AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING GOVERNING COALITIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SOUTH AFRICA WITH A SPECIFIC FOCUS ON JOHANNESBURG AND NELSON MANDELA BAY

BY

KELVIN DAVID KNOWLES
(Student no. 2016446912)

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PROMOTER: DR C.M. GOUWS
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ABSTRACT

The 2016 South African local government election was a defining moment, which changed the political and governance landscape of the country significantly. The results of this election saw the electoral dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) in major metropolitan municipalities diminishing and losing power through the formation of coalitions.

Local government in South Africa is the third tier of government and is regarded as being closest to the people. Therefore, an inherent link exists between democracy and tangible governance affecting the lives of citizens. Moreover, the principal duty of local government is to deliver and ensure access to essential public services.

This developmental role of local government is also accentuated in the White Paper on Local Government where the local government system is committed to working with communities to meet these communities' socio-economic needs in a sustainable manner. With this in mind, were the social and economic needs of the communities of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay met by the governing coalitions, which emerged, post the 2016 local government elections in these two metros?

The coalitions, which emerged after the 2016 local government election in key metropolitan municipalities, necessitated an exploration into these fledgling coalitions and although coalition governments are not entrenched at the local level or are part of the South African political culture, the country has experienced some type of coalition at all levels since 1994.

Accordingly, this study provides an analysis of the emerging governing coalitions as they relate to the minority governments of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela at the local level. Clarifying the link between coalitions and minority government, the premise is that minority governments are formed when a singular political party fails to reach the required majority to govern.

Explaining this further, De Vos (2016) writes the following:

> A party who has obtained the largest number of seats on a municipal council (but not an outright majority) does not have an automatic legal right to form the municipal government. Any group of parties who can cobble together a coalition of 50% plus 1 can form a coalition government, regardless of whether the largest party in the coalition is the largest party in the council. Of course, the closer to 50% of the seats a party obtains in a municipal council; the easier it will be for that party to cobble together a coalition.

The research objectives probe the factors enabling or preventing coalition formation and the features of these emerging governing coalitions. Another objective was to explore how these coalition governments affected the communities of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

This qualitative study used triangulation to provide a cohesive analysis of the data, which was comprised of semi-structured interviews, relevant documents, and other secondary sources. This study's overview and conclusions attempted to explicate and establish coalition governance at the local level in South Africa.

The 2016 local government elections brought a change in the balance of power and a reversal from the electoral dominance of the African National Congress (ANC). This facilitated a re-alignment of power by opposition parties to form emerging coalitions at the local level to affect governance.

This study concluded that ideological and policy parity did not guarantee the survival of these emerging coalitions and that governance was adversely affected by their volatility. The lack of practical strategies which could have been applied more vigorously also negatively affected the efficacy of these coalitions. Thus, this study makes an original contribution to the interdisciplinary science of Governance and Political Transformation.

DECLARATION

I, Kelvin David Knowles, declare that the thesis that I herewith submit for the Doctoral Degree in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.

Signature: _KDKnowles_   Date: November 2021

DEDICATION

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my wife, Octavia and my daughters Tamsyn and Kédin. You have made me stronger, better and more fulfilled than I could have ever imagined.

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Carrying out the requisite work and subsequently writing this thesis was, undoubtedly, the most arduous task I have undertaken. However, one of the joys of having completed the thesis is looking back at everyone who has helped me over the past five years.

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KEYWORDS

Coalitions, Coalition Governance, South Africa, Local Government, Election, Local Level, Good Governance, Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
AD	Alternative Democrats
AG	Auditor General
AIC	African Independent Conference
ANC	African National Congress
APC	African People's Convention
ATTP	Assistance to the Poor Programme
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organistaion
COGTA	Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
COPE	Congress of the People
DA	Democratic Alliance
DASO	Democratic Alliance Students Organisation
ECSECC	Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EFFSC	Economic Freedom Front Students Command
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
ENCA	eNews Channel Africa
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
FPTH	First-Past-The-Post
GCIS	Government Communication and Information System
GNU	Government of National Unity
ID	Independent Democrats
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IPTS	Integrated Public Transport System
KPA	Key Performing Area
LGNF	Local Government Negotiating Forum
LGTA	Local Government Transition Act
MAYCO	Mayoral Committee

MDB	Municipal Demarcation Board
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act
MMC	Member of the Mayoral Committee
MSA	Municipal Systems Act
NMMU	Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
NMU	Nelson Mandela University
NNP	New National Party
NP	National Party
PA	Patriotic Alliance
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PR	Proportional Representation
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SALGA	South African Local Government Association
SASCO	South African Students Congress
SDBIP	Service Delivery Budgets and Implementation Plan
SOWETO	South Western Townships
SRC	Student Representative Council
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UFEC	United Front Eastern Cape
UFS	University of Free State
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1. Background

In South Africa, local government is the third form of governmental jurisdiction after the provincial and national spheres of government (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996, Section 40). Local government in South Africa is no longer exclusively a function of national or provincial government; but it is now regarded as a sphere rather than a tier of government (Sibanda, 2012: 4).

The first democratic local government elections were held in 1995. In 2000, the first democratic local government elections were held (in the new system), and local government was established as a third and independent sphere of government to deliver the constitutional imperatives as well as to address the injustices of the past system of local governance (South African Local Government Association, 2015: 11).

Subsequent local government elections yielded results that were anticipated where the governing African National Congress (ANC) emerged as victors, barring the Western Cape's City of Cape Town, which was initially governed by a coalition of parties in 2000 but has subsequently been governed by the Democratic Alliance (DA).

The 2016 local government elections in South Africa have been described as the most important elections to be held at any level since the first democratic elections for the national and provincial governments in 1994 (Siddle, 2016: 9). Niang (2016: 1) adds, "[as] predicted by opinion polls; the 2016 local government elections have been the most highly contested in post-apartheid South Africa".

Niang (2016: 1) continues and states the following:

> By securing 26.9 per cent of the national vote, the DA could be seen as the real winner by becoming the biggest party in three of South Africa's largest cities, namely, Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane. It secured nearly two-thirds of the vote in Cape Town and is the largest party in Nelson Mandela Bay.

Also commenting on this defining moment Law (2018: 3) writes the following:

> The 2016 Municipal Election was a watershed moment for South African politics, dramatically changing the face of the political landscape. After 22 years of almost complete electoral dominance by the ANC, signs began to emerge that their grip on power was starting to wane, and a more competitive multi-party framework was beginning to emerge.
>
> Of South Africa's eight metropolitan councils, the ANC only managed to win an outright majority in four; of South Africa's four major metropolitan councils, in 2016 the ANC only has a majority in one – eThekwini in the region of Durban.
>
> It had once controlled all nine metropolitan councils, and in the previous Municipal Election in 2011 had won an absolute majority in eight of the Councils. In 2016, the ANC lost control of South Africa's capital city (Tshwane), its economic hub (Johannesburg) and its surrounds (Ekurhuleni), and the major Metropolitan Council of Nelson Mandela Bay in Port Elizabeth in the province that is often regarded as its political heartland.

However, as much as the 2016 local government election points to coalitions in South Africa originating at this time, South African politics have always experienced some type of coalition at all levels from as early as 1994. Booysen (2014: 78) lists the following notable party coalitions and alliances:

- The 1994 Government of National Unity between the ANC, NP and IFP
- The 1999 coalition between the ANC and IFP in Kwazulu-Natal

- The 2000 DP, NNP and FA party merger
- The 2000 ANC and NNP merger which saw the disintegration of the NNP

Adding to this, the outcomes of the 2016 elections brought to the fore lively discussions and debates by different political parties in terms of who they would enter a coalition or 'partner' with (Ngubane, 2018: 11). Moreover, what the results of the 2016 local government elections did was to revive coalition politics and indicate South Africa's shift from a situation where parties were always subjugated to the dominance of the ANC and South Africa's one-party hegemony.

Adding to this, Davenish (2018: 1) writes that "prior to the local government elections on 3 August 2016, South Africa could have been accurately described as a dominant party state democracy. This flowed from the fact that the ANC secured 63 per cent in the local government elections of 2011. In the 2016 local government election, its support weakened to 53.91 per cent".

Eleven months after the 2016 local government elections, the ANC concluded its fifth national policy conference on 5 July 2017. One of the discussion points summarised in its 2017 *Legislature and Governance Discussion Document* dealt with the outcome of the 2016 local government election. Regarding this, the ANC (2012: 6) makes the following assertion:

> The 2016 local government elections highlighted among many other things, three critical challenges – unemployment, crime, and corruption. These are the areas that affect the majority of South Africans daily. Unless they are addressed, these socio-economic challenges threaten to erode the dignity that 1994 restored and reverse the gains of the last two decades.

The results of these elections saw the ANC losing support in major metropolitan municipalities (hereafter referred to colloquially as metros) and losing power through coalition formations. In its reflection, the ANC states, "for the first time since 2000, the ANC lost control of municipalities in areas which have been ANC strongholds since 1994. These include the major urban areas of Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Mogale City" (ANC, 2017: 6).

The ANC states, "the loss of control in other secondary cities has also added to a changing balance of forces in which the ANC finds itself in opposition in significant urban municipalities" (ANC, 2017: 7).

Therefore, the conclusion could be made that the 2016 local government elections led the governing ANC to a "soul searching process within the party to explore why the ANC's national electoral support base had slipped to just above 50 per cent" (ANC, 2017: 7). However, as much as the 2016 local government elections provided the ANC to carry out introspection, it provided the electorate with an opportunity "ensuring responsiveness and accountability in broad social issues" (Blair, 2000: 27).

The ensuing coalition and minority governments formed at the local level necessitate an analysis of how governance unfolded in the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay post the 2016 local government elections. Moreover, this also hints that a more enhanced background on coalition governance is required to arrive at a greater understanding of what is transpiring from the South African experience.

It is with this contention that the contribution of this study to the body of knowledge about coalition governance in a South African local government context would articulate the foundation of the configuration of coalitions in South Africa.

Regarding the above assertion, the focus of this study is an analysis of the coalitions, which emerged in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay after the 2016 local government elections. The development of these coalitions necessitated an inquiry into how these untried coalitions affect governance in these two metros.

Moreover, reaffirming the point at issue for this study is whether coalitions formed at the local government level in South Africa lead to good (or improved) governance or not. The contribution of this study to the coalition-governance discourse through an explanatory analysis is considered a pertinent and a

required contribution to the body of knowledge of political transformation and governance.

This above assertion accentuates the background and intended impact of this study. Therefore, the background further enunciates the issue of whether coalitions are more likely to ensure good governance on the one hand and what features characterise the tendency for good governance.

The selection of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros to base the analysis of this study on stems from the fact that both these metros have been bastions of the ANC. The long-held perception was also that the strangle hold that the ANC had in these metros were impermeable.

In addition, when the dust settled after the 2016 local government election and governing coalitions became the order of the day for these two metros, questions emerged regarding the survival of these coalitions. Indeed, soon after these coalitions assumed the task of governing, rifts started to appear in the composition of these coalitions. This resulted in challenges for these governing coalitions.

The essential feature of coalition governance is concentrated on in later parts of this thesis. At this point, it is important to comprehend that whereas coalition governance here implies a linking of political parties, which can differ fundamentally over a variety of issues; it can also comprise the linking of parties with similar preferences.

This coupling of political parties can provide coalition partners with the 'safety' to realise their political aspirations and deliver on its mandate to its constituents, or it can find itself steering perilously close to implosion. The twenty-eight-month span of this study (from August 2016 to December 2018) provided a contemporary analysis of the emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Therefore, the context of this study is presented to provide for comprehension of what coalitions mean within the South African milieu.

To enhance this background, it is imperative to define coalitions as a precursor to the later parts of this thesis. Defining coalitions, Martin and Vanberg (2004: 13) state that "coalitions are comprised of divergent preferences". Additionally, Dhillon (2003: 2) poses the question "if we should really be looking at "parties" as coalitions of individuals or at coalitions of "parties" or groups of individuals – whether pre-election or post-election– since in many electoral systems it is such coalitions that affect actual policy outcomes". This question alludes to one of the coalition theories based on the motives of political parties when entering coalitions and the impact that coalition partners exert in coalitions.

In addition, a coalition government is formed when a political alliance of two or more parties comes to power, or when a plurality, i.e., not a majority, has not been reached and two or more parties must work together to govern (Govender, 2016). The results of the 2016 local government elections culminated in the formation of coalitions in the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

The resultant minority coalitions, which ensued in these metros, saw political parties joining forces to ensure that the incumbent ANC governed metros were ousted and replaced by minority coalitions. Chua and Felsenthal (2008: 141) who argue that "in a multi-party system where no single party controls a decisive majority in the legislature, the party charged with forming a new government sometimes has the option of governing as a minority government" provide a frank description of the formation of minority governments.

Regarding the above, Field and Martin (2019: 1) assert that while minority governments are entrenched within the larger government formation literature which focused more on coalition formation, there exists significant exploration on minority governments, which according to the authors, attempted to answer the following three questions:

- Why do minority governments form?
- How do minority governments work? and
- How do minority governments perform relative to most governments?

In probing how minority governments are configured, it can safely be said that minority coalitions can be challenging since they comprise political parties, which were political opponents during the pre-election period and now must find some common ground, and in most cases make certain concessions to secure that they have some influence in the running of these metros.

The fledgling coalition-governed metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay have already changed governments after the 2016 local government elections. This is a testament to the volatility of minority governments. Referring to the intermittent coalitions which governed Cape Town recurrently from 2000-2006, Govender (2016: 1) argues that "coalitions of all kinds, but particularly those cobbled together with smaller parties, are prone to inherent instability as desertion by any one of them could result in a vote of no confidence, as was the DA's experience in Cape Town, after the 2006 local government elections".

Augmenting Govender's argument, these Cape Town coalitions saw the New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Party (DP) briefly joining forces to win the 2000 local government elections just to be ousted by an NNP and ANC alliance a year later, with the ANC governing taking over the reins from 2004 until a Democratic Alliance (DA), Independent Democrats (ID), The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and five smaller parties who collectively swayed the power from the ANC and through a Multi-Party Forum, allowed the DA to take sole control of Cape Town.

Enhancing the background of this study was the problem statement that articulated the crux of this study: Do coalitions formed at the local level lead to improved governance or not? Answering this question, it is important to prompt the reader that the core of this study necessitated a descriptive approach where the problem statement succinctly describes the conceptual approach that is used to explain the problem transparently and explicitly.

1.2. Problem statement

Coalition governments are not entrenched in the South African political culture and their emergence might thus pose specific challenges at the beginning and create instability on the local scale if partners are unable to cooperate effectively (Clément, 2016: 2). The situation that emerged in South Africa was new for the country. However, it is by no means unique. Nearly two-thirds of the countries that make up the European Union are run by coalition governments.

In most, they have been part of the political system for a long time, with the exceptions of Britain, Spain, and Greece where they are relatively new (Maserumule, Mokate, & Vil-Nkomo, 2016). Another observation is made by Niang, (2016 :2) stating that "coalitions are not foreign concepts in South Africa but are rare".

Highlighting this, Joubert (2018: 217) states that "while coalitions have not been a way of life in South African politics, its national, provincial and major local governments (i.e., metros) have never seen a change of government control without a coalition - neither in the pre-democratic nor democratic phase. The one exception is the DA's win in the Western Cape provincial elections of 2009".

Adding to this, Law (2018: 18) states that "up until 2009, when South Africa's current second-largest party, the DA, won a majority in the Western Cape, coalitions operated in this province, for example, between the DP and the NNP in 1999 and the ANC and NNP in 2003. In KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) formed an alliance in 1994, which lasted a decade. There have also been and continue to be several coalitions operating at local levels".

However, despite the respective statements of Law and Joubert, academically, comparative analyses of multiple coalition-governed municipalities have been discounted in the literature (Bradshaw & Breakfast, 2019; de Visser, 2016; Jolobe, 2018). This obliviousness is rather unsatisfactory since these novice coalitions at the local level have become more current as witnessed following the 2016 local government elections. One research element that these untried coalitions merited was how these metros affected governance. Responding to

this conundrum, this thesis addressed this requirement within the field of governance and political transformation.

The electoral surveys before the 2016 local government elections were very persuasive for the genesis for this research. These surveys increasingly predicted that some ANC-governed metros stood to lose power to coalition partners post-election, which encouraged a scholarly effort to comprehend this unfolding phenomenon of local government coalitions. In hindsight, this was indeed the case for the metros this thesis focuses on, and as later parts of this study verify.

Commenting on these surveys, the news network eNCA states that "Illustrating the sophistication of these electoral surveys that were vigorously conducted by primarily the IPSOS Company and the eNCA television network validated these predictions; the IPSOS national poll involved 3800 face-to-face interviews and is therefore the most extensive poll available" (eNCA, 2016b).

To illustrate the sophisticated manner in which these surveys were done, votes were recruited using Random Digital Sampling (RDS), of eligible voters in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay and "all interviews were conducted using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) with a representative sample of residents of the three metropolitan areas who have access to a cell phone" (eNCA, 2016b)

At this juncture, it is important to state that notwithstanding the ANC's current position, this study was not on the ANC's electoral performance at local government level. With regard to the changing political landscape, Mashego (2016: 1) states that "the outcomes of the 2016 municipal elections point to one thing: the political landscape of South Africa is gradually taking a turn".

Also commenting on the changing political landscape, Macharia (2016: 1) refers to the DA emerging as the main protagonist after the election and states that "the DA has reshaped the political landscape in South Africa, where the ANC has ruled unopposed since it ended white minority rule in 1994".

South Africa's electoral map has changed dramatically, and perhaps faster than many analysts and party political protagonists are yet to able to appreciate. The coalition negotiations that followed the 2016 local government election have conformed their game-changing implications (Dufour & Calland, 2016).

In this regard, Davenish (2018: 1) states that "before the local government elections on 3 August 2016, South Africa could have been accurately described as a dominant party state democracy". However, fluctuating political dynamics at the local level seems to be shifting away from a one-party dominance system where the ANC controlled almost all the major metros, and pertinent questions emanate from these developments; one of which is whether these coalition-governed metros are indeed 'stronger together' and can deliver their mandates to govern effectively.

Probing the efficacy of the emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, this study's research focus has been motivated by an attempt to comprehend how these fledgling coalitions would navigate their way through uncharted waters. Similarly, the configuration of the coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay also played a role to analyse the factors which would either promote or detract from the success of these coalitions and the effect it would have on governance.

Based on the above premise, Booysen (2014: 67) argues that "this analysis of inter-party alliances and coalitions, as they organise at the time of elections and with an eye on the next round of elections, thus tells a story of piecemeal and gradual emerging change in party politics in South Africa".

It is for this reason that this study aimed to provide a well-informed understanding of how coalition governments at the local level in South Africa function in the execution of their mandates to their respective constituencies. Whereas Chapter 3 provides a transitory overview of local government in South Africa, it is considered necessary to provide a brief explanation of how governance, by its very definition link with the manner in which local governments can realise the mandates of their electorates.

The progressive and democratic local government system, which was established in post-apartheid South Africa, was as Siddle and Koelbe (2016: 1) describe, "a system (that) was to be developmental in nature". They continue and refer to a ministerial document stating that this developmental local government also had to be "committed to working with citizens, groups and communities to create sustainable human settlements which provide a decent quality of life and meet the social, economic and material needs of communities in a holistic way".

Added to this, the Presidency (2015: 2) developed the Local Government Management Improvement Model (LGMIM) to "measure or benchmark the institutional performance of municipalities across a number of Key Performance Areas (KPAs)".

The KPA's that pertain to realising that the needs of the citizenry are met are:

- Integrated Development Planning
- Human Resource Management
- Financial Management
- Service Delivery
- Community Engagement
- Governance (Presidency)

The capacity and resolve to achieve these KPA's by the two metros this study focuses on presented an opportunity to explore how coalition governments perform at the local level fulfilling their mandate to those who elected them to power. By providing insights into the formation and functioning of these coalitions, valuable insights into the South African experience of coalitions at local government level are given.

Furthermore, if one takes South Africa's democratic trajectory into perspective (in its broadest sense) and how it relates to what is currently transpiring at local government level; then it can safely be assumed that there needs to be a better understanding of whether coalition-based local governments provide an alternative form of government.

In this regard, Druckman (2008: 479) states that "Indeed, the presumed goal of the research is to understand which coalition forms, how long it lasts, and how it shapes governing decisions and policy. It seems fairly obvious that processes of coalition formation, governance, and duration relate to one another and to other political and economic dynamics".

The emphasis of Druckman (2008) on governance as a key feature of coalitions, and how it relates to prevalent political and economic dynamics is a departure point for this study. When looking at national governance, for instance, Matlosa (2003: 85) states that "the interface of political governance and democratic governance has not been thoroughly explored and problematised in the democracy debate in Southern Africa today". The discourse on the country's development has been characterised by diverging sentiments, and a similar case can be made of local government in South Africa.

1.3.   Principal objective of the study

The principal objective of this study was to analyse emerging coalition governments at the local level with specific reference to Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Coalitions has become an increasingly current phenomenon and became an increasingly key feature of political transformation at local government level in South Africa. Moreover, the contention that coalitions ensure good governance (as opposed to single-party governments), and the characteristics that are associated with the sustainability of their existence underpinned the principal objective of this study.

Coalition governance at the local government level was the chief focus of this study. For purposes of the research, the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, which emerged post the 2016 local government elections governed by coalitions, were the research nucleus of this study.

The suppositions for concentrating on these metros are clarified in the background section of this chapter. However, this study's rationale was to

provide an answer to the primary research question this thesis is premised on, namely, whether coalition governance at the local level leads to good or improved governance.

The research objectives below provided a further, more detailed exposition of what the study aimed to achieve. These objectives were developed from a thorough interrogation of the primary research question and were deemed important in the carrying out of this research endeavour. The justification of equating these two metros was done to provide a substantive and credible body of knowledge complementing the insight into coalitions at the local level in South Africa.

1.4. Research objectives

Emanating from the problem statement, the secondary objectives of this study were:

- To provide an overview and timeline of coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.
- To illustrate the manifestation of coalition theories in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.
- To describe and interrogate the factors that either facilitate or debilitate the basic tenets of coalition formation at local government level and which either contribute or detract from the preservation of such coalitions and their longevity.
- To examine the characteristics of coalition governments and explore their propensity for good governance as it relates to an index of good governance principles such as transparency, accountability, consensus building, participation, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, equity, and inclusiveness.
- To explore the characteristics of coalition governments that contribute to conducive or adverse outcomes for the citizenry of these two metros.

Subsequently, this problem statement must be reinforced by the research purpose of this study, and ultimately as du Plooy, Davis, and Bezuidenhout

(2014: 67) rightfully ask "is it researchable, feasible, focused and relevant, and does it contribute to an understanding of a specific phenomenon?"

Putting the above question into context and linking it to the research questions this study articulates, it can be contended that the actuality of coalition formation not being entrenched in South Africa at the local level, required responses to several critical questions.

The value of the answers to the research questions in this study must also be seen against Schreiber's statement when the author writes that "coalition politics will move to the centre of our national life" (Schreiber, 2018a: 13).

Commenting on the ANC's hegemony over the past two decades, Schreiber (2018: 13) claims that "while earlier the efforts to imagine a post-ANC future were largely premised on wishful thinking, the data shows that the time has arrived for South Africans to start imagining what the country's politics will be like without the dominance of a single party" (Schreiber, 2018a: 19).

Specified in the problem statement, the ANC's electoral show is not what this study seeks answers to. Reinforcing the claim in the problem statement which petitions that there are pertinent issues requiring responses and whether these metros are indeed 'stronger together', the following research questions are worth posing.

1.5. Research questions

1.5.1. The primary research question for this study is:
- To what extent do coalition governments lead to good governance, and which factors contribute to or detract from their contribution in this regard?

1.5.2. The secondary research questions for this study are:
- What factors facilitate or debilitate coalition formation at local government, and which of these factors contribute to, or detract from, the preservation of such coalitions and their longevity?
- Are there characteristics of coalition governments at local government level, which contribute to their propensity for good governance as it relates to

transparency, accountability, consensus building, participation, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, equity, and inclusiveness?

- Which characteristics of coalition governments contribute to conducive or adverse outcomes for the citizenry of these metros?

Considering the previously mentioned, this study aspired to examine the primary research question to bring to the fore the probable effects of local government coalitions by drawing on current theories of governance.

1.6. Theoretical statement

The 2016 local government elections have resulted in more than twenty hung municipalities across South Africa. To govern a particular municipality, a political party needs to garner most votes in a range of 50 per cent plus 1 of the casted votes (Mokgosi, Shai & Ongunnubi, 2017: 40).

Coalitions can create political stability and governability in areas with 'hung' legislatures in which no single party has won a majority or where there is a multiplicity of competitive political parties (Kadima & Lembani, 2006).

The emphasis in the afore-stated citation is on the probability of coalitions in creating stability and governability. However, this is no guarantee, since the post- 2016 DA-led formal majority in Nelson Mandela Bay and the minority coalition in Johannesburg proved that no coalition is immune to the political permutations, which might threaten coalitions.

Putting the preceding into context, it is imperative to state that the theoretical framework of this study was built on the assumption that there is a correlation between political party coalitions at local government level and governance that could lead to either good governance, characterised by accountability and transparency, or poor governance and a lack of answerability, corruption, and mismanagement.

It is against this assumption that the problem statement and research question was aligned to establish whether these two coalition-governed metros could deliver their mandates to govern effectively.

Furthermore, within the context of South Africa's democratic transition, it presented an opportunity to assess critical factors such as local government voting patterns that could have impacted on a decline in support for local governments who were governed by a singular political party. What it might also point to is the extent of South Africa's democratic maturity post-1994.

On the other hand, the essence of this research is located within the comparative framework between coalition-governed local governments in South Africa, making for the measuring of governance performance across all metros. Resultantly, factors affecting governance might range from one local government coalition to the next.

1.7.   Theoretical perspectives

The theories of party coalitions are essentially based on the experiences of continental Western Europe and have focused on predicting and explaining models of government formation in parliamentary democracies (Kadima, 2014; Resnick, 2014). Also citing the European experience, Maserumule, Nkomo and Mokate (2016) cite the fact that nearly two-thirds of European Union countries are coalition governed.

Focusing on Africa's experiences with coalition governments, Kadima (2014: 5) argues that "coalition theories emerging from the study of party coalitions in Western Europe do not account sufficiently in their theorisation for social-cleavage factors". It is precisely these cleavages that lend an interesting dynamic to how a coalition at a national level in general and a local level in particular influences governance.

Moreover, Kadima (2014: 4) asks a very valid question "what is the applicability to African contexts of theories of party alliances and coalitions in other settings and, if relevant, in what ways might they need modification"?

Therefore, attention is only paid to major coalition theories. This is done to ensure that the focus of this thesis, which is to understand the impact of how coalitions at a local level impact on governance, remains the primary focus. Before answering the question: What then are these coalition theories, and how do they correlate with governance?

The following paragraphs address this correlation by looking at coalition theories. Coalition formation is at the heart of politics in multi-party systems (Skjæveland, Serritzlev & Blom-Hansen, 2007: 721). Another observation is made by Bäck who observes that coalition formation has been a preferred theme for political scientists, and that several coalition theories have been presented (Bäck, 2003: 1).

Although the previous paragraph explicitly expressed that coalition formation has been a preferred field of inquiry, this study's conjecture is to be found in governance. Moreover, the context in which the term governance is used in this study links with Blatter's statement that the foundation and practice of governance "were first introduced in a normative context" (Blatter, 2012: 89).

Citing the emerging criteria for good governance, Blatter states that "international organisations, in particular, have developed criteria for good governance after the importance of the political-administrative system for social development was rediscovered and corresponding quality criteria for good governance were needed" (Blatter, 2012: 89).

Therefore, notwithstanding the link to political science, the administrative system that would emerge from a political configuration is analysed according to whether such a political arrangement resembles good governance, or as Taylor (2016: 3) states when he writes about good governance being typically viewed as a relative concept "whereby some places are considered to be better governed than others".

The literature on coalitions suggests that the advent of coalition theories started in the 1960s. Kadima (2014: 4-5) outlines the two main theories below by referring to 'theories of size and ideology' which centre on the effects of potential coalition size and ideology on its chances of formation and may be

subdivided into office-seeking and policy-seeking theories. These two theories are briefly explained below since a more elaborate analysis of them is provided in Chapter 2.

1.7.1. Office –seeking and policy-seeking theories

The payoffs to any party that joins a coalition are a function of the distance between the parties and the government's respective policy positions, and the office related payoff that the party receives as a member of the coalition (Sened, 1996: 350).

Office-seeking theory assumes that the main goal of political parties is to access power. For the defenders of this viewpoint, government formation is a win-lose scenario in which cabinet portfolios are the payoffs. Therefore, if the most important thing for political parties were to receive cabinet portfolios, a majority coalition in parliament would not accept the existence of a minority government and would take the spoils of office for itself (Kadima, 2014: 5).

In contrast, the policy-seeking theory assumes that party coalitions are justified by policy goals. Drawing inferences from the two theories postulated above, it was interesting to establish where the political actors in these coalition-governed municipalities fell.

Additionally, how these hypothesised theories linked with that of governance overall could provide interesting insights on whether these role players were indeed ensuring that governance was effectively executed or whether good governance was indeed the driving force behind their desire for a coalition.

At this point, it is important to note this section's aim was to lay the foundation for the theories underpinning coalitions and that Chapter 2 provides a more thorough analysis of these theories. At the same time, what must not be lost sight of is that political contestation before an election carries its dynamics into a new coalition government. This does not imply that such a coalition is at risk of fragmenting. Ashworth, Geys, Heyndels and Wille (2006: 22) claim that "political competition at elections has a beneficial effect on the efficiency of municipal performance".

Ashworth et al. (2006) do concede, however, that "these beneficial effects are mitigated somewhat by the fact that such competition may lead to more fragmented governments (and there is some evidence that this works against efficiency)". Moreover, being a coalition government, albeit, at the local level, these municipalities represented what Katsamunska (2016: 135) calls 'contemporary governance'. Katsamunska goes further and clarifies that "contemporary governance is often described as policy networks (where) a wide variety of actors are included in these networks such as state institutions and organised interests in a given policy sector".

In the same vein, Bevir and Rhodes (2001: 7) state that "currently the dominant narratives of governance are the neoliberal one and that of governance as networks". In as much as the coalitions formed after the August 2016 local government elections represented newly led coalition local governments, they inherited governance challenges from the ANC-ruled local government. This change in governance joins with what Constantinos (2006: 1-2) highlights as "the sources of political transitions and how it relates to governance" by emphasising the following two aspects:

- Political transitions are initiated at three levels: state-led transitions, the civil society initiated and led transitions and combinations of state-led and society led transitions.
- Three main strategic and procedural issues are usually considered in the study and analysis of democratic transitions. The first is the presence of objective conditions for political transitions in the socio-economic structures. The second is contingent political dynamics: good governance is installed because of the conscious reform initiatives of individual leaders, elite factions, and social movements.
- Thirdly, it depends on the emergence of a supportive set of rules and political, social, and economic institutions.

If the above aspects were put into context, good governance is influenced by and made up of a variety of 'actors' within the sphere of governance. Moreover, a guiding framework is needed that can ensure that governance and its tenets

of accountability, transparency and service delivery does occur. These characteristics are illustrated in Figure 1.1 and are followed by a concise explanation of these characteristics of good governance.

Figure 1.1 Characteristics of good governance

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009: 3

- **Participation**: Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. All men and women should have a voice in decision-making either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.
- **Rule of law**: Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. The question, which arises, is how legal frameworks are used to maintain the rule of law? In the absence of such frameworks, stability will be compromised and this will have a negative effect on good governance. The rule of law also provides legitimacy to the institutions whose role it is to secure law and order.
- **Transparency**: Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions, and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.

- **Responsiveness**: Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. This is especially true in local governments where there are service delivery challenges.

- **Consensus Orientation**: Good governance obliges divergent viewpoints to reach consensus on critical issues. Disagreement on these issues, for example the passing of budgets to affect service delivery will hamper good governance. Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.

- **Equity**: All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. This is important in communities where there are vulnerable groups. This can also include groups that were historically disadvantaged, as well as minority groups that might feel on the periphery of society.

- **Effectiveness and Efficiency**: Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of the resources at their disposal.

- **Strategic Vision**: Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural, and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded

Similarly, Chigbu (2010: 8) posits that "good governance could be viewed as the processes within which the public, especially where natural resources are situated, participate in ensuring and guaranteeing strategic and sustainable exploitation and benefits from the resources, in a democratic environment devoid of coercion". Chigbu continues and contends that for good governance to work, the following processes must be in place:

- Active and democratic participation of local communities
- Transparent processes in decision-making and implementation
- Equitable and sustainable benefit from natural-resource proceeds to local communities
- Environmental integrity

- Absence of foreign intrusions or externalities that negatively affect local communities
- Periodic monitoring and evaluation of resource exploitation and benefit streams
- Existence of legitimate institutions and processes to undertake auditable procedures

At this juncture, it is imperative to reiterate that to the researcher's best knowledge; very few publications could be found in the literature that addressed the theme of this study (Martinussen & Petersen, 2001; Bäck, 2003; Labuschagne, 2018). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this gap in the literature presents a valuable opportunity to enhance the body of knowledge which exists on governance, and local governance emanating from post-election coalitions.

1.8. Research methodology

The research methodology employed in the execution of this research was qualitative and relates to its ontological position of what Moon and Blackman (2017: 1) define as the "study of being, which is concerned with what exists in the world about which humans can acquire knowledge". Moreover, this research was done in an epistemological position. Epistemology refers to the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known (Hills & Mullett., 2000: 5).

To answer the central research question the researcher decided to use triangulation to provide a more complete analysis of the data. It was important to fuse the different research methods that this study employed, to give what O'Donoghue and Punch (2003: 78) call "methods of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the research data".

Additionally, one of Denzin's four proposed triangulation methods, namely methodological triangulation involves using more than one option to gather data, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and documents (Denzin, 2006).

In this regard, triangulation provided for a cohesive analysis of the data and the methodology for this study comprises data gathered from the analysis of semi-structured interviews, relevant endorsed documents on the governance of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay for the period from 2016 to 2018, as well as other secondary sources.

The data gathering method was informed by the variety of options provided to respondents and ranged from personal interviews and electronic interviews. Respondents were provided with a questionnaire, which included 21 open and closed-ended questions derived from the research questions espoused by this thesis.

Regarding the use of semi-structured interviews, Harris and Brown (2010: 1) write that "in a semi-structured interview, interviewers begin with a small set of open-ended questions, but spend considerable time probing participant responses, encouraging them to provide detail and clarification; these data are generally analysed qualitatively". These semi-structured interviews as well as a structured questionnaire were conducted face-to-face with respondents who were located within Nelson Mandela Bay because the researcher resides in this metro, and this made it more expedient for these interviews to be conducted.

However, for the Johannesburg metro electronic mail-based interviews (e-mail) were used to gather data. It must be noted that the same interview schedule was used for personal, telephonic and e-mail interviews. Validating the use of e-mail interviews for respondents based in Johannesburg, Salmons (2012: 2) adds that "using data collected through online interviews follow fundamental steps and thinking involved in any research as well as those involved more specifically with the qualitative interview research".

Meho (2006: 1290) further corroborates the researcher's use of e-mail-based interviews when he writes that "as in face-to-face and telephone interactions, most e-mail interview-based studies use an interview schedule for data collection".

Interviews with political party leaders and/or representatives across the political spectrum, occupying various portfolios in the metros were conducted to gauge sentiments about coalitions.

With regard to the use of secondary sources, Johnston (2014: 619) clarifies and states the following:

> Secondary data analysis is an analysis of data that was collected by someone else for another primary purpose. The utilization of this existing data provides a viable option for researchers who may have limited time and resources.

Therefore, to enhance this research, it was considered important to systematically study and appraise existing literature and legislation on coalitions using a qualitative desktop study.

In this regard, the researcher focused on local and national newspaper articles. These newspapers included *The Herald* and its online publication *Herald Live*, the *Weekend Post* and *Die Burger* (Eastern Cape). The former two are daily publications whereas the latter are weekend editions. These newspapers had a dedicated focus on the current affairs of Nelson Mandela Bay. The same applied for Johannesburg, where publications such as *The Star* and those of independent publication houses provided up-to-date reports on what was transpiring in Johannesburg.

Additionally, what proved informative was the Politicsweb website, which has a dedicated focus on news and politics in Southern Africa and provided easy access to additional online resources. In addition, the weekly *Mail and Guardian* (South Africa) newspaper and website also provided in-depth political commentary and investigative reporting on the developments of the coalitions in the two metros.

The online platforms of television broadcasters such as eNews and eNews Channel Africa (eNCA) and South Africa's national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) provided a plethora of important opinion pieces by leading commentators on South African politics and society.

These contributors included esteemed national and international commentators, journalists and academics who are regarded as experts in their respective fields. Their fields of expertise were political science, governance, and constitutional law.

A variety of journal articles written by prominent scholars provided additional insight into the understanding of coalition formation. Only some are listed here and include scholars who write extensively on the subject. For example, *The Journal of African Elections* featured articles by prominent scholar Dennis Kadima on the causes and consequences of party-political alliances on the African continent (2014), Danielle Resnick (2014), Booysen (2014) as well as Labuschagne (2018).

Jaap de Visser from the Dullah Omar Institute at the University of the Western Cape also regularly writes on local governance in South Africa. Prominent articles on specific electoral politics are also featured in publications of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), the *American Sociological Review* and the *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance*.

Two major books on coalitions in South Africa were published in 2018. The first entitled *Who will win in 2019* by Jan-Jan Joubert and the other by Leon Schreiber entitled *Coalition Country: South Africa after the ANC*.

Both these publications speculated on a possible coalition government in South Africa's near future. Their data strongly relied on what transpired after the 2016 local government elections.

The interrogation of relevant Acts and legislation such as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the respective Green and White Papers on local government transition in South Africa, the Municipal Systems Act (MSA), Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) were also perused to arrive at palpable evidence of what this study aims to report. The responses of those interviewed have been used to corroborate secondary sources.

As stated in the research question, this study analysed the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay comparatively. The choice of doing a comparative study was to compare two or more things to discover something about one or all the things being compared (Heidenheimer, Heclo & Adams, 1990).

Another assertion is made by Mills, van de Bunt and de Bruijn (2006: 619) when they state, "the underlying goal of comparative analysis is to search for similarity and variance".

The above sources were used to explore what the practical, theoretical, and legislative grounds were for coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay and provide a trajectory for these fledgling coalitions. Moreover, it is imperative to state that insofar as Johannesburg was concerned, this metro culminated in having a minority coalition government, which was made up of smaller parties such as the Congress of the People (COPE), the ACDP and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+).

Regarding this minority coalition and that of Tshwane, Schreiber (2018b) states that "the governing minority coalition only controls 41 per cent of the seats in council and Tshwane just under 46 per cent". Schreiber (2018b) continues, and states that "since both governments fell short of the magic 50 per cent threshold, they relied on support from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) to take power".

Hence, even though the ANC has essentially been ousted, the minority coalition of Johannesburg did not see the EFF enter this coalition as a partner, and as Schreiber (2018b) also rightfully argues, "the party cannot be held accountable to any formal coalition agreement". Schreiber concludes that "the EFF is thus not compelled to vote in favour of the coalition's proposals in council, and is even free to change its mind and vote the coalitions out of power" (Schreiber, 2018b).

Given the comparative nature of this study when presenting the development of these metros while coalition-governed, they presented either unique or common challenges. Moreover, responses to such challenges and their impact

on governance and indeed to the prolonged existence of these coalitions were also compared.

In essence, the rationale of this study was that it warranted an inquiry into the basis on which these coalitions were formed, and what was done directly after assuming power in these municipalities. Moreover, the relevance of this study is also concerned with an interpretation of the status quo (and indeed also the past) of what has and is currently transpiring at local government level insofar as coalition governance is concerned, and renders itself to analysis, and in so doing adds to the existing body of knowledge, also providing a basis for future research of these phenomena.

Also writing on paradigms as a basis for research, Blatter (2012: 6) states the following:

> Governance constitutes a programmatic alternative to other paradigms for organising and reforming the state and public administration. The competing paradigms can be subsumed under the terms of government and management. For analytical purposes, the term governance is used, by contrast, to diagnose a change in forms of political steering, and sometimes even in politics and statehood altogether and to aptly conceptualise this change.

The second part of Blatter's argument underlines how the paradigm of government on the one hand, and management on the other hand, be an instrument to analyse governance (in the case of this research, governance at the local level by the coalition) and the management of such coalitions.

Before discussing the ontological foundation of this study attention should be paid to Richards' (2003: 33) statement where he refers to ontology "the nature of our beliefs about reality" He continues and argues that "researchers have assumptions (sometimes implicit) about reality, how it exists and what can be known about it".

The ontological foundation of this study is rooted in the primary research question of this study. The assumption that the researcher makes about the crux of this thesis, namely coalition governance at the local level, links with what Richards (2003: 33) refers to as "the nature of our beliefs about reality".

In this regard, Rehman and Alharthi (2016: 50-51) argue that "it is the ontological question that leads a researcher to inquire what kind of reality exists". Any addition to an existing body of knowledge requires the researcher to undertake to strive and find concrete answers to the following questions and, which Iacob, Popesu and Ristea, (2015: 148) describe as the object of the study of epistemology: "What is knowledge?", "What are the fundamental hypotheses lying at the basis of the conception of knowledge?", "How is knowledge elaborated?", "What is the value of knowledge?"

It is against this backdrop that the epistemological premise of this study endeavoured to add to the existing knowledge of coalitions at the local government level, in other words, what is known; and what the origin of such knowledge is and how this addition to the existing knowledge can be expounded by this contribution.

1.9.   Ethical considerations

This research was informed by the ethics policy of the University of the Free State (UFS), and was subjected to ethical clearance by the university, and as such adhered to the research principles as stipulated in the UFS Ethics Guide. This contribution of this research did in no way exploit any participant during the research endeavour. The researcher undertook to carry the primary responsibility for this research. The researcher made use of a detailed 'Research Study Information and Participant Consent' form which was provided to interviewees well in advance.

This served to inform the participant of the nature of the study as well as all relevant information regarding consent, confidentiality and use of information. Strict confidentiality of respondents was guaranteed. To enhance the confidentiality of respondents, the researcher encoded the names, surnames and designation by assigning only the word respondent for a singular

respondent of a political party in a metro, and a numerical value next to the word respondent should there be more than one respondent of the same political party in a metro.

The chief focus of this study was outlined in the aim of this document as that of coalition governance at the local government level, and the comparative nature of this qualitative study is also stated.

Moreover, respondents were informed why their participation was solicited by citing their knowledge and/or expertise regarding local government governance in general and coalition governance at the local level: their contributions were deemed vital for the successful execution of this research endeavour. Respondents were always respected.

The researcher ensured that the ethical principles were always adhered to from the time when contact was initiated with respondents to the conclusion of their participation. Upon consenting to participate, respondents were given a consent form for perusal and were asked to provide consent by signing the form.

Respondents were informed that they were in no way coerced to participate and that their participation was voluntary, and that they could withdraw their participation at any stage during their participation without being required to provide any clarification for such withdrawal.

In no way were undertakings taken that respondents would in any way benefit either in monetary or material terms. Respondents were informed that their contribution was greatly appreciated and that such contributions provided for an opportunity to enhance the body of knowledge on governance at the local level in general, and local governance emanating from post-election coalitions.

1.10. Literature study

Within the last two decades, governance has risen as a core concept in the social sciences (Schneider & Bauer, 2007: 2). Governance has been conceived as the relationship between civil society and government in determining governmental action. If the government does not have the capacity to act, the question of governance is moot (Wilson, 2000: 57-58). Another observation is made by Björk and Johansson (2001: 1) stating that "in the political science field theories are constantly launched about the way political systems are governed and organised".

The consulted literature on governance is voluminous, and varied assertions are made on a variety of research themes. Regarding this, Katsamunska (2006: 133) comments as follows:

> At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concept of governance has taken on a central part in contemporary debates in social sciences and particularly in the field of public administration. The concept has been used frequently, but often with quite different meanings and implications. It is considered that a major reason for the increasing popularity of the concept, in contrast to the narrower term of 'government', is its capacity to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing.

Yet another, more encompassing definition of governance is made by Constantinos (2006: 1) writing that "governance can be thought of as the applied realm of politics, in which political actors seek mechanisms to convert political preferences into managing society". This definition underlines the statement made earlier that it would be useful to see whether these 'political actors' are indeed ensuring the execution of governance.

At the same time, while knowing comprehension of governance theory is at the heart of any understanding of this research, it is important to note what Rhodes (1996: 652-653) claims that "governance signifies a change in the meaning of

government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed".

This contention can be understood in terms of a political transformation of some sort, especially against the backdrop of coalition politics where 'a new process of governing' is sought.

Good governance involves improvements in the technical competence and efficiency of the public sector as well as measures to make public policy more accountable, transparent, and predictable to society at large (Constantinos, 2015: 2). He continues and states that "good governance is installed as a result of the conscious reform initiatives of individual leaders, elite factions and social movements".

Constantinos' statement ties up with the crux of this study in two ways: the improvement of public policy in making it more 'accountable', 'transparent', and 'predictable'- and that good governance is connected to deliberate initiatives by individuals (party-political leaders), and other strata of society aimed at reform.

In essence, coalition governance entails just this - a convergence of not necessarily like-minded groupings, but that such groups can be dissimilar too if good governance emerges from such convergence. Moreover, given the South African legacy of Apartheid, Pretorius and Schurink (2007: 19) stat that "post-apartheid South Africa faces a major challenge in ensuring that municipalities provide optimal and professional services to citizens of heterogeneous cultures".

Despite advances made to establish a democratic local government system in South Africa, challenges remain when it comes to governance aimed at redress, and Stoker (1998: 18), in his discussion on governance suggests five propositions of governance. These are:

- Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.
- Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues.

- Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action.
- Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors.
- Governance recognises the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide.

Stoker continues and states that "each proposition has associated with it a certain dilemma or critical issue". These are:

- There is a divorce between the complex reality of decision-making associated with the governance and the normative codes used to explain and justify government.
- The blurring of responsibilities can lead to blame avoidance or scapegoating.
- Power dependence exacerbates the problem of unintended consequences for government.
- The emergence of self-governing networks raises difficulties over accountability.
- Even where governments operate in a flexible way to steer collective action governance failure may occur (Stoker, 1998: 19).

It was deemed necessary to provide the above synopsis of Stoker's inquiry into governance since it offers an informing analysis into the predicaments facing governance. Moreover, the last two bulleted points set out the perilous questions facing coalition governments, since they speak to accountability resulting from self-governing networks and the possible failure of governance in the face of collective action.

The permutation of these networks creates an interdependence which, as Katasamunska argues, "facilitate the coordination of public and private interests and resources and enhance efficiency in the implementation of public policy" (2016: 135)

Adding to this, Dedeurwaerdere (2005: 2) contends that "from a functional point of view, network governance aims to create a synergy between different competencies and sources of knowledge to deal with complex and interlinked problems". Expounding this, Kakai (2013: 5) writes that "under this approach, the formal and legal institutions of self-government are combined with complimentary social systems".

What can be deduced from the paragraph above is that at the centre of governance there should be a commonality in terms of the agreement. This agreement, whether imposed or not, has a direct bearing on accountability since this is the mandate that was given by constituents to those tied up in such agreements. Whether this is always the case, is one of the research questions that this intended research attempts to answer.

Blatter (2012: 1) makes another observation when he states that "the term government(s) represents an understanding of political institutions as formalised instruments of the political community; in contrast, the term "governance" denotes a constitutional understanding of political institutions as a communicative structure which (re)creates the political community".

Adding to this, Blatter (2007: 2) states that "at the beginning of the new millennium, the term governance was one of the favourites in the race to claim the title of the most widely used term in the social sciences". Another definition is given by Fakir (2009: 4) arguing that "consistency, predictability and certainty are important elements of governance and integral to promoting the levels of trust required for sustainable governance and in inculcating the notion of public service".

Analysing the contributions to the current literature on governance, Blatter arrives at three central findings:

- Governance approaches contain basic assumptions on the functioning of the social world not only when they are explicitly presented as political and programmatic reform concepts, but also when they are applied as analytical categories for the description (and explanation) of current processes of change. These ontological assumptions and starting points are contingent and their

definition is characterised by clear affinities to certain values and norms. A typological governance theory reveals the ideological and ontological affinities of specific forms of governance.

- For a typological theory of governance to provide a worthwhile contribution to the analysis and understanding of the current transformations of society, politics, and the state, it, must be considered that forms of political steering and integration are conceptualised concerning fundamental notions of social order. Therefore, it appears expedient to tap into basic theories of societal differentiation and integration.

- For a typological theory of governance to constitute a bridge between core social science disciplines, economic and sociological theories of action/behaviour along with the corresponding understandings of institutions must be taken into consideration. In this regard, it appears more promising not to integrate the different notions of action and institution in a meta-theory, rather use them as complimentary ideal types for the analysis and interpretation of reality (Blatter, 2012: 21-22).

Putting Blatter's analysis into context, it can be reasoned that governance is not a static concept, but that it lends itself to describing a 'current process of change'. Moreover, in an analysis of governance, it is worthwhile to use complementary disciplines to arrive at an understanding of how a particular form of government is established.

Parenthetically, Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004: 143) agree and write on the term governance that "the concept could function as a bridge between disciplines, and it might stimulate comparisons between rather different phenomena, which, when viewed under the more abstract perspective of governance, might be found to have something in common".

At this juncture, it is important to make a distinction between government and governance since governance is the theoretical basis of this study. This is so because it can be argued that governance through coalitions is indeed the (re)creation of the 'political community' as suggested by Blatter.

Three studies were the focus for this study. This focus was on these studies' objectives and central research questions that it sought to answer, the methodologies employed and whether their objectives had been reached.

Furthermore, the research emanating from this and how it might relate to this study is also highlighted. In the final analysis, what it pursues is to lay the groundwork for a convincing argument that there is a need for further research to arrive at a better understanding of coalition governance. This is discussed next.

The first research that this thesis debriefed was a Doctoral thesis entitled *An Evaluation of Good Governance and Service Delivery at Sub-National Levels in Namibia: The Case of the Oshana Region* (Helao, 2015). This voluminous work by Tuhafeni Helao sought to gauge and survey governance structures and practices and service delivery to provide a wide-ranging understanding of governance and service delivery situation at sub-national levels in Namibia.

Helao (2015: viii) argues that "public service agencies are presumed to lack good governance practices which adversely affect service delivery". Furthermore, Helao contends that "it was argued that good governance practices improve public service performance and ultimately enhances service delivery". Notable of Helao's hypothesis is the research question that he probes:

What impact do good governance practices have on the delivery of services at sub-national levels in Namibia and the Oshana Region (Helao, 2015: 25)?

Helao's research correlated with the research of this thesis. Whereas the author's focus was region-specific and of a neighbouring country (Namibia), the research by the author had parallels to this since Namibia gained its independence in 1990 whereas South Africa became a democracy in 1994.

These post-liberation experiences surely presented challenges to their respective governments in terms of establishing overhauled local government systems that would seek to redress the past.

For explanatory purposes, the research objectives of this study are presented here in full, and inferences have been made to the research embedded in this thesis. According to Helao (2015: 26), the objectives of the study were "to explore the extent to which good governance practices contribute to service delivery at sub-national levels".

The second objective conceivably links with what can be researched within the coalition-governed local governments. This objective aimed to provide a broad overview of governance and service delivery. Their effects on the living standard of grassroots communities are at the heart of the study.

In this regard, Govender (2016: 1) also argues that "coalitions at local government level are concerned with the service delivery of water, sanitation, electricity and housing". However, closely tied to this (and other objectives), was the incorporation of how post-election coalition local governments could live up to good governance. An appraisal of basic governance theories sees the theoretical roots of governance such as accountability, transparency etc. referred to, to gauge these municipalities' performance.

The following governance theories are focused on in Chapter 2:

- Rational choice theory
- System's theory
- New institutionalism
- Interpretive theory

Since Chapter 2 provides the conjectural basis for the study, a focus on these theories is valuable to deliver a summary of how these governance theories are related to coalitions and whether features of governance are evident in the data collection. Linking with the second objective, Helao (2015: 26) attempted "to examine (the) existing governance framework and structures to explain their impact on service delivery".

Moreover, besides the provision of services, there are also real socio-economic challenges that are peculiar to a specific region which require different ways of dealing with such challenges.

Concluding the research questions, Helao sought to analyse and interpret results, as well as draw conclusions on governance practices and services delivery in the Oshana Region, and to provide recommendations for the improvement of service delivery.

Insofar as the research methodology used for this study, Helao (2015: 41) writes that "this is an exploratory study that examined and analysed how good governance practices by public institution officials can improve the delivery of services at the sub-national level in Namibia, using the Oshana Region as the case study".

The collection of data necessitated the gathering of empirical data. This first-hand data was then examined, and inferences were made from it to explain governance practices in the region on which the research focuses. Primarily, as is the case with this study, the research methodology employed seeks to answer the primary research question that this study is endeavouring to answer.

Moreover, by similarly employing the comparative studies approach, qualitative data was collected from the qualitative research. This was applied across all coalition-governed municipalities. However, this does not imply that all these political arrangements are related. It refers more to the mechanisms that are similar insofar as the legislative framework that governs these coalitions' operations is concerned.

The undercurrents within these coalitions in the execution of their mandates are what feature centrally when unpacking their governance. Closing the focus on the thesis, Helao (2015: 317) maintains that the answers to the research question in the thesis "were significant because they addressed the research problem that was identified and examined in this study". A reading of this thesis established that although much has been done since Namibian independence in 1990, the empirical evidence collected revealed pockets of inhabitants still being exposed to poor service delivery.

This thesis provided an explanatory hypothesis that employed sound and appropriate research methodology in attempting to gauge the citizenry's attitudes towards governance affecting them directly.

The second research output that was debriefed that succinctly provided an analysis of key components of governance and its tenets was the thesis of Ganiyu Temitope Otunba, entitled: *The Impacts of Post-Election Power-sharing Agreement on Horizontal Mechanisms for Political Accountability: A case study of Kenya 2008 to 2013* (Otunba, 2013).

This is a master's dissertation but is extensive in its effort to answer a fundamental question that links governance with post-election coalitions. It does, however; apply its research effort on a national level by focusing on Kenya.

In the early parts of the thesis, Otunba (2013: 1) makes an essential statement that "In liberal democracies, elections play a central role in the democratic processes necessary for the continuation of democratic governance". Within this statement, Otunba encapsulates a two-prong trajectory:

First, the author mentions elections and then underscores their importance for the continuation of democratic governance. However, democratic governance does not necessarily imply good governance. What it does augur, if one should take the South African example, is that its democracy is maturing and becoming consolidated.

At this time, if the emergence of coalitions at the local government level are added researchers are impelled to investigate these three dynamics:

- Post-electoral alliances at local government level (preceded by pre-electoral alliances, if any).
- The continuation of democracy (consolidation thereof at the local government level).
- The impact of the above on governance on political institutions at this level.

The above-listed points are regarded as useful and provide the precise contribution of this study to the existing body of work. Referring to the status of inclusive governance in fragmented societies and democracies, Otunba (2013: 2) argues that this "is most times based on averting conflict resulting from a discontent with political or economic segregation.

Otunba continues and writes that "Inclusiveness remains an important component of good governance but so is accountability as well". Insofar as Otunba's findings, he acknowledges that "post-election power-sharing weakens horizontal mechanisms for political accountability" (Otunba, 2013: 2).

The afore-mentioned closely ties with Otunba's research question which probed the question: "how do post-election power-sharing affect horizontal mechanisms for political accountability"? Otunba (2013: 5) continues and writes that his study "contributes to the post-election power-sharing discourse by empirically examining how post-election power-sharing affects political institutions and mechanisms for political accountability using Kenya's experience as a case study".

Mentioning the void in studies dedicated to post-election coalitions and their impact on governance, Otunba (2013: 5) believes that "unlike previous studies which have solely focused on the impacts of post-election power-sharing on ethnic conflict or cost of governance, this study contributes to the post-election power-sharing discourse by empirically investigating how power-sharing impact institutions, issues which have often been ignored in literature". Once more, this lack in the research of coalitions at the local government level and its impact on institutions is the case for this study.

The research methodology employed by Otunba is that of qualitative research. The author substantiates his decision for this type of research by stating that "it will help me convey the richness and intensity of details by allowing me to conduct a very detailed investigation of issues and analysis of the phenomena". Otunba continues and argues that "using a qualitative method, the research will reveal more about the phenomenon" (Otunba, 2013: 28).

Otunba's reasoning regarding this type of research and resorting to explorative research further implies that "post-election power-sharing is a new phenomenon, and the case study approach offers the means of tapping the richness and depth of information not usually offered by other methods (Otunba, 2013: 28).

The justification for an explorative study is because the aim of the study is to discover ideas and insights into what impacts power-sharing could have on political accountability, using existing theoretically informed hypotheses as a foundation (deductive reasoning). Literature and in-depth interview methods of explorative studies have been combined to triangulate both sources of data. The methods of data collection for Otunba's study include fieldwork and interviews.

This study concluded by anticipating that power-sharing "would bring awareness to institutional impacts of power-sharing in post-election scenarios and consequently remind power-sharing policy advocates at both continental and international levels that adequate considerations need to be given to government accountability when advocating post-election power-sharing" (Otunba, 2013: 48).

A constructive consequence of this study is that as Otunba (2013: 48) states "it can be replicated… (Hopefully) such studies will shed more light on the institutional dynamics and impacts of post-election power-sharing on political accountability".

The third and final study that will be studied is the Doctoral thesis of Israel Tsatsire (2008) entitled: *A Critical Analysis of Challenges Facing Developmental local government: A Case Study of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality* (Tsatire, 2008).

Tsatsire (2008: 3) explores the "challenges facing developmental local government in South Africa, using the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality as a reference". The author moves from the hypothesis "that the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, like other municipalities in South Africa, is confronted by numerous challenges in implementing its constitutional

developmental mandate conferred on it by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 108 of 1996".

The constitutional developmental mandate that Tsatsire (2008) writes about the growing mandate that government has in terms of, for instance, service delivery as one of the challenges in the metropolitan area so that applicable intercessions can be established. Tsatsire's study was completed nine years ago, and much has happened in the interim. There are eight main questions relating to Tsatsire's study.

This study applied a questionnaire to elucidate the expectations emphasised at the outset of this thesis. This questionnaire "was developed comprising all the relevant indicators identified through literature review" (Tsatsire, 2008: 228). Tsatsire (2008: 228) proceeds and then "tests his assumptions against the available empirical results".

Moreover, Tsatsire (2008: 240) maintains that "the objective of this study was to test attitudinal responses to aspects such as the institutional capacity of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality to deliver services, public participation, governance challenges, co-operative government, development challenges and political-administrative dichotomy".

This thesis' concluding remarks are followed by a succinct list of recommendations, of which the chief is that a want for auxiliary research in developmental local government exists. An assessment of exactly how progressive the post-2016 coalition-governed metros have become in terms of governance in the wake of a post-election coalition local government has yet to be gauged.

1.11. Limitations of the study

This section discusses the limitations of this research as it pertains to the research design and methods of data analysis. In presenting these limitations, the author wishes to validate that he critically reflected on the research problem and that he comprehends the subject literature. Moreover, stating this is also a

way of challenging known and unknown conjectures in the discourse on coalitions at the local level.

This study's limitations are summarised below:

- The qualitative nature of this study required the use of semi-structured interviews as one of the data collection instruments. The study envisaged interviewing at least fifteen to twenty participants across both metros, representative of all the political parties represented in these metros. However, this proved to be challenging for several reasons.

- Firstly, the South African general election was held on 08 May 2019, and political leaders of all political parties at all three tiers of government were engaged in electioneering, despite the researcher initiating contact with potential participants since January 2019.

- Secondly, not all of those contacted were willing to participate in this study. To illustrate this, the national leadership of the EFF initially agreed to grant the researcher an interview after the general election, but when contacted at the time, negated on its undertaking, and efforts to secure an interview with EFF councillors of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metro also proved cumbersome. Likewise, commitments by leaders of the now-defunct ID and ANC in Johannesburg to grant interviews were cancelled.

The above assertion could lead to the assumption that this study is not representative of all the major political parties' experiences and expressions on coalitions in these metros. However, to circumvent this, the researcher secured interviews with the national leadership of political parties represented in these metros. This led to interviews with the national leaders of two political parties represented in the two metros Moreover, a comprehensive literature review and secondary sources such as books as well as journal and press articles supplemented this gap.

- Being a qualitative study, this type of research cannot be subjected to statistical analysis to appraise the extent to which reported opinions expressed by respondents replicate those of the metros concerned.

- It proved difficult to gain access to municipal documents such as financial statements due to the sensitive nature thereof and confidentiality of these and other documents. Nonetheless, this study premised not to build its analysis on the scrutiny, interpretation, and analysis of documents forensically.

- The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 further compounded accessibility to respondents due to the country moving to a hard lockdown. The declaration of a national state of disaster by the Department of Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs minister on 15 March 2020 and the subsequent lockdown level four restrictions saw the closing of all university libraries. The agreement the researcher had with the Nelson Mandela University (NMU) in the metropolitan area where he resides restricted library access to its facility for research purposes.

1.12. Significance of the study

The existing literature on coalition politics in general and at local government indicated a dearth in its focus on governance as a tenet of political transformation. For instance, referring to the discounted research on pre-electoral coalitions, Golder (2005: 643) states that "given their prevalence and potential impact on government composition and policies, this represents a serious omission in our knowledge of coalitions".

Moreover, Golder (2005: 645) accentuates the importance of comprehension of electoral coalitions (although Golder focuses on coalitions on a national level) by arguing that understanding the formation of electoral coalitions is important because:

- They can have a considerable impact on election outcomes, government composition, and policies.

- They have important normative implications for the representative nature of government.

- (And) they are quite common.

Taking the afore-stated paragraphs into context, this study aimed to fill this void in the literature on local governments governed by coalitions in South Africa by evaluating whether these coalition governments lead to better governance.

Moreover, this study's contribution is on the contemporary discourse on the effectiveness or not of coalitions at the local government level and could provide valuable insight into the evolution of coalition governments at a local level.

However, to arrive at a more convincing response, a rigorous analysis was required, which necessitated a comparative study of several local government coalitions in South Africa. These coalitions were drawn into the discussion to expound the relevance thereof in the execution of this research.

This study provides information that could be used by academia, the research fraternity, National, Provincial and local government, the South African Local Government Association, civil society as well as political parties that seek to grasp the dynamics of coalition governments at local government level and how coalition governments may or may not lead to good governance. In this regard, this study provides original insights into the discussion of the evolution of coalition governance.

1.13. Outline of chapters

This thesis is organised into the following five chapters.

Chapter 1: This chapter explains the study by providing a general introduction and overview of the study. Moreover, an investigative analysis of the problem statement is also presented.

Chapter 2: This chapter contains an elaborate theoretical overview of the literature on coalitions, their origins and their applicability within South Africa. The background to coalitions in South Africa and the connection between connection between governance and coalition theories is also presented. This chapter concludes with an overview of minority governments as an extension of coalitions.

Chapter 3: This chapter provides an overview of local government in South Africa and of the two metros on which this study focuses. A synopsis of the 2016 local government election in these two metros precedes a section on how coalition formation unfolded in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay respectively.

Moreover, the relevance of this study is reinforced by suggesting that the prevalent political culture and subsequent governance at the local government level in the metros that are compared were brought about by a variety of factors that are crucial for an assessment of governance by coalitions. This chapter includes a section on the process of coalition formation and the ripostes to key questions arising out the transition to coalition.

Chapter 4: This chapter presents an integrated analysis of the primary and secondary data collected. This was done by stating the criteria, which are used to assess governance in these metros. The manifestation of coalition theories in the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros is presented followed by a section examining the factors, which either enabled or discouraged coalition formation. This chapter concludes with an index on good governance principles and good governance factors in these two metros.

Chapter 5: This chapter provides the concluding overview and conclusions of this study. It consists of a critical discussion of the findings gathered, conclusions related to the research questions and closes with an assessment of good governance stating that the effectiveness or not of these metros' coalition, governance is measurable and how it either led or did not lead to good governance.

Chapter 2, which follows, provides the theoretical basis for the study. It provides an overview of coalition theories and presents the association between governance and coalition theories.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY

2.1. Introduction

This chapter commences by providing definitions of governance and proceeds to give a summary of some of the theoretical underpinnings of governance in general and minority governance and coalition theories in particular. It is imperative to provide definitions of the theoretical aspects of the study since it enhances the understanding of key terms used in the study.

A change in the organisation of government and society implies that there has been a change in the balance of power. This shift in the balance of power also leads to a change in executive authority, and it is for this reason that it is important to understand the underlying theories of governance in the first part of this chapter.

Section 2 provides a background to coalition theories. Building on the clarification of governance and governance theories, the exposition of a conjectural framework for the study is important because it augments an understanding of coalitions in general and coalition formation particularly at the local level. Moreover, it is expedient to provide an outline of how these governance concepts are linked to coalitions and if governance can be categorised according to these theories.

The conclusion of this chapter provides a focus on minority governance. The emerging coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, the focus of this study constituted minority governed coalitions, and it is for this reason that it is essential to survey the various types of minority governments and their constitutional requisites. More detail is also provided on the challenges, which faced these emerging coalitions.

2.2. Defining governance

Governance has emerged as an enterprising research area for the last two decades (Strøm, 1990; Bevir, 2009; Shneider, 2004; Chhotray & Stoker, 2009). However, despite this, there appear to be some dissenting views on this concept. In this regard, Louw (2012: 94), writing on governance in the South African public administration context, asserts that "although the phenomenon is well established in South Africa, and despite the popularity of the phenomenon among both theoreticians and practitioners, there is still a lack of conceptual consensus".

Governance is a growing phenomenon (Asaduzzaman & Virtanen, 2016: 3). Therefore, what is a fitting definition of governance? UNESCAP (2009: 1) defines governance as "the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)".

Another definition is given by Dickinson (2016: 42) when the author states that "governance can be understood as the coordination of institutions and agency in a given policy area towards collective objectives". However, before a discussion of governance and its theoretical foundations, it is prudent to provide a few definitions of governance as it appears in the literature.

To this end, Rhodes (1996: 652-653) states that "governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed". This altered process of governance will necessarily also imply a change in the structure of government on the one hand and society on the other.

Another definition is provided by Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) asserting that "governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there is a plurality of actors or organisations and where no formal system can dictate the terms of the relationship between actors and organisations". Dissecting governance as a concept, the authors go further and highlight the following elements of governance (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009: 3-4). These are stated as questions below and are followed by an interpretation.

- **What are the formal and informal rules?**

Order is needed for governance to take effect. Moreover, how decisions are made and within which legal framework is important for decisions to be translated into action when it comes to governance; and which rules enable who the decision-makers within a governance setting are. Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) also rightfully state that "in studying governance we are interested in both the formal arrangements that exist to structure decision-making and the more informal practices, conventions and customs".

- **What is meant by 'the collective' as a concept?**

Minority and coalition governments imply a consensual agreement, and as such, those parties or groups who are part of a governing collective must understand that "you are not guaranteed what you want even in a system of formally democratic governance" (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009: 5). How these decisions, which involve "issues of mutual influence and control" are handled is an important factor as it relates to governance by consensus.

- **Who makes the decisions?**

Decision-making is guided by how minority governments and coalitions are configured, and the extent to which these decision-makers can be held answerable.

- **Who is in charge?**

The authors juxtapose "monocratic governance" with the collective elements of governance and argue that as much as a monocratic or a singular party governs by relying on its power, these resources are not sustainable. Instead, they posit that governance must rather "rely on negotiation, signals, communication and hegemonic influence rather than direct oversight and supervision" (Chhotray & Stoker,2009: 4).

Regarding hegemonic influence, it would be interesting to see how this is manifested in minority governments and coalitions, particularly since the two metros that this study focuses on were subjected to the hegemony of the ANC since the advent of democratic local government elections.

In the same vein, a pertinent definition of governance is provided by Bartolini (2011: 6) when he states that "at the core of governance there is an evolution towards more 'consensual' decisions (or towards a higher significance, number and relevance of consensual decision-making) and evolution from simply binding decisions towards a growing set of mechanisms and controls reflecting the competence and/or resource control capacities of various actors".

Studying Bartolini's argument, the following two questions, which arise, are first, how the progression to increased compromises within the metros exhibits itself after the 2016 local government elections? and secondly, did the alliances and resultant minority government arrangements at the local level reveal whether such arrangements possess the expertise to garner resources and use them effectively?

It is also important to note that the concepts of governance and government are dissimilar, although both have common purposes. Whereas government provides the legal framework for governance to be affected, it is governance that sees the conception and enactment of shared ideas of the people being governed (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992: 18). Likewise, Bevir (2009: 1) argues that "governance is a broader term than government because it focuses not only on the state and its institutions but also on the creation of rule and order in social practices."

Hence, out of the myriad of connotations attached to governance, the following clarifications are deemed useful for this study:

- Governance is a conceptual approach that frames a comparative analysis of micro politics.
- Governance concerns big questions of a "constitutional" nature that establish the rules of political conduct.

- Governance involves the creative intervention of political actors to change structures.

- Governance emphasises interaction between state and social actors.

- Governance refers to a particular type of relationship among political actors, that is, those which are socially sanctioned rather than arbitrary.

- Summarising the above five points, Governance is a conceptual approach that frames a comparative analysis of micro politics.

- Governance concerns big questions of a "constitutional" nature that establish the rules of political conduct.

- Governance involves the creative intervention of political actors to change structures.

- Governance emphasises interaction between state and social actors.

- Governance refers to a particular type of relationship among political actors, that is, those which are socially sanctioned rather than arbitrary (Bratton & Rothchild, 1992, cited by Dickinson & Virtanen, 2016: 4).

Putting the above into context, it can be argued that the concept governance is a theoretical method that presents and supports the scrutiny of what transpires politically at a micro level, and how government issues are managed.

What also stands out, is that the political players involved in a governing arrangement go about altering such arrangements to either entrench governance or change it altogether. In this regard, the informal, rather than the formal relationships between those involved in a governance relationship are important to establish and maintain. Ungsuchaval (2017: 26) provides a summation of definitions of governance theories (textbox 2.1), followed by an overview of pertinent governance theories.

Textbox 2.1. Definitions of governance

According to Richards and Smith (2002), governance is "a descriptive label that is used to highlight the changing nature of the policy process in recent decades. In particular, it sensitizes us to the ever-increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy. Thus, governance demands that we consider all the actors and locations beyond the 'core-executive' involved in the policy-making process" (p.2).

Rhodes (1997) argues that governance refers to a 'new process of governing' and states that, at least in the British case, "governance refers to self-organizing, inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state" (p.15). He also identifies six separate uses of governance: the minimal state; corporate governance; new public management; 'good governance'; a socio-cybernetic system; and a self-organizing network (see Rhodes, 1996, 1997). In short, governance, for Rhodes (2012), refers to "the changing boundaries between public, private, and voluntary sectors, and to the changing role of the state" (p.33).

Pierre (2000) point outs that the idea of governance has a dual meaning. It can refer to "the empirical manifestations of the state's adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century." Nevertheless, it also denoted "a conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social system and, for the most part, the role of the state in that process" (p.3).

Rosenau (1995) defines governance at the global level, or 'global governance', as "systems of rule at all levels of human activity — from the family to the international organization — in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions" (p.13).

In a more simply expressed definition of governance, the World Bank (1992) defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a county's economic and social resources for development" (p.1). In this respect, governance represents the process by which authority is exercised; and the capacity of government to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions. This definition is created for encouraging 'good governance' around the world (see The World Bank, 1992; Kjær, 2004, chapter 7; Bevir, 2012, chapter 6).

Hyden (1999) refers to governance as "the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules" (p.185).

Gamble (2000) questions the strongly-held-idea of public-private separation in relations to governing activities. He thinks of governing as "to influence, shape, regulate or determine outcomes" (p.110). In this matter, for Gamble, there are numerous other agencies and institutions involving governing a social order: "governing is not the exclusive preserve of government" (ibid.). Governance, hence, is "the steering capacities of a political system, the ways in which governing is carried out, without making any assumption as to which institutions or agents of the steering" (ibid.)

Source: Ungsuchaval, 2017:26

2.3. Governance theories

Sound research depends on applying the most appropriate theory to design theoretical, conceptual, and analytical frameworks to study certain phenomena. Moreover, theories generate hypotheses that can be proven or disproven by research, the results of which may enhance the theory (van der Waldt, 2017: 186-187). It is for this reason that this section provides a theoretical foundation for this study.

This section is useful to provide a summation of how these governance theories are associated with coalitions and whether characteristics of governance can be observed in the data collection. Moreover, can governance be characterised by synthesising what has been garnered from these theories?

Governance theories relate to the various perspectives of governance and how they evolve (Ekundayo, 2017: 154). The meaning of governance varies not only according to the level of generality at which it is pitched but also the theoretical contexts in which it is used (Bevir, 2009: 372).

Bevir contends that the renewed interest in the concept of governance can be attributed to public-sector reforms and that the curiosity this generated "cannot be easily separated from theories such as rational choice and the new institutionalism" (Bevir, 2009: 372). Hence, these two theories as well as systems theory and interpretive theories are focused on in this section. As mentioned previously, this is done to inform an understanding of how governance was impacted after the 2016 local government elections in the two metros on which this study focuses. The first theory that is focused on is the rational choice theory.

2.3.1. Rational choice theory

To understand the process of a coalition government, it is not enough to confine this to ideological and political frameworks. The rational interests of the parties must be also considered (Khomenko & Deminachuk, 2018: 165). Rational choice theory identified—or rediscovered—at least two major explanatory factors that some political scientists had neglected: one, that politicians are

endlessly opportunistic and two, that all decisions take place in some type of institutional setting. Rational choice theorists argued that political institutions structure the opportunities available to politicians and thus help to explain their actions.

At the core of the above definition, there appears to be a causal relationship between political establishments functioning within a particular governance context and action which politicians or as large sections of the literature refer to as "actors".

Lovett (2006: 242) asks the question: "what do we mean by 'rational' choice theory"? Lovett proceeds and answers the question by stating that "the simplest and best answer defines rational choice theory as an approach to the study of social phenomena characterised by a small bundle of core methodological assumptions". Moreover, the rational choice theory also does not mean that people act purposefully all the time or that such action is unrestrained or detached by peripheral issues as long as there are some options to choose from (Lovett, 2006).

Given the focus of this study, it can be reasoned that what transpired after the 2016 local government elections can largely be attributed to a course of action undertaken, which at the time, was deemed to be the most beneficial by those who had the political authority to do so. Bevir (2009: 372) also states that "rational choice theory models individuals acting on the assumption that they adopt the course of action most in accord with their preferences".

Additionally, Bevir (2009: 373) states that rational choice theorists "argue that institutions structure people's strategic interactions with one another: Stable institutions influence individuals' actions by giving them reasonable expectations about the outcome of the varied courses of action from which they might choose".

Emanating from rational choice theory, is a model of rationalist decision-making to navigate, as Bevir (2009) suggests, these diverse paths. This rationalist model is illustrated below and considers the five steps involved in the rationalist model:

Figure 2.1 The Rationalist Model of Governance

Source: Constantin, 2013: 46

Insofar as the rational choice theory of governance is concerned Khomenko (2018: 162) uses this theory to explain the German coalition formation of 2017-2018 and argues that coalition formation is possible in terms of rational theory, given that the parties which formed the coalitions "used the rule of minimising costs and maximising benefits". Additionally, the main actors who will be deemed rational members of the coalition formation of the coalition formation "are parties whose efforts contribute to the formation of a coalition" (Khomenko, 2018: 162).

The rule of lessening costs and increasing the benefits can be derived from entering a coalition and thereby exercising its governance mandate however is not that straightforward. These two coalition types are explained in the section which follows this summation.

The impact of rational choice theory cannot be undervalued in any study of coalitions, and therefore requires a systematic understanding thereof. For instance, Bevir (2009: 373) argues that "rational choice theorists explore self-

enforcing agreements, the costs associated with them, and the circumstances in which they break down".

Attention now shifts towards the Systems Theory.

2.3.2. Systems theory

Perhaps the most fitting point regarding systems theory and governance is made by Schneider and Bauer (2007: 4) when they argue that "governance theory is a modern variant of systems theory - a structural and institutional approach on the various forms of social coordination". They continue by stating that "in such a perspective, societies generate social and political order not only through central decision-making".

It is this local decision-making that is made possible by a local government system that does not necessarily emulate national governance and central decision-making. This is also the arena where political parties might have the capacity to influence who governs as opposed to their national position where they are relegated to being minor players. It is also at the local level that the frustrations of the electorate come to the fore often regarding issues impacting negatively on their existence and threaten the political and social order which Schneider and Bauer (2007: 4) allude to.

Bevir (2007: 374) another strong proponent of systems theory also discusses systems theory in his seminal and voluminous work entitled *Encyclopaedia of Governance* stating that "systems theorists often distinguish (here) between governing, which is goal-directed interventions, and governance, which is the total effect of governing interventions and interaction". As in earlier sections of this chapter, Bevir also highlights the dichotomy between governing and governance.

Explaining his political systems theory, Easton (1957: 384) states that "the very idea of a system suggests that we can separate political life from the rest of social activity, at least for analytical purposes and examine it as though for the moment it were a self-contained entity surrounded by, but clearly distinguishable from, the environment or setting in which it operates".

Easton (1957: 384) continues and states the following:

> Furthermore, if we were to hold the system of political activities as a unit
> before our mind's eye, as it were, we can see that what keeps the system
> going are inputs of various kinds. These inputs are converted by the
> processes of the system into outputs and these, in turn, have
> consequences both for the system and the environment in which the
> system exists.

Easton (1957: 384) illustrates this theory in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 David Easton's Political System

Source: Easton 1957: 384

The significance of Easton's systems theory lies in its usefulness in
comprehending how a political system functions and for governance to be
efficient. This also implies that there needs to be clear insight regarding what
a governance structure aspires to achieve. Explaining this, Mohan (2011: 1)
believes that "effective governance does not interfere with the natural flow; but
it does hold the system accountable to deliver on the prescribed outcomes
and impacts and to integrate the defined value system to avoid the
unacceptable situations".

This statement refers to what Mohan (2011: 1) regards as the three factors that have a bearing on effective governance, namely that it is "proactive in defining outcomes, impacts and values".

To render expectations into tangible results, Mohan suggests the following critical points that need to be defined regarding governance and in particular systems governance:

- What the organisation should achieve and what should be avoided, primarily in terms of prudent and ethical behaviour?
- How should the achievement of identified outcomes and means utilised to achieve the desired results be measured and monitored?
- What is the current assessment and status of the organisation's governance and its effectiveness? Where are the gaps? What are the critical governance issues and challenges facing the organisation?
- What plans, policies, strategies, processes, structures, actions, controls, and culture need to be developed and implemented to address the gaps and achieve the defined results without creating unacceptable situations?
- What is changing or may change in the internal and external environment during and over the organisation's planning horizon necessitating review and readjustment of its thinking and actions (Mohan, 2011: 1)

Mohan's pointers listed above correlate with what is expected of actors in a system of governance. The emphasis is also on the integration of political operations and how to improve governance.

The next section focuses on new institutionalism.

2.3.3. New institutionalism

An institutional approach dominated the study of the state, government, public administration, and politics up until sometime around the 1940s. Scholars focused on formal rules, procedures, and organisations, including constitutions, electoral systems, and political parties. Although they sometimes emphasised the formal rules that governed such institutions, they also paid attention to the behaviour of actors (Bevir, 2007: 373-374).

The above definition reiterates the relevance of grasping this theory as a cornerstone of governance since it could be found that the behaviour of those who are part of a governance arrangement certainly have an impact on such an arrangement.

Moreover, the impact that behaviour would have on whatever political arrangement transpires is also succinctly put forth by Mokgosi, Shai and Ongunnubi (2017: 42) when they argue that "the new institutionalism approach focuses on the decision-making of government post-elections". They continue and state that "this approach focuses on proximity to power, which will give access to decision-making rather than policy, convergence and ideologies".

Moreover, a behavioural component is now incorporated into an analysis of this theory and how it relates to governance since the focus now shifted to as Adcock, Bevir and Stimson, (2007) argue "analysing individuals rather than the institutions which surrounded them".

Inferences that are made here include the role of political actors as they form part of coalitions at the local level and how their behaviour influences such coalitions and what the impact of such behaviour is on coalitions.

Put differently, this approach claims that parties aim to get as close as possible to controlling the power balance in a governance arrangement, and particularly where a coalition has been cobbled together. This is done to exert as much influence as possible when it comes to decision-making.

This approach also sees parties being impassive when it comes to a formal merging arrangement and the possible policy benefits that can be derived from such a merging. Ideological consistency is also not high on the agenda with this approach.

Also looking at the theory of new institutionalism, DiMaggio (1998: 696) states that "new institutionalism or neo-institutionalism is an approach to the study of institutions that focuses on the constraining and enabling effects of formal and informal rules on the behaviour of individuals and groups", supports the research into local government as an institution and the factors that impact the governance either positively or negatively.

Writing on the theory of institutional change as it pertains to Dutch city-provinces, Buitelaar, Lagendijk and Jacobs (2007: 897) regard institutionalisation "as the process in which behaviour and discourses become anchored".

Figure 2.3 illustrates a 'staged approach' by Buitelaar et al. (2007) to institutional change as a derivative of new institutionalism. A brief interpretation of these stages is presented to assess whether these stages also present themselves at the local level of the two metros that are the focus of this study.

Figure 2.3 A model of institutional change

Source: Buitelaar et al., 2007

Buitelaar et al. (2007: 896) move from the premise that "an existing institutional arrangement accompanied by a discursive hegemony". The sustained hegemony of the local governments of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay by the ANC stands out here as the party that dominated the institutional arrangement which existed before the 2016 local government elections.

The two factors which challenged the status quo (ANC's authority) are what transpired externally in these metros and those that were already part of the institutional design. It is here that the prospect of change presents itself when

"one of these developments, or a combination of both, exerts sufficient pressure to open up the discursive arena" (Buitelaar et al., 2007: 896).

The above leads to that critical moment where the broad arena is opened, and challengers of the ANC's hegemony is challenged. If this is sustained in a collaborative effort where the challenges of the incumbent local government (perception of issues and problems) are debated to provide solutions (ideas and solutions/constitutional design), then the second opportunity presents itself (critical juncture/institutional transformation).

The next theory to be focused on is the interpretive theory.

2.3.4. Interpretive theory

According to Bevir and Rhodes (2002: 4), "an interpretive approach follows from two premises. The first straightforward premise is that people act on their beliefs and preferences". To make an inference regarding this, it is assumed that factors such as ideology, culture, and the principles it represents, as well as the policy positions of political parties, play a role in people's party-political references.

Bevir and Rhodes' second premise is that "we cannot read off people's beliefs and preferences from objective facts about them such as their social class, race, or institutional position" (Bevir and Rhodes, 2002: 4). In essence, what the authors posit is that principles cannot be reduced to fluctuations in a political system.

Finally, regarding the interpretive theory of governance, Bevir and Rhodes (2002: 2) approaches this from a political science perspective and argues that epistemologically the question of "how do we know what we know about political science" can be answered by the interpretation of how people act out their "beliefs and preferences". Citing voting preferences as an example of how human behaviour can be construed, Bevir believes that as far as voting preferences are concerned, then people act on their "beliefs and preferences".

This interpretation becomes an enabling factor to explain voting patterns, which is important to understand how parties are voted in and out of power, what the factors are which determine a party's electoral performance, and how these factors culminate in the formation of coalitions. In other words, is there a causal relationship between the way people express their beliefs and preferences and coalition formation between political actors?

Thus, after synopsising four pertinent governance theories, it is deemed important to shift attention to coalitions and minority governments.

2.4.   Background to coalition theories

The theory generally underpins research designs since it provides an understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (van der Waldt, 2017:187). It is for this reason that it is important to ensure that a theoretical foundation is laid to comprehend the research focus of this study.

This section commences with an overview of the origins of coalition theories and their applicability to the local level. Hereafter, the main coalition theories are discussed. However, before an overview of the varying theoretical foundations of coalitions is provided, it is prudent to define coalitions. In doing so, Boissevan (1974: 171) defines a coalition "a temporary alliance of distinct parties for a limited purpose".

So where do coalition theories originate from? The literature consulted suggested that the advent of coalition theories started in 1960 and that the study of coalitions is underpinned by numerous theories. In pursuing an understanding of coalition theory, one must be cognizant that it is as Müller and Miller (2005:2), note "a vast field".

Citing coalition formation in East-Central Europe, Grzymala-Busse (2001: 1) writes that "the patterns of coalition formation (in East-Central Europe) are as diverse as they are puzzling". However, despite this diverse and 'puzzling' body of knowledge and the abundant works on coalitions, there remains a lacuna on the subtleties of theoretical knowledge of coalitions at the local government level. Similarly, Laver (1989: 15) writes that "it is surprising, therefore that

although the theoretical literature on coalition behaviour is by now quite voluminous, little of it is applied to the pervasive European phenomenon of the local coalition government".

It is against this backdrop that this chapter provides a comprehensive exploration of coalition theories. Moreover, the assertion that these theories are 'puzzling', emphasises the threat of a possible negation of trying to understand its complexity.

Like Grzymala-Busse, agreement

(2014: 4) also alludes to the universality of coalitions and reiterates that theories of party coalitions are essentially based on the experiences of continental Europe and have focused on predicting and explaining models of government formation in parliamentary democracies.

Focusing on Africa's experiences with coalition governments, Kadima (2014: 5) goes further and argues that "coalition theories emerging from the study of party coalitions in Western Europe do not account sufficiently in their theorisation for social-cleavage factors". It is precisely these cleavages that lend an interesting dynamic to how a coalition at a national level in general and a local level in particular influences governance.

Kadima's question which is cited in Chapter 1, is reaffirmed here by asking "what is the applicability to African contexts of theories of party alliances and coalitions in other settings and, if relevant, in what ways might they need modification, and how do these coalition theories correlate with governance"? This study's context envisages answering this question by focusing on local governance by party alliances, since it is these party alliances that Kadima alludes to and how they relate to governance that is a very important element of this study.

Moreover, albeit coalition formation is a preferred field of inquiry, this study's conjecture is to be found in governance. This statement must be understood within the context in which the term governance is used in this study. Hence, it is important not to assume that this study is slanting towards political science

because the administrative system that would emerge from minority or coalition governments at the local level is analysed according to whether such a political arrangement resembles good governance.

Furthermore, the fact that this study focuses on the local level provides an opportunity to assess the relevance and applicability within these local settings. Additionally, as the literature regarding global local government coalitions suggests, Vrije (2006: 104) argues that "the appeal of studying local and regional coalitions, if only for the simple fact that they can provide the author with an increased number of cases for testing existing theories and at the same time with the possibility to control for a series of systemic factors, has been early pointed out in the coalition literature (Dodd 1976; Mellors & Brearey 1986; Laver 1989)".

Therefore, one of the premises of this study is to assess whether coalition dynamics are universally applicable insofar as how they impact governance or are there undercurrents that are peculiar to a certain area or region.

What emerged from the studied literature and supporting the above assertion, Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989), despite having an exclusively European focus, rightfully argue that whereas the role of formal coalition theory in the study of local coalitions cannot be discounted, "it will need refinement before it is capable of being worked in the new setting" (Mellors & Pijnenburg, 1989: 303).

Therefore, there is a need to research coalitions at the local level in South Africa in general, and to assess whether these coalitions lead to good governance. This need is accentuated by Bäck (2003a: 2) when the author substantiates her focus on coalitions at the local level by arguing that the "primary reason for studying local coalitions is that there is a need to evaluate coalition theories on new data, and the local scene offers a vast number of coalitions which have never been studied before".

Further mitigating the rationale of studying the local level, Bäck (2003b: 442) argues that "another advantage with studying local coalitions is that we can study a large number of coalition formations at a single moment in time and in

a single national setting, which gives us greater opportunities to test and refine theories". Bäck continues and states the following:

> There are several advantages to studying local data. First, we access many cases of government formation that have never been used as data in coalition studies. This solves one of the problems that coalition research faces. The problem is that coalition researchers have relied heavily on national-level data from parliamentary democracies in post-war Western Europe, even though some coalition theories have been formulated because of observation of these same data. The use of local data also gives us greater opportunities to test coalition theories, since we can study some cases within one country and at a time (Bäck (2003b: 442).

Given the omissions in the study of local government coalitions and the theoretical vacuum that this poses, Laver (1989: 17) agrees with Bäck by asserting that "the analysis of local government coalitions opens up some very exciting possibilities". Laver continues and states that "local government coalitions are very much terra incognita for the coalition theorist and theory analysis offers the opportunity to explore a vastly expanded universe of bargaining interaction" (Laver, 1989: 17).

Hence, the exploration of this 'terra incognito' or unknown territory which Laver (1989: 17) referred to, underlines one of the aims of this study, since the coalition governments of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were still relatively new at the time of writing, it not only provides a study of what Bäck (2003b: 442) calls "a single moment in time", but more essentially, it provides analysis in real-time.

Before the focus shifts to coalition theories, it is important to summarise how the governance theories outlined can be associated with coalitions and the characteristics of governance that the researcher hopes to observe in the data collection. This is done to characterise governance by synthesising what is garnered from these theories.

Regarding rational choice and the possibility of coalition formation, Khomenko (2018: 161) argues that "an explanation of the coalition formation is possible in

terms of this theory", and that the "main actors who will be considered as rational members of the coalition formations are parties, whose efforts contribute to the formation of a coalition".

Thus, after providing an overview of the origins of coalitions, attention is now directed to the types of coalition theories.

2.5. The theoretical framework of coalition theories

At this juncture it is imperative to reiterate that to the researcher's best knowledge, there are very few publications that can be found in the literature that address the theme of this study; and as mentioned earlier, this gap in the literature presents a valuable opportunity to enhance the body of knowledge which exists on governance, and local governance emanating from post-election coalitions.

For this thesis, a thorough literature survey suggested that the two main theories that are focused on are policy-seeking and office-seeking theories. There are of course derivatives of these theories, and these have been referred to intermittently.

Furthermore, the theoretical premise of coalitions and the transpiring political dynamics of the coalitions at local government level that this thesis focuses on are linked in later sections in this thesis. It is foreseen that this association (between theory and practice) could explicate the implications of these coalition-governed municipalities.

Emerging from the literature consulted, the advent of coalition theories started in the 1960s, and Kadima (2014: 4) remarks that "theories of a coalition based on size and ideology emerged in the 1960s and 1970s". He continues and states that "they (theories) centre on the effects of a potential coalition's size and ideology on its chances of formation and may be subdivided into office-seeking and policy-seeking theories."

Also highlighting the dominant theories of office and policy-seeking, Shikano and Linhart (2012: 111) write that "theories of coalition-formation can be

categorised within two groups: models with office motivations and models with policy motivations".

Similarly, Skjæveland et al. (2007: 723) state that "coalition theory may be divided into at least two categories: those theories that somehow take policy considerations into account and those that ignore policy considerations and arguably, by implication, assume that parties care only about government offices".

Also commenting on the dichotomy of these two theories, McMillan (2016: 185) states that there is an interrelation between these two concepts. McMillan's argument is premised on how a certain administrative position is likely to be liable for a specific policy area, and that office-seeking modes of coalitions are more concerned with the quantifiable allotment benefits it could derive from being in office. Regarding policy-seeking models, he states that these "models have focused on how coalition membership is determined by and influences ideological position" (McMillan, 2016: 185).

This is especially the case for political parties in modern democracies, which Strøm (1990) and Strøm and Müller (1999) assume to be motivated primarily by the benefits of office and policy, both of which can be attained only through a sufficient level of voter support. In parliamentary democracies, these motivations have a most profound impact on the process of coalition formation (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2012: 4).

Whatever these motivations are and whether the analytical objectives as the formal theories present are met or not, a central question which surfaces throughout the literature is the reason(s) why parties enter into coalitions?

Therefore, despite the office or policy motives there remain reasons why political or governing alliances are formed. Highlighting three of these reasons, Doherty (2004: 1) argues that coalitions are formed to achieve the following:

- In government to secure a governing majority.

- In opposition, to create a credible alternative to the government; and

- During elections, to consolidate electoral support and maximise results.

In a quest to find a theoretic approach that can articulate the foregoing reasons for coalition formation, the following multi-dimensional approach to study coalition behaviour by Mellors and Brearey (1986: 278) is very valuable.

This inductive approach is grouped under seven broad headings which are listed below:

2.5.1. The multi-dimensional influences on local coalitional behaviour

- **Institutional** regulations (e.g., location of executive responsibility, the requirement to form an executive, possibility of minority administrations, election periods); legal constraints and competencies; political status (e.g., scale, policy-making powers, financial autonomy); arithmetical factors.

- **Historical** local political traditions; past experiences of conflict and co-operation (between both parties and leaders); the evolution of parties in the local authority; shifts in party support; previous patterns of party control.

- **Motivational** office v. policy-seeking motives (and the relationship between them); the nature of 'power' in local government) office/patronage/policymaking); ideological and personal compatibilities; short-, medium- and long-term strategies.

- **Vertical/Horizontal** degree of devolution; compatibility or conflict in roles and bargaining styles of respective party actors; ideological space between parties; extent to which local party politics are 'nationalised'.

- **Party-Interval** extent of national control over local party groups; levels of activism; extent to which national parties have developed strategies for local coalitions and/or see local coalitions as 'laboratories' for national alliances; communication between party levels; extent to which elected politicians have dual interest in local and national political arenas.

- **Socio-Political** degree of party politicisation; nature of local economy; urban versus. rural areas; proximity to national elections; electoral volatility; electoral

movements (e.g., rise of 'new' parties); extent to which political options are understood by the electorate; turnout; personalities and local leaders.

- **External** influence of local bureaucrats; perceptions of local media; 'events' (e.g., occurrence of a local crisis or change in local economy) (Mellors & Pijnenburg, 1989: 7).

Although this multi-dimensional framework pertains to the national level, Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989: 6-8) insist that "the approach is capable of being adapted to fit the local setting". However, Mellors and Brearey (1986: 278) also readily admit that "obviously, these factors are interdependent in real life, but it would be a substantial achievement to be able to present all of these linkages here in an abstract and formalised manner". They continue and state that "while the multi-dimensional framework might provide a useful structure for the ordered discussion of coalitions which recognises links with contextual settings usually ignored by traditional theories, it cannot claim to meet the predictive objectives of formal theories".

Hence, the afore-stated factors are crucial in all the stages of coalitions and have a direct bearing on factors such as the formation and longevity of coalitions and therefore impact governance directly. Below are likely examples of these factors which have a bearing on local government coalition:

Institutional: The electoral system peculiar to a country, for example, first past the post versus proportional representation What constitutes a hung council?

Historical: What are the indicators of support for the various parties?

Motivational: What seem to be the driving forces behind a possible configuration of governance? What are the trade-offs involved?

Vertical/Horizontal: On what level does engagement take place (national or local) and how does a factor such as personality influence the bargaining process?

Party-Interval: Is there not an overlap of roles of those involved in the configuration of governance at the local level? How hands-on are parties when

it comes to translating what transpires at the national level filters to the local level – or even vice versa?

Socio-Political: How do factors such as social movements (for example ratepayers associations) influence possible government formation?

External: How do officials (whether politically appointed or not) impact these alliances?

After laying the basis informing the origins of coalition theory, possible reasons why coalitions are formed and providing a theoretic approach that articulates reasons to study coalition behaviour, the next section explores the two coalition theories which form the theoretic understanding of this study, namely policy and office-seeking theory as well as the six derivatives from these theories.

2.5.2. Policy-seeking theory

While office payoffs have been thoroughly researched by scholars of coalition politics, the empirical evidence relating to the distribution of policy payoffs are few and far between (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2012: 11).

The assumption on which policy-seeking theories are based is that party coalitions are justified by policy goals (Kadima, 2014: 5). Early coalition theories assumed that parties have only one goal, namely, to get into office. They may seek votes or policy as instruments to get into office, but their main goal is to obtain office benefits (Helboe-Pedersen, 2012: 899).

Relying on 1970 theorists such as Axelrod and De Swaan, Kadima, focusing on the African experience of coalitions; maintains that for policy-seeking coalitions to succeed, (winning) coalitions are formed that "contain ideologically adjacent parties" (Kadima, 2014: 5).

Similarly, Timmermans (2003: 2) states that "attention in government formation allegedly is focused on matters on which parties have congruent or at least compatible views". Laver (1984: 202) also concedes that "agreement is much easier to achieve between those with similar policies than it is between those

who are poles apart". Similarly, (De Swaan, 1972, cited in Resnick, 2014: 49) adds that "parties with similar ideologies are more likely to coalesce". In the same vein, Denters (1985: 298) states that "coalitions of parties proposing rather similar policies are more likely to form than alliances between parties proposing radically different policies".

Contrary to winning coalitions which stems from ideologically contiguous parties, Timmermans (2013) believes that "those who disapprove of coalition governments believe that such governments tend to be fractious and prone to disharmony, as their component parties hold differing beliefs and thus may not always agree on policy".

To illustrate this Volden and Carrubba (2004: 523) provide the following insightful example:

> Consider five parties—Greens, Socialists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Conservatives—arrayed in a one-dimensional policy space from left to right in the order listed. In Axelrod's theory, the Christian Democrats and Conservatives would rather form a governing coalition with Liberals than with Socialists. This result is intuitive and not in any way uncommon to other models.

Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge and Sabatier (1994: 120) provide another example citing France, when they state that "there is a clear premium on creating coalitions of parties of similar ideological tendencies. This brings together Gaullists and UDF on the one hand, and Socialists and Communists on the other- the Right against the left". This is an appropriate example of where communal policies increase the probability of parties coalescing.

Another reason why parties would rather coalesce with those who are in closer proximity on the ideological spectrum than their policies is that a post-election arrangement will be less demanding with less if any policy concessions. Later sections of this thesis examine whether a policy has a bearing on concessions that political parties must make, and at what stage such concessions take place- if at all.

However, despite policy similarities, the general agreement is not always guaranteed. In this regard, Klingemann et al. (1994: 31) suggest that "although the need to get general agreement may be circumvented in various ways (particularly by giving ministries to the parties that have made the policy area a priority), parties in coalitions can be expected to have more difficulty in following through their programs than do single-party majority governments".

In the same vein, McMillan (2016: 10) adds that "while theoretical predictions of minimal winning and ideologically coherent coalitions are ideals, in practice there are countervailing pressures and constraints which require consideration".

Focusing on India and coalition governments at the national level, McMillan (2016) cites Luebbert (1986) who proposes the following:

> In a competitive party system, the need to preserve distinctive party identities may lead to parties associating with partners who are not ideologically close. Second, in a segmented polity, where national elections are the outcome of numerous regional contests, it is often necessary to examine the component outcomes as an amalgamation of smaller interactions, rather than simply at the aggregate level.

Taking Luebbert's proposal into context, parallels can be drawn with what transpires at the local government level coalitions occupying South Africa post the 2016 local government elections. This is so because the main political parties who emerged as kingmakers after this election entered into coalition with ideologically dissimilar political parties, and it can be deduced that this was done to preserve their political identity. In this regard, the EFF and DA are two political parties whose ideological premises are poles apart on numerous levels.

Another factor is that each of these coalition partners represents a constituency with its expectations. Moreover, in as much as the allocation of key municipal or mayoral committee portfolios to coalition partners is a way of skirting disagreement, there is no guarantee that such coalitions will be stable and will deliver on their promises to their respective constituencies unless certain allowances are to be made.

What are these compromises or concessions referred to in the literature? Laver (1984) distinguishes between two more facets of coalitions and policy-seeking theory. These are 'logrolling' and 'bargaining power' and are briefly examined in the next few paragraphs.

- **Logrolling and bargaining power**

Another dimension of policy-seeking coalitions is logrolling. Logrolling has a rather complex effect on practical bargaining power, an effect seldom considered by those who write about coalitions. The most important general consequence of logrolling is that parties with more extreme views find themselves at much less of a bargaining advantage than would otherwise be the case. Logrolling replaces policy compromises with policy trading, a process that gives no advantage to those at the centre of the ideological spectrum (Laver, 1984: 206).

Given the number of political parties who contested the local government elections which form the crux of this study, it was interesting to establish how logrolling featured post this election. This was the case for the City of Cape Town which saw several smaller community-based parties contesting the local government elections before this metro was solely governed by the DA.

In line with the above paragraph, it is also worth noting that South Africa, being a multi-party democracy also provides fertile ground for coalition formation, despite some political parties which have deeply entrenched policy positions. However, even though some of these established positions have become part of the electioneering arsenal of political parties and a means to augment their support base, Skjæveland et al. (2007: 721) maintain that "coalition formation is at the heart of politics in multi-party systems". In these coalitions, logrolling is affected when policy concessions are replaced by policy trading.

Laver (1984: 207) explains that "people get those things that they feel strongly about by conceding that which they value less". How feasible this is in practice, and how it unfolded in the metros this study focuses on are brought to the fore in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

Suffice to state that logrolling also has its drawbacks, and as Laver (1984: 207) argues that "the very process of giving each that which each most wants, rather than forcing compromises, can undermine the 'collective' nature of the decisions taken".

Insofar as bargaining power is concerned, Laver (1989: 198) asserts that "bargaining power is measured in threats". Laver continues and uses the following analogy to illustrate this intimidating facet of coalitions:

> When I am attempting to extract some concession from you, whether it is a cabinet seat or an agreement on free transport for school children, I am in a much better position when I can threaten you. And the more I threaten you, the more powerful I am. My threats, of course, must be credible. In terms of practical coalition politics, my threat to keep you out of power is credible only if there is an alternative coalition that I can join with some hope of success. If I simply threaten you to keep you out of office by staying out of office myself, I am threatening to cut off my nose to spite my face. You will probably not take me seriously. Such threats are easy to make, but they are also easy to disbelieve. You will notice that even the most spiteful of people whom you are likely to meet tend to still be in possession of their noses.

It was considered vital to present the above illustration, since its simplicity encapsulates coalition behaviour succinctly. Moreover, while Laver's correlation refers to national governments, it is as Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989: 10) argue that "most definitions of coalitions will accommodate what happens in all local governments."

Putting the above paragraph into context, and looking at what has transpired since the August 2016 local government elections and the coalition-governed local municipalities which emerged, is what could transpire at the national level? This is the conundrum that might be confronting political parties in South Africa, especially in the wake of the performance of these coalition-governed municipalities.

Moreover, the central research question of this thesis which sought to establish whether coalition-governed municipalities led to good governance or not could, by integrating the theory on coalitions, provide an impetus for what could transpire at the national level.

The trajectory from which the South African coalition experience at the local level was examined, and what it attempted to survey (against the backdrop of coalitions based on either similar or dissimilar policies) would then, in essence, be whether coalition partners in the metros forming the nucleus of this research were part of it for office-seeking or policy-seeking motives.

Before concluding the focus on policy-seeking theory, and shifting attention to office-seeking theory, Jungar (2000: 54) distinguishes between the following three types of policy-based motives:

- Policy considered as an end in itself (parties only care about influencing policy).

- Office as an instrument for policy (political parties seek office to influence policy).

- Policy as an instrument for gaining office (parties offer policies to the electorate in exchange for votes).

- Policy as an instrument for gaining office (parties offer policies to the electorate in exchange for votes).

2.5.3. Office-seeking theory

Office-seeking coalitions have been described as "marriages of convenience" with the objective of fighting a common enemy, rather than uniting over policy aspirations (Sithanen, 2003: 8). These theories are the oldest (Skjæveland et al., 2007: 723). Riker (1962, cited in Strøm & Müller, 1999: 5) holds the view that what parties fundamentally seek is to win, and in parliamentary democracies, winning means controlling the executive branch, or as much of that branch as possible.

Office-seeking theories are founded on the belief that the primary goal of political parties is to gain power. Control of the executive and political appointments, as well as have the power to pass and implement legislation, are the key incentives (Indridason 2005: 440).

The ideological likeness is not the overriding factor when political parties enter into coalitions. In this regard, Wolinetz (1994: 152) writes that "the primary emphasis is on securing government office, even if it is at the expense of policy goals or maximizing votes". The author continues: "office-seeking parties seek either to hold power alone, or more realistically (in the context of the systems in which they operate) to share power with others-either for survival (one implication of the cartel party model), or to act as a stabilizer or balance within the system or, more likely, to gain access to patronage" (Wolinetz, 1994: 152).

There seemed to be a tendency that when a change of power was required then parties would put these on the back burner and coalesce despite ideological differences. This was indeed the case in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay when the EFF agreed to be a silent partner of the coalitions which emerged after the 2016 local government election. This does not mean that these coalitions are exempted from challenges.

Law (2018: 7) argues that there are shortcomings "for power-based motives with consequences for the stability of the coalition". He continues and states that "they are argued to be more volatile and susceptible to infighting once in office due to their lack of ideological cohesiveness". Moreover, additional factors such as personality clashes that impact the longevity of coalitions founded by parties contending for office are examined in Chapter 4.

2.5.4. Vote-seeking theory

The main task of vote-seeking is that the main task party is the maximisation of votes in the next election. It is this fact that determines their behaviour in the process of coalition negotiations, the willingness to join or not to join the coalitions (Klimovitsch, 2014: 76).

Influenced by the influential work of Anthony Downs (1957), which argues that parties are "teams of men seeking to maximise their electoral support to control government" (Downs, 1957: 28 quoted in Strøm & Müller, 1999: 8). Formulating Downs's argument Strøm and Müller (1999) suggest that the observant reader would mostly apply this to two-party systems. However, they alert the reader that Downs "maintained the assumption of vote maximisation even in the multiparty context" (Strøm & Müller, 1999: 8).

Clarifying Downs's assertion that parties maximise for votes, the aim is not just to garner votes, but in fact to either retain or gain control of the government. What is also interesting is that when vote-seeking is the motive and yields results, then the possibility of coalitions gaining power is nullified since having maximised votes and becoming the majority party, both office and policy-seeking can now be realised without power brokering.

After explaining the three types of coalition theories this study uses to inform an understanding of political party behaviour as it relates to coalition formation in the two metros, Jolobe (2018: 75-82) identifies the following six types of coalitions that came to occupy the governance arena at the dawn of democracy.

These coalition types are listed below:

- **The cabinet coalition**
  This type of coalition is borne out of the coalescence of two or more parties that share executive portfolios provided they achieve a legislative authority that can be constitutionally enacted by the government. Citing the Government of National Unity (GNU), Jolobe (2018: 76) states that this power-sharing agreement "worked and was made up of the three most powerful parties in South Africa at the time – the ANC, National Party (NP), and the IFP". Similarly, Kadima (2003: 15) states the following:

  > Political party coalitions in post-Apartheid South Africa have evolved from forced marriages under the framework of the constitutionally entrenched Governments of National (and provincial) Unity (GNU), to marriages of convenience, which became commonplace particularly since the second

democratic elections of 1999, with political parties coming together to achieve some common goal.

The formation of this GNU also comes against the backdrop of the unfolding political situation in the country which required unity and level-headedness.

- **The legislative coalition**

  This type of coalition comprises parties that might not necessarily be part of it. A legislative coalition is a political alliance that does not necessarily share power or key positions. Policy or ideological dissimilarities also do not have to be determining factors. Instead, parties can agree to support each other on a case-by-case basis. This was evident in the case of both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay where the EFF pledged its support for the DA on certain issues, although these two parties are on the opposite ideological spectrum.

- **Electoral coalitions**

  This type of coalition emerges from pre-electoral alliances or agreements and as Horowitz (1991 cited in Jolobe, 2018: 77) argues that the "objective of such coalitions is to 'pool votes', that is to mobilise and collect votes across different constituencies to gain an electoral majority".

- **Minimal winning coalitions**

  These minimal winning coalitions are a consequence of office-seeking parties. Riker, (1962, cited in Wieldraaijer, 2015: 8) describes this preferred form of political configuration (minimal winning coalitions) "where side payments are allowed, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information".

  Also influencing these types of coalitions is the size of the coalitions. This is because minimal-winning coalitions require the least majority to be elected to office. These minimal-sized coalitions underscore the fact that policy positions of these least majority coalitions are not the overriding factor that ensure coalition formation, highlighting instead the prevailing aim of office-seeking.

Another factor that impacts minimal-winning coalitions is that the departure of any of the coalition parties would lead to the loss of the government's majority. The risk of withdrawal from a coalition partner is a very real one that can harm coalition partners seeing their programmes through and exerting their power in whatever position they came to occupy. However, the most measurable effect would be on governance.

Another important point in the literature is that the power balance within these coalitions can become distorted. The reason for this is that parties' share of the power in a minimum-winning coalition is relative to the number of positions it holds.

Commenting on this, Luebbert (1986: 79) contends that this power imbalance "permits a kind of blackmail of the dominant party (and all other parties) by a single dissatisfied party; for a party can leave the government at will, and thus compel the dominant party to choose between making concessions or renegotiating the entire government agreement".

Interestingly though, is that as much as the withdrawal of a party from a coalition leads to the loss of power, the opposite can also be true. Emphasising the importance of coalition members, Laver (1998: 8) argues that "every member of a minimal winning coalition is thus pivotal, in the sense that the member can turn a winning coalition into a losing one by leaving and can turn a losing coalition into a winning one by joining".

Having alluded to power imbalances in minimal-winning coalitions and the risk they carry for the longevity of these coalitions, a solution is posited whereby the leaders of the dominant party can avoid this dilemma if they form a government that includes one or more unnecessary parties, none of which can bring down the government by itself (Luebbert, 1986: 79).

- **Surplus coalitions**

The literature refers to coalitions that are more than the minimum of two parties as surplus coalitions. This is indicative of the role that size plays in minimal-winning elections. This changes the coalition's dynamic since the withdrawal

from one of the excess parties does not automatically mean the implosion of the coalition. In this regard, Game (2011: 15) writes that "at least one-party group could withdraw without the coalition's full voting strength falling below 51 per cent".

From a strategic point of view, bigger parties can end up running out of the use of smaller coalition parties as a majority party entrenches its power. This was typical of what transpired in the Western Cape when the DA later incorporated smaller parties which were needed to govern neutralising the ID when these two parties formally merged in 2014. In this regard, Jolobe (2018: 79) also argues that "policy-oriented politicians thus use surplus majority cabinets as a strategic tool to not have to make too many concessions to other parties".

Thus, after focusing on policy and office-seeking coalition theories as two distinct types of action, there still appears to be vagueness regarding these two theories. The literature also suggests that these theories' party behaviour cannot, as Krause (2012: 9) maintains "cannot always be distinguished".

An interesting point is made by Mokgosi et al. (2017: 43) when referring to the Gauteng coalitions when they argue that coalition formation is, in fact, an elitist exercise since "voters do not normally have a say in terms of actors their political parties should go into a coalition with". This virtually leaves voters at the mercy of party leaders whether this is at the national, provincial, or local level.

Likewise, McMillan (2016) argues that "a particular government portfolio tends to bring with it responsibility for a particular policy area". He continues and explains the intersection of these two theories by saying that whereas office-driven models tend to focus on the quantitative distribution of a fixed number of governmental benefits, policy-driven models have focused on how coalition membership is determined and influenced by ideology (McMillan, 2016: 185).

What can be deduced from the above is that there appears to be a gap between policy and office-seeking theories, with Crombez (1994: 5) arguing "that often one is considered to be a means of achieving the other".

Thus, after the overview of coalition theories was given, the question could be asked whether there was a link between governance and these theories? The next section focuses on this.

2.6. The connection between governance and coalition theories

Coalition formation implies an alignment of political parties with the intent of changing the status quo within a particular setting to affect governance in a certain sphere. A coalition is also indicative of a shift in voting patterns which created a situation where no party received an outright majority and needed to conjoin to enable governance also shifting the balance of power at the local level.

To comprehend how coalitions have formed a link between the concept of governance and coalition the theories must be explained. There is a direct link between governance and coalition theories. This association is based on the effect these theories have on the ability of coalitions to deliver on their electoral mandate.

From the coalition theories embedded in this thesis a vantage point would be to draw the correlation between the following theories and governance:

- **Vote-seeking and governance**

Vote-seeking underscores a political party's inherent desire to garner the maximum votes in an election. Achieving this would enable it to emerge victorious and either retain power or gain control of a government and effect change.

Maximising votes, annuls the need to form a coalition with other parties and allows the winning party to effect policy and occupy office without including other parties. Hence, effective governance then becomes the aim of the party in power.

However, being in power and without the shared responsibility a coalition brings, there is no guarantee that governance will result in accountability, transparency and efficiency. The opposite has become systemic in most local

governments. Regarding service delivery, Sithole and Mathonsi (2015: 5) rightfully also assert that "the debate on service delivery and governance takes a centre stage".

Despite the challenges of service delivery, there are, however, those local governments who adhere to the principles of good governance.

- **Office-seeking and governance**

Vote-seeking and maximising votes lead to the control of local government. Could such a party occupy the key position on the council at will? On the other hand, should there be minimal-winning coalitions, then a party can settle for control over most of the portfolios. This also works for smaller parties who being coalition partners (albeit junior partners) can agitate for office as part of trade-offs.

When no party wins an outright majority and a coalition appears to be the best option, governance can be affected in the interim when parties still negotiate on their role in a potential coalition. This is typical for minimal-winning coalitions which can be typified as a result of office-seeking parties.

In the metros on which the study focuses, governance was hampered because of fierce contestation for office in, particularly NMB. The impact of this contestation left this metro vulnerable to implosion. In this regard, the withdrawal of the EFF of its case-by-case support for the alliance led to the fragmentation of this coalition. Regarding this, Tsebelis (1995: 2006) states that there is "a large body of both empirical literature suggesting that the more fragmented and dispersed a political system is, the less effective its government is likely to be".

- **Policy-seeking and governance**

This section previously alluded to the fact that parties are influenced not only by the quest to occupy office, but also join coalitions when they realise that their policy positions can best be realised as being part of a governing coalition.

Being outside of a coalition could mean that these policy positions in all likelihood would not be considered. However, support for coalitions often depends on a trade-off between support for a coalition in exchange for the support for a policy.

However, as is the case with office-seeking, political parties can threaten with withdrawal from a coalition if it feels that its policy position is relegated. This has led to the demise of the Nelson Mandela Bay coalition when the EFF withdrew its support when the DA did not endorse the EFF's land policy which agitated for land expropriation without compensation.

Concluding this section, it is important to juxtapose minimal winning coalitions with a definition of a minority or winning coalition where a majority party attains 50 per cent+1 seats in each legislature or council. Minority governments are focused on in the following section.

2.7.   Minority governments

2.7.1. Defining Minority Governance

When defining a minority government, it is important to distinguish it from a coalition government. In this regard, a minority government is formed when the party that wins the most seats, but less than 50 per cent of the total, informally agrees to work with another party (or parties) on specific areas of agreement to archive more than 50 per cent of the total. This other party is said to be "propping up" the government.

On the other hand, Matthews (2019: 1) states that "a coalition is formed by two or more parties that agree to join forces on all issues brought before the government and form an absolute majority". Matthews continues and says that "the parties have not merged; they have simply agreed to a formal understanding until the next general election".

A minority government is a government that holds less than half of the seats in the parliament (Strøm, 1990: 8). Focusing on parliamentary democracies,

Strøm established that approximately one-third of these national governments are minority governments.

Insofar as the geographical spread is concerned, and within the European context, minority governments have been particularly common in the Scandinavian democracies of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, and also in Spain, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ireland. They have also occurred in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and India, which historically were more accustomed to single-party majority governments. Minority governments also frequently occur at the regional and local levels (Field & Martin, 2019).

Several studies focusing on minority governments at the national level were done and include those by Bergman (1995) and Keudel (2014), and insofar as minority governments in the governance literature are concerned, Bergman (1995: 20) states that minority governments "have been anomalies in studies of government formation on coalition theory". Elaborating on this, Bergman argues that the official supposition that coalitions must be winning and therefore contain an absolute majority is limiting and dismisses minority governments.

Moreover, as opposed to majority governments which gets its political legitimacy from the fact that an electoral majority was attained, a minority government is exactly what it says it is.

The 2016 South African local government election proved that the majority outcome was not guaranteed and that minority governments were increasingly occupying the governance space. Elections do not always produce strict party majorities; therefore, after such elections, parliamentary parties may join to form a majority coalition (La Forrara, 2018: 2).

Continuing La Forrara states that "in some circumstances, however, a plurality party or group of parties may opt to proceed as a relative majority, thereby forming a minority government" (2018: 2).

Within the South African local government level context, the South African constitutional law expert Professor Pierre De Vos (2016) provides an elaborate explanation of the formation of a coalition government:

> If a group of parties form a coalition, they will agree on who to elect as a speaker and Executive Mayor and how many seats each party in the coalition will have on the mayoral committee. If this happens, the council will then be able to govern that municipality or metro accordingly and hopefully in a relatively stable manner.
>
> However, if no agreement can be reached between parties to form a coalition government, this may lead to the forming of a minority government. In such a case the speaker and mayor will be elected by a majority of those present at the forts meeting, with some of the parties who voted for the speaker and mayor doing so without agreeing to go into a coalition with the party of the Executive Mayor.

Contextualizing the above explanation, it must be noted that a minority government is not the same as a majority coalition government, because, unlike traditional coalition governments where two or more parties formally join, outside parties in minority governments may support the plurality party while retaining their independence (Stone, 2015)

The following section provides a synopsis of the types of minority governments.

2.7.2. Types of Minority Governments

Focusing on minority governments at the national level, Strøm (1990) distinguishes between two primary types: substantive and formal minority governments. In addition to these two types, a further two types are listed.

- **Substantive Minority Government**

A substantive minority government is supported by a pre-negotiated agreement between the governing party or coalition and one or more outside support parties (La Forrara, 2018: 4). Consequently, the following statements characterise a substantive minority government:

- The governing party or coalition remains a minority, even if counting the contracted allegiance
- The outside party is not considered to be part of a coalition with the governing party or parties

- The inter-party agreement is not a general commitment to support the government on all policies
- The parties' commitments are specific to the areas detailed in the agreement
- Substantive minority agreements may have alliances with various opposition parties and such alliances are often ideologically, rather than procedurally, focused (La Forrara, 2018: 4).

In contrast to a substantive minority government, there is also a formal minority government. This will he discussed next.

- **Formal minority government**

Apart from entering a coalition government, if none of the political parties could secure an outright majority, the party who won the most seats in the council may also form a minority government in a hung council. A minority government refers to a government that is governed by one or more political parties that do not hold a majority of the seats in the council (Beukes, 2021: 15).

The governing coalitions which governed Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay post the 2016 local government election are examples of minority governments. These coalitions were formed to unseat the ANC which attained the majority of votes in previous local government elections. These coalitions comprised partners who were generally ideologically similar, but unlike majority governments, outside parties in minority governments may support the plurality party while retaining their independence (La Fornara, 2018: 3).

The above was the case in Nelson Mandela Bay where the EFF decided to support this minority coalition on a case-by-case basis. However, no permanent

agreement emerged from this coalition and there was not as La Fornara (2018: 4-5) states a "general commitment to support the government".

Additionally, formal minority governments enable the leading party to appoint leaders of coalition partners to posts. A case in point would be the appointment of Mongameli Bobani of the UDM as deputy mayor to Athol Trollip of the DA in Nelson Mandela Bay.

- **Ad Hoc Minority Governments**

Support is negotiated on a case-by-case basis whereby political parties' support is determined by the parties' vested interest in either policy, budgets or some office benefit that can be derived from either voting for or against. Regarding this type of minority government, Norquay (2009: 1) states that "such minorities are relatively unstable because there are no durable alliances and no guiding principles to govern interparty relationships. Issue-by-issue compromise becomes the order of the day".

- **Loose alliance minorities**

This is where "the governing political party strikes an informal deal with other political parties to ensure majority support. Often this involves the governing party taking on certain policies that are central to the other parties' platforms" (Norquay, 2009: 1).

No governance system is without challenges, and minority governments are no different. This is focused on next.

2.7.3. Challenges of minority governments

There are several challenges facing minority governments. In the wake of what transpired after the 2016 South African local government elections and the establishment of coalitions at the local level, Roberts (2016) quotes Raymond Parsons when he states that "the advent of 'minority governments' in certain

key local authorities and metros takes municipal governance into uncharted waters, with the possible risk of unstable local government in certain areas".

The assumption could easily be made that the majority coalition governments are more stable than minority governments. This hypothesis is however not this easy, and what is important to remember is that minority governments lack the benefit of the security of a majority government, thus making it more prone to possible threats.

Referring to the single-party minority governments of Scotland and Canada specifically (at a national level), Hazell, Paun, Chalmers, Yong and Haddon (2009: 14) argue "that it is far more complicated for the government (minority party) to pass legislation, budgets, and even to survive since the opposition always has the theoretical ability to overthrow the administration by defeating it on a matter of confidence".

The foregoing argument speaks to political parties resorting to a vote of no confidence to unseat a minority government, and this has been a reality for both the metros on which this study focuses. How great this threat was in minority coalitions could be gauged by the impact it had on laws and budgets being passed to affect governance and service delivery.

Another explanation of this is that when a party to a minority government withdraws after the establishment of such a government, they would have a destabilising effect on such government with re-election or configuration of government likely.

This is also the case when if a minority government was formed a vote of "non-confidence" in the government took place. That would result in the government collapsing and the re-election of a government necessitated, whether it be at the national or local level.

Precisely how this transpired and manifested itself in the metros that this study is concerned with is focused on later. However, there remain a few more challenges faced by minority governments. These are postulated below.

Besides the occasional inability of minority governments to pass pertinent legislation and stalemates when it comes to negotiating budgets, minority coalition governments are rife with challenges from their inception. Pre-electoral coalitions carry with them a lot of challenges around who should enter coalitions post-elections.

The earlier section of this chapter alluded to two prominent coalition theories, policy and office-seeking which impact the willingness or unwillingness of parties to seek each other with the aim of a possible coalition. In addition, there is also the cost factor involved in the establishment of minority coalition governments.

Explicating these costs, La Forrara (2018: 8) breaks it down as follows:

- Bargaining costs, which refer to the time required to build a coalition and resolve subsidiary coalition matters
- Policy costs, which are associated with compromise and concession in developing a governing programme
- Office costs, which refer to the pay out or distribution of portfolios

There are of course other ominous challenges facing a minority-governed coalition that are summarised as follows:

- The cobbling of political parties to form a government does not guarantee cohesion and agreement on issues. These parties still represent their respective constituencies and even though it made a few concessions, it most likely still strives to maintain its individuality. However, coalition parties can be nonconformist and their votes on key issues can reflect accordingly.
- This study also looks at the role personality plays in coalitions, from the building stage through the maintenance stage. This is where the discipline factor also plays a role because coalitions can become a perilous balancing act. Often the discipline of coalition parties can make, or break coalitions and appeasing coalition parties becomes increasingly important.

- Smaller parties who have been elevated in status due to them being part of a minority government coalition can begin to flex their muscle. These parties were also often the kingmakers when coalition talks commenced.

Additionally, Cheeseman (2019: 1) refers to the challenges faced by minority coalitions as the "dark side of coalitions" Cheeseman continues and states that "while they may enable new parties to get a foothold in government, they can also be unruly".

Writing exclusively about the coalitions which emerged from the 2016 South African local government elections, Cheeseman argues that instability in local government coalitions leads to political and economic challenges and "opportunistic politics and can undermine, rather than strengthen accountability" (Cheeseman, 2019: 1).

Thus, after the challenges facing minority governments and in effect coalitions were presented, the question arises what are the constitutional designs that must be in place for minority governments to be instituted? These constitutional designs are the enablers of these governments and set the legislative parameters of which government system is possible and which is not.

2.8.   Constitutional requisites and minority governments

South Africa's local government elections use a mixed system where half of the seats in local and metro councils come from the proportional system and half from the constituency (ward) system.

The country's electoral system favours the formation of coalition governments at the local level, especially with South Africa being a multi-party democracy with its multitude of political parties and civic movements contesting local government elections and resulting in constituting a coalition or minority government of some sort.

Regarding electoral systems, Menocal (2011: 3) lists the following key elements of an electoral system:

• the electoral formula (plurality/majority, proportional, mixed, or other)

• the ballot structure (i.e., whether the voter votes for a candidate or a party and whether the voter makes a single choice or expresses a series of preferences)

• the district magnitude (the number of representatives to the legislature that a particular district elects).

Insofar as the two main types of systems are concerned, these are the First past the post (FPTP) and proportional systems (PR). When reviewing the PR system, it becomes clear that smaller parties are, as La Fornara (2018: 23) suggests, "more likely to reward small parties with legislative seats and thus tend to produce parliaments that contain a larger number of small and independent parties".

Referring to a national set-up, La Fornara (2018:23) concedes that PR systems "are more likely to produce minority governments than are FPTP systems".

Another point regarding PR systems and minority governments and coalitions is made by Persson, Roland, Guido and Tabellini (2003: 2) stating that "proportional elections raise the number of parties in the legislature. This raises the incidence of coalition governments".

The formation of minority governments and coalitions depends on the constitution of a country where these forms of government are entered. This applies to what is permissible and admissible for government configuration at all levels. In this regard, a country's electoral system has a direct bearing on the type of government establishment.

2.9.   Conclusion

This chapter provided the theoretical foundation of the study by defining governance and proceeded to give a summary of the theoretical underpinnings

of governance in general and particularly minority governance and coalition theories.

From this scrutiny, it has become apparent that governance developed as an intrepid area for scholars of political transformation and governance. This chapter also focused on the elements of governance which consisted of pertinent questions as a means to dissect governance as a concept. These questions were important because what transpired was that governance, as a theoretical method presented and supported the analysis of what happened at the micro-level and how government issues were managed.

The theoretical foundation in this chapter also presented the trajectory from which the South African coalition experience at the local level was investigated as to whether coalition partners in the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay (post-2016) were policy or office-seeking.

The second section examined the pertinent coalition theories which have a bearing on this study. Moreover, the types of minority governments were also focused on by looking at the challenges facing minority governments.

The assumption could also be made that the advent of these emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay took these metros into uncharted waters risking stability in these metros. Constitutional requisites of minority governance were also focused on in the concluding part of this chapter and it could be deduced that a country's electoral system provided the constitutional design for the type of government that could be established.

Moreover, this chapter laid a comprehensive theoretical overview of the major theories underpinning this study. In this regard, this chapter commenced by defining governance and in doing so provided for a better understanding of governance theories.

An overview of local government in South Africa is deemed imperative for an understanding on the evolution of democratic local government. Chapter 3, which follows, provides a summation of what transpired in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay during the 2016 local government election.

The key questions emerging from the transition to coalitions are also focused on to underpin the significance of this study by signifying that this transition was brought about by the prevailing political culture in these two metros.

CHAPTER 3

AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PROCESS OF COALITION FORMATION

3.1.   Introduction

This chapter gives a transitory overview of local government in South Africa and lists the various categories. An elaborate historical synopsis of South African local government is beyond the scope of this study and this transitory chronology dividing the transformation of local government into phases is presented instead. This is done by focusing on the establishment of local government pre-and-post the advent of democracy.

Using this phased approach is central for grasping the evolution of South African local government against the backdrop of the political fluxes over the past two decades in the country; particularly to the current juncture where coalition politics are occupying the local government space. The significance of this study is emphasised by proposing that the prevailing political culture and resultant governance at the local level are brought about by a multiplicity of factors. An overview of the metros this study focuses on is also provided.

A section providing a summary of how the 2016 local government election emerged in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay is provided and culminates in an exploration of coalition formation. Pertinent questions or what Seyd (2002) calls 'pressure points' emerge during coalition formation. The final section of this chapter sees responses given to these critical questions. come to the fore.

3.2.   Transitory overview of South African local government

Currently there are 278 municipalities in South Africa, comprising eight metropolitan, 44 districts and 226 local municipalities. Municipalities govern on a four-year term basis and run local affairs subject to national and provincial legislation. They are focused on growing local economies and

providing infrastructure and services (Government Communication and Information System, 2013).

The objectives of local government are contained in the South African Constitution and are as follows:

- To provide a democratic and accountable government for local communities
- To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner
- To promote social and economic development
- To promote a safe and healthy environment, and
- To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 1996: Chapter 7).

In this regard, Hoffman (2007: 2) also states that "the primary responsibility of local governments in South Africa today is to provide access to crucial public services". Another point is made by Maharaj (2002: 1), stating that "it is at the local government level that citizens actually `experience' democracy as they try to influence local processes". Sebola (2015: 13) also posits that the South African government "has assigned local government with the role of delivering those services that are beneficial to the livelihood of local communities and to societal welfare in general".

Moreover, enshrined in the constitution of a democratic South Africa, the above-listed objectives make it prudent to juxtapose the role and functions of local government before and post-1994.

Additionally, these phases are referred to in the 2015 South African Local Government Association report entitled *15 Years of Developmental and Democratic local government 2000-2015.*

Given the complexity, the transformation of the sector was undertaken in three phases namely, the pre-interim phase (1993-1995), the interim phase (1995-

2000) and the final phase (2000-) (South African Local Government Association, 2015: 12).

This segmented timeline which the South African Local Government Association uses in its 15-year report has been used to provide an overview of the establishment of the South African local government. Therefore, before the focus shifts to the transitory overview of local government, it is important to reiterate that this section will not be an in-depth focus of the historical origins of South African local government, but rather a concise presentation of the phases of local government development starting as early as the 17th century (pre-1993), followed by the subsequent three phases that the South African local government trajectory underwent since the NP came into power in 1948 with its implementation of Apartheid legislation.

The establishment of a democratic local government was a long and difficult process. Given the complexity, the transformation of the sector was undertaken in three phases, namely the pre-interim, the interim and the final phase. However, the unfolding of the establishment was strongly influenced by the pre-1994 events. The emergence of the Local Government Negotiating Forums, the Pre-Interim Phase: 1993-1995, the Interim Phase: 1995-2000 and Final Phase: Democratic local government – 2000 (South African Local Government Association Report 2015: 12).

Additionally, the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) also mapped out these three phases of transition as follows:

- **The pre-interim-phase,** which prescribed the establishment of local forums to negotiate the appointment of temporary Councils, which would govern until municipal elections.
- **The interim phase,** beginning with municipal elections and lasting until a new local government system had been designed and legislated upon.
- **The final stage,** when a new local government system would be established (Department of Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs, 1998).

Alluding to these phases, Thornhill (2008: 493) states that this pre-interim phase was "the first phase in transforming the system of local government", whereas the interim phase saw "the reform of local government commences with the introduction of an interim phase providing for the first phase in de-racialising local government structures". These two phases were the precursors to the final phase which focused on the transformation for local government from 2000 until the present. Figure 3.1 depicts the various stages of local government transformation:

Figure 3.1: Phases of local government Transition

Source: South African Local Government Association, 2015: 21

For purposes of this study, the current developments at the local level post-2016 until the end of 2018 are focused on. It is thought that this period was vital for analysis as put forth in the problem statement and objective of this study.

This period is studied against the backdrop of the coalitions at the respective metros which are the research focus of this study. Providing a brief background

of the historical trajectory of local government, it is advisable to state that a brief mention is made of the colonial origins of local government in the first phase as follows below.

3.2.1. Local government before 1993

This phase can be traced back to the main Dutch and British influences of South Africa and is characterised by two distinct periods of occupation: The Dutch occupation of the Cape of Good Hope from 1652 to 1795 (and later from 1803 to 1806) and the British occupation between 1795 and 1803 and again from 1806 to the time that South Africa became a Union in 1910 (Tsatsire, Raga, Taylor & Nealer, 2009: 130).

Ensuing from 1910, the distinctive and prevailing nature of this phase was the entrenchment of Apartheid by the Nationalist Party (NP) government which came to power in 1948. Describing this time, Rawat (2000: 2) notes that" apartheid was strongest at the local level, where South Africans were segregated based on racism and where white South Africans enjoyed privilege at the cost of the non-white communities".

The policy objectives of Apartheid were to reinforce separatist legislation, and this compelled the subjugated community to become progressively more militant in their approach to confronting the regime at not only the national level but also at the local level.

Parenthetically, Hilliard (1996: 1) states the following:

> South African local government structures have generally been designed to reproduce the urban system following the policy objectives of the government of the day as can be seen from legislative prescriptions contained in, inter-alia, the various constitutions that South Africa has had. Racial segregation, the influx control of Blacks in urban areas and disenfranchisement of certain racial groups characterised the history of local government during the Apartheid era (1948-1993.) local government in South

Africa became the mechanism through which cultural and racial groups were divided and kept separate. This is the reason why a radical change in local government structures was required for the demise of Apartheid.

Various attempts were made under Apartheid to introduce "own management" structures for black residents at the local level. This was in part to compensate for restricted rights, and in part to bolster the political and economic privileges of racial exclusion. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) lists the following points regarding these Apartheid local government structures:

- In Bantustans, limited local government was established. Traditional leaders were given powers over land allocation and development matters with communally owned land. Some small rural townships (the so-called "R293 towns") were given their administrations, but these lacked real powers.
- In the 1960s. "Coloured" and "Indian" management committees were established as advisory bodies to white municipalities. The Bantu Affairs Administration Act of 1971 established appointed Administration Boards, which removed responsibility for townships from white municipalities.
- In 1977, Community Councils were introduced. Community Councils were elected bodies but had no real powers and few resources. They never gained political credibility.
- In 1982 Black Local Authorities replaced Community Councils. Black Local Authorities had no significant revenue base and were seen as politically illegitimate from the start. They were rejected by popular (and sometimes violent) community mobilisation in the mid-1980s (Department of Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs, 1998: 12).

Contextualising the afore-mentioned points stated by the White Paper, it can be inferred that the attempts by the Apartheid government which encompassed this phase in the history of South African local government, were to entrench its policies of segregation by the establishment of local

authorities who were, in fact, mere extensions of what transpired at the national level of the Apartheid government.

This racially defined phase of local government lasted until the beginning of the next phase, the pre-interim phase spanning two years from 1993-1995. This is focused on next.

3.2.2. Pre-Interim phase

This stage represents the first phase in transforming a system of local government (Thornhill, 2008).

When the transition to democracy took place, South Africa inherited a dysfunctional local government system based on inappropriate jurisdictions, structures and programmes (Atkinson, 2002: 1).

This stage was the first in transforming the system of local government (Thornhill, 2008: 493), and ended with the municipal elections of 1995/1996 which allowed for transitional local government structures to be established (Pieterse, 2007: 4).

This phase was characterised by negotiations between what could be called 'Apartheid' local authorities. Moreover, given the racialised nature of local authorities before this phase, it could be presumed that the task of establishing one single authority could not have been an easy one.

3.2.3. The interim phase

The interim phase of local authorities could not be transformed in one process as the negotiators for a democratic system of government wanted to ensure continuity in service provision. This was also the justification for the decision taken by the negotiators to retain all existing legislation until it was abolished or amended. In the case of local government, the interim phase commenced with the adoption of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act, 1991 (Act 128 of 1991), which in effect relaxed the Apartheid nature of local government and allowed for local authorities to enter into agreements with each other.

What this also meant was that those who opposed the segregated system of local government before entering this phase could be now represented by being part of negotiation forums that required major legal amendments to formalise any negotiated agreements.

On 22 March 1993, the Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) was launched. This Forum signalled the first real stage in the creation of a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, and financially viable local government system (De Beer & Lourens, 1995: 116).

This forum provided for:

- A pre-election phase
- A transitional phase
- A final phase

These phases provided for the repeal of discriminatory legislation, drafting of guidelines for negotiations; financial and human resource issues; broad participation by stakeholders; policy options; and the finalisation of *de jure* local government structures (Thornhill, 2008: 494).

Thus, local government transformation was not a rapid process, and an inquiry into the transformation process is important to arrive at a more informed understanding of South African local government from what it was during the Apartheid state to what it is in the current dispensation. Likewise, Rawat (2006: 1) adds that "local government in South Africa has been through a process of major transformation and is materially different from what it was under the Apartheid regime".

Therefore, the South African government also acknowledges and is cognisant of this continuous transformation. Thornhill (2008: 496) states the following:

It should be borne in mind that the transformation process does not represent a final stage. It is a continuous process that requires the reconsideration of existing processes and functions consecutively; detect

shortcomings as soon as possible, and to act decisively to improve the system until an effective and efficient system is operational.

During the interim phase (1996-2000), the LGTA envisaged that the new local government system would be finalised in legislation. During this period, local government operated based on transitional arrangements derived from the LGTA and from local processes of negotiation. The municipal elections in December 2000 heralded in the final phase when the new local government system would be fully operationalised (Pieterse, 2007: 4).

Pieterse (2007: 12) also states that the final phase, which is focused on next, "saw the further amalgamation and consolidation of local government from 843 to 273 (including six metropolitan authorities and 55 District authorities)".

3.2.4. The final phase

This final transformational phase was introduced with the ending of Apartheid and was contained in the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1993, Act 2000 of 1993). The Government of National Unity (GNU) formed in 1994 had the arduous task of undoing Apartheid policy legacies of poverty, inequality, and racial segregation of service to create a single, efficient public service that delivered the basic needs to all citizens (Managa, 2012: 20).

However, despite the many challenges, de Visser (2009: 10) states that "the transformation of local government institutions began in earnest with the adoption in 1998 of the Local Government Demarcation Act, providing for the demarcation of municipal boundaries by an independent Municipal Demarcation Board".

Notwithstanding these challenges, the advent of democracy in South Africa necessitated the democratisation process of government institutions which were bound to be transformed.

On this, Thornhill (2008: 49) writes that "democratising the system of local government in South Africa required a total transformation of all the municipalities and the services they provide".

Thornhill (2008: 49) continues and makes this elaborate statement:

> When the new government assumed office in 1994 it inherited ±1 100
> fragmented local authorities scattered across the country. These
> structures bore no resemblance to one another as some were fully
> operational (for Whites); some were token local authorities (for Black
> people); some were advisory structures (for people of mixed origin
> and people of Indian descent), and some urbanised communities
> were administered by the so-called *homeland* or *bantustan*
> government.

Transforming these fragmented structures, required extensive political choices, administrative restructuring, and the reconsideration of the role of the local sphere of government in the new political dispensation.

Thornhill's citation on what the newly elected government inherited also refers to the comprehensive approach that the succeeding government had to adopt in addressing these congenital problems from the old dispensation. The literature presents the government's approach as being intermittent due to various challenges.

This concludes the section on the overview of local government in South Africa, and as the final phase indicated there was a need to sustain transformation by putting legislation in place to provide this support. This required the need for local government structures to sustain the transformation and evolving tasks which now needed to be supported in the final phase. To enable this, legislation had to be put in place to provide this support.

Considering the preceding paragraph, various Acts have been promulgated governing local government (see Textbox 3.1). Insofar as municipalities are concerned, Table 3.1 depicts municipalities according to the categorisation applied by the National Treasury. This categorisation is also used by the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB). The number of each category is indicated in the first column of Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Categories of municipalities

Category	Description/characteristics	Number
A	Metropolitan Municipalities (metros)	6
B1	Local municipalities with secondary cities	21
B2	Local municipalities with large towns and substantial urban populations, although the variation in population size is large	29
B3	Local municipalities with small towns and significant urban population but no urban core; rural areas have commercial farming	111
B4	Local authorities that are mainly rural, but have villages, communal land tenure and are typically located in former homeland areas	70
C1	District municipalities that are not a water services authority	25
C2	District municipalities that are a water services authority	21

Source: National Treasury, 2011: 193

Textbox 3.1 Key legislation affecting local government in South Africa

Among the key acts that have been passed to give effect to the Constitutional directives on local government and the policy framework reflected in the White Paper on Local Government are:

- **Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act 27 of 1998)**, which provided for the establishment of the Municipal Demarcation Board, tasked with the determination of municipal boundaries in a manner that would facilitate integrated development, effective service delivery and participatory local democracy.

- **Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998, with three subsequent amendments in 2000, 2002 and 2003)**, which allowed for the establishment of different types and categories of municipalities in different areas (i.e. single-tier municipalities for metropolitan areas and two-tier municipalities outside metropolitan areas), defined two options for executive systems in metropolitan areas (mayoral executive system or collective executive system) and allowed for the establishment of ward committees to facilitate community participation in council matters.

- **Municipal Electoral Act, 2000 (Act 27 of 2000)**, which regulated all aspects of the municipal elections, including the requirements on parties and ward candidates to contest the elections, voter education and election observers, voting and counting.

- **Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000, with an amendment in 2003)**, which established a framework for the operation of municipalities, with guidelines for development planning and service provision (including a partnership-based approach), staffing matters and performance management systems.

- **Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (Act 56 of 2003)**, which created a framework for municipalities to borrow money and determined the conditions for short term and long term borrowing.

- **Local Government: Property Rates Act, 2004 (Act 6 of 2004)**, which established a uniform property rating system across South Africa.

- **Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2005**, which sets out the forums and scope of such forums for coordination between the three spheres of government.

Source: Pieterse, 2007: 4

In conclusion, Pieterse (2007: 1) mentions the developmental role that local government must play when he writes the following:

> The heart of the South African local government system is its developmental ambition captured as follows in the White Paper on Local Government (WPLG): Developmental local government is local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic, and material needs and improve the quality of their lives.

However, these developmental municipalities were faced with challenges, as Binza (2005: 81) states that "the challenge facing developmental municipalities is that of inadequate institutional capacity due to a lack of organisational, management and technical skills (the know-how) to use (limited) resources to improve and sustain development".

Likewise, Picard and Mogale (2005: 16) indicate what the crux of this thesis undertakes, namely whether coalitions at the local level do lead to good governance or not? Whereas the authors do not focus on coalitions at the local level, the core of their argument is, as they state:

> For good governance to occur, participatory processes need to evolve at the level where public institutions and policies most impact society. It is at this grassroots or primary level where dialogue occurs between the state and its citizens and where interest-based organisations and community-based groups both compete and form partnerships with accountable, representative local authorities.

The following section of Chapter 3 provides an exploration of the metros which form the research nucleus of this thesis. As mentioned earlier, this exploration concludes with what transpired at the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay up to the end of 2018.

3.3. Overview of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros

This section provides an overview of the establishment of the metros on which this thesis focuses. Moreover, an overview of the 2016 local government is presented for the two metros. The reason for selecting this election has been explained in previous chapters as Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay entered the era of coalition governance after the 2016 local government elections.

It must be noted that an in-depth synopsis of previous local government elections in these metros is beyond the scope of this study since it might digress from the primary research question which this study endeavours to answer. However, by providing this overview, insights can be gained into the formation of the coalitions which came into existence post the 2016 local government election at the local level in the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. This overview commences with an overview of Johannesburg.

3.3.1. Johannesburg

The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality is located in the Gauteng Province. Johannesburg is the most advanced commercial city in Africa and the engine room of the South African and regional economy. It is a city with a unique, African character, world-class infrastructure in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, water and power, and with globally competitive health care and educational facilities. However, the city is also one of contrasts – home to both wealthy and poor, residents and refugees, global corporations and emerging enterprises.

The demographics of Johannesburg indicate a large and ethnically diverse metropolitan area. As the largest city in South Africa, its population is defined by a long history of local and international migration. Johannesburg is home to almost five million people, accounting for about 36 per cent of Gauteng's population and eight per cent of the national population ((Municipalities of South Africa, 2012b)

The overview of Johannesburg only focuses on the 2016 local government elections because this metro was governed by an ANC majority during all three preceding local government elections. Additionally, a municipal map of Johannesburg (Figure 3.2.) is also provided.

Figure 3.2: **Map of Johannesburg**

Source: Municipalities of South Africa, 2012a

3.3.2. The 2016 Johannesburg local government election

As previously stated, the 2016 local government elections proved to be the catalyst for coalition governance at the local level. This election would define the course of local government for the metros that this thesis focuses on.

Despite surrendering votes nationally, the ANC reaped most of the votes in Johannesburg. However, it still fell short of the required 50 per cent majority which meant that governance would only be possible through a coalition. In this

regard, Ngoepe (2016) states that "the ANC garnered the most votes in Johannesburg, but still fell short of a 50 per cent majority, meaning the metro would have been run through a coalition". Table 3.2. illustrates the results of the 2016 local government election.

Table 3.2: Johannesburg 216 local government election result

PARTY	VOTES				SEATS		
	Ward	List	Total	%	Ward	List	Total
African National Congress	555,284	566,664	1,121,948	44.5	84	37	121
Democratic Alliance	482,494	483,698	966,192	38.4	51	53	104
Economic Freedom Fighters	141,395	137,800	279,195	11.1	0	30	30
Inkatha Freedom Party	21,824	21,512	43,336	1.7	0	5	5
African Independent Congress	17,538	20,332	37,870	1.5	0	4	4
Freedom Front Plus	4,400	4,080	8,480	0.3	0	1	1
African Christian Democratic Party	3,524	3,951	7,475	0.3	0	1	1
Al Jama-ah	2,796	3,911	6,707	0.3	0	1	1
United Democratic Movement	3,494	3,076	6,570	0.3	0	1	1
Congress of the People	1,858	2,691	4,549	0.2	0	1	1
Patriotic Alliance	1,688	2,150	3,838	0.2	0	1	1
Others	22,349	9,749	16,817	1.3	0	0	0
Total	**1,258,644**	**1,259,614**	**2,518,258**	**100.0**	**135**	**135**	**270**

Source: Independent Electoral Commission, 2016a

The immediate aftermath of this election saw political parties in some of the major metros where the ANC failed to secure an outright majority, discussing coalitions. On this, Law (2018: 32) comments that "once the 2016 results were announced, the Democratic Alliance quickly scrambled to secure the coalition partners that would enable it to occupy the mayoral positions and dominate the executive councils in these hung councils".

Law (2018: 3) continues and states the following:

> To its alarm, the ANC lost control of the country's capital (Tshwane), its economic hub (City of Johannesburg) and its traditional political home (Nelson Mandela Bay). With the ANC's failure in 2016 to secure its usual majority in those metros, and no other political party managing to obtain a legislative majority either, political parties who usually cannot talk in the same room before a point of order is raised were forced to collaborate if they wished to govern.

Having obtained 38,40 per cent of the votes in Johannesburg, the DA was set to engage the other contesting parties to form a coalition to effectively keep out the ANC. As cited previously, the fact that Johannesburg was governed by a minority coalition at the time of writing saw the DA forming a coalition with smaller parties such as COPE, ACDP and the FF+, but it was still dependent on the support of the EFF, although the latter was not part of this minority coalition. Decker and Best (2011; 4) state that "either a coalition of two or more parties are formed, or a minority government is supported or tolerated by a party that does not wish to enter government itself".

At the time of data collection, a minority coalition still governed Johannesburg with Herman Mashaba as Executive Mayor. An overview of Nelson Mandela Bay follows next.

3.3.3. Nelson Mandela Bay

Nelson Mandela Bay, South Africa's second-oldest city, is a major seaport and automotive manufacturing centre located on the south-eastern coast of Africa in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. The city is the economic

powerhouse of the Eastern Cape and one of six metropolitan areas in South Africa. Nelson Mandela Bay includes the areas of Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Despatch, Colchester, and Blue Horizon Bay (Municipalities of South Africa, 2012d).

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is a category A municipality, established on 5 December 2000. Nelson Mandela Bay was the first city in South Africa to establish a fully integrated democratic local authority (Municipalities of South Africa, 2012). To elucidate this section, a map of Nelson Mandela Bay is provided (Figure 3.2), and a table depicting the 2016 election results is found in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Map of Nelson Mandela Bay

Source: Municipalities of South Africa, 2012

3.3.4. The 2016 Nelson Mandela Bay local government elections

Discussing the 2016 local government elections in Nelson Mandela Bay, Poggi (2016) comments that "there is a mild anxiety in the air in Nelson Mandela Bay".

Poggi follows this comment with a poignant question by stating that "Nelson Mandela Bay has reached a critical juncture and most of its inhabitants are wondering who will lead us after the 3rd of August".

The city was one of the most contended metros in the build-up to the 2016 local government elections, with a year-long campaign seeing the DA wrestling control from the ANC by securing 46,77 per cent of the vote and 57 seats in the 120-seat council. The ANC secured 40,9 per cent, thus gaining just 50 seats, a major drop from its 62 seats won in 2011.

The EFF was the third-largest party, securing 5,1 per cent of the vote, and six seats on the council, while the UDM secured a 1,9 per cent of the vote, earning them two seats (Spies, 2016a).

After the elections and similar to the Johannesburg results, the Nelson Mandela Bay results also led to a hung council with no outright majority for the ANC and DA (see the results in Table 3.3). This meant that a coalition would have to be formed between the parties who secured seats to attain the majority.

Table 3.3: Nelson Mandela Bay 2016 local government election results

PARTY	VOTES				SEATS		
	Ward	List	Total	%	Ward	List	Total
DA	177,920	177,551	355,471	46.7	24	33	57
ANC	153,496	157,920	311,416	40.9	35	15	50
EFF	19,819	19,132	38,951	5.1	1	5	6
UDM	7,600	6,969	14,569	1.9	0	2	2
AIC	1,078	6,144	7,222	1.0	0	1	1
UFEC	4,133	3,048	7,181	0.9	0	1	1
Independent	7,142	–	7,142	0.9	0	0	0
COPE	2,929	2,658	5,587	0.7	0	1	1
ACDP	1,399	1,313	2,712	0.4	0	1	1
PA	930	1,110	2,040	0.3	0	1	1
Freedom Front Plus	976	941	1,917	0.3	0	0	0

Christian Democratic Party	1,254	133	1,386	0.2	0	0	0
PAC	447	862	1,309	0.2	0	0	0
Alternative Democrats	287	942	1,229	0.2	0	0	0
APC	142	591	733	0.1	0	0	0
ICO	256	467	723	0.1	0	0	0
AZAPO	303	358	661	0.1	0	0	0
Ubuntu Party	165	143	308	0.0	0	0	0
African Power Movement	150	96	246	0.0	0	0	0
Building a Cohesive Society	123	111	234	0.0	0	0	0
Total	**380,548**	**380,489**	**761,037**	**100.0**	**60**	**60**	**120**

Source: Independent Electoral Commission, 2016b

The DA made its intentions known when its national leader, Mmusi Maimane confirmed that Solly Msimanga would be mayor of Tshwane, and Athol Trollip mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay. This, after the party had secured coalition agreements with COPE, ACDP, FF+, UDM and the IFP.

The country's largest opposition party also secured a level of backing from the EFF. What this local government election also inadvertently did, was to elevate the smaller parties to prominence and kingmakers, especially in hung councils where no party won an outright majority. Regarding this, Law (2018: 6) states that:

> In South Africa, it has been seen how the EFF ability to swing municipal councils has aided its political message of being a "government in waiting". To a lesser extent, the importance of the Patriotic Alliance's single seat in the tightly contested Nelson Mandela Bay Municipal Council has allowed it to wield disproportionate power and enjoy significantly more media attention than they otherwise may, thus advancing its political interests.

Using their leverage, the coalition agreements made between the parties was not without conditions though, with the DA putting forth the following conditions:

- Set up transparent and open tender processes
- Zero tolerance for corruption
- Governments to avoid irregular and fruitless expenditure
- To always appoint a fit-for-purpose executive that ensures that people who govern and serve in municipalities are the best people to do so
- Agreement on the blue light brigade
- To bring forward the implementation of an integrated public transport system and broadband rollout to enhance opportunities for people.

The EFF on the other hand announced that while it would not be part of a coalition government with the DA, it would vote for its candidates in Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay (eNCA, 2016c)

Despite having 57 seats, the DA was still four seats short of taking control of the municipality. However, Athol Trollip announced that Nelson Mandela Bay would have a multi-party government, which included the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the COPE and the ACDP, led by the DA (News24, 2016c).

Trollip was subsequently elected as Executive Mayor of Nelson Mandela Bay with Mongameli Bobani as his deputy. Trollip's tenure as mayor lasted just over two years and was marred by clashes between himself and Bobani. This resulted in the UDM withdrawing from the coalition and being replaced by the Patriotic Alliance (PA). After surviving three motions of no confidence in him as mayor, Trollip was ousted as mayor after a fourth motion succeeded in August 2018. Bobani was then elected mayor and he appointed a mayoral committee made up almost entirely of ANC councillors.

Briefly, it was logical to provide the background to the local government elections which saw coalitions being formed. The Nelson Mandela Bay scenario, which unfolded, saw the DA creating a formal coalition with several smaller parties, whereas the Johannesburg setting saw the combined vote of the DA and EFF deposing the ANC.

To provide a synopsis of coalition formation for the two metros, the next section gives what Seyd (2002) refers to as 'pressure points' of coalition formation. Thereafter, a summary of the constitutional design encouraging coalition is discussed.

3.4. Process of coalition formation

What were the enabling conditions that facilitated coalition formation for these metros? Arriving at tangible inferences is not straightforward. In this regard, Golder (2005: 1) states that "Existing theoretical and empirical analyses of party coalitions provide little information about the factors that influence pre-electoral coalition formation. Instead, they focus almost exclusively on government coalitions that form after an election".

Likewise, identifying factors that laid the foundation for coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay suggest that the reasons why parties entered coalitions were to be found in their motives, which in turn were characterised by conditions and precipitants. This was illustrated in the DA's conditions laid out before coalition formation after the 2016 local government election, as well as the EFF's stance on not formally entering formal coalitions. Regarding this, Golder (2005: 10) argues the following:

> Both electoral and government coalitions form because of preconditions and precipitants. They form because of institutional rules, sociological cleavages, or specific critical junctures. From a theoretical perspective, when forming coalitions, parties of different sizes and ideologies consider the strengths and limitations of bargaining with each other.

The theoretical underpinnings of coalitions were discussed in Chapter 2, and a replication of such theories is not quantified here. Instead, a timeline is presented to illustrate how coalition formation came about for Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

A question that arises is whether political permutations peculiar to a certain timeframe and a particular setting (local government) can provide the impetus

or reluctance for political parties to enter into pre-coalition agreements which could result in formal coalition agreements? This section presents a succinct assessment of enabling conditions for coalition formation in general and whether any of these conditions facilitated coalition formation for the two metros given the settings at the time. Moreover, are these conditions conducive for governance?

Seyd (2002), researching coalition scenarios in the United Kingdom (UK), derived data from researching several countries such as Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and New Zealand. In his report, Seyd found that the process of coalition formation is further characterised by what he calls "pressure points". These "pressure points" are important to consider as part of the "transition from a single party to coalition rule" Seyd (2002: 11) maintains that "significant practical and normative differences do exist between a single party and coalition governments".

Seyd (2002: 11) lists these pressure points to illustrate the process of coalition formation:

```
Election → Formation of rules → Negotiations → Agreement → Management → Termination of rules
```

Figure 3.4: Process of Coalition Formation (Seyd, 2002: 11).

Seyd (2002: 140) also provides a summary of the specific issues and more general thematic issues, or 'pressure points', associated with coalition government in Table 3.4. Although these themes have relevance to what transpires at the national level, it bears striking similarities to what is transpiring at the local level. Moreover, parallels can be drawn between the subsequent timeline presented in Table 4.3 and the questions which Seyd asks in Table 3.4. Additionally, some of the questions that Seyd probes are responded to in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: The transition to coalition government: Key questions

Stage of the governmental process	Specific issue	General thematic question
Election	How do voters know when casting the ballot which post-election coalition options are likely? How can voters identify policy responsibility when the government involves two or more parties?	How can prospective and retrospective accountability be provided for under coalition conditions?
Formation and termination	By what rules do governments form, hold and lose office? Under what rules should the negotiations be conducted? What role does the Head of State, or another external agent, play in government formation and termination? What status do caretaker governments have?	How can the constitutional rules be fair across the parties and also allow for an effective formation process? Should the parties be constrained in the way they are allowed to negotiate to form a government? Are additional safeguards needed to ensure the stability of coalition governments?
Negotiations	What are the key features of the negotiating process? Should there be time constraints on government negotiations?	What timescales and resources are needed for parties to conduct effective policy negotiations?
Agreement	What level of detail is usual in coalition agreements? To what extent does the agreement shape the subsequent activities of a coalition?	What kind of agreement most effectively underpins stable and effective coalitions?

Coalition Agreement	What balance should be struck between informal and formal coordination mechanisms? How far can portfolios be used as a tool of coalition management? Within the constraints of collective responsibility, what arrangements are made for party differentiation? What role does the junior partner play? What resources does it require?	How can two or more parties sharing office coordinate their business so that they operate as a unified government? How far is collective responsibility maintained under coalition conditions?
Minority government	What strategies do minorityadministrations use to gain support in the legislature?	Are minority governments prone to instability? How far is the identifiability of government maintained under minority conditions?
Sub-national coalitions		Do coalitions operate in a decentralised political system?

Source: Seyd, 2002: 13

3.5. Responses to coalition formation pressure points by Seyd

- **How can prospective and retrospective accountability be provided for under coalition conditions?**

Most theoretical studies of coalition politics have focused on selection, rather than accountability (Maravall, 2010: 81). What also appears to be the case is that the idea is that prospective coalition partners seek to find those with similar principles, thus enabling more efficient and promising engagements. In the case of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, the desire to oust the ANC from its long-held power became a dominant drive to join forces. Not long into these coalitions, the cracks started to show when some coalition partners made

accountability to the coalition and the constituencies it served cumbersome. Discontent about the distribution of seats in key mayoral commission positions became areas of contestation.

This compromised the accountability of elected officials and coalition partners, especially since the parties they voted for were now part of an expanded agreement that was itself trying to find common ground. This reinforces the assertion that "voters have a rather diminished influence under coalitions, compared to their role under single-party governments in plurality systems" (Maravall, 2010: 83). He continues and argues that "voters vote, but do not decide on their rules- neither prospectively nor in retrospect".

The 2016 local government elections could have provided an opportunity where the current councillors of the two metros this study focuses on could have been left at the mercy of the voters. Voters had the gift of hindsight regarding the performances of these metros- from the minority coalitions which governed initially and the subsequent changing of power. Voters could, through retrospective analysis come to conclusions on how to exercise their vote.

In this regard, Plescia and Kritzinger (2016: 158) argue that "electoral accountability is said to exist when citizens can retrospectively hold politicians accountable, and reward or punish them with their vote". Similarly, Bawn, Cohen, Karol, Masket, Noel and Zaller (2002: 571) argue that "by holding entire parties rather than individual politicians accountable for what government does, voters create an incentive for responsible governance that might not otherwise exist".

In conclusion, Kiss (2009: 11) believes that "the accountability of coalition governments becomes problematic if the voters have no electoral alternative". He continues and states that "it is certain that at least one of the incumbent parties remain in power after the next election".

- **How can the constitutional rules be fair across the parties and also allow for an effective formation process?**

Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of any democracy. The constitutional rules governing South African elections at all spheres of government provide clear guidelines on the conduct of elections. The relevant legislation that enables elections are, for example:

- The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993
- The Electoral Act 202 of 1993
- The Independent Electoral Commission Act, 150 of 1993
- Local Government: Municipal Electoral Amendment Act, 2016, Act no. 1 of 2016
- Local Government: Municipal Electoral Regulations, includes amendments until 2005 (EISA, 2019).

Chapter 2 mentioned that South Africa's local government's mixed system where half of the seats in local and metro councils come from the proportional system and half from the constituency (ward) system favours the formation of coalition governments at the local government level. The fact that the country is a multi-party democracy facilitates this to a great extent.

All parties are subjected to the constitution and the outcome of the elections guides the direction parties will take. For example, if no single party wins an outright majority, the largest parties may attempt to form a governing majority. However, even if a party obtains the majority seats without an outright majority, then parties can form a coalition of 50 per cent+1.

- **Are additional safeguards needed to ensure the stability of coalition governments?**

Both the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros saw a change in leadership. In Nelson Mandela Bay, power has shifted four times since 2016. This can be attributed to these coalitions not being managed effectively, which has a direct impact on their stability.

These coalitions become volatile because the expectations of coalition partners are not met. The arising dissatisfaction led to political parties in both metros re-aligning themselves with whoever would best serve their interests, whether this might see the realisation of policy motives or being awarded a position within the respective local governments.

Another factor that plays a role is that of the type of electoral system. In this regard, Terry Tselane of the Elections Management Services in Africa looks at the electoral systems and argues that the first past the post would mean that a majority party would establish a council.

Tselane (2020) refers to the constitutional provision in section 46(d) of the Constitution that the electoral system "results, in general, in proportional representation". Tselane continues and argues that "it is this section in the Constitution that forces political parties to work together when there is no outright winner".

It was for this reason that parties who were contesting the election would find themselves propelled to the negotiation table to work out a coalition agreement. At this stage, there is no guarantee on how the coalition would evolve. This was certainly the case for both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Another factor that proved to be a drawback was the EFF's decision to not become part of either coalition, but instead to participate and review its participation on a case-by-case basis. This had disastrous consequences for the Nelson Mandela Bay coalition because it was always subjected to the volatility of the EFF in especially in Nelson Mandela Bay.

Tselane (2020) cites the stability that coalitions bring to Nordic countries, and also refers to Kenya as an example where there are major cleavages along ethnic and regional lines. Here, coalitions are managed by a Registrar of Political Parties. Tselane agitates for such an institution as a probable resolution to safeguard the stability of coalitions by proposing the following to parties entering into coalitions:

- A coalition agreement which is signed and deposited with a Registrar of political parties similar to that of Kenya

- The agreement must, among other stipulations, include the policies and objectives of the coalition, and include dispute resolution mechanisms and grounds for regulation, as well as the procedure to be followed in the event of a dissolution of the coalition (Tselane, 2020).

Explaining these agreements, La Fornara (2018: 4) refer to it as confidence and supply agreements, an overall pledge is made by those involved to "support the government in return for government commitments on specific policy areas or procedures". Moreover, this permanent agreement is the conclusion of a bargaining process between the parties.

Another observation is made by Paun and Hibben (2017: 3) when they argue that "they can offer a middle ground between coalition and pure minority government both for the governing and the support parties, avoiding the potential pitfalls of a full alliance or of governing with no guaranteed support at all".

Similarly, Wherry (2019) states that "in a confidence-and-supply agreement, a smaller party agrees to support a government (usually for a set period of time) in exchange for the government's commitment to pursuing a shared list of priorities or policies".

What can be seen as a link with the office-seeking objectives of coalitions, formal minority agreements urge the governing party "to appoint leaders from the supportive parties in executive positions as a way of rewarding the parties' support and encouraging future loyalty" (La Forrara, 2018: 5).

The above definitions of the types of minority governments succinctly explain how these agreements are constructed when it comes to the government configuration.

- **Are minority governments prone to instability?**

Focusing their research on national governments in Europe, Krauss and Thürk (2021) hold the view that the reputation of minority governments as being prone to instability is unwarranted. The authors cite that there are variants of minority

governments that are stable and effective. Their research, based on their analysis of 471 national European governments in 30 countries since 1977 also supports their argument that minority governments can essentially work in a similar way to majority governments when it comes to its survival. However, Krauss and Thürk (2021: 5) caution that "there is one important caveat to consider, especially in countries with little or no experience of minority government: it takes a special kind of political culture to work".

In this regard, Chapter 4 also mentions that the political culture of Gauteng and Johannesburg specifically have a different culture than what is prevalent in the Eastern Cape and Nelson Mandela Bay in particular.

- **Do coalitions operate in a decentralised political system?**

Ribot (2002: 14) describes decentralisation as "any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy". Being local governments, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay fall within the ambit of a decentralised or as Chilenga-Butao (2020) refers to as "subnational governments".

3.6.   Conclusion

This chapter provided a transient overview and analysis of South African local government and listed the different types of local government in the country. The focus was also shifted to the establishment of local government pre-and-post the dawn of democracy.

It was necessary to use a phased approach to understand how South African local government evolved given the political changes over the past two decades to the current day where coalitions are occupying the local government sphere.

To enhance the understanding of coalitions a timeline of coalition formation was also provided. Moreover, from the section that presented the constitutional requisites required for coalition formation, it could be deduced that a country's

electoral system provided the constitutional design for the type of government that could be established.

Moreover, the trajectory of the metros which this thesis focuses on is primarily subjected to the political developments in South Africa post-1990, and by what transpired politically at the local level of each of these metros. The course of events that led to the establishment of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros encapsulates how the formation of coalitions altered the political landscape.

The next chapter presents an assimilated analysis of the primary and secondary data by affirming the criteria used to assess governance in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. How the coalition theories exhibited itself in these two metros are presented and an assessment of factors which either enable or discourage coalitions is presented.

CHAPTER 4

INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter commences with a summary of the conceptualisation of coalitions by respondents at the local level as they relate to the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros. This is important and serves as a vantage point from which the data analysis is presented.

Following the introduction to this chapter, Section 4.3 analyses coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay and uses the theoretical framework of coalition theories to gauge how these theories manifested themselves in the metros. This is followed by the factors that foster and suppress coalition formation at the local government level in South Africa, respectively.

The qualitative research used in the completion if this study necessitated the use of triangulation to arrive at thorough data analysis. Moreover, the use of semi-structured interviews, applicable documents on governance as well as exploring secondary sources enabled a cohesive analysis of the data.

As explained in Chapter 1, respondents in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were identified across party-political lines. It was initially envisaged that seven respondents in each metro would be petitioned to participate. However, it proved cumbersome to secure interviews with respondents because the 2019 South African general election meant that politicians were engaged in electioneering. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 also made engagement cumbersome.

Respondents were initially probed on their conception of coalitions before questions that are more exploratory were posed. This was done so that respondents could elaborate on their responses. This was especially the case with face-to-face interviews. However, when clarity to some responses was

necessary, follow-up electronic interviews with respondents were arranged and this provided more explanation to key questions.

The ethical principles were always adhered to. In this regard, the nature of the research as well as the contribution of respondents were communicated clearly. This was accompanied by the signing of consent forms by respondents and an undertaking by the researcher to protect the identity of respondents.

Respondents were informed that they were in no way coerced to participate and that their participation was voluntary, and that they could withdraw their participation at any stage during their participation without being required to provide any clarification for such withdrawal.

In no way were undertakings taken that respondents would in any way benefit either in monetary or material terms. Respondents were informed that their contribution was greatly appreciated and that such contributions provided for an opportunity to enhance the body of knowledge on governance at the local level in general, and local governance emanating from post-election coalitions.

The contemporary nature of this study required the use of current sources such as newspapers. In this regard, newspaper articles regarding the 2016 local government elections and the evolving coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were abundant and were used to augment the data analysis.

The decision to focus on Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela was, as stated in previous parts of this thesis out of a curiosity to explore whether these two metros, which have been governed by the ANC for such a lengthy time would be governed by coalitions. Against the backdrop of the prevailing political climate at the time, there existed political undercurrents, which manifested in the way coalition partners engaged each other.

Therefore, for the data analysis in this chapter the research questions presented in Chapter 1 are reaffirmed and combine the central research question in pursuing a riposte on whether coalition governance at the local level leads to good governance or not.

The reassertion of the research questions, follows below:

The primary research question for this study is:

- To what extent do coalition governments lead to good governance, and which factors contribute to or detract from their contribution in this regard?

The secondary research questions for this study are:

- What factors facilitate or debilitate coalition formation at local government, and which of these factors contribute to, or detract from, the preservation of such coalitions and their longevity?
- Are there characteristics of coalition governments at the local government level, which contribute to their propensity for good governance as it relates to transparency, accountability, consensus-building, participation, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, equity, and inclusiveness?
- Which characteristics of coalition governments contribute to conducive or adverse outcomes for the citizenry of these metros?

Reaffirming the primary and secondary research questions is important since this chapter presents the data and draws a synthesis between the data, literature review as well as the theoretical framework. The primary data consists of personal, electronic, and telephonic interviews conducted with relevant individuals representing divergent political parties; either at the local or at the national level as well as the secondary sources are assimilated.

Sections 4.5 and 4.6. analyse and discuss the factors that contribute to, or detract from, the preservation or longevity of coalition governments at the local level in general and the local governments of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay from the formation of these coalitions post the 2016 August local government elections up until their termination.

Section 4.7 explores the relationship between the emerging coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay and good governance. The primary data is supplemented with a document review and analyses these two metros

as they relate to the tenets of good governance as well as the factors which contribute or detract from good governance.

The criteria that were used to select respondents to participate were informed by several factors. First, it was established that a total number of at least seven respondents per metro would be selected across party-political lines. This was imperative because impartiality in the selection of respondents would ensure balanced responses.

The focus on local government also meant that local councilors would be targeted for interviews. However, there were instances when although the national leadership of the targeted political parties was sought it was cumbersome to secure interviews with councilors of such political parties at the local level. Responses from the national level also provided for authoritative responses as was the case with COPE and the UDM whose national leadership responded.

The political parties, which were petitioned to participate, were the ACDP, ANC, COPE, DA, EFF and the PA. These parties were either part of a formal coalition agreement or in the case of the EFF, only agreeing to support a coalition on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the Mayoral Committees of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela metros were composed of councillors from those parties who coalesced to form coalitions.

A questionnaire containing a generic set of questions was presented to all respondents, whether at the local or national level. The interview questions are presented here as they were posed to the respondents and their responses were then offered separately for each metro. The construction of a standardised set of questions was employed to extract responses that would shed light on the central research question.

The rationale behind the research focus of this thesis is stated in Chapter 1. An analysis of the governing coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay provide an opportunity to gauge governance at the present time. To do this, the interpretation of the emerging data must be well presented in a manner that provides answers to the research questions.

The integrative approach that was used to disseminate the secondary data and integrate the primary data used the interview questions as a vantage point and are presented under applicable headings. Due to the voluminous amount of secondary data, the extracted data was measured against a combination of governance indices.

Strengthening the interpretation of secondary data was the reference of the responses provided by the respondents from the metros. This also reinforced the triangulation approach of this study because the literature study, the coalition timeline and the indices derived from the reports as well as the primary data provided by the interviews provided for a triangular approach for this research.

Endorsing the use of triangulation, Johnson (2016:91) states that "triangulation is a powerful technique that facilitates validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources". He continues and affirms that "in particular, it refers to the application and combination of several research methods in the study of the same phenomenon".

Lastly, the inclusion of elements from the literature review and theoretical framework saw a critical presentation of arguments. Moreover, reaffirming the primary and secondary research questions is important since this chapter sees a presentation of the data and draws a synthesis between the data, literature review as well as theoretical framework.

4.2. Respondents: conceptualising coalitions

Chapter 2 provided a theoretical understanding of coalitions. This was done to provide a conceptual and analytical framework to study what emerged in the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros. This brief section is not supplementary to the theoretical framework, but rather a summation of the key points emerging from the theory and what the respondents' understanding of the concept was.

Doherty's three-pronged approach of why political coalitions are formed as stated in Chapter 2 provides a straightforward definition of coalition formation.

Firstly, the aim was to secure a governing majority, and if not, to create a credible alternative to government, and to consolidate electoral support during elections and maximising results (Doherty, 2004).

Relating this definition to what emerged in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, was always going to be a difficult campaign given the entrenched position of the ANC strengthened by its liberation rhetoric. This, even though polls indicated diminishing support for the ANC in both these metros.

However, once the election results emerged with the possibility of the ANC not gaining an outright majority in these two metros, opposition parties began to realise that they could elevate themselves from the opposition benches and assume government. Doherty's third reason is typical of vote-seeking coalition theory where the aim is to maximise results (Doherty, 2004).

Integrating the theoretical basis of coalition with that of the respondents, there appeared to be more consensus than dissent. Moreover, the thoughtful understanding of coalitions despite their political affiliations provided much-needed insight into how politicians viewed their individual and party's role in the unfolding of events in these two metros. A summation of these responses is provided in a workable and integrated manner in the next few paragraphs.

In a personal interview, the ANC respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay provided a three-stage trajectory of how the emerging coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay came about:

- First, sustained electoral majorities which also secured and entrenched the dominance of the governing ANC
- Second, the inroads made by the DA into traditional ANC strongholds such as Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros, and
- Thirdly, the ousting of the ANC by coalitions in both metros (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

The Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg COPE respondents held very senior roles in provincial government and described these emerging coalitions as "forced rather than voluntary", and that instead of being based on a

confluence of principles, it merely amounted to "power play that was inherently unstable with trust between political parties being balanced on a knife's edge with no real long-term prospect of surviving" (National COPE respondent, personal communication, 28 July 2019).

The Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1 regarded these two metros as "a test for the principles of South Africa's multi-party democracy and the value of political parties and politicians". Moreover, the respondent believed that these coalitions "is representative of the people of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay where people are experiencing service delivery challenges" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 25 February 2019).

Another view is presented by the Johannesburg DA respondent who asserted that "coalition governance requires cooperation between diverse political parties that must be able to coalesce around common objectives and pursue these in the interests of residents" (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 11 March 2019).

Articulating the party's position on coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, the national leader of the UDM represented in both these metros, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg, the respondent stated that "coalitions must not be viewed as mere marriages of convenience where we could be swallowed up or be used to serve other political parties' agendas" ourselves to be swallowed up" (National UDM respondent, personal communication, 21 August 2019).

Another party position of a coalition partner in both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay enunciated from a national level and simply stated that "coalition governance is when multiple political parties attempt to cooperate to prevent single party's dominance in municipal administration" (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 28 July 2019).

A final response in providing a baseline of how coalitions were formed from the primary sources was provided by the Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent

when he argued that "that there is never a perfect arrangement" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 16 August 2019).

The above-stated responses articulate a first-hand explanation of these political actors who found themselves within the contexts of their respective metros as they unfolded before, during and after the formation of coalitions. From these responses, it was evident that the political parties presented in these metros, whether they coalesced with other parties in forming a minority party-led government or not, showed comprehension of their unique and indeed strategic positions in these emerging coalitions.

Moreover, the respondents' understanding of coalitions coincided with what has been stated in the theoretical section of Chapter 2 and facilitated the data analysis conclusively answering the research questions. However, it is now pivotal to proceed and analyse the factors which fostered the formation of the emerging local governments of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay after the 2016 local government elections.

4.3. Coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

In pursuit of a theoretical approach to explain coalition formation, Chapter 2 highlighted a multi-dimensional approach in the study of coalition formation. This inductive approach in Chapter 2 is now utilised to discuss and analyse the additional factors which fostered coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay and uses five of the factors suggested by Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989:7). These factors are Institutional, historical, motivational, vertical/horizontal and party-interval.

The first of these factors refers to the role that an institutional factor such as an electoral system peculiar to a country can play in the formation of the coalition. The first section of this chapter analysed this aspect by discussing the enabling political landscape referring specifically to South Africa's system of proportional representation as a factor that provides for coalitions to be formed.

Another factor is the resultant hung councils in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay after no party obtained an outright majority.

For illustrative purposes, a restatement of the results achieved by the major parties which contested in each metro is provided below in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.

Table 4.1: 2016 Municipal Electoral Results for Johannesburg

PARTY	RESULT (%)	SEATS
ANC	44,55	121
DA	38,37	104
EFF	11,09	30
IFP	1,72	5
AIC	1,5	4
FFPLUS/ACDP/ALJAMA/UDM/COPE/PA	-1	1

Source: Aref, 2016

Table 4.2: 2016 Municipal Electoral Results for Nelson Mandela Bay

PARTY	RESULT (%)	SEATS
DA	46,71	57
ANC	40,92	50
EFF	5,12	6
UDM	1,91	2
AIC/UFEC/COPE/ACDP/PA	-1	1

Source: Aref, 2016

Considering the above and given the hung councils for these two metros, the second factor asked the question of whether there were any historical indicators of support for the various parties? The above results answered this question as follows: The ANC's support in both metros dropped, whereas the DA's support increased. At the same time, the EFF emerged as the party with the third-

highest number of votes, and which elevated it to kingmaker status when coalition formation seemed inevitable in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

From the interviews, respondents gave their views on the support that their parties received and how coalitions in the two metros were formed.

The stage for the emergence of several coalitions was set when the ANC failed to win with an outright majority in several key metros and many of these coalitions would then become minority coalitions led by the DA because the third-largest party in both metros indicated that it would vote with the DA-led coalitions on a case-by-case basis and not enter into formal coalition agreements (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 26 April 2019).

The ACDP respondent in Johannesburg mentioned that talks were held by the national leadership of the political parties "to address issues of common interest and based on that; a co-government agreement was drawn up" (National ACDP respondent, personal communication, 05 May 2019).

A similar scenario unfolded in Nelson Mandela Bay. Previous sections of this thesis mentioned that the ANC's support dropped in both these metros. This was significant since the ANC always secured the majority votes in both Johannesburg and Nelson Bay in preceding municipal elections. Moreover, these two metros featured strongly in the ANC's historical trajectory.

In the case of Nelson Mandela Bay, not only does it carry the name of the ANC's most prominent leader, but it is situated in a region and province with a rich history of anti-Apartheid struggle and activism. Johannesburg on the other hand represents the economic hub of the country and provided a type of political sophistication to ANC rule. This was indeed also the case when its former mayor Parks Tau was at the helm of the metro before the ANC was outfoxed in 2016 and replaced by a DA-led minority government.

Also alluding to the decline in ANC support where it was formerly historically strong, Schreiber (2018a: 35) writes that "the trend is clear: at the local level,

the ANC's support is rapidly declining and- based on electoral trends since 2006 – will continue to decline for the foreseeable future".

The third factor which had a bearing on how these coalitions were arrived at sought to understand what the motivational factors were behind coalition formation. In this regard, Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989: 7) ask "what seems to be the driving forces behind a possible configuration of governance? What are the trade-offs involved"?

This factor was very significant because it captured the essence of coalition formation and raised several key questions that were crucial to address before there could be any substantive talks of a move towards coalition formation. The first motivation would be to affect a change in governance thereby removing the incumbent local government from office.

The second motivation would be to consolidate and nurture the coalition and sustain governance. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, what guarantees would coalition partners have of the bona fides of coalition partners? These questions are answered intermittently throughout this chapter.

Answering the above question must start with how the parties which ended up in the respective coalitions read and understood the terms of engagement when it became clear that the writing was on the wall for these two ANC governed metros. It is also wise to provide accounts from the role players insofar as the data from the interviews with the respondents are concerned.

A DA respondent from Nelson Mandela Bay summed up his party's position as follows by stating that "the DA understood and has always understood, more so than any other political party that coalition governments are a natural consequence of the evolution of a political system" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 2, personal communication, 05 May 2019).

At a national level, the UDM respondent commented that this party's position in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay when it entered the respective coalitions was that "although there were some frustrations with the coalition, it

remained intact and functional" (National UDM respondent, personal communication, 21 August 2019).

Explaining the ANC's position in Nelson Mandela Bay, its respondent referred to the ANC's and DA's entrenched position that they would not form coalitions with each other by stating that "the ANC and DA were not willing partners, and it was unthinkable that a coalition will be formed because we were contesting an election" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

Moreover, what complicated matters at the start were that the EFF which obtained the third most votes in both metros emerged as the kingmaker and given the fact that the DA's and the EFF's opposed ideological and policy positions, this proved a challenge at first. However, the determination to keep their common enemy out persuaded the EFF to support the DA-led coalition in both these metros on a case-by-case basis, without entering a formal coalition.

Consequently, as the positions of the parties became clear, so too did the requests or what Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989: 7) call "trade-offs". Just days after the election results were known, Du Plessis and Madia (2016) reported that the UDM, EFF, COPE and the UDM - four of the most likely kingmakers in three of the biggest hung metros – also made public their combined shopping list of demands"- which at the time were the following:

- The resignation of President Zuma

- The immediate suspension of the envisaged nuclear acquisition

- The finalisation of the re-naming of Pretoria, an overhaul of the mayoral system and a streamlining of the national cabinet

- Better service delivery

- An end to e-tolls

- Municipal billing reflecting only services consumed by residents

- Constitutional reforms

- A national convention addressing the land question, property ownership, nationalisation, economic emancipation, electoral reforms, party funding legislation and the strengthening of chapter nine institutions.

However, making a collective list of prerequisites public did in no way mean that conceding to or even negotiating these preconditions would be uncomplicated. This was because the parties who would eventually enter coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay would each be inflexibly distinct in not only core beliefs but also their political modus operandi, as a later section in this chapter explains.

It is also for this reason Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989: 7) posit a fourth factor that seeks to establish the level on which engagement took place. This is important because when parties have an inkling of disparity, then it needs to be resolved at a level with the necessary authority. Almost all the parties which entered formal coalitions, including the EFF who remained on the fringes of engagement despite its support on a case-by-case basis, were represented at a national level.

It is safe to assume that engagement occurred vertically (nationally) and horizontally (locally) between the various political parties. Being presented with an opportunity to seize power from the ANC where it could not win an outright majority required political will and astuteness that would have to cross party-political lines.

The primary and secondary data concurred that consultations took place before the outcome of the elections. Respondent 2 of the DA in Nelson Mandela Bay sheds light on the formation of the Nelson Mandela Bay coalition by referring to what transpired on the national level:

The Nelson Mandela Bay coalition was formed through a series of meetings and engagements with all political parties. James Selfe, the chairperson of the Federal Executive Committee of the DA (at the time of writing, Selfe was the DA shadow minister of correctional services) was intimately involved in the

coalition talks" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 2, personal communication, 23 February 2019).

Confirming the above assertion, Selfe also stated that "in 2016, accurate internal polling helped us to project results very early, especially in Johannesburg and Tshwane. Negotiations could therefore start early" (Selfe cited in Joubert, 2018: 94). Also referring to these talks, the DA mayoral candidate in Nelson Mandela Bay Athol Trollip said that talks were taking place at the national level to form coalitions in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and, potentially, in Johannesburg (News24, 2016a).

These vertical negotiations mandated horizontal negotiations between these parties at the local level in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Writing for News24, Spies (2016b) reported that for the DA, this culminated in the DA's mayoral candidate in Nelson Mandela Bay, Athol Trollip, declaring at a press conference that "Nelson Mandela Bay will have a multi-party government (from Thursday, 18 August 2016) led by the DA and including the UDM, the COPE and the ACDP".

Contrastingly to the DA's levels of engagement, the ANC respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay lamented the party's lack of support to the regional ANC, by stating that "we were on our own and did not get support from the national and provincial structures and we were frustrated. Despite efforts by the then Department of Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs minister Lindiwe Sisulu engaging General Bantu Holomisa, our margin was just too low" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 16 August 2019).

Could it be that the ANC miscalculated the way the Nelson Mandela Bay results could sway in 2016? This is highly unlikely, given the outcome of the 2011 local government election results for this metro where the DA made significant gains, and although not emerging victorious, it restricted the ANC to just below 52 per cent (51,9per cent). Surely, this should have resulted in a more focused effort to garner support from smaller parties in Nelson Mandela Bay.

However, in the aftermath of the results of the elections, the Gauteng ANC Chairperson Paul Mashatile was reported saying that "the election results

indicate that metros like Johannesburg and Tshwane produced no outright winner at all and for the ANC- it has now come down to coalition negotiations" (eNCA, 2016).

Whatever form the coalitions took, it became crucial for the two biggest parties to pacify potential coalition partners and tread carefully and cautiously considering what the trade-offs would be.

Referring to Chapter 2 where Laver (1989: 198) posits a daunting facet of coalitions where "bargaining power is measured in threats". Laver's contention bears striking similarities with the South African situation. It would be these threats that would manifest in the conduct of the leaders of the political parties as they were confronted by coalition formation. It is for this reason that Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989: 7) ask the question "how does a factor such as personality influence the bargaining process"?

The role of personalities plays a vital role in all the stages of coalition formation as the next section deals with the factors that supress coalition formation at the local government level in South Africa, and particularly what transpired in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay are illuminated.

The last three factors in coalition formation advocated by Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989) refer to the party interval, the socio-political and external factors which impact coalition formation. This is discussed succinctly. The party interval refers to the role that the national leadership of the political parties play when it comes to establishing coalitions. In the case of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, the data indicated that the national leadership of all parties that were engaged in pre-coalition talks were guided by the national leadership of their respective parties.

Referring to Johannesburg, the ANC provincial secretary at the time, Hope Papo stated in a News24 article that "the province was negotiating under the stewardship of our national leadership" (News24, 2016b).

The ANC respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay also referred to high-level talks between particularly the ANC, UDM, EFF and COPE. However, these talks

proved fruitless because of what the respondent referred to as "divisions between especially the UDM and COPE to support the ANC" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 16 August 2019).

Regarding the DA, its Nelson Mandela Bay respondent stated the following:

> The DA understood coalitions and had time managing coalitions. There are smaller municipalities where we have coalition arrangements with different political parties throughout the Western Cape". The respondent continues and states that "the Nelson Mandela Bay coalition was formed through a series of meetings between with all political parties" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 25 February 2019).

Similarly, the DA in Johannesburg was also dependent on the party interval of its national bodies and particularly the role James Selfe played. The UDM also made its position clear from the outset stating that "the party does not view coalitions as a marriage of convenience, nor would we enter any relationship where the UDM would be swallowed up, nor would we serve other political parties' agendas" (National UDM respondent, personal communication, 21 August 2019).

Insofar as the role of social movements is concerned, one would find that two parties, in particular, the Patriotic Front and the United Front (Eastern Cape) play a dual role by being configured as formal political parties and contesting elections and playing an activist role. This is done by furthering the aims of what constitutes their support base. For the PA, this would be primarily residents from Nelson Mandela Bay's northern areas and the multitude of unionised factory workers in the metro, since the UF (EC) is a workers' party in nature.

Finally, as Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989) allude to in Chapter 2, the possible external factors include the perceptions created in the media and events which can impact voting behaviour. In both metros, several 'events had a bearing on how the elections took place in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

For example, the media reported extensively on the possible changing of the political landscape post the elections, with special emphasis on the stand-off

between the ANC and the DA. This reinforced the possibility of coalitions in key metros such as Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Moreover, issues such as the ANC's factionalism and poor service delivery in Nelson Mandela Bay on the one hand coupled with the e-tolls saga in Gauteng were all contributed to the voting behaviour of residents of these metros.

Thus, attention was paid to the factors which favoured coalition formation as well as applying Mellors and Pijnenburg's theoretic understanding of coalition formation; it is now deemed important to give a concise overview of how the coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were formed.

At the beginning of this chapter, a re-statement of the election results for the two metros were given to illustrate how these metros culminated in being hung councils. It is thus important to refer to the chapter where reference was made where the types of coalitions were explained. This is imperative since it succinctly gives an outline of coalition formation in both metros.

It is therefore important to briefly state what type of coalitions were formed in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. This is followed by a timeline of coalition formation for both these metros. This section then concludes with an analysis of how office and policy-seeking theories manifested themselves in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Hence, a minority coalition was formed in Johannesburg where a minority government was created from a minority coalition, as opposed to Nelson Mandela Bay where a minimum winning coalition was formed.

Referring to the thematic issues or pressure points that were highlighted and set out in Chapter 4 when it came to coalition formation on the national level, these themes bore a striking similarity to what transpired at the local level in the formation of the 2016 coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Analysing this by applying Seyd's 'pressure points when it comes to coalitions, Table 4.3 elucidates how these points unfolded in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Table 4.3: Timeline of coalition formation

PRESSURE POINTS	JOHANNESBURG	NELSON MANDELA BAY
ELECTIONS	2016 Elections: ANC-44, 99% DA-38, 40% EFF-10, 94%	2016 Elections: DA-46, 7% ANC-40, 9 EFF-5, 1% UDM-1, 9%
FORMATION OF RULES	DA leader Mmusi Maimane put forth conditions for coalition formation such as: Set up open and transparent tender processes Zero tolerance for corruption Governments to avoid irregular and fruitless expenditure Appointing a fit-for-purpose executive	
NEGOTIATIONS	Hung council requires a coalition to be formed DA engages other contesting parties in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay DA forms a minority coalition with smaller parties The EFF is not formally part of this minority coalition but agrees to support it In Nelson Mandela Bay DA secures coalition agreements with COPE, ACDP, FF+, UDM and IFP DA also secures backing from the EFF	
AGREEMENT	Formal coalition agreements are entered into in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay	
MANAGEMENT	Parks Tau (ANC) 2011-2016)	Danny Jordaan (ANC) 2015-2016
	Herman Mashaba (DA) 2016-2020	Athol Trollip (DA) 2016-2018 Mongameli Bobani (UDM) 2018-2020
TERMINATION OF RULES	Herman Mashaba was elected mayor after the 2016 elections but resigned in October 2019.	The DA-led coalition collapsed after the fourth motion of no confidence in Athol Trollip succeeded.

Source: Researcher's own summary

4.4. The manifestation of coalition theories

By aspiring to exploit the primary research question and bring the probable effects of local government coalitions to the fore, this section articulates how the main coalition theories manifested themselves insofar as the data analysis was concerned. This was done by extracting the factors which promoted and impeded good governance in the two metros on which this thesis focuses. Therefore, the dual focus of this section is:

- To analyse how the main coalition theories were patented in the two metros

- What evidence there is to either corroborate or contradict the assertion that coalitions at the local level led to good governance.

What parties want – in terms of policies, office, or votes – affects how they represent their voters, make strategic decisions, and responding to external changes in society. But what do parties want, and do all parties want the same thing? The answer to these questions is crucial since parties' goals affect their behaviour. It is widely accepted that parties have multiple goals such as policy, votes, or office, but most theories are also based on the assumption that parties have common goals and therefore behave similarly, such as joining coalitions, given the same circumstances (Helboe Pedersen, 2012).

It is against the backdrop of Helboe Pedersen's assertion above that this section focuses on how these theories manifested themselves in the two metros on which this research is based.

4.4.1. The manifestation of office-seeking

Chapter 1 provided a brief definition of office-seeking as a theory in coalition studies. This section examines how this theory manifested itself in the two metros on which this study focuses. It has also been stated that the 2016 local government elections which heralded in coalition governance for Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay provided an opportunity to scrutinise coalition governance, and the reasons why political parties and leaders would enter coalitions.

There is considerable academic debate in the literature as to the motivation behind coalition formation and whether parties form coalitions to maximise power or advance their policy objective (Law, 2018: 6). When it comes to the South African experience and how it materialised in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, it can be inferred that the formation of coalitions in both metros had office-seeking as an aim to govern, even if the realisation of this aim entailed that it would be attained collectively with other political entities.

As a case in point, coalitions that intermittently governed Cape Town can serve as applicable examples when the ANC and NNP coalesced and the ANC's Nomaindia Mfeketo became mayor of Cape Town. The appointment of the leader of Nelson Mandela Bay at the time, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, as a cabinet minister occupying the portfolio of Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, can then also be construed as a reward for the NNP in coalescing with the ANC.

Similarly, the 2006 local government elections saw the DA's Helen Zille with the help of smaller parties replace the ANC's Nomaindia Mfeketo as mayor of Cape Town. Moreover, the merging of the DA and the Independent Democrats saw Patricia de Lille, the former ID leader, occupying the mayoral seat with Zille becoming Western Cape premier.

This was also the case for the two metros, the focus of this study. At the time of writing, the Johannesburg metro was governed by a minority DA coalition. The ANC lost control of both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay when it could not reach a majority. This saw the DA entering coalitions with other parties in each of these metros. The allocation of portfolios then essentially became a non-ANC allocation with key portfolios dispersed among coalition partners, at the time with that of Executive Mayor both being awarded to the DA's Herman Mashaba and Athol Trollip, respectively.

Regarding the allocation of political posts, de Visser (2016) states the following:

> Stripped of its glory, a coalition is about two or more parties finding each other on a common programme or platform and cementing their newfound love by

dividing political posts among themselves. In municipalities, this revolves mainly around the positions of the mayor and the speaker.

During the DA's tenure governing the Nelson Mandela Bay metro, it occupied the position of Executive Mayor as well as speaker, with the deputy mayor being the UDM's Mongameli Bobani. Personality clashes between Trollip and Bobani saw the latter being recalled by Trollip in May 2017 as MAYCO for Public Health.

Subsequent events saw Bobani also being recalled as deputy mayor after a motion of no confidence brought against him by the Patriotic Alliance's councillor, Marlon Daniels (Spies, 2017).

Insofar as the allocation of portfolios of the MAYCO under the Trollip administration was concerned, all the coalition partners, excluding the ANC and the EFF were represented, with the latter opting not to be part of the coalition, but to review its support on an ongoing basis. Of the 10-member MAYCO, the DA occupied most of the portfolios, of which the seven occupied by the DA were deemed crucial by almost all respondents across all the metros.

When the UDM-ANC coalition wrestled control from the DA in 2018, the same modus operandi was applied by the incoming coalition which saw Mongameli Bobani replacing Trollip as Executive Mayor, with most of the positions occupied by the ANC. This time around, the ANC occupied eight of the 11 MAYCO portfolios, with the EFF being allocated the Municipal Accounts portfolio.

In what can be seen as a classic example of office-seeking in the Nelson Mandela Bay metro, is the frequent shifting of the PA allegiance in its quest to seek office. Whereas the PA's lone councillor, Marlon Daniels was supportive of the DA coalition in 2016, the PA conspired with the UDM/ANC/EFF/UF-EC alliance to oust Trollip in 2018. Reporting on this in 2018, Whittles (2018) writes the following:

> Leaders from the UDM, ANC, EFF and UF — as well as the DA's new coalition partner the Patriotic Alliance — held talks in Port Elizabeth, where the motion

against Trollip was planned for next week. PA leader Gayton McKenzie confirmed the meeting took place, saying a motion would be tabled against Trollip. McKenzie added that the relationship between the DA and PA has broken down and that his party has agreed to a coalition deal with the ANC, EFF and AIC. The ANC has been reinvigorated in its bid to oust the DA coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay amid tension between the PA and DA, following an apparent falling out between the PA's councillor in the metro — Marlon Daniels and Trollip (Whittles, 2018).

In June 2019, the Nelson Mandela Bay metro attempted to pass the budget, but due to Daniels' absence, it could not be passed. In what could be seen as a political trade-off for office, the Executive Mayor, Bobani, appointed Daniels as the MMC for economic development, tourism, and agriculture, in what a News24 article by Manona (2019) reported was "part of a negotiation to ensure that the budget would pass". This trade-off is typical of what Sithanen (2003: 3) calls where "conflict is more commonly around the benefits of office than policy objectives".

Thus, it is apparent that office-seeking within the Nelson Mandela Bay metro was evident in the distribution of portfolios. It was also evident that key political portfolios (if not all) were secured by the coalition partners, with the opposition relegated to the opposition benches.

However, what the Nelson Mandela Bay metro also illustrated was that smaller parties that seemingly held insignificant power could be utilised to unseat coalitions at the local level. This was indeed the case when the UDM led but was supported by a coalition constituting the ANC, EFF, UF and the PA colluded and ousted the DA-led coalition.

Both the UDM and PA are represented by lone councillors in the Nelson Mandela Bay metro, but the impact that they have on the balance of power cannot be estimated. At the time of data analysis, both these parties held office, namely Executive Mayor and MMC, respectively. Although it could be assumed that smaller parties must surely be cognizant that they would not secure most of the votes, they were ingenious in aligning themselves tactically where maximum gains could be secured.

The Johannesburg Metro has been governed by a DA-led minority government since 2016. At the time of data analysis, its Executive Mayor, the DA's Herman Mashaba resigned citing discontent with his party. Notwithstanding, the Johannesburg metro has not been replaced by a counter coalition formation. Moreover, as is the case with the Nelson Mandela Bay metro when it was governed by the DA-led coalition, office-seeking is manifested in the constitution of the MAYCO.

For instance, whereas the EFF might not occupy any portfolio, the EFF stated that it would withhold its backing of the DA when it came to voting in the local governments where it is governing. In a clear example of office-seeking, the EFF wanted the mayorship of Tshwane despite the DA's refusal to relinquish this position.

4.4.2. The manifestation of policy-seeking

While some parties may be exclusively office-oriented, others have policy goals (Kellam, 2017: 397). The literature portrays the policy-seeking party as one that seeks government portfolios as well as ideologically compatible coalition partners (Strøm & Müller, 1999:8).

According to the standard policy-seeking model of party behaviour, a party should always want to join a coalition if its inclusion would decrease the policy distance between the party and the winning coalition (Helboe Pederson, 2011: 297).

Moreover, as much as there are political parties who share similar policies, there are also those who are at the extreme of each other's political spectrum, and whose policies are irreconcilable with that of potential coalition partners. Additionally, the obstinacy of these policy positions can have an impact on the longevity of coalitions. The formation of coalitions can also be stifled due to inflexible policy positions.

Since the policy spectrum of political parties can be broad, an in-depth summary of the policy position of the political parties who are or were part of the coalitions at these two metros is deemed too comprehensive and will not

be provided. However, where it was found that policy-seeking was a determinant in these coalitions, then this has been probed.

Several political parties, which not only contest general elections but also local government elections, occupy South Africa's political space. On this multi-party contestation, Masipa (2017: 44) states the following, "though multiparty governance is widely applauded to contribute to good democracy, power-sharing, and in the consolidation of different policies to move the country forward, this may, however, impose some challenges to the overall governance of the country". Additionally, Shakil and Marzia (2013: 37) state the following:

> The strengthening of democracy requires more than well-functioning elections, parliaments, an independent judiciary and other institutions and processes. It also requires a strong culture of democracy with robust, transparent, internally democratic and accountable political parties. Political parties represent a key feature of democratic good governance.

Linking with Masipa's statement are the following two questions that sought to probe the respondents. These questions are paraphrased as follows:

- What are the ideological and policy differences, if any between political parties and other coalition parties, and how do these differences impact coalitions?

Expanding this question to include differences of coalition parties with those parties who intentionally remain outside of any coalition is also important. This was the position adopted by the EFF after the 2016 local government elections where it resolved not to be part of any governing coalition, and as Mbete (2016: 604) argues "despite not winning control of any council, the EFF's electoral performance allowed it to be the kingmaker in several hung municipalities across the country".

It would be this kingmaker status that would see the EFF flexing its political and policy muscle to influence the configuration and indeed permanency of the coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

The ANC respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay provided the following fitting description of the ideological (and policy) stance of the EFF and its impact on coalitions when he stated the following:

> The fundamental problem with the DA and EFF in coalitions is that that they have better clarity of whom they are against than who they are for. There is nothing that they are for because they are so ideologically dispersed on the ideological spectrum.

However, one of the major catalysts for the EFF to withdraw its support from these coalitions was the DA's stance on the land issue. On this, Khumalo and Masuabi state that "Real cracks in the relation between the two parties started to show in February last year (2018) when the DA did not support the EFF's motion in the National Assembly on expropriation without compensation" (Khumalo & Masuabi, 2019).

The EFF's policy stance on land expropriation without compensation was also what was contained in the party's election manifesto commitments, and on the DA's non-support for this motion, "the issue of land reform has driven the party to turn their backs on their partners in the local municipality" (Head, 2018: 1).

Strøm and Müller (1999: 8) emphasise that "party leaders may seek certain policy goals because they think they can benefit in other ways or because they sincerely believe in them". However, they also contend that "political leaders routinely make momentous decisions, but they cannot always get at what they want" (Strøm & Müller, 1999: 7).

To explain the choices political leadership makes, Strøm and Müller (1999: 13) ask this pertinent question: "Is this behaviour aimed at increasing the party's control of effective office benefits, for whatever reason, even if it means sacrificing policy objectives or our prospects in the next election?"

This contentious policy issue between the DA and the EFF then ultimately saw the demise of the DA-led Nelson Mandela Bay metro government in August 2018. Another example where policy positions did not play a limiting role in coalition formation and where ideologically incompatible political parties

compromised their policy positions, was the NNP and ANC coalitions in the City of Cape Town and most notably was the 2001 ANC and NNP coalition with NNP members being appointed into the cabinet of the time (News24, 2002).

This was an extremely calculated move by the NNP, and as Jolobe (2018: 95) argues that "for the NNP leadership this was a convenient strategy to maintain access to political power and save face following the fallout with DP".

At the time of data analysis, the EFF made pronouncements that the EFF was ready to govern Johannesburg. This, of course, came in the wake of the resignation of Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba. The EFF, which at the outset of the coalition scrambling after August 2016 announced that it would not be part of any coalition at the local government level, had now made its office-seeking intentions known.

Moreover, this was in line with the Law's assertion that "in South Africa, it has been seen how the EFF ability to swing municipal councils has aided its political message of being a "government in waiting" (Law, 2018: 6).

Furthermore, this also reinforces Strøm and Müller's (1999: 13) argument that "policy pursuit is typically presented as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, office-seeking".

4.5. The factors fostering coalition formation: Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

Coalition formation is an intricate process and is typified by a variety of factors that either foster or suppress the establishment of coalitions. This section describes these factors using data from the interviews, a document review, as well as the theoretical framework of this study.

After a rather steady commencement of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay coalitions, Law (2018: 2) states that "we are now beginning to see that the coalition game is a complex one, with power struggles and in-fighting starting to emerge". Referring to Nelson Mandela Bay, specifically, Law further asserts

that coalition politics is one of the most complex and difficult political art forms (Law, 2018: 2).

Considering the above, the analysis of the data presented in this chapter is informed by an awareness of the complexity of evolving coalitions. Given the South African party-political make-up with its contrasting policy positions, this convolution of forming coalitions became even more cumbersome.

Moreover, despite policy and ideology disparities, there was also ample evidence suggesting that intra-party conflicts and factionalism obscured the coalition project from inception to termination. In this regard, Müller and Miller (2005:5) also argue that "conflict is more frequent and consequential in coalitions". Additionally, Ceron (2016: 3) states that "intra-party division negatively affects a party's likelihood of being involved in coalition governments".

But what are the enabling factors of coalition formation, and were these factors facilitating coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay? Chapter 2 mentioned that the 2016 local government elections presented an opportunity for opposition parties to challenge the hegemony of the ANC and presented a real opportunity for these parties to start envisioning an end to ANC dominance (Booysen, 2014; Schreiber, 2018).

To realise this would require both a sensible and shrewd pragmatism from opposition parties and a first step would be to deliberate on the factors which would enable this.

The first of these factors is to assess whether the constitutional design of South Africa's electoral system facilitates coalition formation, and if it does, how does this relate to practice? This is focused on next.

The continued reference to the ANC's challenged position in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay stems from an array of factors, which over a prolonged period of power came to characterise the administrations of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

The literature review in Chapter 2 alludes to Kadima's research of the politics of party alliances and coalitions in Africa, and although his focus is on the continental experiences of several African countries and these countries' coalitions at the national level, there are striking similarities of the geopolitical factors which are present in the two metros that this study focuses on.

What makes Kadima's contribution very relevant is that he admits there is a dearth in the body of knowledge on the impact of these factors on governance (on a national level). Inadvertently, this admission also validates the research embedded in this thesis and especially the goal of this chapter.

The entrenched political culture of these two metros which came to characterise the respective regimes and other valid factors such as ethnolinguistic and regional factors that are unique to each metro, ideology and the impact of party leaders are also factors that emerged strongly from the data.

The following sub-sections therefore provide an analysis of the factors as presented by the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros and commence with an analysis of how the electoral system, as part of South Africa's constitutional design, facilitated coalition formation in these two metros.

4.5.1. An enabling electoral system

The formation of minority governments and coalitions depends on the constitution of a country where these forms of government are entered. This applies to what is permissible and admissible for government configuration at all levels. Therefore, a country's electoral system has a direct bearing on the type of government establishment.

The South African electoral procedures informing the formation of local governments are governed by the provisions of the local government Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). Analysing possible scenarios emerging from the 2016 South African local government elections, the South African academic and constitutional expert, Professor Pierre De Vos (2016) tipped this Act as becoming "the new dolus eventualis".

Explaining the reference to this legal term, De Vos describes it as, "members of the public pouring over previously obscure legislative rules to determine whether party A, B and C will be able to form a coalition in a specific municipality or metro, or whether party D, E and F has the power to block them from forming a government" (De Vos, 2016: 1).

Also, regarding the 2016 election, and as previously stated in earlier sections of this thesis, the 2016 election polls were widely seen as a turning point in the political landscape of South Africa because the dominance of the ANC was greatly weakened while coalition and minority governments such as Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay proved to become more widespread.

The formation of these emerging coalitions was governed by the prevalent electoral system and constitutional design that is in place for minority governments to be instituted. This is important because an electoral system is an enabler of coalition or minority governments and sets the legislative parameters.

In this regard, South Africa's local government elections use a mixed system where half of the seats in local and metro councils come from the proportional system and half from the constituency (ward) system. The two main types of systems are the FPTP and proportional systems (PR). On reviewing the PR system, it becomes clear that smaller parties are, as La Fornara (2018:23) suggests, "more likely to reward small parties with legislative seats and thus tend to produce parliaments that contain a larger number of small and independent parties".

Referring to a national set-up, La Fornara (2018:23) concedes that PR systems "are more likely to produce minority governments that are FPTP systems". Another point regarding PR systems and minority governments and coalitions is made by Persson et al. (2003: 2) stating that "proportional elections raise the number of parties in the legislature. This raises the incidence of coalition governments".

Further postulating the importance of a country's electoral system and particularly the PR system, Gallagher (2011, as cited in Zhai, 2016: 2) describes

what a PR system entails and why it provides fertile ground for coalitions to be formed:

- It allows many parties to gain representation in elections.
- It encourages voters to vote for a larger number of parties, and
- It reduces the likelihood of single-party majority victories. PR systems are electoral systems that allocate seats to parties according to their actual vote shares in elections.

In the same manner, South Africa's electoral system favours the formation of coalition governments at the local level, especially with South Africa being a multi-party democracy with its multitude of political parties and civic movements contesting local government elections resulting in constituting a coalition or minority government of some sort.

Schreiber (2018a) traces the design of the South African electoral system back to the multiparty negotiations at the Convention for a democratic South Africa (Codesa) and argues that political leaders across party-political lines purposefully devised an electoral system that would promote coalition governments. Schreiber (2018a) cites Kader Asmal, the ANC's constitutional expert at Codesa, which announced at the time that "South Africa's cultural, social and economic diversity required and electoral system at all levels that would 'enable sectoral groups to be adequately represented in decision-making" (Schreiber, 2018a: 21).

It is here that the applicability of proportional representation as a factor for coalition formation at the local level is also provided for. This was the case for the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros when no party won more than 50 per cent of the vote. The results for these metros are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively and as exemplified, the two biggest parties in Johannesburg which contested this election both achieved less than 50 per cent of the total vote in the metro.

The ANC attained close to 44.9 per cent and the DA 38,40 per cent of the vote, respectively. This resultant hung council led to a scramble of primarily the DA

to unseat the ANC with the help of smaller parties in forming a minority government in the metro.

In Nelson Mandela Bay, the same scenario unfolded when the ANC could not get over the required 50 per cent threshold that would see a continuation of their dominance. Instead, unlike in Johannesburg where the DA attracted fewer votes, it won 46,7per cent of the vote as opposed to the ANC's 40,92 per cent of the vote. The Nelson Mandela Bay subsequent hung council also provided for the two main parties to engage other parties in forming a coalition.

Given the ANC's dominance at the polls nationally (despite clear evidence of dwindling support) and the defeats it incurred in the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros that this study focus on, a PR system still enabled representation for smaller parties.

The resultant coalition and minority governments of Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg created a symbiotic coalition where smaller parties added their weight behind the DA enabling it to lead, and in effect be elevated from a peripheral party to being a central player in the emerging governance arrangements which transpired at these two metros.

Moreover, even though Gallagher's case that PR systems reduced the probability of single-party dominance might be interpreted as contradictory to what transpired in South Africa because of the ANC's dominance at a national level and to a lesser extent at the local government level, Schreiber (2018a: 25) duly asks a very relevant question that if South Africa's electoral framework encouraged coalitions, why had the ANC been able to rule on its own since 1994?

Highlighting the ANC's narrative of it being the perpetual liberator that it sells to voters, Schreiber argues that such a narrative "proved powerful enough to overcome the logic of the electoral system" (Schreiber, 2018a: 26). What the ANC achieved was to sustain the narrative that it was the only party that could govern, despite an electoral system that discouraged single-party dominance.

However, it could only maintain this narrative for so long, and what the founders of a democratic constitution shrewdly drafted as the country's electoral system seems to be bearing fruit where hegemony is challenged by political parties who might be ideologically disparate, but who will use the PR system to unseat the ANC by entering coalescing and governing by either coalition or a minority government.

Thus, after an analysis of the electoral system favouring coalition formation was presented, there was an emerging political culture in the two metros that were brought about by factors in these two metros which led to discontent of the electorate. These factors are discussed next, starting with Nelson Mandela Bay.

4.5.2. An enabling political landscape

- **Johannesburg**

Before continuing, it must be stated that despite the best efforts of the researcher, the regional office of the ANC in the Johannesburg metro, the office of the former ANC mayor of Johannesburg who at the time of writing was the current deputy minister of the Department of Cooperate Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), as well as the national ANC were not willing to participate in this research.

But, despite this lack of cooperation, there is an abundance of articles providing valuable insight into the reasons how the ANC came to lose power in Johannesburg. The Johannesburg metro was not an issue of a divided ANC. The ANC in Johannesburg appeared to have a more politically sophisticated way of dealing with internal strife, and as Nkosi (2016: 1) also remarks that "the Johannesburg wing of the ANC is known within the party to be professionals and not corrupt".

Moreover, at the time of the 2016 local government elections, the Johannesburg metro was led by Parks Tau, an adept leader who was held in high regard. Commenting on the possibility of the ANC losing Johannesburg, South African political commentator Justice Malala argued that "it's about the national and local issues all at once" (cited in Nkosi, 2016: 1). However, at a

national level, the ANC's image was already marred by failures to deliver in key government departments which in turn were mirrored at the provincial and local level where it governed.

Key issues in Johannesburg were listed by the ACDP respondent in Johannesburg when he wrote that "the people were dissatisfied with poor service delivery in Johannesburg such as poor road infrastructure and potholes, faulty electricity bills and a filthy inner city" (National ACDP respondent, personal communication, 04 April 2019).

After a 2015 public consultation and participation platform which was provided by the Integrated Development Planning process of Johannesburg for the residents of Diepkloof, a large zone of the South Western Townships (SOWETO) of Johannesburg, the municipality released a media statement acknowledging that "among the issues raised for attention at the meeting included the elimination of potholes, provision of road calming measures and sports facilities, abandoned classrooms which were now being used as drug dens and building of more libraries" (City of Johannesburg, 13 April 2015).

An insightful analysis published in the Washington Post after the election cites several reasons for the outcome of the 2016 local government elections which can be generalised for Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. It is important to provide an overview of these explanations by McMurry, Martin, Lieberman and de Kadt (2016) since they posited four crucial factors which played a role in the outcome of this election.

The first factor posited by McMurry et al. (2016: 1) counters a generally accepted notion that economic hardships would lead to voters thinking twice about casting their ballots for a party that was deemed responsible for such hardship. However, the authors suggested that even if it would have been logical to assume that support for the opposition would come from economically marginalised communities, instead "the poorest areas have remained loyal to the ANC, while relatively prosperous urban areas are splitting their votes".

The metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay fall in the category of urban areas with the former being the manufacturing hub of the Eastern Cape

and the latter seen as the financial centre of the country. It would be in these metros that a change in political culture would emerge as a factor that greatly influenced the election outcome for these two metros.

Moreover, as McMurry et al. (2016) alluded to, it was deprived communities that continued with their sentimental vote for the ANC, and it would be the developments around Student Representative Council (SRC) elections at especially the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) where the Democratic Alliance Students Association (DASO) won the 2015 SRC election which would also influence the outcome of this election.

This was a pivotal victory for DASO and the DA less than a year before the 2016 local government elections in the metro because it defeated the African National Congress-aligned SA Student Congress (SASCO) and the Economic Freedom Fighters Student Command (EFFSC). At the time the DA youth leader Yusuf Cassim stated that "the DA is set on winning Nelson Mandela Bay in next year's (local government) election with the continued support of our young voters" (The Citizen Online, 17 September 2015).

This surge in support for the opposition from its young voters at the tertiary level could however not be equated to the tertiary institutions of Johannesburg, where the ANC's SASCO and the EFF's EFFSC appeared to be the dominant players at Johannesburg-based tertiary institutions, especially in the wake of the Fees Must Fall movement which started in 2015.

The above breakdown also coincides with another point McMurry *et al.* (2016) make arguing that "the youth vote is not as loyal to the ANC", and that using liberation rhetoric "does little to activate this "born free" generation".

Dispelling the naivety that an improvement in service delivery would necessarily lead to increased support or loyalty from voters, McMurry et al. (2016: 1), using ward-level data found what they called an "inverse relationship between improved public services and ANC vote share". They attributed this largely to "voters had more direct experience with government corruption, seeing projects given to relatives of local politician".

In the end, this network of a corrupt network of patronage inadvertently provided fertile ground and enabling conditions for alienated voters to change the political status quo and facilitate the political pluralism which transpired after August 2016.

A final point that the authors raised was that "local ANC candidates have begun appealing directly to black citizens and alienating non-black voters" (McMurry et al., 2016: 1). By negating its policy of non-racialism, the ANC created enabling conditions for marginalised communities in both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay to search for political homes which did not seem to be increasingly propagating and indeed promulgating race-based legislation aimed at excluding a very salient part of the electorate for both metros.

In Johannesburg, residents of the Coloured townships of Eldorado Park, Westbury and Ennerdale became a hotbed for anti-ANC protests and accusations of being excluded from employment opportunities. This was echoed by the DA respondent of Johannesburg who stated that "the so-called coloured communities of Johannesburg felt increasingly marginalised by the ANC governed metro" (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 11 March 2019)

Regarding the impact that the changing racial and identity politics had in creating opportunities for the re-alignment of political allegiance, the Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent admitted that this re-alignment was a reality and stated that "the ANC parties such as the EFF made it very clear that it was targeting black youth in particular, whereas the PA largely represented the metro's northern areas with the metro's majority of coloured residents" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

Thus, after providing an overview of factors that contributed to the re-alignment of these two metros and which created fertile ground for coalition formation, it is important to shift the focus to how these coalitions were formed. This is followed by a section that focuses on the factors which suppressed coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

- **Nelson Mandela Bay**

The decline in support for the incumbent ANC in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay did not happen overnight. The inroads that the major opposition, the DA, made in these two metros was a sustained and calculated effort devised to unseat the ANC.

Emerging from the data are several factors which respondents also referred to and which were corroborated by the literature. Regarding Nelson Mandela Bay, the literature is plenteous with data on how factors such as factionalism, patronage and corruption were particularly prevalent in this metro. These factors weakened the ANC over several years and when the opportunity presented itself in the local government elections of 2016, the final blow was dealt when it was ousted after many years of single-party dominance.

The reason(s) for the ANC's decline in Johannesburg appeared to be different from that of Nelson Mandela Bay. Therefore, the following paragraphs look at each of these factors and show how they provided fertile ground for opposition parties to capitalise on these factors in Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg. A separate focus is on the factors which created dissatisfaction in Johannesburg according to the data and which swayed support away from the ANC.

At this point, it must be stated that an in-depth analysis of these factors is not required since the purpose is not to provide a detailed account of 'state capture' at the local level, but it suffices to state that likening the state of local government for these two metros (in particular Nelson Mandela Bay) to be being captured, is influenced by Olver's understanding of state capture as "the more systematic application of corrupt relationship to the whole arsenal of power – the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, allocation of budgets and incentives" (Olver, 2016: 5).

Therefore, it is important to provide some background on how factors such as maladministration, factionalism and corruption contributed to regime changes for these two metros. Putting the above into context, a regime change implies

a shift in the way citizenry expresses their content or discontent on how they are governed.

The 2016 local government elections provided a measure against which political contestation was measured, and previous chapters already mentioned how the political landscape shifted. However, one must be cautious to equate this shift to a change in political culture altogether, but it is important to understand that it could have played a contributing role and enabled a susceptibility to coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Referring to political culture, Swedlow (2013: 624) states that "at its core, political culture—the shared values and beliefs of a group or society regarding political relationships and public policy—answers the question of how human beings are going to live together".

The author continues and states that "political culture answers the question of who gets to do what with and to whom under what circumstances. Political culture also answers the question of who decides, who has authority, and who has power in a group, organisation, institution, or another social unit in society".

The above was exactly what transpired in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay after the outcome of the elections in these two metros led to parties, who were fundamentally in opposition to the ANC, decided who would have the "authority" and "power" in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Commencing with Nelson Mandela Bay, Ralo (2012: iv) states that "the political infighting within the ANC impacts on governance structures and the local government level". Linking with Ralo's statement that factionalism impacts local governance, Steyn-Kotze (2016) comments that as the "ANC seems to be slipping", "local municipalities are characterised by a lack of accountability, under-spending, maladministration, patronage and anorexic delivery of water, housing and electricity".

As mentioned in the previous section, the ANC's liberation rhetoric could only sustain their stay in power for so long in Nelson Mandela Bay, and as Steyn-

Kotze (2016) argues, experiences with one-party systems who dominated for protracted periods are eventually faced with a "crisis of legitimacy".

Insofar as the challenge to the ANC's legitimacy in holding on to power in Nelson Mandela Bay, Respondent 6 of the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay commented by stating that this challenge to its authority "was a bad experience and we were shocked by the outcome, adding more tensions amongst us as the ANC" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

It must be remembered that to stem the factionalism within the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay, the national leadership of the ANC deployed former Nelson Mandela Bay resident and South African Football Association president, Danny Jordaan as its mayoral candidate for the 2016 local government elections. Jordaan, a former ANC member of parliament in the Mandela era who hails from the northern areas of Nelson Mandela Bay was also tasked with wooing the vote of this constituency which makes up a sizeable part of the metro's population.

However, the factionalism that proliferated after the ANC's elective conference in Polokwane in 2007 where the ANC was divided into the Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki camp spilt over to provincial, regional, and local government levels. The Eastern Cape and especially the Nelson Mandela Bay metro became the battlefield for these two factions to wrestle for control over the metro.

The entrenched factionalism within the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay was not something that the ANC was unaware of. Olver (2019) states the following in an online interview:

> The ANC had known for many years that there was a problem in Nelson Mandela Bay. There had been stories of corruption taking place within the context of deep political factionalism within the ANC, and there were several media exposés around funds that were being looted. Even the municipality itself had done a whole string of forensic investigations. But what woke the party up where the national and provincial election results for 2014.

The extent of factionalism in the region worsened to such an extent that former President Jacob Zuma disbanded the regional executive committee of the ANC in 2015. Disbanding the regional executive so soon before the elections did not bode well for the ANC because just a year prior, the Kabuso forensic report on maladministration and corruption in Nelson Mandela Bay was released which exposed the extent of rent-seeking, patronage, and maladministration by the governing ANC. For clarity purposes, rent seeking happens when people try to obtain benefits for themselves through the political arena (Olver, 2016a: 5).

Responding from a national level, the UDM and COPE also alluded to the sustained maladministration by the ANC as a contributing factor to the decline in electoral support for the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay, and the DA's respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay also echoed the impact factionalism had on service delivery in Nelson Mandela Bay, stating that "the inherited affairs of the Nelson Mandela Bay was quite horrific" (National COPE respondent, Nelson Mandela Bay, personal communication, 28 March 2019); and Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 28 March 2019).

Another factor that contributed to the ANC's poor showing at the 2016 polls in Nelson Mandela Bay was the link patronage had with the deeply entrenched factionalism within the ANC in the metro.

In the end, the ANC became the ultimate opposition due to and as Olver (2016b: 27) stated that "although the 2016 election result was widely predicted by opinion polls to favour the DA, the outcome surprised ANC activists in the region", and as the ANC respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay stated, "we never imagined ourselves as an opposition, and we did not know what to do for some time" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

Consequently, what were the fault lines, which enabled the landscape in Johannesburg to such an extent that opposition parties, and mainly the DA could capitalise on to seize power from the ANC? This is discussed next.

4.6.   The factors discouraging coalition formation

There are a variety of factors emerging from the data which point towards the discouraging of coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Although some of these factors manifested themselves at different times in each metro, they remained largely similar. This was so because the parties to the respective coalitions were largely represented in both metros, except for United Front (EC), which only contested the election in Nelson Mandela Bay and not Johannesburg.

This section provides an evaluation of the factors which proved to be stumbling blocks in coalition formation and ultimately impacted on the preservation of the respective coalitions. It commences by assessing what role ideology played in these coalitions.

4.6.1.   The impact of ideology

Party ideology offers an environment of choice for the electorate (Rohanlall, 2014:14).   Within the ambit of coalition survival, several factors exist that can impact the longevity of coalitions in both the metros this thesis focuses on. At the time of writing, both the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay DA-led minority coalitions which were established after the 2016 local government elections imploded.

Insofar as the termination of these coalitions are concerned, respondents alluded to the impact of ideology and personality on the sustainability of coalitions. Both the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay local governments are comprised of political parties who, despite predominantly similar ideologies, must also contend with the EFF and its dissimilar ideological and policy position.

Regarding this, Mbete (2016: 604) states that "despite not winning control of any council, the EFF's electoral performance allowed it to be the kingmaker in several hung municipalities nationwide in every province except Mpumalanga". The status of kingmaker afforded the EFF the prospect of throwing its weight behind whichever political party it chose.

In the case of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, "the EFF decided against forming a coalition with either the ANC or the DA" (Mbete, 2016: 606). The resultant political conundrum for parties in these hung councils made coalitions inevitable. In addition to being ideologically divergent from the main protagonists (the ANC and the DA) in both metros, the EFF also pronounced its reasons for not entering coalitions with either of the two parties (ANC and DA) and described the ANC as a "party of kleptocracy and corruption", and the DA as "the party of racists" (Malema, 2016 cited in Mbete, 2016: 606).

Citing contributing factors to the collapse of the Nelson Mandela Bay DA-led minority coalition, the metro's ANC respondent had the following to say:

> The DA made serious strategy blunders insofar as the credit control policy was concerned because they would punish people by switching off their electricity and their attitude towards the Assistance to the Poor People (ATTP) where people would be given a certain amount of free electricity and water. The DA's approach was half-hearted because they saw poor people as a burden (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

The ANC respondent proceeded and gave a detailed account of how they went ahead and seized power from the DA with the help of three dissident councillors who threw their weight behind the ANC.

At the time of writing, an ANC government replaced the DA-led minority government of Johannesburg after the resignation of its DA mayor Herman Mashaba in 2019. Mashaba's resignation saw the ANC, DA and EFF fielding mayoral candidates. The same was the case for Nelson Mandela Bay when the ANC, UDM and EFF removed Athol Trollip as mayor.

Insofar as Johannesburg is concerned, Herman Mashaba became increasingly disillusioned with the DA and the election of Helen Zille as Federal Chairperson of the DA. Moreover, the ANC's return to power was also aided by at least one to three DA councillors who must have voted for the ANC's Geoff Makhubo as mayor. In Nelson Mandela Bay, a combined effort by the ANC, UDM, AIC and

UF with EFF support removed the DA-led minority government from office, and as Gerber (2019) remarks, "the PA proved to be an unreliable coalition partner".

In the case of both metros, the EFF played a central role in the implosion of the initial coalitions. This could be attributed to the ideological divide between itself and the DA. It was almost inconceivable that a coalition comprised of these two parties would see the light of day, and although the EFF never formally joined any coalition, it remained the one party that would make or break the coalitions in especially Nelson Mandela Bay.

Additionally, Chapter 2 alluded to Axelrod, which reinforces the assumption that parties prefer to form coalitions with ideologically congruent partners. Similarly, Timmermans (2003:2) states that "attention in government formation allegedly is focused on matters on which parties have congruent or at least compatible views".

Moreover, drawing parallels between Volden and Carrubba's five-party example as cited in Chapter 2 with what transpired in South Africa after the 2016 local government elections in Nelson Mandela Bay the South African experience did not prove to be as easy as this five-party example.

This is so because if one were to classify the parties who contested the elections in Nelson Mandela Bay: The ANC, EFF, UDM, AIC, UF(EC), COPE, DA, ACDP and PA be categorised ideologically and insofar as their policy directions were concerned, then one would find that it would be generally accepted that the ANC and EFF would much rather form a coalition with the UF(EC) who are socialist and workerist in nature.

The above-listed parties contested the August 2016 elections in Nelson Mandela Bay but did not end up as coalition partners altogether. Instead, the DA-led minority coalition partners were ideologically more similar- except for the EFF who opted not to be part of the coalition but to review its support on a case-by-case basis.

In the end, it would be EFF's stronghold as kingmaker coupled with its unyielding policy positions which led to the end of this coalition. Coupled with

uncompromising policy positions of parties were leaders who had equally uncompromising personalities which proved to be discouraging coalesces, and ultimately left coalitions vulnerable. This was the case in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. The following section focuses on this factor.

4.6.2. The impact of personalities

The intentions and personalities of party coalition leaders also has a bearing on coalitions. Leaders of political parties "must be perceived as competent to perform the difficult tasks of governance, trustworthy in delivering on promises, and approachable personally" (Caprara, Barbanelli, Consiglio, Piconi, & Zimbardo, 2003: 855).

Considering this, it is important to state that all respondents believed the personalities of political party leaders who were either part of or leading coalitions at the local level was paramount. In the Nelson Mandela Bay metro, for instance, Athol Trollip, the former mayor of the DA-led coalition had been accused of being arrogant by the Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

Additionally, a 2017 report by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group on the state of municipalities in South Africa states that "personality issues are a source of contention as has happened in Nelson Mandela Bay" (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2017: 1)

Commenting on the role that personalities of political actors played in a coalition, the DA's Johannesburg respondent thought that "personalities can make or break a coalition". He cites the EFF's relationship with the DA by contrasting Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay where the EFF continuously expressed its support for Herman Mashaba as mayor and in Nelson Mandela Bay it had a volatile relationship with Athol Trollip as opposed to the EFF emphasising's Mashaba's ability to communicate and engage with the EFF.

However, the respondent thought that the EFF's votes of no confidence against these two mayors invariably centred around personalities rather than policies. (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 11 March 2019).

COPE's respondent for both metros labelled South Africa's democracy as "incredibly immature where party leaders are focused on politics rather than governance". This is a profound statement and underlines what this study is aiming to achieve since the impact of the political affairs as they unfolded in both these metros had a direct bearing on governance.

As an example, the respondent typified personalities who were "strong and egocentric to dominate meetings in an attempt to drive personal political agendas where conflict between party leaders became commonplace" (National COPE respondent, personal communication, 28 July 2019).

Also citing the challenges that faced the DA-led minority government of Johannesburg, the Johannesburg ACDP respondent argued that "if some leaders continuously disrespect other leaders, then the potential for conflict increases, which in turn informs whether a party will exit a coalition" (National ACDP respondent, personal communication, 26 April 2019).

Both the ANC and DA respondents in Nelson Mandela Bay singled out the leaders of two of the parties that featured in the DA and ANC-led coalitions respectively as being cumbersome to manage and negating on agreed positions and not being trustworthy.

Highlighting factors that should discourage potential voters to vote for a coalition in India's 2019 elections, Garg (2019) mentions two factors that impact negatively on coalitions, namely that a lack of consensus among coalition partners stifles decision-making, and that a coalition partner can exit a coalition at any time.

Garg's factors were evident in Nelson Mandela Bay when the 2018 budget for the 2019 financial year could not be passed because the ANC, EFF and UDM were not present in the council chambers therefore a caucus was not obtained. Reporting on this, Spies (2018) wrote that "the almost R12-billion-rand budget

for the 2018/2919 financial year has to be passed before the end of June if the budget is not passed, the city's administration could grind to a halt, as any funds would be unauthorised, and could be deemed as wasteful and fruitless expenditure" (Spies, 2017).

In Johannesburg the same scenario unfolded when, as Goba (2018) reported, "opposition parties rejected the DA-led minority coalition's 2018/2019 R59-billion budget as not being pro-poor".

Insofar as the threat of a coalition partner, that was part of a formal coalition or as was the case of the EFF who only supported coalitions on a case-by-case basis, to exit a coalition was concerned, one would find that this was indeed the case. In Nelson Mandela Bay, for instance, the Patriotic Alliance and some DA councillors added their weight to the ANC-led opposition which included the EFF to oust Athol Trollip as mayor. Therefore, the longevity of a coalition is also under threat with political parties who are prone to change their allegiance at any time.

Thus, after attention was paid to the factors that fostered and discouraged coalition formation and the longevity thereof, the following section focuses on the relationship between coalition governments and good governance. For this purpose, the coalitions which governed Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay immediately after the 2016 local government elections have been gauged against the tenets of good governance. This is crucial since it links directly with the primary research question this thesis poses.

4.7. An index of good governance principles

Several publications provide crucial information and data on the performance of municipalities. Municipalities are mandated by the national government to produce this information and data in the interests of transparency into its affairs.

Regarding this study, it was deemed crucial to scrutinise a number of these publications to provide a correlation between the principles of good governance and whether these principles materialised in the two metros this research focuses on. Coupled with the responses from those interviewed in

Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, an answer to whether coalition-governed municipalities led to good governance or not emerged.

Examples of municipal publications include strategic plans such as the Integrated Development Plans (IDP), Budget Reports that include the Service Delivery Budgets and Implementation Plan (SDBIP).

Additionally, Performance, Annual and Oversight Reports are also important sources of information. Moreover, relevant policy documents such as the policy on Unauthorised, Irregular, Fruitless and Wasteful Expenditure, Financial Management and Public Procedure Manual are crucial to assess whether the implementation of policies was consistent.

There are a variety of entities that monitor governance, whether continentally, nationally or at the local level. Think tanks such as the Good Governance Africa which has a continental focus on researching to supplement the establishment of what they call more inclusive political settlements across the continent.

There appears to be a common pattern that emerged from the data regarding which factors promoted good governance. Chapter 2 (p. 19, par. 2) cited eight characteristics of good governance proposed by UNESCO. Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) adds the ninth element, namely consensus orientation and strategic vision. It is deemed imperative to state these characteristics here once again:

- Participation
- Accountability
- Transparency
- Rule of law
- Responsiveness
- Efficient and effective government
- Equity
- Consensus orientation and
- Strategic vision.

Re-stating the above characteristics of good governance, this section focuses on a selection of these characteristics. This is because the pre-electoral and pre-coalition conditions proclaimed by the DA have been used to draw parallels with what transpired in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros while they were governed by coalitions from 2016 to 2018, and whether this led to good governance, which as Prinsloo (2013: 3) noted, "begins with the political will to govern well".

It is therefore also necessary to reiterate the DA's conditions here below:

- Transparent tender processes
- Zero tolerance for corruption
- Governments to avoid irregular and fruitless expenditure
- To appoint a fit-for-purpose executive that ensures people who govern are the best people to do so
- Agreement on the blue light brigade
- Bring forward Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS) implementation
  (eNCA, 2016c).

Hence, the focus now shifts to looking at the rule of law, and how this was adhered to during the 2016-2018 coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, respectively. Moreover, it is judicious to incorporate the respondents' views on how these metros faired in aligning governance with the principles of good governance.

4.7.1. Good governance factors: Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

One of the founding values in the South African Constitution is the supreme law, which provides the foundation for the rule of law (Bester, 2017: 1). Citing four universal principles comprising the rule of law, Stein (2009: 293) lists the following:

- The government and its officials and agents (which) are accountable under the law

- The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental human rights, including the security of persons and property
- The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient; and
- The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or representatives, and judges, who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

The above-stated four principles closely connect with the rule of law being enshrined in the South African Constitution. Within the context of local government, the safeguarding of the rule of law must be a direct extension of the rule of law at the national level.

However, the lack of political will to enforce the rule of law and ensuring that communities were protected and that officials were accountable appeared to be rife in both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

The immediate questions which come to mind are how the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay coalitions between 2016 and 2018 used their tenures to guarantee clean governance and address corruption?

To understand how Nelson Mandela Bay has been brought to its knees, it is important to reflect on the ANC's term in office in Nelson Mandela Bay 2011 to 2016 which has been characterised by political instability, gross financial mismanagement, maladministration, and institutionalised corruption. ANC factions fought endlessly over control of the municipality's finances and tender processes bringing the metro to its knees culminating in political change at the polls in 2016 (Whitfield, 2020).

Whitfield expressed his view in an opinion piece that emerged from his position as a former mayoral committee member for economic development in Nelson Mandela Bay during the DA-led coalition's tenure at the helm of the metro from 2016 to 2018.

Whitfield (2020) highlights two points as pivotal to understand what he calls the "the fall, the rise and collapse of Nelson Mandela Bay" (Whitfield, 2020).

In an interview conducted by the researcher of this study a year before this article, Whitfield held similar views as expressed in this piece and it was as a result of this that the integration of respondents' views were considered important.

Consequently, commencing with some of the measures that the DA-led coalition executed to address the factors they considered to be at the centre for impeding the rule of law, the DA respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay highlighted its response to upholding the rule of law by the crime-fighting initiatives it undertook when assuming power.

This was implemented by resorting to technology to fight crime and installing shot spotter technology in the Northern Areas of Port Elizabeth which is notorious for gang-related activities. Essop (2017) describes this technology as "using gunshot detection notifying authorities whenever a shot is fired in specific gang-infested parts of the metro and yielded excellent results in the DA-governed City of Cape Town where it is credited for reducing response times and allowing police to analyse patterns of violence".

However, one of the major steps the DA-led coalition undertook, as its respondent stated, "was to clean up the inherited mess from the ANC". In this thesis, prior mention was made of the deep-seated factionalism and politics of patronage under the ANC administration and how this resulted in corruption and malfeasance in council. To counter this, the DA-led coalition introduced "an ethics hotline where whistle-blowers could anonymously call in and give information regarding corrupt and suspicious activities, we started to change the tide" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 25 February 2019).

Corroborating this, Spies (2017) quoted the mayor, Athol Trollip stating that by October 2016, these tip-offs led to investigations by Internal Auditing Processes and other directorates with Trollip vowing that not only would contracts be investigated, but that it would proceed with criminal action if wrongdoing was

found to have taken place, with civil action pursued against companies to recover wasted public money.

It was also noteworthy to mention that in April 2019, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks) raided the office and home of Trollip's successor, Mongameli Bobani. Bobani, from the UDM, was deputy mayor when the DA-led coalition governed Nelson Mandela Bay after the August 2016 local government election.

The above raid was related to allegations of tender fraud and corruption within Nelson Mandela Bay between 2015 and 2017. Sain (2019) reported on the matter as follows:

> The African News Agency (ANA) at the time quoted Hawks Spokesperson Brigadier Hangwani Mulaudzi as saying that "it relates to an investigation into procurement fraud, corruption, money laundering and theft which allegedly occurred at Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality between July 2015 and July 2017.

Also referring to Bobani as a cog in the system of aiding corruption, Whitfield (2020) states that "it became apparent that the values of good governance were antithetical to the values of the UDM's Mongameli Bobani".

Referring to the DA-led coalition assuming power in Nelson Mandela Bay with Trollip as Executive Mayor, Whitfield alludes to the incumbent mayor as moving swiftly to terminate more than R650 million in corrupt contracts, suspending officials and opening mayoral committee meetings and tender adjudication processes to the public (Whitfield, 2020).

From the above-stated, it is apparent that the good governance principles of transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency came to the fore. Moreover, what was significant was that these steps were direct implementations of what the DA as the majority party of the coalition set out as pre-conditions before coalition formation (see earlier parts of this chapter which speaks directly about transparent tender processes and zero tolerance of corruption).

Another prerequisite that the DA felt strongly about was that metros where DA-led coalitions would govern, would see the appointment of fit-for-purpose executive

authorities that "ensures people who govern are the best people to do so" (eNCA, 2016c).

Responding to this challenge, the DA faced a different challenge to the systemic issues that were prevalent in this metro. On this, the Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1 states the following:

> The first challenge we faced was officials that were not willing to assist the DA-led coalition which governed because the administration was highly politicised with people having allegiances with the previous administration who refused to cooperate and we had to turn this around (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 25 February 2019).

Addressing this challenge, the respondent believed that the DA was successful "to separate the administration from politics" He supported his claim by referring to the party's pre-electoral announcements that it would "reward people who were working hard, and deal with people who were messing up and we kept to that" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 25 February 2019).

The efficacy of the new DA-led administration was further highlighted by the DA's respondent 2 when he cited that the unemployment rate in the metro was reduced by two per cent when the metro insourced previously private security personnel.

A 2017 report entitled "The Nelson Mandela Bay Metro Socio-Economic Review and Outlook" by the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC) also alludes to the increase in the employment rate, but points out that the unemployment rate in the metro showed an increase over time from 23.8 in 2006 to 28.2 per cent in 2016. The report noted that the decrease between the labour force participation and the unemployment rate indicated a negative outlook for employment within the metro (Eastern Cape Socio Economic Consultative Council, 2017).

Also commenting on the economic outlook of the Nelson Mandela Bay metro during this time, the ANC respondent for Nelson Mandela Bay lauded the DA-led coalition for stabilising the administration after assuming power. Linking with transparency as a principle of good governance, the ANC respondent stated the following:

> They (the DA-led coalition) created a sense of stability in the administration and the media also reported on this since they (the coalition) opened their MAYCO meetings and portrayed an image of transparency. This was coupled with a certain level of professionalism when meetings were called" (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

However, despite the peculiarity of an opposition party giving credit to a party which had just wrestled power away from it, the ANC respondent in the metro also criticised the DA-led coalition and attributed its replacement in 2018 by a UDM-led coalition to "not taking things seriously that are close to people's hearts like township infrastructure and cleanliness".

Another point raised by the ANC respondent was the DA-led coalition's lack of economic development in the metro. The respondent ascribed this to "the lack of national contacts which they (the DA-led coalition) did not have". This point was significant because it highlighted the fact that although the ANC lost power in Nelson Mandela Bay, it was still governing provincially and nationally.

In no way does the former point imply that the two upper tiers of government would wilfully incapacitate the metro run by its political rivals. But what it does point to is that the ANC had an established network of contacts that likely would facilitate the approval and implementation of metro projects in a faster way.

However, the way things unravelled in the metro; even before the DA-led coalition assumed power was already a matter of great concern. The metro's ANC respondent cited the provincial government's discontent with the ANC's factionalism and the destabilising effect it had on the metro.

Insofar as participatory governance is concerned, the researcher petitioned a response from a former provincial premier who said that the governing ANC at the time held regularly *imbizos* (an isiZulu word that means meeting).

The Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent stressed the importance of engaging communities in issues affecting them, and stated that "people must be able to participate on the ground". In this regard, the former mayor, Athol Trollip held quarterly meetings with each department to see if targets were met and expenditure patterns were monitored in terms of local government grants" (Nelson Mandela Bay DA respondent 1, personal communication, 25 February 2019).

Accessibility and responsiveness are regarded as being available for communities by either providing the platform for such engagement or by a system where communities can voice their opinions regarding matters affecting them.

Respondents also alluded to regular meetings held at all tiers of government by the ANC, to quarterly meetings by the former Nelson Mandela Bay Executive Mayor Athol Trollip. Moreover, the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay also mentioned the system where residents could deliver petitions to the speaker's office with a timeline on the turnaround time for such issues to be attended to.

Accountability, which encompasses the financial affairs of these local governments were previously highlighted as vital. These included clean audits, proper allocation of municipal budgets and zero tolerance of wasteful and irregular expenditure. Transparency was also another important factor that saw the DA allowing the media to be present at MAYCO meetings.

A skilled workforce with suitably qualified personnel is also important since it supports good governance. However, to a large extent, this seemed to be challenging in Nelson Mandela Bay where political appointments and cadre redeployment were rampant under ANC rule. Moreover, as indicated by the Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, there was a reluctance from municipal employees to accept the incoming DA-led administration (Nelson Mandela Bay ANC respondent, personal communication, 26 August 2019).

Furthermore, Ngcukana (2019) states that "citing the National Treasury's Preliminary Report on local government and Expenditure Results, the DA stated that the Nelson Mandela Bay was ranked worst performing in terms of aggregate revenue collection, at 85 of budgeted revenue, as well as worst-performing in terms of expenditure, at 83.2 per cent budgeted expenditure".

On this, Makinana (2019) stated the following:

> The municipality was identified by the Auditor-General (AG) as the worst offender in the country for incurring the most irregular expenditure in the 2018/19 financial year. The AG put the figure at R12.3bn. It ranked tenth out of 257 municipalities in terms of unauthorised expenditure.

Regarding the rule of law, respondents in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay responded as follows to the question on how their respective parties either implemented measures to strengthen the rule of law or being in opposition like the ANC in both metros viewed these measures.

In Johannesburg, the DA respondent had the following to say regarding coalition led by his party confronted what he describes as "inherited" from the former ANC government of the metro.

Says the respondent:

> The DA-led coalition prides itself on its record of good and clean governance. To this extent, the Executive Mayor has been widely lauded for his anti-corruption and good governance efforts which have led to significant changes in the manner the administration operates (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 11 March 2019).

The respondent corroborated his response by highlighting the implementation of operations 'Buya-Mthetho' (bring back the law) as an example of the city's focus on the rule of law. Explaining this, he stated that "operation Buya-Mthetho and a strong forensic investigation have led to increased revenue by holding defaulters and those who do not pay their rates accountable" (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 11 March 2019).

The implementation of this operation was not immune to criticism from the opposition ANC when Jolidee Matongo described Buya Mthetho as "Mashaba's scare tactics" on residents of the city (Mahlangu, 2018). However, despite the ANC's utterances this crime-fighting initiative was launched by the Minister of Police, Bheki Cele in Tembisa on 2 August 2018 (Ngqakamba, 2018: 3).

Additional examples of the DA-led Johannesburg coalition were highlighted by its DA respondent when he listed the following:

- the coalition was responsive to the needs of the marginalised by prioritising and extending service delivery to the most disadvantaged communities. Notable examples included the introduction of mobile clinics which extended access to basic healthcare to communities far from health services
- the extension of operating hours of clinics to cater for greater numbers of residents that cannot attend clinics during normal operating hours
- the increase of the Expanded Social Package (ESP) threshold which is indicative of pro-poor and responsive government
- the City of Johannesburg housing budget for the 2018/19 financial year was the largest in its history, demonstrating the government's commitment to addressing the city's housing backlog (Johannesburg DA respondent, personal communication, 11 March 2019).

Commenting on how the coalition-governed Johannesburg went about upholding the rule of law, the ACDP's Johannesburg respondent stated that "attempts to root out corruption focused on sound governance and continued political oversight to ensure that good governance principle is adhered to and maintained" (ACDP respondent, personal communication, 26 April 2019).

COPE, which at the time of writing was both represented in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, had the following to say about how this party viewed the tenets of good governance and how it transpired in the metros.

Coalitions are regarded as fertile ground for a lack of accountability and where blame-shifting thrived and argued that coalitions were "extremely inefficient and

must still prove itself to effective in governance". The respondent contributed this inefficiency largely to ideological differences or political intent as alluded to in previous chapters. Overall, the COPE respondent believed that the failure of a coalition was overwhelmed by the bureaucracy which in turn "makes the coalition unresponsive to public input".

The lack of consensus is also attributed to "the influence of dominant political personalities whose intention is to control the dialogue" (COPE respondent, personal communication, 28 March 2019).

4.8.   Conclusion

This chapter started with a summary of the conceptualisation of coalitions by respondents at the local level entails as it related to the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros. This was deemed imperative since it served as a basis for the analysis of the data.

This was important and served as a vantage point from which the data analysis was presented in this chapter. The introduction was followed by an overview of coalition formation in these two metros and included a section examining the manifestation of coalition theories in these two metros.

Section 5 scrutinised which factors either fostered or suppressed coalition formation in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. Emerging from this, were key factors such as the current South African electoral system and the prevalent political landscape as well as the extent of which ideological similarities or disparities play a role in the longevity and efficacy of these coalitions.

The next section surveyed the relationship between these emerging coalitions and good governance. The primary data was complemented with a document review and analysed these two metros as they related to the tenets of good governance as well as the factors which contributed or detracted from good governance.

Adding elements from the literature and theoretical framework saw the critical presentation of arguments regarding responses to the primary research question this study probes.

Chapter 5 provides a closing outline and deductions of this study. A critical discussion of the findings is presented together with conclusions related to the research questions.

CHAPTER 5

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the overview, findings and conclusions of this study and concludes with the study's contribution to the body of knowledge. It commences with a general overview of the research problem articulated in Chapter 1 and provides an answer to the research question.

This is done by debriefing each research question to assess the hypothesis of the study which sought to answer this study's primary research question. The subsequent sections provide the findings and the emerging conclusions as they pertain to coalitions at the local level for the metros which this study focused on.

Moreover, the link between the research questions, primary data collection and the responses enunciated by respondents, augment the manifestation of the two dominant coalition theories this study focused on. Consequently, the research findings are concomitant to the research questions. This study's contribution to the body of knowledge concludes the study.

5.2. Overview of the study

The primary objective of this study was to provide an analysis of emerging governing coalitions at the local level with specific reference to Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. The selection of these two metros developed out of a curiosity of how these emerging coalitions would evolve and impact governance.

The changing voting patterns in these two metros indicated a sway from the traditional secure electoral support the ANC enjoyed in these two metros and created the catalyst for a re-alignment of power by opposition parties.

This shift of power, though not seismic, sparked a probe into how these shifts could become fertile ground for coalitions. However, the interest in and highlighting of the ANC's diminishing support does in no way reduce this study to one of electoral behaviour. Focusing on this factor was important to arrive at reasons why opposition parties, of which the DA was chief, making inroads into traditional bastions of the ANC.

Whereas it was the DA which made the biggest inroads into these ANC strongholds and provided the party with the initiative to lead coalition talks, the elevation of smaller parties to become necessary partners to these coalitions and the rise of the EFF as kingmaker following the 2016 elections were all very important factors which came to the fore in this study.

The impact that these coalitions had on governance proved to be complex. This complexity was aggravated by the multifarious nature of the party-political spectrum in South Africa.

For instance, the chasm between the major political parties, where the DA's liberalism and parties which were closer to it on the political spectrum as opposed to the Pan-Africanist and Marxist-Leninist tradition of the EFF and the ANC's ideology of African nationalism and social democracy made these coalitions extremely vulnerable from the outset.

Although the EFF which is opposed to the DA's policies supported the DA-led coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, the literature and research indicated that support came at a very high political price which adversely impacted governance.

It would be the above political undercurrents emerging from the 2016 local government election, and the reality of possible coalitions which necessitated the researcher to pursue an academic project of this nature. Moreover, the shifting dynamics of the South African body politic pointed to a gap in the body of knowledge on the link between emerging coalitions and governance.

5.3.   Summarising the sample profile

As mentioned in Chapter 1 under the limitations section, one major limitation was the reluctance of some respondents and the political parties which they represented to consent to participate in the study. It must be mentioned here again that in 2019 there was a general election in the country, and this contributed to these political parties' indisposition to participate because of electioneering.

Moreover, whereas the researcher envisaged petitioning seven respondents per metro, only 10 could be secured. The respondents who participated were either councillors or leaders of their respective parties at the respective local governments of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay or represented the national leadership of a party. The researcher attempted to reach as many as 14 potential respondents (seven per metro), but only 10 responded positively. This included high-ranking national and provincial leaders of these parties.

Respondents were chosen across party-political lines. The following parties were approached for each metro and their responses insofar as their willingness and participation are also stated here:

- **African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)**
  Only the Johannesburg respondent replied and participated. The Nelson Mandela Bay ACDP respondent did not honour a commitment to participate.
- **African National Congress (ANC)**
  Only the Nelson Mandela Bay respondent replied and participated. The Johannesburg ANC respondent did not honour a commitment to participate.
- **Congress of the People (COPE)**
  A national party figure responded positively and participated in both metros.
- **Democratic Alliance (DA)**
  Respondents for Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay responded positively and patriated.

- **Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF**)

    The national leadership of the EFF was unwilling to participate.

- **Patriotic Alliance (PA)**

    The PA respondent in Nelson Mandela Bay was unwilling to participate.

- **United Democratic Movement (UDM)**

- A national party figure responded positively and participated in both metros.

5.4. Overview of the chapters

Chapter 1 explained the study by providing an investigative analysis of the problem statement. It commenced with presenting the background of local government elections leading up to the 2016 local government election and accentuating that this election was the most important election at any level since the first democratic election in 1994.

Reference to objectives has now been made. This chapter also highlighted the sustained decline of the ANC which controlled these two metros over the years. This change of power which culminated in the re-alignment of political power by coalition formation was also presented and in turn, challenged the dominance of the ANC and its one-party hegemony that the citizenry was subjected to.

Although coalition politics was not a completely new phenomenon in South Africa, the lively debates by the different political parties were brought to the fore in an unprecedented manner. Moreover, Chapter 1 also contended that the contribution of this study must be viewed as an articulation of the foundation of how coalitions are configured in South Africa.

Furthermore, Chapter 1 enunciated the research objectives, research questions and research methodology that this study undertook in the execution of the research.

The theoretical statement was reinforced by the literature review which disinterred that the theories of party coalition were fundamentally based on the practices of Western Europe. Continental experiences, found on the African

continent also provided valuable insight into what was transpiring at the local level in South Africa. Mention was also made of two main coalition theories, namely theories of size and ideology and its subdivisions of office-seeking and policy-seeking.

The limitations of the study were presented in Chapter 1 so that the reader could be aware of the constraints in the execution of the study.

This chapter also stated the significance of the study by affirming that comparative analyses of multiple coalition-governed municipalities had been discounted in the literature (de Visser, 2016; de Vos, 2016; Jolobe, 2018; Bradshaw & Breakfast, 2019).

The second research objective is dealt with in Chapter 2. This chapter entailed an elaborate theoretical overview of the literature on coalitions, their origins and their applicability in South Africa, by dividing it into two parts. The first part provided an elaborate theoretical overview of the literature on coalitions, their origins and their applicability in South Africa.

This first part commenced with a broad definition of governance. This was done to lay a solid foundation of the theoretical perspectives which underpinned this study. Here, governance theories such as rational choice theory where it was argued that to comprehend the process of coalition formation, the concept of coalitions should not merely be confined to ideological and political frameworks, but that the rational interests of the parties involved in the formation of coalitions must also be considered.

Insofar as the systems theory is concerned, it was stated that local decision-making is made possible by local government, which is not obliged to emulate national governance, thus decentralising decision-making. This was especially relevant in the case of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay with the official opposition to the national ANC government, namely the DA, led coalitions in these metros respectively.

This section also focused on David Easton's political system theory and new institutionalism. Here, Easton's political system model illustrated how inputs

must be converted to outputs in terms of delivery. The new institutionalism theory on the other hand stresses the importance of the behaviour of political actors involved in a political agreement such as coalitions.

This section of the chapter concluded with a reference to the interpretive theory where it is suggested that factors such as ideology, policy positions, culture and the overall principles of a political party play an important role in people's preferences of a political party.

The second part of Chapter 2 proceeded to provide a detailed background of coalition theories and the accompanying theoretical framework. The influences on local coalition behaviour as well as the types of coalitions and minority governments were also presented in this chapter.

Chapter 2 concludes with a synopsis of the challenges facing minority governments and the constitutional requisites of minority governments in terms of the preferred electoral systems. Moreover, the first research objective which sought to examine the factors which contributed or detracted from the preservation of coalitions was addressed here. In this regard, a section that focused on the questions asked by Seyd (2002) attempted to answer questions related to the stability of coalitions.

Chapter 3 provided an overview of local government in South Africa. Similarly, this chapter reinforced the relevance of this study and suggested that the prevalent political culture and subsequent governance at the local government level in the metros were brought about by a variety of factors that were crucial for an assessment of governance by coalitions. This chapter also included a synopsis of the development of local government until the end of 2018 as it pertained to the two metros.

Chapter 4 presented an interpretation and analysis of the data collected. It provided a comprehensive explanation of the information provided by the primary sources and relied heavily on the secondary data for the construal and exploration of the study. Moreover, the first research objective was also focused on in this chapter whereby the factors which either encouraged or discouraged coalition formation are presented. A timeline of coalition formation for

Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay was provided and concluded with a discussion on the manifestation of coalition theories.

The vantage point was a summary of respondents' comprehension of coalitions at the local level. Furthermore, it was imperative to reaffirm the research questions postulated in Chapter 1 by combining them with the central research question.

This was done to track retorts on whether the emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay following the 2016 local government elections led to good governance or not. Another reason why the research question was reiterated, was to synthesize the data, literature review as well as a theoretical framework.

The primary data consisted of personal, electronic, and telephonic interviews with respondents who represented different political parties from either the local, provincial, or national levels.

It is considered important to restate that despite the researcher's best efforts, securing interviews and committing respondents to interviews proved difficult.

The reasons were three-fold: Firstly, South Africa held its general election in May 2019, and although contact was initiated in January 2021, potential respondents cited electioneering and demanding schedules for not being able to grant interviews. Secondly, the outbreak of Covid-19 in 2020 made personal interviews nearly impossible with a prolonged national lockdown.

Thirdly, some respondents also failed to honour set dates and times for interviews, whereas three political parties refused to grant interviews. In an attempt to compensate for the lack of cooperation from local councillors, the national leadership of their respective parties was sought. In this regard, the researcher secured interviews with a national leader and one deputy leader of two of the parties who were coalition partners in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Coalitions are not entered into in a vacuum, and it was, therefore, important to explore the type of electoral system which best enabled coalition formation. This chapter saw an integrative approach employed which disseminated the secondary data and integrated the primary data. This enabled the triangulation of the study since the literature study, coalition timeline, as well as interviews, were used.

The second and third parts of Chapter 4 analysed and discussed the factors which either contributed to or detracted from the preservation or longevity of coalitions at the local of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, respectively.

The fifth section explored the relationship between the emerging coalitions of the two metros and good governance. The chapter concluded with a discussion and presentation of critical arguments regarding elements from the literature review and theoretical framework.

5.5. Conclusions related to the research questions

This section presents the major findings and conclusions which were reached by this study. These conclusions are presented in response to each of the research questions stated in Chapter 1.

- **Research Question 1:**

To what extent do coalition governments lead to good governance, and which factors contribute to or detract from their contribution in this regard?

The answer to this question provided varied responses and these responses must be mitigated against the following factor:

The political affiliation of respondents and whether the parties which they represented were part of a current or previous governing coalition of the metro in question.

The literature is clear that the instability of coalition governments has a definitive bearing on governance. At the time of the analysis of data, the coalitions which

were formed to govern the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros ceased to exist. In Johannesburg, the ANC seized control from the DA-led coalition and in Nelson Mandela Bay, a DA-led coalition was back in power for a second time after an ANC-led coalition came into power in 2018. Given the research question, it is prudent to conclude how governance can be contrasted during each of these two coalition tenures.

The Eastern Cape DA leader maintained that its performance evaluation system held officials accountable when it came to the execution of their duties, and also highlighted that it received positive credit ratings. Regarding this positive rating, Paulse (2018) writes that "this positive credit upgrade from the American business and financial services company Moody's in the second quarter of 2018 was due to the municipality's persistently low debt levels and strong liquidity profile relative to its counterparts in the country".

Speaking to other tenets of good governance and highlighting its expenditure priorities and budget allocation, the DA highlighted that the 2018/2019 Nelson Mandela Bay metro budget saw allocations awarded to infrastructure, engineering and housing.

The ANC's general response was that the DA coalition 'failed to take the city forward' once it took office in 2016. Subsequently, it colluded with the UDM to replace the DA-led administration and having relegated the DA to the opposition benches, the ANC respondent admittedly acknowledged that the DA-led coalition stabilised the city's administration and was transparent by allowing the media to attend MAYCO meetings.

However, in 2019 when the ANC regained control of the Nelson Mandela Bay metro, this metro was, as previously stated by Ngcukana (2019), the worst-performing out of all eight metros.

Three years after the DA-led minority government took over from the ANC governed Johannesburg metro, its Executive Mayor, Herman Mashaba resigned and left this coalition vulnerable and unstable. Assertions by respondents which constituted the DA-led coalition concur that this coalition delivered good governance (see Chapter 4).

- **Research Question 2:**

Are there characteristics of coalition governments at the local government level which contribute to their propensity for good governance as it relates to transparency, accountability, consensus-building, participation, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, equity, and inclusiveness?

There appears to be a common pattern emerging from the study regarding which factors promote good governance. This is summarized next.

Accessibility and responsiveness are regarded as crucial for communities. This is done by providing the platform for such engagement or by a system where communities can voice their opinions regarding matters affecting them.

Respondents alluded to regular *imbizos* held at all tiers of government by the ANC, to quarterly meetings by the former Nelson Mandela Bay metro executive mayor Athol Trollip. Moreover, the ANC in the Nelson Mandela Bay metro also mentioned the system where residents could deliver petitions to the speaker's office with a timeline on the turnaround time for such issues to be attended to.

Accountability and transparency which encompasses the financial affairs of these local governments are regarded as important. This includes clean audits, proper allocation of municipal budgets and zero tolerance of wasteful and irregular expenditure. In terms of transparency, the DA respondent mentioned that MAYCO meetings were for instance open for the press to attend.

Finally, the role of National Governmental Organisations (NGO's) and civil society is also an important contributing factor to good governance by holding officials accountable.

- **Research Question 3:**

Which characteristics of coalition governments contribute to conducive or adverse outcomes for the citizenry of these metros?

Chapter 4 analysed the data from respondents and secondary sources and examined the factors that had an impact on encumbering good governance. The conclusions that could be made regarding the factors promoting good governance in general and coalition governance in particular stand in direct contrast to those factors which promote good governance.

A great deal depends on the political leadership provided by coalition partners. For example, the Nelson Mandela Bay metro's DA-led coalition was always going to be left vulnerable because of the office-seeking behaviour and actions by some coalition partners. This was also the case with the Johannesburg metro where the ANC came into power with the aid of the same coalition partners which were part of the DA coalition.

Some respondents alluded to coalitions that were "inward-focused" and appeared constantly to be in survival mode, thus harming governance. Coalition governance in the two metros was also greatly impacted by parties with opposing ideologies. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the DA-led Nelson Mandela Bay metro coalition was extremely volatile, as was Johannesburg, but to a lesser degree.

The intermittent motions of no confidence in both DA mayors over the two years (2016-2018) made it cumbersome for these governments to optimise governance. This was exacerbated with the emergence of the EFF as kingmaker and it became clear that the leverage that this party had, had an impact on the stability of governance.

A lack of oversight by the political leadership in ensuring accountability was also another factor that impeded good governance, as well as poor monitoring and evaluation. The lack of political will to work for greater coalescence in coalitions also had an impact on service delivery.

This was especially evident when parties in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay used their voting power to create deliberate stalemates by either voting for or against the passing of budgets. One respondent also lamented the highly politicised role of trade unions and the impact they had on governance by embarking on industrial action, which impacted service delivery.

Another factor that emerged from examining the data was that coalitions served as a means to an end since political parties used their stature as coalition partners as bargaining or trade-offs. As was illustrated by what transpired in the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros, these trade-offs were normally around a particular party agreeing to vote in agreement on a particular issue, a motion of no confidence. This was the case in Nelson Mandela Bay when parties like the EFF, PA and UDM later became political liabilities for the DA in its quest to govern effectively.

At this point it is deemed necessary to revisit this study's theoretical statement as set out in Chapter 1 and also look at coalition theories to ascertain whether these theories were useful in an analysis of these two emerging coalitions. Furthermore, should any elements of these theories that should form part of an analysis of coalition governance and minority governance be absent, then this should be brought to the fore.

The theoretical statement commenced with a statement on how coalitions could stabilize governance to areas where hung councils emerged post the 2016 local government elections. The assumption was that there was an association between the emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay with either good governance with its tenets of accountability and transparency on the one hand and poor governance with its tenets of a lack of answerability, corruption and mismanagement on the other hand.

The theories that this study examined provided much insight into the analysis of the two metros that were the focus of this study. Moreover, the theory of party coalitions is mainly a European phenomenon where it is utilised to foretell and expound parliamentary democracies at the national level. Although there were similarities of what transpired at the local level when it came to applying these theories, the social cleavage factors lent an interesting dynamic to how coalitions at the local level impacted governance.

The two dominant theories this study relied on to inform the analysis of the two metros were office-seeking and policy-seeking. The coalition experience of the emerging coalitions of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay post the 2016

local government election saw trade-offs of positions in both these metros. For the DA to realise its goal of governing Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay it was important to realise that it had to tread cautiously and not alienate potential coalition partners by outrightly claiming key positions in the council. What followed was consultation and deliberation on how best to configure coalitions to assume governance of these metros.

As previously mentioned, these coalitions afforded smaller parties an opportunity to negotiate for significantly more power or positions than they would have been able to do otherwise. This contestation for office carried over into the coalition government and had the chance of fragmenting such a coalition. This was indeed the case especially in Nelson Mandela Bay where the UDM and PA made life difficult for the DA-led minority coalition with its office demands.

Policy-seeking on the other hand assumes that party coalitions are necessary to realise policy goals. The divergent policy positions of South African political parties provide for fierce contestation along ideological lines. This does not mean that opposing ideological positions make coalition formation impossible.

There is ample evidence in Western Europe that coalitions comprising contradictory ideological positions can govern effectively. What impacts the South African experience is that coalitions at the local level are still in their infancy phase and parties who have radically different policy positions lack the political maturity to make concessions for governance to stabilise from a position of instability.

The liberal democratic disposition versus that of the Marxist-Leninist of the EFF is a case in point where their resentment if the ANC was not adequate to secure the longevity of the Nelson Mandela Bay coalition. Instead, what the EFF did was to hold the coalition ransom with its demand that the DA must agree to its position on land expropriation without compensation.

5.6.   The analysis of good governance

The key finding that emerged from this study was that the two metros that this study focused on, namely Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were characterised by instability. This instability affected governance and ultimately led to the implosion of the initial coalitions. There are a variety of reasons that can be attributed to the volatility of these coalitions. These are listed below:

• Parties who were ideologically more congruent and had similar policy positions would have made for more stable coalitions, but the reliance of these coalitions on the kingmaker status of the EFF made it vulnerable to instability.

• Whereas the experiences of continental Europe where parties of similar a dis dissimilar doctrine joined forces to govern collectively, the novelty of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay coalitions proved to be too challenging.

• The frequent stand-offs between coalition parties also led to the instability of these coalitions. This was the case in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay where the UDM and PA challenged the DA-led coalition for key positions. When the allocation of key portfolios did not go the way of coalition members, these members threatened to withdraw their support.

• The fact that these coalitions were incessantly subjected to protecting themselves by becoming 'inward coalitions' and being in survival mode, governance then suffers because of votes on, for example, budget approval are withheld until certain concessions are conceded to.

Only when one party emerges victorious with a clear majority and the need for coalitions are nullified, is a party then able to concentrate its efforts on implementing its policies and programmes and then can governance most likely meet the criteria of good governance. This has been the case of the City of Cape Town which is solely governed by the DA.

However, it must also be stated that being a majority party and occupying the executive does not always ensure good governance (as been previously alluded to). There is a multitude of local governments where poor governance

characterised by financial misconduct, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, corruption and patronage are crippling governance.

Therefore, it would be imprudent to assume that because Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were governed by DA-led coalitions, that these metros would have carte blanche to run these metros. The evolving political culture in the country contributes greatly to how parties operate when part of coalitions.

Moreover, the existing political culture might also be so entrenched that it makes it a cumbersome exercise to persuade political parties to become part of coalitions. Earlier sections of this thesis discussed the internal strife of the ANC in for instance Nelson Mandela Bay and its impact on governance when it governed the metro. This factionalism did not stop when it became the official opposition to the DA-led coalition in 2016. Since Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay were emerging coalitions, it was not too long before coalition partners began to voice their disapproval of the DA's insistence to refer to these coalitions as being led by the DA.

There is an element of mistrust among parties, and this makes it cumbersome for coalitions to be effective. This is exacerbated by the mandates received from the supporters of these parties. Moreover, even if supporters at the local level give a directive it does not mean that leaders at the local level have the authority to see such a directive through by, for example entering into a coalition since political parties are still centralised with decisions regarding coalitions at a national level.

There are, however, important lessons that parties can learn from being part of a coalition as it becomes an increasing reality at the local level as demonstrated by the 2016 local government elections. The 2019 local government elections appeared to be set for more coalitions to emerge, whereas emerging coalitions which, even though there might have been a change of power would want to consolidate power and insulate coalitions by making smarter choices when it came to who to approach for potential coalitional partners.

Regarding the above, parties will have to become more astute when it comes to their handling of kingmakers. In Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay,

one of the overriding factors for coalition formation was the communal detestation of the ANC. However, this commonality was never a sustaining solution to ensure the effectiveness of a coalition and its longevity. Quite the contrary since some of the very same parties who entered into this DA-led coalition made about-turns and threw their weight behind the unseated ANC to enable this party to regain power.

Generally, an evaluation of governance is undertaken bearing in mind the governance themes such as the strengthening of democratic institutions, the improvement of service delivery, the rule of law and the combatting of corruption. As was shown in this study, the DA-led coalition in Nelson Mandela Bay inherited a metro in distress due to years of corruption and malfeasance. For any emerging coalition or new government to turn things around, the environment must be conducive to counter the implementation of turn-around strategies.

5.7. The contribution of the study

The primary aim of the researcher was to provide an analysis of emerging coalitions at the local level within a South African context with a specific focus on the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. This analysis was done against the backdrop of what transpired post the 2016 local government election.

This study's contribution to the body of knowledge and the interdisciplinary field of political transformation and governance is found in the theory and conclusions which contribute to an understanding of how emerging coalitions at the local level are evolving from their inception to their termination, whether there were factors that either encourage or discourage coalition formation at the local level in these two metros and whether the emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay delivered good governance.

The study is vested in political transformation and governance. The contribution that this study makes extends to include political science where electoral behaviour and voting patterns of the citizenry on the one hand and coalition partners on the other hand, makes for stimulating analysis. Additionally, this

study also lends itself to the public administration sphere with its emphasis on whether coalitions at the local level present an alternative and improved form of administration.

Furthermore, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by juxtaposing an established European phenomenon to what is transpiring at the local level in South Africa. It also provides a platform for further inquiry into the emergence of coalitions in countries where the hegemony of the ANC as the governing party prevailed for so long.

Coalition theories emerging from Western Europe are insufficient to elucidate their theorisation of social cleavage factors that are unique to South Africa. By exploring the dynamics which led to the ANC losing support in these two metros which it singularly governed for almost two decades, this study also provides insights into social cleavage factors within the South African context in general and in the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay in particular.

These cleavages are manifested politically and are characterised by the voting behaviour of the electorate. It would be these voting blocs that ultimately led to what transpired at the ballot box for Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay in 2016. In light of this, this study posited that the prevalent political culture in the metros, coupled with disillusionment with the ruling ANC were some of the factors which resulted in a re-grouping of its political opponents.

The novice status of these coalitions afforded the researcher with an opportunity to track and analyse its course. The evolving literature on coalitions at the local level suggested a need to do an expansive study on coalitions and their impact on governance. Therefore, this study contributes to the growing body of knowledge on governing coalitions at the local level.

This study also provided a systematic analysis of the two main coalition theories, namely office- and policy-seeking theories by illustrating how these theories manifested in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. By doing this, this study demonstrated how coalition partners in the respective metros

exhibited office- and/or policy-seeking behaviour, and how the expression of office and policy-seeking behaviour affected these power-sharing arrangements.

This study concluded that the instability which characterised these coalitions made them prone to conflict and resulted in the implosion of these coalitions. These failed coalitions, which changed power intermittently, adversely impacted governance, and it is this study's assertion that these coalitions were not managed effectively and were compromised by the poor choices when it came to the selection of coalition partners.

This study also revealed fundamental fault lines in how political parties navigated their way around these coalitions. For instance, the role of parties who by virtue of the poll results are elevated to kingmaker status, can either positively or negatively impact coalitions. In both these metros, the EFF proved to be detrimental to the survival of these coalitions.

With the increasing discourse that foresees a coalition at the national level in South Africa, the researcher contends that more research is required regarding this assertion. In this respect, this study provides a foundation for additional academic research on the subject matter.

There is no blueprint that can serve as a master plan on how to steer coalitions. The political forces at work in South Africa are not static and whatever coalition arrangement is cobbled together must be cognisant of the important practical and normative differences which exist between single-party and coalition agreements.

Emanating from the research embedded in this thesis was the lack of pragmatic strategies that could have been applied more vigorously to improve the prospects of coalition governance in these two metros.

Entrenched ideological and policy positions will require concessions for the greater good of the coalition. This will require consultation with the constituencies of the respective parties.

The distribution and allocation of key MAYCO positions must be deliberated on in good faith and prescribed by binding electoral agreements. The absence of legal agreements meant that coalition partners could just exit coalitions, thus creating instability. The enforcement of a legal agreement with legal implications can secure stability.

Greater emphasis should be placed on accountability rather than selection. There is no guarantee that parties with parallel philosophies will refrain from challenging their assigned status in the coalition.

Inter-party conflict resolution mechanisms must be established and potential conflict must be identified and dealt with timeously. It is preferred that this conflict resolution body include the national leadership of coalition parties in instances where such parties are represented nationally. Similarly, intra-party conflict must be resolved to ensure that the commitment of party representatives is unquestionable.

The research also highlighted the role that personalities played when it came to the management of coalitions. In this regard, coalition partners in these two metros became mindful of the role that behaviour played in these coalitions. This was the case in Nelson Mandela Bay where the coalition was characterised by intermittent instability was incessantly under threat, and where governance impacted negatively these coalitions became introspective and focused on survival.

Pre-electoral consultations between parties pre-empting electoral outcomes based on thorough research and sound projections must be convened timeously and on an ongoing basis.

5.8. Concluding remarks

It can now also be concluded that the parties in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay who shared similar policy directives had a greater probability of cooperating, which made the entering into coalitions almost a certainty. However, this did not mean that it was an easy feat for a majority party entering coalitions. This was the case for both Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

where it could be construed that the congruence of policy did not automatically mean that these coalitions would work.

Also, as was alluded to in Chapter 4, the EFF shrewdly held its cards close to its chest, leaving the DA to forego any prior resistance it had working with the EFF. This was influenced by the EFF saying that it would work with parties that would keep the ANC out of government. However, after what transpired in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay, a coalition that was held together by a 'silent partner as volatile as the EFF ran the risk of eventually coming to a halt as it eventually did.

The European experience of coalitions was referred to in Chapters 1 to 3 and indicated that in some parts coalitions were unstable and short-lived, and although these trends were mainly from national governments, it was not unlikely that these could be the case for coalitions at the local level. From the research, it also emerged that the formation and maintenance of coalitions were influenced by several factors, all of which cannot be underrated in an understanding of the phenomenon.

The challenges of building coalitions and how this could be extended to effective governance are vital. It appears that to achieve the aforementioned political parties that are considering entering coalitions, should do an introspective analysis to establish to what extent they are prepared to compromise on their ideological and policy positions. It appeared that even though the entering and establishment of the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay coalitions were crafted at the national level, the true extent of the impact that policy differences, with especially the EFF as kingmaker and some minority parties really played out when these coalitions took office.

Moreover, what was also a shortcoming of these coalitions was that those parties who were closer on the ideological and policy spectrum should have engaged each other on an ongoing basis which would have laid the foundation for successful pre-electoral alliances. This is especially important at the local level because the hung councils and resultant coalitions indicated that South

Africa was gradually moving away from a system where a singular party dominated the local government.

This was also the case for Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay although there is evidence suggesting that coalition talks between the major South African political parties took place before the elections, the permitted timeframe to form a coalition led to rash decisions and problematic coalition partners, especially in Nelson Mandela where the UDM, EFF, and PA proved to be challenging. Therefore, if these parties could have foreseen a practical coalition arrangement, discussions could have been more thorough instead of waiting for the aftermath of the election when it became evident that a coalition government was inevitable.

Another factor that impacted the stability of coalitions and ultimately harmed governance was the conflict that characterised these coalitions. This was the case with Nelson Mandela Bay where this coalition was anxious from the start. It could therefore be argued that if parties who comprised the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay coalitions had established proper conflict resolution mechanisms at the national level, then the volatility which characterised these coalitions could have been handled more effectively.

This was true when it came to ideological and policy differences as being chief catalysts for conflict. Moreover, inter and intra-party conflicts also contributed to the destabilisation of these coalitions and affected governance negatively.

Moreover, the behaviour of those leading the coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay was seen as autocratic and this brought divisiveness to the coalitions and made them susceptible to implosion.

One respondent alluded to the importance of having a binding coalition agreement in place. This is important since the consolidation of political resolve by such an agreement acts as a legal framework binding parties to the rules of engagement when forming part of a coalition. The management of these two metros could have been greatly enhanced if coalition oversight committees were active on a national as well as local level.

What also emerged from the research was that trade-offs for office complicated matters in the two coalitions and stifled governance, especially in Nelson Mandela Bay. Respondents in both metros lamented the fact that legal agreements that were entered into before coalition formation would have created more stability. However, coalition partners who exited these coalitions created instability which negatively affected governance.

Regarding the above, international evidence suggests that if the relationships between coalition partners are managed properly and are strong and amicable, then the policy differences can be managed and the possibility of it negatively impacting a coalition can be minimised.

It is therefore crucial that the management of coalitions in general and the two emerging coalitions which this research focuses on be guided by a pragmatic set of strategic and shared objectives when it comes to governance.

However, what transpired in the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros was that certain parties backtracked on their commitment to the governing coalitions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the former Johannesburg mayor, Herman Mashaba, resigned from his position, as well as from the DA. This is indicative of the intra-party conflicts referred to in this chapter. In Nelson Mandela Bay, on the other hand, the DA was held together by Athol Trollip, although two DA councillors opted to side with the opposition when Trollip was ousted after a vote of no confidence.

What must not be lost sight of is that the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay coalition partners represented constituencies. This is important to mention because constituencies can also raise their dissatisfaction when parties enter into coalitions with rival parties. It was, therefore, crucial for the major coalition partners to intentionally communicate their intentions for power-sharing, and how they intended to serve their respective constituencies as part of a coalition.

In Nelson Mandela Bay, for instance, the PA felt that the metro was sidelining the metro's northern areas which are predominantly so-called 'Coloured'. This led the party to reconsider its participation in the DA-led coalition. In the end, it

was not surprising that this party shifted its alliance to the opposition to unseat the DA-led coalition.

Not only do accusations of marginalisation of communities make coalition parties who are the custodians of these communities fertile for discontent, but it also creates racial tension, which is well documented in the media where communities of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay cite marginalisation as a factor. Hence, these two coalitions also ran the risk of instability because certain coalition partners felt that their constituencies were neglected when it came to budget allocations for infrastructure development in certain areas. Mayoral committees and the top three positions were also contentious issues.

Moreover, as much as these emerging coalitions in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay provided an opportunity for improved governance, it is also known that they were formed to keep the ANC out of power resulting in minority coalitions.

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, these minimum coalitions proved to be vulnerable and prone to instability. Moreover, political point-scoring reared its head in both metros which aggravated the instability of these metros, especially Nelson Mandela Bay. This was rather unfortunate because the local government is the form of government that is closest to the people, and any disruption thereof affected service delivery and was felt by the very people these coalitions tried to serve.

Emerging from the research is the role that smaller parties played in the overall constitution of these coalitions. Regarding these coalitions, not all smaller parties realised that a large part of their survival within the greater scheme of things ultimately depended on where they aligned themselves. Cape Town's coalition experiences proved that it was prudent for smaller yet influential parties, to enter into agreements with a more dominant party which was well-resourced.

 An example is the Independent Democrats (ID), which was absorbed by the DA in Cape Town. The smaller parties in the Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay metros played a crucial role in the establishment of their

respective coalitions and proved that some of these parties soon became disillusioned with the way that the coalitions governed. In the end, policy and office-seeking overruled the quest to provide efficient governance despite these parties' minority status.

It also became evident that these parties became preoccupied with their activist role and failed to see that their constituents' interests could best be served by aligning with a more established party. What the PA in Nelson Mandela Bay, for example, proved was that it was undependable and prone to be used by other parties to further these dominant parties own political agendas.

Hence, the question arises that if the smaller parties can be assimilated, what about the bigger opposition parties? For example, the ANC and DA took a stance in these two metros? In the final analysis, it would be naïve to repudiate suggestions of an ANC/DA platform where the possibility of an agreement of sorts could be initiated. This has worked for the Western Cape at the provincial level and in the city of Cape Town. In doing this, accountability is shared, and the impact of smaller parties nullified for the greater good of governance.

5.9. Conclusion

This chapter presented the overview, findings and conclusions of this study. A section on the contribution that this study makes to the body of knowledge and recommendations on the management of coalitions was followed by an analytical discussion of the findings and conclusions regarding the research questions.

Each research question was examined to evaluate the hypothesis of this study by answering the primary research question. The subsequent sections provided the findings and emerging conclusions regarding the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay as fledgling coalitions at the local level.

Moreover, the link between the research questions, primary data collection and the responses enunciated by respondents, augmented the manifestation of the two dominant coalition theories this study focused on, namely office-

and policy-seeking. Consequently, the research findings are concomitant to the research questions.

The study concluded with an evaluation of good governance and confirmed that the efficacy or inefficiency of governance of these two metros are measurable to arrive at palpable evidence on whether it led to good governance or not. However, the conclusion made regarding the primary research question stands that coalitions in these two metros were too exposed and fractured and this led to greater volatility and instability insofar as governance was concerned.

ANNEXURE A

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

GENERAL/HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (GHREC)

25-Oct-2021

Dear Mr Kelvin Knowles KD

Amendment Approved Research Project Title:

An analysis of emerging governing coalitions at the local level with special focus on Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

Ethical Clearance number:

UFS-HSD2018/1559/1509

We are pleased to inform you that your amendment application for ethical clearance has been approved. Your ethical clearance is valid for twelve (12) months from the date of issue. You are requested to submit the final report of your study/research project to the ethics office.

Should you require more time to complete this research, please apply for an extension. Thank you for notifying the ethics committee of the changes/amendments that have been made to your study; we wish you the best of luck and success with your research.

Yours sincerely

Dr Adri Du Plessis

Chairperson: General/Human Research Ethics Committee

Dr Adri du Plessis

Digitally signed by Dr Adri du Plessis Date: 2021.10.25	205 Nelson Mandela Drive P.O. Box 339 Park West	Bloemfontein 9300 Tel: +27 (0)51401933 duplessisA@ufs.ac.za
18:28:04 +02'00'	Bloemfontein 9301 South Africa	www.ufs.ac.za

ANNEXURE B

GIFT AND RELEASE AGREEMENT

I…………………………………… (Interviewee), transfer to the interviewer, Kelvin Knowles my interest and copyright to the interview that was conducted with me at ……………………………. on the ………. /…. …..../2……….

This arrangement in no way restricts me (interviewee) from sharing the same information with others. The Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, will, in terms of its mission and functions and subject to relevant conditions of release, make the information available to researchers and any other interested party.

I (interviewee) concur that I have been made fully aware of the purpose of the interview and the use to be made of the recording and the transcription by the researcher. I also acknowledge that:

- The interview material is to have the status of restricted/unrestricted;
- Should the researcher use the interview material for any research publication, I am not entitled to financial gain from the proceeds of the publication. Any revenue that may be acquired from this recording will be used to subsidise future research projects of the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State;
- The interview material be catalogued and preserved by the interviewer;
- the interview material may be used for assessment purposes and/or exhibition purposes;
- If requested, a copy of the transcription of the interview will be provided to me free of charge.

Other conditions of release specified by interviewee:

……………………………………………………………………………………….

Address and contact details of interviewee:

………………………………………………   Tel (h) …………………………..

…………………………………………… Tel (w) …………………………..

…………………………………………… Cell …………………………..

……………………………………………

……………………………………………

Identity number of interviewee: …………………………………………………..

……………………………………… ……………………………………………

Signature of interviewee Signature of interviewer

…………………………………….. ……………………………………………

Date …………………………….. Date …………………………………...

I, Kelvin Knowles agree to preserve and manage the material according to the conditions outlined above.

……………………………………………

Signature of interviewer

……………………………………………

Date

RESEARCH STUDY INFORMATION LEAFLET AND CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH STUDY INFORMATION LEAFLET AND CONSENT FORM

DATE

November 23, 2018

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

An analysis of emerging of emerging governing coalitions at the local level with specific focus on Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay

PRINCIPAL RESEARCHER NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER(S):

Mr. Kelvin Knowles

2016446912 (Student Number)

0723673310 (Mobile Number)

kdknowles1@gmail.com

FACULTY AND DEPARTMENT:

Faculty of the Humanities

Political Studies and Governance

STUDY LEADER'S NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER:

Dr. Ina Gouws

051-401 2014

GouwsCM@ufs.ac.za

RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE SECRETARY

Ms. Charné Vercueil

051-401 7083

Vercueilcc@ufs.ac.za

THE AIM OF THE STUDY

Coalition governance at local government level is the chief focus of this study. This qualitative study will compare two coalition-governed municipalities, namely the metros of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay.

THE RESEARCHER

I am the principal researcher and am conducting this research as required for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Transformation and Governance at the University of the Free State.

ETHICAL APPROVAL

This study received ethical clearance approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the UFS on 28 November 2018. The Ethical Clearance Number is UFS-HSD2018/1559. A copy of the approval letter is attached to this form.

THE REASON WHY YOU ARE INVITED TO TAKE PART

Your knowledge and insight regarding local government governance and coalitions at local government level is regarded as important in the execution of this research.

THE NATURE OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY

Data will be gathered from personal interviews, electronic interviews and secondary sources. A complete interview schedule will be used. A list of 21 questions will be provided to you in advance.

Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time and without providing a reason. Strict confidentiality is guaranteed. Anonymity is guaranteed should you wish to remain anonymous. If you decide to take part,

This information sheet will be given to you and you will be asked to sign a written consent form.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY

Your participation in this study will present a valuable opportunity to enhance the body of knowledge on governance at the local level in general, and local governance emanating from post-election coalitions in particular.

THE ANTICIPATED INCONVENIENCE OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY

The possibility exists that this interview might lead to the loss of work time. To resolve this, initial and possible follow-up interviewing times and locations will be scheduled at your convenience.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Confidentiality will be maintained by signing a confidentiality agreement. Should you wish to remain anonymous, then this will be respected and maintained. Your name will not be recorded and no one will be able to connect you to the answers which you give.

You will be given a fictitious code number or a pseudonym, and you will be referred to in this way in the data. Only I, my promoter and editor will have access to the data. Anonymous data may be used for other purposes (research report, journal articles, conference presentation, etc).

A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but you will not be identifiable in such a report. While I will make every effort to ensure that you will not be connected to the information that you share, I cannot guarantee that other participants in the study will treat information confidentially. I shall, however, encourage all participants to do so. For this reason, I advise you not to disclose personally sensitive information.

INFORMATION STORAGE AND NOTIFICATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

I will store hard copies of your answers for a period of five years in a locked filing cabinet and a password protected computer. The future use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if

applicable. If you require any further information, or would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact me on 0723673310 or via email at kdknowles1@gmail.com.

Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in this study.

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY

I, _____ (participant name), confirm that Kelvin Knowles asked my consent to take part in this research and has told me about the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of my participation in this research.

I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the information sheet. I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without penalty. I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal publications and/or conference proceedings.

I agree to the recording of the data collection method.

I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

Your name:

_____

Your signature: _____

Date: _____

Kelvin David Knowles (Researcher)

Signature of Researcher: _____

Date: _____

ANNEXURE D

RESEARCH INTERVIEW GUIDE AND QUESTIONS

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this personal, telephonic and/or electronic mail interview (email interview). This interview is being done by myself as the principal researcher for my PhD thesis in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of the Free State.

Please read the following information:

- The purpose of this interview is to collect opinions regarding coalition governance at local government level.
- All the information collected during this interview will be used for academic purposes.
- Be assured that all information obtained is confidential and should you wish, your anonymity is guaranteed.
- Your participation is voluntary.
- Should you have any question questions regarding your participation, please consult the attached Participant Consent Form.
- Please note that the response time for email interviews will be agreed upon by the researcher (interviewer) and the respondent (interviewee).
- Should responses warrant the need for the researcher to engage in follow-up personal or email interviews, or by means of other information and communications technology (ICTs) such as Skype and/or video calling, this will be communicated by the researcher and consent will be solicited from the respondent.

SECTION A

Personal Details:

Name & Surname (You can choose to be anonymous)

_____

Metropolitan Municipality

□Johannesburg   □Nelson Mandela Bay

Designation

_____

Political Party Affiliation(s)

_____

SECTION B

- There is no right or wrong answer to these questions.
- All responses are equally valuable.
- **Please answer all the questions either in writing or electronically.**
- Thank you.

PERSONAL AND EMAIL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is your understanding of coalition governance at local government level?

2. How was the existing coalition government of your particular metro formed? If it was preceded by a different coalition government, can you please provide insight into its formation? Please elaborate.

3. If the coalition government governing your metro was terminated, what, in your opinion was/were the reason(s) for such termination?

4. Did such a termination have an impact on the governance of the metro? Please provide examples to substantiate your answer.

5. Do you think that political parties must be ideologically congruent to establish a coalition?

6. What are the ideological and policy differences, if any, between your party and other coalition parties?

7. How do you think such differences impact a coalition?

8. Do you think that personalities of party leaders play an important role in parties either entering or exiting coalitions?

9. What contribution does the political party which you represent make to the governing coalition and governance? Please substantiate your answer.

10. If the political party which you represent is not part of the governing coalition, what contribution are you making to governance?

11. Does the current coalition deliver good governance or not? Please elaborate. If more than one coalition governed this metro, can you please highlight any differences in governance by referring to the following tenets of good governance below:

    - Accountability

    - Transparency

    - Effective and Efficient

    - Follows the rule of law

    - Responsive

    - Participatory

    - Consensus Oriented

    - Equitable and Inclusive

12. What do you think are the factors promoting governance in general and particularly good governance at the local level?

13. What are the factors impeding governance at the local level in general, and good governance in particular?

14. Which metro portfolios are key to ensure good governance, and does your political party occupy any of these portfolios?

15. What are the challenges facing this coalition government, and are any of these challenges inherited from the previous local government?

16. Can you list examples of how this coalition government addressed these challenges since it came into existence? Please substantiate by referring to amongst other:

    - Service delivery (housing, sanitation, water and electricity)

    - Economic performance

    - Crime

17. Are there any capacity constraints and how are these addressed by the incumbent local governments?

18. Do you think that this coalition government is developmental oriented?

19. Does this coalition government have the financial, administrative and institutional capacity to initiate development and deliver sustainable services to its local communities? Please substantiate your response by referring amongst other to:

    - The challenges related to service delivery

    - Financial management (audit outcomes, procurement, revenues, unauthorized, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure)

    - Transformation

    - Infrastructure development and the maintenance of infrastructure.

20. The White Paper on Local Government recommended that single-tier authorities be created in metropolitan areas. In light of this statement, what is your opinion on single-tier authorities as a way of redistributing resources and services?

21. How does this metro view and experience its relationship with provincial government and also with national government?

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