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THE PRESUPPOSITIONS
OF DAVID EASTON'S SYSTEMS ANALYTICAL
APPROACH TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

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FOR Teuni,
who saw me through

(I gratefully acknowledge receipt of a research grant from
the Human Sciences Research Council to make completion of
this project possible)

I declare that this dissertation
which I hereby present for the
degree of Doctor Philosophiae
at the University of the Orange
Free State has not previously
been presented by me at any o-
ther university/faculty.

P. B. Brown
.....

P R E F A C E

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INTRODUCTION

Concerning the Choice of Topic

This dissertation treats of the thought of Prof. David Easton as elaborated mainly in his tetralogy: The Political System ('53), A Framework for Political Analysis ('65), A Systems Analysis of Political Life ('65), and Children in the Political System ('69) which was written in collaboration with Jack Dennis.

The first question a reader may wish to ask is: Why?

A good question does not always readily receive a good answer. Why does one research the thought of a particular thinker? Why research the literature relevant to his thought?

In answer I may refer to Easton's own conviction that all research is occasioned by a questioning interest. Through research one hopes to increase understanding and dispel a measure of perplexity.

Let me explain. I was born and raised (socialized, as latter-day modes of speech would have it) in the midst of a cultural setting reflecting the influence of various world and life views. In line with the formative influences guiding my own development I hold to the conviction that any understanding of reality, naive or theoretical, is itself guided by spiritual forces. The central ideas of any view of life are both informed by and seek to relate to such powers as seek to claim man's allegiance in all that he does, individually and communally. Some, in Arthur Bentley's vein, may observe that for scientific purposes such belief amounts to spook-stuff which can only prevent and becloud the intelligence really required for useful understanding of reality. Let it be. It only goes to show that Bentley attempts to understand reality in terms of suppositions and convictions at odds with those that guide my thinking.

Towards the close of the previous and continuing on into the twentieth century, The Netherlands experienced something of the cultural dynamics of basic Christian conviction as expressed in the form of a world and life view by leaders (and followers) of a reformed (Calvinist) persuasion in the various spheres of Dutch societal life. One of these spheres, not without relation to the others, is that of theoretical/scientific reflection and its communal organization. In Dutch 'reformed' and reformational thought it is particularly Groen van Prinsterer, Abraham Kuyper, Vollenhoven, and Herman Dooyeweerd who paved the way in providing theoretical expression to a Christian world and life view.

Such expression was not the result of a straightforward process of deduction from a few basic tenets. Far from it. Rather, it sought to account for the variety of meaning proper to human experience in terms of concepts and ideas which in their coherence (theoretical thought must be systematic) reflect the integral meaning character of human experience in recognition of the Lordship of Jesus Christ over all of reality. It also takes account of theoretical thought which seeks to relate the meaning of life in its unity and diversity, conceptually and ideally, that is, theoretically, to other sources.

Dooyeweerd's philosophy, in consequence, though markedly different from neo-Kantianism, has indeed developed in confrontation with it, and bears its traces. Dooyeweerd's choice of problems as also his terminology reflects his earnest endeavour to communicate with this transcendental tradition in particular. This is by no means to suggest that Dooyeweerd's thought is neo-Kantian or that the material concepts and ideas

which he developed are relevant for a discussion with neo-Kantianism alone. It is to suggest that effective communication with adherents to schools of thought other than one's own requires that one comes to grips with the distinctions, concepts, and ideas current with them. Always one must enquire into their meaning as employed by the members of the school under scrutiny, and one must compare them to the concepts, distinctions and ideas proper to one's own theoretical views. In doing so one faces, at least in the beginning, a considerable measure of perplexity. It is not easy thus to come to terms with a school of thought differing from one's own.

It is to try and remove such perplexity from my own intellectual confrontation with behaviorist political theory that I have chosen to study the work of David Easton. Since Easton has tried to determine the nature of mainstream American political science and seeks to advance its course and cause, the study of Easton's work implies a coming to terms with much of American political theory, theory quite different from that taught at European universities until recently.

It is not easy to decide what we should call the school of thought in question. It certainly breathes the spirit of pragmatism as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey. Still, as with them, it has continued to be expressed in varying ways, ways that have come to receive their own labels, in political science as well as in the other social sciences.

Pragmatism has only recently come in for attention from adherents of Reformed philosophy; even so, its most recent developments have not been studied. It indicates that communication between the schools in question has been the exception rather than the rule.

Since world war II, various schools of thought (e. g. functionalism, structural/functionalism, decision-theory, game-theory systems-theory) have collectively come to be designated by the umbrella-concept of 'behavioral science'.

Easton is one of the more influential thinkers associated with the behavioral movement in the discipline of political science. My first encounter with his writings quickly convinced me that an understanding of his work would go far towards removing some of my perplexity vis à vis the nature of 'American' political science.

The first cause for perplexity on the part of a European who has been used to studying a discipline known for some time as theory of the state (Staatslehre) and who finds that this designation is fast becoming obsolete, is: What's in this name? Why won't the old term do anymore? Why must we call the field that of political science? Whence the pressure for this useage?

The sources of such pressure have been largely American of late. They have not been without effect. To find out what is involved in the change one must find out what is and has been the view of American political scientists of their subject. In view of the tone-setting and influential character of American ways of doing things it is important to find out. I say so, not because American ways of doing things, also academically, should be adopted point-blank as the ways of the free, but because, increasingly, they are representative of the standards, also in the RSA, in terms of which students of politics approach their subject.

Easton's The Political System takes stock of the development of political science , especially in America. Easton seeks to advance that science and to that end analyzes both its positive and negative features. He attempts to establish the scope of the

discipline and argues that it never was that implied by the misnomer 'Staatslehre'.

Easton's work, furthermore, hews closely enough to the basic tenets of pragmatism so as to ensure that his work will be of interest, directly, to political philosophy. Politico-philosophical topics are freely discussed. Easton finds it important to discuss how the political may be distinguished from the non-political; how political science differs from other social sciences; how they nevertheless do interrelate. He also discusses the nature of experiential knowledge and the place of scientific method within it. Clearly, his thought is philosophical in the general sense of the word, providing both ontological and epistemological views.

It is on the basis of such views that he attempts to direct political scientists to research tasks that he finds urgent in view of the perspective that he has systematically developed.

In short, of the many political science texts that I have acquainted myself with more or less casually, I found Easton's works to be the most useful as a gauge by which to take note of the discipline of political science and of the assumptions that have informed it. Coming to grips with Easton's thinking means coming to grips with political science on the American pattern. For the present author it has amounted to the beginnings of communication and confrontation. That confrontation is necessary. It is a pre-condition for communication.

The Plan of this Dissertation.

The over-all aim of this dissertation is to present a fair account of Easton's thought but then in such a way that its presuppositions and supportive motivations receive the fullest of attention. It is not my aim to present and discuss the model of the political system which Easton has provided in order to appraise its potential for application to a variety of subfields of political enquiry. Sufficient literature in which that is done is already available. Instead, we

will be interested in the significance of that model at the most general level of analysis as a flow-model revealing, systematically, the essential life-functions of any political system at all.

It is not my aim to present a rounded evaluation of Easton's thought in the terms of the school of thought whose commitments I share. There are several reasons for not doing so.

Such an evaluation would require more than I can now handle, certainly within the limits of these covers. It would require a) a solid presentation of Easton's views, b) a similar presentation of my own views, and c) an evaluation of a) in terms of b). It is a project I hope to complete; this dissertation may be considered as the first leg of the project.

Moreover, my efforts to date have been directed towards gaining a consistent understanding of Easton's thought and its position within the development of (American) political science generally, not towards spelling out my own commitments theoretically in such a way as to be readily understandable for those who share Easton's assumptions. Were I to attempt such a statement of theory now, it would be couched in a language that those who share Easton's world of discourse would very likely experience as jargon of an esoteric kind.

Our task then, is quite limited. It is to present the thought of David Easton in such a way that the politico-philosophical nature of his work will come to the fore as fully as possible. We will focus on his general and politico-philosophical views. The route we will travel is roughly indicated in the following paragraphs.

Since Easton is both impressed with and concerned about the state of political science in America, he addresses himself to the organized discipline of political science in America as one of its

practitioners. Aware that modern political science is antedated by a long history of political thought distinguishable from it, Easton pays attention to the place of modern political science against the backdrop of that history. In the first chapter we will see just what, according to Easton, distinguishes American political science from earlier political knowledge and we will present Easton's views of the development of political science in America. It will provide us with a sense of the vantage-point from which Easton has sought to further the cause of political science.

The second chapter discusses the various kinds of theory Easton considers important for a balanced development of political science. These are: value-theory, causal theory, and reformative theory. Of reformative theory Easton is critical for stopping short of providing both the general theory needed and possible today and the applied science to be founded on it, and for not providing the kind of value-theory that is now required. Adequate understanding requires the fullest possible development of both causal and value theory while reformative theory tends to siphon the energies of the discipline away from doing so, being content, instead, to settle for a premature combination of underdeveloped value and causal theory in order to meet the practical demands made upon the discipline by society.

American political science has reflected too great a willingness to focus its energies on ad hoc reform-oriented theory while it has closed its eyes to the needs for causal and value theory. It has not consistently sought valid generalizations for political life, when- and wherever, as a system of human, organized, social behavior; nor has it consciously sought to understand its values in terms of the situational possibilities of

their realization. Since the development of causal theory at the most general level is a prerequisite for the development of value theory of the kind that Easton is looking for, and since it is such causal theory that Easton himself seeks to elaborate, we will pay considerable attention to what Easton has to say about its nature.

Chapter three follows Easton in his efforts to define and establish the focus of interest of the discipline of political science by defining the range of phenomena which cohere sufficiently for analytical purposes to allow for their analysis in systemic terms. It leads us into a general discussion of the idea of the political system.

Chapter four presents the implications, in broad outline, of the idea of the political system for the analysis of political life, by taking seriously the notions of system, environment, feedback, and response. It leads to the presentation of the flow-model of political life. This model has been presented as the quintessence of Easton's contribution but usually without sufficient attention to the matrix of thought underlying it.

Chapter five will briefly present the context and content of Easton's presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1969 which has been seen by some as a recantation on Easton's part. We will see that it is, instead, of a piece with his earlier thought as we have interpreted it.

Chapter six has been occasioned by the publication of the First Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council. It points to kinship between the assumptions underlying the Committee's Report and those of Easton. The intent is merely to establish kinship at the level of assumptions, not a discussion of the implications of these for the political views and recommendations advanced by the committee.

Finally, it should be observed that I have largely kept the text of the chapters expository, restricting the expression of my own judgement largely to the notes following the chapters. Footnotes in the text refer to such notes at the end of the chapter. For other references I have made use of the Harvard method in referring to author, year of publication and page in my text between brackets. The complete details can then be gleaned from the bibliography.

I have not written a separate chapter about the wealth of literature referring to Easton's work; it would have been too encompassing. Nor have I dealt much with that literature in the text since that would interrupt the flow of presenting Easton's thought there to too great an extent. Hence my bibliography is annotated to some extent in the hope of thus providing the necessary introductory material to the prospective student of Easton's thought and its treatment in the discipline.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Political Science. An American Discipline?

1.1 A Common Assessment

Non-Americans familiar with the literature produced by American political scientists have had ample occasion to reflect on the implications of speaking about political science as an American science since this ill-formed concept¹⁾ crops up everywhere in American political science textbooks. Phrases such as 'the American discipline of political science', 'the American science of politics', or simply 'American political science' abound.²⁾ Easton is no exception.

There is something curious about this usage. It is difficult to conceive of any other field of learning as 'American'. The American science of psychology, sociology, physics, or theology? Come now... But American political science seems to be acceptable enough. Why is that?

Could it be a matter of origins? Can it be said that whereas the founders of physics, psychology, and sociology, for example, were Europeans, Americans first gave rise to political science? And if so, does that explain what is at stake in this usage sufficiently? Would that justify this usage?

Heinz Eulau and James March observe that political science has "its very beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century" and they certainly do mean 'in America'. (Eulau, March, 1969:5/6) It is then and there, that, according to them, an attempt was made a) to define political phenomena in terms theoretically relevant, and b) to search for units and levels of analysis in terms of which the scientific study of politics can be most fruitfully conducted (Eulau, March, 1969:5/6). This is one of the most slipshod presentations of the case for political science's genesis and growth in the U.S.A. It implies that thought about political phenomena

elsewhere and previously was not undertaken in terms theoretically relevant or concerned with the fruitful conduct and furtherance of political science.

More sophisticated presentations of the argument have been advanced, among them that of David Easton in his The Political System.

Not all who speak of American political science will do so on the ground that Americans first defined the field and followed proper methods for its analysis as do Eulau and March. Others focus on the independent organization of political science as an academic discipline, as a teaching profession. This organization took place during the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Dwight Waldo, for example, calls this an important event in the history of the study of politics and observes: "Reflecting in its origins a national experience, the 'creation of political science' also interacts in the shaping of that experience as the twentieth century advances and, indeed, becomes a potent influence in the study of politics in much of the world." (Waldo, in: Greenstein, Polsby, 1975 : 6/23) This not only suggests that a science is to be recognized as such once its practitioners have organized themselves for the purpose, as in America for political science, but also that American political science has been internationalized.

Indeed, Eulau and March also devote much attention to the academic and professional organization of the discipline. (Eulau, March, 1969: passim). Waldo goes so far as to relate the identity of political science to the subculture provided with its organization: "Some of the integrating forces (ensuring the identity of political science, P. B.) are socio-psychological. Those who are (so to speak) socialized into the subculture known as political science and whose social position, livelihood, and personal sense of iden-

tity are associated with the fortunes of political science have a natural interest in ensuring its identity, integrity, and prosperity. "(Waldo, in: Greenstein, Polsby, 1975:74)

Certainly one can admit to influences of such organizational factors upon the thinking of political scientists without losing sight of the distinction between organizational factors and the activity which that organizational activity is to serve. Waldo is not alone in suggesting that this distinction becomes blurred if it is true, as he says, that organization helps to account for "the more conscious attempts at defining the 'political' or the 'scientific', alone or in relation to each other, in a manner that will command the acceptance of those willing to march under the political science ensign". (Waldo, in: Greenstein, Polsby (1975: 74).

Significant among those attempts, certainly, is that of Easton. It would be worthwhile to weigh the merits of Waldo's suggestion with respect to Easton's work. To what extent is Easton's motivation that of enhancing the discipline of political science as organized profession? ³⁾

That the identity of political science in America is to be understood in terms of its organization as much as by its scientific character is not suggested by Waldo, Ealau, March, and Easton only. All the major historians of the discipline, e.g. Haddow, Somit and Tanenhaus, Crick, Hynemann, Irish, Kariel and Haas, as well as Landau, would seem to share the point of view.

Moreover, even among post-behavioralists afraid of vested interests there would seem to be those who would agree. Surkin and Wolfe may edit a book entitled An End to Political Science, yet it represents a collective effort of the Caucus for a New Political Science (Surkin, Wolfe 1970:3) which sought to organize the science

differently. They wanted the profession to understand that it is and must be politically committed, not to maintenance of the status quo, but to the betterment of the poor and oppressed around the world. (Surkin, Wolfe 1970:4) Easton has all along sought to emphasize the need for commitment, though not at the expense of what he considers to be scientific understanding.

At this point one is tempted to enter immediately upon the issue, contentious enough among American political scientists, as to the presence or absence of value-commitments in the conduct of political science, and to turn to an analysis of Easton's views of that matter. We must resist the temptation and first take note of his view of 'American political science'.

Awareness of the general judgment that there is an American political science definable in terms of both professional organization and intellectual tendencies will help us to own Easton's discussion of it as an instance of this common assessment, but then a special, not common, instance of it.

1.2 Easton's Assessment of the Status of American Political Science. Initial Identification of Problems to be discussed

Easton too sees the rise of American political science as a separate discipline to have taken place "since the Civil War" (1861-1865, P.B.); "in the last quarter of the nineteenth century it was scarcely discernible as a separate teaching or research discipline"(Easton, 1965:38). Sometime after the Civil War political science began to show its individual status as a discipline as is apparent from its organization as a separate teaching or research discipline for, by 1914, even though on a small scale as compared with today's figures, political science was being separately taught at at least 38 universities in the U. S. A.

Already at the turn of the century the beginnings, even if not much more than beginnings, of the separately organized discipline of political science, were in evidence.

For the first time research into political phenomena could take place within a discipline separately organized for that purpose. Previously, the political had always been researched as an indistinguishable, implicit part of social science, moral philosophy and general philosophy, never as independent field of enquiry.

According to Easton then, American political science is born in the process of separate academic organization of teaching and research into political life as a separable dimension of the life of society. It was, indeed, an American achievement taking place within a specific, American institutional matrix which "has shaped and directed the growth of political science as a field" (Easton 1965:51) Organized political science is an American 'first'.

Two things are to be noted at this point. First, there always was the separable but not separated dimension of social life that we call political. Hence, before the separate organization of research and teaching concerning that dimension, men did face political problems and did attempt to deal with them. There was political knowledge but never of a specialized kind that comes with focusing on that dimension as separate from other dimensions of the life of society. Thus Easton can admit to both continuity and discontinuity between political knowledge prior to, and political knowledge following upon the separate organization of the discipline as profession. Secondly, the organization referred to was of immense importance in the history of the development of political knowledge. America did accomplish that feat first of all and

continues to play first fiddle in its development.

There are questions that come to mind. For example, to what extent has the American institutional matrix "shaped and directed the growth of political science as a field"? Easton answers: "more than any other science" because, especially, of the "proximity of political research to the social forces that determine social policy"(Easton 1965:50). Political science is out to reveal the actual locus of power in the community; it is "reaching towards an understanding of the... differences over... the authoritative allocation of values". Therefore political science feels the pressures of entrenched power groups not keen to have "the underlying unifying myth concerning the location of power" exploded by discovery of the real facts of social power relations. (Easton 1965:50/1)

Hence, political science is born free only soon to experience the restraining, fettering, effects of the institutional matrix, which, in America at least, was nevertheless such as to allow for the birth of the organized discipline of political science.⁴⁾

Easton does say that the institutional matrix is not the sole conditioning factor explaining the state of political science; there are other, even more important factors which help to explain the (rather unsatisfactory) state of the discipline. However that may be, Easton does observe that the institutional matrix is influential to such an extent in dictatorial countries that political science there is virtually extinct (Easton 1965:51). It would seem that the infant political science is dependent on a goodly measure of good will for its continued existence; the malevolence or benevolence of the social matrix towards the life-possibilities of political science would seem to be a mighty powerful determining factor for political science, to put it mildly. Political science must be desired by (the members of) society if it is to exist.

The goal of political science being the attainment of reliable understanding of the political system as a subsystem without which society itself would, as system, collapse, and that goal being desired by society, it appears that political science cannot and may not serve private ends but must serve this public end or value of reliable understanding. That is political science's democratic raison d'être. Political science must reflect society's values. Only the proper kind of values will support a free and proper reliable understanding of what goes for what in society. Political science, therefore, can live up to its task in organized fashion, in an open (democratic) society alone. This conviction may help to explain why Americans so fondly speak of the American discipline of political science. It is thought to be valued by American society. American values have much to do with the rise and continued existence of the discipline of political science in America.⁵⁾

Further questions come to mind. Does the rise of political science beyond America's borders since World War II, on the pattern of American political science, indicate that the institutional matrix there is becoming more like that of America? And would the absence of such political science point to the presence of a malevolent institutional matrix and ideology in such countries? Or do various countries with various ideologies allow for different sorts of political science? Why then should America's type alone pass as science? Is America's kind of society alone acceptable?

That such questions are to the point would seem to be supported by recent hot disputes concerning the pro-American bias, the status quo orientation attributed to current behavioral political science by a variety of anti- or post-behavioralists.⁶⁾ Easton has taken sides in that dispute and agrees that the bias was pre-

sent and needs to be overcome. (America may represent the best) of all societies that were or are, but that is not to say that it is the best of all possible worlds.)

It may also be asked what, on Easton's grounds, there is to prevent the conclusion that society not only allows but calls for political science of a kind, the kind that suits it, the kind it considers desirable. Easton himself does not hesitate to say that political science does not measure up to "what is expected of it, to the tasks imposed on it, and to what society demands of it". But what is there to guarantee that what is expected of it coincides with what may truly be expected of theoretical, scientific, thought? Could not America's institutional matrix be such as to have deflected political science from its proper path? Perhaps to an extent not inconsiderable? If so, what ideological assumptions did provide the lure for such deflection? Which assumptions could help political scientists keep to their proper course?

Questions like these are not easily answered; nonetheless they are to be kept in mind during our investigation into Easton's work. I raise them not to prejudice any argument at this point. I raise them because, explicit or implicitly, Easton must have views concerning them; after all, the questions are occasioned by his own text and they are so pertinent to present disputes in the field that one may safely assume that Easton has reflected on them. In view of the fact that Easton discusses the condition of American political science in The Political System we may expect to find some clues as to how Easton would answer these questions there.

First, however, we do well to find out what Easton considers to be the conditions which a discipline must meet in order to qualify as a science. Then we will be in position to judge the better concerning Easton's assessment of the status of American politi-

cal science.

It quickly becomes apparent that Easton does not take a readily optimistic view of the condition of American political science as though it were the best possible condition. Indeed, the present state of political science, says Easton in 1953, indicates that it is by no means the most mature of the social sciences. A science's maturity is by no means a simple function of the professionalization of a discipline for the "numerical strength of political science and its crystallization as a discipline are simply an index of the vast corps of workers now available" (Easton, 1953:38); and although the wealth of accessible knowledge through fact-gathering now available did help to gain some recognition for political science, yet "the condition of American political science is disturbing and disappointing... at least in terms of what is possible". (Easton, 1953:39)

Judgment as to the immaturity of a science implies the use of criteria according to which the sciences may be placed along a continuum showing the relative maturity or immaturity of a particular science. Easton mentions several indices to be used to that end. To assign to political science its place on the continuum we need to compare it with other social sciences. "Comparison with the level of achievement of other social sciences demonstrates what political science could be doing". (Easton, 1953:40) Moreover, we must also compare the social sciences with the physical sciences to realize that the social sciences are centuries behind. (Easton, 1953:59) That makes political science about the most immature science that one can think of.

Easton is quick to describe the development of a science in organic terms. Accordingly he speaks of the birth of a science,

(Easton, 1953:44), of science in the process of removing its swaddling clothes (Easton 1953:93), and of the maturation of a science. It presupposes indices of growth by which to measure the development of a discipline.

Some of the indices Easton mentions are as follows: a) the creation of its own meaningful vocabulary (not to be confused with unnecessary jargon), b) the refinement and precision of concepts

employed, c) development of special techniques geared to the observation, reporting, collation and testing of data. There are, he says, other features distinguishing scientific reason from common sense, but the most important, the foremost, feature of scientific thought consists in "its deliberate attempt to bring to the surface what common sense leaves permanently concealed"

(Easton, 1953:54).⁷⁾ Since common sense is common precisely in that it does not point up the relations among facts except casually, and since "where science has achieved a high level of development, transcended to a high degree the reliability of knowledge derived from common sense alone, there the enabling instrument was theory"(Easton, 1953:60), it follows that theory, showing the actual relations among facts, that is, causal theory, is the most important index of maturity for the development of any science.

Much could be said of these indices, but here it is enough to note that when Easton measures political science against them, political science appears to be in trouble. Matched against the indices mentioned, political science appears to fail on every count. It has not created its own meaningful vocabulary, its terms are all but precise, it lags far behind the techniques employed in other social sciences, and worst of all, it has shown no interest in general causal theory. Indeed, Easton's presentation of the case for political science as an American achievement is not a common one. One is led to wonder whether political science can

claim a birth-certificate at all. To any level of maturity to speak of, clearly, it can lay no claim, at least, not in 1953.

Political science is in such difficulty as to be hard put to explain the reasons for its separate existence. (Easton, 1953:42)

"Indeed, such is the state of political research that many a Washington columnist has an intimate insight into and reliable knowledge of political life envied by most political scientists... Unless political research is able to throw some light on the sources and knowable consequences of policy to give a more reliable picture than the insight of the well-informed layman - in this case the politician, the administrator, and those like top-level columnists or lobbyists, whose job it is to know - the existence of a special political discipline will indeed take a good deal of explaining". (Easton, 1953:42)

In The Political System that is precisely what Easton is about.

In it he explains how it is that political science arose and developed in America. He explains why its development has been stunted and slow, both when viewed in the light of what is in fact possible for it and what is expected of it. He explains how scientific theory, both necessary and possible, has been immoderately neglected and why this theory and its development should be a first-order priority for the discipline if it is to mature at all.

Indications are that Easton has explained convincingly. Twelve years later, in 1965, the need for theory of the kind suggested requires no argument. "Only a diminishing few remain who would deny the utility of efforts in this direction... the whole discipline has been able to shift direction and yet remain in basic control of its intellectual apparatus" (Easton, 1965a: 3). 8)

Curious in this context, once again, is the suggestion that political science (in America) moves as a whole. Clearly, Easton

would have it that American political science displays sufficient unity even throughout transformation, at least shifting, to be capable of treatment as a life-system, a living, persisting whole.⁹⁾ But it certainly does facilitate his characterization of the discipline in terms of birth and development towards maturity. At first sight, Easton admits, political science does indeed appear to be without systemic coherence, consisting of a large number of apparently heterogeneous fields (Easton, 1953:98); moreover, uncertainty about the unity of the discipline is also quite prevalent (Easton, 1953:96). That is supported by Eaulau and March who simply deny that there is a whole discipline. (1969:11).

Further questions concerning the unity of political science in America may come to mind if the unity is one of convictions and assumptions shared rather than, or as much as, a unity of subject matter. That is suggested by the following remark made by Peter Euben: "the relative political and social superiority of America is paralleled, if not enhanced, by a further judgment as to the merits of the behavioral approach (to which the discipline had shifted according to Easton, P. B.) seen, interestingly enough, by many practitioners and critics as uniquely American". (Euben in: Green, Levinson, 1970:8).

For a better understanding of Easton's views of American political science we do well to determine its position against the backdrop of the entire history of political knowledge as Easton, however sketchily, presents it in The Political System. Let us sketch the development of that knowledge in terms which Easton himself has suggested. Consecutively we will try to determine the character of political knowledge or 'science' (loosely used) in its swaddling clothes, in the process of casting off these swaddling clothes, and, finally, in beginning to show some signs of maturity.

Although this will take us beyond the time-span of America's independence and beyond its borders it is to serve for a closer understanding of the peculiar character of American political science and Easton's conception of it.

1.3 Political Science in Swaddling Clothes

1.3.1 The Swaddling Clothes

Round about the turn from the previous to the present century "political science was still in the process of discarding its swaddling clothes"(Easton, 1953:93). While doing so, political scientists were still discussing the limits of the field of political science in an attempt "to convince themselves and others that it was a legitimate progeny of social science"(Easton, 1953:93).

What were these swaddling clothes that needed to be discarded before political science could make its individual appearance?

The genealogy of political science is considerably more venerable than is the social context in which it finally succeeded in freeing itself from its original wrappings. As special discipline political science is but very young; that is not to say, however, that the questions which it seeks to answer were not raised and variably answered from days immemorial. They were, but never from the special scientific point of view given with the sense of a separable kind of data to be empirically investigated in order to be able to answer the kind of questions society has always asked reliably. The logic implicit in the organized nature of society in its response to problems facing it, demanding that certain kinds of questions be answered continually, had not yet resulted in the necessary consequence of a division of the labor of enquiry into society's problems as required by the logic implicit in the problems faced by society. Thus, prior to its emergence as a disci-

pline, a measure of political knowledge had always been part of a more comprehensive, not differentiated, body of knowledge.

In this, political science is not unique. Everyone of the social sciences, Easton observes, has branched off from an original, common and undifferentiated body of social knowledge. Such differentiation took place according to an intrinsic logic of development. That logic was aided by the very impact of the rapid expansion of knowledge making it impossible for any one person to master all of the available social knowledge. (Easton, 1953:100). "Over the past 2500 years the central body... of unspecialized knowledge, has gradually been reduced in quantity and scope by the divorce from it of the specially organized contemporary social sciences" (Easton, 1953:101). That one may speak of an impact of knowledge-expansion would seem to be justified in view of the fact that all these disciplines have come into their own within the last few centuries.

Until the eighteenth century the moral sciences, as the social sciences were then known, possessed greater unity than diversity "... But with the increase in the rate of research by the beginning of the nineteenth century, economics, through the efforts of Adam Smith, and sociology, in the work of August Comte, began to pry themselves loose from the main body of social thinking. Psychology too had by that time made some progress in separating itself from philosophy. And by the end of the century, anthropology... emerged from its swaddling clothes." (Easton, 1953:102)

The swaddling clothes of the social sciences? Simply the undifferentiated body of knowledge 'any one individual' could 'assimilate and comment upon', 'the proper topic for discussion by any articulate person who wished to contribute his share to an understanding of society'; sometime later: moral philosophy; later still:

moral science; and yet later: the social sciences. Finally, various social sciences branched out on their own, eventually leaving philosophy as a residue from which political science at last branched off. (Easton, 1953:102) ¹⁰⁾

Despite the fact that Easton does speak of the whole body of undifferentiated knowledge as a seamless web, still "distinctions in social knowledge have existed from the beginning of human enquiry into society" (Easton, 1953:103). That it remained one body for 2000 years despite these distinctions would have to be accounted for in terms of 'the paucity of information' about human activity; single individuals could master it all, and they were called the philosophers. (Easton, 1953:103). "These distinctions arise from the elemental fact that we are human beings who live in an organized society" where a variety of problems must be solved for the survival of any given mode of life. (Easton, 1953:103)

In sum, a variety of needs and problems of organized society continually require social (re)organization. When questions are raised about such organization, "about the functioning of society itself", investigators had to look at certain clusters of elements in the concrete world, systems of elements, later to be called by the names of each of the social sciences. "Through a long process of selection... each body of knowledge relevant to a set of key issues in which society has shown a vital concern" at last emerged. (Easton, 1953:104)

In A Framework for Political Analysis Easton has provided us with a neat summary presentation of the successive layers of swaddling clothes from which the behavioral sciences, among them political science, at long last emerged: "What we see is a development from indivisible philosophy, to a distinction between natural

and moral philosophy by the eighteenth century when, under the heightening prestige of chemistry, physics and biology these two acquired the names natural and moral sciences. Due to St. Simon and Comte the moral sciences became known as social sciences. From a repository for almost all knowledge, philosophy has been left as a residual category which until today has continued to shrink in scope and...to redefine its tasks. (Easton, 1965a:12)

1.3.2 The Nature of Political Knowledge while in Swaddling Clothes

Now that we have a notion as to the swaddling clothes from which political science has only lately emerged, we do well to look at the character of such political 'science' or knowledge as was part of the one body of knowledge before its differentiation from it. Since, prior to its differentiation, all the kinds of social knowledge now distinguishable were part and parcel of one body of knowledge called philosophy, such kinds of knowledge will all bear the characteristics of that philosophy, while the distinctions between kinds of knowledge will only be implicit, certainly not specifically and consciously distinguished.

For the continuation of organized social life and its amelioration society requires knowledge geared to the problem areas which it faces, its needs. The kinds of knowledge being wrapped all together in swaddling clothes, these needs are not themselves consciously distinguished the one from the other, hence the clusters of data relevant to meeting social needs do not come clearly into focus either; consequently, no relations are systematically established among the relevant facts in an empirically verifiable way. Therefore such knowledge is neither clearly focused on a socially vital field of study, on data which show coherence relative to society's problems, nor is it, therefore, particularly useful for the solution of the problems which society faces. To put it baldly,

such knowledge is not scientific at all. It is casually derived, vague, hardly marked by the indices of scientific sophistication so clearly visible in the physical sciences, and, albeit less so, in the modern social sciences that have left the body of knowledge to shrink to the residue it now is. It is the knowledge of common sense unaccompanied by specialized observation of data-clusters in the concrete social world, the knowledge of which is crucial to the solution of society's perplexities.

No great amount of acumen is needed to sense that this kind of view of the history of political knowledge will necessarily reflect on Easton's evaluation of such political knowledge as was part of philosophy before we became aware of the possibilities of differentiated scientific thought and research, to which developments in the physical sciences had pointed.

About the "2000 years after Aristotle, the first significant scholar to treat facts seriously", Easton is very brief: "few great social thinkers turned to empirical research" (Easton, 1953:7). It was from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century "that the western world became increasingly imbued with a faith in the ability of the kind of reasoning implied by the scientific method to solve social problems, empirical and even moral" (Easton, 1953:7). In its origin, as with Hobbes and Spinoza, "contemporary social science was a response to the work of men like Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei and especially Newton" while "the method of the physical sciences stood model" (Easton, 1953: 7).¹¹⁾

It is this orientation to scientific method, however misconceived, that distinguishes this social science from the thought of the 'great social thinkers' who preceded them and never felt "the need to examine the behavior of men more closely" than did Aristotle. Of such great social thinkers Easton mentions only Plato, Aristotle, and

Machiavelli, and, all of them, in passing only. One is inclined to think that Easton is pulling our leg when he calls them great. Such inclinations however, had best be kept in check until tested against that which Easton has written. He does, after all, say that the problem-solving, organized character of society is such that it has "compelled men to direct attention to certain recurrent typical problems" and also that the fact "that we can turn to Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli for insights into contemporary social (partly political, P.B.) problems vouches for the recurrence of these problems". (Easton, 1953:103) And Easton does, simply, call them great social thinkers. That Easton does not treat of them at any length in The Political System need not imply that Easton is not impressed by them, nor that he is simply critical of all that they have done. Just that they did not (perhaps could not as yet? P.B.) present political knowledge in the form of causal political science. Since Easton does not ever suggest that all relevant political knowledge is causal in kind, there is no direct reason I can see why Eulau and March should observe that "for a critique of this tradition (the great one of political thought, ancient and modern, eastern and western, P.B.), the best work is still that of David Easton, The Political System" (Eulau, March, 1969:147).

In saying so I think they wrong Easton on two counts at least: first, Easton is not at all concerned to discuss that tradition in this work except to stress the need for empirical theory, theory of a specific kind; second, where Easton does discuss the approach modern historians of that tradition have followed, he takes them to task for ignoring the relevance of that theory to both political action and empirical political theory.¹²⁾

To understand Easton on this score it is enough for present purposes to point to a distinction he considers vital, viz. that

between causal and value theory. Whatever Easton may have to say of causal theory, that is, scientific theory empirically oriented, (and it is the need for it that Easton wishes to emphasize in The Political System), it in no way detracts from his conviction that "we are compelled to project our moral views into an image of the kind of society and political system we would accept as desirable and in this way to formulate a view of what we conceive to be the good political life"(Easton, 1953:231). To do so is to engage in value theory, in a constructive approach towards moral clarification. It requires a "synthesis of values with facts to bring out the full meaning of values" (Easton, 1953:231). That approach, says Easton, is well illustrated by the political theory of any of the great philosophers of the past. The study of their thought in political science should, but alas, as undertaken, does not, provide students "with the skills and knowledge necessary to explore fully their own moral preconceptions. Indeed, it is precisely because students of political history have assimilated political theory into empirical and causal science"(Easton, 1953:236) and have thus robbed political theory as it has descended to us in the European tradition, of its earlier constructive role" that an ill-defined value-conformism rules the day in political research, giving the latter all the features of vicious circularity (Easton, 1953:257).

These remarks, although relevant for the issue touched on already, viz. that of the so-called status quo, pro-American bias of behavioralist thought ¹³⁾, here simply serve to let us conclude that political knowledge in its swaddling clothes was "a vehicle whereby articulate and intelligent individuals conveyed their thoughts on the actual direction of affairs and offered for serious consideration some ideas about the desirable course of events. In this

way they revealed to us the full meaning of their moral frame of reference"(Easton,1953:234). It is a function which empirically oriented theory, causal in kind, cannot, and ought not to try and usurp for itself.

To state matters differently, political theory in its swaddling clothes, prior to the emergence of political science, prior even to the notion of social science's possibility, as presented by the great social thinkers, quite in line with common sense even today, responded to the following questions: "First and foremost, what is the nature of the good life, that is, what kind of goals ought men to seek; and once they are articulated, what steps ought society to take to put them into effect as an authoritative statement of policy?" (Easton,1953:126) From these "flows a series of questions out of which empirical political research has stemmed"(Easton, 1953:126). That is: from value theory and the desire to realize the same, flow questions empirically oriented such as: "What are the actual authoritative policies adopted by a society? How are they determined and how are they put into effect?"(Easton,1953:126) These lead to empirical research and causal theory.

In summary form: political knowledge in its swaddling clothes is part and parcel of general social knowledge marked by a malnutrition of facts; hence it is value or moral theory in the main. This is not to suggest that value theory can make do without reference to empirical matters nor that empirical theory is unaffected by value theory, or unrelated to it. Generally speaking one may say that it lacks the division of labor implicitly required by the variety of recurrent problems that society faces. In that, it reflects the common sense knowledge of the common man who fails to make use of specialized data-observation in view of causally

interesting data coherences with an aim to solve society's problems through organization to that end. It lacks the indices of sophistication that we have come to associate with science.

1.4 Political Science in the Process of Shedding its Swaddling Clothes

1.4.1 Beyond the Borders of the U. S. A.

In consideration of the fact that modern social science presumably developed on the model of and in response to the physical sciences, especially as exemplified by the work of Newton, we find in it a newness distinguishing it from social knowledge prior to the development of physical science. As part of this social science movement, political knowledge becomes cloaked in the garb of scientific method, however ill-conceived social science's understanding of that method was. As instances of political knowledge thus attired Easton points to the work of Hobbes and Spinoza. Impressed by the finished product they mistook the method of physical science as though it were the method of mathematical axiology. (Easton, 1953:8/9)

Assuming that Newton's starting point consisted in the few principles which served to integrate a large variety of data concerning the motion of the heavenly bodies, they too began with a few axioms and derived a whole system of theory from these deductively, never realizing that Newton built on the basis of a variety of theories (partial) concerning data established by pains-takingly difficult empirical observation. (Easton, 1953:8) Their axioms, by contrast, were very casually established, introspectively. Their work can be characterized as "rationalistic speculation tempered by some attention to facts but not geared to a real attempt to stay with them by a process of controlled observation" (Easton, 1953:9). Thus their method remained at the level of pre-scientific thinking.¹⁴⁾ It was "not the results, however, but the spirit in which the research was conducted

that counted"(Easton,1953:10). At least they thought to adopt the "standards of valid reasoning of the natural sciences for the solution of social problems"(Easton,1953:10). The quest was on! The quest for experiential knowledge after the pattern of the physical sciences. That much can be said of the social science of the seventeenth century.

Eighteenth century social science, as instanced by Bentham, Rousseau, Helvetius, Condorcet, Diderot, Montesquieu, continued on the pattern of the seventeenth century, projecting and commenting upon it. In applying the mind to social issues they were, by our standards, "more speculative than empirical". By the criteria of the day however and "in the light of the slow movement towards the use of controlled, first-hand observation as a basis for understanding, they made their own contributions to the emergence of a belief in the necessity of scientific reason"(Easton 1953:11). Here too, the intention means more than the result"(Easton,1953:10).

The nineteenth century was indeed the age of scientific method. "The tremendous hold that the mere desire to be scientific maintained over men's minds finally became the source of an outpouring of social research". (Easton,1953:11) There was an ever increasing tendency to lean on observation, at first historical, but increasingly related to contemporary social behavior. "Comte, Marx, and Spencer are the triumvirate who dominate the century". (Easton,1953:11)

Easton's comments once again discount the merits of their conclusions and results and their preoccupation with premature system-building, to stress their complete immersion in something called the scientific approach. He observes that they would have disagreed as to the nature of scientific reason, but, and that is

important, they would have agreed "that without some painstaking application to the facts of experience - the positive data of the senses - no progress could be made in understanding society" (Easton, 1953:12/13). Furthermore they were alike in advancing immodest claims for social science, presenting massive theories of social transformation through time thus demonstrating "the infinite confidence these theorists of the nineteenth century had in the ability of scientific reason not only to give understanding but also to direct human efforts. Theories of progress are perhaps the most telling index of the state of mind in the nineteenth century. In them the optimism of the scientific method infected the historical method and led to the conviction that society was following the course of inexorable laws of a rational world towards its millennium.

The age was so ecstatic with its own presumed success, it seemed progress occurred not just as a matter of chance and reward for continued labor judiciously applied but as the automatic outcome of a rationally ordered world. The inexorability of the laws in operation served to demonstrate the scientific conduct's own helplessness. It is a view of reason beyond and yet determining practice quite at odds with a pragmatist view of reason and intelligence on the go, and holding its own within practice. Still, social science quickly set itself another task, viz. to discover the exact course of this progress as well as the means by which to smooth its path. "Optimism in the fruits of human reason!" says Easton, "could have achieved no greater heights" (Easton, 1953:15).

As Easton would have it, the novelty in the study of social life during the 300 years mentioned is basically one of mood, of spirit, of intention, of optimism, of the desire to be scientific, and of the growing expectations from application of the mind to experience

and its data. As to the results? The social knowledge derived from attending ever more closely to the data of experience, a gain indeed, was embedded in speculative, premature system-building on the grand scale. The desire and intention was towards experientially verifiable theory, but the results left much to be desired. The attempts of Marx and Comte to define the laws of social change were abortive. (Easton, 1953:43) Yet, belief in them did indirectly lead to "an outpouring of social research" of an empirical and painstaking kind, not in the least in trying to discover the precise course the laws were taking and to smooth their path.

This outpouring of research, I take Easton to mean, is the most important new development, in addition to the scientific mood, in the history of social knowledge and, implicitly, political knowledge, prior to the effective division of labor in social study. The very weight of the research data, and the size of the research task thus conceived was a pressure of moment towards the differentiation of social science into the social sciences.

The new mood, however, is of the utmost importance. For the mere desire to be scientific, not managing to be really scientific, is yet sufficient cause for the outpouring of empirically oriented research even if this was put to the service of speculative system-building. The mood calls for our respect more than the method of theory-construction; despite the method there was enough attention to facts to hasten the advent of the specialized study of society, also in the form of political science. Mood alone takes credit for this giant step towards the independent development of also political science with its own cluster of data. All political science required to that end was its own mode of analysis, causal theory,

not the substantive theory or philosophy of history of which the nineteenth century had been so fond; unfortunately, historical positivism, indicative of quite a different mood, was already busy making inroads into broad speculation, and served to delay progress towards the elaboration of various theoretical modes of social analysis. (Easton, 1953:69) Two moods are at loggerheads; the one outlined above helped to give birth to the struggling infant social sciences; the other threatens to devour them.

Will political science cast off its swaddling clothes and truly become a science on the model of physical science? Or will an anti-scientific mood lead to its untimely abortion? Easton has written The Political System to prevent it. Clearly the matter of moods is important enough to be considered more closely. But first we must take notice of the birth of political science as that took place in America, at least in the sense of a separately organized discipline.

1.4.2 In America

It was necessary to take note of the state of political knowledge from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century to understand Easton's view of the rise and development of political science in America, since political knowledge in America, until and even beyond the Civil War, was of a kind with that of Europe.

This state of political knowledge continued at least until the factual conception of science gained ascendancy. (Easton, 1953:69) Previously the building of factual inventories was practically unknown; thereafter, a view of science sprang up which became the basis for modern political research. Essential to this view was that the hard facts¹⁵⁾, the objective data about political life, needed to be discovered and collected.

It is very important to observe that this new view of science,

developing simultaneously with the growing organization of political science as a separate academic discipline, arose in revulsion against the speculative kind of system-building from which the most prominent American social scientists had till then derived their inspiration, many of them having been trained in Europe in such thought. Comte, Spencer, and, for political research especially Hegel, had been the early prototypes for students.

The newly appearing organization of a separate discipline of political science did not immediately reflect the new view of science as a fact-gathering discipline.¹⁶⁾ Instead, this new discipline concentrated on political history and upon the legal aspect of governmental institutions and this interest reflected and stimulated the continuation of a typically European way of looking at politics. (Easton, 1953:154) Perhaps one should speak of a typically English way of looking at politics, for Easton has in mind, especially, the influence of Benthamite utilitarianism which led to concentration on the legal aspect.

On the speculative assumption that men were rational in their activity it was suggested that a proper change of institutional arrangements, by means of appropriate legal prescriptions, would automatically lead to men's following them so as to produce the desired results in social life. "Within the terms of the structural rationalism of utilitarian premises, the lessons of trial and error need only be incorporated into subsequent modifications of the original institutions to lead men to conform to one's objectives." (Easton, 1953:155) According to Bentham all that was needed was a "new political structure based on popular suffrage and a rationalized legislature". (Easton, 1953:155)

This juristic, legalistic way of looking at political life, supplemented by studies in political history and value theories of

various kinds was endemic to the teaching of political knowledge prior to, but also following the Civil War when a new realism began to develop in reaction against it.

The legal was, however, a well-established approach, not easily dislodged, for "in the United States the juristic premises with regard to political institutions merged with the historical circumstances to entrench them even more firmly than in Europe". (Easton, 1953:155) After all, the Constitution "had been the product of legal decisions formally taken at one moment in history". (Easton, 1953:155) The Federalist was legal in tone dealing with a political structure that was still only a piece of paper, a set of legal injunctions calculated to organize the activities of men.¹⁷⁾

The Founding Fathers whose writings were among the major texts for political study, focused on the formal legal structure of political life rather than the actual activity of those in authority; they could only describe the desired relations of authority. This historically determined approach to the study of politics reigned supreme for almost a century, then to merge with utilitarian rationalism in America. (Easton, 1953:155) "The Constitution was studied as though men acted out their political life in close conformity with its directives." (Easton, 1953:156)

To understand the backdrop to the rise of American political science, then, it is, according to Easton, necessary, but not enough, to look at the state of political knowledge and the mood inspiring it, as it prevailed in Europe. The very historical establishment of the United States, with all its attendant political documents and citizen literature were apparently studied from the point of view of the Founding Fathers themselves: establish the proper legal rules, the constitution, and men will follow.

It cannot escape notice that, on Easton's view, this typically American, though historically inescapable, way of looking at politics differs in nothing from that of Bentham. The unavoidable conclusion must be that the speculative theoretical assumptions of Bentham had already become so firmly entrenched in America before Bentham as to determine both its political/legal practice and the study of political life in America.¹⁸⁾ This is odd, to say the least. Are we to assume that every new society inescapably operates on Benthamite premises in establishing political order? Were Americans Benthamites unawares?

I venture to suggest that what Easton calls the speculative empiricist tradition, with which he correctly associates Bentham, goes back far enough to antedate and influence both the thought of Bentham and that of the Founding Fathers. That, of course, is to suggest that the founding of the United States, the adoption of the Constitution together with the attendant citizen literature, all served to enshrine a particular type of moral philosophy in America, one that lasted at least until the Civil War served to cast considerable doubt, particularly among students of political life, upon it at least to the extent that this ideology was tacitly understood to explain the actual course of political life. If true, it stands to reason that to dislodge this approach to political study in America effectively, is to dislodge the influence of a publically accepted ideology from that study; indeed, no easy task.

Many questions come to mind at this point. Is it theoretically legitimate to view the Constitution as a set of formal legal prescriptions designed to call forth such activity of men as is considered desirable? What view of law, of the juridical, the legal aspect of societal life is thus implied? Is such a view legitimate? What basic assumptions support it? Empiricist perhaps? If political science, as a discipline, revolted against law so understood,

would the ensuing thought not necessarily, as reaction, bear the imprint of this ideologically determined view of law? Is not the Constitution the legal expression of a public legal community, whether in undifferentiated tribal or in differentiated modern form of state-life? If the founding discipline of political science did take its cue, increasingly, from, though in reaction to, a highly inadequate view of law, so that it has even come to neglect the legal as an important element in its subject matter, to what extent would this help to explain the sad condition of political science? It is interest in such questions, occasioned by Easton's expressed views of the precondition of political science in America, and interest in the possible answers Easton may provide for them, which requires that we first hold these questions in abeyance and continue to take note of political science in the course of discarding its swaddling clothes as Easton describes the process.

The general state of political science in the newly emerging discipline is well illustrated, Easton observes, by one of the basic texts in use as late as the turn of the century, viz. John Burgess' Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law

"which draws a sharp distinction between law and political science or the political and legal approaches to research. Political research, he writes, treats of the origins of states and constitutions... the way in which particular political organizations have arisen and the social forces behind them. Legal description on the other hand, explains the legal provisions for the organization of the state and government." (Easton, 1953:156) Easton's own comments are as follows: "It is clear here, in the light of the subsequent development of American political science, that what Burgess called political science in his day, was, in fact, political history and that the emer-

ging political discipline was already distinguished by an interest in the legal analysis rather than in the evolution of political institutions... Political institutions, it was thought, could be understood by describing the legal code. "(Easton, 1953:156)

This is interesting. The emergence of political science, says Easton here, was not characterized by what Burgess called political science, viz., political history (presumably the domain of history rather than political research, for Easton?) but by its interest in describing the legal code. What can this mean but that political science as an emerging discipline, in branching out on its own emerged precisely in choosing the descriptive study of law as its particular focus? This emergence was prompted by both the rationalistic assumptions concerning the relation between the individual and political structure ("change the institutions and men will follow") and the utilitarian preoccupation with the locus of formal political authority. (Easton, 1953:157)

"For the utilitarians, such as Austin and Pollock, it was a factual problem as to who actually had the legal right to create policy. "(Easton, 1953:157)" It was not, as with Rousseau, a moral problem;... with the later utilitarians who sought scrupulously to separate the moral from the factual problems, empirical research therefore restricted itself largely to describing the legal organs that had this sovereign right together with the various subsidiary organs utilized in its exercise. "(Easton, 1953:157)

It is here that, for the first time, quite apart from the external circumstance of the discipline's separate academic organization, political science truly begins to emerge as science. That emergence is given with the utilitarians' separation of the moral question of sovereignty from its factual determination at law, the separation of fact and value. It is in the emergence of factual/legal research

that political science worthy of the name, what ever else the discipline may have been doing, first emerges.

Subsequently, realist political scientists, reacting against the failure of legal prescription to describe the actual, neglected the legal as a real determining factor in political life to their own detriment, while the factual bent of orientation busied itself with ever widening kinds of facts actually discoverable as relevant to authoritative policy making. (Easton, 1953:157/8)

Though Easton treats of it very cursorily, this emphasis of the utilitarian legalists on the factual locus of sovereignty according to law is an extremely important link in the continuous development from the speculative but scientifically inclined, grand moral system-building of the nineteenth century to the emergence of political science's own empirical field of study in the twentieth century. Factual/legal research into the locus of sovereignty, quite apart from the question as to who ought to hold sovereignty, may be seen as part and parcel of the outpouring of social research to which the scientific mood, in seeking to emulate the physical sciences, had led in the nineteenth century. It is in this research that political science begins to come into its own.

This very research was subsequently rejected by the later realists when social disturbances of various kinds made it unmistakably clear that actual political life did not naturally follow the legal prescriptions established for it at law. It might well be observed on this interpretation that realist American political science has in fact, by neglecting the legal as an element in the field of political science, attempted to efface an important section of its own birth-certificate.¹⁹⁾ We may well be grateful to Easton for having drawn attention, however sketchily, to the legal as a crucial factor in the emergence of political science. He also deserves credit for pointing out to political science that the legal, even now,

should not be neglected in the empirical study of political life, in which it is a variable.

Prior to the Civil War, guided by the citizen literature extolling the constitutional arrangements of the U. S. A., nationalist speculative views did not appear to conflict to any great extent with actual American political life. The epoch had been one of "relatively peaceful linear social evolution when the going values were accepted without serious challenge and the power of traditional social groupings seemed comparatively secure"(Easton, 1953:162); hence, "political research could be indifferent to the actual pattern of activity in the struggles over social policy and concentrate on legal structure"²⁰(Easton, 1953:162) But upon the disturbance of this relative stability, adaptation to the changing environment demanded enquiry into the actual working of institutions. "The rise of industrialism and its complex problems of mass civilization, which became most marked after the Civil War, made American social scientists keenly aware that the solution of urgent social problems required more than broad historical syntheses or logical analysis of legal obligations and rights."(Easton, 1953:69) Following the Civil War, itself a disturbance of traumatic proportions, the inadequacies of trying to understand political life as a rational adjustment to fixed codes was highlighted. (Easton, 1953:162) ²¹⁾

Succeeding students increasingly felt that legal/factual research did not describe the active variables which influenced the making of social policy (Easton, 1953:157); they began to challenge the value of this kind of political data and started to ask "who has real power", "what are the sources of power", but, in doing so, forgot to see the legal as indeed one element in the political situation,

just as the utilitarians themselves had failed to see that. Political life was, by them, not yet seen as a complex web of interacting political activities. (Easton, 1953:158)

At the same time this emphasis on the locus of real power and its sources remained riveted to the study of governmental or near-governmental institutions and the facts to be unearthed there. The source of this turn to the real or actual, says Easton, is to be sought "in nothing so much as in the empirical revolution in Europe which took root in the nineteenth century", (Easton 1953:67) and it coincided with similar realistic developments in Europe as evident in the works of Maine, Lecky, Stephen, Marx, Mosca and Pareto to mention only a few (Easton, 1953:162). Such realism also arose in reaction to the speculative frameworks in which the 'outpouring of social research' had been embedded, as well as in reaction to legalistic formalism.

Away from the formal prescriptions and values and to the facts! That was the clarion call to which the discipline of political science increasingly rallied. The facts were now to speak for themselves. They were hard to come by; they could not be casually established but only through careful observation and techniques.

The question that requires an answer now that we have followed the rise of political science to this level, a level at which, basically it still is in 1953 according to Easton, is: to what extent can factual research into data related to something vaguely called government, and employed for reformative policy proposals, without any other sort of theory, be called scientific? To what extent is political science at this level to be considered mature?

Easton makes it unmistakably clear that in his view American political science has worked with a very narrow conception of

science over the past fifty years. (Easton, 1953:65) It has misconstrued scientific method, in reaction against the aberrations resulting from an earlier misconception of scientific method in social science²²⁾ to constitute an imperative, first, to accumulate facts with great zeal, and second, in the name of theory to discuss problems concerning the application of knowledge. The latter has amounted to premature policy-science involving value-theory but not causal scientific theory. Easton must conclude that American political science has been scientific only in its, on the face of it rather fragmentary, accumulation of facts. Basically the important literature over the last half century or more reveals that students of political life have been captive of a view of science as the objective collection and classification of facts and the relating of them into singular generalizations which establish causal interrelations of two facts. (Easton, 1953: 66) It is true that the kinds of data relevant to authoritative policy formation have increased in the course of the fifty years under discussion, having moved from governmental or near-governmental data to include those of a great variety of groups and groupings as well as psychological data (Easton, 1953:151).

Nevertheless Easton is none too happy with the restriction of political research to the discovery of facts. That he calls hyperfactualism. Hence he observes: "The American political scientist is born free but is everywhere in chains, tied to a hyper-factual past" (Easton, 1953:47), while political science, at least until 1953, suffers on account of an immoderate neglect of theory. In practice this testifies to a misconception about scientific method so serious that one can hardly say that American political science has advanced far along the road towards maturity. It

may have cast off the swaddling clothes of speculative nationalist theory to hew but to common sense insight in the selection of its data, and to value theory or ideology in applying them. Neither of these can substitute for the role that scientific, causal theory should play in the service of both the selection of facts relevant to society's political problems, and their solution.

American political science still finds itself in the first stage of development of any science (comparable to that of Newton's predecessors (Easton, 1953:8)²³), a stage testifying to the immaturity of the discipline of political science.

In turning to the facts and nothing but the facts, the infant discipline of political science may have succeeded in casting off its swaddling clothes only to lie bare and reveal itself for what it still is, in 1953, a naked, vulnerable infant struggling for continued life, struggling to persist, but doing so ineffectively for lack of empirically oriented theory; under the onslaught of anti-scientific sentiment presently on the rise, political science struggles even to sustain the scientific mood which looks for the maturation of the social sciences, among them, political science.

All this is not to suggest that Easton takes a negative view of what has been done under the banner of political science by way of factual research. Presently available inventories of facts, indeed, go far to awaken considerable expectation on Easton's part concerning what he thinks to be possible for political science. At the same time he maintains that much more is possible than has in fact been attempted. More ought to have been accomplished on the road of the discipline's maturation.

He also draws some hope from those signs that indicate considerable soul-searching to be taking place in the discipline, and even more from the presence of isolated attempts at theory development on the narrow-gauge level. The fact that it is, in 1953, possible to begin thinking of devoting resources to theory construction at the most general level for the discipline fills him with hope, a hope that political science will soon take sizeable steps to effectuate its maturation. It is to the development of general theory that political science looks for its maturation. Easton wishes to contribute to it in The Political System by arguing for its need in the face of all the forces beclouding it.

1.5 Political Science on the Way to Maturity

In the second volume of Easton's tetralogy, A Framework for Political Analysis, which appeared twelve years after The Political System, Easton's judgment concerning the state of the discipline of American political science is much more positive, as compared to his 1953 evaluation. "Nothing testifies more eloquently to the growing strength of empirical political theory than the conviction that now, after twenty-five hundred years of development, it is for the first time possible to think of building a publication series out of volumes devoted exclusively to the construction of such theory. The series is itself a sign of the times...we are in a process of transition in political science toward a more rigorous science". (Easton, 1965a:vii/viii) Furthermore, a brief outline of the basic concepts of a systems analysis of political life, published in World Politics, Americana, as well as in the Italian edition of The Political System, has met favorable reception and is already being applied in research by several scholars; if, Easton observes, A Framework for Political Analysis seems thereby to have lost some of its novelty, there is compensation: "I have a considerable

amount of quite unexpected application and testing of concepts quite similar to those I have proposed". In the footnote on the same page Easton refers to the work by M. Weiner, T. Parsons, G. A. Almond, S. Verba, W. C. Mitchell and observes with restrained optimism: "not that others have always interpreted the concepts in precisely the same way as they appeared in the World Politics article of 1957. But they are sufficiently similar in interpretation to enable us to begin think of at least a coalescence or convergence of basic theoretical perspectives. If this is so, we have indeed moved a long way from the condition in which our discipline found itself at the time The Political System was published in 1953". (Easton, 1965a:xi)

The greater optimism is also clear from the following: "When my volume, The Political System, was first published, there was a transparent need to argue the case for the construction of empirically oriented general theory in political science. It is an index of the gargantuan strides that have been made in the development of political science as a discipline that what was then an entirely appropriate subject for intense discussion, has now come to be taken for granted... Only a diminishing and archaic few remain who would deny the utility of efforts in this direction. (Easton, 1965a:3)"The whole discipline has been able to shift direction and yet remain in basic control of its intellectual apparatus... It stands as testimony to the rich reservoir of talent, skills, and inherited knowledge that have become embedded in political science as a discipline. In so short a time a revolution in general perspectives has occurred, new concepts are being proliferated at an ever increasing pace, and new conceptual structures, with varying degrees of explicitness, have been advanced for research and serious consideration. All this has been taking place under the

rubric of an intellectual upheaval that has been felt throughout the social sciences...the behavioral approach". (Easton, 1965a:3).

The behavioral approach signals a process of maturation for political science. Central to it is the role of empirically oriented theory.

Easton lists eight characteristics of the behaviorist credo, and although adherents may differ sharply as to the relative importance of each of them, the list does make clear, says Easton, that behaviorists "all look forward to the same region in space - a science of politics modelled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences" (Easton, 1965a:8). In that, however, the behavioral approach is not sufficiently distinguished, for science has long been an honoured ideal in the U. S. A. There is more to it. It is "a reaction to and reflection of the fact that all the social sciences are together advancing to a new stage, one of increased scientific maturity, characterized by new theoretical aspirations" (Easton, 1965a:9). The new name of behavioral social science, like the introduction of new names for social study in the past, signals a new stage in a truly linear movement in the nature and assumptions about our understanding of man in society". (Easton, 1965a:12)

The newness implied in this new name refers to two new ingredients of contemporary social research that will help to set it apart from all past eras: first, never before was there so great a demand for selfconscious attention to empirical theory at all levels of generality, theory which at least in principle is testable, and second, the social sciences have been compelled to face up to the theoretical problem of "locating stable units of analysis which might possibly play the role in social research that the particles of matter do in the physical sciences". (Easton, 1965a:13) Related also is a re-

newed hope of drawing the social sciences together into a basic unity, an underlying basic science of behavior. The concept of system, behaving system, has been employed towards this end. Thus the behavioral aspect of the new movement in political research... reflects the inception of a theoretical search for stable units for understanding human behavior in its political aspects (Easton, 1965a:17), even though the behaviorist political scientists do not as yet realize this very consciously.²⁴⁾

Does the onset of behavioralism in the discipline establish it as a mature science in 1965? Lest we think a simple, straightforward, positive answer is forthcoming, let me quote Easton at some length:

In political science one may not always be conscious of the progress slowly being made with respect to the search for useful theoretical orientations under the very broad and poorly outlined behavioral umbrella. Perhaps this is because of the need to concentrate on the difficult and time-consuming task of refashioning the tools of research, learning new languages of analysis, and becoming familiar with the new methods, data, and findings of related disciplines. But the long traditional occupation of political science with theory has left the political scientist peculiarly sensitive to the theoretical implications of the behavioral tendencies. In fact, when we pause to look at the inventory of empirically oriented theoretical ideas it is slight, as we might expect. But, given the very short time that the behavioral approach has been persuasive in political research, it may come as a pleasant surprise to discover that there are a respectable number of alternative conceptual approaches for the study of political life or some of its major segments. Not that these conceptual structures are fully developed or close to any ideal form. They do, however, constitute a beginning and a promise for the future. (Easton, 1965a:19)

At the least there is "a newly sharpened awareness of the need to articulate and to question critically the theoretical premises of empirical work". (Easton, 1965a:21) The "search for adequate units of analysis - is preparing the ground out of which, in the none too distant future, may well emerge some minimal consensus" (Easton, 1965a:19), so as to be able to redefine or describe the limits of political science as a field of relatively self-contained phenomena.

(Easton, 1965a:22) "What some (Bentley, for example, P. B.) have felt to be fruitless and wasteful inquiries into theoretical boundaries of our discipline, have simply represented a groping towards at least the gross units in terms of which political life can be identified, observed and analyzed; power, policy- or decision-making, groups, political communications, functions, systems, are all such units. Slay the dragon of disciplinary redefinition as we may, it insists upon rearing its head in a new form each time and to higher levels of conceptual sophistication". (Easton, 1965a:22) New theory tends to be analytic, not substantive; explanatory rather than ethical, more general and less particular. Thus political science is linked to the broader behavioral tendencies in the social sciences; hence its description as political behavior. This is the full meaning and significance of the behavioral approach in political science. (Easton, 1965a:22)

Well then, progress is being made, though consciousness of it tends to lag, and though progress is slow. (One wonders about the gargantuan strides taken between 1953 and 1965 however).³⁵⁾ There are obstacles to progress but the political scientists are sensitized to the need for theory. Results are slight, expectably, but not in view of the discipline's brief exposure to the influence of behavioralism. The results are not fully developed, nor ideal, but soon some minimal consensus about the limits of the discipline may be achieved. Some, minimal, consensus. But even so the dragon of old will continue to rear its head and demand redefinition of the discipline. At least, however, the behavioral orientation links political science to the other social sciences. For better or worse...united they shall be?

Where does that leave political science? Is it a science? Or still striving to become one? When mature, what will it look like? What are to be its features? What is Easton's ideal of a social science causing him to both praise and criticize all that has been

done in the name of political science to date? Is his ideal more than a hopeful figment of the imagination? A hunch? Whose hunch? Only his own? Or those who till the field as determined by the organized discipline, the profession? Who are they? The behavioralists alone? For how long? Are there not who adhere to a different credo?

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1) I consider it an ill-formed concept. The nature of science should not, I think, ever be designated in terms of the countries where a science may be practiced. One should not speak of American political science any more than one should speak of say, American physical science. Otherwise we should also speak of Russian political science and Russian physics.

That a certain view of both physics and politics might prevail in one country, and a different view of both in another, may well be the case. That allows distinction between American political (or physical) scientists generally and Russian scientists generally in terms of of the views they hold with respect, however, to one and the same universal field of enquiry, that of political science or that of physics.

It is quite conceivable that a certain science first achieves recognition in one particular country. Suppose this were the case for political science and America; even then its practitioners must be aware of concentrating on a universal field of research there for all, not just American scholars, to study. To call such a science 'American' is to hold a rather provincialist view of one's field of research.

That may not have serious consequences as long as the practitioners of the science concerned are indeed Americans only, but it takes on directly imperialist overtones if it should prove that the field is being theoretically researched elsewhere as well. That is, I think, the case with political science. If the political constitutes the field of its research (however it may be delimited) it certainly has been researched by many non-Americans, and during a greater stretch of time than by Americans.

Reference to political science then appears (when called American) to be an obnoxious and elliptical way of saying to those who have been busy in the field in ways Americans are not, that they, if to be accounted political scientists, must adopt the views and methods generally adopted by political scientists in America.

American political scientists should not be surprised when those who do not share their generally held assumptions concerning the field take offense at this designation of political

science as 'American'. When Easton admits that those scholars who employ the concept of the state have thereby sought to provide scope to the field of political science, he should, for this very reason, be willing to recognize them as colleagues working in the same field, albeit on different assumptions. He does so, but, as we will see, rather half-heartedly.

2) Bernard Crick, an Englishman, though critical of American political scientists generally, has done much to continue such usage by choosing to call his book on the state of political science in America The American Science of Politics.

3) This query does not easily allow of a ready answer. It seems to me that Easton's work is designed to prevent the collapse of political science as a social system. The chapters dealing with the anti-scientific mood in The Political System make it quite clear that the very existence of political science as an organized profession was in jeopardy, at least in 1953. It is also clear that Easton is concerned to provide the discipline with the means by which it may hope to justify its existence as a separate discipline. In addition, the very hyperfactualism and lack of interest in general theory has made for bulging inventories of fact that threaten the discipline with disintegration in the face of input-overload, unless the means by which to handle them are discovered. Easton's idea of system is intended to fill the need. Hence it may be said that the concept of political system is, in large part, designed to enhance the existence of the organized profession.

This should not be interpreted as indicative of Easton's egotism which aims to retain the private security of the members of the discipline of political science. In that sense Waldo's remark does not hold good for Easton. Rather, the discipline as such and the legitimate expectations that society may entertain vis à vis the organized discipline of political science, which ought to be able to contribute significantly to the solution of society's perplexities, if, that is, it hews to its task of discovering truly reliable knowledge on the pattern of physical science - that is Easton's concern.

It is essential to Easton's credo to work in such a way as to maintain

an organized profession of political science. It, after all, is a requisite condition without which society will be buffeted about by the complexity of modern post-industrial society; without it society is most likely to disintegrate. It is purposive organization alone that can overcome the increasingly urgent problems of complexity in modern life. This very concern for the existence of political science in view of the tremendous promise that, for Easton, it holds, goes far to explain even Easton's address to the APSA in 1969 which some have interpreted to be a recantation on Easton's part. Throughout his work Easton has remained true to pragmatism's presuppositions concerning the 'place' of science as a logic of procedure in all human behavior. It implies concern for the organization of social intelligence and its continuation in the process of social activity.

As the dissertation proceeds, the reader must attempt to answer for himself whether my interpretation of Easton's concern for the continued existence of political science as an organized social subsystem of extreme importance to the continued existence of society itself is warranted.

4) Political science, at least to this extent, is part and parcel of American experience. To the extent that one holds high expectations from organized political science, and believes that its existence depends on the expectations of a social matrix, on the positive social recognition that it is necessary, to that extent political science's existence necessarily reflects a society whose value-orientations are to be positively appreciated. America is the society where political science was born free; that there are power groups within it that seek to deflect the discipline from the tasks to which it was born, cannot detract from this fact. That political science allows itself to be deflected from its proper tasks of free and unrestricted enquiry in the service of society's amelioration may be true; it means political scientists are betraying the cause of the community then (shades of Dewey).

5) Because this is so, the sad state of American political science is a matter of crucial concern to Easton. If a basic value of American society is the desire to have adequate and reliable understanding of what actually happens politically, then why does the

science not develop according to its possibilities and its promise? Does it not show that American political scientists are chasing values at odds with this basic value? Clearly, we then require a reconstruction of the values held by political researchers. Easton calls attention to the requirement of value-reconstruction continually while he himself develops the logic of procedure, systemic causal analysis, in terms of which actual political life may be analyzed as rigorously as possible. Values are to be reoriented in terms of such empirically oriented understanding of what goes on in the political system.

6) See, for example: McCoy, Playford, 1967; Surkin, Wolfe, 1970; Green, Levinson, 1970; but also see Easton's presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1969 in which Easton goes far to establish the legitimacy of post-behavioral thought with its emphasis on the need for value-commitment without, however, forgetting about the necessity of behavioral thought.

7) Much has been written concerning the features characteristic of scientific, theoretical thought as distinguished from non-theoretical thought and experience. For a view quite at odds with that of Easton, and one that, by and large, I share, see: Dooyeweerd, 1957, Vol. III:1-148.

8) Here Easton expresses surprise at the fact that despite the new demands and stresses exerted on the discipline as a whole, it has nevertheless managed to persist as an organized whole, as a profession. Compare the similar surprise expressed in view of the fact that political systems persist at all despite the stresses continually exerted on them. (Easton, 1965a:77/78, 82) It is the exhilarating recognition of intelligent response in social systems that provides Easton with a sense of elation. It is human intelligence in organization in the midst of a risky existence beset by stressful conditions that ensures the continued existence of social systems. It is persistence against the odds through intelligent behavior. That is the quintessence of experience according to the pragmatist credo adhered to by so many in America.

9) According to Easton that is how it must be if science (and organized society as well?) are to be at all. I do not share that view. For Easton such 'wholeness' of a science-in-practice is necessary if it is to serve the 'wholeness' of society as its direction-determining subsystem of the whole system. For him, social life must take its directive cue from organized intelligence as the sciences have (cumulatively) come to possess it. If society cannot do so it is necessarily delivered up to the buffetings and vagaries of chance and unreliable knowledge in determining its course into the future. For a complex and differentiated society that spells disaster. I share neither this view of society as total system, and that science must serve the same, nor that science's development is that of a whole in any sense of the word.

10) There is cause to take issue with this quick dismissal of centuries of politically oriented reflection as pre- or non-scientific, and as not focused on delimited facts. It indicates that Easton operates with a restricted view of both science and facts. I do not say so to suggest, as does Stankiewicz, that Easton does not consider such reflection important; but to suggest that this reflection failed to develop adequate awareness and reliable understanding of the actually operative necessities and regularities of political life, of political systems, is to suggest too much.

Plato's ideal forms were advanced to reflect universal (also empirically relevant) and most real, most actual, states of affairs only vaguely represented in the shadowy world of sense-bound experience. This world of forms was not without practical heuristic significance for men's political, communal, thinking and doing. It is doubtful whether Plato's theory can be understood at all without recognition of its real concern about the empirical and practical goings-on in the polis (Athens) of the 5th century B.C. Is Plato's relation of ideal form and experience so very different from that between Easton's ideal of a possible political science and that science's actual state?

The thought of the great political thinkers prior to the seventeenth century cannot be understood as mainly value theory, or as mainly speculative theory; and it is doubtful whether one may say that their thought was based on 'casual observation' of their own political reality.

One may even suggest that Easton's faith in scientific procedure and theoretical thought is basically of a kind with Plato's faith in theoria whence guidance for the practice of life was to be expected. That Easton's norms and values are understood in the sense of psychological desires to be realized to the extent that organization in the face of complexity allows of it rather than as absolute standards, does not undo this basic kinship between them in their consideration of the heuristic and supposedly empirical relevance to all practice of theoria or enquiry which both refer to one and the same mode of analytically qualified experience. Neither Easton nor Plato would like to see it as just one mode of human experience among others.

According to Easton the great social thinkers elaborated values and standards and attempted to project them into the kind of social and political life that would represent their realization. Easton has no quarrel with them for trying to do so. It is just that they missed the tools necessary for doing so effectively, viz., the tool, the organon, of scientific method. It is the missing link by way of which alone present values can be effectively projected into a future containing their consequences in recognition of the operative regularities, the instrumentalities of social goal-achievement anywhere and any time.

11) In referring to the common sense level of the thought of men like Hobbes and Spinoza, Easton judges that they only imitated, but did not really follow, scientific method as it had been applied to physics by Newton. In this way Easton short-changes the thinkers concerned. For several reasons:

a) As Easton's own account concerning the differentiation of the sciences also admits, Hobbes and Spinoza lived in times when the scientific enterprise was still a rather undifferentiated activity. That is to say, Newton was rather more than a physicist only, while Hobbes and Spinoza were more than social theorists. Newton, Hobbes and Spinoza, like all scholars of repute during those times, shared a universe of discourse, and a universe of thought, to a much greater extent than Easton would here like to recognize. Social thinkers were not so far removed from what went on in physics that they could not help misunderstand the method followed there.

b) Easton presents the success of physics in terms letting one wonder whether, perhaps, physical scientists had first demonstrated the proof of pragmatism's pudding. As if it first revealed the

necessity of 1) inductively arriving at theoretical statements through careful observation

2) from these statements to deductively derive a body of theory which

3) must itself be capable of proof or disproof in terms of further experience or observation.

I do not deny the role of observation, induction and deduction and their continuing importance to the science. But to suggest that this is the essence of the method employed in the physics of Galilei, Newton and others is to misrepresent them.

It should at least be added that the success of the physicists had much to do with the methodological resolution of natural states of affairs into their simplest elementary, component, parts with a view to their interrelation subject to the laws of motion. And it is this method precisely which the social thinkers sought to apply to social life. In fact, Easton himself follows this method when he wants systems to be the simplest, elemental, component parts of reality.

I suggest that there is rather more continuity than discontinuity between the nature of the early social scientists' thinking and that of Easton himself, than he cares to suggest in this context. Easton does testify to a unity of spirit rather than result, but it is also a unity in method, albeit that Easton would shy away from the extremely deductive character of the thought of Hobbes and Spinoza and leave rather more room for induction as the matrix within which deduction must take place according to pragmatism's tenets. That is to say that Easton leaves rather more scope for the humanist freedom-motive than do Hobbes and Spinoza. In that Easton is closer to Locke, Locke being America's philosopher as Louis Hartz has convincingly argued, and Easton being an American political scientist who was even made president of the American political science association, certain relationships begin to suggest themselves.

12) In doing so Easton vents criticism of a current value-conformism in American treatment of (the history of) political theory, and of the lack of awareness of the reconstructive task to be undertaken with respect to the values held whose consequences must be reliably envisaged. Such theory reflects a staid and complacent acceptance of the going social situation as the best of all possible worlds, a notion quite anathema to any convinced instrumentalist.

13) See notes 6) and 12).

14) See note 11).

15) The notion of 'hard facts' and its role in the social sciences as practiced in America is directly related to the rise of pragmatism as advanced by Peirce, James, and Dewey, as well as by their predecessors, Bain and Emerson.

16) A legitimate rephrasing of this insight of Easton could be: "The pragmatist spirit did not take hold there immediately".

17) This is a curious interpretation of the Constitution's character and of the intent and purpose of those who draughted and ratified it. Certainly the Constitution was not meant to and ought not to be understood as meaning to organize the activities of men. Rather, it reflected a Lockean understanding and guarantee of the rights of men in a community whose members had come to experience a legal void through deprivation of their rights as Englishmen. These rights were now understood in the Lockean sense of the rights of men not to have to be organized in any way at all. The concern was rather more with the legal limits needed to preserve men's freedom to behave as they please within the limits of state-organization to the minimum degree necessary (separation of powers) and within the limits of individual rights as formulated, than with the prescriptive organization of men's behavior.

Here Easton would seem to depart from Locke for whom society was not an organized whole regulated to serve men in their pursuit of property but the world of naturally unlimited individuals. That Locke's references to the public good at times suggest the Leviathan of society as an organized whole with a sovereign as decider for the whole, points up a dilemma in humanist thought concerning the relationship of individual freedom and the requirements of communal order. Locke had been rather inclined to downplay the latter on behalf of the former. America has generally followed suit. It traditionally favors Locke's choice in the dilemma rather than that of Hobbes. Whether that can also continue to be Easton's choice is doubtful. To the extent that social planning and piece-meal engineering for the whole is necessary, that would seem to be precluded.

18) Bentham's assumptions are speculative, expressing faith in a presumed rationality of men such that if one prescribes the rational rationally, men will follow. Accordingly the legal (prescription) is not seen as itself an element in the situation which according to Easton it is; instead, it is viewed as the extra-situational source of order for social behavior. Easton also ascribes this view to the makers and subsequent interpreters (until Bentley) of the Constitution. If true, it goes far to explain why legal realism with its denial of material principles of law, rules the day in the study of American law; it also goes far to explain why American political science lost sight of the legal in its studies and opted for a concentration upon what is influential (power) in society.

19) I wonder... The state has often been conceived as the public legal community; when one rejects this concept as crucial to politics and the study of politics, one rejects emphasis on the importance of public law as well. Without these, however what can still be the meaning of law? Then the way to a conception of law as sanctioned, that is sanction-backed, power of prescription has been paved. Law is commonly taken in the sense of sanction-backed prescription by those who claim the right (or have the power to) regulate effectively in the name of society concerning all such matters as must be resolved in some way or other to prevent society's dissolution. For criticism of this notion of law (and, implicitly, authority, see John Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State, in: Green, Levison: 1970: 276-327).

That this view of law is common among American political scientists and represents a very particular school of legal thought at the same time (see: Van Eikema Hommes; 1972: 177vv; and 1976: 42-45), has relevance for questions raised earlier. It helps to explain both the rise of political science, and its anti-legal bent in America.

Americans have generally been afraid of European state-conceptions; understandably, since many came to America to escape the clutches of European governments. That ties in with Locke's minimal state and minimal government philosophy. It also helps to explain why such political science is only a late arrival on the European scene. In fact, it is a post-World War II development on the continent, by and large. That too is hardly strange in view of the

tremendous influence that America has come to exercise as the champion of liberty for the nations liberated from Nazi-domination by them, and that in all areas of their life.

The question continues to intrigue, however; ought law to be viewed as prescriptive rationality? Is it simply power-backed prescription? Can the meaning of sanction be fathomed without a sense of public legal competence? Are there no valid principles for and of public law which both government and all political actors ought to respect? Are these not to be at the centre of attention for students of public/legal and political life?

One wonders...at least if one dares to question the assumptions of American legal, social, and political theorists which preclude such wonder as ideologically, nationalistically, or speculatively determined and hence misguided and irrelevant. I continue to wonder. Fashion need not be the norm for the study of any science even though the student of politics must come to terms with the fashions in it.

20) This is hardly convincing in terms of responsible historical perspective, however appealing it may be as an explanatory note from Easton's point of view.

If politics refers to the authoritative allocation of values for a society, or, the struggles over social policy, what politics can be present in those times and places where the going values are accepted without serious challenge? Is politics then absent? Or must we read Easton to say that the power of the groupings seemed, but indeed, were not secure? Is there perhaps a process of submerged change that wreaks havoc with the values as distributed among the groupings without their knowing it? Is the political, basically, an unconscious process? At least at such times? These questions, occasioned directly by Easton's own text refer to matters that cannot be laid to rest by means of the distinction between the prescriptive/legal and the actual.

21) But as long as the going values were accepted (among them the value of the Constitution as norm for behavior), and as long as the going values, therefore, did come to expression in the Constitution, as was apparently the case until the Civil War, that long, it seems, political life could be understood in terms of the legal prescriptions thought to hold for it. How do succeeding students and how does Easton, account for the fact that during

all those years, barring disturbances, constitutionalist analysis of politics was good enough? Or was it not? Easton is not clear on the matter.

22) The aberrations concerned are those that see the world and the development of man in it as rational through and through. The aberrations of grand speculative theories which saw science not as an instrument of man in a non-rational environment but as the rationality of the world in the face of which man himself was helpless are the aberrations of Comte, Marx and Spencer. On the assumption that the facts had not yet been adequately discovered, the ideal was merely held in abeyance in order to first discover the facts which, once discovered in sufficient measure, would speak for themselves and anchor reformative practice in fact.

23) It is the stage at which partial theories at the singular and intermediate level interrelate a number of observed data by a process of innovative induction and insight. It does imply, despite express modesty generally, that Easton's work at the general level is comparable to that of Newton's level, also general.

24) Indeed, it was realized by so few of the behavioral political scientists that one can hardly berate those who did not notice it to be a basic characteristic of behavioralism. Had Prof. M. C. Eksteen recognized its non-explicit prevalence in the behavioralist movement and in Easton in particular, I wager he would have been somewhat more critical of the movement than he was already, in view of his adherence to a cosmological perspective proceeding from the temporal irreducibility of a variety of modes of experience in reality and mutually irreducible societal structures of individuality. These are not taken seriously by any behavioralist I know of.

35) Though Easton does have reservations about unrestrained theories of progress, the ideal of progress nevertheless functions powerfully in his evaluations of science and its development. It would appear as if chance plays a major part in progress alongside judicious labor. But progress is at its sparkling brightest in judicious labor. Here, Easton speaks of the ever higher levels of sophistication; above he spoke of a truly linear movement, an incre-

mental development in science. At other times he speaks of its cumulative growth. Still, it remains a risky progress, caught up as it is in a world of hard facts, of increasing complexity. Its systematic development can be seriously threatened. To date, however, the system of science has managed to persist and show progress.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Various Kinds of Theory; Causal, Value, and Reformatory Theory.

1.1 Introduction

Our survey of Easton's determination of the level of American political science has already led us to take note of a distinction which Easton considers important for several reasons. It is the distinction between value and causal theory. In the present chapter we intend to present Easton's understanding of these two types of theory and the grounds advanced for their distinction. In addition it will be necessary to examine the meaning of what he calls reformatory theory, as a kind of theory distinguishable from both value and causal theory, though not unrelated to them.

According to Easton, as we have seen, the problem of American political science is its hyperfactualism. That hyperfactualism reveals itself as such in its conscious attempt to uncover the facts and nothing but the facts on the assumption that the facts will speak for themselves. This position was adopted in reaction to the vaguely scientific but speculative grand and legalistic systematic thought of the preceding few centuries. That thought, it was supposed, never did get down to the establishment of social facts by means of rigorous methods.

Clearly, if the facts of social and political life do indeed, once established, speak for themselves, then there is no special reason for concentration on theory of either the speculative or the value, or whatever kind. Then it is enough to discover the facts and to listen to what they have to say. What would American political scientists very likely 'hear' them to say? From the development of American political science the answer can be readily derived. When the facts speak for themselves they appeal immediately to common sense or common experience, which, being aware of pro-

blems in social life, could make ready use of the facts in formulating policy proposals so as to avoid or so as to remove even, the problems of experience. That is evidently the sense of American political scientists generally concerning fact-discovery and its purpose. Discover the facts and apply the knowledge of facts uncovered directly in policy proposals. The only theory which this understanding of the task of science as fact-gathering allows and calls for, is of the type Easton calls reformative theory, or, as he also calls it, premature policy science which has generally proceeded on the basis of a pro-American value bias.¹⁾

Easton agrees with neither this view of the facts nor this view of policy requirements. Facts do not speak for themselves, although Easton will admit that value theory alone does not provide the kind of theory that we could call scientific, nor does this kind of theory as such determine the empirical connections among facts or reflect the actual connections among them. For that, a different, scientific, in principle verifiable, empirically oriented, therefore, theory is needed. That kind of theory Easton prefers to call causal theory. In attempting to understand just what causal theory is we must constantly remember that it does not represent the only kind of theory that Easton considers important to human, social life. We must remember that, at least for political science, it is preceded by, and develops in the midst of two other kinds of theory to which it must be related, namely, both value and reformative theory. The relation of both causal theory and value theory to reformative theory will require our attention. The relations between the types of theory may be so close that the three kinds of theory must be determined in terms of each other for their several understanding.

These observations must not be viewed as an attempt to prejudice any issue. However, were we to proceed as though the three

types of theory were quite independent entities, understandable, each of them, on their own, we would be working on an assumption, and closing ourselves off to whatever Easton may have to suggest concerning their interrelation. Then our attempt to understand what Easton says would indeed be prejudiced.

It is also evident that each of the kinds of theory mentioned is related in some way to facts, or to what facts are understood to be.²⁾ Speculative grand social theory and the moral science that was its predecessor, as well as the general philosophy antedating both of them, were all of them characterized by a malnutrition of factual knowledge, and the factual knowledge that had been incorporated was casually derived, not scientifically established. It is also evident that reformative theory needs factual knowledge to be at all effective. Yet, says Easton, an interpretation of facts as though they speak for themselves is not acceptable in terms of scientific method, and leads to premature policy science. Needed is theory so factual, so causal, so empirical in its orientation that it is unmistakably of a kind distinguishable from any other, whether reformative or value theory; it may just be that one cannot really understand Easton's three kinds of theory, whether separately, or in their coherence, without understanding what he takes to be facts. We will have to listen closely and be keen to discover what he considers the relation between facts and theory to be. The meaning ascribed to the one may have much to do with that ascribed to the other.

Let us keep these questions in mind and examine Easton's conception of causal, value and reformative theory.

1.2. Causal Theory

The briefest and most readily employed description of the meaning of causal theory in Easton's work is: "theory which seeks to show relation among facts"(Easton, 1953:52) Terms alternative to

to facts are variables and data. The description clarifies little unless we know what is meant by relation, and what by facts. Easton also speaks of pure research, pure theory, conceptual theory and empirical theory as synonyms for causal theory. (Easton, 1965:79) Although three levels of causal theory may be distinguished in terms of scope, every level of causal theory constitutes a mode of analysis that is generalized as compared with the experience of events unexamined. (Easton, 1953:80) Causal theory is descriptive, not prescriptive or reformative in kind. (Easton, 1953:82) It consists of analysis rather than argument. (Easton, 1953:84) It often functions without the thinker being aware of it, but it needs to be made explicit in the form of careful statement of assumptions so as to be testable, thus increasing the reliability of knowledge otherwise founded on theory casually employed. (Easton, 1953:84)³⁾ The relations it seeks to uncover among facts are causal. (Easton, 1953:86)

Since causal theory is 'a phase of research' and 'a logical aspect of the discipline of political science', it is doubtful whether it can be considered as a self-sufficient, independent sort of activity meaningful for what it is by itself. It is foundational to a mature understanding of political life, which appears to be the proximate goal that it must serve. (Easton, 1953:89) Furthermore, it is the kind of knowledge that would put the relation of means to ends on a sure footing (Easton, 1953:89), which, of course, is interesting only if a further raison d'être of causal theory, and perhaps of a mature understanding of political life as well, lies in its utility for social reconstruction (shades of Dewey again).

Causal theory amounts to the search for uniformities of political life (Easton, 1953:86), is hypothetical to the extent that its truth probability is less than one (Easton, 1953:55), and is directed to things as they exist rather than as they ought to be. Causal

theory "must show a universal, that is, highly probable, connection between the ends desired and the means used", that is, it must establish that "under given conditions, whenever B occurs, it is more probable rather than less that A will follow" (Easton, 1953:311) It is in this, I take it, that causal theory "provides meaning⁴ to facts, of a kind that transcends any particular time and place" (Easton, 1953:55).

Our résumé of Easton's comments concerning the nature of causal theory would hardly be complete if we did not mention that it is also "an index of the stage of development of any science" and "a device for improving the dependability of our knowledge" (Easton, 1953:55).

Finally, causal theory serves as a "model to test the relevance of succeeding research", or a "system of working hypotheses... used only as long as it helps to orient empirical research in such a way that socially significant problems are better understood... The supreme test is its utility in understanding phenomena" (Easton, 1953:57/8). This is what The Political System has to offer in denoting the character of causal theory as distinct, at least logically, from other kinds of theory.

A Framework for Political Analysis does not have much to add, although we may well note that Easton, in it, and quite in line with the above, calls causal theory "analytic, not substantive, explanatory rather than ethical, more general and less particular" (Easton, 1965a:22). In A Systems Analysis of Political Life Easton introduces us to two new terms by which to refer to causal theory: behavioral theory, and operational theory (Easton, 1965b:5). The introduction of these terms does not, as far as I can judge, imply any shift in meaning as compared with that in earlier works. We do

find a closer specification of the meaning of causal relations in this work. Causality is here described as "covariance under specified conditions". Causal theory is "any kind of generalization or proposition that asserts that two or more things, activities or events covary under specified conditions"(Easton, 1965b: 7). It consists of hypotheses and laws depending on the degree of confirmation attaching to them. (Easton, 1965b:7)

The fourth volume of Easton's tetralogy, Children in the Political System, offers no further description of causal theory over and above those already mentioned. For a proper coverage of the topic it is necessary to distinguish different kinds of causal theory in terms of scope, and, increasingly emergent as Easton's work develops, in terms of logical coherence or consistency. In the section to follow we will look at them severally.

1.2.1 Singular, First-level Causal Theory

First of all there is causal theory that we might call singular, or first-level theory. It consists of propositions relating isolated and easily identified variables causally, in terms of covariance. Strictly speaking it is not theory. (Easton, 1953:55) An example of such singular theory is Gosnell's theorem stating that non-partisan stimulation of voting will increase the number of people who vote, given certain specified conditions. (Easton, 1953:56) Although it is a laborious and time-consuming activity, the discovery of these types of generalizations is the least difficult, and yet political science possesses few such rigorously formulated propositions. (Easton, 1953:56) Nevertheless, it is this level of causal theory to which American political science has been limited in the main because of a view of science as the objective collection of facts and the relating of them into singular generalizations. It involves the gathering of data "to show that variable A is related to variable B and so forth. Theory at this level amounts to the

pursuit of facts about political life. "(Easton, 1953:66)

The scope is most narrow, focusing on isolated variables. Logical consistency between the singular generalizations is weak. "Whether and why the data so collected really belong together, other than the fact that they are vaguely related to government or an undefined idea of the political, is seldom asked".⁵⁾ (Easton, 1953:66/7)

1. 2. 2. Narrow Gauge, Intermediate-Level Theory

At a higher, intermediate level stands synthetic or narrow gauge theory. It is a set of interrelated propositions that are designed to synthesize the data contained in an unorganized body of singular generalizations, but in synthesizing it goes beyond the actual data included in the original cluster of generalizations. Michell's iron law of oligarchy may serve as an example. That law emerges from an attempt to synthesize a considerable number of empirical observations relating to party-organizations. These were generalized in the form of a law applicable to all social groups organized to fulfill specific ends, including the political system itself.⁶⁾ (Easton, 1953:56/7) If true, Easton observes, the bulk of power cannot reside in the hands of the people, and, if true, it might also help to explain the source of political apathy and other related problems. (Here the shades of Dewey are definitely waning). Examples of American political scientists whose work centers in synthetic theory are Merriam (on power), Friedrich (the basis of constitutional democracy), Simon (administrative behavior), Lasswell (the power of oligarchy) and Key and Truman (interest groups). (Easton, 1953:64/5) The move towards the development of such narrow gauge theory is of very recent vintage and still hardly prevalent. (Easton, 1953:66) Nevertheless, Easton finds it possible to speak of narrow gauge theory in Locke and, he says, what is true of _____

Locke's work applies equally to any political theory. (Easton, 1953:313) Despite the seeming contradiction we will see that it is consistent with Easton's views, as long as it is remembered that Easton distinguishes between theory consciously elaborated and theory unconsciously at work. The consequences of this distinction, however, are considerable and may at least cause one to doubt whether Easton's work is sufficiently seen for what it is when it is described as 'thoroughly scientific' (Kriek, 1975: 33-51). It certainly would have increased the value of his otherwise clear summary statement of Easton's thought if he had paid attention to the role of the un- or less conscious in it.

It must also be observed that Easton later uses the term partial theory as a synonym for narrow gauge or synthetic theory. Partial theories are broader in scope than are singular generalizations; narrower than general theory. It is well to remember that "just because they are narrower in scope, this does not in any way imply that they are thereby lower in importance. (Easton, 1965b:475) "Narrow gauge or partial theories isolate some part or aspect of behavior in a political system, less than the whole and yet greater than any one isolated fragment (singular generalization, P. B.) which experience or intuition suggests is related significantly..."; it "indicates an aspiration on the part of the investigator to develop an integrated set of generalizations about this substantive area"(Easton, 1965b:7/8) The propositions of synthetic theory are more consistent in their relationship to each other, show greater logical coherence or consistency than singular generalizations.

1. 2. 3 Broad Gauge or General-level Theory

It is theory at the highest, most general, level, the conceptual framework within which the whole discipline is cast. In first draw-

ing attention to this kind of causal theory, in consideration of the question: What exactly is a conceptual framework?, Easton observes: it is a sieve which helps sort out, select, and reject observed facts; or a compass which indicates the direction in which research is moving; or a gauge which reports the state of development of a science at a particular time. It has all the advantages and none of the defects of all mechanical contrivances.⁷⁾ It is flexible, in a state of constant flux. It is a body of theory which changes in the light of the facts that it collects or that suggests it. (Easton, 1953:57) Theory of this order is designed to help select the specific variables that are vital to an understanding of the problems confronting a discipline; the more developed the framework, the more precisely will these variables be identified and related.

General causal theory differs from synthetic theory only in that it is broader in scope and, very important for an understanding of Easton, in its sophisticated state as found in physics or economics, it is deductive. It begins with a few postulates of empirical reference and from these deduces a series of narrower generalizations. From these in turn stem singular generalizations capable of empirical proof. This is a theoretical system which serves as an analytical model of the concrete political system. (Easton, 1953:58) Thus, in physics, from a few basic premises, empirically derived (by induction? P.B.) it has proved possible to formulate deductively a whole body of intermediate theory and from this in turn, to predict the occurrence of empirical events. From such predictions the ultimate validity of the parent conceptual framework is then either affirmed or denied in whole or in part. (Easton, 1953:58) Such advanced theory is still, for the social

sciences, excepting economics, in the distant realm of aspiration.⁸⁾

Nevertheless, behind all empirical research there are those basic assumptions with regard to the major variables in the field and their relations, and one way of promoting the maturation of a discipline is to raise these assumptions to the point of consciousness for purposes of careful examination. (Easton, 1953:58/9) This is precisely what Easton is concerned to do for political science: to discover the general theory actually, though implicitly, at work in the discipline even as its practitioners are largely unaware of it.

That general theory is possible for political science will only bear up on the assumption that the phenomena of politics do cohere sufficiently close so as to constitute a system.

A general theory of political life, a theoretical framework, makes it possible to identify the significant variables of the political system and to describe their mutual relations. It would provide a master plan for empirical research and provide the latter with a coherence not now visible while each set of partial generalizations must stand or fall by itself. (Easton, 1953:61)

1.2.4 The Interrelatedness of Singular, Partial, and General Theory

From a few basic premises it has been possible, in physics and economics, to develop a whole body of intermediate theory deductively and from it to predict the occurrence of empirical events. The process, so described, moves from the general level (few basic premises) to the narrow gauge level (intermediate theory) by deduction, to the singular level (prediction of empirical events). That leads to the verification, or falsification, of the parent conceptual framework (basic premises) in whole or in part.⁹⁾ (Easton, 1953:44)

This deductive process proceeding from the general to the singular level is, of course, irreversible. Deduction from the level of the particular to the general is patently impossible.

Yet we must note the importance of a process in reverse order, to which Easton points as well. It is well illustrated in the following quotation: "The accumulation of data through acceptable techniques does not alone give us adequate knowledge. Knowledge becomes critical and reliable as it increases in generality and internally consistent organization, when, in short, it is cast in the form of systematic generalized statements applicable to large numbers of particular cases". (Easton, 1953:55) From the cases, that is, instances of observed uniformity between two variables or facts, a process of generalization (increasing), towards theory most general is suggested.

The development of American political science goes to show that there is a historical movement progressing from a fact-seeking orientation (singular level work) to work at the partial, and finally to work at the most general level. It represents the growth by induction of political science.

Obviously the two processes of development in opposite direction need to be explained in their relation. For present purposes reference to the two processes suffices to make us aware of the fact that the different levels of causal theory are interrelated, and not in random fashion.

The deductive process clearly requires that assumptions at the most general level be the logical ground for deduction down to the level of particular cases (even though one may well doubt whether deduction can be equated with prediction at the singular level). Where Easton does include prediction at the very singular level in the process of deduction, his 'logic' is certainly of a kind. The

general tenor of Easton's work makes clear as well that his logic is a logic of procedure, and as such, an instrument to be employed, whatever the purposes of its employment in the process of experience.

At the same time the process of generalization requires, presupposes the doing of data-work at the singular level without which there would be little to generalize.

These two processes, each of them, fix a definite relation between the various kinds, or levels, of causal theory, and they differ. The apparent conclusion must be that beyond the distinction of different levels of causal theory, one must distinguish, at a more fundamental level, two kinds of theory at every level, the one characterized by induction, the other by deduction. The former continually upsets the latter thus stimulating its intelligent growth and improvement through adaptation on condition that men will continue to have faith in the utility of such intelligence.

At this stage of our enquiry I can do no more than to suggest that this duality of causal theory, evidently crucial to Easton's thought, has to do with the unconscious, the implicit, the tacit, or latent, as distinguished from the consciously elaborated theory. Both of them are causal. One could also say it has to do with a distinction between naive experience or common sense as inductive knowledge, and specialized sensing of a type resulting from the organized division of labor in the task (self- or society- imposed ? P.B.) of developing knowledge adequate to the solution of the problems that society faces. The latter, to be relevant, is based on the former, developing within its limits. It is the possibility of deduction within inductive experiential knowledge.

It remains to observe that the logic leading to the development of general theory is inductive while that leading to prediction at the singular level is deductive. Together they constitute scientific method, the logic of procedure. It is also the case that the

inductive process is an extremely pains-taking one. If we may, as Easton likes to do, follow the light that shines forth from the discipline of physical science, we can see that the work done by Newton's predecessors was of the inductive kind, as was Newton's own derivation of general level assumptions whence, subsequently, he could deduce an entire body of intermediate theory with a view to testing it at the singular level.

When Easton takes the American disciplines of social science, especially political science, to task for its lack of attention to the role of general theory and its development, he actually chides them for not recognizing the presence of causal theory, even of the most general kind, in and behind the work they are consciously and scientifically doing at the level of fact-gathering. He is also chiding them for being satisfied enough with such inductively derived and vaguely present general theory. He is chiding them for not bringing such concealed theory to the surface in the form of careful statement such that it could serve as the basis for deduction of intermediate-level theory as well as singular-level relations capable of empirical (dis)proof. He is chiding them for their lack of faith in the possibility of developing a causal political science deductive in kind, and for not recognizing the utility of such theory to, most proximately, reliable understanding, but understanding, of course, for the purpose of the possible amelioration of society's experience.

Easton praises American political science too, however. For much hard work at the singular level has been done. Indeed, on the intermediate level too we find signs of development. Finally, as we shall see, the very general theory operative (latently) in the discipline is not at all bad; when surfaced for what it is, it requires, tested against the needs of present times, only change. It must be

adapted to accommodate change. It must be put to use in our re-constructive experience. It must be put to the test consciously, in application. Life is amelioration through intelligent experimentation.

That is why the brunt of Easton's argument in The Political System is to urge the need for bringing general theory to the surface. It is to state, carefully, the nature of general theory unconsciously directing the work done by the discipline. Then it can be tested against the requirements of present social needs and adapted accordingly. Not that the social needs of different societies should lead to different general theories, for then theory could not be truly general, but so as to develop general theory in recognition of needs present in any society, a certain kind of needs.

Although Easton devotes his efforts in all his work to the development of general causal theory, he by no means wishes to be interpreted as though only causal theory is important to political knowledge and reflection. Let us therefore also look at Easton's conception of value and reformative theory.

1.3 Value Theory

1.3.1 Introductory notes on Values

Chapter 9 of The Political System is entitled: The Moral Foundations of Theoretical Research. Under this heading Easton discusses the controversial issue of the relation between value and causal judgments.

At this stage we are interested in the properties of value judgments rather than in their relation to causal judgments. His working assumption "which has informed and will continue to prevail in the present work" (as in all his work, P. B.) "holds that values

can ultimately be reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual's total life-experiences"(Easton, 1953:221). It is the assumption "generally adopted today in the social sciences". The "moral aspect of a proposition...expresses only the emotional response of an individual to a state of real or presumed facts" and it is meaningless to approach such propositions in terms of true or false, unlike propositions referring to fact. (Easton, 1953: 221) Yet, values can be examined as observable facts, not to prove them true or false, but as held by persons so as to be consequential for action. It can be shown true or false that a person expresses preferences, that the values are internally compatible, that they have specified implications for action. Example: To say "that the United States is a democracy" can be proven true or false, but to say "I prefer a democracy" is logically different. It expresses my sentiment in favor of this kind of political system". (Easton, 1953:222) But my preference for democracy cannot be called true, nor someone else's dislike of it false. ¹⁰⁾

Having said that, Easton goes on to make things rather difficult for anyone trying to place Easton's view of values in terms of the various philosophical schools that have had something to say of the nature of values as distinguished from facts: It would, he says, be quite rewarding "to enquire whether values are objective, substantive principles, or periphrastic modes for expressing what are essentially indicative moods, as, for example, pragmatism implies. For the present discussion however, a final decision in this matter would not turn out to be vital. In assuming that values are expressions of our preferences and essentially dissimilar to factual aspects of propositions, I am in fact adopting a conception of values which will prove least convenient for the defense of the kind of study of values I find necessary today in order to develop a rounded systematic

theory. I am, however, deliberately operating on this assumption because, if the need for value theory can be justified in these terms, it must by this very fact be reasonable and convincing even to those who would begin with contrary premises about its nature."(Easton, 1953:222/3) What on earth can this mean?

On the assumption that an understanding of the most difficult passages is one of the clearest indications that one has understood the thinker who wrote them, an understanding of the above passage should go a long way towards understanding the thought of David Easton.

Easton, by speaking of his 'working assumption' as to the nature of values, and by calling this position of his the most difficult position for arguing the kind of study of values that he considers necessary, had this reader wondering whether he really does hold to the view that values are reducible to emotional responses to the individual's total life-experience, and whether, perhaps, he has merely adopted this position for the sake of his argument with the 20th century political scientists, meeting them on their own ground in terms of a pragmatist view of values perhaps not his own.

This impression was further supported by Easton's remark that "once the conclusion was drawn in the nineteenth century that all values are the expression of individual or group preferences and that these preferences, in turn, reflect the life-experience of the individual or group, then the impetus for the constructive study of values disappeared"(Easton, 1953:260) For a while I read Easton to mean that such is as it had to be. But the passage thus continued to defy a suitable interpretation.

The question facing us is: How can Easton, on the basis of his working assumption concerning the nature of values, still find sufficient impetus for the defense of a constructive study of values?

Obviously we must not take the 'once/then' relation of the above quotation as a relation of absolute necessity. Apparently Easton holds that although the impetus towards constructive value theory disappeared together with the rise of a view of values as emotional response to the individual or group's total life-experience, such disappearance was neither necessary nor warranted.¹¹⁾ One can hold to this view of values and yet avoid an "incorrect, and misleading" interpretation of the equalistic relativistic kind which assumes that no preference can be proved better than another and that a constructive elaboration of value systems must be a pointless waste of time. (Easton, 1953:261) Indeed, this belief was not a product of logic, but of preference itself. (Easton, 1953:261)¹²⁾

All that can legitimately be said about values as responses to life-experience is that they stem from the life-experience of an individual "and that by factual evidence no one value can be proved superior to another"(Easton, 1953:261).¹³⁾ Values relate to the social conditions in which they appear.¹⁴⁾ The description of these conditions surrounding the emergent moral preference says nothing of the merit of such a preference. Only that they are products of historical circumstances. (Easton, 1953:262) But that is not all they are. "If we wished, we could of course compare them with regard to other qualities such as their moral worth,"(Easton, 1953:262) a separate and independent task, requiring an acceptable moral standard in terms of which varying preferences could be compared. (Easton, 1953:262) The factual recognition of different preferences says nothing of their respective moral worth. It does not mean that all values are equally good; just that they are equally related to historical conditions/facts/experience. They are equally, all of them, responses to historical conditions (Easton, 1953: 263). That does not make all preferences equally valuable. To hold

that position is to hold to equalistic relativism, itself value theory of a kind, inspired by preference.

The kind of value theory which Easton finds necessary is not at all elaborated in political science today. How would we recognize it were it to develop today?

A number of observations relevant to that kind of value theory can be gleaned from The Political System. It would be a kind of moral theory freed from commitment to prevailing values just because of their prevalence, and freed from equalistic relativism. It implies full awareness of the researcher's own moral premises. These are by no means easy to identify. "Special competence is required for this purpose". (Easton, 1953:265) It implies a constructive approach without which political science will lack competence for the detection of the influence of moral views on their research in systematic theory.

1.3.2 What is Constructive Value Theory?

It attempts to answer the following question: "What criteria ought one to use in evaluating the variety of social programs offered by groups (and individuals? P.B.) competing for social power?"¹⁵ It attempts to arrive at some moral standards in terms of which a future political system could be conceived. To think it possible to arrive at such a standard is enough incentive for a constructive examination of past moral ideas.

Uniquely crucial to this formulation is the term 'constructive'. Without it one is limited to the historicist approaches to past moral ideas as exemplified in varying degrees by McIlwain, Dunning, and Sabine which reduces the study of morals to history. (Easton, 1953:257) It "converts moral clarification into a study of historical roots"(Easton, 1953:257). Political scientists have followed this approach even more baldly than have the three historians mentioned. They simply associate all the glamour and sanctity of tra-

dition with the values they, vaguely, and axiomatically, adhere to. It leads to conformity in moral ideals, and helps to forestall development of constructive moral theory of the type Easton is looking for. (Easton, 1953:256) It prevents radical exploration of the values and preferences actually held by researchers in the field of political science.

Such a constructive exploration "would demand the assumption that something new can be said about what is desirable and that the prevailing moral theories are not necessarily the last word" (Easton, 1953:255/6. "It may be that they are, but only by beginning with the contrary assumption could a theorist hope to prove to himself that no other alternative is more acceptable". (Easton, 1953:256)

A constructive value theory differs from the mere avowal of the values held. To think that would do, is to place an imprimatur on the going values, since only the commonly accepted values are well enough known so as to be able to make do with mere avowal. (Easton, 1953:256) Even then, this entails that they are no longer critically examined as to their merit in view of present and possible conditions. Their assumption, continually, is that "the major task in moral matters is to clarify, like extreme semanticists, and not to reconstruct, like imaginative architects" (Easton, 1953: 254). Not that clarification is not needed, as is historical perspective, but they are not ends in themselves. (Easton, 1953:254)

It is highly doubtful, however, that the demand for a purely formal exhumation and presentation of moral premises would enable the research worker to present an accurate picture of his moral views. Self-clarification requires more than a simple self-questioning with regard to one's premises. "(Easton, 1953:229) It requires a long process of moral inquiry. It is not "more easily

learned ... than the canons and procedures of scientific method; and it requires the same creative insight that the discovery of causal relations demands of the most fruitful empirical research." (Easton, 1953:229) It requires training and experience in the concepts and procedures of moral inquiry. It presupposes awareness of one's "ultimate preferences and their modifications or elaborations when applied to political life" (Easton, 1953:229).

How do we achieve clarity concerning them? One way would be through the actual experience of a situation which calls forth an expression of all our basic preferences in circumstances in which not all can be equally realized. But we cannot act out all, the total configuration, of our preferences unless we could reconstruct a political system de novo in our own image. Not even Danton or Robespierre could do so. (If we could, it would no longer be reconstruction anyway, P.B.).

Fortunately there is another way to gain moral clarity. It is the way of traditional political theory "whereby we reflect upon, analyze, and project our moral views into practical political life... the laborious task of constructively forming an image of the kind of political system that flows from our moral premises.¹⁶⁾

It requires a definition of the way in which we conceive our goals, which, to be clear, requires clarification of basic moral views. Basic moral views lack full meaning and expression until their knowable consequences are fully worked out. (Easton, 1953: 230/1) These consequences being social, a "rational understanding of the moral frame of reference... compels us to enter a full enquiry with respect to the application of our goals". It is the task "of constructing an image of the political system flowing from these moral preferences". It requires "the synthesis of values

with facts to bring out the full meaning of the values". (Easton, 1953: 231) It is required continually in continuing self-transformation. This constructive approach is well illustrated by any of the great social philosophers of the past. So, for example, Bentham's moral values become clear only from an investigation of the practical consequences of his principle of utility for jurisprudence and for the general political structure. Values need testing through hypothetical application to the political facts. (Easton, 1953:231/2) Just as value theory always requires testing so values require hypothetical testing; if we desire this and this and this, then in view of present and possible conditions...

For the sake of a proper understanding it is perhaps well to observe that value may be taken as an equivalent for desired goal (good) and that value theory would have to concern a set of values, or goods, desired.

1.4 Reformative Theory

Despite the hyperfactualism, and malnutrition of general theory (both causal and value theoretical) endemic to American political science, facts are indeed collected within a 'theoretical framework'; but that framework is theoretical in a way quite different from the generalized causal modes of analysis which empirical research requires. It refers, rather, to suggested ways by which collected facts can be applied in revamping some part of the political structure. It is the only type of theory of which American political science was aware during the better part of the discipline's existence. (Easton, 1953:79/80)

Reformative theory involves two kinds of mental operations. One, it suggests desirable reforms implying "that we have a standard of preference in terms of which this reform can be approved". That is to say, it implies, and is in part, value theory.

Secondly, we use whatever we can of the knowledge we have of how institutions function to specify the changes needed if the goals are to be achieved. It is speculation on the relation of alternative procedures to the given goals. It is speculation on the results of proposed changes, referring to a future situation. So reformative theory as current in political science contains implications concerning one's ultimate moral position (what one would call good government) as well as statements about the means for realizing it. (Easton, 1953:80)

In this sense reformative theory is often called applied theory, or applied science.

Easton does not object to reformative theory as offered by political science in response to the urgency of society's demand for such knowledge as is available for the solution of experienced problems. He will, however, object to such theory to the extent that it is conceived to be all that political science should do. It is the sort of theory that can serve as somewhat of a stop-gap approach to the problems besetting us. But it remains but stop-gap thinking. Why?

Mainly because, according to Easton, its major theoretical assumptions are not elevated for careful statement and subsequent proof before the value-oriented task of suggesting changes in institutional arrangements is undertaken. (Easton, 1953:84)

As a result, reformative theory may also be called premature policy science (Easton, 1953:78) if it is supposed that this theory is all that political science should be about at present.

There is, let it be stressed again, nothing wrong with premature reformative theory in meeting social problems with whatever help political science can now provide. However, political science must not substitute this theory for its prior task, the discovery

of general causal relations. (Easton, 1953:85/6)

Interestingly, Easton says reformative theory should play only a secondary role in the first stages of a social science. (Easton, 1953:85) Only in the first stages? Why?¹⁷⁾

The reason is that reformative theory involves prediction, and the success of prediction is a function of the reliability of the descriptive knowledge and level of theory. (Easton, 1953:86)¹⁸⁾ That being underdeveloped, reformative theory must not be allowed to siphon all energy away from the possible development of causal theory which would, after all, put prediction on a sure footing.

One is tempted by these remarks to conclude that once scientific general causal political theory is fully and adequately developed, scientists may focus on the application of the available knowledge. After all, the meaning of science is in its use.

Given full clarification of moral values adhered to by means of their projection into the kind of political system envisaged as desirable, full use of general causal theory could be made for the realization of the same. Easton objects to the overriding concern for policy-science (reformative theory) in American political science. The reason is not to be sought in a distinction between applied and theoretical knowledge defining, in any definite way, the limits between the two; rather, Easton would not have premature policy science preclude the very development of adequate policy science for the future. To that end, it seems, both general causal and constructive value theory would have to be developed before such policy science can operate with certainty of adequate prediction in relating means to goals. One should think twice before calling Easton an opponent of policy science simply for not being happy with current policy science as substitute for the prior task of the discipline.¹⁹⁾

These remarks, clearly, already enter into a discussion of the relation between the kinds of theory that we have reviewed. Let us examine what Easton has to say about their connections.

First, let us remember the necessity of distinguishing between an unconsciously operative causal theory at every level and its careful surfacing in explicitly stated causal theory, and observe that there is also unconsciously operative value theory at work in political science. Needed also is the careful elaboration and clarification of the sets of values, constructive value theory. Neither of these types of theory is presently visibly elaborated in terms of factual social/political life, society's organization for continued existence as society.

Both appear to be crowded out by premature policy science, by reformative theory, as if it could substitute for both causal and value theory's elaboration. Yet, value inspired questions are the real stimulus to any pure research into variables. The reformative urge, stimulated by values and goals desired, is the stimulative basis of all research into facts. Since facts do not speak for themselves, their direct use in application cannot be reliable in providing a reasonable measure of reliability (predictability) concerning the adequacy of means to ends. Hence the disputes as to the efficacy of means to be used for attaining goals. Such disputation is often called theory, reformative theory, and it usurps the field of political science for its own limited ends with inadequate means; society demands more of political science than that! And rightly so, for political science has much more to give in response to what society demands of political science. Society requires that political science do what it can to help solve the grave crisis threatening society with extinction today.

Is it too early to suggest that a proper development of both value and causal theory must somehow lead to reliable reformative policy-science? There is too much that is vague and casual in presently applied political science. In it, both value and causal theory is unconsciously at work. It continually sets the cart before the horse.

But why should a policy science, premature by reason of the immaturity of its component elements (casual causal and casual value theory) not come of age once causal and value theory have done so?

The road towards effective, reliable problem-solving in political life seems to be delineated, at least in broad outline. If true, it lends depth to Easton's use of Munroe's observation for introducing the second chapter of The Political System: As a result of this backwardness in what may be called the pure science of politics, there has been almost no applied science of government worthy of the name. (Easton, 1953:37)

1.5 The Interrelation of the Various Kinds of Theory

We have been discussing three kinds of theory as if each kind can function individually as a distinctly peculiar kind of theoretical activity. In doing so we have simply followed in Easton's footsteps. These footsteps, however, were taken as a matter of convenience. For, "it is deceptive to counterpose value to causal theory; in practice each is involved in the other".²⁰⁾ The distinction between these two classes of propositions is logical only; and since "a statement may be heavily weighted on the side of either causal analysis or moral (value) judgment, nothing is lost if we speak as though causal and value propositions each did appear apart from the other". (Easton, 1953:52)

But beware of the deceptive character of speaking in this way! It is looseness of expression. It is justifiable only for purposes

of convenience in discourse and should not lead one to think that causal or value statements exist in pure form. (Easton, 1953:52/3) In fact we have always to do with a synthesis of fact and value, whether casually experienced, or carefully understood, in two-sided factuality.

Here we touch on an issue central to Easton's thought. How is it possible to make a (even if only logical) distinction between causal and value theory, to argue for the very specific need to develop causal theory, indeed, to devote one's life work to the development of causal theory as (logically) distinct from value theory, and yet maintain that each type of theory is involved in the other?

Easton makes comments about the interrelatedness of causal theory in value theory and of the latter in the former that leave no doubt about their mutual intimacy; indeed, they are comments that cause one to wonder whether the two can be distinguished at all.

Let us look at some of them. "...moral views influence theoretical thinking to such a degree that a conceptual framework would be incomplete without a clear knowledge and understanding of its moral premises"(Easton, 1953:220). Which is literally to say that the relation of value theory to causal theory (whether in conscious form or not) is comparable to that between premises and conclusion in logical argument. Also, the moral framework of the investigator is "the major incentive for any research"(Easton, 1953:85). Causal theory would not be undertaken without value theory's call for it. "The inspiration behind political science is clearly ethical. Men want to understand the political system so that they can use this knowledge for their own purposes. "(Easton, 1953:223) "No factual

proposition uttered by a human being can be devoid of all relevance to moral preconceptions. "(Easton, 1953:224) We cannot shed our values the way we remove our coats. "The ideal of a value-free social science has revealed itself as a chimera. "(Easton, 1953:225)²¹⁾

Values not only provide the matrix which shapes the selection of an empirical problem for investigation, but they mold the formulation of the problem, the selection of data, and even their interpretation. This is no mean influence of value-thinking upon/in causal thought. At the same time, in pointing out that political research over the past 75 years "shows its affinity to a belief in democracy as the best kind of political system"(Easton, 1953:226), Easton would have it known that such adaptation of research is not "inherently malignant to satisfactory work! "Without some criteria for choosing areas for research, we would have no knowledge of where to begin in the search for generalizations significant for human living. "(Easton, 1953:227)

All of this holds good for general causal theory too:"...the kind of variables which a thinker considers cogent for his theory, the type of data he selects to test it, even the kinds of relations he sees among his variables, normally show a significant relation to his moral premises"(Easton, 1953:227). "Even if we banish all verbal references to values...our ultimate preferences may...have...exercized an unobtrusive influence on our observations and reasoning. "(Easton, 1953:227)

Unmistakably then, Easton is convinced of the involvement of value orientation and value theory, conscious or not, in causal orientation or theory, conscious or otherwise. But one finds, in Easton's text, as much ground for considering the involvement of causal thinking in value thinking, and, additionally, its effect upon value orientation and value theory. There would seem to be as much reason to speak of the impact of causal theory upon value theory as

the other way around. (Easton, 1953:225)

Let us look at some observations Easton makes which go far to prove the point.

That it is difficult to determine whether the influence of values on causal theory is more basic than that of the latter on the former is evident from the following statement which, at first sight, stresses the influence of the moral upon causal theory: "...moral views influence theoretical thinking to such a degree that a conceptual framework would be incomplete without a clear knowledge and understanding of its moral premises"(Easton, 1953:220). Just think of the 'incomplete', and of 'its' in this quotation. That about makes constructive moral theory part and parcel of causal theory, which is incomplete without it.²²⁾

In addition the need for closer attention to systematic theory "automatically imposes on political science the obligation to re-examine and ultimately to revise the way in which moral theory has been studied over the last half-century"(Easton, 1953:220).

One of the clearest statements as to the influence of causal theory upon the desires we have, the values we hold, the kind of value theory we ought to construct, is that such theory "helps men to decide upon the kind of political system they would prefer..."(Easton, 1953:223). It is in that very given that the utility of political research lies. (Easton, 1953:223)

Indeed, causal research, for instance into the history of political theory, like that of Sabine, McIlwain, and Dunning, can be such as to preempt the very enterprise of moral clarification. (Easton, 1953:236/7). An influence indeed ! It constitutes "a vital source of the contemporary decline in constructive moral enquiry" (Easton, 1953:234) Political theory, in them, has forsaken its genuinely moral aspect. (Easton, 1953:237) If it would hew to its only

unique function it would still include such empirical causal theory, but it would use this for entirely different purposes. It would be a means to inform of alternative moral outlooks in their cultural time-bound consequences and aid the researcher in the construction of his own political synthesis (values projected into facts, the good political life image). (Easton, 1953:237) Also, historicist tendencies strengthen the hold of traditional values. (Easton, 1953:259). At the same time relativist moral views contribute to historicist approaches to the exclusively causal study of values. (Easton, 1953:260)²³⁾

Moral views stem from the life-experience of an individual and factual evidence cannot prove one moral position superior to another. That is, description of the conditions surrounding the emergence of moral preference says nothing of the latter's merit; just that they are both product of factual circumstances. (Easton, 1953:261/2) To evaluate them in terms of moral worth is to engage in enquiry quite different, requiring a moral standard in terms of which to compare them. Factual cleavage in value orientation today makes value re-formulation imperative. (Easton, 1953:263) As ~~we~~ in Easton's thinking, struggle needs resolution; that also goes for the struggle over values.²⁴⁾

"The very needs of work in systematic theory, therefore, demand the rejuvenation of political theory" (constructive value theory, P.B.). (Easton, 1953; 265) This little sentence must be taken very literally, and very seriously if we are to understand Easton. To meet our needs we cannot simply desire their satisfaction; we must work, judiciously, towards their satisfaction and cannot do without systematic theory in the process.

But systematic theory cannot be needed unless there are unmet desires, that is to say, unless desires have not yet been adequately met or formulated in terms of means by which they could be adequately realized. The needs drive us to desire their satisfaction. To that end we need to know how things actually function so as to be able to work towards changes in behavior which will lead to the attainment of our goals, and in the light of factual knowledge we will have to reconstruct our goals to orient them to reality and to keep them from being pure myth; our goals, our values, must be such as to be attainable under specified conditions, only so can we ensure that our value (ultimate) is the best possible, the good, (political) life.

To summarize then, values, factual desires, specifically the desire to satisfy them as best we can, that is, most effectively, themselves demand insight into the workings of social life, demand factual, causal, empirical theory; empirical theory in turn requires the clarification of morals in a constructive way, in a way that pictures the good life, the best life possible, in view of the factual universal regularities actually operative.

1.6 Reformative Theory and its Relation to Causal and Value Theory

Easton equates reformative theory with premature policy science as we have seen. Its substantive content is the disputation of the adequacy of means towards the achievement of ends. It isn't really theory in the proper sense of the term.

It exists by default.²⁵⁾ It exists on account of political science's failure to have developed a systematic body of re-

liable knowledge which would most usefully provide a scientific and reliable basis for ascertaining the result of any particular ways advanced for achieving whatever ends; and of course the dispute over means has to do with both lack of reliable factual knowledge and a lack of clarity as to the goals to be achieved. Only through full-fledged engagement in these tasks of value-clarification and the development of causal general theory can political science provide what society demands of it for effective, authoritative policy-making.

Until such time, reformative theory with all the attendant strife about the adequacy of means to ends to be realized, will be with us. But once we get our causal theory developed to adequately reflect the causal relations of political life, such reformative theory and the strife which attends it, will disappear and become superfluous. In the mean time, such causal theory will not be developed adequately as long as reformative theory is considered to be the very task of scientific activity. For this theory is content to make do without such causal, explicitly formulated, theory except to the extent of developing singular generalizations; and it is content as well to accept the going values casually. It is a contentment that must begin to pall in view of the very cleavage in value-orientations presently affecting society. (Easton, 1953:264)

It is interesting to note that reformative theory "has tended to act as substitute for the utterly different task of conceptual theory"(Easton, 1953:81). On the same page Easton calls reformative theory and causal theory "two legitimate phases of research" while also admitting, or should we say proclaiming, that the 'merit' of causal theory does ultimately consist "in its usefulness for social reconstruction". Are we to think that reformative theory is merely a bad form of social reconstruction?²⁶⁾

Certainly not, for reformative theory has been confined to minor adjustments in the existing mechanisms. If so, one can hardly call it social reconstruction. That rings of rather more thoroughgoing change, as do the times themselves. Certainly if we will not put our shoulder to the wheel and develop adequate causal theory, especially at the most general level, taking note as well of the factual presence and consequences of various conflicting value patterns in it which cause us to fear for the very survival of social organized life, then the radical alterations will come over us and batter us about at random; let's put our shoulders to the wheel at least for the minimal survival needs of society and contemplate radical change as a process of reconstruction rather than to submit to disintegration.

I think it fair to conclude that on Easton's view reformative theory as presently pursued is a very poor substitute for both the need to develop causal theory and the need for thoroughgoing reconstruction of social life as required .

In thoroughgoing reconstruction, I take it, causal and value theory are to be seen as isolable phases of the whole process of social reconstruction. Social reconstruction is at once the essence of social life, of human experience. That experience has two sides to it. The valuative desires and goals (psychological) of individuals and their situational condition side. Not that the situational and psychological must be juxtaposed as two kinds of absolute and autarchic wholes closed to each other. Instead, the two are moments in one process of development (progress) governed by chance and judicious controlling behavioral, systemic, organized, constructive action. (Easton, 1953:14).

Still, the situational and the psychological, the factual and the valuative, the 'is' and 'the ought' are sufficiently different moments or phases in the process of reconstruction as to allow of their distinction, the one from the other. We need to distinguish the two or we would simply be battered about in random fashion, governed by chance alone. We must be aware of this point here because this is the very view underlying Easton's conception of the political system, his selection of the major variables of political life, as well as his elaboration of causal systemic theory, and it represents the only way that I find it possible to arrive at an interpretation of Easton's thought as consistent. It highlights his faith in the logic of procedure, in scientific method. It allows analysis to be determined by practical interests (which order entire clusters of variables as 'interesting'); one could even say that the interest isolates analytically what is to be researched with a view to the best possible reconstruction in the light of what appears to be possible in terms of desires to be realized. And if it helps to let things work, well, fine! Pessimism, at any rate, will get us nowhere!²⁷⁾

Unless one recognizes experience itself as an ongoing, persisting, self-transforming, behaving systemic process of reconstruction, one cannot reconcile at all the various facets of Easton's thought;²⁸⁾ which is not to say that this sufficiently describes the distinctively Eastonian character of his thought. But this basic view of human life, though similarly at the basis of many other, particularly American thinkers' thought, making Easton a member of a particular school of philosophy backed up by a distinctive 'Weltanschauung' that has been making itself particularly strong in America, is most fundamental; the most

powerful regulative factor in the development of his thinking. Furthermore, one should recognize that such a view is not warranted by science, not scientifically provable . As Easton makes abundantly clear himself, it is mood-determined. There are other moods all quite at odds with the mood Easton takes to be scientific, desirable. Indeed, these moods combine to constitute such a threat to the mood believing in the supreme utility of scientific procedure, that The Political System is written to establish the need and possibility of work towards the full expression of the kind of mood he favors, and which, he hopes, will serve for the reconstruction of the discipline of political science as a leading factor in radical, thoroughgoing social reconstruction.²⁹⁾

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1) It could be argued, in Easton's terms, that reformative theory is inadequate because it shows no concern for a kind of knowledge reliably valid so as to hold good for any and every situation (causal theory). It, instead, dips into the present and attempts to relate the data selected and observed there to some speculatively conceived utopia, even if that utopia proves to be, in reformative theory, the present conceived as pretty well the best of all possible worlds.

The attraction of this approach lies in its concomitance with the apparent uselessness of trying to develop speculative utopias. Its drawbacks consist in the evident complacency with respect to the realization of presently actually conceivable progress. It allows one to think that value theory is neither necessary nor useful, while the facts speak for themselves, thus determining our presently held values as the best possible values, whatever they may be.

In the meantime the ends of reformative theory are continually defeated since facts, as discovered, are embedded in causal theory unconsciously and casually at work and related all around to value theory, again rather casually held and all but explicated in terms of the behavioral possibilities of the (f)actual situation.

In view of the behavioral situation pregnant with possibilities for intelligent action-in-control, the only logic of procedure to follow is to develop causal theory in the conviction that it alone can provide the firm foundation for self-conscious value theoretical reflection such as to be capable of realization in view of the considered instrumentalities applicable in the process of experience.

2) Note one also makes plain why Easton can also call facts 'variables'. Facts are not unchanging entities that retain their identity at all times. Facts can, and ought to be, transformed. Change affects them through and through. Facts of a kind are such as covary according to invariant, relatively constant relationships between them regardless of the structure of these facts severally. They covary within a functional systemic whole of such relationships of facts. Such a whole is one of organiza-

tion within complexity, and against it. Once organization arises in complexity, we have systemic wholes seeking to persist against the pressures of complexity. Societies are such wholes of the most encompassing kind and their decider-functions are taken care of by what we call the political system whatever its elements and their structures. The differentiation of organization can itself lead to complexity of a threatening kind. Only the most general organizational intelligence can serve to counteract these stressful tendencies.

3) That causal theory is not to be understood in a downright physicalistic, naturalistic or scientific sense as though it were to report non-committally what actually happens, as though this involves no value-orientation, is clear from the fact that Easton does speak of assumptions one must be aware of in developing causal theory. A most basic commitment concerns the hypothetical nature of any such theory as of a kind that is held to best reflect the actual working of the system being investigated, in the understanding that it must be testable and discarded if it does not prove adequate. Its truth-probability is less than one.

4) It is well to note that meaning is not a question of values and value theory only. Indeed, causal theory provides meaning to facts of a kind that transcends any particular time and place.

Such meaning is not discoverable in facts without causal theory. The latter is the enabling instrument to the attainment of such meaning. It is significantly meaningful for the realization of values (aspirations) which can only be theoretically explicated with such meaningful causal theory to hand. Without it, the meaning of the desired would, I take it, be on the level of the intelligence-lacking biological organism.

All of this adds poignance to the suggestion that causal theory must be the index of the state of maturity of a science.

5) That this is seldom asked may be because of a vague and unexpressed conviction that they may not belong together in any causally connective sense of covariance for any useful purpose. Nevertheless Easton retains sufficient faith in an inherent logic leading to the differentiation of the disciplines and in the political scientists' implicitly causal political orientation to assume

that the data so collected do belong together, that is, cohere significantly. It is the assumption without which his works could not have been completed.

6) It is curious that Easton should draw this inference concerning 'the political system itself'. Does it mean that he views it to be an organization with specific ends in which power tends to be concentrated in the hands of a few? Michels did not think in Easton's terms of the political system. Either Easton draws an inference purely in terms of Michels' Law to say what Michels' conclusion must be concerning the political system had he addressed himself to this question, or, and I think that is in line with Easton's thought, he adopts this position, elitist as it is, himself. That would make the political system a highly specialized 'organ of adaptation'. If so, Easton's 'if true' may be amended to read, 'therefore' (next sentence) power cannot reside in the hands of the people.

7) Although the mention of sieve, compass and gauge may easily evoke a mechanistic view of causal theory at the general level, we do well to note that it is to be serviceable to understanding, to the closest possible identification and interrelation of variables in understanding. Nevertheless, these terms do point up an instrumentalist approach to scientific understanding the significance of which is to be sought in the use to which it can be put.

8) The distinction between induction and deduction is of extreme importance. Deduction is embedded in induction. Deduction has the character of mathematical axiomatic thought which does not, as such, require reference to empirical states of affairs. Now mathematics has axioms which do not depend on induction for their establishment or their proof, despite the fact that it does show empirical relevance in practice, and constitutes a vital prop in physics, whose axioms are also inductively derived.

Experience, and knowledge of experience, that is, knowledge empirically oriented has no choice but to proceed inductively in

establishing its hypothetical axioms, which, because inductively established, always continue to require testing, and to be open to falsification (cf. Popper's views). Yet the axioms established are scientifically relevant only when they can be shown to have implications such as can be deductively elaborated to approach in complexity the very data, theoretically, which had led to the axioms and which continue to always call for the testing of such axioms. Through the deductive elaboration of axioms and through their testing, a body of causal, that is, scientific and general theory of increasing sophistication and reliability, especially in its predictive capacity, arises.

Were it so that the axioms inductively established needed to be abandoned lock stock and barrel in view of their uselessness for increased reliability of understanding, it is difficult to see how general causal and deductive theory could continue to be of use. Such theory could possibly hold its own, purely axiomatically, although we would not know of what use such theory could be. Is that not what post- and anti-behavioralists were suggesting to be the case with the behaviorist's kind of model- and theory-building in 1969?

What could be advanced against the claim that behaviorist theory-building be best abandoned? First of all, mathematical theory without any inductive bases proves to be capable of application in practice to some extent; there is no reason why the same should not hold good for a deductive theory of political life. Secondly, it is the only way in which to improve upon the axioms inductively acquired and relevant to political experience; it is the way to buttress the reliability of the axioms held since their implications are to be spelled out by deduction if they are not to be casually inferred in random, haphazard fashion. Thirdly, experience is not simply random complexity, but shows a good measure of organization in response to the needs of social life. These systemic features of social life can be and must be elaborated in their consequences if we are to survive against the random, disorganizing, persistence-threatening forces of experience. Experience, since organized, has a built-in guide of past organized regularity, which, when known, props further development of intelligence and behavior also enhancing the possible development of deductive causal science of society.

It is true that the complexity of organized experience can be such as to constitute part of the crisis we face and the crisis may be so urgent that political scientists must reformatively take part in actual politics without being able to bring such causal knowledge as we have even now to bear upon practice; still, reformative theory is, as we saw, make-shift and cannot lead to truly effective long-run adaptation and control, even to secure society's survival.

Finally, it best be remembered that no causal theory ought to be abandoned except in favor of theory with greater explanatory power.

In conclusion, where a theory is partially, or wholly, disproven by the facts in its testing, the profession is faced with a perplexity to be solved not by simply discarding the theory held, but by its transformation into more explanatory theory; such transformation is to be expected in view of the altered inductively derived matter of experience whose implications must be capable of elaboration at all times to the greatest possible extent in terms of relevant experiential questions and problems to be solved for the amelioration of society.

9) That a theory could be disproven in whole or in part would seem to be misleading on Easton's terms. If indeed causal theory is systemic so as to reflect the actual political system, and if a system's elements cohere so closely as to covary, then a partial disproof immediately entails the reconstruction of the entire theory. Perhaps that explains why the dragon of a discipline's redefinition continues to raise its head anew, but in ever more sophisticated fashion, in every age. (General causal theory is causal theory concerning the scope of the discipline, establishing the discipline's most general level.)

10) This paragraph highlights the reductionist character of Easton's views. Experience may be characterized as emotional response to real or presumed facts. Whatever may be the meaning of 'real' in this context (concerning the notion of the real in American political science see: Euben, in: Green, Levinson, 1970, 18/19), if value is a matter of response to real or presumed facts, then what is presumption here? Presumed facts must then refer to a (mistaken?) response to real facts. Or Easton may argue that the presumption does not imply 'mistaken' as over against 'real' facts. Then it makes no difference

whether facts are real or presumed, then they are simply always real as presumed and presumed as real. The order to be recognized thus becomes the order as recognized. The nominalist tradition certainly leaves its mark here.

At any rate, value is response to fact. When expressed, the moral aspect of a proposition expresses emotional response or individual preference. Easton's democracy-example illustrates the conditional nature of values with respect to consequences. It makes no sense to say that my preference for democracy is true or false. That is my sentiment, or it is not, however consequential the fact of my holding such a sentiment may be. That the U. S. A. is a democracy can be true or false proven or disproven, provided we can agree on the essential variables of 'democracy' (which, I think, is as unlikely as it would be to agree on the meaning of the term 'state' which Easton rejects for that very reason).

I wonder, however, what Easton would have to say to the possible contention that one ought to prefer democracy to other systems? Can one say that it is true or false that one ought to behave so as to enhance the likelihood of democracy?

Is that, in fact, not what Easton is telling us concerning causal theory: it is true that we ought to develop general causal theory? Not necessarily, for there is a difference between that and saying that Easton would prefer that we, with him, desire to develop such theory. He reduces 'it is true that' as well as 'one ought to' statements (whether these oughts are political, theoretical, religious, lingual, economic, social, aesthetic, legal, or whatever) to expression of emotional preference, to matters of desire. (What has been desired in the past and the realized consequences of these desires, are, of course, part and parcel of facts as now understood.)

11) Some comments about the passage in question are in order. I think Easton does indeed adhere to the view that all values are ultimately reducible to emotional responses. It is not, however, his aim to argue this convincingly in the form of thoroughgoing value theory. Should one wish to see them as objective substantive principles their consequence for causal theory would be no different. All he needs to make clear now is that the very enter-

terprise of developing causal theory is embedded in and inspired by values, not the least among them the value of a reliable understanding of the facts as they are. Even if the values are substantive oughts and more than merely indicative moods, their realization requires that values be projected into the future situation in the fullest awareness of the means by which that situation may be achieved in view of our knowledge of things as they are and have come to be (causal theory). It is that kind of value theory that a rounded systematic theory (more than causal theory alone) requires. Since Easton's work is not directed, in the present discussion, to the elaboration of his values, he does not fully argue his pragmatist/instrumentalist view of values and presents it as his working assumption.

That this working hypothesis, of values being but indicative moods, is the least convenient in terms of which to argue that a value theory, which steers clear of value-relativism, is necessary is because pragmatists have taken the idea that values are sentiments to imply an equalistic relativism.

Anyway, Easton suggests, if one can hold a pragmatist view of values and still convincingly argue the need for constructive value theory as a synthesis of values and facts which places the relation of means to ends on a sure footing, then certainly those who hold values to be objective substantive principles will certainly admit to the need for it.

Nevertheless, I find the passage to be rather too cryptic, and too much of a short-hand attempt to convince all and sundry, whatever their value conception, that their values require a linkage to systematic causal theory of the type Easton seeks to develop. The passage is introduced so abruptly as to be confusing; meant to be convincing, it does not convince. If Easton should be surprised at anyone for not being convinced by this handy catch-all-comers argument, it will be because to him it is inconceivable that his readers should differ on the nature of the facts as the 'is' of present experience.

All who accept the 'is-character' of the facts, which also includes preferences held, as a systemic whole requiring the development of causal systematic theory, must agree in their conception of values at least to the extent that this sort of factual knowledge limits values to being logically distinguishable from it and requires their synthesis in the form of constructive projection of the future.

12) Such a contrast between logic and preference can easily be misunderstood. Easton cannot consider preference to be of inferior standing as compared to logic. Preferences are too important as the matrix of logic's rise and advance. And yet, logic, the logic of procedure, is granted a guiding function, a normative status, in our attempt to overcome perplexities in the process of value realization. The logic of procedure, which leads to reliable knowledge, is a prerequisite providing us with the only hope of organized society's survival in the face of increasing complexity. For future behavior all other values must be mutually adjusted and balanced in their expression according to the requirements proceeding from the logically derived and explicitly stated, deduced, implications of empirically oriented causal theoretical knowledge.

Causal theory and the desire to increase its reliability as the conductor-guide in value-realization, in its restrictive function precluding merely random emotional response, testifies to the overriding value attributed to the emotional desire issuing in attempts to develop, quite dispassionately, according to strict logic, causal, scientific, factual, empirically oriented, theory relative to all the basic and recurrent kinds of problems encountered in organized society.

13) Except, perhaps, in view of note 12, the value of causal empirically oriented knowledge.

14) Hence Easton's preference for the word 'emergence'.

15) That Easton rejects the state as orienting concept is quite clear from this description of the aim of such value theory as is required for political practice and political science. Had he not done so different options would have been open to him. Then the emphasis could have come to rest on the variety of political programs (programs the state's government should realize) and upon groups and individuals to the extent that they express themselves politically, viz. relevant to matters of state. That would help to keep political science and theory away from the totalitarian tendencies presently at work in the field.

16) I cannot help finding the tenor of this way of picturing the relationship between values (moral premises) and political system speculative and metaphysical. No political system "flows from moral premises" at all. To state matters in this way merely indicates the humanist bias of Easton's thought in a stark manner. The source of the political system is identified with the moral premises men seek to realize. These premises are themselves expressions of emotion in response to hard fact. Human emotion thus becomes the source of social order and disorder. No wonder Easton devotes considerable attention to moods! For an order for reality not of our own making to which we cannot but ought to respond for the glory of God and our own well-being there can be no room if political systems flow from our moral premises as expressed through social organized activity.

17) Because it is the very reason of science's existence to transcend ordinary common sense knowledge so as to replace it in practice for a more efficient realization of our desires than can be achieved through a combination of casual value and causal theory. The meaning of science is in its use. The first stages of a science ought to last no longer than the time needed for developing a science's knowledge systematically.

If Easton is correct, it does mean that political science, in 1969, still finds itself in its first stages if it appears that the New Revolution in political science seeks to bypass behavioral theory in order to busy itself with reformative theory again.

Easton's Presidential address would not have it so. For it would negate Easton's view of scientific development as linear and cumulative. Instead the members of the Causus are said not to react against causal theory; they represent the case for social relevance, which, on Easton's terms, is quite compatible with, indeed, called for by causal theory which itself was occasioned by recognized social need for it.

18) That lets a good part of the cat out of the bag. Savoir est prévoir, to put it in Comte's language. An old adage, newly presented. Its dangers remain what they were. It makes laity

o f those not trained in science, and priests of the knowledge-specialists. Priests are not known to be modest in the conception of their own status and importance. In the practice of life they tend to overrule non-priests. Yet the practice of life requires first and foremost the integral wisdom and knowledge of non-scientific experience so that scientifically deepened knowledge is to stand it in good stead.

19) Contra Wagenaar in his incisively critical and stimulating: Enige Gondvragen bij de Ontwikkeling van het Denken van David Easton (Basic Questions about the Development of David Easton's Thought). On page 22 of this unpublished paper he observes: "The idea of social science as the 'policy sciences' certainly does not appeal to Easton" (my translation).

However, as Easton himself states, both the School of Applied and the school of Pure Political Scientific Research form part of political science. That pure research has a certain autonomy with respect to applied research is not to say that pure research is not to serve applied research. It is merely to distinguish two phases required in the process of political research which, as a whole, is part and parcel of and subserves the purposes of social reconstruction, by guiding it as its most important phase. It is, after all, crucial to organized survival. Lest we forget, all things are structure in process, and structure is organization. All organization realized may be viewed as means of survival, organs of adaptation.

(For a discussion of the relation between the schools referred to, and their tasks, as Easton envisages them, see: Easton, 1953: 86-88.)

20) That is to say, the distinction between such statements is purely analytical, as is the distinction between, say, the political and other social systems. Just as the ought may be analytically distinguished from, though determined by, the 'is' in which it is a directing factor towards the amelioration of social life by overcoming the needs of experience, so also value theoretical statements may be distinguished from causal theoretical statements under the guidance of our interest in increasing the reliability of our knowledge of reality for the sake of the more efficient, useful, elaboration, projection and realization of what we desire.

Distinctions such as these are not to be understood as separations but as aspects and phases of process such that every analytically isolated component part covaries with, and is in principle open to, influences of every other part, as it itself may also influence them. That is entirely in keeping with pragmatism's tenets.

21) With that, Easton clearly takes leave of the rationalist science-ideal as it had inspired the logical positivists. Science is caught up in and pressed onwards by desire-directed practice. To put it thus may be somewhat misleading; for science is caught up in experience as a relatively independent element in the whole of experience. It is the organized reflection of past and present experience in its organizational regularity and as such it is experience's most useful instrument towards the reliable control and prediction of the contingent future, which, it appears, always resists full control. Were full control to be realized, we would have realized a state of social entropy difficult to conceive.

22) In Easton's criticism of reformative theory it has appeared that value theory is incomplete without causal theory. Now we hear causal theory to be incomplete without value theory.

Reformative theory shows a gap between values held and facts experienced. Theory here concerns argument about the application of knowledge before that knowledge has been consciously explicated so as to be testable in practice. It is speculation on the relation between various alternative procedures to given goals we wish to achieve. Such theory cannot bridge the gap between fact and value. The 'gap' refers not to lack of relation between fact and value in experience but to the uneasiness between them. Their relation is characterized less by their ordering in scientific knowledge and its application than we would like and than we know to be necessary for social life. Intelligent factual theory, explanation of the regularities of the process of human experience to date through analysis of those coherences of variables that we consider relevant to the realization of our desires

together with the projection of our values theoretically in view of our best knowledge of the regularities interrelating the facts in process, that is, two kinds of theory, never final and absolute as long as the process of interaction between fact and desire continues are to guide the continuing process rather absolutely. All of which holds good only as long as we continue to utilize the knowledge so acquired for the purpose of redirecting our experience. Such is the underlying pattern of Easton's 'Weltanschauung'.

The gap between fact and value is not closed to the greatest extent possible by reformative theory. The mutual development of value and factual theory with a view to their realization as a whole unity can only be achieved if life were to reach the point of being one unified needless and hence desireless whole wholly known as desired and desired as known, the best of all possible worlds realized. Until such never-never time the task is to increase our knowledge for increased control so as at least to ensure the continued existence of man as the organizing experimenter in his all but perfect laboratory of the social world.

23) Understandable. See note 22.

24) As observed already when we discussed the legalist/utilitarian hold on political knowledge in previous times, as long as the going values of at least the powerful groups in society are accepted there is no urgent need for the reconstruction of value theory. There may have been other desires held by the less powerful but in fact they accepted those of the powerful. There is not at such times factual cleavage in value orientation which could put the critical variables of the political system, and with that, the critical variables of the social system, beyond normalcy so as to destroy society. (The absolute norm, evidently, is the desire to continue as society).

Today, says Easton, things are different. Hence value reformulation, value reconstruction, is now imperative. Struggle, conflict, which could destroy society must be resolved in whichever way so as to ensure the continuation of society. The supreme standard, viz. the ensurance of society's survival, is of course absolute, and not itself a candidate for reconstruction.

No Christian can accept this as his supreme norm. This absolute can be held for the love of God only if one accepts man as social organizer as his God. It is the supreme norm of man as norm unto himself, and final norm at that. It is the norm of humanism.

If, in South Africa, we continue to think in terms of our society as a whole to be continued at all costs, whether we think of it as a 'volk', as an association of free individuals, as a socialist economic unit of cooperation, or whatever, we are busy enthroning ourselves as our God, and making our survival the supreme norm of life. We can delude ourselves into holding to the necessity of this absolute standard, but we have, in doing so, sworn off our allegiance to the Lordship of Jesus Christ and abandoned our recognition of God as our Father-Creator Who would have us to love Him above all.

There is something demonic in the cogency of arguments that would have men adopt the supreme norm of pragmatism, viz., the survival of society; belief in the supremacy of that norm cannot but rob life, also societal life, of true meaning which consists in its relation to the actual Origin Whose original Word has caused man to respond to Him as the Author of the creation order in which He made man responsible for a single-hearted desire, mind, and will to conduct himself as he therefore ought.

25) It only makes sense to say so if it is true that those who practice such theory are not taking the promise implicit in the full use of his intellectual capacity seriously. Political science as reformative theory, in neglect of trying to meet the need for value and causal theory, is shirking its responsibility to society.

Society is hungry for much needed knowledge, its bread, its sustenance. In view of what the other sciences are doing it is clear that a slice of bread at least should come from political science, but it provides only a crumb. It stands guilty in the exercise of its responsible calling to meet the needs of society.

Indeed, Easton's work, as it should be, is guided by religious fervor. His entire view of reality expresses the dynamics, theoretically, of his idea of organized human activity as service of God. Society being his God, its needs must be met in faithful devotion. Political science focusing in needs

most central to society's continuation, its practitioners appear as primes inter pares, constituting the chief order among the priests of mankind.

26) The query might have been answered in the affirmative as well. It is a bad form of social reconstruction, a half-hearted one, one that tinkers where revamping is required as the very word 'reconstruction' boldly implies. Because reformative theory does not see this need to radically reconstruct, I have answered the question in the negative.

27) In 1969, witness Easton's soul-cry: "if we but had the time", it would seem that Easton himself is close to admitting to pessimist sentiment. If so, however, the bankruptcy of his faith is not recognition of having banked on a bad horse, of having expected too much from the organized intellect that comes with the maturation of political science, just that bad luck is against him and threatening to win the battle.

It is a moment intrinsic to the pragmatist credo that the battle of social organization and advance must be fought continually against heavy odds. As Zuidema has stated concerning Dewey's position: in the long run good luck chooses the side of intelligence.

In the short run difficulties may give cause for pessimism now and again. In the late sixties and in the early eighties as well, short run difficulties may be such as to preclude the long-run perspective. If so, the likelihood of pragmatism's about-face from optimistic confidence in man's capacities to a pessimistic eudaimonism may be imminent on the supposition that the short run will preclude the long run anyway.

Even in 1953, of course, persistence was to be seen as persistence against odds. It is precisely that kind of persistence at which Easton expresses surprise, also in 1965. (Easton, 1965a: 77/8).

28) Hendrik Hart is correct, I think, in saying that Dewey is representative of a new movement which, since the days of the 'Metaphysical Club' (Peirce, James, Green, Holmes and Wright) has been characterized by the following underlying basic motive:

"The creation of certainty through the operational application of the instrumentalities of free and autonomous intelligence which, since the meaning of their truth can only be tested in the results of actual use, progressively conditions the manifold contingent situation through orderly control of the consequences of human activity". I think Easton too is part of that movement.

It is also useful to note that Hart reckons the neo-positivists, or lingual analysis people, to be governed by that same motive although they restrict it to the world of theory, language, logico-mathematical symbols and the like, as, I think, Easton does not. It helps one to see how Easton can recognize the legitimate place of lingual analysis as a kind of theory (Easton, 1965b:5) although he does not discuss it. If I may venture a guess it would seem to be the analysis of expressed belief systems in the service of creative moral enquiry.

CHAPTER THREE

1. The Political System

1.1 Introduction

Although Chapter two, in its treatment of various kinds of theory, did casually suggest that the relation of these types of theory was to be understood in terms of the discipline of political science so that it is causal theory, value theory, and reformative theory geared to the political which was at issue, that political focus was not there essential to the discussion. Causal theory, value theory and reformative theory are similarly present and related in any social science. Indeed, the social and the physical world are to be considered sufficiently alike that causal theory of the kind so well developed in physical science, may, when appropriately modified, also be discovered for the social sciences. (Easton, 1953: 8) The physical sciences too are stimulated by the possible use to which that knowledge can be put in meeting our desires and, hence, it too is founded on value theory. In view of Easton's discussion of what would be done with the hypothetical discovery of the only blue-prints for the manufacture of fissionable atomic material in existence during the middle of the eighteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, it is clear that the physical sciences too may be overwhelmed by reformative theory (applied theory) from time to time. (Easton, 1953:15/6)

That is to say, Easton's discussions of theory, science, facts, in their relation to experience is so general that we must necessarily call it broadly philosophical. It contains answers to questions typically asked by epistemologists and ontologists such as: what is the nature of knowledge and how does scientific knowledge relate to common sense knowledge? What is the nature of reality and experience? What is the nature of the reality of scien-

tific knowledge in the midst of that reality? What is man? Where does he come from? Where is he heading?

At the same time it is clearly Easton's concern to evaluate the state of affairs within the discipline of political science and to develop general causal theory as suited to that discipline. To do so is, on Easton's views, to assume that a separable political system does show itself empirically as part of the whole of social life and that it is meaningful to develop a discipline of, specifically, political science.

With his idea of the political system Easton attempts to delimit the field of political science by pointing to the orienting concepts which provide unity for the field.

As part of human experience, that which Easton has to say about knowledge and experience in general also applies to what he takes the political and political science to be.

Consequently, in this chapter we wish to take note of his description of the field and to trace the relation of this description to his general philosophic convictions; these constitute the presuppositions of his political systems analysis of political life.

1.1.1 The Political System. A Question of Wholes and Parts

"It is artificial to isolate any set of social relations from the whole for special attention"(Easton, 1953:97) for "everything is related to everything else"(Easton, 1953:97) in such a whole. That fixes the need for the simplification of data.¹⁾ Otherwise the task of pursuing the determinants of any given relation would be so great and ramifying that it would defy the tools of investigation available to either the social or physical sciences. (Easton, 1953:97)

What is this whole from which, artificially, political science must isolate its set of social relations for analysis?

It is the whole of social life, the whole social system and all the variables operative in it. (Easton, 1953:97). The political system of variables of interest to political science is to be seen as a subsystem of the whole social system, which can be profitably examined, temporarily, apart from the whole system. (Easton, 1953:97)²⁾

Here Easton runs into some difficulties not easily resolved, it seems to me. How does one consider a subsystem apart, even if temporarily, from the whole system? That amounts to an antinomy. Either we are dealing with a subsystem and realize that the specific features distinguishing it from the other subsystems will by no means tell us anything of this subsystem's basic characteristics by virtue of its being, indeed, a subsystem, or we examine systemically interrelated variables apart from any other system, a whole in its own right, and cannot then view it as a subsystem of any whole. By speaking of the political system apart from the whole Easton lets us know he wants to have it both ways.

In stressing the artificiality involved in isolating a political system for analysis, our attention is riveted to the whole. The whole of human activity, the whole social system, must never be too far from our minds when we analyse the political system temporarily apart from, in isolation from, the whole.

Now it is easy enough to point to a logical contradiction in Easton's thought, to observe that what Easton wants to do, viz. view a part of a whole as if it were not a part of a whole but the only whole in question, is logically unsound. One could do so and then continue to the next topic for discussion. Then we would, however, miss out on essentials of Easton's thought.

What we are dealing with here is not an instance of a logical slip in an otherwise sound argument, nor just a matter of loose expression. Where we are concerned with the very issue of the identification of an empirical concrete system of political activity, of the field of study properly to be reflected by political scientists in a theoretical political system, an identification that must nevertheless be open to recognition of the whole of human activity, or, the whole social system, we should not, unless we deem Easton to be a thinker of small format, in which case we may as well stop our enquiry right at this point, be satisfied with conclusions deriving from merely logical or lingual analysis; rather, it should cause us to wonder what it is that makes these inconsistencies, such looseness of expression, essential, at least unavoidable, palatable, in view of basic convictions, convictions so basic that logical consistency and clarity of expression are sacrificed for the sake of the persistence of these convictions. Logical contradictions in the presentations of formidable thinkers are usually clues to the underlying motives seeking theoretical expression.

Hence we must ask what it is that causes Easton to speak as he does in antinomious fashion. What suppositions concerning the nature of social life as a whole, and of social knowledge as a whole, cause him to speak of political life as part of that social life and yet also, temporarily, as not part of it? To gain a better view of these suppositions as the driving force behind the antinomy in question let us see how Easton tries to establish the existence of a separable, (or perhaps separate?), political system without which there cannot be grounds for a separate (or must we say separable?) discipline of political science.

1.1.2 Concerning The Need For Clarity about The Limits
Of The Political System

Chapters 4 and 5 of The Political System are most directly relevant to a discussion of this topic. In chapters 1, 2 and 3, Easton's purpose had not been "to sketch even in broad outline a possible theory of the political system but simply to urge consideration for the need to undertake an examination of such theory"(Easton, 1953:91).

Assuming then that Easton did establish the need for a general theory of the political system convincingly we can now enquire into his discussion of the possibility of developing such theory. He now begins to address himself to problems that would arise if political science were deliberately and seriously to begin to face the task of formulating a conceptual framework (causal theory at the most general level). (Easton, 1953: 91) The problems that do present themselves are numerous, but Easton has selected three urgent ones for discussion. He does not pretend to offer a full-fledged theory of the political system in this work but discusses these three problems to illustrate the areas into which the quest for such theoretical knowledge must move research. Of crucial interest here are the kind of problems raised not the substantive answers which Easton happens to advance for them.

He is rather more concerned that his readers should agree about the importance of the kind of problems relevant to theory-construction as raised by him than that the reader should agree that his substantive views of them is correct.

In sum: Easton is saying that if we are to develop general causal theory, a framework for the analysis of political life, at least the following three initial problems must be faced:

a) the basic concepts needed to orient research to political as distinct from other kinds of subject matter must be discovered (Easton devotes himself to the task in chapters 4 and 5) b) the categories of data to be taken into consideration in any piece of research must be known (Easton discusses them in chapters 6,7 and 8) and c) the role that value judgments play in the formulation of theory must be recognized (Easton treats of that in chapters 9 and 10). We will concern ourselves with a) the basic orienting concepts in this chapter.

The first problem then that faces us if we wish to develop general causal theory is: "just what are we to talk about?" (Easton, 1953:92) when we direct our attention to systematic theory in political science. It is a question of orientation, "orientation to the thing that we have learned to call political. Where does the political begin and end, and how is it distinguishable if at all, from other kinds of data that we call economic, sociological, psychological, and so on through the whole catalogue of the established social sciences? The very idea of systematic theory, in other words, raises the question of the gross outlines of the concrete empirical system to which a system of theory is to refer." (Easton, 1953:93) It entails the discussion of the limits of political science, a topic today in disrepute.

The problem area thus singled out for discussion is encyclopedic, a problem of general as well as political philosophy. It is general philosophy in dealing with the interrelations and the delimitation of the sciences the one from the other. It is special political philosophy, a question of the philosophy of political science itself in attempting to provide the basic concepts proper to that field of study. Easton deserves credit for raising this very foundational question once again. At the same time, however,

we may not forget that the scope of the questions thus raised is, in Easton's terms, directly limited to the construction of causal theory as distinct from, though inspired by, value theory, and its assumptions. That is, the scope of the political is very much restricted even before it is explicitly discussed. According to Easton only the 'is' defines the scope of the political. Value-judgments are ultimately reducible to expression of emotion so that they are altogether psychological in kind; they are, to the extent not realized, removed from the encyclopedic discussion of scope in a way that the political facts in their causal coherence are not. Still, to raise encyclopedic questions concerning a special science's place as distinct from and yet related to the other sciences at all is to raise very necessary questions which had indeed been avoided altogether too long by American political scientists generally.

When one sets out to find a conceptual framework one must, says Easton, begin by seeking the grossest, the very simplest, outlines of the concrete empirical system to which a system of theory is to refer. (Easton, 1953:93/3) This frame of reference must consist of those broad concepts which help to orient us to political data; it must be a rough sketch of the ground we must traverse in the development of a theoretical system; unless, of course, one wishes to continue in the realist American tradition which allows political science to become simply that which the political scientist does. (Easton, 1953:93) Not that this was so bad during the discipline's first innings. Empirical investigation amounting to very little, discussion of scope and limits would have been presumptuous. (These re-

marks do show a definite inclination on Easton's part to view only the scientifically gathered data of controlled observation as the legitimate raw material with which political science is to be theoretically concerned. Again, one wonders whether this does not narrow the scope of the discipline unduly at the very outset).³⁾

Oddly enough, despite the fact that Easton justifies avoidance of attempts to delimit the scope of political science in its initial stages, since it would, in the absence of empirical factual data, amount to guesswork, expression of prejudice, or speculation in a vacuum, he goes right on to criticize Arthur Bentley for doing just that in rejecting discussion of scope and definition of the field in 1908. How is that to be explained? Is Bentley not an instance of one who shares Easton's own (positivistically inspired) suggestion that such discussion could not be very useful at that time?

Here again one is tempted to point to a glaring inconsistency on Easton's part. Why should Bentley be chided for his aversion to discussions of the limits of political science, if, as Easton himself agrees, such discussion could not be useful in view of the dearth of established facts? Again, to draw this conclusion and then to pass on would be to miss out on Easton's basic views, views determinative of his understanding of 'political system'.

The inconsistency in question is only apparent as will be seen when we keep in mind that there are two kinds of causal theory with which to reckon at all times, as we argued in our discussion of causal theory: casually held, but nonetheless operative theory that should be surfaced, and factual theory carefully stated with a view to its testability. The former,

when carefully stated, is the latter; when carefully stated, it is verifiable (or, rather, falsifiable, the truth probability of all theory being less than one). Theory so formulated as to be capable of its testing by research into facts shows the implications of theory casually held through a process of deduction.

What Easton has to say of Bentley can be explained in terms of his understanding of scientific method. Bentley was quite right in considering that "to get on with the examination of political phenomena" was "a task obviously prior for his period". Without reliably established facts we have, after all, nothing against which to test the factual adequacy of any general definition of the scope of the field of political science. But to conclude, on this basis, that any mention of scope should be avoided, is to conclude that the field can do without any theory as to the scope of political science. That conclusion, Easton holds, is patently unwarranted. Indeed, as we have observed, no facts can be gathered except in terms of theory, also at the most general level, albeit that such theory is not surfaced for careful statement. Bentley himself did not avoid all mention of scope and felt the need to explore the meaning of political phenomena, "a concealed way of talking about scope". It is deviant and inconsistent to suggest that the matter of scope can be avoided as useless, and then to go and bring the topic in by the back door. (Easton, 1953:94/5)

All this goes to show that theory casually held urgently requires testing through factual research on the assumption that it might not adequately reflect actual fact. It also goes

to show that all factual research is embedded in theory of a factually oriented kind. That theory will necessarily be vague and casual if it is not consciously oriented to actual facts of political experience. Easton wishes to establish the necessary partnership of fact and theory. Where research is going on, there factually oriented theory, assumptions, inductively derived, concerning the factual kind of interrelations between variables considered politically relevant, is at work. It is only theory in testable form when carefully formulated to reflect the facts of political life in a deductively coherent system (an open-ended system); and, in view of ongoing research, the facts discovered, it needs to be continually reconstructed so as to be, in fact, increasingly reliable, at every level. Bentley should have recognized the fact that in research into political life, obviously a task of political science, theory as to the nature of political life, was, indeed, inductively operative.

If such theory was to become testable, to be surfaced in such a way as to be considered true or false in view of the actual facts of political life, then, obviously, at that time, attention should focus first of all on the establishment of the facts to what ever extent the theory casually held allowed of it. One cannot consciously surface theory unconsciously held, except by way of research into the facts in terms of the assumptions held concerning the scope of what the political is.

Easton goes on to observe that, after Bentley, the condition and quantity of political knowledge, witness its bulging inventories of facts, has changed radically. Lack of facts can no longer serve as excuse for not bringing the theoretical assumptions, in terms of which the facts have been gathered, to the surface by way of their careful statement. (Easton, 1953:93-95) The cau-

sal assumptions that have been at work unconsciously, or should we say, at the level of casual theory, must now be checked against the facts collected on its terms, but cannot be, unless it is brought to testable expression. Bentley's aversion to questions of scope and their discussion, if generally shared by the discipline, only serves to make the emergence of such theory unlikely. It may lead political scientists to "misconstrue the earlier historically conditioned need to set aside questions about the limits of political science as a sign of the permanent sterility of such enquiry" (Easton, 1953:95).⁴⁾ That is why Easton has both chided and praised Bentley for his attitude to these questions, and in view of what Easton considers necessary for political science, this implies no inconsistency.

Assumptions as to the limits and scope of what we call the political are essential in the selection of facts to be researched by political scientists, hence clear statements of these assumptions, to the extent that research into facts of a kind we call political allows of it, is at all times desirable as long as we, through research, hope to increase the reliability of political knowledge through scientific method for whatever uses, ends, and their realization to which we may want to put such knowledge. "The concern for systematic theory irresistably leads back to an enquiry into the province of the political discipline". (Easton, 1953:96) How are we to determine that province? How are we to locate political science on the general map of social science? We must stake out some broad concepts to orient us to political data, to serve as an initial guide in developing systematic theory.

In this search "the idea of a political system proves to be an appropriate and indeed unavoidable starting point"(Easton, 1953:96). Why? Not the least because most students of political life "have been acting on the unexpressed premise that the phenomena of politics tend to cohere and to be mutually related. Such phenomena form, in other words, a system which is part of the total social system and yet which, for purposes of analysis and research, is temporarily set apart. "(Easton, 1953:96/7) Political science in fact abstracts "from the whole social system some variables which seem to cohere more closely than others" and views them "as a subsystem which can be profitably examined, temporarily, apart from the whole social system. The analytic or mental tool for this purpose is the theoretical system (systematic theory). It consists, first, of a set of concepts corresponding to the important political variables and, second, of statements about the relations among these concepts. "(Easton, 1953:97/8)

It would seem that the idea of a political system, at least as part of the whole social system, and requiring a theory correspondingly systemic in kind, depends upon recognition of social life as a whole system. Adoption of that idea must have its consequences. At least the following: the idea that the phenomena of social life tend to cohere and to be mutually related so as to form a system. That, at the very least. Whatever else it may entail, depends, of course, on what one means by the concept of system. Before delving into these questions let us see what significance Easton ascribes to the concept of system as employed to define the field of political science, both in the sense of its empirical subject-matter and in the sense of the theoretical reflection of that subject-matter.

Should one think that, in virtue of its title The Political System should present Easton's image and elaboration of the idea of the political system, both concrete and empirical, well... matters are not that simple. Not that the title is inappropriate, for the whole book focuses on the need for theory that is at least systematic in the sense of working on the assumption upon which political science has based its own disciplinary organization, viz. that there is an aspect or subsystem of social life whose component parts or variables cohere sufficiently close so as to form a systemic whole calling for systemic research on the part of a discipline which takes its interest in it. Such systemic research has in fact served to identify what we, in practice, call political science. But it must be said that this research, till now, has been systemic only instinctively, casually, unconsciously. It must become so explicitly.

Easton does, of course, have an image of the political system and a, at least rudimentary, plan for its theoretical elaboration in mind. But that, he says, is beyond the limits of The Political System, which is only to till the ground in preparation for the later elaboration of a political systems analysis.

Still, in preparation for the development of that theory and as illustrations of the kinds of areas that will require attention once we agree to begin to develop systematic systems theory consciously, Easton raises the question concerning the scope and limits of the discipline, and presents the grossest description of the kind of activity in which political science has been interested in response to a basic social demand for it. The presentation of these encompassing orienting concepts constitutes a first step on the way to the development of a systems theory of political life. These concepts, rough as they needs must be

in initiating the process of theory-emergence from a casual to a level of explication, are to be systematically refined in subsequent works.

Accordingly The Political System provides the widest orienting concepts possible, concepts which have, in fact, guided our orientation in the selection of matters political all along. A Framework for Political Analysis presents us with the broad framework of a systems analysis, to be elaborately developed only in A Systems Analysis of Political Life, the third of his four major works, while the last volume, Children in the Political System researches data to test aspects of the general systems approach, being an attempt to integrate data with theory.

Let us assume that Easton has convinced us of the need for systematic theory and that we must direct our energies to its development. It then follows that some initial rough guide to orient us to the basic variables of the political system (concrete empirical political life) will be needed, as a first step, in the development of a systematic causal theory. Such a most general designation of the factual subject-matter of political science can only be provided if indeed the field of political phenomena displays sufficient unity to warrant the establishment of a science sufficiently unified to be considered a science. (Easton, 1953:99). What then, is the basic orientation that provides unity to research into matters we call political? That is to say, what is the scope of the political system and its theoretical systematic reflection?

In posing this question Easton renders the discipline of political science good service. If political science is to be a discipline in its own right alongside others, it must have its own orientation. Indeed, as Easton points out, all political research has had, ultimately, the same basic orientation; which is not

to say that it has been consciously and explicitly recognized and stated for what it is. On the contrary, Easton finds it necessary to discuss two concepts that have been advanced as concepts in terms of which to provide scope for the discipline, viz. the concept of the state, and the concept of power. Easton finds both of them wanting for the purpose.

American political scientists have generally orientated themselves vaguely and loosely to 'governmental' matters without bothering to reflect theoretically on the unifying scope of the discipline. It has caused some to believe that political science is a composite of numerous heterogeneous fields lacking a unifying, systemic scope. American political science has been content to neglect the question of disciplinary scope so that the field appears to be fragmented, consisting of research into a great number of subjects so different that the search for unity "does indeed tax one's ingenuity". Easton, 1953:99). That unity, if there, must be found, however.

If it is not there, political science has no claim to separate individual existence as a science. After all, the discipline is established, and that on the assumption that it is oriented to its own separable interest in distinction from the other sciences. Then, certainly, in view of the great inventories of facts concerning a variety of subjects, political science must now raise the question of scope explicitly to see how this variety of research is of a kind, as are the variables of political life that have been researched. If it does not do so, it can hardly be an organized discipline, nor can it effectively provide what society requires of it.

In sum, there can be no doubt that enquiry into the scope that has unified (instinctively) political research must now be undertaken. It is a matter of most urgent import; if not undertaken,

the very discipline of political science may disintegrate under the burden of the bulging inventories of facts whose meaning and relevance to anything at all will be difficult to fathom for lack of organization. A discussion of the scope of the discipline is essential to the life of the discipline. The discipline of political science, academically organized as it is, could be facing systemic breakdown under the weight of the facts demanding its attention as a discipline, unless it discovers the motivation of its own organization.

In saying so there is not the malice of some unkind critics of Easton's thought suggesting that the whole development of general systems theory was meant to maintain the professional interests of political scientists.⁵⁾ It is not Easton's concern to safeguard private or professional privileges. His concern for the discipline, real enough, is inspired by his concern to meet the demands of society's needs; in that, he feels sure, much is expected of political science.

Organizing activity is always relative to a function of society. A functional need sets the orientation of a discipline, itself organized and organizing relative to a functional area of research, as subsystem of the total research system. The whole system being open, so also every subsystem; all behavior, institutional and fleeting, but showing systemic coherence, is to be seen as instrumental to society's continued existence and amelioration, to the fulfilment of society's functions.

It is now necessary to look at Easton's discussion of the scope of the discipline as an initial step towards the development of general causal theory.

1.2. The Scope of Political Research. Need-determined?

The question of scope is a question of distinctions in social knowledge. And they have existed "from the beginning of human enquiry into society"(Easton, 1953:103)⁶⁾ Although these distinctions are only implicit in the works of the earliest social philosophers, they are there. They "arise from the elemental fact that we are human beings who live in an organized society"(Easton, 1953:103)⁷⁾

It is easily said that the distinctions in social knowledge arise from the elemental fact that society is organized. But what are we to understand thereby? Do the distinctions result from the (for society generic) organizing activity of men? That would hardly be conceivable. Different kinds of social activity can hardly be explained by reference to the fact that they are all organized; that would rather serve to make all social activity of a kind, the organized kind. On that supposition alone one could not expect a variety of social sciences, each with its own subject-matter, to arise. One would be inclined to expect just one general social science to arise, the science of society, the science concerning the organization of society as one whole. It could be the source of the endeavours of those who seek to develop a unified science as the logical positivists had looked for it. It is, as we shall see, an ideal Easton shares.

If organization is characteristic of social life, of society, and according to Easton it certainly is, then various kinds of organization cannot be explained by reference to organization alone.

Easton observes that all the sciences may well have a common body of theory (unified science ideal), as Parsons has argued too, but immediately goes on to say that does not mean that political science does not deal with a subject matter distinctively its own, as Parsons had also argued.

Easton's common body of theory implies a general theory of organization, unified science, general systems theory; but the ubiquity of organization says nothing about the specific variety of functions that society as organization must meet, and meet adequately.

Beyond the logic of organization, systemic in kind, and fundamental to the rise of various disciplines, is another logic. "It is in the logic of the situation that each separate, distinct, and vital set of questions posed leads to the discovery that the answer involves the pursuit of ramifying paths of related knowledge." (Easton, 1953:105)

What is this "logic of the situation"? It is the situation in which "a vital set of questions are posed", questions "the answers to which men thought would help in the amelioration⁸⁾ of their collective lives". (Easton, 1953:105) However vaguely, this provides a clue to the meaning of the logic of the situation. As long as men think questions need answering for the amelioration of collective lives, the situation is one of need, of vital needs leading to vital questions, a variety of them, the answers to which will help men in the amelioration of their lives, their collective lives.

1.2.1 Experience and Knowledge of social Needs

Easton has very little to say directly of these needs and their variety. If one scans his works for specific comments about the specific theme of the nature of human needs in their variety, as I myself have done, nothing much is likely to be found. Still, one is impressed with the very basic nature of needs. They are basic to social organization, basic to social life, to every attempt to ameliorate social life, to the development of knowledge; indeed, they would seem to be the primary situational motivating factor in all organized interaction, or social behavior. They

seem to constitute the very logic of the situation; better, they constitute the condition of human behavior in its perplexing complexity. It is essential to gain adequate awareness of social needs; how else shall society ever have hope of working with any measure of reliability towards the amelioration of the (needy) condition of social life? Despite their importance Easton seems to say but little concerning these needs and their variety. All we seem to be able to find are a few vague clues: the needs Easton has in mind are the needs of men's collective lives, (Easton, 1953:105), they are a source of problems that, recurrently, require solution in organized society, (Easton, 1953:103) if any mode of life is to survive and continue at any time and place, (Easton, 1953:103) and they raise questions about the biological and psychological basis of human conduct. (Easton, 1953:103). They compel men's questioning attention. They are the problems of man's world in their total complexity. (Easton, 1953:104)⁹⁾ They give rise to analytical questioning, a kind of questioning that does not seek a solution to all the complications of social life at once; hence, necessarily analytical questioning. Each major complex of questions demanding solution led to the scrutiny of a special coherence or system of those elements which later came to be called by the names of each of the sciences. This process continues today. (Easton, 1953:103/4) Analytical questions are asked concerning aspects of social life, the answers to which are expected to be of use in the amelioration of human life, and in response, clusters of data begin to emerge as peculiarly the domain of one or another of the sciences. (See Chapter one, above).

The needs of social life in all their complexity raise problems and questions which order, through simplification, ana-

lytically, the variables of social life according to the point of view of the question asked. The question asked must appear to be relevant to the acquisition of knowledge such as to be of use to a) the development of reliable knowledge about the functioning of social life, and b) ultimately, to the amelioration of social life, "to serve human needs". That means that every set of questions asked which led to an interesting cluster of variables of the kind considered typical for a social science is itself need-oriented. The needs of social life occasion society's desire for knowledge about society's functioning. This desire can only be realized through the organized questioning (disciplinary) of reality which orders variables of social life within the scope of the particular questions which any one of the disciplines has set itself to answer. All of them together will then serve to put an interrogator in a superior position "to examine the problems of his world in their total complexity"(Easton, 1953:104).

The unified science ideal continues to shimmer through. The complexity of needs entails problems of social organization. They are better understood if the functions of society's existence as organization are taken as basic interests leading to basic questions, thus analytically isolating various interests from each other for closer scrutiny and understanding of, finally, society as a whole and its problems that are to be overcome.

To put it differently, the total complexity, the problems, the needs of human life can only be understood adequately for any given time in terms of the state of knowledge of the sciences at any given time. Although an instinctive awareness

of kinds of problems of social life on the pattern of common sense knowledge may be present from time immemorial, really useful knowledge towards their solution grows, both in quantity and reliability, only with the advance of scientific enquiry undertaken with a view to the analytically separate questions that have been researched by the various disciplines. These questions represent the scope of the disciplines and serve to focus attention in the field to variables, to data, to facts, of a kind. The questions themselves need systematization, a theoretical surfacing and statement so as to reflect the actual coherence of the variables as they appear to cohere in terms of the questioning interest that is oriented to social need for knowledge of the kind concerned.

Such systematization of knowledge however, is hardly possible without awareness of the kind of question that has casually served to unify research in a discipline. A questioning focus may well serve to support research in a field even though these questions themselves have not yet been explicitly stated and agreed upon, as in the case of political science. Notice, once again, the casual, less conscious knowledge as distinct from, yet informing, explicit knowledge.

The assumption crucial to Easton's view of social needs and their solution, of course, appears to be that intelligence as organizedly at work in the sciences in response to their orienting questions is such as to have correlated relevant questions to relevant problems. They are supposed to have effected a division of labor in the quest for knowledge that adequately reflects the organized sets of variables vital to the survival and continuance of the modes of life (such as the political) as well as the survival and continuance of human society as a whole.

All this opens up a new avenue by which to discover what, according to Easton, we are to understand by different social needs. It now becomes plain that, after all, Easton does have much to say about the needs of society. Although we do have a vague, naive sense of social problems as members of organized society, a superior knowledge of these needs can be acquired by gaining clarity concerning the orienting questions of the various social sciences which, after all, are assumed to reflect the very variety of the needs of social, organized life, at any time and place, functionally recurrent as these needs are. The questions providing the scope of the sciences in their research reflect, as questions, the basic needs of organized society. They are the questions society itself has raised; in response to them human knowledge was developed along the lines presented above in Chapter one.

"The knowledge, therefore, that it is the motivating questions that distinguish the social sciences helps us to understand the subject matter of political science itself." (Easton, 1953:105) Society's needs, problems, requirements, demands, suggest and determine the questions which the sciences seek to answer. What are the questions which political science has always made its own, and which have served to orient political research?

Strangely enough the questions to which political science has arisen in response are not easily discovered. (Easton, 1953:105) Among political scientists there is some doubt why the congeries of subjects they discuss fall within the scope of politics or constitute variables within a concrete political system. (Easton, 1953:105) Among those who do employ major orienting concepts by which to provide scope for all political research there

is lack of agreement as to which concepts are adequate. Clearly, political science is coming late into the field as a social science. (Easton, 1953:106)

How does Easton hope to establish the questions that political science, throughout its development, has sought to answer? What questions have guided, though not explicitly, the research in the field? What can these questions, once discovered, teach us concerning the social needs in response to which this questioning has emerged?

Any view of the limits of political research, even if it be a very rough, not definitive, but convenient one (and each age is called upon to reformulate such a view) will of necessity reflect the level of the prevailing knowledge. (Easton, 1953: 125/6) Easton's rejection of 'the state' and of 'power' as suggested orienting concepts of political research, therefore, is evidently inspired by his conviction that they do not reflect the level of prevailing knowledge. The level of prevailing knowledge is obviously an important heuristic concept for Easton.

At the same time he emphasizes that one and the same question has 'over the centuries' inspired the research of those interested in the political side of life. (Easton, 1953:126) Although that question has always been one and the same, the researchers did not always take the trouble to verbalize it, and explicit attempts at verbalization have not always been adequate to their real interest, witness the proponents of 'state' and 'power' as alternative suggestions that fall short of what is required to indicate the scope and interest of what political scientists have in fact been doing.

One and the same question has over the centuries inspired all political research. Yet every age must reformulate its view

of it, and, in doing so, reflect the level of prevailing knowledge. Setting aside our initial inclination to conclude that Easton is pulling our leg, since a question that has always inspired all political research should at all times be capable of statement in a relatively simple way, what lies behind this way of stating matters?

Clearly, the presence of both the concepts of power and state, employed to provide unity for political research, but unable to do so, points to a need for pressing beyond these concepts to something more capable of orienting all political research. It also leads us to ask how it is possible for political science to lack adequate awareness of the very questioning interest which must unify political science if it is to be a science, the questioning interest that, in fact; motivates all political research.

To raise the questions is again to point to the role of the unconscious as distinct from the conscious. It is this distinction that goes so far to explain why The Political System reads like a psycho-analytical diagnosis of the discipline of political science; indeed, Anrew Hacker has good reason for calling The Political System a "widely discussed essay in academic psycho-analysis...indicative of the methodological trauma through which political science is now passing". (Hacker, in:Gould,Thursby, 1969:103)¹⁰⁾

The motivating questions of the sciences are one thing, their proper theoretical statement, consciously, quite another. Nor are we to forget that the motivating questions themselves are informed by social needs experienced in all their complexity. Variables selected, unless selected on the assumption that they do cohere relevant to the solution of basic questions, may, because of their variety, easily lead us to forget about the re-

quirement of scientific method that we relate them to an expressed focus or questioning in order to establish the systematic theoretical interrelation of the facts established.

The motivating questions direct our attention instinctively to variables of a kind, but these variables, once established, are not thereby sufficiently linked to the motivating questions. An instinctive connection alone, a vague sense of relevance to solution of sensed needs, remains at the inductive level and is but the precondition for the establishment of deductive, systematic, scientific knowledge. The need for deductive theory being established, it is time the discipline moves towards systematic theory, in which facts and scope will be systematically interrelated, and integrated, at the level of conscious theory. In view of the bulging inventories of facts available, it is time to become consciously aware of the scope of political science and to consider the question to which it has always responded in political research very carefully.

1. 2. 2 The Motivating Questions of Political Science

The question to which the science has responded is not itself theoretical; it is, rather, a continuing call for science, it demands knowledge of a kind, it expresses a social need for knowledge of a kind that will be useful for the survival and continuance of any mode of social, organized, life. Precisely because that question itself reflects the awareness of a social need, the need for a kind of knowledge which will reliably inform us of the actual nature of the problems of social experience felt but not sufficiently known, every age is called upon to reformulate its understanding of the basic question in terms of the knowledge then present in the discipline. The sense of the needs behind the organized disciplines,

of what a discipline could and should be doing, is sharpened, becomes clarified, through the very advances made by the disciplines toward reliable knowledge, as long as the discipline, in its discovery of knowledge, is not just instinctively guided by the relevant leading question but, as much, ready to orient the knowledge gained, consciously and theoretically, to its motivating question. The first requirement in that process is at least a rough and initial statement of the question that has guided its research. The discipline must, first of all, become roughly aware of its own unity as a discipline. When that takes place a science is beginning to enter the field of the sciences on its own. Since political science is a late entry into the field, it is only now beginning to state the basic orientation in terms of which its knowledge has been established. It is a felt social need that has occasioned the quest for political knowledge. It has responded to a need of common sense for knowledge by which to meet the need the better, to ameliorate our collective lives.

For its initial formulation Easton therefore makes reference to "the original and unembellished naivité" of the "outlook of the ordinary person" not trained in either political or social science, for it is by an appeal to common sense that the initial formulation of such questions must be tested. (Easton, 1953: 126/7)¹¹⁾ The scope having originated in common sense experience, its formulation must be tested against it and derived from it. Why? Presumably because political science must serve to reduce experienced social need, must be relevant to need-experience, for the amelioration of collective human life in the midst of which it itself emerged, in order to transform it on the basis of the most reliable understanding of that life at any time. It must transcend and help us to overcome the per-

plexities of common experience.

Certainly the basic question as Easton formulates it is itself a perplexing question: "What is the nature of the good life, that is, what kind of goals ought men to seek?" This question, first and foremost, has inspired the research of those interested in the political side of life. (Easton, 1953:126) Once the goals are articulated, an accompanying cluster of questions requires answering: "What steps ought the society to take to put them into effect as an authoritative statement of policy?" Assuming that society's goals have been clarified and ought to be realized to the best of a society's ability, answers must also be found to questions which occasion empirical political research, for example: What are the actual authoritative policies adopted by a society? How are they determined and how are they put into effect? (Easton, 1953:126)

According to Easton this formulation appeals to common sense, which is a) aware of the pervasiveness of a kind of activity we call politicking, that is, the struggle for power, and b) aware of an activity related in some vague way to problems of government or the making of policy for the whole society in which we live...dispute over the policies accepted as authoritative for the society. (Easton, 1953:127) Common sense understands politics, political life, to concern "all those varieties of activity that influence significantly the kind of authoritative policy adopted for a society and the way it is put into practice" (Easton, 1953:127). It is activity which relates in some way to the making and execution of policy for a society.

Any criticism of Easton's discussion of the field of political science, unless it be peripheral, must take issue with this formulation of what common sense describes as political. ¹²⁾

To Easton, this common sense understanding of the political is the first and final court of appeal against which to test the political and politico/theoretical relevance of all political research, and all political theory. These questions are taken to be the inspiration behind all that political science has done, and what political science has done must be tested against and related to this common sense understanding. It is at the heart of Easton's thought, directing it, this common sense understanding of politics.

In addition to such criticism, it may also be questioned whether there is such common sense of social needs and of activities to meet them, as is suggested, quite uncritically, by Easton. Given this definition of what common sense takes politics to be, given the relation of political research to common sense (the former's guiding inspiration) and there will be little to quarrel with in Easton's subsequent elaboration of systematic political theory, at least at its most basic level.

Easton observes that we have thus described, in the crude terms of common sense, the empirical and concrete political system. Common sense, in effect, says that all those kinds of activities involved in the formulation and execution of social policy, . . . the policy making process, constitute the political system. (Easton, 1953:129)¹³⁾

These activities all cohere by relevant relation to the way in which policy for a society is created and effectuated. "And because political science has historically set for itself the task of understanding what social policy ought to be, how it is set and put into effect, its general objective must be to understand the functioning of the political system." (Easton, 1953:129) In the concept of 'authoritative policy for a society'

we have a convenient and rough approximation to a set of orienting concepts for political research, providing the essential property of that complex of activity, called political, which, over the years, men have sought to understand, and which squares with an acknowledged (by common sense) need that must be met by any society. Where we have society, there we find politics, so understood.

To understand the proper scope of political science in terms of this common sense description of matters political, Easton does find it necessary to enquire into the meaning of the three terms of the description: policy, authority and society.

Policy allocates values, granting certain things to some and denying them to others; it is a value-allocating web of decisions and actions (behavior). The decision-making is the formal or legal phase of a policy, the actions to implement the decisions is the effective phase of a policy. The study of policy "includes an examination of both the legal and the actual policy practices"(Easton, 1953:130). Here again, the legal is understood in a particular way.¹⁴⁾ It is to be remembered that "in suggesting that political science is oriented to the study of policy, there is no intention to mistake its subject matter for the kind of legal construction prominent until quite recently"(Easton, 1953:131), for example in the form of Benthamite legalistic constitutionalism dominating the field until the 20th century.

Easton would have policy understood as "every way in which values are allocated for a society", including the allocations "lodged in the consequences of a practice" (Easton, 1953:131).

Not all the ways in which society allocates its values are studied by political science, only the authoritative allocations; otherwise, political science would embrace all social science since all social mechanisms are means for allocating values. Thus churches, schools, etc., are means for the unequal distribution of values in a society. (Easton, 1953:131) What then are we to understand by 'authoritative'? A policy is authoritative "when the feeling prevails that it must or ought to be obeyed" by those to whom it is intended to apply or are affected by it (Easton, 1953:132/3) Any viable society must find some policies appearing in it to be considered authoritative in this sense.¹⁵⁾

Yet not all authoritative policy found in a society is of interest to political science, at least, not for its own sake. To the extent that political science studies authoritative allocations of values in organizations less than society-wide, it does so from an interest in their relation to other kinds of policies, viz., those considered authoritative for the whole society. "In seeking to understand all social activities influencing this kind of allocation, political science achieves its minimal cohesion." (Easton, 1953:134)

Again, this is not a matter of accident, for it reflects a minimum condition for the existence of any society, a social need, the need to establish some mechanisms, however crude or inchoate, for arriving at authoritative social decisions about how goods, both spiritual and material, are to be distributed where custom fails to create other patterns. (Easton, 1953:135)¹⁶⁾ This need flows from the very nature of a society, which is a special grouping the members of which continually interact to develop a sense of belonging together, a common consciousness, reflecting a basic similarity in their culture

and social structure, and it seeks to solve all the problems usually associated with the survival and perpetuation of a group of people.

Some of the minimum needs that must be met by any society are, according to Easton: the need of physical sustenance met by the system of production and exchange, the dissemination of knowledge, the maintenance of order, the inculcation of a sense of purpose and destiny, the provision for the common defense. Only society as a grouping of human beings undertakes to meet all these conditions. All other groupings devote themselves to less than meeting all these tasks. "Only a society casts its net over all these tasks." (Easton, 1953: 136)

Why do we find the authoritative allocation of values for a society a requirement that any society must fulfill? Because custom alone cannot provide for the private solution of all differences and conflicts in society between individuals about their share of the values. Intervention in the name of society to resolve conflicts is patently required in any society. The greater the complexity in a society, the wider must be the intervention of this kind.¹⁷⁾ It represents a minimum, though not the only, requirement (need) of any society.

The authoritative allocation of values for a society then provides the scope of the discipline of political science, of political research. That this is a valid view of the actual scope of the discipline, can, of course, on Easton's grounds, be maintained only if this view really reflects the facts. It is not advanced as value theory, which it would be if Easton had argued that this orientation had not been actually directive of political research but ought now to be adopted by political scientists.

Instead, "a useful definition of a discipline must indicate that aspect of reality about which a group of specialists have been talking"(Easton, 1953:146). It must "identify the system in society in which they have become interested". Or, as Easton also puts it:"I am simply trying to make explicit the kind of subject matter about which, it is now apparent, students of political life have all along been speaking implicitly". (Easton, 1953:146)

Yet, ultimately, this definition of the discipline must rest, within certain limits, upon a value judgment. These limits are that the definition must refer to subject matter sufficiently broad and related as to be capable of treatment as a conceptually coherent body of phenomena. (Easton, 1953:146/7). That is to say, any definition of scope will do as long as it allows of systematic research and theory. But any such definition reflects insufficiently the historically effective demand that society has posed in terms of its needs for science and research of a kind, the kind suited to the amelioration of the social, human, organized, life of men in society, in response to which the sciences have arisen.

For, historically, sciences do not arise capriciously. (Easton, 1953:14) They become areas for special research within the limits of requirements for systematic knowledge because of the cultural and ethical demands of society. Western society has required that certain kinds of questions central to the kind of civilization that has been growing up, be answered. In doing so, western society has been making a value judgment. In asking 'what is the nature of the good life', 'what goals ought men to seek', it has valued, derivatively, systematic enquiry into the actual making of social policy and its effectuation to help serve a prior value interest in the choice and realization of

the goals society ought to pursue.

The interest actually guiding the field of political science, an interest in the contest over the shaping and execution of social policy, which is capable of systematic causal conceptualization, is a distinguishable aspect of a wider social value interest. The interest in the research of the actually authoritative allocation of values for a society derives from the prior value judgment as to the usefulness of such knowledge for the achievement of the kind of political system, and ultimately the kind of society that men desire. The analysis of the actual system of behavior (political), is an analysis of the contest over the shaping and execution of such policy and should reflect the goals men actually hold as apparent from their behavior in the system, as well as the behavior engaged in for the realization of the goals pursued.

Political research has arisen in response to society's demand for this kind of policy-oriented research which is needed for the effective realization of the values, whatever they may be, which society seeks to realize. Any society, to exist, must display a political system, and arrange for the authoritative allocation of values (intervention in the name of society for the resolution of conflict over the share of values between the members of such a society).

Western society, witness the rise of political science along with the other sciences, has desired (valued) research into the values actually held in the making and execution of policy and its realization, and in that value, that interest, lies the immediate inspiration continually occasioning political research; yet, that value, that need, is itself expressed as a requirement of the desire to know what goals society ought to seek to realize in

view of the continuing problems that affect social life and need solution. Continuing need requires continuing reconstruction through social behavior.

That reconstruction must be intelligent; that is, since it rests finally on the motivation to solve the needs of organized social life, society must become keenly aware, consciously, of that organized life and its problems in realizing the kind of life that men desire. Intelligent, scientific, systematic reflection of the actual organization of society (social self-consciousness) is crucially important to the continuation of the whole process of social change and persistence.

In his discussion of the scope of political science Easton's purpose has been to "explore the kind of limits that political research ought to set for itself"(Easton, 1953:148). Easton cannot mean that political research still has not taken place within the proper scope, or that the scope must be newly established to lead to the research of a different kind of subject matter. In fact, Easton has gone to some lengths to prove that the scope of the discipline is actually, and needed to be, provided by what society has required of it. But Easton does argue that political science ought to be better, more consciously aware, of what has always been its scope in fact. That awareness is systematically related to all that it researches. Hence the results of its research should be expressed, explicitly, and systematically in terms of its orienting questions.

Since social reconstruction is organized, that is, systemic, in kind, the system of reconstruction we call political must also be theoretically reflected as a system, a system capable of transformation through time. Political science's present level of development makes the kind of systematic scope of which Easton would have the discipline to be keenly aware,

an actually convenient way or method in terms of which to draw together all the apparently (without such conscious awareness) diverse and isolated social data into a political system. (Easton, 1953:148) It is a most useful orientation in terms of the needs of organized society. Certainly, as Easton would have it, more useful than attempts to theoretically systematize and organize the science in terms of either the concept of 'state' or the concept of 'power'.

1.3 Easton's Rejection of 'State' and 'Power' as Orienting Concepts

"Although there is little agreement on the key questions which orient political research, in the course of history two main schools of thought have developed. One directs itself to the study of political life by asking what are the nature and characteristics of the state; the other, by asking what can be understood about the distribution and use of power". (Easton, 1953:106) These represent the prevailing conceptions of the subject matter of political science. Despite the actually prevailing scope which Easton has raised to the surface as the interest which has directed political research in fact, such theory as has been attempting to provide focus for the discipline has done so in terms of 'state' and 'power'. A bit of psycho-analysis of the discipline on these matters would indeed appear to be in order.

1.3.1 Rejection of 'the State' as Unifying Concept

One could, says Easton, argue that political science should confine itself to something called the state; however, to do so would be to attempt to create a new field in the pattern of its designer. (Easton, 1953:106). Since "there is no evidence that

political science shows any inherent limitations in its present focus to prevent it from answering the questions it rally asks" (political science appears to be interested in all sorts of variables from an interest in their relation to the question: how are values authoritatively allocated for a society, as we have seen Easton to argue) it would be capricious to try to confine the field in this way. It would be revisionistic, needless and gratuitous. (Easton, 1953:107) It does not square with the actual behavior of political science (which is, after all, a behaving system, organized to meet a social need, the need for knowledge of the functioning of the actual political system, all the variables which affect the authoritative allocation of values for a society) to say that political science "begins and ends with the state". (Easton, 1953:107)¹⁸⁾

It must, therefore, be considered bad wishful thinking to suggest that the state-concept is the end-all and be-all of political science. No wonder it causes only confusion rather than clarity for political scientists, at least for those who do not see the state, as does Easton, as an instance of the kind of activity indicated by the basic question which political research actually seeks to answer.

If one takes the state as orienting concept for the field one must immediately answer the question concerning its characteristics. It has been answered so variously that, clearly, one unknown, political science, is simply being described in terms of another, the state. Over twenty-five hundred years of its discussion no uniformity in answer has been achieved... "that is almost unbelievable..." (Easton, 1953:107) There is clearly little hope that out of the great welter of different answers

"anyone today can hammer out a meaning upon which the majority of men will genuinely, consistently, and constantly agree"... "it seems pointless to add a favored definition of my own..."(Easton, 1953:108). (Not that Easton does not have one, as we shall see; but it cannot serve as orienting concept for the discipline of political science, certainly).¹⁹⁾

As a matter of fact, clarity of expression demands total abstinence from any reference to the term 'state' and it will not result in any hardship of expression. No wonder, for it cannot serve to pick out the major properties of the concrete political system. It has obvious shortcomings even when understood in its most widely adopted meaning today, that of, say, Maclver, who calls it an association among many but special in that it acts 'through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, (and) maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social order'. Accordingly the state, in most general terms, exists "when there is a fixed territory, a stable government, and a settled population"(Easton, 1953:109). Easton recognizes this to be a description of the state as we have known it since the Treaty of Westphalia, and that, precisely, serves to show its shortcomings as a concept by which to orient the discipline. If the state is definitive of the political system, so that political theory must be a theory of the state, it is clear that no such political system existed prior to Westphalia, unless in truncated form. Consequently, pre-Westphalian political life, truncated as it is, can be of only passing interest to political scientists presumably concerned with states fully developed. (Easton, 1953:109/10)²⁰⁾

On that supposition, social, that is, organized life in many times and places is devoid of subject matter for political science. Yet, common sense alone (see above for its directive role) would compel us to deny this restriction upon political enquiry"(Easton, 1953:110).²¹⁾ "Where there is any kind of organized activity (that is, purposive activity) , activity in quest of the realization of values desired, there what we may normally call political situations abound. (Easton, 1953:111) Evidently, the state must "fall far short of providing an adequate description of the limits of political research"(Easton, 1953:111). It excludes, by definition, social systems in which, clearly, there is political interaction as an essential aspect of that social system.

In any case, the historical rise of the term 'state' shows it to be a unifying myth rather than an analytical tool. That mythical unity of the state could serve to draw allegiance to the secular authorities with all the force of religion in its struggle with the church. Later, when that battle was decided in favor, largely, of secular authority it was used to buttress national sovereignty against international class, and international society; in some way the state represented the supreme virtue. (Easton, 1953:112)²²⁾ In short, "its importance lies largely in the field of practical politics as an instrument to achieve national cohesion rather than in the area of thoughtful analysis". (Easton, 1953:112)

If we try to treat it as a theoretical tool difficulty besets us.²³⁾ For "it defines by specifying instances of political phenomena rather than by describing their general properties". (Easton, 1953:113) It suggests that political science is interested in studying a kind of institution...not a kind of activity that may express itself through a variety of institutions. This reveals "the

major drawback of the state-concept". The state being a political institution peculiar to certain historical conditions it only illustrates one kind of political phenomenon, a comprehensive political institution which did not always exist and, in future, may not always (need to) exist. (Easton, 1953:113) Use it to define the field and you define the field by denotation, the least desirable, and least meaningful kind of definition. (Easton, 1953:114) It may be unavoidable in the early stages of a discipline for lack of knowledge of the general characteristics of a class of variables, but towards maturity, attempts are always made to get at the general reasons for establishing a class, in terms of the properties they share. Then a definition becomes connotative, and really useful. (Easton, 1953:114)

For political science this means that we must ask "why political science studies the kind of institution often called the state together with other institutions in societies where states are acknowledged to be non-existent"(Easton, 1953:115). We must, in short, look for a kind of activity which can express itself through a variety of institutional patterns. "To say, therefore, that in asking "what is the nature of the state?" political science is drawing attention to the core of its subject matter, is at best to mistake a part for the whole and to attempt to describe the properties of an activity by a single, even if important, instance". (Easton, 1953:115 and 142/3)

1. 3. 2 Easton's Rejection of Power as Orienting Concept

In suggesting that all political research is out to answer the question "who holds power and how is it used?" we have an orientation which, at face value, is better than the concept of the state since it does emphasize a kind of activity thus providing a connotative definition.

Nevertheless it too fails to adequately describe the gross subject matter of political science. It fails not because it is so frequently associated with abusive coercion divorced from noble aims (Machiavelli, Hobbes) for it has been converted, through the work of Morgenthau, Odegard, Helms, Key, Catlin, Lasswell, and others into an irreproachable child of the age (Easton, 1953:116), but because power is only one of the significant variables. "...orientations towards goals other than power itself are neglected. Yet struggle for control stems from and relates to conflict over the direction of social life, over public policy..."(Easton, 1953:117).

Whatever the merits of the power orientations of Catlin and Lasswell, both show a fault in neglecting to distinguish between power in general and power in a political context although their natural predisposition toward political questions quite logically led them to emphasize the political aspects of power. Analysis of this aspect will compel us to modify their conception of the limits of political science. (Easton, 1953:118/9

According to Easton the struggle for power describes only a secondary, even if important aspect of the political system. (Easton, 1953:143) The widest description of the field as "those actions related to the authoritative allocation of values" does not even require specific reference to power. It is of derivative interest in helping us to understand how social policy (that is, policy oriented to social goals or ends desired and their realization through political activity) is formed and executed. (Easton, 1953:143).

As Easton would have it power "is based on the ability to influence the actions of others"(Easton, 1953:143). Now, any interaction between human beings leads to the modification of the

actions of the participants. Not every such action is characterized as power. Then all social science would be the study of power. Instead, we must view power "as a relationship in which one person or group is able to determine the actions of another in the direction of the former's own ends" through the ability "to impose some sanction for the failure of the influenced person to act in the desired way". Power, then, is sanction-backed influence towards desired ends.

Political science's interest in power derives from its preoccupation with how policy is made and executed. That preoccupation limits its interest in power. It is interested in policy-related power, not a general theory of power as an end in itself.

A general theory of power "would be most helpful, of course, in discovering how our ability to set and sanction the value and factual premises for the decisions and actions of others, the essence of a control relationship, influences the formulation and execution of authoritative policy (the focus of political science). (Easton, 1953:144)

"Alone, a theory of power provides too broad a frame of reference for political research which is only interested in one aspect of power relations (their relevance to social policy). Its interest in power in less than society-wide groups extends only to its relevance for social (society-wide) policy. Nor is that interest in power its only interest. Goals other than the achievement of power as an end are its interest as well. So, to assign a proper place to the power-interest of political science and to define the field in most general terms we cannot make power the central variable of the system since it would entail a field of study both wider and more limited than the actual in-

terest of the field has been in fact. To avoid such a misrepresentation of the scope of political science and yet reflect the proper interest in power that this science displays we can say: "Political science is the study of the authoritative allocation of values as it is influenced by the distribution and use of power". (Easton, 1953:146)

By reason of the fact that both the state and power fail to adequately reflect the real scope that has, instinctively, been operative in political research, we could hardly expect the rise and development of a body of theory, explicitly interrelating, at the most general level, the political facts discovered by political research. It is such theory we seek; its development requires both a goodly amount of established facts and a conscious awareness of the scope in terms of which they have been selected as politically relevant.

In view of the prevalent neglect of the need for general theory and the emphasis, instead, on the analysis vaguely known to be politically relevant, only singular generalizations and partial theories (without explicit reference to general scope) have been developed. Now, says Easton, "the mind is prone to search for uniformities as the most economical way to organize the body for action, and the collective mind²⁴⁾ of political scientists is no exception.

If the pieces of interest in theory are accumulated and assembled, like the surprising coherence in the kaleidoscope, they fit together into a theoretical pattern. The pattern emerges, however, less by design than by accident.²⁵⁾

Its form is the 'theory' of equilibrium, the only, discernible suggestion of a theoretical framework on the broad horizon of empirical research. (Easton, 1953:267) Easton, before setting out to elaborate his own systems-analytical theory of political

life in later volumes, feels obliged to deal with the merits and demerits of this vaguely suggested theory of political life in The Political System as part of tilling the ground for a proper introduction to his own general theory to be presented later. As a general theory of the political system, at least an incipient one, both it, and Easton's evaluation of it, should help to provide a better understanding of Easton's idea of the political system and its theoretical reflection in a systems-theory.

1.4 Easton's Critique of the Equilibrium 'Theory' of the Political System

1.4.1 The Equilibrium 'Theory' of the Political System

The apostrophes we employ in speaking of this 'theory' serve to indicate that, on Easton's view, we are "ascribing to it greater pretensions than it actually possesses" (Easton, 1953:267). It is a theory that can be detected, that is discernible, that emerges less by design than by accident. (Easton, 1953:266/7) It does not so much "represent a central concept in a mode of analysis" but is used, rather more modestly, "to describe the results of political activity". (Easton, 1953:267)

Still, the idea of equilibrium has so many theoretical implications that we can treat it as the key concept of a broader theory, so that we can see its vital, though latent, meaning for political research. (Easton, 1953:267)²⁶⁾ In effect, Easton is suggesting that presently causal research in the discipline is being guided by an awareness of an idea of equilibrium whose theoretical implications have not been sufficiently spelled out so as to take the form of real, full-fledged systematic theory of the kind Easton wishes to see developed. The concept of equilibrium is a serious candidate in terms of which such theory could possibly

be developed. Suppose we try to do so in a consistent effort, where would it lead us?

In attempting to follow the lead of the general equilibrium concept in developing causal theory we must quite clearly distinguish this systematic general use of the concept from one Easton calls constitutional equilibrium, sometimes used to describe a system of power elements that limit each other, but more often to indicate a condition an author would like to see. In the former case the concept serves to describe the interrelation of actual power variables while in the second it represents a value orientation.

In distinction from such constitutional uses of the concept, Easton wants to examine its consequences if used as the core concept of "a mode of analysis, implicit in a substantive conclusion for understanding the process within a political system". (Easton, 1953:267) He wants to examine the general equilibrium concept through which a framework for political analysis may emerge. (Easton, 1953:268)

As to its source, the emergence of the idea of equilibrium arose, understandably, together with the emergence of empirical (and, distinguishable from it, ethical) pluralism, which is "practically coterminous with the notion of process"(Easton, 1953:267), at the turn of the century. While the idea of equilibrium includes the suggestion of a tendency towards a point of stability, it also implies "a variety of elements interacting with one another to produce the changing states of the political system"(Easton, 1953:267) which is to say that "the elements or variables in a political system are functionally interdependent", one of the notions basic to the idea of equilibrium. "It leads on the descriptive level, to the recognition of the multi-

plicity of causes, especially of a group nature, that influence social policy"(Easton, 1953:267), and it leads away from the nineteenth century tendency to view social causation in terms of single factors.

The idea of interdependence proper to the notion of process established the need for a concept to link this notion to a mode of analysis permitting students "to relate simultaneously varying elements (basically groups) to the state of the political system at any given time". The concept of equilibrium was used to fill the need. (Easton, 1953:268-70) This it could do the more readily since it had already served economics and sociology well.

It led, however, to the acceptance as well of the second notion proper to the idea of equilibrium, viz., that the interdependence is one in which "the interacting parts tend to come to rest". It suggests that a given state of interdependent variables will tend to maintain itself. In that the idea of equilibrium goes quite beyond the idea of process.

This association of process with equilibrium is already apparent in Bentley's The Process of Government and implies adoption of a framework that, "unobtrusively has come to embrace most political research".

Neither Bentley nor subsequent political science accepted the obligation which this adoption entails for scientific use, that is, to elaborate the implied framework in express connection with the details of political research. The equilibrium idea was taken, nonchalantly, for granted. (Easton, 1953:271) The idea was never challenged and consequently, "the whole problem of the merit of an underlying scheme of analysis" was never opened up. (Easton, 1953: 272) The thoughts expressed on the subject so frequently expressed in empirical literature since the first world war have not even

been distilled for special attention. Author and reader found it such an obviously acceptable image of the political process that the need for its examination was not apparent to them. (Easton, 1953:272/3) It was simply employed "as an inarticulate premise"(Easton, 1953:274).

When we examine the literature we find that the concept recurrently appears in two senses. The one suggests that equilibrium is an actual condition achieved in time, the other that equilibrium refers to an actual tendency "which never works itself out to the point of equilibrium"(Easton, 1953:274).

1.4.2 Catlin's Use of Equilibrium as Description of an Achieved Condition

Catlin employed the notion in the sense of a condition of rest. The concurrence of the social need to live together with the desires of individuals and groups to assert their wills leads to a balance of advantages when no one will consider it to his advantage to change the existing patterns of interaction. This is the point of equilibrium; a stabilized harmony of wills, individual or group. (Easton, 1953:275/6)

So used, the equilibrium concept seems replete with insight. Men do struggle for power while utter chaos is not the rule. Presumably the task of political science is to explain how equilibrium is achieved at any given time, the process, as well as the particular patterns that it takes. Indeed, that is what political science was, unconsciously, doing in bits and pieces. Catlin attempted to work out the implications consistently and coherently at a high level of abstraction and generality.

Unfortunately Catlin employed a casual understanding of the equilibrium notion as, indeed, often employed by his colleagues as well. According to it everything is equilibrium and consequently the notion cannot account for change. That would require

recognition of disequilibrium as well, as Catlin sensed, but chose to ignore.

When we do, as we must, reckon with change, how can we prove "that an empirical system ever reaches a condition of equilibrium?" When does change stop? To answer that question one would have to face and surmount "insurmountable obstacles", as Catlin was aware. (Easton, 1953:277)

Yet Catlin stuck to his usage of the term, conscious as he was of trying to emulate economics and physical science where this idea had served so well, and had acquired such precise meaning. He failed to see, however, that these disciplines had gained precision for the term at the level of theory alone and had never tried to prove its existence in reality, as political science was attempting to do. Catlin's mistake lies in seeking to convert a heuristic device into a substantive description of the empirical world. (Easton, 1953:279) Political scientists, "instead of viewing the state of equilibrium as a theoretical model, helpful in simplifying reality for purposes of analysis, rather than as an exact picture of reality... have committed the natural mistake of considering the equilibrium a possible condition of the empirical system" (Easton, 1953: 279). (Natural mistakes are those we easily and naively make when our terms are not consciously elaborated and articulated, but intuitively employed). (Easton, 1953:279)

Not just Catlin, but Merriam too fell victim to this mistake. Of course it is a mistake only if we think to emulate physics and economics. One may well try to prove that the political process does arrive at moments of rest. To do so, you would need a strict definition of the point of equilibrium. (Easton, 1953:280) It would require quantification of the variables in

political life to an extent quite beyond our capacities at present, and in the foreseeable future. (Easton, 1953:288)

1.4.3. Equilibrium as Descriptive of a Tendency

Those who, like Bentley, implicitly reject the likelihood of the process settling down in equilibrium and yet employ the concept, thereby point to a tendency that never quite works itself out. There is perpetual disequilibrium. Thus, in international relations too a balancing of nations is spoken of. A state of equilibrium is impossible of achievement because of the changing conditions on which national power depends.

This use of equilibrium is more useful for it embodies the correct insight that activity is part of an endless process of change, and, more importantly, it has the merit of transforming "the concept from a substantive conclusion describing the political system into a tool for the analysis of the system". In fact, this use of the term implies that we are contrasting political life with a hypothetical condition of equilibrium (Easton, 1953:282), a kind of normal situation which is a pure abstraction, as if one had in mind "a model of what the equilibrium would be like if the present tendencies were allowed to work themselves out fully without any change in the basic conditions determining the power of various groups" (Easton, 1953:282). "In other words, it seems as though the concept of equilibrium is a heuristic simplifying device to help understand the empirical world" which, according to Easton, is what a systematic framework should be. This, although only implicit, use of equilibrium, then, "brings it more closely into accord with the way we have seen it to be employed in mechanics and economics. That makes it, at least in principle, a likely candidate for employment as con-

taining the major framework for all political science. (Easton, 1953:283)²⁷⁾

To be of such use we must find out whether we can "raise to the level of consciousness and deliberate analysis what lies hidden in the frequent use of the idea of equilibrium in political research"(Easton, 1953:284).

1.4.4 Obstacles to the Useful Elaboration of the Idea of Equilibrium into a Framework of Political Analysis

Despite its initial appeal and promise the possibility of so elaborating the idea of equilibrium in a way useful in providing the major framework for political science is, says Easton, very slim indeed, as it is in all the social sciences except economics. (Easton, 1953:284) It requires that we reduce the important political variables to measurable terms. Until we can do so, and in the distant future perhaps we may be able to do so, the utility of equilibrium analysis will be in doubt.

Equilibrium analysis requires quantification to answer the kind of questions we must ask. Such as: How do the various groups use their power to shape policy? How does the power of one group influence the position of the other power groups, the power of the various groups each other, and how do all these affect the ensuing authoritative allocation of values? (Easton, 1953:285) We would be identifying all the power elements in a situation, showing their interaction to produce policy. Hypothetically, a policy would be reached such that no power element would seek to change its position, to change the authoritative allocation of values. That would be the equilibrium point, a point with which to compare the actual state of the political system. It would immediately reveal the

determinants of policy if we thus knew how much each of the elements influenced the given allocation of values.

All this requires two things, two kinds of mental operations. First, it requires at the theoretical level a model of the possible relations among the interdependent political variables. It could make do without actual quantities; "the relationships could be stated in the form of mathematical equations", a series of simultaneous equations. It would be purely hypothetical, abstract, logical, a tracing of relationships in hypothetical terms only. Conceivably such a model could be developed by a sophisticate in the use of mathematical tools. This would be the first, possible, step.

A second step is required. Some of the symbols (mathematical) would have to be displaced with actual data. "By filling in the actual quantitative data for some of the unknowns, the others could be discovered. Theory here would therefore fulfill its major task of permitting the solution of problems with a minimum of actual observation of data". (Easton, 1953:286)

And there's the rub.

How do we test the model when we find in trying to fill in the logical terms of the various mathematical equations with empirical data "that we have devised very few satisfactory indices with which to measure the power of the interacting political elements"? (Easton, 1953:286/7)

We can measure voting, content of communications, numerical strengths of groups, physical resources, financial reserves, perhaps even social status, but all of these combined is not "even the beginning of an adequate composite index to measure the amount of power held by competing groups"(Easton, 1953: 287), and we could not answer the questions we need to answer

to establish or calculate "just what empirical condition we could characterize as an empirical equilibrium, even though we did not expect the concrete political situation ever to work itself out to this point of equilibrium (Easton, 1953:287); we would still be as far removed from the precision with which economics can use the concept. We lack measurable magnitudes like demand and supply. We could not thus increase our knowledge of what to expect in the way of future political activity. "Lacking appropriate indices for the measurement of power... much of the usefulness of the point of equilibrium as a theoretical norm disappears." (Easton, 1953:288)

"In sum, to be useful empirically, equilibrium theory must put great store on measurement, and therefore political science would have to concentrate on the discovery of units of measurement for its variables. To the extent that political science has failed to do this, it has been remiss in its obligation to equilibrium analysis, the only visible approximation to a systematic theory." (Easton, 1953:288/9) Were it to devote attention constantly to what this incipient theory requires, viz. problems of quantification, then, "barring the sudden discovery of satisfactory devices for transforming present qualitative data... equilibrium analysis would threaten to direct the energies of research workers away from such qualitative data as a most valuable raw material at the present time" (Easton, 1953:289)²⁸⁾ Then, in the words of Mannheim, political science would be guilty of attributing importance to what is measurable merely because it is measurable instead of continuing to ask what one would like to know and to discover what is most significant with the highest degree of precision possible under the exis-

ting circumstances. (Easton, 1953:289/90)

Measurement is important as one way of providing precision to data. Improvement in doing so will enhance the utility of the equilibrium concept. In the meantime, qualitative description can in its own way be just as precise. (Easton, 1953:289) For those more optimistic than Easton as to the likelihood of discovering satisfactory devices of quantification, he adds that the number of relevant variables of political life are much greater than those of economics so that even if we could quantify them all, the complexities of the mathematics then necessary for rewarding analysis would be staggering. (Easton, 1953:290)

The merit of the concept then, "lies at the level of insight, rather than of potentially usable theory" (Easton, 1953:290), In its function as an analogical image of the political process it suggests important ideas. For example, it suggests that the process takes place in a political system, and we have found that idea of system vital for general orientation purposes, lying at the heart of theory-formulation. Implicit in the idea of system, it also suggests that the parts of the process are mutually dependent so that a change in one part will influence the rest of the system, and these in turn react back on the element stimulating the change initially. "It insists on plural rather than on single factor causation" (Easton, 1953:291). Moreover, the equilibrium idea implies that the interrelated parts tend to cohere. "This is the fundamental meaning of system". We need to assume, in the initial stages, that for purposes of analysis "it is realistic to consider those elements in isolation from the rest of the world. They form a system of themselves" (Easton, 1953:291). Only thus are we able to simplify reality. "We can

then try to work out their relations. At a later stage it would, of course, become necessary to trace the effect of variables from outside the system, in this way gradually approximating the real conditions under which the system functions." (Easton, 1953:292)

Thus the equilibrium concept has retained the necessary foundation, the idea of system itself, for any conceptual framework. Equilibrium conceived as a tendency never achieved, has the further merit of maintaining the problem of change at the forefront of political enquiry, while "most research today still tends to devote itself to an analysis of stationary relations rather than of historical change... Historical change... has fallen into disrepute... in part because of its decline by the turn of the century into remote, uninspired philosophies of history." (Easton, 1953:292)

Indeed, the concept of equilibrium has only one difficulty; it requires a degree of quantification unattainable today. To make as if the required quantification were attainable would lead to scientism and press the life out of political science. Were it not so, the idea would be the perfect and perfectly usable thing. Since what is required by it cannot now be had, it is not now useful, except to the extent that it opened our eyes to the idea of system which must guide any framework adequate to our purposes and to the extent that it kept some of us sensitive to the problem of change. In this, the idea of equilibrium did a wonderful service to the discipline of political science, preparing it, in fact, for the ready reception of the framework for political analysis which Easton intends to present in a subsequent volume although he has it, even while he writes, in mind. In that, Easton was not mistaken. In fact, a

systems analytical perspective, though latently, has been present, and, for a keen observer, groping towards expression to such an extent that it is at least discernible as a possible mode of analysis of the actual political system. Easton does owe much to empirical pluralism (realism) as instanced by Bentley. Does he owe as much to ethical pluralism which appeared at the same time? It is an intriguing question not easily answered if for no other reason than that Easton explicitly restricts himself to developing systematic causal theory, not the value theory he also wishes to have 'reconstructed'. Clearly, the idea of the political system, as advanced by Easton, must not be viewed as a new idea that appeared as a bolt from the blue, in a flash of insight by the Newton of political science, David Easton. It was incipient in the discipline for quite some time; American political science has been groping towards its theoretical expression. Easton has simply surfaced expressly the theory that was incipient in the discipline. In the presence of such theory in American political science, no doubt, lies its most legitimate claim to the status and rightful existence as an organized science. Easton wants to be an American political scientist in this, its best, tradition.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1) In the whole of social relations everything is related to everything else. The statement differs from that which says: everything is related to everything else. To say the latter does not include, necessarily, the idea of everything being related to everything else by virtue of all everythings being but variables of a systemic whole. There is a world of difference between Van Riessen's "alles hangt met alles samen" ('all things cohere!') and Easton's position. See: Van Riessen, 1970:134.

Van Riessen takes this coherence to be the expression of the one creational order (of laws and norms), while Easton's coherence is the result of organization immanently emerging in human experience as society's organization (system) and its inferrable and deducible regularities.

2) Easton's approach is in line with modern assumptions concerning society as the greatest whole composed of numerous changing structures and processes affecting and affected by the individuals that are the biological members of the total system of society.

The concept of society, though basic to pragmatism, structuralism, functionalism, and structural functionalism, is I think, problematic. It results from the humanist dilemma of not being able to decide what is prior, the individual, or the communal nature of life; a problem which, in pragmatism, takes the form of the relationship between the individuals' psychology and social psychology, the psychological and the situational, which in process leads to the ideal of community-building by individuals and individual development through community.

Behind the dilemma lies a history of political philosophy that has equated the state with government, while government was conceived as government of the whole community of individuals and on behalf of the community of individuals.

3) Underlying Easton's position is a view of life as in principle understandable through the application of strictly scientific methods of observation. Lacking these, experience is only partly successful in establishing controlled and controllable conditions (experimentally desirable) for experience.

It implies a depreciation of any such knowledge as may be gained

in common sensical ways. It must be superceded by scientifically established knowledge of the facts and their workable interrelation, as much as possible. This implies a restriction of scope for one who considers the task of political science to be one that must accord with experience and operate within the contours of its meaning.

4) Here we see quite clearly that historical (read:practical) needs affect scientific method itself in ways that can only be described as pragmatic. We have seen Easton to complain of hyperfactualism in American political science, arguing that facts and theory require each other according to scientific method. Yet, historically the two never become (or, at least, never did as yet become) fully one. As he remarks in his preface to Children in the Political System "it is questionable whether the accumulation of data and the elaboration of theory can ever avoid a certain degree of independent development in which each follows a path divergent from the other". Yet that book represents an effort "to draw together in a new and meaningful way empirical political theory (as developed in A Framework for Political Analysis and in A Systems Analysis of Political Life, P. B.) and data about children in the political system". Even worse, partial separation for varying lengths of time (between fact-gathering and theory, P. B.) may even be an essential condition for the discovery of new knowledge. "Each kind of enterprise - factual research and theorizing - has a logic of its own which, if not carried to its implicit conclusions, may defeat the pursuit of reliable explanation and understanding". Systems theory at the most general level in a groping and uncertain way resembles theory in physics, but, as yet, mathematics has not, as there, helped to emancipate the imagination from "indenture to data". "By ideal standards, data-collection and analysis are to be ordered by theory; theory is to hew close to the known facts. But the history of science is never as neat and orderly as its ex post facto rationalization." There is, in short, a gap between the ideal of science, the scientific imagination, a desire for the unification of facts and/in theory, and historical development

that always serves to prevent the ideal from being achieved in any way that can continue to be useful. The result is the following pragmaticist/instrumentalist view of the relation between fact and theory in scientific development: "Theory and data may survive for long periods in comparative isolation. Historically, one may be emphasized, indeed, exaggerated out of proportion, at the expense of the other. Severe dissatisfaction of each with the other arises. The tensions finally reach a point that inspires efforts at their reduction. Attempts are then made to reformulate theory so that it becomes more relevant to ongoing empirical research; data-collection and analysis in turn may be pointed more directly to the validation of theory. In the resultant alignment of sights, both theorizing and empirical research may be set going in new directions until once again some distance between them arises and efforts are again needed to bridge the newly created chasms. To this cyclical evolution there can be no end in the search for more certain knowledge and understanding. "

Whatever else one may wish to say about this view, it does display a historical dialectic comparable to that which we find in Hegel, although Hegel, unpragmatically, supposed that his dialectic did find rest in both his own thought and in the idea of the state as it was being realized in Prussia, just as he supposed that the theses and antitheses in history were the expressions of an all-encompassing reason. It also resembles the materialist dialectics of Marx. If, in Easton's account, one replaces fact and theory by 'dominant' and 'dominated class', this becomes plain at once. Unlike Marx however, Easton does not think in terms of a rationality through it all that will serve to resolve the dialectic oppositions in some final synthesis, now imminent because of the very rationality implied in human productivity.

Instead, Easton pleads for recognition of the fact that the rational quest, though ongoing, will never be consummated because of irrational determinants of life that continue to constitute the hard facts of experience so as to defy their theoretical (and actual) synthesis in some situation, fully and finally under the control of reason. Reason, and intelligent control, lead a precarious existence, requiring ever and again new

syntheses of fact and theory, and, as often, their renewed separation. The freedom of imagination and the stubborn persistence of need-occasioning facts will ever be at logger-heads. In the continuation of this struggle lies man's glory. It is because facts change and hence, through need, stimulate our desire to know the facts as best we can that theory and fact never do achieve complete unity and, at times, find themselves rather far apart to cause a desire for their renewed integration for useful purposes.

5) For examples of such unsympathetic criticism see: Stankiewicz, 1980:141 and 256; McCoy, Playford, 1967:236; Gross, 1967:157; Surkin, Wolfe, 1970:290, 307; Pettman, 1975:20, 135. Although only Stankiewicz has Easton directly in mind when criticizing professionalism, the other references, in referring to behavioral theory more generally, also reflect on Easton to the extent that he is viewed as a behavioralist.

6) Notice that the distinctions arise together with enquiry into society. They do not exist regardless of enquiry into society; they depend on enquiry for their existence. All knowledge is result of enquiry, casual, or scientific. Knowledge is discovered in response to questions occasioned by need.

7) This statement, most succinctly, expresses a nuclear conviction underlying and directing the whole of Easton's thought. Whether one takes this to be a statement of fact or a statement of faith will in large measure determine the extent to which one will agree with the legitimacy of political systems analysis as developed by Easton. The importance of this elemental fact to the thought of Easton can hardly be overestimated. It is a major key to a proper interpretation of Easton's thought.

8) Despite the fact that Easton suggests that all the questions asked take their origin from the following one: "What is the nature of the good life, that is, what kind of goals ought men to seek" (Easton, 1953:126), it is not so much the nature of the good life that is his concern as it is the nature of the better life. Amelioration is the watchword. That is true to pragma-

tism according to which "truth and goodness are not found in the past, nor yet in the foreseeable future...the pragmatist does not strive for absolute goodness and absolute truth, but rather for the better and obvious goodness and truth. Pragmatism is meliorism" (Zuidema, 1965, p. 12).

9) For Easton, as for N. Luhman, the reduction of complexity required in the face of continuing perplexity, is an extremely important motive behind the development of systems-theory as the instrument by which to achieve such complexity reductions as to reduce it to manageable proportions. See: Luhman, Habermas, 1975:passim.

10) Twentieth century preoccupation with the psychological and psycho-analytical is the outcrop of the rejection of a normative order that obtains for human life and the acceptance of human behavior as the establisher, the origin of whatever order there may be. If man is, first and foremost, a being that responds emotionally to his situation, by whatever means he has managed to employ, his history, involving change, necessarily takes on the overtones of psycho-analysis.

11) Those who are familiar with distinctions of the philosophy of the cosmomic idea (as, e.g., Dooyeweerd's) may misread Easton here. The meaning of common sense, of original and unembellished naïveté is far removed from Dooyeweerd's "naïve experience". When Easton says 'original', he means closeness to experienced need, the closeness of direct experience as origin of a sense of scope (possible delimitation) making for continued focused enquiry. For Dooyeweerd, by contrast, naïve experience is so structured by an order obtaining for all temporal experience that the modes of ordered experience to be explicated theoretically are given in any and all experience quite unproblematically and in their integral unity and coherence (continuity).

12) This description of common sense awareness of the political accords well with an American understanding of the political generally. More recently, many in other western countries

have come to accept this understanding of the political for all practical purposes and political science there is following suit. In the RSA too, this view of politics is on the rise. There is, however, no necessity for holding to such a view of politics except the necessity of conviction which seeks to prove itself true in practice, a practice which organizes such conviction continually and which, 'obviously', supports the conviction.

In view of the fact that 'the political' was not always understood in this sense by the 'common' man, one may well entertain doubts concerning its adequacy.

13) As may be seen, Easton not only psycho-analyzes the discipline of political science, but common sense experience as well. Those who use the crude terms of common sense like 'politicking activity', may not be aware of it but in fact they say that politics is a system of activity whose end is to provide policy for a whole society. (I do not see why these terms should not be considered as crude, P. B.)

In defining the field as a kind of activity, Easton has already made a fundamental choice in favor of behavioralism and against the prominence of structural determinants of life other than needs and instruments by which to meet them. All structures in a situation are those of needs (changeable and recurrent) in view of the coagulated forms and instruments by which to meet them; among them we find the modern state as one of the relatively constant forms of behavior.

We can be sure that these implications do not follow from the original and unembellished experience of common men everywhere. Such men, common or not, who do come to political science with an understanding of politics that can be said to imply the basics of Easton's systems approach, come to it with a very particular slant on the subject, a slant that does not originate in the facts of political life or its conditions but in a fundamental wish to maintain the hopes of humanism at all cost.

14) The view of law as prescription for society implies no material determination of law and its variety as distinct from say, the aesthetic, the economic, the ethical, the historical, the lingual or any other mode of meaningful experience. It reduces

law to the form of prescription, to the form of ought regardless of content, an 'ought' stipulating what is required behavior in view of a projected and desired future situation. That it must be accepted by a society as authoritative prescription cannot serve to delimit the meaning of such prescription as legal in, say, the sense of public justice.

That there is an overriding need for social policy, policy for a whole society, and that such policy must prescribe, implies a bias towards a (never fully) planned society where expert knowledge must go into policy-prescription; it suits a policy scientist to think of law as prescription and provides him eminently with legal competence, the competence to prescribe, at least concerning the means by which to achieve the ends desired.

15) It is a modern realist view of authority quite divorced from any material indications of legal competence and obligation; for a critical evaluation of such views see: Van Eikema Hommes, 1972:266-278, 193-197).

16) Note that the political system is a mechanism, a means, an instrument, an adaptive organ, for arriving at some policy for a whole society without which the latter would disintegrate. It provides for the minimal survival conditions of any society. It is perhaps at this point that Easton's conception would seem to hold the greatest appeal for South Africans. Across the board, political groupings would here seem to suggest that whatever is done politically either threatens or enhances society's survival possibilities. The political, including the governmental, is thought to relate necessarily to survival as the end of politics. Accordingly, politics is the art of the possible.

17) The relationship of complexity to the increasing need for social policy is curious. Increasing complexity calls for increasing ordering of the whole society. It is a matter of disorder against system and system against disorder, of organization against disorganization and disorganization against organization, of perplexity against intelligence and intelligence against

perplexity, of the random against the systematic and of the systematic against the random, of present order against threatening contingency, and of all this in an ongoing tug of war.

The political system is not the whole of men in society as much as men in society's vital survival mechanism which keeps the differentiated subsystems to compliance with the required minimal order to which all must keep if the whole system of society is to continue. It must seek to ensure the greatest measure of free operation on the part of the subsystems of society by establishing the conditions within which these subsystems may do so. Order and freedom condition each other by the very tug of war that goes on between them. Society leads a risky existence as the order of democracy, and the democracy of order. It is controlled desire and, at once, desired control, always compromising without agreement about the terms of the compromises.

18) If one dares to buck the appeal proceeding from the desire to fall in with the consensus of a majority in the profession, if one dares to entertain the possibility that the behavior of political science does not square with norms that hold good for it, if one believes, as I do, that scientific behavior should have the intention to reflect analytically, theoretically, intentionally, the variety of meaning given in human experience without any pretention on its part to extra-theoretical competences, if one believes that there is nothing in reality that is not subject to laws and norms holding for them according to God's Word for all that He made in order to be subject to His Word, then, I think it becomes possible to reflect anew and come to conclusions quite at odds with those of Easton.

Then one may well hold that political science should focus on the state and the norms that hold for its existence. Political science can then begin and end with the state. That would not at all imply that it looks at nothing but the state; rather, it looks at whatever in view of its relevance for human activity in state-context (which is not to say that the state is but human activity geared to some end of man's own desiring).

19) The kind of argument Easton advances here is neither con-

vincing nor without danger of boomeranging upon himself. It may be said, first of all, that there are good reasons for the existence of a great variety of definitions of the state. (See Wagenaar, 1976:93) There is little merit in avoidance of the concept on the premise that such complexity must be glossed over as meaningless with the aid of the systems-approach. It is also clear that however Easton may wish to take the political thought of past centuries seriously, he does not take its own concern with the state and their understanding of it very seriously. How could he, if, as d'Entrèves observes correctly, Easton's position eminently illustrates the final disruption of the notion of the state at the hands of modern empiricists. They, says he, reduce the state to nothing but "a kind of force-relation among men--however much disguised the ultimate datum of force may be by such broader and milder expressions as 'pressure', 'influence', 'control' and so forth" (Passerin d'Entrèves, 1967:63).

If Easton's argument from variety (there are, he says, at least 145 definitions of the state) suffices to remove the state-notion from a central position in political science, then, of course, systems-analysis itself is in trouble. The argument boomerangs, for, as Linneman has pointed out, there are a great number of definitions of the term system within systems-theory. He refers to the work of Kroese who easily collected some thirty differing definitions. (Linneman, in: Strijbos, 1981:69). If one remembers that systems theory has not been with us very long as yet, that bodes ill for it.

Nevertheless, Easton does have a notion of the state. He describes it as a relatively durable modern form of political activity which may, in future, not be there at all, as it was not prior to Westphalia. Several critics have pointed out that Easton's explication of systems concepts in their relevance to political science reveals a state-orientation no matter how scrupulously he avoids use of the term; hence, they suggest, we may as well assume that Easton's own work points to the state as proper orienting concept for political science. (Wagenaar, 1976:120; also Kuypers, 1973:160)

Such an interpretation bypasses Easton's intent. To state that the state is but an instance of activity of a political kind, and to say that society, to exist, requires such activity, is indeed to remove the state from the centre-stage of political science, and to call for a theory which puts that sort of activity, as a survival condition of society, central instead. That Easton errs in doing so, may well be argued, but one ought not to psycho-analyze his work to let it say what it does not simply because we think that he must say it. That is to fall into a trap which Easton himself did not always avoid.

20) It is clear that to retain the notion of the state as central to political science one must, to convince Easton, at least be able to show that political life prior to Westphalia too, can be understood only by reference to the state-notion. I think that is indeed the case.

Easton has much to say about differentiation through organization. Recognition of normative structural variety, including principles for their differentiated communal expression in time, could go far to help one realize the 'fact'. Easton cannot recognize such variety. He has rejected it in the adoption of the notion of society as a systemic whole which persists by means of organizing behavior in the midst of otherwise random reality to which society as system is open and against which it must continue to organize itself.

21) If the common sense notion of the political does not necessarily make reference to a notion of the state, and is a common notion in the U. S. A. , there are reasons for it.

1) The pervasive influence of a Lockean kind of humanism which tends to identify state with government rather than with a differentiated, public legal community of both citizens and government

2) An ingrained rugged individualism in American practice which would see America as a community of individuals who, to be free, had best be suspicious of communal authorities and their injunctions that could threaten freedom (except, of course in times when the land of the free sees threats to its freedom from without)

- 3) The fact that, throughout its history, America has received immigrants who fled their countries to escape strong governments who deprived them of their personal liberties.
- 4) The ubiquity of the conviction that values are closely related to individuals' desires in a land of unlimited possibilities for their realization with a minimum of sanction-backed interference on the part of authorities.

These are some of the aspects of American thinking and doing that go far to explain the presence of an anti-state, and anti-authority bent in American common sense; but it is a sense more common to Americans than to others. See Hofstadter's books. Since Easton himself seeks to anchor his theory in this kind of common sense (and he is not alone in doing so) there is good reason to question the universal validity of his description of the subject matter of political science. It is indicative only of a view of politics and political science held commonly by Americans as universally accepted by free men everywhere. It is true that this view has gained adherents elsewhere since World War II; but not to the extent that it has in America.

22 Easton is correct in pointing to the fact that the idea of the state has often been misused for purposes of national aggrandizement; the state has been misconceived to serve the myths that men held dear. I deny that such is the essential function of the concept of the state. It only helps to explain the rise of a plurality of definitions of the state, the latest being Easton's own.

23) Here Easton reveals one of his chief tenets. Why, if one should accept the state as central to the focus of political science must the state be a theoretical tool? Simply because Easton's view of reality demands that every structural form or institution, although first conceived as ends, when realized can be nothing but instruments, means, for human activity in the service of the ends of further activity. And if it is to be an instrument of intelligent behavior, it must also be conceivable as a tool for developing the proper understanding of that institution in its function as tool for the achievement of purposes.

24) The use of this term is rather surprising and illuminating. If we are to take it seriously as I think we must, what can it mean? Supposing Bentley were to read this sentence, we may fairly assume that he would shrug and dismiss it as spookstuff. Or would he?

I do not see that Easton can mean anything but the organized discipline of political science, the organized interaction of the careful, observation-based thinking of individual political scientists focusing on the discovery of regularity in social organization geared to the production of policy acceptable to most members of the society as regulative for the sake of continuing social interaction. The collective mind is individual minds organized to reflect the regularity of social organization, for the purpose of continuing organization. The collective mind is identical with the pursuit, organized pursuit, of knowledge, that is, science; that collective mind has emerged and continues to maintain itself in response to basic needs of society's organization which has itself emerged and continues to maintain itself against considerable odds. Easton's collective mind is far removed from Hegel's 'Weltgeist', or concepts of 'Volksgeist'. The latter all-embracing, and all-determining, while Easton's collective mind is quite conditioned, for example by the random nature of reality against which it must maintain itself, by the regularity of organization that has in fact, historically been realized, by the limits of human insight and imagination, by the scarcity of resources needed for its work, and by the (in)adequacy of its professional organization and its conceptual apparatus (the tools of theory and observation).

And yet, Easton's collective mind, organized science, is society's supreme organ of adaptation by which to solve society's problems and ensure its continuation. After all, it busies itself with the patterns and recurrent regularities of social experience and it is these that constitute the firm basis for their organized application and increased control over an otherwise contingent situation. One could say that, for Hegel, contingency is only apparent within an encompassing rationality coming to its own. Easton's rationality must always hold its own against encompassing contingency. The basic elements are comparable, but they are differently weighted.

25) We may grant that there is this emergent pattern as long as we remember the context of its emergence as that of American organized science if, of course, we are willing to exclude some notable figures from it (e.g., Niebuhr, Leo Strauss and the post-behavioralists). We may also grant that the pattern has to be extracted and is not one of conscious theoretical design. We may not grant that this means that it has emerged by accident. It points, rather, to presuppositional homogeneity among the practitioners of political science in America.

26) Notice the continuing psycho-analytical treatment of the discipline. Like the psychiatrist tells his clients, so Easton continually wants to tell his colleagues, past and present, what they have in fact been saying and doing, but unawares. He wants to help them to accept themselves for what in fact they are and have been, that is, groping towards the most adequate knowledge of regularities in political life now possible; the kind of knowledge needed by society in view of the elemental fact of its organization. They must accept themselves as political technologists, engineers, without whose expertise the authorities will have great difficulty in doing what they must, for the sake of social survival. If they so accept themselves they will develop the blue-print, the theoretical model of the patterned regularity of any and every system of (organized) political activity, at its most general level.

27) Here we find several indications of what general causal theory must be like. It must be a tool of analysis, not substantive description. It is hypothetical, a pure abstraction, or model, a heuristic device of simplification to help us understand the empirical world. All these features are characteristic of the systemic flow model of political life which Easton has constructed in the form of general causal theory.

28) In other words, the requirement of quantification, until successfully met, would prevent the theory from serving its end, viz., to be a workable tool of analysis. It would not be useful empirically. Theory not now useful empirically is theory not now useful at all.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Easton's Political Systems Theoretical Framework

1.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have dealt with matters Easton considers to be essential preliminaries to the development of a general political systems analysis of political life. We can, with good reason, view them as matters which such an analysis must presuppose; the elaboration of a systems analysis of the kind Easton seeks to advance must imply agreement on these matters. The previous chapters, in other words, have presented what Easton himself considers to be the presuppositions of his more explicitly theoretical exposition of systems analysis more closely limited, and focused by the scope of 'the political' as discussed above.

The purpose of this dissertation is to take note above all of the presuppositions which inform Easton's systems analysis of political life. Our focus is not on the systems analysis itself as developed in broad outline in A Framework for Political Analysis, nor on the more detailed exposition of it in A Systems Analysis of Political Life. We are rather more interested in the general idea of the political system and its foundations as set forth in the preceding chapters.

Accordingly our focus is on aspects of Easton's thinking that have not come in for careful attention, by and large, in the literature that has something to say of Easton's work. What we do find there are numerous brief surveys of, especially, the more prominent concepts put forward in A Framework for Political Analysis, concepts proper to the idea of system, roughly focused on political life. How and why the

idea of political life itself implies, for Easton, the idea of political system, and calls for its elaboration, discoverable only from the views expressed in The Political System as discussed up to this point, is not usually brought forward in the literature.

Why that should be so is an intriguing question the answer to which should throw much light on the presuppositional nature of much contemporary thought in the the discipline of political science. It is, however, a topic requiring a full-fledged study beyond the limits of the present work.¹⁾

It seems almost superfluous, in view of the many available summary surveys of Easton's framework for political analysis²⁾ to add another here. That I do so nevertheless is not because I find fault with such summaries as are current but because of a desire to avoid a lopsided presentation in a direction opposite to that of available synopses of Easton's thought. Easton did advance a theoretical framework, a systemic model, for political analysis and for reasons set forth has high hopes for its utility to political science. Its elaboration represents an important step towards achieving definite purposes.

While it is true that treatment of the theoretical system which Easton developed should not make as if it has little to do with the presuppositions underlying and calling for its development, it is equally true that one should not focus on the presuppositions of a certain type of analysis without taking note of that analysis to which these presuppositions are important.

Moreover, presentation of the contours of such causal theory here may serve to reveal the close connection that exists between the suppositions of the theoretical model and the mo-

del itself. In that very fact, its presentation here must amount to more than yet another summary-presentation of Easton's model. Here the model does not appear on its own but as a necessary step in the reconstruction of a science, a discipline, itself a step required for social reconstruction. When one presents only the model, one may lose sight of all that, unless, of course, one is obviously in agreement with what Easton has designated as the need of the discipline in relation to a social need. Then one may ask: why pay attention to the obvious? Perhaps that partly explains why attention has been given rather to the explicitly novel in the systemic elaboration of the political system model as a tool of analysis rather than to its declared underpinnings. That still leaves one wondering about the absence of efforts to develop value theory of the kind that Easton considers essential for any useful application of causal theory. Emphasis on the model alone, may well reflect a continued tendency among political scientists (quite against the grain of Easton's intentions) to abide by what he has called a historicist, consensus oriented attitude within the discipline.³⁾

If we are to see this causal general systems theory of political life as instrument in the process of reconstruction, also of political science, we do well to determine its position in that process.

First, Easton 'established' the need for the development of this kind of theory in the face of manifest tendencies which would preclude its development on grounds Easton finds unacceptable.

Secondly, he counters those who doubt the possibility of developing such universally applicable theory capable of empirical (dis)proof by pointing to barriers in the way of doing so,

not the least among them being the lack of explicit reflection on the scope which has actually determined all political research; it explains how a value-laden concept like 'the state' could continue to confuse and confound the members of the discipline for so long. (Not that Easton denies the primacy of values, far be it from him; all activity is, as interaction, oriented to goals, is purposive, seeking to realize values or valued things, but the state being only a particular mechanism for the attainment of values through a kind of action we call political, it can hardly serve to unify political science; it can only confuse us if we settle on it for that purpose.)

In rejecting the concept of power as inappropriate for that same purpose, he can, nevertheless, point to some advance towards a proper view of the scope of political science since it, at least, does point to a kind of activity rather than an instance of activity by which to orient the field. That it did set its sights too broadly by neglecting to see that society demands knowledge specifically relevant to the actual authoritative allocation of values that takes place for a society at any time, must not prevent appreciation of this fact. Nor did this approach prevent the kind of work political scientists did from being actually oriented to the confines of this question in fact.

Thirdly, Easton's own formulation of the scope of the discipline, the scope actually informing the research of the discipline, contains the idea of political life as a system; small wonder that, fourthly, Easton can point to a hesitant (but still present) awareness of an idea of system in political science to the extent that it did appear, couched as it was in the very fine, but unfortunately unworkable, terms of equilibrium theory.

It is only after the completion of all these steps, showing that political science itself demands and makes possible the kind of systems theory which society too demands of it, that Easton can take the next step in the elaboration of the framework he has in mind. He has already presented the very essentials of the system-idea in The Political System, showing that it must necessarily be involved in any proper response to the questions really asked by society and by the discipline. Now, as the next step, it is time to begin to unfold what is implied in the concept of system, factually oriented.

Easton begins by unfolding the major contours of these implications, first, in his article "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems" (Easton, 1957) and, more completely, in A Framework for Political Analysis (Easton, 1965a). Its elaborate statement is to be found in A Systems Analysis of Political Life (Easton, 1965b)

Easton himself states matters as follows. The first book (The Political System, P. B.) "sought to present the case for general theory in political science. The second... laid out the categories in terms of which it has seemed to me that such a theory might be developed. In the present book (1965b, P. B.), the task will be to put that structure of concepts to work, and in doing so, to elaborate them further so that they can be more readily applied to empirical situations"(Easton, 1965b:vii).

The word categories is important here. Their categorical nature hinges on the adoption of the idea of system. Adopt it, and one makes a number of commitments categorically. As it is necessary, categorically, for an adequate analysis of the system of political life, to think in terms of an idea of system, so the major concepts involved in the idea of system must be

the categories in terms of which to develop a theory that is testable by application to empirical situations.

It is these categories that have received most attention in the literature referring to Easton's work, not the question concerning the why of their categorical adoption. Let us look at these categories as Easton develops them from the idea of system that he has in mind.

1.2. A Categorical Framework for Political Analysis

This framework is "the form within which a substantive theory of political life can be cast", a form best described as a systems analysis. (Easton, 1965a:ix) It is the form of society's systemic activity that we call political.

The meaning of Easton's systems analysis should, he says, be derived operationally; that is, exclusively from his text, not from the varied meanings attributed to it in the whole area of the systems sciences. (Easton, 1965a:x)

Although the concept of system has figured prominently in economics and sociology (Easton, 1965a:xi), Easton's systems approach draws its main inspiration from the communications sciences whose systems conceptualization "goes far beyond the typical ways in which systems thinking has developed in sociology and economics"(Easton, 1965a:xi). Even so, Easton has not leaned "on any ready-made model". "A consistent structure of concepts had to be newly developed that would fit the kind of system that political life constitutes". It is the general approach of the systems sciences or communications sciences from which Easton takes his cues in the development of his systems approach to political life. (Easton, 1965a:xii). He did so on the supposition that "the perspectives of a systems ana-

lysis serve to link all of the sciences, natural and social, help to make communication among them possible and rewarding, and generate common kinds of problems that interdisciplinary discussion can help to resolve". (Easton, 1965a:xii)⁴⁾

It would seem that Easton is afraid his readers may associate his systems analysis with a systems approach particular to just one of the sciences, never to see that he takes his cue from a general idea of system fit to serve any of the sciences if but adapted to the specific discipline it is to serve.⁵⁾ That is in line with his characterization of the main features of the idea of system which, in the guise of equilibrium theory, began to exert itself also in political science. It suggests the mutual independence of parts in a process that can be set apart from the rest of the world for purposes of analysis and to meet the need of simplifying reality for the same purpose. That holds good for any set of variables that could be researched. It holds good for all the sciences.

That is to say, more than just borrow metaphors and analogies from other sciences, as has always been fruitful as "a source of new insights and fundamental transformations in thought", we can now move far beyond this and "explore the basic outlines of a conceptual structure based upon the adoption and specific adaptation of systems analysis for the understanding of political life". Although the systems concept has grown up in the biological and natural sciences (Easton, 1965a:2) and remains in its general terrain conceptually, it is so that through adaptation for purposes of social research "biological and natural scientists would no longer feel at home in it, although it might well stir faint and nostalgic memories of a conceptual homeland they once knew"(Easton, 1965a:2).

The concept of system, in its general conceptual nature, also represents the most recent concept on which to build hopes for a unified social science; a unified, underlying, at least, science of human behavior.⁶⁾ Concepts that have been settled upon to serve that end for the social sciences to date are those of action (Parsons, Weber), decision, and, deriving especially from anthropology, function. "Most recently, systems have made their appearance as a possible focus, beginning with the smallest cell in the human body as a system and working up through ever more inclusive systems such as the human being as organism, the human personality, small groups, broader institutions, societies, and collections of societies, such as the international system"(Easton, 1965a:16).

"The assumption is that behavior in those systems may be governed by analogous, if not homologous (is it too early to tell? P.B.) processes. General systems analysis is perhaps an even more ambitious effort than action theory to draw disciplines into a common framework, for it spreads its net over all of the sciences, physical and biological as well as social, and views them all as behaving systems"(Easton, 1965a:16). Thus conceived, systems "would constitute the particles out of which all social behavior is formed and which manifest themselves through different institutions, structures, and processes". (Easton, 1965a:15)

In all this Easton is working on the assumption crucial to the behavioral approach as he understands it. It is connected with current trends toward theory in the general body of the social sciences, sparked, as this new theoretical tendency has been, by a strong interest in the integration of the dis-

ciplines"(Easton, 1965a:17) For Easton this is the most important and most distinctive of behavioralism's features even if the literature tends to seek the essence of behavioralism in the introduction of scientific method, new kinds of data from the hard-core sciences, and the like, leaving each interpreter free to provide his own favorite emphasis. (Easton, 1965a: 17)⁷⁾

Whatever the questions that may be raised by all of this, one thing is certain: 'system' reflects Easton's choice of stable unit for understanding human behavior in its political aspects, while it is clear that the central concepts in the idea of system remain "within the same general terrain in which it has grown up"(Easton, 1965a:2). That may also be rewritten to read: in which science first achieved maturity (P.B.). The point is that the concepts involved in the idea of system, so successfully applied in biology and physics, are also applicable, with the necessary adaptation, to the social sciences.

As already indicated the idea of system entails the adoption of certain concepts categorically. One is committed to them. According to Easton "the bare minima by way of major concepts that need to be understood for the analysis of political life in the systems framework, are: system, environment, feedback, and response. These form the "elementary initial structure of concepts" from which "it is possible to evolve a relatively more complex and, hopefully, logically coherent framework for an analysis of political life... "(Easton, 1965a:25) The concepts of system and environment have been part and parcel of all manner of systemic thought that has become so popular in our time; (Easton, 1965a:24) but it is the concepts of feedback and response which "fundamentally distinguish" Easton's system.

analysis of political life from others which, at least implicitly interpret political life as a system of behavior. (Easton, 1965a: 25)⁸⁾

Concerning the frequent appearance of the concepts of system and environment it is well to bear in mind that often it does not result from an awareness of specific theoretical commitments implicit in the useful employment of such terms, but just a handy notion comparable to earlier uses of terms such as politics, government, or state simply to vaguely cover a range of phenomena. It is Easton's aim to spell out the theoretical implications of the term 'system' at the level of theory. (Easton, 1965a:26) By exploring the implications of the term 'system' Easton will make it "reasonable if not compelling to interpret political life as an adaptive, self-regulating, and self-transforming system of behavior". "The concept 'system'... implies a systems analysis". If that be true, it is clear that Easton is about to take the first steps in a process of deduction from a general notion inductively acquired, in order to theoretically elaborate what is implied in it. Let us see what, according to him, the concept of 'system' implies.

2. The Concept of System as a Concept of Analysis

2.1 Its Two Uses. Its Empirical and its Theoretical Reference

As a concept of analysis the concept of system may be used in two distinguishable ways. It may be used to refer to the objects of observation, empirical behavior, which we wish to understand and explain; it may also be used to refer to the set of symbols through which we hope to identify, describe, delimit, and explain the behavior of the empirical system. It refers to both a set of ideas or theory, a symbolic, or theoretical, system, and it must correspond at the level of theory to the behaving

system which it is designed to explain. It is a symbolic system, like that of mathematics, but also unlike it in being empirically oriented, having the behaving system we call politics as its point of reference. Mathematics lacks such a point of reference.

Easton's concern in developing the framework for political analysis is: if we ascribe systemic qualities to the actions of political life, what commitments does doing so entail at the conceptual level? What are the conceptual consequences of doing so?

First of all, the term system must then be used to refer both to the behaving system and to the symbolic system. The behaving system will be called 'the political system', while we will call the symbolic system 'structure of analysis', 'conceptual framework', or 'theory'. (Easton, 1965a:26/27)

2.2 System as concept of analysis not a natural system as that is commonly understood

In several at first confusing pages (27-33) Easton seeks to counteract the idea that systems are naturally given and that the theoretical system must naturally reflect a natural system. He does, however, finally conclude that his own determination of what is a 'useful system' alone is natural. Had he stated immediately that a concept's empirical reference is not enough to make a system 'natural', these pages might have been more readily understood. His meaning becomes more plain once it is seen that Easton does have use for the idea of natural system; that is, once it is seen that a system is natural, and naturally best defined, as response - as response based on experience, insight and wisdom, to kinds of natural questions to which answers are naturally sought. It then appears that most students

agree that it is natural to consider a specified set of variables as coherently relevant for answering questions asked, in a useful manner. "These comprise a natural system in the sense that they, naturally, appear to cohere significantly. Without them it does not appear likely, on a priori grounds, that an adequate explanation of the major aspects of political phenomena could be obtained. The interconnectedness of the variables seems clear and obvious, at least until dispelled by subsequent inquiry; in this way alone may they be considered 'given' in or by nature." (Easton, 1965a:33)

Thus, and thus alone, is the concept of a system a natural one. This only way in which systems are naturally provided leads us to distinguish system in this sense, as naturally constructed empirical systems, from that idea of system which common sense, without further inquiry, is said to compell. (Easton, 1965a:27)

Easton's use of 'system' is not based on intuitive association with anything real, or naturally given; one does not need to conclude that interactions form a system only when naturally given, like natural phenomena, for then systems would have to be observed in operation. (Easton, 1965a:27) Easton considers that to be the common view underlying also the following statement of Radcliffe-Brown: "a natural system, then, is a conceptually isolated portion of phenomenal reality (the system separated from the rest of the universe which is then the total environment of the system), consisting of a set of entities in such relation to one and other as to make a naturally cohering unity". (Easton, 1965a:28)

Easton is at pains to have us see that however straightforward and unquestionable this point of departure seems to be, it entails such difficulty theoretically that we better forget about it for purposes of theory-development. (Easton, 1965a:28) We must rather

adopt the position that all systems are constructs of the mind so that it is pointless to try to distinguish so-called natural from non-natural or nonexistent systems. Choosing a system is solely a matter of theoretical or conceptual convenience; naturally.

Easton mentions several shortcomings deriving from the attempt to think in terms of naturally given systems. Chief among them is that in so doing we expose ourselves constantly to the challenge of whether what we take to be a system 'really' constitutes a genuine system. It means that one can never push ahead theoretically. (Easton, 1965a:28/9) "The idea of natural systems can in reality serve little theoretically useful purpose". (Easton, 1965a:29) It does not help us to locate such systems nor does it "aid us in the least in establishing the determinacy of the relationships" (Easton, 1965a:29). It raises the insurmountable barrier of making it impossible to determine "at what point the nature of the set as a system disappears and emerges simply as a random collection" of variables. Finally, "not all covariance would intuitively meet the criteria of a system", for it is possible "to discover many kinds of relationships in political actions for which no meaningful explanation can yet be offered". (Easton, 1965a:30) Are they to be incorporated as a system, or not? "Depending upon the subjective judgment of two different observers, the same variables would constitute a member of the two mutually exclusive sets, systems, and non-systems, at least until evidence was adduced to demonstrate the genuineness of the interdependence"(Easton, 1965a:30).

Methodologically it is possible and profitable to abandon the notion of real, naturally given systems, by postulating that "any

set of variables selected for description and explanation may be considered a system of behavior. Whether a system is given in nature or a construct of the mind is operationally irrelevant. We must rather decide whether the set of activities is an interesting one relevant to an understanding of some theoretical problems, or, rather, trivial from this point of view. (Easton, 1965a:30) The point is, any selected variables whether they show relevance to questions or problems, show interdependence, show a common fate, or not, may be considered as a system from our point of view. But if they do not, the system is to be considered trivial and uninteresting.

The immediate benefits which derive from this resolve are twofold: First, we eliminate dispute as to whether the object of our analysis 'really' is a system, since any set of elements we wish to consider is one automatically. Secondly, it allows us to change our minds about the importance of systems, uninteresting ones can become interesting. (Easton, 1965a:31)⁹⁾

Not that the selection of variables to constitute a system is entirely capricious simply because any variables may be viewed as a system. That suggestion is deceptive. It is, indeed, logically the case. Conceptually however, for purposes of research and analysis (remember, we seek to solve problems) it would be pointless to consider "a duckbill'd platypus and the ace of spades as our political system"(Easton, 1965a:31). We must select that combination of variables "which on the basis of experience, insight and past research seems likely to give us the most economical and most valuable understanding of why people behave in politics in the way that they do"(Easton, 1965a:31). Payoff, in the form of increased understanding, acts against indiscriminate selection of variables from which to compose the systems of behavior to

be analyzed. The whole histories of the sciences demonstrate such constraint. They are histories of successive redefinition of the system that constitutes the major unit of analysis.

American political science is a case in point. "The political system has already been expanded and modified in American political research over the last half century or more. From a view of it as being composed of formal or legal structures with attendant and incidental activities, it was expanded to include informal activities within the formal structure, interest groups, and motivational or personality dimensions." (Easton, 1965a:32/3)

"Logically, therefore, we are free to include within a political system any range of actions at all (political science is born free, P.B.); substantively, in the light of the objectives of research with regard to political life, we are limited by our conceptions of what is significant and relevant for an understanding of why people act in the way that they do in political situations (but everywhere in chains, P.B.) so we naturally develop our systems in terms of variables considered most promising by most students for gaining understanding of the questions perplexing us. Whether it is valid to see all as system, leaving no class as non-system, is hardly relevant. "Concepts are neither true nor false; they are only more or less useful" (Easton, 1965a:33).¹⁰⁾ Their adequacy is to ends. This mode of systems analysis is extremely useful. It is a way of orienting ourselves to our data and provides crucial leads into the analysis of our subject. It opens up more doors than it closes. As soon as it does not, we will discard this way of looking at social (more than just political, P.B.) life. (Evidently, the unified social science ideal comes to expression in the above exposition).

2.3 The typical Elements of all Social Systems

If the concept of system is general and contains a mode of analysis full of promise for the achievement of the unified social science ideal, then any social system must be composed of elements enough alike to allow for a similar mode of analysis despite the differences which substantive systems evidence. Hence the following question is in order: "What are the basic elements of which political systems, like other social systems, are composed?"(Easton, 1965a:35).

Again Easton warns us against a common sense interpretation which could easily mislead us to suggest that "palpable, interacting, visible, and whole" human beings are the elements common to all social systems. In this interpretation, says Easton, "lurk unusual ambiguities that are easily ignored or glossed over"(Easton, 1965a:36). Against the argument that "if we designate all... formal and informal political activities, that is, all political interactions, as the components of a political system, such a system seems to become less real or less tangible than a system apparently composed of a specifiable number of biological persons, as in the case of an organization or other formal group" it must be maintained that a natural system is too tangible to include all political institutions. After all, "when we turn to nonliterate and many traditional systems... the problem of empirically identifying a political system, or even other kinds of social systems, becomes infinitely more complex (for lack of role-differentiation, P. B.)... Political life need not be sharply demarcated from other kinds of behavior in all societies. Even in modern societies... One may talk politics to an acquaintance at church on Sunday morning... The whole fabric of society may be permeated... with political interactions of this sort... in

settings not differentiated politically" (Easton, 1965a:41). In short, if "in order to make the idea of a system palatable, we had to insist upon its having as its members a group of biological persons who interact exclusively or largely in a political framework, it is clear that we would not be able to include such interactions as part of the political system"(Easton, 1965a:41/42).

As a matter of fact, "even when we look at highly specific and differentiated types of behavior, as in a political organization, we factor out of the total apperceptive mass of actions only those that are political" so that even these organizations cannot be regarded as membership systems whose members would be the total biological persons"(Easton, 1965a:43).

Biological whole persons are members of only one unique system, that of society which "incorporates all other social systems and therefore refers to the overarching, inclusive, supra-system in which a group of biological persons participates" (Easton, 1965a:38). We would find it impossible to specify the whole range and variety of interaction in which the component person participates... As a concept, society calls attention to the gross mass of conceptually organized social interactions that we might perceive if we were able to take in the whole of society, literally, in one glance". (Easton, 1965a:38). Since we cannot, all social systems are necessarily analytical, abstracted, isolated, identifying a narrower aspect or part of the social interactions in which the biological persons engage. Thus the same biological persons may turn out to play different roles. These are abstracted out of the apperceptive mass of behavior. "Political interactions constitute one kind of such systems". (Easton, 1965a:38)

That systems are analytic makes them no less observable "than the crude undifferentiated mass of behavior" of which it is a part, and does not affect their empirical status. We may, however, never ignore the other kinds of behavior out of which the abstraction is made. These are the political system's social environment; we will have to take into account the interaction among the different analytical systems by which political behavior may be shaped. We must devise the tools to make this systematically possible. (Easton, 1965a:44)

At this point it is enough to know that the theoretical status of a political system, like all other social systems, is analytic, yet nonetheless empirical.

Since any set of interactions is by definition a system, (abstracted from an environment to which it is open), the one remaining question is: is the system scientifically interesting? Will it help to answer some of the major problems that have been raised historically with regard to political research or that appear currently relevant for an understanding of political life? If not, they are still a system, certainly not proven not to be a system. If not useful, this testifies to insufficient insight in terms of which to isolate the critical political variables for inclusion in our system and, therefore, range of interest, or the conceptualization of political life as a system is not particularly helpful towards our aim to understand. (Easton, 1965a:45)

This mode of conceiving of any social system as an isolated part of the total behavior in the most inclusive system whose members are biological persons, establishes systems analysis as a kind of analysis that takes account of a system as abstracted from total behavior as its environment and calls attention to the problem of establishing the boundary between a political system and its environment, a boundary required if the system

is to be identified in its environment; it also points to problems with which the system must cope in order to persist as system. (Easton, 1965a:47)

This formulation contains the programme for the rest of A Framework for Political Analysis. Once we know, as we now do, that a political system consists of behavior, a part of total behavior, and that it is analytical as well as empirical, self-regulating in the face of stress from its environment, then we can begin to look more closely at the basic concepts involved in any social system analysis keeping in mind their empirical relevance to the political system.

Accordingly the rest of the book discusses the identification of the political system, the environment of a political system, system-persistence, stress on the system, and system response; in more familiar terms: system, environment, response, and (implied in response) feedback. These are the major categories of any systems analysis as implicit in the concept of system. They can be put to use, of course, only once it is determined what the units of these systems are. Now that we know that social systems are analytical systems abstracted and isolated from total behavior Easton considers the time ripe for a discussion of the units of systems.

It is Easton's argument that where the members of the systems cannot be viewed as whole biological persons, the systems being abstracted from the whole of human behavior, these elements are to be seen as interactions on the part of individuals and groups. Interactions are the basic functional units of analysis. (Easton, 1965a:49) Political structures are of only derivative interest as forms through which basic political activities and processes characteristic of all systems, manifest themselves. The examination

of the latter is logically and temporally prior and will lend a dynamic character to political analysis. (Easton, 1965a:50) These interactions of the political system relate to the authoritative allocation of values as argued in The Political System (set forth in Chapter Three above).

It is true that authoritative allocation takes place in all sorts of less than society-wide groups as well as for a whole society. Only the interactions relative to society-wide authoritative value-allocation will be considered parts of the political system. The others Easton calls 'para-political'. He is, in other words, concerned only with political life in the most inclusive unit, viz. the society. (Easton, 1965a:51/52)

This distinction is important by reason of two major considerations. First, the para-political systems (i.e. interaction relative to authoritative allocation for less than society-wide groupings) are "subsystems of subsystems" not expected to deal with the major problems "generated by the fact that an aggregate of persons live together as a society, share some aspects of life and are compelled, thereby, to try to resolve their differences together"(Easton, 1965a:52) Para-political systems deal with problems narrower than those of the political system however potentially these groups may participate also in it.¹¹⁾ Second, "the powers available to the political system for attempting to regulate differences are usually broader, corresponding thereby to its greater range of responsibilities"(Easton, 1965a:53/54).¹²⁾ Unlike their counterparts in para-political systems the authorities in political systems are differentiated by the special capacities that they possess to mobilize the resources and energies of the members of the system and bring them to bear upon broad or specified objectives. (Remember that 'authorities' refers not to biological whole persons, but represents an analytical concept to be understood in the sense of 'occupants of differentiated roles

within a system responsible for political group management.
(Easton, 1965a:54)

These differences militate against the fusion of the two types of system that we have called political and para-political. Hence, says Easton, I exclude "the internal political systems of groups and organizations from my frame of reference (from his empirical orientation, P.B.), and I shall choose not to consider them coordinate with the more inclusive political system of a society. Rather, I shall include within the conceptual structure (the theoretical system, P.B.) to be developed only societal political systems. They, at least, have in common the same scope of responsibilities as defined and similar specialized capacities to mobilize and commit the members of a society. Of course, a similar mode of analysis, appropriately modified, may be significant for the study of para-political systems). (Easton, 1965a:55)

In view of this distinction Kleynhans' study of political parties in South Africa falls within the latter category, studying para-political processes within party-organizations rather than their functional relevance to the authoritative allocation for a society.¹³⁾

The decision so to distinguish the political from the para-political systems has an added virtue: it conforms to a long tradition of political research, which did not arise capriciously. (Easton, 1965a:55)¹⁴⁾ It reflects the continuous recognition "that no society could survive without providing for some processes through which authoritative allocations could be made if and when differences arise with regard to valued things" (Easton, 1965a:55).

In summary, the elements basic to all social systems are abstracted interactions; they are isolated in terms of their coherence within the scope of a question vital to society, namely, how are values (to be) authoritatively allocated for a whole society? (The (to be) reflects the prior value orientation which such a research

interest presupposes. It is from the total behavior of biological persons in a society that this political aspect is abstracted as a systemic whole in distinction from the rest of society's behavior. The system-relevant behavior (interactions) is that of the basic structural unit of the political system, 'member', which thus reflects only the systematically distinct aspect of a whole person's behavior. It is interactions of a kind that are the functional elements of a system in which an aspect of a behaving person (isolable in terms of role) which we mean by 'member', are the basic structural unit, not the biological, whole person.

Now that the analytical system and its component elements have been indicated, our systems analysis requires identification of what is not included in the system, viz. the system's environment.

Obviously, to distinguish what is in from what is outside the system requires knowledge of the boundaries between the system and its environment. We will assume that there are exchanges between the system and its environment, otherwise there would be no point in seeking conceptual clarity concerning the system's environment. (Easton, 1965a:59/60)

2.4 Concerning the Boundaries between the Political System and its Environment

The boundaries cannot be settled upon in a simple phenomenal way as common sense may attempt only to run headlong into difficulties. In doing so the concept of boundaries could not be developed to become a useful analytical tool as it is in systems analysis being implicit in the concept of system, at least when the system is considered 'open'. (Easton, 1965a:60/61)

Easton first considers the possibility of analysis in terms of a closed system, the concept that has been so useful in physical science. It "would require us to account for what happens in a political system solely in terms of its internal activities" (Easton, 1965a:61). Indeed, much political research in the past did pay little attention to the parameters of political behavior. "Personality, culture, and social structure, three of the major parametric systems have only episodically been used as central explanatory variables until recent years" though no political scientist could neglect their effects consistently. (Easton, 1965a:62)

If the political system were a closed one it would have to move to maximal social entropy, it would have to be 'running down'. That being socially inconceivable, it makes us realize consciously that we have in fact been conceiving of political life as an open system. We must spell out the implications and consequences of doing so. It also requires clarity concerning the meaning of boundary. Later, the logic behind the idea of open system will require development of concepts useful for an analysis of the exchanges between system and environment. First we must be clear about boundaries. (Easton, 1965a:61)

One way of getting at their characteristics is to look at the boundaries of empirical systems that so obviously seem to have their natural bounds. Physical and biological systems, although to be found in some kind of setting, can be readily distinguished from their environment, as for example in the case of a boulder, the solar system, a waterfall, an apple and the human body. (Easton, 1965a:63/64) Their limits are spatial or material, container-like. But social analytical systems of interaction, diffused as

they are throughout a society, are not easily seen as similarly bounded. It "certainly seems to put a considerable strain on language as well as imagery to think of containing political interactions in some sort of envelope or within spatial boundary lines"(Easton, 1965a:65).

However, the container-image only seems applicable to some things; in fact, they are also products of analytic selection. "We select the density of a boulder, the imaginary celestial line about the solar system, the form of the waterfall, the skin of the apple and of the human being as boundaries because of an interest in what happens to the variables defined by these limits. They "stem from decisions that indicate the nature and limits of the theoretical, or for the layman, the practical interests on the part of the observer"(Easton, 1965a:65). We could have drawn different boundaries had we wished. Conceptually a boundary "is a summary way of referring phenomenally to what we have included in or left out of a system"(Easton, 1965a:66). For systems that cannot be "spatially and wholly separated from each other, the boundaries can be identified by the criteria in terms of which we can for each interaction determine whether it falls inside or outside the system. For the political system the test is whether the interactions are more or less directly related to the authoritative allocations of values for a society. "(Easton, 1965a:66) If so, we wish to examine them; the rest we leave outside the system as givens representing the independent parameters of the system, merely identified as not-in-the-system, thus we "relieve ourselves of the need to go into detail about how they arise and what induces them to take the values that they do"(Easton, 1965a:66). Not that the parameters are less important for understanding the functioning of the system, just that we aim to un-

derstand the strictly political variables included in the system in their interrelationship. The parameters may be explained by specialists in other areas. We accept the variations in the parameters studied by others as 'givens' and seek to trace out their impact on the dependent, internal, or political variables. (Easton, 1965a:66)

Not that the boundaries, once chosen, are eternally fixed. Redefinition to meet our analytic needs is always in order. Our system is, after all, a device to help us understand a defined and redefinable area of human behavior, not a straightjacket. (Easton, 1965a:67)

All this also reflects on the uselessness of accepting geographical boundaries as limits of the political system for theoretical purposes. (Easton, 1965a:67/68)

Even so, experience corroborates to convince us empirically of the existence of boundaries, though not in the form of physical lines; this is more clearly so in differentiated social systems than in non-literate ones. Accordingly societies can be classified and placed on a continuum "with regard to the sharpness of definition and empirical delineation of intersystem boundaries", although this varied boundary-experience does not affect the status of the concept of boundary as part of the theoretical system. (Easton, 1965a:68/69)

2.5 The Environment of Political Systems

The environment of the political system consists "of all the other subsystems of society. (Easton, 1965a:69) It is social as well as physical environment. It is universal, but composed of two basic types of systems: intra- and extra-societal. (Easton, 1965a:71)"By the environment we may be referring to that part

of the social and physical environment that lies outside the boundaries of a political system and yet within the same society. This is the intra-societal part of the environment. "It will engage a considerable share of our attention". Extra-societal systems are those we normally call the international political (sic, P. B.; Easton forgets about the non-political part of the extra-societal system here) system. (Easton, 1965a:71)

"The following may be identified as some of the major external intra-societal systems of importance to the persistence and change of political systems: the ecological, biological, personality, and social systems." (Easton, 1965a:71)

Easton has presented us with a classification chart of the various parts or systems of the environment of the political system. See: Chart 1.


Easton is not worried about the precise classification of environmental systems since the mode of analysis he is exploring does not depend on such precision. Important, rather, are the recognition of the fact of the environment and the theoretical problems it occasions. (Easton, 1965a:71)

His comments about the various systems are brief and as follows . About the intra-societal systems:

The ecological system includes the physical and the non-human organic conditions that influence the conditions of all existence including the political. They are known to affect the structure and processes of political systems. (Easton, 1965a:72)

The biological system refers to hereditary properties that may help to determine human motivation in social contexts. Politically relevant biological traits, though political science tends to neglect them, are not thereby

THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM



theoretically or empirically less important. (Easton, 1965a:72)¹⁵⁾

Variations in personality and acquired motivations have long drawn the attention of students of politics, just as the fluctuations in the social culture by which personalities are shaped, and in the economy and other social systems, have received much attention from political scientists for their relevance to the political system.

Easton does not, in an introductory systems analysis, propose to trace all these relationships but he does hope to devise a satisfactory set of categories for doing so. (Easton, 1965a:73)

About the extra-societal systems:

They are summed up in the whole international society as a unit external to any given political system whose variety of subsystems may have important consequences for the persistence or change of a political system. We must devise a conceptual structure for systematically and economically tracing the exchanges of the extra- and intra-societal parameters with a given system. The relationships intended can be roughly charted even now. (Easton, 1965a:73) See Chart 2.




Chart 2.

2.6 The System as Positive Coping Behavior. Persistence

"A systems theoretic approach... may share with other kinds of analyses the conception that its subject matter is a system imbedded in an environment and exposed to what happens there" (Easton, 1965a:77). However, "what distinguishes the systems theory being developed here is that it presents a view of political life as a responding system as well. It constitutes a set of behaviors through which positive action may be taken to cope with the influences operating on it". (Easton, 1965a:77) Political systems like other social systems and some mechanical and biological ones are not necessarily defenseless in the face of disturbances to which they may be subjected. Their processes and structures are not freely buffeted about by chance. They can "respond to stress in such a way as to try to assure the persistence of some kind of system for making and executing binding decisions"(Easton, 1965a:78).

If so, "this poses a central question for theoretical inquiry": "Regardless of time and place, what makes it possible for a system to assure the perpetuation of any means through which values may be authoritatively allocated, that is, permit the system to persist?... so that even when critically undermined by such extraordinary events as civil wars, revolutions, or military defeat a system of some sort may manage to rise again?" (Easton, 1965a:78) How is even the minimal organization, cooperation, and commitment of resources and energies, and obedience to authority... possible? In the face of blows from within and without? Without them, after all, there could be no political life in any form.

In this context Easton makes it unmistakably clear that the general system-oriented question is not: How do political systems operate? Or, how do they allocate values? Or, what forces are actually determinative? Instead, the question befitting a general orientation to the political system in any society concerns the conditions under which allocative processes and structures themselves, whatever their form, can persist. (Easton, 1965a:78) It must be oriented to the life processes of any and all political systems. These are the processes all systems share and by which they are able to cope with stresses that threaten to destroy the capacity of a society to sustain any political system at all. (Easton, 1965a:79)

Without these questions we do not gain the proper focus for developing a conceptual structure for the analysis of all political systems.

This orientation leads us to ask necessary questions such as: What are the sources of stress? What is meant by the concept of persistence? What do we mean when we say that stress threatens such persistence? What concepts do we need if we are to study the way in which stress is brought to bear on political systems? Answers to these questions will enable us to undertake a systems analysis of political life.

The sources of stress to the system are both internal and external to the political system. As to internal sources, consider scarcity. Scarcity in view of the expectations of the members, perhaps the most significant phenomenon of any society, creates the differences and conflicts among members of the political system, the very matters the political system is called upon to deal with authoritatively to the extent that these differences are not privately settled. "Control over political instrumentalities... has usually been a matter of the greatest concern and strife". That any political system can persist at all is, on the face of it,

amazing! (Easton, 1965a:80)

As to the external sources, consider the process of industrialization as a source of extremely rapid change. "The second Industrial Revolution of the mid-twentieth century has generated its own special problems related to the rate of economic change and the capacity to devise policies and structures to cope with it". (Easton, 1965a:81) All that changes the structure of political life, revises its goals, creates discontinuity with the past, and yet, behold, the authoritative allocation of values continues, at least to a minimally necessary extent; so few societies go down that we tend to take their continuation for granted. It is, however, consequence of an amazing capacity of political systems to persist. In view of the stress, we should rather ask: How could any political system have persisted at all? In answer, one must consider the fundamental life processes of political systems. (Easton, 1965a:81) But first, what are we to understand by 'persistence'?

It means at least that the system has avoided its own complete breakdown or disappearance. Some systems did so disappear by reason of natural catastrophes or social catastrophes like civil wars and revolutions. (Easton, 1965a:82/83) It does not refer to absolute stability which either requires a completely unchanging environment, or a complete isolation against its changing character, as well as against internal disturbances. Systems can shelter themselves from disturbances, but not permanently or fully. Persistence is not system-maintenance free from change. (Easton, 1965a:84) Even stable systems, like that of the U. S. A. , change over the years. In Germany, during its development from the Weimar Republic,

the Nazi regime, and a new order, some form of political system persisted. Change and continuity are not incompatible. Likewise in the British system, quite apart from the ideological belief and feeling of identity with earlier systems, we can describe the transformations at every historical point making possible the continuance of a pattern of relationships through which binding allocations were taking place. A political system of some sort persisted. In other words, "the life processes of a political system have somehow been sustained" (Easton, 1965a:85).

When some set of institutions and practices through which the basic functions of political life are fulfilled continues to be, the system persists, however much the practices and institutions may have changed.

Since, as required by our mode of analysis, we are interested in the life-functions of any political system at all, in the most general level of inquiry, we are not concerned with the particular stresses on a given type of political system, e.g. democracy, or a totalitarian system, however urgently we may need knowledge concerning them. Nor are we interested in how one or another type of system manages to survive. These are second-order concerns from the point of view of general system theory.

The first-order question concerns the way in which the fundamental life-functions needed for system persistence, expressed through specific types of structures and processes, are safeguarded in society. How has stress been met so as to allow any authoritative allocation for a society at all? That is the general level of our concern. (Easton, 1965a:85)

Accordingly we find that if in any society a political sys-

tem is to continue, the members must be prepared to cope with disturbances, whatever their origin, to the point, if necessary, of modifying the system even in major aspects (regime, authorities and community) unless the members of the system actively seek to ward off, to isolate the system, against possible disturbances. (Easton, 1965a:87)

"What this signifies, therefore, is that the cost of survival of some means for dealing with otherwise unresolved differences in a society may at times require the acceptance of change in one or all of the significant aspects of a political system, depending on the circumstances." (Easton, 1965a:87) System-persistence reflects a capacity to modify/transform/reconstruct the system's scope, membership, structure and processes, goals, or rules of behavior on the part of the system's members; or a capacity to manipulate the environment to relieve stress. Unless insulation of the system succeeds, or when change in environment is negligible (the former is never entirely successful, the latter restricted to certain periods only) the members of the system "must be able to adapt, correct, readjust, control, or modify the system or its parameters" to continue the political system, without which no society can exist. (Easton, 1965a:87)

To this end variable means are at hand, limited only by resources, traditions and the ingenuity of members in the face of novel situations, and their skills. "Self-regulation by the members of a political system, even to the point of self-transformation in structure and goals, represents the critical capabilities of all social systems." (Easton, 1965a:87)

In this matter of change and by reason of it, system-persistence is not to be confused with system-maintenance. Inquiry into the one is not inquiry into the other. "The idea of systems persistence extends far beyond that of systems maintenance." The latter relates to a kind of system, not the basic functions of political life, the essential variables of the system. We seek a theory of persistence, not of self-maintenance or equilibrium (as common sense understands that). Some systems, moreover, despite the capacity to seek to cope, do not cope successfully. There is no eu-functional, maintenance satisfying bias to our kind of analysis. (Easton, 1965a:88) Highly differentiated political systems are better suited to deal with change. Their well-defined political elites¹⁶⁾ may be seen as "specialized organs of adaptation". This is crucial in times of swift and ubiquitous change if the system is not to go beyond control and disintegrate. The means by which to ensure persistence are, of course, variable. (Easton, 1965a:89) The particular path adopted is a function of more than the capacity of the members to cope with change. Its analysis is not the first concern of systems analysis which is designed, rather, to clarify the consequences pertaining to the continued survival of of some form of political life; it operates at the most fundamental level.¹⁷⁾ The idea of persistence leads us to ask "how it is possible for the basic political function of a society - its authoritative allocations of values - to be fulfilled regardless of time and place", and that in the face of stress. (Easton, 1965a: 90)

Although Easton has already pointed to the sources of stress, it now becomes necessary to see what stress is to the system. When is a system under stress in its operation? Stress refers

to those changes in the system or its environment that, if allowed to run their course, might lead to complete destruction of the system. This stress threatens or endangers the system and may prevent a system from functioning. (Easton, 1965a:91)

The system is under stress when the essential variables of the system are displaced beyond their normal range. The intuitive plausibility of this notion is clear from the way we judge of various kinds of systems' normal operation, underlying which is an idea concerning the variables essential to such systems while non-essential variables may change without pulling the system beyond the normal range of operation. (Easton, 1965a:93-95)

For general systems analysis, however, we should find out how to determine "when the capacity of a political system to continue as such a system is being put under stress, regardless of the capacity to sustain any particular kind of political system"(Easton, 1965a:95). After all, change in kind of system, from totalitarian to democratic, or vice versa, e.g., does not impair society's capacity to sustain some kind of political system. The latter requires our attention, not the stress that may lead to changes in kind of system. We must determine stress in its threat to the possibility of making any authoritative allocations in a society at all, and find out what the essential variables of any and all political systems are. (Easton, 1965a: 96)

In view of all that has been said the answer is clear. The capacity of the system to allocate values for the society and to assure their acceptance are the essential variables of any political system at all. All other variables are not essential. (Easton, 1965a:96)

These two essential variables may be present to a greater or lesser extent (they are, after all, variables). The behavior involved varies on a range of effectiveness, and within that normal range a system may be able to persist. "Where the disturbance can be interpreted as introducing changes in a system that are driving either of the essential variables beyond their critical range, we can designate them as stressful, as also if they have the potential to do so." (Easton, 1965a:97)

In all this we must remember that conditions stressful to any particular system need not be stressful to political systems as such, but conditions stressing any and all systems, of course, will be stressful for any type as well. (Easton, 1965a:98) It is in the very nature of political life that stressful disturbances cannot be avoided but the consequences of disturbances on the fortunes of the system itself - whether it survives and in what form - will depend on the capacity and readiness of a system to cope with such stress. (Easton, 1965a: 99/100)

Hence we must inquire into the concept of stress regulation. All social systems display the critical capacity to respond constructively to the influences acting upon them. Their members do not need to "sit back, as it were, to accept stress supinely, through some mechanistically conceived way of adapting to changes taking place in the environment. This is what has long been unwittingly implied in equilibrium analysis as a theory of political life". (Easton, 1965a:99)

"Over time (sic!) political systems in general, and each system in particular, have developed extensive repertoires of techniques for coping with possible stress... It builds a flexibility into them that not even the most complex biological systems, and therefore the most versatile of them, have ever possessed".

(Easton, 1965a:99)

The following classes of response may be mentioned: 1) Insulation of the system from all change. 2) control of the changes so as to keep them from becoming stressful, or to ward off present stresses. (These two means of response are proper to human biological systems also). Over and above the capacities of the human biological system social systems also have 3) the capacity to transform themselves, their goals, practices, and the very structure of their internal organization. "No human biological system has yet been able to emulate this kind of self-transforming feat, although with modern computer technology and with a growing knowledge of the genetic structure, controlled mutation is well within the realm of possibility." (Easton, 1965a:100)

There is freedom to select alternative strategies but also to consciously devise new methods for meeting new or old crises adding thus to the store of responses through innovation. "Unlike the implications of the equilibrium model of political processes, the members of a system need not simply absorb a disturbance and mechanically seek to re-establish some old point of stability in the political system or move on to a new one. To accept a conceptualization of this sort would indeed be to leave the system in the hands of some invisible political hand.¹⁹⁾ Members may search out entirely new avenues even for old problems. Call it adaptation if you will, but then creative and constructive adaptation, informed with goals and direction. (Easton, 1965a:100)

To conceptualize the ways in which responses may meet stress it is first necessary to know how disturbances impose themselves upon the system. That task will be undertaken in A Systems Analysis of Political Life. It is not a simple common sense matter to trace the way disturbances communicate themselves to the system (Easton, 1965a:101), although most, especially functionalist, research would have it so (Easton, 1965a:105-107). It forgets


that even under conditions of stability there are exchanges between system and environment; there too is change though in the guise of stability. Our analysis to be applicable, must also refer to the states of stability. (Easton, 1967a:107)

Easton emphasizes that the influences of environment upon system are so varied, interrelated and complex that one cannot trace them all in their uniqueness. We must therefore discover a way of generalizing our method for handling the impact of the environment on a system thus "reducing the enormous variety of influences into a relatively few and, therefore, relatively manageable number of indicators or variables"(Easton, 1965a: 108).

For purposes of general theory then, Easton sets out to reduce the major and significant environmental influences to a few indicators, whose examination should give us an idea of the environmental impact on the system. "I shall designate the effects that are transmitted across the boundary of a system toward some other system as the outputs of the first system and, hence, as the inputs of the second system. . . A transaction between systems will therefore be viewed as a linkage between them in the form of an input-output relationship."(Easton, 1965a: 109)

This is enough to provide us with a rudimentary general linkage model. See Chart 3. It displays the essential framework for political analysis to be refined in A Systems Analysis of Political Life. In that refining activity too Easton professes to remain at the general level analysis of this flow-model.

This model should be self-explanatory in view of all that has been said already. A few remarks only are in order. First, the



the diagram omits much. Many other environmental systems could have been added, while the relationships among the environmental systems are not represented. Also, the structures and processes through which a political system converts its inputs into outputs are invisible except that the serpentine line suggests its being worked on throughout the political system.

The diagram may be simplified even further as follows:




Chart 4.

Chart 4. reveals that after all "in its elemental form a political system is just a means whereby certain kinds of inputs are converted into outputs. At the least this is a highly useful starting point from which to begin plugging in the complexities of political life. (Easton, 1965a:112)²⁰ It is also well to remember that "inputs of the environment are really just the outputs of the political system"(Easton, 1965a:111). Political outputs modify the environment and are an influence on the next round of effects from the environment.

Taken as an entirety this framework's conceptualization represents the invention of a means for tracing out the way in which stress may be communicated to a system. (Easton, 1965a: 117)

For purposes of an introductory framework all that remains to be done in order to reveal the commitments which we may unwittingly be assuming once we begin to pursue the theoretical

implications embodied in the idea of system, is to inquire into the means by which systems have been able to cope with the disturbances threatening any system at all (Easton, 1965a:117), and into the modes of response available to political systems (Easton, 1965a:119).

This response to stressful effects from within and without the system (to distinguish them we will call the former 'withinputs' although they affect the system in the same way altogether) must, of course, be intelligently creative.

The flow-model concentrates and summarizes the stressful effects as inputs, indicators that will sum up most of the important effects that cross the boundary between these systems, so we do not have to trace them all in their particularity. (Easton, 1965a:113) We see the environment as focusing their effects on two major inputs: demands and support. These two channel the vast range of changes in the direction of the political system, reflecting and summarizing them. Demands, by definition, are voiced indications of what the authorities should do. (Easton, 1965a:121) Support reflects the level of support for the basic components of the political system, namely, regime, community, and authorities. If the level of support falls below a minimal level the system will collapse.

There are two sources of demand stress: output failure if the demands are ignored, and demand overload which results, simply, from the system's incapacity to accept and process an infinite number and variety of demands. The system can only cope by reducing the demand volume and by regulating the variety of demands. That is, the system copes by the reduction and integration of demands, by its gate-keeping activity. There are a variety of means for performing this function. Channel capacity may also be increased for the more effective transmission of the greatest number and va-

ieties of demands possible. (Easton, 1965a:122/123)

How does the system meet a critically dangerous low level of support? In one or more of three ways: 1) by a radical way, viz., the alteration of structure and processes of the system, 2) by seeking to induce a high level of diffuse (not specifically related to demands) support among the members of the system, 3) by creating specific support as an appreciative input in return for favors received (by way of specific outputs as demanded). (Easton, 1965a:124-127)

To cope effectively, of course, it will be necessary for the system to have information about the state of the system and its environment and concerning the effects of their outputs on the inputs. (Easton, 1965a:131)

It is the conceptual structure implied in the idea of system to which the ideas of system, environment, response and feedback are crucial if it is to fit any and every political system, as well as the commitments unconsciously involved in this idea of system, that are stated explicitly in A Systems Analysis of Political Life; there the complexities of political life are being plugged into this conceptual framework to refine it into a full-fledged and detailed analysis of political life at the general level in an empirically, as ever, oriented way.

For our purposes it is unnecessary to present the contents of A Systems Analysis of Political Life; the reason is simple: Easton there elaborates upon the framework set forth in A Framework for Political Analysis and remains at what he calls the general theoretical level. He touches on particular political problems only for illustrative purposes without attempting to test the validity of his theory in the further elaboration of it. As up to this point the orientation can be called empirical by intent, in a rather broadly sweeping fashion, only, if at all.

To the extent that Easton's work reveals an empirical bent it is reflected in the consistency of his attempt to hew to and elaborate upon the presuppositions and assumptions of political science as he understands it, the American kind of political science and its pragmatic, instrumentalist nature. He is concerned to spell out, to elaborate for careful statement, what is involved in that kind of political science's assumptions and he does so rather deductively, without much urge to test the theory he thus evolves as yet.

Our interest focuses on the presuppositions of the kind of theory that Easton has drawn forth from the American practice of political science. These have come up for discussion most completely in The Political System which we have discussed. It is not that Easton dogmatically presents his systemic flow model of political life as final and ideal without admitting to the need for its testing. It is rather that the theory must be elaborated before it can be tested. It is in the testing of this theory that the discipline of political science can be organizedly at work as a whole, at least until it should prove to close more doors than it opens.

Nevertheless the entire theoretical enterprise at the general level of causal theory presupposes, of course, that political life is indeed a system, and that the general system does indicate the essential life function society must meet in order to continue as society. Without that assumption the enterprise would be pointless.

One may share the assumptions so as to consider the theory proven by the assumptions from which it was deduced; or, one may share the assumptions and feel that the proof of the elaborated theory is in the pudding as affected by its future testing, (which would imply that the assumptions are only experimentally accepted, and to be proven, always, as well), or one may simply not agree that the idea of system derived from American political science

as it is and based upon the foundation of good old American common sense plus a healthy wish to achieve whatever we can in terms of the facts of that common sense, is well founded. One may wish to quarrel with common sense so understood rather than to elevate it in refined theoretical fashion to the status of paradigm in terms of which to organize the entire discipline of political science. The latter response is one by which the systems approach too has been greeted.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1) The most likely explanation would appear to be that Easton's colleagues share, by and large, the basic assumptions that we have seen to be fundamental to Easton's approach. That does not, as such, tell us whether and why they feel that Easton has adequately shown the connection between these assumptions and the specific framework he advances. It may as well be that his colleagues are not much concerned about the explication of such connections. The latter appears to me to be quite commonly the case.

2) See Chapter 6 for references to works presenting such summaries.

3) See Chapter 6 for further comment.

4) Here the unified science ideal makes itself felt once again. It is, however, more of a beckoning ideal than present reality. A unified science of society is not feasible before the road of a differentiated (in terms of society's needs and interests) specialized scientific practice (required in order to achieve reliable knowledge) has been traveled long enough to allow for the sciences' reintegration in a unified science. In the meantime systems theory is general theory, designed to allow for such reintegration when and where ever possible. As general causal theory, empirically oriented, it is as universal in its explanatory intentions as was the grand moral and philosophically inspired theory of the past, reaching across and hoping to integrate all the sciences in a much more reliable and useful way. General systems theory, reflecting the very methodology of the sciences' own advance and growth, is a methodology of integration as well. In this task it intends to replace grand theory which thus becomes obsolete to the extent that it attempted to account for and integrate causal knowledge. It can only continue to be important through its own redefinition as value theory, as an attempt to picture the world of tomorrow in terms of the desired elimination of present needs to which such theory can now be attuned since causal theory, systemically organized, will state the nature of both needs and desires in the best possible way to allow for the development of the best possible value theory.

5) Easton has, as we will see in Chapter 6, good reason to fear such misinterpretation. Too many systems theories have been advanced in specific disciplines that have no sense of the general import of systems theory; moreover, too many of them keep to equilibrium analysis and do not, therefore, represent

analysis at the most general level applicable to any and all political systems.

6) See note 4.

7) Easton is correct in noting that this feature of the unified science ideal is too often forgotten in characterizations of behaviorist science. One wonders if Easton seeks to inject this feature into it while most behaviorists do not, perhaps, demonstrate the importance of it in their work? Here too we touch on a question awaiting further research. I will only hazard a hunch at this point.

It seems to me that early American pragmatism, as a practice-oriented view and way of life, hewing to rugged individualism theoretically backed by Lockean and Benthamite tenets, dear to Americans even today, does not make for a ready acceptance and confession of the unified science ideal. It is content to stimulate the conduct of science in order to apply its results freely for purposes men freely choose. Hence natural science and technology have taken such early and great flight as the means by which to make and to keep America great.

That social science could also be developed to cure the ills of post industrial and complex American societal life if men would apply the methodology of the sciences to it only dawned upon Americans to any extent in the twentieth century. Deweyan pragmatism did contain the unified science ideal's fervor in a seemingly innocent marriage with rugged individualism. It had not yet, however, come up with a general framework in terms of which to organize social research, content as it was to attribute central importance to the logic of enquiry (science) in social practice.

Even with Easton the general system idea is specifically elaborated (adapted) to suit political life. For the time being that idea must also be adapted to other social systems in order there too to lead to more reliable knowledge. Whether it will prove capable of leading to a unified social science remains to be seen, but the concept is replete with promise to that end. Even so, it must serve the aim of social order without prejudicing the ends of social control, ends to be chosen by whole biological persons. The idea of unified science as instrument of control so easily conjures up images of lost freedom on the part of all to specialists that the idea is not usually and readily emphasized though temptingly present in American thought and practice.

8) It is the concepts of feedback and response that define Easton's systems concept as 'open'. These concepts shape the idea of system so as to make it a candidate by which to attempt to realize the ideal of a unified science.

Not only does emphasis upon these concepts serve to distinguish Easton's analysis methodologically from those who use the concept of system as just a handy notion by which to vaguely cover a range of phenomena, but it also testifies to the belief that methodological employment of the concepts of system and environment without those of feedback and response evidences an inadequate and obsolete view of reality as if it could be physicalistically and meachanistically explained. The use of this model, it has been said, has proven to be inadequate even in physics (since Heisenberg), and it has prevented the development of biology, including the sciences of human life, the social sciences.

Biologists first provided a major stimulus for the development of general systems theory. In particular, it was Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who advanced his theory of open systems to steer clear of the Scylla of mechanism and the Charibdis of vitalism. For the general development of the movement of general systems theory many other theorists deserve to be mentioned. I mention the following with no attempt to be exhaustive: Kenneth Boulding (economics), Norbert Wiener (computer-theory), W. R. Ashby (organization-theory), R. L. Ackoff (organization-theory), A. D. Hall (systems engineering), C. S. Hall (psychology), C. A. McClelland (international relations). It is interesting to note that Pareto is considered one of the harbingers of general systems theory especially in view of his theory of economic distribution. Obviously, the selection of gentlemen mentioned is somewhat arbitrary and does not include many of those who are presently advancing the cause of systems theory in a variety of fields.

9) That helps us to understand why the distinction between symbolic and empirical analytical system is of such importance to Easton. It releases the imaginative insight of the profession from slavish bondage to the all-too-naive desire to recognize only non-scientifically given coherences, a great barrier to the creative and necessary reconstruction of all experience. Still, the imaginatively new has to be limited by the restrictions, as we will see in the next paragraph, of professional organization and continuity in the scientific quest for knowledge (which, after all, must be cu-

mulative). Science, thus conceived, is the professional delimitation and control of logical license. Logic's liberty must be restricted in the practice of experience. Why? For the sake of use, of pay-off.

10) This is certainly one of the baldest and most straightforward presuppositional statements that Easton has made. It confesses to an instrumentalist view of science and concept-formation that ties understanding to uses so directly that understanding is not, except in use. One wonders what is the use of saying so in the form of a categorical assertion?

11) It would seem that the range of the problems handled authoritatively helps to define the political system from the parapolitical ones. This interpretation is, however, fraught with difficulty. Take the parapolitical system of authoritative allocation within a group less than society-wide, the family. Dad, for whatever reason, may decide to give John, age 10, more pocket money than Peter, age 16. On the assumption that the value thus allocated is scarce but desired by both sons, this allocation of values is likely to occasion conflict. Father's decision, Easton would say, holds good for, affects only, Peter and John; therefore it is not part of the political system. If it affected the total aggregate of people in a society, that would be different.

What Easton does not consider is that Dad being the legitimate authority in the matter to hand, his decision must, rather, ought to hold good, and be upheld, against all comers; it must be respected by all. Dad has the legal competence to make this allocation. The government must see to it that Dad can exercise his competence, that he can have his right upheld by law and governmental sanction against those who would prevent him from the enjoyment of his competence. The government (through the instituted courts) may be called upon to uphold dad's legal competence as an integral part of the public legal order. Dad even has the right to make his own parental mistakes.

That may sound like a ridiculously trivial example. But consider: A relatively recent news report had it that Sweden's parliament passed a law forbidding parents to make use of corporal discipline in the training of their children. It declared parents not legally competent to act as they may think they must in the context of familial justice. Should Dad spank his children for good reason in the new situation, his decision directly affects not just his children, but the entire community of state whose public legal order is said, by the government, to require sanctions against Dad for having

violated that order.

The legitimate decisions of individuals and groups everywhere within society's life are such as to hold good for all who would at law deny the same. Otherwise there would not be a public order of legal competencies to be upheld, when challenged, by government, court, and armed force if necessary. Otherwise all becomes a matter of private jurisdiction where neither governmental, nor non-governmental action can be judged against the requirements of a truly public legal order in which the liberties, rights and obligations of men and their varied social orderings (associations, communities and institutions varied in kind) are basically delineated.

12) Here it may be similarly objected that the powers so defined are simply the greater power that can be marshalled to effectively ensure the realization of the desires of the strongest parties however just or unjust they may be when viewed from the viewpoint of public justice. It is for the maintenance of public justice, the defense of the good legal competencies of those who take (quite a-political) decisions in para-political groups, that public powers and sanctions may be employed by those legally appointed to uphold the public order in this way (the state's (not: society's) government).

13) W. A. Kleynhans, *Politieke Partye in Suid Afrika*, Inaugural Lecture, UNISA, 1973. The entire study is so system-specific, a form of what Easton would call substantive analysis, not general, that one should not be too quick in calling it an application of Easton's thought.

14) Which, in effect, is to suggest that organized, common, caprice is not capricious, and that the political system would disappear if society could survive without authoritative settlement of conflicts. The justice of such allocation lies in its justification, viz. continued society, continued conflict control.

15) In this context works like those of Ardrey, Lorenz and others on aggression and the territorial imperative come to mind as possibly significant. If so, the evolutionist bias that comes to expression in Easton's repeated use of the mystifying word 'emergence' receives further support. It may be observed that Easton's evolutionism is not that of a 'natural' selection; the emphasis should, rather fall on self-transforming activity.

16) Political scientists, in view of all that has been observed, must be taken as one of those, and not the least important, specialized organs of adaptation. Of course this raises the entire question of

competencies in the life of men.

17) This way of stating the concern of systems analysis is Easton's way of retaining the causal/empirical/scientific orientation. We have the continuation of some form of political life. It requires little reflection to see that, whatever the values behind the desire and realization, continued realization, of some form of political life, this continuation requires (consequences) that certain conditions (minimal political life conditions) be met.

When we presuppose, as the very persistence of political systems in the face of stress (conflict over values) seems to indicate we do, that the survival of society is our supreme value, what are the consequences of doing so?

At least, a willingness to subject all other values to this one overriding value, a willingness to override and transform all other values. The regularities of society's organized experience, and the most reliable knowledge of them, will be a minimal guide most useful in the process of social reconstruction.

Only fellow-believers will share the view... It involves an ideology. Its supporters are numerous. It involves idolology. The idol is man's image of himself as sufficiently in control of his situation through the development of sufficient instrumental reason in the experimental practice of life. It is a form of humanism. Its acceptance implies rejection of the central realities of Christian conviction to the very extent that it is accepted.

18) Easton's 'over time' is hardly permissible in terms of his own assumptions. After all, political systems can cope with stress in their particularity only over time; particular systems exist 'over time, not 'political systems in general'. The latter represents an abstraction 'in time' from time, from the real temporal order of all (temporal) existence.

More than a slip of the pen is at issue here. Here all the shortcomings of Easton's theory come to a head, revealing an inability and/or unwillingness to stay with the temporal order of experience in abstracting from it.

This slip is indicative of operating with 'society' as a timeless whole representative of all the social regularity that may be drawn from 'societies over time, from particular societies. But these Easton cannot delimit in any way according to an order of time. It is a phantom-concept. It serves to enhance the plausibility of the my-

thical ideal of achieving reason's supremacy over time, over temporal experience, at least supremacy sufficient to ensure survival of the human, organizing, sufficiently controlling species.

It also points up a difficulty of structural functionalism which has paid attention to synchronic order at a particular moment in social life, and to diachronic order 'over time'.

Needed is a concept which retains structural identity over time that will allow us to talk of political life throughout time as well as of political life at any time in particular. Easton has no room for such structural constants unless it be the structural identity of the regularity implied in systemic change, organization, which is taken to be temporal always, yet always freed from time in its recurrent regularity. Knowledge of that timeless regularity, which does 'grow' (accumulate) being the means pre-eminently by which to increase control, science's task is a timeless one, the development of deductive (not temporally or empirically bound) theory in the midst of empirical experience which calls for such development in order to be controlled by it.

It implies a view of time bereft of order except such order as is introduced into it by man's organizing intelligence, and by his intelligent organization. The means of control, wrested from time by intelligent reflection of organized experience as bulwark of man's independence against the vagaries (chance) of time, are indicative of man's possible continued supremacy over time.

19) Adam Smith's invisible hand reflects a measure of piety towards a rationality, an order of some sort, which, if men would not resist it, leads to the best of all possible worlds. Men must follow their inclinations in their pursuit of material aims and all will be as well as it can be. American pragmatism in modern operationalist form no longer has such piety.

It does strive to create, constantly, the best of all possible worlds but by means of controlled rationality. It is a rationality difficult to achieve, and as difficult to maintain. But it is the 'must', our responsibility to ourselves and to our continued existence. The very possibility of orderly, organized existence, depends on the development of such rationality and its application. To that end, Easton's contributions.

20) The circuit image which the flow-model represents, is simply there, since time immemorial, as essential feature of society's functioning at any time and place; it is proper to the idea of society as its minimal regularity. Society everywhere displays particularity in all its disorder which affects, by being plugged into it, the ever-present, and ever-constant circuit. The circuit must be maintained against all that is plugged in. Sometimes that leads to the break-up of the circuit in particular societies. With the presence of interrelation and systemic organization at an international level, one can only hope that what is plugged in is plugged in in a well considered manner, with sufficiently reliable knowledge of to be expected consequences, so as not to blow the circuit.

In the face of present social disturbances, and the availability of nuclear forces of destruction and the like it is plain that indeed we live in perilous times demanding much of the sciences, of political authorities, of members of the political system, in order to ensure continuation. Let us not blow up the system but understand it better to see what the future could look like. That is what Easton's value-inspired causal theory has to offer for present value-reconstruction.

It is, after all, not so surprising that Easton has not developed his value theory under separate cover. Its contours are not invisible. His basic value is in the system. We must adjust all our values in such a way as not to short-circuit it.

We must balance the need for support and the values strived after in the system in such a way as to meet them both sufficiently well to be able to continue to do so. Easton is an advocate of piecemeal social engineering in which democratic values are to be upheld within the limits of possibility that science (and its application, that is, government) rules in or out, possible or impossible.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The New Revolution in Political Science and Easton's view of it

1.1 Introduction.

During the late sixties signs of serious cleavage within the discipline of political science led Easton, then president of the American Political Science Association, to evaluate the issues involved with a view to the future development of political science both as organized profession and as theoretical approach. Easton did so in the form of an address, delivered in September, 1969, at the 65th meeting of the American Political Science Association, entitled: The New Revolution in Political Science.

Some, especially Martin Landau, have interpreted it to be a recantation of behavioralism, and, at the same time, of Easton's own thought.

Although I have not made reference to this address specifically in my interpretation of Easton's arguments as presented in chapters 1 through 4 of this dissertation, the address has played an important part in it, heuristically. Aware of Landau's charge, I have found that Easton's address is consistent, basically, with the earlier work of Easton. It is my considered conclusion that Landau has acquainted himself only casually with Easton's work on the assumption that Easton was a logical positivist like himself, only to be extremely annoyed and surprised on finding out that Easton's views as expressed in 1969 are out of line with Landau's conceptions. Apparently Landau never considered the possibility that Easton's views differed from his own all along.

1.2 Two Credo's in Conflict, or One Two-pronged Credo?

Easton has provided us with both an often quoted credo, the articles of faith, of behavioralism, and the credo of the post-

behavioral revolution. Let us look at and compare them to see if they are compatible (as Easton suggests) or incompatible (as Landau holds).

The behaviorist credo, on the rise in the fifties and characterized by Easton in 1965 is as follows:

1. Political behavior shows discoverable uniformities that can be expressed in generalizations or theories with explanatory and predictive value. (A tenet shared by Easton and Landau)
2. Their validity must be testable in principle by reference to relevant behavior. (Landau would probably delete 'in principle' before sharing this tenet with Easton)
3. Techniques of data-gathering must be improved. (Landau would not quarrel)
4. Quantification, not for its own sake, but where possible as well as relevant and meaningful in the light of other objectives, is desirable. (Landau typifies man as a counter (Landau, 1972:10/11) and places more stock on quantification than does Easton).
5. Values and empirical explanation must be kept analytically distinct. (Landau would question the wisdom of adding 'analytically' and would have the student avoid value-propositions, unlike Easton)
6. Theory and research are the intertwined parts of a coherent body of knowledge. Research without theory may be trivial, theory without research may be futile. (Landau shares the view with Easton)
7. Pure Science. The application of knowledge is as much a part of the scientific enterprise as is theoretical understanding. The latter is logically prior to the former. (Landau agrees)
8. Integration. Political science as social science can ignore the findings of other disciplines only at their peril, thus undermining the generality of its own results. (Here too Landau would agree)

Easton warns that the list of characteristics thus presented is a purely formal statement of the meaning of behavioralism to which each political scientist gives his own combination of priorities to become, everyone, his own behavioralist. It can be seen as a bottle into which any old wine may be poured except that all agree that we are to look for a science of politics modelled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences. That by itself, however, is nothing new; American political science has had that bent all along. More important, to Easton at least, is that behavioralism substantively helps to link political science and other social disciplines together to the future of political research. (Easton, 1965a:6-10).

In sum, it is a self-conscious attempt to develop empirical theory at all levels of generality, theory that is testable in principle, and it seeks units of analysis (stable units) which may play the role in social science that matter-particles did for physics. The theoretical aim of a unified science of behavior is distinctive. (Easton, 1965a:10-17).

Notice that the eight characteristics mentioned would be acceptable to most behavioralists as, indeed, traits of behavioralism. How is it, Easton asks, that current interpretations of the behavioral movement nevertheless fail to appreciate this theoretical tendency towards unified science? His answer is that they attempted to limit it to the improvement of technical skills and are only now groping towards the realization of general theory. It is this groping that is characteristically central to behavioralism, even though many behavioralists do not sufficiently realize that themselves, as yet. (Easton, 1965a:17-22)

In short the eight points as listed cannot be simply quoted to represent Easton's assessment of behavioralism as some have suggested (See Haas and Becker in: Haas and Kariel, 481-482; also Eksteen: 11/12; Kim, in: McCoy and Playford: 39-41 picks

just two of Easton's eight features to define behavioralism as his strawman to be attacked. Spragens:17, observes correctly that the eight points insufficiently describe Easton's understanding but fails to say what is "that crucial contribution of a substantive kind that Easton says behavioralism is making; Almond and Powell, 1966:7, appear unimpressed by Easton's view of behavioralism, to judge by their description of it.) In short, it must be clear that for Easton behavioralism is first and foremost the movement towards unified science.

Easton's summary presentation of the features of post-behavioralism, which he calls a credo of relevance, is as follows:

1. Substance must precede technique. Better is it to be vague than non-relevantly precise. If one must be sacrificed for the other, and this need not always be so, sacrifice technical precision. (I think that always was Easton's own position too)
2. Behavioral science purveys an ideology of social conservatism tempered by modest incremental change through confinement to fact-description without understanding them in their broadest context. (A charge Easton laid at the door of traditional hyperfactual political science and reformative theory)
3. Behavioral research must loose touch with reality since abstraction and analysis serve to conceal the brute realities of politics. Let us reach out to these real needs. Here Easton displays a touch of mea culpa tempered by the fact that he did all along call for value theory and relevance to social problems, never suggesting causal theory alone would do what political science must)
4. Research about, and constructive development of values are inextinguishably part of the study of politics. Science cannot be neutral. Know your value-premises and the alternative uses to which knowledge can be put. (Easton had always argued that position)
5. Intellectuals are responsible for the protection of humane values.

Else they become mere technicians who tinker with society. (Easton would certainly not quarrel there. I submit, however, that regardless of their attitude to humane values, scientists should not as such and by reason of their being scientists, be considered competent to "apply" their knowledge to societal life at all.)

6. Knowledge is responsibility for acting and engaging in the reshaping of society. They are obliged to put knowledge to work, unlike past contemplative theorists in times of moral consensus. Conflict over ideals in society must permeate the research itself. (This is an espousal of pragmatism as means to deal with value conflict. Easton will go along there. I wonder who will question the pragmatic ideal in America if protagonists share this ideal?)

7. Professional organizations of intellectuals - and universities - must welcome the politicization of the profession as inescapable and desirable. (In a qualified way, at least, Easton has always held that position as well.)

Easton thus holds forth the challenge that post-behavioralism presents to the discipline. He finds it a proper challenge, by and large. Does that mean he has renounced behavioralism as Landau suggests? I don't think so. Indeed, he argues that post-behavioralism has not come to renounce behavioralism either.

Barbrook shows more insight in saying that Easton still defends behavioralism and the methodology flowing from it while the "change" from his earlier writing is "one of emphasis only" (Barbrook:182).

Landau may fulminate against what he considers a recantation of sound behavioralist science perpetrated in deference to Kuhn's description of scientific paradigms, but he fails to consider that Easton's view of paradigms had been consonant with that of Kuhn

in principle, to whom he now, in 1969, refers for support of his view of scientific development.

When, in his address, Easton argues for a reconsideration of "our image of what we want to be" under the impact of the modern world, what is this but another call for redefinition of the science to which every age is called? The dragon of redefinition will not be slain, as Easton observed even in 1953.

It is consonant with all that Easton has written to raise, rather, to continue to raise doubts about the adequacy or relevance of political science, of the eight-point behaviorist kind, that is not aware of what it itself is groping towards, in this, the contemporary world, now even more turbulent and crisis-beset than it was in 1953. Remember that even then concern about political science, which assumed that it was doing what it could be doing, had prompted Easton to chart new paths with a view to relevance to social crisis. After all, social crisis is at the heart of matters political that require authoritative settlement. He wanted organized science to produce something more useful in terms of what society demanded of it.

True, in 1953 Easton considered it possible and necessary to plead for a greater allocation of resources to the development of causal theory. In 1969 he experiences that time is not exactly on his side in the effort; as a matter of fact, it is on nobody's side. That in itself is, he says, a frightening new event in world affairs. He refuses however, to abandon the attempt to develop also such theory.

Confronting the cataclysmic possibility says Easton are 1) knowledge of the enormous wealth and technical resources available in favored regions of the world 2) the spectacular rate of increase in man's natural inventiveness and technology and, last, but not least, 3) the rich potential just on the horizon for understanding

social and political processes. That hardly reads like a recantation of formerly developed empirically oriented causal theory, does it? "The agony of the present social crisis is this contrast between our desparate condition and our visible promise, if we but had the time". (Easton, in: Kariel and Haas, 515)

It does not seem as if we do. The immediate demand is for directly relevant, applicable research; we must begin to prescribe and to act, in our professional capacity, so as to improve political life according to humane criteria. That is what the hard facts of experience, despite the good promise of our long-run venture towards developing more reliable scientific insight and understanding now require. That is the message of post-behavioralism which Easton spells out as also his own message. But he adds that this must not cause us to forget to work for long-term benefits; we must not neglect empirical causal theory altogether as of no use.

Even in 1953 Easton made allowance for reformative theory or premature policy science, as long as it be not confused with the real long term task of science. In 1969 the need for reformative theory is even more urgent in the face of urgent crises. Then it was easier than now to plead for a greater allocation of time and resources on the part of the discipline towards the development of causal theory. Remember, the organized profession of political science too is an allocative system.

Easton gently chides post-behavioralism for suggesting that all attention for a 'normal' long-term strategy of scientific research be postponed in favor of research, prescription and action concerning the immediate issues of the day. That would not be wise. (Easton, in: Kariel and Haas, 518)

On the off-chance that we may have centuries ahead of us rather than decades, some apportionment of resources for the long run as against the short "just in case we are not all dead" would be desi-

rable. The cost of devoting our efforts exclusively to short run crises is far too high. "It might easily assure that if we do in fact survive the present crisis, the failure to continue to add to our capital accumulation of basic social knowledge will see us tragically unprepared for even greater crises in the more distant future. We will then have lost every chance to prevent the self-annihilation of mankind or the collapse of those political institutions we cherish." (Easton, in Kariel and Haas, 518)

In all of this I can find nothing at odds with the convictions that Easton has been expressing from 1953 onwards. But what of the following? "In terms of any ideal distribution of our efforts, basic research ought to command a disproportionate share. Although socially useful results from such research are usually a long time in coming, they are in the end more dependable. But under the inescapable pressure of current crises the emphasis needs to be reversed... We can no longer take the ideal stance of behavioralism that because of the limitations of our understanding, application is premature and must await future basic research."

I do not find this indicative of a change of views; merely a tactical shift of emphasis by which to meet the times. The times, they are a-changing. Over against the hard facts, the profession as well as Easton, its 1969-chief, must adopt the proper tactics to ensure short term survival with a long term end well in view.

In fact, says Easton, to meet post-behavioralism's challenge means to continue largely what we have been doing to date. Pure research actually consumes only a very small fraction of the resources of the discipline. But behavioralism did legitimate a new image of basic research and an ideological expectation concerning its pay-off. All we need to do is to temper that image for the present and concentrate on more immediate satisfactions in answers

to immediate problems.

Needed, accordingly, is a systematic examination of the tasks involved in transforming our limited knowledge into a form far more consumable for purposes of political action. Our shift in tactics calls forth some serious problems:

1. Social problems outrun the capacity of political science alone or in concert with other sciences to solve them. The little basic knowledge we have is not necessarily directly applicable to practical issues.

2. We may^{be} at the stage of blood-letting in the hope of curing the patient. We may be doing more harm than good. We must develop measures of the effects of our intervention since we have not as yet successfully done so.

3. Policy-makers seldom seek the collective advice of comprehensive teams of social scientists as the social problems would require.

We must devise ways for elevating the self-conscious development of applied knowledge, inappropriately called social engineering, to the respectability that behavioralism has succeeded in acquiring for basic research. That too Easton would, I think, have welcomed in 1953. Just as long as we continue to devote attention to basic behavioral research for the long run as well. (Easton, in Kariel and Haas:520)

Finally, Easton suggests that we take the message of Weber, Marx, Mannheim, and others to heart and not continue to believe the myth that our basic behavioral research is value-free as behavioralism still does. Our operating values must be brought forward for self-conscious examination, and their impact on research must be assessed. That note too has been familiar to Easton's work all along. Easton called for value theoretical development that has not been forthcoming. That, he says is why the crises of the sixties have not

been anticipated or researched. (Easton, in Kariel and Haas:322)

To stress the point Easton observes: "Many years ago, in The Political System, I argued for the urgent need to reconsider our approach to value theory at the same time as we began the equally critical task of constructing empirical theory. The latter task is now under way in our discipline. The first one, creative construction of political alternatives, has yet to begin." We must construct alternative conceptions of future possible kinds of political relationships. We must formulate broad speculative alternatives to the here and now to understand better the deficiencies of our own political systems and to explore adequate avenues of change. We may no longer reject a science of man. All theories that do, cannot serve the end of reconstructive value theory.

(Easton, in Kariel and Haas:523)

"We require boldly speculative theorizing that is prepared to build upon rather than to reject the findings of contemporary behavioral science itself and that is prepared to contemplate the implications of these findings for political life, in the light of alternative, articulate value frameworks. Failing such we imprison ourselves within the limitations of the ongoing value framework. As that framework begins to lose its relevance for the problems of society, its system maintenance commitments must blind us to the urgent questions emerging even for the immediate future," as has happened to political science. It failed to meet the needs of a post industrial, cybernetic society. (Easton, in Kariel and Haas:523)

"A new set of ethical perspectives woven around this theme might sensitize us to a whole range of new kinds of basic political problems worth investigating". In this way we could perhaps be freed from that occupational myopia brought about by excessive attention to the facts as they are and stay away from empirical

conservatism or commitment to system maintenance perspectives of which political science has been justly accused, among others, by Easton himself as he points out. (Easton, in Kariel and Haas:524)

Basic research needs to be continued although its priorities too should be rearranged in the light of a better understanding of its own value-assumptions... and on the solid foundation of knowledge constructed by behavioral research, alternative possible rearrangements of our political relationships need to be seriously contemplated. All of this represents, I think, the old familiar tune, which, evidently, behavioralists generally have not taken to heart.

Not only the discipline, but the profession too needs reordering. It is not enough for the profession to be on tap, it must be on top as well. In view of his knowledge of the broadest spectrum of interests in society, and in view of the obligation that involves, the political scientist should welcome the politicization of the profession.

This touches on a problem that has sorely affected the discipline and organization of political science throughout its development, at least in America. Easton is aware of the dangers. To counter them he distinguishes three kinds of activities on the part of political scientists: teaching, research, and practical politics. In between he also consults and advises. Easton suggests that we should organize for these purposes: we need 1) organizations for basic research, 2) organizations for applied research (to study and propose solutions and press them politically with vigor) and individual scientists themselves are free to engage in politics where they can. All should be done in terms of commitment to the broadest of humane values requiring freedom from nationalist goals and the denationalization of political scientists (international passport). (Easton, in Kariel and Haas;525-528).

Easton's address, The New Revolution, is not at odds with his

former work, but a restatement (with increased fervor) of the presuppositions expressed all along as set forth in our previous chapters; that fervor is not unrelated to the fact that the very needs of the times and new responses to it (e.g. that of post-behavioralism) would seem to highlight the fact that they are painfully pregnant with new possibility, they are struggling to become aware of the requirements that Easton had detected all along. It is all but recantation, this address. It is rather a statement of self-justification, a self-justification inspired by the very conditions now experienced but anticipated all along by Easton. For him it all adds up to a strengthening of the faith, in the face of all that would challenge it. If we are to go down, we'll go down in defiance of the chaotic forces causing the downfall; we'll go down with our eyes open. But who says we are to go down?

The behaviorist credo as formally summarized and more specifically directed by Easton always did require a complementary credo of relevance to useful practice. Understanding is to be understanding in and for practice. Easton had already appealed for a constructive rethinking of values and their relevance in 1953. The discipline's response to the appeal has been rather scientific, concentrating on the development of causal types of theory in the abstract, and leaving aside the urgent task of developing value theory. The post-behavioral creed makes the same appeal but is in danger of down-playing the importance of causal theory. Post behavioralism is not so much a threat to the discipline as a necessary impulse to help drive the profession to face up to its responsibility as social science in response to society's demands upon it.

The two credo's are not opposed and contradictory, but each others' complements. They represent the two logically distin-

guishable aspects, the two phases, of the one discipline and profession of political science as called for by society. They represent the two-pronged nature of the science's response to the continuing need for reliable knowledge of political life. As such, they cannot but represent the one pragmatistic creed which believes in this relation between facts and values, causal theory and value theory, in an operationalist perspective of science as the pre-eminent means to be employed in and for social reconstruction.

In Easton's perspective the two sub-creeds are nevertheless distinguishable, and that is why scientists can be mistaken about their relationship.

It is possible for members of the profession to think that all must be devoted to the development of causal theory alone on the assumption that it, when developed, can be directly applied to bring about the best possible political system without regard to a careful reconstruction of values. But it is also possible to think that values need rethinking and only values. What we have, then, is members of a discipline embattled in terms of creeds such as to constitute cleavage in the one system of political science. Such cleavage may threaten the system's very existence, since, as system, the discipline and the profession require that both types of theory be undertaken in close conjunction.

1.3 Of Creed and Credo's

The relationship of creed and credo's calls for closer attention. What Easton is in effect telling the discipline is that its members are mistaking aspects of a shared creed for the creed in its entirety. In fact, both parties, despite their mistaken view of the relationship in practice between facts and values, cannot but help, seen from the perspective of the discipline as a whole, to advance the very life-possibilities of the discipline of political science. Both

serve the cause. They need to become aware of the cause in its entirety which, in fact, they serve. Cleavage in the profession must be overcome for the sake of the discipline as a whole in the midst of a society that desperately needs its whole contribution. All along Easton has tried to make the profession aware of its two-fold wholeness-in-fact despite the distinguishability of fact and value, of causal theory and value theory, of applied science and of pure science, of behavioralists and post-behavioralists, of cleavage.

Why? Because, according to his conviction of the elemental fact that we live in an organized society. Organization systematically interrelates facts and values. It has done so from time immemorial. Social organization is the situational interrelation of fact and value. Social systems in which fact and value are interrelated reflect the level of men's organizing capacity. In his organizing activity man experiences the achieved unification of fact and value as the experiential 'is' of his situation in which satisfaction and continuing need are both present (since all organization remains organization in a situation that resists and threatens the hard-won measure of organization).

The social system is an open system. Its very achievement as a value partly or imperfectly realized places continuing demands upon its members to ensure its survival as a system no matter what its changes and transformations. The specific changes and transformations do, constantly, entail consequences for man's organized behavior. Since the totality of organized behavior is transformed, so are the facts and the values organized in it. But the whole of social organization, open as it is, shows systemic regularity or it would not be organizational. It is intelligent conduct, systemic action, but beset, all around, by pressures and influences which

continue to demand intelligent behavior in response, if such action is to continue to be possible.

All this is expression of a creed, of religious conviction. It testifies to convictions of a most basic and all-encompassing kind. Basically the conditions of human experience are those of (good and bad) luck and of emergent and persistent intelligent behavior on the part of men who have interacted to organize their collective survival in the best possible way, that is, in a way that would best ensure the greatest measure of free and intelligent behavior that is (within the limits of the survival-requirements of the whole) allowable. Society thus exists to establish the limits of liberty for individuals who without such organized society would last only as long as they could, individually, and without their organized and specialized, organs of adaptation, continue to exist. Their survival possibilities, even as a species, would be slim indeed. Society is the continuing result of organization for continued organization, required in it is the political system by reason of the scarcity of valued goods.

Initially the result of good luck and random experience, its systemic requirements and regularities were such as to lead men to believe that knowledge of organized society could be had, and be of use in the amelioration of our collective life. Society was and is basically man's chief response to threats against his continued existence as a species. It appeared that it also served to transform the nature of man's intelligence from a kind reflecting the needs of individuals and their values only, to one reflecting also the needs and problems of collective existence.

It also appeared that adequate reflection of organized society in the form of reliable understanding about that society with a view

to the amelioration of the lives of individuals requires division of labor. Hence, from one body of undifferentiated common sense knowledge we find the historical development of the differentiated sciences, both natural and social, as disciplines and as organized professions.

It implies that the various sciences are the component parts of a social organization of that kind of human activity that seeks reliable understanding about aspects of experienced reality to the extent that it does reveal regularity, the knowledge of which is helpful to intelligent action.

This social organization of science in professional (organized) activity has emerged from the whole of organized society as one of its adaptive organs. It must reflect to the greatest extent possible upon our collective lives and all that it involves for the sake of both the survival of organized society and the amelioration of our lives in it. To do the latter requires that we take note of the values and interests of the members of society a) as apparent from their realization in fact, and b) from their expression as desires and preferences to be realized, if and in so far as possible in the light of the possibilities as limited by available means of social reconstruction.

The system of professional research activity aims, through differentiation (division of labor) according to distinguishable social interests, into a number of subsystems (political science and its interest as one of them) to gain reliable understanding of not only the analytically isolated subsystems of society as a whole, but also of the use of all that analytical understanding for the instrumental reorganization or retooling of the whole. For purposes of social policy in practice, science can be, as is expected of it, of use only on condition that there will be integra-

tion and interaction between members of the various disciplines with a view to problem-solution, for the sake of maximum reliability and control in practically facing the contingent, for the benefit of all.

Now the scientific interest in reliable understanding preceded and occasioned the differentiation of labor which has come to be in the differentiated system of professional organizations within the scientific enterprise. It first emerged as a social interest, an interest of and for the sake of men in organized society to which the research in terms of special interests (analytical) must continue to be related. The scientific enterprise must remain responsible to society as the organized whole of whole biological individuals.

The scientific interest was only one interest of men in society. There are others. As a matter of fact these others were historically earlier. For example, there is society's interest in the authoritative allocation of values for and on behalf of society.

The separate interests are all analytically isolated from one all-encompassing interest, that is, society's interest in its own systemic survival as activity, the whole system of activity of all. It has to organize to persist in meeting a variety of functions such that society will not be society without doing so. These are the life functions of society which it organizes and must organize to meet.

Society is analyzable in terms of functionally determined subsystems of activity and behavior which, though analytical, are nevertheless empirical (not: 'natural'). As such they are aspects of society's systemic survival and need. Their reliable understanding provides us with an understanding of the present conditions of whatever desires we may have as individual men. To them we must adapt in all our efforts at value realization. That means that after all the scientific interest appears to be an interest overriding all others in establishing their conditions and in adjusting all pre-

scription accordingly for and in the name of the whole society.


For the organized sciences to do so as professions requires that it has an open ear for the whole variety of interests that can be seen to be part of society's interest, as well as for the preferences which the biological members of society express in whatever society-relevant way. Science must be democratic and establish a) the conditions in terms of which all actions must be organized regardless of the values members seek to realize and b) provide the procedural alternatives of action-programmes and their possible consequences in terms of society as a whole while c) it must not hesitate to voice its own well-informed action programme considered to be the best means by which to move from the present to a still better future. It is to provide alternative choices for organized behavior geared to the survival and amelioration of society as a whole.

The view does have its dangers. There is always, it seems to me, the present danger that the professions, finding themselves collectively in the know about what is good for the whole, will not in fact allow men in organized society that freedom which they desire, or even that freedom which is consonant with the conditions of society's survival. If all the competencies of men in society, however organized, are to be subjected to the competence of scientific insight, and that competence is understood to represent that of the whole in optima forma, necessarily to be exercised in its behalf, then there is not much to prevent a planning for freedom that, in effect, amounts to a planning away of freedom; the more so, if the marks of scientific sophistication imply a technical terminology removed from the capacity of the ordinary man's understanding.

Easton may well counter with the remark that society has in fact desired such scientific organization for such ends in the convic-

tion that it will lead to better insight than that men can have without it, as well as to a better life when life is organized accordingly. It is to say that men in society believe in the overriding value of scientific knowledge, which, being a logic of procedure, must run its course in the practical, organized, transformation of society, and of all human experience. Barring minorities, some of whom cause the crises of the sixties, seventies and eighties, (in reaction against piece-meal engineering?) the observation appears to be correct. All other points of view would appear to be voiced ineffectively. The lie is marching on.

This position entails the elevation of professional scientists to the status of priesthood, competent to direct and control the laity on the basis of what they, but not the faithful, know, at least in principle. In fact the sciences have not yet achieved sufficient organizational and conceptual unity, nor predictive reliability in the terms of a deductive understanding of the systemic whole of society to be able to effectively fulfill their high calling. But it would seem to be the region in space, the value-realization, that Easton considers to be the present promise for future bliss.



CHAPTER SIX

1. Systems thinking and the Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council in the Republic of South Africa.

1.1 Introduction

It may seem somewhat of a forced attempt to achieve a measure of practical actuality when I conclude this dissertation with a chapter which pinpoints an instance of this kind of thought in the republic. Here I have been dealing all along with American political science as it comes to a particular form in the thought of Easton, himself an American; do I now wish to suggest that American pragmatist, behavioralist, instrumentalist thinking is beginning to rule the day in South Africa?

Before I respond to the question in the affirmative, we do well to consider that what I have been analyzing is a philosophically grounded mode of thought, itself backed up by more than philosophical, by directly religious inspiration. Neither religious motivation, nor philosophical modes of thought, nor their expression in special scientific contexts, such as political science, have it in them to wish to be limited to expression within national boundaries. Their (cl)aims are, rather, universal. That pragmatist behavioralism first began to count adherents in large numbers in America does not limit its persuasive appeal to America. Nevertheless, America's position as leader of the west, intent upon exporting its way of life, a position greatly enhanced since the second world war, does facilitate its import into other areas of the globe by those who are there inclined to a similarly based view of life.

I think South Africa to be particularly prone to acceptance of what has, to date, been considered more typically American thinking. There is plenty of circumstantial similarity between the position of especially white South Africa and that of America in terms of size, natural resources, (anti)colonial history, frontier

spirit, development of technology, relative isolation, late entry into the complex stream of theoretical reflection proper to the venerable tradition of European academia etc., to suggest that what works for America will also work for South Africa. American thought and achievement would seem to constitute the model to be emulated in various sectors of South African society. That is so, not because we in the RSA wish to feel and think American, but rather because what has worked for Americans should also go far in working for us as Africans.

It is not circumstantial similarity however which necessarily leads to the adoption of modes of thought that have been so common to Americans. These can only serve to justify, to rationalize a basic choice for the same kind of religious direction which is never circumstantially determined, or explainable.

The point is that pragmatism as developed in America cannot be understood solely in terms of America. American history, including its young academic history, is a particular expression of a religious spirit that has made itself strong in Europe to begin with. Hence it can be argued on good grounds that America has embodied to a large extent the spirit of John Locke's thought. Other European influences have continued to help make American thought what it now is. There is no mistaking the tremendous influence of Spencer and Darwin, of Bentham and Mill, of Marx and Hegel upon what has been developed as pragmatism. South Africa, developing academically at an even later stage than America has only more recently begun to receive the messages deriving from these sources; they have found it convenient not to have to develop their own perspective on all of them in terms of their own traditional conviction; rather, they are willing to operate with the American digested picture of all these influences to a greater extent than is western Europe, the source of all these varied influences. There is, I think, nothing far-fetched in suggesting that the adop-

tion of pragmatist/behavioralist thought in South Africa, although not American, is still pragmatist behavioralist thought. That such thought counts adherents of repute in South Africa can be illustrated in terms of the Constitutional Committee's First Report. It is my limited aim to show that this is indeed so. To the extent that it is so, I submit that it serves to make a case for suppositions that should be critically examined, particularly by those who wish to elaborate Christian conviction, both in terms of political policy and in terms of political theory.

I wish to stress again that the Committee's recommendations could, by and large, well be defended on different grounds. It is not my aim to reflect on their merit or demerit.

I believe the systemic approach comes to expression in the Committee's doings in two ways, basically. First it comes to expression in the Committee's understanding of its own task and modus operandi and secondly it appears in its basic views of society and of government and politics within (and/or 'over') it. Concerning the first we will be brief; the second, representing a framework (see the first paragraph of the dedication introducing the Committee's report) within which the population of South Africa must be willing to trace out its political stance, is intended for general consumption and acceptance in order to defuse the conflict potential in South Africa. We will concentrate our attention on it.

1.1.2 Systems thinking and the Committee's understanding of its own position and task.

One is first alerted to the dominant influence of systems-thinking upon the Committee's self-conception and view of its task by paragraph 1.13 of the Report's first chapter. It states that the process of political reform must be dealt with in the following seven stages: collection of evidence, formulation and discussion (bargaining), followed by the processes of legitima-

tion, implementation, control and evaluation.

There is no mistaking the systemic implications of this view of the process in which the Committee finds itself. Collection of the evidence is the input, bargaining is a matter of gate-keeping, legitimation and implementation constitutes the output, while control and evaluation represents the feedback. At the centre of every use of such system terms is the question: of what system are we speaking? The political system? Or the system of political reform whose central authorities (those who guide the process) are considered to be the Committee? We are not told at this stage.

If Jaap Boekkooi (The Star, June 2, 1982, p. 23) correctly quotes Dr. Worrall, the Committee's chairman, as seeing the President's Council to be a 'decompression chamber' we should not be surprised that the system is not clearly identified. After all, the pressure has been building up so as to threaten the stability of the political system; if then the President's Council is to be seen as the 'decompression chamber' its function is obviously central to the political system in the eyes of its chairman at least. It is also telling that Boekkooi, in the same article, calls Worrall's position that of 'the country's supreme systems manager'.

The systemic distinctions of paragraph 1.13 have been introduced not so much because they are theoretically justified, but as a matter of convenience which indeed proved to be useful as the same paragraph goes on to say. If nothing else, such observations are rather pragmatic, linking distinctions to use rather than to norms for proper distinction. That to follow these 'distinctions' (phases of any process of activity) may keep you from the recognition of the distinguishability of structural and functional varieties which determine different kinds of processes materially and normatively has, I think, escaped the Committee's attention.

To say so is easy; to argue the point convincingly is not so easy.

I will endeavor to show that the point has substance by showing that the Committee's view of society, government, state, politics, and ethnical groups lacks conceptual clarity because it fails to recognize societal diversity, both structural and functional, sufficiently. The major reason for that lack of clarity, is to be found, I think, in the Committee's basic behaviorist/pragmatist/systems theoretical orientation which prejudices the Committee's views. But first, let us establish that such thinking does indeed materially determine and play its part in the Committee's views of societal life.

1.1.3 Systems theoretical /pragmatic presuppositions and the Committee's views of South African societal life

1.1.3.1 Introduction.

Both what the Committee does say and what the Committee fails to say lead me to the conclusion that the Committee's perspective is in line with presuppositions that we have seen to be basic to Easton's thinking. I will divide my material accordingly; I will deal, first with expressed ideas that show kinship with Easton's thought, and then continue by pointing to some moments which are implied rather than expressed and also reveal such kinship further.

1.1.3.2 Expressed ideas showing kinship with Easton's thinking

Of these I will deal briefly with the following without pretending to be complete: emphasis upon experience as the matrix and mother of guidelines to be followed for future behavior in a non-rigid fashion that will recognize emergent values and desires to the greatest extent possible without destabilizing the system to beyond control; emphasis upon scientific expertise and consensus as the know par excellence of past experience and future possibilities in terms of present circumstances; a choice for piece-meal engineering by those 'in the know'; agreement as to the basic nature of the elements involved in the social system, i.e. providing that system

with three dimensions, the normative, the structural, and the behavioral; the emphasis upon the changability of all three in their systemic coherence; the idea of government as (effective) conflict regulation. These are enough to indicate the close kinship between the Committee's assumptions and those of Easton.

As to implied similarities, the Committee's view of ethnical groups as segments of a society, as well as their use of the term segmental autonomy implies absence of the idea of the state as a public legal community for the maintenance of a public legal order in which also ethnic diversity and a host of other group and individual interests are protected and harmonized in case of disputed rights by the authorities, the government, within the community of the state of which government and subjects are the constituents and constituent parts. We have seen that Easton too rejects the idea of the state thus conceived. It is the rejection of this idea, worse, of this reality which allows the committee the political views which it expresses. This we will discuss after we have taken note of the explicit similarities mentioned.

1.1.3.2.1. The similarity in emphasis upon experience.

It is not difficult to point to passages in the Committee's report referring to experience as the mother and matrix of guidelines. I refer you to paragraph 3.20 and 3.20 d, where reference is made to "the experience of ethnically plural societies", 3.20 j "experience shows", 3,20 k "all experience of plural societies shows", and to paragraph 4.9 "the experience of other similar political systems". Expressions like these, throughout the report, make it unmistakably clear that "experience" is taken in some sense as the final court of appeal and the starting point of arguments. The way the Committee employs such expressions would cause one to think that the Committee takes the position that the facts speak for themselves.

Here Easton would add a word of caution. When Easton says that facts do not speak for themselves he would appear to disagree with the Committee's facile reference to experience as guarantor of the dependability of certain tenets.

The quotation of Lord Bryce: "Every creation of a new scheme of government is a precious addition to the political resources of mankind. It represents a survey and scrutiny of the constitutional experience of the past. It embodies an experiment full of instruction for the future", a quotation which precedes the Committee's report, is illustrative of its spirit. It shows the conviction that experience equals experiment. Life is experimental. Certainly that is the tenor of Easton's thought as well as of the Report. Easton would, of course add that for that very reason it must be remembered that facts do not speak for themselves but only within the context of theory which transforms experience into experimentation, providing a measure of control.

I do not believe that the Committee's stance differs significantly and that can be shown by pointing out that the Report throughout suggests that it is the scientifically established (by consensus among scientists?) facts of experience that are intended when mention is made of experience. When experience speaks, it is really facts and theory as scientific consensus holds them up to us that speak, and they speak with the greatest measure of authority attainable. It speaks with absolute authority for the time being. Cool and objectively, it overrides all other forms of authority. But it must remain open, be non-rigid, to accommodate whatever changes are apparent in experience and to establish the limits within which such newness may be allowed expression without destroying the system in which it comes to expression. That takes us into a discussion of the second similarity mentioned.

2.2 Emphasis upon scientific expertise and consensus for the conduct and control of social behavior.

That this emphasis is markedly strong in the Committee's report is indubitable, and gives substance to what is to be understood by experience. The guarantee for trustworthiness and dependability of judgements concerning social affairs would appear to^{be} provided by reference to the latest theories and scientists that have achieved support within the sciences.

The paragraphs mentioned above which refer to experience continue in the same breath by explicitly calling on scientific expertise to back up what the Committee wishes to put across. It is experience of and literature about plural societies, learned authorities and experience. Even if that had not been the case the report makes such copious reference to scientific experts that this flavor of the report could hardly be mislooked.

Experience, however, is not best known in its scientific form. To think so is necessarily to miss out on much, if not most, of experience. To follow the latest scientific consensus may hamstring one's vision. When the Committee, in what I consider to be one of its most irresponsible and ill-founded statements, observes that it cannot advocate a course of action in conflict with the one which all the authorities indicate (paragraph 3.25), I wonder whether the Committee leaves room for any measure of real piety towards the God to whom we are to look up in faith. Real piety consists of obedient recognition of God-in-authority Who gave us His order for life that we might follow it. The view of history as reactions of societies to serious challenges besetting them, though I suppose it does go far to tell the essence of pragmatism's view of history, hardly testifies to history as the realm of Christ's Kingship. History, thus viewed, becomes the realm of man's prowess in the face of forces that threaten his survival. (That too, was a note proper to Easton's thought as we saw.)

3.2.3 Similarity of emphasis upon piece-meal engineering

We have seen Easton to be an advocate of piece-meal engineering within an open society/system. Easton does observe that the term is a misnomer. He has enough sensitivity to realize that social systems are not simply machines or closed systems that can be engineered to perform functions precisely as the engineers would have it. Yet the term is and remains close enough for his purposes. That a Popperian emphasis has entered into his view of scientific methodology has also been noted in passing.

The Committee too has explicitly aligned itself on the side of piece-meal engineering and refers to Popper as one of its authorities. See in this regard: paragraph 3.23 of the Report. The topic is too wide for in-depth treatment here. Let me just say that contrary to scientific opinion popular for some centuries in the Anglo-Saxon (and American) world, to assume that the only alternative to utopian and/or fatalistic determinist thinking is that of piece-meal engineering, is to assume too much.

3.2.4. Similarity in assumptions concerning the basic elements involved in the social system

Like Easton the Committee expressly adheres to the distinction between fact and value and on the basis of that distinction concludes to the presence of three dimensions of every political system, the normative dimension of values, aspirations and expectations, the structural which like Easton's use of the term refers to the institutions of the system, and the behavioral dimension. Concerning the behavioral dimension the Committee does not express itself very clearly, but it may be fairly assumed that it refers to the activity of individuals in the system as both governed by and also altering the system's norms and institutions. The paragraphs 3.16 and 3.17 are revealing in this regard.

The Committee is more explicit than is Easton on the basic values

to be adhered to: the advancement of individual and group rights, equality of opportunity and justice, the protection of identity and self-respect, the advancement of social and material welfare, the securing of internal and external peace, or security (see paragraph 3.18). Nevertheless it is not too farfetched to suppose that these values are in line with what Easton would call the broad humane values of western civilization. I suggest, however, that Easton propagates the development of value theory to establish much more specifically what is now to be done for their proper realization in the light of present empirically determinable (im)possibilities.

1.1.3.2.5 Similarity in emphasis upon change of all the elements in the systemic whole

We have seen it to be Easton's view that social systems to be intelligently and actively responsive must have the capacity to transform themselves if they are not to succumb to the pressures that would otherwise lead to its disappearance. That is precisely what was not sufficiently realized by all who thought in terms of equilibrium systems theory of the functionalist kind. They thought of stability as opposed to change. Not so Easton, and not so the Committee. The system being open to its environment, perfect isolation against it is not to be expected; hence a readiness towards self-transformation is required. It is this conviction about the compatibility of change with stability which leads to the notion of the possibility of social engineering which can ensure stability while actively changing and accommodating change on the basis of known regularities. Changing inputs into the system require changing response (outputs) on the part of the system hence blue-print thinking (utopian) must be replaced with piece-meal engineering. For the Committee's emphasis on change see 3.20 c, esp. its use of observations made by Crawford Young.

1.1.3.2.6 Similarity in emphasis upon government as social conflict regulation. Social conflict represents cleavage in society concerning the distribution of values sought after, splitting the members of society up into conflicting camps such that disintegration of the social system threatens if the conflict is not regulated by effective government in the interest of the entire membership system. It requires of the authorities in any system that they regulate conflict authoritatively on the basis of such a level of support for their policy decisions that the majority will comply with them. It implies reduction of legitimacy to acceptance by the members of their decisions in fact, for whatever reason. That reduces justice to the accommodation of conflicting social forces (groupings). It represents a balancing process, a decompression process, to take the heat off the system. To that end the system may respond to stress in a variety of ways.

The Committee's views are basically in line with this view of things. On the assumption that the policy-making system, the system of authoritative allocation of values is threatened by present cleavage among the various ethnical groupings in and presently focusing on one and the same political system, the Committee sets about to discover the proper response so as to ensure continued participation of all in political systems (systems of policy-making) in such a way as to avoid the disintegration of any system.

The Committee looks to the responses to cleavage (plural society) along the lines of Lijphart and Huntington. These possible responses are threefold: assimilation/integration of the groups (ethnical) involved; consociation of groups; and, finally partition such that different systems are created for the different groups.

Although ^{Easton} has not spelled out such responses in these terms, it is remarkable that he too says a change in membership, community

may be required for the orderly continuation of authoritative value allocation without which neither group can continue as ordered society at any rate. That is to say, partition may be required. Integration, for Easton, would be possible if there can be value-consensus to an extent sufficient for the continuation of the system (that may require value-reconstruction). Consociation, another term that Easton does not use, is nevertheless implied by his idea of "relevant members" of the political system.

Again the basic similarities of thought between Easton and the Committee report are unmistakable. There are implied similarities as well.

1.1.3.3 Similarity in disrespect for the state as a public legal community on the basis of a monopoly of sword-power in the hands of the state-community's authorities. For Easton the state represents the reality of coagulated relatively stable organization, (institution), or institutionalized activity relative to the authoritative allocation of values for a society that we have known since the Peace of Westphalia. It is a largely governmental institution; the term may be equated in meaning with 'national government'. The nation is then the all-inclusive whole or entirety of society, the state is its more or less institutionalized government. It represents the authoritative decision-makers for a society. From this perspective the modern state represents an important institutional part of the political system which may be viewed as that system of activity which represents the decider-function of the entire social system.

There is little in the Committee's report that testifies to a different view. Implied in it are serious difficulties and shortcomings. These amount to a serious lack of clarity concerning the variety of societal arrangements that rest not simply upon human social decision (the decision of the whole society, but upon invariant norms

for the ordering of human life. The spirit of social life may be such as to downplay their structural givenness and view them as mere products of society's own making, as the elements of its own self-established existence, subject, one and all to the political decision-makers, but such a spirit is vain and cannot undo, merely distort, recognition of created variety of societal life.

When society is considered to be the social system all the elements of that system are reduced to being parts of that system which must naturally display the typical characteristics of the encompassing system. When, moreover, the state-idea is reduced to the political function of society's authoritative decision-making web of activity, the state is reduced to become a function of a society. Given its leading function in the social system, as authoritative over all, all the elements of society necessarily become politicized. This very politicization of everything in societal life is everywhere, both behind and beyond the iron and bamboo-curtains, experienced as an overriding evil of our times. Yet our very conception of society as a whole and the political determination of its order calls forth such evil. It beclouds our awareness of the structural variety of societal life where various authoritative offices within varying spheres of competence and responsibility are present. The free and responsible exercise of these offices, however, as callings determined by the Creator, is everywhere hindered by the effects of the omnipresent myth of men's responsibility to a 'thing' we call society, a thing of our imagination only. It is the embodiment, theoretically, of the principle of totalitarianism. When adhered to as guide for practice it leads to totalitarian politics. It leads to exaggerated expectations from those who are called to govern and to wield the power of the sword for maintaining justice publicly by respecting the various spheres of responsibility for what

they are.

The encompassing wholes of society, in terms of which the social sciences attempt to analyze and (as quasi-applied science) regulate societal life, do not exist. Societal life is not the life of wholes called societies. It is rather life lived in the interplay and intertwinement of state, family, church, business-enterprise, school, university and what have you; their interrelation is not hierarchical so that the state lords it over all the others. Each has its own offices and responsibilities to be respected by all the others, and each ought to exercise its calling for the benefit of all the others, in service of God and fellow man.

The elaboration of this view with a view to its relevance for political science and in critical confrontation with current theory as discussed in this dissertation is not as urgent as its elaboration by responsible men in their daily doings, regardless of their level of cultural differentiation and development.

Men are not what Easton calls them, elements, members within societies and nothing more. In their very hearts they transcend their membership functions in societal forms of life in religious service of God or idols of their making. They are not hook, line, and sinker part of societies as regulated by political/governmental decision, alone responsible for deciding for the whole society.

That societal life is ordered so as to call for authoritative relationships is not in question but that it is political authorities who are to regulate in and over all certainly is.

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S U M M A R Y

TITLE: THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PROF. DAVID EASTON'S
POLITICAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

CANDIDATE: PIEBE (PHILIP) BROUWER

DEGREE: DOCTOR PHILOSOPHIAE

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David Easton's systems analytical approach to political life as developed since the publication of his first main volume, The Political System, in 1953, has drawn much attention from colleagues in the field of political science as a possible means, which, if put to use, could pull the discipline of political science out of its doldrums, those of, mainly, fragmentation and general unreliability as means of control over the social process.

Easton's work wants to be in the mainstream of American political science tradition. An understanding of that tradition goes far towards an understanding of Easton. Easton's assessment of that tradition is examined in Chapter One. According to him the discipline of political science has been groping towards the kind of scientific approach that he himself advances. Political science is showing the first signs of becoming mature.

Easton devotes himself to one aspect of the two-pronged task that faces the discipline as he sees it: the development of value and causal theory. He devotes himself to the latter but admits and stresses that it is founded on value theoretical suppositions that also need elaboration urgently. These two types of theory need to be developed as they have not been due to the prevalence of reformatory theory in the discipline, a prevalence that is to be explained in terms of

a neglect of the requirements of scientific method which calls for general causal theory as well as value theory. These three kinds of theory are explained in Chapter Two.

Easton develops the notion of system, which had been proper to the discipline of political science for some time into a full-fledged analytical framework of thought, his well-known flow-model, as discussed in Chapter Four. This model has often been seized upon by students of political science as if it is presuppositionless methodology, applicable to any concrete political system. That is not true to Easton's aims which are to link political science to the other social disciplines in order to move towards the realization of the unified science ideal by way of general systems theory. His theory intends to focus on no political systems in particular but upon the life-functions of any political system at all. For application to any particular system the model would have to be adapted, modified.

Easton is keen not to be categorized as a status quo thinker along with so many equilibrium oriented systems thinkers as may be clear from the contents of Chapter Three.

That this has not always been sufficiently recognized, and that value oriented reconstruction, purposive intelligence, is Easton's concern becomes plain from his position vis à vis the behavioralist/post-behavioralist controversy as discussed in Chapter Five.

That Easton's argument and the presuppositions on which it is founded leave themselves open to critical questioning may be clear from the explanatory and commentary notes at the end of the chapters. That Christian conviction requires a stance critical of this kind of thinking is my contention throughout.

It follows that I am not gladdened by the appearance of similar ideas from which to expect the solution to the difficulties besetting the South African political scene. That such thinking does attract support also here is evident from the President Council's Constitutional Committee's first report as I argue in Chapter Six. The recommendations made by the Committee could well have been linked to a different

argumentation, hence their merit is not directly at issue here. Should these recommendations be followed on the basis of this argumentation it would mean a marked deviation from Christian political conviction to that extent.

I say so as a matter of conviction and creed.