

The Impact of the Second World War on Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), 1939-1953

By

Alfred Tembo

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Supervisor: Professor Ian Phimister

Co-Supervisor: Dr Daniel Owen Spence

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own independent work and has not previously been submitted by me at another university or institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification.

Signed: _____

Date: _____

Alfred Tembo

Bloemfontein

ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the impact of the Second World War on colonial Zambia. The situation faced by the British government during the hostilities required a collective effort to fight a total war against the Axis powers. A supreme effort was demanded not only by Britain and her Allies, but also of Britain in partnership with her Empire. This is a study of how the colony of Northern Rhodesia went about the process of organising its human and natural resources on behalf of the imperial government. Thematically-organised, the thesis begins with the recruitment of personnel for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. It explores the role of traditional authority and government propaganda but also brings to the fore African agency. It also argues that some sections of the African and European populations were opposed to the colony's war effort. The colony's contribution to the Allied war effort was also extended to the supply of base metals to the Allies. Its mining industry came to operate like an appendage of the British war economy, with the imperial government buying the commodity at a controlled price. Furthermore, Northern Rhodesia supplied rubber and beeswax following the fall of Allied-controlled South-east Asian colonies at the hands of the invading Japanese in early 1942. Just as the colony's mining industry had become important to the Allies in wartime, the mines came to play an even more significant role in the reconstruction of the battered British economy post-war. The new relationship was based on the need for Britain to have access to the very valuable copper industry's dollar-earnings, especially following the devaluation of sterling. As the City of London lost its importance as the world's financial centre, the copper companies also shifted their offices to central Africa. This movement was accompanied by growing settler political influence which eventually led to the creation of the Central African Federation. Just as the war affected the British home front, so too, it did that of Northern Rhodesia. The war impacted the lives of ordinary people through commodity shortages, profiteering, inflation, hoarding, and the black market. The colonial government responded by taking an active role never before

witnessed in the history of the colony to control these vices. The thesis ends with a discussion on the demobilization process in which African servicemen felt cheated by an Empire-wide system of racial hierarchy. Although expanded government propaganda machinery contributed to the growth of an African political voice, most ex-servicemen remained concerned about personal affairs, and directed their frustration at their traditional leaders who were active in the recruitment process. Contrary to older arguments, African servicemen did not play an active role in nationalist politics. On a wider historical plane, through a detailed examination of the economic, political, military, social, and agricultural sectors of Northern Rhodesia this thesis is the first major study of the impact of the Second World War on the colony. In so doing, this thesis significantly modifies a number of historiographies and opens up space for creating a more comprehensive history of the Second World War in Africa. Lastly, this thesis also helps to broaden imperial historical debates by its examination of the “second colonial occupation” of Northern Rhodesia after the war.

OPSOMMING

Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die impak van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op koloniale Zambië. Die omstandighede wat die Britse regering gedurende die vyandighede in die gesig gestaar het, het 'n kollektiewe poging geverg om 'n totale oorlog teen die Spilmoonthede te loods. Brittanje sowel as haar vennote binne die Britse Ryk sou 'n uiterste poging moes aanwend. Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die proses waarvolgens die kolonie van Noord-Rhodesië te werk gegaan het om sy menslike en natuurlike hulpbronne in diens van die imperiale regering te organiseer. Die proefskrif, wat tematies georganiseer is, open met 'n ondersoek na die werwing van manskappe vir die Noord-Rhodesiese Regiment. Die rol van tradisionele gesag en regeringspropaganda word nagevors; terselfdertyd word die agentskap van swart Afrikane ook na vore gebring. Daar word aangevoer dat sekere gedeeltes van die swart en Europese bevolkings die kolonie se oorlogspoging teengestaan het. Die kolonie het onder andere die Geallieerdes se oorlogspoging ondersteun deur basismetale aan dié moonthede te verskaf. Mynbedrywighede in Noord-Rhodesië het mettertyd as 'n onderdeel van die Britse oorlogseconomie gefunksioneer, deurdat die imperiale regering dié kommoditeit teen 'n vasgestelde prys aangekoop het. Nadat Japan die Geallieerdes se kolonies in Suid-Oos Asië vroeg in 1942 verower het, het Noord-Rhodesië ook rubber en byewas begin voorsien. Die kolonie se mynbedryf het na die oorlog, met die heropbou van die geknoude Britse ekonomie, selfs méér beduidend vir die Geallieerdes geword. Hierdie nuwe verhouding het berus op die Britse behoefte aan die ryk koperbedryf se dollar-verdienste, veral na die devaluasie van die Engelse pond. Namate London se belangrikheid as die wêreld se finansiële sentrum gekwyn het, het kopermaatskappye hul kantore na Sentraal-Afrika verskuif. Hierdie verskuiwing het met groter politieke invloed aan die kant van setlaars gepaardgegaan, en het uiteindelik tot die totstandkoming van die Sentraal-Afrikaanse Federasie gelei. Nes die Britse tuisfront, is Noord-Rhodesië ook deur die oorlog geraak. Skaarstes in verbruikersgoedere, woekerwinsbejag,

inflasie, die opgaar van voorrade, en sluikhandel gedurende die oorlog het die lewens van gewone mense beïnvloed. Die koloniale regering se aktiewe pogings om hierdie euwels te probeer beheer, het ‘n ywer wat nog nooit voorheen in die kolonie se geskiedenis gesien is nie, geopenbaar. Die proefskrif sluit met ‘n bespreking van die demobilisasie van swart soldate af – ‘n proses waarbinne die Ryk se rassehiërargie gevoelens van verontregting gewek het. Alhoewel die uitbreiding van die Regering se propagandamasjienerie meer geleenthede vir swart politieke uitdrukking gebied het, was meeste oud-soldate met hul persoonlike omstandighede gemoeid en het hul frustrasie op tradisionele leiers, wat by werwing betrokke was, gerig. In teenstelling met ouer argumente in die historiografie word daar aangevoer dat swart soldate nie ‘n aktiewe rol in die nasionalistiese politiek gespeel het nie. Deur noukeurige ondersoek in te stel na Noord-Rhodesië se ekonomiese, politieke, militêre, sosiale, en landboukundige sektore, vorm hierdie proefskrif dus die eerste grootskaalse studie van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog se impak op dié kolonie. Sodoende word beduidende wysigings aan verskeie historiografieë aangebring, en word ruimte geskep vir die daarstelling van ‘n meer omvattende geskiedenis van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in Afrika. Laastens dra hierdie proefskrif tot die uitbreiding van imperiale historiese debatte by deur Noord-Rhodesië se “tweede koloniale besetting” te ondersoek.

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LIST OF PLACE NAMES

Old Names

New Names

Abyssinia

Ethiopia

Balovale

Zambezi

Barotse Province

Western Province

Ceylon

Sri Lanka

Dutch East Indies

Indonesia

Fort Jameson

Chipata

Fort Rosebery

Mansa

Gatooma

Kadoma

Gwelo

Gweru

Kaonde-Lunda Province

North-Western Province

Malaya

Malaysia

Mankoya

Kaoma

Northern Province

Northern, Luapula, and Muchinga Provinces

Northern Rhodesia

Zambia

Que Que

Kwekwe

Salisbury

Harare

Southern Rhodesia

Zimbabwe

Umtali

Mutare

Western Province

Copperbelt province

ABBREVIATIONS

AFIS	African Farming Improvement Scheme
ALAB	African Labour Advisory Board
ALC	African Labour Corps
BCSM	British Colonial Supply Mission
BSACo	British South Africa Company
CAF	Central African Federation
CDWA	Colonial Development and Welfare Act
CDWF	Colonial Development and Welfare Fund
c-i-f	carried-in-freight
CO	Colonial Office
COLA	Cost of Living Allowance
DC	District Commissioner
EATS	Empire Air Training Scheme
EPT	Export Profit Tax
f-o-b	free-on-board
KAR	King's African Rifles
LM	Livingstone Museum
LME	London Metal Exchange

MIA	Mining Industry Archives
MWU	Mine Workers' Union
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NRAC	Northern Rhodesia African Congress
NRR	Northern Rhodesia Regiment
OB	<i>Ossewabrandwag</i>
PEMS	Paris Evangelical Missionary Society
PFS	Peasant Farming Scheme
POSB	Post Office Savings Bank
RAA	Rhodesia Anglo American
RIN	Royal Indian Navy
RST	Rhodesia Selection Trust
TRNVR	Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
TYDP	Ten Year Development Plan
UK	United Kingdom
WNLA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
WPB	War Production Board

KEY WORDS

Britain, copper, demobilization, home front, Northern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia Regiment, recruitment, second colonial occupation, Second World War, Zambia,

MAP



CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1. Background

The Second World War (1939-1945), was a global military conflict that, in terms of lives lost and material destruction, has been the most devastating war in human history. More than 21 million combatants and about 38 million civilians died.¹ It started on 1 September 1939 as a European conflict when Nazi Germany attacked Poland. Two days after Germany began its invasion of Poland, on 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany.² In this war against Germany, Britain enlisted the support of her closest ally, France. Due to Britain's declaration of war, up to one-fifth of the world's population was at war owing to the mobilization of the vast Empire which she controlled.³ Britain called on vast colonial resources to defend its global Empire and trade. In addition to its military participation, the British Empire provided financial and material resources for the Allied war effort. The Empire's main contribution in the early months of war, however, was the deployment of its human resource. Initial assistance came from the dominions. Canada made the first contribution of soldiers on 10 December 1939 while Australasian troops reached the Middle East on 12 February 1940 and joined those from India.⁴

¹ J. Black, *World War Two: A Military History* (London, 2003), xiv. However, varied figures exist, reflecting, in particular, very different estimates for Soviet and Chinese casualties.

² An appropriate date for the beginning of the conflict in Europe is 1 September 1939, but, in Asia, the parallel struggle arising from Japanese aggression and Imperialism began with an invasion of Manchuria in 1931. For details see *ibid*, 31-5. Furthermore, it could be argued that for Africans the war actually started when Italy conquered Abyssinia in 1935 which fascist forces later used as a base for the conquest of British Somaliland in mid-1940. See, for example, G.L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War Two* (Melbourne, 1994), 503.

³ A. Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth and the Second World War', *The Roundtable*, 100, 412 (February 2011), 67.

⁴ *Ibid*, 66. For a more detailed discussion regarding the role of the Dominions in the war, see A. Stewart, *Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War* (London, 2008), especially chapters 2 and 3.

Similarly, British colonies in Africa were of strategic significance to Empire. The continent played a prominent part in the war because of its importance as a battleground for its overland, sea and air lines of communication. This was because of the demands of global resource mobilization by various colonial powers which sought either to extend or protect their territorial portfolio on the continent.⁵ In addition, some 500,000 men and women from British African countries served in the Allied forces in campaigns in the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa.⁶

The North African Campaign was a series of battles and actions between the Axis and the Allied forces in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia from 1940 up to 1943. For a long time, the Fascist leader of Italy, Benito Mussolini, had harboured ambitions over the colonies of France and Britain in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The opportunity came when France fell at the hands of Germany on 10 June 1940. Mussolini declared war, and stepped into Britain's North African Empire, thus ensuring that the Mediterranean became a major theatre of conflict.⁷ The fall of France shattered the balance of power in the Mediterranean because the British had based their strategic calculations for the containment of Italy on the strength of the French army in North Africa and its Mediterranean fleet.⁸ Mussolini's aim was to extend Italian control from Libya and Abyssinia to include Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, and Egypt. He felt that Italian greatness required domination of the Mediterranean and, therefore, British defeat.⁹ At the same time, the main aim of the British in the region in the 1930s was to defend Egypt in order to ensure control of the strategic Suez Canal, thereby maintaining its influence throughout much of the Middle East and South Asia.¹⁰

⁵ Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth', 71.

⁶ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 180.

⁷ Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth', 68.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Black, *World War Two*, 56.

¹⁰ K. Shillington, *History of Africa* (London, 2005), 279.

Italy's declaration of war in the Mediterranean also prompted the commencement of fighting in East Africa.¹¹ From June 1940 to November 1941, forces from the British Empire and other Allies fought fascist troops from the colonies of Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Abyssinia in what became known as the East African Campaign. This was after Mussolini's units from the Italian garrison in Ethiopia occupied frontier towns in the Anglo-Egyptian condominium of the Sudan on 4 July in 1940. On 15 July they penetrated the British colony of Kenya, and between 5 and 19 August occupied the whole of the British Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden.¹²

Many more servicemen from British Africa were utilised in the Middle East Campaign due to manpower problems faced by the Allied nations in 1941. This campaign led directly to the recruitment of 40,000 men from the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland to serve there.¹³ As the war progressed, the colonies in Africa became increasingly vital in supplying the Middle Eastern theatre with not only manpower but food supplies as well.¹⁴

Naturally, Northern Rhodesia, as a British colony, joined the war on the side of its colonial master on 3 September 1939.¹⁵ This followed the British War Cabinet asking the Colonial Office and the War Office to produce a report on the manpower resources of the entire colonial empire.¹⁶ The colony raised eight battalions comprising about 15,000 African servicemen and between 700-800 Europeans.¹⁷ Three of these battalions were infantry and the rest performed garrison duties. They served in Kenya, Somaliland, Madagascar, Ceylon,

¹¹ J.D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (London, 1996), 51.

¹² J. Keegan, *The Second World War* (London, 1989), 212; and B.H. Lidell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (London, 1970), 121-2.

¹³ Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 42.

¹⁴ See, for example, A. Jackson, *Botswana, 1939-1945: an African Country at War* (Oxford, 1999).

¹⁵ Northern Rhodesia became the independent nation of Zambia on 24 October 1964. Throughout this study, use is made of the colonial name.

¹⁶ Cited in Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth', 66.

¹⁷ L.H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953* (London, 1964), 327-8.

Burma, Palestine, and India. In addition to providing servicemen, Northern Rhodesia became vital in the defence of British and Allied interests because she was a major supplier of copper. The metal was crucial for the manufacture of munitions for the Allies.

Rosaleen Smyth has argued that 'Africans in Northern Rhodesia experienced the Second World War vicariously through news and propaganda'.¹⁸ It is suggested here that this overlooks the fact that there was scarcely a level of life that was not affected by the war. Although no military action took place in the colony, the temptation to view the war as external to the local people should be avoided. As Ashley Jackson rightly notes, '[t]he Second World War sent shock waves pulsing from imperial power centres throughout the Empire ... Events in one part of the world affected events in another over long distances, as if connected by a current'.¹⁹

Mobilization for war brought about marked changes in African colonies. Almost everywhere intense pressure on the colonies to produce more goods to meet war needs led to increased imperial direction over colonial economies.²⁰ Additionally, the British African colonies' overseas trade was regulated even more than before by the metropolitan government. Bulk purchase schemes in East and West Africa turned colonial governments into monopoly purchasers of local cash crops, sometimes paying only half the price given on the open world market.²¹ Prices paid to producers of essential commodities were held down, and the ensuing profits temporarily appropriated by the British Treasury in the over-riding cause of imperial survival.²² The colonies also had to accept new conditions imposed by exchange controls,

¹⁸ R. Smyth, 'War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia', *African Affairs*, 83, 332 (July 1984), 1.

¹⁹ Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 42; and *ibid*, 'The Empire/Commonwealth', 65-78.

²⁰ J. Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (London, 1988), 48; and *ibid*, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 43-52.

²¹ D.A. Low and J.M. Lonsdale, 'Towards the New Order, 1945-63', in Low and A. Smith (eds.), *The Oxford History of East Africa vol. 3* (London, 1976), 300.

²² Hargreaves, *Decolonization*, 52.

rising inflation, restrictions on trade with non-sterling countries, rationing, and labour conscription.

The novelty of direct metropolitan intervention in the economies of African colonies and large scale planning affected the post-war relationship between Britain and her colonies. As Britain's dependence on her Empire increased markedly in wartime, the Empire had an even more important part to play in plans for post-war reconstruction and in providing her with scarce dollars.²³ In the post-war period the array of wartime controls persisted, as the direction of imperial economic policy remained firmly in London. There followed what has been termed the "Second Colonial Occupation", which was characterised by an intensive effort by the metropole to press ahead with economic "development" in the colonies,²⁴ very largely for its own benefit and post-war reconstruction.

Moreover, the war demanded a cooperative effort not only of Britain and her Allies but also of Britain in partnership with her Empire, be they members of the fighting forces or civilians engaged in war work, factory workers in the metropole or African industries. The war's major impact was economic, and most other changes emanated from this. The war transformed the world economy from one of excess commodity supply to one of raw material shortage, and it changed the role of government in mediating the market and organising production.²⁵

The effect of the war on Northern Rhodesia was not confined to the recruitment of some 15,000 servicemen.²⁶ In a passage which might equally apply to Northern Rhodesia, Ashley Jackson wrote:

²³ Low and Lonsdale, 'Towards the New Order, 1945-1963', 301.

²⁴ Hargreaves, *Decolonization*, 118.

²⁵ N. Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-49', in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 144.

²⁶ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 327.

[t]he concept of the ‘home front’, so familiar in the historiography of wartime Britain and used as an umbrella for all of the war's domestic manifestations, can be usefully applied to Bechuanaland, where the war affected the social and economic lives of people in a direct way.²⁷

In comparison with the British home front,²⁸ the effects on Northern Rhodesia, as in colonial Botswana, were relatively small scale, however. Between 1939 and 1953, the colony endured commodity shortages, inflation, the black market, and the profiteering of traders that directly impinged on ordinary people's livelihoods. As in Britain, the tasks facing African colonial governments because of the disruption of war and its production demands led to an increase in the size of the state's apparatus, and an involvement in people's daily lives that was unprecedented.²⁹ The colonial state became more involved in running the economy through the adoption of austerity measures such as rationing and price controls. Furthermore, import substitution industrialization, agricultural labour conscription, military labour enlistment, and increased mining of base metals, all meant that the war had a direct manifestation on the Northern Rhodesian “home front” than has hitherto been acknowledged. In the aftermath of the war, the demobilization exercise became the latest impact of the war on the colony. Post-war economic woes in Britain also affected Northern Rhodesia as the imperial authorities kept a tight grasp over the colony in order to benefit from the buoyant mining industry's dollar-earnings. These and related subsets of effects are what this thesis examines.

1.2. Thesis Interventions

The thesis addresses the impact of the Second World War on Northern Rhodesia. It does this by focusing on the period when the war broke out in 1939 right through to 1953. A

²⁷ Jackson, *Botswana*, 123.

²⁸ *Ibid*, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, especially chapter 4.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 43.

general and small corpus of literature does exist profiling the experiences of Northern Rhodesians during the war but is largely focused on copper-mining and fractious labour relations between European settler farmers and the local African population.³⁰ Not even L.F.G. Anthony's chapter in *The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment* is concerned with the specificity of the impact of the war on the servicemen whose expeditions was the focus of the study.³¹ This thesis is the first comprehensive academic study of the ramifications of the war on Northern Rhodesia. For as Michael Crowder observed:

[n]early all writers on the colonial period of Africa's past accept, or at least many, pay lip service to the view that for whatever reasons the Second World War represented a watershed in the history of the continent. Yet, curiously, few of them give its course or impact detailed attention.³²

This study attempts to investigate the extent to which Northern Rhodesia contributed to the British war effort, and the effect thereof.

On the other hand, there is a large body of literature which discusses the relationship between Africa and the Second World War, although central Africa has been pushed to the periphery of this discourse.³³ This justifies a need to enrich the scholarship with wider geographical coverage and in-depth research for all colonised countries that contributed to the imperial war effort. As Jackson put it, 'assumptions still remain that can only be challenged or confirmed by case studies.'³⁴ In Zambian historiography in general, the theme of "war and society" remains relatively undeveloped. This thesis investigates one dimension of such

³⁰ *Ibid*, 232.

³¹ L.F.G. Anthony, 'The Second World War', in W.V. Brelsford (ed.), *The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment* (Lusaka, 1954), 75-102.

³² M. Crowder, 'Introduction', in Crowder (ed.), *Cambridge History of Africa vol. VIII, from c. 1940-1975* (Cambridge, 1984), 1.

³³ Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 232.

³⁴ A. Jackson, 'Motivation and Mobilisation for War: Recruitment for the British Army in Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1941-1942', *African Affairs*, 96 (1997), 400.

history: the Second World War. It is only by critically examining the nature of this war that we can better begin to understand its influence on the colony's economy and society, particularly with regard to how traditional leaders, mining magnates, traders and local producers responded to new imperial policies, and how the war affected production and labour relations.

Firstly, the thesis attempts to examine issues surrounding the recruitment and mobilization of personnel for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) when the war broke out. It also aims to investigate whether apart from the use of government propaganda and chiefly institutions, African men had other motives for enlisting in the army. Furthermore, it will examine the extent to which there was resistance to the British war effort in the colony.

The next intervention is to find out the extent to which the fall of the Allied nations' South-east Asian colonies stepped up the imperial extraction of resources from Northern Rhodesia. By focusing on the wartime production of rubber, beeswax, iron, ropes, and strings, this thesis aims to expose the disparities in policy between colonial officials on the ground and imperial officials in Whitehall, especially with regard to the prices at which Britain bought these commodities. This contradiction was not restricted to buying commodities at below-market prices, but extended to the use of forced labour on European settler farms. More broadly, such policies fit into the general coercive nature of British colonial rule, as similar measures were adopted in other industries in wartime Africa as well as the use of the scorched earth policy in India. The picture which emerges from these undertakings is that in times of war, the notion of morality in imperial circles was further blurred as Britain struggled to avoid defeat.

Thirdly, this thesis attempts to explore how war-induced economic challenges affected the Northern Rhodesian "home front". It suggests that the colonial government abandoned its *laissez faire* policy when it began to engage more directly in the running of the economy than

ever before in order to resolve vices such as commodity shortages, hoarding, the black market, profiteering, and inflation. Among the austerity measures introduced were rationing, price control and import substitution industrialization. It will also attempt to investigate the extent to which these measures persisted into the post-war period due to continued economic challenges in Britain and the sterling area.

The next intervention is an investigation into the impact of the war on the country's economic mainstay - copper mining. The thesis explores the extent to which war-induced changes in the copper mining industry had ripple effects on other sectors in the colony such as agriculture. Furthermore, it is suggested that the value of this colonial backwater was transformed during the late British imperialism. Following the devaluation of sterling in 1949, the British government put pressure on the copper mining industry to produce more copper for sale to non-sterling countries such as the United States of America in order to earn much-needed dollars. In this way, rather than granting independence to Northern Rhodesia, the imperial government strengthened its grip on the colony. It will also investigate the extent to which the colonial state tried to uplift the lives of the local African population as this period was characterized by the formulation and implementation of "development" plans", mainly for Britain's self-interest.

This is followed by an examination of the demobilization process undertaken at the end of the war. The thesis attempts to find out the extent to which war service heightened African ex-servicemen's frustrations by raising expectations that the post-war economy could not meet. It is demonstrated that many African servicemen felt cheated by a demobilization exercise based on an Empire-wide system of racial hierarchy. In spite of this, they remained concerned mainly with personal and domestic matters, the welfare of family, improvement in the home village, and using their gratuity either to buy consumer goods to improve their immediate lives or to establish a business. It is argued that the dissatisfaction over perceived broken promises

by African ex-servicemen was a universal phenomenon that also affected colonial personnel in other parts of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. In fact, complaints about conditions of service were rampant in various theatres of the war before hostilities ceased. At the same time it is argued that contrary to older academic arguments, African ex-servicemen in Northern Rhodesia did not actively participate in the struggle for political independence.

The dearth of literature on the comprehensive examination of the impact of the Second World War on Zambia's colonial history makes this thesis a vital contribution to the country's socio-economic historiography. This thesis also helps to contextualize the "second colonial occupation" of the country which took place after the war. The period covered by this study is from 1939 to 1953, encompassing the year the war started, and the beginning of the Central African Federation (CAF), respectively. The latter date is an ideal cut-off point because it was in April of that year that bulk-purchasing of copper which Britain began at the onset of the war came to an end, and the London Metal Exchange (LME) re-opened. The period after 1953 warrants a separate study due to the rise of a different political economy at both the national and regional levels. Although the war ended in 1945, the effects of the hostilities continued to be felt many years after, hence the case for extending the study into the post-war era.

1.3. Historiographical Debates

The political impact of military service upon African colonial soldiers who served in European-led armies during the Second World War has been a contentious issue since the 1960s. This debate emerged particularly strongly in a West African context, where the involvement of ex-servicemen in the Gold Coast riots of 1948 was regarded in early nationalist accounts as a key moment in the rise of nationalist sentiment. It has usually been assumed that the men who were recruited and participated in the war came back with new ideas, wider experiences, and broader horizons that made them fight for the independence of their countries.

Gabriel Olusanya and Eugene Schleh belong to this category of scholars.³⁵ They claim that soldiers returned home from the Second World War politicized due to their war-time experiences and looked forward to occasions to extend new ideas acquired through contacts with nationalists in Asia. Ultimate proof of the effect of demobilized soldiers on post-war politics is often seen in their participation in the Gold Coast riots of 1948. Such views are shared by Michael Crowder. In his interrogation of the effects of the war on West Africa, Crowder concluded that:

[s]ome returning soldiers were to play a vital role in the formation of the political parties that gained independence in the fifteen years that followed the war. Many were no longer content with the colonial situation as they left it.³⁶

Subsequent studies on the impact of homecoming servicemen on the societies to which they returned shifted somewhat from the above perspective. Some scholars even dismissed nationalist feelings among ex-combatants as mere myths. Richard Rathbone and Simon Baynham accused historians of exaggerating the influence of the war on former Gold Coast war veterans.³⁷ They argued that ex-servicemen in colonial Ghana did not constitute a coherent activist group within the nationalist movement and that the view that African servicemen were directly influenced by personal contact with Indian nationalists “stretches the imagination”. The ex-servicemen did not become a distinct social, political, or economic group.³⁸ A more nuanced approach to this theme was undertaken by Adrienne Israel who, unlike Rathbone and Baynham, suggested that African ex-soldiers’ contribution to the rise of independence politics

³⁵ G.O. Olusanya, ‘The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6, 2 (August 1968), 221-232; and E.P.A. Schleh, ‘The Post-War Careers of Ex-Servicemen in Ghana and Uganda’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6, 2 (August 1968), 203-220.

³⁶ M. Crowder, ‘The 1939-45 War and West Africa’, F.A. Ajayi and Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa Vol. 2* (London, 1974), 665-92.

³⁷ R. Rathbone, ‘Businessmen in Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana, 1949-57’, *Journal of Development Studies*, (October 1973), 390-407; and S. Baynham, ‘The Ghanaian Military: a Bibliographic Essay’, *West African Journal of Sociology and Political Science*, 1, 1 (October 1979), 83-107.

³⁸ *Ibid*, ‘Businessmen in Politics’, 392; and *ibid*, ‘The Ghanaian Military’, 84.

depended on local conditions, ethnicity, educational levels, military occupations and class origins.³⁹

In a 1978 article, Rita Headrick suggested that more important than political awakening during the Second World War was the social transformation of African soldiers.⁴⁰ According to her, reactions to the war can be divided into two major related areas: those dealing with ideological concerns, either of a racial or political nature, and those which resulted from “modernisation” due to war service. Studies by Timothy Stapleton, Ashley Jackson, Louis Grundlingh, Joanna Lewis, Hamilton Sipho Simelane, and Frank Furedi all contend that the return of ex-servicemen to their home areas after the war had little impact on the rise of African nationalism.⁴¹ These studies have shown, however, that the return of ex-servicemen was characterised by dissatisfaction where men did not obtain what was “promised” to them during the recruitment process. The general conclusion is that ex-servicemen made an insignificant contribution to nationalist politics than once was thought.

The dissatisfaction of servicemen at the end of the war was not unique to the African continent either. It affected colonial forces from Asia and the Caribbean as well, especially with regard to perceived broken recruitment promises and delayed demobilisation.⁴² As Daniel

³⁹ A.M. Israel, ‘Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads: Protests and Politics in Post-War Ghana’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30, 2 (1992), 359-368; and *ibid*, ‘Measuring the War Experience: Ghanaian Soldiers in World War II’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25, 1 (1987), 159-168.

⁴⁰ R. Headrick, ‘African Soldiers in World War II’, *Armed Forces and Society*, 4, 3 (1978), 502-526.

⁴¹ Jackson, *Botswana*; *ibid*, ‘African Soldiers and Imperial Authorities: Tensions and Unrest during the Service of High Commission Territories’ Soldiers in the British Army, 1941-46’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 4 (December 1999), 645-665; L. Grundlingh, ‘Prejudices, Promises and Poverty: the Experiences of Discharged and Demobilised Black South African Soldiers after the Second World War’, *South African Historical Journal*, 26 (1992), 116-135; H.S. Simelane, ‘Veterans, Politics and Poverty: the Case of Swazi Veterans in the Second World War’, *South African Historical Journal*, 38 (1998), 144-170; F. Furedi, ‘The Demobilized African Soldier and the Blow to White Prestige’, in Killingray and D. Omissi (eds.), *Guardians of Empire: the Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964* (Manchester, 1999), 179-197; J. Lewis, *Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Woodbridge, 2000); and T. Stapleton *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Rochester, 2011).

⁴² C. Bayly and Jim Harper, *Forgotten Wars: the End of Britain’s Asian Empire* (London, 2007); R.H. Taylor, ‘Colonial Forces in British Burma: a National Army Postponed’, in K. Hack and T. Rettig (eds.), *Colonial Armies in South-East Asia* (London, 2006); A. Deshpande, *Military Policy in India, 1900-1945* (New Delhi, 2005); and D.O. Spence, ‘“They Had the Sea in Their Blood”: Caymanian Naval Volunteers in the Second World War’, in N.

Owen Spence, Dipak Kumar Das, and Anirudh Deshpande, have argued, the fight for better conditions did not always follow the end of the war as cases of protest and mutiny sometimes preceded its conclusion as happened in India, Trinidad, and the Cayman Islands.⁴³

As the wartime shortage of consumer goods took its toll in the colonies, many territories followed directives from London to introduce an array of austerity measures similar to those implemented in the United Kingdom. The adoption of a centralised economic policy in British colonial Africa was exemplified by the adoption of measures such as rationing of commodities and price control in almost all colonies. These issues are which scholars with an interest in the financial history of colonial Africa have focused on.⁴⁴ Michael Cowen and Nicholas Westcott advanced a more comprehensive view of the economic effects of the war by examining the extent to which it reduced colonial autonomy and centralised imperial economic policy around the British national economy. Similar policies were adopted in Northern Rhodesia. On the other hand, John Lonsdale's study declared that the combination of economic collapse and military conflict transformed Kenya from a segmentary to a centralised but ungovernable state.⁴⁵ Brian Mokopakgosi and Hoyini Bhila compared oral and archival material to determine the war's long term effect on farmers, traders, and women and children left behind by the Bechuanaland servicemen who had enlisted,⁴⁶ with the latter claiming that the policies adopted in wartime

Arielli and B. Collins (eds.), *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era* (New York, 2013), 105-123.

⁴³ D.O. Spence, *Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922-67* (Manchester, 2015); *ibid*, "They Had the Sea in Their Blood", 105-123; D.K. Das, *Revisiting Talwar: A Study in the Royal Indian Navy Uprising of February 1946* (New Delhi, 1993); and Deshpande, *Military Policy in India*.

⁴⁴ M. Cowen and N. Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy during the War', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986); T. Falola, "'Salt is Gold': the Management of Salt Scarcity in Nigeria during World War II", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 26, 2 (1992), 412-436; and N. Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-49', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 143-159.

⁴⁵ J. Lonsdale, 'The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 97-142.

⁴⁶ B. Mokopakgosi, 'The Impact of the Second World War: The Case of the Kweneng in the then Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1939-1950', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 160-180; and H.K. Bhila, 'The Impact of the Second World War on the Development of Peasant Agriculture in Botswana, 1939-1956', *Botswana Notes and Records*, 16(1984), 63-71.

‘greatly underdeveloped peasant agriculture and exacerbated the existing social and economic imbalances in Tswana society’.⁴⁷ The current study suggests that to begin to make sense of the war’s varied economic impact on Northern Rhodesia, a deeper understanding of such issues as inflation, profiteering, shortages, hoarding, and the black market is required. This is what this thesis does.

Another popular theme in the relationship between Africa and the Second World War has been the recruitment and mobilization of military labour for the war effort. Timothy Stapleton, David Killingray, Ashley Jackson, Albert Grundlingh, Louis Grundlingh, Hamilton Sipho Simelane, and Mary Nombulelo Ntabeni, analysed the manner in which African men were encouraged to enlist for war service, and the different responses to the enlistment drive.⁴⁸ This thesis demonstrates that while traditional authorities in Northern Rhodesia were utilised to recruit men for the war effort, not all of them supported the imperial war effort. Furthermore, local people also had their own personal motives for enlisting in the colonial army.

The early successes of Germany in the war and Japan’s conquest of South East Asia cut off Allied supplies from many tropical raw materials in 1942. This made Britain in particular increasingly dependent on its African colonies for primary products and food supplies. In this way, the war boosted crop production in some African countries in order to

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, ‘The Impact of the Second World War on the Development of Peasant Agriculture’, 63.

⁴⁸ Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers*; D. Killingray, ‘Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast during the Second World War’, *Journal of African History*, 23, 1 (1982), 83-95; A. Jackson, ‘Motivation and Mobilization for War: Recruitment for the British Army in Bechuanaland Protectorate’, *African Affairs*, 96, 384 (1997), 399-417; *ibid*, ‘Bad Chiefs and Sub-Tribes: Aspects of Recruitment for the British Army in Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1941-42’, *Botswana Notes and Records*, 28 (1996), 87-96; A. Grundlingh, ‘The King’s Afrikaners?: Enlistment and Ethnic Identity in the Union of South Africa’s Defence Force during the Second World War’, *Journal of African History*, 40 (1999), 351-365; L. Grundlingh, ‘The Recruitment of South African Blacks for Participation in the Second World War’, in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 181-203; *ibid*, ‘Non-Europeans Should be Kept Away from the Temptations of Towns’: Controlling Black South Africans during the Second World War’, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 25, 3 (1992), 539-560; S.H. Simelane, ‘Labor Mobilization for the War Effort in Swaziland, 1940-1942’, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 26, 3 (1993), 541-574; and M.N. Ntabeni, ‘Military Labour Mobilisation in Colonial Lesotho during World War II, 1940-1943’, *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 36, 2 (2008), 36-59.

meet the high demand in the metropole which was the focus of studies by Allister E. Hinds, Robin Palmer, Toyin Falola and Nhamo Samasuwo.⁴⁹ These studies inform the case for Northern Rhodesia where the production of such commodities as rubber and beeswax was revived following the fall of Allied-controlled colonies in South East Asia.

As the demands of the war called for the extraction of minerals on an unprecedented scale from African colonies as Raymond Dumett shows,⁵⁰ so, too, did it bring changes to the way African agricultural produce was marketed, especially after the loss of Britain's South-east Asian colonies in 1942. This resulted in the creation of agricultural marketing boards in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia run directly by the colonial Governments as noted by P.T. Bauer, Rod Alence, David Meredith, Gavin Williams, Laurens van der Laan, and Nicholas Westcott.⁵¹ The boards took over marketing activities from trading companies and became statutory monopolies over the sale of cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil, palm kernel and several other minor crops. This change in policy made the colonial state directly participate in the running of the economy, buying commodities from African peasant farmers at low prices on behalf of the British government. This helps to contextualise the role played by imperial

⁴⁹ A.E. Hinds, 'Colonial Policy and Processing of Groundnuts: the Case of Georges Calil', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 19, 2 (1986), 261-273; *ibid*, 'Government Policy and the Nigerian Palm Oil Export Industry, 1939-49', *Journal of African History*, 38, 3 (1997), 459-478; R. Palmer, 'The Nyasaland Tea Industry in the Era of International Tea Restrictions, 1933-1950', *Journal of African History*, 26, 2 (1985), 215-239; T. Falola, 'Cassava Starch for Export in Nigeria during the Second World War', *African Economic History*, 18 (1989), 73-98; and N. Samasuwo, 'Food Production and War Supplies: Rhodesia's Beef Industry during the Second World War, 1939-1945', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29, 2 (June 2003), 487-502.

⁵⁰ R. Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Minerals during the Second World War', *Journal of African History*, 26 (1985), 381-408.

⁵¹ P.T. Bauer, 'Origins of the Statutory Export Monopolies of British West Africa', *The Business History Review*, 28, 3 (September 1954), 197-213; R. Alence, 'Colonial Government, Social Conflict and State Involvement in Africa's Open Economies: The Origins of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, 1939-46', *Journal of African History*, 42, 3 (2001), 397-416; D. Meredith, 'The Colonial Office, British Business Interests and the Reform of Cocoa Marketing in West Africa, 1937-1945', *Journal of African History*, 29, 2 (1988), 285-300; D. Meredith, 'State Controlled Marketing and Economic "Development": the Case of West African Produce during the Second World War', *The Economic History Review*, 39, 1 (February 1986), 77-91; G. Williams, 'Marketing without and with Marketing Boards: the Origins of State Marketing Boards in Nigeria', *Review of African Political Economy*, 34, Market Forces (December 1985), 4-15; L. van der Laan, 'Marketing West Africa's Export Crops: Modern Boards and Trading Companies', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25, 1 (March 1987), 1-24; L. van der Laan, 'The Selling Policies of African Export: Marketing Boards', *African Affairs*, 85, 340 (July 1986), 365-383; and N. Westcott, 'The East African Sisal Industry, 1929-1949: the Marketing of a Colonial Commodity during Depression and War', *Journal of African History*, 25 (1984), 445-461.

institutions such as the Ministry of Supply in the production and marketing of wartime Northern Rhodesia's natural resources which this thesis investigates.

As goods which were previously imported from Europe and North America became practically unavailable in African colonies due to war conditions, demand was created for local industries to fill the void. Industrial expansion in nearby Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during and after the war was fuelled and sustained by a combination of reasons ranging from a rising domestic demand occasioned by European immigration to the movement of Africans into urban centres.⁵² In this regard, the Second World War stimulated incipient industries and led to import substitution industrialization and growth in the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, Bulawayo and Salisbury. For example, in Southern Rhodesia, cotton spinning mills, textile factories, tanneries, the production of alcohol, asbestos, and cement recorded significant expansion. Factories increased in number from 294 in 1939 to 473 in 1948, while gross output rose from £5.4 million to £25.8 million over the same period.⁵³ These developments prompted the current study to investigate the extent to which similar policies were implemented in Northern Rhodesia in order to resolve the shortage of consumer goods which had arisen due to war conditions.

Peter Henshaw and Ronald Hyam's concerns deal with the relationship between Britain and South Africa during and after the Second World War.⁵⁴ The war's disruptions to international trade and the growing strength of the opposition National Party had the effect of entrenching South Africa's economic dependence on Britain. Rather than having to adjust to

⁵² I. Phimister, 'From Preference towards Protection: Manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia, 1940-1965', in A.S. Mlambo, E.S. Pangeti and Phimister (eds.), *A History of Manufacturing in Zimbabwe, 1890-1995* (Harare, 2000), 31-50; *ibid*, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle* (London, 1988); R. Horwitz, *The Political Economy of South Africa* (London, 1967); and H.D. Houghton, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town, 1967).

⁵³ Phimister, 'From Preference towards Protection', 31.

⁵⁴ R. Hyam and P. Henshaw, *The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War* (Cambridge, 2003).

the loss of her external markets due to the war, or shifting into alternative economic activities, South Africa found Britain willing to pay assured prices for almost all of its agricultural produce and gold. For its part, Britain was prepared to concede almost anything economically in order to keep South Africa as an ally in the war and in the sterling area afterwards. The vital presence of South Africa in the sterling area underpinned wider strategic, economic and political connections which bound the two countries very closely. Similarly, this raises the continued importance of the Northern Rhodesian copper industry to Britain in the post-war period especially following the sterling crisis of 1947.

The most comprehensive study of a British colony during the Second World War was conducted on Bechuanaland.⁵⁵ In this study, Ashley Jackson explored the social, economic, political, agricultural and military histories of colonial Botswana. He examined the country's military contribution to the war effort of its imperial overlord and what impact that participation had on its own home front. The book also considered wartime colonial Botswana's interaction with, and impact upon, events and personalities in distant imperial centres, such as Whitehall. It thus produced a unique and "total" history of an African country at war by placing oral history as a crucial source alongside archival material.⁵⁶ Using a similar approach, this thesis builds upon the foundation laid by Jackson by examining, for the first time, the major facets of the war's impact on Northern Rhodesia.

More recent and comprehensive studies of the relationship between Africa and the Second World War were conducted by David Killingray and Ashley Jackson.⁵⁷ On the one hand, Killingray's *Fighting for Britain* is the most comprehensive study attempted on the relationship between British colonial Africa and the Second World War. It relied heavily on

⁵⁵ Jackson, *Botswana*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 19.

⁵⁷ D. Killingray, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War* (Woodbridge, 2010); and Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*.

oral evidence, soldiers' letters, and other sources in which the African rank and file were noted or recorded their experiences of the war years and immediate aftermath. He did this by consolidating disparate accounts into a continental study to 'tell in their own words the story of African soldiers who fought for Britain and South Africa'.⁵⁸ Most previous works focused on regional, territorial or regimental analysis of the subject. On the other hand, Jackson's work is the first single volume to examine Britain's war effort in partnership with the rest of the Empire. It demonstrated that even the tiniest and most obscure colonies contributed to the imperial war effort. It provided an exceptional insight into the complex strategic concerns of a truly global Empire in a world war which is lacking in other works. This study, in examining the impact of the war on Northern Rhodesia, is about reverberations, how war events in one part of the world affected another in a distant place.

Civilian labour for war production was mobilized on a large scale in African colonies. Increased wartime demands, however, led to labour and food shortages which made Britain authorise the use of conscripted labour with a view to securing adequate supplies of either food or minerals. The resurgence of conscripted labour in British colonial Africa during the Second World War was an Empire-initiative mooted on the basis of war and crisis. It was introduced in early 1942 following Axis victories in South-east Asia which curtailed the supply of raw materials to the Allies. Ian Spencer notes that Kenya was the first to use forced labour for agricultural purposes.⁵⁹ In Southern Rhodesia, according to David Johnson and Kenneth Vickery, forced labour was engaged to construct aerodromes used by the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS), and to produce more food in response to increased wartime demand,⁶⁰ while

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, *Fighting for Britain*, 1.

⁵⁹ I. Spencer, 'Settler Dominance, Agricultural Production and the Second World War in Kenya', *Journal of African History*, 21, 4 (1980), 497-514.

⁶⁰ D. Johnson, 'Settler Farmers and Coerced African Labour in Southern Rhodesia', *Journal of African History*, 33 (1992), 111-128; D. Johnson, *World War Two and the Scramble for Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939-1948* (Harare, 2000); and K.P. Vickery, 'The Second World War Revival of Forced Labor in the Rhodesias', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 22, 3 (1989), 423-437.

John Iliffe explains that in Tanganyika enforced labour conscription for European plantations was started with a view to increasing the production of sisal and rubber.⁶¹ The most notorious form of labour conscription in wartime Africa took place on the tin mines of the Jos plateau in northern Nigeria where 100,000 Africans were recruited, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of them due to poor sanitary conditions.⁶² What can be deduced from these instances is that in times of war, Britain was desperate to attain victory at whatever cost. Labour conscription in this way became an important strategy of survival. Likewise, as a shortage of food on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt threatened industrial harmony and the supply of copper to the Allies by early 1942, the colonial Government resorted to enforced African labour on settler farms in order to increase production of maize.

This thesis builds upon the foundation laid in 1954 by the colony's "official" war historian.⁶³ William V. Brelsford's edited collection is a definitive survey of the movements and tasks of Northern Rhodesian servicemen during the war. This thesis attempts to revise the military historiography represented in the above work by examining other aspects of the war's impact on the colony's domestic affairs in form of agricultural, political, economic, and social sectors.

There are only a few articles written specifically on the role of the Second World War in the life of colonial Zambia. Rosaleen Smyth's article written in the early 1980s brought Northern Rhodesia historiographically into line with other former colonial territories during the war period.⁶⁴ She analysed the effect of the growth of war propaganda in hastening the rise of an African political voice. Her study provides an excellent starting point for Northern

⁶¹ J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979).

⁶² K. Jeffrey, 'The Second World War', in J.M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol. IV The Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1999), 312; W.M. Freund, 'Labour Migration to the Northern Nigerian Tin Mines, 1903-1945', *Journal of African History*, 22, 1 (1981), 73-84; and B.W. Hodder, 'Tin Mining on the Jos Plateau of Nigeria', *Economic Geography*, xxxv, ii (1959), 109-122.

⁶³ Brelsford (ed.), *The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment*.

⁶⁴ Smyth, 'War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia', 345-358.

Rhodesia's wartime history, and has profitably been built upon and amplified here through an examination of the activities of the colony's ex-servicemen in post-war. This thesis argues that while there was a general rise in African political thought in the country during the war, this movement was led by ordinary citizens, and not ex-servicemen.

Other studies focused on white-black labour relations and copper mining were done by Kusum Datta and Kenneth Vickery.⁶⁵ They argued that the Second World War presented an opportunity for undercapitalised European farmers to enlist state support in securing African labour that could not be obtained on the free market. As a result of war imperatives, a wartime agricultural crisis and diminished supply of labour, settler farmers pressured the colonial Government and London to introduce labour conscription on their farms in 1942. This was similar to measures adopted in Kenya, Nigeria and Southern Rhodesia during the same period, and this study will show how this policy was replicated in Northern Rhodesia.

Andrew Roberts and Lewis Gann separately examined the prosperity of the Northern Rhodesian copper industry both during and after the war period, and the impact that came to bear on the politico-economy of the territory and the region at large.⁶⁶ Lawrence Butler provided the most recent study of business-government relations under colonial rule and the decolonization period in Northern Rhodesia.⁶⁷ According to him, the copper-mining industry in the country was affected by three central issues since its founding in the late 1920s: overproduction, the introduction of government monopoly purchase schemes during the

⁶⁵ K. Datta, 'Farm Labour, Agrarian Capital and the State in Colonial Zambia: the African Labour Corps, 1942-52', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14, 3 (April 1988), 371-392; and Vickery, 'The Second World War: Revival of Forced Labour in the Rhodesias'.

⁶⁶ A.D. Roberts, 'Notes towards a Financial History of Copper Mining in Northern Rhodesia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 16, 2 (1982), 347-359; *ibid*, 'Northern Rhodesia: The Post-War Background, 1945-1953', J-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, G. Macola (eds.), *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in late Colonial Zambia* (Leiden, 2011); and L.H. Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper, 1923-1953', *Rhodes Livingstone Journal*, 18 (1955), 1-18.

⁶⁷ L. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c. 1930-1964* (Basingstoke, 2007).

Second World War, and the threat of nationalization. As the copper mining industry was completely reliant on external demand for its product, events beyond the industry's control underscored the cyclical nature of the Copperbelt's fortunes. By the end of the war, Britain needed Northern Rhodesia more than ever before because of the importance of dollar-earnings from copper. Northern Rhodesia was thus transformed from a neglected colony in late British imperialism due to the Empire's shifting financial and monetary priorities, as this study shows.

Only one mine, Roan Antelope, has had its operations during the war examined in detail. John Phillips' study demonstrated that the coming of the war affected mineral exploration in the periphery in order for Britain to record victory. Roan Antelope, arguably the Copperbelt's pre-eminent mine by 1939, had its position within the industry, the region, and the country at large, eroded dramatically by the end of the war due to tight production schedules demanded by the British Ministry of Supply.⁶⁸ Walima Kalusa argued that the wartime expansion of copper mining activities at the mine contributed to increased incidences of diseases such as silicosis and tuberculosis.⁶⁹ Occupational ailments due to the deterioration of housing and sanitation in the African mine compound also rose as the mine paid little attention to improving facilities because management put output maximization at the core of the mine's operations. The current study builds upon these studies in its examination of wartime mining in Northern Rhodesia.

In his examination of tariff and railway freight rates, Ackson Kanduza posited that Northern Rhodesian capital continued to face stiff resistance from the state in its quest to industrialize the country both during and after the war.⁷⁰ Due to this state laxity in protecting

⁶⁸ J.G. Phillips, 'Roan Antelope: Big Business in Central Africa', PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000, 248.

⁶⁹ W.T. Kalusa, 'Aspects of African Health in the Mining Industry in Colonial Zambia: A Case Study of Roan Antelope Mine, 1920-1964', MA Dissertation, University of Zambia, 1993.

⁷⁰ A.M. Kanduza, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 1918-1960: a Case Study of Customs Tariff and Railway Freight Policies* (Lanham, 1986).

local industries, capitalist accumulation in Northern Rhodesia was slow to rise in comparison to its southern neighbours. Northern Rhodesia was found unprepared to take advantage of war time scarcity which had induced local manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. This thesis demonstrates that there were also factors other than tariff policy that hindered the attainment of import substitution industrialization in wartime Northern Rhodesia.

Samuel Chipungu's analysis of the relationship among peasant farmers, the state, and technological development, noted that the Second World War acted as a catalyst for agricultural change in the Southern Province of Northern Rhodesia.⁷¹ The war forced the colonial government to review the condition of African peasant agriculture in order to meet the increased food requirements on the Copperbelt, whose labour force had expanded. Chipungu, however, erroneously claimed that the number of miners reached 200,000 by 1946.⁷² While agreeing that the population of African miners on the Copperbelt had increased, this study will demonstrate that the number did not reach hundreds of thousands. Nonetheless, Chipungu's study has been used as the basis for the examination of the impact of the war on the agricultural sector.

1.4. Methodology and Sources

This dissertation is based on extensive primary research conducted in Zambia between July and August 2013, and from December 2013 up to March 2014. The University of Zambia library and its related Elizabeth Colson Documentation Centre provided background reading material as well as useful government documents. The archives at the Livingstone Museum in Livingstone contain hitherto untouched materials on the history of the NRR which have only

⁷¹ S.N. Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation in Zambia: a Case Study of the Southern Province, 1930-1986* (Lusaka, 1988).

⁷² *Ibid*, 62.

recently been availed to the public. Among those I consulted were war diaries, recruitment posters, magazines and photographs pertaining to the NRR. I also used the Mining Industry Archives (formerly, the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Archives) in Ndola, which contains data related to mining operations and associated aspects during the war period. Use was also made of the extensive press coverage received by the country's mining companies in international finance and mining publications during the period under study.

However, the bulk of the archival materials were sourced from the Secretariat and Provincial Series of the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) in Lusaka. Documents utilised there included tour reports, annual reports of various government departments, newsletters, and correspondence between colonial and imperial government officials. Various newspapers and Legislative Council debates also provided information. Although the government *Mutende* newspaper was mainly used for propaganda purposes, it also proved a useful source concerning African activities and views about the goings on during the war period. So were tour reports which provided information regarding African perspectives on the recruitment and demobilization exercises. The post-war economic and social ambitions and expectations by Northern Rhodesian ex-servicemen, such as the desire for better jobs, land settlement, business ventures, and gratuities, are richly set out in many letters they wrote, some of which were intercepted by military and civilian officials. In other instances these views were recorded by government officials after inspecting African servicemen, especially as the war drew to an end.

Despite repeated efforts for authorisation from the Ministry of Defence in Lusaka to interview the few surviving members of the Ex-Servicemen's League of Zambia, this failed to yield a response. However, the thesis still contains voices of the men who fought in the war. For this, I relied upon 12 transcripts of interviews with Zambian ex-servicemen that were conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in Zambia in 1989 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war. These transcripts are lodged at the Imperial War

Museum in London. Copies of these transcriptions were availed to me by Professor Timothy Stapleton of Trent University in Canada. A short documentary, compiled by Lusaka's MUVI TV in 2011, also supplemented materials obtained from other primary and secondary sources. These oral sources contain information concerning the experiences of African servicemen in the various theatres of the war: East Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. African veterans' experiences provided a useful supplement, and sometimes a corrective to what was obtained from official documents and secondary sources. More importantly, the interviews provided voices of Africans actively involved in the recruitment and demobilization processes, missing in official records.

While using oral sources, I was also mindful of the drawbacks of relying too much on this type of data. A good deal has been written on the pitfalls of collecting and using oral evidence. A major problem being the reliability of the memories of ageing informants about events in a war in which they fought many years before.⁷³ Reliance on personal narratives also raises questions of representivity, and the extent to which generalizations may validly be drawn from a limited number of interviews. The task of the historian dealing with oral evidence, however, is to take particular phenomena and elucidate their more general meanings. As Claude Levi-Strauss observed, all the historian or ethnographer can do, and all we can expect of them, is to enlarge a specific experience to the dimensions of a more general one.⁷⁴ Gayatri Spivak further argued that it is impossible to "capture" the full reality of subaltern consciousness and memory across barriers of class and colonialism.⁷⁵ So, too, this thesis cannot imaginatively capture the full reality of Northern Rhodesia's servicemen who participated in the Second World War. More modestly, it has drawn upon a disparate group of servicemen's experiences

⁷³ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 3.

⁷⁴ C. Levi Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York, 1963), 16-17.

⁷⁵ G.C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana, 1988), 217-313.

to speak about their history. At best oral evidence has been illuminating, detailed in recall and powerfully descriptive. The voice of African veterans offers a rich and valid contribution to the history of the Second World War – important and decisive years in modern Africa’s recent past.⁷⁶

1.5. Organisation of the Study

The thesis is arranged in seven thematic chapters. Chapter One is this introduction. Chapter Two addresses the recruitment exercise of servicemen for the NRR. It demonstrates how the British monarch took the lead in calling upon colonial subjects in Northern Rhodesia to support Britain as soon as the war broke out in Europe. The colonial government mainly used chiefly institutions and propaganda to recruit personnel for the army. The chapter also argues that there were both pull and push factors for the participation of Africans in the war. Lastly, it explains that the country’s participation in the war was not without resistance from certain sections of the populace, primarily, both African and European members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Afrikaner settler community.

Chapter Three explores attempts made in trying to cope with the defeat of the Allied-controlled colonies in South-east Asia which were major sources of raw materials. In an effort to fill the void created in the supply chain of raw materials created by Japanese victories, London instructed Lusaka to revive the production of the age-old rubber and beeswax industries as alternative sources of raw materials for Allied use. The country also rejuvenated the production of iron tools, ropes and string in order to meet the demand for home consumption as these commodities could no longer be easily imported from overseas due to war conditions. The imperial government hoped this measure could lift the burden placed on it by providing scarce consumables for its colonies. Prices paid to producers of these

⁷⁶ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 3.

commodities were held down contrary to what British propaganda predicted at the start of the war. Thus, the chapter exposes divisions in opinion between colonial officials on the ground and those in London over prices that should be paid to African producers.

The next chapter contends with wartime economic challenges faced by the Northern Rhodesian “home front”. It investigates how the shortage of consumer goods, inflation, the black market, profiteering, and hoarding which had arisen due to the exigencies of the war, impacted the lives of ordinary people. As a result of these challenges, the government abandoned its *laissez faire* policy by taking a more active role in the colony’s economic affairs than it had ever done before. It tried to solve some of the economic woes through rationing schemes, price control, import substitution industrialization, and by curbing a rise in the levels of inflation. It is demonstrated that this trend continued in the post-war period due to persistent commodity shortages owing to convertibility challenges in the sterling area.

Chapter Five explains the impact of the war on the colony’s economic mainstay – copper mining. The bulk-purchasing scheme of copper developed by the Ministry of Supply ensured that the commodity was bought at a uniform price throughout the war period and only supplied to Britain and its Allies. Following the devaluation of sterling in 1949, the British government put pressure on the copper mining industry to produce more copper for sale to dollar-earning countries. This state of affairs accounts for Britain’s continued hold on the colony post-war. Free market conditions in the copper trade were only restored in April 1953 following the re-opening of the LME which had been closed at the start of the hostilities. The chapter also demonstrates that in the post-war period, the colonial state became very active in uplifting the socio-economic condition of the hitherto neglected local African population. This era was also characterised by the formulation and implementation of “development” plans aimed at transforming the economic and social sectors, especially agriculture on which many

people relied for their livelihood. This measure, the chapter suggests, was implemented due to Britain's self-interest of securing its domestic food supply.

Then follows Chapter Six which outlines the demobilization exercise undertaken at the end of the war. Many African servicemen felt cheated by this process which was based on a system of racial hierarchy whereby European ex-servicemen received more favourable rewards than them. It is argued that the dissatisfaction by African ex-servicemen over perceived broken promises, however, was a universal phenomenon that also affected colonial personnel in other parts of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Complaints about conditions of service in colonial armies, it is argued, in fact did not always follow the end of the war, as protests and mutinies occurred in many theatres before 1945. Contrary to older academic arguments, the chapter argues that African ex-servicemen did not collectively participate in nationalist politics. They remained concerned with personal and domestic matters, the welfare of family, improvement in the home village, and using their gratuity either to buy consumer goods to improve their immediate lives or to establish a business.

The last chapter is the Conclusion which summarises all the major findings and significance of the thesis. This thesis nuances an original contribution to Zambian history by its comprehensive examination of the impact of the Second World War on the territory. Furthermore, this thesis adds to the historiography of the Second World War in Africa in that it questions the prevailing wisdom concerning the impact of the war upon the continent by examining in detail Northern Rhodesia's experience which has hitherto been lacking. This thesis also makes a contribution to debates in Imperial history seeking to explain the decolonisation process in Africa after the Second World War.

CHAPTER TWO

Military Labour Recruitment and Mobilization

2.1. Introduction

While Northern Rhodesia's major contribution to the British war effort was the provision of base metals, human resource mobilization counted second in priority. This chapter

examines the recruitment and mobilization of servicemen for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) during the Second World War. It begins with a discussion on the perception of the public regarding the outbreak of war. Then it explains why African chiefs buttressed military recruitment so strongly, and how ordinary people viewed and reacted to the call to arms. It is argued that while the government used chiefly institutions and propaganda to entice Africans into joining the army, the local people also had their own reasons for enlistment. The chapter also shows that contrary to older academic arguments, war service was not wholly destructive to African life, as those who remained behind devised coping strategies in the absence of male relatives. Another strand in the argument in this chapter is how subversive elements in the form of the Watch Tower Sect and the settler Afrikaner society campaigned against the war effort made in the country. In doing this, it is shown that contrary to conventional thought, the Watch Tower movement was neither unofficial, underground nor entirely a non-European entity.

2.2. Reaction to War News

On Sunday 3 September 1939, His Majesty King George VI spoke, through radio, to the Empire from London. In his speech, the King invoked a spirit of patriotism, rallying colonial subjects to Britain's war cause. Not only was this speech broadcast in Northern Rhodesia, as in the rest of Empire, but it was also translated into various local languages and published in the *Mutende* newspaper aimed at the African readership. Part of the speech read:

[f]or the second time in the lives of most of us, we are at war. Over and over again we have tried to find a peaceful way out of the differences between ourselves and those who are now our enemies, but this has been in vain ... Such a principle, stripped of all disguise, is surely the primitive doctrine that might is right, and if this principle were established throughout the world the freedom of our own country and the whole British Commonwealth of Nations would be in danger ...

It is to this high purpose that I now call upon my people at home and across the seas who will make our cause their own. I ASK THEM TO STAND CALM, FIRM AND UNITED IN THIS TIME OF TRIAL [Emphasis in the original].¹

Before the outbreak of the war, government propaganda in the country presented King George VI as the symbol of Empire, a kind of super paramount chief to whom all Africans owed loyalty, through a “monarchical ideology” linking the ruler and ruled.² It was to this super chief that during the Second World War the people of Northern Rhodesia were to pledge their loyalty. The Secretary of State for the Colonies Harold Macmillan also added his voice in seeking the help of colonial subjects to help Britain win the war against the Axis powers. He stated:

[l]ong and happy associations of so many people of different races and creeds under the British Crown is in itself the best proof that the ideal of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between diverse people, who are willing to understand and respect each other is attainable.³

When Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, the government of Northern Rhodesia was interested in reassuring itself that the local people in the country backed the colonial master in this conflict.⁴ Its attitude towards African participation in the war was

¹ Mutende No. 44, 12 September 1939.

² R. Smyth, ‘War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia’, *African Affairs*, 83, 332 (1984), 346.

³ Mutende No. 44, 12 September 1939.

⁴ It is a source of historiographical debate that the Second World War did not start in 1939 but at different times for different people. It could be argued that for Africans the war actually started when Italy conquered Abyssinia in 1935, and for East Asians when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1937. For a discussion on this aspect, see J. Black, *World War Two: A Military History* (London, 2003), 31-35; C. Bayly and T. Harper, *Britain’s Asian Empire and the War with Japan* (London, 2004); *ibid*, *Forgotten War: the End of Britain’s Asian Empire* (London, 2007); T.M. Williamsen, ‘The Second Sino-Japanese War, 1931-1945’, in L.E. Lee (ed.), *World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the War’s Aftermath, with General Themes: A Handbook of Literature and Research* (Westport, 1998), 27-44; M.A. Barnhart, ‘International Relations and the Origins of the War in Asia and the Pacific War’, in L.E. Lee (ed.), *World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the War’s Aftermath, with General Themes: A Handbook of Literature and Research* (Westport, 1998), 5-24; and D. Killingray, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers during the Second World War* (Woodbridge, 2010), 7, 50-53.

disarmingly straightforward. Northern Rhodesia would participate in the war as a loyal member of the British Empire because the mother country had given protection to the territory since its colonisation in 1890. It was reasoned, because of this, that people enjoyed freedom in the territory. Governor John Maybin's message was couched in an appealing tone. In a special edition of *Mutende* newspaper published on 3 September 1939, the Governor stated that, '[t]he Government will require recruits for the Regiment and drivers for its transport and I am confident that Africans will prove their desire to serve their King by promptly offering their service.'⁵ This plea was directed at chiefs – the custodians of the country's traditional power structure, and was made through government bureaucrats and the press. The Governor informed all chiefs in the country that war had been declared in Europe and requested a guarantee of their loyalty to the British Crown.⁶ This policy of using traditional leaders rather than government functionaries in appealing for support from African masses was candidly stated by the Editor of *Mutende* newspaper. 'From experience' he said, 'I find that a letter from a chief or comments by a reader (or by the Editor under a Native name!) cut a great deal more "ice" than a dozen "leaders" or messages from Europeans'.⁷ Such requests were routine procedures all over the Empire during the war.⁸ In this way, the war contributed to the revival of chiefly powers regarding the recruitment of personnel for the army, a role they had played during the First World War.

⁵ *Mutende* Special Edition, 3 September 1939.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ) NP1/13/13 Loc 4840, Editor, *Mutende* to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 14 September 1939.

⁸ See especially, Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*; M.N. Ntabeni, 'Military Labour Mobilisation in Colonial Lesotho during World War II, 1940-1943', *Scientia Military: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 36, 2 (2008), 36-59; A. Jackson, 'Bad Chiefs and Sub-Tribes: Aspects of Recruitment for the British Army in Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1941-42', *Botswana Notes and Records* 28 (1996), 87-96; *ibid*, *Botswana, an African Country at War, 1939-45* (Oxford, 1999); *ibid*, 'Motivation and Mobilisation for the War: Recruitment for the British Army in Bechuanaland Protectorate', *African Affairs*, 96, 384 (1997), 399-417; D. Killingray, 'Labour Mobilisation for the War Effort in British Colonial Africa, 1939-46', in *ibid* and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 68-96; *ibid*, 'Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast during the Second World War', *Journal of African History*, 23, 1 (1982), 83-95; and H.S. Simelane, 'Labor Mobilization for the War Effort in Swaziland, 1940-1942', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 26, 3 (1993), 541-574.

Each of the four principal chiefs responded with positive statements pledging loyalty to the mother country and to help “their king”. These messages were drafted by the chiefs and their senior officials. Paramount Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni people was one of the first to pledge his loyalty to the imperial government’s war effort. Mpezeni, whose people had fought British colonialists at the end of the previous century, briefly referred to his people’s physical fighting qualities and assured the colonial government that the Ngoni stood loyally by the British King. In his message to the Governor he said, “[w]e are sorry to hear that war has broken out in Europe ... we have derived such blessings and benefits from British rule that we Angoni all stand loyally by our Governor and our King in this hour of need.”⁹

Through his Prime Minister, the Ngambela, the Barotse Paramount Chief Yeta III pledged his loyalty and desire to help King George VI in every way possible to win the war.¹⁰ Chief Kalonga Gawa Undi of the Chewa people of Fort Jameson stated the following:

[w]e Chiefs and people of the Achewa tribe feel it is our duty to stand firmly and loyally by the British Empire and the King during difficulties and troubles at any time and we shall not shake in time of danger. We wish our promise of loyalty should be conveyed to our Governor and His Majesty the King.¹¹

For his part, Paramount Chief Chitimukulu of the Bemba people affirmed his loyalty to Britain because, according to him, the British were simply trying to stop the German persecution of Poland. ‘Britain is only fighting to save a smaller nation from persecution’, he said, ‘on this account my people are willing and ready to offer their services in defence of their country and the Empire in whatever way we may be required’.¹²

⁹ *Mutende* No. 44, 12 September 1939.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

For other chiefs, it was a matter of expressing their continued loyalty and support to the British, as they had done during the First World War when they helped to recruit porters for the East Africa campaign. In the case of Chief Mwewa of the Ng'umbo people of Fort Rosebery district, his pledge of loyalty to King George was because:

[i]n 1914 we fought to help our king, and many of our people died ... When the war finished in 1918, and we were all very glad and said "We are saved". We were glad because we knew that the rule of our king was good. Now may God help our king again. If the war comes here we shall help as we did in the past. We are not afraid. We want to live in peace in Africa.¹³

This stance was also echoed by Chief Imwiko Lewanika of Mwindi in Sesheke district. Referring to Britain as "our great father", the chief stated that he could not support Hitler because he had never fallen under the suzerainty of Germany. Using a proverb, the chief said, 'it is not our custom to praise the paddle which you have never used before. All Malozi should remember this saying!'¹⁴ In the same vein, Chief Milambo of the Ushi people of Fort Rosebery district also assured the Governor of his chiefdom's support for the British war effort because, according to him, the people of Northern Rhodesia were well-taken care of by British colonialism. Like Chief Imwiko above, he too, likened the British to being parents to the people of Northern Rhodesia, hence the need for the "children" to aid Britain in the war. In his message affirming loyalty to Britain, Chief Milambo stated the following:

I begin by assuring His Excellency on behalf of all the Baushi of our whole hearted support in this war. We wish to help as we did in 1914. We are your children, and you have looked after us well, and we do not want our father to be changed for another who is not our father. Therefore we are ready to help in this war in any

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Mutende* No. 45, 26 September 1939.

way we can. We also wish to send [a] loyal message to the Bwana [Master] king, who rules us so well. We are not afraid of fighting, and I hope that God will give us powers so that the Germans will be defeated, as they were in the past, and then we can live in peace again.¹⁵

Arguably the most enthusiastic response came from Chief Tafuna of the Lungu people in Abercorn district who said:

[w]e are sorry to hear about the war which has broken out in Europe. I, Chief Tafuna, and all my people want to give what help we can, as the Governor shall require of us. As we helped during the Great War of 1914, so shall we do now. We shall give all the assistance we can. We all hope that the British Empire will stand forever and that the enemy of peace may be destroyed. Nearly all the people here dislike the German rule, and are contented under the British Government. Under the British rule we have justice and freedom. Thus, we shall rise and help the Governor in whatever he wants us to do. If a man attacks another man's father shall not the son go to help him? We are like sons and so we will give assistance to the father – the British Empire.¹⁶

There were many other pledges of loyalty that came from different chiefs throughout the country.¹⁷ As in much of colonial Africa, these avid chiefly expressions of allegiance to Britain were made without the knowledge of their subjects, however.¹⁸

¹⁵ NAZ NP1/13/13 Loc 4840, Chief Milambo (Fort Rosebery) to Editor, *Mutende* (Lusaka), 14 September 1939.

¹⁶ *Mutende* No. 44, 12 September 1939; and NAZ NP1/13/13 Loc 4840 Chief Tafuna to Editor, *Mutende* (Lusaka), 14 September 1939.

¹⁷ See, for example, *ibid*, Chief Mporokoso (Mporokoso) to District Commissioner (Mporokoso), 7 September 1939; *ibid*, Chief Nsama (Mporokoso) to District Commissioner (Mporokoso), 7 September 1939; *ibid*, Chief Mukupa Katandula (Mporokoso) to District Commissioner (Mporokoso), 7 September 1939; Chief Nsokolo (Abercorn) to District Commissioner (Abercorn), 7 September 1939. See also *Mutende* No. 45, 26 September 1939 for messages of loyalty from Senior Chiefs Kambombo, Magodi, and Mwase from Lundazi district.

¹⁸ See, for example, Jackson, *Botswana*, 34; *ibid*, 'Motivation and Mobilisation', 406-7; Killingray, 'Military Labour Recruitment'; and Simelane, 'Labor Mobilization'.

But not all chiefs pledged their loyalty to the British Crown. Others questioned this loyalism to the British monarch. Chief Mwanachingwala, of the Tonga people in Mazabuka district, voiced his reservation against supporting the British cause during the war. When asked to help with the recruitment of servicemen, his reply, described by the District Commissioner as ‘typical of his undistinguishable career’, was that ‘Bwana, we are all ... women; and we are afraid [of going to war]’.¹⁹ He had not cooperated with government officials before the war broke out, having opposed the colonial government’s land alienation programme in the Southern province in the 1920s.²⁰

2.3. Government Propaganda and the Maintenance of a Positive Public Opinion

To mobilise public opinion in support of the war, the colonial government began to pay more attention to African views than it had done before its outbreak. It tried to influence public opinion by means of a propaganda campaign involving newspapers, leaflets, talks by District Commissioners, radio broadcasts and cinema shows which were designed to explain the war and account for the economic strains brought about by the hostilities, and encourage men to join the army. Government policy was aimed at keeping educated and urbanised Africans as fully and accurately informed about the war as possible, but to avoid giving too much confusing detail to those in rural areas because they were regarded as too remote to understand the war’s technicalities.²¹ To do this, the government came to rely on *Mutende* newspaper. This was a newspaper published by the Information Office meant for African readership in simple English and four other widely spoken local languages: *iciBemba*, *chiNyanja*, *chiTonga*, and *siLozi*. At the outbreak of the war, the newspaper’s circulation was about 5,600; in 1944 this figure was estimated at 18,000. Its message reached a much greater audience as it was projected that each

¹⁹ NAZ SP4/2/9 Loc 5082 Mazabuka District Tour Report No. 7 of 1939.

²⁰ See, for example, S.N. Chipungu, ‘African Leadership under Indirect Rule in Colonial Zambia’, in Chipungu (ed.), *Guardians in their time: Experiences of Zambians under Colonial Rule, 1890-1964* (London, 1992), 67-9.

²¹ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I. Information Officer (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 22 April 1940.

copy was seen by 10 people.²² Fortnightly issues replaced monthly ones from September 1939 until the end of the war. Also as a war measure, a free issue of *Mutende* was supplied to every chief in each district until the end of December 1939. In cases where a chief already subscribed to the newspaper, the extra copy was made available to other members of his Council so that the dissemination of war news reached as far and wide as possible.²³ In January 1940, Native Authority Funds took over the responsibility of buying copies at three pence each.

Broadcasting targeted at African audiences was started in October 1939. This was done from Nkana on the Copperbelt with the assistance of members of the Radio Society. The radio broadcasts, in the four major local languages, consisted of war news bulletins (broadcast on Mondays and Fridays) and a war news discussion programme every week.²⁴ The broadcasts were listened to throughout the southern African region and proved so successful that another broadcasting station was opened at Lusaka. Among the prominent people enticed to speak to the African audience were traditional leaders. Chief Mwase Kasungu of Nyasaland was flown into Northern Rhodesia at government expense in August 1940 specifically for propaganda purposes, following his trip to Britain early that year. He was especially chosen because he was regarded as an extremely intelligent chief who exerted a good deal of influence over his people. Most importantly, he was perceived to have a great deal of sympathy for the Allied cause.²⁵ He spoke to Africans in the chiNyanja language during three broadcasts in which he appealed for them to remain loyal to the Allied war effort.

The main source of descriptive war news came from the newly-established British Ministry of Information (MOI). The Ministry provided news articles about the war and related

²² Ibid; and Smyth, 'War Propaganda', 352.

²³ NAZ SEC1/76 Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to all District Commissioners, 26 October 1939; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I. Information Officer (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 22 April 1940.

²⁴ Ibid, Information Officer to Chief Secretary, 22 April 1940.

²⁵ NAZ SEC2/425 Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Information Officer (Lusaka), 26 June 1940; and ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Zomba, Nyasaland), 7 August 1940.

photographs to the local Information Office for distribution to media houses in Northern Rhodesia. By 1 December 1939, 435 articles and 500 photographs had been received from London and made available to *Mutende*.²⁶ Copies were also supplied to schools and mission stations.

On the other hand, the European settler community was serviced by the *Northern Rhodesia Advertiser*, *Livingstone Mail*, Northern Rhodesia Newsletter, and Southern Rhodesia Newsletter. 100 copies of the Indian Information Newsletter were circulated to the Asian community once fortnightly in addition to the two newsletters from both Rhodesias.²⁷ The Afrikaner community was provided with the Afrikaans Newsletter fortnightly, whose circulation in early 1940 was 300 copies.²⁸ This newsletter consisted of South African and local news items, as well as information counteracting German propaganda.

Towards the end of the 1930s, Britain had become concerned about its image as a colonial power. In order to bring the Empire together, it was decided that a new theme was needed to portray her relationship with her colonies. During the war, the new image of Empire became partnership; trusteeship was abandoned because it was thought to be not sufficiently dynamic.²⁹ The cornerstone of this propaganda was the conventional cliché of Anglo-Saxon democracy and its right to fight for and defend “freedom”. With this type of propaganda, it was not surprising that leaders like Chief Tafuna could claim that people in Northern Rhodesia enjoyed freedom under British colonisation as shown above. Part of this hypocritical campaign appealed to Africans to support the British war effort failure to which they would be exploited

²⁶ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I. Information Officer to Chief Secretary, 22 April 1940.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ R. Smyth, ‘Britain’s African Colonies and British Propaganda during the Second World War’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, XIV (1985), 69.

by German colonialists who, it was alleged, would buy colonial produce at uneconomic prices. This type of propaganda is illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.




Figure 2.1: Propaganda Poster I

Source: Imperial War Museum, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections>, accessed on 18 December 2014.

SLAVES UNDER HITLER

The Germans rob people whenever they can and they never pay cash for what they take. So you would have no money to buy food or anything else that you wanted, for yourself or your children.

You would be allowed only enough food to keep you working for Germany. You could not build your own house and you could not even have a small business. You could not have bicycles or sewing machines.

You would be a slave, working always for the Germans, from childhood to old age. The produce you bring to market would not be your property at all. You would receive no money and there would be no profit from your work.



You would not receive cash payment for your produce



You would have no money for goods and could not buy where you wished



Germans would take your produce and give you no goods in return

Figure 2.2: Propaganda Poster II

Source: Imperial War Museum, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections>, accessed on 18 December 2014.

The Colonial Office in London realised that mobilisation for total war required a coordinated propaganda campaign to combat dissension and aid recruitment for the army. The main organiser of this propaganda campaign was the MOI. The MOI provided publicity materials including posters, pamphlets, and films to Information Officers in each colony. In Northern Rhodesia, this responsibility fell to Kenneth Bradley, the country's first Information Officer, and from 1943, Harry Franklin. The Colonial Office nonetheless continued to formulate its own propaganda campaign aimed at the colonies. The Colonial Film Unit in London made and supplied propaganda films in African colonies. By 1944, 101 titles had been shown in the territory.³⁰ The local Information Office went around the country with its only cinema van to show propaganda films to as many people as possible. By the end of the war, an estimated 80,000 people were said to have seen films shown by the mobile van in various parts of the country.³¹ Yet some of these 16mm films, especially those which lacked human action, were criticised for not appealing to intelligent African audiences.³²

The publicity campaigns devised by the Colonial Office and MOI were designed to convince colonial subjects of three interrelated elements as far as the war was concerned. It was pointed out that Britain was fighting evil (Nazism); that the moral and material development of the Empire after the war depended upon victory; and that by the united efforts of "right-thinking persons" this victory could be assured.³³ The ideological content of this campaign and its articles designed to drum up enthusiasm for the war effort, were written in a typical war propaganda vein, simplifying the conflict as one being fought between oppressed and liberated peoples. Much of this fell on the use of fables where Germany and Adolf Hitler

³⁰ NAZ SEC2/1122, Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the African Film Library and Purchasing Committee held at Kitwe on 20 June 1944.

³¹ Smyth, 'War Propaganda', 349.

³² Ibid, African Film Library and Purchasing Committee Annual Report for 1941; NAZ SEC2/1280, Report on the Provision of Films at Chitokoloki Mission, 13 July 1942; and Smyth, 'War Propaganda', 350.

³³ Smyth, 'Britain's African Colonies', 74.

were constructed as the evil that needed to be defeated at all costs. In one fable, “The Rogue Elephants”, Germans were depicted as people who always caused trouble and never seemed to be able to settle down to live peacefully with others. Germans were compared with a herd of rogue elephants:

[i]n 1914, the elephants raided the gardens of the French. There were many elephants and they were very mad. It took four years to drive the elephants out of the gardens and kill those which were maddest ... The British are another tribe nearby and they agreed with the French that the elephants had become a danger again. When in 1939 the elephants broke out again and started raiding the gardens of small tribes, they called again and warned the small tribes who were not attacked ... Already six small tribes have had their gardens ruined and for six months the British and French have waited for the elephants to come where they could kill them ... When the British and French suggested that they should help the small tribes to dig game pits and put up fences, they were always told that if they were allowed, the British and French to help, the elephants would become angry again.³⁴

Additionally, *Mutende* printed the story of:

The Mad Bull: Another Story to Help You to Understand the Happenings in Europe. The mad bull (Hitler) lived in a village in Europe and was menacing the neighbouring villages. Two strong villagers Jim (Britain) and Tom (France) built a kraal, reinforced with more fences behind the main fence, round the bull. The bull fought wildly breaking fences as he struggled to get out. The villagers mocked and jeered at Jim and Tom because they did not go and finish the bull off

³⁴ *Mutende* No. 63, June 1940.

immediately. They retorted that they would wait until the bull had exhausted himself, 'Then, friends, we will all go and make a big killing'.³⁵

Another story was found in the *Bantu Mirror* in which it was stated that:

[t]he leaders of [the] British and French people have been working hard for the past year to try and persuade the leader of the German people to stop his bad custom of stealing other countries like a thief who beats people on the road with a stick and then takes their goods . . .³⁶

Colonial authorities tried to convince the local people that their lot would be significantly worse under German rule than the British, by expressing the ruthlessness of Hitler and his Nazi party in dramatic language and pictures as exemplified in Figure 2.3. *Mutende* carried the following depiction of how the Germans treated people in recently-annexed Poland:

Polish people must get out of the way of Germans in the streets if it is possible for them to recognise the Germans by their uniforms or armbands (the streets belong to the conqueror (the Germans) and not to the conquered (the Poles)). Male Poles must show their respect for all people of high rank, the Nazi party and the military forces, by taking their hats off. In shops and at the market all representatives of the Germans, must be served first, before the conquered.³⁷

It was constantly brought to the attention of Africans that if the Axis occupied Northern Rhodesia, their position would be only a little better than that of Polish slaves.³⁸ Government

³⁵ *Mutende* No. 62, May 1940. See also Smyth, 'War Propaganda', 351.

³⁶ *Bantu Mirror*, 30 January 1940. Such kind of propaganda was historically ironic because Britain herself was renowned for "stealing" other countries, making her the world's leading colonial power. What can be deduced from this propaganda campaign is that during war, Britain ignored her own frailties in order to win the sympathy of her colonial subjects.

³⁷ *Mutende* No. 63, June 1940.

³⁸ NAZ EP4/2/9 Loc 5477 Lundazi Tour Report No. 10 of 1940.

officials emphasised that it was up to everyone to defend Northern Rhodesia and fight for King George VI.




Figure 2.3: Propaganda Poster III

Source: Imperial War Museum, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections>, accessed on 18 December 2014.

This “evil” propaganda seems to have been successful, even among educated Africans. A typical example is a poem, “The Boom Beyond the Seas”, written by Francis Chandwe, a teacher at Katondwe Mission and published in *Mutende* newspaper in October 1939:

The boom of German artillery,
And the explosion of bombs,
Beyond the seas, has caused great convulsions to the world.

The flight of planes over Poland,
And the showering of bullets over the Poles,
The odium, and the abject poverty,
And misery that will follow is unspeakable.

The cataclysm of this catastrophe,
And the kleptomania of the German monarch,
In search of the road to Utopia
Is horribly detrimental to the world.

The destruction of thousands of lives,
The umbra of fear cast over Poland
The sadism, as it were of the ignoramus,
Yet of a far civilised being, is inconceivable.

The evil of the calamity of that ilk,
The world felt indignation,
And the calmness of the British Empire,
The world can not express.

Poland! Poland! Poland!

Though small as you are
Will you yield, knowing the doom and destruction
Of your liberty, autonomy and your Catholicism?
God forbid!³⁹

As the war progressed, however, it was realised that the “evil things” propaganda could backfire and should be avoided. It was determined that propaganda should focus on the positive aspects of “togetherness” and “future colonial objectives”. Already government officials were finding it difficult to answer queries from some intelligent Africans who wondered whether Britain and the colonial government had the moral right to question German atrocities because their rule in the country was also questionable. It is most probable that this kind of reasoning was as a direct response to the propaganda which was spread in the country such as the one found in the *Bantu Mirror* above in which Germany was portrayed by the British as a thief who stole other countries. The irony of this type of propaganda was that by colonising Northern Rhodesia, Britain had also “stolen” the country. The District Commissioner for Mongu was challenged by the local people when asked whether Hitler treated his white slaves any better than Europeans treated Africans in Northern Rhodesia.⁴⁰ Early in the war, the Information Officer warned the colonial government that:

[t]he African agrees strongly with Hitler that neutrals should be invaded and women and children bombed in order to win the war ... He must be educated out of this savage outlook and stress is being laid more and more on the true value for which we are fighting. This is an uphill task and it becomes more difficult with every fresh piece of criminal initiative on the part of the Nazis.⁴¹

³⁹ *Mutende* No. 46, October 1939.

⁴⁰ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Report on Public Opinion for Barotse Province for February and March 1942, 1 April 1942.

⁴¹ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I. Information Officer (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 22 April 1940.

While the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, the country's only research institution, wanted to continue with atrocity propaganda in Barotseland in 1943, the government objected to this policy. In reply to a proposal made by the Director of the Institute, the Chief Secretary to the government stated the following:

[i]n some ways I think I wish your article had appeared 18 months ago, for it was at that stage in particular that we had to impress on the African how necessary it was to fight Hitler ... I still think that there is a strain in the African make up which would consider some of the Nazi methods sound policy. If you can destroy your enemy's house, his wife and family, you are doing something towards beating him. In fact such acts are really rather clever.⁴²

Despite these reservations, the use of crude anti-German propaganda continued to be used in Northern Rhodesia, as in most parts of Africa. Fear was a strong motivator for those who had knowledge of German imperial goals in the 1914-18 war. For many people living on the western border of the country, stories about German campaigns against the Herero in German West Africa also abounded because they lived in close proximity.⁴³

Britain's gratitude for colonial support in the war effort also became a favourite Colonial Office theme in trying to maintain pride and a positive public perception of the war among its African colonial subjects. This was done through the publication of posters which were distributed in Northern Rhodesia, as was the case with all other colonies, to thank the local people for their financial contribution to the imperial war effort. The posters depicted images of several fighter planes involved in aerial attacks on German aircraft, ports and ships. These planes were regarded to have been bought using financial assistance rendered by

⁴² Elizabeth Colson Research and Documentation Centre (hereafter ECRDC) FLE-LAB, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Director, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (Livingstone) 8 July 1943.

⁴³ Ibid, Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (Livingstone) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 8 July 1943.

Northern Rhodesia and other colonies. Figure 2.4 shows a poster with a caption: YOUR 'HURRICANES' IN ACTION',⁴⁴ accompanied by the following text:

[s]ubscriptions from Northern Rhodesia have bought 'Hurricane' fighter aircraft for Britain. These planes protect British homes and industries from aerial attack and harass enemy shipping and transport. When enemy bombers approach Britain, the fighters go up to drive them away. Here is a Northern Rhodesia fighter plane shooting down an enemy bomber over one of Britain's industrial towns. Northern Rhodesia fighter planes also take part in offensive sweeps over enemy-occupied territory and cause much damage to shipping and transport and communications with their machine-gun fire. Northern Rhodesia fighters protect Allied merchant ships from hostile aircraft. Many vital cargoes have reached port only because of the watchful presence of fighter planes. Thank you, Northern Rhodesia!⁴⁵

Other war gifts which were acknowledged and publicised by imperial authorities included contributions for mobile canteens, war charities such as the Red Cross and St. John Fund, King George's Fund for Sailors, Air Raid Relief, a cinema van, and the Duke of Gloucester's Fund for medical aid to Russia.⁴⁶ Financial donations made throughout the country were also published periodically in *Mutende*. By October 1940, a sum of £37,486 7s had been raised for war charities.⁴⁷ The colonial Government also loaned one million pounds to the British Government free of interest as a contribution towards the Imperial war effort.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Imperial War Museum, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/32950>, accessed on 18 December 2014.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ *Mutende*, 4 October 1940.

⁴⁸ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates of the 3rd Session of the 7th Council, 20 November-10 December 1943* (Lusaka, 1944), 17.




Figure 2.4: Hurricanes in Action Poster

Source: Imperial War Museum, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/object32950>, accessed 18 December 2014.

Another poster was titled 'YOUR MOBILE CANTEEN IN ACTION' which was used to thank the people of Northern Rhodesia for their financial contributions towards feeding servicemen at the war front is illustrated in figure 2.5. below.




Figure 2.5: Mobile Canteen Poster. Source: Imperial War Museum, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/object15819>, accessed 18 December 2014.

2.4. Phases of Recruitment for the NRR

There were three periods of military recruitment in Northern Rhodesia – 1939, with the initial expansion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR) and its deployment in East

Africa; 1940 through to late 1942, following the fall of France and the entry of Italy and Japan into the war; and lastly, the provision of reinforcements for the Asian expeditionary force in 1943-44. Once France fell in June 1940, all prospect of an Allied containment of German power in Europe waned and permitted Benitto Mussolini to enter the war, resulting in campaigns in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The entry of Italy in the war on 10 June 1940 widened the war beyond Europe. Feeling that Italian greatness required domination of the Mediterranean, and therefore, British defeat, Mussolini sought gains from the British Empire and from France, and more power in the Balkans.⁴⁹ Without the French fleet to help defend the Mediterranean, Britain was now the only active opponent of Nazi Germany. Vast new burdens were placed upon a British war machine scarcely capable of ensuring home defence with Italian attacks upon Egypt and Suez, and in 1941, the entry of German military power into the Mediterranean and North Africa.⁵⁰ Italy was able to carry out her activities in North Africa because of the huge metropolitan and colonial forces she maintained in Libya and recently-conquered Abyssinia. In East Africa, plans for the defence of British Somaliland, should Italy enter the war, were torn up when French Somaliland and its sizeable armed forces signalled their loyalty to the Vichy regime, making Britain's position there untenable.⁵¹

Besides, from June 1940, the Japanese navy begun full mobilisation in South-east Asia, although the German failure to invade Britain discouraged ideas of an attack on British colonies that year.⁵² Japanese intervention against Britain was deferred for another 15 months. In the interim, Japan began its expansion into colonial South-east Asia by invading French Indochina.⁵³ From December 1941, Allied war with Japan threatened the British position in Africa and the Middle East. The greatest crisis of the war arrived with the Japanese defeat of

⁴⁹ Black, *World War Two*, 56.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 45-56; and B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (London, 1970), 109.

⁵¹ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 173.

⁵² Black, *World War Two*, 89.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 88.

the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.⁵⁴ The Japanese also attacked British and American positions in the Western Pacific and East Asia. This drastic turn of events forced a swift change in the British policy regarding the expansion of the forces in East Africa for similar reasons. Following the fall of Singapore and bombing of Ceylon at the hands of the Japanese, the British Eastern fleet withdrew to Mombasa, thereby bringing East Africa directly into the Japanese theatre of the war.⁵⁵ An all-out imperial war effort was directed toward a wider involvement of manpower and increased material resources from the colonies on an unprecedented level.

The numbers of Italian men in Africa dwarfed those of the British Empire: there were 300,000 Italians and colonial troops in Italy's African Empire compared to 88,500 British, Dominion and colonial troops in British Africa.⁵⁶ It was in this context that the expansion of the NRR was instituted. In 1939 the NRR had one battalion, but increased to eight during the course of the conflict. A total of 15,000 Africans participated in the war, of which 98 were killed in action, 171 were wounded, and 300 others died of other causes.⁵⁷ Between 700 and 800 Europeans from the territory served abroad, of whom 40 lost their lives.⁵⁸ The NRR served in East Africa, Madagascar, Somaliland, Ceylon, India, Palestine and Burma in various capacities.

2.5. Reasons and Motives for Recruitment

⁵⁴ See, for example, E.L. Rasor, 'The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor', in L.E. Lee (ed.), *World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the War's Aftermath, with General Themes: A Handbook of Literature and Research* (Westport, 1998), 45-55; K. Kotani, 'Pearl Harbor: Japanese Planning and Command Structure', in D. Marston, (ed.), *The Pacific War Companion: from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima* (Oxford, 2005), 29-45; and G.L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge, 1994).

⁵⁵ Black, *World War Two*, 100.

⁵⁶ Liddell Hart, *History*, 121.

⁵⁷ L.H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953* (London, 1963), 327. In 1939, the African population in the country was estimated at 1,300,000 and that of Europeans at 20,000. The exact number of men who served in African colonial forces is not always easy to calculate. Certain men served for a short term, some re-enlisting while others enlisted in nearest neighbouring territories.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 328.

2.5.1. The Role of Chiefs and Propaganda

Of course, no general picture can adequately capture the diverse motives for enlisting in the NRR in wartime. The main method of recruitment was through chiefs and their headmen, who acted as recruiting agents on behalf of colonial authorities. Chiefs were viewed by the colonial state as having considerable influence and it was believed that their subjects would respond to their appeal for men for the NRR. Chiefs' willingness to collaborate with the British authorities must be viewed within the context of colonial power relations.⁵⁹ Colonial rule was always a threat to traditional authorities in Africa. Although military enlistments were supposedly the fruits of spontaneous loyalism, in practice pressure from chiefs counted for more than civic spirit.⁶⁰ As David Killingray observed, when chiefs were used as recruiting agents for the war, the line between voluntary and compulsory service was often very thin.⁶¹ Unlike in the High Commission Territories (Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Lesotho), Northern Rhodesia did not have one or two central monarchs but many scattered across the country's seven provinces. This meant that the government had to approach the numerous chiefs in all parts of the country. The main chiefs were Chitimukulu of the Bemba, Mpezeni of the Ngoni, the Litunga of the Lozi, and Kalonga Gawa Undi of the Chewa. These in turn had various senior and junior chiefs below them who were helped by numerous headmen at the village level. Within the framework of customary social and political order many Africans obeyed the instructions of chiefs to join the army.⁶²

Generally, a chief called a meeting of villages under his jurisdiction and provided information and encouragement to potential recruits based on colonial government and military circulars that outlined the terms and conditions of service and procedures on enlistment. At

⁵⁹ Simelane, 'Labor Mobilization', 550.

⁶⁰ J.D. Hargreaves, *Decolonisation in Africa* (London, 1996), 55.

⁶¹ Killingray, 'Military and Labour Recruitment', 89, 91, 95.

⁶² *Ibid*, 'Labour Mobilisation', 77.

other times, these meetings were attended by personnel from the NRR or civil servants. Some men were caught up in the excitement of the moment in response to the passionate and persuasive call at such meetings. However, it is too simplistic to see chiefs' orders for men to join the army as a sign of "exploitation", because it was their traditional right to call their people, especially when their interests were threatened as they were by German aggression during the war.⁶³ As Ashley Jackson noted for Bechuanaland, asking for volunteers rather than conscripts created a dilemma, for traditionally a chief did not ask for volunteers: he told people to perform a duty and they were expected to obey.⁶⁴ Relations between chiefs and their subjects were nested in a complex of affinity and power far more subtle than the distinction between coerced and free labour. In this way, it can be argued that although compulsion was a factor in recruitment, the image of 15,000 miserable men being hauled to various theatres of war by their chiefs should be avoided. In short, Africans themselves were also active agents in the recruitment process for the NRR.

In spite of persistent denials from government officials about the non-existence of compulsion in the recruitment campaign, evidence suggests otherwise. Rumours that chiefs forced their subjects to enlist in the NRR during the second recruitment campaign in 1942-3 abounded among Northern Rhodesian men working in Southern Rhodesia to the extent that they feared returning home at the end of their employment contracts. A classic example was that of Mendulu Tengetetu Banda of Chief Zingalume's area in Fort Jameson district who was working in Gatooma district at the time. He feared returning home because he had heard rumours that men returning home from work in Southern Rhodesia were captured by government or chiefs' agents in order to be conscripted in the army. Thus, he wrote to his wife:

⁶³ Jackson, 'Motivation and Mobilization', 407.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, Botswana, 44.

Elina Banda I am asking you about the news of home. We heard that people are arrested, to be sent to the war. Is that the truth? Because people who come from home say if any person who comes from this country, Salisbury, as soon as the person gets there he is arrested and is taken to war. I am asking you about this. Don't deceive me, because I want to come home. Tell me what is going on there concerning the war and about the people being arrested. I am sending you these words so that you can inquire for me from Mazambani and Misale.⁶⁵

For its part, the government denied authorising the use of compulsion and heaped the blame on what it termed "overzealous chiefs". The Chief Secretary to the government's response to allegations of forced enlistments was that:

I have always been most careful to impress on DCs and the seconded military officers who are assisting with recruiting, that on no account has any compulsion to be used in addresses to the chiefs and people. I have repeatedly stated that our army is an army of volunteers ...⁶⁶

That complaints emerged during the third phase of the recruitment campaign in 1943 was not surprising at all. This could be attributed to the appointment, effective 7 January 1942, of Colonel A. Stephenson as Controller of African Recruitment. Stephenson's ruthlessness and use of crude methods such as the burning down of huts to force people to pay taxes in the early part of the 20th century is well-documented.⁶⁷ His appointment by the government, therefore,

⁶⁵ NAZ SEC1/1638 Vol. III., Mendulu Tengetetu Banda (Gatooma, Southern Rhodesia) to Tom Maridikani, (Rambe Village, Chief Zingalume, Fort Jameson), 16 March 1943. Misale and Mazambani were the most popular routes used by labour migrants from the eastern parts of Northern Rhodesia to and from Southern Rhodesia.

⁶⁶ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka) 6 April 1943.

⁶⁷ J.E. Stephenson, *Chirupula's Tale: A Bye-Way in African History* (London, 1937), 22, 188; and L.H. Gann, *The Birth of a Plural Society: the Development of Northern Rhodesia under British South Africa Company, 1894-1914* (Manchester, 1958).

was not coincidental as it was designed to ensure that whether by crook or hook, as many people as possible were enlisted.

The army sent recruitment teams into hundreds of villages, posters were put up and pamphlets circulated which stressed the food, order, and cleanliness of army life. The military emphasised that such posters should show servicemen in their best light and be of a nature to make the African realise that a soldier's life was full of attractions.⁶⁸ Figure 2.6 shows a prominent recruitment poster with a picture of a smartly dressed African serviceman accompanied by the following caption written in the local chiNyanja language: *Munthu uyu ali msikari. King George afuna Asikari ena. Kodi muli olimba, anyamata, ndi acimwamuna? Ngati muli tero, lowani usikari* [This man is a soldier. King George is looking for more soldiers. Are you strong, male and youthful? If so, enrol in the army].⁶⁹ Another poster with a picture of a smartly-dressed soldier is shown in Figure 2.7. It had the following slogan also written in chiNyanja: *Kampanje kalila, Shamwale! Lowani usikari!* [The trumpet has been sounded, my friend! Enlist in the army].⁷⁰ These posters were prepared by the Information Office with guidance from military officials. They were often printed in colour to bolster their eye-catching potential. The purpose was to indicate the progress that could be made by becoming a soldier: gaining a uniform, smartness, a weapon to hand, and proven loyalty to the system.⁷¹ Around 8,000 of these posters were distributed in various parts of the country with varied slogans in the major local languages.⁷² *Mutende* also carried various advertisements requiring Africans to join the NRR.⁷³

⁶⁸ LM2/3/4/1/6/1, J. Maclaren, General Manager, Mufulira Mine (Mufulira) to Lt. Col. A. Stephenson, Commander, Sub Area HQ (Lusaka), 28 August 1940; and *ibid*, A. Stephenson, Commander, Sub Area HQ (Lusaka) to J. Maclaren, General Manager, Mufulira Copper Mine (Mufulira), 2 August 1940.

⁶⁹ LM2/3/4/4/1/1/8/4, Recruiting Posters by Information Office, Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, 1939-1945.

⁷⁰ LM2/3/4/4/1/1/8/5, *Kampanje Kalila, Shamwale! Lowani Usikari!*, nd. C. 1943.

⁷¹ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 48.

⁷² LM2/3/4/1/6/1, Information Officer (Lusaka) to Commander, Sub Area Headquarters (Lusaka), 24 September 1949.

⁷³ See, for example, *Mutende* April 1940; and *Mutende* No. 63 June 1940



Figure 2.6: Recruitment Poster I

Source: Livingstone Museum 2/3/4/4/1/1/8/4



Figure 2.7: Recruitment Poster II

Source: Livingstone Museum 2/3/4/4/1/1/8/5

Propaganda campaigns undertaken by the military also induced many men to enlist in the NRR. The regional

East African Mobile Propaganda Unit, set up in 1942, explained the life and training of soldiers and demonstrated modern weapons throughout the region when on tour. It toured Northern Rhodesia in 1943 led by Capt. A.G. Dickson. Though the unit's main aim was to intensify public opinion and support towards the war effort and get those at home to pay more attention to soldiers, a side result was a rise in enlistments.⁷⁴ For example, in September 1943, the Unit conducted two demonstrations in Fort Jameson district, the heartland of the Ngoni people. Between 7,000 and 9,000 Africans, European and Indians attended these shows.⁷⁵ Prominent in attendance at these occasions were paramount chiefs of the Ngoni and Chewa people, Mpezeni and Kalonga Gawa Undi, respectively. Other chiefs were Mkanda, Chikuwe, Sayiri, Madzimawe and Nzamane. That such a heavy delegation of chiefs was present can hardly be surprising noting their importance in the recruitment process for the army. On display was a variety of events ranging from physical training, rifle drill, and unarmed combat to dispatch riding and mortar and Bren gun firing which mesmerised the crowds.⁷⁶ Cinema shows were conducted in the evening on both days and were equally well-attended. A record 15,000 attended a similar event in Luanshya district in October the same year.⁷⁷ Ackson Mwale, a government clerk who attended the occasion in Fort Jameson on 15 September 1943, confirmed the success of the Mobile Propaganda Unit's tour when he remarked that:

I happened to take to the show my three-year old son who, from that time on has kept saying to everyone at home that he wants to be a soldier in the Army! But if this is the impression left on the young mind, what on the grown up men?⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Headrick, 'African Soldiers', 504; and Dickson, 'Studies in War-time Organisation', 10.

⁷⁵ NAZ SEC1/1773, District Commissioner (Fort Jameson) to Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson), 5 October 1943.

⁷⁶ Ibid; and NAZ SEC1/1771, Intelligence Report for 1 October – 15 November 1943 for Western Province and Kaonde-Lunda Province, 18 November 1943.

⁷⁷ NAZ SEC1/1771, Intelligence Report for 1 October–15 November 1943 for the Western Province and Kaonde Lunda Province, 18 November 1943.

⁷⁸ NAZ SEC1/1773, Report by Ackson Mwale on the Mobile Propaganda Unit, c. September/October 1943.

Something of a jamboree was created in rural areas as a result of the activities of this propaganda campaign. The Mobile Propaganda Unit was thus a great advertisement for calling recruits for the army because the adventures of army life that were shown enticed many young men who attended these functions during its tour of duty in the country.

Perhaps due to the province's lukewarm attitude towards the war, the government through the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) took the lead in spreading war propaganda in Barotseland. This campaign was led by the Institute's Director, Max Gluckman. Gluckman had impeccable knowledge of the Lozi kingdom, the area and local people, owing to the various studies he had undertaken there since the institute's establishment in 1937.⁷⁹ The campaign hinged on comparing the outbreak and course of a civil war in the Lozi kingdom in the 1870s with that of the Second World War. He likened Numwa, the leader of the faction which had rebelled against the rule of the Lozi paramount chief Lewanika in the latter part of the 19th century, with Adolf Hitler. In one propaganda article, he argued that:

[L]ike Hitler, he [Numwa] wished to live on the work of others whom he would make his slaves, he wanted that he should sit and take the riches worked by others without paying them. In Barotseland, he had the same plan as Hitler has, to conquer all people ...⁸⁰

While chiefs and propaganda were the main tools used to entice Africans to enlist in the army, this does not give a complete story, however. The next section delves into other factors that may have attracted Africans to respond positively to the call to arms.

⁷⁹ Among these include, M. Gluckman, 'Economy of the Central Barotse Plain', *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 7* (1941); *ibid*, 'Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property', *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 10* (1943); *ibid*, 'Notes on the Social Background of Barotse Music' *African Music*, A.M. Jones Occasional Paper No. 2 (1943); *ibid*, 'Barotse Ironworkers', *Iscor Magazine*, (March 1944); *ibid*, 'Prefix Concordance in Kololo, Lingua Franca of Barotseland', *African Studies*, 1, 2 (June 1942); and *ibid*, 'Zambezi River Kingdom', *Libertas*, 8 (July 1945).

⁸⁰ ECRDC FLE-LAB, Barotse Civil Wars.

2.5.2. African Agency in the Recruitment Process

There were also elements which showed African agency in the recruitment process for the NRR. Some of these were economic pull and/or push factors – not dissimilar to those pertaining to migratory labour so common in the country. Prominent among these was the desire to earn money. Military service offered distinct economic and social rewards that many individual soldiers tacitly accepted as adequate compensation for the personal hardship and loss of individual freedom that came with military discipline. Rightson Kangwa said, recalling 50 years after the event, why as a 22 year old peasant farmer he enlisted in the NRR ‘... it looked to me as if it was a good job which I had never seen before because I had never heard of the war or what it meant ...’⁸¹ Basic pay for unmarried men was one shilling six pence per month while those with families were paid two shillings three pence. Additionally, the army provided free food, clothing, cigarettes, housing, and medical care. The army offered some of the highest rates for unskilled African labour.

Furthermore, new commercial opportunities and an appetite for material goods, coupled with the rising cost of brides’ wealth, led to increased interest in money and wage labour that drove some men to join the army. Although army wages were not very attractive in the more prosperous mining and industrial centres of Northern Rhodesia such as the Copperbelt, these wages were considerably higher than the going civilian rate for manual labour in outlying areas. Justine Master Phiri confirmed that he enlisted in the NRR because, to him, that was just a job like any other from which he could earn a living. ‘It was in April, 1940’, he said ‘when I was recruited at Fort Jameson ... I felt happy and thought it was a jolly good job.’⁸² As the war progressed, recruitment fatigue set in resulting in few people enlisting. What sustained the

⁸¹ Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), R. Kangwa, interview with the BBC on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, Ndola, 1989.

⁸² IMW, J.M. Phiri, interview with the BBC on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, Ndola, 1989.

recruitment process was the financial benefit which some servicemen derived from the army and sent to their relatives in the villages. This is an observation which was noted in Lundazi district by Bradley, the country's Information Officer. It was reported in March 1940 that the war no longer seemed to interest the mass of the people any more. Although the initial excitement over recruitment had disappeared, nothing had done more to calm apprehensions and dispel suspicion than the regular remittance of money from recruits in the Regiment to their families.⁸³

For some volunteering was a way of proving that they were 'man enough'. Gilbert Malama Zulu who enlisted at the age of 18 became a lorry driver because he believed that at that age he had matured into a brave and powerful man so he could now join the military forces.⁸⁴ This type of thinking was exploited by government propagandists especially after the victories recorded by the NRR in battles against Italian forces in East Africa. Second Lieutenant K. Thompson of the 1st Battalion NRR confirmed this in a radio broadcast transmitted from Lusaka:

I want to talk about some of the things askari of our First Battalion in Kenya are saying. Their hearts are very strong, and they are very proud for they feel that when there is a war fighting is the work for real men. They know that they fought well, for each has killed many of the enemy, and now they walk with their heads held high, for by their skill in war they have proved their manhood just as their fathers did in the wars before the coming of the white man.⁸⁵

⁸³ LM2/3/4/4/1/1/10, Information Officer (Lusaka) to Lt. Colonel W.A. Dimoline (Lusaka), 8 March 1940; NAZ EP4/2/9 Loc 5477, Lundazi District Tour Report No. 1 of 1940; and *ibid*, Lundazi Tour Report No. 7 of 1940.

⁸⁴ G.M. Zulu, interview with the BBC on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, Lusaka, c. 1989.

⁸⁵ LM2/3/4/4/1/1/8, Broadcast Talk to Africans by 2nd Lieutenant K. Thompson, 16 October 1940 from Lusaka.

In despising those who had not enlisted, servicemen often claimed that such people were women for whom they had gone to fight.⁸⁶ In a satire about the Second World War, one eyewitness and participant in the war was the renowned Zambian literary author, Stephen Mpashi. In a monograph written in the iciBemba language, *Cekesoni aingila ubusoja* (Jackson joins the Military), Mpashi noted that one reason young men enlisted during the war was because they wanted to prove their virility by fighting in the war. One day when the villagers were busy enjoying their local brew, the young men were alerted to go and hide so that they should not be enlisted as soldiers for the Second World War. Imbibed by the traditional brew, Cekesoni initially went into hiding with his friend but while there, he rejected the idea of shying away from fighting as being unmanly and parochial only befitting people who had not seen the world. He and his friend had just returned from the Copperbelt where he had come into contact with people of different races, had handled difficult assignments working underground, smelting copper and therefore he could not cow away from mere fighting. The two young men then convinced each other that instead of the messenger hunting for them, word should be sent to the Governor that Cekesoni and his friend were waiting to enlist, which they did the following day, together with others who got influenced by Cekesoni.⁸⁷

Soldiers who went home on leave were encouraged by military and civil establishments to bring back recruits upon returning from their places of origin. As was the case with all military units throughout the Empire that were sent to serve in distant theatres of war, serious efforts were made to keep East African soldiers in touch with their home communities, in order to make them more efficient and to limit the disruption of African life that could result from

⁸⁶ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. II., Extract from Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Northern Province Western Areas, Provincial Council held at Kawambwa on 8-9 May 1945.

⁸⁷ B. Nchindila, 'Pan-African Issues in Zambian Bemba Literature: the Case of Stephen Mpashi's (1950) *Cekesoni aingila ubusoja*, (Jackson joins the Military), Paper presented at the European Conference on African Studies, SOAS, London, 2013, 2-3.

their prolonged absence.⁸⁸ Leave, where permissible, was granted for a period of twenty working days to be spent in the village of the serviceman's origin exclusive of days spent on the way to and from the village. It was during this period that some servicemen were able to convince their friends or relatives who had remained in the villages to enlist in the army. In Namwala district in late 1942, the District Commissioner noted that Ila servicemen who had returned home on leave from Madagascar and Ceylon were full of tales to tell their friends and relatives which had beneficial effects on local African opinion and morale regarding the war.⁸⁹ The arrival on leave of several *askari* from East Africa and Madagascar caused great interest among the army in Sesheke district, resulting in the recruitment of six men,⁹⁰ while in Kasama, the District Commissioner reported in 1940 that 'the [r]anks have returned [from Somaliland] full of the "defeat" they inflicted on the Italians and how inferior the Italian askari were to them. This has had a stimulating effect on recruiting and over 240 recruits have been attested in less than a month'.⁹¹

It had been proven that the appearance of *askari* on leave had a substantial effect on the recruitment of more servicemen.⁹² 'If they are decently clothed they are, I think,' the Secretary for Native Affairs reported in 1943, 'more inclined to behave themselves properly, and their appearance might act as an incentive to others to join the army'.⁹³ Items carried by *askari* from Northern Rhodesia, as in other British colonial ranks, on leave home were the following: a hat

⁸⁸ Jackson, *The British Empire*, 188.

⁸⁹ NAZ SP4/2/19 Loc 5084, District Commissioner (Namwala) to Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province (Livingstone), 31 October 1942.

⁹⁰ NAZ SEC1/1775, Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 1 April 1943.

⁹¹ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 11 December 1940; see also NAZ SEC1/1638 Vol. III., District Commissioner (Kasama) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province, (Kasama) 18 March 1943; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 29 November 1940; and *ibid*, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 5 December 1940.

⁹² NAZ SEC1/1638 Vol. III., Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Public Relations Officer, NRR Southern Area HQ, (Lusaka), 27 August 1943.

⁹³ *Ibid*, Extract from Minute from Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 10 August 1943.

or tarbush, boots, puttees and hose tops; two pairs of socks, two pairs of shorts, two shirts, a blanket, two shirts merduff, jersey, haversack, greatcoat, razor, mosquito net, blouse.⁹⁴ To ensure that this measure had its desired effect on recruitment, government officials liaised with military officials to ensure that these conditions were followed to the latter for all servicemen proceeding on leave. The successes recorded by servicemen on leave in the recruitment process prompted the Controller of African Recruitment to authorise District Commissioners to extend the leave, by not more than one month, of serving *askari* who appeared to be suitable for use as recruiting agents.⁹⁵

Another example which shows African agency in the recruitment process can be seen in men who joined the army because they envied their friends who were already serving in the NRR. They looked at colleagues who had joined earlier with respect. Military service was viewed as a “manly” occupation. Carrying a gun marked a man as a privileged government servant, and some recruits believed that women were attracted to the uniforms that they wore. They also believed serving *askari* had large sums of disposable income, and were preferred by young women.⁹⁶ The experience of *askari* earned them a high level of deference and respect in their home societies which colleagues also wanted to enjoy once they enlisted.

African agency was also noted among those who enlisted with a view to acquiring a skill, most popularly becoming drivers. Others such as Samson Muliango were encouraged by their employers to sign up so that they could develop their skills. When interviewed in 1989, he said:

⁹⁴ Ibid, Commander, Southern Sub-Area (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 September 1943.

⁹⁵ NAZ SEC2/181, District Commissioners’ Conference, Northern Province held at Kasama from 22-27 February 1943.

⁹⁶ This was a common motive for many colonial servicemen elsewhere and not just in the Northern Rhodesian or African context. For a comparative case in Trinidad, see A. Palmer, ‘The Politics of Race and War: Black Soldiers in the Caribbean Theater during the Second World War’, *Military Affairs*, 47, 2 (April 1983), 59, also cited in Spence, *Colonial naval culture*, 35.

[i]t all started in 1939, I used to work for Mr Ivor Windsor Simons ... During my time with Capt. Simons he taught me driving around his farm but [I] never obtained a driving permit. After the war broke out in 1939 Capt. Simons ... told me that he wanted me to join the war, I agreed and I was so thrilled by this suggestion. In October 1939, he took me to the Army Headquarters where I was recruited ... ⁹⁷

Prominent recruitment posters illustrated training courses for African drivers and tailors. Emphasised in the development of these posters was the depiction of human interest. For example, a photograph of an African serviceman actually driving a military vehicle was considered more interesting than a mere fleet of lorries.⁹⁸ These posters were designed by the military and showed African servicemen on the job. Enticed by skills depicted on the posters in various localities, some men enlisted with a view to becoming military drivers or attaining another trade.

Furthermore, some veterans cited Northern Rhodesian patriotism as their primary motive for joining the army. One ex-serviceman recalled:

[i]t was in September 1939 when we heard the news that the war has broken out in Europe and that Britain and her allied forces are fighting against the Germans and Italians in Europe and in the far east against the Japanese.⁹⁹

For this reason, he enlisted in the army. Men such as these enlisted to fight for an imperial “mother country” they had never seen, thousands of kilometres away from their homes.

⁹⁷ S. Muliango, interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Second World War, 11 July 1989, Lusaka.

⁹⁸ LM2/3/4/1/6/1, Information Officer (Lusaka) to Officer Commanding Northern Rhodesia Regiment, Service Corp (Bwana Mkubwa, Ndola), 29 August 1940; and Headrick, ‘African Soldiers’, 505.

⁹⁹ L. Kasansayika, interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, Ndola, 24 November 1989.

Another ex-serviceman from Kasama district aptly pointed out that he enlisted because of his desire to help the imperial country defeat the Axis powers.

They [government bureaucrats] told us that fighting broke out between Britain and Germany, allied with Italy and Japan over colonies ... The fighting that broke out spread to all colonies of the British, as well as our country, then called Northern Rhodesia. At once, all chiefs were alerted about the raging war by the District Commissioners who requested them to contribute in form of personnel. Thus in my area, recruitment of soldiers was conducted by a Mr. Whitemore, then DC of Kasama ... That is how I came to be recruited.¹⁰⁰

To such men, Britain symbolised their own country, despite never having been there physically. Consequently, the mother country's conflict was regarded as their own. In explaining his reason for enlisting, another veteran said he did so in order to fight against 'the much, then, hated Germans and their supporters'.¹⁰¹

Despite strict instructions that promises should not be made or the terms and conditions of service misrepresented, evidence reveals that some ingenious recruiting agents deliberately made false promises to entice Africans to enlist. Some people were, therefore, under the impression that they would be exempted from paying poll tax, receive huge tracts of land and lots of money at the end of the war. Oral evidence attests to this. 'During the recruitment', ex-serviceman Samson Muliango claimed, 'the Northern Rhodesia Government promised us all as rewards farms and lots of money if only we fought for the British Army during the reign of King George VI'.¹⁰² Another veteran, Chama Mutemi Kadansa, also acknowledged that bogus

¹⁰⁰ C.M. Kadansa, interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, 17 July 1939, Ndola.

¹⁰¹ J. Mulenga interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, 6 June 1989, Lusaka. See also Killingray, 'African Voices', 430.

¹⁰² Muliango, interview cited.

promises were made to entice people to join the NRR: 'our British officers were seriously promising that after the war a lot of money would be paid to surviving soldiers as reward, and they would be given farms and good jobs. So, we were all very happy and anxious to get to the battle-fields and start fighting'.¹⁰³ Such "promises" led to inflated and imaginary expectations amongst some potential recruits and those who had already been enlisted. But as shown in Chapter Six, these "promises" created discontent among African ranks during the demobilisation process because most of them were not fulfilled.

Military service offered opportunities for adventure to some young men which prompted them to enlist. The wartime army was seen as a chance to see the world beyond the village. In an interview, ex-serviceman Joseph Chinama Mulenga, who enlisted at the age of 19, said: 'the coming or outbreak of the Second World War accorded some of we (*sic*) Africans to indeed have the opportunity to travel overseas or abroad, for the first time'.¹⁰⁴ Another veteran said, '[n]one of us recruits had experienced war before, so we were so anxious to go to war'.¹⁰⁵ For Rabson Chombola, his enlistment in the NRR was simply because '... I thought it was a good job going to [a] foreign country'.¹⁰⁶ These men left home and familiar surroundings, met different people, travelled to East Africa, Madagascar, the Levant, Burma and India, saw new sights, and underwent a range of novel experiences. Thus, enlisting in the army was an opportunity for adventure, to escape the repetitive existence and precincts of village life.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be deduced that there were several reasons why men in Northern Rhodesia participated in the British war effort. The next section examines processes that took place during the recruitment and training of servicemen for the NRR.

¹⁰³ Kadansa, interview cited. See also K. Makasa, *Zambia's March to Political Freedom* (Nairobi, 1981), 15.

¹⁰⁴ J. Mulenga, interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, 6 June 1989.

¹⁰⁵ Muliango, interview cited.

¹⁰⁶ R. Chombola, interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, Ndola, 24 November 1989.

2.6. Procedures for Recruitment and Training

Recruits for the army had to meet the following physical requirements:

- i. Age----- 18-40 years
- ii. Height----- 5 feet 3 inches minimum
- iii. Weight----- 115 pounds minimum
- iv. Chest----- 32 inches fully expanded minimum
- v. Teeth----- a reasonable dental standard
- vi. Hearing----- good in both ears.¹⁰⁷

In the early phase of the war, there was a high rejection rate of recruits on medical grounds, but when the army urgently needed men it lowered the standard of health and worked on the assumption that army feeding, medical attention and exercise over a period of time would raise recruits to the necessary physical standard.¹⁰⁸ The successful candidates were then transported by lorry to Lusaka for training at the Infantry Training Centre (ITC) as part of the “Pool”. These candidates were given lectures and talks by senior army officers. The Pool was the collecting pot and nursery in which a recruit lasted for up to three weeks waiting for sufficient numbers to form the junior training company.¹⁰⁹ During this period, the recruit learned a great deal in the “nursery” and by the time the junior company was formed, he would have accustomed himself to military environment and would start training with confidence.¹¹⁰ The only recruits who spent less time at the Infantry Training Centre were those that were recruited in Fort Jameson district because they would already have undergone orientation and attestation at the local Civil Recruitment Depot set up there before leaving for Lusaka. An

¹⁰⁷ Simelane, ‘Labor Mobilization’, 549; Ntabeni, ‘Military Labour’, 42; and L.W.F Grundlingh, ‘South African Blacks in the Second World War’, D.Litt Et. Phil, Rand Afrikaans University, 1986, 83-4.

¹⁰⁸ Killingray, ‘Military and Labour Recruitment’, 88.

¹⁰⁹ NAZ SEC1/1638 Vol. III., Major H. Ockerdon, Infantry Training Centre (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 April 1943.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

attestation form was completed detailing the soldier's name, ethnic group, village of origin, chiefdom, the next of kin, weight, height and physical appearance. The syllabus of lectures given to the recruits included the following:

- i. Initial Lecture: why recruits had gone to the ITC and what was expected of them. The avenues open to them in the various army branches were also made known to the men
- ii. Regimental history
- iii. Standing Orders
- iv. Hygiene
- v. Discipline
- vi. How to write and address their letters, and censorship in place
- vii. Living quarters and rations
- viii. Pay, promotion, leave
- ix. Method of making complaints and domestic troubles
- x. Weekly talks on the war.¹¹¹

Emphasis, however, was placed on the importance of discipline in the army. It was expected that the recruits would show their military superiors the same allegiance they owed to their traditional authorities by law and custom. The army had traditions and duties no less compelling than what was experienced in the African traditional set up.¹¹² Driving this point home in a patriarchal tone, the Chief Secretary noted that discipline was of paramount importance because '... military service and all its implications, which the raw native finds so difficulty to understand, reflect a duty to his own people rather than an imposition from outside

¹¹¹ Ibid; and *ibid*, Secretary, Office of the Conference of East African Governors (Nairobi) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 22 March 1943.

¹¹² Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Commander, East Africa Command HQ (Nairobi), 9 December 1942.

his tribe'.¹¹³ Upon completion of their training, the men returned home to bid farewell, but also to show the remaining males what army life was all about.

2.7. Martial Race Theory and the NRR

During the Second World War, colonial recruiters sought men who were “martial”, just as they had done during the 1914-18 war. The British imported Indian “martial race” paradigms into Africa and, along with other colonial powers, identified certain ethnic groups as “martial.” The ideology of “martial races” was developed after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, and again in the 1880s, in an effort to recruit better soldiers who could withstand the threat of Russian expansion on India’s northwest frontier.¹¹⁴ In addition, it was meant to ensure that all those who were recruited to the army remained loyal in order to prevent future rebellions. After the mutiny of 1857, British officers concluded that prosperity made the commercial and urban classes of India unfit to be soldiers. As a result, recruiters developed a detailed system of ethnographic classification that identified certain ethnic groups, religions, and castes with the specific biological and cultural attributes of a “martial race”.¹¹⁵ These included Nepalese Gurkhas, Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims from the northern and frontier provinces.

Related to this was the “seafaring race” theory, another colonial pseudoscientific theory used for naval service recruitment purposes in various parts of Empire. In the Caribbean, British colonial administrators relied on Caymanians in the recruitment of personnel for the

¹¹³ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Commander, East Africa Command HQ, (Nairobi), 9 December 1942. See also Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 84.

¹¹⁴ T.H. Parsons, “‘Wakamba are Soldiers of the Queen’: the Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890-1970”, *Ethnohistory*, 46, 4 (1999), 672.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 673.

Trinidad Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (TRNVR) because they believed that these were best suited as seamen because ‘they had the sea in their blood’.¹¹⁶ The “Seafaring race” theory was ‘used to strengthen British power by promoting imperially-loyal groups at the expense of potentially anti-colonial ones, justified on grounds of “racial” suitability for naval service’.¹¹⁷ It was for this reason that the composition of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) was dominated by Ratnagiri and Punjabi Muslims at the expense of Hindus who were perceived to be Nationalist-oriented,¹¹⁸ and in South-east Asia, recruitment for the navy was restricted to Malays, omitting the significant local Chinese and Indian communities.¹¹⁹

Some of the “martial” groups in Africa included the Ngoni of Central Africa, the Zulu in South Africa, the Yao in Nyasaland, and the Tukolor, Malinke, Wolof, Hausa, and Bambara in West Africa. In Northern Rhodesia, colonial authorities regarded “martial” groups as being the Ngoni/Chewa, Bemba, and Ila. It was, therefore, from these groups that the majority of troops came to dominate the military forces of Northern Rhodesia.¹²⁰ In 1938, the Bemba numbered 37.5 per cent, Ngoni 12 per cent, Ila 18.5 per cent, and Chewa 7 per cent. The remaining 25 per cent of troops were made up by the remaining ethnic groups in the country. In relation to their total population, the Ila, Ngoni and Chewa were more highly represented than other ethnic groups.¹²¹ This was in line with the pre-war recruitment policy whereby these ethnic groups had dominated the police force. These “martial” ethnic groups were identified due to their long-standing pre-colonial histories of fighting, making them well-suited for military service in the eyes of colonial authorities. They were perceived to know how to handle

¹¹⁶ D.O. Spence, “‘They Had the sea in Their Blood’: Caymanian Naval Volunteers in the Second World War’, in N. Arielli and B. Collins (eds.), *Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in The Modern Era* (Houndsmill, 2013), 105-123.

¹¹⁷ D.O. Spence, *Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922-67* (Manchester, 2015), 7.

¹¹⁸ Spence, ‘Imperial Transition’, 326.

¹¹⁹ Spence, *Colonial naval culture*, 154-56.

¹²⁰ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 325-6.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 326. See also, Northern Rhodesia Government (NRG), *Northern Rhodesia Regiment Annual Report for the Year Ending 1936* (Lusaka, 1937), 5; and *ibid*, *Northern Rhodesia Regiment Annual Report for the Year Ending 1938* (Lusaka, 1939), 3.

firearms and to be aware of the rigours of military life. The Ngoni found in Fort Jameson district, for example, had the advantage of having the clear marks of a “martial race” because of their stubborn resistance to British colonisation in the late 1890s. They fought running battles against British conquest, eventually being defeated in 1898.¹²² Upon their defeat, however, the Ngoni remained loyal to British colonial administrators.

This is quite different from the Kenyan experience where the Kamba people were classified as martial due to a combination of economic and political realities of colonialism in the 1930s.¹²³ In the early phase of colonial rule, the Kamba had little interest in joining the army. By the early 1930s, however, the Kamba featured prominently in the King’s African Rifles (KAR) due to economic hardships they faced owing to severe famines and droughts experienced in their area.¹²⁴ The Ngoni were of Zulu stock, being descendants of the soldiers of Shaka, the “African Napoleon”, whose impi were the scourge of southern Africa in the first half of the 19th century.¹²⁵ It was for this reason that the main recruiting depot for *askari* during the Second World War was set up at Fort Jameson, in the heartland of Ngoni country for recruiters to easily access this “martial” group. Here, it is hardly surprising that the “non-martial” ethnic groups such as the Chewa, Nsenga and Kunda, who had not resisted British colonisation but lived nearby the Ngoni, also featured prominently among recruits. For such groups, military service was a source of livelihood like any other which they took advantage of.

In wartime, however, in order to fill their quotas, military and government officers accepted all the physically able volunteers they could get. All doctrines and prejudices

¹²² A comprehensive history of the Ngoni people is discussed by W. Rau, ‘Mpezeni’s Ngoni of Eastern Zambia, 1870-1920’, PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974. See also Gann, *The Birth of a Plural Society*.

¹²³ Parsons, “Wakamba”, 695.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 674-678.

¹²⁵ LM2/3/4/1/8/2 Regimental History, Notes, nd.

underpinning peace-time recruitment were revised as there simply were not enough members of the “martial groups” to go round.¹²⁶ But the largest number of recruits for the war effort nonetheless still came from the Eastern and Northern provinces, and Namwala district in the Southern province.

It is possible that some Africans deliberately identified themselves as being martial for economic reasons in order to access employment in the NRR as was the case with the Nsenga and Kunda. From this one may recognise what Cynthia Enloe has called a “Gurkha syndrome” where poorer rural groups embraced martial identity to access military employment because their community’s livelihood depended upon it.¹²⁷ This “martial race” theory was not purely a colonial imposition but at times was negotiated by some ingenious individuals.

2.8. Strategies of Resistance to Enlistment

Although there was no effective, large-scale resistance or indifference to the war effort in the country, some people made it known as soon as the war had broken out that they did not want to participate in the fighting. There were several reasons for avoiding military enlistment in Northern Rhodesia that were similar to those used in other colonies. Some people feared being killed in action fighting in what they regarded as a European war. Lessons had been learnt from the First World War. These fears were well founded considering the number of casualties recorded during the Second World War.¹²⁸ As in the rest of East and Central Africa, recruitment into the army during the Second World War was met with mixed feelings because of the bad memory people had of the dreaded Carrier Corps used in East Africa during the First World War. The Tonga people of Mazabuka district remembered the part played by Africans

¹²⁶ For a comparative discussion, see D.O. Spence, ‘Imperial Transition, Indianisation and Race: Developing National Navies in the Subcontinent, 1947-64’, *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 37, 2 (June 2014), 326-27.

¹²⁷ C.H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Harmondsworth, 1980), 25.

¹²⁸ About 21 million servicemen and 38 million civilians died. See Black, *World War Two*, xiv.

in the 1914-18 war and were unwilling to become carriers again.¹²⁹ During that recruitment campaign, the military developed a sullied reputation amongst many people.¹³⁰ Furthermore, recruitment for the Second World War was hampered by a deeply ingrained hostility in some places that stemmed from broken promises at the end of the Great War. There was the belief among Africans that men had been needlessly sacrificed, wages had not been fully paid, and obligations not properly met.¹³¹ This complaint was explicitly made to government officials during the recruitment campaign in Lundazi district for which the District Commissioner had no convincing response.¹³²

It does seem that as much as economic motives were responsible as a pull factor in the recruitment process, they also acted as a deterrent to those who were already prosperous. It was for this reason apathy was reported among Tonga peasants. The Tonga were agriculturalists, cattlemen and traders and lucrative markets during this period made them relatively prosperous so as not to desire to enlist in the army to earn a living.¹³³ This tendency was not new among this group. Tonga peasants in yesteryears were renowned for refusing to offer their labour to settler European farmers in their vicinity due to their own thriving agricultural economy.¹³⁴ While equating the German attack on Poland to their own victimhood when they were constantly attacked by the Lozi people in the 19th century, Tonga peasants could not understand why the government wanted so many recruits for the NRR if the war was confined to Europe. African peasants told the District Commissioner for Mazabuka in September 1939, that they could not enlist in the army because they believed that there was no trouble in the country to

¹²⁹ NAZ SP4/2/9 Loc 5082, Mazabuka Tour Report No. 7 of 1939.

¹³⁰ Jackson, *The British Empire*, 187; and Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 45.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, *Fighting for Britain*, 58.

¹³² NAZ EP4/2/9 Loc 5477, Lundazi District Special Tour Report No. 1 of 1947.

¹³³ NAZ SP4/2/9 Loc 5082, Mazabuka District Tour Report No. 7 of 1939; and *ibid*, Mazabuka Tour Report No. 9 of 1939.

¹³⁴ S.N. Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation in Southern Zambia* (Lusaka, 1988); and K.P. Vickery, *Black and White in Southern Zambia* (Connecticut, 1986).

warrant such a move.¹³⁵ It was for this reason that in the last quarter of the year, only three men were enlisted in Mazabuka.¹³⁶

For other Africans, the war was simply too far removed in space to be of any real concern. Such people remained apathetic and indifferent towards the war. Reports from various parts of the country confirmed this lack of enthusiasm, especially in the hinterland. In such places, people hardly talked about the war, but when they did speak about the war, their apathetic and even hostile attitude was very evident. For example, attempts to obtain people's reactions to the war by inviting questions in Kalabo district in Barotse province were greeted with 'respectful silence' such that the District Commissioner felt 'as if one were addressing an assembly of deaf mutes on conditions in Mars'.¹³⁷ The government attributed the apathy reported in Barotse province to the lack of leadership in the chiefdom due to a sickly paramount chief Yeta III and the death of his Prime Minister in late 1940.¹³⁸ A close examination of the situation, however, reveals that the province experienced a critical shortage of labour due to the continued migration to South African mines which paid better wages than could be obtained from the army. An estimated monthly average of 4,000 to 6,000 men traversed the Mongu-Mulobezi labour route in the province on their way to South African mines in 1941.¹³⁹ The government suspended recruitment by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) for the Rand in 1943, but reversed the policy the following year due to protestations by South African capital.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ NAZ SP4/2/9 Loc 5082, Mazabuka Tour Report No. 7 of 1939.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, Mazabuka Tour Report No. 9 of 1939.

¹³⁷ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 10 April 1941. See also NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka), Director of Intelligence and Censorship (Lusaka), and Information Officer (Lusaka), 26 September 1940.

¹³⁸ NAZ SP4/2/19 Loc 5084, Report on Public Opinion in Northern Rhodesia for January 1941; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 3 December 1940; and NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Barotse Province Report on Public Opinion for January 1941, nd c. February 1941.

¹³⁹ R. Philpott, 'The Mongu-Mulobezi Labour Route', *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal*, 3 (1945), 51; and NAZ SP2/1/1 Annual Report for Southern and Barotse Province for the Year Ending 31 December 1941.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 54.

To avoid joining the army, in the early recruitment campaign, some Africans hid in the bush. 'I found that young men ran away from a village as I entered it owing to the fear of being compelled to join the regiment', complained the District Commissioner for Fort Jameson in mid-1940.¹⁴¹ In the same vein, during the official opening of the Chewa National School in 1940, it was observed that young men were conspicuously missing at the event:

[t]he native spectators consisted almost entirely of old men and boys. The reason there were no able-bodied men present was because the people expected the Provincial Commissioner to announce that now the children can be looked after in the fine school building there is no reason for the men to remain at home, and all would be sent to the Regiment.¹⁴²

It was further reported that rumours were widespread throughout the district that all able-bodied men were arrested and forced into the Regiment. These rumours were more prevalent the further one left Fort Jameson.¹⁴³

Others simply crossed over into neighbouring territories to avoid being made to join the army. In Chief Kathumba's area in Fort Jameson, men simply migrated to Portuguese East Africa to avoid being recruited into the army.¹⁴⁴ This technique had been as an effective tool for evading tax payments in the country since its imposition at the start of the 20th century.¹⁴⁵ In Kalabo district, a middle aged woman was fined £2 or two months' imprisonment with hard labour in June 1941 for spreading rumours about conscription. She was reported to have visited two villages informing people that recruiters would be in the area to forcibly recruit them to go

¹⁴¹ NAZ EP4/2/5 Loc 5476, Fort Jameson Tour Report No. 10 of 1940.

¹⁴² Ibid; and *ibid*, Fort Jameson Tour Report No. 13 of 1940.

¹⁴³ Ibid, Fort Jameson Tour Report No. 12 of 1940.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. For a continental perspective about this strategy, see Killingray, 'Labour Mobilisation', 78.

¹⁴⁵ Cross border resistance to state policies has been discussed by A. Tembo, 'The Colonial State and African Agriculture in Chipata District of Northern Rhodesia, 1895-1964', MA Dissertation, University of Zambia, 2010.

to war. The entire adult male population of over 50 villages, and some women, too, decamped into the bush or over the border into Angola and only returned a couple of weeks later.¹⁴⁶

For other men, recruitment for the military was used as an excuse to migrate elsewhere in search of jobs. Government bureaucrats complained that recruitment of men for the war effort was being hindered by the continued movement of able-bodied men to neighbouring territories. Complaints were reported in Lundazi district in late 1940 that whenever recruiters went round looking for potential men for the NRR, these immediately left for Southern Rhodesia.¹⁴⁷ Although some recruits were enlisted, there was neither evident enthusiasm for the war nor any anxiety about its possible outcome one way or the other. The District Commissioner further lamented that the habit of exodus to work abroad was firmly established in the area and men simply did what they had been doing over the decades by going south for jobs.¹⁴⁸

David Killingray has argued that the absence of up to 30% of the male adult population in Northern Rhodesia for war service had a negative effect on food production in rural areas.¹⁴⁹ Such observations have also been reported on colonial Botswana where it was concluded that the absence of adult males from their villages due to military service had serious socio-economic effects, such as reduced agricultural production, desolate houses and villages, and juvenile delinquency.¹⁵⁰ This research shows a different trend, however. The network of kin relations through the extended family system took care of the wives and families of the men

¹⁴⁶ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Report on Public Opinion for Barotse Province for June 1941.

¹⁴⁷ NAZ EP4/2/9 Loc 5477, Lundazi District Tour Report No. 8 of 1940. See also NAZ SEC1/1638 Vol. III., Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary, Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury), 21 January 1943; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Eastern Province Report on Public Opinion for the Month of August 1940, nd c. October 1940.

¹⁴⁸ NAZ EP4/2/9 Loc 5477, Lundazi District Tour Report No. 7 of 1940. See also NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Eastern Province Report on Public Opinion for September 1940.

¹⁴⁹ Killingray, 'Labour Mobilisation', 79.

¹⁵⁰ See, for example, H.K. Bhila, 'The Impact of the Second World War on the Development of Peasant Agriculture in Botswana, 1939-1956', *Botswana Notes and Records*, 16 (1984), 63-71; W.G. Morapedi, 'Migrant Labour and the Peasantry in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1930-1965', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 2 (1999), 197-214; and M. Leepile, 'The Impact of Migrant Labour on the Economy of Kweneng 1940-1980', *Botswana Notes and Records*, 13 (1981), 33-43.

who had gone to the war front. Moreover, like with male labour migration to the mines and European settler farms which people were very familiar with, servicemen sent regular remittances to their families which cushioned their livelihoods.¹⁵¹ In Fort Jameson district, for example, it was reported in 1941 that money from servicemen was plentiful, with crowds of men and women gathering at government offices and the Post Office with their Post Office Savings Books to withdraw remittances from the large number of men serving in the forces.¹⁵² This scenario was replicated in many places where recruits came from.¹⁵³ Monies received by wives and family members were utilised in the hiring of extra labour to help with cultivation in the villages and the building of new houses.

2.9. Subversive Elements

2.9.1. Jehovah's Witnesses

Opposition to the war was spread by the pacifist Watch Tower [Jehovah's Witnesses] preachers, who proclaimed that the hostilities which had arisen in Europe were as a result of the hand of God punishing European oppressors. The hotbed for this society was the Eastern province due to its close proximity to Nyasaland where the movement had existed since the early 19th century. But the activities of this millenarian movement were reported throughout the country.¹⁵⁴ Due to the nearness of Nyasaland, Watch Tower elements would cross over into Northern Rhodesia to spread anti-war propaganda which were characterised as seditious. In

¹⁵¹ The notion that the absence of males from households for long periods of time only had negative effects has been dismissed by scholars because Africans devised coping strategies. See, for example, Tembo, 'The Colonial State'; Y.A. Chondoka, 'Labour Migration and Rural Transformation in Chama District, North-Eastern Zambia, 1890-1964', PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1992; and W. Watson, *The Social Structure of the Mambwe of Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester, 1957).

¹⁵² NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Eastern Province Report on Public Opinion for November 1941, 1 December 1941.

¹⁵³ Ibid, Southern Province Report on Public Opinion for November 1941, c. December 1941.

¹⁵⁴ See, for example, ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 5 December 1940; ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 29 November 1940; ibid, Eastern Province Monthly Report on Public Opinion for September 1940; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 April 1941; ibid, Northern Rhodesia Report on Public Opinion for December 1940; and NAZ SEC1/1728 Vol. VII., His Excellency The Governor's Tour to the Copperbelt, 15-22 June 1942.

mid-1940 a Watch Tower disciple on the Nyasaland side of Chief Kathumbi's area in Fort Jameson district made a tour urging Africans not to contribute to the war effort which he alleged was contrived for the benefit of capitalists.¹⁵⁵ Members of this sect were accused by government officials of preaching subversive doctrines 'deliberately calculated to destroy morale and hamper the war effort' and that 'their talk was the talk of madmen ... their doctrines a hotchpotch of the scriptures with cunning interpretations'.¹⁵⁶ Police reports indicated that teachings done by this society were religious but with a strong flavour of pacifism. However, it was further reported that in fact, it was pacifist activities which had now become the group's main agenda. Such teachings, noted government officials, were meant at hindering the recruitment of recruits for the NRR. The teachings took place, it was argued by civil authorities, not because of any profoundly held religious conviction, but simply because they annoyed and teased those in civil authority.¹⁵⁷

Not only did the Watch Tower Sect discourage people from enlisting in the NRR, but it also discouraged them from growing a lot of food for fear of perpetuating the war and precipitating Armageddon. In Kawambwa district in the Luapula valley, members of the sect advised people not to cultivate their gardens; the argument being that when the war came to an end, so would the world. They feared the production of foodstuffs would prolong the war and delay the arrival of "the golden age".¹⁵⁸ These messages were allegedly spread by Thomson Kangale, who was reported to have also played a significant role in the spread of Watch Tower literature during the 1935 miners' strike on the Copperbelt.¹⁵⁹ The members of the sect also removed their children from schools because they objected to them doing drill and becoming

¹⁵⁵ NAZ EP4/2/9/ Loc 5477, Lundazi District Tour Report No. 7 of 1940.

¹⁵⁶ *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 20 January 1941.

¹⁵⁷ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Fort Jameson Tour Report No. 12 of 1940.

¹⁵⁸ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 6 July 1942. See also NAZ SEC1/1772, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 7 September 1942.

¹⁵⁹ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 6 July 1942.

members of the Pathfinder society. The sect alleged that schools were being used to train children to become soldiers.¹⁶⁰ In Chief Mukonka's area in Lusaka district, adherents of the Watch Tower society plainly stated that they were against the war and anything related to European civilisation. 'We do not want to have anything to do with the war. It is a war of aeroplanes and what is the use of sending men. We do not want any schools; we want to be left entirely alone in our country ...',¹⁶¹ they protested. Because of the manner in which adherents of the Watch Tower Society opposed recruitment for the NRR, and obstructed the war effort generally, the importation and distribution of all Watch Tower publications and gramophones were prohibited under the Emergency Powers Regulations in December 1940. This followed similar action by the Southern Rhodesian government in November the same year.

Contrary to Ashley Jackson's observation that the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society in Northern Rhodesia was 'by nature underground, unofficial and non-European',¹⁶² this chapter shows this was not wholly the case as it also had European members. The leader of Jehovah's Witnesses in Northern Rhodesia was in fact a European called Llewelyn Phillips who was based at the sect's headquarters in Lusaka. Phillips and other European members of the Jehovah's Witnesses also vehemently objected to their participation in the war as conscientious objectors. This was in line with Section 9 (3a) of the Compulsory Military Service Ordinance which allowed any person who conscientiously objected to military service to apply in writing to the Governor. Phillips thus wrote to Governor Maybin:

I have consecrated my life to the service of Jehovah, the Most High God. I have devoted my time and energy entirely to His Kingdom under Christ. I am engaged

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 June 1941. See also ibid, Report on Public Opinion for Central Province for the Month of July 1941, 29 August 1941.

¹⁶¹ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., District Commissioner (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill), December 1940.

¹⁶² Jackson, *The British Empire*, 236.

in serving that Kingdom, therefore, I cannot take part in any military or non-combatant service, and I cannot conscientiously fight. The Bible forbids the Christian taking human life. Mark 10:19 and Genesis 9:6 ... As one of Jehovah's Witnesses I must obey God's laws and commandments in preaching the gospel of Christ's Kingdom which commands appear in the Bible at Isaiah 61:1, 3; Isaiah 43:9, 12; Mathew 10:7 and Mathew 24:14, and as one of Jehovah's servants I am compelled to obey God rather than men ...¹⁶³

This was not an isolated case. Other European members of the Jehovah's Witnesses also made their protestations known to the government based on the same line of reasoning.¹⁶⁴ In June 1942 Phillips preached outside the mine compound at Luanshya, prophesying that when the war comes to an end it would kill any person who was not a Jehovah's Witness.¹⁶⁵

Even though the government banned Watch Tower literature, some members of the society hid some of the prohibited material or carried on their teaching using the Bible, instead.¹⁶⁶ They proclaimed that such literature were the 'keys to unlock the mysteries of the Bible' and questioned the power of the Governor to make an order prohibiting the possession of such literature. They alleged that the British Prime Minister had made a statement that all persons should not only be free, but also be encouraged to worship God and study the Bible in their own ways.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ NAZ SEC1/1650 Vol. I., Llewelyn V. Phillips (Lusaka) to Sir John Maybin, Governor (Lusaka), 12 June 1940.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, D.H. Liebenberg (Lusaka) to Governor (Lusaka) 15 June 1940; *ibid*, S.P. Lofford (Nkana) to Governor (Lusaka), 18 June 1940; *ibid*, A. Boshoff (Nkana) to Governor (Lusaka), 18 June 1940; *ibid*, R. Oxenford Stanhope (Luanshya) to Governor (Lusaka), 28 June 1940.

¹⁶⁵ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 July 1942).

¹⁶⁶ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. I., Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 April 1941.

¹⁶⁷ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Report on Public Opinion for Central Province for the Month of July 1941, 29 August 1941.

In total 12 Europeans applied as conscientious objectors under the provisions of the law of which three were approved, eight were rejected and one was found to be mentally unbalanced. Furthermore, during the course of the war, three Europeans were punished for anti-war sentiments and sentenced to imprisonment; one for one month, another for four months and the third for two terms of imprisonment of one month and six months, respectively.¹⁶⁸

2.9.2. *Ossewabrandwag* (Oxwagon-sentinel)

There was also marked anti-British sentiment in the country propagated by Afrikaner settlers who had migrated from South Africa. The majority of these were found in the Lusaka and Broken Hill areas and the mining centres of the Copperbelt. Some of these settlers were of German descent and their sympathies lay with Axis. Not only did this group show antipathy towards their South African government for siding with the Allied nations, but also disliked attempts made by Northern Rhodesia to aid the Allied war effort. Afrikaner anti-British sentiment in the country was detected through the holding of “parties” over weekends at certain farms where they devoted these occasions to listening to German broadcasts and discussing the war on lines sympathetic to Axis.¹⁶⁹ So opposed to the Allied effort was this group that when two of their colleagues were sentenced to imprisonment for refusing to enlist in the Defence Force, they were cheered by leading members of the Lusaka Afrikaner community as they proceeded to jail.¹⁷⁰ Three others were sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment with hard labour in Luanshya in February 1942 while four newcomers from South Africa applied for exit permits as soon as they were approached to enlist in the Home Guard.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ NAZ SEC1/1650 Vol. II., Governor (Lusaka) to Secretary of State (London), 20 April, 1949. See also NAZ SEC1/1771, Monthly Intelligence Report for the Western Province for the Month of February 1943, 3 March 1943; and NAZ SP4/2/19 Loc 5084, Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province (Livingstone) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 28 October 1940.

¹⁶⁹ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Report on Public Opinion for Central Province for the Month of March 1942, 8 April 1942.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 June 1941.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, Intelligence Report for Western Province for the Month of February 1942, 6 March 1942.

The English-speaking community in the country was very suspicious of the activities of their Afrikaner counterparts. They were surprised at the apparent ease and rapidity with which sensitive information about Northern Rhodesia became known to Zeesen, the German propaganda broadcasting station. It was speculated that such information was being relayed by some members of the underground *Ossewabrandwag* living in Lusaka.¹⁷² This organisation represented anti-war Afrikaner opinion. It had the same cultural-political agenda espoused by its parent in South Africa which appealed strongly to Afrikaners to eschew what was considered to be yet another war on behalf of the British Empire. Anti-war opinion was a corollary of the general thrust of Afrikaner nationalism at the time. Central to Afrikaner nationalism was an emphasis on what was perceived to be a common past – from the Great Trek in the 1830s and heightened by the war of 1899-1902 against Britain – through to the continuing British imperial influence in South Africa in the 1940s.¹⁷³ Among such information leaked to the Germans were the existence of the Kafue Internment Camp for European refugees in Lusaka and the manoeuvres of the 27th Northern Rhodesia Infantry Brigade.¹⁷⁴ Intelligence sources felt that this type of information was being conveyed by some members of the Afrikaner community from Lusaka to Portuguese East Africa, where it was then transmitted to Germany.¹⁷⁵ In another instance, a member of the *Ossewabrandwag* at Broken Hill hoisted the Swastika at St. George's Church, a predominantly English church.¹⁷⁶ This caused much annoyance to the English settler community. Although the culprit was fined £10 for the offence and eventually deported from the country, the English speaking community felt that the fine was too lenient. In the Lusaka district, farming activities on Afrikaner farms came to a standstill

¹⁷² A more nuanced discussion of this organisation is contained in C. Marx, *Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of the Ossewabrandwag* (Pretoria, 2008).

¹⁷³ A. Grundlingh, 'The King's Afrikaners? Enlistment and Ethnic Identity in the South African Defence Force during the Second World War', *Journal of African History*, (1999), 353.

¹⁷⁴ NAZ SEC1/1770, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 1 March 1945.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid; and ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 4 October 1944.

in February 1942 as soon as a leading member of the *Ossewabrandwag* was arrested by security personnel for spreading anti-war propaganda.¹⁷⁷

2.10. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the recruitment and mobilisation of labour for the NRR during the Second World War was influenced by a combination of complex factors. The institution of chieftainship and propaganda, undoubtedly, were the major tools utilised to recruit thousands of Africans into the army. This, however, does not account for the enlistment of all men. It has been shown that under close scrutiny, a more complex picture emerges than that of government leaders simply ordering chiefs to recruit men for military service. Africans themselves were active agents in the recruitment process. In addition, it has been argued that the absence of male labour due to war service did not disrupt the local people's way of life, in contrast to Killingray's earlier observation. This was because in the absence of male relatives serving in the army, those left behind devised coping strategies. The chapter has also demonstrated that the country's war efforts were opposed by some members of the local Afrikaner society and members of the Watch Tower movement. In doing so, the chapter has contended that contrary to older academic arguments, the millenarian Watch Tower movement was, in fact, an entity which was neither underground, unofficial nor entirely composed of Africans. The next chapter examines the promotion of commodity production in Northern Rhodesia as part of the Allied war effort which also impinged on the availability of manpower.

CHAPTER THREE

South-east Asia, a Desperate Britain, and African Industries

¹⁷⁷ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 10 March 1942.

3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the effects upon Northern Rhodesia of the fall of Allied colonies in South-east Asia following the extension of war in the Pacific in 1941. The Allied possessions Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Java, Borneo and the Philippines which supplied many of the raw materials needed by Britain and other Allied nations were overrun by the invading Japanese. The victories recorded by Japan, primarily for its own imperialist designs in the region, gave the invaders control of much-needed raw materials such as tin, jute, iron, rubber, oils and fats. This state of affairs had a telling effect on Northern Rhodesia, resulting in attempts being made to produce raw materials like rubber and beeswax needed to supplement what the metropole could not readily obtain from traditional sources. The territory also revived production of locally-needed items such as iron tools, string and ropes which had become difficult to obtain from abroad due to war conditions. The lack of imported raw materials was compounded further by the unavailability of merchant shipping space devoted to carrying civil articles from regions of surplus to areas of deficit such as the colonies. For example, in the week 20-27 June 1940, 135,699 tonnes of merchant shipping were sunk by Axis.¹

This chapter seeks to enlarge our knowledge of developments in industry and commerce in wartime Northern Rhodesia, thereby broadening the discussion on the political economy of the Second World War as it affected the country. The production of rubber, beeswax, iron, string and ropes in Northern Rhodesia reveal the extent to which both the imperial and colonial governments went in the search for resources, the nature of African responses to new opportunities, as well as the unpredictability of the market in export commodities in wartime. However, the production of these commodities faced numerous problems, the major one being the uneconomic prices offered by the metropolitan government.

¹ A. Jackson, 'The Empire/Commonwealth and the Second World War', *The Round Table*, 100, 412 (February 2011), 69.

3.2. Rubber

3.2.1. The Significance of Rubber in Wartime

When the Second World War broke out, rubber's main use was in the manufacture of tyres for military vehicles and aeroplanes as well as footwear for military personnel. After satisfying military needs, the remainder was apportioned to civilian use for similar purposes. On the eve of the war, the main sources of rubber on the world market were South-east Asian Allied-controlled colonies of Indonesia, Java, Malaya, the Philippines and Borneo. In February 1942, Allied fears of facing a shortage of raw materials as soon as the war broke out in the Pacific came to reality when Japanese forces defeated Allied territories in the region, with the result that a major worldwide shortage of rubber and essential fats and oils was triggered.² The late entry of Japan into the war and the rapid fall of South-east Asia exposed the lack of Allied contingency planning with regard to the supply of raw materials. Acknowledging that Britain had lost 60 per cent of the world's tin production, 90 per cent of rubber production, a large proportion of wolfram, lead and other materials and important sources of supply for sugar, tea and rice, British Secretary of State Harold Macmillan said 'we are threatened with further interference with our sources of supply. We need to increase colonial production for war purposes on an immense scale. Everywhere we must increase.'³ The single most important source of rubber left to Allied powers was Ceylon which produced about 80,000 tons per year against world requirements of one million tons.⁴ Following the British retreat from Singapore, the colony became a major battleground in air and sea warfare between the belligerents, which further undermined production and disrupted supplies. As a result, smaller supplies of rubber remaining in Africa, India and South America needed to be tapped.

² National Archives of Zambia (hereafter, NAZ) SEC2/273, Secret Statement by the Raw Materials Department, Ministry of Supply, November 1943; and A.E. Hinds, 'Government Policy and the Nigerian Palm Oil Export Industry, 1939-49', *Journal of African History*, 38, 3 (1997), 462.

³ *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 25 June 1942.

⁴ NAZ SEC2/273, Secret Statement on Raw Materials.

It was in this context that the imperial government urged colonial states, including Northern Rhodesia, to develop commercial rubber production as a war measure. Attempts began to be made to resuscitate the old *Para* and *Ceara* rubber plantations in West Africa and East African colonies of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Madagascar as well as in Ceylon,⁵ while in South Africa rubber was tapped from the *Euphorbia* tree.⁶ Natural rubber production in Northern Rhodesia has a long history⁷ and it was well known that the commodity grew wild in parts of the Barotse, Kaonde-Lunda, Western and Northern provinces.⁸ These provinces contained areas whose altitude ranged between 3500-4000 feet and received annual rainfall of between 55-60 inches, very conducive for the growth of rubber vines. In the period before the First World War, in the western districts of the country, tax was even paid in the form of crude rubber balls.⁹ It was thought that if the making of rubber was an indigenous industry at the turn of the twentieth century, it could now equally be revived as part of the war effort. The nascent rubber industry had been abandoned owing to high transport costs and falling prices in the aftermath of the First World War as the production of the commodity was now viewed to be an uneconomic proposition.¹⁰ Local officials in Northern Rhodesia were jubilant in anticipation of the ensuing benefits the industry could bring to state coffers as well

⁵ *The Planter and Tanganyika Advertiser*, June 1942; and *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 25 June 1942.

⁶ *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 8 May 1942; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 20 May 1942; and *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 21 May 1942.

⁷ See C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia: Being some Impressions of the Tanganyika Plateau* (London, 1911), 332-337; A. von Oppen, *Terms of Trade, Terms of Trust: the History and Contexts of Pre-Colonial Market Production around the Upper Zambezi and Kasai* (Munster, 1992); and R.J. Papstein, 'The Upper Zambezi: A History of the Luvale People, 1000-1900', PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1978.

⁸ At independence in 1964, these provinces became known as Western, North-Western, Copperbelt, respectively while the Northern Province was divided into Northern and Luapula.

⁹ NAZ SEC2/273, Notes by Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioners' Conference, February 1942; *ibid*, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 16 February 1942; *ibid*, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka) and Controller of Customs (Livingstone), 8 January 1937; *ibid*, Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 3 February 1942; *ibid*, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 16 February 1942; *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 5 January 1937; *ibid*, *Nyasaland News* No. 30 of 1942.

¹⁰ NAZ SEC2/273, Resident Magistrate to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1942; and *ibid* for a detailed discussion of the problem of low prices of rubber in the 1920s between the Director of Agriculture and the Controller of Customs, 8 January 1937.

as the creation of employment for local people from whom the state could collect taxes.¹¹ Officers even suggested how production could be expanded through the immediate purchase of suitable machinery to produce thousands of tons per annum, the use of compulsion to ensure that many African peasant farmers took up rubber production, and provision of trade goods to entice the local people to engage more in rubber collection rather than food crops.

On 18 April 1942, the government of Northern Rhodesia sent the first rubber samples to two firms in South Africa: Dunlop South Africa Limited in Durban, and the South African Rubber Manufacturing Company Limited also in Durban. After an analysis of the samples, it was noted that the majority fell into 'the medium or top grade'. The Rhokana Corporation also despatched samples of rubber found on their premises in Nkana (Kitwe) to their holding company Anglo American Corporation in Johannesburg. These were analysed by another laboratory J.H. Vivian and Company Limited. On 22 April 1942, the analysis results were sent to Nkana and revealed that while the rubber was dirty, and contained impurities, it was of medium quality.¹² The purpose underlying these enquiries was to determine the efficacy of the rubber available in Northern Rhodesia and to devise processes, acceptable to the collectors, which would result in the largest possible production of marketable rubber.¹³ Since Northern Rhodesia was close to the Union of South Africa, it was decided to place her within the buying sphere of the Union government which had been appointed official buyer on behalf of the British Ministry of Supply in the region. From a strategic point of view, it was considered essential that even samples which were not to standard should be purchased because such were capable of being improved upon if better purification methods were adopted.¹⁴ Michael Cowen

¹¹ Ibid, Notes by Chief Secretary, February 1942; *ibid*, Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 16 February 1942; and *ibid*, Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province to Chief Secretary, 3 February 1942.

¹² Ibid, J.H. Vivian and Company (Johannesburg) to Rhokana Corporation Limited (Nkana), 22 April 1942.

¹³ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Dunlop South Africa Limited (Durban), 18 April 1942; and J.H. Vivian and Company to Rhokana Corporation Limited, 2 April 1942.

¹⁴ Ibid, Chief Buyer, Dunlop South Africa Limited (Durban) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 4 May 1942; *ibid*, General Manager, South Africa Rubber Manufacturing Company Limited (Howick) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 12 May 1942.

and Nicholas Westcott observed that from early 1942 commodity marketing came almost exclusively under state control as colonial administrations were instructed by the imperial government to become sole buyers of export crops.¹⁵

However, the initial price set by the Ministry of Supply, at between six and eight pence per pound of rubber was too low to stimulate production.¹⁶ As the Director of Agriculture, C.J. Lewin, argued, ‘with regard to future developments it must be admitted candidly that at a value of 6d. per lb. in South Africa for raw material such as that already submitted, the prospects [of a profitable rubber industry] are nil’.¹⁷ The low price offered by the Ministry of Supply meant a mere two pence profit per pound to African rubber collectors living in the remotest parts of the country from which the bulk of the deliveries would come. This small return was worthless considering the amount of labour involved in the production of rubber. It was recommended that the purchase price to African collectors should be at least nine pence per pound at all buying centres in the country.¹⁸ If low prices continued to be offered, it was likely that collectors would sell their rubber to traders in either Angola or the Congo where prices were reported to be about one shilling or exchanged for four yards of calico per pound.¹⁹ It was proposed that District Commissioners and Provincial Commissioners as buying agents of the government, should be empowered to raise the price up to one shilling per pound if the market price over the border areas warranted it, and for purer grades of rubber.²⁰

¹⁵ M. Cowen and N. Westcott, ‘British Imperial Economic Policy during the War’, in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 45.

¹⁶ Ibid, Chief Buyer, Dunlop Ltd to Director of Agriculture, 4 May 1942; and *ibid*, General Manager, South Africa Rubber Manufacturing Company Limited to Director of Agriculture, 12 May 1942.

¹⁷ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to General Manager, South Africa Rubber Manufacturing Company Limited, 19 May 1942; *ibid*, Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 26 June 1942; and *ibid*, Provincial Commissioner (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 28 September 1942. “£”, “s” and “d” are the abbreviations for pounds, shillings, and pence, the pre-decimal currency system in use in Britain, its colonies, and Commonwealth countries up until the 1970s.

¹⁸ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 27 April 1942; and *ibid*, Officer-in-Charge, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 29 May 1942.

¹⁹ Ibid, Officer-in-Charge, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to District Commissioner (Mwinilunga), 27 April 1942; and *ibid* Officer-in-Charge, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 29 May 1942.

²⁰ Ibid, Officer-in-Charge, Kaonde-Lunda Province to Chief Secretary, 29 May 1942.

The Ministry of Supply heeded these complaints. An announcement concerning the purchase of rubber, as part of the war effort, was made on 21 July 1942 through government Notice No. 405 of 1942. The revised scale of prices and conditions for the purchase of raw rubber are stipulated in Table 3.1.

Among the conditions attached to the purchase of rubber was that the product had to be consigned to the Director of Agriculture in Mazabuka for verification in lots of half a tonne. Transport charges were borne by the consignor. Any secure form of packaging was allowed, but bark rubber was not to be tightly baled. If the grades of the rubber were mixed up on delivery, the package was valued at the lowest grade contained therein while rubber found wet on arrival was dried at the expense of the consignor. Furthermore, consignments were paid for based on the basis of the dry or net weight and the official grading system. The first batch of rubber weighing 14,806 pounds and worth £762.19s.7d. was despatched to South Africa on 13 January, 1943.²¹ Two firms were appointed as official agents of the British Ministry of Supply in South Africa, viz: Messrs South African Rubber Manufacturing Company Ltd and Messrs Dunlop South Africa Ltd, both found in Durban.²²

Table 3.1: Schedule of Rubber Prices, July 1942

Grade	Price/lb	Description
TAPPED RUBBER		
T.1.	1s. 6d.	Best quality pure tapped rubber, properly dried and tendered in small balls.

²¹ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Controller of Rubber, Dunlop Limited (Durban), 13 January 1943; and *ibid*, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 January 1943.

²² Ibid, Secretary of Commerce and Industries (Pretoria) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 28 March 1942.

T.2.	1s. 3d.	Good average tapped rubber. Adequately clean and without much moisture or bark scrap. Not tacky.
T.3.	9d.	Dirty tapped rubber, that is, containing much bark or other impurities, provided usable and arriving in sound condition.
BARK RUBBER		
B.1.	1s. 3d.	Properly dried bark rubber, free from avoidable bark, tackiness and sand, and tendered in thin sheets (up to $\frac{3}{8}$ inch in thickness).
B.2.	1s.	Dry bark rubber of average quality; more bark fragments allowed but no sand and only slightly tackiness.
B.3.	8d.	Inferior bark rubber with obvious excess of bark fragments. Some sand or tackiness allowed, provided usable and arriving in sound condition.

Source: NAZ SEC2/273, Government Notice No. 405 of 1942, The Purchase of Raw Rubber, 21 July 1942.

3.2.2. Regulating the Rubber Trade

In order to control the production and export of rubber, a government Notice No. 121 of 1942 was placed in the Gazette on 8 May. By this law, the whole territory was declared open for the collection of rubber, with a proviso that the declaration should not affect any land in private ownership without written consent from the owner.²³ To participate in business, traders were required to take out one of the two types of licences free of charge from respective District Commissioners. The first category stated that a person wishing to trade in rubber was required to take out a licence to trade in, buy and sell rubber. Anyone wishing to employ collectors of rubber, instead of buying rubber from collectors, was required to take out a licence to cut and collect rubber. However only the government through the Department of Agriculture exported

²³ Ibid, Government Notice No. 405 of 1942: The Purchase of Raw Rubber; *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Controller of Customs (Livingstone), 5 May 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 7 July 1942.

the commodity bought from various traders. With a view to improving the quality of raw rubber delivered from different parts of the country, the Department of Agriculture also published and disseminated free of charge a pamphlet - The Purchase of Raw Rubber - which contained information on the distribution, types and quality of rubber with hints on buying, drying and packing.

The Defence (Wild Rubber) Order No. 14 of 1942 provided that after 1 September of that year, the purchase of wild rubber throughout the territory would be solely in the hands of authorised agents. It was envisaged that such representatives would be, for the most part, traders already in business in the various areas concerned and who had knowledge of local conditions.²⁴ As the need for rubber was huge, District Commissioners were asked to do everything in their power to stimulate production and be prepared to augment the outlet for rubber by opening government buying centres where trading posts were too widely spaced.²⁵ District Commissioners were also urged to play an educative role²⁶ by ensuring that the rubber brought in by traders was in as clean and dry a state as possible.

The government also devised a loan scheme to aid undercapitalised rubber traders. Loans of up to a maximum of £150 were given by the Director of Agriculture. Repayments were deducted from the proceeds due in respect of rubber delivered to the Department of Agriculture by the borrowers at the rate of £30 per two thousand pounds delivered while the interest rate was pegged at five percent per annum.²⁷

3.2.3. Hindrances to the Production of Rubber

²⁴ Ibid, Director of Agriculture, Confidential Circular to District Commissioners, 22 July 1942. See also *Nyasaland Times*, 13 August 1942.

²⁵ Ibid, Director of Agriculture, Confidential Circular to District Commissioners, 22 July 1942.

²⁶ This was in line with the “civilising mission” of Imperial paternalism.

²⁷ Ibid, Accountant-General (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), nd.

The export of rubber experienced its own problems like other export commodities during wartime. It was influenced by the lack of processing machinery, a shortage of labour, inadequate trade goods for barter, the inconsistent quality of the product, and its low purchase price. The poor quality of rubber produced was a problem, especially in the initial stages. There were discrepancies in the quality of rubber received from various districts and producers, especially with regard to the moisture content which in turn affected the value of the product delivered at buying stations. Much of the bark rubber was reported to contain resins, fragments and sand by the time it was delivered for sale.²⁸ At other times, the rubber was sticky due to being left in the sun for a long time. So far as tapped rubber was concerned, cleanliness was essential as it had the advantage over bark rubber in that it was readily obtainable in a much purer form, but some consignments were contaminated by dirt which affected the colouring. In order to solve these problems, the Department of Agriculture came up with stringent measures to improve the quality of rubber for export. All rubber balls brought in had to be cut practically in half before they could be submitted for sale, so as to reveal any impurities. In order to ease drying, the weight of the balls was pegged at between one to two ounces, less than the size a golf ball.²⁹ For bark rubber, the recommended method was to have it in the form of sheets of $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ inches, as they dried faster than when in ball form. The problem of poor quality of rubber was not unique to Northern Rhodesia. As the Rubber Production Mission to East African Territories noted, this problem was widespread in the region.³⁰

Another challenge faced by the industry was lack of machinery which could be used to process rubber. Much, if not all, of the bark rubber produced in the country was produced manually, and this affected both the quality and quantity of the rubber churned out. In the

²⁸ Ibid, Pamphlet for the Purchase of Raw Rubber; and von Oppen, *Terms of Trade*, 162.

²⁹ Ibid, Department of Agriculture, Pamphlet for the Purchase of Raw Rubber.

³⁰ Ibid, Rubber Production Mission to East African Territories, Madagascar and the Rhodesias, 21st November 1942–4 March 1943: General Summary and Conclusions, 9 March 1943.

Kawambwa district, for example, rubber trader complained that while there was a great deal of rubber in the area, the limiting factor was the time taken to beat the bark.³¹ Attempts by the mining companies to come up with machinery to process bark rubber were unsuccessful. The Nchanga Trading Company in Chingola district experimented with a 5-stamp – ‘Dolley’- mill but this did not produce the desired results.³²

More than this, the rubber business lacked incentives in form of trade goods which traders could exchange for rubber. This was a difficult factor to overcome, given wartime conditions where consumer goods were generally in short supply. As the Provincial Commissioner for the Kaonde-Lunda province stated, ‘... there is a great shortage of trade goods in the province and a good deal of money lies frozen in the villages.’³³ The position of Northern Rhodesia in this regard was more acute than other territories visited by the Rubber Production Mission in the East African region in February 1943. The Mission noted that this was partly due to the higher purchasing power of the growing number of Northern Rhodesian Africans on the mines, railways and in other industrial employment, where since the war, wages had been increased.³⁴ As the cloth quota for Northern Rhodesia from India and the United Kingdom had been reduced from nine million to six million yards per year due to the onset of the war, this had caused a critical shortage of trade goods in the country. The worst affected were districts in outlying areas, not least those that produced rubber. This was the major challenge faced by Messrs Brice and Bissett, rubber traders in the Kasempa district. This scenario caused the Provincial Commissioner for the Kaonde-Lunda to lament that:

³¹ Ibid, Extract of Notes from the Governor to the Chief Secretary, 24 February 1942.

³² Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 March 1943.

³³ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 7 October 1942; *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner (Kasempa), 14 October 1942; and *ibid*, Minutes of the Western Province Regional Council Meeting Held at 9:30AM on 17 July 1944.

³⁴ Ibid, Report of the Rubber Production Mission in East African Territories, the Rhodesias and Madagascar, 21 November 1942 to 4 March 1943.

... it will take a little time to get production fully functioning. The only established (sic) firm in the district shows no sign of any activity. Its scores (sic) are empty of trade goods and the local atmosphere of deadness seems to have a strangle hold on it.³⁵

The shortage of trade goods was one of the most contentious issues as far as this industry was concerned. In South America, local rubber producers were offered inducements, and it was suggested in colonial government and imperial circles that the same should happen in Northern Rhodesia.³⁶ It was suggested that the type of goods which would most appeal to local people were cotton prints and household items such as pots and pans. So serious was the shortage of these trade items in Northern Rhodesia, and Africa as a whole, that the United States government agreed to export them under Lend-Lease arrangements and not through normal commercial channels.³⁷ But this also underlines the gravity of the shortage of rubber on the world market and the need to develop alternative sources elsewhere. As one trader in Balovale district warned, '[u]nless an adequate quantity of trade goods could be made available, it was useless to expect natives to make great efforts to obtain rubber. The patriotism or rather loyalty to the allied cause, makes but a small appeal to the Africans of Balovale.'³⁸ He considered that

³⁵ NAZ SEC2/278, Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 26 October 1942.

³⁶ Ibid, Colonial Office Telegram No. 126 to the East African Governors' Conference (Nairobi); and ibid, Colonial Office Telegram No. 11 to the West African Governors' Conference (Accra).

³⁷ Ibid, Extract of the Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the East Africa Civil Supplies Board held in Nairobi on the 2nd and 5th October 1942. See also ibid, Extract of the Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the East Africa Civil Supplies Board held in Nairobi on Monday, 9 November 1942; Mining Industry Archives (hereafter, MIA) 18.4.2A, The Report of the First Meeting of the Northern Rhodesia Supplies Board held at Lusaka on Tuesday, 15 September 1942; NRG, Legislative Council Debates Hansard, December 1942. The Lend-Lease programme arose out of an Act passed by the United States Congress in March 1941. The programme provided aid to a government of any country whose defence the American government deemed vital to the security of the United States. An initial sum of US\$7bn was set aside to last up to 30 June 1943.

³⁸ NAZ SEC2/278, Record of an interview between Mr B.P. Rudge with the Director of Civil Supplies at Lusaka, 17 November 1942.

the principal articles demanded by Africans were blue print, check gingham, unbleached calico and blankets.³⁹

Such articles were also used in similar barter arrangements in Angola, the Belgian Congo, and Southern Rhodesia. The Director of Civil Supplies agreed that trade goods for barter in rubber should be ordered from the United States by the British Colonial Supply Mission under Lend-Lease provided traders specified the goods needed and their quantities for at least a period of one year. In order to obtain goods under Lend-Lease, all orders had to be placed in bulk by the government of Northern Rhodesia with the government of the United States or with the imperial government.⁴⁰ It was estimated that goods worth £25,000 bought on government account would suffice for 1943 based on an estimate of 250 tons of rubber production for the year at prices of two shillings six pence and two shillings per pound.⁴¹ Any undisposed of stock was to be carried over to the following year. Two Lusaka-based wholesale firms were appointed by the Director of Civil Supplies as official distributors of merchandise to traders engaged in raw rubber purchases. These were Pelletier Ltd which supplied khaki drill, and Limbada and Company, for ordinary fabric.⁴²

The industry was bedevilled by the shortage of labour due to war conditions. It was estimated in 1943 that in districts where rubber vines existed, as much as 50 percent of all adult males were absent working on the Copperbelt or other urban centres, or outside the country. An estimated 15,000 men had joined the armed forces.⁴³ Those who remained behind in the villages were pre-occupied with food production. Rubber production was not a priority,

³⁹ Ibid, B.P. Rudge (Balovale) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 1 December 1942.

⁴⁰ Ibid, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Supplies Board held at Lusaka on Tuesday 15 September 1942.

⁴¹ Ibid, Financial Secretary to Chief Secretary, 22 January 1943.

⁴² Ibid, Controller of Customs (Livingstone) to Acting Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 7 April 1943.

⁴³ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) replies to Questionnaire Set by the Rubber Production Mission to East African Territories, Madagascar and the Rhodesias, c. March 1943.

considering the laborious work involved. This problem was noted by the Rubber Production Mission during its tour of duty of East African territories. The Mission observed that:

... as with the East African Territories and Nyasaland, the natives [in Northern Rhodesia] do not consider wild rubber collection, and especially of bark rubber, as congenial work. They are comparatively well to do with remittances from relatives absent in the Union, Southern Rhodesia, the Copperbelt and the service and the collection of wild rubber does not offer the same return as or other normal rural unskilled employment.⁴⁴

In May 1942 it was recommended to the Secretary of State in London that a minimum price of nine pence per pound should be offered to Africans collecting rubber and that if this failed to produce adequate response, the price should be increased to one shilling. The Secretary of State replied in June of the same year that the Ministry of Supply, as sole buyer in Africa, could only buy all rubber produced in Northern Rhodesia at ten pence per pound free on rail Livingstone. Nevertheless, the government insisted that as most buying centres were about four hundred miles away from the line of rail, the aforementioned price was still inadequate to arouse the desired levels of production.⁴⁵

The rate of pricing for rubber was uniform throughout British Africa because the trade was determined by the British Ministry of Supply.⁴⁶ The major reason the Ministry of Supply offered low prices for the commodity was to avoid an upswing in the rate of inflation during this period, especially as there were few goods on which people could spend the extra income earned from rubber sales. This approach had also been adopted in the palm oil industry in Nigeria, as both the colonial and imperial governments feared that the higher prices offered to

⁴⁴ Rubber Production Mission to East African Territories, 9 March 1943.

⁴⁵ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 7 July 1942.

⁴⁶ See, for example, ibid for correspondence between Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 8 December 1942, regarding the low prices for rubber in the Gold Coast (Ghana).

producers of palm oil could lead to traders having a lot of disposable income.⁴⁷ The measure was intended to ensure that people had less money in their pockets, so that there was less demand for imports from the metropole. This was viewed as one way of solving the problem of limited merchant shipping space faced by the Allied nations during the war period. Despite the pressure for increased production, imperial officials considered that higher prices would fuel inflation rather than encourage more output because of the restriction on imported consumer goods.⁴⁸ A circular by the British Colonial Secretary Lord Moyne to Governor John Maybin on 5 June 1941 stated that '[i]mport licensing should in general be more strictly administered, and imports most drastically curtailed, as this is the most effective means of directly curtailing consumption in Colonial conditions'.⁴⁹

The major hindrance to the advancement of the rubber industry in Northern Rhodesia was the low price offered to producers by traders based on the price set by the British Ministry of Supply. When the official programme for buying the commodity started, the price was pegged at one shilling and six pence per pound.⁵⁰ Yet, a trader at the Abercorn Trading Company calculated that it took a day to collect rubber weighing one third of a pound – a wage at present prices of ten shillings for 30 days' work.⁵¹ In rural Northern Rhodesia, the average ordinary labourer was paid a wage, including a food portion, which averaged 12 shillings six pence per month.⁵² On the other hand, wages for Africans in urban areas were much higher than in rural areas. In 1940 on the Copperbelt, the starting rate for surface work on the mines

⁴⁷ See, for example, D. Meredith, 'State Controlled Marketing and Economic "Development": The Case of West African Produce during the Second World War', *Economic History Review*, New Series, 39, 1 (February 1986), 84-85.

⁴⁸ Cowen and Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy', 46.

⁴⁹ NAZ SEC1/1761 vol. I., Colonial Secretary (London) to Governor, Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka), Circular No. 2, 5 June 1941. See also Cowen and Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy', 46.

⁵⁰ Northern Rhodesia Government (hereafter NRG), *Legislative Council Debates Hansard*, 19 September 1942.

⁵¹ NAZ SEC2/273, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 12 October 1942.

⁵² R.J.B Moore, 'Native Wages and Standard of Living in Northern Rhodesia', *African Studies*, 1, 2 (1942), 142-148.

was 15 shillings, and 25 shillings for underground work, exclusive of food portions.⁵³ Rates of wages in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia, a popular destination for labour migrants from Northern Rhodesia, were even higher.⁵⁴ Another trader in Ndola district also complained:

... that the price offered by the Government is so small that it precludes the payment of an attractive price either for the purchase of rubber or in the form of wages for labour employed in the gathering of rubber, therefore, it doesn't strike me that the collection of rubber is likely to attract a substantial quantity of attention in the district unless there is a very substantial increase in price.⁵⁵

This statement was echoed by the Electoral Member representing Broken Hill in the Legislative Council. He noted that while the price offered was sufficient to bring in the bulk of the rubber from the more remote districts, it was too low to induce Africans to bring the commodity from districts containing an industrial population and particularly where whites employed Africans to collect the rubber.⁵⁶ In the Ndola district, the Assistant Conservator of Forests observed that it was not possible to have a viable rubber trade unless the price was increased.⁵⁷

The problem of low prices for rubber was not new to the industry. Even before the war broke out, the Director of Agriculture had noted that in most African territories supplies of local rubber came on the market only when the world price had risen high enough.⁵⁸ It was due to this that all plantation rubber-producing countries had agreed to a restriction scheme in the

⁵³ Moore, 'Native Wages', 147.

⁵⁴ See, for example, D. Johnson, *World War Two and the Scramble for Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939-1948* (Harare, 2000); I. Phimister, *Wangi Kolia: Coal, Capital and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894-1954* (Johannesburg, 1994), 181-84; and *ibid*, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe: 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle* (London, 1988).

⁵⁵ NAZ SEC2/273, H. Hope (Ndola) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 21 September 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 22 September 1942.

⁵⁶ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates Hansard*, 21 September 1942; see also NAZ SEC2/273, for correspondence between the District Commissioner (Ndola) and the Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 5 September 1942.

⁵⁷ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates Hansard*, 21 September, 1942.

⁵⁸ NAZ SEC2/273, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Controller of Customs (Livingstone), 8 January 1937.

early 1930s in order to stimulate rubber's price. This caused the price per pound of a standard quality ribbed rubber in London to increase from 1¾d. in 1932 to nine pence by the end of 1936.⁵⁹ In wartime, however, although the colonial government sympathised with local producers and traders, it could not do anything about prices because trade conditions were directed by the Ministry of Supply. The Director of Agriculture did suggest that if the production of rubber was to be expanded near urban areas, the selling price would have to go up to two shillings six pence per pound for the best quality rubber because of higher rates of wages there.⁶⁰

The collection of rubber, however, was not detrimental to African peasants' livelihoods. There were many different strategies used to cope with changes in peasants' social and economic milieu. Production was organised through a social system based on the exchange of labour and food, between members of a household and the community. The absence of men who went to collect rubber in the forests did not, therefore, imply a collapse of food production and attendant hunger because social relations were adopted. When the men were away in the forests, the women and their children performed male-related agricultural tasks in family gardens such as stumping.⁶¹ With income or goods earned from rubber sales, the rubber producers also sponsored communal work parties or hired casual male labour in their gardens. The production and marketing of surplus food crops in the Kaonde-Lunda province during the war period renders credence to this.⁶² Furthermore, hunting and food gathering activities also took place during rubber expeditions and contributed to the acquisition of more food for households. This substantiates the findings of Henrietta Moore and Megan Vaughan that male

⁵⁹ Ibid. Although the price of rubber reached a high of four shillings six pence per pound in 1925, there were no exports of the commodity from Northern Rhodesia between 1923-7.

⁶⁰ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 26 September 1942.

⁶¹ C.M. Chabatama, 'Peasant Farming, the State and Food Security in North-Western Province of Zambia, 1902-1964', PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1999, 185.

⁶² Ibid, 185-6.

absenteeism due to the integration in the cash economy did not always bring about negative effects on colonial societies contrary to earlier findings posited by Audrey Richards.⁶³

Realising that the low prices would not stimulate increased production of rubber, local administrators took it upon themselves to devise propaganda activities aimed at African peasants. One of these was an advertisement placed in *Mutende* newspaper urging people to 'Help the War by Collecting Rubber and Selling it to the Boma'.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the government ran essay-writing competitions on how best to collect and prepare rubber, while explaining the importance of rubber in wartime. Propaganda was spread through chiefs, headmen, and travelling District Officers as well as Messengers. While it was hoped that these measures would assist in boosting collection, District Commissioners agitated for more forceful measures to be adopted. In the Northern Province, the largest quantities of rubber produced came from Isoka district owing to threats on peasants by the District Commissioner that those who did not participate in the collection of rubber would be recruited as porters.⁶⁵

In addition, authorities from the Department of Education in the Northern Province permitted all school managers in rubber-producing areas to allow school children to collect rubber. Such expeditions could last up to two weeks.⁶⁶ This system was also applied in the Kaonde-Lunda Province. In the Kasempa district, authorities at Mukinge and Kalene Hill mission schools sent out boys to collect rubber in areas surrounding the schools.⁶⁷ And in the Balovale district the Local Education Committee agreed in principle that school children in

⁶³ H. Moore and M. Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1900* (Lusaka, 1994), 79.

⁶⁴ See, for example, *Mutende* No. 186, February 1945.

⁶⁵ During the First World War, the Government compulsorily recruited large numbers of carriers. During the 1939-1945 war, however, lorries carried the produce, but the shortage of tyres threatened the exercise. It was threatened by the District Commissioner at Isoka that if head portage was resorted to, it would be individuals from rubber-producing areas who had not assisted in bringing in rubber who would be engaged as porters, see example, NAZ SEC2/273, District Commissioner (Isoka) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama).

⁶⁶ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 12 October 1942.

⁶⁷ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 26 October 1942.

rubber growing areas be given one day's holiday each week to collect rubber and to assist in its preparation.⁶⁸ In Chingola district in the Western Province, authorities also utilised the Pathfinder Scouts to collect rubber and in this way raise some money for the organisation as well.⁶⁹ In the Kalabo district, Barotseland Province, missionaries taught school children how to prepare rubber as part of the handicraft curriculum while in Sesheke district the Catholic Capuchin Fathers and the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (P.E.M.S.) also set aside one school day every week for rubber production.⁷⁰ It was envisaged that the mission schools involved in this enterprise would also raise money from this venture for buying items for their operations.

The most promising district in the Kaonde-Lunda province was Mwinilunga where the 'very energetic trader in Mr Fisher' operated.⁷¹ Fisher had been involved in rubber trading even before the government announced its buying scheme. Although Balovale district had four buying centres (at Chavuma, Balovale boma, Kabompo, and at the Kabompo pontoon) run by private traders, not much rubber had been collected by October 1942. Consequently, the government devised new measures to encourage people to do so. Local people were now allowed to pay their taxes in kind, in rubber, and no one would be imprisoned for tax default as long as that person could satisfy the District Commissioner that he was engaged in the collection of rubber.⁷² Chiefs Ishinde and Kapijimpanga actively gave assistance in this regard and kept a record of rubber collected by each village. As an incentive, they were given a bonus for the quantities obtained from their areas.⁷³

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid, District Commissioner (Chingola) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 4 September 1942.

⁷⁰ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 November 1942.

⁷¹ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 26 October 1942.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

Traders in the Kaonde-Lunda province also faced stiff competition from their colleagues across the border in Angola who offered better terms of trade and bought much of the rubber produced in that part of the country. Government could not easily prevent peasants from selling their rubber in Angola because of a long and porous border. This situation was worsened by the general shortage of administrative staff for policing purposes, many of whom had been recruited into the military. It was hoped more trade goods would entice the local people to sell their produce within the territory. In this regard, the District Commissioner at Balovale appealed for more trade goods to help traders like Mr. T.S. Brice to purchase more rubber from the local people.⁷⁴ The situation was the same in the Kabompo area where another trader, Mr. W. Wood, had no trade goods to stimulate rubber collection, managing to collect only a paltry half a tonne of rubber. This was despite the fact that he had been given an advance of £150 to obtain goods for barter in rubber by the Department of Agriculture.⁷⁵

As the rubber shortage continued, some administrative officials urged the use of forced labour to drive up production levels. The District Commissioner of Mongu-Lealui proposed that an Order be made under Section 8(v) of the Barotse Native Authority to compel the production of rubber as recommended by the country's ecologist C.G. Trapnell. He observed that coercive measures for rubber production were already in use in neighbouring Angola and saw no reason why the same could not be done in Northern Rhodesia.⁷⁶ This plea was repeated the following year.⁷⁷ In the Mwinilunga district, Kaonde-Lunda province, a recommendation was made that every taxable male African not in permanent employment should bring 12 pounds of rubber to a government buying station for sale during 1944 and that whoever did not

⁷⁴ Ibid, District Commissioner (Balovale) to Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda (Kasempa), 30 March 1943.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid, District Commissioner, (Mongu-Lealui) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu-lealui), 16 April 1943.

⁷⁷ NAZ SEC2/273, District Commissioner (Mongu-Lealui) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu-Lealui), 20 March 1944.

comply with the regulation would be guilty of an offence.⁷⁸ A similar Order was also proposed for the Balovale district, the only difference being an increase in the quantity required from 12 pounds to 24 pounds. The District Commissioner in Balovale went further in proposing that an Order be made requiring all Africans in the district not to travel within or without the district until his *Chitupa* (pass) had been endorsed by a District officer with a certificate to the effect that his quota of rubber had been collected.⁷⁹

In November 1942, the first call among Africans was also made to introduce forced production of rubber. This came from the *Kuta* of Lozi chieftaincy at Mwandu in the Sesheke district.⁸⁰ That Lozi traditional councillors wanted to assist in the rubber collection exercise through the introduction of forced labour was not surprising. The Barotse Royal Establishment had already shown the way by cooperating with government in the forced recruitment of labour for European settler farms at the beginning of 1942 due to a shortage of Africans willing to do so.⁸¹ Thus, the *Kuta* proposed to pass a law under the Barotse Native Authorities Ordinance to provide for the production of a fixed number of loads of rubber from each village.⁸² But the Governor, in his reply to this request, noted that while he appreciated the desire by the *Kuta* to increase the production of rubber, he could not sanction labour compulsion.⁸³ However, permission to introduce coercive measures to stimulate rubber production was denied because it was felt that duress would not have a major impact on the industry since the territory was not a renowned producer of the commodity.

⁷⁸ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 17 April 1944.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ *Kuta* refers to the Royal Council of the Lozi people of the Barotse Province whose major role was to advise the chief.

⁸¹ See K. Datta's 'Farm Labour, Agrarian Capital and the State in Colonial Zambia: the African Labour Corps, 1942-1952', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14, 3 (April 1988), 371-392, has discussed the forced recruitment of farm labour in Northern Rhodesia during the Second World War. Her study noted that the highest number of the recruited labour came from the Barotse Province.

⁸² NAZ SEC2/273, Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu-Lealui) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 November 1942.

⁸³ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu-Lealui), 2 December 1942.

Nonetheless, the Ministry of Supply finally heeded appeals for increased prices for rubber. On 4 May 1943 the Director of Agriculture announced a new scale of prices for rubber effective from 15 May 1943 as demonstrated in Table 3.2. The introduction of new prices had a positive effect on the production of rubber, as the Governor confirmed when he addressed the Legislative Council on 20 November 1943. He said:

[r]ubber production is still disappointing but some increase has lately been apparent as a result of the higher scale of price and quality is definitely tending to improve. Exports since the beginning of the year now exceed 30 tons.⁸⁴

Table 3.2: Schedule of Rubber Prices, 1943

I. TAPPED RUBBER		
(a) In thin sheets approximately 1/8 inch thick	Price per <i>lb</i> at Mazabuka	Description
Grade: S.T.1.	2s. 6 <i>d.</i>	Dry and Clean
S.T.2.	2s. 0 <i>d.</i>	With little moisture, dirt or bark scrap
S.T.3.	1s. 3 <i>d.</i>	Dirty or tacky
(b) Other than in thin sheets		

⁸⁴ Ibid, Governor John Waddington's Address to the Legislative Council on 20 November 1945.

Grade: T.1.	2s. 3 <i>d.</i>	Small balls (less than golf ball size), dry and clean
T.2.	1s. 9 <i>d.</i>	With little moisture, dirt or bark scrap
T.3.	1s. 0 <i>d.</i>	Large balls, dirty or tacky
II. BARK RUBBER		
Grade: B.1.	2s. 0 <i>d.</i>	Thin sheets (1/4 inch maximum), dry and clean
B.2.	1s. 6 <i>d.</i>	Thicker sheets or rolls, without much moisture, bark or dirt
B.3.	0s. 9 <i>d.</i>	Dirty or tacky or with much bark

Source: NAZ SEC2/273 The Purchase of Raw Rubber: Circular No. 2, 4 May 1943.

3.2.4 The End of the Rubber Trade

The shortage of rubber for the Allies came to a head at the beginning of 1943, obliging the United States of America to use their long-standing synthetic rubber project in order to offset the shortfall of natural rubber. The considerable stocks of crude rubber which had been set aside before the war were nearing exhaustion, yet military requirements had continued to rise.⁸⁵ Although the American government had begun to develop alternative sources of rubber, synthetic rubber would not be ready until the beginning of 1944. This state of affairs threatened the production of tyres and other military requirements, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency by the British Secretary of State for the period between July 1943 and June 1944.⁸⁶ This declaration was aimed at devoting more government resources towards the collection and processing of rubber in those colonies endowed with the commodity than ever before. It was estimated that by the latter date, many civilian vehicles would also need tyre-replacements.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Ibid, Statement from the Secretary of State (London), to Chief Secretary (Lusaka) 26 February 1943.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid, Secretary of State (London) to Governor (Lusaka), 27 October 1943.

But once supplies of synthetic rubber came on stream a certain percentage of crude rubber would always be necessary for admixture with the synthetic rubber in order to manufacture satisfactory products. To maintain the supply of even this small percentage of natural rubber would require unrelenting effort towards maximum production. This applied to territories like Northern Rhodesia, not normally considered a significant producer of rubber. As the Ministry of Supply observed, the output of even the smallest producing territory would be vital to averting the threatened check to the United Nations' war effort.⁸⁸

In response to the state of emergency declared by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, government officials in Northern Rhodesia took their own initiative to undertake extensive tours of rubber-producing areas with effect from April 1943 in order to stimulate production. These tours were led by C.G. Trapnell, an ecologist from the Department of Agriculture. The Director of Agriculture C.J. Lewin, however, was pessimistic about the whole exercise because in his view the most effective way to stimulate production was to raise prices offered to producers. 'What effect his tours [C.G. Trapnell's] will have in the absence of any increase in prices I cannot say but we should indeed be failing in a clear duty if we did not take all possible steps to increase rubber production whatever work may have to be scrapped or deferred in consequence,' Lewin noted.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, this measure did have a positive impact on rubber production in the country. Production levels did increase in the territory and the Colonial Office was satisfied with the progress recorded. The Ministry of Supply noted this in a minute to the Governor in early 1945 when it stated that:

[a]mong the outstanding increases in production is that of Northern Rhodesia which shows, according to the Colonial Office records, an increase in export

⁸⁸ Ibid, Statement from Secretary of State to Chief Secretary, 26 February 1943.

⁸⁹ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 12 April 1943; and NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for the Year 1944* (Lusaka, 1945), 4.

figures from 34½ tons in 1943 to 107 tons in 1944 ... This increase, which was achieved in spite of the inability of the Ministry of Supply to agree to a further rise in prices, is very satisfactory, and I should be glad if you would convey the thanks of the Rubber Controller to those responsible for the collection of rubber in your Territory.⁹⁰

As the war drew to a close in the latter part of 1945, the colonial administration anticipated that wartime production of rubber would be curtailed. However, this was not the case because new instructions were received from the Ministry of Supply to continue with rubber production even after the cessation of hostilities. This was because it would take time to restore pre-war production levels in the recently re-conquered South-east Asian territories.⁹¹ The Ministry of Supply was anxious that African colonies should maintain existing production and purchase arrangements at least up to June 1946, after which a review of the situation would be done. The government in Northern Rhodesia did not take kindly to this suggestion. The Director of Agriculture argued that:

... I find it difficult to believe that it is now necessary or desirable to continue with hopelessly uneconomic production of relatively low grade rubber in this Territory ... The price paid to native collectors, although fantastic by pre-war standards, is equivalent, on an average, of less than 6d. per working day. As a consequence the bulk of the rubber has been produced under pressure and this has given an already overburdened Provincial Administration more additional work.

⁹⁰ Ibid, Deputy Controller of Rubber, Ministry of Supply (London) to Governor (Lusaka), 23 February 1945. See also *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for the Year 1944*, 3. The Department of Agriculture quotes higher production figures at 40.7 tons and 117.5 tons for 1943 and 1944, respectively.

⁹¹ Ibid, Secretary of State for the Colonies (London) to Governor (Lusaka), 10 December 1945.

While there was the incentive of urgent war needs this additional work could be justified – but not now.⁹²

Consequently, permission was sought from the Colonial Office to discontinue rubber-production. Whitehall agreed to this, and on 6 October 1945 the colonial government announced that consignments of rubber would no longer be accepted at Mazabuka effective from 31 December.⁹³ Deliveries continued to be made, however, as traders still had rubber in their possession by the time the announcement to close the market was made. The last batch of rubber from Northern Rhodesia to South Africa was despatched on 2 April 1946. It was reported in Mwinilunga district, where production had increased “amazingly” during the war, that there were virtually no trade goods for rubber production as the industry more or less had closed down.⁹⁴ In total, rubber with a net weight of about 500,000 pounds and worth over £40,000 was sent to the Ministry of Supply between 1943-6,⁹⁵ despatched in forty-four consignments.

3.3. Iron

Food production during the war was affected by a serious shortage in agricultural implements. Elizabeth Colson noted that it was often difficult for Tonga peasant farmers to get hoes, axes, nails, and hinges.⁹⁶ In wartime, about forty percent of Tonga families were in the subsistence category, that is, about 85.3 per cent of the total number of families, who owned no implements at all.⁹⁷ The shortage of hoes and ploughs had arisen as a result of the world-wide shortage of steel and iron, and the difficulty of transporting these raw materials to the

⁹² Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 20 September 1945.

⁹³ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to all Provincial Commissioners, Director of Agriculture, all District Commissioners, The Accountant-General, The Auditor, 6 October 1945.

⁹⁴ Ibid, Extract from the Kaonde-Lunda Province Newsletter No. 22, 27 March 1946.

⁹⁵ Details of rubber exports from Northern Rhodesia are attached in Appendix 1.

⁹⁶ E. Colson, ‘The Tonga and the Shortage of Implements’, *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal*, 14 (1954), 37.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

colonies due to limited merchant shipping space and their importance in weapons' production. So acute had the situation become on the Tonga plateau that families frequently had to wait until friends or relatives had finished their ploughing before they could borrow a plough and plant their crop.⁹⁸ As a result, peasants became dependent upon farming equipment which had already seen the wear and tear of a number of years when replacements and repairs were difficult or impossible to secure.

While steel and iron resources were available in Europe and the United States of America, the materials were mainly devoted to the manufacture of products vital in the execution of the war, and not to civilian articles. The problem of shipping was so acute that material from overseas was taking as long as 12 or even 18 months to be delivered.⁹⁹ The priority of the Allied nations was to deliver military hardware and supplies to the battle front. So critical had the shortage of steel and iron become that a consignment of 10,000 hoes imported into the country by the African Lakes Corporation, Booth (North) Ltd, and Thoms Stores was sold within ten days of arrival in August 1941.¹⁰⁰

The problem worsened further when the major source of Northern Rhodesian hoes, the Union of South Africa, banned the export of hoes early in 1942 due to a pressing need to reserve the available iron and steel for local consumption. This was in spite of a Special Import Permit and Certificate of Essentiality No. 11570 having been issued to African Lakes Corporation of Northern Rhodesia to import two thousand hoes from the Union. This predicament caused the exporter, Plows (PTY) Limited, to lament that:

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 44; M. Mukerjee, *Churchill's Secret War: the British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War Two* (New York, 2010); and B.S. Siamwiza, 'A History of Famine in Zambia c.1825-1949', PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998, 279.

¹⁰⁰ NAZ SEC2/271, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 11 September 1942.

[e]verything possible that can be done at our end has been done. We have turned two tons of steel into Hoes, and have a further supply of steel ready to be turned into Hoes, but since the strict control of iron and steel in the Union during the last few weeks, we cannot take a chance on proceeding with the making of Hoes, only to find that, when complete and ready for shipment, they cannot leave our factory.¹⁰¹

The South African government's refusal to allow exports of steel tools was non-negotiable. Fearing the loss of its business, the South African company suggested establishing a factory in Northern Rhodesia to avert the controls imposed on steel exports by the Union. However, such an undertaking was not feasible in Northern Rhodesia due to the lack of local steel resources. The company, therefore, decided to maintain the *status quo* until such time that Pretoria lifted the export ban.¹⁰²

The major source of imported farming equipment for the northern parts of Northern Rhodesia was Tanganyika. In 1942 the government of Tanganyika removed the export ban on hoes to Northern Rhodesia, provided local demand was met. But as the demand for hoes turned out to be insatiable in Tanganyika as well, exports to Northern Rhodesia were not sanctioned. Given this difficulty situation, the District Commissioner at Abercorn wondered if:

... in the meantime perhaps it might be possible to get hold of native blacksmiths and make use of old scrap iron? If we would make ourselves self-supporting in hoes or at any rate cease to import from overseas, it would be a direct contribution to our war effort.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Ibid, G. Emrys, Director, Plows (Pty) Ltd, (Cape Town) to African Lakes Company (Ndola), 3 June 1942.

¹⁰² Ibid; and ibid, District Superintendent, African Lakes Corporation Limited (Ndola) to Import Controller and Director off Civil Supplies (Lusaka), n.d.

¹⁰³ Ibid, District Commissioner (Abercorn) to traders, 13 January 1942.

The iron smelting industry in Northern Rhodesia enjoyed a long history dating back to the pre-colonial era. Frank Melland pointed out that the Kaonde people were at one time skilled smelters, while Griffiths Quick noted that the Chishinga people were the most talented iron workers in pre-colonial Northern Rhodesia.¹⁰⁴ It was in this context that the Northern Rhodesian government took it upon itself to revive the iron smelting industry in the country so that hoes and axes, so vital in African peasant food production, could be manufactured locally and sold to peasant farmers. The Chief Secretary acknowledged that:

I feel that if we are to make ourselves self reliant and independent of importation of food stuffs for our native population, it is absolutely imperative that some interest be given to the production of native hoes and axes in this Territory immediately.¹⁰⁵

So desperate was the situation that the Board of the British South Africa Company (BSACo), which owned mineral rights in much of the western part of the country, allowed local people to mine and process iron without the payment of royalties on the ore mined. The Board agreed that Africans could work iron or iron ore from any deposits in the country, other than those in areas covered by Special Grants or registered mining location.¹⁰⁶ This concession referred primarily to land in the Balovale district. The BSACo further emphasised that the iron ore mined would be used solely for the purpose of manufacturing hoes and other implements for use in Northern Rhodesia by Africans either in their village or agricultural life.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ F. Melland, *In Witch-bound Africa: an Account of the Primitive Kaonde and their Beliefs* (London, 1911); and G. Quick, 'Doctor of Iron Stone (*Ng'anga ya Lubwe*)', MSc Dissertation, University of Manchester, 1947.

¹⁰⁵ NAZ SEC2/271, Chief Secretary's Tour Report of Northern Province, 3 August 1943; see also *ibid*, Notes on the Making of Native Hoes by R.H. Howard, Agricultural Supervisor for Northern Province, November 1942.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, British South Africa Company (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 16 June 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to all Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners, 1 July 1942.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*.

Iron-smelting schemes were set up in districts which had a long standing tradition of the industry: Lundazi, Serenje, Kawambwa, Mkushi, Balovale and Abercorn. To foster this industry, the government offered subsidies to African blacksmiths through the newly created Native Development Board to produce as many iron tools as they could.¹⁰⁸ The Board was founded with assistance from the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) of 1940. Through this law, Britain envisaged spending £50 million on development and welfare in the Colonies over the next ten years. Section 1 of the Act authorised the Secretary of State for the Colonies to ‘make schemes for any purpose likely to promote the development of resources of any colony or welfare of its people . . .’¹⁰⁹ In March 1942 the Native Development Board set aside £500 to stimulate African production of hoes and axes to meet local demand which could not be filled by importation.¹¹⁰ This money was used by bureaucrats to purchase iron tools from African smiths for re-sale to peasant farmers. The Board noted:

[i]f output were left to the blacksmiths, many would hesitate to increase their normal rate; but if District Commissioners were given money to buy hoes and axes for resale to Natives, the necessary stimulus would be provided.¹¹¹

Colonial policy was now characterised by direct rather than indirect rule.¹¹² Tools were bought at the ruling local price up to a maximum of three shillings per hoe and one shilling and three pence for an axe. Once bought, the tools were held in stock by respective District Commissioners for sale to peasant farmers at the same price.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in E.R Wicker, ‘Colonial Development and Welfare, 1929-1957; The Evolution of a Policy’, *Social and Economic Studies*, 7, 4 (December 1958), 181.

¹¹⁰ NAZ SEC2/271, Extract from Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the Finance Sub-Committee of the Native Development Board held at Lusaka on Monday 20th July 1942.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² For a comparative analysis, see D.O. Spence, *Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922-67* (Manchester, 2015), 69, 86, 96.

¹¹³ NAZ SEC2/271, Note for Circulation to the Finance Sub-Committee of the Native Development Board, July 1942.

It was soon realised that the industry could not be revived without capital expenditure on such items as bellows and the erection of kilns which were beyond the means of individual smiths. The Provincial Commissioner for the Northern Province observed that while Kawambwa was the most promising district for iron production in the country, the smelting industry could not be revived unless smiths were provided too. Capital for building kilns would be needed.¹¹⁴ The Native Development Board approved a grant of £50 to the District Commissioner, Kawambwa for this purpose.¹¹⁵ In other districts, apart from setting up new furnaces, additional capital was required to engage the services of an expert smelter to teach people in the district how to smelt iron ore. In Abercorn it was estimated that wages for such an undertaking would cost 30 shillings, while seven shillings and six pence was required for smiths' food.¹¹⁶ In Chinsali district, the budget for training new smiths was put at five shillings. In the Balovale district, the erection of furnaces for smelting iron ore cost £27.¹¹⁷ It was estimated that between 500 and 600 hoes could be produced in the Kawambwa district alone, if additional smiths were trained and some form of mechanical hammer installed.¹¹⁸ In this district, five smiths who had previous experience in smelting operations were recruited. They erected five furnaces on a site adjacent to a hill containing a very large deposit of iron ore, receiving a grant of £50 from the Native Development Board.¹¹⁹

The earliest beneficiaries of government subsidies were Kawambwa, Mkushi, Mwinilunga and Balovale districts. From the £20 allocated to the Mkushi district in 1942 the District Commissioner bought 40 hoes and 111 axes from local smiths at a total cost of eight pounds and eleven shillings.¹²⁰ In the Balovale district, 120 hoes bought from local smiths by

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 24 July 1942.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, Note for Circulation to the Finance Sub-Committee, July 1942.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, Extract from Minutes of the Finance Sub-Committee held on 20 July 1942.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, Chief Secretary's Tour Report of Northern Province, 3 August 1943.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, Note for Circulation to the Finance Sub-Committee, July 1942; and *ibid*, Extract from Minutes of the Finance Sub-Committee held on 20 July 1942.

¹²⁰ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 18 August 1942.

the District Commissioner in September 1942 were bought at once by African peasant farmers.¹²¹ In the Mwinilunga district, 53 hoes were purchased by the District Commissioner from smiths in September 1942.¹²² Ninety-seven axes were purchased from local smiths by the District Commissioner in Ndola in August 1942.¹²³

The iron industry encountered problems of its own. The first one had to do with the lack of trained manpower to smelt the raw material. Included here was the shortage of manpower due to war conditions. In September 1942, for example, it was noted that '[t]he old iron industry depended on communal labour of a village or group of villagers. It is proving very difficult – in fact impossible to revive this communal working of the people'.¹²⁴ This could be attributed to the fact that people were aware of the economic value of their labour in relation to the low prices at which the produced articles were bought. Many Africans preferred to work on the Copperbelt or outside the territory where wages were much higher than could be won from smelting iron.

Additionally, the high cost of production made the industry an uneconomic proposition. Commenting on the development of the iron industry, the District Commissioner for Kawambwa commented: '[i]t is regarded as purely a war measure to alleviate shortage of hoes in which case it can be subsidised but not as a measure intended to develop the industry permanently ...' [emphasis in the original].¹²⁵ In that district, the cost of producing one hoe was pegged at five shillings. Similarly, the District Commissioner for Lundazi, who, when he carried out an experiment to produce hoes locally, found out that each hoe manufactured cost

¹²¹ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 18 September 1942.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid, District Commissioner (Ndola) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 4 August 1942.

¹²⁴ Ibid, Senior Agricultural Officer (Abercorn) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 29 September 1942.

¹²⁵ Ibid, District Commissioner (Kawambwa) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 27 November 1942.

six shillings and one and half pence.¹²⁶ While acknowledging that the hoes made in Lundazi district were “very good”, the Provincial Commissioner stated: ‘[i]t would appear however that with the present cost of labour that it would not be safe to sell these hoes at less than 6/ 3d. each . . .’¹²⁷ At this price, the product was regarded as too expensive compared to the pre-war price of three shillings. In line with this, the government agreed that efforts to revive the smelting industry and the manufacture of hoes by means of grants from the Native Development Board had proven disappointing owing to the high cost of production which made the undertaking uneconomic.¹²⁸ It was further noted that:

... there is little prospect of maintaining this native industry after the war in an area where there are other sources of revenue but in view of the present acute shortage of hoes it is suggested that payment should be made from Government funds as Special War Expenditure.¹²⁹

The government agreed to subsidise hoes produced locally at the rate of two shillings per hoe in view of the high cost of production. In a circular to concerned Provincial Commissioners, the Chief Secretary to the government directed that ‘in view of the present acute shortage of hoes it has therefore been decided as a temporary measure, that the difference between the price of 3/ and the actual cost of manufacture should be made up by means of a subsidy paid by Government’.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Ibid, District Commissioner (Lundazi) to Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson), 1 December 1942.

¹²⁷ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 11 December 1942.

¹²⁸ Ibid, Note for Executive Council, 21 December 1942.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioners for Eastern Province (Fort Jameson) and Northern Province (Kasama), 15 January 1943.

The government began paying a subsidy of two shillings for each hoe produced in 1943 following the allocation of £500 for that purpose.¹³¹ As the District Commissioner for Lundazi observed, the fact had to be faced up that if the hoes were wanted, they would have to be heavily subsidised.¹³² Among the first districts to benefit from state assistance was Abercorn which received £10 and spent it on subsidising the cost of 100 hoes.¹³³ Kawambwa district was given £100 from which 221 hoes and 17 axes were subsidised.¹³⁴ In the Balovale district, while waiting for his district allocation from the special subsidy fund set up by government, the District Commissioner used other sources of money to purchase iron tools. He feared that ‘... we cannot afford to damp the enthusiasm of local smiths which took so much to arouse’.¹³⁵

As it took a while before the industry got on its feet, the shortage of farming equipment for African peasant farmers persisted in some parts of the country. But with the resumption of exports from the Union of South Africa towards the end of 1943, the Northern Rhodesian government no longer had to subsidise local production. This followed a direct approach to the South African Ministry of External Affairs, requesting cooperation and the special allocation of raw materials used in the manufacture of hoes necessary for food production in Northern Rhodesia.¹³⁶ As a result, 250 tonnes of steel was acquired from the United States of America for use in the manufacture of 150,000 hoes for Northern Rhodesia in the Union of South Africa.¹³⁷ By September 1943, 88,000 hoes, made from steel specially allocated for Northern

¹³¹ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Accountant-General (Lusaka), 14 April 1943; and Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 14 April 1943.

¹³² Ibid, District Commissioner (Lundazi) to Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson), 19 March 1943.

¹³³ Ibid, District Commissioner (Abercorn) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 1 February 1943.

¹³⁴ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 6 April 1944.

¹³⁵ Ibid, District Commissioner (Balovale) to Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda (Kasempa), 30 April 1943. See also *ibid*, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 6 April 1945.

¹³⁶ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Supplies Representative of the Government of Northern Rhodesia (Johannesburg), 19 October 1942; and *ibid*, Controller of Imports (Livingstone) to Supplies Representative of the Government of Northern Rhodesia (Johannesburg), 8 July 1942.

¹³⁷ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson), 9 April 1943; and *ibid*, Acting Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 15 March 1944.

Rhodesia, had been ordered from the Union by various traders and each was sold at the retail price of two Shillings and six Pence.¹³⁸ It was in this context that the government concluded that '[i]n the circumstances the necessity of subsidising the manufacture of native made hoes in order to keep the selling price down ... no longer arises'.¹³⁹

Following the end of the war, the government was reluctant to continue supporting the iron smelting industry through subsidies. This was observed from the non-allocation of funding for subsidies in the 1945 national budget. In running away from its responsibility, the government assigned respective ethnic treasuries to provide subsidies for the iron industry. But as the Provincial Commissioner for the Northern Province argued, '... it will be unfair to expect the [African] Treasury to bear loss on an industry which was re-started at the urgent request of Government'.¹⁴⁰ In addition, local chiefs in Kawambwa district, for example, totally refused to subsidise the iron industry as they claimed the local treasury was already over-burdened with other priority areas. The government did not budge. This marked the fall of all the interest generated in the iron smelting sector during the war period.

3.4. Beeswax

Like the rubber and iron smelting industries discussed above, beeswax production was not new to Northern Rhodesia. Beeswax was perhaps the earliest non-human export commodity, along with ivory, from the western parts of Northern Rhodesia during the pre-colonial period. Wax was secreted by the African honeybee (*Apis mellifera ssp. adonsonii*) and was indirectly a product of the food of the bee, that is, of honey. To produce one pound of wax,

¹³⁸ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 15 September 1943.

¹³⁹ Ibid, Acting Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 15 March 1944.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 23 August 1945.

bees consumed about ten pounds of honey.¹⁴¹ Nectar was obtained from certain flower varieties and from it honey was derived by partial digestion during transportation in the stomach. Much of the honey collected by African peasants was used locally for brewing mead.¹⁴² As long as no external demand existed, African peasant farmers threw most of the honey combs away. Traditionally, local people such as the Luvale used beeswax for making *likishi* masks, the maintenance of musical instruments, and to mend wooden products such as dug-out canoes.¹⁴³ In the period just before the war, beeswax worth £9788 was exported from Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Britain.¹⁴⁴

In the metropole, wax was used in the manufacture of various types of polish, waxed paper and cartons, medicines, candles and cosmetics. As with all other commodities required in Britain for war industries, instructions were received from the Secretary of State urging the increased production of beeswax in the colonies following the fall of South-East Asian Allied-controlled possessions in early 1942.¹⁴⁵ Messrs Mann and Bishops Limited of London were the first firm to enquire about Northern Rhodesian beeswax. In correspondence with Barclays Bank in Lusaka regarding beeswax, the company stated that:

[i]t has been proved that this commodity is an essential War necessity, and we are asked to endeavour to increase and encourage shipments from all colonies. You will of course know that the Ministry of Supply are now the only buyers of this commodity and it has been agreed with them that business be carried on as in the

¹⁴¹ Von Oppen, *Terms of Trade*, 159.

¹⁴² See, for example, Chabatama, 'Peasant Farming, the State and Food Security', 183.

¹⁴³ Von Oppen, *Terms of Trade*, 155.

¹⁴⁴ NAZ SEC1/45, Extract from Minutes of Meeting of the Native Development Board held at Lusaka on 24 February 1940; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 6 March 1940.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, Controller of Customs (Livingstone) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 23 June 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa), 16 November 1942.

past, the Broker offering them all and every parcel that is available for shipment or that is shipped to this country.¹⁴⁶

Although the Ministry of Supply bought beeswax per tonne at a maximum of 220 shillings cost, insurance and freight (c-i-f) London, it was now suggested that the buying price should be 200 shilling c-i-f London for the same weight.¹⁴⁷

While negotiations regarding the price of beeswax took place directly between firms connected with war production in the United Kingdom and traders in Northern Rhodesia, the colonial State was anxious to assist by ensuring that as much beeswax and cash as possible found its way in the hands of local traders.¹⁴⁸ This was done by banning the export of wax to neighbouring countries like Angola through the non-issuance of export licences so that the commodity could not find its way to countries like Germany and Italy via Portugal. This ban was a strategic move in line with the policy of economic warfare whose rationale was to prevent the acquisition of raw materials by enemy countries.¹⁴⁹ In South Africa, stringent measures were taken to control the use of wax in wartime. Under Regulation 5 of Proclamation 20 of 1942, the Controller of Soap and Oils in the Union of South Africa ordered that all firms or persons holding beeswax in excess of fifty pounds declare them to the government. Anyone who contravened this law was liable to a fine of £200 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or both.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, Extract from Letter from Messrs Mann and Bishop Ltd (London) received by Barclays Bank, (Lusaka) on 18 June 1942; see also *ibid*, Messrs Mann and Bishop Ltd (London) to Barclays Bank (London), 20 August 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 8 October 1942.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, Messrs Mann and Bishop Ltd to Barclays Bank, 18 June 1942.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda Province (Kasempa), 16 November 1942.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 17 October 1942. The concept of “economic warfare” has been explained by M. Fritz, ‘Economic Warfare’, in I.C.B. Dear (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War* (Oxford, 1995), 318-321; and Jackson, *The British Empire*, 48.

¹⁵⁰ NAZ SEC1/45, Gazette of the Union of South Africa, 14 August 1942.

In order to set up a wartime beeswax industry, the government instructed the Department of Agriculture to investigate the sector ‘... and report on the present situation of this industry in the various areas with recommendations as to the areas in which development should be continued.’ The report was to include ‘... information regarding the quality of honey being produced and an estimate of the value of honey being sold.’¹⁵¹ A nationwide tour was undertaken by the Assistant Director of Agriculture between 15 May and 9 August 1940. Messrs Wilson and Mansfield, who handled the bulk of the Northern Rhodesian wax reaching the London market, observed that beeswax from all Empire sources was wanted in the mother country. While many other commodities imported into the United Kingdom required licences, this was not the case with beeswax,¹⁵² revealing that the imperial government was anxious to have as much beeswax as possible brought into the country. Wax from Northern Rhodesia benefitted from increased demand through the relaxation of a 10 per cent import duty on beeswax previously enforced within the sterling area.¹⁵³ Wax from Northern Rhodesia was in high demand in London because it possessed the indefinable quality of “brightness” associated with the better qualities that came from Tanganyika.¹⁵⁴

The war profoundly altered the outlook regarding the marketing of beeswax from Northern Rhodesia due to a sharp increase in the demand for wax, leading to an increase in its price. The price rose in such a way that:

[i]n June 1939 Northern Rhodesian wax was selling on the London market at £98 per ton; a consignment which reached London shortly after the outbreak of war

¹⁵¹ Ibid, Report on Beeswax Development Work in Northern Rhodesia Submitted to the Native Development Board, 5 October 1940.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

was sold for £140 per ton and in June 1940 the price of Northern Rhodesian wax was about £160 per ton.¹⁵⁵

However, the government observed that while shipment had not so far presented any particular difficulty, it feared that the absence of direct shipping facilities from Lobito would seriously hamper the marketing of supplies from far-flung places such as Mwinilunga and Balovale.¹⁵⁶

By 1941, in the Mankoya district, wax production had become attractive to many peasants. The only hindrance to growth in the wax trade was the long distance from the line of rail so that producers usually accepted low prices offered by traders for fear of the long journey on foot to the nearest market in Livingstone or Mulobezi. Many individuals possessed between 100 - 200 beehives, from which they derived an income of about five or six pounds annually.¹⁵⁷ The district was unique in that practically the whole of the wax trade was in the hands of African middlemen, and not European traders. In 1940, the district had 67 licenced beeswax hawkers.¹⁵⁸ Wax was bought in the villages by these itinerant African hawkers for cash or cloth with an invariable “present” of salt for the seller. Although much of this wax was sold within the vicinity of the Mulobezi and Livingstone districts, a considerable quantity was carried over the border for sale in Angola under the auspices of a Portuguese trading concern, Rhodesiangola, which began operations in November 1939.¹⁵⁹

Balovale district had the oldest tradition of producing beeswax from hives. Two demonstrators were employed by the Department of Agriculture between 1938 and January 1940 in addition to two assistants with a view to increasing production and improving the quality of the product. In the first half of 1940, 7,130 pounds of the product was sold and more

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

was expected, considering the good season predicted.¹⁶⁰ Much of this wax was sold to Portuguese traders at Lumbala and Kazambo. Wax was sold at eight pence per pound for the clean variety while ordinary ball wax fetched six pence per pound.¹⁶¹ The price differentiation was aimed at encouraging peasants to produce cleaner wax, which they did as time went by. The Department of Agriculture reported in 1940 that:

[m]any of the producers have now learned to make clean wax and there is reason to hope that if tuition and the present discriminating prices continue for a little longer the practice may become universal.¹⁶²

Local leaders also encouraged their subjects to engage in wax production and to increase nectar supplies by controlling the burning of forests in order not to disturb bee sanctuaries. In Senanga district, only 885 pounds was sold in 1938, but by mid-1940 over 2000 pounds had been traded.¹⁶³ The only wax trader in the district, A. Harrington, offered “reasonably attractive” prices of between four and five and half pence per pound for impure and cleaner wax, respectively.¹⁶⁴

Through the Native Development Board, the state offered subsidies to wax producers for the payment of instructors, demonstrators, and the purchase of uniforms and various other materials used in wax production. The object of the financial support given by the government was to support the industry for a period of at least three years in order to set it in motion. In 1941 the Board put aside £818 for the development of the wax trade, of which £310 was

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

reserved for the five main wax-producing districts of Mwinilunga, Kasempa, Mankoya, Balovale and Senanga.¹⁶⁵

London was asked to release from duty military personnel who could help in the production of beeswax, as had been done in the case of rubber where B.P. Rudge returned to Balovale district to aid in latex collection. Rudge also took up trade in beeswax. At the same time, it was proposed to order between 15,000 and 20,000 trade goods on government account through lend-lease arrangements in order to boost wax production by enticing Africans to exchange their produce for imported articles such as cloth, blankets and cooking utensils.¹⁶⁶ This proposal, though, did not go ahead due to difficulties already being experienced in the procurement of trade goods for the more vibrant rubber scheme.

The Director of Agriculture was reluctant to any action which might result in government buying, controlling or standardising the quality of beeswax because his Department was already overburdened by rubber production. It was pointed out that with rubber production the situation was different because there had been no existing trade in the commodity at the time the war started which meant that government had to step in to aid the industry, while beeswax traders already had overseas markets at the outbreak of hostilities in Europe.¹⁶⁷ This position was supported by the Secretary for Native Affairs who argued that:

[i]n a country where the boosting of native production is a new departure [in Government policy], save as a hobby for the enthusiastic few, it is natural that the efforts of the Agricultural Department should be entirely absorbed in the drives

¹⁶⁵ Ibid; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 6 March 1940.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 22 January 1943.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 10 October 1942.

for rubber and foodstuffs and that they should be reluctant to take on anything else.¹⁶⁸

As a result, beeswax was traded without direct government involvement, unlike rubber which was regarded as very important for the direct execution of the war. But because the beeswax industry did not fall under any government institution, traders faced challenges in the course of their business. The primary problem was limited shipping space at the ports of Lobito and Beira which in turn resulted in delayed shipment and payments from importers. The main exporter of beeswax in the Balovale district suggested that the government needed to intervene in the trade by providing advance payments so that beeswax peasant producers did not get discouraged due to delayed payments.¹⁶⁹ The government agreed to help with two-thirds advances covering the total value of the beeswax exported, on condition that receipted rail notes were provided.¹⁷⁰

By the beginning of 1943, the market for beeswax in Britain had become so saturated that the price at which the commodity was bought dropped. In the Balovale district, for example, the buying price declined from one shilling and two pence to eight pence per pound and traders found it difficult to dispose of their stocks.¹⁷¹ This marked the beginning of the end of the deliberate promotion of beeswax production in Northern Rhodesia during the war period.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 17 October 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary to Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka), 8 October 1942.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, Extract taken from a record of an Interview with Mr B.P. Rudge of Balovale with the Chief Secretary, 27 November 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Accountant-General (Lusaka), 15 December 1942.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, Accountant General (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 19 December 1942.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde-Lunda (Kasempa) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 4 January 1943; and *ibid*, Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 January 1943.

3.5. Strings and Ropes

Following the Japanese conquest in February 1942 of the Philippines and Indonesia, which were major sources of sisal used in the making of string, ropes and sacks, attempts began in Northern Rhodesia and neighbouring Tanganyika to look for substitutes of fibre as part of the war effort. Northern Rhodesia was in a position to help in this regard because it had a history of indigenous rope-making. In the early 1930s, European traders such as the Renaud Brothers and William Freshwater, a missionary with the London Missionary Society, used to buy string made from *Chitatula* roots or the *Kaboke* plant in Mporokoso district in the Northern Province, most of which they used for fishing nets.¹⁷² In fact, many varieties of trees, shrubs, and vines existed in the country's evergreen forests which yielded excellent fibres. In the Barotse Province, two species of the Bowstring Hemp type (*Sansevieria*), locally known as *Lukushye* and *Musokozebe* plants had been used to manufacture rope and string since time immemorial because they were "as strong and durable as any" and resembled sisal. The untreated type of *Lukushye* string was sold at about four shillings six pence per five pounds, while the treated variety of the same weight fetched six shillings.¹⁷³ The major hindrance to the promotion of the industry before the outbreak of the war was that the market was limited to local consumption.¹⁷⁴ As export markets were difficult to find, the government proposed that the ropes and strings manufactured locally be used for such things as flag halyards, sash cords and for tying files in offices.

Apart from varieties growing wild in the forests, some European farmers also grew sunhemp (*Crotalaria juncea*) which they used as green manure. However, the stem of sunhemp

¹⁷² NAZ SEC3/491, Extract from Mporokoso Tour Report No. 7 of 1933, 18 December 1933.

¹⁷³ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu), 30 October 1935.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 24 January 1934; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Senanga) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu), 9 October 1935; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu), 30 October 1935.

yielded good “soft” fibre.¹⁷⁵ The disadvantage of using sunhemp for the manufacture of string was that it required a lot of water and machinery for processing, and because of its bulky nature, it rendered the establishment of a central factory impracticable due to the widely scattered crops grown on farms.¹⁷⁶

Wartime manufacture of ropes in the country began as soon as instructions were sent from the Secretary of State to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia in early 1942. The Secretary of State pointed out that:

... concerning the inclusion of a proportion of sisal in ropes hitherto supplied with a pure manila content, I have the honour to inform you that, owing to the effect of the present situation in the Philippines on future supplies of manila, it is now necessary to increase still further the use of sisal in the manufacture of ropes.¹⁷⁷

The Chief Secretary noted that ‘[i]t is of great importance that string and rope should be produced locally in order to save the necessity of importing it from outside the country’.¹⁷⁸ He noted that ‘the least we can do is to be self-supporting in as many things as possible and I believe the native can play a big part in this’.¹⁷⁹ The use of local people in schemes involving CDWA grants was in line with a circular despatch from the Secretary of State to colonial Governors on 10 September 1940. The circular emphasised that such schemes should be restricted to those that could be carried out with local resources of men and materials without any detriment to the war effort.¹⁸⁰ Already by June of 1942, difficulties in the importation of string from abroad were faced by Northern Rhodesian importers. Although the North-Western

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 16 February 1942.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, Circular from Colonial Office (London) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 30 January 1942; and *ibid*, Note for Provincial Commissioners’ Conference, 10 March 1942.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to all Provincial Commissioners, 23 April 1942.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, Note for Provincial Commissioners’ Conference, 10 March 1942.

¹⁸⁰ Quoted in Wicker, ‘Colonial Development and Welfare’, 182.

Rhodesia Cooperative Society had ordered 5000 pounds of string from Calcutta, India through their agents A.J. Butler of Bulawayo, they had not received the consignment six months later.¹⁸¹ Another firm, E.W. Tarry's, also complained that although there was a big demand for binder twine, they were unable to procure supplies from the usual sources.¹⁸² The market for locally-produced rope and string in rural areas were government departments, mission stations, and shops, while on the line of rail the major buyers were the government Printing Department and the Postal Office headquarters.

A local European trader in the Abercorn district was the first to send string samples to the government on 22 May 1942 made from sisal on his estate. The samples were made by an African employee. In total the worker made nine feet of the washed (plaited) type and 14 feet of unwashed string at a wage rate of six pence per day.¹⁸³ Sail twine was used for sewing sacks and thatching, while binder twine was utilised in the reaping of wheat. The market price of the two string samples was eight pence and six pence.¹⁸⁴ Other samples received by the government came from the Luano Valley, near Broken Hill.¹⁸⁵ By mid-1942 the Government Printer reported that he had been able to obtain good quality string in Pemba and Mazabuka districts in the Southern Province, and urged the Director of Civil Supplies to place an order in that regard.

True hemp (*Cannabis sativa*), known in Northern Rhodesia as Indian hemp or dagga, was also suggested as a crop that could help in the manufacture of string during wartime. Its advantage was that the plant grew wild. Unlike other fibrous plants such as sisal which took

¹⁸¹ Ibid, North Western Rhodesia Cooperative Society (Ndola) to Acting Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 19 June 1942.

¹⁸² Ibid, E.W. Tarry (Lusaka) to Officer-in-Charge, Central Province (Broken Hill), 19 June 1942.

¹⁸³ Ibid, District Commissioner (Abercorn) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 22 May 1942.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Post Master-General (Livingstone), and Government Printer (Lusaka), 17 June 1942.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, Officer-in-Charge, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 18 June 1942; and ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Officer-in-Charge, Central Province (Broken Hill), 22 June 1942.

between three and four years to ripen, *cannabis sativa* grew quickly and matured in one season. These features of the latter plant were ideal for its promotion in wartime. Fears were raised, however, about the deliberate growing of dagga, even for fibrous use. The Acting Chief Secretary observed that:

[t]he danger of large-scale native production lies, of course, in the spread of dagga smoking, but if the war need is vital this risk may have to be taken and as many safeguards devised as possible to avoid it.¹⁸⁶

In wartime, Britain did not care where raw materials came from so long as what was needed was made available. Fearing that dagga would be abused by African peasants, the government decided to allow only Polish and Italian evacuees to grow the crop for processing into string.¹⁸⁷ As this type of fibre was soft in nature, it was used in the manufacture of sacks only.

The government also engaged the assistance of magistrates and the police to retain all hemp seeds confiscated for planting in new areas.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the Department of African Education was asked to issue instructions to African schools to use part of the one-hour handicraft class to teach pupils string-making and sack-weaving.¹⁸⁹ Acknowledging that the only difficulty in executing this project would be the lack of instructors, the Director of African Education responded favourably to this suggestion as a war measure, and hoped that the industry could continue even after the war, provided that the local products could survive foreign competition.¹⁹⁰ Instructors were trained at the Jeanes School in Mazabuka so that they could in turn pass on their knowledge of spinning, weaving and making of looms to their pupils.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, Note for Provincial Commissioners' Conference, 10 March 1942.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Major details of the evacuation, and subsequent settlement of Polish subjects in Northern Rhodesia during the Second World War are found in these files at the NAZ: SEC1/1698, SEC1/1699, SEC1/1700, SEC1/1701, SEC1/1702, and SEC1/1703.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, Note for Provincial Commissioners' Conference, 10 March 1942.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, Director of African Education (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 March 1942.

The government also wanted to use prisoners to grow and process hemp into fibre. For obvious reasons, this suggestion was not well-received in Prison circles. The Commissioner of Police stated that: 'I am not in favour of the introduction of hemp into the prisons. The introduction of unauthorised articles into prisons is already a problem which requires constant check to keep it under control'.¹⁹¹ But this aside, prisoners were employed in the essential work of food production.

In an effort to promote the local manufacture of string, the government offered subsidies to African producers through the Native Development Board, just as they did with other industries. An account, called the Advances – String Purchases Account was opened in order to enable District Commissioners to buy string and twine from Africans on behalf of Messrs Tarry and Company and the Farmers' Cooperative Society.¹⁹² Grants of up to £10 were granted for the purchase of string samples in various districts for onward transmission to the two approved trading firms. The Director of Agriculture also sent samples of good fibres to the Union of South Africa for commercial evaluation.¹⁹³ But not everything was rosy in the production of string. One challenge faced by this industry was that of a shortage of labour willing to produce the raw material required in its manufacture. Lack of manpower was a marked phenomenon in the Luano Valley, one of the areas with some of the best string produced in the territory. The Provincial Commissioner for Central Province, under whose jurisdiction the area fell, noted that:

[t]he difficulty in supplying string and ropes from Luano Valley to Cooperative Society and Tarry has arisen owing to these people being comfortably off through

¹⁹¹ Ibid, Commissioner of Police (Livingstone) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 26 March 1942.

¹⁹² Ibid, Extract of the Meeting of the Finance Sub-Committee of the Native Development Board held at Lusaka on Monday 20 July 1942; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to all Provincial Commissioners, 24 July 1942.

¹⁹³ Ibid, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Provincial Commissioner, Barotse Province (Mongu), 24 August 1942; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Sesheke) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 8 September 1942.

the sale of tobacco etc., and being near a labour market they are not really interested in this proposition although the price is 1/- per lb for their string.¹⁹⁴

Due to these challenges, the colonial state thought the best way of implementing the string project was by employing people to work the “cactus plant” as a commercial concern under the auspices of the Mkushi District Commissioner. They would be paid a monthly wage. Approval was granted on condition that the cost of production should not exceed one shilling for each pound of string manufactured.¹⁹⁵ Ten workers were employed on the project under the supervision of a senior messenger but the average weight of string made per man per month was found to be only just over three pounds.¹⁹⁶ The project was discontinued because it was uneconomic: as the wages paid to each worker amounted to 17 shillings and six pence, this meant that one pound of string had cost a total of five shillings and eight pence to manufacture at a time when the government recommended rate was one shilling per pound.¹⁹⁷ That price of locally produced string was high in Mkushi did not mean that the situation was different in other parts of the country. The case was the same in the Abercorn and Sesheke districts. At Abercorn, for example, Hausser was unable to supply string to the local Post Office at eight Pence per pound because at that rate, workers producing the string could earn a paltry three-quarter Pence per day.¹⁹⁸

3.6. Conclusion

The war impacted on the lives of the local people in unlikely rural areas in Northern Rhodesia through the imperial government’s decision to revive the production of certain raw materials which were urgently required for the Allied war effort. The production of rubber and

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 31 October 1942.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill), 7 November 1942.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 13 January 1943.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama) to Post Master-General (Livingstone), 5 August 1942.

beeswax, it has been demonstrated, was due to challenges faced by the mother country in the acquisition of natural resources from traditional bases of supply due to the Japanese victories over British colonies in the Pacific theatre of the war in February 1942. Rubber was a vital war commodity because it was used to manufacture tyres for military aircraft and vehicles, and footwear for soldiers. On the other hand, beeswax was needed for industrial purposes which supported the war effort. Apart from exporting these products to Britain, Northern Rhodesia also revamped indigenous African industries of iron smelting and string-making with a view to being self-sufficient at a time when these items were difficult to buy from abroad.

However, the production of these commodities has revealed the changing character of the wartime British government which had professed to buy African produce at economic prices if her colonies supported her in the war against Germany as demonstrated in the discussion on wartime propaganda in Chapter Two. At the outbreak of the war Britain convinced African colonies into believing that if they joined the war on the side of Adolf Hitler, Germany would not buy commodities from them at economic prices. As the chapter has argued, Britain bought African produce at below-market prices with imperial officials claiming the low prices were meant to stifle a surge in inflationary pressure. Colonial officials on the ground, on the other hand, agitated for much fairer deals in as far as prices for African produce were concerned. This situation exposes divergent points of view between the metropole and colonial governments regarding the price structure of commodities. The changing character of British policies could be ascribed to the fact that issues of decency in wartime became blurred due to desperation and the desire to secure victory. In this way, unconventional methods became legitimate strategies for British survival. It is to such challenges as the shortage of consumer goods, rationing, inflation, the black market and hoarding, and austerity measures that were introduced in the country that the next chapter turns in order to assess the broader impact of the war upon the Northern Rhodesian home front.

CHAPTER FOUR

War and the Economics of the “Home Front”

4.1. Introduction

This chapter investigates the wide-ranging economic impact of the Second World War on the Northern Rhodesian “home front”. Shortage of commodities, hoarding, inflation, profiteering, and the black market which arose meant that the economic cost of the war to Northern Rhodesia affected the lives of ordinary people far away from the actual fighting. This trend persisted in the post-war period owing to a continued shortage of consumer goods and changes in the imperial economic system occasioned by the sterling convertibility crisis of 1947 which eventually led to its devaluation two years later. These challenges compelled the government to abandon its *laissez faire* policy in order to address the economic woes affecting the country. The colonial state introduced financial controls, mirroring those devised for the metropole, such as rationing and price control. Local merchant capital also advocated the introduction of import substitution industrialization, but this measure yielded limited results.

4.2. Causes of Commodity Shortages

Due to the war, Northern Rhodesia experienced a shortage of consumer goods such as clothing, cutlery, food, and soap. So severe was the situation in some places that police reported a rise in break-ins and the theft of domestic items, as war-time shortage made mundane things like blankets, pots and pans harder to obtain than in peacetime.¹ One of the reasons for this state of affairs was that the country depended on imports for most of its needs. The major sources were the United Kingdom (UK), Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, in wartime the metropolitan economy faced challenges which reduced exports to the colonies. A recurrent problem in the production of commodities during the war was a shortage of labour, resulting in a drastic fall in production for the civilian market.² Britain mobilized civilians more fully than any other combatant country. In June 1944, when 22 per cent of the country’s labour

¹ A. Jackson, *British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 235.

² National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ) SEC1/1362 Note for Executive Council by the Chief Secretary, c. 1944.

force was in the armed services, 33 per cent was in civilian war work.³ As much of Britain's industrial capacity was diverted towards war production, the volume and often the quality of goods off-loaded in Africa was severely reduced.⁴ The prosecution of total war meant that goods not regarded as priorities were not manufactured. Most raw materials were used in the interests of the imperial war economy. Northern Rhodesia was one of those colonies that came to suffer the brunt of reduced exports from the metropole and elsewhere in the Empire.

Additionally, there was a worldwide shortage of raw materials needed for the production of goods in the metropole; most of which had to be imported by shipping. The shortage of soap experienced in colonies such as Northern Rhodesia was ascribed to the loss in early 1942 of British possessions in South-east Asia from which the Empire obtained fats and oils.⁵ Moreover, such raw materials as managed to reach the shores of Britain were immediately earmarked for war purposes or local consumption.⁶ Worse still was that the purchase of materials in non-sterling areas presented great difficulties as imperial sterling balances had to be conserved. In 1941, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Moyne, sent a circular to all colonial Governors urging the accumulation of sterling balances for future use.⁷ The colonies were asked to limit import demands in order to conserve the sterling area's hard currency and ease Britain's balance of payments.⁸ As Michael Cowen and Nicholas Westcott have demonstrated, it was the enforced change in the pattern of international trade in conjunction with the

³ M.R.D. Foot and P. Stansky, 'United Kingdom', in I.C.B. Dear (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War* (Oxford, 1995), 1134.

⁴ D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, 'Introduction', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 8.

⁵ P.T. Bauer, 'Origins of the Statutory Export Monopolies of British West Africa', *Business History Review*, 28, 3 (1954), 205. For a detailed discussion of the Japanese strategic conquest of South-East Asian Allied colonies, see B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (London, 1970), 212-238.

⁶ NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council by the Chief Secretary. See also R. Overly, 'World Trade and World Economy', in I.C.B. Dear (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War* (Oxford, 1995), 1284-5.

⁷ Cited in Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 48.

⁸ *Ibid.*

centralisation of sterling that determined change in market conditions for raw material production.⁹

It was anyway not possible to send goods overseas as usual because of Axis submarine warfare. As John Hargreaves noted, it was the dislocation of pre-war trade patterns, shipping shortages and maritime blockades that weakened whole sectors of Africa's commercial economy.¹⁰ A single ship sunk by the Axis could contain sufficient quantities of goods to satisfy Northern Rhodesia's requirements over several months, and such losses actually occurred more than once during 1943.¹¹ A shortage of shipping caused by the concentration of convoys in the North Atlantic route following the fall of France in June 1940 took priority over dollar-saving. The proportion of British ships using this route to procure supplies from American sources rose from one-third to over a half during 1940.¹² This state of affairs had a three-fold impact on Africa's trade with the rest of Empire. Firstly, supplies of dollars for colonial imports were reduced; British exports to the colonies were also reduced because as many as possible were diverted to dollar markets, particularly in Latin America. All of this greatly limited the markets and shipping available for colonial exports.¹³ It was in this context that import licensing was introduced in all British African colonies. Oliver Lyttleton, future Secretary of State, spoke in Cairo of the task of 'cutting down demands for imports in the most dramatic manner ... Whenever something we could do without is shipped the hour of victory is

⁹ M. Cowen and N. Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy during the War', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War*, 40.

¹⁰ J.D. Hargreaves, *Decolonisation in Africa* (London, 1996), 55. See also Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 44.

¹¹ NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council c.1944. See also Foot and Stansky, 'United Kingdom', 1154-1156.

¹² Cowen and Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy', 41.

¹³ *Ibid.*

postponed'.¹⁴ This policy was to create severe supply challenges for the colonies in the post-war period.¹⁵

Once the Allied armies began to conquer new territories, these too had to be supplied with goods. These supplies were drawn from existing production, so that it was not possible to increase quotas for Northern Rhodesia or other British African colonies for a considerable period of time.¹⁶ Even when the war ended, Europe and the newly-liberated territories still had to be re-stocked before others could be considered. As *The Times* had earlier reported:

[t]here is little prospect of any expansion of supplies for export, and if ... goods have to be sent to some market recently made accessible again to Lancashire firms, such as Madagascar it is virtually certain that some other market will have to suffer proportionately.¹⁷

Before the war the wholesale business of Northern Rhodesia was almost entirely carried out by merchants in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa with distribution franchises over the entire country. At times, there were shortages of goods as traders awaited supplies from these sources. But both countries had, during the course of the war, introduced export control measures aimed at protecting their local consumers, and Northern Rhodesia was left with whatever limited quantities remained over from these traditional sources.¹⁸ The introduction of an import quota system for civilian requirements in the colonies provided for direct importation from the UK to Northern Rhodesia. In the case of official quotas, however, Northern Rhodesia

¹⁴ Quoted in M.F Hill, *Permanent Way: the Story of Kenya and Uganda Railway* (Nairobi, 1957), 258.

¹⁵ See especially C.R. Schenk, *The Decline of Sterling: Measuring the Retreat of an International Currency, 1945-1992* (Cambridge, 2010), 37-80; and G. Krozewski, 'Sterling, the "Minor" Territories, and the End of Formal Empire, 1939-1958', *Economic History Review*, 46, 2 (1993), 239-265.

¹⁶ NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council c.1944.

¹⁷ *The Times*, 14 April 1943.

¹⁸ NRG, *Report of the Northern Rhodesia Supply Mission to the United Kingdom* (Lusaka, 1944), 4; and *Northern News*, 24 October 1946.

was coupled with Southern Rhodesia for the joint allocation of commodities.¹⁹ But not all of the goods so allotted reached Northern Rhodesia.

In early 1944 a special Supply Mission led by the Financial Secretary, Keith Tucker, held discussions with officials of the Colonial Office, the Board of Trade, the Export Licensing Department, the Cotton Board and the Shipping Control Office as well as the London and Manchester Chambers of Commerce. At the top on the agenda of this mission was to find ways of increasing the supply of consumer goods to Northern Rhodesia, particularly textiles. The annual pre-war importation quota of cotton goods for the colony was c.9-10 million yards. Supplies had come from Britain and India through normal commercial channels, and partly by indirect importation through wholesalers in Southern Rhodesia.²⁰ In the twelve months from July 1942 to June 1943, for example, the UK supplied 2,270,000 yards of cotton piece goods of which 1,301,000 yards were shipped direct and 969,000 imported through Southern Rhodesia.²¹ The actual UK quota allocated to Northern Rhodesia for the same period was equivalent to 5,216,000 yards leaving a short delivery of 2,946,000 yards.²² The Indian quota for the same period was equivalent to 2,062,000 yards but actual receipts amounted to 2,793,000 yards. The UK deficiency was partly made good by Indian supplies, the net deficiency being 2,215,000 yards.²³

Quite why the UK quota allocation of cotton piece goods for Northern Rhodesia failed to reach the country, whereas Indian supplies exceeded their quota allocation, is difficult to explain. The UK joint Rhodesia quota was based on 60 per cent of pre-war imports. The figures for Northern Rhodesia are indicated in Table 4.1.

¹⁹ *Report of the Northern Rhodesia Supply Mission*, 4.

²⁰ NRG, *Report of the Northern Rhodesia Supply Mission*, 5.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

Table 4.1: Northern Rhodesia Supply Position of Cotton Piece Goods

		Tonnes	%
(a) Pre-War Imports		3250	100
War Quota		1950	60
Northern Rhodesian Share			
	Tons	%	
Direct Imports	300	15	
Imports via Southern Rhodesia	300	15	
(b) <u>United Kingdom 1942/43 Quota</u>		521	100
Direct Export	281	54	
Via Southern Rhodesia	240	46	
<u>Received by Northern Rhodesia</u>		227	44
Direct Export	130	46	
Via Southern Rhodesia	97	40	
(c) <u>UK Quota Deficiency</u>		294	56
Direct Export	151	54	
Via Southern Rhodesia	143	60	
(d) <u>India Quota</u>		206	100
Direct Export	112	54	
Via Southern Rhodesia	94	46	
<u>Received by Northern Rhodesia</u>		297	135
Direct Export	247	221	
Via Southern Rhodesia	32	34	
(e) <u>India Surplus</u>		73	35
Direct Export	+135	121	
Via Southern Rhodesia	-62	66	
(f) <u>Total UK + India Quota</u>		727	100
UK	521	72	
India	206	28	
<u>Received by Northern Rhodesia</u>		506	69
From UK	227	31	
From India	279	135	
Net Deficiency		221	31

Source: NRG, *Northern Rhodesia Supply Mission to the United Kingdom, 1944* (Lusaka, 1944), 5-6.

From the above figures it can be deduced that Northern Rhodesia received only 69 per cent of its cotton piece goods war quota leaving a net deficiency in the combined UK and India quota of 31 per cent. Northern Rhodesia also received from Southern Rhodesia only 38 per cent of the indirect export quota, yet 95 per cent of the direct quota allocation arrived in the country. As such, it is clear that Northern Rhodesia received a greater share of the allocations by

importing direct than through Southern Rhodesian merchants. One thing that became clear as a result of the supply mission's visit in 1944 was that owing to the diffusion of past UK exports through the wholesale trade of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, Northern Rhodesia continued to face shortages and high prices of commodities.²⁴

4.3. Inflation

The shortage of commodities was not the only problem besetting Northern Rhodesia's domestic economy during the war. Increased incomes from rubber sales, remittances from servicemen, and income from a growing African peasant agricultural sector²⁵ were not matched by increased imports. More money chasing a reduced supply of goods resulted in a surge in inflationary pressure. As David Killingray and Richard Rathbone have demonstrated, a great deal of money in wartime chased a severely restricted supply of goods in Britain's African colonies.²⁶ The "knock on" effect of inflation in the consumer goods sector was quickly felt in the food sector; the period between 1942 and 1947 witnessing increases in the general cost of living for Africans.²⁷ In an attempt to stop this, the government decided to curb the amount of cash in circulation. This was done by encouraging people to save as much money as possible in the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB). Interest from the POSB was at a rate of two and half per cent per annum. By 31 December 1946, when these bonds were withdrawn, there were 13,679 depositors with deposits totalling £342,258.²⁸ Among the depositors were African

²⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

²⁵ See, for example, S.N. Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation in Southern Zambia, 1890-1980* (Lusaka, 1988).

²⁶ Killingray and Rathbone, 'Introduction', 8.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 8.

²⁸ NAZ SEC3/42, Note for Executive Council, c. 1947; NAZ SEC3/88, Extract of Minute No. 522/43 from Postmaster-General (Livingstone) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 7 September 1943; and NAZ SEC3/88, Governor (Lusaka) to Secretary of State for the Colonies (London), 14 February 1947.

members serving in the armed forces to whom the scheme had been extended.²⁹ By these means, consumer demand for hard to-come-by manufactured articles was curbed.

The state also issued war bonds to encourage people to invest for the future, the Auditor General noting that wartime was a period for investment and not consumption.³⁰ Government bonds were issued by the Accountant General at par in five pounds and multiples of five pounds. Individual holdings were limited to £1000, repayable in 10 years at the rate of 101 per cent. The bonds were cashable at any time, on six months' notice, and at a shorter notice in an emergency, but with loss of interest. Total net issues at the end of December 1945 amounted to £202,000 was withdrawn in October 1946.³¹ This measure helped to mop up surplus cash from circulation.

War Savings Certificates had been introduced as soon as war broke out, as a means of contributing to United Kingdom war expenses and were along the same lines as those issued in the mother country. Certificates were issued under the Income Tax War Provisions Ordinance. Individual holdings were limited to 500 units at 15 shillings each, the total authorised issue being £425,000, equating 414,634 units over the whole period. The balance of certificates available for issue at 30 September 1946, amounted to 42,706 units, but repayments had for some time exceeded sales. Completion of the authorised issue of war certificates was 30 April 1948.³²

²⁹ NAZ SEC3/87, Posts and Telegraphs: Proposed Savings Bank Scheme for African Ranks in H.M. Forces, 9 June 1941.

³⁰ NAZ SEC1/704, Auditor General (Lusaka) to Chairman, Legislative Council Committee on Taxation (Lusaka), 29 September 1945.

³¹ NAZ SEC3/42, Note for Executive Council, 1947.

³² Ibid.

4.4. Profiteering

Throughout the war, the administration was concerned about profiteering. The most alarming records of profiteering came from rural areas. Indian traders who dominated retail trade in the countryside took advantage of the war to raise prices of their merchandise, albeit using unconventional methods such as the refusal to display prices or altering prices depending on who the client was.³³ Throughout the war and its immediate aftermath, complaints were received against Indian traders in parts of the Southern Province. Such unscrupulous traders included Changanlal and Company based at Macha, Nayee Brothers at Chilumbe in Chief Mapanza's area, and Narayan and Company on Musali Farm in Choma. Following complaints from the general public about the non-display of prices on goods, the District Commissioner for Mazabuka toured Indian-owned shops. He reported that, 'I visited to investigate this charge but it was obvious that word of my coming had gone before me. The villagers consider the prices in these stores exorbitant'.³⁴ Prices differed for customers according to their perceived ignorance or gullibility. The non-display of prices by traders was a violation of the Emergency Powers Control of Prices and Hoarding Regulations of 1942 (amended in 1945) which made the display of maximum prices mandatory effective from 1 September 1942. The Changanlal stores at Macha village had no list of maximum prices. But the stores were warned of the government officials' impending visit and 'something like a bargain sale was in progress' by the time the District Commissioner toured the area, finding that prices 'bore no relation to the usual ones'.³⁵

Another widespread strategy used by traders was the sale of goods subject to the purchase of other articles not in great demand or expensive. Such was the case of one Bennet

³³ For a comparative discussion on these issues elsewhere, see A. Jackson, *Botswana: an African Country at War, 1939-45* (Oxford, 1999), 142.

³⁴ NAZ SP4/2/6 Loc 5081, Mazabuka Tour Report No. 1 of 1947.

³⁵ Ibid.

Musongo of Broken Hill who, on 22 March 1945, went to buy a bicycle tyre and tube but was told by the shopkeeper he could only do so on condition that he also bought a shirt and a blanket.³⁶ Of all the strategies used by evasive traders, conditional selling was the most difficult to deal with by price control inspectors because most transactions of this nature were personal and between the two parties concerned. It was one man's word against another. Traders, as a rule, were careful not to put anything of this sort into writing and neither buyer nor seller cared to have witnesses when negotiating.³⁷ A similar tendency was noted in Bechuanaland where traders used the "good fors" system which obliged customers to purchase an unwanted item in order to obtain a scarcer commodity.³⁸ In other instances, the weight of goods sold such as bread was reduced, yet the price remained constant.³⁹ Other common offences were the non-issuance of receipts, and the failure to mark goods as prescribed by law.

Unscrupulous merchants also abounded in urban centres. The problem of profiteering became one of the focal points of newly-established African Provincial Councils in the post-war period. The African Provincial Council for the Western Province complained in 1947 that, 'we do not know the exact prices in the Indian stores but prices are much clearer in the European stores'.⁴⁰ Between June and September 1947, 110 prosecutions concerning price control regulations were recorded in various parts of the country, of which 47.2 per cent concerned overcharging.⁴¹ Indian traders proved extremely difficult to trap.⁴² Table 4.2 shows

³⁶ NAZ SEC3/45, S.K. Patel and C.C. Patel v. The Crown, in the High Court of Northern Rhodesia. See also L.H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953* (London, 1964), 349.

³⁷ NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., Price Controller (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 28 April 1947.

³⁸ Jackson, *Botswana*, 140.

³⁹ NAZ SEC3/485, Confidential Correspondence from Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 5 May 1943.

⁴⁰ NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. II., Extract from the sixth Meeting of the African Provincial Council for the Western Province held at Luanshya on 9-10 July 1947.

⁴¹ NAZ SEC3/75, Commissioner of Police (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 18 September 1947; and NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 24 September 1947. See also NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., Commissioner of Police (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 10 July 1947.

⁴² NAZ SEC3/45, Record of Meeting in the Office of the Labour Commissioner at 9:30 on Friday 16 November 1947.

some of the most prominent firms connected with profiteering, the black market and conditional sales along the line of rail.

Table 4.2: List of Traders Engaged in Profiteering on the Line of Rail

Town	Traders
Livingstone	M.A. Patel Bombay Trading Co. Livingstone Trading V.N. Das K.C. Patel Bridgelal and Co. Changanlal and Co. Colonial Trading Co.
Choma	Gokaldas and Co. C.P. Patel
Pemba	T.V. Patel
Broken Hill	Narayan & Co National Commercial Agency C.C. Patel A.J. & Co.
Ndola	S.B. & Co. N.C. & Co. M.R. Patel Arjee & Co. Amin & Co.
Lusaka	E.M. Dudhia & Co. S.I. Limbada & Co. Pandlolikar Mansukhlal & Co. Bradford Clothing Factory M.J. & Co. M.P. Nayik

Source: NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., M.M. Ravat (Fort Jameson) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 12 April 1947.

That Indian traders used underhand trading methods does not mean that they were the only ones to do so. For example, the only two merchants in the European trade at Mufulira were

both prosecuted for making excessive profits in June 1941. These prosecutions were commended by the general public.⁴³

4.5. Rationing

Wartime shortages of commodities did not mean that goods completely stopped coming into the country. But shortages were hard to avoid, fuelling inflation and the anxiety that accompanied them. Consequently, the government embarked upon the rationing of scarce commodities so that a fairer system of distributing goods could be established.

In responding to scarcity and other war-related problems, the British government increased its control and intervention over production and exchange to ensure that all available resources were used to prosecute the war.⁴⁴ Control measures were also established over supplies, shipping, the use of local labour, and the purchase of commodities from the colonies. Similar policies were adopted in British colonial Africa, and Northern Rhodesia was no exception. The imperial government, however, was aware that in colonial conditions effective rationing was often practically impossible for fear it could easily infuriate the local people.⁴⁵ In addressing the problem of scarcity, the colonial government embarked upon its own policies. The voluntary rationing of commodities such as soap, butter, whisky, milk, bread and petrol which started in early 1940 remained in place up to the end of 1943. In this regard, it was reported that ‘people had cooperated extraordinarily well’.⁴⁶ Compulsory rationing was only introduced the following year. The new regulations introduced in 1944 required that within 30

⁴³ NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II. Report on Public Opinion for the Western Province for the Month of June 1941, 2 July 1941.

⁴⁴ Cowen and Westcott, ‘British Imperial Economic Policy’, 20-67. For a detailed discussion on rationing schemes in Britain during the war, see, Foot and Stansky, ‘United Kingdom’, 1135.

⁴⁵ NAZ SEC1/1362, Colonial Office Circular No. 18889/23/42, 22 March 1943. The “equality of sacrifice principle” advocated in Britain could not be applied directly through colonial state controls because the balance of class forces was so different from that which was expressed within British state power, see, for example, *ibid*, ‘British Imperial Economic Policy’, 24.

⁴⁶ NAZ SEC1/1620, Report of the Chairman of the Mufulira Copper Production Committee 12th Meeting held on Tuesday 15 June 1943 at 4PM in the Office of the District Commissioner.

days of their publication, every European purchaser of goods residing within the scheduled area was required to register him or herself and members of his or her household with one retailer for specified goods.⁴⁷ Regulations regarding registration did not apply to Africans in line with entrenched imperial racial practices. Instead, bulk allocations of soap representing half the available supplies were made available to traders for sale to Africans. But no African could purchase or receive a rationed commodity on behalf of a European unless he was in possession of a letter of identification signed by such European.⁴⁸ Contravention of these laws made one liable to a fine not exceeding £200, imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or both.⁴⁹ While coupons were utilized in rationing commodities in the UK, this system was not implemented in Northern Rhodesia because of the shortage of paper, additional work to the retailer, and general inconvenience to the public.⁵⁰

The government resorted to rationing to ensure that all people had at least some soap and butter whose stocks had reached low levels in the country. The root cause of soap rationing was as a result of the worldwide shortage of fats and oils and the subsequent rise in the price of these raw materials. For instance, the price of palm oil increased from £65 12s per tonne f-o-r- Sakania in December 1946 to £120 per tonne in August 1947; palm kernel oil from £78 per tonne prior to December 1946 to £110 per ton in August 1947.⁵¹ Due to the increase in cost of these raw materials, the price of a case of sunlight soap rose from 38 shillings to 50 shillings.⁵² *Mutende* newspaper carried a propaganda campaign urging Africans to save soap by drying it in the sun before use, to never leave it in water, to wash all their laundry at once

⁴⁷ NAZ SEC3/485, Emergency Powers (Rationing) Regulations, 1944.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 16 September 1947.

⁵² *Ibid.*

and to use ashes for washing dishes and pots as well as to manufacture their own soaps by using caustic soda and animal fat.⁵³

The necessity of rationing butter also came about due to the worldwide shortage of fats and the severe restrictions on supplies of the commodity already in force in Southern Rhodesia and East Africa. Following the fall of the British-controlled sources of oils and fats in the Far East in early 1942, the Director of Civil Supplies in Northern Rhodesia instructed all traders and retailers of butter to restrict the sale of the commodity to their customers to 75 per cent of their normal monthly purchases.⁵⁴ In 1944, the British Ministry of Food diverted to the East Africa Command 150 tons of Northern Rhodesia's normal imports of butter from South Africa. This caused the butter ration for white settlers to fall from 14¼ to eight ounces per head per week.⁵⁵ Yet no such mechanism was instituted for Africans, in spite of a government pledge earlier in the war that special consideration would always be given to meet the needs of the local population.⁵⁶

When distributing and rationing scarce commodities, maize was the most difficult to allocate, because it was not a luxury item like butter, whisky, sugar, soap, or fuel. The scarcity of maize brought the war home to many Africans who had no substitute to fall back on and who had to pay any price that retailers set. The importance of maize put the government on the defensive; since it could not suggest that people should stop or reduce its consumption, it had to attempt to solve the problem. Maize was a priority. The primary strategy was to encourage a rapid increase in domestic production and ensure a fair distribution across the country.

⁵³ *Mutende*, November 1946.

⁵⁴ NAZ SEC3/42, Emergency Powers (Control of Prices and Hoarding) Regulations, July 1942.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, Director of Civil Supplies to Financial Secretary, 1 March 1944; and *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 24 September 1943.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, Director of Civil Supplies to Financial Secretary.

Consumption of non-essentials could wait until the end of the war when they were expected to be plentiful on the market, but not maize.

4.6. Price Control

Commodity shortages in times of peace and war frequently lead to the emergence of a black market and smuggling.⁵⁷ An aggravating factor during wartime was a sense of uncertainty which led to a vicious spiral of panic buying and rocketing prices. The Northern Rhodesian government found it necessary to regulate prices of commodities and the ordinary commercial processes of distributing goods during the war.⁵⁸ No sooner had the war broken out than the imperial government imposed controls to protect the sterling area against a drain on its dollar and gold reserves by restricting all imports from non-sterling countries. But the shortage of goods continued even after the end of the war because of restrictions on dollar-imports. Supplies did not improve much after the end of the war, as the world was plagued by fundamental imbalances in production. The situation was exacerbated by the August 1947 convertibility crisis and eventual devaluation of the pound sterling in September 1949.⁵⁹ This entailed even stricter implementation of price control. In view of the devaluation of sterling in the UK, the removal of import controls was postponed, as her colonies were required to contribute to the preservation of dollar earnings by reducing imports from the non-sterling area.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Black market is used here to mean buying and selling at prices above those officially fixed, or in quantities or for purposes not permitted by the rationing regulations. It normally appeared wherever there was artificial restriction on the ordinary operations of a market.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 48.

⁵⁹ A nuanced discussion on these aspects is contained in Schenk, *The Decline of Sterling*, 60-79; and Overy, 'World Trade and World Economy', 1283.

⁶⁰ NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to E. Leishman (Kitwe), 13 August 1947. See also N. Westcott, 'Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-49', in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War*, 144-5.

In order to protect consumers from exploitative traders taking advantage of shortages by hiking up the prices of goods, the government introduced price control in 1942. It remained in force until the early 1950s. The Northern Rhodesia General Defence Regulations No. 301 of 1942 authorized the Controller of Prices to regulate prices from time to time. Other ordinances were enacted to fix the prices of soap, butter, blankets, and maize meal. Through the Emergency Powers (Control of Prices and Hoarding) Amendments Regulations 1941, government Notice No.301 of 1941, the Price Controller had powers to implement price control measures such as the display of prices.⁶¹

There were two methods of controlling prices. One was by the fixed controlled list where each commodity had a specific price. Then there was the general principle known as the factor system, where the profit on an item during the war turned on the profit made in 1939. This was modified by whether or not the article had increased in cost since the start of the war.⁶² The system depended on records kept by traders, and these proved difficult to check. The main principle of the factor system was to control the profit margins of goods which had increased in cost. This was done by means of a table of factors which reduced the pre-war percentages permitted in accordance with the increase in cost. For instance, if an article had increased in cost by 100 per cent the permitted percentage was the pre-war margin multiplied by 0.70. So if a trader previously made 50 per cent profit, he would, under this system, be allowed to make 35 per cent.⁶³ Most traders regarded this system unsatisfactory as they felt they were being asked to sell at a loss. For this reason, the system was discontinued in late 1947.

⁶¹ NAZ SEC1/1362, Colonial Office Circular No. 18889/23/42.

⁶² NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 9 June 1947.

⁶³ NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., Price Controller (Lusaka) to Financial Controller (Lusaka), 23 July 1947.

There were only five fulltime members of the Price Control Office, viz: the Price Controller, the Assistant Price Controller, Inspector of Weights and Measures, and two clerks. As a result, the Department had to rely on district administrative officers and European members of the Northern Rhodesia Police who were appointed inspectors of price control for the whole territory in accordance with General Notice No. 60 of 1945.⁶⁴ Twenty African constables and an Assistant Superintendent of Police undertook special duties in connection with price control. Since the government could not flood the market with scarce goods, enforcing price control was dependent on the cooperation of traders and consumers, but this was not easy when profiteering was some traders' objective.

Due to loopholes in price control mechanisms, and partly to the lightness of sentences imposed when infringements were proved, the system was widely criticized both on the pages of newspapers and in the Legislative Council.⁶⁵ In July 1942, a European trader at Broken Hill, a Mr Jablonski, was convicted of profiteering by making 288 per cent profit on three cases of glass, and 378 per cent on three dozen sheets of glass.⁶⁶ The profit in 1939 for these items was approximately 100 per cent. The accused was fined five pounds and ordered to refund £16 13s excess profit to the purchaser. The excess profit over 1939 was 188 per cent and 278 per cent, respectively.⁶⁷ This was a very light punishment. Stiff penalties needed to be imposed for those who contravened sanctions but this was rarely the case.⁶⁸ Traders like Jablonski went unchecked most of the time because the price control inspectorate was too small. In Britain

⁶⁴ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates* Hansard No. 57, 9 June 1947. Column 144, 237, pp. 317, 394; and NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., Price Controller (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 31 March 1947.

⁶⁵ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 10 May 1943; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 24 September 1943; NAZ SEC3/485, Confidential Correspondence from Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 5 May 1943; *Livingstone Mail*, 26 September 1947; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 1 September 1947; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 3 September 1947; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 14 August 1947; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 27 August 1947; *Northern News* 28 August 1947; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 30 August 1947; *Northern News* 28 August 1947; and *Northern News* 14 September 1947.

⁶⁶ NAZ SEC1/1770, Report on Public Opinion for Central Province for July 1942, 3 August 1942.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ NRG, *Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Cost of Living, 1947*, 7.

stiff penalties were imposed on price control offenders. They included instant revocation of a trader's licence, fining 'a sum equal to the amount by which a black marketer benefitted from the transaction', and 14 days' penal servitude.⁶⁹ Prices of goods in stores were controlled by the Price Controller and included not only the limitation of profit on some and the imposition of maximum prices for others, but also that articles should always have their prices clearly marked.⁷⁰

The Northern Rhodesian government used its emergency powers to control skyrocketing prices of maize meal which had been compounded by the hoarding activities of unscrupulous traders. This was done through the promulgation of the Maize Meal (Wholesale Prices) Order of 1942. By this law, effective 26 November 1942, no wholesaler was authorised to sell maize meal at a price greater than the maximum prices prescribed by the Order in towns along the line of rail. Apart from ensuring that maize meal was available on the market at the right price, this measure was also intended to prevent a rise in wartime inflationary pressure on the economy. The highest price for a 200 pounds bag was pegged at 17 shillings and six pence for Livingstone in the south, with the lowest price of 16 shillings for the midlands.⁷¹ Failure to adhere to the approved price schedule was deemed an offence in terms of Regulation 17 of the Emergency Powers (Control of Prices and Hoarding) Regulations, 1942. An offender under this law was liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding £200 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both.⁷²

⁶⁹ NAZ SEC1/1362, Colonial Office Circular No. 18889/23/42; and NAZ SEC3/45, Memorandum on Price Control c. 1947. See also *Northern News*, 7 August 1947; and NAZ SEC3/44 Vol. I., Price Controller (Lusaka) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 31 March 1947.

⁷⁰ NAZ SEC1/1362, Extract from Despatch No. 35 from Governor (Lusaka) to Secretary of State (London), 25 February 1943.

⁷¹ NRG, *Maize Meal (Wholesale Prices) Order of 1942*.

⁷² *Ibid.*

As argued elsewhere by Cowen and Westcott, the colonial government had abandoned its pre-war *laissez faire* economic policy and adopted an interventionist one.⁷³ In cases where wage adjustments were made conditional on the movement of the price index, administrative action was taken with a view to preventing the cost of living from rising. This took the form of subsidies to millers, as was the case with maize when an additional subsidy was introduced in 1948 in order to prevent a further rise in the price of mealie meal.⁷⁴ Following a recommendation by a commission of inquiry into the cost of living, government subsidised maize meal. It was felt that the use of public funds for this purpose was amply justified in the general interest.⁷⁵ The price of mealie meal along the line of rail was pegged at 15 shillings, down from 19 shillings and six pence per bag at an estimated cost of £150,000 per annum.⁷⁶ As maize was already being subsidised by £240,000 per annum, the total cost of the subsidy on this essential food item was £390,000 yearly.⁷⁷ Additionally, effective from 1 January 1948, duty on blankets, clothes, enamel ware and bicycles was suspended at an estimated loss of revenue of £163,000 per year.⁷⁸ This helped to prevent further rises in the retail prices of these items.

4.7. Cost of Living

The war made imported goods from abroad not only scarce but expensive. A further reason for this state of affairs was rampant smuggling, profiteering and hoarding. According to Killingray and Rathbone, black markets thrived throughout wartime Africa.⁷⁹ In Northern

⁷³ Cowen and Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy', 20-67.

⁷⁴ NRG, *Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Cost of Living* (Lusaka, 1947), 6.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, *Legislative Council Debates*, 3 December 1947.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid*; and Mining Industry Archive [hereafter MIA] 14.3.3F, Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the state of British Territories in East and Central Africa, 1945-1950, 137.

⁷⁹ Killingray and Rathbone, 'Introduction', 8. For a comparative perspective elsewhere, see D.O. Spence, 'Beyond Talwar: a Cultural Reappraisal of the 1946 Royal Indian Navy Mutiny', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 46, 3 (2015), 489-508.

Rhodesia smuggling was particularly prevalent at the Mokambo border post on the Copperbelt, where traders obtained commodities from the black market in the Belgian Congo.⁸⁰ The shortage of consumer goods and resulting rise in the cost of living are best exemplified by an observation made by the Labour Officer at Mufulira who reported in mid-1943 that:

[w]hereas before the war an African who went into a store with £1 to spend could buy ... a good blanket for 5/, a 2 pocket shirt for 3/, a pair of shorts for 4/, a 4 yards of print for his wife for 4/ and a blouse for 1/6-, still leaving himself 2/6 to spend ... Nowadays an African in similar circumstances would be lucky if he could get a blanket for his £1. And to buy the other articles enumerated would cost him probably another £1 and even then the quality would be greatly inferior to pre-war standards.⁸¹

Non-sterling imports fell drastically during the war. In 1938 the value of non-sterling goods entering Northern Rhodesia was 22 percent of total imports; this fell to 15 percent in 1945 and 12 percent in 1946.⁸² As a result of these shortages, European employees recruited by the mines

⁸⁰ NAZ SEC1/1362, Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 20 August 1941.

⁸¹ Ibid, Labour Officer (Mufulira) to Labour Commissioner (Lusaka), 22 July 1943. See also *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 11 June 1947; *Northern News*, 24 October 1946; *Sunday Times*, 13 October 1946; and *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 10 May 1946; ibid, Labour Commissioner (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 3 September 1943 NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 16 December 1941, 353-354; NAZ SEC 1728 Vol. VII., Record of His Excellency the Governor's Meeting with Representatives of the Broken Hill African Community held at the Town Location on Wednesday 24 June 1942 at 11:30; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Intelligence Report for Western Province for the Month of February 1942, 6 March 1942; NAZ SEC1/1758 Vol. II., Report on Public Opinion for Central Province, 8 March 1942; and Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 349.

⁸² A. Kanduzi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 1918-1960: A Case Study of Customs Tariff and Railway Freight Policies* (Lanham, 1986), 186. For Customs purposes, Northern Rhodesia was divided into two areas: the Zambezi Basin Area, south of a line drawn from the south-east corner of the Katanga pedicle to Fife on the Tanganyika border, which contained all the important industries and accounts for the vast bulk of the trade of the Territory, and the area north of this line, which was included in the conventional Congo Basin Area, but which was of negligible importance from the commercial point of view. In the area within the Congo Basin no preference could be granted, and customs duty was charged at the Empire rate on all goods whatever the country of origin.

from South Africa had to bring their own utensils such as pots, pans, bed sheets, cups and crockery, as these were hard to find on the Copperbelt by 1943.⁸³

In the immediate post-war period, the high price of goods experienced was primarily due to foreign exchange challenges experienced by the sterling area. Inflationary pressures caused by the global shortage of commodities, the pent-up demand and, a general import dependence on the United States resulted in a rise in the cost of living in the colonies. Although Washington eventually wrote off almost the entire wartime Lend-Lease account, the combined dollar deficit of Britain and the sterling area was over four billion dollars in 1947.⁸⁴ The deficit in the dollar trade of the entire sterling area increased from \$450,000,000 before the war to \$1,100,000,000 in 1948.⁸⁵

Chiefly as a result of the miners' strike on the Copperbelt in 1940, as discussed in the next chapter, the government commissioned the Southern Rhodesia government Statistician, A. Lynn Saffery, to carry out an investigation into the living costs for urban Africans. Saffery's investigation revealed that for a man with two children, the minimum monthly wage required was six pounds which was considerably higher than average wages paid to African workers.⁸⁶ In 1946, a full-blown Commission of Inquiry into the Cost of Living was appointed by the government, this time due to persistent complaints about the upsurge in the price of commodities from various interest groups.⁸⁷ When it submitted its interim report in mid-1947, the Commission noted that the increase in prices of goods had created a serious situation in the territory as the effects were most pronounced among the lowly-paid wage earners whose

⁸³ NAZ SEC1/1620, Chairman's Report of the 18th Meeting of the Mufulira Copper Production Committee held on Tuesday 16 November 1943 at 4PM in the Office of the District Commissioner.

⁸⁴ R. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective* (New York, 1980), 308.

⁸⁵ A.R. Conan, *The Problem of Sterling* (London, 1966), 38.

⁸⁶ NAZ SEC1/1363, A Report of some Aspects of African Living Conditions on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia by A.L. Saffery, 3 January 1943.

⁸⁷ The most vocal being the Northern Rhodesia Civil Servants' Association and the Associated Chambers of Commerce.

incomes had remained stagnant.⁸⁸ Between 1939 and 1946, living costs had soared; for Europeans by 36 per cent, and Africans by up to 90 per cent.⁸⁹

4.7.1. Cost of Living Index for Africans

As a result of the rise in the price of consumer goods, the Forster Commission of Inquiry into the miners' strike on the Copperbelt in 1940 recommended the payment of two shillings six pence as a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to African miners. The Commission also recommended that if on enquiry this allowance was found to be inadequate, it should be adjusted. Both the government and the mines agreed to implement this recommendation forthwith. After discussions between the Chamber of Mines and government, it was decided to base the COLAs on an agreed list of essential items consumed by the African workforce, excluding food. A cost of living index was adopted in Northern Rhodesia, as in most British colonies during the war.⁹⁰ The index was designed to measure, by means of appropriate weighting, changes in retail prices of goods and services consumed in a particular group to which the index related.⁹¹ As a result, price changes affecting the cost of living of wage-earners were subjected to control.

The agreed list which cost 120 shillings per annum before the war is illustrated in Table 4.3. It demonstrates comparative costs of commodities as of 30 November 1941, 31 July 1943 and, 31 July 1944. In July 1942 the figures were reviewed and the Chamber of Mines agreed in light of them to increase the COLA to five shillings per month. By mid-1943, African miners complained that their allowances were inadequate. By that date, the cost of the approved list was 195 shillings, justifying a COLA of six pence three shillings and by July 1944, 224

⁸⁸ NRG, *Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Cost of Living*, 6.

⁸⁹ L. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia c.1930-1964* (Houndsmill, 2007), 69.

⁹⁰ See, Cowen and Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy', 59.

⁹¹ NAZ SEC3/48 Vol. III., *Interim Report of the Cost of Living Advisory Committee presented by the Minister of labour and National service to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*, London, March 1947.

shillings justifying an allowance of eight shillings eight and a quarter pence.⁹² In 1946 these allowances were upgraded by two shillings six pence per month in line with continued price rises.⁹³ When this change was effected, the Chief Secretary to the government noted that, ‘the index so arrived at indicates that the African cost of living has nearly doubled since 1939 ...’⁹⁴ The government also agreed to grant its African employees earning less than two pounds and 10 shillings per month a similar COLA as paid to African miners.⁹⁵ Most other big employers such as Zambezi Sawmills, Rhodesia Railways and municipalities also granted COLAs to their employees. African servants in receipt of wages and allowances not exceeding 50 shillings per month also received a COLA of five shillings per month while those whose wages and allowances lay between 50 shillings and 70 shillings per month received two shillings six pence.⁹⁶

Table 4:3: Cost of Living Index for Africans, 1939-1944

Commodity	Qty	1939	10 Nov 1941	31 July 1943	31 July 1944
		£ s d	£ s d	£ s d	£ s d
Trousers	2	14	17 6	1 7	1 7
Shorts	2	7	9 6	15	1
Shirts	3	14 3	15 9	1 2 3	1 1
Vests	1	1 6	1 3	2	2 6
Socks	1	9	9	1	1 6
Shoes	1	5	5 3	4 9	5 6
Dishes	5	2 6	5		2 6
Basins	1	1 9	3		1 9
Mug and Cup	2	1	1 6		1
Saucepans	3	18	28 6		1 4
Sieves	1	9	1	1	1
Spoons	1	3	6	6	1
Knife	1	6	1	1	1 6
Soap	18 pcs	9	9	13 6	9
Blankets	2½	12	18	1 10	2 5
Blouses	2	3	3 6	3 6	10
Print cloth	9 yards	10	11 3	1 3	1 3

⁹² NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council.

⁹³ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Heads of Department and Provincial Commissioners, 23 July 1946.

⁹⁴ Ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to North Eastern Rhodesia Agricultural and Commercial Association (Lusaka), 11 April 1946.

⁹⁵ Ibid, Note for Executive Council on Cost of Living Allowances for Africans.

⁹⁶ Ibid, Extract from Despatch from Governor (Lusaka) to Sec of State (London), 25 February 1943.

Dresses	3	12 9	14 3	1 7	1 2 6
Cotton	2 reels	9	9	1 3	1
Needles	1 pkt	3	3	6	3
Matches	3pkts	2 3	2	2	2
Padlock	1	9	1	2	2
Candles	24	2 3	2 6	2 4	2
Total per annum		£6 -. -. £7. 11. -. £8. 16. 10. £11. 4. 3.			
Total per month		10. 0.	10. 7.	16 3.	18. 8½.

Source: NAZ SEC1/1362, Note for Executive Council on Cost of Living Allowances c. 1945.

Demands for a further rise in the COLA from five to seven shillings and six pence by the mines in 1947 was opposed by the government, as it would put pressure on the state treasury once civil servants' allowances were correspondingly adjusted upwards. The government argued that it was already taking steps to reduce the price of essential articles and saw no need for another increase in the COLA. Continual COLA rises themselves fuelled inflation. Apart from a surge in inflationary pressure, the other factor inhibiting an upward adjustment of COLA was that there were insufficient goods in the stores on which Africans could spend the extra money.⁹⁷ Official cost of living indices, however, underestimated inflation because their calculations used only listed prices, excluded extensive black market operations, and underestimated rent increases.

The rise in the cost of living was a regional phenomenon which warranted the introduction of COLAs in most colonies. An inquiry into the cost of living in adjacent Southern Rhodesia in July 1941 showed that since August 1939, living costs had risen 7.2 per cent in Salisbury, 6.9 per cent in Bulawayo, 6.6 per cent in Umtali, 7.6 per cent in Gwelo and 7.7 per cent in Que Que.⁹⁸ By 1945, married African civil servants who received a wage of less than six pounds per month were paid 10 shillings per month as COLA. If the wage was six pounds

⁹⁷ Ibid, Note for Executive Council.

⁹⁸ NAZ SEC3/42, Preliminary Results of the Enquiry into the Cost of Living in Southern Rhodesia. See also I. Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle* (London, 1988), 261-2; and Westcott, 'The Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika', 155.

or more, one was paid an allowance of five shillings per month.⁹⁹ Unmarried employees were paid five shillings per month. By the same token, in the Union of South Africa, the allowances ranged from five shillings per week for employees who earned 20 shillings or less, increasing to 12 shillings for those who earned 45 shillings, and 16 shillings six pence on an 80 shillings per week remuneration. Anyone who earned more than 80 shillings per week was paid 17 shillings as a COLA.¹⁰⁰

4.7.2. Cost of Living Index for Europeans

A cost of living index was also instituted for European workers. The Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines periodically issued what became known as the Mufulira Index, so-called after the first mine to calculate the figure as shown in Appendix II. Known as a War Allowance, it was paid to all European employees on the mines except the General Manager and the Manager. “Man Unit” factors recommended by the Health Organisation of the League of Nations were used to calculate the War Allowance for families of different sizes.¹⁰¹ The average Copperbelt family consisted of a man, wife and 1.5 children. This family expressed in man units was equivalent to 2.75 man units as follows: man 1.0, woman 0.8, child 0.2 to 0.8 according to age, with those over the age of 14 regarded as adults according to gender.¹⁰² The allowance was paid in respect of wives and children no matter where they resided except that

⁹⁹ NAZ SEC1/1362, Secretary to the Treasury (Lusaka) to All Heads of Divisions, 28 June 1945.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, Extract from Report of the Representative of the Northern Rhodesia Government in the Union of South Africa (Johannesburg) for the Month of October 1945.

¹⁰¹ NAZ SEC3/48, Mufulira Copper Mines War Allowance for European Employees.

¹⁰² Ibid.

it could not be paid in respect of children who were in employment. Similarly, no allowances were granted in respect of wives separated from or not supported by their husbands.¹⁰³

On the 20th of each month, the current prices of items used to calculate the index were ascertained at each centre on the Copperbelt, and the allowance was re-calculated according to the new total. The pre-war index of £29 18s 1d was used to show the average difference, divided by 2.75 man units.¹⁰⁴ The sum is what was payable as a War Allowance in respect to each European miner (1.00 man units). Due to continued rise in the price of goods, the allowance was paid long after the war had ended contrary to the initial stipulated six months period after the hostilities. As of 20 January 1949, the index figure was £45 10s 1d, an increase of £15 12s or 52.17 per cent from the pre-war index. As a result, the allowance payable per man unit was put at £5 13s 6d.¹⁰⁵

4.8. Import Substitution Industrialization

4.8.1. Initial Attempts at Industrialization

Challenges faced in the supply of commodities occasioned by the war provided an opportunity for Northern Rhodesia to become more economically independent of Britain and regional sources of imports. It was under these circumstances that the industrialization of the country was constantly discussed in colonial and imperial government circles during the war. In 1940, this impetus came from Colonial Office instructions that colonies undertake local production of edible oils, fats and other commodities for which each colony had resources, in order to reduce reliance on the British reserves committed to the war and home consumption. Additionally, in February 1943 the Colonial Office issued a 'Statement Policy on Colonial

¹⁰³ Ibid, Memorandum issued by R.M. Peterson, Manager, 2 April 1940.

¹⁰⁴ See especially SEC3/42, Preliminary Results of the Enquiry into the Cost of Living in Southern Rhodesia in July 1941.

¹⁰⁵ NAZ SEC3/48, Secretary, Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (Nkana) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 24 January 1949.

Development and Welfare’ which set the tone for the setting up of secondary industries in various colonies.

Industries identified for possible establishment in the colony were for the manufacture of starch and oils. Local raw materials considered as possible sources for these industries in Northern Rhodesia were maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Maize was swiftly eliminated as a possibility because of then inadequate supplies due to drought. Cassava and sweet potatoes were disqualified because of the high cost involved in their production, then estimated at one pound and six pounds six pence per tonne, respectively.¹⁰⁶ For as Ackson Kanduzza stated, the cost of producing sweet potatoes locally was double the cost in South Africa where oil extraction from the commodity had been fairly well-established.¹⁰⁷ The only proposal that offered bright prospects was the extraction of oil from eucalyptus *citriodora*. This oil had already been found suitable for frothing in the mines, and the government acknowledged that this proposal showed a “reasonable margin of profit”.¹⁰⁸ It was estimated that there would be an annual trade value of between £15,000 and £20,000. In January and February 1940, the government coordinated investigations and experiments between the mines and a prominent local settler, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who had been producing eucalyptus oil since 1928.¹⁰⁹ The government decided against local processing, however, because this entailed protection from competitors, which in turn meant financial assistance by the state, and the granting of special low rates by the Rhodesia Railways.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ NRG, *First Report of the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development* (Lusaka, 1946), 4.

¹⁰⁷ Kanduzza, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, 187.

¹⁰⁸ By frothing is meant the de-sulphurisation of mining waste material to prevent pollution. See, for example, M. Benzaazoua and M. Kongolo, ‘Physio-Chemical Properties of Tailing Slurries during Environmental Desulphurization by Froth Floatation’, *International Journal of Mineral Processing*, 8 July 2002, 1-20.

¹⁰⁹ Kanduzza, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, 188; and R.I. Rotberg, *Black Heart: Gore Browne and the Politics of Multiracial Zambia* (Berkeley, 1977).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Local merchants renewed pressure on the government, demanding support for local industrialization. The Administration, however, maintained that if new industries were permitted during the war, they must make a direct contribution to the war effort, such as the mines' and Rhodesia Railways' production of small parts for military tanks, and pistols, beginning in 1941 but discontinued immediately after the war ended. Moreover, the government argued that the war period was not particularly conducive to the setting up of projects in the country that might add to the escalating cost of living.¹¹¹ The government considered that the territory's main concern ought to be rural development. In February 1943, the new Chief Secretary, G. Beresford-Stooke, thought that the economic policy of the country should focus on reducing the gap between the social and economic development of Africans and Europeans. This policy was taken further in 1945 by the government Joint Development Adviser, G.F. Clay, whose plan emphasised agricultural development.

As a result of the difficulties encountered by the maize sector during the 1940s, and the lack of inducement for local secondary production, some settler farmers turned to dairy farming between 1939 and 1942. They found the lack of control and protection in this sector another hindrance to the diversification of their farming activities, though.¹¹² Protection, marketing, and pricing controls might have alleviated the adverse impact of low railway rates on imported dairy products from Southern Rhodesia. For instance, it cost 42 pence per 100 pounds at class rate 6 to freight eggs and butter from Mazabuka to Ndola, a distance of 259 miles, while the same quantity was carried at a distribution rate of 44 pence from Bulawayo to Ndola, a distance of 776 miles.¹¹³ The annual revenue from eggs alone for Mazabuka was estimated at £6,000 in 1942 and it was argued that a reduced competition from Southern Rhodesia might expand the sector. Mazabuka also dominated the settler and African cattle trade, and enjoyed the highest

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 166.

¹¹² Kanduzi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, 166.

¹¹³ *Ibid*.

acreage output for maize in the country. Prospects existed at Mazabuka for an integrated primary and agro-based processing industry, but the administration did not support a broad policy of agricultural protection, as this would have depended on guaranteed support from the mining sector. The mining companies, however, insisted on minimizing overall costs of production through the procurement of cheap imported food for its workers.¹¹⁴ Expensive dairy products would have particularly affected white miners whom the administration was not prepared to provoke during the war.¹¹⁵ As local maize railway traffic and revenue actually declined between 1939 and 1945, a broad protective tariff and the abolition of discriminatory rating rules could not be embarked upon.¹¹⁶ Combined with the poor performance of capitalist agriculture generally during the war, this strengthened the case against a broad policy of protection in the country.

4.8.2. Obstacles to Industrial Growth

In spite of persistent pressure on the state from local merchants and industrialists between 1939 and 1947, a number of factors prevented the Northern Rhodesian government from encouraging the expansion of manufacturing in the same manner as it had supported commercial farming. Lack of markets and vast distances were prominent reasons for this. Northern Rhodesians found themselves in the unenviable position of having to “service” vast areas with roads, railways and other amenities, even as their population remained much smaller than those of more developed countries overseas, where industrialists found all kinds of infrastructural facilities already in place for their use before they even built a factory.¹¹⁷

Perhaps the biggest hindrance to the industrialization of Northern Rhodesia was the unfavourable tariff policy with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesians

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 167.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, *Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances on the Copperbelt, 1940* (Lusaka, 1940).

¹¹⁶ Kanduzi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, 170.

¹¹⁷ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 391.

complained of the absence of tariffs to protect local infant industries, and of existing transport policies which failed to use the railways as an instrument of economic expansion, but concentrated on making profits, whilst grossly favouring Bulawayo and Salisbury through its rate policies.¹¹⁸

The customs and excise system was based on preference. There was preferential treatment for goods from the Empire, including the imposition of additional or alternative specific duties where differences in *ad valorem* duties failed to check imports of foreign goods.¹¹⁹ There was free entry under customs agreements, for all produce of Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, subject to payments by the governments of the two countries in the case of manufactured goods.¹²⁰ These agreements were the most important feature of the Northern Rhodesian customs regime. Overall, Northern Rhodesia was bound to benefit from these agreements, except that her industrial base was left undeveloped. Had the Northern Rhodesian manufacturing base been as developed as elsewhere in the region, she would have been in a favourable position for the export of manufactured articles to Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Bechuanaland and the Northern Rhodesia-Congo Basin Area.¹²¹ As noted by the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development (ACID) in its First Report, this was because Southern Rhodesian manufactured goods paid a duty to enter South Africa, and similarly Southern Rhodesia protected its industries from the Union manufactured articles by the imposition of a duty. On the other hand, Northern Rhodesia had free access to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.¹²²

¹¹⁸ See Kanduzi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, especially chapter 5.

¹¹⁹ A. Pim, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Economic and Financial Position of Northern Rhodesia*, hereafter, [*Pim Report*] (London, 1938), 102.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 102.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 102-111.

¹²² NRG, *First Report*, 2.

These customs agreements operated to the detriment of the commercial community in Northern Rhodesia as they both made it difficult to develop secondary industries, and rendered it impossible for importers to compete with Southern Rhodesian and South African firms.¹²³ From the purely fiscal point of view, the agreements had two disadvantages. In the first place, large quantities of beer from the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and a fixed quantity of wine from the Union were imported annually at half the preferential rate of duty.¹²⁴ Secondly, whereas the percentage payments to the Northern Rhodesian government were calculated on the basis of the preferential rates of duty in force locally, in the case of sleeper timber, an important export commodity to South Africa, the government had to pay duty at a far higher rate than that laid down in the Union preferential tariff.¹²⁵ However, the main disadvantages suffered by Northern Rhodesia importers appeared to arise from the system of distribution rates for the Rhodesia Railways than any modification of the customs regime which could be contemplated.¹²⁶

The establishment of a cigarette industry was discouraged by agreements with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Northern Rhodesian leaf tobacco entered those markets duty free in exchange for the entry into Northern Rhodesia at reduced rates of customs duties tobaccos and cigarettes manufactured in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.¹²⁷ Local products could not face competition from imported internationally-established brands. It was in this context that an existing cigarette factory at Choma closed down before the war, and only one small factory at Fort Jameson survived to cater for local demand in the district.¹²⁸

¹²³ *Pim Report*, 107.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹²⁷ NRG, *First Report*, 14.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 14-16.

One of the first assurances sought by prospective industrialists concerned anti-dumping legislation. No such mechanism existed in Northern Rhodesia to protect projected industries during this period. W.J. Busschau, a South African economist, engaged by the Northern Rhodesian government to investigate carry out a feasibility study of the country's potential in manufacturing briefly mentioned this in his report, and so did the ACID. The latter strongly recommended that the government enact legislation to prevent dumping in Northern Rhodesia. Dumping was defined as the export of goods at a price lower than that existing in the country of destination, with the object of forcing the local producer out of business.¹²⁹ This was the fear of those interested in starting a brewery at Ndola. Their concern was whether government would protect the infant local industry against a sharp drop in the retail price of imported beers.¹³⁰ The government was of the opinion that the only protection it could guarantee was legislation against the sale of imported bottled beers in Northern Rhodesia at prices lower than local brands.¹³¹ While agreeing that freight charges on bottled beer and returned empties to Southern Rhodesia greatly helped to increase the cost of this commodity in Northern Rhodesia, the government argued that the European population in the country was not large enough to support a small local brewery.¹³²

Another obstacle to industrialization was that by law, industries could only be set up at Ndola. According to General Notice No. 397 of 1935, the government undertook to 'develop Ndola as the commercial and distributive centre of the Copperbelt and to provide only retail trading facilities elsewhere to the extent required to meet the day to day needs of the inhabitants and to secure healthy competition'.¹³³ Yet, Ndola was poorly situated geographically as a distribution centre for the whole Copperbelt. Additionally, for manufacturers to reach the

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 2.

¹³⁰ NRG, *Second Report of the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development* (Lusaka, 1947), 3.

¹³¹ *Ibid*.

¹³² *Ibid*, *First Report*, 6.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 2.

10,000 non-African persons in the Copperbelt, considerable transportation was required, while long distances separated Ndola from the other Northern Rhodesian railway towns. Worse still were the great distances to be traversed to the relatively large South African markets and ports of export.¹³⁴ Moreover, Ndola was infested with mosquitoes, the water supply was bad and power supply limited.¹³⁵

Northern Rhodesia's small domestic market discouraged the capital investment required for modern factories.¹³⁶ Until the European population in the country had increased to over 35,000 and the standard of living of the African population was raised above existing levels, the internal market was too small to support manufacturing industries.¹³⁷ During the war, the total population was less than 1,400,000 Africans and 16,000 Europeans.¹³⁸ While whites enjoyed considerable purchasing power, this was not the case for poorly-paid Africans. In rural Northern Rhodesia, the average ordinary labourer was paid an average of 12 shillings and six pence per month. On the other hand, wages for Africans in urban areas were a little bit higher than in rural areas. In 1940 on the Copperbelt, the starting rate for surface work on the mines was 15 shillings, and 25 shillings for underground work, exclusive of food portions.¹³⁹ In comparison, wages in Southern Rhodesia were higher than those in Northern Rhodesia. For example, monthly wages on the gold mines averaged 20 shillings in 1935 and rose to about one pound 10 shillings in the 1940s. On the other hand, an average of 14 shillings per month was paid to farm workers in 1932.¹⁴⁰ As a consequence, the total purchasing power was very low in comparison with other African colonies. It was for this reason that Busschau recommended

¹³⁴ W.J. Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries in Northern Rhodesia* (Lusaka, 1945), 22.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹³⁶ NRG, *Third Report of the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development* (Lusaka, 1948), 2.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹³⁸ Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries*, 14.

¹³⁹ See R.J.B Moore, "Native Wages and Standard of Living in Northern Rhodesia," *African Studies*, 1:2 (1942), 142-148.

¹⁴⁰ See relevant sections in Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*.

that the development potential of secondary industries were limited.¹⁴¹ After the war, the European population grew rapidly, reaching 49,000 in 1953,¹⁴² but even so, absolute numbers were tiny.¹⁴³ The small size of the Northern Rhodesian market and its scattered nature was one of the major factors noted by G.F. Clay, the Joint Adviser on Development to the governments of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For Clay, this was what militated against any large scale industrialization in the country.¹⁴⁴ Clay suggested that the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa should be seen as a single economic area. He argued for the setting up of an arrangement whereby an assured market for Northern Rhodesia's primary produce in this huge economic zone could be guaranteed.¹⁴⁵

Although the ACID stated that the Northern Rhodesian government was prepared to assist new industries in a manner similar to that offered by the governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, in fact the government did not have enough money to finance new industries. There was no financial institution to help industrialists establish enterprises, as was the case in South Africa, for example, where the Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1940. Even when help was provided, there were many strings attached to it. The first was that the industry should promote the development and welfare of the territory, and secondly, the applicant was required to explore other avenues for raising capital for a new industrial venture or extension of an existing industry before approaching the government.¹⁴⁶ As much of the wealth in the country was owned by persons who lived outside the territory, residents, on the whole, could not be regarded as a major source of capital.¹⁴⁷ Although there had been considerable growth in individual incomes which might allow the establishment of

¹⁴¹ *Ibid* 14, 21.

¹⁴² Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London, 1976), 212.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁴ G.F. Clay, *Memorandum on Post-War Development Planning in Northern Rhodesia* (Lusaka, 1945), 25.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁶ NRG, *Second Report*, 1.

¹⁴⁷ Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries*, 39.

small scale enterprises, many local “capitalists” were not willing to invest their savings. As Busschau noted, ‘the existence of a large measure of uncertainty is at present, and is likely to remain a factor retarding investment in secondary industries in Northern Rhodesia’.¹⁴⁸

Merchant capital gained some influence in the legislative council following the election in 1941 of three traders through Roy Welensky’s Labour Party, formed early in that year. The party was sympathetic to merchants’ demands for industrialization in the country because this offered prospects of increasing employment for white workers and also increased political support. Its electoral victory had occurred because of widespread settler dissatisfaction over the import and price controls introduced in 1940. Merchants argued that these restrictions would have been less severe had rating and tariff policies allowed Northern Rhodesia to build up distributive trade and manufacturing industries.¹⁴⁹ However, the elected representatives of merchant capital could not effectively use their political influence in the legislative council because war conditions had increased cooperation between the Rhodesias. This scenario thus eliminated prospects for inward-looking industrialization in Northern Rhodesia. In the 1944 election three of the five representatives lost their seats as an indirect result of these policies.¹⁵⁰

4.8.3. Renewed Efforts by the State

In response to imperial and local pressures for industrialization, the government appointed Busschau. He was tasked to ascertain the necessity of local secondary industries, to advise on the nature of government assistance to industry, and whether such assistance was desirable in the context of the broad economic development of Northern Rhodesia.¹⁵¹ The investigation entailed reconciling a strategy for an integrated regional development, and a gradualist approach to regional development in which less developed territorial economic

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 40.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 186.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁵¹ Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries*, 13.

sectors would be allowed to develop and increase their bargaining strength in the long term. Merchant and emergent local industrial capital in Northern Rhodesia, according to Kanduzi, favoured a gradualist approach.¹⁵² Growth was hindered by the lack of government enthusiasm about state or tariff assistance in stimulating local capital formation. Busschau's South African background and his terms of reference which required that Northern Rhodesia's development should be harmonized with an integrated southern African regional developmental plan meant that the government of Northern Rhodesia would get the kind of report it wanted to use against merchant capital.¹⁵³ Busschau's recommendations supported those of Clay for a regional approach to economic development, thus strengthening the position of the Northern Rhodesian government against protection. He criticized protection and the setting up of secondary industries because Northern Rhodesia stood to gain from its comparative advantage by maximizing copper production.¹⁵⁴

Busschau's argument that 'in general, tariffs should be regarded as an unsuitable instrument with which to encourage the development of secondary industries in Northern Rhodesia', nonetheless encouraged 'the elimination of tariffs in British southern Africa ... [while] it should not acquiesce in arrangements unduly favouring the manufactures of the Union of South Africa against those of other countries'.¹⁵⁵ The Northern Rhodesian administration and the mining companies welcomed Busschau's views because they reinforced their desire to avoid anything that would increase the cost of living and harm production. The position of the mining industry, which produced about 19 shillings in every pound sterling of

¹⁵² Kanduzi, *The Political Economy*, 189.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries*, 9-12

the Northern Rhodesia government's revenue, carried far more weight in formulating the colony's industrial policy than demands for protection by merchants.¹⁵⁶

Roy Welensky, the vocal member representing the Broken Hill electoral area in the Legislative Council, harshly criticized Busschau's report for assuming that "non-economic" industries should not be encouraged, that Northern Rhodesian whites were temporary residents; and his criticism of the relatively high wages paid to Europeans.¹⁵⁷ Welensky also argued that Northern Rhodesia's coal-mining potentialities had not been developed because of the City of London's conflicting interests north and south of the Zambezi.¹⁵⁸ Busschau, Welensky added, assumed the profit motive, and had few positive suggestions to make, except to set up the ACID. His South African background made him biased towards support for industries in the Union. When the ACID was established, it came to be dominated by mining interests, which generally endorsed Busschau's views. The Governor appointed the Advisory Committee on Industrial Development on 3 December 1945 whose terms of reference were as follows:

To examine the range of existing and potential industries in Northern Rhodesia and to advise Government as to those possibilities of industrial development which show the best promise of economic success and to recommend what steps Government should take to encourage the initiation or development of such industries and to report upon such matters as are referred to it by Government.¹⁵⁹

The Committee argued that until the country's white population had increased to over 35,000 and the standard of living for Africans considerably was raised, the internal market would remain too small to support manufacturing industries of a size sufficiently large to

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 11, 51.

¹⁵⁷ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 391.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*. For a detailed discussion of the part played by Southern Rhodesia's Wankie Colliery, see I. Phmister, *Wangi Kolia: Coal, Capital and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894-1954* (Johannesburg, 1954).

¹⁵⁹ Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries*, 32.

warrant financial assistance from government. In the opinion of the ACID, the only new industry deserving government sponsorship was a cement industry near Lusaka to supply the country's consumption of 20,000 tonnes annually.¹⁶⁰ As Kanduzha has pointed out, Southern Rhodesia had captured this market because Northern Rhodesia failed to impose a protective duty, and a special maximum rate of 28 shillings per load instead of 50 shillings per load of 15 tonnes per mile had been used by the Rhodesia Railways in order to stifle competition from the Congo.¹⁶¹ Further, cement, having a comparatively low value in relation to its weight of approximately £5 per tonne, made its export further afield out of the question.¹⁶² There was also a fear that with the likely post-war demand for building cement in southern Africa, a serious shortage might develop in Northern Rhodesia.

A Consulting Geologist appointed to look into this project, W.G. Garlick, came to the conclusion that the limestone deposit at Chilanga between the railway and the Great North Road nine miles south of Lusaka, was the most promising of all the sites surveyed. The site was ideal because all necessary raw materials for the manufacture of cement, except for coal and gypsum, were available. The factory site was close to the railway, a plentiful supply of water was assured, and the electricity supply from the Lusaka Electricity Undertaking was nearby and could easily be expanded.¹⁶³ It was noted, though, that owing to the limited size of the market for cement in Northern Rhodesia, the enterprise might be at a disadvantage in competition with large scale producers in Southern Rhodesia who could manufacture cement at a lower cost.¹⁶⁴ The application of Railway Tariff 12 to the carriage of cement throughout the railway system in Northern Rhodesia ensured the factory at Chilanga an advantage of

¹⁶⁰ NRG, *Third Report*, 7.

¹⁶¹ Kanduzha, *The Political Economy*, 191.

¹⁶² NRG, *First Report*, 11.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, *Second Report*, 4.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*.

approximately 25 shillings per tonne on deliveries to Lusaka and northwards over producers near Bulawayo.¹⁶⁵

A cement plant with an annual capacity of 50,000 long tons was purchased in November 1947 from Vickers Armstrong Ltd, England. From other British manufacturers came a steam boiler and electrical generating plant. The project was sponsored by the Northern Rhodesian government. R.E. Baldwin states that the factory was developed under government initiative and with the aid of funds supplied by the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC).¹⁶⁶ It was developed as a national enterprise, and not a private one because of the importance of cement for the country's construction sector. The CDC provided £750,000 and the government £250,000.¹⁶⁷ Production began towards the end of 1950. Subsequently, the cement works were sold to private enterprise. Cement demand initially came from the Kariba dam project which contributed to the expansion of the firm. By 1954 the plant had produced 74,000 tonnes and this was expected to reach 180,000 by 1956.¹⁶⁸

Once established, the factory employed 29 Europeans and 76 Africans. The enlargement of electricity supply at Lusaka to supply electrical power to the factory also led to a reduction in the cost of industrial power in the City itself. It was further envisaged by the government that the establishment of a cement factory at Chilanga could lead to the founding of a factory manufacturing cement products, such as asbestos-cement roofing, and piping.¹⁶⁹

Skilled European workers and entrepreneurs were responsible for the setting up of small scale manufacturing businesses on the Copperbelt. Most of these were former mine employees.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ R.E. Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960* (Berkeley, 1966), 182.

¹⁶⁷ US Department of Commerce, *Investment in Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Washington DC, 1956), 48.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ NRG, *Second Report*, 3.

They established firms supplying services and goods to the mines.¹⁷⁰ Once established, they began to branch out into operations beyond servicing the copper industry. In addition to the Zambezi Sawmills in Livingstone, the country's largest single industrial enterprise, firms began to manufacture ferro-concrete pipes, bricks, and chemicals on a small scale. Furthermore, consumer goods such as soap, mineral water and sweets, as well as furniture and veneer, clothing and blankets were manufactured.¹⁷¹ Later on an iron foundry and a motor-body building workshop opened up, but enterprise remained small in scale, and confined to Ndola and Livingstone. Other industries dealt with grain milling, meat processing, printing and chemical production.¹⁷²

This state of affairs was quite different from the Southern Rhodesia, where from the end of 1943, industrial expansion accelerated rapidly. Between 1944 and 1948 the average annual rate of growth was estimated at 24.4 per cent.¹⁷³ This expansion was sustained by an influx of white immigrants which drove the settler population up from c. 80,000 in 1945 to c. 125,000 in 1950.¹⁷⁴

Manufactured commodities produced in Northern Rhodesia were usually characterised by the following features: high transportation costs in relation to the value of the product; the local availability of necessary raw materials; and an ability to produce the product efficiently on a small scale.¹⁷⁵ The cement factory, for instance, proved viable because of the relatively high cost of transporting cement from Southern Rhodesia and because a small plant in the

¹⁷⁰ Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth*, 183.

¹⁷¹ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 391.

¹⁷² US Department for Commerce, *Investment in Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, 43. A few more industries were set up in the colony during the period of the Federation of Central Africa.

¹⁷³ I. Phimister, 'From Preference towards Protection: Manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia, 1940-1965', in A.S. Mlambo, E.S. Pangeti and Phimister (eds.), *A History of Manufacturing in Zimbabwe, 1890-1995* (Harare, 2000), 33. A detailed discussion on wartime industrialization in the Union of South is contained in H.J. Martin and N. Orpen, *South Africa at War. South African Forces in World War II (Volume 7): Preparations and Operations on the Home Front, 1939-45* (Cape Town, 1979).

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 32. For a more recent study, see V.M. Gwande, 'Foreign Capital, State and the Development of Secondary Industry in Southern Rhodesia, 1939-1956', MA Dissertation, University of the Free State, 2015.

¹⁷⁵ Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth*, 182.

country was efficient. Similarly, the presence of teak and other timbers in the western part of the country, plus low transportation costs, were factors behind the location of the saw mill and related industries. The same was the case for the meat, slaughtering, dairy, and grain-mill industries which were also dependent on the presence of raw materials.

4.9. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the wide-ranging impact of the Second World War on the Northern Rhodesian economy. The colony experienced shortages of consumer goods, profiteering, hoarding, inflation and the black market. To resolve some of these challenges, the government instituted austerity measures such as rationing and price control, albeit with limited success. The chapter has also demonstrated how scarcity illuminates colonial economic policy; the war exposed the vulnerability of Northern Rhodesia's dependence on external markets for basic needs. Since the war disrupted external sources which supplied her, the country suffered from the war campaign of its imperial overlord. The other conclusion regards the management of scarcity. It was easy for the government to appeal to the people to reduce the consumption of certain imported commodities because they were not regarded as necessities of life. No appeal could, however, work with respect to food items like maize meal. In this way, the government engaged the use of subsidies to cushion livelihoods for low-income groups. But these hardships in Northern Rhodesia, as in most colonies, were mere pin pricks in comparison with more stringent austerity measures adopted in the UK and other belligerent nations.¹⁷⁶ It has also been observed that economic challenges faced by the country persisted many years

¹⁷⁶ B.J. Barker *et al*, *The Reader's Digest: Illustrated History of South Africa: the Real Story* (Cape Town, 1988), 351.

after the end of the war owing to the devaluation of the sterling in 1949. The experiences of demand management and state regulation provided important lessons for post-war economic development. The replacement of the free market by a centralized economy, with a good degree of state regulation aimed at maximizing economic growth, lays a foundation for the next chapter which examines wartime Imperial interventions in the colony's mining industry.

CHAPTER V

War, Copper and “the Second Colonial Occupation”

5.1. Introduction

This chapter addresses the impact of the war on Northern Rhodesia's economic mainstay: copper mining. It argues that the British control of copper mining in Northern Rhodesia lasted almost continuously from the beginning of the Second World War until many years after due to the desire to benefit from, ‘the most important African supplier of a single base metal for the Allied cause’.¹ The importance of copper in the post-war period was prolonged by reconstruction in Europe and the United States, a global shortage of the metal, sterling's devaluation in 1949, and then, by the increased international demand occasioned by the Korean War in the midst of the Cold War. In turn, activities in the mining sector were closely related to the agricultural sector, for mining impinged on food security without which the production of base metals could be threatened. With approval from London, the colonial state resorted to labour conscription for European settler farmers in order to attain food self-sufficiency for the growing urban population.

Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that as the financial value of this “minor” colony increased in wartime, so too, it became bound more tightly to the mother country in the post-

¹ R. Dumett, ‘Africa's Strategic Minerals during the Second World War’, *Journal of African History*, 26, 4 (1985), 393; and L.H. Gann, ‘The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper, 1923-52’, *Rhodes-Livingstone Journal*, 18 (1955), 10.

war period. The colony's new importance was in light of the fact that a fiscally-challenged Britain benefitted from the dollar-earnings of copper exports. But the high cost of doing business in post-war Britain, as well as the decline of the City of London as the world's financial centre, compelled the mining companies to shift their domicile to Northern Rhodesia at the turn of the 1950s. The chapter establishes that the period after the war witnessed increased government involvement in the uplift of hitherto neglected aspects of the local people's livelihoods. This, "second colonial occupation", was characterised by "development and welfare" projects sponsored by the imperial government. Of paramount importance under the new policy was the promotion of peasant agricultural production. While securing food supplies in the colonies, also guaranteeing Britain's own scarce supplies for home consumption.

5.2. The Importance of the Copper Mining Industry in Wartime

The demand for total war by the Allied nations called for the extraction of various raw materials from almost all continents on an unparalleled scale.² Despite pre-war self-sufficiency in basic ores, such as coal and iron, Allied powers were compelled to augment existing mineral stocks in nearly all categories with imports from around the world.³ Northern Rhodesia known for its copper, an essential metal in the manufacture of ammunition and wires, came to play a pivotal role in the Allied war effort in this regard. Apart from copper, the colony's mines also supplied cobalt, whose main use in wartime was as an alloy in tools requiring high speed cutting steel.⁴ Early in the war, more than half of Britain's copper imports came from North America, but by 1945, nearly 68 per cent of her supplies were Northern Rhodesian, making the territory by far its most important source of supply.⁵ Together with the Belgian Congo, Northern

² Total war is a conflict in which a belligerent nation marshals its population for war production.

³ Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Minerals', 381.

⁴ *Ibid*, 392.

⁵ L. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia 1930-1964* (Houndsmill, 2007), 61; and E.L. Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: the Copperbelt from 1924 to Independence* (Oxford, 1974), 54.

Rhodesia remained a major supplier of the mineral to the Allies throughout the war. From Table 5.1 below, it can be deduced that in wartime, Northern Rhodesia had become the world's fourth largest producer of copper after the United States, Canada and Chile. Between 1935 and 1945, the country produced about 2,300,000 tonnes of refined copper to buttress Britain's munitions needs.⁶

Table 5.1 Estimated World Copper Production on Country Basis ('000 long tonnes)

Principal Producers	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946
US	745	497	656	797	878	980	995	898	719	539
Canada	234	259	277	293	287	270	257	244	213	166
Mexico	46	41	48	40	51	51	45	43	61	58
Peru	35	37	35	43	36	35	33	32	30	23
Chile	407	346	334	357	461	477	489	490	463	356
Germany	29	30	30	23	22	23	23	21	(a)	15
Spain and Portugal	31	34	25	13	10	12	12	12	9	(b)
Yugoslavia	39	41	41	42	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Russia	91	96	105	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Japan	75	76	76	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)
Belgian Congo	148	122	121	147	160	163	154	163	158	141
Northern Rhodesia	209	212	213	260	231	250	247	220	193	183
South Africa	(b)	11	10	14	19	21	23	22	23	26
World Total	2,231	1,953	2,130	1,999	2,166	2,295	2,292	2,162	1,898	1,621

(a) Not available and excluded from world total

(b) Not available but estimates included in world total

Source: *The Economist*, 2 August 1947.

⁶ Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Minerals', 393-4.

Copper, exported in either blister or electrolytic form, was mainly used in the manufacture of brass cartridges and canon shells. The greater portion of what was exported, however, was in the form of blister. Additionally, thousands of miles of copper wiring was needed for the electrical systems in aircraft, tanks and warships, while copper tubing was essential for refrigeration units, plumbing and heat transfer devices.⁷ On the other hand, Broken Hill mine produced vital quantities of lead, zinc, and vanadium. Vanadium, which reached a wartime peak of 738 metric tonnes in 1943,⁸ was essential to American and British manufactures of high speed tools and ultra-strength steel forgings. Furthermore, two small mica mines opened during the war. Mica was used in the manufacture of valves in oxygen masks used in bombers.⁹

It was copper production, however, which took centre stage. Due to the increased requirements of the production of copper by the Allies, it was repeatedly brought to the attention of the mines that the greatest war effort that could be made by Northern Rhodesia was to maintain and, if possible, increase the production of the metal. Speaking at Broken Hill early in 1940, Governor John Maybin stated that:

[t]he territory has one great asset of vital imperial importance – the base metal industry. It is producing metals which are vitally necessary to the Empire's war effort. In the case of copper it is the only sterling source of supply. We must keep up our production. I have that on the authority of the Secretary of State. The output of our copper mines has been virtually taken over by the Ministry of Supply.¹⁰

The country's two mining corporates - the Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST) and Rhodesia Anglo American (RAA), prepared everything for production. As belligerent nations had intervened in

⁷ *Ibid*, 393.

⁸ *Ibid*, 396.

⁹ L.H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Earliest Times to 1953* (London, 1964), 330.

¹⁰ Mining Industry Archives (hereafter MIA) 18.4.2A, Governor John Maybin, Address to the nation made at Broken Hill, 26 January 1940.

commodity markets and industry affairs at the onset of hostilities, free market forces were removed. The British government closed the London Metal Exchange (LME) and suspended existing sales agreements made by empire producers, and authorised the Ministry of Supply to take over sales and pricing arrangements of copper.¹¹ The British Metal Corporation in turn was contracted by the Ministry of Supply to purchase the whole of the colony's copper output at the fixed price of £62 per long tonne throughout the war period,¹² based on the LME price quoted the day before the war broke out.¹³ When pressed by the European Mine Workers Union (MWU) to explain arrangements entered into with the British government, the colonial government stated that the mines were supplying copper at a price far below the current world price,¹⁴ a message that was re-emphasised throughout the war period.¹⁵

In line with Emergency regulations, copper and other base metals were considered “contraband of war” if they had belligerent purpose or destination. In wartime, contraband was classified as either absolute or conditional. Absolute contraband referred to all minerals, though fit also for the purposes of peace, were in their nature peculiarly serviceable to the enemy in war, and had a hostile destination.¹⁶ On the other hand, all minerals fit for purposes of war and peace alike, which had a hostile destination, were regarded as conditional contraband.¹⁷ Copper belonged to the latter category. This nomenclature was in line with the object of economic warfare which aimed at denying supplies to the enemy and securing them for the Allies”.¹⁸

¹¹ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 62; and J.G. Phillips, ‘Roan Antelope: Big Business in Central Africa’, PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000, 249.

¹² Butler, *Copper Empire*, 63; and F.L. Coleman, *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 1899-1962* (Manchester, 1971), 144. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 329, puts the figure at £66 per tonne.

¹³ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 63.

¹⁴ MIA 18.4.2A, Governor John Maybin, Address to the nation broadcast from Nkana at 6:30PM, 2 February 1940.

¹⁵ See, for example, Northern Rhodesia Government (hereafter NRG), *Legislative Council Debates*, June 1940; NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 26 May 1943; and NRG, *Address to the Legislative Council by Governor John Maybin, September 1940* (Lusaka, 1941).

¹⁶ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ) SEC1/276, Secret Telegram No. 33 on Instructions to Customs Officers with regard to “Contraband”, 2 September 1939.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The official handbook of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare described its aim as to disorganise the enemy's economy so as to prevent it from carrying on with the war. The ministry was not simply involved in naval blockade but also used such diverse actions as diplomatic negotiations with neutral countries and the

Strict controls over the export of commodities from the colonies were thus instituted. As P.T. Bauer noted, there were three elements in the machinery of export control: licensing of exports to direct them to specific destinations; statutory monopoly in the handling of the main exports; and a system of quotas in the purchase of export produce.¹⁹ Before the war, the most important markets for Northern Rhodesian blister copper were Britain, Germany and Italy, in that order. Germany took about one-third of the output during each of the last four years before 1939 and Italy one-tenth.²⁰ Italy also bought large but varying quantities of electrolytic copper. Under war conditions, this trade situation could not continue as both Germany and Italy belonged to the opposing Axis.

Unlike before the war, export licences now had to be issued by the Comptroller of Customs for all consignments of copper. Copies of such licences were forwarded to the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London to ensure that Axis powers did not benefit from such colonial supplies. In this vein, according to government Notice No. 144 of 1939 (the Export Prohibition Order, 1939), the exportation from the territory of electrolytic and blister copper, vanadium oxide, lead and cobalt alloy could only be done with British government approval.²¹ In conformity with economic warfare, there were no restrictions in the issuance of licences with regard to exports destined to Britain, the United States, France, French colonies, Portugal, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq. The export of base metals to other non-European countries, except Russia, was at the discretion of the Northern Rhodesian government with cases of difficulty referred to the Secretary of State for consideration.²²

bombing of industrial targets. For a detailed examination of Allied economic warfare against Axis see, M. Fritz, 'Economic Warfare', in I.C.B. Dear (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to the Second World War* (Oxford, 1995), 318-321.

¹⁹ P.T. Bauer, 'Origins of the Statutory Export Monopolies of British West Africa', *Business History Review*, 28, 3 (1954), 202.

²⁰ United Kingdom Department of Overseas Trade, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London, May 1939), 29.

²¹ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 48.

²² NAZ SEC1/275, Comptroller of Customs (Lusaka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 April 1940. See also NAZ SEC1/276, Export Prohibition Orders: Instructions to Customs Officers with Regard to "Contraband"; Licences

As the war drew to a close, economists, mining magnates, miners, and colonial and imperial government officials all predicted a post-war slump arising from the large copper stocks at hand.²³ Mine workers' fears about job losses after the war were exacerbated by remarks made by Governor John Maybin in 1940 when he said that the country could face a sharp drop in production at the end of the hostilities.²⁴ Lusaka was anxious about the implications of a sudden post-war cut in production, not least the unemployment which would affect influential European miners.²⁵ The British Ministry of Supply even cut back its purchases of Northern Rhodesian copper in 1944 as it was felt the Allies had secured enough supplies roughly equal to their consumption levels. The Allied powers estimated that the reduction of military copper consumption by the change over from a two-front to a one-front war against Japan after the defeat of Germany would be about 264,000 tonnes per annum.²⁶ Furthermore, the outlook for the mines seemed bleak as the cost of deep-level mining was increasing, fuel was scarce, and the necessary machinery and railway stock were in short supply.²⁷ In consequence of these pessimistic calculations, the mines reduced production from a high of 250,000 tonnes in 1942 to 183,000 tonnes in 1946.²⁸ These fears were not unfounded as a similar trend was observed after the First World War. But this time around, stakeholders in the industry were all mistaken because production neither fell nor remained constant. Instead, the quantities of copper produced went up.

5.3. The Post-War Importance of Copper

for Exportation of certain Commodities; and *ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Controller of Customs (Livingstone), 23 October 1939.

²³ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 329.

²⁴ *Ibid*. See also Butler, *Copper Empire*, 84.

²⁵ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 86.

²⁶ Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 12; *ibid*, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 360; and R.L. Prain, *Reflections on an Era: an Autobiography* (Surrey, 1981), 82-3.

²⁷ Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 110; Coleman, *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt*, 146; and Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 360.

²⁸ Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 12; and Coleman, *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt*, 146.

Contradictions within British imperialism surfaced at the end of the Second World War. The ravages of war had disrupted the world economy, resulting in a global shortage of foodstuffs and consumer products, inflationary pressures, and significantly, a general dependence on imports from the United States. Although Washington wrote off almost the entire wartime Lend-Lease account, the combined dollar deficit of Britain and the entire sterling area was over four billion dollars in 1947.²⁹ This created a crisis in the convertibility of sterling in comparison with a resurgent US dollar. The roots of the convertibility crisis lie in a set of complex factors which we cannot go into here. Suffice to say, this was the first post-war event of great significance to affect the copper mines.

As most parts of the Empire had entered into closer monetary cooperation with Britain in the 1930s in which the mother country acted as banker to the system, transactions were made, and reserves were held in sterling in the City of London.³⁰ The Sterling Area was a bloc of countries whose governments deliberately chose to use sterling as an international currency after 1931 when sterling went off the gold standard. The pressures of the war welded the rather loose pre-war sterling bloc into a closely integrated monetary association that survived for two decades after the war. As Northern Rhodesia was a member of this bloc, her mining industry came to be affected by forces which impacted on sterling. But the sterling balances which Dominions and colonies alike built up in London reflected more clearly than anything else the cost of the war to Britain. Gerold Krozewski has argued that as the centralizing authority within the sterling area, Britain was able to redirect sterling trade and run a deficit to finance the war effort through import substitution and dollar saving.³¹

²⁹ R. Gardner, *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective* (New York, 1980), 308.

³⁰ G. Krozewski, 'Sterling, the 'Minor' Territories, and the End of Formal Empire, 1939-1958', *Economic History Review*, 46, 2 (1993), 241.

³¹ Krozewski, 'Sterling, the 'Minor' Territories, and the End of Formal Empire', 241.

One response to the convertibility crisis of 1947 was to devalue or float sterling rather than suspend convertibility.³² Consequently, the currency was devalued by 44 per cent against the US dollar in September 1949, to compensate for the shift in the economic fortunes and competitiveness of the US as against the UK.³³ The devaluation of sterling meant that Britain could export more easily, as foreigners could now acquire more pounds with the same amount of their own currency. On the other hand, Britain had to pay more of her depreciated money to acquire goods from abroad.³⁴ One of these commodities was copper whose price had now increased.

The copper industry took a new lease of life following the devaluation of sterling. All along the price paid by the British government for the metal had been based on the dollar price and the mining companies persuaded the Ministry of Supply to raise the sterling price accordingly.³⁵ As the price for copper was now based on the American dollar price, devaluation created an entirely new higher value for the commodity in imperial circles. Between 1949 and 1953, the dollar price for copper rose by almost half.³⁶

It was in this context that Northern Rhodesian copper mines acquired a new importance to Britain. Equally important was that with the notable exception of royalties, most of the costs on the mines, including wages, transport, and fuel were sterling-driven and unaffected by the devaluation.³⁷ The increased production of vital export commodities in the colonies was crucial

³² C.R. Schenk, *The Decline of Sterling: Measuring the Retreat of an International Currency, 1945-1992* (Cambridge, 2010), 68.

³³ A.D. Roberts, 'Northern Rhodesia: the Post-War Background, 1945-1953', in J-B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, and G. Macola (eds.), *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in late Colonial Zambia* (Leiden, 2011), 16; *ibid*, 'Notes towards a Financial History of Copper Mining in Northern Rhodesia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 16, 2 (1982), 355; and Prain, *Reflections on an Era*, 88. See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990* (Harlow, 1993), 269-274; and *ibid*, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000* (Harlow, 2000), 625-631. Schenk, *The Decline of Sterling*, 69, puts the rate of devaluation at 17 per cent.

³⁴ Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 13. Following devaluation, the value of the pound in relation to the US dollar became \$2.80, instead of \$4.02.

³⁵ Roberts, 'Notes towards a Financial History', 355.

³⁶ *The Economist*, 2 August 1947; and Butler, *Copper Empire*, 115.

³⁷ Phillips, 'Roan Antelope', 309.

to Britain as it was meant to reduce its dependence on the United States, uphold the international value of sterling, and enable the country to earn dollars.³⁸ Apart from being vital sources of raw materials for sale, colonies contributed to the hard currency pool through their dollar earnings. They also held sizeable sterling balances in London which the imperial government could manipulate more freely than was possible elsewhere.³⁹ ‘The whole future of the sterling group and its ability to survive’, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Minister of Economic Affairs, told an African Governors’ conference in November 1947, ‘depends ... upon a quick and extensive development of our African resources’.⁴⁰ Emphasising the urgency of the situation, he invoked colonial Governors to:

[i]ncrease out all recognition the tempo of African development ... so that within the next two to five years we get a really marked increase of production in ... anything ... that will save dollars or sell in a dollar market.⁴¹

Northern Rhodesia responded accordingly. Blister copper worth £2,000,000 was exported to the United States in 1948, this being the first consignment sold for dollars since the war. The following year the figure rose to £4,800,000.⁴² More important than its dollar-earning capacity was the position of copper as a dollar-saver: and still more dollars were saved by the coming into operation of the new electrolytic refinery at Nkana mine in 1951.⁴³ The refinery was of considerable significance to the sterling area because Britain did not possess sufficient capacity

³⁸ D. Killingray and R. Rathbone, ‘Introduction’, in Killingray and Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 11.

³⁹ Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction*, 279; and *ibid*, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*, 630.

⁴⁰ NAZ SEC1/1362, Minutes of the African Governors Conference held in London, 12 November 1947.

⁴¹ *Ibid*.

⁴² MIA 14.3.3F, Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the state of British Territories in East and Central Africa, 1945-1950, June 1950, 43. Such sums of income earned by the mines meant that devaluation elevated their profit potential, and in the process increased their importance to their London-based holding companies, their shareholders, the central African Governments, and sterling area, at large.

⁴³ *Ibid*.

to produce electrolytic copper of higher purity. As a result, it exported scrap copper to the tune of 145,000 tonnes per year to the US to be refined in exchange for dollars.⁴⁴

Furthermore, post-war reconstruction in Europe and the United States spurred demand for copper. The war had left devastated areas and industries which needed to be rebuilt. The US and Britain, two principal consumers of copper, required more of the metal especially for their electrical and automotive industries than had been thought possible before. *The Economist* estimated that as much as 50 per cent and 40 per cent of all copper imported by the US and Britain, respectively was consumed by the automobile industry in the post-war period. This was followed by the ship-building industry which accounted for 20 per cent of the total used.⁴⁵ Imperial officials estimated that the resumption of copper purchases by the Ministry of Supply after the war saved Britain the equivalent of some £11 million in dollars annually by 1950.⁴⁶ Production which had fallen to 182,289 long tonnes in 1946 reached 309,141 long tonnes in 1951.⁴⁷

The post-war period also witnessed increased demand for copper in other non-traditional spheres such as architecture and building construction. The use of copper sheet and strip, for example, for roofing, flashings, damp-proof course and rainwater goods, and the use of tube for hot and cold water and gas pipes, and heating equally made headway.⁴⁸ As a result, the price of blister copper soared from the controlled wartime level of £62 to £137 per long by March 1947.⁴⁹ The American government's creation of a strategic copper reserve also aided the market's buoyancy, which benefitted producers by keeping surplus war stocks from coming back onto the market and adding to available supplies.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the demand for copper

⁴⁴ Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 14.

⁴⁵ *The Economist*, 2 August 1947.

⁴⁶ Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 110.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Copper Development Association, *Fifteenth Annual Report* (November 1949), 11-12.

⁴⁹ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 107; Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 110; *The Economist*, 2 August 1947; and Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 1-18.

⁵⁰ Phillips, 'Roan Antelope', 288-9.

remained strong and prices buoyant following the end of price controls by the US in November 1946.⁵¹ Similarly, at the turn of the 1950s, Northern Rhodesian mines were put at an advantage following industrial action in the US and shortage of electricity in Chile which hampered production there.

Another contributing factor to the prosperity of the copper mining industry in the period after the war was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. There was more sustained demand for the metal from defence industries, and especially the expanded Western rearmament programmes triggered by the war and on-going Cold War.⁵² By 1951, rearmament in Britain and the US had created a serious global deficiency of the metal. This resulted in a sharp rise in the price of the metal from £180 to £420 per long tonne between 1950 and 1956.⁵³ This development also encouraged massive investment in expanding the mines on the Copperbelt to maintain and increase output. As Lawrence Butler demonstrated, spurred by the effects of the Korean War and escalating Cold War, the Americans began to show a willingness to invest in Northern Rhodesia's mining and infrastructure to boost copper production.⁵⁴ This coincided with a period when British capacity for overseas investment was increasingly stretched. Thus, the expansion of the Copperbelt came to rely on American capital. With the intensification of the Cold War in the later 1940s, and increased defence spending by a financially handicapped Britain, Washington developed more and more interest in Africa's potential to contribute to strategic stock-piling of commodities vital to the West.⁵⁵ The West viewed central Africa through the prism of Cold War calculations, and aimed to forestall Soviet penetration of the

⁵¹ Ibid, 288.

⁵² Butler, *Copper Empire*, 194.

⁵³ Coleman, *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt*, 146.

⁵⁴ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 131.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 3, 4, 271.

industry.⁵⁶ The overall effect was a raise in the value of minerals produced from £50 million in 1950 to £95 million in 1953.⁵⁷

The end of the war also witnessed expansion of the mining industry. Increased demand for copper by the US for its stock-piling programme led to a rise in American interests in Northern Rhodesia's mining industry in the 1950s. This was the rationale for the US government's lending of £3million to the RST in 1951 (later increased to £5million) for a new mine at Chibuluma.⁵⁸ Butler argues that this development was propelled by a new emphasis of strategic stockpiling, itself a product of the Korean War and intimations of future conflict elsewhere,⁵⁹ that is, from cold to hot war. The primary aim was to safeguard the supply of copper which was a strategic commodity in the prosecution of the Korean War. This was the first mine to be opened by the RST group in the post-war era. Further US assistance included a grant of £200,000 to Rhokana made in 1953 for the establishment of a cobalt refinery. This culminated in the opening up of two new mines at Bancroft (RAA) and Chibuluma (RST), and the extension of Nkana and Mufulira mines as well as the establishment of the highly-profitable open-pit at Nchanga.⁶⁰

While all these developments were taking place, the balance of power in the region took a new shape. For some time, the political influence had been shifting from London to members of the European population in central Africa. The end of the war thus had political ramifications for the region as it rejuvenated the idea of a closer union among Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This, however, was an imperial and not just a local movement. There were similar federation schemes in East Africa, the West Indies, and South-east Asia during

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 300. For a comparative perspective elsewhere in Africa, see S. Stockwell, *The Business of Decolonisation: British Strategies for the Gold Coast* (Oxford, 2000), 213-14, 220.

⁵⁷ Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London, 1976), 212; and Butler, *Copper Empire*, 107.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, *Copper Empire*, 131.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 217.

⁶⁰ Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 6.

this period.⁶¹ The issue of amalgamation in central Africa which had died down during the war now acquired new vigour and relevance due to the boom in the copper industry. In the meantime, the copper industry made another significant administrative change by moving their head offices from London to Northern Rhodesia. RST moved to Lusaka in 1951, and RAA relocated to Kitwe on the Copperbelt in 1953. They left the City which had long been losing much of its importance as the heart of global finance.⁶² White politicians in Southern Rhodesia wanted to benefit from the prosperous copper mining industry in the north, and renewed their efforts aimed at amalgamating the three central African territories.⁶³ Britain was in favour of Federation as it also feared Afrikaner expansion northwards following the Nationalist Party victory in the 1948 election. After much debate, both for and against, the Central African Federation, the project came into being in August 1953. With this new political dispensation coming on the scene, the discussion on copper mining ends here. Aside from that, the bulk-buying scheme of copper initiated by Britain at the onset of hostilities came to an end in April 1953, and the LME was re-opened.

5.4. Obstacles to Copper Production

The industry, however, was faced with a number of problems which threatened the supply of copper to the Allies. Among these were work stoppage, shortage of mine supplies, and heavy taxation. The next section discusses these issues in detail.

5.4.1. Miners' Strike

⁶¹ See, for example, D.O. Spence *Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922-67* (Manchester, 2015), 114-5, 137-141, 249-250; M. Collins, 'Decolonisation and the "Federal Moment"', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 24 (2013), 21-40; N.J. Westcott, 'Closer Union and the future of East Africa, 1939-1948: A case study in the 'official mind of imperialism', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 10, 1 (1981), 67-88; and J. Parker, 'Remapping the Cold War in the Tropics: Race, Communism, and National Security in the West Indies', *International History Review*, 24, 2 (2002), 318-347.

⁶² Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesia Copper Industry', 14.

⁶³ See, for example, Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 397-439; Prain, *Reflections*, 95-133; Gregory, *Ernest Oppenheimer*, 462-3; and especially chapters 5 and 6 in Butler, *Copper Empire*. For more specialised discussion, see H. Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation* (London, 1963).

In spite of the status of copper in the Allied war effort, appeals for industrial harmony, and the promulgation of Emergency Regulations prohibiting work stoppages during the war, a strike took place on the Copperbelt in March 1940. On 17 March, about 2000 European miners went on strike at Mufulira and Nkana mines. A few days later, African mine workers followed suit. That the strike occurred six months into the Second World War was not a coincidence or purely the product of worker militancy against the colour bar as we have been made to think by some historians.⁶⁴ It is argued here that it was rather developments of an economic nature specific to war-time copper production which provided critical pre-conditions for the strike's occurrence. These developments which included a labour shortage, inflation, high cost of living and stagnant copper prices, prompted an already adamant Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines to resist any improvements in the rates of wages for miners. Mine managements argued that they did not make profits as the metal was virtually being bought by the Ministry of Supply at a fixed price. Arguing that they were losing much of their profits through taxation, the companies instead asked the Colonial Office to clarify the situation with the MWU. Even more remarkable was the fact that the Governor, too, appeared to be ignorant of the Ministry's arrangements. It is argued here that at the fixed price of £62 per tonne offered a substantial profit to the mining companies because net profits averaged seven pounds and 10 shillings per tonne.⁶⁵ The Rhokana Corporation's profits, for example, had gone up from £615,000 in 1933 to £2,388,000 in 1939.⁶⁶

Another vexing economic problem facing miners was the rising cost of living due to war conditions. This issue was raised with the various mine managements by the miners' union

⁶⁴ See I. Henderson, 'Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Africa: the Zambian Case', *Journal of African History*, 11, 4 (1970), 591-603; *ibid*, 'Wage Earners and Political Protest', *African Affairs*, 72, 288 (1973), 288-299; *ibid*, 'Early African Leadership: the Copperbelt Disturbances of 1935 and 1940', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 2, 1 (1975), 83-97; M.R. Mwendapole, *A History of the Trade Union Movement in Zambia up to 1968* (Lusaka, 1977); and H.S. Meebelo, *African Proletarians and Colonial Capitalism: the Origins, Growth and Struggle of the Zambian Labour Movement to 1964* (Lusaka, 1986).

⁶⁵ Coleman, *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt*, 144.

⁶⁶ NAZ ZP12/1, Evidence, Forster Commission of Inquiry, 574.

in January 1940. At that time, the European miners' union noted that living costs on the mines had increased by 8½ per cent at Mufulira, 12 per cent at Nkana and 13½ per cent at Nchanga between September 1939 and January 1940.⁶⁷ For their part, mine managements regarded as unfair that the MWU expected the companies to bear the total increases in the standard of living for their employees. They argued that they could not increase miners' wages because the shareholders of the companies were also making a great sacrifice by selling copper to the Ministry of Supply at a low price.⁶⁸ Warnings about a possible strike by miners were made early on in the war, but no action was taken by the companies whose prime objective was to maximise profits. An official of RAA in Johannesburg, C. Wilson, who visited Broken Hill in December 1939, found that the rise in living costs was already noticeable at that date. In this regard, Wilson counselled his group's London offices to prepare for a pay increment for miners in order to avoid "unpleasantness" in the future. He reported that:

[i]t appeared ... almost inevitable that in due course there will be an agitation among employees for some additional pay to offset the increase in the cost of living ... In view of the likelihood of it doing so it appears desirable at this stage to make up our minds whether we are prepared to do anything in the way of granting bonuses or increased pay and, if so, how far we should go in this direction.⁶⁹

While no strike took place at the zinc and lead mine owned by RAA at Broken Hill, conditions there were no different from what existed on the Copperbelt in early 1940.

Wartime shortages of skilled European labour strengthened the hand of the MWU. The miners felt the time was ripe for action on pay. Expecting a post-war slump, and fearing that

⁶⁷ MIA 18.4.2A, Notes of the Proceedings at a Meeting between Managers and Representatives of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union held at Nkana on Friday, 26 January 1940 at 3:15PM.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid, C. Wilson, Rhodesia Anglo America of South Africa Ltd (Johannesburg) to Managing Director, Rhokana Corporation Ltd (London), 27 December 1939.

their chance would vanish along with rising unemployment, they believed that they could not delay taking action.⁷⁰ This was at a time when, because of wartime mobilization, European labour was scarce. Due to recruitment for the army, there was a general shortage of skilled European labour available. Moreover, added to the existing sources of resentment among the European workforce was discontent over the barring of some of them from leaving their positions on the mines for the war front due to war Emergency Regulations.⁷¹ This scenario enhanced the MWU's bargaining stance. European miners, many of them young men from the Rand, argued that the time of war was the best to fight for their pay as they were convinced that they would lose that chance if they waited for the expected days of peace, slump and unemployment.⁷² At the beginning of March, therefore, miners at Mufulira formed a Committee of Action to negotiate on their behalf owing to their loss of confidence in their union. This committee called for an immediate pay rise, improved overtime payments and housing, and that the government investigates silicosis.⁷³ As no fruitful answer came out of an ultimatum given to the mine management at Mufulira, the workers refused to go to work on 17 March. The strike spread to Nkana mine, but not Luanshya's Roan Antelope. The strike came to an end on 27 March when managements awarded miners an increase of five per cent of their basic wages, and other demands.⁷⁴

The African strike which began on 28 March was a result of the European strike which ended the day before. It started at Nkana and, like the European strike, also spread to Mufulira, but not Luanshya. This reasoning is strengthened by the fact that at Luanshya, where the

⁷⁰ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 70; Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 11; Prain, *Reflections*, 79; and Coleman, *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt*, 146.

⁷¹ NAZ SEC1/1728 Vol. X., Report of a Meeting between His Excellency the Governor, the Mine Managements (Nkana, Roan-Antelope, Mufulira and Nchanga) and Deputations of Employees from each of the Mines, held at Nkana on Thursday 7 September 1939 on the Subject of Recruiting for Active Service; *ibid*, Speech Broadcast by His Excellency the Governor from Nkana Station on Friday 2 February 1940 at 6:30 PM; Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 336; and Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 99.

⁷² Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 336.

⁷³ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 70; and Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 336.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, *Copper Empire*.

Europeans took no part in the strike, Africans took no part in the strike, too. This was in spite of the fact that wages and conditions of service at Luanshya differed in no significant way from those of the other workers at Nkana and Mufulira.⁷⁵ There are two plausible explanations for this. First, Roan comparatively enjoyed better relations with its rank and file than the other mines on the Copperbelt in the early stages of the war.⁷⁶ Another explanation could be that memories of the bloody occurrences of the 1935 strike⁷⁷ at Roan Antelope, in which six African miners were killed by military personnel, were too fresh for the miners there to contemplate undertaking another strike.

African miners were aware that the European strike had occurred to secure a pay increase to meet the rising cost of living. They saw before them that the demands of the organised European workers had been met and, therefore, they became more insistent in their own demands.⁷⁸ They argued that if by strike action European miners had attained their objectives, a strike was appropriate and, indeed, the inevitable course for obtaining similar benefits for themselves.⁷⁹ Pointing to the example of the successful European strike, one African witness put it to the John Forster Commission set up to investigate the causes of the strike that:

[a] father ... had two children. They were hungry and to one food was given, while the other was let without. The one given food went to his brother and said: "My father has fed me because I refused to work for him". Then the other said: "If I do as my brother has done, my father will feed me".⁸⁰

⁷⁵ NRG, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances on the Copperbelt* (hereafter, *Forster Commission*), (Lusaka, 1940), 25.

⁷⁶ Phillips, 'Roan Antelope', 258.

⁷⁷ See H.S. Meebelo, *Reaction to Colonialism: a Prelude to the Politics of Independence in Northern Zambia* (Manchester, 1971).

⁷⁸ Gann, 'The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry', 11.

⁷⁹ *Forster Commission*, 25.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 26.

The grievance over disparities in the conditions of service between the two racial groups on the mines was stated in anonymous notices put up by African miners calling on their colleagues to emulate the European strike. Two of these notices stuck in the Nkana compound were written under the pseudonyms “I don’t Know” and “Katwishi”. The latter was an expression in the Bemba language meaning the same thing as the former. “I don’t know”, for example, after drawing the attention of his fellow workers to the fact that ‘the Europeans left their work for the sake of an increase in pay’, told them that if the white miners were going to win wage increases as a result of their strike ‘then we should work for one week and if we too do not receive an increase in pay then, so be it, let us leave work’.⁸¹ “Katwishi” wanted the strike to be total: ‘I entreat you strongly my friends that we should not differ about leaving work and that we should come to an understanding with each other so that the thing should be done’.⁸²

There were several other grievances apart from low wages which African miners brought out during the strike. Among these were housing, rations, overtime allowances, firewood and welfare matters.⁸³ The Forster Commission was taken aback by the extent of African mine workers’ grievances as similar issues had been raised five years earlier. It became clear that not much improvement had taken place with regard to the welfare of African mine workers. The commission also found that in the years immediately preceding the war, conditions for mine workers had actually been allowed to deteriorate. An example of this was the overcrowding noted at the Nkana and Kitwe mine compounds.⁸⁴ The commission, however, considered that Africans were not yet ready for trade unionism and that the system of tribal elders should continue being utilised. This reasoning was based on racial assumptions aimed at limiting representation of African workers.

⁸¹ Cited in Meebelo, *African Proletarians*, 107.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Forster Commission*, 30-37.

⁸⁴ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 72; and *Forster Commission*, 32.

The strike on the Copperbelt was not unique to Northern Rhodesia. Wartime inflation was the main causal factor.⁸⁵ As demonstrated in Chapter Four, war conditions had contributed to a rise in the cost of living in the colony. There were similar strikes, walk-outs, demonstrations, and marches elsewhere in wartime Africa. For instance, railway workers went on strike in Nigeria in support of a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) in 1941-42. So did their colleagues in the Gold Coast who went on a work stoppage in 1941 for the implementation of a similar allowance promised them in 1939. Other strikes were recorded in the mines of the Katanga in 1941, and workers at the port of Dar-es-Salaam demonstrated in 1943. Kenya, in particular, experienced a great deal of unrest during the war, as there were massive strikes by railway workers in Mombasa and Nairobi in both 1942 and 1944.⁸⁶

African miners resented the rise in the cost of living as much as Europeans did. As early as February 1940, Stewart Gore-Browne, the member representing African interests in the Legislative Council, had warned London that the cost of living question could cause problems in the territory.⁸⁷ His advice was not heeded. The acting Labour Commissioner made a similar observation. When he appeared before the Forster Commission, he stated that:

I estimated that at least a third of all native earnings on the Copperbelt were spent on such things as clothes, pots and pans and said that I had been informed by Mr Glennie [acting Provincial Commissioner] that the increased cost of such articles since the commencement of the war was in the neighbourhood of 25 per cent. This being so, I suggested that the increase should be 25 per cent on one-third of the average earnings, that is, 2s 6d per completed ticket.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ T. Oberst, 'Transport Workers, Strikes and the "Imperial Response": Africa and the Post-World War II Conjuncture', *African Studies Review*, 31, 1 (1988), 119.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 69.

⁸⁸ *Forster Commission*, 14.

While the cost of living had gone up, the basic minimum wages for African miners were in 1940 actually lower than they were during the serious development of the Copperbelt in the 1920s. The reason given by the representatives of the mine owners was that in the development days of the Copperbelt in the 1920s, labour was more difficult to obtain than during the war hence they paid higher wages to attract them. During the Depression, African wages had been cut, and despite the rise in living costs, and the fact that the mining companies were now making sizeable profits, these cuts had not been restored.⁸⁹ As a result of the wide unemployment and increase in labour supply for the mines in the early 1930s, African monthly wage rates had been cut back. They were reduced from 17 shillings six pence in 1929 to 12 shillings and six pence for surface workers and from 30 shillings to 22 shillings and six pence for underground workers in 1940.⁹⁰ These wages were equal to annual rates for Africans of about £10 16s for surface workers and £18 18s for underground, while Europeans earned an average £506.⁹¹

In addition, urbanised Africans had by the outbreak of the war developed new needs on which extra money was spent than at the time of the mines' development. A witness before the Forster Commission, the Reverend Frank Bedford, noted that the needs of Africans had changed over time. He said:

... soap, clothing, furniture, better schools, books, things which were luxuries are now becoming necessities ... certain commodities commonly purchased by the African have increased in cost by 40 per cent to 50 per cent ... on the other hand, wages have not increased in the same proportion as the rise in the standard (*sic*) of living.⁹²

⁸⁹ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 70.

⁹⁰ NAZ ZP12/1, Evidence, Forster Commission, 559; and Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, 203.

⁹¹ Colonial Office, *Commission of Inquiry into the Economic and Financial Position of Northern Rhodesia* (hereafter *Pim Report*), (London, 1938), 51-54.

⁹² NAZ ZP12/1, Frank Bedford, Evidence, Forster Commission, 499-500.

African miners also disliked the wide disparity between their pay and the Europeans, arguing that they could actually perform some of the jobs done by their European supervisors. They detested the colour bar, and the racial assumptions upon which it was based.⁹³ Not unexpectedly, therefore, the low level of wages paid to African miners, and the great disparity between their own wages and those of white workers represented the most basic and strongest grievance for all categories of African mineworkers. This point was stressed by many witnesses that gave evidence to the Forster Commission when certain suggestions were made that the demands for more pay came from the category of clerks and other more advanced African miners.⁹⁴ The strike ended on 3 April following the killing of 17 miners and wounding of 65 of their colleagues at Nkana by soldiers who had been called in to keep law and order. They were awarded an increase of two shillings and six pence each per month.⁹⁵

5.4.2. Mine Supplies

Wartime production of minerals was hampered by the shortage of vital supplies and modern machinery to replace obsolete and worn-out equipment. Some of the most important items in short supply were repair parts for ball mills, shell plates, crushers, rock drills and locomotives, reagents, graphite electrodes, coach screws, rivets, bolts, nuts, and smelter bricks.⁹⁶ The global shortage of these items affected maintenance schedules, and consequently, levels of production on the mines. In 1945, the general manager of Rhokana Corporation reported that:

⁹³ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 71-2. Although the colour bar was officially implemented in 1941, racist tendencies on the mines were as old as the mines themselves.

⁹⁴ NAZ ZP12/1, Evidence, Forster Commission, 4.

⁹⁵ *Forster Commission*, 30, 51-52; and Meebelo, *African Proletarians*, 133. Primarily due to this strike, the first African miners' trade union was registered in 1947.

⁹⁶ MIA 18.4.2A, Rhokana Corporation (Kitwe) to Rhokana Corporation (London), 20 November 1942. On the same file, see Memorandum of a Meeting which took place at the Ministry of Supply, Bush House, London on Tuesday 15 December 1942; *ibid*, Memorandum of a Meeting which took place at the Offices of Rhokana Corporation Limited on Tuesday 24 November 1942 at 11:15AM; and *ibid*, Anglo America Corporation (Johannesburg) to Rhokana (London), 4 February 1943.

[b]y the end of 1940 ... the general deterioration of plant, particularly the crush plant, had become so serious that it was necessary to reduce production to permit some headway to be made with maintenance and repair work. The production rate was accordingly reduced to an average of 8,100 short tons per month during 1941, including approximately 1,200 short tons from Nchanga.⁹⁷

This state of affairs had arisen due to the British government's decision to ban the export of machinery in order to preserve it for local consumption. A similar policy was adopted by the USA in 1942.

Industry officials, however, engaged with the colonial government to intervene in the supply debacle and apply for stocks under Lend-Lease. Unlike in peace-time when mining companies put out enquiries to different firms and selected the most suitable quotation on their own, they could no longer do so under war conditions. Supplies could only be obtained under Lend-Lease arrangements entered into between the US government and the receiving government in line with the principles of economic warfare. But once purchased, merchants at Ndola were utilised by the government as distributors.⁹⁸ Bulk orders for the mines were placed by the government of Northern Rhodesia with the British Colonial Supply Mission (BCSM) in Washington D.C. through the United States' War Production Board (WPB) at unspecified prices.⁹⁹ The supplies were consigned to the Governor and delivered to particular mining companies which needed them. Under Lend-Lease arrangements, no commission was paid to merchants, who previously received it from their principals. This was to ensure that the mining

⁹⁷ Cited in Gregory, *Ernest Oppenheimer*, 453.

⁹⁸ MIA 18.4.2A, Record of Decisions reached at a Meeting held at Kitwe on Tuesday 29 September 1942 at 9:30AM to discuss Matters of Supplies; and *ibid*, Notes of a Meeting which was held at 11:30AM on Friday 11 June 1943 at the Colonial Office, Dover House, Whitehall, London. See also *ibid*, A.D. Storke, Chamber of Mines (Kitwe) to R.L. Prain (London), 29 September 1942; and *ibid*, A.D. Storke, Chamber of Mines (Kitwe) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 29 September 1942.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, Rhokana Corporation (London) to Rhokana Anglo America (Kitwe), 20 July 1943; and *ibid*, Notes of a Meeting which was held at 11:30AM on Friday 11 June 1943 at the Colonial Office, Dover House, Whitehall, London.

companies paid fair prices for their supplies.¹⁰⁰ This policy guaranteed reduced costs of production for the mines so that there was no ripple effect on the price paid for metals bought by the Ministry of Supply.

Through Lend-Lease, the mines were able to obtain regular supplies of unmanufactured and semi-manufactured iron and steel; non-ferrous metals, ingots or their semi-manufactured forms; finished non-ferrous products, including copper starting sheet blanks, bare copper wire, and insulated copper wire. Others were ball and roller bearings, graphite electrodes, machine tools, cutting tools and other small tools, hand tools, magnesite bricks, chemical reagents, and Canadian timber.¹⁰¹ Effective from January 1943 shipping space for transporting bulk supplies was guaranteed by the British Ministry of War Transport. To ensure this measure was carried out smoothly, mining companies were requested by the Governor to estimate their annual shipping space for all requirements from the US and Britain.¹⁰² With all this support from the metropole, the mines were warned to ‘take every reasonable precaution to ensure that production shall not be affected by a shortage of supplies’.¹⁰³

In the post-war era, the mines still faced supply challenges. This time around supplies in the most critical bracket were steel mill products such as bars, sheets, plates, structured shapes, pipe, and nails.¹⁰⁴ The shortage was ascribed to the rearmament programme and reconstruction in Europe and America. The situation arose at a time the mines such as Nchanga was undergoing extension programmes requiring a lot of steel supplies. The main supplier of steel during this period was the US. The procurement of mine supplies from that country,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, Notes of a Meeting which was held at 11:30AM on Friday 11 June 1943 at the Colonial Office, Dover House, Whitehall, London.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid, Rhokana Corporation Limited (London) to Rhodesia Anglo America (Johannesburg), 26 October 1942; and *ibid*, Rhodesia Anglo America (Johannesburg) to Rhokana Corporation Limited (London), 21 December 1942.

¹⁰³ Ibid, A.M. Baer, Non-Ferrous Metals Control, Ministry of Supply (London) to R.L. Prain, Roan Antelope Copper Mines Limited (London), 9 March 1943.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, Assistant Manager, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mining (Chingola) to The Secretary, Anglo America Corporation (London), 26 January 1951.

however, was complicated by the necessity of having to pay for them with US dollars which were scarce.¹⁰⁵ Naturally, the British government was behind the mines and ensured that the supply of dollars was fully met. To this end, the Colonial Office granted the copper mining companies' full requirements of US\$1,813,000 in 1951 and further guaranteed US\$2,500,000 for 1952.¹⁰⁶

Moreover, to alleviate supply problems the US government created the National Production Authority under the Defence Production Act of 1950. The Department of the Interior was made claimant agency for all mines and concentration plants, and for smelters and refineries of non-ferrous metals. It was given powers to allocate and issue directions for the use of mining machinery and equipment used in American and foreign facilities.¹⁰⁷ An extension of priority to their suppliers for maintenance, repair and operating supplies to the extent of a dollar quota per quarter for various materials other than steel, aluminium and copper was made to Northern Rhodesian mines.¹⁰⁸ The latter were allocated under the Controlled Materials Plan. In this way, mines such as Roan and Nchanga were able to obtain high priority ratings for the purchase and shipment of needed mining supplies for their expansion activities.

5.4.3. Taxation

The imposition of a ruthless Export Profit Tax (EPT) in 1941 on the orders of London stifled re-investment and improvements in the mining industry.¹⁰⁹ Under existing tax laws, a company whose control and management was based in Britain, but operated wholly abroad, or operated partly in Britain and partly abroad, paid full British taxes on all its profits wherever

¹⁰⁵ MIA 16.2.3E, Memo on Copper Production, 12 September 1941; MIA 16.2.2D, RACM Minutes of Meeting held on 5 May 1942; MIA 16.2.2E RACM Executive Minutes of meeting held on 21 April 1942; and MIA 18.4.2A, Assistant Manager, Anglo America Corporation (Johannesburg) to The Secretary (Rhokana Anglo America Limited (Kitwe), 22 April 1951.

¹⁰⁶ MIA 18.4.2A, Notes of a Meeting with the Acting Director of Trade, Transport and Industry and the Controller of Customs held at Kitwe on 18 February 1952 at 7:30PM.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, American Metal Company Limited (New York) to Rhokana Corporation (Kitwe), 10 January 1951.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, American Metal Company Limited (New York) to Rhodesia Anglo America (Kitwe), 27 June 1951.

¹⁰⁹ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 148.

they were earned.¹¹⁰ As both RAA and RST were domiciled in the City of London, the British Exchequer received 60 per cent of the excess profits made by their Northern Rhodesian subsidiaries under this arrangement. The balance of the profits was taxed at a net rate of four shillings and three pence in the pound. The government of Northern Rhodesia, on the other hand, taxed the total profits at four shillings and three pence in the pound.¹¹¹ The rationale for the introduction of EPT was clearly to fund the British war effort. This was explicitly stated in debates in the House of Commons, thus:

... this heavy taxation collected by the UK from the mineral enterprises in Northern Rhodesia and elsewhere is all being spent for the united war effort ... It is a terrific tax at its present rate and with its present incidence, it comes from the wealth created by the Almighty in those overseas countries ...¹¹²

Stakeholders in the industry were opposed to the drastic rise in tax expenditures, which they regarded 'a far more formidable problem',¹¹³ with Ronald Prain, Chairman of the RST group, referring to it as 'punitive taxation'.¹¹⁴

Whereas in 1937-8 the three main copper producing mines of Nkana, Roan Antelope and Mufulira paid an average of 17 per cent of their operating surpluses at tax, this figure had risen to 67 per cent in 1941.¹¹⁵ This in turn impacted negatively on the mines' development and expansion programmes and importantly, the rates of dividends paid to shareholders. One of the hardest-hit mines in the RST group was Mufulira.¹¹⁶ The accounts of Mufulira Copper Mines, the youngest of Northern Rhodesia's mines clearly showed that the weight of the EPT burden was the sole cause of the reduction in dividends declared to shareholders. At its 18th

¹¹⁰ *The Star*, 25 June 1952.

¹¹¹ NAZ SEC1/704, Commissioner of Income Tax (Ndola) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 25 January 1941. See also *Financial Times*, 21 November 1941.

¹¹² *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 24 May 1945.

¹¹³ *South African Mining Journal*, 13 January 1940, 611; and Phillips, 'Roan Antelope', 252.

¹¹⁴ Prain, *Reflections*, 100. See also Butler, *Copper Empire*, 149-150.

¹¹⁵ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 148; and Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Minerals', 395.

¹¹⁶ Roberts, 'Notes towards a Financial History', 354.

annual ordinary meeting in December 1940, directors of Rhokana Corporation expressed unhappiness with the implementation of EPT which had reduced the company's gross dividend from £217,149 the previous year to £177,668.¹¹⁷ Consequently, company directors recommended a reduction in the final dividend distributable to shareholders from 25 per cent to 15 per cent.¹¹⁸ Rhokana's taxation provision at £1,060,000 was actually £601,000 higher than the previous financial year. This new tax provision left the net distributable earnings, notwithstanding the larger operations, slightly lower at £548,254 against £582,431.¹¹⁹ The reduction in the Mufulira dividend involved a decline from £422,082 to £343,328 in the profit of the controlling company, RST, for the quarter ending 30 September 1940. Consequently, RST's dividend was lowered from 16⅔ per cent to 13⅓ per cent.¹²⁰

Concern over EPT came to pre-occupy the main stakeholders in the mining industry during this period. Between 1941 and 1947, a net total of £7,092,483 was paid to the British Treasury by RAA and RST mines as EPT.¹²¹ Opposition to EPT came from various stakeholders when they gave evidence to the Royal Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income in June 1952. One of these was the Council of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The council's main argument was that heavy taxation of the mining companies discouraged investments in stocks on the LSE. Those against EPT felt that mining companies should be treated no differently than other firms with domiciles outside Britain but with British shareholders. Companies trading and controlled abroad only paid British taxes on that portion of profits which was remitted to shareholders in the United Kingdom. The rest of the profits were taxed at local rates, which were generally lower than in Britain.¹²² The tax burden on the

¹¹⁷ *Financial Times*, 5 December 1940.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *The Times*, 1 November 1940.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ NAZ SEC1/704, Commissioner of Income Tax (Ndola) to Financial Secretary (Lusaka), 16 February 1948.

¹²² *The Star*, 25 June 1952.

mining companies, referred to by Butler as ‘a general centrifugal influence’¹²³ came to be the overriding reason for their transfer of head offices from the City to Northern Rhodesia after 1950.

The liability placed on the copper mines in wartime was not restricted to EPT, however. The Northern Rhodesian government also became dependent on the mines for revenue to run its administration. For example, the government added to the burden of taxation with its request that the mines pay early a portion of the estimated income tax for the 1941 financial year to ease its cash flow deficit. This practice originated from the period of Depression when colonial state coffers dwindled.¹²⁴ As a result, Roan Antelope Copper Mines Limited paid £500,000 to the Treasury in 1940. Of this, £200,000 was an advance against income tax, and £300,000 was an interest-free loan.¹²⁵ The colonial government’s reliance on the mines as a source of revenue continued into the post-war period. With high receipts from copper sales, income tax paid by the mines to the colonial Treasury rose from 28 per cent in 1947 to a high of 57.5 per cent in 1952 as shown in Table 5.2.

The British government, however, did provide some relief to the mines for fear that they might not fulfil the contracts entered into with the Ministry of Supply regarding existing plant capacity. Nchanga mine obtained the most significant assistance with a loan of £750,000 to cover half the cost of its expansion programme in 1943.¹²⁶ Aside from this, the amounts granted were minute, such as £7,500 given to Roan mine to pay for the partial cost of 52 temporary houses for European miners.¹²⁷

Table 5.2 Income Tax Paid by Mining Companies, 1947-1953

¹²³ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 202. See also the relevant sections in Prain, *Reflections*; and Gregory, *Ernest Oppenheimer*.

¹²⁴ Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 8.

¹²⁵ *The Scotsman*, 28 October 1940; *The Economist*, 2 November 1940; and *City Press*, 2 November 1940; and MIA 16.2.2D, Roan Antelope Copper Mine, Minutes of Meeting held on 4 July 1941.

¹²⁶ Butler, *Copper Empire*, 66; Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*, 54; and Gann, ‘The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry’, 10.

¹²⁷ Phillips, ‘Roan Antelope’, 255.

Year	Total Revenues (£)	Income Tax paid by Copper Companies (£)	Percentage of Revenue
1947	4,292,711	1,189,918	27.7
1948	6,318,677	2,841,900	44.9
1949	9,895,885	5,009,555	50.6
1950	11,889,033	5,699,329	47.9
1951	15,836,186	7,594,005	48.0
1952	26,064,540	14,987,615	57.5
1953	30,340,709	16,770,911	55.3

Source: E.L. Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule: the Copperbelt to Independence* (Oxford, 1974), 8.

5.5. The Agricultural Sector

In turn, mining was linked to the agricultural sector because miners had to be fed in order to keep production going and prevent industrial action. The size of the African labour force employed in the copper mines rose from 7,200 in 1933 to 24,000 in 1939 and reached 36,000 in 1943.¹²⁸ Added to this was the general increase of the African population on the Copperbelt due to social changes taking place in urban areas. More and more Africans adopted urban areas as their homes for long periods. These population dynamics led to the growth of bustling towns such as Kitwe, Luanshya, Chingola and Mufulira at each of the mines.¹²⁹ During this period, however, the territory witnessed a decline in food production owing to a number of factors. Farmers were hard hit by a drought in 1942, scarce supplies of chemical fertilisers, and a general lack of labour due to war conditions.¹³⁰ In addition, as demonstrated in chapter

¹²⁸ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 236; Dumett, 'Africa's Strategic Minerals', 394; and Butler, *Copper Empire*, 69. An exaggerated figure of 200,000 miners is given by Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation*, 62.

¹²⁹ W.J. Busschau, *Report on the Development of Secondary Industries in Northern Rhodesia* (Lusaka, 1945), 22. See also Berger, *Labour, Race and Colonial Rule*.

¹³⁰ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 331. For a fuller discussion, see especially chapter VII in B.S. Siamwiza, 'A History of Famine in Zambia, c. 1825-1949', PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998.

III, war conditions led to a shortage of farming implements which in turn negatively affected the capacity of peasants to produce food for the market.

This situation forced the country to import much of its maize requirements throughout the war years and continued to do so until 1954.¹³¹ In 1941, the Department of Agriculture noted that:

[t]he season was one of the most difficult and disastrous yet recorded. Planting was delayed and reduced in extent by alternating periods of deluge and drought.

The cessation of effective rain in early February caused much of the unavoidable late planted crop to come to little or nothing.¹³²

While production had declined, the rate of food consumption had increased especially on the Copperbelt and other urban centres in the line of rail provinces. It was estimated that these urbanised areas alone consumed about 430,000 bags of maize per year as against 200,000.¹³³ As consumption increased, there was the fear that it would be difficult even in favourable seasons to meet the demand for food from local supplies. In 1942, maize meal rations for miners were reduced by as much as a quarter. The government in turn praised the miners for accepting this reduction which it viewed as a necessary corollary sacrifice under war conditions. When he addressed the Legislative Council on this subject, Governor John Waddington stated that:

[d]uring recent months, our food position has caused me considerable anxiety and I regret very much that the reduction in maize rations that was effected a few months ago is still in force. This cut on rations has imposed a considerable hardship on African consumers and I wish to express my appreciation of their

¹³¹ R.E. Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960* (Berkeley, 1966), 155.

¹³² NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for the Year 1941* (Lusaka, 1942), 1.

¹³³ *Ibid.* For a discussion on increased consumption levels of fish on the Copperbelt during the war, see for example, J. Chilonge, 'Poverty in the Midst of Abundance: the Case of Fishermen of Samfya District, 1935-1970, MA Dissertation, University of Zambia, especially chapter II.

most helpful attitude in treating the matter as one of the sacrifices to war conditions which has to be cheerfully endured.¹³⁴

This state of affairs needed to be addressed urgently. Table 5.3 shows the quantities of maize sold on the line of rail during the war period.

Table 5.3 Maize Sales on the Line-of-Rail Provinces, 1941-1944

Year	European Grown	African Grown	Total
1941	120,000	38,000	158,000
1942	146,000	51,000	197,000
1943	144,000	60,000	204,000
1944	212,000	115,000	327,000
1945	273,000	202,000	475,000

Source: NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for 1944* (Lusaka, 1945), 5; and *ibid*, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for the Year 1958* (Lusaka, 1959), 8.

Inadequate local production of maize during the war brought about metropolitan intervention to ensure adequate food supplies. The imperial government was concerned about the colony's food security which impinged on industrial harmony in the mines. Labour unrest on the mines could disrupt production of vital base metals. Additionally, as demonstrated above, there were immense financial benefits which Britain derived from a thriving Northern Rhodesian mining industry.

London was keen on ensuring that nothing disrupted the colony's copper production and stepped in to scour Africa for possible sources of supply.¹³⁵ Emergency imports were sought from neighbouring territories, although none were available. There was no surplus in nearby South Africa, and the entire crop of the Belgian Congo had already been bought by the governments of the two Rhodesias in 1942.¹³⁶ It was then that the British Ministry of Food agreed to release stocks from other parts in Africa where a surplus existed. In view of the urgent need, the Ministry of Food provided 10,000 tonnes of maize from its Middle-East quota.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ NRG, *Legislative Council Debates*, 28 November 1940.

¹³⁵ Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War*, 235.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*.

Britain further helped in the acquisition of 33,600 bags of maize from Argentina in March 1943; 5,600 bags from Southern Rhodesia's purchases in the Belgian Congo, and 5,000 bags of potatoes from South Africa.¹³⁸ In April another purchase of 6,720 bags of maize from Angola was made after Britain agreed to sell 1,000 tyres to the Portuguese government in exchange.¹³⁹

While maize remained the most important crop for feeding African miners, it was by no means the only one consumed. As part of the war effort, the government promoted the cultivation and consumption of cassava as a substitute crop. This crop was widely grown in the Northern, Kaonde-Lunda and Luapula provinces. In 1942 the government even utilized trucks from Southern Rhodesia and also diverted vehicles of the Department of Public Works to transport cassava from the major producing areas to the Copperbelt in order to avert starvation.¹⁴⁰ The production of sorghum was also revived because, for the first time, the crop began to be purchased by government agricultural marketing agencies.¹⁴¹ But these measures proved inadequate to solve the food situation in the country. It was in this regard that the government resorted to labour conscription for European settler farmers.

5.6. Forced Labour for Agriculture

Forced labour for the military was an accepted practice in wartime as manpower was required for direct war work. Although compelling labour to work during emergencies was a common and accepted practice in British colonies, large scale conscription for civil production in wartime, especially for private enterprise, was a new departure in policy.¹⁴² Some officials

¹³⁸ A. Kanduzi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Northern Rhodesia, 1918-1960: a Case of Customs Tariffs and Railway Freight Policies* (Lanham, 1986), 169.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation*, 62. See also C.M. Chabatama, 'Peasant Farming, the State and Food Security in North-Western Province of Zambia, 1902-1964', PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1999.

¹⁴¹ NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for the Year 1944* (Lusaka, 1945), 2; and Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation*, 62. See also Chabatama, 'Peasant Farming, the State and Food Security'.

¹⁴² D. Killingray, 'Labour Mobilisation in British Colonial Africa for the War Effort, 1939-46', in Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 82-3.

in Whitehall argued that if conscripted labour for the army was an accepted practice in Britain, it could equally be utilised in the colonies fighting the war against Nazism. For example, before compulsory service regulations were introduced in Tanganyika in July 1940 and in October the same year in Kenya, quotas of recruits for the army had been imposed on areas by District Commissioners.¹⁴³ As civil conscription for the military was already being used in East Africa, a precedent had been set in raising labour for essential services that could be followed by other colonies. In Tanganyika, about 84,500 people were forced to work on estates, producing sisal, rubber, pyrethrum, and other agricultural products.¹⁴⁴

The British government insisted that it abhorred forced labour, but in reality practised it in its colonies. Although words like “recruitment” were carefully employed by colonial authorities, Africans in Southern Rhodesia used the word *chibaro* – meaning slave in local languages – to refer to recruited labourers.¹⁴⁵ During the war, about 15,000 such men were recruited to work on the construction of aerodromes for the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) in Southern Rhodesia. But the most deplorable form of forced labour in wartime Africa took place on the tin mines of Jos in Nigeria where thousands of labourers died due to poor sanitation and working conditions.¹⁴⁶ That Britain used forced labour in wartime showed that she played double standards. In peacetime and at the beginning of the war, Britain had denounced French policies of conscripting soldiers in her West African colonies, under both Vichy and Gaullist regimes.¹⁴⁷ In trying to win African support at the start of the war as demonstrated in Chapter II, Britain even used propaganda to denounce Germany as a violent country but found itself using similar policies as the war progressed.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, 84-6.

¹⁴⁴ K. Jeffery, ‘The Second World War’, in Judith Brown and Wm. Roger-Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire vol. IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1999), 312.

¹⁴⁵ C. van Onselen, *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933* (London, 1976), 99.

¹⁴⁶ See W.M. Freund, ‘Labour Migration to the Northern Nigerian Tin Mines, 1903-1945’, *Journal of African History*, 22, 1 (1981), 73-84; and B.W. Hodder, ‘Tin Mining on the Jos Plateau of Nigeria’, *Economic Geography*, XXXV, II (1959), 109-122.

¹⁴⁷ Killingray, ‘Labour Mobilisation’, 70.

The League of Nations issued its “Slavery Convention” in 1926, reminding colonial powers to stop the slave trade and slavery, while asking the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to investigate the best means of preventing compulsory labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery. The League’s convention of 1930 strongly condemned forced labour for private purposes and created elaborate regulations for compulsory public works labour, arguing that it should be phased out.¹⁴⁸ Britain was a signatory to this pact. The convention, however, left a loophole in that colonial powers were permitted to forcibly recruit manpower in time of emergency, including war.¹⁴⁹ The introduction of forced labour in wartime Africa was similar to desperate policies adopted by Britain elsewhere in Empire in order to win the war at any cost. In India, for example, wartime Imperial policies perpetuated famine conditions in the state of Bengal in which about three million local people died.¹⁵⁰

Although the Colonial Office was unhappy about the use of forced labour on privately owned European farms, it was reluctant to stop the practice for fear of antagonising white farmers in a country where white mine workers, another important constituency, were already hostile to the state. It is argued here that the colonial state wanted to balance the conflicting interests of the various sections of capital without endangering its own interests or upsetting the social unity necessary for the accumulation of profits. In an attempt to increase maize production, the Colonial Office agreed to compulsory labour being used to prepare land for a two-month period starting on 21 February 1942. The War Cabinet in agreeing to an increase in the number of agricultural conscripts emphasised the great importance attached to the limitation of profit where the use of conscripted labour was allowed for private employment.¹⁵¹ This, however, does not mean that was the first time forced labour was used in Northern

¹⁴⁸ International Labour Organisation (ILO), *Report and Questionnaire on Forced Labour* (Geneva, 1929), 1-2; and ILO, *Conventions and Recommendations, 1919-1937* (Geneva, 1939), 179-193.

¹⁴⁹ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 44.

¹⁵⁰ For a detailed discussion, see M. Mukerjee, *Churchill’s Secret War: the British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War Two* (New York, 2010).

¹⁵¹ Killingray, ‘Labour Mobilisation’, 88.

Rhodesia. The practice has had a long and notorious history in the country, dating as far back as pre-colonial times.¹⁵²

The background to agrarian labour conscription in Northern Rhodesia was that no sooner had the war broken out than settler farmers began agitating for a new agricultural policy. This was first voiced by the Midlands Farmers' Association, the most critical of state agrarian policies and later, the Mazabuka Farmers' Association. The farmers' groups emphasised that the promotion of cash cropping among African peasants prevented the flow of labour to their farms. Settler farmers argued that their contribution to the war effort through greater food production ought to be matched by an African contribution of enforced farm labour.¹⁵³ This campaign was partly engendered by statements on wartime agricultural efforts in Britain and neighbouring Southern Rhodesia. Settler farmers hoped that through such a policy, substantial financial assistance from the government would come their way.¹⁵⁴ But at this junction, government policy was totally against any price incentive to maize farmers to boost production or a guaranteed supply of labour and loans free from normal restrictions such as collateral.¹⁵⁵

The government's wartime agrarian policy was spelled out by the Governor when he stated that:

[i]t is essential that production of agricultural produce for internal consumption should be maintained at least at its normal level. Export of crops in large quantities is not an economic proposition, but internal consumption is more likely to increase than to decrease. Some farmers have enlisted in the fighting forces and others wish to go. This is tribute to their spirit, but decrease in production must not be allowed

¹⁵² See, for example, L.H. Gann, *Northern Rhodesia under British South Africa Company Rule, 1890-1924* (London, 1958); and J.E. Stephenson, *Chirupula's Tale* (London, 1937).

¹⁵³ NAZ SEC1/59, Director of Agriculture (Mazabuka) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 2 November, 1939.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

to follow in consequence of it. In time of war much always depends on agriculture.¹⁵⁶

This appeal for increased food production, especially maize, was based on the premise that the country would witness increased food consumption levels and that a market for exports readily existed overseas due to war conditions. Farmers, therefore, were urged to remain on their farms and increase levels of production.

The government's main thrust to increase food production was directed at settler commercial farmers who were called upon to contribute to the war effort by bringing a greater acreage under cultivation. By 1942 the number of mechanised farms was low. The overwhelming majority were undercapitalised with less than 200 acres under the plough, and constantly complained about the lack of labour.¹⁵⁷ In consultation with the Food Production Committee, the government envisaged an increase in the production of maize by 30,000 acres and that of wheat by 5,000 acres. For this to succeed, the government planned to recruit between 2,000 and 3,000 farm labourers in 1942 and raise this figure to 4,000 by 1944.¹⁵⁸

To attain its objectives, the government utilised its legislative powers to compel Africans to work on settler farms. Thus a number of laws were enacted to coerce African labour. The first of such laws was the Emergency Powers (Recruitment of Farm Labour) Regulation of 1942. By this law, the Controller of Labour was empowered to recruit volunteers aged between the ages of 16 and 45 to work on settler farms for a period of two years, with provision for penal sanctions for desertion, absenteeism, or evasion of duties.¹⁵⁹ Punishment was in form of a fine not exceeding £5 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months or both. This law was in line with wartime Emergency powers (War Defence) Act Notices No.

¹⁵⁶ *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 3 November 1939.

¹⁵⁷ K.P. Vickery, 'Saving Settlers: Maize Control in Northern Rhodesia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 11, 2 (1985), 212-234.

¹⁵⁸ NRG, *Emergency Powers (Recruitment of Farm Labour) Regulation 1942* (Lusaka, 1942).

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

139 of 1939 and No. 178 of 1939 where the Governor (or any other competent authority) was empowered to use force to maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the country. Every recruit under this law was paid wages amounting to ten shillings per thirty-day ticket with food rations for youths who were not liable to tax. Those who were eligible for tax payments were paid twelve shillings and six pence and food rations.¹⁶⁰

The “voluntary” recruitment of labour by private agents, however, proved ineffective as not many people came forward because working conditions were not competitive. It was estimated in April 1942, for example, that while only 3,000 volunteers could be recruited under the voluntary scheme, compulsion could bring in about 9,000.¹⁶¹ As elsewhere in colonial Africa, the local people generally regarded forced farm labour among the least desirable forms of employment. Worse still, some European settler farmers had earned a reputation for ill-treating farm workers. After frantic appeals to chiefs to persuade their subjects to converge on the farms failed to achieve the desired goal, the government accepted a recommendation from the African Labour Advisory Board (ALAB) that it should directly recruit labour and invoke Emergency Powers for essential food production.¹⁶² This resulted in the enactment of another law, the Emergency Powers (Conscription of Natives for Farm Labour) Regulation, on 21 February 1942.

This was shortly followed by the passing of the Emergency Powers (African Labour Corps) Regulations of 1942. Through this law, the government embarked upon the conscription of Africans under military discipline in the form of squads to work under the same conditions as the “volunteer” scheme. This constituted a more permanent standing pool of labour for settler farmers. The first group of 730 conscripts, mainly from Barotseland, arrived in Lusaka and Mazabuka to work on maize and wheat fields between March and June 1942. Other

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Killingray, ‘Labour Mobilisation’, 75.

¹⁶² NAZ SEC1/1346, Chairman’s Report of the Second ALAB Meeting, 3 February, 1942.

conscripts were obtained from the pool of “loafers” on the Copperbelt.¹⁶³ Members of the corps were at first organised into gangs of twenty-five under a corporal. For easy supervision, the number was reduced to 15 in 1948, and 11 in 1950.¹⁶⁴ The African Labour Corps (ALC) operated under the charge of an experienced labour recruiter and former farmer around the Lusaka area, Captain J. Brown. Any farmer unable to get labour for food production by other means could hire one or more gangs for a specific task or for a period of two to six weeks. The corps’ greatest advantage was that it brought squads of workers directly to the farm at the most critical periods in the farming cycle: stamping, clearing, sowing and reaping, or in times of emergency, such as a locust invasion.¹⁶⁵ Conscription was costly to implement because in addition to paying wages, the government transported, housed and provided medical facilities for the workers. Often the system benefited inefficient producers and bad employers who could not attract free labour. The government discontinued the system in 1952.

In April 1942 Governor John Waddington appealed to the Colonial Office again, noting that progress in voluntary recruiting had been “very unsatisfactory.” As a result, a further 700 males, mostly youths under sixteen years of age were conscripted in May 1944 and a further 1,000 in January 1945.¹⁶⁶ Waddington was convinced that the only way to get Africans to work was by conscripting them because they had a lot of cash in hand and no reasonable inducement could make them work on farms in sufficient numbers.¹⁶⁷ When interviewed in 1983, a former conscript, Timothy Siamaimbo of Sichiimbwe village in Pemba district, confirmed the nature of the conscription process. He stated:

¹⁶³ K.P. Vickery, ‘The Second World War Revival of Forced Labour in the Rhodesias’, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 22, 3 (1989), 434.

¹⁶⁴ K. Datta, ‘Farm Labour, Agrarian Capital and the State in Colonial Zambia: the African Labour Corps, 1942-1952’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14, 3 (April 1988), 379.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 379-380.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 378.

¹⁶⁷ NAZ SEC1/1346, Governor (Lusaka) to Colonial Secretary (London), 26 November 1942.

That *cibbalo*: He caught us – Bwana Price, the Mazabuka D.C. He came into this village with his messengers. The messengers caught us ... there were many of them – six on this side, six on that side.¹⁶⁸

Siamambo and his friend Thomas Sichintu were the unfortunate ones captured from their village on that occasion. “The rest ran away – they found us ... no luck!”¹⁶⁹

The use of forced labour during the war period added to substantial grants, loans and extension services availed to settler farmers, and marked the epitome of agrarian reforms started during the Depression. The reforms of the 1930s were aimed at protecting settler farmers in the midst of an economic meltdown and competition from African peasant farmers on the Tonga plateau.¹⁷⁰ During the war white farmers came to depend on conscripted labour. By 1945 conscripted labour for settler farms had become well-established that stopping the system could hurt the territory’s food requirements.

5.7. The “Second Colonial Occupation”

The post-war years have been described as those of a “second colonial occupation of Africa”, a time when colonial powers extended their economic and welfare interests on the continent.¹⁷¹ After the drastic reductions in colonial personnel in the early 1930s, the war period saw first an immediate fall in the staffs due to compulsory war service and then an intense increase afterwards. Hundreds of young British graduates and ex-servicemen were recruited, with every expectation of a lifetime career in colonial administration, and instructed in the new doctrines of good governance in a series of university summer schools.¹⁷² In general, the new policy drew more Africans into more direct contact with agents of the colonial state than ever

¹⁶⁸ Quoted in Vickery, ‘Second World War’, 434.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ See Vickery, *Black and White*, 195-210; and *ibid.*, ‘Saving Settlers’.

¹⁷¹ Killingray and Rathbone, ‘Introduction’, 10.

¹⁷² J. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (London, 1996), 118.

before.¹⁷³ The new development agenda brought new European forces into Northern Rhodesia who were assisted by the local people,¹⁷⁴ some of them employed as research assistants and agricultural demonstrators.¹⁷⁵

The driving force behind the new policy was the crisis in which Britain found itself after the war. Britain thus came to rely on her colonies to provide her with financial resources and raw materials. Equally significant was the granting of independence to India in 1947, an event which had the potential to inspire political reforms in the rest of the British Empire. As a result, the less significant parts of Empire, far from being abandoned after 1947, Britain repositioned the Empire in Africa, Malaya, and, informally, in the Middle East.¹⁷⁶

It is at first sight an inquisitive irony that as Britain's power declined after the war, her economic grip on its Imperial system seemed to tighten. Whitehall officials contemplated with greater enthusiasm than ever before the economic uplift of the tropical colonies.¹⁷⁷ This mystery is solved in the section that follows. The Colonial Office was convinced of the merits of government-sponsored "development" and welfare schemes, which were intended to enhance economic efficiency and productivity, improve living standards, and, it was hoped, reduce social, and political unrest in the colonies, while demonstrating to the world (especially the US) Britain's commitment to "constructive imperialism".¹⁷⁸ Equally significant was that imperial officials were concerned about the vital question of the international economic and political position of Britain *vis-a-vis* a greatly strengthened United States in the post-war world. The United States was eager to see the colonial markets opened up to her trade goods, and sub-Saharan Africa had an enhanced economic value for her.¹⁷⁹ It was in this vein that African

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, 108; and J.D. Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (London, 1988), 139.

¹⁷⁴ Hargreaves, *Decolonization*, 119.

¹⁷⁵ See, for example, L. Schumaker, 'A Tent with a View: Colonial Officers, Anthropologists, and the Making of the Field in Northern Rhodesia, 1937-1960', *History of Science Society*, 11 (1996), 237-258.

¹⁷⁶ Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990*, 279.

¹⁷⁷ Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation*, 140.

¹⁷⁸ Jeffrey, 'The Second World War', 325.

¹⁷⁹ Killingray and Rathbone, 'Introduction', 17.

colonies came to occupy a new significance to Britain, and “colonial development and welfare” schemes introduced.

Aggravating the dollar deficit and balance of payments problems in London was the food crisis. Food stocks, especially oils and fats, were low. There were also prospects of further cuts and shortages of these foods unless supplies could be increased elsewhere.¹⁸⁰ The necessity to find and exploit alternative sources of food from non-dollar areas became even more urgent following the convertibility crisis of 1947. In this regard, Britain was only too aware that increased colonial production of food which did not require payments in dollars would only serve to aid the economic reconstruction of Europe.¹⁸¹

A demonstration of this new commitment was the enactment of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts (CDWA) and setting aside of funds for development in the colonies. The first such Act was instituted in 1929.¹⁸² The next was passed in 1940 through which a sum of £50 million was made available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF) for development and welfare in the colonies for the next ten years. Of this allocation, not more than five million could be expended annually. Another £500,000 was set aside for research purposes in the colonies. Furthermore, the Act authorised the remission of about £11 million of British government loans, including loans made under the 1929 Colonial Development Act.¹⁸³ It widened the scope of development projects to include operating charges as well as capital expenditures and expenditure on education. A few small grants were made under this Act, but wartime conditions made the launch of development schemes inexpedient. Notwithstanding this, the Act called for ‘proper machinery and adequate personnel both for

¹⁸⁰ T. Zeleza, ‘The Political Economy of British Colonial Development and Welfare in Africa’, *Transafrican Journal of History*, 15 (1985), 147.

¹⁸¹ Zeleza, ‘The Political Economy of British Colonial Development’, 147; and Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation*, 138.

¹⁸² Although its achievements were not spectacular, the Act of 1929 secured a foundation upon which future policy was built. For a detailed discussion, see C. Baker, ‘Depression and Development in Nyasaland, 1929-1939’, *Society of Malawi Journal*, 27, 1 (1974), 7-26.

¹⁸³ E.R. Wicker, ‘Colonial Development and Welfare, 1929-1957: the Evolution of a Policy’, *Social and Economic Studies*, 7, 4 (1958), 181.

planning and for carrying out plans and that there should be a regular liaison between the authorities at home and overseas'.¹⁸⁴ This advocacy for long-term planning remained the Act's long-lasting legacy.

As the tide of the war turned in the Allies' favour in 1943, these developments were intensified by a new "civilising mission", articulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Stanley into a bipartisan policy sought to reshape the Imperial system on the basis of equal relationships and common economic and social benefits.¹⁸⁵ The result was the enactment of a more significant Act in 1945. The new law envisaged the stimulation of greater profitability in Africa and improvement of social and economic prospects for Africans.¹⁸⁶ The plan provided for grants to the colonial Empire totalling £120 million over ten years between 1946 and 1956.¹⁸⁷ It forced colonial governments to prepare some kind of centrally-co-ordinated development plans to be eligible for funding. But more compelling than public relations was the drive to increase the productiveness of the tropical colonies, and to encourage them towards greater self-sufficiency in manufactured goods which Britain could not supply.¹⁸⁸ Thus, Britain unveiled its new colonial "development" policy due to self-interest amidst the throes of domestic economic doldrums.

In Northern Rhodesia the effect of this Act led to the formulation of what became known as the Ten Year Development Plan (TYDP), the first major effort at long-range planning for the country. The TYDP was based on the preparation of provincial and district plans drawn up starting in February 1943. The next step was the appointment of a development adviser. In late 1944 and early 1945 Mr G.F. Clay, the Northern Rhodesia-Nyasaland Joint Development Adviser, carried out investigations. His report was accepted by the government as giving the

¹⁸⁴ Colonial Office, *Statement Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare*, (London, February 1940), 6.

¹⁸⁵ Jeffery, 'The Second World War', 325.

¹⁸⁶ A. Jackson, *Botswana: an African Country at War, 1939-1945* (Oxford, 1999), 9.

¹⁸⁷ Hargreaves, *Decolonization*, 67.

¹⁸⁸ Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation*, 137.

general principles on which planning was to be based, and the heads of the economic and social departments were then asked to draw up plans for the minimum necessary expansion over the next ten years. The TYDP intended to spend £13 million over a period of ten years between 1947 and 1957.¹⁸⁹

The intention was to raise £5,500,000 from local revenues, and another £5,000,000 through a loan.¹⁹⁰ It soon became clear, however, that departmental plans had overestimated the amount of assistance to be expected from London when it was announced in November 1945 that the country's share of the CDW Fund was £2,500,000 plus a share in the £1,000,000 allocated jointly with Nyasaland. Accordingly, the budgets were adjusted downwards. Table 5.4 shows the TYDP budget which was eventually approved in the Legislative Council in 1947.

Table 5.4: Estimates of Expenditure under the Ten Year Development Plan

Sector	Allocation (£)
Social Services (Health, Education)	3,384,000
Economic Services (Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock, Game, Fish)	2,108,000
Rural Development	1,500,000
Communications	1,820,000
Water Development	970,000
Economic Development (Marketing, Secondary Industries)	500,000
African housing	1,000,000
General Building and Public Works	1,300,000
Loans to Local Authorities	250,000
Unallocated balance	168,000

Source: NRG, *Ten Year Development Plan* (Lusaka, 1947), 5.

¹⁸⁹ NRG, *Ten Year Development Plan* (Lusaka, 1947); and MIA 14.3.3F, Statement by Secretary of State for the Colonies on the State of British Territories in East and Central Africa between 1945-1950, 46.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 46.

The motivation for the CDWA was, as it happened, not the war. Rather, it was events in the colonies themselves which prompted a shift in imperial policy. One of the prime reasons was the outbreak of riots in the West Indies in 1938. The Royal Commission investigating these riots attributed their occurrence to the backward economic state of the islands. The British government, therefore, set up a special development fund for the West Indies and, realising that if such situations were to be avoided elsewhere in the Empire, made funds for development available to all of them.¹⁹¹ In this way, Britain accepted unequivocally its obligation to supply funds for the development of its colonies.

One of the most significant areas to benefit from the TYDP was African peasant agriculture which had been hitherto neglected in preference for European settler agriculture. Speaking of a 'revolution in African productivity' in agricultural and industrial fields in the post-war period, Arthur Creech Jones, the new Colonial Secretary pointed out that '... a radical reform in present methods of land utilisation is ... perhaps the most important task facing administrators, at any rate in East Africa'.¹⁹² It was precisely for this reason that for the first time in the history of the territory, African peasant agriculture appeared in the government development agenda.¹⁹³ A total of £776,000 was set aside for African agriculture. One of the first steps taken to promote this sector was the establishment of the African Farming Improvement Scheme (AFIS). The programme started in the Southern province in 1947 and ran until the end of colonial rule in 1964. The scheme's thrust was to improve peasant farming methods by encouraging the use of manure, ploughs, the adoption of weed destruction strategies, and the conservation of natural resources.¹⁹⁴ AFIS involved the selection and

¹⁹¹ Colonial Office, *Statement Policy on Colonial Development*, 2-3.

¹⁹² NAZ SEC1/1362, Secretary of State (London) to Governor (Lusaka), 22 February 1947.

¹⁹³ Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation*, 11.

¹⁹⁴ NRG, *Ten Year Development Plan* (Lusaka, 1947), 6; and Chipungu, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation*, 11.

planned settlement of peasants who were supervised by the staff of the Department of Agriculture.¹⁹⁵

By the same token, the Department of Agriculture started another strategy, the Peasant Farming Scheme (PFS) in Katete district in the Eastern province in 1948. This was in view of slowness in the transformation of peasants' agricultural system, especially because of the intense pressure on the land due to congestion in the reserves. The government felt that in addition to normal extension work, an "impact scheme" should be started in the Eastern Province.¹⁹⁶ This was with a view to creating a class of landed gentry farming on a commercial scale. The scheme began with the creation of a block of 10 farms in the Kawaza chieftainship. The government provided loans for livestock, implements and land-clearing. Farmers were trained to use a five-course rotation method of crops: groundnuts, maize, groundnuts, grass, grass on five-acre plots, making a total of twenty-five acres of which 15 were under cultivation in any one year.¹⁹⁷ In 1949 the scheme was extended to neighbouring Fort Jameson district where an initial 26 farms were set up.¹⁹⁸ By 1950, the scheme had spread to other parts of the country due to its success.¹⁹⁹

5.8. Conclusion

What can be deduced from this chapter is that Northern Rhodesia played a key role in the provision of base metals for the Allied war effort. As the largest single supplier of copper in the sterling area, the country assured the Allies of the much-needed raw material for ammunition manufacture. The fact that copper had to be produced at whatever cost in order to buttress the British war effort brought about increased colonial and imperial government

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, *The State, Technology and Peasant Differentiation*, 90-104.

¹⁹⁶ A. Tembo, 'The Colonial State and African Agriculture in Chipata District, 1895-1964', MA Dissertation, University of Zambia, 2010', 77.

¹⁹⁷ NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for 1949* (Lusaka, 1950), 10.

¹⁹⁸ Tembo, 'The Colonial State and African Peasant Agriculture', 78.

¹⁹⁹ NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for 1949* (Lusaka, 1950), 8; C.M. Chabatama, 'The Colonial State, the Mission and Peasant Farming in North-Western Province of Zambia: a Case Study of Zambezi District, 1907-1964', MA Dissertation, University of Zambia, 1992; and J.A. Hellen, *Rural Economic Development in Zambia, 1890-1964* (Munich, 1968).

involvement in the activities of the mining industry. It has also been demonstrated that Northern Rhodesia's fiscal value was transformed during late British imperialism. At the end of the war, the copper mines assumed a new prominence for the imperial government which faced economic hardship. Rather than granting political independence to the territory, Britain instead increased its grip on the colony so that dollar-earnings from the copper industry could cushion its economy from further shocks. London's calculations, as Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins noted, were based primarily upon a heightened awareness of the economic worth of Empire during the period of post-war reconstruction.²⁰⁰

It has further been ascertained that the high cost of doing business in post-war Britain, as well as the decline of the City of London as the world's financial centre, account for the decision by the mining companies to relocate their head offices from the metropole to Northern Rhodesia in the early 1950s. This was at a time when political power in the region was shifting more and more into the hands of the settler community. The prosperity recorded in the copper mining industry in the post-war period was the main reason behind the fast-tracked trend toward the political amalgamation of the three territories in Central Africa. In the next chapter, the discussion focuses on the demobilization exercise undertaken at the end of the war and the challenges faced by returning servicemen despite colonial "development" schemes discussed in this chapter.

²⁰⁰ Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*, 630.

CHAPTER SIX

Demobilization and the Great Disappointment of War Service

6.1. Introduction

This chapter examines how Northern Rhodesian ex-servicemen encountered home life after several years at war. The problems faced by them and the society into which they were eventually reintegrated are investigated. On demobilization, it was expected by the government of Northern Rhodesia that most African ex-servicemen would slip back into rural life which they had left years before. This chapter demonstrates that this was not the case. For African

servicemen from the Northern Rhodesian Regiment (NRR), the end of the war marked the start of another struggle. Like their colonial colleagues in other parts of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, former servicemen in Northern Rhodesia had to fight for gratuities, better standards of living, educational and employment opportunities, and better housing.

Challenges faced by African ex-servicemen often made them restless and discontented. In general, they had to “fight for a living” alongside citizens who had not fought in the war. The dissatisfaction of servicemen at the end of the war was not unique to Northern Rhodesia or the African continent. As Daniel Owen Spence, Anirudh Deshpande and Dipak Kumar Das have shown, the fight for better conditions did not always follow the end of the war because cases of protest and mutiny sometimes preceded the cessation of hostilities as happened in India, Ceylon, Trinidad, and the Cayman Islands.¹ On the other hand, European ex-servicemen were well-catered for by the Northern Rhodesian government which paid them higher gratuity rates than Africans and rewarded them with land and employment opportunities based on a system of racial hierarchy. Furthermore, this chapter accounts for why the return of nearly 15,000 servicemen failed to have any appreciable impact upon the growth of national politics in Northern Rhodesia. Contrary to older academic arguments by Michael Crowder, Gabriel Olusanya, and Eugene Schleh, African ex-servicemen were pre-occupied with their immediate personal well-being and not wider societal issues such as nationalism.² Of all the conventional ideas about Africa and the Second World War, it is perhaps that of the political impact of returning servicemen upon their home societies that is most debatable. Too often it is taken for granted that they had a marked impact upon nationalist politics, though nowhere has this been

¹ D.O. Spence, *Colonial naval culture and British imperialism, 1922-1967* (Manchester, 2015); A. Deshpande, *Military Policy in India, 1900-1945* (New Delhi, 2005); and D.K. Das, *Revisiting Talwar: A study in the Royal Indian Navy Uprising of February 1946* (New Delhi, 1993).

² See especially M. Crowder, ‘The 1939 War and West Africa’, F.A Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa* (London, 1974), 8-51; G.O. Olusanya, ‘The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6, 2 (August 1968), 221-32; and E.P.A. Schleh, ‘The Post-War Careers of Ex-Servicemen in Ghana and Uganda’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6, 2 (August 1968), 203-20.

conclusively proven.³ This chapter proves the falseness of this assumption for the case of Northern Rhodesia as the war was noted for its social rather than political transformation of African servicemen.

6.2. The Demobilization Process

6.2.1. African Servicemen

The end of the war in Europe and the Mediterranean in May 1945 was foreseen, whereas the Japanese surrender on 15 August came abruptly following the American use of two atomic bombs. Although fighting had ended, major logistical problems persisted for the triumphant Allies. A large army of labour was needed for reconstruction after such a long war. Vast supply dumps of war materials had to be secured and then disposed of. There was also the need to re-occupy enemy-held territories and guard prisoners-of-war. Moving men and materials was a complex business involving co-ordination between various government departments – those of the Colonies, Dominions, War Transport, plus the War Office, Admiralty and Middle East Command – as well as the military commanders in the field and colonial administrations in various places.⁴

Post-war colonial demobilization was first discussed by an interdepartmental committee on the Machinery of Demobilization set up by the British Minister without Portfolio in January 1941. It consisted of representatives of the service departments, Ministry of Labour, and National Service. These plans were put on hold as the Empire's prospects looked bleak due to Japanese successes in the Pacific in the course of the year until early 1942.⁵ But a circular was despatched to the colonies in July 1943 to formulate resettlement plans, and set the tone

³ A. Jackson, *Botswana: an African Country at War, 1939-1945* (Oxford, 1999), 237.

⁴ D. Killingray, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War* (Woodbridge, 2010), 179.

⁵ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 174.

for demobilization throughout the Empire.⁶ Based on the course of the war during this period, this was a logical thing to do because from the standpoint of Britain and its Allies victory was imminent by that date.⁷ Demobilization was to proceed through dispersal of groups determined according to age and length of service during the war, and not by the availability of transport and employment opportunities as was the case at the end of the 1914-18 war.⁸ The justification for this was the lack of employment opportunities and shipping space to absorb everyone at once.

These plans cheered the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, who in November 1943 remarked on the widespread official initiatives taken by colonial administrators to establish machinery for the returning men. But at the same time, as Frank Furedi has shown, officials in London often revealed deep anxieties regarding the threat posed by the demobilized veterans.⁹ Thought was given by the Northern Rhodesian government about the organisation of demobilization and the resettlement of ex-servicemen, but the process was tied to Imperial and military demands beyond its control. Colonial administrations were consulted at times, but more often than not, they had to fit in with plans made by Imperial and military authorities. David Killingray, however, rightly noted that the schemes themselves and the processes followed by most colonial administrations to return men to their homes can be regarded as fairly successful, although they fell short of the goal of laying “a new foundation for society” asked for by African servicemen.¹⁰

⁶ National Archives of Zambia (hereafter NAZ), SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Circular from the Secretary of State (London) to All Governors, 12 July 1943.

⁷ See, for example, J. Black, *World War Two: A Military History* (London, 2003), 129-158. By 1943 the availability of massive resources following the introduction of Lend-Lease in March 1941 enabled the Allies to attack on a number of fronts at once. The Allies also benefitted from the extent to which the Germans had used up important military assets during their offensives in Russia and North Africa in 1942, while the Japanese had done the same at Midway.

⁸ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I. Circular from Secretary of State to All Governors.

⁹ F. Furedi, ‘The Demobilized African Soldier and the Blow to White Prestige’, in D. Killingray and D. Omissi (eds.), *Guardians of Empire: the Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964* (Manchester, 1999), 183.

¹⁰ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 180.

Joanna Lewis's work reveals how contemporaries widely reported that the war had changed Africans, and that discontent would erupt among servicemen once they returned home.¹¹ This was ascribed to their wide travels, army life, and education attained through military service. Yet, in the short term, the actual destabilising impact of the returning *askari* proved to be negligible.¹² The demobilization of Northern Rhodesian servicemen, like that of other African colonies, faced major challenges. As the war ended, *The Times* noted that demobilizing thousands of *askari* would constitute the greatest challenge for African countries since the abolition of slavery.¹³ The first problem was largely an imperial one, concerning the shortage of shipping. Ships had to be in the right place, and of the right type for transporting men. Priority, however, was given to demobilizing British troops, whose skills and labour were urgently needed to service British industry and reconstruction at home.¹⁴ The men from Northern Rhodesia, like other colonial personnel from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, came a good way down the priority list so that their labour could be conveniently used in place of British troops who were heading home. While no open protests took place among personnel of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment who were very far away from home in the Middle East and Asia, a mutiny took place in the Royal Indian Navy accompanied by rioting in Karachi, Bombay and Calcutta in February 1946.¹⁵ With the victory over Japan in August 1945, shipping was diverted from the Suez to South East Asia to bring back Allied prisoners of war, a high proportion of whom were British and Dominion troops captured at the fall of Singapore in February 1942. The condition of the men who had survived Japanese labour camps was abominable. This demonstrates that aside from racial hierarchy in the demobilization of ex-

¹¹ J. Lewis, *Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Woodbridge, 2000), 201.

¹² *Ibid*, 202. *Askari* (singular = *msikari*) was the ki-Swahili word for soldiers. The term was widely used by colonial and military officials to refer to their African servicemen.

¹³ *The Times*, Tuesday 21 August 1945.

¹⁴ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 180; and *ibid*, 'African Voices from Two World Wars', *Historical Research*, 74, 186 (2001), 440.

¹⁵ Deshpande, *Military Policy in India*.

servicemen, the lives of European prisoners of war depended on speedy evacuation and medical care.¹⁶

Administrators in Northern Rhodesia agreed to the delayed demobilization of soldiers because of Imperial and local logistical challenges. A local committee set up to examine problems of reabsorbing African servicemen acknowledged in 1943 the need for gradual demobilization in order to regulate the reabsorption of the men into civil life as systematically as possible.¹⁷ One major worry concerned the transportation of returnees, should all of them be repatriated within a short period of time.¹⁸ Another concern had to do with finding employment opportunities for the returning men. The Chamber of Mines stressed the undesirability of any sudden demobilization of large numbers of *askari*, as this would work against their gradual absorption by the mining companies.¹⁹ In neighbouring Nyasaland, it was considered essential that demobilization ought to be gradual, partly to lighten the burden upon transport facilities, partly to ease the strain on Army Pay Corps, and to facilitate arrangements for the re-settlement of returnees.²⁰

By January 1946, five months after the defeat of Japan, less than half of the 15,000 men from Northern Rhodesia had returned home.²¹ The 5th Battalion of the Northern Rhodesia, which had been assigned for guard duties in the Middle East as part of the East African Military

¹⁶ D.A. Shackleton, 'Imperial Military Policy and the Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners during the Second World War', PhD Thesis, Indiana University, 1997, 309.

¹⁷ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Employment of African Soldiers Sub-Committee held in the Secretariat on 3 February 1943 at 2:15 pm; and *ibid*, Minutes of the Meeting of the Employment of African Soldiers Sub-Committee held in the Central Offices on Tuesday 17 August 1943 at 9 am.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 8 September 1945.

¹⁹ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol.II., Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (Kitwe) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 20 August 1945; NAZ SEC1/1768, Minutes of the Serenje District After-Care Committee held on 15 January 1946; *ibid*, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Balovale District After-Care Committee held on 2 October 1945; and *ibid*, Minutes of Chinsali After-Care Committee Meeting held at 9am on Saturday 19 January 1946.

²⁰ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Interim Report No. 7 of the Nyasaland Protectorate Post-War Development Committee, n.d. c.1945.

²¹ *Ibid*, Minutes of the Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 17 January 1946.

Labour Corps, left the region in April 1946.²² The last Northern Rhodesian soldiers were repatriated from India in late 1946, long after the war had ended in both Europe and Asia. That demobilization would take a long time was anticipated by soldiers. But the explanation given by military authorities in the East Africa Command was not accepted as satisfactory by the men whose only thought was to get home.²³ Men were angered by repeated delays. The process of demobilizing was desperately slow and camp life was boring in the extreme. Soldiers believed that they had joined to fight a war and now that the war was over they were entitled to go home. The news that British soldiers were leaving for home compounded suspicion of racial discrimination already felt over differences in pay and conditions.²⁴

6.2.1.1. Going Home

The journey home was likewise lengthy. For some it took as long as three or more months from the theatres of war in East Africa, India and the Middle East. The 3rd Battalion sailed from Rangoon in H.M.T. *Cameronia* in March 1946. One member of that battalion, Joseph Maliselo, said:

[a]fter the war it took us about three months to reach home, that is, one month in India, three weeks in Nairobi, Kenya, and about one month in Lusaka before we received our discharge letters.²⁵

Once soldiers arrived in either Durban or Mombasa, this was followed by a further trip by rail and then road to their homes. As Chama Mutemi Kadansa explained:

²² Livingstone Museum (hereafter LM) 2/3/4/1/6/3, The Green 'Un': The Magazine of the 94 Independent Garrison Company: The King's African Rifles (June-November, 1946).

²³ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 184.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 185.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 187.

I spent five years in the army. The war came to an end in 1945 while I was in Burma in the town of Rangoon. On our coming back after the war, we boarded ships which brought us to Mombassa (*sic*) in Kenya. We sailed through Ceylone (*sic*), Bombay and landed in Mobassa (*sic*) at long last. From Mombassa we got on lorries to Nairobi, passing through Iringa, Dodoma, Arusia (*sic*) and Kisumu to Lusaka. We travelled day and night except during meal times. From Lusaka we were taken back to our home districts by war trucks. While in Lusaka, the Governor... entertained us with local beer, each of us being given just a tumblerful (*sic*) of it. A cow was also slaughtered to provide meat for the victorious soldiers.²⁶

Not all reached home as scheduled. Those that came from remote villages were marooned on the way because of transport problems. For ex-servicemen going to Namwala in the Southern province, their journey from Lusaka was delayed at Pemba town where they needed to board other lorries to take them to their villages. But the lorry service from Pemba to Namwala only ran weekly on Tuesdays. This delay caused *askaris* to complain that the three-day food rations issued by the military were insufficient to cover the time taken by the journey.²⁷ This problem was only solved after repeated complaints from the men, when local administrators engaged Messrs Cavadia and Nephews to run another truck service on Fridays and on any day as long as there was a minimum of 12 ex-servicemen waiting to be repatriated. Government officials feared that the more time the men spent at Pemba the more they would wander around nearby villages and waste their money on beer and women.²⁸

²⁶ Chama Mutemi Kadansa, interview with the BBC on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, 17 July 1989, Ndola.

²⁷ NAZ SEC1/1768, Minutes of the Third Meeting of Namwala After-Care Committee held on 29 October 1945; and *ibid*, Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Mwinilunga After-Care Committee held on 20 November 1945.

²⁸ *Ibid*, Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Namwala After-Care Committee held on 29 October 1945.

Many soldiers returning home had not seen their families for several years. There is an emotional edge to most ex-servicemen's memories. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, in 1989, Joseph Chinama Mulenga had this to say about his return to his village home:

[i]t was common to see those who had lost their wives to others in the villages, including their children who they had left behind to roam about. This was so because there was a general belief with fear that those who had gone to war may not return. A few spouses with strong love ties of mind stayed waiting for the day when their beloved, long gone husbands would return. Others through anxiety bore children from other men contrary to tradition.²⁹

Furthermore, Mulenga found that there were great changes in villages to which ex-servicemen returned:

[a] few old boys could not readjust to old adaptations. Others found their former villages non-existent because of so many other reasons. Either death had taken its toll of the aged or there were just no young people to carry on with life. With no support, idle dependents also died and most dwellings remained empty for a long time. Active young men left villages for towns to get jobs.³⁰

Returning home was often a difficult time for ex-servicemen. Army life, exposure to new ideas such as skills training, cuisine, health, hygiene, and the experience of warfare had changed soldiers' perspectives and expectations. Wives had changed, grown older and became detached. Children had also grown up and asserted a greater independence from their parents. Families had suffered from the long years of separation. Harry Franklin, the territory's

²⁹ Sergeant-Major Joseph Chinama Mulenga, interview with the BBC on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the outbreak of the Second World War, Lusaka, 6 June 1989.

³⁰ Mulenga, interview cited.

Information Officer, observed this complaint while touring servicemen in Madagascar. He reported that the most vociferous complaints the men had concerned the misbehaviour of wives at home, how they took the *askari*'s money, committed adultery with villagers, and worst of all, in some cases actually married other men.³¹ These concerns were not unique to Northern Rhodesia or even limited to the Second World War but a common feature of overseas service and labour migration.³² And disillusionment over monetary entitlements, housing and employment prospects, made the business of resuming domestic life even more difficult.³³ Issues of infidelity were also rife in some families. For all the men who were married, anxieties about their partners' fidelity had been a concern whilst they served in the army. Some ex-soldiers found their worst fears confirmed, though if children were not born, information was confined to the shady dominion of rumour and suspicion. Illicit affairs existed. On this subject, the District Commissioner for Broken Hill stated: '... it appears that, at present, the average soldier regards villagers with contempt and dislike – largely, I think, because the villagers interfere with their wives ...'³⁴ But some servicemen themselves were also involved in illicit sexual encounters in different places they worked, with other contracting venereal infections.³⁵

Resettlement and reabsorption required men to go back to their homes and resume their previous occupations before enlistment as far as possible. At the same time, the scheme devised by the colonial state included provision for training and work for about 500 men in order to utilise the skills they had acquired while in the army. Officials had some idea of literate

³¹ NAZ SEC2/1135, Report on Tour to Madagascar from 4 January to 4 February 1943, dated 22 February 1943.

³² The impact of labour migration on colonial Zambia have been discussed by, among others, Y.A. Chondoka, 'Labour Migration in Chama District, North-Eastern Zambia', PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1992; A. Richards, *Land, Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: an Economic Study of the Bemba Tribe* (Hamburg, 1995); W. Watson, *The Social Structure of the Mambwe of Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester, 1957).

³³ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 190.

³⁴ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., District Commissioner (Broken Hill) to Provincial Commissioner (Central Province), 15 September 1943.

³⁵ See L. White, 'Prostitution, Identity, and Class Consciousness in Nairobi during World War II', *Signs: Journal of Women and Culture in Society*, 11 (1986), 255-273; and T.H. Parsons, 'All askaris are family men: sex, domesticity and discipline in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964', in D. Killingray and D. Omissi (eds.), *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964*. Manchester, 1999, 179-197.

soldiers' expectations but there was a general anxiety that they might be well beyond what could be offered by the meagre resources of a strained post-war colonial economy.

In South Africa, demobilization was discussed early on in the war and resulted in the issue of a "Soldiers' Charter" in April 1944 – a scheme that offered benefits to ex-servicemen according to rank, gender and race. Black and coloured soldiers were only too keenly aware that after the war they would be competing for jobs in a labour market where the interests of whites were protected by both customary practices and a battery of racially discriminatory laws.³⁶ White veterans were treated generously, non-Europeans very poorly. In Southern Rhodesia, race also took precedence above everything else. Rhodesian coloured soldiers were disgusted when they discovered that they were paid gratuities which were a quarter of what had been given to white soldiers.³⁷

6.2.2. European Servicemen

Apart from having to suffer the patronising overtones of speeches from government officials on their return home,³⁸ African servicemen did not receive the same post-war treatment as their white counterparts. On their discharge from the armed forces, Northern Rhodesian European ex-servicemen reported either in person or in writing to the Director of Manpower in Broken Hill to seek government's help in securing employment. This applied to both European ex-servicemen who were resuming their former occupations and those who had

³⁶ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 195.

³⁷ J.K. Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia, 1939-1980', *African Studies*, 63, 1 (2004), 82.

³⁸ For specific speeches delivered by government officials at the occasion marking the arrival of the 1st NRR Battalion, see *Mutende* No. 210, January 1946; and *Mutende* No. 212, February 1946. More generally, see K. Makasa, *Zambia's March to Political Freedom* (Nairobi, 1981), 15.

new employment opportunities waiting for them after the war. The Director of Manpower was obliged to advise the ex-servicemen on the question of re-employment and put such applicants in touch with local reinstatement committees. The Director of Manpower paid the cost of maintenance for discharged soldiers whilst they waited to be employed as well as the cost of rail fares, incidental travelling expenses and subsistence allowances during unavoidable periods of unemployment, pending their re-absorption into civil life.³⁹ This process was decentralised to districts where these functions were performed by the reinstatement committees which were set up in Livingstone, Lusaka, Broken Hill, Ndola, Nkana, Luanshya, Mufulira, Chingola, Mazabuka and Fort Jameson. In each case, the committee was under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner.

To formalise reabsorption into civil employment the Legislative Council passed the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Ordinance in June 1945. This law made provision for the restoration in civil employment of European persons who, after 24 August 1939, were in whole-time service in one of the Armed Forces of the Crown. The law empowered any person to whom the Bill applied to make an application to his former employer for re-employment within a period of four weeks upon being released from the Army, and to state the date on which one would be available for employment. On receipt of the application, the former employer became liable to re-employ the applicant at the first opportunity for a period of at least twenty-six weeks or as was reasonable and practicable.⁴⁰ Where the previous employment, however, was of fifty-two weeks' duration or some greater period, then the minimum period of re-employment was fifty-two weeks. It was considered unreasonable and impracticable for an employer to re-engage an applicant if this could only be done by discharging some person in his employment who was in his employment before and for a longer

³⁹ NRG, *Notes on Demobilisation: Benefits, Rehabilitation, Procedure, etc., for Persons of Northern Rhodesian Origin Serving in the Armed Forces* (Lusaka, 1945), 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 2.

period than the applicant, or by refusing to take into employment some such other person who had applied for reinstatement.⁴¹ In such a case, the employer's liability ceased if the applicant refused the offer of employment. The employer was required to provide the applicant with employment not less favourable to him than that in which he was last employed before the beginning of his war service, provided that if it was not reasonable and practicable to employ him on those terms and conditions. In such a situation, the employer had to employ the former serviceman on the most favourable terms and conditions which were reasonable and practicable in his case.⁴²

This scheme was similar to the one developed in South Africa where white former servicemen who worked in the gold mining industry before the war, were aided to obtain either employment or technical and other forms of education which they had lost by reason of absence on full-time military service.⁴³ Apprentices were excluded generally from the provisions of the scheme as, on reinstatement, an apprentice was under obligation to complete his indentures and the opportunity remained for him to resume his educational classes at the Witwatersrand Technical College or other educational institutions approved by the Chamber of Mines. Apprentices received remission from their period of indenture in accordance with the Soldiers' and War Workers' Employment Act.⁴⁴

6.3. Post-War Rewards

6.3.1. Financial Rewards for African Servicemen

Ex-servicemen expected rewards for their enlistment in the armed forces during the war. Yet, their expectations were seldom met and many grew disillusioned. The promise of

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Mining Industry Archives (hereafter MIA) 18.4.2A Memorandum by Transvaal Chamber of Mines Gold Producers' Committee, Johannesburg, 24 July 1945.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

reward often features prominently in reasons for enlistment in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. The men claim they were promised handsome financial gain if they enlisted. Ex-serviceman Kadansa recalled that

[o]ur British officers were seriously promising that after the war a lot of money would be paid to surviving soldiers as a reward, and they would be given farms and good jobs. So we were all very happy and anxious to get to the battle-fields and start fighting.⁴⁵

Another ex-serviceman Samson Muliango recalled that he was told by his white employer to join the war because of the financial and material rewards to be given for military service afterwards. He stated that '[d]uring the recruitment, the Northern Rhodesia Government promised us all as rewards farms and lots of money if only we fought for the British Army during the reign of King George VI'.⁴⁶ But, as he observed after the war:

[t]o our surprise, the Government never gave us (Black soldiers) any money or farms as promised. However, our White soldier friends were awarded farms and money. For example, Col. Bruce-Miller and Col. Giddings were given farms in Kabwe...⁴⁷

Research in other parts of British Africa has shown that this phenomenon was not peculiar to Northern Rhodesia. A similar trend was noted in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa, Ghana, Nyasaland, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda.⁴⁸ The fact that African

⁴⁵ Kadansa, interview cited.

⁴⁶ Samson Muliango, interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Occasion to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, 11 July 1989, Lusaka.

⁴⁷ Muliango, interview cited.

⁴⁸ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 191; A. Jackson, 'African Soldiers and Imperial Authorities: Tensions and Unrest during the Service of High Commission Territories' Soldiers in the British Army, 1941-46', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25, 4 (December 1999), 645-665; *ibid*, Botswana; H.S. Simelane, 'Veterans, Politics and Poverty: the Case of Swazi Veterans in the Second World War', *South African Historical Journal*, 38 (1998), 144-170; A.M. Israel, 'Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads: Protests and Politics in Post-War Ghana', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30, 2 (1992), 359-368; D. Killingray, 'Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen, and Politics in the Gold

servicemen expected financial and material rewards at the end of the war could be ascribed to deliberate misinformation, vague promises, misunderstandings and rumours disseminated by recruiting government functionaries, traditional authorities, and in some instances, servicemen themselves. Mkushi district is a classic example of an area where ‘... wild rumours as to elaborate houses to be built by government for returning soldiers and other imaginary benefits were circulating freely amongst soldiers on leave’.⁴⁹ The Provincial Commissioner for the Northern Province, too, observed that vague promises that the servicemen would be “looked after” by the government in the post-war period were rampant in his area. There were reports that all *askari* would be pensioned for life and supported by government with grants towards any rehabilitation needs they would have.⁵⁰ Similar observations were noted in Bechuanaland, where it was reported that during the recruitment process some chiefs appeared to have misrepresented government policy by suggesting that deferred payments for recruits were akin to life pensions or gratuities.⁵¹

This belief probably developed after the soldiers returned home and spent their deferred pay and savings. The grievance about money is heard throughout Africa and beyond, as is the broader grievance about the neglect of ex-servicemen in society. All that the imperial government did, was to set aside £75,000 for the erection of a war memorial in Northern Rhodesia, a sum which if paid to the ex-servicemen would have amounted to a mere £3 each. A continuing complaint of ex-servicemen throughout British colonial Africa was that they did

Coast, 1939-50’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21, 3 (September 1983), 523-534; Olusanya, ‘The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics’, 221-232; and Schleh, ‘The Post-War Careers of Ex-Servicemen in Ghana and Uganda’, 203-220.

⁴⁹ NAZ SEC1/1768, Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Mkushi After-Care Committee held on 17 April 1945.

⁵⁰ NAZ SEC1/1766, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka), 30 May 1945. See also, Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 198.

⁵¹ Jackson, *Botswana*, 256.

not receive pensions promised by British authorities. In reality, however, pensions specific to war service did not exist in the British Army, neither did they for African colonial troops.⁵²

It is not possible to accurately compute the amount of money each soldier brought back home at the end of the war. Deferred savings, usually one-third of what was earned in the army but sometimes more than that, plus encouragements to save through the Post Office Savings Bank and remittances to relatives home for investments, meant that prudent soldiers, returned home with a decent sum of money. That was the ideal situation. Most soldiers, however were disappointed at the small amount of money they were paid as a result of their absence and hard work.⁵³ Some soldiers came back with only a few pounds; others had enough to buy a bicycle, sewing machine or clothing as an indication of their new status. Though money was spent quite quickly, only a minority appear to have squandered it all without tangible gain. Some invested it in cattle, farm implements, home improvements, and paid for brides.⁵⁴ When interviewed in 2012, ex-serviceman Simon J. Simwinga said he saved part of his army pay through allotments sent to his mother which money was used to start life afresh after the war including marrying his wife.⁵⁵

One of the most visible changes which the men became all too cognisant of upon arriving back in Northern Rhodesia was the economic change brought by the war, most noticeably that the money in their pockets had lost much of its value. Wartime inflation had eroded their expected and real incomes.⁵⁶ As one European speaker pointed out in the Legislative Council, Africans suffered from the sharp rise in the cost of living and farmers

⁵² Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 198.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 191.

⁵⁴ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., District Commissioner (Chinsali) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 5 November 1943; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Lundazi) to Provincial Commissioner, Eastern Province (Fort Jameson), 4 October 1943; and *ibid*, District Commissioner (Kasama) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 19 November 1943.

⁵⁵ S.J. Simwinga, interview with MUVI TV, Lusaka, c. 2011.

⁵⁶ Killingray, 'African Voices from Two World Wars', 441; and M. Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence* (London, 2011), 10.

found that whereas they only obtained six pence more for their maize, they now had to pay ten shillings for a blanket which sold at five shillings before the war when the quality the of the product was superior.⁵⁷ Additionally, there were shortages of many basic imported goods in the stores, especially food and clothing. The rate of inflation differed from place to place, with urbanised towns along the line of rail being hit harder than rural areas. As discussed in Chapter Four, the rate of inflation was based on the index number of retail prices of consumer goods. In urban centres such as the Copperbelt, Livingstone, Lusaka and Broken Hill where imported manufactured trade goods and foods were marketed, prices had increased by as much as 30 per cent or more during the war years.⁵⁸ But inflation reached even remote areas and was reflected in consumer goods, livestock and bride prices. Returning soldiers put more money into circulation and thus also contributed further to the inflationary spiral as they competed for goods.

6.3.1.1. Gratuities

War gratuities were set aside for African ex-servicemen who had served at least six months before they were either released, died or were honourably discharged from the army. They were paid according to the rank held by the soldier on leaving the army as shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Gratuities Paid to African Servicemen

Rank	Amount Per Month of Service
Private	3 shillings and 6 pence
Corporal	4 shillings
Sergeant	4 shillings and 6 pence
Staff Sergeant	5 shillings
Warrant Officer II	5 shillings and 6 pence
Warrant Officer I	6 shillings

⁵⁷ NRG, Legislative Council Debates, 16 December 1941, 353-354.

⁵⁸ *Northern News*, 24 October 1946; and *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 10 May 1946.

Source: *Mutende* No. 198 August 1945.

In addition, the men were allowed to collect part of their personal attire and equipment used in the Army. These included one pair of boots or sandals, two pairs of shorts, two pairs of socks, two shirts, one jersey, one blanket, two towels, a coat, kit bag, clasp knife and a spoon.⁵⁹ Those who served at least six months in the Army were also paid £2 with which to buy civilian clothing.⁶⁰

On leaving the theatres of war, the men's Paybooks were submitted to military authorities for the computation of their final deferred pay and gratuity. The nominal rolls, containing final pay balances were then sent from Pay Corps Headquarters in Nairobi to the Army Pay Office in Lusaka, where, in conjunction with the local Records Office, a man's amount of gratuity was calculated.⁶¹ These amounts and nominal rolls were in turn sent to the Postmaster-General in Livingstone for the preparation of the men's Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) accounts. The POSB books were then sent to Dispersal Centres in respective districts from where the ex-servicemen finally received their dues. The calculation of deferred pay and gratuity included deductions of any fines incurred while serving in the army. An unmarried Private earned one shilling six pence per day while a married Private was paid two shillings three pence per day, of which nine shillings was deducted as deferred pay for both classes of soldiers. The system of deferred pay was widely misunderstood during and after the war, leading to confusion and suspicion.

The scheme of saving through the Post Office was not successful in inducing savings during the war, though it was the only method of handling a man's deferred pay. Typically,

⁵⁹ *Mutende* No. 198, August 1945.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held in Central Offices, Lusaka on Friday 20 July 1945.

soldiers withdrew all of their money as soon as they could. In line with imperial paternalism the administration worried about men squandering their money, but there was very little that could be done to prevent it. The District Commissioner for Mkushi noted this problem in February 1946 because out of a total of £1468.6 paid in service benefits to ex-servicemen in his district, only £748 had been deposited in savings bank accounts. He reported:

[t]here is a great reluctance to save money and without a considerable amount of persuasion I doubt it if anyone would save a penny of their benefits... I know of one msikari who deposited a good proportion of his money at Mkushi and then went straight into Broken Hill and withdrew all of it again within a few days.⁶²

Even those who had saved part of their payments with the Post Office soon went back and withdrew part, if not all, of what they had left behind. This problem was universal. In Mankoya district, government functionaries went to the extent of trying to limit the amount each returning serviceman could withdraw from the savings bank on arrival at the dispersal centre. The District Commissioner suggested:

[i]n the askari's own interest he should be allowed to draw on demobilisation at the Boma not more than £5 of any money due to him. The balance to be drawn after 2 months when the unstable excitement of homecoming and demobilisation will have worn off and hence likelihood of loss or unwise use of such money will have decreased. After 2 months the askari would have made plans for his future when the possession of capital may be most useful.⁶³

⁶² NAZ SEC1/1768, Mkushi After-Care Committee Progress Report, 28 February 1946; and *ibid*, Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Mwinilunga After-Care Committee held on Tuesday 20 November 1945.

⁶³ *Ibid*, District Commissioner (Mankoya) to Civil Reabsorption Officer (Lusaka), 29 November 1945; and *ibid*, Civil Reabsorption Officer (Lusaka) to District Commissioner (Kawambwa), 21 November 1945.

Reports from other African countries showed that the experience was the same as men withdrew money from their bank accounts almost as soon as they were opened.⁶⁴

6.3.2. Financial Rewards for European Servicemen

The most measurable form of inequality between African and European soldiers was pay and gratuities. The following “Release Benefits” were paid to European Officers and Other Ranks:

1. 56 days’ pay and ration allowance in the case of General Releases Class “A”. Men released under Classes “B” and “C”, however, were granted 21 days’ pay and ration allowance,
2. Overseas service benefits at the rate of one day’s pay for each month served “overseas”. This required the individual to have served “overseas” for not less than six months. For this purpose, service in British or Italian Somaliland, Abyssinia or South East Asia was regarded as service overseas,
3. £15 for civilian clothes. In addition certain items and Army clothing were retained by the men.⁶⁵
4. War gratuity at the rates given below in Table 6.2 for every month of service.

These payments were made by the Army Base Paymaster in Lusaka by cheque to the individual officer and soldier, or to his bank account. Measures were also taken to compensate apprentices who had served in the armed forces before completing their terms of apprenticeship. The government agreed to pay such apprentices, over the age of twenty-one, during the remainder of their term of apprenticeship, an allowance equivalent to the difference

⁶⁴ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held in Lusaka on 16 February 1946.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 2. Class A referred to servicemen released after 18 June 1945; Class B meant those that were released between 16 October 1944 and 7 May 1945. Class C on the other hand defined men released between 8 May and 18 June 1945.

between what they actually earned as apprentices and what they would have earned as tradesmen had their training not been interrupted by military service. Apprentices who had served in technical units of the army were allowed to apply for a reduction in their period of training if the work they did during the war was similar to the trade to which they were indentured.

6.4. Land Settlement

6.4.1. African Ex-Servicemen

A major demand by ex-servicemen was land for the establishment of farms. This was the preferred occupation for most servicemen when asked what they wanted to do after the war. The District Commissioner for Chingola reported in 1943:

[u]ndoubtedly, the common topic of conversation among askari on post war settlement is land and housing. Many of them have expressed strongly their desire to have a plot of land, for leasehold which they will pay rent to the Government or Native Authority, on which they could build a good burnt brick house and establish themselves and their family in a permanent home. The more intelligent have little wish to return permanently to the type of village life they left in 1939. There is unquestionably a strong desire for individual landholding outside of all village community.⁶⁶

Table 6.2: Gratuities Paid to European Servicemen

Rank	Amount Per Month of Service
Private	10 shillings

⁶⁶ Ibid, District Commissioner (Chingola) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 17 September 1943; see also ibid, District Commissioner (Kawambwa) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 2 October 1943; ibid, District Commissioner (Chinsali) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 5 November 1943; and ibid, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka), 30 May 1945.

Lance Corporal	10 shillings
Corporal	12 shillings
Lance Sergeant	12 shillings
Sergeant	14 shillings
Staff-Sergeant	16 shillings
Warrant-Officer II	18 shillings
Warrant-Officer I	20 shillings
Second-Lieutenant	25 shillings
Lieutenant	30 shillings
Captain	35 shillings
Major	40 shillings
Lieutenant-Colonel	45 shillings
Colonel	50 shillings
Brigadier	55 shillings

Source: N.R.G., *Notes on Demobilisation: Benefits, Rehabilitation, Procedure, etc., for Persons of Northern Rhodesian Origin Serving in the Armed Forces* (Lusaka, 1945), 2.

Servicemen wrote letters to government departments enquiring about the availability of farms or plots of land on which they could set up agricultural businesses upon their return from the war. A typical example is that of Private Alfred Hezekiah who wanted a farm in Mazabuka district. While serving in South East Asia Command, Hezekiah wrote: ‘I have the honour to ask you, the price of the farm (*sic*) and its tax in a year according to the N[orthern] R[hodesia] law. I want to buy a farm [on] which I can live with my mother and my wife too.’⁶⁷ In reply to this request, the Chief Secretary said there were no farms yet set aside for African troops until after the Native Land Tenure Committee had completed its investigations.⁶⁸ Although this committee had recommended the provision of land in certain parts of the country to be reserved for returning African soldiers, the government refused to do so.⁶⁹ Instead, as demonstrated below, tracts of land were set aside for European ex-servicemen in parts of Central and Southern provinces. This was similar to the Kenya land resettlement scheme started after the

⁶⁷ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. II., Private Alfred Hezekiah (HQ South East Asia Command) to The Manager, Government Farm (Mazabuka), 28 July 1945. See also *ibid*, Private Alfred Hezekiah (HQ South East Asia Command) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 20 October 1945.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Private NRA 1163 Alfred Hezekiah (HQ South East Asia Command), 30 August 1945.

⁶⁹ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Circular from Secretary of State (London) to All Governors, 12 July 1943.

First World War in which over two million acres of land was apportioned to both white former soldiers and to encourage new white settlement.⁷⁰ The aim of this scheme was to boost numbers of new white settlers in Kenya, but in Northern Rhodesia its intention was to draw existing European settlers into farming. Likewise, after the Second World War, Southern Rhodesia encouraged white ex-servicemen from different parts of Empire to immigrate there by offering them farms at low prices. The Salisbury municipality reduced property prices by £100 for white veterans.⁷¹

6.4.2. European Servicemen

A loan scheme was prepared with a view to assisting European farmers who were farming on their own account in the country at the outbreak of the war, and who joined the Armed Forces, but wanted to resume farming operations. Loans were administered by a committee chaired by the Director of Agriculture. Conditions under which loans were granted were as follows:

1. The applicant was required to satisfy the committee that his financial resources were insufficient to enable him to take the necessary measures for getting his farm into production again,
2. The maximum loan granted to an individual was £1,000,
3. Loans were interest-free,
4. Repayment of loans would start after the third year of farming. Thereafter, repayment was at the discretion of the committee, subject to full repayment being completed within a maximum period of fifteen years.

⁷⁰ C.J. Dunder, 'Men of the Officer Class': the Participants in the 1919 Soldier Settlement Scheme in Kenya,' *African Affairs*, 92, 366 (1993), 69-87.

⁷¹ Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front?', 82.

5. Loans granted were for the purchase of equipment, stock and farming requisites, the payment of labour, the erection of buildings and repairs of existing ones. Loans granted could not be used for the purchase of new land.⁷²

Furthermore, Crown land measuring 3,407 square miles was set aside in the area between Livingstone and Broken Hill districts for the settlement of European ex-servicemen who wanted to go into farming. In order to encourage new settlement by this category of Europeans, the Land Board made advances of initial capital on the following conditions:

1. Applicants were required to have in their possession minimum capital of £500,
2. Maximum loan granted was £2,500, or such lesser sum as was necessary to bring the applicant's total capital up to £3,000. But where the applicant already possessed capital in excess of £1,500, the maximum loan was £1,500,
3. Interest on unredeemed portions of loans were charged at the rate of four per cent per annum, and
4. Interest on loans was waived for the first three years from the date of issue of the first portion of a loan.⁷³

Applications were made within one year from the date of the applicant's discharge from the Army. Additionally, a monthly training allowance was paid to the new farmers at the following rates: unmarried men £5, married men £10 plus £3 for the first and £2 for each subsequent child.⁷⁴ Furthermore, to qualify for these benefits, an applicant was required to have either:

1. been resident in Northern Rhodesia at the time he joined the Forces,
2. joined the Forces within three months of having ceased to be resident in Northern Rhodesia, or

⁷² *Ibid* 3; and NRG, *Final Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Examine and Report on the Question of Land Settlement in Northern Rhodesia for Ex-Servicemen and Others* (Lusaka, 1945), 7-8.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 8.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 9.

3. been resident in Northern Rhodesia for at least 18 months during the three years immediately prior to joining the Forces.⁷⁵

These schemes were primarily designed for the growing of Turkish tobacco following the fall in the production of the commodity in the Middle East and the Balkan states due to war conditions. Northern Rhodesia was one of the alternative suppliers identified by the United States because of its long history in the growing of tobacco.⁷⁶ In 1951 the Land Board demarcated 145 farms measuring between 2,000-6,000 acres in the Mkushi farming block of which 15 were occupied in the same year.⁷⁷ There were also many applicants for land from South African ex-servicemen, most of whom were attracted by the possibility of making money quickly from tobacco growing.⁷⁸

6.5. Medical Care

6.5.1. African Servicemen

Men who were sick, wounded or maimed due to military service found it very difficult to find work in the post-war period. A few soldiers never recovered from the psychological effects of war but provision for their needs was minimal. Physical wounds were relatively easy to identify; mental scars were not, so that some ex-soldiers who were traumatised by their war experiences received neither pensions nor gratuities for such. Maimed soldiers feared that they might not be able to work again. Corporal Rabson Chombola lost two fingers in Burma and told his Commanding Officer that he would not go to his home village because of that handicap. He reported that:

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ C.N. Simunchembu, 'Commercial Farming and Social Change in Mkushi District, 1945-1975', M.A. Dissertation, University of Zambia, 1989, 26.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁷⁸ NRG, *Department of Agriculture Annual Report for the Year 1951* (Lusaka, 1952), 6.

[w]hen we left India for Nairobi, Kenya I told my commanding officer of my intentions to remain some where in Africa rather than going to my home village because of this lame. My Commanding Officer told me do not worry because of this lame, you can see some of your colleagues have lost their arms some their legs and some have died. Do not worry of this lame, when you get home you will be rewarded by the Government. The Government is going to give you a place to make a farm and built (*sic*) you a good house to live etc. But after [the war] all these promises became a night dream which never came true... ⁷⁹

Physically maimed soldiers, however, were the only category of ex-servicemen who obtained pensions from the army at the end of the war. Physically handicapped ex-soldiers received *ex-gratia* payments from the government, although the amount was insufficient to sustain their livelihoods, considering the high cost of living in the post-war period. Each of them was paid nine shillings and four pence per month in accordance with government Notices number 167 of 1940 and 254 of 1942. One such beneficiary was Private Levi Ngangula of Broken Hill district who was blinded in action in Abyssinia in April 1941. So small was this pension that the District After-Care Committee in Broken Hill provided him with an additional 10 shillings and eight pence each month in order to cushion his suffering.⁸⁰ No special provision was made for the medical care of disabled African soldiers. As the total number was only 37, the government felt that there was no need to make special arrangements for the resettlement and rehabilitation of soldiers categorised as medically unfit. A committee set up

⁷⁹ Rabson Chombola, interview with the BBC on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Second World War, Ndola, 24 November 1989.

⁸⁰ NAZ SEC1/1768, Minutes of a Meeting of the Broken Hill After-Care Committee held on 4 February 1947 at 2:15 pm.

to investigate and report on this problem concluded that treatment could be provided by existing health institutions.⁸¹

African ex-servicemen were also aggrieved because they felt their European counterparts had been better taken care of by the state than them. As racial discrimination had been a characteristic feature of southern Africa since the beginning of colonial rule, the distribution of available resources in the country was largely determined by racial considerations. This policy was manifest during the demobilization process of troops after the Second World War. European ex-soldiers received much higher gratuities than Africans. As can be deduced from Tables 6.1 and 6.2 above, men having the same rank were paid different rates of gratuity based on race. A European Private or Corporal received 300 per cent more money than their African equivalent.

6.5.2. European Servicemen

Discharged European soldiers, with at least twelve months' service, who joined the Forces in Northern Rhodesia received free treatment at government hospitals for any medical or surgical condition for one year from the date of discharge.⁸² This concession, however, did not include the cost of transport to and from the hospital nor did it apply in the case of accidents which were covered by the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance or other forms of insurance. To qualify for the scheme, an officer or soldier was required to submit within six months of discharge from the Army an application to the Director of Medical Services providing evidence that he was eligible for the concession.

⁸¹ NAZ SEC1/1764, Post-War Problems Notes Circulated to Members of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee, 1943; and NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Extract from Minutes of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held in the Chief Secretary's Office on 20 September 1942; *ibid*, Extract from Minutes of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee Meeting held on 20 October 1943.

⁸² *Ibid*, 5.

6.6. Other benefits for European Servicemen

6.6.1. Loans for Business and Trade

The government were also cognisant of the fact that other European ex-servicemen were not in employment at the start of the war but were involved in business or other trades, hence the need to compensate them for their war service. To this end, a scheme was devised to restore such men into their previous occupations through loan-acquisitions. To qualify for loans under this scheme, an applicant was required to have had a business before the war and the business must have been relinquished when one joined the Armed Forces. The business to be set up was required to be the same as that which had been relinquished. The maximum loan granted to any individual was £1,000 interest-free, to be paid back within a period of ten years, starting in the second year, but if the net profits of the business exceeded the amount borrowed, the period of repayment could be reduced.⁸³ Any overdue instalments attracted five per cent interest. It was a requirement that all loans given out be secured by collateral in the form of a mortgage on property owned by the applicant or tools used in the business. The applicant also undertook not to dispose of the business or to enter into any arrangement with the creditor or to go into voluntary liquidation without the prior approval of the Financial Secretary.

6.6.2. Educational Assistance

Another scheme devised to help European ex-servicemen reintegrate into civil life was educational assistance. This was designed to assist, by means of grants or loans, ex-service personnel whose university studies were interrupted by the war or who wished to take up such studies for the first time.⁸⁴ Those interested were encouraged to contact the Director of European Education at Mazabuka in order to collect an application form. A maximum grant of

⁸³ NRG, *Notes on Demobilisation*, 3.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 4.

£80 could be paid and supplemented by an interest-free loan not exceeding £150 per annum.⁸⁵ All loans paid out were to be repayable over a period of fifteen years, with repayments commencing two years after the completion of the university course undertaken. Consideration was also taken to aid applicants who wished to study at any institution of their choice other than a university.

Further, the government organised vocational training programmes for physically disadvantaged ex-servicemen in conjunction with the government of the Union of South Africa at universities, university colleges, or technical colleges there. The training to be provided depended upon the candidate's vocational intentions and his previous academic or professional training. Anyone interested in this programme was required to contact the Director of Medical Services in Lusaka to start the process.

6.7. Post-War Employment for African Servicemen

The greatest headache for the colonial administration, however, was the demand for employment by the newly released soldiers, many of whom had learned a trade in the army. While the military was responsible for demobilizing the men, the Department of Labour was charged with the responsibility of finding work for certain ex-servicemen. Soldiers were warned that there were not enough jobs available for all of them upon demobilization. This did not reduce their expectations, though. Former soldiers argued that they ought to be rewarded for their wartime service through the provision of jobs. The low level of economic development in the country during the war and immediate post-war period meant there were not enough jobs to meet the demand.⁸⁶ The most difficult to satisfy were those who had been recruited from among the literate sections of the population, and those who had acquired trades in the army.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Unlike in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the war did not stimulate much industrial growth in Northern Rhodesia leading to job creation.

Ex-servicemen returned home with high expectations of economic opportunity and social advancement, often to be cruelly disillusioned.⁸⁷ Nor were men keen on remaining in the army. When asked to return to military positions in the post-war period, the majority of the men of the NRR 2nd, 4th and 5th Battalions, vehemently declined the offer. It was reported that '[r]oars of laughter greeted the suggestion that anybody might stay in the army.'⁸⁸ Working for the army was now looked down upon.

A number of men with trade skills after training in the Army hoped to find equivalent jobs in civil life. Signallers looked to the Post Office, Pioneers to the Public Works Department, tradesmen such as blacksmiths, carpenters and drivers to the copper mines and Rhodesia Railways. These skilled and semi-skilled ex-servicemen were not interested in settling down in their villages, but wanted jobs in urban centres. Unlike the Gold Coast where ex-servicemen with primary education and a trade found satisfactory employment,⁸⁹ the situation in Northern Rhodesia was different. Even ex-soldiers with Class I proficiency such as drivers, signallers and medical orderlies struggled for jobs with other citizens. Northern Rhodesia had 1473 men who had been trained as drivers, 270 as nursing orderlies and 263 in other trades.⁹⁰ This state of affairs, however, was not unique to Northern Rhodesia. In Nyasaland, for example, it was estimated that upon demobilization in 1945 the colony was expected to find jobs for about 4,000 army drivers and other veterans who had built up wartime skills in medical, clerical and educational roles.⁹¹ The Northern Rhodesian economy lacked capacity to absorb the large cadre of drivers and other tradesmen. At the time, there were few secondary industries with openings for the skilled tradesmen that came back from the war.

⁸⁷ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 182.

⁸⁸ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Chief Secretary (Lusaka) to Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka), 30 May 1945.

⁸⁹ Israel, 'Ex-Servicemen at the Crossroads', 361-2.

⁹⁰ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Employment of African Soldiers Sub-Committee held in the Secretary for Native Affairs' Office, Lusaka on Thursday 26 October 1943 at 2PM; and *ibid*, Confidential Analysis of Army Tradesmen (African) Recruited from Northern Rhodesia up to 30 September 1943.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, Post-War Training and Employment for African Ex-Servicemen in Nyasaland, n.d. but c.1945.

Once demobilized, ex-servicemen hoped to receive income commensurate with their new skills and the experience gained within the ranks. Many had high expectations of what they would be able to do after the war. They hoped for wage employment using the skills acquired or improved upon in the army. The majority were dismayed to find that jobs were just not available or if they were, to be told that they were not well-qualified for them. When ex-servicemen refused to accept jobs they were offered and demanded higher pay than other workers or complained excessively, they soon exhausted public sympathy and patience.⁹² The press accused this class of ex-servicemen of suffering from a superiority complex or being infected with the “Burma Complex”.⁹³ This problem was universal; as Timothy Stapleton reveals, in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia, a national Rehabilitation Committee also observed a similar trend.⁹⁴

Returned servicemen developed a dislike for manual labour. Many of them preferred to be employed in supervisory positions, especially those who were literate or skilled. This category was far less willing to return to their pre-war work or economic condition. In the Barotse province, it was reported that ‘... the msikhari (*sic*) is at the moment mostly interested in an easy job of the *capitao* (foreman) kind, and would rather loaf in the village than handle a pick and shovel’.⁹⁵ This kind of behaviour continued to be exhibited even in neighbouring countries where Northern Rhodesian ex-servicemen went in search of work. This was the problem facing men from Petauke district who went to Southern Rhodesia in early 1946 in search of jobs as mine police in supervisory positions. None of them was employed because, as the Labour Commissioner noted, ‘... ex-soldiers can only expect to get work in a supervisory

⁹² Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 195.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ T. Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-1980* (Rochester, 2011), 217.

⁹⁵ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. II., Extract from the Barotse Provincial Newsletter for the First Quarter of 1946, 26 April 1946. See also *ibid.*, Labour Commissioner (Lusaka) to Commissioner of Police (Livingstone), 24 September 1946; and *ibid.*, Labour Officer (Fort Jameson) to Labour Commissioner (Lusaka), 4 September 1946.

capacity by starting as manual labourers and impressing their employers with their superiority to other workers.’⁹⁶ In Southern Rhodesia most African veterans also did not want to do manual labour or domestic service like some men who had not participated in the war did.⁹⁷ The men had become accustomed to the protective umbrella of the army’s welfare system, but after demobilization failed to survive in a labour market where there was a high level of competition for paid employment.

In the period after the war, the search for employment opportunities was urgent for some men who previously were peasant farmers but now had become accustomed to a higher standard of living. After the First World War, the *askari* were only too glad to get home as they had on many occasions, especially in the later stages of the war in Africa, gone short of rations, and looked forward to a better life in their villages than that obtained in the army.⁹⁸ In the Second World War, however, the situation was very different. African soldiers received better food rations and clothing, free cigarettes and other luxuries.⁹⁹ After the war, former soldiers could buy these luxuries only if they had a steady source of income. Many ex-servicemen began to look for employment once their savings began to run out. The reason for this was that as soon as the men returned, they proceeded home to rest for periods ranging from about six to 12 months during which time most of them exhausted their earnings. It was only then that the desire to find formal jobs arose. By early 1947, the District After-Care Committee in Mporokoso was able to report that:

[i]t is at last becoming noticeable that ex-askari are finishing their gratuity. The number of applications for work have risen from about 2 a week to 2 a day, but it

⁹⁶ Ibid, Labour Commissioner (Lusaka) to Secretary, Post-War Problems (African) Committee (Lusaka), 30 March 1946.

⁹⁷ Stapleton, *African Police*, 217.

⁹⁸ Ibid, Labour Officer (Fort Jameson) to Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka), 11 December 1945.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

is pointed out to them that work, unless they care to take on that of general labour or on the roads is very scarce on an outstation.¹⁰⁰

The difficulty of finding employment for returned ex-servicemen was well illustrated by the lamentation of the Labour Officer at Fort Jameson:

[a]s Secretary of the After-Care Committee it is my duty to assist the ex-soldier. This is a very difficult job. I take great pains to find work if possible, but in a country with such a small employer population and with people like the ex-soldiers who are so extremely selective of employment, the scope is small. Any manual labour, as in the case of the Standard IV native from the village, is looked on as quite beneath their dignity. They are all looking for soft jobs and consider themselves entitled to get them, though they are very decent about it.¹⁰¹

The frustration of not finding jobs became widespread among returned servicemen and was observed by all district After-Care Committees. In one instance, Private Chanda Chileshe approached the Secretary of the Mpika After-Care Committee about employment as a driver. The difficulties in finding employment for a Class II driver had been pointed out to him but he refused to consider any other work.¹⁰² As was soon discovered, the challenge of finding employment for men was not restricted to the lower classes of tradesmen as it cut across the board. Indeed, this was the case with Class I proficiency drivers who equally could not find their desired jobs. Private Jim Mulenga, a Class I driver was sent to seek employment as a driver with Thatcher and Hobson, a trucking entity in Broken Hill. He could not be taken on

¹⁰⁰ NAZ SEC1/1768, Minutes of a Meeting of Mporokoso After-Care Committee held on 29 March 1947; and *The Times*, Tuesday 21 August 1945.

¹⁰¹ NAZ SEC1/1768, Extract from the Report for the Year Ending 31 December 1946 by the Labour Officer, Fort Jameson; and NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 17 January 1946.

¹⁰² NAZ SEC1/1768, Minutes of the Meeting of the Sixth Meeting of the Mpika District After-Care Committee held on 2 April 1946.

due to the lack of vacancies, and was forced to return to Mpika, jobless.¹⁰³ So was the case with many other trained drivers such as Corporal Flyson Chibuye, ‘a conscientious N.C.O. and of good character’, who sought employment with Messrs Smith and Kitchin but could not be recruited because of the lack of positions at the firm.¹⁰⁴ Opportunities for the types of relatively more prestigious and better-paid work expected by veterans such as drivers were rare: as Stapleton demonstrates, Africans tended to retain these jobs and employers did not want to discharge an experienced person to hire an unknown former soldier.¹⁰⁵ The low numbers of ex-servicemen who had been re-employed in civilian supervisory, skilled, or semi-skilled positions was a reflection of the levels of unemployment among Africans in the country. Owing to the territory-wide implementation of the colour-bar policy, especially in the mining industry, the single major employer, not many Africans could be employed in the higher classes.

Other employers argued that ex-servicemen were not employable due to inadequate training in the army. Major J.E. Kitchin, a transporter with Smith and Kitchin Company was of the opinion that the ordinary ex-army driver, even Class I men, was not suited by his army training to undertake efficiently the duties of a civilian transport driver. His firm could not employ many returned drivers because:

[t]he ex-Army driver, although a good driver and able to carry out routine maintenance on a vehicle was used to driving in convoy or to having ready assistance from a breakdown vehicle and probably from a British N.C.O., should trouble occur. The commercial driver must be self-reliant when it came to repairs to his vehicle, especially when on his own, on the road.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, Minutes of the Meeting of the Mpika After-Care Committee held on 8 January 1946.

¹⁰⁵ Stapleton, *African Police*, 218-9.

¹⁰⁶ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 16 February 1946.

Ex-servicemen who had received occupational training in the army as drivers and artisans found that military standards of proficiency often did not prepare them to carry on the same occupation in civil life. As Simelane noted, the army was simply a war machine and its educational functions were limited to those necessary to accomplish that single task.¹⁰⁷

Government departments which were expected to give ex-servicemen preference in filling appointments also had reservations about engaging them. The Post Office was expected to employ all ex-army signallers. The assumption was that military training had given the servicemen new skills. The Post Master-General, however, noted that not all men could be taken on, not only due to insufficient openings for Postal Clerks in the system, but also due to the incompatibility between the military signallers' training and that offered at the Postal Training School in Livingstone. For a start, the postal system employed 25 men, representing 25 per cent of the total number of Northern Rhodesian Africans who had qualified as signallers in the army. It was noted that the signallers' course offered in Nairobi was designed solely for military requirements as the syllabus dealt with military signalling procedure, heliograph and flags, and lighting, aspects which were useless for Post Office requirements.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, signallers' military requirements did not call for training in accounts, counter duties, Post Office procedures, and rules and regulations which formed an indispensable part of a Postal Clerk's training.¹⁰⁹ That aside, it was also noted that the training offered to signallers in Nairobi was offered in the ki-Swahili language. There was, therefore, a need to re-train all former signallers in English in order for them to be eligible for appointment to positions in the graded class of the African civil service.

¹⁰⁷ Simelane, 'Veterans, Politics and Poverty', 155-6.

¹⁰⁸ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Post Master-General (Livingstone) to Chief Secretary (Lusaka), 30 May 1945.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

There were also reservations in the Department of Health concerning the employment of medical assistants, sanitary assistants and nursing orderlies who had served in the military. This was due to inadequate training offered by the military. The Director of Medical Services noted that the qualifications of former medical personnel in the army were of very low standard. He could not expect any worthy position in his Department to be occupied by former Army medical staff unless such officers underwent further training.¹¹⁰ It was argued that a nursing orderly Class III would require further training from the beginning before one could be employed, as the army training was not equivalent to a full two-year course obtainable from a mission hospital.

The explanation for this state of affairs lies in the fact that the primary task of the army was simply that of a war machine. Everything was geared to accomplish victory, and nothing else. The army was, therefore, not an educational institution. Any learning process or training which had a long term effect was merely incidental because the overriding aim was to expedite a successful conclusion to the war. More thorough training was necessary to prepare servicemen to carry on the same occupation in civilian life. Educational provision for soldiers was late in being organised. Wartime military education, such as it was, was strictly geared to military ends – it aimed to give men the requisite skills to carry out military duties and did not prepare them adequately for civilian tasks in the post-war era.¹¹¹ Education in the army mainly involved instruction in basic English and a limited number of classes in literacy and numeracy. For the most part, provision was piecemeal and haphazard. The army had only trained men to be of use in their military capacities and very few had developed mechanical skills and literacy to such a standard as to make employment after the war possible without further training.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, Director of Medical Services (Lusaka) to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23 October 1945; and NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. II., Extract from Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 8 September 1945.

¹¹¹ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 185-6.

The majority of returning soldiers were non-literate and returned straight to their homes in the rural areas. Others, however, found that without modern skills and literacy, the only types of wage labour available in nearby towns were low-paying: messengers, gardeners, cooks, cleaners or watchmen. Although local After-Care committees were pragmatic in finding employment for ex-combatants, it was not easy to place all the men in the positions they wanted. While post-war employment opportunities were scarce, many returned men in the country did not want to remain in the army. This scenario was quite different from the Kenyan experience where the Kamba people, for example, used their newly acquired status as a “martial race” to seek employment in the army after the war end of the war.¹¹² In Northern Rhodesia, most ex-servicemen did not develop a strong sense of entitlement towards military service, the wages of which were considerably lower than civilian rates, which they envied. The After-Care Committee in Mwinilunga district found a job for a former Non-Commissioned Officer Sakutenuka as a District Messenger, but he was dissatisfied about it because the rate of pay of 20 shillings per month was far lower than the monthly 48 shillings which he earned in the army.¹¹³ To the consternation of the colonial authorities, a few men went to urban centres on the Copperbelt, Broken Hill and Livingstone in search of employment. Private Mulenga Mushonka was offered the job of a night watchman at the Mindolo Mission in Kitwe but turned it down on grounds that the pay of 35 shillings per month was not high enough.¹¹⁴ Oral evidence attests to this. One ex-serviceman retorted when interviewed, that ‘some of our comrades remained desolate and embittered for a long period of time before something meaningful could be found’.¹¹⁵

¹¹² See Lewis, *Empire State-Building*.

¹¹³ NAZ SEC1/1768, Monthly Report of the Mwinilunga After-Care Committee for the Month of September 1945; and *ibid*, Minutes of a Meeting of the Mwinilunga After-Care Committee held on Tuesday 20 November 1945.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Mpika After-Care Committee held on 2 April 1946.

¹¹⁵ Mulenga, interview cited.

Those that did not find work often became destitute. Anwell Siame, who had served in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment as a Medical Orderly, could not find work after the war ended. When interviewed in August 1989, he said:

I wanted to hang myself simply because I had no chance of going back to school, no where to get money to support my family and since I had no education qualifications I had no were (sic) to find employment, so I joined the world of starvation.¹¹⁶

Such stories proliferated as gratuities and savings ran out and the probability of finding work shrank by the day.

6.8. Political Role of African Ex-Servicemen

Many historians in the 1960s stressed the important role of ex-servicemen in post-war nationalist politics,¹¹⁷ but the evidence for this is thin. This debate emerged particularly strongly in the West African context, where the involvement of ex-servicemen in the Gold Coast disturbances of 1948 was regarded as a key moment in the rise of nationalist sentiment. Recent research presents a different view – that ex-servicemen as a group were no more significant in territorial politics than any other occupational group. David Killingray, Ashley Jackson, John Hargreaves, Louis Grundlingh and Hamilton Simelane, among others, have challenged the idea that the impact of returning African soldiers was of great significance for the rise of nationalism.¹¹⁸ With a few exceptions, military service does not seem to have transformed servicemen in Northern Rhodesia into politically active citizens with a new

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 198.

¹¹⁷ Notable among these include Olusanya, 'The Role of Ex-Servicemen in Nigerian Politics'; Schleh, 'The Post-War Careers of Ex-Servicemen'; and Crowder, 'The 1939 War and West Africa'.

¹¹⁸ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*; Jackson, *Botswana*; J. Hargreaves, *Decolonisation in Africa* (London, 1996); L.W.F. Grundlingh, 'South African Blacks in the Second World War', D.Litt Et. Phil, Rand Afrikaans University, 1986, retrieved from <http://www.ujdispace.uj.ac.za> [accessed 27 July 2014]; and Simelane, 'Veterans, Politics and Poverty'.

national outlook. As one European soldier observed during war service in Asia, African soldiers' concepts were merely broadened rather than revolutionised.¹¹⁹ He went on to say '... I regard as fantastic any suggestion that the returned African soldier will clamour for the franchise – he is not in the least interested in such matters'.¹²⁰ On their return from the war, either through discharge or demobilization, African ex-servicemen did not organise themselves into a political movement calling for the end of colonial rule. Many of them remained politically aloof, seemed loyal to British colonial rule and valued war medals awarded to them at the end of the fighting. In a statement about the Gold Coast which might equally apply to Northern Rhodesia, Killingray observed that:

[w]ithout doubt military service, particularly overseas, helped extend the political and economic understanding of individual soldiers. A number of men undoubtedly returned home with a wider knowledge of the world, and a determination to translate their new perceptions into social and political action. However, military service alone did not mean that the soldiers developed a deeper understanding of politics...¹²¹

Similarly, John Hargreaves argued that:

[d]emobilised soldiers were not, on the whole, burning to liberate their countries from colonial rule; their enlarged consciousness often embraced disciplined loyalty to the empire, and campaign medals were cherished possessions... Ambition was as likely to focus on initiating improvement in the home village.¹²²

¹¹⁹ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. III., Captain F. Johnstone (HQ 21 East Africa Command, Nairobi) to Sir Stewart Gore-Browne (Lusaka), 21 September 1943.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Killingray, 'Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen and Politics in the Gold Coast', 524-5.

¹²² Hargreaves, *Decolonisation*, 70-1.

This chapter endorses the above conclusions for Northern Rhodesia. That ex-servicemen from Northern Rhodesia did not participate, collectively at least, in the rise of nationalism in the country cannot be wholly accounted for by their insignificant numbers, as claimed by David Johnson and Timothy Stapleton for Southern Rhodesia.¹²³ While these scholars' explanation may suffice for colonial Zimbabwe, which, by contributing a paltry 2,000 men, had the least number of manpower among British African colonial forces, this reasoning cannot suffice for all territories on the continent. This is because even in colonies where the ratio of servicemen to the general population was the greatest, their large numbers did not make them amenable to nationalist politics in the immediate post-war period.¹²⁴ Individual affluence and development was very much the order of the day. These had to do with the search for jobs, better living standards, and survival in general. Lewis made similar observations about Kenyan ex-servicemen who were equally concerned with more everyday issues than nationalist politics, as well as the fact that the experience of being in military service often had a conservative effect on individuals.¹²⁵ Upon their return, few of the men desired great change or if they did, did not do much to initiate it. They wanted to be left alone to pursue their lives. Individual ambition usually projected a future of self-improvement within the bounds of traditional avenues of self-enrichment and advancement. It is not obvious that the war made Africans question colonial rule or the rule of chiefs through which it was mediated. As in Bechuanaland, so too for Northern Rhodesia, after up to five years of unbroken military service, most men were simply overjoyed to return to their homes and resume civilian life again.¹²⁶

¹²³ D. Johnson, *World War Two and the Scramble for Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1939-1948* (Harare, 2000), 27; and Stapleton, *African Police*, 221.

¹²⁴ See, for example, Jackson, *Botswana*; Simelane, 'Veterans, Politics and Poverty', and M.N. Ntabeni, 'Military Labour Mobilisation in Colonial Lesotho during World War II, 1940-1943', *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 36, 2 (2008), 36-59.

¹²⁵ Lewis, *Empire State Building*, 203, 240.

¹²⁶ Jackson, *Botswana*, 241.

In Northern Rhodesia, nationalist politics developed on the home front, and was not a development initiated by the return and subsequent frustration of ex-servicemen. The history of nationalism in the country pre-dates the onset of the war. It stemmed from the formation of welfare societies and trade unions. The first African welfare society was formed by African mission-educated elites in 1912 at Mwenzo.¹²⁷ During the next few years, a number of welfare societies were formed in other rural districts, although these turned into social clubs without any political aims. Between 1929 and 1931, more welfare societies were formed in several towns along the line of rail. These were more purposeful than the previous ones. They, too, like others before, were confined to small groups of the educated class, that is, clerks and teachers, among whom Livingstonia mission graduates were prominent.¹²⁸ But they made important efforts to protect the interests of ordinary people, and it was easier to do this in towns than in the sparsely populated countryside. According to a leading nationalist and member of the Mwenzo Welfare Society, Kapasa Makasa, a popular discourse in the meetings of the society in the late 1940s and 1950s was the sensitisation of Africans regarding the exploitation which they had been subjected to due to their involvement in the First and Second World Wars. As he explained:

[p]romises that were made when recruiting Africans were never fulfilled. Fortunately, some of the war veterans who had survived the wars attended these meetings. It was easy for us to point to one of the ex-service men at the rally and compare his poverty-riddled existence with his European counterpart. We did not fail to expose the discrimination and slave-like conditions under which the Africans laboured in the two wars. Apart from earning starvation wages as compared to European soldiers, African *askaris* ... could not be offered

¹²⁷ A. Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (London, 1976), 196-205.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 197.

employment or any other benefits which their white counterparts enjoyed on their return.¹²⁹

This was how some ex-servicemen joined the struggle for independence in the country. African trade unions emerged after the war, but their history goes as far back as the first mine workers strike in 1935.¹³⁰ The first African-led political party was formed in Northern Rhodesia in 1948 following the transformation of the Federation of Welfare Societies into the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (NRAC). It was led by Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika, an aristocrat from Barotseland.

Oral evidence supports the argument advanced by this study that ex-servicemen simply jumped on the bandwagon of the struggle for political independence much later. On their return home, ex-servicemen found nationalist politics already in motion. As Mulenga put it:

[b]y and large, we *found* the situation back home, in urban areas different. There was a different struggle going on - a political one, which was perceptively new to us war veterans. I, like many others, through understanding certain implications had no choice but to toil the line *to support* the political will. After the good things we had seen abroad; [the] dire need to see change [at home] was aflame [emphasis mine].¹³¹

This testimony is corroborated by Makasa who stated that:

[w]e [nationalists] reminded them [ex-servicemen] that they were bundled and pushed into these wars just because they were colonial subjects. We made it doubly sure that these points got rubbed into their heads and that they would

¹²⁹ Makasa, *Zambia's March to Political Freedom*, 41.

¹³⁰ See, for example, H.S. Meebelo, *Reaction to Colonialism* (Manchester, 1970).

¹³¹ Mulenga, interview cited.

understand the evils and disadvantages of colonialism. We called upon them to join the political struggle in order to break the chains of colonialism ...¹³²

Similarly, in nearby South Africa, black civilian organisations such as the African National Congress and trade unions were already politically active when ex-servicemen returned home after the war, and those who wished to express their political concerns joined these organisations.¹³³ In dismissing the front line position of ex-servicemen in the struggle for independence in Northern Rhodesia, Mulenga further stated that 'there were associations like the Mine Workers Trade Union on the Copperbelt and other political factions that were busy spear-heading the political revolution'.¹³⁴ Many studies have shown that these organisations were led by ordinary citizens and not ex-servicemen.¹³⁵ This, however, does not mean that ex-servicemen did not sympathise with nationalist politics or that some of them did not become ordinary members of political parties.

Additionally, the impact of the war on the Northern Rhodesian home front was not as great as in parts of East and West Africa. The war did not precipitate widespread discontent that was later transformed into resistance to colonial rule. Undeniably, the war brought about economic and social hardships to ordinary people as has been demonstrated in Chapter Four. But compared to the huge labour demands made on other British colonies such as Nigeria, Sudan and the Gold Coast, and the scarcity of goods, the war's impact upon Northern Rhodesia was negligible. Consequently, war-time challenges did not adversely affect enough people to

¹³² Makasa, *Zambia's March to Political Freedom*, 41.

¹³³ Grundlingh, 'The Participation of South African Blacks'.

¹³⁴ Mulenga, interview cited.

¹³⁵ See variously Meebelo, *Reaction to Colonialism*; I. Henderson, 'The Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Africa: the Zambian Case', *Journal of African History*, 11, 4 (1970), 591-603; *ibid*, 'Wage Earners and Political Protest in Colonial Africa: the Case of the Copperbelt', *African Affairs*, 72, 288 (July 1973), 288-299; R. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: the Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Boston, 1965); C. Perrings, 'Conflict and Proletarianisation: An Assessment of the 1935 Mineworkers' Strike on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 4, 1 (1977), 31-51; M. Musambachime, 'Dauti Yamba's Contribution to the Rise and Growth of Nationalism in Zambia, 1941-1964', *African Affairs*, 90, 359 (1991), 259-281; and M. Wright, 'An Old Nationalist in New Nationalist Times: Donald Siwale and the State in Zambia, 1948-1963', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23, 2 (1997), 339-351.

provide fertile ground for political agitation by ex-servicemen. As Jackson suggested, part of the mystery about why returning ex-servicemen played little part in the post-war political developments must lie in the fact that the majority of them, despite numerous gripes and grumbles, were content enough to return to the life they had lived before the war.¹³⁶

But, the war inadvertently had an effect in the growth of an African political voice in the country. By launching an extensive propaganda campaign to fight African indifference in the early stages of the war, the government itself helped to make the local people more conscious of wider societal issues. As discussed in Chapter Two, war propaganda for Africans was conveyed by means of radio, film, leaflets, *Mutende* newspaper, and through lectures and talks by military and government administrative officials. The war news and propaganda to which the African population was suddenly exposed hastened the emergence of an African political voice.¹³⁷ This media frenzy had a boomerang effect in the country. By using the expanded media which the government had established to spread war propaganda, African nationalists found it easier to communicate with the masses than before. Wartime *Mutende*, now published fortnightly, was the most important weapon in the Information Office's propaganda arsenal. Key African figures to emerge during this period included school teachers Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula and Dauti Yamba. These emerging nationalists used the media to denounce the planned amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia because of racist policies which operated in the latter country. Owing to government censorship of the media meant for Africans during this period, Nkumbula's letter on the topic of amalgamation was denied space in *Mutende* in 1942.¹³⁸ It was, therefore, through uncensored media that Africans came to know about controversial topics such as the Atlantic Charter and the New

¹³⁶ Jackson, *Botswana*, 250.

¹³⁷ Rosaleen Smyth, 'War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia', *African Affairs*, 83, 332 (1984), 345.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 354.

World Order which supported the right of all peoples to self-government. These topics became regular features in the *Bantu Mirror*'s leaders, editorials, articles and letters. As Martin Meredith argued, African elites took the Atlantic Charter to constitute some form of official encouragement to demand political rights.¹³⁹ In the process of writing to *Mutende* and the *Bantu Mirror* and having their opinions heard in Provincial Council meetings, Nkumbula and other articulate elites established territory-wide reputations in Northern Rhodesia. It is precisely for this reason that Nkumbula's biographer, Giacomo Macola, aptly considered him 'Zambian nationalism's prime instigator in the 1940s and 1950s'.¹⁴⁰

Ex-servicemen from Northern Rhodesia, however, did not remain apolitical. Many of them participated in politics at the local, grassroots level. If there was a group of people the returned servicemen disliked the most in the post-war period, it was that of chiefs in their home areas. This was primarily because it was chiefs who helped recruit many of many for military service and the failure by the government to fulfil the "promises" made to them during enlistment came to fall on chiefs. Some of them rejected local social structures, although this sometimes took an implicit form. As many ex-servicemen returned to their rural homes, some exercised a significant political role challenging the authority of chiefs and questioning accepted ideas and practices. "Truculent" behaviour by servicemen towards civilians was also reported from early in the war, and later there were reports of assaults on civilians.¹⁴¹ Others made more direct attacks upon "unprogressive" traditional authority. There is much evidence that wartime experiences caused soldiers to question structures of traditional authority in

¹³⁹ Meredith, *The State of Africa*, 9.

¹⁴⁰ G. Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga* (New York, 2009), 1. See, also G. Mwangilwa, *Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula: Biography of the 'Old Lion' of Zambia* (Lusaka, 1984).

¹⁴¹ University of Zambia Library Special Collections, Gov.Zam/02/1944, Minutes of the Eastern Province Regional Council held at Fort Jameson on 24 and 25 July 1944; NAZ SEC2/1135, Report on Tour to Madagascar by Information Officer, 22 February 1943; NAZ SEC1/1775 Report on Public Opinion for Barotse Province for April-July 1943; and NAZ SEC1/1775 Report on Public Opinion for Barotse Province for January-June 1944.

Northern Rhodesia than they did the colonial establishment.¹⁴² The stress caused by the circumstances of prolonged overseas service, and particularly the social anxieties caused by men's separation from their wives and families, created tensions in relation to traditional leadership, as soldiers questioned the efficacy of chiefs' management of their family affairs in their absence.

One way in which some ex-servicemen expressed their frustration with traditional leaders was by setting up their post-war settlements away from the villages so that they could not fall under the supervision of chiefs. The word "farm" was used as a cloak for the desire to break from village discipline. One of the earliest people to note this trend was the District Commissioner for Broken Hill who, in 1943, stated that:

... I see no reason why one should expect the returned soldier to regard the Lenje chiefs in any other way. I do not think we can possibly expect men who have been doing their duty in the Army to take kindly to the 'rule' of men like chiefs Chipepo and Chitanda, to mention the worst of a thoroughly bad lot, and it is no doubt for this reason that ... most soldiers hope to find work in the towns or else to have farms of their own.¹⁴³

Despite attempts by the authorities in the villages to allay servicemen's fears of their wives' infidelity through newsletters and radio broadcasts, complaints persisted. The expression of

¹⁴² See, for example, NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., District Commissioner (Mpika) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 29 September 1943; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Kasama) to Northern Province (Kasama), 19 November 1943; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Balovale) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 4 November 1943; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Mwinilunga) to Provincial Commissioner, Kaonde Lunda Province (Kasempa), 3 September 1943; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Kawambwa) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 2 October 1943; *ibid*, District Commissioner (Chinsali) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province (Kasama), 5 November 1943; and A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 188.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, District Commissioner (Broken Hill) to Provincial Commissioner, Central Province (Broken Hill), 15 September 1943. See also *ibid*, District Commissioner (Chingola) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 17 September 1943; NAZ SEC2/1135, Report on Tour to Troops by Information Officer; and NAZ SEC2/181 Minutes of the District Commissioners' Conference for the Northern Province held at Kasama from 22-27 February 1943.

political thought, however, was limited to the local level. It was a perennial fear of colonial civil authorities in Africa that returning soldiers would be “detrified” by their military service, and therefore unable to reintegrate into rural society, or to recognise “traditional” authorities.¹⁴⁴ It was probably due to this fear of returning servicemen that colonial authorities advised chiefs to appoint some of them as advisors on traditional councils.¹⁴⁵

6.9. Effects of War Service

Northern Rhodesian men had been to East Africa, the Middle East, Palestine, India, Burma, Madagascar and Ceylon. These travels undertaken to different countries by the servicemen widened their experiences a greater deal than in the Great War, when they fought within the vicinity of adjoining East Africa and met conditions much the same as those at home.¹⁴⁶ The men had fought on equal terms with white-skinned Italians, and had no great opinion of them. As one European officer from the NRR observed, ‘[a]s Bwanas [masters], they [Italians] failed to fit into the picture. This was a source of great puzzlement, and frequent questions for their European colleagues. The explanation that there are “mitundu” [types] of white men too still leaves heads shaking’.¹⁴⁷ In Ceylon, men from the NRR fought side by side with the British Tommy. Describing a British Tommy, one NRR officer noted that:

[t]his was a white man who rode third class in the trains, was found to brawl in the streets, did manual chores and above all did not consider himself, still less proclaim himself to be, a superior race. On the contrary, British Tommies are

¹⁴⁴ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*.

¹⁴⁵ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., District Commissioner (Chingola) to Provincial Commissioner, Western Province (Ndola), 17 September 1943.

¹⁴⁶ L.H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953* (London, 1964), 328.

¹⁴⁷ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. III., Notes by Col. H. McDowell, Lusaka, 11 November 1942. *Mitundu* referred to many ethnic groups or races. Singular form = *mutundu*.

friendly egalitarians and amiable standers of drinks. These are clearly not 'Bwanas' [Masters] – they are never called anything but 'Azungu' [whites].¹⁴⁸

This does not mean that whites were viewed as super human beings by all Africans before the war. This furthers the historiographical debate promoted by Killingray's challenge of Crowder on this subject.¹⁴⁹ To argue otherwise would be a disservice to the astuteness and experience of many Africans, some of whom had for a long time been interacting with whites in towns, mission stations and other places both within and outside the country.

Serving in the army was a process not dissimilar to that encountered by African migrant workers. Like labour migrants, service in the Army brought changes to the servicemen. One such effect was in the transformation of race relations. Those African servicemen from Northern Rhodesia who served with the 5th Battalion in the Middle East as labourers mixed with British and other colonial other ranks on equal terms. As they were not combatant troops and, therefore, perhaps, not subject to such rigid discipline as existed in the other eight combatant Battalions of the NRR, this was easier to undertake. The consequence of this situation was that at some occasions servicemen mingled with communities surrounding their camps. Military camps have always served as a magnet for prostitutes and African encampments were no exception.¹⁵⁰ Some of them frequented brothels used by European troops and had intercourse with white women. In spite of incessant efforts by military authorities to minimise contact between Africans and local white women in the various theatres of war, servicemen and white women found each other wherever and whenever they could.¹⁵¹ A government official in Northern Rhodesia remarked that, '[l]etters from these men to their friends in this country have been intercepted and have shown that the Africans are proud of

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Killingray, *Fighting for Britain*, 204.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 108.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 'African Voices from Two World Wars', 439.

having slept with white women'.¹⁵² Other servicemen stood up for their rights and challenged military authorities while serving in the Army, something most of those who had come from rural areas hardly did back home. In one recorded incident, servicemen protested about their superior officer whom they accused of not being sympathetic to them. They could, however, not cite any particular case of maltreatment. Without realising it, in fact, it was the men, not the supervisor, who had actually been changed by war experience.¹⁵³

Many men learned trades while serving in the Army: cooks, carpenters, pioneers, fitters, bricklayers, clerks and signallers. In reply to a question by the Labour Commissioner as to whether he considered that *askari* had picked up methods of housing and agriculture, Lt. Colonel Hugh Bayldon, the Commander of Sub A Division, thought that they had absorbed some new ideas. Courses had been run for them on farming methods, tile making and building.¹⁵⁴ Special mention should also be made of the relatively large number of African lorry drivers who took to the field, the first training school for African servicemen being started in Northern Rhodesia in May 1940, so that they rose into "semi-skilled" military occupations, just as the local people were rising into corresponding jobs in civilian life.¹⁵⁵ Another eleven servicemen took advantage of being in the Army to advance their education by taking correspondence courses with South African trades training institutions.¹⁵⁶ Included among the skills learnt was that of leadership. A limited number of carefully selected men were taught leadership in courses offered in East Africa. Leadership training included the complete handling of subordinates in and out of action, organisation and administration of a platoon of 42 men fully armed with modern weapons.¹⁵⁷ In addition to the acquisition of the above trades

¹⁵² NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. III., Notes on Northern Rhodesia Asikari, nd but c. November 1944.

¹⁵³ Ibid, Notes by Col. H. McDowell, Lusaka, 11 November 1942.

¹⁵⁴ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 16 February 1946.

¹⁵⁵ Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia*, 328.

¹⁵⁶ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 17 January 1946.

¹⁵⁷ Mulenga, interview cited.

and skills, African servicemen learnt about personal hygiene, sanitation, nutrition and the adverse effects of venereal diseases.

Post-war educational training facilities were also offered to a limited number of returned ex-servicemen. As in many British colonies, the government in Northern Rhodesia deemed it necessary to provide the requisite vocational training centres for ex-servicemen so that they could be usefully employed. From various quarters, opinions were expressed that some of the ex-servicemen could be given additional training in the trades they had learnt in the army to convert their skills into more marketable qualifications for civilian employment. Government used already established training institutions but additionally set aside £5,670 for capital expenditure to improve these training centres.¹⁵⁸ The scope of training at the main training centre, Munali Trades School in Lusaka, was limited to two-year courses in carpentry, brick-laying and masonry. Other courses were offered at the Jeanes School in Mazabuka and at selected mission schools. The Jeanes School offered teacher-training courses. Of the 46 Northern Rhodesian African educational instructors in the Army, 24 returned to this school to complete their courses which had been interrupted by war service while the rest resumed their former teaching posts.¹⁵⁹ Trainee teachers at the Jeanes School and tradesmen at Munali received an allowance of two shillings per month plus food rations.¹⁶⁰ The uptake of men into these programmes was patchy as very few of them were taken on. Government's covert intention in this regard was clearly stated by the Secretary for Native Affairs, thus:

[a] popular impression seems to be that rehabilitation means placing the returned soldier in a much higher position in civil life than he previously enjoyed... But

¹⁵⁸ NAZ SEC1/1766 Vol. I., Minutes of a Meeting of the Post-War Problems (African) Committee held on 17 January 1946.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

the great majority of Askari will have to fit themselves into civil life with such help as we can afford, but without further training.¹⁶¹

6.10. Conclusion

For most African ex-servicemen, war service heightened their frustrations by raising expectations that the post-war Northern Rhodesian economy could not satisfy. Many African servicemen felt cheated by the demobilization exercise which was based on a system of racial hierarchy. In spite of this, they remained concerned mainly with personal and domestic matters, the welfare of family, improvement in the home village, and using their gratuity either to buy consumer goods to improve their immediate lives or to establish a business. They did not take the lead in anti-colonial nationalist politics. In this way, it can be said that the war was more vital in the social transformation of African servicemen than it was in the political sphere. The chapter has shown that European servicemen benefitted from state-sponsored rehabilitation and re-settlement schemes as they were given loans to set up businesses, farms, plus higher gratuities than African servicemen, and returned to their pre-war employment or educational institutions. The dissatisfaction over perceived broken promises by African ex-servicemen was a universal phenomenon that also affected colonial personnel in other parts of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

The scale of Northern Rhodesia's participation in the Second World War was extraordinary. In reconstructing the impact of the war on colonial Zambia, this thesis has

¹⁶¹ Ibid, Secretary for Native Affairs (Lusaka) to All Provincial Commissioners, 7 December 1944.

repeatedly noted the interconnectedness of wartime events in the Empire and the local society. It has done this by identifying effects under five broad themes: recruitment for the army, commodity production, the “home front”, mining, and demobilization.

A recurring point of discussion in this thesis has been that of racial hierarchy based on colonial pseudoscientific theories. In Chapter Two, this had to do with recruitment for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR). Racial hierarchies characterised colonial societies during the war, just as it did before and after. “Martial race” theory adapted from nineteenth century India was utilised for the recruitment of personnel for the army. This was related to the “seafaring race” theory which was applied in the enlistment of naval servicemen. “Martial race” theory which had been utilised in different parts of Empire, as well as Northern Rhodesia before 1939 was employed during the war. From the late nineteenth century onwards, local groups such as the Ila, Ngoni, and Bemba were considered the best soldierly material in the country. It was from these groups that the majority of servicemen in the NRR came. Unlike the “martial race” par excellence, the Kamba of Kenya, whose skills had little to do with any particular cultural characteristic or pre-colonial military tradition, the Northern Rhodesian peoples had a long history of fighting. The Kamba’s classification from the 1930s, on the other hand, was defined by a combination of geographic and climatic forces, accompanied by economic and political realities of colonialism which made them loyal to the regime.

In wartime, however, due to the need to engage large numbers of men, enlistment was extended to “non-martial” ethnic groups. “Martial race” theory was relaxed as the objective now was to employ any available labour. However, recruitment parties still focused on the Eastern, Northern and Southern provinces, the traditional sources of military labour. “Non-martial” groups such as the Chewa, Nsenga, and Kunda who lived near the “martial” Ngoni, also featured prominently among NRR recruits. For such groups, military service was a source of income like any other form of employment. Some of these “non-martial” groups actually

identified themselves as Ngoni, Ila or Bemba, simply to be employed by the army. By negotiating their way into the army in this way, ingenious individuals demonstrated that “martial race” identity was not wholly a colonial construct, what Cynthia Enloe calls “Gurkha syndrome”.¹

The thesis explained that the colonial government used chiefs and propaganda as tools for enlisting military personnel. Africans themselves were agents of recruitment. Many of them were influenced by pull or push factors such as the desire to seek employment and earn an income, the prestige of wearing military uniform, to learn a trade, and to prove their masculinity. This demonstrates that Africans had a perspective of their own about the goings-on during the war that should be recognised by academics. The evidence presented in this thesis points to the capacity of the majority of the local population to think for themselves and invent strategies to either counter or oppose demands of colonial bureaucrats or traditional leaders.

That the war undermined African agriculture and general livelihoods, as claimed by David Killingray (p. 76), has been disputed here. This study has argued that the network of kin relations through the extended family system took care of the wives and families of the men who had gone to the war front. Moreover, as with male labour migration to the mines and European settler farms with which the local people were very familiar, servicemen sent regular remittances to their families which they used to hire extra labour for farming or repairing houses. In this way, this thesis demonstrates actions Africans in Northern Rhodesia took to either participate or circumvent the colonial apparatus.

The thesis has also explained that recruitment for the war effort was not plain-sailing, as resistance was reported in some areas. People refused to join the army for several reasons: religious beliefs, anti-British feelings, fear of dying on the frontline, inadequate remuneration,

¹ C.H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Societies* (Harmondsworth, 1980), 25.

unfulfilled government promises made during the First World War, and indifference. The thesis has thus demonstrated that in contrast to previous arguments, both European and African members of the Watch Tower movement campaigned against the country's war effort. For their part, the settler Afrikaner community opposed to Northern Rhodesia's participation in the war because they supported the Axis powers, many of them sympathising with Nazi ideology. In this way, the thesis significantly modifies a number of historiographies and opens up space for creating a more comprehensive social history of the war as it affected African colonies. The local African population which did not want to be enlisted for war service used various strategies. Some went into hiding in the bush when they heard about a recruiting party in their vicinity until such a time when it became safe to return home. Others, especially those living in outlying areas, simply crossed into neighbouring territories for "safety". For some, migrating to seek better employment opportunities in urban areas or neighbouring countries was the only solution to avoid military service. This resistance, once again, shows African agency during the Second World War.

The fall of the Allied nations' South-east Asian colonies ushered in a new period of metropolitan economic control and regulation, and stepped up the imperial extraction of resources such as rubber and beeswax from Northern Rhodesia. The colony also revitalised the iron smelting, and rope making industries in order to fill the gap created by the lack of these commodities on the local market due to war conditions in South-east Asia. The thesis, however, has noted that the local industries were beset by many challenges, the most prime being the low prices offered by the British Ministry of Supply for such produce. The thesis argues that the failure by Britain to buy African products at reasonable prices exposes the changing character of a desperate colonial power in wartime. In an effort to win sympathy from African colonies at the outbreak of the war, Britain's propaganda campaign against Axis powers professed a fair trade relationship between herself and the colonised. At the same time, Britain

also tried to convince African colonies that if they supported Adolf Hitler in the war, they would not have trade on equal terms with a victorious Germany.

Also noteworthy on this subject was the difference in opinion between local colonial officials on the ground and imperial officials in London. Colonial administrators agitated for fairer prices for African produce in order to increase the production of commodities which were urgently-required by the Allies. But those in the Colonial Office were against paying economic prices claiming high costs could fuel the rate of inflation in the colony at a time when there were not many goods on which people could spend their income.

The low prices hampered the quantities and quality of commodities produced. For example, while hoes and axes started being produced in certain areas of the territory, the quantities churned out were so negligible that they could not meet local demand. This meant that the shortage of farming implements persisted. The revival of cottage industries in wartime, however, was not restricted to Northern Rhodesia. In neighbouring Tanganyika, which was a major sisal producer, the war also necessitated the revival of an industry which had declined during the economic depression of the 1930s owing to a fall in the commodity's prices. Following the Japanese occupation of Indonesia and Philippines in 1941, the United States of America was deprived of binder twine with the result that sisal became a high-priority dollar-earner for Tanganyika, and covertly, the Empire. To revive the sisal industry and meet the high demand for the commodity, conscripted labour was introduced in 1943. The decision to conscript up to 11,000 labourers for sisal plantations in Tanganyika also reveals the desperate position Britain was in.

The war likewise had a direct impact on the lives of ordinary people once the shortage of consumer commodities hit the country. This shortage was caused by, among other factors, the lack of raw materials in the metropole for manufacturing goods, the unavailability of

exports in the industrialized world, and German submarine warfare which sunk cargo ships delivering to Africa. Unscrupulous traders took advantage of the situation by resorting to hoarding, profiteering, and selling items on the black market. This is another classic example of agency explained by the thesis as some merchants did not support the war effort by exploiting the general public at a time of shortages. The government tried to solve some of these challenges by embarking upon rationing and price controls echoing measures adopted in Britain. These were aimed at ensuring a fairer system for distributing goods. But as this thesis has demonstrated, these austerity measures were difficult to implement for fear of riling the local people. Thus, the equality of sacrifice principle envisaged by the imperial government could not be attained. This was because conditions which existed in Britain and those in the periphery were very different in so far as the motivation for participating in the war was concerned. In the colonies, for example, consumption was reduced by consumer-good price inflation as part of the experience of total war, whereas in the mother country, the government could demand the promise of increased social consumption after the war in return for acquiescing in direct and immediate sacrifice in wartime.² The thesis has demonstrated that it was for this reason that the colonial government was on the defensive to ensure that maize meal was made available to the local African populace at affordable prices as there was no substitute for the commodity.

The colonial government also introduced measures aimed at curbing the rate of inflation, such as issuing bonds and encouraging people to save money. It also tried to regulate prices of consumer goods by engaging price control mechanisms. But as has been observed, this measure yielded little success as traders used other ingenious methods to evade being caught by state agents. It can safely be said that in wartime the colonial government came to

² M. Cowen and N. Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic Policy during the War', in D. Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Africa and the Second World War* (Basingstoke, 1986), 24.

play a more direct role in the country's economy than it did previously. The same processes are identifiable in other parts of the Empire such as India, where the provisioning of armed forces, economic mobilization, rationing, and widespread requisitioning caused the state to penetrate more deeply than before into society.³

Another method which was hoped to address the economic challenges during this period was import substitution industrialization. But as the thesis has observed, a number of obstacles stood in the way of setting up secondary industries. Among these were an inept colonial administration, lack of capital, and regional customs tariff policies which favoured the more industrialized Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Consequently, manufacturing remained Northern Rhodesia's economic nightmare, despite the country's vast potential wealth in timber, copper, lead, coal, and limestone. The colony remained dependent on limited imports from available sterling area sources.

Northern Rhodesia's importance to the Allied war effort was also extended to the provision of base metals. It was the single most important source of copper in the sterling area, a position which made the British Ministry of Supply literally attach the colony to the British war economy. The British government bought the copper produced in the colony at a uniform price throughout the war period following the closure of the London Metal Exchange at the beginning of hostilities in 1939. In accordance with economic warfare, the metal could not be sold to Axis powers or their agents. The outcome of this scenario was that war acted as a catalyst in changing the financial fortunes of the mining industry, the colony, and region at large. Production of copper for the Allies, however, was threatened by such obstacles as industrial action six months into the war, high wartime taxation, and shortage of supplies. The thesis also investigated how as an industry exclusively producing for export, the copper mining

³ K. Jeffrey, 'The Second World War', in J. Brown and Wm. Roger-Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire IV: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1999), 325.

industry was influenced by external factors. This could be viewed in rearmament activities during the late 1930s, the onset of the Second World War, Korean War, and more generally, the Cold War.

The other aim of the thesis was to account for the “second colonial occupation” that took place after the war. The war enhanced the significance of the Copperbelt to both Imperial and colonial administrations, especially following the devaluation of sterling in 1949. It is suggested here that the value of Northern Rhodesia was transformed during late British imperialism, and that this process was closely bound up with the shifting financial and monetary priorities of the mother country. This supports Gerold Krozewski’s argument that as the value of the “minor” territories increased in the post-war period, so too were they bound tightly to the Empire; when their temporary importance declined, so the path to decolonization was eased, if not opened.⁴ Rather than giving independence to Northern Rhodesia after the war, a financially-distressed Britain actually kept a tight grip over the colony. This, it has been ascertained here, was aimed at benefitting from dollar-earnings from the colony’s buoyant copper industry. The prosperity recorded in the copper mining industry in the post-war period was also the main reason behind the fast-tracked political Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland – a project that ultimately came to fruition in 1953.

The expansion and development of the mining industry affected the agricultural sector due to the need to feed miners in order not to disrupt production. But, levels of production were threatened due to declining quantities of food in the midst of droughts, and shortage of farming implements under wartime restrictions. This state of affairs prompted the imperial government to intervene in the acquisition of food stocks for the colony so that copper production could go on uninterrupted. Another measure taken by the imperial government was the granting of

⁴ G. Krozewski, ‘Sterling, the ‘Minor’ Territories, and the end of Formal Empire, 1939-1958’, *Economic History Review*, 46, 2 (1993), 241.

permission to the colonial government to use coerced African labour on European settler farms so that production could be maintained. This was in line with similar policies adopted elsewhere in the Empire. The use of conscripted labour was against the ILO Convention of 1930, which Britain was a signatory to. Therefore, the decline in the moral standing of Britain during wartime was not limited to buying African products at below-market prices, but extended to labour conscription, too. It was another example of desperation on the part of Britain to win the war at whatever cost. It also sheds light on the violent nature of British colonial rule throughout the Empire from the time of conquest, consolidation, and eventual decolonisation.

In terms of broader debates, this policy relates to one of the most outrageous events to occur during the Second World War. This was the perpetuation of famine, orchestrated by the British wartime policies in India in 1943. While this coastal state was prone to droughts and famine, the situation was different during the war period because it was exacerbated by British wartime policies. The manifold causes included the lack of shipping for food imports and the diversion of every industry to war production. Fearing a Japanese invasion of the Indian coastal state which would have had a devastating effect upon the sub-continent, Winston Churchill's British government authorised the application of the scorched earth policy involving 'ruthless destruction in any territory we have to surrender',⁵ in order to starve off Axis powers. This policy directed the Indian army to destroy industrial, military, and transport facilities, while the civil administration deprived the enemy of any form of sustenance. "Rice Denial", one of the key aspects of the scorched earth policy, entailed local authorities throwing away rice supplies in rivers while soldiers burnt whatever supplies were stored in barns or still in the fields. Another aspect pursued under the scorched earth policy was the "Denial Policy" through which

⁵ M. Mukerjee, *Churchill's Secret War: the British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War Two* (New York, 2010), 63.

Indian military authorities requisitioned all serviceable trucks and cars, as well as most buses, bicycles, boats, carts, and even a few elephants were commandeered, destroyed, or forced to move north of the denial line.⁶ The few remaining vessels were used for transporting jute, an urgent war commodity. What this entailed was that there arose a difficulty in transporting rice supplies from regions of surplus to hard-hit famine regions of India.

The post-war importance of the country also extended to the introduction of “development” schemes through which Britain hoped to uplift the lives of the local people in line with its “civilising mission”, whereby colonial subjects were regarded as being too backward and needed imperial guidance to develop. Accompanying this development was the increase in colonial personnel, both local and from abroad. The reason behind this was the formulation of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 through which funds were allocated for “development” programmes in the colonies arising primarily from protests in the Caribbean. In Northern Rhodesia, the Acts led to the formulation of the Ten Year Development Plan (TYDP) for the period 1947-57. One of its major objectives was to promote African peasant agriculture, a sector which appeared in government-sponsored plans for the first time in the history of the colony. The sector was regarded as vital because the majority of the country’s population depended on it for their livelihoods. Two schemes: the African Farming Improvement Scheme (AFIS) and the Peasant Farming Scheme (PFS) were thus mooted in 1947-8, and were implemented in various parts of the country. While securing a steady food supply situation in the colony, this post-war agricultural policy also guaranteed Britain’s own food stocks for home consumption at a time of worldwide shortages.

The thesis has also demonstrated that as the war drew to a close, the colonial administration was anxious about how ex-servicemen were to be reabsorbed into the civil life

⁶ Mukerjee, *Churchill’s Secret War*, 65.

of the territory. Archival evidence from men's correspondence with military and civilian authorities clearly show that most of them were not going to return to their mainly rural homes unchanged. As with the recruitment process for the military noted above, the structure of demobilization was also based on a system of racial hierarchy. Africans had been recruited into the NRR to help the imperial government based on the principle of togetherness or fraternity, but at the end of the war, when it came to having the same entitlements, political or economic, local servicemen were denied them on the basis of race. European ex-servicemen received more favourable rewards from the state than their African counterparts. The colonial government rewarded European servicemen for their participation in the war with pieces of land, higher gratuities, medical care, business and educational loans, and employment opportunities. On the other hand, Africans were only provided with gratuities which were as much as three times less than those of their European counterparts, and small items such as clothing. This situation was widespread throughout the Empire, and not peculiar to Northern Rhodesia. In spite of this, African ex-servicemen concentrated on personal affairs such as seeking employment, and the general welfare of their families, and not political independence.

Contrary to older academic arguments, this study has argued that military service did not transform African servicemen into politically-active citizens. It has further been noted here that the rise of nationalist politics goes back to the formation of welfare societies, labour leaders, and ordinary people many years before the war even broke out. But the war itself did contribute to the growth of a politically-versatile African voice due to an expanded media through which ordinary people expressed themselves. It was through such media outlets as *Mutende* newspaper and radio that nationalists such as Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula were able to reach the masses. Many ex-servicemen contributed to politics at the local grassroots level where they vented their frustration with the demobilization exercise at their traditional leaders who participated in their recruitment to the army.

Using hitherto unexplored archival materials and oral interviews, this thesis examined for the first time, the military, political, economic, social, and agricultural impact of the Second World War on Northern Rhodesia. It thus nuances an original contribution to Zambian historiography. This thesis also fills a gap noted by Ashley Jackson about the lack of a detailed examination of the impact of the Second World War on Northern Rhodesia where emphasis hitherto has been on wartime mining and labour relations.⁷ This thesis, therefore, significantly revises a number of historiographies and creates space for a more comprehensive history of the war in Africa. The thesis finally addresses itself to the broader imperial scholarship seeking to account for the withdrawal of European colonial rule post war. Contrary to what has been widely viewed that due to Britain's economic woes after the war, the mother country began to decolonise, a process exemplified by the grant of independence to India in 1947, the experience of Northern Rhodesia shows a different trend.

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⁷ A. Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London, 2006), 232.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I

Rubber Exports from Northern Rhodesia, 1943-6

Consignment Number	Date Exported	Gross Weight	Net Weight	Value (£)
1	13 January 1943	15344	14806	762.19.7
2	9 February 1943	2396	2337	145.16.5
3	1 March 1943	3015	2851	138.1.0
4	3 March 1943	3481	3386	189.2.6
5	24 May 1943	2200	2147	122.1.10
6	15 June 1943	1000	974	49.10.10
7 ^a	6 August 1943			
8 ^a	25 August 1943			
9 ^a				
10 ^a				
11	11 November 1943	9250	9020	789.19.7
12	2 December 1943	4188	4096	302.4.5
13	19 January 1944	19045	18632	1734.3.1
14	17 February 1944	10582	10321	913.15.4
15	1 June 1944	27726	27078	2311.8.5
16	30 June 1944	14350	13991	1305.8.5

17	18 July 1944	11653	11367	987.6.11
18	27 July 1944	11304	11026	1031.19.10
19	15 August 1944	11229	10943	987.0.9
20	1 September 1944	11518	11214	1047.14.2
21	19 September 1944	14866	14526	1136.10.3
22	23 September 1944	14349	14005	1167.10.6
23	3 October 1944	14706	14353	1124.14.0
24	13 October 1944	14430	14066	1076.16.3
25	1 November 1944	12776	12431	919.14.8
26	18 November 1944	25037	24440	1844.14.8
27	30 November 1944	14258	13902	1181.15.6
28	22 December 1944	17452	17011	1614.7.2
29	19 January 1945	11554	11250	932.5.3
30	9 December 1945	7916	7712	589.4.5
31	27 April 1945	14658	14286	1226.3.7
32	12 June 1945	17353	16902	1626.0.1
33	29 June 1945	14264	13845	1375.3.6
34	26 July 1945	15074	14643	1367.18.8
35	30 August 1945	13340	12980	1263.11.7
36	13 September 1945	16791	16351	1549.16.2
37	12 October 1945	17625	17138	1603.4.5
38	16 November 1945	19240	18739	1755.13.0
39 ^a				
40	21 December 1945	14556	14164	1261.13.8
41	16 January 1946	16577	16150	1531.2.9
42	6 February 1946	12230	11934	1083.13.8
43	28 February 1946	12612	12286	1070.16.4

44	2 April 1946	15862	15423	1392.18
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Source: NAZ SEC2/273, Native Industries: Rubber vols. I-IV.

^a Data not available

Appendix II

Budget used for the Calculation of the War Allowance for Europeans at the Four Copper Mining Centres in 1939 and 1942

Item	Qty of Food for 2.75 man units	Total Pre-War Cost (1939)	Cost in 1942	Increase	% Rise
		£ s d	£ s d	£ s d	
Bread	33.33 <i>lb</i>	14 0	16 8	2 8	19.0
Flour and Meal	23.68	8 11	10 8	1 9	19.6
Oatmeal and Rolled Oats	5.14	2 10	3 4	6	18.2
Rice	5.01	1 4	2 6	1 2	87.5
Mealie-Meal	7.70	8	10	2	25.0
Tea	3.00	8 6	13 0	4 6	52.9
Coffee	0.99	1 10	2 1	3	13.6
Milk-Klim	3 (5 <i>lbs</i> tins)	1 17 6	2 5 0	7 6	20.0
Sugar	23.79	6 5	8 5	2 0	31.0
Golden syrup	1.98	1 3	1 10	7	46.7
Jam and Marmalade	5.67	3 8	5 2	1 6	40.9
Butter	7.01	12 10	15 2	2 4	18.2
Cheese	1.51	2 3	3 0	9	33.3
Eggs	5.61 dozens	11 3	11 3	0	0
Potatoes	31.13	6 5	10 4	3 11	61.0
Fresh meat	30.44	1 4 9	1 6 0	1 3	5.1
Fresh fish	3.71	5 7	5 7	0	0
Bacon and Ham	1.84	3 8	3 8	0	0

Vegetables, fresh fruit/ man unit	*	1 0 10	1 0 10	1 6	
Fruit: canned or dried/ Man unit	*	3 8	5 2	6	40.9
Other meats	*	3 0	3 5	5	13.9
Poultry	*	2 1	2 4	3	12.0
Fish: dried, smoked or tinned/ man unit	*	3 5	4 1	8	19.5
Lard, Dripping or Fat/ man unit	*	2 3	3 4	1 1	50.0
Baking Powder/ man unit	*	1 7	2 3	8	42.1
Biscuits and Sweets/ man unit	*	4 4	4 9	5	9.6
Cakes and Pastries/ man unit	*	3 5	3 5	0	0
Pickles, Sauces and Condiments/ man unit	*	2 9	3 3	6	18.2
Sago, Tapioca, Dried Beans /man unit	*	1 5	1 11	6	35.3
Other Foodstuffs (includes 10s 2d to bring index total to £29. 18s. 1d.		17 9	1 1 0	3 3	18.2

Source: NAZ SEC3/42, Budgets used for the Calculation of Cost of Living Allowance at Four Copper Mining Centres

*Quantities not stated