social protection is consumption and income transfer initiatives for the poor and vulnerable to limit their livelihood risks. Street trading reels in poverty because of its non-inclusion in formal social protection (Chipunza and Nhamo, 2023). The NSSA, a statutory corporate body, constituted and established in the Act of Parliament (Chapter 17:04) of 1989, excludes informal workers from social protection. Informal sector risks include asset loss, exposure to accidents and business interruptions due to maternity, loss of income, and poverty. Standard social insurance schemes from formal institutions like NSSA do not appeal to vendors due to their low contributory capacity and erratic and irregular earnings. SV26 said:

Even if I am to register with the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) I doubt I will be able to timely and consistently pay monthly dues because my income is erratic.

Vendors engage in mutual assistance to cushion against precautionary expenses. Respondents often used phrases like “we help each other” or “we must help each other” when social circumstances changed. SV34 said:

The *Kufusha Mari* programme implementation is under the principle of Ubuntu-chemai nevanochema, meaning one should sympathise with the bereaved.

The current policy environment does not make provision for social services for informal traders in Zimbabwe. Yet, as the following words SV24 shows, there is a need for support:

The moment I get ill; my business goes down, as no one else can stand on my behalf. Unfortunately, we do not get any help from the government. The opposition, CCC, has politically manipulated leaders of the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe, while the ruling party, Zanu–PF, has also manipulated its leaders to get votes in elections.

SV34 said:

We want to join NSSA to get benefits if we get ill or retire.

Figure 6.4 summarises street traders’ weak social protection.




Figure 6.4 Street traders' weak social protection

Remember – you (Source: Tanyanyiwa, 2023)

6.4.5 Street vendors' unionisation

The heterogeneous nature of street vendors makes it difficult to unionise. Vendors have heard of various street vendor organisations, but none in the sample was a member. SV16 said:

We had various unions, and some got information like what you were doing, but all did not matter except putting food on the table; furthermore, I did not have time to attend the meeting.

Self-employment is not revered. People believe working is when one gets a monthly salary from a formal enterprise. Hence do not see the unionisation logic, although unions help develop democratic, representative membership-based organisations that influence change in the economic and legal environment (Dzawanda and Matsa, 2023; Chitimira, 2021).

. Unions that purport to represent street traders are not part of the formal labour movement, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union. Vendors do not want political allegiances of the formal trade unions.

6.4.6 Covid-19 regulations and Harare’s Street trading

Although the government announced a complete national lockdown on 30 March 2020 through Statutory Instrument 83 of 2020, Zimbabwe quickly imposed the highest restrictions with a fragile and collapsed economy without a clear strategy for handling citizens’ livelihoods through Covid-19 containment measures (Gukurume and Oosterom, 2020).

Covid-19 lockdown measures closed most public institutions, industries, and shops, restricted market hours, and confined people to their homes. Although essential services remained, they did not include the informal sector. The army and police ensured compliance. Roadblocks and patrols were common. There was a deliberate attempt to exclude the informal sector. The regulations give the Minister of Health power to:

Authorize any local authority to “evacuate, close, or, if necessary, demolish or destroy any premises the occupation or use of which is considered likely to favour the spread or make it more difficult to eradicate such disease [presumably Covid-19], and define the circumstances in which compensation may be paid in respect of any premises so demolished or destroyed (Statutory Instrument 77/2020; Covid-19 Prevention and Containment).

Consequently, the HCC (2020) informed “all vendors trading at undesignated sites to immediately vacate such places as part of efforts to minimise human contact in the fight against the Covid-19”. The statement on the colonial legislation remnant anchored on hygiene standards and public safety. In order to clean up and refurbish workspaces used by SMEs and informal traders, Covid-19 restrictions were implemented before market booths and cabins were torn down (Mwonzora , 2022). SV29 said:

It was during Covid-19’s initial stages when our stalls were destroyed.

This stringent measure meant vendors could not trade and had no income. SV7 said:

We cannot eat because we cannot sell. It is better to die of Covid-19 than hunger.

The reference to hunger is important as it reflects how the government has prevented people from ensuring a livelihood. One leader of the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe said :

“HCC disparages, despises, or criminalises street trading”, a move that received opposition from pro-democracy activists. NAVUZ1 said:

Under the Covid-19 lockdown, human rights became a concern; vendor victimisation and past historical brutalities were reintroduced, e.g., the demand for permits resonated with colonial Zimbabwe movement restrictions during the hard lockdown.

The state did not consider the country’s context when imposing arbitrary, irrational, uneven, and unreasonable Covid-19 measures that targeted street vendors, sex workers, and touts. The vending stoppage has resulted in job losses and poverty. Income loss and poverty resulted in child labour and school dropouts, especially for females. SV1 said:

I lost my job; the company had to retrench as it lost out to Covid-19 national lockdown.

Vendors who rely on customer interaction to make a living were forced to shut down their operations due to Covid-19 regulations. Two vendors reacted as follows:

SV 4 -Covid-19 affected my business. We could not sell in town; I had to stay at home and adhere to lockdown regulations, especially during level 5 of the lockdown. Vending was the only source of income.

SV21- Zimbabwe put curfews, lockdowns, and other restrictions to curb the Covid-19 spread, which affected the poor with little or nothing to fall back on.

The Government of Zimbabwe enforced social distancing, requiring a distance of at least 1 m from the next person. As the lockdown restrictions were loosened, people who owned cars consented to leave their vehicle in a safe location away from the following trader. Police would examine how passengers were seated and spaced in a car at checkpoints. The checkpoints delayed vendors on their way to and from getting supplies and they were arrested for not following the social distancing protocol. Keeping safe distances is difficult unless the individual owns the car and controls the transport of people and goods. With disgust, SV26 said:

Social distancing is advantageous to the elite, who can distance themselves from everyone because they hide in gated communities. Covid-19 segregates people, and the rich can stay home and keep their distance from others; poor people move to survive.

Street traders were deprived of their safety nets and social capital, thus affecting their functioning and capabilities and exposure to poverty because they survive on their daily income. Customers and traders were staying at home. Social distancing and related measures of hand sanitisation and mask-wearing had inadvertent concerns for the poor and vulnerable, especially the disabled. One vendor said:

We must buy masks and sanitisers, and these eat into our profits.

Lockdown restrictions, like social distancing and quarantine, led to street traders working from home. Working from home had challenges, like household chores and running out of stock to sell due to movement curtailment. Network challenges and power outages were common in Harare, exacerbating the precarious situation. Spouses abusing their partners and other family members gave rise to domestic violence on a physical, financial, and psychological level. SV28 said.

In May 2020, I lost my job, and immediately my husband started to abuse my kids, and he would often slap the children and me to spite me.

Family troubles and a rise in gender-based violence were caused by the Covid-19 macro-economic impact and job loss. More people stayed home when schools, churches, and other social activities closed. Conflicts and misunderstandings arose. Self-isolation and low income led to mental stress, anxiety and depression, and suicidal attempts. To lessen Covid-19 impacts, vendors needed cash, food, grants, loans, personal protective equipment, secure trading, skills training, vaccination, pro-poor vending policies, and social protection. However, for families, working from home increased bonding, SV7 said :

I spend more time during lockdown with my children. I had more time in my garden from where I grew vegetables for subsistence and for sale and anything that could give quick returns. My wife had to do people's hair following social distancing. The few stocks she had soon ran out.

Working from home had advantages and limitations, but for most, challenges emerged. On 17 March 2020, all colleges, schools, and universities closed, resulting in a socioeconomic impact on the vendor's profits. SV15 said:

Students are customers who buy corn, snacks, fruits, and sweets. Sometimes I remained at home to look after my children, who were not in school, since I could not afford a house cleaner.

The closure of educational institutions resulted in the need for robust telecommunication systems where vendors could sell their wares through WhatsApp and short message service (SMS). Lockdown measures exhausted vendor savings, and it was hard to recoup with the relaxation of Covid-19 measures.

Covid-19 measures increased vendors' poverty because they did not have alternative income, leading to social tension and transgressiveness. Vending scenes helped ensure food security and in the Covid-19 initial stages, trade was in food products (classified as essential services), for example, vegetables and meals. SV50 said:

We sold what people demanded most.

Even though medications are necessary services, there was no evidence of drug trading in the unofficial sector. In Zimbabwe, there are stringent laws governing the trade in medications. As the lockdown conditions improved, a wider variety of goods, like perfumes, were traded.

Vendors did not get any social grants or support from the government during Covid-19. SV29 slammed:

We hear vendors got help from the government. Which vendors? We did not receive anything. My family had trying times during the lockdown. We just read in the national papers that the government would assist those earning below the minimum wage. Unfortunately, my friends and relatives did not receive anything on checking. We expected government assistance through the Department of Social Welfare.

Zimbabwe government introduces a Covid-19 allowance of USD75 to government employees in 2020. Zimbabwe's formal social protection excludes informal workers. Although these are inadequate and corruption-prone, lockdown gives the wealthy and powerful unlimited opportunities for unhindered and unchallenged public shows of *donating* and *donations*.

The Covid-19 vaccine has been a relief with the anticipation of reducing the number of infections. Zimbabwe's government provided the Covid-19 vaccine as a response strategy. There has been vaccine misinformation, especially on social media, as stated by two vendors:

SV23 -I heard that vaccines could alter one's DNA and cause infertility.

The virus will kill us all; I will never take the vaccine.

Vaccine apathy and hesitancy drivers include effectiveness, safety, and side effect concerns:

SV17 - I heard the vaccine's side effects, like chills, fatigue, fever, headache, muscle and joint pain, and pain at the injection site. How can I work if I catch all these; moreover, the banning of our services?

The quote shows government needed to start additional health education initiatives to continue the deployment of Covid-19 vaccines and street vending because public awareness was inadequate. During Covid-19, a new vendor typology emerged, vendors on wheels (selling from cars). Cars provide storage and retail space. SV7 explained:

With Covid-19 restrictions, there was the curtailment of freedom of movement. We store most stock in the car and only display small to minimise raids and losses. Only cars could offer that capability because if alerted early, you close the car, pretend you are doing something, or drive away.

According to Covid-19 regulations, 16-seater commuter minibuses were outlawed and redesigned into mobile stores with shelving in place of the seats for the passengers. Movement restrictions were in place at first (total lockdown). All other workers had to stay indoors, save for those who were essential to the food value chain, health professionals, and utility workers. Supermarkets had authority to operate as registered and licensed traders. Subsequently, unofficial food vendors were permitted to operate on authorised grounds. Because of social distance, even traders on wheels encountered difficulties carrying products and were stopped at checkpoints, making them weaker and unable to hide. On wheels, about half of the sellers were new. They started small businesses as substitutes. SV35 said:

I've never traded in food products before. I used to conduct supplementary lessons to supplement my salary as a high school teacher. I ran my business out of the CBD before the epidemic, but it was impossible because of joint ZRP and HMP raids and occasionally military. I went up to my nephew, who was at home with his truck and unoccupied during the pandemic. I showed him wholesalers of fresh food and instructed him in pricing and marketing. He is pleased with me because I can handle commercial matters.

Vehicles provided storage and quick getaway when necessary because the usual trading places became no-go areas during the initial stages of the pandemic.

Overcrowding, filthy housing conditions, and Covid-19 dangers aggravated vendor vulnerabilities for individuals who remained at home. These limitations forced physical separation. Flowing water was scarce because it restricted the options for handwashing, requiring women and children to wait in lines for water, and made it difficult to use personal protective equipment because vendors were not well-informed about Covid-19, its symptoms, and preventive measures. SV11 said:

Our exposure to occupational health and safety risks; is minimal. We are not fully protected; hence we suffer from illness, accidents, and death, all exacerbated by Covid-19. We fall sick, medical care is expensive, and income deprivation results in the virus speeding more, selling productive assets to access health care, and sinking deeper into poverty.

Zimbabwe has fragmented, inefficient, and weak public health care systems that are not accessible to all. Informal workers face more barriers to access health care, namely:

i) Transportation and food insecurity

Travel restrictions and bans on movements at the start of Covid-19 made food distribution difficult, and food, goods, and service prices increased. The increases arose from transport fares that increased. One young vendor said:

Covid-19 restrictions introduced expensive private travel means, making food and distribution expensive.

Vendors had to identify new locations where customers would still come. SV24 went further:

Without mobility, there is disempowerment; a vehicle is a prerequisite when there is no public transport.

Vendors had to hire cars to enhance their businesses; the fee ranged from USD 40 to USD 60 weekly, which was expensive, but a better option than remaining at home.

Covid-19 restrictive measures appear to have affected the street traders more than the high income as street trading thrives in an unregulated space. SV16 commented:

Covid-19, ZRP, and HMP brutally affected my business.

Daring street traders defied lockdown and crackdown measures. However, they met excessive force, beatings, arbitrary arrests, illegal seizure, and destruction of goods. Poverty criminalisation ensured the ZRP holding cells became *de facto* remand facilities as the number of arrested people grew. Urban space restructuring favouring the elite was due to law enforcement and Covid-19 measures like social distancing of street actors (consumers and street traders) and governance actors (municipal planners, politicians, and street-level bureaucrats). However, Covid-19 measures should be lawful, necessary, non-discriminatory, proportional, reasonable, and time-bound and uphold citizens' rights. Vendors were at the mercy of street governance actors.

ii) Enhancing job opportunities in the informal sector and transition to formality

The Covid-19 outbreak has left vendors without the resources they need to survive its effects. Vending hinders decent labour and the SDGs, Zimbabwe hoped to fulfil the SDGs set forth in the 2030 Agenda, particularly (SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all). NAVUZ2 reason was:

Amidst persistent climatic shocks, food and nutrition insecurity, polarisation and unemployment, and Covid-19, achieving these policy pronouncements is difficult; we should be decision-makers in concurrence with the local and central government.

Covid-19 invoked vendor vulnerabilities that need vendor-friendly policies, the transition from the informal to the formal economy (ILO R204, 2020) and the following financial and monetary measures: (a) financial support, grants, subsidised loans, grace periods on

outstanding loans and debt rescheduling, (b) operating costs, reduction waivers or deferred payments for public services like electricity, water and rent, and (c) subsidies, like reduced rates for mobile calls, internet access, training and retraining in digital tools.

iii) Street trader's exposure, hazards, and vulnerability to Covid-19

Figure 6.5 depicts the connections between Covid-19 and other risks and environmental exposure, or system components, for example, people, and assets. Contrarily, vulnerability is associated with circumstances that make people, communities, assets, and systems more vulnerable to the effects of hazards. Because of interconnectedness, Covid-19 demonstrates that (i) hazards [Covid -19] are both exogenous (arising from without) and endogenous (arising from within), (ii) exposure can be indirect (i.e., effects can be felt far away from the source of the hazard), and (iii) the vulnerability of one system can also become a risk for other interdependent systems. International travel was the source of the exogenous hazard known as Covid-19, and the lack of containment measures allowed it to spread. Protecting vulnerable populations or preventing the collapse of health systems through interventions have had a significant impact on street vendors and society (i.e., interconnected sectors, systems, and agents), resulting in total cascading impacts because of the interventions (i.e., lockdowns, business closures and vendor removal from vendingscapes). The interventions are socially built “secondary hazards” within the system. Covid-19 demonstrates that indirect links between exposure and “being positioned in a hazard-prone location” can exist. The scope, diversity, and capillarity impacts of the Covid-19 crisis have given this viewpoint even more strength. The Covid- 19 pandemic showed how weak points in the system can give rise to new dangers and their effects, which can then be addressed by a more comprehensive strategy, best illustrated by Zimbabwe's efforts to prevent the collapse of its weak health services. The consequent precondition for a new shock (societal interventions like lockdowns) that caused dangers in other systems was health system vulnerabilities. Covid-19 demonstrated a shift away from risk-by-risk and single-risk approaches to more comprehensive approaches that fully account for numerous linked vulnerabilities and threats. Figure 6.5 summarises these findings by illuminating lessons for the conceptualisation of Covid-19 hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities, as well as the systemic nature characteristics of the risk (red text items below the risk propeller).




Figure 6.5 Cascading and systemic risk of street trading

Source: Adapted and modified from IPCC (2014).

Covid-19 amplifies existing vendor vulnerabilities, exacerbating societal inequalities and marginalisation, for example, disability, education, gender, and income. (Price, 2020) .Covid-19 affected all SDGs, especially those related to street trading: SDG 1 (No poverty), SDG 3 (Good health and well-being), SDG 4 (Quality education), and SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth). Covid-19 has positive effects, like informal social protection programmes (*Mikando*). Furthermore, Covid -19 needs quality health services, an increase in health care capacity, and accessibility that is financially, geographically, and administratively inclusive (Noah , Krishnendu and Rohel , 2021).

6.5 Conclusion

Structural factors (political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental and governance) influence street traders' occupational lives due to a dearth of legitimate employment opportunities or the insufficient remuneration of those that are available, where street hawking has become widespread in Harare. Street traders have devised strategies to circumvent the vulnerability context they survive in because they remained insecure, excluded from economic planning, and less productive with the Covid-19 pandemic, thereby

exacerbating their vulnerabilities. There are time and situation-dependent fluid relationships between street vendors and street governance actors through agency, negotiation, networks, and innovative strategies. For street governance actors, power lies in vendor destruction and oppression, whereas for vendors political power is exemplified in resilience and resistance in organised strategies and approaches that allow them to use streetscapes, vendingscapes, and other public spaces.

This chapter analysed livelihood assets, the vulnerability context, and PIPs that impacted vendors differently, like depending on age, gender, location of vendingscapes, time of vending (daytime or nocturnal), and time of year. Locational training of informal workers should be compulsory, emphasising apprenticeship, entrepreneurship, and technopreneurship to enhance livelihood outcomes (see voluntarist strategy section 2.3.4). The elite tends to privatise public space, thus driving land values to ring-fence the vendingscapes. Inclusive Harare should limit the accumulation of public space, thus permitting vendor access to streetscapes, vendingscapes, and other public spaces. Vendors need formal recognition; they are essential economic players. Street trading could be very productive and sustainable if supported by balancing the competing demands of street vendors, formal enterprises, and HCC. Harare can create sustainable statutes and put a stop to expensive punitive actions by means of an inclusive national vending policy that acknowledges street vending as a right and a method of reducing urban poverty, while also recognising the necessity for local governments to control it. Chapter 7 focuses on livelihood strategies that (dis)allow livelihood goals and outcomes to increase livelihood security.

Chapter 7

VENDOR LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 builds on the first three components of the SLA, focusing on asset portfolios, vulnerability context, and PIPs (see Chapters 4 and 6). Chapter 6 focused on the structural factors (economic, environmental, governance, legal, political, social, and technological) influencing street traders' livelihood strategies and operations. In contrast, Chapter 7 focuses on the last two components of the SLA (see Chapter 4): livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes. Chapter 7 further investigates street vendors' actions to achieve life goals through their business decisions, investment, and productive activities (livelihood strategies). Furthermore, the chapter analyses the livelihood outcomes (vendors' achievements through their livelihood strategies) that directly influence assets (Figure 7.1).




Figure 7.1 Aspects of the sustainable livelihoods approach in Chapter 7

Adapted and modified from Carney et al. (1999)

Vendors' livelihood outcomes comprise enhanced food security (e.g., more income to buy food), improved human dignity (e.g., self-esteem), increased well-being (e.g., health status), increased income (e.g., cash), reduced vulnerability (e.g., asset increase) and sustainable use of resources (e.g., property rights). The analysis of the livelihood outcomes shows vendors' priorities and new prospects through adaptations and reorientation strategies. The chapter begins with the main vendor livelihood strategies, followed by livelihood outcomes, Harare's Street trading analysis, and the conclusion.

7.2 Vendor livelihood strategies: Adaptations and reorientations

Livelihood strategies are action plans where vendors build internal competencies to reach set goals (coping and adaptation strategies) (see section 4.5.4). A *functional strategy* refers to achieving objectives through maximising resource productivity and marketing, while an *operating strategy* is when vendors develop strategic plans and operational procedures, for example, selling weather-related goods, scarves, and woollen hats during winter (Tanyanyiwa, Marais and du Plessis, 2023). Street traders engage in various socioeconomic and political resistance strategies to assert their right to trade. *Livelihood strategies* sometimes take the form of *coping strategies*, which are safety measures. These are quick fixes to protect one's way of life through stressful and shocking times. There is a tendency to create additional revenue streams during tough economic times. Coping mechanisms are quick, transient reactions to pressures and shocks from the outside world. Yet, as shocks and stresses occur more frequently, fast coping methods transform into longer-lasting *adaptive strategies*, which are ultimately regarded as an everyday survival strategy (De Haan, 2000). Livelihood strategies differ because vendors are heterogeneous: they differ in asset portfolios, strategies, and livelihood outcomes (Tanyanyiwa, Marais and du Plessis, 2023). Variations depend on whether vendors are less or more vulnerable, female, or male, young, or old, working for themselves or working for somebody, and capabilities, strengths, and the ability to outwit competition, and physical strength. The legislation affects vendors differently, resulting in different adaptation and coping mechanisms to circumvent restrictive by-laws and opposition. The next section discusses vendors' livelihood strategies.

7.2.1 Designated vendingscapes

Designated vendingscapes decongest the CBD and create appropriate, affordable, modern, and standard workspaces, enabling livelihood development. The main vending sites in the Harare CBD are:

- Vendingscape 1: The Open Space at the corner of Seke Road and Cripps Road (Graniteside).
- Vendingscape 2: Holding Bay at the corner of Coventry Road and Rotten Row.
- Vendingscape 3: Luna Park Ground at the City Sports Centre.
- Vendingscape 4: Shawasha grounds opposite Rufaro Stadium in Mbare and near the Mupedzanhamo Flea Market.
- Vendingscape 5: Tsiga Open Space in Mbare, the oldest black township and the largest bus terminus in Zimbabwe.
- Vendingscape 6: The Open Space around the National Sports Stadium, 5 km to the west of Harare along Bulawayo Road.
- Vendingscape 7: Parklane.

The evidence from the interviews shows that the location of these vendingscapes is problematic for some and that some locations delink the vendors from market access. The following quotes are from an informal sector organisation leader and one of the vendors:

NAVUZ2 -Vendors moved to the new sites. However, they are few and far away from the market. HCC should dialogue and identify strategic areas.

SV7-The idea of vending sites is good; however, there was no consultation in their planning. We will have told them the spaces are far from our familiar customers. They are just open grounds with no sanitary facilities like toilets, water taps, or shelter.

The above quotes confirm the lack of participation, and the planners did not understand the need for customer access. The sites provided in Harare are keeping the vendors away from customers. The second quote highlight the lack of appropriate infrastructure. Most respondents emphasised the upgrading and importance of infrastructure. Vendingscapes locations further away from customers of businesses make them unfavourable liveable workspaces for street vendors. Also, the non-existence of ablution facilities and waterpoints is a challenge. However, the officials seem to be determined to enforce the locational regulations, with one stating:

We will implement vendors to sell at designated sites, or else we are a lawless city.

The focus on by-laws and planning conflicts with the need for vendors to be near customers. Consequently, vendors do not always use the available vendingscapes.

The above realities lead to three distinct livelihood strategies: Using sites where customers are available (undesignated vendingscapes), migration between designated and undesignated vendingscapes (depending on harassment by authorities) and not displaying all available goods. Vendors ignore these rules and regulations and commonly locate themselves outside the designated areas, leading to underutilisation of designated vendingscapes as well as a disjuncture as far as vendor–authority relations are concerned. Vendors concentrate around busy intersections and commuter pick-up and drop-down zones. The undesignated sites include the Charge Office (Harare Central Police Station), Copacabana, Market Square, Rezende, Simon Muzenda (formerly Fourth Street), and other undesignated zones like the intersection of Samora Machel Avenue and Leopold Takawira Street, where there is substantial human traffic. This need to be where the people are, is in direct contrast to the municipality’s focus to decongest the CBD. Congestion does create economic activity. Migration between sites largely happens because of harassment by the authorities. Only four respondents mentioned that their business strategy was to be mobile. This movement between designated and undesignated stands happens despite vendors saying they prefer one place of operation because their customers would know where they are. In reflecting on their migration between vendingscapes, SV17 said:

We will reappear in the streets despite any force to move to designated sites; the issue is about providing alternative and convenient vendingscapes to earn a decent livelihood in these difficult economic conditions.

The above quote makes two points clear: The need for adequate infrastructure in the right places and the inherent strategy to be mobile (reappear). Stability would enhance the possibility of creating a decent livelihood. In the absence of it, mobility remains away from surviving. The third livelihood strategy in countering possible police action at their vendingscapes is not to display all their goods and services. SV25 said:

We have hiding places, and should a customer want more, we rush to get more.

This is an innovative way to avoid losing stock during police harassments.

The Harare CBD has more than five designated vending areas. However, vendors use the strategically positioned four main bus ranks: The ‘Charge Office’ rank, Copacabana, Fourth Avenue, and Market Square, where there is the most human traffic and customers.

7.2.2 Vendor on wheels and vendors' physical mobility

Most vendors are at fixed locations and occupy spaces in designated areas like shop entrances, street corners, and anywhere convenient. Many vendors monopolise certain vendingscapes for easy location by customers.

A few who are mobile are subjected to ZRP and HMP harassment. They walk around hunting for clients while they carry or push their items in carts. The strategy to be mobile has two main advantages: Evading arrest and accessing customers. SV48 said:

We sell where there are people.

One of the vendors believes that mobility makes it “*difficult to get arrested*” and allows for flexibility and better profits “*as we move to where customers are*”. Mobile vendors typically use pushcarts and vehicles, especially former commuter omnibuses (see Plate 7.1). However, a few use vehicles as trading spaces. On impending raids, they simply drive away or close the vehicle boot and pretend to be doing something else. One of the vendors believes mobility makes it “*difficult to get arrested*”.



Plate 7.1 Vendors on wheels

Source: Tanyanyiwa (April 2022)

Mobile vendors claim that they informally control urban space because of the ambiguous and contentious relationships between the CoH, barons or street bureaucrats (*makoronyera* in the local Shona language), and vendors. SV6 said:

I cannot pay for vending in the street because they belong to us all.

Urban space control results in the marginalisation of street traders, persecution by the authorities, and bribes. Harare's streets are socio-material-spatial contested spaces because of competing uses, including trading and walking. One potential customer said:

If one mistakenly step on the street trader's wares, you invoke their wrath and rebuke.

The urban space contestation is called *street geography* and *street politics* (Hanser, 2016).

Street actors (consumers and street traders) and governance actors (city council planners, politicians, street-level bureaucrats, for example, the ZRP and HMP) manage Harare's open spaces. Street actors are not passive victims of harassment and violence but have agency. The more time the traders spent in one place, the more they claimed the right to the streets. This claim to the trading site leads to the emergence of space barons. These barons acquire large street trading spaces and then, in turn, lease them out to others for a fee. The rising skirmishes lead to intra-street trader violence because of conflict around these informal allocations.

For individuals who are unable to pay the fee for a vending bay, street vendors use two-wheeled pushcarts made from scrap metal sheets. Pushcarts are an addition to vending locations that relieve street vendors of paying monthly leases for vending bays. Fruit and vegetable vendors usually move with the rhythm of the pedestrian traffic using pushcarts. SV39:

I do not obstruct any pedestrians; I place my pushcart on the side of the pavement to allow people to walk up and down the pavement. I make money when I move up and down the cityscape. I do not pay rentals, and my pushcart is cheap to maintain.

Vendors create Harare's tone and morphology by using their bodies and pushcarts, thus challenging the modernistic and technocratic production of space, is viewed as static and a planned end product. Such machinations help vendors to be innovative, resilient, and responsive to the changing urbanscape.

7.2.3 Networks with formal businesses

Vendors network with formal businesses, especially where there is no direct competition. Often these formal enterprises provide storage space and ablution facilities for vendors. But there is also a reciprocal relationship with workers from these established shops who buy fruits and vegetables from them. However, some formal businesses are hostile because vendors are competitors, resulting in vendors having to resist evictions by formal businesses. One retail manager said:

Vendors are a nuisance; they spread their wares in front of my shop and distract customers by encouraging them to buy using the ZWL currency instead of the USD, which they then exchange for the local currency. They lower their prices to lure our potential customers.

Vendors and formal businesses coexist, although there are intermittent skirmishes and evictions by shop owners by arguing that they are competitors who do not pay statutory obligations. SV 16 explained:

The streetscapes belong to us all, and no one has the right to evict us. The shop owner's place extends to where the building stands.

Innovative ways are necessary to enhance the coexistence of vendors and formal businesses go a long way in ensuring vending sustainability, thus reducing conflict.

7.2.4 Encroaching pavements

Undesignated sites also include occupying pavements. Vendors who operate in undesignated spaces will be unlawfully occupying street pavements as a defiance strategy. For them, it is not about law violation but an escape from poverty and unemployment, although disturbing the smooth floor of human traffic. SV41 explained:

Our access, use, and management of street pavements do not harm anyone. If you follow the law, you will starve to death.

Vendors view paying for vendingscapes as making them poorer. Occupying pavements is about sustaining their livelihoods.

7.2.5 Advertising and marketing strategies

Advertising is a communication practice to bring products, services, and opinions to public notice and encourage positive responses. Evidence of advertisements from the interviews includes boards on trading shelters and tents, social networks like Facebook and WhatsApp, word of mouth, and luring customers to their vending spaces by means of specials and loudspeakers. Other ways of advertising include fliers, posters, and art displays due to their cost-effectiveness compared to traditional advertising methods like television or the print media. Specific advertising and marketing strategies identified from the fieldwork included the following:

- Attractive and colourful displays.
- Good personality, for example, being nice.

- Knowing one's stuff; to be specific, creating a good brand, a good product that enhances customer loyalty and repeat purchases.
- Knowing what customers want and understanding the economic challenges.
- Price reasonability; fair prices that resonate with the competition.
- Strategic positioning of the streetscape and vendingscapes near chain stores, for example, Choppies, OK, Pick n Pay, Spar, and shopping malls where there is high human traffic, and also at bus termini, the CBD, pavements, and traffic intersections.
- Watching, emulating, copying, and benchmarking with other vendors for tips and techniques.

SV44 said:

I advertise because there is stiff competition, and it drives my business growth by reaching out [to the] right people with progressive and directed messaging that changes prospective customers into paying customers. We have to move with current technological advancement in our advertising, or we will be left behind; this explains why I bought a cell phone so that I [can] advertise on WhatsApp.

The important point from the above quote and types of advertising is that it emphasises the importance of advertising in the informal economy. Advertisements are often only seen as something that the formal sector does. There is also learning taking place. Vendors look at what their fellow traders are doing and try to improve or copy that.

7.2.6 Self-motivation and customer care

The common perception of the informal sector is that it is disorganised and consists of people who are not motivated (see Chapter 5). The evidence from the interviews shows that vendors have high levels of self-motivation and customer care. Self-respect and business ethics are strategies to keep a business running. Through observing, I noted that vendors are punctual and, if absent, employ someone to stand for them. Self-motivation and customer care, perseverance, and endurance are the central values for street trading because it is an unpredictable business. Customers are more likely to become long-term repeat customers if they feel at ease with the vendor who has a pleasant attitude. A good relationship between the traders is built on trust (see Chapter 6) as they work without supervision. One respondent said:

I am self-motivated, I plan and do my stuff as I please but make sure customers are satisfied.

Self-motivation is a crucial human asset that helps determine and drive people to complete goals and tasks by going beyond the bare minimum requirements. Goal identification is

essential; therefore, such workers do not need reminders as they are in the learning and self-fulfilment mode. Vendors care for their customers through efficiency, tolerance, and a people-first attitude; these attributes create good relationships that grow a business.

7.2.7 Non-compliance to legislation

Trading on Harare's streetscapes and vendingscapes is regulated and guided by the CoH by-laws and national laws. Zimbabwe's legislations and regulations governing street vending hinder the informal sector development (see Chapters 5 and 6). SV23 said:

We are aware of zoning laws that control us. Governing vendor regulatory regimes, i.e., how, what, when, where, and why, are contradictory and inconstant, hence the proliferation of bribery and corruption. Harare city planning is anti-poor, evidenced by limited designated vendingscapes and associated amenities and no social protection schemes. Violent crackdowns marked by arbitrary arrests, beatings, goods destruction, and harassment are common, but we always go back into the streets because we never follow the laws that make us starve.

The HMP and ZRP expel vendors from the city when they see fit, despite the government's lip service to supporting the unorganised sector. Street sellers and law enforcement personnel regularly clash because of the goal of maintaining order. Vendor non-compliance, however, is anchored by legislative initiatives like the ZimAsset and the indigenisation programme.

From a dualist school-inspired perspective (see Section 2.3.1) street trading reliance is due to a lack of formal jobs, and those few available jobs have meagre salaries that cannot meet basic urban living costs; street trading in Harare as a safety net for the poor. The outlawing of street trading is futile; it is and continues to be regulated; there is a need to develop the sector to create sustainable small and medium enterprises with a view towards formalisation. Urban governance and human security require negotiating with the poor to enhance inclusivity and sustainable development. Urban order restoration is essential, although poverty remains.

7.2.8 Protests and street traders' negative characterisation challenge

In response to authoritarian rule and intimidation by the authorities, street vendors have also turned to legal actions and protests. To stop the displacement of their customers, vendors use picketing, petitions, marches, and the legal system. These actions take place even though the state suppresses them. Despite this resistance, SV8 observed that not much is changing:

We have exhausted all methods of showing our poor treatment in the streetscapes and vendingscapes, but there is no change; raids and confiscations continue unabated.

There are loud calls for revision of the Urban Council Act as it retains colonial forms governing the urban space. Street traders use the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, as a litigation tool in asserting their rights to occupy cityscapes. The HCC raids stem from ignorance, intolerance, miseducation, and misinformation. The HCC views vendors as irresponsible and dirty citizens, but some vendors do clean their trading spaces. The discourse that street traders are “dirty” is sometimes illusionary.

7.2.9 Countering harassment through intelligence

The data reveals that vendors are using two intelligence strategies to counter harassment. First, some vendors employ people to monitor ZRP and HMP movements. The daily fee for this ranges from USD 1 to USD 5. SV18 said:

We fight silently, we have people who monitor street governance actors’ movements, and we are alert. We return to the streetscapes after eviction, do not register with HCC, and therefore pay any statutory obligations.

The emphasis on fighting silently is important. Obtaining the information in this way is a way of passive resistance. SV44 boasted:

We retreat into the street once the ZRP and the HMP arrive. We instantly resume once they are gone.

Street vendors use such tactics as minor encroachments – quiet, individual survival strategies – to support their livelihoods by staying at home and performing other household tasks to escape abuse and harassment from HMP and ZRP.

A second strategy includes connecting through WhatsApp and SMS and having secret codes among the vendors. SV3 vendor gave more detail about what they do to protect them against pending raids:

Sometimes we operate silently and get codes from colleagues through short message services (SMS) and WhatsApp.

A third strategy includes bribing low-paying junior officials at the ZRP and HMP to inform them about pending raids. The bribes paid for the information make it possible for these junior officials to provide adequate information. Vendors creatively play cat and mouse with street-level bureaucrats; quite non-compliance works through social networks, spies, and getting information from low-paying junior officials.

7.2.10 Savings and cash management

Most vendors take responsibility for managing their hard-earned money because it is expensive to live in Harare. The first strategy for urban liveability is savings and the other is cash management. They save money to start, remain in business, and expand their common livelihood strategies. The following are the responses from two vendors:

SV17-I only spend on essentials like rentals, food, clothes, and school fees because it is not enough to buy non-essentials like alcohol and cigarettes only.

SV23-We survive through saving money from selling in the streets; for my needs, I use profit generated, so I make sure capital is still available. Courage is important in street trading.

Profits are not banked, making it difficult to grow such money due to incidental expenses. For some vendors, all profits can be spent, including their products, leading to income and profit fluctuations. Although some vendors have low levels of education, they rely on common sense and instinct. Those who record their earnings are likely to save more than those who do not, thus causing bankruptcy and business closure.

7.2.11 Cleanliness of streetscapes and vendingscapes

Clean streetscapes and vendingscapes retain the customer base. Thus, a safe selling environment is critical. Dust, garbage, affluent, stipples and stains distract customers, and they can get hurt. The CoH street cleaning team do not clean the streets regularly. In response, traders sweep their areas themselves. Traders also gather paper that clients have tossed and put it in trash cans. The following response from SV16 summarises the situation:

CoH teams' clean public places, but we also clean before we begin work, and at day end, cleanliness attracts customers and keeps them safe. Public litter bins and litter removal are available, although some are old and leak.

Cleanliness and politeness influence supposed healthiness, reinforcing the perception of product quality as facets of the service influencing the consumer's perception of healthiness (product quality characteristics). With social media like WhatsApp becoming prominent in maintaining reputation, information about dirty stands quickly goes viral. If a customer encounters dirt, they will make it known, thus damaging the vendor's reputation.

7.2.12 Biological body as a vending site

People as infrastructure is when people produce spatial forms through their bodies, social networks, and infrastructure to enable resource flow across the city (Simone, 2008). Sometimes

vendors use their bodies as a medium or extension of vending spaces from which they sell goods, especially when selling lightweight goods like airtime, belts, and sweets. Profits obtained from selling such small goods are meagre and thus insufficient to cover the monthly costs of occupying a designated vending space. SV14 boasted:

I have airtime cards all over my body and sweets in my pocket, belts hang from my shoulders, as you notice.

Vendors' bodies (human capital) are an extension of the physical urban infrastructure (physical assets); thus, the *biological* bodies are the same as concrete and physical spaces in this context. Vendors who are unable to enter urban areas replicate themselves as a substitute for social infrastructure, reviving urban livelihoods and enhancing the rigidity of street trade.

7.2.13 Hiding places

Hiding merchandise is a strategy to handle the risk during raids. Vendors keep merchandise, while awaiting sales in alleyways, licensed shops, offices, storm drains, parcel counters, and vehicle parking lots, with a fee of USD 1 per day to store their wares, depending on when security guards keep the merchandise behind licensed shops and offices or premises. Secret places that hide wares ensure availability of stock if one succumbs to raids. All vendors display fake goods but keep genuine products in safe places. After finding a customer, the vendor would take an actual product from a safe place within a vending site. Ordinarily, the secure strategic store base is close to the vending area. Two vendors said:

SV27 -Hiding places require us to pay to secure my merchandise lest we lose it all.

SV36- Our hiding places are close to our trading places because we do not want customers to wait for a long time whilst we fetch stuff.

Hiding places are sometimes raided by ZRP and HMP. This means that the idea used for hiding is not 100% secure. The payment at hiding places increases the vendor's business cost, thus reducing profits and security. Apart from hiding merchandise at hiding places, some vendors pay security guards to have their merchandise safely kept before the sale and pay USD 5 per day. Increasingly, vendors are incensed by rising operational costs.

7.2.14 Whistling, codes, and signals used

There are various innovative methods of evading the policing and surveillance of urban spaces. One of them is whistling. Whistling on a high-pitched tone signifies that HMP is nearby.

Whistles have different melody patterns that carry messages peculiar to evaders and non-decoding by street governance actors. The following is the evidence from two vendors :

SV43-The whistle melody tells us the intensity of the imminent raid and how we should react. A smooth and hollow whistle is when the imminent invasion is less threatening and is by a few HMP and ZRP. A soft and open whistle created by a small opening with one's lips and then blowing signifies a simple raid. We may not flee. A high-pitched whistle with a high-frequency sound where the air sucking through the lips means an intense attack is imminent and warrants fleeing.

SV41-We now know each other a bit, we have codes like blowing a whistle to signify impending raids, and we are always alert to an eventuality; this is an essential strategy for our trade as HMP patrols in the morning, afternoon, and evening, making life difficult for us.

Whistling melodies are practised by vendors and used in conjunction with other raids and averting ways. The whistling demonstrates how crucial social capital is to the informal economy. Vendors are aware of the neglected HMP vehicles and limited workforce, hence the reason why they use codes like whistleblowing to alert the presence of street governance actors. These methods notify vendors of the arrival of the HMP, causing them to evacuate for safety. This conclusion is in line with Marapira's (2013) discovery that vendors communicate with one another in coded terms like *Jira* to notify one another of the presence of non-uniformed police officers. Upon delivery of a verbal signal, the researcher saw sellers running off in various directions.

In addition to codes, some street vendors who sell light goods attach them to their bodies and make distinct noises to attract customers; items sold include jewellery, mobile recharge cards, and watches. SV14 said:

I tie all light goods around my waist, like mobile recharge cards, so they are not visible to street governance actors.

Vendors help each other through social capital, signals, and codes to alert them of impending raids.

7.2.15 Sheet square strategy

Most vendors (46) preferred having the goods they sold displayed visibly to their customers. Vendors utilise the sheet square technique, whether carrying and displaying goods on a blanket, canvas, cloth sheet, plastic sheets or mats, a sack on the ground or a temporary counter built of cardboard boxes for simple parcelling in case of raids. Long cords have been connected to each of the four corners of the sheet squares. Pulling threads upward makes a pouch that encloses

products on the canvas or plastic mat, making carrying items during an invasion and pursuit simple (see Plate 7.2 showing goods displayed on a “sheet square”). SV22 pointed out:

Our wares are strategically on top of a cloth, canvas, or any other foldable material; upon any sight of danger; grabbing ensures and lifting away together with those wares to safety at the second notice.

The sheet square strategy allows for flexible space and responses to and contests external stimuli that threaten vendor livelihoods. The readiness of vendors to flee from street governance actors is evident in vendors with low-heeled or tennis shoes to increase mobility across the cityscape.

7.2.16 Bribery and corruption

Bribery involves street governance actors acting voluntarily in breach of trust in exchange for benefits and inducements like gifts and money. It is also accepting, giving, offering, promising, and soliciting an advantage by inducing an illegal, unethical action or a breach of trust. Corruption is deceitful conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery (see Chapter 6). Active bribery is when a person offers, promises, or gives a bribe like a vendor is awarded a license after paying a bribe, or they are allowed to trade in undesignated spaces, thereby circumventing planning or safety controls. Passive bribery is when a person requests, receives, or accepts a bribe in certain operating functions and accepts a bribe from vendors to allow undisturbed trading and illegal information brokering on impending raids. Street vendors pay to bribe the HMP to protect their goods from raids by ZRP and HMP, which are breeding grounds for corruption. Vendors bribe to avoid merchandise confiscations. They also bribe to have merchandise released from ZRP and HMP custody. Bribes and protection fees are between USD 1 and USD 10 depending on the vending site location and merchandise sold. One vendor said he pays USD 10 weekly to protect the mobile phone and accessories business.

When a raiding operation is likely to take place, HMP occasionally receives groceries from street sellers as a tip-off to inform traders to remove their goods. The practice of paying someone to return their goods after a raid is known as *kutonyora* or *kudusa* in the vending industry. Any means of support has the potential to withstand pressure and shocks (Chambers, 1992). Bribery is a valuable resource that has evolved as Harare’s most effective defence against raids. SV29 complained:

We bribe; otherwise, we cannot operate in the streets.

For bribes, authorities on the ground have been more aggressive in their harassment of vendors. Intermediaries continue importing through bribing and syndicate formation. Vendors know bribery is terrible, but it is the only way that helps them to remain in the streetscapes and vendingscapes. ZRP and HMP's poor salaries are supplemented by bribes. The greatest threat to Zimbabwe's development is corruption, which has damaging repercussions on the country's stability, progress, and economic growth. The fight against corruption remains a serious and complex challenge. Corruption networks are complex and permeate society, hence the need for robust institutions to ensure a corruption-free Zimbabwe.

7.2.17 Multitasking and income diversification; economic fragmentation and non-vending activities

Vendors engage in multiple sourcing of cash incomes and have a diversified asset portfolio (see Chapter 6), like urban farming by growing vegetables and maize to minimise expenses. Vendors also do menial jobs like car washing and housecleaning if the vending business is low. Women also practice art in the streets, like crocheting doilies. Vendors supplement their income by growing vegetables for subsistence and for swelling, with a few rearing chickens and rabbits. Some multitasking strategies of street traders:

- To expand resources by putting more members of the household into the workforce, launching enterprises, and cultivating their own food. SV1 said:

My rural and urban family work together to increase income. During major holidays we retreat to the rural area to farm.

- To limit or mitigate a fall in consumption by limiting or eliminating consumption-heavy products like meat or by purchasing second-hand or cheaper goods. SV8 said:

We usually get meat from my rural area because it is affordable. We rear chickens, goats, and rabbits.

Livelihood diversification is due to macroeconomic policy changes and droughts; therefore, more people get income from informal and private sources (Zikhali, 2022). Higher education strengthens opportunities and skills for economic diversification, including transport infrastructure that provides market access.

7.2.18 Urban–rural links

Urban–rural linkages involve cash, goods, and people movement. The links vary over time and space and depend on age, education, gender, and socioeconomic status. Vendors adopt strategies that enhance urban–rural connections.

First, street vending is a challenging venture. Vendors leave their young children in the countryside with relatives and visit them during weekends and where necessary. Migration is a livelihood strategy where vendors straddle between the urban and the rural areas because Zimbabweans have two homes, one in the urban area and another in the rural. Similarly, some migrate to rural areas if they fail to get employment or if the business is low. The continued street traders' urban residence is due to economic diversification and risk-minimising strategies by multi-active households straddling urban areas to earn a living, as confirmed by SV15:

We maintain rural links, culture, history, and traditions in the rural area. We ditch our practices if we lose the connection.

Vendors' household composition changes as some family members migrate to rural areas and vice versa in economic hardship. SV32 said:

All my secondary school-going children are in the rural area where they live with my mum and dad. It is expensive for the six of us to stay in town.

The implication is that exclusive breastfeeding stops before the recommended age, with the resulting challenges like stunted growth and malnutrition among children.

Second, vendors maintain access, use, and management of rural land. Zimbabweans have two homes: urban (occupied while economically active) and rural (mainly for retirement). SV48 said:

I have a two-hectare plot in Goromonzi that my late great-grandfather allocated to me; I use and lease where necessary.

Third, vendors participate in rural agricultural production to maximise the return from the land. During the rainy season, vendors go to the rural areas to plant crops to bring to the urban area, for example, maize, beans, and sweet potatoes. In the ensuing pursuit, rural farmers provide vendors a labour supply when they are off duty; SV15

Sometimes I trade vending with weeding in my rural area, albeit for a few days.

Fourth, vendors send remittances to the rural areas for purchasing household goods and services. Remittances mean vendors have less business capital. SV22 vendor said:

I send my parents money for precautionary expenses every month.

Fifth, vendors take or send groceries back to urban areas. There are situations where vendors get groceries from their rural families, especially when business is low; SV6 said :

My rural is my buffer. I get grain from my rural and I sent cash to my family if I sell more.

Table 7.1 shows street traders' views of urban–rural linkages.

Table 7.1 Street trader's urban–rural links and implications

Strategies	Outcomes	Implications
<i>Vendors leave children with rural relatives</i>	Vendors pursue income-generating activities.	Vendors expand income sources: spread risk. Stopping breastfeeding before the recommended age.
<i>Vendors maintain access to land in the rural area</i>	Vendors' urban food proportion comes from rural areas.	Food sources expansion: spreads risk. Frees up expenditure on essentials, for example, bills, health care, and rent. Vendors increase dietary diversity.
<i>Vendors participate in rural agricultural production</i>	Rural households maximise returns from land.	Rural household benefits from vendors' labour. Rural households get agricultural inputs from vendors.
<i>Vendors send remittances back to rural areas</i>	Increase rural households' income.	High expenditure on non-agricultural products, e.g., cooking oil and school fees. Vendors are not able to accumulate capital.
<i>Vendors take or send groceries back to rural areas</i>	Rural households save cash (or in-kind benefits) as they do not barter for these goods.	Frees up limited cash or in-kind benefits to purchase/exchange for other goods.

The rural link spreads risk by diversifying the household livelihood and strengthening the asset base. Urban areas are a refuge for rural social costs. When they leave for town, street traders take time before sending remittances due to costs, for example, bills, rent, and transport. Vendors migrate from rural to urban areas (and usually back again) for economic and social opportunities.

7.2.19 Nocturnal vending and extended trading hours

A strategy street vendors use to overcome the challenge of HMP and ZRP raids is to operate during weekends and change their timetables. They effectively adapt their schedule to periods when the ZRP and HMP have finished work. For example, the ZRP and HMP irregularly work over weekends and after business hours at 17:00. In response, vendors flock to the CBD during such times. Some vendors do business better in the evening, for example, forex traders (change money); work starts in the evening and ends at midnight or early morning during weekends and month-end. Fruit and vegetable vendors operate from around 16:00 until about 21:00. However, they do not have specific trading hours but ordinarily leave when merchandise runs out, or potential customers have gone home.

Informal night “supermarkets” and pharmacies emerge after 18:00. Smuggled goods and controlled and prescribed drugs are traded at night for reprisal fears. SV27 retorted:

We work well in the evening because ZRP and HMP will have knocked off.

Vendors extend trading hours into the night as a coping strategy to maximise economies of scale and reduce skirmishes with street governance actors.

Plate 7.2 shows vendors sleeping on Harare’s streets after a day of hard work, including night vending, with the sheet square strategy evident. The vendors sleep on the street to maximise profits since they will not have to travel back home, although they pay guard fees. At night, there is street littering, and there are minor pools of water on roads from residues from car washing, although this is not allowed by Harare’s by-laws. Cholera, diarrhoea, and typhoid outbreaks became common in Harare due to environmental defoliation.



Plate 7.2 Nocturnal vending

Source: Tanyanyiwa (November 2021)

7.2.20 Operating under the shade of street verandas

Vendors operate along the street and outside shop pavements and verandas in order to overcome the difficulty of inclement weather, which has an impact on product freshness. Sellers came up with the idea of setting up shop in the shaded patios of traditional stores. People who work outdoors construct temporary shelters to protect them from adverse weather conditions like cold, high temperatures, rain, and winds. SV38 said:

We move with our goods when looking for vendingscapes away from direct heat, rainfall, and winds.

Despite this, vendors do not have decent working places in designated and undesignated spaces. The few designated areas do not have the requisite infrastructure, like shades and other amenities like running water (See 7.1.1).

Vendors choose a combination of mechanisms and strategies using their assets to suit their current and changing contexts to achieve livelihood goals. There is a disconnection between what street traders need and what HCC wants. Street traders should tell their stories. Local and central government should work together with key stakeholders towards pro-poor initiatives that improve urban liveability. The main livelihood strategies are investment, productive and reproductive strategies. The various livelihood strategies lead to the livelihood outcomes, for example, asset accumulation, food security, health, high status in the community, income security and well-being.

7.3 Vendors' livelihood outcomes

The economic, environmental, institutional, and social goods and services people get from livelihood strategies are the livelihood outcomes like asset accumulation, food security, income security, health, high status in the community, increased well-being, and self-esteem (Scoones, 2018). Street trading provides livelihood outcomes. However, there is little attention to livelihood risks in light of longstanding threats like occupational hazards, low-quality living environments and PIPs. Livelihood outcomes are a product of vendors' institutional management capacity.

7.3.1 Income and profit

Street traders' income and profits vary seasonally and monthly. NGO2 believed:

Vending is a micro-enterprise; this is particularly important for women because poverty "wears a woman's face". Vending is a livelihood issue; government shows ineptness by ignoring the sector.

SV22 weighed in:

I ran from the HMP and ZRP with my child strapped on my back, lost all my wares, and had difficulty buying food and paying rentals and school fees. I care for four children and relatives in rural areas; it is tough, but endurance and perseverance are critical for survival.

Table 7.2 provides an overview of the income and profits of the vendors who formed part of this study.

Table 7.2 Income and profit per week

Criteria	Income	Profit	Sales were low	Sales were high
Mean	\$110.87	\$59.19	\$22.19	\$69.84
Mode	\$30	\$40	\$10	\$25
Minimum	\$5	\$5	\$2	\$5
Maximum	\$500	\$300	\$100	\$300

Table 7.2 shows that vendors earn an average of USD 110.87 per week. The highest turnover was USD 500, and this was from forex trading, cell phone accessories, children's clothing, and household accessories. The least earners had a turnover of just USD 5, while most vendors had a turnover of USD 30 per week, accumulating to USD 120 per month. In Zimbabwe, civil servants earn less than USD 200 per month, so vendors' salaries are not that bad. Profits averaged USD 59.19 per week. SV10 said:

This monthly income is inadequate to cover my family's needs. My spouse is formally employed and helps, but I feel less important as the household head.

One vendor who made USD 300 per week sells children's clothing and household accessories, while the least earners made USD 5 profit. For the rest, the average profit was USD 40 per week, a small but important outcome, as SV26 put it:

Vending is my only income source. I sell vegetables and tomatoes along Robert Mugabe Street.

Vendors made an average of USD 22.19 per day when sales were low, while those who earned the most, even when their sales were down, earned USD 100 per day. Clothing sales are high during school holidays when parents and guardians buy clothes for their children, especially during Easter and Christmas holidays. Shopping power is enhanced by the 13th cheque in November and December. Vendors focusing on stationery and other back-to-school products has higher sales during school terms. The sales decrease during holidays, especially during year-end, showing non-demand for school products as the learners will be on holiday. SV32 bemoaned the situation when the schools were open:

My sales were low during school opening times. However, the little money goes towards school fees, food, and rentals.

More than half of the vendors believed they could sell more products or services than the previous year. The demand for their services increased as the Covid-19 pandemic rescinded. SV11 who sells children's clothes and household accessories stated:

I sell high-quality products; hence demand is high, and this current year could be better.

Twenty vendors were unsure whether they could sell more products or services this year than the previous year due to the Covid-19 adverse effects and raids. Competition is rife, and seasonality affects profits:

SV45- Demand for my products is seasonal; hence this lowers my profits.

Some vendors could charge more than they did the previous year. SV2 argued:

Demand is there; hence prices have to increase.

However, other vendors would not necessarily increase prices, particularly products in US dollar, as they have been static since the previous year. The Zimbabwean dollar (ZWL) prices increased due to inflation and the currency's weakening against the US dollar.

Most vendors believed their supplies have become more expensive, particularly those they sought from local wholesalers who charged in ZWL bonds and real-time gross settlements,

like Mohammad Mussa Wholesalers. However, suppliers that were selling using USD prices were the same as the previous year, with little significant changes, either higher or lower. Therefore, USD prices for most supplies have been stable in the past year. However, prices in the local currency have risen due to inflation exchange rate irregularities; this has also affected vendors' supplies and pricing. Moreover, money changers were the vendors who seemed to be profiting a lot due to the instability of the local currency as they profited from the widening gap between the ZWL bond rate and the black-market USD rate; this was one of the points highlighted by one of the money changers, as SV30 argued :

Although there may seem to be an improvement in demand and sales, this is just compared to the last two years scourged by the Covid-19 pandemic. With the increase in competition and the ever-increasing police and CoH presence, sales have been low compared with years before Covid-19.

SV23 grieved:

Established and licensed vendors are against the entry of new and unlicensed colleagues for fear of competition. Unfortunately, streetscapes and vendingscapes belong to us all; besides, vending is all we can do.

Zimbabweans have less disposable income due to high unemployment, business failures, and closures due to Covid-19 and the economic downturn. Most vendors focus on necessities and essential goods like vegetables, clothes, airtime, stationery, and foreign currency. All vendors were selling the same products and services compared to the previous year. Some of the reasons highlighted were unemployment, poverty, and ease of starting the business, as there were fewer entry requirements besides capital (Zikhali, 2022).

. Vendors' income alleviates poverty, enhances their self-esteem and dignity, and increases their assets, for example, finances and housing that lead to livelihood resilience and a higher status. SV31 mourned:

There were job promises with the promulgation of the so-called new dispensation in 2017. Unfortunately, the employment space is dwindling owing to the socioeconomic and political challenges the country is facing. We are poor, and our livelihoods are in the streets.

Livelihood outcomes are depressed because Zimbabwe has had an economic meltdown over the last two decades, with rising inflation, a weakening local currency, foreign currency shortages, and a confidence crisis stemming from policy inconsistency and currency instability. The inflationary pressures resulted from exchange rate volatility from external and internal factors. Zimbabwe's workers are poor. In April 2022, about 62% of the employed people,

including vendors, earned ZWL 20 000 (USD 51), with the parallel market exchange rate of \$390 per one US dollar and a 96.4% inflation rate (ZimStat, 2022). During this period, only 3.3 million of the nine million working-age population were employed, with 88% in the informal sector. About 48.8% (1 367 291) of youth between the ages of 15 and 24 were just wandering in the streets (ZimStat, 2022). Thus, Zimbabwe's demographic dividend is an illusion because there seems to be no future prosperity.

7.3.2 Employment opportunities and poverty alleviation

Street trading increases local employment opportunities. While they acquire their items from traditional stores and suppliers, street vendors create demand for services offered by the public and formal sectors, as well as for transport. They animate and liven up the otherwise lifeless streets, they lessen the vulnerability of livelihoods, and so serve the many social roles of participation and representation in societies, groups, and organisations in the diversity of resources for earning money. All street trading participants can send their children to school, thus contributing to poverty alleviation and enhancing strategies toward vision 2030. Zimbabwe's aspiring goal is to be an upper-middle income country by 2030 through productivity growth and quality jobs. SV20 explained this contribution by saying.

I can send my three children to school. I look after my rural mother; therefore, I take vending seriously because it has been my only income source over the last decade.

Vending is a means of marginalised and subsistence livelihoods, with only a small amount of investment in the industry, methods for locating other sources of revenue, maximising income from the smallest amount of resources, and using most of the profits to maintain life. From a Voluntarist school of thought-inspired intervention (see Section 2.3.4), the CoH and central government should not punish street traders but should create opportunities that create a formal and informal nexus thriving sustainably. Informality could enhance entrepreneurship and technopreurship development with the potential to improve human security through formal employment creation. With formalisation, tax collection is easy and increases revenue and human security advancement.

7.3.3 Asset accumulation

Zimbabwe's worst economic catastrophe was in the last decade. Vendors were caught in this milieu, hence the proliferation in the number of vendors. Vendors cannot accumulate more assets because they just raise enough money to live, although some can buy household assets

like radios and television sets. Only four vendors got residential stands in undeveloped areas. SV12 said:

The challenges we face lead to a loss in assets, earnings, and time; this is challenging for us, the self-employed, because we invest more in labour than capital for livelihood enhancement.

The vendors' assets have been deteriorating due to wear and tear as they find it increasingly challenging to repair and buy assets as the economy declines.

7.3.4 Alcohol and drug abuse

Some vendors abuse alcohol and drugs. An alcohol-downing habit is when vendors drink alcohol at work, which lead to public drinking. Public drinking is an unproductive activity in streets like Angwa, Jason Moyo, and Park Street. The practice also occurs at the bus termini, the Charge Office, Copacabana, Fourth Street, Market Square, and Rezende Street. Cobblers, commuter omnibus crews, touts, and vendors are the main culprits, with a heavy drinking and alcoholism culture during and after working hours as they claim to work under challenging conditions (Tom, 2023). They visit nearby supermarkets where beer is cheap and get BronCleeer (bronco) in the streets. They mix the cheap brand with non-alcoholic beverages to deceive the HMP and ZRP. SV27 said:

Selling on the pavement has never been a gentleman's job. After drinking, while the time away, I also get the courage and energy to approach passers-by and convince them to buy my wares so I can fend for my family. I have the negotiation guts, and sometimes HMP just leaves me. Alcohol helps me to deal with HMP and ZRP, who swoop on us.

ZRP1 said:

We need Operation Zvidakwa Kubawa (beer drinkers confined to clubs and pubs).

The public drinking culture grew because beer is cheaper and colder in supermarkets than in bars and nightclubs. It reverses the gains from national clean-up campaigns, intimidating shoppers, school children, and others doing their business decently in the streetscapes and vendingscapes and reducing investment into the economy, while defoliating the city's aesthetics.

Drug abuse is common, with marijuana topping the list; it leads to aggression, anxiety, depression, hallucinations, and paranoia (Maringira and Gukurume, 2022) .Youth vendors are now turning to hard drugs like crystal methamphetamine, commonly known as *dombo* (stone),

or *guka* or *mutoriro* in street slang, because it looks like coarse salt. It is a strong and addictive drug that affects the central nervous system. SV29 said:

We do not have jobs; we sometimes take illicit beer and drugs to escape the complex economic challenges.

Drug abuse and alcoholism result in vendors relieving themselves in nearby alleys as there are no accessible public toilets and pay-toilets are few. Open defecation brings environmental health challenges, for example, cholera, diarrhoea, hepatitis, and typhoid. There have been calls to arrest these nuisances as vendors have accidents, aggression, fights, and squabbles, weakening their livelihood options. The vision of HCC, as a world-class city in 2025, is a mirage because of law and health disregard. Public drinking escalates peace and security risks; hence Zimbabwe should unleash *Operation Zvidhakwa Kubhawa* (beer drinkers to the pub and other designated drinking places) and *Operation no drugs*.

7.3.5 Food security and nutrition compromisation

Food security remains fragile in Zimbabwe due to the deteriorating economic situation, erratic rainfall, and long dry spells aggravated by increasing weather vulnerability in urban and rural areas (Ndawana, 2022). Food security has five pillars: accessibility, availability, stability, sustainability, and utilisation. All vendors complained that food is not always accessible and available because it is expensive. SV35 said:

I have two meals at home in the morning and evening, but when I have good sales, I can buy lunch.

Vendors cannot choose to eat what is available, especially during the Covid-19 era. The few who sell fruits and vegetables are at least guaranteed these provisions. Vendors contribute to food security in Harare. However, they rely on the rural area for food transfers. SV46 said:

I do not get huge profits from street trading, but I can provide adequate food for my family; they will never go hungry because I grow maize, beans, and other crops in my rural area.

Social networking is also essential as traders lend and borrow food from each other, especially maize as their staple food. SV43 claimed:

Fellow vendors will help me in times of crisis as I do the same should they encounter difficulties.

Food vending is illegal, although defiant vendors provide local food at relatively lower prices (USD 1 per plate). Wild fruits with anticancer, anti-inflammatory, antimicrobial, and antioxidants are available. SV42 said:

Street food is cheaper than conventional shops and eateries.

A CoH official pointed to the vendors' poor hygiene and, therefore, the potential for food-borne disease outbreaks, for example, cholera, *E. coli*, listeria, salmonella, and typhoid.

7.3.6 Environmental health

Chapter 6 referenced the importance of natural capital (the environment). Street traders affect and are affected by the environment. Street traders work in open spaces and are at risk from colds, flooding (for example, drain coagulation due to littering), heat waves, and increased intensity and frequency of storms. Street traders are into recycling, a cheap way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, for example, cleaning, collecting, grading, recovering, and sorting; as well as manufacturing goods from recycled materials that needs less energy than non-recyclables. Thus, street traders' carbon footprint is smaller than that of formal enterprises because they mainly source local goods, use less packaging, and reuse and recycle, for example, sandals made from worn-out car tyres. SV2 said:

I clean and dispose of waste in my trading place and its environs daily because this is my factory/shop. Dirt repels customers. Unfortunately, CoH is sleeping on duty in this regard.

HCC2 had a different opinion:

Vendors leave the city dirty; they throw away banana peels, mealy husks, used airtime cards, peeled peas, stale vegetables, rotten tomatoes; throwing paper and put advertising material everywhere. They do not adhere to health standards in the by-laws enshrined in the Urban Councils Act, especially those who sell cooked food.

The legislation referred to in the above quote requires the following:

A foodstuffs vendor in a vending site shall cause every container, storeroom, preparation room, or trade equipment used in connection with their business to maintain in a clean and sanitary condition and maintain and take precautions to safeguard the food from dirt, dust, and pests, vermin or other contamination and ensure that they are clean (Urban Councils Act, 2015).

One vendor lamented that compliance is difficult due to erratic water supply.

Inadequate, contaminated water sources, poor water storage, and poor road infrastructure result in water-borne diseases like cholera, dysentery, hepatitis, and typhoid, thus threatening vendor livelihood options. When vendors fall ill, it leads to depletion of financial assets due to medical expenses. Thus, strategies for vending sustainability should be pursued, as Chabal (2009:130) argued:

The notion of informalisation should no longer be taken as an indication of what is not working in Africa but rather as the conceptualisation of that which is effectively taking place -the norm rather than the exception.

Vendors face several challenges due to limited water accessibility, availability, and waste management. Effluence and garbage on streetscapes and roads lead to blockages, and the lack of street vending laws exposes vendors to health vulnerabilities that increase occupational health hazards and morbidity. SV36 alleged that:

When running away, they get injuries that require doctors' treatment. An unpleasant environment increases disease incidence, limits assets, income generation, profits, and products, and affects our well-being, including women's and children's workload. Similarly, unpleasant weather negatively affects fruits, vegetables, and clothes.

Harare's intention is not only to 'beautify' but reprimand and combat disease, although, in 2017, Zimbabwe outlawed street vending due to public health concerns, a move that received opposition from pro-democracy activists. Garbage is uncollected for days and even months, lowering environmental health standards. SV37 said:

Due to effluent and garbage accumulation, customers shun my trading space because they fear disease.

Personal health is a human right. The five pillars – emotional, intellectual, physical, social, and spiritual – are critical for vendors. SV18 burst into tears when she narrated her coping and adaptation mechanisms:

I was astounded. I take care of my orphaned grandchildren and get little income, which has affected my health. I am dependent on medication.

Street traders' exposure to environmental defoliation includes dust, poor water, and sanitation, the reason Harare is now associated with cholera and typhoid, leading to a high morbidity rate. Street workplaces have no formal building structures but tents, boxes, food trailers, and sheets at outdoor markets, parks, pavements, sidewalks, and storefronts. Vendors and their wares exposition to biological, ergonomic, physical, and psychosocial hazards due to weather exposure, inappropriate shelter, and associated risks like dirt, filth, soot, and grime that breed bacteria that can also cause disorders, for example, salmonella, *E. coli*, and melioidosis. One young vendor bemoaned that "*dirt streets and pavements upset one's mood*". Furthermore, the dust has chemical particles that lead to allergies, asthma attacks, bronchial infections, chest tightness, colds and coughs, dermatitis, dizziness, eye irritation, sore throats, tuberculosis, and wheezing. The vendors' exposure to ambient air pollution led them to a high risk of having a

higher chance of bronchitis and respiratory health problems, for example, influenza and Covid-19, urinary infections, reproductive health problems, and gastrointestinal infections.

Mothers bring their kids to work and expose them to a demanding setting when they are still young, exposing them to dirt, disease, obscene language, heat, rain and cold weather, malnutrition, and monstrous incidences like infringement, abandonment, exposure to car accidents, child labour, fraud, harassment, molestation, physical injuries, sexual harassment and rape, and the learning of social vices (Zhanda et al , 2022).

Medical care needs money, and this reduces vendors' financial and physical capital. SV27 reiterated:

Selling in the streets is my only option; it has negative health consequences; I carry my children with me because there is no one at home, and the pavements are unsafe.

Ambient air pollution leads to upper and lower respiratory health signs and diseases. In Accra, Ghana, women working on the streets have an impact on their unborn, and low infant birth weight has been noted (WIEGO, 2022). SV20 said:

My workplace exposed me to weather vulnerabilities, e.g., cold, sun, rain, and vehicle fumes. Sometimes my colleagues and I complain of chest pains, cough, dizziness, fainting spells, headaches, postnasal dripping, irregular heartbeat, and sneezing.

Vendors sell their wares in green spaces like Harare Gardens and Africa Unity Square, and monuments like the Mbuya Nehanda Statue, leading to aesthetic loss and environmental degradation. There are clean environments where vendors integrate into urban planning areas, like Warwick Junction in Durban, and Central Monrovia in Liberia (WIEGO, 2022). Safety, health, and environmental concerns conceal the socioeconomic contributions of street vending due to pedestrian and vehicular congestion leading to air pollution, crowded sidewalks, streets, and pavements for pedestrian use, not for selling. There is a reduction in aesthetic beauty and an appeal against Harare's Sunshine City principles and Vision 2030 to make Harare a world-class city, thus chasing away investors. Violence threats, traffic congestion, illegal trading space allocation, road accidents, and overcrowding prevent Harare's beautification by squashing people in one place, compounded by vast volumes of human and vehicular traffic. Table 7.3 shows vendors' responses to the environmental implications of street trading.

Table 7.3 Environmental implications of street trading

Environmental impact category	Environmental effects	Street trading implications
<i>Hydrological regime changes</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less infiltration. • More run-off and land surface flooding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flooding, property, infrastructure, and damages to transport routes • Income/livelihood disruption • Maintenance costs • Difficulty in accessing water for informal livelihoods
<i>Soil erosion</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airborne dust particles • Eroded sediment deposits • Lower land surface 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • City drains clogging, a nuisance to transport and vendor operations • Health challenges • Maintenance costs increase
<i>Ecological changes</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes in species types • Soil and tree cover loss • Reduced biodiversity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to workplaces and income-earning disruptions • Assets, homes, and possessions damaged • Health risks for outdoor workers • Loss of biodiversity • Loss of species habitats • Soil erosion • No insurance, increased vulnerability • Income/livelihood disruption
<i>Chemical pollution</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead uptake of crops from exhaust fumes • Vegetation toxicity from industrial waste • Water quality reduction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Algal blooms, a potential health hazard to consumers, a threat to wildlife • Water purification increased costs
<i>Landscape and aesthetics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scenery and environmental diversity loss 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost of alternatives increased • Loss of recreational and public spaces loss
<i>Diseases</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vector-borne diseases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food and water shortages and price increases • Income loss • Monitoring, control, and treatment costs • Water-related diseases`

7.3.7 Contributions to the non-vending and the formal sector

Formal retailers operate from formally owned stores and shops because street traders compete unfairly; they do not pay taxes and take their customers and businesses by loitering at the entrance and in front of their shops while selling the same goods. However, street traders pay indirect taxation through good purchases. They pay value-added tax by buying from a standard outlet. Taxes and other expenses that support street vendors' livelihoods are charges they are

willing to pay. Some shop owners view street vendors as partners because of the partnerships that have formed between business owners and these individuals. Some people view street vendors as an approach to a special cooperation between street vendors and commercial shop owners, where shop owners occasionally lend street vendors their wares to sell on their behalf, rather than as providing unfair competition. One retail shop owner said:

Vendor concentration draws customers, but also slows down and hinders access to adjoining off-street businesses and worsens traffic congestion for both pedestrians and vehicles.

The relationship between street traders and formal shops needs quantification. For some, the relationship is cordial, and for others, it is uncordial. The uncordial relationships are more prevalent between supermarkets like OK, Pick n Pay, and Choppies, who complain that vending is an obstacle to the entrance and outlet entrance routes, disturbing their customers. In such circumstances, networks and social capital are not developed between the two because shop managers and staff keep changing, and so are the relations built over the years.

7.3.8 Desired outputs from minimum investment

With minimal investment and effort from affiliated members, street vending offers environmental and livelihood services. SV18 shared her little investment effort by saying:

I started my vending business with USD 10 and sold freezits [a flavoured drink packed in 150 ml plastic packs, usually frozen] at home. I realised I could sell more to more customers, so I am now in the Harare CBD.

In comparison to other investments in the informal sector, repeat vending can stabilise and manage, leading to the creation of more livelihood options and outcomes, the formation of partnerships, and the institutional empowerment of vendors. Political issues are not in the public domain regarding informality, yet vendors are the agents who bring changes to working and living conditions. Desired outputs from minimum investments should be through innovative schemes on cost-effective and sustainable procedures at vendingscapes.

7.3.9 Enhanced social prestige

Vendors' prestige is the reputation or esteem linked to their context as determined by their social class, and this can lead to enhanced social and human capital. Many people have begun to recognise street traders and others in the informal sector as a result of their interaction opportunities. Vendors' reputations and self-confidence have increased, especially among community women's groups where collective action projects, like community burials, require

monthly contributions. Vending increases one's social prestige with the expanded coping and adaptation capacity to deal with Harare's vulnerability context. The desire to be respected by those in one's social circle and the self-affirmation that results from achieving one's goals in life are the two main sources of social prestige. SV7 boasted:

I do not have much money and assets, but I live everyday life like everyone formally employed.

Vendors social stratification is low due to their ascribed status; however, because of the achievements that they have made in terms of self-sufficiency, putting food on the table, and sending their children to school, the perception of people had been slowly changing and are now viewed as people who try to earn a decent life within the context of macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties.

7.3.10 Social harmony

Family provides strength, care, and support and is the critical bond between individuals and weaving the community together. When one family member is ill or under a lot of stress, the other takes over. The family members share the effort and are happy with the income from selling tangible goods and providing a living for the whole family. SV2 said :

In my family, we are five. I sell stuff in the vendingscapes. My husband goes to the light industries and farmers' markets to buy things. My two teenage boys' responsibility is to grade and sort fruits and vegetables while their sister does the household chores. We use the profits for our household upkeep.

Skills development, representation of interest in each other's lives, conversations, aspirations, talents, abilities, memories, and stories arise with family division of labour. Harmony builds family unionism, happiness, prosperity, and success leading to livelihood enhancement despite living at or below the poverty line. Street trading promotes Harare's human security for the traders and their customers; formalisation could be a long redress of human insecurity challenges from its clamp-down and suppression amidst a poor economy.

7.3.11 Living standards diversity

The standard of living measures life quality in terms of civic engagement, education, environmental quality, health, personal security, and work-life balance. Vendor living standard diversity is due to differences in the indicators mentioned above. There is considerable inter-vendor competition to access much-sought products in the vendingscapes. Said SV23 said:

My standard of living is fair compared to formally employed, e.g., teachers, nurses, and police officers. As a household, we have a roof, feed, and struggle like everyone else, but in the end, we get by.

Diversity promotes creativity through information searching, thus increasing decision-making skills and problem-solving. Looking at the vendor earning trends, differences in living standards are due to human capital elements like age, gender, and education. Capacity building, representation, and participation opportunities improve livelihood strategies and reduce dependence on agricultural occupation. Some vendors easily cope and adapt to risks because they have diversified earnings and other livelihood strategies, for example, being a vendor while formally employed.

7.3.12 Social inclusion

Social inclusion is enhancing the cultural, economic, environmental, political, and social aspects, namely, vendor's ability, dignity, and opportunity, by working on the margins to live sustainably through social capital, namely, connections (Scoones, 2019). Public auditing, social auditing, the inclusion of women in key roles, and decision-making are the roots of community management techniques. Women are present in user group arrangements today. They are considerate of problems affecting their means of subsistence. For the time being, the main challenges are: *Who are these livelihood chances for, what goals are they intended to achieve, how are they being transmitted, which needs of the groups are being met, and whose group has benefited?* Social inclusion complements vendor equality to create inclusive, robust, and sustainable socioeconomic growth. Social inclusion gives vendors dignity, opportunity and security for a better life through being recognised as having connections, for example, *Mikando* groups and vendor organisations that speak on their behalf, like the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe.

The Ministry of Women's Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development is an informal sector parent ministry whose mission statement is *"to create and maintain an enabling environment that promotes the development and sustainable growth of micro, small and medium enterprises and cooperatives"*, however, there is policy discord within government. Vendors do not fit into "SMEs" due to the absence of a documentable structure. Vendors adopt a survivalist strategy (see Section 7.2.7), not a business enterprise, because of financial limitations, poverty, and social hardships. One vendor confessed; *I could not go through the bureaucratic registration process to sell tomatoes.*

7.3.13 Social transformation opportunities

To ensure good governance mainstreaming, it is critical for vending to achieve social transformation. Aspects of social change include communal cohesion and a sense of *us* rather than *mine* regarding ownership in street trading. SV19 boasted:

My fellow vendors are my colleagues, hence our collective participation in our aspirations. The streetscapes and vendingscapes are our collaborative workplaces.

By finding local strengths and exchanging skills, ideas, talents, and experiences despite differences in opinions and changes in the utilisation of chances for social coordination and livelihoods, vendors have opportunities for capacity-building and personality development. Street traders promote local and international tourism by selling cultural, heritage-based products, traditional artifacts, regalia, and Zimbabwe cuisine, thereby transforming the streetscapes and vendingscapes into viable entities. Law enforcement, control, and encroachment in the vendingscapes contribute to crime reduction because vendors are a public eye for criminal activities, which they can promptly report to HMP and ZRP because of their sheer numbers in the streetscapes and vendingscapes making the city life safer from crime, mugging, robbery, and thieving. Conversely, sometimes street traders are conspiring with ZRP and HMP to rob pedestrians and street traders. They also pay bribes to trade without licences, tax evasion, selling drugs, and counterfeit and pirated goods, for example, goods and imitations of genuine brands, which are prohibited by law, and violate the rights of the genuine trademark. All these vices denote street trading as a nuisance and a haven for criminals and drug peddlers.

7.3.14 Skills training and development

Equal access is available to communication, education, and information. The informal trading environment on the street is where numerous talents are frequently learned by street traders. Street traders typically start off with little to no knowledge of their trades, which they eventually pick up through experience. Street traders acquire conversational skills like marketing, bookkeeping, entrepreneurship, and business management while conducting their trading businesses. SV33 said :

I have learned several skills in the street, including promoting sales, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, advertising, and negotiation skills like circumventing street governance actors. I also learned to bargain collectively with fellow vendors, e.g., when buying merchandise together.

Street vendors sustain livelihoods and keep the economy's wheels functioning through apprenticeship, knowledge transfer, creativity, entrepreneurship, innovation, product development, and technopreneurship. However, some vendors have limited business knowledge because a few have had the opportunity to attend training seminars offered by civil society organisations, vendor unions, and government departments and parastatals like the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Corporation (SMEDCO), formerly the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO). Nonetheless, technology has changed how, what, when, where, and why the young, the so-called digital natives, generation tech, *iGeneration*, and millennials are doing intelligent vending whereby they promote sales through the media and ICT, for example, mobile phones, radio, and television. Furthermore, some universities in Zimbabwe, for example, Chinhoyi University of Technology and the Harare Institute of Technology, introduced courses in entrepreneurship and technopreneurship, with many graduates failing to secure formal employment, and vending becomes an easy option. The courses are discordant to NDS 1, which seems to outlaw street trading as an entrepreneurial venture. Table 7.4 shows a summary of livelihood outcomes.

Table 7.4 Summary: Sustainable livelihood outcomes

Environment	Food security and nutrition	Health	Economy, culture and society
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource efficiency • Conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity • Ecosystem services • Climate change mitigation • Access to natural resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability • Accessibility • Utilisation • Stability • Sustainability • Minimising food loss and waste 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human capital • Employment • Productivity • Well-being • Reduced vulnerability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocacy • Asset accumulation • Equity • High status • Livelihoods and wages • Poverty alleviation • Resilience • Social justice

Vendors desire to grow their businesses, an economic improvement that increases their sales and only join the formal sector where monthly income is competitive and stable, which can change their circumstances.

7.4 Harare's street trading PESTLEG analysis

A sustainable street vending environment (the vulnerability context) has an inclusive multistakeholder committee responsible for overseeing policy and legislative changes,

implementation, and ongoing activities. Street vendor representatives and local authority departments – architecture, fire, health, planning, solid waste, traffic, and police – should be part of the committee. The PESTLEG analysis evaluates Harare’s Street trading across chapters, specifically Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis.

PESTLEG is an extended version of the SWOT analysis, which stands for [S]trengths, [W]eaknesses, [O]pportunities, and [T]hreats. A SWOT analysis is a strategic planning framework that evaluates a business’s competitive position by assessing internal and external factors, including existing customers and prospects (Table 7.5).

PESTLEG is a business tool that tracks the business environment to enhance strategic management. PESTLEG is a cue; in its expanded form, it denotes [P]olitical, [E]conomic, [S]ocial, [T]echnological, [L]egal, [E]nvironmental and [G]overnance factors. PESTLEG focuses on the political situation and how the government influences the economy, for example, fiscal policy, tax policies, and trade tariffs. The economic crisis focuses on growth patterns, foreign direct investment, foreign exchange rates, inflation, and interest rates.

The social facets scrutinise cultural trends, demographics, and population analytics. Technological tenets include innovations, business automation, research and development, and technical awareness. Legal analysis refers to laws that affect the business environment, for example, consumer laws, labour laws, and safety standards. The environmental facets refer to the influences of the natural and anthropogenic surroundings on business, for example, climate, ecological offsets, geographical location, and weather. Governance is the organisation’s accountability, controls, operations, policies, resolutions, and rules mechanisms to define business behaviour, for example, administration, compliance, ethics, and risk management.

From a legalist-inspired school of thought-inspired intervention (see Section 2.3.3), business challenges to the formalisation of street trading supposes competition between the formal and informal enterprises, yet the two are interdependent, the need for street trading PESTLEG analysis (Table 7.5). Such thinking retards the growth and recognition of the importance of the informal sector, including its outlawing and crackdown threats. The existence and proliferation of street traders show its complexity and the current fragile Zimbabwe economy, e.g., desperation, unemployment, and the survivalist thrust (Mate, Oosterom and Mpofo (2023) [see Section 2.3.4]; the politicisation of the urban informal economy is secondary. Both local and central governments should not interfere in the CoH affairs for selfish egos. The state should provide an environment where the poor can thrive, the right to the city (see section 3.4.7).

Table 7.5 Harare’s Street trading PESTLEG analysis

Factors	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Political				
Relating to the conduct of government in leadership and urban planning skills. Citizen participation embedded in multilevel politics linked to national, regional, and global structures.	<p>Valve for public dissatisfaction and social tensions</p> <p>Tolerated or encouraged to promote political patronage</p> <p>Safety net for the poor</p> <p>Harare’s local governance structures</p> <p>Central governance structures</p> <p>Full representation of all wards by elected councillors</p> <p>Local projects buy-in</p>	<p>Politicians suspicious of informal entrepreneurs</p> <p>Bypassing political capture of informal entrepreneurs</p> <p>Destructive party politics</p> <p>The informal sector tolerated and promoted political patronage</p> <p>Political lobbying with adverse consequences</p> <p>Corruption increases</p> <p>Misleading informality statistics</p> <p>Poor working relations at the City of Harare</p> <p>Corruption</p> <p>No political will to embrace informality.</p> <p>Poor parliamentary representation</p> <p>Power abuse by street governance actors – police brutality</p> <p>MDC and Zanu–PF antagonism</p>	<p>Politician’s awareness of informal entrepreneurship</p> <p>Banning street trader’s union leaders from political party affiliation</p> <p>Federate to increase reliance against political pressure</p> <p>Relative political stability</p> <p>Entrepreneurship and technopreneurship government thrust</p> <p>Political lobbying</p> <p>Good working relations with the central government and other government departments</p> <p>Realignment of laws</p> <p>Increase in the number of vendors</p>	<p>Limited development strategy</p> <p>Distortions in economic indicators, e.g., unemployment rate, inflation rate and growth rate</p> <p>Power abuse by politicians</p> <p>Power wrangles</p> <p>Political capture/bickering/ manipulation</p> <p>Sanctions</p> <p>Realignment of Acts with the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013</p> <p>Central government bureaucracy</p> <p>Political interference</p> <p>Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)</p>
Economic				
<p>The informal economy’s production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services</p> <p>The choices made by businesses, governments, and individuals in resource allocation</p>	<p>An increase in the space and time for goods and services is unavailable in off-street locations</p> <p>Maintains production competitiveness and flexibility</p> <p>Growth is supported and encouraged</p> <p>Goods and services provided not available off-street locations</p> <p>Personal income generation</p> <p>Employment creation and improvement of well-being</p>	<p>Causes distortions in leading economic indicators, e.g., unemployment rate</p> <p>Increase the technological gap between formal /informal businesses.</p> <p>Limited economic cohesion – infringement</p> <p>Block routes of egress from crowded department stores</p> <p>Limit off-street businesses</p> <p>Receipts not issued, a challenge for accounting, taxes d value-added taxes</p>	<p>Well-being improvement</p> <p>Vast business opportunities</p> <p>Working with relevant funding agencies / civil society</p> <p>Growth, if supported and encouraged</p> <p>Employment creation</p> <p>Freedom and opportunities for initiative and creativity</p> <p>Informal social protection initiatives</p> <p>Limited dependency on state benefits</p> <p>Formalisation of the informal sector</p>	<p>Increase in the number of vendors</p> <p>Low, irregular, and poverty income</p> <p>Increasing vendors</p> <p>Economic meltdown</p> <p>Unavailability of credit facilities</p> <p>Non-availability of central government funding</p> <p>Unavailability of energy</p> <p>Informal trading is marginal</p> <p>Poor road network</p> <p>Complaints from established business owners</p>

Factors	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
	<p>Low goods and services prices The engine of economic activities, social hub, and civic engagement Low labour costs On-the-job training The informal sector limits pressure on wages in the formal labour market Government tax revenues Entrepreneurial and technopreneurial promotion Flexibility in hours and activity levels Vending embraces seasonal, unique, and sporadic demands, e.g., Independence Day Flags and Easter Eggs Street tourism – enhancing tourist vistas and photographs A large pool of customers A growing informal sector Low payment rates or increase in debt Designated vending sites Harare is the capital city (economic hub)</p>	<p>Vendors’ unfair competition to tax-paying off-street businesses Workers poorly paid Contaminated or contraband, fake, and underweight merchandise. Vendors may refuse guarantees or exchanges in defective merchandise Vendors may not have repair services and may disappear in case of complaints Street trading epitomises surplus labour Tax evasion /budget deficits Unsustainable currency Absence of local economic development strategies High unemployment rate Absence of credit lines Bureaucratic tendencies Urban sprawl choking existing infrastructure Liquidity crunch Non-payment of rates by ratepayers Infrastructure decay Competition from established shops Poor/shortage of vending sites Thin resource base Low productivity and low incomes Incorrect GNP measurement Uncoordinated activities Unskilled /Semi-skilled personnel</p>	<p>Existence of the Ministry of Small-Scale and Medium-Scale Enterprises A growing informal sector Establishment of Public–Private partnerships Potential development partners Growing business partnerships Increase in the number of vendors Existence vendor organisations</p>	<p>Increased unemployment rate Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)</p>

Factors	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Social				
<p>Relating to or being with others, i.e., social interaction through awareness-raising, self-commitment, citizen participation, and institutional build-ups</p>	<p>Vending is a social safety net, an Alternative to formal enterprises It serves as an informal and natural initiative for social protection Vending breaks socioeconomic divides and fosters social cohesion Freedom and opportunities for industry and creativity Street trading is an engine of social hubs and civic engagement. Vending is a revolution by the poor against a dysfunctional and regulated state Vendors add life to dull streets. Promotes 'indigenous' features of the Global South. Street tourism Teamwork Considerable market /Population growth It encourages women's empowerment, particularly for women-led families</p>	<p>Traders gravitate towards congestion through circular and cumulative causation, street sales, and increased congestion Pedestrian and vehicular traffic impedes police, fire, and ambulance services Crowded sidewalks block motorists' sightlines Pedestrianising streets create space for traders but reduce motorist routes Delivery space shrinkage Traders can leave, relocate, and swindle customers before being identified by clients or police. Poor working conditions Congested streets provide opportunities for armed assaults, pickpocketing, and snatch thefts Solicitations disturb, frighten, and irritate motorists and pedestrians Absence of a local gender policy Inadequate health knowledge The influx of illegal goods Poor health facilities Prostitution and child marriages Increase in the crime rate Social/power inequalities Exclusion from social benefit and security</p>	<p>Informal economy negatively related to public goods provision Collective bargaining Social capital increase Resilience against threats Support from stakeholders in health delivery Multicultural large population Promotes 'indigenous' features of the Global South Street tourism Teamwork Large market</p>	<p>Vehicular and human accidents Pandemics, e.g., Covid-19 Lockdowns Infrastructure decay Informal economy negatively related to public goods provision Long distances to buy stuff Cultural and religious beliefs Absence of social security The occasional outbreak of diseases, e.g., cholera and typhoid Abuse and harassment cases are difficult to address when perpetrated by police and HCC officials against the vulnerable (women, children, elders) street vendor Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)</p>

Factors	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Technological				
Technological dynamics are enhanced, and societal commitment to research and innovation increases to promote resource efficiency	Online registration and tax payment Credible, integrated accounting High computer literacy rate Mobile and fixed networks connectivity Computerised accounting systems Multipayment platforms, e.g., Swipe, EcoCash, OneMoney TeleCash	Absence of e-governance Inadequate ICT skills Erratic electricity No taxes or social security contributions Inadequate and outdated or lagging technological equipment and applications	Use of technology for e-marketing Availability of all mobile networks Various payment platforms Electricity infrastructure	Limited broadband connectivity Expensive internet Poor internet penetration Access to Wi-Fi/internet limited Unaffordability of appropriate technological equipment and applications Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)
Legal				
Authority derivation from the law. Self-organised initiatives that challenge existing local, national, and global regulations	Constitutional rights allow citizens to choose their occupation and engage in any entrepreneurial activity Statutory instruments provision Local government provisions in the constitution Good constitution Defined acts, e.g., Indigenisation laws	Vendors often contravene labour by employing minors Compromised judiciary system. Failure to adhere to laws, by-laws, policies, and regulations Illegal trading, e.g., pimping, prostitution, selling narcotics, and ticket-touting Underground economic activities encourage and support bribes, crime, and tax evasion that destabilise civil society Non-enforcement of by-laws Lack of a legal division Slow judicial processes Corruption, officials accept bribes	Existence of three arms of government, executive, legislature, and judiciary Affordable statutory instruments Access to private legal firm Bureaucracy: ease of doing business has improved Elected Councillors /members of parliament	No street trading clear laws, by-laws Vending engrossed many ministries and government departments New and restrictive by-laws Conflicting policy instruments (Urban Councils Act and Public Finance Act) Lack of consultation when drafting legislation and enforcing it to understand the plight of the vendors and know which the pertinent issues. Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)

Factors	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Environmental				
The intricate biotic, chemical, and physical factors act upon the informal economy to improve the sustainable use of natural resources and cultural heritage	Street trading helps in the planning, designing, and managing of public spaces and a critical global discussion, e.g., SDG 8 and SDG 11	Food on the street poses public health problems due to exposure to contamination Vendors can relocate quickly during food poisoning outbreaks Trading spaces are dirty and noisy. Urban elites view vendors as disorderly and prone to blight crime and vandalism Littering	National climate change policy Existence of a climate fund Incorporation of climate change into the Greater Harare Water and Sanitation masterplan Good legislation brought the Environmental Management Agency into effect Tourist attraction sites, e.g., Anglican and Catholic Cathedrals	Global warming Climate variability and change Disease outbreaks; cholera, typhoid and Covid-19 Litter and products hidden in drainage pipes lead to floods on the roads during rainy seasons Decayed fruits, vegetables, and wet card boxes cause diseases Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)
Governance				
Actions, norms, and rules are regulated, structured, sustained, and held accountable based on internal laws of the informal economy and external regulations with business partners	Freedom of association Corporate governance laws Defined three pillars of governance: The executive, the legislature, and the judiciary	Hierarchy and control Street governance actor's negative attitudes and lack of respect for the poor Government asymmetry in a collaborative project Corruption: officials accept bribes Favouritism Marginalisation of traders	Local and central governance structures Street vending policy / statutory body Training and awareness building Federate to increase bargaining powers Potential for five primary attributes: accountability, the flow of information, participation, the rule of law, and transparency Decentralisation and devolution Delegation	Limited devolution Political interference Bureaucrats are political appointees Changes in macroeconomic factors (PESTLEG)

7.5 Conclusion

Street trading is Zimbabwe's most significant and survivalist livelihood strategy subcategory in the booming informal economy. Diversification is a general strategy for the impoverished to improve their standard of living. This includes formal waged employment, informal trade, and service activities, with different family members participating in various industries and economic sectors. The vendor advertises and markets to lure customers; vendors, and street governance actors voluntarily breach trust in exchange for benefits and inducements for example, gifts and money, multitasking to have a diversified asset portfolio including rural–urban links, countering harassment through monitoring the movement of street governance actors and operating from designated vendingscapes among a host of livelihood strategies. By reducing reliance on a single source of income, diversification lessens sensitivity to certain stressors and shocks. Too many activities, however, can prevent households from devoting enough time or money to any one activity for it to be lucrative.

Livelihood outcomes feed into PIPs and assets. Successful strategies build the asset base, while the unsuccessful deplete, increasing vulnerability. Livelihood outcomes either build virtuous or vicious cycles although the legitimate is productive. It provides for employment, asset accumulation, food security, health and well-being, high status in the community, income security, local and central government revenue, and self-esteem. Harare's main challenge is a cost-benefit analysis of street trading contributions vis-à-vis corporate and private sector demands for valuable urban land and space access and use, environmental defoliation, drug abuse, thieving, and other vices. Chapter 8 provides the principal findings and recommendations for the livelihoods of street vendors.

Chapter 8

MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

Chapter 8 provides an overview, discussion, and summary of the key findings. The chapter highlights each chapter and the main findings to develop recommendations. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the study's significance and implications for future research.

8.2 Overview of study

Urban poverty is increasing in Harare, with many people participating in the informal sector. However, city ordinances and policies stifle the informal sector. The PIPs are cursory, disabling, fragmented, prohibiting complicated formal standards, and requiring strenuous legal procedures. Often, city governors and managers criminalise the informal sector. The study used the SLA to explore urban livelihood complexity guided by the research question:

How do informal sector practitioners in Harare's central business district shape their livelihoods to deal with the uncertainties related to the macroeconomy and the regulation of informal traders?

Although the thesis considers the ineffective regulatory environment, the primary focus was on the lived experiences of informal sector practitioners in the Harare CBD. Their responses and approaches to the repressive government approach were central to the research.

8.2.1 Chapter summaries

The thesis has eight chapters linked to the research objectives. This section summarises the main contributions of each chapter.

Chapter 2 summarised the literature on different discourses on the informal sector. No universally accepted definition contributes to the varied responses by governments. The informal sector is often marginalised but provides livelihoods and employment. Although a country's socioeconomic, political, and historical circumstances shape the degree of informality, it is more complicated, and existing theories struggle to consider the lived experiences of people in the informal sector.

Considering the above reality, Chapter 3 focused on the informal sector in Africa. Under colonial rule, the non-acknowledgement and marginalisation of the informal sector was rife. Moreover, the informal sector was inconvenient for Africa's postcolonial governments, who expected it would disappear with modernisation. Despite growing recognition of the importance of the informal sector in socioeconomic development, urban planning laws and land-use zoning have largely remained unchanged since colonial times. Africa's nagging question is: Does development require eradicating or working with the informal sector? Working with it seems plausible as it provides livelihood income.

The focus in Chapter 4 shifted towards a discussion of the SLA and discussed how Amartya Sen's capabilities approach (the precursor to the SLA) has become central in the development discourse. For Sen (1999) human capabilities and functioning's drive development, poverty reduction, and well-being. This approach by Sen contrasts the economic frameworks that often dominate the discourse. The SLA evolved from the CA ideas. The SLA established a framework for comprehending macro and micro issues. The SLA was used in this study to understand how informal sector practitioners create livelihoods from assets, despite repressive government approaches and how they respond to repressive measures. The SLA provides a framework to focus on the economic and financial aspects and consider a wider range of factors at play.

Chapter 5 outlined historical perspectives on Zimbabwe's informal sector development. The chapter built on the policy issues discussed in Chapter 3 and applied the analysis to Zimbabwe. Despite extensive official efforts to stop it, the informal sector has developed and grown since the colonial period. The chapter ends with an analysis of urban planning challenges for the informal sector.

Chapter 6 analysed vendor support through their assets and how assets provide a foundation for participation in the informal sector. The chapter explicitly analysed the assets and vulnerability of vendors, as well as PIPs. The chapter further emphasised that assets help to create livelihood strategies. Although some assets are related to economic factors like income and savings, the evidence showed that a range of other non-economic and financial assets play a role.

Chapter 7 showed how the informal sector practitioners countered the government's repressive measures. They protected their business legally and illegally, for example, by bribing. A general strategy for improving the standard of living for those with limited resources is to

diversify one's sources of income, like through an official waged job, informal trade, and service activities carried out by members of the same family in several economic sectors.

8.3 Main findings of the study

This section provides the study's main findings. Specifically, the section offers critical theoretical and empirical contributions of the research.

8.3.1 Main finding 1: The sustainable livelihoods approach has much value for understanding the informal sector and its livelihood guarantee mechanisms

The SLA is widely used as an analysis framework. It has roots in the CA. The CA, developed in the 1980s, is an alternative economic theory with a primary focus of:

- Development – a setting that promotes creativity, health, and longevity, in other words, fundamental freedom expansion: economic, political, protective, security, social, and transparency guarantees.
- Justice – four distinct types of justice: Distributive in the sense of determination of who gets what; procedural in the sense of determination of the fair treatment of people; restorative in the sense of restoration of relationships to rightness; and retributive in the sense of punishment for wrongdoing.
- Well-being – happiness, in other words, life indicators like connections, education, food, health, housing, income, political voice, and social networks.
- Agency – the ability to create change and secure livelihoods.

Chapter 4 provided a detailed analysis of the SLA approach. One of the contributions of this study is to re-emphasise the importance of the SLA to urban studies. The following paragraphs provide five reasons from this study motivating the importance of the SLA as an analysis framework.

First, the SLA is an analytical framework to assess poverty and enhance the livelihoods of people living in poverty. In the colonial period, informality was disenfranchisement, and the same followed in the postcolonial period. However, the informal sector could be enhanced and improve the well-being of informal workers (Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7). Although lack of income of low-income levels may be a sign of poverty, it is a poor indicator of people's well-being. This approach contrasts with economic thinking that a person only has one income (Chapters 4, 5, and 6). The evidence from this study shows multiple incomes, various ways of securing

and using assets, and numerous responses to government brutality to maintain income and livelihood. The SLA, therefore, provides a good framework for understanding these complexities.

Second, the SLA links livelihoods at the macro and micro levels. The study highlighted two macro-level factors: political and economic contexts and regulatory problems. Chapter 2 discussed the harsh measures in the colonial and postcolonial periods to prevent the informal sector from developing or criminalising it as regulator examples. Chapter 5 provided a policy framework, historical overview, evidence of poor macroeconomic policies, and austerity measures contributing to the informal sector challenges as examples of the political–economic context. The SLA provides a framework to link these macro-level issues with local responses. The evidence from Chapters 6 and 7 shows that despite the political–economic context, operators in the informal sectors can build on their assets and create a livelihood. Chapter 7 discussed the responses of informal traders to the harsh measures by city authorities. Research often focuses on some of the issues above in a one-dimensional approach by investigating government policies without analysing local responses. This detailed understanding of the local responses was the main contribution of this study. More importantly, the SLA provided a framework to link these micro and macros aspects.

Third, the SLA provides a framework and opportunity to reflect on a vendor’s lived experiences and agency. Vendors are not passive victims of street governance actors but are critical thinkers and actors. The livelihood resilience measurement framework draws from the SLA (Chapters 1, 4, 6, and 7) as well as Hooke’s law, which state that livelihood challenges are proportional to the induced stress (vulnerability context) (Quandt, 2018). The lived experiences include the responses of informal traders to government brutality through coping strategies. There are also more permanent adaptive strategies, like the permanent relocation to rural areas. Livelihood strategies differ because vendors are heterogeneous, leading to different asset portfolios, techniques, and livelihood outcomes (Chapters 4, 6, and 7). The more the coping and adaptation tactics, the higher the resilience. Chapter 2 analysed different phases in the development of the informal sector. None of these emphasised the lived experiences and building on the assets of informal sector practitioners. Chapters 3 and 5 showed how the government discarded the informal economy during colonial and postcolonial periods. It was not supposed to develop. Therefore, focusing on lived experiences helps ensure an acknowledgment and creates an understanding of these experiences beyond policy and macroeconomic thinking.

Fourth, the SLA is a simplified version of how economic, environmental, financial, human, information, and political changes (livelihoods multidimensionality) affect informality. Data collected through the SLA can promote human rights and social justice through gender-specific data collection and analysis (Chapters 1, 4, 6, and 7). Gender mainstreaming, espoused by the SLA, achieves inclusive development, economic growth, and poverty reduction, for example, the Zimbabwe Women's Microfinance Bank was established in 2018 to serve financially excluded women. The SLA remains a simplification of the multifaceted nature of livelihoods as urban poverty reduction is difficult because of vendor heterogeneity, with women being more vulnerable than men. As rural–urban migration continues, vendingscapes become scarcer (Chapters 6 and 7). As cash economies, urban areas offer opportunities and less societal control on the available means of subsistence of people living in poverty, like hawking. Harare has limitations for the vendors. For example, the Harare (Hawkers) by-laws of 2013 disallow vendors from selling their wares in the CBD, and designated vendingscapes do not have adequate water and sanitation infrastructure like water points (Chapters 5, 6, and 7).

Fifth, most SLA work originated in rural areas, focusing on natural resources (Farrington et al., 2002). This study has made a case for its applicability in the natural resources of urban areas, including various capitals, like political and social capitals (Farrington et al., 2002). There is no reason why the SLA cannot be applied equally to urban areas because the fundamental principles are the same for both rural and urban areas (Beall et al., 1999; Carney et al., 1999; Farrington et al., 2002; Moser, 1998; Satterthwaite, 2000; Tacoli, 1999).

8.3.2 Main finding 2: Street trading has a double burden on women

Gender analysis is critical in the division of labour, resource access, and control, livelihood opportunities, and constraints. For example, gender scholars emphasise women performing household chores before street trading and that they sell low-order goods with lower profits than men (Chapters 2, 3, and 5). Colonial laws further contributed to discrimination against women. For example, a few Black men employed by whites could live in urban houses without spouses and family. Women who accompanied their husbands to urban areas and other relatives were not allowed to work, formally or informally (Chapter 5). Women spent more time on unpaid work, like caring, cleaning, and cooking for household members, than men. Women and daughters are burdened with household chores in addition to street trading, with more burden on physically challenged women. The unpaid household labour makes women's dual responsibility arduous, although they also want ownership and control of their lives as

colleagues, friends, mothers, providers, and partners (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). The ILO (2017) promotes the right to work and inclusion of urban livelihoods in the New Urban Agenda, the 2018 National Gender Policy, and the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, which are progressive in gender equality. These laws advocate for gender mainstreaming to eliminate cultural, economic, judicial, political, religious, and social practices that prevent gender equality and equity in all life spheres (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Urban standards are prohibitive, complicated, expensive, and require strenuous procedures that lead to women's underrepresentation in cultural, economic, social, religious, and political positions due to the unfavourable national context, hence the gender gap.

8.3.3 Main finding 3: Street vendors remain vulnerable

Livelihood outcomes fluctuate because of the vulnerability context. Vulnerability is evident through PIPs, where macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties exist. For example, most African countries do not have vending policies (Chapters 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7). The state must allocate resources to its people. However, the elite gets more privileges, individually or collectively, because of corrupt state institutions like the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the ZRP. Such corruption exacerbates vendor vulnerability through illicit activities like bribing (Chapters 5 and 6). Effective institutions can mediate, compensate for, and lessen vendor vulnerability and advance social justice, thereby reducing poverty and inequality. Fineman's vulnerability theory applies to the inherent nature of human vulnerability (Fineman, 2017). Vulnerability is innate to an individual, although no vendor is autonomous, fully operating, and independent due to embeddedness in social relationships and institutions. The established formal standards are complex, expensive, and require strenuous procedures. Zimbabwe has been using Statutory Instruments, like statutes implemented under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act of 1986, empowering the President to make temporary regulations that last six months to deal with emergencies, for example, public health (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Vending prohibition was to contain Covid-19, but with no government support to the affected. Vendors work in open streetscapes and vendingscapes that expose them to disease from weather vagaries, for example, rain, heat, cold, sun, and winds, thus limiting productivity (Chapters 6 and 7). An insecure workplace exacerbates stock damage, theft, confiscations, and storage challenges, hence the need for prudent skills for any array of mechanisms for livelihood guarantee (Chapters 1, 5, 6, and 7).

8.3.4 Main finding 4: Postcolonial policy framework inhibits the informal sector

The postcolonial policy inhibited the informal sector because of four main reasons:

First, it does not acknowledge the value of informality. In Africa's precolonial era, the economy was mainly informal, dominated by artefacts, arts and crafts, small-scale farmers and miners, construction, traditional healers, and wood and stone carving. Barter trade was more common than wage employment. Colonial governments dismantled many of these initiatives. Postcolonial governments continued in this vein without acknowledging the historical reality.

Second, in the colonial period, colonial structures and laws disfranchised the informal sector through anti-poor urban planning laws where a vendor was a subaltern and viewed as marginal, an enemy, and deprived of a voice. The colonialists viewed the informal sector as marginal in developing commercial and industrial zones (Chapters 2, 3, and 5).

Third, most postcolonial African governments implemented a market-driven, pro-growth macroeconomic model with an economy based on liberalisation focused on economic growth, good governance, poverty reduction strategies, prioritising the private sector and social equity, and focusing on big business over micro-enterprises. Zimbabwe's postcolonial policy framework entrenched the vendor in an unstable subaltern (lack of power recognition and voice). Policy formulation, reformulation, and restructuring in postcolonial Zimbabwe created Black elites and moguls disguised as affirmative action groups aligned with Zanu-PF. Informality increased due to a lack of formal employment. The 2018 ZimAsset and Vision 2030 policy frameworks failed to create employment (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Despite earlier interventions like the 1983 Small Enterprise Development Corporation proclamation through the Small and Medium Enterprises Act [Chapter 24:12] of 1983 to establish micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME), when Emerson Mnangagwa assumed Presidency in 2017, the indigenisation policy, ZimAsset, and Vision 2030 were discarded and traded with the NDS 1 (2021–2025). The NDS 1 disregarded the informal sector but focused on growing the formal economy (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2020).

Fourth, self-employment forms the majority of Zimbabwe's livelihoods in Zimbabwe. The new self-employed city should be inclusive, readapted, and reformulated. Otherwise, the informal sector remains under the state's punitive arm but peripheral to its protective arm. Vendors bemoan the need of policymakers to understand the everyday realities of Zimbabweans because the established but prohibitive formal standards are complicated, expensive, and require

strenuous procedures. State power excess in regulating urban planning and informality regulation is attributable to macroeconomic challenges, resource allocation inefficiency, Covid-19 challenges, limited private investment and public infrastructure financing, high informality, and high production costs albeit restrictive laws, for example, the 1986 Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act Chapter 10:20 of 1986.

8.3.5 Main finding 5: Street vendors help with safety enhancement in the Harare central business district

Any business thrives in a secure environment. Street vending increases the Harare CBD safety and security due to the following:

First, the presence of many vendors is essential for them and their customers in alerting, detecting, responding, and reporting crime and suspicious activity, thus creating conducive streetscapes and vendingscapes (street ears and eyes). Vending promotes heritage, street life, and tourism; it adds to the city's vibrancy through sidewalk mixed-use, therefore, the "eyes on the street". Harare can learn more from Warwick Junction in Durban, South Africa, where inclusive urban planning integrated vendors and increased public safety (Dobson et al., 2009). A bombing attempt in Times Square in New York City in 2010 was prevented by a street vendor (Kilgannon and Schmidt, 2010).

Second, the ZRP and HMP, as the main street governance actors deployed in the streetscapes and vendingscapes, thwart any possible criminal activities by creating a friendly and safe trading environment (Chapter 6). However, vending has security threats like false payment and invoicing, robbery, fraud, theft, and vandalism due to an increase of vendors, ZRP and HMP laxity, and a quest for bribes as the economy dithers (Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7).

Third, some vendors practice occupational health and safety (OHS). For example, streetscapes and vendingscapes are kept clean and safe despite being under-resourced and limited in scope by central government OHS institutions. Street traders face OHS risks with psychological and physical impacts. Vendors, however, face OHS challenges, for example, non-involvement in vendingscapes designation and by-laws that negate well-being, economic (low profits), physical (harassment by street governance actors), political (manipulation) and social (low societal standing) (Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

Table 8.1 Summary of the main findings and recommendations

Main findings	Reference to chapters	Key recommendations
<i>The SLA has value in understanding the informal sector and livelihood guarantee mechanisms</i>	Chapters 1, 4, 6 and 7	The government's PIPs should create an inclusive and enabling environment where livelihood mechanisms develop, expand, and sustainably guarantee livelihoods
<i>Street trading has a double burden on women</i>	Chapters 1;5; 6 and 7	More attention should be on gender mainstreaming
<i>Street vendors remain vulnerable</i>	Chapters 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7	The government should develop regulations that consider street traders' vulnerability
<i>The postcolonial policy framework inhibits the informal sector in Zimbabwe</i>	Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7	The government should legislate street vending by fixing the regulatory context (PIPs) A National Vending Policy will enhance vending sustainability
<i>Street vendors help with safety enhancement in the Harare CBD</i>	Chapters 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7	Harare by-laws should be more inclusive

8.4 Recommendations

On the basis of the key findings in the chapters, this section offers the recommendations. The suggestions should initiate a debate within the academic and policy context. This debate should involve stakeholders (academics and researchers, civil society and NGOs, informal sector practitioners, ordinary community members, policymakers, politicians, and HCC) involved in vending and vending policies. The main recommendations are discussed below.

8.4.1 Recommendation 1: Government should urgently legislate street trading

The informal sector requires local and central government support for street trading legislation that will support the informal sector. One ministry should directly deal with vendor concerns and spearhead a National Vending Policy. Presently, more than five ministries deal with vendors, resulting in fragmented approaches. The government should revisit the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15) as the primary law governing local authorities so that vendors can operate freely in urban areas by following city by-laws which need revision to adjust to the current realities. The government must streamline the bureaucratic procedures of vendor registrations and create a progressive taxation system. The approaches should be pro-poor and designed for macro, small and medium enterprises. The NSSA, the parastatal responsible for social protection, should be inclusive and corruption free to extend social security to informal

businesses. NSSA should have a vendor register allowing them to contribute as formal workers do. A vendor census will offer opportunities for them to pay statutory obligations like taxes and levies, which the government can use to extend formal social security. The current social protection policy is discriminatory as it does not cater for informal workers because they are not considered as workers. In conjunction with the government, civil society organisations should build on sustainable self-initiated vendor safety nets in the informal economy, like *Kufusha Mari* and *Mikando* (Chapter 6).

Zimbabwe should stop the pejorative and belittling colonial terms to denote informal actors but should recognise the informal sector's significance and provide compatible ICT infrastructure (e-inclusion). ICTs could be more catalytic in improving informal activities like e-commerce programmes, mentoring, networking initiatives, accessing market needs online, and delivering goods and services to customers' offices and homes. Similarly, HCC should be able to locate vendors through Geographical Information Systems and Remote Sensing for easy population statistics.

8.4.2 Recommendation 2: Harare should enact gender-inclusive and pro-poor by-laws.

There should be gender mainstreaming and gender-disaggregated data collection and analysis to eliminate economic, social, and political practices that hinder gender equality and equity. Street vendor registration should capture details of all vendors, including home address, age, nature of the business, mobility status, semi-mobile, static, vendingscapes, and streetscape location. For development planning, and after restructuring PIPs, a gender disaggregated database of people whose livelihoods depend solely on street vending, suppliers of goods and raw materials, and the population group that buys from vendors is essential, including gendered facilities, for example, childcare facilities at vendingscapes. Designated vendingscapes rentals should be reasonable to minimise evasion. All public spaces currently not in use should be vendingscapes, where possible. HCC, in conjunction with vendors, should strengthen livelihoods and improve the safety of vendors by identifying, supporting, and diversifying livelihood opportunities in the city. CoH should train vendors on business ethics, including a conducive and sustainable environment with ablution facilities, sanitation, and shades. Harare can partner with private organisations under public-private partnerships to lessen these challenges. The same strategy could construct decent shelters rented out to street vendors and other small businesses. Harare should transform and develop a sustainable vending system through value addition and beneficiation by incorporating the informal sector as an economic

development engine by unfreezing strict by-laws. Further research is essential to understand street trading laws and their gendered nature, especially regarding vendingscapes that are insecure for women to trade at night and do not have childcare facilities.

8.4.3 Recommendation 3: Street vendors should unionise and speak with one voice

At the national level, so many organisations claim to represent vendors. It will be prudent if these organisations and vendors join hands to minimise discord in discussions with the government and the HCC. Street traders should speak with one voice through properly constituted organisations. Non-alignment of these organisations with any political party makes them remain independent. Vendors should pay their monthly subscriptions to ensure the autonomy of vendor organisations and lessen infiltration by politicians for their self-serving needs, like manipulating vendors towards election time. People with unquestionable integrity should lead vendor organisations, and the leadership should go through credit vetting and police clearance before being elected to office. Alignment to specific political and civil society organisations will only divide the vendor's voice and increase their precarious situation. Vendor associations should create opportunities for informal traders to own or rent clean spaces for trading, or they can, in turn, venture into real estate, and members can rent sustainable fees from their organisations. They can also partner with financial institutions to realise these objectives.

8.4.4 Recommendation 4: Banks, mobile money agencies, and informal savings clubs should transform

An inclusive, reinvented, and transformative financial system lends money and allows capital to flow to people, places, and projects that impact society and the environment (the financialisation of economies). The transformation makes the difference between development that includes or excludes the poor. The velocity of money is high in the micro, small, and medium enterprises sector, and banks should find ways to tap into this market by charging nominal bank charges and then ride on economies of scale. Monetary authorities should use simple and understandable language, for example, vernacular language, *Shona*, for vendors to understand economic terminology. The government can use existing adult education programmes at tertiary and vocational learning centres to train vendors on financial management. Financial institutions should work with vendors and organisations to develop appropriate collateral substitutes. This approach alleviates the nagging challenge of security

required before loan approval. The government can guarantee credit and loan facilities extended to the informal sector through the Zimbabwe Women's Microfinance Bank. Organisations and associations representing the informal workers should create relationships with banks to get tailor-made credit or loans and insurance companies like First Mutual Life and have adaptable products to suit this sector. Because of numbers, various insurance products can have discounted premiums.

With the help from civil society organisations and NGOs, informal vendors should get assistance to create registered micro-saving clubs, which should be easy as they have been running *Mikando* and rotational saving clubs. Financial inclusion should grow as the Zimbabwean economy is recently the predominant informal sector. To comprehend financial inclusion, financial and banking exclusion, reasons like digital financial illiteracy, inadequate income (credit risk), language barriers, limited digital financial infrastructure, operations in uncommercially viable areas, services cost, personal beliefs, and conviction, should be addressed by government incentives that encourage informal players to formalise. Cell phone banking by EcoCash, InnBucks, MyCash, OneMoney, and TeleCash has financial inclusion opportunities due to less stringent account opening requirements and platforms that interface with banking systems.

8.4.5 Recommendation 5: Civil society, non-governmental organisations, and multilateral organisations should advocate for informal sector improvement to create alternative sustainable economies

Civil society and NGOs can strengthen street vending organisations through advocacy, educational awareness, and training programmes with the CoH and central government. Multilateral organisations like the IMF and the World Bank could assist by financing the programmes. The ILO (2020) has the technical expertise benched at an international best practice that can be adapted and replicated in Harare. The ILO can help with reviews on PIPs, creating vending infrastructure that supports decent employment, and providing training on the ILO's decent work agenda. Zimbabwe must consent to and adapt ILO R204 of 2015 to adhere to international best practices set by this UN agency. The objectives of R204 are to pave the way for the formalisation of workers and economic units while respecting workers' rights, livelihood and income security, and entrepreneurship. ILO R204 calls for decent work in the formal economy, for example, building vendingscapes with waterpoints, ablution, and childcare facilities.

8.5 Significance of study

8.5.1 Methodological contribution to informal sector studies

The study critically assessed the applicability of SLA in urban areas. Initially, the SLA focused on rural livelihoods, but as demonstrated in Chapter 4, it can fit well in urban areas. The study, therefore, fills this gap through qualitative methods with a focus on informal vendors in the Harare CBD. The SLA explores people's distinct roles as testers (applying the SLA on the ground and producing results); developers (increasing and spreading the notion of SLA to improve its significance); champions (encouraging and supporting commitment to the idea of SLA); communicators (stating the SLA in ways that increases its appeal to diverse audiences); and interpreters (relating the SLA to its various issues and situations and as advocates (creating more support for SLA use). The SLA has six principles that improve human welfare, namely building on strength, dynamism, comprehensive approach, macro–micro links, people-centredness, and sustainability, all covered in the empirical Chapters 6 and 7.

8.5.2 Theoretical contribution of the study

The study's theoretical contribution is threefold:

First, the capability–livelihood approach is an economic and moral framework emphasising people as active actors with assets and capabilities, which they develop to help improve their lives. Despite having assets and capabilities, some PIPs inhibit the right to a better life, hence a sustainable trading livelihood is illusionary in the current circumstances. Also, it is impossible to understand a micro business enterprise as detached from the household within its location as livelihood improvement detection and sustainability anchorage are in the household. The continued economic decline has increased street traders' vulnerability.

Second, street trading has a double burden on women. The double burden is visible in the temporality and complexity (*Kiya Kiya economy*) associated with the informal sector. Much research shows that street trading is female dominated, but in Zimbabwe, it is masculine as the economy dithers due to industrial closure (see Njaya 2014:15; Kamete, 2020). Women continue to suffer as ease-of-entry jobs like street trading becoming increasingly male-dominated, with women marginalised or elbowed. Because of patriarchal hegemony, males must fulfil family responsibilities, a marginal research aspect. However, pressure is mounting

for women to help take up family responsibilities, as males need help because of poor salaries in the informal and formal sectors.

Third, Harare has administrative, economic, judiciary, and political decision-making centres, institutions, and organisations, like the HMP and ZRP, aligned to local and central governments' aspirations of inhibiting street trading.

8.5.3 Policy significance

At the time of finalisation, the study has contributed to one paper (see Tanyanyiwa et al., 2023).

The research has three major policy implications:

First, results could guide planners and policymakers in Harare and Zimbabwe towards a coherent response to the challenges of urban livelihoods in the informal sector, for example, the need for a comprehensive Social Protection Policy and National Vending Policy (Figure 8.1).

Second, the study may impact HCC policy development, planning, and social services delivery, including the historical and contemporary national laws and by-laws influencing informal sector growth and the reasons for its evolution from the pre-colonisation epoch to date (Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7).

Third, the study influences the implementation and achievement of the SDGs within the UN Post-2015 development agenda. Potentially, the study adds value to the performance of the 17 SDGs from a Zimbabwean perspective, primarily SDGs 1, 5, 8, and 11 (UN, 2015); ILO R204 and the New Urban Agenda as in Box 8.1 and Figure 8.1.

Box 8.1 Study policy significance

- *End poverty in all its forms everywhere (SDG 1).*
- *Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (SDG 5).*
- *Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all (SDG 8).*
- *Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (SDG 11).*
- *Support urban development plans, including controlled access for the use of public space and controlled access to public natural resources for sustainable livelihoods (ILO Recommendation 204, 2020).*
- *Recognise the contribution of the working persons in the informal economy who are living at or below the poverty line. The improvement of their livelihoods, access to skills and assets, income security, legal and social protection, working conditions and representation is important (The New Urban Agenda, UN, General Assembly, 2016).*

Figure 8.1 summarises policy contribution of street trading. Although an integral part of urban landscapes, street vendors face many challenges, they are ignored as economic agents and are hurt by municipal and central government policies (politics of policy). There is poor thinking and reasoning in street trading recognition and integration in urban landscapes due to complex internal, external and structural factors (complexity of integrated approach). Street trading academic inquiry is recent. Vast scholarship in the last 40 years has demonstrated the importance of the informal economy although there is dearth in political factors that influence it (navigating theory and practise). Street governance actors require active listening skills, creativity, empathy, humility, patience and respect, to provide street traders with opportunities to express and analyse their lived experiences (facilitating participatory change). The four policy and theoretical contribution of the street trading study are part of the vulnerability context.




Figure 8.1 Policy and theoretical contribution of the street trading study

8.6 Future research direction

The study unravelled several issues outside of the scope of this study. Several studies must be conducted to address emerging issues in the informal sector and urban livelihoods. The current state of Zimbabwe's informal sector provides an opportunity for future research to rethink urban livelihood creation. The study was undertaken in Harare (the capital), one of the two metropolitan provinces or regions. Bulawayo, the second-largest city, is another metropolitan province. Replication of the study in nine other geopolitical provinces will unravel the informality extent in Zimbabwe. Possible countrywide research, including policy analysis, is essential for sustainable socioeconomic development planning. The study covered issues from informality, theoretical debates, the link between informality to urban livelihoods from a global perspective, and policy analysis. The following are targeted areas where research gaps are most extensive and the potential for further inquiry more appealing:

- Access, use, and management of vendingscapes for informal livelihoods.
- Analysing the formal–informal sector connection.
- Informal sector productivity and economic contribution.
- Informality and the quality of informal workers' livelihoods.

- Intra-informal sector linkages.
- Urbanisation and demographic change impact on informal livelihoods.

8.7 Final concluding remarks

Zimbabwe's informal sector is the “economy”, it is a survivalist and voluntarist strategy to livelihood, yet it remains berated, dismissed, fragmented, overlooked, underestimated, and untapped, including responses to ameliorate its challenges. Informality can ease inequality, poverty, and unemployment, although it is absent from economic policy formulation and analysis.

More than 94% of economically active are in the sector (ZimStats, 2021). Informality can be a micro-enterprise incubator if its challenges are minimised through an inclusive and comprehensive informal sector policy. The government uses pejorative terms, e.g., a black market that disenfranchises informality. The underestimation occurs amidst multifaceted and interconnected local and global shocks, e.g., climate change shock, corruption, economic shocks associated with the August 2023 elections, forex shortages, global economic shocks, e.g., the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Covid-19 pandemic, hyperinflation accompanied by high-interest rate, industrial decay/closure, infrastructure decay, liquidity crunch, low production in manufacturing industries, polarisation, poor corporate governance, poverty, prices and exchange rate volatility, rising inequality, sanctions imposed by the some western countries, uncertain regulatory context, unemployment and ZWL weakening (the vulnerability context).

There is no hope for street traders. After 37 years (from 1980 to 2017) under the Mugabe regime, in 2017, there was renewed hope life would be better in the so-called new dispensation under Emmerson Mnangagwa. Still, seven years into the new epoch, the economy continues to deteriorate, unemployment has increased, and so have vendors. Hence comparing the complex nature of urban livelihoods in formal and informal sectors is prudential. The formalisation debate (Chapter 3) is optional to Zimbabwe. To convert all economic activities into a projected "small enterprise" is fictitious and fallacious. Accordingly, there are better solutions than glorifying and romanticising street trading due to challenges like public space occupation. Instead, Harare thrives on a mix of formal and informal businesses that complement employment creation, income generation and production, the need for street vending criminalisation replacements.

Educational reforms are critical, from kindergarten to university. Emphasis should be on technopreneurship programmes than entrepreneurship. Education 5.0 in universities focuses on teaching, research, community service, innovation, and industrialisation, a commendable policy framework because graduates will easily venture into the MSME sector. Regrettably, policy discord exists because the government is against informality, yet it encourages youths to form SMEs (see Section 7.3.12). Informal traders should be in the streets. As an alternative, their associations should encourage them to change into off-street traders for the coexistence of diverse and complementary businesses. This approach recognises the risks faced by different entrepreneurs. Implementing mechanisms to lessen challenges in formal and informal enterprises contribute to stability. Harare should copy and emulate cities like Calcutta, Durban, and London, where street vending is an asset. Inclusive and sustainable urban planning policies help give street vending its requisite place. Finally, this study explored a nagging cityscape challenge, the informal sector. If this research has invoked the need and urgency to carry out similar studies, especially those proffered under Section 8.6 (Future research direction), it will have attained its aim.

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Appendix A

Ethical Clearance

This study received ethical approval from the General/Human Research Ethics Committee (GHREC) of the UFS – **Approval Number: UFS-HSD2019/1287**



GENERAL/HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (GHREC)

28-Aug-2019

Dear Mr Tanyanyiwa, Vincent VI

Application Approved

Research Project Title:

The urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare

Ethical Clearance number:

UFS-HSD2019/1287

We are pleased to inform you that your application for ethical clearance has been approved. Your ethical clearance is valid for twelve (12) months from the date of issue. We request that any changes that may take place during the course of your study/research project be submitted to the ethics office to ensure ethical transparency. Furthermore, you are requested to submit the final report of your study/research project to the ethics office. Should you require more time to complete this research, please apply for an extension. Thank you for submitting your proposal for ethical clearance; we wish you the best of luck and success with your research.

Yours sincerely

Prof Derek Litthauer

Chairperson: General/Human Research Ethics Committee

Digitally signed
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Explanatory Note: At the University of the Free State, permission to undertake general / human-related research application is to The General/Human Research Ethics Committee (GHREC), whose mandate is ethical review. It is after the approval that the research begins. At this point, the “Ethics Clearance Certificate” is issued by the GHREC.

Appendix B

Harare City Council Request for Permission to Conduct Research



REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Dear City of Harare/ Att: Retired Major M. Marara - Acting Human Capital Director - Human Capital & Public Safety Department

I am / We are doing research and would like to request permission to conduct our research in the Harare Central Business District (CBD)

DATE

13 September 2019

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

The Urban Livelihoods of Informal Sector Practitioners in Harare

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR / RESEARCHER(S) NAME(S) AND CONTACT NUMBER(S):

*Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa Student No. 2017042264
Contact Numbers: +263712791441/+263772373626*

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT:

*Name of Faculty: Economic and Management Sciences
Name of Department: Centre for Development Support*

STUDYLEADER(S) NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER:

*Name of Study Leader (UFS staff member) Prof. Lochner Marais
Contact number: +27 051 4012978*

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

This is a doctoral study for Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa. The study has two primary aims. First, at a theoretical level, the study investigates the value of SLA for studying the informal sector. Secondly, the assesses how vendors in Harare's CBD shape their livelihoods within the macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties context .

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa, as a Doctoral Student at The Centre for Development Support in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State, will do the research under the supervision of Prof Lochner Marais and Dr Lyndon Du Plessis. Vincent will be responsible for data collection and thesis writing .



HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?

This study received ethical approval from the General/Human Research Ethics Committee (GHREC) of the UFS.

Approval Number: UFS-HSD2019/1287

WHY ARE YOUR INSTITUTION/ORGANISATION/COMPANY INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?

City of Harare was selected to participate in the study because vendors are operating within its municipal boundaries. Overall, 70 people will participate in the research. It is important for you to know of my research presence in Harare's central business district for at least four months.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

The semi structured interviews with informal traders and representatives of key organisations will take at least 1-2 hours. The interview questions will focus on demographics, vulnerability context, assets, trading information, employment dynamics, business costs, profit/income, training and support as well as organisational affiliation. The study involves audio/video taping and direct observation.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The research aims to reflect on how informality contributes to urban livelihood realities on the ground based on the vulnerability context, livelihood assets, transforming structures and processes, livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes in the sustainable livelihoods perspective (SLA) perspective. The results may guide policy planners and makers in Zimbabwe towards a coherent response to the informal sector.

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL RISKS TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

Given the lengthy interview procedure, between 1- 2 hours, there is the possibility of fatigue. The participants will be given the option of doing the interview over more than one session. I will provide extensive information in the leaflet/ consent form that allow the participant to recuse himself/herself if he/she feels it may lead to opening up of wounds of experiences when they had skirmishes with vendors. I will fit in their daily routine of the City of Harare. Participation will be voluntary and I will slot my interviews to suite your convenient times. Thus, should you be too busy I will end the interview promptly and resume some time and or day when you will be less busy.

WILL THE INFORMATION BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Unfortunately, what the participants say cannot be ensured of confidentiality due to the unique position they are in your department to provide the information. This is related to their position as a person working in informal sector related activities in the City of Harare and their responsibility to be transparent and accountable. That said, the researcher will attempt to divorce information from the individual informant and report information as part of the larger study.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

Hard copies of the responses will be stored by the researcher for a period of five years in a locked cupboard/filing cabinet at the Zimbabwe Open University, Harare (my work place) for future research or academic purposes; electronic information will be stored on a password protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. After the five years, the hard copy notes will be destroyed by giving the stuff to a recycling company. The recorded interview will be deleted after 5 years.

WILL THERE BE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

Unfortunately, no payment nor incentives will be offered for participation in the study. But contributions are invaluable.

HOW WILL THE INSTITUTION / ORGANISATION / COMPANY BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa on +263712791441/+263772373626, Email: tanyanyiwavi@yahoo.com. The findings are accessible for life from the University of the Free State institutional repository and academic journals. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect of this study, please contact Prof. Lochner Marais at +27 051 4012978, Email: MaraisJGL@ufs.ac.za Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact Prof Derek Litthauer : Chairperson: General/Human Research Ethics Committee at +27(0)51 401 2116, Email: WitthuhnRC@ufs.ac.za


Yours sincerely



Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa

Appendix C

Harare City Council Permission to Conduct Research



Appendix D

ZRP Request for Permission to Conduct Research



REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Dear *Officer Commanding Police, Harare Central District, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) / Att: Chief Superintendent O. Mugomeri*

I am / We are doing research and would like to request permission to conduct our research at Harare Central Business District (CBD).

DATE

13 September 2019

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

The Urban Livelihoods of Informal Sector Practitioners in Harare

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR / RESEARCHER(S) NAME(S) AND CONTACT NUMBER(S):

*Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa Student Number :2017042264
Contact Numbers: +263712791441 / +263772373626*

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT:

*Name of Faculty: Economic and Management Sciences
Name of Department: Centre for Development Support*

STUDYLEADER(S) NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER:

*Name of Study Leader (UFS staff member): Prof. Lochner Marais
Contact number: +27 051 4012978*

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

This is a doctoral study for Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa. The study has two primary aims. First, at a theoretical level, the study investigates the value of SLA for studying the informal sector. Secondly, the assesses how vendors in Harare's CBD shape their livelihoods within the macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties context.

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa, as a Doctoral Student at The Centre for Development Support in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Free State, will do the research under the supervision of promotors Prof. Lochner Marais and Dr Lyndon Du Plessis. Vincent will be responsible for data collection and thesis writing.



HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?

This study received ethical approval from the General/Human Research Ethics Committee (GHREC) of the UFS.

Approval Number: UFS-HSD2019/1287

WHY ARE YOUR INSTITUTION/ORGANISATION/COMPANY INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?

City of Harare was selected to participate in the study because vendors are operating within its municipal boundaries. The ZRP and municipal police are responsible for maintaining law and order in the city. Overall, 70 people will participate in the research. Your organisation was selected to participate in the study because you have been directly or indirectly involved in the urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare. Moreso, your organisation, ZRP, is perceived have strained relations with the vendors, hence it is important to understand how you have been dealing with vendors. In addition, it is important for you to know of my research presence in Harare central business district for at least four months.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

Interviews with informal traders and representatives of key organisations will take between 1 and 2 hours. The interview questions will focus on demographics, vulnerability context, assets, trading information, employment dynamics, business costs, profit/income, training and support as well as organisational affiliation. The study involves audio/video taping and direct observation.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The research aims to reflect on how informality contributes to urban livelihood realities on the ground-based on the vulnerability context, livelihood assets, transforming structures and processes, livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes in the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLA) perspective. The results may guide policy planners and makers in Zimbabwe towards a coherent response to the informal sector.

WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL RISKS TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

Given the lengthy interview procedure (at least 2 hours will be used for the interview), there is the possibility of fatigue. Participants will be given the option of doing the interview over more than one session. I will provide extensive information in the leaflet/ consent form that allows participants to recuse themselves if they feel it may lead to opening up of wounds of experiences the organisation may have had with vendors. Participation will be voluntary and I will slot my interviews to suite the participants' convenient times. Thus, should participants be too busy I will end the interview promptly and resume some other time and date.

WILL THE INFORMATION BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Unfortunately, what participants say cannot be ensured of confidentiality due to the unique position in the Zimbabwe Republic Police to provide information. This is related to their position as a person working in informal sector related activities in Harare and their responsibility to be transparent and accountable. That said, the researcher will attempt to divorce information from the individual informant and report information as part of the larger study.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

Hard copies of responses will be stored by the researcher for a period of five years in a locked cupboard/filing cabinet at the Zimbabwe Open University, Harare (my work place) for future research or academic purposes; electronic information will be stored on a password protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. After the five years, the hard copy notes will be destroyed by giving the stuff to a recycling company. The recorded interview will be deleted after 5 years.

WILL THERE BE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

Unfortunately, no payment nor incentives will be offered for participation in the study. But contributions are invaluable.

HOW WILL THE INSTITUTION / ORGANISATION / COMPANY BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa on +263712791441/+263772373626, Email: tanyanyiwavi@yahoo.com. The findings are accessible for life at the University of the Free State institutional repository and journal publications. Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any aspect of this study, please contact Prof Lochner Marais at +27 051 4012978, Email: MaraisJGL@ufs.ac.za Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you may contact Prof Derek Litthauer : Chairperson: General/Human Research Ethics Committee at +27(0)51 401 2116, Email: WitthuhnRC@ufs.ac.za

Yours sincerely




Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa

Appendix E

Zimbabwe Republic Police Permission to Conduct Research

ZIMBABWE REPUBLIC POLICE

Official communications should not be addressed to individuals.



Reference:
HARARE CENTRAL DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS
P.O. BOX CY 154
CAUSEWAY
HARARE

PHONE : 777777
EXT:

7 October 2019


University of the Free State
205 Nelson Mandela Drive/ Rylaan Park
SOUTH AFRICA

Tel: 0712 791 441/ 0772 373 626


Attention: **Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa**

RE: PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH IN THE HARARE CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT

1. The above subject matter is pertinent.
2. Your notification letter to conduct a research from the 8th of October 2019 to the 8th of February 2020 in Harare Central Business District has been noted.
3. Please confine your research to the above stated venue outlined. Police will monitor.
4. The Regulating Authority still reserves the right to stop the research should it turn out to be a public order threat or violate any Zimbabwean laws.
5. Your co-operation with the Police and other Government agents will be greatly appreciated.
6. The provisions of section 29 of the Public Order and Security Act Chapter 11:17 will be invoked if any of the conditions stated above is violated.
7. Thank you in advance for your co-operation.


[MUGOMERI O.] Chief Superintendent
Officer Commanding Police
HARARE CENTRAL DISTRICT

/mmc



Appendix F

Research Study Information Leaflet and Consent Form (Vendors)



Research study information leaflet and consent form (Vendors)

DATE:

13 September 2019

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT:

The Urban Livelihoods of Informal Sector Practitioners in Harare

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR(S) / RESEARCHER(S) NAME(S) AND CONTACT NUMBER(S):

1. Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa Mobile: 0712791441 / 0772373626 Office Tel: 0242-781124. Email: tanyanyiwavi@yahoo.com / tanyanyiwav@zou.ac.zw

2. Professor Lochner Marais (Centre for Development Support) Mobile: 0027826787735 Office Tel: +27 051 4012978. Email: MaraisJGL@ufs.ac.za

3. Dr Lyndon du Plessis (Department of Public Administration & Management) +270514012284. Email: dplesslm@ufs.ac.za.

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT:

Name of Faculty: Economic and Management Sciences

Name of Department: Centre for Development Support

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

The study investigates the value of sustainable livelihoods analysis (SLA) for studying the informal sector. Furthermore, the study will assess how vendors in Harare's CBD shape their livelihoods within the macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties context.

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa, a researcher at The Centre for Development Support at the University of the Free State, will do the research. He will work under the supervision of Prof Lochner Marais and Dr Lyndon Du Plessis. Vincent will be responsible for data collection and writing

HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?

This study received ethical approval from the General/Human Research Ethics Committee (GHREC) of the UFS.

Approval Number: UFS-HSD2019/1287

WHY ARE YOU INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?

You were selected to participate in the study because you are a vendor in Harare. You are one of the 50 vendors randomly chosen to take part in this study. Overall, 70 people will participate in the research.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

You will participate in a semi-structured interview about urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare. The questions focus on how you create urban livelihoods in the informal sector in Harare. Interviews will take at least 2 hours. I shall conduct the interviews during working hours, but I shall not disturb your business activities as you will be able to continue to trade so that you do not lose business.

CAN THE PARTICIPANT WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY?

Participation in the research is voluntary, and there is no penalty or loss of benefit for non-participation. Being in this study is voluntary, and you are under no obligation to consent to participation. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time and without providing a reason.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The research aims to reflect on how informality contributes to urban livelihood realities on the ground based on the vulnerability context, livelihood assets, transforming structures and processes, livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes in the SLA perspective. The results may guide policy planners and makers in Zimbabwe towards a coherent response to the informal sector.

WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED INCONVENIENCE OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The interview will take at least 2 hours and will be conducted during working hours. The interview can be done at different times /days to allow you to continue working. The informed consent will be later modified to indicate the actual time taken that if that appears to be the case in practice.

WILL WHAT I SAY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Your name will not be recorded, anywhere and no one will be able to connect you to the answers you give. Your answers will be given a fictitious code number or a pseudonym and you will be referred to in this way in the data, any publications, or other research reporting methods such as conference proceedings. Your answers may be reviewed by people responsible for making sure that research is done properly, including the transcriber, external coder, and members of the Research Ethics Committee. Otherwise, records that identify you

will be available only to people working on the study, unless you give permission for other people to see the records. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

Hard copies of your answers will be stored by the researcher for a period of five years in a locked cupboard/filing cabinet at the Zimbabwe Open University, Harare (my work place) for future research or academic purposes; electronic information will be stored on a password protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. After the five years, the hard copy notes will be destroyed by giving the stuff to a recycling company . The recorded interviews will also be destroyed after 5 years .

WILL I RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

No payment will be offered for your participation.

HOW WILL THE PARTICIPANT BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa will provide feedback of the research results to all participants through a stakeholders workshop and the Doctoral Thesis will be available online through the UFS Library.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study.

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY

I, _____ (participant name), confirm that the person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the information sheet. I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty (if applicable). I am aware that the findings of this study will be anonymously processed into a research report, journal publications or conference proceedings.

I agree to the recording of the *interview*.

I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Full Name of Participant:

Signature of Participant: _____ Date: _____

Full Name(s) of Researcher(s):

Signature of Researcher: _____ Date: _____

Appendix G

Research Study Information Leaflet and Consent Form (Vendors) [in Shona]



Research study information leaflet and consent form (Vendors)

ZUVA :

13 Gunyana 2019

MUSORO WECHIDZIDZO :

Matengeserwo anoitwa nevanotengesa zvisiri pamurai mu Harare

NDANANI VARI KUTSVAKIRIDZA RUZIVO URWU :

1. Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa Mobile: 0712791441 / 0772373626 Office Tel: 0242-781124. Email : tanyanyiwavi@yahoo.com / tanyanyiwav@zou.ac.zw

2. Muzvinazivo Lochner Marais (Centre for Development Support) Mobile: 0027826787735 Office Tel: +27 051 4012978. Email: MaraisJGL@ufs.ac.za

3. Muzvinafundo Lyndon du Plessis (Department of Public Administration & Management) +270514012284. Email: dplesslm@ufs.ac.za.

VANHU AVA VARIPI :

Bazi : *Economic and Management Sciences*

Bazi diki : *Centre for Development Support*

ZVIKONZERO ZVEZVEDZIDZO ZVINO

Zvidzidzo zvandiri kuita kutsvagiridza kuti vatongesa vari panze kana zvisiri pamurawo vanorarama sei maringe nekunetsa kuri kuita hupenyu

ARI KUITA ZVIDZIDZO

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa, ari kuita zvidzidzo zvepamusoro ari ku Centre for Development Support ku University of the Free State, ku South Africa. Ari kudzidza ari pasi pa Muzvinazivo Lochner Marais namuzvinafundo Lyndon Du Plessis. Vincent ndiye achaita tsvakiridzo sezvo ariye ari kudzidza. Achazonzora gwaro rinoita kuti azadzise zvinodiwa kuti abudirire muzvidzidzo zvake.



AKAPIWA HERE BVUMO YEKUBVUNZA VANHU?

Vincent haasati atenderwa kuti aenderere mberi nekubvunzwa vanhu kusvikira aita zvinodiwa pamutemo ne university yake. Kana aita zvinodiwa achapiwa gwaro rinomutendera kuti achienderere mberi nekubvunza vanhu.

Gwaro rinotenderwa kubvunza vanhu : Chidzidzo chino chakabvumidzwa zviri pamutemo ne UFS. **Approval Number: UFS-HSD2019/1287**

SEI MURI KUBVUNZWA?

Makasarudzwanekuti muri vamwe vanotengesa. Muri mumwe wevanhu makumi mashanu vakasarudzawo muchidzidzo ichi . Mose pamwe muri makumi masere muchabvunzwa.

MUCHABVUNZWA SEI ?

Muchapindura mibvunzo kuti vanotengesa vanorarama sei kwenguva inoita awa kana maviri . Nichabvunza mibvunzo iyi muri pabasa renyu asi ndichaedza kusakukanganisai mubasa renyu ramunenge muchiita .

MUNOVBUMIDZWA HERE KUSAPINDURA MIMWE MIBVUNZO?

Kupindura kwenyu mibvunzo hakumanikidzwe kana musingade kana kusada pakati pebvunzurudzo munovumidzwa kuramba kupindura pamwe nemibvunzo yamunenge maona kuti hamudi kuipindura. Asi ndovimba munondibatsira nekupindura kwenyu.

MUCHAWANEI PAKUPINDURA MIBVUNZO ?

Hapana chamunowana kana kupiwa asi ruzivo rwenyu runogona kubatsira guta reHarare kana nyika ye Zimbabwe kuti vanotengesa vangabatsirwe sei kuti zvinyatsoyendeka .

MUCHAPEDZA NGUVA YAKADII MUCHIBVUNZWA ?

Maawa maviri kana rimwe.

ZVANDICHATAURA ZVICHAUDZWA VANHU HERE ?

Zita renyu harinyorwe kana musingade uye zvamutaura hazviiswe pazita renyu kusara kweve kuuniversity vanoongorora kuti chidzidzo ichi chaakaitwa nemazvo here. Magwaro anobuda pachidzidzo ichi haafe akaburitsa zita renyu.

ZVAMATAURA ZVICHACHENGETWA SEI UYE ZVOZORASWA RIINI ?

Mapepa ezvamataura achachengetwa kwemakore mashanu akakiirwa kubasa kwangu panovhura neni chete uye kana ari pacomputer hapana anoawona kusara kwangu ndenga nokuti ndichaapfigira. Kana ndichida kuzoita zvidzidzo zvimwe ndokumbirazve ku university kuti vaongorore maitiro andinenge ndaronga kuda kuita. Mapepa Emubvunzo achazoendeswa

kune makamabani anoita nezvikugadzirisa mapepa patsva kuti abvarurwe kwapera makore mashanu.

NICHABAHADHARWA HERE KANA NDABVUNZWA ?

Hapana mubhadharwo zvachose

NDICHAUDZWA SEI ZVABUDA MUCHIDZIDZO CHINO ?

Vincent achanyora gwaro re pamusorosoro iro richazotsanangurira imimi kana vanwe venyu kuti chii chaakawana uyezve magwaro aya achawanikwa pasi rose painternet ne library ye University of the Free State.

Maita basa zvikuru nekupindura mibvunzo yangu.

BVUMO YEKUBVUNZURUDZWA

Inini _____ (zita), ndaudzwa zvose maringe nezvechidzidzo ichi chiri kuitwa, zvandichawana uye kukanganisika pabasa rangu pandinenge ndichibvunzwa.

Ndaverenga uye ndatsanangurirwa ndikazeya zvazvineveva.Ndzabvunzwa mibvunzo yezvandanga ndisinga kunyatsa kunzwa ndikawana nguva yekuzeya kuti ndobvunzwa here. Ndinoziva kuti handimanikidzwe kudaira mibvunzo kana ndisingade uyezve hapana chandinozoiwa kana ndaramba kubvunzwa.Ndizoziva kuti pane magwaro achabuda mutsvakiridzo ino uyezve anogona kutsanangurirwa vamwe vanhu pakafanira asi zita rangu risingabude .

Ndinobvuma kutapwa zvandiri kutauro

Ndapiwa gwaro rekunyora kuti ndabvuma kubvunzwa

Mazita akazara eaibvunzwa:

Signature : _____ Zuva : _____

Mazita akazara eaibvunza:

Signature yeabvunza : _____ Zuva : _____

Appendix H

In-Depth Interview Schedule for Vendors



In-Depth interview schedule for vendors

<u>Date of Interview</u>	
<u>Time of Interview</u>	
<u>Result / Remarks</u>	

a) Observable information (these questions do not need to be asked)

1. Gender: Male /Female
2. Fixed or Mobile post: Fixed / Mobile
3. Population Group: 1. African/ Black 2. Coloured 3. Indian/ Asian 4. White 5. Other
4. The appearance of the location of trade: open / covered
5. Goods are sold from/displayed:(*multiple responses allowed*)

b) Demographics

6. Marital status
7. Educational status?
8. The language you speak at home.
9. Where were you born: village / town / city?
10. In which country is that located
11. Which suburb do you live in?
12. Highest level of education completed?
13. What is your household size?
14. Do you own your house?
15. How many children and dependents do you have? Fill box below

Age Group (Years)	Number of Children	Other dependents (not children)	Total
0-7			
8-13			
14-19			



20-24			
25+			

16. Explain how you got involved (the history) in street vending? Why did you get involved? What helped you to start and what were hurdles you had to overcome

c). Vulnerability context

17. Do you feel that your wealth is growing or declining? Give a reason for your answer.
18. Do you face competition from fellow vendors? Give a reason for your answer
19. Is the number of vendors increasing/decreasing? Give a reason for your answer
20. Do you suffer any violence? What and by whom?
21. How reliable is the source of supply for the products that you sell? Explain the answer
22. What are some of the unforeseen shocks/disruption that you encounter in your business? How do you plan to counter these shocks or disruptions?
23. Do you think you can sell more, less or the same amount of products/services compared with this time last year? Explain your answer?
24. Do you think you can charge higher prices compared with this time last year? Explain your answer.
25. Do you think your supplies have become more expensive compared with this time last year? Explain your answer
26. Do you believe more people are buying the products/services that you sell compared with this time last year? Explain your answer
27. Do you think more people are selling the products/services that you sell compared with this time last year? Explain your answer
28. What are your most significant business risks? Explain?

d). Assets

29. What helped you to set up this enterprise? For example, what role did your friends, neighbours, family play? How did your previous work or experience help you in this respect? Did you have some business assets? Did you have land or property?
30. Where did you get the capital to start?
31. What are the assets on which your enterprise depends? List them. Think about both



e). Trading information

32. What were you doing before vending?
33. Why did you become a vendor? Explain
34. What are the primary good (s) or service(s) you sell? Why did you decide on these?
35. Do you have access to running water at or near your vending site? If yes, how many metres away is the water point from your stall?
36. Do you have access to a toilet? If yes, how many metres away is the bathroom from your stall?
37. Do you have access to storage for your goods? If yes, how many metres away do you store your products from your stall?
38. How do you ensure that this space is available?
39. Do you trade in any other locations? Why? Why not?
40. If yes, do you sell the same service(s) /good(s) in each location / stall? Specify
41. Do you intend to expand your business and why?
42. What is the role of the 1) CoH 2) police and 3) government in your daily operations?
43. What are their impacts/ consequences of these three to your business?
44. Are you aware of any regulations for informal activities in the CoH? If, yes, what are these?
45. Has compliance with regulations been costly to your business? Explain your answer.
46. Has the CoH allocated you alternative vending space?
47. What challenges do you face while working here or trading from this space? (Tick all that apply

Arbitrary arrests	
Confiscation of goods	
Political victimisation	
Thefts	
Threats of violence	
Workspace invasions	
Other (specify)	

48. What strategies have you implemented to counter the challenges you encounter?

f). Employment dynamics

49. How many hours do you work per day?

50. In this business, how would you describe yourself, i.e., self-employed, assistant employer?
51. What ancillary services (carriers, lunch/delivery services, porters, repair security /guards storage facilities), etc. do you use in the running of the business?
52. How many other people work and assist this business? (Specify the number)
53. Who are the primary buyers of your goods or services? Why do they buy from you?
54. Which of these benefits do you have?

Benefits	Tick	Benefits	Tick
Childcare services		Paid vacation	
Housing		Pension funds	
Loans		Subsidized housing	
Medical aid		Transportation	
Medical facilities on site		Other	
Paid sick leave			

g). Business costs

55. Who allocated this space to you?
56. . Do you pay to trade in this space? If yes, how much do you pay?
57. About how much do you pay per month for services related to this space such as security, electricity, water, and or sanitation services?
58. How much do you spend per month on purchases for your business, such as stock?
59. Where do you buy or obtain the stock for the service(s) and/or goods that you sell? (Multiples responses)
60. How much would it cost you to replace all of your current stock? (Specify amount in RTGS dollars)
61. Are there other costs associated with the running of this business that we have not mentioned? (Specify amount)

h). Profit/income

62. Do the earnings that you make as a trader come in the form of a salary, profits or wages, etc.
63. If you are an employee, what is wage /salary? (Specify amount in RTGS dollars)
64. In an average week, how much in RTGS do you sell? (Turnover) Specify the amount in RTGS dollars)

65. In an average week, when you have paid all business costs, how much money do you take home? (Profit) Specify the amount in RTGS dollars)
66. On average, when sales are low, how much do you make per day? Specify the amount in RTGS dollars)
67. On average, when sales are high, how much do you make per day? Specify the amount in RTGS dollars)
68. How many people are dependent on what you earn? Specify number.
69. Which months during the year do you have sales that you would consider "high", "average" or "low"? (for each row, tick as appropriate)

	Jan	Feb	Marc	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
High													
Average													
Low													

70. Why are the sales low, average or high during those months?
- 71.

i). Training and support

72. Are there any other income earners in your household? If yes, how many?
73. If there are there how much income do, they bring to the household and or business?
74. Have you ever received support for your business from the government? If yes, explain

j). Organisation Affiliation

75. Are you aware of any street vendor organisations?
76. Are you a member of a street trader organisation or association? Why? Why not
77. If yes, do you pay membership fees?
78. How do these organisations help you?
79. Do you have a trading permit issued by the CoH?

Appendix I

In-Depth Interview Schedule for Vendors [in Shona]



Bvunzurudzo kune vanotengesa panze

Zuva rekubvunza	
Nguvai yabvunzwa	
Zvabuda pabvunzurudzo	

a) Zviripekutengesera (zvinoonekewa asi tisingabvunze)

1. Mukadzi here kana murume ?
2. Vanotengesera panzvimbo imwe chete here kana kuti vanofambafamba
3. Munhuyi ari kutengesa African/ Black 2. Coloured 3. Indian/ Asian 4. White 5. Other
4. Zvimbo yakavharwa here kana kuti iri pachena?
5. Zvinhu zvinotengeswa zvakaiswa pachena here

b) Umboo pamusoro penyu

6. Makore ekuberekwa
7. Makaroora or Kuroorwa here?
8. Mutauro wamunotaura kumba
9. Ndekupi kwamakazvarirwa: dunhu / dhorobha?
10. Inowanikwa munyika ipi
11. Dhorobha ramunogara nderipi?
12. Danho repamusoro redzidzo ramakaita?
13. Mhuri yenyu yakakura zvakadini?
14. Mune musha here wamakavaka mudhorobha?
15. Mune vana vangani vanmunogara navo pamwe nekuriritira? Zadzisai mhinduro pabhokisi riripazasi maererano nemuvhunzo uno.



Makore ekuberekwa (Years)	Vana Vangani	Vamwe vanhu vamunoriritira (vasiri vana venyu)	Vose Pamwe
0-7			
8-13			
14-19			
20-24			
25+			

16. Tsanangudzai nhoroondo yenyu , yemamapindiro nematangiromo amakaita bhizimusi rezve kutengesa mumigwagwa? Chii chakanyanyo kuitai kuti mupinde mubhizimusi iri ? Ndiani akakubatsirai uye zve ndezvipi zvikoneso nematambudziko amakasanganidzana nawo pakutanga basa iri?

c). Zvakakomberedzayi

17. Makatarisa pfuma yamunayo muhupenyu, mungati irikuwedzera here kana kuti irikudzikira? Ipai tsanangudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu.
18. Pabasa renyu rekutengesa pane kukwikwidzwa nevamwevanotengesa kuripo here? Ipai tsananagudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu.
19. Huhwandu hwevari mubhizimusi rekutengesa mimigwagwa semi hurikuwedzera here kan kudzikira? Ipai tsanangudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu
20. Munombosanganidzana nehondo or mhirizhonga pabasa renyu? Mhirizhonga iyi inokonzera nei? Uye nani?
21. Kwamutenga midziyozvamunotengesa, ingava kambani kana misika kana vanhu, kwakavimbika here? Ipai tsanangudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu
22. Ndezvipi zvinhingamupinyi kana kuti zvikoneso zvamunosangana nazvo mubhizimusi renyu? Ndeapi mazano kana nzira dzamunotarisa kukunda nadzo?
23. Munofunga kuti munokwanisa kutengesa midziyo kana zvinhu zvakawandisa kana zvakadupikisa kudarika zvegore rakapfura here? Ipai tsananagudzo zvizere yehinduro yenyu.



24. Munofunga kuti mungakwidza mitengo yezvamunotengesa gore rino , kudarika mitengo yegore rakapfura? Ipai tsanangudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu.
25. Kwamutenga zvinhu zvenyu, mitengo yakakwira here muchiyenzanisa neyegore rakapfura? Ipai tsananagudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu.
26. Nemaonero enyu , mungati vanhu varikutenga zvinhu zvamunotengesa vawanda here kana kuti vashomeka, muchipima negore rakapfura? Ipai tsanangudzo zvizere yemafungiro enyu.
27. Ndeapi matambudziko anonyanya kuremera bhizimusi renyu. Ipai tsanangudzo izere yemhinduro yenyu.

d). Hupfumi

28. Chii chakakubatsirai zvakananyanya pakutanga bhizimusi renyu? Nderipi danho ramayamurwa pakutanga bhizimusi renyu neshamwari, vavakidzanehama pakutanga bhizimusi? Ruzivo rwamunarwo kubva kunemabasa kan basa remaoko rwamakamboshanda kare rakabatsira padano ripi pabhizimusi renyu iri ranhasi? Maiva nemidziyo kana pfuma here musati matanga bhizimusi renyu iri rekutengesa?Maiva nepfuma kana kuti musha kana midziyo yenyu yepfuma here musati matanga bhizimusi rekutengesa iri?
29. Makaiwanepi pfuma yekutanga bhizimusi renyu rekutengesa mumigwagwa?
30. Ndeipi pfuma, midziyo kana kuti zvakanakosha zvinodiwa pakutanga bhizimusi rekutengesa? Domai nekutsanangudza zvose zvamunofungira zvodiwa.

e). Matengesero amunoita

31. Maiita basa ripi kumashure kwekutanga kutengesa mumigwagwa uku?
32. Sei makasarudza kuita bhizimusi rekutengesa? Tsanangurai zvizere.
33. Ndeipi midziyo kana zvinhu zvamunogara muchitengesa? Nemhaka yei makasarudza kutengesa zvinhu izvi? Tsanangurai zvizere
34. Mune mvura yemupombi here pamunotengesera? Kana iripo, irikure zvakadii kubva pamunotengesera muri?

35. Mune chimbuzi here pedyo nepamunotengesera? Kana chiripo chirikure zvakadini, kubva pamunotengesera muri?
36. Mune pekuchengetera here zvinhu zvamutengesera? Kana paripo, parikure zvakadini nepamunoshandira muri?
37. Ndezvipi zvamunoita kana nzira dzamunoronga nadzo kuti pamunoshandira pachengetedzeka parambe paripo?
38. Mune dzimwe nzvimbo here dzamunotengesera muri? Kana dziripo nemhaka yei munadzo? Kana musina ,nemhaka yei musina?
39. Kana mhinduro yenyu iri hongu kumuvhunzo 39, munotengesera zvinhu zvimwechete here panzvimbo dzamunotengesera .
40. Mune tarisiro yekuwedzera nekutambanudza bhizimusi renyu here? Tsanangudzai zvizere mhinduro yenyu.
41. Ndeipi betsero or dziviso iripo kubasa renyu pazuva roga roga kubva kune bato re 1) Kanzuru 2) Mapurisa 3) Hurumende
42. Mabato ataurwa pamusoro pamuvhunza pa42, ndezvipi zvavanobetsera kana zvavanodzivisa kubhizimusi renyu?
43. Mune ruzivo rwamunarwo here maererano nemitemo iripo yakaringana nemabasa evanotengesera panze remaoko maringe nekanzuru yeHarare? Kana muine ruzivo , ndeipi mitemo yamunoziva
44. Pane dziviso iripo here kubhizimusi renyu , pakutevedza mitemo yakaiswa maringe nebasa renyu. Tsanangurai zvizere.
45. Kanzuru yeHarare yakakupai here dzimwe nzvimbo dzekutengesera?
46. Ndeapi matambudziko amurikutarisana nawo muchitengesera pamunotengesera muri? (Sarudzai mhinduro dzose dzoenderana nemi)

Kungosungwa pese pese	
Kutorerwa zvinhu zvamunotengesera	
Kudzvanyirirwa kana kutyisidzirwa neve zvevatongerero enyika	
Kubirwa	
Kutyisidzirwa nenhau yekurohwa	

Kuvhiringidzirwa nzvimbo dzekutengesera	
Kana paine zvimwe (Tsanangurai zvizere)	

47. Ndedzipi nzira dzamurikushandisa kukunda matambudziko amurikusangana nawo pabasa renyu muchitengesera?

f). Vamunoshanda navo nevanokushandirai

48. Munoshanda nguva yakadii pazuva?
49. Mubhizimusi renyu, mungazviti muri mushandi akazvimirira kana kuti muri mutedzeri wewamunoshandira?
50. Ndevapi vamwe vanhu (vangava vanokuigirai zvamunotengesera, vanokubetsera kutakura, vanokuchengetera zvinhu zvamunotengesera), vanokuyamurai pakufambisa bhizimusi renyu zvakanaka?
51. Pane vanhu vanganiwo vanokubatsirai pabhizimusi renyu rekutengesera?
52. Ndevapi vanhu vanotenga zvamunotengesera? Semafungiro enyu sei muchitengerwa neivavo ?
53. Pazvinhu zvinotevera zviripazasi ndezvipi zvamuwana kubva kubasa renyu ?

Zvamunowana	Hongu/kwete	Zvamunowana	Hongu/kwete
Kuchengeterwa vana		Kubhadharwa muri pazororo	
Kupiwa imba/pokugara		Mari yemudya ndigere	
zvikereti		Kubatsirwa nepekugara	
Kubatsirwa pakurwara		Kubatsirwa pakufamba	
Kurapwa pamunoshandira		<i>Zvimwewo</i>	
Kubhadharwa kana warwara			

g). Mari yamunobuditsa pakushanda

54. Ndiani akakusarudzirai nzvimbo pamunotengesera muri?

55. Munobhadhara here mari kuti mutengese muri panzvimbo yamunotengesera muri?
Kana muchibhadhariswa, munobhadhara marii?
56. Munobhadhara mari yakawanda zvakadini kuitira kuchengerwa zvinhu zenyu ,
magetsi, mvura kana zvimbuzi zvamunoshandisa pamwedzi?
57. Munoshandisa mari yakawanda zvakadini pamwedzi pakutenga zvinhu
zvamunotenegesa?
58. Munotengepi zvinhu zvamuzotengesa pamisika yenyu?
59. Mungada mari yakawanda sei, kuti mutsive zvinhu zvenyu zvose zvamunotengesa
(Nyorai mari yacho muma RTGS)
60. Pane zvimwe here zvinodikanwa pakufambisa bhizimusi renyu rekutengesa here
zvamusina kutsanangura?

h). Zvamunokohwa pakutengesa

61. Mari dzamunokohwa pakutengesa kwenyu munodziwana semugove wepamwedzi ,
here kana kuti musi wega wega ?
62. Kana murimushandi pakutengesa kwenyu mari yamunowana semugove wepamwedzi
kana musi wega wega imarii?(mari iri mu RTGS dollars)
63. Musvondo rimwe , munowana mari yakawanda zvakadii pakutengesa kwenyu? (mari
iri mu RTGS)
64. Pasvondo mushure mekubhadhara mari dzose dzinodikanwa pabhizimusi,
munosarirwa nemarii yamunoenda nayo seyenyu? (in RTGS dollars)
65. Kana bhizimusi renyu rakati dzikirei ,munoita mari yakakura zvakadini pazuva? (in
RTGS dollars)
66. Kana bhizimusi rakati kwirei, munoita mari yakakura zvakadini pazuva? (in RTGS
dollars)
67. Vanhu vangani vamunoriritira nemari yamunowana pakutengesa kwenyu ?
68. Ndeipi mwedzi yamunotarisa kuva nebhizimusi rakati kwirirei pagore muchitarisa
mari dzamunoita pagore, Pindura pazasi kuti, ndepapi panenge bhizimusi parakwirira,
kudzikirira nekuva pakati nepakati pazasi.

	Ja	Fe	Mar	Ap	Ma	Ju	Ju	Au	Sep	Oc	No	De	Tota
	n	b	c	r	y	n	l	g	t	t	v	c	l

Zvakati wande													
Pakati nepakati													
Zvishom a													

69. Pamwedzi yamanyora kuti bhizimusi rinenge rakadzikira kana kuva pakati nepakati, kana zvishoma tsanagurai zvizere kuti sei zvichidaro pamwedzi iyoyo?

i). Ruzivo rwebasa ramunoita

- 70. Muimba yenyu pane vamwe here vane mabasawo avanoshanda kuti vawane pfuma? Kana varipo vangani?
- 71. Kana varipo pamhinduro se muvhunzo 71, vanohora mari yakawanda zvakadini yavanouya nayo kubva kumabasa avo?
- 72. Mune rubatsiro here rwamunowana kubva kuhurumende, kana rwuripo, tsanagurai zvizere?

j). Mapazi ehurumende kana akazvimirira oga anokubatsirai mukushanda kwenyu

- 73. Pane mabato here amunoziva anomirira zvichemo zvevatengesi?
- 74. Pane bato here rezvevatengesi ramuri? Kana riripo, nemhaka yei murimo? Kana musirimo nemhaka yei musiri?
- 75. Kana muri mubato revezvekutengesa, panemari here dzamunobhadhariswa?
- 76. Mabato aya anokubatsirai papi uye nei mubhizimusi renyu?
- 77. Mune gwaro here rekanzuru rinokutenderai kutengesa kwamunoita?
- 78. Sei munaro kana kusafa naro
- 79. Zvimwewo zvamungade kutaura



Appendix J

Research Study Information Leaflet and Consent Form for Key Informant Interviews



Research study information leaflet and consent form (KII)

DATE:

13 September 2019

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT:

The Urban Livelihoods of Informal Sector Practitioners in Harare

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR(S) / RESEARCHER(S) NAME(S) AND CONTACT NUMBER(S):

1. *Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa Mobile: 0712791441 / 0772373626 Office Tel: 0242-781124. Email: tanyanyiwavi@yahoo.com / tanyanyiwav@zou.ac.zw*

2. *Professor Lochner Marais (Centre for Development Support) Mobile: 0027826787735. Office Tel: +27 051 4012978. Email: MaraisJGL@ufs.ac.za*

3. *Dr. Lyndon du Plessis (Department of Public Administration & Management) Office Tel: +270514012284. Email: dplesslm@ufs.ac.za.*

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT:

Name of Faculty: Economic and Management Sciences

Name of Department: Centre for Development Support

WHAT IS THE AIM / PURPOSE OF THE STUDY?

The study investigates the value of sustainable livelihoods analysis (SLA) for studying the informal sector. Furthermore, the study will assess how vendors in Harare's CBD shape their livelihoods within the macroeconomic and regulatory uncertainties context.

WHO IS DOING THE RESEARCH?

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa, a Doctoral Candidate in The Centre for Development Support at the University of the Free State, will do the research. He will work under the supervision of Prof Lochner Marais and Dr Lyndon Du Plessis. Vincent will be responsible for data collection and thesis writing



HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL?

This study received ethical approval from the General/Human Research Ethics Committee (GHREC) of the UFS.

Approval Number: UFS-HSD2019/1287

WHY ARE YOU INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT?

You are one of the 20 key informants purposively sampled to take part in the study, i.e. the ideas you will give are essential to the issues under study. Overall, 70 people will participate in the research. You were selected to participate in the study because you have been directly or indirectly involved in the urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY?

You will participate in a semi-structured interview about urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare. The questions focus on the how urban livelihoods are created in the informal sector in Harare. Interviews will take between 1 and 2 hours. These interviews will be conducted during working hours and are deemed part of your work.

CAN THE PARTICIPANT WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY?

Participation in the research is voluntary, and there is no penalty or loss of benefit for non-participation. Being in this study is voluntary, and you are under no obligation to consent to participation. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The research aims to reflect on how informality contributes to urban livelihood realities on the ground-based on the vulnerability context, livelihood assets, transforming structures and processes, livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes in the sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) perspective. The results may guide policy planners and makers in Zimbabwe towards a coherent response to the informal sector.

WHAT IS THE ANTICIPATED INCONVENIENCE OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?

The interview will take approximately 1-2 hours and will be conducted during in working hours.

WILL WHAT I SAY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL?

Unfortunately, what you say cannot be ensured of confidentiality due to the unique position you are in your department to provide the information. This is related to your position as a person working in informal sector related activities in Harare and your responsibility to be transparent and accountable. That said, the researcher will attempt to divorce information from the individual informant and report information as part of the larger study.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE STORED AND ULTIMATELY DESTROYED?

Hard copies of your answers will be stored by the researcher for a period of five years in a locked cupboard/filing cabinet at the Zimbabwe Open University, Harare (my work place) for future research or academic purposes; electronic information will be stored on a password protected computer. Future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if applicable. After the five years, the hard copy notes will be destroyed by giving the stuff to a recycling company. The recorded interviews will also be destroyed after 5 years.

WILL I RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?

No payment will be offered for your participation.

HOW WILL THE PARTICIPANT BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS / RESULTS OF THE STUDY?

Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa will provide feedback of the research results to all participants through a stakeholders workshop and the Doctoral Thesis will be available online through the UFS Library.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study.

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY

I, _____ (participant name), confirm that the person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.

I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the information sheet. I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty (if applicable). I am aware that the findings of this study will be anonymously processed into a research report, journal publications or conference proceedings.

I agree to the recording of the *interview*.

I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Full Name of Participant:

Signature of Participant: _____ Date: _____

Full Name(s) of Researcher(s):

Signature of Researcher: _____ Date: _____

Appendix K

In-Depth Interview Schedule for Key Informants



In-Depth Interview schedule for key informants

Date of Interview	
Time of Interview	
Result / Remarks	

Questions were not precisely similar for the different interviewees; they included (but were not limited to):

Questions for Land/Shop Owners

1. What is the relationship between you and vendors?
2. Do you think it is good for them to use spaces close to your shop?
3. If you were asked to permanently allow them to conduct their businesses in front of your shop/building, what will be your reaction? And why?
4. Can you explain the type of disputes which occur between you and the informal livelihood operators, and how do you solve these disputes?
5. When the CoH evict vendors, do you feel their absence?
6. How does it affect your business?
7. When agreeing with the informal livelihood operators, which regulations protect your agreement?

Questions for CoH

1. What is your role in managing informal activities?
2. How many markets are you planning to build to accommodate the informal activities?
3. How do you relate to the informal operators and their organisations?
4. What are the main criteria used to approve space for informal livelihood activities?
5. Is it possible to meet the demand for space?
6. What actions are in place to address the issue of impacts of informal livelihood activities?

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7. How are spaces for informal livelihood activities controlled? Are control measures effective?
8. How are the permits for space issued and what criteria are used to consider an application for space?
9. How long is the permit valid and how many times can you renew it?
10. What are the primary considerations for rejecting a permit?
11. To what extent do you think that the existing regulations and standards for informal livelihood activities are appropriate, given the social-economic characteristics of the people living in Harare?
12. Which regulations do you think are unsuitable and need to be reconsidered?
13. Why do spaces allocated for informal livelihood activities lack necessary infrastructure?
14. What are the main reasons behind the competition for space in the city centre?
15. Based on your experience, what areas are more suitable for informal livelihood activities?
16. What is your position to new spaces invaded by the informal livelihood operators? And how do you deal with such people? And why?
17. What do you think is the best way to address the issues concerning informal livelihood activities?

Questions for operators' association

1. How many members are there in your association?
2. What services do you provide to your members?
3. How are you involved in the market management team?
4. How are you involved with CoH?
5. What problems do you face in your day-to-day operations?
6. How do you solve these challenges?
7. What plans do you have for vendors?

Appendix L

Semi-Structured Interviewees and Justification for their Selection



Semi-Structured Interviewees and the Justification for their Selection

Key Informant(s)	No	Reason(s) for selection
City of Harare (CoH)	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinating and implementing government programmes • Enforcement of bylaws: allocation of vending sites and related issues such as refuse collection • Monitoring, evaluating, organising and implementing measures for the conservation, improvement and management of resources in the city • Planning and implementing social and economic development activities • Exercising any other functions, including legislative functions
Councillor	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The administrative role, decide how the council should carry out its work and spend money on local services (Developing council policy) • Advisory role/communicate council decisions to residents as part of local governance (Representation) • Legislative role – interpretation of bylaws (Code of conduct and standards) • Managing service delivery in communities (Community leadership). • Represent their ward constituency (planning, consultation and regulation). • Supervision of the implementation of actual tangible deliverables, e.g. refuse collection
Harare Residents' Trust (HRT)	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowering citizens to demand accountability from council leadership and service providers. • Enhancing the capacity of council officials to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry. • Facilitating engagement among council officials, service providers and the citizenry to improve standards of living in Harare Metropolitan Province • Monitoring and auditing the performance of service providers so that they deliver quality and affordable services to the citizenry.

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Heads of Religious Organizations: Catholic & Methodist	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of food aid in times of needy • Running advocacy and or / empowerment programmes • Spiritual healing to those affected by calamities
Member of Parliament(MP)	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acting as a lobbyist for local interest groups • Giving assistance and advice • Initiation/ Implementation of development projects • Planning, developing, scrutinising and discussing policies • Playing an active community role
Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In charge of all local government /local authorities • Planning and development authority at a local level. • Provides national governments' directives and plans at a local level.
Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring that infrastructural facilities, investment and marketing opportunities for MSMEs are developed through maintaining a data bank of these. Facilitating linkages and business consultancy between large enterprises and MSMEs • Formulation and implementation of policies for micro, small and medium enterprises as well as administering the micro, small and medium enterprises development fund. MSMEs. • Promotion, coordination and monitoring innovative financing schemes for micro, small and medium enterprises • Provision of skill and management training that support entrepreneurship and growth of
National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NAVUZ)	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination of vending lobby and advocacy initiatives • Developing and strengthening trade capacities among vendors • Education and public awareness of climate change • Promotion and enhancing vendors' participation in national policy, legislative and economic processes • Provision of legal and social safety nets for vendors
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of food aid • Funding • Run advocacy and educational programmes • Urban development programs on urban livelihoods

Research Institutions	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research and information dissemination • Repositories of vending/ informality data
Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO)	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assisting decent workspace by providing factory shells, office space, artisan hives and vendor marts. • Generating linkages and value chain integration for SMEs • Guaranteeing SME access to appropriate financial products from SEDCO • Providing capacity building products such as training and mentoring according to SME capacity gaps • Pursuing partnerships that benefit SME
Vendors	50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are responsible for sourcing and selling wares and in some cases responsible for producing wares as well • These are the practitioners where this study is based upon
Zimbabwe Republic Police	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement of law and order • Investigating crime and apprehending criminals • Arresting criminals and suspects • Protecting state and individual property.
Total	70	

Appendix M

Structured Observation Guide / Schedule



Participant Observation Guide / Schedule

Date	Observation	Remarks
Day 1	Physical setting –The characteristics of spaces used by vendors: accessibility, adequacy, cleanliness, etc.	Accessibility of the place to buyers, cleanliness as well as the size
Day 2	Objects and material culture. The presence, placement, and arrangement of vendors and how this impact on their behaviour	How do the vendors arrange themselves to attract customers- any material and cultural objects
Day 3	Use of language listening to what is said, how is it being said as well as the tone of the conversations with potential customers.	How do vendors speak with potential customers
Day 4	Behaviour cycles – documentation of repetitive vendor behaviours	What are some of the behaviours that are repeated and why?
Day 5	The order in which events unfold. Sequential patterns of vending patterns and behaviour and their significance.	What are the emerging patterns in terms of items sold and the frequency of buyers?
Day 6	Physical characteristics of vendors, e.g. age, gender, merchandise, clothing, etc.	Anything that might indicate membership in groups or subpopulations of interest to the study, such as profession, social status, socio-economic class, religion, or ethnicity. How do vendors look, exhausted, lively, etc.?
Day 7	Expressive body movements, e.g. body posture or facial expressions and how they support or contradict the language used in conversation	How is non-verbal communication used in the vending business?
Day 8	Systematic description of the "Five W's of investigative reporting are: What - The temporal, physical, and social boundaries enacted to limit vending Where - background information about the informal sector activities	What are the noticeable social boundaries, any interference of vending space? How is the current situation enhancing or destroying vending?



	<p>When - Factual data about the day, i.e. the beginning and ending time of vending and related activities</p> <p>Who - Background and demographic information about vendors, e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, and any other variables</p> <p>Why – what factors created the current situation?</p>	
Day 9	Verbal behaviour and interactions- Who speaks to whom and for how long; who initiates interaction; languages or dialects that are spoken; the tone of voice	Noticeable dynamics of interaction with fellow vendors and customers
Day 10	Physical behaviour and Gestures- what people do, who does what, who interacts with whom, who is not interacting	How people use their bodies and voices to communicate different emotions; what individuals' behaviours indicate about their feelings toward one another, their social rank, or their profession
Day 11	Personal space- How close people stand to one another	What individuals' preferences concerning personal space suggest about their relationships
Day 12	Human traffic -People who enter, leave, and spend time at the observation site	Where people enter and exit; how long they stay; who they are (ethnicity, age, gender); whether they are alone or accompanied; the number of people
Day 13	People who stand out - Identification of people who receive a lot of attention from others	The characteristics of these individuals; what differentiates them from others; whether people consult them, or they approach other people; whether they seem to be strangers or well known by others present

N/B Observation will be done in all fieldwork locations

Appendix N

Summary of Phases in the Generic Process of Qualitative Data Analysis



Summary of the Phases in the Generic Process of Qualitative Data Analysis

Phase 1

- Consolidating and preparing the data through transcription of audio data, typing up field notes, or sorting and arranging the data into different types according to the sources of information;
- Reading all the data and reflecting on the general tone of meaning; and
- Coding data to create meaning out of it by using text data, pictures and images. Codes are essential for labelling, compiling, labelling and organising data. Data integration into emerging themes then follows through summary and synthesis, i.e. the basis for analysis. Coding is done through assigning a colour, number, phrase, symbol and word for the particular coding group.

Phase 2

Initial Coding will be done by creating many codes as I read through responses. Data that are related are banded together.

Phase 3

Focused coding-allows for the review of codes and removing the not so popular ones and combining related ones where possible or sub diving the codes should there be large numbers for a specific code.

Phase 4

- Reading the collected and recorded data and reflecting upon it;
- Initiating meanings from the data;
- Creating topics by clustering relevant data;
- Abbreviating the topics as codes, what are the emerging themes;
- Assembling of relevant topics together; and
- Gathering similar data material into a defined category.

Phase 5

- Developing themes and sub-themes (i.e. active statements) as part of the analysis;
- Applying themes, i.e. attaching them to chunks of the actual text. and connecting them to theory;
- Themes can come for data (inductive approach) before the theoretical understanding of vending and urban livelihoods;
- Themes can also come from features of the phenomenon under study (deductive approach); and
- Open coding is discovering themes as espoused by grounded theorists while latent coding / qualitative analysis as supported by content analysts.

Phase 6

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For working themes, the following techniques will be used:

- Written material, i.e. pawing through texts;
- Transcribing data in recorded audio;
- Numerous replications make a major theme;
- Omitted data, i.e. contrary to theme identification;
- Indigenous categories/ typologies are local words used and how familiar they are;
- Identification of metaphors, i.e. behaviours and experiences; and
- Relationships across units of data, i.e. similarities and differences

Appendix O

Street Vendor (SV) Profiles

SV	Age	Gender	Education	Marital status	Housing	Dependents	Business Type	Experience	Working hours /day	Major challenge
1	32	M	Form 4	single	tenant	5	change money	2	11	arbitrary arrests
2	37	F	Form 4	married	tenant	5	vegetables	13	7	arbitrary arrests
3	36	M	Form 4	married	tenant	6	confectionary/cigarettes	26	13	goods confiscations
4	20	F	Form 4	single	tenant	3	vegetables	4	7	arbitrary arrests
5	40	M	Form 4	married	tenant	4	vegetables	3	8	goods confiscations
6	42	M	Form 4	married	owner	5	clothing	8	11	arbitrary arrests
7	43	F	Form 4	married	tenant	6	stationary //toys	10	12	goods confiscation
8	33	F	Form 4	married	tenant	5	stationary	13	11	arbitrary arrests
9	29	F	Grade 7	single	parents house	5	fruits	1	10	arbitrary arrests
10	24	M	Form 3	married	tenant	4	stationary /toys	5	13	goods confiscations
11	27	F	Form 4	married	tenant	2	diapers / chocolates	3	6	arbitrary arrests
12	38	M	Form 4	married	tenant	3	sweets/ towels	8	13	arbitrary arrests
13	34	F	Form 2	divorced	tenant	3	women's lotions	5	9	arbitrary arrests
14	22	M	Form 6	single	parents house	2	cellphone accessories	2	7	arbitrary arrests
15	44	F	Form 2	married	owner	7	sweets, maputi, cigarettes	18	11	arbitrary arrests
16	29	F	Form 4	married	in laws house	12	medicals / sweets	12	4	arbitrary arrests
17	29	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	cellphone accessories	4	9	arbitrary arrests
18	47	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	sweets, cigarettes	10	9	arbitrary arrests
19	30	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	cellphone accessories	5	8	arbitrary arrests
20	40	F	Form 2	divorcee	owner	7	animal health products	13	12	arbitrary arrests
21	36	F	Form 2	divorcee	owner	5	vegetables	12	8	arbitrary arrests
22	26	F	Form 4	single	tenant	9	vegetable, sweet potatoes	8	9	arbitrary arrests
23	35	M	Degreed	married	tenant	5	money changer	2	5	arbitrary arrests
24	35	F	Form 4	single	tenant	5	children's clothing and household accessories	7	6	arbitrary arrests
25	42	F	Grade 7	single	tenant	9	vegetable	10	6	arbitrary arrests
26	50	F	Form 4	widowed	owner	4	women lotions	11	8	arbitrary arrests
27	30	M	Form 3	married	tenant	3	cellphone accessories	10	6	arbitrary arrests
28	37	F	Form 3	married	tenant	5	women lotions	10	11	arbitrary arrests
29	31	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	shoes	4	9	arbitrary arrests
30	37	M	Form 4	married	tenant	7	change money	2	14	arbitrary arrests
31	28	M	Form 4	married	tenant	6	change money	3	11	arbitrary arrests

32	46	M	Form 4	married	tenant	8	vegetable seedlings	19	10	arbitrary arrests
33	42	F	Form 4	married	tenant	4	sweets/ cigarettes	8	13	arbitrary arrests
34	38	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	fruits	8	8	arbitrary arrests
35	39	F	Form 4	married	tenant	4	airtime / towels / socks	15	11	arbitrary arrests
36	33	F	Form 4	married	tenant	9	vegetables	6	10	arbitrary arrests
37	47	F	Form 4	married	owner	8	vegetables	7	9	arbitrary arrests
38	30	M	Form 4	married	tenant	2	airtime / sweets / maputi /books	10	9	arbitrary arrests
39	26	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	fruits	6	12	arbitrary arrests
40	38	M	Form 4	married	tenant	7	sweets / alcohol / airtime / cigarettes	21	12	arbitrary arrests
41	40	M	Form 4	married	owner	8	multiple goods	5	12	arbitrary arrests
42	22	M	Form 4	single	tenant	5	bracelets / beads	3	24	arbitrary arrests
43	37	M	Form 4	married	owner	9	sweets / phones	10	9	arbitrary arrests
44	19	M	Form 4	married	parents house	5	phones and sneakers	2	8	arbitrary arrests
45	40	M	Form 4	married	owner	8	vegetable seeds / fruit trees	15	12	arbitrary arrests
46	33	M	Form 4	married	tenant	5	men's clothes	4	8	arbitrary arrests
47	35	M	Form 6	married	tenant	3	men's clothes	3	10	arbitrary arrests
48	38	F	Form 1	single	tenant	4	multiple goods	3/4	12	arbitrary arrests
49	32	F	Form 4	married	tenant	5	fruits / green vegetables	6	10	arbitrary arrests
50	32	F	Form 5	single	tenant	3	fruits / green vegetables	6	10	arbitrary arrests

Appendix P

Key informants (KI) Profiles

KI	Age	Experience	Key remarks about street trading
C 1	32	5	Street trading is a job for most people and should be allowed but with proper organisation
HCC 1	27	12	Street vendors must operate from designated vendingscapes
HCC 2	33	10	Vendors should follow HCC by laws
HRT 1	41		Vending is a livelihood for the poor and unemployed
LG 1	50	18	Vendors should have the required papers to sell in designated vendingscapes.
LG 2	42	6	Vendors should adhere to national laws and local by laws
WA 1	33	12	We help MSMEs with technology, start-up funding, marketing, management skills, education and financial support
WA 2	43	9	We develop legal and regulatory framework for MSMEs
MP 1	36	5	Section 64 of the Constitution provides for the right to freedom of choice and practice of a trade or profession.
NAVUZ 1	39	13	A balance between maintaining public health and vendors livelihoods is must.
NAVUZ2	26	8	HCC should identify and create more convenient and profitable vendingscapes
NGO 1	32	4	Street vendors provide valuable services to the urban population
NGO 2	28	9	Some vendors make an honest living albeit regulatory uncertainties
RO 1	43	20	Over 90% of the population is in informal sector, review/remove policies that the criminalises street vending
RO 1	37	12	Government should recognise the informal sector and implement sustainable and inclusive policies
R1 I	52	14	Street vending is a livelihood option
RI 2	48	25	Local and national government should have a street vending policy
SMEDCO 1	31	7	Section 24 of the Constitution provides for the restrictions removal that inhibit people from working
SMEDCO 2	36	5	Vending creates employment but should be helped to establish SME viable enterprises.
ZRP 1	40	16	Street trading is a security threat e.g., selling illegal substances / goods
ZRP 2	31	11	Street traders do not follow national laws and local bylaws

Key

Councillor (C) 1

Harare City Council (HCC) 2

Harare Residents Trust (HRT) 1

Member of Parliament (MP) 1

Ministry of Local Government (LG) 2

Minster Of Women Affairs (WA)2

National Vendors Union Zimbabwe (NAVUZ) 2

Non-governmental Organisation NGO 2

Religious Organisation /Churches (RO)2

Research Institution (RI) 2

The Small and Medium Enterprises Development Corporation (SMEDCO) 1

Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 2

Appendix Q

Confirmation of Technical and Language Editing



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12 May 2023

CONFIRMATION OF TECHNICAL AND LANGUAGE EDITING

I hereby confirm that I have done the technical editing and layout for the following doctoral thesis:

Student: **Vincent Itai Tanyanyiwa**
Student number: 2017042264
Title: The urban livelihoods of informal sector practitioners in Harare
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in Development Studies
University: Centre for Development Support, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences,
University of the Free State

Language editing included consistency and accuracy in grammar, punctuation, spelling and sentence structure. I tried to retain as much of the student's own writing style as possible while making sure that the student's intended meaning was not altered during the editing process. All amendments were marked with the Microsoft Word Track Changes feature. I also left comments for issues that the student needed to check or revise. The student, therefore, had the option to accept or reject the changes.

Technical editing included the layout done on a MS Word template that I created specifically for this thesis. I checked all acronyms and abbreviations for consistent use in the text. I also checked the list of references to make sure that dates and author names used in the text matched those in the list of references. The student was informed of sources in the reference list that were not cited or were cited but not included in the list.

I have more than 40 years of experience in typing, technical and language editing for postgraduate students from universities all over South Africa and also abroad. I gained my experience during the years I was typing student dissertations and theses and while working at different departments at the UFS from 1978 to 1981 and again from 1998 to 2014. I also assisted in compiling a document on technical layout and referencing methods and have presented guest lectures on referencing methods and technical layout issues to postgraduate students at the UFS. In the past couple of years, I have also done language editing for a number of journal articles as well as six books for publication.

Disclaimer: The ultimate responsibility for accepting or rejecting the amendments and recommendations made by means of track changes rests with the student. The editor cannot be held responsible for any changes in terms of the format and style due to subsequent amendments to the text.

Yours sincerely

Dorathea (Dora) du Plessis
Technical & Language Editor