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ONE PARTY DOMINANCE IN THE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION:
A CASE STUDY OF NAMIBIA

BY
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Mosetsane Constance Diseko

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the process of democratization/de-democratization in Southern Africa by looking at the level at which democracies institutionalized democratic principles.

Presently indications point towards non-institutionalization of democratic principles or procedures in the Southern African region. In determining whether democratic structures are in place or not, indicators have been referred to. These indicators are drawn in to categorize democracies as non-institutionalized or institutionalized ones.

This study also points out that one party dominance is a trend in the Southern African region. Although one party domination is rife in the Southern African region it is not the only factor that retards positive political developments, but it is a common factor.

In conclusion this study draws in the survival and revival strategies employed by different democratic regimes over the years. This part is particularly included in this study to inform views on the possible future political developments or route of political developments in the Southern African region.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|--------------|
| 1. Introduction | 1-8 |
| 2. Conceptual orientation and general points of departure | 8-9 |
| 2.1 Democratization | 9 |
| 2.1.1 Stages of democratization | 9-12 |
| 2.2 Institutionalization | 12-14 |
| 2.3 Democratization trends, a world wide phenomenon | 14-16 |
| 2.4 The factors that led to the third wave of Democratization | 16-17 |
| 2.4.1 The legitimacy and effectiveness crises of non-democratic dispensations | 17 |
| 2.4.2 Economic development | 17 |
| 2.4.3 The new political philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church | 17-18 |
| 2.4.4 The snowball effect | 18 |
| 3. Democratization/de-democratization in Southern Africa | 19-23 |
| 3.1 De-democratization through election | 23-25 |
| 3.2 Political leadership and democratization | 26 |
| 3.3 Economic decline | 27-30 |

| | | |
|--------------|--|--------------|
| 3.4 | Strong State/weak state | 30-31 |
| 3.5 | Governance | 32 |
| 3.6 | Voter apathy | 32 |
| 3.7 | External interference | 32-33 |
| 3.8 | Towards institutionalization / non institutionalization of democratic practices | 34-38 |
| 4. | One party domination : a case study of Namibia | 38 |
| 4.1 | Historical background of Namibia | 38-39 |
| 4.2 | Political parties in Namibia | 39-42 |
| 4.3 | Democratization in Namibia | 42 |
| 4.3.1 | Seriousness of purpose | 43 |
| 4.3.2 | Organizational capacity | 43 |
| 4.3.3 | Constituency building | 44 |
| 4.3.4 | Electoral system | 44-47 |
| 4.3.5 | Politics of power | 47 |
| 4.4 | One party domination in Namibia | 48-50 |
| 5. | Towards revival and survival of democracies in Southern Africa | 52-55 |
| 6. | Summary | 56-60 |
| 7. | Bibliography | |

1. INTRODUCTION

The absence of a democratic tradition in the African political culture contributes towards political decay in many African states. Countries like Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola (to list but a few), are examples of governments that have experienced patterns of political decay. Countries such as the ones just mentioned, have experienced a high incidence of regime changes in a violent manner at one time or another, resulting in political disorder. Another related tendency is the inability of the African countries to shed one-party domination. In Southern Africa, countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, a tendency towards one-party dominance has become prominent. These countries can be classified as non-institutionalized democratic dispensations (Duvenhage, 2000:7-19).

Democracy in the Southern African region culminated during the nineties as part of the 'third wave' of democratization. This period is characterized by limited violence or lack thereof during the period preceding the democratic elections. What many observers have noted, however, is that although democratic elections were held and declared free and fair, the democratic culture is not properly established. Instead countries like Namibia and Zimbabwe, are headed in a non-democratic direction by amongst other things, failing to democratically transfer political authority. This has in turn resulted in a low turnover of political leaders (Khumalo, 2000:6).

The democratization /de-democratization process in Namibia is of importance to the new South Africa. There are certain similarities in their political history because these two countries have experienced the South African apartheid laws. In the years that South West Africa (Namibia) was regarded as a South African mandate territory under the UN Trusteeship Board, it was governed under the same apartheid rules that pertained to South Africa. As such, the role played by the apartheid regime under the Nationalist Party of South Africa in directing political changes in the two countries contributed, to an extent, to the present state of political affairs in both countries.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

The problem with most of the Southern African states is that democratic procedures are often tools for replacing one dominant party system with another. This has been the case with old and new democracies as observed by Kabemba (Khumalo, 2000:6).

Another important pattern of political change after the initial free and fair elections in recent democracies is the gradual decline of democratic procedures, to make way for "delegative" democracies that become one-party dominated democracies, and later dictatorship, for example Zimbabwe (Duvenhage, 2000:12).

Pryce (1989:56) notes the similarities in the political developments especially with regard to what he terms "tactics" used by the SWAPO and ZANU-PF during negotiations that preceded their independence preparations. Pryce (1989:56) points out that both SWAPO and ZANU-PF had used the same tactics in breaching the agreed programs prior to their independence. He pointed out that Namibia needed to be careful not to emulate Zimbabwe, as this country is led by a dictator and is heading towards political decay. His work was intended to warn Namibia in advance to avoid a full repeat performance, and also to learn from Zimbabwe's mistakes that had led to such shaky democracy in that country. It can be assumed that his predictions turned to be true since, Namibia is currently a one party dominated democracy with unchanged leadership.

Given the manner in which the constitution was changed to accommodate the ruling party's will, Namibia has an element of dictatorship in its policies. When the ruling party amended the constitution to allow the president to run for political office for more than two terms, there was an outcry of concerns from all over the world because yet, another country in Southern Africa, had undermined democratic principles. Nujoma dominated world political news when he adapted the constitution to extend his term in office even though the move was unpopular and sparked negative reactions from within the ruling party itself (Khumalo, 2000:6; Maletsky, 2000:1).

Having followed the discussions thus far, it can be argued that there is a general trend among political leaders to hang on to power for too long resulting in a one-party dominated system. According to Mukela (1997:19), one party dominated democracy often becomes a dictatorship.

It is important to point out the factors that lead to this tendency in many countries and especially, on the democracies in the Southern African region. Macridis and Burg (1991:175-180) are of the opinion that the absence of socially based opposition parties leads to lack of popular political activity that is necessary for formulation of organizational bases for linking the masses to emerging institutions of representation, decision making and consent. Similarly, Mathien *et al.* (2000:337) ascribe the following factors to a one party domination tendency;-

- ▶ Cleavages based on social class differences such as where the party enjoys the support of the working class over others; and
- ▶ Material economic factors, for example where the control of state apparatus is unevenly distributed, party competition declines, leading to a one- party domination.

Based on the above mentioned factors as being contributory to one- party domination system , it can be argued that, these factors lead to a situation where parties do not continue to build their strong holds but rather depend on their traditional support bases, which weaken with time and which also weaken competition. Once there is no meaningful competition among parties, one party will become important, as is the case with many ruling parties in Southern Africa. SWAPO, for example, emerged with overwhelming majority support during the third turn of elections in Namibia, while the decline in party competition increased.

Gilliomme (1999:11) elaborates on the importance of meaningful party competition as follows;- that where a dominant party system is in place, the dominant party mobilizes the whole population in order to implement the party's policy which is then regarded as a legitimate national policy. In other words, the dominating party becomes the government, as is the case in Zimbabwe and Namibia. This way of development is strongly associated with political immaturity.

With the above in mind it becomes apparent that in democracies, party competition is important. Where a dominant party system is in place, democratic principles are not observed. Because of the one-party domination trend which is rife in the Southern African countries, this study seeks to emphasize Huntington's perspective that the period in which a country democratized has an effect on the level of success of a democracy. In other words late democracies are according to him

unlikely to achieve total democratic status or institutionalized democratic structures. Most of those late democracies are found in the Southern African region. This assumption is based on the theory that the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization (Huntington, 1968:13).

AIMS OF THE STUDY

The main aim of this study is to describe the existence *of one party domination system in the Southern African region with Namibia as a case study.*

More specifically the objectives of this study are-:

- ▶ to provide a conceptual and theoretical framework for the concepts that will form the center of this study namely democratization and the institutionalization of democratic procedures.
- ▶ to adapt a model devised by Duvenhage in illustrating the levels of institutionalization within Southern African countries, and
- ▶ to analyze the case of Namibia as a country where one party domination became prominent during the late nineties.

METHODOLOGY

The approach will be deductive in that general and established theories as well as concepts form the basis of this study.

A graphic model will be drawn in to determine the route of political change and to determine whether a democratic or non-democratic dispensation is in place. This model presents a graph in which two variables namely, *the form of government* and *the degree of government* are key determinants of the potential route of future political change of the Southern African democracies.

The graphic model or sketch being referred to can be interpreted as follows :

- ▶ that the possible route of political change can be determined by placing the two variables viz. the form and the *degree of government* against each other in a graphic form.
- ▶ that with the first variable, the *form of government*, route of change towards institutionalization or political decay will be determined.
- ▶ that with the second variable, the non-existence or the existence of a democratic dispensation will be indicated and that
- ▶ When these variables are placed against each other in a graphic form, a typological presentation of tendencies towards democratization or non- democratization in Southern Africa for the specified countries is formed .

Fig 1.




Fig.1 Duvenhage (2000:12)

The above graphic sketch together with the one to follow later in the text, will serve to interpret the extent of democratization/de-democratization and the possible route of future political change given the indicators to non-institutionalization /institutionalization trends in general.

This study will follow a descriptive design with a qualitative approach. It will be descriptive in that it intends to conduct an in-depth description of the democratic situation in the Southern African region as well as the refinement of concepts.

It will be a qualitative approach because data collected will be non-numerical, and also the method of observation and analysis is descriptive rather than a quantitative measurement of qualities. This method is preferred because the object of this study can better be understood by making an analysis through extracting themes from relevant existing researches, which depict the historical nature of democracy in Southern Africa. This approach will enable the researcher to present a coherent, consistent study with existing contextual data.

The method of investigation will rely mainly on literature and documentary study and reviews, consisting of books, journals, newspapers, Internet sources as well as relevant unpublished works. Key texts on democratic developments in the Southern African region, the process of democracy in Namibia, and one party domination will be drawn from the Africa Institute database, the concept of 'third wave of democratization' from Huntington (1991:13) and a possible route of political change from the graphic model by Duvenhage (2000:8-19) which will be adapted for this study.

With regard to democratization processes in part of the Southern African region reference is made to works by, Duvenhage (2000:19; 1997:23), Khumalo (2000:12), Du Toit (1995:200-400), Pajibo (1999 -2002:1-12), Mtukula (1999:12-15) and Stiff (2000:200-411).

Data collected from all documents will be analyzed and compared to discover connections and to offer an accurate, detailed interpretation and the understanding of the object of this research.

In conclusion, an analysis in a form of a summary will be given.

2. CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION AND GENERAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE

More than two-thirds of the world's population live in countries which are officially pluralistic democracies. The number of countries that have engaged into the process of democratization has increased. Since the middle seventies many states have experienced liberalization and /or democratization, which is often referred to as the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991:1-15). According to reports, 117 of the 191 states were free or partially free by 1996.(Partially free states refers to states that had undergone a process of liberalization without the accompanying democratization). Presently 19% more states are democratic than was the case a decade ago, which implies 54% or 3,1 billion of the world's population at that given time (Anon, 1996:5).

Democratic tendencies began to develop in Africa, and more specifically Southern Africa much later than in some other parts of the world. A notable few, like Liberia and Sudan have been untouched by liberalization and democratization. With the exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Swaziland, all the Southern African states have experienced some form of multi-party elections. The fact that states have experienced one or more multi-party elections does not, however, necessarily imply that democratic procedures, referring to, values and practices, have been institutionalized and consolidated (Duvenhage, 2000:7).

Globally, the issue of institutionalization of democratic values is highly placed on the political agenda. This view in itself is indicative of the global community's expectations that democracies ought to strive for institutionalization of democratic procedures. Among factors that lead to unstable or weak democracies is the failure to put in place democratic institutions or structures to enhance the democratic process (Duvenhage, 2000:7).

What is prominent in some Southern African states is that democratization often leads to one- party domination and as such undermines the democratic procedures. Gilliomee (1999:11) notes that, in states such as Namibia and Zambia democratization paved the way for one- party domination - a common pattern in older "democracies" such as Botswana and Zimbabwe as well.

In describing the present democratic trends and the level of institutionalization in the Southern African region, the discussion commences as follows:

- ▶ a conceptual orientation and general points of departure;
- ▶ democratization trends in world politics; the reasons for democratization in recent times;
- ▶ modi and characteristics of the third wave of democratization;
- ▶ the institutionalization trends, and
- ▶ one party domination in the Southern African region

2.1 DEMOCRATIZATION

Palmer (1989:7) argues that democratization is one form of political change of an existing order.

Political change means any adaptation or change of an existing political order or *status quo*.

Further more, Duvenhage (2000:4) states that every political situation results in the possibility of change occurring with regard to a large variety of politically related aspects. Therefore, democratization may be regarded as a specific type of change and implies the transformation of a non-democratic dispensation in order to meet the requirements set for a multi-party democracy. Non-democratic dispensations may assume a variety of forms, including absolute monarchies, dictatorial dispensations, military regimes, totalitarian dispensations, one-party states and various forms of oligarchies (Duvenhage, 2000:4).

Democracies, the product of democratization, are characterized by "...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Huntington, 1991:6). Although this definition of democratization does not fully express everything that is associated with liberal democracies, it is, however, exceptionally useful for the purpose of this study as a basis for distinguishing between democratic and non-democratic dispensations.

Trends of liberalization as associated with the maintenance, recognition and protection of the rights and freedom of groups and individuals are sometimes wrongly interpreted as democratization. Another practice that is strongly associated with democratization is the holding of regular elections. These regular elections often pave the way to a *one-party dominated* democracy, as it has been experienced in Southern Africa. To allow greater political, economic and other types of freedom like freedom of choice of religion and freedom to express (Duvenhage, 2000:8-10)

For O'Donnell et al. (1988:8), the process of change from a non-democratic to a democratic dispensation, described as democratization, implies ... the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (for instance coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, or administrative practice). These elements of democratization and how they are being applied in the Southern African region will be discussed later. In taking a look at the process of democratization, the stages that lead to democratization will be considered first.

2.1.1 Stages of democratization

It has been mentioned already that democratization is a process, which means that there is sure to be sequences or a set of stages that need to be followed in the process of democratization.

Macridis & Burg (1991:184) identify two stages in the process of democratization, *the stage of transition* and *the stage of completion*. The first stage involves the extension of guarantees of individual rights. These include civil rights, political rights, electoral systems and a legal order based on due process. It is during this period that different groups are enabled to organize themselves and to legitimize their positions. They gain control over resources, make their positions known to the political leadership and attempt to secure their interests by influencing public policies.

In young democracies like South Africa this period is characterized by the emergence of a number of new political organizations that were unknown to the majority of the electorate. According to Moore (1996:7) this emergence in itself signifies the end of the monopolistic leadership of the single party system by opening channels for communication of competing interests.

This stage also includes the establishing of the democratic rules of procedure for the organization of a vast number of interests which in turn necessitates representation of some kind. The importance of representation and consent is increased by the inauguration of an electoral process which creates incentives for the ruling elite to become more responsive to popular demands.

Moore (2001:2) stresses the fact that in a representative democracy, an informed citizenry is essential and it is a fundamental condition for a sound functioning democracy because citizen perceptions direct the flow of governmental policy discussions. In this, the emphasis is placed on the nature of and level of participation on the part of the masses, because uninformed citizens will not be in a position to contribute meaningfully to their democracy thus become elements or agents of a corrupt democratic process. Meaningful contributions and participation in democracies, which is lacking in new democracies like South Africa and Namibia, is a necessary tool to progressive democracies (compare Hyden, 1999:8) .

Du Toit (1995:428-429) argues that there is a need for an incentive based approach to the problem of democratizing divided societies and mentions the **constitutional rules** as an important incentive. The drafting of the constitutions takes place during this period to enhance control and adherence to agreements by all participants. It is worth mentioning at this point that South Africa demonstrated to the world that parties have reached some form of political maturity in that major parties managed to exercise a high level of political tolerance in completing the transitional process.

Other political observers stress that a successful transitional period is important in that an indication is given as to how representative or not the government will be (Macridis & Burg, 1991:184; Moore 2001:3).

Macridis & Burg (1991:185) write that democratization begins when there is a willingness on the part of the ruling elite to accept power sharing arrangements. With regard to the final stage in the democratic process they argue that "Completion of the democratization process involves the peaceful transfer of political authority from incumbents to their opponents through constitutional means..." They further assert that when access to state power has been transferred successfully from those that have been defeated through competitive elections or parliamentary defeat to their

competitors or opponents, democratization can be said to have taken place.

2.2 INSTITUTIONALIZATION

According to Duvenhage (2000:14) institutionalization of democratic trends means the maintaining of a democratic procedure for the appointment of political elites in terms of an established political tradition. The Election Management Bodies and political parties are examples of democratic institutions that will be dealt with later in this study. Furthermore, institutionalization as described by Nieuwkerk (1999:12), is something that happens to an organization over time, reflecting the organization's own distinctive history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies, vested interests it has created and the way it has adapted to its environment.

There are however, two main factors that are linked to institutionalization, viz. socio- economic indicators and political indicators. According to Duvenhage (2000:14) countries that perform well according to these indicators, are said to be more successful in institutionalizing democratic principles. This view will be stressed later by looking into individual performances of some democracies in the Southern African region.

The process of democratization as described broadly above, encompasses what is termed institutionalization. It may be established from the above discussion that democracy can only be established if there exist institutions that would result in outcomes highly adverse to anyone's interests, given the distribution of economic, ideological, organizational and other relevant resources. Such institutions are tailored to meet and support governments, and therefore to serve the democratic needs of each country.

It may be assumed therefore, that institutionalization is based on the premise that there is conflict in political preferences. The purpose of institutionalization is to resolve conflicts in political preferences. By having democratic institutions in place is another form of supporting the process of democratization because these institutions guarantee a form of protection to agreed decisions.

To summarize the difference between the two concepts, viz. institutionalization and democratization, it must be emphasized for the purpose of this assignment that factors leading to democratization are not necessarily the same factors that lead to successful institutionalization of democratic procedures. Instead, without institutionalization of democratic procedures, democracy becomes shaky and the *state weakens*.

The history of democratization provides evidence that the number of states in which democratic values and practices have become institutionalized, is considerably smaller than the number of states that initially had democratic elections (Huntington, 1991:19-21; Emmerson, 1967:272-297). It has also been observed that the factors that result in democratization are not necessarily those that lead to institutionalization. From the literature it is also clear that a large variety of factors are linked to the successful institutionalization of democratic values. Two categories of factors, namely *socio-economic* and *political indicators* this far had been distinguished.

Socio-economic: Huntington (1991:19-21), lists a variety of socio-economic criteria that can be used as indicators for identifying the successful or unsuccessful institutionalization of democratization trends. The most important indicators include **per capita income, the distribution of wealth, the levels of industrialization and urbanization, the development of a middle class and literacy levels**. This explains why a number of the underdeveloped countries fail to institutionalize democratic procedures. The resources are limited to enable democracy to be "democratized," to use the term coined by Tjingaete (1997:1). According to Du Toit (1995:175) the level of economic prosperity is one of the yard sticks being used by political analysts to measure the strengths and weaknesses of the state and its society.

The state of the economy in some of the Southern African democracies will be reviewed. Among others, the following are prevalent in the Southern African region: limited levels of industrialization, low levels of urbanization and elite masses gaps are characteristics of those democracies that are regarded as weak and underdeveloped states as it will be seen later in this discussion.

While a number of indicators to the economic success of a country exist, a few are noted here: Firstly, the importance of a middle class for the successful development of democratic dispensations as emphasized by Moore (2001:418-419). Dahl (1992: 62-65) emphasizes the importance of high levels of literacy as a factor that promotes the institutionalization of democratic values. States in which democratic values have been institutionalized successfully, have in general a high literacy level. This factor is important due to the fact that informed citizenry participate meaningfully in their government. For Du Toit (1995:175), the large economic gap between the poor and the rich plays a role in determining the success of a democracy. He further stresses the existing gap between the poor and the rich in the case of the economic development in Botswana as one disturbing factor despite its strong democratic character.

Important indicators that may determine the successful institutionalization of democratic procedures include an environment in which political stability is present, specific ways in which democratization occurred, the presence of a democratic tradition and culture as well as favorable international factors, writes Moore (2001:7). According to Duvenhage (2000:8), emphasis is on an environment in which political stability, low levels of violence, consensus regarding fundamental matters and a spirit of tolerance are present, is, as a rule, conducive to the institutionalization of democratic political institutions.

Political strategic factors can also contribute to the successful institutionalization of democratic values. To single out some of those already mentioned some factors are the manner in which democratization occurred, the timing of the initiative, and political leadership. These political strategic factors will form the bases of the focus of this study when dealing with the process of democratization in respective democracies of the Southern African region.

Having reached a common understanding of the interconnectedness of these two concepts, in as far as they will be applied in this topic, the focus of this study will shift to democratization trends in general throughout the world, before focusing on the Southern African democratic trends.

2.3 DEMOCRATIZATION TRENDS, A WORLD WIDE PHENOMENON

Huntington (1991:13–26) describes democratization trends as political waves. By waves he means processes or phenomena in politics that occur more or less simultaneously in more than one state. The large number of revolutions in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, the large number of coups in Latin America and Africa during the sixties, and patterns of colonization (imperialism) as well as a decolonization that dominated world politics in specific areas can be described as waves as well.

Characteristics of waves are their sporadic occurrence, their temporary character, their limited influence and counter reactions (counter-waves) that can follow them (Duvenhage, 2000:17-18). Patterns of political decline that can be observed in numerous African states at present may also be regarded as waves. For examples in this regard are Zimbabwe, with a strong adherence to the process of de-democratization, Burundi-Rwanda with a record of internal ethnic wars, the DRC with its long standing rivalry between the government and the rebel group conflicts, and the Angolan internal faction which recently took another turn, are listed highly among factors that contributed to de-democratization processes up to the present state of affairs.

Of the three waves of democratization that had been identified world wide, the last two are of much relevance to this study. The third wave of democratization will receive more attention due to its effect on the democratization/de-democratization in the Southern African region.

According to Huntington (1991:1,21) the third wave of democratization originated in Portugal with the end of the military regime of Marcello Caetano on 25 April 1974. Since then, a number of states including those in Africa democratized or experienced some form of democracy. Although Du Toit (1995:1) is of the opinion that the African continent's contribution to this process has been remote, the following picture reveals a different view.

By taking a glance at the number of African countries that experienced a form of democracy since then, a rather different view to the above can be put forward. For argument sake, in 1990 multi-party elections in Africa were restricted to **Senegal, Gambia, Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tunisia and Morocco**. According to Duvenhage(2000:5), this number had since risen to an estimate of 43 states . To note but some of those that democratized after 1990 are, **Angola** (Sept. 1992), the **Benin** (March 1991), **Burkina-Faso** (Dec. 1991), **Burundi** (June 1993), **Cameroon** (March 1992), the **Central Africa Republic** (Oct. 1992), the **Comoros** (1992), the **Congo (Brazzaville)** (March 1992), **Djibouti** (Dec. 1992), **Equatorial Guinea** (1991), **Ethiopia** (Dec. 1994), **Gabon** (Sept./Nov. 1990), **Zambia** (1991) and **Sao-tome**(1991), **Gana** (Apr. 1993), **Guinea** (1993), **Guinea-Bissau** (July 1994), the **Ivory Coast** (Nov. 1990), **Kenya** (Dec. 1992), **Lesotho** (March 1993), **Madagascar** (Nov. 1992), **Mali** (Feb./ March 1992), **Mauritania** (March 1992), **Niger** (Feb. 1993), **Nigeria** (Aug. 1993), **Rwanda** (1995), **South Africa** (Apr. 1994), **Togo** (Feb. 1994), the **Cape Verde Islands** (Jan. 1991), the **Seychelles** (June 1993), **Chad** (Apr. 1993), **Sierra Leone** (Sept. 1999), **Malawi** (1994) and **Mozambique** (Oct. 1994) **Tanzania** (2000) may be included (Duvenhage, 2000:5; Friedman, 2001:8; Whitaker,1995: 800-1046).

Militarization in Nigeria, Gambia, Burundi and Sierra Leone have rendered the multi-party elections in these states null and void, while political instability in Angola also caused its election to end in failure. As observed by Duvenhage (2000:13), in 1999, 34 states in Africa could still claim to have multi-party systems in operation. At present a combination of internal and external factors are also forcing countries such as Swaziland to democratize. Pressure is mounting on Zimbabwe to revive democratic practices, and talks of peaceful negotiations are currently underway for DRC and Angola (compare Khumalo 2002:7). Still on the negative side, are the political conditions in Rwanda and Burundi and recently Madagascar (ethnic conflict and political instability) which have disqualified these states (compare Du Toit 1995:1, Anon 2002:2).

The recent talks in South Africa by the DRC faction groups is a positive move towards revival of democracy in the Republic of Congo. It is to be hoped that the domestic wars in Angola will subside to be replaced by peace talks after the recent death of the rebel group leader. Lesotho's recently held democratic elections, which saw for the first time the introduction of a new electoral system, adds to the growing trend towards a revival of the democracy in this region. These war torn countries and their spill over effects, are a further set-back for democratization on the African continent (Nanyem, 2002:16).

From the above overview it is clear that democratization has occurred extensively since 1975. Particularly in the 1990s Southern Africa made an impressive progress in the democratization process. It can be agreed therefore that almost all of the Southern African states have been exposed directly to the consequences of the third wave of democratization and that some still are. Although in different ways and for different reasons there has been a remarkable move towards democratization in the Southern African region. Factors that have led to the third wave of democratization are important to this study as they are strongly associated with the latest political changes in the Southern African region. The focus will now be placed on some of these factors.

2.4 THE FACTORS THAT LED TO THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Huntington (1991:46-108) identifies some factors that contributed to democratization in world politics, namely the legitimacy and effectiveness crises experienced by non-democratic dispensations, the new political philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church, new trends of policy proposed by prominent international actors and the snowball effect. None of these factors (reasons) on their own proved decisive with regard to democratization. It is much rather a case of combined factors in interaction which contributes to democratization in the broad sense of the word and they are briefly discussed below. For the purpose of this assignment, these factors do not receive an exclusive treatment but they will form part of discussions on political development during this period.

2.4.1 The legitimacy and effectiveness crises of non-democratic dispensations

During the democratic waves, the established "democratic ethos" undermines the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. Opposition to non-democratic regimes quite often assumes the form of democratic resistance. Since regular and free elections are not held, non-democratic regimes are unable to mobilize support in favor of the specific regimes as mentioned by Huntington (1991:48). Affected regimes attempted to counteract the legitimacy crises by unsuccessfully using norms of effectiveness such as economic growth and military success as substitutes for elections in a political sense, in an attempt to mobilize the citizenry in favor of the specific regime. Military defeats, as occurred in the case of Angola and Mozambique, are testimonies to this effect in the Southern African region (Crocker, 1992:116).

To the same extent that ineffective action may have contributed to a deepening legitimacy crises, effective action (performance) may have promoted a similar trend in that a specific regime may have been threatened by it. Stated differently, the reason/cause for supporting a specific regime disappears because the reason /cause is removed from the political scene though effective action. The restoration of law and order by the respective military regimes in Brazil (1994) and Argentine (1980-1981) resulted in such crises for these regimes (Macradis and Burg, 1991:26).

2.4.1 Economic development

The relation between democracy and economic development has been emphasized by many analysts in the past. For example, in the Southern African region, Botswana has the character of a stable democracy because of its economic progress, among other factors used to analyze its political stability (Du Toit, 1995:178).

2.4.2 The new political philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church

When the Roman Catholic Church's change of approach in dealing with human rights issues influenced governments in adopting this philosophy. The relationship between Protestantism and democratization is mentioned as an one of the important factors that lead to democratization. Huntington (1991:74-86), however, draws attention to the progressive role played by the Roman Catholic Church with regard to democratization. But important to note for the scope of this study is that, other churches played a dominant role in persuading changes specifically in South Africa. The active roles being played by different churches in politics are still noticeable even at the present moment. While not ignoring the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in general during the third wave of democratization in South Africa and any other country that felt this.

2.4.4 The snowball effect

A process of rippling effect like a wave. It starts when one state democratizes and transfers the trend to other states, and the influence spreads. In their turn, other states are being influenced, and this can be described as a wave. This turn of events became one important reason for democratization. Huntington (1991:101) refers to it as the so-called snowball effect that promoted democratization during the third wave of democratization.

Although individual factors had a decisive influence on democratization in certain respects, it was in general rather a combination of the above mentioned factors that led to democratization. Democratization trends were, however, put into effect in different ways. Among others, the third wave of democratization was characterized by negotiations and, low levels of violence. The end result led to governments that agreed to power sharing, regime replacement and transformation (Duvenhage, 2000:8-10; Stiff, 2000:412).

Stiff (2000:412) argues that of these forms, regime replacement characterized democratization in many of the former colonies, especially in Africa. According to Duvenhage (2000:10) *Regime replacement* gives an indication that the power base of the opposition has been extended to such an extent that the position of the existing regime is threatened. In fact, the threat and the inability of the

regime to withstand it, paves the way for the collapse of such a regime.

Another common character that also became apparent is that conflicting parties managed to agree on *power sharing* during the turn of negotiations. This agreement paves the way for democratization, resulting in a democratic election. What turned to be the result of this approach of democratization is that people who are in favor of reform must control the government, and that moderate democrats must take the initiative in the opposition. South Africa stands out as one other example in recent political history of democratization (Duvenhage, 2000:10).

3. DEMOCRATIZATION / DE-DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Nine of the 14 member states of SADC can be classified as parliamentary democracies. Five of these democracies, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa held elections in 1999 and all of them had the parties in power returning with an increased majority. Lesotho, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia also held their presidential and legislative elections afterwards, and parties in power won the elections (Friedman, 2002:80).

What is disturbing, is that the electioneering processes are often accompanied by undemocratic practices which often lead to shaky democracies or weaken the government. Violence and irregularities have been dominating reports during the election period in many countries within the region. The following part will give an indication of the extent of the flawed election trend in this region in recent years.

Proceeding from Schumpeter's (1942:150-168) presupposition that a democracy is no more nor less than a prescriptive procedure for bringing a governing elite to power, **elections** are singled out as watershed moment in the procedure. Huntington (1991:174), emphasizes that elections "...were a vehicle of democratization as well as the goal of democratization". It is proper to have a look at how the elections effected democratization and / or de-democratization in the Southern African region in the following deliberation.

The following argument attempts to point out that, although elections had been commonly practiced by older democracies, they had in many instances been with incidents of intimidation or some form of undemocratic practices. Taking Zimbabwe's political history into account, it can be read that non democratic practices dominate in this democracy. For example the leader of the opposition party, ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo and his party members, suffered tremendous threats from the government of Zimbabwe in 1984 according to Stiff (2000:228). ZAPU as an opposition party was being persuaded to vote for ZANU-PF in the forth coming elections. ZANU-PF aimed at breaking the ZAPU hegemony over the Ndebele. This kind of politics of power had been a common feature for the ruling party in Zimbabwe for a very long time. It may be assumed that the one party dominated system, had been the aim of the ruling party from the onset, given their history of power abuse.

What recent reports show, that democracy has collapsed in Zimbabwe, and that the country is now a dictatorship, has been shaped over the years. One other threat to political developments in this country is the selective regional developments that affect partisanship. According to Stiff (2000:233) ethnic divisiveness had been steering political activities, and this can be traced to as far back as 1984. For example during reigns of terror dating back to 1994, the Seshona speaking villages were spared because of their link to the president. Attacks were directed at the Ndebele speaking areas (Stiff, 2000:233)

The decrease in opposition came as no surprise, because all other strong opposition parties were also targeted. Stiff (2000: 28) argues that Bishop Muserewa's party leadership were detained by the Youth Brigade and the police shortly before the 1995 general elections. What can be said about elections in Zimbabwe following the above is that they were a means to camouflage the totalitarian dictatorship over the years. The recent turn of events in the political history of Zimbabwe are characterized by what many analysts term total collapse of democracy and the weakening state. But the recent polls may have a different indication on political party competition in Zimbabwe according to Wiseman (2002:8) who interpreted the latest outcome of polls as showing that opposition is growing in strength, thus casting hopes for possible change in government. A look at the latest election process may serve to support this observation.

Zimbabweans went to the polls on March 9-11 in 2002, to elect a president who will govern the country for the next six years. The presidential election was perhaps the most heated contest in the country's post independence history. For the first time, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), faced imminent defeat at the hands of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a political party that is barely two years old led by Morgan Tsangirai (Bird, 2002:42).

The period leading up to the election was marred by politically motivated violence resulting in the deaths of dozens of people, mostly members or perceived members of the opposition. The ruling ZANU-PF employed almost every known political trick, including constitutional engineering, to ensure that they maintain power. The government enacted three legislative instruments including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), The Media Bill, and The Citizenship Act. All three legislative vehicles were intended to constrain the ability of the opposition and voters assumed to be opposition supporters according to analysts (Paton, 2002:22).

Other actions that the government employed to frustrate voters included the reduction of polling stations in urban centres, where the opposition is quite strong, while increasing poll stations in rural areas, the strongholds of the government. Clark (2002 :11) reports that according to the opposition, the limited number of polling booths in Harare and Chitungwiza, a high-density suburb, effectively denied about 400,000 voters the right to cast their ballots during the elections reports,.

Reports of this nature are accounted for by different observers. For instance, the control of the electioneering process was poorly organised in that queues in the urban centre were very long and moved at a painfully slow pace. Some voters had to stand in queues for upwards of 13 hours and still did not get to vote. Some had to return the following day to vote. The government was ordered by the court to extend the voting time, but on the extended day the polling stations opened about five hours late and closed before the scheduled time, thereby making it impossible for some to cast their votes (Paton, 2002:22).

During the campaign, the main opposition party, MDC was unable to campaign in many parts of the rural areas due to harassment, intimidation and widespread violence believed to be perpetrated by government supporters. The public media was clearly a mouthpiece of the ruling party and thus, there was not equal access. Several opposition rallies were either disrupted by government supporters or were prevented from happening. In essence, there was no freedom of assembly, no freedom of

movement, no equal access to the public media, massive violence mostly against opposition members. Most certainly the playing field was tilted in favour of the ruling party. All of these variables clearly demonstrated that the presidential election was neither free nor fair (Paton, 2002:22).

It was, therefore, not surprising when the result was announced and President Robert Gabriel Mugabe was declared the winner, taking 56% of the vote while the MDC garnered 42%. International and local observers for the most part correctly stated that the election was not free and fair. The leader of the MDC described the elections as a "daylight robbery" and refused to accept the results (Weatherell, 2002:20).

Several western countries including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark have all condemned the electoral process and have imposed targeted sanctions, such as travel restrictions on Zimbabwean government officials and their relatives, and the freezing of their assets. Denmark has said that it will stop all of its assistance to the country (Weatherell, 2002:20).

The conduct of the election and the response of the international community, especially western countries, will certainly make it more difficult for Zimbabwe and this region to recover economically. The country's economic collapse has contributed to the famine crises in this region although Mugabe explains it differently. Mugabe refutes the fact that his government policies had led to the present state of poverty, but ascribes the famine state to draught that has been experienced by many of the Southern African democracies (Weatherell, 2002:20)

The economic condition, combined with the political polarization in the country, as a result of the election and social discontentment, clearly suggest more difficult times ahead for the government and the region as a whole. The spill over effect that normally follow economic collapse calls for all leaders to take precaution and assist in reviving the economic and democratic situation of Zimbabwe. There had been indications towards this process as reports indicate according to Weatherell (2002:20). But Mbeki believes that a greater effort to revive democracy, lies on the people of that country although the whole region has to assist in economic and governance recovery (Pajibo,2002:3)

Dube and Chirambo (2000:24), are of the opinion that the tendency to undermine democratic procedures is rife in this region, for instance, the Zambian president tried to amend the constitution to allow him to stand for a third term in office. According to Nawakwi (2001:13) Chiluba orchestrated a campaign to amend the constitution and make himself eligible for reelection to a third term in office.

His efforts met stiff resistance from the civil society and the members of the executive committee. Thereafter, Chiluba expelled 24 members of his parliament who opposed the changing of the constitution. Although his move to change the constitution failed, he is still regarded as a head of state who is not a state-man because he failed to unite the nation by giving them the chance to have a leader of their choice. Much dissatisfaction has been directed at the present president, Mwanawasa. He was hand picked by Chiluba to be his successor. This move has sparked much controversy following the elections.

The leaders in this region are inclined to manipulate the election process to lengthen their stay in power. President Nujoma of Namibia did manage to change the constitution irrespective of opposition and much objection from his colleagues and the civil society. This tendency is spreading. For example in Malawi, indications that the president intends to change the constitution for the presidential term to be extended are also rife. The above is an indication of how elections are being used to de-democratize rather than build democracies in the Southern African region. There are however positive trends that can lead to revival of democracies in this region. A look into some of these follows next.

This region should focus on positive trends like peaceful elections to revive democracies and to improve on the negative perception the western world has over democracies in this region. The negative trends like, tendencies of undemocratic procedures like one party domination, inability of the parties in power to transfer authority which often lead to dictatorship are rife in this region. These trends make the prospects of democracies less obvious, bringing into question the durability of the democracies in this region. The focus will now shift to the next democratic element and how it affected the democratization process in this region.

3.1 De-democratization through elections

Looking at negative political development in Southern African states the following pattern can be observed that; elections normally took place after a political crisis of some sort e.g. war, decolonization, revolution, genocide and apartheid) placed a party in power which enjoys inviolable status (one party domination) or low turn over of political leaders (Gilliomee, 1999:11).

Moore (2001:7) identifies the importance of elections in the representative government. He maintains that in order for elections to serve their democratic purpose, the expression of popular will is essential to break the major party's monopoly over politics. Small parties must be allowed to compete freely in order to arise. In this way they will achieve public recognition and build up their constituency. Mechanisms are in place to help the small parties to grow, for example by putting in place electoral systems that create an atmosphere of majority representation in parliament, to name one, proportional representation.

This system allows each party a number of seats, in proportion to their share of the vote. Others recommend some measures that can in combination with the above help small parties to grow, like equal access to the media by all, public financing of campaigns and restriction of election coverage to the to the public media venue. (Wessels, 2000:12 ; Botha, 1996:22).

With electoral reform, along the lines of the above stated , many obstacles to progressive electioneering that lead towards restoring democratic role of politicians in this region will be overcome. This point has recently been demonstrated during the failed democratic election process of Lesotho in 1998. The absence of a legitimate electoral system was, among others, the cause of dissatisfactions. During the repeat elections, that took place in May 2002, an electoral system was in place and all parties accepted it as a democratic tool. This form of democratic institutional structure provided protection for the smaller parties and created a platform to advance their political developments (Keketso, 2002:17).

Another trend is the failure of the defeated party to accept defeat. This had often lead to instability after the elections, making it difficult for the incumbents to govern. This can also point to one other shortcoming in these democracies, that no preparation for changing over of government was made.

Leaving a vacuum in the period between handing over and taking over of power, which is often a battle as literature shows above. The successful transitional period is important in that an indication is given to how representative or not the government will be (Moore, 2001:3).

Having studied the processes of democratization in the Southern African region, it becomes apparent that the second stage, namely, handing over of power to opponents, becomes a problem to arrive at. This often lead to de-democratization as it is currently the case in Zimbabwe . It is at this stage that most of the democracies in the Southern African region come to a halt as already discussed in this study. It has been observed that the peaceful transfer of political authority is one of the democratic conditions lacking in the Southern African Region, which often lead to political dissatisfaction and later internal conflicts and economic declines.

In explaining how this trend manifests itself, Gelliomee (1999:11) reports that the following pattern is followed, “ (t)he dominant party mobilizes the whole population in order to implement the party’s policy which...is regarded as the only legitimate national project”. This pattern is prevalent in almost all of democracies in the Southern African region. As mentioned above, means to change the constitution to suit the ruling party’ interest of prolonging their office occupancy had become a common practice in this region.

Democrats do not approve of a prolonged hold to political power by one party. According to the democratic principles when one party holds political power for the third term in succession, democratic procedures are being undermined. This has been the case with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, and Namibia. The weakening of the state is attributed to factors such as failure to transfer authority from one party to the other in a democratic manner and in most cases from one leader to the next within the same party (Friedman, 2002:8).

A thoroughly planned transitional process is important to those opponents of the regime most likely to benefit from a transition to democracy. This has been the case through the transitional period in South Africa where the result of compromises, and mutual concessions that existed during the transitional stage of the democracy paved the way to a Government of National Unity. The drafting of constitutions takes place during this period to enhance control and adherence to agreements by all participants. I have to mention at this point that South Africa demonstrated to the world then that parties have reached some form of political maturity in that major parties managed to exercise a high

level of political tolerance to complete the transitional process.

The above discussion indicated the level at which elections have not been yielding the expected result, which is to achieve deepening democracies in this region. Strongly related to elections in terms of their importance character to a democracy, is **political leadership**.

3. 2 Political leadership and democratization

Elections with an often unpredictable and sometime unforeseen result prove to be the only peaceful method of getting rid of non-democratic regimes. Although the above is true, other democratic structures like political parties and leadership do influence outcomes of elections as it had been seen above. Successful democratization demands the presence of Democratization as a product of evolutionary reform, therefore, places special demands on leadership (Clark, 2002:11).

Successful attempts at democratization are often connected with great leaders especially the ability to contribute creatively to solutions regarding the choice of strategies and tactics; timing of initiatives; and the ability to establish successful coalitions. Leaders like De Klerk and Mandela, are among those that made it possible for democracy to be experienced. It is an irrefutable fact that leadership can mean the difference between a successful and unsuccessful attempt at democratization – something which was indeed present to a great extent during the third wave of democratization (Duvenhage, 2000:17).

According to Stiff (2000:256), political power play and self serving intentions are strongly associated with some political leaders. An example here is the tactics employed by both Mugabe and Nujoma in the Congo affairs with the aim of gaining economically, from the diamond mines. The two governments committed their national scarce resources by sending troops to Congo not because they were committed to peace progress in that area but to use the confused war situation to tap into the mining business. This indicate how non committal to sound governance and the well being of the nation leads to economic and political crises.

Similarly, Angola suffered from the same fate as the above in that, leaders were implicated in cases of corruption. The entrenched interests as mentioned previously have enlarged the economic and political problems in this country. As reports indicate, those who benefited from the war included the Angolan ruling class, UNITA leaders who dealt in diamonds, multi-national oil and diamond conglomerates, arms dealers, and the like. This also shows the extent to which leaders fail their democracies (Pajibo 2001:4).

Until recently, there had been war in Angola. The 27 years of civil war have resulted in deep schisms within the country. The level of destruction and deaths, the high number of refugees and displaced persons, the numbers of landmines planted throughout the country, the deepened poverty, and a largely corrupt and unaccountable government are among the serious issues waiting to be resolved. Following these discussions, it becomes apparent that to achieve a democratic government in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and others, mature political leadership is a dire need.

The death of Savimbi has, for some, produced the possibility of ending more than three decades of civil war in Angola. Because of the cease fire announcement and the expression to return to talks by the rebels and the government of Angola, there is hope for a normal government. Although this may be regarded as a positive development, there are multiple factors that are directly linked to negative political developments among others, the **economy and governance**. These elements have been prominent in the character of democracies in Africa and the following discussion will focus on these two and their relationship.

3. 3 Economic decline

It has already been pointed out that the economic conditions are a decisive factor towards institutionalization of democratic principles. The level of poverty in this region does not indicate that democracies, are heading towards having democratic structures institutionalized. Recent reports show that the region is performing badly economically. One of the poorest countries in Africa Tanzania is part of this region.

Africa's widespread poverty is conspicuous in most African countries. Africa is home to more than half of the poorest countries in the world. African governments are, for the most part, either unwilling or unable to deliver social services to their people. As a result, Africa's productive capacity has been severely undermined and its deprivation and marginalization deepened.

A look at the economic condition in one of Southern Africa's poorest country will help to visualize the extent to which development stand. At this stage a brief economic overview of Tanzania serves as an example.

Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, which accounts for half of GDP, provides 85% of exports, and employs 80% of the work force. Topography and climatic conditions, however, limit cultivated crops to only 4% of the land area. Industry is mainly limited to processing agricultural products and light consumer goods. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's deteriorated economic infrastructure. Growth in 1991-2000 featured a pick up in industrial production and a substantial increase in output of minerals, led by gold. Natural gas exploration in the Rufiji Delta looks promising and production could start by 2002 (Kamidza, 2001:23).

Recent banking reforms have helped to increase private sector growth and investment. According to Irin (2001:9) continued donor support and solid macroeconomic policies should allow Tanzania to achieve real GDP growth of 6% in 2001 and in 2002. **GDP:** purchasing power parity - \$25.1 billion (2000 est.) **GDP - real growth rate:** 5.2% (2000 est.) **GDP - per capita:** purchasing power parity - \$710 (2000 est.) **GDP - composition by sector:** *agriculture* 49%; *industry* 17%; *services* 34% (1998 est.) **Population below poverty line:** 51.1% (1991 est.). **Household income or consumption by percentage share:** *lowest 10%:* 2.9% *highest 10%:* 30.2% (1993). **Inflation rate (consumer prices):** 6% (2000 est.). **Labour force:** 13.495 million; **Labour force-by occupation:** agriculture 80%; industry and commerce 20% (2000 est.); **Unemployment rate:** NA% ; **Budget: revenues:** \$1.21 billion. (Kamidza, 2001:3).

According to Kamidza (2001:23) Tanzania is one of the countries whose socio- economic and political indications point to severe challenges which require total commitment among all economic agencies to make it competitive in the regional or international trade mainstreams. On the other hand, it is up to this country to eliminate negative factors like poor governance in order to benefit the masses economically. The economic situation in the Southern African region depicts a mixed group of countries which range from those with per capita incomes of over US\$3 000, like South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles, while some, for instance DRC, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania are below US\$300. These income inequalities slow down the regional economic integration plans which is very important in attracting investments.

Nearly all SADC member states are experiencing economic crises that are symbolized by growing unemployment. For instance, in Zambia, the World Food Program (WFP) is asking donors to contribute 45,000 mega tons (mt) of food for the country. The Government of Zambia says it needs to import 300,000 mt of commercial maize, while an additional 50,000 mt will be needed for emergency food aid. In Zimbabwe, towards the end of 2001, more than 500,000 Zimbabweans, mostly rural folks, would be in need of food assistance. The WFP has appealed to international donors for \$54 million to prevent potential starvation in the country. What is sad is that Mugabe and his government are turning the food packages away according to recent reports (Muleya, 2002:12).

The report from WFP, indicates that the growing food shortages in Zimbabwe, applies also in other countries like Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zambia, Angola, DRC, Swaziland and many others in the Africa. Information Network (IRIN) has reported that, "The World Food Program is drafting plans to help thousands of impoverished Malawians survive this year's maize shortages." A survey conducted by WFP in Malawi suggested that 10-25% of the population in a Rural Development Project sample will be in need of food aid (Weatherell, 2002:16).

The causes of food insecurity in the region are multiple. Muleya (2002:11) argues that they include floods, lack of rain, mismanagement of the countries' resources, and pursuit of economic policies that do not accommodate the needs of rural people. According to Du Toit (1995:311) the question of land ownership is said to be a contributing factor as well. In Zimbabwe, the crisis surrounding the repossession of land by war veterans is said to have severely undermined food production in the country. Although recently, President Mugabe has presented different reasons as the causes of the starvation in his country among others, severe draught and poor governance seems to be associated with the present state of affairs in that country as well. Factors such as lack of foreign exchange had hampered the government's ability to purchase food reports, Salter (2002:11).

Muleya (2002:11) states that to indicate the extent of poverty in this region, mention can be made of the fact that, recently the World Food Conference was dominated by reports of a famine crises in this region. Almost all countries but a few are battling with starvation. This is an indication that states are failing in their roles to provide for their citizens. This point highlights the next argument which is related to the poor governance and economic failures that characterize democracies in this region.

3. 4 Strong state /weak state

Notably, there is a striking difference that has been omitted by political scholars and observers alike that, while African countries are similar in many notable ways regarding factors and practices that lead to shaky democracies in this continent, a question of ethnic divisiveness and its effect on the internal wars is not mentioned much. According to Du Toit (1995:327) Botswana's success is not linked to its homogenous culture. But this factor appears to be a possible reason why Botswana has not experienced civil war or ethnic conflicts while tribal or ethnic conflicts led to civil wars in many countries in Africa. Recently, political analysts are linking partisanship to ethnicity. This has happened with the ruling parties in both Namibia, and Zimbabwe. At the time of this writing, the issue of ethnic divisiveness sparked much public debate in South Africa (Mamela, 2002:3).

This factor is mentioned specifically at this point to bring to the surface, the importance of nationality and the importance of nation building in countries with multi ethnic groups. The fact that the colonial regional divisions in Africa as a whole has contributed to confusion regarding nationality is an issue that can just be mentioned in passing because of the scope of this study. But it is important to note that ethnic based political support can inhibit positive political development as is now the case with Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Botswana's superior democratic character is accounted for by the strength of this state and its united society. The absence of considerable infighting, strengthens it. This state of affair further strengthens the notion that the country has the chance to become a true democracy. According to Du Toit (1995:274) Botswana has achieved its independence in a different way, under the conditions that are potentially open to democratic practices. When Khama took over the government, he did so under totally different political and economic adversities compared to Zimbabwe and Namibia. Where from the start democratic conditions are under threat of hostile forces, as in the case of countries mentioned above, the state becomes weak.

According to Wessels (2000:64), a weak state cannot maintain law and order. A democratic government derives its strength from its constitution among others. One way of strengthening the state, therefore, is to rule according to and observe the constitution as the supreme law of the country. It is this characteristic of the Botswana constitution that makes it a strong state (Du Toit, 1995:275).

Robertson (1995:1-2) agrees that the constitution as the legitimate and supreme law of the country, provides guaranteed protection to all members of the society against any abuse of power. What has been observed lately is the inclination to change the constitution by individual leaders to meet their own needs. Zimbabwe, Namibia and also (Zambia tried) while indications that Malawi's president's intention to stand for the 2004 elections are rife (Pajibo, 2002:7).

Since independence in 1966 (after 6 elections), Botswana has not had any change in government. Leadership within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has, however, changed and Festus Mogae was elected as the country's third president in 1998 (compare Duvenhage, 2000:10). Of all the states in Southern Africa, Botswana has the greatest chance of obtaining the status of institutionalized democracy. Pajibo (2001:6) is of the opinion that Mauritius stood a chance until recently when the country experienced political instability.

For Khumalo (2001:12), factors which count most in Botswana's favor are the success with which high economic growth has been accompanied by political stability, absence of ethnic conflicts and sound governance.

According to Duvenhage (2000:18), some of the weaknesses for sustainable democracies and the state as a state, in the Southern African region in particular, are lack of maturity in the political system, the electoral demand which is vibrant and viable, political parties and a regular turnover of political leaders, the procedural demand is for strong checks and balances measured by separation of powers and an economic growth. All these affect the process of democratization negatively. In conclusion the following elements may be said to be present in the Southern African democracies:

3.5 Governance

In many African countries, governments mostly came to power through violent means and then transformed themselves into civilian leadership through flawed electoral processes or "unlevel playing fields." One such government is the Eyadema regime of Togo, where Africa's first military coup d'etat happened in 1963. Others include Liberia, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda. In several other countries, the governments came to power forcefully and have not had any democratic elections yet. They include Burundi, Rwanda, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Eritrea. In several other countries, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola, governments that won the first post-independence elections continue to cling to power by fiat or constitutional shenanigans. In other countries, such as Malawi, Zambia, and South Africa, where governments came to power through popular

mandates, the yearnings of the people have been unfilled. Given these circumstances, Southern African governments have largely remained unresponsive to the needs of the poor majority (IDASA, 2000:12).

3.6 Voter apathy

Voter apathy is another common negative factor in democracies in this region. For instance Lesotho recently held elections and reports indicate voter apathy. The recent elections, which took place in May 2002, followed the much disputed election result of 1998. Among other issues that caused dispute were dishonesty and lack of sound electoral system. Tendencies of this nature are normally reported throughout the region during or after the elections. For instance, due to threats prior to elections in Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, voter apathy was experienced (Keketso, 2002:17)

3.7 External Interference

Africa's heritage includes its colonization by Europe, and residual manifestations of colonization remain strong. Most African leaders seeking to lead their people must travel to European countries or the United States to seek endorsement for their economic plans from the Western governments. Africa's economic linkages to the rest of the world are largely a result of its colonial legacy. These linkages and legacies do not usually serve the best interests of Africans. This history is exacerbated in the post-colonial period by the involvement of multinational corporations and the international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, not to mention transnational corporations (Pajibo 2001:3).

There are however, positive contributions in the involvement of external forces for cooperative intentions from the very wester corporations that can benefit African countries. For instance cooperative measures such as those aiming at controlling illegal diamonds exchange will add to improved governance. For instance, a positive move has been made by major countries involved in producing and dealing with diamonds. According to reports, countries that have grouped themselves into an entity known as the Kimberley Process met in Luanda, Angola. The Kimberly Process is an apparent response by these

countries to the international campaign against "blood diamonds." The campaign seeks to ban illegal diamonds from Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Angola.

In the view of the campaign, proceeds from the sale of illegal diamonds continue to fuel the conflicts in these countries. They, therefore, advocate a certification system that would prevent the flow of illegal diamonds. At the end of the Kimberley Process meeting a communiqué was issued, stating controlled trade regulations in the industry (Pajibo, 2001:3).

In describing the democratic trend in the Southern African region institutionalization also becomes important and forms a larger part of this study. Central to the presentation is the question of whether democratic tendencies (with specific reference to democratic procedures) will in future be institutionalized or not. Attention will be given to incidents where regular elections have led to one-party domination. When focusing on one-party domination led democracies, and on its effect on democratization and institutionalization, a case study will be used to inform the extent to which states are affected by this trend. On the whole, two main criteria will be used as the determining factors. These are the *socio-economic* and the *political indicators* which will be analyzed to determine the level of institutionalization of some Southern African democracies.

3. 8 Towards institutionalization / non-institutionalization of democratic practices

As already mentioned above, stable democracies are those that have managed to establish democratic structures and practices. This far this study has indicated that, indicators point towards negative political developments. Therefore the indication is that most democracies are non-institutionalized in the Southern African region. The focus of this study shifts to the extent of non-institutionalization trend in Southern Africa and the degree of governance.

For the purposes of this study, this category is defined very broadly and includes states in which democratic elections took place without changes in government in later elections. States which held multi-party democratic elections and in which the democratic procedures did not bring about any changes in terms of improved political management and also where an economic decline was experienced, are also placed under this category. Also to be included are states in which multi-party elections simply replaced one dictatorship with another. This category receives attention here due to a large number of democracies in this region that fall under it as described above and will be noticed later in this study. From here a summary of the categories will be provided and is to be read with the 'graphic model' in the next page.

SUMMARY OF STATES CLUSTERED ACCORDING TO COMMON INDICATORS

A= NON INSTITUTIONALIZED DEMOCRACIES

STATES: Botswana; South Africa; Namibia; Malawi; Lesotho; Mauritius; Zambia;
Mozambique, Madagascar

INDICATORS: New democracies,
No tradition of democratic change of government,
Democratic procedures not yet legitimized,
The new democracy has not yet proved itself to be effective.

B=INSTITUTIONALIZED DEMOCRACIES





STATES: NONE

INDICATORS: Sound traditions and democratic governments exist,
Established democratic procedures
Democratic change of government has taken place and has a high turn over of political leaders.
Constitutional rule and strong state had led to stability
Equitable distribution of resources is in place

Non democratic – non institutionalized dispensations D

democratic dispensation C

Route of potential change



Namibia

S. A.

Mauritius


Botswana

Zimbabwe

A
Non institutionalized democracies

B
Institutionalized

Democratic



C=INSTITUTIONALIZED NON DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATIONS;

STATES: Botswana; Zambia; Namibia; Madagascar; Tanzania; Malawi; Mauritius

INDICATORS: States which experienced multi-party elections,
Governments enjoy legitimacy without the existence of democratic procedures,
Elections can take place without a change of government over a long period, Some
states are reduced to status of delegative democracies,
One party dominated system, even dictatorship.

D= NON DEMOCRATIC NON INSTITUTIONALIZED DISPENSATIONS

STATES : Swaziland ; Zimbabwe; DRC and Angola.

INDICATORS: Patterns of political instabilities and praetorianism are prominent,
Often the state is in crises as a state not the type of state,
Forms of political instability, civil wars, coups, revolutions and civil disorder.

In view of the above it may be correct to state that

- ▶ The route of change in the Southern African region is that of non- institutionalized, non-democracies. Comparing new democracies and old ones, currently their progress towards achieving democratic institutions seems bleak.
- ▶ This picture does not however, confirm the prognoses that the third counter wave of democratization will emerge from this region. Because of the latest regional effort which is directed at ensuring democratization in the whole region by member countries, democratization and institutionalization of democratic procedure is also central to political agendas of this region.
- ▶ Although it has been pointed out earlier on in this study, that new democracies do not conform to democratic procedures, in this instance even the older democracies have not conformed to democratic procedure , if we have to mention countries like Botswana and Zimbabwe, with the worst situation of a de-democratized character.

According to the above indicators, the same can be said about Namibia and South Africa as the new democracies in this region. The possible route of political change after its 10 years of democracy in South Africa does not indicate that there will be any change in political party dominance within the near future ; it seems that South Africa is falling into the same pattern as states such as Botswana and Namibia. Against the background of a dominant one-party system which is in the process of becoming the norm, democracy often degenerates into a ritual (form) with restricted substance (functions)- a typical “delegative democracy”. The end of apartheid and the consolidation of opposition support within the ANC prior to 1994 has paved the way for one-party domination in South Africa. In this respect South Africa is following the pattern of not only of other states in Southern Africa, but also in other parts of the world after crises (compare Gilliomee, 1999:11; Du Toit, 1995: 410-449; Stiff, 2000:134).

The institutionalization of democratic procedures in the Southern African states will depend on the ability to shed the tendency **towards one party domination**. In this respect the successful interpretation of opposition politics within democracies is essential. The ability to mobilize and organize support in terms of alternative policies to those of the government is of critical importance (Gilliomee, 1999: 11). Although it is difficult for South Africa, and for other states which have been referred to, to rid itself of the potential threat of one-party domination, this is not impossible if all is done in the spirit of nation building and aiming at creating a strong state.

If political parties can start to educate their followers on political responsibilities, instilling in the electorate a culture of political maturity with the aim of creating informed citizens, with time, institutionalized democracies are possible. States such as Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and even Botswana and recently, Namibia and Lesotho feature prominently as non institutionalized democracies. They share one common negative character, the replacement of one dominant party with another. This turn of events are regarded as characterizing **non institutionalized democracies**. With the above deliberations an in-depth description of the existing situation with regard to the **one party trend in the South African** region follows.

4. THE ONE PARTY DOMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA :case study of Namibia

Namibia struggled for decades to achieve its independence. When the country ultimately gained its democracy, there were many reparations to engage in before it could even start to nurture and develop the new democratic rule. The restoration of social, economic and political stability becomes too burdensome and thus weakens the new democracy. This gives a young democracy very little room to evolve. The decolonization process that involved Germans and British regimes, the struggles to defeat the apartheid regime of the former South African government, interwoven with the Angolan civil war, left Namibia with an enormous task to deal with after independence. A description of the development of political parties in Namibia is presented at this stage to clarify the nature and the factors that are contributory to state of the present political state of affairs. One of those factors is the fact that the ruling party is the dominant party.

An attempt will be made to establish the basis for the ruling party to have enjoyed uncontested support in Namibia for this long. A brief overview of the evolvement of political parties in Namibia, with an emphasis on the ruling party will be my starting point To begin with a historical background leading to the present political developments follows.

4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For the purpose of this assignment, the pre colonial history of Namibia will be left out, and a brief account of the colonial and the post colonial period will be given. According to historians, South West Africa (SWA), declared a German protectorate in 1884, was occupied by South African forces following the outbreak of the First World War. Following the war the League of Nations awarded South Africa a mandate to administer the territory. South Africa started to practise apartheid in 1925 by granting limited self-government to the territory's whites, but excluding other inhabitants (compare Saunders, 1999:755-9; Crocker, 1992:34,37) .

After the Second World War the UN did not conclude a trusteeship agreement with South Africa and thus began the long lasting dispute over the administration of this territory. South Africa extended its rule without approval to South West Africa in 1949 by granting voters representation in the SA parliament. The International Court of Justice (ICT) ruled that SA was not in apposition to alter the legal status of the territory. Following this ruling, a council for SWA was appointed and the UN decided to rename the territory Namibia. South Africa however, did not relinquish the territory's administration to the UN (Saunders, 1999:755).

South Africa was ordered on several occasions to withdraw from Namibia. The resistance by the SA government caused the UN to recognise SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia. SA's use of Namibian soil as a base during the Angolan War escalated the armed struggle by the Namibian people (Saunders 1999:1956).

In the years following 1981, negotiations were focussed on paving the way for the independence of Namibia. South Africa played a greater role in establishing an opposition party to Namibia to counter SWAPO forces. This can be confirmed by the disclosure by the South African government in 1991 in that it funded the DTA and the other anti SWAPO movements election campaign of 1989, with an amount of R100 million (Saunders, 1999:762).

4.2 POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEADERSHIP IN NAMIBIA

A look at the evolution of SWAPO as a political party will give an indication of the democratisation process in Namibia and will also shed some light on the reasons behind the one-party domination in this country.

Namibia's political parties are virtually all products of the apartheid regime. They were formed in the late 1950s to oppose South Africa's occupation of Namibia and its policies. These were parties like SWAPO, SWANU, NUDO. The other parties like the DTA were born of the struggle formed by or in collaboration with the South African regime in Namibia, to oppose the liberation movement spearheaded by SWAPO (Serfontein 1976:335, Laure, 1993:28).

SWAPO as a movement emerged from labor politics. Its three prominent founder members, Sam Nujoma, Toivo ya Toivo and Jakob Kuhanga had a strong labor background which motivated them to launch the first Namibian trade union, that became known as the Ovamboland People's Organization. The OPO took a major political step when it was transformed into SWAPO, the main liberation movement to guide the country's independence struggle.

Although it is argued that OPO was tribally based, its initial affiliation with SWANU, the oldest liberation movement in Namibia, clearly indicates that its leadership consisted of broad-minded revolutionaries who considered national independence as the key priority. Therefore, it is politically naive to characterize the formation of OPO as tribally-motivated at expense of the strong workerist element that guided its establishment. SWAPO's historical labour connection only provided a cosmetic blue-print for its appearance as a Marxist-Leninist movement of the workers. While this approach proved a viable catalyst for Soviet support, SWAPO leadership steered the party towards nationalism and transformed the party into a solid mass movement for the single objective of attaining independence. This point was proved when at the eve of independence, its Marxist-Leninist ideology was dropped in favor of a so-called 'pragmatist' approach (Tjingaete 1997:6).

Furthermore, SWAPO did not have a very strong ideological rival in SWANU for the support of the radical cadres. SWANU, under the revisionistic leadership of Vekuii Rukoro, a strong pro-Western liberal who launched a hysterical witch-hunt to cleanse his party of its Ndjozeist socialist line (Ndjoze was one of SWANU's brilliant leaders who died before independence in Botswana). As a result; SWAPO was able to benefit extensively from both the Soviet and Chinese resources in the absence of a SWANU rivalry. But SWAPO differed from its pro-Soviet camp led by the ANC in one major aspect: it conducted, just like

ZANU in Zimbabwe, an effective Maoist/Guevarian guerilla warfare. Unlike the pro-Soviet alliance of ZAPU/ANC/MPLA whose Soviet military training emphasized a small efficient elitist guerilla army, SWAPO adopted the Maoist philosophy of a people's army, which was sustained through a rural network. It attacked white commercial farmers to dislodge their claim to land (Tjingaete 1997:6).

Once again, SWAPO was in an advantaged position in that it did not have to face any rivalry for peasant support (mostly men) who left their homes to join the exiled wing of the movement. Although the peasantry as a social class carried most of the burden of the liberation war, it seems as if the movement did not emphasize it as a significant revolutionary class. It is in this aspect that SWAPO differed from ZANU. Unlike ZANU, SWAPO had a strong labour movement support that could not be abandoned in favor of the peasantry (Tjingaete, 1997: 6).

This argument raises a further line of questioning that must be touched on, and that is whether the political and economic paths taken by SWAPO emulate the one taken by Zimbabwe by default or by choice. For the purpose of this study this issue will not be explored further but is merely raised as a possible topic for future researches that may seek to outline the similarities and differences in tangents of socialists thinking emerging in the Southern African region.

During the transitional period i.e. after the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435 of 1978, conditions and more political parties were formed. By this time SWAPO was the target for the contesting ten parties of the 1989 elections. Seven of these were elected to the constituent assembly on the basis of proportional representation (Anon, 1999:12)

During the 1994 national and presidential elections eight parties contested and five (5) made it to the parliamentary level. The ruling party wielded a two thirds majority with the DTA becoming the opposition controlling fifteen seats in the National Assembly. The UDF with four, the DCN and the MAG had one each in the National Assembly (Anon, 1999:8).

With its third victory by SWAPO again enjoyed an overwhelming support. During this period, although the elections were judged free and fair, many of the parties voiced dissatisfaction regarding the events that had led to the elections. SWAPO's victory and support is associated with the largest of the tribes or ethnic groups the Ovambo, which comprises half of the population of Namibia. According to Khumalo (1999:14), the reason given for this association is that the president originates from the very tribe.

The Caprivi uprising may confirm ethnic divisiveness in this country (Anon 1999:8). Should selective political development be practised, the possibility of civil war in the near future cannot be ruled out. Africa is still characterized by internal wars sparked by ethnic conflicts ruining democracies and governance in some countries, as is the case in Angola.

SWAPO enjoys support from the working class as it originates from a workers union. For as long as there are no differences encountered regarding important employment or economic policies that matter to such coalitions, SWAPO will enjoy the support from the working class. SWAPO like many other ruling political parties in the African continent, suffers from the colonial and apartheid legacies which might have crippled the party's progress in developing towards an effective political party as these parties are still to shed their initial approaches as liberation movements to become ruling political parties (Crocker, 1992:3).

The crippling effect of the extended negotiations with South Africa cannot be emphasized any further. South Africa extended the delay towards the independence of this country in a considerable way. According to Laure (1993:43-44) the engagement of South Africa in the Angolan civil war was mainly to maintain control of Namibia

He further states that in 1981 South African jets struck important military installations in Angola and at the same time its armored vehicles pursued SWAPO freedom fighters based in that country. During this period South Africa drew its forces into Namibia under the pretence that they were using the land as a base when fighting for UNITA. By having such a large contingent (estimated at 20,000 soldiers) in the northern part of the Namibian soil, where SWAPO was strongly supported, it can be argued that South

Africa had a dual purpose in being engaged in the Angolan civil war. Gaining entry into Angolan territory and having its forces in Namibia was not just to support UNITA but also to destabilize the SWAPO freedom fighters. Laure (1993:44) states that SWAPO as a party has survived to lead its country to a democracy. Having discussed the political parties in Namibia and in particular the ruling party, the democratization process in Namibia will now be considered.

4.3 DEMOCRATIZATION IN NAMIBIA

Democratization in this country will be better understood by analyzing the political and socio-economic developments since independence. Namibia has witnessed an organic association between the growth in strength of the ruling party and the decline of the opposition parties. During the 1989 elections the ruling party won 42 of the 72 seats and the rest were shared among the elected parties. The 1994 national elections saw SWAPO gaining 53 seats in the National Assembly and the trend has continued steadily in both houses of parliaments as well as in the regional authority elections as noticed up until their last elections.

For the purpose of furthering the analysis of the process of democratization in Namibia the following elements are emphasized:

4.3.1 Seriousness of purpose

Before Namibia's independence, the purpose for engaging in political activity was to speed up independence. During the post independence era, the driving force seems to be the determination to keep its gains, to hold on to the seats in parliament or to gain more, and the wish to win a seat in parliament. As a result, most of the manifestos that proliferate during elections seem to be ends in themselves and hardly ever an extrapolation from serious policy manifestos intended to be blueprints to one day govern the country. Also, during the struggle, political parties had membership drives that were marked by ongoing fund raisers and political activities (Mpofu, 2002:3).

The post independence were characterized by political parties that primarily consisted of activists, and to whom membership drives and political activity were restricted to electioneering rhetoric. This trend does not seem to reflect seriousness of purpose. It is the writer's assumption that the ultimate aim of a political party is to one day govern the country and unless the party has an ongoing political program, it is hard to imagine how this can be possible (Mpofu, 2002:3).

4.3.2 Organizational capacity

Using the above arguments as points of departure, an organization can exist if there is a capacity to organise, campaign and mobilise understanding of and support for the aims and objectives outlined. Most of the political parties currently in parliament and outside of parliament have no regular offices and with the exception of SWAPO and the DTA, none have regular staff. It therefore stands to reason that, most political parties in Namibia cannot be expected to perform any differently from the current state of affairs (Robinson, 2002:9).

4.3.3 Constituency building

One way for a political party to grow is by constantly building the strength of own constituencies and by making forays in to new ones. According to Khumalo (2000:8) limited seriousness of purpose and limited organizational capacity serve as obvious barriers to constituency building and most of the parties continue to rely on traditional constituencies for their continued existence and survival. Moving to other democratic incentives, mention can be made here of the **electoral system** which is treated next.

4.3.4 Electoral system

Khumalo (2000:10) argues that one of the democratic incentives that need to be in place is the electoral system. Moving from the premise that, any electoral process cannot be divorced from the basic ingredients of a democratic system such as human rights, liberties and a fair voting process, mutual security, tranquillity, full recognition of all the political role players in an electoral process, trust, reconciliation and tolerance...The electoral process becomes a key to wards facilitating democratization and is as important as the above factors. A brief look at the electoral system of Namibia will give us an indication as to how it was tailored towards shaping future developments in this country.

Namibia opted for two methods, the proportional and the plurality methods. The latter is also referred to as the winner takes all or first-past-the-post method. The plurality method is applied during the regional council and presidential elections and the proportional methods during the local authority and the National Assembly elections. In the presidential elections, a candidate must obtain the support of at least 50% of the votes cast (compare Wessels 2000:20).

Within the proportional method each participating political party can nominate as many candidates as there are seats available (72) in the National Assembly, but parties are obliged to nominate at least 24 candidates. Each party determines the ranking of nominations. Khumalo (2000:12) explains that when all the votes are counted, each party receives the percentages of seats equal to the percentage of votes that it has secured at the polls.

He also points out that the proportional electoral method has advantages and disadvantages. "One advantage is that it takes care of minority interests. Schedule 4 of the Namibian constitution stipulates that once the total number of votes cast in a general election for the National Assembly has been assessed, it will be divided by 72. The result constitutes the quota of votes per seat. Any surplus fraction not absorbed by the number of seats allocated to the party concerned, will compete with other similar surplus accruing to any other political party or parties participating in the election. Any undistributed seat or seats will be awarded to the party or parties concerned, in sequence of the highest surplus

(Khumalo 200:12 ; Wessels 2000:10) .

The latter stipulation has enabled minority parties which at first did not qualify when the full quota was determined, to be represented in the National Assembly. The disadvantage of the proportional electoral method according Khumalo (2000:12) is that, members of the National Assembly are elected according to the party list, and not individually by voters. As a result a member of the National Assembly does not represent a geographically determined constituency in which he or she is personally responsible for a particular part of the population (compare Wessels, 2000:10-12).

Analysts concur that elections can rightfully be considered as an important indicator of a working democracy. "The outcome of elections reflects the barometer of democracy in a country" (Khumalo, 2000:6). However, he points out that free, fair, transparent and responsible elections can only be conducted in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect (Khumalo, 2000:6).

Having weighted the democratization process against the electoral process, one thing becomes clear: that a conducive atmosphere of trust and mutual respect did not prevail during the third round of elections in Namibia. Non-democratic tendencies are apparent in the management style of Sam Nujoma with his decisions to fire Anton van Wietershein a number of years ago; his decision to personally appoint the ombudsman of the law commission to investigate human rights violations and corruption; his personal initiative to militarily support Laurent Kabila in spite of much criticism; his handling of Caprivians who threatened to secede from Namibia. (compare Anon, 1999:10).

Khumalo (2000:6) reports that as Namibia celebrated 10 years of peace, prosperity and democracy President Sam Nujoma received a barrage of criticism and was branded undemocratic after extending his stay in power for a third five year term, and was not seen as democratic by all democrats. International relations expert at the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, Claude Kabemba, argues that Nujoma is running the risk of becoming another Mugabe.. Kabemba states that the tragic reality of African politics is that incumbent leaders are not in the habit of grooming successors. They rather hang onto power for too long.. That is what we are seeing in Namibia and Zimbabwe today (Anon,1999:13).

Balance Sheet of Socio-Economic Development, Namibia, 2001

Joyce Malaba

| PROGRESS | SETBACKS |
|---|--|
| <p>Health</p> <p>Life expectancy has increased by 17 years between 1960 and 1993. Maternal mortality of 103 deaths per 100 000 live births in 1997 is one of the lowest in the SADC region.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Life expectancy at birth has fallen from 61 years in 1991 to 52.4 years in 1997 years. · 45% of the population has no access to health care. · HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 19.54% of persons aged 15 to 49 years in 1999 is high. · Estimated 18 000 AIDS deaths in 1999. · Very high Malaria cases of 26 217 per 100 000 people in 1997. · Infant mortality has increased from 32 per 1 000 live births in 1990 to 58 in 1996. |
| <p>Human resources</p> <p>Net primary school enrolment ratios has have improved significantly since independence from 81% in 1990 to 93.4%.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · High school-leaver unemployment of 29.33 and 25 % for age groups 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 years respectively. · Total unemployment rate of 19% in is high. |
| <p>Women</p> <p>Female representation in parliament is improving, from 15.3% in 1995 to 19 % in 2000.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Female unemployment rate of 21% is higher than that of males of 18%. · Adult literacy rate of 79.6% for women can be improved. The adult literacy rate for men is 82.6%. · Representation of females in Parliament at 19% whilst increasing is still below the Beijing Conference target of 30%. |
| <p>Demography</p> <p>27% of the population is urban.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Total fertility rate of 4.6 children per woman in 1999 is high. |
| <p>Income and Poverty</p> <p>GDP per capita (1990 basis) of N\$4 857 in 1998 is relatively high when compared to other countries in the region. GDP per capita gradually rising since 1990 reversing the trend of the 1980s.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · 23.4% of Namibia's population is deprived of a long life, knowledge and a decent standard of living in 1999. · With a gini coefficient of 0.70, Namibia is one the most unequal societies in the world. · 150 000 communal farmers utilise 42% of the land, whilst 4 200 commercial farmers own 43% of the land. · 23 % of the population has no access to sanitation. |
| <p>Governance</p> <p>Index of Democratic Governance of 0.80, rank of 1 out of 7 selected SADC countries. Respect of rule of law and a general culture of democracy.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Events in the Caprivi area which have resulted in cross-border movement of Caprivians into Botswana is not good for the country's democracy. · The recent constitutional amendment which extends the term of the president does not augur well for democracy and good governance. · The tendency towards one party dominance may not be good for democracy and good governance. |
| <p>Economy</p> <p>Economic growth rate of 2.4% in 1998 is higher than the population growth rate of 2.0 % shows an improvement in the standard of living. Exchange rate of N\$6.14 per 1US\$ is one of the strongest in the SADC region. Money supply (M2) growth rate has fallen from 28.4% in 1992 to 8.3 % in 1998. Inflation has been falling from 11.8% in 1991 to 8.6% in 1999. A decline in interest rates from 22.1% in 1991 to 17.51 in 1999. The overall Balance of Payments position has been improving over the years to US\$57 million in 1999.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Budget deficit of 4.5 % of GDP in 1999. · Government debt of 5.1% of GDP. · Aid per capita (in 1990 N\$) has been increasing from N\$118 in 1990, N\$248 in 1996 to N\$152 in 1998. |

Economic Growth



Economic performance in the Southern Africa Region has been severely affected by sharp declines in world commodity prices. Mozambique has the fastest growing economy in the sub region of 9% in 1999. South Africa, the largest economy in the sub region, is growing at 1.23%.

| Country | Real economic growth rate 1990 and 1999 | |
|--------------|--|-------|
| | 1990 | 1999 |
| Angola | - | 3 |
| Botswana | 6.3 | 4.2 |
| Congo | - | - |
| Lesotho | 6.2 | 11.2 |
| Malawi | 4.8 | 6.7 |
| Mauritius | 7.2 | 3.7 |
| Mozambique | 0 | 9 |
| Namibia | 3 | 2.9 |
| Sevchelles | 7.45 | - |
| South Africa | 4.1 | 1.23 |
| Swaziland | 8.9 | 3.1 |
| Tanzania | 7 | 3.5 |
| Zambia | -0.48 | -2.34 |
| Zimbabwe | 2.60 | -4.11 |

* 1998
Source: SADC Databank



Exchange rate

Currencies have depreciated in almost all SADC Countries between 1990 and 1999. The weakest currency in the region in 1999 was the Mozambique metical whilst the strongest was the Botswana Pula at 12 775 and 4.62 per US\$ respectively.




Inflation

Inflation has gone up in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Angola and Zambia between 1990 and 1999. Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo had three digit inflation rates, whilst Sevchelles, Namibia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe have two digit inflation rates. The rest have one-digit inflation rates.



Interest Rates

Interest rates have been increasing in most SADC countries except South Africa, Namibia and Lesotho between 1990 and 1999. Angola has one digit interest rate compared to other SADC Countries. Zimbabwe had the highest interest in the sub region of 58.5% in 1999. High interest rates discourage borrowing for productive investment which in turn negatively affects economic growth.



Data was not available for DR Congo, Mozambique and Sevchelles
Source: SARTPS/SAPES Databank

INDICATOR

YEAR

VALUE

Social

| | | |
|--|-----------|--------|
| Population, millions (estimate) | 2001 | 1.75 |
| Population density, persons per square kilometre | 2001 | 2.1 |
| Population growth rate (average annual), % | 1998 | 2.0 |
| Population, % females | 1991 | 51 |
| Age groups as a % of total population | 1991 | |
| 0-14 years | | 42 |
| 15-64 years | | 53 |
| 65+ years | | 5 |
| Urban population as a % of total | 1991 | 27 |
| Average household size, persons | 1991 | 4.6 |
| Adult literacy rate | 1999 | 81 |
| Adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, % | 1999 | 19.54 |
| Estimated AIDS orphans, cumulative | 1999 | 67 000 |
| Estimated AIDS deaths (adults and children) | 1999 | 18 000 |
| Life expectancy at birth, years | 1997 | 52.4 |
| Infant Mortality Rate, per 1 000 live births | 1996 | 58 |
| Maternal Mortality Rate, per 100 000 births | 1997 | 103 |
| Total Fertility Rate, children per woman | 1996 | 4.6 |
| Unemployment rate, % | 1996 | 21 |
| Labour force (employable population), millions | 1999 | 0.54 |
| Gini coefficient | 1994/1995 | 0.70 |
| Human Development Index | 1999 | 0.603 |
| Human Poverty Index, % | 1999 | 23.4 |

Political

| | | |
|---|------|------|
| Year of last election | 1999 | |
| Voter turnout last election, % | 1999 | 63 |
| Number of seats in Parliament | 1999 | 104 |
| Political parties represented in Parliament | 2000 | 5 |
| Women in Parliament, % | 2000 | 19 |
| Women in Cabinet, % | 2000 | 14.2 |
| Women Deputy Ministers, % | 2000 | 22.7 |

Economic

| | | |
|---|----------------|----------|
| GDP, US\$ millions (current) | 1999 | 3 151 |
| GDP per capita, US\$ (current) | 1999 | 1 751 |
| GDP, N\$ millions (constant 1990 prices) | 1998 | 8 165 |
| GDP per capita, N\$ (constant 1990 prices) | 1998 | 4 857 |
| Growth in GDP at constant prices (1990 basis) | 1999 | 2.9 |
| Budget deficit/surplus, as a % of GDP | 1999 | -4.5 |
| Current account, as a % of GDP | 1999 | 5.1 |
| Overall balance, as a % of GDP | 1999 | 1.9 |
| Total government debt, as a % of GDP | 1998 | 5.1 |
| Interest rate (prime lending rate - average), % | 1999 | 17.51 |
| Inflation rate, % | 2000 | 7 |
| Exchange rate, domestic currency per US\$ end of year | 2001- February | 7.870 |
| Money supply (M1), millions of N\$ | 1999 | 746.64 |
| Money supply (M2), millions of N\$ | 1999 | 1 403.44 |

Economically, the country's record is a negative one although not as serious as that of Zimbabwe. During the third term of office reports show that Namibia's economy is declining, with public spending having jumped to around 41% of gross domestic product, up from 30% when the country gained independence. Analysts blame the rise of military spending and a bloated civil service, used by the government to alleviate a 35 percent unemployment rate. In 1998, nearly 9000 ex freedom fighters were brought into the service, swelling its ranks to almost 80 000 (compare Saunders, 1999:740).

Although annual per capita income has risen slightly to N\$2 000, the actual average income for 75 percent of the population is much lower and half are considered poor by international standards according to Khumalo (2000:12).

In Contradiction to the above record, there is a different picture about Namibia when comparing it with other countries within Southern Africa as far as other indicators on socio- economic developments go. With specific referenc to an impressive record of among others, governance, health and GDP, a positive outlook of Namibia is created (Malaba, 2001:34).

4.3.5 Politics of power play

Namibia has been characterized by corruption, lawlessness, poor government and poor party competition for some time. These characteristics signal political immaturity and slow economic growth since its independence. Considering governance, a state of lawlessness prevails and the highest Law in the country is used to benefit th ruling party and not the nation as a whole. For instance an extraordinary SWAPO congress was planned for August 1998 to decide whether or not to amend the constitution to allow Nujoma's re-election. It was also suggested that other constitutional amendments might be proposed, including one to allow the government to take possession of commercial farmland for redistribution without paying full market prices. The government claimed that constitutional constraints were preventing it from properly addressing the question of land reform (Pajibo 2000:11).

Another pattern worth mentioning is voter apathy. The increased discontent with the SWAPO government was reflected in the outcome of local elections conducted in February 1998. According to reports, only 34% of the registered voters participated in the ballot, the lowest figure since independence. Voter participation was particularly low in the north of the country, traditionally an area of strong support for SWAPO. Pajibo (2000:7) reports that the ruling party retained control of 27 of the 45 councils contested but lost two to its nearest rival, the DTA, which won nine. Voter apathy is not favourable under the conditions where signs of one party dominance are apparent as this can lead to a one party state.

ONE PARTY DOMINATION IN NAMIBIA

Following the above discussion one-party has been in power since independence and thus far there is no indication of any viable party competition. Namibia is now a **one party** dominated country. In this respect, Namibia may not be a one party- state, but there's only one party that matters, and that is SWAPO.

The above statement may be confirmed by the following political developments with regard to party competition in Namibia. Namibia's first post-independence presidential and legislative elections took place on 7-8 December 1994, and resulted in overwhelming victories for Nujoma and SWAPO. Nujoma was elected for a second term as president, securing 76.3% of the votes cast; his only challenger was Mudge's successor as president of the DTA, Mishake Muyongo. SWAPO secured 53 of the elective seats in the national assembly, obtaining 73.9% of the valid votes cast. The DTA retained 15 seats (with 20.8% of the votes), and the coalition United Democratic Front two. The remaining two seats were won by the Democratic Coalition of Namibia (DCN), an alliance of the National Patriotic Front and the German Union) and the Monitor Action Group. SWANU, which had been a founder member of the DCN, who subsequently withdrew to contest the elections and thus failed to secure representation in the legislature reports Khumalo (2000:12).

Nujoma was sworn in for his second presidential term on 21 March 1995. He retained a number of his cabinet ministers, which indicates that there was no change in the political leadership and the policies of government. For instance Geingob remained as prime minister, with Hendrik Witbooi, previously minister of labour, public services and manpower development, as his deputy. Helmut Angula (hitherto minister of fisheries and marine resources) became minister of finance. SWAPO's secretary-general, Moses Garoeb, was appointed minister of labour and human resources development (Pajibo 2001:7).

The 1999 elections resulted in Nujoma's party winning with a great majority. The inclination towards one party domination in Namibia is showing stronger than before. On 4 November 1998 the National Assembly of Namibia voted 50 to 15 in favor of Nujoma's third term of office notes a drastic adjustment to the constitution with strong non-democratic undertones. Swapo won 76 percent of the parliamentary seats in the 1999 elections, more than the two thirds majority needed to change the constitution. The removal of the two term presidential limit was seen as undemocratic all over the world. The goalposts were also moved, amid resistance within the country, furthering doubt as to the survival of democracy in this country (Khumalo,2000:14).

Mtimkulu (1999:16) is of the opinion that, SWAPO has failed to make the paradigm shift from a liberation movement to a political party has merit. The absence of democratic decision-making in SWAPO together with factors such as a restricted economic growth rate; a culture of intolerance; restricted investment, an unemployment figure of almost 50%; and high levels of crime all inhibit the establishment of democratic values and procedures in Namibia. SWAPO's margin of victory has soared from a two-thirds majority the last time round to what will be in excess of three-quarters. In procedural terms, Namibia is now virtually a one-party state, even if it is a democratically elected one, and this has its hazards as indicated below.

- ▶ In the absence of economic growth and development social decay becomes the enemy of democracy. Expectations of the electorate, more especially for the democracies that were achieved as a result of the liberation efforts by the previously oppressed masses, are higher as far as economic growth and distribution is concerned. Where democracies have failed to sustain the economic well-being of its society, social order, political decay and the weakening of state had resulted (Mtimkulu ,1999: 18).

- ▶ Deepening democracies become difficult for countries that suffers from crippling debts like many of the Southern African Development Community with the exception of Botswana and Mauritius. These two are said to qualify for the label of consolidated democracies. At the moment South Africa is considered to be a consolidating democracy (Anon, 1999:14).

- ▶ Citizens are entitled to vote freely and in a responsible way, express their political will and choice during elections. The third elections in Namibia raised concerns and distrust among citizens of this country due to unpopular decisions and political activities preceding the election period (Mtimkulu,1999:18).

- ▶ Corruption becomes easier to conceal when one party holds all the power. Government becomes more confident of its mandate but often less responsive to the ordinary citizens. Opposition is tolerated but decreasingly so. The views of minorities are less easily expressed and with a smaller impact on national policies.

- ▶ The media comes under fire when it is critical, even if the increased majority was obtained under the umbrella of much reduced turn-out.


- ▶ The temptation to extend a majority party's ambit of power, and in particular the tenure of its leader, becomes difficult to resist even if it means re-jigging the constitution.

In a positive development, the news that the President will not seek another term of office when presidential elections are held in 2004 is welcome news to several countries in the region, where attempts have been made to tinker with the constitution and allow a sitting president to seek a third term. In Zambia, civil society actors prevented President Frederick Chiluba from changing the constitution to seek a third term. In Malawi, attempts are afoot to change the constitution so that President Bakili Maluzi will seek a third term. The news from Namibia may provide additional spine to Malawians, who are opposed to any constitutional shenanigans (on the part of President Maluzi) to perpetuate his rule. It is hoped that the announcement from President Nujoma sets the basis for a smooth transition, as ambitious politicians have a great opportunity and enormous time frame within which to work and avoid acrimony.

On a positive note, having kept track with developments in all democracies and also informed by the above case study, there is hope for democracies to shape up in this region. Questioning the probability of the third democratic counter wave emanating from this region needs to be addressed at this point.

Wiseman (1990:88-89) rules out the probability of the third counter wave of democratization in the region. He asserts that the future of democracy is likely to be patchy but persistent.

Wiseman (1990:89) supports the fact that democracies, in particular those in the African states may be part of a cyclical process in which it alternates with more authoritarian forms. This is a positive view about democratic developments in Africa and stands to be true given the historical battles the region engaged in to achieve true democracies. The graphic representation also indicate that apart from few, the route of change may take any form towards improvement than towards total collapse of democracies. This assessment thus indicate hopes towards institutionalization of democratic procedures although not in the near future for a majority. The following discussion will bring light to what exactly informs the second opinion.



5. TOWARDS REVIVAL AND SURVIVAL OF DEMOCRACIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

It has been observed that authoritarian rules are poor performers, this in itself enhances the image of democracy. Friedman (2002:8) argues that Africans are therefore likely to strive for democracies than they ever did before. The present inter Congolese talks, the peace process taking place in Burundi and Rwanda as well as the pressure exerted on Zimbabwe by its neighboring states, signals the stance taken by Africans towards the revival and establishment of democratization process. Having kept track with the deliberations in the study thus far, there is no doubt that democracy is taking root.

Furthermore, Wiseman (1999:88) asserts that some of the revivals of democracies that took place failed, but the fact that they took place is a testament to the continuing desire for democratic government in Africa. The fact that Africans had alternatives to democratic rules but democratic choices were made, indicates the continuing influence of democratization on African governments.

With the above stated as the bases for the analysis of the survival of regional democracies, mention can be made of militarization as one of the survival strategies. Military rules may be seen as a strategy for the revival and survival of a democracy. The process of militarization had been a common feature that helped democracies to be revived in Africa. According to Wiseman (1990:88) military governments anxious to return the rule to the people revived democracies in Africa. He sees the process in which the authoritarian state is democratized in its terminal period to pave the way for transfer of power to civilian leader as having a striking parallel with what happened at the end of the colonial period. It can be assumed from the above that militarization contributed in reviving democratic dispensations in Africa.

While the above argument stands to be true, this study has observed that, almost all democracies in the Southern African region with the exception of Botswana had declined economically. The internal wars contributed to an extent to the economic situation in many of these countries and therefore the entire region and the continent as whole suffer the spill over effects.

For instance, according to Weatherell (2002:20) many states in the Southern African region recently declared a state of famine. This state of affairs hinders institutionalization of democratic procedures as already indicated above. For purposes of this study a few countries in the Southern African region will be referred to exclusively in an effort to describe the trends in as far as institutionalization of democratic procedure and de-democratization/democratization process go in this region (compare, IDASA (2000:25); Nanyem (2001:16); Mtinkulu (1999:18)).

The above case study brought a number of issues to the fore, which may be summarized as follows: The internal factions that are rooted to ethnic divisiveness in the larger part of Africa are also fueled by the poor regime structural adjustments during the transitional stages. Angola and DRC conflicts are about the control of wealth or the riches of the land. Burundi, Rwanda wars are linked to tribal or ethnic conflicts. Nujoma of Namibia's ruling party is strongly associated with a particular tribe and signs of an imminent clash with the Caprivi Liberation Army at the far north of Namibia may result in tribal or civil war. With all the above stated threats to democracies, Southern Africa as a whole need to guard against indicators that can drive hard won democracies to collapse. South Africa and Mozambique, as new democracies, have to learn from experiences of others to preserve their democracies.

An important pattern of political change after initial free and fair elections is the gradual (incremental) collapse of democratic procedures to make way for "delegative democracies" and later one party domination or even dictatorships. In this regard, the situation in Zimbabwe has degenerated further than in states such as Namibia, South Africa and even Zambia where multi-party elections have been more recent.

Another problem which is experienced by most new democracies, including South Africa, is growing expectations which cannot be met. The inability of newly elected democratic governments to meet the expectations of society often pave the way for authoritarian forms of government and even praetorian politics. What has been noticed is that, democratic procedures are developed to replace dictatorial forms of government, which result in the process of democratization developing in a negative way.

Another pattern of political change is a situation in which democracy is used as a mechanism to resolve conflict, with or without success. In Angola this process was not as successful as it was in Mozambique. In Lesotho the 1998 elections led to chaos which resulted in external interference in order to prevent a civil war. In the DRC, Swaziland and Angola have not contributed to the third wave of democratization. Swaziland is, being pressured to restructure its regime and consider democratic rule only experienced mild forms of liberalization. As noted above the movement towards "delegative democracy" and even one party domination in South Africa are dangerous signs that cannot be ignored.

The combination of political and socio-economic factors including low *per capita* incomes, low levels of literacy, limited urbanization and industrialization, the absence of an established middle class, imperfect nation building and high levels of political instability paints a negative scenario for many African states that recently experienced multi-party elections. Indicators indeed emphasize a course away from the institutionalization of democratic values and practices in a majority of African states.

This way of development compromises economic prosperity and growth. Unrealistic expectations regarding democracy is in itself a factor which inhibits the institutionalization of democratic tendencies and these are often fueled by parties during their campaigns.

Literature shows that many of the African states, do not stand a greater chance of institutionalizing democratic structure due to their negative economic and political development. So far it can be concluded that at least as far as economic indicators are concerned, countries that are economically successful are in a much more favorable position to institutionalize democratization trends successfully. Political indicators, including political conflict and instability, political strategic considerations, a democratic tradition and culture, international factors and nation building also favor those countries that are more developed than the third world ones. By improving on the economy some countries may realize acceptable standards of institutionalization.

Factors such as limited economic growth, the absence of established democratic traditions, high levels of intolerance, relative geographic isolation, the collapse of law and order and unbridled criminality in South Africa are indicative of an unfavorable scenario as far as the institutionalization of democratic values is concerned.

The timing of the democratization initiatives that is to say, how early or late during the wave democratization took place is often decisive for successful institutionalization. States that democratized early as a result of factors within the state itself, for example the level of economic development and an established middle class, are often more successful than those states that democratized later as a result of external influences. As partly, the result of imperialism African countries that suffered along battle against this kind of imposition, will not fair the same as those countries that had non or limited experiences of any form of imperialism. So far, the fact that Southern African democracies are not institutionalized may be emphasized in the same way as emphasis is put on one party domination trend.

Namibia is a one party dominated democracy. It is characterized by a number of negative developments that point towards de-democratization. These includes economic decline, political conflicts, lawlessness, poor governance. Following the discussions up to this stage, the question of whether institutionalization of democratic procedures resulted following the number of elections held in this region can simply be answered with a **NO**. The possible route of future political change is that of non-institutionalized democratic dispensations. But looking at developments towards a democratic government, the following statistical research on socio-economic progress casts a positive picture, see Malaba, (2001:32-34) about this country and this will be used to conclude this case study.

6. SUMMARY

This study described the democratic processes in many of the Southern African region and their positions as far as institutionalization of democratic procedures is concerned. It went further to describe one party domination trend in this region as a factor that contribute to non-institutionalization of democratic practices by utilizing a number of indicators derived from previous studies.

In an effort to give an in depth description, the following questions have been pursued and answered in this study. First, how durable and sustainable is this apparent democratization trend; second, what are the long-term prospects for deepened democratic developments in Southern Africa; third, is there a resolution or hope to the longstanding institutionalization of democratic practices given the historical political developments in this region.

The study observed that surely, regular elections throughout the region are proof enough that the values and norms of democratic governance are finding fertile ground. Yet, according to the literature on transitions, the conditions for institutionalizing democratic principles are complex and demanding and to conform to the above mentioned aspects are the key areas to consider.

- ◆ First, the electoral demand is for the regular turnover of political leaders and vibrant and viable opposition party and be deduced that the one party domination is a direct product of these elections. Thus one- party domination exists in the Southern African region as the case study indicates. This is a sign of political immaturity which strongly points out to lack of party competition. If time and again opposition parties are able to unseat a ruling party through elections, and if the latter accepts defeat, then the system shows maturity. This is not the case in the Southern African region with specific reference to Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

- ◆ Second, the procedural demand is for strong checks and balances, measured by a separation of powers (that is, clear distinctions between, and autonomy of, the executive, the judiciary and the legislature), as well as the existence of vibrant, independent civil societies. The latter means the presence of an environment which allows basic freedoms to flourish. It also means the wide acceptance of a culture of democracy whereby differences are settled through dialogue instead of violence. Violence is often experienced during and before election period by some countries, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and also to an extent Namibia. This way of democratization is not in line with requirements that law and order should prevail in democratic government whose main objective is to curb lawlessness.
- ◆ Third, there is a strong relationship between democracy and economic growth. Being able to manage poverty through equitable distribution of wealth is what democracies aim to achieve. More so, the masses expect to have an improvement in their economic lives in a democratic government. It is a well known fact that, democracies are better able to facilitate economic activity.
- ◆ Put another way, in the absence of consistent growth and development, the scourge of unemployment, poverty, corruption and social decay become the enemy of democracy. And crucially, the external environment matters. Deepening democracy becomes difficult if the country concerned is: under a strict regime of structural adjustment; suffers from crippling debt; and struggles to meet the demands from the industrial world for free trade, including the effects of the raging HIV/Aids pandemic. Based on these criteria, it appears that only Botswana may qualify for the label of consolidated democracies. South Africa might be considered a consolidating democracy. In all other cases, governments and societies are still grappling with the demands thrown up by these three clusters.
- ◆ Finally, the question is whether peace and stability is attainable in the Great Lakes region any time soon. If not, continuing warfare threatens to roll back the important democratic gains made by most SADC countries over the past decade. Indeed, if one proceeds from the analysis that the Angolan and DRC conflict is about capturing the state (such as it exists) in order to control the riches of the land (water, oil, diamonds, copper) then it seems a great deal of courage and will is needed to persuade belligerents of the value of democratic practices.

What the region needs now to keep the process of democratization rolling, is to exhibit more of visionary leadership, backed by generous support from the international community. After the Lusaka Accord, an increasing role in the peace process has been noticed. The inter Congolese dialogue and the death of the Angolan rebel leader, raised hopes for a kind of peaceful settlement to be reached and for governance to be restored. Success will critically depend on whether the region's political, civic and economic leaders understand the great challenge of building peaceful and sustainable democracies in all the countries of the region.

From the above discussion it becomes apparent that the successful institutionalization of democratic procedures depends on a combination of different factors. With the efforts put on to instigate this process of institutionalizing democratic procedures by internal and external powers, many states will strive for democracy rather than de-democratization. With that, this study concludes by differing slightly with the view of a probable counter wave of democratization in this region or elsewhere in Africa. But the notion that with time the efforts put on reviving democracy will lead to stable and sustainable democracies in the Southern African region is supported by this study.

The economic decline in this region is however a disturbing factor. Without sustainable economy, democracy becomes shaky. The erosion of economic prospects by internal wars, corruption, incapacity, illiteracy level, and all other factors that contribute negatively towards the establishment of democratic institutions should be eliminated for **revival and survival of democracy** in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole.

What is generally being observed with regard to political development and specifically the external pressure by stipulating general standards on all types government indicates that there is still a way to workout acceptable democratic practices in Africa as well.

Concluding on the picture of democracies and their possible future, the development of democracy in Namibia, in Africa, and specifically in the formerly colonised countries, has to be appraised in the context of the long view. While global accords reached in international bodies such as the League of Nations, may have been pronounced with honourable motives, in favour of guiding those nations that were hitherto not able to navigate their cause, it is realized that these intentions did not work and in the end, the secondary nations had to struggle their way to freedom and self-determination.

Looking at political development in Namibia, the indication is that a strong civil society has developed. The Namibians stood up against the decision to extend the presidential term in this country. By making their stance on this matter clear, here we see the president obliging to the will of the people and agreeing to step down at the end of his present term in office. This position, strengthens democratization in this country.

Coming to governance Namibia is performing better than many SADC democracies when it comes to rule of law and a general culture of democracy according to the attached information sheet on progress. As such this country stands a chance to institutionalize democratic principles although this may not be the case in the near future. Taking into consideration the balance sheet of Socio-Economic Development, Namibia, 2001, this study ranks Namibia as one of the countries that are likely to prosper economically with time. This positive view about Namibia and some few others like Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania as examples, give hope for a future positive political development in this region.

Lastly, for democracies like Namibia, it may be correct to mention that its political history has not known democracy because the country's perceived mentors or models of democracy, through the years have been those from developed Western countries. These countries have experienced democracies for years unlike Namibia and other former colonies in Africa. The independence of Namibia is primarily a product of the efforts by Namibians themselves based on own methods and the movement towards democracy may therefore have to develop along its own path, at a pace perhaps slower than expectations would have it.

This view applies to other democracies with a similar historical development. Assisting the process of democratization without setting high standards that are beyond reach for many of them, by those that have prospered, may lead to progress in democratization .

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