DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE IN WEST AFRICA: THE WAY FORWARD IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements in respect of the Master's Degree in Governance and Political Transformation in the Department of Governance and Political Transformation in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Free State

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this project paper is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in this University or any other institution of higher learning for examination.

DEDICATION

To my late mother

My source of inspiration and belief in the impossible

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks to the Most High, the giver of life and maker of all things possible.

I sincerely appreciate my older sisters, Florence and Patience, for having faith in me, and being my greatest supporters.

I recognise my only brother, Edehi, my manager for life.

Thanks to Chenai for her intellectual support.

Lastly, thanks to Dr T, my supervisor, for her support and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

The thesis provides a comparative analysis of governance and development in West Africa and South Asia.

It examines Nigeria specifically to find answers and scientific understanding to grasp how the country, with its abundant human, natural and mineral resources, could still be wallowing in poverty and remain in a state of underdevelopment in the 21st century.

It provides the nexus between good governance and development and draws an example from the Southeast Asian economic 'miracle', a sub-region similar to West Africa in terms of political, economic and socio-cultural development post-independence in the 1960s.

This is in order to deduce a way to propose a sustainable good governance structure and function, on an implementation strategy towards the achievement of sustainable development in Nigeria.

This, in turn, will serve as a pacesetter for the whole of West Africa, which can be proffered as a model or guide towards achieving sustainable development in the sub-region.

CHAPTER ONE

THE NEXUS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND POOR GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF WEST AFRICA

1.1. Background and Motivation

Political discourse in the academic world, and within popular and international opinion, clearly depicts the endemic nature of underdevelopment and poor governance in Africa, captioned by De Sardan (2008:39) as the “abundant literature on the state of Africa”. There is unanimous consensus that the path out of this “African tragedy” (Huillery, 2009:176) is through development that is inherently tied to good governance (Abdellatif, 2003:1). This is a reflection of the fact that the underdevelopment that has besieged the continent since its independence from the colonial powers has been largely due to weak, ineffective, and decaying governance structures inherited first, from the colonial powers, then perpetuated by successive governments from the liberation leaders to the contemporary political leaders in Africa (Weingarth and Wiederer, 2011:184). This is by no means a small feat to achieve, more than 50 years down the drain. Sadly, this contagious wastage of decades cuts across the sub-regions of Africa, including West Africa, which is the focus of this study. Ahrens (2011:136-137) espouses the achievement of sustained development in East Asian countries within the same frame of time, which confirms that countries can turn around their developmental backwardness to a state high productivity in half a century.

According to Williams (2003:37), this brings to the fore that development is an “ideological project”; thus, a project that is carefully designed through extensive thought processes, adequate planning, strategic execution and implementation, by the application of scientific knowledge. Williams (2003:39), quoting Cowen and Shenton (1996), points out that finding ways to apply “scientific knowledge to the promotion of human progress” is related to governance and development. This project is of the utmost importance in the 21st century; it must be a top priority in the minds and actions of political leaders and state actors involved with development. Until now, as Altmann (2011:209) observes, there was “a considerable lack of dedication and commitment for, and the ownership of development initiatives on the side of the governments, the public administrations, and the powerful classes”. Duffield’s (2002:1049) statement, “Development can no longer be left to chance”, best describes the urgency for a turnaround in the way of approaching development in West Africa, and Africa at large. This urgency echoes the ethos of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development

(NEPAD), seen as the new messiah to lead Africa to the promised land of political and socioeconomic development (Phago, 2013:106).

Therefore, in the context of this study, Okafor's (2008:83) exposition of the World Bank's definition of development suffices; it is defined as "a sustainable increase in living standards that encompasses material consumption, education, health and environmental protection". The human-centredness of this definition makes the term development more than the mere accumulation of wealth and income; rather, it encompasses the series of action or steps taken to broaden the possibilities available to people (Sagar and Najam, 1998:250). These possibilities include having access to basic public services, like roads and good transportation systems, electricity and energy, good housing and sanitation, good health care systems, food, and access to emergency response systems. The ineffectiveness or lack of one, more, or all of these parameters of human survival brings about varying modes of adaptation, such as migration, involvement in surreptitious activities, dependency, and a short life expectancy. In the efforts of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Human Development Index (HDI) was proffered as a guide to the development agenda (Ravallion, 2012:202). It was conceived from the necessity that to achieve sustainable development, the essential basic foundation must be in place. The HDI assesses three different parameters; life expectancy, education and income (Ravallion, 2012:202).

Although some critics, like Ravallion (2012:217), argue that the Index is not perfect, it offers an accurate picture of what is happening on the ground to the citizens of West Africa, and of Africa at large. For example, of the 17 West African countries listed, 14 belong to the Low Human Development category of the HDI (UNDP, 2015:49), the lowest of the HDI categories. Diop et al. (2010:265) capture the implication of West Africa's human development status in their assertion; that of the over 250 million West Africans, half of them live on less than one dollar a day. This implies that the populace bear the brunt of the poverty, hardship and, underdevelopment. The political elites and their cronies, associates and other network members have never been documented as occupying the bottom half, living on less than one dollar a day. The question that arises is: What meaningful development agenda can be pursued when half of the population are living in extreme poverty? The answer is in a new beginning, starting from scratch, the basics, that of human development, the embodiment of capacity building. Ku and Yuen-Tsang (2010:470) define capacity building as "activities that strengthen the knowledge, abilities, skills and behaviour of individuals, and improve institutional structures and processes" in order to attain sustainable development.

West Africa's epiphany of its dire underdevelopment is irrelevant in the 21st century. Rather, the application of scientific knowledge to these issues of development in West Africa must bring about "a paradigm shift from: problems to challenges, pathology to strengths, and preoccupation with the past to an orientation to the future'' (Ku and Yuen-Tsang, 2010:471). An orientation to the future that foresees a developmental path towards modernisation, as resonates in Williams' paradox: development must mean the modernisation of traditional ways of doing things (Williams, 2003:40). Previous ways of governance and the management of national resources and population must be reversed, existing structures must be polished and expanded, modernised, and geared towards people's orientated governance, people's political participation. Williams (2003:51) refers to this as "deference" to the need for participation by the people and empowerment of the poor. Furthermore, Altmann's (2011:213) assertion that the "central problem with Africa is African government" implies that the failure of successive governments in West Africa, and Africa at large, in providing good governance resulted in the present status of underdevelopment after decades of self-rule.

The present situation in West Africa does not reflect the meaning of De Sardan's (2008:41) definition of governance as the "entire processes of the production and supply of public goods and services, particularly by the official apparatuses of the state, but also by other operators, such as development institutions and the world of associations, which sometimes complement the state". It also fails to resonate with the notion and essence of good governance, defined as: "The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (Kaufmann et al., 1999:1). Abdellatif (2003:4) clearly states, "Good governance is essential for successful development"; whilst Olatunji and Oke (2014:134) assert that good governance promotes political, economic, and social development. As a way forward, the underpinning of the West African tragedy and the woes of underdevelopment can be revisited through a framework of first promoting the concept of good governance, and thence, proceed to development, and modernisation. More importantly, the dissociation from reality between the general populace and the ruling political elites should be critically appraised to forestall the norm that the responsibilities of political office are meant for the service of the people.

Contemporarily, the discourse of development and governance in West Africa is a tale of a paradox against the backdrop of abundant natural and human resources. Whereas, the status quo is that of underdevelopment and poor governance, an envisaged optimistic strategy conceptualised from the understanding of the past towards a formidable capacity building and sustained development within the next half century is heart-warming and worth studying. This stems from the adage that experience is the best teacher when one truly learns from it; thus, forming the bedrock of knowledge and the gift of hindsight. Olatunji and Oke's (2014:144) exposition of Jurgen Habermas' conceptualisation of knowledge as the "critical thinking that presupposes action to effect change" best represents the contention of this study. Similarly, Williams' (2003:43) adoption of Moore's notion that "the state of being developed is the product of historical changes over time" gives credence to the importance of understanding the consequences of the interrelationship between underdevelopment and poor governance of the past, and applying the knowledge in crafting a path towards sustained development in West Africa. Conversely, historical comparison "may enable an account of one case to shed light on another case" (*ibid.*). For example, the Southeast Asian sub-region's success story of achieving good governance and development in half a century (Ahrens, 2011:136-140) can suffice as a model or guide for West Africa's development aspirations. Although models are not technologies that can be taken from one perspective to the other, they can provide insight as to what can be achieved and how it can be achieved (Williams, 2003:44).

1.2. Problem Statement

West Africa has been at the forefront as the world's most unstable region (Ero and Temin, 2004:93). This is the result of decades of armed conflicts (Bah, 2005:77), coup plots and regime change (Bryden et al., 2005:204; Agyeman-Duah, 1990:547,550), military takeover and rule (Abutudu, 2009:133; Agyeman-Duah, 1990:551-552), and recently, Islamic fundamentalist associated terrorism under the guise of seeking to topple the government based on ideology (Alexander, 2012:4-5; Tonwe and Eke, 2013:235). These manifestations can be understood in Vallings and Moreno-Torres' (2005:7) statement that "violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of state fragility". Fragile states have governance structures that will not or cannot provide essential basic services such as education, healthcare, clean water supply and sanitation to their population (Tonwe and Eke, 2013:233-234). Otherwise referred to as governance failure, Diop et al. (2010:272) conclude that the reason for this failure in West Africa is as a result of "poor governance and weak institutions". Conversely, Collier's (2004:2) analogy of the interrelation between armed conflicts, specifically civil war, and development provides useful insight into West Africa's underdevelopment. Collier (*ibid.*) asserts, "The relationship between civil war and failures in development is strong and goes in both directions: i.e., civil war powerfully retards development; failures in development substantially increase proneness to civil war". This is a definite indication that West Africa has development issues stemming from poor governance and weak institutions, and ecumenically, the economic cost implications of financial and human capital loss resulting from armed conflict.

Fearon's (2008:329,332) analysis shows that poor countries are more prone to civil war, and highlights the significant economic loss caused by civil war through the depletion of human capital by way of forced migration and loss of lives (Fearon, 2008:328). On the other hand, "Wars absorb enormous amounts of money, and impede development" (Altmann, 2011:208). Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2007:20) draw the link between failure in development, aid from donor countries and the high risk of a coup. Paradoxically, African governments are induced to increase military spending in order to reduce the risk of a coup at the expense of a development agenda. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2007:20), coups are "closely related to economic weaknesses: low income and low growth". Conversely, Olatunji and Oke (2014:136) assert "In every country where the military ruled, the wealth of that country suffered colossal depletion". According to Olatunji and Oke (*ibid.*), military rule is embodied as follows:

> ... "arbitrariness, lack of political legitimacy, unresponsiveness to the citizens' needs, violation of human rights, disregard for rule of law, disregard for accountability to the citizenry, lack of government transparency, significant administrative incompetence, and above all, despicable levels of fraud and unconscionable corruption".

The effect of armed conflicts and military rule in West Africa after independence informs what has kept the sub-region in "the throes of uncertainty and instability" (Bryden et al., 2005:204). This echoes what Kandeh (2004:146-150) describes as weak state capacities associated with poor governance, resulting from the mismanagement of the military.

West Africa's present state of affairs clearly negates the ethos of the post-independence rhetoric; the Pan-African ideology was inherently tied to questions of poverty, inequality, underdevelopment, and a development agenda (Nkiwane, 2001:282). But, more than half a century later of self-rule, the dire situation of underdevelopment in West Africa echoes Olatunji and Oke's (2014:135) exposition of Jenkins' statement on Africa as inadequate, incompetent and the failure of countries striving to rule themselves. Contrary to Phago's (2013:108) statement, African leaders are wholly responsible for their underachievement after more than 50 years of defeating their aims and objectives of a post-independence ethos. The same applies to West African leaders. They have clearly defeated the aims and objectives centred around development that informed the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) more than 40 years ago (Diop et al., 2010:272). Instead of pursuing a sustained development agenda, the perpetuated self-enrichment schemes are best captured by Fagbadebo's (2007:29) quote of Ayittey, that post-independence leaders institutionalised the looting of their various national treasuries; that is, abused "their positions in government to extort commissions on foreign loan contracts, skim foreign aid, inflate contracts to cronies for kickbacks, and deposit the loot in overseas banks".

The issue of "institutionalized looting" (Fagbadebo, 2007:29), pervasive in Africa as a whole, is unfathomable. Weingarth and Wiederer (2011:178) state that the continent has the "highest rate of capital flight worldwide with 40 percent of private assets being invested abroad". Further, Altmann (2011:208) says, "A large amount of such money does not come from commercial earnings but from diverted public funds, exactly those which should be used for development purposes". As West Africa shares common attributes (Adepoju, 2003:1) with the rest of Africa, the above can be postulated as responsible for the massive capital flight from the sub-region. Political elites and bureaucrats entrusted with governance and the management of state affairs have themselves become the enemy of progress through their nefarious activities, which are inimical to development. It is as if stirring the sub-region through civil conflicts and military rule during these past decades has not brought about enough trauma in the form of the colossal depletion of capital and human resources. The intentional looting and stealing of public funds, which could have been invested in development and state building, more than describe the pathological greed and lack of entrepreneurial vision and skill in past and present governance and leadership structures in West Africa. This is tantamount to governance and leadership failure in all basic ramifications. After all, more than 50 years of self rule is sufficient to have put in place meaningful development structures, and anticipate and plan for future projections, as was achieved in Southeast Asia (Ahrens, 2011:133).

Simply justified, Adepoju (2003:12) states, that "The absence of peace and stability discourages investment, the very foundation of development and leads to capital flight". This is further compounded by the institutionalised looting of public funds and national treasuries by the very same people employed and sworn-in to protect them. The summation of the overall situation has left behind an impoverished sub-region, that has governments unable to "perform its primary functions, or do so in a sub-optimal way" (Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007:142). Otherwise referred to as government failure, this has “adverse effects on growth and development” (*ibid*). In the bid to stay afloat in the running and management of state affairs, as well as the parallel embezzlement of state funds, state governments have accumulated outrageous amounts of debt that has resulted in another form of scarcity of capital, due to the “outflow of debt service payments” (Altmann, 2011:206). It is a case of double misfortune; because West Africa is not only impoverished by the dearth of financial capital; it must service its debt repayment and eventually pay back the initial principal debt. Strikingly, all West African countries except Nigeria are listed as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) (World Bank Group, 2013:1). These countries meet the requirements for comprehensive debt relief as the world’s poorest; hence, they will receive support from the HIPC initiative set up by international financial institutions (World Bank Group, 2013:1). This does not exclude Nigeria from indebtedness; the most probable explanation for why it does not qualify for debt relief lies in the fact, as Fagbadebo (2007:33) pointed out, that “the amount of misappropriated funds is more than the totality of Nigeria’s indebtedness”. In other words, Nigeria is considered to generate enough revenue sufficient to pay back its debt. However, Altmann (2011:207) argues, “This concept has not produced much sustainable effect in practice”. The present situation of underdevelopment and poverty is no different from what it was when the HIPC initiative was launched in 1996 (*ibid.*).

Moreover, “Some critics say that debt relief negatively affects the credit rating of a country, and thus the inflow of private investment” (Altmann, 2011:207). This, in turn, is detrimental to any development prospects, as private investment is a necessary stimulus to economic prosperity and development. Adepoju (2003:1) asserts that the private sector is the “engine of growth and employment generation”. This is of utmost economic importance in contemporary times where foreign aid has yet to benefit West Africa in the context of failed attempts towards alleviation of poverty, or bringing about prosperity and sustained development. This is echoed by Weingarth and Wiederer’s (2011:177) statement, “Development aid has increased parallel with the economic downturn”, expressed as the “aid dependency syndrome”. Of the 27 African countries listed on the tabular representation of overseas development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of governments’ expenditure in 1999, 14 are West African countries which have percentages as high as more than 25 percent to more than 80 percent of their total expenditure derived from ODA (Brautigam and Knack, 2004:258). “ODA is net aid, which equals aid disbursements minus repayments of principal” (*ibid*). In addition, “aid dependent countries are low income”, and the “effects of aid dependence are perhaps difficult to separate out from the constellation of problems facing many low-income countries" (Brautigam and Knack, 2004:258). Furthermore, they defined aid dependence as a state of affair whereby governments are "unable to perform many of the core functions of government, such as the maintenance of existing infrastructure or the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise" (Brautigam and Knack, 2004:257). In other words, aid dependence is "that process by which the continued provision of aid appears to be making no significant contribution to the achievement of self-sustaining development" (*ibid.*). Foreign aid "continues to contribute a very high percentage of government budgets" in many "countries with poor governance records" (Brautigam and Knack, 2004:255). Ultimately, the issue of aid dependency is directly related to governance crisis, which in turn has been identified as a major contributor to development problems in low income countries (Brautigam and Knack, 2004:258), such as in West Africa.

The sum effect of civil conflict and insecurity, coups and military rule, institutionalised looting, embezzlement and capital flight, aid dependency and indebtedness, mired in a maze of poor governance and leadership failure, provides a clear explanation of the reality of state of affairs of development in West Africa. This is occurring despite its abundance of natural and human resources. In a sub-region where more than half of the population live on less than one dollar per day (Diop et al., 2010:265), without basic amenities, good infrastructures, and credible institutions, and no ray of hope in the horizon for improvement or amelioration, it is little wonder that many West Africans have taken their destiny in their hands and resorted to migration in all forms. Adepoju (2003:1) states, "West Africa has experienced a variety of migrations caused by population pressure, poverty, poor economic performances, and endemic conflicts". Black and King (2004:76) contend that West Africa is a "net loser of population", and further argue "International migration has traditionally and simplistically been viewed as a process which results from the failure of development" (Black and King, 2004:77). The argument goes further to stress that international migration "drains developing countries of their skilled professionals and talented individuals, reinforcing these countries' position of weakness and dependency on the world economy" (*ibid.*). In terms of the migration of skilled professionals, West Africa has been most affected by brain drain compared to other regions of the world (Black and King, 2004:77). The sole reason for this phenomenon of human flight to Europe and North America is the attraction for "relatively higher salaries and better prospects of living conditions" (Adepoju, 2003:2). Worse still, many who go overseas for study opt not to return at the end of their training due to the continued deterioration of socio-political and economic conditions in their respective countries (*ibid.*).

De Haas (2008:10) argues, “Rather than a desperate response to destitution, migration is generally a conscious choice by relatively well-off individuals and households to enhance their livelihoods”. Contrarily, evidence shows that in West Africa many people are forced to embrace migration as the last option to avoid civil conflict, all kinds of insecurities including food and personal securities, and political crises (UNHCR, 2015:1), following internal displacement, and the loss of lives and personal possessions. They embrace refugee status, and are willing to embark on perilous land and sea journeys to reach Europe and North America. Their destination of choice towards the North is countries that belong to either the very high human development category or the high human development category of the HDI (UNDP, 2015:47,48). This is a reflection of the quest for better opportunities to guarantee basic to enhanced personal (human) development. Thus, human flight from West Africa, whether intentional or forced, is detrimental to development prospects in the sub-region. The question then arises on what can be done to stop, prevent, or mitigate the migration crisis and its associated brain drain and human flight from West Africa. One cannot imagine a development agenda without the necessary availability of human resources. However, the answer lies in confronting the bigger question of where West Africa will start. If after 50 years of self-rule, the sub-region is still mired in this state of underdevelopment and poor governance, past ruin from civil conflicts, coups and military rule, institutionalised looting, aid dependency and indebtedness, where then does the hope for a better future lie in the 21st century?

Lastly, considering the broadness in the study of development and governance in the entire West Africa, and in conceptualising the framework to address the myriad of problems surrounding underdevelopment and poor governance in the sub-region, the study will consider Nigeria as a typical case, and as a reference country in the sub-region. This lends credence to Adepoju’s (2003:12) assertion that “Nigeria plays a pivotal role in the socio-political and economic affairs of West Africa. It accounts for over fifty percent of the population of West Africa, which itself is one of the largest sub-regional markets across the world”. Historically, West Africa is known for its economic activities, where people move freely, and trade in goods and services (Adepoju, 2003:1). Importantly, “Nigeria is at the forefront of the two-track approach to closer integration in the sub-region as its demographic and economic giant” (Adepoju, 2003:12). Therefore, in conceptualising a model or a guide from the analytical comparison of West Africa and Southeast Asia in the context of development and governance, a framework for sustained development will be formulated from the realities and experiences of Nigeria. This formulation based on scientific knowledge will inform and guide an anticipated transition from this treacherous era of underdevelopment to an era of sustained nation-building, through good governance, towards a sustained development in Nigeria. The successful achievement of good governance and development is much desired in Nigeria, and will serve as a laudable recommendation and source of inspiration for the rest of West Africa. This will further integrate and strengthen the sub-region and the efforts of ECOWAS.

1.3. Aim and Objectives

Based on this premise, the study takes a general look at West Africa, and specifically Nigeria, by drawing on historical and empirical evidence, in an attempt to critically appraise the cause and problem of under development through the framework of political, economic, and social development contexts. As West Africa's "most populous country and economic power house" (Obi, 2006:88), well endowed with human, natural, and mineral resources (Ajayi, 2015:25,26), Bah (2005:79) contends that if these resources are "used properly, Nigeria can be a force for good in the sub-region". The major role played by Nigeria during the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, and its continual push to foster more sub-regional integration (Adepoju, 2005:5) highlights its potential of becoming an established hegemonic influence in the sub-region; in serving as the pacesetter in the pursuance and preservation of a sustained development agenda through good governance.

Going by the analysis and tabular representation of the six dimensions of governance by Kaufman et al. (2002:19-250), the poor performance of West African countries in all dimensions provides a laudable argument why most of these countries lag behind and remain underdeveloped, occupying the lowest category of the HDI (UNDP, 2015:49). Since "good governance is thought to be indispensable to all manner of favourable development outcomes" (Quibria, 2006:3), the aim of the study is to locate the bridge linking good governance and sustainable development in Nigeria, and then, proffer as a template or a model for the rest of the sub-region. Further, an attempt will be made to identify innate potential for development, as well as exploring the successful model of Southeast Asia to propose a sustainable good governance structure, function, and implementation strategy towards sustainable development in Nigeria and, thence, the whole of West African sub-region. Therefore, the objectives are:

To explain the theoretical background and perspective of governance and development, and the relevant criteria;

To determine the role of governance in the development of underdeveloped countries;

To analyse West Africa in terms of its present governance and development status, and in comparison with the level of governance and development in Southeast Asia;

To analyse Nigeria in terms of its present governance and development status, and compare Nigeria's governance and development measures with those of Indonesia;

To identify and develop a plan of action for the improvement and enhancement of development through the establishment of good governance principles in Nigeria;

To proffer this plan of action for Nigeria as a model or guide to sustainable development for West Africa.

1.4. Methodology

The study is to utilise critical theory, which is a way of reading a particular situation in order to not only understand it, but to effect desirable change as well. "Critical theory is social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole. It provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms" (Horkheimer, 1982:188). Thus, the utilisation of critical theory: will explain what the current social reality is in West Africa, using Nigeria as a specific example; will identify the actors to change this reality; and will provide clear standards for critiquing and achieving empirical objectives in order to transform their societies socially through emancipation and empowerment (*ibid.)*. Through the understanding of the contemporary political landscape and development status in West Africa, in relationship with its antecedent historic background, the study intends to link poor governance and leadership failure to the underdeveloped state of affairs in West Africa. By so doing, the causal effect is deconstructed through the qualitative paradigm, which will describe and explain the present governance structure and development in West Africa, and specifically Nigeria. Furthermore, the study will analyse and provide plausible reasons why West Africa landed in this present situation of underdevelopment and poor governance. Then, it will compare this situation with Southeast Asia to determine what the sub-region did better, or how it reached its achievement in terms of development. Furthermore, analyses of governance and development measures will be done on Nigeria through the application of acceptable indicators and indices, and a comparison will be made with those of Indonesia in Southeast Asia to determine if the nexus still exists between good governance and sustainable development on a country to country basis, who share similar characteristics. Lastly, from this acquired scientific knowledge the study will formulate a sub-region specific development model that can be achieved through an enhanced governance structure for West Africa.

This analytical study is particularly feasible because of the abundance of resources in the form of readily available books, articles, journals, documents, policies, reports and newsletters that can be accessed through the library of the University of the Free State, advanced search engines, and the internet. This abundance of research materials also provides access to governance and development theories that will help to conceptualise the notions of governance and development, and provide tools to analyse and understand the reality. Therefore, this conceptualisation will form the foundation for understanding the analysis and information derived from the study of resources that deal specifically with West Africa's issues related to governance and development. Similarly, it will also form the central tenet for understanding the analysis and information derived from the comparative study that deals with Southeast Asia's governance and development discourse. The knowledge derived will be used to identify the discontinuity between governance and development in West Africa, in an effort to find a bridge to bring about favourable developmental outcomes through enhanced and sustained practice of the norms and principles of good governance.

With respect to West Africa, a typical example is found in Nigeria's political, economic, and social development landscape. Popularly referred to as the giant of Africa, owing to its population size and abundant natural resources, this study suggests that Nigeria is the greatest culprit of this nexus of poor governance and underdevelopment. Although it is presently regarded as one of the biggest economies in Africa, it continuously languishing in the lowest category of the HDI is a reflection of the situation on the ground. Therefore, an analytical study of governance and development in Nigeria will be done to provide a clearer overview of governance and development issues in the sub-region, demonstrating political, economic, and social underdevelopment despite political independence for more than 50 years. This is in stark contrast to Southeast Asian countries that gained political independence in the same period, but made unimaginable significant and commendable strides towards development within half a century. Thus, an understanding will be formulated based on the success story of Southeast Asian countries to develop a working model to improve on the pre-existing governance and development structure in Nigeria with the sole aim of attaining sustainable development and much desired modernisation. This, in turn, will be proffered as a template or model for development to West Africa as a whole.

1.5. Layout of the Study

Chapter one introduces the background and orientation of the study, entitled Development governance in West Africa, the way forward in the 21st century. It provides an overview on the issues of development and governance in the sub-region, and the inherent relationship as a direct proportionality to the contemporary underdevelopment in West Africa. It states the aim and objectives of the study, and determines a methodological approach.

Chapter two focuses on governance theory and related concepts, which deal with the dimensions of governance, the principles of good governance, and the criteria for establishing good governance practices in countries. It conceptualises the basis for understanding good governance; it also provides mechanisms that can be put in place for attaining it.

Chapter three focuses on development theory and related concepts on the meaning of development in its different contexts and characteristics, and the criteria and challenges for development. It conceptualises the basis for understanding what is required for the achievement of development, and the means to deal with the obstacles at present, and in anticipation of the future.

Chapter four provides a broad overview on the background and contexts regarding development and governance in West Africa. It examines underdevelopment in West Africa and what led to this situation, whilst also comparing the situation to Southeast Asia through the establishment of a link between governance and development.

Chapter five focuses on Nigeria as a case study, providing insight into the specific situation. It identifies the problems, issues and challenges regarding governance and development in Nigeria, as well as the structures in place for the design of policies and the implementation of strategies, in pursuance of good governance and a development agenda. Lastly, it will analyse government and development measures of Nigeria, and compare with those of Indonesia; a country in Southeast Asia that shares similar characteristics.

Chapter six provides a general overview on the assessment, evaluation, and summation of the state of governance and development in West Africa and specifically in Nigeria. Moreover, it provides the plan of action towards good governance that will bring about sustainable development, and forms the basis for recommendations for the way forward in the 21st century.

CHAPTER TWO

GOVERNANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.1. Introduction

Governance has become a fashionable term used in a variety of ways by many policy-makers, civil society practitioners, and scholars in the public and private domain in the developed and developing world. Gaining traction at the end of the twentieth century, the concept of governance has taken on a central role in contemporary debates in the field of development and public administration. Generally used to refer to all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, organisation, market or network, governance has become a broad term used across different fields and disciplines. The use of the term in various contexts and literature has resulted in different meanings and interpretations being attributed to it (Bevir, 2013:13). These various meanings and interpretations of the term governance have resulted in different and often conflicting understandings and implications.

This chapter explores the theoretical background to the concept of governance and good governance, as part of the theme of this study. Section 2.2 provides an outline of the different ways that governance has been understood. In this section, a discussion on the traditional and new understandings of governance is detailed to illustrate the complexities that are associated with conceptualising and framing governance.

Section 2.3 explores the definition of good governance, as well as the key principles and indicators used to measure good governance. Within the section, literature relating to how good governance is understood in relation to development and democracy, and some of the key contentions that are raised against the concept, are evaluated. Thereafter, in Section 2.4, the way that good governance is perceived and conceptualised in the African context is assessed. Here the study attempts to underline the debates made by African scholarship regarding the discord between how good governance is universally understood and the realities of the African state. The section, in essence, problematises the concept of good governance in the African context, and argues that when assessing good governance in the African state, there are additional factors that should be taken into consideration.

2.2. Understanding the Concept of Governance

Central to the different understandings of governance is a debate on the relationship between government to governance and the role of government in governance. These debates have dichotomised the meaning of governance into traditional and new notions. Scholars that closely identify governance with government are often considered to adopt a traditional notion of governance where national governments use a top down approach to steer and control social and economic activities. In this sense, governance refers to "the capacity of government to make and implement policy, in other words to steer society" (Kjær, 2004:10). Gudbjerg (2008:7) further describes "governance perceived as 'government' as focusing on the management of the public sector and on legal and administrative capacity", thereby indicating that the promotion of governance or good governance is only concerned with the public sector. Likewise, Smith (2007:3-4) argues that to equate governance with government consequentially means to focus on the following: the technical problems of administrative and legal capacity; the improvement of public sector management; the legal framework for development; accountability through better auditing; decentralisation; the policing of corruption; civil service reform; and improved information on policy issues for both decision-makers and the public. This in effect is incorrect as governance usually refers to more than just government. To give reasons as to why governance and government cannot be equated, Weiss (2000:795-797) argues that government is in essence the institution, the administrative machinery that is used to effect policy, while governance refers to the quality of the policies produced. In this sense, governance is a "higher level outcome that goes beyond the traditional services of government and needs to be aligned with a set of ethical and democratic standards" (Naidoo, 2011:32).

Departing from the argument that governance refers to more than just government, new notions of governance have argued that governance has less to do with government and more to do with "how governments and other social organisations interact and relate to citizens, as well as how decisions are taken in a complex world" (Graham et al., 2003:1). Advocates for new notions of the concept contend that governance does not only refer to government and managerial fixes to the public sector, but also to public policies, institutions, systems of economic relationships, as well as the role of the non-governmental sector in the business of the state. Understandings of governance in the new sense therefore suggest, according to Pierre and Peters (2000:29), that the role government plays in governance is a variable and not a constant. This implies that government is but one of the many actors of governance, with other actors, including non-governmental organisations, research institutes, the media, lobbyists, international donors and multinational corporations, playing significant roles in matters regarding governance and governing depending on the level of government involved.

In essence, the new notion of governance seeks to recognise the role that civil society plays in encouraging political accountability, legitimacy, transparency, and participation. The focus of governance in the new sense, according to DANIDA (2007:1), is therefore on both the public sector and the role of civil society groups and other non-state actors in holding the public sector accountable, as well as advocating for the needs and priorities of the public. New notions of governance thus illustrate an evolution of governance from "top down, centralised and hierarchical concepts of government to governance, to a new form of governing that is more inclusive and cooperative" (Hill, 2013:17). Governance, in the new sense, is therefore understood not only as a paradigm that enables a shift in the role of citizens from passive to active participants in democracy, but also as a concept that recognises public-private networks, relationships and interactions (Grote and Gbikpi, 2002:5). The conceptualisation of governance in both the traditional and new sense, according to Pierre and Peters (2000:14), has resulted in the concept of governance becoming "notoriously slippery", as well as increasingly ambiguous as scholars and practitioners fail to find a common definition for it.

2.2.1. Conceptualisation of the term governance

The lack of a shared definition of governance has allowed scholars to produce an array of definitions that are broadly and narrowly focused. For instance, Katsamunska (2016) offers a broad and abstract definition of governance, which provides common ground to the different approaches of governance. According to Katsamunska (2016:134), "Governance is the institutional capacity of public organisations to provide public and other goods demanded by a country's citizens or the representatives thereof in an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner, subject to resource constraints". Matheson (2002:37) defines governance as the incorporation of how decisions are made, the balance of power and institutions, the ways in which politicians are held accountable, and the settings within which public policies are decided and executed.

Other definitions are more narrowly defined, such as the definition by Fukuyama (2013:3), who defines governance as a government's ability to make and enforce rules and deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not. Lynn et al. (2007:5) say governance is used by "successive civilisations to refer to the exercise of authority, control and direction" by government. The definition offered by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) presents another narrow interpretation of governance, which is largely limited to the political dimension of governance. According to the OECD, governance is "the use of political authority and exercise of control in society in relation to the management of resources for social and economic development" (Fuhr, 2000:64). Olowu and Sako (2002:19), however, suggest that governance refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions. While governance "is variously understood, [with] each analysis reflecting the bias of each observer", much of the body of literature seems to conceptualise governance from the perspective that presupposes that governance is essentially about control, authority or a system of regulations (European Commission, 2002:1; Scott, 2002:63).

Despite the definitions offered that look at governance from various perspectives, the UNDP (1997:2) provides a more explicit and comprehensive definition of the concept, describing governance as follows:

> ..."the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the complex mechanism, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Governance includes states, but transcends it by taking the private sector and civil society. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state creates a conducive political and legal climate. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction, mobilising groups to participate in economic, social and political activities".

The definition of the UNDP (*ibid.*) effectively underlines the multifaceted nature of governance by emphasising and highlighting the political, economic and administrative dimensions as distinct levels where authority is exercised. Similarly, Kaufman et al. (2010:3) argue for a definition of governance that is equally both broad and narrow in meaning. These authors (*ibid.*) assert that governance refers to "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, which include the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them". Kaufmann et al. (2010:4) maintain that the definition of governance can further be identified using a classification of indicators that correspond and capture the three parts of the definition. The six categories, which are organised into clusters that speak to each part of the definition, are as follows:

Voice and Accountability – explores the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in the selection of their government, as well as the extent to which free media, freedom of expression and association are allowed.

Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism – investigates the likelihood of the government being destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. According to Kaufmann (2002:5), this index captures the idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the likelihood of changes in government, which not only undermine the ability of a country's citizens to peacefully exercise their right to select those in power but also has direct implications for the continuity of policies.

Government Effectiveness – captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. In essence, this index seeks to assess the inputs required for government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

Regulatory Quality – focuses on the policies implemented and explores the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Rule of Law – seeks to capture the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Control of Corruption – investigates the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the 'capture' of the state by elites.

The above-mentioned dimensions of governance provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010:3) are not to be understood in silos from each other. Moreover, the measurement of governance using these six dimensions is not always clear-cut. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the dimensions offered by Kaufmann et al. (*ibid.*) underline governance as a means to "achieving direction, control, and co-ordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organisations on behalf of the interests which they jointly contribute to" (Lynn et al., 2007:10).

Despite the different definitions and understandings of governance, a careful analysis of the literature enables one to conclude that there are three common elements present in the definitions. In this respect, it may be argued that governance ultimately refers to exercising authority, power or control; power sharing and partnerships among various sectors of society; and a form of co-ordination between subsystems. While the different definitions used to understand governance share these common elements, a shared definition of the concept far from being agreed on as most of the meanings attributed to the concept are largely influenced by the user's bias and placed within different theoretical paradigms (European Commission, 2001:1).

2.2.2. Framing governance

In an attempt to develop a better understanding of the concept of governance, Stoker (1998:18) outlines five propositions that can be used to frame the questions that governance should assist in answering:

- *Governance refers to institutions and actors from within and beyond government*. Stocker (1998) notes that while governance is concerned with all the institutions and actors that are involved in governance, there is a significant divorce between the complex reality of decision-making associated with governance and the normative codes used to explain and justify government.
- *Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues*. Stocker (1998) maintains that the shift in boundaries and responsibilities relates primarily to the way the private and public sector interact, which also includes notions of communitarianism and social capital. However, he highlights that the blurring of responsibilities between sectors can easily lead to blame avoidance and scapegoating.
- *Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action*. In this proposition, it is noted that organisations are dependent upon each other for the achievement of collective action and, thus, must exchange resources and negotiate shared understandings of ultimate programme goals.
- *Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors*. Stoker (1998) states that the emergence of these self-governing networks raises concerns over

accountability as these networks are not only involved in influencing government policy but also engaged in conducting the business of government.

- *Governance recognises the capacity to get things done, which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority*. In this proposition, Stoker (1998) argues that within governance there is a concerted emphasis on finding new tools and techniques to steer and guide to avert the likelihood of leadership and government failure. It is therefore suggested that to avoid failure, governments must address design challenges of public institutions through "revisability, robustness, sensitivity to motivational complexity, public defendability, and variability to encourage experimentation" (Stoker, 1998:26).

While Stoker (1998:18-26) outlines these five propositions as a way to understand the areas of government and governing that the concept of governance seeks to highlight and improve, other scholars have sought to understand governance theory by analysing and operationalising the concept using normative and analytical dimensions.

2.2.3. Normative and analytical understandings of governance

The concept and term governance is widely defined and understood differently among scholars, practitioners and international organisations in different contexts. Largely, the concept of governance can however be said to be contextually used in one of two ways; namely, in a normative-programmatic context where it is understood and applied as a reform approach, or, in an analytical-descriptive context, where it is seen as a way of describing and interpreting transformation processes in politics and the state. Normatively, the term governance has been used to "constitute a programmatic alternative to other paradigms for organizing and reforming the state and public administration", while analytically, the term is applied "to diagnose and conceptualise a change in forms of political steering" (Blatter, 2012:5).

In a normative sense, governance is seen as a political reform approach that offers an alternative to the neo-liberal reform paradigm (Jann and Wegrich, 2004:200). These scholars maintain that conceptually governance dismantles the neo-liberalist idea that development and growth can be achieved through "shifting the boundaries" of the private and public sector, and instead champion the idea of "blurring the boundaries" between the public and private sector (*ibid.*). In this respect, it is argued that governance contrasts the neo-liberalist notion that the control between the private and public sector needs to be shifted in favour of the private sector, which leads to increased privatisation and marketisation of the state and public administration. Thus, governance promotes the idea of blurring the boundaries between the sectors to create a third sector. This sector is comprised of civil societies and is characterised by a situation where the state no longer plays an all-embracing role in governing, but instead plays a central role in “initiating, catalysing and coordinating functions that promote social self-regulatory capacities” (Heinze, 2002 in Blatter, 2012:6). Thus, as a political reform alternative, the concept of governance promotes cooperation and connection between the state, private sector and society as co-producers of knowledge and development, as well as multifaceted forms of participation to increase the legitimacy of public action (Jann and Wegrich, 2004:200-210). Conclusively, the understanding of governance from a normative perspective advocates for a transformed relationship between society and the state, from an instrumental one to an integrative-constitutive one. In this relationship, “the state is no longer an instrument for the realisation of societal goals, [but] rather the state and society interact as co-producers, in order to give society self-reassurance and identity, to mobilise self-regulatory potentials and to guarantee societal integration” (Blatter, 2012:7).

While governance has been used as a normative-programmatic reform model, the concept has also been applied and understood in an analytical sense to describe the transition of governing and statehood (Grande and Pratorious, 2003 in Blatter, 2012:11). According to Blatter (2012:9), the use of governance as an analytical concept provides the opportunity for governance to be viewed as a “trans-disciplinary bridging concept that can be used for the positive analysis and interpretation of historical transformations of political steering and integration”. The use of governance in various fields and disciplines has created confusion as the term has been used as a “generic fundamental concept which includes all institutional forms of social coordination and as a new specific form of governing which is contrasted with other ‘older’ forms – mostly in a dichotomous way” (Blatter, 2012:10). The use of the term governance in these varying ways has prompted scholars and practitioners to argue for the use of governance as an umbrella term. This term would refer to all forms of political steering and integration transformations, as they are understood in different areas and fields of mainly politics, economics and sociology, in order to better understand governance as both a term and concept. Blatter (2012), however, argues that this attempt to create an umbrella or cross-disciplinary understanding of governance for analytical purpose has largely been unsuccessful. This is the case because “neither the integration of steering and integration mechanisms into a systemic approach nor the inductive search for a common denominator of the various governance discourses leads to a concept of governance that can serve as a sufficiently clear interpretive framework for the analysis of change over time or for comparing the variation of political and societal forms of steering and integration" (Blatter, 2012:13).

Although academics have since failed to create a cross-disciplinary definition of governance that can be understood to analyse the historical transformations of political steering and integration, the term governance in this study will be used to refer to the generic concept for all forms of political steering. In addition to understanding governance as a generic concept, the study will also adopt the understanding of governance as a normative concept and will look specifically into how governance has been dichotomised into notions of good or bad and how good or bad governance impacts economic, political and social growth and development.

2.3. Good Governance

Popularly asserted to have been introduced by the World Bank in 1989, good governance has become a much-used term in the fields of administration, development, and aid. Emerging as a policy used to dispel practices of bad governance characterised by corruption, unaccountable governments, and the lack of respect for human rights, good governance has become an important concept used to champion the following:

> ..."democracy; universal protection of human rights; non-discriminatory laws; efficient, impartial and rapid judicial processes; transparent public agencies; accountability for decisions made by public officials, devolution of resources and decision making to local levels; and the meaningful participation by citizens in debating public policies and choices" (Wyman, 2000:1).

Despite the notion of good governance being used universally among development actors as a policy agenda to promote political development, there is no universal definition or consensus on what good governance means. Good governance, therefore, is considered an extremely ambiguous and contentious concept and term that has a number of varying characteristics, dimensions, and principles used to describe and define it.

2.3.1. Defining good governance

According to the United Nations (UN) (2012:3), "Much discussion about the definition of good governance has been centred on what makes institutions and rules more effective and efficient in order to achieve equity, transparency, participation, responsiveness, accountability and the rule of law". The UN (2012) further suggests that with no universal standard for governance, good governance can only be defined by achieving the desired outcomes. Echoing the sentiments made of the UN, Madhav (2007:1) maintains that good governance can only be understood and evaluated through a set of agreed-upon norms. These arguments by the UN and Madhav have consequentially enabled many scholars and researchers to provide broad interpretations of good governance that are based on what they assume are the key outcomes or realities of good governance. For instance, Leftwich (1993:46) asserts that an efficient public service; an independent judicial system; a legal framework that is enforceable; management and administration that is accountable for public funds to an independent public auditor; and respect for the law and human rights in all spheres of government are the essential features that need to be identified when defining good governance. Farazmand (2005:1), on the other hand, states that the most important crosscutting principles of democracy, namely ethics, accountability and transparency are prime features of good governance. The African Development Bank (ADB) (2010:1) clarifies its concept of good governance by identifying accountability, participation, predictability and transparency as its core elements.

While the above-cited scholars define good governance by identifying the core elements and outcomes that supposedly characterise the concept, others suggest that good governance can best be understood by dividing it into distinct dimensions or categories. According to Bebiel and Terlinden (2004:3), good governance can be defined and divided into:

- The technical dimension, which refers to the economic aspect of governance, namely, the transparency of government accounts, effectiveness of public resource management and the stability of the regulatory environment for private sector activity;
- The social dimension, which involves building, strengthening and promoting democratic institutions as well as tolerance and non-discrimination throughout society; and
- The political dimension, which refers to the legitimacy of government and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Similarly, good governance within the development discourse is also defined in categories that attempt to interpret the concept in economic or social terms. According to De la Harpe et al. (2008:2), good governance within the development discourse can be understood either in technical/economic terms or political/social terms, where capacity, effectiveness and efficiency are seen as key elements of the former, and human rights, democracy, accountability and responsiveness as critical elements of the latter. Caluser and Salagean (2007:13), however, contend that the separation of good governance within the development discourse has little to do with attempting to understand the concept in terms of the different dimensions; rather, it is to accommodate the different interpretations of good governance by different development and donor organisations. It is maintained that within the development discourse, the World Bank's limited, apolitical and technicist definition of good governance would fall under the technical/economic dimension of the concept given its tendency to define good governance in relation to economic reforms. Correspondingly, defining good governance as a concept that focuses mainly "on those aspects that are closely related to the surveillance (by international financial institutions) over macro-economies – namely transparency of governments, the effectiveness of public resources management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory framework for private sector activity" (International Monetary Fund, 1997:iv) further illustrates the predisposition of financial institutions to define good governance in technical terms. Essentially, it is argued that the type of good governance defined and adopted by these institutions is located within a paradigm that supports economic interest over public interest. Moreover, it "ingrains the connotative essence of good governance; with the goal of fiscal stability propounded as one of the key variables in its conceptualisation" (Maserumule and Gutto, 2008:66). Whereas financial institutions locate their definitions of good governance within the technical dimension, more politically and socially inclined institutions such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the British Overseas Development Agency (BODA) tend to understand and define good governance within the political dimension. The identification and conceptualisation of good governance as transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness indicates an understanding of good governance from a democratic and human rights viewpoint.

While most of the definitions of good governance put forward by financial, developmental and aid agencies can be located within a technical or political understanding of the concept, the World Bank (2008:1), among other organisations, has argued that the aspects used to define and measure good governance within the dimensions actually supplement and complement each other. This, in turn, has led to more definitions of good governance, synthesising both the political and technical dimensions of the concept. For example, Carlos' (2001:163) definition of good governance as "the emergence of a reformed state, governed by the rules of legitimacy, transparency, accountability and responsibility" indicates a definition of good governance that encompasses aspects of the concept that are located within the technical and political dimensions of good governance. Similarly, the definition provided by Abrahamsen (2000:30), which defines good governance as the "exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs in a manner that ensures openness and accountability, the rule of law, freedom of press, increased grassroots participation and the building of legitimate, pluralistic political structures", highlights a definition that synthesises the technical and political dimensions of the concept.

The definitions and understandings of good governance cited above illustrate a stark difference in meanings. Within the development discourse alone, the understandings of good governance vary, with international financial institutions conceptualising good governance within an economic paradigm, while political and social aspects underpin development and legal agencies' understanding of good governance. Although these differences and contrasts have kept the meaning of good governance fluid, nebulous and evocative, it is unarguable that good governance is a trans-contextual, value-laden, complex and multidimensional concept that can mean different things to different people depending on the context and the level on which it is discussed and used. While good governance is susceptible to different and at times conflicting interpretations, it can generally be agreed that at the core of explaining good governance and its characteristics is the understanding that the concept is strongly related to a better way of governing and the measurement of it serves "as confidence indicators in the political and administrative management of a country" (Naidoo, 2011:33). In essence, it may be argued that in the end, good governance does not only focus on adding value to society and promoting development, it is also about creating systems and structures that complement each other. This is to ensure that a situation of bad governance is avoided, which manifests itself when systems and structures do not function optimally or do not exist. Characterised by accessibility, accountability, transparency, predictability, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, participation and the rule of law, good governance is, especially within development, recognised as a vital feature of the modern government and a sine qua non of economic and social development (Madjid, 1997:3).

2.3.2. Principles and characteristics of good governance

The various definitions of good governance each provide specific principles that apply to their understanding of the concept. Although many of the definitions provided by different scholars, researchers and practitioners offer varying principles, it is argued that these principles largely emanate from the nine principles of good governance set out by the UNDP

(1997:2-3). Graham et al. (2003:3) have further compressed the nine principles into five broad themes, namely legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability, and fairness. The table below shows how the nine principles of participation, consensus orientation, strategic vision, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, transparency, equity, and rule of law, identified by the UNDP fit, within the five broad themes proposed by Graham et al. (*ibid.*).

Table 1 Principles of good governance

Five Broad Principles of Good Governance	The UNDP's Nine Principles of Good Governance
Legitimacy and Voice	**Participation** includes citizens exercising their right to express their opinions and concerns in processes of decision and policy making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. **Consensus orientation** refers to governments establishing adequate mechanisms to mediate differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of all individuals and groups in terms of processes, policies and procedures.
Direction	**Strategic vision** refers to government policies and actions being based on a clear vision and strategy. It speaks to governments and society agreeing on a broad and long-term perspective on issues of good governance and human development, along with what is needed to achieve such development, taking into account the historical, cultural and social complexities.

Performance	**Responsiveness** refers to institutions and processes being put in place to serve all stakeholders and citizens adequately. It includes government administrators becoming sensitive to the needs of the public. **Efficiency and Effectiveness** includes creating processes and institutions that produce results that meet the needs of the public by utilising the available resources optimally and responsibly.
Accountability	**Accountability** refers to decision- and policy-makers, the private sector and civil society organisations remaining accountable to the public about their processes, procedures and policies. **Transparency** refers to the free flow of information and includes the provision of accurate and adequate government information to the public.
Fairness	**Rule of Law** refers to the enforcement of laws and legal frameworks that are fair and impartial. **Equity** refers to establishing equal opportunities for all members of the society to improve their welfare.

Source: UNDP (1997:2-3); Graham et al. (2003:3)

Although the principles set out by the UNDP, when practically applied to a social context tend to overlap or conflict with each other, they are universally recognised and accepted (Graham et al., 2003:2). According to Nelson (2010:23), despite the shortcomings of the principles, they are a critical way of assessing how well power is exercised. Nelson (*ibid.*) adds that the principles enable states and institutions to determine which areas need to be improved to ensure that the ideal conditions for good governance are achieved within an existing government system.

2.3.3. Good governance and development

Although the concept of good governance has its merits, much of the contention regarding the concept is raised regarding its role and centrality in different ideological, political, philosophical and theoretical discourses. The concept of good governance has been fiercely debated within the development discourse in recent years. Scholars who have focused on the relationship between good governance and development have often failed to consensus on the merits and demerits of its inclusion in the discourse. Many independent researchers have argued that good governance has been introduced in the development discourse as "a new orthodoxy [based] on the models of a liberal-democratic polity [that] dominates official Western aid policy and development thinking" (Leftwich, 1993:605). Essentially, it is argued that since its inception good governance has been used by the aid and donor community to push a Western-based agenda, which emphasises free-market economies and competitive democratic politics (see Leftwich, 1993:605; Abrahamsen, 2000:64-65; Ikome, 2007:69). Therefore, to understand the relationship between good governance and development, the evolution of the concept within the discourse will be explored.

2.3.3.1. Evolution of good governance within the contemporary development discourse

A significant portion of the development agenda has become related to good governance. From the 2000s, researchers and development agencies have adopted the concept as a way of exploring the institutional failures and constraints that have hindered the political and economic growth and development of developing nation-states. Though the emergence and popularity of good governance within development can be credited to the admirable characteristics of how governments should govern to ensure development, its evolution within the development discourse is characterised by "two parallel meanings that overlap" (Leftwich, 1993:603). The first meaning is associated with the interpretation of good governance by the World Bank, which is limited to the technical and managerial dimensions of the concept. The second meaning is linked to the interpretation of the concept as purported by political and social development organisations, which support the political and democratic dimensions of good governance (*ibid.*).

When discussing the evolution of good governance within the development discourse, scholars and practitioners suggest that the concept of good governance gained traction within development in the late 1980s following the “intellectual resurrection of the state as a positive ‘player’ in economic and political development” (Grindle, 2010:3). The evolution of good governance in the contemporary development discourse can be located in the development trajectories of the East Asian ‘tigers’ and “the political ascendancy of neo-liberalism in Western theory and public policy from the late 1970s”, which informed the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s (Leftwich, 1993:605; Grindle, 2007:4). Literature on the development trajectories and success of the East Asian ‘tigers’, which underlined the positive role the state could play in development increasingly brought to the fore the fact that the state and its institutions could play a key role in the development of countries. On the other hand, the failure of SAPs in the pursuit of large-scale economic reforms within a largely anti-statist perspective prompted researchers to rethink the role of the state in development (Hazenberg, 2016:49). These two events, coupled with the growing interest of researchers in the analysis of constitutional structures, electoral and party systems, political corruption, the management of the state and notions of state autonomy, resulted in an increased interest in re-establishing the role of the state in development. The inclusion of a chapter on ‘Rethinking the State’ in the 1991 World Development Report, followed by the publication of ‘The State’ in a Changing World Report in 1997 indicated a shift away from the anti-statist perspectives championed in the early 1980s and an acknowledgement of the importance of the state in development despite the impediments it presented to the development agenda.

The increased interest of the role of the state in development, along with an urgent need to develop measures to deal with the growing rate of corruption led development researchers to formulate the concept of good governance. De Alcantara (1998:105) suggested that good governance was devised as “a hygienic way of dealing with political institutions and interactions – like corruption, accountability and leadership”. The concept of good governance, it is argued, provided development agencies with a technical approach to addressing the impediments to development, while allowing international agencies to discuss and become more engaged with the internal politics of donor receiving countries. Hazenberg (2016:34) argued that the introduction of good governance within the development discourse provided a strategic way to reintroduce and reaffirm the importance of the role of the state and government in shaping the right conditions for economic growth and increased social welfare. Essentially, the adoption of the concept of good governance in development assisted organisations and agencies to do the following:

- Escape the “intellectual and practical dead-end into which they had earlier been pushed [into] by their extreme reliance on free-market ideals”;
- Move away from their mainstream theories which championed economic growth as the way to create development; and
- Re-shift their focus to understanding and determining how best the state and government could assist in creating a conducive environment for development (Grindle, 2010:6).

The re-appreciation of the role of the state and government in development led to the proliferation of good governance as a key component of development. Since then good governance has been used as a tool to assess government policies and effectiveness in creating optimum conditions for development. In this sense, and as a whole, good governance in development discourse, it is suggested, “ought to be seen as an evaluative concept of both the outcome of governance and the means through which it is achieved” (Hazenberg, 2016:34).

While Hazenberg (2016:33) argued that good governance was essentially conceptualised as a concept that would emphasise the re-appreciation of government and the state in development, studies done between the 1990s and 2000s demonstrated that the concept could be of more use in the development discourse. According to Grindle (2010:6), by the 2000s the concept of good governance had become more than just a strategy to re-establish the state in development and instead was shown to be a cause of development. Although most of the studies done from the 1990s to the early 2000s had identified a significant relationship between good governance and growth, poverty reduction, aid effectiveness, efficient bureaucracies and higher foreign and private investment, other studies using econometric analysis to understand the cause and effect relationship between good governance and development demonstrated that the relationship between the two was more than correlational (Grindle, 2007:6). These cause and effect studies carried out by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002:1) and other researchers showed that good governance did not merely correlate with development, but that it was in fact a direct cause of development. The World Bank (1999 in Grindle, 2010:7) in its review of a number of development studies argued that there was “overwhelming evidence that good governance was crucial for successful development, as measured by high per capita income”. Following these conclusions, the concept of good governance became more than a way to assess the role of the state in development and intervene in the internal politics of countries. Furthermore, good governance became a defining quality for development and a necessary condition for it. Leftwich (1993:605) writes that good governance and democracy became conditions that were not only desirable but also essential for development.

2.3.4. Good governance and democracy

As indicated above, good governance has, by virtue of proposing to be a guide towards the better exercise and execution of authority and power, become an integral condition for achieving development. While the normative dimension of good governance, which provides fundamental values that governance should adhere to for it be called good supposedly allows for the creation of an environment conducive for development, it also justifies the relationship between good governance and development. Some scholars have questioned the supposed computability and relationship between good governance and democracy, which is promoted within the development and good governance discourse. Adejumobi (2000:5) states that the debate on the relationship between democracy and good governance, as well as whether democracy is the only compatible political system or regime to create and maintain good governance, has been raging for many years.

The examples of countries that boast of good governance without democracy, for example, the United Arab Emirate (UAE) and Qatar, as well as democratic countries without good governance, for instance, most African countries, suggest that the correlating relationship that is believed to exist between democracy and good governance is false. Thus, the question that arises is why development and donor agencies promote the ideal of a relationship between democracy and good governance.

Advocates that insist that good governance can only be effectively achieved where democracy and democratic institutions exist have often based their reasoning on the correlation between the characteristics of good governance with the nuances of liberal democracy (see Hyden, 1992:7; Stoker, 1998:17; Joseph, 1990:6-8). For Hyden (1992:7), good governance refers to the conscious management of regime structures with the overall intention being to enhance the public realm. Thus, Hyden (1992:7) argues that good governance, in this respect, “seeks to reconstitute politics from a high level frequency of zero sum calculation to a middle ground, where politics is a positive sum game characterised by reciprocal behaviour and legitimate relations between governors and the governed”. Hyden (1992:7) argues his point by citing authority, reciprocity, exchange, trust and accountability as the key priorities of good governance, and that each of these components of the concept invariably emphasise or reinforce democratic norms and practices. Similarly, Stoker (1998:17) maintains that good governance parallels liberal democracy. This is because it is only when legitimate political power exists, namely, when a balance between state and civil society and self-governing networks is created through democratic rule, can it be said that good governance, which is primarily concerned with collective action and ordered rule, has been achieved (*ibid.*). Therefore, Stoker (1998:17) concludes that only when democracy is achieved in qualitative terms can good governance be achieved. Taking accountability as the fundamental characteristic of good governance, Joseph (1990:7) argues that good governance and democracy are linked by virtue of the fact that accountability can only be achieved through democratic practices such as free and fair elections and citizen participation. Although these scholars use different characteristics of good governance to exemplify the link that principles of good governance have with practices and nuances of democracy, it is evident that the relationship between good governance and democracy lies in the examination between principles used to identify good governance and elements used to measure democracy (see Albritton and Bureekul, 2009:1).

While the abovementioned scholars maintain that there is a link between good governance and democracy, a study in Thailand on citizens' perceptions of democracy and good governance and the link between the two indicated that good governance indicators are not necessarily related to the essentials of democracy, with the most fundamental condition being elections (see Albritton and Bureekul, 2009:1). Similarly, other scholars have also questioned the extent to which elections in a democratic society ensure political accountability and, therefore, good governance (see Ihonvbere, 1996:6-15, Fatton, 1992:4). Moreover, Albritton and Bureekul (2009:1) argue that good governance characteristics, such as participation, have very little to do with the political system of a country and refer more to participation in the form of non-governmental organisations, rather than in a democratic electoral process. Given the stretching justifications that are used to suggest that good governance can effectively be achieved through democratic institutions and democracy, contenders of this view argue that good governance is not associated with any particular form of political regime or system. Accordingly, it is argued that no specific political system needs to be in place to increase the likelihood of achieving good governance. Arguing that good governance is primarily concerned with the effectiveness and efficiency with which a government governs, it is maintained that good governance can be achieved in any political system as shown by the high achievement of good governance despite the absence of democracy in countries such as the UAE. It is therefore opined that good governance, rather than being linked to democracy, should be understood and seen as being derived from the theory of utilitarianism and be measured by the extent to which a political regime can guarantee popular welfare and promote happiness for the majority (Adejumobi, 2000:4-6; Chabal, 1992:53).

Evidence of non-democratic states that have achieved good governance, coupled with the assertion that good governance is best understood as an evaluation of the ability and capacity of government to increase the welfare of its citizens, suggests that the supposition that good governance parallels democracy and development advanced by development and donor agencies is flawed. Albritton and Bureekul (2009:1) maintain that the different criteria that good governance and democracy rely on show no indication that good governance includes democracy or that democracy is a sufficient cause of good governance. In this respect, it could be suggested that the criticism that good governance as a concept is being used by development and donor organisations to continue spreading economic and political liberalism in the developing world is plausible. It is irrefutable that democracy, which encourages elections, civil and political rights, and economic empowerment, is a formidable political system that may to some extent augment good governance. However, to suggest that democracy is linked or parallel to good governance would be incorrect.

2.3.5. Critique of good governance

Good governance has been accepted as an essential tool in the facilitation and achievement of development by international development and donor agencies. However, over the past two decades the concepts and policies relating to good governance and development have been reviewed and widely criticised. Some of the reviews and the criticism levelled against the relationship between good governance and development is cited below.

According to Abrahamsen (2000:25-45), the promotion of good governance and democracy by international organisations is in fact a strategy used by the West to establish and ensure its hegemony. In her book *Disciplining Democracy,* Abrahamsen (2000) says that good governance is used by the West to advance an agenda that is similar to that of colonialisation and previous development agendas that sought to reform developing countries using Western values and political systems, such as democracy and human rights. According to Abrahamsen (2000:23), “The good governance discourse sanctions the right of Western countries to intervene in the third world to promote their vision of development and democracy, while simultaneously marginalising alternative interpretations”. In addition to expanding their sphere of influence and power, Abrahamsen (2000:51-53,64-65) argues that good governance is used by the West to legitimise economic liberalisation. In relation to this argument, Abrahamsen (2000:25) maintains that by virtue of the link between democratisation and economic liberalisation, good governance consequently legitimises and promotes economic liberalism and delegitimises state-led development through its legitimisation and promotion of democracy and democratic institutions.

Eyasu (2006:4-6), while making a similar point to that of Abrahamsen (2000), argues that the term 'good' in good governance needs to be problematised by developing countries, as the ideological underpinnings used to determine what is good and thereby define good governance are privy to the influence of Western ideologies of power and hegemony. According to Eyasu's (2006:6) definition, the understandings and the operationalisation of good governance in developing countries is only likely to work when the concept is redefined in a way that negates the influence of Western politics of power and hegemony. The arguments made by Abrahamsen (2000:30) and Eyasu (2006:6-7) illustrate what Tucker (1999:12) calls an "unequal power relationship that prevails in the production of knowledge", which he describes as a situation where "one group has the power to articulate and project itself and its worldview on others. The others thus become others - objects to be studied, described and developed". In essence, it is argued that as the wielder of global hegemonic power, the West has defined good governance for the world and in turn "imposed their understandings on what ought to be the meaning of the concept on the less powerful" (Caluser and Salagean, 2007:11). Hence, some critics of good governance have argued for the need to redefine the concept in a contextually appropriate way, which can be used to measure and address issues of governance and development in a context-specific manner that takes into account the realities and complexities of a particular group or society.

In addition to calls by critics of good governance in development to redefine the concept of good governance so as to eliminate the influence of the West, other critics have argued against the vagueness and conceptual brevity of good governance as a term and the indicators used to measure it. According to these scholars, it is fundamentally flawed to base development goals on the concept and indicators of good governance because both the term 'good governance' and the indicators used to measure it are vague and lack substance (see Gisselquist, 2012:14). Langbein and Knack (2010:350) argue that the different indicators used by the World Bank and other international development agencies are so interrelated that their measurements say very little to nothing about the actual performance of a government. These authors, alongside Hazenberg (2016:37-38), argue that the lack of parsimony and distinction between indicators is extremely troublesome, as the use of these indicators has led to a wide range of opposing outcomes being identified and implemented in developing countries. In highlighting the flaws with the indicators used to measure good governance, Andrews (2008:380) asks why some of the indicators used to measure good governance, such as voice and accountability, which are not good by themselves but are instrumentally useful, are used to measure good governance. Furthermore, Hazenberg (2016:38) questions why participation, accountability and components linked to democracy need to be measured to assess good governance when assessing economic development. Hazenberg (*ibid.*) argues that with no evidence to suggest that democratic governance enhances economic development, there should be no reason why democratic components need to be measured when measuring economic growth and development. Regarding the promotion of democracy and democratic institutions through good governance, it is also questioned why countries like the UAE, which lack democratic institutions and practices, score high on overall good governance indicators when they do not have democratic leadership or institutions in place.

The aforementioned questions effectively highlight the loopholes that can be found in the indicators that are supposed to measure good governance. These ambiguities and inadequacies with the concept and indicators of good governance therefore raise the question of whether the accepted international development and donor agencies' interpretations and operationalisation of good governance can be relied on to provide a clear and unbiased measurement of the performance of governing governments in the developing world. The suspicion and doubt cast by the shortcomings of the good governance concept and the motives behind the championing of good governance as an essential condition to development, have consequentially led scholars in the developing world, and more specifically in Africa, to problematise good governance, with most calling for a reinterpretation of the concept.

2.4. Good governance in the African Perspective

In the African context, the failure of SAPs in the 1980s, coupled with the deterioration of most of the post-colonial systems of government in African countries into kleptocracies in the name of democracy, precipitated the evolution of good governance as an alternative conceptual framework from which solutions to African countries' development conundrums could be sought (Havnevick, 1987; Leftwich, 1993). While originally coined by African scholars such as Claude Ake, Waheed Oshikoya, and Gladson Kayira in relation to the concern that state-society relations in Africa needed to be more developmental, democratic, and socially inclusive, good governance was in 1989 adopted by the World Bank and used in Africa as a new label for aid conditionality (Mkandawire, 2007:1). Under the World Bank, good governance became identified as a structural necessity that needed to be implemented in Africa in collaboration with private sector initiatives and market mechanisms to address the poor economic performance and failure of public institutions in countries on the (Conable, 1989 in World Bank, 1989:xii).

Despite having originally been coined within African scholarship, the concept of good governance as interpreted by the World Bank has largely been rejected by African scholars, who have argued against the “condescending and even imperialistic” definitions of good governance that are largely underpinned by the neo-liberalist ideologies of the West (Johnson, 1997:2). The rejection of Western definitions and understandings of good governance, which assume that neo-liberalism is the only correct ideological, philosophical and theoretical framework from which good governance can be understood, has in effect gestured African scholars to seek alternative understandings and perceptions of the concept within a localised context in an attempt to determine what should be considered ‘good’ in African governance. Chigbu (2010:7) advances this notion purporting that “while it is very difficult to speculate on how good the conventional paradigm of good governance (as espoused by the world’s major economic and political powers) is for Africa, there is need for African institutions to start addressing its meaning within a localised context”. Correspondingly, Ayeni (2000:1-7) argues that for good governance to be appropriately adopted in the African context it is important that a localised understanding of the concept be conceptualised. According to Ayeni (2000:4), the measures of good governance advanced by Western development and donor agencies that promote neoliberal democratic values and strong market-orientated initiatives are fundamentally not applicable or relevant in the African context. Refuting the fact purported by the literature that contemporary good governance has finally discovered how society can best be governed, Ayeni (2005:5) concludes that good governance as depicted by the West must be rejected because it carries “ideological baggage which may threaten the entire gains that have been made in re-establishing significance of governance in the development process” of the continent.

2.4.1. Defining good governance for Africa

According to Chigbu (2010:12), “If Africa must attain sustainable development, good governance must be viewed from a more comprehensive lens rather than the narrow political and economic views which have overshadowed other aspects of the lives of the African”. Thus, in an attempt to reconceptualise the concept of good governance, African scholars propose that good governance be understood within a human-centred development paradigm. Within this paradigm, it is argued that the definitions and understandings of good governance must support a more context-specific approach that fits the realities and perspectives of African people and encourages "ownership by the people of reform and development programmes initiated by the state or government; [which further] entails participatory democracy, decentralisation of decision-making centres of power in both a political and economic sense" (Amuwo, 2002:1; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999:47). The proposal for a human-centred understanding of good governance, democracy, and development, according to African scholars ensures that people are placed at the centre of development and play a key role in not only driving development initiatives, but also directly benefiting from the economic and social gains and outcomes that are achieved as a result. In this respect, the African Good Governance Network (in Chigbu, 2010:10) suggests that the following criteria be considered when defining good governance for Africa:

- The power and influence of external change agents and outside resources on states and people;
- The removal of obnoxious cultural barriers to good governance (e.g. gender, woman and child rights) without demonising the cultural rubrics of African societies;
- The organic consolidation of existing effective and efficient governance systems towards good governance;
- Emphasis on the cultural and historical peculiarities of African states and peoples; and
- The need for more culturally sustainable institutional arrangements.

2.5. Conclusion

It is evident that stark contrasts exist in the meanings of governance and good governance. The literature further shows that a number of academics, researchers, and practitioners are wary of the conceptualisation of good governance in the development discourse as interpreted by international development and donor organisations. The advancement of neo-liberalism and democracy through the concept of good governance, which is propagated as having "universal developmental relevance for all cultures and societies in the modern world" and being "crucial for economic growth and development" by development and donor agencies, is largely rejected by mostly African scholarship (see Leftwich, 1993:603-605; Abrahamsen, 2000:25; Ayeni, 2000:3-4). Consequentially, the scholars who reject the generally accepted interpretations of good governance call for a re-conceptualisation of the concept. Understanding the multidimensional complexities associated with measuring and defining what constitutes ‘good’ in good governance, critics that oppose the generally accepted understanding of good governance argue for more localised and context-specific interpretations and measurements of the concept. Contending that the assumption that good governance can only be achieved by adopting democracy and liberalised economies, scholars advocate for alternative approaches to attaining good governance and development. In African scholarship, the importance for understanding good governance that takes cognisance of the African reality and is underpinned by human and social dimensions of development is seen as perhaps the ideal way of improving governance in African countries. The overall postulation is that adopting a human-centred perspective on good governance to emphasise the imperative of public participation in the development process will significantly improve state-societal relationships, which are cited as being a key impediment to achieving good governance and development in African nations.

Scholars such as Cubitt (2014:3-4) and Chigbu (2010:7) therefore strongly believe that a shift in perspectives on good governance that take into account the African reality would increase the chances of African nations being able to achieve the political, economic and social development championed by international development and donor agencies. Although a number of African scholars and policymakers agree with the notion of re-conceptualising good governance within a human-centred paradigm, others (see Khan, 2012:52; Kelsall, 2008:37; Hyden, 2006:228; Schatzberg, 2001:70) pessimistically conclude that good governance cannot take place in Africa due to the normalisation of a political culture that is rife with corruption, militarism, authoritarianism, clientelism, neo-patrimonialism, or tribalism. The presence of these political cultures, according to Khan (2012:52), deadlock the possibility of any efforts made to develop inclusive nations, which are able to control corruption and have the capacity to implement sustainable reforms and functioning democratic institutions.

The widespread concern and pessimism around the meaning of good governance and its practice in African countries is a fact that cannot be ignored in this study that seeks to evaluate the element of governance in West Africa. Therefore, in light of no clearer definitions and perceptions of the concept from an African perspective, the researcher will use the generally accepted definitions and interpretations of good governance keeping in mind the limitations of these accepted interpretations of the concept, especially within an African context. Additionally, the researcher when applying and evaluating the governance situation in West African countries, and more specifically Nigeria, will consider carefully the questions put forward by Ayeni (2000:7), who maintains that the answers to the governance situation in Africa are rooted in the answers to the following questions:

- Is the prevailing perspective of good governance, with its strong market orientation and liberal democratic values appropriate to the situation of Africa?
- Are there ways of making good governance reforms less painful and more beneficial for African people?
- What, in the end, is the idea of good governance that Africa desires? Whose decision is this? Whose responsibility is it to implement this?
- Can good governance be salvaged through a more close appreciation of its use outside of the role of the states?

CHAPTER THREE

DEVELOPMENT

3.1. Introduction

Synonymously used with industrialisation and economic growth, development has since the 1940s been characterised by notions of modernisation, increased productivity and change. The widespread tendency to associate development with positive change and growth, which results in improved quality of life and increased real per capita income of a country, suggests that development is largely concerned with the processes traditional or underdeveloped societies undergo to become modern and developed. This, in turn, means that development can be perceived as a linear process where economic growth results in modernity and the eradication of poverty and inequality in a society (Martinussen, 2004:56). Despite the various approaches to development, and primarily identifying the concept with economic growth and modernisation, the terrain of development remains “ill-defined and contested” (O’Brien and Williams, 2010:310).

This chapter therefore seeks to establish the meaning of development, before critically reviewing the three major development theories (Modernisation, Dependency and Neo-liberalism) that have influenced development thinking and practices. Thereafter, the chapter will examine alternative approaches to development to assess if they provide better solutions and processes to achieving development in the developing world.

3.2. Understanding development

From the 1940s, conceptions of development have been associated with goals of increasing the real per capita income of a country through the adoption of technical innovations and new means of organising production to ensure long-term economic growth, while simultaneously reducing poverty and inequality. Furthermore, for newly independent countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa, development was associated with the "obvious need to consolidate their independence, to convert newly won nominal political equality with the rich countries into an economic equality that would earn them the respect and sense of self-dignity they felt had been denied under colonialism" (Rapley, 2007:2). These conceptualisations of development from an economic perspective have further been advocated by a number of scholars and global financial institutions. Meier (1988, cited in Adah and Abasilim, 2015:276), for instance, maintains that development should be viewed "as:

> ... the capacity of a nation to increase its static economy to a level where it can generate and sustain an annual increase in its Gross National Product (GNP) [and] encompasses processes of modernisation, productivity, social and economic equalisation, modern technical know-how, improved institutions and rationally coordinated policy apparatus".

Similarly, Oghator and Okoobo (2000:203) state that development firstly refers to the increase in the per-capita income of a country. Secondly, it is concerned with the implementation of sustainable improvements in society through the provision of adequate social and economic infrastructure and employment (*ibid.*).

While a number of scholars perceive development from an economic standpoint that focuses on determining the extent of development by assessing the rate of economic growth, poverty, unemployment and inequality, other scholars have argued for a more human-centred understanding of development. Shifting away from economic understandings of development, Onah (2005:129) argues that development does not need to be presented as static, but rather as a continuous improvement in the capacity of an individual and society to control and manipulate circumstances and elements to ensure an increase in the standard of living for all. Adamolekun (2002:9) contends that development is primarily concerned with ensuring that the living conditions of a country's population are improved. According to Adamolekun (*ibid.*), a country can be considered developed if its population enjoys a higher quality of life, higher income, "better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a clean environment", equal opportunities, individual freedom and a rich cultural life. These understandings of development that emphasise the human aspect primarily indicate that development is concerned with more than economic growth; therefore, it should be understood as a multi-dimensional concept that must factor in the economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental structures and standards in its analyses.

The narrow definition of development as economic growth has been criticised for being over generalised and one-dimensional. In the next section, it will be identified further and be critiqued in relation to the three mainstream development theories.

3.3. Theories of Development

3.3.1. Modernisation Theory

Taking the development history of Europe under the Marshall Plan as its point of departure, modernisation theory is centred on the idea that "progress is a universal and inevitable process", which all societies must go through (Swanepoel, 1997:18). Thus, the modernisation theory focuses on the transition and transformation a traditional society has to undergo in order to become modern. Modernisation theorists argue that the level of progress made by a society can be determined by the degree of industrialisation that is found in the given society. They further maintain that during the course of modernising, societies can be distinguished as traditional, transitional or modernised, with all traditional societies becoming modernised at some point through the introduction of new forms of technology, techniques, organisations and social structures (Dube, 1988:29). Coetzee et al. (2007:31) state that the degree of modernity achieved by a society is shown when it displays certain characteristics. They include:

(i) The readiness to accommodate the process of transformation resulting from changes;

(ii) The continuous broadening of life experiences and receptiveness to new knowledge;
(iii) Continuous planning, calculability and readiness towards new experiences;
(iv) The predictability of action and the ability to exercise effective control;
(v) A high premium on technical skills and understanding of the principles of production;
(vi) Changing attitudes to kinship, family roles, family size, and the role of religion;
(vii) Changing consumer behaviour and the acceptance of social stratification (*ibid.*).

Thus, the modernisation theory is based in essence on the assumption that modern societies are more productive and provide people with a better standard of living. It maintains that it is necessary for all traditional societies to transform their political, social and economic structures in order to ensure development, modernity and advancement (Reyes, 2001:2-4). In this respect, the theory views all underdeveloped countries as traditional societies with no "inner dynamism", which need to be transformed into innovative and technologically advanced capitalist nations (Tucker, 1999:3). While some theorists of modernisation focus solely on the transformation of societies by economic means, that is, moving from non-profit-making subsistence economies to more competitive accumulative capitalist economies, others emphasise the need for political modernisation to accompany the economic advancements. Therefore, in practical terms, the "modernisation theory predicts that an increase in political representation will follow an increase in the level of socioeconomic development" (Cutright and Wiley, 1969:23).

Among the most prominent modernisation theorists is Walt Rostow, who postulated the five-stage model of development to trace the developmental transition of underdeveloped societies to developed ones (Rostow, 1960:1-4,12). According to Rostow (*ibid.*), for underdeveloped countries to reach the stage of modernity and become developed they would have to go through the following stages:

- Traditional society, which is associated with countries that are viewed as stagnant, unchanging, not growing, not progressing and lacking innovation. This society is characterised by what Kyere (2014:14) describes as "societies that have a pre-scientific understanding of gadgets". People in this society thus lack the knowledge of how to better their circumstances and their social structures, which are largely feudalistic in nature.

- Preconditions for change/take-off represent an economy that is in the process of changing its economic, political and social structures. This stage is characterised by a shift from feudal agrarian systems to more industrial systems, which are focused on opening up the market, engaging in local and international commercial activities, as well as building infrastructure and preparing for self-sustained growth and development.
- Rapid economic growth refers to the stage of rapid economic growth and the diffusion of Western technology to various sectors of the economy. There is an increase in industrialisation, further growth in savings and investments, as well as an increase in entrepreneurship.
- Drive to maturity is the fourth stage, which defines the point when growth becomes self-sustaining and the economy creates a niche for itself in the international economy. In this stage, the economy demonstrates that it has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to produce the goods that use to be imported.
- High mass consumption is the last stage of development and is characterised by an increase in per capita income, changes in the structure of the working force, and an increase in the desire to benefit from the consumption rewards of a mature economy.

Using the above model, modernisation theorists maintain that all developing countries (traditional societies) can be plotted on the linear development path and strategies implemented to ensure that they reach the next stage of development. In essence, the modernisation perspective suggests that all societies can evolve from a point of underdevelopment to modernity along a “reductionist continuum of economic and social change” (Swanepoel, 1997:19). While most of the adaptions under the modernisation theory resonate with the basic assumptions put forward by Rostow (1960:1-4), there are some theorists that have argued against the proposed stages of development. According to Gusfield (1967:351-362), the assumption that the traditional society needs to be overhauled is flawed. Instead, through engaging with modern societies and experiencing the modernising influences of others, traditional societies can be revitalised to create a dual or mixed economy that is both modern and traditional (*ibid.)*.

Although modernisation theorists may differ in terms of what type of economy a developed society should adopt as indicated above, they do agree that post-colonial countries are more likely to reach modernity with the help of developed countries. This idea thus presents modernisation as a process of change, which requires underdeveloped countries to accept a certain degree of foreign intervention to ensure development and modernity. Grounded on the idea that the modernisation of underdeveloped countries can be achieved with assistance, the Harrod-Domar growth model proposes that an initial impetus for growth comes from foreign aid. The model suggests that developed countries can provide the investment capital that will allow for the expansion and growth of underdeveloped countries, leading to a “virtuous cycle of growth” (McKay, 2004:52).

3.3.1.1. Effect of modernisation on Africa’s development

The planning and implementation of strategies towards Africa’s development was largely influenced by the variants of the modernisation theory until the mid-1960s. The influence of the modernisation theory was characterised by two trends. According to Nkrumah (1966:85), the first trend was in the form of investment, which predominantly was financed by private capital and used to enhance the “production of mineral, agricultural and forestry resources for American and European industries and economies”. The second trend related to the “establishment of large shiny, capital-intensive projects incorporating the latest in foreign technology and sited where everybody could see them – which meant in or near cities” (Pearson, 1992:22).

In terms of the first trend, Nkrumah (1966:84) observed that the increase in private investment was largely justified by African governments as an economic strategy that would assist in generating capital for developing the given country’s economy. The welcoming of private investment by African governments consequentially resulted in the increased misuse of primary products from Africa for export during the 1950s and early 1960s. According to Rodney (1972:183-184), exploitation “in agriculture involved the employment of cheap labour” and the purchasing “of land by capitalists at nominal prices”. Nkrumah (1966:85,233) cites that other forms of exploitation involving tax remissions and duty exemptions for investments and imported machinery respectively. In essence, it is argued that the adoption of notions of modernisation in African development strategies failed to provide African countries with the capital expected to develop their own economies. Instead, it resulted in a new scramble for Africa that focused on assuming a direct role in controlling a country’s natural source of wealth and, in that way, was poised to attain the goals accomplished by colonialism (see Ajei, 2007:35; Rodney, 1972:183-184; Nkrumah, 1966:84-86).

The modernisation theory has been subject to its fair share of criticism. For instance, the notion that underdeveloped and developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America can achieve development by following in the footsteps of affluent developed ones has been severely critiqued. Ajei (2007:37) argues that this notion is substantially flawed, as it does not take into account the "racist superiority complex that relegated [the people of poor countries] to the Third World". Importantly, it is argued that underdeveloped countries cannot follow the development path of the West because much of its development was underlined and achieved on the foundations of colonialism, imperialism and exploitation, which cannot be replicated to ensure the development of non-Western countries.

According to Watila (2013:3), the modernisation theory is also criticised for assuming a top-down approach to development. The basic argument made here is that the theory emphasises the need to concentrate on developing metropolitan centres that will result in a 'trickling down effect' to the outlying areas (*ibid.*). Taking the notion of spatial modernisation from geography, theorists of modernisation argue that the development and modernisation of central areas will eventually result in the gradual expansion of modernity to areas in the periphery, thereby leading to the modernisation of all (McKay, 2004:52). This idea that development can begin at the top and descend until all sectors of society are developed erroneously presents the theory as a dichotomous movement, which in turn creates a dependency syndrome with weaker and poorer areas relying on aid and "exogenous development policies", which often are unsuitable for the societies they are applied to (Swanepoel, 1997:18). Närman (1999:151) argues that although this idea of modernisation having a 'trickle-down effect' is "grossly exaggerated", it seems to be widely used as adequate justification for politicians to adopt the modernisation paradigm. This argument by Närman (1999:151) draws one's attention to the fact that the top-down approach assumed by modernisation theorists more often than not results in the exclusion of some people thereby allowing for the manifestation and legitimisation of inequality. Similarly, Mydral (1968 cited in McKay, 2004:53) argues this claim that the achievement of modernity in society has contradictory results. While modernity brings with it positive outcomes such as technical innovations and economic growth, it consequentially results in the heightening of inequality and exploitation in societies (*ibid.*).

Additionally, the modernisation theory is criticised for oversimplifying social change. Coetzee et al. (2007:101) argue that the assumptions made by the modernisation theory are weakened by its failure to acknowledge that human nature has a propensity to resist change. This agency of individuals to resist change subsequently weakens the assumption made by modernisation theorists that social change happens linearly with no resistance from members of society. More so, Matunhu (2011:67) maintains that the assumptions of the modernisation theory are designed to perpetually impoverish underdeveloped countries because they fail to recognise the creativity and initiative of the people in underdeveloped countries. It is asserted that the deterministic reasoning, which suggests that strategies for change and modernity can only be developed by external forces, demonstrates a perpetuation of Western supremacy while simultaneously discarding the agency of Third World individuals and any endogenous development pathways established by underdeveloped countries. The contradictions between Western theories of development, politics, and the realities of development and politics in Third World countries clearly underline the fact that there is a need to deconstruct the idea that the adoption of exogenously established development strategies will result in the modernisation and development of non-Western countries. The open resistance of people in underdeveloped countries to Western conceptions of development and the failure of modernisation perspectives to expound on the realities of underdeveloped countries further emphasises the need for modernisation theorists to acknowledge that alternative cultures and norms cannot be demonised as being backward, but should instead be seen as an integral part to achieving development (Gyekye, 1997:252).

3.3.2. Dependency Theory

Originating in Latin America in the 1960s, the dependency theory is founded on the notion that some countries experience development because they exploit the natural and human resources of smaller countries to boost their economy. Seen as an alternative to the modernisation theory, the dependency theory argues that modernisation perspectives are misleading in that they fail to articulate the true relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped world (Frank, 1966:4). Therefore, the theory purports that the expansion of market forces in societies ultimately results in greater inequality and exploitation between manufacturing economies, which Prebisch (1984:175) called the core and the primary commodity producers, or periphery countries, within the international economy. This unequal relationship between core and peripheral countries inevitably keeps countries on the periphery compelled to provide developed countries with natural and human resources at a relatively cheap price in exchange for foreign capital and loans (Enoh, 2009 cited in Adah and Abasilim, 2015:278). This unequal relationship subsequently results in countries on the periphery becoming perpetually dependent on those at the core. Unlike the modernisation theory, which envisioned the creation of an economy that is self-reliant, dependency theorists argue that economic and trade policies between the core and the periphery work to weaken the economies of peripheral countries and ultimately result in their systematic underdevelopment (Harris, 2014:17). Dependency theorists therefore, critique the claims made by modernisation theorists that “the past and the present of the so-called ‘underdeveloped countries’ [were similar to the] earlier stages in the history of the now developed countries” (Harris, 2014:18). They argue that this assumption by the modernisation theory was fundamentally flawed, as the “contemporary underdevelopment [of peripheral countries was largely] the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped (dependent) [countries] and the now developed metropolitan countries” (Frank: 1966:3). Accordingly, dependency theorists such as Frank (1966:16-17) prescribe that the only way for underdeveloped countries to achieve development would be to disengage from the international system, which perpetuates their underdevelopment, and pursue their own path to development.

3.3.2.1. Influence of Dependency Theory on African Development

It is said that the doctrines of African Socialism and its development strategies proposed by Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Ben Bella and Kenneth Kaunda are substantially associated with the assumptions and perspectives of the dependency theory. Thus, in order to illustrate the influence that dependency theory has had on African development, a brief discussion of how African humanists subscribed to some of the theory’s assertions is presented.

The rejection of the capitalist systems of modernity in favour of a development agenda that prioritises human dignity and humanism illustrates support for the prescription made by Frank (1966:16-17) that underdeveloped countries are better off endeavouring to achieve development using their own culturally specific initiatives and paths. The advocation for development based on principles of respect for human dignity and equality, equitability in resource sharing and working without exploitation by all in an economy agriculturally oriented, as stated in the Arusha Declaration, illustrated an attempt by Africans to develop their societies on traditional values on the periphery of the international economy. The Arusha Declaration, which focused on creating a self-reliant development process that de-emphasises industrially oriented development and centres on the ujamaa concept, champions notions of cooperation and common good instead of practices of competition and exploitation as advocated by Western systems, further exemplifies the attempts made by Africans to distance their development processes from the economistic practices of the international systems which would result in a relationship of dependency (Ajei, 2007:38).

Although the assertions made by the dependency theory gained much traction in the developing world, some critics argued that the assumptions and arguments made within the theory were inconsistent. For instance, Cardoso and Faletto (1979:13-24) questioned the assumption that the dependency of countries on the periphery hindered their development. Cardoso (2009:298) maintained that underdeveloped countries had the “agency within the global political economy” to adopt different forms of integration into the world market and alternative strategies for economic growth even within situations that seemed to suggest a relationship of dependency. This notion of associated dependent development, which Cardoso (1972:83-95) saw as a dynamic process conditioned by the particular configuration of class and state, was further developed by Wolpe (1980:1-6) and became known as the articulation of modes of production approach. Through this approach, Wolpe (1980:6) asserted that the integration of underdeveloped countries into the world market did not necessarily always result in capitalist commodity relations, but instead, also created non-capitalist social relations which, could be used to generate capital. Similarly, Reyes (2001:7) argued that associations with developed countries did not necessarily have to be seen as detrimental to underdeveloped countries, as these ‘relationships’ could be used to the benefit of underdeveloped countries. Thus, it was suggested that underdeveloped countries could use the associations they had with developed countries as a means to gain knowledge and increase their capacity to break the vicious cycle of underdevelopment (Reyes, 2001:7).

While some critics argued that dependency theorists were wrong for assuming that dependency inevitably led to underdevelopment, others argued the theory committed a faulty induction by assuming that development is equivalent to economic development. In this respect, the dependency theory is critiqued for analysing the relationship between the core and periphery in solely economic terms. Ajei (2007:43) states that using the centre-periphery contrast to analyse the composition of economic association between underdeveloped and developed societies, highlights the economistic inclination of the dependency theory. By virtue of analysing the world based on the economic relationship between the developed and underdeveloped world, dependency theorists in essence depict development as merely an economic concept, which is incorrect.

3.3.3. Neoliberal Theory

The neoliberal theory replaced the modernisation and dependency theories of development in the 1980s. Founded in a time when the development theory was shifting away from the notion that emphasised the need for state intervention, the neoliberal theory argued for minimising the role of the state and promoted the free-market capitalist system as the most viable way to ensure economic efficiency, growth and development. Neoliberal theorists therefore suggested that economic policies and institutions that were primarily controlled by governments restricted the freedom of dynamic individuals, which in turn hindered progress towards development (Ajei, 2007:49-50). Thus, it was maintained that in order for developing countries to achieve complete development, obstacles that hindered the advancement to free market capitalism such as strict government control of economic policies would have to be removed to allow capitalism to generate development. The theory further advocated for the reduction of the role of the state and government through the deregulation and privatisation of state assets, the reduction of "government planning and regulation of the economy, abolition of tariff regimes", and the restriction of government spending on social services (Stallings, 1995:12). In essence, the neoliberal theory asserted that the economic difficulties and underdevelopment of the developing world was a direct result of "inappropriate state dominated policies", which restricted economic growth (World Bank, 1981:1). In this respect, neoliberal theorists insisted that if countries controlled their inflation and limited their debt through balancing their budgets, pursued free trade with other countries by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and reducing the role of the state (Peck and Tickell, 2002:380-381), they could achieve economic growth and development.

3.3.3.1. Effect of strategies and practices of Neoliberal Theory on Africa's development

The influence of the neoliberal theory on African development can primarily be seen through the discussion and analysis of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) devised by the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) programme of the African Union.

3.3.3.1.1. Structural Adjustment Programmes

SAPs are believed to have been designed as a "remedy for Africa's ailing economies" (Ake, 2001:24). Widely influenced by neoliberal understandings for development, SAPs emerged as an economic strategy that prescribed open free market economies, a reduction in state spending, privatisation, the removal of trade barriers, and the reduction of the role of the state. In order to achieve these prescriptions and subsequently development, the World Bank through SAPs promoted currency devaluations against the dollar; the removal of import and export restrictions; the reduction of government spending on social services to balance the national budget; the removal of price controls and state subsidies; and a "focus on the production and export of primary commodities" (Preston, 1997:259). The adoption of SAPs by African countries which "in practice required a strong, determined and a relatively autonomous state, whether democratic or not" were substantially and vehemently rejected by African people as the SAPs seemed to aggravate their plight and encouraged corruption, exploitation and the rise of repressive regimes, rather than democracy and economic growth (Nelson, 1990:9; UNECA, 1988:21).

3.3.3.1.2. Poverty Reduction Strategies

The PRSs initiated by the international financial institutions in 1999, illustrate another neoliberalist initiative that was used to influence the development plans and practices in Africa. The prescribed the "macroeconomic, structural and social policies" and programmes that a country would have to "pursue over several years to promote broad-based economic growth and reduce poverty", while also indicating the "external financing needs" of the country (Ajei, 2007:64). The implementation of the PRSs by African governments further crippled their economies and had little impact on the progress towards poverty reduction and development as most governments opted to present proposals for programmes they knew would be accepted by the IMF and World Bank, even if they were in conflict with national interests and would negatively affect the poor. Through the PRSs and the SAPs, it is evident that policy prescriptions founded on the central tenets of the neoliberal development theory had little to no positive impact on the development practices in Africa. Nyamugasira and Rowden (2002:4) state that these policy prescriptions administered by the international financial institutions, in fact, derailed the countries' ability to achieve the primary objectives of poverty alleviation and economic growth.

3.3.3.1.3. New Partnership for African Development

Seen as the "new messiah to lead Africa to the promised land of political and socioeconomic development", the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was developed as the main development agenda for Africa (Phago, 2013:693). Recognising that Africa's "malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world was the result of centuries of unequal relations between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries", African leaders through NEPAD called for African countries to adopt more African-owned and African-led development programmes (UNION, 2001:1). The NEPAD document proposed that for African countries to join the developed parts of the world, they would have to "achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of above 7% per annum for the next 15 years", also thereby ensuring that the continent achieved the Millennium Development Goals (UNION, 2001:68).

While NEPAD presented itself as a localised initiative, critics condemned the document for its economistic and neoliberal overtures. NEPAD's neoliberal orientation, which "included its endorsement of opening up African economies to external investors and securing the property rights of foreign capital", as well as its proposal of strategies that were fundamentally focused on achieving economic growth outcomes, greatly undermined "its ability to address local needs and therefore secure local ownership and support" (Ajei, 2007:69, Lehulere, 2003:1).

Apart from being criticised for adopting neoliberal strategies and proposals that had repeatedly failed in the African context, NEPAD was also criticised for disregarding the importance African culture and tradition should play in the establishment and implementation of development strategies on the continent. The failure of the NEPAD document to recognise and acknowledge the role of culture and tradition as more than "a means to [consolidate] the pride of Africans in their own humanity and [confirm] the common humanity of the peoples of the world" in the development process indicated that the initiative had failed to acknowledge the importance of cultural appropriateness in the development process (UNION, 2001:9-11). The development agenda proposed by NEPAD was further criticised for its failure to acknowledge in practice and theory the importance of involving ordinary Africans in the development agenda planning process. The failure of African leaders to establish a development agenda that recognised the agency of their populations and the role of culture raised questions regarding the leaders' perceptions and understandings of what an African-led and African-owned development programme meant. Ajei (2007:69) states that the assertion and adoption of the philosophy, aims and processes of globalisation in a localised development agenda, which was supposedly "committed to the self-reliance and sustained upliftment of Africa", perplexed many African scholars and citizens.

Generally, the primary criticism made against the neoliberal perspective is related to the preoccupation the theory has with economic growth and the creation of an autonomous market. Ramose (2002:114-115) argues that the failure of the neoliberal development theory to recognise the key role of the individual in the achievement of any development agenda seems both unethical and irrational. According to Mkhwanazi and Ramose (2005:173), the neoliberal perspectives' exclusion of the human element is illogical as "there is no need for humanity to imagine itself the humble foot-servant of an autonomous economic system…humans make economies, so they can also change them"; therefore, they should be incorporated and involved in the strategies implemented to achieve economic growth and development. Additionally, it is argued that the reverence of market forces and economic growth at all cost advocated by neoliberal theorists is incompatible with the African context. In this respect, Ajei (2007:73) states that with poverty being a prime concern in Africa, poverty eradication must be the leading concern of any and all development perspectives on the continent, rather than market and economic growth.

In essence, these critiques of neoliberal development perspectives, as well as the failure of other mainstream development theories, highlight two key facts about development practices and plans in peripheral countries. Firstly, it is evident that in order to achieve sustainable development in peripheral countries, a multidimensional understanding of development, which takes into account the importance of culture and humanism, needs to be adopted. Secondly, development agendas adopted in these countries need to not only be structured to address the elements that contribute to the perpetuation of poverty in their societies but also strive to ensure that ordinary citizens participate in identifying, planning and implementing solutions to address these problems. For underdeveloped countries to achieve development, economic growth and the reduction of poverty, development strategies that are participative, culturally appropriate, and human-centred need to be devised and implemented. The inability of Third World countries, like those in Africa, to achieve development under mainstream development theories has little to do with these countries being ungovernable or unable to advance, but has much to do with the reality that the conventional development theories implemented in the African context have been too abstract, mechanistic and economistic (Matunhu, 2011:65; Niyonkuru, 2016:1). It is therefore proposed that development strategies that take into account the importance of the human, historical, social, ethical, cultural, and political dimensions must be devised to ensure the economic growth and holistic development of African societies. Thus, it is paramount to assess what alternatives approaches are available to ensure that African countries achieve development.

3.4. Alternative approaches to development

New dimensions and approaches to development began to emerge in the development discourse from the 1980s. The failure of mainstream development theories to provide significant approaches to achieving desirable economic and social development resulted in the rise of alternative approaches and theories. These approaches and theories argued that while achieving economic growth was important, it was inevitably not an end in itself, but rather a means, which only when coupled with improvements in social and political aspects of society would result in development and a holistic improvement in human welfare. According to Martinussen (2004:56), these alternative approaches can be divided into two different approaches. On the one hand, there are the approaches that redefine the goals of development and search for new methods and ways to measure the progress and extent to which these goals have been or are being achieved. These approaches advocate development strategies are concerned with creating an environment that increases the capabilities and welfare of humans (see Sen, 1999:xii,295; Ul Haq, 1995:1). The other approaches begin by rejecting mainstream theories and instead argue in favour of civil society and local communities playing a leading role in creating human welfare and societal development. According to Bjork (2009:27), these approaches, known as "Theories of Civil Society", maintain that development processes should begin locally at grass-roots level with the support and cooperation of the state.

3.4.1. Human Development

Human development is one such alternative approach that is "to some extent built upon mainstream development theory because it does not reject all of it but merely redefines the development goals" (Gudbjerg, 2008:15). Although the human development approach acknowledges the importance of economic growth, it argues that human welfare is in fact the end of development and that economic growth is only but a means to achieving this end. Thus, human development is essentially an approach that is focused on the creation and implementation of development strategies that are people-centred. Emerging with the publication of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDPs) first Human Development Report (HDR) in 1990, human development, according to the report, is defined "as a process of enlarging people's choices" (UNDP, 1990:8-9). The Report suggests that the goal of development is to create the necessary conditions for people in society to make choices, and proceeds to define these choices as opportunities to "lead a long and healthy life", "acquire knowledge" through quality education, and have access to the resources needed to create and maintain a decent standard of living (UNDP, 1990:9).

Ul Haq (1995:14) similarly argues that development is essentially a mechanism that is meant to assist in creating an environment that enables people to have a wide range of choices and possibilities. Ul Haq (*ibid.*) further maintains that while economic growth expands people's choice of income, achieving human development is more beneficial as it focuses on expanding all human choices. Correspondingly, Sen (1989:42) states that there is more to development than economic growth, arguing that development should be understood as a concept that is focused on obtaining human freedom. According to Sen (1989:48), development is concerned with creating an enabling environment that provides people with different political, social, and economic freedoms and opportunities to help advance the capabilities of a person. Essentially, Alkire (2010:23) states, the human development approach comprehensively "make explicit the objectives that many economists, political leaders, citizens, and activists have acknowledged in different ways across time". These objectives are:

- "Well-being: A focus on expanding people's real freedoms, enabling people to flourish;
- Agency: Supporting people and groups as actors and helping them to help themselves; and
- Justice: Seeking to expand well-being and agency in ways that expand equity, sustain outcomes across time, respect human rights, limit environmental destruction and respect other goals of a society" (*ibid.*).

Alkire (2010:24) further argues that human development "aims to expand people's freedoms – the worthwhile capabilities they value – and to empower people to engage actively in development processes".

3.4.1.1. Measuring development in the human development paradigm

In order to determine and measure the extent to which human development exists in a society, scholars have devised a range of components and indicators that they argue are essential to measuring the level of socio-economic development in a country. Although Ul Haq (1995:17-20) suggests that equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment are the four key variables that must be measured to assess the level of human development, the UNDP under the Human Development Index (HDI) state that longevity, education, and access to the resources are key components to measuring development.

Since the 1990s, the HDI has been widely used to rank the level of human development in countries. Designed as a composite index of four indicators, the components of the HDI reflect three key dimensions of human development, namely, longevity, knowledge and access to resources. Derived from the notion of human capabilities, as proposed by Sen (1984:496-498), the UNDP contended that these three dimensions represented three of the essential choices “for people to lead a long and healthy life, acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living” (UNDP, 1990:10-12). Although it has been argued that the dimensions used by the HDI to measure development are limited, as other dimensions such as law and order, human security and freedom could equally be regarded as essential to enlarging people’s choices and enhancing their capabilities, it is maintained that the HDI dimensions are the very basic ones that need to be present in order for other dimensions such as political freedom and self-respect to exist (Gallardo, 2009:3). Thus, with the core dimensions of human development defined, the HDI seeks to measure human development using the following indicators: life expectancy at birth, as a proxy measure of a population’s health and longevity; adult literacy rate and combined gross enrolment ratio, as a measure of knowledge and education; and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity as a measure of a decent standard of living.

Although the HDI has widely been favoured and used as a composite for measuring human development, many critics argue that the Index is limited in its scope and is unable to measure the welfare of a population adequately. According to Gallardo (2009:12), the ever-evolving nature of society as well as the “diversity of cultural richness around the world [makes finding an indicator or set of indicators] that can suit all [realities] and allow for comparisons among countries over time” complex. It is therefore argued that the indicators used to measure human development in the HDI are not wholly reliable, as they present generalised dimensions, which may not adequately reflect the dimensions and indicators that may enrich or affect different populations. Therefore, Gallardo (2009:12) maintains that the indicators used “have to be reliable not only by passing the statistical and mathematical tests but also have to be embraced by the individuals, as a legitimate instrument that reflects, as best as possible, what enriches and affects their lives”. Furthermore, the ability of the HDI to offer a comparative analysis of human welfare and development between countries has been criticised. Kelley (1991:315-324) argues that by attaching equal weight to its components, the HDI consequentially produces the same ranking results as some of its components. This similarity between ranking results thus offers “few additional insights into inter-country development levels and, as such, can be viewed as redundant” (McGillivary, 1991:1462).

While some scholars (see Ul Haq, 1995:14-20) argue that the HDI is pragmatically useful and serves as a motivator that can be used to influence social and economic policy decisions, others have questioned its usefulness. In this regard, it is argued that the HDI is not a comprehensive measure because it does not include important aspects of human development such as the ability to participate in decision-making (UNDP, 2004:128). There is no denying that the imperfections and shortcomings of the HDI raise many questions regarding its ability to measure human development effectively and fairly in and among different countries. However, the HDI is currently the most used method of measuring human development.

Although human development in development theory is presented as an alternative approach to mainstream theories, it also provides the basis upon which many other alternative approaches have been established. The Sustainable Development, Millennium Development Goals and People-Management Development, amongst others, are therefore seen as inextricably linked with the human development approach. Hence, these alternative approaches will be critically discussed in order to outline their basic assertions, as well as some of the criticism levelled against them.

3.4.2. Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) arose from the Millennium Declaration, which was adopted in September 2000. Seen as a concerted political and social effort, the MDGs are aimed at eradicating poverty, promoting human dignity and achieving peace, democracy, and environmental sustainability in an international context. Consisting of eight time-bound goals, 18 quantifiable targets and 48 indicators, the MDGs are geared towards advancing development and reducing poverty. The eight goals outlined by the UN are eradicating of extreme poverty and hunger; “achieving universal primary education”; promoting of women empowerment and gender equality; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; “ensuring environmental sustainability”; and developing a universal partnership for development (UN, 2000:1-2).

Although each goal is considered important, the eighth goal, relating to the development of a global partnership for development, is seen as the fundamental one upon which all the other goals depend. For this goal to be reached, seven targets have to be met. These targets include:

(i) Developing “an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system”;
(ii) Addressing the particular requirement of under-developed countries, which would include excise and “quota free access for least developed countries’ exports, enhanced debt relief” programmes and official bilateral debt cancellation;

(iii) Addressing the "needs of landlocked countries" and developing "small island states";
(iv) Addressing the debt of developing countries "through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term";
(v) Developing and implementing "strategies for decent and productive work for youth in cooperation with developing countries";
(vi) Providing "access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies"; and
(vii) Making available "new technologies" in "information and communications to developing countries in cooperation with the private sector" (UN, 2000:2).

The goals and targets set out by the MDGs, with specific reference to the eighth goal regarding development, while suggesting a new approach to development that is predicated on the notions of partnership and cooperation, on closer analysis are criticised for still being neoliberally orientated.

The assumption that such a global partnership can be achieved in the prevailing global economic system, which is largely unequal, indicates that the goals and targets of the MDGs are largely embedded in the notion that free-market economics is the most viable path to development. Additionally, while the declaration boasts partnership and cooperation between international agencies, developing and developed countries, the targets proposed suggest strategies that are still largely interventionist and top-down in approach, with developing countries being given little mandate to negotiate and participate in the development efforts. Ajei (2007:96) raises the same point, arguing that the partnership sought by the eighth MDGs creates "the supposition that a partnership could be built that would rectify the existing abusive and unequal relations between the West and Africa", when in fact international institutions such as the World Bank and developed countries have "no intentions of forging development-friendly partnerships with Africa". These claims, in turn, suggest that although at face value the MDGs advocate for a human-centred approach towards alleviating poverty and advancing development, the strategies proposed to achieving its goals fail to reflect alternative methods towards doing so.

3.4.3. Sustainable Development

Emerging from the 1987 Brundtland Report, sustainable development advocates the notion "that fulfilling human needs and aspirations for a better life is the most important goal of development and that poor people have a justified right in having these needs and aspirations fulfilled" (UN, 1987:1). Characterised with objectives that are based on the concept of sustainability, the sustainable development approach emphasises the importance of creating development strategies that "meet the needs of the present without endangering the opportunities of future generations to meet their own needs" (UN, 1987:24). Harris (2000:5-6), however, states that since its conception, sustainable development has become recognised in different ways:

- Economically, with an economically sustainable system being understood as one that is able "to produce goods and services on a continuing basis, to maintain manageable levels of government and external debt, and to avoid sectoral imbalances which damage agricultural or industrial production";
- Environmentally, whereby "an environmentally sustainable system" is seen as one that "must maintain a stable resource base, avoiding over-exploitation of renewable resources systems or environmental sink functions, and depleting non-renewable resources" and is concerned with maintaining "biodiversity, atmospheric stability and other ecosystem functions not ordinarily classed as economic resources"; and
- Socially, where "a socially sustainable system" is understood as one that "must achieve distributional equity, adequate provision of social services including health and education, gender equity and political accountability and participation".

In essence, the different understandings of what a sustainable system means in economic, social, and environmental terms illustrate the multidimensional and complex objectives of the sustainable development approach. Despite sustainability and sustainable development being understood differently within the economic, environmental, and social realm, Emas (2015:2) states that the overall goal of sustainable development is "the long-term stability of the economy and environment, [which] is only achievable through the integration and acknowledgment of economic, environmental and social concerns".

While the sustainable development approach theoretically advocates for the establishment and implementation of development strategies that are characterised by the concept of sustainability, a key question that arises is how the approach is translated into practical policies and criteria. The Implementation Plan, created after the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, provides a clear picture of the practical implementation of the sustainable approach. Firstly, the Plan calls for underdeveloped countries to open up their markets and participate in globalisation, which is defined as "the rapid integration of markets, mobility of capital, and significant increases in investment flows around the world" in order to ensure that economic and social development, as well as environmental protection is achieved (UN, 2002:3). Additionally, the Plan highlights poverty as a key challenge hindering the achievement of sustainable development in the world. Therefore, a number of development strategies are presented to address this issue. These strategies include:

- “Establishing a world solidarity fund to eradicate poverty and promote social and human development in the developing countries;
- Developing national programmes for sustainable development and local and community development to promote the empowerment of people living in poverty” and their organisations;
- “Promoting women’s equal access to and full participation in decision-making at all levels, mainstreaming gender perspectives in all policies and strategies”;
- “Eliminating all forms of violence and discrimination against women”; and
- Developing policies, ways and methods of improving access to “indigenous people and their communities to economic activities and increase their employment through, where appropriate, measures such as training, technical assistance and credit facilities” (UN, 2002:3).

As with the criticism put forward against the MDGs, critics argue that the importance of globalisation for sustainable development renders the approach unsuitable for creating sustainable development in Africa. Ajei (2007:101) argues that the adoption and advocation for globalisation as part of the development strategy of sustainable development portrays the approach as yet another way the West can advance their neoliberal philosophies and practices in non-Western underdeveloped countries. The Implementation Plan proposed during the World Summit on Sustainable Development is further criticised for failing to provide any new insight into how development can be achieved and poverty be eradicated, as most of its proposed plans and strategies mirror the goals and targets set out in the MDGs.

3.4.4. Participatory Development

Rejecting the human-centred approaches, which seek to redefine development within the framework of mainstream assumptions, other scholars have advocated for an understanding of human-centred development that completely rejects the philosophies of previous development theories and argue for more bottom-up participatory development. Highlighting the significance of the participation of people in pursuing positive outcomes of development processes, proponents of people-centred development approaches maintain that self-reliance is the main aim of development (Gran, 1983 in Ajei, 2007:82). Thus, identifying civil society as the main drivers of development, these approaches seek to enhance people's choices by emphasising the essential variable to self-determination as participatory rights, considered both a necessity and as an aim of development (Martinussen, 1997:332). The approach asserts "Government would not use resources on mass welfare unless the poor, who are in the majority, are sufficiently powerful to force such a policy on the government" (Ajei, 2007:83). In essence, participatory approaches advocate for a development agenda that is led by people at the grass-roots level, as only they know their dire needs, what needs require immediate attention, and to which degree. This approach therefore rejects the practice of external authorities and organisations, such as national governments, the international financial institutions or multilateral donor organisations and agencies, planning, implementing, and managing the development processes of any community. Promoting the idea that material, social, political, and cultural satisfaction is ultimately what furthers one's development, these approaches favour the practice of communities adopting the mandate to set and drive the development agenda for themselves. A key approach grounded in these assumptions is the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) approach, which has become a widely used development strategy in many countries since the nineties.

3.4.4.1. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)

The PRA began to evolve from the late 1980s. In Chambers' (2014:82-84) view, it is a development approach focused on drawing on the rich insights of the knowledge of rural people, and learning from these as a way of a bottom-up approach to development. It is an approach that emphasises people's active role in pursuing development agendas that are tailored to their needs and values the voice of the people in a community. The approach thus seeks to address the needs of a community using development plans that are agreed upon by all community members and undertaken in a cooperative manner (Thomas-Slayter, 2009:370-374). Evidently, the approach differs from the prevalent development practices pursued by donor and aid agencies, which leaves the responsibility of determining how communities need to be assisted and which areas need to be improved to facilitate development, to donor and aid workers and researchers. Since the notion of participatory development gained traction, the PRA approach has been widely used by governments, multinationals, donor and aid organisations and development agencies because of its methods that "enable and empower people to share, analyse and enhance their knowledge of life and conditions, and to plan, monitor, evaluate and reflect" on their situation

(Chambers, 2004:3). In other words, “Participation thus involves a shift in power over the process of development away from those who have traditionally defined the nature of the problem and how it may be addressed (governments, outside donors) to the people immediately impacted by the issue” (Duraiappah et al., 2005:5). A typical illustrative example is captured by Sanginga et al. (2004:934), being an approach termed “Enabling Rural Innovation”, which provides rural East African farmers in their communities with the opportunity to identify, prioritise, and implement development activities specific to their needs while ensuring the optimal use of existing resources.

While the approach has gained widespread popularity over the years, critics maintain that the assumptions made by the approach are weak and leave communities vulnerable to being marginalised in the development process. Mosse (1995:569-571; 2001:16-35), Moya Garcia and Way (2003:15), for instance, criticised the approach in relation to authority and knowledge, arguing that the approach is flawed in assuming that communities have the knowledge, resources and skills to adequately engage in development processes. According to Mosse (1995:573-578), it is critical to question whether PRA in practice addresses the problem of the limits of local knowledge and awareness, and the need for new skills for community analysis of problems and for planning. Moya Garcia and Way (2003:15) state that in cases where a community does not have the necessary skills, knowledge and resources to actively participate in development practices, participation can easily become “a pretext for manipulating and imposing exogenous ideas and projects”. In addition to highlighting how a lack in knowledge and resources limits the role that community members can play in the development process, the approach is further criticised for assuming that there is an equal distribution of power and consensus within communities. In this respect, critics argue that marginalisation and discrimination within communities has a substantial impact on the development agendas that are undertaken within communities.

The shortcomings of mainstream development theories and alternative approaches have widely influenced non-Western scholarship to develop alternative development frameworks and strategies. In the African context, scholarship attempted to develop alternative perspectives that counter the reductionist and economically-biased development approaches of both the West, as shown through SAPs, and African leaders, as seen under NEPAD. By contrast, African scholarship endeavoured to create a development framework that was based on community, peace, participation and the fundamental notion of beingness.

3.5. African-based Alternatives to Development

In the previous chapter, it was stated that in matters relating to governance and development, African scholarship advocates for a human-centred understanding and implementation of these concepts. This human-centred approach campaigned for by African scholarship thus can be said to articulate many features of the human development point of view, as both emphasise the central position of individuals' participation and the advantages of benefiting from the formulation and implementation of development strategies. But, if human development is a mere renovation of Eurocentric paradigms that function with a top-down approach but with a redefined goal, where people are seen as the primary wealth of a nation, how does the human development perspective of African scholarship differ, if at all? The analysis of development strategies pursued under the SAPs and NEPAD has shown that development models implemented in the post-colonial era in Africa have been fundamentally flawed, largely because none of these models take into the context the historical, political, cultural and social idiosyncrasies of the African state and its people. Thus, it is argued that an African development paradigm founded on the compassion for people and life as a reciprocal aid can progress Africa's development efforts.

While literature on alternative approaches to development is centred on mostly Eurocentric models, African scholarship following the failure of SAPs endeavoured to create an alternative development framework. Maserumule (2011:305) argues that it is upon this alternative framework proposed by African scholarship that the World Bank borrowed "elements such as good governance, poverty conscious and people-centred, and used them as a basis to disarm critics and defend their continued role in Africa". Following a meeting of African ministers of finance in 1989, the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs), philosophically founded on the human-centred development paradigm, was adopted as an African attempt to address the root causes of underdevelopment on the continent (see Keet, 2002:14-15; Ake, 2001:38). According to Ake (*ibid.*), the Alternative Framework placed the origins of Africa's underdevelopment and economic structural deformities in the colonial period, and sought to find solutions to Africa's problems by developing "a long-term agenda from a comprehensive perspective", rather than accept the short-term agendas proposed by international agencies that assumed Africa's difficulties could be corrected by monetarism.

The AAF-SAPs was grounded on the notion that human and social dimensions were key variables that needed to be acknowledged and taken into account when conceptualising development. The framework, according to Maserumule (2011:308) focused on “the transcendence effect of full democratisation of all aspects of economic and social activities” in order to ensure the quality of life of the citizens is enhanced and emphasised. The framework differed from the neoliberal, economically-focused development agenda of the World Bank in that:

- Firstly, it adopted a human-centred approach and “distanced itself completely from the orthodox mechanistic models or approaches that [had] reduced the entire business of adjustment to the attainment of a few balances…without any regard to the implications of the social sectors and the overall welfare of the people”(Maserumule, 2011:308);
- It had “a comprehensive approach to socioeconomic change to the extent that it” situated “change in a broader context of social, political, cultural and economic values and institutions”;
- It was responsive to particularity to the degree that it proposed an agenda applicable to Africa; and
- Lastly, its strategies derived “their validity and legitimacy from the very structural nature of the African political economy” (Adedeji, 1990:28).

The failure of this alternative framework to gain ground and be adopted in African countries despite its African-centredness raises a number of questions. Ajei (2007:103) questions whether the failure of African leaders to adopt the framework in spite of it reflecting a sound African-led and African-owned approach to development can be attributed to a problem with African leaders realising what is right, yet they lack the desire to promote and achieve such goals. While the answers and reasons as to why the framework has not been adopted remain unanswered, the failure to adopt it begs the question of what alternatives are available to address issues of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. If Western-based development approaches have failed to produce any significant and lasting outcomes, and African-centred paradigms cannot emerge as credible alternative strategies, how then can the issues of underdevelopment and poverty be addressed on the continent?

3.6. Conclusion

Development in society is not a new concept; however, the social changes that have occurred over the years have definitely had a major impact on the notion. The rejection of linear and narrow understandings of development, which equated development with economic growth, for more multidimensional understandings of the concept, has resulted in the proliferation of alternative approaches that are primarily founded on notions of participation, humanism and sustainability. An analysis of development history shows that alternative human-centred paradigms to development have within a relatively short time become the prevailing approaches used to evaluate, understand and measure poverty, and assess how development can be facilitated in underdeveloped nations. Although these alternative approaches, while underpinned by interdisciplinary capabilities frameworks differ significantly from the mainstream perspectives of development, they do not provide any innovative or fundamental alternatives to contend with the Western understanding of development. The failure of these alternative development approaches to criticise the principles of mainstream theories, especially on how economic development is achieved, has enabled the concept of development to continuously be characterised by neoliberalist philosophies and underpinnings. For instance, the promotion of globalisation by the MDGs and the sustainable development approach has been widely criticised because globalisation is "part of the most recent mutation of the capitalist ideology resurgent after the collapse of the Soviet Union", which in the African context is being used to brutally exploit natural resources from the continent and consolidate "a chronic dependency syndrome" (Awoonor, 2006:5). Thus, by virtue of perpetuating ideals and practices that have de-developed and exploited Africa, it can be asserted that, like mainstream development theories, alternative development approaches are equally unviable and unlikely to achieve success in eradicating poverty and promoting development in Africa.

The promotion of Western ideals and understandings of what development should entail and how it should be achieved has rightly so led to a rejection and suspicion of these alternative perspectives. However, if alternative approaches are rejected on the basis that their strategies have done little except increase poverty and degenerate Africa into further underdevelopment, how then will the continent successfully combat poverty and achieve development? While the alternative approach proposed under the AAF-SAP appears to be a step towards a more viable, credible, and suitable strategy to development, the failure of it to emerge as such can be said to raise key questions about the political will of African leaders to successfully address development issues in their respective countries. This matter, concerning the political will of African leaders to adopt approaches and strategies that can comprehensively address factors hindering the eradication of poverty and achieve development, is thus to be assessed in the following chapters where the problems and efforts to address underdevelopment in West Africa and Nigeria will be explored.

CHAPTER FOUR

LESSONS WEST AFRICA CAN LEARN FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA'S DEVELOPMENT

4.1. Introduction

Southeast Asia has drawn much admiration from other developing countries and the world over. The developmental success of this vastly diverse region has sparked much debate and research into how it could achieve collective developmental success and economic growth so rapidly. The combined success of Southeast Asian countries to transform their societies from poor Third-World nations, characterised by high rates of illiteracy, poverty, corruption and regional conflict, to economically competitive per capita income nations recording impressive annual growth rates exceeding the rest of the world's regions, has propelled scholars to investigate the methodology of policy formulation and policy choices adopted in the region with the intention of replicating this in other developing countries (World Bank, 1993: 1,2).

While discussions on how to ensure transferability of the Southeast Asian experience to regions like Africa have become popular among development economists, Ohno and Ohno (2012:2) argue that simply replicating the Southeast Asian experience into applicable policy packages to be implemented elsewhere would be wrong and futile. Ohno and Ohno (2012:2) maintain that instead of attempting to transfer the experience of Southeast Asia to other developing societies, more focus should be on analysing and assessing the experiences of these countries in such a way that they are "construed as raw materials from which a development strategy unique to each country is built with selectivity and modification". In essence, while these authors recognise that there were key policies adopted by Southeast Asian countries, they realise that these policies cannot be replicated. Thus, while it is worthwhile to uncover what Southeast Asia did differently or better than West Africa, the development model of Southeast Asia should be used as nothing more than a blueprint to guide the development of other regions (Morrell, 2006:3).

Thus, in light of this argument made by Ohno and Ohno (2012:2) this chapter will seek to identify, through a comparative analysis of West Africa and Southeast Asia, the diverging paths these two regions have taken in their development trajectories. By discussing the key development strategies that Southeast Asian countries adopted and contrasting them with those of West Africa, the chapter will attempt to highlight the importance of understanding the nexus between governance and development. Additionally, the chapter will attempt to highlight some key development strategies adopted by Southeast Asia that West Africa could, in its own context, focus on to ensure its own development.

4.2. Overview of West Africa and its underdevelopment

The African continent faces many socio-economic development challenges. Despite its vast natural and human resources and decades of conceptualising and implementing various macro-economic and development policy programmes, the continent’s economy remains drastically underdeveloped. The low average per capita income in many African countries, coupled with high rates of poverty, has resulted in Africa being described as the poorest continent in the world. This description is confirmed by the fact that Africa has the fastest growing share of the world’s absolute poor, with 21 out of the 25 poorest countries in the world in Africa, and of which nine are in West Africa (Business Insider, 2016:1). While the challenges of state fragility and poor governance, characterised by conflict, famine and abject poverty in Africa (World Bank, 1993:3) that accompany this underdevelopment are not exclusive, these factors have had debilitating effects on the continent. This has resulted in African countries underperforming economically and experiencing a greater rise in poverty, even at times when the global average of poverty was decreasing and the real growth rate showed an upward trend.

The consequences and effects of underdevelopment and poverty in Africa are best illustrated by the situation that exists in West Africa at present. Of the 17 West African countries listed, 14 belong to the Low Human Development category of the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2015:49), and of over the 250 million West Africans, half of them live on less than one dollar a day (Diop et al., 2010:265). Thus, this region is comparatively considered to be one of the worst performing regions on the continent, as well as the most unstable region in the world (Ero and Temin, 2004:93). According to Huillery (2009:176), since acceding to independence in the 1960s, “the economic performance of West African countries has been strikingly low in comparison with other developing countries”. Additionally, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) reported in 2012 that out of all the countries in Africa, those in West Africa were categorised as some of the most fragile on the continent (ECA, 2012:6). One curious question that arises when considering the level of underdevelopment in West Africa is how a region abundant with natural and human resources, as well as a population of over 250 million people combined, ranks as one of the poorest regions on the continent.

In an attempt to answer this question, scholars and development analysts have attempted to investigate the various political, social, and economic underpinnings that have contributed to the underdevelopment of the region. Given that the conflicts that have marred West Africa are directly linked to matters relating to the "acquisition of independence, the multi-ethnic composition of the states, poor governance and the increased liberalization and expansion of international trade", it is generally agreed that there are a number of internal and external factors that have impeded development and growth in the region (Nkurayija, 2011:2). While there is general agreement that the underdevelopment of West Africa can be explained by looking at both internal and external factors, scholars have often been at loggerheads on which between the external and internal factors have contributed more significantly to the developmental retardation of the region. Guest (2004:111), Mbeki (2005:3) and Obadan (2001:64) have argued that the impact of colonial legacies, the recessive impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), imbalances in international trade policies, and the troublesome artificial boundaries created by colonialists are some of the key external elements that have contributed to the underdevelopment of the region.

Other scholars have refuted these claims and argued that while external factors have played some role in under-developing West Africa, the region's underdevelopment is a direct result of internal factors relating to bad leadership, corruption, institutionalised looting, poor and the failure of governance (Diop et al., 2010:272; Fagbadebo, 2007:29; Adepoju, 2003:1,12; Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007:142). According to Iremiren (2011:25), the culture of leadership practiced in West African countries, where leaders "arbitrarily govern their countries like personal businesses", personalising power and denying citizens their fundamental human rights, is primary factor that has contributed to the poor performance and growth of the region's countries.

Although there are varying views as to what the underlining causes of West Africa's slow development are, it is evident that the underperformance of West African countries is a result of a number of historically influenced internal and external factors. These factors have in turn resulted in West African countries experiencing low economic performance and being labelled some of the most fragile states (Huillery, 2009:176; ECA, 2012:6). While rent-seeking in government positions, neo-patrimonialism, corruption and clientelism in West Africa (Woods, 2003:642-643; Theobald, 1999:491; De Sardan, 2011:24) have been cited as key features that have contributed to the economic and developmental stagnation of the sub-region, Van Donge et al. (n.d.:5) have argued that these features cannot in themselves be used to explain the underdevelopment of the region. According to Van Donge et al.

(n.d.:5), the fact that these features are still present in "economically successful Southeast Asia", effectively renders the argument that they are the reasons why West Africa remains underdeveloped flawed. If this argument made by Van Donge et al. (n.d.:5) is anything to go by, then the key question that must be asked is what then have Southeast Asian countries done policy-wise to ensure that these impediments do not negatively influence their ability to grow economically and ensure development. In order to answer this question fully, the following sections will first outline the diverging development paths that have been taken by West African and Southeast Asian countries, before identifying the key policy formulations that contributed to the development of Southeast Asian countries' economies and societies.

4.3. Diversity and divergence of development paths in West Africa and Southeast Asia

The difference that exists in the intra-regional diversity between West Africa and Southeast Asia makes the task of identifying transferable policies from the Southeast Asian experience to West Africa futile. However, one cannot deny that a comparative analysis of the diverging development trajectories of Southeast Asian and West African countries can highlight policy areas that West Africa has failed to develop in order to ensure development.

Like West Africa, Southeast Asia "emerged from colonial rule with predominantly rural economies" that were largely dependent on the exportation of agricultural products, before some of the countries in both regions discovered oil (Van Donge et al., n.d.:3). While the oil boom in Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Nigeria and Ghana resulted in these countries shifting their export strategies, the two regions differ in the sense that, unlike West Africa, where countries became dependent on exporting oil as their primary commodity and neglecting the development of other sectors, Southeast Asian countries recognised the importance of diversifying their economies (Van Donge et al., n.d.:3-4). Therefore, unlike West African countries like Nigeria, that became mono-commodity economies, relying heavily on the exportation of oil to increase their per capita income, Southeast Asian countries diversified "their economies into manufacturing, agro-industries, value added services, and other activities", which enabled them to have variety in the products that they offered to the global market (Van Donge et al., n.d.:4). This thereby ensured Southeast Asian countries a steady stream of income from a number of sectors. This diversification has enabled economies to subsequently realise "rapid and sustained economic growth in association with significantly improving income distribution", as well as improving "human welfare substantially resulting in a significant increase in life expectancy, a considerable reduction of absolute poverty and a rapid improvement of economic and social indicators" (Ahrens, 2011:136,137).

Comparatively, the same cannot be said for West African countries. Their failure to diversify their economies has narrowed their revenue base thereby diminishing chances for growth. Further, Van Donge et al. (n.d.:4) state, "Petroleum and mineral extraction in particular, have limited employment effects, while the rents from these commodities create economic distortions that undermine productive activities other than mining". Subsequently, the lack of economic diversity in West Africa has not only threatened the economic sustainability of the region's countries, but has also limited incomes and left many unemployed as labour-demanding sectors like agriculture have been neglected in favour of oil and mineral sectors that are largely controlled by a few and heavily mechanised. The failure to grow West African economies has further resulted in the region being unable to curtail poverty, thereby leading to an increase in the proportion of the population living on $1 or less per day. Van Donge et al. (n.d.:4) indicate that the success or failure of countries to develop sustainable and stable production and trade policies additionally determines the ability of a region to respond to external shocks. The authors (*ibid.*) highlight how Southeast Asian economies in the face of global downturns have been resilient and managed to keep international debt loads low due to the diversification of their economies. The same does not apply West African countries where "the narrow export base" and the "comparatively low productivity of agriculture and other employment-generating sectors, leave few possibilities open for responding to adverse trade shocks" (Van Donge et al, n.d.:4).

In terms of poverty and the ability of the regions to reduce their rates of poverty, it is argued that the lack of economic diversity, which in turn has limited per capita growth in West Africa coupled with insufficient public spending on the rural and urban poor, has resulted in the region being unable to adequately reduce its poverty rates. According to Van Donge et al. (n.d.:2), the high per capita growth that Southeast Asia has experienced since the 1960s has enabled it to substantially reduce its poverty levels. To confirm this, it is reported that the proportion of the regional population living on less than $1 per day when calculated at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) showed that poverty had fallen by more than two-thirds between 1980 and 2003 (*ibid.*). This has not been the case in West Africa, where poverty levels have steadily increased rapidly, despite recording significant growth in average per capita income in the 1990s (*ibid.*). In addition to having higher poverty rates when compared to Southeast Asia, West Africa shows similar diverging numbers in life expectancy and material well-being. According to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) report (United

Nations, 2009:14,24,26), the absolute decline in life expectancy in West Africa, which is largely due to poor healthcare systems and the AIDS epidemic, has resulted in the region lagging behind Southeast Asia, which has a life expectancy of 70 years. The limited investment in education in West Africa has also in part contributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment, and low life expectancy.

This brief comparison of the two regions already indicates that there are distinct development policies that Southeast Asian countries took which West African countries neglected. Additionally, the section highlights the causal effects development strategies and policies have on different areas. Having provided an overview of the diverging developmental paths taken by West Africa and Southeast Asia, the next section will provide an in-depth discussion on the development policies adopted by Southeast Asian countries. While the strategies discussed here in no way exhaust all the factors that have contributed to the development of Southeast Asia, they do however touch on key areas in which West Africa is struggling. Thus, in highlighting these areas of development, some recommendations on how West Africa could improve are included.

4.4. The development of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is a diverse regional setting that consists of ten countries of varying size, levels of development and governance systems. Of the ten countries, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are considered as the "four fast-growing economies in Southeast Asia" (Booth, 1999:301). While the region's countries vary in their level of development, the region as a whole is seen as an economic and development success. It has been dubbed a "miracle" (*ibid.*, Haque, 2004:228) due to its ability to have collectively transformed itself from being relatively underdeveloped to becoming a contending force in the global economy within a single generation; that is, from the 1960s to date (Ahrens, 2011:136,137). How this rapid development and economic growth was achieved has been a key question that scholars have sought to answer for some time. Given the fact that the economic drivers and histories of the region's countries differ, it is no wonder Southeast Asia become a popular area of study for economists and development theorists since the last decade (Booth, 1999:301). Additionally, details such as the fact that Singapore, which is the richest among them "has a per capita income about 50 times that of the poor mainland states [and] the most populous, Indonesia, which has about 40 times the population of Singapore and Laos" has made Southeast Asia an interesting case study to explore academically (Hill, 2014:2). Although there is a contention on whether the development achieved in Southeast Asia can be described as a model or not, many researchers have spent a significant amount of effort and time identifying and explaining the factors that have contributed to the development of the region. The varying factors that have been identified as being key to the development of the region thus reflect truth in the conclusion made by Perkins (2013:201) that "no single model [can be used] to describe accurately what the most successful economies in [Southeast Asia] did to achieve this transformation". Therefore, based on this conclusion and the agreement that there were common themes that the region's countries followed to achieve developmental success, Petri (1997:1) states that the explanations given to describe the rapid development of Southeast Asia can best be grouped into four major categories, namely;

- Neoclassical explanations, which emphasise outward orientation and macroeconomic discipline;
- Structuralist explanations, which underline the activist role of the government in industrial policy;
- Cultural explanations, which focus on matters relating to governance, culture and social characteristics; and
- Geographical explanations, which highlight resource endowments and geographical proximity.

Despite the way one chooses to explain the economic success of Southeast Asia overall, it may be argued that the developmental and economic success of the region cannot truly be understood without recognising that macroeconomic, government, governance, culture, and resource endowments have all contributed equally to the region's success. In this regard, Quibria (2002:21) maintains that understanding development in Southeast Asia requires a multifactor explanation that does not only discuss the role of various individual factors in detail, but also illustrates how each of these factors interacted with each other to produce the development outcomes achieved in the region. Therefore, in this respect, Quibria (2002:22) provides a summary of the factors that led to the development miracle in Southeast Asia and their interaction:

- "The most critical factor that underlies the miracle process, both growth and poverty reduction, was these countries' openness to trade and technology. Openness helped them overcome the limitations of domestic markets, provided new economic opportunities to exploit in international markets, created competitive pressures for the domestic economy, and allowed access to new technology through imports of new machinery and equipment".

- "Economic openness is largely not fruitful unless complemented by other factors, such as macroeconomic stability, labour market flexibility, and good economic governance. These primary factors together helped to create a domestic economic environment that encouraged productive investment and production, rather than diversion (unproductive resource use in socially unproductive activities such as rent-seeking, corruption and theft)".
- "These economies have authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes that insulated bureaucracies. While these institutions may not have promoted many political and civil liberties, they seem to have done a good job of fostering good economic governance and maintaining the credibility of policies and institutional stability".
- "The outward-orientated policies created a virtuous circle of accumulation and assimilation. The rapid accumulation of capital and acquisition of new technology went hand-in-hand with the formulation of new skills. The new machinery and equipment obtained through imports would largely have been useless unless complemented by the requisite skills. The new demand and supply impulses that outward orientation helped to create facilitated the process of skills formation. On the one hand, export-oriented policies helped to raise the economies' income levels, which in turn increased both private and public investment in education. On the other hand, the availability of new technology led to new pressures on the labour force to upgrade its skills to meet the evolving demands of the new range of equipment. In addition, the economic success of these economies led to rising expectations of international competitiveness that were accompanied by greater demands for new and sophisticated skills".
- "Favourable initial conditions, such as high educational attainment, equitable income and asset distribution, and a dynamic agricultural sector, did not exist in all the miracle economies to the same extent, nor did they all undergo a wrenching process of comprehensive land reform. Thus, these were not the primary factors that initiated the miracle growth process; but, to the extent that these favourable initial conditions existed, they might have helped make the growth process more equitable, or may even have enhanced it".
- "Industrial policy was certainly not a common feature of all the miracle economies. In some of the countries that practiced it succeeded, but in others it did not. The overall impact of industrial policy on growth remains conclusively inconclusive".

This causal summary of how Southeast Asian economies achieved development and growth, provided by Quibria (2002:22) offers a clear indication of the correlations and nexus that exist between governance and growth. This illustration of the nexus between governance and development in the Southeast Asian region affirms the arguments made by development and governance scholars that there is a direct correlation between good governance and sustainable development, as discussed in Chapter two and Chapter three.

4.4.1. Recognising the interaction between politics and economics in development

According to Ohno and Ohno (2012:7), “Development is a political as well as an economic process” that can only be attained “when both aspects are fully taken into consideration, especially the complex interaction between the two, and appropriate visions, strategies and action plans are fleshed out and executed”. These authors (*ibid.*) acknowledge that designing development policies that take both political and economic aspects into account equally is complicated, as the politics of development primarily looks at “what can be done” within the political environment and the economics of development is focused on “what should be done” to ensure economic growth. It is, therefore, essential for policymakers to make compromises that are able to satisfy both the political and economic aspects of development.

In the case of Southeast Asian countries, economic development took precedence over political development, with their political leaders aggressively pursuing a pragmatic development strategy that resulted in the growth of their economies. According to Ohno and Ohno (2012:10), departing from the point of an incompetent and corrupt government, “a leader rose to take power, either legally or illegally, to establish a new government with the sole purpose of achieving rapid economic development to maintain national unity or defend the nation from external threats”. By virtue of establishing themselves as the primary drivers of development, Ohno (2013:8) asserts that these leaders launched an “authoritarian developmentalism”, which aimed to enforce a “national ideology that glorified material advancement, unwavering belief in upgrading technology and competitiveness, popular support for rising living standards, and political legitimacy based on industrial results rather democratic procedure” (Ohno and Ohno, 2012:10). Similarly, Nkurayija (2011:5) states that governments played a proactive role in the economic transformation process, as well as governing “development with a decisive ideological orientation, effective institutions and policies underpinned by adequate bureaucratic and organizational capacity and political will".

Despite the implementation of authoritarian rule having negative consequences for human rights and political freedoms, these leaders recognised the importance of maintaining some aspects related to good governance. Therefore, in this regard, the leaders championed aspects of good governance, such as rule of law, accountability and government effectiveness in terms of developing credible policy to realise specific economic goals rather than to achieve good governance for the sake of it. It is recognised that in terms of the rule of law, Southeast Asian economies lacked this aspect in the political sphere, although "they did a good job of upholding the rule of law in the economy" (Quibria, 2002:69). The ability of Southeast Asian economies to uphold freedoms related to personal economic choice, exchange and production, as well as basic market institutions and property rights enabled both local and foreign economic organisations to function more effectively. Bardhan (1999 in Quibria, 2002:69) highlights that the ability of Indonesia's royal family to "provide the predictable and durable contractual environment that private business needed to thrive without procedural formalities of democracy" made the country an attractive economic destination for firms and investors. Concerning government effectiveness, Quibria (2002:66) asserts that Southeast Asian governments were further able to grow their economies and accelerate their development due to their ability to "commit themselves to a particular policy, based on their welfare-maximizing calculus, and taking into account the reaction of private actors to the policy". This ability to pre-commit to policy, it is argued, enabled Southeast Asian countries to not only guarantee the relative efficiency of interventions at the microeconomic level but also establish coherence in their economic policies (Haggard, 1994:83).

This approach taken by Southeast Asian leaders, which Ohno and Ohno (2012:10) call "dynamic capacity development", subsequently enabled the region's countries to tackle the political and economic factors that were impeding development concurrently. Overall, despite sacrificing the 'democratic' freedoms of their populations, Southeast Asian countries were able to build effective industrial policy capabilities and successfully concentrated on allocating "limited human and financial resources on truly needed areas, [creating] clear criteria for monitoring and assessing performance, [ensuring] flexible reshuffling of resources in response to initial results or changing circumstances, and [achieving] the cumulative pride and sense of achievement as specific targets were realized" (Ohno and Ohno, 2012:10-11). Thus, it may be argued that a key lesson that West African countries can take from the Southeast Asian region is the importance of understanding that development is a joint process that requires political and economic factors to be addressed simultaneously. It is, therefore, not enough for West African countries to attempt to achieve economic growth without addressing issues of national disunity, tribal and ethnic tensions, and poor and corrupt leadership.

Further, Van Donge et al. (n.d.:13) argue that a major regional contrast that has determined the development trajectory between West Africa and Southeast Asia is that in Africa political parties have tended “to be mere candidate-generating machines, whereas in Southeast Asia they are strongly tied to development messages". By virtue of linking political parties and leaders with a strong development message and strategy, Southeast Asian countries managed to achieve rapid development as leaders and public officials set policies and programmes that were not only realistic, but also specific to development goals and economic growth. However, this has not been the case in West Africa, where political parties and leaders have little concern for achieving development and economic wealth for the nation, but are more concerned with personalising power and securing wealth for themselves and their clique of clients and patrons (Iremiren, 2011:25). Thus, according to Nkurayija (2011:8), for the region’s countries to achieve economic transformation and development, governments need to have “the political will and the capacity to articulate and implement capacity-expanding, transformative, distributive economic and social development policies, and not be manipulated by technocratic and socio-political elites”.

The transformation of Southeast Asia reflects that implementing appropriate policies, incentives, and sanctions to ensure that resources are channelled into priority areas is essential to achieving economic transformation and development. Taking into consideration the role that governments in Southeast Asia played in their development process, Nkurayija (2011:8) states that there are key features that West African countries must incorporate to achieve the same developmental success, including the following:

a) A government that has the political will and legitimate mandate to perform specific required functions in the context of a nationally-owned development vision;
b) A good constitution, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, representative political institutions, an effective central bank and other regulatory institutions and property rights enforcement;

c) A competent, professional and neutral bureaucracy, which ensures the effective and efficient implementation of its strategies and policies in accordance with established national development goals;
d) An interactive and institutionalised process in the context of which the political leadership and bureaucracy actively engage other societal actors (private sector, civil society) in development policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
e) A comprehensive development framework in the context of which national development goals are established and the complementarities among social and economic policies are explicitly embedded; and
f) A governance system, which ensures that the focus, context, content and implementation modalities of the national development programme are fully deliberated upon and agreed upon by the full range of stakeholders and societal actors.

The abovementioned features that Nkurayija (2011:9) highlights as key elements that need to be adopted by West African countries to help address development challenges and strengthen government capacity, effectively resonate with the assertion by Ohno and Ohno (2012:7) that development is as much a political matter as it is an economic one.

4.4.2. Government rightsizing and civil service management

Scholars have argued that the small size of Southeast Asian governments in comparison to those of developing countries as a whole have enabled them to achieve developmental success. According to Gonzalez and Mendoza (2002:15-16), the slimming of government in Southeast Asian countries not only enabled them to limit government consumption to 10% of the GDP, but also ensured efficiency in pursuing critical steering tasks and overall growth, characteristics that larger governments often fail to achieve. The "lean governments" of Southeast Asia additionally enabled these countries to lower corruption in public office as fewer civil servants meant that the countries were able to pay these officials higher wages (Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2002:16). While it is acknowledged that a higher income does not necessarily lessen the possibility of corruption, one could argue that it does indeed lessen the likelihood of it. Given the fact that poor pay in developing countries, such as those in West Africa, impels civil servants to participate in corrupt activities and accept bribes in order to supplement their income (Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2002:19), it leads one to believe that offering higher salaries to civil servants in Southeast Asia limited the rate of corruption in public office. Contrarily, Filmer and Lindauer (2001 in Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2002:19) assert that "the result on the relationship between private and public compensation makes low pay as an explanation for government corruption doubtful”. Rather, a comprehensive approach of rightsizing, a high quality workforce, institutional rules that govern civil servants’ conduct and behaviour to ensure accountability, in addition to adequate compensation are the key measures needed for improved civil service and less corruption in public office (Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2002:20).

Morrell (2006:13) found in his study that the reliability of public institutions, the quality of government services, and the effective collection and use of taxes has a significant impact on the business and investment environment of a country. Thus it follows that countries, such as those in Southeast Asia, which possessed capable and reliable public institutions that were “competently and honestly managed would, *ceteris paribus*, attract more foreign investment, better foster entrepreneurialism, and encourage private sector expansion than countries that lacked these characteristics” (*ibid.*). Correspondingly, Quibria (2002:60) stated that the operation of Southeast Asian economies “within a set of economic, social and political institutions that were of uniformly high quality” essentially made the region’s countries more conducive to growth and poverty reduction.

The failure of West African countries to establish public institutions with the adequate size and capacity of manpower with skills, motivation, professional ethics and accountability has rendered their governments inefficient at best; thus, lending credence to the assertion that “sustained development cannot be achieved without institutional reform” (Morrell, 2006:30). Therefore, it can be suggested that the rapid growth of civil bureaucracies in West African countries straight after independence created an undirected and inconsistent public sector, which has since been marred by inadequacies, corruption and unresponsiveness (Morrell, 2006:31). In the true sense of attaining development, “[West] Africa would be well served to reduce the scope of their public sectors and to have fewer government agencies in fewer issue areas” (*ibid.*), much like Southeast Asian countries. Smaller civil bureaucracies and fewer public servants could further allow West African leaders the ability to focus public resources on fundamental societal needs, such as education and public service delivery, as well as better “facilitate internal management and quality control” (Morrell, 2006:31). In other words, a smaller civil bureaucracy focused on attaining a cordial public sector can guarantee meeting the crucial needs of the population, as well as implement more effective accountability and transparency initiatives.

4.4.3. Macroeconomic Stability and Management

Macroeconomic stability and management have been cited as key features that secured the developmental success of Southeast Asia. According to Quibria (2002:38), “Macroeconomic stability is a precondition for sustained high investment, which has important ramifications for growth and poverty reduction”. In an attempt to illustrate the adverse effects of macroeconomic instability, Hill (1996:59) highlights the case of Indonesia, which after experiencing hyperinflation in the early 1960s passed a law that ensured that parliament could not approve any budget that was not balanced. This meant that the parliament could not sign off any budget where state revenues, which included foreign aid and loans, equalled or exceeded expenditures. To explain the adverse impact of macroeconomic instability, Fischer (1993:485-488) states that macroeconomic instability in the form of inflation and budget deficits should be avoided as these tend to enhance economic uncertainty, which in turn results in reduced investments, capital flight and the inefficient functioning of pricing systems which subsequently impede productivity and growth.

Hill (2014:7) maintains that the ability of Southeast Asian countries to consistently keep their annual inflation rate at less than 10%, as well as their quick containment of “double-digit inflation” and hyperinflation rates is not only noteworthy, but also confirms the advantages of “general inflation-aversion and prompt responses to occasional inflationary episodes”. Correspondingly, Quibria (2002:39) reports that this ability of Southeast Asian countries to maintain a high degree of macroeconomic stability and low inflation has in the long-term set them apart from other developing countries that have been plagued by high inflation percentages, large budget deficits, and/or large current account imbalances; in other words, it is the ability of these countries to maintain budget surpluses or keep their budget deficits small, limit their internal and external debt, as well as maintain price stability and their export competitiveness. This, consequentially, enabled the region’s countries to uphold a realistic exchange rate policy and avoid having to overvalue their currencies even at the most tumultuous periods in global economic history (*ibid.*).

4.4.4. Rural and agricultural development

Another key development feature that enabled Southeast Asian economies to achieve varying development outcomes from their West African counterparts has been the adoption of policies aimed at the poor, which were directed at agricultural and rural development. Although rural development policies, which recognise the important role the rural population plays in the overall development of the country, have been implemented in West African countries, little has been done to empower and uplift these populations. This lack of pro-poor and pro-rural development has left West Africa unable to address the problems of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy (Van Donge et al., n.d.:4,6,9).

In contrast, Southeast Asian countries, in realising that most of their "populations lived in the countryside and depended on agriculture" not only for their own survival but also for an income, quickly recognised the importance of rural development (Van Donge et al., n.d.:9). One fundamental process of addressing mass rural poverty and underdevelopment was aimed at increasing the "productivity of export crops", as well as increasing food production to ensure national self-sufficiency (*ibid.*). The strong intervention and provision of subsidised agricultural inputs and credit to increase agricultural production by Southeast Asian governments effectively enabled these countries to not only diversify their products for export and secure supplementary food for their population, but also to reduce their poverty and unemployment rates. Further illustrating the outcomes of growing the agricultural sector, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (1997:104-105) reported the following:

> "Rural poverty was reduced, and rising agricultural incomes improved the health, longevity and productivity of the rural poor. Higher rural incomes also made it possible for the rural poor to invest more in education and thereby to enter the non-agricultural economy. Productivity improvements released labor to work in non-farm employment. In urban areas, reduced food prices helped increase the value of real incomes. Strong agricultural production helped stabilize prices, which enabled both economic and political stability".

However, this has not been the case in West Africa where the focus and development of the agricultural sector has at most been erratic and limited. According to Van Donge et al. (n.d.:9), the "move toward government monopsony in agricultural marketing", which has largely been dominated by either the government or left to the private sector, has resulted in food-crop production stagnation and a per capita basis decline, thereby leaving some West African countries, such as Nigeria, having to frequently rely on food imports. The limited agricultural output and failure to grow the agricultural sector for local and international markets in the long-term has resulted in the countries being unable to alleviate poverty in rural areas where the population is dependent on agriculture. According to Van Donge et al. (n.d.:10,) "The single most important distinction between Southeast Asian and [West] African development strategies is that in Southeast Asia, macroeconomic stabilization has been paired with a concern for 'shared growth' through agriculture and rural development". To illustrate the contrast, the example of Indonesia and Nigeria is utilised (*ibid.*). In Indonesia, revenue from foreign aid and oil was used to enhance the productivity of peasant farmers through providing subsidies for fertiliser and pesticide, and improving the electricity supply, health services, education, and roads to rural areas. This is unlike Nigeria, which used its aid and oil revenues on “ill-conceived schemes for heavy industrial development” at the expense of investing in agriculture, which saw a dismal decrease in funding (Van Donge et al., n.d.:10). Although the calculations and decisions on how much of the total public spending should be allocated to agriculture and rural development are to be made based on the conditions in West African countries, Fan et al. (2008:25) argue that a comparably high allocation of spending to these areas is definitely indicative of a sound pro-poor and pro-rural development strategy.

4.4.5. Openness to Foreign Trade and Investment

Development theorists generally agree that openness to trade and investment has a significant impact on achieving economic development. From the modernisation theory to sustainable development concepts, theorists have argued that “openness can foster economic development by offering easier access to raw materials, new machines and technologies, skills and investible resources, as well as promoting economic discipline” (Quibria, 2002:23). However, SAPs and other economic development programmes that created conditions for openness, adopted and implemented in West Africa, have failed to achieve the assumed outcomes.

In order to explain how openness allowed Southeast Asian economies to improve their incomes and reduce the level of poverty in their countries, it is maintained that unlike West Africa, where openness is conflated with free trade, Southeast Asia used openness to, in a manner of speaking, level the economic market for domestic and foreign trade. Quibria (2002:23) indicates that openness in Southeast Asia was used as a method to “remove trade barriers and eliminate the anti-export bias of import protection measures to ensure the neutrality of incentives between exports and domestic production”. Correspondingly, Thorbecke and Wan (2004:22) maintain that the opening-up process followed in Southeast Asia consisted of transitioning “an essentially inward-looking and closed economy to an outward-orientated open economy”. This transition did not only enable the region’s countries to advance their technologies, but also to become actors in the interdependent global economy; thus, securing a pattern of “growth engendered by a cumulative virtuous circle; created by the interdependence between trade and output” (*ibid.*).

From the 1960s, Southeast Asian economies embarked on a policy of openness that constituted lowering tariff rates and export taxes, the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade and reduced barriers to international investment flows (ADB, 1997 in Quibria, 2002:23). The policy of openness adopted by Southeast Asian countries significantly opened their economies, thereby increasing trade flows and the stock of inward foreign direct investment. Although it is recognised that the adoption of an open economy in these countries did not result in positive outcomes for all, many have argued that their policies to open their economies to international commerce enabled them to increase their GDPs, as well as develop other sectors such as agriculture and infrastructure.

Furthermore, the experience in Southeast Asia shows that developing countries or latecomers to the global market cannot catch-up to the rest of the world without adopting a policy of openness. In addition to openness aiding in the growth of the economy and increasing foreign investment, it was seen as a way through which technology can be transferred. Quibria (2002:26) explains that Southeast Asian countries pursued the same outward orientated policy in their pursuit of technology as they did in economic growth. It is reported that Southeast Asian countries "aggressively sought foreign technology through a variety of mechanisms, including technology transfer via licenses, imports of capital and intermediate goods and foreign training" (*ibid.*). Similarly, Thorbecke and Wan (2004:9) identified that Southeast Asian countries sought to obtain new technologies through openness implemented as either "the sole purpose of [a] transaction, like consulting agreements or the licensing of patented discovery, or, less noticed but conceivably more important, [as] the by-product of trade, labor movement and direct foreign investment". While Quibria (2002:26), Thorbecke and Wan (*ibid.*) highlight the different ways in which technologies were borrowed, it is argued that there were various channels used to not only obtain technology through openness, but also ensure economic growth. Thus it is suggested that Southeast Asia linked openness to trade, technology and economic growth through:

- Increasing exports, thereby enhancing their capacities to import inputs that embodied new technologies.
- Accelerating the process of skills formation through export orientation. According to Pack (2001 in Quibria, 2002:26), increased emphasis on export orientation increased the pressure to learn how to operate and develop new technologies in order to "remain competitive and meet the requirements of complex contracts from Western countries".

- Encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI) did not only create competitive pressure on local firms to acquire new skills, but also came with new techniques of production, mechanisms of quality control, and more accessibility to external markets.

Through its policy of openness, Southeast Asia demonstrated how openness to FDI and imports of foreign capital not only enabled the region's countries to absorb new technologies to close the technology gap, but also grew its economies more rapidly through trade. Thorbecke and Wan (2004:23) assert that establishing close trade and investment connections with leading markets, such as the United States, allowed Southeast Asian countries to not only learn from them but also to emulate and copy their technologies.

While individual Southeast Asian countries have been able to successfully accelerate their rate of growth through openness, Hill (2014:15) states that the "outward-looking regional integration" of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made a distinct contribution to the growth of the region's economies collectively. The multilateral liberalisation of countries of ASEAN, which trades on a non-preferential and non-discriminatory basis, unlike that of the European Union (EU), has enabled the region's countries to move faster towards their goals of free and open trade. How West African countries can strategically adopt openness policies that are better tailored to the environment of their countries through the integration by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a whole is a key question. Given the limited role West African countries play in the determination of international trade pricing, as well as the damage that has been caused by the ill-fitting trade and liberalisation policies implemented under SAPs, one has to wonder how West Africa can restructure their relationships and position on the international market. What mechanisms and strategies can be put in place that will enable the region to develop close relationships and interact more closely with leading markets in a way that will enable them to learn and emulate the technologies of leading countries?

4.4.6. Education

The deplorable educational legacy left in most Southeast Asian countries after colonialism resulted in the region's countries placing a high priority on education after they became independent. With the illiteracy rate reaching 77% in Malaysia, 53% in Indonesia and 32% in Thailand by the 1960s, and the provision of educational facilities being mostly concentrated in urban areas, investment in education, particularly primary and secondary education, was prioritized (Quibria, 2002:42). Thorbecke and Wan (2004:31) suggest that the early emphasis on primary education and government initiatives to spread education throughout the rural areas significantly enabled Southeast Asian countries to successfully transition from what Rostow (1956:26) in the modernisation theory called the "agrarian stage". The upskilling of rural children at the outset of the development process, through the provision of primary and vocational education, created a labour force that was educated and skilled. Thus, instead of having some of their population stagnating in a traditional agrarian life, as is the current case with developing countries in West Africa, Southeast Asian countries recognised the need to provide rural children and youth with the education and skills they would need to operate successfully in non-farming activities (Thorbecke and Wan, 2004:5). As an important constitute of human welfare, education was seen as a way to enhance the productivity capacities of the people and increase their individual household earnings.

In addition to recognising the importance of providing education to both rural and urban populations to enhance their welfare, it is further argued that the emphasis on education stemmed from the notion that the capacity to absorb new technologies and ideas would be easier if the region's populations were educated. According to Thorbecke and Wan (2004:9), "learning is easier for the learned"; thus, with an aggressive strategy to borrow technologies from established markets to reduce the technical gap, it was essential that a quality education system be built. Essentially, Southeast Asia saw the provision of education as a key development strategy that would ensure the generation of "human capital resources required by the incipient industrial sector" (Thorbecke and Wan, 2004:22). Further attesting to the importance of developing nations to focus on education, Lucas (1993:270) said the following:

> "The main engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital – of knowledge- and the main source of differences in living standards among nations is differences in human capital. Physical capital accumulation plays an essential but decidedly subsidiary role. Human capital accumulation takes place in schools, in research organizations and in the course of producing goods and engaging in trade. For learning to occur on a sustained basis, it is necessary that workers and managers continue to take on tasks that are new to them, to continue to move up-the quality ladder".

Lucas (1993:270) argues that human capital development through the provision of education plays a key role in the process of economic development and poverty reduction. Additionally, from the abovementioned quote, it is clear that for human capital development to be a dynamic force of economic and social transformation there is a need to combine it with the attainment of advanced equipment and machinery. While the provision of education has had a positive impact on productivity in Southeast Asia, investment in education was also guided by the direct impact it had on human welfare, such as reducing child mortality rates, improving children's nutrition, and enhancing cognitive skills.

The provision of basic education in Southeast Asia's miracle economies illustrates the strong correlation between rural and human capital development with poverty reduction and economic growth. This recognition of the importance of education provision has however not been fully realised in West African countries. The fact that in 2009 it was reported that 40% of West Africa's adult population could not read or write and that seven out of the 10 countries with the world's lowest adult literacy rates were in West Africa indicates that there is a significant underinvestment in education and human capital development (IRIN, 2009:1). In order to emphasise the importance of education from a non-economic perspective, the United Nations-led Education for All monitoring report indicated that in Nigeria and Niger the mortality rate among children of mothers with secondary education was half of that among children with uneducated mothers (EFA, in IRIN, 2009:1).

While IRIN (2009:1) reported that education is one of the largest items in West African governments' budgets, it is argued that the total percentage of the GDP committed to education in the region's countries is insufficient to address the low literacy rates, increase productivity, and ultimately reduce poverty levels, as well as increase the chances of employment. Similarly, there is the need for West African governments to invest more in education to not only successfully meet key educational targets, but also to increase economic growth rates (AAI, 2015:11). More investment in education could ensure that West African countries stand a better chance of benefitting "from a better-educated labor market where workers possess the skills and knowledge to compete in a knowledge-based global economy, [as well as] achieve a greater impact for advancing development progress and economic growth in [the region's] countries" (AAI, 2015:11)

4.4.7. Regionalism as a development mechanism

Broadly understood as "an expression of common sense of identity or purpose through a conscious policy of states or nongovernmental actions to coordinate activities and arrangements in a greater region", regionalism is seen as a key intergovernmental concept that can be used to promote economic integration and regional development (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995:77-80). According to Das (2004:15), there are various forms of legally enforced regionalism and five stages of regional integration, which range from shallow to deep, and these include "preferential trade agreements, free-trade area, custom union, common market and economic union". The first three stages, according to Tadeo (2015:6), are considered "shallow integration" stages as they attempt to establish "a few trade barriers among member countries via policies that provide preference to trading partners, eliminate tariffs and quantitative restrictions". The last two stages, common market and economic union, are considered deep integration as "each stage respectively represents promoting free movements of factors of production and integrating national economic policies and a common currency" (*ibid.*).

There is little denying that regional integration plays an effective role in development and economic growth. The collective success of the regional integrations, such as those of the EU and ASEAN, has demonstrated that regional and multilateral co-operatives are considered an effective way to address complex global trade and market-related challenges, rather than attempting to do so individually.This is evidenced by the regional integration objectives of ASEAN, which have resulted in the economies of member countries becoming more open against the backdrop of the distinctive approach of outward-looking economic integration of the region (Hill, 2014:1,15), and the prioritisation and commitment to the development of universal education.

While regional blocs in Southeast Asia and elsewhere have been created with the common objective of developing and transforming economically, including reducing and eradicating poverty, the same cannot be said with regards to such groupings in Africa (Muuka et al., 1998:1). Ogedengbe (2015:143) asserts that in the African case, sub-regional integration schemes have "been perceived to be more ceremonial than achieving any economic benefits", which is unfortunate as the rationale for integration in Africa is compelling. According to Ogedengbe (2015:146), more proactive and strategically sound regional integration could increase competitiveness in the global market, as combining the small and mostly fragmented economies would lead to economies of scale that could fair better in global trade, and increase the chances of achieving sustainable development.

Since its inception, ECOWAS has been able to record some significant successes, especially concerning conflict resolution and management (Aning, 2000:50), implementing trade liberalisation schemes that have facilitated trade among ECOWAS members (Odularu, 2009:33), and providing their citizens with access to free movement within the sub-region (Boulton, 2009:32). However, it can be argued that there is room for the sub-regional organisation to do more to ensure collective economic growth and development for its members. According to Sheriff (2013 in Ogedengbe, 2015:149), the lack of a dominant economic power and the fear of hegemony have hindered successful integration in the region. Regarding the lack of a dominant power, Sheriff (*ibid.*) argues that the absence of a viable industrialised and economic power to lead and advise on best practices when dealing with the external world has limited the economic benefits that the region can achieve through integration. It is further noted that the fact that ECOWAS members essentially compete among themselves for markets, as they all produce and export similar products, makes them unable to "form a formidable body to deal with issues of trade in relation to the external world and even among themselves" (Ogedengbe, 2015:149). In this regard, Cisse (2014:4) argues that the success of regional organisations like ASEAN has largely been due to the existing complementaries that are present in each of the region's countries. The fact that Southeast Asian countries have a competitive and comparative advantage that allows them to trade among themselves, as well as externally, "has played an important role in fostering regional integration even though challenges related to regional political and economic tensions or conflicts exist" (*ibid.*). The notion that regional integration is better achieved when member states have varying products and knowledge to share thus essentially relates back to the need for ECOWAS members to diversify their markets and technologies.

In relation to the argument that ECOWAS has been unable to establish itself as a regional powerhouse due to the fear of hegemony, Aja (2002:10) asserts that a lack of mutual trust and confidence has limited the success of the region's integration. Cisse (2014:4) argues that West African countries should learn that integrating national policies with regional policies is a key driver towards achieving successful integration. How a sense of mutual trust and confidence in the abilities of the other can be fostered in West Africa is however unclear. Nevertheless, if success in the integration efforts of West Africa is to be achieved, it is fundamental that West African countries show:

(i) Leadership charisma, which entails leaders setting aside their hostilities and problems to drive integration;
(ii) The political will to share sovereignty and construct strong, legally based, common institutions to oversee the integration project; and
(iii) A consensus approach that is combined with solidarity and tolerance. (Ogedengbe, 2015:150).

The argument that regional integration for economic development in West Africa and Africa as a whole has failed is due to a number of factors, including reluctance to share sovereignty. The differences in terms of economic success between ASEAN and ECOWAS are based on how the regions have attempted to achieve their regional objectives (Regional Integration and Development, n.d.:1). While ECOWAS and ASEAN share the same objectives, which include economic and political stabilisation, as well as infrastructural, agricultural, industrial and transportation development among, the success of the regional bodies has differed greatly due to the different economic and financial strategies the regions have employed to achieve economic integration (Regional Integration and Development, n.d.:1). Correspondingly, Ogedengbe (2015:150) maintains that the pertinent issues that have hindered successful regional integration in West Africa are the methodology of translating the objectives of ECOWAS into action and the lack of political will to actualise integration policies. Thus, in order for ECOWAS members to achieve the same regional economic and developmental success as that of ASEAN members, it is fundamental that the countries develop a group-thinking framework, as well as the political will to not only share sovereignty, but also harmonise their national development goals with those of the region.

4.5. Conclusion

The success of Southeast Asian economies has been widely studied by researchers in the hope of finding development methodologies that can be replicated in other developing regions. The various studies undertaken to investigate the different aspects and preconditions that have resulted in development and economic success in Southeast Asia have failed to reach consensus on the lessons that can be drawn from the Southeast Asian experience. The lack of agreement on the lessons that can be adopted is further illustrated within the World Bank. For instance, the World Bank in its first study o the Southeast Asian experience concluded that macroeconomic stability, early education, development of the agricultural sector, sound financial systems, openness to foreign technology and investment over a period of time were the key lessons that other developing countries could learn from and follow to attain the same kind of development (World Bank, 1993:367). These lessons were, however, revised after subsequent studies were done in which Leipziger and Thomas (1997 in Quibria, 2002:2), courtesy of the World Bank, indicated that outward orientation, macroeconomic stability and investment in human capital were the three key focus areas developing countries had to strategically address to achieve the same level of development as that in Southeast Asia. These were further revised by Yusuf (2001 in Quibria, 2002:2), who argued that macroeconomic stability, “efficient bureaucracy that can conceive and implement sound and credible development policies", industrialisation, increased exporting of industrial output, and the establishment of flexible policies were the four key lessons to be learnt from the Southeast Asian experience. Despite the failure of scholars to agree on the success factors that have contributed to the Southeast Asian 'miracle', it generally can be agreed that good leadership, policy consistencies, and national visions of development have contributed to the economic and developmental success of the region.

The above discussions, which attempted to contextualise some of the key developmental strategies that were adopted by Southeast Asia, does not seek to suggest that a complete replication of these elements will secure development in West Africa, but instead highlights key focus areas the West African region can address to increase their probabilities of a better chance of attaining development and economic growth. It is further recognised that the advent and advocation of democracy, especially in West Africa, where its presence is a precondition for aid, the constant development and evolvement of information and technology, and the diversity in history, country size, ecology, resources and culture, significantly decreases any likelihood of being able to completely replicate or transfer the experience of Southeast Asia to West Africa. Thus, by highlighting the key strategies believed to have contributed to Southeast Asia's success, one can perhaps argue that the challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, corruption and poor governance impeding growth and development in West Africa can indeed be reversed as illustrated by the Southeast Asian experience. The question of how West Africa can reverse its underdevelopment can also be answered by the example of how Southeast Asian countries approached development, as well as by considering a process that is achievable through political and economic means.

Apart from policy formulations and development strategies that underline the importance of the relationship between governance and development, which West Africa can learn from Southeast Asia, a key lesson is the importance of establishing development strategies that are unique and applicable to the context of the region. In describing the development approach of Southeast Asia, Ohno and Ohno (2012:25) state that the approach used by the region was one that was "characterized by real-sector pragmatism, goal orientation and aspiration for building the country's unique strength rather than removing general negatives with limited consideration to their feasibility". The fact that Ohno and Ohno (*ibid.*) found it necessary to underline how distinct the approach was from that of the West, which prioritises a particular practical structure and insists on good governance regarding democracy, as well as the promotion of the adoption of Western-oriented institutions and policies, speaks to the suggestion made in Chapter three that perhaps West Africa and Africa as a whole needs development and governance strategies that are designed for their context and environments.

The success story of Southeast Asian countries illustrates that from poverty, unemployment, and slow economic growth to economic development and good governance is achievable when political will, visionary leadership, efficient bureaucracies, strategic policy formulations, economic diversity, and investment in human capital through education are prioritised. Thus, understanding and establishing the relationship between governance and development in order to formulate policies that are realistic, goal-specific, and designed to ensure a higher standard of living for all regardless of tribe, religion or ethnicity is fundamental to achieving security, development and economic growth in West Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA

5.1. Introduction

Radical scholars have consistently blamed the persistent socio-economic challenges in Nigeria on the structural deficiencies created as a result of the country's colonial legacy. Academics including Ake (2000:1), have argued that in addition to colonialism being designed as a system used to exploit African countries, it was also used to keep these countries in a permanent state of vulnerability and underdevelopment. While these arguments hold some weight, it must be acknowledged that the current state of underdevelopment of African countries, like Nigeria, cannot be blamed solely on the country's colonial experience.

Although this chapter acknowledges the significant impact colonialism has had in creating the structural deficiencies that exist in Nigeria, it also recognises that colonialism can no longer be cited as the fundamental reason for explaining the underdevelopment of the country. Rather, the chapter seeks to identify and highlight the domestic and contemporary challenges that have contributed to the underdevelopment and poor economic growth in Nigeria. Therefore, through a critical analysis of the factors that have contributed to the failure of Nigeria's development vis-a-vis governance policies and structures since the 1960s, the chapter will challenge the argument that colonialism and imperialism are solely to blame for Nigeria's underdevelopment. Further, the chapter will highlight how poor leadership, corruption that resulted in bad governance and inadequate investment in Nigeria's human and resource capital by the country's post-independent regimes have negatively impacted on the process of social and economic development in the country.

5.2. Understanding the socio-political climate in Nigeria

The tale of governance and development in Nigeria since the 1960s is often described as that which continues to defy conventional wisdom. In the midst of abundant natural resources, the Nigerian state is characterised by mass poverty, economic stagnation, endemic corruption, political instability, weak public institutions, insecurity and ethno-religious conflict (Fagbadebo, 2007:28, Ajayi, 2015:25, Aleyomi, 2012:127). Despite being the tenth and biggest oil-producing country in the world and in Africa respectively (OECD, 2012:1), and crude oil providing most of the country's export revenue, Nigeria is still classified as one of the world's 45th poorest countries (Ajayi, 2015:25). Socioeconomically, Nigeria has some of the worst indicators in the world, with high mortality rates, a poor education system, and dismal living standards. According to DFID (2007 in Iremiren, 2011:72), it is reported that one in every five children die before the age of five, and over seven million children do not go to school. Additionally, since 2003, 70.8% of Nigerians are estimated to live below the poverty line of $1 per day, and 92.4% live below $2 per day (Eneh, 2009:59). The aforementioned statistics are a fraction of the evidence available to indicate Nigeria's poor development experience since independence in 1960. The fact that Nigeria features at the bottom of many human and economic development indicator indexes raises pertinent questions as to why a country with abundant mineral wealth and human potential has failed to develop effectively and equitably. Through critical discussions on the various factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria, it will be argued that issues such as poor governance, corruption, poor human capital investment and an overdependence on its oil wealth to grow the economy have indeed played a key role in the country's underdevelopment.

5.3. Overview of Development Plans Adopted in Nigeria since 1960

Through various governments, Nigeria has conceptualised and adopted numerous development policies, plans and projects aimed at improving the quality of life of its citizens, as well as securing economic growth and overall sustainable development. These development plans, although largely geared towards making Nigeria self-sustainable and providing a quality standard of living for its citizenry, have never achieved their intended objectives (Lawal and Oluwatosin, 2011:238). The following discussion will seek to highlight some of the notable developmental efforts made by the different governments.

5.3.1. First National Development Plan (1962-1968)

Formulated by the Balewa Government, the First National Development Plan was established to promote economic growth, employment opportunities, and better infrastructural services (Lawal and Oluwatosin, 2011:238). The Plan largely focused on developing opportunities and improving access to health, education and employment in an attempt to increase the standard of living of the Nigerian people, while also seeking to expand the country's economic base and reduce the risks of over dependence on foreign trade (Okigbo, 1989:40-45). Olayiwola (2013:99) states that the most "notable characteristics of the plan was the extent of coordination between the central government and the federating units", as well as the broad-based involvement of Nigerians in the formulation of the plan. Despite the strategic intentions of the plan, it failed, as the resources required to achieve the objectives were limited (Lawal and Oluwatosin, 2011:238). The limitation of the required resources was based solely on the fact that the plan, aimed at improving the GDP, was heavily dependent on foreign aid, with 50 percent of the total investment cost to come from abroad (Ogunmike, 1995 in Adah and Abasilim, 2015:275). Additionally, the poor leadership and governance of the government, as well as the emergence of the military on the political landscape, which subsequently led to the 1966 civil war negatively affected the success of the plan (Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011:238).

5.3.2. The Second National Development Plan (1970-1974)

The Second National Development Plan, drawn up by the Gowon Administration, appeared to be more comprehensive and ambitious than the first, and outlined five key objectives. These objectives focused on building: a free and democratic society; a just and egalitarian society; a united, strong and self-reliant economy; a great and dynamic economy; and, the prospect of equal opportunities for all citizens (Iremiren, 2011:74). According to Eneh (2011:65), the Gowon Administration, in an attempt to achieve these objectives, as well as address issues of poverty and hunger, implemented a number of programmes including the

"Import Substitution Programme, the National Accelerated Food Production Programme and the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank". Despite the implementation of these programmes, Eneh (2011:65) maintains that none of the objectives were achieved and the country sunk deeper into a situation of heavy "import dependency and food insecurity".

5.3.3. The Third National Development Plan (1975-1980)

Like the Second National Development Plan, the third plan was designed chiefly to promote strategies that would result in the increase of the living standards of its citizenry, as well as address the destruction that had resulted from the years of civil war (Iremiren, 2011:74, Sanusi, 2012:3). Thus, the Third National Development Plan focused on investing resources in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructural facilities; increasing per capita income and skilled manpower; achieving a more balanced allocation of national resources; and, diversifying the economy to support indigenisation (Iremiren, 2011:74). While the unprecedented oil boom and increased earnings from oil production in the 1970s gave the country hope that it was well on the way to economic prosperity and growth, the development of a mono-economy dependent on the oil sector and underdevelopment of other sectors proved to be detrimental to the country's development (Iremiren, 2011:76).

5.3.4. The Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985)

Initiated with the intention to reduce the over-dependency of the economy on the oil sector, the Fourth National Development Plan sought to develop a more broad-based economy. With the emphasis on investing and increasing technology, the Plan was designed to increase the real income of citizens; achieve the equal distribution of wealth among socio-economic groups and individuals; consolidate national resources for development; speed up grass-roots development through increasing income and employment; and, increase employment and skilled labour (Iremiren, 2011:74). "Economic problems owing to excessive external reserve loss, arising from capital flight, worsening terms of trade and drastic fall in domestic production" (Olayiwola, 2013:99) however led to the failure of this plan. This resulted in an increase in economic hardships, as well as rationing, price control, and product shortages. These economic difficulties were compounded further by a political crisis, which culminated in the overthrow of the civilian government and the emergence of a military government (Olayiwola, 2013:99).

5.3.5. Structural Adjustment Programmes (1985-1999)

The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were first adopted in 1986 in an attempt to reposition the Nigerian economy. The SAPs were largely implemented to address the damage caused by the global recession in the 1980s, and the fall of the international oil market, which led to a 50% reduction in oil prices and saw Nigeria's earnings fall from an excess of $25billion in 1980 to $6.4 billion by 1986 (Iremiren, 2011:77). The external shocks, as well as accumulated trade arrears, weak international credit, and the unsuccessful austerity and stabilisation measures introduced by the Nigerian government resulted in the country's economy facing collapse (Iyoha, 2008:21; Iremiren, 2011:77). Thus, in an attempt to address the economic crisis in the country, the Nigerian government adopted the SAPs. The SAPs combined "short-term austerity measures with long-term structural adjustment" policies (*ibid.*). Key policies implemented included "reductions in government workforce and wages; removal of non-statutory allocation to state governments; privatisation of public institutions; market liberalisation; abolition of government subsidies on social services; ending of the dual exchange system; naira devaluation (by about 66%); and, the dismantling of the import licensing schemes" (Okigbo, 1993:78). While the Nigerian government was certain that the SAPs would revive the economy, Iyoha (2008:21) argues that they did little to stimulate economic growth despite the abundance of human and financial resources poured into the programmes. However, some critics maintained that the initiatives implemented under the SAPs were not to blame for the lack of economic growth. Rather, they insisted that "the policy inconsistencies, haphazardness in policy implementation, weak institutions and the syndrome of regional redistribution mechanisms, characterised by ethnic and religious sentiments, sectional politics and elite networks" (CBN, 1999 in Iremiren, 2011:78) significantly undermined and obliterated any chances of the true benefits of the SAPs from manifesting.

The failure of the SAPs subsequently resulted in an increase in public discontent. The increase in poverty rates, high unemployment, and reduction in spending on social services resulted in disgruntled Nigerians rioting and protesting against the SAPs (Iremiren, 2011:78). Lewis (2003 in Iremiren, 2011:78) further argues that the introduction of free markets in Nigeria did not lead, as envisioned, to a reduction in incentives for corrupt activities, but instead resulted in "other forms of rent-seeking and political control over public resources and personal wealth accumulation particularly amongst the political elites". It is maintained that the adoption of SAPs in Nigeria helped "foster a new form of private accumulation, racketeering, patronage and clientelism (Iremiren, 2011:78).

5.3.6. The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (2004)

The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was initiated as a medium term four year development plan by the Nigerian government in collaboration with the states as SEEDS (State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy) and Local governments as LEEDS (Local Government Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy), inclusive of civil society, the private sector, and the general public (Iremiren, 2011:79; Marcellus, 2009:203). The plan was designed as a centrally coordinated policy, which sought to work with all sectors of society to achieve sustainable economic development and reduce poverty through four key strategies. The focus was on four key areas, namely, macroeconomic reform, structural reform, governance and institutional reform, and public sector reform. It was believed that the four key strategies of “wealth creation, employment generation, poverty reduction and value reorientation” would be achieved (Iremiren, 2011:79,80, Marcellus, 2009:204). The NEEDS policy was thus designed to “reduce poverty and create wealth by relying on the private sector to provide jobs and economic growth, while the public sector is meant to create an enabling environment for development” (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005:5).

Marcellus (2009:203) asserts that in contrast to the development plans implemented from 1960, NEEDS was by far the most comprehensive, realistic and efficiently coordinated. The framework sought to promote transparency and accountability, while addressing problems of rent-seeking and endemic corruption, which had spiralled under SAPs. By implementing NEEDS, the Nigerian government sought to provide, in terms of economic growth, an enabling environment for investment through the promotion of sectoral partnerships. Socially, the government hoped to improve the provision of basic infrastructure services and citizen empowerment through the implementation of programmes geared towards generating jobs, increasing access to healthcare and education, rural development, housing, gender equality and youth development. Unlike previous development plans, the implementation of NEEDS resulted in significant improvements and positive results in the country’s performance. For instance, under NEEDS the country managed to reduce its external debt from $35.9 million in 2004 to $5.5 billion in 2005, which comprised of $6.4 billion settled debt arrears, $16 billion received debt write-off and $8 billion purchased outstanding debt at 25 percent discount under a buyback agreement (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:11).

5.3.7. Development agendas and visions post-2004

The abysmal failure of the development plans adopted since independence significantly put Nigeria's pathway to development in jeopardy. Careful analysis into the reasons why these strategies were unable to achieve the intended outcomes reveals that ineffectiveness in policy implementation and political instability, caused by the transitioning between civilian and military administrations, inevitably resulted in the failure of the efforts made to reposition the country. Hence, the Nigerian government under the Yar'adua Administration created the Seven Point Agenda, which sought to address the needs of Nigerians in terms of accessing energy, power and transportation through critical infrastructure; physical infrastructure and people's empowerment; human capital development; land tenure and home ownership; national security and intelligence; wealth creation; and, food security (Dode, 2010:3,4). These objectives were carried forward by President Goodluck Jonathan in the Transformation Agenda, which essentially focused on ensuring "constitutional and electoral reforms and transformation of the budgeting process" (Olayiwola, 2013:100). In addition to these two core objectives, the Transformation Agenda was intended to "overcome the current security challenges through ensuring peaceful coexistence and tolerance; generate employment; poverty alleviation; develop critical infrastructure; and ensure human capital development" (Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, 2012 in Olayiwola, 2013:100). In essence, the Transformation Agenda was poised to deliver good governance, create an enabling environment for growth of the private sector, combat corruption, and prioritise the development of the Nigerian population.

Despite the shift in focus from largely economic strategies in the pre-2004 era to recognising the need for national and human security, as well as a stable democracy post-2004, Nigeria's development plans have yet to yield significant development and growth. While the abovementioned plans, programmes and visions were designed to fulfil the aspirations of the Nigerian economy by "altering the structure of production and consumption patterns, diversifying the economic base and reducing dependence on oil, with the aim of putting the economy on a part of sustainable, all-inclusive and non-inflationary growth" (Sanusi, 2010:2), the current situation in the country shows that the performance of Nigeria's economy has mostly been very poor. From 1960, Nigeria's economic development fluctuated due to internal and external factors. While the country has seen its average per capita income rise from a rate of 0.43% per annum from 1960 to 2000, to 7.5% between 2003 and 2011, in terms of human development the country has consistently been unable to raise the living standards of its citizenry (OECD, 2012:5). However, the improvement (albeit limited) experienced under the NEEDS policy framework, illustrating the potential Nigeria has to achieve growth and development, the question that arises is, what are the fundamental obstacles hindering present-day Nigeria from achieving socio-economic, political and human development.

Scholars have argued that at the heart of Nigeria's development crisis is the issue of governance. The division of Nigeria's elite and political leaders along communal, factional, and ethnic lines has significantly hindered the ability of the country to create a stable political regime that can act as an effective political and institutional centre for economic transformation and overall development (Iyoha, 2008:5-6). Thus, in the next sections the factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria will be discussed.

5.4. Corruption

Corruption has often been cited as one of the greatest challenges to the effective achievement of development and governance in Nigeria. The impact of corruption has been so damaging that the country, according to Akinola (2015:142), has become incapable "of managing its economy because of deep-seated, pervasive, massive and unstoppable corruption". According to Dike (2008:3-4), corruption can broadly be defined as a "perversion or change from good to bad in violation of established rules, which have been made to manifest in a total misuse of public power for private gains". Lawal and Tobi (2006:643) suggest that corruption can be viewed "as a conscious attempt to divert public resources from the satisfaction of the general interest to that of a selfish personal interest". Regardless of the way one chooses to define corruption, it is generally agreed that corruption is anti-social behaviour that causes social and economic degradation.

While the low ratings scored by Nigeria on the Transparency International Index and various other corruption perception indexes confirm that corruption in the country is disturbingly high, it is maintained that the phenomenon of government corruption is not new to Nigeria; in fact it was a matter of grave concern even prior to independence in 1960 (Transparency International, 2016:1; Pierce, 2006:888). Although the colonial authorities recognised and raised their concern about the high levels of government corruption prior to 1960, the true extent of corruption in the country became more apparent in the country's post-independent history, which has been characterised as consisting of a series of corrupt, abusive and unaccountable governments. The high levels of corruption in the country have led to capital flight, exportation of the naira across the world, and ultimately, it has constrained honest businesspeople from investing in Nigeria (Abubakar, 2004:160). Olayiwola (2013:102) further confirms the crippling impact of corruption on the country, when he describes how in 2011 "investors in Nigeria lost 10% of their revenue to poor quality infrastructure, crime, insecurity and corruption". While corruption in Nigeria is prevalent across all facets of society (Dike, 2008:4; Arowolo, 2010:4-5), from top tier government officials to taxi drivers and students, the country is widely known for suffering from:

- Political corruption, which occurs at the highest level of the political spectrum and involves politicians and political decision-makers engaged in the distortion and manipulation of the process and institutions of governance;
- Bureaucratic corruption, which occurs in public places among public officials, with citizens encountering it on a daily basis; and
- Electoral corruption, which includes all electoral malpractices involving the exchange of money in the process of rigging elections (Dike, 2008:4; Arowolo, 2010:5).

Apart from corruption being rampant in these three areas, bribery, fraudulent activities, embezzlement of public funds and extortion are among the other forms of corruption that are practiced in Nigeria (Arowolo, 2010:5). Speaking on the levels of corruption in Nigeria, Majekodunmi (2012:68) states "Corruption is quite widespread and consists of various forms, and this is why each successive administration in Nigeria has always been accused of corruption. All these serve as barriers to our growth as a nation because private interests have taken over public interest". Indeed, corruption is pervasive in Nigeria, linked by all and sundry to the underdeveloped state of affairs of country's economy that has resulted in persisting poverty, unemployment, and various social problems that endanger millions of Nigerian lives through high-level insecurity and societal decadence (Majekodunmi, 2012:68).

In an attempt to explain what has preserved corruption in Nigeria and made the culture of corruption proliferate, Ogundiya (2009:283-284) suggests that corrupt practices have been fostered and sustained primarily by powerful individuals and political elites who seek to gain and maintain control over the resources in the country. According to Ogundiya (2009:283), this struggle for control of resources in the country by particular ethnic groups and constituencies has subsequently encouraged corrupt practices. The struggle for control has in turn created substantial political instability as most of the country's elections have been riddled with complaints of electoral irregularities, fraud and violence, while there are many reports of the misuse of resources and the embezzlement of funds by political leaders. In addition to the political and electoral corruption that has been practiced by Nigeria's political elite, corruption is also embedded in the daily lives of the country's population. Ogundiya (2009:286,287) notes that the corruption practiced by political leaders has effectively created fertile ground for mismanagement within public institutions. The mismanagement and corruption in state institutions has effectively weakened the country's ability to provide basic services to citizens and has enabled public servants to create systems that make corrupt practices easy and normal. The creation of corrupt systems was already prevalent by the early 1980s, to the extent that Achebe (1984:9) asserted that Nigeria "is one of the most corrupt, insensitive, inefficient places under the sun". There is little wonder then on how the culture of corruption has manifested, grown, and become enshrined into the norms and values of the country to where it now has become a normal practice.

From the reasons provided by Ogundiya (2009:281) and Achebe (1984:9) it can be deduced that the culture of corruption in Nigeria is fostered and sustained by weak institutions and unaccountable political leaders. Other scholars (see Ado-Kuwara, 2005:10; Dike, 2008:4,5; Arowolo, 2010:5-6) have suggested that factors such as greed, an insatiable appetite for wealth, a complete disregard for the rule of law, a lack of altruism, diminished moral values, a lack of sanctions for perpetrators of bureaucratic corruption, high poverty rates, wide economic gaps between the rich and poor, a dysfunctional society, and a lack of patriotism have also contributed to the normalisation of corruption in Nigeria. Ogbuagu et al. (2014:20) have further argued that although corruption is a global problem, the peculiarity of Nigeria's case has single-handedly stood in the way of a human-centred development, perpetrated and condoned by both public and private office holders, from executive to bureaucratic; it cuts across the entire nation. According to Onolememen (2015:71), the most corrupt practices were undertaken by the military regimes that took power, who attributed their reasons for coups to "rescue Nigerians from corrupt civil administrations". This, connotes what Ogundiran (2009:281) described as self-aggrandised physicians who became terrible patients of their very own profession.

The endemic corruption in Nigeria has had adverse effects on the growth, development and delivery of public services in the country. The prevalence of corruption in the country has fundamentally distorted the climate for doing business and deterred foreign investment, as the phenomenon serves as a tax on private investments. In their examination of ways corruption has affected growth and development in Nigeria, Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2007:17) indicated that the culture of corruption in the country significantly crippled the country's ability to develop its human capital, improve infrastructure and establish effective institutional frameworks for adequate systems of governance. This destabilisation of the country's social and political fabric caused by corruption has facilitated the maintenance of political elites to extract rent and loot public funds, thereby reducing the ability of the government to provide the necessary goods and services to the public (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012:81-83).

While corruption has significantly plagued the Nigerian society, it must be said that every regime since 1966 has recognised the effects of corruption and attempted to curb it, but to no avail (Ogbeidi, 2012:6-10). From the first republic through to the fourth republic, with the incessant truncation of civilian rule by military regimes, every regime had a programme designed to tackle corruption. In recognition of the magnanimity of the bane of corruption, the new democratic administration at the outset of the fourth republic in 1999 established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Majekodunmi, 2012:68).

The enactment of the Anti-Corruption Bill by the Obasanjo-led administration, which resulted in the establishment of the ICPC in 2000 and the EFCC in 2003 (Ogbeidi, 2012:10), is however argued to have been one of the most relatively successful initiatives at curbing corruption in the country (see Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007:17-19). However, despite the minimal success of these institutions in combating mismanagement and corruption, Ogundiya (2009:290) highlights that the nonchalant attitude of Nigerians and the Labour Congress towards corruption indicates that corruption has become a lifestyle for the majority of Nigerians. According to Ogundiya (*ibid.*), "Wherever corruption becomes part and parcel of political strategies for assuming political leadership and where such strategies enjoy, to some extent, public validation, anticorruption law, policies and campaigns are nothing but empty jingles, propaganda, and mere political rhetoric". This rings true as the present situation in the country shows that corruption is still rife. The prominence of corruption in Nigeria has without a doubt hindered any attempts that the country has made to achieve good governance and development. The mismanagement of resources and electoral fraud have not only ruined the chances of development, but also created a comfortable environment where bad leadership, clientelism, nepotism and neo-patrimonialism are promoted.

5.5. Leadership and governance

It is widely agreed that political leadership is indivisibly linked to good or bad governance. While leadership and good leadership are seen as contributors to achieving good governance and development, the concept of leadership is an evasive one that is understood differently, depending on the angle from which it is viewed. Despite the various ways in which leadership may be understood, it is generally agreed that “leadership is a process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to a collective effort, and causing willing effort to be expended to achieve collective purpose” (Jacob and Jacques, 1990:281). Ultimately, leadership is a process in which a leader must be able to inspire people to work together to attain certain mutual objectives, while being charismatic enough to lead people to where they ought to be even when they cannot see their destination. So what then is the consequence of having leadership that lacks the vision and charisma to guide people towards collectively beneficial goals?

Studies exploring reasons for the underdevelopment of Nigeria have collectively argued that poor leadership is one of the greatest obstacles to socioeconomic and political development and governance in the country. Dike (2014:4) maintains that in the case of Nigeria “poor leadership or leadership without purpose” has rapidly deteriorated the state of polity in the country as “very few leaders, if any, have worked to improve the living conditions of the country’s citizens”. This poor leadership has left the general populace of Nigeria frustrated with their leaders and has fostered complete distrust in the government and its institutions.

Akinola (2015:120) opines that at the time of independence “Nigeria appeared set for rapid development and attainment of a prominent role in the empowerment of Africans due to her enormous resources and huge population among other factors; inept leadership has [since] posed greater challenges to actualising that goal”. Abubakar (2004:161) furthers this opinion by maintaining that the lack of visionary and selfless leadership under both military and civilian administrations has effectively hindered the country from harnessing its resources and securing sustainable development. In this regard, Ehusani (2012:1) asserted,

> “A land devoid of visionary leaders and a nation without integrity can hardly experience stability and peace. That is the story of Nigeria in recent years. Leaders with vision inspire citizens and mobilize them for nation building. Leaders with crystal motives employ wisdom, foresight, sense of purpose and commitment to galvanise a people towards self-actualisation and propel the national spirit in them”.

Nigeria has been plagued by a series of leaders who lack the charismatic leadership qualities needed to develop and steer the country out of the “cloud of ethnic hostilities, which prevented the emergence of true nationalism and command the respect and followership of all the ethnic groups” (Akinola, 2015:121). Having never had the chance for charismatic leadership to develop and govern the Nigerian state, Okafor (2006:10) reiterates that the emergence of military officers into political leadership further pushed away the chance of Nigeria experiencing good leadership as these officers lacked the necessary vision and administrative experience to unify the country and facilitate national development.

While Okafor's (2006:10) statement regarding the inexperience of military officers as political leaders infers that Nigeria would have been more likely to experience better leadership under a civil leader, Abubakar (2004:160) argues that the likelihood of Nigeria experiencing good leadership and governance under a civilian administration was equally unlikely. According to Abubakar (*ibid.*), good governance and leadership were equally unlikely under democratic governance because leadership in Nigeria "does not derive its legitimacy from the citizenry. The fact the Nigerian leadership lacks probity and integrity in governance and can hardly articulate coherent policies that can ensure efficient resources management, social transformation and development" has effectively resulted in Nigeria ranking very low on governance indexes.

The inability of both military and civilian administrations to provide the leadership needed to improve the living standards of the general populace and develop the nation has created a disconnection and a sense of distrust between the government and citizens in Nigeria. Akinola (2015:122) explains that the failure of the state to meet the expectations of its population has reduced its legitimacy and buttressed "the perception of Nigerians that the state is an alien institution acting against the wishes of its own population". Ehusani (2012:1) adds that the lack of good leadership and governance in Nigeria has resulted in the ruling class being dominated by corrupt characters who have plagued the public space with "rogue leadership" and have little or no concern with achieving peace, stability, and development in Nigeria.

There can be no denying that the success of Nigeria's economic growth and development rests on the country's ability to find good leadership and governance. However, the bad governance and leadership that has plagued the country has led to the maintenance of systems that lack adequate checks and balances to control the autocratic tendencies in government and hold political leaders accountable for their actions. Additionally, the lack of political will and commitment of the country's leadership to provide the necessary institutional and infrastructural framework needed to effectively implement the policies and solutions they prescribe to address the economic and social problems in the country further hinders the ability of the country to develop (Dike, 2014:4). In essence, the failure of Nigerian leadership to practice ethical politics and values has significantly contributed to the economic and socio-political underdevelopment of the country.

5.6. The dilemma of public accountability, good governance and effective service delivery

Accountability, like democracy and rule of law, has become a key ideal used by theorists to define good and responsible governance, as well as measure the performance of government and regimes (Diamond, 1996:33). Concerned with how to ensure that those who hold public office and power behave responsibly and can be held accountable for their actions, accountability, according to Adejuwon (2012:33), has become a concept that has been used to “establish a dialogic relationship between accountable and accounting actors” and ensure that both parties are afforded the opportunity to speak and engage with each other. In essence, accountability plays the role of fostering good and ethical governance, as well as gradually building trust in leadership. In addition to being an essential prerequisite of good governance, accountability has over the years also become “a sine qua non for effective service delivery in the public sector” (Abata and Adejuwon, 2012:30).

While accountability has come to be understood as a pivotal feature of good governance, a respectable public official, and a responsive government, the absence of the concept in Nigeria has had adverse results on public service delivery, development and growth. The negative impact the lack of accountability has had on Nigeria has, according to Adejuwon (2012:35), “become a subject of global concern and worry as it underpins the very essence of human development at every level of human relationships”. Adejuwon (2012:36) asserts that the essence and depth of the meaning of accountability has not been fully grasped by Nigerian public officials, who tend to assume that accountability is synonymous with answerability. This misconception has thus led public administrators and agencies to assume that they are accountable to the extent that they are required to answer for their actions, which is not the case.

The abuse and neglect suffered by Nigerians at the hands of their political leaders has resulted in the growth of distrust in leadership and a virtual disconnect between government and the people. Abata and Adejuwon (2012:25) suggest that with “the culture of accountability and transparency [having been] lost over the years [in Nigeria], the relationship needed to forge trust between the government and the governed for the actualisation of good governance to materialise” has been lost. Furthermore, rampant corruption, abuse of power, misuse of government information, bribery, moonlighting, patronage, embezzlement, general deterioration of other ethical standards, misappropriation of funds, nepotism, tribalism, and poor attitude of staff to government work illustrates the absence of accountability and mechanisms to ensure accountability in the country (Wendy, 2004:7; Akhakpe, 2008:54).

It is generally acknowledged that the excessive deterioration of accountability in Nigeria has not only made the country an accommodating ground for corruption and unethical practices, but has also impeded the country's development. Despite the negative outlook, Adejuwon (2012:39) argues that the challenges faced by Nigeria are surmountable. Considering the fact that Nigeria is not short of legislation to enshrine public accountability, all that is required is the political will and active cooperation of both the government and the citizenry to actualise this legislation into practical working policies (Adejuwon, 2012:39). Correspondingly, Keohane (2002:5) suggests that for accountability to be promoted and enforced, Nigerians will need to identify who exactly must be held accountable for what, to whom and how. While these scholars suggest that restoring a high level of accountability in Nigeria is feasible, one cannot help but wonder how the proposed overhaul of the country's political and administrative machineries can be effectively and successfully achieved.

5.7. Security Crisis

Security is a concept that is of great in importance in all societies. The need for security, after all, is among the primary reasons for the social contract in which people willingly surrender their rights to a structure (government), which is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring their survival and protection. Thus, it comes as no surprise that matters relating to security are seen as playing a core role in the discourse of good governance and development. While the understanding of security has become diluted and multi-dimensional over the years, Chandler (2007:362) rightfully argues that security at the level of the state, society, and the individual is fundamentally a concept that is interlinked with development. In fact, development and security directly affect each other, making it impossible to achieve sustainable development in the absence of security (*ibid.*).

It is evident that a key element that has contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria is the absence of national and human security. Scholars such as Okorie (2011:37-38), Eme and Onyishi, (2011:176) and Jega, (2002:35-38) have argued that while insecurity in Nigeria indeed poses dire challenges to national development, tribal tensions, kidnappings, militancy, armed robberies, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts are the primary causes of human insecurity in the country. The prevalence of ethnic and religious conflicts, which are defined as situations whereby “the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is characterised by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation” (Salawu, 2010:346), have undermined Nigeria’s ability to create a national identity necessary to achieve unity towards the pursuance of one development goal. With over 400 ethnic groups belonging to several religious sects, Nigeria has had to deal with religious polarisation and ethnic tensions that have often manifested in political mobilisation, sectarian social movements, and violence (Salawu, 2010:345).

Uhunmawuangho and Epelle (2011 in Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013:288) argue that the adoption of democracy in Nigeria has done nothing but increase the culture of impunity and intensify ethnic and religious separations based on political differences. However, Salawu (2010:348) argues that the primary cause of the ethnic-religious conflict and tension in Nigeria is the inability of the country’s leaders to overlook their religious and ethnic discrimination and distribute state resources, as well as offer good public services, equitably. Therefore, it can be argued that the neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, marginalisation, and discrimination perpetuated by Nigerian politicians of some ethnic and religious groups over others have implicitly reinforced polarisation and separation; thus, increasing the insecurity of mostly the individual and the state, as well as undermining the chances for nation-building and development.

In addition to the insecurities caused by ethnic and religious conflicts, the rise in terrorist activities undertaken by groups such as Boko Haram has “left the country’s economy in an ‘unpalatable’ situation” (Aidelomon, 2016:22). The intensified insurgence of Boko Haram has further increased the level of insecurity in the country. The radical Islamic sect officially known as ‘Jama’atulAlhul Sunnah Lidda’watiwal Jihad’, meaning ‘people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad’, has since 2002 been described as a homegrown terrorist group who threaten Nigeria’s national security (Meehan and Speier, 2011:6). Whilst Boko Haram has been identified as a radical Islamist group seeking to rid the country of Western beliefs and lifestyles, some scholars argue the group has largely become a destructive political tool used by disgruntled politicians in the Northern Nigeria. Investigations into the activities of Boko Haram by Eme et al. (2012:85) indicate that the group is supported by some wealthy individuals, religious leaders, allies and highly placed politicians in Northern Nigeria working against the state. Whether Boko Haram is a radical religious sect or a group of paid thugs used by politicians and governors in Northern Nigeria remains a controversial and debatable topic. Irrespective of the ideologies and supporters of Boko Haram, the activities of the group have evidently added to the woes of Nigeria, not only setting the country back economically, but also under developing an already underdeveloped Northern region and threatening Nigeria's prospect of joining the league of developing countries in 2020 (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013:290).

In addition to the violence and instability caused by Boko Haram, Nigeria has had to contend with development setbacks caused by the Niger-Delta militants, who continue to damage pipelines in a militancy campaign that has cost the federal government a fortune that could have made meaningful impact if channelled towards developmental and infrastructural projects. Paki and Ebienfa (2011:140) assert, "Oil induced militant activities in the region have impacted negatively on the nation's economy. This is evident in disruptions of oil and gas production, reduced national revenue, withdrawal of foreign capital, company and expatriate staff, transportation difficulties and short falls in projected electricity supply". Although, it is a correct deduction that the crisis in Nigeria's Niger Delta is the product of bad governance, underdevelopment, and the reckless abandonment of many decades, there is no moral and positive developmental justification for the path that the militants have taken. It is true that "notwithstanding the abundant wealth that the region parades, the people live in a state of chronic squalor and abject poverty" (Paki and Ebienfa, 2011:141); but, after many years of militant campaign, no significant change has occurred in terms of development of the region and poverty alleviation of the people. Rather the campaign has been mired in the same endemic corruption synonymous with Nigeria that benefits very few citizens and those in the realm of the political elite and their patronage network.

In an attempt to understand the interaction between insecurity and development in Nigeria, Ujomu (2001:245) maintains that Nigeria's quest for security has been fundamentally hindered by the moral condition of the state. According to Ujomu (2001:261), redefining the ethical basis and transforming the moral condition in the country are vital elements that need to be addressed to ensure that Nigeria achieves a secure society with a healthy economy and sustainable development. In essence, it is argued that the moral basis of the country thus far has inculcated in its population the belief that violence is a viable means to desirable ends and tangible political objectives, which in turn fosters insecurity. This insecurity has resulted in the stagnation of the country's development.

5.8. Poor Education

Development discourse indicates that building a country's human resources through investing in quality education is of great importance to achieving development. Recognised as a reliable tool for addressing issues of poverty, underdevelopment, population illiteracy, ignorance, gender exclusion, health problems, conflicts and tolerance, human rights and sustainability, education is seen as playing a critical role in long-term productivity and growth at both micro and macro levels. Olayiwola and Titilola (2014:11) assert that education is a crucial element for development because “a literate and skilled society is better organised, productive, active and development orientated”. Accordingly, the evidence in Chapter four on Southeast Asian countries of the positive impact investing in human capital development has on growth, national development and poverty reduction illustrates the importance of education in achieving stability and economic growth.

In the case of Nigeria, low levels of literacy and inadequate investment in its human capacity through adequate formal and vocational education have greatly impeded development in the country (Olayiwola and Titilola, 2014:11,12). Although many of the national development plans implemented by the various administrations since 1960 emphasised the importance of improving education and ensuring it is provided to all, they have struggled to provide quality education. The “universal primary education has been a stated priority of every Nigerian government since its introduction in the seventies”, “yet the education system is still far from being ready for the challenges of the new century” (Moja, 2000:2). It has been estimated that about eight million school-age children do not attend school in Nigeria, the highest figure in sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO, 2008 in Kazeem et al., 2010:1). By 2007, only 64 percent of boys and 58 percent of girls of primary school age were in school (UNESCO, 2007 cited in Kazeem et. al., 2010:2). The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2003 shows that primary school net attendance rate (NAR) is low at 60 percent, whereby the NAR for boys is 64 percent and for girls is 56 percent (Huebler, 2005 in Kazeem et al., 2010:4).

Noteworthy here is how low the completion rates of primary education are. The recorded rates of completion are 59 percent for boys and 62 percent for girls, with an average of 55 percent and a transition rate to secondary school of less than 51 percent (Moja, 2000:8). If these indexes are only reflective of primary education, then it suffices not to pay considerable attention to secondary and tertiary school attendance indexes for Nigeria, knowing what the obvious answer would be. Evidence of the failure of the Nigerian governments to invest in its population and build its human capacity can be found in what Saint et al. (2003:4) have to say:

> "Secondary education enrolments grew at roughly 10% yearly during the 1990s, but access remains constrained (less than half of secondary school age children attend school) and significant regional disparities in access are evident. Technical education is substantially neglected by policymakers and oriented to the teaching of traditional hand skills that are often divorced from labour market requirements. Higher education enrols a very modest 4% of the relevant age cohort".

While the government has attempted to implement education reforms to improve access to education, the high rate of primary school dropouts reflects the failure of both military and civil administrations to provide affordable quality education to its citizens countrywide. In an attempt to explain why education has not contributed to national development in Nigeria, Orji and Job (2013:317) argue that the unstable political environment has had adverse effects on the education system. According to Orji and Job (*ibid.*), the suspension of existing educational policies for "newly fashioned ones which typify" the political agendas of the administration in power has effectively bottlenecked the ability of education to contribute to national development. Essentially, it is argued that the politicisation of education; that is, the manipulation and structuring of educational plans and policies to meet the current political demands and caprices of policy formulators has deprived the system of continuity in policy formulation. In this regard, Adesina (2005 in Orji and Job, 2013:318) asserts that the use of education to push a particular political agenda has resulted in Nigerian politicians rather opting for "unrealistic populist educational programmes than risk their constituency through technically derived and obviously realistic and productive educational programmes".

In addition to most Nigerians being unable to complete their basic education due to unaffordability, another key factor hindering development through education is inadequate funding (Orji and Job, 2013:317; Saint et al., 2003:17). This factor has led to poor infrastructural development of schools and inadequate remuneration of teachers. In addition, this lack of funding has resulted in many students sitting on the floor or under trees for lessons and lectures, and teachers and lecturers often participating in strike action (Orji and Job, 2013:317). The failure to fund education and offer educators substantial salaries has also resulted in a dearth of qualified teachers and lecturers (Saint et al., 2003:15). As a result, "in 2001 for instance, 23 percent of over 400,000 teachers employed in the nation's primary schools did not possess the Teachers' Grade Two Certificate, even when the national certificates of education (NCE) is the minimum requirement one should possess to teach in the nations primary schools" (Nwauwa and Anyanwu, 2007:129). Thus, it can be argued that the inability to provide affordable quality education in Nigeria has effectively resulted in the underdevelopment of the country. More so, the fact that children cannot access formal education and develop skills in countries like Nigeria, according to Brockhoff et al. (2015:2), can facilitate the increased participation of children and young people in terrorist activities, thereby increasing the level of insecurity in the country and further undermining any developmental efforts made by government.

5.9. Economic diversification

Diversification of the economy refers to the means of widening the range of economic activities and outputs that are produced, as well as the dissemination of goods and services (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015:89). Within the perspective of sustainable development, economic diversification is viewed as having the "capacity to fundamentally strengthen an economy's adaptive capacity and safeguards its long-term prospects in the face of depletion of the basic natural resources and the vagaries of economic fluctuations under the pressure of competition in globalisation". Economic diversity enables the creation of a broad-based economy that is able to "secure equity both within and between generations", while limiting the over-exploitation of "natural resources to the point of extinction and environmental degradation" (Zhang, 2007 in Anyaehie and Areji, 2015:89).

Shortly after independence, the agricultural sector largely contributed to the economy of Nigeria (Ucha, 2010:52). The discovery of crude oil and the development of the petroleum industry in Nigeria brought about the abandonment of other sectors, such as agriculture, solid minerals, and the manufacturing and servicing industries (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015:89). This reckless ignorance or oversight by Nigerian politicians of the need to create and maintain a diverse economic base resulted in the overdependence on oil revenue, making Nigeria a "mono-commodity economy" (Ucha, 2010:52). The overdependence on oil, which has made Nigeria less competitive among other developing nations and damaged the growth process in the country, is what is described as the "Dutch disease" (*ibid.*). Furthermore, this neglect and non-development of other promising sectors such as agriculture, solid minerals and the manufacturing and service industries led the country to immense economic instability. Moreover, the country suffered the consequences of international oil unpredictability, gross unemployment, "poverty in the face of plenty, and a passive political leadership that is lukewarm on articulating and embarking on viable economic policies" (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015:89).

The negative impact the crash in oil prices and demands have had on the Nigerian economy underlines the crucial need for the country to diversify its economy. Additionally, the renewed assertiveness of the international community to move towards environmentally friendly renewable energy sources further emphasises the need for the Nigerian government to rethink its economic development policy (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015:91).

It is generally agreed that more investment in the agricultural sector would most benefit the country, given the significant role the sector plays in the Nigerian economy. With agriculture accounting for between 30 and 42 percent of the GDP (Iganiga and Unemhilin, 2011:81), it is argued that the expansion of the agricultural sector could play a key role in reducing poverty, enhancing food security and ensuring economic growth. According to Modey (2011:140), investing in agriculture could ensure that Nigeria achieves "a measure of food security, offer increased rural employment and incomes, and have the raw materials to sustain agro-based processing industries". Given that the largest population living in poverty is in rural Nigeria (Olayiwola and Titilola, 2014:11), it can be rightfully advocated that agriculture be placed at the centre of the development agenda in order to meet the MDG goal for halving extreme poverty and hunger (Babatunde et al., 2007:49,51).

5.10. Infrastructural and Institutional Challenges

Generally, it is argued that ineffective institutions and dilapidated infrastructure have greatly hindered the ability of Nigeria to develop its economy. The bad roads, erratic power supply, limited access to potable water, malfunctioning ports, inadequate basic healthcare, and ineffective regulatory agencies have negatively impacted the ability of the country to develop and grow (Akinwale, 2010:210). Compared to other countries, such as South Africa and Singapore, Nigeria's infrastructure remains considerably inadequate. The plethora of development policies and reforms of over more than five decades post-independence have thus failed from the inability of political leaders to strengthen the infrastructure and institutions that would drive the economy (Dike, 2014:1). The dilapidated infrastructure and ineffective institutions have subsequently dulled investment in Nigeria, including attracting foreign investors. With it being estimated that electricity in Nigeria makes up 40% of the total cost of production, Aluya (2010:1) argues that if the government were to improve the electricity supply, Nigeria would be in a better position to lure investors and spur the economy. While it is widely recognised that improving infrastructure and institutional efficiency could improve investor interest and revive the economy, it is further recognised that Nigeria's underdevelopment is compounded by the lack of technological capabilities. Understood as "the ability to make effective use of technological knowledge in an effort to assimilate, use, adapt and change existing technologies" (Kim, 1997:4), technological capability is seen as an essential component for achieving sustained economic growth and welfare (Archibugi and Coco, 2004:1).

The lack of technological capability, in addition to poor infrastructure, according to Mankiw (2008, in Dike, 2014:6), has kept productivity levels low and limited the ability of Nigeria to produce large quantities of quality goods and services that are able to meet local consumption and create a surplus that can be exported for added revenue. The argument holds true of a direct correlation between underdevelopment and escalating unemployment, as is the case with Nigeria's lack of technological capabilities and the inadequate number of highly skilled technical workers to drive the economy and create jobs (Rose, 2009 in Dike, 2014:6). Contemporarily, the lack of skilled technical manpower to drive system innovation, infrastructural development, as well as technological and economic transformation has left Nigeria not only underdeveloped but lagging behind in the changes and innovation being experienced in the global economy.

Ultimately, physical capital development in the form of technological capabilities and innovation is key area Nigeria needs to invest in to achieve growth and development. Attesting to this, Mohan (2003, in Dike, 2014:6) states that Nigeria needs to develop "an effective national system of innovation" and invest in technical education in order to achieve technological development and "enhance industrial capital accumulation, technological transformation and national development". According to Dike (2014:7), there is a dire need for Nigeria to "invest copiously in technological education and research and development" in order to not only be able to metamorphose its economy and effectively compete in the global marketplace, but also to become an industrialised nation that is able to develop its own indigenous technologies, as well as copy and adapt other countries technological innovations.

5.11. Migration

Migration is a global phenomenon that refers to "the movement of a person or group of persons, either across an international border or within a state" (International Organisation for Migration, 2017:1). Despite this relatively straightforward definition of migration, scholars have argued that by virtue of migration differing in terms of duration, distance and organisation, there is a need to develop exclusive categories of the different types of migration that exist. In this regard, the typology of migration devised by Gould and Prothero (1975:39-49), which seeks to understand migration based on time and space, is more popularly used. According to Gould and Prothero (1975:43), migration can be divided into three categories. Firstly, there is seasonal migration whereby particularly men migrate for physical labour during the dry seasons and return to farms during the wet season; secondly, in permanent migration mostly educated persons migrate for casual and permanent urban employment; and thirdly, forced migration is when households leave their homes because of civil disorder and discrimination. While each of these types of migration have varying implications for both sending and receiving locations, it is argued that little attention is paid to the rate at which international or cross-border migration has increased over the years. Darkwah and Verter (2014:321) draw attention to the impact and implication of the high movement of unskilled and highly skilled workers from poor to advanced countries, which require attention from the international community.

Although, the rapid migration of especially highly skilled workers from poor countries to advanced countries is detrimental to the sending country, many who have sought to explain and justify the need for the phenomenon have used the push-pull model. According to the push-pull model or Lee model, “push factors such as poverty, unemployment, insufficient basic socioeconomic infrastructure, and lack of economic opportunities” often force people to relocate in search of greener pastures (Darkwah and Verter, 2014:322).

In the case of Nigeria, the hostile economic situation, poor employment opportunities, political instability, and poverty are cited as the key push factors that cause people to leave the country and not want to return. However, careful analysis into the reason for emigration by Nigerians shows that the lack of employment opportunities is a major reason why they relocate (Darkwah and Verter, 2014:322). According to the available data for Nigerians who emigrated in 2000, 34.5% of them had a tertiary education (OECD, 2012 in Darkwah and Verter, 2014:323). In 2010, there was a recorded one million emigrants (0.6% of the population) in 2010 (OECD, 2012:4). Docquier and Marfouk (2004:18,29,32) found in their study on emigration rates by educational attainment and country of birth from 1990 to 2000, increasingly high rates of brain drain from Nigeria to the United States and Europe of those with tertiary education. Another study conducted by Clemens and Pettersson (2008:7,9) into the number of healthcare professionals abroad in 2000 showed, that an estimated 14% of physicians and 12% of professional nurses born in Nigeria worked and lived in developed countries. Although these percentages do not reflect the actual number of Nigerians living and working outside the country, they do provide a clear indication that Nigeria suffers from a serious case of brain drain. In addition to the problem of excessive brain drain, there is also the issue of Nigerians who study abroad and are reluctant to return to the country because the possibility of getting better jobs and living standards in their home country is unlikely (Darkwah and Verter, 2014:323).

Although the Nigerian government in recent years implemented initiatives, such as the Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO), which seeks to encourage Nigerians to contribute and play a vital role in national development (Darkwah and Verter, 2014:323), this has done little to curb migration and attract those abroad to return. The failure of the Nigerian government to address the push factors of poverty, unemployment and instability has resulted in the continued migration of Nigerians to other countries for better opportunities and living conditions. This has contributed to the underdevelopment of the country as a whole, as skilled workers in particular do not stay or return to share the knowledge they have gained abroad to develop the country's technological capabilities and for its overall betterment.

5.12. Empirical comparison between Nigeria and Indonesia

While dwelling on Nigeria as a specific demonstration of underdevelopment in West Africa, there is the need to provide empirical evidence that good governance has contributed to the overall economic miracle of Southeast Asia. Literature review in this chapter and the proceeding ones have proven beyond reasonable doubt that there is a nexus between good governance and sustainable development. In providing empirical evidence, the comparison of a particular country in Southeast Asia that bears similar characteristics to Nigeria will be explored to demonstrate this evidence.

There was little difficulty to find a country in Southeast Asia to compare to Nigeria in terms of economic performance. "Indonesia and Nigeria are particularly suited for comparison of this kind because they have a lot in common" (Vlasblom, 2013:6). Both countries are giants in their respective regions; Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia with respect to surface area and population. Nigeria is the most populous country in West Africa and Africa as a whole. Also, they are both the largest economies of their respective regions (*ibid.*; Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). Constitutionally, both countries emerged from colonisation; British influence and control in Nigeria, while Indonesia was a Dutch colony in the 17th century and was occupied by the Japanese from 1942-1945 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). Both countries had a central government after gaining independence, and have the presidential republic type of government and bicameral legislative system contemporarily. Both countries experienced a long period of rule by the military; in Nigeria, the period lasted from 1966 to 1998 with a five year interruption of civil rule from 1979 to

1983 and in 1993. Indonesia was under military rule from 1967 to 1998 (Vlasblom, 2013:7; Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). In terms of natural resources, both countries are well endowed. They have vast natural resources of different kinds, which include sizeable crude oil reserves making them major oil-producers (*ibid.*).

Furthermore, another thing that they have in common is that their "political elites abuse positions of public power to line their own pockets'' (Vlasblom, 2013:7). "On the basis of their scores on the international Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Indonesia and Nigeria can reasonably be described as two of the most countries in the world (*ibid.*). According to CPI, Indonesia is ranked 96th of 180 countries with a score of 36 out of 100, while Nigeria is ranked 148th of 180 countries with a score of 27 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2018). Although both countries have many in common, it is worthy of note that they have performed differently in economic terms since achieving independence (Vlasblom, 2013:7).

Both countries virtually matched each other in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1960s. "The per capita income (GDP divided by the number of inhabitants) in Nigeria" was higher and rising faster than in Indonesia in the 1960s. However, it was reversed from 1968, and was matched by 1982. Since then the gap has grown wider and unrelenting (Vlasblom, 2013:7). According to the 2017 estimate, Indonesia's GDP (PPP) is $3.243 trillion, GDP per capita is $12400, and GDP (real growth rate) is 5.2%. On the other hand, Nigeria's GDP (PPP) is $1.118 trillion, GDP per capita is $5900, and GDP (real growth rate) 0.8% (Central Intelligence, 2018). Although the difference in Indonesia's budget revenues and expenditures compared to those of Nigeria is more than $100 billion, both countries have similar budget deficit of -2.4% and -2.1% respectively (*ibid.*). Similarly, according the 2017 estimate, although Indonesia's public debt is 33.1% of GDP, and external debt of $322.6 billion, compared to that of Nigeria; whose public debt is 15.3% of GDP, and external debt of $35.23 billion, Indonesia has fared much better in maintaining an inflation rate at 4% compared to that of Nigeria at 16.3% (*ibid.*).

Both countries started off as agricultural-oriented economy until crude oil was discovered. "Indonesia owes its successes to three decades of political stability under Suharto's New Order" (Vlasblom, 2013:8,9). The policy makers in Indonesia and Nigeria had different priorities. Indonesia pursued pro-poor, pro-rural development strategy adopting new agricultural technology that was labour-intensive. This marked the beginning of industrialisation, created jobs and reduced poverty (Vlasblom, 2013:9-10). Nigeria on the other hand embraced "rapid industrialisation'', embarking on mega project at the peril of agriculture (Vlasblom, 2013:10). “While Indonesia was spending its oil dollars in the 1970s on labour-intensive agriculture, Nigeria was using its revenue for capital-intensive industrial projects, including an enormous steel factory that has never produced any steel. Even when they produced something, these new industries employed very few people” (*ibid.*).

As stated in the preceding chapters two and three, the nexus between good governance and sustainable development cannot be overemphasised. The comparison above between Indonesia and Nigeria has shown the superiority of Indonesia’s governance strategy over that of Nigeria. Going back to chapter two where Kaufmann et al. (2010:3-4) classification of indicators for governance was discussed, a closer look at these indicators for both countries will reveal empirical evidence of Indonesia’s superior governance strategy over Nigeria. The classification of indicators referred to as Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), contain six aggregated indicators which score countries differently based on their performances, with higher value indicating better governance scores. Evaluation of the Country Data Report for Nigeria and Indonesia from 1996 to 2014 which scores a total of 100 as the percentile rank confirms the findings so far from the comparison of both countries. They are as follow:

Table 2 Worldwide Governance Indicators for Nigeria and Indonesia

Voice and accountability;

	1996	2014	Peak	Low
Nigeria	4.8	29.6	30.3 in 2000	4.8 in 1996
Indonesia	23.6	53.2	53.2 in 2014	17.3 in 1998

Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism;

	1996	2014	Peak	Low
Nigeria	13.5	5.3	24.5 in 1998	3.3 in 2010-2012
Indonesia	13.0	31.1	31.1 in 2014	2.9 in 2003

Government effectiveness;

	1996	2014	Peak	Low
Nigeria	15.1	11.5	20.5 in 2005	9.6 in 2009
Indonesia	37.1	54.8	54.8 in 2014	29.3 in 1998

Regulatory quality;

	1996	2014	Peak	Low
Nigeria	22.5	23.6	27.5 in 2011	8.3 in 2004
Indonesia	57.4	49.0	57.4 in 1996	20.6 in 2003

Rule of law;

	1996	2014	Peak	Low
Nigeria	10.5	11.5	14.8 in 2000	4.3 in 2002
Indonesia	39.7	41.8	41.8 in 2014	20.1 in 2002

Control of corruption;

	1996	2014	Peak	Low
Nigeria	8.8	7.2	21.4 in 2008	4.4 in 2003
Indonesia	30.7	34.1	34.1 in 2014	8.3 in 2002

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2017, Country Data Reports for Nigeria and Indonesia, 1996-2014.

At a glance, the scores for Nigeria in all six indicators are comparably low. Even in some indicators with improvement; there is a regression as seen in the indicators for 2014. In contrast, Indonesia scored much more in all of the six indicators, and also showing strong improved governance measures in 2014, which indicate better governance with time.

There is little wonder that the improving governance measures in Indonesia has translated into better indices than that of Nigeria in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development reports of 2016, and that of the Central Intelligence Agency World fact book of 2018. They are as follow:

Table 3 United Nations Development Programme Human Development reports of 2016 for Nigeria and Indonesia

	Nigeria	Indonesia
Human Development Index	0.527, ranked 152 out of 188 countries	0.689, ranked 113 out of 188 countries
Life expectancy at birth	53.1	69.1
Expected years of schooling	10.0	12.9
Gross national income per capital (2011 PPP$)	5443	10053
Inequality adjusted HDI	0.328	0.563
Gender Development Index	0.847	0.926
Multidimensional Poverty Index	0.279	0.024
Homicide rate (per 100000)	10.1	0.5
Employment to population ratio (%ages 15 and older)	53.1	63.4
Exports and imports (% of GDP)	30.9	41.9
Demography	182.2, population total (million)	257.6, population total (million)

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports 2016 for Nigeria and Indonesia.

Table 4 Central Intelligence Agency World fact book of 2018 for Nigeria and Indonesia

	Nigeria	Indonesia
Birth rate	36.9 births/1000 population	16.2 births/1000 population
Death rate	12.4 deaths/1000 population	6.5 deaths/1000 population
Maternal mortality ratio	814 deaths/100000 live births	126 deaths/100000 live births
Infant mortality rate	69.8 deaths/1000 live births	22.7 deaths/1000 live births
Improved urban water	80.8% of population	94.2% of population
Unimproved urban water	19.2% of population	5.8% of population
Improved rural water	57.3% of population	79.5% of population

Unimproved rural water	42.7% of population	20.5% of population
Improved total water	68.5% of population	87.4% of population
Unimproved total water	31.5% of population	12.6% of population
Improved urban sanitation	32.8% of population	72.3% of population
Unimproved urban sanitation	67.2% of population	27.7% of population
Improved rural sanitation	25.4% of population	47.5% of population
Unimproved rural sanitation	74.6% of population	52.5% of population
Improved total sanitation	29% of population	60.8% of population
Unimproved total sanitation	71% of population	39.2% of population
Literacy (age 15 and over can read and write)	59.6% of total population	95.4% of total population
Population without electricity	95,500,000	48,700,000
Electrification (Total population)	45%	81%
Electrification (Urban areas)	55%	94%
Electrification (Rural areas)	37%	66%
Electricity production	29.83 billion KWH	221.3 billion KWH
Airports (total)	54	673
Airports (paved runways)	40	186
Airports (unpaved runways)	14	487
Railways (total)	3798 km	8159 km
Roadways (total)	193200 km	496607 km
Roadways (paved)	28980 km	283102 km
Roadways (unpaved)	164220 km	213505 km
Waterways	8600 km	21579 km

Source: Central Intelligence Agency – The Wold fackbook 2018 – Africa, Nigeria; East and Southeast Asia, Indonesia.

Nigeria lags behind in all of the indices illustrated above. Considering both the governance and development measures, there is a strong correlation to the theme of the study, which ties sustainable development to good governance. Furthermore, a close look at the governance measures available in scoring African countries shows that Nigeria is also doing poorly. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG); 2017 Index Report scores Nigeria

48.1 in 2016, which is below the African average score of 50.8. This ranked Nigeria 35th out of 54 countries, with an annual average trend of +0.38 (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2017).

The IIAG-Report consists of four categories, they as follow:

- Safety and rule of law;
- Participation and human rights;
- Sustainable economic opportunity;
- Human development (*ibid.*).

Each contains subcategories under which have organised various indicators making up to 100 indicators. The IIAG-Report provides data measuring the governance performance across all the dimensions above for all 54 African countries for the years from 2000 to 2016 (*ibid.*).

5.13. Conclusion

Literature on the conditions necessary to achieve development and good governance suggests that a nexus exists between the two concepts. One cannot speak of achieving development both economically and socially in the absence of sound governance, as well as accountable and visionary leaders. Different studies and scholars have argued that development cannot be achieved in the absence of an effective government, which is able to provide the services and institutions that will guarantee its people quality living standards. It is further maintained that a lack of good governance in the form of an effective government results in the underdevelopment of a country. This underdevelopment, which is characterised by low productivity, low income, a poor standard of living, with the vast majority being undernourished and without adequate shelter; stagnated rates of growth in employment and investment; high population growth rates; mass poverty, shortages and scarcity; chronic unemployment; and poor technology and infrastructure, provides an environment in which terrorism, insecurity and state collapse thrive. Evidence of the negative impact that poor governance has on a country is clearly visible in the situation that currently exists in Nigeria. Despite Nigerians and the world being hopeful that the country, with its abundance of natural and human resources, would become a competitive economy both regionally and globally, this has not been the case. Instead, since independence, Nigeria has experienced a crisis of development and governance. This situation has resulted in many scholars calling for a serious investigation into how the country can navigate its way out of this rocky terrain of underdevelopment, bad governance, abject poverty and insecurity.

The discussions above have attempted to illustrate why despite earning an estimated US$500 billion in revenue from oil since 1970, Nigeria is still battling with problems of poverty, unemployment, domestic debt, infrastructural dross, woeful health and educational services, as well as social resentment and anarchy (Suberu, 2007:96). While the damage caused by slavery and colonialism is still evident, inept leadership, cronyism, corruption, ethno-religious conflicts, terrorism, and poor education have resulted in the country being unable to actualise its potential and develop the necessary institutions and structures that can provide the capacity to ensure economic growth, the equitable distribution of national wealth, political stability, and accountability. It is thus evident that for Nigeria to reach its full potential and become the economic powerhouse it can be, there is a need to rethink and redevelop its internal structures.

A critical analysis of the factors contributing to the underdevelopment of Nigeria demonstrates that the current development crisis, conflict, violence, and state collapse are largely a result of a primitive and undeveloped political culture. The lack of a sound political agenda that is concerned with attaining development for all Nigerians has resulted in most administrations wasting their time developing economic and social solutions that are unable to fully address the issues that exist within the country. Accordingly, Olanrewaju (2015:13) maintains, “National unity cannot be realised by any means so long as Nigerians are still being chained, psyched and hypnotized by the evil and destructive forces of ethnocentrism and primordialism”. To the ordinary Nigerian, the hope of a new Nigeria is so grim that Olanrewaju (2015:13) surmises, “No amount of political, economic, or educational solutions will recreate and remake Nigeria unless the dark and evil forces of ethnocentrism and primordialism”, corruption and religious bigotry that continue to rob Nigeria of any hope of achieving good governance, development and economic growth are rooted out. But how can Nigeria deal with these debilitating factors?

Literature suggests that the first and most important factor that must be addressed to successfully achieve economic and social development is the country’s leadership deficiency. Here it is argued that the corruption and mismanagement by Nigeria’s leadership has been the bane of development in the country. Achebe (1984:3,10) asserts that the lack of effective management of human and material resources as a result of leadership problems in the country has resulted in its growth stagnating. If Ebun’s (2014:15) assertion that “development requires dreams and visions” is anything to go by, then it is clear that if Nigeria is ever to transform into a developed and economically vibrant state, it will need to elect politically willing, transparent, charismatic, and visionary leaders who are committed to ensuring the welfare and development of the people. While this appears to be a straightforward solution, an apt question to ask is how can the deficiencies in governance be addressed?

According to Ebun (2014:15), the poor leadership and bad governance that Nigeria is plagued by will be resolved when “the poor and the commoners” awake from their sleep and recognise their potential to break the cycle of unaccountable and corrupt administrations, which begins with desisting from the habit of selling their votes. In addition to taking the first step to good governance through voting for credible leaders, irrespective of party, religion and ethnic affiliations, Ebun (2014:16) maintains that Nigerians must also begin to “hold their leaders accountable for their actions and non-actions”. Ebun (2014:15-16) concludes that the road to development and good governance begins with Nigerians becoming more politically aware of the power they hold to change their circumstances through the election of a legitimate government that will promote the culture and value of a unified Nigerian society and implement development strategies aimed at improving all citizens’ living conditions.

Although Ebun (2014:15-16) and other scholars, who suggest that the power and onus of changing the system lies with the people of Nigeria, are within the ambit of truth, a key question relates to how people so disconnected from each other can come together to achieve the overhaul of the current debilitated society they live in, and start afresh. Is it perhaps utopic to believe that the people of Nigeria, who like their politicians and public officials have become accustomed to the unethical, corrupt and poverty-stricken ineffective environment they live in, will have the political will to rise up and declare that they have had enough? Repeatedly in Nigeria new politicians have started political parties and run for office, promising that they will be different, only to find themselves in the same trap as their predecessors of bad governance, corruption and unaccountability (Akoma, 2015:1). This indicates the need for transformation in the country’s political and public structures; alternatively, it will remain a vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment.

When discussing the development crisis in Nigeria, one thing is certain, and that is the fact that there is no one solution to the problems the country faces. Additionally, it can be agreed that there is no particular point from which Nigerians can depart to begin their journey of transformation. One could however argue that education is the fundamental point to start. Access and provision to quality education, which will not only provide Nigerians with the skills to begin to rebuild the nation, but also, it is hoped, make them more accepting of people of different tribes, religions and ideas could be a vital starting point to redefining Nigeria's future. If education is the backbone of development and educating a man means that he is able to become "actional, preserving in all his relations, his respect for the basic values that constitute a human world" (Fanon, 1986:222), then it can be argued that education is the starting point from which Nigerians must trace their development path.

CHAPTER SIX

GENERAL OVERVIEW, PLAN OF ACTION FOR DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GOOD GOVERNANCE

6.1. Introduction

The decision to embark on this study; hence the title, was informed by curiosity and the dire need to find answers and adequate scientific understanding to grasp how West Africa as a sub-region and Nigeria in a specific context, with its abundant human, natural and mineral resources, could still be wallowing in poverty and remain in a state of underdevelopment in the 21st century. Apart from this, scholars and academics have justifiably described West Africa in derogatory terms related to governance and development, which include the following:

- One of the most unstable regions in the world;
- Consist of fragile states;
- Governance and leadership failure;
- Weak institutions;
- Human and capital flight resulting from armed conflicts;
- Corruption and institutionalised looting;
- Military rule and the colossal depletion of resources;
- High indebtedness and the outflow of debt service payments, associated with a poor credit rating and the stagnant inflow of private investment;
- Chronic dependence on foreign aid and its associated economic downturn; and
- Forced migration and the brain drain.

The list is endless, all associated with one sub-region. It explains, therefore, why half of 250 million West Africans live on less than one dollar a day, and wallow in extreme poverty (see chapter one, section 1.1., page 2-3; section 1.2., page 4-9).

This endemic state of underdevelopment has been tied inherently to poor governance which has been exacerbated and perpetuated since self-rule of more than half a century following political independence in the 1960s. The unanimous consensus is that the path out of this development tragedy is through good governance, which is believed to be indispensable to all manner of favourable outcomes. Therefore, the aim of the study was to locate the bridge linking good governance and sustainable development in Nigeria, which will then provide a template or a model that can be proffered to the whole sub-region of West Africa. More so, the innate potential for Nigeria to become developed was located, and as development has remained an aspiration for the nation, the so-called "economic miracle" model of Southeast Asian countries was explored in order to deduce a way to propose sustainable good governance structure and function, and an implementation strategy towards the achievement of sustainable development. The need to grasp first the causal effect of bad governance on development, through the investigation of the case of Nigeria and West Africa as a whole, stemmed from the fact that scientific knowledge, when applied, can result in the promotion of human progress. It also stemmed from the knowledge that experience can be the best teacher when one truly learns from it; thus, forming the bedrock of knowledge and the gift of hindsight. The study's objectives therefore were:

- To explain the theoretical background and perspective of governance and development, and the relevant criteria;
- To determine the role of governance in the development of underdeveloped countries;
- To analyse West Africa in terms of its present governance and development status, and in comparison to the level of governance and development in Southeast Asia;
- To analyse Nigeria in terms of its present governance and development status, and compare Nigeria's governance and development measures with those of Indonesia; and
- To identify and develop a plan of action for the improvement and enhancement of development through the establishment of good governance principles in Nigeria, and thence, in West Africa.

So far, the preceding chapters have dealt with all but the last objective of this study. However, this will come into focus through the overview of the preceding chapters, while highlighting the meaning and the main issues.

6.2. Overview

As the main issues lie within governance and development discourse, and how the practice of good governance can bring about favourable development outcomes, the study took a leap from conceptualising governance and good governance in relationship with government and those governed. Secondly, the study took a critical look at development as a term, and its conceptualisation, meaning, and application to the context of the sub-region under study. Thirdly, the study looked at West Africa in its entirety highlighting the role of governance in the present state of underdevelopment, while comparing it to Southeast Asia, who achieved political independence within the same period as West Africa, but has achieved better development outcomes. Lastly, the study looked at Nigeria as a specific case study, analysing the issues of governance and the results of the development paths chosen, and the unfavourable development outcomes within the inhibitors to the desired objectives and compared its governance and development measures with those of Indonesia (see chapter one, section 1.5., page 12-13; chapter five, section 5,12., page 115-121).

6.2.1. Governance

Within the concept of governance, Chapter two located the various conceptualisations and definitions of the term. By so doing, and in order to delineate the concept for the suitability of this study, the definition that encompasses broadly and narrowly focused meanings was embraced. In other words, while governance is variously understood, with each analysis reflecting the bias of the observer, much of the body of literature seems to conceptualise governance from the perspective that presupposes that governance is essentially about control, authority, or a system of regulations. Therefore, governance can be underlined as a means to achieve direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organisations on behalf of the interest that they jointly contribute to. On the other hand, governance is about exercising authority, power or control; power-sharing and partnerships among various sectors of society; and a form of coordination between subsystems. Thus, this signifies a deviation from the traditional notion to a new notion of understanding that government is only one of the many actors of governance, with others being civil society, nongovernmental organisations, research institutes, the media, lobbyists, international donors, and multinational corporations. This new notion of governance recognises the role that civil society plays in encouraging political accountability, legitimacy, transparency, and participation (see chapter 2, section 2.2., page 15-16; section 2.2.1., page 17-19).

Furthermore, serving as a political reform alternative, governance seeks to promote cooperation and connection between the state, private sector, and society as co-producers of knowledge and development, as well as multifaceted forms of participation to increase the legitimacy of public action. This culminates in a broader conceptualisation of the term good governance, which is not only focused on adding value to society and promoting development, but also creating systems and structures that complement each other. Characterised by accessibility, accountability, transparency, predictability, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, participation and the rule of law, good governance within the realm of development is recognised as a vital feature of the modern government and the prerequisite for economic and social development. Although the characteristics above clearly describe democratic institutions and democracy, good governance was found to not always correlate with democracy. It is irrefutable that democracy encourages elections, civil and political rights, and economic empowerment, as part of a formidable political system, but good governance is not associated with any particular form of political regime or system. Accordingly, it is argued that no specific political system needs to be in place to increase the likelihood of achieving good governance. As long as there is a political will, and achieving favourable developmental outcomes is a priority, any political regime or system will prevail (see chapter two, section 2.2.3., page 21; section 2.3., page 25; section 2.3.4., page 31-33).

6.2.2. Development

There is a tendency to perceive development as a linear process where economic growth results in modernity and the eradication of poverty and inequality in a society; hence, the aim of Chapter three was to establish the meaning of development in tandem with the theme of this study. The chapter reviewed critically the existing Western-oriented development theories, namely Modernisation, Dependency and Neo-liberalism, which have influenced development thinking and practices, finding them not applicable to offer a way forward towards development in West Africa and Africa as a whole. Next, the study examined alternative approaches to development to assess if they provide solutions and processes to achieve development in the developing world (see chapter three, section 3.1., page 40).

While many scholars perceive development from an economic standpoint, other scholars argue for a more human-centred understanding of development. This human-centred approach relates to development as more than economic growth as a multi-dimensional concept that must factor in the economic, political, social, cultural and environmental structures and standards in its analyses. Several development theories have been experimented with in Africa; however, they have failed dismally to achieve the intended objectives. The most recent to have failed is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was seen as the new messiah to lead Africa to the promised land of political and socioeconomic development. It called for African countries to adopt more African-owned and African-led development. However, it's endorsement of opening up African economies to external investors and securing the property rights of foreign capital, as well as its proposal of strategies that focused on achieving economic growth outcomes greatly undermined its ability to address local needs and therefore secure local ownership and support (see chapter three, section 3.1., page 40; section 3.2., page 41; section 3.3.3.1.3., page 51).

The issues surrounding local ownership brought to the fore the failure of African leaders to establish a development agenda that acknowledges the agency of their populations and the role of culture, and raise a number of questions regarding their perceptions and understanding of what an African-led and African-owned development programme means. With poverty being the prime concern in Africa, poverty eradication must be the top priority of any development perspective, rather than market and economic growth. In order to achieve sustainable development, a multidimensional understanding of development, which takes into account the importance of culture and humanism, needs to be adopted. It needs to not only be structured to address the elements that contribute to the perpetuation of poverty, but also to ensure that ordinary citizens participate in identifying, planning and implementing solutions to address these problems. Hence, the review of alternative approaches to development such as: Human Development, Participatory Rural Appraisal, and the African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programmes, in order to find a lasting solution to underdevelopment in West Africa and the rest of Africa (see chapter three, section 3.3.3.1.3., page 51-52; section 3.4.1., page 53; section 3.4.4.1., page 60; section 3.5., page 63).

6.2.3. West Africa's underdevelopment and Southeast Asia's development success

The success story of development in Southeast Asia has sparked much debate and research into how it could achieve collective developmental success and economic growth so rapidly. This has propelled the investigation of the methodology of policy formulation and policy choices adopted in the region with the intention of not necessarily replicating it, but to learn from it, and for it to serve as a guide or model for the development of West Africa. Chapter four, through a comparative analysis of West Africa and Southeast Asia, identified the diverging paths the two regions took in their development trajectories by discussing the key development strategies that Southeast Asian countries adopted and contrasting them with those of West Africa. The chapter highlighted the importance of understanding the nexus between governance and development, as well as some key development strategies adopted by Southeast Asia that West Africa can focus on, within its own context, to ensure its own development (see chapter four, section 4.1., page 66).

West Africa has several challenges to achieving development, which include state fragility and poor governance, characterised by conflict, famine, and abject poverty. These have had debilitating effects, with West Africa underperforming economically; with a greater rise in poverty even at times when the global average of poverty was decreasing and the real growth rate showed an upward trend. The underperformance was traced to a number of external (e.g. colonial legacies) and internal (e.g. corruption, failure of governance) factors, with the proven fact that the internal factors are prevailing contemporarily. The culture of leadership practiced in West African countries is characterised by leaders arbitrarily governing their countries like personal businesses, personalising power, and denying citizens their fundamental human rights. These factors have contributed to the poor performance and growth of the region's countries. Rent-seeking in government positions, neopatrimonialism, corruption, and clientelism have been cited as some of the key features that have contributed to the economic and developmental stagnation of the sub-region (see chapter four, section 4.2., page 67-69).

Comparison of the two regions revealed the distinct development policies that Southeast Asian countries adopted which West African countries neglected, such as outward orientation and macroeconomic discipline; the activist role of the government in industrial policy; a focus on matters relating to governance, culture and social characteristics; and taking advantage of resource endowment and geographical proximity. This provides a clear indication of the correlations and nexus that exist between governance and growth towards sustainable development, as discussed in Chapter two and Chapter three. The transformation of Southeast Asia reflects that implementing appropriate policies, incentives, and sanctions to ensure that resources are channelled into priority areas is essential to achieving economic transformation and development. Apart from policy formulations and development strategies, which underline the importance of the relationship between governance and development that West Africa can learn from Southeast Asia, a key lesson is the importance of establishing development strategies that are unique and applicable to the context of the sub-region, characterised by real-sector pragmatism, goal orientation and an aspiration for nation building. Sustainable development is achievable when these elements exist: political will; visionary leadership; efficient bureaucracies; strategic policy formulations; economic diversity; and investment in human capital through education (see chapter four, section 4.3., page 71; section 4.4., page 72,74; section 4.4.1., page 76; section 4.5., page 90).

6.2.4. Underdevelopment of Nigeria

Contemporarily, to blame the persistent socioeconomic challenges in Nigeria on the structural deficiencies created from the country's colonial legacy is irrelevant and inconsistent. Although it was a system designed for exploitation and oppression, which kept Nigeria in a permanent state of vulnerability and underdevelopment, it has been more than 50 years of independence and self-rule; the same period the Southeast Asian countries' economic miracle took to happen. Chapter five highlighted the domestic and contemporary challenges that contributed to underdevelopment and poor economic growth in Nigeria (see chapter five, section 5.1., page 91).

The fact that Nigeria features at the bottom of many human and economic development indicator indexes raises pertinent questions as to why a country with abundant natural and mineral wealth and human potential has failed to develop effectively and equitably. Further analysis revealed that issues such as corruption, poor governance, poor leadership, poor human capital investment, misplaced priorities and lack of appropriate policy formulation, and lack of economic diversification with an overdependence on oil wealth to grow its economy are responsible for the country's underdevelopment (see chapter five, section 5.2., page 92; section 5.12., page 116-117).

Since independence Nigeria adopted several development policies, plans and projects to improve the quality of life of its citizens, as well as to secure economic growth and overall sustainable development; however, it has never achieved its intended objectives and there have been inconsistencies and discontinuities with successive administrations. The dismal failure of the development plans adopted since independence has significantly disrupted Nigeria's pathway to development. Careful analysis has indicated that the ineffectiveness of policy implementation, endemic corruption, and political instability caused by transitioning between civilian and military administrations brought about this failure. The most implicated of all the vices of underdevelopment in Nigeria is the endemicity of corruption that cuts across all facets society. Corruption, which includes political, bureaucratic and electoral corruption; bribery; fraudulent activities; embezzlement of public funds and extortion; and institutionalised looting, is a prevalent problem linked by all and sundry in Nigeria to the underdevelopment of the economy. Corrupt practices have long been fostered and sustained by weak institutions and unaccountable political leaders; preserved and proliferated primarily by powerful individuals and political elites who seek to gain and maintain control over the resources in the country. This has had adverse effects on the growth and development of Nigeria, as well as public service delivery in the country (see chapter five, section 5.3., page 92; section 5.3.7., page 96; section 5.4., page 98-100, section 5.12., page 116-117).

The normalisation of corruption has no doubt resulted in ineffective institutions and dilapidated infrastructure, and has greatly hindered the ability of Nigeria to develop its economy, and dulled investments, including attracting foreign investors. Worse still is the lack of a skilled workforce owing to the brain-drain and inadequate funding of education to drive system innovation, infrastructural development, as well as technological and economic transformation. All of these factors, including the hostile economic situation, poor employment opportunities, political instability and poverty, have caused people to leave Nigeria and not want to return. The failure of the Nigerian government to address the push factors of poverty, unemployment and instability has resulted in the continued migration of Nigerians to other countries for better opportunities and living conditions. This is a major contributor to the underdevelopment of the country as skilled workers in particular do not stay, or return to impart the knowledge they have gained abroad, to develop the country (see chapter five, section 5.10., page 111,112; section 5.11., page 113,114).

One would wonder how the proliferation of these adverse inhibitors to development have persisted over several decades when Nigeria is not short of legislation to enshrine public accountability. All that is required is the political will and active collaboration of the government and the citizenry to actualise the legislation into practical working policies. The evidence of the negative impact poor governance has on a country has been clearly illustrated by the situation in Nigeria. The aim of the study was to find ways how Nigeria can navigate its way out of the terrain of underdevelopment, bad governance, abject poverty, and insecurity. Clearly, if the assertion that development requires dreams and visions is anything to go by, then Nigerians need to elect politically willing, transparent, accountable, and visionary leaders who are committed to the welfare and development of their people (see chapter five, section 5.6., page 105; section 5.13., page 122,123).

6.3. Findings and Conclusion of the Study

6.3.1. Governance and good governance

According to new notions of governance, government is only one of the many actors of governance, with the other actors being civil society, the public, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), research institutes, the media, lobbyists, international donors, and multinational corporations (MNC). This emphasises that governments play a variable role in developing and implementing policies and strategies to ensure the smooth running of any country, while recognising the role that civil society plays in encouraging political accountability, legitimacy, transparency and participation. In other words, government acts on behalf of its people who legitimise its existence by overseeing the smooth running of the day-to-day activities of a country. The focus of governance in this new sense involves the role of civil society groups and other non-state actors in holding the public sector accountable, as well as advocating for the needs and priorities of the public. This means that government positions exist solely to serve the people, and when this mandate is compromised, someone must be held accountable. However, to have good leadership one needs good followership. Good followership is adjudged by the quality of leaders who are elected or chosen to lead, and vice versa. This is a deviation from the traditional understanding of governance as a top-down, centralised, hierarchical concept to a new form of governing that is inclusive and cooperative (see chapter two, section 2.2., page 15-16).

Seen as a political reform alternative, the concept of governance promotes cooperation and connection between the state, private sector, and society as co-producers of knowledge and developments, as well as multifaceted forms of participation to increase the legitimacy of public action. The implication is that the state is no longer an instrument for the realisation of societal goals, but rather, the state and society interact as co-producers in order to give society self reassurance and identity, to mobilise self-regulatory potentials, and to guarantee societal integration. This ensures that the people concerned are involved from the outset in the development issues that concern them and how these issues affect them, by being able to make informed decisions on best practice on policy deliberations and drafting, and subsequent implementation according to the priority of their needs. This forms the fundamentals of good governance, with emphasis on a people-centric oriented way of governing, which will not only add value to society and promote development, but also create systems and structures, that complement each other. Characterised by accessibility, accountability, transparency, predictability, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, participation, and the rule of law, good governance is, especially within development, recognised as a vital feature of the modern government and second to none for economic and social development (see chapter two, section 2.2.3., page 21; section 2.3.1., page 25).

Good governance does not always correlate with democracy. Despite the stretching justifications that are used to suggest that good governance can effectively be achieved through democratic institutions and democracy, it is not associated with any particular form of political regime or system. Accordingly, no specific political system needs to be in place to increase the likelihood of achieving good governance. Good governance only occurs when there is a conscious effort, imbued political willingness and dedication. Examples of countries that boast good governance are the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, while most African countries claim to practice democracy, but with bad governance structures. Furthermore, Southeast Asia's leaders launched an authoritarian developmentalism aimed at enforcing national ideology that glorified material advancement, an unwavering belief in upgrading technology and competitiveness, popular support for rising living standards, and political legitimacy based on industrial results rather than democratic procedure (see chapter two, section 2.3.4., page 31-33; chapter four, section 4.4.1., page 75).

The measures of good governance advanced by Western development and donor agencies that promote neoliberal democratic values and strong market-oriented initiatives are fundamentally not applicable or relevant in the West African context. Therefore, from a West African perspective, good governance must be understood within a human-centred development paradigm. Within this paradigm, the definitions and understandings of good governance must support a more context-specific approach that fits the realities and perspectives of the people and encourages ownership by the people of reforms and development programmes initiated by the state or government thus, the epitome of participatory democracy. Although many African scholars and policymakers agree with the notion of reconceptualising good governance within a human-centred paradigm, others pessimistically conclude that good governance cannot take place in Africa as a whole due to the normalisation of a political culture that is rife with corruption, militarism, authoritarianism, clientelism, neo-patrimonialism, tribalism, and nepotism (see chapter two, section 2.4., page 36; section 2.4.1., page 37; section 2.5., page 38-39).

6.3.2. Development

Linked to good governance is the concept of development, perceived as a process where economic growth results in modernity and the eradication of poverty and equality in a society. For newly independent countries in Africa, development was the top priority, which was meant to convert newly won political equality with the rich countries into an economic equality that would earn them respect and a sense of self-dignity, which had been denied under colonialism. In this respect, the new leadership delved into development concepts and theories prescribed by their previous colonial masters without consideration that their countries' development must tread a different path having been disadvantaged for an extended period. The assumption that immediate post-independent traditional society needed to be overhauled was flawed. Rather, through engaging with modern societies and experiencing the modernising influences of others, traditional societies could be revitalised to create a dual or mixed economy that was both modern and traditional, which would then serve as a cultural heritage suitable for tourism and a reminder for generations to come of Africa's antecedents (see chapter three, section 3.2., page 40; section 3.3.1., page 43-44).

The adoption and playing to the suggestion that post-colonial countries such as in West Africa, were more likely to reach modernity with the help of developed countries, meant that they had to accept a certain degree of foreign intervention to ensure development and modernity. In most cases this "help" materialised in the form of monetary assistance- as foreign aid that has persisted to the present day and has established a vicious cycle of financial dependence, to countries that had forcefully imposed themselves and fostered a reign of oppression and exploitation, and have left without putting in place structures for development of these colonies, but rather left them barehanded. The adoption of these notions of African development strategies failed to provide countries on the continent with the capital expected to develop their economies. Instead, it resulted in a new scramble for Africa that focused on assuming a direct role in controlling a country's natural source of wealth; in that way, they were poised to attain the goals accomplished by colonialism. The criticism holds true of the assumption that underdeveloped countries can achieve development by following in the footsteps of affluent, developed countries because there is the racist superiority complex that has relegated the people of poor countries to the Third World. Much of the West's development was achieved on the foundations of colonialism, imperialism and exploitation, which cannot be replicated to ensure the development of West Africa to the whole of Africa (see chapter three, section 3.3.1., page 44; section 3.3.1.1., page 44-45).

The contradiction between Western theories of development and politics and the realities of development and politics in Third World countries, such as in West Africa, clearly underlines the fact that there is a need to deconstruct the idea that the adoption of exogenously established development strategies will result in the modernisation and development of

West African countries. The only way for underdeveloped countries to achieve development would be to disengage from the international system, which perpetuates their underdevelopment, and pursue their own path of development. They are better off endeavouring to achieve development using their own culturally specific initiatives and paths. Also, they can use the associations they have with developed countries as a means to gain knowledge and increase their capacity to break the vicious cycle of underdevelopment (see chapter three, section 3.3.1.1., page 46; section 3.3.2., page 47-48).

New examples of Western-based theories from the 1980s saw the advent of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs), and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The adoption of SAPs by African countries, which in practice required a strong, determined and relatively autonomous state (whether democratic or not), were substantially and vehemently rejected by African people and encouraged corruption, exploitation, and the rise of repressive regimes rather than democracy and economic growth. The implementation of PRSs by African governments consequentially further crippled their economies and had little impact on the progress towards poverty reduction and development as most governments opted to present proposals for programmes they knew would be accepted by the international financial institutions, even if they conflicted with national interests and would negatively affect the poor. The failure of the NEPAD document to recognise and acknowledge the role of culture and tradition as more than a means to consolidate the pride of Africans in their own humanity and confirm the humanity of its people by getting them in their development process spelt doom for the initiative. In this respect, poverty which is the prime concern in Africa, was not prioritised; instead, it was market and economic growth (see chapter three, section 3.3.3.1.1., page 50; section 3.3.3.1.2., page 50; section 3.3.3.1.3., page 51).

The inability of underdeveloped countries like those in Africa to achieve development under the mainstream development theories has little to do with them being ungovernable or simply unable to advance, but has much to do with the reality that the conventional development theories implemented in the African context have been too abstract, mechanistic and economistic. Therefore, development strategies that take into account the importance of the human, historical, social, ethical, cultural and political dimensions must be devised to ensure economic growth and the holistic development of African societies. Hence, the review of alternative approaches to development such as the Human Development Index (HDI), Participatory Development, and the African Alternative

Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs) (see chapter 3, section 3.3.3.1.2., page 53).

HDI is useful and serves as a motivator that can be used to influence social and economic policy decisions. Although criticised for not being comprehensive enough to include important aspects of human development, such as the ability to participate in decision-making, HDI is currently the most used method of measuring human development and it is linked to the Millennium Development Goals, sustainable development and people's-management development (see chapter three, section 3.4.1.1., page 56).

The participatory development approach maintains that government would not use resources on mass welfare unless the poor, who are in the majority, are sufficiently powerful to force such policy on the government; thus, it advocates for grass-root development that is community-centric. A typical illustration of participatory development is the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which seeks to address the needs of a community using development plans that are agreed upon by all community members and are undertaken in a cooperative manner. The approach differs from the prevalent development practices pursued by donor and aid agencies, which leave the responsibility of determining how communities need to be assisted and which areas need to be improved to facilitate development, to donor and aid workers and researchers. Since the notion of participatory development gained traction, the PRA approach has been widely used by governments, multinationals, donor and aid organisations, and development agencies. Some critics maintain that the assumptions made by the approach are weak and leave communities vulnerable to being marginalised in the development process. For instance, in relation to authority and knowledge, the approach is flawed in assuming that communities have the knowledge, resources and skills to adequately engage in development processes (see chapter three, section 3.4.4., page 60; section 3.4.4.1., page 61).

As a result of the failure of the Western-oriented model of development, fundamentally flawed for not considering the context of the historical, political, cultural and social idiosyncrasies of African countries and people, AAF-SAPs is an attempt to address the root cause of underdevelopment on the continent. It placed the origins of Africa's underdevelopment and economic structural deformities in the colonial period, and sought to find solutions to Africa's problems by developing a long-term agenda from a comprehensive perspective, rather than accepting the short-term agendas proposed by international agencies that assumed that Africa's difficulties could be corrected by monetarism. The failure of AAF-SAPs to gain ground and be adopted in African countries despite its African-centredness raises a number of questions, prompting one to ask if it can be attributed to realising what should be done and yet lacking the desire to promote and achieve such goals. The questions begging for answers without a response raise the suggestion that doing the right thing may stand in the way of contemporary governance in Africa, which is rife with corruption and, institutionalised looting. The failure to adopt the framework raises the question of what alternatives are available to address issues of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa (see chapter 3, section 3.5., page 63-64).

6.3.3. West Africa and Southeast Asia

It is worthwhile to uncover what Southeast Asia did differently or better than West Africa, but the development model of Southeast Asia cannot be used as more than a blueprint to guide the development of West Africa. There is an absolute need for West Africa to attain economic development because of the burden of poverty it carries, for it has nine out of the 25 poorest countries in the world. Of the 17 West African countries listed on the HDI, 14 belong to the Low Human Development category, and of the over 250 million West Africans, half of them live on less than one dollar a day (see chapter four, section 4.2., page 66-67).

Since independence in the 1960s, the economic performance of West African countries has been strikingly low in comparison to other developing countries, specifically those in Southeast Asia. A number of external and internal factors were identified responsible for impeding development and growth in the sub-region. The external factors include the impact of colonial legacies, the recessive impact of SAPs, imbalances in international trade policies and artificial boundaries, while the internal factors include bad leadership, corruption, institutionalised looting, and poor governance or a failure of governance (see chapter four, section 4.2., page 67-68).

Like West Africa, Southeast Asia emerged from colonial rule with predominantly rural economies that were largely dependent on the exportation of agricultural products before some of the countries in both regions discovered crude oil. Unlike West Africa, Southeast Asian countries recognised the importance of diversifying their economies into manufacturing, agro-industries, value added services and other activities that enabled them to have a variety of products to offer the global market. During this time, West African countries remained mono-commodity economies, exporting only primary products. Their failure to diversify their economies narrowed their revenue base, thereby diminishing their chances for growth. It did not only threaten their economic sustainability, but also limited incomes and left many unemployed as labour-demanding sectors like agriculture were neglected in favour of the oil and mineral sector which is largely controlled by a few foreign expatriates and is heavily mechanised (see chapter four, section 4.3., page 69-70).

In the face of the global downturn, Southeast Asian economies have been resilient and managed to keep international debt loads low due to the diversification of their economies, whereas West African countries, with their narrow export base and comparatively low productivity of agriculture and other employment-generating sectors, have been left with few possibilities open to respond to adverse trade shocks. In addition to having higher poverty rates when compared to Southeast Asia, West Africa shows similar diverging numbers in life expectancy and material well-being. The absolute decline in life expectancy in West Africa, largely due to poor healthcare systems and the AIDS epidemic, has resulted in the region lagging behind Southeast Asia. The limited investment in education has also in part contributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment, and low life expectancy (see chapter four, section 4.3., page 70-71).

Southeast Asia is seen as an economic and development success owing to its ability to have collectively transformed itself from being relatively underdeveloped to becoming a contending force in the global economy within a single generation. The varying factors identified as key to the development of Southeast Asia reflect that no single model can be used to describe accurately this achievement of transformation. To best describe this rapid development, the different approach illustrated below is termed multidisciplinary:

- Outward orientation and macroeconomic discipline: openness to foreign trade and technology by offering easier access to raw materials, new machines and technologies; skills and investible resources and removing trade barriers pursued for foreign technology through technology transfer via licences; imports of capital and intermediate goods and foreign training; macroeconomic stability and management by avoiding inflation and budget deficits; labour market flexibility; and good economic governance. The outward-orientated policies created a virtuous circle of accumulation and assimilation (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 72-73; section 4.4.3., page 79; section 4.4.5., page 81-82).
- Activist role of the government in industrial policy (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 72).

- A focus on matters relating to governance, culture and social characteristics; authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes that insulated bureaucracies may not have promoted political and civil liberties, but fostered good economic governance and maintained the credibility of policies, and institutionalised stability. This included government rightsizing and civil service management to enable the limitation of government consumption and corruption, ensure accountability and adequate compensation, and allow for the pursuit of critical steering chores and overall growth; and the adoption of policies aimed at the poor and directed at agriculture and rural development, thereby addressing rural poverty and increasing the productivity of export crops and food production for national sufficiency (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 72-73, section 4.4.2., page 77-78, section 4.4.4., page 80).
- Resource endowments and geographical proximity; recognising innate potential and maximising exploitation. This included the outward regional integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that trades on a non-preferential and non-discriminating basis; investment in education, particularly primary and secondary education, involving the upskilling of rural children and youth at the outset of the development process through provision of primary and vocational education to create an educated and skilled labour force in readiness for the successful operation of non-farming activities and absorption of new technologies and ideas, hence the accumulation of human capital (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 72; section 4.4.5., page 83; section 4.4.6., page 84-85).

Development is a political process, as well as an economic process, which can be only be attained when both aspects are fully taken in consideration, especially the complex interaction between the two, and when appropriate, visions, strategies and action plans are fleshed out and executed. In the case of Southeast Asia, economic development took precedence over political development, whereas it was neither in West Africa, with Southeast Asian political leaders aggressively pursuing a pragmatic development strategy that resulted in the growth of their economies. These leaders established themselves as the primary drivers of development. Their governments played a proactive role in the economic transformation process, as well as governing development with a decisive ideological orientation, effective institutions and policies underpinned by adequate bureaucratic and organisational capacity and political will (see chapter four, section 4.4.1., page 74-75).

A key lesson that West African countries can take from the Southeast Asia region is the importance of understanding that development is a joint process that requires political and economic factors to be addressed simultaneously. It is not enough for West African countries to attempt to achieve economic growth without addressing issues of national unity, tribal and ethnic tensions, and poor and corrupt leadership. By virtue of linking political parties and leaders with a strong development message and strategy, Southeast Asian countries managed to achieve rapid development as leaders and public officials implemented policies and programmes that were not only realistic, but also specific to development goals and economic growth. In contrast, West African political parties and leaders have little concern for achieving development and economic wealth for their nations, but are more concerned with personalising power and securing wealth for themselves and their clique of clients and patrons (see chapter four, section 4.4.1., page 76).

The result of this poor governance and leadership is reflective of the failure of West African countries to establish public institutions with the adequate size and capacity of a workforce with skills, motivation, professional ethics and accountability, which has rendered their governments inefficient. The rapid growth of civil bureaucracies in West Africa straight after independence created an undirected and inconsistent public sector, marred by inadequacies, corruption and unresponsiveness. Corruption in the civil service is blamed on poor pay and a lack of incentives, which prompt civil servants to participate in corrupt activities and accept bribes in order to supplement their income. Countries, which posses capable and reliable public institutions that are competently and honestly managed, will attract more foreign investment, foster entrepreneurship, and encourage public sector expansion (see chapter four, section 4.4.2., page 78-79).

Furthermore, poor governance and leadership breed poor insight, seen through the lens of the poor policies instituted in West Africa, with even poorer implementation. This is seen in the lack of pro-poor and pro-rural development that has left West Africa unable to address the problems of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. Although rural development policies have been implemented in West African countries, which recognise the important role rural populations play in the overall development of a country, little has been done to empower and uplift the people. The move towards government monopsony in agricultural marketing, which either has been dominated by the government or left to the private sector, has resulted in food-crop production stagnation and on per capita basis decline. This has left West African countries, such as Nigeria, having to rely on frequent food imports. The single most important distinction between Southeast Asian and West African development strategies is that in the former, macroeconomic stabilisation was paired with a concern for shared growth through agriculture and rural development (see chapter four, section 4.4.4., page 80-81).

Another illustration is seen through openness to foreign trade and investment, which can foster economic development by offering easier access to raw materials, new machines and technologies, skills and investible resources, as well as promoting economic discipline. The SAPs and other economic development programmes, which created conditions for openness, were adopted and implemented in West Africa, yet they failed to achieve these outcomes. This is because in West Africa openness is conflated with free trade, whereas Southeast Asia used openness to level the economic market for domestic and foreign trade. Southeast Asia used openness as a method to remove trade barriers and eliminate the anti-export bias of import protection measures to ensure the neutrality of incentives between exports and domestic production. Late comers to the global market, such as West African countries, will not be able to catch-up to the rest of the world without adopting a policy of openness. Apart from openness aiding the growth of the economy and increasing foreign investment, it is also a way in which technology can be transferred (see chapter four, section 4.4.5., page 81-82).

A third illustration is seen through the poor investment in education and human capital development in West Africa. By 2009, 40% of West Africa's adult population could not read and write and seven out of the 10 countries with the world's lowest adult literacy rates were in West Africa. This is an indication of significant underinvestment in education and human capital development. The main engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital and of knowledge, and the main source of differences in living standards among nations is differences in human capital. Human capital development through the provision of education plays a key role in the process of economic development and poverty reduction. For human capital development to be a dynamic force of economic and social transformation there is need to combine it with the acquisition of advanced equipment and machinery. There is a need for West African governments to invest more in education, to not only successfully meet key educational targets, but also to increase economic growth rates. More investment in education could ensure West African countries stand a better chance of benefitting from a better-educated labour market where workers posses the skills and knowledge to compete in a knowledge-based global economy, as well as achieve a greater impact for advancing development progress and economic growth (see chapter four, section 4.4.6., page 84-85).

A fourth illustration is seen through regional integration in West Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) plays a limited role in the determination of international trade pricing, and is more concerned with securitisation and the free movement of people within the region. Regionalism is seen as a key intergovernmental concept that can be used to promote economic integration and regional development, an expression of a common sense of identity or purpose through a conscious policy of states or nongovernmental actions to coordinate activities and arrangements in a greater region. Regional integration plays an effective role in development and economic growth. The collective success of the regional integration of ASEAN has demonstrated that regional and multilateral cooperatives are effective ways of addressing complex global trade and market related challenges, rather than attempting to do so individually. More proactive and strategically sound regional integration could increase competitiveness in the global market, as combining the small and mostly fragmented economies would lead to economies of scale that could better fair in global trade, and increase the chances of achieving sustainable development. The lack of a dominant power and the fear of hegemony have hindered successful integration in ECOWAS (see chapter four, section 4.4.5., page 83; section 4.4.7., page 86-87).

Regarding the lack of a dominant power, the absence of a viable industrialised and economic power to lead and advise on best practises when dealing with the external world has limited the economic benefits that the region can achieve through integration. ECOWAS members compete among themselves for markets, as they produce and export similar primary products, which prevent them from forming a formidable body to deal with issues of trade in relation to the external world and among themselves. This relates back to the need for ECOWAS members to diversify their markets and technologies (see chapter four, section 4.4.7., page 87).

Taking into consideration the role that governments in Southeast Asia played in their development process, there are key features West African countries should incorporate to achieve development success. These features include the following:

- A government that has political will and a legitimate mandate;
- A good constitution, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, representative political institutions, an effective central bank and other regulatory institutions, and property rights enforcement;
- A competent, professional and neutral bureaucracy for effective and efficient implementation of strategies and policies in accordance with established national development goals;
- An interactive and institutionalised process of interaction between the political leadership and bureaucracy engaging with other societal actors (i.e. the private sector

and civil society) in development policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;

- A comprehensive development framework; and
- A good governance system (see chapter four, section 4.4.1., page 76-77).

6.3.4. Nigeria

In the midst of abundant natural resources, Nigeria is characterised by mass poverty, economic stagnation, endemic corruption, political instability, weak public institutions, insecurity, and ethno-religious conflict. Despite being the tenth and biggest oil producing country in the world and in Africa respectively, Nigeria is one of the world's 45th poorest countries, with high mortality rates, a poor educational system, and dismal living standards. Since 2003, over 70.8% of Nigerians are estimated to be living below the poverty line of one dollar per day, and about 92.4% live on less than two dollars per day (see chapter five, section 5.2., page 91-92).

Since independence, Nigeria has adopted numerous development policies, plans and projects. The first national development plan, from 1962 to 1968, promoted economic growth, employment opportunities, and better infrastructural services. The plan was notable because of the extent of coordination between the central government and the federating units, as well as the broad-based involvement of Nigerians in the formulation of the plan. It failed because the plan was heavily dependent on foreign aid. Additionally, the poor leadership and governance of the government, as well as the emergence of the military, led to the civil war of 1967, which finally truncated the plan. The second national development, from 1970 to 1974, set out to achieve a five-point objective, as well as address issues of poverty and hunger, especially post-civil war. However, despite the implementation, none of the objectives were achieved, and the situation in the country deteriorated to heavy import dependency and food insecurity. The third national development plan, from 1975 to 1980, focused on investing resources into the reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructural facilities, increasing per capita income and building skilled workforce, achieving a balanced national resources allocation and diversifying the economy to support indigenisation. Through the oil boom of the 1970s, the objective of diversification was quickly forgotten, and this proved detrimental to the country's development (see chapter five, section 5.3.1, page 92-94; section 5.3.2., page 93; section 5.3.3., page 93-94).

From the 1980s, following the failure of three consecutive development plans, further efforts were made to hatch a development plan for the sake of national interest. The fourth development plan, from 1981 to 1985, was initiated to reduce the over-dependency of the economy on the oil sector, to develop a more broad-based economy, and to invest and increase technology with several humanitarian objectives. Again, the plan failed due to economic problems due to excessive external reserve losses arising from capital flight, the worsening terms of trade, and a drastic fall in domestic production. This was compounded by the overthrow of the civilian government, with the re-emergence of the military in political leadership. Next came the SAPs from 1985 to 1999, adopted to reposition the economy to address the damage caused by the global recession in the 1980s and the collapse of the international oil market. The SAPs included a reduction in the government workforce and wages, the privatisation of public institutions, market liberalisation, the abolition of government subsidies on social services, and the devaluation of the local currency. The implementation was haphazard, with policy inconsistencies, weak institutions, sectional political manoeuvres and elite networks, which resulted in dismal failure (increased poverty rates, high unemployment) and public discontent that resulted in civil protests and riots (see chapter 5, section 5.3.4., page 94; section 5.3.5., page 95).

Following yet another failed development plan, at the new millennium, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was initiated post-2004 as a medium-term four-year development plan in collaboration with the states and local governments. It was inclusive of civil society, the private sector and the public, and the focus was on macroeconomic reform, structural reform, governance and institutional reform, and public sector reform. It was designed to reduce poverty and create wealth by relying on the private sector to provide jobs and stimulate economic growth, while the public sector had to create an enabling environment for development. Compared to the others, NEEDS was the most comprehensive, realistic and efficiently coordinated. The framework sought to promote transparency and accountability, while addressing the problems of rent-seeking and endemic corruption. Unlike previous development plans, the implementation of NEEDS resulted in significant improvements and positive results in Nigeria’s performance. With the successful first civilian-to-civilian transition of the fourth republic, the new administration created the Seven-Point Agenda to address the needs of Nigerians in terms of accessing energy, power and transportation, infrastructural development, human capital development, and food security. It was subsequently carried forward through the Transformation Agenda that was focused on constitutional and electoral reforms, and transformation of the budgeting process that was poised to deliver good governance, create an enabling environment for growth of the private sector, combat corruption, and prioritise the development of the Nigerian population (see chapter five, section 5.3.6., page 95-96; section 5.3.7., page 96-97).

With all these plans, strategies and agendas, Nigeria has seen its average per capita income rise from a rate of 0.43% per annum from 1960 to 2000 to 7.5% per annum between 2003 and 2011. Despite this increase, the country has consistently been unable to raise the living standards of its citizenry, without talk of infrastructural development or economic diversification. The cause of Nigeria's development crisis is the issue of governance. The division of Nigeria's elite and political leaders along communal, factional and ethnic lines has significantly hindered the ability of the country to create a stable political regime that can act as an effective political and institutional centre for economic transformation and overall development. It appears an arduous task to overcome the fundamental obstacles hindering present-day Nigeria from achieving socio-economic, political, and human development (see chapter 5, section 5.3.7, page 97).

In the discussions on the factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria, corruption is cited as one of the greatest challenges that has affected the achievement of effective development and governance in the country. Low ratings on Transparency International Index and various corruption perception indexes attest to its endemic nature. The endemic corruption in Nigeria has had adverse effects on the growth and development of public service delivery in the country. The dawn of the fourth republic saw the enactment of the Anti-corruption Bill that resulted in the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003, argued to be the most relatively successful initiatives at curbing corruption in the country. Corruption in Nigeria goes far beyond governmental and bureaucratic corruption; the nonchalant attitude of Nigerians towards corruption indicates that it has become a lifestyle for the majority. Vote buying has become part of the political culture, and the average poor man or politician seem to have accepted the norm in the electoral process. The anti-corruption legislation, policies and campaigns are nothing but empty jingles, propaganda, and mere political rhetoric. The mismanagement of resources and electoral fraud have not only mired the chances of development, but also created a comfortable environment where bad leadership, clientelism, nepotism, and neo-patrimonialism are promoted (see chapter five, section 5.4, page 98-101; section 5.12., page 115-117).

Another factor that has contributed immensely to underdevelopment in Nigeria is poor leadership. It is one of the greatest obstacles to socioeconomic and political development in the country, which has left the general populace frustrated. It has also fostered complete distrust in the government and its institutions. Nigeria has been plagued by a series of leaders who lack the charismatic qualities needed to develop and steer the country out of the cloud of ethnic hostilities, which has prevented the emergence of true nationalism and to command the respect and followership of all ethnic groups. Leadership in Nigeria does not derive its legitimacy from the citizenry; it lacks probity and integrity in governance, and can hardly articulate coherent policies that can ensure efficient resources management, social transformation and development. Bad governance and poor leadership has led to the maintenance of systems that lack adequate checks and balances to control the autocratic tendencies in government and hold political leaders accountable for their actions. The lack of political will and commitment of the country's leadership to provide the necessary institutional and infrastructural framework needed to implement the policies and solutions to address the economic and social problems further hinders the ability of Nigeria to develop. The success of Nigeria's economic growth and development rests on the country's ability to find good leadership and governance (see chapter 5, section 5.5., page 102-103).

The third factor is concerned with how to ensure that those who hold public office and power behave responsibly and can be held accountable for their actions and inactions. This plays the role of fostering good and ethical governance, as well as gradually building trust in leadership - a prerequisite of good governance and for effective service delivery. The absence of accountability in Nigeria has adversely affected public service delivery, development, and growth. The deterioration of accountability in Nigeria has not only made the country an accommodating ground for corruption and unethical practices, but has also impeded the country's development (see chapter five, section 5.6., page 104-105).

The fourth factor is concerned with the security crisis in Nigeria. A key element that has contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria is the absence of national and human security. Insecurity is posing dire challenges to national development in Nigeria. Tribal tensions, kidnappings for ransom, militancy, armed robberies, political assassinations, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts are the causes of human insecurity in the country. The prevalence of ethnic and religious conflicts has undermined Nigeria's ability to create a national identity necessary to achieve unity towards the pursuance of one development goal. The Nigerian population believe that violence is a viable means to desirable and tangible political objectives; this in turn fosters insecurity (see chapter five, section 5.7., page 105-107).

The fifth factor is concerned with education, which is recognised as a veritable tool for addressing issues of poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy, ignorance, gender exclusion, health problems, conflicts, intolerance, human rights, and sustainability. Education is a crucial element for development because a literate and skilled society is better organised, productive, active, and development orientated. In Nigeria, low levels of literacy and inadequate investment in its human capacity through formal and vocational education have greatly hindered development. Nigeria has the highest number of school-age children out of school in sub-Saharan Africa. The primary school net attendance rate, completion rate, and transition rate to secondary school is low. Less than half of secondary school age children attend school, technical education is substantially neglected, and the orientation is to the teaching of traditional hand skills that are often divorced from labour market requirements. Higher education only enrols around four percent of the relevant age cohort. The suspension of existing educational policies for newly fashioned ones, which typify the political agendas of the administration in power, has effectively bottlenecked the ability of education to contribute to national development. The characteristics comprise of inadequate funding of education, poor infrastructural development of schools, inadequate remuneration of teachers, and a dearth of qualified teachers and lecturers. The inability of children to access formal education and develop skills can facilitate the increased participation of children and youth in terrorist activities (as in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria’s northeast) (see chapter five, section 5.8., page 108-110).

The sixth factor is concerned with the diversification of Nigeria’s economy, which refers to the means of widening the range of economic activities and outputs that are produced, as well as the dissemination of goods and services. Shortly after independence, the agricultural sector was a major contributor to the economy of Nigeria, but the discovery of crude oil and the development of the petroleum industry in Nigeria brought about the abandonment of other sectors such as agriculture, solid minerals, manufacturing, and the servicing industries. The reckless ignorance and oversight by Nigerian leaders resulted in an overdependence on oil revenue - a mono-commodity economy. The negative impact the crash in oil prices and demand has had on the Nigerian economy underlines the urgent need for the country to diversify its economy (see chapter five, section 5.9., page 110-111; section 5.12., page 116-117).

The seventh factor concerns the ineffective institutions and dilapidated infrastructure responsible for hindering the ability of Nigeria to develop its economy. The poor roads, erratic power supply (overdependence on petrol and generators to guarantee constant electricity supply), limited access to potable water, malfunctioning ports, inadequate basic healthcare, and ineffective regulatory agencies have negatively affected the ability of the country to develop and grow. The dilapidated infrastructure and ineffective institutions have subsequently dulled investment in Nigeria, including attracting foreign investors. Nigeria's underdevelopment is compounded by the lack of technological capabilities. Technological capability is seen as an essential component for achieving sustained economic growth and welfare. The lack of technological capability in addition to poor infrastructure has kept productivity levels low and limited the ability of Nigeria to produce large quantities of quality goods and services that are able to meet local consumption and create a surplus that can be exported for added revenue. There is a direct correlation between underdevelopment and escalating unemployment as in the case of Nigeria's lack of technological capabilities and the inadequate highly skilled technical workforce to drive the economy and create jobs (see chapter five, section 5.10., page 111-112; section 5.12., page 118-120).

All of the above factors have culminated in the migration of Nigerians abroad in search of better living conditions. The hostile economic situation, poor employment opportunities, political instability, and poverty have resulted in people leaving the country and not wanting to return. Analysis into why Nigerians emigrate shows that the lack of employment opportunities leads them to relocate. The brain drain from Nigeria to the United States, Europe, South Africa, and other developed country is on the increase, consisting of people who have a tertiary education, including healthcare professionals. The failure of the Nigerian government to address the push factors of poverty, unemployment and instability has resulted in the continued migration of Nigerians to other countries for better opportunities and living conditions. Moreover, skilled workers, do not return to impart the knowledge they have gained abroad to develop Nigeria's technological capabilities (see chapter five, section 5.11., page 113-114).

In summary, one cannot speak of achieving development both economically and socially in the absence of sound governance, as well as accountable and visionary leaders. The lack of good governance in the form of an effective government results in the underdevelopment of a country. Underdevelopment consequentially provides an environment in which terrorism, insecurity, and state collapse thrive. The lack of a sound political agenda that is concerned with attaining development for all Nigerians has resulted in most government administrations wasting their time developing economic and social solutions incapable of addressing the issues pertaining to the country. If Nigeria is ever to transform into a developed and economically vibrant state, it will need to elect politically willing, transparent, charismatic, and visionary leaders who are committed to ensuring the welfare and development of the people (see chapter five, section 5.13., page 121-123).

6.4. Recommendation towards the way forward in the 21st century

The aim of the study was to find ways how Nigeria can navigate its way out of the terrain of underdevelopment, bad governance, abject poverty, and insecurity. Following the findings and conclusion of this study, it will take time to achieve good leadership first in the attempt to mount this huge task of achieving development in Nigeria, and West Africa as a whole. Poor leadership is one of the greatest obstacles to socioeconomic and political development and governance in a country (see chapter five, section 5.5., page 102). Comparable to a pyramid, not until the deficiency at the very top is corrected, little that can be done at the bottom. The success of Nigeria's economic growth and development rests on the country's ability to find good leadership and governance (see chapter five, section 5.5., page 103). Political, economic and social development cannot be achieved in the absence of sound governance, and accountable and visionary leaders (see chapter five, section 5.13., page 121).

To attain good leadership means to have good followership, which implies that the onus lies on the people to ensure that they choose the right leaders to represent them and serve them. Poor leadership and bad governance can only be resolved when the poor and commoner awake from their slumber and recognise their potential to break the cycle of unaccountable and corrupt administrations in the following ways:

- By desisting from the habit of vote selling;
- By holding their leaders accountable for their actions and inactions [through protest, civil disobedience, voting them out during the next election through a vibrant civil society, private sector and nongovernmental organisations]; and
- By becoming more politically aware of the power they hold to change their circumstances through the election of a legitimate government that will promote the culture and values of a unified Nigerian society and implement development strategies that are aimed at improving the living conditions of all its citizens (see chapter five, section 5.13., page 122-123).

True followership, therefore, means to disregard ethnicity and religion for the sake of true nationalism. Aspiring leaders should be evaluated based on their qualities and the conviction that they can deliver on their campaign promises. Political parties must live up to the expectations of the people by thoroughly scrutinising and screening their candidates to bring forward for elections based on their credibility and articulation, past achievements, and intended objectives that are in line with the party's manifesto. All of these also apply to independent candidates coming forward for elected official positions.

Importantly, the responsibility lies with the government to make it possible for the people to preserve the right to choose their leaders under fair and just electoral and political process. This is to ensure that the choice of leadership by the people counts and derives its legitimacy from the true voice of the people. In other words, the government must heavily criticise vote buying, discourage the act nationwide through all media outlets, and pass a law of consequential punitive repercussions for those found guilty. Secondly, electoral rigging and cheating must be criminalised and the guilty parties should be prosecuted and jailed if found guilty. One way to minimise or check electoral rigging and cheating in Nigeria is for the government to commit to the national identity card project.

This project will ensure that every Nigerian's detail from birth is captured on a national database system with specific geometrical features and bar-coded security measures. Existing Nigerians 18 years and above will partake in a catch-up process, that will later include registration of more when they have reached the age of 18. In this way, the national database will provide the true population of Nigerians 18 years and above, in tandem with a once-off countrywide census to account for those from age zero to 17. This means starting from the beginning to collate the number of Nigerians both within and outside the country, to include a new system of national database for the registration of new births and deaths. Every holder of the national identity card is eligible to vote, and is obliged to do so during elections by going to a polling station where there is a mechanism that recognises the security measure on the unique identity card and provides a once-off voting slip. In this way, no one can vote more than once and only eligible voters can cast their votes, as enshrined in the constitution.

Thus, at a glance, the population of eligible voters will be known, and the population of Nigerians will be a true reflection and not an estimate, as it currently is. Does the present or past government not know or have an idea of this process? They do. The lack of the political will to embark on this process and complete it is for the selfish interests of every incumbent government to win elections through treacherous ways. Through good followership the people reserve the right to demand what is rightfully theirs to an extent of exerting force, if necessary, similar to the protest during the Arab Spring.

Departing from this point, the appointment of good, accountable and visionary leaders through a just and fair electoral process is the only guarantee to have a government that has the political will and legitimate mandate that can ensure the following:

- The provision of a good constitution;
- The rule of law;
- An independent judiciary;
- A representative political institutions;
- An effective central bank and other regulatory institutions;
- Property rights enforcement;
- A competent, professional and neutral bureaucracy for effective and efficient implementation of strategies and policies in accordance with established national development goals; and
- The ability to engage with other stakeholders and actors in policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (see chapter four, section 4.4.1., page 86-87).

With this in place, the issues of corruption [the bane of Nigeria's underdevelopment], poor governance, poverty and insecurity will become subjects of national discussion and participation in finding long term lasting solutions.

The reasons for the underdevelopment of Nigeria are well documented in political-economic and socio-cultural articles and books written by Nigerians and non-Nigerians. This raises the question of the insensitivity of the Nigerian government to these written documented sources on the problems facing the nation and which also proffer solutions, or is it a case of a deliberate choice to ignore them or not read them at all? Lessons must be learnt from post-independence leaders who delved into development concepts and theories prescribed by their previous colonial masters without consideration that their countries' development must tread a different paths, having been disadvantaged for an extended period. The only way for Nigeria to achieve development would be to disengage from the international system and pursue its own path of development. It can use the association it has with developed countries as a means to gain knowledge and increase its capacity to break the vicious cycle of underdevelopment (chapter three, section 3.3.2., page 47-48).

Government of great nations have always relied on their learned people and their written theories that problematise and find solutions to national issues in order to raise the living standard of their people. This means recognising the role of culture and tradition as more than a means to consolidate the pride of Nigerians; poverty is the prime concern, so it must be prioritised over market and economic growth (see chapter three, section 3.3.3.1.3., page 51). By so doing, they will be able to deal with internal impediments to development such as bad leadership, poor governance and the failure of governance, corruption, and institutionalised looting (see chapter four, section 4.2., page 67-68). In the case of Nigeria, it is impossible to tell which ranks first as the greatest impediment to its development, from bad leadership to corruption associated with the looting of the nation's treasury. It is true to postulate that in this case they are correlated, as one breeds the other and vice versa. Having dealt with ways of ensuring good leadership, corruption and institutionalized looting must be dealt with heads-on if there is going to be any foreseeable attainment of development in Nigeria.

Speaking of eradicating corruption is utopian, it is impossible; even the most developed nations still get caught up in corruption scandals involving their top officials. Rather, one should find ways to mitigate corruption by ensuring accountability, transparency, implementing a system of checks and balance, monitoring and evaluation, overseeing, and general auditing. Accountability will involve the declaration of assets by government officials before and after holding a government position, which will be investigated for corroboration by who is charged with such duties. Transparency will include making information on government activities, funding, spending, and the salaries of officials accessible to the public through online media and the government gazette. The office of the Auditor-General will become more active and effective in dealing with monitoring and evaluating, auditing government spending, questioning every grey area, and publishing the reports through online media and the government gazette, which will be readily available to the public. Importantly, the Auditor-General must be chosen strictly on merit by the president, but he/she will only be accountable to the legislative arm of government.

As corruption underlies underdevelopment in Nigeria, dealing with it must be of the utmost importance and top the agenda. It is not enough that Nigeria's present administration is seen or heard campaigning to combat corruption, or the recognition of Nigeria's present president as the African Union's anti-corruption champion, real results must be obtained. Since the enactment of the Anti-corruption Bill of the fourth republic, which saw the formation of the ICPC in 2000 and the EFCC in 2003, millions in local and foreign currencies are still being misappropriated and embezzled from the government coffers. This calls for a complete change in strategy whereby corrupt officials are brought to justice and made to face jail terms when found guilty, irrespective whether they are in or out of office, with the complete removal of the immunity clause.

Corruption in Nigeria has warranted the formation of a specialised Ministry of Anti-corruption and other related financial crimes that will be headquartered in Nigeria's capital, with at least one branch in each state capital. This ministry will be headed by a minister with a portfolio that will be in charge of and deliberate on every case of corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement of monies of national interest, while liaising with heads of state branches and the judiciary system. The minister will be chosen by the president strictly on merit, but he/she is only accountable to the legislative arm of government. The minister will be in charge of liaising with international financial institutions and offshore banks to report Nigerian politicians looting the government coffers to hide in offshore accounts. This will be a fervent appeal to the international community to assist in putting a stop to and discouraging institutionalised looting, which finds a safe haven in their countries, in order to assist Nigeria's development plan. This could be considered of much more value to Nigeria than the provision of foreign aid and official development assistance (ODA).

For the aforementioned to be attained in Nigeria, there is the need for the country to undergo political and constitutional reforms. This will begin with the setting up of a national committee, comprising of members of the executive, legislative and judiciary arms of government, political scientists and reformers, representatives of civil society, traditional rulers representing various ethnic groups, religious leaders, and well-meaning and influential Nigerians, including heads of media houses and journalists, to discuss key areas of the constitution that require revision or change, and the modalities to achieve this. Thereafter, their findings will be put forward to Nigerians in the form of a referendum to legitimise support for or against it. Since independence, Nigeria has never conducted a referendum of any sort, which seeks to involve its people in a political process, development programmes, or policy design and implementation. The definitions and understanding of the new notions of good governance must support a more context-specific approach that fits the realities and perspectives of the people and encourages ownership by the people of the reforms and development programmes initiated by the state or government (see chapter two, section 2.4.1., page 37); thus, the epitome of participatory democracy.

The present Nigerian constitution is based on the American political system in that it operates on the presidential system, a bicameral legislature, and holds elections every four years. However, Nigeria is an underdeveloped country, which requires major resources to be channelled to development. For it to be able to afford a presidential system that bestows most power on one person; to have two houses of legislature when most of the legislators do not realise the importance of the duties bestowed upon them by the people and they are paid exorbitant salaries (Nigerian legislators are some of the highest paid in the world); and to conduct elections every four years is a tall order. The time for political and constitutional reform for revision or change is now. It is important to re-emphasise here that good governance does not always correlate with democracy, just like no specific political system needs to be in place to increase the likelihood of achieving good governance (see chapter two, section 4.4.1., page 75). As the practice of democracy in Nigeria since 1999 has not paid off and does not seem likely to do in the near future, it will be worthwhile to modify the country's practice of democracy as Botswana did to suit the country's socio-cultural context.

Adopting the semi-presidential system of government in Nigeria, which is not new in West Africa, will be a good path to follow. It resonates with the earlier recommendation that the minister of anti-corruption and other related financial crimes and the auditor-general be chosen by the president, but only be accountable to the parliament. Preferable is the premier-presidential system, whereby the president appoints the prime minister and the cabinet, and they are accountable to the parliament. This will create a situation where power is no longer conferred on one person; rather, the prime minister oversees the affairs of the country with help from the cabinet members, and on the other hand, there are checks and balances by the president and parliament. In this scenario, the president, who is elected by the people, will retain overseeing the ministries of defence and foreign affairs directly, while reserving the veto power to dissolve the assembly should the affairs of the country go awry, without having the right to dismiss the prime minister or the cabinet. Only the parliament may remove the prime minister and the cabinet by a vote of no confidence. The same will apply to the state governors in collaboration with the state houses of assembly, and their role in overseeing the activities of local governments and their chairpersons. The office of the senate president must be scrapped, downgrading the bicameral house to a unicameral house, which will be presided over by the speaker of the house.

This will form part of government rightsizing that will involve smaller bureaucracies and fewer public servants that will allow Nigerian leaders to focus public resources on fundamental societal needs, such as education and public service delivery, as well as better facilitate internal management and quality control (see chapter four, section 4.4.2., page 78). Government rightsizing in Nigeria is integral to attaining robust public institutions with the adequate size and capacity of a workforce with skills, motivation, professional ethics and accountability. It will also enable the government to deal with corruption in the civil service by addressing issues of poor pay and the lack of incentives (see chapter four, section 4.4.2., page 78-79). Lastly, as an important part of the reform, Nigeria cannot afford frequent elections. Rather, six-year tenure must be established and the two-term limit scrapped. Any contestant can vie for political office and retain a position more than twice, for as long as he or she has not exceeded 65 years, which is the retirement age in Nigeria. This will ensure continuity of government policies, raise the stakes for competitiveness, and discourage aged politicians from clinging on to power to make room for younger politicians in touch with the times and new innovations to vie for top positions in the country.

As there is a dire need for development in Nigeria, as well as the need to address national unity, tribal and ethnic and religion tensions, a unified national development plan will serve as a source of unity and a framework to bridge the gap of ethnic and religious divisions. This means having one thing in common, which cuts across every religion and ethnic group – this is socioeconomic development. Underdevelopment is so rife in Nigeria that it warrants establishment of a ministry of national development that will be headquartered in the federal capital and have branches across the states. These state branches will have satellite offices in all of the local governments of the federation to attend to the development needs in a community-centred faction. A minister, with a portfolio chosen by the president and accountable to the parliament, will head the ministry. This ministry will be in charge of the development needs of the country, as well as in charge of the national development fund that will be set up, which will have a special committee comprised of development experts, theorists and relevant stakeholders tasked with deliberating on and prioritising what development issue will be dealt with in the order of importance and need, as overall development can only be achieved in phases. The ministry of development will organise and host an annual national cultural day to display to the world the richness of Nigerian culture, and why Nigerian diversity is its greatest strength. This will also provide a forum for interaction for all the ethnic groups and religious sects in Nigeria, serving as a means of national reflection and total rediscovery. The day will be declared a national public holiday to mark the importance of socio-cultural influence as a binding force for national development.

The national development fund will be independent of the national budget. It will be a clarion call for all Nigerians, home and abroad. This time it will be about what Nigerians can do for Nigeria. The government would have proven beyond any doubt its commitment to development so as to convince Nigerians to heed this call. It will follow adopting a national development plan with a long-term plan, which has continuity, irrespective of a change of government. Nigerian leaders will establish themselves as the primary drivers of development, governing development like Southeast Asian countries with a decisive ideological orientation, effective institutions, and policies underpinned by adequate bureaucratic and organisational capacity and political will (see chapter four, section 4.4.1., page 75).

The development fund will be derived from multiple sources: the national budget; the budget surplus; a development levy from multinational corporations, banks, churches and mosques set at a derived national percentage; five percent or less of diasporan remittance through banks; recovered loots from thieving politicians and government officials both at home and abroad; contributions from well-meaning Nigerians both at home and abroad, a coalition of Nigerians for development; and donations from NGOs and international development agencies. There will be total transparency of the fund's national account, the sources of money and disbursement, which will be available to the public through online media and the government gazette. In this way, every development plan will be derived from proper planning, and the policy design will be adequately implemented without a lack of funds or dependence on foreign intervention.

With the national development fund in place, the development process will begin by first attending to basic necessities, including investing in decent roads across the country, especially to rural areas; the improvement of the electricity supply, with emphasis on rural electrification; the provision of adequate health care and potable water, with special focus on rural areas; the provision of effective emergency response system; improving on security systems and the provision of effective security gadgets; and investing in education. This will form the first phase of the development plan. By investing in improving the electricity supply, Nigeria will be in a better position to lure investors and grow the economy. Adequate investment on the first phase of the development plan will lay a solid foundation for extensive development projects to take off, such as diversification of the economy and investment in technological education. Diversifying the economy of Nigeria to involve manufacturing, agro-industries, investment in ports, and value added services will not only enhance economic sustainability, it will also provide more national income and create employment for many citizens. Investing in technological education, research and development will not only metamorphose the Nigerian economy, it will enhance the country so it can effectively compete in the global marketplace, and become an industrialised nation that is able to develop its own indigenous technologies, as well as be able to copy and adapt other countries technological innovations.

Key lessons that Nigeria can learn from Southeast Asian countries regarding its development endeavours include:

- Outward orientation and macroeconomic discipline, openness to foreign trade and technology. This involves good economic governance, avoiding inflation and a budget deficit. It will foster economic development by offering easier access to raw materials, new machines and technologies, skills and resources (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 72-73; section 4.4.3., page 79; section 4.4.5., page 81-82);
- The activist role of the government in industrial policy (chapter four, section 4.4., page 72);
- Focus on matters relating to governance, culture and social characteristics. This involves government rightsizing and civil service management, and focus on pro-poor and pro-rural development, pairing macroeconomic stabilisation with a concern for shared growth through agriculture and rural development (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 72-73; section 4.4.2., page 77-78; section 4.4.4., page 80);
- Resource endowment and geographic proximity. This involves outward regional integration, which can promote economic integration and regional development. Also investing in education, involving the upskilling of rural children and youth at the outset of the development process will promote human capital development and play a key role in the process of economic development and poverty reduction (see chapter four, section 4.4., page 70; section 4.4.5., page 83; section 4.4.6., page 84-85; section 4.4.7., page 86-87).

From the above, two key areas stand out towards Nigeria's development endeavours. Firstly, there must be more investment in the agricultural sector, given the significant role the sector plays in the Nigerian economy. Its expansion will play a significant role in reducing poverty, enhancing food security, ensuring economic growth, and increasing rural employment and incomes (the largest population living in poverty are in rural Nigeria), and will enable Nigeria to meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty and hunger (see chapter five, section 5.9., page 111). Secondly, there is the need for the

Nigerian government to invest more in education to not only meet key educational targets, but also to increase economic growth rates. More investment in education will ensure Nigeria stand a better chance of benefitting from a better-educated labour market where workers posses the skills and knowledge to compete in a knowledge-based global economy, as well as achieve a greater impact in advancing development progress and economic growth (see chapter 4, section 4.4.6., page 85).

The adoption of a multidisciplinary approach towards development in Nigeria cannot be complete without the input of Nigerians in the Diaspora. Firstly, the remittances back to Nigeria provide financial support to relatives and friends of Nigerians in the Diaspora, which contribute to the country's economy. This form of financial support is on the increase despite the widening dissociation between Nigerian government through its embassies and Nigerians residing in foreign countries, similar to the estranged relationship between the government and the Nigerian people. By no means exaggerating, there is total lack of patriotism amongst Nigerians living abroad; the tales of horrific experiences at Nigerian embassies and international airports worldwide indicate the willingness of an average Nigerian to dump the national passport at the slightest opportunity. This by extension is similar to the insensitivity of Nigerian leaders to the plight of their people in Nigeria. The socioeconomic factors, responsible for the emigration of Nigerians to search for better living condition abroad, are on the increase. Against the back drop of the recommended development plan towards the 21st century, there is need for the Nigerian government through its embassies to cater for the needs of all Nigerians living abroad. They should have a dossier of Nigerians living in a particular foreign country through a mandatory registration process, in order to ensure that they are well represented, especially in times of trouble. This will foster a healthy sense of patriotism, making it possible for easy access during the clarion call for development purposes, the election process, or to harness knowledge acquired as a result of their residence in a foreign country. This sense of patriotism can motivate Nigerians to decide to return home in a bid to contribute their own quota of knowledge, skills and expertise to the national development process.

In summary, the above multidisciplinary recommendation for Nigeria's development process, while not utopian, can set the ball rolling for a comprehensive process that is achievable, subject to modification. With persistence, perseverance, patience and political will, the much-desired development in Nigeria can be achieved over a period of 50 years or less, similar to that of Southeast Asia. It will place Nigeria on the pedestal of greatness, as an industrialised hegemon and economic powerhouse that will lead and advise on best practice to other West African countries. Regarding the role Nigeria is already playing in ECOWAS, it is at the forefront of the two-track approach to closer integration in the sub-region as its demographic and economic giant (see chapter one, section 1.2., page 9-10).

As West Africa's most populous country (for every three West Africans two are Nigerians) and an economic power house, well endowed with human, natural and mineral resources, properly utilising resources will make Nigeria a force to be reckoned with and a country to emulate in the sub-region. The major role played by Nigeria during the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, and its continuous push to foster more sub-regional integration, highlights its potential to become an established hegemonic influence in the sub-region (see chapter one, section 1.3., page 10). Achieving sustainable development through good governance in Nigeria will serve as a pacesetter for the whole of West Africa.

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