Marabi and Poststructuralism(s): An Inquiry into the Possibility of Forging a *Rapprochement* Between Aspects of Poststructuralist Thinking and *Marabi* in its Context (1920's-1930's)

NATHNE ALICE DENIS

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy: Philosophy (Research)
PhD

in the

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY&CLASSICS
FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES
UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE
BLOEMFONTEIN

JAN 2022

PROMOTER: PROF. BERT OLIVIER

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated in loving memory of my father, Edgar Frederick Martin Denis.

DECLARATION

I, Nathne Alice Denis declare that the Doctoral thesis that I herewith submit at the University of the Free State is the product of my independent work carried out under the guidance of my promoter. This thesis has not been submitted or presented, either in whole or in part, for the award of any degree in any university of learning. I further declare that all anti-plagiarism rules have been complied with and all sources consulted or referred to have been duly acknowledged as appropriate.

Ms N Denis Digitally signed by Ms N Denis Date: 2021.11.30 07:24:28 +02'00' **Date: 11-30-2021**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere thanks to the following:

1. I am deeply indebted to Prof. Bert Olivier, my promoter. Without his endless encouragement, patience and exemplary supervision this thesis would not have been possible.
2. My mother, who has been a pillar of strength throughout my academic career and whose faith in my abilities has never waned.
3. My father's enthusiasm and support. Sadly he passed away before this thesis could come to fruition.
4. I am grateful to Wynand Jonker for his expert help in all computer-related matters.
5. I appreciate Ruvey Zaal and Alice Stander's assistance with the administration of this Phd.
6. I am, moreover, grateful for the financial support of the Post Graduate School of the UFS for my tuition and registration fees and for the generous bursary awarded to me by the Philosophy&Classics Department.
7. Finally, I want to thank and acknowledge the triune God – Father, Son and Holy Spirit – whose mind also needs to be found in us.

SUMMARY

This study forges a *rapprochement* between aspects of poststructuralist theory and *marabi* in its socio-political, historical, ideological and labour contexts of the 1920s to 1930s. After considering the socio-historical context of *marabi* and possible resonances with poststructuralism, the focus falls on the various ethnic and multitudinous manifestations of *marabi* as music, dance, social occasion and as the symbolic prefiguration of a nascent black urban identity. Whilst bearing in mind the 'indefinability' of both *marabi* and poststructuralism in traditional binary, hierarchical terms, the study moves onto a consideration of *marabi*, its context, and various major poststructuralist theorists. Firstly, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's philosophy is employed to demonstrate how *marabi* can be regarded as a "minor music." Thereafter, it is shown how Deleuze and Guattari's notions of the assemblage and rhizome are able to accommodate as well as exemplify *marabi'*s multitudinous constitution. Secondly, the focus falls on how Jacques Derrida's thought can be employed productively to demonstrate how *marabi* deconstructs the traditional (Saussurian) notion of the sign, text, intertext and context (generic, genetic and citational). Thirdly, the deeply entrenched binary horizon of Western thought and rhetoric is explored, specifically that of the male/female binary couplet, as disclosed by Hélène Cixous. A consideration then follows of how *famo* (Sotho) *marabi* resonates with Cixous's notion of *féminine écriture*, notably its ability to undermine phallocentric structures. Finally, *marabi's* ideological and labour context (as a rhizomatic part of *marabi*) is considered as refracted through the critical prism of Michel Foucault's theorisation of disciplinary and biopolitical power. Having established that pre-Apartheid racist ideology is deeply social-Darwinist, the focus falls on *marabi'*s disciplinary, panoptical and biopolitical contexts, as evidenced in the mining industry. This chapter concludes by showing how *marabi* made life bearable in the face of the draconian measures used by the state apparatus to 'deal' with the 'black peril.' In the final analysis, the study demonstrates that, not only is there a correlation between aspects of poststructuralist thought and *marabi* in its context, but also that poststructuralism provides us with expanded ways of reasoning that potentially enrich the way we think about *marabi* and other aspects of society. Inversely, *marabi* has shown itself capable of enriching poststructuralist thinking as well.

***MARABI*, POSTSTRUCTURALISM, DELEUZE, GUATTARI, CIXOUS, FOUCAULT, REASON**

INTRODUCTION: *MARABI* AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM(S): BEGINNINGS

The dancers swayed from side to side like mealie stalks; the right and left feet moving forward and back like springbok crossing a river. They sang as loudly as they could, singing for joy to the spirits of their forefathers. George ran his short fingers over the black and white keyboard as if they were moved by an electric charge. He sang with his face pitched to the ceiling.

– Modikwe Dikobe (1973:6-7) in *The Marabi Dance*

The main impetus behind this research could be described as a heady dose of "insatiable curiosity" (or as Rudyard Kipling puts it "'satiable curtiosity"), like that of the Elephant's Child in Kipling's *Just So Stories* (1987), about *marabi*, and a desire to find ways of understanding it better.

I was first introduced to *marabi* whilst preparing to present a first-year undergraduate course on South African Township Jazz. Before then, my knowledge of *marabi* was scant, to say the least (I subsequently found that I had conflated *marabi* with *kwela*). Moreover, my knowledge of the socio-political crucible out of which it was wrought, was also sketchy. However, as my preparatory research progressed, I became increasingly fascinated by this 'orphan child' of the slumyards of Johannesburg in its social context. In particular, I was astonished by its life-affirming resilience, in the face of almost inconceivable human suffering. I was also intrigued by the way it resisted being pinned down to an 'x','y' and 'z,' rather yielding up a veritable swarming polysemy of meanings. In this regard, with help from David Coplan (1985) I found out that the reason for its indefinability was that *marabi* is characterised by its multiplicity. Not only does it designate music, but also a dance, a social occasion, a type of person, the name of an epoch and "both a setting and a symbolic expression of the birth of an urban community among the African proletariat" (Coplan, 1985:107). Its heterogeneous constitution is also borne out by the fact that it came about in the early 1920's, when "musicians assimilated elements from every available performance tradition into a single urban African musical style" (Coplan, 1985:94). It seemed almost inconceivable that such an inclusive music – one could almost say 'proto-South African music' (*inter alia)* – could come about during a time when intense racial segregation and oppression were the order of the day.

In the meantime my first-year course had commenced. Students listened with rapt attention to the socio-political contextualisation of *marabi*, and with obvious interest as I unpacked the various ethnic forms of *marabi*, with help from Christopher Ballantine's *Marabi Nights* recordings (1993). A turning point was when I played Tebetjane's[1] *uTebetjana ufana n'emfene* ("Tebetjane resembles a baboon"). To my utmost surprise, every time the refrain *uTebetjana ufana n'emfene* recurred, the students began to sing along lustily. The lecture concluded in a highly uncharacteristic manner, when the usually staid first-year students of all races and creeds danced together out of the lecture room singing *uTebetjana ufana n'emfene*. Thus did the hallowed halls of Academia ring with "Tebetjane resembles a baboon." Such was the seductive alchemy of *marabi* that every time I approach the DVD player to play a track, *any* track, the students would take this as their cue to sing *uTebetjana ufana n'emfene* in one accord. This reaction was also surprising, in the light of the fact that these lectures took place in 1994 and shortly afterwards and when the 'seating plan' of this class was 'segregated' according to skin colour and ethnicity. Upon closer questioning, the students found it hard to verbalise *marabi's* obvious appeal. When hard pressed, the Xhosa students said that it was 'familiar' and 'made them feel nostalgic'.[2] In the light of the aforementioned, one could say that *marabi's* almost inexplicable powers of cross-racial appeal, together with a desire to know more about *marabi's* unique constitution, in all its multiplicitous guises, were all factors that put my feet firmly on the path towards further research into *marabi*.

The next discovery that I made was a disturbing and almost inconceivable one. According to Ballantine (1993:1-2):

> In fact, outside of a small circle of specialists, virtually nothing is known – or else remembered – about the history of this remarkable music. Its sounds are silent; its erstwhile heroes are dead or dying in oblivion.

He also speaks of (1993:2-3):

---

[1] There are various versions of his name including Tebetjane, Tebetjana, Ntebetjana and Ntebetjane. I have used Coplan's version – Tebetjane.

[2] This puts a question mark behind Ballantine's averment that *marabi* "died" after workers were confined to impersonal 'locations' detrimental to the intimate *marabi* culture. There is evidence that *marabi* came back to the Eastern Cape via the same railway route that it had taken to Johannesburg. I will address this point later in this thesis.

> Any attempt to recover the music of these early years – certainly this is true of the period before 1950, but in many instances it applies to the period after it as well – is profoundly complicated by the scandalously irresponsible attitude towards its preservation displayed by institutions that ought to have known better: the record companies and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). For example, Gallo (Africa), as it is now known, though one of the major players on the South African commercial recording scene since 1930 does not possess an archival collection of the thousands of urban black popular music the company produced or sold before the 1950's. And the SABC, according to reliable sources within the organisation, simply disposed of vast quantities of this music when the corporation moved to its new premises in Auckland Part – evidently on the instructions of senior executives who believed those recordings were no longer of interest to anyone. From this vantage point, we should not be surprised by the amnesia that bedevils a popular understanding of the history of black South African jazz.

Consequently, I realised that what was at stake here was nothing less than the preservation of a valuable part of the South African musical heritage, which also became a crucial motivating factor for this research.

I was still, however, tasked with finding a way of 'defining *marabi'*, notwithstanding its multiplicitous constitution and obvious resistance to being pinned down. The apparent indefinability of *marabi* called to mind Bert Olivier's (1993:313) observation that understanding deconstruction is based on a paradox, in fact, a conscious 'misunderstanding' of deconstruction, from a position of knowledge is necessary in order to 'understand' deconstruction. In this regard, one could say that *marabi* and aspects of poststructuralism, such as the thinking of Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Hélène Cixous and Michel Foucault, were beginning to "beckon to each other from afar"[3] (in Derrida's words, 1981:73).

It soon became apparent that the problem did not lie with *marabi*, or an error on my part, but rather the very way we think. Olivier presented me with a way out of this seeming impasse in his article "Beyond Hierarchy? The Prospects of a Different Form of Reason" (1996) In this article Olivier cites Derrida and Foucault as being harbingers of a different way of thinking that challenges conventional Western, binary, hierarchical thinking with its logic of essences and unities. Note that this does not imply a wholesale dismissal of the Western conceptual framework – Derrida, for one, would emphatically dispute that we have the means to do so –

[3] The context of this quotation is the relationship between the *pharmakon*, in Plato's *Phaedrus*, and writing, that Derrida uncovers in his book *Dissemination* (1981).

but rather an expansion and modification of traditional ways of thinking, producing "different forms of reason." The question presented itself: "Could these "different forms of reason" be used in order to achieve a more finely nuanced understanding of *marabi*, and conversely, could *marabi* give us new insights into poststructuralism?" A problem was posed, as already intimated by the difficulty of defining *marabi*, or as already intimated, as Coplan (1985:107) puts it, "*Marabi* is difficult to analyse stylistically because the term refers as much to a social situation and a cultural outlook as to a complex of musical features." This resonates with Madan Sarup's (1993:3) observation that poststructuralism is "highly critical of the unity of the stable sign (the Saussurian view)." Moreover, "The new movement implies a shift from the signified to the signifier; and so there is a perpetual detour on the way to a truth that has lost any status or finality" (p.3). It goes without saying that this would also apply to the unadulterated, unmediated 'truth' about poststructuralism (although, as I shall indicate later in this thesis, this rather sweeping statement by Sarup, above, does not mean that the quest for 'truth' simply becomes nonsensical; it is 'problematised' in singular poststructuralist fashion). Another problem was posed by the fact that, although the poststructuralists under discussion shared certain similarities, there are also notable differences between these thinkers. A single example is the famous schism between Derrida and Foucault regarding their conflicting views *vis-à-vis* reclaiming the voices of the repressed 'other' (Olivier, 1996:42-43). It would, thus, be more accurate to speak of poststructuralisms in the plural. In the light of this, I found that, even from the outset, a correlation between poststructuralism and *marabi* emerged in the light of their respective indefinability and multiplicitous constitutions. Hence, based on these findings, I found that a prerequisite for understanding both poststructuralism and *marabi* would be nothing less than what I have already referred to as a "different form of reason" (Olivier, 1996), which challenges the conventional binary horizon of Western hierarchical thinking.

As my research progressed, I found that the correspondence between *marabi* and poststructuralism extended much further than the nascent difficulties in conceptualising both. In particular, I located further correlations between *marabi* and Deleuze and Guattari (specifically their conception of assemblage and rhizome), Derrida (*vis-à-vis* sign, text, intertext and content), Cixous and her notion of *féminine écriture*, and Foucault's thinking about disciplinary societies, Panopticism and biopolitics. Accordingly, along these lines, I set about forging a *rapprochement* between these poststructuralist thinkers and *marabi*, while simultaneously making recourse to new – or rather, expanded – means or forms of rationality

that do justice to the complexity of both. Put differently, the reason for undertaking this research, thus, stemmed from an ("insatiably curious") desire to engage *marabi* and poststructuralism in a mutually enriching, creative dialogue, by way of new, or rather expanded, modes of rationality (some of which are germane to poststructuralism), with salutary consequences for both.

Accordingly, in Chapter 1, I applied myself to a consideration of the socio-historical context which birthed *marabi*. Using four pertinent questions asked by Luli Callinicos (1987:7) as a conceptual framework – namely "What are the origins of South Africa's working people in the towns? What were the forces that led people to leave the land not so very long ago, and take the journey to the unknown life of wage labour in the towns? How did this steadily growing class of people live? What struggles and processes did they pass to become the decisive human force they are today?" – I explored the reasons for black urbanisation, starting with their pre-Colonial past. In the course of considering the consequences of repressive legislation passed to force thousands of black farmers to move to the cities in the employ of white people, I also uncovered the various apparatuses of capture, used by the capitalist State apparatus to the detriment of black people. This socio-political context served as a backdrop for a consideration of *marabi* in all its multi-ethnic guises.

In Chapter 2, I set about mediating seeming opposites, namely *marabi* and the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. Firstly, Having established that *marabi* does indeed meet the criteria for a 'minor language,' and thus by analogy a 'minor music', with reference to Kafka and Deleuze and Guattari, I proceeded, along lines suggested by Bidima, who points out that the music of certain minority groups exemplifies aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, such as assemblage and deterritorialisation (*inter alia*). I then attempted to establish whether the same can be said of *marabi*. In the course of experimentally 'translating' Deleuze and Guattari's thinking to realms uncharted by them, I considered *marabi's* high coefficiency for deterritorialisation of the refrain and its possible relation to the Deleuzoguattarian concepts of the assemblage and rhizome. This revealed how these concepts represent a different way of thinking to that of binary, hierarchical reason.

Buoyed up by my discoveries, I began to write Chapter 3, a consideration of the relevance of Derrida's 'theory' of deconstruction for *marabi* in its context. I began by engaging with the 'indefinability' of deconstruction in traditional terms. Thereafter, I went about demonstrating

deconstructing 'in action' by engaging with Derrida's unusual 'commentary' on writing as *pharmakon* – both poison and remedy – in Plato's *Phaedrus*. After extending these findings to consider *marabi* as *pharmakon*, I went about setting the stage for *marabi*'s engagement with deconstruction by considering Saussure's conception of sign, text and intertext. Thereafter, I demonstrated how *marabi* deconstructs Saussure's idea of the sign, text, intertext and context (generic, genetic and citational). I then concluded this chapter with a demonstration of *marabi* in perpetual, dynamic motion.

In Chapter 4, I focused on the relation of *famo* (Sotho) *marabi* to Cixous's notion of *écriture féminine*. Using Cixous' insights in *Sorties*, beginning with "Where is she?" I extended and expanded her insights into the binary oppositional nature of western thought and language, beginning with the couplet male/female. After considering the extent of this opposition and its detrimental impact on female creativity, I showed how deeply entrenched a rhetoric of opposition, based on the male/female duality, is at work in Haydn's aria "In Native Worth" from his great oratorio *The Creation*. After contextualising Cixous' notion of *féminine écriture* at length within the broader framework of her thinking in order to gain a greater depth of insight into her *écriture féminine*, I then gauged the extent to which *famo marabi* dismantles the deeply phallocentric horizon of Western thought and language in a way that is reminiscent of Cixous' *écriture féminine*. This chapter left me with little doubt as to the commensurability between Cixous's poststructuralist thinking and *marabi*.

In the final chapter, Chapter 5, I concentrated on understanding *marabi's* ideological and labour contexts, with reference to the thinking of Foucault. Using Foucault's notion of 'biopolitics', I set about showing how the pre- (and post-) Apartheid system dealt with what they designated as 'the black peril.' I discovered that the ideological context of pre-Apartheid thinking was deeply steeped in pseudo-Darwinian thinking with reference to international and local thinkers. After a consideration of the oppressive effect of the Pass Laws, I moved onto a consideration of the labour context of black South African mineworkers, given that the urbanisation of black rural dwellers to work in the mines was a crucial part of the historical context of *marabi*. By focusing on the mining practices, especially in the mining compounds, I deduced that this context could be termed, in Foucaultian terms, as disciplinary, panoptical and biopolitical. Finally, I showed how *marabi* helped black workers to endure the draconian circumstances in which they lived and toiled.

In the final analysis, the findings of these chapters left me with little doubt as to the possibility of a *rapprochement* between aspects of poststructuralist thinking and *marabi* in its overall context, as well as of its salutary consequence of opening up and expanding different forms of non-hierarchical, egalitarian reason, which resonates beyond the confines of this study.

CHAPTER 1: *MARABI*, CONTEXT AND TEXT(S)

INTRODUCTION

The passing of the Natives Land Act of 1913 represented a seismic shift for the indigenous people of South Africa, moving Sol T. Plaatje (2007:21) to size up the immediate import of the situation with the following words: "Awakening on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth."

Kadar Asmal, in his foreword to Plaatje's *Native Life in South Africa*, in which Plaatje's averment appears, describes his surmise as "one of the most powerful and memorable first paragraphs in literature, a paragraph that captures so vividly the pain, humiliation and distress of millions of our people who suffered through the exercise of power by the white parliament that created a landless and destitute people" (Kadar Asmal in Plaatje, 2007: xi).

The 1913 Natives Land Act, together with subsequent actions taken by the white parliamentary regime, would, over the course of time, lead to immense changes in black South Africans' relation to the land and to work, leading Luli Callinicos (1987:7), for one, to ask four central questions: (1) "What are the origins of South Africa's working people in the towns?"; (2) "What were the forces that led people to leave the land not so very long ago, and take the journey to the unknown life of wage labour in the towns?"; (3) "How did this steadily growing class of working people live?"; and finally, (4) "through what struggles and processes did they pass to become the decisive human force they are today?" (p. 7).

In what follows I will endeavour to disclose critical insights into these questions, where possible. Moreover, they will serve as a polemical framework in which I will uncover the latent forces that would eventually lead to black urbanisation, firstly by way of considering the musical (*inter alia*) phenomenon known as *marabi's* pre-colonial and colonial socio-political context. I will then introduce anticipatory themes to Chapter 2 by situating the thought of French poststructuralist thinkers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari within this context. Specifically, their thought will be used as a critical tool to probe aspects of the "apparatuses of capture" that black subsistence farmers were subjected to by the capitalist "State apparatus". Secondly, I will use these questions and findings to explore the specific

urban circumstances that were a vital context for *marabi*, as the musical (*inter alia*) consequence of, and response to, enforced black urbanisation. Thirdly, having considered these social and economic conditions of working class life, which strongly influenced the development of *marabi*, the *topos* will shift to *marabi* itself.

What follows, is significant in terms of this thesis as a whole. The point is that, for the philosophical analysis in the following chapters to make sense, the historical context of *marabi's* provenance has to be reconstructed first. Moreover, to deny the socio-historical crucible out of which *marabi* was wrought would be to do it a grave disservice.

1.2 ORIGINS: FROM CATTLE TO CAPITAL

Callinicos's first question pertains to the origins of South Africa's black working people (1987:7). Accordingly, in what follows, I will attempt to trace the origins of black people, from their pre-colonial past and, using the socio-economic theory of W.M. Tsotsi (1981), consider the historical reasons for the erstwhile powerlessness of black South Africans in the face of colonial powers who relegated them to the exclusive status of "labourers".

As Tsotsi (1981:46) writes, the dominant pre-colonial system of production in Africa was the village community, whose mode of production was "primitive communalism". He goes on to note that in pre-colonial Africa, although land ownership was collective, the individual ownership of livestock had already taken place and had led to a class distinction. Despite exerting a certain power over the communal majority, this small 'aristocratic' class who privately owned large livestock did not exploit the latter, instead acquiring additional labour through the enslavement of captives from tribes that they had subjected to military defeat.

Though I have used the term "enslavement", following Basil Davidson (1961:33); this was not European chattel-slavery, in which men and women were entirely dispossessed of their rights and property, but rather a form of serfdom and, thus, quite far removed from what black slaves underwent on American plantations. As Tsotsi (1981:47) maintains, in a process ultimately facilitating the emergence of large monarchical kingdoms, captives from militarily defeated tribes were assimilated and integrated, rather than strictly-speaking enslaved, occasionally even acceding to high ranks within their conqueror's tribal kingdom, as in the case of post-*mefecane* Zulu tribes. The interesting historical parallel is the Ottoman mode of

recruiting Janissaries from the Balkan provinces, where young Christian boys were selected for positions within the imperial bureaucracy, sometimes even being allowed to rise as far as the position of grand vizier. The parallel, however, runs aground at the point where one realises that, in the Ottoman system, Janissaries, despite the special levity accorded them, could theoretically be executed on a whim. In this sense, the Zulu system was considerably preferable to that of the Ottoman.

In contrast to the nature and consequences for those vanquished-and-then-potentially-elevated in these military collisions in the Zulu scenario, the confrontation between Southern African natives and their subjugating European colonisers followed a vastly different pattern. One may view Tsotsi (1981:47) as locating the crucial difference between the former and the latter situation in what he regards as an extant historical anomaly: the encounter between two peoples at entirely incommensurable stages of "historical development". This incongruity was exacerbated by the fact that Southern Africa was the last vast territory to be captured by south-bound central African peoples. Adding to this, the migration southwards of the pastoralist Nguni and Sotho tribes only occurred in the nineteenth century. At the same time, there was a strong element of atavism: south of the Fish and Orange rivers and west of the Kalahari, the Abathwa and Khoi-Khoin tribes abided at the stone-age level of hunting and food-gathering.

This cultural disparity between the colonisers and colonised is thrown into sharp relief in the light of Tsotsi's (1981:47-48) observation, that whilst the indigenous people of Southern Africa were still living in this primitive stage of culture, they suddenly encountered Europeans coming from a vastly different cultural background.[4] Moreover, whereas Europe's historical development from savagery (Tsotsi's term), barbarism and, finally, civilisation, took place in an uninterrupted continuum, in Africa this development was interrupted in the middle stage. By the late 18th century in Europe, feudalism had already largely given way to capitalism. In contrast, when they first made contact with white colonisers at about the same time, the indigenous people of South Africa were still, in the terminology of Deleuze and

[4] Clifton Crais (2002), writing from a postcolonial perspective designated as "cross-cultural contact", would regard this encounter as a "contact zone" between "African and Western conceptions, perceptions, and practices of power and authority" (2002:6). Crais (2002:8) argues, moreover, that "even at its most violent, conquest is quintessentially cross-cultural" or, as Tzvetan Todorov (1982: 250) puts it, " a 'dialogue of cultures', because, it involved people with often radically different ways of conceiving the world coming together and struggling to make sense of what was happening to themselves and others" (As quoted in Crais, 2002:250).

Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1977), in the "primitive regime"[5]. Tsotsi (1991:48) notes that, in fact, black South African society was bereft of even the most basic feudal trappings, such as towns, a clear division between handicrafts and agriculture, a separate merchant class, the private ownership and commodification of land, and even money. What economic structures did exist, were effectively dissolved by the incursion of European colonial capitalism: inherited customs and historical rights were supplanted by capitalist operations of purchase and sale as the dominant socio-economic transactions. He (1991:48) goes on to aver that the integration of indigenous people into the British colonial capitalist economy would, however, not follow the usual laws of capitalist development, with the division between capitalists and workers cutting across the colour line. Instead, as Tsotsi (1991:48) observes, the British, in a distortion-inducing grafting of subjective forces onto the objective imperatives of the historical process, made full use of their cultural and military superiority to enforce racial segregation and co-opt black people solely as a source of cheap labour and naught besides.[6]

This brings us to the second part of our consideration of the origins of black South Africans and how they came to leave their farms[7] to seek work in the unknown cities. Accordingly, in what follows, I will consider, through *inter alia* Callinicos, how the discovery of gold impacted on black subsistence farmers and then, by recourse to Deleuze and Guattari, move on to examine how the ways in which black farmers were forced to leave their land and work on the mines exemplify the capitalist "apparatus of capture" described in the thirteenth Plateau of Deleuze and Guattari's collective work *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987: 424-473).

---

[5] Mark Bonta and John Protevi (2004:131) observe that Deleuze and Guattari represent them [primitive societies] as "agriculturalists, in rhizomatic relationship with the forest, and as enemies of the nomads." They go on to note that "according to the Deleuzoguattarian formula, primitive societies have always been constituted in relationship to States even as they fend them off; by their capture, they give birth to the State as extended land." In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari's thinking differs from the socio-political theory of Tsotsi insofar as they do not see the primitive stage as being part of a developmental process. Rather, *A Thousand Plateaus* takes "the non-evolutionary, complex mutualistic approach of a 'geohistory'" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994:95) to replace any idea that the primitive regime is a "stage" of evolution or development (Bonta and Protevi, 2004:131).

[6] Tsotsi's book is entitled *From Chattel to Wage Slavery*. E. Springs Steele's (1987) consideration of Henry George's thinking about what he calls "chattel (human) slavery" and his indictment of "wage slavery" (economic servitude) strikes a chord with the title of Tsotsi's book and his analysis of the detrimental effects of capitalism, as wielded by the white colonisers, on the black workers.

[7] These were farms and not mere agricultural settlements. Callinicos, who consistently uses the term "farmer", includes a picture of a wealthy black sugar farmer in front of his truck in *Gold and Workers* (1981:25). Moreover, in Bessie Head's foreword to Ellen Kuzwayo's *Call Me Woman* she speaks of chiefs dividing the land into private 'farms' at the turn of the century (1985:xiv).

1.3 THE DISCOVERY OF GOLD

The situation of the native people in the South African colony would be subjected to an additional vicissitude with the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand by the English gold prospector, George Harrison in 1889.

Before this momentous discovery, Diana Cammack (1990:1-2) describes the Witwatersrand, in the mid-1880's as something of a rural idyll, "a sleepy sort of place" with undulating hills and a few scattered farms. However, within ten years this rural landscape would change irrevocably as more than 100 000 people in the grip of gold-fever came to the Witwatersrand in search of gold. Initially, gold deposits were found close to the surface and did not require an extensive labour force. However, with the discovery of vast deposits of gold beneath the surface, mining on this rather minor scale would rapidly give way to something much faster: extensive deep-level mining.

To this end, an extensive labour force was required, and would be drawn from other economic sectors. In 1887, the Chamber of Mines was established. This (Callinicos, 1981:18) organisation monopolised the existing entrepreneurial field of smaller companies, by manoeuvring itself into an unscrupulous alliance with the South African government. Pressure exerted by rich mine-owners on the impoverished governments of Transvaal (the poorest government), Natal, the Cape and the Orange Free State, had the effect that legislation to secure cheap labour was forthwith passed. The gold mines were of crucial importance to the governments, hence their willingness to cooperate with the mine-owners, pejoratively termed "Randlords" (derived from "Witwatersrand") to secure the labour they needed to satisfy their lust for power and money. The following statement reveals something of the vehemence of the mining industry's demand for labour:

> "*We must have more labour*", said the President of the Chamber of Mines. "*The mining industry without labour is as bricks would be without straw, or as it would be to imagine you could get milk without cows*"[8]. As quoted from Johnson (1976) in Callinicos (1981:22) with its original emphasis

[8] The imagery used by the Chamber of Mines is telling. One is reminded of the Israelite slaves in Egypt who had to provide their own straw for bricks and retain the same daily quota, after incurring the wrath of the Pharaoh. (cf. Exodus, 5:6-7, NKJV). The animalistic metaphor of the cow also conveys the tacit idea of workers being regarded as labour 'cattle' rather than human beings. One of the most disturbing of these dehumanising metaphors is one used by Neil Parsons (1993:238) when he states that "Africans were treated by the mines as 'muscle machines', whose life was cheap and who could easily be replaced."

There was, however, no established herd of cows, that is, no existing working class (Callinicos, 1981:22).[9] The mine-owners would have to make one. This required the forcing of thousands of black subsistence farmers and peasants away from their land and into the mines. Hence, the legislation that the government passed dealt specifically with land and taxation.

1.4 TAX LEGISLATION

Thus, the effective large-scale urbanisation of the black subsistence-farming populace would be implemented through legislative measures, among them a new system of taxation. Here I simultaneously aim to answer Callinicos's second question: "What" were the "forces that led people to leave the land not so very long ago, and take the journey to the unknown life of wage labour in the towns?" (1987:7).These forces, as Eddie Roux (1964:88) relates in *Time Longer Than Rope*[10] were draconian. The severity of these measures impelled Plaatje to call taxation "the black man's burden", which is what Louis Green, Maano Ramutsindela and Kylie Thomas (2013:271) describe as being the burden of having to perform low-grade and low-paid labour, and, at once, being forced to pay taxes to swell the coffers of the colonial state. Plaatje writes:

> The "black man's burden" includes the faithful performance of all the unskilled and least paying labour in South Africa, the payment of direct taxation to the various Municipalities, at the rate of from 1s to 5s per mensum per capita (to develop and beautify the white quarters of the towns while the black quarters remained unattended) besides taxes to the Principal and Central Government, varying from 12s to 3 pounds 12s per annum, for the maintenance of Government Schools from which native children are excluded. In addition to these native duties and taxes, it is also part of "the black man's burden" to pay all duties levied from the favoured race. (Plaatje, 2007:19)

Plaatje describes a scenario in which taxation is used as a way of generating wealth for the white state, by way of cheap, unskilled black labour, who did not share the benefits of this wealth (Green, Ramutsindela and Thomas: 2013:271). Land disposition was to play a vital

[9] Tsotsi (1981:52) notes that up to the 1860's there was little wage-paid labour in South Africa. With the discovery of diamonds and gold South Africa developed rapidly from subsistence to an industrial economy and became one of the major investment areas of the world. This rapid economic transformation resulted in what he expresses as "an insatiable demand for labour."

[10] "Time longer than rope" is a West Indian Negro slave proverb. There are various interpretations of this idiom, but the most obvious is that the rope is the symbol of slavery and the black man by some inexplicable law of physics is given more time, or "more rope" figuratively before he is punished – or hunged (see the epigraph of Roux's book with the same title).

role in the creation of a low-paid, unskilled black labour system that would form the bedrock for the country's migrant labour system. Specifically, among the measures introduced to raise revenue Amongst the measures introduced to raise revenue and corral black people into employment were the poll tax and the hut tax. Failure to pay the tax was regarded as a criminal act and Africans had to carry their poll tax receipt with them the whole time. In the Transvaal, the tax was ₤2 per person, which was the equivalent of more than a month's wages. The tax of £1 for every male over the age of eighteen, irrespective of race, introduced in 1905 by Natal[11] was particularly harsh in this respect. Overall, the enforcement of these taxes included the legal necessity that every native have his poll tax receipt on his or her person at all times and rendering the failure to pay these a criminal offense.

The tribes also had to pay one Rand for every hut. Callinicos (1981:23) places this into perspective when she observes that about a century ago, a man would have to work hard on the mines for at least three months to earn just enough money to pay the hut tax for himself, his family and his parents. Tax had to be paid in money, leaving subsistence farmers with no choice but to leave their homes and families and work on the mines. Mahatma Gandhi eloquently expresses the consequences of the hut tax in the following:

> In order to increase the Negro's wants or to teach him the value of labour a hut tax have [sic] been imposed on him. If these imposts were not levied, this race of agriculturalists living on their farms would not enter mines hundreds of feet deep in order to extract gold or diamonds, and if their labour were not available for the mines, gold as well as diamonds would remain in the bowels of the earth. Like, the Europeans would find it difficult to get any servants, if no such tax was imposed. (1968:18)

The co-optation of black people as an organised labour force within the mining sector would be bolstered by the introduction of a labour tax. According the Callinicos (1981:23) in the Cape, earlier, the prime minister and mine-owner Cecil John Rhodes passed a law called the Glen Grey Act of 1894. This law compelled black people in the Cape to pay an amount of 1 Rand annually. Crucially, this law contained a clause, according to which black workers could avoid this tax by proving that they had worked for wages for at least three months. Effectively, this clause functioned as an incentive for more men to perform wage labour under the aegis of the Cape Government. Michael Morris (2004:118) describes the Glen Grey

[11] The imposition of this new poll tax in Natal was met with resistance, leading to the Bambatha Rebellion. Cf. Neil Parsons (1994:203-204) for an account of the circumstances surrounding this rebellion and its aftermath.

Act as "the most powerful measure to assure migrant labour for the mines." This measure was hated, because it appeared on the surface to be beneficial to Africans by promising development and more political influence, whereas the very opposite was true. The Glen Grey Act in fact limited black people's political say in the Cape (where, with property franchise, a small majority had the vote). Moreover, it drastically reduced their hold on the land, by changing rules of inheritance, so that all the members of African families would be made landless, with the exception of one. Disenfranchised black Africans were hereby forced to leave their farms and work on the mines.

Taxation, to be paid in money and not in kind, was a particularly strong mechanism of forcing black people into labour, since it was only through entering into the wage-labour system in the mining sectors that these native people could acquire money and thus enable themselves to pay government tax. This is so because, in their economy of subsistence farming, goods were exchanged through primitive barter, as no money-currency use had yet arisen. Therefore, black people had no choice but to work in the mines in order to earn money in order to pay their taxes. Their dilemma is powerfully expressed in Clifton Crais' (2002:96) quotation of Max Weber (1976:182): "In the nineteenth century the colonized began entering modernity's 'iron cage'".

These, in the final analysis, were some of the nascent forces, to phrase it in terms of Callinicos's enquiry (or what has by now become something of a refrain [*ritournelle*]), that "led people to leave the land not so long ago, and take the journey to the unknown life of wage labour in the cities" (1987:7).

1.5 DELEUZE AND GUATTARI: APPARATUS OF CAPTURE

Through their large-scale eviction from the various rural territories they had hitherto occupied and coerced into the mines, as *inter alia* enforced by the Natives Land Act of 1913 and various laws concerning taxation and labour, the formerly rural black people of South Africa fell under the aegis of what Deleuze and Guattari term an "apparatus of capture". According to Mark Bonta and John Protevi, what the 'apparatus of capture' captures are heretofore localised territories. It does so by causing their productive flows to converge into the 'megamachine' that is the "State apparatus". It is through the 'State apparatus' that the State

essentially is moulded out of smaller components such as villages, towns, the countryside, and cities (Bonta and Protevi, 2004:52).

The apparatus of capture essentially functions through stockpiling. For Deleuze and Guattari, 1997: 441) stock itself comes into existence, and begins to function *as* stock, only when pre-existing territories (between which there had solely been a form of pre-capitalist exchange by barter without stockpiling in the strict sense) are now simultaneously and/or successively exploited by the State apparatus and, through this, become *land*. In this way, local and itinerant exploitation of individual territories gives way to a large scale and global exploitation of land, from whence the general measure of equivalence (based on the global comparison of yields from different territories), through which stock verily functions as stock, emerges.

The Natives Land Act of 1913 may be situated within this apparatus. The upshot of the Act was that, apart from the exception of the native reserves system, black Africans were driven off most of their existing territories and only allowed to be physically present on white land as employed labourers. This allowed white landowners to establish and consolidate a monopoly on land through the subsumption, under fully-fledged capitalist conditions of production, of most territories heretofore still cultivated by indigenous peoples in their non-monopolistic mode of pre-capitalist itinerancy and barter.

Related to the foregoing '*Aufhebung*' of territory as land, we have the first specific apparatus of capture within the overall apparatus of capture (the State apparatus): ground rent. Ground rent charged to land-owners (though we may naturally extend this to mine-owners) is evaluated on the basis of the excess of profit that accrues to produce from the best land (that with the highest conditions of productivity) over profit accruing to the worst land (that bearing the lowest conditions of productivity). It is through this differential measure that ground rent functions as the mechanism which captures territory as land (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997:442). Since any given apparatus of capture, as observed, functions through stockpiling, we may see now that, by way of ground rent, land is simply 'stockpiled territory' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997:444). Though not directly of such great relevance to the early twentieth-century South African scenario that I am here charting, it was necessary to dwell upon ground rent as an intermediate logical step. More crucial for our purposes are the other apparatuses of capture: labour, entrepreneurial profit, and taxation.

Ground rent concerned the stockpiling of territory. Analogously, labour, as apparatus of capture, concerns the stockpiling of activity. By "activity", Deleuze and Guattari mean "activities of the 'free action' type", or "activity in continuous variation". Activity, conceived in this idiosyncratic sense, is performed by the "actant". Within pre-capitalist "primitive" regimes, one would precisely have a scenario of "actants" to which 'activity' was attributed, but no workers, labour, or surplus labour. Under the capitalist State apparatus, however, there emerges the worker (as 'stockpiled actant') and labour (as 'stock-piled activity'). Now, much as land is stock-piled territory only upon the simultaneous basis of monopolistic appropriation and comparison of land, so too labour is stock-piled activity only, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987:441) express it, "from the double point of view of the comparison of activities and monopolistic appropriation of labor (surplus labor)". This stock-piled activity is labor, insofar as it arises from the "quantitative comparison of activities"; yet, it is at the same time surplus labour, inasmuch as it emerges from (Deleuze and Guattari (1987:442) the "monopolistic appropriation of labor by the entrepreneur (and no longer the landowner)". Deleuze and Guattari (1987:442) aver, in this regard, that even when they are distinct and separate, "there is no labor that is not predicated on surplus labor. It is only in this context that one may speak of labor value, and of an evaluation bearing on the quantity of social labor, whereas primitive groups were under a regime of free action or activity in continuous variation." The passing of the Natives' Land Act of 1913 and the legislation regarding taxation and the land in order to force black Africans to the mines to satisfy the mine owner's almost insatiable desire for labour, resonates with Deleuze and Guattari's (1987:442) prior observation that labour and surplus labour applied… "to the monopolistic appropriation of labor by the entrepreneur."

We have already seen that labour is only labour if there is surplus labour. Notwithstanding, if we conceptually abstract labour from surplus labour, then we get labour conceived as an apparatus of capture *of activity* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997:441-442) – our second specific apparatus of capture.

On the other hand, if we conceptually abstract surplus labour from labour, then we arrive at entrepreneurial profit: an apparatus of capture *of labour* on the basis of surplus value – our third specific apparatus of capture (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997:442). Deleuze and Guattari regard entrepreneurial profit as being an apparatus of capture just as much as rent:

> Since it depends on surplus labor and surplus value, entrepreneurial profit is just as much an apparatus of capture as property rent: not only does surplus labor capture labor, and landownership of the earth, but labour and surplus labor are the apparatus of capture of activity, just as the comparison of lands and the appropriation of land are the apparatus of capture of the territory. (1987:442)

In effect black subsistence farmers were captured as labourers in an entrepreneurial undertaking as "actants" for the purpose of entrepreneurial profit.

The final specific apparatus of capture that Deleuze and Guattari delineate is that of taxation. Without taxation, the prior-mentioned apparatuses of capture (ground rent, labour, and entrepreneurial profit) would, in fact, not be able to function. Taxation is, therefore, their conserving ground and, by extension, the condition of the continued existence of the State itself as an apparatus of capture. This is so because it is solely on the basis of taxation that money can be established as the general equivalent for measuring the value of exchangeable goods or services. Money, which derives from a selected portion of the total productive stock (and is in fact "stockpiled exchange"), is circulated by the State in the form of credit to landowners, entrepreneurs and producers, on condition that it be paid back to the State as money (with interest) or goods or services. It is only through taxation that the economy is thoroughly monetised, that money is created as general equivalent, and that goods and services are commodified and rendered exchangeable (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997:442-444).

Though Deleuze and Guattari do maintain, following Eduoard Will's work, that in the specific case of the ancient Corinthian tyranny, taxation could be paid by producers in either goods, services or coin (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997: 442), in the fully-fledged capitalist scenario, this would clearly only be possible in money. As observed in an earlier section, this invalidity of payment of taxes in kind was the case when taxation was imposed on the indigenous peoples of Southern Africa by the British colonial regime. Recalling, moreover, Tsotsi's (1981:47) observation that black people in this region of the world were impacted upon and subsumed by the colonists' capitalist empire at a time during which they still lived in a Deleuzoguattarian "primitive regime" featuring merely elementary barter, their lack of any money commodity was the overriding urgent economic (and indeed existential) factor spurring them on to commute to the mines to earn money to pay their government-imposed taxes. From the perspective of the colonial government, taxation, conceived as an apparatus of capture, was the goad and enforcement mechanism through which the State apparatus

forced black workers off their farms and into the mines. From their origins as subsistence farmers, their status now became that of involuntary "nomads", to use Plaatje's term (2007:750). This leaves us with little doubt that the capitalist appropriation of black workers can be said to have been accomplished, in the words of Karl Marx (1990:928), "by means of the most merciless barbarism, under the stimulus of the most infamous, the most sordid, the most petty and the most odious of passions".

This picture is clearly incomplete if we do not include what may be termed as the 'underside' of the capitalist State, conceived as apparatus of capture. First, a short preparatory note on the notions of "decoding" and "deterritorialisation" in Deleuze and Guattari, as they pertain to the social register, and still more specifically to capitalism. These terms will be unpacked in greater detail in Chapter 2, which deals specifically with Deleuze, Guattari and *marabi* in its context. Suffice to say "decoding" may be defined as a movement which tends to free desire from particular objects and fixed modes of comportment, as well as dissolving the meanings associated with these. "Deterritorialisation" is, in the connotation we require at present, the movement serving to detach human labour from specific objects and means of production, and thereby causing it to become abstract labour-power. Deterritorialisation is, crucially, inexorably attended by a movement of "reterritorialisation", whereby abstract labour-power is re-attached to specific objects of labour and means of production. Since capitalism pilots a tendency in which desire and labour tend to converge in revealing their common nature, Deleuze and Guattari (e.g.1983:337) often describe labour as likewise decoded. Evidently, in that labour is also desire, abstract labour-power is, strictly speaking, both decoded and deterritorialised.

In *Anti-Oedipus* (1983), Deleuze and Guattari maintain that capitalism, at the most fundamental level, functions through the operation of an "axiomatic" that engineers, and constantly re-engineers, the conjunction of "two sorts of flows: the decoded flows of production in the form of money-capital, and the decoded flows of labor in the form of the 'free worker'" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:33). In relation to this axiomatic, the capitalist State is the "regulator of the decoded and axiomatized flows", in the precise sense that it is actually "produced by the conjunction of the decoded or deterritorialized flows of the axiomatic," "evolves entirely within this new axiomatic", and is "party to the generalized breakdown of codes and overcodings" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:252).

For Marx, in *Capital*, workers, within the capitalist conjunction of labour-power and money-capital, are "free" here, "in the double sense that they neither form part of the means of production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc., nor do they own the means of production, as would be the case with self-employed peasant proprietors" (Marx 1990, Vol. 1: 36). It is in this way that the worker, who is "free" in Marx's terms, is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a decoded, and moreover deterritorialised, flow of labour: that is, free of any specific form or object of labour. He or she is, as Marx (1993:498) puts it in the *Grundrisse*, appropriated solely "as objectless, purely subjective labour capacity", which makes him a decoded and deterritorialised flow of labour, in the sense that, "as the use value which confronts money posited as capital, labour is not this or another labour, but labour pure and simple, abstract labour; absolutely indifferent to its particular specificity [*Bestimmtheit*], but capable of all specificities" (Marx, 1993:296-297). In its axiomatic conjunction with money-capital, labour assumes the quality of "a merely *formal* activity, or, what is the same, a merely material [*stofflich*] activity, activity pure and simple, regardless of its form" (Marx, 1993:296-297). On the other side of the conjunction, money-capital is likewise decoded, and also deterritorialised, in that it arises from a process whereby the differences between price structures within various localities of trade has been eliminated and replaced with a general equivalent functioning across all localities. This implies that money-capital, "*as such* is indifferent to every particularity of its substance, and exists not only as the totality of the same but also as the abstraction from all its particularities" (Marx, 1993:296-297).

The overriding political and existential upshot of this winnowing out of all specificity at both sides of this axiomatic conjunction is that it renders capitalism unlike any other 'social machine' in history, since, functioning as it does with pure 'abstract quantities', it absolutely denudes itself of any capacity to furnish codes that could saturate the social field with meaning (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:33). As Eugene Holland (1999:66) has it, capitalism's codeless axiomatic is not only indifferent to, but indeed strongly subversive of meanings, beliefs and established customs, since it operates its conjunction solely for the production of surplus value: that is to say, purely in the pursuit of profit. According to this regime, nameless, faceless workers are only significant insofar as they can provide "labour power" for the purposes of entrepreneurial gain. The profoundly dehumanising effects of capitalism, when seen in this way, are hard to overlook. Capitalism, at least if taken at the level of its axiomatic alone, tends to have an oblivious indifference to the human suffering it incurs, both economically and physically. Olivier (2015: 2017a and 2018) focuses on (*inter alia*) the

psychological suffering produced by (neoliberal) capitalism, which includes pathologies such as obsessional neurosis. Moreover, as he (Olivier, 2018:9-12) points out, capitalism is likewise "perverse", insofar as it gains (sadistic) pleasure from the financial and other kinds of exploitation of human beings. Ray E. Phillips (1938:74) has observed that there is a general consensus among Africans that, notwithstanding the goods Western capitalism brought, these gains are undermined by the increase in anxiety and inner tension. The old tribal superstitions have given way to new fears, e.g. of the police, of unemployment, of eviction from one's home in the location. Added to that is the trauma of working for long shifts in dangerous conditions underground, and life above ground both in both the disciplinary, panoptical and biopolitical regimes of the mining compounds as we shall explore in Chapter 5.

Notwithstanding the deleterious impact of urban capitalism on human beings, Deleuze and Guattari nevertheless maintain that capitalism contains within its own functioning a liberating internal dynamism: a schizophrenising pole, which consists in its deterritorialising liberation of "schizophrenic charges and energies" and "revolutionary potential of decoded flows". This tendency released by capitalism is, however, immediately hindered by its own countervailing paranoiac pole, through which these same revolutionary charges, energies and flows are axiomatically bottled up in one and the same movement through controlling reterritorialisations (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:246-247). At the semiotic, visual and musical level, notwithstanding, capitalism's schizophrenising tendency issues forth 'decoded flows of desire', 'lines of vibration', 'schizzes that constitute singular points, points-signs with several dimensions causing flows to circulate rather than cancelling them' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 366). In Chapter 2, we will situate *marabi* at the crossroads between the schizophrenising effects of the capitalist system on the black workers and its multicultural, multi-ethnic 'composition', as expressed in rhizoidal terms.

In passing, it is noteworthy that a particularly sinister aspect of the dark underbelly of capitalism is also its toll on the environment, which has escalated to the point of a global catastrophe marked by global warming, deforestation and the acidification of oceans, to mention but a few cases in which capitalism has plundered the earth's natural resources, with a view to accumulating economic gain.

1.6 LEGISLATION REGARDING THE LAND: THE 1913 NATIVES' LAND ACT

iLand Act (song by Reuben T. Caluza, English translation by Fatima Dike)

We are children of Africa
We cry for our land
Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho
Zulu, Xhosa Sotho unite
We are mad over the Land Act
A terrible law that allows sojourners
To deny us our land
Crying that we the people
Should pay to get our land back
We cry for the children of our fathers
Who roam around the world without a home
Even in the land of their forefathers.

– Coplan, 1985:73.

…all the Boer really cares about is the stoppage of purchase of land by natives. That is an abomination to his patriarchal soul – that a native should presume to buy land.

– Patrick Duncan, 1913, quoted in Harvey M. Feinberg, 1993:104).

We have seen how the South African government, in cahoots with the mine-owners, passed tax legislation enabling mine-owners to obtain cheap labour for their deep-mining agenda. In addition to this, the government promulgated laws on land (cf. Callinicos, 1981:22).

This measure was so draconian and that it prompted Plaatje's opening paragraph of *Native Life in South Africa* (2007:19), as already referred to: "With the passing of this Act, the South African native found himself... a pariah in the land of his birth." Ruth Hall (2014:1) notes that the Act's provisions were fairly unequivocal, but potentially devastating: 'scheduled areas' were created to serve as native reserves on about 7 percent of the country's land. Moreover, as the Act reads:

> (2) From and after the commencement of this Act, no person other than a native shall purchase, hire or in any other manner whatever acquire any land in a scheduled native land or enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition direct, or indirect, of any such land or of any right thereto or interest therein or servitude thereover, except with the approval of the Governor-General (Union of South Africa).

A measure of the hypocrisy latent in this Act is reflected by its wording which created the illusion of parity between white and black:

> a. a native shall not enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition from a person other than a native, of any such a land or any right thereto, interest thererin, or servitude thereover;
> b. a person other than a native shall not enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition from a native of any such land or of any right thereto, interest therein, or servitude thereover.

This meant, according to this Act, (Meredith, 2007:522) that Africans were prohibited from purchasing or leasing land in white areas; the only areas where they could lawfully acquire land were in native reserves, which then amounted to about 8 per cent of the country. It was later, in 1936, increased to 13 percent of the whole country. These native reserves would eventually become central to the Homeland Policy of the Apartheid regime. Thus, in effect, (Parsons, 1993:233) what South African government had done was to expand the native reserve system of Natal and Cape Colony to include the Transvaal and Free State. Then, by way of the Natives' Land Act of 1913, they forced white farmers to expel black peasant farmers from their land. The Act also laid down the regulation that Africans working on white farms must be contracted to give at least ninety days' labour to the farm owner every year, or must be expelled into the reserves. The rationale was that Africans should not be economically independent, but should be forced to work on white farms[12] or mines. Feinberg (1993:66) perceptively notes, in this regard, that Act Number 27 of 1913, the Natives Land Act, repealed only in 1991, was of crucial importance because it was to be one of the key legislative building blocks that would constitute the legal structure of Apartheid, in particular the homelands policy, as previously intimated.

Hall (2014:3) cites Plaatje as being one of the best contemporary sources on the Act. He was part of the South African Native National Congress's delegation to England in 1914, which petitioned the British parliament to invoke its imperial veto over South African legislation. In it Plaatje used the tools of the white man – learning and Christianity – to expose the hypocrisy of the white man. This is manifestly evident in the tone of the petition presented by the SANNC to King George V, which declares (Hall, 2014:3):

> 3) That petitioners are descendants of a race which, when their forebears were conquered by Your Majesty's might, and their land taken from them, their laws and customs mangled and their military and other institutions brought to naught, loyally and cheerfully submitted to Your Majesty's sway in the full

[12] One is reminded, in this regard, of the words of Kas Maine, a South African sharecropper who said: "The seed is mine. The ploughshares are mine. The span of oxen is mine. Everything is mine. Only the land is theirs" (van Onselen, 1996).

> belief that they would be allowed to possess their land as British subjects, and would be given the full benefits of British rule like all other British subjects (SANNC 1914).

And further:

> (7) That petitioners say that when their forebears submitted themselves to the rule of the British Government, and paid homage to them, they fully accepted the Sovereignty of Great Britain and no other, but fully believed that their land would be reserved for them, and that they would have the full right of British subjects, more especially with regard to the possession of land and all the right incident thereto.

The objection to the Act is framed as a violation of the contract established between the 'natives' and the colonial authorities prior to the Union, arguing (Hall, 2014:3-4):

> (14) That petitioners most humbly say that the Natives' Land Act No.27 of 1913 passed by the Union Government, is an Act that has shown to the natives that the Union Government have overlooked the Queen's Government Proclamation, as quoted in paragraph 4 of this petition, and have started to pursue a policy towards the natives of entirely eliminating them from the interests of the country, and of ignoring their rights as British subjects, and are taking a course that must inevitably lead to disaster.
>
> (15) The petitioners say this Natives Land Act has caused the greatest disappointment to, and suspicions among, and the deepest opposition from, the native races.
>
> (16) That petitioners say that they recognize that it is necessary to initiated without delay a policy dealing with the land question, and other questions affecting the Europeans and natives in this land, but most humbly and respectfully submit that the Union Government failed to do what was right with regard to the said Land Act.
>
> (17) That the petitioners object to the said Land Act as being generally an act of class legislation, and one that would never have been dreamt of had only Europeans been in this land, and see in it the beginning of that policy towards the natives which will end in making them slaves.
>
> (18) That petitioners beg permission to draw attention to the fact that it was the European who came to this land and settled in alongside the native, and the native could not help it, and that they (the natives) most keenly feel and resent the spirit exhibited by the Europeans towards the native races by that Land Act.

The pleas of the SANNC, however, fell on deaf ears. In this regard Plaatje describes the colonial secretary Lewis Venon Harcourt's refusal to engage with the matter, dismissing the claims of the delegation by stating that he had "the assurance of General Botha" that Natives have too much land already" (Plaatje, 2007, 208n4). That left SANNC with no choice, but to withdraw its delegation at the onset of World War I, sending a further delegation and petition in 1918, emphasising their support of the Crown during the war, and requesting the repeal of the Act as a token of the recognition of their allegiance.

Needless to say, the reason for the passage of this Act has been the subject of fierce conjecture. Feinberg (1993:66) gives some of these positions. He maintains that this Act has been situated by writers, notably Edgar H. Brookes (1924), John Whitson Cell (1982), Paul Rich (1977) and Saul Dubow (1989) within the context of the tradition of segregation. Other writers such as Marian Lacey (1981), Timothy Keegan (1986) and Harold Wolpe (1992) see the act as related to the various sectors of 'capital'. Some hypothesise that the Natives Land Act was passed to prevent Africans from squatting on white-owned land, which is likely, given that this act was originally known as the Pass and Squatters Bill. It was also suggested that the Natives Land Act was supposed to promote agricultural labour, to halt land from being purchased by black Africans, and to engender segregation and uniformity of laws and policies regarding Africans in the newly established Union of South Africa. Certain historians, such as Callinicos (1981:26-28), Green, Ramtsidendeala and Kylie Thomas (2013) and Rudolph Daniels (1989:226), suggest that the mining industry endorsed the passing of the Act in the interests of getting a supply of cheap black labour. Other writers note that the Act implemented the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission (Lagden Commission, 1903-1905), which were reiterated by the first Parliamentary Select committee on Native Affairs in 1910. Authors have also posited that poor whites, whose land was being purchased by black Africans, were highly in favour of the Act. There were others who upheld the view that the Act came about as a result of the efforts of Afrikaners in the northern provinces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in order to manoeuvre the newly formed Union in a closer alliance with their policies on race relations and away from the more 'liberal' attitudes of those people living in the Cape Province.

Feinberg (1993:67) situates the Natives Land Act of 1913 in its political context, in particular that of the new government between 1910 and 1913, and goes about uncovering how the overwhelming majority of the members of the House of Assembly allowed a small group of

zealots to sway their votes. Suffice to say, the ejection of Hertzog (given his antagonism to imperialism and Premier Louis Botha) from the ministry, the general political response to this event, and the need for Orange Free State Parliamentary votes, created a situation in which the reluctant government was pressured to enact The Natives Land Act into law (Feinberg, 1993:108).

Regardless of these different perspectives, one thing is certain and that is the devastating effect the 1913 Natives' Land Act was to have on the black population.

According to Martin Meredith (2007:122-123), the effect of the Natives' Land Act was nothing less than to uproot thousands of black tenants – or 'squatters' as they were known – from the land that they were renting from whites. Some went to the reserves, though overcrowding was already becoming a serious problem. Others were coerced, after selling their implements and livestock, to work as labourers for white farmers. An entire class of prosperous black peasant farmers was shattered. By 1936, when the amount of land reserved for Africans was increased from 8 to 13 per cent of the country, overcrowding created a social and environmental crisis. Widespread land degradation, soil erosion, bad farming practices, disease and malnutrition were the order of the day. Africans were unable to support their families or pay their taxes under the ruinous circumstances in the reserves and were, thus, forced to go to the cities to earn money. While I concur that scholars should not endorse mono-causal arguments, I believe that there is a strong argument to be made in favour of Callinicos' contention that the desire for cheap labour for the mines was a notable cause of the 1913 Natives' Land Act. This is borne out by the consequences of this act, as intimated, which left Africans with no option but to leave their farms and seek work on the mines. Green, Ramutsindela and Thomas (2013:279), together with Daniels (1989:226) likewise argue that land dispossession was one of the main ways in which a cheap labour force could be created to generate wealth for the South Africa's white-orientated industry.

The impact of the Natives' Urban Act was particularly severe in the Orange Free State, where numerous white farmers swiftly evicted squatters in accordance with legal decree. Plaatje (2007:72, 73-74) draws readers' attention to the impact of the Act on black squatters in the Free State by giving a harrowing account of the plight of a squatter called Kgobadi, shortly after the Natives' Land Act of 1913 had been passed. According to Plaatje:

> Kgobadi had received a message regarding the eviction of his father-in-law in the Transvaal Province, without notice, because he had refused to place his stock, his family, and his person at the disposal of his former landlord, who now refused to let him remain on his farm except under those conditions. Kgobadi himself was proceeding with his family and his belongings to inform his people-in-law of his own eviction, without notice in the 'Free' State for the same reasons (2007:72).
> .

Plaatje sketches a grim scenario when he observes that it was cold the afternoon that he and a friend cycled into the Free State from Transvaal, and by evening the wind had come up from the south. This turned into an icy, cutting blizzard that raged the whole night causing native mothers, evicted from their homes, to shiver whilst holding their babies. Kgobadi's goats had kids, and as he trekked from the farm, they died by the roadside virtually as soon as they were born, to be devoured by jackals and vultures. These tragic events reached breaking point when Mrs. Kgobadi's sick baby died, due to hardship and exposure out on the road. The devastated parents were then faced with an inconceivable dilemma. They were judicially forbidden to enter the farmlands through which they trekked and were, thus, compelled to keep to the open roads, which were the only places that they were legally allowed to be if they had a travelling permit. This left them with no place to legally bury their child.[13] They consequently decided to bury the baby furtively and under the cover of darkness in a stolen grave, all the while fearful that the farmer or his workers could potentially catch them committing this 'crime'. Plaatje (2007:74) makes a deeply moving observation in this regard:

> Even criminals dropping straight from the gallows have an undisputed claim to six feet of ground on which to rest their criminal remains, but under the cruel operation of the Natives' Land Act little children, whose only crime is that God did not make them white, are sometimes denied that right in their ancestral home.

Plaatje departed sadly from 'these unfortunate nomads of an ungrateful and inhospitable country' (2007:750).

In the light of this *marabi* is nomad music, in its most literal sense, because it was the music of people who were forced to migrate from their farms to the cities for work and then, once their contract at the mines had expired, to migrate back to the so-called Native Reserves, after they were dispossessed of their land by the 1913 Natives' Land Act. Tsotsi (1981:75) wrote in 1981 that Bantustans are the so-called reserves into which the Africans were crowded.

[13] Ingrid Jonker's poem *Die Kind* (Opperman, 1983:453) comes to mind. Such was the fate of Kgobadi's child, "*Sonder 'n pas*" ("Without a pass").

They formed, then, 13 percent of the land surface of the Republic of South Africa and were expected to accommodate four-fifths of the population, in which black South Africans were expected to live along tribal lines. Slavoj Žižek puts it as follows in "Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Problems with Neighbours," EPUB, 2016, "Where Does the Threat Come From?"

> This vision was realized in apartheid South Africa in the form of 'Bantustans', territories set aside for black inhabitants. The long-term goal was to make the Bantustans independent – as a result, blacks would lose their South African citizenship and voting rights, allowing whites to remain in control of South Africa. Although Bantustans were defined as the 'original homes' of the black peoples of South Africa, different black groups were allocated to their homelands in a brutally arbitrary way: these Bantustans amounted to 13 per cent of the country's land, carefully selected so as not to contain any important mineral deposits, the remainder being reserved for the white population. The process was completed by the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970, which formally designated all black South Africans as citizens of the homelands, even if they lived in 'white South Africa', and cancelled their South African citizenship. From the apartheid standpoint, this solution was ideal. Whites possessed most of the land, and blacks were proclaimed foreigners in their own country, treated as guest workers who could be deported at any point back to their 'homeland'. What cannot but strike the eye is the artificial nature of this entire process. Black groups were suddenly told that an unattractive and infertile piece of land was their 'true home'.

The future consequences of the Natives' Urban Act were, thus, to be far-reaching. Hall (1914:1) describes it as a part of a new era of political, economic and spatial dualism, with its effects reaching throughout the 20th century. The Act was to lay the foundation for segregation and apartheid: the homeland policies of Hendrik Verwoerd, the imposition of state-approved and selected Bantu Authorities, the system of influx control and the hated pass laws, and in the towns and cities, the Group Areas Act. Forced removals persisted right up to the 1970's and 1980's.

In the light of the deeply disturbing account of the immediate impact of the Natives' Land Act on Kgobabi and his family and its future – no less troubling – implications, in what follows, I hope to address Callinicos's third question, namely "How did this steadily growing class of people live?" Hence, the next phase of our inquiry will shift to the cities and the circumstances with which black South Africans had to struggle after leaving their initial rural environment.

1.7 THE PASS SYSTEM

PASS OFFICE

Take off your hat.
What is your name?
Who is your father?
Who is your chief?
Where do you pay your tax?
What river do you drink?

We mourn for our country

-Zulu song, Hugh Tracey, 1948

In what follows, I will consider the drastic and humiliating measures taken by the mine-owners, and deployed by the capitalist State apparatus, to retain and control their workers by a *tour de force* of racial social engineering rarely encountered in history. This constituted an act of "structural violence" characteristic of a police state, in Deleuze and Guattari (1987:448)'s words, as we will see.

We will first scrutinise the origins of the pass system in the nineteenth century in order to map out the events leading to the imposition of pass laws in the twentieth century at the behest of the mining industry, in its bid to control the movements of the labour force and curtail 'desertion.'

Ellison Kahn (1949:275), though warning that a definition of the word "pass" in the South African legislature does not actually exist, maintains that, despite this nebulousness, one may still be certain that the pass is a document controlling movement, though such a document would later come to have wider connotations. The test as to whether a given document may be regarded as a pass would entail its fulfilment of the following two conditions, in Kahn's (1949:275) words:

(a) It is required for lawful movement into, out of, or within a specified area;
(b) It must be produced on demand of a specified, authorised person, failure of production constituting an offence.

Pass laws (Kahn, 1949:276-278) were introduced as early as 1760 to regulate the movement of slaves between rural and urban areas. This travelling pass was extended to Hottentots in Swellendam in 1797. Caledon, the Governor of the Cape Colony in 1806, passed a proclamation in 1809, which was to be a significant and far-ranging law according to which all Hottentots had to have a fixed abode from which they were not allowed to legally depart unless they were in possession of a pass. By 1827 (Callinicos, 1981:39-40), all Africans who came to the Cape from outside its boundaries had to have a pass. These laws, and especially the one controlling the entry of black people into the Cape Colony, were to be harbingers of what was to come much later, namely the notorious system of influx control that was a notable feature of the Apartheid legislation. In the Natal (Kahn, 1949:279) passes were first introduced in 1884 and controlled the Bantus' movements in and out of the province. This was, however, only a temporary pass that was leniently administered. Consequently, it was replaced in 1901 by identification passes that had to be carried at all times. In addition to this, Africans were required to keep a register and enter a copy of each pass therein. In the Transvaal (Kahn, 1949:277) the Volksraad of a small republic called Andries Ohrigstad passed a law in 1858 that sought to reduce vagrancy. The law stipulated that any native moving into and out of his area of employment required, respectively, the written authorisation of his chief and that of his employer. This law formed the basis upon which a systematic pass law policy was erected in the Transvaal in 1880.

When examining the growth of pass laws and their imposition on the African population over the course of time, it becomes evident that they were used to keep two apparently contradictory white needs in equilibrium. Michael Savage (1986:181-182) identifies, on the one hand, "an exclusionary" need to obtain political security, by controlling and policing Africans in "white" areas. On the other, there was an "inclusionary" need to ensure a supply of cheap labour in these areas. Pass laws employed to meet "exclusionary" and/or "inclusionary" needs led to changing legislation and administration over the years. In the first part of the twentieth century (up to about 1950), pass laws were inclusionary, their purpose and administration being to facilitate the movement of labour into 'white' agriculture and industry and to redirect labour into geographical areas where it was most needed. From 1950 onwards, pass laws were exclusionary and aimed at "relocating" Africans from "white" areas into the Bantustans. Notwithstanding, an uneasy tension still existed between inclusion and exclusion, requiring the pass system to balance the white need for labour against their need for security.

Symptomatic of the early 20th century "inclusionary need", as Savage (1986:182) puts it, was the contract system, which was contrived by the Chamber of Mines in order to expedite a continuous supply of labour to the mines (Callinicos 1981:39). Black workers, upon being recruited, often under false pretexts, would have to sign a document, which bound them contractually to work on the mines, until the terms of their contracts expired. If any given worker broke his contract and left the mines without permission, he faced imprisonment. This strong possibility of incarceration was buttressed (Phillips 1938:4) by the Native Labour Regulation Act (No.13 of 1911), according to which the breaking of what common law conceived as a civil contract, or Contract of Service, was a criminal offence punishable by more than merely suing for damages. Nonetheless, (Callinicos, 1981:39) this did not deter thousands of workers from committing contractual breach. Low remuneration; poor conditions in compounds; the perilousness of underground work; contract stipulations that precluded improvement in work conditions or renegotiation of pay; and a prohibition of strikes, led many miners to desert their jobs, some evading punishment and forced 'repatriation' to the mines, some not.

Though (Callinicos 1981:39-40) desertion was criminalised by the contract system, it did not yet put in place measures to track down offenders, to take them to book, and dispatch them back to the mine from which they had fled. To patch up this omission, the mining companies demanded the implementation of a system of 'pass laws'. Pass laws in general, far from being a new invention, were not a new invention, as we have seen. In fact, since 1760 they were used to to control the movements of the slaves in the Cape. We have also noted that a law was passed in 1809 by the Cape Governor, decreeing that all the 'Hottentots' were to stay in their particular area and required a pass should they move from it. By 1827, this legislation was extended to all Africans entering the Cape, requiring them to be in possession of a pass. These laws were the harbingers of what was to come, in this case, the notorious system of *influx control* that was prevalent during the Apartheid era.

A crucial 'milestone' within this legal history, which aimed at greater control over the movement of indigenous people, was effected by the Transvaal government, in the guise of the "Volksraad", working in collusion with mine-owners. Privy to the financial

lucrativeness[14] of the mines, the (Callinicos 1981:40) Volksraad passed two laws in 1896 – the year deep-level mining began – to enable and control the movement of black miners. In her words:

- "The first law was a stricter pass law than the previous laws. It said: 'All Natives on the Rand must be in the employ of a master and wear a metal plate or badge on the arm[15] in token of such an employ.' If an African man did not have a badge, it meant that he was unemployed and had no legal right to be on the Witwatersrand; therefore, he could be imprisoned, or forced to work."
- "The second law divided the gold mining areas into *labour districts*. When an African entered a labour district he had to get a *district pass*. This district pass enabled him to stay for three days to look for work. If he was unsuccessful in getting a job within three days, he had to leave that labour district and look for work in another district where there was a shortage of labour" (Callinicos, 1981:40).

Through (Callinicos, 1981:40) these adjustments of and additions to existing pass laws, the government and mine-owners hoped to control the movements of thousands of unskilled workers on the mines, halt desertions, and (re)direct labour where it was most needed. The effect was, of course, that these laws robbed the black workers of their freedom. Employment depended on the availability of work within the time span allotted by the Pass Laws, instead of personal choice. Moreover, workers were compelled, for want of any other option, to work on mines where the conditions were notoriously hazardous and difficult.

Another blow was dealt to black mine-workers when (Callinicos, 1981:40-41), in 1897, new laws passed at the instigation of the Chamber of Mines cut their wages. According to this legislation, the wage to be paid to unskilled black workers was fixed at a low rate. Surface work on all mines by unskilled workers was to be remunerated at a maximum of 12 cents per shift, whereas pay for unskilled workers in the underground was capped at no more than 25 cents per shift. Anticipating disturbances as a consequence of this reduction in wages, the Chamber of Mines secured the deployment of additional police to the mines and compounds by the government. The workers' response to the wage cut was predictable: they deserted *en masse*. Strangely, none of them were caught and returned to the mines. The mine-owners laid

[14] One is reminded, in this regard, of 'entrepreneurial profit' as being an apparatus of capture, in Deleuzian and Guattarian terms (1987:442), as we will see.
[15] This recalls the armband that the Nazis instituted to identify people as Jews during the Nazi Regime.

the blame squarely at the feet of the government, whom they blamed for employing an insufficient number of policemen to check passes and arrest deserters.

The foregoing pass laws pertain, notwithstanding, only to a few of the main passes required. Though it is beyond the scope of this study to foray through this teeming morass of legislation, the municipal pass laws and permits instituted c.1903 in the Orange Free State alone, according to Kahn (1949:281), included: "stand permits, residential permits, visitors' passes, seeking passes, employers' registration certificates, permits to reside in employer's premises, work-on-own-behalf certificates, domestic service books, washerwoman's permits and entertainment permits." At any given time, black Africans had to carry at least four passes or documentation; the absence of any one could lead to fines or imprisonment.

The Pass system (Kahn, 1949:290) imposed great hardship and irritation upon the native population, such as interminable waits in queues to obtain and renew passes, the financial burden of fines and the constant fear of the consequences of failing to carry the compulsory documents. Significantly, passes did not prevent crime, as advocates of the system averred, but rather resulted in the incarceration of thousands of otherwise law-abiding citizens. Moreover, the introduction into the environment of jails, in some cases, led prisoners into a life of crime. In the Transvaal in 1930 there were 39 000 convictions for pass offences, rocketing to 99 000 in 1940 – a barometer of (Kahn, 1949:291) "the volume of technically criminal offenses, which involve little or no moral opprobrium."

Significantly (to our theme), in the 'apparatus of capture' in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 447-448) draw a distinction between various regimes of violence such as war, crime and policing:

> *War*, at least when linked to the war machine, implies the mobilization and atomisation of violence first and essentially against the State apparatus (the war machine is in this sense the invention of a primary nomadic organization that turns against the State). *Crime* is something else, because it is a violence of illegality that consists in taking possession of something to which one has no 'right', in capturing something one does not have a right to capture. But State policing or lawful violence is something else, because it consists in capturing while simultaneously constituting a right to capture.

The State has often been defined by a "monopoly of violence", but this definition leads back to another definition that describes the State as a "state of Law" (*Rechtstaat*). "State overcoding is precisely this structural violence that defines the law, "police violence" and not the violence of war'" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:448). Living under the pass system meant being subjected to this third type of violence – policing by the State, or 'lawful violence.' Workers were, to all intents and purposes, living in what resembled a police state, subject to violence, imprisonment and forced labour, underpinned structurally by legislation, without having committed any crime, except not being in possession of a pass that they were forced to carry on their person against their will.

But let us return to our main thread, that is, of how black people lived in their urban environment under these and other circumstances. In 1899, Britain went to war against the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. What became known as the Anglo-Boer war, now known as the 'South African War', lasted nearly four years (1899-1902). The mineworkers, as well as the majority of the black population, were in favour of Britain winning the war, hoping that the strengthening of British rule would lead to an improvement in their political status. Meredith (2007:494) writes that upon the arrival of the British troops in the Witwatersrand in 1900, crowds of black workers exuberantly burned their passes, assuming that they would not be obligated to carry them by an enlightened British administration. Their hopes were to be dashed. Pass laws were enforced with renewed vigour. Writing in the magazine *South African Outlook*, an African contributor expressed the sense of disillusionment felt in rural areas:

> One strong incentive reason that impelled the Natives of the New Colonies to put themselves at the disposal of His Majesty's troops in the late war was that the British Government, led by their known and proverbial sense of justice and equality, would, in the act of general settlement, have the position of the black races upon the land fully considered, and at the conclusion of the war the whole land would revert to the British Nation, when it would be a timely moment, they thought, for the English to show an act of sympathy towards those who have been despoiled of their land and liberties. Alas! This was not the case. The black races in these colonies feel today that their last state is worse than their first. (Quoted in Meredith, 2007:494)

These fears were justified (Callinicos, 1981: 42). The laws were tightened up to an even greater extent, as the pass system was 'modernised'. In lieu of the old metal badge, the pass took the form of a signed document, which gave a detailed account of the worker's history. Each worker had to be in possession of his or her pass at all times when she or he was not at

work or at home. In this way, it was easier to keep tabs on every African worker. Moreover, the government enlarged the police force to make sure the pass system was implemented effectively and to ensure that 'transgressors' were arrested and duly punished. A pass document was required when looking for work in a specific district, as it *inter alia* contained previous employers' references pertaining to his character and the wage levels at which he had been remunerated. Over and above this, the document was a record of its holder's history and background, bearing details such as his employment history; his criminal record or absence thereof; and a formal confirmation that he had paid his taxes, failing which he would not have been granted the pass in the first place. In addition, to this monthly pass containing the foregoing details, several other passes were required, as Callinicos's notes:

- "The *Six-day pass* gave a work-seeker permission to look for work in a particular district for six days only. This period included weekends and public holidays. After six days, if he had not found employment, the work-seeker had to leave the district, or be in breach of the law."
- "A *Travelling-pass* was also required if a man wanted to leave his home and travel to another district to find a job. He had to pay a shilling fee for this pass."
- "*Night passes* had to be carried by any black person who was out in a municipal area after 9:00 am. These were signed by their employer."
- "A *'special' pass* had to be carried when the worker left his employer's premises, even for a few hours. The *'special'* was directed at black mine-workers who left the compounds" (Callinicos, 1981:42).

Any (Callinicos, 1981:42) white man or policeman could, and often did, stop a black worker and ask to see his pass. If the pass was in not in order, the black worker could be arrested. The new pass system was also designed to deal with the problem of desertion. Desertions could be reported to the Pass Office, which kept a record of the deserter's particulars. These details could then be utilised to track down the deserter for purposes of incarceration. The effects of the pass system were devastating. Crais (2002:81) calls it "a kind of textual state terrorism that wrecked countless lives." The pass system in pre-Apartheid South Africa anticipated that of the Apartheid era, together with the system of influx control. This reflected (Crais, 2002:10) officialdom's obsession with controlling labour and bodies, which were part of an intricate 'linking of bureaucracy to surveillance' as Evans (1997:298, quoted in Crais,

2002:10) puts it. These observations fit snugly into Michel Foucault's conception of bio-power as it came to be constructed and evermore intensively and pervasively exercised in the disciplinary regimes that replaced traditional forms of sovereignty in Europe, Britain and the United States from the second half of the eighteenth century. Foucault (1990:142-3) notes in this regard that:

> …for the first time in history…biological existence was reflected in political existence ….Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects…but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself, giving power its access even to the body.

We shall return at much greater length to Foucaultian biopolitics in Chapter 5, specifically as it relates to *marabi* in its context. Between (Crais, 2002:10) 1952 and 1962, millions of urban Africans had been imprisoned for violating the pass laws and influx laws. The significance of these arrests resides in the fact that they were vicissitudes transpiring within a legal framework constituted by laws, through which the State solved the 'native question' by re-construing black labourers as mere objects of its policy. It is as such anthropomorphic objects that these peoples could then be resettled and generally dealt with within a refined migrant labour system and a reorganised system of governance in the homelands through the forced resettlement of "redundant people" (Crais, 2002:10).

Having considered the circumstances surrounding black urbanisation, with reference to the tax laws, The Natives' Land Act of 1913 and the Pass system, we will continue by focusing on the actual social and economic circumstances of working life that served as a crucial context for *marabi*.

1.8 BLACK URBANISATION: *MARABI* IN ITS CONTEXT

1.8.1 Increasing Black Urbanisation

In what follows, I will expand on the answer to Callinicos's third question, namely "How did this steadily growing class of working people live?" Here is Leo Marquard's (1952:58) picture, as written in 1952, of migrant workers arriving at the mines:

> Every week five or more special trains arrive at Johannesburg with hundreds of Africans going to work on the mines. Some have been there before; many

> are coming for the first time from the simple pastoral life of the Reserves to the rush and noise of a big city, and to a strange machine-dominated existence in a highly organized industry. The train journey is the first unfamiliar experience; thereafter come the harsh compounds with their brick buildings and concrete bunks, the mass produced, balanced diet, the shattering experience of being rushed to the bowels of the earth in a cage to work at a dangerous job. It is a big change from the small village community... to the anonymous vastness of a mining compound where he has a number instead of a name and where he hears the roar of mining machinery instead of the lowing of cattle on the hills.[16]

According to Coplan (1985:56), not only were the workers forced to go to the mines under duress, but in the Transvaal black workers were susceptible to unscrupulous recruiters and an indifferent British administration that was no better that the Boer one that it succeeded. A barometer of the British government's total disregard for the life and health of the workers emerges in Coplan's (1985:56) observation that the government only took measures by way of the Coloured Labourers Health Ordinance of 1905 to improve the conditions in compounds when it emerged that miners had a mortality rate of 10 percent.

Exacerbating this situation is a veritable 'population explosion' that took place on the Reef. As Parsons observes:

> Johannesburg's black population grew from about 60,000 in 1904 to 102,000 in 1911. In 1911 the black population of the Rand industrial area was around 286,000.[17] But unlike the 180,000 whites living on the Rand, most of this black population was temporary. 190,000 migrant workers in the mines were due to return to rural reserves. The permanent black city residents were a smaller unrecorded number. Their presence was recognized when Johannesburg city authorities cleared black shanties in 1903-04 to set up the city's first 'urban location' called Pimville, fifteen kilometres south of the city (1993:237).

This wide-scale urbanisation of black South Africans swiftly led to overcrowding, leading to the establishment of slumyards, which furnished the direct social context for *marabi* as a form of music and as a culture. In Eddie Koch's (1917:170) formulation, *marabi* would become "the lifeblood of slumyard culture."

---

[16] In Peter Abraham's novel *Mine Boy* (1946:66) some of the trauma experienced by a rural black man who enters the mines for the first time is expressed as follows: "Only the startling and terrifying noises around. And the whistles blowing. And the hissing and the explosions from the bowels of the earth. And these things beat against his brain till his eyes reddened like the eyes of the other."

[17] Parsons rightly notes all census figures of the black urban population were probably underestimates because 'illegal' residents without passes avoided being counted.

1.8.2 The Slumyards

'*Marabi*' is the generic name that slumdwellers and others have given to the culture that permeated the yards of Johannesburg.

– Koch (1983:158-159)

Slumyards were, of course, the result of housing shortages as a consequence of the massive population influx into urban areas. These proliferated massively likewise on account of the extreme poverty of Africans, caused *inter alia* by the inadequacy of wages. According to Koch (1983:156), a report by the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives (JCEN) showed that the wages paid by the industries in the city were completely insufficient, especially in the light of rampant rural underdevelopment. JCEN (1921:1; quoted in Koch, 1983:156) notes the following:

> As a result of these (rural) changes, the natives engaged in town work looks for quarters of his own and perhaps brings his family with him. Under these altered circumstances it is impossible for the wages received…to meet the requirements of towndwellers.

Moreover, unscrupulous (Koch, 1983:156) white landowners took advantage of workers by buying or renting ground in the city and building shanties on it, which they let at exorbitant rates, owing to the extreme shortage of accommodation. This led to the emigration of neighbours who objected to yards so close to them and let their plots of land rather to 'rackrenters', a term alluding to medieval torture on the 'rack' and referring to excessive rent. Even 'fashionable suburbs', such as Doornfontein, were to become highly crowded slumyards. Modikwe Dikobe's fictional *The Marabi Dance* (1973) is set in one of Doornfontein's yards – Rooiyard.[18] His opening paragraph gives a vivid impression of the sheer inhumanity of the circumstances under which these people lived:

> The Molefe Yard, where Martha lived, was also home to more than twenty other people. It served as a row of five rooms, each about fourteen by twenty feet in size. When it rained, the yard was muddy as a cattle kraal, and the smell of beer, thrown out by the police on their raids, combining with stench of the lavatories, was nauseating (Dikobe, 1973:1).

He writes further (Dikobe: 1973:32):

[18] Martin Trump (1981:19) points towards a parallel between fact and fiction in the light of Ellen Hellman's (1948) sociological study of Rooiyard, a Doornfontein yard not far from the Molefi yard. Hellman (1948:58, as quoted in Trump, 1981:20) alludes to the tins of illicit home-brewed beer hidden underground in case of police raids and the fact that "after rain the surface presents the appearance of a quagmire."

> Martha's father, guided by the carbide light of his cycle, splashed through the yard and waded his way ankle deep through the pool of muddy water. It took him all his strength to pull his feet and boots out of the slush. One of the lavatories had overflowed and the excrement and urine mixed freely with the mud and water. The stench polluted the air which had been purified by the rain. A tin of skokiaan which had been dug into the ground, to conceal it from the police, lay uncovered and threw a yellow circle of colour, and the whole yard smelt of bread and yeast. Mabongo stumbled further until he reached the gate. 'Morena! If this is how we live, then God, suffer us all to die.'[19]

Koch (1983:158) also takes cognisance of the deplorable condition of these yards, with their squalor, lack of sanitation and over-crowding, together with exorbitant rentals that slum dwellers could barely afford. Koch (1983:158) and Callinicos (1987:180) also mention the heavy toll that these urban conditions had on the African population, by referring to the high infant mortality rate: in 1929, approximately 750 babies out of 1000 births per year died under the age of a year.

The above clearly bears out Andersson's (1981:23) contention that the *marabi* tradition, which was a cultural 'consequence' of these slumyards and the shebeen scene, has become romanticised over the years, whereas in reality there was nothing romantic about them.

Furthermore (Parsons 1993:237), the municipality of Johannesburg built a new location called Western Native Township, next to Sophiatown. Contrary to popular belief, Sophiatown was never a location. Trevor Huddleston (1956:44) cites this as being his first reason for loving it. He speaks of it as being completely free from monotony in its physical site, its buildings and its people. Moreover, Sophiatown was non-racial and a hive of economic, social and cultural activity. Little wonder, then, that Can Themba called it the "little Paris of the Transvaal". People remember it with great nostalgia (cf. Knevel, 2015), despite its harsh realities, such as its lack of amenities. Sophiatown residents' forced removal after the Group Areas Act of 1951 was to represent the end of an epoch.

In the (Callinicos, 1987:180) three freehold townships (Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare) rate-paying black people lived on about two-fifths of the stands, but received

[19] One is reminded, in this regard, of the concept of the Chthonian, which constitutes an unbridled proliferation of all that is most repellent in nature. Camille Paglia (1995:6) expresses this further as "…the blind grinding of subterranean force, the low slow suck, the murk and ooze. It is the dehumanizing brutality of biology and geology, the Darwinian waste and blood-shed, the squalor and rot we must block from consciousness to retain our Apollonian integrity. Western science and aesthetics are attempts to revise this horror into imaginatively palatable form."

almost no public services for their money. Added to this was the lack of public amenities and inhuman circumstances of what people called 'home'. Callinicos observes that:

> Even by the 1930's, the roads were mere dirt tracks, muddy channels in the summer and dust bowls in the winter. There was no street lighting and water supplies were drawn from wells dug by the people themselves. These wells were open. Refuse and drowned animals often infected them, and this spread disease. Sewerage buckets were not collected regularly – after 1935 – three times a week at most (1987:180).

This passage provides ballast for the verisimilitude of Dikobe's otherwise fictional account of life in the slums of Rooiyard. Such living conditions were indeed the context for *marabi* as both a musical and cultural form. As a cultural practice, for Koch (1983:158), *marabi* comprised a 'cluster of activities' that served as the foundation of people's defence against these appalling conditions. Before returning to this theme, we must, however, first run through a diversion regarding the 1923 Urban Areas Act and its implications.

1.8.3 The 1923 Urban Areas Act

The 1923 Urban Areas Act may be regarded as the urban equivalent of the Natives' Land Act. The context of this Act was, according to J.D. Omer-Cooper (1994:169), the increasing expansion of the population attendant to increased economic activity during the war years in South Africa. This meant that black Africans "often lived in appalling shantytown conditions" as he puts it (1994:169). Moreover, the devastating, world-wide influenza of 1918-1919 was to exact a heavy toll on South Africans of all races, although the black population, as the poorest section of the population, were to suffer the most.

The problem of accommodation for the Africans in urban areas still persisted. In 1923, the government passed legislation addressing this problem. The legislation passed would have a devastating effect on the black population of South Africa. It also had a deleterious impact on *marabi* and *marabi* culture. The problem (Omer-Cooper, 1994:169) of African urban settlement and accommodation was addressed by the 1921 Native Affairs Commission and the 1922 Transvaal Local Government Commission (the Stallard Commission). The principle underlying the reports of these commissions was that towns essentially belonged to whites and that permission to live in towns should be granted to Africans solely on the condition that they could be co-opted there to serve the economic needs of the white man. When they failed

to serve this function, they would have to be removed. This principle was rendered law by the (Natives') Urban Act of 1923, according to which Africans were to live in separate urban areas and had a right to live in towns only inasmuch as, and as long as, they provided whites with a source of labour.

According to Paul Maylam (1990:66), the short-term significance of the 1923 Act was limited. Segregation was gradually introduced as certain sections of municipal areas were declared 'white', forcing all non-exempted Africans and those not residing on their employers' premises to move into locations or hostels. Johannesburg and Kimberley proclaimed segregated areas in 1924, Cape Town in 1926, and Durban in early 1930. Wholesale segregation would be unfeasible, because segregated areas could only be enforced if alternative accommodation was provided for Africans who were forced out of their dwellings. This accommodation was immensely limited in the light of municipalities' reluctance to invest in the building of townships. Other provisions of the Act also had a limited short-term impact, such as the establishment of advisory boards, which many municipalities did not undertake and some did belatedly. Moreover, few local authorities implemented the influx controls.

The significance of the 1923 Act, as Maylam (1990:66) avers, was more evident when seen in the long term, since "it represented the first major intervention by the central state in the process of African urbanization" and "provided a framework and foundation upon which subsequent legislation and policy were to be built." The Urban Areas Act, together with the Pass system and the 1913 Land Act, was to serve as the bedrock for segregation under the Apartheid system. It is for this reason that we can designate the era at the beginning of the last century as the 'proto-Apartheid area', insofar as it put into place a network of laws that were to underpin Apartheid proper.

Despite the 1923 Urban Areas Act and all their privations, Africans continued to cling tenaciously to their slumyards and restricted freehold locations (Coplan, 1985:91), since, in them, there still existed a window of freedom wherein they were able to organise their society and articulate and develop their culture in accordance with their own rights. Unlike in Western Native Township or Nancefield, where their independence and mobility would be almost completely curtailed, in the slumyards perimeter fences were very often not installed, as the regulations requiring these were almost never enforced. It was also economic and logistical factors that reinforced their attachment to these slumyards, such as, for instance,

slumyards' greater proximity to places of employment, shops and other amenities, as well as the fact that they were central to the brewing and sale of alcohol, laundering, and other similar informal industries.

From what has gone before, it is clearly evident that, as Ballantine (1993:65) notes, "*marabi* had evolved in particular localities in response to specific material conditions." Even police raids, although they were damaging and disruptive, did not 'fundamentally alter the nature of the slumyards.' As he puts it:

> Defensive and resilient from the beginning, *marabi* culture survived, and so, with it, the innovative musicians whose polyglot creations were laying the foundations for a South Africa jazz tradition. But this was soon to change (1993:65).

Herein lies the most disturbing consequence of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, whereby officials began to lay claim to inner-city suburbs as 'white'; and so the 'repatriation' and then relocation of black residents began. Ballantine (1993:66) writes that "as this began, so did the definitive destruction of *marabi* culture commence. *Marabi* musicians soon realised that their art, stripped of the small, informal, domestic space that had nurtured it, had no future in the sterile new dormitory suburbs." As Koch (1983:170) puts it:

> Marabi music, the lifeblood of slumyard culture, deprived of the conditions that had nurtured it, disappeared and was replaced by the bigger jazz bands, more adapted to playing in the formally organised dances of the 'community' halls that the council had built in most locations.

In Chapter 3, we will consider the veracity of Coplan (1985:138), Ballantine (1993:66) and Koch's claim that *marabi* had 'disappeared' (1983:170). Suffice it to say, Koch (1983:159) appears to contradict himself in his statement that '(*marabi*) today still forms the distinctive feature of black South African popular music.' This will be pursued later.

At present, with the consequences of the 1923 Urban Areas Act having been considered, I wish to backtrack a little to scrutinise shebeen society, as it was after all the prime locus of *marabi*.

1.8.4 Shebeen Society

Marabi was [therefore] an intimate part of ghetto life. It was born out of a people's struggle to survive in the hostile world of industrial capitalism. Music was one of the vital, creative ways in which the

black poor combined survival with entertainment, to help them forget for a few hours the hardships and sufferings of everyday life.

– Callinicos (1987:217)

The only way of fitting into town life was to get into *marabi*...They were urged by the conditions in the town. The environment exposed them to that.

– Koch (1983:158)

What we may term 'shebeen society' sprang up upon the back of the liquor trade. Coplan (1985:93) speculates on the etymology of the word 'shebeen':

> … [it] seems to have originated in Cape Town in the early twentieth century amongst immigrant Irish members of the city's police force. The constables named the illegal non-white drinking houses *shebeens* (Gaelic: 'little shop'). Coloured and Xhosa people brought the term to the Transvaal, where female entrepreneurs developed the shebeen into the centre of urban African social life.

Koch (1983:159) makes us privy to the observation that the kernel of *marabi* culture was the beer-brewing trade. Women were to play an important role in this trade. In fact, especially during times of unemployment, families survived on the wife's beer earnings. Also central to the sale of liquor, with *marabi* as musical accompaniment, were the powerful 'shebeen queens'. During this time, black women were at the bottom rung of the socio-political ladder, firmly ensconced as they were in their roles as domestic workers. A notable exception to this, according to Coplan (1985:93), was the shebeen queens – who made the shebeens the locus of their livelihood. Initially, entertainment in shebeens was provided by the customers themselves. Miners and contract workers in the locations who played African, Afro-Western and Afrikaans folk music on guitars, concertinas, and violins subsequently came off the streets to play in the shebeens.

Music (Koch, 1983:160) was absolutely central to the tenacity and cohesion of shebeen culture. Not only did it provide vivacity to *marabi* parties, but it also furnished young men unwilling to submit to conventional capitalist labour and working conditions with a source of employment.

Financial opportunities (Coplan, 1985:93) were also open to musicians on the fringes of shebeen culture. Zulu musicians, domestic workers and miners crammed into the slumyards on the weekends. In fact, together with the liquor brewers, some were able to earn money by which they could forego white employment altogether. In this way, their musicianship can be seen as a form of protest against capitalist coercion itself. These musicians were called *abaqhafi* (sing. *umqhafi*), or equivalently, as Coplan explains:

> … ‘cultural driftwood’, tossed up by the impact of secular Western culture and the industrial environment upon Zulu society. They cared little for the traditions of either Zulu or European culture, and held the social values of neither. A set of individuals rather than a social group, they took their dress and manner from the American ‘wild West’ films shown at black cinemas in the 1920's which often featured singing, guitar-toting cowboys (1985:93).

The *abaqhafi* were extreme examples of socially displaced people, yet their unique (re-) invention of their own culture based on Spaghetti Westerns brings to mind Holland’s (2004:25) insight about jazz as nomad music, in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the word (which stresses becoming and productive movement; Parr, 2010: 185-188): in a cultural sense, these early *marabi* and jazz musicians “foreground processes of ‘itinerative following’ rather than ‘iterative’ reproducing” just as nomad science does” (Holland, 2004: 25). What is moreover striking, notwithstanding the *abaqhafi’s* professed indifference to both indigenous and urban culture, is that their music actually reflects elements of both. Not only did they introduce ‘new elements’ in their spaghetti western guise to the urban *mélee*, but they also participated in Zulu wedding songs, thus hearkening back to their rural roots. This tensile relationship between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ refrains will be further pursued in Chapter 2. For the time being, we return to the question of *marabi* and how it provided an avenue for musicians to survive despite their being outside the ambit of traditional wage-labour. We have already mentioned the recalcitrance of the *abaqhafi* to capitalist coercion (cf. Coplan, 1985:93). In a similar fashion, *marabi* provided employment to itinerant musicians, such as Boet Gashe and Tebetjane, who may be regarded as the father of *marabi*, was an orphan devoid of any means of support. Playing *marabi* at the shebeens of Prospect Town was the only way he could earn money to survive. For musicians practicing the art, *marabi* was likewise a way of supplementing family income. These ‘informal’ employment arrangements would not have been possible without the close cooperation between the shebeen queens and *marabi* musicians. It was a link that was seen as integral to the existence of the *marabi* culture as such.

Having considered shebeen culture as having a crucial influence on *marabi* and the opportunities that it created for employment outside of capitalism, we now move to survey the various forms of *marabi*.

1.9 *MARABI*: TRADITIONAL, 'NEW' AND ETHNIC VARIANTS

Our consideration of the urban crucible out of which *marabi* was forged has hopefully provided us with an answer to Callinicos's final question, namely "What struggles and processes did they pass to become the decisive human force they are today?" Having considered these struggles and processes, the emphasis will now shift to *marabi* itself. I will proceed to consider the various multi-ethnic variations of *marabi*, by recourse to *inter alia* Coplan (1985), who has written extensively on the various forms of *marabi*, and Ballantine (1993).

Coplan (1985:94) writes: "In the 1920's, these musicians assimilated elements from every available performance tradition into a single urban African musical style, called *marabi*." However, *marabi* was not exclusively music: "Growing out of shebeen society, *marabi* was much more than just a musical style." *Marabi* could be music, the name of a dance, a social occasion, a category of people, or a type of person.[20] Effectively, it was almost an epoch.

Let us pause to consider some of these "performance traditions" and multi-ethnic influences, both old and new that contributed to *marabi's* wildly heterogeneous constitution.

1.9.1 'Old' Influences: Traditional Nguni Music

Ballantine (1993:26), when conceiving *marabi* specifically as music, describes it as:

> …primarily a keyboard, banjo or guitar style based on a cyclical harmonic pattern, much as blues was: the basic *marabi* cycle, however, may be said to have stretched over four measures, with one measure for each of the following chords: I-IV-16/4-V.

This cyclical nature of *marabi* (Coplan, 1983:26) derives from forms of traditional African music, in which one finds repeating harmonic patterns (sometimes called 'root progressions' or 'harmonic segments') as an intrinsic feature. As the ethnomusicologist Gerhard Kubik (1974:23-24) has pointed out, (quoted in Ballantine, 1993:26), cyclicity has also become "an important basis of nearly all neo-traditional music in sub-Saharan Africa." Kubik names these cycles in neo-traditional music "ostinato harmonic patterns", and argues that they give rise to "short forms", as opposed to "song forms" (pp.23-24).

[20] Koch (1983:159) notes, quoting Mochumi (1980), that "sometimes when you quarrel with a guy who's not your type, not your kind of guy, then he says to you, 'You Marabi, leave me alone you Marabi.'"

Ballantine and Edward Sililo (1989) observe that, in *marabi*, melodies are:

> cyclical repetitions of one melody or melodic fragment yielding eventually, perhaps, to a similar treatment of another melody or fragment, and perhaps then still others, each melody possibly from another source. And in this manner you played with no stop – you could play for an hour-and-a-half without stopping. (As quoted in Ballantine, 1993:27)

Rhythmic accompaniment would be provided by a player shaking a tin filled with small stones. This standard rhythmic pattern is one of the most fundamental and pervasive drum patterns used in traditional Nguni music (Coplan, 1993:27).

As far as the urban social context of *marabi*, as well as the themes it portrayed, is concerned (Coplan, 1985:94), it was one of low social status and suffused with conviviality, hedonism, and sexual profligacy:

> As a dance it placed few limits on variation and interpretation by individuals or couples, although the emphasis was definitely sexuality. As a social occasion it was a convivial, neighbourhood gathering for drinking, dancing, coupling, friendship and other forms of interaction. Finally, *marabi* also meant a category of people with low social status and a reputation for immorality, identified by their regular attendance at *marabi* parties.

Marabi music (Coplan, 1985:95), by drawing heavily on the forms and traditions that preceded it, gradually engineered a syncretic amalgam of these, which then served to express an emergent common urban African cultural existence:

> common social experience and class identification helped combine these forms into the common denominator of *marabi*, though *marabi* itself continued to encompass variants based on particular ethnic traditions. Hence, as a term, *marabi* reflects the ways urban Africans socially categorised their emerging culture (1985:95).

1.9.2 The Cape Coloured and Afrikaans Influences

The early contributors (Coplan, 1985:95) to *marabi* were Cape Coloured musicians, "known in Johannesburg as 'crooners' or die *oorlamse mense van Vrededorp* (the *oorlams* people of Vrededorp)." To the emerging *marabi* mix they added the popular performance traditions of Cape Town and Kimberley as well as Cape Afrikaans and black American influences, which merged with urban African working-class music. More specifically (Ballantine, 1993:27), coloured Afrikaans and white-Afrikaans dance music such as *tickey draai* and *vastrap*, as

well as the *ghommaliedjies* of the Cape Malays, were to leave an indelible mark on both the melodic and rhythmic structure of *marabi*.

1.9.3. 'New' Influences: American Jazz

A powerful impact (Coplan, 1985:95-96) on *marabi* was made by jazz. This influence arose from a number of sources, such as Gramophone recordings, tonic-solfa albums, white and coloured bands, and even a few American players, who popularised ragtime and early jazz in the Cape after the First World War. Phillips (1938:209-210) points out, in particular, the importance of gramophone records in disseminating what he calls "Dixie music", "a Negro melody with a lilt." He avers that these records became even more popular than the Native records recorded in South Africa, He cites the names of the most popular of Dixieland records sold up to March 1935 as follows (p.300):

Makers's Number	*Name*	*Sales*
T2864	Lay my head beneath a rose Why do I always remember?	27.500
T5380	Waiting for a train. Blue Yodel No.4.	20,000
T5356	My old pal. Daddy and home.	7,500
T5212	Climbing up the golden stairs. The little green valley	4,800

The sales numbers pale in comparison to contemporary colossal hit sales, but they are, in fact, surprisingly high when one considers the parlous economic conditions of those who bought them. It also highlights the importance of music to those of the *marabi* era, who scrimped and saved to be able to buy gramophone records.

In terms of locality, Coplan (1985:96) cites Queenstown (in the North-Eastern Cape), or 'Little Jazz Town', as being important regarding the impact of jazz on *marabi* as borne out by the "ragtime song and dance companies such as the 'Darktown Four' entertained whites and middle-class Africans at 'soirees'" (Coplan, 1985:96). There were (Crais, 2002:24) frequent delays in Queenstown, lasting for as long as three or four days, while the Labour Agents bargained with Johannesburg mine representatives in order to secure the best available market. Predictably, workers utilised their last days of freedom to the maximum, before boarding the train back to the mines. Coplan (1985:96 referring to *Umteteli wa Bantu,* 1931) relates that, '"full of jazz and women"', miners could be found in the "booze houses" where

keyboardists like Boet Gashe played music called *itswari* (soiree) consisting of "three chords repeating themselves over for four to six hours."'

1.9.4 Xhosa Influences

Xhosa instrumentalists (Coplan, 1985:97) played a crucial role in linking together Coloured-Afrikaans, black American and local African styles. In Johannesburg, the most influential of these Xhosa innovators was Tebetjane, who we have noted, is also designated as 'Tebetjana' or 'Ntebetjane' or 'Ntebetjana' (Sotho: "little Xhosa")':

> Tebetjane began his career in Vrededorp playing guitar and kazoo with the strolling groups of coloured crooners. By the end of the 1920's he had become a full-time musician and a favourite with the shebeen queens of Prospect Township. By 1932 his composition *uTebetjana ufana n'emfene* ('Tebetjana resembles a baboon'), also sung as a refrain, made him so famous in the slumyards and locations that his name became synonymous with the *marabi* genre (Coplan, 1985:97).

According to Veit Erlmann (1991:39), the actual Xhosa version of *marabi* was reputedly less polished than mainstream *marabi* and was named *tula n'divile*, ("Silent, or silence [the] devil") after the words of a song made popular by migrant workers in Durban in the late 1920's.

The Sotho version of the *marabi* party was the *famo* dance:

> In Lesotho a minor may be called *koata* (English: 'squatter'; from an urban area, uncouth, a ruffian) if he returns acting and talking like a rough man of the urban streets. The *famo* dances were associated with a particular category of *koata*, the *sebona marao* ('buttocks behind') – one who intends never to return home and thus 'shows only his ass to Lesotho.' For shebeen dancing, most Sotho migrants preferred neo-traditional styles such as *focha* ('disorder') played on the concertina and a home-made drum. House organists like Gashe took Sotho songs and turned them into *marabi* (Coplan, 1985:98).

1.9.5 Sotho Influences: *Famo Marabi*

Urban Sotho dancing and praise music was marked by a new feature (Coplan, 1985:98): individual women dancing for a male audience. According to numerous eye-witnesses the *famo* (from *ho re famo*: "to open nostrils; to raise garments, displaying the genitals", according to Adams (1976:151), was almost "defiantly suggestive". Coplan, drawing upon

Mphahlele (1971:45) and Themba (*Drum*, 1958, as quoted by Coplan, 1985:98), recounts sultry Dionysian sexual excesses:

> Women made shaking and thrusting movements with their shoulders, hips and bosoms while lifting their flared skirts, perhaps to mime 'showing their ass to Lesotho'. The dancers wore no underwear but instead 'had painted rings around the whole area of their sex, a ring they called 'spotlight'. The dancing was wild to the point of frenzy and accompanied by *marabi* played on a pedal organ. Men, dancing alongside, or seated against the walls, chose the women they wanted and took them into the back for intercourse (Coplan, 1985:98).

According to Coplan (1985:98) the term *famo* not only refers to a dance, but to also to the lengthy recitative songs performed by the women, which served as a correlate to the male *likoata's* praise songs, the *lifela*. The women often addressed their *famo* songs to the men. Usually, they began with the salutation *Aoelele ngoana moshanynana!* ("Hey, male child!") followed by a veritable stream of rhetorical metaphors and invectives expressing the singer's tragic fate. In these *famo* recitatives, a woman quite often expressed bitterness about her lot in general and towards specific people and situations. At the same time, however, she effusively praised her own character and physical charms in no uncertain terms.[21] In Chapter 4, we will consider the implications of such *famo* songs for Cixous' notion of *écriture féminine*, with specific reference to *Famo Ngoanana* ("Famo Young Girl") by Manapetle Makara Koa Famong.

Not only did *marabi* assimilate diverse musical styles as a "common denominator" without denying their cultural idiosyncrasies; it also had the capacity to transverse class barriers. In "Highbreaks: A Taste of *Marabi* in the 1920's and 1930's (2005:116)", Coplan observes that "for African proletarians, middle-class entertainment was something of a model of city culture and it certainly influenced the development of *marabi*." Furthermore:

> The 1920's and 1930's were the era of 'concert and dance' among the urban African petty bourgeoisie. A choir or ragtime-vaudeville company performed for the first four hours of the evening, followed by four hours of dancing to the band. Though shebeens seldom afforded enough space for a concert, black promoters could hire most of the eight halls in Johannesburg available to Africans. At working-class concerts and dances, tireless pianists like Solomon 'Zuluboy' Cele accompanied singers and stage dances from eight pm to midnight and then played for *marabi* dancing until four am (Coplan, 1985:105).

[21] cf. Coplan (1985:257-263) for a transcription and discussion of Famong's *Famo Ngeoanana* ("Famo Young Girl").

1.9.6 Zulu Influences: *Ndunduma Marabi* as "Transitional Object"

Ndunduma (Ballantine, 1993:27) concerts and dance were the Zulu version of *marabi*. These concerts (Coplan, 1985: 105) were often frequented by new arrivals from rural areas who wanted to be assimilated into their new urban environment and acquire some 'town culture':

> The term *Ndunduma* means 'mine dumps' in Zulu and symbolized the totality of Johannesburg's culture to people from Natal. The *ndunduma* concerts and dances were the favourite of the *udliwe i'ntaba*, people 'eaten by the hills', those who, like the Sotho *sebono marao*, left home on contract work and never returned.

The irony and, indeed, pathos of this highly evocative idiom, evoking the idea of people swallowed by unsightly mine dumps, are thrown into even sharper relief when one compares it to Alan Paton's description, in *Cry the Beloved Country* (1987:7), of the rolling grass-covered hills in Natal as "lovely beyond any singing of it".

The reason why (Coplan, 1985:106) black workers took so strongly to *ndunduma marabi* was that, being 'in a state of cultural transit', they found themselves in a position in which they, on the one hand, found traditional African music too rural, coarse, backward and uncivilised for the urban environs they now inhabited whilst, on the other hand, still strongly tethered to an obdurate sense of Zulu identity, they were simply unfamiliar with African American music and culture and Western culture at large. Caught in this interstitial cultural zone, they therefore sought, and found, a form of music that was palpably Zulu in character but, at the same time, sufficiently 'modern' and westernised to support their growing awareness and self-image as urban working-class Africans.[22] Hence, it can be argued that *ndunduma marabi* helped to facilitate the traumatic transitional period in their status from rural subsistence farmers to labourers in the unfamiliar environment of the city. When viewed in this way, *marabi* bears a striking resemblance to Donald Winnicott's psychoanalytic notion of "transitional objects", as appropriated by Bernard Stiegler. In a nutshell, Winnicott views transitional objects as an intermediary link 'between a baby's inability and his growing ability to recognise and accept reality' (Winnicott, 1971:2, as quoted in Olivier, 2016:2). This

[22] This dual aspect also comes to the fore in Wolfgang Bender's (1991:175) observation that "a new music arose in the urban culture: a music not holding on to a continuation of traditional dances, but, one the other hand, also unable to deny its connection to them. This music, which later became known as marabi, was played in the '*shebeens*'."

can take the form of a cherished toy or a blanket (Linus's blanket in the cartoon series "Peanuts" is such an example). Winnicott (1971:2, in Olivier, 2016:2-3) goes on to extend this idea to human nature, specifically by locating a need for an 'intermediate area of experience' (in the case of the infant – a toy or blanket) that serves as a 'resting place' between the inner life of the individual, which according to Olivier (2016:2) might 'vary in richness and the absence or presence of conflict' and outer reality while keeping both 'separate yet interrelated" (Winnicott, 1971:2). In his book *What Makes Life Worth Living; On Pharmacology* (2013:172). Stiegler appropriates and expands Winnicott's thoughts by showing that the function or purpose of transitional objects is to "provide a kind of generative matrix which functions in a persons' later life as a source of meaning, in this way precluding the loss of the 'feeling of existing'" (Olivier, 2016:3). In other words, in the same way in which the transitional object opens up an immeasurable, or sublime (in Kantian terms), space between mother and child, it serves as a matrix for existential worth, or 'meaningfulness' from which a person is able to draw sustenance in times of existential need (Olivier, 2016:4). Not only this, it also serves as a generative space connected to the creation of works of art, be it visual, literary, sonic, or audiovisual. This is explicated in greater detail by Olivier (2016:4) with reference to Kant's "aesthetic ideas." The point is that, when conceptualised in the light of the above, *marabi* can be construed as a transitional object insofar as it opens up a space of "immeasurable consistency" (Stiegler, 2013: location 182-94) that serves to allay the existential trauma experienced by black workers, moving from their familiar rural areas to the unfamiliar urban milieu, thereby affording them with a sense of "existential meaningfulness" (Olivier, 2016:4).

To return to our original theme, overall our investigations thus far leave us with little doubt as to *marabi's* wildly multitudinous constitution and the way in which it played out the trajectories of what had gone before (the worker's indigenous past) and that which was to come (the new elements of their city dwelling) in the manner of a 'transitional object'. We will return to *marabi's* role in mediating the old and new in ensuing chapters.

We have already intimated that *marabi's* socio-economic and political context is necessary in order for the philosophical analysis in what follows to make sense. Thus, having considered *marabi's* harrowing economic and socio-political context, as well as *marabi* itself in its various multi-ethnic forms, let us move on to consider what (mutual) relevance it might have for the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2: DELEUZE, GUATTARI AND *MARABI*

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter endeavours to forge a *rapprochement* between the thought of Deleuze and Guattari and *marabi*, the music *inter alia* of the slumyards and shebeens in pre-Apartheid South Africa in Johannesburg and similar urban centres in the 1920s and 1930s in its context. At first blush, these two could not be more dissimilar. On the one hand, there is the esoteric philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari with its use of neologisms such as "desiring machines" and "bodies without organs" ("BwOs") and, on the other, *marabi* and the squalor and oppression that brought it into being. Compare, for instance, Deleuze's rarefied BwO with *marabi's* neologisms for noxious drinks such as *isikilimikikwiki* ("kill me quick"). Regarding this 'aside', in no ways do I hereby mean to devalue *marabi* or diminish the gravity of its context; I merely mean to point out an example that is humorous in its dissimilarity.

Closer investigation, even at this nascent stage, however, yields surprising results. We have already seen that, not only are aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's thought pertinent to the very important historical and socio-political context of *marabi*, as outlined in the previous chapter – notably their concept of the "apparatus of capture" – but, as I will show, provide us with a completely new way of rethinking *marabi* in *all* of its multiplicitous guises: as music, as dance, as social occasion, and as a category of people, to mention but a few. In this regard, Coplan's (1985:107) following observation leaves us with little doubt that *marabi* is much more than simply music. He notes that "the term *marabi* serves as much to a social situation and cultural outlook as to a complex of musical features. Indeed, during the interwar years *marabi* served as nothing less than both a setting and a symbolic expression of the birth of an urban community among the African proletariat." Todd Matshikiza sums it up succinctly when he recalls that *marabi* was more than "the hot, highly rhythmic repetitious single-based dance turns of the later 20's … *marabi* is also the name of an epoch." It is precisely *marabi'*s multitudinous constitution as shown above and its high co-efficiency for what Deleuze and Guattari call "the deterritorialization of the refrain" that provides us with a potential locus of engagement between *marabi* and Deleuze and Guattari, as shall be demonstrated. This point of correlation will, however, be questioned in our consideration of the (Modern) musical

examples scrutinised by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* and their conception of the goal of music as being the rendering "sonic of the insonic forces of the cosmos" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:342-3). It is important to note, in the light of what is to follow, that central to this "cosmic-becoming" is the 'unhinging' of time from that of measured *chronos* time to that of *aeon*, the 'floating' indeterminate time of becomings and haecceity. We will clarify what is meant by "becomings" and "haecceity" in due course. After this consideration, we will address the impasse in which we find ourselves between *marabi*, on the one hand, and the Western Modern context of Deleuze and Guattari's thought and their ideas regarding tonality and rhythm, on the other. We will see, in this regard, that *marabi* deviates considerably from Deleuze and Guattari's goal of music as "becoming cosmic". Consequently, we will go on to explore ways out of this seeming disconnect, with reference to Jean-Godefroy Bidima's (2004) consideration of what he calls "minor musics," or more precisely "marginalized musics," which fall directly outside the direct ambit of Deleuze and Guattari's specific spheres of musical interest. Particularly pertinent to our discussion is the way in which Bidima shows how certain minor musics – for instance, *Zouk* – exhibit Deleuzian features such as a high co-efficiency of deterritorialisation. He also demonstrates convincingly how *Zouk* can legitimately be called a "minor music," in the same sense as Deleuze and Guattari's "minor languages." Thereafter, using Bidima's insights as a starting point, we will consider the possibility of regarding *marabi* as "minor music" by way of its correlation with Deleuze and Guattari's broadened notion of "minor literature", with reference to Kafka. It will suffice to mention here that Deleuze and Guattari's use of minor cinema to include minor music, also points toward a correlation between "minor literature" and music. Therefore, taking our cue from Bidima, who also argues that Deleuze would encourage the experimental "transportation" of concepts, we will then consider *marabi's* capacity for the deterritorialisation of the refrain, as already intimated. This consideration will also introduce matters of black urban identity, with specific reference to the tensile coexistence of indigenous 'old' and 'new' elements, such as Afrikaner and Afro-American influences in *marabi*.

Through what was adumbrated above, I intend to garner sufficient evidence to suggest that Deleuzoguattarian philosophy and *marabi* are not as incompatible as they first appeared to be, doing so by locating further points of convergence between the two that might potentially emerge, either directly, or 'experimentally'. To this end, I will pay specific attention to the salutary epistemological consequences of conceiving *marabi* as what Deleuze and Guattari

term an "assemblage," given the latter's capacity to combat the logic of essences and the logic of wholes. Thereupon, I will proceed to gauge the extent to which *marabi* can profitably be situated at the crossroads between the 'schizophrenising' effects of capitalism on South African black workers and the multitudinous constitution of *marabi* as "rhizoidally re-configured." Finally, I will conclude our consideration with a consideration of lines of flight, becomings, nomadism, haecceity and *aeon* time with reference to Dikobo's (1973) *The Marabi Dance*.

In the final analysis, I intend to establish hereby that, not only is there an isomorphism between the Deleuzoguattarian philosophy and *marabi*, but that the interplay between them could potentially produce and deploy new modes of rationality that might enrich our understanding of both.

2.2. MEDIATING OPPOSITES: DELEUZE, GUATTARI AND *MARABI*

Having contextualised *marabi* along the lines suggested by Callinicos (1987:7) and Coplan (1985:90-112) in the preceding chapter with reference to its heterogeneous guises, let us pause for a moment and chart the way ahead. In order to do this, we will consider Deleuze and Guattari's ideas about the goal of music, specifically Modern (classical) music, with reference to *aeon* time, the time of cosmic music, becomings, and of haecceities (Bogue, 2003:16). In the light of this consideration, we will then re-evaluate the overarching goal of this chapter, which is attempting to forge a *rapprochement* between aspects of Deleuzoguattarian thought and *marabi* in its context.

The dilemma central to this endeavour is summed up by Jeremy Gilbert (2004) in his consideration of parallels between Deleuze and Guattari's conception of music and certain types of jazz. After exploring two instances of avant-garde free jazz and their possible connection with Deleuze and Guattari, he asks a question, which is highly pertinent to our present purposes:

> How can such different types of music-making be accommodated by the same frame of reference when both are so radically different from any of the types of music which Deleuze and Guattari themselves discussed? (2004:120)

Indeed, at first glance, the chasm between avant-garde free jazz, *marabi* and Deleuze and Guattari's choice of musical *oeuvre* as primary theoretical locus seems impassable. A plausible reason for this disparity is that, although Deleuze and Guattari wrote a great deal about music, their writing is largely located within the framework of a specifically Western classical musical tradition. Consider, for example, their division of classical music into the Classical (Mozart, Haydn, and most of Beethoven – which they oddly conflate with the Baroque) and Modern 'phases', and their focus on western classical composers. Their conception of the goal of music is also problematic *vis-à-vis marabi*, as shall be seen.

Within this paradigm of Western classical music, Deleuze and Guattari identify the goal of all composers, in general, and of modern composers, in particular, as that of capturing virtual forces, that is, "the forces of an immaterial, nonformal and energetic Cosmos" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:342-3) so as to give them sonic embodiment.

The composer Olivier Messiaen's significance is twofold in this regard and is the focus of Deleuze and Guattari's attention. Bogue (2004:99) observes that in one sense, "his music is connected to the actual world, in that he generates thematic material through a deterritorialization of actual birdsong refrains in a process of 'becoming other'". But in another sense, he fulfils the goal of all composers, notably modern composers, as indicated by Deleuze and Guattari, namely (as quoted in Bogue, 2004:99) "they partake of a different realm – the virtual-rendering sonorous the non-sonorous forces immanent within the real." Accordingly, Messiaen's "…compositions may be seen as sonic bodies without organs, palpable plains of consistency that render perceptible what usually escapes perception – the speeds, affects and floating time of the virtual." This "time of the virtual" is the time of *aeon*, which differs fundamentally from the time of *chronos* – chronological time as measured with the aid of devices such as clocks – in that its temporality is based on the infinitive (Bogue, 2004:98): "'to swim,' 'to sleep,' a becoming that is unfixed and non-pulsed, unfolding in no specifiable direction and in relation to no clear coordinates." More precisely, and firstly, the time of *chronos* intrinsically imposes a'hegemony' of the present over the past and future where, as Deleuze maintains in *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze, 1990:162-163), "only the present exists in time. Past, present, and future are not three dimensions of time; only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to the present in time. In other words, whatever is future or past in relation to a certain present (a certain extension or duration) belongs to a vaster present which has a greater extension or duration. There is

always a vaster present which absorbs the past and the future. Thus the relativity of past and future with respect to the present entails a relativity of presents themselves, in relation to each other." In contradistinction, time conceived as *aeon*, according to Manuel Delanda's formulation in *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (2004: 126-127), unlike "actual time, which is made exclusively out of presents (what is past and future relative to one time scale is still the living present of a cycle of greater duration)," entails "a temporality which always sidesteps the present," and which "must be conceived as an ordinal continuum unfolding into past and future, a time where nothing ever occurs but where everything is endlessly becoming in both directions, always 'already happened' (in the past direction) and always 'about to happen' (in the future direction)." As Deleuze himself delineates it (Deleuze 1990: 164), in the time of *aeon*, "only the past and the future inhere or subsist in time. Instead of a present which absorbs the past and future, a future and past divide the present at every instant and subdivide it *ad infinitum* into past and future, in both directions at once. Or rather, it is the instant without thickness and without extension, which subdivides each present into past and future, rather than vast and thick presents which comprehend both future and past in relation to one another." As Miguel de Beistegui's maintains in a beautiful formulation in *Truth and Genesis* (Beistegui, 2004:327), in relation to the quotidian temporality of *chronos*, which is the "time of the world, the time of clocks, measurable and recognizable, the time of individuated phenomena," the time of *aeon* pertains to a much more "subterranean, or perhaps a truly earthly, reality," a reality "beneath the extended time of the present," "the time of earth, the time of the shadow or the *oscuro* from which the *chiaro* of the phenomenon comes forward." Holland (2013:111) notes that in this time – the plane of consistency (in the virtual) is "populated immanently by 'haecceities'. Haecceities constitute the absolute degree-zero of related difference: this and that and this and….; this with that with this with…Each haecceity designates a pure 'this-here-now'." Hainge (2004:36) argues that (music) within Deleuze's philosophical project music is a haecceity, which is to say that, like "a season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date", it is becoming, a certain kind of affect at differing levels of intensity, it is a "this-ness", not a *thing* or *substance*'; as Deleuze and Guattari put it:

> There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date [each has] a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though the individuality is different from that of a thing or subject…In Charlotte Bronte, everything is in terms of wind, things, people, faces, loves, words. Lorna's 'five in the evening', when love falls and fascism rises. That

> awful five in the evening! We say 'What a story!' 'What heat!' 'What a life!' to designate a very singular individuation. The hours of the day in Lawrence, in Faulkner. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:261)

Messiaen's experiments with rhythm are truly extraordinary and typify Deleuze and Guattari's goal of music insofar as he uses rhythm to render audible the nonsonorous force of virtual (*aeon*) time, the time of haecceities. For Almut Röβler (1986:40, quoted in Bogue, 2003:44), "this time can be 'the endlessly long time of the stars, the very long time of the mountains, the middling one of the human being, the short one of insects, the very short one of atoms."

Deleuze and Guattari's conception of modern music "as molecularized sonic matter capable of harnessing cosmic forces," as Bogue (2003:44) puts it, is also exemplified by the music of Edgard Varèse. In this regard, Varèse's 11 compositions from his *Amériques* (1921) to *Poèm electronique* (1958) play an important role in the history of twentieth century *avant-garde* music. Deleuze and Guattari incorporate much of Varèses' vocabulary in their discussion of Modern music. As Bogue (2003:47) avers,

> Throughout his career Varèse sought to dissolve the structures of tonal music and fashion a sonic material capable of capturing vital intensities, frequencies, and rhythms. He created sound prisms that refract nonsonic forces, sound crystals whose inner molecular structures generate multiple external forms, ion machines whose micro-perturbations give rise to sonic transmutations of matter. Advances in technology merely provided him with better tools for creating a music that 'molecularizes' sonic matter, but becomes thus capable of harnessing nonsonorous forces such as Duration, Intensity. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 423, 343, quoted in Bogue, 2003:47)

In the light of the above, it would be hard to find music in the western classical tradition with goals for authentic musical expression more dissimilar to *marabi* than that of Messiaen and Varèse, especially as regards their treatment of rhythm and how it relates to the unearthing of *aeon* time in rendering sonic the forces of the Cosmos.

For one, *marabi* is both African and popular music (although, as we will see in Chapter 3, it is difficult to 'pigeonhole' it to any single genre), which places it squarely outside of the ambit of Deleuze and Guattari's consideration of music, especially considering the examples treated in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Another point of dissimilarity is that of rhythm and tonality.

Marabi, in its guise as music, is implacably pulsed. *Chronos* time is entrenched in *marabi* by way of an accompaniment provided by a player shaking a tin of small stones. We have already seen in Chapter 1 (cf. Sililo, 1986, quoted in Ballantine 1993:27) that the rhythms which characterise *marabi* hearken to the widespread drum patterns of traditional Nguni music. This pattern is both simple and repetitive and at the furthest remove from what Bogue (2003:34) describes in modern music, with specific reference to the music of Boulez as "a free-floating time, a sort of indefinite rubato, unmarked by any organizing pulse…a free-floating time Deleuze and Guattari call Aion". Moreover, notwithstanding indigenous melodic inflections, *marabi* can be characterised as predominantly tonal and by no means analogous with Deleuze and Guattari's predilection for generalised chromaticism.

Fortuitously, however, an observation by Derrida (1979:81) provides us with a way out of this seeming impasse and puts what has gone before into a somewhat different perspective: "This is my starting point: no meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation." Text and context, as seen in Derridean terms, are infinitely open-ended and accommodate a multitude of variables.[23] This does not mean, however, that the spectre of relativism raises its ugly head here; what it does mean, is that – while the context within which something first occurs will always *co-determine* the meanings that this phenomenon will accrue in subsequent contexts – the 'first' context is not 'saturated', that is, cannot, and does not, prevent additional meanings to be added in complex ways to the phenomenon in question in subsequent contexts where it is encountered. (The concept, 'gay', is an obvious example.) Moreover, with Derrida's quote in mind, it can be said that music does not occur in a socio-political vacuum, as we have seen in our consideration of the circumstances surrounding black urbanisation and the advent of *marabi* culture. The same can be said of the Western Modern music and composers discussed by Deleuze and Guattari, which were informed by a completely different set of social and political imperatives than was *marabi*.

Hence, in light of *marabi's* restrictive and exploitative socio-economic context, it would be unjust to compare *marabi* to compositions such as Messiaen's *Mode of Durations and Intensities*[24], which serialises every aspect of music, or Varèse and Stockhausen's experimentation with electronic music. Very importantly, I do not hereby suggest that *marabi*

[23] This is also consonant with Deleuze and Guattari's conception of rhizoidal thinking, in which reality is seen as being infinitely (inter-)connectable and open to new configurations.
[24] For a consideration of Messiaen's *Mode of Duration and Intensities,* cf. Reginald Smith Brindle (1987:23-26).

is in any sense less complex or inferior to the music that Deleuze and Guattari specifically engages with, especially in the light of the complexities of the traditional African musical tradition from which *marabi* draws and the dense construction of its form. The question of context does, however, to my mind remain a valid concern in accounting for certain differences between *marabi* and Western Modern classical music.

Given that the goals and respective socio-political contexts of *marabi*, on the one hand, and those of Western Modern music as seen by Deleuze and Guattari, on the other, are incommensurable, the question that presents itself is: are there not possibly other approaches to *marabi* that do not necessarily fall within the ambit of Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of specific kinds of music, but which are still germane to the ethos of the conceptual framework that serves as a context to their thought?

Bidima (2004) is convinced that an attempt to transfer Deleuze's thought to other types of music, in particular popular minority music, would not only be a viable alternative, but one that would be wholly endorsed by Deleuze, given his insistence on the experimental nature of thought:

> In attempting to transport Deleuze, carrying his views outside of his centre – the Western Capitalist universe of references – and wanting it to attend to the foreign language of popular culture (whether it be African, Chinese or Greek), we were only following Deleuze himself who wanted thought always to be "experimental." (2004:194)

He goes about "transporting" Deleuze by arguing convincingly, with assistance from Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, that, notwithstanding Deleuze's neglect of minorities and minority music, certain kinds of peripheral music, such as *Zouk*,[25] *Soukous*[26] and Greek Rebetiko[27],

---

[25] Jon Pareles in *The New York Times* (1988:23) describes *Zouk* as a highly infectious, melody-packed form of party music, roughly equivalent to the American 'juke' which was pioneered by an Antillean group called 'Kassav'. Its leader, Pierre-Edouard Decimus and brother, George, from Guadeloupe joined forces with Jacob F. Desvarieux, a fellow Guadeloupian and upcoming arranger in Paris studio and began to create a highly idiosyncratic musical mix. Their records, according to Pareles, used the midtempo *gwa ka beat,* a Guadeloupian version of West African ritual drumming and chanting and the rhythm of the St. Jean from Guadaloupe's carnival music. Furthermore, "Kassav [the *Zouk* founding band] also soaked up music from Trinidadian soca, West African highlife and soukous, Cuban and Puerto Rican salsa, Haitian cadence… and North American funk and disco…" to form the inimitable *Zouk* style.

[26] According to Robert White (2004:548) "Soukouss [his spelling] refers to a particular type of Congolese popular music which was developed by Congolese musicians living in the 1980's and is virtually unknown in the Congo itself." "The term soukouss," White further notes, "was originally a dance form from the late 1960's originating from the French word *secouer* "'to shake.'" "This style is also called 'Congo music, Zairean music, Zairian rumba, and most recently soukouss.'"

exhibit salient features of Deleuzian thought, such as notions of "assemblages," "flows," "intensities" and "deterritorialization" (2004:193).

In the light of this, a plausible way of finding a *rapprochement* between aspects of Deleuze and Guattari and *marabi* may well be by establishing the extent to which *marabi* – in a similar manner to *Zouk*, *Soukous* and the Greek Rebetiko – exemplifies key aspects of their thought, that is, to inscribe it in a wider, but still relevant, context. Another possible solution to this problem is suggested by studies by Bidima (2004) and Olivier (2017) who successfully demonstrate that Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a "minor language" can be "transported" to address analogous concerns – in the case of Bidima, that of a *minor music* and, for Olivier, that of forging a "minor discourse" that could potentially deterritorialise the dominant neoliberal capitalist discourse.

Given the efficacy of the above studies, our goal shall now be to "transport Deleuze" in a similar way, and to do so by relating his insights on minor languages, and their salient features, to *marabi* in order to establish whether it can be regarded as a "minor music."

2.3 *MARABI* AND MINOR MUSIC

2.3.1 Characteristics of a Minor Language: Bidima and Olivier

I will commence with Bidima's thoughts on Deleuze's neglect of the music of minorities, notwithstanding instances of minor music that were prevalent during the time of his writing, such as *Zouk* and *Soukous.* The terrain will then shift to Deleuze and Guattari's (1986:18) characterisation of what is meant by a "minor language," with reference to the concept of "deterritorialisation," as explicated by Olivier (2017:3). I will then return to Bidima's application of these characteristics to *Zouk*, a minor music, and use this demonstration as a guideline to gauge the extent to which *marabi* fulfils Deleuze and Guattari's characteristics of a "minor language," and whether it can legitimately be designated as a "minor music."

---

[27] Cf. Bidima (2004:182-183) for a consideration of Rebetiko, with specific reference to the way in which Revault d'Allonnes addresses the question of how a "collective subjectivity" (d'Allonnes, 1973:143) produces a musical work and its relation to society. The parallels between Rebetiko and *marabi* are particularly noteworthy, specifically its vilification by the "good-thinking" stratas of society and its "primitive style; rigorous rhythm…simple orchestration on two instruments …"(d'Allonnes, 1973:146, as quoted in Bidima, 2004:183)

Bidima (2004:188) finds Deleuze's omission of the music of minorities and minority music perplexing in the light of his view that interdisciplinarity is an initiative to be encouraged. By way of example, he cites the works of Roland Barthes, Natalie Sarraute[28] and finally William Labov[29], specifically the latter's "relationship with the languages of ghettos and specific districts" (Deleuze, 1995:28). Here, it is difficult to reconcile Deleuze's recognition of minor languages, on the one hand, and neglect of minor *musics*, on the other. As Bidima (2004:189) puts it: "If Deleuze recognizes, on a linguistic level, the importance of these ghetto languages, why did he not address the music of minorities and minority music?"

Deleuze's "neglect" of *marabi*, specifically, is highly understandable, given what Ballantine describes as the collective "amnesia which bedevils an understanding of black South African jazz" (1993:3) as propagated at an individual level: "outside of a small circle of specialists,[30] virtually nothing is known – or, at least remembered – about the history of this remarkable music" (pp.1-2); and institutionally: "the scandalously irresponsible attitude towards its preservation displayed by institutions that ought to have known better," notably the record companies and the South African Broadcasting Corporation or SABC (pp.2-3). It must also be recalled that Deleuze and Guattari were writing before the frantic postcolonial 'unscramble' took place and an interest in local musics emerged.[31] In contrast, Bidima gives instances of minor music that were emerging in France, such as *Zouk*, which coincided with the time at which Deleuze was writing about the musical ritornello, and the African musical form *Soukous*, which had also made its breakthrough in France at that time. Bidima (2004:

[28] Nathalie Sarraute, a the Russian-Jewish writer, is perhaps best known for her *Portrait d'un Inconnu*, 1956 (*Portrait of a Man Alone*) which elicited high praise from none other than Jean-Paul Sartre, who referred to it as an "anti-novel". Significantly, he does not mean this in a derogatory way; rather he avers that "One of the most singular aspects of our literary epoch is the occasional appearance of exciting and negative works that could be called anti-novels." He cites writers such as Sarraute, Nabokov, Evelyn Waugh and, in a certain sense, the *Counterfeiters* as being examples of such categories. (Sartre and Bromberg, 1995:40)

[29] William Labov (b.1927-) had an immense impact on the way in which language is studied by way of sociolinguistics, which, as the words suggests, emphasises the study of language in its social context. Jack Chambers (2017:3) notes, in this regard, that Labov's research paradigm "introduced the variable as a structural element, a radical departure from the invariant, qualitative phonemes and morphemes of the linguistic mainstream at the time. The variable is variant, continuous and quantitative" and situates language in its social context as "an object possessing orderly heterogeneity", as Uriel Weinreich, Labov and Martin Herzog phrase it (1968:100). According to Chambers (2017:3) he achieved this in three ways: (1) "He introduced social attributes such as age, sex, social class, and ethnicity as independent variables against which dependent linguistic variables could be correlated"; (2) "He studied the speech of people interacting in natural social settings so that contextual styles ranging from casual to formal conditions became a locus of variation" and (3) "he drew inferences about language change based on synchronous differences in variant usage between age groups."

[30] We have already noted that Ballantine qualifies this statement by saying that recent scholarship "has begun "slowly and on the margins" to reconstruct the history of urban black performance culture". He goes on to cite notable efforts in this regard (cf.1993:1).

[31] I am indebted to Olivier for this observation.

189) asks pertinent questions in this regard, namely: as to "why Deleuze did not pay attention to the emergence of this music in the French cultural space in which he was an informed observer and secondly, how could Deleuze have passed by this music that was not of European culture, but existed in European space?" Moreover: "To speak of dodecaphony, of atonality and of the constituent discontinuities of a music that traces lines of flight like that of Boulez, is to repeat the same: Western-Capitalist-Judeo-Christian Civilization!"

The true reasons why Deleuze did not focus on minority music will remain largely opaque, if not impossible to trace. But this is marginal to the study that I am carrying forth here. The pivotal point is, rather than upbraiding Deleuze for this omission, I believe a more productive approach to pursue would be to return to Bidima's insights into "transporting" Deleuze outside of his Western capitalist territory and moving swiftly onward towards Bidima's emphasis on the importance of experimenting with thought.

Bidima continues this 'thought experiment', notwithstanding his exasperation with Deleuze's neglect of minor music, by noting that "these forms of music [*Zouk* and *Soukous,* N.D.] offer an example of 'minor music' in the sense that Deleuze uses the term in literature," proceeding thereupon to demonstrate (2004:189) how *Zouk* fulfils the three characteristics of "minor literature," as Deleuze and Guattari conceive of it and define it (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1986:16-18). We will return to this soon.

This is also the case for Olivier (2017). He considers the possibility of "transporting Deleuze" using literature as a point of departure, as already intimated. He specifically inquires whether Deleuze and Guattari's meaning and criteria for a "minor literature" in their work on Franz Kafka can be transposed to the broader field of language – and language as discourse – in such a way that it contributes towards an understanding of the possibility of a "minor discourse," that is, "a particular way of using discourse" (2017:1) that could deterritorialise the dominant discourses of the present. In particular, the work of Naomi Klein exemplifies a "minor discourse" with a high co-efficiency for deterritorialising the discourse of neoliberal capitalism. Although it falls outside of the direct ambit of our immediate consideration, it is significant to note that Deleuze and Guattari also apply the expanded notion of minor literature to minor cinema (which also includes minor music).

Let us therefore, proceed along these paths suggested by Bidima and Olivier by considering the features of a "minor literature" as identified by Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari.

2.3.2 Characteristics of a Minor Language: Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari

In *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* (1986:18) Deleuze and Guattari identify the three pivotal characteristics of what they term "minor literature." These are "the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation."

Bidima (2004:189) demonstrates how *Zouk* exemplifies these characteristics: "First it deterritorializes the French language through the revision of vocabulary and of syntax, next ts existence is linked to the claiming of Caribbean identity within French society, and finally the lyrics of *Zouk* reflect the construction of a Caribbean subjectivity on a collective level."

2.3.3 *Marabi* as Minor Music

Our question is, of course: can these three characteristics be ascribed to *marabi*? That is, is *marabi* an instance of a "minor music"?

The first characteristic concerns a minor literature's deployment of language's "high co-efficient of deterritorialisation." In answering this, we will first, of course, have to be clear on what precisely is meant by "deterritorialisation."

Olivier gives the following lucid insights into the notion of "deterritorialisation" and its tensile relationship to reterritorialisation, together with its implications for schizoanalysis:

> For Deleuze and Guattari (1983:382) "deterritorialization" entails something like dismantling the comparative stasis and stability that characterize identifications of all kinds, in the process setting free what they call "desiring production." It stands in a tensional relationship of mutual implication with "reterritorialization," which is thought of as "arresting" or discontinuing the productive process, but both of which presuppose a "territory" to begin with. It is therefore consonant with what they understand by "schizoanalysis," which "deterritorializes" psychic identifications, freeing "desiring-production" in the process. (2017:3)

Adrian Parr, as quoted in Olivier (2017:3), expresses it as follows:

> Perhaps deterritorialisation can best be understood as a movement producing change. In so far as it operates as a line of flight, deterritorialisation indicates the creative potential of an assemblage. So, to deterritorialise is to free up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations. (2010:69)

We will return to concepts like "line of flight" and "assemblage" later.

Concerning Bidima's demonstration of *Zouk*'s high capacity to deterritorialise the French language through its revision of vocabulary and syntax, this deterritorialisation would be the effect of *Zouk* 'freeing' French from its existing signifying relations and, in so doing, opening it up to new semiotic and grammatical configurations. The question, of course, is: To what extent can this insight be extended to *marabi*?

A clue to this perhaps lies in Coplan's (1985:107) observation that *marabi* compositions had titles but often no recognizable words, meaning that participants were free to make up lyrics to suit the melody as they wished, thereby spreading the melodies across ethnic lines. Moreover, as with *Tebetjane Ufana Ne'mfene*, some of these became well known. Other *marabi* songs, with recognizable words, achieved general distribution because of their commentary on urban experience or their expression of political protest. Given this, could it not be said that *marabi* deterritorialises language by having songs with titles, but lyrics with no recognisable words? Otherwise put, it would seem that *marabi* deterritorialises (in the sense of 'freeing up') normal stable signifying processes as they relate to song writing, replacing them with free linguistic improvisations that are, in turn, further deterritorialised by their distribution across ethnic lines.

Seen in this way, it can be said that *marabi* fulfils Deleuze and Guattari's first characteristic of a minor language, namely that it harbours a high co-efficiency for deterritorialisation. Let us now move on to the second characteristic of a minor literature, namely, (Deleuze and Guattari 1986:18) "the connection of the individual to a political immediacy". At first blush, it would seem that *marabi* fails to meet this criterion, given that *marabi* was the music of disenfranchised, oppressed black workers from the slumyards. That they were entirely bereft of any political standing whatsoever, either individually or collectively, would appear to indicate that *marabi* was not instrumental in opening up the individual black worker to the political. However, the picture changes completely when one considers that, for Franz Kafka,

‘the political’ (as opposed to 'politics' in the ordinary sense) is by no means synonymous with an individual’s or a collective’s access to positions or forums of governance in the prosaic sense of the term.

At this point, a digression is in order to better scrutinise Kafka’s conception of ‘the political’ and establish how it relates to *marabi*. Importantly, it is hard to pin Kafka down to any specific political position, although mention is sometimes made of his interest in democratic socialism. Rather, what makes Kafka’s writing political is his intense engagement with political themes. In one sense, for Kafka, ‘the political’ is the alienated individual’s or community’s – in his case, the Jews in Prague – struggle against the inexorable, repressive, even surreal machinations of authoritarian systems of control – in whatever guise, be it paternalistic or bureaucratic – and such an individual’s or community’s capacity for resistive change. To enter this fray is to be political. Hence, for Kafka, the simple gesture of straightening a bowed head, accompanied by formless music like that of church bells (a frequent leitmotif in his novels) becomes one of inestimable political import in the sense that it serves as a paradigmatic metaphor for the victory, albeit small, of the individual bowed down by the weight of authoritarianism, yet engaged in resistive action. This ‘straightening up’ also implies the release of desire, expressed in sound, which was previously closed off by the strictures of control and domination. It is important to note that, for Kafka, justice is ultimately synonymous with desire, which animates the social field in an immanent fashion. The same can be said of Kafka’s conception of the political. In *The Trial*, Kafka follows his desire, moving from room to room, along corridors, through contingent dalliances with women, each of which is a functionary of justice. Since Kafka shows desire as immanently saturating the entire social field, all the micro-events in the hallways, backrooms and corridors are intrinsically political. Hence, we can infer from Kafka’s actions that the political is to be found within these micro-events, rather than emanating from a transcendent instance (remember that the tribunal before which he stands toward the beginning of the novel immediately ends in a shambles).

Marabi, as a meta-musical practice, especially in its guise of the *famo* dance, exemplifies something similar to the contingent dalliances that Kafka has with the women, little girls, and to his homosexuality with the artist Titorello. A correlation can, thus, be drawn between the manner in which Kafka draws together the field of social and political immanence of desire and justice through a series of contingent libidinal encounters, and *marabi*, as a convivial and

social practice entailing the spontaneous coming together of disparate social elements within the shebeens dotting the warrens of the slumyards, themselves likewise forming milieus marked by lascivious encounters. In this sense, the individual is already in the domain of the political. This leaves us with little doubt, that *marabi* fulfils the second characteristic of a minor literature, namely "the connection of the individual to a political immediacy" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986:18).

Having established that *marabi* meets the first and second criteria of a minor literature, let us move on to the third, being the extent to which *marabi* constitutes a "collective assemblage of enunciation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986:18). Deleuze and Guattari (1986:83) ask how it is possible that a statement is "always collective even when it seems to be emitted by a solitary singularity like that of the artist?" The point is that (1986:83-84): "when a statement is produced by a bachelor or an artistic singularity, it occurs necessarily as a function of a national, political, and social community." Similarly, *marabi* is always an assemblage of collective enunciation, even when emitted by a single composer such as Tebetjane. The concept of the "assemblage," in particular the "*marabi* assemblage," is dealt with in greater detail in the course of this chapter, so aspects of this present consideration need to be taken at face value. The "*marabi* assemblage" comprises a horizontal axis with two segments, which are both of collective import. The first, the segment of content, consists of all of the refrains constituting *marabi's* content – indigenous, 'new' and what can be called the *marabi* refrain, an assimilation and reconfiguration of both. This is also the level where the assemblage as 'interacting bodies' is encountered. The second segment is a collective assemblage of enunciation, which, in this case, can be seen as a collective sonic enunciation, or symbolic expression of the emergence of a collective working class urban African identity in the early 1920's. From this we can infer that the *marabi* assemblage clearly fulfils Deleuze and Guattari's (1986:18) third characteristic of a "minor literature" in the way in which it serves as "collective assemblage of enunciation." *Marabi's* status as a 'minor music' thus leaves us with little doubt as to the correlation between *marabi* and the thought of Deleuze and Guattari. I hope to pursue this correlation further by demonstrating in what follows that *marabi* is a 'minor music' which deterritorialises the refrain.

Thus, in the requisite experimental vein, I will take up, in particular, *marabi's* high co-efficiency for deterritorialisation, especially of the refrain and its possible relation to the Deleuzian 'concepts' of the assemblage and rhizoid or rhizome. Intertwined in this

consideration will be the themes of indigenous and urban black identity and the way they coalesce in *marabi*.

2.4 MARABI AND THE DETTERITORIALISATION OF THE REFRAIN

2.4.1. The Constitution of the Refrain

Deleuze and Guattari (1987:300) describe music as "the active, creative operation, which consists of deterritorializing the refrain [*la ritournelle*]." An understanding of this definition and its relevance for *marabi* will depend on a clarification of the constituent parts that comprise the refrain. After a consideration of *marabi's* deterritorialisation of the refrain, our attention will shift to the "assemblage" and the extent to which *marabi* can be construed as a "musical assemblage."

We will thus begin to unpack the 'concepts' comprising the refrain. A cautionary word, however, would not be out of place. Ian Buchanan does not inculcate much confidence in the Deleuzian neophyte at the very outset when he says that:

> Deleuze and Guattari's terminology is so abstruse and difficult to engage with and the presentation of its arguments so long and convoluted it tends to get lost in the exfoliation of the concepts themselves. Moreover, these concepts are presented in a manner that is often wholly contrary to the way in which they are used in the workaday academic as well the popular ambit. (2004:1)

The same could be said of Derrida. What initially seems baffling is, in fact, a highly rational, painstaking, Trojan-horse-type unravelling of the violent binary hierarchy created by our explicit (and implicit) belief in *Logos* as a guarantor of presence, or Being-as-Presence, from within the economy of western thought and language (Olivier, 1993:314).

Bogue (2003:16) notes that "in virtually every regard, Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of music is the antithesis of the traditional, Platonic approach to the subject." In their view, according to Bogue, "the cosmos with which music is intertwined is not a circumscribed totality but an open whole whose dimensions can never be given as such" (2003:16).

Before we consider music in Deleuzian terms, let us begin with strata. Deleuze and Guattari point out that assemblages are different from strata. Strata can be seen as:

> phenomena of thickening on the Body of the earth, simultaneously molecular and molar: accumulations, coagulations, sedimentations, folding. They are

> Belts, Pincers, or Articulations. Summarily and traditionally, we distinguish three major strata: physicochemical, organic, and anthropomorphic (or "alloplastic"). *Forms* and *substances*, *codes* and *milieus* are not really distinct. They are the abstract components of every articulation…Articulation which is constitutive of a stratum, is always a double articulation (double pincer). What is articulated is a *content and an expression*. (1987:502, original emphasis)

We will soon return to the formation of codes and milieus. It is significant to note that the two attributes of articulations, namely content and expression, are crucial aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of music, and we will also return to this in our consideration of *marabi* as a possible "musical assemblage."

Buchanan (2004:11) notes that "assemblages are produced in the strata, but operate in 'zones where milieus become decoded[32]: they begin by extracting a *territory* from the milieus'" (quoted from Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:502). The implication here, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is that each assemblage is basically territorial.

Thus, the elements from which territories are formed are milieus and rhythms, which themselves are created out of chaos. We will presently consider the importance of rhythm in the creation of a territory. Bogue (2003:17) qualifies, though, that chaos, as Deleuze insists, is not an undifferentiated, dark 'blur', but a medium in which order spontaneously occurs. Deleuze and Guattari describe (1987:313) a milieu as a "coded block of space-time, a code being defined by 'periodic repetition.'" Every milieu is in contact with other milieus, however, and "each code is in a state of perpetual transcoding or transduction". When a territory is established, "a milieu component becomes at once quality and property, *quale ad proprium*" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:315). The most important feature of the formation of a territory is the expressive role of rhythm. Rhythm, in the Deleuzian sense, is not to be conflated with metre or measure. As Bogue puts it (2003:18), quoting Deleuze and Guattari:

> Measure implies the repetition of the Same, a pre-existing, self-identical pattern that is reproduced over and over again, whereas rhythm "is the Unequal or Incommensurable, always in a process of transcoding," operating "not in a homogenous space-time, but with heterogeneous blocks." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:313)

Rhythm, in brief, is difference, or relation – the in-between – whereby milieus communicate with each other, within themselves (as collections of sub-milieus), and with chaos.

[32] Buchanan (2004:11) clarifies that "decoded" is not synonymous with "deciphered;" rather it literally means the code has been detached from the milieu and made available for alternative use.

Bogue (2003:19) reiterates Deleuze and Guattari's statement that a milieu is, however, not a territory, for a territory "is in fact an act that affects milieus and rhythms and territorializes them" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:314). For Bogue (2003:19) such an action is "essentially artistic and appropriate, one whereby milieu components emerge as qualities and rhythms [in their Deleuzian sense] become expressive."

Territorialisation, thus, is "the act of rhythm that has become expressive, or of milieu components that have become qualitative" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:315). Bogue notes that autonomy is evident in the shifting relations that link various qualities together within a specific territory. As he puts it:

> Qualities and relations occur not in isolation from one another, but in complexes that "express" the relation of the territory to the internal milieu of impulses and external milieu of circumstances. Internal relations constitute *territorial motifs* and external relations form *territorial counterpoints* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:317), and both are characterized by the nonpulsed, autonomous rhythms that organize patterns of inner drives on the one hand, and outer connections with environmental variables on the other. (2003:20)

Territorialisation also introduces two important effects, namely a "reorganizing of functions" and a "regrouping of forces" (Deleuze and Guattari: 1987:320). The result is the creation of new functions such as nest building in the case of birds, or a reduction in aggression in some species. These change the organism's nature in the process of becoming intra-specific. Deleuze and Guattari (1987:22) note that, besides reorganizing functions, "The territory regroups all the forces of the different milieus in a single sheaf constituted by the forces of the earth." "Every territory," explains Bogue (2003:22,23), "has a centre of intensity where its forces come together, a centre that is at once within the territory and outside it...Every territory combines forces in an intense centre which itself is an opening whereby the territory issues forth onto the cosmos at large." Bogue sums up what has gone before by noting that:

> Territorialization, then, is a complex process of decoding and recoding (deterritorialization and reterritorialization), which transforms milieus and rhythms by creating expressive qualities and autonomous rhythms (both territorial motifs and territorial counterpoints) that induce a reorganization of functions and a regrouping of functions.

Deleuze and Guattari also emphasize that a territory is made of decoded fragments of all kinds, which are borrowed from the milieus but then assume the value of "properties":

> as we have seen even rhythms take on a new meaning. In this case, they can be designated as "refrains". The territory makes the assemblage. The territory is more than the organism and the milieu, and the relation between the two; that is why the assemblage goes beyond mere "behaviour" (hence the importance of territorial animals and milieu animals). (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:504)

According to Mark Bonta and John Protevi (2004:133), the term "refrain" (*ritournelle*) is central to Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of territory, milieu, and landscape and the way they are interwoven with bird song, and other musical expressions. A refrain is a "block of sound" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:299) that Bonta and Protevi (2004:133) see as playing the role of an organising principle for a territory: "that which in the territory establishes a link or bond between a body or an assemblage and the Cosmos, earth, and/or milieus." They observe, furthermore, that:

> it is created from rhythm (horizontal axis) and melody (vertical axis), drawn from chaotic and cosmic forces (as we have seen) and essential to the establishment of a home or abode. "Any body, possessing a refrain, can use this refrain as protection as that body wanders out on lines of drift" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:312): the refrain becomes the sonorous shell of the body, and accompanies it through whatever relative de-and reterritorialization it undertakes. (2004:133)

We will presently see how the indigenous refrain, as a "block of sound," serves as a portable territory, a "sonorous shell" that establishes a "home" or "abode" as it is deterritorialised from rural areas to urban areas, together with its relevance to the question of indigenous black identity.

2.4.2 The Refrain and the Question of Indigenous Identity

Music is the deterritorialization of the refrain, and in this sense the refrain is "the block of content proper to music."

–Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 299)

Having considered the constitution of the refrain, in what follows, the focus will shift to music, in particular the role of the refrain in indigenous African music and questions pertaining to rural identity.

A good starting point is Deleuze and Guattari's insight into the nature of music. Buchanan (2004:15) notes that, at the most fundamental level, Deleuze and Guattari define music "as a problem of content and expression:"

> What does music deal with, what is the content indissociable from sound expression? It is hard to say, but it is something: *a* child dies, a child plays, a woman is born, a woman dies, a bird arrives, a bird flies off. We wish to say that these are not accidental themes in music (even if it is possible to multiply examples), much less imitative exercises, they are something essential. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:299)

Why is music so often concerned with death – death of a child, death of a mother, and so on? This is so, Deleuze and Guattari reason (1987:299), because of "the 'danger' inherent in any line that escapes, in any line of flight or creative deterritorialization: the danger of veering towards destruction, towards abolition." Buchanan (2004:15) avers that Death, as a confrontation with the moment at which the line of flight intersects with the line of abolition, is "a necessary dimension of music, or the sound assemblage." To be sure, as he reminds us:

> Music doesn't awaken a death instinct, that isn't why it gives us a taste for death; it confronts death, stares it in the face. That is why the refrain is the content proper to music: the refrain is our means of erecting hastily if needs be a portable territory that can secure us in troubled situations. (2004:15-16)

Buchanan gives examples in which the refrain serves as a "means of erecting hastily if needs be, a portable territory that can secure us in troubled situations," which shall serve for us as a link between Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the refrain, as the content proper of music, (1987:300) and its role in African music. Buchanan (2004:16) gives the follow examples of the refrain:

> (1)We whistle in the dark to keep the phantoms of our minds' imagining at bay; (2)We sing as we march off to war to give us not merely courage but an intimation of immortality; (3)We hum as we work to lighten out burden.

In this connection, "In every case, our music making is expressive in that it marks a territory. That territory defends against the anxieties, fears, pressures we feel; it doesn't do away with them, but it gives them a different form" (Buchanan, 2004:16). Steve Biko (2004:47), while probably not familiar with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the refrain (with its fundamentally ontological implications in relation to music), uses it in a commensurate manner where he gives two examples of the refrain in African music, first to allay fears in warfare and then to lighten the burden of working:

> In war the songs reassured those who were scared, highlighted the determination of the regiment to win a particular encounter and made much more urgent the need to settle the score; in suffering, as in the case of the

> Black slaves, they derived sustenance out of a feeling of togetherness, at work the binding rhythm makes everyone brush off the burden and hence Africans can continue for hours on end because of this added energy.

Biko (2004:46-47) writes furthermore that:

> When we go to work we share the burdens and pleasure of the work we are doing through music. This particular facet strangely enough has filtered through to the present day. Tourists always watch with amazement the synchrony of music and action as Africans working at a road side use their picks and shovels with well-timed precision to the accompaniment of a background song.

Biko's examples of the purpose of the refrain in African culture bears out Buchanan's (2004:16) insight into the expressive capacities of music-making and its role in creating a territory that shields us from our fears and other emotions, not by doing away with them but by forming a sonic block that takes the refrain "elsewhere," as Deleuze and Guattari put it:

> The refrain is [rather] a means of preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it. But music exists because the refrain exists also, because music takes up the refrain, lays hold of it as a content in a form of expression, because it forms a block with it in order to take it somewhere else. (1987:300)

There are many more instances of the refrain in African music, in the light of Biko's insight into the pervasiveness of music in African culture. He notes (2004:46,47): "Music in the African culture features in all emotional states...with Africans, music and rhythms were not luxuries but part and parcel of our way of communication."

These refrains are inextricably linked to the identity of each African people. The songs sung by workers to allay monotony and fatigue may well be Xhosa, or Zulu, or Sotho songs, all of which, therefore, mark off an indigenous territory. In this sense, the refrain also gives a sense of security, of 'belonging', thus serving as a safeguard against the trauma of cultural alienation, of becoming washed up as cultural "driftwood" (*abaqhafi*' in Zulu). This fear was very real in the light of the large-scale deterritorialisation-*cum*-reterritorialisation of Africans by the State apparatus through means of capture such as taxation, entrepreneurial profit, and labour, as previously discussed.

We have already seen that Africans of all races were forced to leave their homes and enter the cultural maelstrom of urban dwelling. The consequence of the collision between their rural and nascent urban identity (this word will be qualified soon) led to the deterritorialisation of

the indigenous refrains that they made recourse to in order to mark a territory and to form a sense of stability and identity. The question of whether this constitutes a valid "deterritorialisation" will be positively established in the next section. Suffice to say, these refrains were transferred as a "sonic block" to establish and retain a traditional, indigenous identity within an urban context.

Before we can continue considering matters of identity, however, it will be imperative to pause and situate our discussion in the context of the Deleuzoguattarian notion of the subject. Olivier (2017a:6) avers in this regard that Deleuze and Guattari's view of the subject represents a radical departure from any substantialist or foundationalist conceptions of it, notably Descarte's model of the unitary, rationally grounded and stable subject. Instead, they conceive of the subject as, in Olivier's (2017a:1) words "as open, complex 'agency-assemblage' that is ineluctably characterized ('virtually', if not 'actually') by a rhizomatic and multiplicitous structure (every subject always being a 'crowd')". The implication of this is that (Olivier, 2017a:3): "the 'subject' – if one could even call it that, and which one should really write 'under erasure', as Derrida would say – emerges here as never complete, open, multiply connected and connectable, constantly in motion in certain, changeable directions, and inclusive of heterogeneity." Suffice to say, this non-substantialist, rhizomatic conception of the subject is a more productive way of conceptualising the *marabi* subject than the traditional unitary notion of subjectivity, insofar as it encompasses the 'open' kaleidoscopic, multitudinous facets of the *marabi* subject (or in Deleuzoguattarian terms "*marabi* agency assemblage") and the dynamic interplay of identities – both old and new – which animates *marabi* as a ~~subject~~ (*sous rature*) constantly in process. Seen in this way, identity is never fixed, or unitary, but heterogeneous and subject to change. It is also significant, as we will see, that the 'old' and 'new' aspects of the *marabi* subject – has the capacity to upend the "either/or" logic that is central to the traditional ontological conception of subjectivity, in a way that is commensurable with the poststructuralist, non-substantialistic logic that Deleuze and Guattari employ to reconceptualise the 'subject.'

2.4.3 Becoming *Marabi* and 'Identity': The 'Old' and the 'New'

Marabi music drew heavily on the syncretic forms that preceded it, many of which were developed in the city by specific ethnic groups. Gradually, common social experience and class identification helped combine these forms into the common denominator of *marabi*, though *marabi* itself continued to encompass variants based on particular ethnic traditions. As a term, *marabi* reflects the ways urban Africans socially categorised their emerging culture.

– Coplan (1985:95)

Music takes the refrain as its content and transforms it by entering into a process of 'becoming' that deterritorializes the refrain.

– Bogue (2003:33)

We will further advance our consideration of the possibility of conceiving *marabi* as a minor music which exhibits aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's thought by continuing to establishing its high co-efficiency to deterritorialise the refrain. This will take place against the backdrop of the question of black rural and urban identity and how the latter impacts on *marabi*. Notwithstanding, a clarification of both is necessary before we forge ahead. I will, therefore, begin with the question of *marabi* and the ambiguous aspects of African urban identity and thereafter relate these insights to *marabi's* deterritorialisation of the refrain.

We have already seen that, as Coplan (1985:107) has observed, "*marabi* is difficult to analyse stylistically because the term refers as much to a social situation and a cultural outlook as to a complex of music features. Significantly, during the interwar years, *marabi* served as both a setting and symbolic expression of the birth of an urban community among the African proletariat." He goes on to say:

> Though *marabi* retained traditional musical practices and elements, its ultimate form reflected the desire of largely unschooled and un-Westernised urban Africans to modernise by absorbing new cultural elements within a familiar structure. African efforts to apply this cognitive familiarity to urban recreation led to the development of a pervasive *marabi* culture. (1985:107)

Ballantine (1993:4) avers that "If there is one concept that is fundamental to any understanding of urban black popular music in South Africa, it is that this music is a fusion – vital, creative, ever-changing – of traditional styles with imported ones wrought by people of colour out of the long, bitter experience of colonization and exploitation." This statement presents us with a problem, because *marabi*, while being a "fusion", still retains the specificity of the traditional and imported styles. From this we can infer that *marabi's* constitution does not fit well within the conventional 'either/or' taxonomy. This very important point will be pursued in due course. Suffice to say, *marabi* is clearly a multiplicity, but within its heterogeneity, as evident from Coplan (1985:10) and Ballantine (1993:4), we can see the outlines of two aspects which coexist, both traditional and imported, in a mutually dependent and tensional relationship with one another. Firstly, there are the 'old,' or 'traditional,' indigenous refrains representing African rural identity; secondly, we have the 'new' cultural elements, which were to form part of their urban identity. Both underwent

changes as they were assimilated into the *marabi* assemblage, which likewise underwent changes in constitution as new connections were forged. We will return to the term "assemblage".

First, however, we shall situate this consideration of black identity within Deleuze and Guattari's conception of music and see how it relates to the deterritorialisation of the refrain. Deleuze and Guattari see music as follows:

> Music is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain. Whereas the refrain is essentially territorial, territorializing or reterritorializing, music makes of the refrain a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression. (1987:300)

The first example of this "creative, active" musical operation occurred when deterritorialised coloured and black workers assimilated aspects of 'new' Afrikaner music such as *vastrap* and *tickey draai* into their own African style, while serving in Afrikaner households. Although the identity of the Africans is not explicitly alluded to, Coplan (1985:95) indicates that by the mid-1920's small coloured-Xhosa string and concertina bands were performing for private African parties called "socials," suggesting that the 'new' – the coloured and Afrikaner elements – had merged with the 'old' (deterritorialised) Xhosa refrains to form *marabi.*

The Sotho version of *marabi* was the *famo* dance. Here, the Sotho refrain was deterritorialised when the Sotho subsistence farmers left their familiar territory under duress from the State apparatus to go to the city to work on the mines. Once again, we see these two aspects interact. The Sotho *marabi* refrain is a hybrid between indigenous Sotho music and new elements, in particular Afrikaans music, suggested by the concertina, which at once shows the miners' (*koata*) contempt for Lesotho as well as their attachment to their familiar territory, as borne out by their preference for neo-traditional styles such as *focha* ('disorder'), played on a concertina and home-made drum.

One of the most extreme human figures of cultural dislocation were the *abaqhafi* – literally "cultural driftwood" – who according to Coplan (1985:93), as we have already seen, were "tossed up by the impact of secular Western culture and the industrial environment upon Zulu society." Although they professed that they cared for neither, their music and behaviour showed both aspects of the 'new' and 'old'. Bizarrely, they took their dress and manner from the American "Wild West" films shown at black cinemas, featuring gun-toting, singing

cowboys. Nevertheless, the atavistic 'pull' of home emerged in their music, also assuming the form of playing at Zulu weddings, and walking as well as courting songs in Johannesburg. Once again, we see the deterritorialisation of the indigenous rural Zulu refrain, released from its rural moorings, but still recognisable within the *mélange* of urban *marabi* elements.

Before we continue with our consideration of *marabi* and the deterritorialisation of the refrain, we must pause momentarily and ask a pertinent question, namely: "To what extent does the transference of indigenous elements from their rural territories and their interaction with 'new' elements, and *marabi* as a whole, constitute a "deterritorialisation?" In order to answer this question, it will be necessary to return to the theoretical underpinnings of the present consideration, as outlined in Olivier and Parr, with reference to Deleuze and Guattari. In Olivier (2017:3), we have already seen that deterritorialisation entails an "undoing" of the comparative stasis and stability of identifications of all kinds, setting free what Deleuze and Guattari call "desiring production" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:16). Parr (2010:69) may be seen as summing up Olivier's observation when the former avers deterritorialisation to be, at base, a movement producing change. Moreover, in so far as it operates as a 'line of flight', deterritorialisation indicates the creative potential of an assemblage. This implies that to deterritorialise is to 'free up' the fixed relations that contain a body, while, at once, exposing it to new organisations.

Now, the dislocation of indigenous music from its roots and fixed conventions, as a refrain, represents a valid deterritorialisation insofar as it 'undoes' the stasis and stability of music practised in rural areas. For one, no longer does the music in question adhere to the roles, forms and use in traditional rituals and ceremonies, but is 'freed' to be played in altered forms at occasions specific to their urban context. Moreover, traditional music underwent profound changes as it interacted with new elements within the ever-changing polyglot constitution of *marabi*. Therefore, it can be said, following Parr's (2010:69) line of thought, that this creative exchange produced new elements, by "freeing up" fixed relations relating to the functions and constitution of indigenous music. Consider, for example, traditional Sotho music played on an Afrikaans concertina and home-made drum in a disorderly way, as suggested by the name *focha*, or the synthesis of traditional Zulu music with the 'Spaghetti-western' identity of the socially displaced *abaqhafi*. It must be noted that these traditional elements were not 'erased' by this dynamic exchange, but reclaimed so as to serve a different purpose to what it had served in rural practice. This new purpose pertains to its role in the

formation of a unique individual and collective black working-class subject, as wrought by *marabi*.

The following question also presents itself: could it not be said that the refrains of the new elements entering into *marabi's* constitution were themselves likewise deterritorialised? It would seem that Afrikaner elements, like *vastrap* and *tickey draai*, and Afro-American forms of early jazz, such as ragtime, were also deterritorialised insofar as they were freed up from their original contexts and musical constitutions as they merged with traditional African elements to engineer *marabi* as the hybrid form that it is. In both cases, it can be noted, that both the Afrikaans and American refrains, came about as a result of a process of geographical as well as music-historical and sonic deterritorialisation, as was also the case with indigenous music. In the same way as Afrikaans music was deterritorialised from rural to urban areas, American popular music was also 'unfixed' from its American sonic and historical context and identifications in the process of transference. It is notable that, during this time, strict lines of racial division were drawn between the Afrikaner, Cape Coloured, and Xhosa people. These lines of racial 'pre-apartheid' and its concomitant conventions had to be breached for Afrikaner music to interact freely with the musics of the other racial groups. We have already intimated that Dixieland was also to be separated from its conventional use and practiced by Afro-Americans. In the light of this, it can be said that both became 'undone' and 'liberated' creatively to produce new configurations and elements as they amalgamated with the new and old components in *marabi*. In the course of this sonic deterritorialisation, certain elements were omitted, some were retained, and others reconfigured. There is, for example, to my knowledge, no evidence of the 'blues notes' characteristic of jazz in extant *marabi* recordings. There also appears to be a considerable reduction in the collective improvisation that is a salient feature of Dixieland and early Jazz. In contrast, the 'stride' left hand accompaniment of ragtime and syncopated right hand melodies were retained. An example of 'reconfiguring' elements is evidenced in *marabi's* characteristic rhythm, which is derived from ragtime and traditional Nguni wedding dances (cf. Coplan, 1985:106). Both of these elements changed as they interacted creatively with *Tickey draai* and *tula'n'divile*, which similarly caused the kaleidoscopic soundscape of *marabi* to change.

At present we return to our discussion of *marabi's* deterritorialisation of the refrain with reference to the Zulu version of *marabi* – the *ndunduma* concerts. Coplan (1985:105) notes that the term *ndunduma* means "mine dumps" in Zulu and that it symbolised the totality of

Johannesburg's culture to people from Natal. The *ndunduma* concerts and dances were the favourite of the *udliwe i'ntaba*, that is, people "eaten by hills", those who left home on contract work and never returned. I have already referred to Coplan's ensuing observation in Chapter 1:

> *ndunduma marabi* appealed to an audience that considered traditional music too uncivilised and rural for the town. Yet they were still unfamiliar with Western or black American musical culture, and a strong sense of Zulu identity permeated their growing awareness of themselves as working-class Africans. They wanted music that was recognizably Zulu as well as "modern" (Westernised) enough to support their urbanising self-image. (1985:106)

Here again, we espy the Janus-faced aspirations of the black urban African: she or he desires to become assimilated with the 'new', unfixed constitution of *marabi* culture, while at the same time holding on to the familiar and traditional 'old.' Our conceptualisation of *marabi* as a "transitional object", a term coined by Donald Winnicott and appropriated by Bernard Stiegler in Chapter 1 is highly pertinent in this regard.

The next example shows *marabi's* open-endedness and remarkable capacity to form new connections, which recalls Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the "rhizome." (I will return to what is meant by the Deleuzoguattarian "rhizome" and the implications of this concept later.) We have already noted Coplan's (1985: 95-96) observation that, through media such as Gramophone recordings, tonic-solfa albums, local white and coloured bands, and even American musicians, ragtime and early jazz became popularised in the Cape after the first world war. Of particular significance was Queenstown, known as "Little Jazz Town" since "ragtime song and dance companies such as the Darktown Negroes and 'dixieland' jazz bands such as Meekly Matshikiza's Big Four entertained whites and middle-class Africans at 'soirees'. Musically unlettered pedal organists in the shebeens were also influenced by ragtime and jazz" (Coplan 1985:96). Here, we once again have the incorporation of traditional elements, especially considering the music of Boet Gashe, a pedal organist in the 1920's. Coplan, following in the wake of Todd Matshikiza (1957), gives the following evocative account of Gashe's considerable keyboard skills and the unconventional way in which he made recourse to matchsticks to retain traditional elements:

> Gashe…was bent over his organ in one corner, thumping the rhythm from the pedals with his feet, which were also feeding the organ with air; choking the organ with persistent chords in the left hand, and improvising for an effective melody with his right hand. He would call in the aid of a matchstick to hold

> down a harmonic note, usually the tonic (doh) or the dominant (soh) both of *which persist in African music*, [my emphasis] and you get a delirious effect of perpetual motion…perpetual motion in a musty hole where a man makes friends without restraint. (As quoted in Coplan, 1985: 96)

Afro-American music also became one of the new styles that merged together with traditional elements to form *marabi*. This is borne out (Coplan, 1985:97) by the fact that Xhosa instrumentalists were an important link connecting Coloured-Afrikaans, African American, and local African styles. The most famous Xhosa instrumentalist to bring this to bear, as we have already seen, was Tebetjane (Sotho "little Xhosa"), composer of the *marabi* classic *uTebetjana ufana ne'mfene* ("Tebetjana resembles a baboon"), who became synonymous with the *marabi* genre.

The above confirms that an effective deterritorialisation took place with regard to the Dixieland refrain insofar as the latter was "opened up", its fixed relations being freed so that it could amalgamate, or rather, creatively engage with elements as disparate as Afrikaner music and Zulu and Xhosa traditional music, in the creation of new configurations.

Having considered Dixieland's capacity for deterritorialisation, let us pause for a moment and consider its status as "refrain", as we have already done with indigenous music. The origins of Dixieland and ragtime are telling in this regard. Barry Kernfeld (1986:413) notes that jazz intertwines with other genres, a salient feature of *marabi*, as has been amply demonstrated. This is already evident in the history of early jazz, like ragtime which "has been linked to blues through instrumental adaptations, derived equally from the black church, of improvisatory story-telling and vocal inflections (blue notes, cries, growls, hums, moans, shouts) as well as through performances with blues vocalists and variations on blues progressions." Furthermore (Kernfeld 1986:413-414), "Ragtime absorbed these influences, together with the instrumentation, multithematic structures, strong tonality, and rhythms of American marching band music." To this were added the harmonic colours of piano music of composers like Debussy and Ravel, introduced by the classically trained Creoles who played a key role in the formation of ragtime.

Although Kernfeld does not allude to it explicitly, the so-called "field-hollers" were an important influence on early jazz that fed into Dixieland. These were call and response vocal inflections used by slaves in the cotton fields. We have already seen (cf. Biko, 2004:46-47

and Buchanan, 2004:16) how music is used as a refrain to create a sense of stability to establish a territory, to ward off chaos, and to provide workers with renewed energy and mutual encouragement. The same sense of security was provided by field-hollers and other work songs, as well as by hymns in the black churches. Thus, it is clear that the history of Dixieland is at once also the history of the refrain, a sonic block that provides us with a means of creating a secure, comforting territory in the face of encroaching uncertainty and fear.

The history of Dixieland is also inextricably connected to the history of New Orleans. Richard Crawford (2001:347) confirms this when he avers that, although there is a great deal of disagreement as to precisely where jazz originated, authorities concur that New Orleans played a vital role in the formation of early jazz. It must also be recalled in this regard that the time in which Dixieland emerged was marked by racial discrimination and reduced socio-economic circumstances, for black Americans and for the Creoles, who contributed to the formation of piano styles such as ragtime. In fact, Court Carney (2006: 305) identifies the 1890's as one of the most volatile and violent periods in New Orleans history, when a series of state implemented laws, court rulings, and racially motivated assaults, solidified the flexibility of many dwellers of New Orleans into a rigid arrangement based on the tenet that black people are inferior to white people.

> By the early 20th century (Carney, 2006:305) the complex diversity of New Orleans had devolved into a simplified racial caste system comprised of white and black New Orleans. The previously middle class Creoles were promptly designated and accepted as Afro-Americans by the white community. In the light of this, it would appear that jazz in its various forms, like Dixieland, served as a sonic way of dealing with and warding off the insecurities and fears associated with being an oppressed minority.

This portable Dixieland "sonic bloc" (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:300) was subsequently deterritorialised to form part of *marabi*, as we have seen.

Given our present locus, namely the deterritorialisation of early jazz, it would seem an appropriate place as any to bring up a controversial point, namely: can *marabi* be regarded as jazz or not?

A certain amount of controversy surrounds this question. Coplan argues that:

> [The] evidence indicates that there was little free or "jazz" solo improvisation in *marabi*. Working-class shebeen and dance hall patrons in the *marabi* era retained the traditional Southern African preference for melodic repetition, which was in any case well suited to continuous dancing. (1985:106-107)

He moves on to maintain, as observed, that *marabi* compositions had titles but often no recognisable words, whereas participants were free to make up lyrics to suit the melody as they wished, helping to spread these melodies across ethnic lines (Like *Tebetjane Ufana Ne'mfene*). This suggests, however, that verbal improvisation was a part of *marabi*.

Earlier, Coplan (1985:106) writes, regarding Ndunduma *marabi*, of the importance of the role of aural transmission in the development of *marabi* and its significance as an exemplar of how musicians interacted with their audiences in the process of cultural urbanisation. Quoting Herbert Dhlomo, he notes:

> [And yet] what naturally talented players the ragtime and the Ndunduma concerts had! Vampers...who improvised many 'hot' original dance and singing numbers at the spur of the moment, and who play or accompany any piece after hearing the melody only once, and do so on any key...Like the tribal bards of old [they] created beauty they knew not how and flung it back unrecorded to the elements which gave it birth. (Coplan, 1985:106)

From this we can clearly seize upon the fact that improvisation was a pivotal aspect and driving motor of *ndunduma marabi*, particularly with respect to the way in which players improvised 'hot' numbers, as well as the spontaneous interaction between musician and audience. In this regard, one should also take cognisance of the recitative songs, the *lifela*, which were improvised songs performed by socially disenchanted Sotho women at *famo marabi* concerts and dances. To be sure, *marabi* is indeed harmonically highly repetitious, but evidence suggests that this is, by and large, *mutatis mutandis* – implying that, despite its repetitiveness, certain changes do occur. The sheer length of *marabi* sessions, one should imagine, would stimulate improvisatory-type variation rather than exact repetition. In my view, *marabi* can be conceived of as a "prism", or as a "crystal", to use Deleuze and Guattari's metaphor for the refrain, which is endlessly repeated with endless variation, depending on the *milieu* in question. An example of the creative use of melody in another setting is that of "*Ntebetjana ufane ne'mfene"* as a refrain for other songs. In the CD accompanying Ballantine's *Marabi Nights* (1993) Griffiths Motsieloa and Company insert the words "*Ntebetjane ufane ne'mfene"*" accompanied by highly infectious music into the refrain of the song "*Sponono naMarabi*" (London 1931 [track 2)]. During the final recurrence

of the refrain the singer's trope syllabic, stylised 'laughter' is added to the "*Ntebetjane*" refrain. This cross-referencing suggests that there was more improvisational freedom than what some writers on *marabi* assert. Regarding *marabi's* status as jazz (or not)[33], it is also significant that Darius Brubeck (in Ballantine 1993: ix) does not debate the point, but refers unequivocally to *marabi* as "early South African jazz". Moreover, Ballantine (1993:26), quoting Todd Matshikiza (1951), asserts that "what is essential to our understanding of *marabi* as the pre-history of South African jazz is that...it was the name given to the 'hot,' highly repetitive single themed dance tune of the period from the 1910's to the early 1930's; and that these were largely the illiterate improvisations of the day." Improvisation is generally considered to be essential to jazz; hence, the latter would place *marabi* squarely in the ambit of jazz, not pre-jazz. In the final analysis, however, no-one really knows what *marabi* sounded like. Our knowledge is based on recordings made in the post-*marabi* epoch and on hearsay.[34] It is my opinion, however, that there were subtle, even overt, differences and degrees of freedom, depending on the incarnations of *marabi*, seen in its totality, not just as a musical style. This becomes evident if one compares the formal, somewhat stilted repetition of the London recordings (made years after and in a completely different context to original *marabi*) to the accounts of sexual and rhetorical excesses of Sotho *famo marabi* dancing and the jazz-like improvisation of *ndunduma marabi*. The point that needs to be made is that *marabi* is a completely unique assemblage of musical styles fused into a common denominator. Whether one calls *marabi* 'jazz', or not, is a moot point. The same applies to the Blues, which is repetitive rather than improvisational, but is generally considered to be 'jazz'.

What we have, notwithstanding, established is that *marabi* is the product of the deterritorialisation of rural and urban musical refrains. Moreover, it can also be argued, along the same lines as those pursued by Holland (2004:25) that, like jazz, *marabi* is "nomad" music, which like "nomad science" foregrounds processes of "iterative following" rather than "iterative reproducing," which latter is a feature of "royal science". This point can fairly

[33] Gilbert (2004:135) argues that "all musics possess an improvisational dimension, which is to say a rhizomatic moment at which connections are made between musics, subjects, and non-musical machines and at which a certain opening into a 'cosmic' space of infinite possibility occurs."

[34] It is not common knowledge that Solomon Linda's famous *Mbube* ("Lion") has the features of traditional wedding songs. It also bears the traces of *marabi*. The recording on *From Marabi to Disco* made in 1939 (1994 Gallo) sounds vastly different to Disney's version thereof. One of my students remarked that it sounded like a train, with the chugging harmonic changes and the wailing 'whistle' almost falsetto, of the solo voice. The theme of a train is very common in black South African music, because it symbolises the loss and departure of loved ones and their joyous return (usually from the mines).

easily be subject to misunderstanding, due to the degree of musical repetition that characterises *marabi*. However, when perceived as a whole, it is an inimitable musical assemblage, as observed, comprising and filtering influences as disparate as Zulu traditional music and Afrikaner guitar styles. As we will see soon enough, in no way may one say that it merely 'reproduces' any other musical style; rather, *marabi* creatively integrates and produces whichever musical exigency is required, doing so from its 'common territory', be it a Sotho musical assemblage for *famo* dancing, or traditional Zulu/nascent urban music for the *ndunduma* concert and dance. The variations are endless. From this perspective, *marabi* is nomad music, in the sense that, as a sound assemblage, it "involves a multiplicity of interchangeable pieces operating in an open or 'smooth' space, rather than a hierarchy of distinct pieces operating in a closed and 'striated' space" (Holland, 2004:25).

Let us now return to *marabi* and its seemingly inimitable capacity for amalgamation of both the 'old' and 'new'. In his Appendix C, Coplan (1985:258-263) gives a detailed transcription and analysis of a classic *marabi* number by Aaron Lebona called "Highbreaks" (1985:259-261), which demonstrates exactly how this flexible style (*marabi*) could incorporate musical resources from so many cultures. I will highlight a few points that I believe are pertinent to our consideration of the consequences of the deterritorialisation of indigenous and Western refrains and how it led to the creative emergence and adaptation of both sonic aspects – 'old' and 'new.'

Recall Bidima's (2004:189) contention that *Zouk* "deterritorializes the French language through the revision of vocabulary and of syntax." Here I wish to forge the analogy that the musical correlate of vocabulary and syntax comprises elements such as harmony, rhythm, and melody (phrasing in this case). In what follows, I will demonstrate how these elements are likewise deterritorialised as they are incorporated into *marabi*, specifically with reference to "Highbreaks."

First, we must observe how African indigenous "root progressions" are transcribed into Western harmonies. John Blacking (1959:21-23, quoted in Coplan 1985:258), writing of ocarina music[35] among South African Venda, first introduced the term "root progression."

[13]Ocarina music is played by ocarina flutes, which Michael Seyfrit (1986:554) describes as "a globular flute…also called a sweet potato or sweet potato whistle." Blacking (1957:16) notes that "Venda ocarinas are made from the shell of the 'kaffir orange' (Venda: *shamba*, pl.*maramba*)", but "more commonly they use the

According to Coplan (1985:258), Blacking here refers to "the short sequence of bass roots and the melody or melodies moving in relation to the tone centre in multipart structures in African music." David Rycroft (1967:96) uses the concept of root progression as a substitute for "chord sequence," since African polyphony does not have real chords or a fixed harmonic scheme. Coplan (1985:258) demonstrates in his analysis of '"Highbreaks" how Gerhard Kubik's (1974:24) observation that the "concept of root progression is projected into tone and chord material of Western provenance" in African popular music, including *marabi,* holds true. For Blacking (1959:23), the distribution of the root progression in African music extends "even in the Tonic-Subdominant-Dominant strumming that one hears on guitars and old pianos." Here we see a deterritorialisation of traditional root progressions resulting in the standard western I-IV-I4/6-V7 progression (as a consequence of enforced urbanisation). Moreover, as Coplan (1985:258) avers, "melodic phrases are staggered in relation to this progression" and "this non-simultaneous entry of parts follows the structure of traditional vocal polyphony." Notably, "in the right hand, short solo melodic figures occur at the top of a series of chords that move mainly in parallel motion. These chords are frequently 'irregular'", which hearkens back to its indigenous roots.

The Western listener (Coplan, 1985:258) may find them disconcerting because they are contrary to traditional Western harmonic usage.

The complex (Coplan, 1985:258) and striking rhythmic features of "Highbreaks" effectively deterritorialise rhythm, reconfiguring both the old and new in novel ways. Here again, we observe the interaction between early jazz and indigenous music. As Coplan sums it up: "The variety, syncopation, delayed beats, and other elements of early jazz are set to a traditional off-beat pattern and played on two tin shakers filled with pebbles" (1985:263).

Another instance of the way in which indigenous music is "opened up" (in the sense of deterritorialisation) as a result of its dislocation from rural to urban areas is borne out by variation induced by phrase-shifting. There are also melodic digressions which may include short phrases from other songs being assimilated from the player's musical environment, suggesting verbal improvisation.

---

fruit of the *mutzwa* (*Ocoba spinosa Forsk*. Wild Custard Apple)." He notes further that "These fruits are also filled with seeds or tiny pebbles and worn as leg rattles for dancing."

It is precisely (Coplan, 1985:263) the interaction between styles such as Afro-American (the 'new') and indigenous music (the 'old') which pose problems when it comes to analysing the influences in "Highbreaks". Coplan:

> A difficulty in analysing the influences in 'Highbreaks' stems from the possible identity of Afro-American and black South African musical practices. A four-bar chord sequence ending on the dominant, may reflect a segmentation of progressions commonly found in blues. The exact sequence I-IV-I64-V7 does not occur in traditional South African music, though the two, four or six bar recurrent root sequence is fundamental to it (1985:263).

From Coplan's analysis of "Highbreaks" we can deduce with certainty that *marabi* exhibits a high co-efficiency for the deterritorialisation of the refrain on a multitude of levels, including harmony, rhythm and words. This high co-efficiency for deterritorialisation, as can be recalled, is the first characteristic of a minor language and directly links *marabi* with Deleuzoguattarian thought. We will presently consider the significance of Coplan's (see above) difficulties in 'pinning down' *marabi's* influences according to an either/or logic of indigenous or imported elements. Together with this, we will also bear in mind Ballantine's (1993:4) prior statement reflecting the problematic status of marabi as a "fusion", whilst simultaneously regaining the specificity of both 'old' and 'new' elements. These difficulties are not mere 'mistakes' on behalf of two very erudite, informed *marabi* scholars, but rather symptomatic of the need to find new non-binary ways of conceptualising *marabi*, as we will see.

To return to our theme, all in all, when we consider the preceding inquiry into *marabi's* deterritorialisation of both indigenous and new refrains and its role in the formation of a unique individual and collective black urban working class subject, *marabi*'s compatibility with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical theory comes clearly into the foreground. Still beyond this, we may aver that becoming-*marabi* is synonymous with the becoming of a people. This must still be demonstrated.

2.5. *MARABI* AS ASSEMBLAGE

Before we continue with matters of the assemblage, let us return to the overarching goal of this chapter, namely to attempt to forge a *rapprochement* between *marabi* and aspects of

Deleuzoguattarian thought in its context, and sum up our progress in this regard by way of recapitulation. Using Olivier (2017) and Bidima (2004) as a point of departure, we located a substantial point of engagement between Deleuze and Guattari and *marabi*, by demonstrating that *marabi* exhibits a high degree of deterritorialisation – the first characteristic of a "minor language" – with reference to *inter alia* the Deleuzian concept of music as "a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorialising the refrain" (1987:300). The above suggests that forging connections between Deleuze and Guattari and *marabi* is not only possible, but desirable in the light of its capacity to bring completely new critical insights regarding both the latter and the former to the fore.

In what follows, I will establish further connections between these two seeming opposites with reference to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the "assemblage." We have already seen that defining *marabi* is problematic, as the multitudinous nature of *marabi* makes it hard to conceptualise in conventional Western epistemological terms. This takes us back to Coplan's (1985:107)'s often-quoted observation that *marabi* is difficult to analyse in terms of style, since, as a term, it refers not only to music, but equally so to a social situation and cultural outlook. It is precisely *marabi*'s resistance to being 'pinned down' that also presents Coplan with problems in his analysis of "Highbreaks," where the same musical elements can be identified as either Afro-American or as derived from black South African musical practices. We have also alluded to Ballantine's (1993:4) difficulties in this regard. In what follows, I hope to show that the "general logic" (in Deleuze and Guattari's terms) of the assemblage and rhizome is more conducive for conceptualising *marabi* in *all* its guises than any traditional binary ('either/or') essentialist thought-paradigm could possibly be.

From various accounts (cf. Olivier, 2017a: 4, Graham Livesey, 2010:18 and Thomas Nail, 2017:22) it can be deduced that something of the meaning of the word "assemblage" has been lost in translation. Nail (2017:22) notes that the English word "assemblage" is the translation of the French word *agencement*, thought it does not carry precisely the same meaning. There is a significant difference, in this regard, between an "assemblage," which is a gathering-together of things into a circumscribed unity, and an *agencement*, which entails an arrangement or layout of heterogeneous elements without totalisation. Livesey (2010:18) adds, furthermore, that assemblages are "*processes* [my emphasis] of 'arranging, organizing and fitting together'", "in an active sense", as Olivier (2017a:4) puts it. This means that, if we view *marabi* as an assemblage, it must necessarily engage in *processes* of arranging,

organising and fitting together heterogeneous elements, which elements hold together without, however, referring back to an extant unity, or 'one' that totalised them in the first place.

2.5.1 Features of an Assemblage

Let us therefore consider Deleuze and Guattari's conception of an assemblage and its features. We will then, in due course, relate it, experimentally, as encouraged by Deleuze and Guattari, to *marabi*:

> *On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, or actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and* cutting edges of deterritorialization, *which carry it away*. (1987:88; emphasis in original)

In gearing up a possible *marabi* assemblage, we would, following this definition, have to establish what makes up the two segments of its horizontal axis: its content, or machinic assemblage of bodies; and its expression, or collective assemblage of enunciation. As regards content, we may first recall that, for Deleuze and Guattari, music is the deterritorialisation of the refrain, where *the refrain is "the block of content proper to music*" (1987: 299; my emphasis, as quoted in Bogue, 2003:33). Thus, we can plausibly regard the segment of content of *marabi* to include the refrains that partly comprise it. This would include the indigenous refrains (the 'old'), the 'new' (for example, Dixieland), and the *marabi* refrain – an assimilation and reconfiguration of both. Thus, since the segment of content is by definition a machinic assemblage of bodies, and in that we are here dealing with music, the content segment would be a machinic assemblage of sonic bodies, in this case, refrains, intermingling and reacting to one other. (The term 'machinic' alludes to the fact that an assemblage comprises heterogeneous elements whose joint consistency is the case without any reference to a higher, transcending, organisational principle, or to any teleology whatsoever.) However, more than simply such a *mélange* of refrains goes into this content segment, since *marabi*, as observed, is more than simply music: it is, in addition, a social occasion and a cultural practice. Thus, the content segment, or machinic assemblage of bodies, necessarily also incorporates the actual physical bodies of the *marabi* players and performers, the (dancing, moving) audience, and the wider community irradiated by *marabi*

as a cultural practice, together with the admixtures, actions and reactions of these physical bodies upon themselves – libidinal or otherwise – and of *marabi* refrains, or sonic blocks, upon the physical bodies, and *vice versa*.

The second horizontal aspect, the collective assemblage of enunciation, is more problematic when applied to music. In this regard, after considering Saussure's characterisation of the linguistic sign, Jean-Jacques Nattiez (1990:3-8) expounds on the problematic nature of the musical sign, its meaning, and its reception. Using the semiotics of Charles Saunders Peirce, Nattiez in his book, *Music and Discourse. Towards a Semiology of Music*, concludes that musical meaning is particularly hard to pin down, as it is, rather, part of an unstable web, owing to the fact that the musical sign is far more slippery, elusive, opaque, and viscous than the linguistic one. This leads to the question: "Is it possible for *marabi* (without lyrics) to express anything, given the instability of the musical sign?" This question can perhaps be phrased differently as: "What is *marabi* trying to 'say'?"[36] After all, a collective assemblage of enunciation consists, amongst other things, of *statements*. It, of course, also consists of acts and incorporeal transformations attributed to the bodies within the machinic assemblage comprising the content segment. However, statements and acts are in no sense separate. Rather, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:79), the "relation between the statement and the act is internal, immanent, but it is not one of identity." This mutual imbrication of statements and acts consists in the fact that "each statement accomplishes an act and the act is accomplished in the statement." In fact, the collective assemblage of enunciation is itself "the redundant complex of the act and the statement that necessarily accomplishes it." Furthermore, acts are inextricably bound up with incorporeal transformations (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:80; emphasis in original), as these "acts seem to be defined as the set of all *incorporeal transformations* current in a given society and *attributed* to bodies of that society." More precisely, acts are "noncorporeal attributes or the 'expressed' of a statement." An incorporeal transformation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:81) consists in "the simultaneity of the statement expressing the transformation and the effect the transformation produces." What an incorporeal transformation accomplishes is a change in the social status of the bodies comprising the machinic assemblage. This is wrought by its furnishing for these bodies of new incorporeal attributes. The transformation of bodies is "the pure expression of a statement attributed to the bodies," in which statement, act, and

[36] We will pursue this question further in Chapter 4 when we consider the 'meaning' of *famo marabi* by way of Kristeva's notion of the 'semiotic' which she associates with music, amongst other modes of expression.

incorporeal transformation stand in a mutual indissoluble imbrication. This is so, in the sense that the statement is at once an act that instantaneously effects an incorporeal transformation. In the *marabi* assemblage, a statement will be born of the combined interaction and effect of the actual music, the lyrics, and dance. We will see fairly shortly that it will be the effectuation of a new urban African collective subject.

At this precise point, what must be guarded against is the notion that the statements of the collective assemblage of enunciation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:86) somehow "describe or represent bodies." Deleuze and Guattari push back strongly against such a notion, on the basis of the averment, as derived from the early Stoics, that "bodies already have proper qualities, actions and passions, souls, in short forms, which are themselves bodies." Instead of describing or representing the bodies comprising the machinic assemblage, what a statement-act-incorporeal-transformation of the collective assemblage of enunciation does in expressing and attributing an incorporeal attribute to these bodies is, rather, of the order of an *intervention*. This intervention is best cognised, as observed, as a change in the social status of the bodies. This transmogrification of the social status of the bodies (and souls) in question is, at once, a subjectification of the latter, for, far from (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:78) "depending on subjectification proceedings or assignations of subjects in language," the statements-acts-incorporeal-transformations of a collective assemblage of enunciation "in fact determine their distribution," in the sense of embedding them differently within the social field as subjects, and as *different* subjects. More plainly, what this subjectification amounts to is an alteration in these subjects' symbolic societal mandate.

This leads us right back to our question: "What is *marabi* trying to 'say'?" On this matter, Coplan (1985:107) supplies an answer that provides a point of anchorage: "Marabi served as both a setting and a symbolic *expression* [my emphasis] of the birth of an urban community among the African proletariat." This averment is entirely plausible, except for the fact that the phrase "symbolic expression of" runs into the familiar error of assuming that the statements within a collective assemblage of enunciation describe or represent something about the bodies comprising the machinic assemblage in which they are arrayed. It ignores that such expressions, in the form of statements, are, in fact, *acts* effectuating incorporeal transformations upon these bodies. It, thus, elides the strictly interventionist aspect of a collective assemblage of enunciation. Thus, it would be better to rephrase Coplan by merely changing one word: "Marabi served as both a setting and a symbolic expression *effectuating*

the birth of an urban community among the African proletariat." Here, of course, logically anterior to, or at least coextensive with, "community" would be the determination of a collective urban African subject through the acts immanent to statements 'pronounced' by the *marabi* collective assemblage of enunciation via the latter's attribution of new non-corporeal attributes to urban African proletarian bodies. Finally, it is now evident that our answer to the question "What is *marabi* trying to 'say'?" has, in fact, changed the question itself. For the question we should have originally asked was, actually: "What does *marabi* 'do'?" *Marabi* engineers a new collective urban African subject.

2.5.2 Deterritorialisation and Reterritorialisation

Having pervasively dwelt upon the horizontal axis of the *marabi* assemblage we are excavating, we now move on to analyse its final aspect: the vertical axis. As observed, the vertical axis (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:88) of an assemblage consists of both "*territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and* cutting edges of deterritorialization, *which carry it away*." Concerning the matter of deterritorialisation, this pertains to both the machinic assemblage of bodies, or content segment, and to the collective assemblage of enunciation, or expression segment, of an assemblage. Indeed (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:87), "Both forms of content and forms of expression are inseparable from a movement of deterritorialization that carries them away." Moreover, the content segment and the expression segment will abide at different degrees of deterritorialisation in relation to one another, whereas the former can serve to further deterritorialise the latter or the latter the former. Our focus is here, of course, on the manner in which the statements-acts-incorporeal-transformations of the *marabi* collective assemblage of enunciation deterritorialise the bodies of its machinic assemblage of bodies. These statements are, of course, wrought from the sonic bodies, or refrains, within the machinic assemblage of bodies, and deterritorialise both these sonic bodies and the human bodies within the same machinic assemblage. In Modikwe Dikobe's novel *The Marabi Dance* (Dikobe 1973:6), the main protagonist, the singer Martha, and her on-and-off romantic partner George, a part-time gangster, pianist, and pimp, but not a reprobate all the way to the point of absurdity, are brought together by their performance of *marabi* music at dance parties in shebeens and other venues. *Marabi*, as music, social occasion and as dance, more than merely bringing them together romantically, effects deterritorialisations upon both of them, through which they are enabled to escape from the territories and assemblages in which they had hitherto been ensconced. Involvement in

marabi precipitates Martha's exodus from the high school assemblage, since her *marabi*-induced absence of classes moves her parents to take her out of school altogether; whereas her *marabi*-inaugurated dalliance with George, with whose child she is soon pregnant, eases her out of the obligation to marry the village boy whom her parents had initially chosen for her, thus allowing her to exit the familial-arranged-marriage assemblage. Roughly in parallel, George's involvement in *marabi*, which leads to his love for Martha, in turn, facilitates his escape from his prior entrapment in the gangster-pimp assemblage and, at the end of the novel, moves him into the conjugal assemblage when he eventually marries Martha.

As observed, specifically with reference to Olivier (2017:3) and Parr (2010:69), any movement of deterritorialisation is inextricable from and exists coextensively with a movement of reterritorialisation. Where deterritorialisation entails the undoing of the stasis and stability that characterise various identifications, setting free desiring-production, reterritorialisation is thought of as arresting or discontinuing the productive process and bringing us to a certain point of, at least provisional, rest. Thus, deterritorialisation, as Parr (2010:69) conceives it, is a movement producing change, freeing up the fixed relations in a body, while still exposing it to new organisations – which latter necessarily entail a correlative, coextensive, and countervailing reterritorialisation. Whereas reterritorialisation serves as a stabilising force, deterritorialisation serves to liberate bodies, or formed contents, from this state of comparative stasis, along "lines of flight." Bonta and Protevi (Bonta and Protevi 2006, 78-79, 106-107) define a line of flight as "the path of deterritorialization," which is at once a becoming, leading bodies from one assemblage to another.

As Olivier (2017a:4) rightly notes, there is a "latent dynamism and conservatism" that characterises assemblages in relation to which the subject is posited somewhere in-between these extremes (p.4). As he puts it:

> Deleuze and Guattari's allusion to the "(re)territorialized" as well as the sharp, "deterritorializing" sides of an assemblage is a negotiation of the Scylla of frozen stability and Charybdis of excessive flux, positioning assemblages in general, and the subject in particular, in the spectral field between these two extremes instead. (Olivier 2017a:4)

Let us continue our consideration of the dynamics of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, using Olivier's insight, above, as a point of departure. As pertaining to the relationship that can exist between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, Deleuze and

Guattari, 1987: 508-510) distinguish four cases: (1) negative relative deterritorialisation; (2) positive relative deterritorialisation; (3) positive absolute deterritorialisation; (4) negative absolute deterritorialisation. Firstly, there is so-termed *negative* deterritorialisation. This transpires when deterritorialisation is "overlaid by a compensatory reterritorialization obstructing the line of flight." Such an obstructive reterritorialisation is often performed by the "State apparatus" which blocks the line of flight "by reterritorializations on property, work, and money" – although there are other ways in which this obstruction can be accomplished. Secondly, there is *positive* deterritorialisation, which is the case when deterritorialisation "prevails over the reterritorializations, which play only a secondary role." Both these instances of negative and positive deterritorialisation are instances of *relative* deterritorialisation. Thirdly, we have *absolute* deterritorialisation, which is not necessarily faster than, or quantitatively in excess of, relative deterritorialisation but, rather, "qualitatively different." As opposed to relative deterritorialisation, which "relates a body considered as *One* to a striated [conspicuously power-relations structured; N.D.] space through which it moves," absolute deterritorialisation "relates 'a' body considered as multiple to a smooth [relatively devoid of asymmetrical power-relations; N.D.] space that it occupies in the manner of a vortex," bringing about "the creation of a new earth." The "earth" is here defined as "eccentric" and "outside the territory and exists only in the movement of D" – that is, deterritorialisation – to the point of being "Deterritorialization *par excellence*." This third case is that of *positive* absolute deterritorialisation, which pilots a movement through which the earth is "connected with the Cosmos, brought into the Cosmos following lines of creation that cut across it as so many becomings." The fourth, and final, case is that of *negative* absolute deterritorialisation, in which the lines of flight of absolute deterritorialisation, through a massive countervailing process of overcoding, are blocked in such a way as to "turn into lines of destruction and death." Such a scenario is one precipitated by fascism, although it can be achieved otherwise.

When visiting these distinctions upon our *marabi* assemblage, the precise nature of Olivier's Scylla and Charybdis comes into view. The "Scylla of frozen stability" would entail a negative relative deterritorialisation in which, as observed, the movement of deterritorialisation piloted by the *marabi* assemblage would be strictly subordinate to a reterritorialisation blocking the former's line of flight. In this Scylla-scenario, a state of stasis would be induced, in which the refrains would be too 'closed' to include new elements necessary for African worker's bodies to assimilate themselves into their new urban

environment. At the other extreme, the "Charybdis of excessive flux" clearly corresponds to the case of a negative absolute deterritorialisation unleashed by the *marabi* assemblage. In this Charybdis-scenario, the movement of African worker's bodies within the smooth, unstriated space of an emergent cosmic new earth, owing to a gargantuan countervailing process of overcoding – typically in the guise of a fascist South African government cracking down heavily upon an ill-advised attempt at escape, sedition, or overly degenerate behaviour by miners and their fellow travellers – seizing upon this same movement of deterritorialisation, would cause its line of flight to be catastrophically mired in destruction, death or, at the very least, terminal dereliction. In the case of a dereliction without undue destruction or death, negative absolute deterritorialisation would render the elements of 'old' indigenous refrains unrecognisable or even absent, thus negating their function of providing the workers with a sense of security by referring to the familiar music of 'home', that is, to a piece of their old territory that they would have carried along with them into their new territory and assemblage. The result would, at the very best, be a destitute homelessness. The new elements would dominate the *marabi* assemblage, to the extent of swallowing up the familiar and indigenous. These elements would, furthermore, be so new that they would be in incompatible, 'too new' as it were, for the workers to make sense of their urban context.

But what if the Charybdis-scenario of "excessive flux" could not also be precipitated by positive relative deterritorialisation? In this case, deterritorialisation preponderates over reterritorialisation, although these reterritorialisations serve to 'segment' the line of flight drawn. What one obtains is effectively an instance of what Deleuze and Guattari (1987:122) term the "post-signifiying," or "passional," materialist semiotic, which is *inter alia* characterised by an upsurge coincident with the origination of its line of flight, a movement along this line, and then a fall into either exhaustion or into destruction, followed by a Phoenix-like re-founding from the ashes and immediate recommencement. This rise, movement, and fall, hereupon proceeds to continually repeat itself. The prime example of such a semiotic is Judaism, in which episodes of captivity, usually coincident with the destruction of the Temple, alternate with release from captivity and reconstruction of the Temple or other forms of renewal of the Jewish people and religion out of the charred embers of dereliction.

There is, however, a caveat here, or perhaps even a reversal, as regards whether this scenario is truly to be adjudged as one of "excessive flux." After all, through all of its catastrophic

reversals, Judaism did manage to preserve itself for thousands of years, albeit admittedly not without a strong dose of reverse engineering, in which its tradition had to be periodically reconstructed through textual exegesis; the antedating of newly-wrought texts (the "J" and "E" documents at the time of Josiah presented as "old," recently discovered books of the Pentateuch); the very un-Judaic use of proselytising in the aftermath of the Roman destruction of Jerusalem to replenish vastly depleted numbers; and the engineering of what would become the Ashkenazi 'Jews' from non-Jewish Khazar stock through the imposition of Judaism as state religion in the kingdom of Khazaria at the invitation of King Bulan.

Notwithstanding, despite this lesser out-and-out racial and scriptural purity of the Jews than is often purported, a remarkable and undisputable preservation of themselves specifically as Jews remains. This observation would then serve to undercut the assertion that positive relative deterritorialisation is indeed one of "excessive flux" and to be arrayed on the Charybdis side of things. It verily appears not to be. For we may possibly attribute the post-signifying, or passional, semiotic to liberation movements: for instance, that of Fidel Castro in Cuba, which foundered with the failed attack on the military barrack at Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, only to resurrect with the 26th of July Movement's seizure of Havana on January 8, 1959; or, closer to our present concerns, the ANC, whose passional line foundered with the Sharpeville Massacre of March 21, 1960, consequent banning on April 8 of the same year and post-Rivonian Trial (October 9, 1963, to 12 June 12, 1964) incarcerations of the leadership, went into imposed exile with the formation of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, and resurrected with its unbanning on February 3, 1990, release of Mandela on February 11, subsequent removal of Apartheid on March 12, 1992, and accession to power in 1994.

What the ANC passional line served to usher in, however imperfectly, perhaps 'virtually' – considering that the non-racial SA subject has certainly not been *actualised* – was a new collective black South African subject and, beyond that, a new collective non-racial South African subject.[37] This is, as we have seen, precisely what the *marabi* assemblage accomplishes, also albeit imperfectly. Therefore, the successful navigation of the passage between Olivier's Scylla and Charybdis would, on this account, lie with a scenario in which the *marabi* assemblage precipitates a movement of positive relative deterritorialisation.

[37] Having said this, one must, however, be sure to distinguish between the *supposed* collective SA subject (i.e. according to the SA Constitution) with what has transpired in political reality since 1994, namely a new group-oriented racialisation of SA subjects.

Being recently rural inhabitants, or at most proto-urban ones, the African workers must, by way of the *marabi* assemblage, make the transition from their former rural or proto-urban assemblage to an urban assemblage. The transitioning of bodies from one assemblage into another is, strictly speaking, effected by a movement of relative deterritorialisation. Yet, this movement must likewise be positive, so that the line of flight drawn is in no sense blocked by by preponderant reterritorialisations, as in the case of negative relative deterritorialisation. Only in this manner will those refrains that occupy the expression segment, or collective assemblage of enunciation, of the *marabi* assemblage accomplish, through their statements, an incorporeal transformation effectuating the transition of rural workers into a new urban African assemblage, in which these workers are, in the same movement, wrought as a collective urban African subject.

I shall not at this point address the case of a *marabi* assemblage possibly navigating a movement of positive absolute deterritorialisation, as this would necessarily usher in, not only a veritable battery of additional concepts, but also a whole slew of ensuing speculations.

2.5.3 Assemblages Against Traditional Forms of Rationality

We have already seen that to view *marabi* as an assemblage, it must necessarily engage in processes of arranging, organising, and fitting together heterogeneous elements. This means that it is potentially 'connectible' to other assemblages in a process of 'becoming', in contrast to 'being'. The logic of the assemblage contrasts with substantialist modes of rationality, hence its 'machinic' status (as evidenced in the first aspect of an assemblage). Claire Colebrook sums it up as follows:

> Deleuze and Guattari refer to "machinic" assemblages rather than organisms or mechanisms, in order to get away from the idea that wholes pre-exist connection (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:73). There is no finality, end or order that would govern the assemblage as a whole; the law of any assemblage is created from its connections. (2002: xx)

Marabi would be a "machinic assemblage" in the sense that it does not issue from some pre-existing conception but is, rather, a (constantly changing or becoming) product of its connections, including what is being written about it here.

Nail (2017:22-23) points out two important philosophical consequences of Deleuze and Guattari's invention of a "general logic of assemblages". These can provide us with insights into alternative ways of conceptualising *marabi*, as assemblage, with possible salutary consequences. The first, according to Nail, is that it provides an alternative logic to that of unities. Nail observes that:

> the unity of an organic whole is given in advance of the emergence of the parts and subordinates the parts to an organizing principle or spirit. Unities can develop themselves, but they never change the whole of what they are. For this reason, unities do not allow for the possible emancipation or recombination of their parts without destroying themselves in the process (2017:23).

Unlike (Nail, 2017:23) the idea of there being organic unities, for Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are like machines, defined solely by "their external relations of composition, mixture, and aggregation" (2017: 23). Unlike a unified whole, an assemblage can be regarded as a "multiplicity, neither part nor whole." Moreover, "each new mixture produces a new kind of assemblage, always free to recombine again and change its nature." Thus, as Deleuze avers, "in a multiplicity, what counts are not the terms or the elements, but what is 'between them', the in-between, a set of relations that are inseparable from each other" (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: viii, as quoted in Nail, 2017:23).

The notion of an assemblage as a multiplicity that determines itself without recourse to any 'higher', circumscribing unity can, in fact, be traced back to Henri Bergson's distinction, in *Matter and Memory*, between *discrete* (or metric) multiplicities and *continuous* (or non-metric) multiplicities. Discrete, or extensive, multiplicities – which assemblages are not – possess the fundamental property (Bergson, 1988: 206) that they may be divided up indefinitely into parts without their nature being changed: "we may carry the division as far as we please; we change in no way, the nature of what is divided." In contradistinction, continuous, or intensive, multiplicities – in the same manner as assemblages – are defined by the fact that any amount of division of them will automatically bring about a change in their 'essential' nature: since they "are one with the successive moments of the act which divides" them. Concerning assemblages as Bergsonian continuous multiplicities, Manuel Delanda (2004:10-12,16) maintains that a different sort of geometry to that of Descartes and Fermat's analytical geometry must be called upon in order grasp what the latter are and how they function: the differential geometry of Friedrich Gauss and Bernhard Riemann, and

specifically the notion of the *manifold*. Like assemblages, manifolds, as defined in differential geometry, are characterised by "the absence of a supplementary (higher) dimension imposing an extrinsic coordinatization, and hence, *an extrinsically defined unity*." This does not, of course, mean that assemblages, as abiding by the characteristics of continuous Bergsonian multiplicities, are intrinsically outside of any measure or metric whatsoever. Rather, as Miguel de Beistegui (Beistegui, 2004:249-250) avers, an assemblage is "susceptible to measurement only by varying its metrical principle at each stage of the division."

The second major philosophical consequence of the theory of assemblages (Nail, 2017:23-24) is that it provides an alternative to the logic of essences. As Nail maintains, "an assemblage does not have an essence because it has no eternally necessary defining features, only contingent and singular features." In other words:

> if we want to know what something is, we cannot presume that what we see is the final product nor that this product is somehow independent of the network of social and historical processes to which it is connected. (Nail, 2017:24)

Nail (2017:24) gives the example of a book to illustrate his point. He observes rightly that we cannot just accept a book 'as is' without considering it in the context of the multitude of processes that brought it into being, such as historical processes like the invention of the alphabet and printing press, amongst other things. There are also singular features such as the circumstances under which the book is being read, the time, and the day. The book is enmeshed in a complex network of variables that effectively leaves it open-ended as a book. As Nail puts it:

> We do not know, furthermore, what the book may possibly become or what relations it may enter into, so we do not yet know its universal or essential features. We only know its collection of contingent features at a certain point in its incomplete process. (2017:24)

For Deleuze, "If one insists, the word 'essence' might be preserved, but only on condition of saying that the essence is precisely accident, the event" (*Difference and Repetition* 1994:191, quoted in Nail, 2017:24).

2.5.4 Rethinking *Marabi* as Assemblage

When applied to *marabi*-as-assemblage, we can speak of there being no essential, unified *marabi* but, rather, an assemblage consisting of multiple parts, which parts inherently resist any incorporation or subsumption by any contemporaneous, lost-phantasmatic, or coming, unified totality. This is logically in perfect lockstep with *marabi's* multiplicitous constitution and provides a way out of the attempt to define and conceptualise *marabi* as a single substantive phenomenon. *Marabi* likewise is in a constant state of change as new elements "produce a new kind of assemblage". It is, thus, possible to conceive of 'old' and 'new' elements generating a completely 'new *marabi*'. *Marabi* can, in other words, be regarded as 'quintessentially' multiple, consisting of disparate elements, interacting creatively with each other to produce more *marabi*s – in the plural. Not only does this include musical elements, but also expressive or incorporeally transformative ones, as we have seen in the vertical aspect of the *marabi* assemblage. When conceived in this way, it is no longer difficult to 'define' *marabi* on the basis of the dissimilarity between *marabi*, in its guise as a multitudinous complex of musical features, and its expressive-*cum*-subjectifying dimension. Thus conceptualised, the disconnect between *marabi* as music and its status as "a social situation and a cultural outlook", in the words of Coplan (1985:107), no longer exists. Both are inextricably connected in the *marabi* assemblage and open to other connections, *both* musical and expressive. The *marabi* assemblage's capacity to accommodate opposites also provides a way out of the predicament, as experienced by Coplan, of pinning down influences as 'either'/'or': either 'traditional or Afro-American, and, in Ballantine's case, of conceiving of *marabi* as a fusion, which still retains the co-existence of traditional and important new influences. The point is that the logic of the assemblage easily accommodates the horizons of 'both'/'simultaneously', hereby destabilising western binary logic and providing us with a very useful means of rethinking *marabi*.

Nail's (2017:23) second major philosophical consequence of the theory of assemblages is highly pertinent to our attempt to (re)conceptualize *marabi*, namely that it provides an alternative to the logic of essences. It is more productive to regard *marabi* as an assemblage of "only contingent and singular features," as he expresses it (2017:24), rather than as a unitary entity produced by some kind of transcendental, or punctiliously originative, universal essence. To regard *marabi* as a 'final' product would be to negate its societal situatedness. Or, put differently, essentialist thinking would regard *marabi* as an autonomous

entity and thus deny the crucial historical and social forces that led to its formation (as we have seen). It would effectively 'erase' the 1913 Natives' Land Act of 1913, the enforced urbanisation of black people, the tax and pass laws, and the squalor and privations of their everyday lives. In short, it would leave a people without a history and without a voice, insofar as these are implicated in *marabi*-as-assemblage. This underscores the urgent ethical import of seeking alternate modes of rationality, such as that of the assemblage, to undermine the type of binary, substantialist thinking that Derrida designates as ineradicably 'Logocentric' (Olivier, 1993:314).

The possibility of forging new ways of thinking, along the lines traced by Deleuze and Guattari, appears viable in the light of Olivier's (1996) "Beyond Hierarchy? The Prospects of a Different Form of Reason." Here, Olivier considers thinkers who have contributed towards new models of thought, beginning with Marilyn French and moving to Derrida and Foucault. Let us first, however, consider the origin and implications of the term "hierarchy". Martin Kornberger *et al* (2006:64) note that etymologically, the word '"hierarchy" is derived from the Greek word *hierarkhia* meaning "the rule of the high priest" (*ta hiera* – sacred rites, and *archeia* – to lead or rule). Initially, the word was used to designate the relative rankings of angels, from highest to lowest. In this sense, a hierarchy of angels mediated between God and the sinful world of mortals. This suggests that this order was divinely sanctioned by God and, thus, sacrosanct. It also implies that the higher up you were in the hierarchy, the closer you were to God. Moreover, so-called superior beings are valorised as defining principles for their opposites. For example, Man, as superior principle is only upheld by a logic that defines Woman in terms of non-Man or inferior logos, Hierarchical thinking thus spawns a constellation of binary opposites, in which the main concept, or Logos (Word), is valorised as paradigm of replete sense and the non-logos denigrated as something of a 'fall from grace.' Little wonder, then, that Derrida contends that a "rhetoric of repression and exclusion" has been operative in Western thinking (Olivier, 1993:314). Kornberger *et al* (2006:65) consider the implications of this hierarchical ranking and its concomitant binary implications for the structure of modern institutions, which, like the celestial hierarchy that sanctioned it, bases itself on a 'top down' logic. There are signs, in the form of recent studies, that this purported 'natural' superiority of those who are 'higher up' and their superior relation to those 'lower down' is not going uncontested. French, for one, opens up novel horizons with her consideration of new scientific developments and their correlation with changes in social configurations. As she puts it:

> examples of forms other than hierarchy abound in the scientific disciplines at present, available to serve as metaphors for social and political arrangements….In any case, although we may have difficulties imagining a business, say, structured other than hierarchically, we can stretch our imaginations by considering the new metaphors that have arisen in astronomy and subatomic theory, in human portrayal of the macro-and microcosm and in biology and ecology. (1986:538)

Following Roy Boyne (1990), Olivier (1996) considers the role of other dissenting voices, by examining "the supportive links that Derrida's deconstructive critique of the violent hierarchy characteristic of the conceptual edifice of Western thought and Foucault's understanding of the pervasiveness of power at all socio-political and institutional levels, on the one hand, have with nascent forms of innovative thought and practice, on the other" (1996:43). From this, we can gather that alternative modes of rationality have begun to emerge. Thus, it would be a plausible gesture to add the thought of Deleuze and Guattari to that of French, Derrida and Foucault, insofar as they endorse a non-binary, nonhierarchical conception of 'reality'. We have already witnessed the salutary consequences of this new mode of rationality in our consideration of a possible *marabi* assemblage. It must be kept in mind that *marabi* is also *inter alia* a non-binary, nonhierarchical mode of musical expression and, thus, highly susceptible to "the prospects of a different form of reason," as Olivier (1996) expresses it in the title of his article, as a critical prism to disclose new insights into its constitution.

2.6. *MARABI* RHIZOMATICALLY RE-CONFIGURED

Having considered the efficacy of assemblages to counteract unitary, essentialist thinking in general, and specifically with regard to conceptualising *marabi,* we now move on to frame *marabi* in terms of another – albeit related – Deleuzoguattarian concept: the "rhizome." In so doing, we will return to matters of context by situating *marabi* at the crossroads between the "schizophrenising"[38] effects of the capitalist machine on African workers, on the one hand, and it's multicultural, multi-ethnic "composition" as conceived in rhizomatic terms, on the other.

[38] Numerous misconceptions surround the word schizophrenia. Holland (1999:3) observes that "Despite their psychological origin, the terms 'paranoia' and 'schizophrenia' for Deleuze and Guattari designate effects of the fundamental principles and dynamics of capitalist society." He goes on to say that "paranoia represents what is archaic in capitalism, the resuscitation of obsolete, or traditional, belief-centered modes of social organization, whereas schizophrenia designates capitalism's positive potential: freedom, ingenuity, permanent revolution." Holland notes that Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) embodies both positions.

2.6.1 *Marabi* as Rhizome and the Question of Schizophrenia

The multitudinous constitution of *marabi* and its capacity to disperse meanings and significations may be viewed as symptomatic of the schizophrenising effect of the capitalist machine on black workers at the beginning of the 20th century.[39] At the same time, the countervailing capitalist tendency – that is, its "paranoiac" tendency – to restrict and thereby hold in check schizophrenia's tendency to disperse significations, or "accumulation of energy of charge," as Deleuze and Guattari (1983:34) put it, finds a correlate in the seemingly innumerable laws set in place by the capitalist State apparatus to control the lives of black workers (as Callinicos, 1981:42, has amply demonstrated).

The intrinsic duality whereby the capitalist machine oscillates madly between a liberating, schizophrenising, decoding and deterritorialising pole, on the one hand, and an opposing incarcerating, paranoiac, recoding and reterritorialising pole, on the other, is, in fact, already implicit in Marx's theorisation of the capitalist production as such. Relating *avant la lettre* to what Deleuze and Guattari term capitalism's schizophrenising tendency, Marx, in the *Grundrisse*, avers that capital (Marx, 1993:541-542), in a rather rampaging and materially insurrectionary manner, "posits the production of wealth itself and hence the universal development of the productive forces, the constant overthrow of its prevailing presuppositions, as the presupposition of its reproduction. Value excludes no use value; i.e. includes no particular kind of consumption etc., of intercourse etc. as absolute condition; and likewise every degree of the development of the social forces of production, of intercourse, of knowledge etc. appears to it only as a barrier which it strives to overpower." This is so (Marx 1993:334-335), since "as representative of the general form of wealth – money – capital is the endless and limitless drive to go beyond its limiting barrier. Every boundary [*Grenze*] is and has to be a barrier [*Shranke*] for it. Else it would cease to be capital – money as self-reproductive. If ever it perceived a certain boundary not as a barrier, but became comfortable within it as a boundary, it would itself have declined from exchange value to use value, from the general form of wealth to a specific, substantial mode of the same." In this decoding and deterritorialising tendency unleashed by the capitalist machine, Marx evidently uses the word "barrier" (*Shranke*) to mean something that, of its nature, is to be crossed. On the other hand, "boundary" (*Grenze*), in Marx's particular usage is something not to be crossed; yet, since

[39] I am indebted to Olivier for this insight.

capital's dynamism inherently treats any such putatively uncrossable "boundary" as a "barrier" which, of its nature, is to be crossed; capital is by definition transgressive of all such ostensible boundaries. However, fully in accord with the fact that, in its paranoiac tendency, the capitalist machine reterritorialises labour onto capital so as to valorise (extract surplus-value from, for the purposes of profit) capital, Marx maintains that there is a barrier to capital which remains uncrossable: capital as such. As Marx avers in the third volume of *Capital* (1991, Vol.3, 358-359), the "*true barrier* to capitalist production is *capital itself*. It is that capital and its self-valorisation appear as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and purpose of production; production is production only for capital, and not the reverse" of the latter. Thus, the capitalist axiomatic's deterritorialising and schizophrenising tendency, wherein one encounters "the methods of production that capital must apply to its purpose and which set its course towards an unlimited expansion of production, to production as an end in itself, to the unrestricted development of the social productive powers of labour," is incessantly countervailed by its own reterritorialising and paranoiac tendency, through which schizophrenisation is periodically halted and plugged up by capital itself as the "barrier within which the maintenance and valorization of the capital-value has necessarily to move," owing to the fact that "the means – the unrestricted development of the forces of social production – comes into persistent conflict with the restricted end, the valorization of the existing capital" (Marx, 1991, Vol.3, 358-359).

To this countermanding movement of paranoiac reterritorialisation of labour onto capital for the sake of capital's valorisation, Deleuze and Guattari add the role of the State in this same process. Here, the massive schizophrenising movements of decoding and deterritorialisation unleashed by the capitalist axiomatic are structurally checked by the State (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:273), which functions as "the regulator of decoded flows as such, insofar as they are caught up in the axiomatic of capital." Capitalist State apparatuses are (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:455), after all, "immanent models of realization for an axiomatic of decoded flows," whose function is to "moderate the superior deterritorialization of capital and to provide the latter with compensatory reterritorializations." It stands to reason that one of the ways in which the capitalist State accomplishes such a reterritorialisation is through the formulation and deployment of laws befitting such a task. To illustrate the relevance of this Janus-faced, oscillating dynamic of capital, its reterritorialising function is powerfully expressed in the following *marabi* song (Coplan, 1985:107):

There comes the big van
All over the country
They call in the pick-up
There, there is the big van
'Where is your pass?'
'Where's your tax?'

This is further illustrated by the fact that pass laws were in effect from 1896 together with a plethora of other restrictions. By 1910:

> the natives…are already kept in their places with a rigour that would surprise you. One result is that they have no footing in the public life of the community outside certain menial forms of labour…'The Nigger'…is not tolerated, except, so to speak, as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water. (*New Nation*, 1910, as quoted in Coplan, 1985:58)

It goes without saying that the shebeen culture out of which *marabi* grew was by no means immune to the restrictive reterritorialising power of the capitalist government, as is instanced by the numerous raids that took place on shebeens and illegal alcohol distilleries. It is therefore ironic, as Coplan (1985:57) notes, that, although the Transvaal government's Liquor Act of 1896 imposed total prohibition on Africans, the Transvaal government knew that most of the brandy distilled under government monopoly was going to Africans. Moreover, "the mining interests themselves took a share of the huge profits from illicit liquor consumed by their own workers". Even more disturbingly, not only did the Liquor Act "ensure high profits for illicit sales, but they forbade traditional grain beers that were relatively nutritious and only mildly alcoholic." Instead, "the government-sponsored distillery at Pretoria and the Portuguese in Mozambique provided cheap brandy, which was mixed with beer and chemicals to produce a variety of near-lethal preparations sold in the locations or smuggled into the mine compounds." An early visitor witnessed that the African miners:

> amuse themselves at times by dancing, especially after having managed to get hold of the vile concoction representing whiskey which… is rapidly ruining fine [human, N.D.] races and is mainly composed of tobacco juice and "blue stone" (sulphate of copper). The effect of this deadly mixture on even a Native's stomach and head can be imagined. Their dance is a strange, incomprehensible one, especially under the above conditions. (Tangye, 1896:95, as quoted in Coplan, 1985:58)

This is capitalism at its ugliest, forfeiting both human health and life in its relentless pursuit of financial gain. It is particularly noteworthy that capitalism was responsible for creating the

harsh, unfamiliar, restrictive environment that workers were trying to 'escape' from by drinking, in the first instance. Seen in this way, the capitalist opportunistic exploitation of workers' vulnerability and weakness resonates with Olivier's (2018:11) insights into the "perverse" pathology underlying neoliberal capitalism, which is also inherently "sadistic" in Freudian terms, insofar as the *jouissance*[40] peculiar to it consists in inflicting pain and humiliation on others, albeit indirectly via financial losses and gains.[41]

Having considered capitalism's tendency to restrict and "posit limits to the very process of releasing schizophrenic energy," as Olivier (2018:13) puts it, let us consider schizophrenia, in contrast, as "the proliferation of meaning and significations." A comment by Holland is highly pertinent at this juncture in order to connect *marabi* to the creative, dynamic aspect of schizophrenia as a process. Holland (1999:x), observes in this regard that Deleuze and Guattari use the term "schizophrenia" to refer to "a specific mode of psychic and social functioning that is characteristically both produced and repressed by the capitalist economy," as we have seen. There is, however, "always a danger inherent in capitalistic induced schizophrenia," (p.x), of which Holland observes as follows:

> In the worst cases – when capitalism is unable to countenance the process of schizophrenia it has itself produced – the result is "madness": schizophrenia as *process* succumbs to a repression that generates "the schizophrenic" as *entity* and the miseries of the psychiatric patient. But in the best cases the process of schizophrenia takes the form of viable social practices and the joys of unbridled, free-form human interaction. (1999: x; original emphasis)

Holland (1999: xi) identifies improvisational jazz as the best illustration of the *process* of schizophrenia that he knows of. He goes on to say that:

> whenever references are made in *Anti-Oedipus* to schizophrenia as the principle of freedom or the realization of universal history, readers should think of jazz, which represents a fulfilment of the process of schizophrenia,

[40] The Lacanian term, *jouissance,* means "enjoyment," except that this is an enjoyment beyond the Freudian pleasure principle (which tends to homeostasis by lowering excitation). *Jouissance*, thus, roughly means "pleasure in pain." More technically, *jouissance* is always already surplus *jouissance*, with the caveat that Lacan plays on the double meaning of the phrase *plus-du-jour*, which simultaneously means "no more enjoyment" and "surplus enjoyment." This means that enjoyment in Lacan, of its very nature, always falls short of satisfaction whilst, at the same time, always being excessive and something that one cannot get rid of (Fink 1995:190-191, note 28 to Chapter 8).

[41] For a more exhaustive account of this phenomenon, situated (amongst others) within the context of Lacanian psychoanalysis, cf. Olivier (2018:9-12).

> rather than thinking of mental illness, which represents the defeat of that process by the forces of power and repression (Holland, 1999: xi).

Thus, by way of analogical transfer, it would be productive to think of *marabi* against the backdrop – or, better, in terms – of a schizophrenic process that is conducive to free expression, notwithstanding capitalism's indirect reterritorialising powers to restrict that which it produces.

This possibility of free expression, in spite of the immanently countervailing strictures of capitalist society, is evidenced by the fact that in the 1920's, "musicians assimilated elements from every available performance tradition into a single urban African musical style, called *marabi*" (Coplan, 1985:94). This, in itself, is a testimony to the resilience of not only *marabi* as a motley of musical forms and practices (and its possible latent resistive capacity), but also that of the workers who had to endure the misery of a capitalist system that relegated them exclusively to "hewers of wood" and "drawers of water."

From here, I will move from the schizophrenising capitalist exploitation of workers, evidenced in the above, to the multicultural and multi-ethnic constitution of *marabi* as expressed in rhizomatic terms, with particular emphasis on the capacity of the logic of the rhizome to open up new modes of rationality. It is apt to proceed at this point from considerations of schizophrenisation to the rhizome, since the productive and expressively liberating movements of decoding and deterritorialisation coextensive with schizophrenisation do lead us away from the stunted logic of "arborescence" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:505-506), as in the case of roots and trees, to rhizomes, which are largely made up of emancipatory "lines of flight" (this will be clarified presently).

2.6.2 Characteristics of a Rhizome

The logic of the rhizome is related to that of the assemblage to the extent that they could almost be regarded as synonymous, but the latter seems to Olivier (2017:9) to be more all-encompassing than the former.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1987:7-13, 21) give us six characteristics of rhizomes, which I will present in six points.

(1) *Connectivity*. Unlike trees or roots, whose points are connected to form an essentially hierarchical order, proceeding from one level to the next by dichotomy, trichotomy, tetrachotomy, or any *n*-chotomy, where *n* is any natural number, rhizomes are fundamentally more akin to networks, in which any 'point' may be connected to any other 'point', with the caveat that these 'points' are not actually points but, rather, "lines" (1987:7).

(2) *Heterogeneity*. The 'points', or 'lines,' of a rhizome may connect to multiplicities defined by a different mode of coding. For instance, semiotic chains may be connected to biological, political, social, artistic, or economic multiplicities, where each such multiplicity also includes its own pragmatic contexts and acts. In this sense, assemblages follow a rhizomatic logic, in that their collective assemblages of bodies and collective assemblages of enunciation interpenetrate and affect one another (1987:7).

(3) *Multiplicity*. As in the case of assemblages, rhizomes are multiplicities defined without any recourse to a 'higher' unity that would totalise them from its vantage point, whether this latter be a subject or an object, neither of which a rhizome coincides with as such. As multiplicities, rhizomes consist instead only of dimensions or lines, a change in whose number will effect a change in the very nature of the rhizome, where this change itself is piloted by a line of flight connecting the rhizome to other rhizomes on a "plane of consistency," which latter is the immanent intersection of all such multiplicities as continuously drawn by this line of flight itself (1987:8-9). "Lines of flight will be discussed below.

(4) *Asignifying rupture*. Though any rhizome is partly composed of "lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc.," as seen in the previously enumerated point, a rhizome also has lines of flight, or deterritorialisation, launched in asignifying ruptures that break from "striated" space and its territories, organisations, significations, and subject-determining bodily attributions, into "smooth" space. These lines of flight, however, often flow and ossify back into "organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore the power of a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject" (1987:9).

(5) *Cartography*. Since a rhizome is fundamentally incompatible with any sort of genetic model or deep structure, it is conceivable not as a "tracing" but, rather, as a "map." Tracing, precisely, entails the reproduction, with or without recombination and variation, of genetic cells or deep structural sequences, and, thus, still operates within the domain of representation (1987:12). This predilection for logically prioritising 'profound structure' and some sort of genetic axis, specifically within the context of traditional musicological analysis, is borne out as follows:

> Analysis posits deep structures that are elaborated into a signifying surface – the musical foreground – without being contingent in any way on what that surface might signify…The rationale for this *de facto* devaluation of the foreground is epistemological. Responsive to the ideal of complex unity originated by nineteenth century organicists and continued by twentieth-century structuralists, the linear analysis of music locates the coherence of a variegated discourse in relationships of underlyingness or subsumption. Its deep structures articulate these relationships, ultimately providing what Schenker, all too aptly, invoking the pre-established harmony of Leibnizian monads, called a "final immutable nucleus" for surface transformations. (Kramer, 1992:15)

A map, in contradistinction, does not proceed through reproduction and its implied denigration of surface to an epiphenomenon of 'deep structure'. Instead, in a map, all is flat surface, except that this surface is itself 'deep' or, better, very rich and fecund. A map is an incessantly mobile and open process that forges constantly shifting and mutating connections between multiplicities, doing so by way of lines of flight (1987:12).

(6) *Decalcomania*. Owing to its open-endedness, unlike a tracing, a map never returns "to the same." A rhizome, as map, is "detachable," "susceptible to constant modification," possessed of "multiple entryways," and can be "reworked by an individual, group, or social formation" (1987:12). It is likewise anarchic and devoid of teleology, as it cannot be assigned a beginning or an end, and instead transpires *in media res*, from whence it endlessly proliferates. Rhizomes likewise proceed "without an organizing memory or central automaton" (1987:21), through "forgetting instead of remembering," "underdevelopment instead of progress toward development," and abide not by the logical principle of exclusive disjunctions, in which one thing is affirmed instead of another, but, rather, by that of an endless paratactic concatenation (1987:25). Deleuze and Guattari refer to this a-teleological,

an-archic, decentered, actively forgetful, non-developmental, paratactic, rhizomatic process as a form of "decalcomania."

2.6.3 The *Marabi* Rhizome

Returning to our main thread, the task of aligning *marabi* with these characteristics of the rhizome proceeds as follows. First, *marabi* exhibits a high degree of connectivity. It is connected to a dance, a social occasion, a type of person, a symbol of urban identity, shebeen culture and many more things. As Koch (1983:159) puts it: "The term [*marabi*]…came close to describing the whole way of life of a people, the way they earned a living, the class position they adopted, the music they played and the way they danced." All elements could potentially be conceived as an intricately enmeshed *marabi* rhizome (or, for that matter, assemblage). Secondly, it must be borne in mind that *marabi* was constituted by a connection of elements from every available performance tradition (cf. Coplan, 1985:94), from Cape Coloured to traditional Sotho music. Moreover, the fact that *marabi*, in the sense of the music itself taken in isolation, was, as seen, inseparable from the formations and pragmatics of social, dance, political, and economic assemblages, implies that *marabi* connected itself to multiplicities defined by a different mode of coding to that deployed in music. Hence, the facet of heterogeneity holds for *marabi*. Thirdly, in that *marabi*, conceived as an amalgam of music, dance and social praxis, is, as already demonstrated, an assemblage and, since an assemblage is a particular subspecies of rhizome defined by the mutual interpenetration within it of a machinic assemblage of bodies and a collective assemblage of enunciation, *marabi* is necessarily a purely immanently wrought multiplicity, devoid of recourse to an encompassing 'higher' unity from whence it could be totalised.

Fourthly, regarding an asignifying rupture *marabi*, in formal terms, is particularly resilient. Unlike traditional musical forms like sonata form, *marabi's* 'structure' can be interrupted or shattered at any point and it will simply continue by taking up these shards (or shoots) and rework them into new configurations. An instance of this is *marabi's* purported 'demise' in the wake of the 1923 Urban Areas Act. This was not the case as is instanced by the new rhizomatic shoots forming, which influenced *mbaqanga*, a big band hybrid style with *marabi's* penchant for cyclicity. Furthermore, Coplan's circular representation of Highbreaks, after Rycroft (Transcription 2, 1985:262) is pertinent to Deleuze and Guattari's rhizoidal features of cartography and decalcomania. The point is that the conception of

music as circle, which is germane to indigenous music, has no sense of *telos* and/or prescribed beginning or end. Musicians can start anywhere. It also follows that no version of the same song will ever be exactly the same. Instead of having a prescribed score (tracing), *marabi* can be seen as an open-ended 'map' and, except for a recurring bass line, any melodic phrases can enter at any point in the cycle. Similarly, rather than set lyrics, the words are also made up along melodic lines and are open to change according to the ethnicity of the singer. Also, like a map, *marabi* has multiple openings; in this case, for a myriad of other elements, be it musical, historical, socio-political or symbolic, to enter and exit.

The above demonstration of the extent to which *marabi*, as both assemblage and rhizome, undermines traditional modes of rationality, exemplifies Olivier's (2011:10) observation that: "It is clear that Deleuze and Guattari are proposing an ontological conception that is radically different from the customary foundationalist one of western thought." In this vein, it is more productive and supple to conceive of and configure *marabi* in terms of rhizomatically connected assemblages than along binary, essentialist, western epistemological lines. Moreover, such an approach accommodates the idea of *marabi*'s schizophrenic release of energy, which is akin to that of improvisational jazz which, as Holland sees it, is a rhizomatic *process*, rather than a static structure.

2.7 LINES OF FLIGHT, BECOMINGS, NOMADISM, HAECCEITY, *AEON*

In what follows, we will continue to explore aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking, with possible relevancy to *marabi* in its context.

2.7.1 *Marabi,* Lines of Flight and Becomings

There is one last aspect of rhizomes that remains to be engaged at greater length and its implications drawn out to a fuller extent: 'lines of flight'. As observed, whereas, on the one hand, a rhizome is composed of "lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed," on the other hand, rhizomes function in line with the principle of asignifying rupture, through which they launch lines of flight. These lines are lines of deterritorialisation that break through the various strata of a rhizome and their territories, organisations, significations, and (quasi-)subject-determining bodily attributions. Of course, as also seen, the lines of flight, or deterritorialisation, of a rhizome

will, often enough, flow and ossify back into "organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore the power of a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject" (1987:9). Robin Usher (2010:71) maintains that segmentary lines are stabilising forces which "connect and unify different practices and effects" and, in so doing, create hierarchies that, of their nature, "define relations between center and periphery" through the creation of "rules of organization which lead to stasis and solidified strata." In contrast, lines of flight "disarticulate relations between and among practices and effects, opening up contexts to the outsides and the possibilities therein. They break-down unity and coherence. They decenter centers, disrupting hierarchies and disarticulating strata." Lines of flight, or deterritorialisation, therefore, foment a pressure under which repressive hierarchical orders are given to a fragmentation through which a movement away from their totalising aegis is initiated. A potential return to hierarchy is, of course, always in the offing.

Such lines of flight are evident in Modikwe Dikobe's *The Marabi Dance*, a novel set probably at some time in the 1920s and 1930s in the slums, townships, and occasionally the white areas (where some of the characters work) of mainly Johannesburg but also Pretoria, Natal, and as far away as Salisbury in the former Rhodesia. The main character, a *marabi* singer named Martha or Moipone, who is expected to marry a man called Sephai, as arranged by her parents, instead pursues a line of flight away from these familial strata and generally hierarchical structures by keeping up a dalliance with her beloved, a *marabi* keyboard player, part-time gangster, and prolific fornicator, George. Against the wishes of her parents, she secretly sings, while he accompanies her at a certain Ma-Ndlovu's *marabi* dance parties. Martha's line of flight likewise takes her away from the strata of school. Here, it is written (Dikobe, 1973:2): "The Head was right in guessing that Martha's withdrawal from school had something to do with George. He was the pianist at the Marabi parties run by Ma-Ndlovu which were very popular but not favoured by respectable people. They knew Marabi as a dance party for persons of a 'low type' and for malala pipe-sleepers, homeless ruffian children. At the end of the novel, notwithstanding, solidified conjugal and familial strata reassert themselves reterritorialisingly when Martha marries George.

If the segmentary lines through which a rhizome is stratified constitute, or re-constitute, a subject, then, clearly, the lines of flight of a rhizome move in the direction of desubjectification. Lines of flight, or deterritorialisation, are, at the same time, lines which pilot various becomings. What is crucial about becoming as Deleuze and Guattari's conceive

it (1987:238) is that it is not about a specific substantive physical entity becoming another such entity, although such a metamorphosis or partial metamorphosis is not forbidden by the logic of becoming. Rather, "The becoming-animal of the human being is real, even if the animal the human becomes is not; and the becoming-other of the animal is real, even if that something other it becomes is not." Inherent in the foregoing is that becomings are always double, assuming the form of a single "block of becoming," which is at once the becoming-Y of X and the becoming-Z of Y. A crucial condition (1987:244-246) for becoming is that an "alliance," or "pact," must be forged with a certain "exceptional individual," likewise termed "the anomalous," which the authors' define as the "borderline," or "cutting edge of deterritorialization," of a rhizomatic multiplicity, beyond which the multiplicity changes nature along a line of flight. For example, in Heinrich von Kleist's *Penthesilea*, one observes the becoming-woman of Achilles, as evinced in his love-induced diminution in virility, and the becoming-dog of the Amazon queen-warrior Penthesilea, who in one military sally bites into Achilles' flesh. The borderline with which alliance is made by the two adversaries would certainly be the attack dogs deployed by Penthesilea. At the same time, it is through such lines of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:247) that a nature-changing multiplicity enters into 'unnatural' "symbioses" with other multiplicities, and it is precisely such 'unnatural' "symbioses" that make up the becomings into which the multiplicities in symbiosis are swept. At the micro-political level, the kinds of multiplicities that enter into these becomings are "minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognised institutions," (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:247) in relation to which institutions they engineer an assignifying rupture

In *The Marabi Dance*, there is a becoming-bee (Dikobe, 1973:1) of people who on Sundays "swarmed like bees in the yards and streets of Doornfontein"; the becoming-springbok (1973:6) of the *marabi* dancers at a party where Martha and George are performing, who "swayed from side to side like mealie stalks; the right and left feet moving forward and back like springbok crossing a river"; the becoming-fly, becoming-rat and becoming-mouse of the same dancers (1973:7), where the "flies, which had become a nuisance to the dancers, buzzed in harmony, and the rats and mice between the wall and the false front of the hall, scrambled into the ceiling"; the potential becoming-Chimpanzee of Ma-Ndlovu (1973:8), as forecast in Martha's words to George that she is "going to send her Mafunyane, the madness that causes one to see chimpanzees, before her husband is lowered into his grave"; the becoming-cow of Reverend Ndlovu and Ma-Ndlovu (1973:16), who during a bout of passionate kissing

"twisted their tongues together like a cow and its calf"; and the becoming-tiger of Black Cat, the leader of the Black Cats gang (1973:76), who after a fight "lay groaning like an injured tiger in a corner," in tandem with the becoming-animal of Bitch-Never-Die, a dangerous moll pursuing him to the point of forcibly impregnating herself by him, who stands "in a corner panting like a bull-frog" and, upon arrest by a policeman supervening upon the fracas, "flung herself at him and sunk her teeth deep into his flesh." In the becoming-cow of Reverend Ndlovu, the "borderline," "anomalous," or "cutting edge of deterritorialization" is Satan himself, who has entered into him from Ma-Ndlovu and caused him to get drunk and become lascivious. Here, the Reverend, immediately after his inebriation and dalliance with Ma-Ndlovu, sees a prophet who, during his performance of an exorcism upon the Reverend, cries: "Kupa satane – take away the devil from this man. He has been bewitched by a woman. A woman who sleeps with evil spirits, with Tokoloshi. Puma satane! Get out, devil!" After the exorcism, the Reverend vomits out a "grotesque shaped creature." The prophet pierces it with a spear and decrees: "I have killed the Tokoloshi which could have ended your life. Gods of Mzilikazi and Lobengula be with you!"

2.7.2 Nomadism, *Marabi* and the "War Machine"

Since lines of flight effect the fragmentation of strata, they likewise precipitate a movement away from the preponderance of "striated" space and toward "smooth" space. Striated space, for Deleuze and Guattari (1987:361-362), is essentially metric, in the sense that it is only occupied after being counted in accordance with an established measure comprised of pre-established units. Smooth space is topological, in that the manner in which it is occupied is not overdetermined by any logically anterior counting procedure. Smooth space is "*nomadic*" (1987:380; emphasis in original), although nomads differ fundamentally from migrants, despite the fact that both move through space. Migrants move between preordained points in striated space along a trajectory that serves to (1987:380; emphasis in original): "*parcel out a closed space to people*, assigning each person a share and regulating the communication between shares." In our South African context of the 1910s through to the 1930s, migrants would be the native African people who were evicted from their farms by the 1913 Natives Land Act, as passed by the State apparatus (the primary machine through which space is striated, since striated space is fundamentally statist space), and forced to move along a preordained series of points from their farms to the cities to work on the mines. Of course,

once their contract on the mines had expired, they similarly had to migrate back to the closed and counted space of the Native Reserves in the Bantustans.

In contradistinction to migrants, although nomads may move between points that could theoretically be accorded to a striated space, these points are strictly secondary to the vectors of the trajectory they improvise for themselves, for they pass through and occupy space in such a manner that their movement "*distributes people (or animals) in an open space,* one that is indefinite and noncommunicating," (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:380-381; emphasis in original), and likewise "without division into shares," that is, "a space without borders or enclosure." Whatever secondary points or nomads do move through are continuously "effaced and displaced with the trajectory." Notwithstanding, in an apparent *volte-face,* Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the nomad, in fact, does not move, and is thus "*he who does not move*." Whereas the migrant is characterised by movement, the nomad is immobile, yet is possessed of "speed." The difference between movement and speed consists in the fact that, whereas movement "designates the relative character of a body considered as 'one', and which goes from point to point" in coordinate-pegged, Euclidean, striated space, "*speed, on the contrary, constitutes the absolute character of a body whose irreducible parts (atoms) occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a vortex,* with the possibility of springing up at any point." Speed is, therefore, absolute deterritorialisation, as we may gather from our earlier discussion of various types of deterritorialisation as delineated in *A Thousand Plateaus*. In the case of the migrant, the State apparatus effectuates a countermanding and countervailing reterritorilisation of the migrant's relative movement of deterritorialisation. In the case of the nomad, there is no such mediation by the State as a mechanism of reterritorialisation, for the nomad's deterritorialisation is absolute, whereas, in his or her compensatory counter-movement, s/he "reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself." Returning to our South African context of the 1920s and 1930s, our nomads are the slumdwellers of the great mining cities like Johannesburg. Koch (1983:158-159) has, after all, maintained that "'*Marabi*' is the generic name that slumdwellers and others have given to the culture that permeated the yards of Johannesburg." Unlike business districts and formal residential areas, slums are, by definition, not zoned by the State apparatus. They therefore fall outside the remit of striated statist space, in which movement is relative and proceeds from point to preordained point, and where land is parcelled out in accordance with designated shares allotted to occupants through a metric that counts and segments space. Slumyard space is, therefore, smooth space, whose occupants are immobile, yet, having the

property of speed, cease to be bodies moved by State-regulated relative deterritorialisations-*cum*-reterritorialisations and acquire, instead, the characteristic of being bodies possessed of absolute movement in the topological space of *spatium*, even though their movements in extensive metric space may be very slow indeed. In *The Marabi Dance*, Martha lives precisely in such a slum, called Molefe Yard.

This 'extra-statism' of our *marabi* slum dwellers summons another Deleuzeguattarian term that may be collectively applied to them: the "war machine." Nomadism forms a "war machine" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:352), since the latter is "irreducible to the State apparatus," "outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere." The war machine is "a pure and immeasurable multiplicity," – immeasurable, that is, in terms of the metric that counts space in terms of the striations imposed by the State – which "brings a *furore* to bear against sovereignty," "secrecy against the public," "a machine against the apparatus." The war machine is, moreover, traversed by, and brings to bear, an assortment of becomings: becomings-woman, becomings-animal, and so forth.

2.7.3 *Marabi* as Haecceity and the Time of *Aeon*

As observed, lines of flight flatten out all rhizomatic multiplicities onto a plane of consistency, which latter is the intersection of all such multiplicities. It is onto a plane of consistency (1987:251), furthermore, that "all becomings are written like sorcerer's drawings," which possess an entirely different mode of individuation (1987:260-261) to that of determined subjects, objects, substances, or things. This mode of individuation is that of Spinozan bodies, or *haecceities*, which, in their "longitude," are defined by compositions of differential movements of "rest, speed and slowness," and, in their "latitude," are defined by combinations of affects, which (Bonta and Protevi, 2004:49) refer to the capacity of these bodies, meant as a Spinozan body, to act or to be acted upon at any given degree of power.

It is also the temporality that attaches to haecceities on the plane of consistency that differs fundamentally from that pertaining to forms, substances, subjects, objects, and things. As observed at the very beginning of this chapter, the temporality of forms, subjects, objects, and things was that of *chronos*. This temporality, which is essentially chronological time, is built upon the hegemony of the present over past and future, in which the past and future only appear as mere functions of the present, that is, as the past present and the future present,

each of which is perpetually held within the ever larger and more all-encompassing pincer-hold of an expanding present. In the time of *aeon*, likewise as seen earlier, this hegemony of the present is no longer the case. Instead, the heterogeneity of past and future *vis-à-vis* the present is maintained, rendering the past not a mere past present but, rather, as a past that is always already past in relation to any present. At the same time, the future is likewise untethered from the present and, thus, becomes a future that is always arriving, yet never arrives to become a present at any time. Therefore, in the time of *aeon*, past and future move into ever receding backward and forward, respectively, temporal horizons, and are, therefore, never present. This double retreat of past and future has the effect of infinitely fracturing the present, with the upshot that the present is transmuted into a pure infinitive. The time of haecceities is, thus, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987:263) have it, is describable as "floating," "nonpulsed," and which "articulates relative speeds and slownesses independently of" "chronometric or chronological values."

In *The Marabi Dance*, Martha sings the following song at a *marabi* party (Dikobe, 1973: 6):

> *Tjeka-Tjeka messie.*
> *Tjeka-tjkeka sebebe.*
> *Tjeka ngoanyane,*
> *Tjeka-Tjeka ngoam wa Marabi...*
>
> Give give, girl
> Give, give, prostitute,
> Give, girl,
> Give, give, girl of the *Marabi…*

This is where Dikobe's narrative continues: "The dancers swayed from side to side like mealie stalks; the right and left feet moving forward and back like springbok crossing a river. They sang as loudly as they could, singing for joy to the spirits of their forefathers. George ran his short fingers over the black and white keyboard as if they were moved by an electric charge. He sang with his face pitched to the ceiling." Dikobe does not describe the *marabi* music that is here being played, or the *marabi* dance that is here transpiring, in terms of chronological (*chronos*) time, as it would otherwise have been if one had a recurring beat punctuated by the sound of a tin of pebbles. Most of the verbs, in the narrative and not in the song, are infinitives. If we re-write the foregoing passage in the present tense, then all of the verbs will be infinitives, deploying the non-pulsed, floating time of *aeon*. To be still more accurate, and in line with Deleuze and Guattari's (1973:263) averment that the semiotic for

haecceities is "*Indefinite article + proper name + infinitive verb*," we could re-write parts of Dikobe's passage as follows, where the hyphenation indicates the inseparability of the words hyphenated: "The dancers were a-mealie-stalks-swaying"; "The dancers were a-springboks-crossing-forward-and-back"; "The dancers were a-singing-as-loudly-as-they-could"; "George was a-running-of-electrically-charged-fingers-over-the-back-and-white-keyboard"; and so forth. Moreover, we cannot say that the swaying mealie stalks or the springbok crossing a river are akin to some sort of improvised metronome whose oscillations would mark out chronometric time. Though mealie stalks may, roughly speaking, sway from one side to the other and back again, not only do they break from strict chronometric regularity due to the irregularity of the wind coursing through them but, moreover, it is the relative movements of speed and rest implicit to the "swaying" or the "to sway," coupled with the sheer idiosyncratic ipseity of the composition of "mealie-swaying" with degrees of wind speed, degrees of atmospheric heat, seasonality, and life itself, that here combine into the haecceity Dikobe draws us to. Similarly, the relative movements of speed and rest of George's fingers enter into composition with degrees of intensity of electric charge to render another distinctly individuated haecceity. In all of this, it is as if time has become 'unhinged' (or, in the French translation of Hamlet's words, time '*hors de ses fonds*'): the time of the infinite – to walk, to sleep, to dream, to die – rather than any specific time.

Moving a step further, we may view *marabi* itself, in that it is a composition of the relative movements of speed and rest with the affects (as previously clarified in Deleuzoguattarian terms) that altogether comprise it, as a haecceity. And since a haecceity, as an individuation outside of subjects, forms, objects, substances, and things, is a becoming on the plane of consistency, *marabi*, conceived as haecceity, is automatically a becoming-*marabi*. *Marabi* is a *haecceity*, as Greg Hainge (2004:36) avers of music in general, insofar as it is comprised of notes (particles) and rests, which "draw relations of movement and rest between melody and rhythm, voice and instrument, instrument and instrument, harmony and dissonance, sound and silence." Music is also "commonly considered to be the art form most capable of *affect*." Following Hainge, we may aver that the specific *marabi* moment painted by Dikobe in *The Marabi Dance* is also "a unique block of space-time," "a very singular individuation," defined by its speeds and affects, a pure "this-here-now," and therefore a musical haecceity. This literacy evocation can also be transferred to actual *marabi* events, particularly the singular, ephemeral, unrepeatable intertwinement of music and dance.

In the light of what has gone before, we can say with certainty that, not only can an isomorphism be located between *marabi* and aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's thought, but it further emerges that the way in which working class urban dwellers constituted themselves as a collective subject capable of maintaining itself so as to become the decisive human (and "inhuman," not in the sense of Primo Levi's *Muselmanner* (Agambenian *homines sacri*) of the *univers concentrationnaire* (Nazi concentration camps), but of the becomings-animal, in a positive sense, they enter into) force they are today, was through a unique experience of music – in particular, the *marabi* of the 1920's and 1930's – that formed a *ritournelle* and took them elsewhere, into a cosmic, deterritorialised terrain. We have already alluded, in this regard, to Gilbert's (2004:135) contention that all musics possess an improvisational dimension, which is to say "a rhizomatic moment at which connections are made between musics, subjects, and non-musical machines and at which a certain opening into a 'cosmic' space of infinite possibility occurs: a moment of the musician-composer's becoming-music." He notes that certain types of music – in this case, *marabi*, in the light of our previous consideration of its improvisatory capacities – would "seem to foreground this moment more than others, enabling it to proliferate and self-multiply without collapsing into a mere chaos of white noise, what Deleuze and Guattari would call a "black hole" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:342-4) of too rapid deterritorialisation and a loss of that 'composure' which a true becoming-cosmic demands."

Therefore, it can be argued that, against the barbaric forces of the State apparatus that would reduce human beings to "muscle machines" (Parsons, 1993:238), and the squalor and constant privations of their existence, through *marabi*, black South Africans were experiencing a life-enhancing, becoming-cosmic "positive deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing mode of expression," as Deleuze and Guattari would put it (1987:300).

CHAPTER 3: *MARABI* AND DECONSTRUCTION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate a striking isomorphism between *marabi* – the music of the black, territorially displaced working class, residing in the slumyards of Johannesburg between the 1920's and the 1930's, in its context – and aspects of the deconstruction 'theory' of Jacques Derrida. Specifically, having considered Derrida's critique of phono-logo-centric metaphysics, after a detour via Plato and *marabi* as *pharmakon*, the attention will focus on Derrida's re-*writing* of the Saussurean sign, as well as conventional notions of text and intertext and how these processes of deconstruction can be seen to be at work in *marabi*. We will then move on to scrutinise the extent to which *marabi* deconstructs its genetic, generic, and citational contexts. The chapter will conclude with the 'return' of *marabi*, as signifying trace in perpetual, dynamic motion.

3.2 DECONSTRUCTION AND *WRITING* AS *PHARMAKON*

Olivier (1993:313) enters into the strange 'through the looking glass' 'reality' of deconstruction with the following quixotic statement:

> The question of defining deconstruction involves a paradox: on the one hand the request for a definition issues, understandably, from a lack of understanding; on the other, understanding deconstruction is accompanied by the realization that any attempt to define it – from a position of supposed knowledge – must necessarily issue from misunderstanding deconstruction.

Readers would react differently to the above. Christopher Norris (1982: xii), for instance, alludes to Paul De Man's complaint that deconstruction has either been summarily "dismissed as a harmless academic game" or "denounced as a terrorist weapon."

Neither is true. The point that Derrida is making, according to Olivier (1993: 313), pertains to the traditional belief in the clear and distinct conceptual definability of entities, relationships and actions. This is rigorously questioned by Derrida by way of his deconstruction-oriented approach to thought and language. Deconstruction, itself is not immune to this usual assumption or belief, hence Derrida's own reticence to reduce deconstruction to a clear-cut

set of concepts. In fact, to present "deconstruction as if it were a method, a system, or a settled body of ideas would be to falsify its nature and lay oneself open to charges of reductive misunderstanding" (Norris, 1982:1).

In what follows, I will attempt to give reasons for Derrida's deconstruction-orientated approach to the conceptual framework of western metaphysics, with the latter's concomitant power relations and his unwillingness to endorse the notion of the capacity of these concepts to yield a pure, unadulterated communicative window into 'reality.'

It is first necessary to note that deconstruction, contrary to popular belief, is not synonymous with 'destruction.' Derrida argues that we are in a 'closed' *oikonomia* (economy) of western thought and language and there is nothing exterior to that economy, no privileged position that can be assumed in order to offer a critique of it. As Derrida (1982:24) puts it:

> It is not a question of junking these concepts, nor do we have the means to do so. Doubtless it is more necessary, from within semiology, to transform concepts, to displace them, to turn them against their presuppositions, to reinscribe them in other chains, and little by little to modify the terrain of our work and thereby produce new configurations; I do not believe in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal "epistemological break", as it is called today. Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually, interminably, be undone.

Olivier (1993:314) draws a correlation between this process of textual raveling with the Homeric image of Penelope weaving a funeral shroud during the day and unravelling it at night to thwart her persistent, odious suitors. The metaphor of weaving is one that, according to Walter Brogan (1989:12), is frequently used by Derrida and appertains strongly to his conception of text:

> The web of writing is not constructed along the lines of simple hierarchies that interrelate fixed points that we call concepts and words. The woven text has a texture that stretches and shrinks, can expand, can be grafted onto, can fold, warp, and unravel. To follow the patterns and interlacing of the composition requires the weaver's art of looping and knotting. The surface of the woven cloth dissimulates its complex and intricate networking.

Far from being paralysed by the paradox of "misunderstanding" deconstruction, Derrida clearly puts forward a proactive engagement with the woven texts of Western thinking. In the following he exhorts us to risk "entering the game" – and that also implies deconstruction:

> There is always a surprise in store for the anatomy or physiology of any criticism that might think it has mastered the game, surveying all the threads at once, deluding itself, too, in wanting to look at the text without touching it, without laying a hand on the "object" without risking – which is the only chance of entering into the game, by getting a few fingers caught – the addition of some new thread. Adding, here, is nothing other than giving to read. (Derrida, 1981:63)

The textile motive here, with its references to the addition and grasping of thread, would seem like as good a place as any to "enter the game." The point is that the Homeric process of raveling, as already alluded to, is pertinent to Derrida's view that deconstruction is, by no means, synonymous with 'destruction', as intimated, given that there is no conceptual economy outside of the existing one to offer a critique of it. The point is that a painstaking process of raveling, de-con, or self-critique remains the only option to modify a fatally flawed economy. To give a graphic, visual example of this dilemma, the term "being" has to be used in order to offer a critique of "being". Hence, Derrida has coined the term *sous rature* ("under erasure") to depict this double gesture and predicament graphically: the word and its deletion stand: ~~Being~~, which demonstrates the inadequacy of the word, but the necessity of using it. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in her Translator's Preface to *Of Grammatology* (Derrida, 1980: Xxi), calls Heidegger, Nietzsche and Freud "proto-grammatologists," because they had recourse to *sous rature*:

> All three protogrammatologists. Nietzsche a philosopher who cut away the ground of knowing. Freud a psychologist who put the psyche into question. Heidegger an ontologist who put Being under erasure. It was for Derrida to "produce" their intrinsic power and "discover" grammatology, the science of the "sous rature."

In this respect, the deconstruction practitioner's vocation is like that of the *bricoleur*, or jack-of-all-trades. Unlike the engineer, who has recourse to tailor-made, calibrated equipment to do the task at hand, the *bricoleur* has to make use of the tools that he or she has, even though they are not suited for the work that has to be accomplished (Derrida, 1977: xix). In some respects, *marabi* can be seen as the music of the *bricoleur*, a conglomeration of musical styles growing out of the conditions of urban working life, rather than a new genre, with black *marabi* players having the luxury of choice of instruments or performing venues.

Having exposed the error of conflating 'destruction' with 'deconstruction,' I will move onto Derrida's critique of Western thought and language, the deconstruction's critique that puts a

question mark behind "the clear and distinct conceptual definability of entities, relationships and actions." as Olivier (1993: 313) expresses it.

According to Derrida, the primary error in Western thought and language is its implicit (sometimes explicit) logocentrism. In other works, we have believed in the veracity of some 'Big Word' or Logos that will act as the foundation for all our thoughts, language and actions. Many of these Logoi have taken centre stage through the centuries: Being, Male, White, Identity and Science, to name just a few. These Words have been valorised primarily due to human beings' yearning for imputed Presence, or as Heidegger puts it: 'Being as Presence'. Humans want to be 'present' to our 'offspring' – the thoughts and language that seem to issue directly and transparently from us. Conversely, the opposite of Logoi are regarded as non-Logoi, as defective Logoi or, even worse, as betrayals of the originary Presence of Logos. Thus, it can be said that Western language has been carved up into binary oppositions, such as Presence/absence, Speech/writing White/black, Male/female, Logic/rhetoric, with the Logos assuming a superior position of power in the opposition and the non-logos assigned a negative value. Thus, the non-Logoi are disempowered, marginalised.

For example, if Man is regarded as supreme Logos and guarantor of replete presence, then woman is automatically regarded as lacking in Presence and therefore assigned a negative value. Thus, she is not (in a primary determination) woman, but non-man. Moreover, she is regarded as a supplement to the originary presence of the logos, a necessary contingency. On the one hand, she is needed to supplement an obvious lack (or there would be no reason for her existence), yet, on the other hand, she is feared and suppressed because of the potential threat she poses to the authority and illusory autonomy of the Logos. According to Norris (1982:37), the supplement (*supplément*) is "that which both signifies a lack of 'presence', or state of plenitude for ever beyond recall, and *compensates* for that lack by setting in motion its own economy of difference. It is nowhere present in language but everywhere presupposed." The logic of the *supplément* ties up with Derrida's belief that "a logic of repression and exclusion has typically and demonstrably been operative in Western culture, guided by the central metaphysical notion of 'Being as presence'", as Olivier (1993:314) expresses it.

Not only is Western metaphysics logocentric, it is also phonocentric, in other words, it values the voice as paradigm of abounding sense and presence. According to Derrida (1977:12) phonocentrism, the privileging of voice,

> Merges with the determination through history of the meaning of being in general as *presence*, with all the sub-determinations that depend on this general form and organise within it their system and their historical linkage (presence of the object to sight as *eidos*, presence as substance/essence/ existence (*ousia*), temporal presence at the point (*stigmè*) of the now or the instant (*nun*), self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, co-presence of the self and other, intersubjectivity as an intentional phenomenon of the ego, etc.) Logocentrism would thus be bound up in the determination of the being of the existent as presence.

Phonocentric metaphysics degrades writing as mere mechanistic marks on a page, as a fall from 'presence', functioning ideally in the absence of the speaker.[42] As Derrida (1977:43) puts it:

> The system of language associated with phonetic-alphabetic writing is that within which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of being as presence, has been produced. This logocentrism, this *epoch* of the full speech, has always placed in parenthesis, *suspended*, and suppressed for essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing.

Norris (1982:29) notes that there is a deep connection between the craving for self-presence, as it affects the philosophy of language, and the "phonocentrism" which prevents linguistic method from effectively broaching the question of writing. He writes: "both are components of a powerful metaphysics which works to confirm the 'natural' priority of speech." On the contrary,

> Derrida shows that these assumptions, though consistent and mutually reinforcing at a certain level, lie open to disruption as soon as one substitutes "writing" for "speech" in the conceptual order that governs them. The effect is unsettling not only for linguistics but for every field of enquiry based on the idea of an immediate, intuitive access to meaning. Derrida traces the exclusion or degradation of writing as a gesture perpetually re-enacted in the texts of Western philosophy. (Norris, 1992:30)

Thus, what Derrida calls this "repression of writing" has become almost a leitmotif in the canon of Western thought and language. Before we move onto Derrida's deconstruction of 'sign', 'text' and 'intertext' with reference to Saussure, let us pause and consider a notable

[42] Brogan (1989:20) notes that "writing is regarded as the orphan child whose activity takes place in the radical absence, the death of the father. It reduplicates the father's progeny as they are there on their own without recourse to their animate nature which only their father can sustain."

example of the 'repression' of writing as it plays out in a Socratic dialogue in Derrida's *Dissemination.*

In *Dissemination*, Derrida shows how Plato (through the mouthpiece of Socrates), prepares the reader for the final pronouncement in the myth of Theuth, the Egyptian god-king of writing as *pharmakon* by way of a series of mythemes and rhetorical tropes. This mode of presentation is ironic in the light of Socrates's undisguised contempt for what he regards as the tools of sophistry. Right from the onset of the dialogue, Socrates tells Phaedrus that (229c-230a) it is his intention "not to bother about mythologemes" (Derrida, 1981:67). He goes on to express his scorn for makers of myths, with their obvious excesses (Plato 1928:266):

> SOCRATES: Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labour and ingenuity will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate Hippocentaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous natures. And if he is skeptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up a great deal of time. Now I have no leisure for such enquiries.

It is, therefore, highly ironic, that Socrates goes about telling the 'truth' about writing by way of no less than three myths – the myth of the cicadas, of Orythyia, and of Theuth. Although writing is not explicitly mentioned in the first two myths, namely those of the cicadas and Orythyia, they are crucial in setting the stage for the final myth, in which "it is without indirection, without hidden mediation, without secret argumentation that writing is proposed, presented, and asserted as *pharmakon*" (Derrida, 1981:73). It is important to note that the word *pharmakon* has a dual signification: it is either/or as well as both/simultaneously a poison or remedy. As Derrida (1981:70) puts it:

> This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination, can be alternately or simultaneously – beneficent or malevolent. The pharmakon could be a substance – with all that that word can connote in terms of matter with occult virtues, cryptic depths refusing to submit their ambivalence to analysis, already paving the way for alchemy – if we didn't have eventually to come to recognise it as antisubstance itself: that which resists any philosopheme, indefinitely exceeding its bounds as nonidentity, nonessence, nonsubstance; granting philosophy by that very fact the inexhaustible adversity – of what funds it and the infinite absence of what founds it.

Socrates first uses the word *pharmakon* to describe how Phaedrus managed to lure him out of the safe confines of the city into the country. As he puts it (Plato, 1952:25):

> you seem to have discovered a recipe (or drug [*pharmakon*]) for getting me out. A hungry animal can be driven by dangling a carrot or a bit of greenstuff in front of it; similarly if you proffer me volumes of speeches I don't doubt you can cart me all around Attica, and anywhere else where you please.

Right from the start, Plato cunningly introduces the (negative) rhetoric associated with books (writing) that is brought into sharp relief in the myth of Theuth. In this case, we have the association of writing as a seductive ploy, which lures the reader outside all that is customary and familiar. There is also the implication that the reader is so drugged that she/he has lost her/his self-control and is the hapless victim of whoever wants to drag them all over the place, simply by putting a book ("the volumes of speeches") in front of their noses. The themes of an addictive, seductive power at work and loss of self-restraint is introduced in the myth of the cicadas, which Socrates compares to the allurement of the Sirens. This reference resonates with what is to follow in light of Felix Guirand's (1959, 147-148)'s account of the Sirens:

> The name Siren derives from the Greek root meaning "to bind or attach" and clearly alludes to the role the Sirens played in mythology. One is inclined, however, to consider them as divinities who symbolised the souls of the dead. They would thus be *funerary genii*, avid for blood and hostile to the living. With their bird's body and woman's head, they recall the human-headed Egyptian hawk who also incarnated the souls of the dead. The Sirens were invoked at the moment of death, and their images are frequently found on tombs. Legend, however, has retained nothing of this conception of them, and depicts the Sirens as malevolent [seductive, female, N.D.] monsters of the sea.

The Siren's seductive; thanatic aspects dovetail perfectly with the myth that is to come. According to this myth, the cicadas were originally men, before the muses came into the world. With the arrival of the muses, they became so entranced with music, that they sang all day and forgot to eat or sleep. So absurd was their forgetfulness that "they actually died without noticing it" (Plato, 1928:117). They were afterward reincarnated as cicadas, who were given the gift of singing all day, without having to eat or drink. Hence "for many reasons, then we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day" (Plato, 1928: 302). Again, in this myth, we have the themes of seduction, irrationality and, more ominously – death, by oblivion. It is no coincidence, in the light of what is to come, that speech is the antidote to forgetfulness and oblivion, which Socrates associates, by way of myth, with writing. As

Derrida has it (1981:68), "Both of these myths arise, moreover, in the opening of a question of the status of writing. This is undoubtedly less obvious…in the case of the cicada story. But it is no less certain." By contriving myths with affiliative resonances to sway the readers rhetorically for his final presentation, Socrates is, in fact, employing the tactic of the sophists that he so opposes, as already intimated. Consider this in the light of Socrates' question: "Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also?" (Derrida, 1981:123). This is precisely what Socrates does in the run up to his presentation of *writing* as *pharmakon*. In what follows it emerges that rhetoric is "a kind of influencing of the mind" in relation to space, when it emerges that Socrates has deliberately staged the *topos* of each of the myths of the *pharmakon*. As Derrida (1981:69) expresses it:

> The *topoi* of the dialogue are never indifferent. The themes, the topics, the (common)-places, in a rhetorical sense are strictly inscribed, comprehended each time within a significant site. They are dramatically staged, and in this theatrical geography, unity of place corresponds to an infallible calculation or necessity. For example the fable of the cicadas would not have taken place, would not have been recounted, Socrates would not have been incited to tell it, if the heat, which weighs over the whole dialogue, had not driven the two friends out of the city, into the countryside, along the river Ilissus.

The same applies to the myth of Orythyia, which Socrates just 'happens' to recount as the friends reach the banks of the Ilissus. As the tale unfurls it becomes evident that the myth and its *topos* is simply a pretext to take up the theme of the *pharmakon* and its affiliative resonances, as already introduced in the myth of the cicadas.

Having reached the Ilissus, Socrates notes that this is the place where the virgin, Orithyia, whilst playing with Pharmacia was swept up by Boreas "down from the rocks hard by" and "having thus met her death was said to have been seized by Boreas" (1981:70). He further notes that a commemorative fountain "perhaps with curative powers" was dedicated to Pharmacia at this spot. The significance of this myth emerges where, as Derrida notes "Pharmacia (*Pharmakeia*) is also a common noun signifying the administration of the pharmakon, the drug: the medicine and/or poison" (1981:70). Once again we have the ambivalence: the death of the virgin, while playing with Pharmacia, yet the curative fountain dedicated to Pharmacia, along the banks of the Ilissus. It is also notable that Pharmacia is associated with violent death, a death that was related to the 'surprise' of the virgin. This suggests that the games with Pharmacia at the diaphanous waters of the Ilissus were

associated with forgetfulness or, as Derrida suggests, a "spell" that had fatal consequences. This resonates with the previous myth, in which the men were so spell-bound by music that they forgot to eat and drink and died. These men were, however, reincarnated as cicadas which could (joyfully?) sing without sustenance. By the time that Socrates explicitly denounces writing as a *pharmakon*, its identity is already by tacit means established in these myths, as both a feminine (in the guise of Pharmakia), benevolent and maleficent force associated with seduction and forgetfulness. As Derrida (1981:73) puts it, "Up to this point in the dialogue, one can say that the pharmakon and the grapheme have been beckoning to each other from afar." It is, however, in the myth of Theuth that "This time it is without indirection, without hidden mediation, without secret argumentation, that writing is proposed, presented, and asserted as pharmakon" (1981:73).

Socrates tell Phaedrus that so the 'story' goes (again here, not the truth), in Egypt, long ago, the inventor god Theuth presented his new inventions to the god-King of the Thebes. After considering the respective merits of all, he comes to writing. Theuth presents writing by saying "Here O king, is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt wiser and improve their memories: my discovery provides a recipe (*pharmakon*) for memory and wisdom the myth." (Plato, 1952:156-157):

The King responds by deftly swiveling the positive pole of the *pharmakon* around to the negative and denouncing it in no uncertain terms. Rather than being beneficial to the Egyptians, the King declares that Theuth has been blinded by paternal pride to the true nature of his invention, which will have the opposite effect to the one he purports it to have. Rather than improving their memories, it will "implant forgetfulness in their souls: they will cease to exercise their memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks (Plato, 1952: 157)". Thus what Theuth has invented, in fact,"not a recipe for memory, but for for reminder (*aukoun mnēmēs, alla hupomnēseōs, pharmakon hēures*)"

As intimated, Plato's final myth ties together themes which emerge in the prior myths. Here again, we see the resonances between the *pharmakon* of writing with death and oblivion. These come into sharper focus in the light of Derrida's (1982:105) observation that "confident of the permanence and independence of its types (*tupoi*) memory will fall asleep, will not keep itself up, will no longer keep to keeping itself alert, present, as close as possible

to the truth of what is". Like the forgetfulness of the men-cicadas who forgot to eat and drink and the distracted virgin, Orithyia, writing, conceived as *pharmakon* belongs to the domain of *lēthe*. It is significant to note that *lēthē* is another word for the Styx, the river that must be crossed to the underworld, the realm of death, and which erases all prior knowledge. "The powers of lēthē," as Derrida puts it (1981:105), "simultaneously increase the domains of death, of nontruth, of nonknowledge. This is why writing, at least insofar as it sows 'forgetfulness in the soul,' turns us towards the inanimate and towards nonknowledge." Speech, in contrast, emanates directly from the soul of the speaker, as a bountiful paradigm of presence and authenticity. Speech is also, the domain of the Father-God, the King, who graciously grants Theuth, a tutelary deity, an audience: "Theuth presents a *tekhnē* and a *pharmakon* to the king, father, and god who speaks or commands with his sun-filled voice" (1981:86). As I have noted elsewhere (Denis 1998:55) writing has no value in itself apart from the dominant patriarchal paradigm, Thamus. Derrida (1981:76) expresses it like this: "The value of writing will not be itself; writing has no value, unless and to the extent that the god-king approves of it." Writing's precise familial status emerges after the myth of Theuth, in which Socrates speaks of writing in Oedipal terms. As Brogan (1989:20) puts it, "Writing is the orphan child whose activity takes place in the radical absence, the death of the father. It reduplicates the father's progeny as they are there on their own without any recourse to their animate nature which only their father can sustain." Writing is, thus, the illegitimate orphan, in contrast to speech, whose forgetfulness or non-knowledge of his origins coincides with the birth of tragedy, as Nietzsche would put it.

This duality between writing/speech, legitimate/bastard son, brings us to an important point. What strikes one here and about Socrates's *pharmakon* myths is the way in which they are construed along the basis of opposition. Derrida (1981:103) notes with reference to Thamus's denunciation of the *pharmakon* that "In order for writing to produce, as he says, the 'opposite' effect from what one might expect, in order for this *pharmakon* to show itself, with use, to be injurious, its effectiveness, its power, its *dunamis* must, of course, be ambiguous." He goes on to say:

> It is precisely this ambiguity that Plato, through the mouth of the King, attempts to master, to dominate by inserting its definition into single, clear-cut oppositions: good and evil, inside and outside, true and false, essence and appearance…Plato thinks of writing, and tries to comprehend it, to dominate it, on the basis of *opposition* as such. In order for these contrary values (good/evil, true/false, essence/appearance, inside/outside, etc.) to be in

> opposition, each of the terms must be simply *external* to the other, which means that one of these oppositions (the opposition between the inside and the outside) must already be accredited as the matrix of all possible opposition. (Derrida, 1981:103)

This brings us to the most important point: whilst denouncing writing as *pharmakon*, the *pharmakon* – as writing – is at once the matrix that makes the series of Platonist oppositions possible. Theuth, hereby, uses writing, in its expanded sense as *différance*, as the very precondition for speech in the speech/writing duality.

Elsewhere, I (Denis, 1998:58) also confirm this point with reference to the Oedipal myth, noting that Thamus's renunciation of writing is not wholly unqualified, but perpetually swivels from the negative to the positive pole of the *pharmakon*. On the one hand, the King needs writing "to perpetuate his regal presence" and secure certain mortality, even if it means, on the other hand, to abandon his bastard son, writing.

> He has an unenviable decision: should he voluntarily "die" in order to "live" for the moment, with no prospects of the hereafter? Even if the king does not explicitly hesitate, his eventual decision presupposes a contrary decision as a possibility, and hence a moment, however fleeting, of indecision. It is this moment of indecision which places the oppositions governing this myth, such as those between death/life, self, other, father, degenerate son, interior/exterior, into a state of indecision. Although the King goes on to denounce the *pharmakon* explicitly, it is already too late. This reflective moment – this deferred decision – has implicitly sanctioned the *pharmakon*.

3.3 *MARABI* AS PHARMAKON

Surprisingly, we find a measure of ambivalence within *marabi* that resonates with Plato's *pharmakon* in the latter's *Phaedrus.* On the one hand (as has been demonstrated), *marabi* has a salutary, woman-related pole, but on the other, it has a negative pole. In this sense, it can be compared to Plato's *pharmakon*, which, as we have seen, means simultaneously and alternatively a poison and/or a remedy, hereby undermining the binary either/or categories of Platonist logic. Plato explicitly associates writing with a *pharmakon*, because, as Derrida (1981:105) puts it,

> it sows "forgetfulness in the soul", turns us towards the inanimate and towards nonknowledge. But it cannot be said that its essence simply and *presently* confounds it with death or nontruth. For writing has no essence or value of its

> own, whether positive or negative, it plays within the simulacrum. It is the type of mime, memory, of knowledge of truth, etc.

Herein lies its danger. In this respect, the same can be said of *marabi*, it confounds any notion of stable identity, be it tribal or urban. It plays within the simulacrum of 'positive/negative', the 'one' or the 'other'. This is its true danger to traditional and urban thinking and to pre-Apartheid and Apartheid logic, which depends on binary opposition to uphold its racially separatist and polarised polities.

In the previous two chapters, we have already taken cognisance of Coplan's (1985:56) observation that new arrivals to the mines were unprepared for the largely unstructured proximity of so many people; even those with experience of city life in the Cape, Natal, or Northern Transvaal found it traumatic to orient themselves in the racial, ethnic, and socio-economic milieu of the Gold Reef. Workers suffered from severe stress due to the lack of organised community, family and recreational life on the Rand. Their need for release and redress was expressed most readily in drinking, dancing and factional fighting. Ironically, many became part of Johannesburg's permanent urban proletariat as a result of alcoholism.

We have also observed that the Transvaal government's passing of the Liquor Act of 1896, which imposed total prohibition on Africans, in fact, only increased the problem. The Act ensured high profits for illicit sales and forbade traditional grain beers that were relatively nutritious and only mildly alcoholic. Instead, according to Coplan (1985:57), the government-sponsored distillery at Pretoria and the Portuguese in Mozambique produced cheap brandy, which was mixed with beer and chemicals to produce a variety of near-lethal preparations sold in the locations or smuggled into the mine compounds.

In this dire context, *marabi* had the salutary effect – its 'positive' pole – of helping black Africans to survive the trauma of enforced urbanisation and granting them a few hours of respite from the inhuman living conditions in which they were crowded; but on the other, alcohol, an inextricable part of *marabi* culture, was 'poisoning', or as already quoted in Sir Harold Tangye's (1896:95) words, "rapidly ruining fine races" (its 'negative' pole). Hence, like Plato's *pharmakon*, *marabi* is both, simultaneously and alternatively, remedy *and* poison.

Another ‘positive’ pole of *marabi* emerges in Koch’s (1983:159) description of the beer-brewing trade of the yards being the socio-economic kernel of the *marabi* culture. The ability of this activity to generate income sufficient to bridge the gap between survival needs and wages can be gauged from the following figures cited by Koch (1983:159), based on research by Hellman, who noted that in 1933 in the Rooiyard in the Doornfontein slums, the women earned £3-17s-6d and £4-16s-0d from beer sales – amounts higher than average wages paid by manufacturing capital. This, according to Koch (1983:159), was during a period when unemployment and a fall in wages due to the Great Depression had caused a decline in business. Before that, women were able to earn as much as £2 to £3 a weekend. According to Hellmann (cited in Koch, 1983:159-160), “the real dependence of the family on the wife’s beer earnings, is thrown into stark relief during times of unemployment, for then the family subsists on the wife’s beer earnings, supplemented when necessary and possible by occasional loans from relatives and friends.” It is for these reasons that the ‘shebeen’ became the predominant urban African social institution (Koch, 1983:160). As previously intimated, in Johannesburg these shebeens – around which the beer trade centred – did not operate in a vacuum and were accompanied by a constellation of cultural activities, notably music.

In the final analysis (Koch, 1983:165), the ambiguous role of liquor (as *pharmakon*) represents one example of the inconsistent and fragmented nature of this culture. On the one hand, it allowed for mutual assistance by the spread of working-class resources; on the other hand, however, it exacted a heavy physical and moral toll on the people who drank it. Political awareness was low – indeed *marabi* culture was not an overtly political one (except in the narrower sense of being inescapably tied to power-relations, particularly the self-empowering of women, which probably also came at a cost) – and this may have in no small way been due to the hard-drinking milieu it embodied.

In this case again, the displacement of logocentric either/or logic with the both/simultaneous logic of the *pharmakon*, which can be regarded as a paradigmatic metaphor for *marabi* itself, undermines the binary malevolent/benevolent opposition on which Western thought and language are premised.

Ballantine (1993:29) also points out another contradiction on a social level when he says the association of *marabi* with illegality, police raids, sex, and a desperately impoverished working class, large numbers of whom would at any one time have been unemployed,

stigmatised it as evil and degrading in the years of those black people whose notions of social advancement rested on an espousal of Christian middle-class values. Yet, ironically, *marabi* spilled over into the social occasions of respectable members of the working and even the middle classes, hereby again revealing its ambiguous malevolent/benevolent physiognomy.

Specific instances that reveal *marabi's* pharmakon-like dislocation of the either/or logic at the basis of Western, logocentric reason pertains to the *marabi* practices of working-class women's *stokvel* clubs and *Ndunduma marabi*.

Stokvels were (Coplan, 1985:102) credit rings in which each member contributed a set amount each week in anticipation of receiving the combined contributions of all the other members at regular intervals. Commonly, each member in her turn used the lump sum she received to finance a *stokvel* party, at which other members and guests paid admission and bought food and liquor and even musical entertainment. Profits went to the hostess of the week. In Johannesburg townships, Tswana rather than Xhosa people were most active in creating *stokvel* societies, though it soon spread to members of all black ethnic groups.

On Sunday afternoons (Coplan, 1985:103), *stokvel* members marched to the party in uniform, singing Tswana regimental and initiation songs, popular and urban songs, and Christian hymns. Accompanying them would be an ensemble of from five to twelve players, like Modikwe's or *the Bakgatla Brass Band*, dressed in blue European military coats with brass buttons.

At the hostess's residence, the band usually performed briefly while the party got under way. Later a keyboard musician accompanied singing by participants and played *marabi*: a conspicuous feature was the bidding for refreshments, performers and musical items – a practice taken from the popular tea meetings and community concerts. There was a (Coplan, 1985:103) very thin line between the church-going women's attendance of occasions held by their *manyano* Christian sisterhoods and their attendance of *stokvel* gatherings. Wilson Silgee (1976, as quoted in Coplan, 1985:103) observes that his father, a minister and band conductor in the 1920's and 1930's, performed brass band *marabi* for *stokvels* together with hymns and marches for weddings and other Christian occasions.

Over and above this, *marabi* (Coplan, 1985:108) became incorporated into other more socially acceptable occasions. For weddings, for example, rural music and *marabi* were both included. Traditional influences took the form of choirs created and special songs composed by young people in the same way as they would for a traditional wedding. However, at the same time they composed songs in the *marabi* style, and an amateur choral-type *marabi* developed that combined traditional wedding songs into the *marabi* repertoire. In this way, Sotho people, according to Coplan (1985:108) "transformed their '*was ala wena'* ('we are leaving you behind'; i.e. at your husband's home) wedding songs into *marabi* played on the concertina or accordion", traditionally used in Afrikaner music.

Of course, there was a vast difference between, on the one hand, the comparatively tame *stokvel marabi*, which easily accommodated singing, *marabi* and tea-drinking practices of Church-going women, together with 'respectable' Sotho wedding practices and, on the other hand, what the poet, playwright and journalist Herbert Dlomo (1953, as quoted in Ballantine, 1993:28) has called "the real refuse dump affairs – musically and morally," that was *ndunduma marabi*. Twenty years after the waning of the *marabi* era, Dlomo described *ndunduma marabi* in the following words:

> They were attended by degenerate young elements, the uninitiated newly-arrived country bumpkins and the morbidly curious. The people danced to the accompaniment of an organ and a most cacophonic "orchestra" of small tins filled with pebbles. The atmosphere was obscene. For the first time in the history of Bantu entertainment liquor was introduced. The functions were like nightclubs of the lowest order.

In Chapter 1 and 2, I quoted Dlomo's (1953, as quoted in Ballantine, 1993:28) observations on the performance aspects of *ndunduma marabi*. For purposes of recall and scene-setting, I shall refer to *ndunduma marabi* again:

> And yet what naturally talented players the ragtime and the *ndunduma* concerts had! Vampers (as they were called) who improvised many 'hot' original dance and singing numbers at the spur of the moment, and who play or accompany any piece after hearing the melody once, and did so in any key; fellows played music not because it was fashionable, but because they were born musicians – helpless victims of a Muse that gave them fire which consumed them as they could not control it, nor knew nor cared what it was; men like the tribal bards of old, created beauty they knew not and flung it back unrecorded to the elements which gave it birth.

One cannot miss seeing how in this passage Dlomo's disdain and enthusiasm go hand in hand: *marabi* is both obscene and musically prodigious. The above quotation is a good example, once again, of the logic of the *pharmakon*, *ndunduma* being both dangerous, "refuse dump affairs," but at the same time almost numinous: as borne out by Dlomo's allusion to the Ancient Greek Muses and "tribal bards of old." Once again, the *pharmakon* deconstructivist 'logic' of *marabi* is highlighted, when we compare these two different contexts and audiences – the 'respectable' middle class stokvel *marabi* wedding parties, in juxtaposition with the "rubbish dump"/sublime *ndunduma* concert. *Marabi* clearly comprises both opposites, the respectable and the chthonian, the benevolent and malevolent, thereby clearly destabilising the binary logic that is a hallmark of Western thought, as undergirded by phono-logo-centric metaphysics.

3.4 SAUSSURE: SIGN, TEXT AND INTERTEXT

Having considered Derrida's deconstruction of Socrates' repression of writing in *Dissemination*, let us move to a contemporary instance, in which Derrida considers the semiological theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, with specific reference to his notions of sign, text and intertext.

3.4.1 Sign

Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern semiology, begins by defining language as a system of signs. According to Jonathan Culler (1983:98), the central question for him becomes the nature of the sign, what gives it its identity and enables it to function as a sign.

Saussure (1959:65-67) noted the following attributes of the linguistic sign. Firstly, the linguistic sign was to be seen as a double-sided entity consisting of two components, the signifier (the word, gesture or image), and the signified (the concept it calls to mind). Secondly, the relationship between the signifier and signified is arbitrary and conventional. There is no intrinsic or substantive link between the signifier 'cat' and the furry four-legged animal. Cat could be 'cat' or 'kat' or 'table' for that matter. Notwithstanding this, convention decrees that the signifier for the animal in question is 'cat'.

Thirdly, as Terence Hawkes (1977:8) observes, "Saussure's revolutionary contribution to the study of language lies in his rejection of a 'substantive' view of language in favour of a 'relational' one." In other words, for Saussure, language is a differential network of meaning. Norris (1982:24) has said that this is the one insight that ties together the otherwise disparate field of structuralist thought. The sign's ability to signify does not depend on some hidden, inherent or substantive quality, but solely upon its relation to, and difference from, other signs. Put simply, 'cat' is 'cat', because it is not 'bat' or 'mat', and likewise not any of the other things within the system of signification.

Saussure (Hawkes, 2003, 2nd ed: 8-9) draws a distinction between language as a system of differences (*langue*) and the speech events which the system makes possible (*parole*); between the study of language as a system at any given time (synchronic) and the study of correlations between elements from different historical periods (diachronic); and two types of differences within the system he calls, respectively, 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic.'

It has already been noted that Western metaphysics, apart from being logocentric, is also phonocentric. In other words, it has valorised the spoken work above writing, creating a speech/writing duality. Given that the spoken word issues directly from the speaker, the illusion has been created that speech can yield an immediate, transparent access to the interior reality of the speaker, whereas writing is removed from this paradigm of ostensible immediacy, since it seems removed from the immediacy of the body, as mechanical marks on the page, and functions ideally in the absence of the speaker.

Derrida locates this speech/writing duality at work in Saussure's theory of the sign and goes on to demonstrate that, notwithstanding Saussure's radical insights into the arbitrary, differential nature of linguistic signification, there is a counter-logic at work, whereby Saussure undermines his own insight into the purely relational nature of linguistic signification.[43] Having insisted that language is a differential network of meaning, Saussure undercuts his own revolutionary insight by stating that "the spoken word alone constitutes the object" (Culler, 1983:100). This means to say that, if communication was purely a matter of relations, there would be no need for an atavistic reversal to an illusory, stabilising moment in

[43] According to Culler (1983:98) Derrida thus shows how Saussure's discourse deconstructs itself, but he also argues, and this is a point that must not be missed, that, far from invalidating the *Cours*, this self-deconstructive movement is essential to its power and pertinence. The value and force of a text may, paradoxically, depend to considerable extent on the way it deconstructs the philosophy that subtends it.

the voice. Derrida draws Saussure's argument to its logical and radical outcome, by declaring what Helen Efthimiadis (1991:7) has termed "the ceaseless deferral or evasiveness of meaning within a text."

Derrida has coined the term *différance* to indicate two things at once: (1) that meaning is generated by differences; (2) that meaning is, at the same time, also constantly deferred, i.e. that it never reaches its destination, regardless of whether it is spoken or written. On a previous occasion (Denis, 1998:30) I noted that, when one applies Derrida's coinage *différance* to language, what one gets is the structure of *writing*. Norris (1982:28-29) demonstrates how this generalised notion of *writing* is anterior to both the written and the spoken word and necessarily underpins both.

It can thus be said that each word, both spoken and written, is constituted by 'traces' of other words that are not present. Communication depends on differences and absences and constant deferrals, rather than immediate, transparent sense. As Derrida (1982:26) puts it:

> the play of differences involves synthesis and referrals that prevent there from being at any moment or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself and refers only to itself. Whether in written or spoken discourse, no element can function as a sign without relating to another element which itself is simply not present. This linkage means that each "element" – phoneme or grapheme – is constituted with reference to the trace in it of the other elements of the sequence or system. This linkage, this weaving, is the *text*, which is produced only through the transformation of another text. Nothing, either in the elements or in the system, is anywhere simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.

Spivak (1974: xii) expresses the usual 'nature' of Derrida's conception of the sign as follows:

> Such is the strange 'being' of the sign: half of it is 'not there' and the other half is 'not that'. That structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever absent. The other is of course never to be found in its full being. As even such empirical events as answering a child's question or consulting a dictionary proclaim, one sign leads to another and so on indefinitely.

3.4.2 Text

This also dovetails with Saussure's notion of "text." Due to the trace structure of sign and text, the elusiveness of semantic meaning and the effects of *différance*, no book can ever

'contain', or circumscribe meaning neatly between its covers. There is always a 'spillage of meaning' that Derrida calls "dissemination." As Madan Sarup (1993:53) puts it, "With deconstruction the categories 'criticism', 'philosophy' and 'literature' collapse, borders are overrun. The work, now called 'text', explodes beyond stable meaning and truth towards the radical and ceaseless play of infinite meanings." Derrida hereby completely re*writes* the notion of text. 'Text', as a metaphor for the manner in which meaning – including meaninglessness – is generated, is infinitely extended to encompass everything. All is ultimately text, as attested by Derrida's much misunderstood dictum *'Il n'y a pas de hors-texte'*, meaning "there is no extra-text," or "there is nothing outside of the text." We will return to Derrida's notion of 'dissemination' presently.

Before I do so, it is imperative to point out, that contrary to first impressions, Derrida is not advancing relativism here, but *complexity* in thinking – that is, along the lines of both/and logic: everything *that has 'meaning', or can be understood* has the structure of a text, corresponding to Hans-Georg Gadamer's (1975:468) statement in *Truth and Method*: "*Being that can be understood is language*". In both cases the structure of the logic is 'both/and' – it does not rule out the possibility that 'something' exceeds 'textuality' or language; just that it would not lend itself to understanding. This is precisely the meaning of Lacan's 'real.'[44]

3.4.3 Intertext

Since *différance* undermines closure between texts, there is a constant 'communication' between texts or transposition of signs between texts. There are traces of absent texts within each text, and this interplay between texts is called "intertextuality." According to Harty (1985:10),

> Intertextuality, like textuality, is a strategic concept whereby the intermingling of all texts including the mental texts of readers may be accomplished. This vast theoretical space is the site, in effect, of all cultural citations. This also encompasses the weave of the cultural, social and political context in which the text was written and subsequently read.

[44] For an expanded explication of what is meant by the Lacanian 'real', see Olivier's (2004) article "Lacan's Subject: The Imaginary, Language, the Real and Philosophy", pp.11-13.

Previously I (Denis 1998:52) came to the conclusion that the implications of intertextuality are so vast and far-reaching that they would provide enough material for a second dissertation. Consequently I attempted, with help from Elsa Nolte (1989), Eric Robin Harty (1985) and Vincent Leitch (1983), respectively, to summarise three of the most significant of these implications for aspects of musicological thinking and deconstruction. In this study, these can be related to *marabi*, in particular.

1. The idea of text as intertext counteracts the centering of the text around a particular composer or author's intention, emphasising rather the boundlessness of textual meaning:

   > Vroeër was die leser aan 'n bepaalde outeurintensie en outeurschronologie gebonde, wat tans nie meer die geval is nie omdat die leser die vryheid het om "tydloos" tussen tekste te kan beweeg. (Nolte, 1989:8)
   >
   > English Translation:
   >
   > Earlier the reader was bound to a specific author intention and author chronology, which is currently no longer the case because the reader enjoys the freedom of being able to move "timelessly" between texts.[45]

2. Intertextuality provides us with a model that is adequately sensitive, not only to the myriad of texts that comprise the musical, or literary/theoretical composition, but also to the context wherein it is composed and subsequently heard/analysed:

   > The absorption of context into the methodological field of intertextuality is a powerful and elegant strategic device for overcoming the limiting and inhibiting effects in the semantic domain of a naively objective view of the text as finished product gripped by an enveloping reality (Harty, 1985:10).

3. Finally, and most significantly, intertextuality discloses a substantial site wherein conventional disciplinary frontiers can be displaced and the seemingly irreconcilable texts of music (*marabi*, specifically) and deconstruction might freely intermingle. As Leitch (1983:123) puts it:

   > the (inter)textualization of context unleashes both text and context (genetic and citational) in the pasture of textuality, where not only the calf lie down with the lion, but where diverse contexts lie down with each other. (Quoted in Harty, 1985:10)

[45] I am indebted to Bert Olivier for this translation.

3.5. DECONSTRUCTION AND THE *MARABI* SIGN, TEXT AND INTERTEXT

3.5.1. *Marabi* as Sign

Having given an overview of Derrida's conception of sign, text and intertext, the terrain will now shift to *marabi*, starting with *marabi'*s deconstruction of the sign.

Coplan (1985:107) gives the following insight into *marabi'*s lyrics:

> Marabi compositions had titles but often no recognized words and participants were free to make up lyrics to suit the melody as they wished, helping to spread the melodies across ethnic lines. Like *Tebetjana ufana Ne'mfene*, some of these songs became widely known.

In what follows, I will attempt to show how the *marabi* sign – which signifies its musical qualities or characteristics, as well as its sometimes arbitrarily conceived lyrics – undermines the Saussurian conception of the linguistic sign with reference to the complex, elusive dynamics of *différance*.

It has already been demonstrated how deconstruction radically re*writes* Saussure's attributes of the sign by deploying the 'non-concept' of *différance*. Put succinctly, *différance* can be viewed as the spatio-temporalisation of Saussure's insights into the differential nature of linguistic signification. The pertinent question is thus: To what extent (if at all) does *marabi* in like manner deconstruct the Saussurian notion of the sign? The clue perhaps is to be found in Coplan's observation, above, that some *marabi* compositions had titles but no recognised words. Moreover, songs with words were semantically deferred as they were spread across ethnic lines. This clearly subverts the conventional view of the sign – be it musical or linguistic – as the purveyor of intelligible, supposedly perfectly communicable meaning, emanating directly from the interior reality of its speaker/singer. This, as we have previously seen, betrays a phonocentric bias, derived from Heidegger's notion of Being as Presence, and manifests itself in the valorisation of speech as a paradigm of replete, transparent sense. Derrida deconstructs phonocentrism by arguing, in contradistinction, that writing, in its generalised sense as archè-writing or *différance*, is a necessary precondition for both speech and writing in its graphic, or inscriptional sense. In the same way, *marabi* (based on Coplan's observation) prioritises the *absence* of sense and of deferral, or the temporalisation of meaning in order to give it its distinctive character and render it stylistically meaningful.

To clarify this, let us look closer at *marabi*'s temporalisation of the linguistic and musical sign. After this, I will turn to matters of space and consider how the interplay of both time and space in *marabi* relates to *différance*.

Marabi's temporal dimension is beyond dispute. Consider, in this regard, Adorno's insight into the temporal, transient nature of music and its historical import (Adorno, as quoted by Susan Buck-Morrs, 1979:43):

> Music, which has often been called the most abstract of the arts, is in the historical sense the most concrete. For no art is more integrally related to the dimension of time. The composition is itself history: the sense of each transient note both determines and is determined by that which has been and that which will come. Musical sound unfolds in a continuous, transitory present.

This applies to music generally, and arguably even more so to *marabi*, given that it was often deliberately left 'incomplete', so that 'history' was made up anew every time the songs were sung with novel, improvised lyrics. *Marabi*'s spatial, or deferring proclivity is evident in Coplan's observation that melodies were spread out along ethnic lines, suggesting temporality, as we have intimated, as well as spacing (differing). This demonstration leaves us with little doubt that the *marabi* sign constitutes a spatio-temporalisation of the Saussurian differential sign, which aligns it with *différance*. In fact, one might say that the poststructuralist appropriation of the Suassurian sign – which consists in re-interpreting language as a 'chain of signifiers' instead of *signs*, with their signifier/signified structure – had the effect of historicising the sign. A disconcerting point, however, arises in the light of the above. If *différance* is indeed characterised by the ceaseless difference and deferral of meaning, is conceptuality – and thus communication – possible at all? This fear seems to be shared by Saussure who, as if unnerved by the possibility of meaning without constraints, sought a stabilising moment in the ostensible immediacy of the voice. Olivier, however, allays our (and Saussure's) fears by pointing out that "the entropic decay of meaning of both difference and deferral is plainly absurd." Rather:

> *différance* 'names' that which, by itself, is ineffable, because only its effects are evident in *both* the relative 'stability' (spacing and temporalization in an economic sense) as well as the 'instability' (spacing and temporalization in the aneconomic sense) of meaning. (Olivier, 2012:229-230)

Olivier (2012:229) clarifies what is meant by these economies by observing that *différance* in its economic sense can be said to be "presupposed in the 'positive' identification of an event in contradistinction to others." This implies that this economy delineates and upholds distinctions between objects or events, thereby securing their (differential) identities. It therefore acts as a stabilising tendency. In contrast, *différance* as spacing in an aneconomic sense releases what Olivier (2012:229) terms "the virus" that dissolves identities, conflates difference and sameness, to the extent that the distinctive character of things blur, becoming what he calls "a metonymic part of an amorphous mass." Olivier notes, moreover, that these two countervailing tendencies are inseparable and work in a "mutually reinforcing manner" (2012:230).

Derrida's essay "*Difference*" precisely illustrates these subtle, often contradictory elements at play in this elusive non-word. Derrida:

> The word "to differ" [*différer*] seems to differ from itself. On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of a *spacing* and *temporalizing* that puts off until 'later' what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible. Sometimes the *different* and sometimes the *deferred* correspond [in French] to the verb 'to differ'…
>
> In the one case 'to differ' signifies non-identity; in the other case it signifies the order of the *same*. Yet there must be a common, although entirely different [*différante*] root within the sphere that relates the two movements of differing to one another. We provisionally give the name *differance* to the *sameness* which is not *identical*: by the silent writing of it's *a*, it has the desired advantage of referring to differing, *both* as spacing/temporalizing and as the movement that structures every dissociation. (Derrida, 1973: 129-130, as quoted in Olivier, 2012:230).

In the final analysis, it can thus be said that *marabi* as sign subverts Saussure's static conception of the sign by introducing the movement of deferral into difference, thereby spatio-temporalising it in a way that resonates with *différance.* Significantly, notwithstanding the ceaseless differing and 'defer-ential' play of meaning governing the *marabi* sign, meaning and conceptuality is still possible because of the tensile relationship between the two tendencies at work in *différance,* namely the economic, which upholds distinctions and stabilises meaning and the aneconomic, the vital Heraclitean dynamism that, while producing difference, intermingles sameness within difference, blurs distinctions and reconfigures identities even as it makes them possible. This is what may be termed its 'quasi-transcendental' function, as opposed to a transcendental one – that is, functioning as the

condition of the possibility of something (that is, as its enabling condition), as well as, simultaneously, as the condition of its 'impossibility' (that is, as that which forever thwarts what it enables from fully and unproblematically being identical with itself).

Having considered *marabi* as sign, it can be said that, whilst the sign '*marabi*' is constituted by differences from other signs, its constant deferral of meaning, the spacing between word and meaning, allies it to Derrida's neologism *différance*, meaning "to differ" and "to defer." It is within these spaces that *marabi* is *written*.

3.5.2. *Marabi* as Text

Terrence Eagleton (1983:134) clarifies the notion of 'dissemination' as follows:

> there is something in writing itself which finally evades all systems and logics. There is a constant flickering, spilling and defusing of meaning – what Derrida calls "dissemination" – which cannot be easily contained with the categories of the text's structure, or within the categories of a conventional critical approach to it.

Due to the effects of dissemination, *marabi* as text is also at the furthest remove from a book bound by its covers. In all respects, it is completely open-ended, spilling over with meaning. One recalls that *marabi*, as music, started in a shebeen context, where musicians strolled in from the streets with instruments as diverse as concertinas and violins to make *marabi*, until it was taken over by professional musicians, the *Abaqhafi* and Xhosa pedal organists such as Boet Gashe and Tebetjane. Even so, the boundaries between *marabi* and other musical types still remained permeable, as it 'raveled' as text to adapt to the contingencies of the various national *marabi*s (plural).

It is difficult to begin speaking about the extent of the polyglot complexity of the text *marabi*, in just one of its incarnations, namely music. In this respect, *marabi* recalls the etymology of the word "text," namely *textere*, meaning an interweaving, or an interwoven sheaf. This textile metaphor is an apt paradigmatic metaphor for the text '*marabi'*, which comprises an interweaving of a multiplicity of other musical texts. Not only this, but its capacity for unravelling its own interwoven strands to accommodate the exigencies of the musical needs at hand, be it *famo marabi*, or *ndunduma marabi*, remains just as mobile and sure as its

capacity to regroup and interweave. This metaphor recalls Derrida's 'raveling' of the text of tradition to expose its hidden assumptions – keeping in mind that 'ravel' and unravel' are both antonyms *and* synonyms. Olivier (1993:314) has noted, as already intimated, that this Homeric image of Penelope repeatedly unravelling the cloth she has woven is crucial for an understanding of Derrida's position with regard to (the 'cloth' of) the tradition of logocentric tradition, which, as said before, is to 'ravel' (and hence also, simultaneously, to 'unravel') them to expose their hidden binary assumptions. According to Olivier (1983:315), one could therefore say that deconstruction "would utilize various strategies to foreground the unresolved contradictions in seemingly coherent, systematic discourses and treatises, in this way preventing their closure."

This resonates with *marabi*. As Coplan (1985:95) observes,

> *Marabi* music drew heavily on the syncretic forms that preceded it, many of which were developed in the city by specific ethnic groups. Gradually, common social experience and class identification helped combine these forms into the common denominator of *marabi*, though *marabi* itself continued to encompass variants based on particular ethnic traditions.

The significance of the foregoing observation, to my mind, resides in the fact that in *marabi* the text is based on syncretic styles. Syncretism is the opposite of inviolable binary opposition and the fact that *marabi* combined dualistic forms into a common denominator and continued to encompass variants based on ethnic traditions, yields a moment of deconstruction in *marabi*, wherein the logic of one/other is replaced with a both/simultaneous, non-dualistic viewpoint. The most significant dismantling was the White/Black musical duality, wherein Afrikaner styles such as *vastrap* and *tickey-draai* fused with African music, and Zulu traditional music was played on the concertina. In the pre-Apartheid context in which this was taking place, this racial interplay is almost unthinkable; or perhaps it is more accurate to say that, from the perspective of apartheid, this interplay, which preceded its advent, highlights the 'artificial' boundaries established by apartheid. Herein lies what Ballantine (1993:9) calls South African's jazz's "alchemy," or, as Derrida would express it, its status as "*pharmakon*."

Coplan (1985: 94) has said on occasion that, "In the 1920's ... musicians assimilated elements from every performance tradition into a single urban African musical style, called *marabi*."

One could therefore say that *marabi* as text is constituted on a logic of inclusion, rather than that of "repression and exclusion" (Olivier, 1993:314), caused by its dismantling of traditional binary musical genres into a common syncretic style, which is not a 'closed' text but instead disseminates to form new syncretic styles based on ethnic imperatives. Certainly, *marabi* deconstructs the traditional equation of music with 'score' or 'sonic text'. Consider also, for example, Koch's (1983:158-159) designation of *marabi* as

> the generic name that slumdwellers and others have given to the culture that permeated the yards of Johannesburg. It was composed of a cluster of activities that formed the foundation of people's defence against the exacting conditions they found themselves in. It is also the name given to the music that developed in the yards at that time...and which both facilitated and symbolized African social organisation and permanence in town.

Furthermore, the sign '*marabi*' was used to signify a certain type of person. Eddie Koch (1983:159) observes that the middle classes of Johannesburg, black and white – who actively opposed *marabi* culture – used the term to refer distastefully to the working and lumpen classes of the slumyards. We have already alluded to the averment of one *marabi* musician, who maintained that "sometimes when you quarrel with a guy who's not your type, then he says to you, 'You *Marabi*, leave me alone you *Marabi*,'" as noted Koch (1983:159), quoting Mochumi (1980). Coupled with this, we should also recall Todd Matshikiza's (1951, as quoted in Coplan, 1985:108) famous apothegm: "*Marabi* is also the name of an epoch…the period of popular history before the effective implementation of urban segregation." Over and above this, far from any conventional conception of musical 'text,' *marabi* (Koch, 1983:159) in fact came close to "describing the whole way of life of a people, the way they earned a living, the class position they adopted, the music they played and the way they danced." All is ultimately *marabi*.

3.5.3 Deconstruction and the *Marabi* Intertext

Having demonstrated processes of deconstruction at work in sign and text, we will now proceed to consider the *marabi* intertext. The most striking thing about *marabi* intertexts is the way in which they undermine separatist, segregationist logic. This can be seen if one continues raveling the musical text of *marabi* in the manner of Penelope in Homer's *Odyssey*.

We noted in Chapter 1 Coplan's (1985:95) observation that among the early (intertextual) contributors to *marabi* were Cape Coloured musicians, known in Johannesburg as "crooners," or *die oorlamse mense van Vrededorp* (the *oorlams* people from Vrededorp). They carried with them the popular performance traditions of Cape Town and Kimberley as intertexts and provided a source of Cape Afrikaans and black American influence on urban African working-class music. The Cape Coloured musicians, thus, bequeathed a rich intertextual musical inheritance to *marabi*. It has already been said that many African musicians had learned to play Afrikaans styles such as *vastrap* and *tickey draai* while serving in Afrikaans households in the countryside. All of these colonial/traditional intertexts constitute the text that is *marabi*. Not only this, contributions to *marabi* also came from abroad. Gramophone recordings (Coplan, 1985:95-96), albums printed in tonic-solfa, local white and coloured bands, and a few American players all helped to popularise ragtime, also a syncretic style (between Creolian instrumental music and African music) and early jazz in the Cape after the first World War. Muff Andersson (1981:23) emphasises the importance of American Jazz records to alleviate the dreary social life in the townships. These were first sold in South Africa on a massive scale in the urban black community. Although there is much disagreement and little recorded fact about the developing styles of the early township music, it is generally agreed that the biggest stimulus to the development of black professional musicianship came in the form of a trinity after World War I: gramophone records, the introduction of American jazz to the townships, and the introduction into society of radios.

Coplan (1979: 142) noted that the black South African cultural response to and with the intertext of American Jazz was of great expressive and inspirational value for black South Africans generally. Both American and South African blacks had been in lengthy and intensive contact with a dominant white, ostensibly Christian society, which "discriminated against Black aspirations in virtually every sphere of life except hard labour." Moreover, "both were faced with the task of mobilizing African-derived and European-derived social and cultural responses in the pursuit of racial unity, 'progress' and a viable modern urban social order, despite deliberate obstruction by white political authority" (Coplan, 1979:142).

However, to return to our theme, what strikes one about the intertextual constitution of *marabi*, from a musical point of view, is that it consists of the unravelling of traditional binary oppositions: white/black, white/coloured, Afrikaner/Xhosa, African/Western,

traditional/ novel, urban/ rural, local/international, to form a richly inclusive musical intertext[46] (although, as it has already been pointed out, *marabi* is not exclusively music). We must also bear in mind the 'non'-musical intertexts: the *famo* dance, with its emphasis on sexuality, a social occasion, the *Ndunduma* concert and dance, a character with a bad reputation, and the name of an epoch. Not only this, on a broader scale, the thesis which you are reading right now can also be seen as the possibility of an intertextual engagement between *marabi* and aspects of poststructuralist thinking, thus expanding the notion of intertext far beyond the sum of *marabi'*s constituent parts.

3.6 DECONSTRUCTING *MARABI'S* GENERIC, GENETIC AND CITATIONAL CONTEXTS

3.6.1 Deconstructing *Marabi's* Generic Context

The next step in our consideration of *marabi* and the question of textuality will comprise the extent to which *marabi* deconstructs its genetic, generic and citational contexts, respectively.

Efthimiadis (1991:54) as well as Wilhelm Liebenberg (1978:18) emphasises the importance of forging a responsible reading practice, in which the text is allowed to re-*write* its own societal intertext. In particular, Efthimiadis (1991:54) offers two possible reading strategies in which this can be accomplished:

1. The critic can demonstrate how the text can be utilized to exemplify the deconstruction of its genetic context.
2. The critic can, subsequent to prior analysis (be it of the text's oppositional claims or by any other method), demonstrate how the text can be used to launch a deconstruction of the citational context (the context in which a text is read and may be written anew).
3. A conflation of the above points would be a third option.

To my mind, over and above Efthimiadis's reading strategies, it is consistent with a transformative deconstructive approach to add the extent to which *marabi* deconstructs its generic context.

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary furnishes three definitions of the word "genre":

[46] We will see that one of the richest intertexts is *Mannenburg* (1974) by Dollar Brand (Abdullah Ibrahim).

1. A category of artistic, musical, or literary composition characterized by a particular style, form, or content such as a classic of the gothic novel *genre*
2. Kind, Sort
3. Painting that depicts scenes or events from everyday life usually realistically

Furthermore, the Merriam-Webster dictionary notes that the word *Genre* is a French word, related to the Latin *genus*. Both words contain the *gen*- root because

> they indicate that everything in a particular category (a genre or a genus) belongs to the same "family" and thus has the same origins. So the main genres of classical music would include symphonies, sonatas, and opera, and the major genres of literature would include novels, short stories, poetry, and drama. But within the category of novels, we could also say that detective novels, sci-fi novels, romance novels, and young-adult novels are separate genres.

What emerges here is the idea of a genre consisting of what the *Cambridge Dictionary* describes as a "style…that involves a particular set of characteristics." This idea of a genre having a set of fixed conventional features also emerges in an observation in the *Cambridge Dictionary* made by Patrick Dias, Aviva Freedman, Peter Medway and Anthony Parr (1999:19). This cognitive quartet avers:

> Most readers will recall the more familiar meaning of genre, as referring to generally unchanging regularities in conventions of form and content, usually with reference to literary works, allowing readers to identify, for example classes of work such as poetry, fiction, and drama….Such classification of text has extended as well to prescriptive classification in school writing and thus the familiar categories of exposition, description, argumentation, and narration…. In the workplace we have such familiar genres as the memo, the progress report, minutes of meetings, and the annual report. The definite article that designates these genres is telling in that it seems to prescribe an unchanging, fixed, and authorized rubric, with the strong implication that adherence to form is tied in with effective writing.

A genre is, thus, a collection of idiosyncratic, fixed features which differentiate it from other genres. *Marabi*, as a 'multitudinous' phenomenon, comprising constantly, creatively changing, heterogeneous features, clearly subverts the notion of a genre, as a fixed, unified collection. It is also important to bear in mind that *marabi* is not only an "entity," but an expression of a new urban, African identity (as demonstrated in Chapter 2). This further deconstructs the idea of a generic classification based on "unchanging regularities in conventions of form and content," as expressed above. Instead, we have a "spilling over" in

the sense of a dissemination of numerous creative and symbolic meanings or *marabis* (in the plural). *Marabi*, moreover, is typified by a logic of both/simultaneous that deconstructs the unitary constitution of what is conceived of as a genre. Notable instances are traditional/urban music. *Marabi,* conceived as jazz (discussed in Chapter 2) is also difficult to pinhole as either jazz or as popular music. In the light of this, the etymology of generic as deriving from *gen* (or 'root') takes a deconstructive turn when we think of *marabi* in Deleuzean and Guattarian terms as a rhizome, a lateral, variegated root system, unlike the hierarchical tap-root, metaphorically suggested by the traditional sense of genre as a single phenomenon with uniform, defining features ascending to an essential, logocentric meaning.

3.6.2 Deconstructing *Marabi's* Genetic Context

Having hereby considered the extent to which *marabi* deconstructs its generic context, let us move to its genetic context, the context in which it was first played, sung, and so on.

The political configuration of the time around the emergence of *marabi* can doubtless be considered as "logocentric" in Derridean terms. In this context white South Africans were regarded as the *logos*, the paradigm of superiority and presence, whereas black South Africans were 'kept in their place' by numerous segregationist laws that enforced separation between the dominant powers and the inferior 'other'. This leaves us with little doubt that black people were trapped in what we have already alluded to as (Olivier, 1993:314) "a rhetoric of repression and exclusion," with seemingly no way out of this prison house. In what follows, however, I will demonstrate how *marabi* deconstructed its repressive genetic context in an unexpected way: by laughter.

In "The Laughter of Jacques Derrida" (2014:296-299), Elizabeth Rottenberg gives examples of the explosive power of Derrida's subversive humour. According to Rottenberg (2014: 299) Derrida, in fact, uses the word *détonant* which means to detonate or explode. The homonym of this word, *détonner*, meaning "out place," is equally pertinent: "Derrida's jokes are all of these things: explosive, out of tune, out of place." The deconstructive power of laughter clearly comes to the fore when one realises that Derrida's humour is a sign "of an attitude that is explosively out of tune with the death-dealing discourse of the Christian, European West, an attitude whose explosive force strikes at the centre of philosophy's '*properly philosophical discourse*'" (Derrida, 2004:235). From this, we may adduce that

> the power of deconstruction, proceeding as it does from an "unconditional affirmation of life" (Derrida, 2007:51), is not unrelated to this humorous attitude. And that the humorous attitude is no joke…but a firebrand that marks one *for life* when it goes by the name of Jacques Derrida. (Rottenberg, 2014:299)

Undoubtedly, one of the most significant instances of Derrida's "humorous attitude" is to be found in his engagement with James Joyce's famous "Yes" in *Ulysses*. Anca Parvulescu (2010:16) points out the importance of laughter here: "It is as if the only way to do justice to the *yes* at the end of Ulysses is to inhabit its aporia and pick up the round robin that Joyce began – laughing. Taking his cue from Nietszche, Derrida experiences what Parvulescu (2010:19) describes as the "vibrating tone he begins to hear: *yes*-laugh [*oui-rire*]. A hyphenated yes; and a hyphenated laugh." (p.19). She goes on to say:

> Both *yes* and laughter call for a radical affective opening to tone. But there is more. If what we are struggling to hear in Ulysses is a *yes* without a word, laughter is in fact such a *yes* (in this sense, *yes*-laughter is strongly tautological, a *yes-yes*). Despite a long traditional that associates laughter with negativity, laughter gives Derrida a way into the *oui* of the *yes* one hears without it being possible to point to a word *yes*." (2010:20)

Ultimately, according to Derrida (1992:291-292, as quoted in Parvulescu, 2010:21), "laughter bursts out in the event of the signature itself. And there is no signature without *yes*." The lesson Derrida draws from Joyce is to "entwine our arts with laughters" (Parvulescu, 2010:25). For Derrida (1984:158), "Beyond any 'theory of laughter' (comedy, humor, irony, etc.), to bring laughter to literature, a certain quality of laughter would supply something like the effect of all calculable literature." "This effect," according to Parvulescu (2010:25),

> presents us with a chance to read Ulysses as a space-producing mechanism for *yes-yes*…this is a Ulysses signed by a Joyce who is always laughing, having learned a Nietzschean (1956:198) lesson: "the artist reaches the peak of his greatness only when he has learned to see himself and his art beneath him – when he is able to laugh at himself [*wenn er über sich zu lachen Weiss*.]" This, is the *Ulysses* Derrida countersigns with his *yes* and his laugh. This is the Joyce he likes, a Joyce laughing both at his own encyclopedic ambitions and those of the Joyce machine he started.

This, too, as we will see, is the explosive, life-affirming *yes-yes* laughter of Tebetjane in the face of the repressive, gangrenous pre-Apartheid regime.

The *yes-yes* deconstruction of *marabi'*s genetic context emerges in the famous *marabi* song *Sponono na Marabi*, with its refrain "*uTebetjana 'unfana ne'mfene,*" translated as "Tebetjane resembles a baboon." This can be found in track 2 of the CD accompanying Ballantine's *Marabi Nights*. Although the song bears the title *Sponono na Marabi*, the refrain is such an integral part of it that it made Tebetjane so famous in the slumyards and shebeens that his name "became synonymous with the *marabi* genre" (Coplan, 1985:97). A unique feature that adds to its humour is a section where the words of the refrain are replaced by stylised (ironic?) laughter. The definitive "Tebetjane" song, entitled *Ntebetjana*, is to be found in track 14 of the CD accompanying Ballantine's *Marabi Nights*. I am deeply indebted to Phakamani Pungu-Pungu, a BMus student at Nelson Mandela University for transcribing the multilingual words and for the translation of the *marabi* song, as well as for his perceptive insights into the significance of the song.

Ntebetjana

Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and English translation

Zulu

Ntebejan'ufana nonina,
Ntebejana looks like his mother.
Akasakwazi nokusel'amarhewu[47],
he can't even drink *marhewu*
Uthi mubi, mubi impela,
he is really, really ugly
Mub'ufana njengendangala,
he is ugly like a baboon

(Instrumentation)

Sotho

Die letse kai dejo tsaka?
Where did you keep my food?

[47] *Amarhewu* is a drink made up of maize meal porridge which is served chilled in the black communities. I am indebted to Pungu-Pungu for this clarification.

Xhosa

Ulelephi wemntakwethu?

Where did you sleep my brother?

Ubulelephi wemntakwethu?

Where did you sleep my brother?

Sotho

Die letse kai dejo tsaka?

Where did you keep my food?

(Instrumentation)

Ntebetjana'ufana nonina,

Tebejana looks like his mother

Akasakwazi nokusel'amarhewu,

he can't even drink *marhewu*

Uthi mubi,mubi impela,

he is really, really ugly

Mub'ufana njengendangala,

he is ugly like a baboon

(Instrumentation)

The first thing that strikes one as odd is Tebejane, a Xhosa man, who probably endured the rigours of the circumcision ritual into manhood, comparing himself to a baboon. This leads one to think that there is some deeper significance to the song than mere self-deprecation. The clue comes to the fore in Pungu-Pungu's observation that the racist pre-Apartheid powers used to allude to black people as 'baboons.' The point is that, in true deconstructive manner, Tebejane is using this term to poke fun at the establishment by jokingly referring to himself as a baboon. In short, he is using the very term meant to humiliate and denigrate to achieve the opposite effect – namely life-affirming laughter. This is enhanced by the mocking, humorous feel of the music, as well as in *Sponono marabi*, sung, ironic laughter. It is significant, in this regard, that Henry Louis Gates refers to "the signifying Monkey" or in African folklore "Esu-Elegbara" as an important trope in the ironic reversal of view of black people as simianlike. According to Gates (1988:57) the Signifying Monkey "dwells at the

margins of discourse, ever punning, ever troping, ever embodying the ambiguities of language." Tebetjane and Gates leave us with little doubt that the system is laughable. Herein lies the danger of humour for the repressive powers that be. In this regard, Miruna Iacob (2017:335) cites Milan Kundera's novel *The Joke* as "one of the most famous literary works which depicts the deeply hostile and suspicious attitude of authorities towards any form of wit that dares to question the infallibility of the system." She refers specifically to the totalitarian Communist regime in Romania, where the state tentacles are everywhere and therefore

> almost all forms of humor are political and almost any joke is subversive because it contains an attack towards a chimerical, falsified system, which in fact did not want to be the object of anyone's laughter. Humour is a serious matter because it courageously returns to transparency, thus revealing the cruel truth: that the emperor wears no clothes; that reality has nothing to do with the communist ideals (Jacob, 2017:335).

Patrick Merziger (2007: 275) traces a hereditary line of the correlation between humour and resistance from the German philosopher, Odo Marquard (1993:12), who called humour a "small subversion," to his teacher, Joachim Ritter, which finally emerged in the theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and Sigmund Freud. Merziger notes that for Joacham Ritter (1940/1), as quoted in Merziger (2007:175), "laughter originates from an incongruity which is fundamentally opposed to every norm or order." For Bakhtin (1952), as quoted in Merziger, (2007:275) humour could be located in modern popular culture and, significantly, as Merziger notes, "he saw it as an opposition to power." Freud (2003), as quoted in Merziger (1993:276), found a similar correlation between the function of jokes in modern society and "characterized the joke as an irritation, a reminder of the unconscious in a rationalised world." In contrast to Freud, for Tebetjane the joke was a conscious reminder of the absurdity of the norms of the so-called 'rationalised' world, as exemplified by the pre-Apartheid regime, and thus no mere Freudian slip of the tongue.

3.6.3 Deconstructing *Marabi's* Citational Context

Having considered *marabi's* deconstruction of its genetic and generic contexts, let us move to its citational context, that is, the present context in which it is being listened to and can be written anew. Again, the focus will be on the subversive power of humour, but within an entirely different contextual milieu than in the 1920s and 1930s of *marabi's* genetic context.

Our present context is one in which 'woke' social justice ideology has migrated from its fairly long period of incubation in university departments and campuses, and spread to corporations, including the various gigantic Big Tech platforms, to the extent of, in many instances in the West, having been endorsed, supported and further implemented by state apparatuses – herein closing the circle of ideological capture. 'Wokeism' has, thus, transformed itself from being an ideology that once existed on the fringes of academia and activism to now having become the dominant institutional (academic, corporate, media and government) ideology, even though most citizens are either opposed to it, vaguely indifferent to it, or, in some cases, do not quite know what wokeism is. Intimately tied with the now very widespread phenomenon of wokeism is the associated phenomenon of 'cancel culture,' according to which even the slightest (and in many cases vaguely tangential or even utterly spurious) infraction of the innumerable speech codes dictating the necessary comportments of "anti-racism," "anti-sexism," "anti-homophobia," "anti-transphobia," "anti-Islamophobia," and so forth, can swiftly lead to offenders having their social media accounts suspended, being fired from their jobs, or their reputations utterly ruined.

Milan Kundera, towards the beginning of the *Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (1980:3), illustrates the much earlier, hard Stalinism version of 'cancel culture.' He starts with an account of a crucial moment in Czech history, in 1948, where the Communist leader, Klement Gottwald, addressed thousands of citizens from the balcony of a baroque palace in Prague. He was flanked by his comrades, notably Clementis, who stood next to him. It was snowing and Gottwald was bareheaded, so Clementis solicitously gave Gottwald his own hat. Four years later, Clementis fell out of favour with the regime and was hanged. The propaganda machine swiftly airbrushed him out of all the photographs of the event. All that remained of Clementis was his hat on Gottwald's head. Such was the fate of those who contested the current regime. Though victims of present day 'woke,' 'cancel' culture are by no means physically executed, every offence against the moral orthodoxy does appear *de facto* to be a hanging offence, where the carrying out of the sentence of 'cancellation' leaves the cancelled a permanent internal exile of the system, access to various vital necessities of the system having been eternally barred to the condemned.

To be sure, the fight against the discrimination against, and oppression of, various sorts of minorities is a noble cause and has gradually led to a more egalitarian society, even though there is admittedly still work to be done and always will be. There are few people who would

not agree that discrimination, purely on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation or religion is morally reprehensible.

However, the liberatory minoritarian politics spanning from William Wilberforce to Frederick Douglass to Mary Wollstonecraft to the Suffragettes to Martin Luther King to Nelson Mandela, the various waves of feminism, the Stonewall riots and so forth, with their justly celebrated victories in vouchsafing the (at least partial) inclusion of the previously excluded, have, at least since 2013, given way to a form of identity politics in the West that must be viewed as *fundamentally different* in character. What is common to the liberatory movements until the explosion into prominence of wokeism in 2013, is that each struggled against violent hierarchies expressed (as we have seen) in binary oppositions, valorising the first term over the second, such as in the couplets White/black, Man/woman, Heterosexual/homosexual, and so forth, in such a way as to denaturalise or de-essentialise each side of the couplet being targeted. They did so usually by appealing, on religious or secular grounds or both, to the common and ethically/axiomatically equal humanity (or "generic humanity," to use a term invoked by Badiou) possessed by both sides of each couplet, since this generic 'substrate' was to be valorised as 'higher' than the biological-*cum*-cultural differences between the left- and righthand sides of each couplet. In contrast to this, the wokeist strategy is to perform the first step of 'deconstructing' (although not really) each binary couplet, but not by reference to a valorisation of the generic humanity truncated and incarcerated by these binary couplets. Rather, what wokeism does is simply *reverse* the valorisation *within* each binary couplet, such that one gets, for instance, Black/white, Woman/man, Homosexual/heterosexual, etc., *while maintaining the binarity of the binary structure itself*. In this reversal, wokeism valorises black, woman and homosexual (although women, gays and lesbians have largely been shunted out of the game by now and significantly politically defused, owing to the valorisation of transsexuals in their place) over a putatively evil and repressive Lucifer-Beelzebub type entity called, notably, by the LGBTQ+ community, the "white cisheteronormative male" ('cis' means stability in one's sex-based gender of birth). Wokeism valorises blacks, women and homosexuals (though actually now transsexuals in place of women and homosexuals, since women and homosexuals are *passé*) as ethically and politically 'higher' than the Lucifer-Beelzebub-type entity just mentioned, owing to their historical and current marginalisation by the structural inequities enforced by this selfsame entity. This accords them victim status, which wokeism imputes as a positive characteristic of the subject and one that the subject must cultivate and

interiorise in order to become more him/her/itself. Kimberle Crenshaw's notion of "intersectionality" adds a further turn of the wokeist screw to this victimology, according to which one's victim status (and hence one's ethico-political standing) is further elevated if one belongs to more than one victim category. Thus, the Ultimate Victim would be a black, transsexual (probably male-to-female lesbian, though the lesbianism would probably be problematic if the person is a female-to-male transsexual).

The wokeist strategy has quasi-Derridean resonances (Derrida, as demonstrated, undermines phallogocentric hierarchies from within in Trojan horse fashion), as it instead must covertly (but not covertly for those with some insight into this strange, quixotic process) somehow maintain the 'white cisheteronormative patriarchy,' as this hierarchy is the only structure within which the various victim positions can maintain themselves as what they are.

If wokeism does in part derive itself from certain strains of post-structuralist thought, it does so solely through a very crude reification of its curious suppleness. Thus, instead of problematising and de-essentialising the categories "black," "woman," "gay," "lesbian," "transsexual" and so forth, it goes about *reinforcing* the essentiality of each of these categories. It is, thus, a social essentialism and a social idealism. This re-essentialisation assumes the form of the wokeist injunction to minoritarian individuals to, in addition to empirically being of the minoritarian category that they clearly are (although this requirement is now often dropped, except with the curious exception of being biologically black), firmly *identify* as such. Thus, one is only truly black if one also identifies as such, the same being the case with the other minoritarian categories and their various combinations and permutations. Hence, each minoritarian individual is charged with transubstantiating (or, rather, 'de-substantiating', in the sense of spiritualising into a pure form, as the physical substance of the host is voided into the spiritual presence of Christ in the Lutheran communion) him/her/itself into a what Foucault calls a transcendental-empirical couplet, wherein his/her/its immutable physical characteristics must, at the same time, through a form of continuous self-cultivation, 'participate' in their transcendental 'essence'. This represents nothing short of an unwitting return to Plato, though a decrepit one, since the woke valorisation (via essentialisation through repeated internalisation) of the various minoritarian identities is accomplished at the cost of suppressing all diversity of viewpoint and, hence, imposes a massive and utterly comprehensive ideological uniformity.

It is, at the same time, deeply *divisive*. This is so for notably two reasons. Firstly, as Douglas Murray observes in *The Madness of Crowds*, through its total and utter reification of identities,

> identity politics under the guise of social justice atomizes society into different interest groups according to sex (or gender), race, sexual preference and more. It presumes that such characteristics are the main, or only, relevant attributes of their holders and that they bring with them some added bonus. For example (as the American writer Coleman Hughes has put it), the assumption that there is "a heightened moral knowledge" that comes with being black or female or gay. (Murray, 2019:3)

Secondly, and still more troubling, "it is something that people both living and dead need to be on the right side of" (Murray, 2019:3). Two steps may be observed here. Firstly, since these characteristics have become the main, or perhaps sole, attributes of those who bear them, woke identity politics effectively fuses all that has to do with these characteristics with the very *being* of the holder. Thus, the subject's race, gender and sexuality become the very essence of his/her/its being. At the same time, all of the actions, utterances and beliefs of the subject, whose being coincides with his/her/its race, gender and sexuality, are seen as a mere function of his/her/its race-, gender- and sexuality-defined being. Secondly, although this is already implicit in the first point, Hughes' allusion to the "heightened moral knowledge" that arises from the subject's minoritarian race-, gender- and sexuality-defined being taps into a broader notion current within present-day wokeist ideology: 'knowledge-through-being'. And knowledge-through-being has already swiftly become 'ethics-through-being'. This is a point most famously made by Thomas Chatterton Williams, who has written that "identity epistemology, or knowing-through-being, somewhere along the line became identity ethics, or morality-through-being" (Williams, 2017, in *The New York Times* online). Morality-through-being is consonant with a certain phenomenon that has recently written itself large to almost the entire body politic. Maxmillian Alvarez describes this phenomenon as one in which "our political culture is marked, at the micro level, by the fusion of a given person's opinion and what they perceive to be their singular, permanent, and authentic self" (Alvarez, 2017, in his online article "The Poverty of Theory. Cognito Zero Sum.") Otherwise put, "a person's political opinions are now treated as if they are hardwired into their being – they are part of one's fundamental, seemingly unchanging essence." (Alvarez, 2017)

Since wokeism fuses utterances and convictions to the essential being (which it defines in terms of race, gender or sexual orientation) of the individual speaking and holding them, if an individual utters a view seemingly incongruent with his/her/its race, gender or sexual orientation, this person may well be excommunicated from his/her/its own race, gender or sexual orientation. This has happened and will continue to happen. I note three examples. The first was the excommunication from the Church of Feminism of Germaine Greer, for averring that male-to-female transgender women are not women. The second was the case of Peter Thiel, a gay man. During a speech (Murray, 2019:44) at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, on July 21, 2016, Thiel had said that "I am proud to be gay. I am proud to be a Republican." The wokeist backlash was swift. It decreed that, by supporting Trump, Thiel had effectively separated himself from his gay identity. Hence, an excommunication from the Church of Gay. *Ex Cathedra!* And, thirdly, there was the case of Kanye West (Murray, 2019:152), who supported conservative black activist Candace Owens' public declaration that Black Lives Matter were more into the business of virtue-signaling and the cultivation of victimology than into advancing the actual lives of black people. "I love the way Candace Owens thinks," West tweeted. This caused widespread apoplexy. In an article in *The Atlantic*, Ta-Nehisi Coates (Murray, 2019:155), a woke-leaning ideologue, compared, absurdly, West's pushback against BLM's black victimology, to Michael Jackson's surgical transformation into a white-looking male: "What Kanye West seeks is what Michael Jackson sought…West calls his struggle the right to be a 'free thinker', as he is, indeed championing a kind of freedom – a white freedom, freedom without consequence, freedom without criticism, freedom to be proud and ignorant." The title that Coates chose for his article was: "I'm not black – I'm Kanye: Kanye West wants freedom – white freedom." A strange, at least implicit, recourse to a racial, gendered, and sexually-oriented 'soul substance' appears to have suffused the ideological firmament, a sort of post-postmodernist, neo-Puritan, neo-Medieval, inquisitorial scholasticism. The credo of the current woke 'religion' could rightly be expressed as: "Outside the Church of Social Justice there is no salvation!"

Here we can, strangely enough, doff the hat to Kanye (while simultaneously trying to forgive/forget his support for Trump). Against Ta-Nehisi Coates' desire to immure freedom within identity, we must side with Kanye's thrust toward freedom, which one should take not, as Coates would have it, as a wholesale freedom *from* identity but, rather, as a freedom to problematise, to *deconstruct*, one's own identity. For what Kanye does with his bi-polar eccentricity is very similar to what one finds in the *marabi* song *uTebetjana unfana ne'mfene*

("Tebetjane resembles a baboon"), although this *marabi* song goes further. As intimated, "baboons" were what black people were frequently pejoratively called in pre-Apartheid (and Apartheid) times, notably by the police. In a similar way, the term 'nigger' was deployed by the pro-slavery ideologues such as John C. Calhoun in antebellum America and by various Southern racists during the Reconstruction-era. By referring to Tebetjane as a "baboon," the song *uTebetjana unfana ne'mfene* also plays a role that is analogous to the frequent use of the term "nigga" by the former Los Angeles-based gangster rap group *Niggaz With Attitudes* (N.W.A), such as in the song "Straight Outta Compton," a few selected lines of which go:

> Straight outta Compton, another crazy ass nigga
> More punks I smoke, yo, my rep gets bigger
> I'm a bad motherfucker and you know this
> But the pussy ass niggaz don't show this

Both "Straight Outta Compton" (as well as *every* other N.W.A. song) and *uTebetjana unfana ne'mfene* may be seen as deconstructing the dominant discourse of wokeist social justice ideology – a simultaneously self-deprecating and self-valorising gesture that contemporary race hustlers like Coates, DiAngelo, Kendi, Cory Bush, the obscenely-rich Patrisse Cullors, and others of their ilk would doubtless term instances of "black white supremacy." Contemporary feminists, animal rights activists, as well as activists for the rights of the fat, the ugly, and the disabled, would also certainly suffer terminal apoplexy when hearing Tebetjane mockingly singing that his mother and he are "ugly, ugly, ugly," "as ugly as a baboon." Alcoholics Anonymous, though their supporters are generally not wokeists, would be troubled by the assertion that Tebetjane, the black man, is such a wimp that he can't even keep down his booze: "he can't event drink *marhewu*," a very mild alcoholic beverage at the furthest extreme to the noxious, death-wielding concoction that was imbibed on the mines.

However, Tebetjane was not at all "cancelled" for any of this. Quite to the contrary, the song became an outright hit among all the shebeen queens in Johannesburg. As already intimated, Coplan (1985:97) writes that "in 1932 his [Tebetjane's] composition *uTebetjana ufana ne'mfene* (Tebejana resembles a baboon) made him so famous in the slumyards and locations that his name became synonymous with the *marabi* genre." It is ironic that in a society bereft of human rights a song such as Tebetjane's could be sung lustily without censure, whereas in our current culture, with all its civil liberties, it would cause a pandemic of seizures. Looking forward a little toward Chapter 4, there are clear resonances between Tebetjane's song and Hélène Cixous' *Laugh of the Medusa*, in which essay Cixous subverts phallocentric

hegemony and shows that the Medusa is, in fact, beautiful – and she is laughing. In contrast to the wokeist culture of victimhood, Tebetjane emerges as a black man who is so self-assured that he has the confidence to laugh at himself, poke fun at his mother, not only deconstruct the ruling powers of that time, but as it has emerged, also *marabi's* citational context: the narcissistic, identity-politics-obsessed, virtue-signaling, woke context of today.

3.7 *MARABI* IN PERPETUAL MOTION

Ballantine (1993:28) bemoans the fact that *marabi* and its close relatives, together with the vital hedonistic subculture that supported them, have long disappeared. Indeed, in their original form, none of these styles was ever recorded or, in their day, even written about, except in the most cursory and disdainful fashion. "What little we know," Ballantine (1993:23) writes, "we owe to those who, long after the event, had something they were able to remember and committed a recollection to paper, or lived until a much later time when historians were interested in recording their oral testimony." The contention that *marabi* had 'disappeared' or died in the late 1930's is also endorsed by Coplan (1985:138). He notes that "The Jazz Maniacs made the first *marabi* jazz recording '*Izikalo Zika Z-Boy* (Better XU 9-a) in 1939. By then, however, American swing had already replaced *marabi*." Coplan ascribes the demise of *marabi* to what he calls "a more pervasive attack upon the urban African community and working-class culture under the terms of the Urban Areas Act." There was no place for *marabi* as a product of intimate shebeen culture in the halls in the sprawling new townships. Koch (1981:27-28) observes, as quoted in Coplan (1985:138), that "in the new municipal townships the barter trade and its associated activities were almost eliminated…People no longer knew their neighbours, and the physically squalid but socially supportive neighbourhoods were replaced by drab, separate rows of township houses without amenities or communal spirit." Koch (1983:170) shares Coplan and Ballantine's claim that *marabi* had consequently 'disappeared':

> Finally, marabi music, the lifeblood of slumyard culture, deprived of the conditions that had nurtured it, disappeared and was replaced by the bigger jazz bands, more adapted to playing in the formally organised dances of the "community" halls that the council had built in most locations.

There is, however, evidence that calls into question Ballantine, Coplan and Koch's averment that *marabi* 'disappeared' or 'died' in the late 1930s. Part of this has to do with *marabi's*

trace structure and, as a sign, its propensity for constant deferral, as we have seen in *marabi*'s deconstruction of the Saussurian sign. Regrettably, constraints of both time and space do not permit a comprehensive account of the history of black township jazz. In what follows, I will merely touch on jazz styles that illustrate my contention that, due to the dynamics of *différance*, *marabi* did not simply 'stop.'

A good place to start is with an observation by Edward Sililo (1986, as quoted in Ballantine, 1993:29), a member of the fledgling *Jazz Maniacs* that came into being after *marabi* was succeeded by the time the group had expanded into big band swing. He notes that they used to play *marabi* tunes, either by ear or (occasionally) in written out arrangements. This practice continued long after the band expanded. Ballantine (1993:29) points out that even band members who grew up in homes that deeply disapproved of *marabi*,[48] knew the style and its turns well. Not even the prestigious *Merry Blackbirds* steered clear of *marabi*. Peter Rezant (1985, as quoted in Ballantine, 1993:29).

> You can't avoid that at that time, you see. Everything had that twist into *marabi*. Because it was the marabi era...*They were little ditties, you know, coming from the townships-ditties as you hear them. And someone would be suggesting, who'd being toying around with them, and then ultimately we play them as we hear them. One playing the melody and the others would fit in and so forth. Well, the trumpet and the alto [saxophone] were always the lead instruments. Then if the trumpet plays in front, then the alto should find itself the, ahm, the harmony, to harmonise – and so did the trombone. And the correction would come, to correct our harmonies, from the piano. That's how we began, you know, before the orchestrations came in*. [Emphasis in the orginal]

Big band swing, or *mbaqanga*, clearly did not replace *marabi*, but grew out of it. Coplan (1985:161) describes it as a "blend of African melody, *marabi*, and jazz." The term *mbaqanga* was coined by Michael Xaba and referred in Zulu to traditional steamed maize bread. Not only was it familiar, traditional food, redolent of home, but also the 'daily bread' for musicians. *Mbaqanga* was to enjoy its heyday in Sophiatown with bands like *The Manhattan Brothers* accompanying singers such as Miriam Makeba, Dolly Rathebe and Dorothy Masuka.

---

[48] Andersson (1981:23) quotes a legendary band leader, who remarked disparagingly later: "Marabi music was made from whatever instruments were available, by anyone who could play or make a noise."

Marabi also played an important role in the formation and constitution of the street jazz style of pennywhistle jazz or *kwela*. Laura Allen (1993:11) describes *marabi* as “the mother of kwela.” Kwela, according to Allen (1993:15) was so closely associated with *marabi* that the terms were used synonymously. This is borne out by the fact that certain recordings in fact conflated these two terms, such as the USA record label, in the case of numbers such as "Sweet Dhladhla" by *The Black Hammers* (USA51) and "Twatwa" by *The Buthelezi Flutes* (USA31), which was termed "Flutes: Marabi". The same term was used on the RCA label to describe pennywhistle compositions "Korea" and "Stone Breakers," by the *Orlando Shanty Maxims* (RCA 74015). The reason for the conflation of *marabi* and *kwela*, Allen avers, is that both served a similar social function (Allen, 1993:15-16). Although there are considerable similarities, she notes that there are, however, distinct stylistic differences between *marabi* and *kwela*. These differences are threefold: “instrumentation (kwela must include pennywhistles or a solo, a point made by Lerole, 1990), rhythm (kwela is generally swung whereas *marabi* styles are based on a straight beat); and melody (the character of kwela motifs and the distinctive way in which they are structured).” There is, notwithstanding, also (Allen, 1993:20) a family resemblance between *marabi* and a style called “African Jazz,” which may be termed “the child of *marabi* and swing.” A noticeable trace of *marabi* in “African Jazz” is the constant repetition of the three primary chords. As Piliso (1984, as quoted in Allen, 1993:25) expresses it, “with our music, I think the dominating factor is the monotony .... [You] repeat it so much that it must get into you. And then when they dance, they dance themselves into a frenzy. It gets into the soul ...”

South African Jazz suffered during the Apartheid era, during which many musicians were forced into exile. SAHO notes that during this time fusion with other styles, including the *marabi*-influenced *mbaqanga*, *kwela*, American Jazz, soul and even funk, has been a salvific force. A notable example is the *marabi*-inspired Jazz fusion number *Mannenburg* (1974). According to Coplan (1985:193), Dollar Brand (Abdullah Ibrahim), in conjunction with the saxophonist Basil Coetzee, “took an old jazz mbaqanga melody composed by trumpeter Elijah Nkonyane in the late 1950’s and combined it with marabi, Xhosa ragtime and hymn melodies, Cape Coloured folk music, kwela, American swing, and township rhythms.” Coplan (1985:193) ascribes *Mannenburg*’s enormous success to its ability to combine so many heterogeneous forms of South African music into a whole that a wide variety of listeners can identify so completely with.

Mannenburg was to set a precedent for African Jazz during the Apartheid era, incorporating traditional sounds with a *mbaqanga* solo, in the format of a traditional jazz improvised solo. In 1984 the *marabi*-inspired kwela, pop, multi-ethnic group *Mango Groove*, burst on to the scene and is still performing. Although their most recent album was the 2016 *Faces to the Sun*, Mango Groove is still going strong. As John Leyden (2008) puts it in *The Essential Mango Groove (booklet)*: "We don't churn out albums." "Mango is a lot of people and we have different creative projects that we've done over the years…[We've had] long hiatuses, but Mango has never stopped going."

I am greatly indebted to Dr Madhlozi Moyo from the Philosophy & Classics Department of the University of the Free State for drawing my attention to *marabi*-influenced music in Zimbabwe. This music includes artists such as Lovemore Majaivana (cf. his *The Pennywhistle Song*, with its conspicuous *marabi* traces), Fanyana Dube, and Jeys Marabini. Regarding the latter, 'Marabina' is said to be derived from '*marabi*'. The same is true for his song *Emarabini* (2002). Another *marabi*-influenced band is the *IYASA*[49] *Dance Group*. Cf. for example *S'jaiva Sibancane* (2014), *IYSA* (Official Music Video), as well as Jays Marabina's (2019) *IYASA-Ngizobuyela* (Official Music Video). Dr Moyo insightfully noted that although this music belongs to the 1980s, it stretches over a very long period of time, including the rest of the twentieth century. Dr Mojo accounts for the link between South African and Zimbabwean *marabi* by pointing out that the Matabeleland parts of Zimbabwe have a strong link with South African culture (Ndebele/Zulu) that dates a long way back. Another reason is the prevalence of Zimbabwean (then Rhodesian) mineworkers in the Johannesburg mines who took *marabi* home with them via train routes. The same pertains to the 'nostalgia' that black Eastern Cape students that I lectured a decade ago professed to feel when they heard *marabi*. It is likely that, in the same way the train routes, stopping at Queenstown, as we have seen, before a final night of alcohol, women and *marabi*, before going to the mines in Johannesburg, brought *marabi* back along the same railway tracks. This would have been possible because of the predominance of gramophone records during that time. It is a disgrace that the SABC disposed of thousands of records, so very few remain in

[49] According to *Wikipedia* (2021), *IYASA* is the official name of 'The Inkululeko Yabatsha School of Arts' and means 'Freedom of the Youth'. It is a resource centre for the arts, established by Nkululeko Innocent Dube in 2001. One of *IYASA*'s biggest success stories is *The IYASA Dance Group* which has won numerous awards, notably (the) Best Dance Group and Video of the Year Award, conferred by the Zimbabwe Music Awards (ZIMA).

the public domain. Suffice to say, it would be the subject of another thesis to find out whether private collections of this rare music still exist.

The above should leave little doubt that *marabi* did not 'disappear,' but was rather 'deferred' by being incorporated in a number of Jazz styles in the course of time. Having said this, a caveat is necessary. There would appear to be a disconnect between the paucity of *marabi* that exists and the numerous examples of *marabi*-influenced music that succeeded its purported demise. Although one must take care not to fall into the trap of asserting that some kind of 'essential' or 'original' *marabi* exists, a distinction, stylistically and socially, can be drawn between the 'original' *marabi* in the early 1920's and 1930's, and the *marabi*-influenced, or *marabi*-'traced', examples that followed. The focus in this study is the former and is, thus, restricted by the few extant examples of early *marabi*.

The preceding exercise is, however, an important one, not only in that it refutes the general consensus that *marabi* 'died' in the 1930s, but gives insight into the *marabi* sign, differing and deferring in perpetual motion, that resonates with Derrida's notion of *différance*. This chapter leaves us with little doubt that *marabi* as 'sign', 'text,' 'intertext,' and 'meaning' actively exemplifies important aspects of Derrida's 'deconstructionist 'theory' in perpetual, dynamic motion.

CHAPTER 4: "WHERE IS SHE?" BINARISM, CIXOUS and *MARABI*

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will use Hélène Cixous's insights into the binary, gendered horizon of Western thinking, especially as they are expounded in her essay "Sorties" (Cixous and Clément, 1991: 63-64) beginning with the central question "Where is She?" in order to determine more precisely how this binary-oppositional dynamic was at work in the construal of the concept of genius and creativity along strong patriarchal lines in the nineteenth century. Evidently enough, during this period in history, this binarity effectively deterred woman from composing their femininity in anything even resembling a sonic version of what Cixous terms an *écriture féminine.* The notion of the male genius has persisted through to the twenty-first century, where female composers and conductors are still at the periphery of the compositional (and performing, in some cases[50]) arena. After demonstrating how these binary dualities, starting with Male/female[51] are entrenched in Western thinking and a brief consideration of music and rhetoric, I hope to show how they play out in the musical rhetoric of "And God Created Man" and "In Native Worth" from Joseph Haydn's (1732-1809) oratorio *The Creation* (1798). I will, thereafter, focus on key leitmotifs in Cixous' thinking which inform her concept of *écriture féminine* and finally on the way *famo marabi* recitatives counteract the binary, patriarchal discourses with the critical 'target' of Cixous's *écriture féminine* hereby providing us with a tantalising glimmer of new forms of reason beyond the traditional stolid binary patriarchal horizon. I must emphasise that all the aspects of Cixous' complex thought – reconstructed in this chapter – contribute, at least implicitly, to an understanding of *famo marabi*, as I hope to demonstrate in the final section.

[50] One thinks, in particular, of the Vienna Philharmonic, which, as recently as 2013 only had 6 female players. In 2008 the violinist, Albena Danailova, caused a sensation by becoming one of the concertmasters, the first woman to hold this position in the history of the orchestra, which was established in 1842.

[51] In each polarity, I will capitalise the first letter of the dominant, privileged term, except where it is quoted by Cixous or others.

4.2 COMPOSITING THE BODY: A *CRISIS OF VERSUS*[52]

Let us consider the following passage from Cixous in *Rootprints* (Cixous and Calle-Gruber, 1997:64):

> When I refer to music, it's because music lets us hear directly that language is produced in an interplay with the body. One writes with one's ears. It is absolutely essential. The ear does not hear a single detached note: it hears musical compositions, rhythms, scansions. Writing is a music that goes by, that trails off in part, because what remains is not notes of music, it is words. But what remains of music in writing, and which exists also in music properly speaking, is indeed that scansion which *also* does its work on the body of the reader. The texts that touch me most strongly, to the point of making me shiver or laugh, are those that have not repressed their musical structure; I am not talking here simply of phonic signification, nor of alliterations, but indeed of the architecture, of the contraction and the relaxation, the variations of breath[...]Who writes like that – like emotion itself, like the thought (of the) body, the thinking body? I have a passion for stops. But for there to be a stop, there must be a current, a coursing of the text. Always the mystery of difference, of *différance*? Never the one without the other.

Cixous applauds music as an aural conduit for the language of the body. Writing, moreover finds its correlate in music, except unlike music which we hear in its totality, writing's lyrical musicality is partial, indeed halted by a remnant of words. She is, moreover, most moved by texts that have retained the "architectural" structure of music. It appears that she has vocal music in mind when she speaks of "the contraction and the relaxation, the variations of breath."

Cixous's insight into the role of music in hearing language proceeding from the "interplay with the body," which emphasises its positive association with the (female) body, is highly significant in the light of what follows. I allude to the nineteenth-century gendering of the notion of genius along a binary Mind/body duality, in which femininity is associated with the body and is thus incommensurate with the notion of genius, which valorises the male mind as a prerequisite for the creation of great musical works. I will expand on this point presently. In "Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out/Foray", Cixous leaves us with little doubt that gender is conceived in Western thinking along the lines of binary polarities, notably

[52] The expression is Derrida's (1981- 25).

Male/female. Her insights are also arguably one of the best known of her contributions to a post-structuralist analysis of difference:

> Where is she?
> Activity/Passivity
> Sun/Moon
> Culture/Nature
> Day/Night
> Father/Mother
> Head/Heart
> Intelligible/Palpable
> Logos/Pathos
> Form, convex, step, advance, semen, progress
> Matter, concave, ground – where steps are taken, holding – and dumping-ground
>
> Man
> _____
> Woman
>
> Always the same metaphor: we follow it, it carries us, beneath all its figures, wherever discourse is organized. If we read or speak, the same thread or double braid is leading us throughout literature, philosophy, criticism, centuries of representation and reflection.
> Thought has always worked through opposition,
> Speaking/Writing
> Parole/Écriture
> High/Low
>
> Through dual, hierarchical oppositions. Superior/Inferior. Myths, legends, books. Philosophical systems. Everywhere (where) ordering intervenes, where a law organizes what is thinkable by oppositions (dual, irreconcilable; or sublatable, dialectical). And all these pairs of oppositions are couples. Does that mean something? Is the fact that Logocentrism subjects thought – all concepts, codes and values – to a binary system related to "the" couple, man/woman?
>
> Nature/History
> Nature/Art
> Nature/Mind
> Passion/Action (Cixous and Clément, 1991: 63-4)

In what follows, I will attempt to answer her question "Where is She?" and, at the same time, scrutinise the dualistic, hierarchical horizon of Western thinking and aspects of its music and its impact on the way "woman" has been construed. A notable theme that will underlie my consideration of how the seminal opposition man/woman that Cixous speaks of above has influenced female creativity. There is also a critique to be countered, which is that of Rosemary Putnam Tong (2009:121), who points to an apparent omission in Cixous's writing:

> It is just this absence of any specific analysis of the material factors preventing women from writing that constitutes a major weakness of Cixous's utopia. Within her poetic mythology, writing is posited as an absolute activity of which all women *qua* women automatically partake. Stirring and seductive though such a vision is, it can say nothing of the actual inequities, deprivations and violations that women, as social beings rather than as mythological archetypes, must constantly suffer.

Against Tong, I wish to demonstrate that Cixous, specifically in "Sorties", provides ample evidence of her awareness of women's plight, as evinced in her scrutiny of precisely how deeply embedded these binary pairs are in Western thought and how they have underpinned, in a palpable way, those injustices or "actual inequities, deprivations and violations that women, as social beings," in Putnum's words, have had to suffer, particularly within the realm of creativity. To purport that Cixous is "unaware" of woman's plight in this regard, simply does not hold true when one considers that she had interiorised patriarchal attitudes to creativity to such an extent that she was effectively muted until the age of 27, when she began to write for the first time. There is also ample evidence of her deep awareness of her triple exclusion as woman, Jewess, and Algerian in her discourses. Verena Conley (1984:45-46) expresses the political import of Cixous's writing with commendable clarity in the following:

> All of Cixous's speech is political. Her insistence on deliverance and freeing intersects with multiple causes. Contemporary and historical figures are defended with the same vehemence as the heroes and heroines of myth. Singular cases open onto general issues. Problems dealt with in literature have corollaries in our society. The equivalent of absolute characters in literature are those incomprehensible beings who cannot be assimilated by societal laws. They are immediately looked at with suspicion. The trials of women can be extended to other symbolic trials in society where everything that is incomprehensible – women, Jews, real strangers are suspect. To bring about real changes, daring individuals have to take a leap and cut their ties with society and the state.

Hence, if there is an 'omission' in her writing, it does not lie in an unawareness of the plight of actual women, but rather her decision to find an 'exit' to this problem by looking towards the poetic and mythological for 'doors' instead of utilising traditional western metaphysical means or implementing various socio-political programmes. Even so, as Conley notes, the plight of the real women are regarded with as much gravity as those of myth and poetry.

What I will, therefore, do in the ensuing pages will be to flesh out, or rather 'write out,' the various ways in which the dualisms enumerated by Cixous in "Sorties" have contrived a distorted sense of the feminine subject in Western thinking and instances of Western music, a

long-standing historical distortion that has effectively hindered women from finding and expressing their 'authentic,' creative selves. Thereafter, we will turn to Cixous's *écriture féminine* and, through it, pursue an "exit" to this dilemma. Thereupon, I will move on to gauge the resonances between Cixous's specific characterisation of feminine writing and *famo marabi*.

4.3 WHERE IS SHE?

4.3.1 Mind/body

Outwardly, what is simpler than to write books? Outwardly, what obstacles are there for a woman rather than for a man? Inwardly, I think, the case is very different; she has still many ghosts to fight, many prejudices to overcome. Indeed, it will be a long time still, I think, before a woman can sit down to write a book without finding a phantom to be slain, a rock to be dashed against.

–Virginia Woolf (2001:245).

Marcia Citron (1993:44) goes as far as to say that "daring to write, daring to compose: at least a challenge facing talented women, at the most an act of rebellion." This is evident in Woolf's (1929:48-58, as quoted in Citron 1993:44) hypothetical account of a female Shakespeare, Judith, the sister of the famous playwright:

> Extremely talented, adventurous, yet denied education, forbidden to pay attention to books, and forced to marry a local tradesman, Judith rebels and runs away to the big city, to London. Here she lives her fantasy by hanging around at stage doors and hoping to become part of the life of the theatre, like her brother William. She meets a man of the theatre, who befriends her, and soon she is pregnant. Now in a state of shame and isolation she has nowhere to turn, especially back to her home, and she commits suicide.

Though there would not always be this sort of rather grim denouement, the sixteenth century would certainly not be the last century in which women pursuant of creative endeavours, traditionally thought the sole preserve of the males of the human species, would encounter a formidable headwind of resistance, opprobrium, censure, disdain, or at the very least simple incomprehension. This phenomenon of the frustrated female creative artist would be particularly prevalent during the course of the Romantic period, where transgression of patriarchal norms could even lead to budding female writers and composers descending into the quagmire of clinical insanity. Since stiff-necked opposition to the notion of woman as

creator continued more or less unabated well into the twentieth century, it remains wholly unknowable how many Judith Shakespeares have been lost to posterity.

The tentacles of patriarchal antipathy, of course, extend far deeper than merely to overt misogynism. It is precise this greater depth of reach of the structural effects of patriarchal norms, practices, and their more covert presuppositions, that I wish to pursue at greater expanse in what follows. What is at stake is nothing less that the patriarchal capture of the concept of creativity along binary lines and its deployment as a means of silencing women (Citron, 1993: 45). More precisely, I will show how the concept of 'genius' as underpinned by a logic of an either/or "binary system affiliated to 'the' couple, man/woman," as Cixous and Clément (1991:63-4) express it, has for centuries served as a powerful impediment to female creativity.

Implicit to the historically-entrenched Man/woman binary opposition are an entire host of other related binary couplets. The first of these is the Mind/body binary couplet, where Mind is the provenance of men and conducive to creativity, whereas body is associated with women and an obstacle to creating works of art. By way of example, Glenn Jordan and Chris Weedon (1995:178) give a vivid account of what Stanley Hall regarded as the "essential nature" of women:

> Stanley Hall [founder of the American Psychological Association] sees woman as essentially different from men. Her very 'soul' is geared to procreation. Both her biological and psychological constitutions fit her exclusively for the roles of wife and mother. She is guided by emotion rather than reason. Too much reason is detrimental to her, and her sexuality is a great unknown which science has hardly begun to understand.

The idea of women as trapped by their bodies also emerges in an observation made by Paul Ableman (1983:31):

> But woman is Other: she is not-fully-individual and not-fully-human. Designed by Nature solely for the purpose of perpetuating the species, women's biological, and hence psychological mission remains, child-bearing and home-building and sooner or later, it will assert itself.

The role of woman as "a happy wife" suggested here, rather than that of a veritable creative force, comes to the fore in an almost scurrilously patronising diary entry by Robert Schumann (1810-1856) concerning his wife, Clara Schumann (*née* Wieck, 1819-1896):

> You played magnificently. People here don't deserve you. You are too good for this life your father holds out – he thinks it will bring you happiness. All that work, these difficulties, for a mere few hour's triumph! This is not your future. No, my Clara will be a happy wife. (Galloway, 2002:162)

Clara's draconian father, Friedrich Wieck (1785-1873), saw her as his 'creation' by brutally preparing her for the life of a concert pianist, while Robert saw her role as being merely his "happy wife."

Contrary, however, to women's biology which was purported to harbour restricted creativity, male biology has traditionally been regarded very differently. A possible reason for this is, as Christine Battersby (1989:5) notes that the origin of the word "genius" stems from the worship of sacred aspects of male procreativity amongst the ancient Romans. This idea also persisted in a more Catholic guise in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, where male sexual potency was considered the foundation of creativity, and could be depleted in sexual acts (Citron, 1993:51). The difference, however, according to Battersby (1989:25), between male and female sexuality is that "while males can *transcend* their sexuality; females are *limited* by theirs" (emphasis in the original). The centrality of the notion of male transcendence of sexual biology is crucial in upholding the Mind/body duality, as Citron (1993:52) points out:

> Male appropriation of creativity has depended on another ideology for its success: the link between creativity and the mental. In general, rational knowledge has been constructed as a transcending, transformation or control of natural forces; and the feminine has been associated with what rational knowledge transcends, dominates, or simply leaves behind.

Simone de Beauvoir (1970:96) unravels this puzzle of male transcendence of the creation of life:

> Here we have the key to the whole mystery. On the biological level a species is maintained only by creating itself anew; but this creation results only in repeating the same Life in more individuals. But man assumes the repetition of Life while transcending Life through Existence; by this transcendence he creates values that deprive pure repetition of all value…[woman's] misfortune is to have been biologically destined for the repetition of Life…

In short, men are able to sublimate their biology to the level of transcendence, while women are doomed to repeat life *ad infinitum*. We will return to this idea of male transcendence in the guise of the sublime presently, when we consider Kant's conception of female reason.

There is a long philosophical prehistory which sternly upholds the strict separateness of the mind and body, as well as the superiority of the former to the latter, and thus the need for the mind to tame the capricious and base unruliness of whatever may be associated with the body, in order for the individual, and by extension society as a whole, to be morally sound (in the particular vision of thinkers of this ilk). In Plato's *Republic*, for instance, Socrates argues that the individual may be considered just only when his reason (*nous*) is in charge of his spirit (*thumos*) and when his *nous* and *thumos* conjointly regulate his appetite (*epithumia*). The self-imposition of this operational hierarchy within the individual is what ensures that he is simultaneously wise, courageous, and self-disciplined, and therefore just (Book IV.442). This sort of fastidiously policed Mind-body dualism (or at least hierarchy, in Plato's case) is taken up again by René Descartes in the seventeenth century, where the ontological separateness of mind and body is posited, and the mind prioritised over the body through the *cogito ergo sum*, in which the certainty of the existence of the subject is anchored in the mind and the proof of the existence of the body has to pass through additional steps, including an establishment of God's existence (in Descartes' *Meditations*). In Descartes, the mind continues as the seat of higher moral, legislative and intellectual functions, whereas the body is relegated to the realm of the intra-mundane: the domain of woman (in the mind of Descartes). The primacy of mind over body and that of man over woman would continue through Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Hegel's description of woman as "the eternal irony of the community" (this is also the title of Luce Irigaray's essay in *Speculum of the Other Woman*, 1985:214-226) is fairly well known, as is Schopenhauer's (1970:80-84) more extreme estimation of women as congenital liars as well as what he scathingly calls "the unaesthetic sex", since, to his mind, "Neither for music, nor poetry, nor the plastic arts do they possess any real feeling or receptivity: if they affect to do so, it is merely mimicry in service of their effort to please (Schopenhauer, 1970:85).

But let us zero in more closely on Kant's conception of what one could term 'female reason' and the purported incommensurability of the latter with genius that Kant strives to establish. In Section 3 of *his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764, as quoted in Battersby, 1989: 111), Kant avers that women's overriding concern is to act in accordance with the beautiful, which accounts for the predominance of emotion and sympathy in their moral makeup. Women's appearances are not only beautiful, but so are their minds. Women's upbringing and education must, thus, be consistent with the moulding

of a 'beautiful' (read: 'effete') mind. Kant believed that rigorous intellectual pretensions defeminise women and their minds. As he puts it, "The content of woman's great science, [rather], is humankind, and amongst humanity, men ['*der Mann'* = the male or husband]. Her philosophy is not to reason, but to sense (1960:79)." Women who know Greek or mechanics "might as well have a beard: their knowledge makes them ugly (p.78)." To be sure, Kant does not deny that women are capable of reasoning, but still contends that only male reason can reach the rarefied echelons of that what he terms the "sublime":

> The fair sex has just as much understanding as the male, but it is a beautiful understanding, whereas ours should be a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity with the sublime. […] strivings and surmounted difficulties which arouse admiration and belong to the sublime. Deep meditation and a long-sustained reflection are noble but difficult, and do not well befit a person in whom unconstrained charms should show nothing else than a beautiful nature. Laborious learning or painful pondering, even if a woman should greatly succeed in it, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex. (Kant 1960:78)

So, while Kant does not entirely dismiss the possibility that a woman genius may arise, and that some such may have existed and do exist, he does, however, aver that woman cannot and should not strive for the sublime. For Kant, any such striving for the sublime by woman merely causes her to be ridiculous. It makes her a freak and even *ekelhaft* ("loathsome"), is counter to the natural order as it usurps the lordship of man over woman in nature, and in fact makes woman positively ugly (Kant, 1960: 78).

This is also a theme that emerges and is music-rhetorically underscored in the aria "In Native Worth" in Haydn's *The Creation*, where the wording of 'man' as "the lord and king of nature all" corresponds uncannily to Kant's formulation. We will pursue this in due course. For now, we may simply surmise that, over the vast historical expanse of thought from Plato through Kant and even beyond, the distribution of the triplet creation-labour-conception across the sexes has overwhelmingly historically been such that man creates, that his labour is production, and that his conception is mental, whereas on the side of woman, we have creation only as procreation, labour only as the labour of biological reproduction, and conception only as conception in the womb.

4.3.2 Culture/nature, Abstract/concrete

The Mind/body duality is intimately related to the Culture/nature duality, in which the creative male is master of the domain of 'Culture' and woman that of 'nature.' The privileging of culture over nature in the Culture/nature binary is precisely what has been at the helm of excluding from consideration women as intrinsic creators of artworks, since the domain of creativity is thought to be that of culture. This idea comes to the fore in Nietzsche's remark that "Woman is more closely related to Nature than men and in all her essentials she remains ever herself. Culture is with her always something external, a something which does not touch the kernel that is eternally faithful to Nature "(from *The Greek Woman*, 1911, 22-23, as quoted in Lloyd, 1984:1-2).

The pertinent question in this regard is: Why, in particular, are women affiliated with nature? Sherry B. Ortner addresses this question insightfully in "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?" According to Ortner (1974:73), it all starts with the female body and the procreative functions, specific to women alone. She identifies three levels in which this absolute physiological fact has significance: (1) since the *body* of a woman and its *functions* are *de facto* more heavily invested in the species life of the human being, this tends to place her in greater proximity to nature, whereas the far lesser investment of male bodies in this biological reproduction and nurture of offspring frees man up for cultural projects; (2) this greater embroiling of the female body in human species life, in turn, tends to relegate woman to lower rungs of cultural production itself; (3) this occupation by woman of lower cultural rungs, in the form of her traditional social roles, in turn, tends to attribute to her a different *psychic structure*, which latter itself comes to be viewed as closer to nature than that of man. Let us consider each of these three points separately:

1. *Woman's physiology as closer to nature*. De Beauvoir has strikingly maintained that "the female, to a greater extent than the male, is the prey of the species" (de Beauvoir, 1953:60). This entrapment of woman by the species itself, in the form of its propagation, has the upshot of cutting against her individual health and emotional stability. Beauvoir, for instance, mentions that "ovarian secretions function for the benefit of the egg, promoting its maturation and adapting the uterus to its requirements," whereas "in respect to the organism as a whole, they make for disequilibrium rather than for regulation – the woman is adapted to the needs of the

egg rather than to her own requirements" (de Beauvoir, 1953:24). Menstruation is heavily disruptive of the normal course of women's lives and often immensely painful. In certain cultures, menstruation is, moreover, seen as a source of dangerous contamination. For instance, in the Crow tribe menstruating women were forbidden from coming near to wounded men, men setting out for battle, or to sacred objects (Lowie, 1956:44). Childbirth itself has, right up until some point in the twentieth century, been a downright dangerous endeavour for women. Therefore, a far greater slice of woman's body and of the space associated with her body, as well as of her lifetime, is devoted to irremissible natural processes connected to the reproduction of the human species. These facts alone would seem to firmly ensconce her on the 'nature' pole of the Culture/nature divide. Notwithstanding, one must note that, as Ortner (1974:71) is correct in observing, these facts and differences "only take on significance of Superior/inferior within the framework of culturally defined value systems." To this we may add Moira Gatens' (1991:53) averment that, though it is true that "neutral biological facts" can (and often are) turned into "social values," these facts do not mean "the female body is an intrinsic liability," nor do they indelibly chain woman exclusively to nature. Ortner (1974:75-76):

> …it is perfectly obvious that she is a full-fledged human being endowed with human consciousness just as man is; she is half of the human race, without whose cooperation the whole enterprise would collapse. She may seem more in the possession of nature than man, but having consciousness, she thinks and speaks; she generates, communicates, and manipulates symbols, categories and values, she participates in human dialogues not only with other women but also with men. As [Claude] Lévi-Strauss says, "Woman could never become just a sign and nothing more, since even in a man's world she is still a person, and since insofar as she is defined as a sign she must [still] be recognized as a generator of signs." (1969:496)

The above leaves us with little doubt as to (Ortner, 1974:76) "the fact of women's full human consciousness, her full involvement in [and] commitment to culture's project of transcendence over nature…"

2. *Woman's social role as closer to nature*. The biological fact of lactation in the female tends to create an indissoluble natural bond between the mother and the child, a fact that culturally ensconces woman in the role of child-minder, a domestic social role often seen as closer to nature than to culture. The biologically-grounded tethering of

woman to this ‘nature-proximate’ social function extends beyond the bare reality of breastfeeding into the mother’s need to constantly supervise the unruly, uncoordinated and generally low-functioning infant, further embedding her within the domestic sphere and generating the cliché that a woman’s place is ‘naturally’ in the home. Ortner (1974:77) gives a few reasons why this arrangement induces the view that women’s social role is somehow intrinsically closer to nature. Firstly, mothers’ association with rearing children causes certain of the ‘pre-cultural’ aspects of children to rub off on them in the collective imaginary. Children, in a loose sense, fall under a sort of state of nature, as exemplified by their inability to speak, walk upright or control their excretions, and inability to understand social norms and obligations. The close propinquity of mothers to this ‘pre-cultural’ milieu lends itself to lowering women, in the social imaginary, to precisely this more sordid and besmirched, quasi-raw ‘natural’ level – a level from which, ironically, boys are seen as elevated by initiation rituals, whose function is to symbolically ensconce the initiated within culture proper through a purging of maternal ‘defilement. Secondly, there is the fact that pan-cultural social systems have built into them a Public/domestic dichotomy, where the strongly cordoned off domestic sphere is functionally associated with *inter alia* the birthing and rearing of offspring, which itself is, as already seen, associated with nature, in contrast to the public sphere, which is that of culture. Therefore, the domestic/Public duality maps near perfectly onto the Culture/nature duality. This mapping, in turn, goes a fairly long way to explaining the relative exclusion of women from the public sphere, that is, from the *polis* as the sphere of political action. As Gatens (1991:7) expresses it: “Women are constructed as close to nature, subject to passion and disorder and hence, excluded from the self-conscious creation of the body-politic, which is precisely where nature, passion and disorder are transcended (or at least converted into public goods).” Yet, Ortner (1974:80) argues that this duality is not watertight, as attested by women’s socialising and cooking functions within the domestic arena, which reveals her as a powerful proponent of the cultural process, in particular her capacity to transform raw materials into cultural products. This is significant in the light of Lévi-Strauss’ argument in *The Raw and the Cooked* (1969b) that the transformation of the raw into the cooked represents the transition from nature to culture. This would place woman squarely in the category of culture.

3. *Woman's psyche as closer to nature*. This presupposition, too, is based on a number of constructed dualities, as Ortner (1974:81) amply demonstrates. One relevant duality that is pan-culturally applicable is that of Abstract/concrete. The female personality is ostensibly geared to concrete feelings, things and people in contrast to the male association with personalism and universalism. This generates a second duality, namely that of relative-Objectivity/relative-subjectivity. Nancy Chodorow (1974:56), citing Rae Carlson's study (1971:270), concludes that "males represent experiences of self, others, space, and time in individualistic, objective, and distant ways, while females represent experiences in relatively interpersonal, subjective, immediate ways." The crux of Chodorow's paper is, however, that these differences are by no means innate, but arise from woman's roles in the family structure, namely that (1974:43-44) "women, universally, are largely responsible for early child care and for (at least) later female socialization", and that "the structural situation of child rearing, reinforced by female and male role training, produces these differences, which are replicated and reproduced in the sexual sociology of adult life." Chodorow argues that, because women are involved in the early socialisation of both boys and girls, they develop "personal identification" with her, i.e. diffuse identification with her general personality, behaviour traits, values and attitudes (1974:51). A son, however, will ultimately move towards a masculine role, derived from his identification with his father. Given that a father is less immediately involved with childcare than the mother and works away from the domestic sphere for most of the time, according to Chodorow (p.49), a boy's identification with the father involves something she terms "positional identification", in other words, identification with the father's male role as a collection of abstract elements, rather than an immediate, intimate identification with the father as a real individual. Moreover, according to Michelle Rosaldo (1974:28-29) and Chodorow (1974:51, 58), as the boy enters the social world at large, he finds it organised around more abstract and universalistic criteria. Hence, his earlier socialisation (or "positional identification") with his father exposes and moulds him for the type of adult social experience he will have. In contrast, the process of socialisation is different for girls, because of the continuity between the personal identification with the mother forged in early infancy and later socialisation, which does not entail the learning of externally defined role characteristics. This pattern serves as the preparation and reinforcement for her social situation later in her life, as she becomes involved in the world of women, which is

characterised by few formal role differences. As she enters motherhood, she forges "personal identification" with her own children and, in this way, the cycle is perpetuated. Chodorow and Ortner leave us with little doubt that "the feminine personality, characterised by personalism and particularism can be explained as having been generated by social-structural arrangements rather than by innate biological factors" (Ortner, 1974, 82). The example of Clara Schumann bears out this contention. Despite having seven surviving children between 1841 and 1854, Clara's biology had a very limited impact on her artistry. The greatest impediment to her creativity was, in fact, her husband. Not only did she have to contend with his increasing mental instability, she was also unable to practice while he was composing, as she wrote in her diary: "My playing is getting all behind, as always happens when Robert's composing, I can't find a single hour in the day to myself. If only I didn't get so far behind" (Dowley, 1982:70). This, however, did not prevent her from undertaking a gruelling schedule of concertising and – when she found "a single hour in the day to herself" – composing. Ironically, it was Robert Schumann's innate biological constitution that hampered his creativity. Whilst for Clara, according to Nancy B. Reich (2001:7), playing was not only marked by her faultless technique, but also her unusual powers of recall. She was one of the first pianists, together with Liszt, to play entire programmes from memory. Not only did she, hereby, confound the Culture/nature bipolarity, but also the Mind/body duality. Nicolette Venter (2004:66) makes a good case to suggest that Robert Schumann, on the other hand, was *biologically* (genetically) predisposed to mental instability, as evinced by his sister's suicide, as a result of severe depression, at the age of 19, and his father, August Schumann's death only a few months later. Dowley (1982:8) has also noted that August Schumann's restlessness and anxiety threatened his stability and he verged on a nervous breakdown during the year that Robert was born. Moreover, Robert's mother was also described as morbid and neurotic. Tragically, one of Robert Schumann's sons was mentally ill and incarcerated in a mental hospital for over forty years. After an unsuccessful suicide attempt, Schumann also spent the rest of his life in a mental asylum at Endenich, near Bonn.

Suffice to say, the idea of Robert Schumann as the superior Logos, capable of transcending the exigencies of biology, and Clara Schumann as *supplément* possessing an inferior female psyche, as informed by lactation and child-rearing, simply does not hold water.

4.3.3 Public/private, Objective/subjective

Genevieve Lloyd (1984: 74-75) recounts how in Virginia Woolf's novel *Night and Day,* the heroine Katherine Hilbery indulges a secret passion for mathematics, retreating from the emotional complexities and responsibilities of female life into a contemplation of abstract symbols and geometrical figures. For Katherine, this 'unfeminine' activity represents clarity, impersonality and a necessity against the engulfing confusion and contingency of domestic life. In her commentary on Woolf's novel, Lloyd notes:

> The familiar female longing which Virginia Woolf here describes goes beyond a desire for escape from the frequently crushing boredom and claustrophobia of a life spent entirely in the private domain. It is a longing also for release from a certain style of thought, from intellectual confinement to a realm of the particular, the merely contingent; a longing, in brief, for access to Reason. For Reason is the prerequisite for, and point of access to, not just the public domain of political life, but a realm of thought – of universal principles and necessary orderings of ideas. (1984:74-75)

Here we see that the Public/domestic duality is also allied with the primacy of Reason, as a male prerogative. For Katherine, Reason is a mode of escape from the 'mindlessness' of domestic drudgery, hence her passion for mathematics, which she indulges in furtively. The relegation of women to the private (domestic) domain has far-reaching consequences for creativity. Battersby (1989:19) notes that the social duties of the genius are inconsistent with those of "fulfilling mundane domestic and reproductive tasks, nor of living a life of enforced, upper-class ease." In contrast with this regarding men (Citron, 1993:113), "ideologically he inhabits the sublime and as such is distanced from the trivialities of daily existence. This contributes to an aura of timelessness."

To be sure, as Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kuman (1997:2) rightly observe in *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy,* the Public/private duality is a slippery, protean dichotomy, irreducible to a single unitary entity and subsumes a number of dualities (for example, Professional/amateur). They go about clarifying this distinction by exploring ways in which it has been deployed in the social and political domain. Particularly pertinent to our consideration is their insight into the tendency of feminist thought, in particular, to draw the lines between 'Public' and 'private' in relation to "the distinction between the family and the larger economic and political order – with the

market economy often becoming the paradigmatic 'public realm'." In what follows (and what has gone before), we will use the duality in this sense.

I have already intimated that woman has been identified with the private realm and man with the public realm. The Public/private duality has served to stifle female musical creativity at numerous levels, some of which we will explore in what follows. The first pertains to the question of education, generally falling within the provenance of the 'public' arena, although not exclusively. Citron (1993:60) rightly notes that that a musical education is central to becoming a composer. She goes as far as to say that "Most musicians would agree that a music education functions as a necessary ingredient in composing, at least, in the Western art tradition." Notable female composers faced opposition to studying at conservatoires in the 'public' domain, due to parental opposition, usually paternal. Ethel Smyth (1858-1944), for example, locked herself up in her room for days to convince her domineering father of her intention to study at the Leipzig Conservatory. Hippolyte Chaminade strenuously forbade his daughter, Cécile (1857-1944) to attend the Paris Conservatoire, although he relented and permitted her to study privately with some of its faculty. Rebecca Clarke (1886-1979), moreover, had a longstanding battle with her stern father to pursue musical studies. Germaine Failleferre (1892-1983) was indebted to her mother's support against her father's objections to her studies at the Conservatoire. Augusta Holmès (1847-1903) was impeded, in her case, by her mother from leaving the home environs to study music. Only after her mother died was her father, Monsieur Holmès, at liberty to arrange musical instruction for Augusta.

The underlying Public/ private divide is also a key factor among many unpinning the barring of women from public classes or programmes to advance their music education. Citron recounts Mabel Daniels' (1878-1903) disturbing, but also strangely amusing, story of the astonished reactions of the male students upon entering a classroom one day and finding a woman in their midst: she was the first woman admitted to a score-reading class at the Munich Conservatory. According to Daniels, "until five years ago [1897], women were not allowed to study counterpoint at the conservatory. In fact, anything more advanced than elementary harmony was debarred" (cf. Neuls-Bates 1991:220-222, as recounted in Citron 1993:59). At the Paris Conservatoire, Citron notes, "women were apparently excluded from advanced theory and composition classes until well into the century, and only in the final decades admitted into programs in these areas." This is significant, because it took place during a time in which music was valorised for the size of its compositions and complexity –

in texture, timbre, and harmony – thus necessitating advanced classes (1993:59-61). It is little wonder that Ethel Smyth felt impelled to say, in 1933, that "There is not at this present moment one single middle-aged woman alive who has had the musical education that has fallen to men as a matter of course, without any effort on their part, ever since music was!" (Smyth, 1933, as quoted in Neuls-Bates, 1982:286).

Another restrictive consequence of the patriarchal relegation of women to the private (domestic) domain pertains to professionalism in the arts. Citron (1993:81-82) notes that the growing gender split between public and private brought on by industrialisation served to exclude women from professional positions and the concomitant processes that funnel into what Ethyl Smyth has termed the "musical machinery." Structures such as orchestras and publishers were both public and market-based and therefore off-limits to women. Male composers, however, like Felix Mendelsohn (1809-1847) and Robert Schumann utilised these public institutions as a conduit to their entire public life. Mendelssohn, for example, conducted several orchestras and could present his works and publish his name in newspapers and magazines, whilst Schumann wrote extensively, hereby creating a public forum. Citron (1993:82) notes that "Professionalism has thus eluded many a female composer. This is why so few are known." Gatens (1991:28) explains this omission in the following terms: "it is worth noting here that the alleged scarcity of great women philosophers, artists and writers [and musicians, N.D.] throughout history can be partly explained by the invisibility of private services to the public eye."

It can be argued that one of the most damaging consequences of the Public/private duality has been women's exclusion from institutional life, in particular the founding of musicology as a discipline. Particularly pertinent in this regard is the founding of the New York Musicological Society in 1930, which in 1934 was to become the American Musicological Society. Suzanne Cusick recounts the infamous event that took place on 22 February 1930, the day in which the New York Musicological Society was founded, which leaves no doubt as to the literal 'closing' of the doors to women to a society which would subsequently become America's most prestigious and influential national musicological institution. The specific woman was the brilliant young composer, Ruth Crawford (1901-1953), who at that time was lodging at the New York home of the music patron Blanche Walton, during which time she could

devote herself to studying dissonant counterpoint with the musical polymath Charles Seeger. Crawford wryly wrote as follows of that fateful day:

> The musicologists meet. It is decided that I may sit in the next room and hear [Joseph] Yasser about his new supra scale. Then when I come out for this purpose, I find someone has closed the doors. Blanche is irate, so am I. Men are selfish, says Blanche. You just have to accept the fact. Perhaps, I wonder, their selfishness is one reason why they accomplish more than women…I walk past the closed door to my room, and when I pass I turn my head towards the closed door and quietly but forcibly say, 'Damn you,' and go on in my room and read Yasser's article. Later, my chair close to the door, I heard some of the discussion. (Gaume, 1986:196)

Cusick (1999: 472) notes that many year later, Charles Seeger, a principal organiser of both the New York Society and the successive national one, told an interviewer that he had deliberately excluded Crawford "to avoid the incipient criticism that musicology was 'woman's work.'" "Women's work" would clearly fall under the gamut of the private space, something that the founding fathers of musicology, a *public* institution, wanted to avoid at all costs. His extreme reticence in the context of the Public/private (*inter alia*) duality is best understood in terms of two powerful ideological narratives underpinning the formation of musicology as a discipline. The first is the myth of autonomous, or 'absolute' music, a term coined by Wagner, which Citron (1993:142) rightly notes was constructed in the early part of the nineteenth century, particularly in Germany. Central to this myth was that it could "transcend the vagaries of daily [read 'private'] existence better than any art-form and catapult creator and listener into some timeless, placeless realm of pure aesthetic contemplation." The Romantics posited the concept of the 'pure idea' and intellectuality ("*Geistigheid*") at the centre of music and aligned it with a gendered notion of genius which favoured men. By valorising the higher faculties of the mind, this Romantic idea of male genius not only denigrated the 'mindless' toil of women in the private sphere, but affirmed the Mind/body dualism and the concomitant devaluation of the body. Women were deemed unable to reach the level of intellectual and person anonymity required by absolute music due to their socialisation. Moreover, as Cusick (1999:485) notes, the patriarchal perception has been that women are never able to fully individuate from their mothers, because they identify too closely with them and compensate for their failure of individualisation as adult women by being more concerned than (fully individuated, fully autonomous) men "with maintaining the social fabric and having porous ego boundaries that make them more vulnerable to the personalities and desires of others." This stands in the way of composing 'absolute' music,

which requires the musical creator to stand aloof and remain unsullied by prosaic societal influences.

Another powerful narrative that feeds into the myth of absolute music, which, as intimated, valorised the higher capacities of the mind, is the founding (male) members' desire to establish musicology on the same intellectual plane as the 'hard sciences,' such as mathematics and physics. This casts some light on the reason why Ruth Crawford was debarred from the founding of the New York Musicological Society. The point, as Cusick (1999:473) avers, is that being perceived as "woman's work" would undermine the intellectual legitimacy of musicology as "the science of music" (in Germany termed '*Musikwissenschaft*'), with its connotations of objectivity, discipline and intellectual gravity, because "it would automatically relegate musicology to a position in the intellectual world analogous to the position of women (and their work) in the 'real world' [this would also pertain to the private (domestic) domain. N.D.] – a position of inferiority and relative powerlessness, characterized by emotionality, sensuality and frivolity." Cusick goes on further to note that (1999:473), "Because music itself, the object of musicology's study was already widely associated with the feminine in American culture, and consequently of embattled status, it was especially important that musicology not seem associated in any way with music's feminine qualities."

The absence of Crawford in physical terms is significant in this regard and stems from the affinity of music and the female body, not only in American culture, but in European thinking extending from Plato to more recent thinkers such as Giovanni Artusi and Eduard Hanslick, This assumption, Cusick (1999:477-478) suggests, is pervaded by a deep-lying anxiety that music's irresistible power is similar to the erotic power that women have ostensibly wielded over men.[53] "The result", as Cusick puts it, "has been a long tradition of metaphorically associating the control of music with the control of women." It is precisely musical power and the erotic that coalesced in the body of Ruth Crawford. Crawford's presence would, therefore, have:

[53] The intertwining tropes of women, music and danger, particularly in an erotic sense, form something of a leitmotif in the history and mythology of western thought. A particular vivid example are those of the the Siren-songs that ravished sailors into a stupor, and which led to their violent death against rocks. In Homeric legend, Odysseus orders his men to tie him to the mast (*histos*) of his ship, so that he could hear the music of the siren *femmes fatale*s, while stopping the sailors' ears with wax to keep them unharmed.

> all too vividly resurrected the cultural similitude between musical and erotic power, distracting him from the main business at hand – achieving intellectual control over music's power by the accumulation of scientific knowledge about music. To exclude her was to exclude the erotic power both of women and of sounding music in a single stroke, to close the door of musicology on music so that musicology might be practised from a space within which an active composer's quiet "Damn you" could go unheard. (Cusick 1999:478)

These swarming polarities – Private/public, Objective/subjective, Mind/body and more – leave us with little doubt as to a plausible response to Cixous' and Clément's (1991:63-4) question posed at the beginning of this consideration of the polarised, gendered structure of creativity, namely: "Is the fact that Logocentrism subjects thought – all concepts, codes and values – to a binary system related to 'the' couple, man/woman?" The answer is, clearly, an emphatic 'yes'!

The reader may wonder what these lengthy reflections on the binary system in question has to do with *marabi*; the answer will be provided later in this chapter, and has to do with the manner in which it undermines, explodes, or 'deconstructs' the system from within its own ambivalent musical structure.

4.3.4 Logos/non-logos

I have already mentioned Derrida's identification of the fatal flaw in Western thinking as its propensity towards Logocentrism, which is at once also phonocentrism, designating a valorisation of speech as paradigm of Presence, or in Heideggerian terms, "being-as-Presence." This implies that the Logos is the *creative* originary breath that spoke western thinking into being. A notable instance of this, as we will see, is to be found in Haydn's "In Native Worth," where Adam's shining eyes reflect "The soul, the breath and image of his God." We will return to this later. The perceptive reader might well ask how this binary ordering of Western thinking along the lines of Male/female and phonocentric Presence/absence could have an impact on female creativity? Venter (2004:47-50) clarifies this question in her consideration of Clara Schumann's relation to her father, Frederick Wieck's paternal Presence, and later that of her husband Robert Schumann.

Frederick Wieck was swift to note his daughter's prodigious musical talents and set about developing them with a rigour that was almost abusive in its harshness. The lines, however,

crossed – and this is where Wieck emerged as paternal Logos – when he began to claim her as his creation. As Dowley (1982:55-56) puts it:

> To understand Wieck's attitude, we need to examine his feelings about Clara. She represented his special creation, his life's work, He had laboured with her for many years at the keyboard [without giving credit to her own special gifts, N.D.]. She had finally emerged as his best pupil, the star exemplar of his techniques.

Wieck's proprietary attitude toward Clara could also account for his extreme opposition to her marriage to Robert Schumann, whom he saw as a usurper and threat to his (logocentric) hold over Clara, his "special creation." This attitude was clearly internalised by Clara and unmistakably comes to the fore in her diary entries. Significantly, it was Wieck who began a diary for Clara, in which she could record her daily activities and emotions. His appropriation of what should have been an intimate and highly personal account of her inner life clearly indicates the extent of his hold over her. Her initial diary entry is significant. It tacitly speaks of her father's 'ownership' over her and her inability, as she perceived it, to do anything without his creative (logocentric) sanction. She wrote: "Whom do I belong to, after all? Whom? My diary. His own hand…." (Galloway, 2002:11).[54] Wieck clearly saw the necessity of policing Clara's writing. The reason for this emerges when one considers writing's association with the female principle and as threat to the prevailing male logocentric hegemony. We have already seen in Chapter 3 that the link between woman as writing and 'non-logos' is not of a recent vintage. In Derrida's *Dissemination* (1981), his unconventional "commentary" on Plato's *Phaedrus*, he goes about (un)ravelling the affiliative resonances between writing and Plato's *pharmakon*, meaning both a poison and remedy simultaneously and alternatively. Plato's dialogue between Socrates and his antagonist, Phaedrus, gradually proceeds by way of a series of myths strategically placed in a series of settings, beginning with the myth of Cicadas, then that of Orithyia, which previously I have opined is a water-sprite (Denis, 1998:61). This leads up to an Egyptian myth in which the precise relation between writing and a *pharmakon* is laid bare by the Egyptian King Theuth, who emphatically denounces the inventor god Thamus' new invention – that of writing – as one and the same as a *pharmakon*, in the way in which it functions both poison and remedy.

[54] Clara could well say "his voice." It yields insight that Clara only began to speak when she was over four years old. This led to rumours that she was slow and deaf (Reich, 1987:14). Posterity proves that this was by no means the case. A possible reason is that she was dominated by her tyrannical father to the extent that she did not feel the necessity for verbal self-expression. In Freudian terms, her father, as superego stunted her development as ego (which mediates between the superego and Id), thereby delaying her entry into the verbal symbolic realm.

Elsewhere I (Denis, 1998:101-108) have located an isomorphism between Plato's *pharmakon* and women in the specific guise of Lulu (the character in the opera by the same name by Alban Berg (1885-1935). Lulu, as well as writing as *pharmakon*, is "dangerous[55]" (cf. "character(s) of Lulu… That Dangerous *Supplément*"; Denis, 1998:101-108), because they harbour the capacity to destabilise the logic of either/or and its affiliate oppositions. Woman is thus branded not only as a threat to binary, logocentric reason, but communication as we know it.

In the light of this, let us return to Clara Schumann's status as non-logos, which emerges also in her marriage to Robert Schumann.

Notwithstanding the authenticity of the reciprocal love relationship between Robert and Clara, Robert was to "become [perhaps unwittingly, N.D.] the next link in the patriarchal appropriation of Clara and what seems to be her unquestioning acquiescence" (Venter 2004:50). Unbelievably, they began their marriage with an ostensibly mutual diary that Robert initiated, an act that parallels that of her father, who prescribed what she was to write. This supposed equality is, however, called into question at the end of the first entry, in which Robert writes: "If you agree, wife of my heart, sign your name here under mine. Robert. Your wife who is devoted to you with your whole heart, Clara" (Venter, 2004:50). Clara emerges as non-logos, the woman who has to relinquish her identity as "Clara"[56] and become 'wife (of Robert)' or what Derrida would call a *supplément* to Robert as Logos and as paradigm of *presence*.

Evidence of Robert's assumption of his creative logocentric authority is seen in his attitude towards Clara's creative endeavours. Initially, he was supportive of her concertising and composition, but subsequently began to criticise her work. Janice Galloway (2002:171) suggests that this was by no means because her work was deficient in any way, but as a result of his teeming insecurities and failing mental capacities. In a letter to her, astonishingly, he draws a parallel between himself and God as Creator. It is as if (Venter 2004:54) Schumann is positing a Divine mandate for his creativity by asserting his creative presence:

---

[55] The notion of the *supplement* as "dangerous" is Derrida's (1981:109).

[56] Clara was named by her father. As she writes in her diary "It means limpid. Light" (Galloway, 2002:19). Here, too, the name identifying her was pre-*scribed* by the rule of the Father.

> we quarrelled only once because of the way you interpret my compositions, you are not in the right, Clarchen. The composer alone knows how his work is to be presented, no other. It is as if you wish to paint a tree better than God made it. Now do as you're told and give me a kiss… (Galloway 2009:199)

The patronising tone of his admonition, especially with the diminutive "Clarchen," is hard to overlook. It is as if he is speaking to a querulous child, rather than an equal and creator in her own right. "Thus the paternal rhetoric of Wieck and of exclusion and repression continues through Robert Schumann, exacting complete and unquestioning acquiescence" (Venter 2004:55).

On one particular occasion, Robert's view of man as creative Logos, and the violence (in Derridean terms) of the hierarchy which it underpins, took a sinister, even disturbingly sadistic, turn at a gathering in the Schumann's home. Clara performed for the guests, who included the conductor and pianist, Tausch. As she was playing, she felt Robert's hand on her shoulder pushing harder and harder. He ordered her to stop and Tausch to take over, proclaiming that "A man understands this kind of thing better." On another occasion he enlisted Tausch to "relieve her" as the accompanist of the chorus "since the pianoforte drumming tired her too much and was more suitable for a man." Moreover, as Nancy Reich (1985:116) notes, as early as November 9, 1850, Schumann blamed the quality of Clara's playing for the cool audience response to his D-Minor Trio, and faulted her performance of Beethoven's "Appassionata" Sonata (a work she had made her own as early as 1838). Reich suggests that this criticism was an excuse for his diminishing powers as male creative Logos, rather than any fault of Clara's, as reviewers and friends reported no diminution of her artistry. In contrast, Robert chastised her by saying that her accompaniment of a singer was "terrible." The extent of her anguish is evident in her diary entry after that evening in November:

> What grieved me so frightfully was that I had played with all my strength, given it my best, and thought to myself that it had never gone so well, and so it was even more bitter to hear, instead of a friendly word, only the most bitter, discouraging reproaches. I hardly know any more how I should play, though I took great pains to accompany the singer in the most sensitive and responsive way, Robert said my accompanying was terrible! If I did not have to use my playing to earn some money, I would absolutely not play another note in public, for what good is it to me to earn the applause of the audience if I cannot satisfy him? (Reich, 1985:115-116)

What emerges here is Clara's interiorisation of the Logos/non-logos duality, insofar as she unquestioningly regarded Robert's estimation of her work as infallible. There are numerous indicators to show that his negative appraisal of her work was groundless. Reich (2001:65), for example, has noted that not only was Clara's playing marked by a faultless technique, but also an extraordinary power of recall. As mentioned earlier, she was one of the first pianists, together with Liszt, to play entire programmes by memory. Robert, on the other hand, was plagued by mental instability, as already intimated, to the extent that he, at times, could not recall the notes he had composed. His attempts to uphold his status as Logos and creative progenitor came at a high price – the denigration of Clara's abilities. What also strikes one in Clara's confession (in what one assumes to be a private diary) is her inability to view herself as an autonomous, creative being. Without Robert's approval, Clara was willing to throw in the proverbial (creative) towel.

It is little wonder, in the light of the above, that Clara was plagued with self-doubt regarding her own creative abilities, as emerges in the following:

> I once believed that I had creative talent, but I have given up this idea; a woman must not wish to compose – there never was one able to do it. Am I intended to be the one? It would be arrogant to believe that. (Reich, 1985: 228-229)

Venter (2004:56) notes that the impact of the Logos/non-logos, Male/female and its cognate *supplements,* likewise had a devastating impact on Fanny Hensel (1805-1847), Clara's contemporary and sister of the more famous Felix Mendelsohn. A similar vein of anxiety regarding her female authorship surfaces in her letter to Felix in July 1829 regarding an 8-voice piece she had written for her then fiancé, Wilhelm Hensel. She said: "It won't be much but it will be something…I fret if it's bad" (Citron 1993:85). She furthermore speaks of the almost demonic power (or presence) that her brother wielded over her, and like Clara said that she would summarily cease composing if he so wished it.

The binary ordering, Logos/non-logos, and the patriarchal attitudes it sustained clearly not only prevented women from fulfilling their creative ability, but eroded their self-esteem to the point of abject despair. Indeed, this interiorisation of patriarchal mores by creative women was not exclusive to the nineteenth century, but was to persist for many years. Anaïs Nin (1943:258) speaks of the guilt that beset her as a creative woman in her *Journals*: "I tried to efface my creation with a sponge, to drown my creation because my concept of devotion and

the roles I had to play clashed with my creative self." Even more recently, Judy Chicago, the eminent feminist and artist, told the brutal truth (1975:42): "Being a woman and an artist spelled only one thing: pain." The extent of her pain and fear is evident in her account of the trauma surrounding 'coming clean' publicly regarding her true feelings about being an artist and woman:

> For one entire year, I lived in terror, I recognized that my fear reflected how deeply I have internalized society's taboos about revealing my true feelings. I had been told that if I told men the truth, I would "castrate" them, and I was afraid that they would retaliate. (1975:60)

Chicago's pain and fear in 'coming out' is also reflected in Cixous's experience of being a creative woman. Astonishingly, she only started writing when she was 27-years old, as already intimated. Before then, she had internalised patriarchal norms to the extent that they had effectively muted her (1976:876). As she writes:

> Time and again […]I have felt so full of luminous torrents that I could burst – burst with forms much more beautiful that those which are put up in frames and sold for a stinking fortune. And I, too, said nothing, showed nothing; I didn't open my mouth, I didn't repaint my half of the world. I was ashamed, I was afraid, and I swallowed my shame and my fear. I said to myself: You are mad! What's the meaning of these waves, these floods, these outbursts? Where is the ebullient, infinite woman who, immersed as she was in her naiveté, kept in the dark about herself, led into self-disdain by the great arm of parental-conjugal phallocentrism, hasn't been ashamed of her strength? Who, surprised and horrified by the fantastic tumult of her drives (for she was made to believe that a well-adjusted normal woman has a […]divine composure), hasn't accused herself of being a monster? Who, feeling a funny desire stirring inside her (to sing, to write, to dare to speak, in short, to bring out something new), hasn't thought she was sick? Well, her shameful sickness is that she resists death, that she makes trouble.

This selection of cases is a clear indication that the Logos/non-logos duality and the fear and self-doubt that it instilled in woman was clearly a massive impediment to their ability to speak, write, or paint without fear of a brutal patriarchal backlash. Trapped within the dyad Male/female, women were effectively effaced to the point of near non-existence. Hence, to call into question this distinction by writing was tantamount to resisting death, but at the expense of incurring patriarchal wrath for upending the 'natural' order of things.

4.4 MUSIC AND THE 'AFFECTS': THE ART OF (BINARY) PERSUATION

I have explored ways in which thinking has been (and still is) polarised into a Male/female dualism, beginning with Cixous's "Sorties", seeing how this dualism spawns numerous other dualisms which are detrimental to female creativity and authentic self-expression. I will now extend this consideration by moving to the *topos* of music and how these polarities have been entrenched in ostensibly innocent musical texts, using music-rhetorical means. The point that will be explored is that the entrenchment of these polarities exceeds that of pure logic, by encompassing a visceral, emotional dimension, which artfully persuades the hearer to endorse these same polarities.

In order to do so, we will first situate this consideration within the broader musicological conversation regarding musical meaning and societal referentiality.

Susan McClary (1991: xviii), in her groundbreaking – and controversial[57] – book, *Feminine Endings. Music,Gender and Sexuality* expresses the fundamental problem regarding the disclosure and deciphering of the meaning and emotional impact of musical texts with characteristic candour: "Without question, it is difficult to write or speak effectively about music, and our attempts always fall short of the experience of the sounds themselves. Yet our refusal to address meaning at all has made musicology an increasingly arid and esoteric field." Note that McClary is alluding specifically to traditional musicology, with its almost obsessive preoccupation with the rationally verifiable aspects of music theory, as borne out by its (exclusive) emphasis on formal and structural analysis and eschewal of the idea that music may have any social or emotive aspect whatsoever. The 1980s, however, witnessed a profound paradigm shift in the guise of the so-called "New musicology," whose quest was to usher in a more critical, humanistic orientation to the study of music. For the first time, patriarchal biases were disclosed in the discourse of traditional musicology, such as with entries in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music* (1980) entitled "Masters of Italian Opera" and "Masters of the Second Viennese School," to cite particular instances of female exclusion

[57] Consider, for example, the contrast between the following views of McClary's thinking: Georgina Born (1992:79) observes that, on the one hand, McClary has "become, in the USA, the accepted face, and (reluctantly) a star of feminist musicology and music criticism…McClary has been one of the crucial means whereby feminist music scholarship has gained an audience and institutional support (even if limited) from within mainstream musicology." Lydia Goehr (2009:89), however, on the other hand, opines that McClary's work tends towards a "positivistic directness", which either endorses the establishment, or constructs counter-hegemonic modes of subjectivity, reducing musical representations to basic models of power relations and (more or less) generalised readings. I am indebted to Prof. Martina Viljoen for drawing my attention to Goehr's position.

from the dominant discourse. Moreover, traditional musicology's penchant for dissecting music into what McClary calls "atomic bits" and its tacit refusal to engage with the question of musical meaning also fell under the critical spotlight. McClary identifies, in this regard, two professional camps regarding the question of musical meaning; those who "think they are above such nonsense" and eschew musical meaning in lieu of rigorous formal and structural analysis of musical texts, and the other camp, which has not entirely surrendered the notion that music signifies something, "but they have kept this carefully hidden, rather as though they were adults who still believe in the Tooth Fairy" (McClary 1991:22).

McClary (1991:20) argues, however, that these attitudes were not always prevalent. In contrast to traditional musicology, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were characterised by their preoccupation with music's capacity to move the affects (this term will be clarified presently) and likewise with rhetoric. Composers such as Claudio Monteverdi (1567-1643) used various signs to signify madness, military ferocity *inter alia.* The Baroque era also saw thinkers such as Johann Matteson and Johann David Heinechen, who painstakingly catalogued music according to rhetorical devices and their corresponding affects. In the same vein, composition teachers at this time "instructed students on how to produce passionate responses in listeners through rhetorical manipulation." The nineteenth century, however, saw a change in the tide. Music was seen as an 'Absolute' art form, not to be sullied by social references. In practice, however, even though there was widespread disdain for the notion of music having social codes, the actual documentation produced by composers and theoreticians "testify to a belief in the emotional power of music, even if they wished that power to be regarded as unmediated and transcendent" (McClary 1991:20).

The emphasis on music and its capacity to move in the sixteenth and seventeenth century dovetails with the aim of this consideration, as previously intimated, which is to show how composers have used music-rhetorical devices not only to uphold the Male/female duality and its correlates, but also to persuade the listener in a visceral sense that these dualities are 'meant to be.' After a consideration of the history of music rhetoric and meaning in the seventeenth and eighteenth era, we will go on to demonstrate how these binary, patriarchal narratives play out in the recitative "And God Created Man", and the aria "In Native Worth", from Joseph Haydn's *The Creation.*

Rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, has been the subject of voluminous writing in Western thinking from Antiquity, where the most important work in this field was done by Plato and

Aristotle[58]. Regrettably, an exhaustive account of the full canon of philosophical writings on the expressive and persuasive powers of music far exceeds the scope of this present study. Consequently, I have chosen to focus on the relation between music and rhetoric, as it fell most vividly under the spotlight during the Baroque era in the writing of Johann Matteson in *Der Volkommene Capellmeister* ("The Perfect Music Director," 1739, revised translation 1981).

In his consideration of the rhetorical proclivities of music, Claude Palisca asks, in *Music in the Baroque Era* (1991:1), if it is indeed justifiable to designate music of such diverse styles as, in vocal music, the madrigals of Carlo Gesualdo (1566-1613), the early musical pastorals of Jacopo Peri (1561-1633) and Claudio Monteverdi (1567-1643), the tragicomedies of Domenico Scarlatti (1685-1757) and the *tragedies lyriques* of Jean-Philippe Rameau (1683-1764), in instrumental music, the toccatas of Claudio Merulo (1533-1604), the trio sonatas of Arcangelo Corelli (1653-1713), and the concertos of Antonio Vivaldi (1678-1741) and, in Church music, such diverse styles as the passions of Heinrich Schütz (1585-1672) and the cantatas of Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750) as "Baroque." For Palisca (1991:6), such a gesture is ultimately justifiable, since all these diverse musical manifestations, spanning between c.1580-1750, are united by a common expressive ideal rather than a consistent body of musical techniques, namely its preoccupation with the capacity of music to move the passions or "affections" in a manner akin to that of a skilled orator. Hence (Palisca 1991:4-5), "Whether it is a madrigal of Luca Marenzio (1553-1599) in the late sixteenth century or an aria of Bach or Handel in the 1730s, this belief strongly determines the musical style." Let us pause to consider Palisca's (1991:3-4) overview of the meaning and history of affects.

Regarding the meaning of the word "affects," the sixteenth century poetic critic Lorenzo Giacomini (1597:38) describes affect as "a spiritual movement or operation of the mind in which it is attracted or repelled by an object it has come to know." Central to this belief was the idea that animal spirits and vapours flowed continuously through the body and that an affect was caused by an imbalance in these spirits and vapours. Palisca (1991:4) describes the composition of these vapours and its concomitant affection thus: "An abundance of thin agile spirits disposes a person to joyous affections, while the torpid and impure vapours prepare the

[58] For a more detailed account of the expressive powers of music in Antiquity, and its impact on all aspects of human social and political endeavours, such as education, the State and ethics, cf. Andrew Barker's (1984) *Greek Musical Writings. Vol.1 The Musician and his Art* as well as LeLouda Stamou's (2002) "Plato and Aristotle on Music and Musical Eucation. Lessons from Ancient Greece." In: *Journal of Music Education*. pp.3-16.

way for sorrow or fear. External and internal sensations stimulate the bodily mechanisms to alter the state of the spirits." This activity is felt as "a movement of the affects" and the resultant state of imbalance is the affection. Once the vapours reach this state, the mind and body remain the same until an external stimulus causes a change in the composition of the vapours. This view of the mechanics of the affections was not of new vintage. It perpetuated the Aristotelean belief, as expounded in his *Rhetoric* (2007), very briefly summarised, that there exist discrete states such a fear, love, hate, anger and joy, to mention the key ones. The arousal of these affections was considered to be the underlying goal of both poetry and music. The period between the last decade of the sixteenth century and the eighteenth century was to see a plethora of theoretical writings regarding the passions. Palisca (1991:4) cites René Descartes' treatise *The Passions of the Soul* (1649) as being a comprehensive study of the affections, comprising an elaboration of extant theory.

Johann Matteson's *Der Volkommene Capellmeister* (*The Perfect Music Director*, 1739[59]) is generally regarded by musicologists as the definitive tome on the study of the affects or *Affektenlehre*. In this work, Matteson painstakingly codified various musical features and devices such as intervals, keys, rhythms and genres based on their capacity to elicit the corresponding affects. Johann Matteson and Hans Lenneberg[60] (1958:47) notes that in the course of his writing, through the span of his long life, Matteson became more and more specific, from a fairly modest beginning in *Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre* (1713). In this work, (in part III, chapter 1) he went about exploring the affective qualities of all seventeen major and minor keys. In his next text, *Das Forschende Orchestre* (1721) he focused on hearing as the primary one of all the senses, because "through hearing, the mind and its Affections are most powerfully aroused" (Boomgaarden, 1989:99). This idea also comes to the fore clearly in John Locke's (1632-1704) *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), which Matteson translated into German. Locke conceived the human mind as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) on which knowledge attained by experience is inscribed. Experience, in turn, is

[59] Readers who may find my references to authors who wrote in previous centuries strange, if not 'unacceptable', should remind themselves that, unlike in the natural sciences - where older theories (which may still have some interest from a historical perspective) are replaced by more recent ones when it comes to the practice of science - in the humanities, which are interpretive-hermeneutic disciplines, it is not only legitimate to enter into 'conversation' with thinkers across centuries, but often highly valuable. A case in point is Plato, with whose magisterial *Republic* every political philosopher engages from time to time. Moreover, if critics should find vestiges of patriarchal sentiments in these historical texts, there is no reason to reject them; they should simply be seen as documents reflecting the mores of their time, without necessarily condoning these. The same can be said of my use of Matteson and Lenneberg's (1958) analysis, which some might regard as being 'dated.'

[60] Although Matteson did not quote this, the article in question is ascribed to *both* Matteson and Lenneberg and contains Lenneberg's quotation and comments on sections from Matteson's *Der Volkommene Capellmeister*.

obtained by the exercise of our senses and that which is discovered by means of our senses (Rowell, 1984:106). According to Locke, sound is one of the many "simple modes of sensation", and hearing is the corresponding conduit by which ideas are received in the mind:

> The like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of sound: by which we see that, from the sense of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas, to almost an infinite number. Sounds, also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds, so put together silently in his own fancy (Locke, 1894:159).

Against the backdrop of the primacy of hearing as the most important sense and means of eliciting the affections, Matteson elaborated in far greater detail on his theory of the affections in *Critica Musica* (as part of a series of periodicals issued between 1722-1725). Specifically, Matteson identified the importance of melody as transporter of the affections and, therefore, dense contrapuntal writing, comprising a number of melodies, "confuse, darken, glue-up the main point, the main modulation and the affection" (Matteson, 1981:113).

Matteson's theory of the affections found its most complete and cogent expression in *Der Volkommene Capellmeister* (1713), in which he (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:48) "finally created a veritable catalogue of almost all that should be known by the composer to write affectingly." Lenneberg (in Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:48) notes perceptively that Matteson's desire to write a complete and systematic account of the affects, not only stemmed from a practical composer, but one who was also under the spell of the *ethos* of the Enlightenment, a period in which neat categorisation of knowledge was the order of the day.

To return to the overarching goal of this consideration, in what follows I will attempt to show how certain patriarchal, binary oppositions, as identified by Cixous in "Sorties" are rhetorically endorsed in the recitative "And God Created Man" and the aria "In Native Worth" from Joseph Haydn's *The Creatio*n, particularly with reference to Mattesons's *Affektenlehre*, where possible, and the broader framework of music and rhetoric provided in the preceding consideration, but not exclusively so. This is something Matteson would endorse, as emerges in his following formulation (1958:56):

> The affects especially are like the bottomless sea; it cannot possibly be emptied, no matter how hard one may try. A book can present only the smallest part [of this subject] and much has to be left unsaid, *left to everyone's own sensibility in this area* [my emphasis. N.D.].

A word regarding musico-historical delineations is necessary before we proceed. Although Palisca and Manfred Bukofzer (1993) generally situate Matteson's *Affektenlehre* in the Baroque era, it is my opinion (and this also emerges in Palisca's consideration) that whilst one should not eschew categories such as 'Baroque' and 'Classical', neither should they be regarded as inviolable or watertight. A precedent for this is the way in which Palisca shows how certain works considered to be Renaissance are shown to fall under the umbrella term 'Baroque,' given their unifying expressive goal, the movement of the affections. There is, moreover, a clear chronological overlap between Haydn's *The Creation* (1798) and Matteson's *Der Volkommene Capellmeister* (1739). Matters of chronology aside, I also believe that it is justifiable to use 'Baroque' devices (*inter alia*) as a refractive lens to analyse a 'Classical' piece, given the overarching ethos of the Enlightenment, which spans both centuries. Importantly, as intimated, I do not hereby mean to deny the stylistic differences and specificity of each period, but rather resist the tendency to be too pedantic in setting and maintaining watertight musico-historical delineations. I hope, by way of what follows, to demonstrate that the relationship between Baroque and Classical is more porous than it has been assumed to be, by showing how some of Matteson's devices are used to masterful rhetorical effect in the Haydn texts in question.[61]

4.5 HAYDN: CREATING 'NATIVE' WORTH

The fluidity between music-historical periods and genres (in this case, that of the oratorio) is borne out by what Nicholas Temperley (1991:5) describes as "the overwhelming emotional effect" of Handel's oratorios on Haydn. From all accounts, the primary creative impetus for Haydn's *The Creation* can be traced back to two visits to London in 1791-2 and 1794-5 during which he attended performances of some of Handel's oratorios such as at Westminster Abbey during the 1791 Handel Festival. The programme included two performances of *Israel in Egypt*, *Messiah* and excerpts from other Handel oratorios. Temperley (1991:5) notes that

[61] The pertinence of Affektenlehre in the Classical period is explored in journal articles such as Frederick Wessel's (1955) *The Affektenlehre in the Eighteenth Century* (Unpublished PhD diss) and "Reflections on Affektenlehre and Dance Theory in the Eighteenth Century".In: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1998. Vol.51, no.1. pp.21-28. by Francis Sparshott.

the results of this experience are to be found in Haydn's *The Creation*, notably his simplicity of musical diction and Baroque features (although not exclusively), such as imaginative use of tone-painting and rousing choruses of praise.

The libretto for *The Creation* was originally intended for Handel. Although *The Creation* (*Der Schöpfung*) was performed in both English and German, Temperley (1994:19) unequivocally avers that the original libretto was in English. Although no copy of it has yet been discovered, Gottfried van Swieten, who translated the libretto into German for Haydn, wrote the following about its origins at the end of December 1798:

> My part in the work, which was originally in English, was certainly rather more than mere translation; but it was far from being such that I could regard it as *my own*. Neither is it by *Dryden* ... but by an unnamed author who had compiled it largely from *Milton's* Paradise Lost, and had intended it for Handel. What prevented the great man from making use of it is unknown; but when *Haydn* was in London it was looked at, and handed over to the latter with the request that he should set it to music. (Olleson, 1968:4, original emphasis)

A certain amount of controversy surrounds the authorship of the '*ur*-libretto' and translation that I just wish to touch on here. Neil Jenkins (2005:2) goes as far as to say that the English version of the 1st edition could hardly have represented the *ur*-text that had been given to Haydn due to errors in syntax and translation, in both the English and German versions. The impression is created that the text was put together hurriedly by an inept English speaker, as is evident in lines such as "*Their flaming looks express, what feels the grateful heart*" and "*with thee is life incessant bliss, thine it whole shall be.*" Notwithstanding an imperfect text, it is significant that Haydn supervised the entire initial publication himself with a view to it reflecting his work as completely and accurately as possible. It is my opinion that imperfections can be overlooked given Haydn's preoccupation with the fidelity of the text to its musical setting.[62]

Having considered the origins and aspects of the libretto of *The Creation*, let us move on towards a consideration of the text of "And God Created Man" and "In Native Worth." The score is (Haydn, J). 1950. *Die Schöpfung*, Hob XXI:2 for Soli, Mixed Choir, Orchestra.

[62] For a more detailed consideration of the origins and translation of Haydn's *The Creation*, Cf. Edward Olleson, 1968. "The Origins and Libretto of Haydn's *Creation*. pp.148-168 and Nicholas Temperley, 1983. "New Light on the Libretto of The Creation".pp.189-211.

Partitions classique Breitkoft and Härtel, Nr.118. Consistent with the format in the score, the English translation will be given with the German in italics beneath it.

Recitative (*secco*): Uriel- "And God Created Man"/"*Und Gott schufden Menschen*"

And God created man
Und Gott schufden Menschen
In his own image,
Nach seinen Ehenbilde
In the image of God created him.
Nach dem Ebenbilde er schufer er sie.
Male and female he created he man
Man und Weiß er schufer er sie.
He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life
Den Athem des Lebens hauchter er in sein Angesicht,
And man he became a living soul.
Meschen wurde zur lebendigen Seele.

Aria: 24 "In Native Worth"/ "*Mit Würd und Hoheit angethan*"

In native worth and honour clad,
Mit Würd und Höheit angethan,
With beauty, courage, strength adorned,
Mit Schönheid, Stärk und Muth begaht,
To heav'n erect and tall,
Gen Himmel, aufgerichtet,
he stands a man,
steht der Mensch
the Lord and King of nature all.
Ein Mann und König der Natur.

The large and arched front [brow?] sublime
Die breit gewölbter erhabne Stirn,
Of wisdom deep declares the seat,
Verkünd't der Weisheit tifen Sinn,
And in his eyes with brightness shines,
Und aus den hellen Blikke strahlt,
the soul, the breath and image of his God.
Der Geist, des Schöpfers Hauch und Ebenbild
And in his eyes with brightness shines,
Und aus dem hellen Blicke strahlt,
the soul, the breath and image of his God.
Der Geist, des Schöpfers Hauch und Ehenbild.

With fondness leans upon his breast
An seinen Busen schmieget sich,
The partner for him formed
Für ihn, aus ihn geformt,
A woman fair and graceful spouse

Die Gattin hold, und anmuthswoll
A woman fair and graceful spouse
Die Gattin hold, und anmuthswoll
Her softly smiling virgin looks,
In froher Unschuld lächelt sie,
of flow'ry spring the mirror.
Der Frülings reizend Bild
Bespeak him love
ihm Liebe, ihn Liebe
Love and joy and bliss
Glück und Wonne zu
Her softly smiling virgin looks,
In froher Unschuld lächelt sie,
of flow'ry spring the mirror.
Der Frülings reizend Bild
bespeak him love
ihm Liebe, ihm Liebe
love and joy and bliss
Glück und Wonne zu
Bespeak him
Ihn Liebe
Love, and joy and bliss.
Glück und Wonne zu.

A plausible place to commence an analysis of the recitative is to consider the music-rhetorical significance of the keys in this score, given the importance that Matteson ascribes to their unique affective properties. After all, in his earlier book, *Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre*, he devotes no less than an entire chapter (Part III, Chapter II) to the affects elicited by using various keys. Since he omits this consideration in *Der Volkommene Capelmeister*, we will rely on this earlier work, whilst bearing in mind (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958: 234) that, however dogmatic as it may seem. Matteson acknowledges that there will never be complete consensus on this topic and therefore exhorts the readers to form theories of their own. Hence, there will be some leeway in our music-rhetorical analysis of Haydn's texts with regard to key in what follows.

Both the recitative and aria under scrutiny are written in the key of C major, which according to Matteson is suited to express joy: "A clever composer, who chooses the accompanying instruments well can even use it for tender and charming compositions" (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:234). In the light of what is to come, Haydn could have had this in mind with the creation of woman, whose text suggests feelings of love and tenderness, notwithstanding its subversive music-rhetorical undercurrents, as I will show.

After commencing on the dominant of C major, the recitative moves to I_6 on "image" (m.3). On "In the image of God created him", Haydn modulates to a minor, a key which Matteson finds to be "somewhat plaintive, dignified [*ehrbar*] and relaxed" (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:235). It is highly significant that on "Male" (m.5) Haydn stays in the key of a minor, but on "female" introduces the dominant 7th of d minor (V4/2). The effect/affect of the intervallic outline of the tritone or three whole tones, from g – $c^{\#}$,[63], comprising this chord, is brutally dissonant and its harshness is compounded by the reiteration of the $c^{\#}$,[64]in the voice part. This interval is commonly designated as the "*diabolus in musica*," due to its 'diabolical' dissonance and instability. This suggests that evil, hereby, cunningly insinuates itself into the innocent prelapsarian locus of Eden, doing so by way of the creation of the 'female.' After the reiteration of the $c^{\#}$', the key moves swiftly to d minor on 'man' (m.6), hereby completing the modulation. D minor, the *tono primo* (Dorian) is believed by Matteson to be "somewhat devout and calm at the same time grand, agreeable, and expressive of contentment." He furthermore recommends the use of it to elicit feelings of devotion in the church "and for achieving peace of mind in *communi vita*" (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958: 234). In contrast to this, Matteson explicates the affections evoked by dissonances, such as *diabolus in musica*: "Music, although its main purpose is to please and to be graceful, must sometimes provide dissonance and harsh-sounding passages. To some extent and with the suitable means, it must provide not only unpleasant and disagreeable things, but even frightening and horrible ones" (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:56). This explains the sudden resolution of the '*diabolus*' on "man" (d minor). What emerges clearly here is the association of man with 'good' – evoked by the ecclesiastical d minor – and woman with 'evil' – represented by '*diabolus in musica.*' It is notable that, although the German translation "*sie*" is more inclusive than the English "him," it could be argued that the collective "them," including male, counteracts or 'neutralises' the detrimental effects of the creation of woman, as evoked 'affectively' by the tritone. It can be said that good hereby prevails against evil in a 'devout,' according to Matteson, d minor chord. Music and morality, in the guise of the battle between 'good' (man) and 'evil' (woman), suggested here in Haydn's text, are linked in Matteson's following pronouncement:

---

[63] My use of the apostrophe after $c^{\#}$' (sharp') is deliberate. This is consistent with the most widely used way of designating pitch names. According to this system c' is middle c' and with each octave the commas increase to c'', c''', etc. The c which is an octave lower than middle c (c') is written as c, followed by C, C_1, C_2.

[64] Cf. the preceding footnote for an explication of the use of an apostrophe in this case.

> those affects which are our strongest ones [such as that evinced here by the dissonant '*diabolus in musica*' on "woman"; N.D.] are not the best and should be clipped or held by the reins [this could account for the hasty resolution of the tritone by way of the tonic chord of d minor; N.D.]. This is an aspect of morality which the musician must master in order to represent virtue and evil with his music and to arouse in the listener love for the former and hatred for the latter. For it is the true purpose of music to be, above all else, a moral lesson [*Zucht-Lehre*]. Matteson and Lenneberg (1958:51).

This underlines a prior observation that gendered oppositions are not only a structural aspect of Western thought and language, but are also underpinned by a rhetorical dynamic which, when taken to its extremes, is propagandistic in evoking "love" for one principle and enflaming "hatred" for another, to use Matteson's formulation. The text and music are, to all intents and purposes, telling us how to feel. We will return to the theme of woman as '*diabolus*' and her negative moral aspect as underpinned rhetorically both by Haydn's text and music presently. A note about the Biblical origins of Eve's connection with evil is a pertinent gesture here, because it informed the patriarchal values of the time. In Genesis 3:1-13 (New King James Version) an account is given of the way in which Satan/nature tricked Eve into eating the fruit of the tree of life that God prohibited her and Adam from eating, because "in the day you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil" (v.5). Adam's response to his sinful disobedience was to blame his wife (v.13). Eve's action, in effect, caused humankind's 'fall from grace' as well as the catastrophes which followed.

To return to Haydn's score: the next words under 'affective' consideration are "He breathed into," which coincides with an upward leap of a fourth from a – d' on "He breathed" and a downward leap of a fourth (c' – g) on "into." We have something similar happening in m.8^4 to 9^1, where the melody leaps the interval of a fourth again from c' to a high (suggesting elevated) f' on "man." For Matteson "joy is an *expansion* of our vital spirits [*Lebens-Geister*], it follows sensibly and naturally that this affect is best expressed by large and expanded intervals" (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:51-52). "Man" is, thus, rhetorically underscored by utilising large intervals, which, according to Matteson evokes corresponding affects of joy.

The next line, "He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," is significant for reasons apart from Matteson's *Affektenlehre*, in the sense that the text is an explicit instance of

phonocentrism, which, according to Derrida, is a long-standing bias that undergirds Western logocentric thought and language. In Derrida's critique, as disclosed in Chapter 3, 'Breath' is erroneously associated with speech and the preserve of Presence. Both are secured and perpetuated by the logo/phonocentric valorisation of "man" in Haydn's text. Moreover, "became a living soul" also extends the idea of man being vitalised by the originary Presence and breath of his creator, hereby establishing a divine mandate for his speech and – as we saw in the case of Robert Schumann – also his creative endeavours. The idea of man as fully present in his voice emerges centuries later in Theodore Adorno's early essay on the phonograph, "The Curves of the Needle." Barbara Engh (1994:120) alludes to Adorno's astonishing claim, in this essay, that "a woman's voice singing cannot be recorded well, because it demands the presence of her body." A man's voice, in contrast, "is able to carry on in the absence of his body, because his self is identical to his voice; his body disappears," or as Adorno (1990:52) puts it:

> Male voices can be reproduced better than female voices. The female voice easily sounds shrill – but not because the gramophone is incapable of conveying high tones, as is demonstrated by its adequate reproduction of the flute. Rather, in order to become unfettered, the female voice requires the physical appearance of the body that carries it. But it is just this body that the gramophone eliminates, thereby giving every female voice a sound that is needy and incomplete. Only there where the body itself resonates, where the self to which the gramophone refers is identical with its sound, only there does the gramophone have its legitimate realm of validity: thus Caruso's uncontested dominance. Wherever sound is separated from the body – as with instruments – or wherever it requires the body as complement – as is the case with the female voice – gramophone reproduction becomes problematic.[65]

The idea of disembodied female voices also traditionally evokes fear. Consider, for example, Homeric legend in which, for Odysseus, the power of the Siren's songs does not lie exclusively in their seductive beauty. Rather, "The appellation 'Siren'…designates the dangerous, beautiful *femme fatale* – the fearful and desiring projections of a disembodied aesthetics" (Engh, 1994:134).

This sentiment forms a crucial link with a prior theme. The question is: Where does this leave woman, given her exclusion from the living, animating presence of her creator? Or, as Cixous asks, "Where is she?" A good place to start would be woman's rhetorical association with evil, as established by the use of the *diabolus in musica* in tandem with "woman" in the

[65] One must bear in mind that we have far superior audio technology than Adorno had in his time, so this would no longer be the case.

recitative. According to myth, Adam's first wife was Lilith, whom he rejected because she refused to give him children. The etymology of Lilith clearly links her to the *diabolus* introduced in Haydn's text on "woman." According to the online entry "Lilith" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (20180 Lilith is considered to be the female demonic figure of Jewish folklore. Her name stems from that of Mesopotamian demons called *lilû* (feminine: *lilītu*). Thus, it can be said that, instead of *creating* Eve, Haydn rhetorically (and perhaps inadvertently) *contrived* Lilith, the she-demon, by way of using the *diabolus in musica* to represent all womankind. Moreover, the etymological correlation between 'Lilith" and 'Lulu', the character in Alban Berg opera *Lulu* (1937), written centuries after Haydn's *The Creation*, is obvious and a plausible place to look for "her" (in terms of the Cixousian question "Where is She?"). This link is strengthened by Olivier's observation in 'Laws outside the law' (2021) that Lulu in all her ambiguity as saint and strumpet[66] – as we will see in the aria –is a veritable metaphor for Adam's mythical first love, Lilith. Bereft from the animating and creational God-breath, breathed into Adam's nostrils, woman's (as Lilith and Lulu's) "native worth" is to be found in the prologue of *Lulu*, where the audience is invited by the Animal Tamer to view Lulu, "*die unbeseelte Kreatur*." The absence of the God-breath that made Adam "a living soul" renders woman 'soulless' or "*unbeseelt*." "She" is, thus, less than human, a creature rather than a creation and is to be found as a ghoulish apparition (suggested as 'soulless') in Haydn's text. The title of the recitative "And God created man," which excludes woman is, thus, apposite, in the light of her not-fully-created, inhuman (perhaps bestial) aspect.

The sentiments endorsed in this recitative can be said to receive a masculine 'stamp' of approval with an emphatic g – C progression in the bass, which also draws it to a close. These notes would conventionally be actualised as a perfect, authentic, or 'masculine cadence', as part of a figured bass.

The use of the word 'masculine' to describe a cadence is significant in the light of McClary's (1991:9) observation that "music theorists and analysts quite frequently betray an explicit

[66] Elsewhere (1998:116) I point out another notable instance in which a dissonant, ambiguous chord, namely Wagner's 'Tristan chord' (f –b – d$^{\#}$' – g$^{\#}$') which also comprises the *diabolus in musica* (f – b), is used to represent Lulu. Cf. mm.335-336, in which Lulu is described as both love potion and murderer, simultaneously and alternatively, hereby aligning her to a *pharmakon*, which means both poison and remedy. This "vagrant" chord (*vagieredend Akkord*), according to Arnold Schoenberg (1978: 258), effectively evokes the moral ambivalence of Lulu, specifically, and in Haydn's text (in mm. 99-100^{2}) womankind as a whole.

reliance on metaphors of gender ('masculinity' vs. 'femininity') and sexuality in their formulations." For McClary, "The most venerable of these – because it has its roots in traditional poetics – involves the classification of cadence-types or endings according to gender." The 1970 2nd edition of the *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, for instance, includes the following entry by Willi Apel (1970:506):

> **Masculine, feminine cadence.** A cadence or ending is called "masculine" if the final chord of a phrase or section occurs on the strong beat and "feminine" if it is postponed to fall on a weak beat. The masculine ending must be considered the normal one, while the feminine is preferred in more romantic styles.

Whilst the more recent entry in the (1986:470) *New Harvard Dictionary* edited by Don Randel retains the gist of Apel's earlier definition, Randel omits his description of the masculine ending as the norm and the feminine as the preserve of Romantic music, which, according to McClary (1991:10), evokes the binary oppositions Normal/abnormal, Reason/feeling, with masculinity privileged in each pair. This comparative sensitivity to gender coding in the more recent edition of *The New Harvard Dictionary of Music* is significant, given the emergence of the "New Musicology" in the mid-1980's when it was published. The notion of the masculine cadence being associated with metrical strength and the feminine with weakness is still, however, to be found in the definition, which evokes the Strong/weak dualism found in Apel's earlier definition.

In what follows, I will endeavour to demonstrate how the aria "In Native Worth," which succeeds this recitative, depicts – and music-rhetorically underscores – the 'contrivance' (as opposed to the purported neutral 'creation') of man and woman along the binary, androcentric lines which McClary locates in music theory and Cixous discloses in "Sorties".

For Matteson (Matteson and Lenneburg, 1958:67) the aria is a particularly fecund locus for the evocation of the affects:

> [the] instrumental aria may be properly used for the keyboard as well as all sorts of instruments. It is usually a brief two-part singable, simple melody, often stated simply only in order that it may subsequently be made complicated, disguised and altered in countless ways. Thus one can show off virtuosity while maintaining the bass progressions [*Grund-Gänge*]. The affect of the aria may very well tend towards affectation; even so, this most simple and basic melody may be used for several different emotions.

A clue to the overall affect evoked in the aria in question is perhaps to be found in Matteson's (Matteson and Lenneburg, 1958:52) thoughts on Italian adjectives:

> In examining larger and more presentable instrumental compositions, the uncommon variety in the expression of affects as well as the observation of each and every rule of punctuation can be readily felt, provided the composer knows his business. Adagio expresses sadness, a lament; lento, relief; [*Erleichtung*]; andante, hope; affettuoso, love; allegro, consolation; presto, desire; etc.

The Italian adjective for this aria is *andante*, which Randel (1986:38) designates as a moderately slow tempo or, as a performance instruction, apart from tempo, a "walking" character. For Matteson '*andante*' in both senses of the word is an affective evocation of hope. In what follows, we will soon see that this 'blanket affect' contains several subversive stitches.

A few words on the structure of the aria will be of vital import in this regard. "In Native Worth," according to Temperley (1991:74), originates from the mid-eighteenth-century *cavatina*; but can, however, be regarded as a free binary structure. Both "In Native Worth" (Aria 24) and Aria 22, "Now heav'n in all her glory shone", begin with a *ritornello* which introduces an opening vocal section that modulates to a new key and then proceeds to the conventional tonic recapitulation. Temperley notes (1991:74) that "in both cases [Aria 22 and 24] significant new text impels Haydn to depart from the original melodic material." However, in the aria under scrutiny, the initial music of the first section ("In native worth and honour clad, /With beauty, courage, strength adorned") is the same as that of the creation of Eve/Lilith: "With fondness leans upon his breast, /The partner for him formed." This clearly suggests that, although the music is the same, the sentiments expressed by these words could not be more different. The point is that, in the light of Temperley's contention above, that completely different words compelled Haydn to write different music, the stark contrast between the initial words employed to describe Adam and Eve should have impelled him to write different music for each, right from the outset. This would also be consistent with Matteson's (1958: 213) maxim that "Opposition of the words demands similar opposition in the music. Such conflicting delivery is best suited to recitatives and arias."

Here Haydn seems to sacrifice fidelity to the text in order to genuflect to the convention of the aria structure. The use of the same music to depict such different sentiments (and affects)

is highly detrimental, because it suggests that the initial description of Adam is on a par, musically and qualitatively, with that of Eve. This could not be further from the truth, when one considers that the pertinent words which, as indicated, are "In native worth and honour clad, with beauty, courage, strength adorned," in contrast to "With fondness leans upon his breast/The partner for him form'd." Adam is, thus, imbued with "native worth and honour." "Native" suggests "innate" or "intrinsic," rather than socially constructed or embedded, which contrasts to woman as "The partner for him formed." While Adam is painted as an innately worthy and autonomous being, woman is construed as having no innate ("native") value of her own, but "a partner for him formed." She is derived from man and created solely as a helpmeet, a dutiful spouse, who "leans upon his breast" (suggesting neediness) rather than an independent, creative being in her own right. These words are, however, set to the same music, creating a false sense of equality. In what follows, I hope to demonstrate by way of Haydn's verbal and musical text and the affects evoked by them that Adam's purported "native worth" is, in fact, a societally constructed, patriarchal myth.

The next words, "erect, with front serene, he stands", are pertinent in this regard. A literal rendering of man, as erect, in a libidinal sense is not as far-fetched as it may seem in the light of this text's pre-Darwinian context. According to Vallentine and Rightmire (1990) in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the term '*homo erectus*' was, in fact, only used much later, in 1893, by the Dutch anatomist Eugène Dubois, in the course of an expedition to Southeast Asia in order to find the elusive 'missing link' between apes and humans. Earlier we located a connection between male virility and creative genius. According to Battersby (1989: 38), the English term "genius" is derived from the Latin *genius*, which originally meant "the begetting spirit of the family embodied in the paterfamilias." This, according to Jane Nitzche (1975:4), establishes an association between man-as-genius with male sexual and generative power. (We have earlier also seen that man is traditionally viewed as being able to transcend his sexuality and 'bear' works of art, whereas woman's sexuality is an obstacle in creating works of genius). To return to Haydn's text, the valorisation of the 'divine' aspects of male procreativity, as suggested in "erect, with front sense, he stands," contrasts with woman, who is biddable and chaste, with her "softly smiling virgin looks." The latter clearly downplays, even denudes her of her worth as a sexual being, and concomitantly of the creative powers traditionally associated with (male) virility and genius. It could, thus, be said that, understood within Cixous's binary matrix outlined in "Sorties", "she" is trapped in a sexual Activity

(Male)/passivity (female) duality in the woof and warp of Haydn's text like a butterfly trapped in a spider's web.

The idea of male activity and autonomy – sexual and otherwise – is rhetorically underscored musically by the words "he stands," followed by a rest in the melody. "A man" is both preceded and followed by a rest. The same applies to "the Lord." This evokes, musically, a sense of autonomy and self-sufficient independence. After "King," the orchestra is (reverently?) silent. Each of these phrases ("he stands," "A man," "the Lord") is preceded by the orchestral punctuation of a dotted quaver followed by a semiquaver on the same note, rising successively in step, which culminates with increasing urgency on a high (within the tenor range) *forte* (It. for 'loud') g' on 'King" (m.21). This dotted figuration is significant in music-rhetorical terms. In his discussion of the *loures*, or a slow dotted gigue, Matteson (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958: 61) describes this figuration as having "a *proud* and *pompous*" character. A consideration of the affective qualities of dotted notes also emerges in his consideration of the *entreé*, "which has a sharper, more dotted and pulling quality than any other melody." The affect aroused by the *entreé* and these dotted features must "always be of an elevated and majestic character." In Haydn's text, this dotted motive is orchestrated using the full orchestra with clarinets, trumpets and timpani. Hence, the overall effect of this trumpet's dotted 'punctuation' is a martial one. A few words on the affective qualities of the *march* would, hence, not go amiss here. Matteson (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:60) says, regarding the *march*, that "The composer must form his picture of thinking of a hero. Too much fire does not make a real hero. Rather he is completely fearless, with a firm spirit [suggested by the almost dogged dotted notes. N.D.] that is unseated or shaken [*bewegt*] by nothing…The picture the composer should bear in mind is not that of a raging fire but of a courageous warmth." This is consistent with the text, where man is described as being (innately) "adorned" with "courage." In contrast to the steadfastness of man, as evoked by the *march*, Matteson associates woman with fickleness. In his discussion of the *gigue*, he speaks of "a kind of frivolity that is neither hateful nor unpleasant, but rather agreeable. Like so many women, it retains its charm in spite of a somewhat fickle character" (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:64).

Let us, however, return to Haydn's aria. We have seen how man's native worth ascends by way of concise pronouncements, which are 'autonomously' encased by rests and punctuated by rugged, ascending dotted figurations that ascend stepwise to an exultant high *forte* (It. for

‘loud’) g' on “King.” A notable feature is also the introduction of the German Augmented 6th chord (+iv4/3, or Gr.6) of C major on “the” preceding “King.” We have also seen how this dissonant chord, comprising the tritone, *diabolus in musica* (f♯’ – c♮’’, in this case), has already been rhetorically associated with the word “woman,” yet here it precedes “King.” To make sense of this, one needs to read the text in its totality, as well as take cognisance of the musical-rhetorical tropes that underpin it. The full text is: “A man the Lord and King of nature all.” On “nature” the melody literally plummets an entire octave downwards from the forte g’ of “King” to a *piano* (It. for ‘soft’) ‘g’ on “nature.” This is almost a sonic and visual (on the score) ‘fall from Grace.’ This abrupt change in dynamics and register, which is ‘restored’ on “all” (after “nature all”) to *forte* and an ascending 4th to C, gives us a clue to the interpretation of this section. It can be argued that the bold chromatic harmonies at this climax, which Temperley (1991:74) opines is a reflection of Adam’s masculine qualities, is also the dissonant *diabolus* that anticipates man’s Lordship over nature or woman “of flow’ry spring the mirror.” This brings to mind John Lavater’s (1745-98:6) pronouncement that man is “the essence of creation. The son of earth, he is the earth’s lord; the summary and central point of all existence, of all powers, and of all life, on that earth which he inhabits.” Once again, man’s Lordship over nature (woman) – as affiliated with and anticipated by the *diabolus in musica* in Haydn’s text – can be viewed as a moral victory.

After man’s sovereignty over Nature and woman is, hereby, verbally and music-rhetorically entrenched, we find a 3-measure forte passage. What strikes one here are the *sforzato* accents in m.24, 28-29 and again in m.31. ‘*Sforzato*’ (abbreviation ‘*sfz*’*)* means literally “forcing the tone,” which suggests, disconcertingly, that man’s Lordship over nature/woman is far from benevolent, but rather one of brutal tyranny.

The next lines (“The large and arched front [brow? N.D.] sublime/Of wisdom deep declares the seat”) clearly associates man with Reason, in contrast to Uriel’s exhortation for Eve/Lilith to “Bespeak him love/Love and joy and bliss,” which places her squarely in the realm of feeling and subservience. The latter is strengthened and emphasised rhetorically by being repeated three times. The Reason/feeling duality underlying Haydn’s text is, moreover, evoked in the music as well as the text. Where Adam, as man of reason, is depicted by vital, *sforzato* passages, as already intimated, Eve/Lilith, as woman of feeling and nature, is underscored by a flowing, sustained melody marked *pianissimo* (It. for ‘very soft’). We also

locate another binary opposition derived from Man/woman in the next lines: "And in his eyes with brightness shines/ the soul, the breath and image of his God." One cannot help but be reminded of Nietzsche's description of Apollo, the god of light and wisdom as "the shining one" (*der "Scheinende"* – Nietzsche, 1967: 36). According to Allan Megill), "it was the 'figure of Apollo' that made the difference between barbarism and culture."

> The barbarians remained barbarians because their Dionysian impulses were left unrestrained. The Greeks became Greeks because, under the influence of Apollo, these impulses were redirected and transformed, becoming an ingredient of culture, rather than nature (1985:40).

Given that the Dionysian principle is associated with nature "red in tooth and claw," as Tennyson would put it, and feeling, and, by association, women, further dualisms such as Culture/nature, Apollonian/dionysian, radiating from Man's shining (Apollonian) eyes, are evident in Haydn's purportedly neutral account of the creation of the perfect man and woman. What we have here, rather, is Man/woman pitted in a violent hierarchy. Musically, Man's shining eyes are evoked by ascending 'breathy' flute ascending arpeggios. After "shines," we have the return of a prior musical motive, where "the soul" and "the breath" are 'isolated' by way of rests and punctuated by a repeated dotted semiquaver, quaver and staccato crotchet which, as we have already seen, rhetorically suggests the autonomy, heroism and steadfastness of man (cf. Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:60). "The soul, the breath and image of his God" is again, here, an instance of phonocentrism, where man receives the unmediated soul and breath of God. Here again man as created in *imago dei* stands in stark contrast to woman, who reflects nature – "of flow'ry Spring the mirror." Thus, while he reflects the image of his creator, she reflects, once removed, the image of God's *creation*.

The words "And in his eyes with brightness shines/The soul, the breath and image of his God" are repeated after a 3-measure *forte* quaver *ritornello* passage. However, unlike the first appearance of the words, something drastically different happens, which prompts Temperley (1991:74-77) to make the expansive claim that this aria

> contains the most extraordinary tonal surprise in the whole work – *perhaps in all classical music* [my emphasis N.D.] – and the surprise depends for its effect on the contrary expectation induced by the conventions of form. After a very strong and perfectly normal modulation and cadence in the dominant, G (bars 33-34), reinforced by a brief ritornello, Uriel begins what looks to be an ordinary repeat of the same passage, but by an astonishing twist Haydn diverts

> it to a cadence in A♭[...] he then calmly turns the A♭ chord in an augmented sixth in C and proceeds at once to the recapitulation already described, as if nothing unusual had happened. No amount of rehearsing of this amazing passage can make it sound ordinary.

Temperley (1991:77) is clearly at a loss to find a compelling reason for this baffling, extraordinary passage, given that there is no reason for it arising from the text. This leads him to conjecture that this is simply an instance of Haydn's capricious penchant for tricking the audience. While I agree that the reason for this passage is by no means clearly self-evident, I believe that something is happening here that makes Haydn's modulation more palatable and not as unexpected, even extraordinary as it seems to be. To my mind, the clue to this unfathomable passage is to be found in the context of the repetition (now in A♭) of the previous passage. The point is that, unlike in the first statement, its repetition and *ritornello* precedes the creation/contrivance of woman. A further clue is to be found in the augmented 6th chord in m.52. of the *ritornello*, which can be introduced with almost imperceptible ease from A♭, simply by raising the f♮'' to form the tritone between f'♯' and c♮'', then moving swiftly to the next g''. We have already seen a rhetorical correlation between 'woman' and the tritone – *diabolus in musica* – in Haydn's text, so it makes sense, given the text to introduce her creation/contrivance by way of a transitional *ritornello* containing a chord that has already been established as a veritable leitmotif for woman. While this does not provide an incontestable reason for Haydn's foray into the key of A♭, the ease with which it segues into the tritone, certainly makes it less surprising.

This introduction of the 'diabolical' tritone moves the locus of our discussion to the creation or contrivance of woman. The word 'contrivance' is apposite, given the deliberate binary construction of Male/female and its swarming plethora of correlates, as we have seen – and woman's music-rhetorical association with malevolence and evil by way of the tritone. Given the oppositional structure of 'Eve,'[67] most of the text has already been discussed in our consideration of Adam. Let us, thus, dwell on the music-rhetorical aspects of woman and how they relate to what has gone before.

Temperley notes that the difference between Adam and 'Eve' is to be seen in the difference between the melody and texture of the A section and its recapitulation. Contrary to the bold

[67] My use of scare quotes around 'Eve' is deliberate, given her dual aspect as Eve and Lilith.

leaps in A which, as already intimated, represent joy (cf. "the breath," for example in m.89, with its leap of a fourth), 'Eve's melody, in contrast, is characterised by smaller intervals (cf. "Bespeak him love"). According to Matteson (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:52), "sadness…is a *contraction* of [the] subtle parts of our bodies [i.e. the vital spirits, N.D.]. It is, therefore, easy to see that the narrowest intervals are the most suitable." Moreover, woman's melody is characterised in certain places by descending melismatic figuration, for example in "Of flow'ry Spring the mirror." This is significant in the light of Matteson's (Matteson and Lenneberg, 1958:52) observation that "Hope is an *elevation* of the spirits, despair, on the other hand, *a casting down* [*Niedersturtz*] of the same. These are subjects that can well be represented by sound especially when other circumstances (tempo in particular) contribute their share." The "other circumstances" that Matteson alludes to could, in this context, be regarded as the way in which, after the recapitulation to woman, the strong, repeated-note chords of Adam's accompaniment "melt into a rounded legato over a tonic pedal" (Temperley, 1991:74) in mm.64-67. Moreover, in contrast to the held dotted notes and *sforzato* accents, this section, as a whole, is overall more subdued and rhythmically passive. This brassy dotted punctuation gives way to a cello line emerging "with a lyrical obligato" in mm.71-86 which relates to woman (Temperley, 1991:74). The predominance of *p* and *pp* dynamic markings, particularly at the last *pp* pedal point I chord, which fades into abject silence in the voice part on the final bar, further creatives a passive, subdued backdrop against which the 'creation' of woman plays out. There is, however, a final exception to this lyrical idyll which puts into question Temperley's (1991: 74) view that "This aria ends in a soft dream of beauty." While this is perhaps true of the *pp* pedal point on the final tonic chord that we have alluded to here, what precedes it is, to my mind, more shocking and surprising than Haydn's modulation to A-flat which, as Temperley earlier put it, is "the most extraordinary tonal surprise in the whole work – *perhaps in all classical music* [my emphasis]." It is baffling that Temperley, a highly esteemed musicologist with an obvious awareness of the inexplicable twists and turns in Haydn's music could overlook something as surprising as the penultimate chord preceding the tonic pedal point in this aria. The point is that, on the *pp* marked "joy," the music unexpectedly surges by way of a *crescendo* into a *sforzato* chord that leaves one baffled, firstly, by its dissonance (between the tritones, f and b♮ and f') and, secondly, by its ambiguity. There are various ways of viewing this chord, but the most obvious is that it is either I_{13} or V_{13} in the last inversion. The latter seems more likely because the inclusion of the mediant is a more logical succession to the pedal point on the

tonic chord. Regardless of how it is viewed, this chord is wildly out of place within the vocabulary of classical harmony, with its extended 13th notes. To be sure, it would not be out of place in an impressionist work by Debussy or even jazz, but is comes as a complete surprise in this particular context. Moreover, this chord is not meant to be a fleeting moment of frivolity, but is deliberately sustained by means of a *fermata* (pause) and tie for a measure and a half. We have already also noted that this chord is emphasised by a *sforzato* marking and a marked thickening of the orchestral texture. It's almost as if Haydn was trying to prove a point, rather than randomly creating a climax in which he introduces the *diabolus* interval by way of a loud, very dissonant, perplexing chord at the end of the 'Eve' section before she fades into oblivion. To my mind, it only makes sense within the overall narrative of the recitative and aria, in which woman is consistently represented by chords containing the '*diabolus in musica*.' In particular, woman's ambiguous aspect as the virginal 'Eve', bespeaking him (Adam) "Love, and joy and bliss", is here juxtaposed with the diabolical Lilith evoked by the tritone. The threat posed by woman is plausibly suggested by the words "bespeak him love" in another sense. Dunn (1994:55) points out how Clément and Cixous claim song as "the archetypal" feminine discourse, "the first music of the voice of love, which every woman keeps alive" (Cixous, 1976:881):

> The Voice sings from a time before law, before the Symbolic took one's breath away and reappropriated it into language under its authority of separation…Within each woman the first, nameless love is singing. (Clément and Cixous, 1986:91)

The positing of women's voices as existing in a kind of prelapsarian innocence outside language is a powerful one (Dunn and Jones, 1994:12), because it suggests a plenitude of presence denuded from her in Haydn's text. The idea of woman as fully present bespeaking him love that is specifically and inherently feminine, as *écriture féminine*, clearly presents a threat to the patriarchal binary symbolic order entrenched in the text, thus marking female love as dangerous, even malevolent. This brings to mind the *femme fatale*, whose love is deeply toxic to the point of being synonymous with death (as abundantly demonstrated in the cinematic genre known as film *noir*). Haydn is clearly giving us a mixed message with his lyrical, gentle depiction of women, which is violently overturned at the very end with the introduction of the diabolical tritone. It is almost as if he is saying "love her by all means, but at your peril!"

4.6. CIXOUS – WRITING THE BODY: LEITMOTIFS

4.6.1 Sexual Difference

Cixous' initial question "Where is She?" still continues to haunt us. How can 'she' be liberated from the binary patriarchal oppositions that have ensnared 'her' ideologically and musically and silenced her (creative) voice, as we have demonstrated at length in what has gone before? A clue is perhaps to be found in Cixous' term "Sorties." This French word is significant, because it suggests a military skirmish, but also means "Exits." This could suggest that the way out (exit) from the binary patriarchal horizon that she elaborates is fraught with conflict – evoked by her military metaphor – but that there is, however, a plausible "exit," which she terms *écriture féminine*. In what follows we will narrow our focus and ask "Where is Cixous?" or rather "Who is Cixous?" That is, to what extent can Cixous' notion of *écriture féminine* provide an "exit" from the binary polarities in "Sorties, beginning with the seminal originary opposition "Male/female"? We will do this by reflecting at length on various leitmotifs in Cixous' work. This will not only clarify and set the stage for a consideration of *écriture féminine*, but will also give us a greater insight into *famo marabi* and the extent to which this form of *marabi* 'sings the body' in a way that resonates with Cixous' *écriture féminine*.

The most 'natural' place to begin is with Cixous' conception of *sexual difference*. When Cixous speaks of sexual difference, she conceives it neither as something that is purely socially constructed nor, to the opposite extreme, on the basis of the anatomical difference between the male and the female. Nor, and staying with the anatomical basis, contrary to Freud and Ernest Jones, does sexual difference revolve around the voyeuristic/imaginary relation to possessing or not possessing the male sexual organ and this organ's elevation to a (symbolic) phallus that one has or does not have. This sort of error must be avoided, since it is precisely such a voyeuristic-*cum*-anatomical determination of sexual difference that undergirds phallocentrism and allows this phallocentrism to embed and rigidify itself at the level of the societal construction of sexual difference in the form of the duality Man/woman. Cixous (1991:81-82) cuts a diagonal against these proclivities and locates sexual difference "on the level of *jouissance*, inasmuch as a woman's instinctual economy cannot be identified by a man or referred to the masculine economy." So, while anatomy is there and the societal

construction of sexual difference likewise exists, the question of sexual difference concerns, rather, the manner in which masculine *jouissance* (extreme, ineffable pleasure) and feminine *jouissance*, respectively, inscribe themselves heterogeneously on male bodies and on female bodies, within the male unconscious and the female unconscious, and how these two different modes of *jouissance* "write" themselves in the case of the two sexes (Cixous and Clément, 1991:81-82).

Notwithstanding this characterisation of sexual difference in terms of two heterogeneous and non-oppositional modes (masculine and feminine) of relating to *jouissance* (in Lacan, pleasure, though inclusive of pleasure-in-pain) through the body, the unconscious and writing, since the Cixousian subversion of the phallocratic hierarchy Man/woman can only transpire, in Trojan horse fashion, within the confines of the same hierarchy, the opening salvo of Cixous' subversion must resort to a sort of strategic essentialism that initially identifies man and woman as they are given by the phallocentric symbolic system. This means that it is strategically necessary to posit a truncation of the far more nebulous and complex manner in which masculine and feminine *jouissance* articulate themselves, in order to orient oneself and bring the battlespace into clear view. This is acknowledged by Cixous (1993:50):

> as women we are at the obligatory mercy of simplification. In order to defend women we are obliged to speak in the feminist terms of "man" and "woman". If we start to say that such and such a woman is not entirely a woman or not a woman at all, that this "father" is not a father, we can no longer fight since we no longer know who is in front of us.

Therefore, in order to establish a strategic point of reference, the terms "man" and "woman" must still be deployed strategically, although one must at the same time keep in mind the fact that these terms have been locked into a phallogocentric symbolic hierarchy. What is crucial, notwithstanding, is that when deploying these traditional terms designating man and woman, as Abigail Bray (2004:50) notes, one must detach them from any reference to a univocal grounding in anatomy. This conceptual detachment, thereupon, permits us to think these terms together in a way that is "open to writing, to a subversive reinscription" which, for Cixous, assumes the form of *écriture féminine*.

6.6.2 The "Other Bisexuality"

The ineluctable bridging concept for seeing how Cixousian *écriture féminine* may be deployed to subvert the strategically maintained man/woman binary couple is Cixous' concept of the "other bisexuality," which is closely aligned with the question of sexual difference. This "other bisexuality" is not to be confused with the positing of a single hermaphroditic being, whose phantasmatic unity consists of two complementary halves, male and female, the bisection of which would lead to catastrophe (Cixous and Clément, 1991:84). It is, rather:

> the location within oneself of the presence of both sexes, evident and insistent in different ways according to the individual, the nonexclusion of difference or of a sex, and starting with this "permission" one gives oneself, the multiplication of the effects of desire's inscription on every part of the body and the other body. (Cixous and Clément, 1991:85)

This evidently amounts to the acceptation of whatever traces of femininity are experienced within themselves by men and the embracing of the inundations of masculinity within herself by the woman and, above all, the experimentation by women with the masculinity within their femininity and by men with the feminine within themselves, including the extension of this creative experimentation to something that touches upon relations with other women and with other men. Such an experimentation is not merely intrapsychic, but must be strongly related to the body and its *jouissance*. It is also an injunction for women to render men open to the feminine within themselves, so as not to experience their inner femininity negatively as a threatening force of castration, an opening up that, if pursued, can make for more egalitarian relations between the sexes.

Cixous' notion of the "other bisexuality," through which she enjoins women to break through the wall of castration that stymies the embrace of the masculinity within woman's own femininity and the femininity within man's own masculinity, is geared toward unlocking the operation and efflorescence of what she terms *feminine libidinal economy*. Masculine libidinal economy is phallocentric and based on a reappropriation of difference under the banner of the self-same or identity. This reappropriation of difference is organised around the primordial positing of the opposition Identity/difference, which subsumes the associated oppositional pairs "appropriate/inappropriate, proper/improper, clean/unclean, mine/not mine," and above all masculinity/femininity, where masculinity occupies the pole of identity

and femininity the pole of a difference opposed to masculinity, that must be subordinated to it in such a way that the self-sameness of masculine identity is actualised, preserved and reinforced (Cixous and Clément, 1991:80). Within this phallogocentric order of the same, woman is: "Night to his day – that has forever been the fantasy, Black to his white. Shut out of his system's space, she is the repressed that ensures the system's functioning" (1991: 67). This means that, without woman functioning as the repressed term of this phallogocentric system, the system itself could not exist. She is the *supplément* of man, in the Derridean sense – both necessary and contingent to him.

The entrapment within and subsumption of women under a phallocentric economy based on opposition has been a recurring theme of this chapter. The Active/passive opposition has been particularly prominent, of which Cixous avers "Either woman is passive or she does not exist" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:64). We have seen how this is expressed using music-rhetorical means in Haydn's "In Native Worth," where Adam is underscored by music that is vital and energetic, and Eve/Lilith by subdued, 'docile' intervals and dynamic (degrees of loudness and softness in volume) levels. Moreover, libidinally, Man is described as "erect…he stands," while woman has "softly smiling virgin looks." Masculine libidinal economy, since it operates so as to secure its identity in the face of otherness, organises itself in a highly centralised fashion. For Cixous, the masculine libidinal economy is centred around the head and the male sexual organ, through this "engendering that centralized body (in political anatomy) under the dictatorship of its parts" and a "regionalization which serves the couple head/genitals and which is inscribed only within boundaries" (Cixous, 1976:889). In contrast to the masculine libidinal model of extreme propriety, the feminine libidinal economy is fundamentally marked by

> her capacity to depropriate unselfishly: body without end, without appendage, without principal "parts." If she is a whole, it's a whole composed of parts that are whole, not simple partial objects but a moving, limitlessly changing ensemble, a cosmos tirelessly traversed by Eros, an immense astral space not organized around any one sun that's any more of a star than the others. (Cixous, 1976:889)

Thus, whereas the masculine libidinal economy is a whole composed of parts, the feminine libidinal economy, if it is a whole at all, is one composed not of parts subordinated as elements of this purported whole, but rather one where each part is uniquely itself in its own self-containment. Despite Cixous' reluctance before notions of symbolic castration, there is

here a strong enough parallel to Lacan's theory of masculine and feminine sexuation in Seminar XX, where he presents sexuation in the form of two antinomies. Masculine inscription under the phallic function is that of the exception constitutive of the universal: man, as a whole, is included under the phallic function, on condition that there is at least one part of man that is not thus included. Feminine inscription under the phallic function is that of the non-universal without exception: woman is included under the phallic function as not-whole/not-all, while at the same time there is no part of woman that is not included there (Lacan, Seminar XX, 1998:79-80). Succinctly put, the phallic function inscribes man as a One based on a necessarily excluded part of man, and woman as a One that structurally does not coincide with itself. What is crucial here is that, in Lacan, neither man nor woman actually "has" the phallus. Rather, the phallus, as phallic function, is something which no one possesses and in relation to which man and woman are inscribed as two different forms of failure of the symbolic.

Slightly differently formulated, in Lacanian masculine sexuation, men are individuated by their inclusion into a closed universal set, whose closure and universality constitutes itself on the basis of an exception to this set. That is, all men are individuated as men by falling under the aegis of the phallic function, if and only if there exists one man to whom the phallic function does not pertain, where this man may be taken as the mythical primordial father of Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, whose *jouissance* is unencumbered by symbolic castration. The closed and universal nature of the set of all men, by its very nature, constitutes for the entity "man" a common underlying essence, on the basis of which further predications may be attributed to him by the symbolic order. In contradistinction, since women are individuated on the basis of the "not all," which is devoid of a constitutive exception whose existence would otherwise have generated set-theoretic closure, unlike in the case of men, there is no closed universal set of all women from whence one could posit a common feminine essence. For this reason, each individual woman is radically singular. This is ultimately the sense to be made of Lacan's (in)famous assertion "*la femme n'existe pas*" ("woman does not exist"): the absence of a closed set of all women implies that there can be no "substance" of woman as such, since each individual woman exists only as an exception not *to* a closed set of women, but as an exception *within* the open set of women. That is to say, the open and non-universal set of women is, by definition, a set in which each woman is singularly herself and, for this reason, can be considered what Cixous describes as always already a "whole" and, therefore, as self-sufficient in her own uniqueness. In contradistinction, the fact that men possess a

common substance, as conferred by the set-theoretic closure of the universal set they are bundled into, is actually a drawback for men, as it subsumes each man as a mere part of the closed universal set of all men (Reinhard, 2005:57-59). We may thus conclude that the non-existence and non-substantiality that Lacan attributes to woman (which is echoed in the Cixous' characterisation of feminine libidinal economy as an endless, nebulous de-appropriation and self-de-appropriation) is an advantage, whereas the existence and substantiality that essentially marks man is almost a curse upon the penis-toting variant of the species *homo sapiens*.[68]

Since, in accordance with Lacanian masculine sexuation, men constitute a closed set of which each man is a part, man can be said to be constituted through a common measure, where this common measure is his belonging to this set of all men as a part. The closed nature of the set of all men, at the same time, accords to masculinity a closed or restricted economy which, in turn, functions on the basis of the common measure of man. Within a restricted economy, whose closure is always anchored in a common measure, all expenditures, whether libidinal or otherwise, must be somehow recuperated within a logic of the self-same. Thus, Cixous writes of man's comportment within his masculine libidinal economy that "he is the en-grossing party: loss and expense are stuck in the commercial deal that always turns the gifts into a gift-that-takes. The gift brings in a return. Loss, at the end of the curved line, is turned into its opposite and comes back to him as profit." Through the principle of return, man gives only so "that he gain more masculinity: plus-value of virility, authority, power, money, or pleasure, all of which reinforce his phallocentric narcissism at the same time" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:87).

In stark contrast, since Lacanian feminine sexuation gathers women into an open and non-universal ("not-all") set in which each woman is included as radically singular, the feminine libidinal economy is bereft at once of both closure and of common measure. The feminine libidinal economy is, therefore, what thinkers like Bataille and Derrida term an unrestricted or, rather, general economy or, still better, an "an-economy." Since this "an-economy" is devoid of circular closure and common measure, it is completely refractory to the principle of restitution of expenditure characteristic of restricted economies, wherein the counter-gift annuls the generosity of the gift. Rather, it is a libidinal economy of the pure gift without

[68] For a clearer and more expansive explanation of the workings of Lacanian sexuation, see the final chapter of Joan Copjec's *Read My Desire. Lacan Against the Historicists* (1994) particularly pp.212-235.

return. Of the role of the an-economic gift-as-pure-generous-expenditure in the feminine libidinal economy, Cixous avers that "She too, with open hands, gives herself – pleasure, happiness, increased value, enhanced self-image. But she doesn't try to 'recover her expenses.' She is able not to return to herself, never settling down, pouring out, going everywhere to the other" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:87). It is the female body itself which, within the feminine libidinal economy, serves as the generative force and basis of the greatest of all possible gifts: the gift of a child, which pierces the restricted masculine libidinal economy more than anything else, given that one wishes nothing in return from the pure creation of life itself, in all its anarchic, irreplaceable, irrecuperable, and singular excessiveness.

A core characteristic of a general economy, or an-economy, such as Cixous' feminine libidinal economy, unlike a restricted economy, which premises itself on the preservation and reinforcement of the Same, is that it exposes itself to the Other. We are here within the problematic theorised most famously by Lévinas: that of the ethical relation to the Other (*l'Autre*). The relation to the Other, which is not of the order of the ordinary matrix of sociality, since the latter is a restricted economy that subsumes the Other under the order of the Same, Lévinas describes in *Otherwise than Being* as "contact with the other. To be in contact is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, nor to suppress myself in the other. In contact itself the touching and the touched separate, as though the touched moved off, was always already other, did not have anything in common with me" (Lévinas, 1981:86). Thus, we may say that the relation to the Other is a relation without relation, or a non-relation, since the hetero-affectivity inherent to my limitless exposure to the Other entails an experience that exceeds the bounds of any notion that I may form to encompass it. Indeed, the notion of the Other factored by the restricted economy of the Same is encompassed, for Lévinas, in what he terms the Said (*le dit*), through which the pre-thematic and pre-ontological Saying (*le dire*) of the Other that enjoins me to heed the Other's otherness is reappropriated in the thematic and ontological discourse of sameness, in which the otherness of the Other is subsumed and colonised. Similarly, Cixous writes that, of its very nature, "The 'other' escapes me. It is elsewhere, outside: absolutely other" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:71). And it is precisely the nature of the feminine libidinal economy, being a general and not a restricted economy, that it allows woman to "take the risk of *other*, of difference, without feeling threatened by the existence of an otherness, rather, delighting to increase through the unknown that is there to discover, to respect, to favour, to cherish" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:78). Indeed, she goes

as far as to declare that "without there being in the inventing subject an abundance of the other," there can be no creativity per se (Cixous and Clément, 1991:84). I shall link this to *écriture féminin*e further down.

It is precisely the greater permeability, greater decentred-ness, and therefore greater openness to the outside, of the feminine libidinal economy that allows woman, far more than man, to open herself to the other in the other's otherness. This is so because the feminine libidinal economy organises woman's *jouissance* in such a way, writes Cixous, that she can constitute herself as a "subjectivity that splits apart without regret, and without this regretlessness being the equivalent of dying," "without the ceaseless summoning of the authority called Ego" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:90). That the ego, the primary agency of centring and effecting the restrictive closure of any libidinal economy, plays a far less pronounced role in feminine *jouissance* has the upshot that woman "takes pleasure in being boundless, outside self, outside same," and most crucially for our present purposes, "very far from the 'hearth' to which man brings her" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:91) under the centralising snares of the phallogocentric order. This capacity of woman to libidinally split herself and travel outside herself without the dread and paralysing experience of the Lacanian *corps morcelé* ("fragmented body") is precisely what renders her from the beginning more generously open to the other, to the other inside her that permeates her, and to the other that she is or can become. We've already picked up on a certain form of self-splitting of woman – indeed the most fundamental form of such self-diremption – in connection with the gift-without-return that she gives in the form of bearing a child, which is not experienced by woman as a form of alienation but is wholly integral to the feminine libidinal economy and feminine *jouissance* as such, the instance par excellence of the other within the self through which a new self is born and through which woman herself becomes other than herself.

6.6.3 Fidelity

The opening to the other, vouchsafed by the intrinsic permeability of feminine libidinal economy is linked, in Cixous, to the notion of fidelity, a motif that runs through much of Cixous' writing. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, fidelity is a noun which means "continued loyalty to a person, cause, or belief," and "the degree of exactness with which something is copied or reproduced." Etymologically, the word originates from the Latin *fides*, for "faith." Fidelity is fidelity to the other, and since the other is more of the order of an

experience excessive of the bounds of experience within the restricted economy of the same than it is of positive knowledge, fidelity is more precisely fidelity to the vertiginous encounter with the strangeness of the other, the encounter which pierces the enclosure of the same and of the ego. Fidelity must, therefore, maintain a relation to the other that has impinged upon the self that avoids the two opposite extremes of, on the one hand, appropriating the other and, on the other, of recoiling from or shutting the other out. A fall into either of these two extremes will erase the intrinsic strangeness of the other. In her essay "Extreme Fidelity," Cixous finds the necessary middle path between these twin errors in the writing of Clarice Lispector, in which the secret to the non-appropriation of the other, and therefore fidelity to the other, consists in cultivating "the right distance" to the other, which for Lispector necessarily entails "a relentless process of de-selfing, a relentless practice of deegoization. The enemy as far as she is concerned is the blind self," a blind self that unblinds itself solely by "remembering that my self is only one of the elements of the immense mass of material," that "we are dust" (Cixous in Sellers, 1997:136).

Cixous' linking of fidelity to the other with her call that we constantly remind ourselves that we are matter, and indeed a small piece of matter, is part of her broader correlation of fidelity to the other with attention to, and respect for the materiality of the world and of the other itself. In this connection, Andrea Nye maintains of Cixous' text *Illa* that in it Cixous offers an "experience of things, an experience which does not attempt to master or to classify, but listens, looks, feels, hears. To speak a rational language is to kill the things, to refuse to hear them or look at them" (Nye, 1988:199). This strongly recalls Maurice Blanchot's positing of there being two "slopes" in literature. The first slope, which we may christen 'Hegel avec Sade', "is turned toward the movement of negation by which things are separated from themselves and destroyed in order to be known, subjugated, communicated" (Blanchot, 1999:386). This Blanchotian first slope may be seen as the operation of the phallogocentric, masculine libidinal economy, which by its very nature deploys an appropriative language that truncates the singular materiality of things and the singular materiality of the other, so as to subsume them/it under the economy/logic of the same. Blanchot's second slope, in contrast, is "a concern for the reality of things, for their unknown, free, and silent existence" as such (Blanchot, 1999:386). Although Cixous would be averse to Blanchot's further, much darker, starkly nihilistic and dread-inducing, characterisation of this second slope as that which turns language into "a force" that "announces – through its refusal to say anything – that it comes from night and will return to night" (Blanchot, 1999:386), she certainly is on board with the

second slope's 'letting be' of things in their singular, material thingness. There is not, however, in Cixous, anything like Blanchot's identification of the second slope of literature with Lévinas' *il y a*, which is the dread experience of consciousness stripped of subject. Neither is her approach to the singular, uncolonised materiality of things that of Sartre's protagonist, Antoine Roquentin, in *Nausea*, who is existentially repulsed, disgusted, alienated and – yes – nauseated and corporeally contaminated by merely touching a pebble (Sartre, 1975:22). To the contrary, Cixous' approach is more akin to Heideggerian *Gelassenheit*, a form of poetic thinking and existential comportment/attunement wherein things are allowed to appear in the opening of the 'clearing' of their being as a 'gathering'. This comes to the fore, for Cixous, in Lispector, who "makes us hear things calling. The call is there in things: she gathers it back. The Clarice voice gathers. And offers us the orange. Gives us back the thing" (Cixous, 1991:61). For Cixous, the letting be in its otherness of the singular materiality of things entails a certain passivity on the part of the subject. As seen, Sartre's Roquentin experiences his passivity in the face of material otherness as internally contaminating disgust, as invasion by otherness in the guise of a sort of viscous hideousness. Cixous, in contrast, has a very different reading of passivity: "As for passivity, in excess, it is partly bound up with death. But there is a non-closure that is not submission but confidence and comprehension; that is not an opportunity for destruction but for wonderful expansion" (Cixous and Clément, 1991:42). It is precisely this sort of Cixousian passivity as non-closure of self, through which a Heideggerian *Gelassenheit* in relation to the materiality of otherness avails itself, that is at the core of fidelity. Playing upon the lexical and homophonic propinquity between the words "matter" and *mater* (Latin for "mother"), Bray (2004:60-61) links fidelity to the materiality of the other with the material world as *mater*, as maternal, and thus to a feminine libidinal economy that extends beyond the actual womb of the woman into the very substance of external reality which, by implication, like the mother bearing a child, bears itself as its own child.

As seen, Cixous has linked the faithful non-submissive passivity of non-closure to a "wonderful expansion." This linkage of fidelity to the singular materiality of things, on the one hand, to wonder, on the other, is a theme discussed by Luce Irigaray in her essay "Wonder: a Reading of Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul*," wherein she quotes Descartes' averment that "Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul which causes it to apply itself to consider with attention the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary" (Descartes quoted in Irigaray, 1993:77). It is, of course, the other in its irreducible otherness that, by definition,

has precisely these qualities of rareness and extraordinariness (which adjectives can be telescoped into the single term "strangeness") in relation to any economy of the same. Tying these strands up and relating the terms fidelity, wonder, materiality, gift, otherness and strangeness to one another in the same syntagmatic arc, Bray's final recapitulation of Cixous' notion of fidelity cannot be surpassed: "a form of keeping alive the passion of wonder towards the materiality of the world in order to receive the gift of Otherness by being faithful to its continual strangeness," or as Cixous herself has it, "to allow a thing to enter into its strangeness" (Cixous, 1991:66).

6.6.4 Love

We may view Cixous' conception of fidelity as flowing naturally into her concept of love. Whereas fidelity is the wonder-driven maintenance of one's openness to the strangeness of the other in its singular materiality, love is the "work" of continued "exploration" of, as Cixous intimates to Mireille Calle-Gruber, "the immense foreign territory of the other," while knowing at the same time that it is not something that we can truly "discover." It is a "path of attention, of reception, which is not interrupted but which continues into what little by little becomes the opposite of comprehension. Loving not knowing. Loving: not knowing" (Cixous and Calle-Gruber, 1997:17). We may therefore venture the definition that love is *fidelity to fidelity*. It is that through which fidelity maintains itself and endures, through the maintenance of attention and receptivity to the other. Yet, at the same time, this continuation of the one who loves in his or her receptive openness to the other is not a path toward an accumulation of knowledge of the other; as such straightforward knowing of the other would incorporate the other within a masculine economy of the same and, thus, vitiate the other's otherness. It is, rather, a path of "unknowing," in which the strangeness of the other becomes perhaps still more strange as love deepens. This, of course, is a paradox: the more I am in the other and the other is in me, the more other are we to one another, or as Cixous has it, "right where we are unable to share, we share this non-sharing, this desire, this impossibility. Never before has what separates us united us with such tender ties" (Cixous and Calle-Gruber, 1997:54).

The main two Cixousian takeaways here, namely, that love of the other is not strictly of the order of knowledge and that love maintains itself precisely and only in separation from the other, may be seen as further elaborated upon in Badiou's theorisation of love. Firstly, as regards the correlation of love and non-knowledge, Badiou avers that "the experience of the

loving subject, as the matter of love, does not constitute any *knowledge* of love," since "the thought that constitutes love is not the thought of itself" (Badiou, 2008:182). Secondly, concerning the correlation of love and separation, in Lacanian fashion, for Badiou, love involves a relation that is a non-relation between a beloved who assumes the 'masculine' position and a beloved who occupies the 'feminine' position, even though these sexuations need not necessarily correspond to actual anatomy. In a manner consonant with the fundamental separation that Cixous sees in love of the other, Badiou posits the love non-relation between these two positions as a complete and utter *disjunction*, in the sense that "*nothing* in the experience" of love "is the same from the position of man or from that of woman," which is to say that "no coincidence can be attested between what affects one position and what affects the other" (Badiou, 2008:183). This means that love is the faithful and loving preservation and elaboration of the figure of an irreducible Two, yet a Two that 'consists' of "'one' and 'one' which do not make two, as the one of each one is indiscernible, although totally disjunct, from the other" (Badiou, 2008:187). Indeed, if the two pseudo-ones were to add up numerically to a two, this would only be possible from the vantage point of a One that would encompass, and therefore subsume, the two pseudo-ones constitutive of the purely disjunctive Two. If this were the case, it would effectively amount to the subsumption of love under the centralising aegis of what Cixous terms the masculine libidinal economy, whose inherent imposition of the centralising and reappropriating economy/logic of the same amounts precisely to its self-constitution, self-preservation and self-reinforcement as a monolithic One wholly destructive of the disjunctive Two of love.

What is striking, and eminently and consonantly relatable back to Cixous, in Badiou's characterisation of the type of 'roles' the 'masculine' and 'feminine' positions play in the disjunctive Two of love, is that woman plays the more thoroughgoing function. Whereas 'man' simply enters into the disjunctive Two and thereupon remains "motionless," in the sense that "he does nothing" for love, that is, does not actively work or elaborate on love as such, 'woman' assumes, in love, a "function of wandering (*l'errance*)" through which she "makes love voyage" and "sustains the articulation of the Two and the infinite" (Badiou, 2008:192-193). When Badiou speaks here about the "infinite," he is referring to the world, or to the societal matrix of sociality, in which the love of the disjunctive Two unfolds. It, thus, turns out that love is more about the amorous disjunctive Two's relation to the world, and by extension to life itself, than it is about the relation between the 'one' and the other 'one' that make up this Two: "Love is an enquiry into the world from the vantage point of the Two, and

not at all an enquiry about each term of the Two about the other" (Badiou, 2008:193). In the continued amorous trajectory of the disjunctive Two of love, one finds that it is almost as if 'man' functions at the level of a fidelity *without love*, whereas 'woman's role is to maintain fidelity and also, and above all, to bear the entire weight of that fidelity to fidelity which is called love. This is so since 'man', in his mute motionlessness, merely "supports the split of the Two," whereas "woman makes the Two endure in wandering" (Badiou, 2008:194). Endurance in wandering, as opposed to the mere supporting of the disjunction that is the Two, clearly entails work or labour on the part of woman. One could, therefore, following Badiou's reasoning, say that whereas man does have faith, it is only truly woman who has love and who bears love. It is, thus, woman who is the one that articulates love in the world and brings it to humanity. After all, does not Cixous declare of woman that "Her libido is cosmic, just as her unconscious is wordwide" (Cixous, 1976:889). She also writes: "Our naphtha will spread, throughout the world, without dollars – black or gold – nonassessed values that will change the rules of the old game" (Cixous, 1976:880). This naphtha will spread through love, the hydrocarbon of feminine fidelity.

Despite this strict and irreducible disjunction between the masculine and the feminine positions in love, at another level there is, notwithstanding, something that Badiou misses in his highly abstract and somewhat incorporeal approach, something that passes from one position into the other position, something that is produced 'between'/'alongside'/'transversally-through' the two positions. Cixous writes that in love "a Third Body comes to us, a third sense of sight, and our other ears – between our two bodies our third body surges forth," a body which "dives, swims in our waters, descends, explores the depths of the bodies, discovers and consecrates every organ, comes to know the minute and the invisible" (Cixous, 1991:53-4), a body that is at the same time "projected outside me and covers over me, this body foreign to my body that rises from my body and shrouds it" (Cixous, 1999:34). This third body is produced "at a place where there is no law" (Cixous, 1999:70), whereas in it "we are exchanged up to the highest degree of resemblance; in this body we translate each other" (Cixous, 1991:153), while through it "We have mouths all over our body. Words come out of our hands, our underarms, our belly, our eyes, our neck" (Cixous, 1999:79). The third body is, therefore, something that: (1) is produced/constructed through the love encounter; (2) is immanent to the bodies of the lovers and, at the same time, transcendent of these bodies (not in the sense of any 'vertical' transcendence, as would be the case with the Law in the negative theological readings of Kafka, but rather in the sense of a

‘horizontal’ transcendence-within-immanence as a going-beyond); (3) is refractory or oblivious to legality/law; (4) multiplies affects within the bodies of the two lovers at the very minute level of the organs and at a still finer level, to the extent of producing, at the level of affect, a sort of dis-organisation of the organs in terms of sensation; (5) allows intensities to pass, or be exchanged (though not symmetrically), between the two bodies of the lovers.

If we drop from Cixous’ the words “resemblance” and “translated” in reference to what passes between the two bodies of the lovers, we move straight into Deleuzoguattarian territory and, more specifically, to their notion of the body without organs (BwO), which is what Cixous certainly seems to be alluding to when she speaks of the third body (*le troisième corps*). As with Cixous’ third body, Deleuze and Guattari aver that love produces and transpires on the BwO: “on it we penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:150). Like the third body, the BwO is, of course, not a quotidian organic body possessed of tangible external visibility and an external skin that envelops it in extended space. Rather, a “BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities.” “The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a *spatium* that is itself intensive, lacking extension” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:153). The BwO is, at the same time, “*the field of immanence of desire*” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:154) and, by the same token, the field of immanence proper to and constructed by love (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:156). Much as Cixous’ third body is the conduit through which intensities pass between two lovers, “the formation of a circuit of intensities between female and male energy” is facilitated by love’s production of the BwO (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:157). Just as, as we observed in Chapter 2, an assemblage has one surface that faces the strata and another surface that faces the plane of consistency, so too is this the case for the BwO. When the BwO is freed, as it is in love, and thereby pushes in the direction of the plane of consistency (the totality of all BwOs), it precipitates a movement that disarticulates the various strata, principally those that organise significations and meanings, those that rigidify the subject around these significations, meanings and the ego, and those that entrap desire within the strictures of the organisation of the organs in extended space, called the organism (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:159). Thus, love’s production and freeing of the BwO is coextensive with a deterritorialising and decoding movement that loosens up the phallogocentric significations and meanings that incarcerate feminine and masculine libido alike, firing off pervasive vectors of a de-subjectivisation through which the self is prised open and allows itself to be interpenetrated by the other and the other by the self, the other

within the self and the self within the other, in a circulation of desire throughout the third-body/BwO of love. In this, the third-body/BwO of love serves as the purely intensive transcendence-immanence through which the prosaic corporeal limits of the two anatomies are transgressed and through which, by way of a dis-organisation or, more precisely, of a disorganisation of the organic organisation of the organs known as the organism, there comes to pass a shifting of the centre of gravity away from the bodily organs in their extensive form (as organised into the organism) toward an unleashing of the organs as purely intensive partial objects of the third-body/BwO of love. This is so, Deleuze and Guattari may be seen as explaining, since whereas organs in the quotidian sense are "partial (*partiels*) in the sense of extensive parts," organs conceived as partial objects are, instead, "partial ('*partiaux*') like the intensities under which a unit of matter always fills space in varying degrees (the eyes, the mouth, the anus as degrees of matter)," and are related to one another through transversal connections, disjunctions that paradoxically include all disjoined terms, and conjunctions that polyvocally affirm all conjoined terms, all irrespectively of the organic unity of the organism and the person alike (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:309). It is through this movement that we can understand the effects of kinaesthesia, of organic-*cum*-sensory 'cross-pollination,' that Cixous (1999:79) alludes to when she madly exclaims: "We have mouths all over our body. Words come out of our hands, our underarms, our belly, our eyes, our neck." Thus, it is by way of love's production of the third-body/BwO that the body begins to truly *write* itself, and perhaps even – why not? – to *sing* itself.

One of the strata that the BwO moves in the direction of disarticulating is the stratum of the Law. The Law is always phallocentric and tethers desire to lack through symbolic castration. What strikes one about the Law, and legality in general, is its solemnity, its intimidating and prosaic sobriety. Moreover, since the Law ties desire to lack, it imbues desire with a tragic quality by sending the desiring subject on an indefinite quest, driven by lack, for endless metonymic stand-ins for this lack. Against this, love's production of the Cixousian third body, which we have modelled as the Deleuzoguattarian BwO, since it brings about movements of destratification fragmenting the stratum of the Law, precipitates an internal fissuring of and rupture with the phallogocentric Law. This rupture with the overly serious gravitas of the Law induces *laughter*, a theme that runs through Cixous' subversive writing. As Georges Bataille has it, laughter is precisely what is induced as "the power to capture and endlessly recapture the moment that counts, the moment of rupture, of fissure." Laughter is the "miraculous moment when anticipation dissolves into nothing, detaching us from the

ground on which we are grovelling, in the concatenation of useful activity" (Bataille, 1991:203). Activity is counted as useful solely from the vantage point of a restricted economy, such as the phallogocentric libidinal economy, since in such an economy all expenditures are recuperated and thereby indelibly marked, or counted, accorded a measure of utility related to the preservation of the same. The Law, being phallocentric and phallocratic, is, for this reason, a Law of necessarily useful works to which one is bound. Laughter, produced by love through its own production of the third-body/BwO, which is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and of the order of an incalculable life-affirming grace, thus, allows woman to escape this utilitarian slavishness, prompting Bataille to describe laughter as "the experience of a way out of my servitude" (Bataille, 1991:208).

6.6.5 Laughter

Laughter is the overriding theme of Cixous' feminist manifesto *The Laugh of the Medusa*. According to the Greek myth, Medusa, originally an extremely beautiful celibate priestess, was punished by Athena for having an affair with the sea god Poseidon by being transformed into a monstrous being with a head of hissing snakes that turned all those who looked upon her face into stone. Debadrita Chakraborty interprets the figure of Medusa as embodying the suppression of the female voice out of a fear of castration (2013:2897). Initially tarrying with this commonplace negative portrayal of Medusa, Cixous uses it as a metaphor for the no less negative view of women fabricated under phallogocentrism. Here she says: "They riveted us between two horrifying myths: between the Medusa and the abyss." Moreover, "Men say that there are two unrepresentable things: death and the feminine sex. That's because they need femininity to be associated with death" itself (Cixous, 1976:885). Clearly, the Medusa is femininity as death, whereas the abyss is femininity and death as unrepresentable things, where each is conceived as absence, as lack. If we apply a Deleuzoguattarian (and Lacanian) twist here – and throughout her writings Cixous does exhibit a sort of very distinctively Deleuzoguattarian affirmativeness, in addition to a Derridean deconstructive bent, as well as an expenditure of Bataillean laughter – then we know, of course, that lack is organised only at the level of, and in relation to, the 'strata' which represent the social distribution of sexual roles and the relations and articulations between these. This means that that which is excessive in relation to itself, since it, by this dint, cannot to recuperated by the strata in accordance with the unit of measure according to which any given stratum functions, will appear from the vantage point of the strata as lack. Since symbolic castration erects the

phallogocentric Law in the first place and since the law of castration is that of lack, it is precisely the Law that organises lack. From the viewpoint of the Law, therefore, since the feminine libidinal economy is, as seen earlier, a 'general economy' (or 'aneconomy') that by its very nature exceeds itself and likewise exceeds any unit of measure as dictated by a phallogocentric economy, woman will appear to the Law as lack.

In reality, however, woman is not lack but, rather, excess. And when she is party to the construction of the third-body/BwO of love, she is laughter. And laughter signals a rupture with the Law and its organisation of lack. As Bray avers apropos of Cixous, "laughter transforms the absence attached to the female sex into an image of the maternal as the source of a subversive plenitude and jouissance" (Bray, 2004:66). Or as Cixous herself declares: "If she's a her-she it's in order to smash everything, to shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the law, to break up the 'truth' with laughter" (Cixous, 1976:888). The laughing perspective prised open by the destratification wrought by the third-body/BwO of love is one in which the Law of lack, which projects woman as Gorgon, abyss and death, is turned inside out. Through it, one is brought beyond the coupling Man-Presence/woman-lack. Athena's curse is reversed. The love of Medusa and Poseidon has created a third-body/BwO that has fissured the phallogocentric Law. From the vantage point of this intensive body one can finally see Medusa as she truly is: "You only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her. And she's not deadly. She's beautiful and she's laughing" (Cixous, 1976:885).

Since the laughter here is laughter elicited in the face of the initially death-wielding face of the Medusa, it is a laughter in the face of death, in defiance of death. In this connection, Bataille speaks of "uncontrollable laughter, where the laughter increases in proportion to our anguish if some dangerous element supervenes and if we laugh even though at all costs we should stop laughing" (Bataille, 1991:100-101). The crucial reversal wrought by the Cixousian-Deleuzian third-body/BwO of love is that it transmogrifies the false appearance of absence (as projected by the phallocentric Law), where the confrontation with this seeming absence is felt as identical with death, into a true experience of overabundance, self-exceeding plenitude, excess and immensity. And laughter is set off precisely through a transmutation of lack/death into excessive immensity, which comes coupled with the epiphany that "the immense is not overwhelming" (Cixous and Calle-Gruber, 1997:21). Cixous intermingles this capacity of the feminine libidinal economy (of its very nature an

economy of excess and immensity) with its maternal aspect, which manifests itself through laughter in woman as "the imaginary possibility of taking a mountain in one's arms," since priviness to this possibility is tantamount to "knowing that one can always give life, protection, care, even to the biggest," an experience of renewed possibility through which "we escape or we have escaped death" (Cixous and Calle-Gruber, 1997:21-2).

6.6.6 De-Stinging Death

Bray (2004:66) is right to assert that Cixous' laughter is not the same as the "apocalyptic laughter" of Kristeva, which the latter sees as emerging from horror in the face of maternal abjection (the child's experience of the mother's body as 'abject', requiring separation). Cixous' laughter, avoiding this hysterical trap, is elicited rather from an experience of how absurd the positing of the maternal as abject itself is. Hers is, therefore, an affirmative, life-affirming laughter. This laughter is occasioned precisely from the reversal of the representation of woman as absence, lack and death into excessive foreground plenitude, as wrought by the third-body's/BwO's destratification of the Law and, with it, the demise of the Law's representation of the feminine as deathly lack. The concomitant lifting of the repression through which the Law tethers desire and femininity to lack and death is precisely what precipitates laughter before the feminine abyss of death which, with the deactivation of the Law, suddenly resurrects the laughter of Medusa, who laughs at death and transcends it. As Cixous relates it in *Rootprints*, "I burst out laughing. Death went through me and I laughed. I became frightened until I understood. The phenomenon of great nervous hilarity was this: I was alive!" (Cixous, 1997:26). In Nietzschean terms relating to the 'will-to-power', what one finds here is a transmutation through which reactive force, which by its very nature internally limits itself and posits its own limit as lack and death, becomes active force, which in contrast is inherently self-transgressive, refractory to the law of lack and treats death as merely a subordinate moment through which to renew itself by incessantly exceeding itself. Coextensive with this becoming-active of force, the rendering inoperative of the phallogocentric Law transmogrifies a formerly negative will to power into an affirmative will that crosses the threshold of death posited by this now-derelict Law, doing so with boisterous laughter.

Finally, this merry and affirmative crossing of the limit of death is, for Cixous, the condition of possibility of writing, of *écriture féminine*. She was, after all, herself brought to writing by the death of her own father. Indeed, in order "To begin (writing, living) we must have death," since writing is "learning not to be afraid, in other words, to live at the extremity of life, which is what the dead, death, give us," so as to liberate us. This transcendence in and through death figures almost as a sort of Cixousian ethical imperative, decreeing that "We need to lose the world to lose a world, and to discover that there is more than one world and that the world isn't what we think it is" (1993:7,10). This affirmative crossing of the formerly proscribed limit of death moves one beyond the phallogocentric Law and its proscription of the female creator through its figuration of woman as negativity, absence and lack in the subordinate part of the couplets Man/woman, Presence/absence, Activity/passivity, and so forth, toward an affirmative will to power wherein death functions as a mere subordinate moment immanent to the unleashing of the becoming-active, becoming-woman and becoming-other of the feminine. In relation to death, this entails a transition from death in the guise of "the limits imposed in the real on life, on freedom, on individual possibilities, by the institutions and their go-betweens" and "the limits imposed on writing by the literary establishment," toward a transfiguration of this limit of death into, at its opposite extreme, "a vertiginous peak, from which elsewhere, the other, and what is to come, can be seen" (Seller, 1997:28). An affirmative feminine writing, thus, calls the bluff of the spectre of castration that would consign woman to an unrepresentable deathly absence and proceeds forthwith to write the overabundant foreground plenitude which death, when its sting is defanged through its decoupling from phallogocentric representation, harbours on its liberatory side as a fecund and cosmically maternal site proper to a writing of the feminine libidinal economy into the world as a new world.

As intimated at the beginning of this chapter, in the following (final) section the relevance of Cixous' multi-facetted, recuperative, woman-oriented philosophy will become apparent.

4.6. *ÉCRITURE FÉMININE*

> Unleashed and raging, she belongs to the race of waves. She arises, she approaches, she lifts up, she reaches, covers over, washes ashore, flows embracing the cliff's least undulation, already she is another, arising against, throwing the fringed vastness of her body up high, follows herself, and covers over, uncovers, polishes, makes the stone body shine with the gentle undeserting ebbs, which returns to the shoreless nonorigin, as if she recalled herself in order to come again as never before…She has never "held still: explosion, diffusion,

effervescence, abundance, she takes pleasure in being boundless, outside self, outside same, far from a centre.

– Cixous (1985:90-91).

Let us look a little more closely at this writing of the feminine libidinal economy, this Cixousian *écriture féminine*, and in particular at how it can serve to provide an 'exit' from the repressive phallogocentric horizon and its slew of entrapping binary oppositions. Although, as Rosemary Putnum Tong (2009:275) rightly notes, there is no single thinker behind Cixous's highly idiosyncratic, complex thought (as illustrated in the almost Heraclitean-like flux in the quotation above, where woman belongs to "the race of waves" and is characterised by various non-teleological, decentralising, decentring and ab-original features), aspects of her thought align her fairly closely with Derrida. This debt is one that she openly acknowledges:

> Insofar as philosophy is concerned, if I refer myself especially to Derrida, it is because he, of course, works on excess. How to exceed, how not to exit from, how to go out of, and exceed without forgetting or retracting. (Quoted in Conley, 1984:150)

In the light of what follows, Cixous's affiliation with Derrida is, thus, a good place to start to find a way of going out of the dyad man-woman, wherein "She" cannot be found, leading up to a consideration of *écriture féminine.* As Tong (2009:275) has it, Derrida's notion of *différance*, which he deploys to undermine binary thought (and the phallogocentric hierarchies erected on the basis of binary oppositions) from within, forms part of the inspiration for Cixous' creation of her own idea/practice of *écriture féminine*. Toril Moi (1985:106) defines *différance* as the "open ended play between the presence of one signifier and the absence of others," although this is not quite sufficient, since what Derridean *différance* encompasses is not merely the fact that meaning is generated in the play of differences among signifiers (as Saussure already long since observed) but that, owing to being haunted by traces of purportedly absent signifiers, there can be no purely transparent self-presence of signifiers, and thus of meaning, to themselves/itself and to the cognising/interpreting subject. This trace of other significations within any given signification implies that any final anchoring of self-sufficient, self-present and terminally conclusive meaning is perpetually deferred and under erasure (*sous rature*). Whereas masculine writing, which is often termed literature (*littérature*), forms itself on the basis of a denial or repression of the internal vectors of unwinding and 'de-present-ification' implied by the notion of *différance*, Cixous' concept/practice of *écriture féminine* is privy to and takes

on board many of the features of Derridean *différance*, and proceeds by creating texts that open out from within in a liberated and liberating polysemy, rather than striving to enforce a self-contained monosemy, as one finds in phallogocentric writing.

For Cixous, writing has for long stretches of history been the mere servant of a masculine libidinal economy, which functions by way of a phallogocentric falsification of sexual difference in the truncated guise of sexual opposition (Man/woman), wherein woman's voice is either quasi-fatally othered or reduced to silence (Cixous, 1976:879). Being a function of the masculine libidinal economy, masculine writing premises itself upon the colonisation and subsumption of the other by the constant reinforcement of the economy of the same. To frazzle this linguistic colonisation of the other by the same, *écriture féminine* proceeds by lodging itself in the interspace between the same and the other. Cixous expresses this particular strategy when she postulates that "writing is precisely working (in) the in-between, inspecting the process of the same and the other without which nothing can live," and is born of and sustained by the desire "to want the two, as well as both, the ensemble of the one and the other," and by setting off the play among these in such a way that they are "infinitely dynamized by an incessant process of exchange from one subject to another" (Cixous, 1976:883). Much as Derridean deconstruction functions by inhabiting the texts of the Western tradition and tracing the Penelope-like process of spinning and unspinning of significations cascading along its crisscrossing chains of supplementarity, *écriture féminine* lodges itself within phallogocentric discourse "to dislocate this 'within,' to explode it, turn it around, and seize it," in order to make it "fly" (Cixous, 1976:887). This feminine gesture of "flying in language and making it fly," mimicking the drifting and discombobulating movement of *différance*, is that through which *écriture féminine* engages in a quasi-anarchic intra-textual insurgency of "dislocating things and values, breaking them all up, emptying structures, and turning propriety upside down" (Cixous, 1976:887). The propriety that is here subverted by *écriture féminine* is clearly that of the phallus as organising centre of signification, the dis-appropriation/mis-appropriation of which effectuates the hollowing out of phallogocentric discursive structures, as well as the concomitant frazzling and interrogation of the values secreted from their binary oppositions.

This purely dismantling gesture of *écriture féminine* is, however, only the negative side of the fundamentally positive and productive movement that it unleashes and which is itself. For *écriture féminine*, at the same time, "lets the other language speak – the language of 1,000

tongues which knows neither enclosure nor death" (Cixous, 1976:889). The turn that Cixous takes here moves her somewhat away from Derrida, in the sense that she links *écriture féminine* far more closely to the body than Derrida does *vis-à-vis différance*. She declares that "Women must write through their bodies," that they must deploy "their carnal and passionate body words," since while men are alienated from their bodies by the sublimation of libidinal drives required for being ensconced in social roles, "women are body. More body, hence more writing" (Cixous, 1976:886). It may seem that by emphasising the feminine voice so thoroughly Cixous may be veering in a direction that Derrida would censure as phonocentrism. However, phonocentrism refers to the subordination of writing by a disembodied voice, by a voice that disincarnates itself and thereby subordinates writing in tandem with repressing the body. It is the voice as etherealised Logos that is properly speaking phonocentric. In Cixous, however, the voice is almost indissolubly linked to the body. For in the case of woman, "it's with her body that she vitally supports the 'logic' of her speech," to the extent that "she physically materializes what she's thinking; she signifies it with her body." In fact, the inherently corporeal voice of woman comes always already intermingled with a sort of arché-writing that 'writes' itself across her body, for "she *inscribes* what she's saying, because she doesn't deny her drives the intractable and impassioned part they have in speaking." This corporeal voice, shot through with a libidinal and corporeal arché-writing, is at the same time inherently that of song, of the love song (Cixous 1976:881), the corporeal arché-love-song of the female body.

But what precisely does Cixous mean when she refers to the body as the site and wellspring of a highly corporeal, singing, loving voice that at the same time 'writes' itself across this body? A curious definition of this body that she gives may well serve as a clue. At one point, she describes this body as "no more describable than god, the soul, or the Other; that part of you that leaves a space between you and yourself and urges you to inscribe in language your woman's style" (Cixous, 1976:882). Since this body is not describable in quotidian terms, it is clearly not the body conceived in ordinary organic terms: it is not the organic body. The fact that this body opens a space between woman and herself suggests that this body must be some sort of field of potentiality coextensive with a becoming. As this field of potentiality, this body has a "thousand and one thresholds of ardour" and a "profusion of meanings that run through it in every direction" (Cixous, 1976:885). Adding to this, we may recall Cixous' earlier point that *écriture féminine* transpires in the space between the self and the other, together with the more recently mentioned point concerning the way in which this body

writes itself as a corporeal arché-love-song. From this, it certainly appears that this body of woman that writes itself, and does so as an arché-love-song in the region between self and other, is none other than the third-body/BwO of love. For the Deleuzoguattarian BwO does, in fact, itself possess a sort of arché-writing that inscribes itself across its entire intensive surface. This arché-writing on the BwO is a pre-signifying semiotic composed of "figures" that

> do not derive from a signifier nor are they even signs as minimal elements of the signifier; they are nonsigns, or rather nonsignifying signs, points-signs having several dimensions, flows-breaks or schizzes that form images through their coming together in a whole, but that do not maintain any identity when they pass from one whole to another (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:241).

If we replace the word "meanings" with "proto-meanings," is Cixous' "profusion of meanings that run through" the third body of love "in all directions" not perhaps homologous to the criss-crossing proliferation of polyvocal "points-signs" along the entire surface of the BwO? It certainly seems that Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari are referring to the same intensive-libidinal-generative basis for creativity outside the stratifications of the Law, outside the entrapments of the phallogocentric economy of the same, enabling a liberation of desire. The BwO is, after all, the pre-personal generative intensive matrix of libido, which it produces precisely through the same "flow-breaks or schizzes" by which polyvocal points-signs inscribe themselves in a multi-directional profusion over its surface. At the level of the BwO and that of the Cixousian third body, semiosis is indistinguishable from libido; making this intensive body the loving and singing vehicle of an *écriture féminine* through which woman can finally become the one who she is. As intimated at the beginning of this chapter, in the following (final) section the relevance of Cixous' multi-facetted, recuperative, woman-oriented philosophy will become apparent.

6.8 *FAMO ÉCRITURE FÉMININE*: SINGING/DANCING THE BODY

Basus'immbokodo, bawel'imilambo.
(They remove boulders and cross rivers)

– Nomboniso Gaza (2007:vii)

The Dark Continent is neither dark nor unexplorable.

– Cixous (1976: 885)

After briefly contextualising *famo marabi*, we will move to a consideration of its capacity to 'sing' the female body in a gesture that is reminiscent of Cixous's *écriture féminine*.

Malara Ogundipe-Leslie (1993:107) avers that the African woman has six mountains on her back: one is oppression from outside (colonialism and neo-colonialism); the second is from traditional structures – feudal, slave-based, communal etc.; the third is her backwardness (neo-colonialism?); the fourth is man; the fifth is her colour, her race; and the sixth is herself. In what follows we will consider some of these mountains, in particular the second that African women have to traverse, by way of considering *famo marabi*'s context, beginning with the traditional tribal position of black women and the consequences of their migration to the urban areas.

Phillips (1938:89) notes that the central theme of women in tribalism is that they are always under restraint. They are never regarded as grown women, but minors. First, they were under the control of their fathers and then that of their husbands. In the event of the death of their husbands they would be, by inheritance, under the control of the husband's brother. Central to the institution of marriage and the interaction between husband and wife was (and still is for those who elect to adhere to traditional customs) the system of *lobola* or *boxadi*, which furnished objective proof of marriage by way of a gift of cattle (or cash, more recently) to the bride's family, and was regarded as guaranteeing the welfare and protection of women. Moreover, it served to bind together the various tribal groups and afforded status to the woman and her children. Surprisingly, many native, even many Christian women, still uphold the *lobola* system, because they feel that a husband who pays a substantial *lobola* for her would treat her well. In instances where trouble arises between husband and wife, there is always a safe haven for the wife at her father's kraal where, as the expression goes, "there is food for her" in the way of the *lobola* cattle.

Phillips (1938:91) asks a pertinent question, namely: what caused unmarried girls to leave their rural dwellings for the Witwatersrand? An obvious reason is the back-breaking drudgery of tribal life; the long carries of water from the far-off river, bringing home heavy loads of wood from the bush, the endless days of hoeing in the garden under the blazing sun and the interminable hours of crushing mielies in a giant mortar (1938:74). A notable reason is also the scarcity of boys and young men in the kraals, because of their migration to the urban areas. The rural population thus comprises mainly women, children and old men. There was, therefore, an excess of marriageable girls, whose future is likely that of spinsterhood in monotonous kraal life. Hence many women were drawn to the Witwatersrand in search of husbands, in some cases those who have left them and not returned. Life in the city, however,

was repressive, even exploitative in a different sense for black women. Whilst there were numerous marriageable men on the Rand, they simply could not afford *lobola* for a wife. Phillips (1938:92) highlights instances where women were 'informally' married simply for the purpose of business. Husbands would leave their lawful wives in the country and keep another on the Rand for liquor selling and for sex. Typically, this surrogate wife would tend so well to her husband's business and his welfare that he would forget his first wife until she returned to the city. Stranded, she would be forced to 'marry' another 'husband.' Hellmann (1948:50) notes that women, especially in the slumyards, were forced, due to economic reasons, to resort to prostitution. Although society frowned on it, many women, nevertheless, had to resort to prostitution to supplement their meagre incomes. The male beer-customer could easily, after satisfying his need for alcohol, find a woman to buy for 2*s*. 6*d*. Hellmann (1948:50) tells us furthermore that some married women formed more permanent arrangements with a *nyatsi* or "back-door husband." These so-called 'husbands', gave them cash presents every month, which the women said came from their beer-brewing businesses, when questioned about it by their (legal) husbands.

The beer-brewing industry was a central part of urban women's lives. Suffice to say, the all-consuming role of women in the beer-brewing trade effectively stymied any attempt at self-expression or creative endeavour. Not only was it an arduous, time-consuming process (the making of *mqombothi* took up to 12 hours), but brewers were constantly at the mercy of police raids. Hellmann (1948:47) observes that arrest for illegal brewing carried no social stigma, but was simply regarded as 'bad luck.' Detention in prison was preferred to fines, especially by women without children in order to save money. Better prison food also acted as an incentive to choose imprisonment as an alternative to fines!

Another avenue for employment was domestic work. Here, too, women were under the strict control of their employers. As Callinicos (2007:160) puts it: "Dependent on their bosses for accommodation and food, with the close proximity of their quarters to the main house, even the social and cultural lives of domestic workers' were controlled. Indigenous music was frowned upon, and visitors were forbidden or closely monitored." The long arduous working hours also prevented women from making friends in the neighbourhood.

The above leaves us with little doubt that women were forced, by patriarchal and economic imperatives, into an equally oppressive mode of existence to that of their tribal backgrounds.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that the *famo* recitatives delved deep into a reservoir of bitterness wrought by a lifetime of male domination and economic privation – and ironised it.

A recapitulation of our discussion of the *famo* dance earlier in Chapter 1 is necessary here in order to bring *marabi* and *écriture féminine* into closer proximity. According to Coplan (1985:98) *famo marabi* was a dance, *inter alia*, by individual women for a male audience. The word "*famo*" is derived from the Sotho expression "*ho re famo*" meaning "to open nostrils; to raise garments, displaying the genitals." The dancing was highly lascivious and in it women made thrusting gestures with their hips and bosoms, while lifting their skirts possibly to "show their ass to Lesotho." The *famo* dancers wore no underwear but "had painted rings around the whole area of their sex, called "spotlight." Men, dancing alongside chose the women they wanted for sex in the back room. *Famo marabi* is, however, more than a dance. It also designates the lengthy recitative songs sung by women. These were addressed to men, beginning with the salutation "Hey, male child!" followed by "a series of rhetorical metaphors and challenges expressing the singer's tragic fate." This includes bitter feelings about people and situations, as well as valorising her own character and lascivious body and its attractions in blunt language. An example of this is to be found in Manapetle Makara Koa Famong's lengthy Sotho *famo marabi* recitative song called *Famo Ngoanana* ("Famo, Young Girl!"). The words, in Sotho with their English translation, are as follows:

Famo, Ngoanana

Famo, Young Girl!

Aoelele ngoana moshanayana!	Aoelele the manchild!
Heholimi le ka be le na le tulo	Heaven should have a place
Mor'a molimo e moholo ke mang?	Who is the eldest son of God?
Hela oa mantlha oa matsibolo Satane	Oh, the first and the first born is Satan
Mohla a qalang ha ntsoa motsana	At first he was allotted a small village
Hela ke eo bam o tsoere ka	(then) he was given the pit of hell
Hela ke eo bam o tsoere ka toropong.	Oh, there he is, caught up in town.
A le thipa a le selepe sa hae,	On him are a knife and an axe,
Hela a le kobong tsa lefu a Feletse.	Oh, he is in full funeral dress.
Hela Khomo li besua ka Mollo, Satane	Oh, the cattle are burned with fire, Satan
Ha li le ta la li ka u hlatsisa.	If they are raw, they make you
Nkoko poli ea se roala moqhaka.	Vomit.

	Nkoko is a goat that wears a *moghaka* [married woman's headband].
Bua ngoanan'a heso, famo! famo!	Speak, girl of my parents' home famo! famo!
He ke etsa joalo ke etsa motho.	When I do this [movement imitating intercourse] I am making a human being.
Nkoko poli ea se roala moqhaka.	Nkoko is a goat that wears a moqhaka.
Ele mahlapa e eo u lahla	She swears and may disappoint you
Hela, u ea tholoa ke manong	Oh, so that you may be picked up by vultures at ploughing time
Selemo	
Famola bo ngoanana, iketle	Do the famo, young girl,
Thope ngoanyana	Take it easy, young girl
U tsamaile	You are travelled
U lahlehile…	You are lost to your people. [i.e. Why hold back?]…
…Ngoanana ose ke ua botsa	…Girl, don't ask the water animals
Lihlapi	
Hi-tsoa-metsing li meno a bohale	Water animals have sharp teeth
(repeat)	Say more, Makhobane (the soloist)
Bua Makhobane, ke utloa u nkhopotsa hae.	I feel you remind me of my Country.
Bua ngoanana heso	Say more, my home girl
U buile Makhobane	You have said (a lot) Makhobane
U bue.	Say more,
U tsamaile ngoana Mosotho	You have travelled, Sotho baby
U qerehetse eng.	Don't hold back anything.
Ke be ke hopole Mathakane.	Sometimes I long for Mathakane
Ke be ke hopole mae ea Ntutu.	I long for the daughter of my paternal aunt.
Mali-matsebe-tseba oa Matikne isoa kae?	Matikane, where is Matsebetsebe taken to?
Morena ha u tebela matekatse,	Tsoane-betere Mamohatlana
U se ka siea Mamokhahlana.	Oh, Tsoane-betere child of Moselane,
Litsietsi hali makatse mosali.	Chief! When you get rid of Prostitutes,
Hele malitsietsi mae ea Khobane.	Don't leave out Mamokhahlana.
Ke tihile pelo goana a Mosotho.	Troubles are no surprise to a Woman,
Ke tihile pelo, ke hotse bohase.	Oh, the woman of trouble, the mother of Khobane [the soloist].
Ke hots eke bo kakatlela bophelo.	My heart is tough, I grew up an Orphan.
(Transcription and translation By Joachim Ntebele and David Coplan	I grew up under hardships of life

Before we even begin considering the text, let us take cognisance of Coplan's (1985:101) observation that such recitatives are typically delivered in a high-pitched voice and "a forceful declamatory rhythm". The singer of *famo* is, music-rhetorically speaking, no shrinking violet. This sets the tone for what is to follow.

Right from the outset, female *famo marabi* undermines phallocentric mores, with the conventional brazen salutation *Aoelele ngoana moshanyana!* ("Hey, male-child!"). This is, in fact, deeply insulting and suggests that the man in question has not been ritually circumcised and is, thus, still a child. This is the equivalent of calling a grown man, a 'boy,' a racial slur prevalent during the Apartheid era. He is, thus, not fully man, but a boy still clinging to his mother's skirt tails. Not only does it situate him squarely within the maternal orbit and her sphere of authority, it also carries connotations of cowardice. The "male-child" is too scared to face the rigours and pain of circumcision school and, thus, his passage to authentic manhood within the social and symbolic order has been interrupted. In this regard, one cannot help contrasting the traditional female *famo* salutation with Haydn's Adam, a man "with native worth and honour clad/with beauty, courage, strength adorned," as rhetorically underscored by the music. Put in colloquial terms, unlike Haydn's Adam, the female *famo* singer implies right off the bat that the man-child is not only dishonourable but also a wimp.

In this specific example of *famo marabi*, Makara Koa Famong's recitative, entitled "Famo Young Girl," is it is not entirely clear whether she uses the salutation "Hey male child", which is the norm for female *famo marabi*, unlike the male *likoata's* praise songs, the *lifela*, which uses the salutation for the opposite gender. Although the title is "Famo Young Girl," it starts with "Aoelele the manchild!" which would suggest that she does, in fact, use the conventional "Hey male child!" to call him out, so to speak. Let us, however, consider the significance of the title "Famo, Young Girl," even though it is unclear if this title is used to start this recitative. Suffice to say, "Famo, Young Girl" has a completely different symbolic significance to the derogatory "Hey, male child!" We will see how Makara Koa Famong's exhortation to "*famo*," which is reiterated, is used in a highly positive sense and is akin to Cixous's plea to woman to write their bodies. Moreover, "Young girl" is significant, because it places the girl-child in close proximity to her mother, the bountiful source of overabundant pre-symbolic *jouissance*, the "white ink" (or mother's milk) that she writes herself in, and makes her purported 'lack' seem like a laughing matter as seen in *Laugh of the Medusa*. The language in which *famo* is written is, moreover, like *écriture féminine*, unctuous, deeply

poetical and overflowing with symbolism and rhetorical metaphors. The *famo* example in question is, in fact, written in the twelve-syllable lines characteristic of *sefela* and other Sotho poetic forms. Statements by the singer are, moreover, punctuated with responses from members of her group, which can be assumed to be other women (Coplan, 1985:99).

As we have seen, from the outset, the *famo* singer does not pull any punches and what follows is very much in the same vein. After hailing "Aoelele the manchild!" she says that "Heaven should have a place/Who is the eldest son of God?" and her sung reply is (shockingly) "Oh, the first and the first born is Satan." With one blow she knocks Adam, as crown of God's creation and Lord of nature, right off his pedestal. Moreover, instead of rhetorical and lyrical evocations of woman as Eve/Lilith (in Haydn and Berg, by the Tristan chord), there is nothing morally ambivalent about Man. He is called the Satanic firstborn of God and he is brutally derided as being evil to the core. As already intimated, this barrage of scorn is not delivered in the passive, subdued music-rhetoric of the traditional Male/female binary, but in a high, forceful, rhythmically vital, declamatory style. After calling him 'Satan', the *famo* singer continues with her relentless assault on the male character by averring that, although he was initially given nothing less than a small village, thus elevating him to a position of some social standing, eventually he ended up with "the pit of hell," the logical destination for a son of Satan. Hence, from a position of respectability, the urban man regressed to that of a ruffian, armed "with a knife and an axe", and a harbinger of death suggested by "Oh, he is in full funeral dress." Addressing him as "Satan," the *famo* singer then relentlessly declaims that he has squandered his previous wealth, his cattle, which has been "burned with fire," because "If they are raw, they make you vomit." The meaning here is unclear but can perhaps be construed as an excuse for eating, rather than keeping his cattle for respectable purposes such as a dowry (*lobola*). Her crass reference to bodily excretions such as vomit is also far from being 'lady-like.' All told, the *famo* singer is clearly subverting, by way of song and dance, man's dominance and superiority as Logos in a manner akin to Cixous's writing, although perhaps in a more abrasive vein.

We have dwelt at length on woman's status as passivity in relation to man as activity, particularly in the virile sense required of a creative man. What follows is at the furthest remove from Haydn's phallocentric description of Eve's "softly smiling virgin looks." Makara Koa Famong states that Nkoko, perhaps a female friend or relative, "is a goat that wears a *moqhaka* [married woman's headband]." A goat is traditionally viewed as the most

lascivious of animals, thus suggesting that Nkoko is so virile that her virility exceeds that of her husband. The marital bed is clearly insufficient to meet her voracious libidinal appetite, leading her to seek sexual adventure and fulfilment elsewhere. The imagery of a goat wearing a married woman's headband is also humorous and resonates with Cixous's use of laughter to volcanically subvert traditional male phallogocentrism:

> A feminine text cannot fail to be more than subversive. It is volcanic; as it is written it brings about an upheaval of the old property crust, carrier of masculine investments, there's no other way. There's no room for her if she's not a he. If she's a her-she, it's in order to smash everything, to shatter the framework of institutions to blow up the law to break up the "truth" with laughter. (Cixous, 1976:888)

Moreover, instead of gagging the female voice, rather, in a gesture that is reminiscent of Cixous, the *famo* singer exhorts "the girl of my parents' home" to speak, which is followed by the chant "*famo*! *famo*!" She goes on to link the act of female speech, *famo* and the body by illustrating her words "When I do this/I am making a human being" with movements imitating sexual intercourse. She is at once a sexual being *and* a mother. Note that the father is conspicuously absent in this 'song of the body.' This is all about singing *her* desire in bold defiance to all phallocentric constraints. She goes on to repeat the phrase "Nkoko is a goat that wears a *moqhaka,*" as if to drive her point home. Next, instead of portraying women as innocent victims, she continues by warning men that "(Nkoko) swears and may disappoint you/Oh, so that you may be picked up/by vultures at ploughing time." Nkoko clearly transgresses all boundaries of acceptable, passive 'lady-like' behaviour with her coarse speech and penchant for leaving her victims for the vultures to pick up. This is at the furthest remove from Haydn's Eve who is to "Bespeak him love/ Love and joy and bliss." The woman of *famo marabi* is no mere *supplément* or helpmeet to man, but a powerful, autonomous being in her own right.

It must be noted, before we continue, that, unlike in *famo marabi*, the voices of black women have traditionally been muted. In *Theorizing Black Feminisms* (1993), the black lesbian poet, André Lorde (1984:242, as quoted by Tesfagiorgis, 1993:243) focuses on the black unspoken word, when she says "my silences had not protected me. Your silence will not protect you." She continues:

> What do you need to say? What tyrannies you swallow day by day and attempt to make your own, until you will sicken and die of them, still in silence. Perhaps for some of you here today, I am the face of one of your fears. Because I am woman, because I am Black, because I am lesbian, because I am myself – a Black warrior poet doing my work – come to ask you, are you doing yours? (Lorde, 1984:243)

The singer of *famo marabi* would answer in the affirmative, as attested in Makara Koa Famong's next line in which the young girl is exhorted to do the *famo*, but at the same time "take it easy, young girl/You are travelled/You are lost to your people" (i.e. why hold back?). A plausible explanation to the apparent conflict between "take it easy" and "why hold back?" is that Famong is telling the young girl to recover from the rigors of her arduous journey and be revitalised by doing the *famo* without reserve. To return to an earlier Cixousian leitmotif, for the *famo* singer, the forced migration of the young girl from the rural areas and her familial ties, with their patriarchal alliance to the alien urban environment, is something of a symbolic death. For Cixous, death it a limit one has to traverse in order to write a new, richer, more authentic feminine self. Having survived death, there is nothing to be afraid of. Hence the *famo* singer exhorts the young girl to do the *famo*, to sing and dance the body without restraints and with joyous abandon, because she has traversed beyond limits, severed all ties and has nothing to lose. It is as if she is saying in her own tongue, "Let's hurry: the continent is not impenetrably dark. I've been there often" (Cixous, 1976:885). Yet at the same time, there is her gentle admonition to "take it easy girl," which reveals the 'softer side' of *famo marabi* in the way it extends a sense of (maternal) love to the young, uprooted girl.

The meaning of the symbolism in the next line "Girl, don't ask the water animals/ Water animals have sharp teeth" is opaque, although it could be construed as a warning of sorts. This use of rich symbolism also resonates with Cixous' poetic tropes in her *écriture féminine* and ties up with Kristeva's thoughts on women's relation to the Lacanian imaginary, a theme we will take up soon.

To return to the text: "Say more, Makhobane" (the soloist) is likely to be a response by her female group to speak more, to do the *famo*. For her female audience, Makhobane reminds them of a new different home, a safe place and solace away from the rigours of patriarchal rural life. In Chapter 5 we will see how the theme of homesickness pervades *marabi* in our consideration of mine workers' songs. In what follows, the soloist exhorts her audience to speak and her audience reciprocates by commending her on speaking and urging her to speak

even more, without abandon. These words and the symbolic water animal trope are then reiterated in order to emphasise its significance. This gesture of female solidarity and reciprocal desire for creative self-expression is at the furthest remove from the experiences of the western creative women that we have looked at who, having internalised patriarchal mores, are afraid of writing or composing at the risk of a patriarchal backlash. A notable exception (Citron, 1993:61) is the experiences of Lili Boulanger (1893-1918), the first woman to capture the *Prix de Rome* in 1913. Lili was surrounded by creative women, including her mother and grandmother, as well as her sister, Nadia, a conductor, composer and teacher. In this environment of mutually supportive women, Lili's creativity blossomed. This sense of female support and upliftment is also the driving force behind *famo marabi*.

The next line extends the theme of homesickness but, significantly, for the *famo marabi* singer 'home' is the women that she misses. She speaks of how she longs for a woman called "Mathakane," for "the daughter of my paternal aunt," thus her cousin, and she longs for the mother of Ntuti, presumably a female relative. Thus, *famo marabi* is a space inhabited by the voices of women present but also past. Consistent with the Cixousian themes of love and fidelity, these are the women that the singer cherishes and loves despite their multitudinous similarities *and* differences.

The next two lines of the recitative are virtually impenetrable in their symbolism, but what is noticeable are the predominance of female names. She is clearly alluding to those she holds dear in a language that is all her own.

The next line strikes a discordant note with what has gone before. In something of a *volte face*, she demands from the Chief that when he gets rid of the prostitutes, he must not leave out Mamokhahlana. In the light of the sheer weight of this song's repeated calls for authentic female expression and themes of female solidarity, one can speculate that the singer has a private vendetta against Mamokhahlana, or that this line is meant facetiously.

What follows is a testament to the strength and resilience of the *famo* singer: "Oh, the woman of troubles, the mother of Khobane [the soloist]/My heart is tough [I] the Mosotho child/My heart is tough, I grew up as an orphan/I grew up under hardships of life." She has, in a literal sense, traversed beyond the death of both her parents and has emerged as a strong woman and survivor who sings the *famo* with wild abandon and exhorts her sisterhood to do likewise.

This unique way of singing the body and attacking phallocentrism in a poetic form resonates strongly with Cixous's *écriture féminine*. We can even take this a step further by referring to *famo marabi* as *écriture famo*. It must, however, be recalled that the women who narrated, sang and danced the *famo*, with all its sexual excesses, were largely illiterate, so instead of writing the body, the women of the *famo* would sing it, but in the same Cixousian vein.

Coplan (1985:101) notes that although *famo* provided a setting for the practice of illegal trades, from the above we can deduce that it provided a sense of catharsis to women with similar problems. The experience of Adelina who attended *famo* in Vereeniging, Kroonstad, and other towns during the 1950's is a case in point. When asked if money was the primary motivating factor for her attendance at *famo*, she replied:

> No, it was a form of entertainment. At that time I associated with people whose manners were rough, wild. When I was deeply depressed and worried, in order to express myself and feel contented, like a Christian would open a page in the bible, with me I went to the shebeen to sing these things, I had gone (to town) to visit my husband and I found him but we separated. I suffered a lot because of that. So I had to go to these places and get some joy out of life and unburden myself. Others came for similar reasons, and to share their feelings with others…they were like me…The men came and spent their weekends there, they were from the mines, or working in town. These were *likoata*, and even *MaRussia* would come to visit from Benoni [Original grammar].

The MaRussia (Coplan, 1985:101) that Adelina alludes to were notorious gangsters who arose in the late 1920's as vigilantes organised by other ethnic groups. Their name is likely to have been derived from the Russian involvement in World War II and they terrorised residents in the location for decades.

By way of a Coda, I will consider a further correlation between *famo marabi* and *écriture féminine*. *Famo* gave Adelina and others a sense of self-expression and contentment within a deeply phallocentric symbolic order. This resonates with Kristevian themes highlighted in Olivier's insightful article *The Piano*: "What a woman wants", which refers in its title to Jane Campion's film *The Piano*. The following is of particularly significance (Olivier, 2021:229):

> Kristeva extends and enriches Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of the human subject, which accounts for the subjects "iconic" and linguistic dimensions via the distinction between the registers of the "imaginary" and the "symbolic." Through her elaboration on the semiotic as a pre-symbolic register of signification, Kristeva amplifies the function of both the imaginary

> and the symbolic – of the imaginary, with its specular-iconic mode of generating meaning, and of the symbolic, with its implicit connections between signifiers (inter alia words, images) and signifieds (the conceptual "meaning" of a signifier such as "cat", to wit: a furry, quadruped mammalian carnivore"). It bears repeating that she does this by positing the "non-linguistic" mode of signification with the *chôra* of the mother's body, because the drives (for example the oral drive), are "oriented and structured around it." (Kristeva, 1984:27)

Whereas the symbolic, according to Olivier (2021:230) is geared towards an "inescapable conceptual aspect," the semiotic falls within the ambit of creating meanings "which are not easily subsumed under conceptuality." Olivier (2021:230) furnishes examples such as music, guttural sounds, humming, rhythms, odours and texture, etc. The instance of music is of particular relevance to *famo*. It must be borne in mind that the *famo* recitatives were merely one feature of *famo marabi*. *Famo marabi* is a highly sexualised song – with or without discernible meanings – and dance in which women like Adelina derived peace and contentment, as a Christian would after reading Scripture. The significance of music is that of a place where woman – in Olivier's analysis, Ada, the main character of *The Piano* – can feel "completely at home," as he expresses it. The significance of this musical semiotic space comes to the fore in the following:

> Mallarmé calls attention to the semiotic rhythm within language when he speaks of "The Mystery in Literature" indifferent to language, enigmatic and feminine, this place underlying the written is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgement, but strained by a single guarantee: syntax…we shall quote only those passages that ally the functioning of that "air or song beneath the text" with women (Kristeva, 1997:38, as quoted in Olivier, 2021:232-233).

The resonance with Cixous's *écriture féminine*, with its poetic 'musical' style and the register of the semiotic here are hard to overlook. Yet, Cixous's poetic style is verbal and thus situated within the symbolic register. The question is: How can these two co-exist? For Olivier (2021:240) there is no disconnect: "just as the semiotic, once traversed remains "chiasmatically" interwoven with the symbolic, the feminine, and therefore women, are 'already there', intertwined with the masculine, or men, given their union of mutual implication."

The same can be said of Adelina and other wild, unfettered women of the *famo* and its highly idiosyncratic, feminine interaction between music, dance and verbal recitatives. Most

significantly, this also answers Cixous's question that we commenced with and pursued throughout this chapter, namely: "Where is She?"

CHAPTER 5: FOUCAULT AND *MARABI I*N ITS IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I wish to consider *marabi's* ideological context by using both Foucault's conception of biopolitics, panopticalism and of disciplinary societies as a framework through which to scrutinise the manner in which the pre- (or rather proto-) Apartheid South African regime 'dealt with' its black population – the 'black peril'. Biopower, functioning in tandem with disciplinary power, functions *inter alia* through the deployment of a classificatory regime of groups arrayed in such a way that those deemed more deviant from what is construed as the 'norm' (in this case, white Protestant) are more markedly individuated. In this vein, I shall demonstrate how this biopolitical-*cum*-disciplinary array was constructed in the first half of the 20th century by white South African ideologues on the basis of already extant pseudo-scientific 19th and 20th century European racial theories. Using this racial and ethnicist biopolitical array, the South African regime would in tandem deploy disciplinary measures to maintain the separations dictated by the former. In particular, I will scrutinise the precise functioning of Pass laws, enforced racial segregation more generally, and the coercive practices in mining compounds (*marabi's* labour context) within a state apparatus that can be deemed both panoptical and biopolitical in the Foucaultian sense of these concepts. Likewise, I shall focus particularly on how *marabi* refrains described, rendered temporarily palatable, ironised, and subverted the draconian strictures of the regime and ideology under which the oppressed laboured and lived.

5.2 DISCIPLINARY, PANOPTICAL AND BIOPOLITICAL POWER

Even prior to fully-fledged institutionalised racism, as formally inscribed in state policy, the white South African regime was fairly well dyed in racist practice and ideology. This situation is of earlier vintage than Apartheid itself. At issue is the manner in which sub-scientific racial ideologies, quite long before formal Apartheid, were co-opted into a biopolitical regime. Foucault is the most ready-at-hand theoretical-interpretive source here, so I shall use him as a starting point. Then we will proceed further afield.

Foucault begins *Discipline and Punish* on a gruesome note with his account of the public torture of the would-be regicide Damiens, a grisly spectacle drenched in blood and gore. Of course, it is precisely the wildly ostentatious and spectacular nature of the judicial punishment that was the point, as such levels of jarring public horror were deliberately staged as a strong deterrent to anyone contemplating a capital crime. The purpose of punishment in the monarchical regime was, thus, to terrify, to place the fear of God into the people, rather than to reform them. At the same time, however, punishment itself was reserved only for the most heinous of crimes, with an entire slew of more minor infractions passing blissfully under the radar. The essential purpose of these pornographically shocking public punishments for select crimes lay, at base, given the great paucity of more refined modes of policing the populace, in the necessity that State power, in the face of being infracted upon, re-exert and re-establish itself through a vastly disproportionate counter-vengeance. There was also a strongly paranoid and personalised aspect to it, in that any capital crime was experienced by the ruling caste as one that had directly touched the very being of the sovereign in his sentient totality.

Within less than a decade of Damiens' public torture and execution, there occurred an abrupt transition in approach to criminality by the State. Instead of labouring under the albeit distant threat of being torn to shreds for the commission of capital crimes in a sumptuous public spectacle, the populace was more and more concertedly being placed under the aegis of novel mechanisms of discipline, surveillance, and control, whose purpose was to produce what Foucault termed "docile bodies." The eventuality of punishment is now something which is interiorised in the form of self-policing by the subject him – or herself. What, precisely, is meant by "docile bodies" and why were disciplinary regimes from the late eighteenth century onwards so interested in projects of corporeal docility? After all, it was not the first time the body was subjected to "such imperious and pressing investments," in the words of Foucault (1991:136). According to Foucault (1991:136), "A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved." The eighteenth century's newfound interest in projects of control can be ascribed to a number of factors (1991:136-137). Firstly, instead of dealing with bodies *en masse*, 'wholesale' as it were, the emphasis shifted to dealing with it 'retail', that is, to exercising minute actions of control and coercion on the body, as a mechanism. In this way, power came to be exercised over "movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity; an infinitesimal power over the active body" (Foucault 1991:137). Secondly, the object of control shifted from the signifying aspects of behaviour, or the language of the body, toward

bodies' "economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization." (p.137) Constraint is, thus, directed at forces, rather than on the signifying economy. Foucault identifies exercise as being the only significant action in this regard (p.137). Lastly, there is the modality which implies an uninterrupted, continuous supervision of the processes of activity, rather than the overall result, and it is, "exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement" (p.137). In the final analysis:

> These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called disciplines. (Foucault, 1991:137)

These disciplinary technologies were deployed extensively in a wide range of domains, such as prisons, schools, the military, as well as medical and psychiatric institutions. In the instance of schools, for example, control was exerted over space, where the pupils sat in a way they could all be observed by the teacher, minute motor movements such as those involved in cultivating a uniform handwriting was controlled, the correct posture was to be assumed, timetables and examinations were put into place to regulate, observe and discipline pupils, rendering them "docile bodies" (1991:136).

As already hinted at, central to the entire disciplinary project was, and is ever the more so today, the interiorisation by subjects of the external constraints placed upon them. This, in effect, has led, from the late eighteenth century onwards, toward a system of *control*, in which subjects effectively police themselves.[69] Foucault describes the dynamics behind this new disciplinary society as follows:

> The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point would be both the source of light illuminating everything and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned. (1977:173)

This conception of an all-seeing eye (this time not that of God, as was previously the case) toward which all eyes must be turned finds concrete embodiment in Bentham's conception of

[69] Deleuze, in his "Postscript on Control Societies" (1990a:177-182) argues for the surpassing of disciplinary societies and their replacement by societies of control, through debt, for example. I am indebted to Olivier for this reference.

the Panopticon. The Panopticon is an architectural device, and also a paradigmatic metaphor for the way in which discipline operates in disciplinary society. It is constructed in an enclosed circle with cells along its periphery and a central watchtower in the middle. The watchman is able to survey all the inmates from this central position. The prisoner is aware that he could potentially be watched at any given time and is, thus, constantly vigilant. Foucault notes that Bentham hereby laid down the principle that "power should be visible and unverifiable":

> Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. (Foucault 1991:201)

It is this inability on the part of the prisoners to foresee when the all-seeing gaze would fall on them that quickly disposes inmates to discipline themselves. This also applies to sound, prompting Silisiäinen (2010:42) to speak of "panacoustics" or the "panauditory." According to Bentham's design, small tin tubes were connected to each supervisor's lodge. Silisiäinen (2010:43) identifies the benefits of the panacoustic, or panauditory apparatus as twofold. Firstly, instructions could be given, without having to get physically closer to the hearer, implying that instructions could be given at a distance. Secondly, this system enabled the voice to generate "the *illusion of omnipresence* of the inspector." Self-policing was, thus, also engendered by an "all hearing ear."

These panoptical and panacoustic features implied that internal self-disciplining was so effective that it was not only applied to prisons, but swiftly migrated to a broad range of other institutions and practices in the social field. Panopticism thus, became the principle underlying disciplinary society as a whole. In this society, instead of being imposed from without, discipline came to be lodged within the very 'soul' of the subject, which became the well-spring of docility – an imprisonment of the body by the soul (Foucault, 1977:29).

We seem to have come a long way from the gory public spectacle of the would-be regicide Damiens being splayed by four horses at the beginning of *Discipline and Punish*. Before the move to disciplinary power, the truth of the crime of the offender was thought to reside directly within his or her flesh. This resulted in the need for judicial torture, in which pain and its eliciting of a series of confessions were seen as the primary and ineluctable medium

for the production and conveyance of criminal truth. Simple spontaneous confessions of culpability on the part of the alleged culprit uttered outside the ambit of ritualised judicial torture were considered fundamentally unreliable. With the move away from monarchical power toward disciplinary power, it was now the 'soul', and not directly the body, that was appropriated and weaponised by the State apparatus in such a way that it would hereupon itself continuously torture and discipline the body almost autonomously, doing so, through the inculcation of a 'conscience' geared specifically to the intra-mundane rather than the celestial. This interiorisation of State control – together with that exerted by the growing profusion of sub-State institutions, whose disciplinary effects in fact radiated beyond their immediate ambit – within individual bodies is the essence of disciplinary society. To be sure, this involved a distancing from the State. Paradoxically, however, this distancing of the State from the populace, rather than diminishing the State's efficacy served, instead, to vastly increase it. This is so since, while the relations of obligation between the subject and the State were becoming steadily less intimate, less preponderant, and more vague, there was a massively countervailing extension of the State's reach down to the level of individual bodies by way of State and sub-State disciplinary technologies diffusing themselves far beyond their ostensible points of origination and, swiftly thereupon, throughout the entire body politic. Thus, concomitant with the ostensible distancing of the State, there was an increasingly rapidly encroaching immanentisation of State power effectuated through the diffusion of the disciplines, which were, so to speak, 'emissaries' or 'vicars' of the State, or tendrils through which the State became virtually present in the midst of the populace.

From the tail-end of the eighteenth century onwards, there was, however, another mechanism of power which, born roughly at this time, started to work ever the more diligently and intensively in tandem with disciplinary power by converging with it: biopolitical power. On this matter of biopolitics, or biopower, Foucault writes:

> What we are dealing with in this new technology of power is not exactly society (or at least not the social body, as defined by the jurists), nor is it the individual body. It is a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted. Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem. (Foucault, 1977:245)

Here there is a markworthy change in emphasis between the control of individual bodies in disciplinary regimes, on the one hand, and biopolitics' preoccupation with life itself and, specifically, the lives of an entire population, on the other. Hardt and Negri, in *Empire* (2000:24) describe this shift by typifying disciplinary societies as those in which the disciplines of power depend on the resistive capabilities of the individual, whereas, in contrast, biopolitical society is entirely subsumed and enveloped by the mechanisms of power in its totality. Power reaches into and permeates the depths of the very life of a population – its 'collective psyche', bodies and social configurations, hereby forging it into a single body.

The focus on life itself, but now "reflected in political existence" also comes to the fore in Foucault's following observation:

> For the first time in history…biological existence was reflected in political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from time to time amid the randomness of death and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge's field of control and power's sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects…but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life…that gave power its access even to the body. (1990:142)

To be sure, both disciplinary power and biopolitical power apply themselves to multiplicities of human beings. The difference between the two is that, whereas disciplinary power "tries to rule a multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, used, and, if need be, punished," superficially similarly but ultimately fundamentally contrariwise, biopolitical power, while maintaining a multiplicity of men as the domain into which to intervene, does not so intervene by breaking up this multiplicity into individual bodies. Biopower targets this multiplicity of men "to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on." Whereas the upsurge of disciplinary power in the second half of the eighteenth century represented a "first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode," the ensuing emergence of biopolitical power toward the end of the same century ushered in "a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species." With both of these two mechanisms of power having insinuated themselves, what one finds is an increasing imbrication of disciplinary power's

"anatomo-politics of the human body" with a "'biopolitics' of the human race" (Foucault, 2003: 242-243).

But what, precisely, is a population? Firstly, we must ascertain what the population is not. Foucault, in *Security, Territory, Population*, argues that it is "not the simple sum of individuals inhabiting a territory" (Foucault, 2009: 70). What the population also is not, is "a collection of juridical subjects in an individual or collective relationship with a sovereign will." Nor is the population "a collection of subjects of right differentiated by their status, localization, goods, responsibilities, and offices" (Foucault, 2009: 74-75). Indeed, far from being "a primary datum," the population is, in fact, always already "dependent on a series of variables." The upshot of this inherent dependency of the population on an entire series of variables is that the population "cannot be transparent to the sovereign's action and that the relation between the population and the sovereign cannot simply be one of obedience and refusal of obedience, of obedience or revolt." If the relation between the population and the State is not the same as that between the sovereign and his subjects, then how does the State govern the population? It does so through intervention upon the variables of the population. These variables are ones linked to, among other things, commerce, taxation, geography, climate, the level of food and energy, fertility, income, education, and so forth. For example, the State can alter the level of specific imports and exports (Foucault, 2009:70-72), it can increase or decrease taxation on the rich and alleviate or fail to alleviate the tax burden on the less well to do, it can alter the level of basic income, it can change the retirement age, introduce a capital gains tax, increase subsidies to families, choose not to, or decrease these, and so on.

Foucault, in fact, provides a precise definition of what is meant by a population. The population, as an object of intervention by biopolitical power, is "a set of elements that, on one side, are immersed within the general regime of living beings and that, on another side, offer a surface on which authoritarian, but reflected and calculated transformations can get a hold." The first mentioned side of the population pertains to human beings conceived in terms of their biological processes, that is, "the human species." The other side of the population is, quite simply, "the public," that is, "the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements." Biopower apprehends and strives to transform this side of the population "through education, campaigns, and convictions" (Foucault, 2009: 75). Obviously, since

biopolitics ultimately concerns itself with the very life of the population, the guiding rationale of its intervention upon the public will be such as to ultimately produce certain effects on the population in the first mentioned sense, that is, to bring to bear transformations on the population as a biological substrate. It will do so in two ways: firstly, through the manipulation of public opinion; secondly, by intervening upon the aforementioned variables upon which the population depends.

The manner in which the modern biopolitical State governs the population, therefore, differs fundamentally from that deployed by older-style sovereignty *vis-à-vis* its subjects. Sovereignty imposes the law upon its subjects and holds them under its sway through legal bonds of obligation. Biopower, in contradistinction, ushers in a shift from sovereignty in this more traditional sense and, instead, manages the population through an ensemble of techniques that Foucault circumscribes under the broad umbrella of what he terms "governmentality." Rather than governing the citizenry through the imposition of the law, governmentality does so through a mobile collection of tactics. This does not, of course, mean that governmentality will not use law. It does use law, except that it deploys laws themselves in the manner of tactics, often doing so in conjunction with tactics that do not fall strictly within the purview of the law, that is, non-legal tactics but not necessarily extra-legal ones (Foucault, 2009: 99). Whether pursued through legal tactics or non-legal ones or by way of a combination of such, governmentality's purpose is not merely to govern but, instead, to go beyond this and pursue the ultimate end of optimising the life-functions of the population, such as its fertility and longevity. This optimisation will be achieved by likewise optimising the population's variables, predominantly those related to the maximisation of overall productivity and wealth, in other words, variables falling within the general field investigated by the science of political economy (Foucault, 2009:105-106).

Though the ways in which disciplinary power, on the one hand, and biopolitical power, on the other hand, exert themselves on a population differ, the first being individualising whereas the second considers the population as a whole, they do, notwithstanding, inexorably converge upon one another. This convergence consists in the fact that they conjointly impose the *norm*. The norm, as Foucault argues, is "applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize." What disciplinary power and biopower conjointly create, maintain and increasingly perfect, is a "normalizing society" (Foucault, 2009: 252-253).

In relation to the norm, the precise contours of which are here established, the co-functioning of disciplinary and biopolitical power occurs by way of the corresponding deployment of a classificatory regime of groups arrayed in such a way that those deemed more deviant from the norm (in the proto-Apartheid South African case, white Protestant) are more markedly individuated and thus susceptible to more stringent control, or worse, abjuration. This idea of deviance from the norm, rather than 'otherness' in the Emmanuel Lévinasian or quasi-Lévinasian sense, comes to the fore in the following observation by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* as regards race:

> European racism has never operated by exclusion, or the designation of someone as Other… Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves. (1987:178)

Deviance from the norm is, of course, not only racial. It also entails deviations in matters of sexuality, disease, fertility, as well as those touching upon issues of indolence, criminality, poverty, culture, religion, and so forth. Race is, notwithstanding, one of the preponderant forms of 'deviance'. Arguably, Foucault downplays the role of ideology across his analyses (for which his notion of 'discourse' compensates to an extent) hence my presentation will go to some lengths to highlight what can be regarded as this omission in his texts. Thus, in what follows, we will consider the ways in which the biology of a population – in this case, that of proto-Apartheid South Africa at the beginning of the last century – has been construed and controlled along racial lines and underpinned by segregationist pseudo-scientific ideologies, ostensibly for the benefit of the population at large. Attention will be paid to the way in which deviance from the norm is justified and buttressed by these ideologies, rendering the black population more distinctly individuated in relation to the white norm, or the "White-Man face."

The questions of race and racism figure clearly in Foucault's lectures at the College de France. In *Society Must be Defended*, Foucault characterises racism as differing from what was previously a war between races, in the sense that racism is:

> a battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage. (Foucault 2003:61)

The question, in the context of pre-Apartheid South Africa, is how did this come to be? Which criteria were invoked to establish what the norm was to be – in this case, white Protestant or Calvinist – and what would be construed as deviating from this norm (black 'distorted' Protestantism, or even black non-Christianity), and what impact did this have in biopolitical terms on the population? In this chapter, we will *inter alia* probe the ideology underpinning the normalisation of one colour group above the other with specific emphasis on the Darwinian-related concept of eugenics and the way in which the government put legislation in place to implement selective breeding through the deployment of 'Immorality Acts'.

Notwithstanding, in order for this consideration to make sense, we will first consider the mechanisms at work in racist societies and their biopolitical structures. Thereupon, we shall explore an instance in which the very law of the State is suspended for the ostensible 'security' of the population.

Let us ask this question: Why was it necessary to impose such draconian measures as the pass system on the 'deviant' black population to 'keep them in their place'? Vanessa Lemm and Miguel Vatter (2017:43) give us some insight into this question, when they note that when a collection of individuals are considered as a species or population, biopower takes the form of a *technology of security*. In totalitarian regimes, as well as colonial and settler societies, the concept of the population is parsed along racial and ethnic lines in order to place them in a hierarchy, often underpinned by the social Darwinian construct of the survival of the fittest. In a second moment, which is pertinent to the question at hand, Lemm and Vatter (2017:43) observe that these hierarchies are used in order to justify modes of state racism, eugenics, apartheid and genocide under the justification that the 'health' of the 'higher' or 'more developed' races are to be defended against the 'lower' or 'more primitive' races. Here we see that the notion of 'security' is paramount. In more extreme forms of totalitarianism like the Nazi regime, the 'purity' and 'health' of one population group calls forth the extermination of whole groups of people. This thanatopolitical and racist turn taken by biopolitics in the late nineteenth century presents us with a paradox which Lemm and Vatter (1917:43) express as follows: "How can biopolitics understood as a form of power over life that seeks to preserve and reproduce species life acquire the right to put this same life to death?" Foucault maintains this proclivity to be a feature specific to modern racism:

> I think that broadly speaking, racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of the other makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality. Racism is a mechanism that allows biopower to work. (Foucault 2003: 258)

Foucault (2003: 256-256) avers further that "The death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or degenerate or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer." This justifies the elimination, or control of the aberrant race in the interests of the health and security of the population as a whole. This, at least on its surface, would seem to be in direct contradiction with the very essence of biopolitical power, as it is at base a power to "'make' live and 'let' die." After all, Foucault does maintain that:

> I think that one of the greatest transformations political right underwent in the nineteenth century was precisely that, I wouldn't say exactly sovereignty's old right – to take life or let live –was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the *power to 'make' live and 'let' die*. The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die. (2003:241).

However, as we have seen, biopolitical power also forges the norm for the population, and the right to make live or let die depends precisely on the creation of this norm – for example, in this case, a 'pure race' – in relation to which deviations from it are seen as a threat to the entire population's very survival. The interlocking of modern biopolitical governance with the resuscitated holdover of old-style sovereignty, thus, functions in the sense that the sector of the population proximate to the norm will live under the biopolitical aegis of '*making live'* and '*letting die'*, whereas those deemed as overly deviating from the same norm will fall under the rule of a sovereignty that tends, rather, to '*let live and make die*.' Of course, this anachronism of a still extant sovereignty within the heart of modern biopolitics is here the handmaiden of the biopolitical rather than the other way around, since sovereignty's '*letting live*' and '*making die*' of some has its *raison d'être* in and is subordinated to biopolitics' broader project of making the population as a whole '*live*' whilst at the same time '*letting it die.*'

One can, in fact, tie together not only sovereign and biopolitical power, but also these last-mentioned two to disciplinary power. We have seen how biopower and disciplinary power converged upon one another in the determination and enforcement of the norm. Indeed, the greater the prevalence of biopolitical power, the more it must call upon disciplinary power, since "managing the population does not mean just managing the collective mass of

phenomena or managing them simply at the level of their overall results" but, instead, "managing it in depth, in all its fine points and details." These fine points and details are managed precisely through the reach afforded into the level of individual 'docile' bodies and their control by the technologies of disciplinary power. These reciprocal reinforcements of disciplinary power by biopolitical power and *vice versa*, in turn, touches strongly upon questions of sovereign power which, far from causing sovereignty to make a hasty retreat (Foucault, 2009:107), in fact expands it. This expansion and intensification of sovereign power assumes, in modernity, the form of an ever-burgeoning and rapidly advancing "'governmentalisation' of the state" – hence, the ever-greater reach, complexity and convolution of what has come to be known as the administrative State (Foucault, 2009: 109-111).

There is a particular modern governmental order that results from this superposition, interpenetration, and mutual galvanisation of these three forms of power. It is what Jacques Rancière terms the order of the "*police.*" By the order of the 'police', Rancière has in mind something far more general and comprehensive than merely an order established and maintained by a modern police force. Broadly, the logic of the order of the 'police' is one which "distributes bodies within the space of their visibility or their invisibility and aligns ways of being, ways of doing, and ways of saying appropriate to each" (Rancière, 1999: 28). It does so to ensure that "bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task," herein rendering the order of police essentially "a configuration of *occupations* and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed" (Rancière, 1999:29). Overall, somewhat analogous to the law and order guaranteed by the physical police in blue uniform but extending far beyond it in breadth, scope and extent, the Rancièrian order of the 'police' is an entire "social mechanism linking medicine, welfare, and culture," in addition to all that falls under disciplinary power and the legal order (Rancière, 1999:28). The order of police is, therefore, the efficiently-stated way in which we may summarise, in a few short lines, what modern power (though not exclusively[70]) looks like, in skeletal fashion, after passing through the Foucaultian extended elaboration.

Inextricably bound up with the determination of the norm in accordance with which the specific manner of hybridisation of biopolitics and resuscitated sovereignty is wrought and functions is, as previously intimated, the role of ideology – in this case, pseudo-Darwinism. Social Darwinism determines the norm (the 'pure' white race) and that which is deemed as

[70] It is important to bear in mind that Rancière's 'police-order', understood in conjunction with his other central concept – 'the distribution of the sensible' – does not only apply to the modern world; it applies to *any* society, including that of ancient Greece, e.g., in so far as it stands for what is visible, audible, do-able, and sayable according to the hierarchies of power operative along the defiles determined by 'the police'. I am indebted to Olivier (in conversation) for this insight.

departing from it (the lesser races). We will now consider the way in which the black population was historically construed, along *faux*-scientific lines, specifically Social Darwinian ones, as 'lesser' beings.

5.3 SOUTH AFRICAN RACISM THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

5.3.1 Social Darwinism

Let us, thus, take up the theme of the ideology – specifically pseudo-Darwinism – that underpinned the tenets of South African racism theory. To this end, we will consider the thinking of certain notable British and European ideologues.

The nineteenth century saw a proliferation of pseudo-scientific theories which upheld the evolutionary superiority of certain races – whether it be the white race as a whole or the Aryan more specifically – to those that these theories 'proved', seemingly incontrovertibly, to be 'lesser' exemplars of the genus *Anthropos.* One of the consequences was the belief that programmes should be taken to keep the superior races 'pure' and uncontaminated from genetically inferior 'feeble-minded' ones, to the ostensible benefit of the population in its entirety. In the context of proto-Apartheid South Africa, this meant *inter alia* passing legislation to prevent mixed marriages between white and 'non-white' (black, Asian, coloured) people to forestall the degeneration of the dominant white race. But first, a brief propaedeutic on the broad social Darwinist ideological terrain would be in order.

It is difficult, according to Dianne Paul (2003:228) to formulate a precise definition of social Darwinism, due to its association with contradictory causes, in particular, political causes and an absence of 'social' Darwinist content in the biological views of classical 'Darwinism'. A plethora of definitions abound ranging from the narrow, such as the identification of social Darwinism with the legitimation of buccaneering, egotistical, Ayn Rand-style *laissez-faire* capitalism, to its expansive application to any social use of Darwinian theory, or even to any social use of evolutionary theory irrespective of its debt to Darwin. Paul observes (2003:237-238) that the social power of a theory – Darwinian, in this case – seldom depends on either a detailed or correct understanding by its interpreters. Rather, Darwinism's main contribution to social theory in particular has been "to popularize certain catchwords." This by no means negates the significance of Darwinism, but rather stresses that today, as in the past, rhetoric

can be a potent resource.[71] Similarly, Hawkins (1997:17) emphasises that "as a world view Darwinism is a powerful *rhetorical* instrument", because its persuasive and flexible rhetorical resources derive precisely "from the existence of *indeterminacies* within the world view itself, i.e. openendedness and even ambiguity over the precise meaning either of certain key terms or over how they are to be related to other terms."

5.3.2 The Rhetoric of Racism: Pseudo-Darwinian Ideologues

A consideration of certain neo-Darwinian ideologues who had an impact on South African twentieth century thought about race and the bio-control of the population is of paramount importance, given the paucity of its own established body of social Darwinian theory intended to justify the way in which ideologues and politicians 'dealt with' the black population. In particular, Francis Galton and his eugenic quest was to have a far-reaching impact on social-Darwinian thought and is a logical place to commence unearthing the ideologies that were to inform South Africa's own pseudo-scientific racial theory. Attention will also be given to the extent to which Galton's theory influenced Nazi conceptions of "racial hygiene," which resonates fairly strongly with the various South African Immorality and Mixed Marriage Acts.

5.3.2.1 Francis Galton (1822-1911)

With the benefit of hindsight, Francis Galton was a notable casualty of what Roger Sandall (2008:170) perceptively termed "The Law of Half-Intended Effects." By this he means the well-intentioned actions of those who know more-or-less what they intend, but are appalled when their conceptual frameworks subsequently spiral out of control to monstrous proportions. Sandal avers that, in like manner, Galton's promotion of eugenics began fairly benignly, but would ultimately lead to unthinkable atrocities such as the Nazi "Final Solution": the Third Reich's gargantuan project to eradicate all European Jewry as called upon by SS-*Obergruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich and decided upon by senior Nazi government officials and the leadership of the Schutzstaffel (SS) at the Wannsee conference on January 20, 1942.

[71] Cf. Victor Klemperer's *The Language of the Third Reich* for a chilling reminder of the consequences of pseudo-scientific rhetoric.

Francis Galton, according to Chris Renwick (2011:344), strikes one as being a historically complex, even quixotic figure. Although he studied medicine, he neither held a degree in medicine nor the natural sciences. Galton also occupied an uneasy position *vis-à-vis* late nineteenth century science, especially when compared with his contemporaries, such as T.H. Huxley. His ideas were, however, enthusiastically embraced by the next generation of biologists and statisticians, notably William Bateson, Karl Pearson and W.F.R. Weldon. Overall, Galton's significance for twentieth-century racialist ideology can be summed up in terms of two points of reference: firstly, state-sanctioned biosocial programmes, such as compulsory sterilisation, implemented in Europe and the USA; and, secondly, his contributions to this period's research on genetics and evolutionary biology, intertwined with eugenic ideas.

Eugenic thought, as an exemplar of the unfortunate "Law of Half-Intended Effects," did not start off with the intention of exterminating Slavic '*untermenschen*' or Jewish 'vermin' or 'bacillus', but was instead a more comparatively benign concern. According to Mike Hawkins (1991:216), prior to its being weaponised in the guise of the various thanatopolitical deliriums of the mid-twentieth century, it concerned itself primarily with the biological decline caused by various social and philanthropic practises that prevented the process of natural selection from taking its course through the elimination of weaker, sickly individuals and their offspring. Darwin, in his *The Descent of Man*, expresses the consequences of this overly 'bleeding-hearted' practice as follows:

> Thus the weak members of civilised society propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed. (1896:205-6)

In the closing pages of the same book, Darwin returned to this topic, averring that "all ought to refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject poverty for their children," pointing out that "if the prudent avoid marriage whilst the reckless marry, the inferior members tend to supplant the better members of society" (1886:94). Darwin emphasised the importance of natural selection in human evolution, and the necessity that man must be engaged in a severe struggle for existence: "Otherwise he would sink into indolence, and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate

of increase, though leading to many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means" (Darwin, 1886:945).

These themes were readily taken up by Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin. In Galton's autobiography, *Memories of My Life*, he writes:

> The publication in 1857 of the *Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin made a marked epoch in my own mental development, as it did in that of human thought generally. Its effect was to demolish a multitude of dogmatic barriers by a single stroke, and to arouse a spirit of rebellion against all ancient authorities whose positive and unauthenticated statements were contradicted by modern science. (1909a:287)

Galton's locus of interest differed, however, from that of Darwin (Renwick, 2011:350). In particular, the species question that preoccupied Darwin held little interest for Galton. Rather, his sphere of interest was "the central topics of Hereditary [sic] and the possible improvement of the human race" (Galton, 1909:288). Galton believed, in a rather deterministic manner, in this regard that all human virtues, such as talent, character and ability, were purely a function of the individual's genetic blue-print, rather than that of industry and application.[72] This led to the insight that these salutary qualities could be selected and bred, thereby improving the genetic 'stock' of human beings like that of animals. Hence, Galton's coinage of the word "eugenics" in 1883, which Renwick (2011:344) designates as "the biosocial science of breeding," or, as Galton defines it in his *Essays in Eugenics* (1909), "the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage."[73] After defining eugenics, Galton turns his attention to its scope and aims. The scope of eugenics for Galton (1909: 35-38) is "the improvement of the inborn qualities, or stock, of some one [sic] human population." It soon transpires in the course of his consideration that he is alluding to the British population. The aim of eugenics, furthermore, "is to represent each class or sect by its best specimens; that done, to leave them to work out their common civilisation in their own way." Favoured qualities include "health, energy, ability, manliness and [a] courteous disposition." Furthermore, the long-term aim of

[72] Galton elaborated on this idea in Hereditary Talent and Character. In: *MacMillan's Magazine*, vol.12 (1865:157-166, 318-327) and *Hereditary Genius* (1892), 2nd Edition. London: MacMillan and Co.

[73] This would be an instance of "positive" eugenics. Elof Axel Carlson (2001:14) describes "positive eugenics" as efforts to persuade the higher British classes to have more children than the lower classes and "negative eugenics" as an attempt to keep the basic genetic stock from being corrupted. Moreover, Carlson (2001:183) points out that the appropriation of eugenics in the United States differed from that of Galton in Britain. Unlike Britain with its wealthy aristocratic upper class, the United States consisted largely of an immigrant population, some of which were considered genetically 'unfit', hence the need for negative eugenics, employing draconian measures, in some instances, such as compulsory sterilisation.

eugenics is "to bring as many influences as can be reasonably employed, to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute *more* than their proportion to the next generation." The foregoing is to be achieved through the deployment of four broad procedures at the behest of "a learned and active Society such as Sociological [sic]." Curiously, this sits uneasily with his definition of eugenics as a "science," which for Galton (1877:471) was restricted "to precise measurements and definite laws, which lead by such exact processes of reasoning to their results, that all minds are obliged to accept the latter as true." From the outset, thus, eugenics emerges as a *quasi-science*. This also filters through in Galton's five eugenic procedures (1909:38-43):

1. He first homes in on what he calls "the *actuarial*" side of heredity which, on the basis of "*average* closeness of kinship" would record and treat data such as birth and death-rates, and other actuarial concerns, in a mathematical manner.

2. He then advocates a historical inquiry into the comparative extent to which the various classes in society have "contributed to the population at various times, in ancient and modern nations." Of particular importance is the correlation between the infertility of lower species and their contact with "high civilization," leading to the disappearance of "barbarous races," with the exception of "the negro." For Galton, the ideal social scenario would be a highly civilised, fertile class, even if it meant inducing fertility by artificial means.

3. The pseudo-scientific tenor of Galton's eugenics is apparent in what he calls "the *conditions* of Eugenics which are to systematically collect facts showing the circumstances which produced 'large thriving families.'" By "thriving" he means families in which the children excel above their class mates in their formative years, whereas a "large" family was one with at least three adult male children. The first step in compiling a eugenic database would be to ascertain "the *status* of the two parents at the time of their marriage" in order to predict the eugenic character of the family. This would include variables such as their race, profession, and residence as well as their parents and siblings. Finally, reasons would be required to establish why the children deserved to belong to a "thriving" family, and this would be furnished by gauging their comparative success or failure. This third procedure, with its emphasis on highly subjective variables such as the "thriving family," infant "excellence" and parental "status," reveals a vast chasm between Galton's eugenic aspirations and his conception of science, which, by his own admission, deals with precise measurements

and incontrovertible laws. Thus, notwithstanding his scientific rhetoric and emphasis on statistics and mathematical inerrancy, as well as his conviction that the compilation of genealogical records would convince the public at large that "Eugenics had at length become a subject of serious scientific study by an energetic Society," eugenics, as Galton conceives it, bears all the hallmarks of a pseudo-science.

4. Galton proposed that social pressure should be brought to bear on what he terms "unsuitable marriages." This would be done by harnessing the eugenic stance to ban such marriages, or regard them with "unreasonable disfavour." The aim of this censure would be to stigmatise "unsuitable marriages" and to thereby deter them.

5. The ultimate elevation of eugenics to a broad civic concern of the entire nation, replete with its implied nationalistic and missionary zeal. This revolutionary surge would pass through three distinct stages. Firstly, eugenics had to be regarded primarily as an academic concern, "until its exact importance has been understood and accepted as fact." The second tenet flows from the first: this is the recognition of eugenics as a subject "whose practical development deserves serious consideration." The third tenet reads like eugenic proselytism, with its insistence that eugenics be imprinted on the national consciousness in the manner of a *new religion*. As Galton (1909:42) puts it: "It has, indeed, strong claims to become an orthodox religious tenet of the future, for Eugenics co-operates with the workings of Nature by securing that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races." Moreover, "I see no impossibility in Eugenics becoming a religious dogma among mankind, but its details must be worked out sedulously in the study." Obviously, the combination of sleight of hand, the desire to have one's proverbial cake and eat it by forging an impossibly perfect coincidence of science and personal religion writ large to an entire populace and national consciousness, and, one might just add, pure and simple muddle, limps here quite brazenly before the beholder as the pseudo-scientific mystification and mystagogy that it is.

Galton's relevance to biopolitics clearly emerges in his principles for eugenics, above, with their emphasis on the control of the body of a population – in this case, the British – by a selective breeding programme that would eliminate "undesirables" from the national "stock."

Galton's eugenic theories, as outlined here in *Essays in Eugenics* (1909), were immensely influential. They were to inform the way in which nineteenth and early-twentieth century

American, British and European ideologues conceived of race and the possibilities of racial engineering. This comparatively benign racial theory – which perhaps would have been a little less benign had it actually been fully implemented – was to have monstrous implications later in the twentieth century at the hands of Nazi ideologues and their henchmen.

5.3.2.2 Ernest Haeckel (1834-1919)

Owing to the dearth of a settled social Darwinist theory, South African ideologues had to look further afield for theoretical underpinnings to justify the way in which they 'dealt with' the black population. To this end, we will consider the thought of Ernest Haeckel (1834-1919), a gifted, influential zoologist from the University of Jena, whose thinking was widely disseminated and adopted. Mike Hawkins (1997:133) describes Haeckel as a prominent naturalist who was not only an indefatigable advocate for evolutionary theory but also one of scientific education, as evidenced by his large number of publications on popular studies, translated into a number of languages. There is, thus, a strong likelihood that some of these studies reached South African shores in the early-to mid-twentieth century.

Evolution, in Haeckel's view, is a process in which organisms, which arise from inorganic matter by "spontaneous generation," are subject to a continuous, relentless process of diversification and perfection. This, he describes as "the law of progressive development, resulting in the modification of species over time to produce new species." (Haekel, 1910:4, as quoted in Hawkins, 1997: 134) Haeckel made recourse to embryology – "The history of the foetus is a recapitulation of the human race" – in order to account for the development and descent of all living beings from earlier life forms. This idea is encapsulated in Haeckel's famous Biogeneric Law positing that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Hawkins, 1997:134). Haeckel also embraced one of Darwin's most important contributions to the theory of evolution, namely natural selection, which revealed that the struggle for life was what Hawkins terms "the impersonal regulator" of what Haeckel regards as the "reciprocal action of heredity and adoption in the gradual transformation of species" (Haeckel, 1910:4, in Hawkins, 1997:134).

These Darwinian theories clearly come to the fore in Haeckel's consideration of race. Hawkins takes cognisance of the anti-egalitarian sentiments which pervade Haeckel's writing, notably in his first book, *History of Creation* (1876), which emphasised inequalities

between individuals. According to Haeckel, evolution also created inequalities between races and societies. He divided humankind into twelve species and thirty-six races on the basis of differences in speech and hair type, which he regarded as the primary defining features of race. He went on to arrange these species and races according to their degree of proximity to the apes (Haeckel, 1876:93, quoted in Hawkins, 1997:139).

In *The Origin of Creation* (1876:307), Haeckel draws a distinction between Ulotrichi, or woolly-haired men, and Lissotrichi, or straight-haired men. Haeckel describes all Ulotrichi, or woolly-haired men, as having "slanting teeth and long heads, and the colour of their skin, hair, and eyes is always very dark." Africans would clearly fall under this classification. As a whole, Haeckel considers woolly-haired men, or Ulotrichi, to be "at a much lower stage of development, and more like apes, than most of the Lissotrichi, or straight-haired men." Moreover, Haeckel opines that the Ulotrichi are incapable of an inner cultural life or higher cognitive development. These deficiencies are hereditary and cannot be remedied, even when the Ulotrichi are exposed to conditions conducive to adaptation such as in the United States (Haeckel 1876:307).

Haeckel's consideration of what he calls *Kaffres (Homo Caffer)*, the kinsmen of the Hottentots, is pertinent to our theme. These include the inhabitants of the Zulu, Zambesi and Mozambique regions of the east coast, Beschuans in the interior, and the Herrero and Congo tribes of the west coasts. He notes that the many languages of the "Kaffres" are derived from the Buntu languages, a primeval language, which is now extinct. Haeckel's pronouncement on nations such as the "Kaffres" is damning: "No woolly-haired nation has ever had an important 'history'" (Haeckel 1876:312-313).[74]

At the furthest remove from the "Kaffres," we have the straight-haired, fair-skinned *Caucasian* or *Mediterranean* races (*Homo Mediterraneous*), which Haeckel describes as having "from time memorial been placed at the head of all races of men, as the most highly developed and perfect." Moreover, "In bodily as well as in mental qualities, no other human species can equal the Mediterranean." Significantly, Haeckel notes that this is the only

[74] In 1964 UNESCA launched the mammoth project, the *General History of Africa* (GHA) to reconstruct Africa's history, hereby liberating it from the colonial prejudice that Africa had no history or civilisations of note, with the exception of Egypt. GHA, which comprises 8 vols. and entailed 35 years of collaboration between more than 230 historians and specialists overseen by an International Scientific committee, soundly exposes this fallacy.

species (other than the Mongolians) which has an actual history, and that this bespeaks of it having a higher degree of civilisation than other nations (Haeckel 1876:321). Even in the survival of the fittest, or what Haeckel calls "the struggle for life," only the Mediterranean races possess the inclination to spread further afield, often at the expense of more backward nations. Haeckel cites only a few exceptions, such as the Mongolians and the species that have managed to adapt to their environment, such as the Negroes, Kaffres and Hubians living in tropical areas, the Malays and Davidas and the polar races, as being immune to the "encroachment of the Indo-Germanic tribes." However, the other races, "which as it is are very much diminished in number, will sooner or later succumb in the struggle for existence to the superiority of the Mediterranean races. The American and Australian tribes are even now fast approaching their complete extinction, and the same may be said of the Papuans and Hottentots" (Haeckel 1876:324-325).

Haeckel strongly opposed artificial means of halting this relentless progress of the survival of the fittest, as instanced above, favouring, instead, means by which stronger races could be cultivated and weaker races and undesirable elements "weeded-out." It is little wonder, then, that Hawkins (1997:140-141) is moved to aver that these beliefs were allied to those which would prefigure the eugenic programmes of some later social Darwinists.

In particular, Haeckel (1910: vol.1:171) deplored contemporary practices such as what he called *military selection*, which ran contrary to that of natural selection. Nolan Hele (2004:18) expresses Haeckel's stance succinctly when he says that "Haeckel regarded war as the greatest eugenic disaster." As a brutal agency of 'unnatural selection', modern warfare placed healthy, strong youths in the firing line, while those who were unhealthy or weak stayed at home, married and propagated themselves. Haeckel believed that war should be averted at all costs and that the money spent on modern 'killing machinery' would be more wisely invested in education. According to Haeckel, the effects of unnatural selection in the guise of modern medicine and warfare *in lieu* of the education of the robust youth and public instruction are that (Haeckel 1916:172) "weakness of the body and weakness of character are on the perpetual increase among civilized nations, and that, together with strong, healthy bodies, free and independent spirits are becoming more and more scarce."

Another instance of 'unnatural selection' scorned by Haeckel was, in fact, modern science. Haeckel, following Herbert Spencer, believed that medical efforts to prolong human life of

those suffering from inheritable diseases and mental illness caused greater suffering. Moreover, these efforts would increase the number of children they produced, who would, in turn, inherit these infirmities, causing a vicious circle. As Haeckel puts it:

> the longer the diseased parents, with medical assistance, can drag on their sickly existence, the more numerous are the descendants who will inherit incurable evils, and the greater will be the number of individuals, again, in the succeeding generation, thanks to that artificial "*medical selection*" who will be infected by their parents with lingering, hereditary disease. (Haeckel, vol.1, 1876:172-273)

Haeckel's thought makes sense within the context (Hele, 2004:17) of his view that the sanctity and preservation of human life was a medieval myth dependent on the belief that one will suffer eternal damnation for disobeying divine commandments. Haeckel (1910, vol.1: 171), thus, had no moral objections to the Spartan and American Indian practices of carefully selecting their young, by destroying weak and sickly infants and nurturing strong, resilient ones in order to strengthen the race. Lest, however, his support of infanticide be considered barbarous, Haeckel, according to Hele, informed his readers that the *phromena* cells, which are the seat of consciousness, are underdeveloped in the brains of newly born infants and that it should not be regarded as murder to put sickly infants out of their misery (Hele, 2004:17). Medical practitioners were, by prolonging the life of these infants, in fact, going against the grain of natural selection, by using 'unnatural selection,' not only to perpetuate suffering, but to cultivate a congenital strain of infirmity. Haeckel (1910, vol.1: 173) also points out the hypocrisy of so-called liberal society, which would be appalled by the idea of killing sickly babies and executing murderers, but accepts "without a murmur," the death of thousands of strong, fine men in war.

In another eugenic conviction, Haeckel endorsed the use of the death penalty to 'weed out' recidivist criminals. This 'weeding out' process, he believed, would lessen the strain of the struggle for existence among the better portion of mankind and prevent the genetic transmission of criminality to the offspring of these "degenerate outcasts" (Haeckel, 1876: 172). Coupled with this, Haeckel believed capital punishment to be more humane than life-long imprisonment:

> …capital punishment is not only a just retribution for murderers who have deprived others of their lives, but should be applied also to other incorrigible criminals. Life-long imprisonment, advocated in its stead, appears on closer,

> impartial consideration to be much worse and crueller punishment. (Haeckel 1916:134),

Using the analogy of a garden, Haeckel (1910, vol.1: 173) regarded capital punishment as akin to "destroying luxuriant weeds, for the prosperity of a well cultivated garden."

Robert Richards (2008:231) and Hawkins (1997:141) point out that, notwithstanding these putative degenerative tendencies – both medical and military – Haeckel believed that the relentless action of natural selection in the sphere of intelligence would neutralise these evils in maintaining the health and progress of the human population. Moreover, Haeckel (in Richards, 2008:231), like Alfred Russel Wallace,[75] opined that the pressures of natural selection had been transferred from the body to that of the mind:

> The result of the struggle for life is that, in the long run, that which is better, because more perfect, conquers that which is weaker and more imperfect. In human life, however, this struggle for life will ever become more and more of an intellectual struggle, not a struggle with weapons of murder. The organ which, above all others, in man becomes more perfect by the ennobling influence of natural selection is the *brain*. The man with the most perfect understanding, not the man with the best revolver, will in the long run be victorious; he will transmit to his descendants the qualities of the brain which assisted him in the victory. Thus then we may justly hope, in spite of all the efforts of the retrograde forces, that the progress of mankind towards freedom, and thus to the utmost perfection, will, by the happy influence of natural selection, become more and more certain. (Haeckel, 1876:174, as quoted in Hawkins, 1997:141)

Haeckel's pejorative assessment (Hawkins, 1997:141) of the intellectual and cultural deficiencies of races that did not conform to the white norm, his affinity with eugenics, in particular, his view of the sick and insane and his desire to 'weed out' criminals could easily suggest an affiliation with proto-Nazi ideology. Whilst Richards (2008:231) admits that Haeckel's eugenic notions, to which he would turn towards the end of his life in *Das Lebenswunder* ("The Wonder of Life"), are highly unsettling to the contemporary reader, he denies that Haeckel's ideas actually paved the way for the moral horrors of the Nazis. Specifically, Richards gives three features of Haeckel's position that were distinctly at variance with Nazi policy and in certain instances consistent with contemporary liberal sentiments on these matters. Firstly, unlike the Nazis, Haeckel regarded military action as

[75] Wallace was a 19th century naturalist who announced the theory of evolution by way of natural selection at the same time as Charles Darwin. He went further, however, than Darwin by applying the theory to human evolution (Eiseley,1959:70).

contrary to natural processes; which as, Richards succinctly puts it, "relied on the better revolver instead of the better brain." Secondly, there is scant difference between our contemporary tolerance for therapeutic abortion and Haeckel's more primitive solution to the problems of debilitating and degrading chronic disease. Thirdly, and finally, as Richards expresses it, "there is no evidence that Haeckel seriously advocated, as a workable policy, the kind of eugenic practice he mentioned. He placed his faith in the corrective hand of natural selection"[76] (2008:232).

5.3.2.3 Pre-Apartheid South African Ideologues

In his influential book, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa*, Saul Dubow considers the contributions of ideologues who used social Darwinism to justify the supposed biological inferiority of the black race, based on existing nineteenth century pseudo-scientific theory. We will consider the wide-ranging impact of these ideologues in what is to follow.

According to Dubow, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time when the social Darwinist idea became part of South African political and social discourse. To be sure, although the vocabulary of social Darwinism proliferated at the end of the nineteenth century, as already intimated, theories of race had not yet been formalised or articulated in any systematic way in South Africa in the aftermath of the Great South African war, otherwise known as the Anglo-Boer War. This was to change in 1903 with the appointment of the South African Native Affairs Commission under the chairmanship of Godfrey Lagden, which provided a crucial impetus for the theoretical explication of 'scientific' racism (Dubow 1995:30).

We will now consider the contributions of ideologues whose social Darwinist thought, as catapulted by the Lagden commission, had a far-reaching impact on South Africa's conception of race, specifically how to 'deal' with the black population by utilising pseudo-science to justify racial segregation.

Initially, the scientific underpinnings for segregation did not emanate from academic quarters, but rather from amateurs, such as missionaries, administrators and 'gentlemen experts.' An example of this was the Fortnightly Club, which comprised forty public figures

[76] Paul (2003:214) suggests that perhaps the only historian to argue a direct path from Darwin to Hitler, via Haeckel is Gasman (1971).

and formed in 1906 as a private debating forum. Notable presentations delivered between 1906 and 1908 included James Howard Pim's influential paper "The Question of Races," Lionel Curtis' discussion "The Place of the Subject Races in the Empire," W.S. Webber's "Can the White Race Continue to Dominate South Africa," and W.L. Honnold's paper "The Negro in America." Although their attempts, as Dubow (1995:130) maintains, situate the South African racial problem within the broader ambit of social Darwinist ideology, nevertheless, in the absence of any body of indigenous 'scientific' research to draw from, the conceptualisations of these theorists was often a *bricolage* derived from 'authorities' in Britain and the United States

The Native Affairs Society of the Transvaal, formed in 1908, was orientated to consider the "native question" with a view to enunciating "a liberal, consistent, and practical Native policy throughout South Africa" in the run up to political unification (The Native Affairs Society of the Transvaal: Constitution and Rules, 1908, as quoted in Dubow 1995:130). Rich (1990:671) wryly observes that the Society proved less that liberal by excluding black Africans from membership. Moreover, it tended to represent English-speaking commercial and professional interests in the Witwatersrand. However, notwithstanding its bias and small size, it nevertheless made an important contribution to formalising the segregationist ideology. These matters of segregation were wholly endorsed by its chairman, Howard Pim, who was also a member of the Fortnightly Club. Dubow (1995:130) notes that, although Pim's ideology was steeped in neo-Darwinism, and he was one of the first ideologues to endorse a wholly segregationist viewpoint, he was not in favour of some of the more extremist racial aspects of neo-Darwinism.

Pim was subsequently ousted from the Native Affairs Society by a hard-line group[77] led by F.W. Bell. Bell was a racial extremist, who upheld the most salient forms of social Darwinist ideology prevalent in Britain and the United States at that time. "Without segregation," he insisted,

> we are destined to become a mongrel race, growing darker all the while, the lowest stratum of the white race sinking to the level of the native, the natives meanwhile losing their own virtues and becoming affected by the vices of the whites. Thus, socially and morally, present tendencies are for evil other than

[77] This hard-line group, led by Bell, in fact accused the Native Affairs Society as being dominated by 'negrophilists' (Rich, 1990:671).

> good, and are toward the eventual assimilation of the white race by the black. (Bell 1909:130, as quoted in Dubow, 1995:129, 130)

One observes here Bell's explicit belief in the inferiority of the black race ("sinking to the level of the native") and the danger of racial mixing, which he saw as mutually detrimental to both white and black civilisations. Allegedly, the white nation eventually faced the danger of being completely engulfed by the black and thereby turning into a "mongrel race."

Bell's racist ideas are of significance insofar as it set the stage for a 'scientific' way of upholding the genetic purity of the white race by preventing its contamination by biologically inferior races – in this case, the black race.

The eugenic movement was to step perfectly into this breach. In this regard, Evans (2014:68-69) describes eugenics as "the belief that humanity could be improved by breeding out, sterilising or eliminating those with undesirable traits." This term, as we have seen, was coined by Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin. Galton (1982:330) wrote about the superiority of Europeans over "lower races" and described black people as being "so childlike, stupid and simpleton-like as frequently to make me ashamed of my own species." He furthermore opined that the colonisers would supplant the natives by a "superior civilization" (p.330).

In South Africa (Dubow 1995: 132), eugenic ideology became more visible in the years between the First World War and the mid-1930's. Symptomatic of the popular impact of eugenics was the horror of "race fusion" or "miscegenation," as evident in Bell's thinking (Dubow 1995:180). Sander L. Gilman (1985:107), in *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness*, observes that the paranoid preoccupation with "miscegenation" originated from the late nineteenth-century vocabulary of sexuality and that "it embodies a fear not merely of interracial sexuality, but its supposed result, the decline of the population." Interracial sex was, thus, seen to be detrimental to white civilisation at its core, in that it subverted the fundamental notions of racial 'pride' and 'purity'. The wide-scale urbanisation of "vigorous," "virile" Africans elicited fear in the white populace. This was seized upon by politicians such as Herzog, who used the dangers of black urban "swamping" in his segregationist discourse of the 1929 "black peril" election campaign. This fear of swamping (*oorstroming*) persisted a generation later and helped to formulate and

solidify the concept of "Apartheid," which brought D.F. Malan into power in 1948 (Dubow 1995:180).

To prevent racial miscegenation and the degeneration of the white race, the South African government drafted legislation directed at the very body of the population. This took the form of a number of Immorality Acts (Dubow 1995:181-182) which passed through three phases. In 1927, an Immorality Act was passed preventing marital miscegenation between whites and Africans. Legislation preventing these 'mixed' relationships was considered, but not passed because it was surmised that social ostracism and public censure would prevent such marriages from taking place in the first instance. In 1936 and 1937, there were renewed efforts to include marriages between whites and all "non-Europeans" in the Immorality Act, but these Bills subsequently lapsed. Rather, two government commissions of inquiry were appointed in 1937 and 1939, respectively, to investigate the problem. Legislation criminalising all forms of interracial sex between whites and 'non-whites' (which was extended to coloureds and Asians as well) was confirmed in 1949, soon after Malan's National Party came into power. As Dubow (1995:182) contends, "The Mixed Marriages Act, perhaps more than any other single statute, symbolised the meaning of apartheid, possibly more so than any other statute for supporters and opponents alike." This is a clear instance of Foucault's '*let live and make die'*. In biopolitical terms, the State wielded the power of permitting, or disallowing life, based on the supposedly detrimental effect of the ideologically contrived lesser (deviant) races on the purity and health of the populace as undergirded by the norm – in this case the white Protestant norm.

Let us, however, return to our consideration of the ideologues whose racial conceptualisations, in particular regarding eugenics, formed the biological underpinning of legislation such as the Immorality Acts. Dubow (1995:133) cites the zoologist Harold B. Fantham (1876-1939) as one of the most consistent and active promoters of eugenics. Fantham (Rich 1990:677) eschewed Lamarckian ideas regarding the inheritance of acquired characteristics and, instead, emphasised the notion of an *ineradicable* heredity. Fantham's eugenics was directly influenced by the Mendelian principle of genetic transmission, whilst he also upheld August Weissmann's (1834-1914) gene-plasm theory (which maintained that only germ cells in the gonads transmit heritable information, whereas somatic cells do not). According to these theories, all influences on the phenotype (physical characteristics, as opposed to 'genotype', which indexes the genetic characteristics) were purely hereditary,

without the intrusion of any social or environmental variables. Fantham's implacable belief in biological determinism, combined with his conservative political outlook, lent a particularly hard edge to some of his views on social issues. In this regard, his views encapsulated the entire gamut of mainline eugenics, as developed in Britain and North America, notably the conviction that human advancement rested on conserving "good human germ plasm" and the elimination of defective genes. Fantham's 'hard edge' comes to the fore in his spurning of philanthropy, immigration and even the development of medical services, because they worked against the principles of natural selection by preserving the physically and mentally unfit. He argued that "feeble-mindedness" was highly detrimental to the survival of civilisation and should be prevented by eugenic measures (Dubow 1995:135). According to Fantham (as referred to in Dubow, 1995:135), unless those with superior genes could be persuaded to reproduce, "race degeneracy" was bound to take place. He was strongly in favour of segregating people with hereditary defects, such as epileptics, idiots and criminals, and by 1930 he supported the sterilisation of the "feeble-minded."

Fantham (Dubow 1995:135) was, moreover, convinced that treating mental patients (through sterilisation) and detaining criminals was necessary in order to prevent them from procreating and tainting the population with their genes. He believed that taking care of them was a waste of taxpayers' money, which could be put to better use by the (genetically advantaged) individual and the state.

Fantham's preoccupation was the maintenance of white supremacy (Dubow 1995:135) and the prevention of the white race's degeneration at the behest of intermarriages between blacks and whites. He (Rich 1990:677) warned of an escalation in the black birth rate and supported the banning of inter-racial marriages and sexual contact. His favourite hobby horse was his constant tendency to polemicise against 'racial degeneration' resulting from the intermarriage between black and white, and the creation of the 'coloured' race. He believed that coloured people, as a hybrid race, were inferior to *both* whites and blacks, lacking in the whites' energy and persistence and the blacks' tribal social control, precisely because of their detachment from tribal conventions (Dubow 1995:135).

As a eugenicist, Fantham upheld the belief that biology was central to understanding and shaping society (Dubow 1995:13) and was motivated to foster a "eugenic consciousness" in the public at large. To this end, he advocated university courses on hereditary principles. He

was determined to inculcate this consciousness at an early age, by even encouraging schools in the Transvaal to include a section on the awareness of practical eugenics in their school syllabus. Other public activities included the formation of a eugenics study circle in Pretoria. He was the South African representative at the International Federation of Eugenic Organisations. Fantham was also the founder and chairman for a period of the Race Welfare society in 1930. This organisation was geared at influencing public opinion in favour of eugenics as well as addressing the biological source of 'feeble-mindedness', hereditary disease and 'poor whiteism'. The most important 'achievement' of this society (Dubow 1995:157) was the encouragement of birth control among women of the poorer classes.

The views of the post-Darwinian ideologue James E. Duerden (Dubow 1995:139-142) were more benign than those encapsulated within Fantham's somewhat grim and pessimistic outlook. In fact, Duerden (1925:63, as quoted in Rich 1990: 677) attacked the "force" of heredity and the idea that "the germ plasm contains within itself something which must necessarily express itself in a certain fashion in the completed body." However, like Fantham, he believed that biologists should advise the government and influence social policy. The fundamental difference between Duerden and Fantham's more drastic views is that Duerden believed eugenic practices, together with social welfare intervention measures, could lead to an improvement in society at large. Duerden sketched out a tripartite scenario of South Africa's eugenic future: each racial group could: (a) remain entirely apart; (b) intermingle; or (c) mix in "the ordinary affairs of life" while maintaining their racial differences. He (Dubow 1995:139) upheld the view that blacks and whites could work together in an industrial setting on the proviso that they remained completely separate, both racially and socially. In this context, however, the superior, genetically hard-wired whites would naturally have to dominate. Notwithstanding, if they led politically without harshness and arrogance, a beneficial system could arise. For Duerden, however, one issue needed to be overcome for whites to retain their superiority: "poor whiteism," which had to be solved to prevent racial degeneration. Duerden contended, on the pessimistic side, that nothing could be done about existing adult poor whites exposed to years of harsh environmental factors, as these could not be assimilated into modern industrial society. On the other hand, however, the future could be better for their offspring who, by remedial means such as education, could be socially reclaimed. Notwithstanding Duerden's significant contribution to the debate, the problem of "poor whiteism" was still regarded with alarm, especially the intermarriage between poor whites and blacks, which was seen as threatening the purity, health and supremacy of the

white race. On close scrutiny, a strange logic asserts itself regarding the issue of poor whiteism. The point is that if racial superiority was solely genetically determined, as endorsed by ideologues like Fanthan, what could account for the phenomenon of the 'inferior' poor white? Poor whitetism, thus, clearly puts Fantham and his ilk on a slippery theoretical slope. That is to say: if whites could genetically retrogress, then this potential regression upends the notion of immutable white hereditary superiority. The way around this conundrum was to argue that whites' strong Dutch and German genetic stock was weakened by its exposure to harsh environmental elements, which eroded their strength and led to the emergence of poor whites. Ideologues such as Duerden were swift to note that this weakening could be reversed in the succeeding generation by implementing remedial measures. Nevertheless, the fear still persisted that the racial mixing of poor whites would be highly detrimental to the genetic supremacy of the white race. This was to play a large part in the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. Dubow notes in this regard, in *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36* (1989:32), that nineteenth century racial science's claims to justify white supremacy were bolstered by the Bible for its authority. Based on a distorted interpretation of Scripture, Afrikaner nationalists, especially from the 1930's onwards, believed that Africans were forever destined to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water" on account of their being descendants of the Biblical Ham who was cursed.

Social Darwinian did not cease here in the 1930's, contrary to the expectation that it would have waned considerably in the aftermath of the Holocaust, which explicitly drew deeply on aspects of social Darwinism to legitimise its atrocities. On the contrary, as Gavin Evans (2014) argues convincingly in his book *Black Brain White Brain*, faux-scientific theories still abounded in the second half of the twentieth century and have spilled over into the twenty-first. These studies set out to demonstrate that intelligence, specifically, is not only a hereditary trait, but also that it is genetically determined and a consequence of more rapid evolutionary processes at work in certain races than in others. These erroneous studies then take their findings one fatal step further to claim that black people, and other non-white races, are innately intellectually inferior to their white counterparts. Evans (2014:298), as he puts it, sets out "to expose the toxic brew that comes from blending a skewed notion of race with a flawed notion of intelligence, under the umbrella of IQ." He goes on further to state emphatically that "this is what 20-th century and 21-st century racial 'science' is all about – and there is nothing scientific about it at all." From this, we can infer that 'scientific' racial science is nothing less than a particularly insidious form of racism dressed up in lamb's wool.

One may quickly debunk the myths about myth by first noting, following Evans (2014:298), that race is a less solid scientific category than is commonly intuited, in that each of the commonly defined races – East Asians, Africans and Caucasians – have the entire human genetic range within them, implying that there is as much genetic variation within each race as between distinct races. Secondly, intelligence and intelligence quotient, or IQ (Evans 2014:298-299) are by no means synonymous, implying that the acronym IQ is somewhat misleading. This is so because IQ measures merely a very restricted form of reasoning, whilst eliding other legitimate forms of reasoning in its tests. Intelligence, moreover, cannot be reduced to a single number and the idea of there being a general intelligence (*g*) is a tricky supposition to sustain. Beyond this (Evans 2014:199), although the forms of reason measured by IQ tests have a genetic component, which varies between population groups, the reason for differences between the scores of different population groups can more often than not be ascribed to the environment, a factor that biological determinists tend to completely overlook. From this, it is possible to conclude, as Evans (2014:299) does, that there is insufficient evidence to support the idea that there are innate racial differences in intelligence in any way and that, over the past century, IQ testing has been harmful in its attempt to rate individuals, population groups and races on the erroneous assumption that it reflects intelligence and that it is biologically entrenched.

Of course, IQ tests, based on American models, were used in proto-Apartheid South Africa to bolster arguments of racial inferiority. According to Rich (1990:679) intelligence tests began to be examined by the South African government in the 1920s as a means of gathering evidence to tackle the 'poor white' issue. It was to have detrimental consequences to black people because, while differences between groups of white children were ascribed to environmental differences, the differences between whites and blacks were perceived as hereditary. The commissioner for mental disorders, John Thomas Dunstan (1923:155, as quoted in Rich 1990:680), made a comparison between "retarded' and "defective" white children. In comparison to the salutary consequences of educating "retarded" white children, Dunstan claimed that there was "such a deficiency of brain cells" among Africans that "neither education, nor environment, nor any other factor, except a mutation, can lead to their rising to the level of advancement of the higher races."

This is a paradigmatic instance, in Foucaultian terms, of how power is exerted over the body of the population, in this instance, that of black South Africans. The point is that IQ results,

and similar data and statistics, provide a powerful tool for the regulation, control and surveillance of the human species and, in this case, the legitimisation of racial inequality. Ironically, the fate of human beings is not in the hands of the law in the direct sense, but of governmental bureaucrats who use knowledge garnered from administrative data, such as IQ tests and the law, more as a tactic to intervene in the life of the population at the level of its biological processes. One thinks, in particular, of IQ tests appraised by mainly unqualified military personnel to test soldiers' intelligence and, as we will see, the issuing of passes to musicians by bureaucrats who used dubious methods to establish black Africans' musicality.

The obvious question is: 'Why has this mode of thinking persisted, notwithstanding its false premises and detrimental impact on certain races?' Evans (1994:195) suggests that part of the answer is that it makes good reading. Editors are interested in controversial issues and stories on races (and gender), specifically when bolstered by 'scientific' data that fit the bill. If the 'scientist' gives a genetic backing to his claims, so much the better, because they know that the population at large is gullible and generally accepts the view that genes can account for everything. It is for this reason that 'scientific' racial theories will persist. As Evans expresses it:

> …we can expect more of the same in years to come. The building blocks are always in place: a group of dedicated far-right IQ missionaries pumping out race-tinged data; a wider group of psychologists, academics and writers (like the evolutionary psychologists in recent years) deeply committed to a hereditarian intellectual agenda and periodically willing to draw on the data of the racist core; an even wider network of politicians, editors, academics, authors and publishers with anti-welfare agendas, leaning in the libertarian direction; and most important, media decision-makers who know that any story combining race, science, genetics and intelligence is likely to fly. (2014:297)

Our emphasis will shift now from our consideration of the partly ongoing role of pseudo-scientific theories to uphold white supremacy and 'malign' black 'deviance', to that of the mechanisms at work in contemporary biopolitical societies and their resonances with early 20th century South African governmentality.

5.4 TOLERANCE AND RACE

In the past few decades, modern democratic societies have been, and continue to be, accurately describable as multiculturalist, in the sense that, in theory, they incorporate and exercise a plausible degree of tolerance of minorities. Tolerance of persons of differing race, gender, ethnicity and religion has been seen, in its broad effects upon contemporary society, as a beneficent, stabilising force, which serves to largely prevent the social pots of discontent from boiling over, as well as vouchsafing, for the most part but not completely, fairness of civic relations, equality of opportunity, and equal legal treatment across biological and cultural differences. As we shall see, there is much more to this, as there is a darker side to contemporary multicultural tolerance from whence the outwardly egalitarian and purportedly culturally neutral edifice of such western democratic regimes does reveal an underlying logic that is, in fact, far less egalitarian and, on the contrary, shot through with an array of antagonisms that it contains solely through the deployment of a pervasive apparatus of normalisation. Notwithstanding, contemporary multiculturalist tolerance discourse, for the most part, still remains vast apart from the manner in which the South African regime of the first half of the twentieth century comported itself in matters of race, where one saw strictly enforced racial segregation, the rather unsavoury pass laws, and so forth. Of course, during this period, the white South African regime was not strictly speaking fascist, although some proto-fascist elements were in place. Certainly, there was nothing like the Nazi extermination of '*untermenschen*', 'lice', or vermin. That is, the regime never braced itself into as a posture so paranoid that the necessary industrialised death of racially profiled pockets of population was seen as the *sine qua non* of the entire population's salvific regeneration. The 'purity' and 'health' of the white population was, instead, upheld through disciplinary-*cum*-biopolitical technologies such as tight control and surveillance, which enforced compulsory racial segregation. Even though the state racism during this period did not quite reach the level of institutional formalisation and severity that it would following the actual imposition of Apartheid by the National Party under D.F. Malan in the late 1940s, its treatment of blacks does seem, and is *de facto*, loathsome from present-day multiculturalist high ground. Still, a measure of tolerance of less esteemed races did exist, with racial segregation, as maintained by a system of surveillance and control, providing the institutional and existential condition for such tolerance. Of course, today we would consider such highly conditional tolerance a form of intolerance. However, strictly speaking, the opposite of intolerance is not exactly tolerance. It would rather be condoning, if not encouraging, a complete merging into a non-

differentiated mass bereft of contours between self and other. Therefore, tolerance is always and by definition conditional, and by this token, limited tolerance, that is, conditional tolerance. The difference between a less enlightened regime and a more openly cosmopolitan one would, thus, consist in a difference concerning what these conditions ought to be.

This insight is borne out in better detail in Wendy Brown's *Regulating Aversion*, where she maintains that (Brown 2006:26) none of the *OED* definitions of the word 'tolerance' designates either neutrality, or respect for that which is tolerated. Rather:

> tolerance checks an attitude or condition of disapproval, disdain, or revulsion with a particular kind of overcoming – one that is enabled either by the fortitude to throw off the danger or by the capaciousness to incorporate it or license its existence. Thus, tolerance carries within it an antagonism toward alterity as well as the capacity for normalization. (Brown, 2006:26)

That Brown concludes the above quoted passage with the word "normalization" is telling and, in fact, the point. In modernity, and especially in late modernity, we are, of course, firmly ensconced within biopolitical regimes and, as observed much earlier, biopower and disciplinary power always structurally converge upon one another in the forging, maintenance and reinforcement of the norm. This biopoliticisation and normalisation inevitably changes how the very mechanism of intra-societal tolerance functions. Prior to the advent of biopower, tolerance in western liberal societies was essentially Lockean, or at least was aspired to be such in certain more idealistic quarters. In Locke, the identity of the subject was primarily national, whereas tolerance essentially concerned itself with the beliefs of such individuals. These beliefs, and the practices that would naturally emanate from them, were considered as sourced in individual conscience. After the shift from traditional sovereign power to disciplinary power, with biopower hot on its heels and functioning in lockstep with it, that is, the transition to governmentality, the beliefs and the associated practices of individuals were more and more construed as rooted in the identity of the believer and practitioner. This ever-greater fixity of identity came to increasingly usurp the role of what was previously conceived as autonomous moral conscience. In this way, tolerance, under biopolitical regimes, was progressively linked to identity, making tolerance itself essentially the tolerance of identity. This is how modern 'multiculturalist' tolerance functions. In a strictly biopolitical fashion, it entails the regulation of a sizeable matrix of disparate identities, where each given identity, from the vantage point of the system, is seen as a kernel, or immanentised Platonic form, from whence the beliefs, experiences and practices

associated with it arise and elaborate themselves. The consequence of this, as Brown (2006:43) argues, is that "opinions, belief, practices are cast not as matters of conscience, education, or revelation but as the material of the person of which certain attributes (racial, sexual, gendered or ethnic) are an index: hence, the notions of 'black consciousness', women's 'morality', 'cultural viewpoint', or 'queer sensibility'." Fundamentally, then, what the contemporary discourse of tolerance minimises and throws into the more distant background is:

> the Lockean notion that beliefs are matters of personal revelation or deliberation in which our agentic individuality is the expression of our fundamental humanness. In its place, this order of subject formation expresses our humanness as a cultural, ethnic, or sexual being and not as a choosing or thinking-free-individual. (Brown 2006:43)

Thus, one can see what is lost in the passage from the Lockean conception of tolerance toward the purportedly more enlightened and more tolerant tolerance systematised under the carapace of 'multiculturalism'. What is likewise lost in 'multiculturalism', and is lost to a still greater degree in the peevish and vindictive sensibilities of the Mr Creakles, Mr and Mrs Murdstones, and other protestant schoolmarms that make up the present-day hysterical spate known as 'wokeness' which, despite itself, even more strongly reinforces this biopolitical rigidity and essentialism – are the egalitarian aspirations of Martin Luther King Jr's address at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington DC, on August 28, 1963: that our children should "one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character."

The situation of black Africans in the white South African regime in the few decades prior to the formal institutionalisation of Apartheid would fall somewhere between the Lockean conception of tolerance and its radicalisation in Martin Luther King Jr, on the one hand, and contemporary 'multiculturalist' tolerance and its 'woke' intensification, on the other. In fact, we can view it as, quite strangely, biopolitically and structurally much closer than it is ordinarily thought to contemporary 'multiculturalism', to a sort of 'wokeness' that has not been 'awokened', with the crucial caveat that the intense preoccupation with race then, in proto-Apartheid South Africa, fell on the side of a white government busied with enforcing physical racial divisions rather than, as is the case at present, on an 'enlightened' academic and corporate clerisy exacerbating racial, and other, divisions at the ideological and polemical level. The fundamental way in which racial segregation, in the decades running up to formal

Apartheid, was isomorphic to 'multiculturalist' racialism – yes, racial*ism* – consisted in the fact that, during this time, the opinions, beliefs, experiences and practices of black South Africans were largely subsumed under the notion of 'blackness', of blackness as a rigid, ossified identity, as the deep genetic structure from whence these characteristics of black people were thought to arise. Much as in the 'multiculturalist' discourse of tolerance, black people's background, history and humanity were compressed and coagulated into a single identity based on the colour of their skin. The racialisation of a given group's cultural practices and sensibility, at the same time, ushers in, as Brown (2006:46-47) argues, the immediately attendant corollary of race itself being culturalised. We have, therefore, a self-reinforcing double-pincer movement comprising the racialisation of culture and the culturalisation of race. This also applies to ethnicity more broadly as well as to gender and sexuality, with all such originally physical differences being progressively transmogrified into differences that are now cultural and, above all, ideological. Notwithstanding, though there was an ideological weaponisation of race in proto-Apartheid South Africa to the ends of justifying the systematic marginalisation and maltreatment of blacks under the white government of that time, the extent to which race, sexuality and gender had been culturalised had not proceeded to the point where, absurdly, race, sexuality and gender suddenly came to unmoor themselves from biology altogether. That is, at the level of pure ideology, things had not reached the point, such as they have today under conditions of advanced 'wokeness', where, as we saw in Chapter 3, a sector of the clerisy have fairly recently decreed the excommunication of Kanye West from the church of black, the excommunication of Peter Thiel from the church of gay and the excommunication of Germaine Greer from the church of feminism.

In addition to this racialisation, sexualisation and genderisation of cultural differences, and the coextensive culturalisation of race, sexuality, and gender, which entire Janus-faced process generates the identities falling under modern biopolitical regimes of tolerance of minorities, we must look at the deeper structure of normalisation that underlies it. As Brown (2006:43) maintains apropos of biopolitical-*cum*-disciplinary regimes, "individualization is 'descending': as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised," by which is meant minorities slated for tolerance, "tend to be more strongly individualized." At the same time, the 'normal' subject is less subject to individuating mechanisms than is someone who deviates from the norm. As Foucault expresses it,

> in a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards the first of these pairs that all the individualizing mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and when one wishes to individualize the healthy, normal and law-abiding adult, it is always by asking him how much of the child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, what fundamental crime he has dreamt of committing. (Foucault 1979:193)

This relation between normalisation and individuation in modern regimes of power, hereupon, continues to be very much in operation in what Brown (2006:42) describes as the "regulatory individuation of the deviant, the abject, the other," in "the normalizing work of contemporary tolerance discourse." What emerges into sight is that in modern biopolitical regimes, upon which multiculturalism itself rests, categories of individual more distinct from what is constructed from the vantage point of the combined distributed effects of biopolitical technologies as the norm are more strongly individuated than those closer to this norm. The further one moves away from what the regime entrenches and reinforces as the norm, the more acute and starkly etched is the individuation. Therefore, individuals and groups that are to be tolerated will, by definition, be those who depart from the norm. The further these individuals and groups depart from the norm, the greater will be the degree of tolerance that will need to be exercised with regard to them. What this dialectic between normalisation and individuation brings about (Brown 2006: 44) is, thus, a tacit split, engineered by the discourse of toleration, into those who tolerate (who are closer to the norm and thus less individuated) and the tolerated (who are further and more deviant from the norm and thus more individuated). In this way, multiculturalist tolerance broadens the chasm between the tolerating and the tolerated, thereby effecting the mutual alienation of the two groups. One may add to this that this alienation serves, also, to incubate, and thus allows to fester, the resentments that the tolerating and tolerated groups entertain with regard to one another.

Of course, contemporary multiculturalist tolerance discourse functions under the aegis of what is claimed to be a universalist and culturally neutral liberal nation State. However, as we have seen, contemporary tolerance discourse functions solely under, and is the product of, a biopolitical regime of normalisation and the regulation of deviancy with respect to the norm. For instance, in the United States, the ostensibly multicultural tolerance of marginal identities such as blacks, Hispanics, Asians, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, queers, trans, and so forth, in fact, hides the Anglo-Saxon Protestant norm which it continues to tacitly uphold. The actual existence of this norm, as biopolitically entrenched, will, notwithstanding, extrude itself in

scenarios where the sovereignty of the nation-state itself is threatened. This has frequently transpired in historical periods marked by a more torrential influx of immigrants, or even the threat of such an influx, during which the biopolitical structures underlying the discourse of tolerance are placed under unusual strain. Such an influx, if it exceeds a certain threshold, will place severe pressure on the purported cultural 'neutrality' and 'universality' promulgated by the nation-state into which this influx is to take place. In the process, the various identity claims (ethnic, racial, sexual, religious) of the incoming population will come into conflict, either explicitly or tacitly, with the normative features underlying the ostensibly culture-neutral universalism of the nation-state and its apparatus of multicultural tolerance. In this case, the hitherto masked norm (usually white, Protestant), which is hardly universal or culturally neutral, of the host nation is bound to become more apparent and step forth into the light of day, especially when the immigrants, or certain others-in-excess within, deviate considerably from it, for example, if they are fundamentalist, manifestly non-liberal elements.

In general, to fall obeisantly within the parameters of tolerance of the modern multiculturalist nation-state, it is crucial for the immigrant to embrace the national identity of the host state, while relegating his or her trans-national identity to a strictly secondary role in relation to this national identity. That is, he or she must necessarily metabolise his or her trans-national identity as a strictly subnational identity subordinate to his or her national identity, which latter must always be prioritised. However, in the face of an increased influx of populations bearing contrary, reactionary identities into the liberal host nation, the subsumption of the immigrant's trans-national identity by his or her subnational identity may start increasingly to fail and come apart at the seams. If this happens, what formerly appeared to be the universality and cultural neutrality of the nation-state doing the tolerating shall give way to the manifest extrusion of the always extant, hidden, underlying norm (whiteness, Protestantism) in accordance with which its toleration functioned. Such pressurised scenarios are precisely the situations that reveal the structural biopolitical preservation of the disavowed norm as the condition *sine qua non* of contemporary multiculturalist tolerance of minorities and, by the same token, also that of earlier forms of more limited racial tolerance in earlier, more harsh, modern regimes, except that in these harsher regimes the norm is not actually, or scarcely, hidden.

This radical shift in comportment leads to the temporary supersession of the discourse of tolerance by that of *raison d'État*. Foucault treats the notion of *raison d'État* fairly

extensively in his lectures at the Collège de France collected as *Security, Territory, Population*. *Raison d'État* is a form of rationality that concerns itself with the State's maintenance of its own structural integrity, together with the actions and general posture of the State required for this preservation and, if need be, reconstitution in the event of the State being undermined. *Raison d'État* is fundamentally conservative and, as it were, a solipsism of the State with regard to itself (Foucault 2009:257-258). It is a form of reason, statist posture and comportment that is, moreover, 'higher' than the positive order of law and logically anterior to the latter. For the most part, in the normal course of its smooth operation, *raison d'État* is indistinguishable from the simple functioning of the laws of the juridical order. In its quotidian operation, *raison d'État*'s relation to the laws of the juridical order consists in the fact that "it posits them as an element of its own game" and "makes use of them in its usual functioning precisely because it deems them necessary or useful." Notwithstanding, without departing from its fundamental logic of State-preservation, *raison d'État* can also shift its modality to that of *coup d'État*. The colloquial usage of this term is, in fact, the exact opposite of its original meaning, which is the one that Foucault has in mind. The *coup d'État*, in its original sense, is not an insurrection against the State but, rather, a top-down action of the State itself enacted to defend itself against a real or perceived threat mounted against it. When the State effectuates a *coup d'État*, it does so by suspending the law with respect to the particular sector of the population it deems a danger to its fundamental integrity, so that it can exclude, corral, extra-legally detain, or even kill people belonging to this 'dangerous' cross-section, all with a view to accomplishing the salvation of the State (Foucault 2009:261-263).

When *raison d'État* becomes *coup d'État*, within the context of 'multiculturalist' tolerance, as Brown (2006:103) argues, "tolerant reason" is superseded. With this shift having come to pass, *raison d'État* no longer merely maintains the regime of tolerance but, in the face of a perceived threat to national sovereignty, the State reverts at the same time to its security function. The State will now defend the principle of tolerance by targeting a group, or groups, that it perceives as being intrinsically intolerant. It will do so by, in extreme cases, inciting the citizens against this perceived intolerance and even take extra-judicial action against the purported threat posed by the intolerant group or groups. The State justifies this latter action by recurring to the principle of 'virtue'. When the 'intruder' is seen as not fulfilling its mandate of properly subsuming his or her trans-national identity under his or her subnational identity, this intruder is seen as being intolerant and neither free nor possessed of virtue and must, thus, be thwarted extra-judicially. It is deeply ironic then, that a crucial precondition for

this ‘virtuous’ action of the State against the purportedly intolerant, ‘unfree’, ‘unvirtuous’ intruder is precisely the multiculturalist tolerance that it advocates. Under the pretence of universalism and cultural neutrality, the discourse of multiculturalist tolerance, as shown by more extreme situations, in reality functions to protect its national identity: the usually white and protestant norm, in the case of Anglo-Saxon liberal democracies, which are the flagship regimes of this variety of tolerance.

The South African regime of the few decades running up to the formal installation of Apartheid as law in the late 1940s certainly differed quite markedly from the purportedly culturally neutral, multiculturalist western modern liberal democratic State. For one, it made no pretence to cultural or racial neutrality, explicitly exposing the clash between the white, Protestant norm and the black, quasi-Protestant, or ‘distorted Protestant’, deviance from this norm. I use the term ‘distorted Protestantism’ here in a non-pejorative sense to designate the wide-spread melding of indigenous pagan rituals and beliefs among blacks, such as ancestor worship, with Christian Protestant religious practices. However, and as already observed, notwithstanding the conflict and normative differences between the races, the white regime still did exercise a modicum of tolerance to maintain social order and forestall, or quell any possible uprisings, on a small or large scale, by the black majority. This was accomplished through the *de facto* segregation of persons of different culture and race, and the enforcement and management of these distinctions, spatially and legally. In spite of this unabashed racism, there still remain some fairly deep structural similarities between modern liberal-democratic tolerance discourse and the racially segregated white South African regime of the second quarter of the twentieth century. For one, though in contemporary liberal-democratic regimes of tolerance, unlike in the pre-World War II white South African regime, there is no formal spatial segregation between whites and other races, as well as there being formal equality before the law (although in practice things are a little different), these contemporary regimes still do segregate conceptually at the biopolitical level, in terms of the array of increasingly individuated deviances from the norm that they presuppose and maintain as the structure designating and entrenching those who do the tolerating and those to be tolerated. The difference is that, whilst itself functioning on the basis of precisely such a biopolitical array of differentiations, except one that is taxonomically less intricate, the South African white regime did not occult this array, because biopolitically individuated identities were more closely linked to the policing of a striated space and to the legal system.

Another parallel between contemporary multiculturalist regimes of tolerance and the proto-Apartheid South African regime is their ready recursion to *coup d'État*. The threat posed by an above-threshold-level influx of the intolerant to the identity of the multicultural host (white, Christian) finds its homology in the danger perceived by white urban Afrikaners in the face of an influx of thousands of blacks to the cities from the countryside in the wake of the 1913 Natives' Urban Areas Act, amid conditions of widespread poverty and crippling drought. True to form, the usually vocal South African government expressed its grave concern citing the dangers of 'swarming' ('*oorstroming*'), or over-population, as a cause for national alarm. This sentiment was to be central to Herzog's segregationist rhetoric in his 1929 election campaign. The rhetoric of 'overpopulation', however, artfully veiled the more fundamental reason for the authorities' fear, which was in actuality the apprehension that widespread migration of the black population to white areas would pose a threat to the white Protestant norms underpinning the national identity of Afrikaans and English South Africans. Included within this was the horror of miscegenation, engendered by the closer proximity of white and black people in their living areas – it must be noted that most slumyards were racially integrated and featured a not insignificant portion of poor whites – and in their working environments in the mines and white industries. Of particular concern were the consequences of the intermarriage between poor whites and blacks, which they believed would potentially lead to racial enfeebling and the retrogression of the white race.

In contrast to contemporary multiculturalist nation-states, where racial difference is certainly marked by the biopolitical array of increasing individuation from the norm, with the South African regime of the first half of the twentieth century, these differences were not merely biopolitically individuated, but also legally differentiated. Among these legal differentiations were, among others, those effected by the 1912 Mines and Works Regulations Act, which enjoined the employment of only whites in certain more technical mining occupations; the 1926 Doctor and Works Amendment Act, which reserved these mining occupations for white and coloured people proficient in Afrikaans; the 1927 Immorality Act, which prohibited sexual relations between whites and blacks; the 1913 Natives Land Act, which forbade the buying of land from natives by whites and *vice versa*, with occasional exception needing to be approved by the Governor-General; the 1923 Natives Urban Areas Act, which mandated male black African citizens and those outside their homelands to carry pass books; and the 1936 Representation of Natives Act, which removed black voters to a separate voters' roll. What here comes under Brown's designation of transnational identity would be the cultural

identity of the black people under the South African Union, as defined by their 'primitive' tribalism, 'pagan practices' of ancestor necromancy, and other traits that would have culturalised their race at the biopolitical level. Though weaker than in multiculturalist liberal democracies, there would have still been an effective subsumption of this transnational identity under a common national one, except under conditions of legal, economic, geographic, and spatial segregation. So, there is a subsumption conditional upon the understanding of segregation followed by the segregation itself. The legal segregation then follows the divisions already inscribed by the various biopolitical individuations of racial-*cum*-cultural deviances from the white protestant norm. In multiculturalist regimes, this legal, economic, geographic, and spatial segregation is not juridically enforced by the liberal democratic State, although it does *de facto* happen still to be the case to some degree. The overwhelmingly black poor neighbourhoods in urban and suburban areas in Britain, the United States, France, Sweden and other countries are obvious examples.

Of course, under the segregating biopolitical and legal regime of the South African Union, black South Africans were to be tolerated only insofar as they adhered to the strictures of segregation, such as those enforced by the Pass laws. If they violated these principles, following Brown (2006:103), they were regarded as 'intolerant' and thus neither free nor virtuous and, thus, subject to legal censure. At worst, as in the case of Kgobadi, who was left stranded with his wife and dying baby, without a pass (as we saw in Chapter 1), subjects were abandoned by the judicial order and life was reduced to 'bare life' (Agamben) under the control of a sovereign power suspended in its validity with regard to this life. Those such as Kgobadi were, herein, reduced to the status of what Giorgio Agamben (1998:8) theorises as *homo sacer*. *Homo sacer* is life that may not be sacrificed, but which may be killed by anyone with impunity, that is, without committing murder.

5.5 DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL AND STATES OF EMERGENCY

Let us now expand our consideration of *marabi*'s ideological context, by viewing it in the light of what subsequently became 'The Apartheid era' and Georgio Agamben's notion of '*homo sacer*.'

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the figure of *homo sacer* came into greater focus in the media, although not exactly by that name. In 2002 in the USA, the Guantanamo Bay

detention camp was established by the Bush administration as part of the 'war against terror'. Detainees are held indefinitely without recourse to any legal rights, as Judith Butler (2004:51) notes:

> The rights to counsel, means of appeal, and repatriation stipulated by the Geneva Convention have not been granted to any of the detainees in Guantanamo, and although the US has announced its recognition of the Taliban as 'covered' by the Geneva Accord, it has made clear that even the Taliban do not have prisoner of war status; as, indeed, no prisoner in Guantanamo has.

There is, of course, a homology between the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, in which the rule of law was effectively suspended and prisoners were indefinitely incarcerated without any means of legal appeal, and the events that unfolded in South Africa in the 1960s and 1980s. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960 in South Africa and its concomitant backlash, a State of Emergency was called on 30 March 1960. The ANC and PAC were also banned, leading to a spate of arrests. Subsequent to the start of the State of Emergency, approximately 18 000 prisoners were detained without recourse to a trial or any legal counsel. Moreover, most of these detainees were placed in solitary confinement and prohibited contact with the outside world.

On 25 July 1985, a partial State of Emergency was declared by the then State President P.W. Botha. After being briefly lifted on 5 March 1986 it was swiftly re-imposed on a country-wide scale on 12 June 1986. Even more draconian measures were imposed than in prior states of emergency to quell civil unrest. In particular, tight controls were exerted over both national and international media to prevent coverage of a country consumed by violence and police brutality. Approximately 26,000 people were detained between June 1986 and June 1987.

The winds of change were to bring about a new era in which negotiations between the ANC and the National Party set the tone for a new political dispensation. On 7 June 1990, President F.W. de Klerk lifted the four-year State of Emergence in all provinces, except that of Natal, due to ongoing conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC.

The Guantanamo Bay Prison Camp, covert extraordinary rendition operations under the 'war against terror' in general, and the States of Emergency in South Africa in 1960, 1985 and 1986, were all cases highlighting the perception of certain persons, deemed 'dangerous' and

irretrievably 'intolerant', as a perceived threat to the security of the population. As Butler (2004:51) puts it: "In the name of a security alert and national emergency, the law is effectively suspended in both its national and international forms."

This suspension of the normal functioning of the juridical order, specifically for those for whom *habeas corpus* rights are, coextensively with the same suspension, denied, brings us to a certain fundamental feature of both sovereignty and biopolitics, unearthed by Giorgio Agamben in his book *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998) and in the continuation of these theorisations in Agamben's subsequent volumes. Agamben differs from Foucault in the sense that he pushes the biopolitical right back to the very origin and self-constitution of the sovereign juridical order itself. As we shall see, this does not contradict Foucault in ways that are crucial for the present line of argumentation. For now, I will simply posit that sovereignty is always biopolitical as such, and that the difference between regimes of traditional sovereignty prior to the disciplinary-*cum*-biopolitical transition of the late eighteenth century, as theorised by Foucault, is that the former are biopolitical in-themselves, whereas the latter are biopolitical in-themselves and for-themselves. Regarding the fact that biopolitics is as old as sovereignty itself, Agamben maintains that "the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power," in the sense that "*the production of the biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power*." The emergence of biopolitics in the late eighteenth century in Foucault's analyses is the point at which the modern State becomes aware of itself as biopolitical by rendering "the secret tie uniting power and bare life" explicit (Agamben 1998:6). From this moment onwards, bare life, which was hitherto located solely on the margins of the social body, begins to increasingly saturate the entire political domain, to the point of almost coinciding with it (Agamben 1998:9).

The manner in which sovereignty, for Agamben, primordially constitutes itself as a juridical order is by way of the inclusion, through a sovereign decision, under its sway, of its outside. Crucially, however, and paradoxically, this inclusion is in fact an inclusive *exclusion*, in that it entails "the suspension of the juridical order's validity" in relation to that which is included. That is, in primordially including this outside, sovereignty, in its self-constitution, does so by abandoning it and constituting it as the exception to the juridical order. This sovereign decision is, therefore, "the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity" (Agamben, 1998:18-19). What is captured under this

sovereign ban is *homo sacer*: life that may not be sacrificed but which man be killed with impunity (Agamben, 1998:8). This prohibition of the sacrifice of *homo sacer* or, perhaps better put, the incompatibility of *homo sacer* with the logic and/or economy of sacrifice, means that *homo sacer* is strictly an-economic. As a consequence, *homo sacer* cannot be used as an exchange value to make restitution to society or to the State. Therefore, *homo sacer*, by definition, can neither fall under due legal process, nor can it be properly-speaking subjected to the death penalty. It may, however, be eliminated extra-judicially, or, if there is less bloodlust, detained indefinitely.

But how does the figure of *homo sacer* appear in modern democratic regimes? What is the relation between bare, unqualified life and the modern democratic citizen? The link is traceable back to the 1678 writ of *habeas corpus*, in which the very meaning of the term was the exact opposite of what is meant by '*habeas corpus* rights' today. The writ, in fact, demanded the physical presence of a person's body, here meant as pure, unadorned body, or *corpus*, before a court of law, and not that of a citizen bearing rights figuring within the legal provisions falling under what our post-World War II era terms *habeas corpus*. What the 1678 writ operates upon, and sanctions the appearance of, is the same as the bare life of *homo sacer* captured under the sovereign self-constitution of the juridical order as such. The appearance of modern democracy, in turn, repeats the 1678 writ's own repetition of the primordial sovereign inclusive exclusion of *homo sacer*, except that it does so in a rather peculiar way. As Agamben avers, modern democracy, "does not abolish sacred life but rather shatters it and disseminates it into every individual body," doing so in such a way that each such body is produced as *homo sacer* in the virtual state, with the rights-bearing citizen constructed from, and upon, this virtually homosaceralised body (Agamben, 1998:123-124). This construction of the modern citizen-subject from the almost groundless ground of bare, unqualified life may be partly inferred from La Fayerre's gloss on the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man: "Every man is born with inalienable and indefeasible rights." On its surface, this single sentence seems a mere innocuous cliché. However, upon drilling down, one sees that citizenship is here built upon the foundation of bare life, on the simple fact of a body having been born on the soil of the nation of which it is a citizen. This is a direct interpellation of bare life, of man as *homo sacer* in the virtual state (Agamben 1998:127-128). Thus, the modern democratic construction of the rights-bearing citizen-subject is directly biopolitical.

This is where the territories covered by Agamben and Foucault overlap. In Agamben the citizen is a direct interpellation of bare life, whereas this same bare life, through the biopolitical technologies delineated by Foucault, is subject to the normalisations we saw in the early part of this chapter. Foucaultian disciplinary power also zeroes in upon this formally egalitarian operative framework of rights-bearing citizens. In this connection, Foucault argues, in *Discipline and Punish*, that there exists a mutual interpenetration between the juridico-political order and its "formally egalitarian juridical frameworks" within the domain of citizenship, on the one hand, and the panoply of disciplinary mechanisms situated, so to speak, on the underside of the latter, on the other. Concerning how this imbrication functioned in the late nineteenth century – though this is naturally generalisable to the present democratic era – Foucault maintains that the "general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, every day, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines." That is to say, the "real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, juridical liberties" as embedded within the juridico-political order (Foucault,1979:221-222). As also seen much earlier in this chapter, disciplinary power interpellates individual bodies as labour. The joint action of biopolitical technologies and sovereign power, which we have now seen also to be biopolitical, interpellates the bare, unqualified life of virtual *homines sacri* as both the rights-bearing citizen and as that which is subject to normalisation – with the addition that disciplinary power, working together with biopower, also normalises, except that it normalises bodies grasped as labour, whereas the biopolitical, taken abstractly, normalises bodies and the population taken, respectively, in their and its raw materiality.

This now brings us back to the scene painted by Butler of the Guantanamo inmate, hauled into the camps there via extraordinary rendition, and now being indefinitely detained as pure, unadorned, unqualified *corpus*, and thus in the absence of legal provisions, that is, held at a remove from the juricido-political order, yet still under its aegis, except as abandoned by it. What I want to delve into here is the 'anatomy' of states of emergency declared by the State, more generally termed states of exception, through which the law is suspended for individuals deemed 'dangerous' or 'intolerant', and thus a threat to the body politic and State alike. To establish how a state of emergency kicks in, one would have to inquire into how one passes from the 'normal state', in which all bodies under the State are merely virtually *homines sacri*, toward the movement through which certain of these bodies are rendered

actual homines sacri. The short answer to this is: by passing from governmentality to the resurgence within governmentality of a more anachronistic type of sovereignty, through which the direct and naked power of the State executive is brought to bear.

As intimated closer to the beginning of this chapter, the mode of governance specific to modern disciplinary-*cum*-biopolitical regimes Foucault terms 'governmentality'. Governmentality proceeds through State and non-State institutions and governs not so much through the direct application of the law *because* it is the law but, rather, through a diffuse panoply of tactics, including the deployment of laws *themselves* as tactics. Butler (2004:51-52) explains that governmentality, as conceptualised by Foucault, is "the way in which political power manages and regulates populations and goods," and, specifically, that governmentality "has become the main way state power is vitalized." The last word is crucial, since the State is in no sense 'legislated' by governmentality, but rather *vitalised* by it, hereby implying that, without governmentality, the State would lose its motivating power and subsequently collapse. Before the rise of the modern state and governmentality in the late eighteenth century, the State was vitalised by sovereign power, where the latter is understood as "providing legitimacy for the rule of law and offering a guarantor for the representational claims of state power" (Butler, 2004:52). In contradistinction to sovereignty, governmentality is "a mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and persons, the production and regulation of persons and populations, and the circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and restrict the life of the population" (Butler, 2004:52). Governmentality, furthermore, does not operate under the aegis of a unified source or system of control. Rather, it is a shifting, multi-centred, protean, mobile and diffuse set of practices and manoeuvres the purpose of which is "to dispose and order populations and to produce and reproduce subjects, their practices and beliefs, in relation to specific policy aims," (Butler, 2004:52) that, notwithstanding, remains central to the fundamental functioning of the State. Foucault goes as far to say that (1978:103) "the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have become the only political issues, the only real space for political struggle and contestation," in the absence of which the State would cease to exist.

Notwithstanding this primacy and crucial vitalising function of governmentality, the recrudescence of sovereign power within the very midst and heart of governmentality is not only not precluded but, in fact, almost structurally preordained as an ever-present possibility. This possibility of a resurgence of purely sovereign power from the very ambit of

governmentality resides in the fact that, since governmentality deploys laws purely tactically, its tactical deployment of laws, in that it is already non-legal in essence, may swiftly morph into a tactical deployment that is extra-legal, that is, one that, in fact, suspends the law for a class of delineated cases. In Agambenian terms, this occurs precisely through a repetition of the primordial sovereign decision on what the constitutive exception to the juridico-political order will be and which captures bare life as this exception. It is through this decreeing of the sovereign exception that some of the virtual *homines sacri* managed by biopolitical governmentality are transubstantiated, or rather *de*-substantiated, into actual *homines sacri*, through the removal of their *habeas corpus* rights. They will henceforth be biopolitically managed precisely through the suspension of the juridical order's validity with regard to them and their resultant exposure to the naked sovereign power of the State executive. Butler correctly avers this to be the case for those rendered to the various covert 'black sites' in the war on terror:

> the current configuration of state power, in relation both to the management of populations (the hallmark of governmentality) and the exercise of sovereignty in the acts that suspend and limit the jurisdiction of law itself, are reconfigured in terms of the new war prison. (2004:54)

According to Butler, (2004:54) this form of anachronistic sovereignty is evident when the executive branch assumes the power of the judiciary and where the person of the President, or even lesser petty sovereigns, like the sovereign of yore, is invested with the final power to decide when, where, and whether a military trial takes place for our modern day *homines sacri*. It is as if, in these particular instances, "we have returned to a historical time in which sovereignty was indivisible, before the separation of powers has instated itself as a precondition of political modernity."

It is precisely such foregrounding of executive power as well as the suspension of the power of the positive juridical order that invested presidents such as P.W. Botha with the sovereign power to declare States of Emergency in the South African political context. Crucial to this is the 'return' of anachronistic sovereign power or, as Butler (2004:55) puts it, the scenario in which "sovereignty is reintroduced in the very acts by which state suspends law, or contorts law to its own uses."

Butler returns, in this regard, to the prison camps at Guantanamo, where she notes (2004:56) that, according to new regulations, the US government decrees that a number of detainees

will not be given trials at all, but will be 'detained indefinitely.' The obvious question Butler (2004:57) asks is 'under what conditions some human lives cease to become eligible for basic, if not universal, human rights' and how does the US Government construe these rights? The same question is pertinent to the approximately 26,000 people who were detained between June 1986 and June 1987 in the 1986 and 1987 State of Emergency in South Africa.

Significantly, Butler (2004:57) tries to establish which role racial or ethnic factors play in rendering detainees less than human and, thus, bereft of the rights that are germane to a human community. Moreover, by detaining some prisoners indefinitely, the state accords itself the extended power to judge which prisoners are irredeemably dangerous and, thus, bereft of legal rights. This also strikes a chord with the Robben Island prisoners who were considered to be a threat to society and were thus to be 'indefinitely detained'. Butler (2004:64) notes the significance of the word 'detainees', in lieu of 'prisoners', because to call them 'prisoners' would suggest that they are entitled to the international rights pertaining to the ethical treatment of prisoners of war, whereas here it is precisely the case that they must not be granted such rights and instead be treated extra-judicially.

Butler (2004:57) pinpoints what has gone before in biopolitical terms when she says that: "Here we can see that the law itself is either suspended or regarded as an instrument that the state may use in the service of constraining and monitoring a given population." Those who are deemed a threat to the population are detained – or worse. The latter was to be the fate of Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto, and Sicelu Mhlawuli, all victims of Apartheid's 'killing-machine', who were to be "permanently removed from society". The meaning of this seemingly obvious phrase was subsequently hotly contested by state officials and the security police in order to prevent them from being implicated in his death and that of the other 'Cradock Four'.

Very similar was the case of the homosaceralisation of Kgobadi. Such cases were ones in which, whatever rudimentary the biopolitical regime of tolerance existed under proto-Apartheid or Apartheid regimes in South Africa, those individuals' identities possessed of the most biopolitically accentuated individuation away from the norm, were deemed fundamentally 'intolerant' (but in fact 'intolerable') themselves. This resulted in jolting *raison d'État* into its emergency modality of *coup d'État*, through which the State, in order to protect its fundamental integrity from the threat posed by those exceeding the bounds of

biopolitical tolerance, would de-substantiate such individuals into actual *homines sacri*, from whence they would be treated strictly extra-judicially.

5.6 PASS LAWS AND BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL

We have already taken cognisance of the critical moment when "biological existence was reflected in political existence" (Foucault, 1980:142). Recall that Foucault distinguishes between two basic ways in which power is exerted over life. Firstly, the disciplining of the individual body and secondly, the regulatory control of the population (1980:139). Both are of political import.

We have also seen how the first disciplinary regimes emerged in the eighteenth century and the way in which the human body was subjected to strict, repetitive routines with the purpose of producing 'docile bodies.' Thomas Lemke (2011:36) notes that, in contrast to earlier forms of domination such as slavery or serfdom, discipline enabled, on the one hand, an increase in economic productivity of the body, whilst on the other, diminished its political power. Furthermore, "It is exactly this coupling of economic and political imperatives that define discipline and establish its status as a technology." As Foucault puts it:

> The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. (1977:137-138)

As we have likewise seen, the second form of power that Foucault speaks of as emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century, unlike disciplinary power, was directed, not at the individual body, but the body of the population as a whole. This was biopolitical power, or biopower. It was, and is, for Foucault, "a technology of security" (2003:249). According to Lemke (2011:37), this technology is aimed at preventing or compensating for the potential danger that might beset a population as a species or whole. In this case, regulation and control are paramount, rather than the earlier regime of discipline and supervision. Biopolitics, hereby, aims to define "a technology which aims to establish an overall equilibrium, that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers" (Foucault, 2003:249). Biopolitics can also be seen as that form of power which focuses on: "the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological process: propagation,

births and mortality, the level of health, life-expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary" (Foucault, 1990:139). The population, as an object of biopolitics, is, thus, a species which needs to be controlled "*signalatim et omnis*," individually and as a whole (Foucault, 1990:139).

There is a correlation between the biopolitical concern with statistics as a way of being able to monitor and thereby control the constitution of the population, and the Apartheid state, which, as Crais (2002:10) observes, became increasingly obsessed with controlling labour and bodies as part of an intricate "linking of bureaucracy to surveillance" (Evans, 1997:398, as quoted in Crais 2002:10). According to Crais (2002:71), in the Eastern Cape, as elsewhere in the colonial world, empirical data regarding space, numeracy and culture were the three fundamental modes integral to the emergence of the state, through which it could make sense of the subjects it controlled. Each played a crucial role in transforming and controlling black African bodies and their communities, rendering them intelligible to the state, and creating a model for bureaucrats to act on. Crais (2002:71) expresses this heady preoccupation with statistical data and its consequences as follows: "Indeed, over the course of the twentieth century officials evinced a near obsession with rendering Africans more cognizable to the state, creating with apartheid a regime of official information where moral or ethical considerations were quite simply irrelevant." Arguably the most notorious instance hereof is the way the pre-Apartheid and Apartheid governments used the Pass system as a powerful bureaucratic tool to control the black African population. Initially, the Pass system was instituted to control the movement of black Africans, but later, as Kahn (1949:275) observes, "the passes were also aimed at the enforcement of contractual relations, maintenance of order, and identification of the bearer." There, thus, developed a science of government – a governmentality which, in addition to a system of surveillance, developed to administer all governmental minutiae, with the goal of greater surveillance and control. In Chapter 1, we covered, at length, the system of pass laws that were used to keep the black population 'in check'. What follows are specific details required on pass documents during the *marabi* era and their relevance to Foucault's notions of disciplinary power and biopower.

To illustrate pre-(and post) Apartheid's obsession with governmental surveillance, Callinicos (1981:41) enumerates what could be found in any given pass document:

- The name and address of the bearer, as well as his father's name and his chiefdom, so that the bearer easily be traced if he ran away or committed a 'crime.'
- The name of the district where the pass owner was allowed to look for work.
- The date on which the pass was issued – the pass bearer had only six days to find a job, otherwise he had to try for another district. This method ensured that labour was directed to the areas where it was most needed.
- The names and addresses of all the employers of the pass bearer, past and present, how long he had worked for each them; what kind of work he had done and what the employer thought of him (in the character reference, at the back of the document). In addition, the pass bearer's wages for each job were recorded. The job seeker was therefore at the mercy of all his employers. What they said about him decided whether he would get future employment. Moreover, the wage that he was paid in the past decided the wage he would be paid in the future. If he broke his contract, he received a criminal stamp, which would jeopardise all future possibilities of employment.

All the information, Callinicos (1981:41) notes, was also registered in the files at the pass office, making it easier to keep track of all workers. Desertion had to be reported to the pass office, so the deserter could be tracked down and punished for contractual breach.

It is important to bear in mind that, although Callinicos makes use of the masculine gender, 'he' and 'him', women were, in fact, also compelled to wear passes and were subject to the same draconian restrictions as men.

The pass system can also be regarded as symptomatic of disciplinary power, in the light of Foucault's following observation:

> Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed…Its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities and merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering and using. (1977:143)

The very *raison d'être* of the pass system can be said to be knowing "where and how to locate individuals." As a system of labour control, it was able to establish presences and

absences and know where and how to locate individuals with the greatest efficacy. Moreover, because the pass system increased employer control in a number of ways, it served to maintain an obedient work force – which recalls Foucault's notion of the 'docile body'. Failure to conform to the rules could result in a poor character reference or a criminal stamp, both of which could prevent a worker from ever being employed again.

The pass system can, thus, be regarded as panoptical as well as disciplinary and biopolitical, where panopticism is, of course, part of disciplinary power. With regard to the latter, any white man or policeman could demand of black Africans to produce their pass books, unexpectedly, "both day and night" (as lamented by a member of the Transvaal Native Congress in 1919). As a result, they were forced to be constantly vigilant, not knowing when their pass would be required. It goes without saying that this led to the 'self-policing' of their actions and movements, to avoid a violation of the pass laws and subsequent incarceration, which corresponds with the self-monitoring of prisoners in the panoptical prison (discussed by Foucault), where they knew they *could*, in principle, be under surveillance at any time.

These modes of power exerted a degree of control associated with the pass system that made it very difficult for jazz musicians to play professionally. Musicians were unable to cite a specific 'employer' on their pass forms and often had to work during the day to play at night. This was also hampered by the nine o'clock curfew, which made it problematic for musicians to play their gigs in white areas. According to Ballantine (1993:67), for black Africans taking part in nocturnal cultural activities, events that lasted the entire night were a safe way of avoiding the night curfew. However, the effect of early closing necessitated another bureaucratic infamy: the night pass. A document was essential to musicians and these passes were issued only at the end of the event, creating a logjam for those in the frantic rush to get the necessary pass, which they were required to carry at all times. However, even here there was no security, because the police could, without warning swoop early. Those who did not possess a night pass were summarily arrested. Jazz and *marabi* were, thus, constantly subject to the regimes of discipline and control. This control, as Ballantine (1993:68) puts it: "governed the lives of Africans in the towns, which affected aspirant professional musicians in various ways."

In particular, musicians were subjected to bureaucracy, controlled by government officials, who had little or no knowledge of music. It has already been intimated that musicians had to find legitimate employment, i.e. a non-musical job during the day in order to reside legally in

the towns and to be able to perform at night. Trumpeter Edward ('Boetie Vark') Sililo recalls that after some years this system changed and he was able to get a 'daily labour permit' – a change in the details of his pass – which now registered his employment simply as "musician" and thus permitted him to give up his daytime job. However, the procedure for obtaining the permit was as bizarre as it was humiliating. Sililo (1989) recalls these details in an interview with Ballantine (1993:68b). The emphasis is Ballantine's:

> *Well, you had to prove you were a musician and if you were a plumber you had to prove you were a plumbing man. They took me to another place and I was told to play a piano. And, well, it's Afrikaner people: you play 'Sarie Marais*[78]*' and they are very happy…'Kom spiel 'Sarie Marais', jong [hums] 'Nee man, jy ken! Kom!...You just had to go do that, and when you come back, 'Ja, hy's 'n musikant, man!'And then they give it. [laughs]…And many of us could get these passes, and we used to help the other guys and tell them, 'Oh no, you just tell them, 'Oh no, you just tell them you're this, and you play what they [want] you to play.' Because they ask you to play. 'Jy moet speel! 'Die Hand Vol Vere', jong!' Now if you don't know 'Die Hand Vol Vere' – Jy's nie 'n musikant nie!' You must play an Afrikaner song. There you are, sign! Got my credentials: from there I was a musician.*

The quotation with a translation of the Afrikaans interjections:

> *Well, you had to prove you were a musician, and if you were a plumber you had to prove you were a plumbing man. They took me to another place and I was told to play a piano. And, well, it's Afrikaner people: you play 'Sarie Marais' and they are very happy…'Come play 'Sarie Marais', boy [hums] 'No man, you know it, jou know it! Come!...You just had to go do that, and when you come back, 'Yes, he's a musicians, man!'And then they give it. [laughts]…And many of us could get these passes, and we used to help the other guys and tell them, 'Oh no, you just tell them, 'Oh no, you just tell them you're this, and you play what they [want] you to play.' Because they ask you to play. 'You must play! 'Die Hand Vol Vere' boy!' Now if you don't know 'Die Hand Vol Vere' – You're not a musician!' You must play an Afrikaner song. There you are, sign! Got my credentials: from there I was a musician.*

In this way, uninformed bureaucrats had the power to control the future of a musician's life. Ballantine (1993:69) observes that their control of what he calls "the gateway to international opportunity" – the passport – gave bureaucrats even greater power. He recalls an incident in which, in 1937, one of the country's leading vaudeville troupes, "Lucky Stars" were about to make their first trip abroad. In order to do so, their passports had to be approved by the government. One letter – "typical of many that followed" – according to their white

[78] A simple, traditional Afrikaans folk song.

impresario, Bertha Slosberg dashed the hopes that the government would allow any trips abroad by black African musicians, since "Taking aborigines to London or other European capitals has not been very productive of *any* happy results in the past." Then, the crux of the matter: Negro musicians "tended to behave badly in Europe" and, most importantly, "the class of person they came in contact with is not such as to improve their estimate of white people, which is low enough already" (Slosberg: 1939: 217-218). Black musicians were, thus, seen as a threat to the morals of the white population, hence the need to control them by way of passes and withholding passports.

In the final analysis, as Ballantine (1991:70) puts it: "The denial of an enabling document (a passport, a pass, a license); the fear, or reality, of harassment or arrest: urban black popular musicians experienced these and similar kinds of repression as a formal, or legal, policing of their culture by white authority."

5.7 *MARABI'S* LABOUR CONTEXT: MECHANISMS OF CONTROL IN THE MINING INDUSTRY

Mining compounds, part of the labour context of *marabi*, can be seen as situated at the crossroads between different modes of punishment: 'overt' punishment, as evidenced by the brutal punishment meted out to the miners and, then, discipline in the Foucautian sense as biopolitical power asserted on the body by way of spatial, reproductive, associational and police control. Finally, as indispensable to enforcing the disciplinary regime in place here, we will consider the panopticism as evidenced in the design of key mining compounds. In what follows, we will consider these modes of discipline and their impact on the lives of black workers.

5.7.1 Disciplinary Punishment

Discipline in the context of confinement was to take place in 'closed' mining compounds. Neil Parsons (1993:150) notes that closed mining compounds were introduced by the De Beers Mining Company in 1885 and describes them as the first "concentration camps," where workers were locked up, away from their families for three to six months, and enclosed by metal and wire fencing. In response, in the same year, black miners went on strike against

being incarcerated in closed compounds, but De Beers swiftly quelled the strike within a week by sacking the strikers and recruiting new workers from interior chiefs.

There were various ways in which the control over workers was wielded. We will consider these measures as well as the reasons for the powerlessness of the workers in the face of these inhuman circumstances. In the light of the paucity of accounts of conditions in compounds, especially at the turn of the century, this will be done with extensive help from Sean Maroney's article "The Development of the Compound as a Mechanism of Worker control, 1900-1912" (1978:1-11).

Sean Moroney (1978:3) identifies the central authority in the closed mines as being the white manager who exerted a disproportionate amount of control over the working lives of the black workers. These mine managers were assisted in their task by compound "police". Situated somewhere between the compound "police" and compound manager was the head Induna, whose role was to oversee the compound police. In addition to this, their task was to provide the manager "with a constant stream of politico-economic intelligence" (Maroney 1978:4[79]). There was also (Maroney, p.4) the coercive chain of violence asserted by the "bossboys" and exacted in the horrifying detention centres. "Bossboys" were a crucial link in the chain of power and violence which marked the mining compound. Specifically, they controlled the workers underground using sjamboks. They also turned a blind eye when white workers inflicted countless blows on black workers. Also crucial to the brutal working of the mining compound (Maroney 1978:5) were the infamous detention rooms, or as the workers called it, "stocks," which were used in these rooms to restrain workers. The "official line" that detainees were seldom detained for more than a few hours could not be further from the truth. In reality, the detention room was a room of unspeakable horrors as attested by an account of the treatment inflicted on a black worker in the detention room by a white contract worker, Anderson, on the Croesus mine in 1905. Anderson was found guilty of "placing handcuffs on his wrists and handcuffing him to an iron staple attached to a wooden plank made fast to the floor and did keep the said Jim Simali in this position for 4 days without food or drink." Simali's 'crime' was that he did not report to Anderson for the night shift, because he had just worked the entire day shift.

[79] Native Grievances Enquiry Report, 1913-1914.UC, p.19, as quoted in Maroney (1978:4).

Anderson, in his defence, claimed that "This is a common practice on the mines to lock up natives like this kind of punishment. We are not allowed to lash them so they are locked up." Anderson was found guilty and received the equivalent of a slap on the wrist by being fined £20 or alternatively a month's imprisonment (Maroney 1978:6[80]).

Similar horrifying abuses of the detention room were not isolated events by all accounts. In 1909, the Assistant Compound Manager was guilty of brutalising a worker by "inflicting various wounds" by thrashing him with a sjambok in the detention room while he was fastened with handcuffs to a table for about 12 hours (Maroney, 1987:5[81]).

Another instance occurred in June 1902 (Maroney, 1987:5-6) when "1000 workers at the Langlaagte mine went on strike, broke out of their compound and marched towards the Village Deep Mine from where they had been recruited." The Police quelled the uprising. One, however, gave insight into the reasons for the strike:

> The compound manager ill-treats them by having them thrashed in the compound and down the mine with a cat-o-nine tails and thrashed them on the testicles: further that they were not allowed out of the compound for a moment, that they were shut up like dogs. Also that the compound manager gave instructions to the native police to hit them when they saw fit, stated that they would work and not give trouble if the compound manager treated them as human beings not dogs and they would not continue to work while he was in charge of the compound and they would kill him if he continued. (Maroney, 1978:6[82])

There were a number of reasons, which we will now consider, why workers were reticent to take action against such sustained, abject violence. According to Maroney (1978:6), in order to lay a complaint of assault, the black worker had to obtain a special day pass from the manager. If the manager suspected that this was the reason for the pass, which was frequently the case he could simply refuse the pass and the worker would then have to suffer the consequences of his 'audacity.'

Another reason why workers were loath to take action is that Native Affairs inspectors or police investigators would have to gain the permission of the mine manager to enter the compound and state the reason for being there. In order to avoid dismissal, the compound

[80] SNA 57/2147/05 Court transcript: van den Berg vs Anderson 13 May 1905, as quoted in Maroney (1978:6).
[81] SWA 89/1261/09. Press clipping entitled "Savage Brutality", as quoted in Maroney (1987:5).
[82] SNA 11/1308/02. Report of Trooper Brickhill. 26 September 1902, as quoted in Maroney (1978:6).

management would deliberately misdirect the authorities by suppressing the true state of the conditions in the mines. As Pritchard, the Boksburg Native District Controller, put it: "the Compound Overseers – and I go further and say – *dare* not, report to the Officer of the Department every occurrence having reference to the natives under them…the mere giving away of 'compound secrets' might mean summarily dismissal" (Maroney, 1978:6[83]). Action against brutality was also stymied by the 'disappearance' of key witnesses, as Pritchard experienced in 1905:

> On the new Modderfontein Gold Mining Company a very serious case of assault was unearthed in which a native who had been kicked in the ribs, died of the effects. The case was handed over to the Transvaal Town Police, but notwithstanding their most strenuous endeavours, no prosecution was instituted, owing to the fact that the principal witnesses were – in my opinion – spirited away. (Maroney, 1978:6[84])

The odds were also firmly stacked against black workers by the unequal treatment accorded them in law courts, which favoured white workers and often only gave minimal punishments for white miners who were convicted of ill-treating black miners. In this regard, a Native Affairs Official in 1906 referred to a case of assault in which the accused was merely given a warning. The Magistrate justified his ruling by making remarks in court suggesting that "he considers flogging of natives by their employers as justifiable under certain circumstances." The District Controller noted that "This may in some way account for the number of assault cases in which I have recently failed to obtain convictions against white men for assaults of natives" (Maroney, 1978:6[85]). In light of these miscarriages of justice, it is little wonder that, as Maroney (1978:7) has it, "A worker had very little to gain by lodging a complaint."

The harsh regime enforced by the "bossboys" with their sjamboks, especially coupled with the brutal treatment in the detention cells of certain mining compounds meted out to workers such as Jim Simali, nudges us quite strongly in the direction of homosaceralisation, as we can certainly speak here of torture, whether it is by whip scourging the testicles, punitative incarceration, or by near-starvation. Though in the above we do not see an exclusion from the remit of the law machinated specifically from the upper echelons of government, the fact that the management of certain of the mining compounds misled inspectors arriving from the

---

[83] NSA 61/3868/05. Boksburg District Controller to Windham. 15 December 1905, as quoted in Maroney (1978:6).
[84] SNA 61/3868/05. Boksburg district controller, 15 December 1905, as quoted in Maroney (1978:6).
[85] SNA 68/2579/06. Kimberley to Pritchard 10 August 1905. As quoted in Maroney (1978:6).

outside through various cover-ups of abuses transpiring under their aegis, meant that the actual enforcement of legal strictures was shut off. This created a scenario in which mining compounds whose management consistently acted in the manner had become miniature despotic regimes, with the mine management operating in the role of a petty sovereign bearing *de facto* discretionary power that manifested itself in the capricious lawlessness of the "bossboys" and other enforcers who thrashed and detained workers. As likewise indicated, this reign of impunity in the mines was further reinforced by the systematic bias of courts, where complaints brought by black workers concerning their mistreatment in the mines were extremely unlikely to gain significant legal traction, and certainly far from enough traction to counteract the prevailing lawlessness in the compounds. The situation, therefore, can be seen as one in which credible *habeas corpus* rights were effectively suspended for the mine workers, even though it was not formally the intention of the national government for this to be *de jure* the case. Related to this Agambenian-Butlerian point, is the Foucaultian-Brownian point of our earlier sections. This is so, since the *de facto* suspension in the mining compounds of *habeas corpus* rights for black workers, and not for white workers, was, of course, foreshadowed and facilitated by the biopolitically inscribed deviance of blacks from the white norm of the South African regime as such. As observed, the racial identities placed at a further remove from the white Protestant norm, were ones encompassed and slated for toleration. Tolerance is, of course, conditional tolerance, and likewise serves also to incubate resentment within a regime of partly forced civility. Of course, as seen within the mining compounds, identities at the furthest remove from the norm are the first to drop out of the regime of toleration and suffer effective homosaceralisation.

Apart from these brutal modes of control in the mining compounds, black workers were also controlled in a more subtle, more Foucaultian, way, specifically by way of a biopolitics through which blacks were managed in order to protect the white population and the integrity of the State apparatus. The biopolitical grid of individuated deviations from the white protestant norm was here in operation, in which blacks, considered more deviant by the regime, were more incisively marked in the same grid.

5.7.2 Panoptical Control

Crush (1992:829) notes that not only were the coercive practices in mines deemed as disciplinary, they were also inscribed in space. In typical panoptical fashion, compounds

were designed in such a way as to create the illusion that workers were perpetually being watched. This element of uncertainty led to the interiorisation of discipline – that is, to subjectivation in the form of self-discipline – as workers began to police themselves. Crush (1992:829) notes that most of the compounds were initially built in the more typical, square or rectangular shape. However, during the mining industry's period of expansion in the 1930s, the panoptical design became more common. One of the earliest panoptical compound designs was the City Deep mine in Johannesburg. In 1914, the Deputy Commissioner of the Johannesburg Police force described the City Deep compound to the Buckle Commission as follows:

> It is surrounded first of all by a high galvanised iron fence. It has barbed wire at the top which prevents anybody getting in or out…The gates are so constructed that they have turnstiles by which each native can file in singly. The buildings are so constructed that from the compound manager's office he can see down any direction along the line of huts. The buildings are arranged like the spokes of a wheel with the office as a hub [and] by that means they are able to see exactly what goes on in the compound and practically almost in the rooms. (Dunbar Moodie, 1990:3, as quoted in Crush, 1993:3)

The panoptical structure of City Deep clearly bears out Foucault's (1977:205) contention that the panopticon "is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power."

5.7.3 Biopolitical Control

We have already considered the way in which the pass system exerted control over the bodies (and lives) of black workers. We will now move onto another way in which they were controlled by other biopolitical modes of control that Andries Bezuidenhout and Sakhela Buhlungu (2010:242) designate as a "normative control order." It is normative because "it contains an element of ideological legitimization, and corporal because regimes of control essentially add up to the regulation of actual bodies…" Normative control designates "how it is used in regimes of accumulation, and how its movement is circumscribed, and how it is reproduced and represented."

In this regard, Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2010:241) identify four ways in which black bodies were controlled along normative lines. These included spatial control, reproductive

control, control of association, and police control. S*patial* control was introduced as early as the 1913 Natives Land Act, which restricted the black peoples' freedom of movement by evicting them from their farms and controlling their movements by means of the pass system. In the mining context, spacial control relates to the regulation and "restriction of individuals and groups of individuals" and refers to the "movements in and around the compounds." *Reproductive* control pertained to "intervention into people's actual reproductive functions, their intake of food and beverages, issues such as personal hygiene and even how they spent their leisure time." *Associational* control designated "the regulation and restriction of voluntary interaction among workers, including forms of worker self-organisation such as union activities, sport, religion and leisure." *Political* control referred to the policing function that constituted what Micheal Baroway (1985: page not provided, as quoted in Bezuidenhout and Sakhela 2010:241) called "the company state," specifically when company officials incorporated elements of force and coercion into their activities. We will now consider each of these means of control in turn.

One of the most notorious modes of spatial control was the contract system. Allied to the contract system and means of worker control was the notorious Masters and Servants Act of 1886, which was only revoked in 1974. Rochelle le Roux (2010:143) notes that "these laws made the registration of contracts compulsory and a break of contract criminally punishable." The consequence of this, according to Christopher Merret (2019:15) was that "African workers were essentially servants, subject to the whim of white masters." In spatial terms, the contract system (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2010:244) forced black miners into the compounds, a highly regimented form of spatial control, situated close to the mine shafts, so that miners could be summoned for work when it suited the mine owners.

Reproductive control was also a particularly odious feature of the closed mining system. Compounds were restricted to male-only occupancy and marked by what Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2010:244) term "invasive reproductive control, including the conditions under which husbands and wives were allowed to interact." Moreover, black workers were separated from their homes for months on end and visits from their spouses to the compounds were rigidly controlled. Due to the 'policing' of sexual intercourse, reproduction took place in the homelands where families had to make a living under harsh circumstances. In Ellen Kuzwayo's *Call Me Woman* (1985:4) Kuzwayo receives a letter from a friend in detention,

Debra Nikiwe Matshoba. In the letter, Matshoba says that she plans to ask the Minister of Justice for "conception leave" Kuzwayo (1985:6) explains: "This is a sick joke about the migrant labour system, whereby many black men spend their working lives in cities, compelled to leave their wives behind in the country. The few weeks a year spent at home are referred to as 'conception leave'." James Twala's poem *Family Planning* (1979), as quoted in Callinicos (1981:51), evokes the desolation of single-sex compounds, occupied by "half-castrated" inmates – an allusion to the emasculating impact of the mining regime on the male body – and ironically, given its title – the devastation of the family, under the guise of "Family Planning." The miner's evident satisfaction after the act of masturbation is significant. It suggests that the mining apparatus' control over the worker's body, in the middle of the night, is not absolute. The worker retains some control over his body – and sexuality – even if it is under cover of darkness. Ultimately, however, the reproductive control of the worker remained largely under the auspices of the mine apparatus.

The poem is worth recounting in its totality:

FAMILY PLANNING

Row upon row
Like winter-shaken stalks of maize,
The barracks stretch from one
Miserable end to the other.

Within the enfenced hostel
No gay children bounce and romp about,
No busy housewives colour
The washing line once a week.
Here there is no homely smell of food
That wanders in the air during the day.

Sunset fathers the half-castrated inmates
Like stale crumbs from the city.
They plod through the large gates
Weary, bent: and shut
Their fatigued minds, eyes and ears.
For them the day is over.
They are headed to a twilight life.

The silence that they left behind
At the breaking of the dawn is
Rippled as if it was a calm lake

By laughter as they buzz about
Like newly-wedded women.

They strip off to their vests
Embalmed in a day's sweat.
Yesterday's tripe and porridge are
Hastily warmed up for supper again.

One by one, they enjoy their naked
showers
Splashing their rigid bodies in the water,
and return to their stuffy rooms.

An inmate belches like a sea-rover.
It echoes the far-flung room.
He raps his full stomach
That is as large as a mole-hill:
'Exchoose [sic] me you bastards!' he thunders.

They slip into their stony beds,
Clasp their baggy and sweat-reeking
Pillows as if they were their
Beloved ones left in the homelands.

They look at their shirts,
Overalls, trousers, jackets – all ragged,
Hanging aslant on the damp walls
Like faded, dusty family portraits.

Portable radios are switched off,
Candle flames flicker and die,
Darkness and silence covers
Them all like a large blanket.
Alone,
They quietly succumb to sleep.

In the night,
An inmate's untroubled sleep is
interrupted.
He sits on the edge of his bed
Half dozing
Gazing from darkness to darkness,
And then he spills the seeds of nature
All over his slovenly sheet with
half-satisfaction:
'Family planning,' he whispers to himself.
Then the musical snores inmates
Slowly lull him back to sleep.

-James Twala

Mining companies also exerted stringent control over food supplies and beer halls (Bezuidenhout and Bulungu, 2011:245). Food was often of very poor quality, as is borne out by an inspection of a sample of mielie meal from the Treasury Gold Mining Company (Callinicos, 1981:45): *"Coarsely ground meal. Many of the particles of flour were black and purple. Slightly mouldy and musty smell. Not fit for human consumption"* (original emphasis). Workers resorted to buying food at *kwamashonisa*, or compound stores. Due to the closed nature of the compound system, these stores ran a very profitable monopoly, by controlling consumption. Leisure activities such as beerhalls were also controlled by mining companies and located in the mining compounds, so workers did not have the freedom to seek entertainment elsewhere. Even leisure activities took place under the all-seeing eye, or panoptical, eye of the mine authorities. If workers were fortunate enough to obtain a pass, *marabi* halls with their music, alcohol and women provided a welcome respite from the draconian measures of surveillance instituted in the compound mines.

Associational control was based on the control of various racial groups that constituted the South African body politic and stringent measures to prevent association with unions. In this regard, resistance by black workers by way of unions such as the African Mineworkers Union (AMU) was summarily crushed. According to J.D. Rheinallt Jones (1947:1), the Masters and Servants Act, Chapter 7, Section 3 was a key factor in forbidding the use of the strike weapon. Described by Colin Bundy (1988:7, as quoted in Merrett 2018:15) as "Feudal" and "punitive," the Act regarded the breaking of contracts as punishable by law and branded strikers as deserters. The Masters and Servants act was repealed as late as October 1974.

According to Bezuidenhout and Buhlunga (2010:245), in addition to the associational control effected by the banning of means of resistance, the mining industry also promoted association based on "ethnicity" by ear-marking jobs and rooms in the compounds to specific racial groups. Other means of non-subversive association such as sport, religious and self-help societies were also promoted by the mining authorities (Badenhorst and Matter, 1997: page number not provided, cited by Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2010:241).

"Political control" (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 20:10 241) referred to the coercive and policing function of authorities in the mining compounds. As already intimated, this entailed *inter alia* the use of mine police who created 'order' by way of batons, sjamboks and knobkieries.

The most devastating impact of this regime of control was the high rate of mortality on the mines. This was caused largely, in part, by the compound environment which had an adverse effect on the worker's health. Maroney (1978:2) describes the compound rooms as having double decked bunks built against the wall. Overcrowding forced workers to sleep on earth floors which became muddy during the rain. Workers were provided *imbanla* or fire buckets to heat the rooms and these had no chimneys. The combination of the damp environment combined with poor ventilation and the fumes of the fire buckets caused a high incidence of respiratory illnesses which were compounded by work in the mines. Moreover, workers were exposed to drastic changes in temperature when they came to the surface after an underground shift, which was exacerbated by wet clothes and the extreme cold of Highveld winters. They also had to stand in queues in the heat, wet or cold as they waited for work or meal tickets. According to the figures taken from the Coelho Report (SNA 40/12/03, p.19, as quoted in Maroney, 1978: 3) in 1903, 5022 African workers died on the Witwatersrand. The causes were summarised as follows:

Pneumonia and meningitis: 59, 901
Intestinal infections: 11,861
Tuberculosis: 5,391
Scurvy: 5, 871
Accidents: 4,031
Other: 12,901.

Maroney (1978: 8) notes that these figures do not take account of the workers who died on the way to or at home as a result of diseases or injuries sustained while working on the Witwatersrand mines.

Not only were the bodies of workers exposed to coercion and control (even fatal, as seen above), these forces soon began to inveigle their minds. This emerges in Jonathan Crush's (1992:829) description of the compounds of the Kimberley diamond fields as "instruments of industrial discipline and control over a rurally-orientated workforce." These compounds served as spaces wherein workers were "observed, partitioned, subject to timetables and disciplines" for the purpose of the "fabrication of virtue" and hard work, as Stanley Cohen (1985:208, as quoted in Crush 1992:829) expresses it in terms that resonate with Foucault's

in *Discipline and Punish*. Vic Allen evokes this disciplinary regime of control and coercion with great clarity in the following:

> Workers living in a compound under the control of the employer for whom they work are not free. Their time and activities are strictly regulated to conform to a routine and organisation determined by the employer and based on considerations of economy and efficiency. The worker who lives in a compound is a machine…The state of affairs in most compounds is comparable only to medieval conditions…the African miner is a slave, herded in a compound, under the control of his master twenty-four hours a day. He is not free to sell his labour or live as he chooses. He is compelled to eat the food that will turn him into an instrument for the production and profit for his employer. He must live cheaply, so that his employer may at all times be able to exert 100% control over him. This is not the life of a free human being. This is the modern counterpart of the old slave compounds. (1992:454)

Crush (1992:829) notes that not only were the coercive practices in mines deemed as disciplinary, they were also inscribed in space. In typical panoptical fashion, compounds were designed in such a way as to create the illusion that workers were continuously being watched. This element of uncertainty led to the interiorisation of discipline – that is, to subjectivation in the form of self-discipline – as workers began to police themselves. Crush (1992:829) notes that most of the compounds were initially built in the more typical, square or rectangular shape. However, during the mining industry's period of expansion in the 1930s, the panoptical design became more common. One of the earliest panoptical compound designs was the City Deep mine in Johannesburg. In 1914, the Deputy Commissioner of the Johannesburg Police force described the City Deep compound to the Buckle Commission as follows:

> It is surrounded first of all by a high galvanised iron fence. It has barbed wire at the top which prevents anybody getting in or out…The gates are so constructed that they have turnstiles by which each native can file in singly. The buildings are so constructed that from the compound manager's office he can see down any direction along the line of huts. The buildings are arranged like the spokes of a wheel with the office as a hub [and] by that means they are able to see exactly what goes on in the compound and practically almost in the rooms. (Moodie, 1990:3, as quoted in Crush 1993:3)

The panoptical structure of City Deep clearly bears out Foucault's (1977:205) contention that the panopticon "is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power."

5.8 *"EBAYI": MARABI* AS RESISTING VOICE

The question presents itself: "How did workers escape the strict, closed confines of the panoptic mining compounds to find respite in the *marabi* culture?" Crush (1992:304) notes that although most Rand compounds were designed to exclude outsiders (including the dependants of miners), the workers themselves were able to leave the compounds (by way of a pass) and "insert themselves into complex cultural and social networks with the residents of neighbouring slums, segregated townships, and 'tin towns' (settlements for stabilized workers)." To be sure, although they could not prevent it, according to Julie Baker (1992 and Moodie, 1992, as quoted in Crush, 1994:304) "compound managers devoted considerable effort to discouraging workers from leaving mine property in their off hours. Workers in search of drink, female companionship, and temporary escape from the harsh and sterile environment of the compound often found these things in neighbouring townships or slums." Crush notes further that on the East Rand in the 1930s and 1940s officials erected massive fences to prevent miners from leaving the mines to go to townships. These, however, proved to be a "dismal failure." Cécile Marie Badenhorst, (1992:346, as quoted in Crush 1994: 305) argues that the general result was "constant interaction" between compounds and the other spaces of the South African city. This points, as Foucault would advocate, toward an avenue of resistance within a deeply oppressive and coercive order, and, as has already been demonstrated in earlier chapters, *marabi* could, and was, harnessed in the service of such resistence.

We have already considered the way in which *marabi* ironised white perceptions of black people in the famous *marabi* song *Tebetjane Ufana Ne'mfene* in Chapter 3. Another way in which workers were empowered to endure the conditions they laboured under was by means of songs which, as Coplan (1985:107) notes were a commentary on urban experience, or a means of political protest.

Ballantine (1993:65) gives an example of a song reflecting urban experience:

Namk' amaphoyisa –
Azosibopha.
Asbophel'ugologo.

Here are the policemen –
They are going to arrest us.

They will arrest us for [possessing] alcohol

The following is an example of a song expressing political protest (Coplan, 1985:107)

There comes the big van
All over the country
They call in the pick-up
There, there is the big van
"Where's your pass?"
"Where's your tax?"

In what follows, we will gauge the significance of other *marabi* songs that rendered temporarily palpable the draconian structures of the regime and ideology which controlled every aspect of the workers' existence. I am indebted, in this regard, to Phakamani Pungu-Pungu, a BMus student at the Nelson Mandela University for his painstaking transcriptions and translations of a selection of pertinent *marabi* songs from the CD's accompanying Ballantine's *Marabi Nights* (1992), as well as for his perceptive insights into plausible subtexts underlying the songs.

What strikes one about the few existing *marabi* songs is the theme of homesickness. It would be plausible to say that one of the most important ways in which migrant workers dealt with the privations of their lives on the mines was by immersing themselves in memories of home and the prospect of returning home on leave from the mines as described in *marabi* songs. In this sense, *marabi* served as a crucial means of escapism. A notable example of this is *Ebayi* by Snowy Radebe (Track 10) where the mine-worker reaches his long-awaited destination – Port-Elizabeth. His sense of relief is almost palpable, where he reaches the place where "all worries are gone, all fears are gone." Home is the place where the workers regain their humanity. The treatment of the worker at home is in stark relief to the draconian strictures at the mines. The worker is urged to put down his blanket, sit down and is given water. The song is pervaded by a deep sense of yearning and relief and, upon singing or hearing it, would remind the worker that his circumstances were impermanent and give him renewed courage to carry on. Note how almost lovingly, he dwells on the word 'Port-Elizabeth', where in one place it is reiterated five times. It is also significant that he speaks of Port-Elizabeth as *his*. This also stands in stark contrast to the sense of alienation and dislocation experienced by the workers pitched headlong into the cultural and ethnic maelstrom of Johannesburg. Home is a place that belongs to him and he belongs to. The almost Homeric resonances here are hard to overlook. After braving perilous circumstances, like Odysseus,

the worker finally reaches a safe, comforting haven – home. Considering the lyrical repetition of the word, *Bhayi*, one is also reminded of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the refrain (discussed in Chapter 2), as the essence of music, in the embrace of which one enjoys a safe refuge that protects one against extant dangers, including death.

Lyrics and translation

Xhosa	**English translation**
Ebayi	Port-Elizabeth
Nam ,nantsikeyam ,nantsi	Here, here is mine, here is it
Nam ,nalikelam,nali	here is mine
Hayi,hayi pho Ebhayi lam	in my Port-Elizabeth
uXuthu uthengamanzi	he bought water
uXuthu uthenge ERhawtini	he bought in Gauteng
ndithetha ngeBhayi,	I speak about Port-Elizabeth,
hayi ndibiziBhayi,	I'm calling Port-Elizabeth
hayi eBhayi,lam Ebhayi kwam	In Port-Elizabeth, my Port-Elizabeth
Wakufika Ebhayi,	When he arrived in Port-Elizabeth,
akungena eColchester	just as he approached Colchester
Wakufika Ebhayi,Bhayi,Bhayi,	When he arrived in Port-Elizabeth,
eBhayi,Bhayi,	Port-Elizabeth, Port-Elizabeth,
Laphelixhala,kwaphelubugwala	all worries were gone, all fears were gone
Ungenile ebhayi	he has entered Port-Elizabeth
Ungalahla ingubo ,ufikile eBhayi	You can throw your blankets , you have arrived in Port-Elizabeth
Yandlala natsi ingubo, yindawo le	Here is a blanket, place it on the floor right in this spot
*Khabuhlalaphantsi ubuselamanzi***,**	For the time being, sit down and have water
kubungenile eBhayi	for you have arrived in Port-Elizabeth

Another *marabi* song, *Sbhinonono*, by the Amanzimtoti Players (Track 11) recounts how adamant the miner is to go home to Port-Elizabeth, despite his friend's reservations. In the course of the song, he assures his friend that all will be well and they will meet again.

Lyrics and translation

Xhosa	**English translation**
(Spoken)	
Akheningishayel'ingoma	Please play for me a song
ethi Sbhinono ndiyeke (Speaker)	entitled *Sbhinono ndiyeke* (Leave me *Sbhinono*)
(Sung)	
Sbhinono ndiyeke 2x	*Sbhinono,* leave me

Sbhinono ndiy'eBhayi 2x	*Sbhinono,* I am going to Port-Elizabeth.

(Instrumental section)

(Sung)

Hamba mfana	Go boy
Wosh'ekhaya	You will tell them at home
Awukezwa?	Haven't you heard?
Kade ngangisho	I have been saying
Sobe sihlangane	We will meet again

Other *marabi* songs convey aspects of the miner's life that are far-removed from that of the repressive milieu of the mining compounds and, serve, in this sense as a form of escapism. In the following Zulu song, *Bohamba Besibuza* by the "Hot Lips Dance Band" (Track 14) the singer introduces his friends and, as Pungupungu notes (in conversation), the wording suggests something of the self-importance and charisma of the friends. This also contrasts to the treatment of workers in the mines that eroded their self-confidence, to the point of emasculating them, as Twala notes in his poem "Family Planning." In this sense, this *marabi* song can be seen as a gesture of defiance in its depiction of the workers as strong and charismatic. *Marabi* songs such as these clearly served to bolster the shattered self-confidence of the debased, dehumanised mine workers.

Bohamba Besibuza

Lyrics and Translation

Zulu	**English Translation**
Bohamba besibuza ,	They will be asking around
Bethi abaphi labafana,	Saying "who are these boys" ?
uTompson lo omnye,	this is Thompson
ngu-Gumejana lo omunye,	this one is Gumejana
dlo omunye uSgananda	the other one is Sgananda
lphumenkana khona e e-Alexander ngenyawo, mfana.	we are from Alexander by foot, boy.

The above leaves us with little doubt as to the seminal role played by *marabi* in rendering the lives of the workers bearable, even temporarily, largely by serving as a form of escapism from their oppressive circumstances. Significantly, *marabi*, in all of its guises, could not be controlled by the mining authorities and, thus, provided the workers with a heady,

exhilarating window of freedom from the disciplinary and panoptical regime that policed their every waking moment. Furthermore, by affording one a revealing theoretical perspective on the lives of African mineworkers in the dehumanising spaces of mining compounds, Foucault's conception of panoptical discipline amplifies which was reconstructed in largely historical terms in Chapter 1, in such a manner that the historical material has gained conceptual comprehensibility or transparency.

CODA

In *Dissemination* (1981:65), Derrida says "To a considerable degree, we have already said all we *meant*[86] *to say*."

To my mind, each chapter has furnished us with palpable evidence that I have accomplished what I have set out to do, namely to forge a *rapprochement* between aspects of poststructuralism and *marabi* in its social and cultural context; hence I have already said "all I have meant to say." This final section is thus entitled 'Coda', which is Italian for 'tail', rather than a definitive 'Conclusion.' There is no 'The End', given the constant spillage of meaning – which, as we have already intimated, Derrida calls "dissemination" – that prevents this text, in fact *any* text, from being an enclosed book within its covers. Hence, this is a 'tail' that also 'de-tails' the text. Significantly, we have seen that this study also 'spills over' into numerous other variegated fields, including that of gender, postcolonial, socio-political, historical and African studies, and numerous more. Hence, dissemination extends it far beyond what "we *meant to say*." It is hoped that it will, therefore, have salutary consequences for further studies beyond the (permeable) boundaries of poststructuralism and *marabi*.

With the benefit of hindsight another positive aspect has emerged. The point is that this study is by no means purely an academic exercise in which resonances between poststructuralism and *marabi* in its context have been traced. Rather, it has also provided us with insights into the history of a people, of their suffering, but at the same time, their strength and resilience in the face of a deeply oppressive political order. This study, therefore, not only negates what Ballantine (1993:3) calls "the amnesia" that marks an understanding of *marabi*, but also that of a people and their culture and experiences in the early part of the twentieth century. This highlights its value in preserving an important part of our South African cultural heritage that has largely been neglected up to now, although there are signs that this is changing.

Having said this, I do not mean to downplay the primary overarching motivation behind this study, which attempts to gauge the mutual relevance of *marabi* in its encompassing context

---

[86] Derrida's averment also highlights the fact that, due to the semantic indeterminacy of the linguistic sign, the writer's intention and the play of meaning cannot ever be identical. This, too, is pertinent to this thesis.

and poststructuralism. What has emerged is that, not only is a *rapprochement* indeed possible between these two very dissimilar bedfellows, but also that the use of poststructuralism as critical prism has greatly enhanced our understanding of *marabi* in all its multifarious richness. The converse is also true. *Marabi* and its context – historical, socio-political and ideological – have also provided us with insight into the complexity of poststructuralism and its importance and relevance as a critical tool to understand non-hierarchical, non-binary discursive practices such as *marabi* in all their heterogeneous guises.

This brings us to an important leitmotif in this study: the emergence of what Olivier (1995) calls "a different form of reason" that has resulted from the interaction between *marabi*, its context and poststructuralism. We have seen, for example in Chapter 2, how Deleuze and Guattari's conceptions of assemblage and rhizome provided us with tools for rethinking *marabi* in a vastly more nuanced way than traditional binary, hierarchical thinking. In Chapter 3, Derrida provided us with insights into the way *marabi rewrites*, not only in its graphic, or inscriptional sense, but in its generalised sense as *différance*, traditional notions of sign, text, intertext and context – generic, genetic and citational. In Chapter 4, in which we disclosed the extent of binary, patriarchal thinking, inspired by Cixous's insight into the male/female dichotomy in "Sorties," and the way in which she, by way of her notion of *féminine écriture*, not only destabilises the dominant phallocentric, dualistic economy, but enables women to "write their bodies" and reclaim/reinvent/recreate themselves. This dovetailed with *famo marabi*, with its brazen indictment of phallocentrism by way of song and dance, which valorises the female body in a manner that resonates with Cixous's *féminine écriture*. This, too, provided us with new ways toward a more gynocentric mode of thinking. As intimated, Chapter 5 focused on *marabi'*s context by way of Foucault's "different forms of reason" into understanding disciplinary societies, panopticism and biopolitics. We also saw how black mine workers used *marabi* as a form of escapism in order to make their lives bearable.

Significantly, the aforementioned points to the possibility of new ways of thinking which subvert, in various ways, as we have seen in each chapter, traditional Logocentric thought and language marked by (as intimated) a rhetoric of "oppression and exclusion" (Olivier, 1993:314), hereby opening up the way to a more inclusive, egalitarian way of thinking. Significantly, it also demonstrates how these "different ways of thinking" open up the way to

understanding multitudinous, non-hierarchical, non-binary music (*inter alia*) such as *marabi* and critical prisms such as poststructuralism.

In the final analysis, as intimated, there is evidence, in the light of the above, that we have done what we set out to do, which is to engage *marabi* in its context, and poststructuralism(s) in a mutually enriching manner, using "different forms of reason" to disclose poststructuralism's value as a critical prism, and *marabi's* teeming richness and complexity as "text," as Derrida would conceive of it. However, it has to be kept in mind that, given the complexity involved in both poststructuralism(s) and *marabi*, these "different forms of reason" were (largely) drawn from the latter two 'prisms' themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahams, P. 1946. *Mine Boy*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.

Ableman, P. 1983. *The Doomed Rebellion*. London: Zomba.

Adams, C. 1974. *Ethnography of Basotho Evaluative Behavior in the Cognitive Domain Lipapadi* (*Games*). PhD, Indiana.

Adorno, T. 1990. The Curves of the Needle (*Nadelkurven*) In: *Musikblätter des Anbruch,* Trans. Levin, T. Vol.10, Feb.1928. pp.48-55.

Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Eds. Hamacher, W. and Wellbery, D.E. Trans. Heller-Roazen, D. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Allen, L. 1993. *Pennywhistle Kwela: A Musical, Historical and Socio-Political Analysis*. Unpublished MMus Degree, University of Natal.

Allen, V.L. 1992. *The History of Black Mineworkers in South Africa*. Vol.1. W. Yorkshire: The Moor Press.

Alvarez, M. 2 August 2017. The Poverty of Theory. Cognito Zero Sum. https://www.thebaffler.com/the-poverty-of-theory/cognito-zero-sum-alvarez. Accessed 30 July 2021.

Andersson, M. 1981. *Music in the Mix. The Story of South African Popular Music*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Apel, W. 1970. Masculine, Feminine Cadence. In: *Harvard Dictionary of Music,* 2nd ed. Revised and enlarged. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. p.506.

Aristotle. 2007. *On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civil Discourse*. 2nd ed. Trans and Intro. Kennedy, G.A. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Badenhorst, C.1992. *Mines, Missionaries and the Municipality: Organised African Sport and Recreation in Johannesburg, c.1920-1920*. Phd thesis, Department of Geography, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario.

Badenhorst, C. and Mather, C. 1997. Tribal Recreation and Recreating Tribalism. Culture, Leisure and Social Control on South Africa's Gold Mines, 1940-1950. In: *Journal of South African Studies.* Vol.23, no.3. pp.473-489.

Badiou, A. 2008. What is Love? In: *Conditions*. Trans. Corcoran, S. London and New York: Continuum. pp.179–98.

Baker, J. 1992. Prohibition and Illicit Liquor on the Witwatersrand, 1902-1932. In: *Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa*. Eds. Crush, J, and Ambler, C. Athens OH: Ohio University Press. pp.139-161.

Bakhtin, M. 1984. *Rabelais and his World*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Ballantine, C. 1993. *Marabi Nights, Early South African Jazz and Vaudeville*. Audio Recordings included. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Barker, A. 1984. *Greek Musical Writings. The Musician and his Art*. Vol.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bataille, G. 1991. *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy*. Vols.1.and 2. Trans. Hurley, R. New York: Zone Books.

Battersby, C. 1989. *Gender and Genius. Towards a Feminist Aesthetics*. London: The Women's Press Ltd.

Bell, F.W. 1909. *The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution*. The Native Affairs Society of the Transvaal: Constitution and Rules Article 1. Johannesburg.

Bender, W. 1991. *Sweet Mother. Modern African Music*. Trans. Freis, W. Foreword. Chernoff, J.M. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Bergson, H. 1988. *Matter and Memory*. Trans. Paul, N.M. and Palmer, W.S. New York: Zone Books.

Bezuidenhout, A and Buhlungu, S. 2011. From Compound to Fragmented Labour: Mineworkers and the Demise of Compounds in South Africa. In: *Antipode*. Vol.43, no.2. pp.237-263.

Bidima, J. 2003. Music and the Socio-Historical Real: Rhythm, Series and Criticism in Deleuze and O.Revault d'Allonnes. In: *Deleuze and Music*. Eds. Buchanan I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.176-195.

Biko, S. 2004. *I Write What I Like*. London: Picador.

Blacking, J. 1959. Problems of Pitch, Pattern and Harmony in the Ocarina Music of the Venda. In: *African Music Journal of the African Music Society*. Vol 2, no.2 pp.15-23.

Blanchot, M. 1999. *The Station Hill Blanchot Reader: Fiction and Literary Essays*. Ed. Quasha, G. Trans. Davis, L. Auster, P. and Lamberton, R. Barrytown, New York: Station Hill Press, Inc.

Bogue, R. 2003. *Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts*. London: Routledge.

Bogue, R. 2004. Violence in Three Shades of Metal: Death, Doom and Black. In: *Deleuze and Music*. Eds. Buchanan, I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.95-117.

Bonta, M. and Protevi, J. 2004. *Deleuze and Geophilosophy A Guide and Glossary.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Boomgaarden, D.R. 1989. *Musical Thought in Britain and Germany During the Early Eighteenth Century.* Ann Arbon Mich.: University Microfilms International.

Born, G.1992. Women, Music, Politics, Difference: Susan McClary's *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality*. In: *Women: A Cultural Review*. Vol 3, No. 1. pp 79-86, DOI: 10.1080/09574049208578110. Accessed 30 March 2021.

Boyne, R. 1990. *Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Bray, A. 2004. *Hèléne Cixous. Writing and Sexual Difference*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brindle, R. 1987. *The New Music. The Avant-Garde since 1945*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Britannica, 2018. The Editors of Encyclopedia. Lileth. In: *Encyclopedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lilith-Jewish-folklore. Accessed 18 February 2021.

Brogan, W.1989. Plato's Pharmakon: Between Two Repetitions. In: *Continental Philosophy. Derrida and Deconstruction*. Ed. Silverman, H. Vol.2. London and New York: Routledge. pp.7-23.

Brookes, E. 1927. *The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the Present Day*. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Ltd.

Buchanan, I. 2004. Introduction: Deleuze and Music. In: *Deleuze and Music*, Eds. Buchanan, I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp.1-19.

Buck-Morss, S. 1979. *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*. New York: The Free Press.

Bukofzer, M. 1983. *Music in the Baroque Era from Monteverdi to Bach*. London, Toronto, Melbourne: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd.

Bundy, C. 1988. *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*. 2nd ed. Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip. London: James Curry.

Buroway, M. 2008. The Public Turn: From Labor Process to Labor Movement. In: *Work and Occupation.* Vol. 36, no.2. pp.87-95.

Brown, W. 2006. *Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Butler, J. 2004. *Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London: Verso.

Callinicos, L.1981. *Gold and Workers 1886-1924. A People's History of South Africa*. Vol.1. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Callinicos, L. 1987. *Working Life. Factories, Townships, and Popular Culture on the Rand,1886-1940. A People's History of South Africa*. Vol.2. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Callinicos, L. 2007. Testimonies and Transitions: Women Negotiating the Rural and Urban in the Mid-20th century. In: *Women in South African History*. Ed. Gasa, N. Cape Town: HSRC Press. pp.153-184.

Cammack, D. 1990. *The Rand at War 1899-1902. The Witwatersrand and the Anglo-Boer War.* London: James Currey.

Campbell, E. 2013. *Music After Deleuze*. London, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Place.

Carlson, E.A. 2001. *The Unfit. A History of a Bad Idea*. New York: Cold Spring Harbor University Press.

Carlson, R. 1971. Sex Differences in Ego Functioning: Exploratory Studies of Agency and Communication. In: *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*. Vol.37. pp.267-277.

Carney, C. 2006. New Orleans and the Creation of Early Jazz. In: *Popular Music and Society*. Vol. 29, no.3. pp.299-315.

Cell, J. 1982. *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chakraborty, D. 2013. Analyzing Ecriture Feminine in "The Laugh of the Medusa". In: *European Academic Research*. Vol.1. pp.2895-2904.

Chambers, J. 2017. William Labov: An Appreciation. In: *Annual Review of Linguistics*. Vol.2, no.1. DOI 10.1146/annurev-linguistics-051216-040225. pp.1-23. Accessed 2 November 2019.

Chicago, J. 1975. *Through the Flower. My Struggle as a Woman Artist*. Intro. by Nin, A. New York: Anchor Press/ Doubleday.

Chodorov, N. 1974. Family Structure and Feminine Personality. In: *Woman, Culture, and Society*. Eds. Rosaldo, M. and Lamphere, L. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp.17-42.

Citron, M. 1993. *Gender and the Musical Canon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cixous, H. 1976. *The Laugh of the Medusa*. Trans. Cohen, K. and Cohen, P. In: *Signs*. Vol.1, no.4. pp.875-993.

Cixous, H. 1991. Coming to Writing. In: *Coming to Writing and Other Essays*. Ed. and Intro, Jenson, D. Trans: Suleiman, S. Cornell, S. Jenson, D. Liddle, A. and Sellers, S. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. pp.1-59.

Cixous, H. 1991a, Clarice Lispector: the Approach. In: *Coming to Writing and Other Essays*. Ed. and Intro, Jenson, D. Trans: Suleiman, S. Cornell, S. Jenson, D. Liddle, A. and Sellers, S. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. pp.59-77.

Cixous, H. 1999. *The Third Body.* Trans. Cohen, K. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Cixous, H. and Clément, C. 1985. *The Newly Born Woman*. Trans. Wing, B. Intr. Gilbert. Boston: Beacon Press.

Cixous, H. and Clément, C. 1991. *The Newly Born Woman* Trans. Wing, B. Intro. Gilbert, S. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Cixous, H. and Calle-Gruber, M. 1997. Inter views. In: *Cixous, Rootprints, Memory and Life Writing.* London: Routledge. pp.1-116.

Cohen, S. 1985. *Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classifications.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Colebrook, C. 2002. *Understanding Deleuze*. Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin.

Colebrooke, C. 2010. Actuality. In: Ed. Parr, A. *The Deleuze Dictionary* (revised ed.) Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.9-11.

Conley, V. A. 1984. An Exchange with Hèléne Cixous. In: *Hèléne Cixous: Writing of the Feminine.* Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press. pp.129-161.

Copjec, J. 1994. *Read My Desire. Lacan Against the Historicists*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press.

Coplan, D. 1985. *In Township Tonight! South Africa's Black City Music and Theatre*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Coplan, D. 2005. A Taste of *Marabi* in the 1920's and '30's. In: *The World of South African Music: A Reader.* Ed. Lucia, C. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. pp.116-120.

Crais, C. 2002. *The Politics of Evil. Magic, State Power and the Political Imagination in South Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crawford, R. 2001. *An Introduction to America's Music*. New York: Norton and Company.

Crush, J. 1992. Power and Surveillance on the South African Gold Mines. In: *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol.18, no.4. pp.825-844.

Crush, J. 1994. Scripting the Compound: Power and Space in the South African Mining Compound. In: *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*. Vol.12. pp.301-324.

Culler, J. 1983. *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Curtis, L. 1907. The Place of Subject People in the Empire. 9 May. Fortnightly Club Collection. A 146. *Wits Historical Papers*. Johannesburg.

Cusick, S. 1999. Gender, Musicology, and Feminism. In: *Rethinking Music*. Eds. Cook, N. and Everist, M. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. pp.470-498.

D'Allonnes, R.1973. *La Création Artistique et les Promesses de la Liberté*. Paris: Klincksieck.

Daniels, R.1989. The Agrarian Land Question in South Africa in Its Historical Context. In: *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. Vol.48, no.3. pp.327-338.

Darwin, C. 1860. *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Section, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.* 2nd ed. London: John Murray.

Darwin, C. 1896. *The Descent of Man and Selection to Sex*. 2nd revised and augmented ed. London: Murray [1871].

Davidson, B. 1961. *Black Mother*. London: Victor Gallanze.

De Beauvoir, S. 1953. *The Second Sex*. Trans. Borde, C. and Malovany-Chevallier, S. Intro. by Thurman, J. New York: Knopf.

De Beauvior, S. 1953. *The Second Sex*. Trans. Parshley, H. New York: Knopf.

De Beistegui. M. 2004. *Truth and Genesis. Philosophy as Differential Ontology.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Definition of *Genre* from the *Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus***.** Cambridge University Press. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/genre. Accessed 16 July 2021.

De Kiewiet, C.W. 1941. *A History of South Africa. Social and Economic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Delanda, M. 2004. *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*. London: Continuum.

Deleuze, G, and Guattari, F.1972. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Hurley, R. Seem, M. and Lane, H. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G and Parnet, C.1977. *Dialogues*. Trans.Tomlinson, H. and Habberjam. B. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. 1983. *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Hurley, R. Seem, M. and Lane, H.R. Preface by Foucault, M. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze G, and Guattari, F.1986. *Kafka Towards a Minor Literature*. Trans. Polan, D. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G and Guattari, F. 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Trans. Massumi, B. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, G. 1990. *The Logic of Sense*. Eds. Stivale, C. and Boundas, C.V. Trans. Lester, M. London: Athlone Press.

Deleuze, G. 1990a. Postscript on Control Societies. In: *L'Autre Journal*. Vol.1, pp.177-182.

Deleuze, G. 1994. *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. Patton, P. New York: Columbia University.

Denis, N. 1998. *Crossing Frontiers: Music and Writing. Some Implications of Deconstruction for Musicological Theory and Practice*. Unpublished MMus dissertation, Nelson Mandela University.

Derrida, J. 1973. *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* Trans. Allison, D.B. Garver, N. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Derrida, J. 1977. *Of Grammatology*. Trans and Preface, Spivak, G.C. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press.

Derrida, J. 1979. Living On. In: *Deconstruction and Criticism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Press. pp.75-176.

Derrida, J. 1981. *Dissemination*. Trans, Introduction and Additional Notes, Johnson, B. London: The Athlone Press.

Derrida, J. 1984. Two Words for Joyce. In: *Poststructuralist Joyce: Essays from the French.* Eds. Attridge, D and Ferrier, D. London: Cambridge University Press. pp.145-159.

Derrida, J. 2004. *For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue (Cultural Memory in the Present)*. Trans. Roudinesco, É and Fort, J. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Derrida, J. 2007. *Learning to Live. Finally: The Last Interview*. Trans. Brault, P.A, and Nass, M. Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing.

Descartes, R. 1989. *The Passions of the Soul*. Trans.Voss, S. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.Co.

Dias, P, and Freedman, A. Medway, P. and Par, A. 1999. *Worlds Apart. Acting and Writing and Academic and Workplace Contexts.* New York: Routledge.

Dikobe, M. 1973. *The Marabi Dance*. London: Heinemann.

Dlomo, H. *ILN* 20 June 1953. As quoted in Ballantine, 1993:28.

Dowley, T.1982. *Schumann: His Life and Times*. New York: Hippocrene Books.

Dubow, S. 1989. *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36*. New York: St. Martins Press.

Dubow, S. 1995. *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duerden, J.E. 1925. Genetics and Eugenics in South Africa Hereditary and Environment. In: *South African Journal of Science*, XXII. pp.59-72.

Duncan, P. 1913. *UCT. Duncan Papers. D 5.7.15*. Duncan to Lady Selborne, June 11, 1913. As quoted in Feinberg, 1993:104.

Dunn, L.C. 1994. Ophelia's Songs in Hamlet. In: *Embodied Voices*. *Representing Female Vocality in Western Culture*. Eds. Dunn, L. and Jones, N. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.50-64.

Dunn, L.C. and Jones, N. 1994. Introduction. In: *Embodied Voices*. *Representing Female Vocality in Western Culture*. Ed. Dunn, L. and Jones, N. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.1-14.

Dunston, J.T. 1923. Retarded and Defective Children-Native Mentality: Mental Testing. In: *South African Journal of Science*. Vol.20. pp.148-156.

Eagleton, T. 1983. *Literary Theory. An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Efthimiadis, H. 1991. *Mediating Opposites: Deconstruction and the Book of Ruth.* Unpublished MA Dissertation, Nelson Mandela University.

Ehrenreich, E. 2007. *The Nazi Ancestral Proof. Genealogy, Racial Science and the Final Solution*. Bloomington and Indianapolis; Indiana University Press.

Eiseley. L. 1959. Alfred Russel Wallace. In: *Scientific American*. Vol.200, no.2. pp.70-87.

Engh, B. 1994. Adorno and the Sirens: Tele-Phonographic Bodies. In: *Embodied Voices*. Eds. Dunn, L. and Jones, N.A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.pp.120-135.

Erlmann, V. 1991. *African Stars: Studies in Black South African Performance.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Erlmann, V. 1992. The Past is Far and the Future is Far: Power and Performance among Zulu Migrant Workers. In: *American Ethnologist*. Vol.19, no.4. pp.688-709.

Evans, I. 1997. *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: California Press.

Evans, G. 2014. *Black Brain, White Brain. Is Intelligence Skin Deep?* London: Thistle Publishing.

Feinberg, H.M. 1993. The 1913 Natives' Land Act in South Africa: Politics, Race, and Segregation in the early 20th Century. In: *The International Journal of African Historical Studies.* Vol. 26, no.1.pp.65-109.

Fink, B. 1995. *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Joussance*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fleischhacker, D. and Hahn, C. 1988. Abortion and Eugenics in Nazi Germany. In: *Population and Development Review*. Vol.14, no.1.pp 81-112.

Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline and Punishment. The Birth of the Assylum.* Trans. Sheridan, A. London: Penguin Books.

Foucault, M. 1990. *History of Sexuality*: *An Introduction*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. 2003. Lecture 11, 17 March 1976. In: *Society Must Be Defended*. *Lectures at the College de France*. Trans. Macey, D. New York: Picador Press. pp.239-264.

Foucault, M. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France*, 1978-1979. Ed. Senellart, M. Trans. Burchell, G. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. 2009. *Security, Territory, Population*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

French, M. 1986. *Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals*. London: Penguin.

Freud, S. 2003. *The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious*. London: Penguin.

Friedlander, H. 1995. *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.

Gadamer, H.G. 1975. *Truth and Method*. 2nd ed. Trans.Weinsheimer, J and Marshal, D. London and New York: Continuum.

Galloway, J. 2002. *Clara*. London: Jonathan Cape, Random House. pp.120-135.

Galton, F. 1865. Hereditary Talent and Character. In: *MacMillan's Magazine*. Vol.12. pp.157-166.

Galton, F. 1877. Economic Science and the British Association. In: *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*. Vol.40, no.3. pp.468-476.

Galton, F. 1892. *Hereditary Genius*. *An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences*. 1st ed. London: MacMillan and Co and New York.

Galton, F. 1892. *Hereditary Genius*. *An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences* 2nd ed. London: MacMillan and Co and New York.

Galton, F. 1899. Considerations Adverse to the Maintenance of Section F (Economic Science and Statistics), in Economic Science and the British Association. In: *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*. Vol.40. pp.468-473.

Galton, F. 1909. *Essays in Eugenics*. London: The Eugenics Education Society.

Galton, F. 1909a. *Memories of My Life*. 3rd ed. London: Methuen.

Galton, F. 1943. *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development.* London: Dent and Sons.

Gandhi, M.K. 1968. *Satyagraha in South Africa. The Selected Works of Mahatma Ghandi*. Vol.2. Ed. Narayna, S. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House.

Gasman, D, 1971. *The Scientific Origin of National Socialism: Social Darwinism in Ernst Haeckel and the German Monist League.* New York: American Elsevier.

Gatens, M. 1991. *Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Gates, H.L. 1988. *The Signifying Monkey. A Theory of African American Literary Criticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaume, M. 1986. *Ruth Crawford Seeger: Memoirs, Memories, Music*. Metuchen NJ and London: The Scarecrow Press.

Genre. In: *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, Merriam-Webster. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/genre. Accessed 16 June 2021.

Giacomini, L. 1597. De la Purgation de la Tragedia. In: *Orationi e Discorsi*. Florence: Bartolomeo Samartelli . pp.29-52.

Gilbert, J. 2004. Becoming Music: The Rhizomatic Moment of Improvisation. In: *Deleuze and Music*. Eds. Buchanan, I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.118-139.

Gilman, S. 1985. *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Gohr, L. 2002. *The Quest for Voice: On Music, Politics and the Limits of Philosophy, the 1997 Ernest Bloch Lectures.* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Green, L, Thomas, K. and Ramutsindela, M. 2013. The Plague Act. In: *Social Dynamics*. Vol.39, no.2. pp.278-281.

Guirand, F. 1959. Greek Mythology. In: *The New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology*. Introduction, Graves, R. London: Hamlin, pp.85-167.

Haeckel, E. 1876. *History of Creation*. Vol.1. Trans. Lankester, E.R. London: King.

Haeckel, E. 1904. *Die Lebenswunder: Gemeinverständliche Studien über Biologische Philosophie, Ergänzungsband zu dem Buche über die Welträthsel.* Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner.

Haeckel, E. 1910. *The Evolution of Man*. Vol.1. Trans. McCabe, J. London: Watts.

Haeckel, E. 1916. *Eternity: World-War Thoughts on Life and Death, Religion, and the Theory of Evolution.* Trans. Seltzer, T. New York: The Truth Seeker Company.

Hainge, J. 2004. Is Pop Music? In: *Deleuze and Music*. Eds. Buchanan, I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp.36-53.

Hall, R. 2014. The Legacies of the Natives Land Act of 1913. In: *Scriptura* 113. pp.1-13.

Hannold, W.L. 1907. The Negro in America. 15 Nov. Fortnightly Club Collection. A 146. *Wits Historical Papers*. Johannesburg.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2000. *Empire.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Harty, E.R. 1985. Text, Context and Intertext. In: *JLS*. Vol 1, no.2. pp.1-13.

Hawkes, T. 1977.1st ed. *Structuralism and Semiotics*. London: Menthuen.

Hawkes, T. 2003. 2nd ed. *Structuralism and Semiotics*. New York: Routledge.

Hawkins, M. 1997. *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945. Nature as Model and Nature as Threat.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haydn, J. 1950. *Die Schöpfung*, 2nd ed. Hob xxi:2 for Soli, Mixed Choir, Orchestra. Partitions Classique Breitkoft and and Härtel.

Hele, N. 2004. Ernst Haeckel and the Morphology of Ethics. In: *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association.* Vol.15, no.1. pp.1-27.

Hellman, E. 1948. *Rooiyard – A Sociological Survey of an Urban Native Yard*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Holland, E.1999. *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. Introduction to Schizoanalysis*. London: Routledge.

Holland, E. 2004. Studies in Applied Nomadology. In: *Deleuze and Music*. Eds. Buchanan, I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp.20-35.

Holland, E. 2013. *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus*. London: Bloomsbury.

Huddleston, T.1956. Sophiatown. In: *Sophiatown Renaissance. A Reader*. Ed. Masilela, N. https://pzacad.pitzer.edu/NAM/general/essays/Sophiatown%20Reader%20Real.pdf. pp.37-52. Accessed 30 March 2019.

Huddleston, T. 1956. *Naught for Your Comfort*. London: Collins.

Iacob, M. 2017. Humour as a Survival Technique during Communism in Romania. In: *Interlitteraria*, Vol.22, no.2. pp.332-340.

Irigaray, L. 1985. *Speculum of the Other Women*. Trans. Gillian, C.G. Ithaca, New York: Cornel University Press.

Irigaray, L. 1993. Wonder: A Reading of Descartes' *The Passions of the Soul*'. In *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*. Trans. Burke, C. and Gill, G. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp.72–82.

Jenkins, N. *Haydn's "The Creation". Programme Notes. On Preparing a New English Text for "The Creation."* http://www.neiljenkins.info/documents/thecreation.pdf. pp.1-7. Accessed 20 March 2021.

Johnstone, F.A. 1976. *Class, Race and Gold*. London. As quoted in Callinicos, 1981:22.

Joint Council of Europeans and Natives (JCEN). *Report of the Wages Committee*, 1921. As quoted in Koch,1983:156.

Jones, R. 1947. Memorandum on Statutory Recognition of African Trade Relations (as amended and adopted by the Council of the Institute on 24/1/47). South African Institute of Race Relations (Incorporated). *Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut vir Rasseverhoudings (Ingelyf)*. pp.1-6.

Jordan, G. and Weedon. C. 1994. *Cultural Politics-Class, Gender, Race and the Postmodern World*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Kahn, E. 1949. The Pass Laws. In: *Handbook of Race Relations in South Africa*. Ed. Hellmann, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.275-291.

Kant, I. 1960. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*. *Section 3*. Trans. Goldthwait, J.T. Oakland: University of California Press.

Keegan, T. J. 1986. *Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Kernfeld, B.1986. Jazz. In: *The New Harvard Dictionary of Music*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkap Press of Harvard University Press. pp.413-417.

Kipling, R. 1987. *Just So Stories*. London: Penguin.

Klemperer, V. 2000. *The Language of the Third Reich: ITl – Lingua Tertii Imperii*. A Philologist's Notebook. Trans. Brady, M. London and New Brunswich NJ: The Athlone Press.

Kneval, P. 2015. Sophiatown as *Lieu De Mémoire*. In: *African Studies*. Vol.74, no.1. pp.51-76.

Koch, E. 1983. “Without Visible Means of Subsistance”: Slumyard Culture in Johannesburg 1918-1940. In: *Town and Countryside in the Transvaal. Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response*. Ed. Bozzoli, B. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. pp.151-175.

Kornberger, M. Rhodes, C and ten Bos, R. 2006. The Others of Hierarchy: Rhizomatics of Organizing. In: *Deleuze and the Social*. Eds. Fuglsang, M and Sorenson, B.M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.58-74.

Kramer, L. 1992. Schenker’s Order or Haydn’s Chaos. Hermeneutics and Music Analysis: Can they Mix? In: *19th Century Music*. Vol.16. pp.3-17.

Kristeva, J. 1984. *Revolution in Poetic Language*. Trans. Waller, M. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kristeva, J. 1997. *The Kristeva Reader*. Ed. Oliver, K. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kubik, G. 1974. *The Kachambo Brothers Band: A Study of Neo-Traditional Music in Malawi.*Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kundera, M. 1992. *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*. Reading, Berkshire: Cox and Wyman Ltd.

Kuzwayo, E.1985. *Call Me Woman*. Preface by Gordimer, N. Foreword by Head, B. Johannesburg: Picador.

Lacan, J. 1998. *The Seminar XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*. Ed. Miller, J. New York and London: Routledge.

Lacey, M. 1986. *Working for Boroko*. Johannesburg.

Lavater, J.C. 1945-98. *Essays on Physiognomy*. 18th edition. Vol.4 Trans. of Abridged ed. by Holroft, T. London: Ward.

Leitch, V. 1985. *Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lemke, T. 2011. *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction*. New York: New York University Press.

Lemm, V. and Vatter, M. 2017. Michel Foucault’s Perspective on Biopolitics. In*: Handbook of Biology and Politics.* Eds. Peterson, S. and Somit, A. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. pp.40-52.

Lenz, F. 1923. *Grundriβ der Menschlichen Aulese und Rassenhygiene*. Band 2. *Erblichketslehre und Rassehygiene*. Eds. Bauer, F., Fischer, E, and Lenz, F. Munich: Lehmanns.

Lerole, J. 1990. *Allen’s Interview with Jake Lerole. 3.7.1990*, as quoted in Allen, 1993:15-16.

Le Roux, R. 2010. The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in South Africa. In: *Industrial Law Journal*. Vol.39. no.2. pp.139-165.

Levi, P. 1958. *If this is a Man*. Trans: Woolf, S. New York: Orion.

Lévinas, E. 1981. *Otherwise than Being: or Beyond Essence*. Trans. Lingis, A. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

Lévi-Strauss, C.1969. *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*. Ed. Needham, R. Trans. Bell, J.H. and von Sturmer, J.R. Boston: Beacon Press.

Lévi-Strauss, C. 1969a. *The Raw and the Cooked*. Trans. Weightman, J. and D. New York: Harper and Row.

Leyden, J. *et al.* 2008. *The Essential Mango Groove (booklet). Gallo Record Company.*

Liebenberg, W.1987. Derivean Reading – a Critique of Deconstructive Criticism. In: *JLS*. Vol.3, no.1. pp.11-20.

Lifton, R.J. 1986. *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books.

Livesey, G. 2010. Assemblage. In: *The Deleuze Dictionary* (revised). Ed. Parr, A. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp.13-17.

Lloyd. G.1984. *The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Locke, J. 1894. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (1690) edited by Campbell, A. Frazer. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Marabina, J. 2019. *IYASA-Ngizobuyela* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6TeODwCGZ0. (Official Music Video).

Maroney, S. 1978. The Development of the Compound as a Mechanism of Worker Control, 1900-1912. In: *The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest.* University of the Witwatersrand, SA. Institute of Race Relations. pp.1-11.

Marquard, L. 1952. *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa.* London: Oxford University Press.

Marquard, O. 1993. Interview: Das Lachen ist die kleine Theodizee. In: *Luzifer Lacht. Philophische Betrachtungen von Nietzsche bis Tabori*, Ed.and interviewer, Dietzsch, S. pp.8-21.

Marx, K. 1990. *Capital*. *A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 1. Trans. Fawkes, B. Intro. By Mandel, E. Middelsex: Penquin Books.

Marx, K. 1991. *Capital*. *A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 3. Trans. Fawkes, B. Intro. By Mandel, E. Middelsex: Penquin Books.

Marx, K.1993. *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy.* Trans. and Foreword Nicolaus, M. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Matshikikiza, T. 1951. Twenty Years of Jazz. In: *Drum*. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:108.

Matteson, J. 1713. *Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre*. Hamburg: B. Schiller.

Matteson, J. 1721. *Das Forschende Orchestre*. Hamburg: [publisher obscured in scan].

Matteson, J. *Critica Musica* Journal published between 1722-1725.

Matteson, J. 1981. *Johann Matteson's Der Volkommene Capellmeister. A Revised Translation with Critical Commentary*. Trans. Hariss, E., Arbor, A. Mich.: UMI Research.

Matteson, J. and Lenneberg, H. Johann Matteson. 1958. On Affect and Rhetoric in Music (I). In: *Journal of Music Theory*. Vol.2, no.1. pp.47-84.

Matteson, J. and Lenneberg, H. Johann Matteson. 1958. On Affect and Rhetoric in Music (II). In: *Journal of Music Theory*. Vol.2, no.2. pp.193-236.

Maylam, P.1990. The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa. In: *African Affairs*. Vol. 89, no.354. pp. 57-84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/722496. Accessed 22 March 2019.

McClary, S.1991. *Feminine Endings.Music Gender and Sexuality. With a New Introduction.* Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Meredith, M. 2007. *Diamonds, Gold and War. The British, the Boers, and the Making of South Africa*. New York: Public Affairs.

Merrett, C. 2018. Masters and Servants: African Trade Unionism in Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands before the Early 1980's. In: *Natalia*, vol.48. CC.BY.NC. pp.1-34.

Merziger, P. 2007. Humour in Nazi Germany: Resistance and Propoganda? The Popular Desire for an All-Embracing Laughter. In: *IRSH*. Vol.52. pp. 275-290.

Mitshikiza, T. Twenty Years of Jazz. In: *Drum*. December, 1951. As quoted in Ballantine, 1991:26.

Mitshikiza, T. *Drum*. December 1951. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:107-108.

Mitshikiza, T. *Drum*, June 1957. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:98.

Mochumi, E. 1980. *Interview*. As quoted in Koch, 1983:159.

Moodie, D. 1990. *Changing Patterns of Domination and Resistance in the Compounds*. Paper presented at the Workshop on the Politics of Gold Production in South Africa. Northwestern University; copy available from D.Moodie, Department of Sociology, Hobard and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY.

Moodie, D. 1992. Alcohol and Resistance on the South African Gold Mines. In: *Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa*. Eds. Crush, J, and Ambler, C. Athens OH: Ohio University Press. pp.162-186.

Morris, M. 2004. *Every Step of the Way- The Journey to Freedom in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgan, R. 1991. *Twentieth-Century Music*. New York: Norton.

Mphahlele, E. 1971. *The Wanderers*. London: Fontana.

Murray, D. 2019. *The Madness of Crowds. Gender, Race and Identity*. London: Bloombury Continuum.

Nail, T. 2017. What is an Assemblage? *SubStance*, vol.46, no.1, Issue 142. pp.21-37.

Natiez, J. 1990. *Music and Discourse. Towards a Semiology of Music*. Trans. Abbate, A.C. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Native Grievances Enquiry Report. 1913-1914. UC, p.19. As quoted in Maloney, 1978:4.

New Nation. 1910. Vol 1, no. 5. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:58.

Nietzsche, F. 1911. The Greek Woman, In: *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Vol. 2, Ed. Levy, O. Trans. Mügge, M.A. London: T.N. Foulis, pp.21-26 (fragment).

Nietzsche, F. 1967. The Birth of Tragedy. In: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Ed. and Trans. Kaufmann, W. New York: Modern Library. pp.19-345.

Nin, A. 1966-1967. *The Journals of Anaïs Nin*. Ed. Stuhlmann, G. Vol. 3. London: Peter Owens.

Nitzsche, J. 1975. *The Genius Figure in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nolte, E. 1989. Die Teks as Interteks: ŉ Parakos ("ŉ Misleidende Titel"). In: *JLS*. Vol.5, no.1.pp.1-7.

Norris, C.1982. *Deconstruction. Theory and Practice*. London and New York: Routledge.

Nye, A. 1988. *Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Man.* London: Routledge.

Olivier, B. 1993. Deconstruction. In: *Conceptions of Social Inquiry*. Ed. Snyman, J. Pretoria USRC Publishers. pp.313-346.

Olivier, B. 1996. Beyond Hierarchy? The Prospects of a Different Form of Reason. In: *The South African Journal of Philosophy*. pp.41-50.

Olivier, B. 2004. Lacan's Subject: The Imaginary, Language, the Real and Philosophy. In: *The South African Journal of Philosophy*. Vol.31, no.1. pp.1-19.

Olivier, B. 2009. Music and Architecture: Time and/or Space? In: *Philosophical Planes-Philosophical Essays.* London and Frankfurt: Peter Lang Academic Publishers. pp.219-235.

Olivier, B. 2015. Capitalism and Suffering. In: *PINS* (*Psychology in Society*). Vol.48. pp.1-21.http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309-8708/2015/n48a1. Accessed 15 August 2019.

Olivier, B. 2016. Visual Encounters with Nature, Technology and Community in Japanese *Anime* as "Transitional Objects." In: *South African Journal of Art History*. Vol.31, no.1. pp.1-19.

Olivier, B. 2017. The Ethical (and Political) Status of Theorizing the Subject: Deleuze and Guattari. In: *Pychotherapy and Politics Int*. pp.1-10. https://doi.org/10.1002/ppi1408. Accessed 11 July 2019.

Olivier, B. 2017a. The Possibility of a "Minor Discourse" that Deterritorialises Neoliberalism Politically. In: *Journal of Literary Studies.* Vol. 33, no.3. pp.1-24. https://DOI:10.1080/02564718.2017.1376802. Accessed. 15 July 2019.

Olivier, B. 2018. Pathoanalysis of the Subject of Capitalism. In: *Psychotherapy and Politics Int*. pp.1-17. https://doi.org/10.1002/ppl.1467. Accessed 25 July 2019.

Olivier, B. 2021. Laws Outside of the Law. Thought Leader. In: *The Mail and Guardian*. https://www.thoughtleader.co.za/bertolivier/2021/02/11/laws-outside-the law/. Accessed 1 March 2021.

Olivier, B. 2021a. *The Piano*: What a Woman Wants. In: *Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Culture and Society*. Eliva Press. www.elivapress.com. pp.224-242.

Olleson, E. 1968. The Origins and Libretto of Haydn's *Creation*. In: *Haydn Year Book*. Vol.4. pp.148-168.

Omer-Cooper J. 1994. *History of Southern Africa*.2nd ed. Oxford: James Curry.

Opperman, D.J. 1983. *Groot Verseboek*. 9th ed. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Ortner, S. 1974. Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture? In: *Woman, Culture, and Society*. Eds.Rosaldo, M. and Lamphere, L. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp.67-87.

Paglia, C. 1990. *Sexual Personae. Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson*. London New Haven: Yale University Press.

Palisca, C. 1991. *Baroque Music*. 3rd ed. Prentice Hall History of Music Series. Ed. Hitchcock, H.W. Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Pareles, J. 1988. RECORDINGS; Zouk a Distinctive, Infectious Dance Music. In: *The New York Times.* May 29. Section 2. p.23.

Parr, A. 2010. Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation. In: *The Deleuze Dictionary*. Revised edition. Ed. Parr, A. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.69-72.

Parsons, N. 1993. *A New History of Southern Africa*. 2nd ed. London: MacMillan.

Parvulescu, A. 2010. To Yes-Laugh Derrida's Molly. In: *Parallaz.* Vol. 16, no.3. pp.16-27.

Paul, D. 2003. Darwinism and Eugenics. From Part II. Historical Context. In: *The Cambridge Companion to Darwin*. Eds. Hodge, J. and Radick, G. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.189-214.

Paton, A. 1987. *Cry, the Beloved Country*. London: Vintage.

Philips, R.1938. *The Buntu in the City*. Johannesburg.

Piliso, N. 1984. *Ballantine's Interview with Ntemi Piliso*. 24.1.1984. As quoted in Allen, 1993:25.

Pim, J.H. 1906. The Question of Race. 15 Nov. A 146 *Wits Historical Papers*. Johannesburg.

Plaatje, S. 2007. *Native Life in South Africa*. London: Picador.

Plato. 1928. Phaedrus. In: *The Words of Plato*. 3rd ed. Ed. Irwin, E. Trans. Jowett, B. New York: The Modern Library. pp.263-329.

Plato. 1952. *Phaedrus*. Trans. Hackforth, F.B.A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rancière, J. 1999. *Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Trans. Rose, J. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Randel, D. (ed). 1986. Masculine, Feminine Cadence. In: *The New Harvard Dictionary of Music*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Havard University Press.

Reich, N. 1985. *Clara Schumann. The Artist and the Woman*. Ithaka and London: Cornel University.

Reich, N. 2001. Schumann [*née Wieck*], Clara. In: *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*. 2nd ed. Eds. Sadie, S. and Tyrrell, H. Vol.22. London: MacMillan. pp.754-758.

Reinhard, K. 2005. Towards a Political Theology of the Neighbor. In: *The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theory*. Eds. Žižek, S., Santner, E. and Reinhard, K. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Renwick, C. 2011. From Political Economy to Sociology: Francis Galton and the Social-Scientific Origins of Eugenics. In: *BJHS*. Vol, 44, no.3. pp.343-369.

Rezant, P. 1985. *Ballantine's Interview with Peter Rezant*. Riverlea, 23 June 1985. As quoted in Ballantine, 1993:21.

Rich, P. 1977. 'The Agrarian Counter-Revolution in the Transvaal and the Origins of Segregation'. In: *Working Papers in Southern African Studies*. Ed. Bonner, P.J. pp.55-112.

Rich, P. 1990. Race, Science and the Legitimization of White Supremacy in South Africa, 1902-1940. In: *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*. Vol. 23, no.4. pp.665-686.

Richards, R. 2008. *The Tragic Sense of Life. Ernest Haeckel and the Struggle over Evolutionary Thought*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Ritter, J. 1976. Über das Lachen. In: *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie.* Vol.14. pp.1-21.

Rosaldo, M. 1974. Women, Culture and Society. A Theoretical Overview. In: *Woman, Culture, and Society*. Eds. Rosaldo, M. and Lamphere, L. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp.17-42.

Röβler, A. 1986. *Contributions to the Spiritual World of Olivier Messiaen*. Trans. Dagg, B. and Poland, N. Duisburg: Gilles and Francke.

Rottenberg, E. 2014. The Laughter of Jacques Derrida. A Decade After Derrida In: *Oxford Literary Review*. Vol.36, no.2. pp.296-299.

Roux, E. 1948. *Time Longer than Rope. A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa*. London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Rowell, L. E. 1984 *Thinking about Music: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Rycroft. D. 1967. Nguni Vocal Polyphony. In: *Journal of the International Folk Music Council*. Vol. xix. pp.88-103.

Salilo, E. 1986. *Ballantine's Interview with Edward Salilo*. As quoted in Ballantine, 1993:27.

Salilo, E. 1986a *Ballantine's Interview with Edward Salilo*. As quoted in Ballantine, 1993:29.

Salilo, E. 1986b *Ballantine's Interview with Edward Salilo*. As quoted in Ballantine, 1993: 68-69.

Sandall, R. 2008. Sir Francis Galton and the Roots of Eugenics. In: *Sociology*. Vol 45, no.2. pp.170-176.

Sarraute, M. 1956. *Portrait d'un Inconnu*. 2nd ed. Paris: Gallimard.

Sartre, J-P and Bromberg, B. 1955. The Anti-Novel of Nathalie Sarraute. In: *Yale French Studies*. *No.16. Foray Through Existentialism*. pp.40-44.

Sartre, J-P. 1975, *Nausea*. Trans. Baldick, R. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Sarup, M.1993. *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism.* 2nd ed. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.

Saussure, F. 1959. *Course in General Linguistics*. Trans. Baskin, W., Eds. Meisel, P. and Saussy, H. New York: Columbia Press.

Savage, M. 1986. The Imposition of Pass Laws on the African Population in South Africa 1916-1984. In: *African Affairs*. Vol.85. pp.181-205.

Schoenberg, A. 1978. *Theory of Harmony*. Trans. Carter, R. London, Boston: Faber.

Schopenhauer, A. 1970. On Women. In*: Essays and Aphorisms*. London: Penguin. pp.80-84.

Sellers, S. (ed.). 1997. *The Hélène Cixous Reader.* London and New York: Routledge.

Seyfrit. M. 1986. Ocarina. In: *The New Harvard Dictionary of Music*. Ed. Randel. D. p.554.

Silgee, W. 1976. as quoted in Coplan, 1985:103.

Silgee, W. *Interview*, 16 September 1976. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:108.

S'jaiva Sibancane, 2014. *IYASA*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y9HSlmbl0fY. (Official Music Video).

Silisiäinen, L. 2010. Foucault's Voices. Towards the Political Genealogy of the Auditory Sonorous. In: *Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and SocialResearch*. Vol. 384. Jyväskylä. pp.1-227.

Slosberg, B. *Pagan Tapestry*, pp.217-218. As quoted in Ballantine, 1993:60.

Smyth, E. 1933. *Female Pipings in Eden*. London: Peter Davis Limited.

SNA 11/1308/02. *Report of Trooper Brickhill*. 26 September 1902. As quoted in Maloney, 1978:6.

SNA 57/2147/05. *Court transcript: van den Berg vs Anderson*. 13 May 1905. As quoted in Maloney, 1978:6.

SNA 61/3868/05. *Boksburg District Controller to Windham*. 15 December 1905. As quoted in Maloney, 1978:6.

SNA 68/2579/06. *Kimberley to Pritchard*. 10 August 1905. As quoted in Maloney, 1978:6.

SNA 89/1261/09. *Press clipping entitled "Savage Brutality*". As quoted in Maroney, 1987:5.

Sparshott, F. 1998. Reflections on Affektenlehre and Dance Theory in the Eighteenth Century. In: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. Vol.51, no.1. pp.21-28.

Stamou, L. 2002. Plato and Aristotle. On Music and Music Education: Lessons from Ancient Greece. In: *International Journal of Music Education*. Vol.39, no.1. pp.3-16.

Steele, E. 1987. Henry George on Chattal and Wage Slavery: The American Social Philosopher Condemned both Forms as Immoral, Irrational Denials of Equality. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* Vol.46. no.5. pp.7-46.

Stiegler, B. 2013. *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*. Trans. Ross, D. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Swiboda, M. 2004. Cosmic Strategies: The Electric Experiments of Miles Davis. In: *Deleuze and Music*. Eds. Buchanan, I. and Swiboda, M. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp.196-216.

Tangye, H. 1896. *In New South Africa: Travels in the Transvaal and Rhodesia*: London: H. Cox.

Temperley, N. 1983. New Light on the Libretto of The Creation. In: *Music in Eighteenth Century England; Essays in Memory of Charles Cudworth.* Eds. Hogwoord, C. and Luckett, R. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.189-211.

Temperley, N. 1991. *Haydn: The Creation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tesfagiorgis, F. 1993. Centering Black Women Artists. In: *Theorizing Black Feminisms. The Visionary Pragmatism of Black Women*. Eds. James, S. and Busia, A. London and New York: Routledge. pp.228-266.

Themba, C. *Drum*, 1958. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:98.

Themva, C. 2006. *Requiem for Sophiatown*. Johannesburg: Penguin Books.

Tobias, P. Vallentine and Rightmire, Philip G. Homo Erectus. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 13 November 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Homo-erectus. Accessed 14 March 2012.

Todorov, T. 1982. *The Conquest of America*. Trans. Howard, R. New York: Harper and Row.

Tong, P. 2009. *Feminist Thought. A More Comprehensive Introduction.* Charlotte: Westview Press.

Toscana, A.1990. Capture. In: *The Deleuze Dictionary* Ed. Parr, A. Revised ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press. pp.43-45.

Tracey, H. 1948. *Lalela Zulu: 100 Zulu Lyrics*. Trans: Tracey, H. Johannesburg: African Music Society. As quoted in Callinicos, 1981:40.

Trump, M. 1981. Literature and Social History: An Analysis of the Marabi Dance by Modikwe Dikobe. In: *Conference on Literature and Society in Southern Africa*. Vol. 8, no.11. University of York Centre for Southern African Studies. pp.1-46.

Tsotsi, W. 1981. *From Chattel to Wage Slavery. A New Approach to South African History.* Durban: W.M. Tsotsi.

Twala, J. 1979. Poem Family Planning. In: *Staffrider*. Vol. 2, no. 3 July/August. As quoted in Callinicos, 1981:51.

Umteteli wa Bantu, 1931. As quoted in Coplan, 1985:96.

Usher, R. 2010. Riding the Lines of Flight. In: *European Journal for Research on the Education and Learning of Adults.* Vol.1, no 1-2. pp.67-78.

Van Onselen, C.1982. *New Babylon New Nineveh. Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand 1886-1914*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Van Onselen, C.1996. *The Seed is Mine. The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper 1894-1985*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Venter, N. 2004. *Disclosing Aspects of Gender and Creativity, with Reference to Clara Schumann and Erika Bothma*. Unpublished MMus dissertation, Nelson Mandela University.

Wagenaar, O. 1978. *Hitler aus Nächster Näher: Aufzeichnungen eines Vertrauten.1929-1932*. Ed. Turner, H.A. Frankfurt an M: Ullsteing.

Weber, W.S. 1907. Can the White Race Continue to Dominate South Africa. 23 May. Fortnightly Club Collection. A 146. *Wits Historical Papers*. Johannesburg.

Weber, M. 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Trans and Eds. Shils, E. and Finch, H. Illinois: The Free Press.

Weber, M. 1976. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. Parsons, T. Intro. Giddens A. New York: Scribner.

Weinrich, U., Labov W. and Herzog, M.L. 1968. Empirical Foundations for a Theory of Language Change. In: *Directions for Historical Linguistics: A Symposium*. Eds. Lehmann, W. and Malkiel, Y. Austin: Univ. Tex. Press. pp.95-188.

Weintraub, J. and Kumar, K. 1997. *Public and Private in Thought and Practice. Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Wessel, F. 1955. *The Affektenlehre in the Eighteenth Century*. Unpublished PhD diss., University of Indiana.

White, R. 2004. Music: Soukouss. In: *African Folklore: An Encyclopedia*. Eds. Peek, P.M. Yakah, K. New York: Routledge.

Wikipedia. 2021. IYASA. Primary contributors: Revision history statistics. Page Version ID: 1024752097. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IYASA. Accessed 30 September 2021.

Williams, T.C. 2017. How Ta-Nehisi Coates Gives Whiteness-Power. In: *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/ta-nehisi-coates-whiteness-power.html. Accessed 30 July 2021.

Winnicott, D.W. 1971. *Playing and Reality*. Tavistock e-book.

Wolpe, H. 1972. Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid. In: *Economy and Society*. Vol.1, no 4. pp.425-456.

Woolf, V. 1929. *A Room of One's Own*. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Woolf, V. 1996. *Night and Day*. London: Penguin Random House.

Woolf, V. 2001. Professions for Women. In: *Available Means. An Anthology of Women(s) Rhetoric(s).* Eds. Ritchie, J. and Ronald, K. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp.242-246.

Žižek, S, 2016. *Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Problems with Neighbours, Where Does the Threat Come From?* EPUB,