A holistic framework for beginner instrumentalists: Synergising product and process by way of meaningful learning experiences

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

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Dedication

I dedicate this study to my son, Reuben.

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I wish to express my gratitude to the following:

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Abstract

This study investigated an alternative to a disembodied, individualist philosophy used in traditional beginner instrumental instruction, in order to make suggestions for a wider holistic and inclusive approach to meaningful teaching and learning. Despite advancements made in situating the whole student, embodied and inter(en)active, in the process of instrumental learning, there still seems to be a lack of strategies for practical application. By making use of philosophical, theoretical and educational developments with regards to balancing body, mind, environmental and social transactions in instrumental music education, I suggest an extended embodied framework in beginner instrumental teaching and learning which is aligned to the way in which a young child learns. Making use of an integrative literature review, both established and recent material was reviewed, critiqued and synthesised to create an extended embodied framework. Considering suggested strategies made in this study opportunities can be created for the young student to engage in extended meaning-making experiences.

Keywords

Beginner instrumental teaching and learning, individualist, disembodied, embodiment, enactive, inter(en)active, agency, social, experience, meaning.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

“Will society ever support, encourage, and even demand changes in the way beginning instrumental music is taught?” (Grunow, 2005, p. 180). “The instruction in most beginning instrumental music classes contradicts common sense and research results related to how children learn music” (Grunow, 2005, p. 184). In this study, I explorethe philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of traditional beginner instrumental teaching and learning that, despite advancements made in balancing mind and body in cognition, still rely on disembodied notions of music education that contradict the embodied, experiential and social way in which a young child learns music.

1.1 Background and rationale

Drawing on transformational music education philosophies that advocate for the inclusion of active, social and inter(en)active music-making experiences[1], my focus is to search for ways to enrich the musical experience and meaning making opportunities of the beginner instrumentalist in the traditional setting. I take, as point of departure, Westerlund's (2002) adopted version of Dewey's (1958) experiential holism, in which physical experiences, social relations and democratic principles are implicit in meaningful educational practice.

Jorgenson points out that the morale and happiness of all that is involved in the *process* (my emphasis) of music teaching and learning are not the main concerns of music educational practices in general (Jorgensen, 2011, p. 103). She (Jorgensen, 2011, pp. 101, 102) concludesthat the standard curriculum is aimed at musical production, rather than the “[h]olistic process of music education”. Along the above-mentioned lines, music learning can be seen as a continuous and holistic process “that grows out of ordinary doings and undergoings” (Westerlund, 2002, pp. 16, 233), and is therefore practical and

[1] Bowman, 2002; Jorgensen, 2003; 2008; 2011; Schiavio, 2014; Schiavio, et al., 2002; Schiavio, et al., 2014; Schiavio, et al., 2016; Schiavio, et al., 2020; Schiavio & Cummins, 2015; Schiavio & De Jaegher, 2017; Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018; Westerlund, 2002.

“related to music in human life”. The proposal is that the synergism of product and process can optimally be realised in music educational undertakings, of which learning to play an instrument is one example (Jorgensen, 2003; 2008; 2011).

I argue, that there should be more to music teaching and learning than sitting next to a child learning to play an instrument, correcting her/his counting mistakes mostly by way of non-conversational verbal remarks, and hastily 'conditioning' the learner for an examination, competition or upcoming concert. In cases such as these the general aim is to deliver an aesthetically pleasing product in the typical master-apprenticeship[2] mode of instruction. Bowman (2002, p. 75) goes so far as to assert that “[t]he master-apprentice mode of applied music instruction … too often focuses on imitative repetition to the detriment of educational ideals”. In the same vein, and drawing on the work of Hultberg (2002), Väkevä, Westerlund and Juntunen (2015, p. 237) theorise that “this kind of reproductive approach to the printed score, especially in early levels of instrumental tuition may obstruct the student's development and even prevent the student from applying her musical understanding later”. The reason for the previously mentioned statement is that the emphasis of the pedagogical situation is placed on the teacher and not on the student, resulting on “inequality between [the teacher] and the student’s abilities to understand what the subject matter is about (Väkevä, et al., 2015, p. 237).

Features of the “production model”, described and typically associated with formal instrumental education, are the “[s]tandardization of musical composition, performance, instruments and the transmission of musical knowledge” (Jorgensen, 2011, p. 96). Grunow (2005, p. 181) criticises that “[t]he most pressing issue is to read music and manipulate the instrument in time for the first concert, which is only months away”. He further states that instrumental tuition often commences with technical tuition and formal reading procedures, but without preparatory music learning experiences that could allow

[2] “[T]he novice gradually develops practice-specific readiness under the guidance of the expert teacher” (Vakeva, Westerlund & Juntunten, 2015: 3). In this model the teaching-learning interactions consist of a linear process in which the learner responds to instruction generally without the opportunity to contribute with own ideas.

for the internalisation of musical structure (Grunow, 2005, p. 181). Davidson and Scutt's (1999, p. 83) suggestion that the beginner learner could possibly view failure in an examination negatively therefore takes precedence over a holistic pedagogical situation, where the focus of instruction is not only on a product for an examination but on the child as a person. In his discussion on parental feedback before, during and after examinations, one candidate's mother, for example, reported that her young child did not gain from the examination experience and predicted that it was rather the "violin's death warrant" (Davidson & Scutt, 1999, pp. 89, 99). Students can consequently be inhibited by the specific demands of the examination system (Davidson & Scutt, 1999, pp. 81, 83), an observation that is especially true of the young child (Costa-Giomi, et al., 2005, p. 239).

I have come to realise that learners commence with traditional instrumental tuition too early for effective capitalisation on their correct "musical age"[3]. In the course of the interaction described above, I came across several predicaments regarding the young child's audiation skill and resultant readiness to engage in formal instrumental instruction and associated evaluation. In my own experience, the situation produces an outcome of meagre exposure to the processes of music enculturation, a condition many educationalists are wary of (Gordon, 2003; Green, 2002, p. 22).

In this regard, Gordon (2013, p. 15) theorises that the child's music aptitude is in a process of development until more or less the age of nine to ten years – the age group implicit in this study. Gordon explains that to encourage instrumental tuition before the "audiation instrument" has been developed sufficiently (2013, p. 151) is to act "injudiciously and in haste" (Gordon, 2003, p. 273). Gordon (2003, p. 290) asserts that the correct "musical age" is a precondition for musical growth and is at best maintained (and remediated) by way of supportive strategies which comprise rhythmic and melodic learning sequence activities and embodied experience before, and in the course of, instruction. His theoretical principles constitute a source for the growth of the beginner instrumentalist's

[3] Gordon (2003, p. 273) asserts that the beginner instrumentalist at best exhibits "a sense of tonality, a sense of meter, a vocabulary of tonal patterns, a vocabulary of rhythm patterns, and can sing some tonic and dominant patterns in major and minor tonalities and chant some macro/microbeat and decision patterns in usual duple and usual triple meters".

music aptitude by way of processes of skill acquisition, as proposed in this study. Grunow (2005, p. 195) validates Gordon's learning theory as having the potential to "impact … directly on beginning instrumental music instruction". Incidentally, Norman (2005, p. 202) establishes that utilising Music Learning Theory in beginner instrumental instruction is essentially different from more conventional[4] approaches.

Leaning on the philosophical constructs of aesthetics and influencing music education practice, music teaching and learning philosophies rely on a product-oriented approach set forth by Reimer (1989a) (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005). Developed in the 1960s, an Aesthetic philosophy to music pedagogy was an attempt to give music education a philosophical grounding to validate its inclusion in the school curriculum (Kopkas, 2013, pp. 52, 53). In essence, the Aesthetic philosophy focused on teaching Western classical music, mainly through contemplating its structural and technical features (Reimer, 1991, p. 203).

In order to better explicate the focus of this study, the philosophical underpinnings of the Aesthetic philosophy to music education will ensue with discussions on Kant, referentialism, formalism, absolute expressionism and idealist approaches. Thereafter the implications for music education and beginner instrumental music pedagogy will be discussed in the light of the focus on intellectual learning within the Aesthetic philosophy, including training and banking approach. Intellectual learning is considered a key construct of the Aesthetic philosophical approach and relies on the teacher focusing on training a student in understanding and correctly reproducing the symbols or music notation, which in turn produces intellectual behaviour (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019, p. 21). Argued and opposed by Freire (2005, p. 77), the "banking" idea in education sees the student as a container that is used to store information. Furthermore, a discussion on the musical object, which is said to bring forth an aesthetic experience or feeling will ensue, as well as critique on the Aesthetic philosophical view.

[4] Conventional approaches to music pedagogy do not focus on the advancement of audiation skills through experiential processes as seen in Gordon's Music Learning Theory (Gordon, 2013).

In opposition to the Aesthetic philosophical approach and marking a paradigm change in music education philosophy, Elliott (1995) proposes an approach that does not focus primarily on the product of music-making education (Silverman & Elliott, 2013, p. 4). By focusing on the process of making music, Elliott (1995) advocates for a Praxial philosophy within music education philosophy. Grounded in Aristotelian concepts of theoria, techne, poiesis and praxis, a Praxial philosophy for/of music education advocates for musical doings (discussed in 2.15.1; 2,15,2; 2.15.3). Consequently, there is a discussion on Elliott's (1995) term "musicing" (discussed in 2.17), which means all kinds of musical doings or ways in which to participate in music. Lastly the critique on the praxial philosophical approach will ensue (discussed in 2.18).

I argue also for an embodied approach where mind and body are united in dynamic interaction with the environment and social milieu (Schiavio, 2014). Stemming from the writings of the 17th-century philosopher Descartes, the divide between mind and body was brought forth as a distrust of bodily sensations (Dawson, 2013, p. 57). Seeing cognition, or understanding, as solely stemming from the mind, a separation of mind and body came to be known as Cartesian dualism (Robinson, 2020). By the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, an effort was made to remediate the disembodied notions brought on by the work of Descartes (Alperson, 1991, p. 224). Dewey (2005) and Merleau-Ponty (1945) advocated for the inclusion of the whole human being, not just the mind, in a holistic embodied approach to cognition. The phenomenological construct of embodiment[5] advocates for the unity of body and mind, stating that mind cannot cognise that which has not been experienced by the body first (Leitan & Murray, 2014, p. 4). Overarching ideas which will be discussed in Chapter 3 are Cartesian dualism, embodiment, embodied cognition theories and meaning.

The disembodied production model displays a lack of "diverse learning styles" (Jorgensen, 2011, p. 99). In his philosophical clarification of what it means to teach with

[5] Embodiment refers to the "biological and physical presence of our bodies, which are a necessary pre-condition for subjectivity, emotion, language, thought and social interaction" (MacDonald, et al., 2002, p. 92). Embodiment will be discussed in Chapter 3 (3.4, 3.5).

the autonomy of the learner in mind, Bowman (2002, p. 69) draws on the Aristotelian idea of two distinct kinds of practical knowledge, namely the technical know-how of the skilled craftsmen, as well as the nature of “experiential resourcefulness”; both essential dimensions of musical practice. He (Bowman, 2002, p. 64) therefore makes a clear distinction between mere “training”, which he describes as education *in* music, and educational experiences *through* music (italics as in original), which is focused on ethical aims such as independence, agency, embodiment, and involvement in a social learning environment, all of which he declares as essential processes to develop musical “wisdom” or *phronesis*. Jorgenson (2011, p. 208) comments that musical wisdom cannot develop if information and skills are standardised, and Juntunen and Westerlund (2001, p. 207) criticise the production model for being an “information perspective instead of an experiential one”. According to Dewey’s democratic principles, educational results include both the goal of the teacher as well as the experiential process of the learner (Westerlund, 2002, p. 217). In addressing the social and democratic components of the adopted holism stated in the first paragraph, it might be fitting to utilise McCormick’s (McCarthy, 2009) holistic, social (shared) performance as an alternative for what Bowman refers to as “sterile possibilities” (Bowman, 2004, p. 43). Democratic education is understood as a transformational situation in which the needs of everyone involved are considered by way of customised strategies.

From a music learning perspective, music educationalist Dalcroze’s claim that “the body is an inseparable ally of the mind; body and mind should harmoniously perform their diverse functions, not only separately but simultaneously” (Jacques-Dalcroze, 1985, p. 108). In accordance, Gordon (2013) asserts that embodied experiences are paramount to maintain the beginner instrumentalist’s musical potential. Gordon (2003, p. 137) states that if learners are unable to sing what they have played on their instrument or demonstrate the phrasing by way of expressive movement, they do not audiate (‘understand’) what they have performed musically. These music educational viewpoints are reinforced by contemporary embodied cognition theory. According to this theory, the unity of body-mind contributes to learning and understanding by way of multi-sensory experience (Varela, et al., 2016, p. 26).

I advocate for an extended embodied framework (Schiavio, 2014) to give philosophical grounding and practical applications for a more extended and holistic embodied approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning. In recognising the individual's autonomy[6] to bring forth change with their unique experience of the world, an enactive approach to music teaching and learning will be suggested (Varela, et al., 2016). Within an enactive approach, meaning creation is not merely a cognitive construct typically associated with Cartesian dualism (Glover & Ward, 2004, p. 65). Meaning within an enactive approach is created because of the holistic interaction and transaction between a person and her/his environmental and social milieu (Staveley, 2020, p. 27). Extending the enactive approach even further towards the social milieu, an inter(en)active approach sees the interactive and transaction processes between two or more autonomous individuals. I will view the various approaches as an extended embodied framework which includes active, enactive and mutual aspects.

Hence, from both a philosophical and educational perspective, the goal is to involve the beginner instrumentalist in a holistic and inclusive way. Therefore, this study will provide a historical and philosophical background of music pedagogy, which includes both Aesthetic and Praxial philosophies to music teaching and learning practices as these philosophical views form the grounding for music education practices and also for traditional instrumental music teaching and learning practices (discussed in Chapter 2). Instrumental music teaching and learning is seen as a component of music pedagogy and is included in the discussed perspectives. Thereafter, in Chapter 3, follows a discussion on the historical and philosophical underpinnings of the disembodied notions found within traditional instrumental music education pedagogy. For each embodied philosophical construct suggested as an extended embodied framework, a recommendation will be made for its practical application for the beginner instrumental student (discussed in Chapter 3). In conclusion I will argue for the synergism of product and process-oriented approaches.

[6] Autonomy in this sense is the processes within people which empower them to "shape their environment" (Schiavio & Cummins, 2015, p. 6).

1.2 Research problem, questions and objectives

There seems to be a lack of impetus, as well as teaching and learning strategies, to enrich the music learning processes of the beginner instrumentalist, from the point of view of holism, mentioned above. According to McMillan (2009, p. 11) there is "remarkably little" in the way of creative ideas. Similarly, Triantafyllaki (2005, p. 383) remarks that there are "surprisingly limited numbers of studies investigating instrumental teaching". This study attempted to address this gap by designing a holistic and integrated, extended embodied framework in order to enhance the musical learning process.

In focusing on development rather than ability, the link with instrumental instruction[7] for the proposed framework will be premised on shared and practical processes with regard to the internalising of musical elements in relation to musical structure. In his landmark text, *The Process of Education,* Bruner (1999, p. 12) verifies that an experiential disposition towards the teaching and learning of structure empowers one to gain knowledge of the subject material.

1.2.1 Main question

Following the gap identified in the previous section, the objective of this study is to determine alternative strategies of meaning-making opportunities of beginner instrumentalists by way of embodied, social and inter(en)active processes.

The main research question is formulated as follows:

What is a holistic alternative to an individualist, disembodied philosophy, in order to enrich the musical experience and meaning-making opportunities of beginner instrumentalists?

[7] Benjamin Bloom (1985) recognised that the one-on-one instruction setting is an intriguing test site for the studying of teaching and learning across disciplines.

Sub-questions are:

- What are the philosophical underpinnings of an Aesthetic philosophy in traditional instrumental pedagogy and the implications for traditional instrumental pedagogy?
- What are the philosophical underpinnings of a Praxial philosophy in traditional instrumental pedagogy and the implications for instrumental pedagogy?
- What are the philosophical underpinnings of a holistically embodied, meaningful and shared instrumental music education framework?
- How can a holistic approach be implemented to establish a synergised learning environment for the beginner instrumentalist in a meaningful way?

The intention here is not to refute the value and tradition of learning to play an instrument excellently, which remains a profound skill that is well documented for both aesthetic and utilitarian values (Bresler & Stake, 2006; Reimer, 2003). It is also not the aim to discuss particularities of instrumental pedagogy. Rather, the objective of this study is to elucidate a position in which music learning is engrained in, and understanding is generated from, enactive, mutual and active experiences, particularly with young children. Huang (2007, p. 103) concurs that instrumental learning for young children should include "listening, singing, moving, playing instruments … repertoire including self-satisfying musical creations, and attitudes such as respecting and valuing music as a part of everyday life". From this natural and experiential setting, an educational opportunity for a special kind of developmentally appropriate practice[8] emerges. This kind of embodied learning is important because learning does not only occur in "the head", for it is "not the eye that watches, not the ear that hears, it is always the entire person – the body and the mind" that are involved in the teaching and learning experience (Gruhn, 2019, p. 75).

[8] An educational framework that reflects knowledge regarding the processes of development and learning is a developmentally appropriate practice (Jordan-Decarbo & Nelson, 2002, p. 226).

1.3 Research Design

The dual paradigmatic[9] stance of this study will be built on the views of several philosophers; described by Jorgensen (2011, p. 191) as the construction of a synoptic view in order to validate one's own interpretation. This study is viewed through a Deweyan lens, which is both pragmatic in recognising the embodied and shared nature of the musical experience (Westerlund, 2002), and constructivist[10] in suggesting that the individual constructs knowledge and meaning from experience-based activities (Paul & Ballantine, 2002, p. 571). Dewey (1958; 2005) connects the person with the subject in order to uphold the child's need and agency (Jorgensen, 2011, p. 185). These adopted views provide a perfect fit for this study, which aims, *inter alia,* to describe the music educational experience as a holistic and ongoing process of both doing and sharing.

An integrative literature review was applied in this study which, according to Torraco (2016, p. 404) is a research process that draws on both old and new literature to review, critique and synthesise focused literature in an integrated way to generate a new framework and new perspectives in order to add contributions to the field of music education A literature review is a "sophisticated form of research that requires a great deal of research skill and insight" (Torraco, 2005, p. 356). In order to conduct a literature review, Torraco (2005, pp. 356, 357) proposes that a researcher must search for and review appropriate literature, "analyze and critique literature", and "create new understandings of the topic". Torraco (2016, p. 409) further asserts that a "mature" topic can be reviewed and critiqued in order to reconceptualise the content and expand the information at hand. Through a metasynthetic[11] process I interpret, evaluate and integrate findings from multiple research studies (Cronin, et al., 2008, p. 39). The aim is to transform findings "into new conceptualizations and interpretations" (Cronin, et al., 2008, p. 39).

[9] Drawing on the writings of Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009), Pragmatism is a philosophical stance that forms part of the outer layer of a "research onion".

[10] Constructivism, similar to Pragmatism, also forms part of the outer layer of a "research onion" (Saunders, et al., 2009). Constructivism represents a philosophical stance taken in research and consists of meaning construction through a cognitive or mental representation and contemplation of subject material (Glaserfeld, 1995)

[11] A metasynthetic process involves the analysis and synthesis of "key elements" in a study (Cronin, et al., 2008, p. 39).

According to Onwuegbuzie & Frels (2016, p. 31) an integrative literature review can be both systematic and narrative. A systematic literature review comprises of “critical assessment and evaluation of all research studies that address a particular research question on a research topic”. A large amount of literature including mature and new sources, was identified, collected and evaluated (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 31). Findings were integrated in a logically flowing argument (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 31). The study was also narrative, in that it “optimally critiques” researched literature on the chosen topic, without including any “quantitative findings or qualitative findings” (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 23). Thus, an integrative literature review, “pull together the existing work on an educational topic and work to understand trends in that body of scholarship” (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 31).

Data was collected by using search engines such as Google Scholar and databases such as ERIC, JSTOR, and EBSCOhost (Callahan, 2010, p. 301). Selection of data[12] included both empirical and conceptual work was used (Callahan, 2010, p. 302) to analyse, critique and synthesise information (Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016, p. 17). In order to enrich the beginner instrumentalist’s musical experience, I attempted to re-evaluate and advocate the use of “mature[13]” (Torraco, 2016, p. 418), as well as contemporary philosophies and educational strategies. For this reason, an integrative literature review, as defined by Torraco (2016) as “critically analyzing the literature and integrating diverse and sometimes conflicting perspectives from the literature” in order to form new perspectives, seemed most appropriate.

1.3.1 Research Structure

This study consists of four Chapters. The first Chapter serves as the introduction to the study and gives an overview of the rationale, research problem and questions, the design,

[12] Concepts and themes were identified and researched. A total of 334 sources was included in this study, of which 138 were books, 179 were journal articles, 6 was internet resources and 8 were masters’ and doctoral studies.

[13] According to Torraco (2016, p. 418), what is meant by “mature” philosophies is a topic that much has been written on, which contains literature “from early publications to the present”.

structure and value. The second Chapter views two opposing philosophies for music education, namely the Aesthetic - and Praxial[14] philosophies. The third Chapter gives insight into the philosophical and theoretical core of the disembodied, individualist nature of the Aesthetic - and Praxial philosophies discussed in Chapter 2. Furthermore, within the third Chapter, I research approaches to beginner instrumental music teaching and learning that take into account the holistic, active and inter(en)active nature of the student and make suggestions towards practical applications[15] of suggested theories. The fourth Chapter serves as a conclusion of the study, where I give an overview of the study, answer the research questions, give recommendations, discuss limitations and give suggestions for further research.

1.4 Value of the Research

The study aimed to make available a wide array of educational ideas to improve the musical understanding and situated experience of beginner instrumentalists, a need clearly communicated by various authorities (Elliot & Silverman, 2015; Matyja & Schiavio, 2013; Trevarthen, 2011). Jorgensen (2003, p. 147) remarks that traditional music instruction has changed "relatively little" since the establishment of public schools at the beginning of the 19th century. Grunow (2005, p. 186) adds that "[m]uch of … the reason that the musicianship of society is clearly substandard, is related directly to the way music is taught – specifically the ways in which beginning instrumental music is taught".

Recent research tells us *how* people learn music (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; Gordon, 2013; Jorgensen, 2011). Thus, in focusing on *how* people learn, rather than how people at best *should* learn (Paul & Ballantine, 2002, p. 571), embodied experiences, societal involvement and an extended holistic approach will be integrated in order to contribute to the one-to-one instrument teacher community.

[14] It is important to note that the Praxial philosophy discussed in Chapter 2, specifically pertaining to that of Elliott, follows a progressive pathway, focusing on his early works (1986; 1987; 1989a; 1989b; 1991a; 1991b; 1995) in Chapter 2, and Elliott's (2012; Elliot & Silverman, 2015; Elliott, 2016) later works in Chapter 3.

[15] I will draw on the music educational approaches of Dalcroze (1985; 2018) and Orff (Campbell, 1991; Sarrazin, 2012), Laban (1960) movement theory and Gordon's Music Learning Theory (2003; 2013).

Chapter 2

Rethinking the isolated, individual experience in music education theory and practice

2.1 Introduction

In recent decades a growing number of authors have argued against the long-standing and unchallenged prominence of Westernised ontology that views music's nature as a matter of "humanly organized sounds and silences" (Elliott, 1995, p. 20; Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 63). It has been argued that the value and meaning of music education arise from the structural aspects of the musical work and therefore involve the cognitive apparatus[16] and technical knowledge[17] (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 85; Colwell, 2015, p. 128). The musical work is seen as an isolated and individualistic event that is "confined to the artist" (Dewey, 2005, p. 81). Contemporary scholars point out that such an "information-processing"[18] view of cognition is based on disembodied and decontextualised approaches to cognition (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 85). This constricted view of music and music education has specifically ignored the "whole sensing human being" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 157). Unfortunately, despite several philosophers' theorising of new ideas[19] (Burwell, 2012), basic ontological positions are rarely questioned in music teacher education. The Western ontological position "still remain deeply embedded" in music education and can be seen in the "cult-like teaching methods" (Johnson, 2009, p. 18).

[16] Cognitive apparatus can be explained as what happens in the brain, "information processing, rules [and] problem solving", detaching one from real situations, experiences of pleasure, and subjective bodily feelings and senses such as tastes, smells etc. (Westerlund, 2002, p. 157).
[17] Technical knowledge describes the "manual skill" or "craft" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 182).
[18] "In cognitive approaches, mind is treated as an information-processing system, which receives inputs from bodily sensors and sends outputs to motor systems" (Westerlund, 2002, pp. 60,61).
[19] Jorgensen (2011, p. 125) suggests the use of a pragmatic "growth model" which draws on students' "insight, imagination, and willingness to learn", consequently promoting critical thinking. On the other hand, Jorgensen's (2011, p. 96) ''production model" focuses on the "[s]tandardization of musical composition, performance, instruments and the transmission of musical knowledge".

Given the research aim, the main focus of this study is to explore a position where beginner instrumental music teaching and learning is rooted in meaningful experiential opportunities. In order to answer the problem statement, I will shed light on the philosophical underpinnings that have influenced music education in a general sense and in turn also influence beginner instrumental teaching and learning. This Chapter will consist of an overview of the underpinnings of Music Education from two distinct philosophical movements in the subject field The two opposing philosophical views are the Aesthetic philosophical view, or Music Education as Aesthetic Education (MEAE), developed by Reimer (1989a), and the Praxial philosophy of music education advanced by Elliott (1995). From the 1950s onward, MEAE was the primary philosophy for Music Education curriculum in schools (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 19; Kopkas, 2013, pp. 52,53). Music education practices focused on the advancement of and listening to good aesthetic products or works of art that found their prominence in 18th Century Enlightenment (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005).

In searching for an approach that comprised a more practical involvement with music, Elliott (1995) suggested a praxial philosophical view. The Praxial philosophy shifted the focus from the work of art to the process of making the artwork. Through the process of "musicing" or musical doing, the development of musicianship became a prominent focus in music educational settings (Elliott, 1995, p. 49). Even though the Praxial philosophy strove to remediate the faults of the Aesthetic philosophical view to music education, it is not itself faultless (Bradley, 2012; Westerlund, 2002). Accordingly, an outlay of the development of both the Aesthetic and Praxial philosophical perspectives will follow with a discussion of the underpinnings and relevant concepts and applications of the Aesthetic and praxial theories. Firstly, I will discuss concepts related to aesthetics, Reimer's Aesthetic philosophy to music education, his dissatisfaction with the application of his position, the philosophical movements referentialism, formalism, absolute expressionism and idealism, the importance of intellectual learning including training and banking approaches, essential Aesthetic philosophical components such as the aesthetic object, aesthetic experience and an education of feeling as well as a critique of the Aesthetic philosophy. Secondly, I will discuss Elliott's Praxial philosophy, including Aristotelian

notions of praxis, theoria, techne and poiesis, musicing and musicianship, and lastly, I will critique Elliott's theory.

2.2 Defining aesthetics

To address the research question, I construct my argument on the view of several philosophers. Drawing on a vast amount of literature from the past 70 years[20], music as an aesthetic object, a Western philosophical field, is one of the most prevalent philosophical perspectives on music (Jorgensen, 2003, p. 80; Jay, 2016, p. 64). The term aesthetic, often assumed to be the same as 'beautiful' in a general sense, underpins a considerable number of meanings. Artist and philosopher Mandoki (2016, p. 3) writes that these various meanings include abstract notions such as the following:

> an experience, the quality of an object, a feeling of pleasure, classicism in art, a judgment of taste, the capacity of perception, a value, an attitude, the theory of art, the doctrine of beauty, a state of the spirit, contemplative receptivity, an emotion, an intention, a way of life, the faculty of sensibility, a branch of philosophy, a type of subjectivity, the merit of certain forms, or an act of expression.

Similarly, Fossum and Varkøy (2012, p. 12) note that the term aesthetics displays various perspectives that differ in meanings and implications. Aesthetics is "definitely an elusive phenomenon difficult to define" (Mandoki, 2016, p. 6) – it comprises a large and hazy field (Sparshott, 1987, p. 467). Finding its origin in the Greek word *aesthesis* or *aisthesis,* aesthetics means "sense perception" (Regelski, 2011a, p. 75) or "rooted in the senses" (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 91). Defined also as "sense experience" (Sparshott, 1982, p. 473), *aesthesis* refers to perception where one is "sensitive, receptive, or porous to [the] environment" (Mandoki, 2016, p. 48) – that is to say, one has a sensorial experience, "breathing in" surrounding information (Hillman, 2014, p. 39). Thus, knowledge is gained through the senses (Regelski, 2011a, p. 90), rendering *aesthesis* "psychosomatic",

[20] Bradley, 2012; Britton, 1961; Colwell, 1986; Cox, 1983; Daugherty, 1996; Fossum & Varkøy, 2012; Hultberg, 2002; Jorgensen, 2011; Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001; Koopman, 1998; Lemmon, 1977; Lippman, 1992.

meaning both “concrete” in terms of sensory perception[21] as well as cognitive or in the mind (Deimler, 2019, p. 2).

2.3 Philosophical underpinnings of aesthetics

Aesthetics first found its foundations in the metaphorical application of being a “spectator” within the writings of Addison and Steele (1712). Described by Norton (2015, p. 124) as the “fountainhead of modern aesthetic thought”, the writings of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele in a 1712 edition of the magazine *The Spectator* played a “central, perhaps unrivalled role” in the developmental pathway of aesthetics. As the title suggests, the meaning of aesthetics took on the form of a “spectator”. Norton (2015, p. 125) describes Addison and Steele's aesthetics as having a “kind of spectatorial distance or detachment”, “push[ing] the world away”. Addison writes about how ‘Mr. Spectator’ introduced himself in their writings: "Thus I live in the World, rather as a ‘Spectator of Mankind’, than as one of the Species”. Drawing meaning from the name Mr. Spectator, one can deduce that in this early aesthetic notion there is a distanced, “outside” engagement with the world “without any thought of practical interest or gain” (Norton, 2015, p. 126). Regelski (2017a, p. 112) concurs and writes that the traditional aesthetic notion involved rational, intellectual, and disembodied qualities.

The modern notion of aesthetics came into being and was introduced to the field of philosophy in 1750 by the German philosopher Baumgarten[22] (1714-1762) (Norton, 2015, p. 124; Westerlund, 2002, p. 104). For Baumgarten, aesthetics encompassed more than the philosophical readings and study of beauty (Elliott, 1995, p. 22), although he focused exclusively on poetry (Regelski, 2017a, p. 109). During the 18th and 19th centuries the margins of aesthetics widened and included the study of “visual images and objects of painting, the effectiveness of music conceived as ‘works’ and later in time all things natural

[21] Sensation is defined as the “action of *stimuli* on our body” (italics as in original) or detecting of signals from the body’s sensory receptors (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 37). Perception can be described as an “interpretation” of the images that our senses supply to us, a “hypothesis” that the mind concludes from sensory input (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 33).

[22] Baumgarten coined the term “aesthetics” which was first published by his student, G.F. Meier. He utilises the term aesthetics in his book *Foundations of all Beautiful Sciences* (Wenzel, 2005, p. 4).

such as ‘sunsets, flowers, and landscapes’” (Elliott, 1995, p. 22). Within his publication *Aesthetica* (1750/1758), Baumgarten wanted to reinstate and re-establish the philosophical importance of *aisthesis* (Regelski, 2016, p. 14; Wenzel, 2005, p. 4). In other words, based on the Greek notion of *aesthesis*, Baumgarten founded the field of aesthetics, a “general theory of sensory cognition” (Shusterman, 2012a, p. 106). Stated differently, aesthetics entails the manner in which sensory perception can promote knowledge or cognition[23] (Shusterman, 2012a, p. 106). Within *Aesthetica,* Baumgarten writes of aesthetics as “gratifying corporeal perception” and the “subjective sensual response to objects rather than objects themselves” (Jay, 2016, p. 66). This brings aesthetics closer to the origin of *aesthesis* found in ancient Greece.

Aesthesis then is in direct contrast to the rationalist, intellectualised and disembodied stance that knowledge is gained through logic and reason (Regelski, 2017a, p. 112; Regelski, 2019, p. 86). In favour of this 18th century Enlightenment rationalist stance, *aesthesis* was continuously trivialised for being dependent on the bodily senses, unified between the individual and her/his environment (Regelski, 2016, p. 14), and in turn regarded as untrustworthy (Regelski, 2019, p. 87). Knowledge gained through the senses was “deemed unreliable in comparison to knowledge reached through reason[24]” (Regelski, 2011a, p. 90). However, by the mid-eighteenth century, *aesthesis* evolved into a rationalised, “acontextual, intrinsic, and ‘distanced’ aesthetics attitude” (Elliott, 1995, p. 24; Regelski, 2020b, p. 10). With the onset of the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, aesthetics gained a prominent place in philosophy. Pertaining to the focus of this study, which is to enhance the embodied, holistic and inter(en)active experiences of the beginner instrumentalist, the grounding of music education philosophy has to be identified. As seen in the writings thus far, aesthetics has a disinterested and distanced notion, which influenced the philosophical groundings of music education. The discussion ensues.

[23] A complete discussion on cognition will follow in Chapter 3.
[24] Similar to the development of the construct of *aesthesis* or knowledge gained through the senses, the notion of embodiment and embodied cognition is contrasted against the rationalist, disembodied stance of the Enlightenment. This is discussed at some length in Chapter 3 (3.4-3.6).

2.4 Kant's Enlightenment aesthetics

Three decades after the publication of *Aesthetica*, iconic philosopher of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) published *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *Critique of Judgement* (1790). Kant's philosophy influences aesthetics and philosophy even today (Rohlf, 2020). Kant, like many philosophers, was a product of his time and influenced by his social and political surroundings, consequently pursuing the question "how it is that we know what we know" (Bradley, 2012, p. 418). By the 18th century, the Enlightenment marked a radical shift in the development of "self" and "independent thought", an "intellectual awakening," as it were (Beck, 1993, p. 6). In a 1784 publication by Kant, translated by Nisbet, the essence of the Enlightenment is explained as the shedding of one's "self-incurred immaturity", which he describes as the inability to make one's own choices without the help of another (Kant, 2009, p. 1). Kant describes the motto of the Enlightenment as "*Sapere aude",* "Dare to be wise" (Kant, 2009, p. 1). This is to say that the individual, the self, was encouraged to make own decisions. Individuals were encouraged to explore their own abilities to free themselves from social restrictions (Westerlund, 2002, p. 97). Beck (1993, p. 6) explains that prior to the Enlightenment, individuals relinquished their freedom to others who would think for them. The individual self needs to be "emancipated" from, for instance, a book that understands for you and a doctor that decides on your diet for you (Kant, 2009, p. 1). Thus, the individual gained recognition and was encouraged to make use of own intellect and make own decisions and judgments. A distinctive feature of Kant's philosophy is that he claimed that judgment of taste, or "pure aesthetic judgment of taste", is universal (Barnes, 2017, p. 35). Judgment of taste contrasts individual or personal judgment, as discussed above – it is universal, because this type of judgment is the same for all humans, because all human minds function in the same way (Bowman, 1991a, p. 44).

Kant believes that in the verdict of judgment as to whether something is beautiful or not, one does not use understanding that arises from intellectual knowledge, or processes of logical thinking. Instead, to make such a judgment, one uses two cognitive faculties: "imagination" in conjunction with "reason", understood as the mind's working

understanding (Barnes, 2017, p. 36). Wenzel (2005, p. 50) stipulates that one is made aware of the universality of aesthetic judgment, because imagination and reason are cognitive powers that all humans have in common. Accordingly, aesthetic judgment is not objective, but subjective, as the feeling that one has about an object is subjective (Wenzel, 2005, p. 11). Unlike Baumgarten's interpretation of *aesthesis*, namely that knowledge or cognition is gained through the senses, Kant insists on keeping these capacities separate (Wenzel, 2005, p. 5). Sensation, for Kant, can have different meanings, such as feeling or perception (Wenzel, 2005, p. 5). According to Wenzel (2005, p. 5), Kant's interest lies in feelings of pleasure or displeasure, rather than perception or cognition. Wenzel (2005, pp. 6,7) explains that when looking at a work of art, such as a painting, the imagination absorbs what is seen, and with understanding attempts to decide its meaning. Bowman (1991a, p. 44) adds that this is not a means to gain knowledge, but it is an imaginary practice of "free play". Wenzel (2005, p. 9) defines the Kantian notion of free play as a "pleasant (or unpleasant) interplay within or of our mind, with perceptions that we have of something we see or otherwise perceive through our senses and that we judge to be beautiful (or ugly)".

Thus, pleasure felt is the result of the "free play" between imagination and understanding. The judgment of taste is not the mere processing of information, instead, it is subjective (Mandoki, 2016, p. 46; Wenzel, 2005, p. 7). Westerlund (2002, p. 105) adds that the Kantian notion of the subjective feeling of pleasure in fact demonstrates his idea of a shared consciousness in matters of judgment. In other words, Westerlund infers that universal aesthetic judgment is rooted in its unique kind of feeling. It is a uniquely felt experience that cannot be compared to ordinary emotion and pleasures (Bowman, 1991a, p. 45). To clarify the nonconceptual nature of aesthetic judgment of taste, I will draw on Reimer's (1986; 2003) explanation of concept formation.

In two of Reimer's publications (1986, p. 113; 2003, p. 144), he describes two aspects that are needed in processes of concept formation. Firstly, he explains that a "singular instance of something" is not a concept (Reimer, 1986, p. 113). Mozart is not a concept, but if you become aware of elements or traits of his works or a performance thereof, a

concept is formed. Reimer (1986, p. 113; 2003, p. 144) also explains that a concept is formed by recognising at least two features of the person/work. Similarly, an apple, for instance, is not a concept, but when you perceive something about the apple (fruit, eat, red, etc.), a concept is formed. Secondly, a visual or symbolic representation is required for concept formation, discussed in the following sentences. As for art and music, there is no need for a symbol or physical entity to be present for one to experience it. Therefore, one can make a subjective, nonconceptual judgment of taste, “not by concept,” but by the free play of the imagination and understanding (Barnes, 2017, p. 37). Guided by the aesthetic notions founded in the Enlightenment, music education philosophy is still today influenced by aesthetic thinking (van der Schyff, 2020, p. 14). A discussion on the influence of aesthetics within the scope of music education is necessary as influences of the Aesthetic philosophy to music education still has an impact on music instruction. As will be discussed in the following sections, the distanced and disinterested position of aesthetics has influences on music education philosophy and practice. For beginner instrumental teaching and learning, education focuses on the end-product of instruction, giving little attention to the child and their holistic state.

2.5 Aesthetic music education

Preceding the 1950s, the inclusive development of social, intellectual, moral and physical values was at the heart of music education (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005). Understandably, this focus gave rise to discontentment as music educators were dissatisfied with this undue emphasis on the functional values of music education as the basis for their approach, taking the attention away from the value of music *per se*. While the utilitarian values of music mentioned above may seem convincing to a hesitant school administrator to motivate the inclusion of music in the school programme, those values are not related nor unique to the discipline with regards to aesthetics (Leonhard, 1965, p. 59).

In the last 70 years, there have been notable writers on Aesthetic philosophy who have guided the field of music education. Scholars such as Britton (1961), Broudy (1961; 1978),

Leonhard (1965), Schwadron (1973), Reimer (1989b) and Smith (1989, 1999) became dissatisfied with the focus on and advocacy for the utilitarian benefits of music education (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 20). Since the late 1950s, educators pursued Aesthetic philosophical constructs to replace the utilitarian tactic and to further defend the inclusion of music in the education program (Kopkas, 2013, pp. 52, 53). Several scholars began to develop a philosophy for music education based on ideologies from Western aesthetics (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, pp. 19, 20).

2.6 A Philosophy for Music Education

From the middle of the 1950s, music education literature began to focus on music education based on aesthetic principles (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005). As a result, "MEAE" was introduced and accepted with minimal opposition. A philosophy for music education based on aesthetic principles thus guaranteed providing a suitable alternative to music education based on advocacy for utilitarian values. As McCarthy and Scott Goble (2005, p. 20) write: "[a]esthetic philosophy would focus on music as a form of fine art and provide music education with a more respectable basis for explaining the nature, value, and uniqueness of their subject in the school curriculum".

A groundbreaking publication commissioned by the Music Educators National Conference (MENC), *Basic Concepts in Music Education* (1958), formally inaugurated MEAE (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 20). Providing the needed momentum, the publication of Leonhard and House, *Foundations and Principles of Music Education* (1959), inspired music educators to think of their profession in a renewed way, becoming a driving force behind the MEAE movement (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 21; Mark, 1999, p. 13). The Aesthetic philosophy for music education gained significance in the 1960s as the *Journal of Aesthetic Education* was established in 1966, consequently confirming the reign of the Aesthetic education movement (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 21). With the foundations laid, the Aesthetic movement blossomed in the 1970s (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 25). Recognising the need for and importance of a philosophy for music education, Reimer, undeniably recognised as the most influential

philosopher behind the justification for modern music education, was inspired by the writings and ideas of Leonhard (Colwell, 2015, p. 118). A discussion based on Bennett Reimer's (1932 – 2013) iconic writings will follow.

2.7 Bennett Reimer's Music Education as Aesthetic Education

The career of Reimer, American music educator and pioneer philosopher, has fluctuated between extreme highs and lows. In the 1960s, Reimer established his philosophy (Reimer, 1963). Over a period of nearly 60 years, Reimer initiated and developed a watershed philosophical position in music education research (Reimer, 1996). By exploring the meaning of music in his publications, Reimer revealed several key features of what has come to be known as MEAE (Reimer, 1989a). Reimer encapsulates the constructs of aesthetic experience and feeling, which are brought on by listening to musical works which are said to have aesthetic meaning (Reimer, 1989a). Most notably, he was responsible for the "aesthetic education movement" in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, where many music educators obtained foundations for their teachings (Jorgensen, 2003, p. 64; Reimer, 1991, p. 193). "It was Bennett Reimer who predominantly defined the twentieth-century music education as aesthetic education enterprise" (Scarborough, 2015, p. 56). As noted earlier, in search of more than utilitarian benefits to advocate for the inclusion of music education, educators turned to aesthetics (Kopkas, 2013, pp. 52, 53). Reimer's ideas have been a constant influence on the modern understanding of the arts and the planning and preparation for instruction, assessment criteria, and interaction with students (Reese, 1999, p. 161). McCarthy and Scott Goble (2005, p. 25) write that Reimer's iconic publication, *A Philosophy of Music Education* (1970/1989), brought the various aspects of Aesthetic philosophy together in an "unprecedented way". Similarly, Mark (1999, p. 7) writes that Reimer's "towering" publication was a "culmination of the developmental period of the philosophy of aesthetic education".

2.8 MEAE improperly applied within music education practice

“A phrase can become a signal of a person’s identity” (Reimer, 2009, p. 15). Reimer (2009, p. 15) explains that this happened to him with the notion of Aesthetic education, noting that “… the idea of aesthetic education [became] as influential as to make a catchphrase for the entire field’s aspirations”. He explains that he became uncomfortable with being associated with the term aesthetic and Aesthetic education, as the construct turned into a constricted and rigid concept. He wrote that the aesthetic perception is so overwhelming that “one is tempted to throw up one's hands in despair, turn his back on the entire field of aesthetics, and proclaim that in aesthetic education one might as well do whatever strikes his fancy” (Reimer, 1989a, p. 12).

Reimer advises that a philosophy is to be taken as a “point of departure for practitioners’’ at a specific time in their career. The values and meanings of music are situated in the lives, needs, beliefs, and artistic traditions of a particular group at a particular point in time (McCarthy, 2009, p. 30). Taking little notice of this rather unwarranted statement, Reimer’s core philosophical stance, focused on the musical object, ensues as a basis for the profession of music education (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 25). McCarthy and Scott Goble (2005, p. 26) mention that as the Aesthetic philosophy was gaining momentum, concern increased because of its “hasty adoption and immature application”. Reimer (1972, p. 29) rightfully claims, “the reality to which [music education as aesthetic education] refers, remains disturbingly obscure”.

In Reimer’s 1991 publication titled *Essential and Nonessential Characteristics of Aesthetic Education*, he notes that he needs little convincing as to how difficult it is to build an intellectually valid philosophy that is suitable for application across the entire spectrum of music teaching and learning (Reimer, 1991, pp. 199,200). He (Reimer, 1991, p. 194) further proposed that Aesthetic education is “not a body of immutable laws but instead provides some guidelines for a process that, by its very nature, must be both ongoing and open-ended”. Reimer (1991, p. 200) remarks that he spent much energy disputing the elitist view of Aesthetic education, stating that “aesthetic education should

clearly be conceived to apply to all students no matter their level of interest or talent in the arts". This implies that Aesthetic education takes on a comprehensive stance *vis-à-vis* the curriculum, including all the ways that all types of people interact with music, namely, listening, performing, improvising, composing, and historical and social contexts (Reimer, 1991, p. 200). Reimer (1991, p. 203) writes

> Engagements with works that emphasize their meanings as art – their ability to yield meanings from their structures of interrelated sounds and to transform words, images, ideas, emotions, and any other socially shared human values by incorporating them as meaningful aspects of musical structure – may be understood to be aesthetic education.

MEAE established the standards by which music is to be valued (Barnes, 2017, p. 36). This is not only applicable for general music education, but also for one-to-one instrumental instruction. Swinkin (2015, p. viii) claims that, also in the beginner instrumental teaching classroom, "aesthetic teaching eschews the mere utilitarian transmission of knowledge and acquisition of skills". Similarly, Davidson, Pitts & Correia (2001, p. 52) write that instrumental learning commences with specific focus on "physical and notational aspects", especially for young students. To emphasise and better explain different philosophical viewpoints for Aesthetic theories, Reimer "works through" three different philosophical positions (Scarborough, 2015, p. 130). These broad philosophical perspectives are referentialism, formalism and absolute expressionism (Reimer, 1989a; Dillon, 2001, p. 38) which will be addressed in the sections to follow.

2.8.1 Referentialism

Referentialism entails a philosophical perspective where music refers to meaning outside of itself. Meaning in this sense refers to "what is intended to be", what is "expressed" or signified through the music (Unknown, 2020). In referentialism, the meaning and value of music are found in "clues leading outward from the work of art" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 112). This implies that the sounds that are heard are said to contain a message, comparable to a message communicated in language – hence rendering all music as programme music (Reimer, 1997, p. 13). Musical sounds, like words, refer. "They point

outside of themselves to meanings, images, ideas, emotions, descriptions of places, things, people, events, and so forth" (Reimer, 1997, p. 13). It is the role of the teacher to differentiate between these previously mentioned aspects and "decipher" which music is good art or bad art depending on the "extra-artistic" meanings they refer to (Farrugia, 2020, p. 40). Reese (1999, p. 163) writes that one takes a referentialist stance if, while listening to music, you focus on the message of the words or the description of your felt emotions. Such an activity can take place in the general music classroom, or in the one-to-one instrumental lesson. Alongside the meanings found in the musical work, a referentialist stance also entails the utilitarian values of music such as general educational ideals, moral beliefs, emotional and social needs, to foster self-discipline (Reimer, 1989a, pp. 22,23; Westerlund, 2002, p. 112), which has a positive connection for a wider holistic approach. In order to further situate Reimer's (1989a) aesthetic position, the formalist view, in opposition to the referentialist view, will be explicated.

2.8.2 Formalism

Formalism, a philosophical movement that began during the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, sees aesthetic value in "form" and musical "works" (Alperson, 1991, p. 224). Formalists insist that an artwork contains no references to the world outside of the work, and that such references are irrelevant to the meaning of the work (Reimer, 2003, p. 41). Thus, music has no meaning outside of itself and is unconnected to other human endeavours or life experiences (Reimer, 1997, p. 10). Within Formalism, "musical meaning is the result of intellectual perception of formalized structures" (Scarborough, 2015, p. 60). It is Aiello's (2013, pp. 75, 76) view that Reimer's Aesthetic philosophy has many formalistic views, specifically the disinterested position of the musical work. To clarify, Reese (1999, p. 163) describes a practical application, in a music educational setting, of the formalist perspective in Reimer's Aesthetic philosophical view. Such a view entails focusing on and doing "extended analysis of the prominent rhythmic and melodic patterns and themes, the meter, the harmonic progressions, and the phrases and sections of the form" (Reese, 1999, p. 163). The previously described view by Reese (1999) on how a formalistic view to music teaching and learning is realised, relies greatly

on the dualistic view of the separation of mind and body founded in Descartes' philosophies. This view, which will be discussed at length in Chapter 3 (3.2), sees the mind as solely assigned to "intellectual work" and the body for "practical work" (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019, p. 27).

The stance mentioned above renders music teaching and learning primarily intellectual as opposed to music teaching and learning that is grounded in experience. Within the formalist stance, "only a few talented students can be educated musically" (Farrugia, 2020, p. 40). Performances by amateurs and youth thus fall short of the artistry needed to represent aesthetic excellence (Regelski, 2003, p. 66). Reimer (1989a, pp. 22,23) mentions that this is a formalistic application focusing on teaching the talented and gifted children and entertaining the remaining masses. He (Reimer, 1989a, p. 23) writes, "[a]s with all special abilities, artistic enjoyment is possible for a few, and these are the ones who can benefit from serious music education". Formalism disregards inclusiveness and equality for all through music education practice (Westerlund, 2003, p. 56). Absolute expressionism is found in-between the referentialist and formalist perspectives and will be discussed in order to better situate the Aesthetic philosophical view.

2.8.3 Absolute Expressionism

After concluding that neither referentialist nor formalist philosophical positions fitted his view, Reimer relied on absolute expressionism (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 25), a midway between the formalist and referentialist stances (Scarborough, 2015, p. 21; Westerlund, 2002, p. 112). Absolute expressionism was introduced by Leonard Meyer in 1959 (Bowman, 1991b, p. 41; Scarborough, 2015, p. 58) and entails that musical meaning and value is founded in itself while acknowledging the connections music has outside of itself (Farrugia, 2020, p. 40). Musical meanings in turn give rise to "feelings" and an "emotive response" to music (Scarborough, 2015, pp. 60, 62). Reimer embraced the absolute expressionist stance as he "championed an aesthetic education of feeling" (Scarborough, 2015, p. 62). Reimer (2003, p. 89) described an education of feeling, which will be discussed later on in this Chapter (2.12), as an enhanced awareness of the "extent

and depth of what we feel, as musical experience uniquely provides and as music education attempts to cultivate". Reese (1999, p. 162) describes these above-mentioned philosophical perspectives as "Reimer's three-part summary of the continuum of aesthetic theories", mentioning that these standpoints provide a framework for contemplating the nature and value of music itself. Finding its roots mostly in the idealist philosophical view, MEAE within the construct of the idealist philosophical view will be discussed next.

2.9 Idealist philosophical view

MEAE is rooted in the philosophical movement known as Idealism (Regelski, 2003, p. 66). Westerlund (2002, p. 189) and Määttänen (2003, p. 66) confirm that Reimer's Aesthetic philosophy is rooted in idealistic traditions. In other words, the "what" and "how" of Aesthetic education is embedded in idealist ideas. Regelski (2003, p. 66) writes that the idealist MEAE model has been the central philosophy used as the rationale for music education. In his publication *Implications of Aesthetic versus Praxial Philosophies of Music for Curriculum Theory in Music Education*, Regelski (2003) explores the practical consequences that three[25] broad philosophical perspectives have on curriculum design in music instruction. I use the analogy of a tandem bicycle for the absolute expressionist and idealist philosophical positions, as it is directed towards the same individualistic, cerebral, disinterested Aesthetic position in music education. I draw on the philosophical constructs of aesthetics, as it forms an important part of the focus of this study. Traditional instrumental teaching and learning models have, for many decades, relied on the disembodied and distanced notions of the Aesthetic philosophy. Subsequently and to elucidate the Aesthetic philosophical view towards music education, the idealist philosophical framework, as interpreted by Regelski (2003, p. 64), will be utilised. The emergent themes are 1) the importance of intellectual ways of learning, 2) the musical object, 3) an aesthetic experience and 4) the education of feeling. These four themes are seen as the pivotal elements of Reimer's Aesthetic philosophy, as it contains the essence of his philosophical view.

[25] Regelski (2003, p. 64) discusses idealism, realism and neo-scholasticism philosophies. Two of these philosophical frameworks lie beyond the scope of this study.

2.9.1 The importance of intellectual learning

For Idealists, knowledge is not obtained through experience, but is *a priori*[26] and acquired through predefined, abstract (intellectual) ideas (Regelski, 2003, p. 64). *A priori* refers to knowledge that exists independently from exploration and experience. Experience is described as navigating through interaction with a social and physical setting that occurs in "ordinary doings and undergoings" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 16). Regelski (2017a, p. 114) describes *a priori* as knowledge that is "built into the world". According to this *a priori* status, cognition and knowledge are the results of abstract information gained from concepts that come "ready-made from the world" (Regelski, 2017a, p. 114). Idealists believe that knowledge is present before any type of experience (Westerlund, 2002, p. 70). Therefore, intellectual learning is considered most important, given that the rational mind gains knowledge (Regelski, 2003, p. 64). Westerlund (1999, p. 97) describes intellectual learning or an "intellectual happening" as "something happening between your two ears". In turn, the curriculum is grounded in abstract concepts and information that are transferred verbally, rendering education "merely academic" (Regelski, 2003, p. 64). Within one-to-one instrumental instruction, the "printed score directs the actions of the teachers who teach the students how to follow the markings appropriately" (Hultberg, 2002, p. 194). For beginner instrumental students, the correct interpretation of the score takes on the form of a "reproductive approach" and can prevent the students to successfully apply their knowledge in the future (Väkevä, et al., 2015, p. 5). An overemphasis on the teaching of skillful playing technique, can hinder a child's expressive and communicative skills on their instrument (Davidson, et al., 2001, p. 52). Thomson (2001, p. 254) describes this reproductive mode of teaching as the transmission of facts and information in order to fill the mind "as if inscribing a tabula rasa[27]". In other words, a student's mind is seen as an empty "vessel" to be filled by the teacher's information

[26] *A priori* is contrasted with a posteriori, where knowledge is dependent on experience (Westerlund & Väkevä, 2011, p. 41).

[27] With his writings in *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689), the 17th century English philosopher John Locke introduced the modern idea of *tabula rasa* (Duschinsky, 2012, p. 509). Tabula rasa "refers to a state in which a child is as formless as a blank slate" (Duschinsky, 2012, p. 509). "When born, the mind of the child is like a blank slate – "tabula rasa," to be filled later with the data" (Androne, 2014, p. 74).

(Aiello, 2013, p. 84). The filling of the mind idea rests on the concepts of training and banking.

2.9.1.1 Training

Training within an instrumental music teaching and learning scenario relies on mainly intellectual and cognitive modes of instruction. Taking the form of a traditional cognitive approach towards teaching and learning, where cognition and mind are isolated from bodily experiences, training focuses on computational internal processes "by which symbolically encoded stimuli are transformed into symbolically encoded instructions" in turn producing "intelligent behavior" (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019, p. 21). Van der Schyff (2015, pp. 75,76) writes that this perspective renders music education as training to analyse and accurately reproduce musical works. This view of music was founded in the Enlightenment and presents instrumental teaching as the correct representation of a musical work, a "created thing" (van der Schyff, 2015, pp. 75,76). Drawing on the work of Bowman (2002, p. 64), music education is placed into two opposing approaches which are instruction that is implemented with "educational intent" or instruction that focuses mainly on training. Bowman (2002, p. 66) explains that training centers around the imprinting of skills and techniques to reproduce "prespecified" behaviours. That is to say, training seeks to produce "future job fillers" that are trained to reproduce musical works and attain trophies by filling a student's "empty container" with complex information (Elliot & Silverman, 2015, p. 18). A connection is made between the above-described transferring of information and musical knowledge to the "banking" approach described by Freire (2005)The banking approach is pivotal to mention, as this approach opposes the focus of this study. The beginner instrumentalist is not merely a vehicle for information, but is a holistic and embodied person.

2.9.1.2 Banking approach

The Brazilian philosopher and educator Paulo Freire (1921–1997) was the pioneering developer of critical pedagogy (Abrahams, 2005, p. 3). Freire was a language teacher who focused on teaching illiterate adults to read Portuguese (Abrahams, 2005, p. 3). The focus of Freire's teachings was to empower and transform students in giving them the ability to associate the teachings with experiences and knowledge unique to their world and allowing them to participate and contribute to the learning process. In turn, students perceive their world in a deeper manner as the knowledge that is gained is more than mere information – it is information that can be applied to their experiences in order to bring forth change (Abrahams, 2005, pp. 3,4).

The above discussed educational approach describes training as the filling of an "empty container" (Elliot & Silverman, 2015, p. 18). Within the Freirean pedagogical approach, "banking" is the concept best describing this filling or storing of deposits, which Freire strongly opposed and critiqued in his pedagogical model (Freire, 2005, p. 72). "In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing" (Freire, 2005, p. 72). Thus, the student passively receives information from the teacher who is regarded as the primary source of information. Within this model, there is no room for active exploration and experiences in order for students to accumulate knowledge or create meaning from their own active experiences with the body in and with their environment. The perception of the curricular concepts is separated from the actions, explorations and agency needed for the internalisation of these concepts. The information said to be used to "fill" the student's mind[28], is "encoded into the score" of music pieces (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 85). Within the Aesthetic philosophy, the focus on teaching and learning lies in the correct representation of a musical work, in turn disregarding the young child as a holistic and embodied person. This links with the banking approaches' focus on depositing information into an empty container. The

[28] The notion of a person being merely a 'brain' which is to be filled with information links to the discussion on Cartesian dualism in Chapter 3 (3.2).

concept of music as object will next be discussed. The concept of music as object will next be discussed.

2.10 The musical object

Music as object or a work of art forms the core idea of Reimer's idealist Aesthetic philosophy. The work of art is seen as the omnipotent object on which all cognition and contemplation is focused, disregarding any practical, physical experiences outside of it. Founded in Western thinking that was advanced by Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle founded the groundwork that created a hierarchy for musical activities (Humphreys, 2006, p. 352). Stamou (2002, p. 11) explains that the construct of art as an object stems from the search for "truth" through objective means. Resulting from this paradigm, Humphreys (2006, p. 351) notes that it was expected of educated persons to envision things "outside themselves". Regardless of different views, the philosophers mentioned above agreed that intellectual knowledge concerned "eternal truth" (Dewey, 2001, p. 270). Stemming from this novel way of thinking, the concept of subject-object dualism came into being. Within this subject-object dualism, works of art were seen as objects in themselves, separated from other life processes. In turn, the study of such objects was seen as an intellectual activity (Humphreys, 2006, p. 351).

During the Enlightenment, the subject-object dualism continued in Cartesian[29] thinking. Humphreys (2006, p. 352) writes that the notion of the "ideal man," put forth by the Hellenic-Cartesian[30] approach saw "man" in isolation. Contemplation was favoured over action, which undeniably contributed to the principles of aesthetic thinking (Humphreys, 2006, p. 352). Juntunen and Westerlund (2001, pp. 204, 205) agree and write that in Cartesian thinking, music is seen as structures to be cognised instead of felt, done or experienced. In comparing the theories of Kant, Descartes and Reimer, Westerlund

[29] The term Cartesian is used when referring to the philosophical position of Descartes. Anderson (2011, p. 32) writes that the "Cartesian idea of a body/mind dichotomy has come to dominate the typical Western" approach mirrored in music education. The mind/body dualism will be discussed in Chapter 3 (3.2).
[30] Hellenic also means "Greek" (Unknown, 2021).

(2002, p. 6) argues that there is a correlation between Kantian autonomy, the Cartesian[31] self, which she refers to as the "Cartesian-Kantian self," aesthetic ideals and Reimer's approach.

Westerlund (2002, p. 6) remarks that the "dualistic isolation of the subject from the object, the mind from the body, and the individual from the social and communal is a shared tendency". Drawn from the dualistic separation described above, a distinctive feature of Reimer's MEAE approach is the claim that "aesthetic meaning is said to be contained within music's sounds as governed by the score of particular 'works'" (Regelski, 2003, p. 65). Reimer thus repeats the Cartesian-Kantian tendency to distance the mind from action and experience as it distances itself from participation and the "fleshy 'social'" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 123). Action, experience, participation and social constructs all form part of the suggestions made within this study to oppose Cartesian-Kantian dualism[32].

From a praxial[33] teaching point of view, Regelski (2003, p. 65) describes that in the late 19th century, works of art, the focus on the score as well as the autonomous, intrinsic meaning that is found in these "works" became the primary concern of music educational instruction. As mentioned previously, during the 18th century, "inner worth" became favoured over "social or material inheritance" (Elliott, 1995, p. 23). This new belief focused on the autonomy of the individual, irrespective of the individual's background. Elliott (1995, pp. 22, 24) writes that the autonomous musical work, much like the autonomous individual, "was to be valued in terms of 'innate properties alone'". Reimer (2003, p. 65) confirms that the nature and value of music lie in the independent, self-sufficient musical work or art object, and it is to be studied for its own sake. Meaning is found within the artwork itself and the qualities that make it a "created thing" (Reimer, 1989a, p. 14). Van der Schyff et al. (2016, p. 85) write that in this stance, meaning is mainly understood as

[31] Discussed in Chapter 3 (3.2).
[32] A full discussion on the influence of Cartesian-Kantian Dualism will commence in Chapter 3 (3.2).
[33] In this sense, "doing" is connected to a "praxial philosophy" of music education, meaning education through actions. The first reference to praxial philosophy of music was in 1990 by the philosopher Philip Alperson, challenging the tradition of aesthetic philosophy (Regelski, 1998, p. 22). Alperson argued that only a praxial philosophy of music education could fully justify the multiplicity of musical meaning and value in people's lives and serve as a basis for an inclusive philosophy of music education (Regelski 1998: 22). This important shift in educational thinking will be discussed later in this Chapter.

abstract mental schemes and concepts and accordingly, aesthetic experience relies on contemplating the formal aspects of the "supposedly autonomous" musical object or work. Much like the autonomous, disinterested individual of the Enlightenment, the musical object within Aesthetic philosophy is said to have ominous value and contemplation of this work, relying on purely mental representations. In other words, the musical object has no connection to the person or persons that brought it into existence, disregarding the holistic individuals with their unique personal and cultural contributions, as well as the social and interactive possibilities of said object. Furthermore, a musical object is said to bring forth an aesthetic experience, which is also disinterested and distanced from the factors and persons that mobilise such an object or work. To better understand an aesthetic experience, a discussion will ensue.

2.11 An aesthetic experience

An aesthetic experience is described as an intellectual happening that results from the contemplation of an aesthetic object. To better comprehend aesthetic experience, Marković (2012, p. 1) gives a description from a psychological perspective. He (Marković, 2012, p. 1) writes that "aesthetic experience is a psychological process in which the attention is focused on the object while all other objects, events, and everyday concerns are suppressed". Marković (2012, p. 1) continues that there are three fundamental characteristics of aesthetic experience: attention to an object, judgment of its "symbolic reality" as well as "a strong feeling of unity with the object of aesthetic fascination and aesthetic appraisal". In other words, aesthetic experience is unlike an everyday experience – it is a unique state of mind (Marković, 2012, p. 1).

For Reimer (1989b, p. 35), from a music educationalist stance, aesthetic experience is caused by the interaction between an experiencing individual subject and the artistic object that carries musical and artistic qualities in its form. Westerlund (2010, p. 3) adds that in Reimer's view, art is concerned with each individual's personal experience. Moreover, for Reimer, learning music is a matter of inwardly cognising the aesthetic qualities of the musical object, omitting the "non-musical" concerns such as the moral,

personal, cultural, religious, political, social and any other context or practical connection (Westerlund, 2003, pp. 46, 47). According to Reimer (1989a, p. 28), the individual subjective experience is isolated from the social, ethical and practical realms in which music is situated. Meaning, as mentioned earlier, is found in, or "possessed" by the formal structure of the music (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 84), thus paying little attention to its situatedness or practical concerns of the music itself. Stubley (2003, p. 3), in response to her readings of Reimer's work, writes that

> I knew music had meaning. Having myself been profoundly touched by its powers, I believed that meaning to be connected in some way with human feeling. And if the patterns and forms of music were in fact analogous to those of human feeling, then that explained why my music education, both practical and theoretical, was concerned primarily with "how music goes".

She (Stubley, 2003, p. 3) explains that, while her colleagues in Literature Studies were enthralled by "what a poem meant," she was captivated by the details within the music's compositional syntax. Stubley (2003, p. 3) makes a comparison between music and language based on the view of Reimer (2003, pp. 89-94). Stubley (2003, p. 3) writes, "[i]f music was to feeling what words were to the world of material objects and things, then to ask 'how music goes' was also to ask 'what it means'". In relation to the focus of this study, a main focus of traditional music teaching and learning is to teach music notation in order to produce a musical work (Thumlert & Nolan, 2019, p. 2). The Aesthetic philosophical view, with the emphasis on the musical work and its correct interpretation and representation, takes the focus away from what the music might mean to the learner who engages with it. Moreover, with the focus on the cognition of the structural aspects of the musical work, the social milieu in which it comes into being and the role that the body plays in cognition and experience are neglected.

2.12 An education of feeling

An education of feeling focuses on the inner thoughts said to be awakened by listening to a musical object. Reimer's approach has often been referred to as an education of feeling (Reimer, 2003). Feelings are conveyed through thought processes or "perceptual

structuring" and they manifest in musical experience (Stubley, 2003, p. 4) . Stubley (2003, p. 4) stipulates that this "cognitive lens" offers "a distinct mode of knowing". In turn, Regelski (2017a, p. 134) writes that "aestheticized feeling is *intellectually known* in symbolic form" (italics as in original). In other words, feeling as well as experience within an Aesthetic philosophical view form a cognitive construct. Reimer (2003, p. 213) writes that feelings are the foundation for the meanings we experience. Furthermore, feeling is "an essential enabler of intelligence" (Reimer, 2003, p. 213). Stated differently, feeling is an "underlying enabler of or precondition for the discriminations and connections on which intelligence is based" (Reimer, 2003, p. 212). Colwell (2015, p. 128) validates this notion and writes that feeling is associated with "intelligent interactions with music'" and is essentially cognitive. In essence, feeling, according to Reimer, is a cognitive experience felt in a subjective individual. This rational, inner feeling is felt subjectively because of a musical work, the meaning of which is carried in its form. Form, for Reimer (1989a), can be seen as the expressive qualities of a musical work that are independent of any connections outside of the work itself.

For the last twenty years there has been a surge in transforming ideas in music education research in order to establish a comprehensible philosophical-epistemological perspective[34]. Fossum and Vark*øy* (2012, p. 13), for example, observe that Reimer's MEAE has been subjected to "harsh critique". An investigation into the critique on Reimer's work will follow.

2.13 Critique of the Aesthetic philosophical view

Numerous writers, often using exaggerated terminology, oppose and criticise an Aesthetic view guiding music education. Their scrutinisation points out degrees of inadequacy with regard to holistic and inclusive music education. Barrett (2002, p. 67) writes that for too many authors Reimer's Aesthetic ideology is seen as an antagonizing "red cloth" (Fossum & Varkøy, 2012, p. 13). Instead of seeing music as an embodied

[34] De Jaegher, 2008; Di Paolo, et al., 2010; Gallagher, 2017; Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001; Regelski, 2006a, 2017b; Reybrouck, 2012, 2020, 2021; Schiavio, 2014; Silverman,2012, 2020; van der Schyff, 2015; Varela, et al., 2016; Westerlund, 2002.

experience, educators have accepted a “near-sighted” cognitive approach to music teaching and learning (Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001, p. 206). Westerlund (2003, p. 45, 46; 2010, p. 5) adds that not all academics agree on the Aesthetic discipline and maintains that Aesthetic theories are misrepresentative and unfitting. In a compelling statement, Bowman (2004, p. 33) writes that in searching for a justification for the educational value of music, we have settled for principles based on inadequate arguments of the nature and value of music and the arts. MEAE education “became a convenient slogan around which to muster the troops and convince the public that music was worth including in the curriculum for its own sake” (Jorgensen, 2003, p. 64). “While Reimer's intentions are undoubtedly ‘altruistic’, his aesthetic approach denies music educators to have an active and creative role in the search for an ideal philosophical approach” (Bradley, 2012, p. 420). Elliott (1995, p. 33) asks if it is possible to contend that music and music education are greater than autonomous aesthetic objects. Elliott (1995, p. 33) advises that not only is it possible, but crucial to an inclusive understanding of music education. Following is a discussion on the aspects of MEAE that are regularly critiqued for their idealist, cognitive, disembodied notions: firstly, a discussion on Reimer’s exclusive focus on the musical work, secondly aesthetic experience, thirdly an Aesthetic philosophical view that is based on Kantian philosophy and lastly the aspect of social that is absent in an Aesthetic philosophical view to music teaching and learning.

2.13.1 Autonomous, disinterested musical object

As mentioned earlier, by the turn of the 18th century, the Enlightenment marked a radical transformation of European society. Social order was no longer based on inherited wealth and privilege, leading to a decline of European aristocracy and the rise of the middle-class. With the belief that all men (but not women) were equal and free, this “intellectual awakening” started to focus on the development of independent thought, the “self,” and inner worth (Elliott, 1995, pp. 23,24).

Outspoken critique follows the construct of the autonomous and disinterested musical object. With an emphasis on autonomous individuals, regardless of their background and

social situatedness, aesthetic theories of music followed suit, focusing on the disinterested and distanced contemplation of objects (Beck, 1993, p. 6; Elliott, 1995, pp. 23,24). Aiello (2013, p. 74) concurs that a disinterested contemplation along with the autonomous aesthetic object is privileged in traditional Aesthetics, rendering *a priori* knowledge and cognition a priority. Scarborough (2015, p. 168) writes that within the Enlightenment, the autonomous individual was to dominate nature. This Kantian tradition rooted in the Enlightenment sees the mind as an end in itself that is independent of social or other useful purposes (Regelski, 2020b, p. 10; Westerlund, 2002, pp. 18,110). Like the autonomous individual, an autonomous musical object's value lies only in its inherent properties (Elliott, 1995, p. 24). Aesthetic meaning is thus contained "within music's sound as governed by the score of particular 'works'', to be "contemplated for its own sake" (Regelski, 2003, p. 65). Aiello (2013, pp. 76, 77) elaborates that the autonomous musical object is thus "free of 'extra-musical variables'" rendering it "timeless, faceless, and placeless". Ridley (2004, p. 11) criticises this view as follows:

> There is something very odd, after all, about how so much philosophy of music has so often been done. To try to isolate music entirely, to try to leech or prise out of it its context-laden character, and indeed the very nature of one's context-laden engagement with it is rather like trying to pretend that music had come from Mars.

In accordance with the above statement, Regelski (2020b, p. 10) adds that such a socially devoid aesthetic position or "autonomania" detaches music from its role as social practice and process rendering it a mere artistic product. Jorgensen (2003, pp. 81, 82) comments that an Aesthetic philosophical approach towards music education emphasizes musical products, paying insufficient notice to the "unfolding or flow of sound through time". In other words, the musical product is seen in isolation from the contexts within which it was created – contexts such as the social, emotional, cultural and embodied embeddedness of the musical work and the experience of the person engaged in the music-making process. Jorgensen (2008, p. 26) confirms that the situatedness of the musical work, such as the social or cultural context, and the "role of music as a social practice" are inadequately noticed and addressed. Focusing on and specifically listening to the musical work or object brings forth an aesthetic experience of which is also disinterested of any

social, cultural and holistic features. Within beginner instrumental music education, a young child is taught to focus on “fingering, notation, and sound production”, in order to bring forth an aesthetically pleasing product, in turn hindering any opportunity for expression or bodily experience (Davidson, et al., 2001). The critique on aesthetic experience will follow.

2.13.2 Aesthetic Experience

The aesthetic experience receives critique because of its isolated, individualistic nature. With intent I write “the” experience and not “an” experience, because of the lack of grounding or context that an aesthetic experience has. Panaiotidi (2003, p. 73) accurately summarises an aesthetic experience as a “depersonalization”. Westerlund (1999, p. 100) adds that Reimers’ Aesthetic philosophy is an “interest-free theory” and that this is considered the core problem of the Aesthetic philosophy in music education. Similarly, Panaiotidi (2003, p. 76) accurately describes this disinterestedness as a *clinical* focus on the structural elements of a musical work (Italics added). “[T]here are no autonomous, *a priori*, and universal meanings, values, or symbolized feeling-states that can be timelessly experienced in singular form” (Regelski, 2017a, p. 114). Disinterested contemplation, along with the supposed autonomous musical object, became the only true path to pursue in music education stemming from traditional Aesthetic theories (Regelski, 2006a, p. 282). In terms of instrumental music instruction and performance, the disinterested, clinical features of the aesthetic experience can be seen in the manner in which instrumentalists are taught music through the “classical conservatoire culture”, focusing on the teaching of the popular composers of classical music such as Mozart, Beethoven and Bach (Sloboda, 2005, p. 278). Here, the focus lies in the “faithful reproduction” of said musical works with “extreme technical difficulty”, in turn comparing different instrumentalists with each other (Sloboda, 2005, p. 278). Consequently, an aesthetic experience is brought forth for the previously mentioned instrumentalists[35] through the cognitive contemplation

[35] I do not wish to discard the product as put forth by the aesthetic approach. Rather, I look for a synergism between the product and process in which the product is brought forth. Musical products “embody and communicate a wide variety of meanings, including artistic-structural, emotional, representational, cultural-

of the classical musical object. The aesthetic experience with its dissociative nature is an insufficient occurrence and does not answer to the inclusive, relational nature of music teaching and learning.

2.13.3 Kantian stance

Kantian philosophy is grounded in individualistic, cognitive constructs. Reimer's description of aesthetic experience holds a resemblance to the Kantian experiencing individual where experience is situated inwardly and "not through the social world" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 118). "Subsequently, individual subjectivity is the end in view of aesthetic transformation as in Kant's philosophy" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 119). Elliott (1995, p. 124) agrees and writes that Reimer's use of the term aesthetic experience has close connections to Kant, especially with the usage of the terms "disinterested", "distanced" and "purposeless" (Fossum & Varkøy, 2012, p. 14). Reimer (1997, p. 10) writes that art is isolated from other life experiences, thus separating works of art from other human undertakings. He goes so far as to state that even when the musical or social influences of a musical work are acknowledged, that too is "considered insignificant or at least secondary" (Reimer 2003:42).

I infer that the disinterested nature of the aesthetic experience can be linked to Kant's "purposiveness without purpose". Last mentioned is described by Alperson (1991, p. 220) as the focus given to the form, construct and structure while disregarding the "practical significance" of the musical work. Commenting on the Kantian view, Dewey (2005, p. 256) wrote that "disinterestedness cannot signify uninterestedness". Rendering aesthetic experience as conceptless and disinterested, Bowman (1991a, p. 45) argues that a Kantian aesthetic experience is a cognitive activity that is embedded in perception and form. "The term aesthetic thus suggests the perception and contemplation of things rather than their creation – looking, listening, or reading rather than making – which is congenial

ideological, narrative, autobiographical, and ethical meanings" (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 193). Importantly, musical products rely on the "socially situated nature of the musical people, processes, products, and contexts involved" (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 193). I want to synergise the product and process in beginner instrumental music education.

to my purpose" (Smith, 1989, p. 4). Thus, by focusing on the cognition and contemplation of a musical work, the practical aspect of how that work is brought into being is neglected. Bowman (1991a, p. 54) concurs that the aesthetic orientation is likely to "value contemplating music over 'doing' it". Westerlund (2002, p. 118) distances herself from Kantian universals as she mentions that the Kantian stance is constituted in human cognition, rather than in social action. Music teaching and learning relies on the social construct and milieu in which it is realised. The critique on the lack of social situatedness within the Aesthetic philosophical approach will now be discussed.

2.13.4 Social situatedness

Music-making experiences along with teaching and learning rely greatly on the social situatedness of all persons involved. Persons engaged in making music bring with them a unique social and cultural background which are brought forth in the teaching and learning situation. A fundamental criticism of Reimer's philosophy is the role of social context and content (Dillon, 2001, p. 41). An aesthetic experience disregards its social and cultural situatedness (Jorgensen, 2008, p. 26). British ethnomusicologist and social anthropologist John Blacking was one of the first academics who observed the social and cultural facets of bodily experience (Westerlund, 2001: 208). Blacking (1973, p. 72) noted that 18th century aesthetic ideals cannot separate the social setting and persons who are involved in listening and performing music.

Westerlund's first critique on Reimer's Aesthetic philosophical view towards music education in *Bridging Experience, Action, and Culture in Music Education* is that his approach undermines the social context in which music education takes place: "I distance myself from Reimer, who fixes his theoretical emphasis between inward subjective experience and the musical object" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 23).

MEAE does not acknowledge the shared aspect of music-making. Instead of focusing on the "flesh-and-blood social being", MEAE relies on inner, subjective experiences (Westerlund, 2002, p. 105). Westerlund (2002, p. 117) explains that Reimer does not

acknowledge the shared ideas and practices within an individual's thinking when writing that, “[m]usical practice is always social and not subjective”. In agreement, Regelski comments that “[w]e are social beings” – music is a social activity that induces “human connectedness” (Regelski, 2020b, p. 4). Westerlund (2002, pp. 76, 77) writes that a universal subjective view may be destructive as it separates meanings from “actual socially lived life”. Furthermore, Westerlund (2002, p. 26) explains that a musical experience and learning is not simply a private undertaking and that an individual is a part of larger contexts, social networks, and “even social battles” (Westerlund, 2002, p. 72). Dewey (2005, p. 204) also distances himself from solely focusing on the object as the sole agent of value, isolated from the human circumstances and “actual life experience” in which it originated. In answering to the lack of practical engagements in the Aesthetic philosophical view, I proceed with a discussion on the Praxial philosophy in music education.

2.14 Praxial philosophy: dissatisfaction with the Aesthetic ideal

The Praxial philosophy to music education resulted from dissatisfaction with the Aesthetic philosophical approach. Elliott (1995, p. vii) writes that his Praxial philosophy

> offers a philosophy not in the popular but mistaken sense of a canon to live and die for, but as a possible view and, therefore, as a tool – as a means to initiating, stimulating, guiding, and supporting the efforts of music teachers … as they tackle the many theoretical and practical issues involved in music education.

Focusing on the action needed to bring the musical work mentioned in the Aesthetic philosophy into being, a Praxial philosophy to music education focuses on “doing” music. Much of 20th century music education was guided by notions of aesthetics founded in the Enlightenment (van der Schyff, 2020, p. 14). From this vantage point, pedagogical approaches became “technically-driven” in order to produce a created “thing” (van der Schyff, 2020, p. 14). Rooted in the philosophical core of the Enlightenment, MEAE came to be known as the “official philosophy” of music education for over half a century (Elliott, 1991a, p. 22). Even today, remnants of the Aesthetic philosophical view can be observed

in the school curriculum. Thumlert and Nolan (2019, p. 2) insist that in present-day classrooms, the tradition of “policing sounds and music” still resides under the aesthetics banner. They (Thumlert & Nolan, 2019, p. 2) point out that

> aural/sound/music experiences … and competences have been curricularized in ways that largely detach sound and music from wider cultural … and embodied contexts, subjecting music (learning) to disciplinary modes … that ultimately abstract sounds and embodied sound play into notational systems, idealized performance goals, and associated skills assessments.

Since the 1970s, MEAE came under growing criticism. Within instrumental music practices, teaching and learning grounded in MEAE was seen as the “driving force of the profession” (Bauer & Berg, 2001, p. 61). Many music educators started to identify aesthetic rationales’ limitations (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 28). Schmidt (2005, p. 5) writes that “[b]esides the indisputable contributions” the traditional Aesthetic philosophical view to music education has made to education and practice, it has inevitably come to serve as a medium to estrange the meaning found in practices in school music. At the outset of the 1970s, Schwadron (1973) identified a need for music education to answer the many cultural varieties and embraced ethnomusicological perspectives for a more inclusive music education (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 28). Criticism and growing uncertainty in the Aesthetic rationale was, amongst other aspects, directed towards the lack of accommodation of pluralist society, various musics, and multiplicity of thought (Schwadron, 1973, p. 49). Commenting on the restrictions of the Aesthetic philosophical view, Lemmon (1977, p. 8) illuminates:

> We may approach what Reimer has done in one of two ways. Either we must believe that all musicians … work according to the principles of Reimer's theory of art … or only those works and activities of musicians that can be shown to conform to the conditions laid down by Reimer's theory of art can be justifiably included in deliberations on [curriculum making].

McCarthy and Scott Goble (2005, p. 29) state that the 1980s marked a loss of confidence in the Aesthetic philosophical view towards music education and that the “era of philosophical unity was drawing to a close”. Likewise, Colwell (1986, p. 37) remarks that, although music education still marches forward under the Aesthetic rationale,

philosophers and educators are searching for a “new gonfalon” which is plausible to the general public. The potential of a "new philosophy” in music education was first proposed by the music philosophers Sparshott (1987) and Wolterstorff (1987) in two essays published in Alperson’s book *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music* (1987). Resisting the purport of an Aesthetic philosophy towards music education, a Praxial philosophy seemed to answer the Aesthetic ideal's growing dissatisfaction with the Aesthetic ideal. In adopting a Praxial philosophy, Alperson (1991, p. 233) maintained that a praxial view opposes the universalistic, formalist view of an Aesthetic philosophical view. The objective of a Praxial philosophy of music is to recognise “just what music has meant to people”, an objective that Alperson (1991, p. 234) affirms, including but not restricting music's purpose as in Aesthetic perspectives.

The potentials of the aforementioned “new banner” were in the minds of various music education scholars (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 31). Elliott (1995), Regelski (1981) and Bowman (2002) are the leading figures that have endorsed a Praxial philosophy for music education, with Elliott as the most notable advocate for a Praxial philosophy. "His efforts ultimately opened the door to new ways of thinking about the philosophy of music education" (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005, p. 31). Elliott, professor at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development of New York City, is a prominent and influential philosopher and educator. As a student of Reimer’s, Elliott became very well acquainted with the workings of an Aesthetic philosophical approach to music education, yet in the latter half of the 1980s he became interested in approaching practices in music education in a different way (Scott Goble, 2003, p. 25).

Believing that music educators’ commitment towards a specific philosophical standpoint can become “static”, Elliott (1991b, p. 48) called for teachers and philosophers’ views to constantly be reevaluated in order to benefit the “health of the profession”. As an alternative to the Aesthetic philosophical view, Elliott (1995, p. 14) suggested that the application of a Praxial philosophy presents music educators with an alternative view to earlier beliefs. Elliott pointed out what he considered to be the principal errors and inconsistencies within the Aesthetic concept of music, calling for its total abolishment and

replacement with the praxial view, which he considers to be the only viable alternative available (Panaiotidi, 2003, pp. 71, 72). In essence, the Praxial philosophy focuses on the teaching of musicianship, or thinking and knowing music, through musicing (Karslen, 2011, p. 109). For instrumental music teaching and learning, a Praxial philosophy poses an opportunity for the student to gain “musical understanding … through playing an instrument” (Bauer & Berg, 2001, p. 56) – that is to say a learner acquires musical knowledge by practically engaging in a diverse selection of music by playing, improvising, composing and conducting (Elliott, 2005, p. 7). The Praxial philosophy differs from the Aesthetic philosophical view in that it does not see the musical work as the main carrier of value and instead acknowledges the actions needed and situatedness of those actions in order for the work to come about (Elliott, 2005, p. 8).

In the second half of the 1980s, Elliott (1986) published an article focusing on jazz education based on the theorist Ernest Schachtel’s perspectives. Elliott (1986, p. 45) wrote that jazz performance gives one a sense of “*being in* music” (italics as in original). He made a landmark contribution by remarking that “[p]articipation, not contemplation, is the hallmark of the jazz aesthetic” (Elliott, 1986, p. 45). Furthermore, Elliott (1986, p. 52) suggested that jazz educators should not permit themselves to be inhibited by the aesthetic ideal. Still finding that the Aesthetic philosophical view does not sufficiently apply to jazz education, Elliott published an article, *Structure, and Feeling in Jazz: Rethinking Philosophical Foundations* (1987). In the concluding paragraph, Elliott (1987, p. 32) maintains that music education's then-current philosophical foundations needed reconsidering.

From the outset of Reimer’s second edition of *A Philosophy of Music Education* (1989), Elliott (1989a, p. 5), in reviewing this work, noted that even though Reimer attempted to showcase a “new vision” for music education, he missed the plot. That same year, Elliott (1989b, p. 12) in his publication *Key Concepts in Multicultural Music Education* goes a step further and states that the Aesthetic philosophical view to music education fails to recognise “the fact that music is something that people make and do”. Philosophers and teachers alike have argued for “musical action” rather than contemplation (Westerlund,

2002, p. 6). In avoiding the Aesthetic basis that became the ideological foundation for music teaching and learning, a Praxial philosophy gained prominence (Regelski, 2017a, p. 103). The notion of "praxis" comprises experience and identity (Regelski, 2002, p. 69) and therefore contemplates ideas of action and people (Regelski, 2017a, p. 111). Regelski (2017a, p. 111) explains that this type of action, or doing, is an ethical action because it involves people. Praxis is not mere “doing” that involves “things” (Regelski, 2017a, p. 111). Regarding music education as praxis, Westerlund (2002, p. 182) explains that for Elliott, praxis stresses musical performance, thus, action. Within a one-to-one instrumental music teaching and learning situation, action manifests through the playing of or performing on an instrument (Bauer & Berg, 2001, p. 56). By focusing on performance, Elliott (1995) contrasts his praxial view to that of Reimer (1989a) who focuses on listening to the Western elite, aesthetic musical works (Smith, 1989, p. 4). With the focus on action and performance, the Praxial philosophy as applied by Elliott (1995) moves a step closer to the focus on experience sought after in this study[36].

Praxis is not a current convention and stems from classical Greece (Stamou, 2002, p. 11). The Praxial philosophy towards music education draws on the philosophical underpinnings in Aristotle’s writings (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 76). Stamou (2002, p. 4) concurs that the views of Aristotle, in particular, have influenced many generations of intellectuals, and evidence of this influence is still found in the writings of modern-day philosophers and music educators (Stamou, 2002, p. 11). Similarly, Van der Schyff (2020, p. 14) mentions that Aristotle’s concept of praxis was developed into a “theoretical framework”, specifically guiding philosophical thinking in music education for philosophers such as Elliott and Silverman (2015) and Regelski (1998).

2.15 Aristotelian bases of praxis

To better situate the Aristotelian notion of praxis and to clarify key concepts, I draw on the writings of Alperson (1991), Elliott (1995) and Regelski (1998). In his publication *The*

[36] The critique on Elliott’s (1995) application of praxialism in music education will be discussed in this Chapter (2.18).

Aristotelian Bases of Praxis for Music and Music Education as Praxis Regelski (1998, p. 23) mentions that Aristotle subdivided knowledge (*episteme*) involved in thinking (*dianoia*) into three different principles, namely theoria, techne and praxis. Accordingly, a discussion on 1) Theoria, 2) Techne, and 3) Poiesis and Praxis follows. Praxis in the third instance is separated between making (poiesis) and doing (praxis).

2.15.1 Theoria

Van der Schyff (2015, p. 83) describes *theoria* as "technical knowledge" or "speculative knowledge" that is to be “studied, arranged, and contemplated for its own sake”. Dissanayake (2003, p. 17) describes contemplation for “own sake” as “nonutilitarian”. Similarly, Regelski (2017a, p. 111) states that *theoria* is a manifestation of "theoretical knowledge". In Aristotle's view, *theoria* is autonomous, universal, abstract, objective and true (Regelski, 1998, p. 23; Regeski, 2020a, p. 14). To put *theoria* into perspective, it has to be noted that Aristotle was a student of Plato (Regelski, 1998, p. 23). One can deduce that *theoria* correlates with the Aesthetic philosophical approach where the focus lies on the autonomous musical object that is to be contemplated for its own sake. Regelski (2017a, p. 112) confirms that the Greek concept of *theoria* is consistent with the Aesthetic philosophical approach. *Theoria* “also describes the kinds of meanings and values advanced by the aesthetic theories” (Regelski, 2003, p. 76). In line with the idealist philosophical perspective discussed earlier, *theoria* is therefore experienced as “merely academic” (Regeski, 2020a, p. 14). In this sense, Regelski (1998, pp. 23, 24) explains that knowledge is only in the mind – abstract, intellectualised, cerebral knowledge is “entrained” for the mind alone, and not for practical use (Regelski, 1998, p. 24). *Theoria*, or in standard terms, theory, is used to "just know about," "knowing that," or to "understand" a specific concept of a topic (Regelski, 1998, p. 24). In a 1991 publication, Elliott (1991a, p. 27) explains that in the Aristotelian sense, music is seen as a form of knowledge that is to be learned about. He (Elliott, 1991a, p. 27) urges that music is not only knowledge that is “in the mind”, but that it is a practice, it is action. The previous statement highlights the disembodied nature of the Aesthetic philosophical approach and how Elliott, with the Praxial philosophy, tries to remediate separation of mind and body in

bringing the body back into the music-making process. Elliott and Silverman (2019, p. 9) make it clear that educators should focus on teaching through music, not only in or about music.

2.15.2 Techne

Secondly, and to answer to ordinary pragmatic[37] needs, Aristotle identified another two types of knowledge, techne, and praxis (Regelski, 1998, p. 24). According to van der Schyff (2015, p. 83), techne is the "technical or procedural knowledge[38]" that is coupled with production. Techne is knowledge that is needed for "making," "creating," or "producing" (Regelski, 1998, p. 25). Elliott (1991a, p. 29) describes techne as a "form of know-how". According to Regelski (2011, p. 228), techne utilises cognitive and technical skills to create "things". Regelski (2011, p. 225) describes this process as a "factory assembly line". Techne encapsulates the "job" that has to be done to get results, and therefore the process of making has no value to either the maker or the user (Regelski, 1998, p. 25) – it simply represents information held within the brain that is necessary for the production of a created thing or musical work.

2.15.3 Poiesis

Lastly, Aristotle distinguished between making and doing (Westerlund, 2002, p. 182). Poiesis is knowledge that is needed for "making," "producing," or "creating" certain products or objects (Regelski, 1998, p. 25). Similarly, poiesis can also be described as "bringing forth" (Regelski, et al., 2003). Poiesis is, thus, the actions involved in producing

[37] Regelski (2017a, p. 106) stipulates that Charles S. Peirce is the "father" of pragmatism. Schooled in the field of mathematics and science, Peirce coined and developed the term pragmatism around the 1870s. Two of Peirce's articles are most prominent in this development: *The Fixation of Belief* (Peirce, 1877) and *How to Make Our Ideas Clear* (Peirce, 1878). "The lesson to learn from pragmatism is that action is involved in the ways we perceive the world" (Määttänen, 2015, p. 28). In pragmatism, experience is interconnected with action. Määttänen (2015, p. 24) explains that cognition continues along the following line: "perception – reflection – decision – action", a pragmatic approach towards cognition involves perception and action, thus cognition in a pragmatic sense continues along this line: "action – obstacle encountered – search for new possibilities of action – reflection – decision – action".

[38] It is the procedural knowledge that changes sensation into perception, as that which is being sensed is changed into perception through that one already knows (dos Santos & Gerling, 2012, p. 196).

a product (Regelski, 2017a, p. 111). In poiesis, the product is separated from its production (Westerlund, 2002, p. 182). Where techne is the theoretical knowledge that is needed to produce something, poiesis is the action needed in the production. Thus, techne and poiesis are closely linked to one another (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 83). Within the context of this study, a praxial view is the first step in the direction of an active, embodied and inclusive approach to music teaching and learning, especially true for Elliott's later works which will be discussed in Chapter 3 (3.12.2).

2.16 Restructuring the nature and value of music education

In 1995, when Elliott published *Music Matters—A New Philosophy of Music Education,* it marked a paradigm shift for music education (Silverman & Elliott, 2013, p. 4). Van Der Schyff (2015, p. 75) describes Elliott's 1995 publication as signifying a crucial change in thinking regarding what music could mean for music education and humanity. Spychiger (1997, p. 33) provokingly calls the aesthetic ideal an "obsolete" approach towards music education. Elliott (1995, p. 39) expresses that past ways of explaining the nature and significance of music are insufficient and writes (Elliott, 1995, p. 32) that students need to be "active participants" in music. Up until this point in music teaching and learning in regards to the "official" Aesthetic philosophy, the student was merely seen as a reproducer of the great works. Within the Praxial philosophy, the student is an active participator in the teaching and learning situation, especially for beginner instrumental instruction (Gordon, 2003; Gordon, 2013; Matyja & Schiavio, 2013; Trevarthen, 2011). Like Alperson (1991), Elliott's forerunner, Elliott (1995) questioned and challenged the Aesthetic rationale and pursued the application of a Praxial philosophy to music education.

Aiello (2013, p. 78) states that the fundamental aspect of Elliott's 1995 writings was the "rethinking of the nature of music itself". In doing this Elliott (1995, p. 39) urges that music is more than a piece of music, "work" of art, a performance, composition, or an improvisation. Music is an "intentional human activity" (Elliott, 1995, p. 39). Spychiger (1997, p. 34) concurs with Elliott's definition of music as a "*human practice*", or even more

accurately, "a *diverse human practice".* “Music making is, after all, one of the very oldest of human activities” (Alperson, 2010, p. 172). With an absence of human activity comes an absence of musical works (Elliott, 1995, p. 39). Directly following this statement Elliott defines four facets of music that he considers the starting point and foundation of a praxial music education philosophy, namely that music consists of a doer or maker, a product, the action or activity whereby the product is produced, and lastly the entire context in which all of this takes place. See below (Figure 1) a visual representation of these four constructs:



Figure 1: Elliott’s foundation of a praxial music education philosophy (Elliott, 1995, p. 40).

The aforementioned facets of music function as a whole within a Praxial philosophy and hold close to the Aristotelian notion of praxis. Originating from the Greek word “prasso,” “praxis” can be translated as “action,” “acting,” “to do”, or “to act purposefully” (Elliott, 1995, p. 14). Elliott (1995, p. 14) remarks that “prasso” means more than just the action alone. For Aristotle “prasso” or “praxis” refers to action within a situation. In other words,

praxis means action that is “embedded in, responsive to, and reflective of a specific context” (Elliott, 1995, p. 14). Context, Elliott (1995, p. 40) explains, is the “total of ideas, associations, and circumstances that surround, shape, frame, and influence something and our understanding of that something”. Henceforth, the four facets will be referred to as musicer (doer), musicing (doing), music (product) and context (Elliott, 1995, p. 40). Focusing on the praxial or “doing” aspect of Elliott’s philosophy, a key facet is musicing and its manifestation in musicianship, which will be discussed.

2.17 Musicing and musicianship

Finding that the traditional Aesthetic philosophical approach focuses on music’s connection with “matters of beauty, goodness, and truth” and in turn obscures music education as a form of intentional doing or making, Elliott (1995) suggests a Praxial philosophy (Jorgensen, 2008, p. 26). Focusing on the “doing” or “action” facet of what he considers to be the foundation of a praxial music education, Elliott urges that the focus of music teaching and learning should be on “musicing” (Elliott, 1995, p. 49). A term coined by Elliott, “musicing” refers to music-making or music listening (Daugherty, 1996, p. 7). Elliott (2016, p. 1) defines musicing as inclusive of performing, composing, improvising, leading, listening, dancing and the “social-cultural contexts” in which the musicing transpires.

The need for the creation of a term that could encapsulate the action and doing essence of music-making was also recognised by Christopher Small (1995, p. 2), a music educator and philosopher from New Zealand. Small (1995, p. 2) offered a term to capture the essence of “to music”. That term is “musicking”, the “k” in which Small (1995, p. 2) mentioned be added for a “little caprice of [his] own”. In his publication *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening* Small (1998, p. 9) defines musicking as participation in any capacity, whether it be performing, listening, rehearsing or supplying material for a performance. He notes that in musicking there is no distinction between the performer and the rest of the souls present at a performance: each person is involved and has some level of responsibility (Small, 1998, p. 10). Regelski (2017a, p. 109)

captures this stance in stating that musicking involves the musical event in its entirety and "not just the sound of the moment".

In Elliott's praxial theory the teaching of musicing and to move forward in musicing is the primary goal of music teaching and learning (Regelski, 2017a, p. 102). Westerlund (2002, p. 167) points out that as aesthetic experience is at the root of Reimer's philosophy, so is musical action or "musicing" to that of Elliott. Elliott (1995, p. 40) proposes that the term "musicing" reminds, or in his words "re-minds" us that musical compositions and works cannot exist without music-making. Musicing is an essential term and construct of praxis because even aesthetic musical works will "remain silent" unless performed or interpreted by musicians (Elliott, 1995, p. 49). Musicing reiterates that performance and improvisation lie close to the heart of music (Elliott, 1995, p. 49).

It can be deduced then that musicing equals action, and Elliott (1995, p. 53) describes music-making or musicing as realised through *procedural* knowledge[39] (italics as in original). Daugherty (1996, p. 3) explains that procedural knowledge is a form of nonverbal "knowing-how," which Elliott (1995, p. 53) calls musicianship. Stated differently, musicianship is revealed through actions or practical knowledge instead of words (Elliott, 1995, pp. 51, 52). When people of all ages make music well[40], they display musicianship (Elliott, 1995, p. 52). Elliott (1995:64) insists that "musicianship crystalizes in a student's effort to develop practical solutions to realistic musical problems in relation to the standards, traditions, history, and lore of a musical context". Drawing on the works of Schőn (1987), Elliott (1995, p. 54) utilises the terms "thinking-in-action" and "knowing-in-action" to better describe musicianship. "Thinking-in-action" is a type of "demonstrative explaining" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 169). "Knowing-in-action" can be described as a type of "reflective thinking-in-action" or "reflection-in-action[41]" where actions are adapted

[39] Commenting on the construct of cognition that is wholly "in the mind", Elliott (1991a, p. 27) comments on how disembodied theories neglect to see "'knowledge' as a body of practice or a form of rational action".
[40] As Elliott was a student of Reimer (2003), imprints of the Aesthetic philosophy can be found in his early works (1986; 1987; 1989a; 1989b; 1991a; 1991b; 1995).
[41] In instrumental music practices, reflection-in-action manifests when "an instrumentalist practices to move his or her fingers fast and correctly and when the player stops and reflects upon what he or she did are no longer two separate phases" (Gruhn, 2005, p. 110).

according to various changes within a situation or tradition (Westerlund, 2002, p. 170). Westerlund (2002, p. 170) explains that music-making, for Elliott, is a type of thoughtful, non-verbal and reflective action, thus "knowing-in-action".

"Thinking-in-action" or "knowing-in-action" is a non-verbal form of thinking, knowing, or cognition[42] (Daugherty, 1996, p. 33). Daugherty (1996, p. 33) writes that Elliott's Praxial philosophy combines two "major ingredients", music as cognition and music as action. Consequently, "the actions of making and listening to music involve thinking, or cognition, which is manifested in and with those actions themselves" (Daugherty, 1996, p. 33). In other words, music cognition equals music action. Even though the perception and action involved in musicianship bring one closer to the holistic and embodied nature of the research, Westerlund (2002, p.148) comments that Elliott's approach is "not without problems".

2.18 Critique of the Praxial philosophy

Elliott's philosophy has not been accepted without critique or criticism. A year after the publication of *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* (Elliott, 1995), Reimer (1996) gave his commentary on this "new" philosophy. Titled *David Elliott's "New" Philosophy of Music Education: Music for Performers Only,* Reimer (1996, p. 60) commented on the wording of Elliott's publication. In stating that his philosophy is "new", Elliott gives the impression that the field of philosophy is a "competitive sport" where the outcome is to "win" (Reimer, 1996, p. 60). That is to say, this "new" philosophy is meant to improve the "old" construct, rendering the old as "something to be discarded" (Reimer, 1996, p. 62). Mentioning that in Elliott's attempt to develop a "new" philosophy in order to "overthrow" the weaknesses of MEAE, Reimer (1996, p. 61) argues for the inclusiveness of all the ways in which people make music, including and not limited to "listening, performing, improvising, composing, judging, analyzing, describing, and understanding". Further criticism from Reimer (1996, p. 66) includes Elliott's reference to MEAE as being "product obsessed", advocating in turn for the process in which the product came into

[42] Active engagement in cognition is linked with embodied cognition theories which will be discussed in Chapter 3 (3.6).

being. Reimer (1996, p. 66) articulates that Elliott "blatantly misrepresented" the MEAE model and writes that the products of musical work "rely heavily" on the practical application of musical skills. Arguing that MEAE is an inclusive approach, a "new" philosophy from Elliott seems unnecessary (Reimer, 1996, p. 62).

A second important aspect that is not considered in Elliott's early works[43], specifically his 1995 book *Music Matters*, is the "ethical element of praxis" (Bradley, 2012, p. 422). Regelski (1998, p. 28) concurs that an ethical kind of doing is not addressed in Elliott's 1995 publication. The type of ethical doing referred to is called "phronesis". Phronesis is an ethical concern to participate in rightful action as opposed to action that is correct, practical, or convenient (Bradley, 2012, p. 428). At the heart of phronesis is the development of each student's unique connection with music as well as the forming of identities (Bradley, 2012, p. 422). Stated differently, in education, phronesis is where teachers are aware and mindful of the repercussions their actions might have on learners and as a result constantly reflect upon their behaviour[44] (Bradley, 2012, p. 428). Elliott's early writings on his Praxial philosophy does not take into consideration the ethical side of praxis which is found in its Aristotelian basis.

A third point of criticism is that even though Elliott focuses on musical action and cognition, his Praxial philosophy neglects the "intuitive and experiencing individual as a whole" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 22). The undue focus on "incoming information" in Elliott's praxial view fails to consider the "situational and contextual aspect of musical action" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 148) Westerlund (2002, p. 226) argues that in this reliance on "individual cognitive experience", the student appears to be a mere "brain-machine" which "has to be put to work"[45]. As Elliott argued for procedural knowledge, discussed in 2.8.1, he argues for cognition through the use of the body. Elliott (1995, p. 103) validates the

[43] Elliott's later works include extensive writings on elements of ethics (Elliott & Silverman, 2012; 2015; Elliott, et al., 2016). Elliott's later works will be discussed in Chapter 3.
[44] The notion of neglecting phronesis in praxis aligns with teaching with an authoritarian approach, giving no room for the students to reflect, vocalise and adapt to the learning process (Bradley, 2012, p. 422). In a more recent publication (Schiavio, et al., 2020, p. 1), it seems that the master-apprentice mode of teaching, also mentioned in Chapter 1, is still evident in current music pedagogy.
[45] Suggestions will be made in Chapter 3 in an attempt to overcome the individualist, cognitive stance that is still found in Elliott's praxial philosophy.

previous statement when he says that “if the body is in the mind, then it makes sense … that the kinds of moving involved in music-making are essential to improving musical understanding” (Westerlund & Juntunen, 2005, p. 117). The individualism that manifests in Elliott's work neglects the social and situational nature of musical interaction (Westerlund, 2002, p. 22). Elliott writes of a social aspect in his early work, but Westerlund (2002, p. 211) clarifies that Elliott's social notion instead focuses on how meaning and knowledge are constructed within a social situation. With regards to a one-on-one instrumental music teaching and learning situation, instruction takes the form of “a conductor who controls decision making within an ensemble” (Bradley, 2012, p. 422) In other words, a master-apprentice manner of instruction where the teacher is seen as the sole carrier of all information that is then deposited to the student. This implies that the “students lack the potential to contribute to collective knowledge production” (Bradley, 2012, p. 422). Thus, students have little power to contribute to the teaching and learning situation as instruction remains rooted in “traditional authoritarian” ways of instruction (Bradley, 2012, p. 422). Consequently, students have little to no opportunity to engage in communal and shared music-making experiences[46] with the teacher and peers at large. In conclusion, the deconstruction of Elliott’s early philosophical writings questions whether the focus on the performing individual, although in a social situation, but not socially engaged, is the correct application of a praxial theory.

2.19 Conclusion

The focus of this study is to offer proposals for meaningful educational experiences for beginner instrumentalists and to synergise the construct of process and product. Throughout this Chapter, I have given insights into the philosophical foundations for music education by exploring the two most utilised views in Western[47] music education, namely, the Aesthetic and Praxial philosophical approaches. Within the initial interpretation and

[46] An enactive approach comprising the transaction and interaction between an autonomous individual, mind and environment will be discussed in Chapter 3 (3.15).
[47] “Western” thought comprises individualistic views on music education with great focus on the “product” (Westerlund, 2002, p. 85).

usage of MEAE advanced by Reimer, the focus of music teaching and learning with educational intent became obscured. Stemming from Kantian roots, music education's focus concentrated on the Westernised idea of a musical art object, product or the Western elite, in turn depreciating the human being in the music-making process and remaining prominent in classroom usage for more than half a century (McCarthy, 2009, p. 30). In instrumental music education students are taught to develop a sensitivity to recognizing and responding to the expressive features of music (Bauer & Berg, 2001). Consequently, meaning-making is left to the interpretation of indications on how to perform the song in score sheets (Hultberg, 2002), in turn, deducing meaning-making opportunities to mere "understanding", as opposed to a holistic, personal view of meaning creation.

Regardless of being a student of Reimer's and being schooled in aesthetics, Elliott challenged the Aesthetic philosophical view to music education. Elliott's Praxial philosophy to music education is based on the constructs of Aristotelian praxis and advocates for education that calls for action in performance and acknowledgement of the person or human being in the process of music-making. Elliott and Silverman (2015, p. 18) write that a classroom should not be "reduced to a business-based process driven" entity where "students and teachers as people" are removed from the educational setting. Even though Elliott tries to bring the active human being, the person, back into the process of music-making, he does not take into account the total social and interactive setup of the music-making scenario and is criticised for not taking into account the ethical ways in which humans engage. Within one-on-one instrumental music education, this notion is seen in a master-apprentice model of instruction where instruction relies on "one-way communication" from the expert teacher to the novice student (Hultberg, 2002, p. 194). Within the next Chapter, a discussion will follow on the philosophical underpinnings of the disembodied construct still applied in music education philosophy and how approaches based on embodiment, embodied cognition, enaction and, later, inter(en)active approaches to music education that offer an alternative approach to beginner instrumental music teaching and learning practices.

Chapter 3

A pathway model: an extended embodied framework for beginner instrumental teaching and learning

3.1 Introduction

Stemming from philosophical epistemology dating back to the 5th Century, the divide between mind and body saw its origin in the thoughts of Plato (Broadie, 2001). Plato's philosophical stance sees the soul or mind and the body as two separate entities, arguing that the soul/mind exist independently of the body (Broadie, 2001). The disembodied philosophical stance initiated by Plato was continued in the writings of Descartes. Descartes's mind and body dualism, also known as Cartesian dualism, sees mind and body as isolated beings, claiming that the body is merely a vehicle for the mind and has no influence on cognition (Bowman & Powell, 2007; Shusterman, 2012b).

The epistemology of Plato and Descartes influenced theories on cognitive sciences, which carried on with the disembodied notions initiated by Plato and Descartes (Bechtel, 2009). Traditional cognitive sciences stem from the 1950s, and find inspiration for the view of mind and cognition in a traditional computer (Dawson, 2013). In other words, the mind is seen as a machine that manipulates symbols and figures. Cognition thus has no reliance on the body for cognition.

In order to remediate Cartesian dualism, from the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, Dewey (2005, p. 95), American psychologist and philosopher along with French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1945), advocates for an embodied stance to cognition and meaning creation. Initiating restoration of the path of separation brought forth by Cartesian dualism, both the previously mentioned philosophers advocate for the role that the body and experience play in cognition. Dewey's (1958) holistic approach advocates for the embodied, experiential, social and situated nature of cognition and meaning. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1945) advocates for an embodied stance towards

cognition and meaning-making. Stating that cognition and meaning is “lived”, Merleau-Ponty emphasises the “*actual* human” (italics as in original) (Johnson, 2006, p. 3).

In music education specifically, the general dissatisfaction with the separation between mind and body in cognition is an ongoing topic in academic research, researched by scholars such as Dewey (1958; 2005) and Westerlund (2002). In rethinking the nature and value of music education and the role that the human being with his/her mind and body plays in cognition, Dewey’s holism, viewed through the lens of Westerlund (2002), allows for a philosophy of music education that bridges the Aesthetic and Praxial philosophies discussed in Chapter 2. Dewey’s (2005) experiential holism holds a position of teaching and learning that is not confined to mental structures, contemplations and representations, but unites the mind, body and soul in a dynamic interplay of inseparable constructs[48]. By utilising Westerlund’s (2002) vertical and horizontal perspective on experience, an explanation is given on the individual and social experiential realms in music education. When these two perspectives are balanced, a holistic view of music education is brought forth (Väkevä & Westerlund, 2007, p. 101).

In cognitive science in general, Valera, Thompson and Rosch (2016) made an advancement in research on the relationship between the mind and body in cognition. Formulated as embodied cognition, Varela et al. (2016, p. xxvi) advocate that “the body plays a constitutive role in cognition”. In traditional cognitive sciences, cognition takes on the form of a “sandwich”, where cognition is sandwiched between perception and action (Hurley, 2008, p. 2). As with embodied cognition, the “sense-think-act” continuum is replaced with a “sense-act” cycle of cognition (Dawson, 2013, p. 261). Thus, cognition relies directly on action, and is not constricted by mental representations.

Within the context of traditional approaches to how cognition is realised in instrumental music education, the disembodied philosophical constructs mentioned above are still observed (Bowman, 2002; 2004; Correia, 2014; Juntunen, 2020; Schiavio & van der

[48] Constructs that will be discussed are embodiment, agency, the autonomous individual, the environmental and social milieu (Westerlund, 2002).

Schyff, 2018). Traditional instrumental music education relies on verbal instruction and the identification of abstract musical concepts (such as rhythm and melody), in turn giving no opportunity for the student to actively explore these concepts with their bodies.

For embodied instrumental teaching and learning practices, the constructs of embodied cognition, according to Schiavio and van der Schyff (2018, p. 2) offer

> a shift in how music education is practiced and studied—from more traditional pedagogies where a unidirectional stream of knowledge is passed from a teacher to a student, to more relational approaches that highlight improvisation, creativity, collaboration, as well as the role of movement and the situated body for learning.

Consequently, a discussion on embodied learning will ensue with the focus on experience and meaning as significant concepts. According to the Aesthetic philosophical approach towards music education as discussed in Chapter 2 (2.5-2.12), experience is realised by mentally contemplating structural aspects of a musical work (Reimer, 1989b), thus exemplifying Cartesian dualistic notions where the body is separated from understanding or cognising. As for embodied learning, experience relies on interactive exploration of the social and material world by which the individual creates not only mental meaning, but holistic and emotive meaning.

An extended embodied framework (Schiavio, 2014) allows for a philosophical foundation on which the suggested practical applications are built, for a more extended and encompassing approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning. I will discuss the role of embodiment as extended by praxialists Bowman (2002; 2004; Bowman, 2012), Regelski (2005; 2006; 2016; 2019; 2020a; 2020b) and Elliott (2012; 2016; Elliot & Silverman, 2015). In particular, I will discuss Elliott's extension and advancement of his 1995 publication *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education,* and his 2015 publication in collaboration with Silverman: *Music Matters: A philosophy of Music Education*, where he takes on a more holistic and embodied stance towards music education. Elliott, along with other authors and their contributions to the extended field of embodiment and embodied learning, offers a step towards discussing

the enactive approach towards music and instrumental teaching and learning (Silverman, 2020; van der Schyff, et al., 2016).

Research[49] in more active, experiential and relational forms of engaging in instrumental and beginner instrumental music teaching and learning has taken precedence in the enactive and inter(en)active approaches. Drawing on advancements made in embodied cognitive science and the role of the body in cognition and meaning creation in music education, various authors[50] have made contributions to remediate the "ruthless individualistic" reminiscent of traditional cognitive sciences (Cummins, 2013, p. 7). For an enactive approach (Schiavio, et al., 2016; van der Schyff, 2017; van der Schyff, 2019), constructs such as structural coupling, meaning, autopoiesis, sense-making and affordances will be discussed. The section on the inter(en)active approach (Schiavio, 2014; Schiavio & Cummins, 2015; Schiavio & De Jaegher, 2017) will commence with discussions on participatory sense-making and inter(en)action through shared musical experiences.

The beginner instrumentalists' position is influenced by all of the topics and philosophies discussed in this study. The natural way in which young children learn music by engaging in their environment through movement activities and experiences within a social context, utilising adaptable materials such as sounds, textures and colours, is inhibited by the disembodied views that shift the focus of understanding and meaning-making opportunities from active exploration to inner mental structures and "thoughtful discussions with the children" about the music (Taetle & Cuttietta, 2002, p. 290). Nijs and Bremmer (2019, p. 88) urge that

> early childhood is an age category *par excellence* in which the movement-learning connection could be fully exploited. Considering that young children have a natural inclination to move and to learn through experience, physical activities would fit in well with early childhood education. However, learning as embodiment is

[49] Schiavio & Cummins, 2015; Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018; Schiavio, et al., 2016; Schiavio, et al., 2020; Staveley, 2020; Stolz, 2015; Valerio, et al., 1998.
[50] Bowman, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2012; Regelski, 2005a, 2006a, 2016, 2017b, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Elliott, 2012, 2016; Elliott & Silverman, 2015.

> disappearing in early childhood education and, more and more, young children are becoming just the activity of their brains.

Consequently, utilising the theories of music education and embodiment specialists, I will make suggestions for practical applications to beginner instrumental instruction based on how the young child makes sense of his/her world through active exploration (Nijs & Bremmer, 2019). Recommendations will stem from the theories of Correia's instrumental performance (Correia, 2014), Gordon's Music Learning Theory (2003; 2013), Laban's Effort movement components (Hodgson & Preston-Dunlop, 1995; Laban, 1960; Valerio, et al., 1998); Dalcroze's embodied music educational approach, Eurhythmics (Anderson, 2011; Daly, 2021; Dutton, 2015; Jacques-Dalcroze, 1985; Jacques-Dalcroze, 2018), the holistic notion of Personhood (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; Silverman, 2012, 2020; Westerlund, 2002), Orff's Schulwerk (Campbell, 1991; Sarrazin, 2012), the philosophical constructs of an "event" (Westerlund, 2002), collective "musicing" (Regelski, 2017a; Small, 1995) and informal performance, or "informance" (Nowmos, 2010).

3.2 Philosophical underpinnings of mind-body dualism

A game of hide and seek is the description of the history of the nature and value of music education given by Bowman and Powell (2007, p. 1087). They explain this as: to hide the body, with aspects such as "its materiality, its subjectivity, its temporality, and its specificity" and seek value in the "formal, the structural, the ideal" cognitive, mind structures (Bowman & Powell, 2007, pp. 1087,1088). As mentioned earlier, in the 18th century Enlightenment rationalist stance, the sensing body was seen as untrustworthy[51]. Knowledge gained through the senses was seen as unreliable, resulting in seeking in turn for knowledge gained through cognition, reasoning and thought (Regelski, 2011a, p. 90). The conclusion is then reached that cognition is confined to the brain and body, detached or disembodied (Descartes, 1996; Robinson, 2020). In instrumental music education practices specifically, Fortuna (2017: 121) notes that traditional instrumental instruction

[51] During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, sensation and perception, or perception gained through the senses in order for cognition to take place, became a prominent area of research called Embodiment (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 137). Embodiment will be discussed in more detail in section 3.5 below.

tends to follow “disembodied teaching modalities: verbal instructions, rehearsals, reading notations, but no movement”.

Hints of this disembodied approach can be traced back to the Greek philosopher Plato (Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001, p. 204). Small (1995, p. 1) refers to the treatment of the body as a lesser counterpart to the mind and cognition as the “old besetting sin of European thinking” and confirms that it was founded in Plato’s philosophy. Plato’s (1911) work *Phaedo* is seen as offering the flagship argument in this regard (Shusterman, 2004, p. 55). In a book compiled and translated by Cooper, *Plato: The Complete Works* (1997, pp. 57,58), Plato reasons that a philosopher should not be concerned with the body as the body confuses the soul and takes the focus away from the search for truth. Shusterman (2012b, p. 33) explains that Plato’s aim for philosophy was the separation of the “knowing mind from its deceptive bodily prison, [and that] the somatic senses and desires have been repeatedly condemned for both misleading our judgment and distracting our attention from the pursuit of truth”.

In the 17th century the divide between mind and body was put forth by the philosopher Descartes[52] (1596 – 1650) and came to be known as Cartesian dualism. Ideas brought on by the external world via the senses were seen as "unreliable” (Dawson, 2013, p. 57). Descartes urges that the source of knowledge and cognition is in the mind and not in the senses (Westerlund, 2002, p. 97): “from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” (Descartes, 1996, p. 12). Sensory perception, or insight gained through the senses, was merely to “inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part” (Descartes, 1996, p. 57). Descartes’ philosophical position of dualism thus views the mind and the body, or the mental and the physical, as two completely different things (Robinson, 2020). Robinson (2020) even goes so far as to state that in dualism, “mind” is contrasted with “body” in the same way in which, in the field of theology, God is

[52] Plato’s dualist philosophical view contrasts the soul with the body, whereas Descartes opposes mind with body. “Both philosophers argue that we consist of something incorporeal, whether one calls it 'mind' or 'soul', which for the time being is somehow united with a body that is part of the physical world” (Broadie, 2001, p. 295).

juxtaposed with the devil. Finding its roots in Descartes' perspectives, traditional cognitive science is a necessary aspect to discuss to be able to understand embodiment and embodied cognition better (Dawson, 2013, p. 55). Following is a discussion on traditional cognitive science.

3.3 Traditional cognitive science

Stemming from the 1950s, traditional cognitive sciences, otherwise known as the classical approach to cognition, were inspired by the computer, viewing the human mind as simulating a digital computer (Dawson, 2013, p. 55). The mind is described as a "symbol manipulating machine" (Thompson, 2007, p. 4). Stated differently, traditional accounts of cognition are described as "representational and computational", focusing on the "manipulation of representational mental structures" (Gallagher, 2018, p. 364) with information arranged and rearranged within our minds (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019, p. 20). In other words, within traditional cognitive science, a person's body and senses are seen as irrelevant in the process of cognition, which is confined to the machine-like brain. Particularly, cognition is described by Hurley (2008, p. 2) as a sandwich, with cognition sandwiched between perception and action.

Perception can be defined as "input from world to mind" and action as "output from mind to world" (Hurley, 2008, p. 2). Input from the world happens through the use of our senses, resulting in a perception of the information received, rendering our senses "channels that connect the internal mind to the external world" (Määttänen, 2015, p. 22). Similarly, "perceptions are effects caused by external objects" (Määttänen, 2015, p. 18). Sensation is the information or data that is gained by the sensory organs through external interaction (Coon & Mitterer, 2013, p. 126). Sensation is the "action of *stimuli* on our body" (italics as in original) or the detecting of signals from the body's sensory receptors (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 37). Perception, in turn, can be described as an "interpretation" of the images that our senses supply to us, a "hypothesis" that the mind concludes from sensory input (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 33). In other words, perception is already processed sensory information that the senses brought forth through external stimuli.

In Figure 2 below is an illustration developed by Fraser (1908, p. 307), known as the "twisted cord" illusion. There is a black and white "cord" seemingly twisted along with black, white and grey diamond shape sections (Fraser, 1908, p. 308). The black and white cords all form perfect circles: however, because of the diamond shapes' format, it seems as though the circles make a spiral instead (Fraser, 1908, p. 317). Our visual senses are "tricked" into perceiving that the circles form spirals[53].



Figure 2 Optical illusion to indicate difference in perception (Coon & Mitterer, 2013, p. 144).

In turn, within traditional cognitive sciences, our minds receive "perceptual inputs" and convert the information into "behavioral outputs[54]", resulting in a "sense-think-act" cycle (Dawson, 2013, p. 11). The sense-think-act parts of this 'mental sandwich' are isolated and unequal as a strong emphasis is placed on the "purely mental" part of cognition or

[53] Linking with the construct of "sense-think-act" cycles in traditional cognitive sciences, sensation and perception change to "sense-act" cycles through the course of the discussion in Chapter 3 (3.9).
[54] Also described as "computational", "abstract" and "mental" (Varela, et al., 2016, p. xlvii).

thinking, in turn understating the sensing and acting body (Dawson, 2013, p. 207). Thus, even though the body and its sensory systems are involved in the cognition process, mind and body are still seen as merely a "production system" (Dawson, 2013, p. 89), with the body seen as an information-processing machine, which "receives inputs from bodily sensors and sends outputs to motor systems" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 61).

Within the scope of music education, both the Aesthetic and the Praxial philosophies (Chapter 2), as well as the separation of mind and body, which viewed that mind as merely a machine, constitute a deep-seated problem. For music education, according to the Cartesian stance, music seems to be "permanent ideational structures to be known (cognised) rather than something to be done, felt or experienced" (Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001, p. 205). In a recent doctoral dissertation, van den Dool (2018, p. 5) remarks how he became aware of the need for visual representations to accompany his sound recordings for his music students in Nepal. To aid the learning process, he added a visualisation of his hands on the piano keys along with his swaying body that accompanied the beat of the song (van den Dool, 2018, p. 5). He (van den Dool, 2018, p. 5) remarks that the use of his body was in stark contrast with what he was taught at the conservatory[55]. "I had spent my formative years at the conservatory actively removing my body from learning" (van den Dool, 2018, p. 5). With this realisation came the spark to research how to "reverse the Cartesian split" (van den Dool, 2018, p. 5). A need to rethink the mind-body Cartesian split is not only seen in recent works such as that of van den Dool (2018). Questioning the Cartesian dualism and paving the way for what has later come to be known as embodiment and embodied cognition (Chemero, 2009; Dewey, 1910; Dawson, 2013; Gallagher, 2018; Johnson, 2006; Merleau-Ponty, 1945;), dates as far back as the 19th century with philosophers such as Dewey and Merleau-Ponty (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; Stolz, 2015). Embodied cognition, for music education especially, "views cognition not as a medium for planning, but instead as a medium for acting"

[55] With regards to instrumental music education, traditional ways of teaching focus on a "teacher-directed" approach, where communication is unidirectional (Ryu, 2017, p. 4). Being so accustomed to this unidirectional manner of teaching of verbal instruction on learning material with no opportunity to engage either verbally or with their bodies, most students "had trouble sharing their thoughts" when engaged in conversation with a new teacher (Ryu, 2017, p. 4).

(Dawson, 2013, p. 304). A discussion on Dewey and Merleau-Ponty's philosophical stances will follow.

3.4 Philosophical underpinnings of embodiment

For the last part of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, John Dewey's (1859 – 1952) philosophy was seen as the "foundation for a monumental revolution in education" (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 137). Dewey (2005, p. 95) claimed the Cartesian dualism of mind and "physical nature" to be the "source of modern epistemological problems". In a Deweyan[56] holistic approach, as mentioned in Chapter 1, music is seen as an "embodied situational experience and learning as a process in and through social contexts" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 6). Holistic education, built on the philosophical underpinnings of Dewey, comprises experiences gained through the interaction between the individual and his environment, otherwise stipulated as the "shared social world" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 6). The mentioned interaction contrasts the isolated individual discussed in Chapter 2. Dewey (1958, p. xv) specifies that mind finds meaning in social interactions. He explains that the "answer to the problems which haunt philosophy" is found when one views the person inside their environment, the nervous system inside the person and the brain inside the nervous system (Dewey, 1958, p. 241). Hurley (2001, p. 15) concurs that traditional cognitive approaches do not accommodate the holistic person with unique desires, beliefs, intentions and perceptions. A person is seen as a holistic whole, mind and body and not just "thinking brain", which interacts and functions within his/her environment (Westerlund, 2002, p. 162). For Dewey, music education not only comprises educating the whole child in terms of the mind and body, emotions and spirit, as mentioned earlier in this paragraph. Rather, a Deweyan holistic approach is deeper: as Elliott and Silverman (2015, p. 137) explain, Dewey's philosophy

[56] Dewey wrote his PhD thesis on his dissatisfaction with Kant's philosophy in 1884. This sparked a "lifelong" scholarly journey to demarcate the "bodily, psychical, imaginative [and] practical" as integrated constructs (Hildebrand, 2008, p. 2). Stemming from a century and a half ago, a Deweyan holistic view is as applicable now as it was then.

> conceives students' personhood[57] and education in ecological terms: students' personal, biological, social, and cultural worlds – including the educational and problem-solving opportunities their worlds present – activate and inform their knowing, doing, learning, growth, ethical development, and democratic dispositions.

French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Dewey were called by Johnson (2006: 1) "the two greatest philosophers of the embodied mind". Merleau-Ponty also contributed[58] towards the exposure of the dualistic view of the mind and body, arguing for the inclusion of the "lived-body" in cognition and the engagement of the body with the world (Leitan & Murray, 2014, p. 4). In rejecting the mind-body dualism and in search of a stance where meaning is created because of a person's bodily interaction and engagement with the world, Merleau-Ponty advocated for an embodied process of meaning creation (Johnson, 2006, p. 2). Merleau-Ponty views embodiment as the manner in which humans experience themselves, the way in which they as beings and bodies "inhabit" the world instead of reflecting on it from some position outside of it (Stolz, 2015, p. 478). Embodiment according to Merleau-Ponty encompasses the whole human being as a person, a holistic, "acting, feeling, thinking being-in-the-world" (Stolz, 2015, p. 474). Through the remediation of Cartesian dualism put forth by Dewey and Merleau-Ponty and followed by important contributors such as Clark (1997; 1999), Damasio (1989; 1994), Johnson (1987; 2006) and Varela (1995; 1997), the person is seen as a holistic, authentic self that lives and understands through the body as opposed to representational scenarios through the isolated mind.

3.4.1 A Deweyan holism for beginner instrumental experiences

Through a Deweyan holistic lens and leaning on the advancements in embodiment made by Merleau-Ponty, holism, its origin and relevance in beginner instrumental teaching and learning will be discussed. The terms holistic and holism were coined by South African

[57] The construct of 'personhood' forms an integral part of a holistic and embodied approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning and will be discussed later in this Chapter (3.16).
[58] Contemporary scholars such as (Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001; Munro, 2018; Stolz, 2015; van der Schyff, et al., 2016) also expand on and contribute to exposing the dualistic notions found in music education especially.

philosopher and statesman, Jan Smuts (1926), in his book *Holism and Evolution*. Smuts (1926, p. 317) wrote

> The ultimate synthetic, ordering, organizing, regulative activity in the universe which accounts for all the structural groupings and syntheses in it, from the atom and the physico-chemical structures, through the cell and organisms . . . The all-pervading and ever-increasing character of synthetic unity or wholeness in these structures leads to the concept of Holism …

Holism constitutes the complete inner and outer[59] workings of an organism in its environment. No part can be separated from the entirety of the organism. Smuts (1926, p. 86) explains that "the whole is in the parts and the parts are in the whole, and this synthesis of whole and parts is reflected in the holistic character of the functions of the parts as well as of the whole". Specifically, no system or entity or organisation can exist or even be comprehended without every part being connected to the workings of the entire construct (Preston, 2012, p. 253). A holistic approach in education in general entails the teaching of the whole person which includes the "mind, body, emotions, and spirit" (Orr, 2005, p. 87). For music education and the purpose of this study, Dewey's (1910; 2001; 2005) holistic approach is utilised.

In order to better situate Deweyan holism within the context of this study, I utilise Westerlund's (2002, p. 17) explanation of "vertical first-person perspective" and "horizontal third-person perspective". Key within this study, as well as Westerlund's vertical and horizontal perspectives, is the concept of agency. Within a holistic teaching and learning approach, a learner acquires agency. Through agency, a student can influence his/her environment and experiences through actively engaging in their circumstances. In other words, it contrasts the unidirectional way of traditional music teaching situations where the student is told what to do in the lesson.

[59] This links with the principles of embodied learning where the building of skills and knowledge is an ongoing interactive process between the "inner self" and the "outer environment" (Munro, 2018, p. 11). Embodied learning is discussed later in this Chapter (3.10).

3.4.2 Agency

Agency is the capacity to act and bring forth change. Green (2008, p. 103) describes agency as learners' "personal autonomy", allowing for opportunities that are given to them to make their own decisions and choose their own actions. Jorgensen (2003, p. 118) urges that by giving learners a sense of agency, transformation is able to take place within the students and society as a whole. Westerlund (2002, p. 25) concurs that within a holistic approach to music education, students are seen as "active agents" who are able to change their experience by making their own choices within the teaching and learning situation. Consequently, transformation of the students, their experience and their social environment follows and gives rise to "transformational agency" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 16). As the learners are empowered to determine their own actions, they are in turn able to create new social possibilities as opposed to the view that learning happens within the mind and in the brain resulting in no bodily or social interactions or consequent agency and change (Westerlund, 2002, pp. 16,17).

To put the individual learner as well as the collective social world into perspective within the holistic approach, I draw on the writings of Westerlund (2002). In search for a better understanding on how an individual's conceptions and experience form part of the social realm and how an individual's decisions can affect his/her social experience, Westerlund (2002, pp. 17-19) formulated a representation of both these aspects utilising a "vertical" and "horizontal" perspective that represents, firstly, the "individual subjective experience" and secondly, the "public world".

3.4.3 Vertical and horizontal perspective in holistic music education

Westerlund's vertical and horizontal perspectives create two axes that represent two opposing perspectives. The vertical perspective give an account of the disembodied, socially devoid, individual, Westernised, traditional approach taken within music education and beginner instrumental music teaching and learning. In turn, the environment including the public and social world at large is represented within the

horizontal perspective. Viewing these two axes as separate exemplifies the dualistic separation of mind and body along with the separation of the individual from the social. When there is a balance between the two axes, a holistic approach is set forth that unites the individual and social as well as mind and body worlds.



Figure 3 Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives in a Holistic Approach (Westerlund, 2002, p. 18).

Westerlund (2002, p. 17) explains that the vertical perspective represents an individual's first-person subjective experiences – always unique. On the other hand, the horizontal perspective represents a third-person perspective of cultural norms that contain traditions, customs and beliefs (Väkevä & Westerlund, 2007, p. 101). The vertical perspective that represents the individual and subjective experience works in relation to the lived environment that has common habits and customs (Väkevä & Westerlund, 2007, p. 101). Within the vertical perspective, the individual develops "autonomous musical agency" and individualism because of the interaction between the individual and their physical and social environment (Westerlund, 2002, p. 17). As mentioned earlier, autonomy is described as the capability to make own decisions and choose which actions to take (Green, 2008, p. 103). In other words, "*new social realities*" (italics as in original) are created because of the interaction between the autonomous individual and the "social

world" (Westerlund, 2002, pp. 16,17). With this suggested interaction comes an ontological question about the interplay between the individual (who has a brain and a body) and the larger social and material or physical milieu, otherwise stipulated as the environment. This ontological question of the brain or mind inside the individual has for decades been a great source of research in various fields such as phenomenology, linguistics, ecological psychology and theoretical biology (Schiavio, 2014, p. 254). Embodiment, in essence, is part of the field of cognitive science and refers to "understanding the role of an agent's own body in its everyday, situated cognition" (Gibbs Jr., 2005, p. 1). A continued discussion on the concept of embodiment follows.

3.5 Embodiment

Embodiment is a multi-faceted term found in various fields; thus, several definitions ensue. According to Juntunen (2017, p. 117) embodiment is concerned with the "understanding and studying of the body-mind world". Shapiro and Stolz (2019, p. 23) explain that embodiment entails the theory that an "organism's body" is unified with cognitive processes. The body is constantly situated within and interacts with an environment. Information from the environment or within the mind is perceived, organised and understood in and with the body (Munro, 2018, p. 5). It is through bodily interactions with the environment, otherwise stipulated as embodiment, that "sense of the world" is made (Stolz, 2015, p. 484). Bodily interaction with the environment, whether it be physical or social, makes a determinate difference in cognition (Varela, et al., 2016, p. xlvii). The importance of embodiment and its role in thinking and learning can be seen in the new research programme or movement known as "embodied cognition" that draws on a number of distinct traditions in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science (Stolz, 2015, p. 475). Although the research themes in embodied cognition are various, embodied cognition practitioners take as their foundation not a disembodied "mind working on abstract problems, but a body that requires a mind to make it function" (Wilson, 2002, p. 625). Consequently, a discussion on embodied cognition and its implications in teaching and learning will ensue.

3.6 Embodied Cognitive Science

Embodied cognitive science is essentially the approach to cognition that relies on and is ingrained in embodied processes. Seen as the catalyst for embodied cognition, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* was written by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (2016). They (Varela, et al., 2016, p. 205) write that cognition is *"lived"* (italics as in original), an "enactment or bringing forth of a world". According to Leitan and Murray (2014, p. 5), embodied cognition encompasses a number of theories and topics, all with the same underlying hypothesis that the body acts as a "*constituent* of the mind" (italics as in original) rather than a passive perceiver. With the involvement of the body in cognition, embodied cognition entails a deep-rooted "connection between perception and action" (Stolz, 2015, p. 476). Thus, cognition depends on the types of experiences the body has or actions the body takes with its various sensorimotor abilities that are rooted in a biological, psychological and cultural context (Varela, et al., 2016, p. 173). Action emphasises the body's sensory as well as motor functionalities and their effect on cognition (Wilson, 2002, p. 625). In other words, cognition relies on the actions of the sensing and experiencing body with its sensorimotor abilities and the body's situatedness in an environment and social world. Where traditional cognitive science relies on the "sandwich" of sense-think-act, embodied cognition strives towards "sense-act cycles" (Dawson, 2013, p. 261). Therefore, embodied cognition strives to view cognition as the "control of direct action upon the world rather than the reasoning about possible action" (Dawson, 2013, p. 261). From the discussion above, it is clear that sensorimotor processes and active engagement with the world are ingredients of embodied cognitive sciences. Consequently, a facet of active bodily engagement, namely the proprioceptive system, will be discussed[60].

[60] Suggestions for practical applications for embodied cognition is made at 3.9.

3.7 Proprioception

The body is at all times aware of its situatedness in the environment. Proprioception is the body's sensation of its "position and movement" within the environment (Tuthill & Azim, 2018, p. 194). Embodiment theories suggest a close link between cognition, the sensorimotor system and active exploration of the environment (Kiefer & Trump, 2012, p. 16). More recently, the focus on cognition emphasises not only the body with its various sensorimotor abilities, but also the "understanding we have as subjects of what our bodies can do", for instance, movement, stretching to change a lightbulb, grabbing an item off the top shelf, turning one's head to see more clearly (Krueger, 2009, p. 101). Senses such as hearing, seeing, tasting, feeling, smelling give a "conscious perception" of external surroundings within the environment (Tuthill & Azim, 2018, p. 194). Proprioception is the sensation of the body's position within the environment as well as the body's movement, all of which occur unconsciously (Tuthill & Azim, 2018, p. 194). Awareness such as motion, balance, equilibrium and posture all form part of proprioceptive awareness (Staveley, 2020, p. 67). Thus, proprioception is "your inherent sense of your body's position and motion in space" (Blakeslee & Blakeslee, 2007, p. 9). In other words, proprioception encompasses the awareness of the body's movement potential and is not limited to only one type of movement. With this sense, it is for example, possible to touch both one's index fingers together with closed eyes (Blakeslee & Blakeslee, 2007, p. 9). Tuthill and Azim (2018, p. 194) refers to proprioception as a "sixth sense".

Proprioception, sensorimotor abilities and active discovery of the world by the student form part of the application of how embodied cognition theories are applied in a teaching and learning situation. Firstly, how the application of the principles of embodied cognition are lacking in beginner instrumental teaching and learning is discussed and secondly, how embodied cognition principles are realised within a beginner instrumental teaching and learning situation.

3.8 Embodied cognition in traditional instrumental practice

Embodied cognition principles are rarely included in the music curriculum in general as well as in beginner instrumental teaching and learning. According to Paparo (2016, p. 489), embodied experience in music teaching and learning is a “fairly recent” field, and its principles have not yet reached every proverbial corner of music education practice. More recently, Staveley (2020, p. 22) has noted some interest in embodied approaches to music education: however, how to incorporate this in the classroom is lacking. In general, the instrumental music curriculum remains based on Reimer’s Aesthetic philosophical approach from the 1960s. Within the traditional Aesthetic philosophical view to beginner instrumental teaching and learning, isolation of the sensory and proprioceptive systems are seen in the focus spent on the verbal discussion and identification of musical concepts such as rhythm (crotchet, minim, etc.) without an opportunity for the student to experience for instance the duration of the sound and intensity of sensorimotor actions needed to physically play the note or rhythmic pattern (Staveley, 2020, p. 68). Staveley (2020, p. 68) concludes that traditional music pedagogy “isolate[s] sensory information”. In beginner instrumental music education students are verbally instructed on what musical elements entail, with no opportunity given to explore and experience these elements with the body and senses, with and without the use of the actual instrument. Pedagogy based on embodiment without movement is unimaginable. With my personal experience in the field of teaching beginner instrumentalists, I add that a child has a natural curiosity towards handling and exploring an instrument.

Children are naturally attracted to “how their bodily movements change the sound” of an instrument (Staveley, 2020, p. 68). It is here that sensorimotor and proprioceptive systems come into play with the actual handling of an instrument where the child can sense and feel what motor movements are needed to produce a sound. It is in movement that a child can perceive and understand complex musical contexts and elements. “People perceive to move and move to perceive” (Thelen, 1995, p. 89). For optimal comprehension and perception of complex musical content, students need to embody the constructs of music by using their bodies. In other words, learning to play an instrument cannot be reduced to a verbal explanation as will be elaborated on below.

Kiefer and Trump (2012, p. 20) give an example of a student learning to play the bassoon. A teacher can verbally describe what a bassoon looks like, the material it is made of and how it sounds. However, this approach will result in “impoverished, less durable knowledge” (Kiefer & Trump, 2012, p. 20). With embodied cognition theories, an emphasis is put on the role that the body plays in cognition (Leman & Maes, 2014, p. 236). Hence, the student should directly experience the bassoon through tactile, auditory, sensorimotor and proprioceptive processes. When isolating learning from the input of sensory information given by the body, there is a disconnect in understanding (Staveley, 2020, p. 68). Paparo (2016, p. 489) explains

> Humans are embodied beings, who think, sense, feel, and act as an integrated whole. Musical action … is embodied because it depends on mental, physical, and emotional processes. Experience through the body constitutes a way of knowing … and provides a concrete foundation for abstract, conceptual knowing. Experiencing music is necessary to understand, know, and make meaning in music.

In line with the example of the bassoon above, an empirical study conducted by Correia (2014) regarding the teaching of instrumental performance and creativity through an embodied approach further emphasises the importance of the involvement of the body in instrumental teaching and learning. Correia (2014, p. 121) examines the question of why “tell[ing] and show[ing]” a student how an instrument should be played is an insufficient method of teaching. Within this empirical study, flute students were guided to foster their own thoughts of interpreting their playing, rather than relying on the sole imitation of the teacher’s model of instrumental playing (Rodrigues & Rodrigues, 2009, p. 598). By making use of unique expressive bodily movements, the students create a narrative or “active expression” for a piece of music (Rodrigues & Rodrigues, 2009, p. 598). An example of such movements and actions are the movement interpretations given by a student for a piece of programmatic music, Debussy’s piece, Syrinx[61]” (Rodrigues &

[61] The story of Syrinx summarised is the character “Pan” that is in pursuit of the river nymph “Syrinx”. Syrinx sets off to the river’s edge to ask the other river nymphs for help in order to escape the pursuit of Pan. Syrinx is turned into reeds on the edge of the river bed where Pan in turn starts picking reeds to make pipes, killing Syrinx (Rodrigues & Rodrigues, 2009, p. 599).

Rodrigues, 2009, p. 599). Through this bodily involvement in their repertoire, the students "felt stimulated and challenged by having to create [their] own interpretation" resulting in more unreserved, "present" and in-the-moment performances (Rodrigues & Rodrigues, 2009, p. 599). Consequently, through Correia's (2014) study, it is evident that embodying the sound constructs of the pieces through unique, creative, interpretative movement aids in the understanding or cognition of music.

Making use of the body in cognition, as is the case in embodied cognitive sciences, students explore their unique sense of agency (as discussed in 3.4.2). It is because of unique phenomenological experiences that every person has an exclusive and unreplicable identity (Hackney, 2002, p. 48). Because each person's bodily experiences are unique, embodied cognition offers a realm in which personal agency can be explored. Munro (2018, p. 9) explains that "each person experiences and engages with the learning process slightly differently due to unique perspectives, perceptions and paradigms". Therefore, as in the previously discussed example of the flute student's unique bodily movements to internalise the repertoire, students have agency and can act upon experiences and give unique meaning to the educational process. The unique agency gained, and meaning given in the instrumental learning situation through embodied cognitive practices oppose a situation where the teachers' meaning and agency are poured into the students' minds, similar to the training and banking (2.9.1.1, 2.9.1.2) approaches discussed in Chapter 2. In the search for a practical application of embodied cognition in music pedagogy where students can construct their agency and meaning, an overview of Gordon's movement aspects in his Music Learning Theory will be discussed.

3.9 Application of embodied cognition through Gordon's Music Learning Theory

Edwin Gordon (1927 – 2015) was an American teacher and academic who made important contributions to ideas of how music should best be taught. His Music Learning Theory (MLT) model comprises many key constructs such as audiation, music aptitude and a compilation of rhythmic and tonal sequences to aid in attaining a vocabulary of music for music students. I will draw on Gordon's (2003) suggestions for movement experiences to enhance beginner instrumental teaching and learning. Physical

experiences form part of the key constructs of MLT and Gordon draws greatly on the works of Laban (Gordon, 2003; Valerio, et al., 1998). Rudolf von Laban (1879 – 1958) was a German dance and drama teacher who deeply studied the essence of movement in all creatures and nature. Hodgson and Preston-Dunlop (1995, p. 16) explain that Laban created a universal model of movement which encompassed the core construct for all things in humans, animals and nature:

> All around is change: in growth and decay, in division and union, in vibration and oscillation, in rhythm and flow – in the sea, the heavens, the earth and under the earth, in the planets, in the tides, in the mineral and the crystal. Movement is in all living things. Even when people think they are still, movement continues within them while life remains. It is movement that enables them to discern life.

Movement can be observed in all things, and observing and discerning from different movements can lead to better understanding of one another. Laban (1960) identified four components which describe movement, including its expression and function: “Body, Effort, Space and Shape” (Alaoui, et al., 2017, p. 2). Alaoui et al. (2017, p. 2) explain that the first component, Body, represents *what* it is that is moving, Effort signifies *how,* Space signifies *where* and Shape signifies “the *relationship* of the body shape changes to the environment” (italics as in original). Focusing on “Effort” or “Dynamic Awareness” (Carline, 2011, p. 5), Maletic (2005, p. 9) articulates that

> Laban sees Effort as the inner impulse – a movement sensation, a thought, a feeling or emotion – from which movement originates; it constitutes the interface between mental and physical components of movement … Accordingly, every human movement, including thought, has the potential to engage the Four Motion Factors – Space, Weight, Time, and Flow.

Table 1 Laban Effort movement components (Maletic, 2005, p. 10).

Motion Component	Effort elements: Accepting	Resisting
Space	Indirect	Direct
Weight	Light	Strong
Time	Sustained	Quick
Flow	Free	Bound

The four motion components give insight into how movement is organised in terms of the placement of weight, the changes in direction and levels in space, the length of the movement and positioning (Lewis, 1998, p. 119). Each element of movement is made along a “continuum” and is described at its most extreme (Valerio, et al., 1998, p. 16). Movement focus in Space is direct or indirect, Weight is either light or strong “sensations of body weight”, Time is sustained or quick and Flow exists in free or bound “bodily tension” (Valerio, et al., 1998, p. 16). Laban Effort movement elements were intended for dancers, but can be applied to instrumental music teaching and learning efforts. Valerio, Reynolds, Bolton, Taggart and Gordon (1998, p. 17) assert that Laban Effort elements can be applied to music education in the following order:

> Flow, emphasizing continuous free-flowing movement; Weight, emphasizing strong and gentle movement; Space, emphasizing self-space and shared space, stationary and locomotor movements, making and filling up spaces, and moving in different directions, and at different levels, using straight and curvy pathways; and Time, emphasizing first quick and slow …

Effort movement elements initiated by Laban can be applied in a music educational setting before education on a musical instrument commences. For beginner instrumental music teaching and learning, by utilising the movement elements suggested, the teaching of technical aspects of instrumental playing is approached from an embodied perspective. Valerio et al. (1998, p. 17) remark that students “will breathe, draw the bow, reach for an upper octave, finger a difficult passage, and accurately begin to play again after long pauses in the music, all while not rushing or slowing the tempo of the music”. In turn, instrumental playing does not take on the form of the traditional cognitive approach where cognition is seen as sandwiched between perception and action (3.3) (Hurley, 2008, p. 2), in turn separating the body from the mind. Rather, by utilising Laban Effort principles, a cycle of “sense-act” arises (Dawson, 2013, p. 261) where the body and mind are balanced. Consequently, by parting ways with representational manners of teaching, where the teacher verbally instructs or demonstrates, Laban movement principles unite body and mind. Laban Effort components correlate with psychological “inner states” (Stirling, 2010, p. 47).

Laban's Effort components correspond with the theory of function types by Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung (1875 – 1961). Jung developed psychological or personality types as well as four key purposes of each, namely thinking, feeling, sensing and intuition (Maletic, 2005, p. 113). Table 2 shows the relationships[62] made by Laban in the second edition of his publication *The Mastery of Movement* (Laban, 1960) (Maletic, 2005, pp. 113,114).

Table 2 Laban Effort components corresponding with Jung's function types (Maletic, 2005, p. 10)

Motion Component	Inner participation: contains phases of	"Powers of"
Space	Attention	Thinking
Weight	Intention	Sensing
Time	Decision	Intuiting
Flow	Progression	Feeling

The Effort component of Space is associated with the power of Thinking. Thinking within the motion concept of space can "manifest as clarity of thought" (Maletic, 2005, p. 11). Sensing is associated with the Effort component of Weight and the display of "strength or delicacy in performance" (Maletic, 2005, p. 11). Time is associated with intuition to make decisions and flow is associated with feeling and manifests in "holding back or being outgoing in communication" (Maletic, 2005, p. 11). Even though Laban never concretely explained how he came to categorise Jung's personality types with his own Effort components, I infer these comparisons as the way in which the mind and the body unite and co-depend on each other in embodied cognition. In other words, the comparison of Laban Effort components with Jung's function or personality types is a representation of how cognition is not merely situated within the head but how it is situated within the body and how cognition manifests through bodily interaction. In turn, students engaging in movement develop autonomous agency through in-the-moment discussions and

[62] Maletic (2005, p. 114) mentions that Laban did not fully explain the link he made between his four movement conceptions and Jung's function types. "It is as though we are presented with the results of Laban's thinking but not the origin and process that led to them" (Maletic, 2005, p. 114).

engagements with themselves, the environment and their instrument. Focusing on how Gordon relied on Laban movement components to further explain the internalisation of musical elements, the discussion on Gordon will continue.

With regards to a key component of music, namely rhythm, Gordon (2003, p. 265) asserts that a student is taught rhythm, or in Laban terms, time, before the exploration of space, weight and flow via body movements. The manner in which students are taught rhythm, assumes the typical Westernised traditional approach where teachers fall back on verbally explaining beat and rhythms according to “accents, fractions, and counting”, disregarding movement experiences (Gordon, 2003, p. 173). With the focus on verbal instructions and explanations comes a disregard for the proprioceptive and sensory systems on which cognition relies. The term rhythm originated in the Greek word *rhythmos* which means “flow” (italics as in original) (Gordon, 2003, p. 174). Hence, the internalisation or cognition of rhythm and rhythmic patterns without movement is irrational (Gordon, 2003, p. 265). With ample movement experiences, students will internalise, comprehend and “audiate space” as they perform their movements and be able to predict and adapt these movements according to the rhythmic source (Gordon, 2003, p. 265). A practical application of MLT principles that can be utilised in a beginner instrumental class is the following (Mullen, 2017, p. 12):

1) Chant a simple duple or triple metre song on a neutral syllable such as “Baa”.
2) Move with the upper body in free and flowing movements through space.
3) Move further with the upper body in free and flowing movements through space, now while flicking your fingertips to the microbeats[63]. The fingertips will pulsate the microbeats while the arms move freely.
4) With the fingertips, tap the microbeats on your thighs.
5) Break the chant up into smaller parts and echo the phrases.

[63] Macrobeats and microbeats are terms coined by Gordon (2003; 2013) to describe beat divisions. Macrobeats are those beats that are the longest in a sequence of rhythmic beats. Macrobeats are coupled beats and equal or unequal division of the macrobeats.

6) While standing, alternate your weight from one foot to the other on the macrobeats. In a swaying movement, shift your weight from one foot to the other on the macrobeats.
7) While alternating your shifting weight between your two feet, tap the microbeats on your thighs.
8) Break the chant up into larger phrases and echo the phrases.
9) Walk around the room on the macrobeats. Weight is still shifted between the two feet, but this time while walking on the macrobeats.
10) On the tips of your toes, walk around the room to the microbeats. With swift, light movements you tip-toe across the room on the microbeats.
11) Swap between walking to the macro- and microbeats.

The movements described above for the internalisation of rhythm and beat make use of Laban “Effort” components to “explain how we move and most naturally and musically perform macrobeats, microbeats, and rhythm patterns” (Gordon, 2003, p. 188). Through making use of principles by Gordon (2003) that are enhanced by the movement components identified by Laban (1960), a student can experience a key element of music (rhythm) through exploration with the body in movement. By giving students an opportunity to move in Time, Weight, Space and Flow Efforts on macro- and microbeats before they produce those sounds on an instrument, they are given the opportunity to internalise an intangible concept and, in turn, also given the agency to make choices within the lesson. To further develop the construct of embodied cognition, a discussion on embodied learning will follow with discussions on specifically experience and meaning.

3.10 Embodied Learning

The construct of embodied learning encompasses the internalisation of information through meaningful experiences making use of the body. Traditionally, learning encompasses the “acquisition of knowledge and skills” (Juntunen, 2017, p. 118). The school curriculum is based on the assumption that the body plays no role in cognition, favouring theory over practice (O'Loughlin, 1998, p. 292). O’Loughlin (1998, p. 292)

emphasises that students have little opportunity to experience and "do" their subjects, rendering the teaching and learning scenario "stripped bare of all that is experiential". "At school, learners sit, watch, listen, and write" (Macedonia, 2019, p. 1). In instrumental teaching and learning, even today, students are required to learn to read musical notes and to translate those notes into "meaningful sounds" by "adjusting fine finger movements (on) an instrument" (Habibi, et al., 2021, p. 30). Macedonia (2019, p. 1) in her book *Embodied Learning: Why at School the Mind Needs the Body,* urges that even though efforts were made during the past three decades to part ways from the traditional Westernised way of thinking, teaching and learning still rely on "mentalistic" approaches. The disconnect between the role that the body and experience play in learning is evident in a learner's understanding that has not been comprehended meaningfully (Stolz, 2015, p. 474). "An experience … is capable of "carrying any amount of theory", but theory that is devoid of experience, cannot be comprehended (Dewey, 2001, p. 150). In explaining what embodied learning entails, Munro (2018, p. 5) writes that "[e]mbodied learning is … the deliberate use and recognition of multimodal bodymind activities and strategies to facilitate shifts in perspectives, perceptions, paradigms, behaviour and actions".

Learning occurs from experience and interaction between students and the environment through the use of "senses, perceptions and mind-body action and reaction" (Juntunen, 2020, p. 45). Thus, in embodied music learning, students should be able to experience the learning material not only with their minds and their instruments. Instead, they should also be able to experience with their whole bodies and beings. Munro (2018, p. 7) concurs that teaching strategies that rely on the underpinnings of embodied learning focus on a

> transactional mode of knowledge sharing, dialogue, experiential processes and simultaneous engagement with inductive and deductive learning strategies as well as acknowledging and working through the continuous presence of emotions.

Within an embodied learning approach, students are engaged in meaningful, holistic, and experiential processes with their bodies and beings, in the environment, alongside and in relation to other persons, holistically integrated within the embodied learning situation (Munro, 2018, p. 9). Hence, in embodied teaching and learning scenarios learners actively explore and experience because they "inhabit" the world and are "present in it

and involved with it" (Stolz, 2015, p. 480). Experience is a key component in embodied learning: a discussion on experience from the two camps of aesthetic experience, namely those of Reimer and Dewey, will follow. For Reimer, an aesthetic experience relies on the cognitive contemplation of a musical work, mainly through listening. On the other hand, Dewey's notion of aesthetic experience focuses on the social and embodied interactions.

3.10.1 Experience

Experience is seen as a crucial element of embodied learning and, within this framework, encompasses interactions with the social and material environment so as to bring forth change in both cognition and within the self. "An ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any theory has vital and verifiable significance" (Dewey, 2001, p. 150). With this statement, Dewey (2001, p. 150) emphasises the need for experience within the music teaching and learning situation. Experience, according to Westerlund (2002, p. 16), results from the activities that are found in a human organism's life. She (Westerlund, 2002, p. 16) explains

> Musical experience is gained through navigating the world of musics, through interaction with the social and material environment. In education, musical experience can be seen as a continuous *process* that grows out of ordinary doings and undergoings, of trials and errors, into knowledge, thoughtful action and the search for musical meaning (italics as in original).

Within our daily lives, information is gained by actively exploring and experiencing the world through the use of one's body and sensory system. Being one of the first philosophies in the post-Second World War era to be utilised in music education, Reimer's approach advocated for the value of an individual aesthetic musical experience (Westerlund, 2012, p. 10). Within Reimer's (1989a) theory, experiences are restricted to the individual and an aesthetically pleasing object or musical work. Learning and experiencing music, for Reimer, focuses on the cognition of aesthetic features within a musical object, disregarding the practical and social milieu in which the musical object is imbedded (Westerlund, 2003, pp. 46-47). Reimer (1989a, p. 185) explains that "[T]he

point is to experience the great diversity of music in the only way possible for all people when music is required – through listening as the fundamental behavior. Performing … is an essential but contributory mode of interaction with music".

Thus, an aesthetic experience according to Reimer's philosophy consists of the individual interaction between the person and the musical work, mainly through listening[64]. Musical meaning, then, is seen as something "out there", encapsulated in scores and recordings (Spruce, 2012, p. 188). In a teaching and learning situation, explanations and analysis of said works are given to students who are required to "cognitively process and understand", otherwise described as "memorizing and reiterating" this information (Spruce, 2012, p. 188). A Reimerian aesthetic experience reverts back to 17th century Cartesian dualism where cognition is confined to the brain. Reimer's approach is incompatible with Dewey's notion of an aesthetic experience (Westerlund, 2002, p. 6). Aesthetic experience, in the sense that Dewey intended (viewed through the application of Westerlund), did not aim to be only inward and private (Westerlund 2003: 48). As Westerlund (2003: 46) states

> Dewey's aesthetic leads us to situated, not only individual but also communal, transformative experiences. Hence, Dewey's pragmatism that opposed reductive individualism asks us to abandon a mechanistic naturalist world-view in favor of a humanistic naturalism in which the individual is an integrative part of her dynamic environment.

For Dewey, an aesthetic experience is social, individual, embodied and essential to action and interaction (Westerlund 2003: 46). Westerlund (2003: 49) writes that a Deweyan aesthetic experience is an experience that *transforms*[65] life (italics as in original). It is a fulfilling and meaningful action that cannot be separated from "the processes of making sense, practices, habits, and social life in general", and juxtaposes the mechanical, nonintegrated, meaningless forms of engagement based on Cartesian dualism as

[64] The critique on Reimer's philosophical approach and the influence on music education are discussed at length in Chapter 2 (2.13).
[65] Dewey preferred the term transaction over interaction and wrote that it is not isolated or self-sufficient (Dewey 1925: 163).

described earlier (Westerlund, 2003, p. 49). She (Westerlund 2003: 49) writes that “[i]t is these good and fulfilling experiences that we want in our lives and education in general”. Musical meaning stems from embodied experiences (Hebert, 2009, p. 48), and it is meaningful experiences, specifically for beginner instrumentalists, that I seek for in this study. Hence, a discussion on meaning is inevitable.

3.10.2 Meaning

Meaning is formed when students have significant experiences and interaction with their instrument, other people and the environment. Meaning is a concept that has roots in both philosophy and psychology (Correia, 2014, p. 17). Glenberg and Robertson (2000, p. 379) describe the construct of meaning as follows:

> Meaning is the most important problem in cognitive psychology. Meaning controls memory and perception. Meaning is the goal of communication. Meaning underlies social activities and culture: To a great degree, what distinguishes human cultures are the meanings they give to natural phenomena, artifacts, and human relations.

With the above description, it is evident that the construct of “meaning” has many definitions. Meaning in Cartesian dualism is solely cognitive, abstract and intangible, because of the separation of mind and body in the concept formation process (Johnson, 2006, p. 5). Similar to Cartesian dualism, the Enlightenment aesthetics discussed in Chapter 2, saw a separation of the body from meaning creation, in turn rendering it mental and rational (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 69). Meaning in the sense put forth by Enlightenment aesthetics focuses on the technical properties of a musical work, or as Varkøy (2009, p. 39) explains, “acoustic data”. Stated differently, the “individual brain” of a single person analyses and interprets the acoustic data (Westerlund, 2002, p. 26). Glover and Ward (2004, p. 65) describe musical meanings as “using” thinking and not just “having” thinking. Meaning is related to “how people make sense of their active participation and experiences” within the teaching and learning situation (Schiavio, et al., 2020, p. 2). Staveley (2020, p. 27) asserts that “[i]t is through these active, bodily experiences in the world that all cognitive, physical, emotional and spiritual meanings are

developed". Within an embodied learning framework, meaning is created through active participation and experience with one's body.

Consequently, through making use of the body, meaning is created. Johnson (1987, pp. xix,xx) expresses how meaning formation is grounded in bodily experience. He (Johnson, 1987, p. xix) explains that meaning and understanding are dependent on our bodily movement, physical handling of objects and perceptual and mental patterning, without which the experience would be "chaotic and incomprehensible". In other words, active participation in collaboration with mental processes of understanding brings forth meaning. Active participation involves engagement with the environment with one's sensorimotor processes (Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018, p. 4). The forming of musical meanings is situated within sensorimotor encounters and active exploration of the world (Leman & Maes, 2014, p. 237). Freeman (2001, p. 43) explains that "[m]eanings arise as a brain creates intentional behaviours and then changes itself in accordance with the sensory consequences of those behaviours". In other words, within beginner instrumental teaching and learning, students will not be verbally instructed about the instrument and asked to reproduce those instructions on the instrument. Nijs and Bremmer (2019, p. 99) advise that music education for the young child should be immersed in activities that offer experiences that encourage "musical meaning-making". Accordingly, meaning and understanding through an embodied learning lens involve the use of the students' bodies and sensorimotor abilities through movement, listening, singing and handling their instrument. Yet, embodied learning comprising meaningful experiences has been neglected within traditional music education. A discussion on the lack of embodied learning experiences as well as suggestions for the application of embodied learning strategies will follow.

3.10.3 Traditional instrumental learning in practice

Learning within traditional instrumental education relies greatly on verbal instruction and the practicing of technical exercises. For most of history, up until the middle of the 19th century, the teaching and learning of a musical instrument was mainly done verbally

(McPherson & Gabrielsson, 2002, p. 99). In order to become accustomed to the "language" of music, technical exercises such as scales and arpeggios were utilised and, in turn, assisted in the development of musical skills such as improvisation, composition and sight-reading (McPherson & Gabrielsson, 2002, p. 99). From the 1850s, music notation and scores could be printed by the lithograph and printing machines, putting even more focus on the teaching of technical exercises, as these could now be printed out and read (McPherson & Gabrielsson, 2002, p. 99). By the beginning of the 1900s, the influence of focus on technical fluency could be seen in beginner instrumental method books, where the drilling of technical aspects such as rhythmic patterns, articulation and finger exercises became the norm (McPherson & Gabrielsson, 2002, p. 100). Drilling of technical exercises can be linked back to training (2.9.1.1) and banking (2.9.1.2) discussed in Chapter 2.

Drilling is the repetitive practicing of notes, note-values and the "motor skill[s]" needed to play these notes, but without the "musical context" related to the music (Wiggins & Wiggins, 2008, p. 16). From experience, I can deduce that drilling leads to a trained instrumentalist, but with no grasp of the related context or the experience of meaning that instrumental education should offer[66]. Elliott and Silverman (2015, p. 8) describe drilling as stuffing an "empty container" with "numerical and verbal knowledge" only to train "future job fillers". They (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 53) state that if change is not brought about in music education, then "… skill-drilling, talking, and testing will take over every other aspect of expressive, educative, and creative music-making and music education". In conclusion, from the onset of music education, traditional instrumental teaching and learning practices relied on the undue focus on technical proficiency by drilling students into musicians. In turn, beginner instrumental teaching approaches focused on the training of an instrumentalist, rather than a holistic, embodied, interactive approach towards teaching.

[66] Relating to the concept of praxis without poiesis, the drilling of technical skills relies on techne as described in Chapter 2 (2.15.2). Thus, drilling is a technical kind of doing, devoid of the ethical implications of the person in the pedagogical situation.

3.11 Application of embodied cognition through Dalcroze Eurhythmics

In search for a practical application of embodied learning within beginner instrumental teaching and learning, Dalcroze Eurhythmics offers valuable insights. Émile Jacques-Dalcroze (1865 – 1950) was a Swiss music education specialist, pianist and composer who aimed to resolve the "imbalance caused by the intellectualization of musical knowledge and the tendency towards abstractions without practical or bodily connections in learning practices" (Juntunen, 2019, p. 52). As one of the earliest pedagogues to question the Cartesian approach, which is known for the dualistic separation of mind and body, Dalcroze searched for ways to teach that included the whole student, the combination of "thinking, sensing, feeling, and bodily action[67]" making the student both "bodily and mentally active" (Juntunen, 2019, p. 52).

Dalcroze noticed that, even though his students at the Conservatory of Geneva displayed the ability to reproduce pieces of music, their musicality was lacking (Juntunen & Westerlund, 2001, p. 204). The strong emphasis on the development of "intellectual concepts" such as composition and analysis while fundamental elements such as rhythm and pitch were ignored was a cause for concern (Daly, 2021, p. 2). Similarly, Dalcroze remarked that children, regardless of proficient listening skills, struggled to play their instruments or sing in time (Jacques-Dalcroze, 2018, pp. ix,x). Consequently, Dalcroze questioned the teaching methods and philosophical approaches used, and as a result, his approach, coined *Eurhythmics*[68]*,* aimed to resolve the abstract, intellectual and cerebral methods utilised to teach music (Juntunen, 2016, p. 28).

Eurhythmics consists of three main principles, namely rhythm, improvisation and solfège. Together, these three principles form the "eurhythmics triangle" (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015,

[67] It is important to note that Dalcroze and Laban lived in the same time-span and that Laban was in a relationship with Suzanne Perrottet, who was a student of Dalcroze. "It could be said that Suzanne Perrottet was able to convey first-hand understanding of Dalcroze's work, methods and theories and was thus instrumental in helping inspire and solidify Laban's thinking in relation to movement, rhythm and sound" (Curtis-Jones, 2017, p. 14).

[68] The Greek word "eu" means "beautiful" or "good" and "rhythmics" which stands for rhythm and movement. The term Eurhythmics was first coined in 1911 by university lecturers and English teachers at Hellerau, a school of rhythmics in Dresden Germany (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 24).

p. 14). Rhythm, or rhythmics, as Dalcroze calls it, refers to rhythm, metre and pulse (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 14). Rhythm is a prominent principle in Eurhythmics as it "is indisputably the basic element without which there is no musical art" (Findlay, 1971, p. 1). Solfège[69] syllables and hand signs assist in the internalisation of melodic lines, tonalities and harmonies (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 14), as well as improvisation, which allows students to explore their own "capacities for self-expression" (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 15). At the core of Dalcroze Eurhythmics is movement. With the use of movement, students explore, interpret and express themselves, in turn assisting in a "deeper understanding" of complex musical concepts (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 14). Movement occurs with the use of one's body as the vehicle to explore and interpret various stimuli. Children's encounters with and exploration of their environment rely greatly on their senses and motor engagement so as to gain information about their surroundings.

[69]In an effort to assist the studying of Catholic songs solely by ear, solfége syllables were invented in the 11th Century by the Italian monk Guido of Arezzo and originally contained only six of the seven pitches, ut (instead of do), re, mi, fa, sol, la (Sagrillo, 2016). In the middle 1600s, G.B. Doni proposed the use of a different syllable than "Ut" (McNaught, 1892, p. 43). By making use of the first syllable of his surname, the "Ut" was replaced by "Do" (McNaught, 1892, p. 43). By the end of the 16th century, "Si" was added to the original 6 tones proposed by Guido, and represented the 7th tone (McNaught, 1892, p. 40). In 1835, Miss Sarah Glover proposed the usage of "Te" for the seventh tone (McNaught, 1892, p. 45).



Figure 4: Eurhythmics triangle including the three principles of Dalcroze Eurhythmics: Rhythmics, Improvisation, Solfège, all realised within movement (Findlay, 1971, p. 14).

A child naturally responds with movement to information gained by the senses. Through these natural movement responses, a sense of rhythm is unconsciously developed (Findlay, 1971, p. 3). The daily activities of a child, such as brushing teeth, combing hair, running around the yard, skipping rope and kicking a ball, all contribute to their "instinctive capacity for rhythm" (Findlay, 1971, p. 3). In music education, the teacher is tasked with directing this natural affinity for rhythm to rhythms in music (Juntunen, 2002, p. 86). These explorations happen because of and through the body: the body is essentially an "instrument" (Juntunen, 2002, p. 88). With the bodily instrument, Dalcroze urges that a student's rhythmic skills need to be explored before a musical instrument is to be studied (Findlay, 1971, p. 2). Daly (2021, p. 2) elucidates that

> As the body is our primary instrument, he considered that we need to train it in the same way we approach learning a musical instrument. [His approach] aim[s] to develop the two-way communications system between brain and body. The student learns by firstly doing and experiencing, then analysing and intellectualising, followed by experiencing again with greater understanding.

By utilising the body to explore musical elements, body movements "create a link between the ear and brain" so that complex musical elements and features are understood (Fortuna, 2019, p. 3). To give an example of the type of experiences that are suggested before instrumental education commences, I draw on a description by Swinkin, who (2015, p. vii) describes a father who wants to teach his child the sitar and veena. Before playing the instruments, the child is guided to recognise "musical sounds found in nature" and to associate animal noises with solfège and connect ragas with "colors, emotions, and seasons" (Swinkin, 2015, p. vii). Only after a year of exposure to and experiences with musical elements did the father allow his child to play on the sitar and veena (Swinkin, 2015, p. vii). This example gives insight into the experiences the student should have before commencing instrumental education. Consequently, "music is intimately connected to the world" and "the teacher can (and should) foster in his pupil this and other fundamental precepts from the earliest possible stage and in an experiential way" (Swinkin, 2015, p. vii). Drawing on Dalcroze principles, to follow are examples of activities that a beginner instrumental teacher can use to facilitate the internalisation of musical elements.

Following the suggestions of Dalcroze Eurhythmics, the teacher should initiate movement exploration with movements that come naturally to the child and that form part of their daily activities. Movements such as walking, running, skipping, and swaying can be associated with basic rhythms in music. By using the child's natural and instinctive movements, teaching music comes "closer to a child's natural method of learning" (Fortuna, 2017, p. 121). The method suggested[70] is to play simple chords on a piano or,

[70] The suggested example is merely one way in which the principles of Dalcroze Eurhythmics can assist in the experiences of musical elements. Van der Merwe (2014, p. 1) expresses that Dalcroze Eurhythmics gives an opportunity for "social integration, joyful experience, bodily experience, easier understanding, and musical expression".

alternatively, a drum or by clapping your hands, mimicking the natural rhythms of walking, running, skipping and swaying and asking the child to respond in movement. The rhythms are: walking  , running  , skipping  and swaying  (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 159). Children respond to the rhythms played by the teacher and move accordingly. In turn, they learn to "listen with the body" as they move according to what they hear (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 157). Natural movements, as described in this paragraph, give the students an opportunity to experience basic rhythms that they will be playing on their instrument. An extension of this activity is to walk four steps forward and four steps backwards, giving a sense of a bar or phrase in music (Farhana & Jais, 2021, p. 29). When students become acquainted with keeping a beat while walking forwards and backwards, they can also clap the rhythmic pattern(s) of a piece of music they are currently learning on their instrument.

A further suggestion is to use adaptable material such as a ball. Ridout and Habron (2020, p. 2) write that besides making use of only the body in Dalcroze Eurhythmics, other apparatus with "expressive potential" such as balls, scarves and sticks can be used as an extension of the body. A movement as simple as bouncing a ball on the beat of simple chords played by the teacher on the piano or a beat on a drum, allows a student to audibly hear the ball bounce on the floor, visually see the ball bounce as well as feel the movement through the body (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 85). This activity allows the student to become acquainted with beat, which forms the basis of all music.

Another suggestion is that the ball can be bounced, thrown or rolled between the teacher and the student in order for the student to anticipate, prepare and react to catch the ball within the correct timing (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 85). An example is using a four-beat phrase. The teacher pushes the ball on beat one, and the student catches it on beat three. Later, the roles are reversed, and the student has to roll the ball to the teacher and anticipate the effort needed to get the ball there in the correct timing (Nivbrant Wedin, 2015, p. 143). The anticipation, preparation and reaction that is explored when the ball is rolled between the teacher and the student, in turn, prepares the student for similar

anticipation and reactions in playing an instrument. An example of this is the anticipation, preparation and reaction needed when a beginner violinist plays two or three notes under one bow, for instance a “down bow”. The beginner violinist needs to anticipate the amount of bow needed for the group of notes and prepare to react accordingly. Through embodied learning experiences, the student is equipped to make such technical decisions because exploration with the body gives the necessary preparation.

Consequently, Dalcroze Eurhythmics challenges the traditional account of cognition that was built on the notions of Descartes. Within traditional cognitive models, cognition relies on “sense-think-act” cycles (Hurley, 2008, p. 2), as discussed in this Chapter (3.3). Dalcroze successfully transforms the learning process into “sense-act” cycles of embodied cognition (Dawson, 2013, p. 261). The suggestions proposed in this section, specifically for the use of embodied learning approaches to teaching beginner instrumental music, can be extended further. By utilising Dalcroze Eurhythmics, the student learns to be expressive through bodily movement, in turn creating unique opportunities for meaning-creation.

In line with the transformation of traditional cognitive theories suggested thus far, where the mind, body and environment are united in the music-making process, I discuss an extension of the Praxial philosophy referred to in Chapter 2 (2.14-2.17). The Praxial philosophy put forth by Alperson (1991) and Elliott (1995) focuses on musical action through performance as opposed to the mental contemplation of an aesthetic object in aesthetic theories (Reimer, 1989b).

3.12 Extending embodied music education: An expansion of praxial ideas

Extensions of the Praxial philosophy advanced by Bowman, Regelski and Elliott (Elliott collaborated with other authors)[71] rely greatly on the constructs of embodied learning. To follow is an outlay of these praxialists' contributions to the advancement of embodied learning.

Wayne Bowman (born 1947) is a professor at Brandon University in Canada and has contributed extensively to music education philosophy (Elliott, 2005, p. xiii), specifically in ethics (Aiello, 2013, p. 78). In an early publication, Bowman (1992, p. 11) concurs with Elliott's (1995) dissatisfaction with the Aesthetic ideal and mentions that it "restrict[s]" music and separates it from the circumstances and context that are essential to understanding it fully. The very idea of aesthetic musical value carries a body of largely implicit restrictive assumptions as to what features of music are pertinent to "truly" musical perception and musical understanding (Bowman, 1992, p. 11). Bowman (2000, p. 45) writes that while Elliott rejects the aesthetic notion, Elliott indirectly accepts a number of the assumptions brought forth by the Aesthetic philosophical view. "Accordingly, a major challenge for music education is to extend the domain of presumed critical relevance beyond the 'aesthetic'" (Bowman, 1992, pp. 34, 35).

Bowman (2000, p. 45) advises that Elliott abandon the idealist and cognitive theories of perception and mind. A serious fault found within the focus on the idealistic Aesthetic philosophical views is that it does not use the "body" as a starting point (Bowman, 2000, p. 45). Bowman (2000, p. 46) explains that for Elliott, music is significant because it is "cognitively substantiative" and engagement therein is "mindful". "The body is an enormous blind spot in traditional idealistic philosophy, and I would like to see us work to correct this" (Bowman, 2000, p. 45). Musical participation or "musicing" needs to realise that the body alerts and enables the musical action or doing (Bowman, 2000, p. 46). In other words, even though Elliott advocates for musical action in contrast to the aesthetic

[71] Bowman, 1991a, 1991b, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2012; Elliott & Silverman, 2012, 2015, 2019; Regelski, 1981, 1998, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b 2009.

autonomous focus on the object, he neglects to realise the unity of body and mind suggested in embodied cognition theories (3.6-3.9).

A year after the above discussed publication, Bowman (2001, p. 16) elaborates on his concern for music, the main focus of which is on music knowledge or aesthetic responses. He (Bowman, 2001, p. 16) articulates the need for music education to be concerned with "who people become" as a result of music education and experiences: thus, the concern for ethics. The construct of ethics was "*redefined*" (italics as in original) in the Enlightenment age and became a matter of obedience to authority, rules and morals in order to avoid evil and commitment to responsibilities (Bowman, 2001, p. 14). Ethics does not entail the making of and obedience to rules of conduct. In an educational setting, teaching with ethics means to give students a "sense of meaning and purpose" (Boyce-Tillman, 2021, p. 1) and not seeing students as "more of the same", denying the uniqueness and distinctive abilities of each learner (Bowman, 2002, p. 68). Such an approach diminishes an ethical engagement to a mere technical one (Bowman, 2002, p. 68). As ethics is concerned with the care, wellbeing and flourishing of the person, specifically in an instrumental music education setting (Silverman, 2020), the focus is not on the technical instrumental proficiency of the student. Consequently, teaching ethically shifts the focus away from teaching techniques to being "musical mentors", having "continuous concern for protecting and advancing meaningfulness, human flourishing, and wellbeing" (Silverman, 2020, p. 7).

3.12.1 Regelski

Thomas J Regelski (Born 1941) is the co-founder of the "MayDay Group," alongside Terry Gates. Regelski and Gates founded the group in 1993 to address the growing challenges that educators faced as well as the standing of music within society (Regelski, 2002, p. b). "MayDay Group" is a collective of interdisciplinary scholars whose focus is on action and change in music and music education, mainly focusing on Critical Theory, critical thinking and other relevant research (Regelski, 2002, p. b). In the flagship publication of the "MayDay Group," Regelski (2002, p. c) comments on the vision of the

group. He (Regelski, 2002, p. c) writes that the group's focus is to "facilitate and disseminate new ideas, to continue to promote analysis of and open-minded dialogue about both old and new ideas, and to help effect change for the betterment of music education and music in society".

Regelski, a former school music teacher, completed his doctoral studies in philosophy of music (Regelski & Gates, 2009, p. xvii). Serving as a "college-level introduction to the psychology of music teaching and learning," his first book, *Principles and Problems of Music Education* (1975), focused on aesthetic reactions to music and feeling (Scott Goble, 2003, p. 29). Within his second college-level publication, *Teaching General Music: Action Learning for Middle and Secondary Schools (1981),* Regelski started to advocate for "action learning", initiating a departure from the then-current Aesthetic philosophical view. However, it was not until his writings in 1994 that Regelski committed to developing music as praxis for music education (Scott Goble, 2003, p. 30). Regelski agreed that music education's foundation should be in action and not aesthetic perception and experience (Bradley, 2012, p. 422). Instead, they are "closely related" (Aiello, 2013, p. 74).

Regelski's philosophy mimics that of Elliott with his dissatisfaction with the disinterested, autonomous musical object, the hierarchy of Western classical music as well as the cognitive traits that seep through (Aiello, 2013, p. 74). Since Aesthetics placed Western classical music on a pedestal, a distance between society and the elitist Western aesthetic art object is clear in the "dwindling audiences, struggling opera houses" (Aiello, 2013, p. 75). Yet the divide between typical aesthetic music that was made for "concert listening" and "functional music" that was made for other purposes is invalid (Scott Goble, 2003, p. 31). The primary reason for the disconnect between music and society lies within the "habit" of viewing music as a work of art that is to be contemplated for its own sake (Regelski, 2006b, p. 10). Regelski (2006b, p. 10) expresses "the assumption that 'good' music is made and listened to 'for itself' and is somehow aesthetically sanitized of all down-to-earth human and social 'goods' is simply a philosophical and social mistake".

In an effort to reconnect music education with society, Regelski (2006b, p. 10) urges for a reconsideration of what music "is" and what music is "good for"[72] in life, society and beginner instrumental education. Instead, Regelski advocates for all music to be regarded as "functional", whether it be the main focus of a certain praxis, for instance a concert, or not the main focus of a certain praxis, for instance in advertising (Scott Goble, 2003, p. 31). "For him, the all-important question is: What is music 'good for' in each situation in which it is present?" (Scott Goble, 2003, p. 31). Regelski (2006b, p. 10) explains that music is "good for" a multitude of different praxes, and this does not take away from its value. An example is jazz music that can be used when dancing. He (Regelski, 2006b, p. 11) urges that even though jazz can be used to dance to, it does not prevent listening and appreciating jazz music. Similarly, worshipping to the accompaniment of secular music does not prevent us from respecting it. Regelski (2006b, p. 11) explains that music is thus used "in action":

> It focuses on music as it has been and is *used* in society for a multitude of 'goods' that, regardless of aesthetic rationalizations, are never devoid of the sociality brought by and invigorated by the music that occasions its use (italics as in original).

Through active participation by an autonomous individual, a Praxial philosophy as set forth by Regelski opposes the Aesthetic philosophical view to music education. In turn, active participation in the instrumental teaching and learning situation is directed towards a larger goal (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 87), advocating for "right action" or "phronesis" as mentioned in Chapter 2 (2.18) (Bradley, 2012, p. 428). Phronesis is an ethical manner of "doing" where the needs of all that are involved in the process of learning is taken into consideration (Regelski, 2005b, p. 230). The production of "things" in isolation as with the Aesthetic philosophical view, gives way for an "ethical dimension of praxis" that is responsible for "the needs of [all] people" (Regelski, 2005b, p. 230). The goal is education

[72] What music is "good for", was borrowed from the American scholar Dissanayake (2003). Dissanayake (2003, p. 22) explains in his "thesis that the evolution and selective value of a behavior of art arises from a tendency to make special rests on the claim that humans everywhere, in a manner that is unlike that of other animals, differentiate between an order, realm, mood, or state of being that is mundane, ordinary, or 'natural,' and one that is unusual, extra-ordinary, or 'supernatural'".

directed towards "flourishing[73]" (Boon, 2009, p. 7). Similarly, for beginner instrumental (piano) teaching and learning, teachers "may fuel the flourishing of students" (Thompson, 2018, p. 92). In turn, for beginner instrumental students, flourishing advances "personal growth", a "thriving" student who is "highly motivated" (Thompson, 2018, p. 93).

Previously it has been mentioned that the focus of the Aesthetic philosophical view to music education was the omnipotent musical work and the correct representation of that work. In turn, music education reproduces a schooled listener that is able to appreciate and, in some sense, respect the musical work. The praxial view extended by Regelski shifts the focus to the active participation needed for the musical work to come into being, acknowledging the work as the medium and not quintessential element of the teaching and learning situation. Extending his own work on a Praxial philosophy, Elliott broadened his views set forth in his 1995 publication of *Music Matters.* A discussion on Elliott's later works will ensue.

3.12.2 Elliott's later works

Elliott's Praxial philosophy discussed and critiqued in Chapter 2 (2.14-2.18) has extended over the course of his career. Encouraging criticism, Elliott's work has evolved to incorporate "new philosophical, sociocultural and scientific research" (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 76). In 2015, Elliott collaborated with Silverman, associate professor at the Montclair State University in New York, and wrote the second edition of *Music Matters*. Within this publication the authors began to focus on a Praxial philosophy to music education through a critical ontological lens (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 75). Critical ontology was researched in great depth by Kincheloe (2007, p. 33), who explains that critical ontology is a "transformative, self-aware way of *being* human" (italics as in original). In viewing a Praxial philosophy through a critical ontological lens, music education is brought closer to the human being as a "being-in-the-world" (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 75). This statement links to the notion of an embodied philosophical approach discussed in this

[73] Flourishing or *eudaimonia* (Boon, 2009, p. 7) will be discussed and applied in full later in this Chapter (3.14).

Chapter (3.4-3.5), where a human being is seen as an active, thinking and feeling person. It can be deduced that Elliott and Silverman (2015) oppose Cartesian dualism by focusing more on the role of the body and being in music education. Bowman (2004, p. 25) articulates that a philosophy of music education that focuses on the ontological importance of the body and not the mind initiates "healing" the mind-body dualism created by Westernised philosophy. Kincheloe (2007, p. 33) agrees and states that a "key dimension of a critical ontology involves freeing ourselves from the machine metaphors of Cartesianism".

In a shift towards adopting the enactive approach, Elliott, alongside van der Schyff and Schiavio, worked together on the publication *Critical Ontology for an Enactive Music Pedagogy* (van der Schyff, et al., 2016). For transformation to occur, the origin of mind and cognition and human encounters and engagement with the world need to be reconsidered (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 103). An enactive approach offers an "open-ended, creative, intersubjective" process which can restructure the way thinking, feeling, acting and music education at large is advanced (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 103). By utilising a critical ontological perspective, the second edition of *Music Matters* (Elliott & Silverman, 2015) supports the notion of an enactive approach towards music education[74] (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 75). Although not always explicitly discussed in the text, the notion of an enactive approach towards music education nevertheless "permeates much of the book" (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 77). As Elliott and Silverman (2015, pp. 153, 154) write

> … our…experiences of music making, listening, feeling, knowing, teaching learning – everything we can possibly do, desire, feel, think, etc. – can trace back to the fundamental issue of what it means to be the kind of living entity that possesses, undergoes, enacts, and "performs" his or her personhood.

Elliott and Silverman's (2015) ontological position suggests a close link between the enactive perspective and their writings in *Music Matters* II. Van der Schyff (2015, p. 90)

[74] With regards to beginner instrumental teaching and learning, an enactive approach allows for "the most primal, basic and intimate level of our musical involvement" (Matyja & Schiavio, 2013, p. 353) and creates meaning-making opportunities for instrumentalists at any proficiency level.

writes that the enactive approach "resonates rather closely with the fundamental mode of human being-in-the-world associated with *phronesis*-as-*praxis*" (italics as in original). I suggest the enactive approach as an extension of embodied cognition theories, as an enactive approach includes the autonomous individual and his/her ability to effect change on the environment (Varela, et al., 2016).

An enactive perspective answers to a theoretical truth that is missing in the embodied cognition approach: the process of transaction between the mind, body and environment and the active, interwoven shaping and transformation that occur within the enactive perspective (Varela, et al., 2016). How the body is used within embodied cognition theories suggests an approach still influenced by computationalism[75]. Referring back to Cartesian dualism as founded by Descartes, "the body was never 'forgotten'" but its role was to be a "servant" to the mind (Loaiza, 2016, p. 4). To state that embodied cognition theories rediscovered the body is "simply the re-foundation of Cartesian dualism" (Loaiza, 2016, p. 4). Di Paolo, et al. (2010, p. 42) explain:

> It is not only a question of moving the mind from a highly sheltered realm of computational modules in the head into messy bodily structures. So-called embodied approaches that do not move beyond this first step remain largely functionalist and see the body as yet another information processing device …

Integrating body, mind and environment in a dynamic system, as is seen in an enactive approach, further extends the need for finding unity in body and mind. A discussion on an enactive approach to cognition will ensue and will be followed by its application in instrumental practice.

[75] The notion of computationalism is discussed in full in this Chapter (3.3).

3.13 Enactive approach

The construct of enaction[76] had its roots in various fields within psychology, neurobiology and education. Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896 – 1980), within his theory of child development, focused on the use of sensorimotor effects on cognition and development (Piaget, 1923). Kurt Goldstein (1878 – 1965) was a German psychiatrist and neurologist and used constructs of enaction in his theory of the self-realisation of a person (Goldstein, 1934). Aspects of the enactive approach can also be found in the works of previously discussed phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1945) and pragmatist Dewey (1958). The term "enactive" was coined by American psychologist Jerome Bruner (1915 – 2016) in the 1960s (Bruner, 1966). Bruner's definition for the term enactive is encapsulated in the word itself, that action is a means by which to gain information and knowledge. The enactive approach that will be utilised in this study stems from the works of Varela, Thompson and Rosch. *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (2016), originally published in 1991, explains an enactive approach as the transaction[77] between the mind, body and environment. The body is seen as a living system, where the "lived body as a single system" encompasses mind, body and environment (Varela, et al., 2016, p. xlviii). Shapiro and Stolz (2019, p. 20) explain that an enactive

> account not only brings to our attention that cognition is grounded in our embodiment (embodied action) and that these histories are '*lived*' (experiences) but also brings to our attention how adaptation to our environment (natural drift) has resulted in a cognitive system that is enacted through structural coupling and also constrained by the pathways laid down.

[76] An enactive approach to cognition forms part of a larger milieu of embodied cognitive sciences called 4E cognition. "Proponents of 4E cognition have argued against the assumption that cognition is an isolated and abstract, quasi-Cartesian affair in a central processing unit in a brain" (Newen, et al., 2018, p. 5). "4E cognition … is an umbrella term for the terms Embodied, Embedded, Extended and Enacted. Cognition in this view, involves the entire body of a living system (embodied); it is co-determined by physical, social and cultural aspects (embedded); it is offloaded into biological beings and nonbiological devices, such as, e.g., a notebook, a computer or a smartphone (extended); and it implies a mutual exchange between a living organism and its environment (enacted)" (Reybrouck, 2020, p. 38).

[77] The term transaction instead of interaction is used here, because interactions involve "unchanging entities that become intertwined, but retain their separate identities" (Reybrouck, 2006, p. 63). Transaction suggests a "fluid, interpenetrating relationship between objective conditions and subjective experience: once they become related, both of them are essentially changed" (Kolb, 1984, p. 36).

Within an enactive approach to cognition, meaning creation is an ongoing occurrence that depends on continuing structural coupling between a person and their environment (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 89). Structural coupling is described as the mutual influence between the environment and a "biological organism" (Quick, et al., 2000, p. 1), the impact that the organism or person has on the environment and vice versa. Thus, cognition does not occur with information that is "out there" to be "processe[d] by an anonymous subject" (van der Schyff, 2015, p. 89) or by a person "'fitting' itself to an unchanging and unyielding environment" (Quick, et al., 2000, p. 7). The enactive approach explores cognition "in the basic biological processes of life itself – in the ways even the simplest organisms move, interact and thus actively shape the environments they inhabit" (van der Schyff, 2017, p. 163). Thus, an enactive approach gives rise to an autonomous individual that interacts with the environment through the use of the body and by making in-the-moment decisions.

Meaning is created and information is cognised because of the reciprocity between a person or living system and the environment. Through action and active engagement by an autonomous individual with the environment or world, meaning is generated. Meaning creation is entwined with "being alive" (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 488). The difference between meaning created within the embodied cognition approach and the enactive approach, is that the first-mentioned remains categorised as within the head. Loaiza (2016, p. 5) explains that within an embodied cognition approach, meaning and understanding are subject to "processes that are only temporarily coupled – "online" and casually – with events "outside"". Meaning thus "remains *locked inside"* (italics as in original) (Loaiza, 2016, p. 5). Within an enactive approach to cognition, meaning means that the autonomous individual has a "purpose" (Silverman, 2020, p. 5).

The organism, or the person, actively shapes their environment through a process of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is the construct of a biological system or organism that actively and constantly renews the transaction between itself and the environment. Coined by Chilean theoretical biologists Humberto Maturana (1928 – 2021) and Francisco Varela (1946 – 2001), in their publication *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the*

Living (1980), autopoiesis encompasses the workings of a living system that is not a "thing", but rather "a process with the particular property of *engendering itself* indefinitely" (italics as in original) (Stewart, 2010, p. 2).

Through the process of enaction, the person makes sense of or cognises the surroundings. The autonomous individual housing the ability to actively shape their environment, makes sense of this environment because of the "self-regulat[ing]" abilities they have to cognise the environment (Schiavio & Cummins, 2015, p. 6). Thompson and Stapleton (2008, p. 3) explain that "[s]ense-making is the interactional and relational side of autonomy". Here lies the "niche" in that the person is able to "actively participate in the world by *enacting* the system's own domain of meaning" (italics as in original) (Schiavio & Cummins, 2015, p. 6). In other words, a person makes sense of the surroundings and information because of their active exploration between the environment and themself. In turn, the environment or other persons in it is shaped or changed because of the interaction and vice versa. Sense-making depends on the active exploration of the world and is contrasted to information that is passively received from an external source or the environment (Di Paolo, et al., 2010, p. 39). Di Paolo et al. (2010, p. 39) explain that

> Natural cognitive systems are simply not in the business of accessing their world in order to build accurate pictures of it. They participate in the generation of meaning through their bodies and action often engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions; *they enact a world.*

Making sense of one's surroundings and creating meaning in music-making all depend on the active engagement that a person has with the world and does not rely on information that is passively ingested by the student. Autopoiesis lies in opposition to training and banking described before in Chapter 2 (2.9.2-2.9.3), as it focuses on the "self-creating" or "self-production" system (Beer, 2020, p. 6). Within the scope of beginner instrumental teaching and learning, the autopoietic nature of the enactive approach allows for students to create their own meaning through the pedagogical situation instead of the teacher being the sole provider of information. Students are thus involved in an

"intersubjective[78] union" with their teacher as they are able to share their thoughts and feelings (Trevarthen, 2011, p. 185). Hence, instead of being a static individual, the biological organism in autopoiesis allows for active participation and meaning creation in its own existence. Autopoiesis gives rise to a "self" and a "world" through constant transaction and interaction between the person and the environment (Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018, p. 4). Through this transaction and interaction, cognition or sense-making takes place.

Making sense of music does not rely on "static representations"[79] of a score or musical work as is the norm in the Aesthetic philosophical approach to music education (Reybrouck, 2020, p. 36). Varela et al. (2016, p. xxvi) explain that the body within an enactive approach is not a system encompassing "inputs and outputs", but rather an "adaptively autonomous and sense-making system". In his book *Embodied Music Cognition and Mediation Technology,* Leman (2008) describes different aspects which can be seen as mediators between the person and sense-making from an embodied cognition framework. Examples are the musical score, verbal description of the score or an audio track of the score, all of which act as mediators between the person and sense-making (Leman, 2008, p. 5). Leman (2008, p. 196) also gives an example of the body and body movement, or action, as mediator for sense-making. Matyja and Schiavio (2013, p. 352) comment that

> In his [Leman's] view, the body enables the transfer of physical musical energy to a "mental level," allowing the agent to make sense of the musical material in light of her motor expertise. What is more, the human body is able to transform ideas (or mental representations) into the form of sound.

[78] Intersubjectivity is the interaction between people or as Trevarthen (2011, p. 185) explains, an "awareness of being a person with persons, and [of] a sense of self". By taking into account the intersubjectivity of the young child implicit in beginner instrumental teaching and learning, the teacher will acknowledge the "intuitive abilities and values, and growing initiatives that are present in the child from birth and that motivate learning. Innate impulses of human imagination … make sharing of experience and building of meaningful memories possible for a young person" (Trevarthen, 2011, p. 173).

[79] From my experience in the field of teaching beginner instrumental students, the representation of the score in a static manner as mentioned comprises the student sitting or standing stationary with their instrument and the teacher pointing to the notes in the score accompanied with verbal explanation. The student will in turn reproduce what the teacher explained without any form of intersubjective communication or autonomy.

Leman (2008) considers the body and action in the process of sense-making, however, his description still leaves the mind and body as separate entities. Matyja and Schiavio (2013, p. 352) explain that Leman's view of the body and action is a "miscomprehension" of the role the body and active exploration play in the process of sense-making. In reflecting on the discussion on Leman's misconception of the role that the body plays within an enactive approach, the transaction and interactive processes within the body, mind and environment essentially equal sense-making. Gallagher (2017, p. 115) explains that the "'brain-body-mind system' is operating within the situation itself rather than on a model of the situation inferred by the brain". Hence, sense-making relies on the interplay and "seamless" interaction (Silverman, 2020, p. 2) between "the role of life, self-organisation, experience and the animate body in shaping cognition as an ongoing and situated activity" (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, pp. 486,487).

In the case of sense-making in a one-to-one instrumental music teaching and learning setting, sense-making can take on many forms. Reybrouck (2012, p. 2) asks

> Is music something 'out there', a kind of structure or artefact, that can be dealt with in a static way? Or does it rely on processes which call forth interactions with the sounds? Should we conceive of music users besides the music, and think about music as something which is perceived, conceptualised and enacted upon in order to be meaningful?

In the questions posed in the above statement, sense-making in a musical setting relies on "interactions with the sounds" (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 2). Performers adjust their "performance and expressions" to achieve coherence between themselves and other performers or "shared embodied states" between other interacting performers (Schiavio, et al., 2016, p. 13). Improvisation is seen as an example of sense-making in a music teaching and learning situation. Improvisation requires "radical shifts that demand new emotional-bodily-cognitive relationships and a heightened adaptability to the sonic environment" (Schiavio, et al., 2016, p. 13). In looking at the examples of interactions the student has with music in musical sense-making, it is clear that the boundaries set forth by Cartesian dualism and the Western approach are overstepped in an enactive approach

by allowing the student to make sense of music outside of a certain prescribed and few elite works. Here, sense-making and the "process of structuring [is] as important as the structure of the music" (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 2). In other words, the process of making sense of music is as important as the product or musical work. Thus, the autonomous, autopoietic student[80] is empowered to make sense of the world, and specifically the musical world, through active exploration and decision making. All of these constructs would not be able to emanate without the affordances or opportunities that music has to offer for the pedagogical situation.

3.13.1 Affordance within an enactive context

The term affordance, coined by Gibson (1978), takes on many meanings. Gibson (1978, p. 129) explains that

> [A]n affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.

There are many debates (Chemero, 2003; Heft, 2001) on what exactly Gibson (1978) meant with the term. For the purpose of this study, I will rely on the definition of affordances found within ecological psychology (Oudejans, et al., 1996, p. 879). According to ecological psychology, affordances are seen in "animal-relevant" terms, that is to say "in terms of what the animal can do with and in the environment" or the "behavioural possibilities of the environment" (Oudejans, et al., 1996, p. 879). Krueger (2014, p. 2) explains that affordances are the "action possibilities" in a percipient's environment. An object, a place or event gives forth "functional significance" and portrays qualities and features that are meaningful to an "active perceiver" (Reybrouck, 2012, p.

[80] By using the metaphor of "scaffolding", van der Schyff, et al. (2016, p. 98), suggest that an enactive teacher should provide the "appropriate developmental 'scaffolding'" for their students. Adopted from the theory of Vygotsky, Wood, Bruner and Ross (Wood, et al., 1976) I use the metaphor of scaffolding, usually found in building, to explain how adults can help children to learn by building "scaffolding" for them.

5). In addition to these features, affordances also rely on the relational capacities of the relevant actions as well as the specific “structural features” pertaining to the environment and the “sensorimotor capacities” that the perceiver uses in order to sense and act in response to the features (Krueger, 2014, p. 2).

Examples of affordances are, for instance, an object like a chair. For an adult, a chair’s structural features can be described in shape, height, material and so forth and may afford sitting on, picking it up or standing on it (Krueger, 2014, p. 2). For other persons or animals, a chair affords something different. The same object, event or place can afford different things for different people. For an animal or infant, the chair affords bumping into, crawling under or hiding behind (Krueger, 2014, p. 2). The important viewpoint of affordances is not the features and qualities of an object, event or place, but “the world as perceived by organisms” (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 394).

Within a musical context, affordances can focus on “*productive aspects*” or on the “*receptive level* of experience” (italics as in original) (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 404). The productive side of musical affordances is 1) the making/building of a musical instrument, 2) the training in playing technique or “sound-producing actions” such as “hitting, stroking, kicking and blowing” or “drumming a rhythmic pattern”, and 3) the “shaping of sounds by using modulatory techniques” such as a violinist using different bowing techniques to adjust the sounds on the instrument (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 404). An aspect that holds close to the productive aspects of affordances is the constructs of “musicing” discussed in Chapter 2 (2.17). Musicing holds valuable insight into the productive affordances of music. Similarly, music also affords bodily movement in the way that a “buoyant melody of a children’s song” affords equally buoyant and swinging movements from the listener (Krueger, 2014, p. 2). In order to situate the enactive approach in instrumental practice, and make suggestions for application within a beginner instrumental class, a discussion on how the enactive approach pans out in traditional instrumental instruction will follow.

3.13.2 Enactive approach in traditional practice

In traditional music education practice, instruction is rooted in a non-active, static manner of gaining information (Bowman, 2002; 2004; Correia, 2014; Juntunen, 2020; Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018). Indeed recently, despite efforts made to include embodied and enactive practices into music teachings, “the conventional curriculum remains little changed, and a firm mind-body dualism marches on” (Gutlerrez, 2019, p. 2). Schiavio and van der Schyff (2018, p. 2) agree that “educational environments” still have “leftover functionalist assumptions” that obscure the creativity, potential and meaningful engagement of the students. As an example, I draw on the work of Gutlerrez (2019) with his writings on an enactive approach towards learning music theory. Gutlerrez (2019, p. 1) writes that a “legacy of Cartesian thought” underlies music theory teachings. In a novice music theory lesson, while observing American singer and song-writer James Brown, and discussing different layered rhythms, students exclaimed that Brown “did all *that*, without knowing music *theory*?” (Italics as in original) (Gutlerrez, 2019, p. 1). With this statement, it can be deduced that the student acknowledges the claim that music theory, and in turn, instrumental music playing, is “confined to the particular symbols, terms, and procedures presented in [a] textbook” (Gutlerrez, 2019, p. 1).

The enactive approach to beginner instrumental education offers an alternative to music instruction as it poses a view that enriches the experience and meaning creation opportunity for the beginner instrumentalist, taking into account sensing and experiencing beings in interaction with their environment. Focusing on the theoretical aspects of music-making, and teaching and learning music, relies on formalistic perspectives and reserves music for talented and gifted students as discussed in Chapter 2 (2.8.2). In turn, this renders music an exclusive instead of an inclusive, holistic art form suggested in this study. Inclusive, embodied and enactive approaches take into account “body-based and world-related” factors disregarded by traditional disembodied theories (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 205). In order to further explicate the notions of the mentioned inclusive, holistic, embodied and enactive approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning practices, a discussion on the application of an enactive approach through focusing on personhood and eudaimonia will ensue.

3.14 Application of an Enactive Approach through Personhood and Eudaimonia

A philosophical lens and foundation on which one can approach the application of an enactive approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning are the concepts of "personhood" and "eudaimonia" (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; O'Neill, 2012; Silverman, 2020). Personhood is a term used to accentuate and remind the educator that the students taught in music lessons have different background and needs (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 153) and are "interconnected" with the environment and others (Silverman, 2020, p. 8). O'Neill (2012, p. 2) explains that the essence of personhood is "what it means to be human". Elliott and Silverman (2015, pp. 153,154) elaborate that

> …learners of all ages are unique, social, cultural, emotional, corporeal, cognitive, intersubjective, empathetic, and gendered human agents. … everything we can possibly do, desire, feel, think, etc. – trace back to the fundamental issue of what it means to be the kind of living entity that possesses, undergoes, enacts, and "performs" his or her personhood.

The holistic account of personhood in the explanation above sheds light not only on what personhood is but also distinguishes it from an oppositional approach to personhood or the ability of the organism to reach its own potential as fully as possible. Personhood in its truest sense is not limited by "universal laws" or "Western thought[s]" that limit a person's autonomous agency and freedom to infer (Walker, 2013, p. 354): it is not rooted in Western, dualist, aesthetic values. Personhood thus firmly withstands the notion that you are merely a "brain" and all that is significant about you is "inside your brain alone" (Elliott, 2016, p. 5). Elliott and Silverman (2015, p. 158) accurately describe a disembodied view of personhood by stating that a person is not two separate entities, a brain or mind and a physical entity that walks around and "plays the bongos". Elliott and Silverman (2015, p. 189) urge

> Because many educational "leaders" and policy makers fail to understand the nature and complexity of personhood, they look for educational values where they are not: in "measurable" test results of so-called learning, data-driven teaching, or simplistic curricula.

As a solution for the dualistic notions found in music education and instrumental teaching and learning practices, one should take into consideration the unique attributes of each individual in the teaching and learning situation and the holistic concept of “personhood”. An optimum teaching and learning environment is one where there are “mutual respect, shared responsibilities, joyful and meaningful learning, and a context in which learners feel they are safe, secure, and welcome” (Elliott & Silverman, 2015, p. 154). The learner agency found in enactive learning links to informal instrumental learning settings proposed by Green (2012). Informal learning proposes learning through guidance instead of instruction and entails the learner choosing the learning material (Green, 2012, p. 163). In turn, learning happens through the integration of “listening, playing, composing and improvising” (Green, 2012, p. 163).

Within the enactive approach, the constructs of autonomy, sense-making, affordances and situatedness, music teaching and learning can afford “a flourishing life” or “*eudaimonia*” (italics as in original) (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 92). The Aristotelian term eudaimonia from ancient Greece can also be described as “human flourishing” (Bowman, 2002, p. 63). Eudaimonia aligns with the enactive approach as it allows “the capacity to interact with the world in an open-ended, relational, autonomous, situated, and self-making way becomes the fundamental bio-ethical principle of a flourishing life, *eudaimonia*” (van der Schyff, et al., 2016, p. 92). Thus, in contrast with the Cartesian view of a disembodied being, within an enactive approach the body is not seen “as an *object*, but as an *event*” (italics as in original) (Budgeon, 2003, p. 36). For music education specifically, the idea of eudaimonia and personhood can be achieved through an “event” (Westerlund, 2002, p. 46).

3.15 An “event” as practical application for an enactive approach

Through the democratic lens of Westerlund, an “event” is used as an example of application of an enactive approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning. An event can either be seen as an end product and accumulation of work done, or an event can be seen as a happening that occurs “in the moment” within the teaching and learning

scenario where meaning and sense-making prevail (Westerlund, 2002, p. 46). Westerlund draws on Dewey to explain an “event” (Westerlund, 2002, p. 54), describing it as the interaction between an individual and the environment, never experienced in “isolation” (Westerlund, 2002, p. 54). The crux is that the individual is able to shape or “make” their environment (Westerlund, 2002, p. 55). Hence, the individual has a meaningful experience where cognition, emotion and praxis are intertwined in “holistic unity” (Regelski, 2017a, p. 109). Consequently, meaning within an event is not only information that is unchangeable and can be “passed on”. Rather, because autonomous individuals are able to shape their environment and experiences, the results are pragmatic and holistic meaning-creation opportunities (Regelski, 2017a, p. 138).

An example of providing “in the moment” conditions for a learning environment is when a teacher allows children to be agents in their learning experiences. The teacher needs to provide a space where students can develop their own ideas, explore their surroundings, investigate, and build their own conclusions by making sense of their world (Young, 2004, p. 220). By taking the construct of personhood into consideration, individuals are able to shape and influence their environment and the people around them and are not merely spectators, as is common in the banking model mentioned and opposed by Freire (2005), previously discussed at 2.8.3. Hence the student, within the “event” described, “is someone who takes control of doing things instead of just letting events happen to or in him/herself” (Westerlund, 2002, p. 26). In turn, possibilities for more ethical ways of teaching and learning are explored and students (and teachers) are “personally present to their own learning processes and self-reflective with regard to them” (Greene, 1995, p. 181). The transaction and interaction between the student and the teacher within a beginner instrumental teaching and learning scenario afford an extension of the enactive approach. The social interplay between two autonomous beings is known as participatory sense-making and will accordingly be discussed.

3.16 Participatory Sense-Making

Participatory sense-making stems from the search for a middle ground between interaction and the individual within social science research. Cognitive scientists De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007; 2008) extended the concept of sense-making within the enactive approach to cognition and coined the "participatory sense-making" approach[81]. A participatory sense-making approach extends the interaction between the individual and the environment or world as is the case in an enactive approach, to an interaction between two or more individuals. In other words, the sense-making domain of the enactive approach is extended into participatory sense-making through the interaction between two or more persons. Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009, p. 465) explain participatory sense-making as "an *interaction and coordination of two embodied agents*" (italics as in original). Thus, "interaction is here understood as the coupling between an agent and a specific aspect of its world: another agent", amounting to social interaction (Di Paolo, et al., 2010, p. 61). De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 493) explain the social interaction relevant in participatory sense-making as follows:

> Social interaction is the regulated coupling[82] between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved.

Therefore, within participatory sense making, the social interaction occurs with two or more autonomous persons. Through coupling, the individuals influence each other's autonomous individuality without harming or negatively influencing each other. Instead, "new domain[s] of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual[s] on [their] own" (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 497). Stated differently, Di Paolo et al. (2010, p. 72) explain that the individual's sense-making actions "intertwine" and through this interaction, generate "new meanings and the transformation of existing

[81] Participatory sense-making is also researched by other authors (Hermans, 2021; Maes, et al., 2018; Schiavio & De Jaegher, 2017; Schiavio, et al., 2021).
[82] Coupling is described as "the amount of influence that a system's variables have on another's parametrical conditions" (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 490).

meanings". Similarly, Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009, p. 465) state that through participatory sense-making, two or more autonomous agents enter a mode of "embodied interaction" where common meaning is generated through joint interaction. A realm of meaning or sense-making is opened up that is not accessible to the individual in isolation (Di Paolo, et al., 2010, p. 34). Drawing on the participatory sense-making theory, an approach termed an inter(en)active approach which focuses on shared music experiences will subsequently be discussed. I focus specifically on the joint interactions between the student and the teacher within beginner instrumental teaching and learning.

3.16.1 Inter(en)active

An inter(en)active approach to music education is built on the constructs of participatory sense-making where meaning-creation stems from the interaction and transaction between two or more autonomous embodied beings. Coined by Schiavio in his publication *Action, Enaction, Inter(en)action,* Schiavio (2014, p. 258) considers "joint musical experiences" in an enactive approach to cognition. An inter(en)active approach is based on the relational, intersubjective and interactive context of music-making, because "what a musician is playing is a *constitutive* part of what someone else is playing" (italics as in original) (Schiavio, 2014, p. 258). With the focus primarily on musicians in a performance setting, Schiavio and Høffding (2015, p. 5) write of the co-creation of meaning through musicians that make music together. By using the example of a quartet, Schiavio and Høffding (2015, p. 5) explain that as a member of a quartet, one instrumentalist is not separated from another.

> His experience, intentions, and emotion (his/her world) are 'enacted' while playing. But, at the same time, the condition of being immersed in the musical dynamicity of the quartet forces him to self-regulate the same domain of meanings that he enacts, giving rise to circular interplay between music, subjects, and embodied actions…

Accordingly, inter(en)action is seen as a coupled system where musicians form unique meanings and transform each other's meanings through "enacting unique shared worlds"

(Schiavio & De Jaegher, 2017, p. 33). Where an enactive approach sees a coupled system as the interplay between mind, body and environment, inter(en)action takes this construct a step further and adds another person's mind, body and environment. By coupling two persons together, another dimension of meaning-making is opened up for both persons. To bring the inter(en)active approach into context within this study, how the approach lacks application within beginner instrumental music teaching and learning practices will be discussed. Thereafter suggestions for the application of an inter(en)active approach will be addressed.

3.16.2 Inter(en)active approach in practice

In practice, the inter(en)active approach offers an alternative to traditional[83] one-to-one instrumental instruction. The one-to-one approach to beginner instrumental education falls short of what an inter(en)active approach can offer for remediating instruction that became rooted in Cartesian dualism. Private music tuition became popularised in the 18th century as many schools lessened the amount of music being taught in the school (Roske, 1987, p. 143). Roske (1987, p. 143)wrote that by the min 19th century "private music instruction for the first time led to a professional image of music pedagogy". Although this traditional manner of instrumental instruction has given rise to "an impressive number of talented musicians – mostly devoted to Western classical music", concern came over whether this teacher-student approach is the "most effective [approach] to enhance musical learning" (Schiavio & Cummins, 2015, p. 3). Referring back to the discussion on training and the banking approach (2.9.2, 2.9.3), the one-to-one model of a single teacher pouring information into a single student's brain simulates a cognitive approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning.

Schiavio and Cummins (2015, p. 4) explain traditional one-to-one instrumental pedagogy as follows: A teacher teaches guitar to a student within a one-to-one setting and 1)

[83] Traditional one-to-one instrumental teaching and learning practices rely on a unidirectional method of teaching where instruction relies mostly on verbal commands and technically driven outcomes. Embedded in disembodied philosophical constructs, traditional one-to-one instrumental teaching and learning is at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of participatory sense-making and the inter(en)active approach.

explains, using verbal instruction on how the fingering on the guitar looks, 2) the teacher gives an example by concretely showing the student how correct fingering on the guitar appears and 3) the student repeats what the teacher explained and demonstrated. In the one-to-one model, prominent in beginner instrumental teaching and learning, the student does not play an active role in learning the instrument. Similarly, there is no interaction and transaction between the autonomous beings (teacher and student) resulting in collective meaning-making experiences. Schiavio and Cummins (2015, p. 4) comment that "one-to-one tuitions seem to be rooted in a disembodied approach that downplays the autonomous faculty of the learners to self-generate knowledge". Thus, one-to-one beginner instrumental instruction relies on the disembodied, individualistic constructs of Descartes's philosophy, "I think, therefore I am". In order to accommodate the relational aspects of music-making in action, I draw on the ideas of music(k)ing (2.17). A discussion on the application of an inter(en)active approach towards beginner instrumental education within a music(k)ing framework and a suggested approach towards collective musicing will follow.

3.17 Application of participatory sense-making through collective musicing

Musicing is an inclusive term for the activities and actions that bring forth meaning in making music. Like Elliott, Small (1995) used the term musicking (with a "k") to encompass the many ways in which "to music[84]" (Small, 1995, p. 2). Musicing/musicking captures the entire construct of the musical event and "not just the sound of the moment" (Regelski, 2017a, p. 109). With this in mind, music(k)ing offers a step away from the one-to-one individual approach to beginner instrumental music teaching and learning that is deeply rooted in the typical Westernised approach of aesthetics. The construct of music(k)ing offers an opportunity for the interplay between student and teacher as enactive and embodied beings to engage in collective meaning-making experiences. Music(k)ing offers a "wider process and a genre of social-life" (Loaiza, 2016, p. 2). As Small (1998, p. 13) proclaims:

[84] Small's (1999) notion of musicking, links with the inter(en)active approach to music teaching and learning as it focuses on the relationships that are built while making music.

> The act of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies. They are to be found not only between those organised sounds which are conventionally thought of as being the stuff of musical meaning, but also between the people who are taking part, in whatever capacity…

Music(k)ing offers active, interactive and relational aspects to musical understanding and meaning-creation. As music exists because of actions, and actions are connected to relationships, "we see that whatever meaning a musical work has lies in the relationships that are brought into existence when the piece is performed" (Small, 1998, p. 138). Young and Ilari (2019, p. 9) write that music(k)ing is an appropriate activity for young children, "because its expanded conceptions of musical process are able to capture the fluid, multimodal and context-embedded nature of young children's music-making". Because music is intertwined with active, relational ways of bringing forth meaning, this very construct should not be neglected in beginner instrumental teaching and learning. In order to better explain the relational manner of meaning creation with musicing as a tool, I will draw on the African philosophical approach Ubuntu.

3.17.1 *Ubuntu* philosophy

The philosophical constructs of *Ubuntu* offer an approach on which beginner instrumental music education can be based. *Ubuntu* (*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*) is a Zulu word that means "to be a human being is to affirm one's humanity by recognising the humanity of others and … establish humane relations with them" (Naicker, 2015, p. 3). *Ubuntu* philosophy lies in contrast to Descartes's "I think, therefore I am" (*cogito ergo sum*), which focuses on an individual being (Naicker, 2015, p. 3). Within a music educational setting, Primos (2001, p. 2) describes *Ubuntu* as follows:

> It is deep-seated in all traditionally rooted Africans and creates a unique unity of persons across the continent. The way in which they make and use music closely reflects this *ubuntu* spirit. Everyone brings their personal contribution to the whole musical fabric and united event, be it in a leading role or as part of group interaction.

Ubuntu thus offers an inter(en)active manner of making music together. For music education specifically, *Ubuntu* offers "possibilities of transformation" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 137). Finding inspiration in how music is transferred between people of a community in African cultures, I suggest the usage of improvisation[85] as a tool for *Ubuntu* in a beginner instrumental teaching and learning situation. Traditionally, in African music, music is learned orally and recalled from memory (Primos, 2001, p. 2). Reproduction depends on recalling from memory and does not rely on exact reproduction, rather on "correct recreation" (Primos, 2001, p. 2). Leaning on the last-mentioned statement, I will draw on an element of musicing, improvisation.

3.17.2 Improvisation through the lens of social learning experiences

Improvisation within a musical setting entails spontaneous and creative engagement with one's instrument and other persons. Within a teacher and student setting, improvisation relies on ongoing vocal or instrumental conversation between the teacher and student. The conversation depends on what each of the individuals has to "say" to each other and in turn creates an opportunity for unique contributions from both teacher and student. Therefore, in the spirit of *Ubuntu*, the teacher and the student improvise without the constraint of correctly representing musical features: rather, each creates and recreates music for musical dialogue. In turn, the student is not pressured to play correctly in front of the teacher. Rather, the student and the teacher are placed on equal ground, in a forgiving and safe environment for making music together. Through improvisation, the student is allowed to adapt to the setting and learn from practical engagement with the teacher.

The suggestions made below are drawn from 20th century music education pedagogue, Carl Orff (1895 – 1982). The Orff Approach, otherwise known as Orff Schulwerk, is an "experiential form of music learning through creative play" (Campbell, 1991, p. 219). Orff

[85] "Creating music aurally without the aid of notation" (McPherson, 2005, p. 10).

met dance and gymnastics teacher Dorothee Gunter in 1923 and from this meeting came the initial ideas on which the *Gunterschule* was founded (Sarrazin, 2012, p. 123). Focusing on uniting movement, dance and music, this school for children exemplified the beliefs that all humans are "musical by nature" (Sarrazin, 2012, p. 123). The Orff Approach comprises the use of language (speech-patterns, poems, stories) (Sarrazin, 2012, p. 143), singing, movement, using the body as an instrument (body percussion), rhythmic and melodic patterns (ostinato patterns and drones), the Orff instrumentarium and recorder (Campbell, 1991, p. 219). Through imitation, exploration, improvisation and composition, students are led to develop their "innate musical abilities" (Sarrazin, 2012, p. 123).

In *Schulwerk*, music is inseparable from movement and speech and forms part of childhood experiences (Campbell, 1991, p. 219). As a starting point, rhythm is used to ultimately develop "creative musicianship as displayed in the ability to improvise". A suggested application is for the teacher and student to each play on a drum or alternatively their instruments. The teacher plays a "question", which the student will "answer" with their own improvised pattern. The student is then given the opportunity to ask the "question" to the teacher. As the level of proficiency of the student progresses, the phrases for improvisation can be longer, for instance, four bars for the teacher and four bars for the student. Van der Schyff (2019, p. 331) asserts that improvisation will encourage

> students [to] be attentive to and reflect on how relationships form and develop with the people (ensemble mates), things (instruments) and places that constitute their reality; how their "selves" extend into the environment and play a role in constituting the lives of others; and how their sense of musical identity is continuously transformed though the activities of their peers.

Making use of improvisation in the context of the inter(en)active approach, the student is capable of actively shaping their environment and that of others and giving meaning to what is being played. Leaning on the explanation given by Schiavio and Cummins (2015, pp. 6,7) with regards to what effect active, "exploratory", and self-regulated musicing or improvisation has on a student: 1) The student is motivated through "active and reflexive

exploration", 2) the student regulates their own learning and meaning-making, 3) meaning and skills are acquired. By utilising an inter(en)active approach and Ubuntu philosophy for beginner instrumental education with improvisatory musicing as a tool in meaning construction, it is evident that a one-to-one approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning is not sufficient.

3.17.3 Informance as tool for democratic education

Participatory sense-making and the inter(en)active approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning accumulate in democratic education. Democracy in education is not an elective process where voting takes place for a representative of a country: rather democracy entails "surrendering one's individual body to a common rhythm" (Wiles, 2016, p. 24). In a democratic teaching and learning setting, autonomous individuals become integrated with the community by means of "joint sense-making" experiences, without losing their individuality (Abramo, 2014, p. 90). An example of a democratic event in music education is the construct of "informance" (Nowmos, 2010). An informance is an "informal and informative presentation[s]" of what the students have learned throughout the course of their tuition (Nowmos, 2010, p. 1). McCormick (2009, p. 12) proposes a social and collective event in which "the musical performance of a competitor is … an effortless embodiment of musical meaning, a communication so effective that it brings an experience of collective effervescence". Such an "informance" allows a parent to observe what is being learned in educational situations, thereby representing a bioecological systems view[86] of development. In addition, according to Burton (2004, p. 18), an informance portrays each individual school's music curriculum and each teacher's distinctive teaching method, which relates to the democratic aims of this study. With regards to beginner instrumentalists, an informance allows for an "informal" setting where the young child is not exposed to the stress of a formal concert (Nowmos, 2010, p. 7). Moreover, the parents can a be a part of and take part in the educational setting, an element which is not possible with traditional concerts (Nowmos, 2010, p. 7).

[86] Bronfenbrenner's (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994) bioecological model advocates for frequent, appropriate and social processes of learning and development, over an extended period of time.

Offering a democratic, inter(en)active opportunity for students and parents to take part in collective music-making experiences, an informance opposes a “traditional concert” setting (Nowmos, 2010, p. 1). Parents are invited to take part in the meaning-making experience through collaborative “musicing” experiences in a democratic manner. Reflecting back on constructs of democracy mentioned in Chapter 1, collaborative “musicing” experiences give all students, teachers and parents the opportunity to participate in learning “on equal terms”, to make music together and be “empowered” within the pedagogical situation (Karlsen, 2008, p. 129).

3.18 A new extended embodied framework for beginner instrumental teaching and learning.

Within this study, my aim is not to discard traditional approaches towards instrumental music pedagogy. Rather, I aim to synergise the product-driven Aesthetic philosophical view with that of the process-driven Praxial philosophy in order to suggest an extended embodied framework (Schiavio, 2014). The predicament in which typical traditional instrumental music education puts the student, is that of abstract, rule-bound instruction. Within the suggested extended embodied framework (Figure 5), “[b]eginners are not asked first to follow abstract rules” (Schiavio & van der Schyff, 2018, p. 6), but are rather engaged in holistic, embodied, meaning-making experiences. In giving a graphic representation of my argument thus far, the figure below will be discussed.



Figure 5 An extended embodied framework for the synergism of product and process.

I identify aspects of the individualist Aesthetic philosophical view within Westerlund's (2002) vertical first-person perspective and the social, embodied and situated aspects of the enactive and inter(en)active approaches with the horizontal third-person perspective. I infer that the two separate axes exemplify the dualistic separation of mind and body and individual and social. When the two axes of Westerlund's (2002) model are balanced and transaction finds place in an ongoing manner, as is pointed out with the circular and transactive manners in which the arrows in Figure 5 are set up, a holistic approach is found where mind, body, individual and social are united. Thus, I argue along the lines of Westerlund which stated that a holistic view is found when the vertical and horizontal perspectives are balanced, as is shown in Figure 5 when the vertical – and horizontal

perspectives get together (shown through the arrows pointing towards Holistic).Furthermore, Westerlunds' (2002) inclusive holism aligns with the ideas of the enactive approach in that it views the person as a culturally situated and embedded being that influences their surroundings or environment and vice versa. Within the mentioned inclusive holism and enactive approach, the person has an active contribution in their growth, experiences and meaning-making opportunities. Similarly, her ideas of an autopoietic organism aligns with the autonomous individual in an enactive approach that is able to actively change or shape their environment. Moreover, Westerlund's (2002) advocacy for the interaction and transaction between mind and body align with the ideals of embodiment. The transactive processes between an autopoietic organism and the social milieu (Westerlund, 2002) aligns with an inter(en)active approach that focuses on two or more autopoietic persons that make music collaboratively. The reciprocity between all of the aspects mentioned, forms a good fit for the beginner instrumentalist as it allows for embodied, experiential, social and inter(en)active encounters.

Consequently, the aim of this study is not to discard traditional approaches to instrumental music education, rather, a synergism of product-driven and process-driven approaches is suggested by way of an extended embodied framework towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning.

3.19 Conclusion

The need arose to further clarify the philosophical foundations for the disembodied, cognitive, individualised notions found in the Aesthetic and praxial philosophical approaches towards music education discussed in Chapter 2. In order to give suggestions for practical applications of an alternative approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning, an extended embodied framework was considered within the course of this Chapter.

The recognition of the body's role in the cognition process emanated from the writings of phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1945) and praxialist Dewey (1910). The unity of mind and body in philosophy argues for the active role that the body and sensation play in the process of cognition, claiming that cognition cannot take place without the exploratory role of the body to gain information (Dewey, 1910; Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Mind and body unity, as described above, is termed embodiment. Drawing on the notions of embodiment, embodied cognition science, initially developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (2016), focuses on the role that active exploration and sensation plays in perception or cognitionThe undue focus on cognition is replaced by a cycle of perception or understanding that relies on sensation and action.

Relying on the advances made in embodied cognitive sciences, embodied learning, specifically for instrumental music education, focuses on creating opportunities for experiences in the teaching and learning situation that do not only rely on the mental part of meaning creation, but also on the holistic notion of personal meaning making experiences (Munro, 2018). A suggestion for the practical application of embodied learning constructs is made by Jacques-Dalcroze's (2018; 1985). Dalcroze advocated for an educational approach that involved the student as a whole, holistic, sensing, feeling and thinking person who is both physically and mentally part of the learning situation (Juntunen, 2019, p. 52).

An extended embodied framework is suggested (Schiavio, 2014). A discussion ensues with the work of 'later[87]' praxialists: Bowman (2002; 2004), Regelski (2005; 2006; 2016; 2019; 2020b; 2020a) and Elliott (2012; 2016; Elliott & Silverman, 2015), paving the way for conversations on an enactive approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning.

The enactive view of cognition stems from various fields: however, the view utilised in this study is built on the work of Varela, Thompson and Rosch in their publication *The*

[87] The 'later' praxialists' philosophical positions differ from Elliott's (1995) earlier works. With all the later praxialists there is an overarching embodied approach to music education philosophy.

Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (2016). An enactive approach is described as the transactional processes between the mind, body and environment (Varela, et al., 2016). The body is not only viewed as the vehicle that carries the mind, but as a living entity that is able to influence the environment and also be influenced (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019).

Through the actions made by an individual within an enactive approach in order to bring forth change and influence in the environment, a need arises for expanding the ideas of an enactive approach further into the social and participatory realm. The enactive approach remains insufficient when the social aspect of meaning creation is not taken into account (Froese & Di Paolo, 2009). Relying on the advancements made in social science research by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007; 2008), known as participatory sense-making, Schiavio (2014) initiated a field of collaborative music-making experiences known as an "inter(en)active" approach. An inter(en)active approach relies on the relational, interactive and intersubjective context of making music together, where individual music-making relies on and is influenced by that of another (Schiavio, 2014). A suggested practical application is using the principles of musicing (Elliott, 1995), Ubuntu philosophy (Naicker, 2015; Westerlund, 2002) and improvisation through the lens of Orff Schulwerk (Campbell, 1991; van der Schyff, 2019).

"Musicing"/"musicking", discussed in Chapter 2 (2.17), is a term utilised by both Elliott (1995) and Small (1995) to describe all the ways in which a person can engage in the music-making process. This includes, but is not limited to, performing, listening, composing and improvising (Elliott, 1995). For the inter(en)active approach, "musicing" offers an active and interactive opportunity for students and teachers to engage in the music-making process by making music collaboratively. Through the process of making music together, persons are engaged in an inter(en)active process where each individual collectively shapes their environment while also influencing the other persons' environment.

I utilised the philosophical construct of Ubuntu as a lens through which to approach the collective music-making processes of the inter(en)active approach. With this informal and flexible manner of approaching music pedagogy, I draw on the usage of improvisation as a tool. Music in African cultures is transferred through oral transmission, in turn memorising the music as no traditional score is present (Primos, 2001). Reproduction thus does not rely on the correct representation of what was learned, as is typical in traditional Western ontological approaches to music teaching and learning (van der Schyff, 2015). Hence, improvisation through the lens of Ubuntu philosophy serves as an appropriate tool to utilise in the exploration of new concepts in beginner instrumental education. I make use of the music education approaches of Orff and Dalcroze as groundwork for how improvisation is implemented. Finally, I suggest an “informance” as a manner to promote democratic interchange between the teacher, students and parents (Nowmos, 2010).

Chapter 4

Conclusion

4.1 Introduction

In this study I researched the philosophical core of the individualistic and disembodied view followed in typical traditional instrumental music education. Thereafter, I researched the philosophical and theoretical groundings of a more social, embodied and inter(en)active approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning with the aim of synergising the product-driven traditional approach and the process-driven approach I propose. Practical suggestions for applications to meaningful beginner instrumental teaching and learning that are closer to an extended embodied framework, that allow for a holistic approach that embraces the embodied, inter(en)active and social way in which a young child explores and obtains knowledge, are made. This Chapter firstly provides an overview of the study. Secondly, the research questions are discussed. Thirdly, recommendations for further research are given and fourthly the study's limitations are noted before final remarks.

4.2 Overview of this study

The objective of this study was to determine holistic alternative strategies of meaning-making opportunities of beginner instrumentalists by way of embodied, social and inter(en)active processes. The philosophical and practical product-driven application of traditional instrumental pedagogy was researched, specifically the Aesthetic philosophical view to music education which represents individualistic and disembodied notions of teaching and learning. Finding its philosophical core in the work of Kant, the Aesthetic philosophical view focuses on the disinterested contemplation of the musical object, in turn rendering the approach a product-driven method of instrumental teaching. The Praxial philosophy to music education opposes the aesthetic view and advocates for action in the process of music-making, relying on the Aristotelian basis of praxis. Even

though the praxial view brings the active role of those engaged back into music education, the interactive social setup and ethical ways in which people engage are disregarded. In an effort to make suggestions towards a more embodied, social and holistic way of teaching beginner instrumental music, I proceeded to research approaches to cognition in general and the philosophies that underpin the disembodied notions that also influence instrumental music education.

The separation of mind/soul and body in cognition stems from the philosophies of Plato and Descartes. Imprinting on traditional cognitive sciences where mind is seen as a computer, relying on mentalistic and computational processes for cognition. In traditional cognitive sciences, cognition is seen in cycles of “sense-think-act”, where sensation and action are positioned with an undue focus in between on cognition, in turn separating mind and body in understanding.

In search of an approach that balances the mind and body in cognition, embodiment and embodied cognitive sciences were investigated. Embodiment argues for the role that the body plays in cognition: hence, the philosophies and contribution to the field of embodiment from the views of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty were discussed. In order to situate mind, body, social aspects and individuals within a music educational framework, I utilised the works of Westerlund with her explanation of the vertical first-person and horizontal third-person representation of experience. By identifying aspects of the individualist Aesthetic philosophy within the vertical first-person perspective and the social, embodied and situated approach with the horizontal third-person perspective, I argued in line with Westerlund who stated that balancing the views of the vertical and horizontal perspectives, accumulates in a holistic view. Specifically, the idea of agency – an individual’s capacity to bring forth change and transformation within the educational setting – was discussed.

Embodied cognition that argues for “sense-act” cycles of cognition was then extrapolated. Arguing that the body and its senses have a direct influence on cognition, embodied cognitive science constructs were used to emphasise the negation of the mind-body

linkage in traditional instrumental music education. Verbal instruction and identification of musical concepts, without bodily and sensory engagements in order to aid learning, are still found in traditional instrumental practice that relies on disembodied notions founded in Plato and Descartes. Suggestions for practical activities were made based on Gordon's Music Learning Theory and Laban Effort concepts for using the body in movement to internalise musical concepts, specifically beat and rhythm.

By extending the embodied framework, embodied learning in music education, specifically focusing on meaning-making experiences, was researched. Experience and meaning were investigated and compared from both an aesthetic and embodied view. Suggestions for the practical application of embodied learning were made based on the principles of Jacques-Dalcroze's Eurhythmics. Involving a child's natural movements such as walking, skipping, running and swaying, suggestions were made to explore rhythmic aspects as well as experience of a "bar" and phrase in music by utilising body movements and adaptive material such as a ball, scarves and sticks. As in Dalcroze's approach, the importance and effect of movement activities for cognising complex musical concepts were highlighted – in turn contributing to my argument for a more embodied approach towards musical meaning-making experiences.

The 'later' praxialists, Bowman and Regelski, together with Elliott's later works, were discussed as paving the way for an enactive approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning. An enactive approach towards cognition consists of the interaction and transaction between the autonomous individual's mind and body and environment and the way discussions change and affect changes in cognition. Leaning on the constructs of personhood, eudaimonia and an "event", suggestions are made towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning that involves seeing the student as a holistic, autonomous person who has an active role in shaping the way the lesson unfolds.

By extending the enactive approach further into the social realm, an inter(en)active approach is discussed. An inter(en)active approach comprises two or more autonomous individuals that shape the environment and learning situation in collaborative music-

making opportunities. Suggestions were made in the context of “musicing”/”musicking” or making music together. In line with Ubuntu philosophy, improvisation as tool is utilised to demonstrate ways in which teacher and student can explore question and answer phrases in an informal setting.

Within the literature review, both established and recent literature was studied, critiqued and synthesised in order to create a new framework. I interpreted, assessed and integrated findings from multiple research studies through a metasynthetic process. Taking a dual paradigmatic stance, which allows for the construction of a synoptic view in order to validate the claims made, this study is built on the philosophical constructs of transforming philosophers, Dewey and Westerlund. Dewey’s view allows for a pragmatic lens that recognises the embodied and shared nature of musical experience. Westerlund adds a constructivist view and focuses on how students construct their own knowledge. Data was collected through search engines such as Google Scholar, various databases and ranged from academic studies, scholarly research articles and books. The disembodied notions founded in Cartesian dualism, were researched. I focused on the implications of all the previously mentioned constructs on beginner instrumental pedagogy and why they are insufficient for the young child that primarily learns through embodied, social and explorative experiences. I examined embodiment, embodied cognition, enactive and inter(en)active theories and the impact that they have on music education, in order to make suggestions towards practical applications for beginner instrumental teaching and learning that affords holistic, meaningful experiences.

Following are discussions pertaining to the research questions.

4.3 Discussions around the research questions

In researching the philosophical underpinnings of an Aesthetic philosophy in traditional instrumental pedagogy, the origin of aesthetics was investigated. Aesthetics originated from the word *aesthesis* or *aesthesis,* and has a significant connection to the senses,

however, the way in which an Aesthetic philosophy is applied speaks of negligence of sensorial exploration (Regelski, 2017a; Regelski, 2019).

The four sub-questions, stated in Chapter 1, are now answered at the conclusion of this study.

4.3.1 What are the philosophical underpinnings of an Aesthetic philosophy in traditional instrumental pedagogy and the implications for traditional instrumental pedagogy?

The need arose to investigate the philosophical core of the Aesthetic philosophy to music education in order to better understand the implications for instrumental music teaching and learning. In 1750, Baumgarten introduced the constructs of aesthetics to the field of philosophy (Norton, 2015; Westerlund, 2002). Baumgarten aimed at re-establishing the sensorial aspect of aesthetics founded in Greek *aesthesis* or *aisthesis* (Regelski, 2016; Wenzel, 2005). Thirty years after Baumgarten's' publication, *Aesthetica* (1750), the philosopher Kant published three works, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *Critique of Judgement* (1790), which philosophical underpinnings still influence aesthetics today (Rohlf, 2020). The iconic Enlightenment philosopher Kant was a product of his time where the emergence of an independent "self" marked a shift in thought: previously, individuals relied on others to think for them (Beck, 1993, p. 6). In essence, Kant's Enlightenment aesthetics relies on cognitive constructs instead of sensation in order to make judgments as to whether something is beautiful or not (Barnes, 2017). Engagement with objects said to carry aesthetic value thus relies on reasoning and contemplation within the mind instead of sensorial engagement.

Focusing on the utilitarian benefits of music education, which include the fostering of discipline, general educational ideals, moral beliefs and emotional and social needs, instruction was seen to benefit social, physical, cognitive and moral elements of a child's development (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005; Reimer, 1989a; Westerlund, 2002). However, in search for a philosophy that did not rely on the functional values of music

education, educators turned to an Aesthetic philosophy (Kopkas, 2013), which advocated for teaching music for its own sake and not for the utilitarian benefits (Reimer, 1989a). Providing grounding for music education, an Aesthetic philosophy promised to focus on music as a type of fine art and provide a reputable foundation on which to build its curriculum (McCarthy & Scott Goble, 2005). The most notable educator and philosopher to establish the Aesthetic philosophy's place in music education curricula is Reimer (1989a). Key features of a Reimerian Aesthetic philosophy to music education include an aesthetic experience and feelings brought forth by listening to and contemplating the structural features of a musical object or work of art (Reimer, 1989a).

Drawing on the philosophical groundings of aesthetics, the implications of the Aesthetic philosophy to traditional instrumental pedagogy are highlighted. Stemming from Enlightenment philosophies of the individual, autonomous person whose mind is seen as an end in itself, independent of any social and situated purposes (Regelski, 2020b; Westerlund, 2002), Reimer's (1989a) undue focus on reasoning and contemplating the structural and aesthetic value said to be contained within a musical work has implications for instrumental pedagogy in the following ways. While the focus lies in the contemplation of musical works, mainly through listening, the active, social and creative role that the student has in order to bring forth the musical work is downplayed (Bradley, 2012). This intellectual focus reduces the teaching and learning situation to training, where a student is instructed to reproduce chosen musical works with the needed technical proficiency (van der Schyff, 2015). I made a link between the training of the students and the banking model initially discussed and opposed by Freire (2005). In Freire's banking model, the student is seen as the passive receiver of information which in turn leaves no room for active exploration by the student. The focus thus relies on the technical proficiency of the student to bring forth a musical object, which is separated from any practical, social or cultural concerns (Westerlund, 2002). Said to bring forth a unique kind of feeling or aesthetic experience, the musical work is appreciated and contemplated by an individual for its structural features (Reimer, 1989a; Westerlund, 2002; Westerlund, 2003; Westerlund, 2010).

For beginner instrumental music teaching and learning, the implications of an Aesthetic philosophy lie in students passively receiving information while asked to reproduce that information on their instrument with no opportunity to engage with abstract concepts in an explorative experiential, social and holistic manner. This is in contradiction to the way in which a young child learns, through explorative, embodied and social experiences (Nijs & Bremmer, 2019; Taetle & Cuttietta, 2002).

4.3.2 What are the philosophical underpinnings of a Praxial philosophy and the implications for traditional instrumental pedagogy?

In an effort to suggest a philosophy that would balance and synergise the individualistic, product-driven Aesthetic philosophy with the practical manner in which a musical work is produced, Elliott (1995) suggested a Praxial philosophy to music education. In essence, the Praxial philosophy as proposed by Elliott in his early works, focuses on the practical manner in which music is made – in his terms, “musicing” (Elliott, 1995). Music education is thus seen as action through playing, composing, listening, singing and improvising (Elliott, 1995), as well as the cognition that manifests in and through the actions (Daugherty, 1996; Stolz, 2015; van der Schyff, 2020; Varela, et al., 2016; Westerlund, 2002; Wilson, 2002). Even though Elliott focuses on the actions to bring forth a musical work, specifically in his early works, there still seems to be an emphasis on the individual, disregarding the social and environmental milieu of the teaching and learning process (Westerlund, 2002). The implication for beginner instrumental education is that, while the focus within a Praxial philosophy is shifted from mental contemplation to physical action, the connections of the music-making process to those of social interactions, environmental and cultural influences as well as the holistic and ethical connotations still seem to be disregarded in Elliott’s early Praxial philosophy (Westerlund, 2002). The educational process is viewed in a unidirectional manner, where the instruction flows from the teacher to the students, but the students cannot contribute back with their own voices and views (Bradley, 2012).

4.3.3 What are the philosophical underpinnings of a holistically embodied, meaningful and shared instrumental music education framework?

The philosophical underpinnings of a holistically embodied, meaningful and shared educational framework were explored. Drawing on Westerlund's (2002) perspectives of inclusive holism, people are seen as entities that influence and are in turn influenced by their interactions with the social and material environment: they have the agency to make an active impact on their growth, experience and meaning-making opportunities. The ideas of Westerlund are in line with the suggested extended embodied framework (Schiavio, 2014) of this study that views students as holistic, embodied agents who experience music not only with the mind, but with their whole body and being.

I explained the disembodied philosophical core of cognition which was initiated in the thoughts of Plato and Descartes where the body was seen as the carrier of the brain, which had no impact on cognitive processes (Descartes, 1996; Robinson, 2020). Influencing traditional cognitive sciences in the 1950s, cognition was confined to the mind, which was seen as a computational device (Dawson, 2013). In an effort to remediate the disembodied stance towards cognition of Plato (Broadie, 2001) and Descartes (Bechtel, 2009), Dewey (1958) and Merleau-Ponty (1945) advocated for embodied, holistic and shared constructs of cognition. In contrast to the Enlightenment's autonomous individual, cognition or learning through a Deweyan holistic lens is realised through experiences and transactions in and through the body which is situated in a social context (Westerlund, 2002).

Furthermore, I extrapolated embodied cognitive sciences where mind/soul and body are balanced in cognition. The body is thus an active agent in cognition (Stolz, 2015; Varela, et al., 2016). I focused specifically on the proprioceptive system that encompasses the embodied awareness of its situatedness in the environment (Tuthill & Azim, 2018). People have an awareness of what their bodies can do in movement (Krueger, 2009). Advancements made in embodied cognitive sciences, with the acknowledgment of the body with its senses and proprioceptive systems towards cognition, encouraged

discussions in embodied learning constructs (Munro, 2018). Within an embodied learning situation, students can actively engage in the exploration of the environment in which they as holistic and embodied beings reside (Stolz, 2015). Specific focus was placed on experience and meaning, and both constructs were explored within the aesthetic and embodied view in order to emphasise the importance of creating opportunities within the beginner instrumental teaching and learning situation for meaning-making experiences through active involvement.

Moreover, the 'later' praxialists, Bowman, Regelski and Elliott's later works and their contribution to the advancement of the balance between mind and body was explored. Paving the way towards an extension of embodied learning, an enactive approach was researched. An enactive approach views cognition as an interaction and transaction between mind, body and environment (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019, p. 20; van der Schyff, 2015; Varela, et al., 2016) and was explored as a potential approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning because of the active and autonomous role that students play in their learning. A student is thus not pressured to adjust to a rigid environment (Quick, et al., 2000). A discussion on the construct of affordances within the enactive approach was explored. Affordances means the possibilities for action in a person's environment (Krueger, 2014). An enactive approach contributed to my argument because it focused greatly on the way that the student is empowered to actively change and be changed by their environment.

In extending the enactive approach further into the social domain, an inter(en)active approach was investigated. An inter(en)active approach focuses on the enactive realm of two or more autonomous persons that is able to shape their environments and learning situation. The inter(en)active approach towards beginner instrumental teaching and learning was researched to explore the interaction and transaction of the teacher and the student or between two or more students.

4.3.4 How can a holistic approach be implemented to establish a synergised learning environment for the beginner instrumentalist in a meaningful way?

Suggestions were made as to how a holistic approach can be implemented in beginner instrumental teaching and learning in order to establish a synergised learning environment. Through focusing on how young children learn through use of their bodies in active and exploratory movements, I drew on the theories of various music education and embodiment specialists. Each practical example followed after a discussion on the philosophy or theory that influences teaching and learning for a beginner instrumentalist. All practical applications suggest an extension of the individualist, disembodied notions found in typical traditional instrumental pedagogy.

After the discussion on embodied cognition theories, an example of a practical application is given. Through making use of embodied performance models, Correia (2014) suggests that students should learn to foster their own thoughts in the music-making experience through interpreting programmatic music with actions and movement, instead of relying solely on the verbal instruction or modelling of the teacher. In other words, the student is seen as an active agent and creative collaborator in the teaching and learning process (Matyja & Schiavio, 2013; Munro, 2018; Westerlund, 2002), instead of a mechanical model that reproduces musical works (van der Schyff, 2015).

Instead of sitting still and gaining complex information through verbal instructions (Ruy, 2017), the student is encouraged to understand the musical content through embodied experiences. By utilising Gordon's (2003) Music Learning Theory, suggestions were made to move to macro- and microbeat patterning on songs in duple and triple metre in order to internalise beat and rhythm. Considering the addition of Laban's (1960) Effort components, students' movements are enhanced through flow, space, weight and time Effort constructs. Thus, through moving the body according to different rhythmic divisions, understanding is enhanced because the student experiences the rhythms first hand instead of verbal explanations from the teacher.

Drawing on the works of music education specialist Dalcroze (2018), and his approach, Eurhythmics was used to enhance the embodied experiences of the beginner instrumentalist. By comparing natural movements such as walking, running, skipping and swaying with note values, students are guided to explore basic rhythms with their bodies before applying their knowledge to their instrument. Using adaptable material such as a ball gives an opportunity for expression to a student's movement (Ridout & Habron, 2020) and can be added to movement by bouncing, throwing or rolling to different rhythms, beats and phrases. Through these movement experiences, the beginner instrumentalist is equipped to anticipate technical aspects of their instrumental playing such as bowing on a violin, which is conceptualised more easily because of the embodied processes involved.

The philosophical core of Personhood and Eudaimonia is utilised to highlight the autonomy and agency of the student, specifically within the Enactive approach to beginner instrumental teaching and learning (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; O'Neill, 2012; Silverman, 2020). Personhood reminds the teacher that the student is a human being, with unique wants and needs and that the educational situation should be adapted accordingly (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; O'Neill, 2012; Silverman, 2020). As students are interlinked with action and their environment and have agency to make their own choices and collaborate with the teacher in the educational situation, personhood opposes a position where they are separated from embodied and environmental constructs, typically founded in the disembodied notions of Descartes (Elliott, 2016; Walker, 2013).

An "event" (Westerlund, 2002, p. 54) is a construct that explains the "in the moment" music-making opportunity (Westerlund, 2002, p. 46). This allows for the student to shape his/her environment through autonomous agency (Westerlund, 2002, p. 55). An event is thus seen as an opportunity for meaning-creation in a holistic and pragmatic way (Regelski, 2017a), instead of just a place where information is passed along from the instrumentalist to the audience, as in a typical Western concert setting.

Practical application suggestions made for a shared, inter(en)active approach are drawn from the idea of music(k)ing (Elliott, 1995; Small, 1995) and contrast the linear, one-to-one instruction of typical traditional instrumental pedagogy. Music(k)ing in collective

settings allows for active music-making opportunities in social and interactive situations. It is especially an appropriate activity for beginner instrumentalists, because young children learn in “multimodal and context-embedded” ways (Young & Ilari, 2019, p. 9).

The relational manner in which music-making takes place is supported by Ubuntu philosophy that offers a humane way of recognising unity between persons (Naicker, 2015). Finding inspiration in how African music is passed on and reproduced through relying on truthful recreation, instead of exact reproduction, I utilise improvisation as a tool for social learning experiences. Viewed through the lens of Orff Schulwerk, improvisation is an informal conversation between teacher and student. Rhythmic patterns are used in a question-and-answer style activity in order for the teacher and student to have an ongoing conversation in a setting where the student does not have to rely on exact reproduction, but rather has the autonomous agency to make own unique and creative decisions through explorative rhythmic patterns.

Lastly, to give an opportunity for parents to become involved in the music-making process, an informance is suggested (Nowmos, 2010). An informance is an opportunity for the teacher and students, in an informal and collaborative manner, to show what they have learned in their lessons (Burton, 2004). It thus lies in direct opposition to a traditional formal concert performance where the audience does not engage in the music-making process (Nowmos, 2010). An informance answers to the democratic principles pursued in this study, not only giving an active role to the student, but to the parents as well so as to have an opportunity for collaborative music-making and meaning-making.

In answering the above four sub-questions, I have also answered the main research question: In order to enrich the musical experience and meaning-making opportunities of beginner instrumentalists by way of an inclusive holism, what is a holistic alternative approach to an individualist, disembodied philosophy?

A holistic alternative to the traditional approach toward instrumental music education entails the creation of musical experiences that allow for embodied, social, situated and inter(en)active opportunities to explore musical elements in a more social and holistic way. By making use of the mind and body in an embodied and situated way, opportunities

for meaning-creation are created. Through this embodied and inter(en)active way of teaching and learning, the student is allowed a sense of agency and personhood and personal meaning is generated from experiential and explorative interactions with music. In turn, cognition or understanding of complex musical concepts are brought closer to the way in which the young child learns by explorative, embodied experiences.

4.4 Recommendations

In conclusion, typical traditional approaches to beginner instrumental music pedagogy are largely void of meaningful experiences that allow for the young child to explore the musical content and context with their bodies. Traditional instrumental pedagogy relies on disembodied and individualistic ways of instruction, reducing students to empty containers waiting to be filled by the expertise of their teacher. By looking into how embodied experiences influence cognition and meaning-making, I recommend an extended embodied framework that includes the student as an active, autonomous and holistic being that explores new knowledge with their bodies in collaboration with the teacher and other students.

Recommendations for the practical suggestions towards an extended embodied framework include the use of embodied performance models (Correia, 2014). Correia (2014) suggests that by interpreting programmatic music with their own unique actions and movement, students learn to foster their own thoughts in the music-making experience. Suggestions were made to utilise Gordon's (2003) Music Learning Theory in addition to Laban's (1960) Effort components. In an effort to internalise beat and rhythm, students are guided to move to macro- and microbeat patterns on songs in duple and triple metre. The philosophical groundings of Personhood and Eudaimonia was used to highlight the autonomous agency of each student (Elliott & Silverman, 2015; O'Neill, 2012; Silverman, 2020). An "event" as described by Westerlund (2002, p. 54) is suggested to offer "in the moment" opportunities for music-making (Westerlund, 2002, p. 46) in order to shape their environment through autonomous agency (Westerlund, 2002, p. 55). In order to nurture a shared and inter(en)active approach toward beginner instrumental

teaching and learning, the idea of collaborative music(k)ing is offered (Elliott, 1995; Small, 1995). The relational manner in which music(k)ing takes places is considered under Ubuntu philosophy, which recognises the unity between people (Naicker, 2015). Drawing inspiration from how African music is passed on through relying on truthful inspiration, I utilise improvisational conversation between teacher and student viewed through the lens of Orff Schulwerk. Lastly, an informance is proposed (Nowmos, 2010) as an opportunity for teachers, students and parents to explore collaborative music-making practices in an informal manner (Burton, 2004).

4.5 Further research

Suggestions for further research are to adapt the activities for beginner instrumentalists who are older in age or for different instruments. Similarly, an empirical study can be conducted in a beginner instrumental class setting, to research the manner in which the suggested embodied and social practical application suggestions contribute to musical meaning-making experiences. Aspects of the suggested extended embodied framework can further be extended and researched by focusing on the social or cognitive facets. Aspects of the suggested extended embodied framework can also be re-used in a different field of music or education.

4.6 Final remarks

By closely relating the way in which instrumental music is initially taught to the way in which children learn through embodied, exploratory and social experiences, beginner music teaching and learning will not only make a contribution to their cognitive and mental growth, but, most importantly, to their holistic well-being and flourishing as unique and creative young people.

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