CHANGING INTERNATIONAL REALITIES AND THE CONFIGURATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

LAETITIA OLIVIER

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Supervisor: **Prof T. G. Neethling**
Co-Supervisor: **Prof F. Vreÿ**

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DECLARATION

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Date: 29 January 2015

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Laetitia Olivier
University of the Free State
Faculty of Humanities
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ABSTRACT

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is currently in the process of evaluating its policies, strategies and force design in order to ensure that it is optimally postured and configured to successfully carry out its ordered tasks in the 21st century. Success will depend on how well the SANDF analyses the environment in which it will have to function, as well as how well it prioritises its objectives when making decisions about the most appropriate approach to the development of a national security strategy, force planning and the role of the military as one of the components of national power.

The study examines developments in the South African defence debate since 1994. Two key policy documents, namely the South African White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the South African Defence Review of 1998, established the national defence posture and defined the functions and tasks of the Department of Defence. The primary organising principle behind these documents was its commitment to designing the SANDF for its so-called primary role, namely the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa against an external military threat. This principle was ultimately used as a yardstick to determine the SANDF's force design, force structure and capability requirements. The focus on the primary tasks of the SANDF has, over time, proven to be misaligned with the governmental objectives to be achieved and it has become evident that the force design and structure as prescribed in these documents fail to adequately address the current and future operational requirements of the SANDF. Furthermore, many defence analysts have pointed out that critical issues such as the continuing misalignment between the allocated defence budget and expected defence outcomes have also not been addressed. This has created a dilemma in which the SANDF, despite the acquisition of state-of-the-art air and naval assets in 1998, is still not optimally configured, adequately trained or equipped or sufficiently funded to execute and sustain its required operational tasks. Furthermore, due to significant changes that have taken place in the security environment since 1994, it has become evident that the principles on which the SANDF was originally designed might no longer be relevant to current defence requirements.

The study includes an analysis of the 21st century's security environment – a threat environment that is, and will be, characterised by political and social complexity and a variety of modes of warfare that will converge in unexpected ways. Defence forces will have to develop capabilities to conduct a wide range of missions simultaneously while retaining the capacity to operate across the full spectrum of warfare – from traditional

warfighting and peacekeeping to disaster management and support to other government departments. These requirements demand a reassessment of the current SANDF force design and force structure as the current frameworks have proven to be misaligned with current Government deployment requirements and the characteristics of the prevailing African security environment.

The study is based on the premise that significant changes should be made to the current SANDF force design and structure. The 2014 Defence Review highlights the fact that the SANDF is, and will be, expected to play a variety of roles in Africa, and that it will often be deployed in 'secondary' functions such as peacekeeping, border management and humanitarian support. Despite this shift to a more holistic and multifunctional approach to defence, which addresses both traditional and non-traditional roles of the military during Joint, Interdepartmental, Interagency and Multinational (JI^{2}M) operations, the 2014 Defence Review continues to structure the SANDF in accordance with traditional single service organisational structures. These structures, the SA Army, the SA Navy, the SA Air Force and the South African Medical Health Services are not optimally configured to meet the demands of JI^{2}M deployments. Defence planners refer to the adage that *structure follows strategy*, therefore, if the SANDF is expected to function in a joint environment, its force design and force structure should reflect this 'jointness' as the essence of its design principles.

The study concludes that the logical cost-effective solution to the configuration of the SANDF would be the adoption of a modular force design, based on composite brigades that could be utilised as interchangeable building blocks which can be tailor-made for specific deployments, rather than to continue with the cumbersome traditional practice of using the services as building blocks. Modular force design will enable the SANDF to have a mass organic, scalable, joint precision effect, at an increasingly higher level than before, and enable the SANDF to balance the principles of concentration of force with economy of effort.

OPSOMMING

Die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) is in die proses om die organisasie se beleid, strategieë en magsontwerp te evalueer om te verseker dat die Weermag optimaal gekonfigureerd en georiënteerd is om take, soos deur die Regering vereis, suksesvol gedurende die 21ste eeu uit te voer. Die sukses van hierdie proses sal bepaal word deur hoe goed die SANW se beplanners daarin sal kan slaag om die omgewing waarin die SANW waarskynlik sal opereer te analiseer, sowel as deur hoe goed die beplanners die organisasie se doelwitte sal kan prioritiseer wanneer hulle beslissings maak oor die mees gepaste benaderings tot die ontwikkeling van ’n nasionale veiligheidstrategie, die magsvoorbereiding en die rol wat die Weermag sal moet vervul as een van die komponente van die staat se magsbasis.

Die tesis verken die ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsdebat sedert 1994. Twee primêre beleidsdokumente, naamlik die Suid-Afrikaanse Witskrif ten opsigte van Verdediging van 1996 en die Suid-Afrikaanse Verdedigingsoorsig van 1998, het die nasionale verdedigingspostuur geïdentifiseer en het ook die rol en take van die Departement van Verdediging duidelik uitgespel. Die primêre organisatoriese beginsel wat in hierdie twee beleidsdokumente vervat is, was die oriëntering tot die organisering van die Weermag om sy sogenaamde primêre rol, die beskerming van die soevereniteit en territoriale integriteit van die staat teen aanvalle deur ’n eksterne militêre bedreiging te vervul. Hierdie beginsel is dan ook gebruik as maatstaf om die SANW se magsontwerp, magstrukture en vereiste verdedigingskapasiteit te bepaal. Die fokus op die uitvoering van die Weermag se primêre take is egter met verloop van tyd uitgelig as ’n onvanpaste benadering tot die rol wat die Weermag moet vervul en dit het duidelik geword dat die magsontwerp en magstruktuur wat in bogenoemde beleidsdokumente uitsgespel word nie daarin geslaag het om aan die huidige en toekomstige operasionele behoeftes van die SANW te voldoen nie. Verskeie kenners op die vakgebied van nasionale verdediging is dit ook eens dat kritieke aspekte van die verdediginsdebat in Suid-Afrika, soos die verdedigingsbegroting wat nie met die voorgeskrewe en verwagte verdediginsdoelwitte ooreenstem nie en ook nie in een van die beleidsdokumente geanaliseer word nie.

Die dilemma het onstaan dat die SANW, ten spyte van die feit dat nuwe vegvliegtuie en frigatte ten duurste aangekoop is, steeds nie optimaal gekonfigureerd is nie en dat lede van die SANW nog nie optimaal opgelei en toegerus is om operasies suksesvol uit te voer en logisties te ondersteun nie. Verder het dit, in die lig van verskeie ingrypende

veranderings wat in die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsomgewing sedert 1994 plaasgevind het, duidelik geword dat die beginsels waarop die samestelling van die SANW aanvanklik gegrond was, nie meer relevant is tot huidige en toekomstige verdedigingsbehoeftes nie.

Die studie sluit ’n analise van die 21ste eeu se veiligheidsomgewing in – ’n omgewing wat gekenmerk word deur politiekie en sosiale kompleksiteite en ’n omgewing waarin verskeie metodes en tegnieke van oorlogvoering op onverwagse wyses op mekaar sal inwerk. Weermagte van regoor die wêreld sal daarop gevestig moet wees om vermoëns te onwikkel om verskeie tipes van militêre ontplooings gelyktydig te kan uitvoer terwyl hulle terselfdertyd die kapasiteit sal moet behou om die volle spektrum van oorlogvoering suksesvol te kan aanspreek. Dit beteken dat die SANW oor die vermoë sal moet beskik om tradisionele, konvensionele oorlogvoering te kan voer en om vredessteunoperasies suksesvol te kan ondersteun, terwyl die Weermag ook sy kapasiteit om hulp te verleen tydens mensgemaakte en natuurlike rampe voortdurend sal moet uitbou. Hierdie vereistes impliseer dat die SANW se huidige magsontwerp en strukture herevalueer moet word aangesien die huidige ontwerp nie belyn is met die Regering se doelwitte en opgelegde take nie, en ook omdat die huidige magsontwerp nie voorsiening maak vir die tipe bedreigings wat eie is aan Afrika se veiligheidsomgewing nie.

Die studie is gebaseer op die veronderstelling dat ingrypende wysigings gemaak sal moet word aan die SANW se huidige magsontwerp en strukture. Die voorgestelde nuwe Verdedigingsoorsig van 2014 (2014 Defence Review) lê klem op die feit dat die SANW tans, sowel as in die toekoms, daarop voorbereid sal moet wees om verskeie verdediginstake in Afrika uit te voer en dat die Weermag dikwels in sy sogenaamde sekondêre rol ontplooi sal word. Sekondêre take wat deur die SANW uitgevoer sal moet word, sluit vredessteun, grensbeheer en humanitêre steun operasies in. Ten spyte van die feit dat daar ’n duidelike verskuiwing in denke plaasgevind het oor die take wat die SANW in die toekoms sal moet uitvoer as deel van ’n geïntegreerde, inter-agentskap, inter-departmentele en multi-nasionale mag (Joint, Interdepartmental, Interagency and Multinational) word die Weermag steeds in die voorgestelde Verdediginsoorsig van 2014 voorgestel as ’n organisasie wat uit vier afsonderlike weermagsdele bestaan, naamlik die SA Leër, die SA Lugmag, die SA Vloot en die SA Geneeskundige Dienste. Hierdie strukture is egter nie die mees gepaste magsamestellings vir die tipe operasies waarin die SANW betrokke sal raak nie. Verdedigingsanaliste en beplanners verwys dikwels na die aanvaarde norm dat *struktuur strategie volg* en daarom sal dit meer van pas wees om die

SANW se magsontwerp aan te pas om optimaal as deel van gesamentlike en geïntegreerde mag te kan fungeer.

Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die mees logiese en finansieël verantwoordelike oplossing te vinde is in die aanvaarding en toepassing van ’n modulêre magsontwerp, gebaseer op saamgestelde brigades as boublokke. Hierdie saamgestelde brigades kan aangewend en aangepas word om aan die spesifieke vereistes van bepaalde missies te voldoen, eerder as om die tradisionele weermagsdele as boublokke te gebruik. ’n Modulere magsontwerp sal aan die SANW die geleentheid bied om gebalanseerde, geintegreerde magselemente saam te voeg wat optimaal toegerus is om spesifieke doelwitte te bereik en wat uiteindelik meer effektief aangewend sal kan word om die beginsels van konsentrasie, die ekonomiese aanwending van mag en buigsaamheid te laat realiseer.

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CHANGING INTERNATIONAL REALITIES AND THE CONFIGURATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Preliminary study and rationale

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), like most military organisations, continually evaluates its policies, strategies and force design to ensure that it remains ready, relevant and appropriately equipped to carry out its assigned roles and functions successfully. The development of the SANDF's policies and strategies do not take place in a vacuum and the SANDF's mandate, posture and force design must therefore be understood in the context of South Africa's role in the international and regional geo-political environment, in terms of government imperatives, as well as in the context of the ongoing process of defining the roles and functions of a military in a developing democratic society such as South Africa. In addition, the processes of force design, force preparation and force employment are also driven by diverse mission requirements across the spectrum of conflict. This study was aimed at defining how the South African military instrument of power can be configured optimally to be utilised as an instrument of foreign policy, given the rapid and fundamental changes that have occurred in the strategic environment since the beginning of the 21st century.

South Africa's foreign and defence policies are based on the notion that the country recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore interprets its national interests as being intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity and prosperity (Department of International Relations and Cooperation [DIRCO], 2011:3). The role that South Africa plays on the continent, and particularly in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) therefore stems from its foreign policy objectives, which are focused on the socio-political and economic development of the SADC and the continent as a whole. The rationale for these foreign policy objectives is to be found in the realisation that South Africa's interests and objectives for political and economic freedom will not be achieved in a region that is not economically and politically stable. South Africa, in cooperation with its

strategic partners, is therefore focusing its foreign relations and defence policies to pursue the institutionalisation of democracy and the promotion of sustainable economic advancement and peace. The SANDF is consequently focused on the establishment and maintenance of a stable and secure region within which growth and development can take place. In order to achieve this, South Africa's military capability must remain commensurate with its international status, strategic posture and inescapable continental leadership role (Defence Review Committee, 2014:vii). The recently tabled 2014 Defence Review was therefore aimed at analysing the strategic role that the SANDF plays, and then to compile a diagnostic of the current and future force design, force structure and requirements of the SANDF. The 2014 Defence Review was thus presented as defence policy that "defines and expands on the guiding principles that will steer the Defence Force through the next twenty to thirty years" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v)

The guiding principles encapsulated in the 2014 Defence Review are linked to one of the most important issues to be addressed by the Department of Defence (DOD) when formulating defence policy and strategy, namely to determine the level of defence ambition – deciding on how, when and under which circumstances the government will employ its military capabilities. This is an enduring conundrum, as expressed by the 19th century military strategist, Carl Von Clausewitz (1976:87), who argued that the primary task for a soldier was to understand the war which he or she was fighting and that it should be understood that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. The task of correctly understanding the character of the conflicts within which it will become involved is therefore crucial to the SANDF's current and future military success and defence. To achieve this type of success, defence policy must provide insight and guidance to the SANDF by correctly analysing and conceptualising the implications of postmodern war and warfighting in the context of local and regional cultural practices of warfare in Africa (Duyvesteyn & Angstrom, 2005:241). The aim of the 2014 Defence Review is thus "to define defence policy so that it maintains, coordinates and employs the assets of the defence sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation's security goals" (Chuter, 2011:1). Chuter (2011:1) also emphasises the importance of linking national security policy, foreign policy and defence policy by stating, "defence forces exist primarily to underpin the domestic and foreign policies of a state." The 2014 Defence Review

clearly expounds the interface among state departments as far as security and defence are concerned, and provides guidelines on how the defence force should be designed, structured and sustained to meet its ordered tasks and commitments. The 2014 Defence Review, as capstone defence policy, therefore defines the military scope of South Africa's national security (South Africa's level of defence ambition), as well as the strategic posture, defence capabilities, defence alliances and security mechanisms (national and international) that govern the utilisation of the Defence Force as foreign policy instrument (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-6).

Since the democratisation of South Africa in 1994, the South African defence debate has been guided by two key policy documents, namely the South African White Paper on Defence of 1996 (DOD: 1996) and the South African Defence Review of 1998 (DOD:1998). These documents established the national defence posture, defined the functions and tasks and the required force design of the SANDF and described the overall structure of the DOD and SANDF (Le Roux, 2007:269). The 1996 White Paper on Defence was aimed primarily at defining the defensive posture of the SANDF, whereas the 1998 Defence Review was largely focused on the transformation of the defence force to defence in democracy and the integration of the seven separate military organisations (former statutory and non-statutory military organisations) into a single, united SANDF. The 1998 Defence Review also provided a framework for the justification of the strategic defence packages which provided for the acquisition of state-of-the-art weapon platforms for the SA Air Force (SAAF) and SA Navy (SAN). The key organising principle of both these documents was its commitment to design the SANDF for its 'primary' role, namely the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity to be achieved primarily by employing its conventional warfighting capabilities against formal military adversaries as described in the 1996 White Paper on Defence in Chapter 5, paragraph 3 (DOD, 1996:21). This primary role was presented as the raison d'être for the existence, maintenance and funding of the SANDF. Notwithstanding the existence of and the need for the secondary functions of the SANDF, both the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review obliged South African defence planners to design and prepare specifically for the SANDF's primary, conventional warfighting function.

The SANDF has therefore, since 1994, been designed, structured, equipped and trained to defend South Africa against external aggression, which, due to the lack of an imminent external military threat, has had significant influence on the downsizing and compilation of SANDF force structure elements. In addition, post-apartheid South Africa has reacted against its past in a way similar to that of post-Nazi Germany by consciously choosing to limit its armed forces and assert influence in more peaceful ways. During the 1990s, decisions on the future force structure of the SANDF were thus heavily influenced by the new leadership of the government and the SANDF, who were focused on transforming the SANDF into a 'new', post-apartheid defence force, rather than focusing on the preparation of the SANDF for deployment. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the SANDF had limited power-projection capabilities and no longer posed a military threat to its poorer and weaker neighbours to the north (Sondhaus, 2006:120). This downsizing of the SANDF, however, seems contradictory to the expanding number of roles it has been expected to perform regionally, as well as domestically since 1994. This role inflation clearly demands a re-appreciation of the military models and structures that were used as a basis for the SANDF's force structure and force design in the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. Ultimately, expectations which had been created in terms of the roles and functions of the SANDF on the continent demanded a much more elaborate role for the SANDF than that which had been envisaged in chapter 5 of the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996:21–28).

Since 1994, the South African government has placed great emphasis on re-defining the Defence Force as a 'force for good' and has continuously highlighted the importance and function of a defence force in a democracy. In order to ensure that the SANDF would be capable of executing its ordered tasks, members of the DOD and defence analysts have continually argued for a larger portion of government expenditure (Heitman, 2013b:1). The DOD succeeded in this endeavour in 2005, following the presentation to Parliament of the Update of the 1998 Defence Review in which the changing strategic environment and the increasing need for collaborative action on the continent were addressed (DOD, 1998:21–25). The DOD utilised the 2005 Defence Update to the increasing prioritisation of the African Agenda (cf. Briefing to Defence Portfolio Committee, 14 June 2005) as motivation and justification for the more prominent and multi-faceted role that the SANDF is to play on the continent. Yet, according to Mills (2011:18), the report did not succeed in restructuring the

actual force design of the SANDF, which would have allowed the organisation to optimally structure, prepare and equip for what was originally referred to as 'secondary' functions in the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996:24–25). The prime mission equipment that was acquired, upon the promulgation of the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998:32), provided the SANDF with state-of-the-art capabilities for traditional warfighting or 'primary' functions such as defence against attacks by formal military organisations, but these capabilities have proved to be misaligned with the current deployment requirements of the SANDF, which are focused on the execution of the 'secondary' role, such as peace support operations and border-safeguarding operations. Mills (2011:24) argues that a stock-take of the Strategic Defence Package, as described in the 1998 Defence Review, will reveal the problems caused by a leadership that created extensive 'equipment wish-lists', but which, at the same time, was unable to convince government to allocate sufficient budgets and sustainment systems to the SANDF. Mills concludes that: "[O]verall, ensuring the right force composition and posture in South Africa, as with others, is fundamentally about putting people, not technology first" (Mills, 2011:24).

In addition to dwindling budgets, several other factors also contributed to the steady decline of SANDF capabilities. The socio-political transformation that has taken place in South Africa since 1994 caused changes to the role, function and stature of the defence force in South African society. One of the primary reasons for the altered role of the SANDF in the 'new' South African society was the process of demilitarisation (Louw, 2013:1). This emphasised a clear shift away from the way in which the former South African Defence Force (SADF) supported regime security as part of the apartheid government (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-1). Furthermore, by 1996 it was evident that there was an absence of an immediate military threat to the state and this afforded government the opportunity to focus on and fund socio-economic development initiatives and the institutionalisation of democracy in the 'new' South Africa, rather than spending money on the SANDF (DOD, 1996:6).

As part of the transformation to democracy, one of the primary focus areas of the SANDF was the integration of the various statutory and non-statutory forces into a single military organisation (DOD, 1996:25–26). Decision-makers in the SANDF were therefore focused on the organisation's deliberate transformation which was primarily aimed at legitimising the

defence force in the eyes of the South African society, rather than focusing on the force design, preparation and capability development of the SANDF to prepare it to execute its constitutional mandate (Esterhuyse, 2010:1). Government's post-apartheid focus on transformation, and the difficult task of integration and the right-sizing of the SANDF occurred against the limitations of continually decreasing defence budgets (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-10). As a result, the SANDF was characterised by an internal structural focus, as opposed to a focus that emphasised the requirements to design, structure and prepare the SANDF to conduct external, expeditionary roles as part of peacebuilding efforts on the continent (Louw, 2013:2). Operational commitments, however, soon exposed the fact that the SANDF has become under-staffed, under-funded and ill-equipped to execute and sustain deployments as ordered by government. This, in turn, revealed the reality that South African defence policy and strategies have become misaligned with operational requirements, which highlighted the urgent requirement to update and reformulate SANDF policies, strategies and warfighting concepts to enable the SANDF to attain the desired end states successfully during deployments.

Despite the constraints described in the preceding paragraphs, the SANDF has to be designed, structured and prepared to play a significant role in peace support operations in Africa, as political strife and conflict will continue to require peacekeeping and peace enforcement in order to address human security challenges on the continent (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-6). Of the 15 peacekeeping operations that are currently being administered by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) worldwide, seven are being conducted in Africa (UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, 2013). Over 75% of the approximately 92 233 uniformed peacekeepers deployed in 2013 can be found in Africa and the bulk of the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping budget of nearly US$ 7,33 billion in the 2012/13 period was budgeted for African peacekeeping operations (UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, 2013). Africans should not, however, expect this support for peace missions in Africa to continue indefinitely. Towards the end of the 1990s, it was often asserted that Africa was at the receiving end of the so-called Somalia effect, i.e. Western disenchantment as a result of the failure of many peacekeeping operations in Africa (cf. Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:429). The endeavours of the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone also indicated that the UN has not always been in a

sufficiently strong position to put a lid on hostilities in complex emergencies in Africa (Neethling, 2009:8). In order to provide the African Union (AU) and other role-players on the African continent with a sound foundation for undertaking peacekeeping missions, the AU, the African Standby Force (ASF) and the regional brigades will have to increase their capacity to address African security challenges themselves. In this regard, South Africa will be compelled to take the lead as far as the strategic management capacity and operational level mission management are concerned. It will also be expected of the country to contribute significantly to the financial and logistical support of peace missions on the continent (Neethling, 2009:13).

Contrary to the expanding force provisioning demands placed on the SANDF as described above, the continually decreasing defence budget has resulted in a persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, South Africa's growing defence commitment and the defence resource allocation. This has had a severely negative effect on the SANDF's human resources, as well as its deployment capabilities and operational readiness (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-4). The current defence budget translates into less than 1,2% of gross domestic product (GDP) which, in turn, have caused the SANDF to be effectively 24% underfunded in respect of its current size and shape (Defence Review Committee, 2014:ix). Despite the restrictions created by dwindling budgets and over-extended, diminished capabilities, the planners and strategists of the DOD and the SANDF are compelled to find answers to the enduring challenge of defining and operationalising the perceived requirements (ends), optional courses of action (ways) with available forces and resources (means) (Collins, 2002:3). They are thus compelled – literally and figuratively – to get more of the proverbial 'bang for their buck'. As part of these efforts, the 2014 Defence Review was drafted to ensure sufficient defence and security at an acceptable cost.

The task of the Defence Review Committee – to develop a new policy to guide defence strategy – was clearly stated in the Defence budget speech by the then Minister of Defence, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu in May 2010, in which she stated, (Defence Review Committee, 2014: 0-2):

> Major changes, both dramatic and evolutionary, have taken place in the defence environment over the past fifteen years. The policy review and strategy would of necessity take this into consideration and will be informed by a clear-eyed assessment of what we want our foreign

> policy to achieve, the potential threats facing us, and socio-economic interests in what is a very uncertain era of growing completion among new major powers. The new environment requires a new thinking and new approaches. To this end, we remain committed to creating a dependable, agile and flexible Human Capital base in the defence force.

The 2014 Defence Review clearly stipulates that the SANDF should be designed and prepared for both its traditional conventional warfighting (so-called 'primary') roles, as well as the non-traditional ('secondary') roles, which include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, border-safeguarding and humanitarian assistance (Defence Review Committee, 2014:vii). This Defence Review therefore not only provides guidelines for the traditional warfighting role of the SANDF, but also includes assessments of a variety of other key aspects of the defence function such as civil – military relations, collective and collaborative security architectures, the defence posture, roles, budgets and doctrine in chapters 5 to 9 of the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:5-1–9-34). These additional roles and functions were highlighted as some of the most important reasons for the formulation of the 2014 Defence Review. Since 1994 there has been a specific and enduring need to define specifically the SANDF's responsibilities during non-traditional deployments, as this aspect has remained a vague conceptualisation and did not provide specific direction as to how members of the SANDF should be specifically trained and equipped to execute tasks related to non-traditional (so-called 'secondary') deployments. South Africa's growing regional responsibilities, its political and economic integration into the SADC and the AU has resulted in greater involvement on the continent, compared to the country's involvement in Africa prior to 1994. While the SANDF has become highly involved in the execution of secondary roles since 1994 (compared to involvements in the SANDF's so-called 'primary' tasks, it was the environment of 'secondary' tasks that was neglected in the 1998 Defence Review. Despite these shortcomings, however, there is a continually growing demand for South Africa to become involved in international interventions in conflict areas, due to a variety of non-traditional security threats and non-conventional manifestations of insecurity and instability (Defence Review Committee, 2014:vi).

In addition to South Africa's growing regional responsibility, the internal role of the SANDF has also progressively changed since 1998, resulting in the re-deployment of the SANDF to police the borders in 2010 (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-4). The pace of change in

the tempo and character of warfighting has prompted significant changes to the roles and tasks of members of the SANDF since 1994 and it has become evident that incremental shifts and evolutionary processes will no longer suffice in preparing soldiers for the tasks at hand. This realisation made it necessary to review the conclusions on the roles and functions of the SANDF as described in the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) and calls for a redesign of the SANDF and the acquisition of an additional range of capabilities (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-2).

The evolution of conflict and changes to the roles of the SANDF has emphasised the need for a redesign of the Defence Force – calling for a force design and force structure that are better suited to deployment than what is currently offered in terms of force design principles. Current SANDF deployments also require a different suite of capabilities, if compared to the force design and force structure as set out in the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998:46:86). To this effect, the mandate of the Defence Review Committee was to (Defence Review Committee, 2014: 0-2):

- validate and confirm the defence mandate as prescribed in the Constitution and other statutes;

- provide a defence policy that is supportive of government's strategic intent;

- describe the complete spectrum of defence responsibility;

- indicate the strategic defence concept, broad capability requirements and high-level defence doctrine;

- posit a level of defence effort that should be funded by government and pursued by the Defence Organisation;

- provide policy guidance for the development of the blueprint design and structure of the Defence Organisation; and

- provide a high-level first-order discussion on the funding principles for Defence.

1.2. Changing roles for militaries in an evolving defence landscape

International trends in peace and security have made it clear that the SANDF (as all other militaries) must develop and maintain its capacity to undertake its defence roles and functions in an extremely complex environment which will continually be moulded by the perpetual interaction between human behaviour and natural phenomena and/or processes. In order to grasp the role and functions that the SANDF will have to perform on the continent in the 21st century fully, it is essential to understand the changes in the characteristics of warfighting as well as shifts which take place in the nature of the interface between African military organisations and African political systems. These changes are primarily due to the democratisation processes currently taking place in many African countries (cf. Mac Ginty, 2008:49). Changes include a thorough analysis of the determinants of military power, military potential and effectiveness, military security in the African context, as well as the historical roles and capabilities of militaries and the challenges of effective land, air and maritime forces. All of this should be viewed against the background of intra-African defence cooperation at continental and regional level, and the participation of African military organisations in peace missions and interventions.

In addition to significant changes that have taken place in the types of conflicts and operations in which defence forces must achieve stated objectives, significant changes have also taken place in the ways in which defence forces are designed, structured and equipped. The post-Cold War era has presented new challenges and demands for which most security organisations were not designed or prepared. With the threat of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact removed, the defined enemy against which most Western forces were prepared to fight, no longer existed. The majority of threats to societies is of a non-military nature, namely terrorism, organised crime, arms trafficking, illegal international immigrations, global environmental degradation and disease. Although many of these threats manifest locally, they often involve a myriad of transnational connections. It therefore becomes impossible to typify or characterise these threats as being internal or external, aggression or repression, or even local or global (Moore, 1998:1). There were, and are, no clear-cut adversaries against

which to be prepared, and as a result, the means and methodologies to deal with these new threats became more complicated, and traditional notions of security strategy and planning proved to be insufficient to address these contemporary, complex and wide-ranging challenges of the post-Cold War security environment (Sinovich, 2011:1).

One of the most notable changes that have influenced defence forces is the notion that military organisations are not the sole providers of military expertise and power (Moskos & Burk, 1994:149). For the military, it became evident that they were required to respond to a widening spectrum of tasks, and for this, they were required to become more flexible and deployable (cf. Mills in Neethling & Hudson (eds.), 2013:227–248). In essence, this entailed moving away from military organisations that were structured along fordist lines (mass defence force, single product) to tailored organisations able to deal with niche wars, requiring post-fordist structures, optimally structured to conduct diverse missions (Frost, 2001:37–48). A general trend in post-Cold War military organisations is the transition from mass armed forces, mobilised to fight particular wars, to smaller professional armed forces, which are continuously mobilised and possess multifaceted capabilities to respond quickly to a wide variety of threats (Dandeker, 1994:117–139). Most defence forces have come to the realisation that peace support missions require close cooperation with a wide variety of role-players that include other government departments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as a variety of military organisations from the respective troop contributing countries (TCCs). This has given rise to defence and security conceptualisations such as the 'comprehensive' or 'whole-of-government' approaches to peace support operations (UK MOD, 2006:1–2). At the core of these 'comprehensive' approaches to deployments, force designs and force structures, is the need to ensure the integration of political, military, development, economic, humanitarian, policing and intelligence instruments of national power to address internal and external security challenges (Watson, 2000:436). The comprehensive approach (CA) is a conceptual framework which is aimed at rejuvenating existing governmental approaches to peace missions which are essentially focused on the military's contribution to peace missions (Schnaubelt, 2011:56). The CA aims at establishing holistic, joined-up and cross-disciplined approaches to security challenges (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2006:1–2). Although many North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries, such as the United States of America (USA), United

Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Germany and Australia have adapted to the comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to strategic planning, the level of integration of activities achieved and the methodologies used, vary considerably. The CA to operations has many permutations and has been widely accepted by the majority of modern defence forces (Sinovich, 2011:5). The greatest point of contention among scholars and security practitioners on the concept of the CA is not the feasibility of the CA approach, but about the scope and extent of the role of the military as part of the CA (Sinovich, 2011:6).

The post-Cold War defence and security debate has been dominated by conceptualisations related to 'jointness' and integration (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2006:1–2). The shift to 'joint' operations has been characterised by the process of streamlining traditional military organisations in terms of organisation, shape and size (Manigart, 2003:323–343). This entails, inter alia, reducing service-oriented structural differentiation that has emerged over years as a result of the merging of inter-service facilities and capabilities to eliminate duplication. Whereas the different arms of service still maintained their own unique organisational culture and structure during the time of the Cold War, the post-Cold War period has been characterised by a greater degree of inter-service integration and the development of a 'joint' organisational culture to encourage greater cooperation among the different services (Dandeker & Weibull, 1999:30–33). Another change, directly related to the above-mentioned organisational restructuring was the shift towards modular, flexible structures that will enable military organisations to put together elements of the force at short notice for specific purposes, be this for traditional warfighting or for military operations other than war (MOOTW). Dandeker refers to the latter as "force packaging" – a kind of mix-and-match system involving various specialised segments of all the different armed forces and arms of service assembled for specific missions (Dandeker, 1994:117–139).

The South African security sector's contribution to peace missions, as part of the CA, is encapsulated in the concept of a joint, interagency, interdepartmental and multinational (JI^2M) approach to military operations. The JI^2M concept describes an approach to operations in which the defence force, other state departments and some external military organisations plan, coordinate and conduct operations in an integrated, well-coordinated manner to achieve shared goals (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). The emphasis is on the integration of

activities, as opposed to mere cooperation among individual entities. JI^{2}M operations have, since the beginning of the 1990's, become the framework force design for the majority of Western and NATO military organisations (UK MOD, 2006:1-1). The 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3) also describes the JI^{2}M approach as the core concept of the DOD's force employment strategies. Emphasis will be placed on "increased collaboration with and between the DOD, government departments, international organisations, multinational partners, non-governmental organisations and volunteer organisations during both internal and external matters of security" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3).

Despite the growing demands on the SANDF to become increasingly involved in peace missions on the continent and its re-deployment to the borders of South Africa, current discourses on the themes of the roles and functions of the SANDF, its development and security sector reform continue to be dominated by arguments in favour of reductions in force levels, defence budgets and armouries in favour of expanding social development budgets (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-1–9-9). Government's current focus and spending on social development programmes have taken place at the cost of, inter alia, defence spending and resulted in significantly reduced defence budgets since 1994 (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-3). As stated in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-4), the SANDF is in a critical state of decline, characterised by obsolete equipment, a disproportionate budget allocation in terms of the ratio allocated to human resources, product systems management and capability development, and the unaffordability of many of the SANDF's main operating systems (Defence Review Committee, 2014:ix). The SANDF is now challenged with rejuvenating the defence force and to ensure that it is optimally designed and configured to execute its ordered tasks in the context of a JI^{2}M approach to exploit combined potential to generate joint combat power, integration and unity of effort (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3).

1.3. Problem statement and focus

Current defence debates, and indeed the South African defence debate, are focused on how military organisations should be configured to perform their roles and functions optimally in

the 21st century. One of the primary requirements of the current and future SANDF, as described in the 2014 Defence Review, is the development of its capacity to operate successfully in a JI^{2}M environment. (The term **joint** as utilised in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3), refers to operations in which the capabilities of all four services of the SANDF (SAAF, SAN, SA Army and SA Medical Health Services) are integrated and synchronised to exploit the combined potential to generate joint combat power (Defence Review Committee, 2014:vii). The 2014 Defence Review stipulates that JI^{2}M operations "will integrate military and non-military operations, leveraging each participant's strength into unified action to address multidimensional security challenges" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-4).

The *problem statement* addressed in this study departed from the contention that the SANDF continues to design and structure South African armed forces with the focus on the execution of the primary function (i.e. traditional warfighting role) as its *raison d'être*, notwithstanding the fact that it will more often be deployed in its secondary, non-traditional functions. This has been the case since 1998 and was demonstrated in deployments to Lesotho, Burundi, the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), and more recently in a border-safeguarding capacity. This line of argument is confirmed in the 2014 Draft Defence Review in which it continues to describe the "primary object" of the defence force as to "defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-5).

This study was also premised on the assumption that the SANDF should adopt modular, joint structures as design framework when organising, staffing and equipping force structure elements (FSEs) and in determining the required preparation and training of members of the SANDF. These modular, joint structures differ significantly from the current service-oriented blueprint force structure, described as a "master plan" in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1) in which it is stipulated that the Defence Force "Blueprint Force Structure is the full force structure requirement of the Defence Force, including present and future capabilities required for the execution of the defence mandate, reflecting differing

state of readiness, differing levels of equipment sets and indications for the opening and closing of these units" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1).

As far as this study was concerned, the problem statement was demarcated conceptually, geographically and temporarily.

- *Conceptual demarcation*. The analysis was confined to the changing international environment and its influence on the approaches to the primary and secondary functions of militaries in general and the SANDF in particular. This analysis included the primary reasons for conflict and war, the nature of future warfare, the security-development nexus as foundation for sustainable political and economic development and the configuration required of the SANDF in terms of the above.

- *Geographic demarcation*. The research focused on the SANDF's role, functions and responsibilities on the African continent.

- *Temporal demarcation*. The analysis focused on the SANDF's current and future involvement in Africa as part of a cross-dimensional analysis of the context of the 21st century. Historical factors were considered if they had a direct bearing on the concepts and the research problem.

In this study report, the configuration of the SANDF refers to the design framework on which the force structure and organisation of the SANDF should be based. This proposed force design would provide the framework for the structure of the SANDF's growth path and the development of FSEs towards a JI^{2}M posture and capability. The term **configuration** will be utilised in this report to describe how the SANDF's FSEs should be organised to achieve optimal performance in an operationally successful and cost-effective manner. The proposed configuration of the SANDF will also describe the functional relationships between FSEs and service capabilities and will demonstrate how a modular, joint force design could contribute to improved JI^{2}M success.

1.4. Research question

The research question that this study intended to answer was:

How should the SANDF reconfigure its force structure to operate in a JI^{2}M environment to meet the shifting mission requirements associated with the changing security environment of the 21st century?

This problem generated three subsidiary questions:

- What are the current international trends and realities that would shape the security environment in which the SANDF will have to execute its tasks in future?

- What are the salient issues that the SANDF needs to consider in terms of evolving security challenges, the threat environment, and the political imperatives relating to future deployments in Africa?

- How should the SANDF deal with its future configuration in terms of the need to operate effectively in a JI^{2}M environment in the 21st century?

1.5. Aim of the study

The aim for this study was to determine how to configure the SANDF coherently in order to operate in a JI^{2}M environment to meet the shifting mission requirements associated with the changing security environment of the 21st century.

1.6. Purpose and significance of the study

The changed security environment and related issues such as the role of defence in the post-apartheid society, the capabilities required for complex missions and the requisite levels of defence expenditure have been highly contested issues since 1994. These issues all

stemmed from uncertainty about the most appropriate force design, force structure and required capabilities for the SANDF. In the light of this uncertainty, scholars, planners and military practitioners all expected that the 2014 Defence Review would provide clear direction and guidelines to the issues of force design, force structure and capability requirements. The thesis topic arose from a pragmatic interest in measuring the alignment between the guidelines provided about force design and force structure in the 2014 Defence Review and the current requirements for operating as part of a JI^{2}M force during current and future deployments.

The purpose of this study was therefore, firstly, to analyse whether the 2014 Defence Review does indeed provide the required guidelines in terms of the roles, function, design, structures and capabilities required from the SANDF as part of a JI^{2}M force. Secondly, the study wanted to propose an alternative force design and force structure which would configure the SANDF optimally to meet the demands of current and future deployments in a JI^{2}M environment as described in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3).

Despite the fact that the 2014 Defence Review was developed with the JI^{2}M approach to operations as basic framework for force design, the Defence Review does not provide any guidance as to how to design the SANDF to be configured optimally to function as part of a JI^{2}M force. Although the 2014 Defence Review provides force generation guidelines in Chapter 10 of the document, it, however, only addresses the SANDF and its respective services, and does not provide any guidance for JI^{2}M structures. The emphasis on the JI^{2}M approach in the Defence Review is indicative of a significant change to the defence strategy of the DOD. This change was, however, not carried through to the force design and force strategy guidelines as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review. This is indicative of a significant shortcoming/omission in the document. The opportunity to change the force design and force structure of the SANDF to be aligned with the defence strategy was not exploited and this has resulted in the creation of a significant 'knowledge gap' as far as the optimal force design for the SANDF as part of a JI^{2}M force is concerned.

The quest for finding an optimal force design for the SANDF is an on-going process and the SANDF, like most other militaries, employs analytical processes in which international best practices and models (such as the CA and JI^{2}M approaches) are analysed and evaluated in terms of their suitability to local defence requirements. Foreign models cannot, however, be accepted or imported merely at face value. They must be developed, morphed and incorporated in terms of the historical and current political and cultural context of specific states and regions (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:15). The process of military change and the adoption of military models have many sources, ranging from the internal and external politics of states, to the military culture that influences the decision-making of a particular state, to the manner in which strategy, politics, and military culture interact with technology in affecting the outcome of military change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:16). This study was therefore focused on identifying the possibilities of the diffusion, incorporation and adoption of an optimal force design for the SANDF in terms of the current political context, strategies, defence requirements and military culture of South Africa.

In terms of force design, the current study was based on the assumption that, by adopting a 'modular', JI^{2}M force design structure (as applied in part by Western and NATO forces) (UK MOD, 2006:1-1), the SANDF would be provided with a flexible, well-balanced, JI^{2}M-oriented force that would be able to provide more adequate responses to envisaged threats than the current service-oriented force design (as expounded in Chapter 10 of the 2014 Defence Review).

The significance of this study was found in the analysis of how to structure and posture the SANDF coherently to deploy successfully as part of a JI^{2}M force and in order to remain ready and relevant for its international role and functions in the 21st century. In addition, the study was conducted on the eve of the final approval of the 2014 Defence Review, which is set to position the SANDF for its future role and the study thus coincides with the DOD's second review in twenty years.

1.7. Research methodology

This study was based on a literature study and an analysis of South African defence policy, supported by unstructured interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee and other key role-players in the current South African defence debate. The approach to the research was inductive by nature, as the observations and ideas gathered from defence policy and interviews were filtered through strategic and international relations theories and utilised as base-line for the development of a model that could serve as a design framework for the structuring and configuration of the SANDF as part of a JI^{2}M force.

The primary unit of analysis related to the SANDF, the missions that it had conducted in Africa in the past, as well as the predicted future deployments that it would have to conduct. South African defence policy, as well as the processes that underpin the development of defence policy has been well documented, and this implies that sufficient and appropriate data is available for analysis (Louw, 2013:3). Because South African defence policy has been well documented since 1994, it provides sufficient grounds for making deductions and conclusions about defence policy and the interface with defence strategy. As a result of the sensitive, classified nature of some aspects of force design, force structure and force support, only open, unclassified literature was used in this study. While the limitations of the limited supply of unclassified literature were bound to have an effect on the validity and outcome of the analysis, it was appreciated that the application of standard methodological processes would mitigate this risk by taking cognisance of any possible bias caused by the short supply of appropriate literature (Louw, 2013:3). Primary sources included official UN, AU, DOD and SANDF policy documents, as well as a selected range of interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee who were directly involved in the drafting of the new Defence Review. The value of these interviews is to be found in the fact that very little has been published about the process of the drafting of the 2014 Defence Review and that contents of these interviews provided new and original insight into the process of the development of South African defence policy. The insights obtained during the interviews also provided solid base-lines for analysis of the SANDF's force design and force structure as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1–10-22).

The sources utilised for this analysis were all open, unclassified sources, as the researcher is a serving member of the SANDF who had to comply with the restrictions placed the publication of classified documents. No classified documents were therefore utilised for the analysis of data for this thesis. The researcher attempted to mitigate the effect of the limitations on available literature by viewing the restrictions on the use of classified SANDF documents as a filter to create distance between the researcher and the topic in an attempt to enhance objectivity and to allow for objective criticism.

The study aimed to provide some answers to address the complex issues pertaining to the future deployments and primary and secondary functions of the SANDF. The research also intended to be utilised to analyse the relationships between the political needs/demands and the military role and supply capacity to reach recommendations and conclusions on how the SANDF should be structured and postured for its future role in Africa.

This thesis therefore comprises of applied research, based on a qualitative approach because the processes and activities utilised to analyse the sources had an essentially non-quantitative nature. The focus was to use gathered data to create theoretical ideas, compared with experimental research that starts with a theoretical position and accumulated data in order to test its validity (Neuman, 2003:38–39).

In addition to the above-mentioned qualitative research (consulting published books, magazines, academic articles, policy documents, and other relevant documentation), the study also solicited the perceptions of selected respondents regarding the future configuration of the SANDF in terms of the need to fulfil its roles in Africa in the 21st century effectively. The study can therefore be typified as a qualitative, descriptive analysis, with risk accruing to its theoretical and inferential validity. This was done through what can be described as unstructured elite interviews, which normally included experts or functionaries in leading positions. As a result of the subjective nature of the results of the interviews, the researcher attempted to mitigate bias by addressing rival explanations as part of the analysis and data interpretations when applicable. In this regard, the task of the researcher was to examine and interpret the views of selected persons in influential positions who were cardinally involved

with the functioning and future political–military strategic and operational challenges of the SANDF.

1.8. Literature review

The literature and data sources consulted for this research can be divided into four categories. The first deals with the background information on the concepts of the changing international political environment, the nature and reasons for conflict and war (past, present and future), and their implications for militaries of the 21st century. Literature on the development of military strategy and the development of military models is also included to provide context to the analysis contained in the study.

The second category of sources refers to literature that addresses the theoretical underpinnings and conceptualisations of the security-development nexus, its implications for peace missions internationally, as well as the security-development nexus's specific applicability to and relevance for Africa. Literature that addresses the interrelationships between the security-development nexus, sustainable development and peace was also included in the study. In this regard, the contents of various reports and policy documents in which the events and processes that guided the establishment of the AU and ASF were recorded, were included in the study.

A third category contains literature on the conceptualisations of military power, force design and force structure, military strategy and the roles and functions of African military organisations in the 21st century.

The fourth category comprises literature that addresses the structure, approach, doctrine, concepts and capabilities to be developed by the AU, ASF, DOD and SANDF. The literature includes as primary sources policy documents and other guiding documents used to design and structure the future SANDF. Other primary sources are selected interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee. Secondary sources, which address the structure and design of modern militaries, are also included where applicable.

The literature and data sources consulted for this study thus include the following:

- Literature on the current international environment, the nature of war and peace, modern militaries and their expected future roles and functions across the full spectrum of conflict in general and the SANDF in particular. Sources include works by, Williams (1998), Lloyd (2000), Ross (2000), Duyvesteyn and Angstrom (2005), Gat (2006), Le Roux (2007), Cilliers (2008), Mac Ginty (2008), Neethling (2009) and Gray (2009).

- Literature on the security-development, sustainable development, human security and peace. Various sources relating to the security-development nexus, including works by Annan (1998), Boutros-Ghali (1992), McGowan and Nel (eds.) (2002), Tschirgi (2003), Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini (2010) and Neethling (2013) were consulted.

- Literature on military strategy, military power, the roles and functions of military organisations and sources that address the characteristics, development and diffusion of military models. Works by authors such as Lutwakk (2002), Collins (2002), Farrell (1996) and Farrell and Terriff (2002), Goldman (1997) and Demchak (1991; 1996) were included in the study.

- Literature on the historically changing roles of the SANDF. Works by Williams (2004) and (2005), as well as Cilliers (2007) and Le Roux (2007), Franke (2009) were especially relevant.

- Literature on the participation of the SANDF in peace missions, specifically applicable to the AU and the ASF. Several reports from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (1998) and the AU (2004), as well as various articles and reports published by the Institute for Security Studies, including those by Solomon (1998), Hendricks (2006) and Lewis (2006) were of significance. The paper by Williams (2008) on the AU Strategic Culture also informed this study.

- Literature on the military role of the SANDF and defence co-operation in Africa. Works by Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams (2004), Williams (2005), Cilliers (2008), Le Roux

(2007), Franke (2009), Heitman (2013) and the South African Defence Review (2014) were some of the most important references that were extensively consulted for this study.

- Literature on the prospects for the SANDF in the 21st century. Several works by Williams (2004 and 2005), Le Roux (2007), Cilliers (2008) and the popularised version of the Future SA Army Strategy (2006) and the Defence Review (2014) were especially relevant to this study.

- Literature on the inclusion and effect of unstructured interviews, such as that by Neuman (2003) was also included in the study.

1.9. Structure of the research

The study was structured in the conventional way, being divided into a theoretical framework, a main body and a concluding section containing an evaluation.

- *Chapter One* is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction, identification and formulation of the research theme and problem statement. This chapter demarcates the study and provides the methodology adopted in the research. The literature review that forms part of this chapter provides an overview of the sources consulted to complete the study and includes international as well as South African sources on the current defence debate, as well as a number of unstructured interviews with selected experts and functionaries in influential positions who were cardinally involved with the functioning and future political–military strategic and operational challenges of the SANDF at the time of the study.

- *Chapter Two* provides definitions of all the key concepts and theories that are relevant to the current international security situation (i.e. 1994 to 2014), the history, nature and reasons for war and conflict, the changes in the characteristics of armed conflict and the implications of these changes for the preparation and training of current and future militaries. The discussion includes the interrelationships among the conceptualisations

and strategies of modern militaries, the security-development nexus, sustainable development as well as human security and peace, with special reference to the African continent. New sources and conceptualisations in the international defence debate are important to South Africa as they can be used to develop an overarching framework for the role and functions of the country's armed forces.

- *Chapter Three* focuses on 21st –century multi-modal warfare, the shifting modes of war and the changed roles and functions of militaries. The analysis includes trend analysis of the changing roles and functions of militaries in general, and concludes with a trend analysis – specifically pertaining to the African continent and with the focus on the implications of these changes for the SANDF.

- *Chapter Four* addresses African militaries, the changed security environment and the evolving African peace and security architecture. Specific attention is given to the origins and development of the AU, the ASF and the regional brigades. The effect of these developments, as well as the implications thereof on the roles and functions of the SANDF and its role in SADC is at the centre of the analysis in this chapter.

- *Chapter Five* focuses on the required configuration of the future SANDF in the context of changed international realities and contemporary security challenges on the African continent. The chapter includes an analysis of how adequately (or inadequately) the force designs as described and stipulated in the 1998 and 2014 Defence Review documents respectively, provide for the security challenges that the SANDF will most probably have to address. The analysis includes a proposed alternative force design model for the SANDF, based on a joint, modular design framework.

- *Chapter Six* outlines the perceptions of selected respondents about the future configuration of the SANDF in terms of the need to deploy effectively as part of a JI^{2}M force. Respondents were, inter alia, required to respond and reflect on the prospect of adopting a modular, JI^{2}M force design framework (as opposed to the application of the respective SANDF services as design framework) to provide the SANDF with an optimal force configuration.

- *Chapter Seven* comprises the evaluation and summary of key findings following on the research question posed in Chapter 1. This chapter includes an assessment of the roles and functions that the SANDF will be expected to perform in the 21st century in Africa and culminates in final conclusions on a proposed force design and force structure that will configure the SANDF optimally to conduct operations as part of a JI^{2}M force.

1.10. Conclusions

The SANDF, like most modern militaries, is currently in the process of evaluating its policies, strategies, structure and force design in order to ensure that it is optimally postured to carry out its primary and secondary functions successfully in the 21st century. The threat environment within which the future SANDF will have to execute its defence roles and functions will be complex and will continue to be moulded by the continuous interaction between human behaviour and natural phenomena and/or processes. In order to carry out its missions effectively in this complex environment, the SANDF will have to transform its current way of doing business in order to be more effective, efficient and economical as well as to remain relevant in the future. This study was an effort to determine which policies, strategies and force design the SANDF should adopt to ensure that it is optimally postured and configured in terms of the above to carry out its roles and functions successfully as part of a JI^{2}M force.

The next chapter describes the theoretical foundation of the study, focusing on understanding the SANDF as an instrument of foreign policy and on the theories and military models that could be applied to enhance our understanding of the roles and functions of militaries. The chapter presents the most prominent contemporary international relations (IR) theories as frameworks for the analysis of the use of military organisations as instruments of foreign policy. These IR theories were also applied as lenses through which the changes in the post-Cold War international security environment were analysed in terms of their influence on military organisations and the development of military models. Chapter 2 includes an analysis

of the diffusion of military models and the effect of this diffusion on the development of defence strategies, force designs and force structure of JI^{2}M forces.

CHAPTER 2: KEY CONCEPTS AND ANALYTICAL CONSTRUCTS UNDERPINNING DEFENCE PLANNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY

2.1. Introduction

Defence planning and decisions on strategy and force planning are difficult and require the consideration and integration of a wide variety of factors to ensure that military organisations are capable of delivering required defence effects as defined by government. The military instrument has traditionally been viewed and accepted as one of four primary instruments of state power and foreign policy – the other three being diplomacy, economic techniques (ranging from sanctions to foreign aid) and psychological techniques (information and propaganda) (cf. Drew & Snow, 2006:108). These instruments of state power are usually applied in combination with one another, and it is implied that the military instrument of power will be retained as a 'last resort', depending on the situation (Schoeman, 2013:209). This military instrument of power comprises many permutations across the spectrum of conflict and can be applied in a variety of deployment types such as collaboration, defence diplomacy, coercion and warfighting (Jablonsky, 2010:133). These variations in deployment types demand sufficient organic flexibility in the structures of military organisations to enable them to be optimally configured and equipped to meet the challenges presented by the various types of deployments. The ability of states to achieve national security policy aims will therefore depend largely on whether and how well their military organisations adapt to their changing strategic, political, budgetary and technological environments (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:3).

The development of military strategy – the ends, ways and means adopted by defence forces – is influenced by an extensive range of warfighting concepts, military models, domestic and international relationships, influences and differences of opinion on the complex issues relating to the concepts of **defence** and **security** in the 21st century. Military strategists must therefore take a holistic view when evaluating all the contending views and theories on the roles and functions of military institutions when devising strategies that would allow the military to be applied effectively as an instrument of foreign policy – and as conceptualisations of these roles change over time. Military force remains an important asset in operationalising

foreign policy and it remains true that: “[s]tates need some coercive capability (hard power) to deter and defend, with military means being the main instruments for this purpose” (Schoeman, 2013:210). The notion, however, that states exercise monopoly on the “management of violence” as described by Huntington (1996:13–18), is a rather narrow perspective, which does not ring true in terms of recent experiences with the application of the military instrument of power. According to Henk (2009:1), the “use of military force are not the only expectations of contemporary military establishments”, and the application of military force might also no longer be the primary role of modern military organisations. Hudson and Henk (2009:1) point to the irony in the escalating pace of the transformation of institutions, which were originally created primarily to win armed conflict to organisations which are now equally responsible for preventing or tempering wars. The extent to which modern military organisations have become involved in peace missions and other so-called ‘secondary’ military tasks confirms this change in the understanding of the use of military organisations and have compelled strategists, planners and military professionals to take these developments into account when devising strategies and conducting force planning.

Changes in the international political and security environment, as well as perceptions and theories on the use of military force are major drivers and sources for change in the strategies and force structures adopted by military organisations. Over the past few decades, some of the reasons for changes in military strategies and organisations were prompted by the end of the Cold War, which changed the strategic environment in that many of the principles that informed strategic thinking in the Cold War era no longer applied. The end of the Cold War has also resulted in significant budget cuts to defence ministries, which in turn prompted significant decreases in the size and configuration of military forces. In addition to the latter, the effect of the Information Revolution (cf. Gray, 2005:143) and the continuing accelerated pace of technological change has also prompted most militaries to reassess their planning and strategising parameters (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:3). These changes have resulted in conceptual shifts in military planning and, according to Henk (2009:2) have at least three important implications for military planners and strategists:

- the definition and prioritisation of the ends that military and other security organisations may be expected to serve;

- how best to shape, develop and resource security establishments (especially military forces) to serve those ends; and

- the locus and quality of decisions on committing and employing security agencies.

Ultimately, these shifts in military planning point to a re-assessment of the parameters traditionally utilised by strategists tasked with aligning desired governmental outcomes (ends) with appropriate capabilities (means) and feasible ways (warfighting concepts). The development of feasible ways and means implies a continual re-evaluation of facts and involve significant changes in the security sector itself, including changes in the application, structure, focus and ethos of military organisations (Henk, 2009:2).

This condition of general uncertainty and shifting priorities means that governments and their decision-makers (military planners and foreign policy analysts) can never be totally certain about the current and future motives of those able to harm them in a military sense (Booth & Wheeler, 2008b:134), nor can they be certain about the correct posture and structure of their respective military organisations which will be used to counter such threats. Donald Rumsfeld, the former United States (US) Secretary of Defence commented on these "unknown unknowns" during the Defence Department Briefing in Washington DC on 12 February 2002, and said:

> ... reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are 'known knowns'; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 'known unknowns'; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 'unknown unknowns' — the ones we don't know we don't know.

What is clear in this uncertain and fast-changing security environment is that we do not know enough about possible future threats to effectively plan on how to defend against all possible future threats. It is therefore prudent for defence planners and strategists to provide for national defence across a broad spectrum of threats, as they are unable to make confident predictions about when, where and how specific threats will manifest. It is in this environment

of prevailing uncertainty that strategists and defence planners are required to identify and formulate national security goals (ends), military strategies (ways) and future military requirements (means) (Bartlett, Holman & Somes, 2000:18). This requires holistic analysis and in-depth evaluation of competing perspectives to optimise defence forces' abilities to provide the appropriate forces and capabilities to deployment demands in an ever-changing and evolving security environment.

The difficulties often associated with defence strategy and planning are exacerbated by the fact that equally valid arguments are often made for widely different choices, each depending on various approaches to defence thinking, as well as the objectives sought and the assumptions made about threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, opportunities, technological advances, and future economic and political conditions (Lloyd, 2000:1). This tendency is complicated further by planners who focus on one or more factors that are most important to them, rather than adopting a holistic approach which will aid them to explore and understand the full dimensions and complexities of defence strategy and planning (Lloyd, 2000:2). Added to the difficulties of this pervasive uncertain security environment, defence planners are also expected to make decisions and plans that will be implemented and executed over long periods of time, usually for periods of up to twenty or thirty years, as these are the timeframes associated with the life cycles of many weapon platforms and prime mission equipment (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-4). Planners and strategists must, however, irrespective of the abovementioned difficulties and their respective frameworks of analysis, ultimately ensure that their decisions will contribute to optimising the effects and outcome of the application of the military as an instrument of foreign policy.

The SANDF is a unique instrument of power at the disposal of the South African government and the SANDF's capabilities must be commensurate with the country's international status, strategic posture and inescapable continental leadership role (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-28). Changes in the South African political dispensation in 1994 demanded a re-think of the role of the military in society and gave rise to a new security paradigm – essentially a demilitarised new South Africa (Louw, 2013:1). This resulted in significant changes to defence policy, South Africa's defence posture and the government's position on the utility of military force.

The defence policies that formed part of the democratisation processes in South Africa, namely the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998), emphasised the defensive posture of the SANDF and envisaged the SANDF as: "a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently" (DOD, 1996:7). Great emphasis was also placed on the integration of former SADF members, non-statutory forces who participated in the struggle against the apartheid regime, as well as members of the former Homeland Defence Forces (TBVC) countries, namely Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Operational realities and experience have, however, since highlighted serious shortcomings in the SANDF's force design and force structure, operational capacity, force preparation and sustainment capabilities. Moreover, operational realities emphasise the fact that the SANDF has been largely unsuccessful in complying with and operationalising the demands as stated in defence policies such as the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review as a result of the significant deficits between required operational capabilities and resource allocation.

According to the 2014 Defence Review, the SANDF is required to make "a vital and unique contribution that complements South Africa's diplomatic efforts and enhances South Africa's influence within wider international developments" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:vii). In order to position the SANDF to meet these demands, the SANDF's planners and strategists must determine the ways as well as the circumstances within which military force will be applied to pursue national interests and ultimately attain governmental objectives.

The current South African defence debate and strategy processes are therefore dominated by and focused on the interpretation of the recently tabled 2014 Defence Review as this document is of the utmost importance and significance to the current and future roles, functions, force design and force structure of the SANDF.

This chapter expounds the theoretical underpinnings that are relevant to understanding military strategy and the way such strategy translates to the roles, functions, force designs and structures of militaries. In a scholarly context, IR theories are useful to enhance a better

understanding of how militaries in various contexts are used as foreign policy instruments. This also pertains to the SANDF as a foreign policy instrument of the South African (SA) government. The argumentation contained in this chapter is aimed at creating a universal, validated context or common operating picture (COP) and context within which the optimal configuration of the SANDF as instrument of foreign policy can be analysed. This context was applied in the analysis of the force design of the SANDF (as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review) and measured against the required capabilities and configuration of 21st-century military organisations that are to address the challenges created by the changes in the paradigms of international relations and military power.

The chapter comprises three parts: firstly, there is a section that is focused on an analysis of the most prominent contemporary IR theories as frameworks for the analysis of the use of military organisations as instruments of foreign policy. The second section of the chapter is comprised of an analysis of the changes in the post-Cold War international security environment and of its influence on military organisations and military models. The final section focuses on an analysis of force planning and the diffusion of military models and the effect and influence on defence strategies, force designs and the force structure of modern military organisations. These three issues are analysed in terms of the perspectives provided by the dominating IR theories as applied the context of the international security environment in general, and on SA defence planning in particular.

2.2. Contemporary IR theories as frameworks for the analysis of militaries as instruments of foreign policy

IR scholars, strategists and defence planners continually formulate and develop concepts, paradigms, models and theories in a bid to explain the complexities of the current international security environment, as well as the actors occupying and functioning in the international security landscape (Lloyd, 2000:2). It is commonly accepted that the theories and concepts associated with the social sciences and IR theory cannot provide definitive cause-and-effect answers to the complex issues related to the study of human relations. However, they provide particular insights and structural perspectives, which “create and recreate the social understandings within which we live and condition our understanding of

the social world" (Vale, 2013:203). The utility of IR theories can be found in the fact that they provide alternative views or 'lenses' that can be applied to enhance our understanding of the time and world within which we live.

Since 1994, the development of post-apartheid South African defence policy, as well as the planning and strategising processes of the DOD and SANDF has been dominated by the quest for establishing and maintaining a defence force which, as part of the broader security sector, would be relevant to the current as well as the future threat environment. This implies that the defence force must be appropriately structured and prepared to be applied successfully as a 'tool' in the foreign relations tool-box – along with the other instruments of power such as diplomacy, economic cooperation, information exchange and social networking (cf. Chuter, 2011:137). As part of this process, great emphasis has been placed on the development of SA defence policy and on the definition of the defence function in a modern democratic African state. The importance of this is clear from the fact that the SA Minister of Defence and Military Veterans in July 2011 constituted a heavyweight Defence Review Committee and mandated the Committee to look critically at South Africa's defence policy (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-2). This review of defence matters stems from the rapid and fundamental changes that have occurred in the strategic environment over the last number of years and the SANDF is increasingly falling out of step with specific reference to its roles and mission sets assigned by the government to the defence force (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-4–9-9).

2.2.1. IR theories and their relevance to the South African military

The evolving IR theory and new concepts about defence planning and strategy should be understood as an interrelationship with current international security perspectives, frameworks, models and paradigms. The application of divergent thought processes and a wide array of theories and frameworks are particularly important to security analyses relating to the continent of Africa, which has, until recently, essentially been marginalised in the IR theory. This has resulted in a stereotypical and largely Eurocentric presentation of Africa that fails to show the essence and theoretical relevance of the continent's political realities (Franke, 2009:4).

The question can be raised as to how, and if, IR theories can contribute to an improved understanding of the role, structure and functions of military organisations. Vale (2013:201) points to the frequently posed question of whether the military (should) not be deemed to fall outside social theory's domain, given that "they (due to the unique nature of their role and function) operate in an averred 'real', rather than feigned, state of exception?"

Smith, Booth and Zalewski (1996:13) state, "theories do not simply explain or predict: [t]hey tell us what possibilities exist for human actions and intervention and define not merely our explanatory possibilities, but also our ethical and political horizons". Theories can identify the processes through which ideas are reified into institutions and then treated as reality, because theories reject an objectivist conception of the theory–practice relationship and instead view theory itself as constitutive of the very reality it seeks to explain (Bilgin, 2013:95–106). Theories, should therefore, not be accepted as truths – they merely provide us with particular 'optics', or frameworks for analysis that can enable us to have a better and deeper understanding of the world within which we live. Vale (2013:213) reminds us, "while theory helps us to see the social world, it also enables us to see the limitations of that which we know".

Despite their limitations, IR theories can be utilised as frames of reference by scholars and analysts to ponder and explore multiple contexts for military organisations, as well as to gain insight into their roles, functions and force design (Kurki & Wight, 2010:15). To this effect, some of the most prominent IR theories underpinning security studies and which are of relevance to a scholarly understanding of the roles and functions of militaries were analysed to gain insight into the motivations and processes related to the SANDF's force design and force structure as encapsulated in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1–10-22).

2.2.1.2. The realist approach

Perhaps the most pervasive assumptions underlying security studies are those associated with the theory of what is generally known as **realism** (Williams, 2008:17). The theory of

realism addresses a very wide array of issues and is manifested in an equally wide variety of ideas, thoughts and conceptualisations (Lebow, 2010:59). Despite the great number of differences in thought on the topic of realism, it can be described as a school of IR theory that prioritises national interest, competition, security and state power as central to the shaping of the manner in which states interact with one another. Realists, **such as** contend that the international system and security environment are the most important determinants of state behaviour (Lebow, 2010:61). They also believe that states act independently of each other and that the sovereignty of such states should be deemed sacred (Gat, 2006:667). Realists therefore view power and competition to be the currency of international politics, and argue that international politics are dominated by states that act in the pursuance of self-interest and the quest for power (Mearsheimer, 2010:78).

The classic realist approach (cf. Mearsheimer, 1994:5) assumes the international system to be 'anarchic' and argue that, as there is no authority above states capable of regulating states' interactions, states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity (Lebow, 2010:61). Russet (2010:96) reminds us that this 'anarchy' should be understood in the context of how the early Greek philosophers understood the term: **anarchy** – not as in 'chaos', but understood as 'without a ruler' – having no overarching authority to enforce order. In this context, realists view every country as a potential enemy of the other – intentionally, or not, a threat to their security and continued existence. "Countries are therefore, in the absence of a 'world state', forever caught up in an uncertain state of freedom and risk" (Russet, 2010:96).

Buzan (2009:39) explains this anarchy as follows: "[s]ince the claim of sovereignty automatically denies recognition of any higher political authority, a system of sovereign states is by definition structured as anarchy". The importance that is ascribed to the sovereignty of states perpetuates and reinforces the anarchic international world political system by the actions of individual states that are intent on maintaining their independence and sovereignty (Buzan, 2009:40). Whilst the quest for and maintenance of individual state sovereignty contribute to maintenance of the anarchic international political system, it also ensure that states remain self-sufficient and competitive in their relationships with each other (Louw, 2013:16). In such an anarchical, self-help system, states are inevitably preoccupied with

national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the utility of military power (Ross, 2000:58). According to the realists, it is therefore the competitive nature of the international system that generates imperatives for state action (Lebow, 2010:61). This, in turn, compels states to balance power externally through alliance formation and internally through mobilisation and military organisation (Terriff & Farrell, 2002:271). In most cases, military power is deemed one of the most tangible manifestations of state power, and realists therefore argue that competition for power is part and parcel of the anarchic international system and that conflict is inevitable (Mearsheimer, 2001:337). There is therefore no escape from the threat of war in realism's anarchical world (Ross, 2000:57). Realists, consequently, are preoccupied with maintaining national security against external military threats – the primary focus of most militaries (Gilpin, 1981:7). By and large, this outlook reinforces the focus upon the primary role of militaries – that of fighting regular wars against peer or near-peer opponents (Gilpin, 1981:7). A readiness for regular warfighting continues to serve as a general underpinning for the military preparedness of modern armed forces in the early 21st century (Elman, 2008:27). However, this realist–warfighting interface is not uncontested.

However, despite the continued importance of military power, Buzan (2009:33) points to empirical evidence that indicate that the growing pressure of global interdependence among states is mitigating the risks of violent conflict between national states, and therefore changing the way that realists view the world, as well as their views on the use of military force. The classic realist view as described above was, due to the changes brought about in the post-Cold War international security environment, altered in order to describe the application of state power in a new multi-polar world order (Buzan, 2009:33). This process has resulted in the new permutations of the classic realism theory, namely 'neorealism' or 'structural realism' (Lynn-Jones, 1995:668–691).

Without expanding on the variants of realist theorising in a current-day context, suffice it to say that contemporary neorealism, which is mostly associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz in his publication, *Theory of international politics* (1979), continues to emphasis the dominance and importance of the national state and the anarchic nature of the international political system (Waltz, 1979. Neorealism, however, no longer presents the uncontrollable human quest for power as the driving force in the behaviour of states in the international

political system, whether it be a bipolar, unipolar or multipolar approach that most affects the foreign policy choices made by governments (Lynn-Jones, 1995:58). The abilities of states to deftly employ the respective elements of state power as a holistic and focused manifestation of state craft in the context of the international political system will ultimately determine a state's position and standing in this international structure. For armed forces, this shift reinforces notions of a defence policy moulding armed forces to become more adept to be employed alongside other elements of state power and only be confined primarily to warfighting roles (Lynn-Jones, 1995:58).

As far as realism and defence policy are concerned, it could be argued that, in terms of realist perspectives, the military dimension of foreign policy is conceived in rather narrow military and national security dimensions**.** According to Alden and Schoeman (2013:210), this perspective on the role of the state deems the national security of a state as the most important foreign-policy goal and requires the military to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. This, in turn, implies that states must be able to apply the military instrument of power in the event that coercive measures are required in defence of the country (Schoeman, 2013:210).

Notwithstanding the universal utility and value of classic realism, particularly during the Cold War, the essentially narrow definition of the concepts of **security** and **defence** has proved to be misaligned with broader, more holistic post-Cold War conceptualisations of peace and security. The broadening and deepening of the post-Cold War understanding of **security** have resulted in new conceptualisations, such as human security and the responsibility to protect' (Schoeman, 2013:210). In other words, for the past few decades, the post-Cold War era has borne witness to a shift in emphasis away from the state-centric security perspective as described above, to that of an holistic and inclusive conceptualisation in support of broader human security objectives (Hendricks, 2006:1).

In the SA context, there is a clear acknowledgement of realist leaning in state behaviour in general, as is evident form the 2014 South African Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-6–2-7):

> Conflict and war have mostly been the result of states pursuing their interests to the detriment and insecurity of others … Although political and economic integration has made progress in recent years, states jealously guard their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will continue to secure and protect these through the maintenance of powerful military capabilities. Significantly, military power continues to be exercised alongside both economic and political power. While most states in the post-Cold War era have reduced their military spending, some have strengthened and expanded their conventional capacity, allowing traditional major powers to sustain their military dominance. Accordingly, military strength continues to provide powerful states with the means to embark on unilateral acts of force and even armed aggression in pursuit of their own national interests.

Still, it would be hard to describe or label South Africa's foreign and defence policies as explicitly or even largely realist. In fact, it would be inaccurate and oversimplified to place South Africa in any particular theoretical categorisation. Although section 200(2) of the Constitution places emphasis on the role of the defence force as primarily in defence of the national security of the country, section 201 – against the background of the preamble, which underlies the core principles of the country's foreign policy – allows for involvement in international peace missions as part of South Africa's international obligations. Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy can be characterised as a 'foreign policy of peace' – which is clearly associated with the IR theory of liberalism-idealism.

2.2.1.3. Liberalism-idealism

Realism has always been challenged by the contending theory of idealism, originating from liberalism, which provides a very different point of view to the processes involved in defence planning and the military as a foreign policy instrument (Russett, 2010:96). Since its formulation after World War II (WW2), the theory of idealism, originating from the older tradition of liberalism, has always been divergent in its views on international politics (Louw, 2013:19). This theory supposes that individuals have rational qualities and the conviction that humans, despite their self-interest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society (Russet, 2010:96). Idealism thus places more emphasis on the importance of actors other than the state in international relations (Navari, 2008:30). Because of this, idealism is often described as antithetical to realism. This notion is, however, not

totally correct. Kant accepted Thomas Hobbes' realist description of conflict among states, but also went far beyond Hobbes' description. He envisaged that the respective members of the 'pacific state' would maintain their sovereignty, but that membership would be oriented to improving cooperation, economic interdependence and the acceptance that international law and organisations will be applied to overcome the challenges posed by the international system (Russett, 2010:96). There was thus a clear conceptual realisation that the achievement of durable and sustainable peace cannot be attained by the application of mechanical processes and that the outcomes of activities and peace interventions cannot be determined in any useful detail (Russett, 2010:104).

Idealism is generally accepted as a liberal attitude or course of action which opposes all established forms of authority, which are considered to be restrictive to individual freedom and social progress (Navari, 2008:37). Idealism has always accentuated the importance of liberty, equality and common destiny among individuals (and not states), and considered the pursuit of *principle* over the need for *power* (Navari, 2008:36). Idealism and the notion of liberal democracy are therefore usually thought to have common aims, but in the past, many liberals considered democracy as dangerous because it encouraged mass participation in politics – transforming democracy into the 'tyranny of the masses'. Nevertheless, idealism eventually became identified with movements to change the social order through the further extension of democracy (Russett, 2010:97).

The idealist security argument was developed by a variety of different belief systems within a developing tradition of liberal thought, and resulted in concepts such as ideational, commercial, republican, international and ideological liberalism which all had different implications for security planning (Navari, 2008:29). Idealists view war and conflict as international risks that demand collective or multilateral intervention to mitigate their effect or to prevent war and conflict from occurring at all. For idealists, the solution to war and conflict is to be found in the mobilisation of the international society to eliminate those institutions that make war possible (Louw, 2013:20). International organisations such as the UN and NATO, or even international regimes such as the Bretton Woods system (Sterling-Folker, 2010:120), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Sterling-Folker, 2010:129) were created, both to maintain a balance of power, as well as to regularise cooperation between nations (Navari,

2008:30). Liberal thinking in international relations reached its high-water mark during the inter-war period (1920–1938), as liberal thinking was founded on the notion that warfare was an unnecessary and outmoded way of settling disputes between states (Russett, 2010:103). Liberalism again influenced policy-making elites and public opinion in a number of states after World War II (WW2), with the birth of the UN – although these flames of hope were soon extinguished by the return of the Cold War politics. After the Cold War, there was a resurgence of liberalism as Western state leaders proclaimed a "New World Order" (Navari, 2008:41).

While realists focus on war and peace (Lebow, 2010:59), the central focus of idealists is cooperation (Russett, 2010:103). At least for some years, the relevance to South African foreign policy is that the post-1994 South African government made a serious attempt not to present itself as a regional hegemon, even though the country has always been perceived as such and it has been expected to take a leading role in the economic and security situation on the continent (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-2). The post-1994 South African government has thus been burdened with the benefits and downside of its economic profile on the continent. In this regard, South Africa has increasingly been forced by circumstances to take on a leadership role in resolving national or regional crisis problems, and once addressed, subsequently assisting in managing the consequent development challenges (Habib, 2008:9). This also had significant impact on the posture of the DOD and on the size and composition of the SANDF after 1994. On the one side, the SANDF was expected to pursue peaceful relations with other states and to maintain a defensive posture and avoid "any aggressive intentions towards any state" (Department of Defence [DOD], 1998:5,7). At the same time, however, the SANDF had to be mindful of government's acknowledgement of the fact that domestic and international expectation have steadily grown regarding South Africa's role as a responsible and respected member of the international community and that "expectation have included a hope the South Africa will play a leading role in international peace missions" (Department of Foreign Affairs, [DFA], 1999:3).

As far as defence policy is concerned, South Africa's leaning towards idealism is perhaps clearest from the following statement in the South African Defence Review 2014 (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-1,7-2):

> South Africa's foreign policy, shaped by its own domestic priorities, seeks a "better Africa in a better world". Economic integration, development, peace and security are cornerstones of this policy. South Africa will thus continue to support regional and continental conflict resolution, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade and champion sustainable development. South Africa's engagement with other states will be one of peaceful relations, adherence to international law on armed conflict and in pursuit of international treaties to which it is party. South Africa recognises that development and stability are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing, hence the commitment to the promotion of continental and regional security … South Africa also remains committed to the international systems of global governance for the promotion and protection of human rights through equal emphasis on civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights.

Nathan (2010:55–57) correctly argues that South Africa's foreign policy outlook might sometimes appear as "incongruous behaviour by a democratic country whose foreign policy encompasses the promotion of human rights", especially in view of the fact that the SA government provoked international dismay and criticism when it made an attempt to stand in the way of UN censure of states such as Zimbabwe, Sudan and Burma. One way to understand this is explaining South Africa's position in terms of constructivism, which boils down to the centrality of particular ideas in South Africa's foreign policy. In this regard, South Africa's principal solidarity with African governments and anti-imperialist world view are of special importance (Nathan, 2010:55–57). This will be discussed in the next section.

2.2.1.4. Constructivism and the Copenhagen school

Constructivism has become one of the major schools of thought within the postmodernist IR discourse since the late 1980s and early 1990s (McDonald, 2008:59). Constructivism was first mentioned by Nicholas Onuf in his book *World of our making* in 1989 and the concept of constructivism has since acquired considerable significance in the study of international relations. Franke (2009:22) points out that within little over a decade it had risen to be one of the top three paradigms in the discipline. Constructivism should not, however, be viewed as a monolithic theory, but should rather be understood as a theoretical framework that has been ascribed to a wide variety of approaches to international relations that range from Alexander

Wendt's scientific realism to post-structural constructivism (Franke, 2009:23). In addition to analyses about security, constructivism has also been applied to other issues such as political economy and international organisation. In fact, McDonald (2008:60) points out that despite the attention given to some security issues, the extent to which constructivists have developed a theory of international security is limited. This tendency distinguishes constructivists from critical theorists (as discussed under 2.2.1.5) who define security in terms of its commitment to emancipation and realists, who view the world through the lens of power politics, states and competition (McDonald, 2008:60).

In the discipline of IR, constructivism supports the notion that significant aspects of international relations are determined by historical events and social issues, rather than inevitable outcomes of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics and power. The central shared assumption of constructivist approaches to security is that security is a social construction (McDonald, 2008:61). It is thus a broad theory that aids us to understand how we can approach security studies. Constructivists therefore reject an exclusively materialist and power-driven conception of states and the international political system (the realist view) and instead aim to explain state interests and conduct in terms of inter-subjectivity constituted by identities and meanings (Wendt, 1992:391–425). Constructivists argue that the world is constituted socially through inter-subjective interaction; that role-players and structures are mutually constituted; and that conceptual factors such as norms, identity and ideas are generally central to the composition and dynamics of world politics (McDonald, 2008:60). According to the constructivists, social meaning is constructed by social interaction which creates a web of norms and rules that govern appropriate action. They therefore argue that normative and ideational structures are just as important as material structures (Franke, 2009:23).

In terms of the formulation of foreign policy, constructivists argue that, although it might seem self-evident that foreign policy should serve to defend and advance national interests, the nature of these interests are not self-evident and they do not derive simply from a state's objective place in the international political system or world order. Rather, a country's 'national interests' are socially constructed and historically contingent, reflecting an interpretation of the world and the country's place in that world (Weldes, 1996: 275–318).

While the realist–liberal institutionalist debate has been primarily concerned with studying the barriers to cooperation, constructivists concentrate on how, under certain conditions, transnational forces and state interactions can cooperate and are able to generate the trust, reciprocity, shared knowledge and common identities necessary to transform global politics and overcome Hobbesian anarchy (Franke, 2009:4). Alexander Wendt (1999:323) rejects the realist notion that egoistic state behaviour is independent of time, place and culture and that states are unable to surmount the security dilemma because it is embedded in the state system. Constructivists argue that an actor shapes his or her own social context of shared values and norms, and that these in turn, shape an actor's interests, identity and behaviour (actions and interactions as expounded in a state's foreign policy). These actions and interactions are based on international and domestic rules, norms and values (McDonald, 2008:69).

Some realists criticise constructivist views and argue that constructivism has generally rejected a focus on the power of security and focused instead on the development of benign norms for managing interstate competition and institutionalising broader forms of political community. According to McDonald (2008:60), this argument indicates the commitment of realists to a narrow conception of security, defined in terms of states and militaries and the use or threat of the use of force. This is, however, an oversimplification of the constructivist theory and constructivists would argue that their approach actually allows for the development of a more sophisticated and complete understanding of dynamics traditionally associated with realist approaches to security, which ranges from the analysis of the nature of political power, to the security dilemma and the balance of power.

In view of the above, constructivism offers a useful theoretical view to analyse and explain current developments in international relations. The usefulness of constructivism firstly lies in the fact that it explains change by focusing on the power of 'ideas' (such as values, norms and rules) in defining ranges of actions and interactions between states. Ideas have been pivotal in shaping the vision, goals and strategies of South Africa's foreign policy as described in South Africa's Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy (cf. DIRCO, 2011). Nathan (2010:67) points to the fact that ideas have shaped and continue to shape South Africa's vision and

goals associated with the African Renaissance and equitable global relations, as well as ethical and normative principles such as human rights and the adherence to international law. He further argues that the claim that ideas are determinants of foreign policy does not imply that ideas are more important than interests in shaping foreign policy and "that ideas and interests are dichotomous" (Nathan, 2010:67). He maintains that the linkages and interfaces between ideas and interests should be valued as fertile grounds for empirical investigation and theoretical reflection when seeking to find an explanation for decisions on government policies and the varied responses of different countries to common problems (Nathan, 2010:68).

These ideas are pursued through strategies that are based on the relationships between means and ends, such as democratic governance and neo-liberal economic policies as the route to the African Renaissance and negotiations as the most effective way of addressing conflicts and crises (DIRCO, 2011). Ideas, in the form of values and norms, focus on the importance of identifying what actors want and these ideas focus on the cyclical relationship between actors' interests, identities and behaviour and the social context within which the actors exists. Constructivists argue that an actor shapes his or her own social context of shared values and norms, and that these in turn, shape an actor's interests, identity and behaviour (actions and interactions as expounded in a state's foreign policy). These actions and interactions are based on international and domestic rules, norms and values (McDonald, 2008:69).

Contrary to the essentially deterministic preconceptions of most of the IR theories, the open and process-oriented approach of constructivism can account for the general intensification of security-cooperation initiatives across the globe, for example developments of the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU). Franke (2009:4) explains that constructivism was developed in part to overcome the inability of rationalist approaches to explain collective action, including the resolution of security dilemmas. Constructivism goes much further than the dominant theories of security cooperation in portraying international relations as social constructs susceptible to limitless reformulation over time rather than static concepts fixed to definable and unchanging conditions (Franke, 2009:22). In terms of analysing the current international security environment, the constructivist approach offers a useful theoretical lens

through which to examine new evolutionary patterns of international relations, as well as their institutional manifestations (Franke, 2009:23).

Constructivism can be considered as a source of the post-modern movement in IR and some IR theorists has gone so far as to attribute the rise of cultural studies to constructivism. This approach has given rise to several theories and frameworks for theoretical analysis which focus the role of ideational factors, the social construction of world politics and the development of theories, frameworks and schools of thought for the study of security in the constructivist tradition. One of these schools of thought has become known as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, which merits specific attention.

The Copenhagen School is a label given to the collective research agenda of various academics at the (now defunct) Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark centred on the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. The proponents of the Copenhagen School of Thought support the arguments regarding international relations first posed by Barry Buzan in his book *People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations* (1983), followed in 1998 by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde's collaborative work, *Security: A new framework for analysis* (McDonald, 2008:68), which is widely regarded as the key statement to date on the Copenhagen School approach to security. The intent of the supporters of this school of thought was not initially aimed at developing an alternative theory or framework for the study of security. The concepts and cases related to the Copenhagen School evolved over time and it was only later that the observations and arguments about the operation of security in Europe were presented as a separate framework for analysis (cf. Weldes et al., 1999). The core theme that is pursued by the supporters of the Copenhagen School is the quest for finding answers to how security 'works' in world politics. This was an important quest as the realities of the post-Cold War security environment demanded re-assessments and broadening of our conceptualisations of security.

The Copenhagen School's approach, namely development in the context of the post-Cold War era, calls to broaden definitions of security that sought to include a range of pressing and neglected concerns such as environmental change, poverty and human rights on state

security agendas (McDonald, 2008:70). The Copenhagen School simultaneously contributed to these calls for broadening the concept and attempted to place analytical limits on it. At the same time, its proponents have not attempted to develop a framework for how security should be defined or how key actors should approach external security dynamics or crises (McDonald, 2008:68).

According to McDonald (2008:68), the Copenhagen School focused on how security itself is given meaning through inter-subjective processes and, to a lesser extent, on the political effect of these security constructions. Buzan and Wæver (2003) have suggested three central concepts of security, namely **sectors**, **regional security complexes** and **securitisation**. Of these concepts, the notion of regional security complexes might be of special relevance to an understanding of South African foreign policy and defence planning.

First published in his work, *People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era* (2009), Buzan argued that a region means that security complexes are held together, not by the positive influences of shared interests, but by shared rivalries. Security complexes link states together to the extent that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. This boils down to regions and subsystems of security relations among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other Buzan, 2001:471–488). Relationships could be based on genuine friendship as well as expectations of protection and support. Security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and interactions: balance of power contests, lingering conflicts that emerge between neighbouring states, conflicts that arise from transnational threats (e.g. political Islam and international terrorists), and intra-state conflicts (Fierke, 2010:192). Security complexes are practically defined in terms of mutually exclusive geographic regions such as Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa (McDonald, 2013:72; Sharamo, 2011:2–3).

Buzan's conceptual framework as expounded in *People, States and Fear* (2009) can certainly provide meaningful insight into South Africa's foreign policy approach and defence planning as far as specific pronouncements are concerned, such as that (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-4):

> [s]ecurity is promoted by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) through timely and effective response to conflicts and crises in Africa. The work of the AU PSC is promoted through its mechanisms: the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Peace Fund. South Africa will intensify its engagements in the AU and its structures towards building African security and the social and economic development of the continent.

Buzan's work (2009) is likewise of relevance to the following point of departure in South Africa's Defence Review 2014 around the occurrence of intra-state conflict in the developing world in general and African states in particular (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-2):

> The vast majority of armed conflicts occurred within states, rather than between them. Such intra-state conflicts will continue to feature prominently in the underdeveloped and developing worlds, due to reasons including political intolerance, competition for resources, ineffective governance, corruption, extreme poverty and underdevelopment. Although occurring within states, intra-state conflicts also negatively affect inter-state relations. (It is important to bear in mind, although most conflicts in Africa are described as being 'intra-state', all these conflicts also have 'international' characteristics as the participants/belligerents to conflicts do not confine their activities to particular states, but move and act across states and regions). The consequences of such conflicts in terms of displaced persons, refugees, the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and the disruption of transport hubs and trade will have profound spill-over effects on neighbouring states.

Lastly, Marxism and critical theory also deserve attention, even though it might appear that Marxist theorising is of little or no importance to matters pertaining to foreign policy and defence planning in South Africa or further afield.

2.2.1.5. Marxism and critical theory

Traditionally, international relations and the current world order were analysed in terms of 'traditional' social theory and manifested in assumptions that the social world is unchanging

and that solutions to challenges in the world order must be found within the very conditions that created it (Vale, 2013:208). Similarly, realist IR theory presented the world as an anarchical system in which states must continually pursue their national interests in a bid to maintain their existence and sovereignty. These 'traditional' views and conceptualisations of the world were dominated by problem-solving theories, which accepted the status quo was content with focusing on fixing the anomalies or shortcomings in prevailing systems so as to make existing relationships and institutions work smoothly (Cox, 1986:129). This problem-solving approach to international relations was also applied to a number of other disciplines related to international relations and problem-solving theory has been, and remains, for example, at the heart of military studies. The application of problem-solving techniques is, subsequently still at the core of most military campaign planning processes and is often accept as a guide to action (Cox, 1986:208).

Social and geopolitical realities have, however, prompted the development of alternative views and new epistemologies to those associated with problem-solving theory as the complexities of international relations proved to be beyond simple cause-and-effect explanations (Lawler, 2008;85). One of these alternative views is to be found in Marxist theory.

Marxism provides another alternative view to the traditional 'statist' understanding of security and views it as a process through which human beings create and build relationships with others to work towards finding ways of coexistence without depriving others (Bilgin, 2013:96). Marxism is, however, over-simplified and often dismissed as being preoccupied with economics, rather than with politics and is often perceived as primarily focusing on domestic, rather than international social relations. This is, partly, due to the fact that Karl Marx essentially identified the relations of production as the fundamental root of the international political system (Rupert, 2010:158). In this context, Marxism is often perceived as primarily focusing on domestic, rather than international social relations (cf. Smith1993:21). Rupert (2010:166) argues that the Marxist paradigm should, in fact, be understood as a theory that aims to provide a critical understanding of capitalism as a historically particular way of organising social life, rather than to oversimplify it as a critique on capitalism (Vale, 2013:209). This form of social organisation entails a mixture of political, cultural and

economic aspects which need to be understood as a dynamic ensemble of social relationships not necessarily contained within the territorial boundaries of individual nation states, but which have an international character and effect which transcend national borders. Accordingly, Marxism can yield valuable insights when applied as a lens to provide an alternative view on complex social relationships at all levels – and ultimately international relations (Vale, 2013:210).

The Frankfurt School of Western Marxism refers to a group of theorists who were originally associated with the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University in the early 1920s (Rupert, 2010:166–167). The Institute was established with the aim of developing Marxist studies in Germany and aimed at promoting the spirit of what they perceived as the "true" Marxian critique of the disabling effects of the modern capitalist system (Rupert, 2010:166). This school of thought is the original source of what later became known as critical theory Rupert, 2010:166). Today, the proponents of this school of thought in some ways continues to promote the spirit of the Marxian critique of the disabling effects of the modern capitalist system, but in other ways, they diverge from the mainstream formulae of Marxism. Much of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory takes **critique** to involve the uncovering or emancipation of 'a humanity' (or a society) whose autonomy and freedom is bound by ideology). This shift in thought was prompted by some theorists who lost faith in the revolutionary potential of the working class against the background of the triumphs of fascism and the integration of labour into the capitalist system in democratic capitalist countries. In addition to the latter, proponents of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory also saw how the Soviet Union was transformed into a rigid doctrine of economic determinism. Supporters of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory wanted to retain a critical and potentially progressive role for social theory, but were wary of orthodox Marxism's preoccupation with production and the corresponding emphasis on the historic role of the proletariat (Cox, 1981:129).

In more recent years, the Welsh School, also known as the Aberystwyth School (Bilgin, 2013:101) rose to prominence in the early 1990s. The Aberystwyth School was associated with emancipatory realism (Bilgin, 2013:93) and relied on insights from the Frankfurt School with a view to linking security to critical theory (Cox, 1981:129). This school of thought also based its work on that of the Italian political theorist and activist, Antonio Gramsci (1891–

1937). Notable in this paradigm was Gramsci's differentiation between critical theory and problem-solving theory. He argued that the difference between the two theories was to be found in the purpose for which theory is built. Critical theory is presented as a theory which stands apart from the prevailing order and asks how that order came about. Problem-solving theory, on the other hand, accepts the status quo and is content with focusing on fixing the anomalies in the prevailing system so as to make existing relationships and institutions work smoothly (Cox, 1986:129). Bilgin (2013:96) points out that the differences between these two theories should not be oversimplified and limited to conclusions that critical theory merely dismisses the realities or the problems experienced in the security realm – not that it merely presents a critique of problem-solving theories. Critical theory does, in fact, engage with present problems, but does so against the background of and in the context of the historical processes that have produced them, whilst also proposing alternatives that constitute a feasible transformation of the existing world (Bilgin, 2013:96; Cox, 1986:129).

The Aberystwyth School also moved away from 'statism' that treats the state as the ultimate referent object and agent of security to include other referent objects beyond the state (Bilgin, 2013:101–102). This also provides for the broadening of the current understanding of security in order to consider a range of insecurities faced by an array of referent objects (Bilgin, 2013:102). According to Ken Booth (2005), in this sense, proponents of critical theory do not securitise issues, but politicise security. This is done to reveal the political and constitutive character of security thinking and to change conceptions about the military and state-focused threat that have dominated traditional security agendas (Booth, 2005:22). Proponents of the Aberystwyth School redefine the concept of security as a derivative concept and calls for politicising security. The latter allows for a questioning of how state elites use security and the merits of policies based on zero-sum, statist and militaristic understandings (Bilgin, 2013:103).

As far as foreign policy and defence planning are concerned, Marxist and critical theorists do not express themselves explicitly on such matters, but their approach and scholarly work serve as a constant reminder that the possibilities of social transformation – and defence planning by implication – should be done through the development of alternative social orders and that it should sometimes go beyond the confirmation and explanation of the current world.

Thus “defence planning should be imaginative, while change and problem-solving should sometimes be approached and carried out in fundamental ways” (Vale, 2013:208). It cannot, and should not, be about problem-solving within the status quo.

Furthermore, Marxist and critical theory can be usefully applied in the analysis of the South African political landscape during and after the apartheid regime. The period between 1948 and 1994 was dominated by the National Party’s apartheid regime, centred on the assumptions of white supremacy (Bilgin, 2013:97). The South African government at the time presented the country’s security in terms of Western security – a term that was used to cloak the interests of the ruling white minority. As a result, the security strategy that was adopted by the National Party was one of forward defence that was designed to overpower potential threats at home and in the neighbouring region; thus, upholding the status quo and solving problems within the existing framework. Critical theory, in turn, recognised apartheid for what it was – “just another idea reified into being through intersubjective understandings and coalescing practices” (Bilgin, 2013:97). Supporters of critical theory viewed South African security as being conditional upon a non-racial and freely elected government that would seek security not at the expense of, but together with, its people and its neighbours (Booth & Vale, 1995:285–304). Critical theory laid bare the ways in which beliefs about white supremacy had facilitated the formation of the apartheid regime and the related policies that maintained the status quo. It also proposed alternative policies which eventually contributed to the ending of apartheid (Bilgin, 2013:97).

Marxism and critical theory, according to Vale (2013:210), are still of importance to South African military planners, not only for the role that Marxism or the anti-Marxist views of the apartheid regime played in shaping or defining South African military thought, but also because Marx opened up our understanding of social processes and highlighted the opportunities for social change, which is an issue that is crucial to the successful development of the South African state (Bilgin, 2013:98). Marxism provides an alternative perspective to ‘statist’ understandings of security in terms of which human beings establish and build relationships with others with a view to finding ways of coexistence without depriving others. Marx’s work should therefore be evaluated and valued as a useful framework for alternative

views on our traditional conceptualisation of security which were essentially centred on state security or 'statism'.

2.2.2. Evaluation of the utility and function of the respective IR schools of thought

The aim of the above-mentioned analysis (see 2.2.1.5) is to revisit and evaluate the IR theories that underlie security studies and which, as such, are of relevance to a scholarly understanding of the roles and function of militaries in the modern era (Louw, 2013:18). Such theories provide scholars and analysts with multiple or alternative views on international relations, politics and their applications. Although there are significant variations among these theories and their points of departure, they are very helpful to explain international relations and cannot be regarded as mere academic curiosities (Kurki & Wight, 2010:33). These frameworks, directly or indirectly, shape perceptions of what matters in international relations as a social activity. At least indirectly they also inform the choices taken by decision-makers on foreign, as well as defence policy (Ross, 2000:55). Despite their inherent shortcomings, these frameworks continue to influence current defence and security debates and, ultimately, IR theories provide useful constructs that can be applied to evaluate defence thinking in relation to current threat environments (Kurki & Wight, 2010:33).

In light of the above analysis of the prevailing issues that affect governmental decision-making it is evident that the policy directions of governments are not only determined by state-centric pursuance of interest (as purported by realists), but also by ideas and norms that play important roles in the decisions made by governments (Nathan, 2010:66). It is evident that South Africa's foreign policy was influenced by the ideas that promote the African Renaissance and the pursuance of equitable global relations (Nathan, 2010:67). However, assuming or accepting the point that ideas and norms shape the formulation of foreign and other government policies, does not imply that such ideas and norms are more important than issues related to interest, and interest as drivers for policy-writing are therefore not dichotomous (Campbell, 2002:21). Nathan (2010:67) rightly argues that it is the linkages between ideas and interests that should be analysed in terms of their effect on foreign and other policies.

Existing literature on foreign policy strategies suggests that regional powers, such as South Africa, adopt a number of strategies – based on a variety of perspectives, and not necessarily from one dominating theory or perspective. Habib (2009:13) therefore argues that "regional powers can adopt foreign policy ranging from hard and soft power, to bandwagoning, buffering, binding and niche diplomacy". (Bandwagoning in international relations occurs when a state aligns with a stronger, adversarial power and concedes that the stronger adversary-turned-partner disproportionately gains in the spoils they conquer together). Bandwagoning, therefore, is a strategy employed by weak states. Ultimately, the strategies employed by regional powers are motivated by a complex mix of rationalisations and can therefore not be defined in simple categories.

This makes defence planning for powers such as South Africa one of the most challenging functions of government. Generically, defence planning is premised on an appreciation of the international security environment and the global, social, economic and military forces at work. Defence planning takes into account long-term national and security objectives and economic factors (Lloyd, 2002:2). In other words, defence planning is essentially a subset of overall national planning in the political, economic and social spheres. Defence planning also takes into account the philosophy and ethos animating the national psyche and is thus shaped by the historical and cultural forces of nations. The above-mentioned is also of relevance to defence planning in the South African context and in this regard, IR theories are helpful and useful to enhance a better understanding of how the South African military as a foreign policy instrument needs to operate and plan for various contexts ranging from the identification of security threats and contingencies to operating in the diplomatic context as part of the country's comprehensive foreign policy practice on the continent and beyond (Nathan, 2010:69).

Many studies that were conducted to investigate and decode South Africa's foreign policy have resulted in polarised assessments. Some academics and activists depicted South African foreign engagements as 'progressive' and 'reflective' of being in support of a strong human rights- and idealist agendas (Landsberg, 2000; Mandela, 1993), whilst others, applying liberal and Marxist critiques concluded that South African foreign policy reflected "realist calculations or sub-imperialist ambitions" (McGowan & Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998)

respectively. Habib (2008:2) comments that, while both sets of analyses addressed some parts of a reality, they did not provide persuasive explanations of South Africa's comprehensive foreign policy practice.

According to Habib (2008:3), the second generation of research studies was less focused on the operationalisation of ideology, and more focused on building an understanding of the RSA's foreign policy engagements. This research resulted in the conclusion that South Africa's middle-power status predisposed it to multilateralism and partnerships at global and continental level (Schoeman, 2013:210). Some of these studies also found that South Africa is being perceived as a 'pivotal state', although its leadership role did not constitute that of a regional or hegemonic power (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 1999:35). Other analysts, however, were of the opinion that South Africa was indeed much more than a 'pivotal state' and that, at least for now, South Africa, together with Nigeria, should be viewed as a regional hegemon – given the country's aggregate economic, political, diplomatic and military capacities in relation to other African nations (Habib, 2008:3).

When analysing the decisions made in support of South Africa's foreign policy in terms of the frameworks of the dominant IR theories, it might seem as if some of the decisions made by government are contradictory and inconsistent. South Africa's refusal to support resolutions by the UNSC to condemn and impose sanctions on Iran, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe, confounded human rights activists (Habib, 2008:2). South Africa's stance of quiet diplomacy disappointed the human rights community as they expected the country to play a positive role in advocating a human rights agenda – given the history of the suffering experienced under the apartheid regime (Nathan, 2010:74). Many viewed the decisions to apply 'quiet diplomacy' when international boycotts and sanctions were expected as the betrayal of the spirit of South Africa's own democratic transition, as well as the international support that had facilitated the fall of the apartheid regime (Habib, 2008:2).

South Africa's contemporary foreign policy cannot, however, be understood outside an explanation of how the country's post-apartheid political transition took place. After 1994, South Africa's foreign policy shifted from "an isolated, politically belligerent, regionally militaristic, globally defensive agenda to one that is supportive of multilateralism and which

involves political partnership, regional leadership and global engagement" (Habib, 2008:6) The actors, the ideas they express, the interests they pursue and the institutions that they craft have all been influenced by and affected by South Africa's democratic transition and how the country's political situation has evolved (Habib, 2008:1). One of the primary themes and issues that have influenced South Africa's foreign policy, has been the quest for racial equality – in South Africa, regionally, and further afield (Nathan, 2010:67). Another central theme is that of the African Renaissance and the focus on the prioritisation of Africa in order to bring about sustainable social, political and economic growth on the continent (cf. DIRCO, 2011). In addition to the African Renaissance, decisions on foreign policy in general, and defence planning in particular were influenced by the effect of the evolving new world order which brought forth new definitions of the interests which prevailed in the new world order. This has manifested in South African foreign policy in the prioritisation of Africa by establishing and maintaining sustainable growth and development, as well as through the desire to reform the global order so as to create an enabling environment for African development. This 'enabling environment', which is to expedite African growth and prosperity, is not only being unilaterally pursued by South Africa, but also through transnational alliances such as (India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) that are intended to collectively challenge the dominant role-players in the current international political and economic system (Habib, 2008:1).

Despite the idiosyncrasies that have at times characterised South African foreign policy since 1994, there are, however, some elements that reflect enduring central political, strategic and ideological themes of South Africa's foreign policy. This is reflected in the prominence that has been afforded to the processes related to peacemaking, socio-economic development and the pursuance of the ideals of the African Renaissance, as well as to the preference for using quiet diplomacy as a methodology to address conflicts and crises (DIRCO, 2011:3). Since 1994, the South African government has also been consistent in its anti-imperialist paradigm, which contributed to solidarity with other states that were placed under Western economic and political pressure (Nathan, 2010:73). Decisions to support dictatorial regimes are usually motivated by the South African government as providing support to countries that are suffering the most as a result of the inequitable global system and the 'bullying tactics' of

Western powers (Nathan, 2010:57). The support of the South African government to such states is intended to address the inequities that characterise the international political and economic system by means of 'soft power' – often referred to as 'the foreign policy of ubuntu' (DIRCO, 2011:1). An evaluation of this strategy indicates that it was not emancipatory or in any way transformative; it essentially succeeded only in maintaining oppressive governments in power and resulted in a situation in which these states were only further marginalised to the lower ranks of the international system which contributed to their economic ostracism (Nathan, 2010:73).

In the final instance, it should be clear that the aforementioned theories underpinning the analysis of South Africa's foreign policy and related use of the military instrument of power as foreign policy instrument must be understood in terms of recognising the position or ability of states to pursue multiple strategic orientations simultaneously (Habib, 2008:13). Since 1994, South Africa's foreign policy has thus exhibited great flexibility, as it, at times demonstrated purely rationalist orientations, whilst at the same time promoting neoliberal orientations by the pursuance of the African Agenda (Schoeman, 2013:214). This oscillation between (neo)realist, (neo)liberal and constructivist stances in the pursuance of South Africa's foreign policy – and the effect thereof on defence planning – is typical of developing states that aim to find the balance between promoting and preserving national interest whilst simultaneously also promoting contemporary international norms. In view of the above, theoretical perspectives in the discipline of IR are certainly or great relevance and value to a solid understanding of defence planning in South Africa, as well as the role and functions of the SANDF as a foreign policy instrument on the African continent and beyond.

The SANDF, as foreign policy instrument, is compelled to re-assess the implications of its leadership aspirations continually, both at continental and regional level. This is particularly relevant as far as determinations pertaining to the scope and reach of the SANDF's involvement in peace missions in Africa are concerned (Schoeman, 2013:12). South Africa's current involvement in peace missions in Africa, compared to the contributions provided by other emerging powers, such as India and Brazil, has been very limited (Bertazzo, 2012:13). The determination of the level of defence ambition in terms of participation in peace missions is therefore a vital step in the development of the SANDF as a foreign policy instrument and

will also provide guidance to the development of defence strategies, force design, force structure and the determination of the types of capabilities required to shape and strengthen this instrument of national power.

2.3. Analytical perspectives, trends and concepts shaping the defence strategies and force designs of modern military organisations

The changing strategic environment and trends that have characterised the post-Cold War international security environment have had a considerable effect on man's understanding of concepts such as **the state**, **security**, **defence** and the **roles of the military** over time. Internationally, these new conceptions and developments have significantly influenced approaches to defence strategy and force design and have contributed greatly to the way in which military decision-makers plan for the future (Cimbala, 2002:20). Locally, these changes have also prompted the re-evaluation of the role and function of the SANDF, as described in the Defence Review by the Chairperson of the Defence Review Committee (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v):

> The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans constituted the Defence Review Committee and mandated it to look critically at South Africa's defence policy, given the rapid and fundamental changes that have occurred in the strategic environment over the last number of years.

2.3.1. The nature of war in the 21st century

Two questions have dominated the discourse about war and politics since the earliest times: what is war and what purpose does it serve?

Colin Gray (2005:30) proposes that if an apparently convincing general solution to the problem of war was achievable, it is probable that someone would have found it by now. The fact that no such solution has yet been promoted suggests that the scholarly campaign against war may have been thoroughly misconceived. Gray uses a disease analogy to demonstrate this point: whereas individual maladies can be explored for their causes, and may be treated and even cured, disease per se does not lend itself to direct scientific assault

(Gray, 2005:30). The requirements for the cessation of and the prevention of wars and warfighting remains undefined and the complexities related to war continue to perplex strategists and military planners alike.

In the light of significant changes in the security environment, some theorists have argued that war can change its nature. Gray, as did Clausewitz, however, insists that the nature of war does not change (only the characteristics of warfighting can change) and that the only definition of the nature of war is that war is organised violence threatened or waged for political purposes (Clausewitz, 1976:89). Gray (2005:30) argues that the (violent) behaviour that is currently being studied is different (if compared to state-sponsored armed conflict) and that it does not constitute war. He argues that the activities of terrorists can be likened to those of criminals; what distinguishes the two is the dominant motive. In support of this argument, Gray cites Carl von Clausewitz who, on the very first page of *On war,* advises that war is an act of force to compel our enemy to our will and he also reminds us that "force – that is, physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law – is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object" (Clausewitz, 1976:75).

Many defence theorists and strategists liken military transformation to the transformation of war itself, without recognising the distinctive differences between the two concepts. This notion, however, is strongly rejected by other scholars who claim that Clausewitz was very clear on both the nature of war and on warfare's potential for change. These scholars emphasise Clausewitz's assertion that the nature of war will always remain the same, whereas the characteristics of warfighting or the grammar of war may change over time (Clausewitz, 1976:89).

Clausewitz (1976:75) argues that war has two natures: objective and subjective. The objective nature of war consists of the universal elements that distinguish war from all other activities. He insists that war is an instrument of policy or politics, that it, as noted already (Clausewitz, 1976:75), is always a duel conducted for the purpose of imposing one's will on the enemy by force, and that war perennially has a distinctive 'climate' that is made up of four elements: danger, exertion; uncertainty and chance. Clausewitz finds war, all war that is, to

be a “remarkable trinity” and that the nature of war is composed of violence and hatred, chance and probability, and reason or policy (Clausewitz, 1976:89). Clausewitz argues that this “objective” nature of war does not change, even with revolutionary changes in technology, or indeed with anything else (Clausewitz, 1976:89).

On the other hand, Clausewitz argues that war’s secondary or subjective nature, the character of war, is always changing, albeit at different rates at different times (Clausewitz, 1976:593). He substantiates this statement by pointing out that the pace of change was slow in the eighteenth century and that strategic history accelerated with the cumulative effects of the French and Industrial Revolutions. These events posed problems of comprehension for governments and their professional military advisers probably more severe than those that press on us today. Governments and military practitioners of the time had to grapple with the influence which railway lines, electric telegraph systems, developments in the range and lethality of infantry small arms and artillery, the arrival of new explosives and the perfecting of reliable machine-gun technologies would have had on defence planning and the conduct of war (Gray, 2005:32). Similarly, current conflicts and wars are characterised by significant changes to the conceptualisations of war, as well as on the manners in which we wage war and establish peace (Gray, 2005:37).

2.3.2. The evolving character of war

Security objectives (ends) must fit within the bounds of a country’s political, economic and military power (means) (Lloyd, 2000:4). A mismatch between security objectives and military power will pose some risk to overall security interests. Force planning can be described as the process of establishing military requirements based on an appraisal of the security needs of the nation (Lloyd, 2000:4). This notion is confirmed by the Chairperson of the Defence Review Committee, Mr Roelf Meyer who states that the 2014 Defence Review is the end result of a diagnostic process that was aimed at defining the current defence function and analysing the strategic role that the SANDF plays (and will have to play) for the next twenty to thirty years (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v). Mr Meyer also states that the requirement for a new/updated Defence Review was prompted by “current strategic circumstances (that) call for a far greater Defence contribution towards the continuance of South Africa’s national

security, the deepening of democracy on the Continent and meeting South Africa's international responsibilities" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v).

The participants in contemporary armed conflicts have not just been state actors, but they have also involved a wide spectrum of non-state actors (Gray, 2005:140). Other primary actors engaged in warfare are international organisations and a variety of armed non-state actors. Various international organisations have engaged in contemporary armed conflicts for several reasons but primarily as a result of fielding peace operations in zones of ongoing conflict.

In addition to states, a great variety of role-players have participated in armed conflict in the post-Cold War period and these include, amongst others, the UN, EU, NATO, AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC. A large number of armed, non-state actors have taken part in armed conflict which included mercenaries, private military and security companies, insurgents, paramilitaries, militias, suicide bombers and child soldiers (Williams, 2008:161).

With the reduction in the number of major military engagements and the subsequent decrease in the number of battle deaths, civilians account for a greater proportion of those killed in contemporary armed conflicts as indicated by the findings of researchers at the Human Security Centre which indicates that between 30 and 60% of violent deaths in today's armed conflicts constitute civilians Human Security Centre (2005:75). The difficulty, however, in obtaining reliable and systematic information from the world's war zones makes it impossible to obtain the exact number of civilian deaths.

War and war fighting have also changed in that the traditional distinctions between war (violence between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence by private associations – usually for financial gain) and large-scale human rights violations (violence by states or private groups against mainly civilian individuals) have collapsed. This phenomenon is described by some IR scholars 'new wars' (Kaldor, 1999:165). The term 'new wars' is used to describe 21th-century conflicts that do not fit the 'mould' of traditional, 20th-century inter-state wars which were fought by the regular armed

forces of states. The violence and conflict that have manifested in the first two decades of the 21st century do not fit neatly either into "war" or "peace", or into "political" or "criminal violence" (World Bank, 2011). Kaldor (1999:165) argues that 'new wars' are distinct from 'old wars' in their goals, methods and systems of finance, all of which reflect the ongoing erosion of the state's monopoly on legitimate organised violence. New wars are fought through a novel mode of war that draws on both guerrilla techniques and counter-insurgency. This mode of warfare is distinctive inasmuch as decisive engagements are avoided and territory is controlled through political manipulation of a population by sowing "fear and hatred", rather than by "winning hearts and minds" (Kaldor, 1999:166). Whereas 'old wars' tended to extremes as the opposing sides tried to win and gain the upper hand, 'new wars' tend to spread, persist or recur as each of the sides involved in the conflict gains in political or economic ways from violence itself, rather than from 'winning' (cf. Keen, 2012a).

The force structure and force designs of militaries must be understood as these are closely related to the environments within which they will be expected to operate (Bartlett et al., 2000:18). The rapid pace of political, economic, demographic, social, scientific and technological changes imposes unprecedented challenges to military strategists. It is in this environment that military strategists and defence planners must identify innovative deterrents, war-fighting and conflict termination concepts and address the perplexing problems associated with military operations even in space – a medium quite unlike land, sea and air (Cimbala, 2002:204). Rogue states and non-governmental groups armed with biological and cybernetic warfare weapons are beginning to expand the potential conflict spectrum far beyond past confines (Gat, 2006:656). Future threats will most probably encompass a wide variety of possibilities across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from peace, to crisis management, from humanitarian aid and disaster relief to armed conflict and war (Cimbala, 2002:204).

During the last few decades, it has also become evident that various forms of conflict will not necessarily follow chronological, logical, linear progressions from war to peace, but that various types of conflict will most probably manifest simultaneously (Beier, 2008:93). Postmodern conflict is multidimensional and the variety of conflicts defies simple categorisation. It is therefore essential for academics, force strategists, planners and

commanders to realise that it will not be possible to isolate and categorise threats clearly into neatly distinguishable categories, as the distinction between conflict and war is one of degree and perceptions, rather than substance (Beier, 2008:93). In addition, postmodern conflicts have demonstrated that militaries will be expected to address many of these categories simultaneously as the postmodern spectrum of conflict embraces a wide range of situations in which military forces may be required to operate – from stable peace to unrestricted war (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-19).

The evolving character of postmodern conflict can therefore best be described as a convergence of factors and issues. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological dimensions, kinetic and non-kinetic effects and the activities of combatants and non-combatants. The primary driver behind this convergence is the so-called 'Information Revolution' (Latham, 2008:123). Recent developments in information technology continue to provide dramatic improvements to the scope and quality of information available to commanders at all levels, but have exposed another potential avenue of attack. Success in conflict requires the ability to exploit information whilst denying it to an enemy; thus, establishing information dominance (Latham, 2008:125). In the light of the general acceptance of the notion that there would be limited time for warning in the case of armed conflict, most militaries emphasise the belief that information superiority will be the lifeblood of postmodern militaries and the key to battlefield success. The ongoing transformation of military capabilities centres on developing the improved information and command-and-control capabilities needed to enhance joint operations significantly. Military capabilities are currently primarily focused on establishing and maintaining capabilities that are comprised of a system-of-systems which connects space-based, ground-based and air-based sensors, as well as decision-assistance technology (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:3).

The effect of the Information Revolution will allow protagonists and their attacks to be more widely dispersed, more decentralised, as well as more surreptitious than ever before. Offensive and defence operations will become blended and the temporal and spatial dimensions of conflict will be compressed at all levels of war. Disruption, rather than destruction, may often be the intended strategic aim. Non-state actors, many of them transnational, will play roles that are as crucial to warfighting as those played by nation-state

actors. Odd alliances are also likely to occur – notably between political and criminal, and between state and non-state actors (Mutimer, 2008:35). As a result of the increased connectivity among systems, traditional hierarchical actors, such as state militaries, will lose many battles as well as entire wars to newly networked actors (Cimbala, 2002:21). Notwithstanding the role of high-tech weapons, sensors and information and communications systems in the post-Cold War era, less advanced technology such as analog communications systems will continue to play a role. Curious combinations of premodern and postmodern elements will appear in antagonists' ideologies, objectives, doctrines and organisational designs (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:4).

Developments in weapon technology allow military force to be applied at longer range and more accurately than before, by day and night, as well as in poor weather. In combination, these developments mean that modern conflict has the potential to be fought simultaneously over a wide expanse in all four environments (land, sea, air and space) and exploiting the entire electro-magnetic spectrum at a much faster rate than before (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2004:2–7). This will result in a movement away from old operational concepts such as massed force and sequential operations in favour of massed effects and simultaneous operations. This will be possible because information technology will allow commanders to identify targets and co-ordinate complex actions much better than in the past (Cimbala, 2002:21). Furthermore, "the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical) means that military forces need to be able to operate effectively in a nuclear, biological and chemical environment" (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2004:2–7).

According to Clausewitz, each period would have its own theory of war (Clausewitz, 1976:593). In attempting to understand the influence of new phenomena on the nature and character of war, it is thus prudent to bear in mind that some kinds of war and style of warfare are currently out of fashion, but that they may well be resting, rather than declining in irreversible obsolescence. Major interstate war, including nuclear war, indeed interstate war of any kind, is fortunately not much in favour at present (Kaldor, 2013:2). Gray (2005:36), however, points out that the conditions that brought about the changes that have produced this situation are also certain to change:

> When they do, the current literature which proclaims the obsolescence of 'old [regular] wars' between states, or which finds large-scale war obsolete because of the slowly growing likelihood of it having a nuclear dimension, or proclaims the mature arrival of war's largely extra-statist Fourth Generation Warfare, will look more than a little foolish.

2.3.3. Fourth-Generation Warfare

Changes in theories of war come most often during periods of historical discontinuity (Gat, 2006:568). Events after 9/11 clearly show that we are currently in such a period. Before 11 September 2001, the great hope was that technology would permit the creation of new theories of war. This gave rise to the vast amount of literature and discussion on the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Latham, 2008:121). This view, primarily influenced by the historical successes of the US armed forces in exploiting technology, was carried to extremes by some proponents of effects-based and network-centric operations as supporters of these theories believed that sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would improve operational intelligence. It was generally accepted that the improved 'situational awareness' that would potentially be brought about by new technologies would assure victory as military decision-makers would be able to have real-time knowledge and understanding of belligerents (Cimbala, 2002:23). The attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001, however, proved these assumptions to be wrong and it became necessary to develop new theories on war and warfare to fill the void left by the collapse of techno-centric theories of war after 9/11 (Gray, 2005:103).

One of the big ideas or grand theories that is currently informing the contemporary strategic defence discourse is the so-called Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) – one that claims that all Clausewitzian theories of state-on-state warfare have become momentarily obsolete (Gray, 2005:141). This concept was developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the American Global War on Terror seemed to validate the idea that a new sort of war was developing. The 4GW concept has become iconic for this era and is applied in our efforts to achieve a better understanding of modern warfare, which ranges from the Iraqi civil war and US counterinsurgency operations and to continuous counter-terror operations of the US and UK Coalition in Afghanistan (Gray, 2005:141). The premise of 4GW arises from the notion that

Western states are threatened by an amorphous, globally based insurgent movement (Gat, 2006:637). The idea of 4GW soon gained 'hard cover' status with the publication of TX Hammes' book *The sling and the stone* in 2004. Supporters of 4GW, of which William S. Lind and Thomas X. Hammes are the most prominent, predicted a shift in warfare which they assumed was both in the character and nature of war (Gray, 2005:144). Over the ensuing years, a number of military thinkers and strategists demonstrated that the 4GW theorists were not correct in their assumptions (Gray, 2005:192). They did, however, set the stage for a generation of subsequent theorists to follow with their own predictions of future warfare (Williamson, 2009:2).

Eventually, 4GW was defined as being different to previous types of warfare in that it (Lind, Nightengale, Schmidt, Sutton & Wilson, 1989:22):

- is guided by mission orders that enable small groups of combatants to operate within the commander's intent, yet retain a necessary level of flexibility. Local flexibility directed by general guidance is essential to 4GW, which is mostly fought in a dispersed manner throughout the whole of the enemy's society.

- has a decreasing dependence on centralised logistics that facilitates the conduct of dispersed conflict and a higher operational tempo. All 4GW warriors must be able to fend for themselves in whatever environment they operate.

- has more emphasis on manoeuvre over firepower that negates the traditional requirement of massing of soldiers and weapons. In addition, 4GW relies, instead, on small, highly manoeuvrable, agile forces that can blend into the environment to avoid being targeted (Lind et al., 1989:24); and

- is aimed at collapsing the enemy internally, rather than destroying him physically. This requires that 4GW leaders have a keen ability to identify and target their enemy's centres of gravity. Lind et al. assert that in 4GW, the enemy's population and even the culture itself become the targets (Lind et al., 1989:24–34).

Thus, 4GW studies focused on the idea that the character of war evolved due to the dynamic of multidimensional action–reaction processes. This multidimensionality is caused by a variety of societal, doctrinal and technological developments which produce temporary military advantages which, over time, induce responses that aim to mitigate those very advantages. As a result, authors like John Boyd argued that military technology is just one among many non-technological drivers of change and determinants of success (Boyd, 1987). It seems that 4GW authors are concerned with the traditional over-reliance on technology and physical destruction, instead of focusing on the great variety of intangibles of strategic interactions, such as time, the moral and mental dimensions, organisational culture and non-technological drivers of change. Eventually, 4GW has been presented as the next logical evolutionary step following Third Generation War (3GW), which was marked by conventional Western-style military manoeuvre warfare (Gray, 2005:142). In contrast, 4GW is distinctly non-conventional and non-military in character. At the core of this theory is the weakening of the state which, as an organising and governing mechanism results in the rise of non-state actors willing and able to challenge its legitimacy. The role of political will and internal social disintegration is central to the construct (Hoffman, 2007:18).

The end of the Cold War (1990s) and the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) raised expectations for global peace, but these were soon thwarted as inter- and intrastate conflicts proliferated during the establishment of the new political world order. Following the collapse of empires in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and post-colonial Africa, violent ethnic divisions and nationalist claims for self-determination made a mockery of the liberal policies underpinning the new political world order. The international arena was presented with a vast array of new trends that have affected the types and scales of armed conflicts in various degrees. Most significant was the decline in interstate warfare, whilst there was a commensurate increase in the incidence of intrastate warfare (Williams, 2008:156).

2.3.4. Risks and characteristics of interstate and intrastate wars in the post-Cold War era

The risk of conventional war and interstate conflict will persist, although its likelihood in future should be reappraised when compared with other threats that can be categorised as either

formal or informal war (Kaldor, 2013:2). The complex nature of global interdependency and the reliance of developed nations on a stable and secure environment for access to energy and other vital resources will, however, make it impossible to ignore certain crises (Cimbala, 2002:175). Despite the fact that many scholars and defence analysts claim that the trend in warfare is sharply turning away from interstate conflict, the truth of the matter is that war is not changing its character, let alone miraculously accomplishing the impossible and changing its nature (Gray, 2005:380). In fact, there has always been intercommunal strife. The changes in the characteristics of warfighting from traditional interstate warfighting to that of intrastate warfighting are a global phenomenon, and have always been. The incidence of these types of wars should therefore not be exaggerated, because, when great empires and federations dissolve, there have always been belligerent scrambles by communities to seize the historic opportunity to establish a sovereign homeland for themselves (Gray, 2005:19). State-based or interstate conflict is currently less likely, but definitely not extinct (Gat, 2006:673). The increasing economic interdependence of states in a globalised economy and the need to confront the symptoms of challenging ranges of transnational problems have resulted in cooperative governance and action among states, in this way diminishing the chances of interstate wars. The potential risk of interstate wars, however, may increase when intensifying competition for resources, particularly energy and possibly food and water, and continued population growth result in heightened tensions (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2007:67).

In the future threat environment, regular and irregular styles in warfare will frequently, indeed almost routinely, be mixed. As explained by Clausewitz, the *nature* of war (danger, uncertainty, chance and exertion) will remain constant, despite changes that will take place in the *character* of conflict and warfare – as every age has its own kind of war (Clausewitz, 1976:89). Currently, interstate wars *per se*, might have taken a back seat to domestic (intrastate) forms of conflict and some kinds of war and styles of warfare are currently out of fashion, but this does not rule out a re-emergence of these types of conflict and war. As such, interstate wars may well be resting, rather than declining in irreversible obsolescence (Williams, 2008:159–161).

In addition to the decrease in interstate conflict, there has also been a significant decrease in the level of violence and intensity of armed conflict (Williams, 2008:164). This is despite the hundredfold increase in weapon effectiveness that was brought about by technological developments. There are various reasons for this, including the fact that development in military technology also exponentially increased situational awareness and protective power (Sloane, 2002:6). Contrary to widespread assumptions, studies of war lethality, measured by military and civilian casualties have, in fact, confirmed a decrease in battle deaths (Gat, 2006:535). According to Williams (2008:159) the decrease in battle deaths during non-state conflict was measured at 71% during the period 2002 to 2005. As far as battle deaths are concerned, the average number of battle deaths per conflict per year was approximately 38 000 in 1950. This had decreased to about 700 per conflict per year in 2005 (cf. Human Security Centre, 2005. (Battle death counts do not include either the unintentional killings of civilians [collateral damage] or 'indirect deaths' from war-exacerbated disease or malnutrition (Gat, 2006:409). The lower levels of violence and the intensity of armed conflict can be ascribed to a variety of reasons varying from the end of colonialism, the end of the Cold War, the general decline in the number of battle deaths and the shifting regional spread in armed conflict (Williams, 2008:159).

The shifting regional spread of armed conflict has also affected the manifestation of armed conflicts. According to Keegan (1994:68–73), the constraints imposed by geography and climate confined earlier conflicts to a relatively small portion of the earth's surface. Since 1945, different regions, at different times, have experienced far more wars than some others (Gat, 2006:512–569). Until the mid-1970s, East and South-east Asia suffered the most battle deaths, whereas during the latter part of the Cold War, the casualties were spread between the Middle East, Asia and Africa (Williams, 2008:159). Since the mid-1990s, however, sub-Saharan Africa proved to be by far the world's most conflict-prone region (Williams, 2008:161).

This changing international security situation continually initiates not only the emergence of new defence theories, but also the maturation of concepts such as human security and the security-development nexus (Mutisi & Maregere, 2006:16). Both have had a significant effect

on defence thinking, and new approaches to defence strategies and force designs in the post-Cold War era.

2.4. Influence of the changed security environment on the roles, functions and required operational capabilities of future military organisations

Future threats will encompass a wide variety of possibilities across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from peace to crisis management and from humanitarian aid and disaster relief to armed conflict and war (De Coning, 2013:26). It is essential to bear in mind that it is not possible to isolate and categorise threats clearly into neatly distinguishable categories as the distinction between armed conflict and war is one of degree and perceptions, rather than one of substance and several of these categories will most probably have to be addressed simultaneously (cf. Liang & Xiangsui, 1999). Hoffman (2009:34) argues that, in an era that is increasingly dynamic and non-linear, it is essential to eschew simplistic meta-narratives that would result in an over-simplification of the very complex scenarios that characterise modern armed conflict. This increasing complexity of future conflict environments, will pose a challenge to armed forces which operate within them, demanding new tactics, specialised equipment and heightened levels and tempo of decision-making (Sloan, 2002:6). Military personnel at all levels will furthermore require increased awareness of the legal implications of their actions, and they will require much more specialised training that is informed by current, authoritative doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) (Farrell, 2013:7). These changes will ultimately require, inter alia, significant increases in military spending (Lloyd, 2000:10). The principle that there is military security in diversity and tailor-made assets, however, can be hard to explain to narrow- and economic-minded budget and financial managers who do not relate to a strategic context (Bartlett, et al., 2000:31).

The changed threat environment and the broad spectrum of conflict that have to be addressed by future militaries have required a change in planning methodologies – using new tools for thinking about developing the required capabilities (Bartlett, et al., 2000:28). This implies that new sets of transformational programmes and conceptual tools should be built into the analytical processes of defence planners and strategists (Lloyd, 2000:10). In the light of the great variety of challenges to be addressed, it is evident that an environment should be

created that would foster broad discussions within and among different communities that have an interest in the security and defence arenas (Bartlett et al., 2000:19). Furthermore, it is essential that the required capabilities be defined, whilst balancing near-term operational and force-management demand with longer-term future capability and institutional opportunities (Lloyd, 2000:11).

2.5. Changed paradigms on the understanding of primary and secondary roles of militaries

The primary role of militaries has traditionally been understood to be the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation state (Neethling, 2002:1). In this regard, the primary role of defence forces remains the key organising principle and the *raison d'être* for the maintenance and funding of armed forces.

The reasons for the emphasis on the primary function are multifaceted (Williams et al., 2003:213):

- It is widely understood that the ultimate and primary function of the state is to provide security to its citizens against external threats to its sovereignty – best expressed in its role to ensure the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.

- There is significant support for the argument that armed forces should confine themselves to their primary line function and desist from getting involved in various secondary functions, as the continued involvement in secondary functions would result in the politicisation of the armed forces and the incremental usurpation of the authority of elected civilian governments by their armed forces. Continually involving the armed forces in their secondary tasks could result in the politicisation of the armed forces by, either overtly or insidiously, facilitating their entry into the realms of both government and civil administration. This could also result in the politicisation of the corporate identity of the armed forces and could facilitate the development of a mentality that would confront government, rather than remain subordinate to its dictates.

- Some military analysts argue that the increased involvement of members of the armed forces would undermine the legitimacy of the armed forces.

- Other defence analysts argue that the increased involvement in secondary tasks would result in the militarisation of societies.

- Some members argue that the increased involvement of the Defence Force in secondary tasks would negatively affect the combat readiness of the armed forces.

- The influence of Western metanarratives, which all focus on the primary function of armed forces, continues to dominate the arguments of many defence planners across the globe as this is the product of the strong a-scriptive affinities that exist between many armed forces of the developing world and the intellectual discourses of the former (mainly Western) colonisers.

States view the establishment and development of their defence forces as so-called 'insurance policies' in the event of any threat to their national security (Lloyd, 2000:10). It is therefore very important to understand the importance of casting a sound theoretical foundation upon which such development could be based. Furthermore, should a country adopt inappropriate models upon which to develop the roles and functions of their armed forces, their force designs and doctrine, major political and financial implications could emerge. According to Williams (1998:2), the well-worn military dictum that "structure follows strategy" is as applicable to the military process as it is to the political process. Any major flaws or inconsistencies in a country's defence theory and strategy could result in a range of unintended and problematic political and economic consequences prevailing in the future, should either the defence strategy or the theoretical model adopted by that country prove inadequate or inappropriate.

During the post-Cold War period, many scholars and defence planners were of the opinion that armed forces should reappraise their position regarding the involvement of militaries in their secondary functions. According to Williams et al., (2003:215), modern armed forces have rarely been used in the primary role. In this regard, Williams (2003:215) utilises the

example of the British Army which was always on active service between 1815 and 1914, but usually in remote areas of the world in a quasi-gendarmerie role – and not in terms of their primary function, the protection of the UK's territorial integrity. The same can be said for the endeavours of the French army for most of the 19th century as well. In addition, even in the age of what was termed the Total War of the 20th-century, modern armies have spent very little time engaged in state-on-state armed combat (Williams et al., 2003:215). In the light of the changes in the security environment after the Cold War and in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, many governments, most notably those of Germany, Great Britain, the USA, Denmark, Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, China and South Africa, initiated processes to review their respective defence policies and structures to ensure that their defence forces were prepared and structured to meet the changing security and defence demands of the 21st century.

In a world characterised by a fast change of pace, the prioritisation of defence functions into a rigid hierarchy of primary and secondary functions is problematical (De Jager, 1998:6). The low probability of external military aggression reflected in historical, global and regional trends, compared with other contingencies [secondary tasks] requiring the use of military force, provides a questionable basis for regarding defence against formal state-on-state military threats as the primary function of a defence force. Given the prevalence of wars aimed at limited political or military objectives (limited war, as opposed to all-out general war), there is no reason to assume that the effects of military aggression would necessarily be more serious or catastrophic than other forms of threat such as, for example, insurgency or domestic insurrection (Vreÿ, 2010:47). In the developing world, regional instability, civil strife, anarchy and crime constitute an insidious long-term threat that can destroy the very fabric of society, as events in several areas of the world testify (Metz & Millen, 2004:12–14). These manifestations of conflict, often exacerbated by external interventions, have caused far more human misery in Africa than direct interstate war; yet the application of the vital military means to enable and assist in the prevention, containment and reversal of those threats is seen as *secondary* by defence planners and politicians (Vreÿ, 2010:64). The causes of these types of conflict are generally of a non-military nature and, in essence, military action alone cannot solve the problem. Military action can, at best, only stabilise the security situation and

create conditions which are beneficial for non-military role-players to use other means to address the causative factors (De Jager, 1998:6).

The secondary functions of militaries are numerous and complex and have been broadened by defence planners and analysts to include specific non-traditional military tasks or responsibilities, not only during war, but also during peacetime (De Coning, 2013:26). Military leadership is now challenged to think more broadly about concepts such as security and defence than ever before. The controversial and well-debated operations other than war (OOTW) mission track itself is evidence of this need to move beyond the comfort zone of familiar conventional warfare thought patterns (Cimbala, 2000:178). The same is true for most militaries, and as a result, there is an ongoing review of defence policies and force structures (Neethling, 2002:2).

Secondary tasks of the military include:

- support to civilian police in the maintenance of law and order;
- countering internal threats to the constitutional order;
- border protection and participation in peace missions;
- maritime protection; and
- support to socio-economic development programmes for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and support of foreign policy.

The role of the military in socio-economic development and post-conflict reconstruction and development is specifically important to the developing world (De Coning, 2013:18). The emphasis on the secondary role of the military emphasises a shift away from deterrence and defence against a massive and sophisticated attack from an ideologically committed opponent, to dealing with a multifaceted array of regional or global security challenges during peace missions (Neethling, 2002:2).

In recent times, defence planners have generally advocated that a fresh look be applied when role-players appreciate the role which the secondary functions currently play and will play in the future in determining force design, equipment purchase and training requirements

(Neethling, 2002:16). The weakness of the approach of focusing on the primary function and assuming that this will satisfy secondary requirements is becoming increasingly visible in South African defence planning (Defence Review Committee, 2014:8-1–8-13). In spite of the fact that the military, political and public lobbies agree in theory on the primary functions orientation and the core-force principles, the obvious unlikelihood of an external military threat has consistently undermined the credibility of a force design ostensibly motivated by the need for defence against external aggression (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1–10-22). Focusing on the primary function thus has not enabled the suggested or efficient execution of secondary tasks and this void is illustrated in the on-going South African defence debate.

As far as the SANDF is concerned, the requirement for a re-assessment of its roles and functions is highlighted in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v). The Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-4) concludes:

… the global shift in focus regarding threats and sources of insecurity has necessitated a review of defence and security policies worldwide. South Africa cannot escape this and must clearly contextualise the defence contribution to national security, with particular emphasis on achieving national goals and defending vital interests. Regional and continental socio-economic integration is the foundation for Africa's socio-economic development and essential for South Africa's own prosperity (and that) South Africa's growing peacekeeping commitment on the African continent has compelled the need to re-examine and reprioritise defence roles and functions accordingly in pursuit of the 'African Agenda'" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:viiii).

It is evident that it is essential for policy-makers and defence planners to re-appraise the functions, resource requirements, tasks, ethos and political direction of the armed forces continually, because the political and economic landscapes of the countries and regions in which the armed forces will be deployed are also continually being subjected to profound transformations. The dilemma that is faced by defence planners and strategists is that their vision of the future roles of militaries cannot be neatly, conveniently and economically captured by a single paradigm (Gray, 2005:192). The 2014 Defence Review, as all other defence policy documents, can therefore not be appreciated as a once-off or finite description

of South Africa's defence planning and it is acknowledged that "defence planning should be robust enough to allow for some deviation from the baseline" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-6).

2.6. Force planning and the diffusion of military models: effect and influence on defence strategies, force designs and force structures

In the light of the described dynamic security environment and the increasing competition for scarce resources, choosing the best strategy and design for defence forces is more crucial than ever before (Bartlett et al., 2000:24). Errors made when devising defence strategy would result in the establishment of defence forces that are ill-suited to their nation's future needs (Lloyd, 2000:15). Farrell and Terriff (2002:3) argue that the ability of states to achieve national-security policy aims is largely dependent on whether and how well their military organisations adapt to their changing strategic, political, budgetary and technological environments. This required adaptability is of particular importance for developing countries such as South Africa, as the military organisations that must enhance the security environment in which the development and economic growth should take place, must be inherently flexible in order to meet the requirements of the great variety of secondary tasks that must be executed in the pursuance of sustainable development. This flexibility must be achieved, not only in the warfighting concepts and doctrine, but must also be part and parcel of the posture, force design, force structure and capability development of military organisations (Bartlett et al., 2000:22).

On the one hand, changes to the force design and ways in which military organisations execute their missions would appear to be contrary to the general perceptions about the military (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:8). On the other hand, militaries are commonly viewed as traditional and conservative in nature and therefore disinclined to make major change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:4). This view, as described by Farrell & Terriff (2002:4) supports the notion that militaries prefer to preserve tried and tested strategies and structure, rather than adopting new ones. It is therefore generally accepted by military strategists and defence planners that military organisations will only make minor adjustments and only when absolutely necessary.

In the same way that competition is at the foundation of the quest for power, competition is also a key stimulus to the spread of military practices and the driving force behind military change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:13). Kenneth Waltz (1979:127) argues that the competitive logic governing the international system creates powerful incentives to emulate the military practices of the most successful states in the system, as argued by Kenneth Waltz (1979:127):

> The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and instruments of force … Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of the major contenders, even their military strategies, begin to look much the same all over the world.

Military change takes place for a variety of reasons, such as cultural norms, politics and strategy and new technology (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:6). Norms, politics and new technology all simultaneously contribute to military change, rather than singularly having individual effect upon and causing changes in the environment. The most prominent source of military change is at the strategic level and takes the form of a changing threat to national security, new conceptualisations on the topics of defence and security and changes to cultural norms (cf. Katzenstein, 1996).

Cultural norms are important agents of change as they are the beliefs that people hold about the social and natural world that they live in (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:7). These norms regulate activities by defining what constitutes effective and appropriate action in terms of the accepted social rules and moral codes. In the case of military culture, the accepted norms make meaningful action possible by indicating to military actors who they are, what their roles are and what they are permitted to do in a given situation. In this way, cultural norms define the purpose and possibilities of military change (Latham, 2008:126). Norms that are specific to national or organisational communities produce behavioural patterns peculiar to these communities, such as national strategic style and organisational ways of warfare. These norms ultimately produce persistent patterns of behaviour by becoming institutionalised in their respective communities and manifest in community rules and routines (Farrell & Teriff, 2002:7). Once institutionalised, norms are either taken for granted or enforced by powerful sanctions. By studying and analysing these norms, patterns and trends can be derived which

can be used to explain why military organisations sometimes act in ways that are inconsistent with prevailing strategic and operational circumstances. In such cases, the military reality changes at a faster pace than the perceptions of the members of the organisation (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:7).

History clearly shows that war compels states and their military organisations to adapt in various ways and to varying extents (Farrell, 2013:1). Military change is thus brought about for diverse reasons and manifest in a wide variety forms. These changes include changes to strategy and the geopolitical environment, force generation and/or military plans and operations, undertaken in response to operational challenges and campaign pressures (Farrell, 2010:570). Changes in military organisations are prompted by three pathways (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:6):

- **Innovation**, which involves the development of new military technologies, tactics, strategies and structures.

- **Adaption**, which pertains to the adjustment of existing military means and methods. Adaptation often results in innovation when multiple adjustments over time gradually lead to the evolution of new means and methods.

- **Emulation**, which occurs when military organisations import new tools and ways of war through imitation of other military organisations.

It is only when the new military means and methods result in new organisational goals, strategies and structures that innovation, adaptation and emulation lead to major military change (Sloan, 2002:3).

Change in and emulation of military practices is thus part and parcel of the drive to be as effective as possible (Sloan, 2002:4). Emulation takes place because, according to Goldman (2002:42) “there is simply one best practice and everyone figures it out, or because figuring out the best practice is difficult, so states satisfice by imitating”. She also explains that, although viable alternative institutional and technological options might be available to military

organisations, the urgency to implement changes to meet the demands of the fast-changing threat environments compel governments and defence forces to adopt the most successful forms and practices as demonstrated by the great wars taking place in a particular period of time. This "emulation is deemed as the primary behaviour expected of units in a self-help system" (Goldman, 2002:42).

Changes to the conceptualisations of threats to national security are also one of the most prominent drivers of change in the military, as this demands changes to national security strategies (Bartlett et al., 2002:27). Strategic pressure therefore operates through political processes in shaping military change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:10). An example is the US Defence Force which failed to innovate and adapt ground and air strategies for the Vietnam War and then had to suffer the resultant fallout (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:11). In the post-Vietnam environment, which combined turmoil within military ranks with public apathy, the military had very little incentives to examine their own shortcomings critically let alone promote substantive change. It was only with changes in US politics and society in the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan that the military opened up strategically and politically (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:10). Reagan's policies significantly changed the American political landscape and provided a supportive environment in which the post-Vietnam generation of officers could begin to question the military's conduct of the war and seek to learn lessons from it. The response of US military to a major strategic development – the defeat in Vietnam – was shaped by political developments in a similar fashion (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:11). The changes in the political landscape in South Africa after 1994, prompted significant changes to the manner in which the role and function of the SANDF has been defined and understood (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v).

The changed international security environment has compelled military organisations, including the SANDF, to re-assess their conceptualisations of defence and security. Conceptualisations of security now encompass a wide range of inter-related issues and the concept of 'security' has changed from the geographical, defence-based, state-centric and physical security realm to a concept that is based on a human-centric, human security paradigm (Sinovich, 2011:5). The modern, wide-ranging security environment, with its complex human security dimension, demands pro-active, preventative, comprehensive

responses that are optimally suited to the history and culture of the society in which military organisations deploy (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:9). This notion of integrated, holistic responses to threats and crisis situations, initiated the development of the CA to defence planning and deployment. The Comprehensive Approach (CA) describes a more collaborative process between the respective instruments of national power, in which shared understanding, planning and action is imperative for proactive responses across the spectrum of conflict. As noted in Chapter 1 (paragraph 2.1), the CA has been adopted by a significant number of countries (Sinovich, 2011:viii). The CA, with its emphasis on the human-centric focus of military organisations, is entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996), and is therefore an important aspect of South African legislation. The establishment of the South African National Planning Commission (SANPC) is indicative of government's efforts to improve long-term planning and to coordinate a common set of objectives and priorities to drive development over the long term. (Government Gazette, 2010:3).

The CA is centred on the notion that the military instrument cannot operate in isolation and successful responses in the contemporary security environment entail a wide range of contributors and influences (De Coning & Friss, 2008:2). The CA includes comprehensive analysis, planning, execution and measurement of effectiveness that should enable a more effective and efficient deployment of national capabilities, including heavily tasked military assets (UK MOD, 2005:1-5 & 1-12). This is indicative of another change that have diffused across military organisations, namely that of effects-based warfare. Effects-based warfare (cf. Finn, 1998) seeks to utilise not only the direct, kinetic, effect of activity, but includes the extent to which that activity will create a ripple-effect in an opposing force's system of warfare, seeking a wider degradation of its capabilities. Finn (2002:2) suggests the following working definition: "effects-based warfare is an approach to defence, which seeks to appreciate, integrate and assess the direct, as well as the full range of indirect impacts of defence policy and activity".

The military contribution to the CA, as described in Chapter 1 (paragraph 2.1), is encapsulated in the JI^{2}M approach to military operations (Schnaubelt, 2011:56). The JI^{2}M approach is central to SA defence planning and forms a so-called 'golden thread' throughout the 2014 Defence Review. The CA and the JI^{2}M approach to military operations are of

particular importance to South Africa's participation in peace support missions, border-safeguarding and area defence operations (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). In order bring about the CA by means of JI^{2}M operations, the SANDF's force design must be based on a balance of capabilities that adheres to concepts such as rapid reaction operations for interventions, expeditionary operations to project and sustain forces for protracted periods, as well as complex warfighting within the human and physical dimensions of the battlespace (Defence Review Committee, 2014:vii). In order to execute these operations successfully, JI^{2}M forces must develop interoperable command-and-control capabilities, joint doctrine and integrated systems (Sloan, 2002:45–46). The Information Revolution has already had a significant effect on the development of JI^{2}M systems, as well as on other defence-related systems and platforms (Cimbala, 2002:20).

New technology also acts as one of the major drivers of military change (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:12–14). The exact nature of the role and extent of technology as an agent for prompting military change continues to be a contested issue (Sloan, 2002:24). One of the most prominent current technological drivers of change is that of information technology (Cimbala, 2002:20). The influence of the so-called Information Revolution is another issue that remains high on the priorities of those involved in defence planning and strategising. Some analysts claim that the spectacular operational successes that were achieved by the US military in the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003) can be attributed to the opportunities provided by information technology. As a result of these successes, many military organisations across the world, such as the defence forces of the UK, Canada, Europe and Australia have embarked on processes related to the emulation of the US military (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:10) . The jury on the actual success achieved by operationalising the opportunities provided by information technology is, however, still out.

For realists, competition remains the key stimulus to the spread of military practices and the driving force behind military change (Lynn, 1996:509) They therefore predict that the likelihood of emulation will be high, given the constant pressure of competition in the international system – to emulate success in line with international best practice. Lynn (1996:509) argues, "[M]ore than any other institution, militaries tend to copy one another across state borders, and with good reason. War is a matter of Darwinian dominance of

survival for states, and of life or death for individuals." When an army confronts new or different weaponry or practices on the battlefield, it must adapt to them and this adaptation often takes the form of imitation (Goldman, 2002:42). Therefore, the drive to be militarily as effective as possible produces emulations, either because there is simply one best practice and everyone figures it out, or because figuring out the best practice is difficult and states therefore satisfice by imitating (Goldman, 2002:42). As a result, the defence forces of many states are therefore continually busy with the process of importing new military practices from abroad. Diffusion of military models takes place because military and political leaders are constantly monitoring the security environment and observing the practices of their neighbours and leading military powers in an attempt to adopt the most successful ones, particularly because national survival has historically depended on battlefield success (Demchak, 2002:231). Different assumptions about the motivations for states to adopt new military models lead to different expectations about the national response to the demonstration of successful military practices abroad and the scope, pace and direction of military change (Demchak, 2002:231). According to Goldman (2002:42), a variety of alternative institutional and technological options may be available to military organisations, but there is an urgency to adopt the most successful forms and practices as demonstrated by the great wars of the time – especially when there is a perceived threat to stability. Emulation is therefore viewed as the primary behaviour expected of units (states) in a self-help, realist system.

Although competition is an important driver for military change and emulation, institutional pressures also stimulate the spread of forms and practices across organisations in the same line of business or profession (Demchak, 2002:231). Organisations emulate other organisations for a variety of reasons. One of the main reasons is to attain legitimacy within a particular social system. Emulation is therefore not only motivated by the quest to increase efficiency (Goldman, 2002:42). Over time, as more organisations emulate the same practices, the relationship between adopted innovations and actual need is decreased. Adoption is not predicated on improving performance but on being seen to have legitimate structural forms (Goldman, 2002:94). The process of growing imitation or homogenisation among organisations is encompassed in the concept of isomorphism. Isomorphism is

described as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:66).

There are three processes through which institutional isomorphic change may occur, namely: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (Goldman 2002:95). **Coercive isomorphism** stems from political **influence** and occurs through both formal and informal pressure that is exerted on organisations upon which they are dependent, as well as the cultural expectation in the society within which organisations function (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:67). Some argue that, the greater the dependence of an organisation on another, the more likely it will be coerced to change isomorphically to resemble the organisation on which it is dependent (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:69). In terms of military organisations, this is also true because the more one military organisation depends on one another for training, supplies and combat support, the greater the likelihood that the dependent military organisation will emulate the military organisation that it is dependent upon. Since its inception, for example, NATO as a military organisation has been dependent on the political and military support of the USA. This has prompted NATO to adopt US practices – explicitly or implicitly – in order to facilitate the accommodation of US needs (Goldman 2002:95). As far as the SANDF is concerned, coercive isomorphism has played a significant role in the shaping of continental and regional security architectures and continues to influence decisions made by the AU and other regional security organisations.

Mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:69). It is argued that mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations are faced with uncertainty and then choose to model themselves after other organisations, which provide the borrowing organisation with practices and examples that furnish a solution to the problems that are being experienced. DiMaggio and Powell (1991:75) argue that the more uncertain the relationship between means and ends, or the more ambiguous the goals, “the greater the extent to which an organisation will copy practices from an organisation that it perceives as successful”. A form of mimetic isomorphism was detectable in NATO during the 1990s when NATO had to find answers to the demands that were created in a decade of great uncertainty with the changing security environment, leading to a reappraisal of NATO’s

purpose and questions about the suitability of its Cold War force posture and command structure (Terriff, 2002:112). The organisation was thus challenged to achieve new goals and missions (Goldman, 2002:94). In addition, 14 of the 16 member states are members of NATO's integrated command structure, with most officers serving a set duration within the alliance's military command structure and rotating back to their respective national command, once they have served their time at NATO headquarters (HQ). NATO's command structure therefore, has to contend with a high degree of employee transfer and turnover, providing fertile ground for solutions to problems of uncertainty being modelled on the practices of other military organisations – most likely that of a successful member state (Goldman, 2002:95). Similarly, as far as mimetic isomorphism is concerned, another example is the SANDF, which continues to play a leading role in joint, multinational SADC exercises as new regional goals and missions are set. This usually results in a situation in which participating SADC member states accept and participate in the SANDF's command-and-control, planning and execution processes (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-7).

Another manifestation of organisational isomorphism occurs in the form of **normative isomorphism** which is purported to stem from the professionalisation of organisations, as well as from professional networks (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:71). There are two ways in which the process of professionalisation are an important source of isomorphism: firstly, due to the similarity of formal education and common 'cognitive base' and norms, and secondly, due to the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organisation and across which new models can rapidly diffuse (Terriff, 2002:95). DiMaggio and Powell (1991:71) hypothesise that, the greater the similarity between individuals in education and personal attributes, the more likely it is that they will tend to see problems in much the same way, see the same policies, procedures and structure in much the same fashion and approach decisions in much the same manner. The relative indistinguishability of individuals within a profession (i.e. professions that transcend national differences), coupled with the relative interchangeability of individuals in a particular hierarchical positions, "becomes a matrix for information flow and personnel movement across organisations" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:71). Most SADC member states, including South Africa, have strong ties with Britain and the way in which British military organisations have been and are organised. This has resulted in a situation where many of the SADC countries have emulated UK command-and-

control and staff systems and have also incorporated British (and where applicable) US military doctrine in their organisations, or based their doctrine development on the concepts encapsulated in UK and USA doctrine. This phenomenon is most likely fuelled by the exchange of information and ideas among soldiers during multinational training exercises or joint operations and through the attendance of international military courses that are presented as foreign learning opportunities (Terriff, 2002:112).

One consequence of professionalisation and professional networks is that central high-stature organisations that are perceived as having prestigious professional rewards may be used as models in order to confer similar benefits (Demchak, 2002:231). One of the most prominent post-Cold War manifestations of the diffusion of successful military models, based on operational success, is the adoption of the US Army's composite brigade-centric construct, also known as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). The US Army adopted the construct of the SBCT to enhance its organisational responsiveness to generate versatile combat power with units that are inherently self-contained, sustainable and organised with capabilities for the full range of missions (Kugler, 2008:13). The reality of the current complex threat environments demands military organisations that are flexible and which have the ability to deal simultaneously with current operations, as well as future operations, and they should be capable of combining routine behaviour with improvisation (De Waard et al., 2013:1). This required organisational responsiveness is dependent on two factors: organisational sensing and modular organising (Linick, 2006:4). **Sensing** is understood as an organisation's ability to fathom its complex relationship with the outside world, and **modular organising** refers to the ability to combine autonomous organisational units into customised constellations. The key merit of modularisation is presented as providing military organisations with the ability to increase organisational flexibility without jeopardising performance (De Waard, Volberda & Soeters, 2013:1). Following the operational successes of the SBCTs, many countries across the world have embarked on a process of institutionalising the same concepts in their respective militaries. For example, the Spanish Army is in the process of transformation, most significantly to move away from division-centric approaches to force design and force structure, to that of composite brigades as basic building-blocks of the organisation – using the US SBCT as an example for force design and force structure (De Waard et al., 2013:3). Similarly, the Dutch and the Australian armies also

conducted research to evaluate the opportunities offered by composite, modular brigades, similar to that of the US SBCT model (De Waard et al.,2013:5).

The above-mentioned research was based on the quest to find the optimal configuration for military organisations which must be prompted to have appropriate crisis-response capabilities to meet the challenges of the turbulent post-Cold War security environment (Kugler, 2008:9). Various armed forces have found modular designs to be a useful organisational approach to react efficiently to vastly differing crises situations (De Waard et al., 2013:5). Constantly changing operational environments leave deployed forces in permanent states of flux (Kugler, 2008:9). The characteristics of crisis situations have made organisational sensing, or, in military terms, shared situational awareness and understanding a critical success factor for repeatedly outsmarting opponents and staying abreast of developments in the security situation. Post-Cold War military organisations must therefore find the appropriate balance among sensing, modular organising and organisational responsiveness (De Waard et al., 2013:2).

Although the above-mentioned theories explain the circumstances which influence the diffusion of military models, they do not fully explain why so many militaries around the world are organised along such remarkably similar lines? Most militaries are organised around standing and standardised professional armies that are organised around major weapon systems (Farrell, 2002:72–75). Whatever the reason for the similarities in force design and force structure, history has shown that the Western model of standing, standardised and technologically structured armies requires a capital-intensive form of militarisation that is only cost-effective for states that are well resourced with capital and have a need for great military capability. On the other hand, for developing and newly independent states (such as South Africa) which tend to have greater human than capital resources and require a lower level of military capability, armies based on mass mobilisation of lightly armed militias have proven to provide a more efficient and cost-effective way of generating military power (Wendt, 1992:391–425).

From the above, it is evident that it is important to adopt a comprehensive and holistic view when attempting to understand why and how military organisations change. It is also

important to comprehend the mix of drivers and factors that shape military adaptation. The primary function of a military organisation is to provide the best means for security and defence of the state and the state's interests. Military change should therefore be understood as part of the continual quest to improve the military's capacity to protect state interests (De Waard et al., 2013:1). A critical issue in this regard is to ensure that, once the decision has been made to change, especially in cases of the emulation of other military organisations, the proposed change is necessary or appropriate (Terriff & Farrell, 2002:270). This is because, what is appropriate for one military to do in support of its government's objectives may not necessarily be appropriate to achieving the objectives of a different state. Military change must be tailored to ensure that a state's interest can be effectively secured, rather than to fulfil potentially self-serving military organisational interests (Terriff & Farrell, 2002:270).

It is evident from the above that military organisations of the 21st century must cultivate and rapidly expand their inherent abilities to adapt in order to meet the changes in the security environment. In the case of the SANDF, it is crucial that the organisation expands its capacity for change in order to enhance operational efficiency and to provide adequate responses to envisaged threats and operational challenges. The SANDF has, over the past 20 years, undergone significant changes in terms of its ethnic composition, its orientation and in the types of missions in which it has been and is currently participating – driven strongly by political imperatives and changing international norms. This has compelled the SANDF to evolve in order to face new threats and deployment requirements effectively and to change in order to maintain relevance as an effective security tool that is capable of a flexible and timely response wherever the national interest would demand its employment. In the same manner that South Africa's foreign policy has demonstrated great flexibility in the manner in which national interest has been pursued over the past two decades, its defence force as a foreign policy tool must commensurately be designed to adapt rapidly to the demands of fast-changing operational requirements (Schoeman, 2013:221). In keeping with the latter, the aim of this study was to explain that, by adopting a modular, JI^{2}M approach to the SANDF's force structure and force design, the SANDF's operational effectivity would be greatly enhanced and it would be able to rapidly provide tailorable responses across the spectrum of conflict compared to those provided by the more traditional single-service orientation as described in the 2014 Defence Review, as well as earlier defence policies.

2.7. Conclusions

The end of the Cold War created an opportunity for planners, scholars, political and other international role-players to revisit dominant conceptions and theories about security, defence and force design. This opportunity also requires a revisiting and review of the dominant theories and current IR concepts related to the concepts of defence and security, as well as the analysis of the institutions, organisational structures, systems and processes that are designed to support defence and security initiatives in a rapidly changing security environment.

This chapter was aimed at expounding the theoretical underpinnings that are relevant to understanding the roles and functions of militaries in the 21st century. The first part of the chapter focused on an analysis of the most prominent contemporary IR theories as frameworks for the analysis of the use of military organisations as instruments of foreign policy. The theoretical analysis focused on some of the major theoretical approaches that underpin security studies.

The first section resulted in the conclusion that the metanarratives that comprise the IR theory should be understood within the context of the timeframes in which they were developed, and that analysis of the effect of various IR theories on the defence and security debate should therefore be viewed and judged against the circumstances and trends that shaped the development of the respective theories. Furthermore, it was concluded that:

- analysts should steer away from focusing their attention on determining which of the IR theories are more accurate than others (see 2.2);

- they should rather support the notion that all theories should be viewed as providing unique perspectives or 'lenses' to the defence debate (see 2.2); and

- the great variety of IR theories all contribute to the broader defence debate in one way or another (see 2.2).

The second part of the chapter comprised an analysis of the changes in the post-Cold War international security environment and of its influence on military organisations and military models. This part of the chapter focused on an exposition of the changing strategic environment and on the identification of trends that have characterised the post-Cold War international security environment. The analysis (see 2.3) addressed major shifts that have taken place in man's understanding of concepts such as state, security, defence and the roles of the military over time. These concepts were analysed (see 2.3) to determine the role of the state, weak or failed states, the interests and the power of nation states and the broader conceptualisation of human security, the security-development nexus and the security dilemma. The purpose of this part of the chapter was to expound how these developments have influenced approaches to defence strategy and force design in the context of their historical development.

The third and final part of the chapter (see 2.5 and 2.6) highlighted the contending analytical perspectives, trends and concepts influencing and shaping defence strategies and force designs of modern militaries. These sections dealt with the theories of military change and diffusion of military models which provide explanations, as well as examples of models for change. One of the imperatives for military change that was highlighted in this chapter was that of change in response to operational realities or experiences. Another catalyst for military change that was addressed in this analysis was that of change as imposed through political processes or demands. Finally, the requirement to remain abreast of or to keep up with international best practice was also analysed (see 2.6). These perspectives were applied to South Africa, as the country's defence force and policies are influenced by all three imperatives for military change:

- firstly, the changes to the South African political landscape had a significant effect on the changed perspectives about the roles and functions of the SANDF in a democratic dispensation;

- furthermore, following the first democratic elections in 1994, changes to the force design and force structure of the SANDF were significantly influenced and shaped by what was then perceived as international best practices; and

- finally, operational pressures and experiences since 1994 have laid bare the neglect of the required changes to the preparation, acquisition and upgrades of the operational capabilities of the SANDF, particularly the misconceptions about the secondary roles of the SANDF.

Conclusions were presented on the reappraisal of the roles and functions of militaries and also included an analysis of the drivers of change in military organisations (see 2.6). The aim of this analysis was to bring to light the vast and diverse challenges to be met by modern militaries and to analyse how these demands affect the approaches adopted by governments and defence planners when they develop defence strategies, determine force design and make decisions on the configuration of postmodern military forces.

The contents of this chapter serve as departure point and basic structure and organising framework for the analysis in Chapter 3 of the study in which the context, roles and functions of post-Cold War militaries, globally as well as regionally, are analysed. The SANDF's role and function as instrument of foreign policy and as encapsulated in the Defence Review 2014 will also be analysed in terms of the suitability of the proposed force design and force structure that are intended to position the SANDF toward providing adequate responses to envisaged threats and operational challenges in the coming decades.

CHAPTER 3: CONTEMPORARY WARFARE AND CONFLICT AND THE EFFECT THEREOF ON THE ROLES OF 21ST-CENTURY MILITARIES

3.1. Introduction

The world is currently experiencing a prodigious change in the balance of power in the international political system. This great transformation is the result of the convergence of various trends such as power struggles associated with the rise of new powers, increased political and economic connectivity and the global change in values and norms. Based on the continuing increase in globalisation, it has become evident that every aspect of human life will continue to change at an unprecedented rate in the 21st century (Atkinson & Moffat, 2007:5). Globalisation has shaped the nature of interrelationships among global, regional and national powers in economic, diplomatic, informational and security concerns (Baylis & Smith, 1997:7). This, in turn, has developed into the convergence of concepts underpinning personal, national, regional and continental security, and has also resulted in intensifying the process of merging defence strategies with broader security and development concerns (Bisley, 2008:218).

As a result of globalisation, international borders decreasingly constitute barriers and internal and external security issues have become inextricably linked (Navari, 2008:35 -36). The growth in the international movement of people, money, goods, information and technology has helped to bring about a situation in which national borders and traditional state institutions have become significantly less important in shaping the lives of individual citizens (Moller, 2010:49. At the same time, non-state actors have succeeded in increasingly making their presence felt in the arena of international affairs and threats to security (Buzan et al., 1998:27). The UN, NATO, AU and most formal defence structures have proved to be limited in their capacity to address the challenges posed by these changes effectively, which has prompted a re-evaluation of the roles, functions and structures of defence forces and other security mechanisms (Hampson, 2008:241). Similarly, African continental and regional security structures will have to implement reforms to security architectures and several structures will have to undergo significant changes in roles, organisation and approach as failure to reform will lead to eroding the credibility and authority of these institutions, as well as

their ability to resolve conflicts on the continent (cf. Buzan, 1991:1–12). The process of security reform is, however, extremely complex and multidimensional, and despite the plethora of scholarly analysis on the nature of war and peace, mankind is still limited in its ability to explain the phenomenon of war adequately, as well as to act (and react) appropriately to create circumstances conducive to the establishment and maintenance of peace (Gat, 2006:10).

People and states have been involved in and have suffered from the ravages of war throughout the ages, and the complex and multifaceted subject of war and warfighting continues to fascinate scholars, philosophers, historians, politicians, defence planners and strategists, particularly because, despite the fact that we have 25 centuries of often disputable historical experience to draw from, we have been unable to find all the answers to the most fundamental questions relating to the 'riddle of war'. Gat (2006:xi) lists some of the most pertinent questions as:

> Why do people engage in the deadly and destructive activity of fighting? Is it rooted in human nature or is it a late cultural invention? Have people always engaged in fighting or did they start to do so only with the advent of agriculture, the state, and civilisation? How were these, and later, major developments in human history affected by war, and in turn, how did they affect war? Under what conditions, if at all, can war be eliminated, and is it declining at present?

Despite all this uncertainty, the fundamental character of armed conflict seems likely to remain unchanged: a dynamic contest of wills, involving death, destruction, terror and human suffering (Gray, 2005:31). No matter how much technology, systems, operational methods or military organisations shift or change, the nature of war will essentially remain the same, because, as Clausewitz noted, war will always involve a dangerous and dynamic relationship among passion, hatred, reason, chance and probability (Clausewitz, 1976:89).

Defence planners and strategists will, as they did during past centuries, continue to grapple with questions about the nature, causes, origins and consequences of war, whether the causes of war are shifting, or whether all forms of organised and politically focused violence constitute war (Gray, 2005:64). Despite the prevailing uncertainty about the character, means and motivations for war, defence planners and strategists have been, and always will be

required to draft strategies, policies and contextual analyses to address the challenges associated with continually changing threat environments, changes in the modes of war-fighting and new perceptions and conceptualisations of the roles of militaries in the 21st century (Farrell & Terriff, 2002:4). Despite the many uncertainties that persist about how militaries should be structured and prepared to face the current complex mix of threats, it is clear that defence forces continue to play a prominent role as part of any country's reaction to conflict – despite the significant changes that have taken place in the roles and functions of military organisations (cf. Atkinson & Moffat, 2007:172–179). The focus of this chapter will be on how the changing context of war and the characteristics of current threat environments have affected the roles and functions of military organisations in the post-Cold War era.

The chapter comprises of an analysis of the following:

- the changing roles and functions of post-Cold War military organisations;
- the characteristics of the various modes and types of war that have characterised the first two decades of the 21st century – globally, as well as continentally;
- the changing roles and functions of military organisations and its effect on the modes and types of post-Cold War warfare;
- the manifestation of these modes and types of war in the African post-Cold War threat environment; and
- the requirements for the development of tailor-made, optimally configured military organisations that are capable of successfully addressing the challenges associated with the current and future African threat environment.

3.2. The changing roles and functions of military organisations

Internationally, significant changes have been taking place in the way in which societies relate to military organisations, as well as in the ways that governments define the roles and functions of military organisations. These changes were initiated by a number of phenomena,

such as the changed post-Cold War political environment and the Information Revolution which has forever changed the manner in which military organisations execute their missions.

As is the case with most military organisations, African armies have, over time, played various roles in shaping the governments, institutions and societies in which they deployed (Obasanjo, Richards, Diogo & Myers, 2013:1). Development processes in post-colonial African countries have been diverse, and changes in terms of development reflected the history, policy choices, natural resource endowments, the effect of ethnicity, geographic location and size of the respective countries. Africa's armed forces reacted to these changes, which ultimately shaped and affected the force designs, force structures, roles and functions of contemporary African military organisations (Obasanjo et al., 2013:2).

In Africa in the 1960s, armies were used for a variety of purposes. Armies were used either as a tool of liberation from colonial rule, or applied as a tool of subjugation by colonialists. After independence, many African armies were also used as a tool to intervene in politics – undermining and frequently usurping civilian rule (Terrie, 2010:152–153). In the 1970s, there were more than 30 unconstitutional changes to African governments and no African heads of state departed by the ballot box. In Nigeria, for instance, there were eight coups d'état, and the military ruled virtually uninterrupted for nearly 33 years from 1966 until 1999 (cf. Meredith, 2006:194–205). The post-Cold War period has however seen significant changes to the roles and functions that African militaries fulfil on the continent (Obasanjo et al., 2013:1). Most importantly, aside from protecting and supporting individual constitutions, African militaries are expected to contribute to the establishment of secure environments in which development can take place.

The redefinition of the concepts of security and defence is not a process that is unique to South Africa or other African defence forces. In the light of global changes in IR, development in the manifestation of armed conflict and new perceptions of the roles of armed forces, most militaries are currently analysing the posture and force designs of their armed forces (as described in paragraph 2.6 of Chapter 2). The process of redefining the roles of military organisations is crucial to the success of future military deployments as the current force designs are not optimally suitable for the tasks that modern militaries are expected to

perform – ranging from warfighting types of operations, to peace support operations, to OOTW such as disaster management and humanitarian assistance (cf. De Coning, 2010:26). The force designs and force structures of 21st-century militaries must, therefore be re-assessed to ensure that they are optimally configured and equipped to execute stated tasks across the spectrum of conflict.

Many Western and NATO forces have initiated changes to their force designs and force structures to meet current operational requirements, but the force designs of post-colonial African countries are still based on frameworks that mirror those of their former colonial masters, traditional force designs that were tailored to provide frameworks for fighting formal, inter-state wars (Moller, 2009:19). These force designs, however, are increasingly being questioned and are deemed as being restrictive and inappropriate to the irregular, asymmetric types of threats they continually have to address (Osinga, 2007:10). The problem is that most African states lack the funds to sustain and maintain security forces that are optimally prepared and capable of countering the great variety of possible threats (Mills, 2011:21). A compounding issue is the fact that the equipment of African armed forces is often not suited to the types of operations that must be executed. African governments are thus challenged with the dilemma that they are compelled to find answers to the current, irregular types of threats that are characteristic of African conflicts, but that the force designs, force structures and force employment strategies are not aligned with the fast-changing realities of the current African threat environment (cf. Van Nieuwkerk, 2009:99–108). In order to provide effective defence and security, African military organisations will have to change and "develop security forces that are context appropriate; adequate to deal with current and likely threats; and must be affordable and sustainable" (Heitman, 2011:2).

In reality, however, African militaries are generally under-resourced for the roles they are expected to perform and they are also not optimally structured or sustained to execute the great variety of operations that are assigned to them (De Coning, 2014:34). Hard choices will have to be made on capability management and development, sustainment policies and strategies and the manner in which African military organisations will respond to the great variety of development needs. Traditionally, African defence forces deal with peace support

and development as ‘secondary’ roles such as engineering inputs and disaster relief, but contemporary peace missions demand much more (Obasanjo et al., 2013:2).

It has become evident that African countries in the post-Cold War African security environment are compelled to face highly diverse security threats. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all solution’. Given the nature of the wide range of security threats that will have to be addressed, most operations will be of constabulary or counter-insurgency in nature (Potgieter, 2010:81). Furthermore, the traditional boundaries between fighting a war and stabilisation operations have become blurred in the present security environment (Hoffman, 2007:7). It is probable that defence forces will have to execute a mixture of conventional and unconventional operations while adopting symmetric and asymmetric approaches (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-19). The implied duality (conducting operations in both symmetrical and asymmetrical modes) demands focused recruiting, training and the enablement of troops to assist people, and to ensure that the troops are aware of local customs and can converse in local dialects (Arundell, 2009:3). Security forces will have to develop capacity to provide sustained presence that can be deployed to protect and support the population and to discourage organised crime as well as the formation of irregular forces. It also demands the provision of current, comprehensive intelligence without which small security forces cannot be effective (Pretorius, 2005:80). This requires continuously updated intelligence to enable security forces to monitor trends, highlight relevant developments, predict potential threats, and develop situational assessment. This, in turn, necessitates effective collection, collation and distribution systems, and information–intelligence–action cycles that run at the lowest possible unit level. A typical bureaucratic intelligence system that provides intelligence long after it might have been useful will not suffice (Heitman, 2011:3).

3.3. Militaries as a foreign policy instrument in Africa

Militaries have, through the ages, performed a wide variety of roles in international and domestic politics. Foreign policy, according to Du Plessis and Hough (2000:108–110), can be implemented by various means and ways, known as the ‘techniques or instruments of foreign

policy'. In this regard, a traditional distinction is made between four categories of foreign policy instruments, namely political, economic, psychological and military techniques.

The political and military techniques of foreign policy are of specific relevance to militaries, as these are the sectors in which defence forces are most directly involved (Schoeman, 2013:209). A wide range of activities across the spectrum of international relations are at play and are relevant in various environments ranging from peace to war. The political technique involves diplomacy and is considered to be the traditional, peaceful and most direct instrument of foreign policy (Schoeman, 2013:211). It is practised by representatives authorised to act on behalf of the governments of state or other legitimate and recognised political entities.

The military instrument involves the use of military means and is a technique of last resort. It is generally associated with the coercive use of the armed forces in a situation of war, but also includes military approximations short of war, such as military threats, military interventions, military aid and assistance (Dandeker, 2013:26). It could also involve the use of military peacekeeping operations. In this context, African militaries can, and are, used as foreign policy instruments that can be applied in a diversity of ways which are not limited to the waging of war (Schoeman, 2013:212). In this regard, African defence diplomacy can play a vital role in the process of strategic engagement by various means, including military cooperation and assistance, peace operations and humanitarian assistance as a component of wider policies designed to improve international relations with other nations. Militaries are political institutions of a very particular kind and can therefore play various roles in politics described in the paragraphs that follow (Du Plessis & Hough, 2000:110):

3.3.1. Militaries are instruments of war

The central purpose of militaries is to serve as instruments of war that can be directed against other societies or states if deemed necessary.

3.3.2. Militaries are guarantors of political order and stability

The coercive power and operational efficiency of militaries are not only of significance in international relations – militaries may also be decisive factors in domestic politics.

3.3.3. Militaries are interest groups

Militaries could seek to shape or influence the contents of policy itself by making use of 'insider groups' in the key policy-making bodies and processes and so utilise these as an institutional power base.

3.3.4. Militaries are potential alternatives to civilian rule

The control of weaponry and coercive power gives militaries the capacity to intervene directly in political life, leading in extreme cases to the establishment of military rule.

3.3.5. Militaries may function as instruments of foreign policy

Militaries should be understood as political institutions of a very particular kind that function as instruments of foreign policy. Military means thus constitute a foreign policy instrument in its own right in both war and peace, albeit linked to other means, and are strongly supported or facilitated by diplomacy. An inverse relationship, however, invariably exists between diplomacy and military means. Although sometimes dichotomous, the generic relationship between diplomacy and military means, military force in particular, has always been evident and recognised. Military capabilities can be used to provide a background of assuredness and stability for the pursuance of diplomatic objectives. The military instrument is an integral part of foreign policy implementation, globally, as well as in Africa (Du Plessis & Hough, 2000:110–111).

Cottey and Foster (2004:15) argue that one of the major changes in patterns of defence diplomacy since the early 1990s has been the increasing use of military cooperation and assistance in Africa. This is particularly evident in the support on the continent for the

establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the respective regional brigades (Cawthra, 2007:24). Their rise has, however, not come about through their traditional role as a means of strengthening the defence capabilities of allies, but rather as an instrument for attempting to build cooperative relations with former or potential adversaries, and thereby helping to prevent potential conflicts (cf. Du Pisani, 2007:13).

3.4. Defence diplomacy as a means of conflict prevention

Defence diplomacy works in a number of different ways and operates at a number of different levels. It can be employed to perform an important conciliatory political role by acting as a symbol of willingness to pursue broader military cooperation, mutual trust and commitment to overcome or manage differences (De Coning, 2013:26–31). Defence diplomacy and military cooperation can also be applied very effectively as a means of introducing transparency into defence relations, in particular with regard to states' intentions and capabilities and may be used as an incentive to encourage partner states to cooperate in areas such as socio-economic development (Cottey & Foster, 2004: 16). In this manner, defence diplomacy can contribute significantly to conflict prevention in Africa by signalling a political commitment to develop cooperative relations, promoting military transparency and reducing misperceptions, promoting perceptions of common interests and socialising towards cooperation (Schoeman, 2013:212). South Africa's engagement with other states, for example, will be characterised by peaceful relations, adherence to international law on armed conflict and in compliance with international treaties to which it is party (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-1). This will be achieved by pursuing multilateral security objectives, capacitating multilateral institutions, developing regional and continental partnerships and by means of direct participation in selected bi-lateral mechanisms (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-2).

The 2014 Defence Review clearly states, that South Africa's foreign policy, shaped by its own domestic priorities, endeavours to contribute to the development of a "better Africa in a better world" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-1). As part of defence diplomacy, South Africa will thus continue to support regional and continental conflict resolution, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade and champion sustainable economic

development. The country recognises the need to enhance its international contribution through candidatures and the secondment of South Africans to positions in regional, continental and global governance institutions (Schoeman, 2013:215). This will include appointments and secondments to the UNDPKO, the AU Peace and Security Commission (AUPSC) and the SADC Organ for Defence, Politics and Security (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-3). South Africa will also provide trained, joint forces with inherent escalation, enforcement and sustainment capabilities for operations in support of the defence diplomacy objective. The South African government has also pledged that the SANDF will, at all times, be able to provide and maintain a credible intervention capability, the prepositioning of forces and the contribution of South African forces to various forms of peace missions (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-2).

3.5. The post-Cold War era: types of war and modes of warfare in the 21st century

In the midst of all the uncertainty that characterises the future threat environment, one aspect that is certain, is that the 21st century will be time during which violence and bloodshed will occur in various forms and as a result of a wide variety of reasons (Gray, 2005:24–25). War will also manifest in different types and scales of armed conflict – sometimes in a seemingly non-linear and even chaotic manner. Undaunted by reality, however, scholars strive to impose some order on the course of events (Gray, 2005:131). The quest to find order results in the continuous development of theories, constructs and metanarratives which all aim to understand the phenomenon of war as it has manifested over time.

Concepts such as ‘new’ and ‘hybrid’ wars have entered the lexicon of defence analysis, suggesting that there is an important, perhaps profound distinction between wars of the past and wars of the present and wars of the future (Hoffman, 2009:36). Some analysts argue that the concepts of war themselves have become obsolete and propose that militaries and defence establishments must undertake wholesale retooling of transformation to adjust to contemporary war (cf. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:v). Others support a more traditional approach to understanding modern wars, focusing on continuity. They contend that, despite the fact that the *character* of war has changed, its essential *nature* persists (Metz & Cuccia, 2010:1).

In order to make any meaningful contribution to the understanding of future war, it is essential to interpret war in the social and political context in which it occurs and to understand the changing meaning of war. According to Gray (2005:55), "as '*location, location, location*' is the central truth which unlocks the mysteries of property valuation, so '*context, context, context*' decodes the origins, meaning, character and consequences of warfare" (emphasis added). War has several contexts, most prominently the political, social, cultural and technological contexts, and discussions about how war and warfighting have changed should not be presented as if these were autonomous phenomena. This supports the Clausewitzian notion that unless we recognise and accommodate the "multiple contexts of war" in our analyses of war and warfare, discussions of future warfare will lack all meaning (Clausewitz, 1976:88). Many of the current theories pertaining to future warfare, however, are based on constructs of future warfare that are shaped primarily by technological advances, without positing the developments within the contexts of political and social developments and cultural realities (Sloan, 2002:3). As a result, possibilities are often sketched quite bereft of plausible political meaning. Technological advantage and reliance upon technology does, however, not guarantee ultimate success and/or victory, as technology predictions, to a great extent, ignores the inherent uncertainty of war (Sloan, 2002:4). Scholarly attempts to outline the changing historical context of war through the ages, particularly in terms of technological advances, therefore inadvertently provide more questions than answers to the phenomenon of war.

Defence planners and strategists should also always bear in mind that there is a perennial temptation to misread recent and contemporary trends in warfare as signals or evidence of momentous, radical shifts in all conceptualisations about and understanding of war and warfare (cf. Sloan, 2002:3–25). Some of these changes or shifts are then described as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and give rise to the development of a wide variety of constructs and theories that are developed in attempts to describe the effect of these development on wars and modes of warfighting (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:v). More often than not, however, the characteristics of warfare in specific timeframes are shaped, even driven, to a far greater extent by the political, social and strategic contexts in which

warfighting occurs than they are by changes caused by military science or technology (Gray, 2005:55).

Despite their limitations, the various constructs and models that scholars and defence planners use to analyse threat environments have utility in that they highlight the primary trends that have affected and are currently shaping warfighting. The theories and constructs, as expounded in Chapter 2 (see 2.3), provide us with different windows or views on the past, present and future of warfare, insights that could assist us in understanding current developments (Gray, 2005:131). What has become clear is that postmodern developments associated with the technological, economic and social pressures of globalisation have eroded the authority of governments and the real independence of countries, and those pressures have radically changed the political context character of war (Baylis & Smith, 1997:7). The future political world will thus continue to experience violent strife, but certainly not in the pattern of previous centuries. In the same manner in which the Industrial Revolution industrialised warfare – which resulted in mass destruction – the Information Revolution will affect all aspects of warfare in the way in which society engages in conflict, including the way in which economies are organised (Toffler & Toffler, 1997:xiii).

In the quest of finding a better understanding of armed conflict, a number of quantitative datasets have been developed to measure, categorise and typify the varying forms of conflict (Gat, 2006:663). One of the constructs that have been developed in an attempt to make sense of the manifestation of war in the 21st century is the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) (Williams, 2008:156). The UCDP is a sophisticated model, based on a number of datasets that are used to analyse post-Cold War conflict. According to UCDP, the term **war** is applied where there are at least 1 000 battle-related deaths per calendar year within the bounded area of fighting (Furley & May, 2006:3).

The data collected in this regard, indicates four main trends, which have characterised armed conflict since 1945. The first trend demonstrates that there has been a significant decline in interstate armed conflict from the mid-1970s, with internal conflict (intrastate war) accounting for the vast majority of organised violence. The number of major conflicts (those involving battledeaths of more than 1 000 people) dropped even more significantly by 80% and wars

between countries fell to only 5% of all conflicts. The period since 1946 is the longest in hundreds of years without a war between major powers (Mills, 2011:9). A second major trend is that, since reaching a peak of 52 state-based armed conflicts in 1991 to 1992, the number of such conflicts have dramatically declined between 1992 and 2005 (Mack, 2007:1). The number of wars has halved since the 1990s and the character of the conflicts has also changed significantly with the lines between criminal and political violence becoming increasingly blurred (World Bank, 2011:2). A third trend in armed conflict since 1945 has been the decline in battle deaths, and the fourth characterising the post-Cold War era, has been the shifting regional spread of armed conflict. In global historic terms, the constraints imposed by geography and climate have meant that major wars have been confined to a relatively small portion of the earth's surface. There are many reasons for the decline in the numbers of wars, including (Gat, 2006:664–665):

- the general realisation that war is too destructive to be waged among state actors of relatively equal power;
- the fact that nuclear war is tantamount to mass suicide; and
- the growth in international organisations, globalisation and complex interdependence which provides for new ways of solving conflict.

According to some scholars, war between states, the only kind of belligerency sanctioned by international law from the mid-seventeenth century until the third quarter of the twentieth century (in accordance with Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention), has become obsolete (Green, 2000:335). The fact, however, that this type of armed conflict is viewed as having become outdated does not imply that it will never occur or that it is impossible.

What has become evident about 21st-century war, however, is the fact that multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries who understand the application of multi-mode warfare to achieve specific operational objectives at orchestrated pre-determined times. Current and future enemies will thus employ combinations of warfare types (Hoffman, 2009:36). Contemporary wars therefore require greater emphasis on the integrated use of all the elements of national power, and should

demonstrate a clear understanding of the opportunities and limitations of the military element of power when applied in the context of 21st-century wars. Post-Cold War wars tend to last longer than previous wars, involve more civilian casualties and entail rapid adaption on the part of the combatants (Metz & Cuccia, 2010:11). Security and defence sectors will therefore have to develop their capabilities to conduct military operations effectively during various types of war, which may include the simultaneous conduct of formal war, informal war and non-lethal war (Department of Defence [DOD], 2006:4-3). This is of particular importance, not only for the SANDF, but for all African militaries, as recent and current conflicts in the DRC, CAR, Sudan and Mali were all characterised by the utilisation of a combination of various types of warfare in the respective areas of operation (De Coning, 2013:27). Although various modes of warfighting are currently being applied simultaneously by a variety of belligerents (whether they be formal state or non-state warfighters), it remains important to have a clear understanding of how each of the individual primary categories of warfare manifests in the 21st century, in order to enhance the concepts of successfully addressing the combined effect of the various types of warfare.

The primary categories of 21st-century wars are expounded below. The aim of this exposition is to analyse some of the important issues that act as catalysts for changes to force design (FD) and force structure (FS) of 21st-century military organisations.

3.6. Formal war

Debates on if and how the character of war is changing are as old as the concept itself (Williams, 2008:163). This has resulted in many conceptualisations and definitions of the frameworks that are relevant to warfighting and these continuously change over time. The concept of formal war is usually associated with conventional wars between the regular armed forces of states (Gray, 2005:168). Formal war, however, does not always manifest in exactly the same way, which has resulted in sub-categories such as total war and limited war.

3.6.1. Total war as manifestation of formal war

Formal war has, since the 17th century, been the most strategically significant form of armed conflict and will probably remain a primary form of conflict for at least a few more decades, perhaps even longer (Gat, 2006:662–673). Formal war involves the reliance on a central command structure, technology and the use of heavy firepower, and aims to gain control of territory and resources (Gossman, 2010:31). The term **total war** was coined by the German Quartermaster General, Erich Ludendorff in 1918, and fear of such a prospect has dominated Western views of warfare since the 1800s. These fears were exemplified by the horrors of WW1 and WW2 which killed approximately 8,5 million and 55 million people respectively (Bourne, 2005:117– 137). Few contemporary wars come close to matching the scale and intensity of the two world wars.

Total war, as a manifestation of formal war, is usually understood as an ideal type, that is, as a set of circumstances which reality can approach, but which it never can reach. Despite the fact that the possibility of the outbreak of total war was limited, due to practical limitations to the ways and means that could be applied during warfighting, the notion of total war continued to dominate defence debates during the two world wars (Gat, 2006:608–609). There are several reasons for this:

- firstly, technological and industrial advances during this period permitted the methods of warfare to become more destructive – especially in terms of nuclear war and the application of so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD);

- governments were increasingly able to mobilise national resources and harness them to the war effort;

- the scope of war aims had significantly expanded in comparison with those waged during the pre-industrial era (limited goals such as territorial gain and economic advantage were replaced by the determination to achieve outright victory defined not simply as the defeat of an enemy's armed forces, but also more ambitiously as the replacement of a political regime) (Williams, 2008:164).

There are several reasons why total war seems inconceivable, such as the cost and the development periods of modern weapons and their platforms (Gat, 2006:608). The rate of attrition of such weapons, when used against each other, is likely to be significantly more rapid than the rate at which they can be replaced. Practical factors such as topography, weather and capabilities of the participants are also likely to place constraints on the use of military force (Carver, 1986:814). In addition to the limitations posed by cost and time, total wars, as a manifestation of formal war, are also limited by international law and conventions such as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), the UN Charter and the Hague and Geneva Conventions which specify the circumstances for legitimate recourse to armed force and the regulations for the use of force in conflict (Gray, 2005:162). Although it remains difficult to enforce the stipulations contained in these conventions, would-be aggressors refrain from the all-out use of violence and conflict as it would prove counter-productive to successful long-term international relations and partnerships.

3.6.2. Total war and the use of WMD

The threat posed by WMD is of enduring concern and will all play a pivotal role in total war environments. Many states regard the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems as a priority threat (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-11). WMD comprise an assortment of various weapon technologies with widely ranging and diverging potency (Gat, 2006:637). The industrial– technological age that made the development of these weapons possible, saw an exponential rise in destructive power that was, in turn, more or less paralleled by a similar increase in defensive power. The effect of chemical weapons, pioneered during WWI, was almost immediately countered by development in defensive gear – such as gas masks and protective clothing – which, when utilised, sharply decreases the effectiveness of these weapons. An example of this is the fact that only a few per cent of those gassed on the Western Front during WWI died, as opposed to a lethality rate of a quarter to a third among those injured or killed by conventional artillery and small arms (Gat, 2006:639). As a result, many regarded chemical weapons as more ‘humane’ than conventional weapons and led military decision makers to regard the ban on the use of chemical weapons in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as “irrational and unjustified” (Gat, 2006:639).

The ban had very little effect on the development and manufacturing of chemical weapons which continued unabatedly during the inter-war years. The Germans secretly developed a family of nerve gases that were far more lethal than their earlier versions. The use of chemical weapons during WWII was, restrained, however, due to their unwieldy characteristics, mutual deterrence and various other considerations by the warring sides (Legro, 1995). There were, however, some instances in which the ban on the use of chemical weapons was broken after WWI – by Italy in Ethiopia in 1935–6, by Japan in China from 1937, by Egypt in Yemen in the mid-1960s, and by Iraq against Iran and her own Kurdish people in the late 1980s (cf. Gat, 2006:640–647). The following preconditions always manifested when these weapons were utilised: the side against whom the chemical weapons were used was always particularly vulnerable, because it did not possess chemical weapons to retaliate or deter, nor did they possess the defensive protective gear that would minimise the effect of the chemical attacks. The greatest potential for the use of chemical weapons is based on the element of surprise, affecting vast numbers of people who are unprotected and highly vulnerable in the open air of urban spaces (Gray, 2005:269–273). Despite all the inherent limitations on the application of chemical weapons, the lethality of a single successful chemical attack is estimated in the thousands (Gat, 2006:640).

Biological weapons, on the other hand, currently pose a far greater threat than chemical weapons. The use of biological weapons was also banned in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, yet they continued to be manufactured from the late 1930s and during WWII. Biological weapons include strains of viruses and bacteria that are particularly lethal, resistant to medication and persistent in the environment (Gray, 2005:265–269). These include anthrax, plague, tularaemia, typhoid fever, cholera, typhus, Q fever, small pox and Ebola. It is a fact that, through the ages, the big epidemics were much greater killers than wars, with a strain of influenza that killed between 20–40 million people in 1918-19 – more than the number of people killed during WWI. Biological weapons are also unique in their invisibility and their delayed effects. Biological warfare (also known as ‘biowar’) attacks are not only aimed at causing sickness and death in a large number of victims, but these attacks are also aimed at creating fear and panic. Its goal is disruption of social and economic activity, the breakdown of government authority and the impairment of military responses. This was clearly

demonstrated by the so-called ‘anthrax letters’ in the aftermath of the attack in New York in September 2011 – the occurrence of only a small number of infections can have an enormous psychological influence on the affected population as everyone feels threatened (Riedel, 2004:9). It is estimated that virulent laboratory-cultivated strains of bacteria or viruses, particularly ‘superbugs’ against which no immunisation and medication exist, might bring the lethality of biological weapons within the range of nuclear attacks, while being far more easily available to terrorists than nuclear weapons (Gat, 2006:640).

As markets and communications are increasingly linked as a result of globalisation, the materials and knowledge required for the development and manufacturing of WMD have become far easier to acquire and more difficult to detect and thwart. Much of the equipment and materials are of duel use, and can be purchased for what can be described as presumably benign civilian purposes. The relative easy access to these types of weapons has, for example, dramatically increased the ability of non-state entities to obtain these weapons.

Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult were the first non-state groups to build production facilities for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons (Kaplan, 2000:51). The cult, which counted some very wealthy members and well-trained scientists and engineers among their ranks, bought the required materials from all over the world, many of them on the open market. They produced botulinum toxins and anthrax, but when they found that the results were not as effective as expected, they focused on the production of nerve gases, especially sarin gas. The cult launched a number of attacks – approximately ten biological and ten chemical with varying levels of success (Gat, 2006:642). One of the most publicised of these attacks occurred in 1995 in Japan when 12 people were killed in a Tokyo subway when members of the Aum Shinrikyo launched a sarin gas attack. The reasons for the limited numbers of fatalities were ascribed to the poor quality of sarin used and a primitive dissemination mechanism, although thousands required medical treatment (Gurr & Cole, 2000:43). Despite the limited applications of chemical and biological weapons in the post-Cold War era, it is evident that it remains a persistent threat that can and will manifest unexpectedly with devastating effect on the victims of such attacks.

The use of nuclear weapons, as part of a total war arsenal, has been, and remains, a greatly contested issue since the first atomic bomb was tested in New Mexico in July 1945 (cf. Gat, 2006:608–609). Since the attacks on Japan in August 1945, no atomic weapons have been used in anger, although tens of thousands have been accumulated by major powers and the destructiveness and sophistication of the weapons have increased immensely (Freedman, 1986:735). Despite all the debates and theories about the limitations associated with the use of nuclear weapons, in practice the weapons never left centre stage. In this regard, the Korean War is probably the best example of a limited war during the time of the Cold War. When the Korean War broke out in 1950 no nuclear bombs were used (Kahn, 1965:12). The reappraisal of American strategy that followed the testing of the first Soviet atomic device in 1949 indicated that the days in which the West would rely on nuclear weapons for its strategic advantage were numbered. According to Freedman (1986:735), this has resulted in a situation in which the concept of nuclear strategy has essentially developed into "the study of the non-use of these weapons". This supports the argument developed by Herman Kahn as early as the 1960s that the utility of nuclear weapons resides in their possession rather than in their use (Kahn, 1965:12). Kahn describes deterrence as a 'way station' – a way of coping with demands imposed on policy makers until something better came along.

In the decades following the Cold War, the nuclear strategy that evolved has been characterised by a gradual return to the simple view that, in conditions of nuclear stalemate, arsenals of these tremendously powerful weapons tend to cancel each other out (Freedman, 1986:735). This resulted in the general acceptance of the notion that the best way to prevent a future war from leading to unrestricted violence was not to use nuclear weapons at all. This gave rise to the development of concepts such as mutually assured destruction (MAD) to describe the standoff that exists between states that possess nuclear weapons for deterrence based on mutually assured destruction should the decision be made to use the weapons. In the absence of effective defence, mutual deterrence – which had always been central to conflict, whether human or not – now came to the fore and gained almost absolute dominance, so far preventing a nuclear war between nuclear states since 1945 (Gat, 2006:641). The idea of nuclear deterrence was at the forefront of the Cold War defence debate and resulted in a large body of literature on the subject. Despite all the debates and opinions on the concept, a common understanding of the meaning of **deterrence** remains

elusive. According to Cimbala (2002:46), **deterrence** means different things to different role-players and can either be viewed as a process of influence, condition, latent feature or part of a policy-prescriptive orientation toward a particular state. Others, such as George (2002:73) point to the fact that:

> … early deterrence theory places too much emphasis on various gimmicks for enhancing the credibility of commitment – such as "the threat that leave something to chance", "playing the game of chicken" etc. – and that it failed to recognise that credibility is based on the magnitude and nature of the national interests that are at stake.

Despite its shortcomings and modest beginnings, deterrence has outlived most of its creators, proponents and detractors (Cimbala, 2002:49). In the end, it was the possession, or protection under the umbrella of nuclear weapons that was regarded as one of the primary factors contributing to the long period of relative peace that was experienced after the end of WWII (cf. Gray, 2007b:206–217). Even in the post-Cold War period, the possession of and protection by nuclear weapons remains the fundamental basis for world order (Freedman, 1986:735). This is evident from the dependence on nuclear weapons by states already possessing them and the acquisition of these weapons by new states (Kahn, 1965:12). Despite the controversy that accompanies any discussion on the use of nuclear weapons, it is clear that states continually seek to add nuclear weapons to their arsenals "because states view nuclear weapons as promoting their security, enhancing their prestige, augmenting their influence and improving their economic conditions" (Epstein, 1977:17). Countries in possession of nuclear weapons are usually held in higher regard than countries that do not have nuclear weapons. States possessing these arms are given greater weight in the entire range of foreign policy matters, and not just in military terms (Epstein, 1977:21).

Since the completion of the negotiations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 1 July 1968, there has been a desire to prevent new states from acquiring nuclear weapons and to curb the unfettered build-up of nuclear weapons among states that do possess such weapons. At the time of the signing of the NPT in 1968, only five states were known to possess nuclear weapons: the USA, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and France. The number rose to nine in 2007, with Israel, India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) joining the nuclear club. This did have some effect on

curbing the proliferation of such weapons. There has been a dramatic decline in the number of nuclear weapons – (from about 80 000 in the late 1980s to fewer than 40 000 by 2008. Several states, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Poland, Romania, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and Yugoslavia, which had nuclear weapons during the Cold War eventually abandoned them. During the post-Cold War period, other states that possessed nuclear weapons, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa also terminated their respective nuclear weapons programmes (Cimbala, 2002:206).

History has, however, proved that the NPT has been far from effective in the objective of preventing the build-up and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Contrary to some expectations, nuclear weapons and arms-control issues have not disappeared in the post-Cold War era. There are a number of reasons for the continued relevancy of nuclear weapons, including the fact that many countries, such as Russia, still have thousands of nuclear weapons, including those of inter-continental range (Cimbala, 2002:206). Furthermore, countries that are determined to achieve nuclear capability have indeed proved themselves able to do so, whether they have signed the nuclear NPT or not, which is in any case formally a voluntary agreement, freely entered into by sovereign states. Since 1968, there has been an increase in the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. By 2007, there were nine countries that owned nuclear weapons, with Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK also joining the above-mentioned nuclear club (cf. Waltz, 2003:126–130, 159–166). Acknowledged nuclear powers have also given no indication that they intend to abandon nuclear weapons as ultimate deterrents. India and Pakistan have joined the club of declared nuclear states, and Israel is widely acknowledged as an unacknowledged member of the nuclear club (Cimbala, 2002:206). It is estimated that there are about 27 000 nuclear weapons in the international nuclear arsenal. The fact that nation states are subsidiaries of nuclear proliferation protocols of course does not exclude the possible use of nuclear weapons by parties who have signed the protocols (Jervis, 1989:183). Nations who did not sign the nuclear protocols, however, might well be easily tempted to use WMD, rather than engage in protracted traditional combat or accept defeat as they would not view themselves bound by international conventions and protocols (cf. Cimbala, 2002:51–53). Countries such as Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea tried or are trying to develop nuclear capabilities (Waltz, 2003:126–130. These are precisely

the countries of the sort that the NPT most sought to stop – developing and unstable countries from the world's 'zone of war' that are most at odds with the existing international order and from which nuclear technology is most likely to leak. These countries are most eager to develop such weapons in order to secure their regimes from external intervention while continuing their own internal and external activities with impunity (Gat, 2006:647).

South Africa became the first nation in the world to voluntarily give up all nuclear arms it had developed when it ended its nuclear weapons programme in 1989. All the bombs (six constructed and one under construction) were dismantled and South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991 (Pike, 2011:1). Following certification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 19 August 1994, South Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group on 5 April 1995. South Arica also played a leading role in the establishment of the African Nuclear weapon Free Zone Treaty (also referred to as the Treaty of Pelindaba) in 1996, becoming one of the first members in 1997.

Despite the fact that no clear and unambiguous answers have been found to the uncertainties pertaining to the utilisation of nuclear weapons, it is evident that nuclear weapons have a particular role to play in deterring such escalation – and indeed, many still regard **deterrence** as the primary function of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. This is based on the paradoxical notion that "to defend, we must stand ready to attack at all times" (Luttwak, 2011:2). To derive the full benefit from nuclear weapons, they must, in fact, never be used – despite the fact that they have been acquired and maintained at great cost. The possession of nuclear weapons has always been problematic and rife with paradoxical dilemmas, as it was accepted that to be ready to attack – in retaliation – would be accepted as evidence of peaceful intent, but to prepare antinuclear defences would be deemed as aggressive or at least provocative (Luttwak, 2011:2).

Nuclear conflict between two evenly matched partners is unlikely in the near future, yet the possibility of nuclear war cannot be excluded. Miscalculation in regional crises or the actions of a belligerent state could spark conflict that could plunge several military powers into war (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-11). Furthermore, the possibility of non-state actors, such as terror groups, acquiring WMD remains strong, as the materiel and technology

required to manufacture these weapons become increasingly readily available (Gat, 2006:641).

There are valid reasons for imposed restrictions on the waging of war and the modes of warfighting when winning seem too costly when in the form of irreplaceable lives and precious resources. As a result, conflict is almost invariably subject to limitations of one sort or other: practical, legal, ethical, pragmatic or political, and astute strategists in circumstances of war scale back political objectives, military aims, participating forces, weaponry, targets and areas of operations – either singularly or in combination. This has resulted in the development of the concept of **limited wars** (Snyder, 2008:6).

3.6.3. Limited wars

The concept of limited war has been applied to many conceptualisations related to post-Cold War and modern warfare, and the concept should therefore not only be understood in terms of nuclear warfare, but also because (as, in practice, virtually all conflict is limited in some way) armed force will almost invariably be subject to constraints involving the objectives to be achieved and the means by which they may be pursued (Metz & Cuccia, 2010:22). The common denominator in limited war is that the objectives, and not the resulting damages or battle deaths that must be achieved, must be **limited** (cf. Gray, 2005:214).

Nations and subnational groups have long attempted to develop and apply rules to control and limit the destructiveness of war, whether formal rules codified in law or informal rules (cf. Gray, 2007b:33–37). Great effort has been made to formalise the rules governing war through LOAC and other conventions and these transcend cultural differences by applying a single set of normal rules and laws derived from the Western tradition (Metz & Cuccia, 2010:22). Recently, however, the proliferation of non-state antagonists, who feel themselves little bound by laws and conventions, have made the legal and treaty regimes ineffective. New participants in wars such as private and military security companies (PMSCs), new technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), robotics and non-lethality, and new modes of war such as cyber war, also continually test the traditional, Western-built legal and

treaty structures that focus primarily on conventional warfare between states (Gray, 2005:101).

The emergence of agents who act outside the legal perimeters of what is understood as *formal war* is not only relevant to Western governments, but has become to characterise most of the current conflicts on the African continent. This is particularly true in terms of PMSCs and belligerents who participate in wars across national boundaries as was recently experienced in 2013 when rebels who participated in the conflict in Mali, later also participated in conflicts in CAR and in Sudan (Heitman, 2013b:2). The consequences of these conflicts are an increase in the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, the disruption of transport hubs and the spill-over effects of neighbouring states. The aforementioned trends also support the notion of informal war as they tend to collapse the set conditions for defining formal wars.

3.7. Informal war

In contrast to the characteristics that are used to define the general conceptualisations that constitute formal war, informal war is understood to be armed conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity such as an insurgent army or ethnic militia. Informal or unconventional war is often described as the antithesis of formal war. This type of warfare is protracted and becomes a war of attrition rather than a decisive military victory, and aims to control the loyalties of people (Beckett & Pimlott, 1995:1).

Theories about informal war and irregular forms of warfare have developed to explain the phenomenon of the rise of warfare within states and with or between non-state entities. These theories support the notion that the concept of 'state' is in decline as principal provider of security and as the objects of primary public loyalty. In accordance with these theories, states with armies, and states as the only legitimate and legal war-making entities are no longer the only agents of warfare (Gray, 2005:139).

Informal ‘new wars’ are described as displaying the characteristics of both guerrilla and insurgency techniques. The methods applied as part of ‘new wars’ also differ from ‘old wars’, which were typified by decisive battles that were waged to capture territory through military means – through control of the population. One of the examples of the application of this methodology is population displacement by the forcible displacement of those with a different identity or different opinions. According to the UNHCR (2011), the figures for forcibly displaced people in 2010 were at their highest in fifteen years at approximately 43,7 million, including 15,4 million refugees, some 27,5 million IDPs and 837 500 individuals whose asylum applications had not been processed. Belligerents who participate in these ‘new wars’ purposefully direct violence against civilians as a way of controlling territory, rather than against enemy forces (Kaldor, 2012:3).

‘New wars’ are also characterised by the avoidance of decisive engagements, and the notion that territory is controlled through political manipulation of a population by sowing fear and hatred, rather than winning hearts and minds (Kaldor, 1999). According to Mueller (2000: 24–70), paramilitaries and groups of hired thugs are a common feature of these war zones as they can spread fear and hatred among the civilian population more effectively than professional armed forces.

The concept of ‘new wars’ as debated by, for example Duffield (2001), Hoffman (2007), Kaldor (2012) and Van Creveld (1991), has been widely questioned. The term, **new** has become the main butt of the jokes of critics. Kaldor, in reaction, points out that ‘new wars’ should be understood, not as an empirical category, but rather as a way of elucidating the logic of contemporary war that “can offer both a research strategy and a guide to policy” (Kaldor, 2012:1). According to Kaldor, ‘new wars’ are wars of the era of globalisation in which authoritarian states have been greatly weakened as a consequence of ‘opening up’ and connecting to the rest of the world. In this environment, “the distinction between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and political are breaking down: [m]oreover the breakdown of these binary distinctions is both a cause and a consequence of violence” (Kaldor, 2012:2).

‘New wars’ differ from the logic of ‘old wars’ in terms of actors, goals, methods and forms of finance. The ‘old war’ paradigm (the idea of war that predominated in the nineteenth and twentieth century) held that ‘old wars’ were fought for geopolitical interests or for ideology, such as democracy or socialism (cf. Gray, 2007b:225–228). ‘New wars’, on the other hand, are presented as being fought in the name of identity (ethnic, religious or tribal). Identity politics, according to Kaldor (2012:2) has a different logic from geo-politics or ideology as the aim of identity politics is to gain access to the state for particular groups (local or transnational), rather than to execute particular policies or programmes in the broader public interest.

One of the most important differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars is found in the reasons for war. Clausewitz purported that (formal) wars were, at their core, a contest of wills to achieve political aims – “… not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz, 1976:87). Kaldor (2012:3) on the other hand, argues that war is a violent enterprise framed in political terms. From this, it becomes clear that the distinctions between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars is based on the premise that these two typologies are ideal types and that they constitute ideas of war, rather than providing empirical descriptions of war. The utility of the distinctions between ‘new’ (informal) and ‘old’ (formal) wars is found in the fact that the construct provides scholars and policymakers with new ways of thinking about the characteristics of war and to exclude old perceptions and assumptions about war (cf. Gray, 2007b:225–228).

Future informal war will most probably be based on some combination of motivations and reasons for war will focus on a wide range of issues such as ethnicity, race relations, regionalism, economic factors and ideologies (cf.Snyder, 2008:6–7). In addition to the latter, ambitious and unscrupulous leaders will use ethnicity, race and religion to mobilise support for what is essentially a quest for personal power (cf. Till, 2008:111). The objectives of informal wars and ‘new wars’ may thus be autonomy, separation, outright control of the state, change of policy, control of resources or ‘justice’ as defined by those who use force (Snyder, 2008:123–134). This perspective provides insight into the phenomenon of the rise in one-sided massacres of civilians by violent groupings. These bands of paramilitary forces can be exploited as useful pawns in the achievement of political goals because it can be difficult to

trace back responsibility for their actions to political leaders. Another characteristic of these irregular wars is that they are usually financed through a globalised war economy that is decentralised and increasingly transnational and the fighting units are often self-funding through plunder, the black market or external assistance (Duffield, 2001).

3.7.1. Irregular warfare

Irregular warfare will manifest in a great variety of modes during the 21st century. These will include various types of conflict modalities that will be used as part of civil and ethnic wars, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and multi-modal warfare (Hoffman, 2009:36).

3.7.1.1. Civil and ethnic wars

Civil wars have played a very important role and have scarred the global political landscape throughout the 20th century. Though overshadowed by the two world wars and then the Cold War, civil wars were more common than international wars throughout the twentieth century (Kaufman, 2008:201). The disparity became particularly evident during the 1990s: one study registered over 50 armed civil conflicts which occurred during that decade, and only two international armed conflicts (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1999:593–606). Classifications of these conflicts vary, but they are most commonly described as wars that are conducted largely within the boundaries of a state in which a significant part of the population is associated with opposing sides (Sarkees, 2000:123–144). The contest is for government of the state or regional autonomy or secession. One or both sides may have external help. According to Kaufman (2008:201), about half of the civil wars and other internal armed conflicts erupted as a result of ethnic conflicts. In this regard, ethnic conflict has long been one of the primary sources of insecurity in the world, and continues to become even more so (Obioha, 1999:2).

According to a list of the 10 bloodiest civil wars of the 20th century, half of the cases were ethnic conflicts (Sarkees, 2000:123–144). African ethnic conflicts can be classified in a number of ways. There may, for instance, be a distinction between public realm ethnicity

(which involves conflicts related to the determination of who gets what, when and how) and private realm ethnicity (which may not invite state intervention) (Osaghae, 1994). In Africa, most ethnic conflicts are related to public realm ethnicity, probably because the private sector in most African societies is less developed and less influential. The degree to which ethnic conflict affects and manifests in African societies also differ widely. Ethnic conflict may be latent or it could manifest in outbursts of violence. Ethnic conflict might therefore manifest in the form of non-violent actions, such as competitive party politics, judicial redress, media protests or peaceful demonstrations, whilst violent conflicts represent only one extreme on a continuum (Obioha, 1999:2).

The definitions of ethnic conflict remain contentious because people disagree about what should be understood as ethnic conflict. Some scholars view ethnicity as a 'primordial' identity which is, in essence, unchangeable (Kaufman, 2008:202). This is specifically applied to language and religion, and as a result, this type of ethnic conflict implies that ethnic conflict is based on 'ancient hatreds' that are impossible to eradicate and nearly impossible to manage (Kaufman, 2008:203). This ethnic consciousness is often harnessed by political leaders to gain support for their respective political positions (Obioha, 1999:4).

Another group of scholars believe that ethnic conflict is not 'primordial', but merely 'instrumental'. They believe that people follow ethnic leaders when it is in their best interests at the time, and leaders attempt to create ethnic solidarity when it works for them (Hardin, 1995). This view implies that ethnic conflict can be blamed primarily on selfish leaders who mislead their followers in pursuit of their own power (Kaufman, 2008:203).

A third point of view on the nature of ethnic conflict mixes the other two views by emphasising the degree to which people create their identities and support the notion that ethnic identities are socially constructed (Obioha, 1999:2). This constructivist view on ethnicity serves as a way to settle the argument between the primordialists and instrumentalists, because constructive ideas explain both the insights and the problems of the other two views (Kaufman, 2008:204).

A fourth point of view relevant to ethnic conflict is focused on the answer to the question of how to tell whether a particular conflict is an ethnic conflict. Most African states are multi-ethnic, but more contemporary African civil wars often involve warlords who are competing for control over extractive resources and who are not necessarily focused on who fights on which side. Often, one or both sides of an ethnic conflict will be a coalition of ethnic groups rather than a single one, but the conflict is still ethnic because the people involved choose sides on the basis of their ethnic group membership, rather than other considerations such as economic interests (Obioha, 1999:3–4).

Ethnic consciousness and multi-ethnicity are two of the root contexts of ethnic conflicts in African nation-states. Other factors that can be considered as immediate and very important factors are related social conflicts, the character of ethnic demands and interest articulation, the degree of decentralisation of governments, structure, competition for scarce resources, competition for state power and the balance between economic and political control (Osaghae, 1994).

3.7.1.2. Insurgency and counterinsurgency

Insurgency has manifested in various forms over time. The term has thus been used to describe various forms of conflict by a wide variety of belligerents and various definitions have been associated with the term (Seegers, 2010:12). The term is inter alia used to describe "... an attempt to overthrow or oppose a state or regime by force of arms ..." (Gossmann, 2010:31). Another description of insurgency is that it is a protracted struggle, conducted methodically, step by step, in order to obtain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order (Krepinevich, 1986:44). In British military doctrine, insurgency is defined as "an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence [UK MOD], 2004:4). The same definition is also used by NATO (cf. NATO, 2008) and the US military (cf. US DOD, 2010). The term **insurgency** thus usually refers to a political rebellion against incumbent authorities which is sustained over a relatively long time. The methods used by insurgents are unconventional and can include terror, bombings and

hit-and-run operations in urban areas, and guerrilla warfare in rural areas (Seegers, 2010:12). Insurgency describes the actions of a minority group within a state (or in some instances a majority group which lacks power) intent on forcing political change by a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure. The intent is to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a change. Again, each side may have help from outside. There is not always a clear distinction between civil war and insurgency (cf. Boyle, 2008:183–189). Successful insurgency may indeed pass through a phase of civil war, or be conducted for more limited objectives. At its most anarchic, insurgency may see the collapse of the state in any form. Both civil war and insurgency may employ the type of partisan or revolutionary warfare exemplified by the campaigns of Tito, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh (cf. Mao Zedong, 1961). Typically, the insurgent forces will seek to avoid conventional engagements between the large forces while seeking the active support of the population at large. Such campaigns are likely to be protracted.

Insurgents defy established authorities and invaders for political, ideological, economic, social religious, ethnic or cultural reasons. Insurgency manifests itself in various forms, ranging from revolutionary warfare, counter-revolutions and activities by resistance movements (Collins, 2002:167). Insurgency can be located in both rural and urban contexts and importantly, insurgents do not have to win the fight – they just have to outlast the enemy, eroding the enemy's will to continue fighting, rather than their capacity to fight. This is not limited to the morale of the troops on the ground, but includes the political will on the home front to continue fighting (Smith, 2005:161). The insurgents are then rendered victorious by not having lost, rather than by winning outright. Insurgency warfare is essentially a "clash of wills" and in an insurgency, it is the most committed party who wins (Smith, 2005:232).

Insurgency is enduring both as a method of fighting and as a bloody conundrum for those who try to counter it. Faced with an insurgency, conventional militaries are required to fight in an unconventional manner, "... to perform in ways, and for purposes, for which they are relatively ill-prepared" (Gray, 2007a:121). At times, insurgency forms part of the background security 'noise' and regular warfare dominates. Other times, as in the 21st century, insurgency is the dominant 'security noise' on the international landscape. It never disappears as a form of warfare utilised by belligerents. Insurgency is currently one of the

dominant forms of conflict in the world and it is imperative that militaries are able to engage insurgents successfully and to develop capabilities to set the scene for the achievement of the political and strategic goals set by higher authority for deployments in insurgent environments (Gossmann, 2010:43).

Counterinsurgency (COIN) on the other hand, is defined in British and NATO military doctrine as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency" (UK MOD, 2004:4). The USA definition is subtly different: "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken *by a government* [emphasis added] to defeat insurgency" (US DOD, 2010). Thus, for the USA, COIN is a solely government activity, whereas Britain and NATO have a rather more free-wheeling attitude (Williams, 2008:392). COIN can therefore be described as actions taken by government forces, or allies of the government, to counter and eliminate insurgency and as ways states respond to protect themselves. This, however, is easier said than done, and from Sun Tzu to the Romans, from the colonial wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, to this day, COIN has posed a formidable task to any military, no matter how well-trained, disciplined and supplied (Gossmann, 2010:33). COIN requires conventional forces or regular militaries to fight unconventional or irregular wars. This poses a significant challenge to formal militaries, as they are designed and trained to fight opponents with similar characteristics as their own, on a traditional battlefield and with maximum force. During COIN operations, conventional forces are required to apply minimum force with surgical care in highly charged populous environments. Conventional tactics, troops and weapons, however superior, do not guarantee victory, and the COIN force is perpetually reacting, the initiative forever in the hands of the insurgents (Gossmann, 2010:33). COIN, with its emphasis on winning public support, requires a more restrictive notion of collateral damage and a greater acceptance of military risk. This demands robust training regimes that extend beyond the simple rules of engagement (Metz & Guccia, 2010:30).

One major difficulty that results from attempts to place warfare into categories as attempted in the above discussion is the reality that armed conflict often reflects more than one of the categories outlined by analysts. It is thus also necessary to attend to the inclination of actors

to turn to several styles of armed combat, whether simultaneously, or in tandem when conditions are favourable.

3.8. The emergence of multimodal warfare

Modern military planners often resort to simple reductionist distinctions between classifications of regular/formal war and irregular/informal war (Gray, 2009a:23). Many conflicts, however, manifest in both regular and irregular styles of combat – often simultaneously in the same theatre of war. The potential for types of conflict that blur the distinction between war and peace, and between combatants and non-combatants appears to be on the rise (Hoffman, 2007:7). This multi-modal type of warfare is complicated further by the simultaneous compression of the levels of war in the same battle space. Non-state actors may primarily employ irregular forms of warfare, but will clearly support, encourage and participate in conventional conflict if it serves their ends. Similarly, nation states may engage in irregular conflict in addition to conventional types of warfare to achieve their goals (Hoffman, 2007:5).

This convergence of levels and modes of warfare has emerged as the primary mode of warfare since the beginning of the 21st century (Hoffman, 2009:35). As a result of the increasing awareness and prevalence of this type of warfare, defence planners currently base their strategic thinking about future conflict on multimodal or multivariant modes of conflict and a blurring of the lines between the modes of war, rather than on an oversimplified characterisation of one or two distinct forms of warfare (cf. Gray, 2007b:246–262). It has become apparent that, instead of separate challengers with fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular or terrorist), protagonists will employ several forms of war and tactics, most often simultaneously. Criminal activity may also be considered part of this problem, as criminality will be used to further destabilise local governments or abet the insurgent or irregular warrior by providing resources, or by undermining the host state and its legitimacy (Hoffman, 2007:7). Conflicts are increasingly characterised by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralised planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Two of the primary

constructs that dominate current military thinking on multi-modal warfare are “compound warfare” and “hybrid warfare” (Hoffman, 2009:36).

Historians have noted that most wars are characterised by both regular and irregular operations, but when there is a significant degree of strategic coordination between separate regular and irregular forces in conflict, they can be considered as “compound wars” (Hoffman, 2007:8). Compound wars are wars that have significant regular and irregular components fighting simultaneously under unified strategic direction. The complementary effects of compound warfare are generated by the potential of these effects to be exploited to the advantages of the unique characteristics of each kind of force. The Vietnam War also offers some good examples of compound wars in which strategic synergy was created by juxtaposing the irregular tactics of the Viet Cong with the more conventional capabilities of the North Vietnamese Army. Mark Moyer, in his book, *Triumph forsaken*, explains the Vietnam War as a compound war in which the North Vietnamese very effectively employed a combination of irregular and conventional force to achieve their desired end state. The ambiguity between conventional and unconventional approaches vexed military planners for several years, and even years after the conclusion of the Vietnam War, many Americans still debated what kind of war they actually fought and lost (Hoffman, 2007:21). Both Colin Gray (2005) and Max Boot (2006) argue that there is going to be a further blurring of warfare categories. This blending of capabilities is being hailed as “hybrid warfare”.

Hybrid warfare is characterised by the operational fusion and convergence of conventional and irregular capabilities *at the strategic, operational and tactical levels* in wars where one or both sides blend and fuse the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the same battle space. Whereas compound wars offer synergy and combinations at the strategic level, hybrid wars depict the complexity, fusion and simultaneity that are anticipated specifically at the operational and tactical level of war (Hoffman, 2009:36). Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. These multimodal activities can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors and be executed by separate units, or even the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battle space to achieve

synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. These effects can be gained at all levels of war (Hoffman, 2007:8).

Unlike Maoist or compound wars, the purpose of multi-modal hybrid wars is not to facilitate the progression of the opposition force through stages and phases, nor is it to help set up a conventional force for decisive battle. Hybrid opponents, in contrast, seek victory by the fusion of irregular tactics and the most lethal means available in order to attack and attain their political objectives. The disruptive component of hybrid wars does not result from the application of high-end or revolutionary technology, but from criminality. Criminal activity is used to sustain the hybrid force or facilitate the disorder and disruption of the target nation, or both. The goal may include protracted conflicts with a greatly diffused set of force capabilities to wear down resistance or to defeat a conventionally oriented government.

Hybrid warfare clearly presents a mode of conflict that severely challenges conventional military thinking. Its primary tenets – convergence and combinations – occur in several modes of warfare. In order to effectively address these challenges, military strategists, planners and practitioners will have to adapt intellectually and institutionally (Arquilla, 2007:369). This will demand innovative thinking, rigorous experimentation and constant adaptation in approaches to defence issues such as the implications of hybrid warfare for operational art, command and control, leadership development, force structure, force design, training, development and education in the 21st century (Atkinson & Moffat, 2007:12). Despite the rise in the prevalence of hybrid warfare, many militaries are still focused on what have essentially become outmoded forms of warfare, and continue to focus their efforts on making Industrial Age warfare more precise, more predictable and more pristine (Hoffman, 2007:13). Many militaries continue to focus on out-dated distinctions between types of warfare, despite the fact that the emerging fusion of war that hybrid warfare portends reveals that the future cannot be captured with a single approach to defence planning (Williamson, 2009:23). It is very clear that militaries should adapt their strategies, warfighting concepts and force structures to this type of multi-modal, hybrid warfighting – failure to do so will result in military organisations that are ill-suited for their emerging blend of warfare. Modern military forces will have to become as effective at shaping the strategic environment as they are responding to operational threats associated with multi-modal warfare. 'Mobility' in the context of hybrid,

multi-modal warfighting therefore does not only apply to the physical attributes of weapon platforms and operating systems, but is especially focused on the mobility of the mind. Modern militaries should therefore also develop greater psychological precision, including the full integration of lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

It is evident that modern fighting forces must be prepared for the full spectrum of conflict (formal, as well as informal modes of warfare) from all fronts and realise that preparing forces for only selected types of conflict will be a recipe for defeat. The rise of hybrid warfare does not represent the end of traditional or conventional warfare, but it does present a complicating factor for defence planning in the 21st century. Strategists and military planners will have to modify their mindsets with respect to the relative frequency and threats of the future conflict. It will also require a rethinking of priorities in defence spending, and serious reflection about the role of technology in the strategic culture (Hoffman, 2007:8).

Irregular wars have continued to mar the security situation in Africa since the 1960s. Many of the intrastate wars in Africa were by-products of historic disputes kept hidden during the Cold War. These wars led to the collapse of state institutions in Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Uganda, Sudan and Burundi (Boyle, 2008:183). Participants in these wars utilised unconventional, asymmetric warfare to wage and prolong conflicts (Jackson, 2007:7). These conflicts were fuelled by greed (economic reasons), as well as grievances (inequality, political oppression, ethnic and religious motivations) (Cilliers & Schünemann, 2013:2). African intrastate wars are mostly driven by greed motivations in mineral-rich countries and conflict over valuable scarce resources as income from natural resources is an important source to finance rebel movements (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002:1).

Informal war and irregular forms of warfare are not only more common than in the past, but also more strategically significant. This is true, in part, not only because of the rarity of formal war, but also because of the effect that global interconnectedness have had on the manifestation of informal war. The potential of an increased target range where nothing is deemed sacred did not go unnoticed and one response to this unlimited target range is that of unrestricted warfare.

3.9. Unrestricted warfare

The concept of unrestricted warfare was coined and developed by two Chinese colonels (Liang & Xiangsui, 2002). Unrestricted warfare can also be described as 'war beyond limits' and is used to describe a mode of warfare that has been described as an immoral and potentially violent mutation in human conflict – one that was beyond the pale of decency for most Western military scholars and practitioners. The concept is based on the potential implications of globalisation on the manner in which wars will be waged and the premise that unrestricted warfare serves not just to expand the forms that warfare takes, but also to shift the boundaries of the domains or dimensions of warfare that most Western military officers might hold – modified combined war that goes beyond the limits such as the restrictions contained in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Liang and Xiangsui (2002:162) sought to expand the definition and understanding of war beyond its traditional military domain in that:

> … the great fusion of technologies is impelling the domains of politics, economics, the military, culture, diplomacy and religion to overlap each other. The connection points are ready, and the trend towards the merging of the various domains is very clear. All of these things are rendering more and more obsolete the idea of confining warfare to the military domain and of using the number of casualties as a means to determine the intensity of a war.

Warfare is no longer an activity confined only to the military sphere (Liang & Xiangsui, 2002:190). Military planners and strategists, who will make use of unrestricted warfare, must master the ability to combine all the resources of war at their disposal and must then apply them as means to prosecute war. These resources will include information warfare, financial warfare, trade warfare and other entirely new forms of war. The principles of unrestricted warfare are (Liang & Xiangsui, 2002:204–216):

- **Omni-directionality**. This requires commanders to observe a potential battlefield without mental preconditions or 'blind spots'. The designs of plans, employment measures and combinations must make use of all war resources which can be mobilised. The commander should make no distinction between what is or what is not

the battlefield, and all the traditional domains such as land, air, maritime and space, as well as politics, economics, culture and moral factors are to be considered battlefields.

- **Synchrony**. Commanders who employ unrestricted warfare will have to link the disaggregated nature of multiple battlefields in different domains taking into consideration the temporal dimension. This implies that a great variety of military actions will have to be executed in different spaces at the same time to achieve the desired outcomes and effects. Instead of coordinated actions that will constitute stages and phases, with the accumulated results of multiple battles that are associated with conventional warfare, strategic results will now be attained rapidly by simultaneous action or at designated times.

- **Asymmetry**. Asymmetry has always manifested itself to some extent in all aspects of warfare, whether in the form of regular or irregular warfare. It should be emphasised that asymmetry, as a form of unrestricted warfare, is to be applied in a much broader spectrum which overlooks traditional military dimensions. Asymmetric warfare is generally understood as a type of conflict that deviates from the norms associated with traditional, conventional warfare. Research by Grange (2000:1–5) referred to asymmetric warfare as "conflict deviating from the norm, or an indirect approach to affect a counterbalance of force since forces seek to negate or avoid the strengths of another, while employing their own strength against other's weakness". It is viewed as an indirect approach to affect a counterbalance of force since forces seek to negate or avoid the strengths of another, while employing their own strength against other's weakness (Sloan, 2002:109–112). Following the publication of *Unrestricted warfare* in 2000, the issue of asymmetry again became a prominent issue in defence debates – primarily because the 9/11 attacks emphasised the fact that asymmetric attacks could no longer be deemed secondary to conventional threats.

3.10. Asymmetric warfare

Attempts to define asymmetric warfare have generally proved to be unproductive. Several explanations were given to describe asymmetric warfare, but not one of these definitions has

universal application (Buffaloe, 2006:17). Current US answers to asymmetric attacks are based on expensive, high-technological, low-casualty combat, but this viewpoint does not necessarily correspond with the inexpensive, limited low-technological guerrilla strategies used in African intrastate wars (Munene, 2010:429). Experience has shown that high-technological warfare is largely ineffective against 4GW types of warfare as described in Chapter 2 (see 2.3.3) conflicts in which one of the parties in the conflict is not a state and where the state loses its monopoly to wage war against decentralised, non-state actors not adhering to the rules of conventional warfare (Lind, 2004:13–14).

Some scholars argue that it would be more fruitful to understand asymmetric threats through identifying the principal characteristics and corollaries of asymmetry, rather than conduct a forlorn quest for the perfect definition of the term. Asymmetric threats tend to be irregular in that they are often posed by instruments unrecognised by the long-standing laws of war that are central to the control of regular military machines engaged in open combat. Furthermore, asymmetric threats tend to be unmatched in the traditional arsenal of military capabilities and plans. Asymmetric threats are highly leveraged against particular assets – military and probably more often, civil (Boyle, 2008:183). These threats are designed not only to secure leverage against conventional assets, but are also intended to work around, offset and negate what in other contexts are deemed military strengths (Cimbala, 2002:50–53). Asymmetric threats are therefore difficult to respond to in a discriminate and proportionate manner and are devised to pose a level-of-response dilemma to the victim (Cimbala, 2002:50). This might result in a situation where the regular belligerent takes action which fatally imperils its own political legitimacy. Military responses that are readily available will be deemed to be unduly heavy-handed or plainly irrelevant, while the policy hunt for the carefully measured and precisely targeted reply can all too easily become ensnared in a lengthy political process which inhibits any real action (Gray, 2002:2).

Defence and war planning always have significant asymmetric dimensions, which should find expression at every level of war and competent tacticians, operational artists and military strategists are obliged to be aware of salient actual and possible asymmetries. The discourse on asymmetry does, however, have some utility, albeit that the recognition of the dangers posed by these types of attacks offset the perils of indiscriminate type of ‘strategic autism’ to

which great powers are prone by dismissing novel forms of asymmetric attacks as demonstrated on 11 September 2001 when terrorists used American civilian aircraft to attack the World Trade Centre (cf. Gat, 637–648). Although it is accepted that asymmetry is always inherent to warfare, the change in the operating environment since the end of the Cold War has produced a significant asymmetry that poses a particular challenge to 21st-century armed forces (Gray, 2005:21).

All military organisations are compelled to take these new types of threats and modes of warfare into account and to operationalise the required changes to force structure, force preparation and force support. Manifestations in the changes in possible threats to be addressed by militaries include reaction to acts of terror, piracy and cyber-attacks. These forms of conflict clearly demand re-assessments of force structure and force design, as well as changes to policies, strategies and defence mandates (Beier, 2008:84–93). The continually increasing participation in peace missions also demands changes to the force designs of traditional military organisations. The 2014 South African Defence Review acknowledges the changes in global and regional threats and confirms the effect of these changes on the roles and functions that the SANDF is, and will be, required to perform. The 2014 Defence Review clearly states (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-2):

> … Defence must have the ability to conduct a wide spectrum of operations under complex conditions. This spectrum may range from benign to hostile missions, including the support of other government departments, humanitarian support and the participation in peace missions, and the defence of South Africa.

The manifestation of the modes of warfare will be significantly influenced and shaped by the battle space in which the wars are waged. In order to apply the abovementioned context and characteristics of the 21st-century conflict environment to the setting in which African militaries are most likely to be deployed, the discussion now turns specifically to the African continent.

It is evident that asymmetric and unrestricted warfare as modes of warfare are an expansion of thinking about what constitutes war. Unrestricted warfare includes a wide range of supra-domain operations which could include economic warfare that would exploit modern computer networks, banking systems and information operations. These shifts that are taking place in

the characteristics of warfare, as well as the domains in which warfighting will take place, emphasise the fact that traditional force designs and force structures are not suited to develop military organisations that are optimally designed to meet the challenges of wars of the 21st century. The concept of unrestricted warfare emphasises the importance of applying all the instruments of national power – the economic, political, military and information elements of national power – to address the challenges of the 21st-century threat environment successfully.

Concepts such as asymmetry and unrestricted warfare have some relevance to Africa, as they provide alternative contexts within which the characteristics of 21st-century warfare can be understood. The current use of these concepts, however, does not fit the contemporary context of African conflict. The concepts of asymmetry and unrestricted warfare needs to be qualified as based on the respective combinations of grievance and greed motivations that fuel African intrastate conflicts (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:18–20). For this reason, these terms should be suitably expanded or qualified to specify and include different African low-intensity warfighting strategies (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:4–15). In terms of the above, irregular warfare will be the mainstay of contemporary and future intrastate conflicts in African countries where democratic norms and values are not adhered to and where inherent contradictions exist in societies where people to not have equal access to resources.

3.11. Information warfare

The information age has and will continue to alter the character of warfare and will compel analysts, advisers, policy makers and strategists to redefine their concepts of organisation, doctrine and strategy (Cimbala, 2002:20). The information age has caused what is popularly known as the Information Revolution (Sloan, 2002:111–112). This concept is based primarily on significant technological advances that have increased our ability to collect vast quantities of precise data, to convert that data into intelligible information by removing extraneous 'noise', to transmit this large quantity of information and to convert this information rapidly and accurately through responsive, flexible processing into near-complete situational awareness (Davis, 1997:83). Information-age modes of conflict will be largely about knowledge – about who knows what, where and why, and about how secure a society, military or other actors

feel about their knowledge of themselves and their adversaries (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:5). What is essential to bear in mind is that the Information Revolution is not solely or primarily about technology; it is an organisational as well as a technological revolution (Latham, 2008:124).

Information warfare can be defined as activities by a state or non-state actor to exploit the content or processing of information to its advantage in time of peace, crisis, and war, and to deny potential or actual foes the ability to exploit the same means against itself (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997:1). The Information Revolution is having an effect on organisations of all kinds as traditional hierarchies are increasingly being replaced by amorphous networks (Atkinson & Moffat, 2007:89–116). The reason for this phenomenon is to be found in the fact that the Information Revolution favours the growth of amorphous, non-hierarchical networks by making it possible for diverse, dispersed actors to communicate, coordinate and operate together across greater distances and on the basis of more timely and higher-quality information than ever before (Arquilla, 1997:6). The emphasis should therefore not centre on technology only, but should focus on the challenges organisations will face in utilising technologies. Most importantly, the Information Revolution favours and strengthens network forms of organisations, whilst it has a negative effect on hierarchical forms. The rise of network forms of organisations – particularly all-channel networks in which every node can communicate with every other node – is one of the single most important effects of the Information Revolution for all realms: political, economic, social and military. A good example of this phenomenon is the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional [EZLN], a revolutionary leftist group based in Chiapas, the southernmost state of Mexico. They have been waging a declared war against the Mexican state (Baily, 2000:6). This war, however, has been primarily nonviolent and defensive in a bid to offset the politico-military responses of the Mexican government. After the Mexican Army had suppressed the EZLN's uprising on New Year's Day in 1994, the EZLN abstained from offensively using their weapons, and they have since adopted a new strategy that is aimed at garnering both Mexican and international support. Through an internet campaign, the EZLN has begun to disseminate an understanding of their plight and intentions. The EZLN has thus succeeded in pitting a non-state actor, applying network-enabled information warfare against a state actor which was still organised in terms of traditional, hierarchical command-and-

control systems. With this change in tactics, the EZLN received vast support from a variety of NGOs and international organisations and increased attention in both leftist and mainstream media outlets. The Mexican military found itself wholly unprepared for this type of offensive and was unable to effectively curb the successes of the EZLN (Baily, 2000:8). The implication is that small, non-state actors can organise themselves into sprawling networks that can launch attacks more effectively than traditionally hierarchical nation-state actors. This means that future wars will increasingly be waged by networks, rather than hierarchies and implies that, whoever masters the network form of information warfare, stands to gain major advantages in the new epoch (Atkinson & Moffat, 2007:102–116). Network-enabled information warfare must, therefore, be mastered by defence forces, not only to counter information warfare attacks by other militaries, but also, for example, to prevent the embarrassment as suffered by the Mexican military establishment as their societies enter the information age.

The Information Revolution has created shifts in how societies may come into conflict and how their armed forces may wage war (cf. Gray, 2007b:240–243). This has resulted in the formulation of new warfighting concepts such as ‘netwar’ – societal-level ideational conflicts waged in part through ‘internetted’ modes of communication – and ‘cyber war’ – at military level (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:27). Cyberwar is a comprehensive, information-based approach to warfighting, usually discussed in terms of high-intensity and mid-intensity conflicts. Cyberwar is more focused on the province of states and conventional wars, whereas netcentric war (‘netwar’) represents a new entry in the spectrum of conflict. Netcentric war spans economic, political and social as well as military forms of war and refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or societies (Arquilla, 1997:60. In essence, netcentric warfare aims to disrupt, damage or modify what a target population ‘knows’ or thinks about itself and the world around it. Netcentric war is therefore mainly aligned with non-state actors and unconventional wars (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:275–294). A netcentric war will focus on public or elite opinion and it may involve public diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, infiltration of computer networks and databases and efforts to promote a dissident or opposition movement across computer networks. Designing a strategy or counter-strategy for netcentric war requires continuous organisational transformation which could include more

fidelity to coalition warfare, more flexible force packages and coordination of multidimensional warfare (Blank, 1997:74).

Information warfare will require militaries to make significant changes to their organisational structures and composition. The scope of change will be defined by the types of change that they wish to bring about. Waging war in the postmodern era will require major innovations in organisational designs – in particular a shift from hierarchical to network structures (Atkinson & Moffat, 2007:89–116). The traditional reliance on hierarchical designs must be replaced with network-oriented models to allow greater flexibility, lateral connectivity and teamwork across institutional boundaries. This will require that capabilities for the command and control of simultaneous, continuous operations be increased and that the current distinctions between types of operations be eliminated. Moreover, shortening the time constraints for decision and action will require the decentralisation of command authority, and a concomitant relaxation of downward command and control (Davis, 1997:93).

It is evident that war in the 21st century will present itself in ways that have not yet been fully conceived. Defence planners and analysts will continually have to focus all their efforts on correctly analysing the type of war that they have to fight in order to choose the most effective way of addressing the challenges presented to them. They should bear in mind the admonitions of Clausewitz (1976:89) who stated: “War is more than a chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case”. The importance of correctly analysing the context and characteristics of war correctly was also emphasised by Clausewitz’s claim that: “the aims a belligerent adopts and the resources he employs ... will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character” (Clausewitz, 1976:594).

In light of the above, it is evident that the SANDF must continually assess the strategic environment within which it is likely to be deployed, as well as to make the required changes to policies, strategies, doctrine and warfighting concepts. The 2014 Defence Review acknowledges the complexities of current and future conflict and confirms the requirements for defence forces to be prepared and equipped “to execute a mixture of conventional and unconventional operations while adopting symmetric and asymmetric approaches” (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-19). The 2014 Defence Review also clearly indicates that the

SANDF must develop the capacity to cooperate with other government departments, agencies and multi-national organisations – particularly where security issues transcend national borders (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-20). This notion is explained as being based on a JI^{2}M approach during which the emphasis will be placed on increased collaboration with and between the Defence Force, government departments, international organisations, multinational partners, NGOs and volunteer organisations and to address both internal and external matters of security (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). The development and operationalisation of a JI^{2}M approach in the SANDF is crucial to the development of more adequate responses to the complex post-Cold War African threat environment into which the SANDF will deploy.

3.12. The post-Cold War African threat environment

Intrastate and interstate conflict became endemic in the first four decades following the independence of most sub-Saharan countries. No fewer than 30 violent conflicts, which have claimed the lives of seven million people, including more civilians than those who died during WW2, and displaced many millions more (Wassara, 2010:281). Many of the independent 'states' were often largely fictitious entities sustained only as diplomatic or judicial units and as a result, many sub-Saharan countries were faced with a string of insurgencies, separatist movements and full-blown civil wars (cf. Kubai, 2010:45–53). These problems impeded most long-term planning for development. Armed campaigns to take control of a state contributed to the overthrow of repressive regimes, but also often contributed to political violence and a collapse of state authority. Several African governments were also confronted with wars of secession, such as those in southern Sudan, in eastern Nigeria (Biafra) and Katanga (now Shaba in the DRC). During the first decades of independence of many African countries, internal and cross-border conflicts erupted in every region of the continent (Du Plessis & Hough, 2000:123).

The more recent history of armed conflict in Africa has been characterised by intrastate war and domestic insurrection, rather than formal conventional interstate war. Between 1960 and 1982, almost 90% of the 45 independent African states experienced a military *coup*, an attempted *coup* or a plot. In addition, about 24 heads of state or government were killed in

the African post-Colonial era. This translates to some 115 illegal government changes, 52 successful coups, 56 attempted coups and 102 plots, making the military *coup* "the institutionalised mechanism for succession" (Mazrui & Tidy, 1984:572–575). During the late 1980s, the central executive of 45 independent states was in military hands and the military remained a powerful force in the remaining states.

This close relationship between African militaries and their corporate sponsors is sometimes explained by the military centrality theory (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990:861–875). This theory focuses more narrowly on the corporate interests and available resources of the military and the nature of civil–military relations. Particularly in developing regions, the military is perceived as the most powerful state institution, with more resources at its command than the civilian sphere. As a result of common training, military officers with similar nationalistic beliefs generally form the most cohesive elite groups (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990:860). Colonialism left the military as an inward-oriented force, dealing specifically with domestic political dynamics. In many African states, the officer corps was Africanised immediately following independence, which encouraged the politicisation of the officer corps as a means to signal sovereignty following the withdrawal of the colonial authority. Political and military analysts who have commented on the nature of civil–military relations in Africa have premised that post-Colonial African military establishments who control significant portions of state resources have a strong corporate character, continue the practice of domestic, and in particular urban control, and develop political aspirations which result in their centrist positioning within the state (Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010:20–21). This central political position allows military forces in Africa to forego an apolitical ethos and actively intervene in the civil sphere of government (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990:861–875).

In contrast to the prevalence of conflict of domestic origin, direct interstate conflict since the end of the Cold War has been a rare phenomenon in Africa (Omach, 2010:288–290). Conflicts that transgressed national borders were usually initiated by intrastate conflicts, often manifesting in the form of ethnic wars which later spilt over into neighbouring countries. These include the conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, the CAR and the DRC (Meredith, 2006: 488, 492,528, 535, 544). The most pressing challenges facing many African states remain paramilitary threats – threats that are beyond the ability of most police forces and frequently

transcend national borders. Organised crime, rural banditry, piracy, local warlords, guerrillas, ethnic and religious violence and extremist Islamist groups are but a few of an array of such threats (Heitman, 2011:1). The prominence of intrastate conflict is also addressed in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-2), which acknowledges that the vast majority of armed conflict is occurring within states, rather than between them. The Defence Review, does, however, also point to the fact that, although of an intrastate nature, these conflicts negatively affect interstate relations. Intrastate conflict in Africa is exacerbated by large territories that lack proper governance and infrastructure which, in turn, tend to provide safe havens for criminals, terrorist-groupings, armed guerrillas and armed insurgents (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-2).

The prevalence of domestic conflict will continue to scar the African security profile, which will continue to fuel the legacy of economic underdevelopment, which in turn will continue to drive on the competition for scarce resources (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:20 – 21). Another reason for the continuation of internal conflicts in Africa is the quest for political self-determination by various ethnic groupings in the post-Colonial era – current African conflict is all about making the new-found freedom work and surviving the post-Cold War peace (Mac Ginty, 2008:3). Two of the primary issues that need to be addressed are good governance down to grass-roots level, and the economic and social development and upliftment of the population across racial, ethnic and class lines. These two issues are endemic to conflicts on the continent and have contributed to the situation in which Africa's perception of the strategic concept of security has become almost wholly focused only on domestic security (Jung, 2009:8).

Unprecedented domestic and regional security threats are challenging many African states and the region's balance of military power between state and insurgents often appears to shift in favour of insurgencies (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:7). The characteristics of most African conflicts – decentralised insurgent groups having few fixed bases or targetable economic–military assets, while wielding low-cost but effective weaponry and engaging in often indiscriminate brutality against civilians – pose exceptional problems for the conventionally trained militaries of states (Howe, 2001:1). Irregular forces who participate in these activities include guerrillas fighting perceived disenfranchisement (Darfur) or economic injustice (Niger Delta), for secession (Cabinda, Angola and Casamance, Senegal) or for various other causes

(Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:18–26). They also include compromised militias protecting territory and recourse, for example in the DRC, private armies hired by illegal miners, loggers, smugglers, and groups with seemingly no rational cause, such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) with its origins in Uganda (Heitman, 2011:1).

Many scholars have been perplexed by the escalation of intrastate wars in Africa that followed the end of the Cold War and some commentators have dwelled on the seeming irrationality and particularity of Africa's conflicts. Some attempted to ascribe the pervasiveness of African intrastate wars to greed and grievances as motives for the onset of civil war (economic opportunity linked with illicit exploitation of natural resources), and social grievances such as inequality, the absence of political rights and ethnic or religious differences. In reality, however, the motives for African intrastate wars are multifarious, and establishing lasting peace remains a complex and time-consuming challenge (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:18–26). The aims of the protagonists in Africa's wars thus defy simple categorisation. Far from the orthodox Clausewitzian pursuit of politics by other means, the multiplicity of participants translates into a multiplicity of objectives – political, economic and cultural, as well as local, national and international (Furley & May, 2006:20), although Duyvesteyn & Angstrom (2005) avers that, upon closer scrutiny, one can observe a cruder form of pursuing politics (state building in particular) by other means.

The security environment of most African countries is located somewhere in between the endpoints of the peace-war continuum. Peace, in the African context, does not imply an absence of violence. Whilst the formal status of war might not be obtained in African conflicts, widespread crime and violence through the use of the instruments of state or sponsored militias frequently create conditions analogous to war. Successful endings to African wars invariably involve mediation and negotiation, and post-conflict political considerations usually compel a degree of compromise. Negative peace or the absence of war is invariably unsustainable and underpins the baleful statistics that half of Africa's wars have reignited within a decade of ending. The construction of a positive peace that addresses the diverse motivations of the combatants and the residual mutual suspicion is a challenge that frequently lies beyond existing economic and political capacity. This has changed UN interventions in that, rather than seeking to keep a narrow, negative peace, the

focus has been shifted to more complex tasks of peace-building, reconciliation and reconstruction (Furley & May, 2006:5).

The notion that modern peace missions demand more than traditional peacekeeping, is echoed in the 2014 Defence Review which also describes the shift from traditional peacekeeping to more holistic peace support operations that include stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) operations as part of South Africa's contribution to security, normalisation, prosperity and sustainability on the continent. Stabilisation and normalisation tasks "relate to the immediate and extended intent to improve circumstances and to create the conditions for the sustainment of stability, security and the rule of law in a former area of conflict or instability" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-12). These tasks are specifically listed as Task 9 of the SANDF, namely "Contribute to Peace and Stability", and pertain to contributions to (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-13):

- international peace support operations;
- international humanitarian assistance and intervention in support of civil authority;
- reconstruction in a former conflict area;
- demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former belligerents;
- demobilisation and repatriation of child soldiers and those not wishing to take up arms in a statutory force; and
- advising, training and educating security personnel and organisations.

3.13. The characteristics of African wars

Few comprehensive studies of modern wars in Africa have been conducted. There are many reasons for this: firstly, the African battle space is extremely disorganised and dangerous for journalists and military observers, and secondly, the wars are considered to be pre-modern

conflicts. Other (less valid) reasons proffered for the inattention to the phenomenon of postmodern African wars include a wide variety of factors (Kruys, 2004:15):

- the facilities to write, store and send reports are poor;
- no side in the conflicts can ensure the reasonable safety of observers; and
- for modern military organisations, there is often little or nothing to learn from groups involved in what are mainly ethnic conflicts fought with mostly out-of-date weapons.

Howe (2001:1) argues that, despite the fact that the belligerents in Africa make use of 'out-of-date' weapons from a Westernised perspective, the phenomenon of current African conflicts demand in-depth analysis of the military challenges that have to be solved by formal African military and other institutions as these challenges are extremely complex and demanding.

The aims of protagonists in Africa's wars also defy simple categorisation. Far from the orthodox Clausewitzian pursuit of politics by other means, the multiplicity of participants translates into a multiplicity of objectives – political, economic, cultural, as well as local, national and international (Clausewitz, 1976: 87). While some groups may be pursuing truly genuine political grievances, or seek state power of self-determination, others pursue chauvinistic ethno-nationalist or religious goals: ethnically or religiously pure political communities, genocide, 'politicide' and the maintenance of elite power (Furley & May, 2006:21). Simultaneously, local actors may be struggling over access to critical resources such as water, land, grazing rights, security, profitable criminal enterprises or sources of traditional authority. Economic agendas drive many of Africa's wars, and warfare is a smokescreen for the pursuit of accumulation in the form of direct exploitation of valuable commodities such as diamonds, the monopolisation of trade and taxation, the establishment of protection rackets, the diversion of emergency aid or sanction busting – among others. Ultimately, an important effect is to confound Clausewitzian teleology by transforming violence from instrument to object, that is, from a means to an end, to an end in itself. In some cases, such as illegal resource exploitation or the provision of protection for humanitarian agencies, an ongoing state of war is more profitable then the conditions of peace (Clausewitz, 1976:95). In this way, violence becomes intrinsically valuable to its

practitioners and the underlying incentive structure is configured in favour of its perpetual continuance (Furley & May, 2006:21).

The nature of the actors/protagonists in Africa's wars rarely conforms to the conventional conception of organised, hierarchical and disciplined professional armies which fight in identifiable military uniforms. African wars are characterised by the involvement of a multiplicity and diversity of military and non-military actors: government military formations (both internal and external), rebels, insurgents, private militias (government established or locally organised religious, tribal and community-based militias), warlords, criminal gangs, mercenaries and private security providers, multinational corporations, local entrepreneurs and business interests, NGOs (local and international), peacekeepers (international, regional and ad hoc) and child soldiers, among many others (Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010:1–15). A significant number of these actors have non-hierarchical structures and are prone to splintering and frequently engage in shifting and reflexive patterns of alliances. In such deconstructed settings, the task of identifying the main warring parties can become highly problematic. In addition, these actors are often embedded in highly complex 'war networks' that straddle territorial boundaries, monetary and trade zones, identified groups and epistemic communities (Ikelegbe, 2010:129). They may link diasporic, transnational nongovernmental and ethnic communities and include internal and regional organisations and have global reach.

African irregular forces are very dangerous opponents with vast experience in bush war and they are usually well armed. They are also highly mobile, using a wide variety of transport modes, often making use of four-wheel-drive vehicles and are well equipped with global positioning systems (GPSs), night vision goggles and satellite telephones – as was demonstrated in 2013 in the CAR against members of the SANDF. Some elements of irregular forces are supported by neighbouring countries, enabling access to even better equipment. There also seems to be a trend toward collaboration. An example is the operations of Tuareg rebels, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in Nigeria and smugglers in Mali and Niger who are becoming increasingly intertwined in their activities (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-10). The movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has also developed symbiotic relationships with bunkering gangs in Nigeria

and guerrillas in Cameroon's Bakassi Peninsula. Al Shabaab is said to derive some of its funding from piracy off the coast of Somalia and has recently launched several terror attacks on villages along the Kenyan coast. Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have also been the two most violent armed groups in Africa in recent years. Most of the states where these irregulars are active are unable to counter these threats successfully, as most of the states in the region cannot afford suitable security forces (Heitman, 2011:2).

African wars are also characterised by weak government responses resulting from personal rule and patronage politics, which has become a predominant governing method for many African countries since independence (cf. Ibaba, & Ikelegbe, 2010:221). This phenomenon has often weakened military professionalism. The civil–military divide has continually been breached by civilians attempting to manipulate military affairs and by military officers who pursue political control of the state. Most African states have at one time or the other come under military rule with its attendant maladministration and consequent legacy of economic underdevelopment. The political leadership in many of the African states involve the military as a political instrument in the political chess game thereby compromising the integrity of the military (Howe, 2001:2). Many of the military institutions continue to be afflicted by the social malaise of corruption, ill-discipline, factionalism, ethnicity and other vices that compromise their professionalism. Because of these complex issues, African militaries have repeatedly failed as a safety net for African states and the military, which should act as the lead agency to protect state institutions, has thus become part of the problem instead of establishing a safe environment conducive to state-building and sustainable development. The resultant weaker militaries increasingly threaten African state legitimacy in the post-Cold War era by not being able to play their role of national defence (Howe, 2001:2).

3.14. The classification of wars in Africa

As described previously, it is extremely difficult to classify types of war in the 21st century, and in most cases, the attempt causes more confusion than clarity. This is because each African war contains several of the characteristics usually associated with the full spectrum of conflict, ranging from conventional interstate war, to limited conventional interstate war, intrastate war, low intensity war, and guerrilla and/or revolutionary war. The objectives pursued by the

participants in these wars are often due to challenges against those in power or over territory, ethnicity or access to resources – challenges over who should be in power or challenges pertaining to the ideology or system to be institutionalised (Duyvesteyn & Angstrom, 2005:104).

Africa's wars are therefore notable for their hybrid modalities and strategies. Most wars are conducted by employing a unique mix of conventional and non-conventional military doctrines, drawn largely from asymmetric warfare strategies. Orthodox military tactics can manifest themselves alongside forms of insurgency, guerrilla warfare (rural and urban), terrorism, sabotage, destabilisation, gang warfare, traditional forms of ritualised warfare and forms of criminality like banditry or frontier raiding. Ethnic cleansing, mutilisation, murder, mass rape, forcible conscription of minors, for example the LRA, ritual violence, the deliberate creation of famine and a great many other unspeakable practices have replaced conventional military tactics as central modes of warfare in recent decades. In essence, Africa's wars exhibit all the signs of the wider revolution in strategic affairs that has transformed the characteristics of warfare around the world – and which Western security managers have largely ignored, at their own peril. From Somalia to Afghanistan and Iraq, irregular forces continue to frustrate their technologically superior enemies with their novel and tactically effective methods (Furley & May, 2006:21).

3.14.1. Conventional interstate African wars

In terms of formal definitions of wars, most of post-Colonial Africa has been characterised by conflicts that are generally of low intensity, but which are extensive and destructive (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-15). Intrastate conflict has been a far more frequent occurrence in Africa than has interstate war – in the form of direct somatic aggression between two or more sovereign states (Furley & May, 2006:3). Whilst low- or medium-intensity border conflicts have taken place with regularity, few have escalated into interstate war. In fact, as Franke (2009:19) points out, if the UCDP's threshold of 1 000 battle-related deaths per year is applied, there have only been four events in Africa's post-colonial history that qualify as interstate wars, namely (Meredith, 2006:354):

- the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia (1977–78);
- the war between Uganda and Tanzania (1978);
- the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998–2000); and
- the war between Chad an Libya (1980–1981).

The nature of the protagonists in Africa's conventional state on state wars rarely conforms to the conventional conception of organised, hierarchical and disciplined professional armies who fight in identifiable military uniforms and units (cf. Agbese & Kieh, 2007:4). African wars have always been characterised by the involvement of a multiplicity and diversity of military and non-military actors, which included formal military formations and state actors (both internal and external) on the one side, and a mix of rebels, insurgents, private militias (government-established or locally organised religious, tribal and community-based militias), warlords, criminal gangs, mercenaries on the other.

3.14.2. Unconventional intrastate conflicts in Africa

There is a multitude of reasons for the outbreak of unconventional conflicts in Africa. The end of superpower rivalry resulted in empowering insurgents in several respects and has dramatically changed the nature of African conflict. During the Cold War, foreign supporters usually linked their material support to groups exhibiting acceptable ideological or political agendas, Warsaw Pact nations often being the primary suppliers to African insurgencies (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:25). The collapse of the former USSR and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact saw the end of the supply of masses of armament to insurgencies, and also ended the period during which communism had its ideological appeal. This, according to Kruys (2004:25), was especially relevant to Southern Africa where most insurgents advocated communism/socialism as the political and economic philosophy upon which their doctrine was based. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demobilisation or shrinking of non-African militaries, cash-strapped Eastern bloc nations sold military equipment to insurgents without political preconditions (Howe, 2001:4).

Since 1990, economic opportunities, and not necessarily ideology, have attracted insurgents to join armed factions. In many instances economic gains motivate the leaders and basic subsistence sustains the rank and file in many poverty-stricken African countries. A combination of poverty, ethnicity and the availability of weaponry and loot therefore often encourages large numbers of factions to enter into a conflict (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010:20–22).

After the Cold War, Africa continued to suffer from violent conflict which impeded the possibilities for growth and development. Many Western countries attempted to assist Africa in escaping from the grip of civil wars and poverty. These attempts were highlighted by the visit of American President, Bill Clinton, who embarked on a continental tour to Africa in 1998. Clinton's strategy for Africa involved selecting a small group from the 'new generation' of African leaders who passed American tests for their commitment to democracy, economic renewal and civil rights. Besides Thabo Mbeki from South Africa, the group included Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Ethiopia's Meles Zenami, Eritrea's Isaias Afwerki, and Ghana's Jerry Rawlings. Despite President Clinton's good intentions, , Ethiopia and Eritrea embarked on a futile border war in which 100 000 people died, a third of Eritrea's population were displaced and hundreds of millions of dollars were squandered on arms within three months of Clinton's visit to Africa. Two months after the start of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Rwanda and Uganda plunged headlong into another round of war in the DRC and then began fighting among themselves over the spoils of their occupation there (Meredith, 2006:678).

In addition to wars in Angola, the DRC, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea, a host of other conflicts also bedevilled Africa in the post-Cold War era. Congo-Brazzaville was convulsed by tribal strife that brought an end to its experiment with multiparty politics and wrecked parts of the capital. The CAR was also torn apart by tribal strife. In Côte d'Ivoire, renowned for its stability during Houphouët-Boigny's reign, a succession of leaders stirred up ethnic and religious divisions for their own purposes, setting Christian southerners against Muslim northerners, eventually precipitating a civil war that engulfed Abidjan and split the country apart (Meredith, 2006:678).

Resources such as oil, diamonds, coltan, coffee and cacao feed intrastate wars, as was the case in, for instance, Angola, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia. These resource-based insurgencies often create parallel economies which are often stronger than the official economies of the countries in which they are waged. It was reported that, for instance, money earned from the sale of diamonds made the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) "a far more ferocious military organisation than it had been while receiving support from either the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the South African government" (Meredith, 2006:680). Similar patterns emerged in Sierra Leone and Nigeria's Niger Delta region where diamonds and oil benefits served to perpetuate low-intensity armed conflicts.

Generally, the protagonists in these resource-based insurgencies are unable to group and develop into large-scale fighting forces and they usually lack the strength to challenge the dominant, formal military organisations in the capitals of the affected countries. African non-state armed/irregular forces conducting the unconventional wars often lack military discipline and seldom abide by internationally accepted rules of war. They do not receive regular salaries and are often compelled to live off the land. In this vein, the wars in Sierra Leone and Somalia are sometimes categorised as criminal insurgencies. These economies of "armed chaos" then become the only viable forms of economy amidst unconventional conflicts that usually result in wide-scale pillaging and human rights abuses (Kaldor, 1999:85–86).

The complexity of intrastate conflict is further complicated by the involvement of private security providers, multinational corporations, local entrepreneurs and business interests, NGOs (local and international), peacekeepers and child soldiers. The above-mentioned non-governmental actors usually have non-hierarchical structures, are prone to splintering and frequently engage in shifting and reflexive patterns of alliances. The complex mix of actors is usually embedded in highly complex war networks that straddle territorial boundaries, monetary and trade zones, identity groups and communities. These networks are used to link diasporic, transnational non-governmental and ethnic communities, include international and regional organisations and have a global reach (Furley & May, 2006:20).

The lack of effective government control and rampant poverty amongst rural societies allows armed groups to direct wide-spread public disillusionment and anger at self-serving unaccountable rulers. These armed groupings often press-gang child soldiers into their forces and they are usually able to purchase sufficient weapons and live off the population. Outside forces have very little control over these armed groupings. These belligerents often shift allegiances and break up into splinter groups, which make it extremely difficult to achieve negotiated settlements. Conflict in Africa appears to be increasingly fragmented, and the number of actors, particularly non-state actors involved in conflicts, are continually increasing. This became evident again recently during the peace process that was finalised at the Al Darfur Stakeholders' Conference in May 2011 in Doha, Qatar when fighters who were involved in the conflicts in Darfur, Sudan were involved in peace negotiations. These peace negotiations were significantly complicated by divisions among various rebel factions – primarily because these belligerents lack clear military objectives and coherent military strategies or tactics. In a second case, the Seleka coalition in the CAR whose advance on the capital, Bangui in 2013 was temporarily halted by the intervention of other African countries, eventually consisted of five separate groupings (Heitman, 2013c:6–7). Three of the five groupings signed a peace agreement with president Bozize on 13 January 2013. Bozize was later ousted when the coalition resumed their advance a few months later. Another example of the difference and struggles among rebel factions is the armed conflict in Mali, during which former allies, Tuareg and Islamist rebels, fought each other in the latter stages of Operation Serval in January 2013 when French forces recaptured Mali's northern region. Also, in the eastern provinces of the DRC, the March 23 Movement (the M23 rebels) have also recently split into different factions ahead of the decision to deploy a neutral intervention force as part of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (UNOSM) in the DRC (Cilliers & Schünemann, 2013:4).

In addition to the above-mentioned complexity, several of the current insurgent groups have very strong transnational characteristics and therefore the ability to move across borders and between states with relative ease. This has resulted in the current situation where conflicts, although categorised as 'intrastate wars', in fact, also reflect an international element. This international element makes matters worse for the armed forces that for all practical purposes serve as the primary policy instrument employed by most African governments.

3.15. Force design and force structure implications for African military organisations

From the above, it is evident that traditional notions of security strategy and planning will no longer suffice to address all the issues that characterise the contemporary, complex and wide-ranging security environment. Due to the complex nature of current African threat environments, one of the most notable changes is to be found in the notion that military organisations are not the sole providers of military expertise and power. African defence forces must therefore develop their capacity to deploy in cooperation with a wide variety of role-players that include other government departments, IOs, NGOs and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) – in essence the JI^{2}M approach as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). These integrated and holistic responses to threats require the integration of political, military, economic and intelligence instruments of national power to contribute effectively to security threats on the continent.

In terms of the SANDF, the challenges associated with the current threat environment also demand integrated, holistic responses from across the spectrum of conflict. This JI^{2}M approach is at the core of the DOD's force employment strategies and must therefore be operationalised by means of the appropriate force design and force structure which will provide the framework when organising, staffing and equipping FSEs. In order to achieve the desired levels of integration and cooperation, the 2014 Defence Review points to the fact that modular structures will provide the SANDF with well-balanced, optimally configured, tailor-made force groupings that have been specifically trained and equipped to effectively meet the challenges associated with the idiosyncrasies of the respective deployment environments and various types of opposing forces (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-7).

The complex African threat environment will be characterised by the activities of a large variety of state and non-state actors and defence forces will have to develop their capabilities to address simultaneous manifestations of multi-modal warfare. In the case of the SANDF, these operations will most probably be of an expeditionary nature, which will continue to exert significant influence on the Defence Force's sustainment concepts and capabilities. In order to deploy forces successfully over Africa's vast terrain, the SANDF must have the ability to

provide contingent-capable forces that are designed to support JI^{2}M connectivity and interoperability, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity (Johnson, Peters, Kitchens, Martin & Fischbach, 2011:8). These JI^{2}M forces must maintain the capability of functioning in a traditional-warfighting capacity, and must also develop and expand their capacity to deploy during OOTW.

3.16. Conclusions

The above sections outlined how the strategic environment changed, as well as the rise of an ever-extending continuum of threats that demand armed responses from governments. Future militaries will therefore have to address a range of key strategic challenges in order to have the capacity to address future threats in whatever mode of warfare these threats manifest. Modern military forces will have to attain greater strategic mobility and will also have to become as effective at shaping the strategic environment as they are responding to threats associated with multi-modal warfare. This 'mobility' does not only apply to the physical attributes of weapon platforms and operating systems, but also and especially to mobility of the mind. Modern militaries should therefore develop greater psychological precision, including the full integration of lethal and non-lethal capabilities, and they will have to continually address the full modularity of equipment, systems and organisations and develop methods for the rapid transformation of doctrine, concepts and organisations in order to remain ready and relevant. Militaries will be expected to conduct a wide range of dissimilar simultaneous operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The ongoing changes in the character of armed conflict demand that defence planners and strategists think expansively whilst investigating the wider implications and relationships and exploring cross-cutting connections between technology, ethics, social trends, politics and strategy. Defence planners should refrain from placing too much emphasis on trend analysis as a basis for planning for future warfare as all trends decline and eventually expire over time. African defence establishments should also guard against the development of impressive military solutions to problems that they prefer to solve, rather than to address actual problems which cunning and innovative foes may pose. In as much as war is a duel, postmodern adversaries will strive to deny stronger opponents a mode of warfare that privileges the

strengths of formal military powers by applying asymmetrical methodologies. African military planners should therefore take cognisance of the fact that the strategic future is driven by the consequence of the trends that characterise a specific timeframe – trends which interact in unexpected ways and may trigger non-linear developments.

It is essential to appreciate the significance of all the contexts of war, and care should be taken not to overemphasise the military context. The political context should always be appreciated and it should be borne in mind that military performance in the conduct of warfare is always affected by the cultural context of the environment. The current political context in Africa is generally focused on the process of democratisation and sustainable development. In order to achieve this, Africans are currently heavily engaged in building governmental institutions and economies and establishing regional and continental frameworks that will facilitate sustained levels of economic growth and stability. These intentions are also echoed in the 2014 South African Defence Review in which South Africa's participation in the development of peace and security is clearly expounded. As part of these developments, the SANDF is strongly focused on and involved in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts to establish stable environments that will facilitate growth on the continent. The increasing extent and quality of African security cooperation towards peace and security is appraised in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4: AFRICAN MILITARIES, THE CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE EVOLVING AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

4.1. Introduction

The prevention of war and the maintenance of peace remain two of the most vital and elusive objectives of international relations. As a result, political leaders and defence and security organisations are primarily judged on the levels of success that they achieve in establishing peace and preventing wars (Field, 2004:16). Sadly, in Africa, despite the efforts of the large number of international and regional security organisations and NGOs involved in peace support operations (PSOs), the continuing proliferation of intrastate wars and other forms of conflict is a clear indication that governments and security organisations are failing to deal effectively with the challenges to peace and security on the continent (cf. Keen, 2012b:32). In addition to the inherent organisational flaws that might be the cause of the limited successes achieved by these security organisations, the political will needed for international organisations to take prompt and effective action to prevent or contain conflict is also a contributing factor.

The previous chapter described the changes that are taking place across the spectrum of conflict in the international threat environment and concluded with the assertion that militaries and international and regional security structures will have to implement significant reforms to their architectures, force designs, roles and functions in order to meet the threats and demands of the 21st century. The configuration of defence forces will have to change to address multi-modal missions that are primarily aimed at building peace and setting the scene for sustainable development, as opposed to being focused primarily on preparations for traditional defensive operations or warfighting. The required transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping to peacebuilding is sometimes referred to as so-called ‘mandate creep’ or ‘mission creep’ as PSOs are not only focused on peacekeeping, but have come to include aspects such as the establishment of democracy, post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), justice and civilian protection (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:296).

Current operational concepts, force designs and force structures of most African militaries have not been keeping pace with evolving mission mandates (Holt & Berkman, 2006:1). Despite these limitations, African militaries are nonetheless increasingly being expected to contribute to so-called 'African solutions to African problems' whilst Western entities disentangle themselves from physical involvement in PSOs on the continent (Franke, 2009:64). Despite the significant changes that have taken place in the security environment and the commensurate changes to the tasks that militaries are expected to perform during operations, the force structures and force designs of African militaries continue to be structured to address the traditional 'primary' tasks of defending their homelands against conventional military threats. In contrast, operational realities show that the 'secondary' tasks such as PSOs, support to the people and humanitarian interventions (MOOTW), are in fact the tasks that will most often be performed by Africa's armed forces. The increased involvement in MOOTW does not diminish the importance of the 'primary' task of defence forces, but it emphasises the requirement for a re-appraisal of the required force structure and force preparation of post-Cold War African militaries to address both 'primary' and 'secondary' tasks.

The changes in the roles that African militaries are expected to perform (as explained in Chapter 3 – see 3.3 and 3.4) have taken place in a timeframe in which most African states have been challenged with the operationalisation of post-colonial state-building, as well as the second wave of democratisation which has been taking place on the continent since the end of the Cold War (Ikelegbe, 2010:131). These processes have been taking place in the context of the post-Cold War security environment which has been characterised by vast changes in international power politics and the roles and functions of regional and continental security regimes (Franke, 2009:33). Changes in the post-Cold War African political and economic environments have been witness to the emergence of a great number of new continental and regional leaders who have taken the lead in international politics, sustainable economic development, as well as continental and regional security and defence environments. Changes to the political and economic environments have been particularly evident in the post-apartheid South African security environment (cf. Omari & Macaringue, 2007:53–60). These changes have continually influenced, and are still influencing, South Africa's participation in the African security architecture at various levels – from UN level to

AU level as well as at regional level. What has become clear during this time of volatility and uncertainty is that African militaries will have to adapt to these changes, whether the changes are brought about by politics, events on the battlefield, new technologies or the emergence of new types of PSOs (Curtis, 2012:2).

Since 1994, South Africa has played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture, as well as during PSOs on the continent (Mandrup, 2009a:1). South Africa's approach to PSOs on the continent over the past two decades sometimes seemed contractionary – similar to the seemingly contradictory characteristics of South Africa's foreign policy as expounded in Chapter 2 (see 2.2.2). Although it is quite clear that South Africa is normatively committed to the continental security architectures through and in cooperation with regional committees such as SADC, it has also demonstrated its intention to play an individual leading role on the continental AU level – such as taking the lead in the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). There is thus an emerging tension to be found in the manner in which South Africa relates to the UN on the one hand, for example its contributions to the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC under a UN mandate, and how it relates to the AU – contributing forces to ACIRC under an AU mandate (De Coning, 2014:35). Despite its ubiquitous vocal support to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Renaissance, it is, however, also clear that South Africa will only become involved in PSOs if the country's interests are at stake (Habib, 2008:13). South Africa's participation in PSOs clearly demonstrates the country's commitment to the African Agenda, but also demonstrates a clear realist approach in the pursuance of the country's national interests.

The SANDF has, since its establishment in 1994, been appreciated as one of the leading military establishments on the continent (Mandrup, 2009a:1). It has been actively involved in a number of PSOs and is still viewed as a military organisation that is well prepared for its peace support role (cf. Schoeman, 2007:156–166). South Africa's involvement in PSOs since 1998 has indeed had a significant effect on the training, sustainment, capability development and deployments of the SANDF. However, despite the SANDF's continued efforts and contributions, politicians, military analysts and academics are increasingly questioning the ability of the Defence Force to perform its mandate continually or "whether it indeed has the

capacity to serve purposefully, meaningfully and functionally as an instrument of foreign policy implementation during peace missions on the continent" (Neethling, 2010:134). This widely held opinion is confirmed explicitly in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-5) where it is clearly stated that, "[T]he SA Army faces block obsolescence of its prime mission equipment … and [that] the SA Army is no longer in a position to conduct major combat operations, nor fully roll out the forces needed to safeguard South Africa's borders within the required timeframes." It also points to the fact that "The SA Air Force remains critically underfunded" and "… resulted in a situation where the SA Navy's vessels can no longer be made combat-ready to execute the full range of missions they were designed for" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-5).

The changes required to the force designs and force structures of post-Cold War militaries, globally, as well as on the African continent in particular, have been expounded in Chapter 3 (see 3.3 and 3.4). In order to grasp the multiple roles and functions that African militaries are performing fully, specifically in terms of participation in African PSOs, it is essential to understand the current approaches to African regional security as well as to analyse the nature and scope of PSOs on the continent. In view of the above, Chapter Four addresses the relationships between the political and economic needs, the military role and the required sustainment capacity during peace missions in order to make recommendations and come to conclusions on how African militaries should be configured and postured to conduct PSOs in Africa as these are the types of operations that have come to exemplify military deployments on the continent. This chapter also explores the development of African PSOs and security architectures, as well as inter-African security cooperation at continental and regional level. The chapter concludes with an analysis of South Africa's role in PSOs on the continent and in the SADC region and also includes recommendations on the requisite changes to the force design, force structure and organisation that should be implemented to enable the SANDF to lay sound foundations for peace building and sustainable development – most often in post-conflict environments where little or no infrastructure, institutions or governance exists.

4.2. Complexities experienced by African militaries during PSOs on the continent

Internationally, most militaries have accepted participation in PSOs as a significant aspect of their operational repertoire of possible deployments and have subsequently instituted changes to their organisations, structures and education and training to prepare forces for participation in such missions (De Coning, 2013:27–31). Due to the complexity of peace missions, the preparation and structuring of military forces for PSOs are motivated and understood as supportive to enhancing the security-development nexus, as stability cannot be achieved without commensurate sustainable economic and social development (cf. Tschirgi, Lund & Mancini, 2010:2–3). This holistic approach to the management of multidimensional PSOs is aimed at aligning peace and security activities with political, governance, democratisation and socio-economic development objectives to address larger development agendas, and subsequently also the causes of conflict. Subsequently, in the past several years, governments and multilateral institutions have devoted considerable time and effort to the task of integrating development and security policy responses more effectively to the related challenges of countries affected by conflict, post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict prevention (Sherman, Gleason, Sidhu & Jones, 2011:8). This notion was also highlighted in the UN Millennium Development Goals and the AU Constitution (Molomo, 2009:141).

Emerging powers have proved to be strong contributors to UN peacekeeping operations and Brazil, China, India and South Africa all count under the top twenty TCCs to UN missions (De Coning, 2013:31). In 2010, Brazil deployed 2 198 troops and registered the second-highest increase in troop contributions to UN peacekeeping in 2010 (cf. Schoeman, 2013:220). Brazil, as head of the military command for the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which was established on 1 June 2004, played an important role in integrating diplomatic, military and development cooperation activities during the disaster caused by an earthquake (UN Resolution 1542 of 2004). India is also a key participant in UN peacekeeping and the country deployed 7 727 troops in 2010, including contingents playing critical operational roles in the DRC, Liberia and Sudan (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:58). China is also steadily increasing its participation in peace missions and it is currently appreciated as the most active peacekeeping contributor of the five permanent members of the UNSC (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:59). In December 2010, China had 1 955 personnel deployed to nine UN peacekeeping

operations, representing a twenty-fold growth since 2000 (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:62). China has primarily focused its peacekeeping contributions in the areas of military observers, engineering, transportation and medical support (Sherman et al., 2011:8).

In the quest for understanding African security policies and approaches to peace missions, analysts have offered a wide variety of perspectives on the security dynamics that shape the continent. Some, like Goldgeier and McFaul (1992:467–492), describe Africa as remaining part of a global periphery wherein security dynamics are explained in Realist terms as part of a typical Hobbesean (cf. Gat, 2006:5 –6) struggle for power in which calculation of material interest and power-balancing dominate. On the other hand, many Africanist scholars argue that states can function in a variety of ways, albeit with less desirable outcomes for most of their citizens. Weak state institutions could manifest as the counterpart of strong and resilient social structures in which neo-patrimonial systems, based on patronage and affinity, are ubiquitous – a phenomenon that is common in the African political marketplace (Schatzberg, 2001). Some scholars insist that 'Africa works' under such systems and that, despite these idiosyncrasies, it will continue to do so in future (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

In Africa, there are currently only a few countries that have state institutions that are mature and capable of managing conflicting political views and many can be described as merely exercising a monopoly on organised violence (Jung, 2009:11–12). Ethiopia and Eritrea are examples of such state institutions (Omach, 2010:300). In Rwanda and Uganda, patrimonialism and state institutions are so closely harmonised and equally balanced, that it creates an impression of classic statehood. Across the continent, political life can generally be described as a so-called 'auction of loyalties' in which provincial elites seek to extract the best price for their allegiance from some or other metropolitan centre or political leader. In this context of so-called "patronage politics", national boundaries most often do not matter in this political market place, as, for example, currently being demonstrated in the DRC where the cities of Kinshasa, Kigali and Kampala are all competing for the loyalties of elites in eastern Congo (De Waal, 2009:103).

This analysis does not dismiss that fact that Africans, the polity as well as political leaders, hold strong political beliefs. It merely contends that, in Africa, the vehicles that are available

to promote political agendas, such as political parties, legislature and government ministries operate according to different socio-cultural rules than what has been and is the norm in the West (Kubai, 2010:47–48). Patrimonialism and patronage politics are key characteristics of many political regimes in Africa and this explains why Africans, while angered by issues such as social injustices, wide-spread corruption and incompetency of their rulers, remain largely incapable of utilising their institutions to right wrongs and to bring inspiring selfless leaders to power (De Waal, 2009:101). These beliefs and characteristics must be analysed in depth by peacemakers to ensure that approaches and plans that are drafted are optimally suited to the socio-political context that is prevalent in deployment areas.

The distinction between state institutions and patrimonial governance in Africa has proven to be as relevant to insurgents as it is for the formal militaries of governments – and it is as valid in wartime as it is during peace. International peacemakers and peace builders who are deployed on the continent, must therefore pay attention to the way in which states with weak institutions and strong patrimonial marketplaces function, including how they manage conflict – or fail to do so. This distinction has, however, not been successfully operationalised during peace-building efforts on the continent and current conflict resolution practices follow an implicit hierarchy in which the formal, generic, legal-institutional approach is senior to practices that draw upon locally specific ways of conducting political business – a process that is not always tailor-made to the challenges and idiosyncrasies that characterise specific African conflict situations. African peacekeepers must be attuned to the fact that in most cases, neo-patrimony, or patronage politics and the lineage of the role-players in the peace process will manifest as the key shapers of the outcome of PSOs. According to Tull and Mehler (2005:416), the only semi-stable outcome or ‘success’ for peacemakers in the patrimonial political marketplace is an inclusive buy-in of all elites by the best-resourced role-players in that political marketplace – military victories have proved to be rarely decisive. This so-called ‘cooptation approach’ is used to keep all possible spoilers tied into the arrangements when some form of settlement is reached (cf. Du Pisani, 2007:15–20). This approach is based on the principle of a comprehensive, ‘whole-of-government’ approach to PSOs that emphasises the fact that the military is an important, but not the primary role-player in setting the foundations of lasting peace and sustainable development (Sinovich, 2011:6).

Success in peace missions remains difficult to define. Kofi Annan (2004:1), in his report "no exit without strategy", identified three key objectives: consolidating internal and external security; strengthening political institutions and good governance; and promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation. The focus of Annan's report is, however, on the processes rather than on the outcomes of the PSOs, and as such, reflects the difficulties in appraising the achievement of any of the three objectives. In his report, he also concludes that none of these objectives can be measured in the context of a poorly institutionalised state. Unfortunately for this approach, many of the world's most difficult conflicts occur in countries where state institutions are often subordinate to social affinities and patronage networks, and are likely to remain so (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011:23).

Success in PSOs can also be described in terms of normative, human security measures for success (cf. Aboagye, 2012:5). A normative measure of success can be defined as the achievement of clear political milestones such as peace agreements, the holding of elections or political assessments which confirm that a country is indeed on the road to good governance and peace. Another way to determine success, specifically human security success, is to assess how safe ordinary people in the afflicted country feel. Measures for 'human security' success could include manifestations of a decrease in the numbers of deaths from violence, hunger and disease, as well as the return of displaced people and refugees to their homes. A third way in which operational success of peace missions can be measured is in the level of inclusive buy-in from all role-players in the political process or marketplace. This would generate genuine political good for the country in question (De Waal, 2009:112). Not one of these methods offers holistic, comprehensive and clear conclusions on how to measure for success during peace missions, but all provide some insight into understanding the complexities for determining exit strategies and measures for success.

According to Abiola & Otte (2014:3), critics of the holistic, multidimensional approach to PSOs argue that the construct is too all-encompassing and that it, like the concept of human security, is destined to fail because the goals and objectives that are to be achieved, are too ambitious. Whilst it is true that multidimensional PSOs might not achieve all the objectives that they set out at the start of a PSO, the greatest advantage of these types of PSOs is that

they provide a formal framework within which the multitude of role-players who are involved in these missions can coordinate their activities. PSOs constitute long-term missions and the military component of a PSO is designed to be of temporary nature, sometimes described as a "light footprint" **(**Van der Spuy, 2010:37–39)**.** The ultimate aim of a PSO is to stabilise the situation and lay the groundwork for sustainable peace. National ownership of the peacebuilding agenda is crucial to the success of the PSO and should be strongly supported by all the role-players involved in PSOs. The "light footprint" approach supports the notion that UN activities should be limited to those that are appropriate to local needs and contexts and that international staff should be limited to the minimum required with an effort to ensure local capacity building, so that nationals can take over from the UN as soon as possible (United Nations Department for peacekeeping Operations [UN DPKO], 2003).

What is, however, crucial to the understanding of what constitutes successful PSOs is that political leaders should accept that it is an abiding misconception that peace agreements to end civil wars can resolve the so-called 'root causes' of conflict (Gat, 2006:132). In cases where the belligerent parties are strong and institutionalised, they will settle on the basis of their interests and not allow any international mediation to impose further requirements on them. Ironically, it is indeed these parties that would be capable of honouring more onerous commitments to accountability and democracy, which are rarely demanded of them by the peacemakers. In countries that have weak institutions and in which patrimony rules – which is often the case in Africa – attempts to address the so-called 'root causes' of conflict such as injustice, lack of liberal democracy and unequal development may not help, but could even hinder the achievement of more modest but realisable goals based on elite bargains (De Waal, 2009:112). It is therefore essential to determine the causes of individual African conflicts continually, rather than to attempt to apply broad peace mission templates based on the normative demands of international peace engagements. The normative demands that are prescribed by peacekeepers often create peace agreements that include far-reaching commitments to political transformation with ambitiously mandated peacekeeping operations tasked with overseeing these transformations (Gat, 2006:wi). The international community makes these great demands because it can do so without challenge, and because diplomats are genuinely hopeful that they can achieve the defined outcomes (De Waal, 2009:113). In many cases, however, the goals cannot be realised, as the peacekeepers who try to

implement them, find themselves so deeply affected by their host country's patrimonial political marketplaces that they cannot leave without the danger of further conflict. Peacekeeping in Africa is at a crucial juncture, and so-called 'template solutions' are just not good enough anymore (Olivier, 2013:122–123). This notion was at the core of the statements made by the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations which stated on 19 February 2013 that Africa faces numerous emerging challenges that require a mind shift starting at the top structures in the UNSC down to the most common operating procedures (Leijenaar, 2013:1). It is clear that there are no so-called 'template solutions' that would fit all African peace missions. Therefore, there are also not template force designs that would guarantee the success of African peace missions. This implies that there is no one-size-fits-all solution and that the force designs and force structures of African militaries who participate in PSOs should be individually appreciated and designed to address the idiosyncrasies of individual peace missions.

Another view on the unique nature of African peacekeeping is offered by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, some of the leading proponents of constructivist theory (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998). They argue that Africa is caught up in the regionalisation of international security, wherein patterns of enmity and amity and relative material capabilities within particular regional security complexes are crucial to understanding peacekeeping and security dynamics on the continent. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003), Africa contains 'mutually exclusive regional security complexes' (Southern and Central Africa), proto-complexes (West Africa and the Horn), one sub-complex (North Africa) and a range of 'insulators' between them (cf. Buzan and Wæver, 2003). These security complexes are home to many quasi-states that prioritise regime security rather than liberal international politics or human security (Williams, 2007:254). Constructivists explain African security complexes as frameworks that are based on the premise that, in contrast to rationalist theories, the forming of African security complexes is shaped by interests and identities that are created over time, and more specifically by the ways in which self-images interact with changing material incentives (Williams, 2007:256). African state interests and state identities are uniquely shaped by the idiosyncrasies of particular histories and cultures, domestic factors and by the ongoing processes of interaction with other states through foreign policy initiatives. Understanding these processes can explain why the two transnational norms of "intolerance of

unconstitutional changes of government" and the "responsibility to protect" have been internalised unevenly by the AU's member states (cf. Habib, 2008:9). It also underscores some of the complexities involved in attempts to shift the AU's stance from non-intervention to what is now commonly referred to as the so-called 'doctrine of non-indifference' and the realisation by African leaders that only Africa can provide lasting solutions to Africa's problems (Williams, 2007:259). In part, Africa's security culture contributes to the debate about the perceived duality of an international/African conundrum (Franke, 2009:19 – 22).

The AU's security culture should be understood against the character of a partly autonomous African society of states (Franke, 2009:21). According to Williams (2007:259), this society of states is only partly autonomous because it is embedded within a wider international society that influence how African states think about sovereignty, statehood and security. The formation of this society of African states occurred against the background of the contradiction between the establishment of an African international society in the late 1950s (a reaction against Western imperialism), whilst at the same time, African states were accepting the concept of the Westphalian state and the political borders that the imperial powers had imposed upon the continent (cf. Bellamy & Williams, 2012:4–5). The intention with the development of an identity and integrity of an African international society was to provide international political systems and processes that would guarantee the survival, security, identity and integrity of African states, which the majority of African states cannot provide individually (De Coning, 2013:22–23). This resulted in developments that emphasised the need to understand Africa as a cognitive region and the realisation of African leaders and diplomatic elites who perceived themselves to be members of an African international society that is based on a degree of shared historical experiences and cultural ties (Williams, 2007:261).

The complexities of post-Cold War relationships between African leaders and their societies and leaders and societies from other parts of the globe have prompted a rethink and reassessment of traditional approaches to peace and security (Franke, 2009;140–149). These realities call for new concepts and requirements to promote African security by way of revisiting peacekeeping concepts and to change the ways in which African armed forces are structured, prepared and equipped.

4.3. Foundations for lasting peace – new concepts and requirements for African security

The African peace and security scene has changed fundamentally in the post-Cold War era. This change relates not only to the changing nature of conflicts and the focus of the discourse on security, but also to various initiatives taken by Africa to institute an effective peace and security regime (Franke, 2009:16 – 29). Changes to the relationship between politics, economics and the military have resulted in security policies and peacekeeping operations increasingly assuming responsibility for managing large-scale socio-economic and political change, rather than merely focusing on military activities. The end of the Cold War and the changes that prompted developments towards a multi-polar world order have forever changed theories and conceptualisations underpinning the political, economic and military dimensions of power (Gat, 2006:622–624). The receding threats of nuclear war and a full-scale confrontation between East and West have improved the potential of the international community to jointly address threats to common security. This particularly manifested in the growing commitment to conflict resolution that has emerged in various regional and international forums in recent years and was also encapsulated in the Revised South African White Paper on South Africa's Participation in Peace Missions (Department of International Relations and Cooperation [DIRCO], 2012:11–13). This is because the nature of international activities aimed at international conflict prevention, management and resolution has changed dramatically over the past decade (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). A radically altered post-Cold War security environment has seen the transformation of classic peacekeeping operations into complex, comprehensive multidimensional conflict management activities with a diplomatic or political focus in which the military is but one of many participants.

The complexity of modern PSOs is found in the great number and variety of role-players who are involved in all the aspects of the mission. The planning and control of the achievement of objectives and tasks is also a very complex endeavour and various planning tools have been developed to assist those involved in PSO to coordinate, sequence and synchronise activities (DOD, 2006a:3A-1–3A-18). Traditionally, the progress and plans of military operations have graphically depicted planning tools in the shape of lines of operation (LOOs). These LOOs are used to coordinate and manage military deployments and tasks and are also used to

frame the achievement of military objectives by military entities over time – essentially a graphic presentation of how campaigns, major operations and battles unfold chronologically within a specific mission timeframe (DOD, 2006a:DEF-6). LOOs are used as planning tools to manage and control the proper sequencing of objectives and tasks and to synchronise and sequence the employment of all military and non-military sources of power and influence. The key elements of traditional LOOs include, inter alia, the desired end state, objectives, required forces and assets, focus of main effort (FME), centre of gravity (COG) and other planning tools (Vego, 2000: 433). The author has drafted an example of such a generic LOO in Figure 4.1. Military capabilities and specified tasks are at the centre of traditional LOOs, and other aspects that affect, shape and influence operations, such as the political, economic and informational dimensions, are depicted from the perspective of the military contribution to the operation.

It is, however, extremely difficult to assess the success and progress of PSOs in terms of the achievement of military objectives as depicted by traditional LOOs. In an environment that is characterised by multidimensional conflict management activities, such as the diplomatic, economic and information dimensions play a far more important role in the achievement of mission objectives than what is the case with traditional warfighting operations that are focused on the achievement of military objectives and the coordination of military capabilities and military organisations.



Figure 4.1: Traditional warfighting lines of operation (LOOs)

PSOs require the coordination of a multitude of stakeholders, role-players, organisations and agencies that are all present in deployment areas. In addition, many of the objectives achieved during PSOs cannot be accepted as 'having been achieved', as the effect of events in the political and economic dimensions demand continuous dedication and action to maintain the status quo (progress during the peace mission). It would therefore be more accurate to use the term circles of operation (COOs), as peace mission objectives are enduring and iterative in nature and require continued action by a multitude of military, as well as non-military entities. The author has outlined a generic COO for PSOs in Figure 4.2.



Figure 4.2: Circles of operation (COOs) for PSOs

The changes in the security environment, coupled with the changes to the doctrine of military organisations involved in PSOs, ultimately challenged the traditional concepts of security. This has given rise to processes aimed at redefining the strategies to establish and maintain security. In turn, this process called for a broadening of traditional concepts of security (until that time largely limited to the military dimensions linked to state security) to include political, economic, social, cultural and personal security, often collectively referred to as 'human security' as defined in the UN Agenda for Peace and later popularised by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report, which links humanitarian, economic and social issues to alleviate human suffering and ensure security (Annan, 2001b:1). This has led to widespread acknowledgement of the fact that appropriate responses to ongoing political, economic and social instability must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and ongoing economic and social development

(DIRCO, 2012: 6). Ultimately, this new understanding of the concept of security entailed a shift in focus for militaries, that is, from an essentially state-centric focus on security to a human-centric focus as part of the broader understanding of security. This shift in focus was also explicitly stated in the South African White Paper on Defence (1996) (DOD, 1996) and in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) of 2002 (AU, 2002). The change from a state-centric to a human-centric approach to security is complex and multi-faceted and remains difficult to operationalise beyond the normative. This shift towards a human-centric approach was analysed and expounded in Chapter 2 (see 2.2) in terms of the various schools of thought and IR theories. Similarly, the relationship between human security and irregular warfare was discussed in Chapter 3 of this document (see 3.7.1). It is in the planning and execution of peacekeeping where both the aforementioned dynamics meet and become the "real world" for political and military decision-makers.

Tschirgi, Lund & Mancini (2010:2) argues that peace building lies at the nexus of development and security, and that it requires the readiness of militaries to act initially as lead organisations during peace interventions and to make a difference on the ground in preventing conflicts or establishing the conditions for a return to sustainable peace. In order to lay sound foundations for peacebuilding, it is vital that militaries be designed and structured in accordance with tailor-made security architectures that will allow them to execute the multitude of complex tasks that are essential to the achievement of peace-building objectives. Militaries of the 21st century must therefore be structured and specifically equipped for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) operations in order to achieve mission objectives as these types of operations require organisations, structures and equipment that differ significantly from those that soldiers would utilise during conventional operations (Bellamy & Williams, Bellamy & Williams, 2012:19).

At the start of the 21st century, indications were that Africa had departed on a new growth path, evident in concepts and initiatives such as the AU, the African Renaissance, NEPAD and the new resolve on the part of Africans to settle their own conflicts (Franke, 2009:2). These important security and development initiatives have come at a time when the international community became increasingly indifferent to the plight of war-torn countries in Africa (Field, 2004:19). In order to achieve the security and development objectives seen to

underpin NEPAD and the African Renaissance since the establishment of the AU in 2003, it has become necessary to re-position African security architectures, as the contemporary demands for peace and security have changed significantly and often make an anachronism of many of the older security architectures that had been developed to serve peace missions on the continent under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the 1960s and 1970s (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:90). Renewal of or adjustments to organisations and institutions tasked with peace support roles thus became all the more important.

Despite the initiatives by the AU to develop practical solutions to conflict on the continent since 2003, there continues to be a palpable lack of synergy among current efforts to improve African security (Cawthra, 2007:25–27). This lack of synergy among role-players remains at the core of the problems experienced during PSOs in Africa. Most African militaries do not have sufficient capacity to address all the challenges to be addressed as part of PSOs. External support in terms of personnel and equipment is therefore crucial to the successful outcome of African multinational PSOs. The success of PSOs will therefore be determined by the levels of effective collaboration among multinational role-players during these operations. High levels of collaboration among role-players during African PSOs are difficult to achieve, not only because of organisational and cultural differences and historic experiences, but also because various role-players at all levels draw on the same scarce sources of external assistance to supplement their respective contributions. It is especially important to link all early warning mechanisms in a continental network that also feed into the UN's Executive Committee on Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). Internally, such collaboration will facilitate the reappraisal, development and synchronisation of global African strategies for peace and support and peacebuilding. It will also help to steer external donors towards multilateral rather than bilateral regional arrangements.

In addition to changes to the ASF at AU level, Leijenaar (2013:1) suggests that changes should take place at the UNSC level where there is an enduring requirement to enhance cooperation with regional partners to ensure more timely and pragmatic consultation, which is necessary for political coherence on the fundamental objectives of peace operations. Leijenaar further argues that the UNSC should consider engaging regional organisations in a more structured and regular manner during crisis situations in which those regional

organisations have a vested interest. Although it might prove difficult to institutionalise some of the proposed changes, this should not prevent discussions on the reform of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to be initiated (Leijenaar, 2013:1).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter anticipates the need for close consultation between the UNSC and regional organisations, but the right balance has not been found as yet. According to UN Deputy Secretary Jan Eliasson, the traditional principles of neutrality/impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence has given way to strong political engagement and more 'muscular' intervention approaches such as the intervention brigades in the eastern DRC and Mali, which are similar to peace enforcement (Elmendorf, 2014:1). "Early warning mechanisms, including sound analysis and integrated planning, combined with the political will of all stakeholders, are required to ensure preventative action" (Leijenaar, 2013:1). In general, however, Africa has entered a phase where the declaratory commitments and the less impressive operational execution of what is said must be urgently addressed. The following section of this chapter will focus on the progress with the development of an African security architecture.

4.4. The quest for conflict resolution on the African continent

African continental and regional security cooperation and the establishment of regional and continental security architectures are relatively recent phenomena which only started to gain momentum during the last few decades of the 20th century. The struggle against imperial domination and the pursuit of liberation prompted the quest for the establishment of a kind of defence/military alliance among the people of the continent (Cawthra, 2007:35). This movement to continental security cooperation received forceful impetus not only from the Pan-African ideology, but also from purely practical military concerns. Once liberation was achieved, the perceived need to defend the newly established sovereignty against neo-imperialist attempts to re-colonise the continent became the driving rationale for seeking military cooperation. It was only after the end of the Cold War that the continued violent intrastate conflicts and the simultaneous disengagement of the international community, combined with a renewed wave of Pan-Africanist idealism, shifted significantly in focus away from liberation activities to those of continental defences to conflict prevention, conflict

management and conflict resolution as the primary purpose of inter-African security cooperation (Franke, 2009:49).

Africa continued to be financially as well as politically marginalised from the so-called 'developed world' and several European powers such as France, Britain and the United States drastically reduced their aid packages to Africa in the 1990s (Du Plessis & Hough, 2000:150). In addition to the significant reductions in foreign aid packages to Africa, the USA, Britain and France experienced severe budget cuts to their respective defence budgets. This resulted in the restructuring of their defence forces, the closing down of several units and the general reduction in the size of their defence forces. This in turn, initiated a significant reduction of non-African peacekeepers and support to peace missions in Africa. This situation was exacerbated by the limited successes achieved by the deployment of peacekeepers in African conflicts, especially after UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement misfired, not only in Somalia and Angola, but also in traumatised Central Africa. The negative experiences of American forces during peace missions in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 marked a turning point, if not a watershed, in American and Western contributions to peacekeeping operations – especially in their involvement in African conflicts (Neethling, 2010:51). The three-year UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda also failed to halt the ethnic genocide that resulted in between 500 000 and one million deaths in 1994. These occurrences negatively affected the willingness of the international community to become involved in peace operations in Africa (Du Plessis & Hough, 2000:151). The UN's failures or difficulties in these states have overshadowed the world body's relative success stories such as the peacekeeping efforts in Namibia and Mozambique. Instead, the failures of its endeavours in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Sierra Leone are emphasised as weaknesses on the side of the UN to act as diplomatic arbiter, peacekeeper and peace-enforcer. There seems to be a cynical perception in parts of the international community that peacekeeping in Africa has absorbed enormous resources and energy, but has brought little in return (Neethling, 2010:50). The international community's approach to African conflicts has for several years been characterised by the provision of financial and technical aid to bolster Africa's crisis management capabilities, rather than to commit forces to African peace missions (Franke, 2009:77).

The phenomenon of providing financial and technical aid to African peace missions rather than committing the armed forces of Western nations to UN peacekeeping efforts is supported by reports and statistical analysis on the numbers of uniformed personnel made available for service during peace missions on the continent. Since the early 1990s, the increase in troop contributions to the UN was made possible through contingents supplied by developing states (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:301–313). At the beginning of 1991, out of the top ten contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide only two were developing states, namely Ghana and Nepal (Berman & Sams, 2000:3–34). In recent years, however, the overwhelming majority of the top ten contributors were developing states, three of which were African states, namely Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya (Neethling, 2010:52). Prior to 1988, only 12 African states had contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping system. Since 1999, however, 29 African states have contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (Berman & Sams, 2000:3–34). This was particularly evident in the UN's most difficult endeavours, the peace missions in Sierra Leone and the DRC, in which the majority of peacekeepers were provided by developing countries. African states, in particular, play significant roles in these missions. Notwithstanding the poverty and limited means of African states, there seems to be a willingness among them to assume greater responsibility for providing the UN and other multinational organisations with peacekeeping personnel (Neethling, 2010:55).

The reluctance of the UN and Western countries to commit their troops to peace missions in Africa has effectively compelled regional organisations and military organisations in Africa to assume greater responsibility in the domain of peacekeeping. At the same time, and partially as a result of this, African multilateral interventions developed a momentum of their own in the 1990s and increasingly began leaning towards some type of peace enforcement (Schoeman, 2013:211). The forceful operations of the ECOWAS, and specifically its 'military arm' or Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia (1990-1996) and Sierra Leone (1997-2000), as well as the SADC in the DRC (1998) and in Lesotho (1998) have especially added a new dimension to the character of peacekeeping by Africans in Africa (Curtis, 2012:10). Added to this, the actions and decisions by the UN could be interpreted to mean that the UN indicated a willingness to hand over responsibility for peace and security to willing regional alliances and organisations. An example of this is when ECOMOG not only intervened militarily in the

Liberian conflict in 1990, but also took responsibility for the actual peace support process after the UN formally became involved in the peace process in 1993. Developments in Sierra Leone took a similar direction in 1997 (Hutchful, 2012:73). After ECOMOG had intervened militarily in the conflict, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) – which preceded United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – served alongside ECOMOG forces in a limited role (Neethling, 2010:60). In the case of the DRC, UN inaction effectively opened the way for Southern African states (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) to intervene militarily in the conflict in the name of SADC in 1998 (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:43). In this case, however, regional military intervention aggravated the problem instead of solving it and the UN had no option but to involve itself in what has become one of the most complex and perplexing events in the post-Cold War era (Neethling, 2010:61). This shift to more forceful interventions was also witnessed through the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), established by the UNSC Resolution 1778 of 2007, in which the UN, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and France attempted to deal with the threat in the CAR (Draman, 2001:121–141).

The continued deployment of African peacekeepers in Africa has been supported in general by most Africans and is indicative of the quest to find 'African solutions to African problems'. Despite these good intentions, however, there have been several problems that are common to all PSOs undertaken by the AU and subregional organisations. To date, the AU and its regional economic communities (RECs) have mounted PSOs in Burundi, the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia and CAR. While these missions demonstrated and confirmed the value of quick responses to conflicts, the ability to implement the respective mandates of the missions have often been constrained by a lack of military capabilities, insufficient resources and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, manage, deploy and conclude operations (Dersso, 2010:14).

One of the most prominent resource problems experienced by African TCCs is the lack of a strategic airlift capability, which is crucial to the success of peace missions, given the size of the continent. The problems that result from the lack of a strategic airlift capability is not only related to the physical sustainment of the operations, but it also affects the political level: it means that regional brigades will be primarily utilised for crises pertaining to their respective

region, as opposed to engaging in extra-regional PSOs. Whilst this 'regional approach' might hold some advantages, such as increased knowledge of local conditions and culture, there is also the disadvantage that the conflict will become regionalised. In addition, some of the neighbouring states may have a vested interest in who comes to power in the post-conflict period. As a result, national interest might thwart regional considerations (Solomon, 2012:23).

Another problem that has limited the success of the AU is the organisation's acceptance of the regional structures at face value and the fact that the five geographical regions (North, Southern, East, West and Central) do not correlate with existing regional organisations that were established on the continent prior to the establishment of the AU in 2002. Initially, there were attempts to co-locate the ASF with each of the existing five RECs with the aim of strengthening sub-regional identities. This intention was, however, not realised, resulting in a situation in which membership to various regional organisations overlap. Angola and the DRC, for example, are both members of SADC REC, but they are at the same time also part of the central and southern regions of the ASF (Solomon, 2012:22). Madagascar and Mauritius, also members of the SADC REC are also members of the southern and eastern regions of the ASF respectively (African Union [AU], 2003). This is problematic as regional brigades are formed outside some of the regional frameworks, creating uncertainty about who contributes to which regional brigade as well as uncertainty about the nature and capacity of the respective institutions (Mandrup, 2009a:4). In addition, from an operational perspective, it leaves countries with multiple memberships overstretched in terms of personnel and equipment. These overlaps are graphically represented in figure 4.3. This further requires great effort from coordinating mechanisms as these institutions must address a great variety of operational challenges to ensure that overlapping memberships do not hinder the deployment of standby forces during times of crisis (Solomon, 2012:22).



Figure 4.3: Graphic representation of RECs and SFs overlaps

Despite these difficulties, some progress has been made with early warning and conflict prevention endeavours on the continent. The increased appointment of mediators during crises and their effectiveness during interventions with the assistance of the AU, and the respective RECs has had a positive influence on emerging or ongoing conflicts in places such as Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar and Sudan. At regional level, the economic communities have evolved their own early warning and conflict prevention systems, councils of elders and 'wisemen' who are cooperating with continental bodies (UNSC, 2010:7). RECs have strengthened their capacity in early warning, monitoring and

preparedness for conflict situations with a view to effectively put in place mitigation mechanisms. ECOWAS, for example, adopted the protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 (Franke, 2009:64–67). Since then, ECOWAS and the East African Community (EAC) have undertaken several mediation initiatives in Burundi, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Niger (Franke, 2009:64). Another example of the development at regional level is that of the SADC which, through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDSC), has played a significant role in Madagascar (Omari & Macaringue, 2007:64).

Many reasons could be cited for the limited successes achieved by African security organisations. In addition to the inherent organisational flaws, such as overlapping membership and scant resources which might contribute to the limited successes, the political will required by international organisations to take prompt and effective action to prevent or contain conflicts is, in most instances, lacking (Solomon, 2006:23). In addition to the problems experienced with the political will of states to become involved in PSOs, the AU is also still experiencing difficulty with defining its legal authority. Several key issues regarding the mandating authority for AU missions are still outstanding. Other challenges that need to be addressed include the finalisation of policy instruments, PSO doctrine, operational concepts, standard operating procedures, training and building of the necessary infrastructural capacity and funding (De Coning, 2013:30-31). The AU must also develop and expand its command-and-control systems, its administrative capability and organisational coordination (Dersso, 2010:12).

One of the greatest challenges to be addressed by African militaries is to define the exit strategies once forces are pledged to and committed to PSOs. The problems with the definition of exit strategies are coupled with the requirements for peace, as defined by a variety of role-players. In 2001, UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, wrote

> '… domestic peace … becomes sustainable, not when all conflict is removed from society, but when the natural conflict of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of state sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance. In many cases, an effective strategy for realizing that objective will help warring parties to move their political and economic struggles

> from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where a peaceful settlement process can be engaged and future disputes can be addressed in a similar fashion' (Annan, 2001:1).

To facilitate such a transition, the mandate of a mission should include peacebuilding and incorporate such elements as institution building and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, by assisting the parties to develop legitimate and broad-based institutions (Franke, 2009:139–149). Annan (2001:1) concludes that the success of an international engagement in peacemaking or peacekeeping depends on functioning state institutions that manage political disputes. Unfortunately for this approach, many of the world's most difficult conflicts occur in countries where any such state institutions are subordinate to social affinities and patronage networks, and are likely to remain so.

In states where official institutions are weak and shaped by regime security and cadre deployments in the public service, people still care about political issues and fight over them, but can neither organise their political allegiances through rule-governed organisations nor resolve them through state institutions according to the rule of law (Okomu & Ikelegbe, 2010:11). Ramsbotham et al. (2011:23), suggest that the political life in such a country could be viewed as being organised according to a patrimonial marketplace, which operates according to socio-culturally determined rules. This can be viewed both as a state failure/fragility and as an alternative way in which countries can function. Moreover, just as state institutions are co-opted by the patrimonial system, so international peace engagement efforts also become enmeshed in that local political marketplace where they are usually at a disadvantage because peacemakers and peacekeepers are neither well attuned to the marketplace nor highly skilful in operating there. It follows that, "insofar as peace efforts distort the market of allegiances (indeed, they are usually designed with that end in mind), then an internationally mediated peace agreement can be sustained only through the continued involvement of the international guarantor without an exit strategy" (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:22). This, in turn results in 'mission creep' and 'mandate creep' as peace engagements have also come to include achieving democracy, post-conflict rehabilitation, justice and civilian protection (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:23).

In addition, the post-Cold War security situation in Africa clearly demonstrates that the international political will to become involved in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in Africa continues to become an increasingly depreciated currency. This is because "the human and financial costs of security operations, the myopic primacy of national interests, and the inclination towards post facto intervention all contribute to (this) depreciation" (Field, 2004:16). African alternatives to conflict resolution, such as the philosophy underlying initiatives to the African Renaissance and NEPAD do not fare much better at the moment.

Many questions remain about the way forward for PSOs in Africa, such as whether peace settlements have to be imposed forcibly in the event that one or more parties to the conflict appear not to be committed to the peace process and whether the UN would in future only become involved in PSOs on the continent where the characteristics and contours of classical peacekeeping apply (Neethling, 2010:62). Despite these uncertainties, it does seem that there would still be a requirement for classic or first-generation PSOs as was the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is, however, "likely that the bulk of PSOs that will be undertaken by the UN during the next decade would be PSOs in the civil–war context" (De Coning, 2002:50). Africa is no different, and the AU and its RECs will most probably also be primarily involved in PSOs in COIN environments. African organisations will in all likelihood also be required to assume even greater responsibility for conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa as non-consensual peacekeeping is likely to remain the most prevalent form of peacekeeping on the continent. In addition, of great importance, the reality is that Africa is (due to the under-development of the various RECs and SFs) not comparable to many other parts of the globe where relatively strong regional organisations are willing and able to play a role in PSOs to complement UN efforts in acute civil war conflicts (Neethling, 2010:63). African regional organisations will therefore be compelled to assume greater peace support responsibilities and these responsibilities will not only have to extend beyond peace enforcement and peacekeeping, but would focus on peacebuilding and PCRD initiatives as well in order to increase the chances of creating the circumstances of building lasting peace. The unfortunate truth, however is, that regional role-players in Africa can only contribute limited resources and means towards peacekeeping and peacebuilding (cf. De Coning, 2013:30–31).

4.5. African peacebuilding and PCRD

It is essential to use the successes achieved with peacekeeping and peacebuilding as foundations to the concept of the UN's PCRD process in order to help countries emerging out of conflict towards sustainable growth and development (Hudson, 2013:9). The need for PCRD was identified in the UN Secretary – General's report on peacekeeping in 1998, also known as the Brahimi Report (UNSG, 2000). The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has subsequently established ad hoc advisory groups on African countries emerging from conflict, with a subsidiary group each for Guinea-Bissau (2002) and Burundi in 2001 (UNSC, 2010:10). In concert with the respective country-specific configurations, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the UN Peacebuilding Commission acted as an essential mechanism for linking peace and the development of agendas. The UN Peacebuilding Commission has, since then, assisted in coordinating initiatives, actors and resources in Burundi, the CAR, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, thus helping to focus international attention on countries that might otherwise have elicited limited engagement (UNSC, 2010:11).

Through the establishment of its peacebuilding architectures, special political missions and integrated peacebuilding initiatives and offices, the UN has the ability to improve collaboration with relevant institutions at the respective national levels (Franke, 2009:237). Experience has shown that successful peacebuilding requires long-term engagement, a higher degree of flexibility and continued experimentation with different models of cooperation at country level to ensure that the funds, strategies and country-specific configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission respond to the specific and unique needs of individual post-conflict situations.

The UN has established several systems that are aimed at strengthening policy coherence in peacebuilding. These include the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) (also adopted by the AU as official planning tool for peace missions), the Peacebuilding Contact Group and the Peace and Security Cluster of the regional coordination mechanism which supported the AU in the development of the AU policy on reconstruction and development of post-conflict countries which was adopted in 2006 (African Union [AU], 2006). Other role-players such as the World Bank, the UNDP, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime all contribute to PCRD

efforts on the continent. Their activities include assistance in reforming state institutions, promoting democratic governance and solidifying the rule of law. The UN Children's Fund, for example, has assisted in rebuilding basic social services, including strengthening national education and health systems in countries emerging from conflict. What has emerged from the lessons learned during PCRD operations is that post-conflict peacebuilding priorities must focus on promoting economic growth for the poor, ensuring access to basic services and accelerating socially inclusive and equitable sustainable development. PCRD efforts must be owned and led by affected communities, with the full participation of local institutions and community organisations, especially the private sector, civil society, women, youth and children. In seeking to bridge funding in the transition from conflict to recovery, it is essential to address the shortfall that often exists between the political commitment entered into by member states and the actual disbursement of the funds that had been pledged (UNSC, 2010:12). This notion has also been accepted and implemented by the AU which has also included PCRD activities in its policy documents such as the Policy Framework on PCRD as reviewed by the meeting of governmental experts which convened in Addis Ababa over the periods 7–8 February and 8–9 June 2006. During the 9th Executive Council Ordinary Session of the AU in June 2006, the AU's PCRD Policy was adopted in Banjul, Gambia. This was followed by several other workshops during which PCRD policies and activities were discussed, such as the Workshop on the Implementation of PCRD in Africa which took place in Lusaka, Zambia over the period 17–19 July 2007. Accepting the PCRD concept implies that the AU also accepted the imperative that post-conflict activities and contributions are essential within the ambit of peacekeeping for which African security mechanisms must cater. It is thus necessary for the sake of clarity to also allude to African security mechanisms that must give expression to peacebuilding and PCRD.

4.6. Common, collective and collaborative mechanisms for the African security management

Approaches to regional security co-operation on the continent are not merely of conceptual interest. The adopted approaches have had profound implications on individual national and multinational policies and it has become very clear that various defence capabilities and decision-making systems have radically different trajectories which all have significant effects

on the external environment. According to De Coning (2002:52), a broad consensus has developed over time regarding some aspects of conflict management, peace and security. Firstly, decision-makers at UN and AU level recognise the need to enhance Africa's capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Secondly, it has been recognised that PSOs in Africa should be undertaken with UN authorisation, and that there should be close cooperation between the AU and the UN in this regard. Thirdly, there is an acceptance that in exceptional circumstances – when the UN security council is effectively unable or unwilling to execute or fulfil its responsibility toward African peacekeeping challenges – Africa will most probably have to undertake such operations on its own. In the light of the above, it is clear that, in order to increase the possibilities of success for the continental and regional security architectures, a policy framework should be established to direct, regulate and financially support conflict resolution and govern peacekeeping on the continent. The AU's Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) has created such a policy framework which clearly stipulates the interfaces between conflict management, peace, security and PCRD activities (AU CADSP, 2002:8).

One of the key issues to be addressed in such a policy would be about the type of peacekeeping operations that the AU and regional organisations should and could become involved in. The hybrid peace mission in Darfur, namely the African Union and United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNMID) accentuates the determination to find a careful, albeit intricate, balance between strategic relationships involving the UNSC and the AU PSC. These 'hybrid' peace missions might be capable of addressing the urgent peacekeeping requirements effectively, but it is clear that these types of arrangements cannot substitute the requirements for an effective long-term African peacekeeping capacity (UNSC, 2010:9). Continental and regional peacekeeping policies should provide detailed guidelines about the reasons that would serve as grounds for peacekeeping or peace enforcement initiatives. Once these issues have been clarified, all the role-players (the UN, AU, regional organisations and donors) could focus their outlook, general approach and capacity-building programmes on such a policy framework and the scope thereof (Neethling, 2010:64).

Much of the IR discourse on security communities has been focused only on such organisations in the developed world (Franke, 2009:34). In stark contrast to the proliferation

of academic studies on security communities in the Western world, analyses of security communities in Africa, and specifically the applicability of constructivist theories to these analyses, has hardly begun (Franke, 2009:34). Some scholars argue that the prevalence of violent conflict and humanitarian disasters in Africa disqualify relations among African states as security communities (Nathan, 2004). Others, such as Charles Tilly, warn that such a line of argumentation bears the danger of applying an implicit comparison with the developed world to the analysis of African international relations, and the argument also contends that the presence of wide-spread intrastate conflict should be part of the explanation for the emergence of an African security community, rather than a criterion for its disqualification on definitional terms (Tilly, 1998:3). Scholars, such as Amitav Acharya, point out that, when the idea of security communities was initially developed, the concept (then designed to meet the requirements of the developed states of the North Atlantic region) was applied to the developing world without paying any attention to the idiosyncrasies and requirements for security cooperation in the so-called 'developing world'. This ultimately resulted in a bias towards accepting the characteristics of security cooperation in the developed world as the 'gold standard' for security communities (Acharya, 1998:198–227).

Subsequent research has consolidated this bias (Franke, 2009:35). The emphasis on the Kantian notion of a 'democratic peace' (cf. Kant, 1991) as a philosophy that underpins the Western concept of security communities, as well as the emphasis on the requirements and necessity of liberal economic interdependence among member states, has discouraged research into the possibility of establishing security communities in the developing world (Franke, 2009:34). Despite the fact that 'democratic peace' and the manifestation of liberal economies have not necessarily been among the defining characteristics of developing world dynamics, many other aspects of the security community concept are, in fact, well suited to explaining interstate cooperation in the developing world (cf. Cawthra, 2007:23–44). According to Franke (2009:35), a slight redefinition of the security community concept – away from its liberal roots – as zones of institutionalised security cooperation on the basis of shared values, norms and understanding in line with the theory of social constructivism, will increase the applicability of the concepts of security communities to specific areas of the developing world. This is because constructivism explains how developing societies approach security (cf. McDonald, 2008:59–72) and how they understand security cooperation as a social

construction determined by historical events, rather than the inevitable outcomes of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics and power. Approaches to security architectures therefore manifest in different frameworks and are shaped by a variety of influences, events and rationales. One of the most prominent manifestations of formalised security cooperation is that of common security architectures.

4.6.1. Common security architectures

Common security architectures are founded on the argument that states in a given regional formation share common security concerns, often of a multidimensional nature, and together can address their security needs more effectively than alone or in opposition to one another (cf. Du Pisani, 2007:15–17). The term 'common security architecture' or 'common security regime' has its origins during the Cold War period when the Palme Commission (cf. Palme, 1982:ix) and other initiatives that emphasised the common threat of nuclear destruction faced by the major powers argued for confidence- and security-building measures to overcome the 'security dilemma' – whereby one country's war-making capabilities could become another's threat in a mutually reinforcing spiral of insecurity (Cawthra, 2009:33). This resulted, for example, in the elaborate mechanisms for security management that were put in place by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – a classic example of a common security regime, which is used more to mediate relations between member states and govern their internal security processes than to protect them from external insecurities. Such multidimensional arrangements, which cover not merely relations between states but also issues such as democratic practice, human rights, and even civil–military relations, are sometimes referred to as a comprehensive security arrangement in which the 'widened' concept of security is addressed largely at an interstate level. The term **common security** is now widely used in subregional groupings such as the SADC, although it is doubtful that the SADC, or the AU, could be regarded as constituting true common security regimes. The security co-operation within these structures is probably better described as collaborative, implying less systemic and comprehensive interaction (Cawthra, 2009:33).

It should be borne in mind that approaches to regional and continental organisations are also informed by the global collective security system as personified by the UN. This implies that

international order should rest not on a balance of power, but that it should be based on a preponderance of power wielded by a combination of states acting as the agents of the international society as a whole and who will deter challenges to the collective security system or deal with them if they occur (Bull, 1977:239). This concept and approach to security are expressed in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, while Chapter VIII extends the principle to regional organisations recognised by the UN, such as the AU (Franke, 2009:240). A global collective security approach allows for both the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Chapter VI) and the use of military force by states or groups of states, as long as this is authorised by the Security Council (Chapter VII). Since the end of the Cold War, and with peace missions having to take place in the context of complicated 'new wars' such as those in Sierra Leone or Bosnia-Herzegovina, the principles of impartiality, the non-use of force (except in self-defence), and the consent of all the various parties, have been questioned, but the fact remains that peacekeeping operations still hinge on the concept of obtaining the consent of the principle parties to the conflict, whereas collective security operations, sometime referred to as 'peace enforcement operations', do not. Moreover, while the UN can authorise enforcement actions, it cannot fight wars: "it is up to 'coalitions of the willing' or regional alliances and collective defence organisations such as NATO to do that" (Cawthra, 2009:34).

Global collective security and common security approaches should, however, be distinguished from collective self-defence arrangements (cf. Bellamy & Williams, 2012:216). Collective self-defence arrangements refer to agreements in which states make arrangements to protect each other from external aggression – the emphasis is on defence against external military threats. Typically, such arrangements are concerned less with governing relations between the states concerned, and even less with internal practices or political processes, than with threats from states from outside of the arrangement. Collective defence is therefore usually actualised through mutual assistance or mutual defence treaties through military alliances such as NATO or through treaties of guarantees in which one state undertakes to protect another, although sometimes only in specific circumstances (Cawthra, 2009:34). The security cooperation that was envisaged for the AU, by nature, falls short of mutual defence, and focuses rather on extending the principles, practices and structures of the UN collective security system to the African continent (Cawthra, 2009:36). The founding principles of

NEPAD describes a wide range of security prescripts, including peacekeeping and early warning functions. NEPAD therefore specifically links security and development in a comprehensive way, and goes further than the establishment of collective self-defence arrangements (Franke, 2009:97). This, according to Cawthra (2009:36), has been underway since 1993 and has been endorsed at the AU summit meeting in Durban, 2002. It establishes a set of core values, and lists about 50 performance indicators relating to security, democracy, human rights, economic issues, and development. These issues were incorporated into the AU's Peer Review System (Cilliers & Malan, 2005:11).

African security frameworks show more or less congruence with the range of frameworks that have come into being over time. Two of the most prominent peace and security frameworks that are gaining prominence in Africa are referred to as collective security architectures and collaborative security architectures.

4.6.2. Collective security architectures

Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to and breaches of the peace (cf. Fawcett, 2008:311–319). Collective security is often more ambitious than systems of alliance security or collective defence in that it seeks to encompass the totality of states within a region or indeed globally and to address a wide range of possible threats to stability, rather than being focussed on the destruction of military threats. Interests to the common good are defined in terms of common defence of all member states.

Collective security approaches in Africa seek to replicate the principles and possibilities of the UN at regional level. Collective security architectures are guided and characterised by very strong legal prescripts which are, unfortunately, often ill-suited to the imperatives of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU) (AU, 2002). Several challenges have arisen due to the fact that many of the regional security organisations, which were intended to serve as building blocks for the continental system, are weak or vastly different in nature. If collective security architectures are to play a meaningful role towards a stable and secure continent, the

ground rules and decision-making processes for intervention need to be made clear, and strong regional organisations capable of taking on security functions need to be built. In this manner, if collective security structures could contribute to the postmodern thinking on state sovereignty, they have to be modified as part of their inter-relationships with the interests of good governance, democracy and human rights (Cawthra, 2009:38).

One element of successful collective African security structures, as identified by both the AU and NEPAD, is the establishment of regional early warning systems that are linked to a continental situation room at AU headquarters. This has proved to be a very problematic endeavour as experience has shown that it is difficult to implement and operate such an institution on the continent. In the first place, African governments are usually reluctant to have their problems pored over by other governments and NGOs – primarily because African states place such a high value on their sovereignty (Du Pisani, 2007:3). In the second place, states are notoriously reluctant to share intelligence – except when it suits them – and this is likely to put a cap on the extent to which multinational monitoring and analysis capacity can be built. This is also true for UN peacekeeping missions, in which the sharing of data and information have been resisted, leading to serious intelligence deficiencies in some operations. The reluctance to develop shared intelligence systems is also evident in the fact that the UN does not refer to 'Intelligence Officers', but only to 'Information Officers' who are tasked to analyse data and information (DOD, 2006a:DEF-5). Even where problems relating to information sharing are resolved, issues such as early action, decision-making for preventative deployment or other preventative actions are very difficult issues to address. The UN itself has only used preventative deployment occasionally in part because of the difficulties of making a judgement on an imminent crisis and taking the political risk associated with it (UNSC, 2010:7).

An inherent danger in collective security arrangements, and especially in collective defence arrangements, is that the sovereignty of individual states is compromised by membership of such security arrangements. In the event that security is isolated from issues such as democracy and human rights, the illegitimate regimes can effectively protect themselves not only against external intervention, but also against internal challenges by calling on their neighbours for support. For this reason, a common or comprehensive security approach is

preferable. Another advantage of the common/comprehensive approach (cf. Franke, 2009:104–107) is that, by combining economic, social and human rights and political and security matters, the density of interactions is increased and progress in one sector might pull other sectors into the right direction – socio-economic matters can have a positive influence on political matters and vice versa. By addressing several factors simultaneously, interaction in one field might contribute to the development of another. It is unlikely that security cooperation on its own will succeed in bringing peace to a region or to the continent (Franke, 2009:35).

On the whole, the AU, NEPAD and many of the charters or treaties of regional organisations amount to blueprints for comprehensive or common security (Franke, 2009:213–221). The majority of the governing documents of continental and regional security institutions stipulate the need to develop ground rules for the behaviour of states that are members of the agreements such as the CAAU (AU, 2002). The structures of the AU and the regional organisations provide for organisations that deal specifically with security council-type issues, such as threats to and breaches of the peace. It would, however, be inappropriate, difficult and physically impossible for the AU PSC to deal with all human security issues and security concerns, including threats to the environment and the economy (Kasaija, 2010:205). In order to be operationally effective, it is imperative that the AU PSC limit its focus. Commitments to continental and regional security structures will also require considerable political will, as states would have to trade some of their sovereignty for the benefits of common security as "it is impossible to build a regional regime in which human rights and democratic norms are upheld, without becoming involved in each other's 'internal affairs'" (Cawthra, 2009:39).

4.6.3. Collaborative security architectures

Collaborative security points to a shift from collective security to a less formalised collaborative security medium. The trend towards collaborative security focuses on principles such as the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the prohibition of the use of force or threats of force and the right of intervention in the affairs of member states in case of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (cf. Diehl, 2008:161–163). Political bargaining, joint

management, flexibility and responsibility are therefore all part of the 'tool kit' required by modern security architectures in order to apply the above-mentioned principles. Traditional collective security structures and approaches would therefore be ill-suited to meet this required broad scope of post-Cold War peacemaking imperatives. Collaborative security architectures provide a sound basis for a different kind of Lockean social contract (cf. Locke, 1980) and states also do not need to labour under the total abdication of all rights to sovereign choice in determining what the appropriate collective response to a relevant situation should be (Field, 2004:17). Collaborative security regimes are also optimally structured to provide flexibility in addressing the idiosyncrasies of specific security challenges, whereas the rigid legality of collective security regimes are often ill-suited to meet specific imperatives for establishing a lasting peace.

4.6.4. Collaborative security architectures versus collective security architectures

Collaborative security architectures are deemed as being more idealistic in nature, compared to collective security architectures which have strong statist and more rigid realist foundations. Collaborative security architectures are based on the premise that non-state entities have an equally important role to play in security, whereas collective security architectures are based on the notion that formal state institutions are the primary role-players in the establishment and maintenance of security cooperation among states (cf. Abass. 2000:211). Collaborative security architectures allow for a significant contribution by non-state entities, whereas collective security architectures are based on formal agreements among state institutions (cf. Echezons & Duru, 2005:39). Collaborative security co-operation within security structures is loosely formed and shaped by current events and situations, rather than according to formal and permanent structures that are characteristic of collective security architectures (Field, 2004:34). These security structures also imply less systemic and comprehensive interaction and are therefore less rigid than collective security architectures. They are more attuned to social contracting, often associated with constructivist views, which are believed as being able to describe African international relations better, as opposed to pure realist motivations, which more accurately describe Western political interactions (Abass, 2000:211). Collaborative security frameworks, as described by Aboagye (2004:1), are founded on the premise that states do not need to labour under the total abdication of rights to sovereign choice in

determining what the appropriate collective response to a relevant situation ought to be. Field (2004:17) argues that:

> collective security architectures allow sovereign equals to come together to maximise their values and norms within a framework in which, for example, the African continent's peace and security interests are paramount – in securing these interests, they are, in fact, securing their own.

Although it seems that African states have proclaimed their preference for collective security, the reality of Africa's politics seems to lean towards collaborative security (Abass, 2000:211). The establishment of security architectures in Africa is still very much that of a work in progress whose failure or success will depend on the will and decisions made by member states of the AU (Echezons & Duru, 2005:39). In addition, African international relations should also be understood as part of the role and effect of the domestic politics of respective African states (cf. Olonisakin, 2004). It is essential to keep this role in mind as African political leaders are, due to the highly personalised nature of African political leadership, compelled to be highly attentive to domestic concerns to protect their political positions when making decisions about international engagements (Zaum, 2012:47). In addition to these levels of analysis, African international relations must also be analysed and understood to enclose two other layers of systemic investigation, namely a *regional* layer of interstate cooperation and a *continental* layer of interstate cooperation (Franke, 2009:6). This is because Africa's emerging peace and security architecture is unique in the manner in which the continental level relies on regional organisations as pillars and implementation organs of its policies (Franke, 2009:6). This differentiation is important, not only because it explains an important characteristic of contemporary security cooperation in Africa, but also because it could provide important insight into the possibility of different motivations for, and evolutions of, teamwork at the two respective layers (Zaum, 2012:47). In attempting to find definitive answers to understanding African interstate cooperation, it is vital not to rely on monolithic levels of systemic analysis that do not take into account the unique characteristics of African interstate collaboration and support (Field, 2004:17). It is therefore crucial to differentiate between regional and continental security cooperation because it will provide more insight into the different numbers of actors involved and of the different rationales at play (Zaum,

2012:47). It will also provide better insight into how international security collaboration and support in Africa should be understood and developed (Franke, 2009:6).

4.7. New structures for African security: in search of a continental 'force for good'

The changing security environment of post-colonialist Africa, coupled with the less than successful peace initiatives launched on the continent, demanded the establishment of more appropriate and effective international, continental and regional peace and security architectures more attuned to the conditions found in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War there has been increasing support for the establishment of tailor-made continental and regional security organisations that would be able to address Africa's security challenges (Franke, 2009:6). In Africa, this resulted in calls for the establishment of the AU and regional security organisations. Reasons that motivated the establishment of these structures were, for instance –

- the complexity and longevity of African conflicts;
- the multidimensionality of 'widened' security issues;
- the transnational character of the new security threats; and
- the complex character of 'new wars' (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:3).

In addition, the increasing pressure on the UN system for peacekeeping, coupled with the pressure for democratisation and security sector reform, as well as the complex effects of globalisation, all contributed to the adoption of integrated, regional solutions to conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011:3).

It is generally accepted that continental and regional security organisations should be afforded the authority to intervene in international, transnational as well as intrastate conflict in order to limit the damages inflicted by conflict and war. At organisational level such organisations must have the ability to compel member states to comply with decisions, and to develop the capacity to resolve problems (Mathiasen, 2006:5). These organisations must also

have the capacity to intervene pre-emptively at any stage of an emerging conflict. Most importantly, the organisations must have the ability to conduct operations and provide adequate funding to build sufficient structures. It was therefore clear, that the establishment of the AU would be a very complex and demanding endeavour (Mathiasen, 2006:4).

4.7.1. Establishing the AU: a shift in focus and approach

Africa's security dynamics have been and continue to be shaped by a wide variety of factors, particularly those relating to security culture and norm localisation. In practice, ethical and normative questions about what it means to be 'African' play an important role in defining what counts as legitimate security challenges and determining the appropriate forms of response. As a result, the AU and its members are involved in a continual process of argumentation about what the central tenets of the organisation's security culture should be. Although good progress has been made with the institutionalisation of norms such as democratisation and human rights and building support for the condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government and the responsibility to protect, they have not been internalised evenly by all African states (Williams, 2007:278).

At the start of the 21st century, indications were that Africa has departed on a new growth path. This was evident in the introduction of concepts and initiatives such as the AU, the African Renaissance, NEPAD and the new resolve on the part of Africans to settle their own conflicts. These important security and development initiatives came at a time when the international community increasingly became indifferent to the plight of war-torn countries in Africa (Field, 2004:19). In order to achieve the security and development objectives that underpin NEPAD and the African Renaissance, it became necessary to re-define African security architectures, as demands for peace and security had changed over time and had made anachronisms of many of the older security architectures that had been developed to serve peace missions on the continent since the 1960's (Abass, 2000:211).

The transformation of the OAU to the AU was not a mere change in name only. It ushered in substantive normative and institutional changes that were totally unthinkable some years back under the OAU. At the centre of these changes was the shift away from strict adherence to

the OAU's non-interference policy to the AU's responsibility to intervene, which, in turn, was informed and motivated by strong normative approaches to human rights and democracy. These normative approaches were included in the CAAU (AU, 2002) and repeated without fail in almost all of the major instruments of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (AU, 2002). This was indicative of a strong normative stance in line with the 'responsibility-to-protect' which also had a significant effect on decisions to intervene by the UN and EU. The huge political and social changes that the world witnessed as part of the post-Cold War era brought about new challenges with which Africa had to contend. While the OAU system had reached its major objective of the full liberation of Africa, it was operating on the basis of outdated normative frameworks, institutional structure and operational techniques. The OAU had therefore served its time and was due for replacement (Dersso, 2010:3).

The AU took over from the OAU with the adoption of the CAAU (AU, 2002). The entry into force of the Act on 26 May 2001 marked the birth of the AU and its inauguration in Durban in 2002, its official launch (Dersso, 2010:3). The AU subsequently embarked upon the establishment of the ASF to develop a permanent capacity for African militaries to structure and prepare for effective peacekeeping in Africa. The ASF was, in fact, one of the first institutions that was operationalised as part of the APSA and confirmed a clear shift away from ad hoc security initiatives to that of a permanently institutionalised security framework – specifically through formalised collective security arrangements (AU, 2002). African leaders subsequently agreed to collaborate towards the establishment of the ASF as a collective mechanism to facilitate timely and quick responses to conflict, as well as to promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities (De Coning, 2013:27). The emphasis on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives encapsulated in the governing documents of the ASF is a clear indication that African leaders accept the fact that 21st-century peace missions demand far more from peacekeepers than what was expected from them during the previous century (cf. Hudson, 2013:37–39). To meet these requirements, African militaries will have to hone their capacity to act beyond the traditional peacekeeping role in which the primary task of the peacekeepers was to separate belligerents and secure ceasefire lines.

The AU and NEPAD were developed to address the shortcomings of the OAU in managing Africa's security challenges (Kasaija, 2010:206). The 37th summit of the OAU which took place in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 adopted NEPAD as the integrated and comprehensive socio-economic development programme to accelerate Africa's renewal in the form of Declaration 1 (XXXVII). The Lusaka Summit agreed on the creation of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) which in turn established the NEPAD steering committee and the NEPAD secretariat to coordinate and administer activities. NEPAD had as its overarching objectives the eradication of poverty, the promotion of sustainable development and the arrest of the marginalisation of Africa under globalisation. In particular, the goal to eradicate poverty in Africa was focused on meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (cf. Hudson, 2013:49). In line with the integration of NEPAD into the structures and processes of the AU, the 14th summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February 2010, strengthened the NEPAD programme by transforming the NEPAD secretariat into an implementation agency – the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency as part of the AU (DFID, 2005:20). Both the AU and NEPAD framework documents focus on common visions to eradicate poverty and the vision of placing all African countries on a path of sustainable development – typical of the development-security nexus referred to earlier **(see)** – in so doing improving the security situation on the continent (OAU 37th summit, July 2001). What was clear was that holistic and integrated processes would have to be put in place – merely restructuring the OAU would not make any difference to Africa's security if Africa's ruling elites did not develop the political vision and will to promote human security on the continent effectively (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:42).

4.7.2. Security cooperation under the AU

The AU's new security framework has proved to be a major step towards finding 'African solutions to African problems'. The current African security dynamic is dominated by two principles, namely the intolerance of unconstitutional changes to government and the 'responsibility-to-protect' (United Nations [UN], 2005). Despite all the efforts made towards the establishment of the ASF in particular, very little has been written on the recent steps taken to rectify and prevent the failings of the past (cf. Franke, 2009:157). This is in stark contrast to the vast amount of literature on the shortcomings of the OAU and the need for

viable and effective security regimes in Africa. There is thus a great need for analysis, especially from an African perspective, on the way in which regional security is being conceptualised and what should be done to ensure that the new security system functions effectively (Franke, 2009:139–152). Major challenges remain to mobilising resources and capacity building, and analysts need to address these realities and develop creative recommendations for the formulation of policy. Africa should not uncritically emulate other security models, but should learn from them, at least by avoiding their mistakes and finding the most effective ways of operationalising its new security framework (Field, 2004:23).

Various regional and continental security models were analysed by the AU in the quest for finding the most appropriate security model for Africa. The AU initially intended to build high readiness forces on the same basis as the UN Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) (Cilliers & Malan, 2005:4). The application of the SHIRBRIG model in the AU was abandoned soon after its initial conception, primarily because of the multidimensional character of the ASF, which was envisaged as consisting not only of military elements, but also of police and civilian components.

4.7.3. The devolution of African continental and regional security cooperation

Acknowledging that peace and stability were essential preconditions for social and economic development, African policy makers began to devise new mechanisms for empowering the new body to deal actively with conflicts as opposed to merely working to prevent them as prevention obviously failed, given the prevalence of violent conflicts. When African leaders established the AU in 2002, they acknowledged the fact that, for the most, security threats to the continent did not arise from wars between states, but they primarily flowed from upheavals and conflict within states. Given the nature of contemporary warfare, they recognised the need to supplement the traditional concerns of state security with those of finding solutions to human security threats (African Union [AU] Constitutive Act, 2002).

In addition to the resolve to find sustainable ‘African solutions to African threats’, there was also a conviction among African leaders that the horrors that unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 should never be repeated. The legacy of Rwanda has thus contributed to bring about a

paradigm shift in thinking about continental security. In the wake of the massacre African leaders acknowledge the fact that it may occasionally be necessary to intervene robustly in the internal affairs of states in order to protect vulnerable groups and ward off large-scale human rights abuses and crimes against humanity (AU, 2002). Article 4(h) of the CAAU (AU, 2002) creates not only a legal basis for intervention, but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene in grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Dersso, 2010:4). This is a very significant shift away from the OAU's founding principles of never interfering in the internal affairs of member states as this would equate to impeding on their sovereignty (Bellamy, 2012:19–26). Such an approach is also in line with current international guidelines pertaining to the 'responsibility to protect' (Solomon, 2013:21)

The increasing reluctance of key members of the UNSC to embark on peace operations in Africa compelled African leaders to acknowledge the fact that they would have to rely on their own resources to protect human security on the continent. As early as 1992, the then UN Secretary General (SG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An agenda for peace* argued that regional security arrangements should be utilised to lighten the peacekeeping burden that had, until then, been shouldered by the UN (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The UN's devolution of responsibility for conflict resolution to regional organisation provided an added imperative for devising an analogous security regime within the framework of the AU (AU, 2002). The AU has to ensure that it speaks with one voice and that the ambitions and activities of its RECs support overall AU objectives (Leijenaar, 2013:2).

In understanding the unique characteristics of African regions, it is important to keep in mind that there are many definitions of 'regionalism', and regions can be defined in many different ways: through geographic proximity or the intensity of interactions such as trade; through internal or external recognition and formal declaration as such, politically, historically or culturally (Cawthra, 2009:23). Generally, however, there is consensus that geographical proximity is not a prerequisite for regional cooperation, but in general it is understood that regionalism describes "a notion encompassing entities, which may, but do not necessarily, belong to a geographically determinable area, having either common or disparate attributes and values, but which seek the accomplishment of common goals" (Abass, 2004:25). This is especially true of African regionalism, as individual African states which constitute a specific

region often have divergent values. This could be interpreted that there is no cohesive African REC culture or consensus on how the RECs would feed into the continental system. This is reflected in the way that members of a single regional organisation vaunt extremely diverse political systems – varying from absolute monarchy and democracy to militocracy and dictatorship. Despite these differences, the individual states that contribute to the respective RECs all subscribe to the continental African theme (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1997:11–12). African regionalism should therefore be understood on the basis of communal historical, political and economic aspirations among states, rather than overemphasising mere geographical proximity as the singular motivation for regional economic and security cooperation (Franke, 2009:7).

Regionalism has become a prominent feature in African conflict prevention, management and resolution (Diehl, 2008:66–67). The UN is unable to intervene in every conflict on the continent and regional organisations are improving their own capacity for PSOs. Debates on regionalism of the old type often revolve around the issue of whether regional organisations were building blocks for the construction of the global collective security system in the form of the UN and attendant organisations, or whether they were, in fact, stumbling blocks to that process. Cawthra (2009:24) points out that military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact appeared to inhibit the building of a global security system, whilst, on the other hand, regional organisations such as the OAU were given, and executed, an important maintenance role under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The past focus of African conflict management has been on establishing strong conflict prevention capabilities, rather than attempting to establish an entire range of conflict resolution capacities that mirror European conflict resolution capacities (Cawthra, 2009:25). Regional organisations on the continent are increasingly exploring concepts and capabilities that will provide tailor-made organisations, strategies and self-help solutions to conflict situations on the continent, rather than expecting the UN to intervene in every conflict (Mandrup, 2009b:126).

The quest for regional and continental security cooperation in Africa has developed well since the end of the Cold War (Powell, 2005:54–55). Current efforts to establish continental security architecture are based on a broad consensus among Africans and the international community that is focused on sustainable development and peace in Africa. Changes in the

geopolitical security situation, the continent's organisational landscape and self-conceptualisation, as well as the level of international support, have allowed the AU to centralise the responsibility for peace and security on the continent and to institutionalise an appropriate framework that differs from the half-hearted attempts of the OAU (Franke, 2009:1). The AU has distinguished itself by adopting a normative commitment "to protect". Under the AU, member states enjoy the privileges of sovereignty such as non-interference in their internal affairs as long as they fulfil their responsibility to protect their citizens as described in Article 4 of the CAAU (AU, 2002). By defining sovereignty in the conditional terms of a state's capacity and willingness to protect its citizens, the CAAU (Article 4 (h)) is the first international treaty to recognise the right of an organisation to intervene militarily in its member states' affairs (AU, 2002). It not only takes the idea of collaborative security to a new level, but it also provides the AU with a powerful legal foundation on which to anchor its emerging conflict management mechanism (Baker, 2004:1497–1498).

Burundi offered the first test case of this emergent mechanism of the AU (Mandrup, 2009b:120–134).

In February 2003 – somewhat sooner than was expected – it was announced in Addis Ababa that South Africa would serve as a 'lead nation' for the deployment of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) – the first AU peacekeeping operation to be deployed in a conflict situation (Mandrup, 2009b:120). Mozambique and Ethiopia also pledged peacekeepers to the mission and the deployment started soon after in June 2003 (AU, 2004b). The number of troops deployed in Burundi were 1 600 from South Africa, 217 from Mozambique and about 1 000 from Ethiopia (AU, 2004b). The main task of AMIB was to oversee the implementation and verification of the ceasefire agreements, as well as to assist in the disarmament and demobilisation of force elements. This was the first deployment of the AU, and it was generally accepted that this mission would test the depth of the organisation's capacity to address an ongoing crisis, especially if its role would be that of peace enforcement (Neethling, 2010:62). The AU's commitment of peacekeepers to Burundi was soon after followed by the deployment of AU peacekeepers to Darfur. The deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur was not as smooth as the deployment to Burundi, and resulted in heated debates

and severe challenges from Sudan to the AU, based on Sudan's notion of sovereignty through the protection of own citizens (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:206–211).

In May 2006, under the auspices of the AU and with support of the UN and other partners, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in an attempt to finding a lasting solution to the ongoing war in Darfur (Bellamy & Williams, 2012:206). This was followed by a renewed peace process under a joint AU–UN mediator, as few parties signed on during the first peace initiatives. This meeting resulted in the definition of a framework document, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), was subsequently formally established by the UNSC on 31 July 2007 through the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1769, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMID formally took over from AMIS on 31 December 2007 and added another chapter to the AU migration towards its emergent security architecture that must support hybrid operations (Wassara, 2010:282).

The AU is also unique to the extent that its peace and security architecture is multi-layered and symbiotic in its approach to security cooperation (cf. Franke, 2009:139–156). The AU's continental security architecture rests firmly on its respective regional security mechanisms which act both as pillars of and as implementation agencies for continental security policy. It also allows the AU to benefit from the respective regional organisations' comparative advantage in military and security matters, their experience with peace operations and, in the case of western, eastern and southern Africa, from their established frameworks and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (Franke, 2009:189). At the same time, the AU recognises the requirements for decentralised collective security, and the central organisation does not deny the respective regional organisations a significant stake and central role in all processes regarding regional security. Under this system of decentralised collective security, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains vested in the regional organisations as the first level of response, while the AU serves as the clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives thus filling the conceptual and institutional gap between the global level (UN) and the continental level (AU, 2002).

Some critics and defence analysts, however, argue that this decentralised approach reinforces additional layers of bureaucracy and that it slows down the response times to crises and conflict (Cawthra, 2007:24). On the other hand, there are those who point out that the decentralised approach is in fact already bearing fruit: during the past few years, the establishment of a continental security architecture has been taking shape at a remarkable pace, and the AU has become deeply involved in the continent's security problems by building on the experiences and relying on the resources of the regional organisations (Franke, 2009:266). Many point out that this is the positive outcome of the adopted decentralised approach to collective security because the regional organisations accept ownership of the process of establishing a continental security architecture and this virtually eliminates the risk of competition between the various levels of inter-African security cooperation (Cawthra, 2007:24).

The aforementioned statements, suggested frameworks and emergent bodies for coordinating and directing security cooperation are ultimately directed at operational matters and it is at operational level where the declaratory notions, aspirations and foresight discussed up to now, have to find execution. Since the inception of the AU, the ASF received a new impetus to back the decisions and declarations about African solutions to African problems as far as threats to security and armed threats in particular are concerned. The discussion now turns to the ASF as an important variable in the emergent roles and structures of African armed forces. The ASF is utterly dependent upon the armed forces on the continent and for them to adjust to what the AU requires of them (Aboagye, 2012:1).

4.7.4. The development of the ASF

In July 2002, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council formally concluded a long process of discussion on the purpose and shape of an African continental military force, the ASF that has been going on since the process of decolonisation began (Aboagye, 2012:1). With the adoption of the CAAU and the establishment of the AU and its Commission in 2002 (AU, 2002), African leaders established an institution that has the potential to meet the complex security challenges of the 21st-century African security environment (UNSC, 2010:6). The AU subsequently embarked upon the establishment of the

ASF to develop a permanent capacity for African militaries to structure and prepare for effective peacekeeping in Africa through formalised collective security arrangements (Franke, 2009:157). The ASF is thus part of a holistic African approach to engaging conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and PCRD (De Coning, 2014:35). This signals a clear shift from ad hoc security initiatives to a permanently institutionalised security framework. To operationalise this permanent security framework, the members of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) decided to establish five brigade-sized contributions to a common standby force by the continent's regions (AU, 2003). A final document was later adopted by the AU Heads of State in which the details of the structure of the ASF and its five regionally managed standby brigades were spelled out (AU, 2003).

At regional level, each of the five geographic regions was designed to have one REC or a specifically dedicated coordinating mechanism in charge of setting up and administering a regional standby component for the ASF (Franke, 2009:157). Each standby components had to be between 3 000 and 4 000 troops strong, which would ultimately provide the ASF with an overall strength of 15 0000 to 20 0000 troops and a number of predefined military capabilities (Franke, 2009:158). The ASF structure also provided for civilian police and a continentally-managed permanent body responsible for final oversight, coordination and harmonisation. The ASF was designed, in relation to the nature of conflicts on the continent, to meet the requirements to conduct the full scale of operations at least at joint corps size (Mathiasen, 2006:8). These operations were envisioned to be executed and sustained over several years during which it would provide nation and state-building support operations, whilst taking care of the security of its own members (Aboagye, 2012:2). These activities would be logistically sustained over vast distances (Cilliers & Malan, 2005:7–17). While the AU's diplomatic support has been commendable, the AU's financial and logistical contributions to regional peacekeeping initiative have been insignificant (Aboagye, 2012:2).

The stipulated requirements for the establishment of the ASF and the establishment of the regional brigades have proved to be difficult to achieve (Aboagye, 2012:2–3). In an effort to prevent genocide, as was witnessed in Rwanda in 1994, the ASF was called upon to be able to deploy within two weeks from the provision of a mandate by the PSC of the AU (Cilliers, 2008:9). The lack of a strategic airlift capability on the African continent, however, continues

to prevent such rapid deployment. The same is true of the sustainment and provision of forces: most African defence forces are experiencing persistent disconnects between their peace support mandates, commitments and resource allocations in terms of personnel, equipment and sustainment capabilities (Hussien, 2012:6–7). This dilemma is, according to De Coning (2014:34), not only true about African militaries; there are very few "international or regional organisations that can deploy such a force within 14 days" and there are "only a handful of countries in the world that have the kind of standing readiness capacity to deploy at such speeds".

The AU PSC understood the complexity of the African security context and insisted the ASF should not only include military elements but also civilian police and other capabilities on account of the multiplicity of roles that the ASF is expected to perform (Solomon, 2013:21). It was, however, exactly the requirement to deploy not only military elements but also various civilian and police elements that slowed down the rate of operationalisation of the ASF, due to the ongoing tension between the actual human and financial investment in the ASF and the required need to deploy troops, police and civilians (Diehl, 2008:106–107). Despite all the good intentions that motivated the establishment of the ASF, progress with the establishment of the ASF has taken place in a haphazard manner, as the division of labour between the AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention (which is limited to periodic interventions) and the more ambitious regional mechanisms has often been uncoordinated.

Another issue that negatively affected the planned operationalisation of the ASF was the reality that the boundaries of the ASF regions did not coincide exactly with the boundaries of the RECs of the continent, which resulted in overlaps as far as memberships to the respective organisations were concerned. It was only during a summit of the ACDS in May 2003 and its subsequent approval by the Heads of States in July 2004, that the idea of the envisaged standby arrangements was somewhat clarified (Franke, 2009:157). During this summit, a decision was made that regional security forces should be viewed as regional institutions contributing to wider continental security interests, and that they should not only focus on their own areas of responsibility (Franke, 2009:161). It was concluded that the activities of the forces should therefore be harmonised in accordance with Article 13 of the Protocol, which provides for the establishment of an ASF in order to enable the PSC to perform its

responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention in Africa as described in Article 4 (h) and (j) of the CAAU (AU, 2002).

The ASF was originally envisaged to be operationalised by 2010 (Helfrich, 2014:1). However, due to many of the above-mentioned problems, the deadline for the establishment of the ASF was postponed to 2015 (Aboagye, 2012:1). As a result of the multitude of problems that were experienced as part of the establishment of the ASF, many security analysts argue that the size, role and functions of the ASF and the regional standby forces need to be reconsidered (De Coning, 2014:34). According to these analysts, the requirement for the operationalisation of the ASF, despite the extension of the date for final operationalisation to 2015, will not be achieved in its current concept, unless the disparities between the ASF and the respective RECs' individual force designs and mission readiness profiles have been addressed (Leijenaar, 2013:2). As a result, a decision was made by AU members in 2013 to conduct a comprehensive re-assessment of the ASF, inclusive of its rapid deployment capability. This re-assessment resulted in a decision to establish ACIRC as a transitional arrangement ahead of the ASF becoming fully operational (Helfrich, 2014:1). Both options have become convoluted with neither showing real progress to deliver the intended response capabilities while both appear to be receiving renewed attention as 2015 draws closer.

The establishment of ACIRC was the result of the tension between available capability and operational requirements coming to a head in 2012 when the government of Mali asked France to intervene in the crisis because the AU and ECOWAS were not able to deploy mission-ready forces rapidly enough to deal with the unfolding security crisis in Mali (De Coning, 2014:35). As a result, a number of African countries decided to jointly create ACIRC to address the rapid responses deficit until such time as the ASF and its rapid deployment capability (RDC) reach full operational readiness levels (De Coning, 2014:35). ACIRC is a temporary solution, based on voluntary participation by a coalition-of-the-willing model that will be deployed by its contributors, initially at their own cost, under a lead-nation model (Helfrich, 2014:1). Although ACIRC is presented as a temporary solution, it fails to address one of the AU's fundamental objectives – the need to have a predictable rapid deployment capability (De Coning, 2014:35). In essence, this implies that countries will only be willing to deploy at their own cost when they have national interests at stake (Ero, 2013).

It is intended that, when the ASF becomes fully operational by the end of 2015, the RDC of the ASF should be on standing readiness to deploy within 14 days in response to mass atrocity crimes (De Coning, 2014:34). It has become evident that African leaders intend to deploy the ASF as a collective mechanism not only to facilitate quick responses to conflict, but also to promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities (AU, 2002:10). Whether this ambition can be met, despite the good intentions, is questionable. The fact is that there no international or regional organisation on the continent that has the ability to deploy mission-ready forces in 14 days. The primary constraint on AU missions is the inability of AU member states to fund their own operations (Helfrich, 2014:2). It has become very clear that, the AU will not be able to make independent decisions about the mandate, scope, size and duration of PSOs, as long as it remains dependent on external partners to cover the cost of PSOs (De Coning, 2014:36). Despite these problems, however, the emphasis on peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and development initiatives encapsulated in the governing documents of the ASF serves as confirmation that African leaders have accepted the fact that 21st-century peace missions demand far more from peacekeepers than what was expected from them during the previous century (AU PCRD Stakeholder Workshop, 2007:1). This notion was also encapsulated in several other prominent AU policy documents, most importantly, the AU's CADSP in which it was confirmed that one of the principles of the CADSP is "the fundamental link and symbiotic relationship that exists between security, stability, human security, development and cooperation, in a manner that allows each to reinforce the other" (AU, 2002:7). To meet all of these requirements, African militaries will have to make changes to their force designs, force structures and force preparation schedules to prepare soldiers to act beyond the traditional peacekeeping roles in which the task of the peacekeepers was essentially aimed at separating belligerents and securing ceasefire lines.

In terms of AU deployments, experience has shown that some of the premises on which the ASF was originally constituted should be re-assessed (De Coning, 2014:35–36). The ASF was constructed in terms of the same design principles as the UN's multidimensional peace mission frameworks which were based on peacekeeping experiences in the 1990s (Franke, 2009:176). Since the establishment of the ASF, however, AU missions in Burundi, the CAR,

Darfur and Somalia have produced a body of knowledge on African-led PSOs. These experiences have highlighted the disjuncture between the consensual peacekeeping model, which was one of the primary design principles of the ASF, and the actual peace enforcement and stability type of deployments that the AU undertook in Mali, Somalia and the CAR (De Coning, 2014:36).

Another factor that has hampered the development of an effective ASF is the fact that there are a great number of diverse views on the roles and functions to be executed by the ASF and the regional brigades. Some analysts, such as Samuels (2006, 1–20) argue that the ASF was established to provide a means of collective security, whilst others (De Zeeuw, 2005:481-504) argue that it is essentially a collective defence structure. The latter was underlined by the signing of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact in January 2005, which focused on common defence and not on collective security (AU, 2005). The stipulations contained in the Pact emphasised the notion that "an attack on one member is to be considered as an attack on all and that signatories are obliged to respond with all available means" (AU 2005, Article 1 ci and 4b). This matter has, however, not yet been resolved and will continue to affect decision-making timelines negatively as it will take time to create consensus among role-players (Curtis, 2012:8). The lack of consensus on the approach to the type of security architecture will also continue to have a negative effect on the operationalisation of the ASF as TCCs will exhibit various levels of commitment to deployments – depending on their approach to the respective missions (Landsberg, 2012:134–135).

In order to circumvent the initial financial problems surrounding the deployment of troops, AU planners decided that TCCs should bear the costs involved for the first three months of the deployment (cf. Harrison, 2012:158–169). The AU would then assume full financial responsibility for the rest of the operation. The CAAU and the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC acknowledge the primary responsibility of the UN for maintaining international peace and security (AU, 2002). They also recognise that subregional mechanisms form an integral part of the AU security framework (Field, 2004:22). There has also been an urgent requirement to appoint an AU Police Advisor and activate the Police

Strategic Support Group (PSSG) to ensure a balance between military and police representation in AU peace operation decision-making (Leijenaar, 2014:2).

Some argue that the problems experienced with the standby capability of the ASF were not only to be found in the political commitment of member states or the lack of funding, but that the problems resulted from the design and structure of the ASF standby force as well (De Coning, 2014:36). The logic behind the standby concept was that the ASF would have the ability to deploy rapidly to a peace mission, because it would have a trained and equipped mission-ready capability – ready to deploy at any time. The standby model assumes that such a standing readiness capacity is a necessary precondition for rapid deployment, but acknowledges that it is not sufficient to ensure that a peace operation can be rapidly deployed when faced with a dire crisis (Leijenaar, 2014:2).

Two other interrelated vulnerabilities also continually constrain the development of the standby capability of the ASF (Heitman, 2013b:2). The first is the political will of the contributing countries to participate in any given PSO. Agreeing to participate in a standby agreement is one thing, but agreeing to participate in a specific PSO is a separate decision all-together. The second vulnerability relates to the match between the context-specific needs of a specific mission at hand and the off-the-shelf generic design of the standby force (cf. De Coning, 2014:38–40). It is a combination of these two vulnerabilities that has undermined to date all international efforts to establish standby arrangements that can generate predictable rapid response mechanisms. The ASF is, however, not the only organisation constrained by these realities (Aboagye, 2012:1). The UN's SHIRBRIG (which has subsequently been abandoned) and the EU's Battle Group concept have also been constrained by these vulnerabilities (cf. Franke, 2009:156). This is because each crisis is unique and it is doubtful whether a generic standby capacity could sufficiently match the needs (both in terms of the political coalition as well as the operational capabilities) posed by the specific challenge (De Coning, 2014:38). Each crisis requires a context-specific solution, including the coming together of a unique set of countries that have a political interest in the resolution of the conflict, or have an interest in being part of that particular mission. Each crisis also requires a different set of capabilities, and the off-the-shelf generic standby brigade model does not meet such needs (De Coning, 2014:38).

Rapid deployment is also only possible if there are capabilities at national level that can be deployed (Leijenaar, 2014:2). The basic assumption or logic of the standby model thus holds true at national level, but falls apart when it is applied at multinational level. This is because at this level the decisive factor is not capabilities and readiness, but how those capabilities are amalgamated in a political coalition that forges tighter political will, financial means, the capacity to plan, deploy and manage an operation, and the national capabilities that can be deployed (Aboagye, 2012:4). National interest is an enduring driver of participation in the consensual-type peace operations the UN and EU typically undertake. In the AU context, where the operations undertaken to date have almost all been peace enforcement operations, with a stabilisation mandate that requires a higher degree of intensity, robustness and risk, the national interest of the major TCCs, in particular has been of decisive importance. Both the missions in Somalia and the CAR have sustained heavy losses (Leijenaar, 2014 and Heitman, 2014). A country with no interest in a given crisis is unlikely to agree to its capabilities being deployed in high-intensity and high-risk operations just because it agreed to be part of a regional standby arrangement (De Coning, 2014:39).

This leads to the recommendation to change the ASF concept from a standby arrangement, to a just-in-time (JIT) capacity, rather than a standing readiness capacity (De Coning, 2014:38). A JIT model should focus on developing common standards and procedures, joint training and joint exercises. It should also focus on developing AU, regional and national planning, command, mission management and mission support capabilities. At national level, many AU states should, and do, have some units on standby to respond to national and international crises, regardless of the ASF, so the suggestion is not that member states move away from the standing readiness concept at national level (De Coning, 2014:40).

The current design of the AU does not generate the kind of predictable rapid response the AU member states desired when they initially agreed to establish the ASF. The logic behind the standby concept is that the ability to deploy a peace operation rapidly will be greatly enhanced if soldiers, police officers and civilian experts are preselected, prepared, trained and equipped to be deployed when required (Leijenaar, 2014:2). This argument is not necessarily correct as rapid deployment can only take place if there are capabilities at

national level that can be deployed (Aboagye, 2012:4). The basic assumption of the stand-by model therefore might hold true at national level, but will fall apart when it is applied at multi-national level as part of JI^{2}M deployments (De Coning, 2014:38). De Coning therefore argues for the migration from models based on standby forces to JIT organisations. He states that a JIT organisation will be more effective than formal standby forces as each crisis is unique and generic standby capabilities might not be optimally suited to specific threat environments. A JIT model will require a smaller ASF investment, because less effort will be needed to manage the pledging and verification of specific units, and to manage the model of rotating the responsibility for being on standing readiness among regions. A shift to the JIT model will provide the AU and the regions with a model that is based on a much more realistic use of limited resources. Such a JIT model will be based on three elements (De Coning, 2014:40):

- the modalities necessary to put together context-specific coalitions consisting of the AU, regions, member states and partners;

- the ability of member states to contribute military, police and civilian capabilities; and

- the ability of the AU and regions to plan, deploy, manage and support peace operations.

Events in Mali demonstrated that the AU will not always be able to deploy rapidly, but the events in Somali and the CAR have also shown that the AU, together with its member states and partners, can under certain circumstances deploy troops at remarkable speed (Helfrich, 2014:1). The reasons why the AU was able to deploy much faster in the latter cases had less to do with the predesigned standing readiness arrangements and more to do with the kind of political will the AU was able to generate at the time. The political will to deploy was energised by the context-specific coalitions the AU, interested member states and partners were able to put together. This is why a JIT standby arrangement, such as ACIRC, is likely to be the most realistic and the most cost-effective option for the future of the ASF (De Coning, 2014:38 – 40).

4.8. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The current SADC was preceded by two regional groupings, namely the Front Line States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Franke, 2009:68). Neither of these two organisations contributed much to security cooperation, as the primary focus of the FLS (the original members of which were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) was towards the political liberation of the region, whilst the SADCC, on the other hand, was aimed at diminishing the economic dependence of other Southern African states on South Africa (Franke, 2009:69). Despite these diverse raisons d'être, the two organisations did succeed in fostering a sense of regional belonging among member states and laying the foundations for SADC's current security structures (Mandrup, 2009a:1).

The FLS provided a platform on which various sub-Saharan leaders could discuss the political issues and difficulties experienced by the newly independent states of Angola, Mozambique and Zambia (Franke, 2009:68). Despite the fact that the FLS was an informal organisation which had no official structure or institutional procedures (no agendas for meetings were published and no minutes were taken), it played an important role in bringing about the shifts in the regional balance of power that occurred after 1975 (Khadiagala, 2001:1–14). Its primary function was to offer political support and a platform for political negotiations, rather than to coordinate and manage military support for guerrilla movements as is sometimes postulated (Jaster, 1983:4). Although the FLS did establish the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) to improve the synchronisation of defence activities in the region, there was very little military interaction between members of the FLS (Franke, 2009:68). The focus of the ISDSC was on informal military collaboration, the exchange of information on defence and security matters and the training of newly established armed forces such as the Mozambican armed forces, or the occasional joint operations undertaken to combat national resistance movements (Breytenbach, 2000:25). Despite these limitations, the ISDSC laid the foundations for increased military interaction by institutionalising meetings and fostering open dialogue among the top political and military leaders of the region (Franke, 2009:68).

In order to address the collective economic dependence of member states on South Africa, the FLS passed the Lusaka Declaration in 1980, which created the SADCC (SADC, 1980). The aim of this conference was to bolster economic liberation and integration and to provide the economic foundations of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region (Franke, 2009:68). As long as some states remained under colonial or minority rule during the 1980s, the SADCC and the FLS remained separate platforms, with SADCC accepting responsibility for economic coordination and the FSL for mutual political and military support.

By the late 1980s, it became evident that the SADCC required strengthening. Namibia's attainment of independence in 1990 formally ended the struggle against colonialism in the region. This resulted in the establishment of the SADC during a summit in Windhoek 1992 (SADC, 1992). The purpose of transforming the SADCC into the SADC was to promote deeper economic cooperation and integration to help address many of the factors that made it difficult to sustain economic growth and socio-economic development, such as continued dependence on the exports of a few primary commodities (SADC, 1992). When the SADC was established in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework (Mandrup, 2009a:1). In the 1990s, the membership of the organisation increased to 14 with the accession of Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and the DRC (Franke, 2009:82). While the SADC would focus on economic matters, the ISDSC would continue to retain the responsibility for defence and security matters under the guidance of the FLS (Franke, 2009:69).

The ISDSC has developed into a very complex and multi-tiered organisation. The organisation consists of three primary subcommittees which, in turn, are divided into various specialist sub-sub-committees. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was established in 1996 and is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region (cf. Cilliers, 1996). The OPDS was intended to complement the ISDSC activities and fulfil sixteen objectives, among them the protection of the region and its member states against instability, the development of a collective security capacity, the conclusion of an SADC Mutual Defence Pact (in 2003) and the development of a regional peacekeeping capacity. It is to this purpose

that the OPDS was positioned within the institutional structures of the SADC (Franke, 2009:70).

The 1990s heralded a time of momentous political change in the sub-Saharan region: the anti-colonial struggle finally concluded and South Africa abolished the apartheid system and adopted a democratic system in 1994. South Africa's changed political landscape had a significant effect on the development growth path of SADCC structures and architectures, as the region's alliance patterns have been significantly influenced by South Africa's military and economic pre-eminence since the early 1960s (cf Jaster, 1983). Following in the wake of the liberation struggles, SADCC countries shifted their focus towards the region's many political, economic and military challenges and adopted the Abudja Treaty on 3 June 1991, which was subsequently entered into force on May 12, 1994 (SADC, 1994). This Treaty was aimed at establishing a continent-wide economic community by 2025.

Despite the good intentions that motivated the establishment of the OPDS, namely the promotion of political cooperation among member states and the development of common foreign and security policy, growing tensions over its form and functions threatened to pull the region apart (Breytenbach, 2000:4). The OPDS was modelled on the OAU's Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and was intended to provide a special forum for political, defence and security cooperation with a focus on conflict management (Cilliers, 1996:1). However, due to the fragmented motivations of the member states as well as different interpretations of some of the key stipulations of the final Extraordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Summit Communiqué which was formulated during the summit of the Organ in Botswana in 1996 (SADC 1996), the OPDS did not become operational until the 2001 SADC Summit in Blantyre (SADC, 2001). The period that transpired between 1996 and 2001 is indicative of the difficulties experienced to institutionalise the SADC effectively due to differences in opinion on the direction of and ambition for the SADC community's future development (Franke, 2009:69). In addition, several SADC member states have been, and continue to be plagued by insecurity, underdevelopment, political strife and conflict (cf. Breytenbach, 2000). As a result, it seems as if a rift has occurred in the organisation on the direction it should take for future development (Mandrup, 2009a:5).

One of the key disputes was a single sentence which stated that “the OPDS would function independently from other structures” (SADC, 1996). This stipulation was interpreted very differently by some of the leaders of the member states. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe took it to mean that he, as the chairperson of the OPDS at the time (2001), could act independently of the SADC decision-making process, whilst President Nelson Mandela interpreted it as meaning that the SADC should be in firm control of the organ (Franke, 2009:70). The infighting that was caused by these different interpretations had a significant divisionary effect on the activities of the organ and it subsequently prevented the SADC from responding meaningfully to the crises that developed in the DRC and Lesotho (Neethling, 2003:37). The excursions by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia into the DRC (in 1998) and of South Africa and Botswana into Lesotho (in 1998) under the banner of the so-called SADC Allied Armed Forces (AAF) revealed such deep divisions within Southern Africa that both the memories of previous collaborative efforts by the states of the region and its hopes for creating a viable security architecture could not but fade away (Malan, 1998:22).

Despite the creation of the OPDSC and the objectives stated in the SADC Treaty which all tend to point towards the creation of a security community (Kent & Malan, 2003:1), the continued instability in the DRC and the unresolved political crises in, for example, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, indicate to some extent that the SADC is not going to transform itself into a security community, but will, rather, remain a loose association of states (Mandrup, 2009a:5). Different interpretations of the content of the SADC Treaty by member states have resulted in fragmented responses to political crises in the region and this has hampered progress with military cooperation in the organisation since its inception (Mandrup, 2009a:5).

SADC leaders eventually realised the disastrous effects of their disunity on regional growth and stability and all the region’s leaders finally agreed to become signatories to the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in August 2001 (SADC, 2001). This protocol clarified the nature of the region’s institutional structure for security and opened the way for further interaction on all matters related to defence and security. This agreement eventually matured into the adoption of a Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 during the SADC’s 2003 summit (Nathan, 2006:33). Despite being a more conservative version of earlier drafts, article 9 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact describes a clear commitment by the signatories to

permanent military cooperation and integration (South African Development Community [SADC], 2003). This was founded on the belief that a strong partnership between the Southern African states would make it possible to create a foundation for a renaissance in the Southern Africa sub-region, as well as Africa as a whole. The belief in strong regional partnerships also provided for increased interaction among member states on aspects such as military intelligence, joint defence research and cooperation in the development and production of military equipment to ensure interoperability. The SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) (SADC, 2003) read together with the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) of 2004, which contains the instructions relating to the development of a regional defence capability and the formulation of doctrine that would make the region's armed forces interoperable, is at the foundation for SADC's security cooperation (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:42).

As was the case with the evolution of ECOWAS towards regional security cooperation, the SADC developed from an economic initiative into a regional security provider in order to safeguard its development objectives and to fill the security gap that was left by the OAU's ineffective approach (Baregu & Landsberg, 2003:11). Despite the prevalence of disagreements and dissent among SADC member states over policy issues during the early 1990s, the creation of the OPDS (sometimes referred to as the OPDSC), was an important step towards the establishment of a Southern African security community and, together with the precedents set by ECOWAS, provided a clear signal to the continent's other regional organisations (Ngoma, 2005:14). It was also believed that the formation of a security community would help to dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. Some scholars went as far as to state that the institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. This 'integration ambition' surrounding the new concepts of security correlated with the ambitions of a democratic 'new' South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions which focused on the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and in South Africa itself (Mandrup, 2009a:1).

Despite claims that the SADC charter has the creation of a 'security community' as its primary aim, Nathan (2006:277) claims that the very notion that SADC is a 'community' remains questionable. He argues that the SADC region has never been characterised by close social

relations and contacts between member states as, for a community to exist, there needs to be a common sense of belonging and common goals and objectives – which do not exist among SADC member states (Aboagye, 2012:3). This opinion is shared by Vale (2013:121) who argues that the SADC can at best be described as an association, with disagreements continually being solved by the use of force or threats of the use of force. He also purports that formal agreements still direct cooperation as exemplified by the Millennium Development Programme (MDP) (UN, 2000) while individual SADC members continue to prioritise national interests over collective interests. The SADC is therefore "not a community, but merely a Westphalian system structured around South Africa – the first in a community of unequals" (Vale, 2013:123). As far as a security community is concerned, South Africa continues to persist at the pinnacle of the system, dominated by itself and sustained by its economic, and to some extent, military capacity.

Despite the above-mentioned challenges, South Africa has, since its 1998 deployments to Burundi and Lesotho, indicated a willingness to participate fully and to assist in the development of security co-operation practices in the region, particularly through the building of security structures from the start of its membership of the SADC. The SANDF has participated in a number of multinational exercises with fellow SADC member countries, and has also provided humanitarian and disaster relief to a number of its SADC neighbours (cf. Kent & Malan, 2003:1–9).

South Africa's strength, however, soon proved to be the SADC's biggest challenge. Despite South African declaration of the priority of the region for the country's security and foreign policies, it found it difficult to 'find its place' within the SADC. South Africa made significant efforts not to impose itself as a 'big brother' on its neighbours (Mandrup, 2009a:20). Other SADC member states, however, continued to be suspicious of South African intentions, and accused the country of not playing a dominant enough role in regional affairs, but privileging relations with the First World, and in particular with Europe (Baregu & Landsberg, 2003:14).

The current political environments in many of the SADC member states also make it very difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe South Africa's participation in regional security cooperation practices as directly or even necessarily related to democratisation and

democratic practises. Many of the SADC members, not all of them democracies, have already participated in exercises such as Exercise Blue Crane (in 1999) or Exercise Golfinho (in 2009) or assisted neighbours during times of crisis (Mandrup, 2009a:21). South Africa participates actively in the security institutions of the SADC by supporting institution and capacity-building. South Africa is also deeply involved in the activities of the ISDSC which is regulated through the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (PPDSC). South Africa also played a leading role to bring the SADC Rapid Reaction Brigade (SADCBRIG) to fruition in 2007 (Franke, 2009:171). The purpose of SADCBRIG was to participate in missions, including performing observations and monitoring peace support, intervention for peace and security, and restoration in grave circumstances at the request of a member state (SADC, 2007). The brigade was also intended to be prepared to participate in missions to prevent the spread of violence into neighbouring areas of conflict and to prevent the resurgence of violence after agreements had been reached (*Lusaka Times*, 2007).

Soon after its conceptualisation, however, the name SADCBRIG fell away and was replaced by the SADC Standby Force (SADC SF). The name change was intended to indicate the multidimensional character of the force and to emphasise the fact that the force would not consist of military elements only, but that it would comprise a number of police and civilian components as well (Solomon, 2013:24).

Progress with the development of regional security institutions, however, has been slow, and at times, problematic (Aboagye, 2012:3–4). From 1996, with the inception of the SADC OPDSC, until 2001, no agreement could be reached on the operationalisation, particularly given the stance of Zimbabwe, its first chair (Franke, 2009:70). The stalemate was eventually broken and a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was adopted and the responsibility for the OPDSC was handed over to Lesotho in 2003, to be followed by a term for South Africa (Mandrup, 2009a:2). Progress was slow and although the SADC MDP was signed during the 2003 SADC Summit: only four countries had ratified the pact by the end of 2004. Six other SADC member states had ratified the SADC MDP by June 2010, whilst Angola, Madagascar, DRC and Malawi still have not ratified the document (Southern African Development Community [SADC], 2010:11–12). This emphasises the difficulties in finding common ground in the face of divergent approaches to security, ranging from hard-core

political–military security preoccupations to member states privileging human security (Mandrup, 2009a:2).

Van Nieuwkerk (1999:2) points to the fact that one of the longstanding problems that have been plaguing the development of the SADC SF and other SADC structures is the fact that it relies on states to solve problems among states, even though many of the states themselves constitute the problems. Member states are themselves often a source of instability, governed by weak leaders who use patronage politics to remain in power, or because of neo-patrimonial structures and various degrees of authoritarianism (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:2). As a result, national interests are often incompatible with regional interests, the protection of which should be at the centre of any regional security structures. Intrastate conflicts and unrest will continue to destabilise the SADC region and therefore jeopardise the potential for the development of a security community (Mandrup, 2009a:8).

In addition to the above, several other problems have hampered the progress of the SADC SF. These challenges are not unique to the SADC SF as the majority of African TTCs that pledge forces to standby organisations are also affected by the same problems. One of the greatest challenges has proved to be interoperability problems experienced with equipment and systems of the respective SADC member states. This has had significant effect on the development of command-and-control, as well as communication systems. Another problem is language. The SADC is comprised of an extremely diverse cultural and linguistic community. It comprises of Anglophone, Lusophone as well as Francophone and various African elements, and language has proved to be a great challenge to the development of the SADF SF (Solomon, 2012:24). In addition, whilst good progress has been made with the military components of the SADC SF, the civilian and police components of the SADC SF have remained underdeveloped. This has resulted in a situation where effective synergy during JI^{2}M operations and exercises could not be achieved, as was demonstrated during Exercise Golfinho in 2009 (Solomon, 2012:24). Another challenge that was faced by the SADC SF was the fact that some SADC member countries who pledged forces, pledged forces who were already committed elsewhere, thereby hampering the creation of a roster of troops being contributed (Cilliers, 2008:14). Furthermore, as a result of the resource constraints experienced by some SADC countries, South Africa has come to occupy a

dominant role with the SADC SF – a factor that could have a negative effect on the willingness of SADC member states to participate in SADC SF activities and deployment (Solomon, 2014:25). In addition, the greatest challenges to the development of the SADC SF was of a political nature, as the SADC political leadership proved to be deficient in terms of the values that it represented: preferring to keep incumbents in power as opposed to aligning themselves to the principles of sustainable socio-political development (Van Nieuwkerk, 2009:109). The SADC political leadership therefore seems to exist for the security of state elites (regime security), as opposed to the broader concepts associated with human security and the African Renaissance (cf. Van Nieuwkerk, 2009:1).

Despite all the problems experienced with the establishment and roll-out of the SADC SF, some progress has been made over the past few years. The SADC SF's planning element has been established and is co-located with the SADC secretariat in Gaborone. The SADC SF has also progressed with the development of common, multinational doctrine, operational guidelines and some standing operating procedures (SOPs) and sustainment concepts (Cilliers, 2008:14). Progress has also been made with training at the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, as well as at the Peace Mission Training Centre in Pretoria. One of the highlights of common training was the participation of SADC member states during Exercise Golfinho (in 2009) – a brigade-size (8 000 soldiers) field training exercise which involved both maritime and land elements of several SADC countries (Mandrup, 2009a:17). The aim of the exercise was to prepare SADCBRIG for multidimensional PSOs in line with the ASF Roadmap (Boshoff, 2009:1). In addition, most SADC countries train their soldiers according to the AU and UN PSO doctrine which fosters greater coordination during the planning and execution of operations and which also enhances interoperability standards of equipment and systems (Solomon, 2012:24).

The fact that South Africa offered to act as lead nation for ACIRC, will definitely have a detrimental effect on the roll-out and development of the SADC SF (De Coning, 2014:38). The SANDF has limited capacity as it is, and time, effort and resources that would have been directed to the SADC SF, have now been re-focused towards the establishment of ACIRC (Leijenaar, 2014:1). This can be interpreted that the SANDF's relative successes during the Bangui Battle, as well as with the FIB deployment to the DRC have provided decision-makers

with the confidence to present the SANDF as a primary role-player in PSOs on the continent (Heitman, 2013c:3). There are many uncertainties as to how this shift in focus will develop, primarily because there is no indication whether additional funding will be made available by government to fund these types of deployments (De Coning, 2014:34). ACIRC is viewed by many as a more appropriate structure to deal with the region's (in)security challenges, if compared with that of the SADC SF (De Coning, 2014:38–40). These proponents argue that the ASF seems to be more of a military–diplomatic forum for PSO cooperation – where all members should be involved, but when it comes to actual troop deployments where robust intervention actions are required, that the AU will look towards ACIRC (Leijenaar, 2014:2).

This shift seems to support arguments in favour of national readiness packages (JIT forces) which can be optimally configured from TCCs that have special interests in a given situation, as opposed to permanently established regional stand-by forces which seem to be less cost-effective and realistic in terms of the challenges to be faced during PSOs (De Coning, 2014:38). The JIT approach will also provide planners and decision-makers with greater flexibility and more options to configure and deploy the troops provided by TCCs optimally in terms of force designs and force structures that are tailored to the specific characteristics of the respective PSOs (De Coning, 2014:38–40).

Despite the multitude of problems that have been experienced with the operationalisation of the SADC SF, the establishment of the organisation was an important investment in the security and development of the SADC region (Aboagye, 2012:1). Problems with interoperability, the establishment of common command–and–control systems, overlapping memberships of the regional brigades and the dangers associated with one state dominating particular regional institutions and political and military leaders in Africa have bedevilled progress with the SADC SF and also confirmed that high levels of commitment will have to be demonstrated by African TCCs to develop the concepts and theoretical framework of the ASF from the drawing board to a fully equipped, trained and operationalised mission-ready standby force (Aboagye, 2012:1–3).

4.9. South Africa's role in peace and security on the continent

When South Africa transitioned to democracy in 1994, there were great expectations on the part of the international community that the country would actively participate in conflict resolution on the continent (Mandrup, 2009a:18). It soon became clear, however, that the South African government was heavily pressed on addressing the domestic agenda to find workable solutions to poverty reduction, unemployment, the restructuring and transformation of the economy and addressing social inequalities. The South African government, during the first few years of democracy, displayed a reluctance to become involved in operations outside the borders of South Africa (Mandrup, 2009a:19). Towards the end of the 1990s, however, it became evident that there was a growing realisation that the country's stability and prosperity were inextricably linked to the economic and political development of the continent as a whole and the SADC region in particular – a realisation that reflected an appreciation of the close nexus between regional stability and national interest.

The above-mentioned changes also addressed the requirements for the conduct of successful African peace missions and the need to execute hybrid peace operations through a partnership between the UN and AU (Leijenaar, 2013:2). Hybrid peace operations, such as the deployment in Darfur and western Sudan, are characterised by very complex challenges relating to the political, economic and technical aspects of such missions (cf. Wassara, 2010:255–284). In order to establish a meaningful partnership between the UN and the AU, both organisations will have to show leadership to overcome the internal ambitions responsible for fragmentation and the lack of political will (Leijenaar, 2013:2).

Since South Africa's entry into African peace missions following the inception of democracy in South Africa in 1994, domestic and international expectations have steadily grown as part of South Africa's role as a responsible and respected member of the international community. These expectations include the hope that South Africa will play a leading role in a variety of international, regional and subregional forums and that South Africa will also become an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and international conflicts. These sentiments were also expressed in the Revised South Africa's White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (DIRCO, 2012:3).

The White Paper (2012) also states that South Africa will continue to cooperate with regional partners, particularly those within the SADC, in enhancing its capacity to participate in international peace missions. South Africa's Permanent Mission to the UN will remain fully focused on the country's potential diplomatic, military and police contributions to peace missions and this will be communicated to the UN Secretariat on a regular basis (DIRCO, 2012:23–25).

South Africa has since emerged as a key role-player in conflict resolution and the management of some of Africa's less stable and conflict-ridden states – this despite severe budget cuts and the reduction in deployable personnel as a result of a variety of reasons that range from HIV and AIDS infection rates to an ageing soldier population, the near collapse of the reserve force and a serious skills shortage (Mandrup, 2009b:118). Despite these shortcomings, South Africa has been a major contributor to UN and AU peacekeeping mission efforts and has troops and military observers deployed in several countries such as the DRC, Darfur in Sudan and Nepal In recent years, South Africa was rated at number 14 in the world in terms of overall country contributions to UN missions, which is quite substantial if the size of the SANDF is taken into account (Lucey, 2013:2). On the other hand, there are some commentators who argue South Africa is doing far less than what it should – 'punching below its weight' given the strength of its economy (Leijenaar, 2014:2). This is somewhat out of step with the notion that African states should play a more prominent role in solving security problems on the continent.

According to Kornegay (2011:41), the South African approach to what has been considered 'fragile' states in Africa has been heavily influenced by the country's own transition, including its experience in conflict resolution and management. South Africa's role in regional conflict resolution is directly related to the country's perception of itself as a democracy in which human rights are of paramount importance, and can perhaps be traced to the nature of its own transition to democracy – a peaceful one (Schoeman, 2007:166). The idea that conflicts can be solved through negotiation is one strongly adhered to by South African policy makers, and much time, energy and resources have been spent on conflict resolution in countries such as the DRC and Burundi, including the contribution of troops to peacekeeping

operations in both countries (Schoeman, 2007:169). The South African model of conflict resolution emphasises negotiated settlements, national unity governments, and reconciliation through the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions (Olivier, Neethling & Mokoena, 2013:198). These experiences have significantly influenced the normative basis of South Africa's foreign policy and the DIRCO Strategic Plan 2011–2014. In this respect, policy is oriented toward the peace and security stabilisation of the continental hinterland as an enabling condition for South Africa's own economic development and regional security interests.

South Africa's involvement in PSOs on the continent coincides with the growing role of multilateral institutions that are involved in security and developments in Africa. These developments have generated a new perspective to the emerging powers' equation on development and security – one that is a uniquely African-grounded peace and security perspective. Despite good progress in this regard, these developments have not been captured in clearly defined governmental policy conceptualisations for South Africa's engagement in crisis- and conflict-affected states. These developments are also informed by South Africa's regional integration efforts, including efforts to establish, under the AU, a comprehensive post-conflict recovery regime as a component of the AU's broader peace and security architecture (Kornegay, 2011:41).

South Africa's approach to PSOs on the continent has been characterised by the quest for lasting solutions to continental and regional development and security (DFA, 1999). This regional emphasis was reflected in South Africa's political intercession in support of the transfer of power from Zairean Mbobutu Sese Seko to Laurent Kabila in Zaire's 1997 transition to the DRC, as well as in the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998, which was carried out within a SADC framework (Kent & Malan, 2005:3–5). Coordination of military activities took place with South Africa as leading the politico-diplomatic intervention in Lesotho in (1998) which was aimed at finding a political solution to Lesotho's breakdown in governance and security. Notable of these early engagements in the Zaire-to-DRC transition and in the political and military interventions in Lesotho is that they were conducted outside the framework of the UN, highlighting an earlier disconnect between UN peacekeeping and African regional initiatives (Kent & Malan, 2005:7–9). Indeed, more often than not, regional

peace and security urgencies have required regional intervention that precedes UN mandates. In terms of South Africa's participation in PSOs, there is a thus measure of tension as the country wants to play a leading role in UN missions, whilst at the same time pursuing a leading role in the AU, as well as at sub-regional, SADC level.

The Revised South African White Paper on Peace Missions (2012) was aimed at expounding a holistic, multidisciplinary approach, where political and military tasks were also driven by humanitarian concerns (DIRCO, 2012). Post-conflict reconstruction and recovery gained increasing currency with South Africa figuring importantly in the intellectual conceptualisation of developmental peacekeeping as an approach in line with African needs in addressing the underlying developmental imperatives of peace and security (Olivier, 2013:111–118). The concept of developmental peace missions (DPMs) was included in the SA Army's long term strategy as one of the strategic objectives to be achieved as part of the operationalisation of the Future SA Army Strategy and was encapsulated in the SA Army's direction-giving Vision 2020 document (DOD: SA Army Future SA Army Strategy, 2006). The concept of DPMs was also specifically addressed in the 2014 Defence Review and it was confirmed that the SANDF would pursue reconstruction and create conditions that are conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peacekeeping objectives. The "process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during and immediately after military operations will enable and reinforce the process of development and reconstruction" forms a significant theme of the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-8).

Whereas 'traditional' peacekeeping was focused on the deployment of forces on cease-fire lines and peace agreements between armies and/or armed groups, focusing purely on military aspects of 'keeping the peace', the developmental dimensions of African conflict/post-conflict situations are seen as demanding something more comprehensive (Olivier, 2013:126–127) . This prompted the formulation of the South African DPMs concept, which addresses a broader range of post-conflict reconstruction and developmental imperatives. Initiatives such as these follow on the realisation that one of the major problems confronting implementation of the AU/NEPAD framework on the continent was the prevalence of conventional approaches to PCRD in Africa. Emphasis tended to be on stabilisation as the essence of traditional, non-African conceptualisations of how post-conflict efforts should

proceed and how to strengthen fragile states. Such approaches were seen as departing from a longer-term perspective in how PCRD is conceptualised in the African context. Instead, a general sense was expressed that approaches should address questions of legitimacy at three levels: national level, solidarity at continental level, and forging partnerships at international level. This emphasised the lack of coordination between peacemaking entities and the lack of coordination between AU/NEPAD priorities and international donors in supporting AU/NEPAD framework as the point of departure for international engagement (Aboagye, 2012:2–4).

Despite the South African government's focus on negotiated settlements by means of mediation and the promotion of dialogue among adversaries, experience gained by the SANDF during its participation in PSOs on the continent is that the SANDF must have the capacity to make efficient use of military force during some stages of the peace processes (Leijenaar, 2014:2). Concurrent to the definition of South African approaches, governance and policies pertaining to peace missions, the SANDF is compelled to develop its people and equipment to conduct robust PSOs – South Africa's most likely operational commitment. According to Mills (2011:12), these types of robust PSOs have characteristics that are very similar to counterinsurgency tasks faced in Afghanistan and elsewhere. During the 1990s, conflicts that erupted in Somalia, Rwanda, the Great Lakes region and Lesotho made it clear that classic peacekeeping in conflict areas was not always the most appropriate approach to complex post-Cold War peace missions, a notion which the Brahimi Report (cf. UN, 2000) confirmed. This report facilitated the introduction of a more robust approach to peace missions in the UN, and members of the SA Army soon participated in multinational operations under a UN Chapter 7 mandate. One example is the participation in the Mission de l'ONU en RD Congo (United Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) (MONUC) in March 2005 during which members of the SA Army, together with Pakistani troops, took part in an operation against rebels in the Ituri region, when the rebels ambushed and killed nine UN Bangladeshi soldiers. Many of the tactical actions in such missions involve, in essence, counterinsurgency tactics and techniques, although the rules of engagement place necessary restrictions on the use of force. As a result of operational realities, distinctions between peace operations and counterinsurgency operations are no longer as clear as they were during the Cold War (Baker & Jordaan, 2010:x).

The SA Army, as the largest component of the SANDF (37 000 of the 62 000 uniformed personnel), is currently the service that is most affected by the effect of an ageing force and the limits that this place on the number of trained personnel available for deployments (cf. Heitman, 2013b:1–10). From the White Paper on Defence 1996 (DOD, 1996) and the Defence Review 1998 (DOD, 1998), it is evident that it was not envisaged in the mid-1990s that South Africa would, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, be deploying more than 3 000 soldiers in peace missions on the continent. Most prominent are the challenges experienced with sustaining these large contingents, coupled with the commitment of even more troops to unscheduled interventions such as the Comoros (Bellamy & Williams, 2010:308 – 309), deployments in support to humanitarian operations, for example the Mozambique floods in 2002, as well as the recent commitment of forces to ACIRC in 2013/14 (Leijenaar, 2014:2). The vast distances over which these peace missions must be sustained place new demands on the force design of the SANDF – a design that is influenced by a concept of mobile operations with relatively short lines of support, and geared to defending the territorial integrity of the country (Mills, 2011:18).

The SANDF has participated in a variety of PSOs since 1994 (cf. Mandrup, 2009a). It played a key role in providing the policing function during peace efforts in Burundi, contributed significantly to the success of the mission and is currently involved in peace efforts in Darfur as part of a UN/AU hybrid peace mission (UNAMID). The SANDF continues to participate actively in peacekeeping efforts in the DRC (as part of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Mission [de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo] also known as MONUSCO and provided assistance to the CAR government against rebel threats in 2013 (Heitman, 2013c:1) The recent 'Battle for Bangui' in 2013, however, differed vastly from the overall normative–positive interface that has characterised the SANDF's approach to the de facto involvement on the continent and the hawk-like surprise, in which South Africa operated outside the usual peacekeeping posture, is hopefully the exception to the rule.

In order to participate effectively in PSOs in Africa, it is clear that members of the SANDF must have and must sustain the required warfighting concepts and capabilities associated

with robust peace enforcement operations (De Coning, 2014:36). This, however, is no longer sufficient to ensure operational success. Whilst peace missions undoubtedly have a kinetic military dimension, these operations are profoundly socio-political in nature (Mills, 2011:13). The SANDF requires wide-awake intelligence services, where experts can understand the roots of conflict and the intersecting network of personalities, ideologies and tribes that often underpin African armed conflicts to effectively conduct PSOs. The 2013 Battle for Bangui, CAR, however, demonstrated that the SANDF's intelligence service dismally failed the soldiers as they were unable to provide effective tactical intelligence analysis and an in-depth understanding of the security situation (Heitman, 2013c:19). The Battle for Bangui also clearly demonstrated that the SANDF must create the capacity to deploy more robust deployments to PSOs when the security situation on the ground so requires. The force composition of the SANDF in the CAR was clearly too light and the troops were too lightly armed for a sustained combat role. Most importantly, The SA Army does not have air-transportable combat vehicles or artillery unlike the SAAF, the SANDF does not have the strategic airlift capacity to fly reinforcements in quickly, to deploy combat vehicles or to deploy helicopters for hot extraction (Heitman, 2013c:37). If the SANDF wants to set itself up for success during peace missions, especially in operational concepts such as DPMs, the SANDF will have to work more closely with its civilian developmental counterparts and gain more knowledge of the 'softer side' of war. PSOs are conducted in a variety of areas of development and are focused upon remedying the conditions that originally gave rise to insecurity in the first place (Mills, 2011:15).

Contemporary PSOs are essentially political initiatives, despite the complex admixture of political, humanitarian and military concerns and means (DOD, 2006a:1-1). South Africa must therefore continually appraise the political and strategic environment within which peace missions are to be launched and should very clearly define the specific principles that will govern South Africa's participation in such efforts. This notion was clearly expressed in the 2014 Defence Review which describes South Africa's approach to its growing continental and regional responsibilities (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-2–0-3). In light of these complexities, special attention should be given to the required type of mandate that governs peace missions in order to facilitate a detailed articulation of acceptable entry and exit criteria and to determine the scope, level and type of resources that South Africa is willing to commit

to future peace missions. This will provide a clear indication to the international community (including South Africa's regional and subregional partners) of the country's stance on participation in peace operations (cf. DIRCO, 2012).

Security threats such as civil war, intercommunal violence, terrorism and insurgency will continue to affect the international environment significantly, and as South Africa is internationally regarded as a primary role-player or lead nation (Mandrup, 2009b:18) on the African continent, it will be expected to contribute to peace, stability and development in the emerging African defence and security architecture. South Africa will have to contribute significantly to the AU and ASF as there are great expectations that the AU will be able to rapidly deploy an all-African standby force for future peacekeeping (Neethling, 2009:19). The SANDF will thus, in addition to developing into a well-balanced, effective, modern, conventional military force, also have to develop its capabilities to mobilise effectively as part of a multinational force to address non-traditional security threats, non-state actors and non-conventional methods of promoting insecurity and instability.

In light of the above, the SANDF must prepare and configure itself to provide for the growth and development of a defence organisation that can be effectively deployed across the full spectrum of conflict and which will have the inherent capacity and flexibility to function optimally in JI²M operations. These should include all the contours of PSOs, with the focus on conflict prevention, DPMs and PCRD activities that require internal military changes, but also externally directed changes to bring military and civilian expertise and cooperation into equilibrium.

4.10. Conclusions

The establishment of the AU and the ASF was a positive development for Africa in terms of security and development and provided insight into how African leaders intend to address security challenges on the continent. In order, however, to provide the AU and other role-players on the African continent with a firm foundation for undertaking peacekeeping endeavours, the AU, the ASF and the regional standby forces will have to develop and enhance their capacity to address African security challenges themselves. African decision-

makers and defence planners must therefore develop the peacekeeping capacity of African militaries as an on-going priority and the prospect of increased peacekeeping responsibilities and requirements must be addressed in short-, medium- and long-term planning of African defence forces. The strategies, force designs, force preparation and force structure elements must be sufficiently flexible to ensure that African defence forces remain capable, not only of executing their constitutional duties to protect themselves from acts of external aggression during conventional military operations, but that they must also be designed, prepared and fitted with the capability of seamless integration with regional and continental security architectures during PSOs and humanitarian assistance operations.

The process of developing and establishing a continental security architecture is a complex and multidimensional endeavour. In the light of experience gained with the establishment and management of the OAU and subsequently the AU, it was generally accepted that several obstacles would have to be met on the road towards the desired end state – that of the establishment of an effective and efficient ASF. Despite all the shortcomings and problems that have been experienced with the establishment of the AU and the ASF, it has to be acknowledged that Africa has taken the first steps to put a comprehensive African peace and security architecture in place and that good progress has been made with the development and acceptance of the overall concept of the ASF. The actual operationalisation of the ASF has, however, taken longer than anticipated and several of the milestones that were initially envisaged, have not been realised yet. The primary challenges to the operationalisation of the ASF, besides financial and logistical constraints, are of a political and not of a military nature. This is because the governments of many AU member states are often themselves the cause of internal instability in their countries, and because many of the African political leadership seem to exist for the security of state elites as opposed to the broader human security needs of their citizens.

The establishment and development of the respective regional security architectures remains as complicated as the establishment of the continental architecture. In terms of the participation in PSOs and the role to be played during peace missions, South Africa's approach and contributions to peace missions on the continent should be understood against the backdrop of complexity and the fact that different motivations initiate and result in action

on continental, regional and national levels respectively. South Africa clearly aims to play a leading role at UN level, but at the same time, it also wishes to take the lead in the AU and ASF at continental level. South Africa's participation in SADC activities are also not only motivated by benevolent motivations such as the African Renaissance and the African Agenda, but they are essentially motivated by the pursuance of the country's national interests.

As a result of the continuing financial and logistical constraints experienced by the defence forces of SADC countries, South Africa, and specifically the SANDF, will be looked upon to take the lead as far as the strategic management capacity and operational-level mission management of PSOs are concerned. South Africa will be expected to contribute significantly to the financial and logistical support of PSOs on the continent. Because of the complex nature of the threats on the continent, the SANDF, as one of the primary instruments of foreign policy will have to prepare, provide and sustain its members to be capable of executing a wide variety of tasks simultaneously. History has shown that the civilian and police contingents to PSOs on the continent remain underdeveloped and that, although not the preferred solution, the military solution in the form of 'boots on the ground' will be the most probable solution to security crises in Africa. To support this, it is essential for African militaries to develop a strategy, force design and force structure that are optimally configured, supported and organisationally flexible to address the complexity of the tasks that they will be expected to perform in the African theatre of operations during PSOs. These tasks will be executed across the full spectrum of conflict and will include aspects of robust, conventional military operations, humanitarian interventions, disaster relief operations, area defence operations and PCRD operations – often to be executed simultaneously. This implies that the SANDF must be inherently flexible, adaptable and capable of expeditionary operations, extended campaigns and of conducting several types of operations simultaneously. *Chapter 5* will focus on the configuration of the future SANDF in the context of changed international realities and contemporary security challenges on the African continent discussed thus far.

CHAPTER 5: CONTEMPORARY SECURITY CHALLENGES, TRENDS IN DEFENCE PLANNING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SANDF

5.1. Introduction

At the start of the 21st century, the SANDF, as all other defence forces, faces the challenge of defining its roles, functions and posture to ensure that it is ready to answer the call for duty when so ordered by government. Policy makers, force developers and military practitioners are therefore tasked with adopting fitting approaches to the selection of an appropriate strategic direction as a basis for force structure, force design and force preparation of the SANDF and to adopt business practices that will ensure the SANDF's future relevance. It is essential to bear in mind that decisions on approaches to defence for democracies are not only dominated by the quest for optimal solutions against impending threats, but that decisions on strategic direction for defence are also significantly influenced by decisions of politicians who are compelled to find a suitable investment in a defence force that would be defendable to the electorate (Bartlett, Holman & Somes, 2000:21). In the light of the complex security environment described and the changes in the roles and functions of African militaries as described in Chapter 3 (see 3.3), it is evident that the SANDF's force readiness and relevance will require a broad spectrum of tasks and responsibilities – tasks that do not correspond with those traditionally executed by state militaries. These tasks include activities across the spectrum of conflict – ranging from traditional warfighting to the execution of activities during OOTW (DOD, 2006b: 2-17).

The South African government has, since 1994, tried to distance itself from the image of the sabre-rattling dominant political, military and economic hegemon of the *apartheid* era in Southern Africa. Consequently, it is continually attempting to identify and posture the 'new' South Africa as a country that is dedicated to the promotion of human rights, peace and socio-economic development of South Africa and the African continent as a whole (Southall, 2006:1). As part of this approach the government introduced a defence policy that revived South Africa's defence diplomacy into Africa, whilst deliberately placing limitations on and reducing the use of the military instrument in South Africa's foreign policy (Schoeman, 2013:213–217). Early post-1994 defence-related policies were therefore characterised by the

reassessment of the use of the military instrument as part of South African foreign policy in pursuance of national interests in Africa (Southall, 2006:1). In addition to the repositioning of the military as a foreign policy instrument, the South African government is also compelled to posture itself to meet the expectations of the international community which increasingly identify South Africa as the one state on the continent that has the capacity to contribute meaningfully to effective conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa (Mills, 2013:238). South Africa, currently Africa's second largest economy after Nigeria, is therefore expected to take up a leading role as a military peacekeeper in African conflicts (Van Wyk, 2004:113).

In order to prepare for these military challenges, it is essential that the DOD's planners and strategists continually reassess and rethink force structure and force design premises to ensure that the SANDF remains relevant and ready for the challenges that have to be met in a significantly changed national and continental security environment (Schoeman, 2013:217–223). Various defence policy documents such as the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review have been formulated and promulgated since 1994. Following this, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, during her budget speech in Parliament on 4 May 2010 announced that a future defence policy framework would be drafted. She clarified that the primary reason for the new Defence Review was to address the "major changes, both dramatic and evolutionary, that have taken place in the defence environment over the past 15 years**"** (Sisulu, 2010).

Another widely debated issue is the fact that the force design and force structure as prescribed in the above-mentioned policy documents fail to provide adequately for the required current and future operational capabilities of the SANDF (Defence Review Committee, 2014;2-20–2-22). The 1998 Defence Review focused on fitting defence capability requirements, as appreciated at the time, into expected DOD funding levels (Department of Defence, 1998:155). The process of determining defence capability requirements was based on assumptions and broad estimates and was concluded without taking into account the results of a detailed strategic assessment which was also conducted at the time (1998). The disjuncture between what is actually required and what was appreciated has resulted in the current situation where there is a vast mismatch between actual capability and required

operational outcomes (Heitman, 2013b:6). The 2014 Defence Review also describes this disjunction (Defence Review Committee, 2014:ix):

> The Defence Force is in a critical state of decline, characterised by force imbalance between capabilities, block obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems, a disproportional tooth-to-tail ratio, the inability to meet current standing defence commitments and the lack of critical mobility. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling.

This has created the current dilemma in which the SANDF finds itself, despite the acquisition of state-of-the-art air and naval assets in 1998. The SANDF is therefore still not optimally configured, adequately equipped and sufficiently funded to execute its required operational tasks (Mills, 2011:19). There are several reasons for these misalignments, ranging from vastly differing opinions between politicians and military practitioners on the roles and functions of African militaries to short-sightedness on the budgetary, affordability and capability management and development issues that were, and still are, at stake.

The aim of this chapter is to report on current and future tasks of the SANDF to meet contemporary security challenges associated with the changed international political and security environment and to determine whether the SANDF has the capacity to provide forces that are ready, able and optimally configured to contribute militarily to peace, stability and development in Africa as part of South Africa's foreign policy. The analysis will address South Africa's approach to defence planning, force design and force structure since 1994 (see 5.4), and will include an investigation of current international trends in defence planning and capability management (see 5.5.3) as well as an evaluation of the possible benefits of the application of these concepts to the SANDF's planning processes (see 5.5.4). The chapter concludes with a proposed modular force design option as a feasible alternative to the current single service-oriented force design and structure of the SANDF. The intention is to offer a viable alternative force design and force structure option that will provide the SANDF with optimally configured forces that are tailor-made to meet contemporary African security challenges across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from conventional warfighting to OOTW – now, as well as in the future.

5.2. Contemporary security challenges and the roles and tasks of the SANDF

Clausewitz argued that one of the most crucial requirements for the successful deployment and tasking of any military force is to understand the kind of war upon which it is embarking (Clausewitz, 1976:87). Once the type of war in which a military organisation will become involved has been identified, the government will determine the posture, configuration and level of defence ambition of its defence force (Lloyd, 2000:10). The configuration and posture of a defence force are therefore indicative of a government's approach to the military as a rational instrument of state policy and a reflection of the military's role in society (Obasanjo et al., 2013:4). This ensures civilian control over the military and premises that the military, as are other state institutions, is accountable to civilian power and the public, and that the defence force should therefore adhere to a certain level of transparency imposed by law (Pretorius, 2008:38).

The defensive posture that has been adopted by the South African government since 1994 is founded on the uncompromising requirement of deterring conflict and threats to the sovereignty of the state (cf. DOD, 1996 and DOD, 1998). The credibility of this deterrence, however, remains strongly dependent on political will and the actual capability to defeat security threats militarily. The SANDF must therefore be configured to defend robustly, and if deterrence fails, to be ready to apply decisive lethal force to set the conditions for political progress. Credible defence is crucial to the safety, security and socio-economic development of South Africa, as the sources for competition, confrontation and conflict are increasing. These threats will continue to drive the requirements for the SANDF to provide and expand options and political choice in defence of South Africa's vital national interests (Van Wyk, 2004:103). Furthermore, there is broad consensus among defence analysts and planners that future wars will be a hybrid mix of regular and irregular warfare and the character of conflict will be congested, cluttered, connected and combined (Gray, 2005:211). The SANDF must also be prepared to engage adversaries equipped with an extensive range of capabilities, from the unsophisticated with low-end technological capabilities, to those with more sophisticated capabilities. Adversaries who combine the structure and tactics of insurgency types of warfare with the capabilities of high-end technologies will further complicate the SANDF's operating environment (Baker & Jordaan, 2010:x). In addition to

addressing hybrid threats, the SANDF will also have to perform many other roles and functions in addressing current security challenges. The SANDF must therefore maintain a credible, demonstrable and persistent capacity to defeat adaptive hybrid adversaries who will conduct multimodal types of warfare, whilst also developing a credible capacity to be deployed in border-safeguarding operations and other tasks in support of internal stability (DOD, 2006:2-18).

From observations, studies and analyses of the threat environment during the past two decades, it has become clear that the future tasks of the SANDF are not going to be participation in conventional conflict in the classic sense of the word. The types of military operations in which the SANDF will become involved will most likely be that of low-intensity warfare of a COIN type (Baker, 2010:209), rather than conventional, traditional warfighting among warfighters in tanks and armoured vehicles whose primary aim is to seize and occupy key terrain (essentially an attritional approach to warfighting). Since the start of the 21st century, it has become evident that the character of warfare has, to a great extent, reverted to being the realm of the light infantry and modern cavalry (in the form of heliborne and air-delivered military forces) in which numbers ('boots-on-the-ground') and getting the forces there are the most important aspects – along with the critical enablers of tailored command-and-control systems, intelligence, surveillance, local knowledge and efficient sustainment systems (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence [MOD], 2012:1–7). Air mobility and air lift are required to support the deployment, sustainment and manoeuvre of future forces and must also meet the requirements for precision air delivery, air-to-air refuelling, air assault and airborne missions, air logistics missions, personnel recovery and aero-medical evacuation (UK MOD, 2012:vi).

South Africa is often expected to serve as a lead or framework nation during multi-national operations on the continent which underpins the requirement for the SANDF to operate effectively with partners and allies across the spectrum of conflict (DOD, 2006:2-32). South Africa is perceived as wealthier, more stable, technologically more advanced and having greater leverage in relations with the developed world (Pretorius, 2008:48). Deployments to the CAR, the DRC and Darfur have demonstrated South Africa's willingness to 'put its money where its mouth is' in contributing to peace and stability on the continent (Heitman, 2013a:2).

The characteristics of these types of operations not only require the SANDF to prepare for traditional PSOs, but also demand that it must be equipped with limited scales of conventional equipment to undertake more robust peace enforcement operations succesfully. The development of a defence force that can be deployed effectively across the spectrum of conflict (from warfighting to peacebuilding) will help to reinforce South Africa's influence internationally, thereby increasing political options (Van Wyk, 2004:104). After all, credible hard power provides the foundation of soft power, and defence engagement makes a key military contribution to this (Heitman, 2013b:1). In this regard, although the country's willingness to intervene in Africa has received praise and approval, South Africa has also been on the receiving end of criticism, primarily as a result of the limited number of peacekeepers it has deployed on the continent.

According to Heitman (2013a:3), the former AU Commission Head recently pointed out to South African officials,

> "… you are a country of 50 million people; with by far the largest economy in Africa and the 26th largest in the world, (yet) you have (only) two battalions deployed. This is in stark contrast to Burundi which, with a population of only 10 million people and being one of the poorest countries in the world, which has an entire brigade deployed".

It is therefore imperative, and in the interest of good IR, that the SANDF's contribution to safety and security must extend beyond border-safeguarding and the protection of the territorial integrity of South Africa (Obasanjo et al., 2013:4).

South Africa's role on the continent and the role the SANDF should play in advancing South Africa's national goals as part of foreign policy are therefore important determinants of the posture, size and configuration of the SANDF. Some roles, such as stability projection, participation in peace operations, pacts and alliances may have significant implications for the force design approach (Heitman, 2013b:1), whereas other tasks such as general military cooperation and assistance, electoral assistance, humanitarian aid and aid to civil authorities would have less or little influence on the force design approach, but could have significant effect on the numbers of forces that could be deployed or on the cost implications of such deployments. These roles should be understood and interpreted as part of the defence

mandate and the constitutional functions for which the Defence Force may be employed (Defence Review Committee, 2014: 01).

It is evident that the future roles and functions of the SANDF will be multiple, complex and varied in nature and the SANDF must develop forces that are capable of achieving the required outcomes in terms of all the above-mentioned tasks. This premise of agility, multiplicity and complexity must determine the required force capability levels and informed decisions on a flexible force structure that will provide forces for the conduct of major combat operations, participation in peace missions, and the execution of tasks in support of other government departments. Members of the SANDF must be able to successfully conduct (DOD, 2006:2-19):

- **Self-defence operations**. The SANDF must be able to act decisively during conflicts with states over territory, scarce resources, control over migrant populations and a myriad of other problems as these are part of international circumstances that have a significant effect on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Escalation to armed conflict over these issues is not impossible, although improbable. The SANDF must, therefore, have the capacity and remain ready to deal with a wide variety of military threats in order to remain a credible defence force.

- **Peace missions and regional defence cooperation**. South Africa recognises that security and development in South Africa are inextricably linked to the situation elsewhere in the region and vice versa – this is a central tenet of the national security policy, as well as South Africa's foreign policy. Participation by the SANDF in peace missions and regional defence cooperation are thus important sub-sets of these policies. South Africa cannot afford to distance itself from events in Africa, because, apart from the humanitarian aspect, instability and conflict on the sub-continent has direct as well as indirect implications for South Africa's security and economic development and spill-over effects on international confidence, investment and regional development. The credibility of South Africa as a regional power depends on the country's ability to contribute significantly to regional stability, not only through UN operations, but also through common security arrangements, alliances and military

assistance to other African countries. To this effect, the SANDF must develop and maintain the capacity to contribute effectively to robust peace enforcement as well as more docile peacekeeping operations on the continent. The SANDF will also increasingly become involved in peacebuilding efforts on the continent which has already been formalised in various policy documents of government and the SANDF. As such, the concept of DPMs has been incorporated as one of the pillars of the Future SA Army Strategy (DOD, 2006:2-28–2-29). DPMs call for a more timely effort to bring security closer to development in order to minimise the return of conflict and to facilitate a transition to international and local actors responsible for conducting long-term state-building efforts. DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction efforts should as soon as possible – even when conflict is still ongoing – contribute towards security, peace and obtaining long-term political orders and economic legitimacy. The SANDF's involvement in peace missions can therefore not be dealt with on an ad hoc basis; it requires serious long-term commitment and investment to regional defence cooperation and assistance.

- **Humanitarian operations**. In the absence of adequate civilian resources to support humanitarian operations, both in South Africa and the region, humanitarian operations will remain a permanent feature of the defence scene. It is the one area where, except if conducted as part of a peace mission, the aspect of military force is irrelevant. In this sense, humanitarian assistance is a truly secondary or collateral task. Such operations, however, render an invaluable service in the preservation of life and property and therefore make an important and highly visible contribution to security. In this regard, these operations remain an essential aspect of the defence function – both from a practical and a public relations point of view.

- **Border safe-guarding and protection**. The adequate protection of air and land borders and maritime zones signals that a country is serious about its sovereignty and territorial integrity and can contribute significantly to general security and well-being. It can as such, be understood as the primary object of defence as encapsulated in the Constitution of South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1996). While it is clearly an interdepartmental task, illicit cross-border activities have taken on a paramilitary aspect

that makes the military a vital element in the execution of the tasks. In the absence of civilian authorities that are adequately equipped and empowered, it falls in any event upon the military. There has been a significant shift in the approach to the involvement of the SANDF in border-safeguarding and border protection since 1994. The SADF deployments during the pre-1994 period were primarily aimed at containing armed incursions across the landward borders, whereas the period directly after 1994 was characterised by a growing realisation that the management of borders constitutes a great deal more than just securing the Republic of South Africa (RSA) against armed incursions. In 1994, however, the process of political transformation and the negative sentiments that prevailed about the internal deployment of the SANDF by the *apartheid* regime prompted decision-makers to announce the withdrawal of the SANDF from the borders of the RSA in 2009 (DOD, 1998:27). Since this decision, significant changes came about in the sentiments related to the domestic deployment of the military in South Africa – primarily as a result of the increases in cross-border crime due to ineffective border control and the significant increases in the number of incidents of internal unrest which have had serious repercussions for safety and security within the borders of the RSA. In 2010, the government subsequently decided to re-deploy members of the SANDF to the border in an effort to improve border management and to curtail cross-border crime (Defence Review Committee, 2014:04).

- **Domestic/Internal operations**. The internal deployment of the military in society has always been and will remain a contentious issue. Combating of crime, by nature, is a police matter and this is most often used as the primary motivation for not deploying militaries domestically. The high incidence of violent crime has, however, distorted the profile of police activity and has escalated to a point where it threatens to disrupt the social fabric of the country. Despite the fact that several politicians, such as the leader of the Democratic Alliance, Ms Helen Zille, as well as several members of the South African citizenry, has repeatedly called for the deployment of the military to support the fight against crime, it still does not justify the routine use or threat of force associated with military activity (Engelbrecht, 2012:1). Therefore, the role of the military in anti-crime operations should be restricted and limited to the provision of back-up for the police during high-intensity anti-crime operations – this notion has been strongly

supported by both the Mbeki and Zuma governments.

Essentially, the SANDF must be able to patrol and protect the RSA's land borders, maritime border and zones (including islands) and airspace. The SANDF must also patrol shipping routes that are critical to South Africa (for instance the Mozambique Channel) and respond effectively to threat to vital external interests such as the Khatse Dam in Lesotho and the Cahora Bassa power station and Maputo harbour in Mozambique (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-1–3-14). It must have the capacity to react with a combat-group (composite brigade) strength with air and naval support to a security crisis within the SADC or in an adjacent country, with follow-on forces for twelve months (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-10–9-34). It must also maintain its capacity to sustain the current peace support commitments in Darfur and the DRC and maintain a contingency force of approximately brigade strength and equivalent reserve capacity in the SAAF and SAN Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-11–10-16). In addition to the above, the SANDF must also be able to maintain the capacity to support execute a variety of other specialist types of operations such as supporting the South African Police Service (SAPS) in anti-terrorist operations and conducting small non-combatant evacuations, for instance embassy staff (Heitman, 2013b:1). The SANDF must, however, have the capacity to execute all the above tasks at the same time – it will not have the opportunity to complete one mission before embarking on the next.

Despite having to execute a great number of diverse tasks simultaneously, the SANDF also has to contend with the challenges posed by distance on the African battlespace. Africa measures approximately 8 000 km north to south and 7 400 km west to east, has a surface area of 30 370 000 km^2, and a coastline of 30 539 km (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-4). To provide more regarding the influence of the size of the continent on military operations, the following figures for comparison should also be borne in mind:

Region	Surface area	Land borders	Coastline
SADC	9 293 820 km^2	7 864 km	9 719 km
Western Europe	3 466 199 km^2	3 861 km	43 053 km
India	3 287 090 km^2	14 103 km	7 000 km
Brazil	8 511 965 km^2	14 691 km	7 491 km

USA	9 372 610 km^2	12 248 km	19 920 km
China	9 596 960 km^2	22 143 km	14 500 km
Russia	17 075 299 km^2	20 139 km	37 653 km

In order to overcome these challenges, the SANDF's force structure and force design must therefore exemplify an expeditionary mindset as military operations will be conducted at the end of very long logistical lines where extreme levels of self-sufficiency will be required (Cilliers, 2007:9–10). The current threat by M23 rebels in DRC and the implications of long lines of communications during the CAR operation have emphasised the very real possibility of contested entry into deployment theatres. Without the required capabilities to support expeditionary forces that will have to traverse vast distances, the SANDF's relevance as an instrument of power to the South African government will continually be stymied. In addition to the above-mentioned environmental challenges that complicate military operations in Africa, members of the SANDF will also be expected to confront various types of threats from adversaries contesting access to theatres of operation simultaneously by the denial of lodgement areas required for support to deployed expeditionary forces (Heitman, 2013b:7).

The combination of South Africa's regional position, the continued instability in much of Africa, and the effect of renewed major power competition in Africa emphasises the fact that there are numerous imperatives which demand that the SANDF have the capacity to project focused power into Africa as well as to play a prominent role in the international political stage (Heitman, 2013b:7–8). Several other developing countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, China and Brazil all face similar challenges in that they are expected to play important roles in the development of their respective regions, despite the developmental challenges they have to overcome domestically. To this effect, both South Africa and Brazil, for example, have expressed their intention to obtain permanent seats on the UNSC as a long-term goal of their respective foreign policies (Bertazzo, 2012:11). Political engagement in the international arena and a demonstrable contribution to international peace and security are part of the requirements these two countries need to fulfil if this goal is to be attained (Bertazzo, 2012:12). As prominent nations in their respective regions, South Africa and Brazil are therefore not only expected to act as lead nations in the economic, social and political development of their regions, but they are also expected to act as mediators, moving across

the global North– South divide by obtaining consensus between the developed and the developing world (Bertazzo, 2012:15). In addition to the nurturing of good relationships between the developed and the developing world, South Africa's, as is Brazil's, membership of BRICS is also crucial in the development of good South–South economic and political relationships in the developing countries of the South. Both South Africa and Brazil have been called upon to take on greater responsibilities in the field of peace and stability and in the military realm and favourable domestic and regional conditions have allowed them to participate in various peace missions. In addition to the requirements for increased participation in peace missions, the current security environment also demands increased and improved defence diplomacy initiatives and adroitness in the politics of non-intervention – a notion that has exemplified African international relations since the inception of the OAU and continues to inform the decisions of AU members (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-5).

In stark contrast to the South African experience since 1994, however, Brazilian leaders have recently acknowledged that they will not be able to take on a leadership role in the wider international arena without accepting the associated costs and increases in the defence budget (Bertazzo, 2012:15). They also expressed themselves as more willing than ever to engage in the reconstruction of their defence industry. This is a significant change of course as, despite its status as a large nation experiencing unprecedented political and stability (Brazil has one of the ten largest economies in the world), it still ranks low in investment in military capability. Approximately 80% of its military budget, which was recently estimated to be the eleventh largest military budget in the world, was spent on personnel (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 2011). South Africa, on the other hand, although having the largest economy in Africa, has a very small economy in relation to the rest of the world, and concomitantly also has a very small military budget (Heitman, 2013b:8). In addition, since 1994, the South African defence industry has paled into insignificance when compared to the development of the defence industries of other developing countries such as China, India and Russia over the past twenty years. This again highlights the current mismatch between the roles and tasks that the South African government expects its defence force to execute; the capabilities provided to execute the assigned tasks; and the budget that is annually allocated to the SANDF – currently 1,2% of the GDP per year, which has rendered the SANDF effectively 24% underfunded (Defence Review Committee, 2014:ix).

In light of the above, it is evident that South Africa's current level of defence ambition, by continuing to increase the numbers of deployed peacekeepers, as well as increasing the number of SANDF members involved in border-safeguarding, is not realistic (Heitman, 2013b:). The cost of maintaining modern defence forces has compelled many countries, such as the USA and the United Kingdom, to lower their military ambitions and to reassess their approaches to defence. In cases where it was not politically expedient to lower their defence ambitions, militaries have employed innovative force design frameworks to create the greatest possible military 'footprint' with limited means (Schilling & Paparone, 2008:285). The RSA, however, continues to punch above its weight as far as deployments are concerned, yet has not embarked on a reassessment of its approaches to defence, force design or force structure. Major decisions will have to be made on the scope of South Africa's level of defence ambition. This will demand significant paradigm shifts – not mere refinement of current approaches and designs.

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that the current force strengths of the SANDF will make it increasingly difficult, if not near impossible, to deploy sufficient numbers of soldiers to meet all the security challenges in the vast array of complex security challenges that characterises the 21st-century African threat environment. What is evident is that flexibility and adaptability are key requisites to success in this very complex environment and that the forces deployed in missions must be tailored to address the idiosyncrasies of the mission in which they are deployed. In terms of force design, it can no longer be accepted that one type of force design will be adequate and suitable to all missions. On the other hand, it is not possible to design specific structures that will only be utilised for specific types of operations as this will prove far too expensive and will thus not be cost-effective. One way in which the problems relating to force design and force structure can be addressed is by adopting design principles that facilitate changes to force structures as defined by the security environment and the type of mission. This implies that a modular design approach be utilised when decisions are made about force structure of specific missions. This means that forces should be structured in the context of composite forces, based on modular building blocks that can be strengthened or changed to meet specific mission requirements by adding or changing force structure elements as and when required (Schilling & Paparone, 2008:281).

Due to South Africa's extended coastline, the exploitation of the sea as an operational manoeuvre space is a crucial aspect of the South African defence environment. Littoral manoeuvre along the African coast is an important part of the SANDF's maritime deployment as it allows for the utilisation of the oceans by means of which sea-based or sea-landed forces can influence situations, decisions and events where the denial or unavailability of ports, land routes, or airfields and airspace necessitates littoral manoeuvre (Heitman, 2009:50–53). Naval capabilities such as landing platform decks are required to allow forces to land by means of air capabilities. Once these capabilities have been established, sea- and air-landed forces can be employed to realise simultaneous effects directly against objectives through ship-to-objective manoeuvres using unexpected penetration points and landing zones to avoid established defences. The SAN does not have any of these capabilities and it is not foreseen that it will do so within the next 10 or 15 years (Potgieter, 2009:7–8). This predicament has very serious implications for all deployments of the SANDF. Defining activities in any littoral scenario demand maritime-shaping activities that can set the conditions for successful land manoeuvre, decisive action and exploitation. Sufficient air, surface and subsurface capabilities are also crucial to success as these defining activities may be required to influence the wider littoral or induce a favourable situation on land.

In addition to the conventional warfighting and peace mission roles and functions which focus on external deployment, the SANDF must also be prepared to perform internal deployment in support of homeland defence and border-safeguarding tasks. The role of the SANDF in border-safeguarding and other area defence operations is focused on support to other government departments and crisis response (DOD, 2006:2-32). This task is a constitutional function in that the SANDF "may be employed for service in upholding of law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said police service is unable to maintain law and order on its own" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:6–6). This role is also one of the military-strategic objectives that constitute one of the pillars of the SANDF's long-term strategy. As part of this objective, the SANDF will provide support to civil authorities when a situation or an emergency is beyond the capabilities of civil authorities. This will include specific activities as part of the functions of judicial, public order and security policing, the national civilian protection structure guaranteeing continuity of service in disaster areas, and aid to the population. Typical tasks

will include the augmentation of vital services during strikes, restoration of law and order, consequence management after man-made and natural disasters, support to special events, protection of life and state property, as well as national key points, and the provision of relief after natural disasters (Defence Review Committee, 2014:6–6).

5.3. Defence planning for the 21st-century African battlespace

The threat to Africa's security is multifaceted and complex, ranging from weak and failing or so-called 'failed states' that are incapable of providing safety and security to their citizens, to overpopulation, unemployment and resource scarcity (Cilliers, 2013:2). As a result of this complex range of causes, more people were being killed in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the 1990s than in the rest of the world combined, despite the fact that the number of conflicts in Africa have been steadily decreasing.

> By 2010, only four (the insurgencies in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC and Uganda) of the 15 major conflicts world-wide, were taking place in Africa. Indirect deaths, including deaths as a result of disease and malnutrition caused by protracted conflict, are estimated to account for more than 90% of all war-related fatalities during these insurgencies (Mills, 2011:9).

In light of the above, most African conflicts are likely to take the form of so-called 'small' wars between ill-defined often non-state opponents, fighting for complex sets of causes ranging from greed to deeply entrenched grievances, fought at a low-intensity, employing mostly small arms (Baker, 2010:209–211). These are most likely to be fought not over territory, but over ideas and symbols – among, rather than between peoples (Gat, 2006:671). The military concept of decisive manoeuvre still rings true, but it will also manifest in the political, economic and informational domains, because the conflict is about people and not merely the occupation of territory (Terrie, 2010:153-154). In order to address all the related security issues, of which the military is but one, effectively it is essential that a holistic approach to security be applied to set the scene for sustainable peace and development.

Changes to the required defence capabilities of modern African militaries require defence forces to re-orientate themselves as peace builders, rather than acting as warfighters exclusively, which, in turn, require different postures and skills sets, compared to those of earlier militaries (Gat, 2006:670). African militaries must therefore be optimally structured and prepared to meet the fall-out from the interlocking challenges from population growth, political radicalisation and social and economic inequality, rather than to fight traditional, conventional types of war. This requires significantly different postures and skills sets and training, compared to those for which most armed forces of today are trained and equipped (Mills, 2011:12). Soldiers will therefore have to be educated (and not merely trained to respond according to doctrine) and developed to make correct and innovative decisions at all levels, rather than rely on institutionalised thinking and on the execution of drills and procedures which would prove wholly ineffective against asymmetric attacks by insurgents (Terrie, 2010:154).

5.4. Defence in a democracy: South Africa's approach to defence strategy, force design and force structure since 1994

The manner in which defence policy and strategy have been developed since 1994 differs fundamentally from the manner in which South African defence policy was traditionally managed. Discussions on defence policy and strategy increasingly moved from the realm of the secret and technocratic into the sphere of popular and open discussion and debate. Reasons behind this shift are varied and motivated primarily by a changed political environment, especially the quest for strengthening the country's democratic civil–military relations by instituting new partnerships between the political, civil and military elites (Williams, 1998:206). The formulation of the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) was characterised by a consultative process that incorporated into the defence debate a range of actors that had been, until then, excluded from the defence decision-making process. These documents were also aimed at redefining key assumptions of South African defence policy to ensure effective defence management and good governance and provided the framework upon which the equipment and human resource needs of the SANDF could be based.

Despite the open and collaborative processes that were used to develop South African defence policy frameworks since 1994, significant discrepancies have developed between the outcome of the stated policies and the current situation comprising the preparation, employment and funding of the SANDF. It has become clear that some of the premises on which the policy frameworks of the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review were (DOD, 1998) based were overly optimistic and have not fully been realised. Recent domestic security developments relating to domestic law and order, regional developments relating to peace and stability and especially the widening gap between approved defence policy and the annual defence budgets since 1998, have challenged many of the premises of these post-apartheid policies and have hampered their implementation (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-2–9-3).

5.4.1. The 1996 White Paper on Defence

Prior to 1994, South Africa had seen very few Defence White Papers in its history – the last significant White Paper (prior to 1994) was the 1977 Defence White Paper which outlined the then 'total strategy' of the apartheid regime (Williams, 1998:208). Before 1994, Defence White Papers were developed and defined in a closed environment, without public participation and consultation. The 1996 White Paper on Defence was therefore significant in that it differed from those before it in both content and inclusivity.

The SANDF's integration and transformation processes have taken place in an environment of dwindling resources as the new democratic government prioritised budgetary allocation to areas such as education, health and social welfare, rather than to the defence sector. Budget cuts since 1994 have been motivated by the belief that South Africa's 'new democratic era' would usher in a period of peace, prosperity and stability, which would allow the defence budget to be significantly reduced to the benefit of social spending – "that butter would be bought instead of guns" (Mills, 2011:6).

One of the most important design principles described in the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996:7) was the primacy of the so-called primary function' of the SANDF, namely the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. This primary function of

defence was posited as the *raison d'être* for the existence of both the defence function and stable civil–military relations.

The premise that the primary function and focus of the SANDF are the defence of South Africa against external military threats has, since 1996, remained the central pillar of South African defence policy (DOD, 1996:7). It describes the primary role of South Africa's armed forces as the classic role of deterrence and defence as part of a state defence approach to the military: deterring aggression against South Africa or its allies, or defeating any attack (DOD, 1996:7). In addition, it prescribed that the SANDF would be responsible for the protection of certain vital assets and interests outside South Africa such as the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric scheme in Mozambique and the Highlands Water Scheme in Lesotho, as well as tankers bringing oil to South Africa during a crisis in the Persian Gulf region or along the African coast. The SANDF's force design was consequently defined largely in terms of unilateral defence against various levels of military aggression against South Africa. Other tasks, such as border-safeguarding, regional military co-operation, participation in PSOs and support to the SAPS were regarded as secondary, and it was presumed that the ability to execute the primary defence tasks would automatically enable the execution of these secondary tasks – a premise that was proved wrong by later realities as the SANDF was overwhelmed by secondary tasks.

The general acceptance of this narrow view of defence and the emphasis on the 'primary' task of the SANDF was a result of the confluence of the interests of opposing groups with entirely different motivations. Some analysts viewed it as maintaining the focus on what they held to be the 'real' work of the military, namely conventional defence. This focus had to ensure that dwindling resources would be channelled into conventional defence capabilities, thus preventing the deterioration of the traditional warfighting function which would supposedly follow on extensive involvement in the 'secondary' functions. Anti-militarists, on the other hand, supported the focus on the 'primary' function, since it confined the military to a clearly defined function outside the domain of normal civil affairs, thereby contributing to the demilitarisation of South Africa. Disturbing examples were given of how the involvement of the armed forces in non-primary roles has resulted in the development of a praetorian identity and the subsequent translation of this identity into various forms of military influence over or

intervention in the political processes of countries (Obasanjo et al., 2013:2). Examples that were presented at the time included the Argentine, Chile, Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana, South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Greece and Spain. Although, according to Williams (1998:213), the influence of the military did not always translate into the classic *coup d'état*, it often did result in a high level of military interference within and over the decision-making processes of civilian governments. In South Africa, the deployment of the SADF in a variety of internal roles during the 1980s undoubtedly contributed to both politicisation of the SANDF and the extension of its influence within the executive nodes of the state ensemble, most notably demonstrated by its role and influence within the State Security Council and the National Security Management System (cf. Le Roux, 2005:235–252).

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On the other hand, the deployment of military forces in the execution of 'secondary' tasks did not necessarily result in the politicisation of the armed forces or in an assault on the principle of civil supremacy. Senegal also utilises its armed forces almost exclusively in secondary functions (internal development tasks and PSOs), yet its armed forces remain non-partisan and subordinate to the elected government (Williams, 1998:213). The deployment of the SANDF in a police-supportive role during the post-1994 period (in numbers much larger than those deployed at the height of the State of Emergency from 1984 to 1986) (Le Roux, 2005:235–244) also did not result in the SANDF's further politicisation, nor did it attempt to undermine the authority of the democratic government. There is thus no necessary link between the deployment and utilisation of the armed forces in their secondary roles and their eventual politicisation. Rather, the relationships between government and the armed forces are not necessarily determined only by the roles in which they are deployed, but also by the amalgam of a variety of factors that shape a society at a given moment. These factors include,

- the legitimacy and authority of the elected government;

- the resilience of civil society and its influence over the formal decision-making processes in government;

- the level of economic development in the country concerned;
- the composition of the armed forces; and
- the corporate identity of the armed forces themselves (Pretorius, 2008:37–38).

The emphasis on the pre-eminence of the primary function should therefore be understood as a context-determined variable and not as an absolute principle.

The focus on the so-called 'primary' function of the SANDF clearly did not provide answers to many of the key defence-related issues that had to be addressed after 1994. Rather than adopting as its departure point an appraisal of the strategic environment within which the SANDF found itself, defence policy myopically emphasised the importance of ensuring and protecting robust and stable civil–military relations in a democracy, without analysing the force design and force structure issues that were crucial to determining an appropriate defence force posture.

5.4.2. The 1998 Defence Review

The 1998 Defence Review was aimed at elaborating on the policy framework as first set out in the 1996 White Paper on Defence by providing insight into the required posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding of the SANDF through comprehensive, long-term planning processes (Defence Review, 1998:1). The Review was aimed at strengthening the country's democratic civil–military relations by establishing new partnerships among the political, civil and military elites. The Review was also aimed at redefining the key assumptions of South African defence policy in a manner that was intelligible to effective defence management and good governance. It provided the framework upon which the equipment and resource needs of the South African armed forces would be based.

The government's initiation of the ambitious tendering process for re-equipping the SANDF in late 1997 was a direct product of both Parliament and Cabinet's approval of the Defence

Review force design (Williams, 1998:207). The 1998 Defence Review also confirmed the defensive posture of the SANDF which marked a significant shift away from the previous regime's doctrine of offensive defence. More than any ethical or political reasons, however, budgetary realities, rather than political choice, had effectively forced South Africa's defence posture into a defensive mode, in effect creating a defensive posture by default, rather than by choice (Pretorius, 2008:39). Much was made of the fact that there was no direct conventional military threat to South Africa and that there was a reduced threat environment for both South Africa and the rest of the region. It was argued that South Africa should reap the benefits from the post-apartheid era and that it could afford to redirect much of the defence budget to civilian and social-development programmes (Pretorius, 2008:39).

The 1998 Defence Review also confirmed the decision, first described in the 1996 White Paper (DOD, 1998:18–20), that the SANDF would be responsible for executing a range of additional secondary functions if so ordered. These tasks would include regional security cooperation, international PSOs, cooperation with the SAPS, as well as a variety of other non-military tasks. Overall, the broader understanding and more inclusive approach to the security concept and the 'human security' discourse gained significant support during the Defence Review process. Defence planners and strategists attempted to introduce 'human security' as an alternative paradigm into the South African security discourse. They also agreed on widening the security agenda to include socio-economic and environmental issues and emphasised the notion that humans (and not states) were the ultimate referents of security (Pretorius, 2008:39).

Despite the significance of the document and the good intentions of those involved in the drafting thereof, the 1998 Defence Review process was flawed and contained several significant shortcomings. The major limitation was the Defence Review's continued emphasis on the 'primary' function of defence as the *raison d'être* for the existence of both the defence function and stable civil–military relations. Sheer political, budgetary, practical and historical realities require a revision of this central principle in South African defence planning. The notion of a classic modernist defence force, configured to protect the country against a conventional external military threat, continued to enjoy a disproportionate influence in the minds of defence force planners and strategists when they drafted the 1998 Defence Review.

The fact that defence planners conformed to what was then the dominant Western models of government and military organisations, should not be viewed as essentially flawed. Many non-Western militaries, such as Turkey, Japan, India and Egypt also 'modernised' their forces in ways that seemed to reflect accepted Western norms. This is understandable because there is an important imitative dynamic in force design and warfare as described in Chapter 2 (see 2.6) of this thesis. This results in the practice that armies imitate the structures, values and practices of other armies which have demonstrated a history of effectiveness. During the 1998 Defence Review process, the SANDF thus placed great emphasis on what was the 'accepted' international standard and norm for defence posture and design. The result was that the SANDF was assigned an organisational architecture that did not adequately provide for forces that were optimally configured to achieve other governmental defence objectives such as homeland defence, peace missions and border-safeguarding operations (Mills, 2011:7).

Despite the fact that the 'secondary' role of the SANDF received more attention in the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998:18–20), many of the premises on which the analysis of the 'secondary' role was based, have proved to be incorrect or only partially true. For example, in the 1998 Defence Review, only one battalion was committed to peacekeeping – and only for a period of twelve months (DOD, 1998:21–24). The reality was that three battalions were committed to missions that far extended the appreciated twelve-month periods over the period 2001 to 2009. The effect of this under-appreciation of the commitments of the SANDF, and the Army in particular, was devastating and the Army was compelled to deploy under-strength battalions (13 under-strength battalions as opposed to the 18 required at a 1 in 6 rotation) (Heitman, 2013b:3). Similarly, the SAN only acquired four frigates and the SAAF halved its airlift capacity. Force design and acquisition decisions were based on the notion that South Africa would not be participating in extensive regional commitments and that it would not have an internal or border-safeguarding role to play. These decisions, however, proved to have been incorrect and short-sighted: despite a decision by Parliament that the SANDF would be withdrawn from the borders by the end of 2009, a decision was taken in 2010 to re-deploy the SANDF to the borders (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-4). Furthermore, in addition to the already large deployment of members of the SANDF in PSOs on the continent (inter alia in Sudan and the DRC), government decided in 2013 to commit a

combat group to the ACIRC (Leijenaar, 2014:2). As far as participation in peace support operations is concerned, the 2014 Defence Review (as further outlined below) expects a deployment of three joint combat groups for multi-year missions – of which one is likely to involve peace enforcement. In addition, the 2014 Defence Review argues for the simultaneous establishment of a joint combat group intervention capability, the standing deployment of two warships on each coast and the ability to conduct several smaller external operations of a non-combatant nature, for example, election support missions (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-9).

From the above it is evident that the DOD and the SANDF will have to revisit the SANDF's force design and force structure, as well as the SANDF's capability to execute the great variety and tasks assigned to it by government successfully. From the 2014 Defence Review, it is evident that the concept of JI^{2}M operations has become central to the SANDF's deployment strategies (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). The JI^{2}M theme that is at the core of the strategies encapsulated in the 2014 Defence Review implies that SANDF should be appropriately structured and prepared to meet the requirements for the execution of tasks as part of JI^{2}M deployments.

5.4.3. The 2014 Defence Review

The process of defining the SANDF's strategy, force design and force structure in the 2014 Defence Review must be appreciated against the background of mounting political pressure and expectations on South Africa to play a larger role in resolving Africa's problems, despite the fact that government has afforded less prominence and budgetary support to the DOD (compared to, for example, the Departments of Health, Education and Labour). In addition, experiences since 1994 have demonstrated that government has an inclination to turn to the SANDF as the lead entity during times of security crises or humanitarian disasters – more than to other government departments or agencies.

The 2014 Defence Review is intended to serve as a governing policy document that will endeavour to establish the direction of South African Defence and Foreign Policy for the next 15 years – despite the fact that both the South African foreign and national security policies

are still somewhat vague (Heitman, 2014:22). Consequently, the thenMinister of Defence, Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, constituted a Defence Review Committee whose mandate it was to prepare both a consultative document and engage in a comprehensive public consultation process with key stakeholders, interested parties and civil society (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-2). The Defence Review Committee met for the first time on 14 July 2011, during which the Minister of Defence provided the Committee with its mandate and terms of reference (Defence Review Committee, 2014: 0-1–0-2). The Defence Review was posited as a defence policy document that would be supportive of government's priorities and strategic intent and which would also provide a reviewed and confirmed defence mandate and guidelines with associated defence functions, high-level tasks, strategic concepts, doctrine, required capabilities, and level of effort and defence structure. It was also stated that the Defence Review would provide "a sound policy for determining the blueprint defence force design and force structure, as well as the future defence fiscal and resource framework" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1).

The 2014 Defence Review expounds the wider, more holistic approach to security and development in spelling out the complex security environment in which members of the SANDF will be expected to operate (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-1 to 2-29). The document emphasises the multiple roles that the SANDF is expected to perform, effectively describes the posture of the SANDF and emphasises the higher-order deployment concept of JI^{2}M operations (Le Roux, 2012:4).

Given the duality of the SANDF's mandate, calling for both a warfighting and an OOTW capability, the question arises: where should the priority lie? The probability of a conventional threat against the RSA is still viewed as remote, but the SANDF's involvement in UN and AU peace enforcement operations (Chapter 7 of the UN charter [cf. name and author]) could require small-scale warfighting capabilities at very short notice. The SANDF is currently expected to remain prepared for both warfighting as well as OOTW roles, since it is argued that losing either the peace or the war will have disastrous security ramifications for the RSA and its allies. In the light of the current levels of funding it is, however, clear that both these postures (warfighting and OOTW) cannot be effectively maintained. It is therefore imperative to make decisions on the primary identity and posture of the SANDF. A political choice must

be made as to where the emphasis will be placed: on OOTW as these are the types of multimodal operations in which the SANDF will most probably become involved, or to prepare the SANDF for the more traditional (conventional) warfighting role. This choice holds considerable risk, and might be deemed as radical in nature, but if no primary identity is selected, none will be maintained. Based on the remote probability of a conventional threat against the RSA, it would be prudent primarily to prepare and equip the SANDF for OOTW and robust peace enforcement operations, whilst placing less emphasis on preparing, equipping and investing in conventional operations.

The 2014 Defence Review is intended to serve as the primary policy framework that would determine how the SANDF should be redesigned and restructured to support government's priorities, strategic intent and level of defence ambition. It is stated in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1) that the details of operationalisation of the force design is the preserve of the Defence Force, which will manage and implement the force design through a detailed planning process. The non-provision of joint force design principles, however, presents a serious problem as it is not possible for the DOD to support governmental objectives without receiving clear guidelines on the defence budget and the envisaged joint force design; policy must be implementable to be of any value and implementable policy has a price tag. The 2014 Defence Review refers logically to the ends, ways and means in defence policy and arrives at a capabilities statement – but without addressing the crucial aspects of cost, budget and design principles for force structure elements. There is no indication of the annual budgetary cost of the stated capabilities and no priorities are defined for short- to medium-term development of these capabilities. This means that, although the Draft Defence Review successfully addresses some of the shortcomings of post-1994 South African defence policy, it does not address the primary dilemma of the SANDF, namely that of a gross mismatch between defence policy (as it is being practised), actual operational capability, and defence funding (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-1–9-2). This shortcoming is indicative of serious flaws in the force planning processes of those involved in the compilation of the 2014 Defence Review.

The three most prominent DOD governing documents, namely the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996), the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998), and the 2014 Defence

Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014) all emphasise the fact that the potency of the SANDF is derived from the criticality of joint operations, underscored by civil support in the DOD and in close cooperation with other governments departments, allies and partners (Defence Review Committee, 2013:10-3). This notion is also encapsulated in the higher-order JI^{2}M concept that permeates most doctrine and policy documents of the DOD and SANDF. Yet, despite the fact that policy documents and doctrine refer to JI^{2}M operations and the deployment of members of the SANDF in OOTW and in support to the SAPS in the domestic theatre, not one of these documents provide sufficient guidance for the configuration, equipping and legal mandates of forces for these types of deployments. In addition to these shortcomings, some defence analysts argue that the premises on which current South African defence governance documents are based are still essentially focused on traditional conventional warfare concepts defined during the Cold War – concepts that are misaligned with and ill-suited to current African security requirements. In reality, current force design and force structure principles and guidelines have resulted in the creation of a defence force that is essentially structured for an industrial-age type of war as part of a Cold War stand-off, rather than providing for a defence force that is optimally configured to meet the demands of the changed security challenges that characterise hybrid and multimodal warfare in the 21st century (Baker, 2010:210 – 212). The challenge of creating a defence force that is optimally suited for current security challenges is further complicated by the requirement to design and structure a defence force that conforms to international norms for postmodern defence forces, thus establishing a defence force that is legitimate, professional and appropriately structured. The question remains: what are the force design and force structure principles and guidelines that should be included in South African defence policy to ensure that the SANDF would be optimally configured, equipped and prepared to militarily achieve stated governmental objectives and outcomes in a security environment that is characterised by a complex array of known and unknown contemporary security challenges? The Defence 2014 Review clearly offers a new opportunity for the Chief of the SANDF and his planners to re-design the SANDF to have the ability to conduct a wide spectrum of operations under complex conditions (Defence Review Committee, 2014:102). The 2014 Defence Review creates the opportunity for defence planners to make conscious efforts not to repeat the force design and force structure mistakes that continually hobbled the successful operationalisation

of the 1996 White Paper (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) respectively.

5.5. Current trends in defence planning and their influence on the SANDF

Defence planning is a complex area that seeks to ensure that a defence system has the required forces, assets, facilities and capabilities to fulfil its tasks throughout the full spectrum of possible missions. In a broader sense, the process encompasses various participants, process and functions, as well as various time horizons (Zrnić, 2008:26).

Defence planning in the narrow sense of defence resource management is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities and supports preparations for war (Lloyd, 2000:4). Such planning comprises the processes of strategic and programmatic scheduling and represents the main tools for the transformation of national defence objectives and available resources into the comprehensive set of military capabilities required for the future security environment. A significant part of defence planning also involves the budgeting and costing of defence capabilities. Internationally, because of the need for greater efficiency in the spending of public resources, changes have been initiated to the principles of defence budget construction – primarily a shift away from input-oriented budgeting processes to that of output-oriented/outcomes budgeting processes (Zrnić, 2008:27). The adoption of capability-based planning and budgeting was ultimately intended to replace previous processes that were based on single-service planning which did not optimally apply to capability development for joint operations in JI^{2}M environments.

Current trends in defence planning that have influenced the force designs of defence forces in various degrees include concepts such as **jointness, capability-based planning** and **modularity**. These trends affect force designs of defence forces to a greater or lesser degree, depending on how individual states view the role and function of their defence force. Although broadly related by means of an integrative approach to defence planning, these trends warrant individual analysis.

5.5.1. Jointness and joint operations

The requirement for jointness and the ability to execute JI^{2}M operations over vast distances, as expounded in Chapter 3 of this thesis (see 1.2.), are crucially important for the SANDF, as South Africa's geographic location by nature demands expeditionary forces which, in turn, confer the requirement of two primary means of theatre entry: by sea or air space. Strategic mobility therefore rests on the freedom to use the oceans and control the air. These are essential prerequisites for joint expeditionary operations on the continent to enable land and maritime surface manoeuvre, combined with the ability to deliver precision effects to the battlespace. Yet, despite the purchase of high-tech equipment for the SAN and SAAF, the SANDF remains "people and finance-poor" (Mills, 2011:19). Serious gaps remain in South Africa's security arsenal for strategic air-lift, coastal patrol vessels, replenishment and supply vessels and medium-range transport aircraft. Many defence analysts and military planners continually emphasise the capability limitations and financial over-stretch currently being endured by the SANDF (Heitman, 2013b:2; Mills, 2011:19).

A joint expeditionary capability must, therefore, by its very nature, include strategic maritime and airlift assets to deploy ground forces to the crisis, and more broadly requires the integrated employment of the full panoply of JI^{2}M capabilities (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). The SANDF should therefore be able to deploy high-quality forces, irrelevant of whether for humanitarian operations or scalable interventions to promote international peace and stability – on land, sea and in the air. The JI^{2}M approach to deployments is, and will, thus remain vital to the success of any force deployment of the SANDF. Therefore, force planners and strategists who continue to apply 'silo' approaches to force design by using the respective services as building-blocks for the SANDF, rather than using joint, combined and integrated cross-service configurations as building blocks for the defence force (optimally suited to JI^{2}M operations), will perpetuate the misalignment between required operational capabilities and force structure and force design – as currently being experienced.

A number of significant changes have occurred in the international political and security environment since the end of the 20th century. It has become evident that insurgencies (which have become more prevalent over time) have changed from essentially two-

dimensional (national/colonial government versus insurgents) to three-dimensional (where the insurgent faces a national government, but with a complex range of multinational governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the security and development effort) (Mills, 2011:16). Many security challenges arise very quickly, e.g. the Arab Spring and the crisis in the Crimea, and with little warning to the security professionals who are expected to respond appropriately within very short time spans. On the other hand, some threats, such as those to food and water security, emerge so slowly and over such a vast scale that near-term options appear limited (Gat, 2006:663). In order to prepare military forces to react to these diverse challenges to security, strategists and force planners must develop the capacity to distinguish in near real time between what can be described as a 'tectonic shift' and that which merely constitutes a 'low-magnitude tremor' in military security affairs, and then have the capacity to make the required adjustments and changes to force design so that deployed elements will be optimally configured to execute their tasks (Sloane, 2002:32). This implies that strategists and force planners have to apply design principles and approaches that are sufficiently flexible to provide force structure elements that are specifically organised to conduct operations as ordered. These tailor-made force structure elements must also be mission-specifically organised and fitted with appropriate capabilities to execute the wide variety of tasks required to achieve governmental objectives and outcomes. This requires the optimal alignment of the SANDF's planning, budgeting and capability development processes and implies a dramatic shift away from the 'stove-piped' single service approach that permeates these processes.

The continued emphasis on joint operations and jointness throughout the 2014 Defence Review is based on establishing cross-service synergy which, in turn, will enhance operational effectiveness and unity of effort in the achievement of military objectives. Joint campaigns require holistic approaches to maximise the overall operational effect of the joint force, making the best use of the complete range of capabilities (Vego, 2000:7). It is not simply about separate and stove-piped single service operations organised under a single point of command. **Jointness** is also derived from the integration of service cultures and competencies and requires teamwork among services to accomplish objectives in the best interest. In addition, jointness also demands teamwork from various governmental agencies and departments, as well as cooperation from coalition or multinational partners to achieve

unity of effort to accomplish shared objectives (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). Jointness is not easily achieved as it requires significant changes to service culture and the ways in which military organisations assess and integrate capabilities. It requires mind-shifts that transcend parochial service and combatant command ownerships of capabilities, and demands the assumption of global perspectives on military operations to achieve globally integrated operations (Vego, 2000:7). Jointness also requires the capacity to integrate across the land, sea, air, space and cyberspace domains seamlessly– sometimes referred to as cross-domain synergy. The requirement for cross-domain synergy stems from cyberspace and cyberwarfare (Mauro, 2006:219). Whereas physical space delineates the land, sea, air and space domains with the physical characteristics of each determining the relative capabilities and vulnerabilities of the actions that occur within them, cyberspace has different characteristics than those of the geographical domains. It is a crosscutting global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructure such as the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (Mauro, 2006:220).

Jointness, translated into enhanced operational success, is ultimately aimed at achieving and enhancing cross-domain synergy by shifting the focus to employing capabilities without regard of service origin (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). Ultimately, cross-domain synergy is about evolving the understanding of jointness. This can only be achieved by building trust and nurturing shared understanding by educating all soldiers on the topic of jointness during joint training, joint exercises and joint deployments throughout their careers. Currently, members of the SANDF only start with formal joint training when they attend the Joint Senior Command and Staff Course – at a time when they are already senior officers in the SANDF and when they hold the ranks of lieutenant colonel in the SA Army, SAAF, South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) or commander in the SAN. The concepts **jointness** and **joint operations** therefore only become part of the individual soldier's world view at a relatively late stage of his or her military career – and not all soldiers are equally able to internalise these concepts into their decision-making processes (DOD, 2006:2-45–2-48). The current force structure of the SANDF is based on four services and members of the services only become part of joint structures once they have been detached or allocated to Chief of

Joint Operations (DOD, 2006:2-32). Upon completion of their missions, members are returned to their units in their respective services.

It is, however, important to bear in mind that the emphasis on jointness and joint operations does not negate the need for or the importance of the respective services. It is essential to nurture and maintain service cultures, training and doctrine – particularly during the early parts of a soldier's career. Services must be developed to function optimally in particular domains, and this can only be achieved by people who are selected, trained and developed to achieve this in specific environments. Services remain the best organisations to develop an understanding of the future of warfare and to define an intellectual, organisational and future force structure plan to address that future in specific service environments. This service-uniqueness must, however, be understood for what it is and more importantly, it must be clear how these unique attributes will contribute towards the achievement of joint objectives.

5.5.2. Holistic approaches to defence: capability-based planning and output-oriented budgeting

Capability-based planning and output-oriented defence budgeting are two of the main trends in contemporary defence planning (Zrnić, 2008:28). Developments in the international security arena, especially the modes of warfare, have prompted a shift from primarily threat-based planning to more holistic approaches to defence planning, such as capability-based planning and output-oriented defence budgeting. Conventional threat-based planning served as a fundamental concept during the Cold War when a very clear distinction was established between friends and foes (Bartlett et al., 2000:27). Threat-based planning is founded on the identification of potential adversaries and on the assessment of their current and future capabilities. Defence planning thus involves the development of specific capabilities for exceeding these possible adversaries. Capability-based planning, on the other hand, prepares a defence system for a variety of future missions, and not only for fighting against concrete adversaries (Zirnić, 2008:28). It identifies the future missions and tasks of defence forces and the generic capabilities needed to accomplish them. The term **capability** is used to describe the ability to achieve a desired effect/outcome under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform specific tasks. Capability-

based planning involves a functional analysis of expected future operations. The outcome of capability-based planning is not a concrete/tangible weapon and manning system, but a description of the tasks that force structure units should be able to perform, expressed in capability terms. Once the capability inventory is defined, the most cost-effective and efficient physical force structure options to implement these capabilities are derived (Zrnić, 2008:26). Capability-based planning is therefore planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.

Internationally, as expounded in Chapter 3 of this study, governments and their defence forces have been compelled to reassess and revise their approaches to defence, as well as the premises on which they based their force designs, force structures and defence budgets (see 3.2). While there is undoubtedly still a significant kinetic dimension to military deployments, dealing with modern insurgency is a profoundly political and developmental task. It is as much about governance as guns, and about providing jobs and economic security as military activity. It is much more than attack and defence, guns and rockets; it is also about the aspirations and fears of people. Nations engage in crisis and conflict resolution for a variety of motives such as normative values, humanitarian considerations, as well as pragmatic self-interest and legal obligations that collectively constitute national interest. The threats to peace and security in the 21st century therefore include not only international war and conflict, but also civil violence, organised crime and terrorism (Gray, 2005:215). Threats also include poverty, deadly infectious diseases and environmental degradation, since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. These significant changes to the security environment and the prevailing character of warfare, coupled with ever-decreasing defence budgets, have prompted governments, military planners and strategists to find new solutions to defence planning that would optimise the forces and capabilities available for military deployments (Schilling & Paparone, 2008:281**)**.

In contrast to traditional single-service approaches to force design and force planning, new approaches to force planning view the warfighting vision (how forces intend to fight) as 'born joint' at DOD level at the start of the planning process. This does not imply that the services

would be excluded from the process of required capabilities development, but that the adoption of joint capability-based planning and budgeting at all levels will ensure that all systems and resources are optimally integrated and that duplication and interoperability challenges are diminished from the start of the planning processes (Zrnić, 2008:27). The aim is to establish better cooperation and true sharing of responsibility among the services, to eliminate the duplication of capabilities, and to increase the ability of each service to operate in concert with other services in the joint arena – ultimately increasing productivity and efficiency (Kugler, 2008:15). Capability-based planning therefore provides a more rational basis for making decisions on future defence acquisitions and makes planning more responsive to uncertainty, economic considerations and risk (Zirnić, 2008:27). This approach also provides a framework to support analysis and facilitate risk management. It focuses on goals and end states/outcomes and encourages innovation. It is focused on questions about capability requirements, rather than on merely focusing on what equipment should be replaced. It means that capability-based planning tends to remove traditional single-service 'stovepipes' and provide more efficiency in the defence resource management process. It is, essentially, a shift from an input-oriented (line-item) budget, which focuses on cost items or inputs such as wages and salaries, goods and services and spending on capital items, to an output-oriented defence budgeting (Schilling & Paprone, 2008:285). Input-oriented budgets are usually constructed on an annual basis, following incremental principles compared to the expenditures of the previous year (Zrnić, 2008:45). This tends to favour existing programmes so that new programmes must compete with one another for limited resources, which ultimately stymies innovation and the development of competitive advantages. Input-oriented budgeting processes also constrain the budget users to purchase only specific inputs, over specified time frames, and to spend no more than specified amounts. Very little or no flexibility is allowed during the budget execution phase to substitute inputs, transfer investments or increase the quantity or quality of output in response to shifts in demand, changes in the environment or technological developments (Kugler, 2008:15). Budget users are also indirectly discouraged from saving costs, because of the fear that this will bring about a cut in future budget allocations (the "use-it-or-lose-it" effect) (Bartlett et al., 2000:31). A capability-based budgeting approach on the other hand, will contribute to shifting the focus from budget inputs (what budget users buy) to budget outputs (what it does/must achieve) associated with the former. This transition ultimately results in programme budgeting which

links planning and budgeting processes, so that planning is realistic and effective and *leads*, rather than *follows* the budget (Zrnić, 2008:45).

The adoption of a capability-based planning and output-oriented budgeting approach would ensure that the SANDF will, in an era where the financial resources allocated for defence needs are limited and will be even more restricted in the future, be afforded a defence planning system that is based on a holistic approach to defence reform, preparation and capability development (Sinovich, 2011:6). This important shift to more holistic planning should be appreciated as one of the key changes to the DOD's planning principles and processes and would go a long way in moving away from an unaffordable mandate-driven perspective to that of a mandate-driven but cost-constrained approach to policy development (Bartlett et al., 2000:31). The institutionalisation of a holistic capability-based-planning, budgeting and control framework will result in the development of implementable defence policies, as well as an affordable and sustainable force design (capability statement) and structure (Le Roux, 2012:2). This, in turn, will allow for the design and structure of force structure elements that are optimally configured and equipped to execute JI^{2}M operations.

5.5.3. JI^{2}M operations and the 'whole-of-government'/comprehensive approach to defence planning

Capability-based planning has proved to be central to the preparation of forces for the successful execution of J^{2}IM operations, which require defence planning to be based on a holistic security strategy, which is based on the appropriate application of all the elements of the power base of a state, namely diplomatic, informational, military, economic and social (DIMES) resources. These elements of national power should be viewed as mutually supportive elements that cannot be divided or applied singularly or individually (De Coning & Friis, 2008:2). Many modern democracies have adopted more holistic, inclusive approaches to planning. The Canadian government originally developed the '3D' (diplomacy, development and defence) concept (cf. Fitz-Gerald & Macnamara, 2012). The United Kingdom adopted the comprehensive approach (CA) and also developed an inter-agency unit, first called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), which was later renamed the Stabilisation Unit. The USA adopted the 'whole-of-government' approach, which included the

establishment of the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Various other governments, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, have all attempted similar national-level coherence initiatives – with various levels of success. Most of these structures involve inter-departmental coordination meetings, some at various levels ranging from the ministerial to the working level (De Coning & Friiss, 2008:3). The EU has also accepted a more holistic and comprehensive approach to the management of security crises, and has established the EU Crisis Management capability, which comprise of military, police and civilian capacities. This institution has, however, not yet been deployed in integrated missions. Until recently, they have been deployed in parallel missions, alongside other EU presences in the same countries, executing tasks as part of election monitoring, developmental and humanitarian mission, and political/diplomatic council and commission representation. NATO has also made explicit reference to the importance and utility of a comprehensive approach to respond to the challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere during the 2006 Riga Summit and the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declarations (De Coning & Friis, 2008:5). So far, the UN has had the most success with institutionalisation of a comprehensive approach. They applied this approach to enhance the coherence among UN role-players working in the humanitarian, development and environmental areas (United Nations [UN], 2006). This has resulted in various policy documents that are utilised to plan and control the execution of peace support missions. A prime example is the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which is used to plan and execute integrated peace missions (UN, 2006:1).

These holistic, comprehensive approaches should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent international conflict management system and are used to coordinate the objectives and activities of various agencies and role-players in identifying, analysing, planning and executing national responses to complex political situations. Results achieved by the adoption of these joined-up and cross-disciplined approaches are founded on the realisation that the achievement of mission objectives in crises environments is dependent on how well role-players manage the various interlinked aspects of and activities related to of complex crisis systems. The implementation of these holistic approaches to defence planning provides useful institutional frameworks that support collective decision-making and which are optimally structured to achieve mission objectives.

As part of a cross-government 'whole-of-government'/comprehensive approach, all government planners and strategists are compelled to focus not only on specific threats to the state, but they must also improve their evaluation of a wide variety of environmental factors to determine the root causes of and catalysts for the conflicts that ultimately produce the perceived threats (Sinovich, 2011:60. Partnering among government departments should also extend to multiple non-governmental role-players and should include systematic processes to include industry, academia and other agencies that provide access to capabilities that a defence force does not have in depth (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence [UK MOD], 2012:3–4). The relative weight of effort and influence of each individual element of state power will vary according to the circumstances, but generally departments and agencies will find themselves in the position of being a supported or acting as a supporting entity. This means that, depending on the character of a crisis, the military instrument may often not constitute the main effort and might be required to conduct enabling or supporting activities to create conditions for other instruments or organisations to deliver an enduring outcome (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence [UK MOD], 2007:1–2).

Incentives for participating in the comprehensive approach are varied and various actors and agencies will have differing motives for engaging in a holistic, comprehensive approach. Motives could include aspects such as:

- efficiency (joining and coordinating scarce resources to be more cost-effective);
- consistency (the notion that 'one hand should know what the other is doing');
- urgency (to improve coordination);
- politics (politicians are not willing to accept military losses and are committed to finding additional tools for securing territory and withdrawing troops); and
- legitimacy (with more actors involved in crisis management, legitimacy – both moral and political – will tend to increase) (De Coning & Friis, 2008:3).

The complex political and security environment of the 21st century requires governments to develop capabilities that focus on holistic, preventative and developmental lines of activity, focused on the prevention of conflict, rather than on purely reactive (military) intervention (Defence Review Committee, 2014:3-11). Prevention, however, requires a longer view and a proportionately greater effort in establishing and developing early warning systems that would indicate and warn of an impending crisis. In addition, actions should be coordinated to tackle the root causes of instability, rather than merely addressing the obvious symptoms. Early responses may be difficult to determine, but will, in an interconnected world, always require decisions and intervention across a wide range of activities, involving several state departments and other organisations which will focus on various aspects of economic, diplomatic, military, developmental and humanitarian factors (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence [UK MOD], 2007:1–4). This implies that, in the event that a government takes the decision to deploy its defence force as part of the human security agenda, the deployed forces must be attuned and sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of the needs, communities and individuals of their societies. To this end, all constituent parts of a society, such as the rule of law, education, the economy, health system, as well as information, military, diplomacy and governance aspects, should be considered in the context of the history and culture of an individual society (Gat, 2006:665). Only then can a range of appropriate objectives, resources and contributors be established to influence the security situation. International experience has indicated that successful resolution would overwhelmingly rely on the attitude and motivation of the indigenous and/or local population at the heart of the crisis and those in the surrounding region.

The degree to which the 'whole-of-government'/comprehensive approach will be applied would be guided by the imperatives for a comprehensive response (De Coning & Friis, 2008:4). This will also depend upon the complexity, duration and nature of the situation and the potential benefits of such collaborative action. Most importantly, the levels of success achieved by means of the application of comprehensive, integrated approaches to security crises will depend on professional leadership, good personal relations, as well as the reduction of prejudices and cultural or organisational barriers – for instance the differences between NGOs and military actors. These 'soft' issues might prove even more important for

achieving success than the establishment of organisational structures associated with comprehensive approaches (De Coning & Friis, 2008:8). The required levels of coordination and cooperation are not achieved overnight and the recognition that all actors are dependent on each other for success is a starting point for these processes (De Coning & Friis, 2008:20). The establishment of appropriate structures at various levels will, however, set the scene for the development of functional lines within which all actors can execute their tasks without infringing on the territory of other organisations or actors involved in CA processes. In this context, the military is more often than not a primary agency, if not the primary player, and must design and eventually align itself accordingly.

This formalisation of functional lines of command between the SANDF and other state departments in South Africa is vital to the execution of successful JI^{2}M operations. In environments in which several state departments have a role to play, for instance border-safeguarding or area defence operations, it is crucial to stipulate when and how the various role-players will be mobilised or react to events. It also functions to define the legal implications and parameters within which each of the role-players will execute their tasks as part of a comprehensive approach to events in deployment areas.

5.5.4. Modularity as design principle for 21st-century military organisations

The characteristics of 21st-century conflicts require defence forces that have the ability to respond quickly to crises that are frequent, often in austere theatres, of long duration, and well short of a large-scale war with a peer competitor. There is thus an overriding need for force structure elements to be greater than the sum of their parts and to find alternative ways and means to deliver ingenuity and initiative. This demands a force design and structure whose organisational design, capabilities and operational conduct are adaptable as well as integrated, as such a force will be optimally configured to respond to specific and unknown threats. A force structure that is adaptable will also permit the rapid projection of a force capable of regenerating, reconfiguring and retasking in a complex and ambiguous context.

In an era during which defence budgets are being reduced, however, it is not possible to fund large formal structures that might not be optimally configured for the tasks at hand. In order

to address these challenges, it would be prudent to expedite the move toward an approach of modularity to design mission-specific type forces that can be configured into mission-tailored joint task forces (DOD, 2006:2-33). The integrated design of modular units is also a clear aid to deployability: by being formally grouped together, the modular units are not slowed down by attaching, detaching and 'marrying-up' the constituent parts of the modular units which often extends the time required for the deployment process. Modularity therefore greatly eases the coordination tasks of deployments (Linick, 2006:6).

Modularity refers to a set of principles for managing complexity, and modular design principles are accepted as endowing organisations with flexibility (Linick, 2006:2). Modular systems are optimally suited to address aspects of uncertainty and also tolerate design changes, repairs and upgrades without affecting the other components of a system (Kugler, 2008:13). Modular approaches to design invite rapid innovation, encourage networking and sustain the simultaneous testing of many different approaches to complex problems (Linick, 2006:6). This makes modular systems particularly ideal for organisations that require the adaptability to function effectively in a decentralised manner in an unpredictable, constantly changing environment.

A modular approach to force design and force structure can be applied to the SANDF by using directly interchangeable units as force design tools – units that are all joined and which comprise appropriate elements of all four services of the SANDF. Modular force structures will allow the SANDF to reorganise its deployed assets over time in order to take part in enduring operations, or to provide a base upon which to expand if threats or strategic circumstances change. These interchangeable units will provide force commanders with a tailorability that would give them the opportunity to configure forces optimally to execute specific tasks and to align resources with tasks. The idea is that force designs will grow flatter and less hierarchical in response to development in information technology. This will provide versatility to design forces that are tailored to meet most contingencies (Johnson et al., 2011:8).

Modularity also provides opportunities that will permit the SANDF to carve more units out of the existing force structure without an increase in end strength, and will also allow the SANDF

to transform itself into a fully integrated JI^{2}M force able to function across the full spectrum of conflict in a continuously rapidly evolving joint framework. A joint framework will be aimed at integrating the distinctive strengths of each of the single services of the SANDF to increase the chances of success during operations (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-4). The force structure elements of the SANDF will therefore have to be integrated at the lowest levels to achieve the required levels of coherence to deliver operational effectiveness. Members of all four services of the SANDF must train and experiment with other services from early on in their careers during formal courses to develop their capabilities jointly and ultimately to deploy together. A similar embedded, integrated approach will also be central to working within SADC and AU structures. The end result would be the transformation of the current force to a strategically responsive, precision manoeuvre force which has the capacity to dominate across a range of military operations.

One way of securing the effective transformation to jointness will be the adoption and institutionalisation of a force design and force structure based on interchangeable standardised joint units that will ensure compatibility with emerging joint concepts and the strategic mandates that are driving joint transformation. These interchangeable units will provide opportunities for a force design that moves away from the traditional division-based, single service-oriented forces to those of modular composite brigade-centric designs that comprise elements of all four services of the SANDF. It is proposed that these modular forces will offer commanders at all levels far more operational freedom compared to that offered by the rigid, traditional force design that is based on army divisions supported by elements of the SAN and SAAF. In addition, it is argued that, if current deployments of the SANDF, internally as well as externally, are taken into account, it will prove increasingly difficult to provide sufficient forces to support divisional-strength force designs.

The decision to base the SANDF's force structure elements on traditionally configured divisions again is not explained in the 2014 Defence Review. The Review provides no clear indication of the logic underlying this particular level of defence (Le Roux, 2012:2). Instead, the Review merely states the requirement for one mechanised division, one motorised division, one squadron of multirole-fighter aircraft and two conventional submarines without motivating why these force levels should not be halved or doubled and, also not why they are

included in the first place. As described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study, the current security environment is extremely complex and varied, which requires force structure elements that are more flexible and optimally designed to meet the idiosyncrasies of each type of conflict, than those suggested by the 2014 Defence Review.

The adoption and application of a modular force design will positively contribute to the restructuring of the SANDF to produce a supply of flexible, directly interchangeable units which could be used as a framework structure for JI^{2}M operations. A modular force design will allow for a methodology that establishes a means to provide interchangeable, expandable and tailorable elements. This will provide better agility, more scalability and more flexibility for military forces that would be able to face omnidirectional and simultaneous attacks from belligerents that have the capacity of rapidly changing alliances, tactics and command-and-control structures. The approach will also provide the SANDF with the opportunity to configure or establish suitable units out of the existing forces without an actual increase in end strength. Studies carried out by the US and other militaries (cf. Lucas, 2009) have found that modular force designs, based on composite brigade-based structures, proved to be superior to earlier force structures that were based on traditional division-centric force structures (Johnson et al., 2011:9). The modular approach has confirmed its flexibility and versatility across the range of military operations and their associated risks. Establishing composite brigades that comprise elements of the SA Army, the SAN, the SAAF and the SAMHS will allow the SANDF to deliver combined-arms task forces rapidly and tailor-made to meet the required specialised tasks associated with the respective deployment areas and types of operations. The SANDF's force design and structure will ultimately benefit from using composite force structure elements, rather than the respective services as design building blocks.

Historically, modular forces are not new concepts to military organisations. As far as South Africa is concerned, modular battalions, such as 51, 52, 53 and 54 were already formed in 1976 (Heitman, 1998:15). So, for instance, was 55 Battalion formed as the SADF's Western Area Battalion of 1 Military Area to counter the infiltration of SWAPO into Kavango. Likewise, 61 Mechanised Battalion Group was formed in 1979 on the basis of the force design of Combat Group Juliet, the mechanised force of Operation Reindeer, one of the major

operations during the South West African War (Heitman, 1998:15). It was the core of most major external operations and played a key role in defeating the 1987/88 FAPLA offensive against UNITA. The organisation of the battalion varied for a time before stabilising at two mechanised infantry companies, an armoured car squadron, a tank squadron and an artillery battery (Heitman, 1998:16). Support elements included an anti-tank platoon, a mortar platoon and anti-aircraft troop and engineer, signal, medical and technical elements. These modular battalions were comprised of infantry battalions whose number of companies, armoured cars, mounted or motorcycled troops, engineers and other attached elements varied, depending on their areas of responsibility. Each company in turn, was also modular in structure, often with five infantry platoons and one of armoured cars as well as some armoured personnel carriers for mobile patrols (Heitman, 1998:16). Such modularity allowed each battalion and company to be tailored precisely to its area of responsibility (AOR) – size, terrain, roads, population density and conducting a range of operations with its own resources (Johnson et al., 2011:10). Current modular design principles, as adopted by many postmodern militaries, merely take the battalion group concept one step further by permanently allocating air and naval assets to ground forces (De Waard et al., 2013:3). There is thus some antecedent for this proposed type of modular, composite force structure grouping in the SANDF.

Modular force design approaches are also conducive to the development of a culture of partnerships with other militaries as well as with other government departments – an essential requirement for successful JI^{2}M operations (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3). The design of modular units inherently facilitates cooperation and integration (De Waard et al., 2013:3). The adoption of modular design principles for the SANDF's force design and force structure will also address the growing requirements for support to civil authorities in peace missions, border-safeguarding and internal operations, as well as during domestic and regional disaster mitigation and response. The adoption of a modular force design approach will further support the imperative of flexible and adaptive force designs by affording commanders balanced building-blocks for responsive, mobile, interoperable forces that could be structured optimally and deployed to meet specific tasks at hand.

Commanders often require a function to be performed which does not warrant the deployment of an entire unit – hence the practice of **task-organisation** as a temporary grouping of forces

designed to accomplish a particular mission (cf. Johnson et al., 2011:9). Old methods of task organising did not optimise capabilities and they often involved deploying only sections of an organisation, rendering the remaining portion unbalanced and incapable of performing missions. Deploying portions of units can thus, under certain circumstances, render the 'parent' organisation incapable of performing its mission. One way of addressing this problem is by applying the concept of modularity which would improve the SANDF's ability to respond to a diverse spectrum of operations by deploying the minimum number of troops and equipment adequate to do the job. It is essentially about deploying the right number of the right functions and capabilities in the right place at the right time (Johnson et al., 2011:9).

Modular force designs offer commanders excellent opportunities to attach some units temporarily to subordinate commanders to execute given missions – a practice that allows commanders to tailor the force to the specific requirements of a given operation (Johnson et al., 2011:xi). By applying an approach of modularity, force structure elements that are more rapidly deployable and flexible can be grouped in a relatively short period of time. Because these elements work and train together on a daily basis, they will have a thorough understanding of the modus operandi of the various force structure elements which will ultimately be more effective than a force that is rapidly grouped together in an ad hoc fashion, as was the case with the rapid grouping of force structure elements for the deployment to the CAR in early January 2013 (Heitman, 2013a:2). The establishment of permanently grouped, integrated force structure elements who understand their roles as part of other force structure elements will support the intention of configuring a force that is strategically responsive, sufficient in size and capability, and able to dominate across the full spectrum of operations.

The basic structure of composite, modular forces integrates ground forces, aviation and maritime elements, as well as support elements under common command structures (Johnson et al., 2011:12). This force composition matches the required characteristics of force structure elements that are deployed for the execution of JI^{2}M operations – exactly the type of operations that the SANDF will become involved in. However, current structures of the SANDF only provide for the integration of forces provided by the respective services on an ad hoc basis and deployed forces return to their units and service commands directly after deployments. This creates many problems as the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), who is

charged with providing joint command during deployments (intended to improve inter-service cooperation in the achievement of JI^{2}M objectives) only receives members of the units that are to be deployed a few months prior to deployment. By permanently grouping force structure elements from all the services together to form composite type forces, the SANDF will be provided with tailored forces with the ability to maintain integrated multi-element task forces permanently. This will allow for the efficient implementation of combined-arms warfare principles and will contribute to the fostering of a joint military culture and joint training in the SANDF.

The advantages of combined force structures such as composite type forces, are that these essentially self-contained formations can be established across the active/full-time and SANDF reserve components. Each modular, composite type force will have, for example, elements of combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CCS) unit types, which will include aviation, sustainment, mobility enhancement, battlefield surveillance and firepower. By using composite type forces that are organised around battalion groups as modular force design building blocks, each composite type force will have proportionately greater organic CS and CSS capability, compared to what is currently allocated to individual brigades. Composite structures will also vastly improve and enhance integrated command-and-control and intelligence capabilities, as well as the outputs of integrated support elements such as the military police, maintenance and medical elements.

There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to employing increasingly modular designs, and the most-cited advantage is modularity's ability to increase flexibility in the task organisation greatly by allowing a variety of possible configurations (Linick, 2006:4). Modular organisations can give commanders greater discretion over the function and scale of the desired task organisation, enabling them to choose building-block capabilities more closely suited to their unique mission needs. In the case of joint or multinational force modularity, such organisation also enables commanders to use elements from a variety of different services or nations, rather than be locked into a single service or nation (Schilling & Paparone, 2008:285)..

Modular approaches to force design are not supported by everyone. The application of a modular force design that uses composite-type forces rather than the services as building blocks for force structure elements, might be viewed by some as radical and might even be interpreted to imply the absorption of the SAN and SAAF into the structures of the SA Army. Those opposed to the proposed composite, modular force design will oppose the shift to modular force structure elements, arguing that the unique features, capabilities and corporate knowledge of the respective services will be lost for future generations.

It could also be argued that the problems and shortcomings that are currently being experienced by the SANDF are so pervasive that they cannot be addressed by simply altering the manner in which the defence force is designed, structured and organised – and that the force design and force structure of the SANDF constitute only a specific part of a much larger problem. This is a valid argument and it is acknowledged that, in order to ensure that all members of the SANDF will be optimally prepared and able to execute ordered tasks, that, for example, all the elements of the POSTEDFITB (personnel, organisation, sustainment, training, equipment, doctrine, facilities, information, technology and budget business model should be addressed in a holistic, comprehensive and integrated fashion (DOD, 2006:2-50 – 2-56). The primary reason for the emphasis on firstly changing the force design and force structure of the SANDF, however, is that that the principle of 'structure follows strategy' is applied to ensure that the defence force is organised to support the JI^{2}M concepts that have been accepted as the core of the SANDF's current and future deployment strategies since 1994 optimally. It is acknowledged that, once the modular force design and force structure principles have been accepted as far as organisation (O) is concerned, the other elements of POSTEDFITB will also have to be changed and adapted to support the 'system-of-systems' approach to force preparation, force employment and force support (DOD, 2006:2-51).

The above-mentioned criticisms are all valid, yet there are ways in which the effect of these challenges could be mitigated. Furthermore, during deployments since 1994, all services of the SANDF have, in any case, resorted under a single command structure (CJOPS), as the concept of **jointness** underpins current operational concepts of SANDF deployments. As was argued in previous chapters of this study, the possibilities of one of the services to be deployed on its own, have, in the context of the modern threat environment, been deemed

remote. It will therefore be in the best interest of the SANDF as a whole, to structure jointly at all levels, even in peacetime and to place less emphasis on service-specific structures and configurations. The services could still be utilised for administration and management purposes and some formal training courses, but for command and control, training, deployment and support of members, it is crucial to configure force structure elements to support 'joint' rather than single service operations.

By adopting a modular approach to force design, the SANDF will be able to deliver expeditionary, combined task forces, capable of being delivered into the area of operations from the air, over land and by sea. This modular force design will enable the SANDF to mass organic, scalable and joint precision effect, at an increasingly higher level than hitherto, which will enable the SANDF to balance the principles of concentration of force with economy of effort. The forces will also be optimally configured to conduct asymmetric warfare against conventional, irregular as well as hybrid forces. A modular force design and structure for the SANDF will also achieve operational benefits from new concepts by transforming itself from a single-service, staff-centric command-and-control structure to a joint, integrated, network-enabled battle command that will enable decision superiority and self-synchronisation (Vego, 2000:59–62).

A modular, integrated force design will ultimately increase the synergy of integrated, 'joint' operations and will contribute significantly to the optimal configuration of an SANDF that will be able to field forces that are ready and able to meet the vast array of contemporary security challenges. A completely modular approach to force design in which the constituent building blocks – infantry, command and control, signals, logistics, artillery and all the other building blocks – are assembled depending on the mission might be radical, but if managed correctly, will prove to be operationally more efficient.

5.6. The SANDF's current force design and force structure

The 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1) describes force design as those components of the SANDF within the wider defence force structure, which can and may be mobilised for operational deployment or which directly support defence operations.

This includes combat, CS, CSS as well as command-and-control systems that may be deployed to execute operations. The force design guidelines also addresses non-deployable units that are in direct support of deployed forces, such as military hospitals and maintenance and supply depots (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-8).

The 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996), the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) as well as the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014), all emphasise the importance of differentiating between the so-called 'primary' and 'secondary' roles of defence forces on which the acquisition of primary equipment and the structuring of the force design should be based. Mills (2011:9), however, argues that the premise that preparations for the primary function will enable the execution of secondary functions might be true for developed countries where domestic and non-military threats to security are muted, but adds that the argument may not be as valid for less developed countries where extensive non-military threats to security may prevail. The fact that the 'primary function' vs the 'secondary function' debate has become less relevant to current SANDF deployments, does not, however, mean that separate force structures should be developed for conventional and non-conventional types of deployments.

In contrast to using the same force in different roles ('primary' and 'secondary' roles), force designers could be tempted to follow the 'horses for courses' approach – splitting the force into units that are optimised for conventional war on the one hand, and developing another group of units optimised for low-intensity, non-conventional conflicts on the other. This notion creates several problems. Firstly, not many countries can afford the luxury of having specific defence forces for traditional warfighting, whilst at the same time having a defence force that is optimally designed for OOTW deployments. Secondly, this kind of approach totally ignores the phenomenon of hybrid, multi-modal wars, i.e. the kinds of conflict in which members of the SANDF are most likely to become involved (Baker, 2010:208). This implies that the SANDF must have the capacity to deploy forces simultaneously in very different types of conflicts and in dispersed locations.

Far from being a mere theoretical argument, the weakness of the approach of focusing on the primary function and assuming that this will satisfy secondary requirements has become

increasingly visible in South African defence planning (Mills, 2011:10). In spite of the fact that the military, political and public lobbies agree in theory on the primary function orientation and the core-force principles, the obvious unlikelihood of an external military threat has consistently undermined the credibility of a force design ostensibly motivated by the need for defence against external aggression. In the face of pressure against large-scale reduction in the SANDF's force size, the arguments in favour of maintaining a defence force that is capable of countering external military threats have not provided convincing against a seemingly endless series of budget cuts. At the same time the SANDF is expected to provide extensive support to the SAPS without additional funding (Heitman, 2013b:8). The SANDF is therefore not only suffering the steady erosion of its conventional capabilities, but has reached a point where those capabilities can only be maintained at the expense of domestic deployments in support of the SAPS, border-safeguarding and the ability to execute PSOs. According to Heitman, (2013b:8), the interpretation of defence goals and tasks, such as contributing to regional peace and stability, border-safeguarding and internal support to the SAPS, presents an expansive mandate-driven view on defence that is out of step with the available budget, the threats the country faces and the actual tasks of the SANDF.

From the above it becomes evident that the continued focus on the primary function does not necessarily enable the unlimited execution of secondary tasks, which are precisely the kind of tasks the SANDF will be called upon to execute for the foreseeable future. If anything, this reasoning has contributed rapidly to undermining the ability of the SANDF to execute any of it tasks (primary or secondary) efficiently. It is therefore evident that the post-1994 approaches to and the foundations for the SANDF's force design – oscillating between the primary and secondary functions of a defence force – were essentially based on arguments which had their origins in the apartheid era and which were, in essence, aimed at preventing the mistakes of the past rather than focusing on designing and structuring a defence force that would be configured optimally to execute the tasks as required by government – now and in the future. The problems that have resulted from the primary-versus-secondary role argument have been intensified by the fact that the defence budget has provided insufficient funds to carry out both or either of these roles efficiently. In the light of the changed international security environment and the changes to the expected roles and functions of

militaries, it is evident that a redefinition of the force structure, force design, mandate and budget of the SANDF is required in order to meet stated governmental imperatives.

The 2014 Defence Review assumes that the Defence Force should be maintained at a low readiness level (as part of the defensive posture of the SANDF). It is argued that it is not necessary to maintain high readiness levels, as there would be between two to five years' warning of a significant threat (Defence Review Committee, 2014; 9-10). This planning horizon ignores the obvious point that international crises tend to erupt far more quickly than this envisaged warning period. This phenomenon was recently highlighted by the events on the border between Russia and the Ukraine. While it is not incorrect to assume that a significant conventional threat to South Africa is unlikely, it is questionable to assume that, in the event that such a threat should arise, it would arise slowly (Baker, 2009:19). Based on this argument, many of the SANDF's capabilities have been 'moth-balled' or placed in long-term storage and it will take considerable time and money to re-activate these capabilities to full strength.

As far as force design is concerned, many defence planners and strategists argue for a smaller regular force. They base their arguments on the fact that it is too expensive to maintain a large standing defence force that is primarily made up of regular, full-time serving members of the SANDF. They argue that it would be more cost-effective to maintain a small, 'core war force' made up of regulars, which can be augmented by reserve force (part time service) members when the operational situation so requires. This is premised on the argument that, in all likelihood, it would be the active, regular component units that would be called upon to contribute to PSOs when necessary – with reserve units being deployed only as a last resort. This line of argument has two primary shortcomings. Firstly, it is unlikely that the reserve forces allocated to a specific division that is oriented towards a highly unlikely conventional threat will receive the resources necessary to maintain them at a realistic deterrent level (Baker, 2009:24). Secondly, modern complex missions require specialised training of all defence force members who are to be deployed as peacekeepers. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that reserve force members could be brought up to speed quickly enough to be operationally effective and to operate side by side with regular force members who execute these tasks on a daily basis. According to Baker (2009:30): "[s]uch

complacency is misguided, given the high level of proficiency required to survive and thrive on today's conventional battlefields. A salient lesson Operation Desert Storm (US invasion of Iraq in 1991) and Operation COBRA II (US invasion of Iraq in 2003) is that troop numbers are largely irrelevant if the troops concerned lack the necessary levels of training."

Despite a significant shift to move away from the emphasis on the traditional primary task of the SANDF in the 2014 Draft Defence Review, which now offers greater emphasises to the importance of participation in peace missions and the provision of humanitarian support (Defence Review Committee, 2014:7-7), deterrence, defence and the protection of key national interests remain at the core of the tasks assigned to the SANDF. This is proffered as the reason why the current force design of the SANDF, with the emphasis on a traditional warfighting configuration, is essentially still oriented toward fighting against conventional types of adversaries in open and mixed savannah-type terrain. In addition to defence against military aggression, however, the SANDF must also be able to provide forces for COIN operations, peace support, humanitarian and border-safeguarding operations, as well as other operations in support of the SAPS and other government departments – something for which the current force structure and force design are not optimally suited.

According to the 2014 Defence Review the Army is envisaged as having three divisions that will be established and built up in stages (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-8 to 10-11). This force structure will include:

- A mechanised division, which comprises an armoured brigade, a mechanised brigade, as well as a motorised infantry brigade. These will be supported by the required numbers of divisional troops, which will provide signals, engineering, sustainment and intelligence support. This capability is aimed at serving as a deterrent capability and the mechanised forces of this division will provide forces for peace enforcement (United Nations Chapter 7) missions.

- A motorised division that will consist of six motorised brigades and divisional troops. This division will be tasked with border-safeguarding and area defence operations, and will be the primary provider of forces for PSOs.

- A contingency division with three brigades (one airborne, one sea-landed and one air-landed), also with divisional troops for support as required. The contingency division will be focused on providing early-entry forces for the intervention missions and the rapid deployment forces with which to reinforce other missions when required.

The 2014 Defence Review describes all three divisions as being staffed from both the regular and reserve forces of the SA Army, in line with the 'one force' concept of the SA Army Strategy (DOD, 2006:1-4) which emphasises the fact that regulars and reserves will provide a unified effort during deployments – differentiation between regulars and reserves will not take place as far as mission types are concerned. The Defence Review emphasises the requirements for specialised equipment for border-safeguarding and area defence duties, as well as the urgent need to replace the SA Army's truck fleet, which is more than thirty years old. It also describes the requirement for air-transportable armour capabilities and new armoured personnel carriers.

The SAAF, as described in the 2014 Defence Review, is not described in terms of a 'wing structure' as is the framework used by most air forces, but is described in terms of 'capabilities' (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-11–10-13). This design framework is, according to Heitman (2013b:8), out of line with the intent of the Defence Review, which was aimed at providing the SAAF with a balanced structure, described in recognisable military terminology. The SAAF capabilities are also not defined in detail and provide no indication of required capability levels (number of aircraft). The SAAF force design, as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3) also divides, for instance, tactical helicopters, such as the Rooivalk attack helicopters and the Oryx tactical transport helicopters, between the combat capability and the mobility capability, which will greatly complicate effective training of what are supposed to be two elements of a cohesive team (Heitman, 2013b:9). The Defence Review does, however, emphasise the need for new transport aircraft – particularly long-range aircraft for the strategic lift required to support PSOs on the continent. Just as important is the requirement for maritime aircraft to support patrolling ships and an additional number of shipboard helicopters that will deploy with the Navy's future offshore patrol vehicles (OPVs). Special forces and the SAMHS have pressing

requirements for heavy rotary-wing airlift support, for example CH-47s. The SAAF's fleet of Rooivalk and Oryx helicopters is too small to provide for operational requirements.

The current force design of the SAN is based on the concept of frigates, submarines, patrol vessels, support vessels, marines and mine warfare capabilities (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-13–10-16). It is envisaged that the mine warfare capability will be transformed from dedicated mine-sweeper vessels to off-board systems that can be deployed offshore and inshore from patrol vessels and also from shore. The naval support capability will be comprised of combat support ships, joint support ships and landing platforms, as well as a hydrographic survey vessel (Heitman, 2013b:9). It is clear that a substantial fleet expansion is required, with at least eight OPVs and a second combat support ship. It will also require landing platforms and at least two more frigates.

The 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1) describes the SANDF's force structure as the complete structure of the defence organisation, inclusive of the force design. This ranges from DOD level to units and force structure elements at tactical level. The proposed structure, however, is still presented as four single services of the SANDF: the SA Army, SA Navy (SAN), SA Air Force (SAAF) and SA Medical Health Service (SAMHS) (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-8–10-22). This structure is not primarily focused on jointness, integration and interoperability – crucial elements for the development of joint military culture and doctrine, as well as for conducting successful JI^{2}M operations. The utilisation of services as building blocks of the SANDF has, by default, resulted in a situation where the majority of training in the SANDF occurs within the specific training environments of the respective services, rather than in the joint training environments, which would ultimately be more appropriate as members of the SANDF are and would be expected to be deployed and operate as part of JI^{2}M forces. A good measure of joint, cross-service and integrated training is provided to members of the SANDF during some courses and exercises, but training in the SANDF has remained essentially service-specific. The development and acquisition of equipment, CS and CSS entities and processes also continue to be developed in the respective service environments in a serve-specific 'stove-piped' fashion. This often results in duplications and creates interoperability problems. Overall, although the 2014 Defence Review was posited as a higher-order governing document that would provide new

direction and enhanced operational capabilities, the force design, as described in the document, does not address the problem of how to transform the SANDF from its essentially Second World War and Cold War single-service (e.g. army, navy and air force specific) configurations to a force design and force structure that would be better suited to postmodern 21st-century JI2M operations.

Against this background, it is evident that the procurement of the strategic defence package of modern fourth-generation fighters, frigates and submarines after the promulgation of the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998), aimed at furnishing the SANDF with cutting-edge defence technology, has proved to be misaligned with actual operational capability requirements. In addition, despite the positive outcome of the budget that was allocated for the acquisition of these very expensive defence capabilities, the SANDF remains essentially poor as far as human resources and overall financial capacity are concerned (Heitman, 2013b:2). This is because the defence budget does not only pertain to the acquisition of primary equipment and the funding of peace mission deployments, but must also provide for the cost of day-to-day maintenance of equipment, infrastructure, training, administration and force preparation. The current threat-based, 'needs-driven but cost-constrained' approach to capability development and acquisition, which permeates the broader defence debate, must be defined more clearly and the implications thereof must be expounded in much more detail (Mills, 2011:17). The consistent underfunding of the SANDF has resulted in a situation where the defence force has been rendered incapable of sustaining more deployments – although it is clear that government will not accept this as reasons to wind down existing commitments or to refrain from pledging more forces to peace missions on the continent – as was seen from the recent decision to pledge forces to the ACIRC. The SANDF, however, remains out of step with the commitments made that depend so heavily upon the armed forces.

The SANDF currently has no ability to deploy forces outside South Africa by air, except by making use of chartered transport, which may not always be possible in times of crisis (Heitman, 2013c:37). The SA Army is four infantry battalions short of the minimum to meet its present obligations and it lacks the equipment for any real crisis response capability. The SAN has so few ships that it can either patrol South African waters or conduct anti-piracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel, but cannot do both at the same time. The SAAF has no

maritime patrol aircraft, no tanker aircraft, a very limited air transport capability and too few attack helicopters (Heitman, 2013c:37). The SANDF also does not have the funding to acquire the equipment and systems required to close stated capability gaps and to replace obsolete equipment and systems (Heitman, 2013c:20). Serious gaps have been identified and remain in South Africa's security arsenal – most importantly coastal patrol vessels for patrolling the country's extensive maritime borders, naval transport and replenishment vessels, and medium transport aircraft optimally suited for strategic lift to support peace missions and humanitarian relief operations in Africa (Mills, 2011:19).

The systems and equipment that were acquired as part of the Strategic Defence Package have proved not to be optimally suited to address the requirements of South Africa's current threat environment. The latter is less about territorial incursion by external state forces than about crime, unemployment and failing governance within and beyond the SADC region that results in mass migrations and a plethora of social consequences and pressures. South Africa's peace and development are tightly interwoven with peace and security on the rest of the continent and it is expected that South Africa will not draw the fixed capital investment it requires to grow its economy without peace, security and stability in the wider region. The South African government must therefore make clear and unambiguous decisions on South Africa's level of defence ambition and decide on the role the SANDF is to play. If the South African government intends to position itself as a key player in Africa, it must put its money where its mouth is, which implies proper and consistent funding of the SANDF. Some defence analysts, such as Helmut Heitman have pointed to the fact that South Africa is not pulling its weight in peace missions on the continent: among twenty-two sub-Saharan countries that have sizeable contingents deployed for peace support, South Africa is only ninth in the number of troops deployed and twentieth in the number of troops deployed relative to economic strength (Heitman, 2013b:10).

The shortcomings and capability deficits that have become evident since 1994 were not addressed by the 1998 strategic defence packages and neither is the current defence budget sufficient to achieve stated governmental objectives. The result is that the SANDF is not optimally equipped to perform the tasks that it will most probably be called upon to execute across the African continent. In addition, the current 2014 Defence Review does not address

the issues of joint force design, force structure and capability gaps and commensurate risks, despite the fact that these have been pointed out consistently as shortcomings by academics and military planners. It is evident that a different approach to force design and force structure of the SANDF is required to ensure that the SANDF is optimally configured and equipped to execute its tasks. Such a new approach must be able to filter out the compromises of official strategic guidance – a fine balancing act – but may be rewarded with real political support and defendable proposals for slight increases to the defence budget over time.

5.7. Current force requirements for the optimal deployment of members of the SANDF

The Battle of Bangui in CAR in March 2013 further compelled government and defence planners to reassess the type of defence force South Africa needs. While the deployed troops fought valiantly, the Defence Force had no means to either reinforce promptly or extract them (Heitman, 2013c:1). South Africa in effect had no control over the battlespace dimensions within which its forces had to operate and its newly required defence systems also played no role to bring about a better outcome.

In sharp contrast to the sequential, deliberate campaigns of the 20th century, future joint operations will emphasise rapid strategic response by joint services, followed by synchronised shaping and decisive operations, distributed throughout the entire joint operations area (JOA). The joint force commander must establish early control of all the battlespace dimensions (air, land, sea, space and information) and focus power against the critical elements of the adversary's structure (key capabilities, decisive points, and centres of gravity) (Vego, 2000:307).

The SANDF's force design must also be sufficiently agile to provide for integrated JI2M headquarters that will facilitate multinationality in its headquarters. Greater emphasis must be placed on the importance of both conceptual and operational interoperability, particularly with those countries in the SADC with whom the SANDF has strong historic ties and with whom they are most likely to operate in future – as portrayed by the force intervention brigade (FIB)

in the Eastern DRC. A credible South African defence force will be able to provide reassurances to allies and will prevent future conflict through training and assistance missions in the region and by nurturing strong bilateral military relationships with its allies in the SADC. As an example, the current practice of the exchange of members of the directing staff by the South African National War College (SANWC) with members of the directing staffs of other SADC countries should be expanded upon and could be extended to include the exchange of instructors and members of the directing staffs of Junior Command and Staff Colleges in the SADC region. This will contribute to the building of SADC countries' military capacity to enable them to resolve their own security problems and contribute more effectively to international peacekeeping operations. By improving the levels of defence education and training in the region, SADC militaries will be able to support comprehensive, whole-of-government political and/or military solutions to threats by contributing to the overall contextual understanding of the operating environment, as well as by dealing with threats at a distance through a range of scalable responses, including military advice, planning assistance and partnering with indigenous forces. The SANDF must therefore increasingly utilise military diplomacy and collaborative defence concepts to influence events and developments in SADC and on the continent as a whole.

5.7.1. Force requirements for the SA Army

The requirements for the Army implies that the size of the Army be expanded to allow for proper rotation (1 in 4 as the highest sustainable tempo) for peace operations, border-safe-guarding operations and having the required rapid deployment and contingency forces. This implies eight dedicated mission-tailored battalions and one specialist battalion for border-safeguarding, one airborne brigade and a motorised or mechanised battalion group for quick reaction or rapid deployment, one light mechanised brigade and one motorised brigade for peace support commitment and a reinforced mechanised brigade to serve as a contingency force. The light mechanised and motorised brigade would each be responsible for a particular peace support mission (four infantry battalion groups each, mechanised and motorised infantry and support units). The mechanised brigade would serve as the primary contingency force and would include a tank regiment, forming a nucleus on which to build a

stronger force and which would further provide heavy units should one of the above brigades become involved in peace enforcement operations.

5.7.2. Force requirements for the SAN

In terms of the SAN, the fleet requirements include four attack submarines (of which two to three will be operational whilst the others are being maintained) for surveillance patrols, eight OPVs for mainland exclusive economic zone (EEZ) patrols, and six frigates, two combat support vessels and landing platforms for distant patrols and support of the contingency task force as well as task-tailored port security units per port. None of these fleet designs would provide any ability to deploy forces by sea (except special forces elements). To deploy forces by sea, additional capabilities (such as amphibious vessels) will have to be acquired at a later stage (Heitman, 2013a:2).

5.7.3. Force requirements for the SAAF

The SAAF will also have to be redesigned and equipped for current and future operational requirements. In addition to the current capabilities (Gripen, Rooivalk and Oryx), maritime surveillance aircraft will have to be acquired. Heitman suggests that the SAAF is in need of twelve long-range surveillance aircraft (such as the HC-130J or Orion aircraft), eight coastal surveillance aircraft and a total of eighteen shipboard helicopters (Super Lynx). It will also require six aircraft for border surveillance and patrol, as well as optronic and other sensors (for instance Aerostats or blimps). The SANDF is urgently in need of long-range (strategic) transporters (such as the A400M whose planned acquisition was halted), as well as medium/heavy transports such as the C-130J (Mills, 2011:14). Heitman (2013c:37) argues that 12 heavy, long-range transports, six medium transports and 12 light transporters, such as the C-27J, are required for parachute, air-landed and special forces operations. As far as air assault operations are concerned, the SANDF requires 12 Oryx for deployment in the RSA and 12 Oryx available for PSOs. Twelve Rooivalk attack helicopters are required to deliver deployable close air support (six available in South Africa and six deployed during PSOs). Twenty-four Gripens are available for reconnaissance and air strikes and deployable combat air patrol. The SAAF also requires aerial refuelling (four multi-role tanker/transport aircraft),

due to the vast distances involved in operations in Africa. These aircraft could be used as tankers and long-haul transport and are convertible for very important persons (VIP) tasks. Importantly, it is essential to add airborne radar capability and to expand the airlift to be able to deploy a parachute battalion groups in a single lift and air-landed battalion within 48 hours (Mills, 2011:14). This emphasises the urgent need for heavy-lift helicopters such as Chinooks.

5.7.4. Force requirements for the SAMHS

The SAMHS will have to be restructured to match the medical support requirements of the future force design, with three divisions of the Army. Specialised elements will also be required.

The total force packages as outlined above will cost the South African tax payer about R60 billion per year, assuming that the equipment was acquired over a ten-year period. This amount would foot the bill of an allocation of about R25 billion for the Army, R6 billion for the SAN, R10 billion for the SAAF and R500 million for special forces. The remainder of the R60 billion will be used to pay for other components, including the SAMHS and joint training establishments. This implies a 45% increase to the current SANDF budget of R42 billion. This is a substantial increase and would be so for any defence force. More importantly, South Africa is a developing country that is compelled to address huge socio-economic challenges and government would face severe criticism for significant increases to the defence budget. More especially because the Sereti Commission which had been tasked to investigate the processes that underpinned the acquisition of the Strategic Defence Packages, continues to be questioned in terms of its transparency. The increased budget, according to the 2014 Defence Review calls for an additional R11,7 billion in the 2014/15 financial year and R11,2 billion in the year thereafter. After the increase of some 20,5% and 18,9% above the levels of defence expenditure reflected in the medium-term expenditure estimates, the subsequent annual increase will average 6,8% from 2017 to 2028 (Defence Review Committee, 2014:9-1–9-34). This amount would, however, allow the SANDF to meet current operational commitments and develop a reserve. It is important to bear in mind that South Africa is currently underspending on defence and has been doing so for at least the past decade

(Defence Review Committee, 20142:2-23). Angola, long considered South Africa's only potential rival in the Southern African power stakes, already spends about 50% more on its military than South Africa in absolute terms – and Algeria almost three times that of South Africa (Defence Review Committee, 2014:2-24). To put the latter analysis into perspective: neither Angola or Algeria has demonstrated the political ambitions of South Africa and neither has pretences to continental leadership and imposing regional stability – yet they have allocated significantly larger portions of their government expenditure to defence. In terms of the application of the Defence Force, South Africa's level of defence ambition and capacity are clearly at odds with one another.

5.8. Proposed modular force design and force structure for the SANDF

The proposed force design is based on using composite battalion groups as building blocks for the various types of composite type forces. These composite type forces are not intended to be applied as four different 'mini-defence forces'. Rather, they are based on the notion that specific force structure elements (FSEs) will be allocated to the type forces – this allocation does not imply co-location. The reason for allocating specific FSEs to particular type forces will allow for the nurturing of a culture of jointness among various elements, as they will participate as a 'family' during exercises and deployments. Members of these type forces will come to know one another, and even more importantly, they will come to understand how various FSEs will interface and jointly pursue the achievement of common objectives. The establishment of permanently grouped joint headquarters (HQ) structures will provide impetus to the development of joint command-and-control architectures and will enhance interoperability among systems and platforms (Linick, 2006:7). This will reduce duplication and will result in the standardisation of systems and procedures. Just as important is the fact that the members deployed must internalise the legal parameters within which they would be expected to deploy, as members deployed as part of a United Nations Chapter 7 deployment have significantly different legal mandates to those deployed as part of United Nations Chapter 6 PSOs. Furthermore, members who deploy to the South African borders as well as those deployed during area defence operations will act within totally different legal parameters than members deployed outside the border of South Africa. The legal implications, as well as interoperability standards and command-and-control specifications, are even more important

in the JI^{2}M approach on which much of the 2014 Defence Review is based. Specific FSEs must know exactly where and how they will fit into joint structures, particularly when they are to operate with members of other state departments, as well as with other defence forces. Protocols and SOPs must be developed, taught and inculcated in the common traditions of FSEs that are to deploy – even if they are from other state departments or countries. These processes are cumbersome and take time to develop. It will not be possible to develop these before every mission as the attainment of these requirements requires continual liaison and cooperation among all stakeholders and role-players. In being prepared for deployments in specific environments, role-players and participants can formalise command-and-control arrangements and ensure CS and CSS systems are inter-operable. This will also allow for the development of integrated deployment, support and sustainment concepts. In a bid to operationalise the JI^{2}M approach, it is proposed that the SANDF be organised in the following type forces as illustrated by the author in Figures 5.1 to 5.4:

5.8.1. The heavy/conventional type force – for defence, deterrence and peace enforcement

The heavy/conventional type force is comprised of various elements provided by the land, air, maritime and medical health components (Figure 5.1). The heavy/conventional type force is made up of mechanised forces, organised around a battalion group concept and used as basic building block for the force structure. Although specific air wings and naval task forces are not permanently grouped (or, for that matter, co-located) with the land components, these FSEs are identified and organised to be commanded by a joint force commander through a permanent joint HQ type force. When so required, however, composite battalion groups from the other type forces can also be attached to the heavy/conventional type force as the command-and-control architecture will be designed to accommodate 'plug-in' capabilities. Similarly, the SAAF transport fleet will be utilised to transport forces and equipment to forward mounting bases and forward operating bases.

Forward mounting bases (FMBs) are bases that are established within an operational area to support operations at forward operating bases (FOBs) and forward staging bases (FSBs). In the case of South Africa, it has become evident that, due to the vast distances involved in the

deployment of members of the SANDF in PSOs in Africa, South Africa would improve the SANDF's operational effectivity by establishing sustainment bases closer to where the troops are deployed, rather than relying on being supported from bases in South Africa. FMBs are resourced to a greater level than FOBs or FSBs and will include well-developed command-and-control systems, logistics and administration support elements. The current UN sustainment base at Entebbe, Uganda from where UN and AU operations in Africa are sustained is a good example of a FMB. Current appreciations indicate that South Africa would benefit from the establishment of at least two FMBs – one on the east coast and one on the west coast of Africa. The location of FMBs will be determined by the operational situation as well as by the opportunities developed by effective defence diplomacy. The 2014 Defence Review refers to forward-basing on the continent, but does not provide any detail on where these FMBs would be established (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3).

FOBs are bases deployed within the operational area to support tactical operations. FMBs are thus established closer to actual operations than FMBs. FMBs are resourced to provide minimum services commensurate with sustaining the required levels of support during tactical operations.



Figure 5.1: The heavy/conventional type force

5.8.2. The light/medium peace support type force – for PSOs and peace keeping

The light/medium peace support type force (Figure 5.2) is tailored for deployments during PSOs. It is structurally different to traditional warfighting frameworks in that it has four battalion groupings allocated to each composite brigade. This expansion is in line with UN requirements of four companies per battalion for PSOs. It will be optimally designed and equipped to conduct operations in joint, multinational deployments. Most of these missions must be supported over vast distances and it is therefore essential to develop sustainment systems that are capable of optimally supporting such missions. This will require the cooperation of TCCs and host nations. This type of cooperation is only achieved if developed

and sustained over time. The success of PSOs is greatly dependent on how well the various agencies and organisations cooperate and work towards shared objectives. As is the case with the heavy/conventional type force, FSEs allocated to the light/medium peace support type force, such as the Rooivalk attack helicopters, can also be attached to the air component of the light/medium peace support type force when so required.



Figure 5.2: The light/medium peace support type force

5.8.3. The area defence type force

The area defence type force (Figure 5.3) describes the 'home guard', focused on protecting the people of South Africa by border-safeguarding and area defence operations. An important aspect of these types of deployment is that a totally different legal mandate is required for

members of the SANDF who are deployed during these missions. The formal command-and-control structures that will shape the manner in which the SANDF will 'plug' into joint border management agency (BMA) structures must still be confirmed. Members of the SANDF that are deployed during these types of operations will have to be specifically trained and equipped with, for instance, non-lethal weapons. Concepts of operation must be developed that are tailored to the specific characteristics of each of the deployment areas as they differ significantly from one another.



Figure 5.3: The area defence type force

5.8.4. The contingency type force – for expeditionary intervention operations and the operational reserve

The contingency type force (Figure 5.4) includes airborne, air-landed and sea-landed forces that are deployed in expeditionary intervention operations or deployed as an operational reserve. These forces should be rapidly deployable and should be self-sustained for at least 72 hours before they will be relieved. It is essential that the forces grouped into this type force regularly rehearse and exercise their deployment drills as there will usually not be sufficient time to rehearse prior to these deployments. If prepared to deploy as part of a JI^{2}M force, aspects such as the interface between static and on-board command posts will be formalised prior to deployments and equipment will be certified as interoperable.



Figure 5.4: The contingency type force

5.9. Conclusion

The premise on which the 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) based the primary function of defence, namely the "protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of South Africa" has proved to be continually misaligned with government's deployment requirements and the characteristics of the prevailing African security environment, force design, equipment and funding. However, the continued requirement to participate in PSOs on the continent, coupled with additional requirements of providing support to other government departments (the so-called secondary function) emphasises the fact that the concepts and baselines for force planning and capability development must be revisited to enable the SANDF to execute its required tasks successfully. As important is the requirement to provide adequate funding to enable the professional execution of required tasks. At the heart of any force design is the necessity of deciding which league a defence force wants to play in – and then to fund that level.

The principles and norms traditionally applied to the design and structure of defence forces will not suffice to meet the requirements of the complex threat environment of the 21st century. Flexibility, innovation and the optimal configuration of FSEs, tailored for the idiosyncrasies of various kinds of deployments, will be the key to the success of future JI^{2}M deployments of the SANDF.

South African defence force planners and strategists must therefore re-assess the premises for South African defence planning and must embark on a concerted effort to disenthrall themselves of many of the traditional, modernist warfighting concepts and defence assumptions that continue to dominate South African strategic defence thinking. Failure to do so will result in the design of a defence force that is unaffordable, inappropriately staffed and ill-equipped to meet the defence needs of the country. This re-assessment must address all aspects of defence planning – from force design to force structure, capability management, budgeting and control, and the SANDF must make use of the opportunities for the force design as encapsulated in the 2014 Defence Review to design tailor-made forces for specific threat environments.

Planning in the DOD and SANDF will also benefit greatly from adopting another trend in international defence planning, namely that of cross-service capability-based planning (cf. Zirnić, 2008). The application of capability-based planning to the acquisition, management and development of equipment will also contribute significantly to the development of the SANDF as a military force. Capability-based planning will contribute positively to the overall joint capability of the SANDF as it will, to a great extent, prevent the situation where singular pieces of equipment or systems are acquired, without addressing the interoperability and integration issues relating to those systems or equipment.

Coupled with the above, the most logical and cost-effective solution to the configuration of the SANDF would be to adopt an approach of modular force design, based on composite battalion groups that could be used as interchangeable building blocks which are tailor-made for specific deployments, rather than to continue with the cumbersome traditional practice of using the services as building blocks of the SANDF. By adopting a modular force design approach, the SANDF will be able to deliver expeditionary, air–ground combined task forces, capable of being delivered into the area of operations from the air, land and sea. This modular force design will enable the SANDF to have a mass organic, scalable, joint precision effect, at an increasingly higher deployment rate than before, and will enable the SANDF to balance the principles of concentration of force with economy of effort. The forces will also be optimally configured to conduct asymmetric warfare against conventional, irregular as well as hybrid forces. A modular force design and structure for the SANDF will achieve operational benefits from new concepts by transforming itself from a single-service, staff-centric command-and-control structure to a joint, integrated, network-enabled battle command that would enable decision superiority and self-synchronisation

In addition to the imperative of establishing joint FSEs for the defence force, there is also the additional requirement to structure the defence force to integrate seamlessly with other government departments, agencies and other defence forces as part of the JI^{2}M deployment concept. From a security and defence point of view, the comprehensive or 'whole-of-government' approach (cf. De Coning & Friis, 2008) provides a useful framework to synchronise, manage and focus the activities of various government departments and

agencies to address challenges throughout the continuum of conflict, internally and also externally to the borders of South Africa. This JI^{2}M approach, as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-3), also provides a structure into which the SANDF's warfighting concepts can be seamlessly applied. The approach will also provide for comprehensive planning, which should allow the DOD to make better use of limited resources through better targeting and tailoring of the military instrument.

Properly done, the correct decisions on force design, force structure and capability development will be a powerful investment in South Africa's future as the defence force remains a prominent tool in government's foreign policy arsenal (cf. Schoeman, 2013). It is therefore imperative to decide on South Africa's approach to defence and on the concomitant identity of the SANDF.

The next step is to select the most appropriate approach to force design and force structure, based on the country's level of defence ambition. Once a decision has been made on the approach to the force design and force structure of the SANDF, these frameworks could be applied to the SANDF's FSEs to optimally configure the SANDF for successful JI^{2}M deployments.

The design and planning issues pertaining to the SANDF as analysed in this chapter (see 5.1 and 5.6), as well as the deployment and use of the SANDF as a foreign policy tool and the requirements for appropriate force designs were interrogated during interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee, and are expounded and analysed in Chapter 6 of this study. The key issues pertaining to force design and force structure were interrogated during the interviews with the members of the Defence Review Committee. Questions to the Defence Review Committee (see Appendix 1) were focused on the optimal configuration of the SANDF to deploy successfully in complex missions across the spectrum of conflict during JI^{2}M operations.

CHAPTER 6: SELECTED VIEWS ON THE OPTIMAL CONFIGURATION OF THE SANDF AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY

6.1. Introduction

The current force structure and force design of the SANDF, as expounded in Chapter 10 of the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1–10:10-22) was analysed Chapter 5 of this study in order to evaluate its suitability to achieve the operational objectives and tasks as expounded in Chapters 5–8 of the Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:5-1–8-13). Chapter 5 includes a proposed alternative force design that could serve as a feasible, and more suitable, alternative to the current single service-oriented force design and structure of the SANDF as expounded in Chapter 10 of the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-1–10-22). It was argued that the proposed force design (as explained in Chapter 5 of the study) would better serve the SANDF in providing the defence force with optimally configured forces that are tailor-made to meet the idiosyncrasies of contemporary African security challenges. In order to obtain insight into the processes that was used by the Defence Review Committee to determine the SANDF's force design, it was necessary to conduct interviews with the members of the Defence Review Committee as these processes were not expounded in the Defence Review.

This chapter focuses on the results of personal interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee. The interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee were, in terms of the scope of this study, necessary to clarify some issues relating to the approach to the compilation of, as well as the content of the 2014 Defence Review that could only be obtained by such interviews. In addition, it was appreciated that these interviews would provide insight into many sentiments not visible in the written outputs. The 2014 Defence Review expounds all aspects relating to South African defence policy matters and is appreciated as the primary and highest-order defence policy document. The DOD and SANDF must abide by the guidelines and stipulations as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review – both of these institutions have very limited 'room for manoeuvre and interpretation' as far as adherence to prescripts are concerned. The value of the interviews with the members of the Defence Review Committee is to be found in the fact that the content of the

2014 Defence Review formally represents the Government's intent as far as the roles and functions of the DOD and SANDF are concerned. The 2014 Defence Review represents a comprehensive description of the role and functions of the DOD and can be viewed as a manual to fix the department and as a path towards the future. The members of the Defence Review Committee who were interviewed confirmed that these were the first interviews relating specifically to the content of the 2014 Defence Review upon the approval of the Defence Review by Cabinet on 17 March 2014. As such, these interviews constitute a primary source of information and the opinions included in this Chapter are original and not the result of interpretation.

The members who were interviewed included the chairperson and the deputy chairperson of the Defence Review Committee, members of the resource group and a member of the secretariat who was appointed as the programme manager of the Defence Review Committee. The chairperson and deputy chairperson presided over the activities of the Committee by, inter alia, "providing strategic direction to the compilation process; providing policy and strategy direction to the drafting of the Defence Review; managing and directing the Defence Review political and consultative engagements, but also by providing direction to the administrative support to the Defence Review" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:A-3). The resource group, on the other hand, comprised of members who researched and drafted documents required by the Committee as well as executing other tasks as ordered by the chairman of the Committee (Defence Review Committee, 2014:A-3). Two members of the resource group, Mr Sendell and Brig Gen Gibbs were the primary role-players in the resource group, who upon receipt of inputs from individuals, groups or institutions would integrate inputs, coordinate research objectives, draft research documents and present the findings of the Defence Review Committee to the president, cabinet and parliament. The secretariat, particularly Mr Evert Jordaan, was provided by the DOD and tasked to provide administrative support to the Defence Review Committee (Defence Review Committee, 2014:A-3). The members of the Defence Review Committee were interviewed by means of an unstructured interview process, based on the questionnaire in Appendix 1.

The views of the following individuals were obtained:

- Mr Roelf Meyer, the chairperson of the Defence Review Committee and former Minister of Defence;

- Dr Pandelani Mathoma, the deputy chairperson of the Defence Review Committee and former South African ambassador to Mali;

- Mr Nick Sendell, a member of the resource group of the Defence Review Committee and Chief Director Defence Policy Formulation at the Defence Secretariat;

- Brig. Gen. John Gibbs, a member of the resource group of the Defence Review Committee and the Deputy Chief of Defence Reserves;

- Mr Helmoed Heitman, a civilian member of the resource group of the Defence Review Committee who is a professional defence analyst for military journals such as Jane's Defence Weekly amongst others; and

- Mr Evert Jordaan, programme manager of the Defence Review Committee and Deputy-Director Defence Policy Formulation at the Defence Secretariat.

6.2. Background to the role and function of the Defence Review Committee

The Defence Review Committee was established on 5 July 2010 and was tasked to undertake a complete review of South Africa's defence policy. The Defence Review was intended to serve as South Africa's primary defence policy document. In the 2014 Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:0-6), Chuter (2011) argues "(d)efence (f)orces exist primarily to underpin the domestic and foreign policies of a state" and that "defence policy is the result of the process of coordinating, employing and maintaining the assets of the defence sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation's security policy goals". In compiling the Defence Review, it was evident that the Defence Review Committee would have to conduct an extensive environmental scan/diagnostic to determine characteristics of

the strategic security environment within which members of the SANDF would be deployed. Upon completion of the environmental analysis, the Defence Review Committee had to compile a draft Defence Review for consideration by the Minister of Defence. After the Defence Review Committee had completed the Defence Review, the Minister of Defence engaged the national executive and the legislature on the contents of the Defence Review, after which the document was approved by cabinet on 17 March 2014.

The Defence Review Committee was tasked to develop a Defence Review that would (Defence Review Committee, 2014:A-2):

- identify the high-order principles pertinent to the defence function;

- ensure the comprehensive alignment of South Africa's defence policy with the Constitution, domestic statutes and international law;

- establish a long-term policy and strategic defence vision supportive of South Africa's strategic posture and international responsibilities;

- enunciate the complete spectrum of defence responsibility, through stated defence functions, high-level goals and tasks, identifying strategic concepts, doctrine and required defence capabilities;

- provide a level of defence efforts which must be pursued by the Defence Force;

- provide a sound policy base for determining the concomitant military strategy and the blue-print Defence Force FD and FS (an aspect that is at the heart of this thesis' contribution to South African defence policy);

- provide the long-term defence trajectory, in terms of defence organisational interventions, force generation and defence capability development;

- provide a high-level, first-order discussion on the funding principle, practices and requirements of the defence organisation; and

- provide a strategic discussion on the role and function of South Africa's defence industry, with all relevant ramifications thereto.

The aim of the interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee was to determine whether the force design and force structure as described in the Defence Review provide a framework for the SANDF by means of which the Defence Force will be able to meet and provide for South Africa's level of defence ambition – externally, as well as internally (Defence Review Committee, 2014:D1-2). The level of defence ambition, as expounded in the Defence Review, requires the SANDF to be optimally configured to deploy forces successfully during traditional, conventional deployments, PSOs, border-safeguarding operations, area defence operations, humanitarian operations and disaster support.

The focus of this chapter is therefore to confirm, through interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee, whether issues such as the interface between defence policy, DIRCO and the other relevant government policies were sufficiently encapsulated in the Defence Review, and whether the respondents were of the opinion that the force design as expounded in the Defence Review was the optimal configuration for the wide range of tasks that the SANDF would be expected to perform on the continent – ultimately, whether they were convinced that the force design, as expounded in the Defence Review, was optimally designed to configure the SANDF for JI^{2}M operations across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately, the inputs provided by the members of the Defence Review Committee were used to provide answers to the research question which this thesis intended to answer, namely **How should the SANDF reconfigure its force structure to operate in a JI^{2}M environment to meet shifting mission requirements?**

6.3. Key issues pursued during the interviews

A number of issues were pursued during the interviews, and the questions were focused on inter alia:

- How did the Defence Review Committee approach the process of compiling the Defence Review to ensure that it is an inclusive document that will provide “a new defence policy to ensure continued relevance and legislative compliance” (Defence Review Committee, 2014:A-1)?

- What was the level of participation and cooperation received from other state departments during the compilation of the Defence Review in support of JI^{2}M operations and a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to safety and security?

- How much emphasis was placed on the fact that the SANDF is one of the most important instruments in government’s foreign policy ‘tool box’ and to which extent was this notion included in the Defence Review?

- Are deployments of members of the SANDF to the AU, the SADC and PSOs on the continent actively pursued and presented as defence diplomacy inputs to South Africa’s foreign policy?

- What was the level and effect of benchmarking in terms of international best practice that was conducted as part of the diagnostic that was concluded prior to the compilation of the Defence Review – particularly as far as post-Cold War force designs and force structures are concerned?

- Were the significant changes that have taken place in terms of the characteristics of post-Cold War warfare taken into account when the blue-print force design was drafted, or was there a decision to persist with the design framework as set out in previous defence policy documents – a design focused on traditional, conventional warfare and the primary task of defence forces?

- Was the concept of composite type forces appreciated as a workable solution to the complex mission profiles which the SANDF will be expected to demonstrate during deployments across the spectrum of conflict?

6.4. The Defence Review as an inclusive defence policy document

As part of the societal outreach that was at the heart of the approach to the compilation of an inclusive defence policy document, Jordaan (2014) stated that role-players from a wide variety of environments were consulted during public consultations and imbizos (Zulu word meaning “gathering”) across all nine provinces of South Africa. This included presentations during ‘road shows’ at which the people of South Africa were consulted at grass-roots level over the period 2011–2013. Representatives of several divisions of the SANDF were also consulted about inputs to the Defence Review. Several academic institutions and academics who are knowledgeable on the topic of defence, as well as ‘think tanks’ such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) were also requested to provide inputs to the Defence Review. Numerous non-governmental organisations, such as “Gun Free South Africa” also provided inputs to the members of the Defence Review Committee. This broad scope of consultation was confirmed by Gibbs (2014) who stated that nearly 400 formal consultations were made by a wide variety of stakeholders. He added that the members of the Defence Review Committee’s Resource Group were, in fact, quite surprised by the extent of participation during consultations and imbizos. Jordaan (2014) pointed out that the reasons for attendance at public consultations and imbizos were varied, and many people who attended the imbizos only came to enquire about employment opportunities for their children and did not really understand what the process was about. Those who enquired about job opportunities also did not envisage long-term careers in the SANDF, but viewed employment in the SANDF as a stable source of income over the short term. Jordaan (2014) also noted that very few of the attendees had any understanding of the deployment of members of the SANDF in countries such as the DRC, the CAR and Sudan as the rationale for these deployments have never been communicated to them. During question and answer sessions it also became very clear that the DOD’s corporate communications department had little or no contact or relationship with the media at grass-roots level and that this was one of the primary reasons why South Africans were left uninformed about the activities, role and purpose of the SANDF. Dr Pandelani Mathoma (2014) said that he found, predictably, that people whose safety was under threat, or whose live-stock or other property was under threat were actively involved during consultations. Many attendees were concerned about illegal border-crossers and

stock theft and argued for the deployment of the SANDF inside the borders of South Africa as they did not have confidence in the SAPS to ensure the safety of their persons and/or their property. On the other hand, in areas where people who did not experience threats to their safety, they demonstrated little interest and did not participate in the process. This phenomenon was confirmed by the chairperson of the Defence Review committee, Mr Roelf Meyer (2014) confirmed that people whose safety was not under direct threat were not interested in participating in the work of the Defence Review Committee. Dr Pandelani Mathoma (2014) added that many South Africans were, in fact, wholly unaware of the process and they still did not have a clear understanding of the role and functions of the defence force. He said that there was an urgent requirement for wide-spread consultation with the people of South Africa and that this notion was shared by the president of South Africa, who, during one of his meetings with the members of the Defence Review Committee said that there was a clear requirement to communicate the contents of the Defence Review to the people of South Africa and that it should be explained to them why it was in their best interest to invest in the defence force. Dr Pandelani Mathoma (2014) also confirmed that several academics and members of 'think tanks' such as the ISS and the Institute for Global Dialogue provided valuable inputs to the Defence Review Committee.

Brig. Gen. John Gibbs (2014) also noted the members of the Defence Review committee were sometimes surprised at the responsible approach of many ordinary South Africans towards the role of defence as an asset to the country. He said that it was clear that the opinions of many ordinary South African have changed in terms of what the roles and functions of the defence force were compared to what they thought the role of the defence force was prior to the democratisation process which started in 1994. Mr Meyer (2014) pointed out that individuals who were well informed about the roles of defence forces in democracies were convinced of the fact that the security situation had changed between 2004 and 2014 and that it was therefore necessary for the SANDF to adjust to the changed security environment. The people who attended the road shows were very supportive of the SANDF. He also emphasised the requirement for an extensive media campaign to inform the general public about the role and functions of the SANDF and why there was a requirement to allocate a substantial part of the GDP to the DOD. According to Mr Meyer (2014), it became evident during the public consultations that one of the primary reasons why many people

were uninformed about the SANDF's activities was that the defence force did not visibly contribute to safety and security within the borders of South Africa. Some participants were vaguely aware that the SANDF had a presence on the borders, but most did not know anything about the SANDF's activities in the DRC, Sudan and other crisis situations on the continent. They indicated that little or no media coverage was allotted to South Africa's contributions to PSOs on the continent and as a result, they were in the dark as to the rationale behind South Africa's contribution of troops to peace missions on the continent. Mr Evert Jordaan (2014) said that many of the attendees at the imbizos had expressed their concern about the declining defence budget and the fact that the defence force's support base and capabilities had been severely eroded. Mr Helmut Heitman (2014) expressed the opinion that the contributions by ordinary South Africans during consultations and imbizos were very important to the process of compiling the Defence Review as this reassured the members of the Defence Review Committee that their understanding of government policy and their views on defence policy were more or less in line with how ordinary South Africans understood government policy and the role of the defence force. He observed that this confirmed a measure of buy-in into the process by ordinary South Africans who, although they did not write the document, significantly informed the compilation of the Defence Review. Although there was a good measure of participation of ordinary South Africans in the consultative processes related to the compilation of the 2014 Defence Review, there are no indications that this process had necessarily brought the South African society, Government intent and the defence community closer to one another.

6.5. Levels of participation and cooperation between the DOD and other state departments during the compilation of the Defence Review

The members of the Defence Review who were interviewed had different opinions on the levels of participation and about the contributions of other state departments in the process of compiling the Defence Review. Mr Jordaan (2014) stated that there was excellent cooperation with the various departments involved in the crime, justice and security cluster (CJSC). According to Mr Jordaan (2014), members of DIRCO also regularly provided inputs to the Defence Review Committee. Several inputs were also received from the State Security Agency (SSA) and the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). The Defence

Review Committee studied the contents of the Draft National Security Strategy (NSS) and attempted to align the contents of the Defence Review with that of the NSS. Despite good cooperation from representatives of DIRCO, it became clear that there was no real understanding of how the Defence Force should be utilised as an instrument of foreign policy. Dr Mathoma (2014) confirmed that DIRCO had provided presentations on the concepts of the Africa policy and the diplomacy of ubuntu (Zulu word meaning "humanity"). Presentations were also provided by the members of the SSA, the Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP) and members of the SAPS. The continual liaison with various role-players had several advantages. When the Defence Review Committee was in the process of finalising the Defence Review, the directors-general of the various CJSC departments were able to identify with the document. They confirmed that they had all been consulted. The BMA also confirmed the fact that they approved of the contents of the Defence Review. The good cooperation among departments confirmed the commitment to an integrative approach to governance. Mr Jordaan (2014) pointed out that one of the reasons for the disjointed approach to foreign policy decisions was the fact that diplomats were not developed to become career diplomats who specialised in defence and security and to become experts in the use of the defence force as an instrument of foreign policy. Individuals were appointed as diplomats only for limited periods of time and there were no long-term plans that were pursued to achieve specific, stated foreign policy objectives. In most instances, individuals who were appointed as diplomats merely viewed their appointments as temporary milestones in their careers. Dr Mathoma (2014) stated that there was good cooperation among those state departments who responded to calls for support to the Defence Review Committee. He emphasised that the fact that defence was not sufficiently addressed in the National Development Plan (NDP) should not be interpreted as that the National Planning Committee (NPC) viewed the defence force to be of lesser importance, but rather that the members of the NPC were of the opinion that the Defence Review would serve as the 'defence input' to the NDP.

It is in the disjuncture between the policies of DIRCO and the DOD that the greatest dangers are posed to the operational successes or failures of current and future SANDF deployments: the SANDF has, since 1994, become the face of South Africa in its policy execution on the African continent. It is also evident that the SANDF will continue to be deployed on the

continent and that it will be set for an even larger footprint than what is currently the case. Therefore, in terms of force projection, there is an inherent tension between the diplomatic initiatives and 'veranda politics' being played to lower South Africa's military profile in Africa, which does not correlate with the actual high tempo of SANDF deployments as part of the country's foreign policy initiatives.

6.6. Extent to which the Defence Review depicts the SANDF as an instrument of South African foreign policy

Mr Jordaan (2014) pointed out that South Africa's foreign policy is sometimes perceived as being contradictory as the country's international relations posture oscillates between multi-lateral idealist tendencies in pursuance of the African Agenda and Ubuntu diplomacy, whilst on the other hand, it sometimes demonstrates unilateral realist tendencies in the pursuance of national interest. (These seemingly contradictory policy initiatives was also expounded in Chapter 2 of this study). South Africa's foreign policy continues to be essentially undefined and in terms of actual policy remains in draft format. This 'foreign policy gap', prevails, despite the fact that South Africa does not have the military capacity to unilaterally secure the whole of the Atlantic Ocean. To successfully achieve regional and continental security, South Africa requires the assistance of strong external partners – something that can only be achieved and maintained by effective, multi-lateral foreign policy initiatives. This opinion was seconded by Mr Nick Sendell (2014) who also emphasised the problems created by the fact that, at the time of this research, South Africa does not have a clearly formulated foreign policy. He also highlighted the problems created by the fact that South Africa's foreign policy remains in draft form. According to Mr Sendell (2014), very few people in decision-making positions in government have any regard for the draft foreign policy document and it is spoken of in a derogatory manner. Dr Mathoma (2014) also confirmed that DIRCO had not clearly formulated South Africa's foreign policy. As a result, it is evident that the current draft foreign policy did not have a significant impact on the content of the 2014 Defence Review. Dr Mathoma (2014) argued that at the time of the research, the draft foreign policy did not clearly indicate who South Africa's strategic partners were, and also did not provide any useful detail about the country's foreign policy. As a result, decisions pertaining to strategic partners were made by politicians who pursued their individual (short-term) objectives, rather than forming

part of an overarching, holistic, long-term governmental plan to shape South Africa's international relations. The misalignment between South Africa's foreign and defence policies limits the SANDF's defence diplomacy options, which, in turn, impacts negatively on South Africa's 'layered defence' approach. (A layered defence approach is crucial as Africa's early-warning systems remain under-developed). Dr Mathoma (2014) said that DIRCO had to make recommendations to politicians on which countries would be deemed strategic partners with whom the African Agenda could be pursued, rather than leaving all the decisions to politicians. Similarly, decisions on South Africa's participation in PSOs had to form part of a long-term plan, rather than being based on ad hoc deployments to individual crises. The short deployment schedules emphasises the requirements for flexible force designs that will allow for the configuration of tailor-made forces to meet the idiosyncrasies of various deployments and deployment areas – a clearly need for orientations towards modular force designs. Dr Mathoma (2014) pointed out that South Africans are often criticised by academics from outside South Africa who state, "You speak on behalf of the African Agenda, but you have never consulted with the rest of Africa – how can you speak on behalf of Africa if you have never consulted and do not have a mandate to do so?"

According to Dr Mathoma (2014), a second issue that was limiting the potential success of South Africa's foreign policy related to the differences in the understanding of the diplomacy of Ubuntu as expounded in the draft foreign policy. Dr Mathoma (2014) explained that some DIRCO members had explained the diplomacy of Ubuntu as 'turning the other cheek'. The Defence Review Committee did not agree with this interpretation as they were of the opinion that South Arica cannot merely turn the other cheek when human rights abuses and the abuse of political power takes place in other African countries. Turning the other cheek is also not in South Africa's best interest. Dr Mathoma pointed out that many of the people who participated in the imbozos were aware of the fact that the international security situation has changed since 1994 and that South Africa should re-asses and redefine its foreign policy to ensure that it provides South Africa with the opportunity to pursue national interests. Dr Mathoma (2014) also said that, although South Africa has played an important role during PSOs and peace initiatives on the continent, the country does not reap the benefits that can flow from their efforts. For example, South Africa played a major role in bringing the parties involved in the conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC to the negotiation table, but once

agreements had been are reached and problems had been solved, South Africa stepped back and did not follow up with economic agreements that would benefit the country in the long run. As a result of South Africa's failure to follow up with economic agreements, other countries, which were not as involved in the pursuance of peace during negotiation processes, then moved in and reaped the benefits of the peace dividend. If South Africa becomes involved in the pursuance of sustainable development on the continent, it must do so for the benefit of national interest – the contribution of troops to PSOs must follow the same line of reasoning. The latter has not always been evident. Dr Mathoma (2014) also pointed out that xenophobic attacks in South Africa are motivated by perceptions that foreigners who come to South Africa to find employment opportunities are 'stealing jobs' from South Africans and that this would justify the attacks. These perceptions should, in fact be used to motivate the deployment of South African troops to other African countries, because, if South Africa would succeed in stabilising those countries in which the security situation have been marred by conflict, people would not need to come to South Africa to find work as job opportunities would be created in their own countries. In addition, by stemming the influx of foreigners into South Africa, the new markets created in the stabilised countries would also provide more trade opportunities and partners for the South African economy. Because the South African foreign policy remains ill-defined, it is however, very difficult to make any deductions as to how the DIRCO interfaces with the policies of other state departments in order to reach conclusions of how the interface between foreign policy and defence policy contributes to a 'whole-of-government' approach. The matter of a comprehensive, holistic approach to governance in South Africa remains fractured: although policies such as the NDP and institutions such as the BMA clearly depict the requirements for synergised, inter-departmental and inter-agency action, it essentially remains in the realm of rhetoric and little progress has been achieved with the operationalisation of the envisaged comprehensive approach.

Mr Meyer (2014) pointed to the fact that South Africa's Defence Foreign Relations policy appears to be 'unorganised'. He pointed out that very little attention has been afforded to the development of a comprehensive approach to defence diplomacy. Defence diplomacy remains, according to Mr Meyer, ill-defined and to a large extent, a vague idea. Mr Meyer stated that, for South Africa's foreign policy to be effective in Africa, South Africa's military

deployments on the continent must support the foreign policy objectives and vice versa. There is currently (2014) an urgent requirement for an alignment of the policies of the DOD and DIRCO. According to Mr Heitman (2014), at the time of this research, the rationale behind South Africa's contributions to PSOs on the continent remained hidden. He voiced the opinion that South Africa's approach to foreign policy was very similar to foreign policies of many other developing countries: continually criticising the USA and the West, but when any crises develops, turning to the USA and the West for assistance. The South African government also still did not appreciate the fact that countries such as India and Pakistan are not South Africa's trade friends – they are our trade competitors. Importantly, South Africa's relationship with other SADC countries also remained unclear: this despite the fact that the South African economy would sink or swim with the economies of other SADC countries. Mr Heitman (2014) pointed to the fact that South Africa remained the most prolific producer in the SADC region and that the region had to be developed to serve as one of South Africa's primary external markets. It is therefore essential, for example, to stabilise the DRC, as insecurity and violence in the DRC would have a negative impact on direct foreign investment (DFI) prospects in South Africa. In order to ensure socio-economic prosperity in the region, it is vital that South Africa's foreign policy and security policies must be aligned and efficiently operationalised and that the same policy directions be included in South Africa's foreign policy, the Defence Review and the SANDF's defence foreign relations policies. Failing to align these related policies will imply in effect, that the concepts included in these policies will/could not be effectively exploited as direction-giving policies as part of a comprehensive approach to South Africa's foreign policy. Ultimately, this will result in a situation in which the SANDF's potential as foreign policy tool will, and cannot be fully realised.

Mr Sendell (2014) pointed to the difficulties in positioning South Africa as a player in the international as well as continental playing field, and argued that these difficulties were at the core of the problems experienced when attempting to define South Africa's defence diplomacy. South Africa has to balance a number of foreign relations challenges: on the one hand, South Africa has an important south–north role to play with the EU – with Europe being one of South Africa's largest export markets. We also have an important continental role to play in the pursuance of the African Agenda and are viewed by many as a key role-player on the continent. South Africa also has an important role to play in terms of south–south

relationships with other developing countries – particularly BRICS countries. South Africa has been invited to participate in the multi-lateral environment of the G8, G20 and BRICS countries, and plays an important role in the African peace and security architectures. Mr Sendell (2014) also pointed out that the fact that South Africa is a member of the non-aligned movement (NAM) is a strong point for the SANDF, as well as for the local defence industry. The fact that South Africa is a member of the NAM is the reason why many countries buy from South Africa. Many countries do not want to buy from countries such as Russia, the USA and France as they are of the opinion that they will not have independent control over the algorithms and other systems contained in the weapon systems. This is, for instance, one of the reasons why Algeria decided to purchase the Makopa missile from South Africa. Despite all these opportunities, Mr Sendell (2014) stated that South Africa and the SANDF remain relatively naïve in terms of our involvement on the continent. There is thus a clear requirement to develop systems and frameworks to optimally configure the SANDF for complex future deployments. Currently, when decisions are made to deploy members of the SANDF in peace missions, the Defence Force immediately focuses on the number of soldiers required for the mission, or on the equipment and sustainment of the troops who are deployed to the mission. These assessments and analyses are therefore primarily focussed on the operational and tactical levels of the deployments and it is at these levels that the configuration of troops is crucial to the success of the mission. At national and military-strategic levels it is clear that the current disjunction between South Africa's defence and foreign policy is ultimately constraining the efficacy of the SANDF's deployments and limiting the effect of force projection – even in cases when the defence force succeeds at tactical and operational levels.

As far as the national and military-strategic policy levels are concerned, the SANDF's and DIRCO's processes and procedures are not aligned and are less developed. This is the environment in which "the SANDF sells itself short" (Sendell, 2014). It is at the national and military-strategic policy levels where South Africa has the greatest opportunities to shape the events in mission areas, as it is at these levels where the mandates, memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and other regulatory documentation are drafted. The SANDF has played a very insignificant and understated role in the shaping of the mandates of the missions in which they became involved. By primarily focusing on the operational level and

operational level requirements, the SANDF did not focus on defining its contributions at the military-strategic level – the level where the battlespace can be shaped and influenced. It is at this level, the military-strategic level, that military attachés must play a vital role. Despite these requirements, the SANDF afford little effort to developing and training military attachés to use their deployments as contributions to an overarching South African defence concept – to deter and prevent conflict through the shaping of the strategic environment. It is crucial for the SANDF to develop career paths for both defence attachés and potential brigade commanders of peace support missions. This process must be supported by taking up our positions in the AU and the SADC. Mr Sendell (2014) points to the fact that South Africa has been allotted 29 posts in the AU, based on the country's contribution to the AU. Yet, South Africa has only two to five people deployed at the AU at the time of this research. The majority of the seats allocated to South Africa, had been filled by West Africans. The same is true about the seats allocated to South Africa in the SADC organisation: the majority of the posts and seats available to South Africa had been filled by Zimbabweans. In order to shape and influence events in Africa, it is essential for South Africa to take up its position in the AU and the SADC. If this does not happen, our future will continuously be shaped by others. Dr Mathoma supported this notion during his interview and said that South Africans should clearly define what they stand for as a country: "there is no more total onslaught against us" and therefore it is essential that South Africa presents itself as a country that supports and pursues "peace, development and a rules-based international system". He stressed that we should not take a long time to do this. "We cannot wait for another 15 years" (the time it took to develop the 2014 Defence Review), but we have to make a decision on where we want to place South Africa on the continent."

6.7. The Government's view on the role and function of the defence force in a developing country

In answer to the question why the issue of defence was addressed only three times in the NDP – a document of 430 pages – Brig Gen Gibbs explained that the reason for the limited profile of the defence force as role-players in the NDP should not be interpreted to mean that government does not appreciate the important role of the defence force. The NPC who drafted the NDP, did, in fact, appreciate the role of the defence force in the diagnostic that

was completed prior to the drafting of the NDP. All the issues that affect South Africans' lives were assessed as part of this diagnostic: job creation, crime, health, safety and security, etc. This diagnostic was released at the very same time that the public consultation process of the Defence Review was embarked upon (from mid-October 2011 to mid-March 2012). Subsequently, the NPC, cognisant of the fact that the Defence Review process was in process, decided that the Defence Review would be accepted as the input on defence in the NDP. Once the NDP diagnostic went into development, the NPC also appointed an official to focus on the coordination of activities between DIRCO, the DOD and the NPC. The Defence Review Committee submitted a 104-page document to the NPC in which the interfaces and alignment of defence-related issues with the issues of South Africa as a developing country were analysed. It was later agreed that the Defence Review would form the backbone of the defence component of the NDP. However, when it became time for members of the Defence Review to give a final presentation on how the defence force would interface with other departments in terms of the NDP, the meeting was cancelled by the NPC. Brig Gen Gibbs (2014) expressed the opinion that, despite the fact that the presentation did not take place, the indications were that the activities of the NDP and the defence force would become more aligned over time. The disjuncture between the defence foreign policy objectives as described in the Defence Review and South Africa's Foreign Policy remains indefinite and it is clear that there is not clear understanding in DIRCO on how to effectively deploy the SANDF as foreign policy tool.

Mr Meyer (2014) commented on the limited reference to defence in the NDP as linked to the fact that, at the time of this research, many South Africans were still struggling to define the role and function of a defence force in a democratic society. This was also evident during consultations with members of the public during the Defence Review imbizos. There are two primary schools of thought: on the one hand, those who support greater involvement of the defence force in the activities of a developing country, and those who are opposed to the military becoming involved in the internal affairs of the country. According to Mr Meyer (2014), some argue that the defence force should not become involved at all in service delivery issues, whereas others are of the opinion that the defence force has substantial potential to contribute to the state's development agenda. To this effect, Mr Heitman (2014) said that initially, when former Defence Minister, Lindiwe Sisulu, gave the initial outlines for

the Defence Review, she requested that a chapter be included on the role of the military in a developing country and that the defence force's contribution to the country should be expounded. It was later decided not to include the chapter, but Mr Heitman (2014) said that many opportunities remained by means of which the SANDF could quantify its contribution to the developing country agenda. If, for instance, a decision was made to place an infantry battalion in an area such as, Springbok, Nababeep and Okiep (towns in the northern Cape), more than a thousand people (members of the battalion), who all have buying-power, would be injected into the area. This will immediately stimulate the local economy. In addition, if the military established a clinic and a school for the children of members of the SANDF, it should not be too difficult to share these facilities with members of the local populations. In the long term, these remote, rural areas will become more populated, vast parts of the border areas will not be uninhabited (which creates opportunities for crimes and border crossings), and the defence force would have the opportunity to recruit members of the community. Mr Heitman continued and said that this was the pattern in many developing countries, such as Brazil, Peru and Indonesia. The capabilities that are invested in the defence force, for example the engineers who can fix roads, can also fix the roads in the areas around the base.

The possible use of the SANDF in tasks as describes above will, on the one hand, probably bring the SANDF closer to what society expects from a defence force in a democratic society (contributing to the development of the state) and on the other, it will also contribute to 'Ubuntu politics' – in whatever mangled form it manifests. Importantly, the experience that will be gained by members of the SANDF in such deployments will stand them in good stead when they will have to execute tasks as part of PCRD activities when they deploy in peace support operations in pursuance of the SANDF's developmental role on the continent.

6.8. The DOD's interaction with and presence in the structures of the AU and SADC

One of the most important differences between previous defence policies and the 2014 Defence Review is the fact that the latter does not purely focus on 'what the Defence Force is against' (as was the case with the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review), as the focus, according to the chairperson of the Defence Review Committee, has shifted to "what

defence is for" and consequently "what the Nation expects its Defence Force to do" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v). This shift requires a defence capability to respond in a way that is functional and timely. According to Heitman (2014) the primary aim of defence diplomacy, particularly in terms of participation in continental and regional security structures, is to shape things in the security environment. By effectively utilising appointments to the AU and the SADC, for example, the SANDF will be in a position to influence the situation, should conflict erupt. It is to the benefit of all countries to contribute to regional and continental stability as instability in one country will affect the stability in all the neighbouring countries. Despite the clear need for active participation in continental and regional security structures, South Africa does not make the most of the opportunities afforded to it by taking up its posts in the AU and the SADC. Mr Jordaan (2014) confirmed that the criteria for the appointment of incumbents to available posts are ill-defined, and career paths of incumbents are not developed. At the time of the research, the deployment of members to SADC and AU structures were not aligned with the intentions of DIRCO. Mr Meyer (2014) agreed that, at the time of the interview, South Africa's defence diplomacy and foreign policy had not been developed fully. He ascribed this phenomenon to the fact that before 1994, South Africa was viewed as a pariah state and the country was excluded from international relations on the continent, as well as in the rest of the world. After 1994, the focus of the defence force and most other government departments was on the internal transformation of departments while little attention was given to the external posture of the defence force. In essence, Mr Meyer (2014) said, it seemed as if the SANDF "forgot about the outside world". In 2014, after the first twenty years of democracy, the time had come to re-assess the objectives of South Africa's defence diplomacy initiatives. The reality is, however, that South Africa had fallen behind in terms of these initiatives, whilst neighbouring countries and the rest of the continent progressed well in terms of foreign policy initiatives and objectives. Mr Meyer (2014) described South Africa's diplomatic profile on the continent at the time of the research as a "little bit of a "Johnny-come-lately" and the foreign policies of many African countries have surpassed that of South Africa in terms of vision and scope. This is not only true about the AU, but it also rings true about many multi-lateral organisations in which South Africa's role is virtually non-existent. Mr Meyer (2014) emphasised the fact that South Africa's defence diplomacy initiatives should not only be Africa-focused, and that it is crucial to pursue a broader worldview when drafting foreign and defence policies. He suggested that South Africa should look at what other

developing countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam and Colombia are doing, as these countries are in the same stage of development as South Africa. South Africa could gain valuable insights from the experiences of these countries and should therefore not only be primarily Africa-focused.

At a time in which the continental security situation remains extremely volatile whilst the early-warning systems and security architectures remain underdeveloped and ineffectively sustained, it is evident that answers to security challenges will have to be developed swiftly and tailor-made to specific threat environments. This again, points to modular force designs as solutions as they are inherently pliable and allows for the fast configuration of appropriate forces.

6.9. The extent to which the force designs and force structures of other military organisations were analysed in the process of defining the SANDF force design and force structure

Members of the Defence Review Committee were asked about the processes involved in and the approaches applied to the determination of the SANDF's force design and force structure. According to Jordaan (2014), extensive research was conducted by the Defence Review Committee on international best practices in terms of post-Cold War force designs and force structures. Changes to international force designs and the emulation of these changes in militaries would imply that integrated, joint designs have become the norm during most post-Cold War deployments. The reasons provided for increased operational success by flexible, modular forces has been ascribed to the fact that forces can be tailored to address specific threats – having more success than traditional, less economical, 'one-size-fits-all' approaches to force design. Increased operational success has been the primary drive behind for the emulation in terms of joint, integrated force designs in many military organisations across the world. This, in fact, places more pressure on the DOD to investigate the possibilities of using modular, composite force designs as these have proven most successful when applied during recent military deployments across the globe, whilst allowing for incremental improvements – the best option for defence forces with limited budget allocations. The force designs and force structures of a great number of defence forces were analysed and included analyses on

the defence forces of Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Poland, India, the USA and the UK. This was confirmed by Sendell (2014) who pointed out that the force designs of defence forces of more than 40 countries were analysed to determine whether there were any aspects of these force designs that could be applicable to the South African force design. The defence forces that were analysed included defence forces from Australasia, Europe, the USA, the UK and Africa. As far as African militaries are concerned, the Defence Review Committee focused on the force designs of larger African defence forces, such as those of Ghana, Nigeria and Angola. Sendell (2014) also said that the members of the Defence Review Committee had visited the militaries of Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria and that they also visited the AU and the SADC. It was evident that the force designs of the majority of African defence forces had an 'internal' focus – aimed at protection and defending the state and its institutions, rather than focusing on external deployments to peace missions and intervention operations. This was particularly evident in terms of the Nigerian defence force, which in 2014 had to focus on addressing the threats posed by Boko Haram. At the time of the research, Angola was expanding its defence force and had significantly expanded its defence budget over the past few years. The force designs of Algeria and Egypt provided for very large defence forces, but this had to be viewed against the fact that they were located in very unstable regions. Although South Africa's regional security environment is not currently as unstable as the regional security environment of countries such as Algeria or Egypt, the country remains situated in a 'rough neighbourhood' and it therefore requires significant investment in the country's defence and security organisations.

Sendell (2014) confirmed that many valuable lessons were learned during visits to African defence forces and he highlighted the fact that the example of the Kenyan Defence Academy was used as a framework for the development of the envisaged South African Defence Academy as expounded in Chapter 11 of the Defence Review. What was evident in general, was the fact that there was no common model for military force design on the African continent. The visits and analysis was, however, to the benefit of the SANDF, it provided insight into the designs and approaches applied by other African defence forces which will prove very useful when the DOD is requested to supply troops to multi-national peace missions on the continent.

6.10. The force design and force structure of the SANDF as framework to configure the SANDF optimally to achieve stated objectives as part of JI^{2}M forces across the spectrum of conflict

The force design as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review is similar to the force designs expounded in the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review. In answer to the question on why the 'new' force design remains organised around the framework of four separate services, which, by design is not optimally configured for JI^{2}M operations (a concept of operations that is used as a 'golden thread' throughout the Defence Review), the respondents all agreed that the current force design had not been developed in sufficient detail to fully support JI^{2}M operations. When asked his opinion on the development of integrated, trans-service force designs, Jordaan (2014) pointed to the example of the Canadian Defence Force that attempted such an endeavour, but had later found that it was a mistake. He said that the Canadians decided to do away with separate services as part of their endeavours to facilitate JI^{2}M operations, and that all elements of the defence force would wear the same uniform and would serve under a unified command structure. The decision was later reversed and the Canadian Defence Force was re-organised in terms of separate services. Jordaan did, however, agree that the interfaces between the SANDF and other state departments who would form part of JI^{2}M structures had not been developed in any useful detail. Gibbs added that there was generally a consensus that the current 'blue-print' force design had not been developed sufficiently to support JI^{2}M operations during hybrid missions, but that most members of the Defence Review Committee agreed that this issue would most probably be addressed during the writing of the next Defence Review, which is intended to start in about 2017. When asked about the force design and its suitability to JI^{2}M operations, Sendell (2014) proposed that the question was rather premature. He pointed to the fact that most military organisations, and not only the SANDF, were struggling with the challenges of aligning their forces with the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. In many African countries, the challenge is still to find a balance between state security and the security of the individual. Most militaries agree that there is a demand for expeditionary, deployable forces with sufficient firepower and protection – but that the levels of protection and firepower remain undefined. Sendell (2014) gave the example of the Dutch defence force who decided to decommission their Leopard tanks. At the time of the decision,

the Dutch only thought of tanks in the conventional application of the weapons, and did not foresee the utility of tanks, for instance, in conjunction with dismounted infantry. Militaries require rapid, mobile reaction forces – but they also need heavy combat capabilities to go along with it. Sendell (2014) pondered on the issue of sufficient armament and protection and posed the question, "if we [South Africa] had deployed Rooikatte and Rooivalke against the M23 rebels in the CAR, we would have fought a totally different battle". (At the time, the SANDF did not, and still does not have, a force design or support systems to support the simultaneous deployment of Rooivalke and Rooikatte during operations and battles that form part of expeditionary deployments. Mathoma (2014) said that attempts were made to provide more direct guidelines and principles on the issue of force design, but that the members of the Defence Review Committee were advised that they should not get involved in the detail for the force design, as this is the domain of the Chief of the SANDF and his service chiefs. From the SANDF's side, the Defence Review Committee was told that force design is vested at the operational level of war and that the Defence Review Committee should only provide advice at the military-strategic level of war and about 'higher-level issues'. Meyer (2014) confirmed this position and stated that, despite the fact that the Defence Review Committee was instructed not to elaborate on the force design of the SANDF and the fact that jointness was not more prominently applied as a design principle, the framework for such structures has indeed been established.

From the interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee it was evident that there was a clear understanding among them that significant changes should be embarked upon when defining the future SANDF's force designs. The need for modular approaches was confirmed in the 2014 Defence Review, but was not analysed in any useful detail. It was evident that the general feeling that prevailed among members of the Defence Committee that previous structures of the SANDF were not optimal to the great variety of threats that have to be addressed. The analysis and inputs described in Chapter 5 of this document will provide sufficient context for decisions on more suitable future force designs. As far as the composite, modular force designs described in Chapter 5 of this study, the 2014 Defence Review indicates some migration to modular force designs, but fails to initiate processes and decisions to operationalise composite modular force designs.

6.11. The concept of composite type forces as a workable solution to complex mission profiles

Meyer said that the majority of people involved in the Defence Review process were in agreement that the current force design and force structure were not optimally aligned with the changes that had taken place in terms of the types of conflict in which the SANDF would become involved. Changes to force designs, however, do not occur in the short term – it is usually a long-term process that evolves over time. The references to the advantages of modular force designs in the Defence Review (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-2) is, however, very relevant to the analysis in terms of force designs in Chapter 5 and provides for the development of composite, modular units for the SANDF in future defence Reviews. Most militaries are grappling with the problem of how to prepare optimally for irregular types of operations, whilst also maintaining their more conventional capabilities. There are many opinions, and some decision-makers, inside and outside the SANDF, with strong views about the SANDF's force design. Some are convinced that the SANDF should continue with the traditional force structure of four services, whilst others are more open to designing joint, modular structures. Meyer (2014) pointed to the fact that recent events on the continent, such as the attacks by Boko Haram and al-Shabab, as well as attacks by pirates on both sides of the continent, have changed many people's beliefs on how military organisations should be structured and equipped. He gave a few examples. It is evident that the deployment of frigates against pirates is not the optimal solution and that OPVs would be a more efficient and effective answer to these threats. The same is true about the force design and equipment of the SAAF. In 2014, South Africa still did not have any guaranteed strategic airlift capacity, a factor that has a significant influence on the success of all SANDF operations. In terms of the vehicles provided to the SA Army for deployments in PSOs, it was evident at the time of the research that the vehicles used by the Army did not provide sufficient firepower or protection for our troops. It was very clear that changes should be made in terms of how the SANDF structures for deployments, and such changes were also required in terms of how members of the SANDF were organised, staffed, equipped and trained for these deployments.

In answer to the question whether structures such as composite, modular units were appreciated as more appropriate structures for the SANDF's force design, Sendell (2014) confirmed that the Defence Review Committee consciously made a decision to remain at the military-strategic level of planning, and that they would not become involved in the operational level 'nuts and bolts' of defence design. This decision was made after they had received strong opposition to their proposed designs during the initial stages of the compilation of the Defence Review. The Defence Review Committee was provided with no political space for discussion about force design. Similarly, the subject of national key points remained a subject that was not to be addressed in the Defence Review, despite the obvious role that the defence force would have in securing national key points. Sendell (2014) did however, point to the fact that some aspects of increased 'jointness' were, in fact, included in the Defence Review, albeit 'between the lines' and not directly spelled out in the document. This includes requirements to include joint training during the early stages of a soldier's career and the requirement to embedding joint elements at brigade and division level. Sendell (2014) emphasised the importance of designing a defence force that is not centred on Army brigade operations, but that all FSEs should include and provide for the involvement of the SAAF and SAN as part of composite, modular brigade structures. The force design should also not only depict the force design of the SANDF, but it must also include depictions of the interfaces with various other government departments and defence partners who will deploy with the SANDF during JI^{2}M operations.

Heitman pointed to the fact that when the Defence Review Committee initially embarked on the process of compiling the Defence Review, the Minister at the time, Minister Lindiwe Sisulu (2011), requested that a chapter be included on the force design of the SANDF (as was the case with the chapter on the defence force's contribution to South Africa as a developing country, a decision was later made not to include the chapter). The conclusions made as a result of the analysis of force designs in Chapter 5 of this study could prove useful in future defence policy documents as it is evident in the 2014 Defence Review that there was a realisation by many contributors and role-players that a shift to modular force designs would provide the SANDF with more appropriate force design options than traditional force designs. Some members of the Defence Review Committee as well as the Chief of the SANDF were opposed to the inclusion of a detailed force design in the current Defence Review. Heitman

(2014) said that in the end, a decision was made not to make changes to the current force design of four services as such decisions would prove to be premature. He did however, acknowledge the fact that the potential for change remains and that it would most probably be addressed in the next Defence Review. He did however concur with the notion that at least the higher-order linkages to other state departments in terms of JI^{2}M operations, should have been addressed in the latest Defence Review.

As far as the development of holistic, 'whole-of-government' solutions and policies are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that, whenever members of a variety of departments and agencies are involved in finding solutions or drafting policies, that a significant amount of 'compromise' will be required before agreements will be reached – usually over extended periods of time. The disjuncture that is evident among some state departments should be appreciated against the reality that South Africa is still a young democracy and that many incumbents do not have the necessary experience or training about a 'whole-of-government' approach to governance and that many departments have so many internal decision-making and budgetary challenges that it is extremely difficult and near impossible to align inter-departmental activities. From the interviews with the members of the Defence Review it is, however, clear that there is a general realisation among state departments that their respective departmental activities should be coordinated and integrated with the activities of related departments, but that this realisation, for the moment, remains at conceptual level and that it will take another few years before the operationalization of these concepts will become a reality.

6.12. Implications of the force design and force structure of the SANDF as expounded in the Defence Review in terms of the role, functions and deployment of members of the Defence Force

From the interviews with members of the Defence Review, it was evident that a conscious effort had been made to integrate defence policy with the policies of other state departments. Special attention was afforded to DIRCO and other departments that form part of the CJSC. From the interviews with all the members of the Defence Review Committee, it was clear that there was, as far as government departments were concerned, a general understanding that

departments should not operate in silos, but that departments would have greater effect if their tasks and activities were coordinated and joint efforts were made to achieve objectives, for example all the departments involved in the NDP. Despite the general realisation by state departments on the potential advantages of joint and coordinated actions among departments, essentially, the comprehensive 'whole-of-government' approach as described in Chapter 1 of this thesis (see 1.2), it is clear that most South African state departments continue to conduct their tasks in isolation.

One of the most outstanding examples of the disjointed actions of state departments, in terms of the Defence Review, is the interface between the DOD and DIRCO. From the interviews with the members of the Defence Review Committee, it was very evident that there was no alignment between the two departments. This, despite the fact that the Defence Force is one of the government's primary foreign policy tools. It was also emphasised by several of the Defence Review Committee members that DIRCO had no understanding or plan of how to employ members of the SANDF to achieve foreign policy objectives – the deployment of military attaches and contributions to peace missions were conducted on an ad hoc basis. Support from DIRCO to members of the SANDF who were seconded to the AU, was also very limited.

This disjointed approach to the application of the defence force as a tool of foreign policy does not only exist in DIRCO, but the same situation is true about the SANDF's foreign relations division. There is no comprehensive plan with the deployment of military attachés as primary role-players on the operationalisation of defence diplomacy, and appointments to missions are made on an ad hoc, temporary basis. The SANDF does not have systems to identify specific members for careers as military attachés and there are also no clear career paths for members of the SANDF to become specialists in specific areas of foreign relations. At the time of the research, being appointed as a military attaché was viewed as being advantageous to an individual soldier's career as it would increase his/her promotion potential – more than it was appreciated as a specific objective in the SANDF's defence diplomacy campaign. These views were expressed by most of the members of the Defence Review Committee who were interviewed, but were particularly stressed by Mr Sendell (2014), Brig Gen Gibbs (2014) and Dr Mathoma (2014).

One of the contributing factors to the undefined defence diplomacy trajectory of the SANDF is the fact that the SANDF has still not clearly defined its military-strategic objectives. Apart from broadly outlining some aspects of the military-strategic level, the detail on how these objectives were intended to be achieved remained unclear. The SANDF has good systems and institutions available to train members of the SANDF on the attainment of tactical and operational level objectives, but there is, for instance, no facility or course during which members are specifically trained on the achievement of military-strategic objectives. They are merely trained on what the SANDF's military-strategic objective are, but not on how to structure campaigns at the operational level to support the achievement of these military-strategic objectives. At tactical level, tactics and activities are taught to soldiers throughout their careers, and officers are specifically trained to conduct major operations and campaigns at operational level during the Joint Command and Staff Course, which is attended by soldiers from all four services. The next course that is attended by officers after completing the Joint Command and Staff Course is the Executive National Security Programme, which is pitched at national level and is focused on national security. At the time of the research, the SANDF had no course that was aimed at empowering members of the SANDF on how to contribute to the attainment of objectives at the military-strategic level. As a result, before members of the SANDF can be very clear on how they will achieve objectives at military-strategic level, there is limited possibility of projecting these objectives to other state departments, such as DIRCO, or to multi-departmental agencies such as the CJSC and the BMA. In order to establish a joint, integrative approach to defence diplomacy in cooperation with other departments, it is vital that the SANDF and the DOD optimally structure itself for JI^{2}M operations, as well as to train and educate its members to achieve JI^{2}M objectives as expounded in Chapter 2 of this thesis (see 2.6).

The members of the Defence Review Committee all confirmed the fact that they were instructed by the chief of the SANDF not to become involved in the process of force design and force structure of the SANDF. This should, however, not have prevented the Defence Review Committee from establishing design principles and frameworks that would provide for the interfaces between the DOD and other government departments. The establishment of formal structures for multi-departmental agencies, for example the BMA, would have provided

the baselines for the establishment of comprehensive, holistic approaches to deployments and would also have provided clear guidelines in terms of command-and-control issues among agencies and departments. Although it is the Chief of the SANDF's prerogative to decide how it would structure the SANDF, the Defence Review Committee did not exploit the opportunity to set out alternative force design options, nor did they establish a baseline for multi-department and multi-agency structures by defining the joint, integrative structures that would bind government departments and agencies together in order to improve and support the attainment of government's objectives and tasks.

Given the tendency of armed forces to change slowly and that existing structures and ways of doing things have staying power, it holds the risk of 'more-of-the-same' and little of brining the SANDF into line with the demands of the external threat environments. The 2014 Defence Review may point to modular approaches to force designs, but little will change in terms of the force design if the Chief of the SANDF maintains the status quo.

The members of the Defence Review Committee who were interviewed were all in agreement that the current force design did not optimally configure the SANDF to participate successfully in JI^{2}M deployments. Some, such as Gibbs (2014) and Sendell (2014), pointed to the fact that, although no JI^{2}M structures were expounded in the Defence Review, the approach to modular, composite structures were implied throughout the Defence Review. They further pointed to, for example a paragraph in Chapter 10 of the Defence Review where it is stated, "[t]he use of a modular approach to force design may well provide the Defence Force with greater numbers of smaller, highly capable units which have been optimally designed to meet the requirements of specific missions" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-2). In Chapter 10, the requirement for JI^{2}M forces is described as "JI^{2}M operations will integrate military and non-military operations, leveraging each participant's strength into unified actions to address multidimensional security challenges" (Defence Review Committee, 2014:10-4). The proposed composite, modular force designs described in Chapter 5 of this study takes the notion of JI^{2}M operations further than a mere concept, in that clear descriptions are provided of the force designs of each of the four type forces – providing detail as to how **structure** (a composite, modular force design) follows **strategy** (JI^{2}M, integrated approach to operations) as described in the 2014 Defence Review.

6.13. Conclusions

The interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee highlighted the fact that that government, at the time of the research, had not effectively initiated the processes that would operationalise inter-departmental and inter-agency cooperation, despite the fact that comprehensive 'whole-of-government' approaches had been applied during the drafting of policies such as the NDP and the establishment of the BMA. Despite the fact that there was a realisation by government that cooperation among state departments would improve service delivery and enhance the achievement of government's objectives, this realisation remained at the conceptual level, and had not yet been operationalised at the time of completion of this study.

Because DIRCO has not yet clearly defined South Africa's foreign policy, the DOD's contribution to the achievement of foreign policy objectives also remains essentially undefined. As far as defence diplomacy is concerned, the DOD and SANDF must also initiate processes to define foreign policy objectives clearly in terms of specific measureable tasks and activities. Much more should also be done to select the best candidates for appointments as military attachés and these identified individuals should be provided with clear career paths to ensure that specific foreign policy objectives be achieved. Most importantly, the SANDF should take up available appointments to the AU and the SADC. If not, the SANDF will essentially act as observers to defence diplomacy processes on the continent and will have limited capacity to shape and influence the African battlespace and security environment.

The members of the Defence Review Committee who were interviewed were all in agreement that the current force design and force structure as expounded in the 2014 Defence Review were not the most suitable structures for the types of operations and deployments in which the SANDF will become involved in future. All the members agreed that more detail about JI^{2}M structures should be included in the compilation of the next Defence Review – a process that has been scheduled to commence in 2017. According to the interviewed members of the Defence Review, the envisaged structures should be more focused on the achievement of JI^{2}M objectives and the structures should provide frameworks for integrated activities, not only within the SANDF, but across state departments and agencies.

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1. Summary

The purpose of this thesis was to analyse the changing international, and specifically African, political and security environment and to determine how to configure the SANDF coherently for successful deployments on the continent in the 21st century. To facilitate this thesis, the following research question was formulated:

> How should the SANDF reconfigure its force structure to operate in a JI^{2}M environment to meet the shifting mission requirements associated with the changing security environment of the 21st century?

Chapter 1 of the thesis presented the approach to the thesis, the aim of the thesis, as well as the research question, problem statement and research methodology applied to support the thesis. Chapter 1 was intended to create context for the thesis and therefore included background to the thesis and also expounds the purpose and focus of the thesis. The problem statement that was addressed in Chapter 1 of this thesis departed from the contention that the SANDF continued in recent years to design and equip South African armed forces primarily with the focus on the execution of their primary function and traditional conventional role as its *raison d'être*, notwithstanding the fact that the SANDF is, and will most probably be deployed in its so-called non-traditional secondary functions. Chapter 1 also included a literature review and sets out the structure of the research.

Chapter 2 of this thesis was aimed at identifying the theoretical underpinnings that are relevant to understanding military strategy and the way this translates into the roles, functions, FDs and FSs of militaries. These theoretical concepts and constructs are then applied to decisions on strategy and force planning and their implications on the role and functions of defence forces in the 21st century. The chapter comprised three parts:

- firstly, a section that focused on an analysis of the most prominent contemporary IR theories as frameworks for analysis of the use of military organisations as instruments of foreign policy.

- secondly, an analysis of the changes in the post-Cold War international security environment and of their effect on military organisations and military models; and

- thirdly, an analysis of force planning and the diffusion of military models and the effect and influence of these models on defence strategies, FDs and the FSs of modern military organisations.

Chapter 3 was aimed at presenting the context of contemporary warfare and conflict and the effect thereof on the roles of 21st-century militaries. Chapter 3 also comprised three parts, namely:

- a section that focused on the analysis of the changing roles and functions of post-Cold War military organisations;

- a section in which the characteristics of the various modes and types of war that have characterised the first two decades of the 21st century were analysed; and

- an analysis of how these modes and types of post-Cold War warfare have manifested in the African post-Cold War environment.

The chapter concluded with an assessment of the requirements for the development of tailor-made, optimally configured military organisations that are capable of successfully addressing the challenges associated with the current and future African threat environment.

Chapter 4 focused on an analysis of African militaries, the changed security environment and the evolving African peace and security architecture. Chapter 4 addressed the relationship between the political and economic needs and the role and required sustainment capacity of the military during peace missions. The chapter included recommendations on how African

military organisations should be configured and positioned to conduct PSOs in Africa successfully. The chapter included an evaluation of the development of African PSOs and security architectures, as well as an analysis of inter-African security cooperation at continental and regional levels. The chapter concluded with an assessment of South Africa's role in PSOs on the continent and in the SADC region and recommendations on the requisite changes to the FD, FS and organisation that should be implemented to enable the SANDF to lay sound foundations for peace-building and sustainable development on the continent.

Chapter 5 was aimed at analysing current and future tasks of the SANDF to meet contemporary security challenges associated with the changed internal political and security environment. The chapter included an analysis of South Africa's current capacity to provide forces that are ready, able and optimally configured to contribute militarily to peace, stability and development in Africa as part of South Africa's foreign policy. The chapter included an analysis of South Africa's approach to defence planning, FD and FS since 1994 as well as some recommendations pertaining to current international trends in defence planning and capability management. The chapter concluded with a proposed modular FD option as a feasible alternative to the current single-service oriented FD and structure of the SANDF.

Chapter 6 reflected interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee who provided selected views on the optimal configuration of the SANDF as a tool of foreign policy.

Chapter 7 comprises a summary of the chapters included, in the study, and includes comments at the level of interdepartmental cooperation on the utility and purpose of the thesis, as well as on the possibilities for future research.

7.2. Background to the thesis

Since 1994, the South African defence debate has been dominated by questions pertaining to the role and functions of the SANDF in the 'new' South Africa, following the abuse of the military as an instrument of power during the apartheid era. Much of the 'defence in a democracy' debate therefore included deliberations on the most suitable and appropriate approaches to South Africa's defence and security. After a broad-based consultative

process, which involved government, the military and the citizens of South Africa, the government decided to adopt a 'defensive posture' against an external military threat. Much of the South African defence debate then focused on determinations on how to prepare and equip the Defence Force appropriately to execute ordered tasks in defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of South Africa. This formed the basis for the decision to equip the SANDF for its primary tasks while affording less thought to the required equipment, FD and FS for secondary tasks. It was argued that the 'collateral utility' of prime mission equipment would make it useful in the execution of secondary tasks. These arguments were then used to support and motivate decisions on the acquisition of new prime mission equipment for the SAAF and SAN in 1998 as part of the SDP. Although government officials and defence planners argued that the 'collateral utility' of prime mission equipment could be used just as effectively in the execution of the SANDF's secondary tasks, operational realities faced by members of the SANDF during deployments in PSOs in Africa soon revealed that this assumption was incorrect.

Despite the acquisition of state-of-the-art equipment for the SAAF and SAN, it has since become evident that the SANDF is not optimally structured and equipped to meet the demands of the 21st-century African security environment. Current security assessments indicate that the chances of becoming embroiled in conventional interstate war (the primary tasks of traditional defence forces) are minimal and that it is more probable that the SANDF would be deployed in secondary or non-traditional roles, as has been the case since 1994. In the light of the changes to the appreciated South African strategic security environment and the roles and functions that the SANDF are most likely to perform (internally, regionally and on the continent), it is evident that many of the premises of post-1994 South African defence policies, based on the primary role concept, have become irrelevant. This demands a reappraisal of the SANDF's roles and functions as it is essential to continually re-assess and rethink FD, FS and capability development premises to ensure that the SANDF remains optimally prepared for the deployment challenges that have to be met.

The 2014 Defence Review confirmed the change that has taken place in terms of the conceptualisations pertaining to defence since 1994. This change was described by the chairperson of the Defence Review Committee in the 2014 Defence Review as: … "not what

defence is *against*, but what defence is *for"* (Defence Review Committee, 2014:v). There is thus a clear shift from a reactionary approach to defence, namely defence against imminent threats to the security of South Africans, to that of a more proactive stance. By adopting a more proactive stance, members of the SANDF will be empowered to shape and influence the operating environment (the African battlespace) within which they will be deployed continually. This notion of "what the defence force is for" is also more closely linked to the so-called secondary roles of the SANDF, which again emphasises that the FD, FS and equipment of the SANDF must be reconfigured to suit these types of operations optimally, as they are the types of operations in which the SANDF is mostly likely to be deployed. The 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) were strongly focused on the execution of the primary role of the SANDF: this departure point defined the manner in which the SANDF was structured and equipped. This view has dominated concepts and approaches to the FD and force employment of the SANDF since 1994 and was at the core of the disjunction between what the SANDF was equipped to do and what constituted the operational realities in deployment areas. Despite the calls by defence analysts and military strategists to equip the SANDF for current operational realities, defence policy remained focused on the traditional, warfighting concepts and equipment. It was only after twenty years of democracy that the 2014 Defence Review cited reasons – after reassessment and re-evaluation – for the differentiation between what had been accepted as primary and secondary roles.

The current thesis focused on determining how to configure the SANDF coherently to operate in a JI^{2}M environment to meet shifting mission requirements associated with the changing security environment of the 21st century. Geographically, the thesis focused primarily on the role, functions and responsibilities of the SANDF on the African continent, although some examples and lessons learned from other parts of the world were also incorporated when relevant. As far as the temporal demarcation is concerned, the thesis focused on the South African defence debate since 1994 with the aim of providing insight into the future roles of the SANDF in the 21st century.

The study was based on a literature study, an analysis of factual data sources as well as unstructured interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee who compiled the

2014 Defence Review. The data analysis included an investigation of concepts such as the JI^{2}M approach to operations, comprehensive, 'whole-of-government' approaches to the management of defence, as well as analyses of the trends and concepts that have been shaping the defence strategies and FDs of modern military organisations. To this effect, theories of military change and the diffusion of military models were analysed and interpreted as catalysts for change in defence forces. The implications of changes in the current strategic security environment and the implications of these changes for defence forces were also analysed and interpreted in terms of requirements for suitable FDs and FSs and related to the requirements for the SANDF. The implications and requirements for participation in regional and continental security architectures, particularly the AU and the SADC, were also analysed in terms of the FD and FS of the SANDF to ensure that the Defence Force is designed, prepared and fitted with the capability of seamless integration with regional and continental security architectures. The thesis included a proposed FD and FS, which would optimally prepare the SANDF for deployments across the spectrum of conflict – singularly, as well as in multinational PSOs under the auspices of the SADC and the AU. The current FD and FS of the SANDF were analysed in terms of the required deployments and tasks, and it was found that South African defence force planners and strategists should re-assess the current premises for South African defence planning and that they should distance themselves from many of the traditional concepts about defence that continue to dominate South African strategic thinking. As part of this analysis, alternative composite, modular FDs designs were analysed in terms of their suitability for the SANDF and recommendations were made as to the optimal FD and FS for the SANDF to deploy effectively as part of JI^{2}M forces. Primary sources utilised were policy documents from the UN, the AU and the DOD, as well as interviews with members of the Defence Review Committee.

The significance of the thesis is that the conclusions reached can be used to inform government officials, defence planners and strategists on the posture, roles and functions of the SANDF in the 21st century. The answers to the research question provide possible solutions to the complex issues pertaining to the roles and functions and commensurate FD and FS of the SANDF. This will enable the SANDF to meet future deployment requirements and could be used to inform decision-making for future Defence Reviews and other defence policy documents.

7.3. Primary focus areas of the thesis

The thesis is focused on an analysis of the key concepts and theories that are relevant to the current international security situation, the changes that have taken place in the character of armed conflict and on the implications of these changes on the roles and functions of future militaries. The analysis also evaluated the changes and shifts that have taken place in accepted interpretations of concepts such as **state**, **security**, **defence** and the roles of the military organisations in societies. These changes and developments were analysed to determine if and how they can be used to develop appropriate frameworks for the roles, functions, FDs and FSs of military organisations in general, as well as for the SANDF in particular.

The thesis focused on the challenges being presented by the 21st-century's multi-modal, hybrid warfare and included an assessment of the changing roles and functions of militaries in general, and African militaries in particular. The reappraisal of the roles and functions of militaries as a result of changes in the characteristics of warfare included an analysis of the arguments underpinning the discourse on the primary and secondary roles of postmodern militaries. The study also focused on the approaches to and participation in peace missions by African militaries, with specific reference to the origins and development of the AU, the ASF, regional standby brigades and other structures such as the FIB and the ACIRC. Specific attention was afforded to the role of the SANDF in PSOs on the continent.

Besides all other focus areas, the thesis primarily focused on an analysis of the required configuration of the future SANDF in the light of changed international realities and contemporary security challenges. Based on the findings of the study, recommendations are made on the premises that should be applied to determine the defence policy, strategy, FD and FS of the SANDF to carry out its roles and functions on the continent successfully.

The results of the study points to the requirement to change the manner in which the SANDF is organised and structured. The primary reason for the focus and emphasis on (firstly) changing the FD and FS of the SANDF, is that the principle of structure follows strategy

should be applied to ensure that the Defence Force is organised to support the JI^{2}M concept that has been accepted as the approach to the SANDF's current and future force employment strategies optimally. The results of the study clearly indicate that the DOD and SANDF should adopt composite, modular FD premises, which will result in the creation of balanced, optimally configured FSEs that are tailor-made for the tasks that they will be expected to perform.

The thesis was also focused further on the presentation of a workable alternative to the SANDF's current FD and FS. The study focused on the SANDF's operational environment which is and will be characterised by asymmetric attacks, the involvement of state as well as non-state actors, and by the 'tyranny of distance' as expeditionary operations will have to be conducted and sustained over vast distances. The study also focused on the hybrid, multi-modal modes of warfighting that have characterised and will continue to characterise threats against South Africa and members of the SANDF. The study also focused on the operational benefits which the SANDF will receive from adopting a composite, modular FD and FS and concluded by proposing a set of alternative FDs for the SANDF. Finally, the study focused on determining the approaches and processes that were applied to formulate of the 2014 Defence Review. This was achieved by conducting interviews with members of the Defence review Committee.

7.4. Conclusions

In relation to the research question, three subsidiary questions were posed:

> What are the current international trends and realities that will shape the environment in which the SANDF will have to execute its tasks in the future?

The international security environment is characterised by uncertainty, ubiquitous connectivity and complexity. The constant changes in the character of armed conflict demand that defence planners and strategists think expansively whilst investigating the wider implications and relationships and exploring cross-cutting connections among technology, ethics, social trends, politics and strategy. Future militaries will therefore have to address key strategic

challenges in order to have the capacity to address future threats – whatever the type of warfare they have to conduct. Modern military forces will have to attain greater strategic mobility and become as effective at shaping the strategic environment as they are in responding to threats associated with multi-modal warfare. This mobility is not only restricted to the physical attributes of weapon platforms and operating systems, but also applies the mental agility of commanders and other relevant decision-makers. Modern militaries should therefore also develop more precise psychological effects, including the full integration of lethal and non-lethal capabilities and they will have to address the full modularity of equipment, systems and organisations continually and develop methods for the rapid transformation of doctrine, concepts and organisations in order to remain ready and relevant. African defence establishments should therefore guard against the development of impressive military solutions to problems that they prefer to solve rather than to address the actual problems which cunning and innovative foes may pose. Insofar as war is a duel, postmodern adversaries will strive to deny stronger opponents a mode of warfare that privileges the strengths of formal military powers by applying asymmetrical methodologies. African military planners should therefore take cognisance of the fact that the strategic future is driven by the consequence of the trends that characterise a specific timeframe – trends which interact in unexpected ways and which may trigger non-linear, asymmetric developments.

> What are the salient issues that the SANDF needs to consider in terms of evolving security challenges, the threat environment, and the political imperatives relating to future deployments in Africa?

The SANDF, as with all other African militaries, will be compelled to operate in a diverse, complex, diffused and potentially lethal environment where enemies will utilise conventional-, as well as unconventional asymmetric strategies. The SANDF must therefore be both prepared and equipped to conduct a wide range of missions simultaneously, or in quick succession at short notice, as well as have the ability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict at any given moment. Much of what the SANDF, and other African security forces, will have to do in future will be either constabulary duties or COIN tasks, which will not require full-scale conventional capabilities. In addition to these roles, the SANDF has become

involved in peace missions on the continent and performs a wide range of tasks during such missions – from peace enforcement-, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is evident that the required participation of the SANDF in continental peace missions will continue to increase, in part because the developed world has reached the conclusion that the cost and other challenges associated with peacekeeping in Africa simply outweigh the altruism of contributing to peacekeeping in Africa. African role-players, and specifically South Africa, as the second largest economy on the continent, will therefore have to assume more of the responsibility for conducting peace missions on the continent.

African decision-makers and defence planners must therefore continually develop the capacity for peacekeeping as an ongoing priority. The prospects of greater peacekeeping responsibilities must also be addressed in their short-, medium- and long-term planning. African militaries must also continually analyse and assess their strategies, FDs, force preparation and FSEs to ensure that they are capable, not only of carrying out their constitutional duties to protect themselves from acts of external aggression during conventional military operations, but they must also be designed, prepared and fitted with the capability of seamless integration with regional and continental security architectures during peace missions and humanitarian assistance operations. The SANDF will therefore, in addition to developing well-balanced, effective, modern military forces, also have to develop its ability to mobilise effectively as part of a multinational force to address non-traditional security threats, non-state actors and non-conventional methods of promoting insecurity and instability.

To achieve the above, it is essential for the SANDF to develop a strategy, an FD and an FS that are optimally configured to address the complexity of the tasks that they will be expected to perform in the African theatre of operations – tasks that include conventional military operations, humanitarian interventions and disaster relief operations, area defence operations and PCRD operations. This implies that the SANDF must be capable of expeditionary operations, extended campaigns and conducting several types of operations simultaneously.

> How should the SANDF deal with its future configuration in terms of the need to operate effectively in a JI^{2}M environment in the 21st century?

Successful defence planning is ultimately dependent on a balanced and holistic approach to the relationships between strategy and force planning, as well as the ability to identify all the most essential elements and their dominant relationships correctly. Strategists and force planners must therefore consider numerous international and domestic factors, including diplomatic, informational, economic and military influences –

- when deciding how to obtain the most from national resources (means);
- when making decisions on the required objectives (end states); and
- when developing strategies on how they intend to achieve these end states (ways).

It is essential to appreciate the significance of all the contexts of war, and care should be taken not to overemphasise the military context. The political context should always be taken into consideration and it should be borne in mind that military performance in the conduct of warfare is frequently affected by the cultural context of the deployment environment. These interfaces should shape the conduct of operations across the spectrum of conflict – from traditional warfighting to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In light of the above, it is clear that 1996 White Paper on Defence (DOD, 1996) and the 1998 Defence Review (DOD, 1998) based the primary function of defence on the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of South Africa and that this has proved to be misaligned with current government deployment preferences and the characteristics of the prevailing African security environment – not only in terms of FD and equipment, but also in terms of funding. The continued requirement to participate in peace missions on the continent, coupled with the additional requirements of providing support to other government departments (the so-called ‘secondary’ function), emphasises the fact that the concepts and baselines for force planning and capability development should be revisited to enable the SANDF to execute its required tasks successfully.

The principles and norms traditionally applied to the design and structure of defence forces will not suffice to meet the requirements of the complex threat environment of the 21st century. Flexibility, innovation and the optimal configuration of FSEs, tailored for the idiosyncrasies of various kinds of deployments, will be the key to the success of future deployments of the SANDF. In addition to the imperative of establishing joint FSEs for the Defence Force, there is also the additional requirement to structure the Defence Force to integrate seamlessly with other government departments, agencies and other defence forces, for instance as part of a SADC deployment, or as part of the JI2M deployment concept which underpins SANDF doctrine.

As part of the continued transformation of the SANDF to meet current deployment demands, it is proposed that the SANDF adopts a composite, modular FD approach to be able to deliver tailor-made expeditionary, air–ground combined task forces, capable of being delivered into the area of operations from the air, from land and from the sea. This composite, modular FD will enable the SANDF to mass organic, scalable, joint precision effects, at an increasingly higher level than hitherto, and will enable the SANDF to balance the principles of concentration of force with economy of effort. These forces should be configured optimally to conduct asymmetric warfare against conventional, irregular-, as well as hybrid forces. A modular FD and structure for the SANDF, based on CDs and CBs, will also achieve operational benefits from new concepts by transforming itself from a single-service, staff-centric command-and-control structure to a joint, integrated, network-enabled battle command that will enable decision superiority and self-synchronisation in dispersed areas of operations. Ultimately, a composite, modular FD will increase the synergy of integrated, joint operations and will contribute significantly to the optimal configuration of the SANDF to enable the latter to field forces that are ready and able to meet a vast array of contemporary security challenges.

7.5. Contribution of the thesis

This thesis focused on and provides answers to how South Africa's primary defence policy document was developed. The thesis makes an important contribution to the general South African defence debate, as issues pertaining to South African defence policy formulation and

strategy-making are limited to the involvement of a very small group of decision-makers and academics. As a result, the South African knowledge base pertaining to defence policy making is very small and many aspects pertaining to the roles and functions of the SANDF in the 'new' South African society remain undefined. The study revealed an important shortcoming, in that it became evident that interdepartmental cooperation between government departments, such as between DIRCO and the DOD remains ill-defined, despite claims of progress in terms of the comprehensive 'whole-of-government' approach to governance. During the interviews, it became evident that there is very limited alignment between South Africa's defence and foreign policy objectives. Moreover, it also became clear that, although the South African government openly supports the notion of South Africa as a 'developing country', no clear objectives have been outlined to the DOD and SANDF in pursuance of the developmental agenda. The study also found that the members of the Defence Review were not permitted to include more detail about the 'blue-print FD' than what is currently included in the 2014 Defence Review, and that there is a general understanding that more should be done to develop frameworks for the operationalisation of the JI^{2}M approach to operations in future defence policy. The interviews included in the thesis were the first interviews held with members of the Defence Review Committee directly after the 2014 Defence Review had been approved by cabinet. The opinions and insights of members of the Defence Review Committee, as encapsulated in this thesis, represents a truly original contribution to the relatively under-developed knowledge base on South African defence policy and strategy formulation processes. From the interviews it also became evident that, unless the South African government develops a clear understanding of the role and function of the SANDF on the continent and within the borders of the country, the defence budget will remain too small to fund operations, as well as to maintain and develop defence capabilities. Finally, as far as an original contribution to the defence knowledge database is concerned, the proposed composite, modular FD can be utilised as base-line planning document during the compilation of future defence review documents, as such alternative FDs have not, been developed prior to this study. The proposed alternative FDs as described in Chapter 5, was based on international best practices and lessons learned, and would optimally structure the SANDF for deployments as part of JI^{2}M forces in the complex, ever-changing African security environment.

7.6. Possibilities for future research

Research on the topic of the configuration of the SANDF in a continually changing international security environment is, by nature, an endeavour without a final chapter. Perceptions, constructs and approaches to defence and security will continually be shaped by international, as well as domestic events, and this will demand further analysis and investigation of the roles and functions that the SANDF will be expected to perform. The intense public debate that followed in the wake of the Battle for Bangui in the CAR during March 2013 has again highlighted the many unanswered questions about the SANDF's readiness status and required capabilities (personnel and equipment). The issue of when, where and under which circumstances the SANDF would-, and should-, deploy, will also clearly remain a hot topic for politicians, defence planners and scholars. Answers to these issues demand ongoing research on South Africa's level of defence ambition, as well as in-depth analysis of the implications thereof on the configuration, capability management and capability development of the SANDF. This thesis could also prove very useful to the compilers of the next Defence Review, which has been scheduled to commence in 2017/18.

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONS POSED TO MEMBERS OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW

1. What was your role and function as a member of the Defence Review Committee?

2. Since 1994 the open and consultative manner in which the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review was developed and promulgated was widely lauded as an outstanding achievement of "a defence in a democracy". What is your opinion on the levels of participation of other government departments as well as members of civil society in the compilation processes of the 2014 Defence Review? What were the levels of understanding of the role and functions of defence forces: was there insight into the current roles and functions (primary COIN and hybrid types of warfighting) or were people's understanding still based on the traditional, formal warfighting activities of military organisations?

3. The military has traditionally been viewed as an instrument of foreign policy – what was the level of participation of DIRCO in terms of the development of a 'Whole-of-Government' approach and in your opinion, how does DIRCO view the role of the SANDF as an instrument of foreign policy?

4. In the South African National Development Plan, a document of 430 pages long – there are only 3 references to "defence" (indicating a rather small role for the SANDF in society in as far as national development is concerned). What is the perception of the role of the Defence Force in the South African society within other Government departments, as well as among South African citizens?

5. In your opinion, how does the Defence Review define the SANDF in terms of the role it is expected to play as a foreign policy instrument – what are the outstanding characteristics of the 2014 Defence Review compared to the foreign policy roles as expounded in the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review?

6. In your opinion: what are the outstanding characteristics of the 2014 Defence Review; what is the Centre of Gravity (COG) of the 2014 Defence Review?

7. In terms of the DOD's involvement in the activities and organisations of the AU and SADC: does the 2014 Defence Review go far enough in expounding how the SANDF intends to interact with these organisations? What are the implications of South Africa's understated presence in the governing bodies of SADC and the AU?

8. The force design and force structure as currently described in the 2014 Defence Review continues to be presented in terms of single-Service structures. This, despite the fact that the defence strategy described in the 2014 Defence Review is based on a JI^{2}M approach to operations at all levels – an approach that requires integrated, "joint" structures to effectively achieve 'JI^{2}M' operations. Whys was no suggestions or basely-lines included for the establishment and development of 'joint' structures – why did the Defence Review Committee adhere to a traditional, single-Service force design when there are clear requirements for 'JI^{2}M' structures?

9. Did the members of the Defence Review Committee bench-mark international "best practices" as far as content of the document and force design and force structure of the organisation is concerned? Was international "best practices" in terms of force designs for COIN and hybrid warfare appreciated as alternatives?

10. Did the Defence Review base the force design and force structure (as included in Chapter 10 of the Defence Review) on current African security threats? This implies, inter alia: was the focus of the Defence Review Committee still on the 'traditional' warfighting tasks of the SANDF, or was equal time afforded to OOTW, COIN and hybrid organisations?

11. Why are the posts and positions reserved for South Africans in the AU and SADC not filled by South Africans? Is the South African specifically down-playing the SANDF's role in the situation? Does it constitute an attempt not to be seen as a hegemony on the continent – and if so, why?

12. Does the 2014 Defence Review go far enough to establish the foundation for a tailor-made African defence force as far as the SANDF is concerned?

13. Was the alternative force designs such as Type Forces and composite, modular brigades assessed as optimal force designs for the SANDF's deployments to complex environments?

14. In your opinion – does the force design and force structure expounded in the 2014 Defence Review sufficiently support "jointness" and the JI^{2}M approach to operations which is at the foundation of the SANDF's strategy as expounded in the Defence Review?

15. In terms of the diffusion of military models which characterises changes to the modus operandi, force structures and equipment of defence forces: did you analyse current changes and processes of other military organisations and did you include some of these aspects in the 2014 Defence Review?

ACRONYMS

AAF	Allied Armed Forces
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACDS	African Chiefs of Defence Staff
ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANAD	Accord de Non-Aggression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BMA	Border Management Agency
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAAU	Constitutive Act of the African Union
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CB	Composite Brigade
CD	Composite Division
CEAO	Communiuté de l'Quest
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJOPS	Chief of Joint operations
CJSC	Crime, Justice and Security Cluster
COG	Centre of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency

COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COOs	Circles of Operation
COPAX	Le Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CS	Combat Support
CSP	Civilian Secretariat for Police
CSS	Combat Service Support
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFI	Direct Foreign Investment
DIMES	Diplomatic, informational, military and economic powers of state
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DOD	Department of Defence
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPM	Developmental Peace Mission
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EISAS	Executive Committee on Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat
EU	European Union
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
FD	Force Design
FLS	Front Line States
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FMBs	Forward Mounting Bases
FME	Focus of Main Effort
FOBs	Forward Operating Bases

FSAAS	Future South African Army Strategy
FS	Force Structure
FSBs	Forward Staging Bases
FSE	Force Structure Element
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPSs	Global Positioning Systems
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSGIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
HQ	Headquarters
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IED	Improvised Explosive Devise
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPV	Inshore Patrol Vehicle
IR	International Relations
ISDSC	Interstate Defence and Security Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JI^{2}M	Joint, Interdepartmental, Interagency and Multinational
JIT	Just In Time
LOOs	Lines of Operation
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23 [rebel] Movement
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDP	Millennium Development Plan
MEND	Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC	Mission de l'ONU en RD Congo

MONUSCO	Congo Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	National Development Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NICOC	National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NPC	National Planning Committee
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS	National Security Strategy
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
OPDSC	(SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vehicle
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PCRU	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PPDSC	Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMSCs	Private and Military Security Companies
POSTEDFITB	Personnel, Organisations, Sustainment, Training, Equipment, Doctrine, Facilities, Information, Technology and Budget
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSSG	Police Strategic Support Group
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability

RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAAF	South African Air Force
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern African Development Community Brigade
SADCC	SA Development Coordination Conference
SADC SF	SADC Standby Force
SADF	South African Defence Force
S/CRS	Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stablization
SDP	Strategic Defence Package
SFs	Standby Forces
SAMHS	South African Military Health Service
SAN	South African Navy
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPS	South African Police Service
SHIRBRIG	(UN) Standing High Readiness Brigade
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SSA	State Security Agency
SOPs	Standing Operating Procedures
TB	Tuberculosis
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UK	United Kingdom
UMQA	Union Monétaire Quest Africaine
UNAMID	(UN) African Mission in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UN	United Nations
UNDP	(UN) Development Plan
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSM	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WW1	World War I
WW2	World War II
3GW	Third Generation Warfare
4GW	Fourth Generation Warfare

APPENDIX C

REFERENCE LIST

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